


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
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CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
PREPARED BY
Donald J. Mulvihill & Melvin M. Tumin
With Lynn A. Curtis

NCJ-000571



The White House
June 10, 1968
EXECUTIVE ORDER #11412

**ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Establishment of the Commission.* (a) There is hereby established a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall be composed of:

Dr. Milton Eisenhower, <i>Chairman</i>	Senator Roman Hruska
Congressman Hale Boggs	Albert E. Jenner, Jr.
Archbishop Terence J. Cooke	Congressman William M. McCulloch
Ambassador Patricia Harris	*Dr. W. Walter Menninger
Senator Philip A. Hart	*Judge Ernest William McFarland
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham	*Leon Jaworski
Eric Hoffer	

SECTION 2. *Functions of the Commission.* The Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

(a) The causes and prevention of lawless acts of violence in our society, including assassination, murder and assault;

(b) The causes and prevention of disrespect for law and order, of disrespect for public officials, and of violent disruptions of public order by individuals and groups; and

(c) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.

SECTION 4. *Staff of the Commission.*

SECTION 5. *Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies.*

(a) The Commission, acting through its Chairman, is authorized to request from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this Order. Each department or agency is directed, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and assistance to the Commission.

SECTION 6. *Report and Termination.* The Commission shall present its report and recommendations as soon as practicable, but not later than one year from the date of this Order. The Commission shall terminate thirty days following the submission of its final report or one year from the date of this Order, whichever is earlier.

S/Lyndon B. Johnson

*Added by an Executive Order June 21, 1968

The White House
May 23, 1969
EXECUTIVE ORDER #11469

**EXTENDING THE LIFE OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE**

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, Executive Order No. 11412 of June 10, 1968, entitled "Establishing a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," is hereby amended by substituting for the last sentence thereof the following: "The Commission shall terminate thirty days following the submission of its final report or on December 10, 1969, whichever is earlier."

S/Richard Nixon

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

Vol. 13

A STAFF REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

CA 0909

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December 1969

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STATEMENT ON THE STAFF STUDIES

The Commission was directed to "go as far as man's knowledge takes" it in searching for the causes of violence and means of prevention. These studies are reports to the Commission by independent scholars and lawyers who have served as directors of our staff task forces and study teams; they are not reports by the Commission itself. Publication of any of the reports should not be taken to imply endorsement of their contents by the Commission, or by any member of the Commission's staff, including the Executive Director and other staff officers, not directly responsible for the preparation of the particular report. Both the credit and the responsibility for the reports lie in each case with the directors of the task forces and study teams. The Commission is making the reports available at this time as works of scholarship to be judged on their merits, so that the Commission as well as the public may have the benefit of both the reports and informed criticism and comment on their contents.

Michael R. Rosen

TASK FORCE ON INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE

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PREFACE

From the earliest days of organization, the Chairman, Commissioners, and Executive Director of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence recognized the importance of research in accomplishing the task of analyzing the many facets of violence in America. As a result of this recognition, the Commission has enjoyed the receptivity, encouragement, and cooperation of a large part of the scientific community in this country. Because of the assistance given in varying degrees by scores of scholars here and abroad, these Task Force reports represent some of the most elaborate work ever done on the major topics they cover.

The Commission was formed on June 10, 1968. By the end of the month, the Executive Director had gathered together a small cadre of capable young lawyers from various Federal agencies and law firms around the country. That group was later augmented by partners borrowed from some of the Nation's major law firms who served without compensation. Such a professional group can be assembled more quickly than university faculty because the latter are not accustomed to quick institutional shifts after making firm commitments of teaching or research at a particular locus. Moreover, the legal profession has long had a major and traditional role in Federal agencies and commissions.

In early July a group of 50 persons from the academic disciplines of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, political science, history, law, and biology were called together on short notice to discuss for 2 days how best the Commission and its staff might proceed to analyze violence. The enthusiastic response of these scientists came at a moment when our Nation was still suffering from the tragedy of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

It was clear from that meeting that the scholars were prepared to join research analysis and action, interpretation, and policy. They were eager to present to the American people the best available data, to bring reason to bear where myth had prevailed. They cautioned against simplistic solutions, but urged application of what is known in the service of sane policies for the benefit of the entire society.

Shortly thereafter the position of Director of Research was created. We assumed the role as a joint undertaking, with common responsibilities. Our function was to enlist social and other scientists to join the staff, to write papers, act as advisers of consultants, and engage in new research. The

decentralized structure of the staff, which at its peak numbered 100, required research coordination to reduce duplication and to fill in gaps among the original seven separate Task Forces. In general, the plan was for each Task Force to have a pair of directors: one a social scientist, one a lawyer. In a number of instances, this formal structure bent before the necessities of available personnel but in almost every case the Task Force work program relied on both social scientists and lawyers for its successful completion. In addition to our work with the seven original Task Forces, we provided consultation for the work of the eighth "Investigative" Task Force, formed originally to investigate the disorders at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the civil strife in Cleveland during the summer of 1968 and eventually expanded to study campus disorders at several colleges and universities.

Throughout September and October and in December of 1968 the Commission held about 30 days of public hearings related expressly to each of the Task Force areas. About 100 witnesses testified, including many scholars, Government officials, corporate executives as well as militants and activists of various persuasions. In addition to the hearings, the Commission and the staff met privately with scores of persons, including college presidents, religious and youth leaders, and experts in such areas as the media, victim compensation, and firearms. The staff participated actively in structuring and conducting those hearings and conferences and in the questioning of witnesses.

As Research Directors, we participated in structuring the strategy of design for each Task Force, but we listened more than directed. We have known the delicate details of some of the statistical problems and computer runs. We have argued over philosophy and syntax; we have offered bibliographical and other resource materials, we have written portions of reports and copy edited others. In short, we know the enormous energy and devotion, the long hours and accelerated study that members of each Task Force have invested in their labors. In retrospect we are amazed at the high caliber and quantity of the material produced, much of which truly represents, the best in research and scholarship. About 150 separate papers and projects were involved in the work culminating in the Task Force reports. We feel less that we have orchestrated than that we have been members of the orchestra, and that together with the entire staff we have helped compose a repertoire of current knowledge about the enormously complex subject of this Commission.

That scholarly research is predominant in the work here presented is evident in the product. But we should like to emphasize that the roles which we occupied were not limited to scholarly inquiry. The Directors of Research were afforded an opportunity to participate in all Commission meetings. We engaged in discussions at the highest levels of decisionmaking, and had great freedom in the selection of scholars, in the control of research budgets, and in the direction and design of research. If this was not unique, it is at least an uncommon degree of prominence accorded research by a national commission.

There were three major levels to our research pursuit: (1) summarizing the state of our present knowledge and clarifying the lacunae where more or new

research should be encouraged; (2) accelerating known ongoing research so as to make it available to the Task Forces; (3) undertaking new research projects within the limits of time and funds available. Coming from a university setting where the pace of research is more conducive to reflection and quiet hours analyzing data, we at first thought that completing much meaningful new research within a matter of months was most unlikely. But the need was matched by the talent and enthusiasm of the staff, and the Task Forces very early had begun enough new projects to launch a small university with a score of doctoral theses. It is well to remember also that in each volume here presented, the research reported is on full public display and thereby makes the staff more than usually accountable for their products.

One of the very rewarding aspects of these research undertakings has been the experience of minds trained in the law mingling and meshing, sometimes fiercely arguing, with other minds trained in behavioral science. The organizational structure and the substantive issues of each Task Force required members from both groups. Intuitive judgment and the logic of argument and organization blended, not always smoothly, with the methodology of science and statistical reasoning. Critical and analytical faculties were sharpened as theories confronted facts. The arrogance neither of ignorance nor of certainty could long endure the doubts and questions of interdisciplinary debate. Any sign of approaching the priestly pontification of scientism was quickly dispelled in the matrix of mutual criticism. Years required for the normal accumulation of experience were compressed into months of sharing ideas with others who had equally valid but differing perspectives. Because of this process, these volumes are much richer than they otherwise might have been.

Partly because of the freedom which the Commission gave to the Directors of Research and the Directors of each Task Force, and partly to retain the full integrity of the research work in publication, these reports of the Task Forces are in the posture of being submitted to and received by the Commission. These are volumes published under the authority of the Commission, but they do not necessarily represent the views or the conclusions of the Commission. The Commission is presently at work producing its own report, based in part on the materials presented to it by the Task Forces. Commission members have, of course, commented on earlier drafts of each Task Force, and have caused alterations by reason of the cogency of their remarks and insights. But the final responsibility for what is contained in these volumes rests fully and properly on the research staffs who labored on them.

In this connection, we should like to acknowledge the special leadership of the Chairman, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, in formulating and supporting the principle of research freedom and autonomy under which this work has been conducted.

We note, finally, that these volumes are in many respects incomplete and tentative. The urgency with which papers were prepared and then integrated into Task Force Reports rendered impossible the successive siftings of data and argument to which the typical academic article or volume is subjected. The reports have benefited greatly from the counsel of our colleagues on the

Advisory Panel, and from much debate and revision from within the staff. It is our hope, that the total work effort of the Commission staff will be the source and subject of continued research by scholars in the several disciplines, as well as a useful resource for policymakers. We feel certain that public policy and the disciplines will benefit greatly from such further work.

* * *

To the Commission, and especially to its Chairman, for the opportunity they provided for complete research freedom, and to the staff for its prodigious and prolific work, we, who were intermediaries and servants to both, are most grateful.

James F. Short, Jr.

Marvin E. Wolfgang

Directors of Research

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SUMMARY

To millions of Americans few things are more pervasive, more frightening, more real today than violent crime and the fear of being assaulted, mugged, robbed, or raped. The fear of being victimized by criminal attack has touched us all in some way. People are fleeing their residences in cities to the expected safety of suburban living. Residents of many areas will not go out on the street at night. Others have added bars and extra locks to windows and doors in their homes. Bus drivers in major cities do not carry cash because incidents of robbery have been so frequent. In some areas local citizens patrol the streets at night to attain the safety they feel has not been provided.

The private market is responding to the inadequacies of our public response. Safety has become a commodity that is explicitly sold or rented with real estate. One new high-cost subdivision under construction outside Washington, D. C., will be guarded by electronic alarms. The entire development will be surrounded by two fences, broken for entry at only two points, both with guardhouses. Residents will be telephoned to approve visitors. The two miles of fencing will be surveyed by a closed-circuit television system and fortified by hidden electronic sensors. All residents will carry special credentials for identification.

If present trends are not positively redirected by creative new action, we can expect further social fragmentation of the urban environment, formation of excessively parochial communities, greater segregation of different racial groups and economic classes, imposition of presumptive definitions of criminality on the poor and on racial minorities, a possible resurgence of communal vigilantism and polarization of attitudes on a variety of issues. It is logical to expect the establishment of the "defensive city," the modern counterpart of the fortified medieval city, consisting of an economically declining central business district in the inner city protected by people shopping or working in buildings during daytime hours and "sealed off" by police during nighttime hours. High-rise apartment buildings and residential "compounds" will be fortified "cells" for upper-, middle-, and high-income populations living at prime locations in the inner city. Suburban neighborhoods, geographically removed from the central city, will be "safe areas," protected mainly by racial and economic homogeneity and by distance from population groups with the highest propensities to commit crimes. Many parts of central cities will witness frequent and widespread crime, perhaps out of police control.

The fragile sense of community that enables us to live and work peaceably together in common institutions is in danger. Unchecked criminal violence can conceivably lead even to a collapse of the nation and society as we know

them, or to a dictatorship to restore order by repression. Short of this extreme, the legacy of bitterness, distrust, and consequent violence among hostile groups will produce an increasingly weakened society.

We must act now if the trend is to be reversed.

THE DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENT CRIME

How much violent crime exists in the United States? Who commits these acts? Who are the victims? Are we more violent now than we have been historically? Are we more violent than other countries?

Available figures from the FBI *Uniform Crime Reports*, such as those in the table below, indicate that the amount and rate of violent crime over the last 10 years have been substantial.

	Total Number 1968	Rate Per 100,000	Percent Increase 1958-1968
Criminal homicide	13,960	6.8	52
Forcible rape	31,700	15.5	71
Robbery	266,700	131.0	143
Aggravated assault	286,300	141.3	82

But history does not allow simple conclusions to be drawn. National information on crimes of violence has been available in this country only since the 1930's. Scattered accounts prior to then give no unequivocal proof that the rates of criminal violence today are significantly greater than in the more distant past. "Alarming" increases in robbery and other violent crimes are on record before the Revolution, and the first century after independence saw years of considerable violence.

The F.B.I.'s *Uniform Crime Reports* are the only national crime data available and consist of voluntary submissions by most local police jurisdictions in the country on offenses known to the police and arrests made. The FBI states that such data must be read with great caution. Based on voluntary disclosures by local police, these statistics are imperfect measures of the actual levels and trends of violent crimes in the United States.

The greatest problem in counting crime is the considerable gap between the *reported* figures and the *true* figures. It has been estimated by the Crime Commission that the true rate of major violent crime as well as serious property crime may be nearly twice as high as the reported rate. Reasons for the gap include failure of citizens to report because they believe police cannot be effective in solving crime, do not want to take the time to report, do not know how to report, or fear reprisal.

Many other problems exist. For example, arrest data have numerous inherent biases. Compared to whites, Negroes may be disproportionately arrested on suspicion. The resulting arrest statistics, therefore, may indicate a relatively higher Negro involvement in crime than is valid. Of equal concern is the fact that many police departments are upgrading their reporting

procedures, so recent reported crime increases in some cities may well reflect more complete disclosure of the violence that was always present, rather than any real increase in crime.

Balancing the numerous reporting problems against the dramatic reported increases in major violence, we nonetheless conclude that there have been significant increases in the true rates of homicides, assaults, and robberies during the last 10 years. Although there has been a large reported increase in the forcible rape rate, the associated reporting difficulties are too great to allow firm conclusions about a true increase.

From numerous sources, including the *Uniform Crime Reports*, independent studies, and the Task Force seventeen city victim-offender survey, we have sketched a rough profile of violent crime as follows:

Violent crime is primarily a phenomenon of large cities. The 26 cities with populations of 500,000 or more contribute about half of the total reported major violent crimes, but comprise only about one-fifth of the total reporting population. Violent crime in the city is primarily committed by youths between the ages of 18 and 24, followed by youths in the 15-17-year age group. The continued increase of the youthful age groups portends a parallel increase in future violence.

Unsurprisingly, a significant proportion of the recent increase in major violence is attributable to migration of the population from rural to urban areas and to an increase of the proportion of people aged 15 to 24 relative to the rest of the population. Thus, part of the real increase in violent crime is due to basic demographic shifts, rather than to pathogenic forces.

Violent urban crime is overwhelmingly committed by males. The reported male homicide arrest rate in large cities is five times the female rate, and the robbery rate is 20 times higher. Similarly, poor, uneducated persons with little or no employment skills are much more likely to commit a serious act of criminal violence than persons higher on the socioeconomic ladder.

In spite of the numerous deficiencies in arrest data, true rates of violent crime by Negroes appear to be considerably higher than rates for whites. Reported urban arrest rates are much higher for Negroes in all four major violent crime categories, ranging up to 16 times as high for robbery and 17 times as high for homicide. Correlations of data by race do not, of course, reflect differential social, economic, job, educational, and opportunity status between black and white groupings. The urgent need to reduce violent crimes among urban Negro youth is obvious, requiring a total effort toward changing the demoralizing conditions and life patterns of Negroes, the unequal opportunity and discrimination they confront in this country, and the overcrowding and decay of the urban ghettos in which most of them must live.

Although it is difficult to make comparisons among nations with their different histories, cultures, levels of development, criminal statutes, and statistical reporting procedures, the United States probably has true rates of serious violence noticeably higher than other industrial countries, or among the highest. Our rate for criminal homicide is virtually unsurpassed by rates in other industrialized societies. The prevalence of guns offers a partial explanation—the United States with 200 million people averages 6,500 gun

murders a year, while England, Germany, and Japan with a combined population of 214 million together average only 135 gun murders a year. Rates for robbery and aggravated assault may also be noticeably higher than in other industrialized countries. Our rates for suicide, violent auto fatalities, and burglary, although high, do not stand out as much. We are often not alone in incidents of criminal violence, especially when recent trends are compared to England and Wales, but we are constantly a leader in comparison to other countries.

The statistics indicate a seriously high level of violent crime in America today, but they do not reveal the underlying cultural and historical attitude toward violence. Exploring this theme, a survey done for the Violence Commission shows that the incidence of "legitimate" violence and "normal" deviance is diffused throughout American habits: most of us have been spanked as children (93 percent); more importantly, the frequency of people being slapped and kicked (55 percent), or beaten (31 percent) is also high. Many more have witnessed acts of violence ranging from schoolyard fights to much more serious incidents.

Our statistics show that a young man is particularly liable to become delinquent if he lives in wretched housing near the center of a large metropolitan area, without a father in the house, with low income, unstable employment, little education, and in a subculture that has a grievance against society and the police. These features describe the conditions and prospects of Negro youth in the urban ghettos. Many become violent offenders.

Homicide, assault, and rape are predominantly *intra*racial, the majority involving Negroes attacking Negroes. Robbery is the one major violent crime with a high *inter*-racial component: although a large proportion of robberies involve Negro offenders and victims, an ever larger percentage appears to involve Negroes robbing whites.

Contrary to common fears of "violence in the street" committed by strangers, there is a strong likelihood that when homicide and assault occur they will be between relatives, friends, or acquaintances in the home or other indoor locations. Forcible rape is considerably more likely to be perpetrated by a stranger who may pick a woman up on the street but will most probably commit the act indoors. Robbery usually occurs outside among strangers, and so may be the only serious violent crime consistent with many popular conceptions.

Alcohol, narcotics, and dangerous drugs are deeply intertwined with crime in both fact and popular belief. Their actual role in violent incidents is, however, difficult to determine. Sensational press reports of "drug-crazed" criminals create misconceptions about the relationship. Although an addict's need to support his habit often leads him to burglary or robbery, there is little evidence that narcotics and drugs cause violent behavior directly. However, use of both alcohol and drugs can weaken inhibiting controls, thereby making potential violence more possible. In addition, alcohol is involved in more than 25,000 (over one-half) of all auto fatalities and in many lesser accidents.

Marihuana has relatively mild effects on the user, and there is no evidence

that it leads to the use of more dangerous drugs or that it causes aggressive behavior. Quite to the contrary, it makes many users more relaxed. On the other hand, hallucinogens such as LSD have often caused extreme reactions and even psychosis.

In analyzing the interaction between the victim and the offender, we find that the victim, the offender, or both were often drinking prior to homicide, assault, and rape, and there is good reason to believe that the victim sometimes provokes or helps precipitate homicide, assault, and, to a lesser extent, robbery. The ostensible motives in homicide and assault are often relatively trivial, usually involving altercations, family quarrels, jealous rages, and the like. The two crimes are very similar, and there is no reason to believe that the assaulter sets out with any less intention to harm than the killer. Except for the seriousness of their final outcomes, the important distinction is that homicides most often involve handguns while knives are most common in assault.

We have intensively studied the criminal histories of many offenders and conclude that by far the greatest proportion of all serious violence is committed by repeaters, not by one-time offenders. When all offenders are compared, the number of hard-core repeaters is small relative to the number of one-time offenders, yet the former group has a much higher rate of violence and inflicts considerably more serious injury. A violent offender released from an institution, if he recidivates, appears most likely to commit crime roughly 2 to 3 years after release, and the length of sentence seems to bear no regular relationship to the chance of recidivating among violent offenders. If anything, there may be a tendency for violent offenders who have served longer sentences to recidivate more often than those who have served shorter sentences.

Such are the dimensions of violent crime in America. The costs of such violence are enormously high, both in dollars and in psychic and social damage. Millions are spent to maintain the law enforcement and criminal justice system, but the real costs are paid by those whose lives and spirits are crippled by it. We can readily conceive the psychological damage to individuals and their families when victimized by rape, murder, and physical harm. However, the impact on the community may be less readily grasped. In our society, we hold a delicate balance between values such as individualism and conformity, liberty and security, progress and stability. Pervasive violence creates a climate of fear and mistrust of others, which seriously degrades the normal social and political interaction that holds a society together. Under the fear of violence, the use of public facilities such as parks declines; racial conflict and segregation into subcultures increases; communities and neighborhoods break up as people withdraw inward or flee the area; and civil liberties are threatened with a cry to "do something" to "put a stop" to violence. New undesirable social groups and practices, such as political demagoguery and vigilante action, increase. The possibility of compromise and rational communication among differing groups breaks down, while polarization and conflict are heightened by escalating violence. In short, violence weakens the cohesion of a society and the authority of its

government. Instead of calling attention to trouble areas, it may give rise to vicious spiral of new conflict, violence, and social disintegration.

EXPLANATIONS OF VIOLENT CRIME

Is there something in an individual's biological and genetic makeup that can explain his violent behavior? Although we find differences among age, sex, and racial groups in the tendency to violent behavior, there is no evidence to link these variations to genetic or biological difference. Social and cultural experiences appear more important in molding behavior. For example, although data show that women are clearly much less criminal than men, the explanation appears to lie far less in their biological differences than in their social upbringing and differing cultural roles. The female child is usually more supervised than the male; she is taught to be soft, gentle, and compliant, while, especially in the ghetto subculture, the male is encouraged to be tough. The woman's role as wife, mother, and homemaker tends to involve her in far fewer situations that can lead to criminal or violent behavior. Even if a woman is caught up in the meshes of the law, the social attitude toward her tends to be sympathetic and protective, rather than harsh and punitive. Importantly, however, when the cultural roles of women and men come to resemble each other, their rates of crime and violence also become more similar.

Man has the *capacity* for aggression, but evidence that he is *innately* aggressive has not been persuasive. Whatever the capabilities of an individual—whether he is intelligent or feeble-minded, suffers brain damage or chromosomal abnormalities—the likelihood that he will turn to either normal or criminal behavior depends not so much on these characteristics, but upon his environment and the kinds of social interaction he has with the people around him.

What of personality factors? Psychologically, potential aggressiveness and violence are lodged in all individuals, but success or failure in controlling them are dependent on the interaction between the individual and his environment. A psychoanalytic understanding of the dynamics of personal behavior is important for the treatment of a violent person but such treatment is usually only successful when violence is a symptom of some mental illness and not a "normal" or functional reaction to outside forces.

In sum, although the biological, psychological, and psychiatric factors underlying violent behavior have a role, we must more carefully consider the external influences that help create personalities with different capacities for violence and different abilities for diverting aggression into socially acceptable channels.

Much can be learned about aggression and violence by examining the dynamics of socialization of the young child. The newborn child is a "natural" deviant so far as he has to be socialized into conformity. Until he learns otherwise, he seizes and takes what he can, screams for his own way, and demands attention. It is through the process of socialization that he learns approved or "normative" behavior and is able to postpone his immediate needs for gratification. If gratifications, material and otherwise,

are perceived as low in quality, quantity, and general attractiveness, the child will be less likely to learn approved behavior and may well learn to lie, cheat, and be dishonorable to gratify his impulses as directly and as immediately as he can.

The learning pattern into deviant behavior contains the following elements: no firm and continuing inducement to conform to the norms of peaceful, legal behavior; an unattractive payoff for conformity in relation to the prospective costs; relatively few models of successful normative behavior; more impressive models of successful deviant behavior; the perception that deviant behavior is easier, less costly, and more rewarding than conforming behavior; and the presence of an established group of individuals who are involved in and may be actively recruiting others into deviant behavior. Under these conditions, there is a high probability that deviant behavior will be engaged in, particularly if it is reinforced by success and gratification, including acceptance by one's already deviant peers. In order to outweigh the attractiveness of deviant behavior and its promises, it is necessary to build a superstructure of restraints and rewards that will have value for the child. Meaningful and rewarding relationships are needed with others—friends and family, peers and community. With these relationships, the child gains feelings of comfort, security, approval, and self-esteem. And it is the normative behavior of these groups that he uses as the model of his own behavior. Gratifying rewards of love and security, power, and prestige must be present if the child is to be persuaded to accept the general normative life. By this means, the individual acquires a "stake" he does not wish to risk, one that he values enough to put aside recurring impulses to deviant behavior. He learns that his stake will be in danger if he either uses violence or encourages it, outside the general normative or legitimate framework.

The concept of "stake" is very important in learning to control one's impulses to criminal and violent activity. It is an investment in society that makes it possible to build habits of deferring gratification, for without something to bargain with, there is no attraction in bargaining. A stake can be a reputation valued; a certain esteem or prestige enjoyed with people about whom one cares; a level of material comfort; a future for oneself or for one's children; acceptance as a member of various groups; community, family, neighborhood, occupation, nationality, whatever. It is obvious that the more stake one has, the more one stands to lose and the more likely he is to exercise restraint in their defense.

That large segments of our population lack a "stake" and have all too numerous models for deviant behavior, can be seen from an understanding of life in the urban ghetto, where the most severe of criminogenic forces are constantly at work.

If the slums in the United States were defined strictly on the basis of dilapidated housing, inadequate sanitary facilities, and overcrowding, more than five million families, or one-sixth of the urban population, could be classified as slum inhabitants. Many of the deteriorated houses in the slums have been the primary targets of clearance and renewal projects, yet only a small percentage of new buildings constructed on the razed sites have been open to former inhabitants. Urban renewal programs, therefore, seem to be

limiting rather than expanding the number of housing units in the sections to which the poor and nonwhite have most access. The result is more intensive overcrowding. Even when new housing becomes available, it is often too expensive.

The ghetto child grows up in these circumstances, on streets littered with trash, discarded liquor bottles, sleeping drunks, narcotic addicts, and prostitutes. Home life is characterized by crowded sleeping arrangements, inadequate plumbing and sanitary facilities, falling plaster, rats, roaches, and a shifting group of relatives housed in incredibly few rooms. Personal possessions are few and minimal respect exists for the property of others. There is little to hold a child close to this kind of home, and his parents often lose control of his activities.

Employment problems, particularly as they affect the young and untrained, add to the negative influences in deteriorating urban areas. Seventy-one percent of all Negro workers are concentrated in the lowest paying and lowest skilled occupations. They are the last to be hired and the first to be laid off. The unemployment rate for nonwhites is twice as high as that for whites, although there has been some improvement in recent years.

The realities of employment are clearly reflected in the figures on income. Although Negro family income in the cities has recently increased to a median of \$5,623 at present, this figure represents only 68 percent of the average white family income. While one-third of the Negro families in cities lived on \$4,000 a year or less, only 16 percent of the whites did.

The urban school system often fails to counteract those influences that draw individuals toward crime and violence. The link between school failure and delinquency is not completely known, but there is evidence that youths who fail within the school system contribute disproportionately to delinquency. One estimate is that the incidence of delinquency among dropouts is 10 times higher than among youths who stay in school.

The public school should be a major institution for the transmission of legitimate values and goals of society. Recent commissions and studies, however, have pointed out that the school system is failing to reach all youth equally and is thus contributing to low achievement and school dropouts. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted from its survey of 75 major central cities that 75 percent of all Negro elementary school students were attending institutions that were 90 percent or more Negro, while 83 percent of the white elementary school students in those same cities were attending schools that were 90 percent to entirely white. It has been estimated that by 1975, 80 percent of all Negro pupils in the 20 largest cities, or half the nation's Negro population, will be attending schools that are 90 to 100 percent Negro.

School segregation is particularly unfortunate in light of the finding of the Coleman Report that minority group pupil achievement appears more affected by the school environment than is the case for majority groups. When a white pupil from a home strongly supportive of education was placed in a school where most pupils did not come from such homes, his achievement was little different than if he were in a school with students of similar home backgrounds. Yet when a minority pupil from a home with little stress on education was put in with students from backgrounds strongly encouraging education, his achievement was likely to increase.

The environment in which these basic institutions fail is also highly anonymous, releasing the individual from community restraints more easily than in less urban environments and providing greater opportunity for deviance. The police are often strangers carrying out their duties in, at worst, an alien subcommunity and, at best, among an anonymous set of subjects. Metropolitan areas with mass population, many commercial establishments, and highly visible wealth provide more frequent opportunities for theft than other places. Property is insured, and consumer goods in more abundance are vividly displayed and more portable.

Combine poverty, deteriorated and inadequate housing, lack of good employment opportunities, economic dependency, poor education, and anonymous living with population density, social and spatial mobility, ethnic and class heterogeneity, reduced family functions, and broken homes—and an interrelated complex of powerful criminogenic forces is produced by the ghetto environment.

The impact of these forces is more clear when they are set against the normative behavior American society encourages, the pervasive beliefs that help us determine who is good and who is bad, who is successful and who is a failure, who is worthy and who is not.

In American culture, the belief that the well-being of others should be safeguarded is balanced against belief in the individualistic pursuit of success. The competitive road to success is accorded great emphasis in American life, and achievement is often measured in material terms. Failure to achieve, especially when aspirations are increased, can cause deep frustration.

There are different ways to cope with this frustration. One can conform to the system, take solace in the fact that others are even further behind, and perhaps make false claims of success and associate with those of higher status. Or one may withdraw: alcohol, drugs, mental illness, and suicide are possible avenues of escape. One can reject the dominant values of the system, or accept them ritualistically without conviction, often living a life of quiet desperation. One can reject the values and substitute others. Hippies and many students are but contemporary examples of alternative value sources that in the past have ranged from church congregations to artist colonies and revolutionary movements.

Finally, one can accept the competitive system but not the socially approved rules for running it, choosing instead illegitimate means for enhancing one's position. Having little stake in the system, those in this last category see little to gain by playing according to the rules and little to lose by not. The leap to violence is not far, for in an effort to secure material goods and services beyond those available from legitimate sources, lower class members without work skills and education are pulled into crimes for which force or threat of force has a functional utility. Being the less skilled and educated members of a professed open society, these people are more responsive to opportunities for illegal gain and less constrained to seek that gain by violent methods.

The role of frustration suggests that violent aggressive crimes, such as homicide, assault and rape, might partially be viewed as expressive of pent-up rage over not having sufficient opportunities to gain. Yet this perspective

seems more satisfactory in explaining acquisitive crimes, such as robbery or burglary, whether or not they are violent.

More useful in explaining aggressive violence is the notion that the urban ghetto produces a subculture within the dominant American middle class culture in which aggressive violence is accepted as normative and natural in everyday life, not necessarily illicit. A subculture of violence is not the product of cities alone. The thugs of India, the *vedetta barbaricina* in Sardinia, and the *mafioso* in Sicily have existed for many years. But the contemporary American city has the accouterments not only for the birth but also for the highly accelerated development of violent subcultures, and it is in these cultural settings that most violent aggressive crimes in fact occur.

Violence, of course, is not absent from the established middle class culture of the majority in our society. It is simply the greater frequency and approval of illegitimate violence that distinguishes the subculture of violence from the dominant culture pattern.

Not everyone in the ghetto accepts an ethos of violence. Even among those who do, primarily young males, violence is not the only or predominant mode of expression. When it is used, the context often involves the desire to prove one's masculinity and to become a successful member of ghetto society. Male adolescence requires rehearsal of the toughness, heavy drinking, and quick aggressive responses that are characteristic of the lower class adult male.

From the perspective of dominant middle class standards, the motives in criminal homicide and aggravated assault—mainly altercations, family quarrels, and jealousy—are cheap issues for which people trade their lives or become seriously injured. Yet they are much more reasonable if we accept the existence of a ghetto subculture of violence in which a much wider range of situations are perceived by many as justifying an aggressive response. An altercation with overtones threatening a young man's masculinity, a drunken misunderstanding between husband and wife on Saturday night, a competition for the same woman—these can be more than trivial events in an environment that accepts violence as a norm, allows easy access to weapons, is physically deteriorated and segregated from the rest of the community, and has reduced social controls.

The suggestion that the conflict situations in which aggressive crimes are generated occur within the ghetto slum is consistent with the facts that homicide, assault, and rape are predominantly intraracial, involving Negro offenders victimizing other Negroes in a majority of cases. Those who subscribe to subcultural violence, therefore, are often not burdened by conscious guilt, because their victims are likely to belong to the same subculture. Even law-abiding members of the neighborhood may not view various illegal expressions of violence as menacing or immoral. Thus, when the victims see their assaulters as agents of the same kind of aggression that they themselves represent, violent retaliation is readily legitimized.

To be young, poor, male, and Negro; to want what the open society claims is available, but mostly to others; to see illegitimate and often violent methods of obtaining material success; and to observe others using these means successfully and with impunity—is to be burdened with an enormous

set of influences that pull many toward crime and delinquency. The current political and social posture of minority groups reinforces the pressure, creating an awareness and expectation that unfortunately far outdistance any real progress toward equality that has been made.

If the poor, young, black male with little stake in society is socialized into the ways of violence by his immediate subculture, he is also under the influence of many forces from the general, dominant culture. Violence is a pervasive theme today in the mass media. The sheer frequency of screened violence, its intensity as well as its context, and the myriad forms it takes, cannot claim to instill firm notions of nonviolence in the viewers. Unless the assertion that such violence encourages violent behavior (or strips us of our sensitivity to it) is countered by scientifically acceptable evidence, we are playing a dangerous game with the influence it may have on the young of today and adults of tomorrow.

Much of the same can be said about guns in American society. The ease with which anyone over 18 can obtain firearms is well documented. During the past decade, about 29 million new guns have been added by domestic production and importation. Weak or unenforced statutes on possession or use of firearms and the stimulus of advertising increase the availability. Today, half of our population could be armed if guns in this country were evenly distributed.

Mail-order and other firearm advertisements, the highest gun-to-population ratio in the world, the glorification of guns in our history, and the daily television displays of guns in the hands of heroes surely play no positive role in minimizing violence. These and many other socializing forces colored with violence further shape the values and form the mentality of many American youth.

THE RISE IN VIOLENT CRIME

If, as we believe, the conditions of life for inner-city populations are largely responsible for the sharp difference in violent crime rates between these populations and other groups in our society, there remains a puzzling paradox to be considered: Why, we must ask, have urban violent crime rates increased substantially during the past decade when the conditions that are supposed to cause violent crime have not worsened—have, indeed, generally improved?

The Bureau of the Census, in its latest report on trends in social and economic conditions in metropolitan areas, states that most "indicators of well-being point toward progress in the cities since 1960." Thus, for example, the proportion of blacks in cities who completed high school rose from 43 percent in 1960 to 61 percent in 1968; unemployment rates dropped significantly between 1959 and 1967 (from \$6,720 to \$7,813), and the median family income of blacks in cities increased from 61 percent to 68 percent of the median white family income during the same period. Also during the same period the number of persons living below the legally-defined poverty level in cities declined from 11.3 million to 8.3 million.

There are some important counter-trends. The unemployment rate for blacks, though lower, continued to be about twice that for whites. Unemployment among black teenagers in cities increased by a third between 1960 and 1968 (to 30 percent, two and one-half times the urban white teenager rate). Moreover, figures indicating a closing of the family income gap between blacks and whites in the 1960's do not reflect a number of critical details, such as the fact that in cities black men who worked the year round in 1967 earned about seven-tenths as much as white workers and that this fraction was unchanged since 1959, or the fact that the "dependency ratio"—the number of children per thousand adult males—for blacks is nearly twice that for whites, and the gap widened sharply in the 1960's. The degree of poverty among the Negro poor in metropolitan areas remained severe, half the families reporting incomes \$1,000 or more below the Social Security Administration's poverty budget of \$3,335 for a family of four. We also find a significant increase in the number of children growing up in broken homes, especially among Negroes and lower income families in the cities. Among Negroes in the cities in 1968 with incomes below \$4,000, only one-fourth of all children were living with both parents, as compared to one-half for white families of the same income level. Significantly, for families with incomes of \$10,000 per year, this difference between white and black families disappears.

Whatever may be the correct over-all judgment on the change in inner-city living conditions over the past ten years, it is clear, however, that the change has been less dramatic than the change in violent crime rates during this period. How is this discrepancy to be explained? Why, if a high percentage of the crime in our cities is caused by factors such as poverty and racial discrimination, has it increased in a period of unprecedented prosperity for most Americans and in a time of painfully slow and uneven but genuine progress toward racial equality? These questions are not susceptible to precise scientific answers, but it is possible to offer informed judgments about them. In our considered opinion, the following factors have been significantly operative in the increasing levels of violent crime in the inner cities:

- The United States has been changing with bewildering rapidity—scientifically, technologically, socially, and politically. Americans literally are changing how we work, how we live, how we think, how we manage our vast enterprise. Sociologists and anthropologists have long observed that rapid social change leads to a breakdown of traditional social roles and institutional controls over the behavior of young and old alike—but particularly the young, who, because of the social change, are less likely to be socialized into traditional ways of doing things (and not doing them) and, hence, ineffectively constrained by these traditional ways. This process includes the breakdown in traditional notions of civility, respect for elders and the institutions and patterns of conduct they represent, property rights, ways of settling disputes, relations between the sexes and many other matters.

With economic and technical progress in the United States has come increased affluence for most—but not all—of the members of our society. This combination of rapid social change and unevenly distributed affluence is devastating. At a time when established ways of doing things, traditions of

morality, and attitudes about personal and property rights are changing, rising levels of affluence, interacting with public promises of a better life and television displays of still more affluence, have created expectations that have outstripped reality, particularly among the poor and especially the poor black. Rising income statistics look reassuring until one focuses on the continuing gap between black and white incomes.

We have in this country what has been referred to as a "revolution of rising expectations" born of unprecedented prosperity, changes in the law, wars on poverty, space spectacles, and a host of other features of contemporary life. But a rapid increase in human expectations followed by obvious failure to meet those expectations has been and continues to be a prescription for violence. Disappointed has manifested itself not only in riots and violent demonstrations—but may also be reflected in the increasing levels of violent crime.

- Our agencies of law enforcement have not been strengthened sufficiently to contain the violence that normally accompanies rapid social change and the failure to fulfill human expectations. The criminal justice process, suffering from an insufficiency of resources and a lack of management, has become less effective as a deterrent to crime and as an instrument for rehabilitating those who are apprehended and convicted.

- Public order in a free society does not and cannot rest solely on applications or threats of force by the authorities: It must also rest on the people's acceptance of the legitimacy of the rule-making institutions of the political and social order and of the rules these institutions make. Persons obey the rules of society when the groups with which they identify approve those who abide by the rules and disapprove those who violate them. Such expressions of approval and disapproval are forthcoming only if the group believes that the rule-making institutions are in fact entitled to rule—that is, are "legitimate." What weakens the legitimacy of social and political institutions contributes to law-breaking, including violent crime.

In recent years a number of forces have converged to weaken the legitimacy of our institutions. The spectacle of governors defying court orders, police unlawfully beating demonstrators, looters and rioters going unapprehended and unpunished, and college youth attacking society's rules and values, makes it easier, even more "logical," for disadvantaged young people, whose attachment to law-abiding behavior already is tenuous, to slip into law-breaking behavior when the opportunity presents itself. In addition, pervasive suspicion that personal greed and corruption are prevalent among even the highest public officials has fed the idea among the poor that nearly everyone is "on the take," and that the real crime is in getting caught.

The beliefs that some claim to be widely held among poor young ghetto males—that the "system" in the United States is collectively guilty of "white racism" and of prosecuting an "immoral" war in Vietnam—have also tended to impair the moral impact upon them of our restrained the commission of violent crimes against society.

These three factors—disappointments of minorities in the revolution of rising expectations, the weakening of law enforcement, and the loss of institutional legitimacy in the view of many—have had their effects on crime

rates throughout our society. It is not surprising, however, that their greatest impact has been in the inner-cities, among the young, the poor, the male, the black. It is there that reality most frustrates expectations, that law enforcement provides the least protection, and that the social and political institutions of society serve the needs of the individual least effectively. It is in the inner-city that a subculture of violence, already flourishing, is further strengthened by the blockage of aspirations whose fulfillment would lead out of the subculture, by the failure of criminal justice system that would deter adherence to undesirable subcultural values, and by the weakness of institutions which would inculcate a competing set of values and attitudes.

GUIDELINES FOR ACTION AND RESEARCH

Social Reconstruction

If we are to alleviate the root causes of violence, as well as other mounting problems in a complex, changing, interdependent society, the problems that change brings to the society must be anticipated. Our institutions of government can no longer wait for crises to become obvious before examining them and implementing a response. Piecemeal reactions to inequalities and problems after they have reached crisis proportions are inadequate, wasteful, and ineffective. The United States can continue to flourish only if political leaders and government officials, businessmen, university scholars, church leaders, opinion molders of media, and the general public, all anticipate developing problems and together solve them with sufficient speed, resources, and will.

Changing job technologies, agricultural overproduction, vast migrations of rural blacks and whites to cities, urban sprawl, and decay of central cities with festering ghettos are not individual problems with separate solutions. They are one problem. To a large extent, our current high levels of crime and violence are symptoms and a part of a single American social problem. We therefore call for deliberate social reconstruction to solve our problems of race and poverty, of inequality and violence.

A comprehensive range of policies are necessary that in the short run will help contain and control violence and in the longer run will resolve the underlying inequalities and attitudes that are its root causes.

Our philosophy is that safety and justice are intertwined. Those changes in the lives of the deprived population that will involve more justice for them, we believe, will provide more safety for the rest of the population.

The first essential in a program to lessen violence in America is continued national economic progress and prosperity. This requires government policies to maintain a high general level of income and employment as the best overall means for ending poverty and deprivation. But general macroeconomic policies will not alone suffice to insure that all deprived individuals and groups are brought into our growing population, especially for young jobseekers. To end unemployment, we must assist the black, the young, and

the hard-core unemployed through private and public job-training programs, through vigorous government and private action to end job discrimination, and through programs to develop more business activity in the ghettos with increased minority participation in management and ownership.

Those who cannot work—the old, the disabled, the family without a wage earner—still have a right to decent living without fear and degradation. But their burden is too great for state and local governments, whose welfare programs vary widely and inconsistently in their adequacy. Thus, a national minimum welfare policy is needed—perhaps along the lines of the negative income tax—that will insure the right of all citizens, especially children and the elderly, to a decent standard of living.

More than a minimum income level is required to end the culture of poverty and deprivation that traps many Americans. The decaying slums in the center of our major cities remain the setting and breeding ground for much of the nation's poverty and violence. Extensive reconstruction of our urban environment in all its facets will be required. The Model Cities program offers considerable promise in its concepts of experimentation and demonstration of what concentrated efforts by all levels of government working with local citizens can do to rebuild their urban environment. In the mass society of our growing urban areas, the individual's sense of alienation and lack of responsibility for his environment are partly a product of feeling powerless and dependent on anonymous forces of government that he cannot control or influence. Measures are needed to organize community involvement and participation, not only by the ghetto dweller, but by all urban groups, in the public decisions which affect their lives, thereby building community pride, cohesion, and responsibility. Gaining services and influencing government through the normal political process will give the urban resident a "stake" in his community, while reducing the alienation and frustration that breed violence.

Improvement of citizen access to the diverse government service agencies is badly needed. Community Service Centers are one answer. They would coordinate and dispense services rendered by traditional city, state and federal agencies, including such functions as job counseling and training, family counseling, adult education, and the like. Centers should be scattered close to the population in various sections of the city and should make maximum use of local people as workers. Other means for citizens to overcome government red tape include local offices to handle grievances against public officials and private business. We urge that the federal government fund experimental projects designed to serve these purposes.

The most serious general problem is the concentration in urban ghettos of Negroes and other minorities caught in a vicious subculture of poverty and violence. Their chances for full integration into the larger American culture mostly depend on breaking through the walls of discriminatory housing practices. Direct federal housing programs and those that seek to aid private construction of dwellings should be closely controlled to insure that minorities have full access to housing throughout our cities and suburbs. Evidence indicates that Negro families in integrated communities readily adopt middle class behavior and norms. We recommend experiments in

subsidized scattered relocation and redistribution of poor ghetto families into middle class white communities where integration with its accompanying opportunities would break those cultural patterns that sustain poverty and violence.

For the barriers of housing discrimination to fall as well as for the urban environment to be rebuilt, a new level of housing programs must be developed. We must have programs to build adequate, inexpensive homes for urban dwellers, while maintaining and rehabilitating old units. There will be 100 million more Americans to house by the turn of the century. The task of housing them offers an opportunity to build new urban centers ("New Towns"), fully integrated in race and class, yet planned and governed to furnish the best in environment, education, and community involvement and participation.

Hope for significant social reconstruction with diminished violence lies in the future generations, the cohorts of children and youth growing up each year. The solutions that will break the cycle of violence lie in their upbringing and socialization into the society—from preschool days through formal education to adult jobs and marriage. From the earliest preschool age, children must learn the costs and dangers of violent behavior, and how to work and play cooperatively without violence. We recommend that the President convene a White House Conference on Family Life and Child Development to discover problem areas in American child rearing and youth and to discuss needed changes and the governmental action necessary to support them.

Although further research is required to understand the psychological and social contributions of early childhood to later violent behavior, we do know that many children in our society are deprived of adequate affection, attention, and stimulation in the crucial preschool years. As a result, they are handicapped, both socially and educationally. The Head Start experience offers much useful information and advice for developing preschool programs, both formally and informally in the home, that would stimulate the young child's mind and teach him to develop normal relationships with adults and other children in which violent habits would be minimized. A program of preschool training, accompanied by considerable parent participation and indoctrination into easily practicable methods of stimulating, disciplining, and otherwise rearing children, could go far to minimize frustration and violence in poor children, while at the same time helping to equalize their future opportunities in life. Because the attitudes and practices of parents and community are vital to the efficiency and long-term success of such a program, a strategy for preschool training should be designed to popularize it and meet obvious needs of the community.

Wrapped up with preschool training and the child's early learning of behavior is the problem of child abuse. Those who abuse their children tend to feel inadequate and overwhelmed by the problems and stresses of family life and child care. Child abuse might be minimized by expanding day-care centers for children of working mothers, Head Start programs and parental education in child rearing. Community Service Centers or other local facilities should provide needed family services such as counseling and health services.

More study is also needed on the role of primary and secondary schools and their capabilities in integrating children, especially those from deprived subcultures, into the norms and values of the larger society, thereby decreasing tendencies toward violent behavior. We do know that our public educational system, overburdened and inadequate as it may be for the tasks, remains the major single instrument for opening opportunities for success, influencing patterns of future behavior, and recognizing and answering specific individual problems and needs before they become dangerous. Teacher training, school-community relations, programs for dropouts and educationally handicapped adults, and many other areas of education deserve more research and national support for the roles they can play in diminishing violence in America.

Criminal violence is only one aspect of the protest of youth, but it is a significant one: in 1966, men under the age of 25 accounted for over 70 percent of arrests for robberies, burglaries, and rapes. Policy responses based on the broadest possible perspectives are required. We recommend the creation of new roles for youth, so that young people can lend their energies, visions, and skills to the decision making processes of this country and learn through their participation that peaceful change can be affected within the framework of democratic institutions. Innovations in youth self-help programs are needed with particular emphasis on the involvement of indigenous youth in planning and operation.

In an effort to restore the respect of youth for our laws, we should legalize marihuana use, or possession for use by persons over 18 years of age. There is no reliable scientific evidence of harmful effects, nor is there evidence of marihuana's being a steppingstone to hard narcotics. Through our harsh criminal statutes on marihuana use and in light of evidence that alcohol abuse accounts for far more destruction than any known psychoactive substance today, we have caused large numbers of our youth to lose respect for our laws generally. We have also criminalized untold numbers of young people. The scientific data do not support harsh treatment. Although we do not intend to encourage use, because as with any psychoactive substance, abuse can be harmful, we leave the restraining effort to educational campaigns, family influences, and the like.

SAFETY FOR THE NON-CRIMINAL POPULATION

We do not suggest that broad social reconstruction will eliminate all criminal violence and recognize that in the short run the risk and difficulty of committing crime and violence must be increased.

The key to safety lies in the criminal justice system—police, courts, and corrections. Yet the system has been shockingly ineffective. Personnel at all levels are severely understaffed, training is inadequate, equipment and facilities are archaic, and funding is minimal. In spite of efforts at prevention, the largest percentage of all crimes known to the police do not result in imprisonment or probation. In 1968, only 86 percent of homicides, 55 percent of forcible rapes, 27 percent of robberies and 66 percent of

aggravated assaults resulted in arrest. Of all arrests, only some result in prosecution; of all prosecutions, only some result in determination of guilt; of all those found guilty, only some end up incarcerated. The attrition between commission and institutionalization varies by crime—in some categories more than 90 percent of all crimes known to police do not result in institutionalization or probationary treatment outside the walls. And the crimes known to police are only a fraction of all crimes committed, so it is quite clear that the "preventive" aspect of the system of criminal justice is far from effective.

One response is expanded use of new police techniques, equipment, and strategies for deterring crime. Control by deterrence is primarily effective against rational and impersonal crime, such as burglaries, street robberies, and some assaults. It is here that experiments will intensify police patrolling, street lighting, surveillance, and alarm systems should be encouraged. Ways of "target hardening"—making victims and property less susceptible to attack—need to be imaginatively explored by all levels of police and government, as well as by urban designers and private manufacturers. Residential buildings, including parking and routes of access, should be designed for maximum feasible security and deterrence of crime. Perhaps teams with expertise in both security and design could evaluate residential areas, schools, parks, and other facilities in order to develop more secure patterns of use. The areas of police equipment and organization—communications, police car, nonlethal weapons, command centers—offer considerable prospect of improvement. Computers and statistical methods have already proved their immense value in understanding and predicting criminal patterns.

The ready availability of firearms to almost anyone increases the problems of control and the likelihood of violence. Tighter federal and local laws regulating the sale, licensing, and ownership of deadly firearms are therefore necessary throughout the nation. The passage and diligent enforcement of effective laws for licensing and control of sales of firearms could materially lower the level of and damage from violence in America.

Because of organized crime's impact in weakening local government and law enforcement as well as public respect for law, we recommend a more vigorous and aggressive attack on organized crime and its activities by all agencies and levels of government. The dimensions of the problem demand that national leadership and law enforcement agencies play the major role in an all-out coordinated campaign against organized crime. We recommend the continuation of the strategies and recommendations proposed by the President's Crime Commission, with the further investment of national attention, will and resources necessary for success. The task will require use of all available tools and techniques to obtain proof of criminal violation, greater punishment for acts that constitute part of organized criminal enterprise, suppression of illegal organized gambling, and reduction in the movement of illegally acquired funds into legitimate commercial activities.

A strategy to reduce and control crime and violence can only be as effective as the personnel and organization implementing it and the citizens supporting it. Planning and resources must be directed at upgrading

professional personnel and developing the appropriate understanding and mutual support in the common problem among the diverse public officials and the general public. Improved training, professional standards, and career opportunities for police are needed, but equally important are broader recruitment and careful screening of police, as well as better community relations, especially with deprived minorities. Perhaps more than any other representative, the policeman directly demonstrates the attitudes and interest of the larger society to the poor and deprived communities of our cities.

About half the calls to which policemen respond are incidents growing out of quarrels among intimates, and certainly a great amount of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and forcible rape involve families and acquaintances. Because both the outcome of these incidents and the general state of police-community relations depend on the policeman's attitudes and skills as a conflict resolver, we recommend that all police be specially prepared and sensitized for these functions in their training and operations. Imaginative innovations such as "domestic quarrel teams" are needed, as well as closer police cooperation with such purely social agencies as suicide prevention and mental health services.

Courts and correctional institutions have the difficult task of controlling criminal offenders after arrest while attempting to alter their inclinations toward violent and illicit behavior into habits more acceptable and legitimate in our society. Both systems are woefully overburdened and inadequate in relation to their swelling caseload of offenders.

A 1964 study estimated that 1 in every 9 youths (1 in 6 for boys only) would be referred to a juvenile court before his 18th birthday. The juvenile justice system is therefore especially critical in diminishing recidivism, yet it has generally operated with low prestige and inadequate resources in the overall justice system. The Supreme Court's *Gault* decision has imposed stricter procedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, for young offenders in juvenile courts. In light of *Gault* and of the Crime Commission's findings, we reiterate their recommendations for increased pre-judicial disposition of all juvenile cases not requiring adjudication. State legal codes covering juvenile offenses should be narrowed to encompass only those offenses considered crimes when committed by an adult. At the same time, more non-judicial supervision and assistance should be furnished young offenders, in contrast to currently inadequate probation practices that frequently stigmatize a youth without constructively influencing his behavior.

There are many, often conflicting, correctional goals, including punishing the offender and restraining him from doing more harm to the community; deterring him and other potential offenders from future offenses; rehabilitating him into accepted patterns of behavior; and reintegrating him into full citizenship in the community. Unfortunately, public opinion and resulting institutional actions usually emphasize immediate restraint, punishment and deterrence over the more long-run goals of rehabilitation and reintegration. The former approach has failed. No satisfactory data exist to show that length of sentence bears any real relationship to recidivism among violent offenders. In fact, there may be a higher recidivism rate for violent offenders who have served longer sentences.

Most major violence as well as the most serious injury is committed by a relatively small core of recidivists. It would therefore appear that the corrections system has done little for the offenders with whom we are most concerned. Yet high recidivism rates come as no surprise to persons experienced in the facts of prison life. Most prisons are schools for crime. Prison experience normally degrades and demoralizes men detaching them even further from any integrative ties with the normal and legitimate community. As a result, an average term in prison today probably does as much to create crime as it does to deter or prevent it. We can expect little else from an environment that is perhaps more criminogenic than even the urban ghetto environment from which most prisoners originally come.

The entire correctional system must be reconstructed in light of this evidence. The goal of rehabilitation must be given first priority. The offender must acquire the attitudes, habits, and work skills necessary to play a respectable, satisfying role in society. Programs such as pretrial releases without bail, supervised rehabilitation of offenders in their community with minimal or no confinement, smaller specialized institutions with more educational, job-training, counseling, and therapy services are needed.

Each offender has a particular background and personality, and so the correctional treatment of court and correctional institutions should involve to mix of strategies best tailored to turning the individual offender toward a more normal law-biding way of life. This requirement is especially important for juveniles and first offenders. Very few first offenders are hardened into patterns of violent, criminal behavior and can be readily returned to legitimate patterns. But all too often they imprisoned in local jails or large "total institutions" of correction and restraint.

As the offender is reintegrated into society, he must find a decent job and accepted position in the community. He requires not only the supervision of parole but continued assistance and access to financial and other services to help give him a "stake" in his community. The priority of effort should again be on youth and new offenders, especially during the 2 or 3 years after release, before they become habituated chronic offenders.

These recommendations for improving the adult and juvenile corrections systems will require not only increased funds but also much more professional talent and effort. Upgraded and expanded correctional staffs could be supplemented by recruiting part-time assistance from the professions of the community. Young lawyers or law students employed in programs such as a Youth Justice Corps could ensure that young offenders receive the legal and counseling services they need. Local Youth Service Centers and even existing private organizations could serve to make professional help more readily available to juvenile offenders.

In considering society's response to violence, we do not limit ourselves to the perpetrators of violence. We also have a responsibility to the innocent victims of violence, who often are left impoverished during long expensive recoveries. Because it is impractical for victims to obtain compensation from their attackers, we strongly endorse victim compensation by the government

to victims of major violent crimes and call on federal and state legislatures to adopt such plans.

The policies and programs needed to alleviate and control the problem of crime and violence will require coordinated support and numerous specialized services from all levels of government. Most urgently needed is better information on crime, criminals, and our criminal justice system as it actually operates. The Crime Commission report and the recent report on National Needs for Criminal Justice Statistics by the Bureau of the Census both offered recommendations for a better system of crime statistics, by improving coordination and integration of numerous federal, state, and local agencies now collecting data on crime and violence. The Statistics Center, authorized as an arm of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, together with the FBI's National Crime Information Center, the National Center for Health Statistics of the National Institute of Mental Health, the Children's Bureau, and the National Safety Council, all have roles to play in collecting and evaluating statistical data on individual violence.

CONCLUSION

We emphasize that there can be no genuine safety without real justice. Stability and security come only when the citizens of a society accept its rules of conduct as legitimate and reasonable; this acceptance can be expected to prevail generally only among those who find they can enjoy the normal benefits and pleasures of life in law-abiding ways. It is those groups most deprived of respect, opportunity, and the sense of responsible participation in our society who contribute most to its violence. And it is those programs leading to social justice for all our citizens that in the long run will reduce the causes of violence in America.

The various rising trends of violence in America today constitute a national problem requiring a national response. Our public officials, the leaders of governments and our people, must press that public response with the necessary programs, resources, energy, and persuasive leadership. Perhaps even more critical than the governmental response is the collective response of the American people. Only a fuller commitment to the task can insure justice and safety for all.

APPENDIX 17

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE BY WOMEN*

By
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I. INTRODUCTION

Americans are greatly concerned about "crime in the streets" and "the rising tide of juvenile delinquency." These concerns do not, however, include the criminal activities of females.¹ The most obvious reason that the public's attention is focused on the crime and delinquency of males is that males contribute from 80 to 90 percent of all persons arrested, convicted, and confined for crimes of violence in the United States. In one type of violent crime—forcible rape—males account for every arrest. The disproportionate contribution males make to "the crime problem" may be seen in table 1 which reports the arrests of males and females for the seven so-called "Index crimes" and other common offenses. These data are compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are reported annually in *Crime in the United States*.

*We wish to express our gratitude to Jacqueline Ridley and the other sociology graduate students at the University of California, Riverside, who assisted us in collecting the data for this study. The staff at the California Institution for Women and the Minnesota Women's Reformatory were always cooperative and helpful. We want to thank Mrs. Iverne R. Carter, Superintendent of the California Institution for Women, for her continued encouragement and support of criminological research on the female offender.

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Note.—Superscript figures indicate references on p. 166.—

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Table 1.—Crime in the United States by sex, 1967

Category of crime	Total reported arrests* in U.S./1967	Men (percent)	Women (percent)
1. Index crimes (murder, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny over \$50, forcible rape, auto theft)	996,800	86	14
2. Felonious crimes of violence:			
a. Murder and non- negligent man- slaughter	9,145	84	10
b. Negligent man- slaughter	3,022	90	16
c. Aggravated assault	107,192	87	13
d. Robbery	59,789	95	5
e. Forcible rape	12,659	100	—
3. Index crimes and 22 other common offenses— misdemeanor and felony (includes prostitution and commercialized vice, drunkenness, vagrancy, runaways, narcotics, gambling, arson, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, vandalism, disorderly conduct, and others)	5,518,420	88	12
a. Prostitution and commercialized vice was the only crime out of the 29 in which the proportion of women exceeded men		22	78
b. Runaways was the only other category in which the proportion of women was more than 1 in 4		52	48

*4,566 agencies covering estimated population of 145,927,000.

Source: *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports—1967*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 124.

Because the bulk of the data for this study was gathered in California, and because California has perhaps the best crime reporting system in the United States, it is worth noting that the percentages of arrests of women in California for violent crimes approximated those for the country as a whole.

Table 2.—Crime in California, by sex, 1966

Arrests	Males		Females	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
Homicide	84	1,084	16	213
Assault	87	12,820	13	1,866
Robbery	93	8,760	7	695

Source: *Crime and Delinquency in California, 1966*, Department of Corrections, Sacramento.

Other measures of the involvement of women in crimes of violence pertain to criminal convictions and prison commitments. These data are, however, even more skewed in the direction of males over females than are the arrest data. As female offenders move through the criminal justice system, prosecutors, judges, and juries manifest reluctance to deal with them in the same manner that they deal with males. Thus while one out of seven persons arrested for a serious crime was a female, only one female is confined in our State and Federal prisons for every 22 males. California data on convictions and commitments for 1966 are as follows:

Table 3.—Convictions and commitments for violent crimes in California, 1966
[In percent]

	Conviction		Commitment	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Homicide	87	13	91	9
Assault	91	9	92	8
Robbery	97	3	98	2

Source: *Crime and Delinquency in California, 1966*, pp. 57, 117; and *California Prisoners 1964, 1965, 1966*, Department of Corrections, Sacramento.

In addition to noting the limited amount of felony crimes by females reported in our national and state crime statistics, it is important to distinguish between male and female offenders in terms of the types of crimes each group tends to commit. As can be seen in table 4 when women are sentenced to prison they are three times more likely than men to be sentenced on forgery and bad check charges, twice as likely to be sentenced for homicide, but far less likely to be sentenced for robbery, burglary, and felonious sex offenses (e.g., rape, lewd and lascivious conduct, child molestation). Commitment percentages for assault, narcotics, and theft were about the same for male and female offenders.

Table 4.—Commitment offense for California felons, by sex, 1967
[In percent]

	Men	Women
Crimes against person	31.6	26.8
Homicide	6.0	11.0
Assault	6.5	7.7
Robbery	19.1	8.1
Crimes against property	41.5	54.8
Burglary	17.2	8.8
Theft (including auto)	13.2	15.5
Forgery and checks	11.1	30.5
Sex offenses	6.5	1.1
Narcotics	13.7	13.6
Other offenses	6.7	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0
N	(4,872)	(272)

Source: *California Prisoners 1967*, pp. 17-18.

The differential involvement of females in the various types of crime points up the role that culture plays in influencing the behavior of the sexes. The norms and traditions in American society which prescribe the manner in which women and girls are supposed to behave is also a part of the explanation of the differential response of the community and organized criminal justice agencies to the female criminal offender—namely that women are more to be pitied and protected than punished and that imprisonment is to be used only as a last resort. In a later section we will discuss the importance of the relationship between sex roles and behavior for the understanding of female criminality in our society. Here we only want to note that the limited number of female offenders and the differential processing of female felons by the criminal justice system has had implications for the amount of systematic research that has been directed toward this group of criminal offenders.

Until very recently most of the studies of criminal populations were conducted in prisons for men simply because the investigators found it expedient to study large groups of offenders conveniently assembled in one spot. In five States there are not enough female felons to justify maintaining a separate prison for women; these States house their female felons in city or county jails or board them in the prisons of neighboring States. Fifteen States house small numbers of female felons in wings or in sections of prisons for men. Twenty-seven States operate a separate correctional institution for women, but in most of these States the number of prisons for men ranges from 2 to 10.² So larger numbers of male offenders meant more men's prisons and more potential study sites.

Given the smaller numbers of both prisons for women and women in prison, the competition of research opportunities in prisons for men, and the salience of crime problems posed by male offenders, it is not surprising that

criminology textbook writers have been able to cover the available knowledge about female criminality in one chapter or less. Our knowledge of the character and causes of female criminality is at the same stage of development that characterized our knowledge of male criminality some 30 or more years ago.

The most obvious implication of being at this rather primitive stage of systematic data collection is seen in the kinds of questions we have had to answer in our research—questions whose answers would provide rudimentary data about female criminality: What are the basic demographic and personal characteristics of female violent offenders? How do these characteristics compare to other types of female offenders? To male offenders? What are the characteristic criminal roles of female offenders? More specifically, do females convicted of assaultive crimes use weapons? Who are the victims? How much physical strength or agility do women use in committing crimes of violence? Do they commit crimes of violence alone or with others? If others are involved, who are they? What reasons do women give for committing violent crimes?

Another range of questions included in this inquiry involves the population of the California Institution for Women (CIW), the largest correctional facility for female felons in the United States. We asked: Has there been an increase in recent years in the number or proportion of women committed to CIW for crimes of violence? Are women more aggressive in committing violent crimes today than in the past? Has there been an increase in the number of CIW rules violations? Do women committed for violent crimes contribute disproportionately to institutional violence compared to other offenders?

In the following two sections we present data related to female offender characteristics and the nature of female criminality. The incidence of violent behavior within the women's prison is dealt with in section IV, in section V we discuss some of the trends in the extent and nature of female criminality, and in section VI we summarize the study findings.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEMALE OFFENDERS

Although there has been very little systematic study of female criminality, we do not mean to imply that this is the first excursion into this area. Some 100 years ago an Italian physician and physical anthropologist, Caesar Lombroso, studied the skulls, brains, and physical "anomalies" of female criminals and those of "normal" women. Lombroso's book, *The Female Offender* (1893), also included the author's commentaries and descriptions of some social and psychological characteristics of his subjects.

Certainly the most extensive systematic study to date of the characteristics and personal histories of female offenders was the one conducted by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck of *Five Hundred Delinquent Women* (1934) whose parole from the Massachusetts Women's Reformatory expired between 1921 and 1925. The Gluecks gathered 285 separate items of data about their study population. These data—gathered from prison records, interviews, and field investigations—covered family backgrounds and personal histories of the women before prison, during prison and parole, and after expiration of sentence.

A comprehensive review of the state of knowledge about female criminality, based upon reports and studies published before 1950 in the United States and abroad, was made by Otto Pollak. In his book, *The Criminality of Women* (1950), Pollak presented evidence pertaining to several major characteristics of female criminals (age, race, marital status, occupation, and intelligence) and updated Lombroso's description of the circumstances under which women carry out criminal roles.³

The three works briefly described above have reported almost all of the research data there is about the characteristics of female offenders. A similar review of studies of male offenders would take up all the pages of this report. Even if the focus was upon only the male murderer, a review of all the investigations by anthropologists, geneticists, biochemists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, and legal and judicial authorities would take up many pages. When the presentation of systematically gathered data on the characteristics of female offenders gets beyond items such as age, race, and IQ, criminologists are exploring areas that have been investigated in one or two earlier studies at most.

Study Population

There are always problems in selecting any criminal population for study. For example, a study of all persons arrested includes some who are not guilty and excludes other persons who have violated the same laws but who have not been caught. A study involving an arrest population would be more likely to exclude property offenders than violent offenders because arrests by the police are made most frequently in connection with crimes against persons.⁴

Furthermore, our criminal justice system operates in such a manner that different groups of arrestees are dropped into a variety of disposition categories. Some of those arrested are released from the system when no formal complaint is filed; of those formally charged, some cases are dismissed or charges dropped before trial; some of those held for trial are acquitted and some are found not guilty; of those persons who are convicted some receive fines or suspended sentences, some are placed on probation, some go to jail, and some go to prison. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice examined the flow of offenders through the criminal justice system and reported that only 11 percent of the 727,000 persons arrested in 1965 for so-called "Index Crimes" (homicide, assault, rape, robbery, burglary, theft over \$50, auto theft) were ultimately committed to prison.⁵ Clearly, some serious limitations must be placed upon the generalization of findings from prison populations to criminal populations. Prison populations are biased in favor of offenders who do not have the kind of social status or the financial resources that influence prosecutors and judges to utilize alternatives to penal confinement. In addition to containing a disproportionate number of persons from the lower socioeconomic class, offenders in prison have the most extensive criminal records both in terms of the frequency of arrest and number of alternatives to imprisonment that have been tried.

Given this general caveat, it should also be pointed out that prison populations do contain larger proportions of those who have committed violent crimes. Persons convicted of murder are seldom found in probation,

suspended sentence, jail or juvenile populations. Wolfgang's study of criminal homicides committed in Philadelphia reported, for example, that of the 387 persons convicted, only 4 percent were placed on probation. The remainder received sentences ranging from indefinite (mostly women) to life imprisonment or death.⁶ Women in prison for homicide represent a good sample of all the female murderers in particular jurisdictions who were adjudged legally sane at the time the crime was committed. Similar data on the dispositions of assault and robbery cases is not available, but the chances of making arrests and obtaining convictions in assault cases are somewhat better than for property crimes because the offender is often known to the victim. Even in those cases of assault and robbery where the offender's identity is not known, the victim is often able to assist the police by identifying suspects. The higher clearance rate for all crimes against persons when coupled with the seriousness of these offenses leads to the imprisonment of relatively more violent offenders than is true of other offender types.

Violent crimes committed by women who would be excluded from a prison sample include those cases in which: (1) murders, assaults, or robberies were not reported or in which no arrest was made; (2) women committed suicide after committing murder or assault; (3) women were charged with murder or assault but were not tried, or when tried were found not guilty by reason of mental defect or insanity; (4) the defendant was acquitted or released due to a mistrial. It should also be noted that the charges upon which some convictions are obtained may be less serious than the original charge. (For example, as a result of plea bargaining a murder charge may be reduced to manslaughter or felonious assault may be reduced to a misdemeanor.) All of these qualifications considered, the power of generalization of findings about female murderers included in a prison population to the larger population of legally sane female murderers is greater than could be expected of any offender type. This same point applies to a somewhat lesser degree to prison samples of females convicted of assault and robbery.

Study Design

This report is an outgrowth of a study of the adjustment that women made to life in prison which was conducted during the early 1960's at the California Institution for Women by Ward and Kassebaum.⁷ For that study basic descriptive data was gathered which pertained to the demographic characteristics, personal histories, and institutional experiences of all inmates housed at CIW between 1962 and 1964 ($N=832$). In 1968 comparable data was obtained for a 25 percent sample of the inmate population ($N=200$). Inmates from the earlier study group who were still in the prison were excluded from the sample.

In the analyses that follow, the 1962-63-64 study population (hereinafter referred to as the "1963 group") and the 1968 sample are presented separately. There were no statistically significant differences between the two groups over time, except where noted. (For several items we can present only 1963 or only 1968 data; in one case we mistakenly omitted the item when making up the 1968 coding sheets, in another case the data pertaining to one study group was rejected because of apparent coding inconsistencies with the other group.)

Information on inmate characteristics was taken from the prison files kept for each inmate confined in the California Institution for Women. Since the validity of some of the file information can be questioned we focused on those items that involved fairly objective issues, such as number of arrests, test scores, age, etc. To keep the abstracting of file information uniform we checked the reliability of decisions made by our coders and had more than one judgment made of ambiguous or difficult items. We recomputed the numerical counts of certain items made by probation officers or institution staff members because there were a sufficient number of mistakes to warrant the effort.

In several cases we established our own guidelines for using or excluding various kinds of file information which dealt with the same item. For psychiatric diagnosis, for example, we coded only reports prepared by psychiatrists or psychologists and not the opinions offered by police officers, prosecutors, judges, and correctional officers. Nor did we use reports made by probation officers or prison case workers because of their highly variable quality.

The most obvious limitation in the use of officially recorded information arises in the area of reports of illegal or illicit behavior. All figures relating to the incidence of sexual promiscuity, prostitution, criminality, delinquency, and homosexuality are only measures of these activities as officially reported and are thus underestimates of true rates.

The specific items gathered for this study do not, of course, represent all the information that it would be useful to have on the characteristics and personal histories of female offenders, but they do represent the best information that was consistently reported in the prison records and represent many hours of investigation by various law enforcement, correctional, and social service agencies. Stated simply the inmate files at the California Institution for Women contained the best available supply of basic information on a large sample of female felons we could obtain for an exploratory study. Approximately 10 percent of all women confined in our State and Federal prisons are housed at CIW.

Findings

The discussion and data which follow focus upon women who were committed to prison for crimes against persons: homicide, assault, and robbery. Data on two other groups of female felons are included for comparative purposes: those committed for property crimes (forgery and bad checks, grand theft, burglary), and those committed for violation of narcotics laws. (The latter is more accurately classified as a "crime against morality" than as a crime against a person or property.)

1. Ethnicity

It is not easy to determine the most accurate way to present the ethnic and racial composition for different types of offenders. Should it be expressed in terms of the racial distribution of the prison population? The commitment population? Or the population of the State? Table 5 gives the percentages that whites and nonwhites represent in each of these three populations.

Table 5.—Ethnic distribution of female felons in California
[In percent]

	White	Mexican	Negro	Other	Total percent	Number of women
California State population ¹	92	6	2	100.0	7,880,000
Prison commitments: ²						
1964	60.8	5.2	32.1	1.9	100.0	324
1967	66.2	7.4	25.0	1.4	100.0	272
Prison inmates:						
Dec. 31, 1962 ³	64.1	4.4	29.7	2.5	100.0	667
1963 population	68.0	⁴ 5.0	27.0	⁴	100.0	⁵ 819
Dec. 31, 1967 ³	51.8	8.4	37.4	2.4	100.0	704
1968 sample	55.0	10.0	33.5	1.5	100.0	200

¹Statistical Abstracts, U.S. Census, percent of population of women of Mexican ancestry not given. Included in percent white.

²California Prisoners, 1964, 65, 66 (p. 29), and 1967 (p. 27), Research Division, Department of Corrections, Sacramento.

³Ibid., p. 59. Excludes felons in the Reception-Guidance Center.

⁴The Mexican group includes fewer than 5 Indian and Chinese women.

⁵No information on ethnicity of 13 women.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the distributions presented in table 5 is that minority group women, given the proportion of the State population they constitute, are substantially overrepresented in terms of their proportion of felony commitments to the California Institution for Women and their proportion of the year-end institution population. Also apparent is the problem of reconciling conclusions based upon the population of women committed to prison on felony charges during a given year with the population of the prison at a given point in time (as reported by the California Department of Corrections and as indicated by our two study groups). Data from 1964 to 1967 show the proportion of Negro women committed to prison has declined and that the proportion of Mexican women has increased. Among the prison population, however, the proportion of women in both minority groups has increased.

One reason for this discrepancy may be due to differences in type of offense committed. Negro and Mexican women are disproportionately represented in the assault commitments and Mexican women also comprise a disproportionate share of narcotics commitments. Since assault and narcotic

Table 6.—Ethnicity: Violent offenders, 1968 sample and California commitments, 1966/67
[In percent of offense categories]

	Number	White	Mexican	Negro	Other
Female prison commitments,¹ 1966/67					
Total ²	628	61.5	8.0	28.5	2.0
Homicide	61	57.4	6.5	36.1	—
Assault	47	29.7	15.0	49.0	6.3
Robbery	41	58.5	7.3	29.3	4.9
Property crimes	360	69.0	5.8	23.3	1.9
Narcotics	84	54.8	15.4	29.8	—
Female prison inmates, March 1968³					
Total ⁴	200	55.0	10.0	33.5	1.5
Homicide	28	64.3	10.7	25.0	—
Assault	23	30.4	17.4	52.2	—
Robbery	12	83.3	—	8.3	8.3
Property crimes	94	60.6	7.4	30.9	1.1
Narcotics	34	35.3	14.7	47.1	2.9

¹ Adapted from *California Prisoners, 1967, op. cit.*, p. 41 ($\chi^2=42.82, df=12, p < 0.01$).

² ($\chi^2=23.64, df=12, p < 0.05$).

³ Includes 35 commitments whose offense does not fit into these 5 categories (e.g., abortion, escape).

⁴ Includes 9 inmates whose offense does not fit into these 5 categories. Differences did not exceed acceptable significance levels.

law violations generally carry longer prison terms than do property offenses, it may be that over time more minority group women "accumulate" in prison.

Whatever the reasons for the differences in ethnic (racial) distributions between prison commitments and prison populations, it seems safe to conclude that, given the proportion of minority group women in the State population, they are overrepresented among offenders convicted of assaultive crimes.

2. Intelligence

The IQ scores of women in the 1968 sample tended to be concentrated at the low end of the scale: only one in six scored in the above average range, and two out of six scored below average. The validity of IQ test scores may be questioned, however, when they apply to culturally disadvantaged groups. Since prison populations have large percentages of minority group persons, this issue should be kept in mind in examining IQ distribution for specific groups of offenders. (Among whites in the 1968 sample, 17 percent scored below average and 38 percent scored above average. Contrast this with the percent distribution for women from the minority groups—Mexican and black: 59 percent scored below average and 4 percent scored above average.)

Cross-tabulating offense with IQ we found a significant difference: women serving time for assaultive crimes had significantly lower scores than other offenders.

Table 7.—IQ scores: Violent offenders, 1968 sample
[In percent]

	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Property crime	Narcotics
Below average (under 90)	42	68	8	31	35
Average (90-110)	29	27	59	48	59
Above average (over 110)	29	5	33	21	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(28)	(22)	(12)	(94)	(34)

($\chi^2=23.76, df=8, p < 0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.333.

However, when *race is held constant* (that is, when we cross tabulated offense with IQ for whites and nonwhites *separately*), differences were no longer significant. These data are presented in table 8, Note, for example, that women committed for assault tended to score below average irrespective of majority-minority status; also, among whites committed for homicide there was an equal number of women in each of the three IQ categories.

3. Criminal Record and Crime in Family of Female Felons

A. Criminal Record

When compared to other offenders, women in both the 1963 prison population and in our 1968 sample committed for homicide were significantly less likely to: (1) have had a criminal record or have been previously confined; (2) have been arrested before age 21; or (3) have been previously committed on a felony charge. Women committed for assault had more extensive criminal records prior to their current commitment than did homicide commitments. Robbery commitments had the most extensive records of the three types of violent offenders.

Noting the differences in the criminal careers of homicide offenders compared to women committed for assault and robbery, if these three groups are combined into the "violent offender" category and then compared to the property offender and narcotics offender categories as a group, violent offenders have less extensive criminal careers. Twenty-one percent of the violent offenders for example had no criminal record reported prior to their commitment to the California Institution for Women but only 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of the property and narcotics offenders had no prior record. In terms of prior felony commitments, 63 percent of the violent offenders had no such commitment compared to 39 percent of the property offenders and 38 percent of the narcotic offenders. There were, however, no statistically significant differences between these three groups of offenders in terms of age at first arrest, about one-half of each group was arrested before the age of 21.

B. Crime in the Offender's Family

In 6 out of 10 homicide cases no member of the family was known to have been arrested—either for a misdemeanor or for a felony. Somewhat fewer families of assault offenders had "clean" records. Looking at the most serious end of this continuum it can be seen that murderers were the least likely to have had a member of the family involved in a felony charge.

Differences between offender categories were significant among the 1963 inmate population essentially because of the large proportion of narcotic offenders whose families had felony arrests or convictions. However, these differences were not significant for the 1968 sample.

4. Personal, Sexual, and Emotional Troubles

A. Broken Homes

Are women who commit crimes of violence more likely to come from broken homes than is the case for other offenders? Our data (on the 1968 sample only) reveal that there were no statistically significant differences between offenders committed for crimes against persons, property or narcotics. On a percentage basis, fewer of the murderers come from homes broken by desertion, separation, divorce, or death than was the case for any other offense group. Inmates in other offense categories were more equally split between those who did and did not come from a broken home.

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Table 8.—IQ score for violent offenders, within white and nonwhite¹ inmate groups, 1968 sample
[In percent of each offense category]

IQ score	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	White ²	Nonwhite ³	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
Above average (110+)	33	20	14	—	30	(1)	33	2	17	—
Average (90-110)	33	20	29	27	60	(1)	55	38	75	50
Below average (-90)	33	60	57	73	10	—	12	60	8	50
Total	99	100	100	100	100	—	100	100	100	100
N	(18)	(10)	(7)	(11)	(10)	(2)	(57)	(37)	(12)	(22)

¹Includes women of Mexican descent.

²($\chi^2=15.09$, $df=8$, not significant.)

³($\chi^2=8.29$, $df=4$, not significant.)

Table 9.—Extent of criminal record: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offense category]

Prior record	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
None reported	34	34	10	11	8	6	9	6	1	3
Arrests, fines, or probation	29	29	20	23	30	29	17	15	20	29
Jail, training school, jail and probation	26	23	53	47	30	29	37	28	46	29
Reformatory or prison	11	13	17	19	32	36	37	51	33	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(108)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(193)	(34)

¹($\chi^2=113.14$, $df=12$, $p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.3569.

²($\chi^2=40.62$, $df=12$, $p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.4197.

Table 10.—Age at first arrest: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offense category]

Age at first arrest	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
20 or younger	29	32	57	58	74	75	46	50	61	44
21-27	35	32	27	21	20	19	30	36	33	41
28+	36	36	16	21	6	6	24	14	6	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(108)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(193)	(34)

¹($\chi^2=60.81$, $df=8$, $p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.2697.

²($\chi^2=17.93$, $df=8$, $p<0.15$) contingency coefficient = 0.2929.

Table 11.—Number of felony commitments: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offense category]

Prior commitments	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
None	82	80	67	63	62	57	56	40	55	38
1	12	13	27	26	6	8	25	17	30	35
2	2	2	6	11	14	16	10	22	12	12
3 or more	4	5	—	—	18	19	9	21	3	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(108)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(153)	(34)

¹($\chi^2=52.71$, $df=12$, $p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.2523.

²($\chi^2=3167$, $df=12$, $p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.3689.

Table 12.—Severity of reported family criminality: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offense category]

Known family crime ³	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
None	64	60	57	49	42	43	52	39	31	20
Misdemeanor	6	9	6	6	4	5	10	18	5	12
Felony ⁴	30	31	37	45	54	52	38	43	64	67
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(108)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(193)	(84)

¹($\chi^2=51.72, df=8, p<0.01$)

²($\chi^2=11.58, df=8$), not significant.

³ Any relative by descent or marriage.

⁴ With or without misdemeanors.

Table 13.—Parents' marital status: Violent offenders, 1968 sample
[In percent of offense category]

Parents' marital status	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Property crimes	Narcotics
No break	68	50	50	48	54
Home broken by death, separation, desertion, or divorce	32	50	50	52	46
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(28)	(23)	(12)	(92)	(33)

¹Up to age 18 of subject.
($\chi^2=3.59$, $df=4$, not significant.)

B. History of Illegal and Illicit Sexual Behavior

Even though the behavior that individuals keep most private—illegal activities and personal sexual activities—are certainly under-reported in prison records, almost two-thirds of the 1963 population and the 1968 sample were reported to have been promiscuous, to have engaged in prostitution, or both; about one-fifth were reported to have had homosexual involvements or to manifest homosexual traits.

Consistent with their less extensive criminal records, compared to other offenders, the women in our study committed for homicide were least likely to have engaged in prostitution. (Assault commitments, on the other hand, were more likely to have reports of either promiscuity or prostitution or both—at least eighty percent—than any other offense group except narcotics offenders.) In addition, fewer women committed for homicide had reports of homosexual involvements than did other offender groups. The most notable involvement of any offense group in homosexuality was among robbery commitments—a finding we shall refer to later in this paper.

C. Drinking Problems

Compared to property offenders and narcotics offenders, violent offenders were, to a statistically significant degree, more likely to be labeled as "alcoholics." In 1968, one in three of all inmates serving time for violent offenses was labeled "alcoholic" compared to 1 in 8 and 1 in 16 of the property and narcotics offenders.

Table 15 presents data pertaining to drinking problems for the specific violent offense groups. For the 1968 sample the percent of alcoholics among the homicide and assault offenders was at least double that of the other offense groups.

Of additional interest is the increase in the percentage of female offenders regarded as alcoholic in the 1968 sample compared with the 1963 population: 18 percent of the sample confined in 1968 had been labeled "alcoholic"—twice the percentage for the earlier study group. The increase

Table 14.—History of illegal or illicit sexual conduct: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offender category]

	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
Promiscuity and prostitution:										
None reported . . .	38	41	16	17	38	36	40	36	14	27
Promiscuity ³ . . .	30	31	37	40	18	20	25	40	19	32
Prostitution ⁴ . . .	32	28	47	43	43	44	35	24	67	41
Total ⁵	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(106)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(49)	(12)	(386)	(94)	(192)	(34)
Reported homosexuality										
Some ⁶	⁷ 11	⁸ 11	23	19	44	39	18	29	23	29
N	(108)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(193)	(34)

¹($\chi^2=70.07$, $df=8$, $p<0.01$)

²($\chi^2=14.92$, $df=8$, not significant)

³Includes illegitimate children, promiscuity (also referred to as "sexual delinquency"), or both.

⁴Includes prostitution; promiscuity and prostitution.

⁵Women who had been victims of rape or incest, but about whom promiscuity or prostitution was not known or alleged were excluded.

⁶Observed or alleged in or out of prison; also included are subjects to whom homosexual traits were ascribed.

⁷($\chi^2=26.70$, $df=4$, $p<0.05$)

⁸($\chi^2=6.33$, $df=4$, not significant)

among violent offenders was even greater—39 percent of the women confined for murder and 35 percent for assault in the 1968 sample were labeled “alcoholic.” In 1963, among these two offender groups, only 14 percent and 13 percent were “alcoholic.” We cannot be certain, however, whether these changes represent an actual increase in inmates with an alcoholic history or changes in labeling practices by law enforcement, court, and prison personnel.

D. Narcotics History

This item of information was gathered on the 1963 population but was omitted in the 1968 record abstract due to an administrative error detected too late in the project to remedy; it is thus possible for us to report on narcotics history among violent offenders for the 1963 group only. In 95 percent of the cases, narcotics “use” referred to the use of heroin or other opiates.

The use of narcotics was distinctly a minority characteristic of the homicide and robbery commitments in the 1963 study population compared to assault commitments, property offenders and, of course, narcotics offenders. The 92-percent figure for narcotics use by persons committed for violation of narcotics laws reflects the fact that a small number of persons sold or were charged with possession of narcotics but did not use drugs themselves.

E. History of Psychological Disabilities

We gathered data pertaining to psychological disabilities in an effort to answer three questions: (1) How widespread are these disabilities among a population of confined female felons? (2) Has there been an increase in the proportion of inmates who are reported to have these disabilities? (3) Compared to other types of offenders, are women committed for crimes of violence more likely to have these disabilities? We combined the diagnoses of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists into three categories: (1) “No Disability Reported”; (2) “Gross References,” which included reports of neuroses, psychopathy and a number of other psychological conditions which were referred to as disabilities; and (3) “Evidence of Psychosis.” When more than one diagnosis was contained in the inmate file, the most serious diagnosis was coded.

It is important to indicate that some of the women in the 1963 CIW population were received at the institution during periods when there was no psychiatrist on the staff. It is the case, however, that violent offenders, particularly homicide commitments, were given diagnostic interviews later in their terms when clinical staff became available. Also most of these offenders had in their files psychiatric reports or testimony which was used at their trials. Similarly, inmates whose behavior in the institution was regarded as bizarre or “disturbed” would have psychiatric interview information added to their files during their terms. In all, 90 of the 832 women in the 1963 group had no psychiatric interview data in their files and rather than classify them “No Disability Reported,” we excluded them from this analysis. For the 1968 sample we excluded 10 women for whom this information was not available.

Women in both study groups serving time for assault and homicide were described as psychologically disturbed significantly more often than other offenders.

Table 15.—Alcohol history: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of offense categories]

Alcohol history	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
No known problems . . .	46	40	36	39	56	59	72	65	82	68
Drinking associated with past offenses or reported as a problem	40	21	51	26	34	25	17	23	16	26
Described as “alcoholic”	14	39	13	35	10	16	11	12	2	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(107)	(28)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(192)	(34)

¹($\chi^2=70.19, df=8, p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.2885.
²($\chi^2=20.31, df=8, p<0.01$) contingency coefficient = 0.2812.

Table 16.—Reported use of narcotics: Violent offenders, 1963 population
[In percent of each offense category]

Narcotics use ¹	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Property crimes	Narcotics
Some	2	25	3	24	92
None	98	75	97	76	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(105)	(18)	(48)	(370)	(191)

¹In 95 percent of the cases, narcotics refers to opiate use, primarily heroin. ($\chi^2=264.33, df=4, p<0.01$)

The data in table 17 indicate that female felons have been increasingly diagnosed as suffering from some type of psychological disability. This shift can best be seen among homicide commitments. In 1963, 47 percent were regarded as psychologically disturbed; by 1968 the figure had risen to 81 percent. The percentage of all offenders reported to show evidence of psychosis doubled between 1963 and 1968, but the increase for homicide commitments more than tripled.

The major shift in the diagnoses of assault and robbery offenders was, on the other hand, in the direction of the "Gross reference" category ("Disturbed-but-not-psychotic"). In fact, the proportion of women serving time for these two crimes who showed "Evidence of psychosis" was lower in 1968 than in 1963.

The increase in reported psychological disability between 1963 and 1968 may reflect a real change in the characteristics of women committed during that period. It may also, however, reflect the fact that more clinical staff members mean more diagnoses and more thorough psychiatric examination, or it may reflect changes in preferences for certain diagnostic categories.⁸

The characteristics of female offenders set forth in this section will be summarized at a later point in the paper when we shall also summarize the character of their violent crimes. Together these two sets of data give us a more complete picture of female criminality.

III. THE ROLES OF WOMEN IN CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

There has been only one really detailed study of the character of criminal homicide in the United States—Marvin E. Wolfgang's *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*.⁹ Using police reports of 588 cases of murder which occurred in the city of Philadelphia over a 5-year period, Wolfgang presents data pertaining to the race, age, and sex of persons charged with homicide, the time and place where the homicides occurred, the methods and weapons used to inflict death, and the relationship between victims and offenders. In our effort to focus upon critical elements of the roles played by women in committing violent crimes we used the findings of Wolfgang's study and Pollak's report as the basis for specific lines of inquiry.

After a preliminary search identified those aspects of criminal roles that could be reliably obtained from prison files, we abstracted this information for each inmate confined in the California Institution for Women (in 1963-64 and in 1968) and in the Minnesota Women's Reformatory (1964-66) for the following offenses:

- Murder:
 - Murder, first
 - Murder, second
 - Voluntary manslaughter
 - Involuntary manslaughter
- Assault:
 - Assault with/without deadly weapon
 - Assault with intent to kill; rob
 - Attempted murder; assault
 - Assault with caustic acid
 - Wife, child beating; mayhem

- Robbery:
 - Robbery, first
 - Robbery, second
 - Attempted robbery
 - Kidnaping for purpose of robbery
 - Assault with intent to rob
- Burglary:
 - Burglary, first
 - Burglary, second
 - Attempted burglary

Table 17.—Psychological disability: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of each offense category]

Psychological disability	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics		All offenders	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
None indicated	53	19	25	22	66	55	62	41	63	53	59	38
Gross references ²	37	46	37	48	30	45	32	45	32	37	33	45
Evidence of psychosis ³	10	35	38	30	4	—	6	14	5	10	8	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(95)	(26)	(24)	(23)	(46)	(11)	(359)	(90)	(177)	(30)	(742)	(190)

¹($\chi^2=38.14, df=8, p<0.01$) contingency coefficient=0.2271.
²($\chi^2=17.06, df=8, p\leq 0.05$) contingency coefficient=0.2942.
³Excludes 89 cases from 1963 and 10 cases from 1968 groups in which no information was available. The total includes 53 inmates whose offense could not be classified in one of these five offender groups (1963, N=44; 1968, N=9).
⁴Antisocial, emotionally unstable, low frustration tolerance, weak superego, character disorder, sociopathy, psychopathy, etc.
⁵Schizoid, paranoid, or manic-depressive.

The reasons for including homicide, assault, and robbery cases in a study of crimes of violence are self-evident. We have, however, included burglary which is not in the "crimes against persons" category. We were interested in the involvement of women in this type of crime because it implies behavior that is atypical, given the stereotypical roles of women in our society. Burglary suggests force in terms of breaking and entering and a burglar runs the risk of personal confrontation with victims should he—or she—be discovered in the course of committing the burglary. Crimes such as forgery, bad-check writing, theft, and narcotics use do not involve behavior that are particularly "unladylike." Other crimes important in typologies of male criminals have so little relevance for women that we did not include them for sheer lack of number. The dozen or so women convicted of auto theft, for example, were generally companions to men who actually stole the vehicles. No women were committed to the California or Minnesota prisons for rape and the several "sex offenders" in the CIW population were involved in secondary roles in these crimes. (In one case the woman had obtained money as a "pimp" for a teenage prostitute and in another case the woman had encouraged the statutory rape of her daughter by her new husband.) Data on the cases of women who were convicted of kidnaping, arson, and criminal abortion were gathered, but the small number and the extremely unusual character of most of these crimes did not warrant their being included in our analysis.

The features of crimes of violence and burglary committed by women presented in this paper are by no means all of the items that a criminologist would want to have available if he wished to construct an adequate picture of the situational complex within which a particular form of criminal activity took place. We have mined from police, court, and prison records and from personal statements made by the offenders themselves those data we considered to be the most reliably and accurately reported in prison files. The best source of detailed data on the circumstances under which any crime occurred is where Wolfgang gathered his data—in the records of the homicide detail in a police department. This discussion is thus limited to aspects of criminal homicide which were related to the roles of the participants in the crime drama. Given these limits in the range of our data the reader should not expect to get a sense of the "character" of these types of criminal activity from reviewing only the tabular material. We have therefore included descriptions of some of the 444 crimes committed by our study population. These descriptions have been grouped into several categories to illustrate the findings of the statistical analysis, to point up some additional features of these crimes and, perhaps most importantly, to show how the features of the crimes that were quantitatively measured mesh together in one criminal action. The descriptions were taken verbatim from the prison records and our editing consists only of deletions of redundant or extraneous statements. In some cases we have used an inmate's statement, in other cases the statements of police officers or excerpts from the transcripts of criminal proceedings.

FINDINGS

We present below a summary of the principal conclusions to be drawn from our effort to answer several very basic questions about the nature of

violent criminal behavior by women. Case descriptions follow the summary and supporting tabular materials. The aspects of violent crimes examined include: whether the women acted alone or with others, who the victims were, where the crimes took place, whether the crimes were premeditated, what weapons were used, whether physical strength was required, what the condition of the victim was at the time of the assault, and what rationale, justification or explanation was given by the women for their crimes.

1. The Criminal Roles of Women

The number of roles women can play in committing crimes of violence and burglary include that of the *conspirator*, who instigates or has knowledge of the crime but who does not participate in committing the criminal act itself; the *accessory*, who plays a secondary role in committing the crime—acting as lookout, driving a getaway car, carrying weapons, tools, or the proceeds of robberies and burglaries; the *partner*, who participates equally in all aspects of the crime; and finally, the woman who acts as the *sole perpetrator* of the crime. Data presented in Table III-1 indicate that most of the women in our study population who committed homicide or assault acted alone, but when they were involved in robberies and burglaries they accompanied someone else. When other persons were involved in homicide and assaults, they were husbands and lovers in about half the cases and friends or acquaintances in the others. In robbery and burglary cases women tended to accompany friends or acquaintances rather than persons intimately related to them.

Table 18.—Offender's role: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Criminal role	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Conspirator	3	5	4	10
Accessory	3	1	23	15
Partner	16	16	57	56
Sole perpetrator	77	75	14	15
No information	1	3	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

Table 19.—Crime partner: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Partner	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Husband/lover ¹	51	53	40	25
Friend/acquaintance	49	47	60	75
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(39)	(17)	(89)	(68)

¹Includes female homosexual intimates.

2. The Victims of Female Offenders

That murder tends to be a family affair has been documented in a number of studies and reports, including the *Uniform Crime Reports*: "The significant fact emerges that most murders are committed by relatives of the victim or persons acquainted with the victim."¹⁰ In 1967 approximately 37 percent of all murders involved a spouse killing a spouse, a parent killing a child, and other family killings, romantic triangles, and lovers' quarrels. Our data on violent crime show that husbands, lovers, or children were the victims in over half of the cases of homicide and in over one-third of the assault cases.

Male adults and female adults were victims in 61 percent and 16 percent, respectively, of the homicide cases; nearly all were friends or acquaintances of the murderer. Assault cases involved strangers and women somewhat more often than in cases of homicide.

Table 20.—Victim: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Victim	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Adult female	16	23	6	5
Adult male	61	48	39	6
Husband/lover	35	19		
Friend/acquaintance	18	13	11	4
Stranger	8	16	28	2
Child	19	17		
Commercial personnel	2	5	47	5
Commercial establishment			6	83
Not known	2	7	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

Table 21.—Locale of offense: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Locale	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Residence of offender and victim	47	39	3	2
Offender's residence	13	11		
Residence of victim (same neighborhood as offender)	2	5	1	6
Offender's neighborhood	6	2	12	8
Nonlocal (i.e., away from offender's neighborhood)	32	43	84	84
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

Robbery victims were generally strangers to the offender. Commercial personnel were the victims in about half of these cases; unknown men (i.e., men not victimized in connection with their employment) constituted an additional 28 percent. Few women were victimized.

By definition burglary is not a crime against a person, hence the concept of "victim" was taken more broadly to include a person's property. Women committed to prison for this offense seldom victimized an individual, instead they stole from commercial establishments.

Given the relationship between female offenders and their victims, the finding that 60 percent of the homicides and 50 percent of the assaults took place in the offender's residence is not surprising. (In most of these cases, it was the victim's home also.) Robbery and burglary victims tended to be strangers, since the great majority of these offenses occurred away from the residence and neighborhood of the offender.

3. Premeditation

We were able to obtain from the prison files of about 70 percent of our study sample some evidence of the degree to which the women consciously and deliberately planned their crimes. Operationalizing the concept of premeditation is no easy task, for the amount of time between the point at which one begins to think about and plan for committing a crime and the time when the criminal act actually occurs, which is necessary to constitute premeditation, is subject to different interpretations by judicial authorities, legal experts, psychiatrists and sociologists. We have tried to avoid the intricacies of resolving such issues as how long a period can one's behavior be said to be the result of "hot blood" and how much activity is required to constitute a deliberately planned robbery or burglary. To do this we have categorized the crimes of our subjects as premeditated *only* when there was a definite statement about a definite plan of action made by the subject or her crime partners, when the crime was one of a series of similar crimes, or when the crime was first-degree murder. In the latter instance we, in effect, accepted the definition of premeditation used by prosecuting attorneys in determining the degree of murder with which the subject was charged. In the case of other offenses this was not a reliable method of establishing premeditation. File data indicated that in some cases the woman was with someone else who actually planned the crime without her knowledge, but she was charged with the offense in the first degree because once the criminal action began she participated actively; in other cases there was evidence in the file of prior planning but perhaps as the result of "plea bargaining" the subject was actually charged with a lesser degree of the crime. In about one-third of the homicide and assault cases in our sample there was not enough information in the prison files to permit us to designate the crime as premeditated or not. For the remaining cases of homicide 21 percent were classified as premeditated; 40 percent as not premeditated. The classifiable assault cases were evenly divided in terms of whether or not premeditation was evident. Robbery and burglary cases gave greater evidence of planning, as might be expected.

Table 22.—Premeditation: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Premeditation	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Yes	21	31	63	78
No	46	31	7	2
Unable to determine . .	33	38	30	20
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

4. The Use of Physical Strength and Agility by Female Offenders

Examining this aspect of criminal conduct posed a serious problem for operational definition. Some physical strength is required to engage in any activity and we chose to rely upon a definition that focused upon gross rather than subtle actions. In the cases of murder and assault, we looked for instances of physical combat in which the female fought or attacked the victim with her fists or with a knife or some other weapon. We thus excluded from the "physical-strength-required" category cases where the woman walked up to or came upon the victim and shot him; cases where death was caused by poison or neglect; robbery cases where the female *herself* did not participate in subduing, beating, tying up or otherwise physically acting against the victim; and burglary cases where the female did not physically force or assist in forcing entry into rooms or buildings. The data in table 23 indicate the use of some physical strength was required in about 4 of 10 murders and 6 of 10 assaults, but in only a small minority of the robbery and burglary cases. The physical strength aspect of female criminality is meaningful only when it is considered with two other classes of data: the use of weapons, and the "condition" of the victim at the time of the crime.

Table 23.—Use of physical strength: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Was physical strength used	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Yes	43	59	22	12
No	51	39	71	74
Unable to determine . .	6	2	7	14
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

5. The Use of Weapons in Assaultive Crimes

The need for women to use physical strength, particularly in the assault cases, is more understandable in the light of the type of weapons that were at hand at the time of the crime. As can be seen in table 24, a knife or some household implement (e.g., kitchen utensils, hand tools, lye, gasoline, bottles, closet pole, steam iron, straight razor, garden hose, woman's shoes) was used

in almost half of the assaults and about one-third of the murder cases. Guns were less frequently used than knives in the assault cases (it may be that since guns are more likely to produce lethal injuries some assaultive acts become homicides). The use of a gun—the great equalizer—by women in assaults, murder, and in about one-third of the robberies, helps to explain why the use of physical strength is not a necessary feature of these crimes. Since burglaries do not involve physical confrontations with victims the extremely limited use of weapons in the crimes is not surprising. Our data also indicate that there were very few cases in which women took weapons on burglaries "just in case" someone discovered the crime in progress. Guns were used in some of the robberies or available in some of the burglaries but the women did not personally carry them.¹¹

Table 24.—Weapons used: Violent offender, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

Weapon used	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Knife or household implement	35	49	6	1
Gun	34	29	35	1
Other*	8	7	6	3
No weapon used by subject	23	15	53	95
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

*Other: Clubbing instruments other than household articles—pipe, rocks, baseball bat; caustic chemicals not normally found in homes; special-purpose tools such as surgical instruments.

Although one might assume that an unarmed woman is unable to physically harm a healthy, adult male, in our study population more than half the women's victims were adult males. And, in fact, an examination of the victim's "condition" at the time of assault substantiates this assumption. Victims were incapacitated in some way—either ill, drunk, off-guard, or asleep—in 42 percent of the homicides, 38 percent of the assaults, and 44 percent of the robberies. Furthermore, the female's role in cases of adult male robberies should be viewed in connection with the role played by male partners. Burglaries were not committed against persons in the sense of assaultive crimes and were excluded from analysis for this item.

Table 25.—Victim's condition at the time of the crime:
Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined
[In percent of offense category]

"Condition" of victim	Homicide	Assault	Robbery
Helpless (child)	19	19	
Ill, drunk, off-guard asleep, infirm (adult)	42	38	44
Not incapacitated (adult)	28	28	44
No information	11	17	12
Total	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)

6. Offender's Rationale

Twenty-two percent of the women who committed homicide and 19 percent of those who committed assault claimed self-defense or the defense of others as the rationale for their crimes. Of the homicide cases only 2 percent said the victim "deserved it" and 17 percent said that the crime was accidental compared with 13 percent and 8 percent in these categories for assault offenders. Drunkenness accounted for 5 percent of the rationale in homicide cases and 11 percent in cases of assault. Innocence (i.e., nonguilt) was asserted by 13 percent and by 10 percent of those women who committed homicide and assault. There was not enough information to determine how the offender characterized her action in 21 percent of the homicides and in 13 percent of the assault cases.

Table 26.—Rationale for commission of the crime:
Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups combined

[In percent of offense category]

Offender's rationale	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Burglary
Offender claims innocence-framed . . .	13	10	16	9
Offender claims justifiable action	24	31	1	3
Victim deserved it	2	12	1	3
Self-defense, or defense of others	22	19	—	—
Offender claims extenuating circumstances	34	36	46	35
Drunk	5	11	7	10
Accidental	17	8	1	—
Others to blame	3	6	11	5
Psychological reasons	9	9	12	3
Economic reasons	—	2	15	17
Multiple reasons or other reasons	8	10	6	9
No information	21	13	31	44
Total	100	100	100	100
N	(179)	(80)	(105)	(80)

It was even more difficult to determine the rationale of robbery and burglary offenders; 31 percent and 44 percent, respectively, of these cases included no information pertaining to the offender's rationale. Such information as there was suggested that motives for robbery were seldom expressed in terms of personal assault; rather economic and psychological reasons were cited in 28 percent of these cases. Sixteen percent claimed they had been "framed" and 11 percent blamed others for getting them involved in the robberies. Sixteen percent of the burglary offenders indicated that the rationale for their crime was based upon economic factors, while 10 percent claimed drunkenness. These findings should be regarded only as suggestive, due to the large "No-Response" category.

The data presented above deal with those aspects of violent crime by women which are amenable to quantitative analysis. At best, this is a beginning step to far more detailed statistical studies of the nature of criminal activity. Until those additional steps are taken we feel that the reader can gain

some sense of the nature of the violent criminal behavior of women by reading descriptions of their crimes. In the pages that follow we have provided a representative sample of the reports of robberies, burglaries, assaults, and homicides committed by women in our study group.

Descriptive Accounts of Robberies and Burglaries by Women

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the robberies and burglaries committed by or involving the women in our study group is that most of them were so badly planned. This seems to be because these crimes often resulted from a spur-of-the-moment suggestion made by one of a group of three or four persons that the group embark immediately to rob or burglarize some "easy touch." The risks taken were great and the possible financial rewards small. Our data clearly indicate that the women tended to play secondary roles in these hastily contrived schemes. The following robbery cases illustrate these points:

Offense: Robbery, 1st degree

The defendant and two male accomplices robbed the victim (male stranger) of \$350. They had been drinking all day, moving from bar to bar, and when they realized that the man they had met in a bar [the victim] was carrying a large sum of money with him, they got into the car, and drove out to a deserted country road. The two male co-defendants got out of the car, and the defendant enticed the victim to get out also. When the victim left the car, the two male defendants beat him up while the defendant stood by the car watching. The victim fell to the ground and one of the men took his billfold and gave it to the defendant. The three left him behind on the ground and drove off in his car. The defendant claimed that she met the two accomplices on the three or four days prior to the incident. They gave her a ride home and met her the next day at a bar. They spent the entire day drinking. She had intimate relations with one of the co-defendants and continued doing so for the next few days. They went to a bar and met the victim. She thought that one of the co-defendants had known him before. The defendant claims that there was absolutely no plan to rob the victim. However, one of the co-defendants said that they had discussed it while waiting for the victim as he bought some liquor in a store the day of the offense.

Offense: Accessory after Robbery

... four farm laborers were robbed and beaten in their bunkhouse on a range located in a remote area, far off main roads . . . the robbers wore masks and carried a shotgun and two pistols . . . within three hours after the crime, the three men were arrested [in a stolen car]. The car was being driven [by subject] . . . In the trunk [was] a 12 gauge shotgun. [Subject] had about half of the total (of money allegedly stolen).

Subject had prostituted in area of farm laborers and knew where the men lived and that they were getting seasons-end wages. "The three male robbers must have had a guide" [to find bunkhouse in isolated area at 3 a.m.]. Robbers got victims to open bunkhouse door by saying, "open the door, we have a woman for you guys." Subject helped plan the robberies, made the masks and drove the getaway car.

Offense: Attempt To Commit Robbery 1st and Robbery 1st degree

In two separate cars, the defendant and her husband, and the defendant's mother and father-in-law drove to a market. While the women waited in the cars, the men entered the market, each being armed and disguised. They announced their intention to rob the market . . . a policeman, on duty in the store, fired at the men who returned his fire and fled. The defendant's father-in-law collapsed at the car and died . . . the defendant fled to Arizona where she was arrested.

Another robbery occurred previously . . . the defendant's husband held up a gas station and ran to a waiting car, driven by the defendant's father-in-law. The defendant and her mother were waiting in a car nearby. "My father-in-law would just stop

someplace and give mother and I orders and we'd better do them or else . . . I was scared . . . I didn't know what maybe he'd hurt mother, my son, or even my husband, his own son . . ."

Offense: Robbery, 1st degree

The two co-defendants, a male friend and the husband of the defendant, entered a market by gaining entrance through a roof vent . . . The two co-defendants, armed with pistols, forced the manager of the store to open the safe . . . monies from the wallets of the employees were also taken . . . the co-defendants were picked up at a nearby location by the defendant, who was driving the get-away car . . .

Offense: Robbery

The defendant took a gold diamond stick pin worth about \$300 from an 81-year-old man. The victim said that he warned the defendant not to take the pin, but she did anyway. The robbery took place in the victim's home. She had met him drinking in a bar. The male co-defendant, her boyfriend, had suggested that she get friendly with the victim, and take the pin, which she did. Defendant was also charged with obscene literature, and in connection with this, a 71-year-old man and the defendant took pictures of each other in a cemetery and cornfield. In the pictures, the subject was nude or near it. He had the film developed and tried to sell it [prints] in and around [town] where the film was taken. The defendant admitted the offense, but says that her crime was caused by drinking. She and this man had gotten together, and "he got me all drunk up and that's when it happened about me stealing. I honestly don't think I would have done it otherwise." She planned to take the stick pin and make a wedding ring out of it. She admits to having intercourse with both the 71-year-old man who took the photographs of her, and the 81-year-old man from whom she took the pin. . . . She made the comment that she considers her downfall to be too much drinking and running around with a wild crowd.

A wide variety of items were taken in the burglaries in which our study subjects were involved. In one case the "take" consisted of \$5-\$6 in pennies, 25 packs of cigarettes, sandwiches, cookies, potato chips, four cigarette lighters, and lighter fluid. In another case the subject, a female companion and two male companions took not only \$9 in cash from a bakery but *also* some cakes and rolls. The casual basis under which these criminal activities proceeded and the pathetic rewards are underscored in the following:

Offense: Burglary, 3d degree

In the early morning the defendant, with three accomplices, all male, entered a country club and took liquor, cigarettes, and an electric razor. Entry was made by removing a screen and breaking a window through which one of the male accomplices crawled to open the front door, thereby enabling the others to enter.

"I met one of the male defendants in his home Monday night (day prior to the burglary), and we started walking toward the bridge. We had been dating for some time. While walking we encountered . . . who talked with the one accompanying the subject. Not until then was I informed of their plan to burglarize the club. We all decided to walk out to the club and look the situation over, and hid in the nearby bushes until the club members left. At about 1:00 a.m. . . . tore off the screen, another crawled in the broken window, which he smashed with an empty pop case, and opened the front door for us. I went in and stood by the door as a lookout. While I saw the others carry out the cases of liquor and look for money, I know I didn't. I know something about the law and have read up on it. Therefore, I knew that if I did not touch any of the stolen goods, it was unlikely that I would be charged with felony. Then . . . hid the liquor in the bushes, gave . . . some money, and they split up. I'm not sure if the money given to my boyfriend was stolen. My boyfriend and I then went back to town and slept in a used car lot because my folks had locked me out of the house. I was arrested that same afternoon and questioned by the police. I didn't expect to get by with it, but I didn't worry about it either because I figured out just how much I could get away with."

Offense: Burglary, 1st degree

Probation was revoked because the defendant made little effort to make restitution for her offense. Also, the defendant has been extremely lax in reporting to the Probation Officer.

The defendant and co-defendant, a 14-year-old male, gained entry to a private home by breaking a rear bedroom window. Clothing, jewelry and toys were taken, a pan of roast beef was partially eaten and left inside the house and a partially consumed ham salad was left outside. . . .

Offense: Burglary

The defendant and a male accomplice broke into an establishment, stole four plastic bags containing 1000 Beatle buttons and 1000 JFK rings. She committed the burglary while her male friend waited outside. The offense came to the attention of the police department when they received a report of prowlers in the vicinity, and upon investigating, they found a window had been broken, and were advised by witnesses that a woman had been seen crawling through the window as the man waited outside. A description of the couple was obtained, and it was ascertained they'd fled on foot. The subject and her friend were apprehended a short time later by a squad car in the vicinity. When questioned initially, she denied the offense, but later admitted the breaking in, after the male friend had related the details to the authorities. He said that they had been walking on the evening of the offense, after leaving a party, and had noticed a hole in the window of the store. Seeing the hole, subject had advised him that she was going to rob the place. Then she put her coat over her hand, broke out several pieces of glass, further enlarging the hole to allow her entrance. He wanted no part of it. He waited outside while she entered the building. She came out carrying several plastic bags and he proceeded with her to the home of his sister, where they left the stolen merchandise. They were apprehended shortly after leaving the sister's home. No charge was filed against him. The subject said that during the course of the evening, she had been playing Bingo, and had been drinking excessively. She saw the broken window, and decided to go through it, [even though] all her companions "chickened out" and fled. She attempted to locate the cash register, but saw someone coming down the street, became frightened, grabbed the bags of Kennedy rings and Beatle buttons, crawled out of the window, and she and the man ran down the alley. She accepts full responsibility for the offense, and has shown remorse. She states that she would not have done such a thing if she hadn't been drinking.

Offense: Burglary, 3d degree

. . . Subject stated that on the night of the offense, she and her friend were at his parents' home with other friends. It was suggested that they go out for a ride, and in the course of so doing, stopped the car, and the group decided that a house at the end of the road looked deserted, and that they ought to go and look it over. She said that she could tell immediately that someone lived there, though she hollered "anybody home?" Defendant related that she and her friend took a box, which she later found was full of jewelry, and because she liked old things she took two vases and some handkerchiefs out of the dresser drawer. She claims she left the house, went back to the car, and returned to his home to show the goods to their friends. Her only reason for taking the things was her liking for old things. At the time, she expressed no remorse for the offense, or even concern for the loss incurred by victim.

Offense: Burglary, 3d degree

. . . Subject stated that on the night of the offense, she and two male friends, Frank and Bill, had been drinking in the . . . Bar . . . She said they had left there at closing time, and while walking down the street, the man she calls "Bill" pointed out a liquor store and said he would like to have some more whiskey. She claims that when she asked how he would get it, he replied, "Here is a brick." The subject and Frank tried to talk her out of it, but when unable to do so, left her and walked down the street. She then took the brick, threw it at the window, crawled into the store, and took two or three bottles of whiskey, in addition to some money from an unlocked cash register. She then crawled back out of the window and went to the back of the building where Bill was. She gave him some whiskey, and while walking down the street, came upon Frank and gave him a

bottle of whiskey. Bill then reappeared and suggested they go back for more, so the two of them again crawled through the window and removed more liquor. Subject says that when she crawled out of the window she saw a taxi cab standing in front of the building. The driver told her to get in. She refused, and instead walked down the street with Bill. All of a sudden he disappeared into an empty lot, so she kept on walking. Within minutes after that she was stopped by the police officers.

Offense: Burglary, 2d degree

The police were notified, by a woman, who claimed that she heard glass breaking at a gas station. The police checked the gas station and were unable to find anyone [at first]. A few minutes later the defendant came out of hiding, surrendered herself to the police, and returned the \$12.72 taken from the cash drawer of the service station. Defendant states she entered the gas station office by breaking a window with a stick. She then opened the cash drawer which was unlocked and took the money out of it. She was inside the building when the police came and then hid. After remaining hidden for a short time she realized that she would be caught and surrendered herself. Defendant stated she can give no logical reason for committing this offense, other than she had been drinking quite heavily several hours prior to the offense.

Offense: Burglary, 1st degree

Subject . . . had had three acts of sexual intercourse with Mr. X, and that for the third act, Mr. X gave her a check for \$5.00. She states the check bounced twice after she had given it to her landlady . . . Mr. X refused to make it good. She confronted him in his apartment and when he refused . . . she was quite angry and she left the latch of a window open and later returned with the co-defendant [male] to take the articles [\$600 worth]. She states that she actually did this more for revenge as she was so angry with him.

These descriptions of burglaries are neither atypical in terms of the roles women played, nor in the amount or variety of "loot." Simply stated, there is very little evidence that female burglars qualify as "master criminals." It may well be, of course, that the women who plan crimes carefully are not caught. A prison sample of criminals—male and female—is by definition more likely to include the foolish, inept, careless burglar than the careful, professional racketeer, or white-collar criminal. We do not mean to suggest that we found no reports of systematically planned robberies or burglaries, nor do we mean to suggest that none of the women played aggressive roles in the robberies or burglaries in which they were involved, but these cases were rare. The following, for example, represent the most sophisticated burglaries involving our study subjects:

Offense: Burglary, 2d degree

Defendant burglarized two houses, getting a mink coat worth \$3,000 and some jewelry in one house and \$5,100 worth of jewelry from the second. She knew both homes would be unoccupied when the burglaries occurred as both victims were friends of her employer [subject worked as a domestic]. Defendant admits drinking prior to both offenses: "The liquor took over on me." Unable to explain her motivation as she did not need the items, "Loneliness," she explains, "could have been a possible factor in that when I was alone too much, I just got all balled up." Subject had babysat at homes of both victims.

Offense: Burglary, 2d degree

The defendant, her common-law husband, and a male friend of her common-law husband were arrested for speeding on the morning of the burglary. The police observed burglary tools on the floor of the car and questioned the occupants, whereby one of the co-defendants admitted they had broken into the car.

The two co-defendants had entered the market through the roof by drilling a hole and then cutting a larger one with a saw. They then let the defendant enter through a side door and all three ransacked the office. They found silver dollars, change and two guns. The guns were kept close by while the safe was being cut open and left in the building when the culprits departed. . . . Each took turns as lookout.

One of the co-defendants stated that the three of them committed numerous [20] burglaries throughout California. Also the defendant's common-law husband said she was the brains behind the burglaries; often driving the car, acting as lookout and entering the buildings. . . . The police believe the defendant was the brains of the group, adding that the present offense was a professional job as evidenced by the know-how used on opening the safes, the professional tools, etc.

Offense: Burglary, 2d degree and possession of machine gun

The co-defendants, one of whom is the defendant's husband, the other a friend, burglarized a laundry, at which time they broke open a safe and removed the money chest which was in said safe. The defendant was in the car one block away. The money chest was found in the ocean. There were several film negatives in it showing the co-defendants. The finished photos were shown to police and the co-defendants were later identified. . . . The defendants were also found to be responsible for three other burglaries. An automatic machine gun was found and defendant and co-defendants were charged with illegal possession.

Offense: Burglary

Subject and female partner caught by police. One in car—another approaching car—both picked up as result of a call reporting a suspicious person at door.

In gutter under passenger door, officers found flashlight and pair of black ladies gloves. In car, they found black and red journal containing numerous names and addresses, including one from which report was made. Defendants [stated that] in July 1966 they began burglarizing. Picked victims from death and society columns of local newspapers. Entered through unlocked windows and sometimes by prying doors open. Police went to defendants' home and found [enough] stolen items [to fill four police cars].

Victim one: not a planned burglary. Defendants intended to burglarize residence next door. They had walked to rear of address with intention of going over wall and entering residence. They observed car, found revolver, food, tool box, and \$60.

Victim two: had left home on weekend trip. Defendants entered through unlocked rear window, removed jewelry, clothing, antiques.

Victim three: out of state. Through unlocked rear door [defendants] removed jewelry, furs, silver and auto key.

Victim four: on vacation. [Defendants] pushed open sliding glass window, safe was removed [along with] over \$130,000 in stocks and securities and jewelry. [Defendants] transported safe to home. Took all items home and sold two or three small silver candle holders and pawned some jewelry in Las Vegas.

[Defendants] would check obituary columns and society pages that listed funerals or vacations then record the names in book. Telephone book would be checked and telephone call made. If there was an answer, residence would not be burglarized. Code was used after each name: "V" for vacant, "Dec." for deceased, "No ans." for no answer, "A" for answer. If no answer was received location was checked out. Burglary usually occurred between midnight and 4 a.m.

[Defendants] admitted committing approximately 30 to 40 burglaries and maybe more. Thirty-one victims were able to claim property that was returned.

Even in several of these cases where some planning and "professional" skill was involved and where the proceeds of the burglaries were more substantial, the general points about the character of female property crimes—carelessness and participation that was consistent with a "feminine" role—still apply. In the first case, for example, the risk of being identified was high because the defendant was known to the victims and, in addition, she had a prison record

for burglary. This effort at burglary was hardly better than an earlier venture in which she stole a \$3,000 ring from her employer and then turned the ring over to a "fence" for \$150.

In the second case the woman who was reputed to be the "brains" of the burglary ring did not climb up to the roof of the building or help force an opening for entry; rather her confederates did the physical labor and then opened the door for her to enter.

In the third case, criminal sophistication was really only demonstrated by the male participants. Even then the fact that the trio left the negatives from photos of themselves in the abandoned money chest suggests a certain degree of carelessness that would not be expected of a truly professional burglary troupe.

Only the last case seems to meet minimal standards of care, planning and creativity in criminal enterprise. *This was the only such case among the burglaries we examined.*

Robbery Involving Physical Assaults on Victims

Fewer than five percent of the cases of robberies we examined involved a physical assault upon the victim. One case involved three homosexual women, with the leader of the trio a "butch" (a label given to a woman who plays the masculine homosexual role). In this case the aggressive behavior of the leader may be seen as an effort to emulate the role of a male robber. The other two cases of assaultive robberies should be regarded as exceptions to our general propositions about the roles played by female robbers.

Offense: Robbery, 1st degree

The victim stated the following: the defendant and co-defendant, No. 1 and co-defendant No. 2 came to the victim's home and requested the use of the telephone saying that their vehicle had broken down . . . once inside co-defendant No. 1 pulled a gun and told one of the victims to sit in a chair . . . the victim was told to call her sister from the kitchen . . . when the latter entered the room, the defendant and co-defendant No. 1 and No. 2 threatened to choke both of the victims and kicked one of the sisters on the leg and in the stomach . . . co-defendant No. 1 then ordered the defendant to tie both of the victims up and to go through the house to see what she could get. Both victims had their wrists bound by a woman's silk hose, arms placed behind their backs . . . one of the victims stated that she and her sister had been threatened with a knife at their throats. . . . The defendant and the co-defendants left after ransacking the house. The victims, aged 68 and 65, are sisters. Money and a watch were taken. The defendant and her two female co-defendants met in a bar, and knew each other less than a month prior to the offense. All three are admitted homosexuals and were living together.

In addition to the above offense, the defendant and co-defendant No. 2 committed two motel robberies and the defendant and co-defendants stole a car on the way to the above victims' house.

Defendant stated: "I was with the co-defendants on the night preceding the robbery. We were out drinking at a bar and decided to do something exciting . . . we decided to ride to . . . to see if we could pick up some money . . . we took a friend's car but it wasn't running well so we got off the freeway and stole a car, switched license plates with another car and proceeded . . . we drove to the home of the victims (the defendant stated it was she who pointed out the house as she had noticed while attending school that there seemed to be only women around the place)."

Offense: Robbery

Defendant took wallets from the two men at gunpoint at a laundromat. This action was repeated several times to obtain money to buy drugs. One time defendant hit an

older woman over the head numerous times with a blackjack in a department store restroom in order to get her purse.

Offense: Kidnaping with intent of committing robbery and bodily harm—2 counts

Subject, her husband and a friend in a borrowed car, bought beer and had guns in their possession. They picked up a hitchhiker. Subject, the driver. Victim (A) hit on head by gun by friend of subject. Victim, at direction of friend and subject was forced to strip off his clothes. His money, 15 cents, was taken from him. Subject and friend wielded guns, which were both loaded. Victim was told to make a break for it. As he did so, jumping off a 43 foot cliff, he was shot in the back. The bullet lodged in his spine and caused permanent paralysis. The three, with subject's husband driving, then drove off until they met a car wherein a man was sleeping. Friend and subject approached victim (B)'s car. Subject stuck her gun in his neck and friend hit victim over the head with his gun. Victim forced to strip, robbed of \$41. He was then told to make a break for it and started to run for a clump of trees. Husband fired a shot but missed. Subject fired a shot which struck victim . . . then she went up to victim and fired three more shots into his body. His watch was taken.

Subject referred to by prosecuting attorney as "one of the most depraved, cruel, cold-hearted females that ever existed. From the evidence . . . it is very apparent that [subject] was the instigator and leader of this entire escapade . . . *It was due to her being a young woman that she was not actually sentenced to death.* [Italic ours]

Descriptive Account of Assaults and Homicides by Women^{1 2}

Unlike the robberies and burglaries in which women acted in the company of others, most of the homicides and assaults were the actions of a solitary offender. Also as indicated earlier, slightly more than half of the homicide victims were husbands or lovers (35 percent) and children (19 percent); only 10 percent did not know the victim prior to the crime. Assaults also involved intimates, but to a lesser degree. Strangers accounted for somewhat more than one-fourth of the assault victims, and women were somewhat more likely to have been the victim of an assault than a homicide. The similarities, as well as the differences between groups of women committed for homicide and assault, may be seen in the following cases, but it should be emphasized that the distinction between homicide and assault is often a fine one: whether the victim lives or dies. Wolfgang points out in *Studies in Criminal Homicides* that victims of assaults have a greater chance of survival today than they had a generation ago due to technological achievements such as improved communications to report injuries, rapid transportation to medical facilities, and advances in medical science.

Subcultural Violence

These cases fall into a category that Wolfgang and others have called "subcultural violence." Wolfgang has noted that studies of homicide and assault in this country and abroad consistently report that these offenses are committed by persons in the lowest socioeconomic class whose values allow, or at least tolerate, interpersonal violence.

When homicide is committed by members of the middle and upper social classes, there appears to be a high likelihood of major psychopathology or of planned, more "rational" (or rationalized)

behavior. This, the fact that they commit an act of willful murder, which is in diametric opposition to the set of values embraced by the dominant social class establishment of which they are a part, often means that these persons are suffering severely from an emotional crisis of profound proportions. Or they have been able . . . to meditate and mediate with their own internalized value system until they can conceive of the murder act without the consequence of an overburdening guilt and thereby justify their performing the deed. This self-justificatory behavior undoubtedly requires of the actor considerable time and much introspective wrestling in order to remain within, yet contradict his supportive value system . . .

. . . our thesis contains principally the notion that the man from a culture value system that denounces the use of interpersonal violence will be restrained from using violence because of his positive perspective that conforms to his value system, not because of a negation of it.

The absence of that kind of value system is hardly likely to be a vacuous neutrality regarding violence. Instead, it is replaced by a value system that views violence as tolerable, expected, or required. As we approach that part of the cultural continuum where violence is a requisite response, we also enter a subculture where physically aggressive action quickly and readily can bleed into aggressive crime. The man from this culture area is more likely to use violence, similarly because of a positive perspective that requires conforming to his value system. Restraint from using violence may be a frustrating, ego-deflating, even guilt-ridden experience. Questions of the risks of being apprehended and the distant, abstract notion of the threat of punishment are almost irrelevant to he who acts with quick, yet socially ingrained aggressivity, neither reasoning nor time for it are at his disposal.¹³

The first account below represents the kind of subcultural violence in which assaults are provoked by a barroom or heavy drinking situation. Also in this group are altercations between prostitutes, between prostitutes and pimps, or between prostitutes and customers. Often the precipitating incident is a disparaging remark or an "offensive" gesture.

Of particular note in these assaults is the number of cases in which the woman carried a weapon such as a knife or razor blade for "protection." The availability of weapons suggests something about problems the women encountered in their work as "hustlers," or waitresses, or in their drinking experiences with men—friends or strangers.

Offense: Assault With Deadly Weapon With Intent To Commit Mayhem

Following drinking and a cafe argument with the victim [male], during which he allegedly slapped her, defendant slashed victim across genitals and thigh. Victim testified he did not know defendant's name, that she slapped him and invited him outside to fight. He remained drinking coffee. Defendant went outside, returned and said, "I will cut your balls off," and then she hit him cutting him with the razor. Defendant immediately left scene and victim was hospitalized for four days.

Defendant claims victim called her dirty names and attempted to drink her whisky. She snatched glass out of his hand; he slapped her and they fought; she claims he knocked her down so she cut him in self-defense. Subject says she ran after cutting victim because she was afraid of him as he was an ex-prize fighter. Subject carried the razor in her bra. Usually carried a penknife for her own protection. Frequents bars where fights occur regularly.

Subject has many drunk arrests and ADW charges on *separate* occasions for use of ice pick, penknife, broken beer bottle, snap-blade knife, twin-blade-knife, knife, razor, gun, knife, butcher knife, knife. [Subject has record of] 48 arrests, including 11 assaults.

Offense: Mayhem

Victim, his wife, subject and her husband and a male friend were all drinking in victim's home. All parties knew each other. A fight ensued during which time subject's husband took \$20 from victim's pocket and defendant [subject] took out a straight-edge razor and cut off the tip of victim's nose. Subject says she was drunk, denied carrying razor or cutting victim. [Subject had a record of] 61 arrests for drunkenness [and] prostitution.

Offense: Voluntary Manslaughter

The defendant and victim were both prostitutes who worked for a time for the same pimp. . . . The two got into an argument in a bar over the victim's superiority . . . they started at each other and the manager of the hotel bar grabbed the defendant and took her to the coffee shop to calm her down . . . she started to leave after having some coffee and passed by the victim in the bar . . . the latter reached towards her with one hand, and as she did the defendant struck her with a knife six times. . . . The victim ran out of the back door and met two friends, whom she'd talked to earlier in the bar, and all three went to her house. . . . She surrendered herself to the police.

(According to subject): "There was a girl that was aggravating me for a long time . . . she came at me with something that flashed . . . all I could think of was protecting myself."

Offense: Manslaughter

The female victim was fatally stabbed to death by defendant. . . . Both the defendant and the victim were in a bar where they exchanged some words, apparently about a mutual male acquaintance. Defendant then left the bar and shortly thereafter re-entered, having changed her clothes. Subsequently the defendant stabbed the victim. At the time of her arrest defendant claimed that the victim had struck her first with a beer bottle and that after this attack, defendant removed a paring knife from her brassiere and struck the victim an unknown number of times.

Defendant states she went to the bar to avoid a quarrel with her husband. While at the bar she had a couple of beers and saw a male friend who in turn told her that his lady friend [referring to the victim] was there so he could not talk to her. When she got up to leave, the victim met her in the middle of the floor of the place and called her a "bitch." Defendant called the victim a smart "bitch" . . . Defendant left the bar, changed to her working clothing and returned to the bar to get a ride from a friend up to her girl friend's house. As defendant walked through the bar, the victim was sitting on a bar stool . . . as defendant walked by, the victim hit her on the head with a beer bottle. This stunned defendant, then she claims the victim continued hitting her and this is when defendant tried to defend herself, bringing out the knife and stabbing victim. She [defendant] went outside to wait for the police.

Defendant's arrest record shows four previous arrests for violent attacks. Two arrests involved fights with her husband; once she threw an ash tray and cut him; another time she chased him with an ice pick. The other arrests involved attacks on bar patrons; one time she cut a man with a beer bottle and the second time she stabbed a man with a knife.

Offense: Assault With Deadly Weapon

Subject and boyfriend in cafe, subject had one-half quart of beer and one-half pint of whiskey in approximately one hour. Alleges boyfriend had a gun, he showed it to subject who said, "this is cute," and stuck gun inside her dress. They went into different cafes. A man asked subject to dance and "kept on mess with me." Subject decided to leave to find boyfriend and outside cafe, on sidewalk, alleges man grabbed her arm, that she pulled the gun out to scare him and it went off.

When arrested, the defendant had a very strong smell of alcohol about her, her clothes were mussed and unbuttoned from the waist up. Investigator in this case

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indicated that this shooting occurred as victim came out of the cafe and defendant accidentally stepped on his foot. The victim apparently asked the defendant to apologize to which she replied, "apologize, hell, I'll shoot you."

Offense: Manslaughter

Evidence indicates [defendant], who undoubtedly made her living as a prostitute, rolled victim of \$90 and when he sought to reclaim the money she cut him in seven places and as a result of this he died.

Subject was observed to take a snap blade knife and stab at victim. He resisted, knocked the knife out of her hand and hit her with an empty wine bottle. She went into her bag and grabbed a pair of scissors which she dropped, went over to another woman and told her she wanted her knife which was given her and she then followed the victim who was staggering down the street, apparently drunk. He turned around and threw an empty whiskey bottle at her and it hit her. They struggled again and victim finally went down on the ground with the defendant on top of him stabbing him. She continued to stab him until somebody came up with a fire extinguisher and put it in her face.

[Subject] claims victim wanted to go to bed with her and she refused. He hit her with a bottle. She stated that the knife was his—they tussled for the knife. She didn't remember cutting him. Blames panic and fear for what happened.

While on parole for above offense subject charged with assault with deadly weapon. She stabbed a woman with whom she had a few words. The woman accidentally bumped into a man the subject was talking to—subject pushed the victim out of store and stabbed her on the neck and arms, 42 stitches necessary. Four other assaults with deadly weapon charges.

Domestic Violence I

This group of violent crimes relate to deteriorated marriages, threatened divorces, infidelity, love triangles, and to assaults upon children. In Part II of "Domestic Violence" we shall deal with cases involving *repeated* acts of violence directed toward child victims. In both groups some violent crimes occurred on a spur-of-the-moment basis and others were deliberately planned. The violence we are discussing here is often what Conrad calls "situational" violence.¹⁴

Almost always when violence is used to settle a personal problem, the problem has been large enough to distort the individual's judgment. He has been enraged by frustration, humiliated by his inability to arrive at a reasonable understanding with everybody else concerned or his very livelihood has been put in jeopardy. Most such situations involve interpersonal relationships of a very close quality in which passions are engaged and the tolerance of the individual to rejection or humiliation has been reduced.

It is worth pointing out again that in some of these cases the difference between a prison sentence for assault and a prison sentence for murder was a fortuitous circumstance such as the woman's poor aim, the fact that medical attention was quickly given to the victim or that others intervened before further injury could be done to the victim. The case below is such an instance.

Offense: Assault, 1st degree

The defendant is charged with assaulting her husband by shooting him seven times with a .22 caliber pistol which she had purchased that day. Her husband was divorcing her, and claiming in the divorce papers that he would get all of the property they owned. She was very upset, and went to a hardware store to buy a pistol. After her husband came home, she said she wanted to talk to him about the divorce. He said she should talk to his attorney about it. She reached for the gun and started shooting. Nine bullets were discharged from the gun. He ran to the back steps and yelled for help. They had struggled for the gun; he was able to take it away from her. She was not able to get it back in order to shoot herself. She said that she wanted to kill him first, and then shoot herself, but it just didn't work out that way.

Offense: Manslaughter

The police responded to a neighbor's call of a "man on fire." On arrival the police interviewed the victim and when asked, "Who did it?" he replied, "[the defendant] did it." Due to extreme shock and injury the victim was taken to the hospital where he died.

The defendant and victim had been living as man and wife, and on the date of the offense they had consumed excessive amounts of alcohol, had become involved in an argument, and shortly prior to the time of the offense, the defendant said that the victim struck her and then defendant left the cabin . . . the defendant then obtained a can of gas from outside the cabin, and waited for the victim to come out. In a few minutes the victim did come out, and at this time she poured the gas over him, struck a match, and set him on fire. The defendant later stated that she did not recall any of the events that occurred following the time when she was struck by the victim. . . .

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

Police were called to the defendant's residence by the defendant, and they found the victim dead and that the defendant had shot herself. . . . The defendant told police she had known the victim for six months and had cohabited with him most of the time . . . they had been arguing lately because she was several months pregnant by him and she wanted marriage. . . . She had purchased a gun a few days prior to the shooting with the thought in mind of shooting herself. . . . The morning of the offense there was an argument . . . the defendant and the victim had been separated and the former pleaded for reconciliation . . . the defendant got the gun from the closet and shot the victim once . . . she then turned the gun upon herself and fired. . . .

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

The defendant killed her husband by stabbing him in the heart with a paring knife. . . . After dinner they watched television with the victim saying he wanted to see the Kennedy programs. Defendant objected to political programs and after some bickering the victim called his mother and complained that defendant was a Republican and that all Republicans should be killed. The mother told him to forget it and leave the house. Defendant then unsuccessfully attempted to call the mother, noticed the victim sitting on a stool in the kitchen and had words with him, the nature of which she did not recall . . . her next recollection was the striking of him in the shoulder area, with the victim [crying] "You've killed me." She then called her son, and through him police were called. The victim was dead on arrival at the hospital.

The landlady informed the police that the defendant had repeatedly, at least fifteen times, stated that "some day I'm going to kill that son-of-a-bitch," meaning the victim. The defendant's mother-in-law reported that the couple argued constantly during their six months of marriage. The victim's sister and the victim's friend both stated that they heard previous deadly threats by the defendant and against the victim.

The defendant said the victim would slam her around, and that they argued often, especially after they'd been drinking . . . she claimed she knew enough not to argue with the victim when he was drunk, as he was at that time. She thought he was picking an argument with her so she tried to get out of the way. . . . She denied making threats against him as stated by witnesses.

*Offense: Murder, 1st degree*¹⁵

After years of fighting, separations and alleged abuse by her husband, the subject "had enough" and when he returned home after a row, she shot and killed him.

Statement of son 12 years old: "On this date I got up at about 7 a.m. . . . and my father left for work soon afterwards. [A man] came to the house and he had a quart of whiskey. My mother and he had several drinks together. . . . In the afternoon two men came to the house. I do not know who they were, but one of the men limped, and they had a gallon of wine. They came back with some groceries and some more wine; and then my dad came home. I was watching television and the program was "My Friend Flicka" and I think that program comes on about 6 p.m. My mother and dad were arguing and he slapped her. He told her to get her things together, and get the hell out by tomorrow morning. Dad then told me that there was plenty to eat in the house and that he would come back to get me. I thought he was going to walk to [town]. Mother then got very mad, cursing him and kicking the TV set. She knocked books and things that were on top of it on the floor. Dad came around to hit her with his fists. I had asked Mother not to kick the television as I had a program on. Dad then went out the side door of the front room, and mother went to the bedroom and got the rifle. I took all the shells away from her except the one that she had in the chamber. I asked her to give it to me and she told me not to do that. I thought that she would go to sleep and I know that she would have to go to sleep sometime and then I would get the rifle. I hid 18 shells. Mother said that she was going to sit there if she had to wait for a month and that when he came in she was going to shoot him—in the guts. About half-an-hour passed and Dad came back. Mother was sitting in the dining room off of the kitchen in a chair and as he came in the door, she pointed the rifle at him and pulled the trigger. Dad had reached for the rifle, and he nearly grabbed ahold of it. The [male visitor] fell down on his knees, for he was afraid of being hit by a bullet and when Dad fell he fell over the top of the man that was kneeling. Mother then laid the gun down and she hunted for a shoe that was missing off her foot. I went into the bedroom and tried to wake up the man that had gone to sleep. I shook him, told him that my father had just been shot and to please take me to [town]—as I didn't want to stay there anymore."

Most homicides and assaults involving women assailants occur suddenly, in the context of marital squabbles, street or barroom altercations, or interpersonal conflicts associated with the consumption of large amounts of alcohol.

The woman who kills deliberately, after carefully planning her crime, is rare, although the newscopy these crimes generate when they do occur may contribute to the stereotype of the female murderer as more diabolical than her male counterpart. There were only ten cases in our study population of a planned and deliberate killing of an adult in which the female offender was *not* described by one or more psychiatrists as insane or suffering from severe psychological disability. The accounts that follow are examples of premeditated murder arising out of domestic situations.

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

M. worked as a hired man on the P.S. farm about two months during the summer. At that time, there commenced an illicit love affair between M. and Mr S.'s wife, the defendant, continuing until the spring. The two discussed the possibility of marriage, and in that connection, there evolved a plan for eliminating her husband by the use of poison. M. purchased a vial of strychnine poison at the drugstore. Subject accompanied M. for that purpose. She took the strychnine, mixed it in a partially filled bottle of whiskey which she kept in the closet in their home. She became angered at her husband because of his drinking, and she transferred a portion of the poisoned whiskey into an empty whiskey bottle, placing the bottle under the front seat of his car, within easy sight

and reach. By a quirk of fate, he also on that day placed a nearly empty bottle under the seat. One morning her husband drank the remaining contents of the bottle he had placed there, and later in the day, he took out the other bottle and offered a drink to two acquaintances. One drank a portion, and became violently ill, and was later saved from death by his doctor. Unfortunately, the other man consumed the remainder of the contents and died within 15 minutes of strychnine convulsions. The defendant admits committing the crime but doesn't feel she's guilty of murder in the first degree. On the Saturday before the commission of the crime, her husband began drinking, and continued for several days. He left and said that he would be back, but failed to show up. She and the children did the chores, and when he came home he was staggering drunk. Her son drove the car into the garage. She poured a small amount of the strychnine crystals into the bottle of whiskey and put them on the floor of the car near his seat. She says that she put the poison into the whiskey to sicken her husband so that he would stop drinking. When questioned about threats she made against her husband's life, namely from M.'s testimony, she stated that there had been some joking remarks between herself and M. as to putting poisoned wheat in her husband's coffee. They kept poisoned wheat in the attic to destroy the mice. M. had cleaned the attic and knew where it was. When questioned about M.'s testimony that she had asked him to run over her husband with a tractor, she stated some laughing remark between her and M. had been made when they watched her husband in the fields. When questioned about shooting her husband, she said that M. had jokingly remarked of "clipping her husband off the tractor with a rifle, saying he would only get five years for it."

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

Subject and victim [husband] met through a lonely hearts club. Subject hid the fact that she was an alcoholic from him and they were married. In July the victim got violently ill in a restaurant, he was hospitalized in October; in November a doctor went to his home and advised hospitalization, victim refused. Next day the subject asked a neighbor to come over as husband was dying and then called a doctor. The husband was taken to hospital where he died. The subject asked the doctor not to have an autopsy but one was held and arsenic poisoning was determined. It had been administered orally over a period of several months.

Subject had been married five times and lived with a number of other men. She was told by the victim to stop drinking or leave. A week after her husband's death subject contacted an old boy friend and arranged to go to Nevada with him. She also applied to several lonely hearts clubs.

After the death of her husband, the subject visited her son and his wife. She disliked the latter and gave her a box of arsenic-poisoned chocolates.

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

In 1957 the defendant was hospitalized as a result of taking an overdose of sleeping pills . . . because she was afraid her son would "leave her." While visiting defendant in the hospital son met victim who was working there as a nurse. Defendant objected to son seeing victim and telephoned her almost daily for 3 months. . . . She told victim to "leave her son alone" and frequently threatened to kill her if she did not stop seeing him . . . son and victim were secretly married . . . in 1958 . . . and when defendant learned of the marriage she would not allow them to live together.

Son lived intermittently with wife. In 1958 the subject offered a friend \$1500 to assist in killing her daughter-in-law, whom, she alleged, had become pregnant by another man and was trying to frame her son. Friend told son who moved back to his mother's house.

Subject then tried to carry out a fraudulent plan for annulling marriage in which she and an ex-con posed as the victim and her husband.

Some months later subject asked a cafe owner if she had any friend who could help to get rid of the victim. Two men were contacted by the cafe owner and the subject told them that her daughter-in-law was blackmailing her son.

Subject agreed to pay \$3000 when the job was done and \$3000 within three to six months. The subject and the two men considered several plans and finally decided to

kidnap the daughter-in-law, take her across the border and kill her in Tijuana. The two men hired a car, borrowed a pistol and bought ammunition, gloves and adhesive tape, drove to victim's apartment and lured her to the car by saying her husband was drunk. She was hit with gun until handle broke. The men took turns strangling her and when no pulse was evident they dug a hole and buried her.

The subject paid \$150 to men. Son told police that he was afraid his mother was involved in his wife's disappearance. Later the killers confessed and implicated subject.

Victim's . . . body was disinterred and an autopsy surgeon found that victim had been pregnant and that her death was caused by head wounds, strangulation or suffocation such as would be produced by being buried alive.

Subject denied all, alleged she was convicted because "foreigners" lied about her, the people in the town were prejudiced, the judge was too old, the whole thing was a plan for revenge by a gang who wanted to get back at her son [an attorney] because he failed to get the cafe owner's husband freed on a criminal charge.

Subject was executed for this crime.

Two additional cases of premeditated murder, each of which involved the murder of two children, we have classified as instances of "cold-blooded murder." In neither case was the woman reputed to manifest evidence of psychosis.

Offense: Murder, 1st degree (two counts)

The subject was living with [male] co-defendant; she had three children by [prior] marriage. At a supermarket, children [males 3 and 5] left in car released brake, car rolled into two others. Co-defendant became enraged, suggested killing the two boys. [Subject suggested according to co-defendant.] Co-defendant said subject told of some woman she knew who killed her children and got away with it. The two discussed the killing of the boys and mutually decided on the matter. According to co-defendant when they reached the scene of the murder, subject said, "Well, you might as well get it over with." At this the co-defendant took the boys from the car and strangled them. . . . According to co-defendant's sister, subject and co-defendant returned to her house for dinner and "petted and laughed."

Police called by co-defendant's sister after subject and co-defendant went back to murder scene, picked up bodies and drove back to co-defendant's sister's with them.

Offense: Murder 1st degree

Subject and common-law husband came home after drinking with friends. Husband picked up older of two children [one his, both sons of subject] "swung him over his shoulder by the legs and bashed his head on the floor about four times." Subject testified the act enraged her, so she picked up the other infant and hit his head on the floor several times.

Subjects stated they were drunk, didn't intend to hurt children, were "fooling."

Domestic Violence II: Systematic Abuse of Children

Some 75 years ago, Lombroso wrote about the female violent offender: "The culminating examples of . . . barbarity are offered by mothers in whom maternal affection, the most intense of human sentiments is transformed into hatred."¹⁶ In this section we focus attention upon the most brutal crimes and the most pathetic victims encountered in this study—examples of "maternal hatred."

Among female murderers and assaultors confined in California and Minnesota prisons during our study, 34 were convicted of having killed a child and 14 for assaulting a child. The victim, although not always the

woman's own child, was nearly always a child (or children) with whom she lived—stepchild, foster child, or the son or daughter of her common-law husband. (In only three cases was the child victim not related in one of these ways to the assailant.) All but three of the victims were under 8 years of age.

The salient feature of the accounts that follow is the fact of repeated abuse. Cases that involve the death of minor children through repeated physical abuse do not fall into the "premeditated" category because it is not clear that the women intended to kill the child; rather their expressed intent was to inflict physical harm as "punishment."

Offense: Manslaughter

The victim, defendant's daughter, age 2½, was being punished for soiling her pants and not eating. Defendant had started punishing the victim . . . had whipped her with a hose and electric cord, and then placed her in a tub of cold water . . . finally, defendant again whipped the victim with a hose and electric cord and then threw the victim into the tub, which was half-filled with cold water. The victim hit her head on a faucet . . . when the defendant returned 20 minutes later, the victim was lying with her face in the water . . . when the ambulance arrived the victim was dead.

Defendant stated she had been drinking more heavily than usual and had had about four cans of beer on the day of the offense. . . . Throughout the day, she had whipped the victim and placed her in a tub of cold water . . . she whipped her again and threw her in the tub . . . she states she saw the child hit her head but did not know the child had been injured.

Says she had been drinking for four days straight. Subject not married, had three illegitimate children.

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

The victim was a three-year-old who was the daughter of defendant's boyfriend. . . . Defendant admitted and neighbors verified there had been a long course of brutal conduct toward the child. The child was severely beaten on numerous occasions. . . . On day of the offense, a glass of milk was spilled in the kitchen of defendant's home. Defendant summoned the child into the bathroom and asked whether she had knocked the milk over. Defendant picked up a broom handle and struck the child several times over the top of the head. About one-half hour after this the child collapsed and was taken to the hospital by the defendant. She was subsequently arrested and charged.

Subject stated: "Although the crime I committed was not intentional, I am guilty in many ways. I did lose my temper which is bad."

Offense: Manslaughter, 2d degree

The Police Department received a call from physician at a hospital, reporting the presence of an infant suffering from severe bruises who was not expected to live. Two men from homicide division went to the hospital. After questioning the defendant and her husband, they learned the baby had been hurt at home. The baby died at noon that day, and had suffered from severe head bruises and abrasions with possible brain damage, fracture on the upper left arm, broken wrist bones, fractures on both knees. There were also teeth marks on the right wrist. The doctor stated that some of the injuries were sustained approximately three weeks ago. The defendant was originally charged with murder in the third degree but this was reduced to manslaughter, second degree, and she pled guilty. The facts leading up to the offense are vague; the defendant states she does not really remember the weeks prior to her offense. Her husband was working long hours, and when he returned home the baby was usually sleeping, so he did not notice anything unusual about her. He did notice that the defendant was somewhat on edge, but it was nothing he could put his finger on. On one occasion just prior to the baby's death, the defendant's husband states that they had company, and the wife brought the

baby down for the company to see. In looking back, he thought it was rather unusual that she would not let anyone hold the child. After a minute or two she returned the child to the bedroom. In describing the offense, the defendant states she cannot remember the occurrence—only that she knows she hurt her child and took her to the hospital. She appears not to realize that she had killed her child. She refers to the incident as when she hurt her baby. She says she does not remember the actual events leading up to the offense, but if what people tell her is true regarding the offense, it must have been terrible.

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

The victim, a three-year-old, died of a severe cerebral contusion and hemorrhage due to multiple traumatic blows to the head. . . . The defendant who was the boy's foster mother was arrested after she had sent the victim to the hospital. . . . she admittedly whipped the boy five separate times with a washbowl brush handle and an elm switch. . . . Those whippings occurred over a three and one-half hour period. . . . Evidence showed that the beating was not a spur-of-the-moment impulse, as the defendant contended, but a continual practice in her treatment of the foster children. Victim's four-year-old brother was also beaten.

Subject stated: "I believe that under those same circumstances the same thing could have been done by anyone, no matter who they were. I know I did not cause his death. . . ." Convicted by "news propaganda and very prejudiced trial. I know I did not cause his death. . . . [it] could have been caused from the surgery."

Foster father was never implicated in the case.

Offense: Involuntary Manslaughter

The victim, the 22-month-old son of the defendant, died from malnutrition. The body, which weighed only 11 pounds, was discovered in a lot wrapped in a curtain with a sock stuffed in its mouth. A neighbor of the defendant informed the police that the body recovered could be the body of the defendant's child. . . . upon questioning, the defendant said the child was in good health and with relatives of hers. . . . the relatives could not be found. . . . Upon further investigation the defendant admitted the child found was hers and that it was dead when she put it there.

Husband not involved apparently. Another child [of subject] died "under very mysterious circumstances."

Offense: Manslaughter

The defendant and her husband were found guilty of the death of the former's four-year-old daughter. The defendant's husband told his uncle that the child was dead, and his uncle notified the police. It was learned the child died of broncho-pneumonia brought on by emaciation or starvation; secondary cause, vitamin deficiency with scurvy. There were many abrasions and wounds on the body and head. The child weighed about 40 pounds when she was returned to the home of her mother. At the time of her death she was then emaciated and her body showed evidence of extreme physical abuse in that she was covered with bruises and lacerations. At this time she was four years old and weighed 18½ pounds. Relatives testified that when they made an unexpected visit to the. . . home they found her nude and tied to a chair on the back porch.

Investigation revealed that it was customary to keep this child locked in a closet or on the back porch. She was not permitted to eat with the other members of the family and was not given food sufficient for her needs.

"I didn't mean to kill my baby. I didn't want it to turn out that way. I just wanted to scare her, but she didn't get scared. She just stayed mad and wouldn't eat or go to the bathroom. Sometimes when she got mad she would fall down and bruise herself."

Subject and her husband kept the child in the home to get child care payments from Welfare Department.

Offense: Corporal (traumatic) injury to child

Subject admitted slapping, hitting and punching her infant daughter almost since the date of her birth. She stated she dropped the child at the approximate age of one month,

which resulted in cranial hemorrhage and hospitalization. . . . She admitted hitting the child on the jaw three months later and further stated that two months after that, when the child began crying she picked her up, shook her and hit her because she, the defendant, was tired and nervous. On another occasion she admitted losing her temper and hitting the child with her fist which may have caused the child's broken ribs.

Child suffered permanent brain damage and will eventually necessarily be committed to a state institution. . . . Police were informed of the child's injuries by suspicious hospital personnel.

Offense: Assault, 2d degree

The defendant admitted that she beat her three-year-old son with one of her shoes, to the point where he had wounds and bruises all over his body. She insisted that she was not drunk on that day, nor had she been drinking during the day. However, on a previous evening she had been out with the boy's father, and had been drinking excessively. She insists she does not remember anything that occurred on the day of the offense, and claims she does not recall being out of the house. She did admit that she had punished the child severely on previous occasions by beating him with a belt, electric extension cord, her shoe, and her fist. On a couple of occasions, she stuffed his mouth with a washcloth so his screams would not be heard when she punished him. She said she hated the man who claims to be the boy's father so much that she might possibly have transferred some of this hostile feeling to the child without realizing it.

After reviewing these cases one might ask if the women were not "insane." About one-third of the women committed to the California Institution for Women for homicide and assault were diagnosed as manifesting evidence of psychosis (see table 27), but none of them had been legally judged insane at the time they committed their crimes. (Such cases would have resulted in commitment to a mental hospital rather than to prison.) Adjectives such as "cruel," "sadistic," or "brutal," rather than references to psychological disabilities were used to describe the women convicted of assaults upon children. There were, however, several cases of child abuse which reported much evidence of psychological disability, and these cases belong in our next category: "Borderline Psychotic" women. This overlapping of cases into two categories should serve as a reminder that our classification system makes only gross distinctions between the cases under study.

Homicides and Assaults by "Borderline Psychotic" Women

This group of cases includes those violent crimes which seem to be rooted in, or related to severely impaired or disabled personalities. Because of the severity of the psychological disturbance most of these crimes contain bizarre or sadistic elements.¹⁷

Offense: Involuntary Manslaughter

The defendant described the events leading up to the shooting as follows: she had come home that afternoon and things were pretty much as usual. Her husband came in, kissed her and she poured him a couple of glasses of fortified wine and she had some herself, but she believes that neither of them became intoxicated. . . . Later, he tipped the kitchen table over, all the food and dishes crashing to the floor. She became alarmed and grabbed a .22 pistol. . . . he lunged for her. She pulled the trigger and as she phoned for help he fell to the floor. . . . then the police and firemen arrived.

Subject stated the victim lost his temper easily and beat her severely. She became chronically terrified of him. . . . often the beatings would be ushered in by his tipping over

the table . . . therefore on the evening of the shooting, she was terrified and her behavior was motivated by fear.

Several informants have discussed their knowledge of the victim and his wife, the defendant, and have indicated that the defendant demonstrated unstable and peculiar behavior for many years as well as actually threatening to kill the victim. The threats were described as arising out of little or no provocation.

The court psychiatrist noted, "schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, chronic. Her mental illness, thus, did have a direct bearing on the offense. Her behavior was motivated in part by fear of exaggerated degree and stemming out of her paranoid thinking about her husband."

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

The defendant met her victim, a 76-year-old pensioner, on the street. . . . The victim resided alone and was known to the police for many drunk arrests. . . . The defendant was seen coming and going to and from the victim's apartment fairly regularly for several days . . . the neighbors became suspicious when they didn't see the victim . . . they found his body in a chair in his bedroom. The apartment was ransacked . . . the cause of death was a heavy blow to the head which shattered the skull. . . .

The injuries sustained by the victim indicated the use of brute force by the defendant, who is a large woman . . . one of the victim's fingers was nearly severed when he apparently raised his hand to protect himself . . . the murder weapon was a heavy steel wood rasp.

Subject stated that the victim had employed her to clean his apartment. She stated that when she was in the apartment he attempted to "peek under her dress." The gist of her story was that she struck the victim "to protect her virtue."

The psychiatrist who examined the defendant states, "she is a chronically emotionally disturbed person . . . severely schizoid, chronically alcoholic . . . she was not at the time of the alleged crime, actually psychotic."

Offense: Mayhem (and assault with deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury)

Over a number of years, subject and her husband sadistically beat their nine-year-old daughter. . . . After accusation by daughter, her husband started hating daughter and urged subject to "hit her, hit her." He brought a piece of garden hose into the house for me to hit her with. Kept the child home from school to beat her. The daughter's arms were broken, her eyes were injured, her skull beaten out of shape, her spine fractured, nose fractured, and a large number of teeth knocked out. She is now permanently blind in one eye . . . [case came to attention of police via complaint by subject's mother-in-law].

Beatings became more severe when daughter accused step-father of sexually molesting her.

Subject stabbed first husband in back, "I got a thrill from seeing the blood run out." Subject tried to commit suicide, asks for psychiatric care since she fears she might do injury to other when she is released. Possibility of brain injury and an epileptic condition. Symptoms of schizophrenia.

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

Two years ago [subject] became intrigued with the idea of killing someone and with planning details of a perfect crime. She first thought of killing her mother, then herself, then the family doctor, but she selected for her criteria a victim, male, over 21 years and single. She was obsessed with the idea that a person could kill someone and still be normal, that is, not "crack up" afterward . . . she stole a gun from a friend . . . [a month later] she bought a box of ammunition for the gun . . . [a month later] she took a walk, carrying the gun in the front edge of her capri pants and the box of shells in her purse. She met Mr. . . . who she knew only casually, and went for a ride with him. They drove to an isolated area where they stopped and Mr. . . . opened a quart of beer. Subject drank only a mouthful, opened the car door and got out. Standing on the outside by the passenger side she fired the first shot. She states she didn't remember firing the first shot, but then she realized what she had done and she then thought of taking him to

emergency, then remembered he knew where she lived and emptied the remaining four shells into his body. She recalls that after the first shot he did say "you stupid ass." She then ran to the back of the car and reloaded the gun. . . . She then went to the driver's side of the car where Mr. . . . was in a sitting position, and again emptied the gun into his body. She returned to the back of the car, reloaded as before and returning to the passenger side of the car, fired every shell into the victim's body. . . . The victim's body had 35 bullet holes which were ascertained to have come from no more than 18 gunshot wounds.

Subject did not date victim or have other than a casual relationship with him. He made no passes at her.

Three psychiatrists agreed that the subject was sane at the time of the examination. Psychiatrist for the defense diagnosed her mental illness as schizophrenia, paranoid type and psychotic at time of offense.

Economically Motivated Homicides by Women¹⁸

The number of homicides committed by women who wanted the victim's money or personal belongings is very small. There are no cases in our sample of women who offered their services as a "gun-for-hire" and few cases in which a woman did the killing in a robbery/murder. The largest category of economically motivated homicides involved some half-dozen criminal abortions which resulted in the patient's death. The following cases do not represent an important category of criminal homicides by women; they have been included here only to indicate that participation in this type of criminal homicide did occur.

Offense: Manslaughter, 1st degree

. . . Subject beat a 69-year-old deaf-mute with a stick, resulting in his death. The offense occurred when the subject and her 15 year old male cousin robbed the victim of \$2.32. Also present were two 15 year old girls who were placed under probation supervision. According to the male cousin of the subject, he had been over to his cousin's home drinking beer, and she called two fifteen year old girls by phone and they came over about 2:00 a.m. They were sitting in a car in front of the subject's home and began talking about obtaining money. Subject suggested that they roll somebody and later when the victim walked past the house in an intoxicated condition, she suggested they get money from him. Subject and her cousin got out of the car, followed the man for a short distance. Subject's cousin claims that he stopped and his cousin continued to follow the man and hit him over the head with a board. However, he denies touching the old man and felt that his only part in the incident was failing to stop his cousin, the subject, and receiving one half of the money which she stole.

Offense: Murder, 2d degree

The victim was admitted to the hospital suffering shock, infection of the uterus and uterine bleeding . . . she admitted that she had an abortion but refused to identify the defendant. . . . The victim died, and her sister reported the defendant to the police.

The victim had two prior abortions performed on her by the defendant . . . the defendant told the victim that she had inserted a tube into her and that she was to leave it inside until she passed the baby . . . the same method was used both times.

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

Subject and co-defendant were living together as man and wife. Both had spouses. They traveled about and during this time the subject became addicted to narcotics as co-defendant was a user. They were bigamously married. They decided to get rid of subject's husband, subject invited him to her apartment [they were living apart] and contacted co-defendant . . . telling him that her husband would be there and that they

were to get rid of him. They murdered him by beating him unmercifully and stabbing him 82 times.

A neighbor heard a man yelling for help and called police. Police found the victim and a note written by subject to co-defendant stating: "He won't drink. He won't do anything but argue. He is in bed. Kill him one way or the other." Co-defendant admitted that he did the stabbing and that subject was present and she participated by striking victim with a hammer. Co-defendant had five penitentiary commitments behind him, alleges subject wanted \$30,000 insurance on victim [husband].

Offense: Murder, 1st degree

An 80-year-old woman, weighing only 115 pounds, of little means, wanted a companion. Son of a neighbor told by subject that she wished to leave her life as a prostitute if she could only secure honest employment. Subject went to live with woman and after a week left. Neighbors entered the home and found victim "... lying in a pool of blood with about 24 stab wounds upon her person and her jugular vein severed, and blood scattered and spattered about the bed and room and walls and so forth." House rifled indicating larceny.

We shall summarize the major findings reported in this section, along with those presented in earlier parts of the paper in our general commentary on the female offender in section VI.

IV. VIOLENCE WITHIN THE WOMEN'S PRISON

During the 1968 data collection phase at the California Institution for Women, some staff members expressed the opinion that disciplinary problems had become more severe since the first phase of the study was concluded in 1964. The staff thought, for example, that there was more violence within the Institution and that the women who were being sent to CIW for crimes of violence had played more aggressive roles in committing those crimes than had the women committed in earlier years for these same crimes. These contentions were further related to an explanation of increased violence within the women's prison as being due to the changed character of the violent offender population. Here and in section V we have tried to test the accuracy of these assertions.

Prison Behavior as Measured by Disciplinary Reports

A comparison of the 1963 CIW study population and the 1968 sample indicates that there was a substantial increase in the number of inmates who received one or more disciplinary reports during their prison terms: from 32 percent in 1963 to 65 percent in 1968. It will be pointed out shortly, however, that these infractions rarely involved aggressive or violent acts. In 1963 women serving time for property crimes or homicide were, at least on this measure, significantly more rule abiding than other types of offenders; by 1968, while still relatively more rule abiding, these two offender categories were no longer significantly different from the others.

A review of all disciplinary actions taken from January 1965 through July 1968 indicates that rules relating to disobedience and insubordination were broken most often. The increase in numbers of these infractions, in fact, account for nearly all of the increase in disciplinary reports over the 3½-year period.

Table 27.—Extent of prison rule infractions: Violent offenders, 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent of offense category]

Number of rule violations	Homicide		Assault		Robbery		Property crimes		Narcotics	
	1963 ¹	1968 ²	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
None	70	48	54	40	48	25	70	36	51	27
1 or 2	15	30	16	30	22	67	20	43	30	47
3 or more	15	22	30	30	30	8	10	21	19	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(107)	(27)	(30)	(23)	(50)	(12)	(394)	(94)	(193)	(34)

¹($\chi^2 = 37.51, df=8, p < 0.01$)

²($\chi^2 = 8.14, df=8, \text{not significant}$)

Rates per one hundred inmates for rules violations involving insubordination were 106 in 1965; 115 in 1966; 119 in 1967; and the projected figure for 1968 was 159. Rates for all violent acts (attacks upon staff members, upon inmates, and prison disturbances) for the same years were 29, 28, 26, and 29. When violent assaults did occur, inmates were far more likely to be the victims than were staff members. The rate of these assaults seems to be returning to the 1965 high of 14 per 100 prisoners. The rate of assaults on staff, on the other hand, has remained constant (less than one per 100) while the number of disciplinary reports based upon threats made against staff had declined. (See table 28.)

Table 28.—Prison rule violations: 1965-68

Type of violation	1965	1966	1967	1968*
Insubordination:				
Annual number	878	1,081	1,023	*1,222
Monthly average	73	90.1	85.3	¹ 101.9
Rate per 100 inmates per year . .	106	115	119	*159
Prison violence:				
All:				
Annual number of reports . . .	238	266	221	*224
Monthly average	19.8	22.1	18.4	¹ 18.7
Rate per 100 inmates per year	28.7	28.2	25.6	*29.2
Against staff—threats:				
Annual number	18	21	18	*5
Monthly average	1.5	1.8	1.5	¹ 1.43
Rate per 100 inmates per year	2.2	2.2	2.1	*.67
Against staff—actual physical attacks:				
Annual number	8	11	10	*7
Monthly average	7	.9	.8	¹ 1.7
Rate per 100 inmates per year	.97	1.2	1.2	*.89
Against inmates—actual physical attacks:				
Annual number	116	98	76	*99
Monthly average	9.7	8.2	6.3	¹ 8.3
Rate per 100 inmates per year	14.0	10.4	8.8	*13.0
Prison disturbance:				
Annual number	96	136	117	*113
Monthly average	8.0	11.3	9.8	¹ 9.4
Rate per 100 inmates per year	11.6	14.4	13.6	*14.8
Escape:				
Annual number	7	6	7	*10
Monthly average58	.50	.58	¹ 1.86
Rate per 100 inmates per year	.8	.6	.8	*1.3
Suicide:				
Annual number	61	42	92	*36
Monthly average	5.1	3.5	7.7	¹ 3.0
Rate per 100 inmates per year	7.4	4.5	10.7	*4.7
Homosexuality:				
Annual number	63	58	64	*53
Monthly average	5.3	4.8	5.3	¹ 4.4
Rate per 100 inmates per year	7.6	6.2	7.4	*6.9
Other problematic behavior:				
Annual number	24	10	9	*2
Monthly average	2.0	.83	.75	¹ 1.14
Rate per 100 inmates per year	2.89	1.06	1.04	*.22

*Projection based on 7-month data.




Figure 1.—Prison rules violations: 1965-68, (rate per 100 inmates).




Figure 2.—Prison violence: 1965-68 (rate per 100 inmates).

Table 29.—Inmates who were reported to have committed rule infractions during current confinement; 1968 sample

[In percent of offense category]

Violations of rules	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Property crimes	Narcotics
Insubordination (staff authority) ¹	36	48	59	50	56
Governing inmate interaction—person ²	29	35	33	32	35
Governing inmate interaction—property ³	21	22	42	31	38
Maintaining administrative economy ⁴	21	22		23	21
Involving violence against inmates	18	13	8	13	12
Involving violence against staff ⁵	4	4		4	
Violated at least one type of rule	52	61	75	64	73
N	(28)	(23)	(12)	(94)	(34)

¹ Disobeying orders, refusal to work, insolence, disrespect, threatened assault, destruction of State property as protest gesture.

² "Horseplay," fighting, disturbing the peace, offensive language *not* directed at staff, actual or alleged homosexuality.

³ Stealing from inmates, contraband, gambling.

⁴ Careless-use (or waste) of State property, "poor work," violation of fire, safety, sanitary and movement regulations, illegal communications.

⁵ Physical attacks only.

Summary

Our analysis of prison disciplinary records does not support the impression held by some of the prison staff members that there has been a real increase in the incidence of violent behavior among inmates of the California Institution for Women. Furthermore, it appears that violence against inmates or staff members is an infrequent occurrence in the Institution and is not the exclusive or likely property of the so-called violent offender.

V. TRENDS IN CRIMES OF VIOLENCE BY WOMEN

There seems to be little doubt that crimes of violence have been increasing in recent years, but attempts to determine trends for different classes of offenders (in this case women) are inconclusive due to the lack of necessary data. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice describes the problem:

Although the Commission concluded that there has been an increase in the volume and rate of crime in America, it has been unable to decide whether individual Americans today are more criminal than their counterparts five, ten, or twenty-five years ago. To answer this question it would be necessary to make comparisons between persons of the same age, sex, race, place of residence, economic status and other factors at the different times: in other words, to decide whether the

fifteen-year-old slum dweller or the fifty-year-old businessman is inherently more criminal now than the fifteen-year-old slum dweller or the fifty-year-old businessman in the past. Because of the many rapid and turbulent changes over these years in society as a whole and in the myriad conditions of life which affect crime, it was not possible for the Commission to make such a comparison. Nor do the data exist to make even simple comparisons of the incidence of crime among persons of the same age, sex, race, and place of residence at these different years.¹⁹

National crime statistics have been collected by the FBI and reported in *Uniform Crime Reports* since 1930, but it is not possible to draw accurate conclusions about crime trends from these data because changes in population are not taken into account when increases in crime are cited. The fact that more arrests are reported may also reflect an increase in the number of police officers available, the increased efficiency of law enforcement efforts, greater uniformity of police record-keeping operations and that more law enforcement agencies are contributing to the *Uniform Crime Reports*. These qualifications should be kept in mind as we look at arrest and commitment data to try to determine trends in the rates of crimes of violence by women.

Arrest Trends

The most reliable data available in the United States—the *Uniform Crime Reports* and *Crime in California*—show that larger numbers of women are being arrested each year for all index crimes, including the violent crimes. For example, the 1967 *Uniform Crime Reports* show that arrests of females more than doubled between 1960 and 1967.²⁰

Table 30.—Total number of female arrests for Index crimes in the United States in 1960 and 1967*

	1960	1967
Homicide	1,011	1,797
Assault	7,993	13,849
Robbery	1,340	3,100
Burglary	3,083	9,709
Larceny over \$50	34,967	106,944
Auto theft	1,940	5,006
Forcible rape
All Index crimes	50,337	140,405

*Source: *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1960, 1967.

It is not enough, however, to report the gross arrest figures to show that there are more women arrested today than in the past, the next question must be whether the rate of increase is greater than the increase in the U.S. population during the same period. Unfortunately, the *UCR* do not provide statistics in terms of rates per so many thousand Americans which would take population increase into account. The best that we can do is to compare the increases reported by *UCR* for each offense category with the increase in

population covered by their data from 1960 to 1967. Table 30 presents arrest data for estimated populations of 106.3 million in 1960 and 145.9 million in 1967. The change reflects both an increase in the number of people living within the jurisdictions of agencies reporting in 1960 and the addition of population covered by agencies reporting for the first time since 1960. In other words, 1967 data cover a population 37 percent larger than in 1960. Female arrests during the 8-year period rose 73 percent for assault, 78 percent for homicide, and 131 percent for robbery. Property offenses were up even more, and the percent increase for all index crime arrests was 179 percent.

Table 31 shows these data each year during this period as a percent of all persons arrested and as a percent of all women arrested. At least three conclusions can be drawn:

(1) Arrests of women for all serious crimes have increased faster than the population;

(2) The percent that women represent among persons arrested in the United States for violent crimes has been declining for homicide and assault—from 16.1 percent in 1960 to 14.8 percent in 1967 and from 15.3 percent to 12.9 percent, respectively. The proportion women account for among robbery arrestees has increased from 4.6 percent to 5.2 percent. (Note that in California women are accounting for an increasingly larger percentage of arrests for each of the three violent offense categories. See table 32.)

(3) The percentage of women arrested for violent crimes out of the total number of women arrested has remained fairly stable over the last 8 years.

Conclusions based upon California arrest data are consistent with those based upon national data. We were, however, able to calculate a *rate* (arrests per 100,000 State population) for California because all local jurisdictions send arrest reports to a central clearinghouse, the California Department of Justice. As can be seen in table 32, arrest rates for robbery and assault have risen consistently since 1960—an increase of 32 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The arrest rate for homicide also increased 21 percent in the last 8 years, but the increase has not been a steady progression; rather it has fluctuated from a low of 0.88 in 1963 to a high of 1.13 in 1965.

Prison Commitments

Prison staff members base their impressions of the female violent offender not upon information about arrestees, but upon impressions of women they have contact with, namely those committed to prison. Looking at this population then it should be noted that while more women are being arrested today than in 1960, this increase is not evident when prison commitments during this period are considered. In fact, the absolute number of women sentenced to prison is down for both Federal and State institutions.

In California the rate of women sentenced to prison per 100,000 State population has declined from 2.1 in 1960 to 1.4 in 1967.²¹ Fifty fewer

Table 31.—Arrests for violent crimes: United States, 1960-67*

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Percent change over 1960
Estimated population covered by these data (in millions)	106.3	115.4	123.6	125.8	132.4	134.1	138.0	145.9	+37
Homicide:									
Total arrests	6,273	6,243	6,591	8,805	9,097	10,163	10,734	12,167	+94
Number of women arrested	1,011	994	1,132	1,367	1,411	1,562	1,642	1,797	+78
Percent of total arrests who were women	16.1	15.9	17.2	15.5	15.5	15.4	15.3	14.8
Percent of all women arrested that year2	.2	.2	.3	.2	.2	.3	.2
Assault:									
Total arrests	52,277	55,355	58,315	68,719	79,895	84,411	98,406	107,192	+105
Number of women arrested	7,993	8,404	8,592	9,644	10,877	11,434	12,973	13,849	+73
Percent of total arrests who were women	15.3	15.2	14.7	14.0	13.6	13.5	13.2	12.9
Percent of all women arrested that year	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0
Robbery:									
Total arrests	29,326	33,175	35,384	37,836	39,134	45,872	47,031	59,789	+10
Number of women arrested	1,340	1,612	1,821	1,845	2,072	2,400	2,349	3,100	+131
Percent of total arrests who were women	4.6	4.9	5.1	4.9	5.3	5.2	5.0	5.2
Percent of all women arrested that year3	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5

*From *Uniform Crime Reports*.

women went to prison in 1967 than in 1960, although the State population almost doubled. Commitment rates for crimes of violence are so small for women that they barely exceed one in a million.

Table 33.—Female felons newly received from court, 1960-67*

	All institutions	State	Federal
1960	4,311	3,749	562
1964	4,241	3,732	509
1965	4,264	3,730	534
1966	3,757	3,305	452
Percent change	-12.8	-11.8	-22.4

*National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions for Adult Felony, Bulletin No. 43, U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 34-35, Aug. 1968.

Table 34.—Women committed to prison by offense: California, 1960 and 1967

Offense	Number		Rate per 100,000 State population	
	1960	1967	1960	1967
Homicide	32	30	0.2	0.15
Assault	10	21
Robbery	22	22
Burglary	16	24
Theft ²	45	42	.3	.22
Forgery and checks	131	83	.8	.43
Sex offenses	3
Narcotics	61	37	.4	.19
Other offenses ³	10	10
All	327	272	2.1	1.4

¹ Includes auto theft.

² Includes driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, abortion, deadly weapon, escape from jail or county camp, arson, failure to render aid, kidnapping.

Source: *California Prisoners, 1960 and 1967*, Department of Corrections, Sacramento, Calif. Rates computed to 2 decimal places in 1960, 3 in 1967.

Given these data the question remains: What is the basis for staff contentions that "Women are more violent today than they used to be," if no more women are being committed for violent crimes today than in the past?

There is one other way to try to test the hypothesis that women are increasingly involved in violent crimes—one that considers the role played in committing these crimes.

Changes in the Role of Female Violent Offenders

Were the women in the 1968 sample more aggressive, or did they play a more active role in the commission of their offense than the women in prison at the time of the 1963 phase of the project? Two measures which we felt would shed some light on this question were the use of weapons and the extent of participation in the crime. In both cases a comparison of the two study groups seems to indicate that the women in the 1968 group played more active roles and used guns more often in committing their crimes.

Table 32.—Female felony arrests in California: 1960-67*

	Homicide				Assault				Robbery			
	Total arrests	Number of women arrested	Percent who were women	Arrest rate per 100,000 population	Total arrests	Number of women arrested	Percent who were women	Arrest rate per 100,000 population	Total arrests	Number of women arrested	Percent who were women	Arrest rate per 100,000 population
1960	1,141	143	12.5	0.90	11,107	1,269	11.4	8.00	9,978	517	5.2	3.26
1961	1,124	167	14.9	1.01	12,024	1,397	11.6	8.49	10,882	591	5.4	3.59
1962	1,151	175	15.2	1.03	12,136	1,422	11.7	8.34	10,411	626	6.0	3.67
1963	1,116	156	14.0	.88	12,448	1,624	13.0	9.19	10,026	601	6.0	3.40
1964	1,158	186	16.1	1.02	12,992	1,810	13.9	9.94	9,934	597	6.0	3.28
1965	1,329	211	15.9	1.13	13,419	1,818	13.5	9.71	10,200	681	6.7	3.64
1966	1,297	213	16.4	1.11	14,686	1,866	12.7	9.75	9,455	695	7.4	3.63
1967	1,327	212	16.0	1.09	16,048	2,062	12.8	10.56	11,561	796	6.9	4.07
Percent change over 1960				+21				+32				+25

*From *Crime in California* (retitled *Crime and Delinquency in California*); rates calculated from population figures from California Statistical Abstracts, 1967.

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Crimes of Violence

Guns were used in almost half of the murders and robberies committed by the 1968 group, compared to about one-fourth of these crimes committed by the 1963 group. There was, however, no increase in the use of guns in the commission of assaults; in fact a slight decrease was recorded. The use of knives and other household implements in assaults also declined, from 61 percent to 39 percent. (The number of assault cases is small, however, and percentage differences can be misleading.)




Figure 3.—Use of guns by women in the commission of violent offenses.

Slightly more than three-fourths of the women in both study groups who were committed for homicide or assault acted alone; thus the degree of participation for these offender types does not show change over the past 4 or 5 years. The proportion of women acting alone in robbery almost doubled over this period, as table 35 shows. (Nevertheless, it is still the case that most robberies are committed with other persons.) *But when other persons were involved in each of the three crimes there was a tendency for the women in the 1968 group to play more active criminal roles.* This tendency was particularly apparent in the robbery cases. The proportion of women identified as "conspirators" and "accessories" (less active criminal roles) declined, while those who were crime "partners" (a more active criminal role) increased.²²

Table 35.—Criminal role: A comparison of the 1963 and 1968 groups
[In percent]

	Homicide		Assault		Robbery	
	1963	1968	1963	1968	1963	1968
Conspirator	5	1	8	2	5	2
Accessory	5	1	1	2	29	16
Partner	13	21	14	18	54	63
Sole perpetrator	77	78	75	78	10	19
Role not known	1	1	5	1	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(114)	(65)	(36)	(44)	(56)	(49)

¹Less than 1 percent.

VI. PROFILES OF VIOLENT FEMALES OFFENDERS

Homicide

Women committed to prison for homicide—

- were 65 percent white, 25 percent black, 10 percent Mexican
- tended to be of average to below average intelligence
- came from families in which there was no reported criminality
- came from unbroken homes (two-thirds)
- were reported to have been sexually promiscuous or prostitutes (6 out of 10)
- seldom had reports of homosexual involvement (1 out of 10)
- had serious drinking problems
- had virtually no reports of narcotics use
- were diagnosed as having some type of psychological disability (over 80 percent of these women in the 1968 sample)
- had limited criminal careers (one-third no prior arrests, one-third arrested for the first time after age 28, 8 out of 10 had never been in prison before)

Compared to other offender categories, homicide offenders had—

- the least reported family criminality
- the lowest known incidence of illegal sexual conduct
- the least extensive prior criminal record
- been arrested later in life
- the largest proportion of alcoholics
- the smallest proportion of known narcotics use
- the highest percentage evidencing psychosis

The commission of homicide usually involved:

- the woman as sole perpetrator
- children and husbands or lovers as victims (over 50 percent); usually occurred at home
- premeditation in only one of five cases
- limited use of physical strength because victims were either helpless (small children) or in some way incapacitated (drunk, asleep, ill)
- the use of a gun (one-third) and knives or other household implements (one-third)

Extent and trends of homicides committed by women:

- two out of every 1000 women (.2%) arrested in the U.S. are arrested for homicide—this percentage has remained stable.
- of all homicide arrests (male and female) in 1967 women accounted for 1 in 7 (the proportion has been declining slowly: in the early 1960's it was 1 in 6).
- of prison commitments for homicide the ratio is lower: 1 in 11.
- the increase in the number of arrests of women for murder and manslaughter has increased faster than has the population.

Assault

Women committed to prison for assault—

were most likely to be from minority groups (7 out of 10—52 percent black, 17 percent Mexican)
 generally scored below average on intelligence tests (white or black)
 were as likely as not to come from families whose members had criminal records
 were as likely as not to have come from a broken home
 were reported to have been prostitutes in about half the cases, and promiscuous in an additional one-third of the cases
 had serious drinking problems; 1 in 4 had used narcotics
 were diagnosed as having some type of psychological disability (about one-third were reported to evidence psychotic traits)
 often had prior penal confinements (mostly jail or juvenile institutions)
 had been arrested before the age of 20 (6 out of 10)

Compared to other offender categories, assault offenders—

tended to fall between homicide and property offenders in terms of prior criminality (themselves or their families)
 were the most likely to be known prostitutes except for narcotics offenders
 were often reported to have had homosexual involvements
 had the most serious drinking problems
 had a large percentage of narcotics use (25 percent)
 had the largest proportion of disturbed but-not-psychotic women

The commission of an assault usually involved—

the woman as sole perpetrator
 someone known to the assailant—friends (13 percent), intimates (19 percent), children (17 percent)
 the use of some degree of physical strength because knives and other household implements were most often the weapon used
 claims by the assailant that the victim deserved the attack (31 percent) or that it was accidental (17 percent)

Extent and trends of assaults committed by women:

approximately 20 out of every 1,000 women (2 percent) arrested in the United States are arrested on assault charges.
 women accounted for 13 percent of all assault arrests (male and female). (This percentage has declined steadily since 1960.)
 in terms of all prison commitments for assault women constitute about 8 percent.
 like homicide arrests, the increase in the number of women arrested for assault is greater than the population increase.

Robbery

Women committed to prison for robbery—

were 59 percent white, 29 percent black, 12 percent of Mexican ancestry, Indian, etc.
 tended to be of average or above average intelligence.
 came from families in which the chances were 50/50 that other members had felony arrests (or more serious criminal action), and 50/50 that the home was broken by death, desertion or divorce.
 were reported to have been sexually promiscuous and/or prostitutes (6 out of 10).
 were reported to have had homosexual involvements in 4 out of 10 cases.
 had serious drinking problems in 4 out of 10 cases.
 had virtually no reported use of narcotics.
 had psychological disabilities reported in less than half of the cases.
 had fairly extensive criminal careers (one-third had prior prison terms, another 30 percent had been committed to jails or to youth institutions, three-fourths were arrested for the first time at age 20 or younger).

Compared to other offenders, women serving time for robbery—

resembled property or narcotic offenders somewhat more closely than homicide or assault offenders.
 had the largest proportion of women in the above average intelligence range.
 had more extensive criminal records than other violent offenders.
 had more reported family crime than other violent offenders.
 had the largest proportion of offenders arrested before age 21.
 had a larger proportion of women who had been in prison a number of times before.
 had the highest prevalence of reported homosexuality.
 were the largest proportion of offenders diagnosed to have evidence of psychosis.

The commission of a robbery usually involved—

women as accessories and partners to males (more often friends or acquaintances than intimates).
 some degree of planning.
 a locale away from the offender's neighborhood.
 commercial establishments or male strangers as victims (8 out of 10 cases).
 no weapons or the use of physical strength (when a weapon was used it was a gun).
 adults, one-half of whom were incapacitated in some way at the time of the crime.

claims by the offender that funds were needed or that she was framed or that others were to blame.

Extent and trends of robberies by women—

in 1967, 5 out of every 1,000 women (0.5 percent) arrested in the United States was arrested in connection with robbery charges. (There has been a steady increase since 1960 when 0.3 percent were arrested for robbery.)

robbery is the least "female" violent offense: of the 60,000 persons arrested in 1967 for robbery, 5.2 percent were women; while the percentage is small, it has been increasing during this decade.

of prison commitments for robbery the ratio of men to women was 98 to 2.

female arrests for robbery have shown the greatest percentage increase since 1960 of the three violent crimes.

SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON CRIMES OF VIOLENCE BY WOMEN

One of the interesting aspects of crimes of violence and burglary by women is that these actions seem to directly contradict the role women in our society are supposed to play. The notion of the female as an aggressive, fist-swinging, gun-carrying criminal ready to take on any potential victim—healthy, adult males included—is difficult to reconcile with the stereotype of the female as the relatively passive, dependent, physically weaker partner to the male. It was thus our task to examine instances in which women violated not only the criminal law, but also the norms that define behavior appropriate for "ladies." What we found was that the participation of women in robbery and burglary was not consistent with the criminal role males play in these crimes but that their behavior was consistent with their role as women. Our female offenders robbed few healthy adult males by themselves. In burglaries too they acted as supporting players to men who played the leading criminal role. In short, we found that very few females are arrested for serious crimes, that only a very small portion of the women who were arrested for felonies were involved in robberies and burglaries and that the women who were involved in these crimes did not, in most cases, act in a very unladylike manner.

In the case of homicides and assaults the salience of the sex role was also apparent. The objects of violent attacks by women were most often persons with whom they had affectional relationships such as husbands, lovers, and children. Unlike male violent offenders, the victims of women rarely included store keepers, service station attendants, or others slain or assaulted in the course of committing robberies and burglaries (some 21 percent of the homicides reported to *Uniform Crime Reports* in 1967 were "felony or suspected felony type" murders). When adult males were the victims of assaults by women, the usual case was not that they were beaten up by women tougher or stronger than they, but that a weapon was used by the woman, that the victim was drunk, asleep, or off-guard, or that the woman had help from other persons.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this study is that female criminality is a separate and distinct order of criminal behavior in which

cultural factors relating to sex roles in our society are of critical importance. Those who study the etiology of criminal behavior should be prepared to find that most of the current theories of crime causation are inappropriate when applied to female offenders.

Those persons charged with the responsibility of doing something about the problem of violence in our society will find it difficult to draw policy implications from this study. The problem is based in part perhaps upon the primitive level of knowledge we can provide about female violence, but such data as we have indicate that in order to prevent a major portion of the criminal violence in which women engage, one would have to do something about unhappy marriages and love affairs, drunken brawls, and in some cases, stupidity or bad judgment. Intervention might be possible however in the area of crimes against children, because the assaults occur over time. A major difficulty here is that our data indicate that in many cases other persons did know or have reason to suspect that children were being brutalized but they still did not attempt to intervene or call the situation to the attention of medical, welfare or police agencies. Laws pertaining to protection against libel charges for physicians, the handling of child abuse cases by agencies other than police departments and more public awareness of the child abuse problem may be helpful in encouraging the reporting of these cases.^{2,3} One other category of violence cases where intervention, that is, prevention of further violence, may be feasible are the cases in which the presence of severe psychological disabilities gives warning of future trouble. The problem here again is in encouraging those most likely to detect the onset of psychological problems, namely family members and friends, to bring cases to the attention of physicians, clergymen, or social agencies which can initiate remedial action. For women overwhelmed by disappointments, crises, and life experiences the availability of community mental health centers would provide valuable orthopsychiatric assistance. Finally we want to remind those who point to the small contribution women make to the overall population of violent offenders; that the trend in violence by women is upward, and that the rate may be accelerated as women become emancipated from traditional female role requirements.

REFERENCES

1. While the term "female" is used in this paper synonymously with "women," it is the more accurate in that it avoids the implication that all offenders we describe or discuss are adult women.
2. Information on the housing of women prisoners in three states was not available for the August 1968 issue of *National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in state and Federal Institutions for Adult Felony*, Bulletin No. 43, U.S. Department of Justice, pp. 34-35.
3. A more recent but less detailed review of the literature dealing with female criminality may be found in Ann D. Smith, *Women in Prison*, London: Stevens and Sons, 1962, chs. 1 and 2. Most of the criminological literature which deals with personality and social characteristics of female felons is listed in the bibliographies of the books by Smith and Pollak.
4. In 1967, of crimes known to the police, the clearance rate (arrests made) for each offense category was as follows:

- | | Percent |
|------------------------------|---------|
| Murder | 88.2 |
| Aggravated assault | 70.8 |
| Forcible rape | 61.5 |
| Robbery | 28.5 |
| Burglary | 21.0 |
| Auto theft | 21.6 |
| Larceny over \$50 | 18.2 |
5. *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, Report of the President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; Washington, figure includes persons who originally were placed on probation but violated the conditions of probation and had their prison sentence imposed.
 6. Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958, p. 304.
 7. David A. Ward and Gene G. Kassebaum, *Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structures*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965.
 8. For example, the interest in "brain damage" of one psychiatrist, who joined the CIW staff in 1966, resulted in an increase in the number of inmates who were reported to have this disability.
 9. Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, *op. cit.* Brief comments or discussions about crimes of violence by women not cited elsewhere in this report may be found in Evelyn Gibson and S. Klein, *Murder*, Home Office Research Unit Report No. 4, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961; John M. Macdonald, *The Murderer and His Victim*, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1961, pp. 31-32; Nancy Barton Wise, "Juvenile Delinquency Among Middle-Class Girls," in Edmund W. Vaz (ed.), *Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency*, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 179-188; James S. Wallerstein and Clement J. Wyle, "Our Law-abiding Law-breakers," *Probation*, 225, Mar.-Apr. 1947, p. 110; Lester Adelson, "Slaughter of the Innocents," *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 264, No. 26, June 1961, pp. 1345-1349. See also the articles by Wolfgang, Mooris, and Blom-Cooper, Verkko, and Bohannon in Marvin Wolfgang, *Studies in Homicide*, New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
 10. *Crime in the United States 1967*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
 11. It should be noted that our "No weapons used" category included those cases in which the subject was an accessory or partner in a crime where a weapon was used by others and those cases where death or injury was the result of beatings, strangulation, or other types of physical attack where the "weapon" was hands, arms, feet, etc.
 12. Our groupings of homicide and assault cases are analogous to four of the types of violent offenders described by John Conrad in a paper entitled "The Nature and Treatment of the Violent Offender: A Typology of Violence." Conrad's paper and the report of an effort to implement his typology for purposes of classifying men committed to the California Department of Corrections may be found in Carol Spencer, *A Typology of Violent Offenders*, Research Report No. 23, Research Division, California Department of Corrections, Sacramento, September, 1966. Our use of these categories is intended only to help organize the descriptive materials, and the reader should be aware that some kinds of "domestic" or "economic" violence may also be classified as "sub-cultural" in character and that "domestic" violence may be committed by "borderline psychotic" or "pathological" women.
 13. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Criminal Homicide and the Subculture of Violence," in Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide*, New York: Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 6-7. See also in the same volume, Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, "Subculture of Violence—A Socio-Psychological Theory," pp. 271-280, and the discussion of the "culturally violent" offender by Spencer and Conrad in Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12 and 61-63.
 14. Conrad in Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 68; also Spencer, pp. 20-23.
 15. This case is particularly interesting because of the dispassionate manner in which the boy described the murder of his father by his mother. His account of the crime

- suggests not only that he had grown accustomed to domestic warfare, but also is a reminder that while some studies have focused on the murderer and his or her victim, none that we know of has systematically examined the impact upon the child of criminal homicide involving his own parents.
16. Caesar Lombroso, *The Female Offender*, originally published 1893; Philosophical Library Edition, published 1958, pp. 147-49.
 17. This category corresponds to Conrad's "pathologically violent" offender type. See Spencer and Conrad, in Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19 and 66-68.
 18. This grouping is analogous to John Conrad's category of "criminally Violent" offenders. See Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15, and Conrad, in Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-66.
 19. *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, a report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 31.
 20. The UCR provide arrest trend data on p. 119 of the 1967 Report, based upon "comparable reports" from 2400 agencies for 1960 and 1967. They do not specify the population covered by the 1960 data hence it is not possible for us to calculate a rate of population increase with which to compare the percent increases represented. For all females the percent changes from 1967 were as follows; Homicide, +22%; Assault, +44%; Robbery, +68%; Burglary, +58%; Larceny, +126%; Auto Theft, +77%; All Index Crimes, +101%. Arrests of females under 13 are included in these figures.
 21. It should be pointed out that the rate of men committed to prison is declining as well: from 35.9 per 100,000 State population to 24.9. However, male commitments for assaultive crimes have not declined:
 22. This also applies to women convicted on burglary charges: in 1963, 43 percent of the 42 women serving time for burglary were accessories or conspirators; while among the 38 "burglars" in prison in 1968, 95 percent were either partners (75 percent) or sole participants (20 percent).
 23. The problem of child abuse is discussed at length in another report to this Commission by David G. Gil, *Physical Abuse of Children: One Manifestation of Violence in American Society*.

APPENDIX 18

VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME*

By Mark H. Furstenberg*

PREFACE

In Chicago, between 1919 and 1934, there were 765 "gang murders," an average of 48 per year. From 1935 to 1967, a period twice as long, there were 229 such murders, an average of seven per year. Chicago is not unique. Its organized crime is probably somewhat more violent than that of most other cities. But everywhere in the nation during the past 30 years, as organized crime has broadened its bases and increased its controls, it has become steadily less violent. Today, it is far stronger and far less violent than ever before. The ways it uses violence to maintain control over a \$25-billion-a-year empire—one which is prospering and growing—without recourse either to the law or to wholesale violence as a substitute for the law are the subjects of this paper.

I undertook this project during the waning days of the Commission's work. It is an ambitious undertaking, one worthy of a year's research by a team of sociologists, psychologists, economists, and law enforcement experts. That I was willing to do something so reckless is far more a measure of my confidence in my friends than in my own knowledge. Among those who helped me were Martin Danziger, Director of Organized Crime Programs, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, who contributed important concepts, valuable information, and support. Charles Rogovin, Director of the U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, was my mentor on organized crime, and was, as always, incredibly generous. Henry Petersen, Chief of the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, permitted me to bother him repeatedly, and always responded kindly. Gerald Shur of the OCRS suggested, critiqued, and made very helpful comments. Richard J. Schneiderhan, Special Agent in the Organized Crime Section, Department of the Attorney General of Massachusetts, contributed invaluable insights from his remarkable experience. Henry Ruth, Director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, made enormously creative comments.

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Ralph Salerno, who did for another task force of this Commission a paper from which I stole shamelessly. G. Robert Blakey, Alfred J. Scotti, Nick Scoppetta, Frank Rogers, Courtney Evans, William G. Handley, Alan Baron, and John Ingersoll all generously answered questions, made observations, and demonstrated once again how dedicated and capable the "good guys" are.

Finally, I owe special debts to Donald J. Mulvihill and Kenneth E. Demario of the Commission staff, and to Ferris Lucas, Executive Director of the National Sheriffs Association, who permitted me to take time away from an important and urgent project to write this paper.

Many who read this paper will find it highly speculative, a vast number of questions raised, but unanswered. It is a criticism to which I readily agree. In part, this is due to the brief time available; but, more significantly, it is a reflection of how little is known about organized crime. All of the questions raised, and particularly the final section of the paper are a plea for more research in this field. Those who labor in these areas know too well that everyone loves to hear and talk about the "celebrities" of organized crime; but few people seem to care about what they do.

Perhaps, as a result of this paper, the new Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, on which we shall depend so much, will be persuaded to sponsor projects whose objective is solely to gather, organize, and analyze the information available on organized crime—especially the sociological and psychological data—and to help design methods for obtaining the intelligence we need to test our theories and speculations.

It is traditional for authors of papers such as this to claim responsibility for the information contained. I suppose it is particularly important in this paper, since its footnotes are clearly inadequate. The reader will understand that some of the information in the paper has been altered slightly to protect sources, and much of it must stand unattributed. I accept responsibility for all of it.

CONTROLS OVER VIOLENCE

The common image of organized crime is of a recklessly violent band of psychopathic men with bizarre names like "Three-Fingered Brown" and "Lucky" Luciano. They hijack, import narcotics, run gambling operations, and reach into legitimate business and labor fields, driving out the decent people by wholesale terror. Constantly at war with each other, they kill, mostly by ambush, strange people with Italian names—people as remote from real life as the semifictional characters of *The Untouchables*. They are, in this myth, ruled by the most violent hoods of all, who, with ruthless abandon, murder dissenters, police, judges, prosecutors, and anyone else who questions their authority or threatens their domain.¹

It is true that during its period of rapid change and development, when it was consolidating its strength, organized crime was violent, sometimes wildly so.² But being far more inherently rational than they are inherently violent, organized crime's leaders, when they finally realized that of all their activities only violence exposed them to public criticism and law enforcement pressure, began to avoid violence, and to win a security which killing threatened. They developed and refined a system of rational alternatives to violence.³

As in most institutions, organized crime's evolution from 1920 to 1940 was a mixture of conscious decision and unconscious response to changes occurring rapidly in most American institutions. The old Mafia was suited to a rural society; but the United States was becoming urban.⁴ Moreover, as Prohibition, the main source of syndicated crime's income, came to an end, alternative fields of endeavor had to be found. Many of these required more sophisticated organization than that of the purely local gangs.⁵ Further, new generations were moving into leadership positions, and they, like all younger generations, rejected some of the old methods. The gradually emerging consensus that violence should be avoided whenever possible was part of this change, and was a decision of strict rationality.⁶

La Cosa Nostra, the dominant force in organized crime today, is a government, with all the forms of government, including elaborate sets of internal and external controls. Internally, LCN is authoritarian, offering protection and demanding obedience. In a democratic society, the individual who does not consent is subjected to the force of the state (police intervention, adjudication, and incarceration). In La Cosa Nostra, the system is very much the same, and is just as essential to its existence as our society's is to ours. All must subscribe to the rules; and in return, all get order, immunity from the police, businesses protected against interference from fellow criminals, and the loyalty of others. It is not a bad arrangement.

The paramount rule is the absolute authority of the boss.⁷ Literally everything is under his control, and must be specifically approved by him—expanding into new territory, beginning new businesses, hiring employees, and committing significant acts of violence. As one loanshark put it, "The Cosa Nostra is the Cosa Nostra. You just do what the f--- bosses tell you."⁸

Under the boss's authority is a well-organized system for settling disputes—a system which evolved, but which is as effective in controlling violence as would be one rationally designed for that purpose. If two soldiers in the same family quarrel over a particular area of activity, they are expected to settle their differences without violence which might factionalize the organization and arouse the citizenry. If they cannot come to an agreement, one of them asks the caporegime to arbitrate. The accused sometimes presents his defense, depending on the nature and seriousness of the charge; and the caporegime's decision has the same force as a judgment of law.

If the caporegime cannot resolve the issue or if the disputants are unsatisfied with his decision, they may request that the matter be taken to the underboss, the consiglieri, or the boss. Once the boss has made his decision, it is final. There is no appeal. If one of the parties refuses to abide by it, he is punished—not by the man with whom he was quarreling, but by the impartial hand of the organization. Punishments range from a slap in the face, administered before friends and associates to show the power of the organization and the weakness of the dissenting individual, to a beating, to murder.

When disputes occur between members of different families, the bosses or consiglieri of those families meet in a "sitdown." If they agree, they issue a notice. If they cannot, the matter is referred to the Commission, or which sit the bosses of the most powerful families.⁹ Designed to avoid violence or other public settlements of disputes, this is a well-conceived system of

compulsory arbitration for which disputants are sometimes charged fees, but which they are always required to use.

Donald Cressy believes that LCN's authority is divided two ways, by rank and expertise. He believes that the organization is changing to make rank less important than skill, and authority based less on status than on expertise. The position of "enforcer" and its well-defined authority is cited by Cressy as evidence.¹⁰

Little is known about enforcers, but that they exist indicates how consciously structured internal controls are, and how carefully limited violence is. It also indicates that there is a set of rules generally understood and obeyed, and that punishments for deviation are imposed disinterestedly.¹¹ It appears that enforcers are technicians, not always members, who arrange for the punishment of other members, and in rare instances, non-members. For example, a caporegime who doesn't turn in all the money he earns in his numbers operation, an underboss who tries unsuccessfully to overthrow his boss, a member who becomes psychotic and a threat to the organization, a soldier who ignores the boss's orders to stop invading the bookmaking territory of another family, a customer who cannot pay, a recalcitrant employee—each of these problems may be handled by an enforcer.¹²

Only the boss can order an execution within his family.¹³ It is of critical importance that the enforcer have no authority to do so. As Cressy puts it,

... force is not physical control; it is ex post facto infliction of pain for deviation. If such intentional infliction of suffering is to be accepted by the recipients and by citizens generally, it must be made "justly," in measures suitable to correcting deviation without stimulating rebellion. Maintaining "consent of the governed" then, requires that punishments for deviation be accepted as legitimate by those being governed.¹⁴

Internally, the members of LCN have given the organization a virtual monopoly on deadly force. They have given up their discretionary right to use force against each other, and have granted unlimited force to their ultimate superior. They accept the right of the organization to torture or kill dissenters, and order them to kill partners or friends. Because a higher-up orders it, it is legitimate and must be done—part of the group process. Since honor, loyalty, and silence are strongly emphasized, members have no recourse whatever from the boss's decisions.¹⁵

They may not like that, but they will accept it, knowing well that they too may be ordered killed by their boss. It would be totally unacceptable if anyone other than the boss used this ultimate power. The enforcer, therefore, must be an entirely impersonal technician of the system. If he exercised judgment, he would be more powerful than the boss, and would destroy the "government of laws" organized crime has constructed.

EXTERNAL CONTROLS

Like internal controls, the function of external controls is to minimize violence. While internal controls are built into the structure of the organization and govern its members, external controls govern the relationship between organized crime and the rest of society.

Corruption is a good example. Ever since Huey Long gave Frank Costello an exclusive franchise to Louisiana gambling and Al Capone was buying the government of Chicago, organized crime has depended on corruption of police and politicians. It is, in fact, the core of organized crime's success. With its tremendous financial resources and skill at blackmail and extortion, organized crime buys an accommodation with governments, immunizing it against law enforcement pressures. One underworld figure insists that 50 percent of a major eastern seaboard city police department receives regular payments from the city LCN. He says that each month the "bluebook" of raids scheduled for the month is delivered by members of the force; and he is warned about police plans which might interfere with his business. As the President's Crime Commission said, "All available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted local officials."¹⁶ Corruption enables organized crime to operate with relative impunity and little violence.

A second alternative to violence in external relations is money. The money which corrupts public officials is equally effective with businessmen, labor leaders, and potential rivals. LCN can offer tremendous opportunity and wealth to those who will cooperate. Its economic power can buy people, give or withdraw business, grant or withhold areas for operation. The loanshark operating outside the control of LCN can be brought under its control by the promise of protection from law enforcement (bought with money), additional working capital, and an exclusive and secure franchise on his territory.¹⁷

La Cosa Nostra, sophisticated and eager to reduce violence, understands now that most people can be used for something. Few are so valueless that they should be wasted by murder. The owner of a prosperous New York restaurant, finding legitimate credit unavailable, turned for help to a loanshark, agreed to pay interest of 5 percent a week, and to retain as "labor consultants" SGS Associates.¹⁸ When he was unable to meet his payments, his shark permitted him to default in exchange for certain agreements. First, he was required to buy his meat from a new distributor, and soon became an outlet for stolen, hijacked, and diseased meat. He agreed to buy stolen liquor from another distributor. Soon the son of one of his "investors" was put on the payroll as a headwaiter; and the restaurant became a favorite hangout for bookmakers who used it for their operations. All the while, the owner was attempting to pay off his loan, never able to make a dent in the principal because of the high interest rates.¹⁹

Nearly every borrower has some use. Bank officials can be forced to embezzle and manipulate. Stockbrokers can steal securities, and their firms can be outlets for stolen securities. People have been forced to commit burglary, to finger robberies—all because they have become indebted to a loanshark.²⁰

By far, the most effective alternative to violence in the external relations of organized crime is fear of violence. As Ralph Salerno, formerly Sergeant of Detectives, Central Intelligence Bureau of the New York City Police Department, wrote, "The use of violence by syndicated criminal groups has been careful, calculated, and controlled . . . [it] has been so successful that the fear instilled by it has actually reduced the need to use force."²¹

To make fear credible the organization must be prepared to beat or kill individuals in debt, regardless of the amount of money they owe. One shark

said that he couldn't afford to permit *any* default. Although \$100 meant nothing to him, "If you let \$100 slip by, soon \$200 accounts slip by. You can't let anybody slip by. So we kill for \$100." This man became known as the toughest loanshark in his city; and people who borrowed from him understood that defaulting was out of the question.

The fear of violence is effective not only with those in debt to organized crime. It can be used to force a liquor retailer to buy stock at inflated prices, or a small businessman to submit to labor extortion. Organized crime need not make good its threats in every case. That it does so in a few is sufficient to compel obedience nearly all the time. Henry Ruth wrote, "Selective fulfillment of threats gives the appearance of an ability to make any threat an actuality. Thus, only occasional violence is needed by organized crime to exploit in full the opportunities that the threat of violence affords."²²

Some organized crime figures manage to create fear by namedropping. They have business cards printed with their names or those of better-known criminals; and merchants to whom such business cards are presented decide to shift their business to companies with criminal connections.²³ Power, as in any field, begets power; and the demands of organized crime are met without the public outrage and law enforcement activity which would follow continuing violence.

KINDS OF ORGANIZED CRIME VIOLENCE

Classification by external and internal violence is useful; but it is not sufficiently precise to describe fully the violence of organized crime. A number of other categorizations are possible. One is violence used for discipline and violence used for business. That division seems artificial since all violence, directed inside the organization against a stubborn loanshark, or against outsiders like customers is for discipline. Another division might be crime-related violence and power-related violence, the former exemplified by a loanshark beating a borrower to compel payment of a debt, and the latter the murder of a boss or underboss. But there are too many kinds of crime-related and power-related violence, and the categories are not sufficiently precise to be useful. Ralph Salerno suggests "tactical" and "strategic" violence as a useful division. The beating of a customer by a loanshark to induce payment is tactical; the beating of a small loanshark by a larger one who wants to control his business is strategic. This is a useful distinction; but is the beating of an informant tactical or strategic. It can be both.

One useful categorization of violence caused by organized crime is: (1) business, (2) security, (3) competitive, and (4) rebellion. Violence caused indirectly by organized crime's operations is treated as a separate category.

BUSINESS VIOLENCE

It is well known that organized crime exists and thrives because it provides services the public demands. In the two clearest areas of "public service"—gambling and narcotics—there is little violence because they involve money transactions, rather than credit transactions. A gambler may occasionally compel payment by a beating. But whether conducted in cash or on credit, there is little default in the gambling business since both producer

and consumer want the relationship to be a continuing one. When borrowing is necessary, the customer generally goes not to his gambler, but to a nearby loanshark who may or may not be part of the gambling business. Whatever violence may then follow does not involve the gambler. Besides, a large percentage of organized crime's gambling operations are concentrated in the ghetto numbers racket; and the numbers are played nearly always with cash.

Narcotics too are purchased with cash; credit is extended only very rarely by pushers to customers. Drug retailers may obtain credit from wholesalers, but they always make good. Addicts may commit violent acts to support their habit; but there is little credit and little violence between merchant and customer. There are certain kinds of violence, such as that of a customer against a gambler who has cheated him, by the organization against a gambler who has held out, against numbers runners and narcotics pushers who are consistent prey to holdupmen.

In loansharking, on the other hand, credit is the commodity, and the threat of violence always exists. George and Jack Chiagouris were owners of a thriving construction business in Chicago. They had an opportunity to buy a Loop hotel at a bargain price; but because they already had a loan outstanding, they were unable to get another from legitimate credit institutions. In April 1964, they borrowed \$150,000 from a loanshark and agreed to pay \$50,000 interest over the following year. By April 1965, they had repaid \$163,000, but the racketeers from whom they borrowed insisted that they still owed \$124,000. On May 7, 1965, unable to meet the higher payments, the Chiagouris brothers were kidnaped from a restaurant, held for 15 hours, and severely beaten. They were released only after they agreed to sign a new note saying that they still owed \$124,000.²⁴

The loanshark's sole aim is to maximize profits; and he generally does not resort to violence except to achieve certain specific criminal objectives.²⁵ Certain businesses are particularly valuable to organized crime. Coin machines, businesses with a high cash flow lend themselves to the establishment of monopolies, offer pure cash profit through skimming, and tax evasion through the hiding of money. Others, like restaurants, are valuable as fronts for illegal activities. Still others, like meat packers, food processors, and liquor wholesalers—also high cash flow businesses—are valuable as outlets for stolen goods. Certain other kinds of businesses—those which require a large stock—the loanshark; backed by the power of the mob, would prefer to take over, sell the stock, and bankrupt it, emerging with pure profit, than merely to beat or kill owners.²⁶

Still, loanshark violence is the most common form of business violence because it is a credit, rather than a cash transaction in which payment must be compelled outside the law. Johnny C. was a close friend of loanshark Charlie K. Johnny needed \$1,000, and borrowed it from Charlie. When he was unable to meet his payments, Charlie, his best friend, had him taken into an alley, and beaten with a baseball bat. Charles Siragusa, formerly Executive Director of the Illinois Crime Commission, says, perhaps too extremely:

The juice victim is taken for a ride, riddled with bullets, and thrown into the trunk of his own car. The juice gangsters arrange for the car to be parked so that the police find it. Discovery of the murder is a

warning to other delinquent juice customers. They get the message with stark emphasis. The news headlines don't cost these gangsters a dime of advertising space.²⁷

Another form of business violence is labor racketeering. It is not new. In the 1920's, the mob was taking control of union locals to embezzle and manipulate welfare and pension funds, to extort payoffs and kickbacks from employers through threats of violence or sweetheart contracts, and to use union power to drive out of business people competing in industries being taken over by organized crime. Opportunities in labor racketeering are limited only by imagination. Control of a union with jurisdiction over coin machines means the ability to parcel out territories and gain a complete monopoly of the industry—enforced by union contracts, picket lines, and, if necessary, "labor violence." Control over a bartenders' union can mean the ability to force taverns to buy food, liquor, and supplies only from certain wholesalers.²⁸

Labor racketeering also is the power base of racket-controlled labor consulting firms. Owned by the same men or by associates of those who control unions, corrupt consulting firms offer their services to employers who are having labor problems. A New York nightclub owner, Benjamin Maksik, testified that he was having labor difficulties in 1955-56. Advised to contact SGS Associates, he paid a \$1,500 fee each month until 1958. During that time, he was induced to change meat, liquor, linen, and oil suppliers, and his labor difficulties continued.²⁹

A final form of business violence is that which occurs when the organization decides to invest in a new industry. Generally, it is able to gain control of one firm through its loansharking operations or through simple extortion. It then uses a powerful combination of economic weapons, extortion, and judiciously applied violence to drive all competitors out of business. As one authority said, "When organized crime embarks on a venture in legitimate business, it ordinarily brings to that venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation which are employed in its illegal enterprises."³⁰ The economic power of La Cosa Nostra insures that a monopoly, once secured, can be maintained if no new intervention is forthcoming.

Internal Security

The second category of organized crime violence is related to internal security. The New Jersey racketeer, Willie Moretti, apparently was killed because his "mental and emotional instability" made him a threat to the organization. They were afraid that he could no longer be depended on to behave "rationally."³¹ A member of the organization who consistently disobeys orders is a threat, and must be disciplined. A member who is too independent is a threat too. Dutch Schultz, it is believed, was killed because he talked too freely about planning to kill Thomas Dewey, a murder which would have brought more pressure than relief.

The beating or murder of an informant or potential informant is the most common kind of security violence. Stephen T. drove the getaway car in the murder of a mob figure in one city. It appeared to the organization that Stephen was preparing to reveal to law enforcement authorities his role in the murder; and fully seven attempts were made to kill him. John Fitzgerald was

a lawyer for Joseph Baron, chief witness in the conspiracy trial of New England Cosa Nostra boss Raymond Patriarca. Baron, under tight security, could not be reached; but Fitzgerald, who had counseled Baron to inform, represented a security threat too. And so, one day, Fitzgerald's leg was blown off by a bomb planted in his car.

The integrity of the organization depends on its security. If a member doesn't meet his obligations, he must be punished as a warning to others, and to preserve all agreements. The police cannot investigate organized crime if there are no complaints, no witnesses, and no testimony; so violence is used to neutralize law enforcement. Potential informants, if they are not discouraged by fear of violence and are sufficiently threatening, must not only be killed; they must be killed in the cruelest and most vicious ways. Examples must be made of each case; and so violence is frequently planned to include some inhuman torture before death. The body of Albert Anueci, an organized crime figure who had threatened the organization with exposure, was found some years ago outside Rochester. Some 20 pounds of flesh had been cut with a knife from his body. He had then been shot, strangled, and set afire.³²

In the 1960's, a number of restaurant owners in Chicago who had testified before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations became the victims of arson and bombings. One was hit twice, once in November 1963, and again in November 1964. Another who owned three restaurants lost all of them to bombings and fires. The State Director of Public Safety offered a reward; the Justice Department was asked to investigate; a special grand jury was impaneled. But with minor exceptions, none of the crimes was solved.³³

Rebellion

Closely related to security violence is violence resulting from rebellion. In April 1951, Albert Anastasia succeeded Vincent Mangano as boss of a New York Cosa Nostra family. During 1953 and 1954, his underboss, Frank Scalise, began to take large numbers of people into their family as soldiers, demanding "membership fees" of \$40,000 to \$50,000 and a cut of each business. The membership books had been closed for 20 years; and older LCN leaders were unhappy about the admission of large numbers of people they considered unqualified and dangerous.

In May 1957, an attempt was made on the life of Frank Costello, apparently by order of Vito Genovese. Genovese, certain that Costello, through Anastasia, would retaliate, called in all his lieutenants to explain why he had tried to have Costello killed, and to deploy his forces in case Costello fought back. Anastasia surprised Genovese by attempting to intervene peacefully on behalf of Costello.

Shortly thereafter, Anastasia had his underboss, Scalise, murdered, apparently for his extracurricular moneymaking activities. In the meantime, he began attempting to move into territory controlled by the Florida syndicate, seeking rights to a gambling casino in the Havana Hilton. On October 25, 1957, Anastasia was murdered.³⁴ New York was seething, and open warfare seemed possible. The instability could not be permitted to continue.

Three weeks after the death of Anastasia, Vito Genovese called together all the families in a top-level meeting at Apalachin, N.Y. The meeting probably had a number of purposes: to confirm the new leaders, and by giving Commission legitimacy to them, to discourage future outbreaks of violence; to read out of the organization 200 "button men" who had shown dangerous incompetence, and were therefore a security threat; and to approve ex post facto the resolution of the Anastasia threat.³⁵

This kind of rebellion appears to occur fairly often.³⁶ It appears that a major LCN internal war was recently ended by a realignment of the New York rackets. This one began in October 1964, when Joseph Bonanno, who had been plotting against two other families, was kidnaped, apparently with Commission approval. Bonanno managed to escape death by promising to surrender all his New York activities and move away. But on January 28, 1966, when Gaspare DiGregorio tried to kill Salvatore Bonanno, it was apparently a warning to stop trying to rebuild his father's organization. Sometime later, the Commission decided that DiGregorio was incompetent, and appointed Paul Sciacca to succeed him. Then the war with the Bonannos began in earnest.

Law enforcement authorities say that the war is now coming to an end, successfully arbitrated by consiglieri and bosses of other families, a "subcommittee" appointed by the Commission. Paul Sciacca has won; Joseph Bonanno has moved to Arizona, and his son to California. No one knows how many victims the war has claimed; but seven Bonanno henchmen and four Sciacca loyalists are known to have died.³⁷

This kind of revolution or civil warfare is the most spectacular kind of organized crime violence; but some authorities believe that there is constant warfare below the levels of boss and underboss. The testimony of one soldier-informant indicates that his boss constantly had men killed because they were getting too powerful, and might have threatened him. It occurs regularly among the leaders, he said. He became very valuable to the boss, he says, and close to him as well; but after only 18 months, "they" began trying to kill him. Apparently he had become too powerful, and therefore dangerous, although he is certain that he never violated rules. If he is correct and if this is common, there may be internal warfare we know little about—revolutionary and counterrevolutionary thrusts, and a good deal more insecurity and instability than we think.

Competitive Violence

Related to security violence and even more so to rebellion is the final category of violence, competition. Before 1962, the Boston activities of the New England Cosa Nostra branch were inhibited by three strong, independent Irish criminal organizations which maintained such tight control over gambling and loansharking, the LCN could not move in without an enormously costly war. So, typically, it waited.

In 1962, a member of one of the Irish gangs was insulted by a member of a rival gang; and all prepared for war. A series of ferocious beatings quickly escalated to murder; and just like nations which sacrifice their young men to war, the Irish gangs were depleted and weakened. Seeing its chance, LCN moved in with its vastly greater force and far more effective terror. To the

public, Boston's gangland slayings seemed to be continuing. But, in fact, a fundamental change had occurred. Whereas the earlier warfare had been between Irish gangs, now LCN was doing the murder—to teach lessons, force subservience, even to satisfy personal grudges. Now it was LCN terrorizing to eliminate the competition.

There were more than 50 murders in all, a remarkably large number in this age of the subtle use of power. Apparently, the New England Cosa Nostra felt secure enough—and had enough confidence in the apathy of the Boston population—to believe it could get away with that kind of public violence.³⁸

Competitive violence against LCN occurs only when its position in the criminal community is weak enough to be challenged. That this kind of violence has diminished during the past three decades is an indication of how strong LCN has become. But it is quite possible that during the next ten years competitive violence will increase. In nearly every large city of the nation, the street level operation of numbers and narcotics has been turned over by LCN to Negro gangs which have demanded a share of the business, will not tolerate being left out, and can operate more effectively on the streets of urban ghettos.³⁹ In some cities, the Italian-dominated syndicates are moving out of hard narcotics altogether, except for securing it at the foreign sources. It is too risky, business costs (including corruption) are too great, the penalties are too high, and racketeers have been heard to say that they "want no part of it."⁴⁰ As their organization improves, their skills increase, their business grows, and their power increases, will black gangs not demand more?

It has always been the tough, ambitious first-generation criminals who have had the stomach for street-level operations. There are few first-generation Italians to populate the lower levels of organized crime. Just as the Jews moved out to make room for the tougher and hungrier Italians, the Italians may now have to move out to make room for Negroes and Puerto Ricans.⁴¹

This changing of the guard may increase competitive violence. On April 24, 1967, Michael Luongo, a New York racketeer, was kidnaped, apparently by Negro racketeers. The same people had attempted previously to kidnap Luongo's boss, Joseph Manfredi, but had been thwarted. The kidnapers demanded \$45,000 ransom, and referred in their conversations with Luongo's nephew, Anthony Luongo, to a narcotics figure who had earlier been found with his head and hands cut off. They showed a thorough familiarity with the operations of Luongo and his boss, Manfredi, and mentioned that they were settling "old scores" with Manfredi.⁴² On April 25, Anthony Luongo paid the ransom; and after Michael had been released, Manfredi, who had put up the money, asked Rocco Mazzi and John Ardito to obtain permission to kill the kidnapers. Apparently it was granted because the suspected kidnapers have disappeared, and are presumed dead.⁴³

It is possible only to speculate about the future of Italian-Negro competitive violence. The enormous power and sophistication of LCN would seem to preclude a real challenge to its supremacy. And yet, as Negro gangs become stronger and larger, they certainly will demand more, and may not always make the most rational calculations. Certainly LCN will not accept many severe indignities like kidnaping. But the Italian gangs are growing smaller, older, and weaker; and they may, sometime in the future, have to choose between moving out to make way for Negro syndicates, or fighting

back with a ferocity which almost certainly would focus public and law enforcement pressure to intolerable levels.⁴⁴

Competition is not limited to minority groups. There is a kind born naturally of the rebellion of youth. Young men who work at the lower levels of organized crime are required to take all the risks, but receive only about 50 percent of the rewards. The old men who control organized crime need daring and aggressive young men; but the young men eventually begin to wonder whether they need their bosses.

In Massachusetts, nonaggressive criminals were long ago driven out of narcotics because they did not want to risk the higher penalties the law provides. They moved into gambling, for which the penalties were substantially lower. But the Massachusetts Gaming Act of 1968 made gambling operations a felony; and the more cautious racketeers are now looking for safer activities, making way for the aggressive ones to take over the operation of gambling. As one law enforcement official put it, "It used to be that the gambler who hung around the bar was a nice man, an easy man; and the loanshark in the back room was the tough. Now they're the same guy, and he's the mean one." There is no question that higher penalties make more timid operators withdraw, leaving the field to the toughs—and the dangers of violence increase.⁴⁵

Secondary Violence

The violence of organized crime is not limited to that which criminals use on each other and on victims and informants. There is an additional dimension—violence or suppression of violence caused directly or indirectly by organized crime's activities, but not committed by organized crime itself. This kind is perhaps more insidious, and reveals the most pernicious consequences of organized crime, some of its tragic results, and evil deeds.

It is not clear how much crime ordinarily considered unorganized is controlled entirely or in part by organized crime. LCN is the General Motors of illegal operations; its members know the criminal community intimately, work with it to generate good will, use it, and, to an undetermined extent, control it. The rank and file of organized crime come from the general criminal population; and it has a wide variety of working relationships with professional criminals.⁴⁶ Fences and loansharks with whom professional criminals deal are part of the structure of organized crime. Shoplifting in some metropolitan areas is highly organized, with the stolen goods handled only by certain fences. Independent operators like fences and loansharks are known to La Cosa Nostra, and when their business becomes significant, they are absorbed.

The extent to which street crime can be controlled varies. In one neighborhood regarded as highly controlled, two professional baseball players parked their car on the street one evening. Their car, having out-of-State license plates, was immediately noticed and identified as not "belonging to us." When the men returned, two sets of golf clubs had been stolen. Intelligence officers from the city police department spread the word in this insular little community that the golf clubs belonged to two sports heroes and must be returned. Within two days, they were returned, and, as an apology, one set had been treated to new club covers.

A student living in the same section, who had been accepted by the community, returned to his apartment one evening and found it burgled. He owned little of value, and did not bother to report the burglary to the police. But two days later, he was having dinner in a restaurant of which he had become a regular customer, and happened to mention to the owner that his belongings had been stolen. The restaurateur, agitated, said, "Why didn't you come here before?" Within a day, nearly all of the young man's possessions were returned.

Organized crime exercises considerable influence on crimes generally considered "unorganized" by using fear, and by providing superior services which professional criminals need. Occasionally, in Chicago, LCN is asked to arbitrate underworld disputes. It often "employs" professional criminals to commit large jewel thefts and hijackings. And its participation usually suppresses violence because it is able to plan and commit crimes with great skill.⁴⁷

Organized crime's influence on street crime is most dramatically seen in some big city neighborhoods where crime is so tightly controlled that rates are strikingly low. There may be gaming in such areas, but very little robbery, burglary, or violent crime. In one such area of New York, a law enforcement agent dressed himself with elaborate care as a "wino." His hair was long, face unshaven, his clothes dirty. Before going on the street, he drank wine, doused his clothes with it, and carefully dirtied his fingernails. He had not been out more than 10 minutes before a woman walked up to him and growled, "Get off the street or you'll be killed." He didn't belong.

In the North End section of Boston, any strange face on the street brings whistles from merchants standing in their stores and people in front of their homes. When Internal Revenue agents went to the North End to arrest Genaro Angulo on gaming charges, their presence nearly caused a riot. The police were sent in to protect them against the crowd which shouted, "Why don't you go to South Boston and get the Irish; and stop picking on the Italians."⁴⁸

This extraordinary community control is not the result of fear, but of support, organization, and ethnic cohesion. For a century, the Sicilian Mafia has tried to establish itself as a kind of ombudsman of the poor, providing services people need and protecting them against outsiders.⁴⁹ Like big city bosses of the early 20th century, LCN is regarded in certain areas as the benevolent protector of the people against the police, and against more dangerous crime, particularly violent crime. As one law enforcement expert said, "You want to talk about safe streets? A woman can walk through that neighborhood and not worry about being attacked. They keep the streets a lot safer than the cops do."⁵⁰

Organized Crime and the Urban Poor

But organized crime, although it may suppress some violence, is responsible for far more. Nearly all consumers of hard narcotics are the urban poor.⁵¹ Organized crime thrives on the support of the middle class, but it preys and depends on the ghetto. An underworld figure said, "You can make more money out of a Harlem than a Scarsdale." It is the urban poor who need the escape heroin provides; it is they whose lives are so desperate that

the promise of quick wealth makes the numbers attractive. As Joseph Valachi put it, "The numbers are good only when times are bad. It's poor people that play the numbers, and if you want the truth, most of them play because they are desperate for money and they don't have no other way to get it."⁵³ Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote:

The most grievous charge against municipal police is not brutality, although it exists. Permissive crime in ghettos is the nightmare of the slum family. Permissive crime is the name for organized crime that flourishes in the ghetto—designed, directed, and cultivated by the white national crime syndicates, operating numbers, narcotics, and prostitution rackets freely in the protected sanctuaries of the ghettos. Because no one, including the police, cares particularly about ghetto crime, it pervades every area of life.

Maintaining a heroin habit costs between \$20 and \$100 a day. The addict, who must pay cash, almost certainly does not earn enough to support his habit, and must steal most of it. Authorities say that a thief earns only about 10 percent of the true value of the property he steals; and so, if an addict requires the minimum \$20 a day for his addiction, he must each day steal property worth \$200. That means he must steal \$73,000 a year just to maintain his habit, not to mention money he needs to feed, clothe, and shelter himself and his family.⁵³

There is no way to estimate how much street crime—which includes violent crime—is committed by addicts desperately needing money. The New York City Police Department says 50 percent. Other experts think this figure is too low. They believe that most apartment and house burglaries and petty thefts are committed by addicts.

A social worker told a Senate committee:

When people talked about "problems of Harlem" or even "problems in my block," the mention of integrated schools, busing, police brutality, or some other problem... just don't get much attention or mention... they choose to talk about inadequate housing, and the problems which are offspring of that major problem, such as crime, addiction, winos, and inadequate police protection.

Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach told a Senate subcommittee:

It is racketeers' involvement in narcotics which causes substantial theft and robbery, committed by addicts to support their hunger. It is the racketeer's method of dealing with those who stand in his way which establishes examples of violence for others.⁵⁴

The urban poor can be victim-criminal, but they are, as well, purely victims. Five uneducated laborers, employees of a glue factory, got usurious loans from a clothing store at which they shopped. They agreed to pay 20 percent interest per week, and signed blank wage assignments, which were served on their employer. Each week, 15 percent of their salaries was withdrawn, and paid to the clothing store through which they had taken the loans. One of them had been the subject of wage assignments for 19 years, the entire length of his employment; the others for 10 years.⁵⁵

Authorities agree that organized crime robs poverty areas of far more money than the Federal Government invests through the Office of Economic Opportunity. But just as important, incalculable damage is done to people in the ghetto and to all of us by the implications of its charmed existence and immuned activity. To ghetto youth, who see rich lords, well dressed and driving big cars, success comes to mean successful criminal activity, and the "smart ones" are those who succeed in the mob. Mr. Katzenbach said:

Young people in the slums cannot be expected to obey and respect laws if the guardians of the law are on the "take."⁵⁶

And William G. Hundley, former Chief of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Section, wrote:

The insulated organized crime lord walks the streets freely eschewing violence true enough, but corrupting and plying his illegal trades and as such, he is somewhat of a hero and his status is the goal for many a young would-be hoodlum.⁵⁷

How can we measure organized crime's contribution to the violent subculture of the urban ghetto?

Research Needs

Organized crime experts often wonder whether Americans really care about organized crime.⁵⁸ True believers themselves, they seize every occasion to proselitize, and welcome those who share their crusading sentiments. But they know that organized crime exists and thrives because it provides services people want. As Walter Lippmann wrote nearly 40 years ago:

The underworld... lives by performing the services which convention may condemn and the law prohibit, but which, nevertheless, human appetites crave.⁵⁹

Organized crime depends not on victims, but on customers. All its activities depend on establishment of a long-term, continuing relationship between criminal and customer, who share criminal responsibility, and therefore have an equal stake in thwarting the police. Gambling is illegal; yet millions of Americans want to gamble regularly. Operation of many popular kinds of gambling requires an elaborate, expensive organization, with personnel, places of business, wire services, capital, and a national organization which can corrupt to keep itself safe.

Sale of narcotics is illegal, and yet at least 63,500 Americans want heroin regularly. The manufacture, importation, and sale of hard narcotics is a huge enterprise, requiring overseas operations, professional smuggling, and a large processing and sales organization. Organized crime can provide it. Who else could?

Usury is a crime, but there are thousands of Americans—businessmen, consumers, gamblers—who need short-term credit without references, collateral, or questions. Loansharking requires a capital investment, sizable personnel, and enforcement powers. Organized crime can provide these things.

As long as Americans enact their consciences and live their tastes, organized crime will be needed. Donald Cressey wrote:

If all burglars were miraculously abolished, they would be missed by only a few persons to whose income or employment they contribute directly—burglary insurance companies, manufacturers of locks and security devices, police, prison personnel, and a few others. But if La Cosa Nostra were suddenly abolished, it would be sorely missed because it performs services for which there is a great public demand.⁶⁰

It is not appropriate here to discuss legalization of the activities LCN operates illegally. It is clear that as long as we provide no legal means for people to satisfy their tastes and needs, they will find illegal means to do so.

But it would be irresponsible to propose solutions to organized criminal activity when we know so little about the phenomenon. Very little research has been done on organized crime or, for that matter, on most criminal justice problems. So much more must be learned about its structure, operations, and public attitudes toward it that efforts such as this paper inevitably end with a plea for genuine research.

The early section of this paper speculates on the ways in which the family structure of LCN inhibits and controls violence. We need to know more about the family structure. We must try to find out whether a growing need for sophisticated management skills will force LCN to promote outsiders to positions of power and authority, and if so, whether they will make it more or less violent.

If younger generations of LCN hoods are more restrained than the older generations were, will diminished violence lead to greater or less control; and what new alternatives to violence will enable LCN to maintain control? One LCN hood believes that there always will be young men willing to do the violent jobs because it is the only way to move up in the system. He made a bargain with LCN: In return for a larger share of loanshark profits, he killed for his superiors. If this man's experience is typical, the age and sophistication of LCN personnel will make no difference; violence is built into the system.

Very little is known about the culture of organized crime. What makes people go into this life? Many children of LCN members take the money their fathers have earned, and enter legitimate business. What motivates those who go into the rackets? Few family histories of LCN people have been written.

We need case studies of large numbers of LCN people. We need to know more about their careers in crime, how they got admitted into the organization, what being part of it means, why they remain there, and what people give to and receive from LCN. The question will become vitally important because if, as many law enforcement officials believe, the membership books have been closed, they will have to open soon. Will those admitted to the organization be of Italian origin only?

The apparent cultural rigidity of organized crime figures is curious, and may offer some clues to effective intervention. At the time of the Apalachin meeting, Vito Genovese lived in a modest home in Atlantic Highlands, N.J., drove a 2-year-old Ford, owned about 10 suits, none of which cost more than \$100 when bought. On the top of his bedroom dresser were cheap plaster statues of saints. His children and grandchildren visited him frequently, and he personally cooked dinner for them.

One of the biggest loansharks, a pioneer in the business, started his career as a laborer. Even after he had become exceedingly wealthy, he continued to drive a 6-year-old car, and to work five days a week digging ditches at a salary of \$85. On weekends, he earned extra money by raising the gate at a local racetrack—while earning many thousands of dollars a month in loansharking.⁶¹

What makes these men so culturally rigid? Why, simply because Mafia leaders in Italy lived modestly as men of the people, do many Cosa Nostra members in America value humility? Perhaps they consider austerity a vital part of the code, and fear that any breakdown in the discipline and self-discipline of the code will threaten the organization. Yet there are ways in which this austerity program is violated. Men may live modestly in three-bedroom frame houses in New Jersey; but at the same time, they keep mistresses in fancy apartments on Park Avenue. Moreover, their dissatisfaction with their lives is revealed by their common, though not universal, hope that their children will not follow them. We must know far more than we do about the racketeer and his environment.

It is equally important that we devise better methods of measuring and evaluating organized crime. No one knows how much LCN earns, net or gross, in a year. It is impossible to say now how much money is made in each of its activities, and which are growing fastest. This paper has emphasized gambling, loansharking, and narcotics—and underemphasized what may be the major growth activity in organized crime—infiltration of legitimate business. This subtle use of power, some experts believe, may be the organized crime activity of the future. They think that the old and experienced men of LCN will say, "Leave the dope and numbers to the Negroes. We've got something better."

And perhaps they do. The profits of gambling, loansharking, and other rackets are sent by courier to secret Swiss bank accounts, and come back into the country "cleansed" and ready for investment. With this money, organized criminals can buy into businesses, install their children to operate, and gain new power bases. Once inside, they can use terror to eliminate competition, arrange advantageous labor contracts through corrupt unions, loot companies, pad payrolls and expense accounts, and continue to expand. If this is, in fact, the organized crime of the future, we should know it—and know its implications for violence.⁶²

We must find ways of quantifying the violence caused—indirectly or directly—by organized crime. People do not report beatings, knife wounds administered by LCN hoods. They are treated, if at all, by private doctors; and the police do not hear about them. It is just as important that we devise better methods of measuring and evaluating law enforcement intelligence on organized crime.

Seven years of intelligence were required to make a case against New England Cosa Nostra boss Raymond Patriarca; and even then he was really convicted by a lucky break. Arrests and convictions may not be a fair way of measuring our law enforcement effort against organized crime. But what is?

It is possible to imagine many new ways of judging law enforcement's effectiveness. Martin Danziger, chief of the organized crime program for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, has suggested seven measurements of law enforcement's effectiveness against organized crime:

(1) *Number gambling odds.* The statistical likelihood of a given number winning remains fairly constant. Therefore, an increase in the odds offered to the players on a given bet indicates a decline in the effectiveness of law enforcement, because the costs of doing business—paying salaries, securing attorneys, bail bonds, paying off corrupt officials, and supporting families—are diminishing.

(2) *Purity and cost of narcotics.* A decrease in the purity of narcotics offered for sale at a given price indicates an increase in the effectiveness of enforcement, a blocking of the lines of commerce. Conversely, increase in purity at a constant price indicates that the market is well supplied.

(3) *Extent of public corruption.* Since corruption is necessary for organized crime to exist, a decrease in the number and status of public officials suspected would indicate an increase in law enforcement effectiveness.

(4) *Number of gang killings.* A rise indicates that a struggle for organization or succession has caused a breakdown in organizational stability. When struggle follows imprisonment of a leader, killings become a measure of effectiveness.

(5) *Number of informants.* A rise in the number of people willing to testify and inform, especially those from the middle ranks of organized crime, indicates a breakdown of organization discipline, and a corresponding gain in law enforcement strength.

(6) *Large-scale thefts.* A decrease in the dollar value of thefts of such goods as securities, bulk commodities, and drugs, which require elaborate distribution systems, indicates an increase in law enforcement effectiveness.

(7) *Organization meetings.* Since organized crime operates through a series of agreements regulating geographical areas of activity, an increase in the number of meetings, people attending, and regions represented indicates disputes or vacancies, in turn suggesting disruption caused by law enforcement.

There are no satisfactory ways to explain variations in the violence of organized crime. Why have there been so many gang murders in Chicago, compared to other cities where organized crime is strong? What makes Chicago's syndicate more violent than others? The regional patterns of organized crime have not been satisfactorily explored. No one has attempted to study organized crime in cities across the nation. There are, for example, different styles of killing in each city. Chicago is noted for the shotgun; Youngstown is the dynamite city; New York perfected the "disappearance."⁶³ Why are there differences? In New York they talk about a "hit." But in Boston, a "hit" means an assault; and "whack out" means murder. Does it make any difference?

It is terribly important to learn more about the customers of organized crime. "No comprehensive analysis has ever been made of what kinds of customers loan sharks have or of how much or how often each kind borrows."⁶⁴ The same can be said for gamblers and addicts. We know so little about the desperate feelings which lead an urban slum-dweller to begin taking heroin, and so little about the misery of life which makes the

100-to-1 numbers racket, which pays only 600 to 1, appeal to him. What can be done to reduce organized crime's market? It is very easy to argue that the way to rid us of organized crime is to legalize the activities in which it engages. And we must consider more seriously legalized gambling, maintenance doses of narcotics, and easier credit. But no one seriously believes that organized crime would be destroyed by legalization of all its current activities.

Perhaps law enforcement authorities are correct when they assert that no one except a few organized crime zealots really cares about organized crime. Bostonians tolerated with remarkably little outcry 50 gang murders. New Yorkers seem to live happily in a city which has five organized crime families which influence a large part of the city.

What is it about the legitimate businessman that enables him to seek a sweetheart contract through Carlo Gambino? What happens to the conscience of the restaurateur who turns his back when illegal liquor is brought into his establishment? How can the stockholder agree to sell stolen securities?

People have a strange rationalization about organized crime. "It doesn't have anything to do with me," they say. "If it corrupts public officials and police, then we'll get rid of those who are corrupted. I don't like to pay a few cents more for bread, meat, liquor, garbage disposal; but a few cents is not worth making a fuss. If some people get killed, they're the ones who are involved in this, and they're just getting what's coming to them."

Can we really believe these things? Do we really believe that organized crime is none of our business? Does any one deserve murder in a civilized society? Does corruption of public officials mean anything? Can there be respect for law if people are permitted to live—and die—outside it?

On the other hand, organized crime does control violence remarkably well. They are aware of this. "If it weren't for us," said one LCN figure, "there would have been ten Chicagos (St. Valentine's Day Massacre)."⁶⁵

In many ways, organized crime supplies definite advantages. Crime is controlled, violence is controlled; it says to the public, "Stick with us and we'll give you the kind of crime you like. We'll give you a joy ride through drugs, business opportunity through loan sharking, games, labor peace at little cost—and to boot, we give you the extra fund of reading about our exploits in the Sunday papers."⁶⁶

This paper has tried to show that violence occurs in organized crime only when the organization is threatened in some way. When LCN is able to maintain so much conformity that internal dissension is no problem and external resistance is weak, fear is a sufficient substitute for violence. If illegal operations can be conducted over a long period in relative safety, violence is not needed and the absence of violence further increases security. But whenever there is a challenge to, or weakening of the structure, there is a commensurate increase in violence. If law enforcement ever becomes truly effective against organized crime, violence—competition among gangs, competition between men for succession, murders of witnesses and informants—might increase. Thus violence might be the best barometer of law enforcement effectiveness.

But is the public willing to tolerate an increase in violent crime? Suppose law enforcement drove organized crime out of loansharking and gambling, and thrust it back into robbery, hijacking and street crime. Suppose organized

crime were forced by law enforcement to operate in the open. An increase in felonies with a gun might be the consequence. Suppose organized crime were broken apart altogether. Violence would increase greatly as independent entrepreneurs competed for business. All this would be easier to deal with by conventional law enforcement techniques. But is the public really so concerned about organized crime that it would tolerate more violence as a price for successful war on it?

There really is no end to the violence of organized crime. The violence done to a loanshark debtor who defaults is really no worse than the violence done to the law by a policeman who is corrupted. The violence done to an informant is no worse than that done to people who are hooked on narcotics, to families whose fathers are destroyed by loansharks, to the union member whose dues are stolen, the housewife who pays inflated prices—laws unenforced, respect for law diminished, the public encouraged to disregard law, the alienation of people who know that the police who demand their respect take payoffs from those who exploit them.

Organized crime corrupts society in every way that a society can be corrupted. It corrupts officials, the law, our values, and our social fabric. Its violence—overt and hidden—is a small part of what it does to the nation. But its violence should be sufficient to command determination to end it.

REFERENCES

1. Hostetter, G. L. and T. Q. Beesley, "Twentieth Century Crime," In Gus Tyler, *Organized Crime in America* (Ann Arbor: 1962), p. 54, write:

Gangsters ruled their various realms like despots. They set up and dispensed their own law through their "Kangaroo" courts in which men were tried, sentenced to death, and executed. They appeared to be, and indeed, in many instances were, absolutely without fear of prosecution by the authorities. If prosecution was attempted, it became a farce. Witnesses were intimidated or killed; juries were bribed; judges were influenced by threat of defeat at the elections. Indeed, candidates for public office, having definite alliances with professional gangsters were elected by a system of fraudulent control of the state legislative assembly, to the municipal council, and places of similar power.

The problem of fiction is one which has plagued law enforcement and retarded serious treatment of organized crime. Professor Donald R. Cressy, in "Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem," *Annals*, 374 (November 1967), 104, discussed the problem of sensationalism in newspaper, magazine, television, and virtually all other reporting of organized crime. Even law enforcement personnel, as Cressy points out, adopt the terminology of the media. The Thomas Lucchese becomes "Three Fingers Brown," and Arthur Flegenheimer becomes "Dutch Schultz," and the public is encouraged to think of organized crime as some wonderful, titillating game played by awful but charming characters, and having nothing whatever to do with the lives of everybody else.

2. Donald R. Cressy, "The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates," *Organized Crime Task Force Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice* (Washington, 1967), p. 53, writes:

During the period of national prohibition, the illicit governments controlling persons engaged in the production and distribution of alcohol were ruled primarily by men who, in prison life, would be called "toughs," "hoods," or "gorillas." Wild and sometimes public violence, principally against members of rival gangs, was the order of the day. Further, within individual syndicates, executions of nonconformists were sometimes performed almost capriciously in an effort to maintain rank authority.

Dion O'Banion, a murderer and powerful leader of Chicago's underworld, refused to

cancel the \$3,000 gambling debt of Angelo Genna, member of the Chicago syndicate, and issued an ultimatum to Genna. On Nov. 10, 1924, three Capone men entered O'Banion's flower shop. One of them shook his hand in a friendly way while the others emptied their revolvers into him. Virgil Petersen, "The Barbarians in Our Midst," Tyler, *op. cit.*, 1957.

Joseph Valachi described the warfare which led to the formation of La Cosa Nostra, violence which culminated in the Masseria-Maranzano war in which on September 11-13, 1931, approximately forty Sicilian gang leaders were killed in New York, Buffalo and Chicago. Masseria and Maranzano were among those who were killed. "Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics," "hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Government Operations Committee, 88th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, p. 214. Maas, Peter, *The Valachi Papers* (New York, 1968), p. 84; Cressy, Donald, *Theft of a Nation* (New York, 1969), p. 38.

3. The origins of La Cosa Nostra remain somewhat hazy. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* of Dec. 6 and 17, 1928, reported a meeting of the "Mafia Grand Council of America," which representatives from Chicago, Gary, New York, Newark, St. Louis, Miami, and Tampa are supposed to have attended. In May 1929, Al Capone invited the leading Mafiosi from New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia to Atlantic City, where he proposed the establishment of a nation-wide syndicate to control bootlegging, prostitution, labor racketeering, and extortion. But two years later, Capone was indicted, convicted, and imprisoned, and it fell to Charles Luciano and his underboss, Frank Costello, to realize Capone's dream. They deplored useless violence. They were businessmen, and changed organized crime's behavior from overwhelmingly violent to overwhelmingly rational. Working out a system of peaceful coexistence among gangs, they persuaded everyone that there was enough business for all, and no point to fighting. Besides, Luciano reasoned, violence caused people to be killed and the police to look in; syndication, on the other hand, would maximize the profits of each through pooling of material resources and political contacts. So the basic outlines of syndicated crime emerged—Costello in charge of gambling; Luciano, narcotics, numbers, and prostitution; Joe Adonis, bail bonding, waterfront activities, and corruption; Louis Lepke, industrial and labor extortion; Bugsy Siegal and Meyer Lansky, enforcement; Abner Zwillman, New Jersey operations; and Dutch Schultz, restaurant rackets, Harlem numbers, extortion, and beer. (Burton B. Turkus and Sid Leder, "Murder, Inc.," in Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 215.)

Organized crime today is a nationwide alliance of at least 24 "families," not all of whose members are related, but all of whom are Italian and Sicilian. The wealthiest and most influential families are in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, Michigan and Rhode Island. Their estimated strength is 5,000 of which 2,000 are in New York alone. These "families" are linked to each other by marriage relationships, old-country ties, business associations, and mutual needs, and are presided over by a Commission, on which currently sit the heads of the nine most powerful families in the nation.

This organization controls nearly all gambling, most important loan sharking, and virtually all "hard" narcotics imported into the nation. It infiltrates unions to steal and extort, businesses to create monopolies; it has its own fences, lawyers, bail bondsmen, and fixers; it corrupts political leaders and law enforcement officials at all levels of government; and it is extraordinarily refined, with a set of roles, allocated duties, established rules, divisions of labor, and specialization.

Estimates of its business activity are very poor. The best indicate that La Cosa Nostra earned \$20 to \$50 billion in 1967 from gambling; \$350 million from loan sharking, the major growth activity; \$350 million from narcotics; \$225 million from prostitution; and about \$200 million from untaxed liquor and cigarettes. There is no way of estimating its numerous other business activities.

For detailed descriptions of organized crime, see *Organized Crime Task Force Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice* (Washington, 1967); "Electronic Surveillance and Organized Crime," a speech by Senator Joseph D. Tydings, *Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (May 13, 1968), S. 5437; American Bar Association, *Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance* (New York, 1968); G. Robert Blakey, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Senate Judiciary Committee, *Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement*, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 932; Maas, *The Valachi Papers*; Cressy, *Theft of a Nation*.

4. Anderson, Robert T., "From Mafia to Cosa Nostra," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71: 3 (1965), 302; Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," *Antioch Review*, 13: 2 (1953), 131; Andrew Sinclair, *Era of Excess* (New York: 1962); William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity* (Chicago, 1958).
5. One of these was narcotics. Since opium is not grown in the United States, international connections in the Middle East, Italy, Sicily, and France are required to purchase, process and smuggle drugs into the United States. Another activity which required more sophisticated organization was sports betting for which there must be elaborate wire services and complicated "laying off" of money. Also, both narcotics and gambling require huge capital investments.
6. The rationality of this decision can be appreciated only by realizing how inherently violent syndicated criminals are. They come from a background in which violence is used naturally and easily to settle disputes. They talk all the time about killing. Suppressing their naturally violent natures must require extraordinary restraint.
7. The boss presides over a family structure which—based on what we know—appears to parallel that of Mafia groups in Sicily. Beneath the boss is the underboss, who collects information for the boss, relays messages to and from him, and is a buffer between the boss and the organization. On the same level as the underboss is the consigliere, usually an elder member whose judgment is valued but who possesses no line authority. Below the underboss are the caporegima, who serve either as buffers between the top men and lower level personnel, or as chiefs of operating units or geographic areas. One may be in charge of numbers, another of heroin, another of loan sharking operations. Below them are the soldati who operate illegal enterprises, supervising employees on the streets. This structure is diagramed by the Crime Commission in the Organized Crime Task Force Report, 9.
8. New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control and Effect on Society, "The Voices of Organized Crime," p. 10. The boss has approximately the same absolute authority over his domain as Joseph Stalin or Adolph Hitler held over theirs. He approves business, personnel, all killings, making decisions ranging from the most minute to the most important. The extraordinary FBI "Airtels" or summaries of electronic surveillance on Raymond Patriarca, the New England Cosa Nostra boss, revealed that Larry Baione, when he was released from prison, asked permission to open a crap game; but Patriarca refused because the game would have competed with one already being run by Bades, who had been paying a percentage to Baione while he was in prison. Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, *op. cit.*, p. 953.
They also reported that Patriarca demanded that the gang wars of Boston stop because the police were beginning to round up criminals, and were hurting the organization's operations. Patriarca agreed to talk to a certain James Flemmi, and said, "If the killings don't stop, I'll declare martial law." *Ibid.*, p. 954.
9. As of 1963, five from New York and one each from Buffalo, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago. There is some evidence that bosses are being so closely watched by law enforcement agencies that they cannot risk Commission meetings. So settlements of disputes may be delegated to a "committee" of the Commission.
10. The enforcer is an expert technician who arranges punishments. This means that his position must be integrated with others—those who do the killings, and those who order them. Cressy, "The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates," 52; *Theft of a Nation*.
11. The set of rules is very complex and obscure. No one really learns how well defined they actually are. Gus Tyler quotes Ed Reid, author of *The Mafia*, as listing five basic rules: Reciprocal aid in all cases; absolute obedience to the chief; an offense against one is an offense against all; no appeal to the authority of the state; no revelation of the names of any member. But as Tyler points out, these rules might very well have been written for the Three Musketeers (one for all and all for one), for the Industrial workers of the world (an injury to one is an injury to all), for the Irish Republican Army, the Mau Mau, the Hatfields and McCoys, or for any street corner gang engaged in warfare against another gang or against the "authorities." These are the standard rules of the "We's" versus the "they's," of the tribe against the world, of the hostile subculture against the reigning civilization. *Op. cit.*, p. 333.

Valachi listed 11 rules: the security of the organization comes first; secrecy on penalty of death; death for fooling with another man's wife; prohibition against

Valachi listed 11 rules: the security of the organization comes first; secrecy on penalty of death; death for fooling with another man's wife; prohibition against hitting another member with your hands; prohibition against kidnapping; protection against the outside; all orders passed down through the hierarchy obeyed without question; lieutenant may be demoted to soldier by the boss; transfer to another area cannot be made without a letter of recommendation from the boss; approval for murder; and prohibition on partnership with member of other family without authorization of both bosses.

Valachi's code is probably more detailed and specific than the code actually is. In reality, it may be nothing more than loyalty, honor, respect and absolute obedience. But it is very functional. As Valachi pointed out:

It is a hard rule in this thing of ours from the days of Mr. Maranzano that one member cannot use his hands on another member. In New York, the no-hands rule is most important. It ain't peaches and cream like in Buffalo, say, or in them other cities where there is only one Family and everybody is together. It is different in New York . . . we step all over each other. What I mean is there is a lot of animosity among the soldiers in these Families, and one guy is always trying to take away another guy's numbers runner or move into a bookmaking operation or grab a shylocking customer. So you can see why it is that they are strict about the no-hands rule. Maas, Valachi, 196.

12. Murder is nearly always rational. But Albert Anastasia once saw a television interview with Arnold Schuster who had informed on Willie Sutton, the bank robber. He became enraged. "I can't stand squealers. Hit that guy," he said, and Schuster was murdered. Maas, Valachi, 202.
13. Raymond Patriarca was called upon to settle a dispute between two of his soldiers. One had called the other a "motherfucker," and the abused one asked for a "sit-down." Patriarca listened to the complaint, and told the offending soldier, "That's a terrible thing to say." His resolution of the dispute was to promise that if the soldier ever again used that description about his colleague, the latter could kill him.
14. Cressy, Organized Crime Task Force Report, 45.
15. All depends on the authority of the boss, and his authority depends on the reality or illusion of immunity from police intervention. If the boss is arrested, indicted, or convicted, the system is rocked; since everyone understands that if the boss can get caught by the criminal process, so can everyone under him. Valachi described the reaction to the Apalachin raid:

I'll tell you the reaction of all us soldiers when we heard about the raid. If soldiers got arrested in a meet like that, you can imagine what the bosses would have done. There they are, running through the woods like rabbits, throwing away money so they won't be caught with a lot of cash, and some of them throwing away guns. So who are they kidding when they say we got to respect them. Maas, Valachi, 249.

16. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, 1967), 191.
Whyte, William, *Street Corner Society* (New York, 1955), 134, Whyte was told about an incorruptible police officer by other police officers, and concluded that the primary function of policing, in a corrupt environment, is not law enforcement, but regulation of illegal activity.

The cops down here all hate Clancy . . . He makes it tough for them. It wouldn't look right up at headquarters if Clancy was the only sergeant making pinches. Headquarters is paid off too, but there are some honest cops there, and you have to watch out for them. On account of Clancy, the other sergeants have to make some pinches too.

And a captain, known for incorruptibility, said:

If a man makes too many arrests, he isn't doing his job right. Of course, if he doesn't make any arrests at all, we know something is wrong. We rate the efficiency of the man as a variable considering the character of his route and how quiet he keeps it. If a man has a difficult section and he keeps it quiet so that there isn't much violence, places aren't being robbed, and the women aren't being bothered, then we know he is doing a good job.

17. Cressy, Organized Crime Task Force Report, p. 52.
18. Saltenberg, Gambino, and Silver, the "legitimate" business of Carlo Gambino, boss of one of New York's five families.
19. Testimony of Michael H. Metzger, Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, New York, before Senate Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d sess., p. 48. "High interest rates" does not mean 10 or 20 percent a year. It means 10 or 20 percent a week.
20. An example of the ways in which people can be used is the story of Jerry Wolff and Nathan Sackin. Wolff, a Wall Street brokerage house clerk who owed \$5,000 to Sackin, a loan shark, had been having difficulty meeting his payments. He had been badly beaten, threatened, and forced to supply three other customers to the loan shark. Now Sackin was looking for other ways to use Wolff. Their conversation was recorded and reproduced by the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control, and Effect on Society, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

Sackin: "Hey, by the way, a thought occurs to me."

Wolff: "Huh?"

Sackin: "If there was such a thing as stocks . . ."

Wolff: "Yeah?"

Sackin: "... Say for argument's sake, say this stock is in Al's possession . . . And Al wanted you to sell the stock . . . Can you handle that?"

Wolff: "Sure."

Sackin: "Without his authority?"

Wolff: "Without his authority . . . No."

Sackin: "Let's say that Al stole it from him."

Wolff: "... As long as it's signed on the back I don't care."

Sackin: "What if he, somebody, signed it on the back."

Wolff: "I don't know who signed it."

Sackin: "Can you sell the stock?"

Wolff: "Sure."

Sackin: "Maybe there's a shot of you getting out of this after all."

So that simply, a murder is averted, and the organization finds another outlet for stolen securities.

21. Salerno, Ralph, "Organized Crime and Violence," unpublished paper prepared for President's Commission on Violence. The loan shark, Nathan Sackin told Jerry Wolff, "Understand, because if you open your yap they'll kill you . . . I mean kill you. So don't think I'm giving you a way out of the deal. If anything happens they'll leave you for dead." New York State, *op. cit.*, p. 67. Charles Stein, one of the biggest loan sharks in New York City, would say to debtors, "If you can't meet the payment this week, Jiggs [Nicholas Forlano] will be around next week." Jiggs seldom had to come around.
22. Ruth, Henry S., F., "Why Organized Crime Thrives," *Annals, op. cit.*, p. 115.
Fear has many forms and serves many purposes of organized crime. One can fear for one's own physical wellbeing or that of family and other loved ones. One can fear that the business to which a lifetime has been devoted will be destroyed. One can fear that a past moral dereliction may rise to the surface and destroy a promising career or advanced employment status.
23. Petersen, Virgil W., "Organized Crime and Violence," an unpublished paper prepared for the President's Commission on Violence.
24. Robert J. Walker, testimony before the Senate Committee on Small Business, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Charles Siragusa, in the same hearings, p. 107, told of the case of a woman whose husband was loaned \$300 for medical bills. He frequently had difficulty meeting the 10 percent weekly interest payments, and one night he was dropped at their doorstep badly beaten. In May 1964, Joseph Grieco, the shark to whom they were in debt, tried to kidnap their five year old son, and the wife begged \$30 from her grocery store employer. On another occasion she was told that if they continued to have difficulty meeting the payments, enough male customers would be found to enable her to earn \$100 a day and meet her husband's payments. Finally, the husband, having paid \$1,000 in interest without ever having reduced the principal, despaired and committed suicide.

25. Loan sharking does sometimes turn into pure extortion. Larry Baione, Phil Waggenheim, and Leo Santaniello—all of the New England syndicate—lent money to an employee of a successful home improvement firm. When he was unable to meet his payments, they threatened him and the employee asked his boss for help. The boss met with the three, and agreed to pay the debt. Deciding that the boss was a pushover, the three then demanded that he pay them \$5,000 or get his head broken. He refused indignantly, and one day they trapped him, beat him, and forced him to agree to pay them the \$5,000. Now believing that they really had a good thing, they demanded \$20,000 and a piece of the business. But they had gone too far; so the boss went to the District Attorney for help.
26. This is bankruptcy fraud, known in the special lingo of this field as "scams" or "bust-outs."
27. Charles Siragusa, testimony before the Small Business Committee, 109. Occasionally a customer will borrow from loan shark A to pay loan shark B. This is considered bad form and if discovered will certainly result in a beating. A shark never cuts into the territory of another.
28. Petersen, "Organized Crime and Violence."
29. Grutzner, Charles, "Ex-Bookie Held Contract Agent of Mafia-Controlled Company," *New York Times* (Mar. 5, 1969). 1.
30. Cressy, Organized Crime Task Force Report, 26.
31. According to Valachi, Vito Genovese said, "Willie has got to be hit because he is not well. I remember him telling us, 'he has lost his mind,' and that is the way life is. If tomorrow I go wrong, I would want to be hit so as not to bring harm to this thing of ours." Maas, *Valachi*, 211.
32. Maas, *Valachi*, 262. This is not to say that all witnesses and informants are killed. Law enforcement authorities sometimes seem to want it both ways. On the one hand, they do not want LCN murders of witnesses and informants—usually unspeakably cruel and vicious—publicized for fear that people will then fear to come forward. At the same time, they don't want it known that LCN often does not bother to kill informants, and usually doesn't kill witnesses. People who agree to testify probably know the risks. Informants, particularly, involved in organized crime themselves, know better even than law enforcement how vicious the mob can be in retaliation. So if they inform, they must know what they are risking and have compelling reasons for taking the risk—like the certainty of death without law enforcement's protection.
33. Petersen, Virgil, "Organized Crime and Violence," 12.
34. Maas, *Valachi*, 238, tells the story in detail.
35. A score had been kept of all the badly done executions and there had been twenty-seven incidents of near misses, slight wounds, and bodies left carelessly in the street.
As Valachi put it, "When a boss gets hit, you got to explain to the others why it was done." Maas, *Valachi*, 118.
36. Another war broke out in New York in late 1960. Joseph Profaci, head of a family there, was beginning to lose his grip. He was giving the most lucrative work to older members of the family; and the young members—among them Joseph and Lawrence Gallo, Joseph Giorelli, and Carmine Persico—felt they were being cheated. These four had worked for Frank Abbattemarco and when he was killed in November 1959, they expected to be given part of his operations. But Profaci vetoed that. They prepared their defiance and waited. Profaci and his underboss, Joseph Magliocco, appeared to be headed for prison as an outgrowth of the Apalachin conference, and the Gallos intended to take over the organization then. But the convictions were set aside by the courts, so the Gallos had to try to fight their way in. They kidnaped five Profaci men and held them until Profaci agreed to their demands. But he did not keep his word. In spite of the likelihood of armed conflict, the Commission ruled that the matter was intrafamily, and should be settled there. In August 1961, Joseph Giorelli disappeared, and an attempt was made on the life of Larry Gallo. This was Profaci's attempt to put down the rebellion, but it didn't work. Between August 1961 and August 1963, nine men were killed, three disappeared, and fifteen others were wounded or narrowly escaped. The Gallos themselves would have been murdered had it not been for the intervention of the New York City Police and the FBI. Eventually, Profaci's underboss, Joseph

Magliocco, got the support of Angelo Bruno, boss of Philadelphia, and Stefano Maggadino of Buffalo, and was made boss.

This is a kind of rebellion by sufferance of the Commission. The Commission didn't feel capable of settling the war; and so it permitted a dispute to become public until one side had been sufficiently weakened for the war to be settled. Another kind of sanctioned rebellion is described by Frederic Sondern, Jr., in his *Brotherhood of Evil*, excerpted in Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 305. The time had arrived for Giuseppe Masseria to retire. He wouldn't take the hints—even the assassination of a personal bodyguard. So Lucky Luciano took him to an excellent Italian restaurant, filled him with food and wine, and then discreetly withdrew to the men's room while three men walked up behind Masseria and killed him. The case is discussed in detail, Maas, *Valachi*, 103; Cressy, *Theft of a Nation*, 41.

37. Grutzner, Charles, "Mafia Leaders Settle 'Banana War,'" *New York Times*, (Nov. 24, 1968), p. 1, tells the story superbly. It is especially interesting, and probably significant that within one month after the "Settlement" of this war, both Joseph Bonanno and his son, Salvatore, who had been pursued for years by law enforcement at every level, were indicted. It appears that when leaders are weakened, they are really weakened. Grutzner, Charles, Bonanno, p. 36, "Indicted in Theft of Credit Card to Finance a Trip," *New York Times* (Dec. 4, 1968).
38. Rogovin, Charles H., and George V. Higgins, "Organized Crime in Massachusetts," *Tufts Assembly on Massachusetts Government* (Medford, 1968).
39. La Cosa Nostra has always been willing to use other ethnic minorities as street level employees. In Boston, Chinese, Syrians and Lebanese all have their own organizations under the big umbrella.
40. A large scale numbers operation will net \$50,000 a week. If one is caught for operating it, the conviction probably will carry a 30-day penalty, since felony gambling convictions are so difficult to obtain. A conviction for selling heroin, on the other hand, can bring a sentence of 5 to 20 years. The risk just isn't worthwhile; there are too many other ways to make money illegally.
41. Haller, Mark H., "Urban Crime and Criminal Justice: The Chicago Case," a paper read April 18, 1968, to the convention of the Organization of American Historians. Haller's study showed that of the 108 top crime figures in Chicago in 1930, 30 percent were Italian, 29 percent were Irish, 20 percent were Jewish, and 12 percent were Negro. Not one was of native Anglo stock. We know that 1930 was a turning point in American organized crime. It would be fascinating to have similar ethnic breakdowns for 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1969. What happens to the children of gang leaders is vague. Some reject all ties with their families. For example, the niece of a mob executioner teaches school in Harlem; the daughter of a boss is a New York department store buyer. Others follow a middle road, leading their own lives, but accepting the benefits of mob power. And a third group slides into family businesses. A fascinating account of the socialization process is in *New York Times* (Mar. 9, 1969), 71: "Many Mafia Heirs Involved in Mob Penetration of Legitimate Business."
42. Manfredi is a member of the Carlo Gambino family.
43. Indictments of the *People of the State of New York against Rocco Mazzie, a/k/a Roggie Mazzie* and the *People of the State of New York against Michael Luongo*, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York.
44. One unknown is the ability of Negro gangs to prepare their youth for careers in crime. La Cosa Nostra has developed a highly sophisticated training process. A young man is watched for years to evaluate his development, intelligence, and courage. He is tested under a variety of conditions, even set up for arrest. Gradually, the importance of the jobs given to him increases, and if, over a period of 6 to 10 years, he shows that he has the "character" for the work and has learned well, he is accepted.

There is no objective reason why Negro and Puerto Rican gangs could not develop similar systems. There is a hypothesis that Italians are just better at this sort of work because of Sicilian traditions and their family structures. But no one is certain about this. Narcotics are now being sold in the streets by Negroes and Puerto Ricans; numbers are passed by them. There is no reason why, eventually, as they increase their power, these new gangs will not develop their own training systems and gang structures. Gambling would come first, numbers and sports betting, followed by

loan sharking, and international narcotics business. Just as Italians have controlled the traffic from processing plants in Marseilles, Puerto Ricans could import narcotics from Latin America, and Negroes from the Middle East. And why not black protection for black business as black capitalism emerges? Negroes, particularly, are showing some considerable aptitude for the conspiratorial, secret forms of organization required. They also appear more daring and more willing to use force. If the Blackstone Rangers and Black Panthers ever turned to crime, these highly disciplined organizations might be impressive.

45. Interestingly, it appears that in Providence, young Turks are shaking down loan sharks and gamblers. Apparently Raymond Patriarca is allowing it. How long can that continue without violence?
46. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report on Crime and Its Impact (Washington, 1967), 100.
47. An interesting example of the complex relationship is that of a jeweler whose business was virtually wiped out by a theft. The organization was afraid that he would bring too much police heat; so it purchased the jewels through its fence, and sold them to another dealer. Then one night it stole them and returned them to the original owner.
48. The *Boston Globe* that day, Nov. 1, 1965 reported "Twenty-three men arrested, including Michele and Donato Angiulo, brothers of Jerry Angiulo, reputed Cosa Nostra chieftain in Boston—Gambling cash seized—Hostile crowds insult and harass arresting officers—Jering residents pelt government agents with eggs and tomatoes as the suspects and boxes of confiscated gambling slips are hauled away."

An IRS undercover agent, disguised as a sailor, was stopped in the North End and questioned by Gennaro Angiulo, Peter Limone, and William Cresta about his true identity, and told to get out of the area. When he did not, they accused him of raping a woman and on this pretext of legitimacy, beat him. When indicted, they carefully planned their defense on the basis that they did not know his true identity. FBI Airtel, hearings of Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, *op. cit.*, p. 952.
49. In Italy, no Mafioso saw himself as criminal, but as an enemy of true petty crime. In 1946, one day shortly after the liberation of Sicily, people cheered their Mafia Don, who they knew had assisted in the liberation, with, "Long Live the Allies. Long live the Mafia." Lewis, Norman, *The Honored Society* (New York, 1964), 16 and 21.
50. Community support for La Cosa Nostra is not completely irrational. They are, in many ways, good to the community. They contribute vast amounts of money to build churches, and win the support of the parish priests. It is the classic case of the minority community "taking care of our own." Occasionally, however, the syndicate cannot control everything. A New York City racketeer complained that the Police Department wasn't doing its job. "It's getting so that a man can't walk on the street." On the evening of Jan. 13, 1967, Albert Frabotta, alleged syndicate terrorist and enforcer, was walking his toy poodle, Suzy, in Chicago's Lincoln Park. Two young muggers jumped him and stole his poodle. He reported it to the police under an assumed name, and admitted to the officers who visited his home that the experience was "unnerving." Petersen, Virgil, A Report on Chicago Crime for 1967 (Chicago, 1968), p. 126.
51. Ruth, *op. cit.*, 118.

Why does narcotics addiction flourish in some places and not in others. Nearly all heroin addicts live in New York, California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of Columbia. Is this because all of these states are urban, because all have large populations of poor, because all have organized crime? What are the reasons or combinations of reasons?

McDade, Joseph, et al., "Organized Crime and the Urban Poor," a study of the Wednesday Group, a small number of young Republican Congressmen, *Congressional Record*, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Aug. 29, 1967).
52. Maas, *Valachi*, 184. Tydings, *op. cit.*, S. 5438.
53. Salerno, *op. cit.*
54. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 13, 1965, quoted in Ruth, *op. cit.*, 117.
55. Siragusa, *op. cit.*, 108.

56. Ruth, *op. cit.*, 118.
57. Letter to Donald J. Mulvihill of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, dated November 18, 1968. The President's Crime Commission in *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, 209, put it this way:
- As the leaders of Cosa Nostra and their racketeering allies pursue their conspiracy unmolested, in open and continuous defiance of the law, they preach a sermon that all too many Americans heed: The Government is for sale; lawlessness is the road to wealth; honesty is a pitfall and morality a trap for suckers.
- The effect of the rackets upon youth is described in Whyte, William F., *Street Corner Society* (New York, 1955), 113-15, in his account of how Mario Serrechia and "T.S." got into the rackets. Also Spengel, Irving, *Street Gang Work* (Garden City, 1967), 7, discusses the effects of neighborhood homogeneity on the children of racket-controlled neighborhoods.
58. The "Good Guys" professional investigators, philosophers, prosecutors, and cops who specialize in organized crime investigation, feel very lonely most of the time. They seek and receive a good deal of reinforcement from each other; but because their work takes them into the secret corners of people's behavior, they tend to be closed-mouth, and do not, for the most part, seek public contact. Consequently, the public and many professionals are not enriched by the insights they share with each other.
59. Lippmann, Walter, "The Underworld as Servant," in Tyler, *op. cit.*, 60:
- In spite of the magnitude of its operations, the ordinary house-holder has little personal contact with the grosser felonies of the underworld. Arnold Rothstein was murdered in a hotel which is a ten-minute walk from my home; Jack Diamond was shot in a hotel which is not much farther away. But for the fact that I am a newspaper man and know reporters who were at the scene shortly after the shootings, I should not, I think, have any greater conviction of their reality than I have about a murder in a novel by Edgar Wallace.
- Hill, Stuart, "Organized Crime and American Society," *Midwest Quarterly*, 9: 2 (Spring, 1968), 171. Mr. Hill cites four reasons for the growth of organized crime: It is an adjunct of the American economy, providing services which the public demands. It has been a route for upwardly mobile groups. It has profited by our traditional political values, e.g., distrust of central government and of certain law enforcement techniques.
60. Cressy, Organized Crime Task Force Report, 49.
61. These stories are endless. Tony Higgins was a baker; and even after he was a great criminal success, he went to his bakery every morning at 4:00 a.m. to prepare the goods for the day.
62. For more on infiltration of legitimate business, see Cressy, *Theft*, 99-108; Maas, *Valachi*, 274; Grutzner, Charles, "Ex-Bootlegger Manages Money in Swiss Banks for U.S. Mobs," *New York Times* (Mar. 2, 1969), 1; Grutzner, "State Hearing Told of Mafia Tie to 20th Century Industry, Inc.," *New York Times* (March 7, 1969), 49; *New York Times*, "Many Mafia Heirs Involved in Mob Penetration of Legitimate Business" (Mar. 9, 1969), 71.
63. Salerno, *op. cit.*
64. President's Commission, *The Challenge of Crime*, 189.
65. Salerno, *op. cit.*
66. There have been many occasions on which we, who deplore organized crime, have been willing to use its incipient violence for our own purposes. In 1927, a group of Italian fliers visited Chicago, and Al Capone was invited to be a member of the official greeting party. Officials said that his presence would discourage anti-fascist demonstrations (i.e., he could enforce the law while the police could not).
- During World War II, Charles Luciano, in prison on a thirty-to-fifty year sentence for white slavery, was used by Naval Intelligence to end sabotage and pilferage on the port of New York and to make contacts in Sicily for the invasion of Allied forces.
- In the Summer of 1966, CORE was picketing the Mulberry Street Police Station in Brooklyn, and was being taunted by neighborhood Italian boys with words and

rocks. At the request of the New York City Youth Board, a representative of Lawrence and Albert Gallo went to the area, and told the boys "Go home." John Casses, President of New York's Patrolmen's Benevolent Association protested.

I can just see what will happen. It's this way. When a police officer goes up to some juveniles who have been misbehaving and tells them to quiet down and move along, what will they say to him? "You're not the boss around here. Mr. Gallo is." When you single out people like that, you make them tin gods in the neighborhood, people known for their habitual lawlessness. *New York Times*, Aug. 15, 1966.

The Police themselves have been known to ask Cosa Nostra criminals for assistance of one kind or another. The FBI Airtels, *op. cit.*, and the brief of the government in the U.S. Court of Appeals, *Raymond Patriarca v. U.S.* tells the story of one such incident. In the Spring of 1965, Captain John Eddy of the Providence Police Department visited Raymond Patriarca to ask that he shut down a crap game which was causing difficulty for the police. Patriarca apparently tried and could not persuade the operator, William Marfeo, to cooperate. So Patriarca ordered him killed immediately. Is this really what Captain Eddy had in mind?

Yet what Patriarca did is not so unusual. As Gus Tyler wrote in "The Roots of Organized Crime," *Crime and Delinquency*, 8 (Oct. 1962), 336, "Police are glad to cooperate (with established organizations) because the 'Indian' is a disturbance, a source of violence, a disruption to old ties, a threat to the monthly stipend."

Is there any way to measure the damage done to legal authority by the use of syndicated criminals by society? What do we say about our society when we admit that the police cannot control anti-fascist demonstrations, close a gambling operation, and that the police and the Army together cannot prevent theft and sabotage in our nation's largest port—but that La Cosa Nostra can do these things. What do we do to legitimize organized crime when we make it, for certain purposes, an extension of legitimate authority? Don't we put a stamp of approval on people whom we presumably abhor? Can we have it both ways?

Perhaps the most significant statement of our failure to deal with organized crime was Attorney General Robert Kennedy's testimony before the Senate Government Operations Committee (88th Cong., 1st sess. (Oct. 11, 1963), 25) about witness and informant protection.

We have taken steps, Senator, to even move people out of the country. We have provided them positions and work in areas where nobody will really have any contact with them. We have arranged to move their families and have their names changed. I think we have procedures now where, if an important individual comes forward and is willing to testify, that we can give him that kind of protection.

What the Attorney General was admitting is that our nation cannot protect, with all the force at its command, people who testify on its behalf. We can do so only by stripping such people of their identities, taking them from their communities, changing their names, and sending them to some remote corner of the world to live in isolation.

As the President's Commission said, "When the government of a powerful country is unable to protect its friends from its enemies by means less extreme than obliterating their identities, surely it is being seriously challenged, if not threatened." (Organized Crime Task Force Report, 1.)

APPENDIX 19
VIOLENCE AMONG INTIMATES

By William Goode*

In the standardized murder mystery, the plodding detective stubbornly tries to pin the crime on the husband, wife or good friend of the victim, while the imaginative super sleuth through a dazzling skill in intuition or reasoning proves that a seemingly unrelated individual plotted the dark deed. Bureaucratic lack of imagination and the authoritarian forces of the police are thus exposed to ridicule.

Real life does not imitate art that closely. In ordinary life, when the homicide squad encounters a crime of violence there is no murder mystery at all. Several people already know who was the criminal. If not, some patient questioning of close friends, lovers, or spouses reveals who the culprit was. The best guess as to "who did it" is that an intimate of the victim was the culprit. In one half to three fourths of the homicide victims reported on in various studies, the murderer and his victim had at least some previous association.¹ Why do intimates commit violence against one another? Perhaps the most powerful if crude answer is that they are *there*. Most automobile accidents occur within 25 miles of the home because that is where the cars *are* at the time. Home may not be as dangerous as mines or ski slopes, but more injuries occur there because people are there more of the time. It cannot be surprising that more violence is directed against those with whom we are in more intimate contact. We are all within easy striking distance of our friends and spouses, for a goodly part of the time.

Moreover, again crudely but reasonably, we are violent toward our intimates—friends, lovers, spouses—because few others can anger us so much. As they are a main source of our pleasure, they are equally a main source of frustration and hurt.

What they do affects us more directly and painfully than what most strangers do.

At this simple level, then, *why* most murders and a high but partially unreported percentage of violent acts are aimed at intimates appears to contain no mystery at all. Nevertheless, from the earliest myths to the latest plays and novels, the theme of violence between those who are emotionally close has fascinated the human observer. From Cain and Abel to Othello;

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from Clytemnestra to Lolita, our literature (like that of the East) has been written in blood, because the theme entranced both writer and audience. Indeed, as a literary theme, violence between *strangers* is pallid and uninteresting. It must be supposed that all of us respond in darkly atavistic ways at the deepest levels of psychological impulse to the idea of killing or maiming those who are emotionally close to us.

If the human response is so common, and the primal impulse to do violence to our intimates is so ubiquitous and powerful in the human animal, must we also accept the widespread belief that man is by nature a killer, by his very biological predisposition prone to attack his fellow man? And if he is, does this mean that we must despair of ever pressing him gently or firmly onto the paths of civility, restraint, or at least a lower propensity to violence? If the gloomier interpretation of man's biological nature is correct, then why intimates kill one another is even less of a mystery. If we are natural killers, put together in the same cages and habitations, then surely many of us must die.

Certainly man must plead guilty to part of the accusation. From Homer to the present, social philosophies have denounced our savage deeds. We now know that over a million years ago our man-like ancestors in the Olduvai Gorge had already become the scourge of the animal kingdom. Clever at killing both small and large prey, our ancestors included members of their own species among their victims. Doubtless, until man sinks into the abyss of eternity, he will continue this ancient practice.

By contrast, man's anthropoid cousins, the gorilla, chimpanzee, gibbon and orangutang, began to follow a separate line of evolution 15 or 20 million years ago and remained largely herbivorous and pacific while we become omnivorous and warlike.

However, we are not only unlike our closest relatives in this respect alone. We are also unlike all animals as well. First, because man makes tools he is unlike the great killers in this: almost *any* adult human being can kill any other human being with stone or club, knife of split bone or obsidian, gun or poison. The weak can kill and hurt even the strong, can equalize the differences in strength or skill that nature or training has granted to the superordinate. The lion or leopard, weasel or shark, that is smaller or less competent in attack must learn to accept the dominance of its superiors, but the oppressed, frustrated, or merely angry human being can work out a successful plan for eliminating any of his fellows.

In the wild state, as so many animal ethologists have reported, animals do not kill members of their own group or species. But the weak ones *cannot* do so, and when whipped they submit. A whipped man or woman can by contrast bide his or her time until an opportune moment for redressing the balance of power.

Man's violent urges are less controlled or controllable than those of animals not because he has an "instinct to kill" but because he has no instincts at all. Although some adult animals will eat the unprotected young of their species, and under stressful circumstances (mainly in captivity) some mothers have eaten their own young, no species has any instinct to kill other members of its own species. Inherently self-destructive, such an instinct would have been an intolerable burden for any type of animal in its fight for survival. Indeed, if Conrad Lorenz is correct, the killer animal has

counter-instincts against any dangerous intraspecies aggression, which include both limitation of the types of attack and rigid patterns of submission when one animal is defeated.

By contrast, man has no biologically described "solutions" to standard environmental problems: he has to learn all that he knows or does. Thereby he is the most flexible of animals in searching for answers to environmental challenges, the most open to new procedures for adapting to social or biological pressures.

But precisely for that reason, what he has learned is not sufficiently compelling to overcome his aggressive impulses, if his fellow men cannot inhibit his violent urges, no built-in biological restraints or instincts exist that would keep his actions within even the bounds of civility that lions or wolves respect. Untamed by instincts, man is frequently not gentled by his childhood or adult learning experiences either.

Indeed, in this set of learning processes, man achieves at best a precarious, paradoxical balance. If in fact others succeed in implanting in him a deep and passionate concern for others so that he might cherish them, their actions become thereby so important to him that they can arouse a murderous anger in him. If he cares little or not at all, he may not feel much concern or guilt when weighing the advantages of getting rid of others.

The same precarious and paradoxical balance may also be observed in man's dealings with outsiders, strangers, or foreigners. In a warlike, primitive society, strangers are not brothers, and the society may exact only a minor penalty for killing someone who hardly belongs to the human race. Western explorers and settlers displayed such cool sentiments in South Africa, in the South Pacific and the New World. Natives were able, at times, to return the compliment. Again, however, when groups become more important to one another, and their welfare is more dependent on other's actions, they also begin to be more indignant about what others do and thus more willing to kill or hurt.

Thus, in its rearing and controlling processes, the civil society aims at a balance between caring too much about what others do, and being indifferent to their fate.

That few men do kill or maim others seems to refute the notion of a biological urge or instinct to murder. Whatever man's aggressive impulses, obviously most men learn to control them. Much more compelling, however, are the great differences in homicide and assault rates among nations, regions within nations (e.g., the southern United States or Italy as compared with the north), classes and ethnic groups, the two sexes. The differences are so great as not to be explicable, except by reference to *social* factors. This fundamental conclusion also gives some support to those who aim at reducing man's violence toward his fellows. If different social patterns create high or low rates then perhaps we can find out why, and build toward social structures that will generate less violence.

Since broad social differences affect the relations among intimates, they also lower or raise the frequency of violence between intimates and we must examine them in this analysis. However, it seems likely that the peculiarities of intimate emotional links among human beings have their *own effects within* the general and pervasive pressures from great cultural factors. In this analysis, those peculiarities, as mediated by the larger social-structural pressures will be the main object of our attention.

Before considering some of the broad regularities that govern the outbreak of violence between human beings, we should at least take note of the range of variegated forms that violence may assume among intimates. Clearly no theory or interpretation can encompass all of them, and any classification is subject to criticism. These overlap here and there, and the motives for them vary considerably.

As a major category, we shall place most emphasis on various forms of homicide and assault. Within this, of course, we shall have to consider the smaller case of murder accompanied by suicide. To include various forms of assault with homicide may appear to confuse the issue somewhat, but we must keep in mind that many forms of homicide actually appear in court as aggravated assault and many whose anger stimulates them to an act of homicide claim later, in all sincerity "they did not mean to do it." Many fail, in turn, to murder and only maim another when their real intention was to kill. In addition, all of us are enough aware of our own emotions under periods of great stress to know that though we were inhibited from an actual attack, our deepest impulse was to destroy, to eliminate our opponent. All who have observed opponents in a furious contest of merely verbal debate will recognize the intensity of anger that may well up, and intuitively can understand how—given different circumstances—one or another of the opponents would cheerfully crush the other. Thus, the overlap within this broad category is very great. It is safe to say that many children engaged in an ordinary fight have a strong wish to kill at the moment, even though they would recoil in horror at the reality itself. Thus, the overlap within this set of complex legal categories is extremely great and they do share a considerable common root, and intense murderous emotion.

Violence among intimates must also include the wide range of behavior under the general category of forcible rape. We shall later on present some of the data that indicate how frequently this type of case involves people who have had prior or even very close contact with one another. More important, it is safe to say that rape is like assault in that a very high proportion—even a majority of the cases that actually occur—never come to the attention of the police. Certainly this would be true for cases of attempted rape, or the use of force to achieve a sexual end, even when it ends in failure. The steps by which men and women move consciously or unconsciously toward this type of confrontation will be dealt with later on.

Of course, any examination of violence among intimates must include fights and homicide among friends, drinking companions, and adult and juvenile gangs. These include both the enmities that exist between chronic opponents as well as the transformation of friendship into momentary hate, not to say the simple arguments that result eventually in a fight. We shall also have to consider the extent to which such networks of friendship actually stimulate one form or another of violence.

One of the more troubling of the cases we shall have to consider is the case of child abuse, a phenomenon that has occupied the attention of welfare workers for many decades, but which has received little public recognition. Without any question, child abuse is far more common than most believe, and those who have published reports on it have had to face the relative disbelief of others in their data. In individual cases, welfare workers or physicians have

been reluctant to invoke public authority or legal powers to save the child from further hurt.

That type of case overlaps psychologically in turn with cases of matricide and patricide, as well as the case of parents killing their older children. The complex swirl of emotions within the small family is usually difficult to understand or even to untangle, but we must at least attempt to see what light can be thrown upon such cases.

It is clear, of course, that many cases of child abuse and homicide or assault within the family between parents and children often grows from severely neurotic or psychotic personality structures. The extent to which families maintain their common residence, even when one or more may be dangerous, is a problem we must also examine. Such cases overlap in turn, of course, with the more general case of the mentally ill person who murders or assaults someone who is close to him. This may include a good friend or helpful neighbor as well as a member of the family. We cannot, of course, unravel here the transformation of psychotic impulses into homicidal impulses, though we have progressed enough in the past 50 years to be well aware that psychosis does not necessarily lead to homicide. The "mad murderer" is a common enough newspaper phrase but psychoses themselves are not specifically homicidal in character.

Finally, of course, we must consider somewhat separately—at least analytically separately—the case of the *calculated* murder or assault against an intimate, when material advantage is the aim. These include the instances of homicide for insurance or inheritance, the removal of a spouse or lover who is blocking the way toward a satisfactory new life arrangement, the murder of a competitor, the attempt to "persuade" a competitor in a business or illegal racket, and so on. It may be somewhat less productive of understanding to consider these cases, since they seem to approximate a simpler case of jungle warfare. What makes them somewhat more interesting is that often they involve two people who have not only intimate relations with one another, but sometimes apparently friendly relations with one another. At a minimum, some simulated friendship may be utilized as a way of achieving the objective of destruction. In addition, we need to consider why people are willing, in the face of the known risks, to attempt so hazardous a course for the achievement of what seem to be quite ordinary goals.

But though we shall wish to consider some of these types of cases separately, all of them could be crowded under the broad category of "homicide and assault" and much of our analysis will therefore focus on this most general category, for whatever the motives or backgrounds of those intimates who hurt one another may be, they issue in violent attacks, some of which end in homicide.

As we noted previously, the peculiarities of human relations that grow from closeness and intimacy alter and shift the characteristics of violence in many ways, but these in turn form part of a broader category of violence in our time. Homicide between strangers is different from violence between intimates in some ways, but both are subject to the broad social pressures that generate or reduce the rate of homicide or assault. In a society with a general low rate of homicide, there will, of course, be fewer homicides between intimates. We must therefore give at least some passing attention to

problems that are analyzed in much more detail in other reports of this Crime Commission. In these other reports, the general distribution and incidence of violence are analyzed, but those data are also relevant here, since they constitute the broad framework of forces that generate violence between intimates.

These broad patterns are also of use to the analyst, because they help to guide him toward possible *causes*. Unfortunately, as all researchers in criminal behavior have noted, official reports do not help us much in understanding the social and psychological causes of crime, because they contain only the information that is necessary to the policeman in keeping his own records, and to some extent in formulating the case for prosecution. The law is much less interested in the forces that created crime, and far more in setting the stage for demonstrating what crime actually took place and who was actually responsible for it.

On the other hand, these reports do contain some evidence as to where violence is most likely to occur since it will normally follow the patterns of the past. The categories that are typically used are not *causal categories*. They are often what the sociologists call "status variables" such as age, sex, region, class, etc. They are not themselves the causal influences, but they help us locate such causes. Thus, for example, the status category "Negro" is not, strictly speaking, a racial category, but is a social one. Much more fundamentally, however, it says nothing about cause per se; it merely directs us to look at the social factors within the lives of a disadvantaged group, to ascertain why the rate might be high or low within that group. Similarly, we know that women are convicted far less than men of almost any category of crime, but we do not suppose that we have located a biological cause. Rather, we are directed to look again at the social constraints, the manner of socialization, the allocation of energies, the differential opportunities and so on that may lead to a lower rate of criminal conviction, and possibly a lower rate of criminal activity.

Because other reports in the Crime Commission deal more extensively with these broad patterns, we shall not even attempt an adequate summary here, but merely make reference to a few of the findings that by now have been validated in many studies. For our purposes they constitute only the background or framework within which violence among intimates takes place. Perhaps the most general of these is the finding that among industrial nations, the United States is perhaps the most violent. Although of course legal definitions vary greatly from one nation to another, to the point that category of "assault" is almost useless for comparative purposes, and "homicide" can be compared only very loosely, it is unlikely that any standardization would change this general ranking by much.

This finding has been widely discussed by commentators and criminologists for many decades. Americans, it is claimed, begin with a frontier tradition and though the frontier itself included only a small percentage of the total population after the first settlement, its patterns affected all of the United States. On the frontier, men had to depend upon their own mastery of violence in order to survive, whether against lawless intruders or Indians. Courage was useful in such a social structure, it is asserted. The ideal of a man facing the threat of death unafraid became embedded in myth and folklore. Moreover, some would argue that those who

settled here were primarily not from the more civil, polite layers of European or Anglo-Saxon society, but lower middle class or lower class people, accustomed to violence in their own country.

In addition, there is at least some reason to claim that Americans have been more restive under authority than the population of Europe, more prone to local revolts, riots and feuds. Colonists evaded English law before independence, and dissidents of all types refused to bow to the yoke of legality. As a consequence, we must face the fact that from the beginning of American settlement, our cultural tradition has leaned toward the solution of personal and social problems through the use of force, more than the population from which the settlers came.

It is not surprising then that various studies over the past generation have disclosed our homicide rate (by various modes of calculation) is typically from 3 to 10 times as high as that of other Western nations. For many American cities, the present rate would come close to 9 or 10 per 100,000, while that of, say, Amsterdam or Berlin would be 1 or less.

Doubtless, the comparison between the United States and such Western nations is the correct one to make, but it should not be forgotten that many other nations almost certainly have rates equally high. Certainly many Latin American nations have extremely high rates of assault and homicide and some Eastern nations also fall into that category.²

Moreover, as against the frequent gloomy analyses of the present time, almost certainly this rate has not risen over the past half century. The "rising tide of violence" is almost certainly a fabrication of newspaper excitement, moralistic preaching, and changes in police reporting. In an earlier period, most assaults never appeared in the police court, and far more killings did not, for they were viewed as relatively private, local affairs. It is true that people fear for their safety in American cities now, but this has been true in the past—and once was also true in London too.³

The importance of this general set of facts is, however, that all of us live to some extent, in an atmosphere of greater violence than in nations whose technological development is close to that of ours. Consequently, the propensity to violence among intimates is likely to be higher than in other countries.

The same may be said with reference to *regional* differences within the country itself. Here, of course, the most obvious difference is to be found in the *southern* regions, i.e., the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States, whose rates of both homicide and aggravated assault vary from two to five times as high as those of other parts of the country. Here again, assayers and even casual observers have noted the cultural differences. Southerners are much more likely to carry guns. They have maintained, longer than in other parts of the United States, a resistance to authority and a cultural emphasis on a man's right to solve some of his personal problems by direct intervention rather than recourse to the law. This grew partly out of a rural tradition, but also out of a tradition that gave great weight to the ideal of the cavalier who had a right to bear arms and a duty to uphold his own honor.

Apologists for the South have sometimes urged that the extremely high rate of homicide and aggravated assault was caused only by the high percentage of Negroes in the South. According to this argument, Negroes are

an especially violent part of the American population; they are not only more emotional than whites, but are subjected to fewer restraints. Lacking adequate socialization in the home, they are unable to bear frustration and vent their rages immediately without thinking of the consequences. Thus, the rate of *general arrest* among Negroes is about three times that of the white population. If we confine the cases to criminal homicide, the Negro rate is about 4 times that of whites. Cities with a higher percentage of Negroes have higher homicide rates.

Unfortunately for this kind of explanation, Southern *whites* also have a higher rate of homicide than the rest of the nation. One could, then, argue that since it was the Negroes who were the immigrants, and who have learned their cultural patterns from the whites, in fact they have done no more than acquire the propensity to violence that characterizes the Southern white culture.

Nevertheless, by almost any type of criterion, the rate of homicide and aggravated assault is higher among Negroes than among whites, both men and women. The Negro rate is lower in areas where the white rate is lower, but it is nevertheless higher than that of the whites. This general fact is important, again, as a guide to understanding the dynamics of violence among intimates.

For many decades it has been known that women commit homicide less than men do. Among Negroes, the ratio is somewhat less, perhaps as much as 4 to 1 and for whites as much as 9 to 1, but the ratio is high in all reported studies, in this as in other countries. One study of nearly 20 years ago suggests that where the rate of homicide is low, the difference between men and women is less.⁴ Nevertheless, by almost any comparison, women are much less likely to commit homicide than are men. We shall examine some of the reasons for this difference later on.

Although official police reports do not include class differences, in homicide rates when assault or homicide is distributed on city maps by census tracts, it is clear that the higher rates are found in the poorer areas, and the lower rates in the suburbs. This finding accords, of course, with commonsense and with ordinary observation, though again the dynamics are not equally obvious. In such poorer areas, a higher percentage of Negroes is also to be found, but higher rates are also recorded in poorer white areas as well.

It should be kept in mind, however, that poverty per se is not the causal variable. It is true that the South is poorer than the rest of the nation, and has higher homicide rates, but poorer counties in Idaho or Iowa will not exhibit rates as high as those in the somewhat wealthier urban counties in the New York City sprawl. Poorer areas in the United States are more likely to be rural, but rural areas do not have rates as high as urban regions do. Thus, we must interpret class variables as referring to various kinds of social and cultural dynamics, not merely to mechanical relationship between poverty and violence.⁵

Such broad differences suggest that people in different social settings acquire different *predispositions* to violence, and are restrained more or less by the social networks within which they live. Since violence between intimates must be shaped or generated by such factors, it is necessary to consider first the patterns of socialization, the ways by which the kin and

friend networks, and later the school, attempt to mould the child to fit the demands of the society.

In perhaps the simplest of socialization models, the infant is a bundle of unformed desires, and the parents from their first interaction with it are occupied with trying to inhibit most of those desires, and to implant more civilized ones. By punishment and reward, parents (and others, later on) "teach" the child that crime does not pay and that virtue does. In the ideal case, the child learns "what is right and what is wrong," which does not mean only that he can describe what his parents want, but that he comes to feel deeply the same values they have been urging on him.

The child, in this ideal version of what happens, becomes an autonomous individual, who refrains from violence, revenge, or crime not because he can not get away with it, but because it is wrong in itself, because his conscience would bother him, because he is not even tempted to kill or rob. He has learned a distaste for crime. From an inarticulate, savage beast—fortunately, helpless at birth—he is transformed into a civil adult, pleased to obey the laws.

Of course, it is recognized that some people are not so transformed, and in this description the criminal is viewed as one whose impulses were not inhibited. He remains at some primitive or childlike level, and at best learns that others will punish him, so that he had better be careful when he breaks the law. His parents were ineffective, or he associated with evil companions who persuaded him to flout the civil rules of his society.

The dynamics of socialization seem to be more complex than the above description suggests. Children do come to acquire the values of their parents, but it is not clear just how or why.⁶ Often they do so only because both parents and children live in the same neighborhood, class, and ethnic group.

We also see more clearly that most of us can be tempted by crime at times, and indeed a rather high percentage of people actually do engage in it.⁷ Professional criminals *are* different in some ways from the rest of us, but all those who commit crimes are probably more like the rest of us than different. Few of us are so completely socialized as to feel no impulse to aggression. We do feel committed to legal order, civility, nonviolence, and similar virtues, but we are also quick to spin out a chain of moral justification if we are tempted to their opposites.

Moreover, it is clear that some part of the process toward criminal behavior is a "labeling process," by which the young person is gradually *typed* by others as a criminal, is treated differently, and responds differently. In harmony with our previous comments on cultural differences, we also note that the criminal—and these comments apply, as we shall see, to much of assault and homicide among intimates—has more *opportunity* to engage in crime, and is more likely to associate with others who are part of (or who at best do not object to) a criminal subculture. We shall later see at which points some of these general processes are relevant for violence among intimates.

However, more fundamental for our present inquiry is the extent to which we are all trained to some extent *for* violence, including aggression against intimates. Let us consider this process briefly.

In general, social science has neglected force as a factor in social interaction. The economist postulates a civil society in which people obey the

laws, and only now and then recognizes that force protects the telephone company against an intrusive competitor, the heiress against the predatory embezzler, the wife against the demands of her husband. Typically, the economist does not even touch on the sprawling criminal enterprises of the country. Similarly, the sociologist or psychologist analyzes the value commitments and motivations of people, but ignores the ways by which force or its threat may shape decisions, actions, and even wishes. The pupil may respect the teacher, but is also aware that the teacher is (in the lower grades) stronger or can call a policeman to remove the obstreperous from the classroom. The parent can call on force to impose his will on the child, and either spouse can invoke outside force to protect himself or herself.

This underlying factor in social relations is usually neglected, because we see little force, and because our own impulses to use force are concealed—often even from ourselves. Nevertheless, this concealed variable is of considerable importance, and not the least in intimate relations. Napoleon is said to have remarked that one can do anything with bayonets except sit on them: People must be persuaded, not merely forced. Nevertheless, force is *at least an ultimate deterrent*, and its threat colors many aspects of our private lives.

We must view the outbreak of violence among intimates as not merely an example of *failed socialization*, a case that shows the individual received a poor or inadequate rearing as a child. Many people are capable of homicide or assault whose earlier experiences could not be distinguished from those of the law abiding.

Next, we must not suppose that violence, even among intimates, is a simple function of association with others who are criminal or addicted to violence (although that experience *does* have its impact). It is not only criminals who support the social patterns of violence.

We must rather understand that not all of the socialization experiences mould the child *against* violence. Indeed, in many ways what happens in the earlier years is a training *for* violence. It supports violence more in some groups than in others, but few groups can claim that the entire content of their rearing and social control techniques press toward peaceful behavior.

First, of course, the child learns from the earliest years that force is effective, and does in fact prevent others from carrying out an act that they disapprove. Although observation studies of child rearing are rare, any observer can see that American parents characteristically use force on their children, from the earliest ages on. Certainly they use far more force than the parents in most primitive societies do. The contrast with Japanese parents is especially striking. Although hundreds of articles have, over the past 20 years, denounced John Dewey's notions of progressive education, Dr. Spock's earlier advice to punish less and love more, or the various forms of "permissive" child rearing, in fact none of these theories was ever put into effect. American parents *do* whip their children less. Teachers also use less force on their pupils than a generation ago. But love and peacefulness as parental or pedagogical techniques have not been tried. Indeed, since the adult generation has had so much childhood experience with the ultimate effectiveness of force, it would be surprising if its members could put such a philosophy into action.

The child learns, then, that when *he* does something that displeases others

who are stronger, they will deter or punish him if they can. This is a simple and powerful lesson, and is clearly not limited to strangers, since it is first learned within the family.

He learns from observing his own parents that males are stronger than females, and when they lose in a verbal battle they can have recourse to violence. Even if his parents do not fight physically, he may observe (even in middle class households) that his mother is frightened when his father is furious. He learns that even grown men who are neighbors may goad one another into fighting. Here again, he will see more violence in a lower class than in a middle class street, but he will be conscious of these flares of temper. At a minimum, he sees his father threaten violence to another driver who has bullied his way through traffic; or see his father avoid a threatened battle with another driver.

Of course, parents do preach nonviolence to their children, and so do teachers, but both sets of authorities, like policemen, exhibit their *own* belief in the efficacy of force when used on intimates, and impose their will through the superior deployment of violence.

The adult learns several things from these experiences, which become part of his adult personality, forces in his own psychodynamics. First, of course, he learns that violence *can* be useful, and that many get away with it. Very little of the aggression he observes ever comes to the courtroom, and force is often successful in protecting one's rights, or in imposing one's will on another.

Second, he learns the various *gradations* of violence, fitted to different types of situations, frustrations, insults, or people. Part of this is, of course, simply learning the *costs* of different grades of violence. A man learns to judge (erroneously or not) how tough other men are, so that in various encounters he knows when to retreat and when to stand his ground. Each individual is also taught a complex set of cost *contingencies*: A boy is punished more for using violence on a girl than on a boy, on a younger boy than on a boy his own age, on a teacher than on a stranger; more for imposing his will by violence than protecting his rights; etc..

The adult has also acquired, as part of his emotional dynamics, a set of values and attitudes that rank violence differently according to the action that potentially stimulates it. Until recently in Texas, for example, not only did courtroom practice support the outraged husband who killed his wife and her lover when he caught them in *flagrante delicto*—this could be a calculated *cost*—but men were socialized to *feel* that degree of outrage, to feel so dishonored that they could not without shame treat the event nonchalantly. In an earlier day in the United States and in Western countries generally, certain types of confrontations required a duel, and men felt shame if they avoided one.

So extreme a set of cases merely points up the central fact that we come to respond with different intensities of emotions to the different actions of our friends, spouses, and lovers, and thus we learn gradations of violence with which to respond to those actions. Almost no one as parent refuses violence as a tool, to put down the violence that a child directs against *him*, but some parents will ultimately refuse to use violence against the verbal attacks from their teenager children. At an earlier age, such an attack would have been met with violence. Middle class husbands do not often use fists on their wives, but

I would venture that most have at least slapped their wives at some point in their married lives when the provocation seemed great.

Of course, no rule in contemporary society approves of homicide as an answer to even adultery, but many informal rules are applied, that show how we are trained to respond with different degrees of violence to different types of action. These may be observed both in the results of jury trials, where "folk values" often soften the rule of law, and in neighborhood gossip about a given act of violence. For example, few men will condemn outright a man who shot his wife's lover when he came to the house to take her away, and both men and women "understand" a woman who after much physical abuse stabs a husband who threatens to kill her. Similarly, people will not approve, but they will at least sympathize, when they read of a father who used force on his high school daughter who announced her intention of staying out all night.

We acquire, then, a set of values and attitudes toward others' actions, by which we are guided. Simply put, some actions anger us more than others, because in our value system they are more important: some cause us material losses, but others cause us shame. In a society in which romantic love is central, almost all of us feel violence when our love is threatened. In a subculture in which male honor requires courage and competence in confronting others, certain types of challenges and insults are dangerous. Where the mother is venerated, at least as a theme in the culture, the taunt "Your mother!" calls for violence.

Parents and the larger society *also*, and much more publicly, attempt to inculcate in everyone a repugnance to the actual use of violence, but by their partial approval or lessened disapproval of some violent responses to the certain types of actions, our actual attitude toward violence is not a simple rejection. We hide our own impulses not only from others, but also from ourselves. We even try to hide the extent to which we *do* grade the degree of violence to fit the acts that arouse our anger, for we say publicly that all violence is "wrong." Nevertheless, what the society grades as unimportant most of us view as trivial, while almost everyone comes to respond more violently and aggressively—even when he controls his counteraction—to acts that are rated as more serious.

Finally, of course, as part of the socialization *toward* degrees of violence, we acquire a range of *rationalizations* that justify our own lapses into physical aggressiveness. Few people are so deprived intellectually as to be unable to create a moral or ethical justification for their assault on another. As we shall note later, it is not at all certain that most of these rationalizations are cynical or morally obtuse. Indeed, in most intimate relations the balance of the ethical books is not at all clear. But what is significant in this context is the deeper fact that the gradations of insults or hurts that lead to gradations of violence are based on a set of values, and these in turn can be used to "explain" why we lost our heads in anger, or succumbed to a blind fury. According to *our* values, which we learned from our parents and our own society through our socialization experiences, the other person was in the wrong, and we had a *right* to be angry, or even to use violence.

We are emphasizing, then, that although the main official thrust of socialization in modern society opposes the use of violence, and especially, when directed against intimates, many themes, forces, and processes in family,

neighborhood, and school convey a somewhat *different* message in support of some violence, under some circumstances, against some individuals.

This range of factors emphasizes the degree to which individuals have a greater or less *predisposition* to use violence in certain types of situations, and to that extent introduces the victim *as a causal agent*. That is, what he does also affects the outcome. We cannot consider only "the" aggressor or murderer as an isolated figure. The dynamics that produce violence between intimates requires special attention to the offender-victim relationship. This direction of inquiry has been neglected in the past, because official records contain few usable data on the actual processes through which violence was generated; because of our propensity to find a guilty party; and of course because the social researcher cannot easily locate a sample of violent acts for field observation.

This neglect will continue in the future because of the research difficulties, but by now a goodly number of analysts have at least brought to our attention the importance of these dynamics, especially in cases involving intimates. Indeed, some have come to use the term "victimology" to underscore the contribution of the victim to his own demise. It is not necessary here to review the work of Mendelsohn, von Hentig, and others, in which they urged this type of focus.⁸ Nor is it useful to debate who first suggested the idea.

In fact, of course, the *idea* that the victim contributes to his victimization is frequently expressed in the socialization experience, since it is part of folk wisdom. Every child has been shocked at some time by the refusal of his parents to give him sympathy for having been hurt, and by the harsh question, "But what were you doing with him, anyway?" The terse phrase, "served her right" conveys not alone retribution, but is also applied to the individual who entered a situation which a really innocent person would avoid.

When applied to the relations among intimates, however, this notion must be narrowed somewhat. We *can* not avoid all intimate relations, all friendships, all family ties, all interaction except with strangers. Perhaps we should not have acquired *this* spouse, *this* set of in-laws, this set of friends, but we do not all have the option of choosing wisely, and violence occurs between people who once seemed to be reasonable human beings. The question can and must include the problem of *entering* the relationship when we consider the case of forcible rape with intimates, but even there the dynamics of generation seem to be more important than the original choice of a companion.

In Schafer's recent report on a Florida inmate population, about sixty percent had been incarcerated for violence committed against a stranger, but this included theft with violence (the largest single category). Most studies, as noted before, report that half or more of various acts of violence were committed by people who were at least acquaintances. In a study of 588 homicides in Philadelphia, Marvin Wolfgang found that close friends (28 percent) and family associations (25 percent) formed the two most frequent types of cases, and "paramours" accounted for another 10 percent. Indeed, strangers were killed in only 13 percent of his sample, for the other categories include such types as homosexual partners, paramour of the offender's mate, sex rival, enemy, acquaintance, and the felon or police officer case. In the

Uniform Crime Reports of 1965, 31 percent were killings within the family, 21 percent were outside the family unit but were lovers' quarrels or involved a romantic triangle. In the District of Columbia Crime Commission report, only 19 percent of the aggravated assault victims were not acquainted with their assailants, and indeed 20 percent had had confrontations with their assailants before. In a national survey designed to ascertain the amount of unreported crime, as well as attitudes toward the police, respondents were also asked why they did not report the crime. Some of these answers ("did not want to harm offender," "afraid of reprisal," "was private not criminal affair" suggest that the victim had some kind of relationship with the offender. In other answers ("police wouldn't want to be bothered," "did not want to take time," etc.) there is at least the possibility that the response conceals some knowledge of the offender.

As noted earlier, a high but unknown percentage of assault, forcible rape, and attempted rape cases are not reported to the police, and they are not reported because the victim would prefer to avoid being questioned about his or her part in the generation of the violence. Especially in incidents of assault, as in schoolyard fights, it might be difficult ever to disentangle the contribution of the conflicting parties to the outbreak. Certainly a decision as to who was hurt the most would not do as evidence, as often it would not in homicide. Both von Hentig and Wolfgang have documented in some detail the frequent case of the victim who was originally the offender, the bully who is killed in a fight, the wife beater who is finally knifed. Homicide is fairly reliably reported, such cases are known, but it is safe to say that most unreported cases of assault fall into this category of battles between people who have at least known each other before. Those who are involved know that the police sergeant, like their parents, will begin to ask them how they got into that situation in the first place, and a truthful answer will reveal that both contributed some share to the conflict.

Both Negro and white males are more likely than females to be killed by a close friend, while women are overwhelmingly killed in a family or lover relationship. Men spend more of their time outside the home, and thus are more likely than women to be killed by people outside the family. On the other hand, white male victims are more likely than Negroes to be killed by strangers, because far more are the victims of a robbery. This, of course, is more likely because whites are more likely to be proprietors or managers of a business place, and more likely in any event to look like a lucrative prospect for a robbery even on the street.

Although women exhibit a much lower homicide rate than men, when they do kill they are more likely to kill their husbands than any other category of persons. Since men have a wider network of acquaintances and are involved in other types of emotional ties, their victims are more widely distributed, and wives make up 10 to 15 percent of their total.⁹

Because both homicide and assault are highly personal relationships, those who hurt one another are likely to be of the same class, roughly similar ages, the same race, and from the same neighborhood. Various studies, a few of them of doubtful validity, also suggest that in a very high percentage of cases one or both parties were drinking. Detailed arrest records and being known to the police are usually not included in analyses of violence, but studies confirm what the ordinary respectable citizen darkly assumes, that victims

and offenders—especially the latter—have some prior history of violence. Although those who commit homicide or assault are not comparable to professional criminals, and typically are not engaging in violence for profit, their offenses are not usually the only one they have committed.

Indeed, if we allow for the variegated forms that violence takes, a substantial percentage of cases will fall into a general category which the middle class citizen is concerned about in only an abstract way, as an index of how much the social fabric is dissolving. When newspaper editorials comment on the "rising tide of violence," and the citizen deplores the state of the nation, they are referring to acts and events that are confined to a relatively small part of the population. They are concerned that some part of this violence might touch them, but it has little direct bearing on their lives or their emotions. They guess what the data roughly show, that a substantial part of the violence which is expressed in deeds is to be observed among the brawling, drinking poor, among the lower class Negroes and whites whose weekend drinking is climaxed by anger, conflict, and fighting.

However, those who are killed are dead just the same, though poor, or Black, or brawling lower class whites. The processes that lead to their violence are similar, if somewhat lower in frequency, to those among the more respected. Lovers, children, and spouses mourn for them as well. If this epoch is to tackle the problems of poverty, deprivation, race discrimination and hatred, and psychological disturbance, because we have decided that we *are* our brothers' keepers and cannot pass them by under the belief that they caused all their own problems, then we can do no less with violence. For some of the factors that produce the former set of problems also generate violence. And if a large part of it is directed at each other (as, indeed, is theft: the poor stealing from the poor), we cannot even then avert our eyes from a problem that must concern us as well.

Let us then probe more fully the processes by which violence is generated among intimates, within the broad set of forces we have been analyzing.

A perceptive Cornell University investigator of automobile collisions once noted that the primary element in any such accident is *surprise*. Had the driver predicted accurately what was to happen, no one would have been injured. When a conflict between intimates issues in assault or homicide too, one or both are surprised. Why?

If we begin with the climax, or the denouement, it is because the beginning is like any other interaction. On their way to a killing, people take the same road at first that others travel in an ordinary argument or disagreement. The fights that culminate in serious injury or death are at first like the arguments and fights that others have. Although all of us harbor some hostility in our hearts and doubtless the world would soon be depopulated if all of us could, by pressing a button, eliminate undetected any other person, a relatively small percentage of offenders fully desired to see their victims dead or maimed before them, and certainly few wanted to face all the consequences of the act.

But even more obviously, neither did the victims desire that end. Again, why did neither take another way out? In the simplest formulation, why did neither break off the interaction before it reached such a crescendo? An answer tells us more about man than the hypothesis that we are inherently bloodthirsty.

Few of even the predatory animals kill one another in the wild, in part because when one begins to lose, he submits or runs away. Caged animals sometimes kill, but there the loser cannot easily break off the interaction. Man shares with a few of his domestic animal creations (e.g., pit bulldogs, gamecocks) a considerable unwillingness to submit or escape. It is reported that under special circumstances rats (caged, as it were, in the same building) will also make war, but if so, they are the only animals that share this unlovely trait with man. Again, however, war also exhibits man's unwillingness to submit or escape.

Several factors combine to support this pattern, which, it must be emphasized, is not so much a predilection for violence as a willingness to risk it rather than back down. We have already alluded to one such source, the socialization experience in which values are inculcated in the growing person. There we focused on the values that approve various degrees of violence. However, we must here take a broader view in order to underscore the fact that man's whole existence is guided by values. Men have—in radical distinction from other animals—been willing to die for their religious or patriotic values, their views of personal honor and their political philosophies, far more frequently than for their narrow self-interest. Indeed, what is so striking about man is that through his socialization experiences he comes to believe that his self-interest is identical with such abstract values and to deny them is more abhorrent than to risk his life. Far fewer people will endanger their lives for money than for honor as defined by these fundamental values, that after all give meaning to human existence.

But such definitions of what is right, good, honorable, beautiful or decent also guide social relations among intimates, whether friends, spouses or lovers. Any two people who become emotionally close to one another are drawn together in part because they share common definitions of what is appropriate behavior and because their psychological needs mesh to some extent. The wider their shared experiences, the more they learn about each others' values. In an ideal case, they enhance the significance of each others' lives by supporting each others' values, attitudes, and opinions.

In any continuing intimate relationship, the sharing of values is expressed in and buttressed by an unending series of transactions. Some of these may be thought of crudely as "exchanges" and a couple may so describe them. For example, when a husband states his *right* to be given respect and a clean household in exchange for his financial contribution, he may use such a rhetoric. Most transactions are not described that way, except when one of the couple violates their common, unspoken understanding, and then the other angrily refers to what he "owes." A wife may prepare a special meal on Sunday and her husband expresses his thanks or admiration for her cooking. A friend agrees indignantly that his buddy was shabbily treated by his boss, and his buddy reiterates their solidarity. Relatives exchange babysitting or Christmas presents or appear at each others' solemn occasions, such as weddings or funerals.

In such transactions, a rough balance is to be observed when both sides are content. Although the contributions may not seem to be equal, both sides feel they are about equal, because they place similar *evaluations* on what each other does. Money may, for example, flow in only one direction, from husband to wife, but if he evaluates highly what she does he may consider the

bargain "fair." One friend may "pay out" far more deference than he receives from his partner, but if he feels his partner's friendship and companionship are worth that much, he will not feel he is unfairly treated. In the ideal case, then, both participants in an intimate relationship reinforce one another's values, affirm the other's significance and worth, and feel that continuing the interaction is worth more than possible alternatives. But the vicissitudes of life sour many partnerships, and one or both members come to feel they are being cheated, betrayed, or wronged. The husband who loved his bride enough to tolerate her nagging, loses his ardor, and the cost of staying together rises too high. Evaluations change, because social positions alter. Thus, the coquettishness that was attractive during courtship looks like promiscuous flirtation after marriage. The drinking companion comes to believe that his buddy is too quick to anger when bested in an argument. A man is at first pleased that his brother-in-law has had a bit of success, but later feels he takes advantage of it by trying to dominate his relatives.

From time to time all have the experience of being put down by others, of being pushed about, of feeling diminished by those to whom we are emotionally close. As Norman Mailer has commented, "threatened by the extinction of our possibilities, we react with rage." We are confined in the relationship, but cannot redress the balance, or open the door to a new set of inviting prospects.

When both are wise, one discusses his reasons for resentment and persuades or is persuaded. But perhaps most of us are not wise, and follow other roads. One is to nurse the annoyance, and now and then engage in sporadic outbursts over an unrelated slight. Friends may gradually avoid one another while keeping up the pretense of civility.

Intimacy survives an argument more easily than the corrosive fester of suffering a continuing imbalance, in reciprocities. Such an imbalance is most difficult to redress, because the other person will rarely concede, and honestly does not perceive the injustice. Accustomed to one set of transactions, or gradually adjusted to his own pattern of behavior, he is more inclined to believe that his own contributions are already sufficient—or, at most, the cost of giving more is too great. If each values what he gives more than what he receives, then neither can, without losing face or feeling an even greater loss, concede still more.

It is in such a state that many people find themselves. The rules of polite society are arranged not to solve such problems, but to gloss over them. At a cocktail party we engage in chit-chat rather than probe to a level where we or the other person will be hurt. We learn to break off a conversation in the office when we perceive the other individual is becoming angry or resentful. Such rules vary in form among different circles, cliques, classes and personalities, but all serve the function of easing social interaction while avoiding a real intimacy that might only increase anger and violence.

In a sense, these modes of behavior become "masks" which we present to one another. They are not our real self, but then we do not wish most others to know our real self. Social philosophers of love have often deplored such barriers to communication, and have urged that everyone open himself and bare his heart. This has become an especially pervasive doctrine among hippies in our generation, and many applied psychologists have organized training sessions to encourage a greater openness. Nevertheless, ordinary

people in every society have rejected this message, and instead followed the intuition that it is dangerous, or at least uncomfortable to drop their defenses. Only with intimates is it safe to expose one's true self, and even there the intensity and frequency of hurt proves that the pleasures of emotional closeness are sometimes dearly bought.

In an intimate relationship, as noted, one or both persons can come to feel (suddenly, in a flaring argument or over time) that the other is unfair or wrong but a redress of the imbalance is difficult to achieve, because both are convinced that they have already overextended their resources, and already done enough for the other. There is no more to give out without making the exchange even more fair than it is. Being emotionally close, each is vulnerable, and knows how to hurt the other, while neither can easily retreat to the comfortable, civil formulas and masks that are permissible and common with mere acquaintances or strangers.

Many people cannot easily choose the equally obvious solution, breaking off or letting go. This fact is often overlooked, because we observe the continual formation and dissolution of human ties. However, most of these are not intimate, do not carry a high voltage of emotional intensity. More important, when we review in our memory the shattering of past love or friendship bonds, most of us will recognize the breaking off was hurtful, and it was difficult.

Letting go is painful, because both individuals once fed each other's emotional needs, and the need remains, while no other person is exactly a substitute. Breaking off is hurtful also because one or both may feel that the other is getting away scot free without a just revenge being inflicted, without a fair and final balance of the emotional books. One or both may not wish to let go without one more attempt to wound, to pay back, to justify one's behavior.

One consequence is that many people remain in a relationship which they have come to detest and which they know may even be physically dangerous. In a bitter marital situation, all the above factors may combine with still others to prevent one or both from letting go; one or both spouses may still need the other emotionally; one or both may feel guilty *and also* feel the other has behaved unfairly; one or both may still be trying desperately to pay back his old hurts and injustices. In addition, the pressure of friends and the sheer practical difficulty of starting and maintaining a new household can seem insurmountable. Even now, when divorce is thought to be easy, it is taken for granted that spouses do not finish their fighting when they divorce: we still take note of the unusual cases by commenting, "they are being very civilized."

Locked in but suffering from it, couples may engage in fighting that is savage and even lethal. Many men and a goodly number of women have finally come to the conclusion that homicide is a cleaner, neater solution than the dragged out, acerbic destruction of ego and dignity that is inherent in breaking off.

Another solution is even perhaps more difficult than the foregoing: accepting one's losses. Having observed over time that in the intimate relationship one is constantly losing, the odds are poor, and change is unlikely, few people can simply shrug their shoulders and decide that there is no point in worrying or brooding over the past. One could either accept the

new set of bargaining terms, or leave in the secure knowledge that one should not continue to throw good energies and emotions into a bad investment. Several factors combine to make this solution difficult for all but the most philosophic. One of the most fundamental is an insight derived from Skinner's Theory of Random Reinforcement. When an animal has been trained to perform a set of acts, a schedule of random rather than regular reinforcements will generate a greater propensity to continue that behavior pattern. Comparable to some extent is the gambler's addiction, or perhaps that of the sports fisherman. In the face of a low but random payoff, the individual now and then receives some reward, so that he is never quite willing to abandon the enterprise entirely. In any intimate relationship, even one that has become corrosive and hateful in many respects, the habitual patterns of interaction do yield from one day to the next a few rewards—a memory of fun shared together once, a quick understanding when some outsider makes a foolish statement, a casual pat on the shoulder. These do not outweigh the hurt and the sense of injustice, but they continue to give some type of hope that things might be improved. Few intimates can be so totally bent on constantly hurting the other that they will not stop from time to time to support the continuance of the relationship for yet a while.

Moreover, though the payoff is low, it is one relationship in which there is *some* payoff and alternatives are not obvious. New relationships are risky, and casual ones do not yield the same satisfactions.

When an intimate is finally seen as a person who will continue to do wrong, to betray, to be overbearing, one might suppose that the other might simply cut his losses and leave. If a man learns that his wife is sleeping with another man, or a lover learns that he is betrayed, or a mistress learns that she is betrayed, it might seem to be wise to say, in effect, who wants a person like that? If the person is really to be labeled unworthy or inadequate, then a serene person might be able to accept the fact and sever a relationship that does no honor to either person.

However, the values that give meaning to the relationship also prevent most people from being able to accept the losses, as suggested before. If a man knows that he has been betrayed, the loss is too great to accept as it is. At least part of the solution must be some hurt, and at the deepest levels of emotion among peaceful as well as violent people, this hurt must be physical and destructive. If the roulette wheel is crooked, then we wish to smash it, not merely walk out. We may not smash it because we fear the consequences, but the urge to do so is strong in all of us. Indeed, the greater the sense of betrayal, which ought to show that the other person should be cast aside easily, demands the most vigorous counter-payment in hurt that we can safely manage.

An additional factor is sometimes overlooked in the violence among intimates. Who is the victor in the war of words? The conflicts among friends, lovers, and spouses is never action alone or physical battle alone. It is most pervasively a war of words, and this always means arguments about who is wrong and right. Unfortunately for the distribution of justice in the cosmos, the person who is least fair may not be the least competent in verbal skill. On the average, of course, women are somewhat more skillful than men, but each person develops his own rhetorical abilities in order to justify his behavior or his wishes. The guilty one may win the argument and the other person thus

feels doubly wronged. He or she has not even had the satisfaction of redressing the balance by stinging words.

One small factor in the distribution of homicide by sex should be noted here. Women are socialized to use far less physical violence than men, but typically do not feel that the words they use justify violence against them. Men are trained differently and recognize far more clearly that certain degrees of verbal violence will have a high probability of eliciting a physical counterattack, not only a verbal counterattack. With a different perspective, women are far more frequently surprised by a physical counterattack when they use stinging words.

Another element of importance in the battle of words as it leads to physical violence is a peculiarity of all conversations. As ethnomethodologists have documented so fully by now, all societies have a set of implicit rules as to how to begin the conversation, whether among intimates or strangers. Those who violate the rules will often be rebuffed, or they will merely puzzle the other person. Certain settings permit easy initiation of conversation, while in other settings we understand the rules do not permit it.

Similarly, whether in casual telephone conversations or serious discussions in a conference, there are implicit rules of order as to when a conversation is finished. We give small cues to one another, in tone, gesture, and actual words, to indicate that the conversation is completed. However, there are no recognized rules that define when a conversation of a violent character is completed, and especially such a conversation between intimates. Clearly it is not finished when there has been no resolution and typically there is none. As long as the other has something that he desperately wishes to express, he feels the conversation should not end and among conflicting intimates there is usually no limit as to the emotions yet to be expressed. In addition, violent arguments between intimates continue to move toward higher pitches, and in all such a progression the natural ending is attack, not calm and peaceful analysis. Thus, to leave the scene immediately is to lose face; to back down from a violent argument with a friend is likely to make one feel cowardly. Thus, in the intense verbal conflict among intimates, the very lack of orderly and adequate rules for ending the conversation forces the dispute toward a more total confrontation.

All of these factors combine to offer only two fundamental reactions: crush or run. Both participants feel a deep need for resolution; the transaction is not adequately finished, but the various avenues of mind just now are awkward, dishonoring, unsatisfactory, or impossible. The animal emotions that arise in such fights between intimates—and on a psychophysical level, these are the same among the most well-mannered members of the middle class and the most violent of the lower class—are fight or flight. But flight, as we have just noted can come to seem a less desirable alternative than the risk of violence. Since neither knows exactly at what point the other is likely to express his anger in hurt or homicide, both are tempted to continue to press the other to strike once again verbally, to taunt, and of course, one or both may make a substantial and catastrophic error. The anger that boils up is murderous in all of us, and at least generates the desire to crush. As we have noted earlier, it is easier to run at an earlier stage in the battle, to avoid the later surprise when actual violence erupts, but running away is more likely

to be a flash of rationality, a recognition of the objective dangers, rather than a satisfying solution.

It will be noticed that in this analysis of the dynamics of conflict between intimates, we have referred from time to time to various kinds of precipitants, which are sometimes labeled "motives" in discussions of homicide and violence. Typically, the category of motives has included the reasons for a final fight as needed in a police investigation. By and large, these do represent *precipitants*, that is, the final triggering events. Sometimes, of course, the category of "motives" will include "reasons why." Such lists are varied, and usually unproductive. In using such motives as examples in our previous discussion, we do not assume that these are the real motives. As recorded, such motives include adultery, being cheated by a partner in business, a falling out among thieves, a family fight that began in a dispute about who contributed the most money to the support of the parents, and the conflict about who had the right to a deceased aunt's bracelet, and so on.

In the strict psychological sense, of course, these are not motives. They are not basic psychological needs. They are merely the events that generated either a final conflict or a continuing action pattern that contributed to the development of anger and hurt. It is not likely that either victim or offender could adequately describe his motives in the psychological sense for most would not have sufficient clinical insight to know the structure of their own personality dynamics. Such continuing psychological needs doubtless create a major part of the clash between intimates, but the analysis of homicide and assault in a psychological framework has not yet advanced that far.

At a simpler level, of course, the conflict is the immediate outcome of primitive emotions rather than motives: rage and anger and the urge to destroy. But, as we have noted, that denouement must be traced back to the dynamics that generated it. All of us feel these emotions from time to time and are inhibited from expressing them fully. But they are the outgrowth of our psychodynamic heritage. Thus, the reasons that people give for violence against those close to them are to be taken seriously, but only as guides for finding where the sense of outraged injustice began to grow.

A concrete tabulation of such answers is likely to be infinitely broad. The reasons for killing are all the reasons for living. Hurting others is, for many people in a tragic situation, a life-affirming act, though, of course, only rarely as life-affirming as other acts might be. This is especially so for violence between intimates. With a stronger ego, one could get out, one could ignore the social loss of face and the internal sense of lessened worth; one could start a new life. But, like most neurotic solutions to life problems, violence is easier, given all the restraints, assumptions, pressures and sense of injustice each person feels. All of us can envision killing or crushing as simpler than solving an apparently impossible problem and, of course, as we have seen in the dynamics of conflict among intimates, those who are emotionally close "help" toward this outcome by forcing another individual into that violent solution—tempting and taunting, not letting go, exacerbating the conflict, winning the verbal debate while committing other hurts, refusing to cooperate, etc.

Hurting aims at redressing an imbalance as the aggressor sees it by a means which also seems efficient at the moment. Violence is, as noted before, often

socially supported although officially deplored. It is at least a *deterrent*, even when it is not very effective in engendering positive actions. At the least, it stops the other individual from what he is doing now. It is satisfying in anticipation, and possibly sometimes after, because the aggressor is then also the agent of vengeance. Against the impersonal fate that has given another person the advantage in action or argument an opportunity to cheat or betray, and against the evil that one's friend or spouse has committed, one can take part in the cosmic redistribution of goods and pleasures and retribute by forcing one's will on another person. To this extent, one must see violence as one "solution" for an ideological problem that creates overwhelming emotions. Nothing is as violent as passion in the service of ideology and values, whether it is the outraged husband killing his wife for betraying him, or a demagogue inflaming the masses to loot and burn the enemies that are exploiting them. It seems likely that even the calculating murderer, rationally plotting to kill for material gain (insurance and inheritance to avoid blackmail) manages to convince himself most of the time that he has a "right" to the money or advantages he seeks by the homicide.

This account of the dynamics of violence among intimates also explains to a considerable extent why so much of assault is not reported and why it is so difficult after a serious conflict for the outsider ever to ascertain precisely what took place—not merely all the motives, reasons and pressures, but even the objective sequence of events. Neither participant can bring to bear an undistorted perspective on what took place, or when it all began.

Illustrative of certain events in the foregoing analysis is Wolfgang's finding that women are homicide offenders in the kitchen first and then in the bedroom, in order of frequency. Over one third of females were killed in the bedroom.¹⁰ He links this location with the somewhat lopsided distribution of offender and victim, that over four-fifths of all female victims are slain by males, and when females slay, four-fifths of them slay males. In a high proportion of these, of course, arguments are concerned with sex, love and family matters. It is especially the bedroom where unresolved conflicts are likely to burst out because when finally both have gone there for the evening: neither can have an adequate excuse to leave or break off the conversation. To a lesser extent, of course, this is true for the kitchen, which in many lower class dwellings is where family members are likely to spend a good bit of relaxed time. Not being in contact with one another during the working day, they confront the dilemmas and distasteful solutions finally in the rooms where by social definition this is the only unresolved business.

The few data on homicide-suicide also support the general perspective we have sketched here. Primarily, it is confined to a relationship between a man and a woman; very few cases exist of male-male or female-female relationships. Of course, this means that there are few cross-racial cases. Furthermore, if one tabulates homicides by whether they were accompanied by excessive violence—repeated stabbings, shootings, beating—husband-wife slayings are much more common than any other category of intimate relationship.

Perhaps of deeper significance is the fact that wives rarely commit suicide after committing homicide; the combination is most often carried out by males. Wolfgang suggests that the husband is likely to feel more guilt and remorse than wives do.¹¹

There are at least some data that bear partially on this pattern. Perhaps the most significant come from studies of husband-wife attitudes, and from analyses of the dynamics of divorce. In all studies, women feel that they do most of the adjusting in marriage (and some data suggest that that, indeed, is correct) and are more likely to feel somewhat abused in the relationship.

This does not mean, on the other hand, that women are more likely to seek an end to the marriage. Indeed the data suggest the opposite, because men are less likely to make their marital relationship the center of their lives, because they move about far more and establish other relationships that are meaningful, and because they can go much further in new and alternative emotional relationships without serious criticism or control, men are more likely to try to get out of the marriage first. Indeed, it may be suggested that they pursue unconsciously or consciously a strategy of making themselves sufficiently obnoxious (within the limits of permissible or approved conduct in their social circle) to the point where women are really convinced the marriage should end.

Although those factors in interaction may generate some hostility on the part of the male, they also leave him with some considerable residue of guilt. He may engage in violent behavior as an expression of his wish to end the relationship, but also feel guilty that he has, as it were, added insult to injury. One must suppose that when women finally do commit homicide (as, doubtless, when they commit assault) they are much more inclined to feel that they have been goaded to it and thus feel relatively innocent. That this may represent a partial reality may be seen in the fact that husbands are less often acquitted than wives. This fact is only a partial confirmation, because we must keep in mind that our society makes an assumption that women will in fact be less violent and that only when they have been driven to it will they engage in serious attacks on others. The courts are not inclined to view the verbal attacks or the nagging of women as an adequate justification for assault or homicide, though the injured man may feel differently.¹²

One further qualification ought to be introduced here, which also has a broader application. As noted earlier, far more men commit homicide than do women, and more men kill one another than kill women. We have considered at several points the factors involved in this differential but one more ought to be noted, since it bears especially on the problem of the successful act as against the assaultive emotion. Specifically, men are technically better equipped to kill each other, or to kill women, than are women. The differential may be seen in several areas. Men can strike harder, pound for pound, than women can. They are far more skilled in the use of all tools, have had far more training in combat and body contact sports from their early childhood. More of them can shoot accurately, and even own guns. Any attack by a woman is much less likely to issue in a court case, even when her emotions are as extreme, her urge to destroy as intense, simply because what she does is futile or ineffective.¹³

A very small part of all homicide is committed by the psychotic. However, we should at least note that although the ultimate, fundamental generation of the psychosis cannot be located in the immediate situation where the homicide or assault occurred, when psychotics do kill people who have been emotionally close to them, the dynamics of target fixation, and the generation of resentment against particular persons is not greatly different

from that of ordinary people. Their reactions are sometimes more extreme, and laymen read with avidity the bizarre details of their behavior, but the clinical work of the past half century shows all too clearly how similar are the psychodynamic patterns of the normal, the neurotic, and the psychotic.

There are no "murder psychoses." There is no specific psychosis whose resolution is inevitably assault-homicide. Doubtless the classic paranoid and the paranoid schizophrenic are more likely to commit assaults than other categories. Their delusions of reference by which they suppose all sorts of unrelated activities by others *do* aim at them, their sense of great self-importance, their feeling of being beleaguered and thus often hostile, doubtless generates more aggressive feelings. On the other hand, this aggression often takes the form of self-aggression, and, in any event, the dynamics do not specifically *aim* at aggression per se.

In any event, although the psychotic may be in error as to who has harmed him (if anyone) and who threatens him, and in a technical, legal sense he is often held to be not responsible for his crimes, in fact most psychotics do know what they are doing when they commit assault or homicide, and have (within their own version of reality) the same kinds of justifications for it that ordinary people have, when they succumb to the temptation to attack their lovers, friends or spouses. And, of course, all the factors that prevent an adequate or wise resolution of their life problems are to be found in these cases to an even more extreme degree. Those against whom they aggress, whether or not they themselves have contributed greatly to the exacerbation of the conflict are, in turn, even less capable of the behavior of the mentally disturbed person since they simply do not have any relevant clinical techniques.

In this extended analysis of violence between intimates, we began with various differences in behavior, by race, sex, class, region and relationship between offender and victim. These led to a consideration of differences in values and in the socialization process, by which those values are inculcated. All of these can be roughly categorized as ways by which differential predispositions to violence get generated, a differential willingness to use violence in a dispute. These different propensities to use violence do increase or lower the chances that someone will resort to homicide or assault.

In examining the dynamics through which violence is generated, we were turning to various alternatives among which people can choose when they engage in disagreements with friends, lovers, and spouses. Those who can choose or are helped to choose some of these alternatives are less likely to resort to violence. Since assaults of all kinds are more common among the young than among older people, we can suppose that experience does teach some to opt for other roads than attack.

At all points in the decision to act, of course, people do calculate the costs, as we have noted before. Doubtless few would ever kill if all were certain to face a public execution as a result. But that outcome is rare, and the press of immediate anger or long-suffering resentment is great. Moreover, the "costs" of nonviolence include, we saw, many undesirable sequels *other* than official punishment—degradation, loss of face and honor, continued maltreatment and so on.

In addition it is clear that if *one's predisposition* to violence is high and if one's evaluation of various courses of action different from that of other

people, one may therefore be more inclined to rank a violent confrontation above most peaceable alternatives. We have continued to explore these various differences in evaluation, precisely because they figure as elements in the calculus of cost, whether that computation is carried out in the heat of rage or alone and slowly in the quiet of the night.

No kind of analysis can explain adequately why one man kills another, while a different person kills no one even under great provocation, but we can lay bare some of the factors that create higher or lower chances of violence among people of different characteristics as we have been doing.

To continue our analysis, we must consider at least briefly some of the *social pressures* toward violence. We introduced some of these at an earlier stage when we considered the "subcultural" differences among regions or even districts of a city, in which a greater or lesser approval of violence could be found, and also when we discussed the socialization patterns by which people learn the appropriate degree of force to use when answering different intensities of provocation. Implicitly, then, we were pointing to just such social pressures, but let us take note of them when they appear in a more direct form.

Everyone as a child has observed the common practice of boys who egg on two of their playmates who are engaged in a bitter quarrel. Often, neither would have struck the other had there been first of all no audience and secondly if the audience had not attempted to cut out all avenues of retreat. Youngsters do this physically by surrounding the two potential combatants; they do it socially by taking sides and by articulating clearly the possible loss of face or the charge of cowardice if either backs down. If one does back down, the group will taunt him so that everyone learns the costs of retreat. If one person strikes the other, the other cannot easily decide to run, in the face of so much pressure to do battle.

In the above paragraph we have deliberately used an innocent vocabulary, appropriate to a playground situation in which young children are pushing one another about. At a later age, and in tougher sections of the city, the encounter can be lethal. Weapons can be and are used from broken bottles to zip guns. The two sides can move toward battle that parallels the one between the two combatants. These battles take place, as so much research has already documented, between gangs in different turfs, or subgroups within the same neighborhood. Sometimes they are friends, but of course more often they are simply well known to one another but enemies just the same.

A similar type of social support to assault, even an attack that may lead to death occurs when two drinking buddies engage in an antagonistic altercation. They are not likely to be pressed hard toward violence if they are strangers to one another among strangers. On the other hand, when they are close friends and other companions are around, the support for violence may become relatively strong. To some degree, of course, this is no more than a thirst for drama, for excitement. At a deeper psychological level, of course, it is also an expression of each person's reservoir of hostility, his desire to participate vicariously in the striking of blows. To a smaller extent, one or more of the group egging the combatants may simply want one or the other to be hurt. Whatever their motives, the two antagonists feel the pressure, and see fewer alternatives to an attack.

Such pressures are, of course, greater in an urban district of high violence.

The standards of physical reaction to provocation vary greatly. Two middle-class friends in a violent altercation in a fashionable bar might simply walk out in a huff. If they did not, but seemed to be edging toward a physical attack, the management would intervene. It is considered unseemly to engage in battle in a respectable bar. In a lower class bar the bartender would not want the battle to occur within the bar itself, because his license might be threatened, but he might be quite tolerant if the couple moved out to the street to "settle" their argument. Similarly, violence in most middle class circles, whether between men and women or between friends of the same sex, is so frowned upon that those who commonly express their anger in physical attack are likely to be ostracized. The social pressures are very strong in subjecting others to this kind of violence. Proper people restrict it to situations when they are alone.

We ought also, however, to keep in mind that within a given neighborhood, and within a group of friends, one may observe different fields of "violence potentiation," i.e., aside from the immediate differential pressures in different neighborhoods and districts. There are different "fields" in different areas and social circles, which may be expressed by saying that even when no immediate pressures are evident, everyone knows that one or more has engaged in some physical battle recently. Much of the gossip is about the threats and dangers that are encountered daily. Each person observes some violence each day, though often nothing with which the police have been concerned. Friends disappear for a few hours or a few days to be sewn up at the emergency clinic or to recover at home from a fight. The reverberations of this atmosphere of violence may be as pervasive and as generating of additional violence, as the immediate social pressures in a combat situation. Living in a kind of jungle, men become alert, hypersensitive to provocation, quick on the trigger, swift to retaliate. This affects greatly not only the relations between strangers, but the intimate relations between friends or between men and women who care for one another.¹⁴

Again, such a field of potentiation does not mean that everyone engages in battle, but it does mean that those who live in it are more likely than others to be affected by it and a major consequence is the lowering of the threshold of violence. Each person is less likely to be inhibited in the expression of his own hostility, to be less restrained in using physical attack or counterattack as a way of settling differences. In such an atmosphere, a smaller provocation is necessary than in others to stimulate individuals to a physical attack and, as already noted, this powerful effect may be observed in the interaction among intimates. The same dynamisms operate that have been analyzed earlier, but when the field of potentiation is especially intense, those dynamisms will more quickly express themselves in physical assault.

Although we had earlier noted that assault and homicide are more common among the lower classes than among middle or upper social strata, we focused there far more upon the differences in the subculture, the differences in the socialization experience. Most treatises that focus on class differences in violence take note of the fact that the lower class person is less inhibited in his expression of violence (though not less constricted psychologically), and is more willing to infer gratification now in exchange for a somewhat surer payoff later. Thus, the middle class person is more

likely to calculate correctly the costs of engaging in violence and to avoid it. He is taught as a child to disapprove of violence.

However, we just took note of a very different type of factor that separates the lower class experience from the middle- or upper-class pattern, which may be characterized as a difference in *structural position*. We noted, for example, that there is much less likely to be a highly intense field of potentiation of violence in middle class social strata, and that the social pressures against it are strong, to the point of ostracism against those who give vent to their hostilities by physical attack.

But let us consider a few additional differences in structural position. A fundamental difference in the class position of the lower social strata is that they have far fewer alternative sources of pleasures or contentment. Essayists have long attempted to praise the virtues of lower class and rural life, pointing to harmony, quiet, lower aspirations, the serenity of limited horizons and so on. It is notable that few such essayists join the lower strata or their rural cousins and Benjamin Franklin long ago expressed his skepticism about that argument, by wondering why so many writers spent energy on *proving* the virtues of poverty: surely if the advantages were so obvious, one would need no additional argument.

However, we need not argue the relative contentment of people in different classes, though the empirical data do support the common sense suspicion that to be rich is better than to be poor. All that we are emphasizing is that when the relations between intimates become somewhat painful or a festering sore, usually both participants do have a wider range of alternative sources of pleasure from the theater to being warm in their apartments; from the sensuous delight in a well-cut coat to the fascination of travel. Granted, these do not give happiness, but they do drain away some part of the anger and hurt in the intimate relationship.

Similarly, the lower class person has far fewer resources with which to achieve his aims, whether in an intimate relationship or in interaction with outsiders. He has less prestige, money, and power so that his sense of frustration and bitterness are greater than a member of the middle classes. One consequence is, of course, that when an additional frustration occurs in his intimate relations, he may feel tempted to displace them onto even a person he cares about. The lower class father brings home far more hurt than does the middle class father and sometimes those about him suffer from it.

These resources also permit greater independence within the middle and upper social strata. Individuals can move about more freely, make far more decisions that do not depend so intimately upon their friends or spouses. Although it is a common observation that everyone feels poor in all social strata, the objective differences remain, and are not erased by the higher standards of consumption towards the higher social strata. Spouses *can* take vacations separately from one another, whether these are only a few hours of shopping in pleasant stores or some days at a resort.

Another important difference to be included here, although it derives ultimately from the different socialization experience in different classes: the development of a wider range of peaceful techniques for dealing with disputes. The middle and upper strata are far more articulate, and indeed, much of their school training is aimed in that direction. The differences in IQ

between lower social strata and middle strata are not great, but the differences in verbal skills are substantial. The middle-class child is taught far more intensively to mediate, to talk out difficulties, to suggest or initiate alternative arrangements for alternative role relationships. Where the lower class husband and wife are typically relatively inarticulate in their sexual relationship, so that neither may know the other is dissatisfied, except in a vague way, middle-class couples are much more likely to discuss their sexual problems openly and to utilize both counseling advice and sexual manuals for achieving a better adjustment. Middle class households are much more likely to read about, to discuss and use the latest psychological advice on how to get along with one another.

Thus, even aside from a greater inhibition in matters of violence and a higher evaluation of nonviolence in intimate relations, the middle and upper social strata have far more rules of manners, civility, avoidance, escape and discussion available to them in their habit structure that will mitigate somewhat the normal hostilities that grow out of their intimate disputes.

A final structural difference overlaps with a somewhat peripheral topic that should be discussed at this point: The role of police in disputes between intimates. Although this topic will reappear briefly in the later section on policy recommendations, it is relevant at this point too. The effect of the police is multiplex, but in at least two ways it increases the frequency of violence between intimates.

The most obvious effect has been noted for well over a generation. Although middle and upper class people are much less likely to be arrested, and will be treated more gently if they are arrested, this large generalization must be qualified in several ways. In a street dispute between an obviously lower class man, especially a Negro and a white man in a middle class neighborhood, the chances are high that if anyone is arrested, it will be the Negro. The police are much firmer in protecting the lives and homes of middle class people than lower class people.

On the other hand, in part because in lower class districts there is so much violence, and so much near-violence the police take a somewhat lenient attitude toward anything short of real injury. Moreover, serious assaults and even homicides are not likely to be punished as severely, in part because such events are usually shown in court to be the outcome of an altercation in which both sides contributed considerably. The police feel surrounded by a considerable amount of potential violence, and feel that they cannot stem the tide fully. All that they can do is to control the most obvious manifestations. To that extent, then the police exhibit a somewhat more permissive attitude toward violence in lower class areas, so that the inhabitants are less likely to take as seriously the legal consequences of physical aggression. This permissiveness extends, of course, to violence between husband and wife, lovers, and close friends.

In addition, in lower class areas, a high percentage of the population feels angry toward the police as representatives of exploitation, as people who are physically threatening, as sources of further degradation and insult. Both Negroes and whites, but especially Negroes, feel the insults of the social system as frequently coming through the harsh voice, strong arm, and blazing revolver or the policeman. One consequence is that the relations between men

and women and between close friends of the same sex (but especially men) carry a heavier emotional burden. They must console more, be more effective in redressing the emotional imbalances of the day, than similar relationships among the middle or upper social strata. It is not necessary to over-emphasize the role of the policeman in engendering hostility that is carried to intimate relations, but far too many personal accounts of life in lower class districts have expressed this theme, to ignore it here.

It should also be added, that one further consequence of this complex linkage is the high chance that policemen themselves may at times bear the brunt of this greater hostility, when they are called upon to intervene in a dispute between husband and wife, lover and mistress or close friends. When the outbreak becomes violent because the sense of wrong has risen to intolerable levels, and a policeman is called, the overflowing anger may be displaced onto the policeman. Indeed in one recent report, it is asserted that "one of every five policemen killed in the line of duty dies trying to break up a family fight."¹⁵

Commonly in a family dispute, one or both of the antagonists will turn on the policeman, eager to show that at least in that encounter he can come out honorably, though he has failed in doing so within the more intimate relationship. The policeman is an especially fine target, because in American society, he is likely to be cast in the role of a local, unofficial judge. He is called upon to settle minor disputes, calm down combatants, to stop bloodshed, and to the extent that he prefers (as the society wants him to prefer) to soothe and mollify rather than lock up people, he may well antagonize one or both disputants. In endeavoring to calm down an angered husband, the policeman may attempt to overpower or dominate when the husband has reached the end of his ability to bear any more domination, with the result that the policeman's life may be in danger—and, of course, a greater chance that one of the combatants will be killed.

A complete analysis of violence between intimates should include the case of forcible rape, but we shall deal with it only briefly here, and primarily to clarify a few elements in its dynamics. Most people can empathize to some degree with ordinary assault, because they can remember their own angers in the past, though perhaps most would deny that their rage was murderously intense. Almost all men have participated in assault at some time, if only as a child. Few men would admit, at least in ordinary conversation with friends, that they had attempted rape at some time in the past. Indeed, understanding of the case is hampered somewhat by the usual stereotype of the rapist, who is pictured as a sex-crazed pervert who waylays a lone and innocent woman on a deserted street, and then drags her into a dark alley. The term "sex offender" covers a wide variety of extremely different cases, from child molesters and fetishists to relatively ordinary heterosexual males.

In the United States, forcible rape is an urban phenomenon, with an overrepresentation of Negroes, lower class whites, the young, and those who live in districts characterized by a high frequency of violence. The overwhelming percentage of rapes are intraracial. Contrary to most white peers, the victims of rape are mostly Negro girls. Although studies report somewhat different percentages, something like half of the victims had some prior association with the offenders.¹⁶ As Amir has shown, in approximately

half of the cases, actual force was not used to subdue the victim, though of course, a mixture of seductive words and threats make that category somewhat empty.¹⁷

If we confine ourselves to the cases of rape between intimates, we confront first of all great gaps in information, for obvious reasons. Violence itself is a continuum, ranging from a mere push through serious verbal threats, to the use of knives, clubs, and guns. And though rape is by definition a completed act, various degrees of approach to it do occur, from being forced by superior strength to submit to mere petting, to being subjected to various kinds of sexual humiliation. A substantial but unknown percentage of women have at least experienced a forceful attempt by some male to press her toward sexual intimacy. In two studies done on the college campus in the 1950s, for example, about one-fifth reported some forceful attempt at intercourse and 6 to 9 percent reported that someone they had dated had used "violence or menacing threats or coercive infliction of physical pain" in order to achieve sexual intercourse.¹⁸

Various studies have asked men whether they have committed various delinquencies in the past, and a substantial minority admit an attempt to use some force in an erotic situation.

It should be remembered that these college girls form a sample of women who are least likely to be aggressed against, so that their report is a minimum percentage. We would suppose that a random sample of lower class girls would report a much higher percentage of such experience.

In Amir's study, approximately one-third of the forcible rapes that were actually reported were committed by close neighbors, close friends, or boyfriends, family friends or family relatives. Whether one should, within the context of the present analysis consider all of these "intimates" is not clear, but the figures do suggest a substantial minority of cases in this category.¹⁹

A substantial percentage of actual rape remains unreported, and especially that between intimates, since in the majority of instances, the rape was preceded by at least some stages of erotic intimacy. And, of course, as young men have complained in court, at least some charges of rape are false, since there was consent first, and then a later denial of consent.

Because a real sample is difficult to obtain, and because most analyses are confined to police and court records, it is difficult to probe deeply into the motivational patterns of rape between intimates. However, a few points seem clear enough beyond those noted above. One is that the cases seem to fall primarily into two large cases, those of multiple rape (pair rape or group rape) and rape by a single person. In the former instance, intimacy is less likely but in more than half of these cases, the victim had at least some prior contact with the offenders and in a small number of cases had actually been intimate. Very common is the factor of trying to persuade the girl, with the support of some intimidation or threat, to have relations with a friend as well, or a "bargain" is made by which the girl is told that if she submits to one boy, the others will not rape her—a bargain which is typically violated.

These cases are interesting in their own right, but primarily as part of the general syndrome of multiple rape, which has been relatively little analyzed, though it may well represent, as Amir argues, over two-fifths of all cases of rape. More relevant to our explorations are the instances of rape between people who are steady dates, close friends, or at least persons with whom the

victim could suppose herself reasonably safe. Unlike the multiple rape situations, which are overwhelmingly planned, these are most likely to be rapes by a single person, and the victim is typically not transported from one place to another. Instead the rapist simply takes advantage of a situation in his own or the victim's residence, or while on a date in an automobile.

Most of these cases occur in a social structure in which there is no shortage of females, so that sex ratio is not a serious factor in the generation of this offense. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that such men are especially perverted in their psychodynamics, or are unable to obtain sexual favors by ordinary seduction.

They do, however, enter the situation with a set of understandings which is at least widespread in lower class areas. One of these is the principle is that if anyone has a duty to control the situation, it is the female's alone. The male is permitted to go as far as she will permit. If her permission extends very far, then it is her responsibility.

There is the further principle, widely shared by most males, that women are to be exploited if possible. Part of the code of *Machismo*, the intense glorification of specifically male characteristics, such as courage in battle, recklessness, independence of family ties, etc., is a contempt for female characteristics, and a philosophy that urges the use of women as a mere instrument of pleasure. To be dependent on a woman, and especially to show her tenderness and consideration because she deserves it as a human being rather than because it is a useful device for overcoming her resistance, is thought to be foolish. It is taken for granted among such men that women are trying to tame their men, trying to catch them in the toils of matrimony, and indeed they have good reason to believe that.

It is also a principle of lower class male society (and increasingly at all levels of American society) that sexual intercourse is expected if dating continues. With each successive date, the male will try to go as far as he can, and will judge the dating series to be a failure if there is no progression toward full sexual intercourse. Any previous stage of erotic intimacy must be followed by a forward step. The male is likely to feel cheated and betrayed if there is a backward step and indeed is not likely to continue dating, unless he actually falls in love seriously, or persuades the girl to engage in sexual relations with him. Needless to say, the establishment of a sexual relationship may or may not mean real intimacy. His aim was to exploit, not to become involved. Within his group of male friends, he would assert, with their approval, that he owes her nothing, and feels no need to continue the sexual relationship if he has better alternatives.

This set of values and treatise positions is supported by male friends in their gossip and philosophic exchanges about girls and it also occurs in a milieu in which—as we have analyzed at some length—violence is common. Men should not be as violent toward women as toward men but mainly because it is not necessary: they are much weaker.

It is meaningless for the stern moralist to argue that the young woman should not get herself into that situation to begin with, because it is in such situations that most raped girls live. Moreover, we are talking only of the situations in which a previously intimate relationship existed, so that the young woman had at least some reason to suppose that the danger was low.

Here, however, we enter a most murky set of patterns. Most important is

the problem of communication. If young men enter a dating situation, or even visit a close friend at her house, with such a set of understandings, it is likely that he will interpret almost any acquiescence as a signal to proceed. Moreover, he is also likely to become angry when he is blocked: he is being "cheated."

Still more important, in his experience, force is an almost legitimate technique for getting his way, and not least with women. Few would wish to admit that they could obtain sex only through force, but men at all class levels, from fraternity boys and college football players to ghetto dwellers, can brag from time to time that they used a bit of forcible persuasion on a date, especially when they could do so safely. In Amir's cases, it is clear that violence was more commonly used when a single person raped some woman with whom he had a fairly close relationship, than one who was a stranger. This is partly an artifact, of course, since the very intimacy would have otherwise permitted an otherwise ordinary seduction had it *not* been frustrated.

However, common in such situations is a reciprocal failure to communicate. Beginning with the ordinary pleasantries and exchanges of friendship or affection, the male feels that he can go further, and at least hopes that her apparent unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse is only an effort toward appearing "respectable," while the young woman in turn feels that their previous relationship established an agreed upon limit to the intimacy permitted, as well as a trust that her rejection will be accepted. The male, in turn, often hopes that if he uses a modicum of force, and is ultimately successful, the mutual enjoyment will persuade her to relent, and to forget this temporary unpleasantness. In addition, of course, the very struggle itself is likely to be not only somewhat exciting to the male, but its very excitement persuades him that the girl feels similar emotions. Indeed, it may be said that the sexual appetite is the most projective of all drives: it is difficult for someone who feels a sexual hunger to believe that that person does not reciprocate at all.

Consequently, the patterns of communication, coupled with the lack of adequate techniques for deflecting the aggression, may well lead to still more violence and even brutality, along with the rape itself. Pervasive in such episodes is a strongly aggressive element, which is frequently a factor in lower class sexuality, but possibly to some extent in a high percentage of male seduction. We need not pursue the psychodynamics of this aggressiveness far except to note the extent to which males view females as sources of frustration as well as pleasure; as persons who refuse to give what is so easy to give, who balk the spontaneous expression of appetite—and, of course, this pattern has its own roots in the much earlier infant and childhood experiences with the mother, who so frequently appears in psychiatric analyses as a source of emotional fulfillment that was denied.

NEED FOR DATA

Throughout the foregoing analysis we have made many references to the paucity of data. Most studies of violence are hampered because they are confined largely to official records, and the criminologist has had little access to the offender at a point in time close to the offense itself. For obvious

reasons, most offenders do not care to expose the details of their crimes to outsiders, especially prior to the trial. Interviewing prisoners fills only part of this gap, because the events occurred so far back in time that the individual has lost many details and in any event has managed to fabricate a consistent story from what may have been a set of confused events. The sample of prisoners, in any event, omits a high but unknown percentage of violent confrontations between intimates, especially when they were assaults that were not reported to police. Thus the sample itself is likely to be biased.

Most important, of course, is the lack of systematic interviewing of both offender and victim. In homicide this is a natural gap, but considerable light would be thrown on the cases of assault if both could be systematically interviewed.

Such data would be especially useful in obtaining a better understanding of *process*: the dynamics by which such aggressive acts are generated, whether they end as homicide, assault, or rape. Process must include not only a specific act of violence, but also a *longitudinal* collection of data on successive confrontations, many of which were not violent in themselves, in that they did not include physical assault, but many of which threatened violence and did over time contribute to its generation. We do know that a high percentage of offenders have previously been guilty of some assaultive acts against either their last victim or other people. It would be useful to know the pattern of generation in those successive acts, as well as the gradual process by which violence became an accepted mode of procedure for dealing with others.

Most important, we need wider samples of people who live within the same milieu, but who *have not* participated in such acts of violence either as victims or as offenders. Our present sociological and psychological tools do lead us to the areas and situations in which violence among intimates is more likely, but these are crude devices, that permit only the most general statements. We cannot chart either the psychodynamic characteristics or the social patterns that lead to violence, other than the most general of factors. Thus we need larger, more representative samples so that we can examine more precisely the differences between those who engage in violence and those who manage to avoid it *within* similar social structures.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It seems worthwhile, after this small scale exploration of violence among intimates, to comment briefly on policy recommendations. Much violence occurs between intimates, but it is hardly sensible to recommend that people not enter intimate relations. Many men and women are killed in bedrooms, just as most people eventually die in bedrooms, but it seems this statistical fact cannot be the basis of a policy recommendation that we all avoid bedrooms.

We can, however, make a few suggestions. Not all of them can be easily implemented, and some can be implemented only by changing the society radically, but all of them deserve some attention.

Perhaps, since our earlier comments suggested that the total effect of the police is likely to exacerbate the amount of violence between intimates, we might begin with this important subgroup of our society. Here, one important

policy recommendation can be made briefly, since it has been put into effect in one city, New York.

Here the Police Department has set up, under the training supervision of a psychological center, a police unit whose specific task is to intervene in dangerous family quarrels in upper west Harlem. As against the gloomy comment from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that one of every five policemen killed in the line of duty was attempting to stop a family fight, the Family Crisis Intervention Unit in the 30th Precinct has not sustained any injuries at all in its first 15 months of operation, during which it has intervened in more than 1,000 individual crises.²⁰

Since policemen are in fact called to intervene in the entire range of domestic quarrels, and indeed in most quarrels among intimates that end in violence, it would seem the part of wisdom to train policemen to handle such problems more effectively.

Our earlier analysis of the dynamics of violence between intimates suggested the kind of emphasis necessary in police intervention: showing respect for the combatants; avoiding any show of force; deescalating the anger by informality, listening to both sides and discussing with sympathy the arguments on both sides; conceding explicitly the man's masculinity; permitting both antagonists to talk out their problem at length, suggesting alternative solutions; etc.

A more obvious policy recommendation that has been so widely discussed within the past year, that little addition seems necessary: strong gun controls. By now the data are relatively obvious, although those who wish to continue present American practice have hardly budged in their intransigence. Here the cultural complexities are great and the difficulty of persuading people to give up their guns is great, but every serious analysis shows that a reduction of gun ownership would substantially reduce the rate of homicide.²¹

It is difficult to make precise estimates, because it is not known how many homicides were committed out of previously worked out and steady intent. It seems unlikely that more than a very small percentage of homicides between intimates would fall into that category, so that one would expect gun control to have more effect upon *this* category than of the wider category of homicide. These, after all, include gang killings, insurance murders, etc.

However, the substantial elimination of especially hand guns would have a further effect that is rigorously predictable from sociological theory, although a numerical estimate cannot be made. Without question, the reduction of hand guns in the nation would deescalate the atmosphere of violence, just as the gradual elimination of guns from the hands of police would do so. Here, we return to the comments made earlier about the social potentiation of violence—the creation of an atmosphere in which each person is subject to some threat and thus prepares himself for that threat. The existence of an intense field of violence in Southern cities creates a lower threshold to violence and a greater desire to carry or own hand guns, but since everyone knows that a high percentage of others *do* carry such guns, they have a reciprocal effect upon that field. The simple knowledge that other people are armed persuades some that they should be equally forearmed, and equally quick to protect themselves. The obvious social consequence, which is only common sense, is that the tools of violence increase the potential for violence

not only directly (since more people *can* kill) but also by generating a higher tension and anxiety, and a greater readiness for violence.

Much more utopian would be the recommendation that a concerted attempt be made to introduce in American child-rearing practices a greater concern with peaceful modes of solving disputes and confrontations. Though somewhat utopian, it should be kept in mind that American parents have over the years actually changed their child rearing practices in part, to conform with expert opinion, and over the last decade this pattern has extended increasingly beyond the middle classes to the lower social strata. At the present time, insufficient attention is paid to the problem, and parents merely yell at their children harshly to "stop fighting!" It seems especially worthwhile at this point in our history to urge the inclusion of peaceable techniques of social interaction, since so many confrontations are occurring in which a large number of issues are labeled as "nonnegotiable"; force is viewed as a legitimate tool for blocking others; many groups deny the right of others to be respected; and so on. It seems very likely that we are entering upon an era in which there will be more violent confrontations than in the past. Consequently, though our primary concern here is with the reduction of violence between intimates, and we have suggested some of the patterns which ought explicitly to be made part of the socialization experience of a child for dealing with such battles: in fact, such a childhood training would be salutary for issues and problems outside those arising in intimate relationships.

Far more fundamental, however, and of course far more difficult, is the suggestion that if we really wish to reduce violence between intimates or violence generally, we must reduce the frequency and intensity of insults that the social system pays to the members of the lower classes, both white and Negro and especially Negro. We have taken note of the structural differences by class, the different childhood experiences, the dissimilarities in value pattern, and the great likelihood that some disadvantages, the degradation and humiliation suffered especially by Negroes in our society will be displaced onto intimate relations. Far too great a burden is placed on such relations in the lower class. They cannot discharge all the hostility that is generated by the daily experiences; they cannot generate enough consolation to redress the emotional imbalance created by the hurts that come from the society. The much higher divorce rate among the lower classes is in part a function of the intolerable burden that such marriages are forced to carry. The Negro male cannot act as an adequate role model for his sons, because they see all too clearly that it is not respected.

Space does not permit us here to present an organized plan for restructuring our society toward the end of paying more respect to the lower classes, toward incorporating Negroes into full membership in the society, though in other works I am indeed pursuing that problem. However, from our earlier analysis of the dynamics of violence among intimates, and of the structural position of those who occupy the lower social strata, it seems likely that the frequency of violence between intimates would be reduced if this policy recommendation were to be put into effect.

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3. See the study reported by the *New York Times* Nov. 3, 1968, which announced that the homicide rate of recent years was close to that of 1931 in New York City. Here again, of course, we are faced with *official* data, and such a report does not reach back to frontier or rural violence, which typically did not appear in any official data.
4. Veli Verkko, *Homicides and Suicides in Finland and Their Dependence on National Character*, Copenhagen, G.E.C. Gads Forlag, pp. 42-54.
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6. See the summary of studies on this point, and the problems of demonstrating how values are transmitted, in Frank Furstenburg, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967.
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8. Hans von Hentig, *The Criminal and His Victim*, New Haven: Yale University, 1948, and "Remarks on the Interaction of Perpetrator and Victim," *J. Am. Inst. Crim. Law and Criminology*, 31 (May-June 1940); B. Mendelsohn, "The Origin of the Doctrine of Victimology," *Excerpta Criminologica*, 3 (May-June 1963).
9. Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, p. 14. See, however, the comparative data from other countries (and decades), in which considerable variation is reported, pp. 217-221.
10. Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
12. A special irony in the cases of homicide-suicide is in the conclusion that a higher percentage of "persons who commit murder in the first degree inflict death upon themselves as punishment for their crimes than are legally executed by the state." (Wolfgang, *ibid.*, p. 83.)
13. I also suppose that this differential explains some part of the differential in the successful suicide rate as between men and women. Women try more frequently but succeed less frequently.
14. For an extensive analysis of a subsociety of this type, though hardly as violent as many Harlem districts, see Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner*, Boston, Little, Brown Co., 1967, especially chs. 5 and 6.
15. The source is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as cited in Ronald Sullivan, "Violence Like Charity, Begins at Home," *N.Y. Times*, Nov. 4, 1968.
16. Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
17. Menachem Amir, *Patterns in Forcible Rape*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1965.
18. Clifford Kirkpatrick and Eugene Hanin, "Male Sex Aggression on a University Campus," *American Sociological Review*, 22: Feb. 1957, p. 53; and Kanin, "Male Aggression in Dating-Courtship Relations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 63: Sept. 1957, p. 198.
19. Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 490.
20. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
21. See the interesting hypothetical calculations by Frank Zimring, "Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?" *University of Chicago Law Review*, 35 (Summer 1968), pp. 721-737.

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APPENDIX 20

BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

By Gerald E. McClearn*

A FRAME OF REFERENCE

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide an integrated frame of reference in terms of which information concerning the biological bases and consequences of aggressive and violent behavior can be assessed.

The causes of aggression are currently being examined with an unprecedented vigor, impelled by the urgency of many of our contemporary social problems. The social, behavioral, and biological sciences are all concerned with this evaluation, and the data and concepts from their domains are being invoked in the attempt to understand the causes of violence. Unfortunately, a residual from the old nature-nurture controversy impedes the exchange of ideas and concepts among these various disciplines. There often appears to be among social scientists an implicit (and sometimes explicit) feeling that any point conceded to biological factors is one point less for social and environmental factors. This attitude reflects a dichotomous view of behavioral determination that is as unwarranted as it is widespread.

There is no merit in the old proposition that pits "nature" against "nurture" as logically incompatible forces. The factors and processes that constitute the domain of the biological scientist interact continuously with those of the social scientist, and the first part of this report will be concerned with outlining a generalized conceptual model that integrates these diverse casual factors. This model is relevant to all behavioral characteristics, not just to those with violent or aggressive aspects, and in elucidating the model it may be necessary from time to time to cite examples of non-aggressive behavior or even of physical traits in order to make a point.

For our present purposes we may regard the classical gene as the basic biological unit, and thus our starting point.

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Genotype and Phenotype

At the simplest analytical level one may study the relationship between the genetic makeup (genotype) of the individual and a given trait of the individual (phenotype). Differences in the genotype are related to differences in the phenotype, but the relationship is not always a straightforward one. In the simplest case the relevant genetic basis of the particular phenotype will consist of a single pair of genes. It is important to note that reference is to *paired* genes. In organisms that reproduce sexually, an individual receives a gene from one parent and a partner of that gene from the other parent. These partner genes are basically alike but they may differ somewhat in detailed function. These different possible forms or states of the same genes are described as *alleles*. For some genes there are many different allelic states. For our immediate purposes, we may confine our attention to the simpler situation in which there are only two allelic forms. Let us represent one allele by Θ , another by O . Then, since each individual has two, we can have three different genotypes: $\Theta\Theta$, ΘO , and OO . As a matter of terminology note that the first and third genotype shown contain identical alleles. This condition is referred to as *homozygosis*. When the genotype consists of two different alleles, the condition is referred to as *heterozygosis*.

A number of types of relationships between genotype and phenotype can exist. Perhaps the classical form is illustrated in Fig. 1. The phenomenon of dominance is displayed in this situation, in that the heterozygote ΘO is just like the homozygote $\Theta\Theta$, and both of these are different from the homozygous OO . This type of outcome was the one that Mendel investigated, and it was the starting point for all of the subsequent developments in the field of genetics.

This particular type of gene action is not the only possible one, however. In some cases the heterozygote is located exactly intermediate to the two homozygotes, and one speaks of *additive* gene action. In other cases, the heterozygote is between the homozygotes in phenotypic value but not exactly halfway between. In this circumstance, one refers to partial dominance. A requirement for investigating this type of situation is that the phenotype must be capable of subdivision into clearly definable groups, and unambiguous assignment of all the individuals under study to one of these groups must be possible.

There are several examples of behavioral characteristics that are influenced in this classical Mendelian way. Perhaps the best known example is that of phenylketonuria, in which homozygotes for the recessive allele of the gene are mentally retarded, unless dietary therapy is undertaken soon after birth. Another behavioral trait under single gene control is the ability to taste phenylthiocarbamide (PTC). For approximately 30 percent of the population, PTC is a tasteless compound. People who find it so are homozygous for a recessive allele of the gene. Heterozygotes and homozygotes for the alternative allele of the gene find PTC to be a bitter substance.

Quantitative Inheritance

For most behavioral traits of interest, the genetic determinants are more complex than in the situation just described. For traits which are not capable

of dichotomous or trichotomous classification, but which are continuously distributed, many genes may cooperate in influencing the trait. These relationships are illustrated in a very simplified manner in Fig. 2. This diagram shows six gene pairs on the left exerting influence in various combinations on three behavioral traits, B1, B2, and B3, on the right. The interconnecting lines trace the paths of influence from gene to phenotype. There are two aspects of this diagram that require particular emphasis. In the first place it should be noted that each of the separate behavior patterns are shown as being influenced by several genes. This situation is sometimes described as multiple factor or *polygenic* inheritance. A complementary feature of this model is that many gene pairs have influence on more than one behavioral trait. This is called *pleiotropy*. One consequence of these two characteristics of quantitative inheritance is that some traits will be correlated by virtue of having subsets of determinant genes in common. In the particular example shown, 6 genes of a single individual are displayed. The topmost set are shown as homozygous, OO , the second pair as heterozygous, ΘO , and so on. Other individuals could possess quite different combinations of alleles of these genes. Any difference in the allelic composition of any gene pair can potentially give rise to changes in several phenotypes. Considering only these six gene pairs, it is easy to see the potential for individuality which is resident in such a system. In view of estimates that the number of genes in man is on the order of 10 to 100,000, the scope for genetic individuality is seen to be truly staggering.

One of the most important points to be made concerning quantitative genetics is the necessity for such individuality. The term "necessity" in this context has two meanings. The first is that the evolutionary process has depended and continues to depend absolutely upon the existence of genetically controlled variability within the population. Hereditary variability has thus been the basis and the sine qua non of the development of the whole phylogenetic scale. This point will be explored in some more detail later. The second meaning is that our reproductive process inevitably generates variability and uniqueness. This can be illustrated, again in another simplified way, by Fig. 3. This diagram shows the genotypes, with respect to three gene pairs of a male and of a female. The sex cells or *gametes* that they are capable of generating are shown on the top and side margin, and the genotypes of the offspring that this couple would be able to generate are in the body of the diagram. The process of gamete formation operates in such a fashion as to draw one allele of each pair randomly, and independently of the selection of any other gene pair. (There are some restrictions on this independence, which needn't concern us for present purposes.) Of the 16 cells in the table, each of which describes the genotype of the offspring that would result from fusion of the indicated gametes, 12 are unique combinations. Thus the two combinations represented by the genotypes of the parents are capable of generating many different combinations. Again, the scope for generation of variability can be easily imagined by considering the situation that would pertain to hundreds or thousands of genes. Indeed, this mechanism for creating individuality is so effective that every human being (excepting those who have identical twins) is a unique and non-repeatable event, genetically speaking.

These points have basic and fundamental implications for some

assumptions of contemporary social and behavioral sciences. In one form or another, the tabula rasa doctrine has profoundly influenced the approach of social-behavioral sciences to their subject matters. If it is assumed that environment is all important as a determinant, it is necessary that the organism be born as a "blank slate," and one blank slate is pretty much like any other blank slate. Therefore, the application of any particular environmental variable should have the same consequence for all individuals. When this ideal result is not obtained, the differences are often regarded to be a type of "error." The foregoing material should make it clear that, far from being error, variability is a basic and fundamental biological fact of life, and the inevitable consequence of sexual reproduction. Far from being born alike, each individual is different from each other, and some of the most exquisite biological processes occur during gamete formation to guarantee that this is so.

The Mechanisms of Gene Action

The picture that has been presented of quantitative inheritance must now be further amplified. The straight lines of influence connecting genotype and phenotype must be replaced by an interacting network such as that shown in Fig. 4. This diagram attempts to represent the fact that the genes exert their influence through pathways that consist of the organ systems of the body and the functioning of these organ systems. The initial pathway from each gene pair is shown to be a short one giving rise to what might be called the primary gene product. These short arrows therefore can be regarded as representing the process of transcribing the genetic information carried in the DNA molecule of which the gene is composed onto RNA molecules which subsequently are involved in the determination of the specificity of an enzyme. The enzymes are the organic catalysts without which the physiological functioning of the body would immediately halt. The processes of digestion, of nervous system conduction, of dark adaptation of the retina, of muscular contraction, of urine formation—all of these and all the rest of the functions that comprise the living organism are dependent, at some stage, upon the functioning of enzymes. Different genotypes result in different enzymes, and thus influence the efficiency of these biochemical processes. As the figure illustrates, these processes interact with each other. The end product of one reaction may be utilized in another reaction, accumulation of some products can exert an inhibitory influence on the process that produced them, and so on. In such a network, a deficiency at one point can have widespread ramifications. A case in point is the condition of phenylketonuria mentioned earlier. Homozygous recessives produce a deficient form of the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase which is involved in the metabolism of phenylalanine, an amino acid found in most of the food we eat, to tyrosine. In the normal individual this metabolism is accomplished at an appropriate rate and tyrosine is then utilized in subsequent reactions. Lacking an active enzyme, individuals with phenylketonuria accumulate vast quantities of phenylalanine and a variety of metabolic products which result from the "overflow" of this excess into alternative biochemical pathways. Some of these metabolic products are seriously detrimental to the developing nervous system, and result ultimately in mental retardation, if untreated. This is,

incidentally, no isolated case. A number of other aminoacidurias are now known which have similar features.

The key point to be emphasized from this discussion is that anatomical structure and physiological and biochemical processes constitute the routes through which genes influence behavior. This fact has sometimes been misunderstood, and the effects of genes are sometimes discussed as though they were mystical and noncorporeal.

The Interaction of Genes and Environment

At this point it is necessary to incorporate environment into our model. Fig. 5 is an elaboration of Fig. 4, with the addition of numerous arrows in the system at various points in the sequence from genes to behavior. It is in this regard that the modern perspective on genetic and environmental determinants differs from that which was often encountered in the heyday of the nature-nurture controversy. Nature and nurture are now seen as cooperating sets of forces that interact continuously. In this context it is also important to understand the breadth of the definition of environment. Genetic influence is definable as resulting from the information that is coded in the DNA molecules. All else is environmental. Thus, the nature of the cytoplasm of the cell is an environmental influence just as surely as are extra organismic factors such as the physical stimuli impinging upon the sense organs, of the peer group, or the social milieu.

One of the best illustrations of the fact that questions concerning the importance of genetics cannot be answered without environmental specifications, and vice versa, is provided by the now classical work of Krafka as described by Hogben (1933). The phenotype under discussion was the number of eye facets in the eye of *Drosophila* (the fruit fly that has been such a useful research tool for genetics). Two different genetic differences were investigated, one called "low bar" and the other called "ultra bar." Two different environmental circumstances were provided by controlling the temperature at which the larva were reared at 16° centigrade or at 25° C. Let us first inquire concerning the effectiveness of the difference between the two genetic conditions. Inspection of Fig. 6 shows that the answer to the question is very much dependent upon environment. The difference between low bar and ultra bar flies is very much greater at 16° than at 25°.

Similarly, if one inquires about the efficacy of environment in affecting this particular phenotype it will be seen that the answer depends upon the genetic constitution of the organism in question. Rearing at 16° rather than at 25° induces only a moderate increment in eye facets in ultra bar animals, but a much greater increment in eye facets in low bar animals. Although this example is non-behavioral, the clarity of the outcome makes it particularly useful for illustrating the point. Behavioral examples can be cited, however. DeFries (1964), in a study of the effects of prenatal maternal stress upon offspring behavior, found that various types of moderate stress administered to female mice during pregnancy were effective in influencing the activity and emotionality of the young when they attained adulthood. The direction of the effect was exactly opposite in the two genetic groups under investigation, however. In one strain of mouse, the effect was to enhance activity significantly, whereas in the other strain the result was a detriment. A similar

example can be taken from research on the effect of inhalation of alcohol vapor upon activity in mice (McClearn, 1962). Of the six mouse strains investigated, two showed decreased activity following the treatment, one showed increased activity and three were unaffected.

Armed with the understanding that genetic and environmental factors interact continuously we may return to a consideration of quantitative inheritance. It is easy to see that we cannot now be concerned with the issue of whether a trait is attributable to heredity *or* to environment. Both environmental agencies and genetic factors must be present for the organism and therefore for the trait to exist. The question that is meaningful and in principle answerable is: what proportion of the *variability* that is exhibited with respect to this trait in the population is due to *differences* in the genotype of the individuals, and what proportion is due to *differences* in the environmental circumstances to which they have been exposed? In a somewhat simplified form, we may represent the total variability of the phenotype as V_P which can be regarded as composed of both a genetic component, V_G , and an environmental one, V_E :

$$V_P = V_G + V_E$$

An index of the importance of genetics will be provided by the ratio V_G/V_P . For technical reasons this index, which is generally called the "degree of genetic determination," is less useful for prediction purposes than an index called "heritability." The genetic source of variance, V_G , can be regarded as composed of an additive portion V_A and a nonadditive portion V_{NA} . Heritability is defined as V_A/V_P . For detailed discussion of these concepts, the interested reader is referred to Roberts (1967) and to Falconer (1960). The index of heritability is a relative one. The heritability of a particular trait could be enhanced by reducing the amount of environmental variability in the population. For a given array of environmental factors, heritability will be larger in a genetically heterogeneous population and smaller for a genetically more homogeneous one.

The study of quantitative inheritance clearly requires techniques different from those of classical Mendelian genetics. Instead of tracing the progeny from specific crosses, it is necessary to employ statistical techniques describing means, variances and covariances among relatives of different degrees of genetic relatedness. Prominent among the techniques that are available to the researcher in human behavioral genetics are the twin studies techniques and the techniques of regression analysis in which resemblance of offspring to parents or the resemblance of siblings to each other is examined. Deliberate breeding is possible in experimental animals, of course, and techniques that are pertinent to selective breeding, inbreeding and cross breeding are available for analysis of the quantitative systems.

Utilizing these various techniques, the degree of genetic determination or heritability has been estimated for a large number of intellectual and personality characteristics of man and for a wide variety of behavioral characteristics ranging from phototaxis and geotaxis in fruit flies through alcohol preference, activity, learning and memory, sexual behavior, hoarding, and a variety of other traits in experimental mammals such as the mouse.

Genetics and Development

Two further perspectives, both dealing with temporal considerations, must be added to the model described in Figure 6. One of these is the ontogenetic perspective. A common former misconception was that in order to be genetic, a trait had to be congenitally evident. Perhaps one reason for this misconception was the failure to distinguish between genotype and phenotype. It is true that all of the genetic material is present at birth, but the phenotypic expression of the genotype can unfold over the entire lifetime of the individual. Recent remarkable discoveries in the field of developmental genetics have shown how it is possible for genes to be turned on or turned off at different stages in the life of the individual, and in different developing tissue systems. Thus, while each cell of the developing embryo contains equivalent genetic information, only certain genes are called upon in given cell lines and at given times. This selective functioning of the genes is not restricted to the prenatal period. A good example is provided by the disease Huntington's chorea in man. This disease is caused by a dominant allele which has no obvious effect until about the age of 35 years on the average, at which time progressive degenerative changes in the central nervous system begin, resulting in progressive mental deterioration.

Another example may be taken from a developmental anomaly in mice, which illustrates not only a developmental process but also provides an illustration of the anatomical and physiological pathways through which gene effects are made manifest. The condition in question is known as Kreisler. It is due to homozygosity for a recessive allele, and affected animals begin at about two weeks of age to crawl in circles, to become rigid when placed on their backs and to exhibit head shaking. Examination of the nervous system of an affected animal reveals liquid-filled cysts in the vicinity of the pons which compress and deform the telencephalon. By examining successively younger affected individuals it has been possible to identify the Kreisler condition in embryos nine days post-conception. The anomalous development apparently is a consequence of the fact that the developing otic pit, which ordinarily would develop into the auditory and vestibular systems, does not make physical contact with the neural fold. Evidently in the normal developmental process some chemical substance is diffused between these tissues which initiates or permits further development. The lack of physical contact prevents the development of the normal ductus endolymphaticus, with a consequent increase in pressure of the endolymphatic fluid and the resulting distortion of the nervous system structures.

One additional example that will illustrate developmental processes also attests to the fact that questions of the influence of environment must specify genotype. Cortisone injected during development of mice has been shown to have occasional teratogenic effects. When the identical dosage was administered to pregnant mice of one strain, cleft palates were observed in 100 percent of the offspring. The identical treatment given to mice of another strain resulted in the abnormality in only 17 percent of the offspring (Fraser et al., 1954).

Among the most remarkable pieces of evidence concerning the timing of gene action has been the observation of puffs on chromosomes of certain insect larvae. In some tissues, a particular pattern of enlargement of the

chromosome has been observed with puffs forming on different parts of the chromosome at different times in a fixed and highly reliable sequence. In other tissues different parts of the chromosomes puffed. It has been possible to show that puffs are the sites of heavy RNA concentrations, which is taken to indicate that the genes located at those sites are active. Interaction of gene and intraorganismic environment is illustrated by the fact that administration of a hormone can initiate chromosome puffing sequences.

Genetics and Evolution

The other time perspective which must be considered is on a vaster scale: evolutionary time. To give some notion of the relative durations involved requires an analogy. A most apt one is provided by Washburn (1968) who may be paraphrased somewhat as follows. Life is now thought to have begun some three billion years ago. If we represent this time span by a line as long as six football fields placed end to end, the history of the vertebrates will only occupy the last one of these fields. Mammals have only been in existence for the last fifteen yards, and man's span on earth has been so brief that it wouldn't even show as a mark on the goal line. Evolution has had a lot of time in which to work.

The basic process of evolution is changing of gene frequencies. Let us consider a particular gene which has two allelic forms, A and a . Let us further assume that a is very much less frequent than A . That is to say, of all of the sex cells in a particular breeding population, the overwhelming majority are A . There will therefore be very few occasions on which an a bearing sperm will meet an a bearing egg to give rise to a homozygous aa individual. Let us suppose, however, that these rare aa individuals have a somewhat higher fitness than the average AA or Aa individual. By fitness in this context is meant that such an individual has a better chance of surviving and producing offspring. The mechanism of this advantage can be any of a diverse variety: a retina with more densely packed retinal cells which permits more accurate aiming of a spear, more active sperm producing cells in the testes, a heightened adrenal response in intraspecific confrontations over mates, a reduced likelihood of appendicitis, a greater than average inclination to protect the young, a capacity to digest and utilize a larger than average array of foods, and so on and on. The effect, whatever the mechanism, is that aa individuals will, on the average, leave somewhat more surviving offspring than will Aa or AA individuals. There will therefore be a small increment in the number of a alleles in the next generation, and if the advantage persists, the increment will grow in each succeeding generation until the a allele becomes more frequent than the A allele, and might replace the latter completely. It must be emphasized that the reproductive advantage need not be large to be effective. If the increased likelihood of having offspring is only a small fraction of 1 percent, it will suffice over the entire population to bring about a change in gene frequencies. It will be a slower change, of course, when the advantage is small. But evolution, as we have seen, has lots of time.

The present construction of the members of any living species is attributable to such effects—the changing of the frequencies of thousands of genes—over their evolutionary past. This is true of man no less than of mice or corn plants or fruit flies.

Why then does genetic diversity exist *within* a species? Why have not the reproductive advantages of the various alleles resulted in elimination of all of the less advantageous ones? There are several answers to this question. In the first place, there undoubtedly *are* many "fixed" or nearly fixed genes in any given species. These may be regarded as the sine qua non genes for the species. If all individuals share a number of genes in homozygous conditions, they cannot be studied, since our techniques require that at least two alleles be present in the population.

Many genes are not fixed, and these are the ones that interact with environment to produce variability within the species. The reasons why more than one allelic form persists are various. In the first place, mutation—an infrequently occurring alteration in a gene which is essentially a change from one allele to another—can keep a small number of the mutant allele in the population even if it is highly deleterious. Furthermore, selection does not always work in the same direction long enough for fixation to occur. There is some evidence that different genetic constitutions are advantageous at different times of the year in *Drosophila*, for example. Such a change in selection pressure, with now one allele and then the other being favored, will keep both in the gene pool. Another force that will keep different alleles in the population is selection for intermediates. It is frequently the case that individuals with intermediate values of a given trait are most fit (in the reproductive sense). This category will include many heterozygotes, and heterozygotes, by definition, possess two alleles which they can transmit to their progeny. A particularly illuminating illustration of heterozygote advantage is provided by the gene for sickle cell anemia. Homozygotes for one allele have abnormal hemoglobin and usually die of anemia before attaining adulthood. It would appear that an allele with such a deleterious effect would soon be eliminated from the population. In some areas of Africa, however, the frequency of this allele has been found to be substantial. The reason apparently is that heterozygotes have greater resistance to malaria than either homozygote. In malaria-ridden areas, therefore, heterozygotes are at an advantage and survive to pass the allele for abnormal hemoglobin on to their offspring. Occasionally, a gamete containing this allele will be joined by another and the offspring will be fatally affected. The frequency with which these affected homozygotes will be produced can be specified with considerable precision. Let the frequency of the normal allele be symbolized by p , and that of the abnormal allele by q , and assume that $p+q=1$ (i.e., these two are the only alleles for this gene). It can then be shown that, given certain conditions pertaining to the stability of the population, the frequencies of the genotypes in the population will be:

Homozygous normal	p^2
Heterozygous	$2pq$
Homozygous abnormal	q^2

It is important to appreciate how many heterozygotes may be in the population in the case of a rare recessive gene. Consider that the condition of phenylketonuria occurs with a frequency of the order of magnitude of one in ten thousand births. These are homozygous individuals, and their frequency provides a direct estimate of $q^2 = 0.0001$. Then $q = 0.01$, $p = 0.99$, and $2pq \cong$

0.02. That is to say, although the condition occurs only once in 10,000 births, one out of every 50 individuals is a heterozygote, and thus capable of transmitting the gene.

Genetic diversity is essential for the survival and continued evolution of a species. As the environmental circumstances in which a population finds itself change, either gradually or cataclysmically, there will be changes in selection pressure. Traits formerly of high positive adaptive value may become less useful or even of negative value, and vice versa. The population must have reserves of genetic variability in order to meet this challenge, or it will not survive. This is not the teleological reasoning it might appear to be at first glance. It can be explained in the mechanistic terms of evolutionary process without recourse to concepts of purpose or goal. Very simply put, those species in which there were mechanisms for maintaining genetic variability were the ones that survived. Those which had not developed these mechanisms became extinct. It is instructive to remember that there are more extinct species than there are living ones.

BIOLOGY AND AGGRESSION

Generalizability of Animal Research Results

With this basic frame of reference, we may now approach the information that exists concerning the biological basis of aggression and violence. Much of the available data is derived from research on infra-human animals, and it is appropriate, at this point, to consider the relevance of these studies to man. This is, of course, only a particular case of the general problem of the comparative method. It is not necessary that research on animals be motivated by anthropocentric concern. The phyletic array of diverse species can be studied in its own right. However, it is often the case that research is conducted on animals because the procedures cannot be applied to man for one reason or another. The utility of such research then depends upon the extent to which the results can be generalized to man.

In general terms, evolutionary theory provides the logical basis for expecting some degree of generalizability. If species were not related, but were each the result of special creation, then there would be no reason to expect any common principles. But, in terms of evolutionary theory we understand that different species are variations on themes within themes. Animals are one basic theme; plants another. Within animals, invertebrates are one basic theme and vertebrates another; within vertebrates there are the themes of the fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals (and several less well known); within mammals are (among others) the themes of the insectivores, carnivores, rodents, ungulates and primates. Among the primates will be found New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, gibbons, and man.

Now, some features have been so successful so early in the evolution of life that they are shared by many or most living things. The basic building block of the cell was so advantageous a development that it is nearly ubiquitous; hemoglobin as a means of transporting oxygen is a device that has been utilized by most organisms with circulatory systems; most species have found it useful to have genes arranged on chromosomes, and so on.

Yet each species must be a *variation* on the theme, otherwise it would not have come into being. New species form only when some difference makes one group more capable of "earning a living" in a particular environment. We must expect that some solutions to the problems of living are very general, but some are relatively restricted.

The development of modern medicine has depended to a very great extent on animal research, and its present status is testimony to the fact that many anatomical, physiological, biochemical, and pharmacological processes are indeed generalizable, at least to a useful degree.

It would appear possible to make two mistakes in respect to the comparative method. One is to accept uncritically evidence from one species as descriptive of some process or function in another species. The other is to deny that any generalizable result might reasonably be sought. Both mistakes have been made and continue to be made in the realm of behavioral research. Both are attributable to biological naivete. The first arises from a failure to appreciate the *variation*, the second from a failure to appreciate the *theme*. Critics of the comparative approach have often proposed that once man had developed culture, he set himself apart from the rest of the community of life, and from the rules of biology. It is easy to maintain this posture if the conceptual alternatives are limited to nature *or* nurture. The impact of culture is so obvious that it cannot be denied. In a dichotomous and mutually exclusive perspective, then, nature would have to be impotent. But we have seen that this perspective is not appropriate. Genotype and environment are mutually supportive and interacting, in terms of the functioning of the organism at a particular moment in time, in the developmental history of the individual and in the evolution of the species of which the individual is a member.

Certain minimum requirements had to be met before the first steps to culture were taken. These first steps provided a new environmental milieu which exerted selection pressure on the population. Some were more fit under the modified circumstances than were others; they survived better and reproduced more. The next generation was capable of further innovations, and so on, to this day. There has been a mutual boot strapping of cultural development and biological capacity for culture. There is no reason to believe that the process has ended—that having reached this cultural level, evolutionary pressures have been eliminated. We do not have sufficient perspective even to judge whether the evolutionary rate of our species has slowed or accelerated.

In any case, the position taken in this report is that man is not uniquely apart from the rest of the phyletic series. The proper attitude to be taken toward data obtained from some nonhuman animal is to regard it as suggestive. One should be neither too eager to apply the data unaltered to man nor to deny the relevance of the data to human processes. In many cases the accumulation of data from a variety of sources will provide a general scheme in which human processes become understandable. In other cases, after research efforts have clarified processes at one phyletic level, hypotheses will appear that can be tested directly on man.

Heredity and Aggression in the Mouse

We may now turn to evidence concerning the genetic mechanism in aggressiveness and dominance behavior in experimental animals. The most extensive research has been conducted with the laboratory mouse, and in particular it involves comparison of highly inbred strains. It is therefore necessary to make a brief statement concerning the methodology. Highly inbred strains are, as the name implies, a product of intensive inbreeding. Inbreeding is defined as the mating of relatives more closely related than would be expected by chance in a population. The degree of inbreeding employed in generating inbred strains in research animals is very much more intense than the minimal requirement of this definition. In fact, inbred strains are maintained by sib mating, and each generation is the progeny of a single male and his sister. After a sufficient number of generations (usually regarded to be 20) animals within such inbred strains will have approached a condition of genetic homogeneity in that each mouse will be like each other mouse (except for the sex chromosomes, of course) and they will all be homozygous for all genes. Inbred strains thus represent a sort of crystallization of a particular homozygous genotype, and it is possible to obtain replicate individuals upon demand. Thus a researcher can employ a number of variables on different naive samples from a particular strain, content in the knowledge that the basic material of the research, the experimental animal itself, has remained unchanged from one experiment to the next.

The probability that such separate breeding groups would achieve homozygosity in the same allelic state for all of the different genes is negligibly small. Thus, if two or more such inbred strains, which have no breeding history in common, are reared under the same environmental circumstances and tested under constant environmental circumstances, then any differences that appear between these strains must be attributable to differences in their genotypes. Such a demonstration of strain differences serves only as an indicator of genetic influence, and more detailed examination of the mode of hereditary transmission requires the study of generations derived from crossing of the inbred strains. Inbred strains are also useful, however, in testing hypotheses about correlated characteristics. For example, hypotheses concerning physiological mechanisms involved in the determination of a trait or process can be tested by selecting strains that differ on the process in question, and examining the level of the hypothesized related trait.

Several situations have been employed in the assessment of mouse aggression. We may begin by considering spontaneous fighting in "matches" arranged by taking animals from their home cages and placing them in a fighting chamber. The type of behavior that can occur in such a contest is illustrated by the following seven-point scale, one or another variation of which has been used in numerous investigations.

0. No interest in each other except occasional slight nosing.
1. Frequent vigorous nosing. No blocking, shoving or crowding or any other display of hostility.
2. Occasional blocking, shoving, or crowding.
3. Frequent blocking, shoving, or crowding of opponent. The aggressor keeps after the other animal throughout the period.

4. Slight wrestling and/or assuming a dancing position in which the animals clasp each other while standing nose to nose.
5. Fierce wrestling. They jump, roll, and turn all over the cage very rapidly.
6. Fierce wrestling. An animal bites the other hard enough to draw blood. (As modified from Lagerspetz, 1964, pp. 40-41).

It must be emphasized that the fighting behavior involved in the scale is almost completely restricted to males. Females almost never show aggression in this type of situation.

This description points up one of the basic difficulties in research on social processes in experimental animals. Unlike the circumstances in which one assesses an animal's activity or learning performance or some similar trait by placing the animal in an objective, standard, constant situation, in studies of social interactions such as aggression it is necessary to pit one animal against another. Since both are capable of change over time, one is faced with a shifting standard. The aggressive behavior of a particular mouse is likely to be rather different when he confronts another aggressive mouse than when he confronts a submissive one. A solution to this problem is usually attempted by pairing each animal with a number of opponents in "round robin" fashion. Ginsburg and Allee (1942) and Scott (1942) employed this basic technique in the first observations of strain differences and aggression. Animals of a strain called C57BL were found to be superior to a strain called C3H, which in turn were found to be superior to a strain called BALB in ability to win fights. This order of superiority is not immediately obvious when the bouts are first begun, but develops only after a series of encounters. In order to test the possibility that the C57 mice were more aggressively successful than the others because they were reared by C57 mothers rather than because they were themselves C57, cross-fostering experiments were performed in which C57 and BALB litters were split, with half of each being foster reared. Such change in maternal environment produced no effect on aggression. However, the importance of environment is indicated in three other observations. In the first instance, a number of fights were staged between mice within the same strain. In these intrastain bouts hierarchies develop with one dominant mouse, some very submissive animals, and some intermediate ones who may shift about in aggressiveness from time to time. This pattern was produced in all three strains studied, but it was noted that the most stable hierarchy was established in the C57BL strain. Because each of these animals can be regarded as being genetically like every other animal of the strain, it is clear that the individual differences in hierarchy position cannot be attributed to genetic differences. Presumably a small environmental difference, such as might exist with respect to the point of uterine implantation, subsequent nutritional status differences, and so on—things either unrecognized or beyond the power of the experimenter to regulate or control—must account for these individual differences.

Experience with aggression was shown in this same series of experiments to be an important environmental determinant. In an attempt to modify the behavior of aggressive animals, they were repeatedly exposed to defeats by even more aggressive animals. When returned to their regular group of contenders, these formerly aggressive and dominant animals were seen to be

very much reduced in aggressiveness. Similarly it proved possible, although rather more difficult, to increase aggressiveness of submissive animals by exposing them to a series of victory experiences in confrontations with even more submissive animals.

Bauer (1956) used a different technique in an attempt to provide a more constant stimulus object. C57BL and BALB/c animals were tested for their response to animals made helpless by being dangled by the tail. The C57BL animals were found to make more strong attacks than the BALB/c animals, confirming the previous outcome. This "dangler" technique has been successfully employed in subsequent experiments as well.

Fredericson and Birnbaum (1954) performed an experiment which required that C57BL and BALB males be housed together. Rather surprisingly, in view of the previous observations that C57BL animals appeared to be more aggressive in short bouts, it was found that under these conditions, 8 of the 10 BALB animals had killed their C57BL partners. This strongly suggests that different types of aggression are being assessed in short bouts and more prolonged social interactions.

In an attempt to explore the relationship between sexuality and aggression in these mouse strains, Fredericson et al. (1955) introduced females into fighting chambers of highly trained fighters. This procedure greatly reduced the aggression of the C57BL mice, who left off the combat to investigate the female. In BALB animals, the introduction of the female produced no effects, and vigorous combat continued. No clear-cut relationship between sexuality and aggressiveness was therefore demonstrable, but the results do once again demonstrate a genetic difference in social behavior.

Another approach to the measurement of dominance, in this case not involving actual fighting, has been used by Lindsey et al. (1961). In this experiment, animals were trained to run from one end of a tube to the other in order to receive a food reward. After this response had been thoroughly learned, mice of different strains were placed in opposite ends and started simultaneously. Dominance was assessed by determining which animal would literally "back down" in the confrontation. The animals were of course tested in pairs, and three strains were involved. When four mice competed with C3H's, the former were dominant; C3H animals were dominant over DBA and A mice were dominant over DBA.

Other strains were employed by Levine and his colleagues (1965) who were able to demonstrate that males of the CBA strain were superior to males of the ST strain under a variety of testing conditions. Mating success and fighting success were measured simultaneously when males of the two different strains were placed in a fighting chamber with a female for a one hour period. Not all such situations actually elicited aggression, although rather more than 50 percent did. Of the instances in which fighting did occur, the CBA male was victor in 86 percent of the cases, the ST male was victor in 6 percent of the cases, and the remaining 8 percent of these confrontations were draws. Similarly, mating occurred only in approximately half of the contests. The CBA male was successful in mating more than five times as often as the ST males. These data would lend some weight to the proposition that aggressiveness in this type of situation would be related to reproductive fitness.

An even more "natural" situation was employed by Calhoun (1956) who

placed samples of DBA and of C57BL mice in large enclosures where they were allowed to reproduce without outside interference. Bountiful supplies of food, water and bedding were made available. In each case only a small founding colony was provided and the populations were observed periodically for several months. In these semi-natural settings, the DBA colony exhibited reproductive and maternal behavior malfunctions, and were characterized by highly intense social interaction which even involved attacks by DBA males upon pregnant or lactating females. The DBA strain was not capable of maintaining itself, whereas the C57BL mice were much more successful, due at least in part to the fact that stable social hierarchies were established. Aggressive behavior in the C57BL was less intense and of shorter duration than in the case of the DBA animals. Furthermore, submissive behavior of the subordinate mouse was responded to by cessation of attack on the part of the dominant animal in the C57BL strain. In the case of the DBA strain, submissive behavior by subordinate animals was frequently ineffective in terminating attack by the dominant animal.

The most comprehensive approach to the study of the genetics of mouse aggression has been provided by the work of Lagerspetz (1964). This research utilized the technique of selective breeding rather than strain comparisons. In selective breeding, one begins with a genetically heterogeneous group of animals, and mates together animals who display extreme levels of the trait under investigation. Depending upon the extent to which the phenotype of an animal selected to reproduce has a genetic basis (that is to say, depending upon the heritability of the trait), offspring of mated animals with high manifestation of the trait should have higher average values than the average of the generation from which their parents were selected. Similarly the offspring of animals selected to have low manifestation of the trait should have lower mean values than the mean of the population from which their parents were selected. The rate at which the selected lines diverge in fact constitutes a direct measure of the heritability (V_A/V_P) of the trait in that population. Thus a successful selective breeding program demonstrates conclusively that the trait under investigation has a heritable basis. Such a demonstration has been provided for a variety of behavioral traits including maze brightness and maze dullness in rats, high and low activity in rats, alcohol preference in mice, positive and negative geotaxis in fruit flies, and a variety of other behavioral characteristics. In addition to providing a demonstration of the importance of genotype, a successful selective breeding program culminates in strains of animals from the same basic gene pool (the same foundation population) with highly different levels of the particular behavioral traits under investigation. These selected strains are therefore very useful for testing hypotheses about determinant systems and correlated characters. This general approach has been utilized by Lagerspetz in an experiment involving seven generations of mice selectively bred for high and low aggressiveness. Figure 7 shows the mean aggressiveness score utilizing the scale described above for all successive generations of the aggressive and nonaggressive selected lines. The increasing divergence of the two lines is quite apparent. The somewhat erratic progress of the selection, particularly in the aggressive line, is a common feature of selection experiments, and presumably represents environmental changes that occur from generation to generation. Another way of examining the data and one which typically gives

rise to smoother results is shown in Fig. 8, in which the difference between the upward and downward selected lines is plotted as a function of generation. In combination with the differences among inbred strains in aggressiveness, this success in selective breeding for aggressive behavior constitutes unassailable evidence of the importance of hereditary factors in determining individual differences in mouse aggressiveness.

Having generated these two lines, Lagerspetz was able to investigate a variety of hypotheses concerning interaction of genotype and environment and the correlation of other behavioral characters with the selected one. First, Lagerspetz investigated the effects of victories and defeats on the level of aggressiveness of mice. It was found that defeats reduced aggressiveness of animals of both aggressive and non-aggressive strains. The initial aggressiveness of animals from the aggressive strain could be enhanced by repeated victories, but victories did not have this effect on animals from the non-aggressive strain. Because they had frequently been used as indices of emotionality in mice, scores of ambulation and defecation in an open field were obtained from animals of the aggressive and the nonaggressive strains. Aggressive animals defecated significantly less often and were more active in the open field situation than were animals from the nonaggressive strain. In another measure of activity, a revolving wheel, animals from the aggressive strain were also more active. A somewhat superior maze learning ability was demonstrated for the aggressive animals.

One of the more interesting experiments performed by Lagerspetz was directed to the question of the incentive value of aggressive behavior. Animals were tested in a two-compartment test chamber. A swinging door permitted movement from one chamber to the other, but not in the reverse direction. After two animals were placed in the same compartment for a standard period of time, they were then separated. The animal in one of the compartments was then in a position to enter the other compartment containing his erstwhile opponent. Briefly stated, the results indicated that when the first mouse had been victorious the latency to open the door into the opponent's chamber was very much lower than when the opponent had been victorious. An extension of this general approach was provided by investigating a willingness of animals to cross a grid floor with punishing electrical shocks administered to their feet in order to make contact with a previous opponent. In general, animals from the aggressive strain were more willing to undergo this punishment than were animals from the non-aggressive strain. Furthermore, animals from the aggressive strain who had been exposed to a fight just prior to the experimental situation were very much quicker to cross the grid in order to reach their erstwhile opponent. The data from these two experiments strongly suggest that once aggressive behavior has been initiated, the opportunity to continue or resume fighting has rewarding properties.

Although this review has emphasized research on the genetics of aggression of the mouse, which has been most intensively studied in this regard, supportive evidence from other species can be cited. For example, breed differences in aggressiveness in dogs have been intensively studied by Scott (1958). As another example, selective breeding produced white leghorns with high and low levels of aggressiveness (Guhl et al., 1960).

In sum, these observations provide conclusive evidence that individual

differences in aggressiveness within a number of species are influenced by genetic factors.

Mechanisms of Aggression

Inquiry into the mechanisms of aggression, in terms of the frame of reference presented above, is concerned with the network of structures and processes between gene and behavior. This network has been the province of the physiological psychologist, and the behavioral physiologist. Detailed reports on the neural and endocrine systems in relation to violence are being made independently. This report will provide only a very brief résumé of some salient features.

Nervous System

Early research into brain function revealed that ablation of certain areas influenced rage-like behavior and that stimulation of certain areas could elicit attack behavior. The involved structures have been fairly widespread, but parts of the paleocephalon appear to be particularly involved. The paleocephalon, as the name implies, is old in the evolutionary sense, present in recognizable form in all vertebrates. Of the paleocephalic structures, the hypothalamus and various parts of the limbic system, especially the amygdala, are involved in emotional, rage or attack behavior.

The hypothalamus appears to be important for a variety of motivational processes. In it have been found thirst, hunger, and satiety centers. Destruction of certain parts of the hypothalamus of cats produces very tame, unemotional animals, and destruction of other parts can produce viciousness. Furthermore, stimulation by electrical current of different hypothalamic areas can produce either attack or flight reactions.

Similarly, removal and stimulation studies have demonstrated amygdaloid involvement in rage behavior, although the nature of the effects reported varies from study to study. To a certain extent these inconsistencies may be due to slightly different areas of damage in a highly complex neural area of which different subparts may serve different functions. Complicated interactions between different brain areas have also been described, with the effects of damage in one area being modified by damage in another area.

These observations have been made in a number of mammals with an emphasis on cats, and reviews of the extensive literature are available in Grossman (1967) and Thompson (1967).

Some recent observations of particular interest were made by Adams (1968) who found some cells in the midbrain of a cat that provided action potentials only when the cat was fighting another cat.

Delgado (1967) has stimulated various parts of the cerebrum of monkeys by radio broadcast to implanted electrodes. Stimulation of many areas evoked motor responses, some of which are involved in threat responses. Stimulation in the thalamus and central gray areas could elicit fully organized attacks against other monkeys. These responses were not undirected, but were well coordinated, adapted to the social situation and directed against specific individuals.

Several parts of the nervous system have been implicated in aggression of man in clinical disorders. Serafetinides (1965) described pronounced

aggressive tendencies in 36 percent of epileptic patients with temporal lobe epileptogenic focus. Sano et al. (1966) treated 22 cases of epileptic patients with intractable violent behavior by surgical removal of part of the hypothalamus. "Satisfactory calming effects" were reported, without impairment of measured intelligence. Heimburger et al. (1966) have reported on surgical destruction of the amygdala in successful treatment of epilepsy accompanied by aggressive behavior.

Endocrine System

The endocrine glands that appear to be principally involved in aggressive behavior are the adrenals and the gonads. There are many feedback systems involved in endocrine function, particularly with respect to the "master-gland," the pituitary, and through the pituitary's functional relationship with the hypothalamus, to the nervous system. There will, therefore, be many complex interactions.

Generally, it appears that hormones from both the adrenal medulla and adrenal cortex may be related to aggression and fighting. It is often regarded to be the case that medullary hormones are more important in short-term stressful situations, and the cortical ones in longer term stress. Bronson and Eleftheriou (1964, 1965a, 1965b) have shown an increase in adrenal weight and in adrenal corticosterone levels of the plasma of C57BL mice exposed to trained fighter mice for a period of time. Adrenalcorticotrophic hormone from the pituitary was also found to be increased.

In addition to observations on changes in endocrine levels with experience, manipulation of the endocrine status can be accomplished experimentally by surgical removal and replacement therapy. Edwards (1968), for example, caused the neonatal masculinization of female mice by injecting testosterone on their first day of life. Later, as adults, when tendency to fight was investigated as a function of dose of exogenous testosterone, it was found that these females behaved just like normal males. The author suggests that the early treatment by male hormone organized the nervous structures involved in aggression along male lines. The reasonableness of this interpretation is indicated by the fact that similar processes have been described with respect to sexual behavior. These results are complementary to the results described in detail by Levine in a separate report.

Psychopharmacology of Aggression

Demonstrations of the effects of drugs on aggressive behavior certainly implicate biological processes, and when more becomes known about the sites and modes of action of the drugs, will provide further insights into the mechanisms of aggression. Some examples of recent research will serve to illustrate the type of finding that has been obtained. It should first be noted that, for purposes of screening drugs for effects, the spontaneous aggression procedure has often been regarded as too inefficient, and aggression has been induced by isolation or shock. The first technique requires single caging of a male mouse (for example) for a period of time prior to the encounter with another mouse. This procedure generally results in higher incidence of fighting during the confrontation period. The shock induced aggression situation involves placing two animals on a shockable grid floor. Administration of electric shock tends to elicit fighting behavior.

In one early study, Yen et al. (1959), several drugs were assessed for their effects on isolation induced aggression in mice. Many were found to reduce the aggression, with reserpine and chlorpromazine being particularly effective.

Tedeschi et al. (1959) tested some of the same drugs on shock induced aggression, also in mice. Of those drugs that suppressed fighting (including reserpine), most appeared to require doses that were large enough to produce motor inactivation. One exception was meprobamate, which provided pronounced suppression of fighting with only moderate reduction of motor activity. Chen et al. (1963) also found that doses of various drugs effective in reducing shock-induced aggression in mice were approximately those required to produce sedation. In isolation induced aggression, Cole and Wolf (1966) have found differential effects, however, with chlorpromazine and chlordiazepoxide (but not meprobamate) selectively reducing aggression. Similarly, Santos et al. (1966) found that an extract of marijuana was capable of abolishing isolation induced aggression without reducing motor activity. It is not clear to what extent the results of these studies are dependent upon the mode of elicitation of the aggression.

Uyeno and colleagues (1966a, b; 1967a, b) has performed a series of experiments testing the effects of LSD and other substances on aggression and dominance. LSD was found to inhibit dominance behavior of rats in food competition situations, of isolation induced aggression of mice and of submissiveness in a water tank (where the dominant animal submerged the submissive to keep above water) by squirrel monkeys. An excellent review of the literature on drugs and aggressiveness is provided by Valzelli (1967).

Chromosomal Abnormalities in Man

A subject of considerable recent interest is the possibility that certain kinds of chromosomal abnormalities may be associated with aggressive and antisocial behavior in man. In order to place this topic in its proper context, it will be necessary to provide some general background information on the whole topic of human chromosome anomalies.

The physical vehicles of the genes are the chromosomes, small bodies located within the nucleus of the cell. Genes are arranged in serial order along the chromosomes, and this order is (with some exceptions that are unimportant for present purposes) constant from one individual to another within the species. The number of chromosomes within each cell is also characteristic of the species. In man, there are 23 chromosome pairs with one of each pair having been provided by the father, and the other having been provided by the mother. Twenty-two of these pairs are called *autosomes*, and the 23d pair are called sex chromosomes. The chromosome pairs vary in size and in certain morphological features which permit investigators to assign identifying numbers to particular chromosomes. In the case of the autosomes, the paternal and maternal contributions are identical. In the case of the sex chromosomes, those of females are of equal and intermediate size, and are called X chromosomes. In males the sex chromosomes are grossly unequal in size. One is an X chromosome, provided by the mother, and the other is a small Y chromosome from the father. Normal females are thus described as having an XX sex chromosomal complement, and males are described as XY.

Ordinarily, in the process of sex cell (gamete) formation, the chromosomal

complement of the individual is reduced by half. A given cell divides into two, with each of the "daughter" cells receiving one member of each chromosomal pair. The result is that the egg and sperm each have one half of the chromosome complement or a *haploid* set. When the sperm and the egg combine in fertilization, the net result is a restoration of the normal *diploid* number characteristic of the body cells of all normal members of the species. Occasionally, however, an accident occurs that gives rise to a gamete with something other than a haploid set. Of the various errors that can occur, the most relevant to the current discussion is probably *nondisjunction* which gives rise to a sperm or egg with either one chromosome lacking or one chromosome present in duplicate rather than singly. Then when such an abnormal sperm or egg is joined by another egg or sperm in fertilization, the resulting individual (*zygote*) will be in possession of the diploid set plus one chromosome, which condition is called *trisomy*, or will be in possession of the diploid set minus one chromosome, which condition is called *monosomy*. The first human autosomal trisomy to be identified involved a rather small chromosome which had been given the designation No. 21. It was discovered that trisomy 21 was a characteristic of individuals with the condition of mental retardation known as mongolism or Down's syndrome. This is an extremely well known syndrome that, because of its unique constellation of symptoms, had been the object of study for many years. A relatively frequent condition, occurring about once in each 800 births, Down's syndrome accounts for approximately 10 percent of the hospitalized cases of mental retardation.

Two other chromosomal trisomies, each less frequent than trisomy 21, have been described. These involve slightly larger chromosomes than No. 21, and the degree of malformation is considerably more severe. The average survival of infants born with this kind of abnormality ranges from a few weeks to a few months. Other trisomies for larger chromosomes have not been reported in live births, but have been found in spontaneous abortions. Evidently, the organism can accommodate an excess of genetic material only within certain ranges. The amount of material represented by an extra chromosome No. 21 is compatible with life, but results in quite severe mental retardation and associated physical abnormalities. The excess genetic material in the other two identified trisomies is rather more, and is compatible with prenatal development, but not with extended postnatal life. Larger excess quantities of genetic material are evidently incompatible even with prenatal development.

In addition to extra chromosomes, nondisjunction should give rise to monosomies. No autosomal monosomies have been described in live births. It would seem that insufficient genetic material is even more deleterious than excess. There are cases, however, in which part of a chromosome is missing. Such a partial loss is described as a *deletion*. Deletion of part of a rather large chromosome, No. 5, has been found to be associated with a particular constellation of symptoms called the cri du chat or cat cry syndrome. Individuals thus afflicted are severely mentally retarded, are microcephalic, possess a number of other physical abnormalities and, as the name implies, have a cry very reminiscent of that of a cat. This latter symptom, which is so clear and uniform as to be diagnostic, is evidently the consequence of abnormal development of the larynx.

Of considerable interest are individuals who are composed of two different kinds of cells. These mosaics, for example, may have a part of their body composed of cells with normal chromosome complements, and a part composed of cells that are trisomic. In general, the severity of the symptoms of the mosaic individuals is less than that of a complete trisomic.

In the case of sex chromosomes, where we are dealing only with a single pair, we can make predictions in advance as to the consequences of non-disjunction at various times in both the egg and sperm development. These consequences are shown in Figs. 9 and 10. In figure 9 is shown the effects of non-disjunction in egg formation. The topmost circle represents the oogonium which divides normally to give two daughter cells, each of which contains a duplicated X chromosome. The normal sequence of events would then be for each member of this duplicated X to be distributed to each of the daughter cells at the next cell division. However, nondisjunction is shown to have occurred at this time, so that one of the daughter cells receives no X chromosome, and the other receives two. The various possible combinations that can arise when fertilization by normal X bearing or Y bearing sperm of these two kinds of egg occurs are shown at the bottom of the figure. The resulting individuals can be: X only (usually described as XO), Y only (designated YO), XXX (Triplo-X) and XXY.

The first of these conditions, XO, has been found to be accompanied by a syndrome of sexual infantilism called Turner's syndrome. Patients with Turner's syndrome are phenotypic women. They are short in stature, possess a webbed neck, and suffer from a generally defective development of the reproductive system. From the psychological point of view, these individuals are particularly interesting. Early results suggested that Turner's cases were moderately retarded, but subsequent analysis has indicated that their verbal IQ scores are rather elevated, with performance scores depressed on the Wechsler intelligence test. Further examination has raised the possibility that Turner's patients suffer from a particular kind of cognitive deficiency, in that their perception of spatial relationships is grossly defective.

The other possible monosomy arising from non-disjunction during egg development is YO. This condition is evidently lethal, and has never been described.

The trisomy, XXX, was first described in 1959. These women are not very remarkable, although there is some suggestion that they may suffer, on the average, from a moderately depressed IQ.

The trisomy, XXY, is also associated with the condition of sexual hypodevelopment. These individuals are phenotypic males, but suffer from lack of development of the testes. In addition, the condition is associated with a degree of mental retardation and that can range from profound to mild. Other reports have suggested that XXY cases were unusually prone to delinquency and aggressive behavior. It was in an attempt to assess this apparent association that the YY syndrome, to be described next, was identified.

Figure 10 displays potential results of nondisjunction during sperm formation. Examination of the possible zygotes displayed at the bottom reveals that two of the syndromes already described, Triplo-X and Turner's syndrome, can arise from nondisjunction in formation of the male gametes as well as in formation of the female gametes. Another possibility is also

encountered in this case, however. If a sperm bearing YY fertilizes a normal egg, a chromosomal constitution of XYY will result.

For various technical reasons, the XYY condition cannot be screened for in large populations as easily as can X. It happens that, if more than one X is present, a small body of darkly staining chromatin material, which is easily recognizable and requires minimal procedures, can be identified. This is true of normal females, and of XXY's. Triplo-X's have two such chromatin bodies. Individuals possessing only one X chromosome such as normal males, XO females, and XYY males have no such convenient indicator, and a full scale chromosomal analysis is required for identification.

The XYY Male and Aggression

The first described case of an XYY male revealed a quite unremarkable person. This man was investigated only because of other chromosomal anomalies, including trisomy 21, in his progeny. The father was also shown to be trisomic, but that, rather than being trisomic for No. 21, possessed an extra Y chromosome. He was a large man who was described as being essentially asymptomatic with respect to physiological, anatomical and mental characteristics.

The next relevant observation was provided by the work of Casey et al. (1966a), who were interested in determining whether an excessive number of XYY patients might be found in an institution that specialized in patients requiring special security because of violent and aggressive behavior. Of 922 male patients, 21 were found to be sex chromatin positive. That is to say, they gave evidence of having more than one X chromosome. This incidence of 2.2 percent is substantially in excess of the incidence of sex chromatin positive males in the normal population (0.2 percent). Of these 21, subsequent detailed chromosomal examination revealed that 12 had 47 chromosomes, and were XXY. Two were mosaics, containing some cells that were XXY and some that were normal XY cells. The remaining seven were found to possess 48 chromosomes, and to be XXYY with respect to the sex chromosomes. This is an extraordinary excess of XXYY individuals. Ordinarily, samples of chromatin positive males will contain less than 10 percent of these XXYY "double males." These subjects were very tall, and otherwise possessed the symptoms of Klinefelter's syndrome.

Jacobs et al. (1965) reported on mentally retarded male patients institutionalized because of "dangerous, violent or criminal propensities." In this study, instead of preliminary screening by using the sex chromatin test, all 197 inmates who were willing to cooperate (out of the total of 203 inmates) were given the complete chromosomal examination. Twelve of these 197 had a chromosome anomaly of some kind. One was XY/XXY mosaic, one had 48 chromosomes and was XXYY, and seven were found to possess seven chromosomes with an XYY constitution. Three more cases involved minor autosomal defects. Thus 3½ percent of this population were XYY individuals. It might be noted that, in the study previously described by Casey et al. (1966a) XYY individuals could not have been detected since all individuals were first screened for two X's. Of this institutionalized population, the average height of males with only one Y chromosome was 67 inches. The average height of those with two Y chromosomes was slightly more than 73 inches. This is in accord with the previous descriptions. Shortly

after the Jacobs report, Price et al. (1966) found two more XYY patients in the same institution, but in a different wing. In a detailed physical examination of all nine cases there were no physical characteristics which distinguished the XYY from the XY individuals except height.

Casey et al. (1966b) examined several populations including those already described and published the following summary table:

Population	Number of males exceeding 6'	Number of XYY
Detained:		
Mentally retarded	50	12
Mentally ill	50	4
Criminal	24	2
Mentally ill	30	0
Normals	30	0

These data were interpreted as suggesting that there is some degree of association at least between an XYY chromosome constitution and anti-social behavior.

The populations just described were all British. An American population was studied by Telfer et al. (1968) who examined inmates in four institutions for care of criminal males in Pennsylvania. The four institutions included one for juvenile delinquents, one for mentally defective delinquent adults, one for unselected adults and one for the criminally insane. Of these populations, subjects were selected for chromosomal analysis on the basis of height. Those over 71 inches tall were selected. The following table gives the results. A remarkably uniform ratio of XYY individuals was found.

Summary of institutional surveys pertaining to the XYY karyotype

Investigator	Reference group size	Classification	Height selection	XYY	Approximate percent XYY
Jacobs	197	Violent propensities	None	7	3.5
Telfer	14	Juvenile delinquent	>71"	1	7.0
Telfer	30	Mentally defective adult delinquents	>71"	0	.0
Telfer	35	Unselected delinquent adults	>71"	2	6.0
Telfer	50	Criminally insane	>71"	2	4.0
Welch	22	Defective delinquent	>74"	1	5.0
Welch	35	Various criteria (see text)		1	3.0
Goodman	52	Caucasian inmates	>73"	2	4.0
Goodman	100	Caucasian and Negro inmates	>73"	2	2.0
Weiner	34	Prisoners	>69"	4	12.0
Hunter	29	Approved schoolboys	"tall"	3	10.0

Another American study (Welch et al., 1967) concerned 464 institutionalized inmates classified as defective delinquents. Of this total number, an initial screening of all who were at least 72 inches tall provided a group of 97. This group in turn was screened for IQ, and 11 were selected with IQ's less than 75. All of these cases were found to have a normal chromosome complement. These investigators then asked the resident staff to name the 12 most aggressive patients in the institution. Upon examination all of these were found also to be normal, with 46 chromosomes and an XYY chromosome complement. Finally a more vigorous screening with respect to

height (regardless of IQ) was instituted. All those with height in excess of 74 inches were examined. Of the 22 in this category, one was an XYY. This latter group, consisting of individuals screened for height without regard to IQ, is probably the most comparable to the previously described studies. The incidence of one in 22 is rather lower than the other studies reported, however. The authors suggest one possible explanation in that of all of the 35 individuals whose chromosomes were studied, 21 were Negroes. Prior to this study, no Negro case of XYY had ever been reported.

In another American investigation, Goodman et al. (1967) obtained 100 volunteers who were 73 inches and taller from a penitentiary in Ohio which had 3,000 male inmates. Of the 100, there were 52 Caucasians and 48 Negroes. Four of these individuals had chromosomal anomalies. Two, one Negro and one Caucasian, were Klinefelter's, with an XXY constitution. Two others, both Caucasians, were XYY. The IQ's of the XYY individuals were normal.

In Australia, Wiener et al. (1968) found 34 prisoners between the heights of 69 and 82½ inches. Four of these 34 had chromosome anomalies. Three were XYY, one was a mosaic with some cells being XYY and XYYY. Of the XYY's, one had committed murder and another had been declared unfit to plead on the same charge.

One further report, Hunter (1968), pertains to a study of 29 tall boys from an approved school in England. Three of the 29 were XYY. Their IQ's were 77, 78 and 91. The antisocial actions of these boys began at the ages of 6, 7, and 9, respectively.

In addition to these survey studies there have appeared several individual case histories of XYY individuals, some of which report dramatic evidence of aggressive behavior and some of which do not. It is interesting to note that of the three reports prior to 1966, none made mention of aggressive behavior, but were concerned mostly with sexual development. Three papers appeared in 1966, after the report by Jacobs et al., but perhaps too soon to have been influenced by it. Of these three, two cases were characterized by sexual infantilism, and one was described as an aggressive psychopath. Since that time, one case has been described as "extremely aggressive," one as having aggressive fantasies but not being overtly aggressive, one as a juvenile delinquent (the first reported Negro XYY case) and one, a 9-year-old boy, as unmanageable, destructive, mischievous, defiant and dangerous. A mosaic has also been reported with some XY and some XYY cells. A point was made of the fact that this young boy had *not* shown any unusual antisocial behavior.

These reports illustrate the problem of selective publication in case histories. It may be that some of the earlier described patients were indeed aggressive but, since the focus of attention was on sexual development, no special comment was made on this "personality" trait. It is also possible that the more recent tendency has been to report those cases that are in accord with the expectation of aggressiveness.

The survey studies, although not as subject to this difficulty, have their own problems of interpretation, arising largely from the nature of the populations surveyed. To state the problem briefly, and in a somewhat simplified manner: if you screen a population of tall aggressive criminals, and find that there are some XYY individuals among them, it is no surprise to find that these XYY individuals are tall aggressive criminals. This fact, in

order to be interpretable, must be placed in a context of other facts, some of which we do not have. Fig. 11 illustrates the situation. XYY individuals constitute a subset of those institutionalized for aggressive, criminal tendencies. To know the significance of this requires that we know how many XYY individuals are *not* institutionalized for this reason. The implications are quite different if the situation is as depicted in *a* than if it is as in *b*. If any appreciable number of XYY males are in the population "at large," then another question arises: of those at large, what percentage are also aggressive and criminally inclined, but have not yet been caught in transgressions and convicted?

The information we now possess on these matters can be reviewed as follows. Sex chromosome anomalies other than XO in general appear to occur in live births with a frequency not exceeding 0.16 percent, or 16 in 10,000 (Polani, 1967). Many of these will be XXX and XXY and higher polysomies, and so on. One-fourth of this value, or 4 in 10,000, would probably represent a generous upper limit to the frequency of XYY. In a survey of newborn males, Court Brown (1967) found one XYY in 2,000 cases, which would suggest the same order of magnitude. (This single case might not remain "at large" of course when grown up.) We may conclude that XYY's are infrequent in the general population. How frequent are they in tall, normal men? The only evidence on this point to date is that of Goodman et al. (1968) who studied the chromosomes of 36 college basketball players with an average height of 76 inches. No XYY cases were found (although a high incidence of another chromosomal peculiarity, large satellites on group D chromosomes, was observed).

Together, these observations appear to implicate the XYY condition as being associated with a heightened tendency to aggressive, antisocial behavior. The mechanism is obscure. Some studies have reported heightened testosterone levels; but others have not. A social mechanism is entirely possible. Large, possibly slightly retarded, males may be ridiculed for their height and may respond aggressively. In any case, it would appear that of the total amount of violence in our society only a very small part is contributed by XYY individuals. Society's attitude toward the XYY individual, particularly in terms of special legal status, must await the clarification of further research.

AGGRESSION, EVOLUTION, AND MAN

In recent years there has been a striking increase in efforts to understand the behavioral evolution of man. Field studies of baboons and other primates have been undertaken on an unprecedented scale (for examples, see DeVore, 1965), and the fields of comparative psychology and ethology have been scrutinized for insights into man's behavioral origins. It is likely that much of the apparent urgency with which the problem is being considered arises from the realization that man's evolutionary *future* is now in doubt. The overwhelming problems brought about by population pressures, imminent mass starvation, nuclear and biological weapons and environmental contamination have burst upon the scene, largely in the last decade. We are,

bluntly, in a mess, and some suggestions as to how to get out of the mess might arise from a consideration of how we got here.

In addition to the large professional literature that has increased so strikingly, a number of publications dealing with the topic have become bestsellers (Ardrey, 1966; Lorenz, 1966; Morris, 1967). To become popular on the general market, a book cannot maintain the scholarly standards that would be expected of professional literature. Thus, while these publications have served the useful purpose of informing the public on urgent matters, they have in some instances been easy targets for critics who prefer to believe that man's evolutionary past and biological condition are irrelevant to the human condition.

To be sure, there can be found non sequiturs, generalizations based upon slender evidence and propositions that are untestable. But the basic point, that man is a product of evolution and that his current behavior has origins in his evolutionary past, is undoubtedly correct. Assuming that the doctrine of special creation is no longer seriously regarded, one could only argue man's exemption from evolutionary biology on the basis of the uniqueness of culture. This point has already been discussed, and the argument made that culture provides a new set of environmental factors to interact with the genetic ones, but does not constitute any new principle. One cannot even argue that, since man has become self-domesticated, the genes for behaviors relevant and appropriate for his early, and very animal, history have been eliminated. It is unquestionably true that the emergence of highly articulated societies has imposed new selection pressures, and has altered gene frequencies appreciably. But social change has been too rapid for genetic changes to keep pace. There has not been sufficient time to alter the basic wiring diagram of the species.

So we're here today armed with the adaptations, propensities, inclinations and aptitudes that enabled our ancestors to deal successfully with some formidable problems. Among the propensities are affiliative ones, cooperative ones, altruistic ones, and, to the point of this report, aggressive ones.

The provocations that arise from dense populations are probably among the major sources of man's current problems. We probably evolved from group territorial species. Space is important to us, and violations of the requirements of members of territorial species can cause enormous changes in endocrine status and these influence physiology and behavior very generally.

What can the biological perspective offer for the violence of today? Probably not much that will be of use in the next long, hot summer. Not enough is yet known about specific mechanisms. We know that individual differences in aggressiveness in our species are in part genetically determined. We have seen that it is not "aggressiveness" that is inherited, but a series of processes that interact with the environment to determine predilections to respond with aggressive behavior in certain situations. We have seen that it is not useful to inquire if aggressive men are born *or* made; they are born *and* made. The most important implication is for a longer term perspective. The problems are probably not next year's alone, nor even the next decade's alone. Solutions will only be gradual, and they will likely come from research yet to be conducted. It is essential that this research not be handicapped by the dangerous vestiges of the nature-nurture controversy. To concede a biological contribution is not to deny the importance of environment

factors—either as determinants or as sources of amelioration. Research conducted with the old dichotomous perspective is grossly handicapped—the back is turned on a whole domain of potential explanatory principles. The problems are too urgent to permit this intellectual chauvinism.

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


Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11

APPENDIX 21

THE BIOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE: AN OVERVIEW

By Frank Ervin*

The biology of individual violence must focus on brain function and dysfunction. The brain is the organ of behavior. Personal violence, like other behavioral phenomena, is the reflection of a particular pattern of cerebral organization. This pattern is a resultant of the current environmental (sensory) stimuli, the stored experience of the individual (both the personally unique and the socio-culturally shared experience), and the functional and structural organization of the brain tissue. This structural organization, in turn, is a product of the evolutionary development, the genetic (familial) heritage, and the individually unique exigencies of birth, maturation, accidents and disease, as well as the immediate physical and chemical environment (the "milieu interieur").

The role of current environmental stimuli and of learned responses in determining behavior is traditionally the concern of sociology and psychology (including psychodynamic psychiatry) and is not to be covered in the present survey. It should be emphasized, however, that this is an artificial dichotomization of the continuous brain-environment interaction. On the one hand the availability of environmental stimuli is essential for the normal anatomic maturation of the brain. On the other, both the genetic endowment and any deviations of brain structure set the limits within which environmental cues are perceived, interpreted, and acted upon.

With this caveat against simplistic reductionism clearly stated, we shall consider in turn each of the factors outlined in the first paragraph.

I. PHYLOGENESIS

The phylogenetic (evolutionary) determinants of human behavior are poorly understood. It is clear that the neural mechanisms of the simplest machinery for insuring the individual and species survival is predetermined. Chewing, sucking, swallowing, breathing, temperature regulation, etc. are complex neural mechanisms subject to little modification, although the behavior which leads to these final acts may be ever so complexly determined. The suggestion that the final behavioral expression of personal

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violence (e.g. physical attack on another individual) may share this quality of being "preprogrammed" rests heavily on laboratory studies of experimental animals. These may conveniently be divided into the following:

(A) Observation in Nature

During the past several years there has been an increasing attention to the patterns of behavior of animals living in natural environments. The ethologists in particular, under the leadership of Lorenz and of Tinbergen, have focused on "innate" mechanisms which are built into the brain of the species and are relatively independent of postnatal experience. Other workers, particularly DeVore and other observers of primate groups, have emphasized observations of the social structure of the group, patterns of individual interaction, and "acculturation" of the individual into the group without the theoretical concern about the sources of the behavioral phenomena observed. Because of the articulate, popular presentations of the ethological position recently, much of the popular philosophizing about aggression in man has reflected their position without adequate regard for the serious criticisms raised by other animal behaviorists both about the primary observations and the interpretation of the data. The essence of this position as presented either by nonscientific writers such as Ardrey, or by scientists such as Lorenz, or Morris, for example, is that the animal, including man, is innately aggressive. In dangerous predatory animals this aggressivity is balanced by other evolved instinctual patterns which prevent intraspecies killing under normal circumstances. In nonpredatory animals there is no need in the wild for these control mechanisms to have evolved, so that rabbits and doves, for example, when confined are likely to kill during conflicts over territory or sexual partner. By this logic, man is assumed to have a nonpredatory inheritance (or one of too short duration for evolution of controls), and the necessary instinctual control mechanisms are absent. These are replaced in this schema by weak, learned social controls which break down readily under provocation. The weaknesses of this hypothesis and its variants (cf. for example the combination of this logic with historically related psychoanalytic theory as presented by Storr) are twofold. The primary data are in question and have been sharply criticized, for example, by Scott. The extrapolation of these data to man, with his uniquely protracted childhood for social and cultural learning and his use of symbols, is entirely without experimental justification, as pointed out by C. R. Carpenter. In view of the considerable experimental and logical weakness of this position, it is important to note how influential it has become in recent years. It is perhaps because of the scientific gloss added to an ancient philosophical position that man is inherently evil. The debate as to man's inherent goodness or evil has occupied philosophy, religion, and political theory for some millennia and in the absence of convincing data will probably continue to outlast contemporary theories.

(B) Brain Stimulation in Animals

The vertebrate brain has evolved by elaboration of and additions to the basic neural machinery necessary for individual and species survival. In the

course of this elaboration, basic mechanisms have been retained and some functions automated. This process is clear in relationship to such processes as swallowing, breathing, etc., as mentioned above. In a similar way learned skills are automated so that if it is necessary, for example, to catch a ball one need not "think about" each separate motor act, but to call into operation of a preprogrammed sequence of neural events.

One method for investigating these preprogrammed patterns is to use tiny wires which permit one to apply brief electrical currents to parts of the brain. These currents crudely imitate the normal electrical signals used by the brain and evoke responses from the animal which can be observed and studied. A similar procedure can be carried out by applying small amounts of chemicals which are also involved in normal brain signal transmission.

Among other observations made by this method, directed attack behavior can be evoked by proper stimulation of sites in the so-called limbic brain. Within the limbic brain mechanisms can be defined which underlie sexual behavior, eating and drinking, flight and fight behavior, and other aspects of "emotional" behavior. Particularly the work of Flynn, Delgado, Kaada, and Hunsperger has defined a region of the amygdala and its projections to the hypothalamus and midbrain which is critical for this behavior in a varied group of animal species. In the most dramatic instance, stimulation in these regions will change a placid animal promptly into a ferocious adversary, who will attack in effective and purposeful manner either animate or inanimate neighbors. It is important to note however that this behavior is dependent to some extent on immediate circumstances, and can be modified by drugs or by stimulation of still other parts of the limbic system. It is also of importance that it is possible to utilize the state produced by stimulation for training. That is, an animal stimulated in an empty environment will not attack the cage walls, but can be trained to "work," i.e., to open doors, explore mazes, etc. in order to gain access to an appropriate object for aggression. Thus in normal circumstances, these neural mechanisms for attack behavior are in constant interaction with the rest of the brain and are influenced through it by the impinging environmental stimuli.

Finally, it should be noted that these limbic system structures, precisely delimited in the experimental animal work, are those implicated in the more limited studies of human behavior discussed below.

(C) Brain Ablations

In contrast to studies by stimulation of brain regions, ablation or removal of brain tissue in small areas can reveal deficits in behavior. Such studies have been carried out in regard to attack behavior and although there were some confusing and contradictory reports in the early literature, a consistent picture has emerged in the past few years. The attack behavior elicited by limbic system stimulation can be prevented by lesions made "downstream." That is, stimulation in the amygdala can be rendered ineffectual if a lesion is made in the hypothalamus. Second, careful work of Schreiner and Kling, and of Green et al., has demonstrated that removal of the amygdala in feral animals, such as the bobcat and the lynx, will produce marked taming and the loss of aggressivity. This is also true in the rhesus monkey, and in primate colonies animals with such lesions show loss of aggressivity in those

dominance relationships not normally accompanied by actual fighting but only by ritualized displays of threat and appeasement. Such changes in behavior may not be permanent if lesions are limited to the amygdala. It is also apparently the case that amygdalar lesions made in infant monkeys show little effect on adult behavior. It may be that these phenomena reflect the enormous plasticity of the central nervous system, or that suitably extensive experiments have not yet been completed. It is important that these studies be extended because the application of focal ablation to treatment in man is increasingly important.

In summary, there exists a neural machinery for directed attack which can be called into action by environmental demands for self protection, can be artificially activated to produce effective behavior, and can be removed by appropriate brain lesions. This machinery is in constant interaction with and under the control of the rest of the brain under normal circumstances and its effects on behavior are modulated by past experience and the current environment, both sensory and metabolic.

II. GENETICS

Under this heading we shall refer both to inheritance from the parents in the common usage of the term and to post-conception changes in gene or chromosome function. The entire field of the genetics of behavior is young and knowledge is fragmentary. Early, simplistic notions about the inheritance of complex traits such as "criminality" or "intelligence" did much to discredit the usefulness of genetic concepts. That behavioral attributes have genetic determinants is probably most manifest in the practical areas of animal breeding. Breeding for behavioral traits of aggressivity or of tractability is common in both dog and horse raising. Even in these cases, of course, the results are statistical rather than individual. That is to say a given individual's life experience may modify the genetic inheritance which simply weights the outcome—it is easier to produce a killer from a German Shepherd than from a French poodle. So few human communities approach the genetic homogeneity of a selected animal species that these considerations are of limited practical application to man except to emphasize the potential importance of genetic influences.

More germane to the real problems of man are the studies of the interaction of genetic factors and early life experience. For example, the work of Ginsberg at the University of Chicago has demonstrated the importance of genetically determined patterns of enzyme development in the brain in setting the threshold for changes in function due to early trauma or learning experience. We have no direct evidence in man about these processes nor is there any major research in this area. It would be of particular importance to pursue the study of the interaction of early hormonal exposure and/or of social inputs such as handling, crowding, and maternal deprivation, which have been shown to have profound influence on adult behavior of various animals. The work of Levine and of Harlow is especially suggestive in this area, for they have shown that temporary changes in the internal or external environment at a critical stage in development may lead to permanent changes in later behavior (and by implication, in brain organization).

It is the understanding of these complex interactions in early development which in the long run will be most critical for our understanding of the genesis and prevention of violent behavior in biological terms. Unfortunately, at the present little work is being supported in these areas and almost nothing useful is known in regard to man. More attention has been drawn recently to another critical area, that of chromosomal abnormality, or "aneuploidy." The development in recent years of the techniques of cytogenetics has allowed the direct observation of chromosomes, those large intracellular structures which contain the genes which determine genetic traits. In normal man there are 46 such chromosomes, half from each parent. Two of these are sex chromosomes; femaleness being determined by two X chromosomes, and maleness by one X and one Y. The others, or autosomes, exist normally as 22 matched pairs. It is possible, either at conception or some time later, for errors in division to occur so that individual chromosomes are lost, distorted, or more frequently, increased in number. For example, three rather than two chromosomes of a particular type may appear. When this occurs in the autosomes, widespread disorders may appear, frequently incompatible with prolonged life. One such abnormality well known is that which produces mongolism, a type of mental deficiency. Many of these abnormalities produce disorders of the central nervous system. Similar abnormalities in the sex chromosomes are less devastating, although also often associated with brain dysfunction and particularly with mental retardation. The presence of an extra X in either the male or the female is especially common in retardate populations, amounting to 3 to 4 percent of such populations. In particular, males with XXY chromosome configurations tended also to have criminal records and to be assaultive in the original study by Zublin.

Although the relationship between chromosomal abnormality and brain dysfunction seems apparent from the work already noted, the intervening mechanism is not clear; therefore it was with some surprise that the description of XYY aneuploidy was received. Both Court-Brown's group and Telfer, among others, have described the XYY abnormality to be twenty times as common among inmates of institutions for the "criminally insane" as in the general population. Such abnormalities occur among only 3 to 4 percent of the total offender population, but the increased frequency among such population suggests an important shaping role for this anomaly. Unfortunately, there is no evidence for the reciprocal question of the incidence of criminal offenses among the population group with XYY chromosomes. If it were to be unusually high, this would be one population of easily identifiable potential offenders in whom preventive intervention would be useful. Unfortunately, epidemiologic cytogenetics is a badly underdeveloped field, primarily because of the tedium of developing and counting chromosomal preparations. The application of new computer technology to this problem should have significant impact on a variety of problems in social medicine.

A major problem remains in understanding the role of the observable XYY or other abnormality in contributing to the behavioral anomaly. Whether it modifies gross brain structure, sensitivity to endocrine levels, higher endocrine levels, etc., is unknown. Obviously, such intervening processes must be defined if adequate preventive or therapeutic measures are to be developed.

III. BRAIN DISEASE IN MAN

We have implied earlier that the neural mechanisms for organizing attack behavior in vertebrates are shared by man, and that they can be activated by disease. Two mechanisms are possible, and both seem to occur upon occasion:

(1) The more recently evolved control mechanisms may be impaired leaving the primitive emotional brain vulnerable to inappropriately strong response to minimal stimuli.

(2) The limbic brain may itself be involved in disease which produces irritation not unlike that of the exploring experimental electrode described in animal experiments. This too may leave a hyperresponsivity to ordinary stimuli or, on occasion, outbursts of aggressivity minimally related to any stimulus.

The first category of cases probably is represented by patients with diffuse brain disease. In particular, the syndrome of hyperkinetic destructive behavior seen in some brain damaged children is pertinent. Such cases are often so severe as to require continued restraint, and any object in the environment is destroyed. Many such children are controlled by drug therapy or by specific brain surgery (see below) aimed at interruption of the amygdala hypothalamic circuit described earlier. Patients, whether children or adults, with such widespread brain disease are too impaired to pose much of a social threat or to indulge in crime and are of interest here only in that they indicate one extremum of a problem. The same is true of many other common diseases which directly involve the limbic system structures. Infection, trauma, and neoplasm, when involving the limbic system, may be accompanied by directed assaultive behavior and, on occasion, sexual assaultiveness or major deviance as well. Rabies is the classic instance, as its very name implies. Less dramatic infections may also produce these results. Head injuries frequently involve the medial temporal lobe and its limbic system structures because of their anatomic position and unique vulnerability. A recent study by McLaurin has emphasized this point and pointed out the number of accident victims emerging from unconsciousness with assaultive behavior in the early period. In all these cases other neurologic symptoms both make it clear that the patients have a medical problem, and interfere with performance in ways that preclude any major social significance of their acts. More significant perhaps are the patients with undetected tumors of the limbic system, a number of whom, as recently reported by Malamud, show periodic dyscontrol of their emotions, including rage. These are, happily, few in number and they may also have other symptoms which call them to medical attention.

Of more importance in the second category of limbic system dyscontrol are those patients with epilepsy, particularly so-called temporal lobe or psychomotor epilepsy. A number of these patients have episodic dyscontrol of their emotional impulses probably related to limbic system disease. It is unusual for this behavior to be of social or legal significance during a seizure because of the accompanying impairment of perception and of awareness, although such cases do occur and have been recently reported in detail by Sweet et al. More frequently episodes of attack behavior, or impulsive aggressive driving occur without other "seizure" symptoms. The importance

of these episodes has recently been emphasized by Monroe and by Jonas. The mechanism has long been obscure, but it has recently been demonstrated by Ervin et al. that recordings made from the depths of the brain show seizurelike discharges in the key limbic structures of these patients preceding an attack. Further, these authors demonstrated that directed attack behavior could be initiated by electrical stimulation in these areas just as has been described in the experimental animal.

Such behavior can be aborted by electrical stimulation in other brain regions, sometimes prevented by proper pharmacotherapy, or permanently relieved with neurosurgical ablation of the proper limbic structures. The frequency of such cases involved in criminal violence is unknown. It is apparently not high, but no adequate epidemiologic surveys have ever been carried out. Of more importance may be individuals with covert brain disease described in the next section who share the problem of episodic dyscontrol with the known epileptic.

IV. THE ROLE OF BRAIN DISEASE IN INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE

Since there are patients with known brain disease who show impaired control of aggressive impulses and frequently commit acts of violence in response to minimal provocation, it is logical to ask if the recurrent violent offender is likely to have focal brain disease. The answer to this question is not conclusive but there are suggestive leads which call for vigorous investigation. They are particularly provocative because they suggest the presence of at least a subset of offenders who can be diagnosed, definitively treated, and perhaps even detected prior to major crime and offered preventive treatment.

The evidence is of three kinds. Most impressive are those individuals who as adults have a central nervous system injury (trauma, hemorrhage, or tumor, most commonly) and who undergo a "personality change." The appearance of episodic rage attacks, often manifest by wife beating, impulsive automobile driving, and fighting after ingesting small amounts of alcohol may be the only symptoms noticed or detectable. Careful examination of such individuals may reveal suggestive signs of limbic system damage without major neurological symptoms. Management of such individuals by anticonvulsant or neurosurgical therapy lends support to the hypothesis that the structural impairment of the limbic system was the etiologic process in the personality change.

Second, a recent study by Lion et al. of self-referred violent patients indicates that there are a large number of individuals who seek medical help with complaints of episodic dyscontrol felt by the patient to be alien to him. These patients present a common historical pattern of multiple assaults, multiple automobile accidents, poor sexual integration, and frequent minor "neurologic" symptoms. On examination, the frequent occurrence of minor signs of brain dysfunction was noted, although the lack of definitive tests for limbic system disease made it impossible to test clearly the hypothesis presented above. Again, many of these patients were improved by appropriate pharmacologic therapy, particularly in combination with psychological and social intervention.

The third line of suggestive evidence comes from the study of convicted

criminals. A number of such studies are noted in the bibliography, but most are inconclusive either because of faulty examination procedure (generally limited to electroencephalographic examination) or poor delimitation of diagnostic categories. Common to most studies however is the finding of a high incidence of abnormality of the EEG in criminals guilty of physical assault, with the highest incidence in individuals guilty of "motiveless" murder and the lowest in highly motivated single offenses (crimes of passion or revenge). These studies are far from definitive, and again are particularly handicapped by the lack of criteria for testing specifically the limbic system; but no really thorough studies have ever been made of a criminal population in respect to neurobiological function.

A serious handicap in all studies of the kinds outlined above is the practical logistic one of combining adequate medical facilities with penal setting. There are no laws requiring or providing facilities for competent examination of the criminal offender. The noncriminal violent patient can not be tolerated in the usual medical setting and even those few physicians willing to be involved in his diagnosis and treatment are frustrated in their attempts by social structures.

V. THE ROLE OF DRUGS AND ENDOCRINES

Much emphasis is placed in lay discussion of the problems of individual violence on the role of drugs. The most commonly abused drugs in our culture are alcohol, the opioid derivatives or hard narcotics, the barbiturates, the amphetamines, the major and minor "psychedelic" agents (LSD and marihuana, for example) and the psychoactive agents given therapeutically—the tranquilizers and mood elevators. There is no convincing evidence linking the narcotics to crimes of personal violence. There is a marked increase in crime rate among narcotics users, but usually crimes against property or for monetary gain. The psychedelic agents, if anything, seem to mitigate against violence and at the extreme may actually decrease "normal" aggressivity. (They might, in fact, be worth investigating as therapeutic agents in individuals with recurrent violence crimes.) Evidence concerning the amphetamines is less clear, but they are known to be effective therapeutic agents in the hyperkinetic destructive syndromes of childhood mentioned above and are effective in behavior disorders of adolescence. These data would suggest they are not provocative unless producing an overt paranoid psychosis (which may occur upon chronic administration).

While the major tranquilizers are of value in the treatment of certain individuals with episodic dyscontrol either with or without epilepsy, others may, like the mood elevators, increase aggressivity. The reports of these changes to date are based on subtle measures of effect and may not reflect a social hazard; however the widespread use of these drugs may have social implications. Further observation here is necessary.

The major important pharmacologic agent of note is alcohol. It is perhaps of significance that alcohol ingestion is associated with more than half of all crimes and automobile accidents. The significant evidence comes from that small group of individuals who manifest "pathological intoxication." These individuals, after a small amount of alcohol by usual social standards, become wildly assaultive and often uncontrollable. They are more likely to

commit assault than homicide, but the latter may accidentally occur. There is some evidence that a number of these individuals may have temporal lobe disease activated by alcohol, so that they are analogous to the epileptics described above. Many also show episodic dyscontrol in nondrinking situations. It may be then that alcohol is a specific activating agent for the sensitive limbic system in addition to being a more general releasing agent of inhibitions. This point too has never been definitively clarified.

Although they are "drugs," for the sake of completeness the influence of hormones should be included at this point, though they may have little social-legal significance. The most important hormone probably is testosterone, which can be demonstrated to increase aggressive behavior in experimental animals, and in the absence of which, aggression is diminished. The importance in man is unknown, although it may contribute to the 4:1 ratio of males to females as perpetrators of violent crimes. It may also be an important intermediary in explaining the role of sex chromosome abnormality in violent acts. Other steroids may also be important, but most visibly in those individuals who have significant endocrinologic disease for which there are other indications for medical care.

A final endocrinologic abnormality is hypoglycemia, usually induced by excess insulin, either from the body or administered therapeutically to treat diabetes. A few cases of violent behavior induced by hypoglycemia have been described. Hypoglycemia is a well-known provocation for epileptic foci, and the limbic system is uniquely sensitive to it. It is likely that any such cases have either undetected temporal lobe epilepsy or the episodic dyscontrol syndrome described above with minimal limbic system pathology and hypersensitivity.

In summary, chemical agents, whether endogenous hormones or exogenous chemicals, affect behavior by altering brain organization or sensitivity. The major offending agent of social-legal significance is alcohol and its mode of action is insufficiently investigated to draw firm conclusions.

VI. RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF BIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE

It has been demonstrated that there are some individuals in whom brain dysfunction is the primary factor in their violent behavior. There are others in whom episodic, recurrent violent behavior coexists with similar brain dysfunction and in whom therapy directed at the brain modifies the behavior. The question then arises as to how many such individuals there may be or to what extent such biologically detectable and modifiable abnormalities may account for personal violence in the United States. There is in fact no way of knowing at the present time, for no systematic studies of offender populations have been adequately carried out. This is partly because of lack of interest and the lack of strong hypotheses to test. It is also because of serious limitations on our present techniques for examining brain function in sophisticated ways, and because of crippling limitations on available facilities for carrying out multidisciplinary examinations of violent individuals.

In spite of this lack of hard knowledge, a strong case for further investigation of this issue could be made solely on the grounds of feasibility of detection and treatment of even a few cases. That the problem may be

greater than just a few cases is suggested by the incidence of known abnormality of the kinds described. Known temporal lobe epilepsy afflicts at least one-quarter of a million Americans. Clinical experience would suggest an equal number who are undiagnosed and untreated. Brain disease of one kind or another, including mental deficiency, afflicts ten million individuals at least. It is not implied that all of these individuals are at risk of committing violent acts, but they do represent the grossest possible dysfunction of the nervous system so that they are most easily diagnosed. More subtle impairments are unknown as to frequency. We do know that the brain is particularly sensitive to insult during the birth process and the immediate postnatal period when anoxia, infection, mechanical trauma, and malnutrition (particularly protein lack) may produce permanent damage. It may be important that the population at greatest risk from these factors of neglect is just that population from the slums, ethnic ghettos, and rural "backwoods" in which the personal violence rate is highest. There are many other social, cultural, and psychological factors in such areas which contribute to use of violence as a personal problem-solving technique, but the existence of impaired neural mechanisms for impulse control would amplify these other factors dramatically. The processes of social reconstruction necessary to remove any of these factors are the same—whatever their relative significance is in the personal violence problem. The problem is raised sharply only to emphasize how little attention has been paid to issues of brain function in social thinking in general.

VII. DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION

If adequate facilities existed for the examination of either criminal offenders or noncriminal violent individuals, our present techniques of psychiatric, neurologic, psychologic, and laboratory examination would detect many of those with brain disease. New and more sensitive techniques need to be developed, but the direction in which such studies should evolve is clear from present animal studies and clinical experience.

Treatment of even those individuals with demonstrable biologic abnormality is still entirely empirical. Anticonvulsant drugs, tranquilizers, modified psychotherapy, and social rehabilitation all seem to be important.

Existing pharmacologic agents are not in general designed for specific neurophysiologic or neurohumoral purposes and are effective in only a fraction of cases. The application of neurosurgical ablative techniques has been limited to patients with gross neurological disorder, and whether it has any role in the alleviation of recurrent uncontrollable violence without gross brain disease is not known.

Powerful techniques of conditioning and behavior therapy have not been applied in the field of violence enough to know their potential therapeutic value.

Prevention requires first an accurate prediction method. At the present, the most powerful predictor of personal violence is a past history of the same behavior. This is not a trivial matter since in more than half of all serious crimes of violence the offender has a previous history of less serious violent offenses. An early diagnostic workup would at least remove those individuals who could be treated by known methods. Further, this population of

recurrent, though minor, violent offenders is the ideal one on which to test the efficacy of preventive intervention, of whatever kind.

While there are many lacunae in our knowledge, we already know enough to begin work in an effective way. The critical necessity is to recognize that individual violence is not just a legal or moral offense to be penalized, but that it is a problem in behavior which is to be prevented if possible—certainly diagnosed and treated against possible recurrence, if not. For any given individual, this will require the insight and resources of all the sciences of human behavior. The biological sciences cannot be excluded from this task.

VIII. SUMMARY: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE BIOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE—AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

1(a). Violent behavior is a reflection of brain organization. The present summary ignores the vitally important role of experience—individual and social—in determining brain organization. These topics are covered in other sections.

1(b). We do not know clearly what lasting effects early experience may have on brain organization; i.e., whether changes occur which are not reversible by later experience and require biological intervention for modification. Much evidence suggests that this may be true.

2(a). Many individuals with abnormality of a specific brain region (the limbic system) show loss of control of angry feelings and dangerous recurrent physical assault on other individuals. This is true whether the abnormality is caused by birth injury, impaired development, trauma, tumor, or infection. There exist in this country at least half a million individuals known to have such brain abnormality. The probable incidence is several times this figure.

2(b) We do not know—

(1) The actual incidence of covert abnormality of this kind, although it clearly exists.

(2) The actual social risk presented by this population (e.g., how many of them actually commit dangerous assault).

(3) How many persons guilty of assaultive behavior (crimes of violence or violence by automobile, etc.) have such abnormality.

3(a). In addition to primary brain disease as a detectable (treatable, and preventable) factor in violent behavior, chromosomal abnormalities are of particular importance. It is clear that populations of (institutionalized) violent offenders have an incidence of chromosomal abnormality 20 to 50 times as great as the general population.

3(b) We do not know—

(1) Whether the individual with chromosomal abnormality (about 0.2 percent of the population, or 4 million people) is more likely to commit violent acts than is the chromosomally normal.

(2) By what mechanism the chromosomal abnormality modifies brain function. (Whether directly or via endocrine mechanisms.)

(3) What therapeutic or preventive measures could be most effective in modifying the behavior of these individuals.

4(a). Many observations agree that endocrine mechanisms—particularly the sex hormones—are important in determining the threshold for, and occurrence of, aggressive behavior.

4(b). We do not know how important these mechanisms are in man nor how best to modify them for therapeutic effectiveness.

5(a). There are some empirically developed treatment modes which are effective in certain individuals. Pharmacologic agents, neurosurgical procedures, and reeducative methods alone or in combination may dramatically improve a majority of individuals who seek help voluntarily or are referred at an early age.

5(b). We do not know—

(1) Which pharmacologic agent or which procedure is most likely to be effective in a given instance (i.e., by what criteria to predict therapeutic efficacy).

(2) How effective such procedures might be in an adult, nonvoluntary population (e.g., prisoners).

(3) How rationally to design more effective therapeutic agents than we now have.

6(a). We know that there are a large number of individuals with recurrent violent behavior, many of whom are aware of and concerned about their lack of impulse control. There is at present no systematic social or professional policy for identifying and helping these individuals. Their problem is not recognized as a medical one; they are ignored by most professional groups (physicians, psychologists, sociologists) and even when in legal custody are not systematically examined and diagnosed. No legal standards or guidelines for adequate medical examination exist, even for murderers. Most court ordered "psychiatric examination" is, at the best, incomplete, and usually incompetent.

There are no adequate facilities for the diagnostic evaluation or therapeutic study of such individuals whether self referred or in legal custody.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

Many recommendations for research are implicit in the summary. Much of the information noted as unknown is readily available by the investment of time and money. With that information, effective strategies of immediate action and further research could be specified. Concretely, as first steps in such a program, we propose the following:

(1) That medical biological examination of the violent individual be considered an important aspect of his evaluation. That such guidelines or instructions for the court and penal institutions as are necessary be evolved and disseminated.

(2) That medical and medical auxiliary groups (such as the Mental Health Association) be widely informed and enlisted in concern for the problem of individual violence.

(3) That pilot model centers be established promptly (perhaps under the "Safe Streets Act" of 1968) to bring together community institutions and academic resources to implement our present knowledge in biomedicine, psychology, sociology, and law for the treatment of the violent offender. In the course of active diagnosis and therapy further research could evolve, and interdisciplinary education both of young professionals and of established community leaders

could be developed.

(4) That the planning for the newly authorized National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice consider the development of several regional centers of excellence, each utilizing existing strength in a particular pertinent area of research (sociology, medicine, criminology, etc.) while developing interdisciplinary collaboration. The development of such centers could be considered as an alternative to the NIH model of concentrating the full spectrum of special talents in a single national center. Such a plan would recognize the limited number of competent, interested professionals in this field, would enhance recruitment of interested young professionals from the academic and practicing community, and would promote the prompt application of useful methods to real community problems as well as involving the community directly in awareness of the problem and support for the program.

(5) That directed research be contracted to answer the epidemiologic problems enumerated in the Summary and to implement the necessary technological procedures for such research. Such contracting should be done with the advice of existing scientific advisory groups even if funded from the Department of Justice (i.e., Psychopharmacology Branch, NIMH, for therapeutic drug studies; Division of Biological Standards for chromosome surveys, etc.).

(6) That, as a corollary of focused epidemiologic surveys, adequate crime and automobile accident statistics be compiled. This clearly must be done by a competent body independent of the FBI or other politically motivated institution.

(7) That the public be fully and accurately informed about the true incidence and nature of individual violence. This is necessary to prevent widespread apprehension, and to gain support for a rational program. In addition, it should serve to encourage families, or violence prone individuals themselves, to seek help before tragic crimes occur.

(8) That in our social preoccupation with the problem of violence we not lose sight of the fact that it is one facet of a complex behavioral repertoire—to deal with this issue we must have as broad and basic an understanding of the behavioral sciences as possible, and research and application of knowledge must go on in all areas of knowledge. The understanding of behavior is, for the remainder of the century, both as intellectually exciting and as socially significant as nuclear energy was to the beginning.

In particular, we must avoid simplistic solutions which promise revelation through application of a single scientific discipline. Ways must be found to unite social and biological scientists, community teachers, ethical thinkers, and others, for sharing of information and for formulation of ideas and action. The entire structure of American science now militates against this, as dramatically symbolized by the categorical disease structure of NIH. The social visibility of violence, and the sense of urgency about its management should not overshadow the critical basic research which needs to be carried out in all areas of the behavioral and social sciences.

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APPENDIX 2 2

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEORIES OF VIOLENCE

By Edwin I. Megargee *

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF HUMAN VIOLENCE

This paper is one of five major critical reviews of theories of violence that are being prepared for the President's Commission. Therefore, before dealing with violence itself, it is appropriate to discuss how a psychologist's perspective on violence compares with that of his colleagues in the disciplines of psychiatry, anthropology, physiology, and sociology.

Psychology defines itself as the "science of behavior." Thus the psychologist commits himself to the proposition that the scientific method, which looks to empirical data for answers to questions, is the one most likely to produce accurate results. In this regard he is no different from the anthropologist, the psychiatrist, the physiologist, or the sociologist.

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Moreover, insofar as scientists in these related disciplines also study behavior, the subject matters are similar.

What, then, is the special contribution of the psychologist? It is probably his dedication to understanding the full breadth of behavior. To this end, psychologists study not only human behavior, but also the behavior of animals ranging from primates and mammals to fruit flies and unicellular organisms. They do so by a variety of methods, both experimental and observational. In seeking the causes of human behavior, psychology does not restrict itself to "psychological" factors, such as the influence of the mother or early childhood experiences, but also investigates the physiological bases of behavior and the influence of social and cultural forces on behavior. Therefore this report on the psychology of violence will seek to integrate and evaluate theories and data contributed not only by psychologists, but, where appropriate, by others whose disciplinary allegiance is in allied fields.

Violence and Aggression

No definition of violence has ever proved completely successful. Although everyone "knows what violence is" no one has ever been able to define it adequately so that every possible instance of violent behavior is included within the definition while all the excluded behavior is clearly nonviolent. The working definition that has been adopted for the purposes of this Task Force is that acts of violence mean the "overtly threatened or overtly accomplished application of force which results in the injury or destruction of persons or property or reputation, or the illegal appropriation of property." This definition would therefore include as violence such crimes as homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, arson, suicide, gang violence, mob violence, and lynchings. Thus far, there is probably no quarrel with the definition. The definition also includes, however, other acts that some might not regard as violence. For example, by including as violent behavior any acts that result in injury or destruction of persons, property, or reputation, we include as violence a number of legal acts such as executions, homicide in self-defense, justified homicide, and accidental homicide, as well as any force which results in injury on the baseball diamond, the football field, or the basketball court. It even includes in its purview the parent who physically punishes his child, or the newspaper reporter who exposes graft at the expense of someone's reputation. One could even classify as violent the behavior of the janitor who empties waste baskets and burns the contents in an incinerator. On the other hand, the man who plots a murder but who is prevented from carrying it out by forces beyond his control would not be considered a violent person. Nor would milder aggressive acts such as scolding or the administration of mild shock, as in a laboratory setting, be considered violent. The definition also excludes behavior by subhuman species, so that the lioness pulling down her prey would not be considered as falling within this definition.

Readers who have felt uncomfortable with some of the examples in the foregoing paragraph have had to confront two of the major problems in formulating a definition of violent behavior. The first of these is the issue of legality. The Task Force's definition, which is better than most definitions of violence, has chosen to ignore the issue of legality and focus on the act. This

has the drawback of categorizing as violent various legal injuries to people, such as those administered by the police or by parents to their children. The alternative, however, is to classify as nonviolent the behavior of the Nazi genocidists or Roman gladiators, to name but two examples.

The second issue confronting those who would define violence is the question of intentionality. Intentionality by its very nature is something that cannot be observed. Our insights into human behavior have shown that there is no hard and fast line between what is intended and what is not intended. Since Freud's pioneering studies of the unconscious, it has become quite obvious that people can act on the basis of motives of which they are quite unaware. The man whose wife electrocutes herself plugging in an iron which he "accidentally" forgot to repair may never have consciously intended that any injury should befall her. Yet unconscious hostility may have caused this omission just as surely as repression might lead another person to forget a dental appointment. The present definition includes unintentional destruction of property or injury to people. The inclusion of "accidental" violence will no doubt make some uncomfortable as will the exclusion of consciously intended violence that is not carried out.

Many expert man-hours went into the formulation of the definition of violence to be used by this commission. It is certainly no worse than many that have been proposed and, indeed, is far better than most. The reason for pointing out the difficulties with the definition has not been to quibble with it, but instead to illustrate some of the basic problems confronting the person who would do research on violence. If we cannot agree what acts are violent and what acts are not, then it is unlikely that we will be able to agree on the causes of violence. Differences in semantic definitions will make for differences in operational definitions so that different investigators, all of whom are studying "violent individuals" or "violent behavior," may well find themselves studying different populations of people or behavior. If observers focus on different phenomena, it is natural that their reports of the nature of these phenomena, as well as the theories based upon these reports, will differ. When we add to this the variability that inevitably results from the fact that different disciplines focus on different aspects of behavior and that individual investigators within a discipline prefer different approaches to the problem, it becomes obvious why we should expect divergent explanations for violent behavior.

However, we should not despair because of this heterogeneity. Systematic scientific approaches to the study of human behavior are very recent phenomena. Whereas physics and astronomy have had approximately 25 centuries in which to come to some agreement on methodology and definitions, the scientific study of behavior is less than a century old. At this stage, our scientific knowledge of human behavior is analogous to the early Greeks' understanding of the physical world. A wide variety of methods and approaches at this stage of our development offers the best hope for finding valid answers to the problems that confront us. Emphasis on orthodoxy and agreement would be premature and likely result in a great setback to accumulation of knowledge in the behavioral sciences, just as the agreement upon an earth-centered universe produced a setback for astronomical research.

Difficulties in Performing Empirical Research on Violence

Behavioral scientists rely on two major methods of collecting the data with which they test their theories. The first is the method of naturalistic observation in which the scientist records and observes an ongoing behavioral sequence without interfering in its development. Suppose that a social psychologist were interested in investigating whether a violent film increased the potential for violence among high school students. If he used the method of naturalistic observation, he would wait until a suitably violent film happened to be playing at the local theater and would then observe whether there was a tendency for students who had just seen it to be involved in fights.

The second is the experimental method by which two groups (matched in all respects except for the effect of some independent variable) are compared on some dependent variable. Using the experimental method to investigate the effects of filmed violence, our social psychologist would obtain a sample of students and randomly assign them to two groups, one of which would be shown a violent film and the other a nonviolent film. Then each student would be placed in a situation where he had to choose between a violent response and a nonviolent one so that the incidence of violence in the two groups could be compared. If all factors except the violence of the film were controlled, it would then be possible to make definite statements as to whether or not the film contributed significantly to violent behavior.

It is not possible to make such causal statements on the basis of naturalistic observations, however, for even if it could be established that there was a greater incidence of violence among the boys who had seen the film as compared with others who had not, the possibility might remain that the violent behavior was the result of some factor other than the film itself. Perhaps there were more fights among the group who saw the film simply because the film kept them out late at night so that they were more likely to get into trouble. Or it could be that this particular film appealed to boys who were already potentially violent while the more peaceable ones selected other films or chose to stay at home. Perhaps the theater was in a tough section of town where fights were commonplace. Alternative explanations such as these always make causal inferences from observational or correlational studies speculative. Hence, the experimental method is usually preferable.

Violence, however, cannot be studied directly by using the experimental method. It is manifestly unethical to conduct a laboratory experiment that might result in the injury or destruction of people or their property. Laboratory studies necessarily confine themselves to the investigation of milder forms of aggression, such as the administration of an uncomfortable electric shock or willingness to express anger verbally. Some have even relied on symbolic forms of aggression and violence, such as telling stories with violent themes. Such studies are quite useful, but it is obvious that the dynamics involved in these laboratory analogs could be substantially different from those involved in actual violence. It is one thing to deliver a mild electric shock to an unseen victim when told to by an experimenter who is committed to safeguarding his subjects from injury; it is another thing to pull the switch that will send a lethal dose of high voltage electricity to a condemned man in an electric chair.

Because the direct experimental method has been inappropriate for the investigation of human violence, scientists have had to resort to different strategies. One, as noted, has been to apply the experimental method to milder forms of aggressive behavior in the hope that the derived principles can be extrapolated to violence without too much distortion or error. Another approach has been to fall back on the method of naturalistic observation. However, there are also ethical problems in studying violence in this fashion. A psychologist who is making behavior ratings while observing incidents of aggressive behavior in a school playground should remain unobtrusive and not interfere with the ongoing behavior. However, if a squabble escalates to the point of violence so that serious injuries are possible, it is incumbent upon the observer and other adults in the vicinity to intervene. Once this occurs, the observations are no longer naturalistic.

Another tactic has been to attempt to reconstruct incidents in which violence actually erupted. This is generally done by interviewing people who were there or who took part in the events. This procedure unfortunately has the drawback of relying on observers who are not only untrained, but who may have reasons to distort events in order to justify their own behavior. The disturbances in Chicago at the time of the 1968 Democratic National Convention were probably observed by more people, including members of the press, who are trained to observe and report the facts, than any similar confrontation in our history. The plethora of differing accounts of the events that took place, not to mention the differing opinions of their causes, are good examples of the unreliability of this form of evidence for scientific purposes.

Despite these drawbacks, the method of naturalistic observation remains one of the primary sources of data regarding violence, particularly group violence. When carefully conducted, such investigations can provide valuable insights into the factors associated with violence, although caution must be taken in making causal inferences from the results of observational studies.

Although naturalistic observation with the use of informants has been one of the principal techniques used by social psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in personality research have taken a somewhat different course. In many studies, they have relied on people who have participated in violence, not so much for information about events that caused or led up to violent confrontations, but to obtain data about the personality structure of violent individuals. Of course, the subjects might be uncooperative; moreover, the judicial and correctional experiences they have experienced may have altered their personality structure.

Another research strategy that avoids some of the ethical dilemmas inherent in the investigation of human violence is the study of extremely aggressive behavior among infrahuman species. This approach is particularly favored by those who seek innate causes of aggressive behavior. As with humans, ethical considerations prohibit procedures that might inflict severe pain or injury on an animal. Therefore, animal research has relied, for the most part, on naturalistic observation in the field with some laboratory investigations of mild or moderately aggressive behavior. Such ethological studies have the valuable function of reminding us of important similarities and continuities between the behavior of homo sapiens and the other

primates and members of the animal kingdom. At the same time, there is a tendency for some ethologists to underemphasize the differences between man, the only truly verbal animal, and other fauna.

Because of these methodological problems, there is a dearth of data on human violence. If we compared the number of scientific articles that have been published on human violence with those that have been issued on the more easily investigated, but no more important, topic of human learning, we would undoubtedly find less than one empirical study of violence for every 100 such papers on learning.

In the absence of adequate data, theories of violence have taken two forms. One is "armchair" or "philosophical" theorizing: i.e., the formulation of hypotheses on non-empirical bases. The other is the formulation of theories of aggression rather than theories of violence. Because there are much more sound data on the broader and more easily studied topic of aggression, such theories often do have a sound empirical base. Whether or not these theories can be extrapolated to account for violence is another question.

In this review, the writer plans to confine himself to theories that have at least some empirical basis. Anyone who has read the writing of the major theologians and philosophers is no doubt aware that this excludes a large body of literature which seeks to account for human violence on the basis of a priori assumptions about human nature. However, as noted above, psychology is the science of human behavior and as a science, psychological theory must perforce be empirically based. The restriction of the scope of the paper to empirical theories means that the bulk of the report will have to deal with general theories of aggression that treat violence as a special case.

TYOLOGIES OF VIOLENCE

The usual first step in the scientific investigation of phenomena is an attempt to classify them into self-contained groups or categories that can then be studied more intensively. A number of different schemes have been proposed for the classification of violence. Their diversity demonstrates some of the problems involved in constructing an adequate theory of violence, for if different experts cannot agree on a taxonomy, it is unlikely that they will agree on causes.

The most widely used typology is that offered by the penal codes of the various States and nations. Typically, the law looks at several factors in categorizing a given act of violence. The first basic distinction made is whether the act is legal or illegal. A homicide may be judged a "murder," which is a crime; it can also be ruled "justifiable" if it is felt that the perpetrator had a good reason for slaying the victim, or "accidental" homicide if it is felt that the perpetrator did not intend to kill the victim. Given that an act is illegal, the next major considerations are the degree of violence and the object of the attack. Homicide, aggravated assault, and assault and battery represent differences in the injury or potential injury to the victim; similarly, the various laws against vandalism, malicious mischief, arson, and the like take into account varying degrees of destructiveness leveled against property. The final consideration is the degree of malice aforethought, which distinguishes first from second degree murder and manslaughter.

Typologies of violence offered by behavioral scientists have focused more on the motivation of the violent person than on the actual act. This focus recognizes the fact that the difference between murder and aggravated assault often depends on whether a bullet chances to hit a muscle or an artery or on whether a physician is nearby to treat the victim. Because murder is the most dramatic of the violent crimes, the majority of typologists have focused on constructing classification of murderers, although most would agree that these typologies could be used equally well for people who have committed lesser assaultive acts. While there is some overlap among the theories offered, the diversity is surprising when one reflects upon the fact that all seek to describe essentially the same behavior. In presenting our overview of theoretical schemes, we shall start with those that are broadest in their scope and then proceed to those concerning narrower categories.

Arnold Buss (1961) has proposed that aggressive acts, including violent acts, can be divided into two broad classes: those in which the basic goal is to injure someone else, which he calls "angry aggression," and those for which aggression is the means to some other end, which he calls "instrumental aggression." The latter category would include such diverse acts as the parent who spansks the child for his own good and the felon who shoots a bank guard in order to escape. Another broad typology has been proposed by the present writer, who has suggested and gathered evidence to demonstrate that within Buss's angry aggression category it is possible to differentiate between those whose violent acts stem from inadequate control over aggressive drives and those whose violence paradoxically stems from excessive controls (Megargee, 1964, 1965, 1966) over aggression. Within the first category would be habitually aggressive people who have not learned the inhibitions and taboos against violent behavior that are common in our society; within the second category are to be found those who are rarely aggressive and whose hostility builds up to the point where it overwhelms even their massive defenses, with the result that an extremely violent act occurs.

F. Tennyson Jesse (1952) has grouped murderers into six types on the basis of whether they killed for (a) gain, (b) revenge, (c) elimination, (d) jealousy, (e) the lust of killing, or (f) conviction. According to Spencer (1966), John Conrad has also proposed that violent offenders can be divided into six groups: (a) the "culturally violent," who grew up in a subculture where violence was an accepted way of life; (b) the "criminally violent," who would commit violence to achieve some end, as in a robbery; (c) the "pathologically violent," who were mentally ill or had suffered brain damage; (d) the "situationally violent," who would commit a rare act of violence under extreme provocation; (e) the "accidentally violent," who might injure others by accident; and (f) the "institutionally violent," who might commit violence while incarcerated. It can be seen that Conrad's "criminally violent" category is essentially the same as Buss's "instrumentally aggressive" group and Jesse's category of those who would murder for gain. The "culturally violent" distinction is similar to Megargee's notion of the "undercontrolled assaultive" type.

Banay (1952) has distinguished three broad classes of murderers: the "subcultural," the "cultural," and the "supercultural." The "subcultural" murderer, according to Banay, is someone who is unable to adjust to society's rules, perhaps because of some innate deficiency in controls. The "cultural"

group are people who are from good homes, are fairly normal, and who commit murder in the course of a robbery to prevent themselves from being apprehended for an offense or as part of gangland activity. (These murders would fall into Buss's general classification of instrumental aggression.) The "supercultural" group consists of people who, according to Banay, are so inhibited that they do not have adequate outlets for their natural aggressive impulses. On some occasions, they may be placed under such stress that they behave in an aggressive fashion and when they do so they release all their pent-up hostility in a violent act that is out of character. This category is similar to Megargee's "chronically overcontrolled assaultive" type.

Abrahamsen (1960) has distinguished between symptomatic murderers, whose violence is the result of some inner conflict, and manifest, or essential, murderers who commit acts of violence either for profit or for some unrecognized motive.

Glaser, Kenefick, and O'Leary (1968) distinguished two broad categories of murderers, each of which had several subcategories. In the first broad category were those murderers whom they deemed "appropriate." Included within the "appropriate" category were: (a) the ordinary murderer, who is a product of an environment in which violence is expected (a distinction similar to the "culturally violent" group described by Conrad); (b) the cultural murderer, who is compelled by social pressures to commit a murder in order to destroy or assassinate someone who is perceived as being an enemy of society; and (c) the professional murderer, such as the Mafia "soldier." Among the "inappropriate" murderers, Glaser et al. listed: (a) the inadequate murderer, the unstable fringe member of a group who seeks to bolster his status or self-esteem by undertaking to avenge some social wrong; (b) the brain-damaged murderer, whose inability to contain his impulses stems from central nervous system pathology; (c) the psychopathic murderer, who lacks controls over his aggressive impulses to a pathological degree; and (d) the psychotic murderer. These last three categories would probably all fit into Conrad's concept of the "pathologically violent" person.

Probably the most extensive typology in terms of the number of groups proposed is that of Mannfred Guttmacher (1960). His categories, which have considerable overlap, include: (a) the normal murderer who, although not psychotic, has little regard for human life; (b) the sociopathic murderer; (c) the alcoholic murderer; (d) the avenging murderer; (e) the schizophrenic murderer; (f) the temporarily psychotic murderer; (g) the symbolic suicide, who kills someone else in order to kill a part of himself which he has projected into the victim; (h) the gynocidal murderer, who kills women as a defense against fears of castration; (i) the homosexual murderer, who kills his partner; (j) the passive aggressive murderer, who is similar to Megargee's "overcontrolled assaultive" type; and (k) the sadistic murderer.

This overview of the numerous categories that have been proposed for the classification of violent offenders demonstrates how little agreement there is in the field, not only on the basic types of violent offenders, but even on what their most important attributes are. Some theorists have focused on motivation, others on psychodynamic factors leading up to the offense, while still others have looked at the characteristics of the victim or the victim-offender relationship. There are few common threads. Most of the typologists agree that within the ranks of the violent we will find some people

who appear psychiatrically normal in that they seem to be free of the anxiety and conflicts usually found among neuropsychiatric patients. They also agree that some violent acts are means to ends other than the injury to the victim. That is, some people kill or assault others for profit, sexual gratification, or to effect political or social changes. For other offenders, however, the injuries inflicted on the victim are the primary goal in and of themselves.

Given this heterogeneity of opinion regarding the types of people who perpetrate violent acts, what general principles about the causes of violence can be drawn? To answer this question, it is necessary to retreat from the immediate problem of violence and the personality of the violent offender and ask ourselves what are the basic personality factors that determine whether or not an aggressive act takes place. When we do so, we will find that the various typologies that have been offered simply represent different combinations of the same basic variables. In the next section, we shall discuss these basic factors in rather abstract terms, and we shall then go on to examine the theories that have been offered to account for the origin and interaction of these fundamental processes.

THE DYNAMICS OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

Most human behavior, including aggressive behavior, is performed on a fairly routine basis. As response follows response in a smooth-flowing, often automatic sequence, it is easy to lose sight of the complex determinants of human behavior. However, when we analyze a single response we become aware that each act is the result of the interaction of many factors and of dozens of choices, of which the individual is usually unaware.

In most situations, the individual can make any one of a number of different responses. A person who is threatened can fight, run away, or attempt to make some conciliatory gesture. If he chooses to attack he can do so verbally or physically, with vigor or with restraint, within certain limits or with no holds barred. How is the choice of response made? Typically, the individual selects the response that appears to offer the maximum satisfactions and the minimum dissatisfactions in that particular situation. This statement conceals a rapid but extremely complex internal bargaining process in which the capacity of a given response to fulfill many different drives and motives is weighed, often unconsciously, against the pain that might result from that response as well as from the postponement of the satisfaction of other competing drives. In some situations, flight might best satisfy the individual's need for safety, but only at the expense of humiliation from what might be regarded as cowardly behavior. Attack might satisfy the individual's aggressive needs, but at the expense of possible injury. By means of this internal algebra, which occurs so rapidly the individual is usually unaware of it, the net strength of each possible response is calculated and compared with all other responses and the strongest one selected.

What determines the net strength of a response? In the case of an aggressive or violent response, we can isolate three broad classes of factors that interact to determine response strength. The first of these is *instigation to aggression*. By instigation to aggression, we mean the sum of all the factors which motivate an individual to commit a violent or aggressive act. This includes not only any desire to injure or kill the victim but also any desire for

other outcomes which the violent act might effect, such as economic gain as in the case of a strongarm robbery, or sexual gratification as in the case of a forcible rape.

We shall designate instigation to aggression by the symbol "A" and use subscripts to differentiate the strength of motivation for different aggressive acts directed at various targets. Thus $A_{J:T-1}$ will denote the instigation for an aggressive act J directed at Target 1. This might be the motivation for stabbing (J) a particular individual ($T-1$). $A_{K:T-1}$ would indicate the motivation for some other aggressive act, K , directed at the same target $T-1$, such as striking him instead of stabbing him. Similarly, $A_{J:T-2}$ would denote the amount of instigation for stabbing some other person, $T-2$, while $A_{K:T-2}$ would mean the motivation for hitting some other victim.

The second major set of variables influencing the strength of a given aggressive act is *inhibition against aggression*. This includes the sum of all the internal factors acting against a particular aggressive act directed at a particular target. Included within this would be moral prohibitions, such as conscience or "superego," and learned taboos, as well as any internal inhibitions which might stem from the fact that the individual may regard the act as unwise. Thus, inhibitions against punching a woman in the jaw could stem from the feeling that any violence is wrong, or the feeling that although punching a man is all right, punching a woman is taboo, or the judgment that while it is all right to punch a woman in this particular case, it would be unwise since the lady has a black belt in judo. We shall denote the strength of inhibitions against aggression by the letter "I." As with instigation to aggression, the subscripts $J, K, \dots N$ will be used to denote inhibitions against particular aggressive acts, and the subscripts $T-1, 2, \dots N$ will designate the different targets of the various possible aggressive acts.

Instigation and inhibition are both characteristics of the individual.¹ Behavior, however, results from an individual interacting with his milieu. The final class of variables, *stimulus factors*, will encompass those immediate environmental factors that may facilitate or impede aggressive behavior. Among the external stimulus factors that might facilitate aggressive behavior are the availability of a weapon, the presence of other people urging violence, and aggressive gestures or behavior on the part of an antagonist. Such facilitating stimuli will be designated " S_a ." Stimuli that inhibit violence might include people who will stimulate guilt over aggression, such as parents or clergy, or people who promise swift retribution for violent behavior, such as police, as well as those who may decrease aggressive instigation by pacifying an opponent or by relieving tension through humor. Stimuli which thus impede aggressive behavior will be designated S_i .

Let us analyze in a molar fashion some of the dynamics involved in the expression of a particular aggressive act J directed at a certain target $T-1$. First, the strength of the instigation for this behavior ($A_{J:T-1}$) plus any facilitating stimuli in the environment (S_a) must exceed the total strength of internal inhibitions against the commission of this act against this target ($I_{J:T-1}$), as well as any environmental stimuli which may impede the expression of this behavior (S_i). Symbolically:

Given this state of affairs, it is *possible* for the individual in question to perform this aggressive act. However, before the possibility becomes an actuality, this particular response must compete with all other possible responses.

Let us suppose that a police officer is severely provoked by a demonstrator calling him a "pig." There are many responses that he could make toward that individual. Some will be rejected because the inhibitory factors outweigh the instigation. For example, even though he is angry he will not shoot the demonstrator because he knows he must not kill people who are simply calling him names. Here, inhibitions outweigh instigation and block the response.

However there are other possible responses from which the officer may choose that are not prevented by internal inhibitions. If he arrests the activist, he could do so in a number of ways involving various degrees of force: (a) he could simply tell the man he is under arrest; (b) he could arrest the man and at the same time grasp him by the arm; (c) he could arrest him and handcuff him with his arms in back with the cuffs closed as tightly as possible; or (e) he could even hit the man or "Mace" him.

Just as the range of possible aggressive acts² can vary, so too can the range of possible targets. Our policeman could direct his response to the specific person who is insulting him or he might direct it toward the ringleader of the group. If he inhibits any aggressive response in the situation he might later displace some of his anger to other individuals, perhaps by behaving aggressively toward his wife or toward an overly inquisitive newspaper reporter.

For each possible target of aggression, there is a range of possible aggressive acts, each having different amounts of inhibition attached. The fact that some acts of aggression or violence are more acceptable when directed at some targets rather than others is easily illustrated. Let us take two acts, slapping the face and hitting over the head with a bottle, directed by an adult man at two targets, his own young child and an adult male peer. In our culture, it is more acceptable for a man to slap his own child's face than it is for him to slap the face of an adult peer. This is because such behavior can be rationalized as "being for the child's own good," but the point is that the inhibitions against the aggressive act of face slapping are lower when the target is one's child.

On the other hand, it is more acceptable (or less reprehensible) for an adult man to hit another man over the head with a bottle than for him to treat his child in this fashion. While there may be fewer inhibitions against mild aggression when it is directed against children, there are more inhibitions against violence when a child is the target. Public dismay at the revelation of the extent of the so-called "battered child" syndrome is clear evidence that violence directed at children is more disturbing than that directed to other targets. (See Fontana (1968) for a review of the "battered child" literature.)

Thus the choice of response is a function of the relative strength of various acts directed at different targets. In symbolic terms, if we let $P_{J:T-1}$ represent the net strength of aggressive response J directed at a given individual $T-1$, then $P_{J:T-1} = (A_{J:T-1} + S_a) - (I_{J:T-1} + S_i)$.

If $P_{J:T-1} > 0$, then there is a possibility that the act can occur. However it must first compete with other alternative responses, both aggressive and

nonaggressive. Unless it is stronger than other responses in this situation, the aggressive act $J:T-1$ will not occur. Symbolically:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 P_{J:T-2,3\dots N} \\
 \text{or} \\
 P_{J:T-1} > P_{K,L,\dots N:T-1} \\
 \text{or} \\
 P_{K,L,\dots N:T-2,3\dots N}
 \end{array}$$

Where $P_{J:T-2,3\dots N}$ represents the same aggressive response directed at another target and $P_{K,L,\dots N:T-1}$ represents alternative responses at the original target and $P_{K,L,\dots N:T-2,3\dots N}$ represents all other possible responses directed at all other targets. In each case, the strength of these alternate responses is a function of instigation, inhibition, and stimulus factors.

Thus far, we have discussed the dynamics of an aggressive response as if aggressive instigation were the only need or drive to be satisfied. This is obviously an oversimplification. At any given time, there are dozens of needs and drives operating and an important consideration is the capacity of a given act to satisfy, simultaneously, as many as possible. Sometimes these needs are directly incompatible so that no adequate compromise can be made. Our policeman, for example, may know that if he arrests the insulting activist he will have to appear at the arraignment on the following day to present his evidence. However, the next day may be his day off and he may have promised his wife to take the family to the beach. To arrest the belligerent demonstrator would mean satisfying his aggressive needs, as well as his need to maintain his dignity and self-respect and perform his duty, but it would be at the expense of frustrating his needs for relaxation and marital harmony. The competition of these needs may lead him to make a compromise response such as merely threatening to arrest the demonstrator or taking him to the patrol car for a lecture and then releasing him. (Such a temporizing response may not satisfy his anger, and his wife may later suffer some displaced verbal abuse if the policeman's hostility is redirected against her for the indignity she unwittingly made him suffer by her insistence that he devote his day off to his family.)

To avoid oversimplification, therefore, we should expand our equation to include terms which would reflect how the satisfaction of other drives might contribute to aggressive instigation while the potential frustration of other needs might contribute to internal inhibitions. However, to do so would make the situation even more confusing than it already is. For the present, it is enough for the reader to keep in mind the fact that the dynamics of aggression have been oversimplified and that, while we may treat an attacking soldier as if his only motive were hostility toward the enemy, we remain aware of the fact that he may also be satisfying other needs for prestige, respect, or even, paradoxically, counterphobic denial of fear.

THEORIES OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION: AN OVERVIEW

In the previous section, we identified three basic variables that interact to determine the strength or response potential of any given act of violence or aggression: instigation to aggression, internal inhibitions against aggression,

and stimulus factors that either facilitate or impede aggressive acting out.

Different theorists have chosen to emphasize different factors. Some have stressed instigation, others have focused on inhibitions, while still others have dealt primarily with stimulus factors.³ Underlying these differences in emphasis, there is at least some common ground of agreement. A substantial proportion of the hypotheses offered by the members of one school is acceptable to those of other theoretical frames of reference, particularly if some terms are translated or recast in slightly different language. While theorists may disagree about the relative importance or emphasis which should be placed on instigation, inhibition, and stimuli, they agree that all three of these factors are important in the dynamics of violence.

The fundamental disagreements are found when we push the analysis one step further and ask where instigation or inhibition come from and what factors add to and detract from them. Does physical punishment *increase* inhibitions by causing a child to suppress his aggressive tendencies? Or does such punishment *decrease* inhibitions by providing the child with an aggressive model to imitate? Does watching a violent movie or television show impede the expression of aggression by allowing the viewer to drain off his aggressive instigation vicariously, or does it instead excite him so as to facilitate violent behavior? Are violent instincts innate within the human species or is violence a habit learned in childhood?

On issues such as these, one can rely on the fact that for every theorist who upholds one side of the issue another can be found who will just as vigorously defend the opposite point of view. Such disagreement is not uncommon in science, and, typically, scientists turn to empirical research to determine the answers to such controversial issues. Unfortunately, as we have seen, it is difficult if not impossible to do adequate experimental research on violence. Consequently, there are strong differences of opinion as to what constitutes appropriate research methodology. Those who do clinical research on the personality structure of murderers are likely to regard the laboratory studies of social psychologists as being irrelevant to the study of violence, while social psychologists are likely to reject clinical findings as too lacking in rigor or experimental controls to be worthy of consideration. The only thing the two groups are likely to agree on is that research on subhuman species is meaningless; however, ethologists will reject any studies limited to man as being unlikely to shed any light on the phylogenetic origins of violence.

Because of these differences in values, researchers in one group may automatically reject theories emanating from a different camp and their criticism of rival theories often consists of a priori attacks on the source of the data or the research methodology. It is rare for such critiques to be based on further research, using minor variations of the same basic methods, which is customary in less controversial research areas. In short, the complaint is not that experimenters in a given area are not performing their studies well, but that they are doing such studies at all.

Because of these differences in outlook and methods, there is little basis for a meaningful dialogue between investigators with markedly different orientations, and no basis for a resolution of their differences. Indeed, while different researchers may use the same words, such as "aggression," "controlled research," "significant differences," and the like, the operational definitions they give these words are often so different that they are using

different languages. This is one reason the literature is so confusing to the layman who may not realize that the same sentence can mean quite different things when written by representatives of different viewpoints.

Thus, while theorists agree on the importance of instigation, inhibition, and stimulus factors, there is considerable disagreement as to the variables that influence these three factors and little likelihood that, in its present state, the empirical literature can provide data that will permit us to decide who is right and who is wrong. Therefore, in the following discussion, we shall simply examine in turn the many different hypotheses that have been offered about each of these factors. Although a complete review of the literature summarizing all of the studies conducted to test these theories is beyond the scope of the present paper, some of the typical experimental operations will be critically described.

INSTIGATION TO AGGRESSION (A)

"Instigation to aggression," it will be recalled, referred to "aggressive motivation," "drive," "need for aggression," or "predisposition to respond aggressively." (There are some subtle theoretical differences between these various terms which we shall ignore in this treatment. Suffice to say that instigation to aggression refers to those internal factors that motivate the individual to respond aggressively to a given stimulus or in a particular situation.⁴)

We shall first examine various notions as to the origin of instigation to aggression and then turn our attention to factors that might decrease aggressive instigation.

The Causes of Instigation to Aggression

Different theorists have postulated a number of possible sources of aggressive instigation. One group of theories hypothesizes that instigation is an innate characteristic of the human organism. Another seeks the cause of aggressive instigation in the various environmental variables that influence the organism during its lifetime. In addition to these two possible sources, at any given time additional aggressive instigation may result from the fact that the individual perceives aggressive or violent behavior as a means for satisfying other needs such as dominance, space, sex, and so forth. We shall examine each of these possible sources of aggressive instigation in turn.

The Phylogenetic or Ethological Approach

Before discussing ethological theories of aggression, we should first establish what "ethology" is. The definitions of the term vary. A popular dictionary of scientific terms defines ethology as the "... study habit in relation to habitat; study of behavior" (Henderson and Henderson, 1960). Ardrey (1966) describes ethology as "... the precise study of innate behavior patterns in animals." The noted ethologist Niko Tinbergen characterizes himself as "a zoologist studying animal behavior" (Tinbergen, 1968).

Ethological research thus falls within the area generally encompassed by comparative psychology and behavior genetics. The major difference between

students of animal behavior who identify themselves as ethologists and those who identify themselves as comparative psychologists lies in their academic training. Ethologists, for the most part, are trained in medicine, physiology, or zoology rather than psychology. While they do not, despite Ardrey's definition, limit themselves to the study of innate behavior, they do approach the problem of violence as a biologist would, seeking answers to the following four questions: (1) How does violence or aggression influence the survival of the animal? (2) What triggers aggressive behavior at any given moment? (3) How does the aggressive behavior machinery develop as the organism matures? (4) How have the aggressive behavior systems of different species evolved to reach their present condition? (See Tinbergen, 1968.) Social scientists tend to focus on questions (2) and (3) without considering the adaptive significance or evolution of behavior patterns, an approach that the ethologists feel is shortsighted and unlikely to permit an adequate understanding of the function of behavior.

Thus, ethologists in their research typically look at the similarities and differences between species, using both the methods of naturalistic observation and experimentation. They do so feeling that hypotheses derived from the study of lower organisms will provide valuable insights into the behavior of man as well. Unfortunately, many of the more widely circulated and popularized ethological reports, such as those by Ardrey (1966), Lorenz (1966), and Morris (1967), have emphasized the similarities and continuities between man and other animals without sufficiently warning against the dangers of uncritically applying ethological data to human problems (Tinbergen, 1968). The overly assertive and rather polemical style of writing which characterizes some of this work has tended to polarize reader opinion and lead to either uncritical acceptance or premature rejection by both social scientists and the lay public (see Montagu, 1968c). Closer scrutiny of these works, as well as of the more cautious statements of Tinbergen, does yield some hypotheses about the causes of human violence that are worthy of exploration.

In discussing human violence, the question most ethologists seek to answer is why man is so homicidal. According to the ethologists, no other animal approaches man in his propensity for killing other members of the same species.⁵ History shows that this was true even before weapons of mass destruction were developed; indeed, according to Ardrey (1966), the skull remnants of the earliest humanoid indicate that he was murdered.

Surveying the animal kingdom, ethologists differentiate between *interspecies* and *intraspecies* aggression. While the survival value of violence between species—a lioness pulling down a zebra or a mother bear attacking men who venture too near her cubs—is easy to understand, this is not true of violence between two members of the same species. Assuming that behavior evolves because of its survival value for the species, it is at first glance difficult to understand the adaptiveness of intraspecific aggression. However, ethologists have argued that intraspecies aggression does have survival value for the organism. "Unless the special interests of a social organization demand close aggregation of its members, it is obviously most expedient to spread the individuals of an animal species as evenly as possible over the available habitat" (Lorenz, 1966, p. 27). Intraspecies aggression accomplishes this goal. Darwin pointed out how fighting for desirable mates ensured that it was the

stronger, and presumably more fit, male who would spawn the most progeny. Among social animals, intraspecies aggression also provides a pattern of dominance known as the "peck order" that provides a stable hierarchy of leadership and discipline in times of stress. Implicit in this latter notion is the rather Germanic assumption that such authoritarian discipline is naturally desirable and that it increases the group's ability to survive.

Lorenz (1966) has even suggested that intraspecies aggression is the foundation of love. In order to defend a territory and raise young under the pressure of aggressive intrusions by other members of the same species, a male and female will ally with one another to share the tasks of defense and rearing offspring. "Thus intraspecific aggression can certainly exist without its counterpart, love, but conversely there is no love without aggression" (Lorenz, 1966, p. 209). Such anthropomorphic attribution of human emotions to other species is repugnant to most behavioral scientists; if Lorenz had stated instead that "pairwise mating patterns," an observable phenomenon, rather than "love," which is unobservable, are more common among certain species, he would be on somewhat sounder ground. In any case, it is not sound scientific logic to infer causation from correlations.

Assuming that intraspecific aggression does have adaptive significance, Lorenz, a naturalist who has studied a wide variety of fish, bird, and mammal species, has gone on to suggest that man and other animals are born with innate aggressive instigation. Fighting apparently reduces this instigation, but if fighting does not occur, instigation accumulates to such an extent that the individual actually seeks out opportunities to engage in aggressive behavior.

Many comparative psychologists and ethologists feel, on the basis of their observations, that most animal aggression is instrumental in nature. Animals aggress against other members of the same species not for the sake of injuring them, but instead to accomplish some other aim such as to defend their territory, increase their status in the hierarchy, or even to obtain food as in cannibalism (Davis, 1962). Some have inferred from this that human instigation to aggression exists to serve the same ends. Ardrey (1966), for example, extrapolated from observations of the territoriality of many species in an attempt to account for violence between men and nations. According to his analysis, the urge to territorial defense is an innate human characteristic. Unfortunately, in his phylogenetic history man has also acquired a predilection for making territorial intrusions; the result is human conflict.

Ardrey went even further and postulated that aggression is the natural response of one human to another:

Enmity is the biological condition of cross-purposes. It is the innate response of an organism to any and all members of its own species, and enmity will be suspended, totally or partially, only for such periods of time as two or more individuals are embraced by a single, more powerful purpose which inhibits all or part of their mutual animosities and channels the inhibited energy into a joint drive to achieve the joint purpose. Since amity persists no longer than mutual purpose, then when the purpose is either achieved or permanently frustrated, amity will end. Unless a new joint purpose arises to channel joint energies, individuals will return to a normal condition of mutual animosity (Ardrey, 1966, p. 272).

Ardrey hypothesized that friendship or amity between members of a species is equal to the sum of the enmity and hazards arrayed against them. He supported his contention that adversity from without yields amity with anecdotal observations of prairie dogs, howling monkeys, lemurs, blue geese, and smooth-billed ani. Among humans, Ardrey pointed to the unifying effect Arab hostility has had on the Israeli nation, neglecting the divisive effect World War I had on the Russian people or the deep divisions in the United States stemming from reverses in Vietnam. Those who accept the notion that cooperation and brotherly love are the inevitable result of external aggression and misfortune would do well to study the accounts of Andersonville in addition to those of the Battle of Britain.

Ardrey specifically rejected the theory that aggression is a learned habit or that instigation to aggression is environmentally caused. Indeed, he implied that the Yale theorists who popularized the hypothesis that frustration is the prime determinant of aggressive instigation were responsible for most of what Ardrey sees as the major ills of our society. "No citizen," he wrote, "bewildered by mass violence, by government by demonstration, by soaring rates of crime and delinquency in a time of affluence, by evidences of social irresponsibility on the part of groups both old and young, even by certain trends in the arts, should in his inquiry into first and collateral causes fail to read *Frustration and Aggression*, by John Dollard, Neal E. Miller, Leonard W. Doob, O.H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears" (Ardrey, 1966, p. 290 f.).

Tinbergen (1968) has taken a more reasoned and balanced approach than either Lorenz or Ardrey toward the question of human violence. While he agreed that much aggressive instigation must be inborn, he also described the complex ways in which heredity and environment interact to produce overt behavior. He pointed out that, even in apparently innate responses, the behavior mechanisms that are operating might well have been influenced by prior learning. Moreover, he described how the aggressive behavior of his favorite species, the three-spined stickleback, varies as a function of different internal and external factors. In his research on aggression, Tinbergen has also used the experimental approach to a greater extent than many other ethologists. For example, he has introduced model fishes of different colors and shapes into the tanks of male sticklebacks in order to determine the stimuli that elicit attacks. He and other investigators have also investigated the stickleback's propensity to attack as a function of other internal and external conditions, such as the level of male sex hormone, water conditions, and the like. Experiments such as these have demonstrated the complex interrelations of the determinants of aggressive behavior and the danger of attributing everything to a single factor.

Tinbergen has faulted those who would uncritically use the patterns of lower species to explain the problems of homo sapiens. He correctly points out that ethology is concerned with the differences between species, and the fact that man is a distinct species means that his behavior patterns will differ in many respects from those of other animals.

The point that "man is different" is, of course, one of the major criticisms typically leveled against ethologists who attempt to increase our understanding of humans through studies of lower animals. There is no denying that man is indeed different; however, the fact that he is not an exact replica of the other apes does not mean that he has nothing in common with

them. The fact that territorial intrusions or extreme population density have been found to be closely associated with aggressive behavior in other species does not *prove* that these factors are the causes of human aggression; however, the fact that these data may not prove the case does not mean that they do not suggest important hypotheses that need to be tested.

Critics of the ethological approach have also pointed out that treating man as a species may neglect the important individual and cultural differences in aggressive behavior within the human species. The anthropological and ethnological literature are full of accounts that demonstrate the variety of aggressive patterns found in men and women from different cultures. Different tribes of American Indians, for example, have developed quite different patterns of aggressive behavior, ranging from an extreme warlike stance to quiet acquiescent passivity. Montagu (1968a), for example, has criticized the notion of innate instigation to aggression by inquiring, "How has it come about, then, that the Pueblo Indians, the Eskimo, the Bushman, the Ifaluk, the Australian aborigines, the Pygmies, and many other peoples have managed to avoid this alleged internal urge to fight?"

Another criticism leveled at Lorenz and Ardrey is that they have not only overlooked much psychological and anthropological literature, but also relevant ethological studies that fail to support their hypotheses. Crook (1968), for example, emphasized that the primates nearest to man in the evolutionary sequence lack territoriality. Although Ardrey speculated on how such an odd evolutionary pattern may have come about, there are no adequate data to support his hypothetical reconstruction of early man's behavior patterns. Similarly, Scott (1958, 1962) has reviewed studies of the aggressive behavior of a variety of mammalian species and conducted experimental research showing the importance of training in conditioning aggressive behavior in the mouse. He concluded, "All of our present data indicate that fighting behavior among the higher mammals, including man, originates in external stimulation and that there is no evidence of spontaneous internal stimulation" (Scott, 1962, p. 173). While he acknowledges that aggressive or violent behavior could be influenced by inherited temperamental differences, he went on to state that the most fruitful area to search for the causes of an individual violence was in the immediate social environment.⁶

If the notion that aggressive instigation is innate and that it must be expressed periodically is correct, a number of implications for the control of violence result. It would follow that it is fruitless to seek to remove environmental conditions that seem to cause aggressive instigation, such as poverty, slums, and the like, for man will have aggressive instigation no matter what environmental manipulations are performed. Instead, the ethologists recommend various ways that aggressive instigation can be redirected, sublimated, or channeled into constructive or harmless activities. As we shall see, some such suggestions are bitterly opposed by those who regard aggressive instigation as being environmentally elicited and who feel that mild aggressive activity actually creates aggressive habits that can later result in violence.

In addition to these substantive criticisms, many also have adverse emotional reactions to the idea that man has an innate aggressive instinct, or indeed to the notion of any hereditary behavior patterns. While early

behavioral science has a strong hereditary bias, as exemplified by the studies of the oft-maligned Jukes and Kallikaks, in recent years the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction with a strong emphasis on environmentalism. It is, perhaps, to counter the extreme environmentalism now current that some ethologists feel compelled to adopt such a polemical tone, marshaling anecdotes as if they were preparing a legal brief rather than conducting a dispassionate scientific inquiry. As Kenneth Boulding (1968, p. 86) pointed out in his aptly titled article, *Am I a man or a mouse—or both?* "The crux of the matter, of course, is the old argument about nature and nurture, heredity and environment, instinct and learning." Fortunately the horse that Ardrey, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Lorenz, are flogging has long since died of old age. The question of whether behavior is influenced by environment or by heredity has been answered "Both," and the burgeoning science of behavior genetics is busy charting out *how* genetic and environmental factors interact and exercise their respective influence (Anastasi, 1958). The main contribution of the ethologists, particularly Tinbergen, has been to demonstrate the importance of inquiring into the physiological substratum and adaptive significance of aggressive behavior and to remind behavioral scientists that they should take account of comparative data in formulating and testing their theories.

Psychoanalytic Theories of Violence

Sigmund Freud was trained as a physician and did physiological research long before he turned his attention to the psychological complexities of human behavior. Given this background as well as the Darwinian spirit of his times, it is not surprising that he should have arrived at a theory of human behavior that was firmly rooted in man's animal nature. While the ethologists, as we have seen, depend on observations of lower animals, Freud focused on humans, obtaining most of his insights through an analysis of his own inner dynamics, through the psychoanalytic treatment of disturbed patients, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, through study of man's literary and artistic products.

A summary of psychoanalytic theory is far beyond the scope of this paper. However, a survey of psychological theories of aggression and violence would not be complete without at least a passing reference to that portion of Freud's work most directly related to violence and aggression.

Freud postulated that man is motivated by two groups of biologically based instinctual drives which he labeled the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts (referred to by other analytic theorists as Thanatos). The energy of the life instincts was termed "libido," and the aim of these instincts was directed toward the preservation of the individual and the race. Freud never gave a name to the energy of the death instincts, but the aim of these instincts was the destruction of the individual. When redirected outwards, the energy of the death instinct motivated aggressive drives directed at others.

While the existence of life instincts was fairly obvious, partly because they "made sense" and partly because the behavior which satisfied the life instincts was easily observable, this was not true of the "death instincts." The idea that there existed within man forces seeking his ultimate destruction and return to nothingness seemed contrary to common sense, although it

followed logically from his view that the aim of instincts is to return the individual to a previous quiescent state. Freud noted that early in his career even he had had difficulty accepting this radical idea, as had his psychoanalytic followers. He stated:

It was not easy, however, to demonstrate the activities of this supposed death instinct. The manifestations of Eros were conspicuous and noisy enough. It might be assumed that the death instinct operated silently within the organism toward its dissolution, that, of course, was no proof. A more fruitful idea was that a portion of the instinct is diverted towards the external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness. In this way the instinct could be pressed into the service of Eros, in that the organism was destroying some other thing, whether animate or inanimate, instead of destroying its own self (Freud, 1929, p. 119).

Thus Freud concluded that, while the basic aim of the death instinct is to return the individual to his original state of inanimate matter, it often interacts with the life instinct; as a result, the object or target of the death instinct is changed so that, instead of being directed exclusively inward at the self, it is redirected outward against others. It is thus manifested in violence and aggression directed toward other people.

Psychoanalysts like to describe drives or instincts in terms of four basic attributes: the impetus, the source, the aim, and the object. Freud, as we have seen, postulated that the source of the death instinct is innate. It is one of the two basic instinctual drives with which the human infant comes equipped. Many people, including some nonorthodox psychoanalytic theorists, are uncomfortable with and reject the idea of innate destructive tendencies (Rank, 1949). This reflects a longstanding philosophical dispute in Western culture. For centuries, philosophers and theologians have argued over the issue of whether man is basically good or evil. Even prior to the Hobbes-Locke-Rousseau disagreements, the doctrine of Original Sin and the account of Adam's Fall provoked similar theological discussions. The theory of innate destructive drives is squarely in the tradition of those who argue that man is born with evil tendencies that must be curbed, while, as we shall see, the environmental learning theory approach is simply the most recent reappearance of the *tabula rasa* doctrine. Acceptance of one or the other of these positions has waxed and waned over the centuries. In terms of scientifically respectable data, from which one might make a rational decision, our position has not improved significantly since St. Augustine's day.

Within the ranks of psychoanalysts, there is no real disagreement that a destructive drive, or instigation to aggression to use our terminology, is a major factor motivating human behavior. There is disagreement as to the source, however. As we have seen, this has important implications for the prevention of violence, for if the destructive instincts are indeed innate, then efforts to prevent violence should focus on inhibiting or redirecting these urges. On the other hand, if they are learned, then research should focus on how they are acquired in childhood with the hope of somehow lessening or possibly even preventing the development of death instincts.

Turning to the *object* of the death instincts, we have seen that Freud postulated that the original and ultimate object of the death wish is the self, and it is only through interaction with the life forces that this destructive energy is redirected outward in part toward others. This does not have any major implications for social control of violence as long as both suicide and homicide, both sadism and masochism, are seen as equally undesirable.

The *aim* of the destructive urges is another matter. In Freud's original conception, the aim was the complete annihilation of the individual. "If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for *internal* reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that 'the aim of all life is death' . . ." (Freud, 1920, p. 38).

Many analysts would hold that the aim of the redirected aggressive urge would also be ". . . total destruction of objects, animate or inanimate, and that all attempts to be 'satisfied with less,' with battle with or domination of the object, or with its disappearance imply restrictions of the original aims" (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949, p. 18). The importance of this theory is that the psychoanalytic theory of aggression is basically a theory of violence. Violence is the original aim of the destructive instinct; lesser aggression comes about only as a result of intrapsychic conflict between this violent urge and other facets of the personality, such as the ego or superego, which seek to moderate these tendencies and bring the behavior into conformity with the requirements of living in a civilized society. Violence is thus seen as the "normal" or "natural" form of aggressive behavior and, because its source is innate, the implication of this theoretical viewpoint is that the way to prevent overt violence is to concentrate on increasing inhibitions.

If this psychoanalytic viewpoint about the origin of violence is correct, then, if we are to explain violence, we should not focus on instigation to aggression or waste time inquiring what made the instigation so strong, but instead turn to the inhibitory mechanisms and inquire as to why they broke down and failed to prevent or moderate the expression of the violent impulse. As we shall see, some theorists (the present writer included) disagree with the notion that high inhibitions are a universal panacea for the prevention of violence.

As is often the case with psychoanalytic hypotheses, the suggestion that violence is the aim of aggressive impulses cannot be adequately tested empirically. Certainly all human aggression is not designed to destroy the victim, but there is no way of determining if this is because the original aggressive instinct had a lesser aim or if a homicidal impulse was curbed. Ethological reports indicate that animal aggression is generally instrumental and that, once the goal has been accomplished—the intruder repulsed from the territory or dominance established—most animals will break off an attack instead of continuing to the death. However, such data are hardly adequate to disprove such a complex hypothesis, although they might cause us to be somewhat skeptical.

What of the broader question of the adequacy of the general psychoanalytic theory of innate aggressive instigation? As with the ethological theories, there are no firm data on which to make a judgment. The psychoanalytic case is supported primarily by philosophical reasoning and anecdotal illustration. Because Freud does not pretend to offer definitive

data "proving" his contentions, his style of exposition is less objectionable to many behavioral scientists than that of those ethological writers who make excessive claims for the empirical basis of their speculation.

As we have noted, many scholars (including psychoanalysts) balk at Freud's notion of a death instinct, particularly when they attempt to work out the biological implications. While the notion of "life instincts" appears consistent with the observation that most organisms behave so as to perpetuate themselves and their species, the concept of "death instincts," innate ones at that, seem, to many, to violate all the canons of biology, zoology, and common sense.

Even Lorenz, who accepted innate instigation, rejected the death instinct:

It is more than probable that the evil effects of the human aggressive drives, explained by Sigmund Freud as the results of a special death wish, simply derive from the fact that in prehistoric times intra-specific selection bred into man a measure of aggressive drive for which in the social order of today he finds no adequate outlet (1966, p. 234).

The present writer must confess that he shares some of these misgivings, particularly when the death instincts are discussed in teleological terms. However, if we retreat from the aura of mysticism which so often pervades such discussions, there is no denying that selective breeding of fighting cocks, pit dogs, and fighting bulls has been quite successful. Tigers are more aggressive than tapirs. We may prefer to substitute a more respectable pseudonym, such as "aggressive drive" or "arousal threshold," for the term "death instinct." However, there is little doubt that some species are genetically predisposed to be more aggressive than others. It does not appear to be stretching reason too far to assume that, if there can be differences in innate aggressive potential across species, then there may also be such differences within species. Indeed testing calves for individual differences in aggressiveness is an indispensable part of selecting Spanish fighting bulls (Hemingway, 1932). If there can be such individual differences in lower vertebrates, it does not seem beyond the realm of possibility that individual differences in innate aggressive instigation may exist in human infants as well.

Theories of Environmentally Induced Instigation to Aggression

In contrast to the hereditary approach taken by the ethologists and psychoanalysts is the position that instigation to aggression is an acquired rather than an innate characteristic of the human organism. As we have noted, American psychology has assumed a strong environmentalist bias in recent decades, and, just as Freud was in the spirit of his times in proposing an innate physiological aggressive drive, so too modern theorists who propose environmental causes of violence reflect the traditions and biases of the present.

One of the major characteristics of American psychology in the last half century has been a strong behavioristic tradition. American psychologists prefer to tie their theoretical notions directly to overtly observable events. While it is sometimes necessary to postulate the existence of hypothetical constructs, such as instigation to aggression, they attempt to minimize the

number of hypothetical or unobservable variables in their theories, and to seek rigorous empirical verification of their theories through experiments designed to test the inferences which can be logically deduced from them. For this reason the theories of environmental causation that we shall review will appear considerably less speculative and more empirical than the genetic theories discussed above. By the same token they may appear more dry and mechanistic. Frequently, man seems to be regarded as an empty robot making automatic responses to the various stimuli that impinge on him, and the richness and complexity of the personality dynamics emphasized by the psychoanalytic theorists is lacking.

Behaviorists generally rely on rigorous experimental procedures. As we have noted, it is difficult to apply these methods to the study of human violence. Consequently, they have been forced to study milder aggression in humans and laboratory animals. In human subjects the administration of a mild electric shock or verbal criticism of an experimenter are typical types of aggression that are studied. Among children, a favorite technique has been to study doll play and record the number of instances when, for example, the child depicts a "father" doll hitting a "child" doll. While some research has focused on the personality of the murderers or the social structure of the violent gang, most of the data that have been collected to test the implications of environmental theories have been concerned with the mild forms of aggression described above. Although theorists have attempted to extend the principles derived from the study of aggression in the laboratory to the problem of violence in the streets, extreme caution should be taken in making such generalizations.

Frustration-Aggression Theory

The best known and most thoroughly explored theory of environmental causation was originally proposed by a group of psychologists at the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University in 1939. In the true behavioristic tradition, the Yale group stated their hypotheses in clear and unambiguous prose. While this may have oversimplified the problems inherent in the study of aggression, particularly because aggression was treated as a unidimensional construct, it did have the advantage of permitting the various formulations to be tested empirically.

The first basic assumption of the Yale group was as follows:

This study takes as its point of departure the assumption that *aggression is always a consequence of frustration*. More specifically the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939, p.1).

The Yale group did not offer an opinion as to whether this inevitable relationship was innate or learned; they simply hypothesized that it was a necessary relationship no matter what its origin.

What did they mean by frustration? In the initial formulation of the theory, a frustration was defined as something that interferes with an ongoing

goal response. If a child is found by his mother on a chair with his hand in the cookie jar and she orders him to close the jar and to get down without having a cookie, then his sequence of cookie-securing behavior has been interrupted prior to completion and the child is said to have been frustrated. As we shall see, other theorists have attempted to extend the definition of frustration to include other behavior such as being injured, being criticized, or being physically attacked. Berkowitz (1962, p. 30), for example, suggested that one becomes angry after having one's toes stepped on because stepping on the toes frustrates one's internal responses directed at maintaining security and comfort. The present writer feels that, given such extension, the term "frustration" loses its explanatory power, so for the present we shall simply treat frustration as it was originally defined.

It was, of course, obvious that every frustration does not culminate in overt aggressive behavior (aggressive behavior being defined as responses that are directed towards the injury of people). They therefore clarified the original postulate by saying that instigation to aggression is the response to frustration. Whether or not this instigation results in overt aggressive behavior depends on other factors such as internal inhibitions and external stimulus events.

The Yale theorists then went on to hypothesize that the strength of instigation to aggression varies directly with the amount of frustration. They postulated that the amount of frustration, and hence the strength of instigation to aggression, was a function of three factors: (a) The drive strength of the frustrated goal response. If, for example, a man goes into a bar and orders a beer only to be told that they do not have any more, his frustration, and consequently his instigation to aggression, will be greater if it is a hot day, he is very thirsty, and has been looking forward to a beer for some time. (b) The degree of interference with the frustrated response. According to this postulate, our hypothetical beer drinker's frustration will be greater if there is no other place he can get a beer. (c) The number of frustrated response sequences. According to this principle,

... the amount of strength of aggressive response will depend in part on the amount of residual instigation from previous or simultaneous frustrations, which instigation summates to activate the response under observation. Minor frustrations add together to produce an aggressive response of greater strength than would normally be expected from the frustrating situation that appears to be the immediate antecedent of the aggression (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 31).

This important principle states essentially two things: first, that the aspects of frustration can remain active over a period of time, and second, that the frustration from different events can summate. Returning to our example, if our would-be beer drinker who has been told that he cannot have a beer has also been refused service in three or four other bars prior to entering this one, he will be angrier than if this had been the first refusal.

The postulate also states that different kinds of frustrations can add together to yield greater instigation to aggression. Suppose our would-be beer drinker is not only thirsty but also tired and hungry, and, in addition to not being served a beer, he is told that he cannot sit down or get anything to eat. In this situation, the frustration resulting from failure to satisfy his needs for

rest and hunger could combine with that from failure to satisfy his thirst and result in an even higher level of instigation.

Subsequent research on the frustration-aggression theory has suggested that there are other factors that may influence the amount of perceived frustration and the subsequent instigation to aggression. Pastore (1952) suggested that the more arbitrary the frustration, the greater the resulting instigation to aggression. According to this formulation, if a man went into a bar and asked, "May I have a beer?" and the bartender simply responded "No," the would-be patron would feel more frustrated and angry than if the bartender said, "No, because we can't sell beer on Election Day."

While research has indicated less overt aggression following nonarbitrary as compared to arbitrary frustration, it is difficult to establish whether this was because the arbitrary frustration elicited more instigation to aggression, or because the nonarbitrary condition aroused greater inhibitions against the overt expression of aggression. The latter possibility was pointed out by Rothaus and Worchel in 1960 and subsequently Kregarman and Worchel (1961) obtained data which they felt supported the hypothesis that arbitrariness influences inhibitions rather than instigation.

This ambiguity of interpretation illustrates one of the major difficulties in doing research on the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Typically, all one can measure is the overt behavior that results from a given situation, and often there is no way of determining whether the experimental manipulations have influenced the instigation, the inhibition, or the stimulus factors. As we shall see, one promising technique which may break through this impasse is research using the internal physiological correlates of instigation, such as blood pressure.

Experimental research has also indicated that another factor which may influence instigation to aggression is whether or not the victim of the frustration believes that he will have an opportunity to aggress against his frustrator. Studies by Thibaut and Coules (1952) and Worchel (1957) suggest that subjects who believe that they will have an opportunity to counteraggress suffer less frustration. Once again, the problem with studies such as these is that only the resulting overt aggression is measured and it is impossible to determine the internal dynamics from which this aggression resulted.

Berkowitz (1960) has suggested that another factor which might influence instigation to aggression is whether or not the frustration was anticipated. According to this analysis, if a football team suffers a defeat their frustration will be less if they had anticipated that they might lose the game than if they had been quite confident of the victory.

Turning now from the factors that have been suggested as influencing the amount of instigation to aggression, let us examine briefly the status of the theory itself. There have been two main criticisms leveled at the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The first concerns the notion that frustration always leads to aggression. While a number of studies have indicated that frustration *may* follow aggression, a variety of other studies have suggested that aggression is not the inevitable consequence of frustration. Consequently this formulation has been changed to read: "Frustration produces instigation to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression" (Miller, 1941, p. 338).

The next major concern has been with the hypothesis that *only* frustration can elicit aggression. Buss (1961) has suggested that attack can also elicit instigation to aggression. A number of studies on animals have shown that stimuli that elicit pain, such as electrical shock, intense heat, physical blows, tail pinches, and even, in one study of killer whales, depth charges, can result in intraspecies, interspecies, or displaced aggression in a variety of creatures (Ulrich, Hutchinson, and Azrin, 1965). Research on humans has been hampered by the ethical prohibitions against inflicting injury on subjects as well as by the fact that the research designs used in many studies often confound frustration with attack. However, laboratory and field data indicate that among humans, attacks also elicit aggressive behavior and, by inference, instigation to aggression.

By and large, it thus seems safe to conclude from the available evidence that frustration is not the only antecedent of aggression. Those who would dispute this notion usually do so by redefining frustration to include the type of painful stimuli described above. According to this argument, if a man becomes angry because he has been punched in the nose, it is not because such acts elicit instigation to aggression, but instead because the punch in the nose frustrated his need for self-respect. If we stretch the term "frustration" in such a fashion to encompass any antecedent event that elicits aggression, then the term loses its meaning and its explanatory value. In the long run, it appears more parsimonious simply to include attack as one of the variables which, along with frustration, can elicit aggressive instigation.

There is considerable research support for the proposition that environmental factors such as frustration or attack can elicit aggression (Buss, 1961). While we have illustrated this contention with examples of very specific frustrations or attacks, the reader must not be misled into thinking that *only* such immediate stimuli can produce instigation to aggression. Instigation to aggression can also stem from chronically recurring or generalized frustrations. Being trapped in a second-rate job because of the color of one's skin, chronic hunger, or substandard living conditions are among the frustrating conditions that can yield chronic instigation to aggression.

As we have noted, instigation to aggression from different sources can summate. Thus it might be expected that someone who is chronically frustrated would require less immediate provocation to elicit overt aggressive behavior because the instigation to aggression stemming from some relatively minor incident could summate with the chronic instigation to aggression stemming from the general frustrations of everyday life. Indirect support of this formulation can be found in the work of Hovland and Sears (1940) and Henry and Short (1954) who demonstrated significant correlations between economic conditions and violence. Such summation can also be observed in everyday life. Parents have learned that quarrels with children tend to be more frequent just before mealtimes because of the instigation to aggression induced by hunger (Goodenough, 1931). Similarly, invalids tend to be irritable because of the many frustrations their illnesses entail. It therefore would follow that the more arbitrary generalized frustrations can be eliminated from an individual's environment and life, the more his chronic instigation to aggression will be decreased. This in turn should decrease the likelihood that he will engage in overt aggression and violence.⁷

If we accept the evidence indicating that frustration, attack, and similar environmental factors can result in overt aggressive behavior, does this discredit the theories of innate instigation to aggression summarized earlier? The answer is no. Lorenz, Tinbergen, and other ethologists do not deny that environmental events can trigger aggressive behavior. Indeed, as we have seen, Ardrey has emphasized at great lengths how territorial intrusions elicit aggressive counterresponses in a variety of species. However, instead of interpreting such observations as indicating that the territorial intrusion frustrated the home animal's need for *lebensraum* and this in turn yielded instigation to aggression, genetic theorists would be more inclined to argue that the aggressive drive is innate and the intrusion or frustration simply served as a trigger or a sign which released the aggressive behavior. The difficulties associated with such research, which we have described a number of times, make it impossible to determine whether the apparently frustrating event causes the instigation to aggression directly or if it simply activates innate instigation. Even the autonomic nervous system studies that regularly report increases in arousal level following a frustration or an attack cannot really resolve this issue.

Even if it could be established that frustrations or attacks caused instigation to aggression in and of themselves, this could not be taken as proof of the invalidity of the ethological or psychoanalytic contention that instigation to aggression is innate. It would merely demonstrate that not all instigation to aggression is genetically determined. It would not rule out the possibility that some instigation to aggression is inherited and that other instigation to aggression is acquired. Since we know that infants differ in a number of temperamental characteristics, including arousal thresholds, irritability, and the like, it would not be too farfetched to suppose that there are innate differences in the propensity for aggressiveness as well. The individual's overt aggressive patterns would then stem from a combination of experiential and genetic factors.

If one wished to avoid the notion of innate aggressive instigation but still retain the concept of individual temperamental differences, one could simply restate this position as hypothesizing that there may be innate differences between individuals in the degree to which different events arouse frustration and instigation to aggression, possibly mediated by congenital differences in autonomic nervous system arousability, for a number of studies have demonstrated a link between hormonal levels and aggressiveness in man and other animals (Moyer, 1967).

Social Learning Theory Approach

Social learning theorists who have studied aggression have generally focused on the factors that facilitate or impede the learning of aggressive habits. Most of the data they have collected, therefore, concerns inhibitions and stimulus factors that help direct instigation into aggressive or nonaggressive channels. Favorite topics include child-rearing practices and the investigation of how various reward and punishment contingencies influence the formation of aggressive or nonaggressive habits. However, social learning theory is also relevant to our immediate topic of the development of instigation to aggression.

One of the major criticisms of frustration-aggression theory is that while interference with an ongoing sequence of behavior will elicit aggression in our culture, this does not always appear to be the case in other cultures (Bateson, 1941). It may be that in these cultures inhibitions are so great that the instigation is never expressed overtly; on the other hand, it is also possible that the interference is less frustrating or that it does not elicit instigation to aggression.

If the latter possibility reflects the true state of affairs, as appears likely, it is probable that the differences are the result of social learning. We have already noted that some theorists have suggested that expectancy is a major factor influencing the frustration which ensues from interference with a given goal response. Social learning is probably the major factor that determines the expectancies an individual develops (Rotter, 1954). In the United States, for example, businessmen are trained to be prompt and waste no time "getting to the point." In a country in which lateness is common and in which much time is spent in ceremonial circumlocutions, both an American and a native businessman will experience equal interference in the goal response of reaching a definite agreement. However, because of the differences in socially learned expectancies, this frustration is likely to arouse much more instigation to aggression in the American.⁸

A particular type of social learning is the training by which the military attempts to transform a random selection of young men into disciplined killers. For the most part, this training is focused on lowering inhibition levels. However, attempts are also made to raise instigations. This is done through films and lectures designed to make the men aware of the threatening aspect of the enemy and to make them angry and indignant over what the enemy has done. Research on prejudice has shown that instigation to aggression toward other groups is similarly the result of social learning, although the indoctrination is typically less deliberate than in the military (Buss, 1961).

The influence of social learning can also be seen in the ritualized aggression found in many cultures. The dueling code is an example of how, through social learning, individuals have learned to perceive certain signs, statements, or gestures, such as throwing down a glove, as symbolic attacks that can arouse instigation to violence. In such situations it is, of course, frequently true that the resulting instigation is primarily instrumental with the challenged party more interested in protecting his reputation and "honor" than in injuring his opponent. (Social learning is also responsible for the individual valuing honor more than personal safety.) While formal duels are now rare in upper class Western culture, ritual aggression can still be observed in the rumbles of "bopping gangs" (Yablonsky, 1966; Thrasher, 1927).

Social learning has its greatest effect in teaching the child that aggression can satisfy a number of needs. As McNeil has pointed out:

Since a child will learn whatever responses are rewarded by others or bring gratification of his needs, it is easy to see how he can grow in sophistication in the use of aggressive devices. When other individuals are blocking the child's way and frustrating him, he can, by accident, learn that an aggressive attack will remove them and free the path to gratification. . . . When the child discovers the benefit of hurting others and he gains experience and learns more about the motivation of

others, he'll become more and more skilled in using this knowledge of motivation as a means of controlling them and getting what he wants (1959, p. 227).

This is particularly true in the culture of poverty. McCandless has described rewards for aggressiveness in the world of a lower class child as follows:

He has learned that he had better grab while the grabbing is good, because if he doesn't, one of his brothers and sisters, or his parents, or his peers, will grab instead. Reason has never won a street fight nor enabled him to get the biggest share of the can of beans, nor served to keep his father from beating his mother when he got drunk . . . Without immediate action and intense drive, the child may not survive the tooth-and-claw existence that for him is almost routine . . . When one is battling for survival—for his fair share of the limited supply of food in the window cooler or ice box, for his turn with the local girl who will let the boys go as far as they want—intense emotion facilitates and spurs action. Standing back, thinking, and suppressing result in failure to reach the goal. Striking out, yelling, and pushing cause others to stand back so that you can go ahead (1967, p. 587).

Given a milieu such as this, it is easy to see how the child can learn that aggression can satisfy a variety of needs in addition to whatever satisfactions are to be gained through violence itself. It is, therefore, not surprising that investigators such as McKee and Leader (1955) have observed more aggressiveness on the part of lower class children. Goldfarb's (1943a, 1943b, 1944, 1945) studies of the development of children in institutions with inadequate adult attention have shown that they too develop more aggressiveness as manifested by temper tantrums, destructiveness, impudence, and antagonism to others as a result of being reared in an environment in which they had to learn aggressive habits to compete successfully for adult attention. Thus environmental deprivation can produce instigation to aggression not only through frustration, but also by teaching the child that aggression is the best way to satisfy his needs for attention, food, safety, and the like.

Before proceeding, it might be worthwhile to speculate briefly on the implications of this. If we analyze the various ways in which violence can be averted, we find that they reduce to the following: (a) reducing instigation to aggression and the stimuli that facilitate its expression, (b) increasing inhibitions against the expression of aggression and the stimuli that impede it, and (c) strengthening competing responses. Historically, the second course has been favored most. Judicial procedures and correctional institutions are designed to increase inhibitions by punishing misbehavior. If, however, complete reliance is placed on repressive measures, without removing the environmental causes of instigation to aggression, then it is quite likely that instigation will continue to accumulate until inhibitions are overcome and violence results. If, instead, punitive sanctions are used to forestall violence, while the sources of instigation of aggression are eliminated and competing responses are taught, then it is more likely that violence can be avoided instead of simply being postponed.

Frustration-aggression theory suggests that one way of reducing instigation is to minimize arbitrary frustrations. The social learning theories that we have examined further suggest that instigation can be reduced if response contingencies are established which will allow for the satisfaction of such basic needs as hunger, territory, self-respect, and independence by means other than violence or aggression. Programs such as those proposed by Ulrich (1968) and those already in effect in New York City (Pileggi, 1968) that seek to avert violence by allowing immediate consideration and redress of citizen grievances thus seem to be founded on sound principles. Not only is frustration, and hence instigation to aggression, reduced but, more important, the citizen is rewarded for nonviolent, democratic action rather than having his needs satisfied only after violence has claimed public attention.

Residual Aggressive Instigation

In our discussion of the dynamics of aggression we have pointed out that in some cases inhibitions outweigh instigation so that although aggressive instigation has been aroused it is not expressed. The fate of this unexpressed aggressive instigation is a controversial theoretical issue. Many theorists view the human personality as if it were a closed hydraulic system. In this viewpoint the aggressive energy, although dammed by inhibitions, remains potent and can be expressed at some later time. Others such as Berkowitz take strong exception to the view that man might carry with him aggressive energy waiting for a chance to be expressed. Berkowitz (1964, 1968) in particular has criticized the notion of chronic instigation to aggression.

The present writer does not subscribe to a closed hydraulic model of personality. He agrees with Berkowitz that aggressive instigation once aroused may dissipate in time unless later rearoused. By the same token, however, the present writer also contends that in *some* individuals, instigation to aggression can remain active for a long period of time if no instigation-dissipating mechanisms such as displacement, humor, or catharsis function in the interim. If we deny the possibility that instigation can gradually accumulate over a long period of time, it is impossible to explain adequately the paradoxical violence of, for example, the "model student" who suddenly slays his family.

Berkowitz has stated:

The *habitually hostile* individual does not have a reservoir of aggressive energy pressing for discharge. Nor, I believe, does he have year-long accumulation of anger pent up within him. His frequent aggressive outbursts are not emotional explosions from a storehouse of repressed energy or anger but, rather, are reactions evoked by appropriate cues (1964, p. 105-106).

This may be correct for the *habitually hostile* person, although by means of such internal cues as fantasy, brooding over mistreatment, and the like, a chronic state of anger might be maintained that would be similar in many respects to a reservoir of aggressive energy. But even if this is the case for the *habitually hostile* person, the present writer's research has demonstrated that

in addition to this type there is another type that he has labeled the "chronically overcontrolled assaultive type."

His inhibitions against the expression of aggression are extremely rigid so he rarely, if ever, responds with aggression, no matter how great the provocation. These inhibitions are not focused on a few specific targets, as was the case with the Undercontrolled Aggressive type, but instead are quite general. He is, therefore, unable to make use of the mechanisms of displacement or response generalization. The result is that through some form of temporal summation such as that described by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939, p. 31), his instigation to aggression builds up over time. In some cases, the instigation to aggression summates and exceeds even his excessive defenses. If this occurs when there are sufficient cues to aggression in the environment, an aggressive act should result (Megargee, 1966, p. 3).

Many highly controlled people go through life without ever engaging in aggressive behavior, particularly if their circumstances are such that they are exposed to a minimum of frustration and attack. Others, however, are not so fortunate, and if they do reach the point where their instigation exceeds their inhibitions, then an act of extreme violence can result. Empirical research by the present writer and his associates (Megargee, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967; Megargee, Cook, and Mendelsohn, 1967; Megargee and Mendelsohn, 1962) as well as by independent investigators (Blackburn, 1968a, 1968b; Molof, 1967) has supported this typology and, indeed, any reader of the daily press is familiar with instances of extreme violence in apparently mild-mannered and well-controlled individuals. Laboratory studies have also illustrated the phenomena of temporal summation of aggression (Berkowitz, 1960a; Otis and McCandless, 1955). While such studies are less relevant to the issue of violence, they do support the notion that residual instigation to aggression can add to the overall instigation level at a given point in time.⁹ In connection with violence, however, it is interesting that Palmer (1960) and Duncan et al. (1958) in their studies of murderers found a high incidence of frustration and trauma in their early childhoods. Palmer's study was especially noteworthy because he compared murderers with their own brothers, thus roughly controlling family environment.

Before leaving the topic of residual instigation to aggression, we should note one additional factor that has complicated a number of research designs. When instigation to aggression has been aroused but its expression has been blocked by internal inhibitions or external sanctions, the individual suffers additional frustration. The gentleman who is refused service in a bar suffers a frustration that, according to the frustration-aggression hypothesis, should produce instigation to aggression. This instigation may motivate him to make some physical or verbal attack on the bartender. However, his own inhibitions (or the fact that the bartender is an extremely large person) may prevent him from making this attack. This frustrates him even further and adds even more to his aggressive instigation. According to this conception then, the frustration-aggression hypothesis implies that when the performance of an aggressive act is inhibited, we not only have residual aggressive instigation to

cope with but also additional instigation resulting from the frustration of the aggressive response sequence.

Factors That Decrease or Diminish Instigation to Aggression

Having surveyed the theories as to the origin of instigation to aggression, we shall now examine various hypotheses that have been offered to explain how instigation is dissipated. In this treatment we must distinguish between (a) behavior or factors that diminish instigation and (b) behavior or factors that simply block or prevent an overt expression of aggressive instigation. If a man threatens violence and is thrown into jail before he can carry out his plans, violence has been averted, but his instigation to aggression has not been lowered. A variable that decreases instigation would reduce the desire to commit the aggressive act instead of merely suppressing its performance. While this distinction between aggression-blocking and instigation-reducing is easy to write about, it is more difficult to operationalize these factors successfully so that they may be studied separately.

The question of the factors reducing instigation to aggression lends itself to experimental study, and social psychologists have performed a number of laboratory studies on this problem. The typical procedure is to anger two groups equally and, after subjecting one to some treatment to reduce instigation, determine if there has been a significantly greater decrease in aggressive instigation in the treated group than in the untreated group. As we shall see, the outcomes of these studies depend on a variety of subtle factors, so that slight differences in experimental techniques may produce quite different outcomes. Consequently, the effectiveness of some of the factors we shall review can be considered rather controversial. Moreover, the vast majority of these studies deal with relatively mild levels of instigation; whether these techniques can reduce the high levels of instigation found in violence remains to be seen.

Innate Reduction of Instigation to Aggression

We have already noted that there are several theories that attribute instigation to aggression to genetic factors and, as we shall see, some theorists have also maintained that inhibitions to aggression can also be traced to heredity. At present, there is no viable theory of genetically based reductions in instigation to aggression. However, if we accept the notion that there is an innate aggressive drive, which as we have seen is a controversial position, then it would follow that this drive could be reduced through selective breeding. Indeed, this may have taken place in the breeding of certain breeds of dogs. While such breeds as the bulldog and the bull terrier have been selected for their aggressive characteristics, other breeds such as the St. Bernard have been selected for their docility and gentleness. Similar selective breeding has been carried out in mice and rats (Moyer, 1967). There is of course no way of determining whether the success of such efforts stems from reduction in some sort of innate aggressive drive or if instead it comes about through an increase in innate inhibitory characteristics.

Putting aside selective breeding, many theorists agree that instigation to aggression will diminish or decay over time in the absence of additional

frustrations or arousals. Certainly, there appears to be little doubt that people "cool off" following an insult or an injury so that the likelihood of their making an aggressive response diminishes as a function of time. It may be that during the interim the individual engages in activities such as displacement or sublimation that reduce the instigation level. It may be that as time passes other needs become prepotent, so that the aggressive response is less favored in the response competition. However, it may also be that there is a basic mechanism whereby instigation simply decreases as a function of time and that this reduction mechanism is inborn. According to Berkowitz, "Unless the thwarted person is kept aroused or is re-aroused by being reminded of his frustrations, his anger probably will dissipate with time, and the probability of aggressive behavior will decline" (1964, p. 106). If this is the case, and there is an aggressive drive that can diminish with time, then aggression would be similar to other drives that do not serve essential tissue needs and diminish without rearousal, in contrast to drives such as thirst, hunger, or the need for oxygen, that increase sharply over time if not satisfied.

Environmental Factors and Behavior That Reduce Instigation to Aggression

As might be expected, behavioral scientists have spent much more thought and energy studying environmental factors that may dissipate aggressive instigation than they have investigating the possibility of innate aggression-reducing mechanisms. A variety of instigation behaviors or factors that have been proposed can be divided into three broad categories: (a) reduction of instigation to aggression by satisfying the frustrated need; (b) reduction of instigation through expression of behavior; and (c) reduction of instigation through cognitive redefinition of the situation. We shall deal with each of these in turn.

Reduction of instigation to aggression through need satisfaction.—By far the simplest and most effective way of reducing environmentally caused instigation to aggression is to remove those environmental conditions that elicit the instigation. To return to our man in search of a beer, the best way to reduce his anger would be to give him a beer. If frustration of a goal-oriented response results in instigation to aggression, then allowing the individual to achieve his goal should reduce the instigation.

While few would argue that this is not an effective technique for reducing aggressive instigation, it cannot be regarded as a panacea. Man has an extraordinary capacity for reminiscing about unpleasant events. Even as he drinks his beer, our indignant barfly might think back to the initial refusal and find himself angered once again at the thought of it. (In frustration-aggression theory, this would be explained as being because the initial refusal frustrated not only his thirst, but also his status needs while providing the beer satisfied only the former.)

Another somewhat related problem is that man also has an extraordinary ability to disguise his motives, even from himself. He may say that he wants one thing, when in fact he is ambivalent or wants something else. Satisfaction of his consciously expressed need may leave his unconscious or unexpressed need unsatisfied; because of the resulting frustration there is no reduction in

instigation. Children and teenagers, for example, sometimes test their parents by making inappropriate requests. While they may become somewhat angered when the request is refused, they may be even angrier if the request is granted because the parent has not behaved as the child covertly hoped he would.

We must not make the mistake, however, of overgeneralizing from these exceptions and ruling out satisfaction of frustrations as an instigation-reducing mechanism. This is clearly not the case. The ethological evidence shows that, particularly in the case of instrumental aggression, accomplishment of the desired ends typically results in a cessation of aggressive activity. The dog that chases an intruder from his front yard usually does not continue in hot pursuit and press the attack to the death. Instead, once his territory is secure, he typically halts. Many species of animals have behavioral cues that signify surrender and, upon seeing these cues during a fight, other members of the species usually discontinue their aggressive activities. At the human level, labor unions typically stop striking once their demands for higher wages or better working conditions have been met. Thus removal of the environmental antecedents of aggressive instigation frequently, although not inevitably, reduces instigation to aggression.

Reduction of instigation through overt aggression and catharsis.—Most theorists agree that the overt expression of aggression is one way of reducing instigation. If a man for some reason wants to hit someone in the nose, then hitting someone in the nose should satisfy this desire. Such overt expression of aggressive instigation is often referred to as "catharsis," a term applied by psychoanalysts, who in turn derived it from the Greeks.

While this seems to be a simple, straightforward notion with which everyone would agree, closer examination reveals a number of complexities and controversies. The first problem is that there is a lot of excess theoretical baggage attached to the catharsis concept. Because of its psychoanalytic origins, use of the term "catharsis" often implies to psychologists an acceptance of the psychoanalytic theory in which the catharsis concept was originally embedded. This is described well by Buss:

The concept of catharsis is part of the "hydraulic" model of personality which is based on the analogy to a liquid held under pressure in a container or reservoir. Additions to the liquid increase pressure on the walls. There are regular channels for drainage which operate when the liquid places sufficient pressures on the container. In the absence of adequate drainage, the pressure builds up until there is a leak in the walls of the reservoir. Each increase in the liquid adds pressure for release of the liquid; each time there is drainage, there is at least a temporary decrement in pressure for release. The pressure is analogous to impulses, in the present context—aggressive impulses. The reservoir is fed by incitements to aggression, and the walls of the reservoir represent inhibitions against expressing aggressive impulses... The expression of aggression represents the draining of the reservoir; the more drained, the less that remains in the reservoir. The less that remains in the reservoir, the less pressure is exerted by impulses seeking release. The expression of aggression is called *catharsis*, and the diminution in the tendency to aggress as a consequence of such expression of aggression is called the *cathartic effect* (1961, p. 75).

The Yale group adopted this model specifically when they stated, "...the occurrence of any act of aggression is assumed to reduce the instigation to aggression... when any response of aggression is expressed, its cathartic effect should lessen the instigation to the other aggressive responses" (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 50 f.).

One of the problems with a hydraulic model of personality is that it takes as a basic assumption the physical principle of the conservation of energy. Energy such as aggressive instigation cannot be destroyed. According to the most popular version of catharsis theory, if instigation is not expressed in direct aggressive activity, the individual will remain in a state of tension unless it can be expressed through some substitute activity. This form of catharsis theory is widely held. As we have seen, Lorenz (1966) upheld this viewpoint when he wrote that man must have periodic outlets for his aggressive instigation. Even earlier, William James indicated that the society must plan for appropriate release of aggressive instigation.

There appears to be some measure of truth in this formulation. Any student of abnormal psychology can cite numerous cases where unexpressed feelings of hostility have resulted in a variety of psychological and psychiatric disturbances. Among the more common pernicious results are such disorders as essential hypertension and ulcers, and unexpressed hostility can often be found as an etiological factor in the psychoneuroses and some of the functional psychoses as well.

However, a number of psychologists have become increasingly uncomfortable with catharsis theory and with the hydraulic model it implies. Some psychologists feel that those who uphold this position have adopted the model too literally. Physicists frequently use models, but they do not confuse models with natural laws. They realize the model is simply an analogy that helps one to conceptualize a problem but that it should not be confused with reality. The hydraulic model is useful for some purposes and, indeed, the present writer likes to use it to help illustrate how instigation can summate to the point where it overwhelms the defenses of the "chronically overcontrolled assaultive" type. However if we slavishly attempt to make the structure and dynamics of human personality functioning conform with that of the behavior of fluids in every respect, we end up with more conceptual difficulties than the effort is worth. For example, if we want to uphold the position that aggressive instigation can decay with time, we would then have to postulate some sort of a psychological process akin to evaporation in the lake behind our inhibitory dam. This may resolve the problem for the moment but, if we get obsessed with our hydraulic model, we would soon realize that the vaporized aggressive instigation rains down on the plains of the ego at some point, and we would need to specify what happens at this juncture. At this point, the model is no longer working for the theorist; the theorist is working for the model.

McNeil has objected to the hydraulic model as follows:

The principal objection to the catharsis hypothesis is that it suggests that each of us has a reservoir of aggression which must be allowed to spill over at regular intervals if we are to avoid having the dam burst. This analogy is a sloppy approximation of the facts of human hostility. If a hostile way of life is learned in early childhood in response to bitter

experience, it can be based on such deeply ingrained resentment and deprivation that no attempt to drain it off could cope with the rate with which it is replenished within (1959, p. 209).

It is to avoid such convolutions and distortions that some psychologists would prefer to drop the catharsis notion entirely. However, if we may be permitted a few more liquid puns and metaphors, damning catharsis in this fashion appears to the present writer to be throwing out the baby with the (bath) water. It seems possible to postulate merely that overt aggressive behavior is one, although not the only, way of reducing instigation to aggression without being compelled to adopt a full-fledged hydraulic model.

Many studies have attempted to test catharsis theory over the years. The typical procedure has been to take two groups and arouse instigation to aggression in both. Then the experimenter allows one group to express the aggression or catharsis but does not allow such an opportunity to the other group. Finally, the experimenter measures the residual instigation to aggression in both groups to determine if the catharsis group is significantly lower.

Unfortunately, such studies are much more complex than they appear at first glance. A major problem is how one goes about measuring the residual instigation to aggression. Many investigators have done so by giving both groups a chance to express aggression on the assumption that the group with more residual instigation will behave more aggressively. A favorite technique is to ask all the subjects to fill out a bogus questionnaire ostensibly evaluating the experiment and the experimenter. If a subject indicates that he did not enjoy the experiment, this is regarded as an aggressive response and as an indication of greater instigation. Another strategy has been to measure residual instigation to aggression by allowing the subjects to pull a plunger or press a lever as part of some other task. Here, the assumption is that vigorous pulling of the plunger indicates more instigation to aggression.

There are two drawbacks to this sort of approach. The first is that such behavior as pressing a lever or writing a negative evaluation does not directly injure anyone and therefore may not have anything to do with aggression (Gentry, 1967). In any case, such responses are certainly far removed from violence.

The second is that, even if the dependent variables do constitute overaggressive responses, such behavior is a function not only of instigation to aggression, but also of inhibitions and stimulus factors. Following the experimental "catharsis," overt aggression may decrease, not because instigation has decreased, but because inhibitions have increased. For example, some theorists have suggested that a group that has engaged in aggressive behavior may be less aggressive subsequently simply because this behavior has aroused their guilt feelings (Berkowitz, 1958).

Another variable that complicates the experimental literature is the nature of the interpolated "cathartic" behavior. As noted above, the typical paradigm is for students to be angered, following which some have a chance to engage in aggressive behavior while others do not. The nature of this intervening aggressive behavior varies widely from study to study. One difference is the target of the aggressive behavior. Another is whether the aggression is verbal, physical, or symbolic. Thus, in some experiments a child is allowed to break balloons or strike a Bobo doll. In others, a person has a

chance to complain about the experimenter who originally angered him. In still others, the subject may deliver a painful electric shock to some unfortunate fellow subject. In short, a variety of operational definitions of catharsis have been used, and it would be surprising if this did not make a difference in the results. The data show also that such factors as the relative status of the victim and the subject, whether there is any manifestation of pain by the victim, and the physical remoteness of the two can influence what happens.

What else might influence the results of such studies? Another variable is the original instigation. If after all these experimental procedures—arousal, interpolated aggressive activity, and subsequent test for instigation to aggression—the groups do not differ on the dependent variable, it will usually be taken as evidence that catharsis was ineffective in reducing instigation. However, it could also mean that the initial manipulations designed to anger and arouse the subjects at the beginning of the experiments were ineffective. If neither group was effectively angered in the beginning, there is absolutely no reason why they should differ on instigation to aggression at the end of the experiment.

In an effort to demonstrate that the anger-inducing conditions were indeed effective, some investigators have inserted a test of aggression immediately after the initial arousal procedures. Unfortunately, such a test in itself may be cathartic; if so, the two groups would then go into the experimental conditions in a nonaroused state.

The complexities of doing catharsis research are thus quite obvious. In an effort to eliminate these various sources of possible confounding, experimenters have increased the complexity of their designs and the number of experimental and control groups which are used. However, as the complexity of the research designs increases, the interpretability of the results often decreases. Moreover, as more artificial manipulations are inserted, the possibility of the subjects seeing through the experiment and tailoring their behavior accordingly increases. Most central to our present concern, increased complexity also means decreased generality, so that the more artificial the laboratory design, the less relevant it becomes for the problem of violence.

One body of research that has avoided some of the problems found in much catharsis research is the series of studies coming from the laboratory of J. E. Hokanson (Hokanson, 1961a, 1961b; Hokanson and Burgess, 1962a, 1962b; Hokanson, Burgess, and Cohen, 1963; Hokanson and Gordon, 1958; Hokanson and Shetler, 1961; Hokanson, Willers and Koropsak, in press; Willers and Hokanson, in press). Hokanson's work does have the drawback of using an artificial laboratory-based task so it is not directly relevant to violence. However, Hokanson has managed to cut through some of the problems inherent in measuring the effects of catharsis by using as his dependent variable the individual's second-by-second variations in autonomic signs of arousal, such as metabolic blood pressure, as he engages in various aggressive and nonaggressive acts. While it would be grossly overstating matters to assert that autonomic activity is a direct measure of instigation to aggression, there is considerable evidence suggesting that it does vary as a function of aggressive instigation. In interpreting his data, therefore, Hokanson does not have to worry about whether they reflect changes in instigation or changes in inhibition.

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The data collected in Hokanson's laboratory strongly suggest that the expression of aggression against a frustrator or attacker can reduce instigation to aggression, but that this is not a necessary, inevitable, or innate characteristic of the organism. In Hokanson's typical experimental setup, the subject is administered a painful electric shock that raises his blood pressure. It is assumed this blood pressure rise reflects an increase in instigation to aggression. The subjects are then offered an opportunity to administer a shock in return to the person who shocked them; on the other hand, they may, if they choose, make a friendly response. It would be expected on the basis of catharsis theory that when the subject counteraggresses, his instigation to aggression would decrease, and this would be reflected by an abrupt decrease in blood pressure. Among men, this is exactly what happens, but this is not the case among women. Hokanson has theorized that this sex difference comes about because men in our culture have learned that counteraggression is the most effective way of reducing threats, so counteraggression reduces their tension level. Women, on the other hand, have learned the opposite pattern, so they attempt to disarm an antagonist through friendliness. If threat reduction is indeed the primary factor influencing tension level, Hokanson reasoned, then by changing the reward contingencies it should be possible to change the autonomic responses. By rewarding a friendly response and punishing aggressive responses, Hokanson has found that man can learn not only to administer friendly responses when attacked, but also experience the same tension reduction they formerly experienced when they counteraggressed. The reverse pattern has been found for women. If we accept the premise that systolic blood-pressure changes reflect changes in instigation to aggression, Hokanson's data suggest that "catharsis" can reduce instigation to aggression, but that this is a learned response which depends on the reinforcement contingencies in the person's cultural environment. This stance is in sharp contrast to the position of theorists who state that only counteraggression can reduce instigation.

Summarizing this rather lengthy discussion of catharsis, we have seen that there is considerable controversy over the effectiveness of counteraggression in lowering instigation to aggression. The issue has been clouded in part by the association of the catharsis hypothesis with a rather unwieldy hydraulic model. Moreover, experimental research on the hypothesis has been hindered by problems of operationally defining the independent and dependent variables as well as the interpolated aggressive tasks.

It is the present writer's conclusion that counteraggression undoubtedly can reduce instigation to aggression. However this is not inevitable, nor is counteraggression necessarily the most effective way of reducing instigation. Over a long period of time, the problem is complicated by the fact that: (a) subsequent stimuli, or the individual's own reminiscences, can rearouse the instigation despite catharsis; and (b) while the catharsis may lower instigation, it may also lower inhibitions even more, so that the individual will have an even greater propensity for aggressive behavior after the catharsis than he did prior to it.

Displaced aggression.—In the preceding section, we explored the hypothesis that instigation to aggression can be reduced through direct overt aggression leveled at the original instigator or frustrator. In the present

section, we shall deal with the notion that aggressive behavior directed toward other targets ($T \cdot 2, 3 \dots N$) may also reduce aggressive instigation.

In a given situation, the inhibitions attached to a particular act of violence or aggression will vary as a function of a target toward whom that act is addressed. For example, a military officer might have relatively few inhibitions against spanking a disobedient child. It is likely, however, he would have more inhibitions against spanking a disobedient wife and considerably more against spanking a disobedient enlisted man. Instigation also may vary as a function of the target. Instigation provoked by one target may generalize to other targets through response generalization mediated by psychological similarity (Miller, 1948). We alluded to this earlier when we noted that a policeman angered by a demonstrator might take out some of his resentment on his wife.

If inhibitions exceed instigation so that it is not possible to make a particular aggressive response toward the original target, it may therefore be possible to make that aggressive response toward some other target for whom fewer inhibitions are felt. This phenomenon of expressing aggression against a substitute target is called "displacement."

A particular type of displacement is taking out one's resentments on the member of some minority group, or "scapegoating." The attraction of scapegoating is not only the fact that the minority group member may lack adequate means of retaliation so that he is a "safe" target, but also the fact that, within some subcultures, the aggressor will be awarded prestige and status by his peers in addition to whatever intrinsic satisfactions he derives from the aggression. Scapegoating was originally used by some to account for all racial prejudice but more recent thinking has changed this formulation. Although it may account for some racial prejudice, and for some acts of violence between the races, most such behavior represents learned attitudes that are not dependent on displaced aggression (Buss, 1961). McNeil has stated:

A quite commonplace method of dealing with hostile feelings which cannot be expressed toward the source of the frustration is through the mechanism of displacement. Since a child is forbidden to express his anger toward his mother, he can easily learn to release his feelings by changing the object toward which they are directed. If the prohibition against the expression of aggression is a stringent one, then he must find a substitute object that is only remotely related to the original one. Perhaps his rage can find an outlet only through kicking an inanimate object or tearing the arms off a favorite doll. If all aggressive actions are forbidden, the child may be limited to a blood curdling fantasy life in which the phantasms (which may resemble the mother in certain ways) meet a series of imaginative, but horrible fates. The most satisfying form of expression would be overt aggression directed immediately toward the mother; as substitute objects become less and less similar, psychologically, to the original object, the amount of gratification decreases accordingly (1959, p. 212).

According to McNeil, the object of displacement is chosen so that it resembles the original target as closely as possible. This may be a physical

resemblance but it is more likely to be symbolic. Thus, resentment toward the mother would be more likely to be displaced onto another female authority figure such as a teacher, rather than onto a sibling. In scapegoating, the target chosen is typically a member of some group which the individual has already learned to dislike (Buss, 1961).

Pure displacement is probably relatively rare. Pure displacement is an aggressive act motivated solely by instigation induced by someone other than the eventual victim. One such case the writer examined involved a white boy who had been beaten up by several Negro boys one evening. He returned home, secured a rifle, and with his friends drove through the local Negro ghetto searching for his attackers. Unable to find them, he shot instead the first Negro he saw, a young woman who did not resemble his assailants in any respect save for her skin color.

This is relatively unusual, however. Given an inhibited aggressive response, it is more common for the instigation to aggression to combine with additional instigation induced by the new target before it is expressed. Typically, the victim of the displaced aggression has done something in his own right to provoke aggression, but the violence of the aggressor's response is disproportionate to that provocation because of the residual instigation resulting from the earlier inhibited aggressive response (Berkowitz, 1962; Buss, 1961).

Thus far, displacement has been discussed as a negative response that can lead to violence. However, some regard it more positively as a way in which instigation to aggression can be redirected or channeled into relatively harmless patterns. In a nursery school, an angered child may be encouraged to "take it out" on a Bobo doll, just as his high-school-age sibling might be encouraged to channel his aggressive drives into contact sports. On the international scene, displacement is commonplace. Hitler, for example, attempted to displace aggression induced by domestic economic deprivation away from the government and toward the Jews. In World War II, many of the British people displaced the aggression induced by German bombs onto their own government, which was a more accessible target than the Germans, a response not too dissimilar to the reaction of many Americans to the North Vietnamese Tet offensive.

While we have treated displacement as if it were directed only against others, suicide also can be viewed as displacement according to some theorists. (The psychoanalytic school which holds that the self is the original object of the death instincts would be of the opinion that aggression toward others represents displacement outward. In either case, the same basic mechanism of a redirection of target is operating.)

Response substitution.—Another way to cope with the situation of having an aggressive response toward a particular target blocked by inhibition is to change the response rather than the target. Returning to our example of the military officer confronted with the disobedient soldier, it is quite likely, as we have noted, that his inhibitions would prevent him from spanking the soldier as he would an unruly child. However, his inhibitions would not prevent him from making some other aggressive response, such as having the soldier confined to the guardhouse or instituting a court martial. Sometimes verbal aggression can be used in place of physical aggression, or a hostile letter in place of direct verbal aggression. A particular type of response substitution

in which aggressive instigation is redirected into very constructive paths is called "sublimation." If Jack the Ripper had sublimated his homicidal tendencies, he might have become a gifted surgeon specializing in tracheotomies. Some theorists, such as Tinbergen (1968), view sublimation as the only possible ultimate solution of human violence.

In some situations, the algebra of aggression may be such that both response substitution and displacement work together, so that a different aggressive response is directed at some other target. The classic and often repeated example of this would be the man who wants to punch his boss in the nose but who instead contents himself with scolding his wife.

By definition, response substitution and displacement take place only when inhibitions have blocked the expression of some aggressive response. As such, some additional instigation is likely to have resulted from the frustration induced by the original blocking. Moreover, by implication the substitute responses or targets are less satisfactory than the original. Therefore, we can infer that these mechanisms are generally less effective in reducing instigation to aggression, and that the individual who resorts to them probably has some residual instigation. If it does not decay with time or get reduced by some other means, this residual instigation might summate with other instigation to make the individual somewhat readier to respond aggressively than he would have been otherwise. This is a difficult notion to test, however, because it is based on sequences of events taking place over time, most of which relate to unobservable hypothetical constructs.

Vicarious Expression of Aggressive Instigation

In addition to reducing instigation to aggression through a direct attack on the original target, by an attack on a substitute target, or by a substitute response toward the original or other targets, it has been suggested that aggressive instigation can also be reduced by watching someone else perform an aggressive act. The small boy beaten up by the neighborhood bully would, according to this analysis, have his anger reduced by watching his big brother thrash the bully.

Generally speaking, two types of vicarious aggression have been described. The first is the type noted above in which the angered person watches someone else attack his tormentor. The second type is watching aggressive behavior that is not specifically directed against the frustrating agent. According to this analysis, the boy who was beaten up by the neighborhood bully might have at least some of his instigation reduced if he went to the movies and watched cowboys and Indians shoot each other. It is on the basis of this latter theory that media representatives have often justified violence in films, television, and the press. According to Berkowitz:

Representations of violence are often defended, by people in the industry that sell them and also by many consumers, on the grounds that they serve a cathartic purpose. The theory, loosely derived from Aristotle's view of the function of tragedy, contends that violence which is indulged in vicariously drains a reservoir of accumulated hostility and releases tensions that might otherwise explode into actual violent behavior (1968, p. 20).

As might be expected from Berkowitz's comments, those who object to the hydraulic model of personality are also skeptical about vicarious reduction of instigation to aggression. Even those who do not object to a hydraulic model still question whether or not vicarious participation in aggressive behavior is effective in draining instigation to aggression.

A number of experiments have been performed in an effort to shed light on these issues. The results are equivocal. Relatively few studies have investigated the first type of vicarious catharsis in which the aroused subject observes direct attacks against the person who angered him. In two such studies, the angered person was permitted to listen to a fellow subject verbally abuse the frustrator (deCharms and Wilkins, 1963; Wheeler and Caggiula, 1966). The effect of this was to increase the frustrated subjects' aggressiveness rather than to decrease it. Wheeler and Caggiula (1966) attributed this increase to "contagion," suggesting that observation of the confederate's aggression released the subject from any inhibitions against the expression of aggression he might have had. On the other hand, Rosenbaum and deCharms (1960) found both direct and vicarious expression of aggression significantly *reduced* subsequent aggression for subjects low in self-esteem as would be expected from the catharsis hypothesis. A study by Willers and Hokanson (in press) investigated changes in blood pressure readings following direct and vicarious aggression. In this study, it was found that the vicarious aggression reduced blood pressure, which may be related to instigation to aggression, as effectively as did direct aggression. Thus, the evidence on the effects of vicarious aggression against the instigator is mixed. It may "drain off" instigation but it may lower inhibitions as well.

Another technique has been to arouse subjects and allow one group to observe aggressive behavior or watch a violent film while the other group observes nonaggressive films or behavior. In this situation, the observed aggression is not directed at the original frustrator. A variety of results has been reported. Most investigators report that viewing the filmed aggression decreases subsequent aggression, but others have reported significant increases. A number of subtle differences in experimental techniques have been found to influence the results. Among them are the way in which instigation to aggression is measured in the particular experiment, the age of the subjects, the resemblance of the victim of the vicarious aggression to the frustrator or to the potential victim of the subject's aggression, whether the filmed aggressor is punished for his act, whether the filmed aggression is viewed before or after the subject has been angered, whether the subject identifies with the aggressor or the victim, the realism of the film, whether or not the nonaggressive film is as exciting as the violent one, and the amount of justification that is presented for the filmed violence (Albert, 1957; Bandura, Ross, and Ross, 1963; Berkowitz, 1964; Berkowitz and Geen, 1966; Berkowitz and Rawlings, 1963; Eron, 1963; Feshbach, 1961; Maccoby and Wilson, 1957; Walters and Thomas, 1963).

In attempting to apply these results to the problem of the effects of mass media on violence, it must be remembered not only that the evidence is contradictory and that it shows that many subtle factors can influence the findings, but also that all the experiments to date have investigated some mild form of aggression condoned by the experimenter. In no case has the experimenter actually allowed his subjects to engage in violence. Therefore,

when some psychologists conclude from the results of these studies that "...witnessed violence can stimulate actual violence..." they are overstating the case. It may be that witnessed violence can stimulate actual violence, but the data only show that *in some studies* witnessed violence is associated with mild aggression.

Thus the effects of vicarious participation in aggression are uncertain, as are the effects of the other forms of aggressive expression we have surveyed. Kaufmann (1965, p. 359) has summarized the contradictory nature of the literature and also the variety of interpretations of any given finding regarding instigation reduction as follows:

The evidence is truly conflicting. Aggression enhances or reduces subsequent aggression; a vicar's aggression may serve either as a substitute (Rosenbaum and deCharms, 1960), or as a model (deCharms and Wilkins, 1963) for the subsequent aggression. However the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of catharsis phenomena do not end here. After all the cathartic effect may be due to any of the following reasons: (a) the subject has "let off steam" (an undifferentiated autonomic arousal model), (b) the subject has aggressed against someone or other (a hydraulic aggression model), (c) the subject has successfully aggressed against an indeterminant target (an expressive model), (d) the subject has successfully aggressed against the instigator (a self-esteem restoration or threat removal model), (e) the subject has seen the frustrator punished, even by someone else, and cognitive expectations regarding justice have been confirmed (a dissonance reduction model), (f) the subject has accumulated reactive inhibition or fatigue (a behavioral oscillation model), (g) the subject has developed guilt or aggression anxieties subsequent to aggression (an aggression-anxiety-with-delay model), (h) the subject perceives that a given amount of aggression is appropriate under the circumstances (a social reality model). Where a cathartic effect is ostensibly absent, it may be the case that his aggressive habits have become stronger, that he perceives greater social desirability or tolerance for aggression, or that he perceives aggression to be the most effective way to deal with the situation, etc. (1965, p. 359).

Summing up the evidence regarding vicarious release of aggressive instigation, it must be concluded that those who would advocate vicarious participation in violence and aggression as an antidote for aggressive behavior have a weak case on which to base their argument. Although some experiments have obtained data consistent with the hypothesis that vicarious aggression reduces instigation to aggression, it appears that many subtle factors operate to determine whether or not this takes place. There is also a considerable body of evidence, as we shall see, that suggests that although instigation may be lowered, inhibitions may also be lowered so that the net effect might be an increased tendency toward aggressive behavior. It is more than likely that individual differences play a major role and that the vicarious stimulus which "turns on" one person may "turn off" another.

The same sorts of comments can be applied to the other forms of aggression expression that we have reviewed. Direct or displaced aggressive

behavior probably lowers instigation to aggression. However, instigation can be readily rearoused. Moreover, the satisfaction of aggressive instigation by expression of aggression would reinforce this behavior, thus strengthening aggressive habits and lowering inhibitions.

This discussion of the reduction of instigation to aggression highlights the importance of the rather abstract theoretical arguments about the origin of instigation. If Lorenz is correct that instigation is generated within the person and that it must be released through some sort of aggressive behavior, then obviously some mechanisms must be built into society whereby this instigation can be released with a minimum of damage. On the other hand, if instigation is wholly or primarily induced by the environment, such instigation-reducing social mechanisms are not as necessary if ways can be found to minimize or eliminate the causes of aggressive instigation.

Cognitive Redefinition of the Situation

In addition to reducing aggressive instigation through some form of expression or through satisfaction of whatever need is frustrated, aggressive instigation may also be reduced through a cognitive redefinition of the original situation. For example, a man who is jostled roughly while waiting for a bus may be aroused and turn around angrily only to have his anger disappear when he notices that the man who bumped into him is blind. He has cognitively redefined the situation from a rude attack to an unavoidable accident. Similarly, an apology, a "soft word," or a joke can dissipate aggressive tension. Singer (1968) for example has found that humor helps to relieve instigation to aggression. As might be expected, hostile humor is particularly effective since it is an expressive mechanism. However, even nonhostile humor where a person realizes the ridiculousness of a frustrating situation and is able to laugh about it can serve as an instigation-reducing device. Similarly it is possible for instigation to be reduced through persuasion. Explanations for the original frustration may help in this regard, as might appeals for charity and forbearance in which the angered party is asked to put himself in the other person's role.

Reduction of Instigation by Physiological Means

On quite a different level, it should be noted that it has been proposed that physiological procedures can also lower instigation to aggression. Animal husbandrymen have long known that reducing androgen levels in the bull through castration produces a much more manageable and docile animal. Research on the brain has identified certain "rage" centers that can be influenced. According to Moyer:

The many details of the neuro-endocrine interactions in the various kinds of aggression need to be worked out, but the general pattern appears to be emerging rather clearly. Certain hostility circuits appear to be sensitized by particular hormone balances and when these circuits are sensitized, a variety of environmental conditions will evoke hostile feelings and hostile behavior. These environmental situations may involve frustration, stress in many forms, pain, or if these circuits are

highly sensitized, simply the presence of an attackable entity. What types of entity will be attacked will depend in part on the reinforcement history of the organism and in part in the particular aggressive circuit which is sensitized.

Brain surgery on animals and man aimed at interrupting "aggressive circuits" has led to increased docility; however while men become less violent they also become less able to lead useful lives as a consequence. Electrical stimulation of suppression areas and chemotherapy are other physiological techniques of influencing aggressive behavior which are now being explored (1968, p. 6).

INHIBITION OF AGGRESSION (I)

The major factor determining whether aggressive instigation is acted upon is the strength of internal inhibitions against overt aggression. Such inhibitions are separate and distinct from the factors that diminish aggressive instigation. Internal inhibitions block the aggressive goal response without reducing the level of instigation. Indeed, the frustration induced by this blocking may actually increase aggressive drive strength.

In our discussion of aggressive instigation, we noted that some aggressive instigation is general in the sense that it can be directed toward a wide number of potential targets, while some is quite specific to a given target. This is also true of inhibitions. Violence is generally taboo in our society and most individuals have some general inhibitions against any form of violence against any target. Among those who have extraordinarily high general inhibitions against any form of aggressive behavior are pacifists and the "chronically overcontrolled" (Megargee, 1966).

In addition to such generalized inhibitions, most people also have some focal inhibitions against certain particular forms of aggression, such as homicide, no matter who the target is, as well as some inhibitions against any form of aggression toward certain targets. Finally there are inhibitions regarding certain particular acts directed at certain targets. These inhibitions naturally vary in intensity, and the total strength of inhibition for any given aggressive act toward a particular target is the sum of all these forms of inhibition.

A major factor influencing the arousal of inhibitions against a given act is the cognitive definition of the situation. Before inhibitions against aggressive behavior can be aroused, the individual has to perceive at some level that the behavior in question is aggressive. A person who would never endure verbal aggression might readily engage in very extreme forms of "constructive criticism."

Even when behavior is clearly an act of angry aggression, there are often ground rules as to the form the aggressive response may take and the circumstances under which it may be expressed. In the classic Western melodrama, it is permissible to shoot a hated enemy, provided that it is done from the front and that he is given a chance to defend himself and make one final statement before the commercial. In Mexican-American male peer groups, men can make disparaging remarks about each other's wisdom, potency, and prowess that would be mortal insults if uttered in the presence

of one of the victim's relatives (Rosenquist and Megargee, 1969). Instrumental aggression is generally considered less odious than angry aggression, so that killing someone in defense of home or country or because it is one's job, is more acceptable than killing someone because one wants to kill him. It is permissible to fire someone for the "good of the company" but not because we don't like him. The same sorts of distinctions apply to spanking a child or, to bring the example closer to home, administering shock to a subject in the laboratory.

Thus inhibitions against the overt expression of aggression are extremely important, not only in determining whether or not an aggressive act can take place, but also in shaping the nature and direction of those aggressive acts that do take place. In the present section, we shall examine the factors that have been suggested as contributing to and detracting from inhibitions against aggression.

Theories of the Causes of Inhibitions of Aggression

Theories of Innate Inhibitions

In the previous section, we saw that some theorists proposed that instigation to aggression may be an innate human characteristic. In the present section, we will explore the notion that differences in inhibitions may also have a genetic basis. As might be expected, this position is advocated primarily by ethologists. However, we shall also evaluate the notion held by some laymen that there may be innate racial differences in aggressive impulse control, as well as Eysenck's (1960) theory that hereditary differences in the ability to profit from experience might account for antisocial behavior.

Ethological contentions.—As was the case with instigation to aggression, ethologists have made observations on apparently inhibitory behavior in a number of species. On the basis of these observations, they formulated theories as to how man's inhibitory mechanisms might have evolved:

In the preceding section, we noted that observations of lower species have shown that animals engage in intraspecific aggression primarily to establish dominance, defend their territories against intrusions or overcrowding, or to win a desirable sexual partner. Morris (1967) has pointed out some interesting aspects of the form which these aggressive responses take:

Typically the animal that is aroused to fight does not go straight into an all-out attack. It begins by threatening to attack. Its inner conflict suspends it, tensed for combat, but not ready to begin it. If, in this state, it presents a sufficiently intimidating spectacle for its opponent, and the latter slinks away, then obviously this is preferable. The victory can be won without the shedding of blood. The species is able to settle its disputes without undue damage to its members and obviously benefits tremendously in the process.

Throughout the higher forms of animal life there has been a strong trend in this direction—the direction of ritualized combat. Threat and counter-threat has largely replaced actual physical combat.

Full-blooded fighting does, of course, still take place from time to time, but only as a last resort, when aggressive signaling and counter-signaling have failed to settle a dispute (Morris, 1967, p. 150).

Sometimes threat is ineffective and actual combat ensues. "Even so," writes Morris, "it is extremely rare for one contestant to kill the other. Species that have evolved special killing techniques for dealing with their prey seldom employ these when fighting their own kind" (Morris, 1966, p. 156). When one animal is vanquished it typically leaves the field of combat. If escape is impossible it will engage in behavior which, according to Morris, stimulates nonaggressive responses in its opponent. Typical signals include adopting a juvenile food-begging posture, adopting the female sexual posture, or starting to groom the other animal. When the vanquished animal engages in these acts, the victor typically breaks off the attack rather than pressing on to the death. Ethologists have interpreted these observations as indicating that most creatures have innate inhibitory mechanisms.

What then of man? Why is it that among humans violence to the point of death appears so much more frequently? According to Lorenz (1966), man's homicidal proclivities are a result of the fact that his genetic evolution has not yet caught up with his technological evolution. He argues that animals that have the physical capability of easily killing other members of their own species have inhibitions against such intraspecies aggression bred into them:

... I have spoken of the inhibitions controlling aggression in various social animals, preventing it from injuring or killing fellow members of the species. As I explained, these inhibitions are most important and consequently most highly differentiated in those animals which are capable of killing living creatures of about their own size. A raven can pick out the eye of another with one thrust of its beak, a wolf can rip the jugular vein of another with a single bite. There would be no more ravens and no more wolves if reliable inhibitions did not prevent such actions. Neither a dove nor hare or even a chimpanzee is able to kill its own kind with a single peck or bite . . . Since there rarely is, in nature, the possibility of such an animal seriously injuring one of its own kind, there is no selection pressure at work here to breed in killing inhibitions (Lorenz, 1966, p. 232).

Lorenz points out that man began as a relatively harmless creature like the dove and the chimpanzee. Because he was unable to kill other animals his own size easily, he did not evolve the same sorts of inhibitions against intraspecies violence that such animals as tigers or wolves developed. However, with the discovery of weapons and with the verbal ability that enabled man to pass this lethal knowledge on from one generation to the other, *homo sapiens* rapidly became the most deadly of all creatures. The rapidity of this technological development, according to Lorenz, outstripped the much slower process of genetic evolution so that man's inhibitions against intraspecific aggression have not as yet caught up with his ability to kill.

Lorenz (1966), as well as Tinbergen (1968), have also pointed out that, as human weaponry has improved, the distance between the aggressor and his

victim has been steadily increasing. The spear allowed one to kill from a distance of several feet, the bow from a distance of several dozen yards, the gun from a range of hundreds, and later thousands, of yards, while the airplane and guided missile have increased the distance between the aggressor and his victim to leagues. While man might well respond to gestures of conciliation as the lower animals do, this increase in the distance from which he can kill has reduced the amount of communication possible between the aggressor and his victim. According to Tinbergen:

Another cultural excess is our ability to make and use killing tools, especially long-range weapons. These make killing easy, not only because a spear or a club inflicts, with the same effort, so much more damage than a fist, but also, and mainly, because the use of long-range weapons prevents the victim from reaching his attacker with his appeasement, reassurance, and distress signals. Very few aircrews who are willing, indeed eager, to drop their bombs "on target" would be willing to strangle, stab, or burn children (or for that matter, adults) with their own hands; they would stop short of killing, in response to the appeasement and distress signals of their opponents (1968, p. 1415).

Thus, according to these ethological theorists, inhibitions against violence are genetically based and, like all genetic characteristics, subject to the laws of evolution. Because man in the distant past had no particular need for inhibitions against homicidal behavior, there was no selective pressure for these inhibitions to evolve. Man's present level of violence can be attributed in large measure to the fact that evolution has not yet caught up with technology; hence man's innate inhibitions are inadequate to prevent wars and other violence.

What are the social implications of this point of view? Lorenz has concluded, and Tinbergen agrees, that it is unlikely that education can eliminate the internal urge to fight. Given biologically based instigation to aggression and innately inadequate inhibitions, we are left with man as an aggressive animal. The major hope for the species held out by Lorenz and Tinbergen is that the aggressive behavior can somehow be channeled into acceptable outlets. According to Lorenz (1966, p. 244), "... there is, in the modern community, no legitimate outlet for aggressive behavior." One possible outlet that Lorenz endorses is ritualized combat in the form of sports. In addition to improving physical fitness, "... the main function of sport today lies in the cathartic discharge of aggressive urge ..." (Lorenz, 1966, p. 271). Tinbergen demurs somewhat:

I would not like to claim, as Lorenz does, that redirected attack exhausts the aggressive urge. We know from soccer matches and from animal work how aggressive behavior has two simultaneous, but opposite, effects: a waning effect, and one of self-inflammation, of mass hysteria, such as recently seen in Cairo (Tinbergen, 1968, p. 1418).

While Tinbergen agrees with Lorenz that the aggressive urges must be redirected, he suggests sublimation, pointing to how the Dutch have

successfully directed their aggressive energies against the sea. Tinbergen feels that the best long- and short-range solution is for man to sublimate his aggressive energies into scientific research. Not only may such research solve the problems of population density and human behavior, but also the energy invested may drain off the instigation to aggression. Although he realizes that not everyone can do research, he suggests that increased communication between scientists and the public can make everyone feel that they have a share in this effort.

As we have seen, the whole catharsis notion, as well as an emphasis on innate mechanisms, is repugnant to many behavioral scientists. Not only do they disagree with the position that education or environmental changes are ineffective in inducing inhibitions against aggression, but they take particular umbrage at the suggestion that mild or ritualized aggression might alleviate violence. On the contrary they tend to feel that such behavior lowers inhibitions and thereby fosters violence. (See Berkowitz, 1967.)

In the section on instigation to aggression, we discussed some of the drawbacks of the ethological approach. They included the problems of generalizing from subhuman to human behavior patterns; the fact that anthropological and ethnological literature is often overlooked; the frequent failure to discuss comparative animal behavior which might not support the central thesis; and finally, the unavoidable problems of demonstrating that behavior patterns have a genetic as opposed to an environmental base. These same difficulties and criticisms also apply to the ethological work on inhibition.

Racial differences.—Studies of the incidence of violence in the United States have consistently shown higher rates of aggravated assault, homicide, and similar offenses among Negroes (Lalli and Turner, 1968; Pokorny, 1965; Wolfgang, 1958). While no serious scholar of human behavior, and particularly of human genetics, has advanced such a suggestion, laymen who become acquainted with these data sometimes wonder whether this might not indicate that there is some genetically based deficiency in inhibitions among members of the so-called Negro race. There is absolutely no evidence for this notion. In the first place the "American Negro" or "Afro-American" is hardly a pure genetic type. Many individuals identified as Negroes in the United States have more European than African ancestors. By the same token, many "white" Americans, particularly those whose families came to the United States over a century ago, have some African ancestors. Consequently, no respectable geneticist would feel comfortable inferring hereditary causation of racial differences in aggressive behavior given the mixture of the U.S. gene pool.

Another confounding variable that scarcely needs to be pointed out is the fact that the American Negro is disproportionately represented in the lower class and has suffered frustrating privations in education, housing, and equal opportunities for employment. Such environmental variables would, in and of themselves, suggest that a higher rate of violence might be expected.

The most significant evidence, however, comes from a crosscultural study by Bohannon (1960). Bohannon and his associates conducted a far-reaching study of homicide and suicide in a number of African tribes. If the disproportionate rate of violence among American Negroes was the result of "black" genotypes, then it would be expected that even more violence would

be found among the black tribes of central Africa. This does not prove to be the case. The homicide rates found in African tribes were only a small fraction of those reported by Wolfgang (1958) for American Negroes in Philadelphia. Indeed, the African homicide rates were not only lower than those for American Negroes, but also lower than those for the general American population. Bohannon concluded:

If it needed stressing, here is overwhelming evidence that it is cultural and not biological factors which make for a high homicide rate among American Negroes (1960, p. 237).

Differences in conditionability as a cause of antisocial behavior.—Since the origins of criminology, many theories of hereditary criminal types have been advanced (Rosenquist and Megargee, 1969; Vold, 1958). Most of these, such as the Lombrosian hypothesis that the criminal is an atavistic throwback to a more primitive physiological type, have been thoroughly discredited on the basis of many empirical studies over the years.

Eysenck (1960) recently proposed a genetically based theory of psychopathy that appears somewhat more plausible than its predecessors. Because the psychopath is a person whose inadequate inhibitions make him particularly prone to violence, we shall examine Eysenck's hypothesis. Eysenck suggested that it is not violent or nonviolent behavior patterns that are genetically transmitted from generation to generation, but instead one's capacity to learn from aversive stimulation. If we assume that inhibitions are learned through punishments, as many theorists suggest, then innate individual differences in the capacity to learn from such experiences would result in individual differences in inhibitions. According to Eysenck (1960, p. 6), "People and animals differ in the speed and firmness with which conditioned responses are built up." Individuals who are born with a high level of autonomic nervous system reactivity will quickly learn anxieties and fear reactions that will inhibit them from engaging in forbidden or antisocial behavior. In extreme cases, this can result in neuroses. By the same token, individuals who are below average in their response to aversive stimulation will be slow to build up conditioned avoidance responses and, consequently, they will be deficient in the speed with which they learn to conform to social controls. At the extreme low end of the scale, we would find those who appear unable to profit from punishment and who are consequently regarded as psychopaths.

Eysenck takes great pains to point out that he is not suggesting that the behavior is inherited directly, but only that differences in individual reactivity to various sorts of rewards and punishments are inherited. The final behavior sequences are the result not only of the innate predispositions, but also of the environmental experiences that the child undergoes.

Eysenck has tested his theory in the laboratory by comparing psychopaths and nonpsychopaths in their ability to acquire habits through Pavlovian conditioning. He concluded:

I have shown how psychopathic reactions originate because of the inability of the psychopath, due to his low level of conditionability, to

acquire the proper socialized responses. But this failure is not absolute; he conditions much less quickly and strongly than others, but he does condition (1960, p. 8).

According to this viewpoint, the prognosis for the psychopath is good. While it may take him much longer than most to acquire normal socialization, he is still able to learn to conform his behavior to the dictates of society.

As yet, relatively little research has been done to test this hypothesis. Such research would be difficult to do. One approach would be to test the conditionability of a large sample of infants and then follow their longitudinal development to determine if those whose rate of conditionability was low indeed developed a higher amount of antisocial behavior. However, it would be necessary to somehow insure that the reinforcement schedules imposed on the high and low conditionability children were equivalent.

Even if future research should establish that Eysenck's suggestion is correct and that innate differences in the capacity to develop inhibitions are a factor in psychopathy, this would not of course explain the entire problem of violence. As we saw under "Typologies of Violence," the so-called psychopathic or undercontrolled violent person is but one type found among the ranks of assaultive criminals. Not only do we have to reckon with "normal" and "subcultural" assaultive types, but we also have to consider the Overcontrolled Assaultive type (Megargee, 1966) whose problem, we might infer from Eysenck's theory, is excessive, rather than inadequate conditionability.

Environmental Theories of the Development of Inhibitions

The primary goal of most parents is to socialize their children . . . to teach them to do the things that the parents approve of and to refrain from doing those of which they disapprove. Because the parents' values are generally in harmony with those of society as a whole, this has the effect of transmitting the cultural values to the child. During infancy, the immediate family constitutes the child's entire world, so at this stage the familial patterns, interacting with the child's innate abilities is the primary determinant of behavior. Later, as the child ventures forth into the neighborhood, the school, and the larger society, he is influenced by a wider variety of people: playmates, schoolmates, teachers, coaches, clergymen, professors, employers, Scout leaders—even people whom he encounters only through books or television. Through the processes of learning and identification, the child often incorporates the values of some of these individuals into his own value system while he rejects the values of others. These incorporated values, consisting of "thou shalt's," guiding what he should do, and "thou shalt not's," telling him what he must not do, are some of the primary factors that regulate behavior.

The value system acts in such a way as to reward "good" behavior and to punish or induce guilt over "bad" behavior. If violence is regarded as "bad," then both aspects of the value system come into play in attempting to inhibit violence. Not only will the individual feel guilty, depressed, or anxious if he engages in violence, but he will also feel proud if he refrains from it. This pride in remaining nonviolent was often stressed by the followers of the late

Martin Luther King, Jr., in training civil rights workers. Some regard these internal injunctions as a loose system of specific habits that have been conditioned over the years; others refer to them as the individual's conscience, while psychoanalysts prefer to label them the "superego."

As we have seen, however, instigation to aggression is a powerful drive. The inhibition of this drive can come about only after an internal conflict that is often quite stressful; if the inhibitory mechanisms succeed in preventing the overt expression of the violent impulse, the individual is likely to pay a price in increased tension and frustration. If there is satisfaction to be derived from the expression of aggressive impulses and stress associated with their inhibitions, how does the child come to learn such inhibitions? It is not enough to point out that most of the forces in society—family, school, church, and the like—are allied in their stand that violence should be suppressed. Even for those children for whom this is the case (and there are cultures and subcultures where violence is not condemned), simply stating that society disapproves of violence does not explain why the child should shape his behavior to conform to these externally imposed dictates or why he should come to internalize them and adopt them for his own.

To explain this phenomenon, a number of theories and hypotheses have been offered. Many of them have generated considerable empirical evidence. Thus far, the data which have accumulated do not permit us to make a definite choice and label one position as "truth" and the others as "falsehood."

Most theories of environmentally acquired inhibitions against the expression of aggressive behavior rely on the principles of learning theory, either implicitly or explicitly. This is true even of the psychoanalytic approach. Although a review of the major theories of learning is far beyond the scope of the present paper, most learning theorists agree that behavior that successfully meets an individual's needs will be repeated and become habitual; unsuccessfully behavior will tend to drop out of the individual's response repertoire through a process known as "extinction." Other factors being equal, behavior sequences that lead to undesirable consequences or "punishment" will also be repeated less often than sequences that are rewarded.

A very important finding of learning theorists has to do with what occurs when an act is rewarded only occasionally and is not rewarded or punished the rest of the time. It has been found that habits developed from such a schedule of reinforcement are extremely difficult to eliminate. This is the type of schedule of reinforcement usually found in child rearing, because parents are not able to detect every instance in which a given act is performed so that they can administer the appropriate reward or punishment. It is because of this that childhood habits are so persistent.

Extinction

Extinction of aggressive habits through nonreward has never been advocated as a useful method of fostering inhibitions against the expression of aggressive behavior despite the fact that extinction has been found to be one of the most effective methods of eliminating other undesirable habits. Certainly, it would appear plausible that if aggressive behavior were never

rewarded, then "reactive inhibition" would accumulate to such an extent that aggressive responses would eventually be eliminated from the individual's response repertoire.

The reason extinction has never been seriously advocated is entirely pragmatic. It is virtually impossible to find a life style such that aggression will never be rewarded. Earlier, McNeil (1959) pointed out how the child will learn almost inevitably that aggressive behavior is effective in shaping his parents' behavior. At the very least, it will secure additional parental attention and this is generally rewarding for the child. In his interactions with his peers, the child growing up in our culture will inevitably find that aggressive behavior has its uses on the playground and the athletic field. In addition to these instrumental rewards, many feel that the very expression of aggression when instigation has been aroused is rewarding in and of itself (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949). Indeed, the concept of an aggressive drive implies that satisfaction of the goal responses induced by that drive is rewarding, and animal data support this view (Azrin, Hutchinson, and McLaughlin, 1965; Ulrich and Favell, in press). Because it is, therefore, impossible to have a complete absence of reward for aggressive behavior, the idea of using extinction schedules to eliminate or to prevent the development of aggressive habits is sound theoretically but worthless practically. For this reason, extinction has not been proposed as a remedy for violence.

Punishment and the Anticipation of Pain

A much more frequent suggestion has been that punishment is the optimal way to foster inhibitions against the expression of aggression. Indeed according to the Yale group:

The basic variable that determines the degree to which any specific act of aggression will be inhibited appears to be anticipation of punishment. Provisionally it may be stated that "the strength of inhibition of any act of aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment anticipated to be a consequence of that act . . ."

In essence this principle derives from the law of effect; those actions cease to occur which, in the past, have been followed by punishment. It may be supposed that each frustration acts as an instigator to a great variety of aggressive responses. Some of these are overt in the sense that other persons can perceive them and some are so minimal (nonovert) that only the subject himself is aware of them. If past experience has taught him that certain of these aggressions are followed by punishment, those forms will tend to be eliminated and there will remain a residue of the forms that have not been punished (1939, p. 33).

By punishment, the Yale group meant not only physical injury, insults, ostracism, and deprivation of goods or freedom, but also injury to a loved one or anticipation of failure. Thus, according to their formulation, once an individual learns that a given aggressive act is likely to be followed by or lead to such noxious occurrences, then inhibitions against that act will develop.

Of course the notion that punishment inhibits behavior did not originate with the Yale theorists. Leaving aside the theological efforts over the centuries to shape positive behavior by threatening eternal punishment for sin, Beccaria suggested in the 18th century that violence and other crimes could be deterred by determining the satisfactions inherent in any given crime and imposing penalties, the pain of which would exceed the satisfactions to be gained from the crime. Our modern code of laws with its varying degrees of punishment for various acts is, of course, a reflection of the principle that punishment should inhibit or eliminate undesirable behavior. Similarly, calls for "tougher penalties" for various acts reflect such thinking. The basic premise is that man is rational and will not engage in maladaptive behavior (Vold, 1958). Unfortunately, the framers of the penal codes did not reckon with the fact that an immediate although small reward will often be chosen, despite the fact that it may result in a much larger punishment at some later date.

There is a considerable body of evidence that supports the contention that anticipation of punishment does have an inhibitory effect on aggressive behavior. Studies by Scott (1962) and Seward (1945) have shown that animals that are unsuccessful in fighting become less aggressive, while an investigation by Chasdi and Lawrence (1955) demonstrated that children who were punished for engaging in aggressive doll play quickly learned to inhibit such behavior. Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963) also obtained data that indicated that observing someone else get punished for an aggressive act leads to inhibition of aggression on the part of the observer.

Does this mean that punishment, particularly physical punishment, of aggressive behavior is the best way to eliminate such responses from a child's repertoire of behavior? The evidence on this question is much less clear cut, but by and large it does *not* appear to be the case. As strange as it may seem, punishment of specific aggressive acts does not inevitably lead to anticipation of punishment for all aggressive acts. In the first place, the effects of punishment for all aggressive acts can "wear off." According to Berkowitz:

Punishment seems to have an inhibitory effect primarily because of the emotion it arouses. Once this emotional state (probably largely fear or anxiety) wears off, the previously punished response tendency is as strong as ever (1962, p. 73).

It also appears that the effects of punishment can be quite specific, inhibiting performance of the particular act that was punished in similar circumstances, but not necessarily other acts which would appear similar nor the same act in other circumstances (Kohlberg, 1963). For example, punishing a boy for hitting his little sister in the presence of his mother may inhibit future occurrences of this act, but the inhibition may not generalize to hitting other little girls or to hitting his sister when mother is not looking. Because of this, Berkowitz has concluded:

Punishment, and especially physical punishment, is relatively ineffective as a disciplinary technique. The parent who relies primarily on his child's fear of punishment must be constantly on guard for violations of

his rules. If his child sees that the parent is not present and believes he can get away with some transgression he is all too likely to take the chance (1962, p. 73).

It would appear from this analysis that punishment alone is relatively ineffective in eliminating aggressive habits. Indeed, there is evidence in the child-development literature that punishment may even be conducive to the development of aggressive behavior. Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, and Sears (1953, p. 215) found in their study of the relationship between certain child-rearing practices and aggressive behavior, that "...there is a clear, positive correlation in boys between severity of maternal punitiveness for aggression and amount of overt aggression displayed by the boy in preschool..." Severe punishment often has an effect similar to that of rejection, and studies such as those of McCord and McCord (1958) have demonstrated that rejection is conducive to the development of hostile and delinquent behavior. Similarly, Bandura and Walters (1959) reported that the fathers of aggressive delinquents were more aggressively punitive than the fathers of nonaggressive adolescents. In a subsequent publication, they concluded:

Thus, while impersonally administered punishment for aggression may reduce, at least temporarily, the incidence or amplitude of aggressive behavior, punishment administered by a punitive-aggressive model may, unless the punishment is very severe, increase the incidence or amplitude of aggressive responses (Bandura and Walters, 1963a, p. 371).

The reason for this is that children learn behavior patterns not only on the basis of the rewards and punishments that are administered, but also on the basis of imitation and identification. Punishment, particularly physical punishment, is an aggressive response because it delivers a noxious stimulus to the recipient. Therefore, the child who is being punished is being exposed to an example of aggressive behavior that he may later emulate. The fact that punishment constitutes both a frustration and an attack on the child also diminishes its effectiveness because it increases instigation to aggression. Thus, while punishment may increase inhibitions, it may also augment instigation, making the child more aggressive overall than he was prior to the punishment. Such a pattern can be observed in some prison inmates who, instead of becoming increasingly docile and socialized in the course of their sentences, instead become increasingly embittered and hostile.

Thus it seems that no matter how much punishment is administered for the performance of aggressive or violent acts, punishment alone will probably not be sufficient to inhibit such behavior. In situations in which the individual can anticipate that punishment will follow from the completion of an aggressive response, then aggressive behavior will be inhibited; however, when such punishment cannot be reasonably anticipated, it is unlikely that there will be any inhibition of aggression stemming from externally imposed punishment. Why is it then that individuals generally abide by social rules and, for the most part, refrain from violence, even in situations where it is extremely unlikely that their misbehavior could be detected or punished? The answer to this lies in the fact that in a normal course of development,

individuals develop systems of internal values by means of which they will punish themselves for such deviant acts. It is to the development of such internal value systems that we shall now turn.

Inhibitions Stemming from Guilt, Identification, or Superego

Personality theorists differ considerably on the issue of how value systems are developed. Those who take a learning theory approach treat values and inhibitions as being the generalized results of punishment. According to Kohlberg:

The basic assumption used in applying Hullian-Pavlovian theory to morality research has been the assumption of habit generalization. This assumption leads to the expectation that avoidance, anxiety, or inhibition learned in the home should generalize to an unsupervised situation outside the home (1963, p. 280).

This position takes a somewhat broader view of the effects of punishment than was taken in the preceding discussion. According to this analysis, the punishment of an aggressive act induces anxiety or fear in the child. Just as Pavlov's dog learned to salivate at the sound of the bell, so too with time the child will automatically feel anxious and frightened if he performs the forbidden aggressive act. Indeed, through such conditioning he may even become anxious at the mere thought of performing an aggressive act and will consequently refrain from it. In this way, inhibitions are learned which will be effective even if there is no parent or authority around to administer punishment. The conditioned anxiety and fear aroused by the act will constitute punishment and will lead the child to inhibit it. The maintenance of such conditioned responses, however, is dependent upon the occasional occurrence of overt punishment. If the child performs the aggressive act enough times without being actually punished, then the conditioned anxiety and fear should extinguish. What is more likely to happen is that the child will learn a discrimination, so that he will feel anxious about performing the aggressive act in those situations where it is likely he might be punished but not in those situations where it is unlikely he will be punished. Thus conditioning theory brings us back to our original analysis of the effectiveness of punishment. It is likely to lead to an inhibition of the act when punishment can be anticipated but not in other situations. If this is an accurate analysis, then it would be unlikely that through punishment alone the child could develop the kinds of internalized value systems that are the present topic of discussion.

This analysis appears to be consistent with the data that have been collected. In reviewing a number of studies of the relationship between learning theory and conscience development, Kohlberg concluded, "The results do not indicate any general simple relationship between learning conditions and indices of conscience" (1963, p. 281). Although Kohlberg pointed out the problems involved in obtaining adequate data on the relationship between child-rearing practices and overt behavior, he reported that the data had been obtained thus far, "... do not support the notion

that internalized moral conformity or conscience consist of 'conditioned anxiety responses' or general avoidance-habits produced by parental discipline" (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 285).

Those who would account for the development of conscience have generally had to postulate a process of "identification" in which the child imitates and seeks the approval of his parents and those whom he admires and, in so doing, adopts their value system in whole or in part.

Theorists such as Mowrer (1950) and Sears, Maccoby, and Levin (1957) have suggested that a child's identification with his parents comes about as a result of his initial dependency upon them for food and comfort. Given warm and nurturant parents, the child develops a strong positive relationship with them. In learning theory terms, the parents assume the status of powerful secondary reinforcers; in other words, the child enjoys their presence and company for their own sake. He learns to value their approval and tries to act as they want him to. Given this state of affairs, the parents can then use this love relationship to help shape the child's behavior. Because the child values their love, the parents can make demonstrations of their love and approval conditional on his behavior, withholding demonstrative love or affection when he is naughty, and bestowing it when he is good. The more consistently they do this, the more readily the child learns to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate behavior. In part, then, the child behaves in accordance with the parents' values because he fears the loss of love which might result from failure to do so and values the affection that comes from conformity. This aspect is enhanced by the fact that the young child often conceives of his parents as being omnipotent—as knowing what he is thinking and doing even though they may not be present.

However, the process of identification goes beyond this simple tailoring of behavior so as to maximize rewards and minimize punishments. The child soon wants to behave in the approved manner because it is pleasing to the parent, rather than simply because he will be rewarded by doing so. This is a subtle point, but essentially what comes to pass is that the child evaluates his own behavior and rewards himself through feelings of pride and achievement when he does things the parents would approve of, and punishes himself through feelings of guilt when he engages in behavior of which the parents would disapprove. At this point, then, the child is conforming because *he* wants to conform. This process generalizes to some extent to the other significant people in the child's environment whose good opinion he values. While the parents are the primary source of values for the young child, teachers, clergymen, coaches, and friends also influence value development, although generally to a lesser extent.

This formulation is reasonably consistent with the research literature. Although the process that has been postulated is a hypothetical one that is not open to direct observation, nonetheless, predictions can be made on the basis of it. By and large, these predictions have been confirmed by the empirical data. Studies reviewed by Kohlberg (1963) have found positive associations between the warmth and nurturance of the mother and father and such characteristics of the child as identification, resistance to temptation, and guilt. The dependency of the child and the presence of the mother or father living in the home have similarly been associated with conforming behavior. Other studies have shown that the child-rearing

technique of love withdrawal as opposed to direct punishment is much more likely to induce guilt. Similarly, studies have found positive correlations between measures of conscience development and degree of parental identification. The research data are by no means unanimous; many studies have found an absence of such relationships and some have even found the relationships to be the opposite of those that would be expected. However, the general trend of the data appears to be in accord with what would be expected on the basis of these formulations.

Throughout our discussion of the development of individual conceptions of morality, the emphasis has been on how the child introjects the parents' values. By and large, violence is taboo in our society so, along with other values, we would expect the child to develop inhibitions against violent and, to a somewhat lesser extent, aggressive behavior. However, if the family or the culture do not condemn violence, then there is no reason why the child should develop such inhibitions. Among the Kwoma, adult men are expected to express hostility and to fight, and boys are trained in such a way as to prepare them for this role (Whiting, 1941). Similarly, the Mexican male is expected to engage in violent behavior if necessary to defend his family's honor (Rosenquist and Megargee, 1969). Even within a broad culture, particularly, one as heterogeneous as the United States, there will be variations in the patterns of values. Sociologists have often suggested that the reason for excessive crime rates among certain segments of society is because of subcultural differences in approved behavior patterns (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955). More recently, drawing upon this sociological tradition, the area studies of Shaw and McKay (1942), and the data that show disproportionate rates of violence amongst certain racial, ethnic, and age groups in different areas, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) have hypothesized the existence of a "subculture of violence" in which the attitudes toward the expression of overt aggressive behavior and violence are more permissive than those found in the society at large. If a child's parents are members of such a subculture, and if they view aggression or violence as being permissible in certain situations or against certain targets, then it is entirely likely that the child who identifies with them will introject the same values and will also learn that violence in these contexts is permissible. To be sure, some conflict may take place when the child is exposed to the wider society in school or through exposure to mass media, but in such cases it is typically the parental values that win out. Of course there will be individual differences within such a subculture based on the differences in degree of identification which takes place. No culture, nor even any subculture, is completely homogeneous in its effects.

The orthodox psychoanalytic theory of the formation of values differs somewhat from the developmental-learning theory approach outlined above. According to the Freudian position, the child does develop a strong attachment or "object cathexis" for the parents early in life. This early identification becomes stronger over the years until the Oedipus complex forms.¹⁰ In the Oedipus complex, the young boy's attachment to his mother becomes so strong that he wishes to obtain exclusive possession of her and replace his father in her affections. This hypothesis, and particularly Freud's theory that it is genital sexual possession that the child desires, is probably the most controversial part of psychoanalytic theory. Inevitably, the boy is

frustrated in this desire because the mother prefers the father and because the father is not willing to relinquish his possession of the mother. Moreover, the boy fears that the father will seek retribution against him by cutting off his genitals. This period of turmoil is resolved when the child represses or gives up his desire for the mother and identifies with the father.

At this point, the mechanisms of identification introjection . . . come into full action. If the little boy identifies himself with the father in a rather literal sense and unconsciously *becomes* the father, then he can both enjoy the mother and can *himself* inhibit his own dangerous proclivities (Munroe, 1955, p. 207).

Thus, if he can control his own behavior, he no longer needs to fear his father; moreover, by being like the father the son can vicariously enjoy the mother. It is these introjected parental values—or, more properly, *perceived* parental values—that make up the superego which, according to psychoanalytic theory, is the part of the personality that acts to block the expression of id impulses. Because it is not the parents' actual value system but instead the immature child's *conception* of the parents' value system that is introjected, the child's superego will not be a carbon copy of the parents'. If the parent verbalizes certain attitudes but acts in a contrary fashion, the child may introject the covert values rather than the overt values. For example, the parent who preaches the value of honesty and forthrightness but who cheats on his income tax return may find that the child has introjected the parent's actual behavior patterns rather than his overt moral code (Johnson, 1949). Thus, the parents are crucial in the development of inhibitions, according to orthodox analytic theory.

In the *absence* of adequate parental figures, the superego often fails to develop properly, and object relations tend to remain at the narcissistic level. Here the difficulties of children brought up in institutions may be mentioned again. Too often, the lack of a person to identify with results in a conscienceless individual—in the kind of personality development known as psychopathy. The child, and later the adult, can love only himself. Unusually harsh or anxious handling by the parent also predisposes the child to later difficulties . . . (Munroe, 1955, p. 210).

As noted above, many aspects of psychoanalytic theory in general, and the Oedipus complex in particular, are quite controversial. Because the Oedipal conflict is repressed, most people have no memory of this struggle, if, indeed, it did take place. But whether or not one accepts the orthodox psychoanalytic account of the dynamics involved in the origin of a value system, it is noteworthy that the analytic position emphasizes the same basic variables as did the developmental learning theory approach. Like the social learning theorists, psychoanalysts stress the importance of the affectional relationships within the nuclear family and the identification of the child with his parents' value system. Most of the predictions one would make about observable behavior patterns on the basis of analytic theory are similar to those one would make on the basis of developmental-learning theory.

Therefore, the studies cited above regarding the relation between early familial factors and guilt can be used to support the psychoanalytic contentions as well as the developmental approach. One possible difference might lie in the fact that there is a greater threat of potential violence in the psychoanalytic formulation. We have already noted that analysts regard aggression as outward manifestation of the death instincts. If the Freudian account of the formation of the superego through the resolution of the Oedipus complex is correct, then the child perceives the father as a potentially violent person who might mutilate him unless he abandons his incestuous desire for the mother. It would appear that this formulation implies that the child therefore perceives the father's superego as one that might condone violence in certain situations. If it is this perceived parental value system that the child introjects and makes his own, then this would suggest that the male child emerges from the Oedipal crisis with a superego that under certain circumstances would also condone violence—particularly violence against the self when transgressions take place. Psychoanalytic theory does hypothesize that the superego is quite unrealistic and irrational in its structures and that it is up to the ego to moderate the demands of the superego and bring them into harmony with social realities.

Positive Rewards for Nonaggression

Because this section deals with inhibitions against the expression of aggression, it is natural that the emphasis should have been on such factors as punishment, guilt, and anxiety, all of which contribute to the pain that might result from the performance of an aggressive or violent act and thus decrease its net response strength.

Performance of an aggressive response, however, also means that the individual cannot perform a competing nonaggressive response. This means that to express the aggressive instigation, the individual must relinquish whatever satisfactions come about through the performance of nonaggressive acts. The fact that an aggressive act can result in the loss of such rewards adds to the negative result and, hence, the inhibitions attached to it. In short, inhibitions against aggressive behavior can result from being rewarded for other responses that are incompatible with aggression. As Bandura and Walters have pointed out:

Theorizing and experimentation on the inhibition of aggression have focused exclusively on the inhibitory influence of anxiety or guilt on the assumption that response inhibition is necessarily a consequence of pairing responses with some form of aversive stimulation. The development of aggressive inhibition for the strengthening of incompatible positive responses, on the other hand, has been entirely ignored, despite the fact that the social control of aggression is probably achieved to a greater extent on this basis than by means of aversive stimulation (1963a, p. 389).

This was demonstrated in a study by Brown and Elliot who instructed nursery school teachers to ignore aggression and reinforce cooperation as

much as possible. There was significantly less physical aggression when this procedure was in effect compared with periods when the teachers were free to use their usual techniques. The reader will also recall our discussion of Hokanson's research indicating that when nonaggressive responses are rewarded in a two-person game situation, not only will the frequency of such responses increase but also the subject will come to experience the same amount of "catharsis" or autonomic tension release as he would ordinarily be expected to experience through aggression.

Because learning theory in general has demonstrated the greater potency of rewards as opposed to punishments, the elimination or reduction of aggressive behavior by means of rewarding responses but compatible with aggression deserves greater research in both the laboratory and the field. Those who subscribe to a hydraulic model that implies that aggressive instigation must be expressed through some form of aggressive behavior would not be optimistic about the results of such programs. However, the preliminary data we have reviewed indicate that rewarding nonaggression may well be more effective than catharsis theorists would suppose.

Inhibitions Stemming From Love or Libidinal Object Cathexes

Psychoanalytic theory, as well as everyday observations, indicate that man's feelings toward his fellow man are rarely, if ever, pure or unmixed. The situation in which man feels love or friendship to the exclusion of any animosity, or, by the same token, hate, to the exclusion of any positive regard, is so rare as to be virtually impossible. This means that our aggressive urges are usually directed at targets toward whom we are ambivalent. In such a situation, the positive affectionate components will tend to inhibit the aggressive components somewhat. According to the Yale group, injury to a loved one, for example, constitutes a punishment. Therefore if our aggressive instigation has been aroused by a loved one, acting upon it directly automatically results in punishment. The stronger the love relationship, the greater the inhibitions. Provocation, aggressive instigation, and the like being equal, one is less likely to express violence toward a loved one than toward a stranger.

This fusion of the life and death instincts, or libido and aggression, occupies a central role in psychoanalytic theory. According to Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein:

As far as ego and superego imposed modifications on both instinctual drives, conditions with libido and aggression tend to be similar. In the case of aggression, however, modification of aims is imposed by an additional reason of particular and paramount importance: The unmodified aggressive impulse threatens the existence of the object and the investment of the object with libido acts as its protection. Through a simultaneous cathexis with libido the aims of aggression are modified. This modification may be brought about in two different ways: By the mere coexistence of two investments, leading to the prevalence of libido over aggression; and the fusion of both instinctual drives. In discussing types of ambivalence we will later refer to this difference.

The fact, however, that the ultimate aims of aggression are more frequently modified by libido and those of libido by aggression may well be thought to be connected with the genetic importance of the love object for the survival of the individual (1949, p. 19).

This formulation of the conflict between love and aggression may appear at first glance to be inconsistent with the observation that most murders are committed by relatives or friends of the victim (Hoover, 1967). However, when we reflect upon the fact that intimates are most likely to induce the severest frustrations, this begins to make more sense. Given the instigations to aggression that almost inevitably result in any close relationship, if love-induced inhibitions block the expression of aggression toward that target, we might expect the instigation to summate over time (Megargee, 1967). This is particularly true when the frustrations are reexperienced day after day so that aggression is continually rearoused and has little opportunity to decay with time. In the present writer's formulation of the Overcontrolled Assaultive type, it was noted how in some cases in which high inhibitions block aggressive acting behavior, instigation may gradually accumulate until it overwhelms even these strong defenses. If this occurs, the instigation level has often reached such a point that it will lead to an extremely violent act. Thus, the affectionate love relationships within the home block the expression of moderate aggression to some extent, but they may also increase the violence of those aggressive interactions that do take place.

Factors That Decrease or Retard the Formation of Inhibitions Against Violence and Aggression

Innate Factors

The question of innate factors that might hinder the development of inhibitions was indirectly dealt with above when we discussed theories of innate inhibitions. It will be recalled that Lorenz (1966), along with other ethologists, suggested that man shares with other animals hereditary inhibitions against intraspecies violence. However, man's unique technological evolution into a lethal animal outstripped the development of genetic inhibitions. We also examined Eysenck's theory that psychopaths, who are particularly prone to violence, may be innately deficient in their ability to learn from punishment.

In addition to these factors, certain individuals may be born without the capacity to control their behavior adequately because of congenital damage to the central nervous system. Brain damage, which can result from birth injury as well as from hereditary defects, can lead to poor impulse control, restlessness, and irritability. Not only do brain-damaged children tend to be less inhibited than children without such disorders, but they also tend to be subjected to more frustrations. School can be particularly frustrating because they are often slow to learn and may have difficulty regulating their behavior to conform to school rules. The resulting instigation to aggression combined with low frustration thresholds can lead to acting out behavior.

In the section on instigation, it was noted that certain areas of the brain have been identified as "rage centers" that apparently mediate aggressive

behavior. Delgado (1963) has identified other areas that apparently mediate inhibitions. He found that electrical stimulation of the caudate nucleus produced inhibition of aggression in a normally assertive monkey. On the basis of this, one might infer that a congenital deformity or abnormality of this area might lead to a deficiency in aggressive inhibitions. It should be pointed out, however, that this speculation by the present writer goes well beyond the available data.

A congenital abnormality that has received considerable attention of late is the so-called XYY chromosome type. This research was stimulated by the report in 1965 that an excessive proportion of the inmates of a prison hospital had this chromosomal type. Additional emphasis for this research came about when chromosomal studies of two notorious murderers indicated that they, too, were of the XYY chromosome type. Montagu (1968b, p. 48), while pointing out that "... it would be an error to identify the XYY constitution as *predisposed* to aggressive behavior..." nevertheless concluded, "However, the high frequency with which individuals with XYY chromosomes commit crimes of violence leaves little doubt that in some cases the additional Y chromosome asserts a preponderantly powerful influence in the genesis of aggressive behavior." While many more data must be collected, and while the manner in which the extra Y chromosome will be expressed undoubtedly varies as a function of the individual's environment, it does appear that this particular chromosomal aberration may be associated with inadequate inhibitions against overt aggressive behavior.

Environmental Factors Decreasing Inhibitions

In our discussions a number of environmental factors that might decrease inhibitions have been mentioned in passing. For example, in our account of the effects of vicarious aggression, we noted that, in addition to decreasing instigation, vicarious aggression might also decrease inhibitions. In such instances the literature will not be reviewed again in detail.

Inhibitions stemming from environmentally induced changes in the central nervous system.—In addition to the innate central nervous system pathology discussed above, the environment can also exert a disinhibitory effect on the nervous system through the influences of drugs and diseases.

Many drugs and toxic agents can lower inhibitions. The effects of alcohol, for example, are well known. The behavior that results from ingestion of alcohol depends on the individual personality structure. Some people become more aggressive and belligerent, others become more amorous, and others become talkative. Many other substances also have the effect of lowering inhibition levels and thereby making possible overt aggressive behavior if instigation to aggression is present.

Impulse control can also be lessened by a number of organic diseases of the nervous system. Included within this classification would be such disorders as senile psychosis, presenile psychosis, general paresis, and postencephalitic disorders, as well as brain damage that may result from a cerebral accident, brain tumors, wounds, or a trauma to the brain.

Before turning to the effects of learning, it should be pointed out that some functional—i.e., nonorganic—emotional disturbances can also lower inhibitions against aggression. For example, deficient ego and superego

controls are found in some of the functional psychoses. The possibility of violence directed at others is particularly high in paranoid schizophrenia, while a danger of violence directed at the self or at minor children is found in many of the affective disorders such as psychotic depressions. The psychoneuroses, in which the superego is intact, are less likely to be associated with violence, with the exception of those cases described by the present writer in which inhibitions against aggression are so great that they can lead to accumulation of so much instigation that violence may result. In the so-called character disorders, we enter an area marked by semantic confusion. Included in this broad category are people with problems in ego control and with deficient inhibitions or superego controls. If we are not careful, we could classify every violent person within this category by definition. If we did, however, then the concept would lose any explanatory value. Giving the term its proper psychiatric meaning, violence is found to be associated with many of the so-called character disorders, particularly with the sociopathic reactions. However, it should be noted here that the psychodynamics and the personality structure are the defining symptoms of sociopathic reactions and that the violence and aggression are only accessory symptoms. Not every violent person suffers from a character disorder or, indeed, from any emotional disturbance; by the same token, not every emotionally disturbed or character disordered patient is inclined to violence.

The effects of learning: role models, rewarded aggression, and cultural sanctions.—The major influence of the environment is felt through learning. In discussing how learning may lower inhibitions, we shall examine three interrelated topics: the effect of aggressive models, the effect of rewarded aggressive behavior, and the effect of cultural approval for aggression that may provide both models and rewards.

1. *The effects of aggressive models:* Bandura and his associates at Stanford have conducted a number of studies on the effects of observing a model engage in aggressive behavior. In most of his studies, Bandura exposed children to either a live or a filmed model who engaged in various highly distinctive aggressive acts. The model seen by the control groups did not engage in such behavior. Subsequently the children were observed in play, and the number of instances in which they performed the same sorts of distinctive aggressive responses that had been made by the models were recorded. Although Bandura and his associates have varied the conditions of their experiments in order to determine the effects of friendly and unfriendly models or punished and unpunished models, the typical finding has been that those children who observed the models engage in aggressive behavior subsequently engaged in more aggressive behavior themselves. Since we can assume that most of these children arrived at the laboratory with learned inhibitions against aggression, it would therefore seem that the effect of watching the aggressive models was to reduce these inhibitions (Bandura and Walters, 1963a).

Although the studies of modeling and imitation have taken place under controlled laboratory conditions, it would appear plausible that similar imitation and modeling can take place on the street. Violent and aggressive models abound in what Wolfgang has termed the "subculture of violence," and it appears likely that the observation of such real life models could similarly have a disinhibitory effect on the child. Sutherland's "differential

association" theory, which was originally postulated to account for how criminal values can be transmitted within a high delinquency area, describes in essence the social learning of deviate values (Sutherland and Cressey, 1966), and the same sort of process could easily take place with respect to attitudes toward violence.

Within the broader culture, other examples of violent behavior could also have an influence. Among the cultural models that have been suggested as possibly having a disinhibitory effect are TV and news reports of active violence, such as the Texas sniper, films, and mass media, as well as culturally sanctioned violence such as war and capital punishment. (See Larsen, 1968.) Frederic Wertham (1966, 1968a, 1968b) has been one of the most outspoken critics of the mass media, arguing that televised violence on entertainment and news shows has transformed television into a "school for violence." Wertham's argument is that repeated exposure to violence in the media, as well as aggressive toys and games, has had the effect of lowering inhibitions against violent behavior by blunting the normal emotional responses of horror and compassion. As might be expected, Wertham takes a very dim view of the notion of vicarious catharsis:

If I were asked to give an example of brain washing successfully carried out on a great number of educated people, I would cite the prevalence of this theory . . . This outlet theory is not only overdone; it is false. It is pseudoscientific dogma. There is no shred of clinical evidence for it. In reality the programs do not provide a catharsis for children's feelings. On the contrary the children are overexcited without being given adequate release. Delinquent behavior is not prevented but promoted. Far from providing an innocuous outlet, the brutal and sadistic stories of the mass media stimulate, overstimulate, and lead natural drives into unhealthy channels. For example, the brutal mishandling of girls leads to sadistic masturbatory daydreams (Wertham, 1966, p. 220 f.).

As we noted earlier, the bulk of the data that have been collected in laboratory investigations indicates that exposure to aggressive models does increase the prevalence of mild aggressive behavior. However, this has not been a universal finding, nor has the relation of films or media to overt violence ever been given an adequate empirical test. While it could be that the televised coverage of the Vietnam war has had a brutalizing effect on the American public, as Wertham believes (1968a), it could also be argued that this unique exposure to the effects of violence played a major role in arousing popular objections, or in our parlance, inhibitions, against the war. Studies of returning Vietnam war veterans who were exposed to and participated in violence certainly indicate that the reaction varied from individual to individual, with some having their inhibitions lowered and others having them increased (Polner, 1968). It is likely that the effects of media similarly vary from individual to individual. Until better data are collected, Wertham's statements about the effects of media on actual violence must be regarded as plausible hypotheses that have not yet been empirically verified.

A topic of particular concern to sociologists has been the influence of "anomie" or value confusion on deviant behavior such as violence. Role models can influence the development of such a state of normlessness. This is

particularly true in disorganized neighborhoods in which the child may be exposed to and identify with a variety of conflicting role models (Sellin, 1938). Moreover, in such areas the neighbors often do not help the parents in their efforts to establish consistent patterns of rewards and punishments; the neighbor who sees a child engaging in illicit or aggressive behavior is less likely to inform the child's parents or take it upon himself to correct the child than are neighbors in more stable areas. Therefore, misbehavior that is not observed by such parents is more likely to go unpunished; as we have seen, such a partial reward schedule can lead to the development of very persistent habits.

2. *The effect of rewarded aggressive behavior:* In an earlier section, we explored how taking part in rewarded aggressive activity can lead to the formation of aggressive habits. In particular, we discussed how aggression might be necessary in order to secure a modicum of food in a poverty culture, and how animals that have been rewarded for aggression become increasingly aggressive. Such rewarded aggressive experience can have the effect of lessening inhibitions against aggression.

A taboo or an inhibition against the performance of a certain act can be conceptualized as conditioned anxiety. Research on psychotherapy by Wolpe (1958) has shown that successful performance of an act similar to the tabooed act will lessen anxiety about the tabooed act. If a man has strong inhibitions against murder, then, according to this analysis, if he can overcome his inhibitions to the point where he can commit justifiable homicide in war, then it will not only be easier for him to kill again in combat but it also might be expected that this would generalize so that his anxieties and inhibitions about committing murder would decrease. Similarly one would expect that an individual who has overcome his inhibitions against killing deer might find it easier to overcome his inhibitions against killing men in combat. This is, of course, assuming that the performance of the response is followed by a reward. If there was an adverse reaction to killing the deer, then this negative reaction should generalize and make it more difficult to engage in other aggressive behavior.

Bloch and Geis (1962) indicate that the data do not support the notion that military training leads to an increase in aggressive crimes. They state:

It has always been one of the more attractive theses in popular criminology that war service would inevitably become a crime incitant because of its role as a training school in death-dealing. . . . Post-war statistics, however, belie the validity of the hypotheses . . . both in regard to crime in general and homicide in particular' (Bloch and Geis, 1962, p. 277).

The evidence they cite in this connection is a study by the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons which showed that World War II veterans were less likely to be arrested and sent to prison for Federal crimes than men who did not serve in World War II. There are a number of drawbacks to this study. In the first place, the military prefers not to accept men into the Armed Forces who have previous juvenile or criminal records. This would mean that the veteran population has already had the most seriously antisocial people screened out. Second, most crimes of violence are State rather than Federal offenses, so the study was not directly relevant to crimes of violence. Finally,

judges may take military service into consideration when passing sentence; other things being equal, one might expect Federal judges to be somewhat more lenient toward veterans than toward men who had not served their country.

These criticisms may cast some doubt on the data that suggest rewarded aggressive practice such as military training does not lessen inhibitions against aggression. However they cannot be used to support this hypothesis; in the absence of adequate data this notion must be regarded as no more than a plausible conjecture. However, it should be noted that the learning-theory principle on which it is based, namely response generalization, has been demonstrated many times in laboratory experiments.¹¹

Culturally sanctioned disinhibition.—Internal inhibitions can also be lowered by leaders or other agents of society who condone or encourage violence in certain situations. Such persuasion is a major factor in military training. Similarly, in times of international or intergroup conflict, leaders may try to persuade their followers that violence toward the enemy is not only permissible but patriotic. The more prestige and authority the communicator has, the more likely it is that his arguments will be accepted.

In previous sections it was noted that inhibitions can shape the form of the expression of overt aggression. In essence, this involves establishing a set of discriminations with regard to both the form that violence takes and the permissible targets of violence. In Nazi Germany, the generalized taboo against taking human life was suspended in the case of Jews, just as in the American West in the 19th century only dead Indians were regarded as good Indians. Sometimes cultural sanctions are lifted against people who behave in certain ways. The penal codes make explicit allowance for this when they permit any citizen to kill in defense of his life and, in some jurisdictions, even in defense of his property. Similarly, culturally established inhibitions govern the form of violence that is permitted. In warfare, the Geneva Convention permits shooting the enemy with full-jacketed bullets but not with soft-pointed bullets. Smothering the enemy is allowed if napalm is used but not if chlorine gas is employed.

Little research has been done on how cultural approval may lower inhibitions against violence or on the individual personality factors that determine whether such manipulations will be effective. Some research has investigated the effect on milder forms of aggression. The fact that social psychologists who require their subjects to inflict electric shocks or other painful stimuli on victims never report substantial numbers of subjects refusing to do so is in itself evidence that the authority of the investigator is enough to reduce inhibitions against aggressive behavior. Investigators who have attempted to study the effects of providing justifications or excuses for aggressive behavior have found that these manipulations generally have a disinhibitory effect (cf., Berkowitz, 1965).

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL STIMULI (Sa and Si)

It is a fundamental principle in psychology that behavior results from the interaction of the organism with its milieu. It requires no great insight to be aware that people often may act one way in one situation but quite differently in another. However, psychologists have generally investigated the personality factors involved in aggression and neglected the external stimulus

factors that might facilitate or impede the expression of aggression once instigation has been aroused. There are notable exceptions to this. Toch (1967) has investigated the interactions between police and offenders in an attempt to determine the stimulus factors that lead to violence. Research on the scapegoat hypothesis has investigated whether the fact that the target of aggression belongs to a minority group or has a Jewish name influences the expression of aggression (Berkowitz, 1962, ch. 6). On the animal level, Tinbergen (1953) has studied the stimuli that trigger an attack by the three-spined stickleback. However, by and large, behavioral scientists have been relatively uninterested in exploring these stimulus parameters.

Stimulus factors are particularly important in acts of violence. It has already been noted how the stimulus situation can influence the initial level of instigation or inhibition by providing cues for the definition of the situation. The tone of voice or the facial expression with which a remark is delivered can determine whether it is perceived as a compliment or an insult. The work in Hokanson's laboratory discussed above has shown that shock delivered in an arbitrary fashion elicits much greater autonomic arousal than a shock which the subject has been told in advance is an unfortunate but essential part of the experiment.

External stimulus factors can also facilitate or impede the expression of aggressive instigation. The range of stimuli that can influence the translation of aggressive instigation into overt aggressive behavior are extremely wide and only a few illustrative examples will be mentioned here. Because of the relative poverty of quantitative data, it will be necessary to rely on anecdotal evidence with the realization that the hypotheses these anecdotes suggest must be rigorously studied in empirical research.

One of the most important stimulus factors is the behavior of other people. The victim through his behavior can facilitate or may even directly precipitate the aggression. In his study of 588 homicides in Philadelphia, Wolfgang (1957) identified 150 as being victim precipitated. MacDonald (1967) has also discussed such cases, including one wife who, when her husband threatened her with a gun, taunted him, "What are you going to do, big man, kill me? You haven't got the guts to kill me." At other times, the provocative aspects of the victim's behavior may not be obvious, as in situations in which the victim inadvertently behaves like the original frustrating agent so that displacement of aggression is facilitated.

However, the behavior of the other member of the aggressive dyad is only part of the story. The actions of onlookers are also important. Aggressive behavior on the part of others seems to lower the individual's inhibitions against acting in an aggressive fashion himself (Bandura, Ross, and Ross, 1963; Redl and Wineman, 1957; Wheeler and Caggiula, 1966). Redl and Wineman (1957) called this "contagion" and described its action in a group of impulsive aggressive boys in a residential treatment center as follows:

The mere fact that a youngster sees one of his less relaxed contemporaries throwing things around, banging his fork against the plate ferociously, jumping up and crawling under the bed and table, may in itself suddenly set loose behavior in him of which he really hadn't thought until that very minute. In short, it seems as though

sometimes behavior will "spread" and become infectious by the very lure its visualization implies (Redl and Wineman, 1957, p. 87).

The joint action of a number of stimulus factors, including an atmosphere of ongoing violence, the presence of weapons, and the acquiescence of a sibling can be seen in this verbatim account by a 12-year-old boy of how his brother killed their father:

Yesterday, July 5, 1966, Father, Mother, my brother Bobby Joe, and Billy Carter were sitting in a circle in the front yard of my house. They were all drinking wine except Bobby Joe. My father, William Jedsoe,¹² had knocked all the windows out of my mother's car and then had tried to set fire to the car. I then ran into the house and layed down on the bed and started to cry. Then my brother Benjamin then walked into the bedroom where I was and asked me if I wanted him to kill my father. I told Benjamin yes. Benjamin then walked out on the porch with a shot gun. I did not see him shoot my father. I heard what I thought to be a firecracker go off and then I saw my daddy fall to the ground.

The presence of a potentially approving audience can also have a facilitating effect. This helps escalate crowd violence, because some individuals will behave more aggressively than they would otherwise in order to gain approval of a crowd. An individual who would never think of walking up to a police officer on a quiet street and calling him "a pig" might chant "pig" repeatedly when he is with a crowd of sympathizers.

The presence of others can also have an inhibiting effect on aggression. Levin and Turgeon (1957) found that the presence of a strange adult inhibited aggressive doll play in children. Wright (1943) studied the effects of frustration on children who had either a "strong friend" or a "weak friend" present. Pairing a child with a strong friend decreased the amount of conflict within the pairs but increased the amount of aggression toward the adult experimenter. Thus, inhibitions against aggression toward peers were apparently stronger in the presence of a close friend, while inhibitions against aggression toward adults were weaker.

We have already noted how dependent behavior or supplication on the part of the victim can inhibit the aggressor. Morris (1967) noted such behavior in apes while Buss (1966), in a laboratory study using human subjects, found that when a shocked victim responded with moans and groans it decreased the subsequent aggression by the attacker.

The presence of others can influence the expression of aggression in yet another fashion. As we have noted, sometimes the aggressive instigation toward a target T_1 is outweighed by inhibitions. In such a situation, the overt aggression may be displaced toward others ($T_2, 3 \dots N$). Such displacement is, of course, facilitated by the presence of others who may serve as substitute targets. Some alternate targets are always available. Some people vent their spleen against "the administration" or write letters to the paper complaining about the "Commies" or the "Birchers." The self is another such ever-present target, and instigation to aggression is sometimes turned inward upon the self. This is most likely to occur when aggression is blocked by internal inhibitions rather than by external constraints, and when the individual feels guilty for having the aggressive feelings.

Another important stimulus factor is the availability of weapons. Berkowitz has suggested that weapons in and of themselves may increase aggressive instigation (Berkowitz, 1968; Berkowitz and LePage, 1967). Berkowitz has sought to demonstrate this in a complex series of studies in which aroused subjects are required to deliver shock to another person in the presence of either a gun or a badminton racket. Although the data are generally consistent with Berkowitz's hypotheses showing more aggressiveness in the presence of the gun, the situation is artificial and the results should be generalized to behavior outside the laboratory only with the greatest caution.

Whether or not weapons in and of themselves elicit aggression, there can be little doubt that their presence or absence can play an important role. Weapons make aggression easier and safer, especially against a physically superior antagonist. That is why guns are sometimes referred to as "equalizers." If a weapon is readily available, an aggressive impulse can be acted upon immediately, giving the ego little opportunity to neutralize, displace, or sublimate the instigation. In the case described above of the boy who impulsively killed his father, it is unlikely that the murder would have taken place if a gun had not been readily available. MacDonald (1967, p. 480), describing the treatment of individuals who have made homicidal threats, stressed:

Patients should be requested to arrange for sale of their firearms . . . Although it is easy to purchase another pistol, the fact that one is not immediately available in the moment of rage may be life-saving. Shakespeare's comment in *King John* is pertinent: "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds, makes ill deeds done" (1967, p. 480).

Of course, weapons do not always operate to facilitate violence; they can also impede aggression. A person who has strong instigation to aggress against someone may be deterred if his intended victim is armed. It was this aspect of weapons that led Samuel Colt to name one of his revolvers the "Peacemaker." Similarly, the motto of the Strategic Air Command, "Peace is our profession," is a reflection of the fact that the recent defense policy of the United States, along with other major nations, has been to attempt to prevent aggression by accumulating weapons.

The behavior of others and the presence of weapons are but two of the many stimulus factors that can facilitate or impede aggressive behavior. There is no need to discuss all the many ways in which such factors can influence aggression. The main point is that the occurrence of violence cannot be fully understood if we restrict our study to the aggressor's internal instigation and inhibitions without considering the external stimulus situation.

EPILOGUE

In the previous pages, we have examined in detail the three major factors that interact to determine the strength of a violent or aggressive response: instigation to aggression, inhibitions against aggression, and stimulus factors. We have discussed various theories that have been offered to account for the origins of each factor. We discussed theories that proposed that instigation and inhibition to aggression are innate, and others that proposed that they

arise from environmental factors. We also examined those factors that theorists have suggested decrease instigation and inhibition. In our discussion of stimulus factors, we noted that some classes of stimuli can facilitate the expression of aggression while others impede its expression. It became clear from this discussion that the dynamics of overt aggressive behavior are quite complex and that the empirical data collected thus far are not adequate to allow us to come to any final conclusion as to what theoretical position is closest to the truth.

Few of the studies we examined attempted to test theories of human violence. Those empirical studies that did focus on violence were generally not designed to test theories. Investigations that did focus on important theoretical issues generally investigated milder aggressive behavior or used infrahuman subjects. A paramount need is for research attempting to determine whether the hypotheses derived from such studies apply to human violence. Although no single investigation can provide a definitive answer about the dynamics of violence, a series of smaller studies could do much to advance our knowledge in this area. If theories of aggression were examined and deductions made from them about certain aspects of violent behavior, then the accuracy of these predictions might be empirically determined. Gradually a pattern of results could be accumulated that might well be meaningful.

A good example of this is Palmer's (1960) study in which he interviewed the mothers of convicted murderers to determine if there was a higher incidence of frustration in the early childhood of the murderer as compared with his next eldest brother. Palmer himself was well aware of the limitations of this study and of the fact that mothers' reports are likely to be inaccurate. Despite these drawbacks, if Palmer had found no differences in early childhood trauma and frustration, it would have cast doubt on whether frustration-aggression theory could be generalized to the problem of violence. The fact that he did find significantly more frustrating events in the lives of the murderers when they were children does not *prove* that childhood frustration results in violence, but it does provide some encouragement for those who would attempt to apply frustration-aggression theory to the problem of violence. If many more such studies testing predictions based on different theories of aggression were carried out, confirmation of a number of predictions would add to our confidence in a theory, while disconfirmations would increase our skepticism regarding a given theoretical principle.

Investigators who wish to study the dynamics of violence will thus have to be patient and tolerant. The problems of such research are similar to those involved in smelting low grade ore; a great deal of time, effort, and energy must be expended in return for a relatively low yield. However, for those willing to make the effort, the goal can be obtained.

Given the great heterogeneity in the field, researchers on violence would do well to remain as open and receptive to new ideas as possible. Psychologists should attempt to test their laboratory-derived ideas on ethological and ethnological reports. Laboratory studies of such phenomena as vicarious catharsis should be supplemented by field investigations of sporting events, while hypotheses derived in the field or the clinic should be tested rigorously in the laboratory whenever possible.

Given the variety of theories and approaches, no generally agreed on prescription for the elimination of undesirable violence can be written; unfortunately, the urgency of the problem will not permit us to wait until a sure remedy is found. This means that a variety of programs will have to be tried. However, such pilot programs should be designed so as to maximize their contribution to research. If they are firmly rooted in well-articulated theoretical principles, then data regarding their effectiveness will constitute a partial test of these principles.

In the present writer's opinion, one reason there is such a variety of theoretical positions and such diverse data is that aggression is not a unidimensional phenomenon. The variety of typologies examined in "Typologies of Violence" is evidence for diversity in people who are violent; indeed, it appears that the concept "violent person" is about as homogeneous as the terms "nonviolent" or "normal" person. One person may become violent because of inadequate inhibitions. The sight of a policeman may stimulate violence in one person and suppress any aggressive tendencies in another. If a variety of action programs based on different theoretical principles should be established, attention should be paid not only to their gross overall effectiveness, but also to the characteristics of those individuals who benefit from a given program and those for whom it is ineffective. Only by keeping careful records of this type will differential diagnosis of individuals or groups who will profit from different remedial or preventive programs become possible. In some circumstances, incarceration or suppression may be the best policy, in others, removal of economic obstacles by providing training or jobs, and in still others, psychotherapy or training in human relations. If action programs can thus be designed with research as a paramount goal, it will be a major help in building the necessary bridges from theories of aggression to theories of violence, and from theories of violence to programs of violence prevention.

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FOOTNOTES

- 1 This singling out of instigation and inhibition as important factors not only "makes sense" but also appears consistent with recent physiological research which suggests that there are brain circuits mediating excitation of aggression while other circuits are antagonistic to these aggressive circuits (Moyer, 1968).
- 2 Arrest is considered an aggressive response insofar as it delivers a noxious stimulus to the recipient.
- 3 One probable reason for these differences in emphasis is the fact that different investigators have worked with different patient or subject populations. The neurotic patients usually seen by psychoanalysts differ more in respect to their instigation to aggression than they do in their inhibitions or in the stimuli to which they are exposed. Therefore, it is not surprising that psychoanalysts should study instigation. The present writer has focused on inhibitions partly because the criminal samples with which he has worked have typically had uniformly high instigation so that differences in inhibitions appeared to be a major factor differentiating one from another. Berkowitz has studied normal college students who probably differed relatively little in instigation or in inhibitions; in his research, stimulus factors have emerged as a primary determinant.
- 4 Some authors use "anger" as a term synonymous with instigation to aggression; however, anger generally denotes a consciously felt emotion and not all aggressive instigation is of this nature.
- 5 While no ethologist, the writer would question whether man is unique among all fauna. Although he appears to be more violent toward his own kind than other mammalian species are, he would appear to rank as an amateur compared to certain tropical fishes whose cannibalistic tendencies are the despair of hobbyists.
- 6 As might be expected, Ardrey (1966, p. 298 f.) did not agree with Scott's conclusions, accusing him of repeating "party line" falsehoods.
- 7 The notion that reducing environmental frustrations should reduce instigation to aggression and, thereby, violence, may be interpreted by some as an implicit call by the writer for social programs which, in essence, attempt to "buy off" potentially violent people by doing things for them. Such an interpretation is based on an overly shallow interpretation of what the writer means by frustration in this broader context. Hungry people are frustrated, but not all frustrated people are hungry. Man is made up of many drives and these include not only basic tissue needs but also needs for self-respect, dignity, autonomy, and some measure of self-determination. Social programs that simply satisfy tissue needs and maintain life while keeping the individual in a dependent and essentially helpless condition are not likely to reduce frustrations or alleviate violence, in the writer's opinion.
The essence of the original definition of frustration was an interference in a goal response—that is, in something which the individual *himself* was trying to accomplish; programs which do everything for the individual instead of providing him with opportunities to do things for himself can also be a major source of frustration. The writer concludes from this that if a social program aimed at the alleviation of chronic frustrations is to be effective, the frustrated individuals themselves will have to play a major role in planning it. If programs are designed to alleviate what planners *think* are the major frustrations without consulting the people at whom the programs are aimed, then they may well contribute to the problems.
- 8 Social learning probably plays an even greater role in influencing inhibitions against the expression of aggression. Even if both businessmen were equally aroused by the delays in the above example, the businessman reared in a culture in which a great emphasis is placed on maintaining composure and calm equanimity would be less likely to manifest his irritation than would a businessman from a society that encourages frank expression of feelings.
- 9 It will be recalled that, in the earlier discussion of the strength of instigation to aggression, we referred to the hypothesis that the greater the number of interrupted response sequences, the greater the amount of frustration and consequently the greater the amount of instigation. The person who has been refused service in four bars in a row will be more upset than the person who is refused service in only one. In the present context, however, it is not presupposed that the residual instigation to aggression necessarily stems from frustration. It could stem from other environmental

- causes or from genetic causes as in Lorenz's hypothesis that unexpressed aggression will accumulate in the absence of discharge.
- 10 In psychoanalytic theory, the nature of the Oedipus conflict and hence the development of the superego differs in boys and girls. The present account applies only to boys.
 - 11 The crucial factor would be whether the aggressive experience is followed by reward or punishment, satisfaction or guilt. Rewards should generalize to lessen inhibitions, while punishment should increase inhibitions. Polner's (1968) anecdotal accounts of the reactions of Vietnam combat veterans indicate that some learned to find joy in combat while others were so disgusted they returned home to devote themselves to antiwar activities or social service.
 - 12 All names are fictitious.

PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES OF VIOLENCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

Psychiatry developed as a medical specialty in close association with the rest of medicine, and understandably has been primarily "disease" oriented. We find, as we well might expect, the psychiatric view of violence primarily interwoven in the subject matter of diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disorders of the human mind and behavior. For all of us, psychiatrist or layman, an individual act of violence implies that "something is wrong" with the person so engaged; for the psychiatrist as a medical specialist, he sees the individual as acting under the influence of disease, psychological malfunctioning, or developmental defect, or as an expression of a disorder of adaptation, or more recently, as a consequence of disturbed metabolism or genetics.

Psychiatry, for the most part, is "eclectic" and draws its explanation and understanding of human behavior from many sources. It has no general theory of human behavior and is dependent on knowledge obtained not only from its own clinical involvement (diagnostic and therapeutic) with patients, but also from other medical, biological, psychological, sociological, or behavioral sciences. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, has always been

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NOTE.—Figures in parentheses indicate references at end of appendix. Superscript figures indicate footnotes at end of appendix.

concerned with a general theory of human psychology and has contributed much to psychiatric understanding. It has been one of the important influences on American psychiatric thinking.

In its development in the 19th century, psychiatry was primarily concerned with description of behaviors that were considered abnormal.¹ Although little knowledge of causation was available, the predominantly naturalistic trend of medicine expected that a physical cause acting on the anatomy and physiology of body and brain would ultimately be discovered.² While psychological stress had not been entirely neglected as a cause of emotional illnesses, it remained for the development of the psychoanalytic perspectives to bring psychological conflict and stressful emotional development into focus as major contributors to the psychiatric disorders. From psychoanalysis and from the social sciences has come the broader view of emotional illness as an adaptation to life's stresses.

Although violence as a concept and subject for study has not attracted much attention from psychiatry and psychoanalysis, our point of view emphasizes the importance of these specialties contributing to (1) the understanding of its manifestations, and (2) the means by which its devastating effects may be controlled. The role which psychiatry and psychoanalysis should play may present the same controversy as does the consideration of the role psychiatry can take in the field of crime. Halleck (1) writes that "psychiatry holds an instable position in the field of criminology. For every zealot who heralds psychiatric concepts and treatment as the only answer to the crime problem, there is a critic who believes that psychiatric contributions to criminology are unscientific and misleading. A realistic assessment of the value of psychiatric criminology must lie somewhere between. . . ."

Careful review of psychiatric literature (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), especially that which would be used in teaching and training settings, makes it apparent that violence as a concept and subject for study has hardly achieved a recognizable status. Yet, the individual who behaves violently, threatens or inflicts injury and destruction has been described and classified in every recorded psychiatric nosology.³

Since violence rarely has a character of its own in psychiatric literature, it must be sought elsewhere. Descriptions of criminal behavior, psychotic behavior, neurotic and characterological behavior, the results of organic brain illnesses, and other areas of psychiatric concern contain what is generally known about violence. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that violence rarely goes by its own name. Its many possible synonyms—murder, destruction, crime, aggression, hostility, rage, assault, hate, etc.—are not equivalent. They suggest not only overt behavior but subjective feeling states as well. We find violence included as a byproduct of man's postulated instinctual aggressive nature or inborn propensities (8, 9, 10), or we see it as a result of frustration (11) or learning (12, 13). Violence's most common nom de plume seems to be aggression, both in general psychiatric and psychoanalytic writing.

The relative absence of discussions about violence in psychiatric literature is compounded by the lack of adequate attention to it in psychiatric training programs. Violent behavior is not a major subject in the education of

psychiatrists, yet the control and management of violent behavior in hospital wards or other closed settings such as state hospitals, prisons, and the like, require special skills. If these skills are not devised and taught, the psychiatrist's function loses some of its value. The traditional use of restraints, either physical or chemical, has often been the only role a physician could take when violent behavior would erupt.

The diversity of violent behavior leads us to doubt the possibility of arriving at a single cause theory of its origin. We are aware that hard facts about violent behavior are difficult to come by; they must be welcomed from whatever direction they flow. We are concerned with what psychiatry can contribute to an understanding of individual violence.

The question frequently arises about the usefulness and applicability of clinical techniques as a method of testing hypotheses about the personal functioning of people. Much less is understood about such application of psychoanalytic techniques, and it is this that we shall for the most part discuss. Our presentation is primarily based on the writings of Brenner (14) and Waelder (15).

In applying the psychoanalytic method to the study of an individual, the analyst has an opportunity to learn facts which are not available to everybody about this individual. He learns:

- (1) Facts of conscious life which the individual is not eager to relate to others.
- (2) Facts about which the individual does not ordinarily wish to tell the truth.
- (3) Facts which are primarily related within the psychoanalytic situation because of its climate of relaxation, discipline, and intimacy.
- (4) Facts which are not conscious or preconscious, but have derivatives which can become conscious under the conditions of the psychoanalytic situation.

The analyst not only learns all these, which are not available to others, but also sees repeatedly the configuration in which they are assembled, and the context (social, emotional, etc.) in which they appear. This may be called, as does Waelder, the *Level of Observation*.

This is followed by clinical interpretation: observational data is interpreted with regards to their inter-connections, and inter-relationships with other behavior, or conscious content. This represents the *Level of Clinical Interpretation*.

Observational data and their interpretations derived from numerous individuals enable us to make statements about a particular type of person, condition, experience, or symptom. This is called the *Level of Clinical Generalization*.

Our clinical interpretations allow us to formulate theoretical concepts which are either implicit in the interpretations, or to which the interpretations may lead. Examples of these concepts so derived would be: repression, defense, regression. This is the *Level of Clinical Theory*.

We need not stop at the level of clinical concepts, and may go even further and develop more abstract concepts such as: psychic energy, cathexis, life and death instincts. Here we have the *Level of Meta Psychology*.

It is possible to define an even more abstract level of hypothesis involvement, and that is the *Level of Philosophy*.

This would be a way of looking at the world and is at times more a matter of faith. An example of this in psychoanalysis was Freud's early philosophy of positivism, and faith in the possibility of human improvement through reason.

The levels described above are not of equal importance. The levels of observation, and clinical interpretation are indispensable for individual understanding and clinical practice. The other levels follow closely in importance, but to lesser degrees. Metapsychological formulations are much less important to the clinician for his practice. They represent formulations which can be replaced and discarded without doing damage to the rest. One's philosophy would be even further removed and independent of clinical functions and conceptualizations.

Waelder stressed the point that any appraisal of psychoanalysis must come from consideration of the data of observation, the clinical generalizations which they generate, and the consequence of the analyst interpreting these to his patient.

Brenner (14) has also discussed those issues related to the problem of determining the accuracy or validity of the work of the psychoanalyst. He pointed out that the analyst forms a conjecture about the patient in an intuitive way, but with steps that are retraceable in his awareness. At an appropriate time, he presents this as an interpretation to the patient. If he is correct, in his interpretation, then he may expect observable consequences.

Specific confirmatory responses may appear immediately or after a time delay. They are recognized from what the patient reports and what the psychoanalyst observes. Some typical confirmatory responses are:

- (1) Decreased anxiety.
- (2) Symptom improvement or its opposite should the patient have a need to suffer.
- (3) Confirmatory memories, fantasies, dreams, gestures, verbal associations with or without an appropriate emotional experience.
- (4) Feelings of surprise, recognition, or the thought "that clicks" on part of patient.
- (5) Sudden laughter reflecting affect or tension discharge.
- (6) Patient's repetition of what was interpreted.
- (7) Confirmation of a reconstruction from an external source.
- (8) Ability of a reconstruction to enable the analyst to fit together all the facts of the patient's life, and neurosis which otherwise remains jumbled.

Before embarking upon an attempt to validate the psychoanalytic interpretation, we must accept certain hypotheses as valid and adequately established by observations. These are: Psychic Determinism and Unconscious Mental Functioning.

The dynamic psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst deal with subject matter that lies mostly in the past. Even contemporary events which the patient reports happen before the therapy hour and are, therefore, "past" events. All variables under study are related; each affect the others so that it is not possible to observe a change in one without the presence of simultaneous

change in the others. The patient himself changes during treatment; he matures or declines, but is always assimilating experiences encountered in the course of living. We see, therefore, that the likelihood of establishing the power of prediction can only be expected under very limited conditions. The advantage, however, which the psychoanalyst and dynamic psychiatrist has lies in his use of introspection and empathy. The interpretations offered to a patient show the patient inner connections which he can experience. He gradually achieves an awareness of what was previously unconscious. He feels these, he experiences them. He communicates an inner experience which he can also define for himself, and confirm on other occasions.

The work of the psychoanalyst and the dynamic psychiatrist does not lend itself toward exact proofs. Their object of study lies in the past, very much like those of archeological studies, history, and evolutionary theory. Direct evidence is not available in any of these. We, therefore, take as evidence the fact that a reconstruction or major interpretation offered to a patient fits an enormous mass of data from many sources. The probability of this being a matter of coincidence is almost negligible. Biological sciences, and social sciences often find themselves functioning in a similar manner.

II. ENCOUNTER WITH VIOLENCE

Let us consider the circumstances in which the psychiatrist encounters violence in his varied practice settings. We have already mentioned the obvious attention to violence in closed settings such as hospitals and prisons.⁴ In the open settings, clinics, or private practices of psychiatry where individual evaluation and treatment is the model (rather than where there is a community or sociological model of practice), there are limited conditions where the violent person is seen—and then generally after the violent event. Where the violent event has already taken place and when an immediate need for hospitalization is no longer present, psychiatrists may be referred patients from courts or social agencies to determine whether treatment would help. In the case of minor sexual offenses, the provision that the offender get psychiatric treatment may be stipulated. Other offenses, such as assaultive behavior due to alcoholism or drugs, may appear to officials to be the result of emotional disturbance; then, psychiatric referral rather than prosecution becomes a way of handling the offense. Families may seek out psychiatrists because of strange, assaultive behavior, or more likely, threatening behavior on the part of a member of the family. Here paranoid and depressive conditions are most common and the problem is to evaluate the potential for actual violence (murder, suicide, assault, etc.).

The practitioner treating a patient and not aware of the fact that there is an underlying psychosis, may discover that the patient develops psychotic symptoms, including some act of violence. Hospitalization of the patient certainly would be indicated and sought prior to the event of such a violent act, but the practitioner may not always be able to predict the occurrence of such an event. An act of violence in the psychotic patient may occur without the patient giving his therapist clues that this will take place. The patient manages to keep from revealing certain fantasies, certain plans or facts, that might signal the possibility of violence. Even though the potential for

destructive acting-out is present, the psychiatrist might not feel it advisable to hospitalize such a patient. A similar situation occurs in a patient thought to be suicidal. It is impossible to hospitalize a patient indefinitely because he may be suicidal or homicidal, unless the physician can be absolutely sure that such an outcome is imminent. The psychiatrist who works with alcoholic patients may see a number of patients who have been involved in destructive acts accomplished during alcohol intoxication.

Juveniles whose behavior is known to the family but not yet to the authorities often have violent histories and are referred. Any bizarre, sudden outbreak of actual or threatened violence may be first referred to a psychiatrist. The responsibility for determining whether actual or further violence will recur is often placed on the psychiatrist—as is the responsibility for instituting a treatment program, either of out-patient therapy or hospitalization.

In many of these cases, the patient is placed on probation by the courts, with the requirement that he accept psychiatric treatment. Patients who have to come for psychiatric help in order to avoid being sentenced usually continue in treatment only until the danger of being sent to jail is over. In some cases, as for example with the alcoholic referred by the courts, the patient may eventually become motivated to continue treatment on his own (16).

An important determinant of whether such a referral will work out to be a therapeutic success is whether the patient's destructive behavior was symptomatic. That is, was it essentially an aspect of a neurotic pattern, or was it a manifestation of what we would consider to be a character pattern disturbance? In the latter case, we might expect the destructive behavior to present less of a problem for the patient. It is acceptable to him and it is what we would call "ego-syntonic." His behavior becomes a problem for other people and for those attempting to maintain law and order but does not present a problem to the individual himself. Where the action is an expression of a conflict or is associated with anxiety and guilt, we have a basis for instituting certain therapeutic measures which potentially can help the patient.

In the case of the psychotic patient, usually the treatment is the treatment of the illness itself and the violence is a byproduct of the psychoses. When a psychiatrist operates within the setting of a penal institution, then the violence is much more a part of the individual's very personality structure. Here treating the act of violence really implies a rehabilitation of the entire personality and in a prison setting, for example, the acts of violence run the gamut of arson, rape, assault, property damage, murder, and the like. It is in the setting of some kind of penal institution, that most occasions of violent acts would be seen or treated by a psychiatrist. Unfortunately, the psychiatrist is least effective with his armamentarium of therapeutics in such a setting. The vast array of tranquilizing drugs, antidepressive drugs, and the variety of psychotherapy approaches in effect, have very little influence upon the personalities of these kinds of patients. The need for rehabilitation is certainly recognized, but the means by which rehabilitation is accomplished is still in an extremely crude state. Patients usually suffer such severe personality deficiencies as to make it difficult to do psychotherapeutic work with them. The rehabilitative effort should serve as a kind of replacement,

therapy providing them what their original development did not accomplish. The problem here is that in some cases it is too late! In these individuals' growth and development, certain experiences could have been helpful to them had they occurred at a stated time in their development; coming now, they are much less effective. In many cases, the best we could hope for is that institutional control will help them maintain an effective adjustment within that setting. There is a real problem in many of these cases that one sees in a prison; they make excellent adjustments to the prison because the setting provides and makes up for certain basic deficiencies within their growth and development. Their good behavior in the prison becomes a basis for parole without recognizing that when such individuals return to civilian life, they again become persons with deficiencies, but now without the opportunity for replacement therapy as that provided by institutionalization.

It is an interesting contradiction that the sentence for varieties of degrees of murder or homicide generally are much longer than other sentences for various assaultive behaviors; yet, the individual committing murder is much less likely to repeat this act than the individual involved in assaultive behavior. Records of a prisoner sentenced for some kind of assaultive behavior usually include a long list of arrests for previous assaultive behavior. A most interesting problem is that of the large number of people who become involved in an extreme act of violence because their very life is made up of contact with an environment where violence is practiced (17). They are unable to free themselves from an environment which may include alcoholism, drug addiction, frequent fights, frequent use of weapons, frequent encounters with the law and sexually abusive behavior. Such people daily live in the presence of violence and destructive behavior. They only come to the attention of the law or to a psychiatrist who might be called upon on a consulting basis, when they become involved in a much more serious destructive act such as homicide. These individuals are not just tough and brutal, but also are found to be helpless, naive, dependent, passive people, who seem ready to accept as natural the kind of existence they lead.

Persons who have made suicidal gestures are frequently seen in practice. The problem is usually depression, but may also be immaturity or attention seeking. Here the task is to evaluate and predict recurrence and the possibility of a successful attempt and to institute measures of forestalling it by out- or in-patient treatment.

In the course of psychotherapy every patient who has consulted a psychiatrist for whatever reason will report fantasies of violent behavior. It is a rare human being in therapy who has not been aware of hostile destructive fantasies. The fact, though, is that most persons do not commit violence and most do not continually experience violent destructive urges.

The relationship between mental illness and violence is as confusing as that between mental illness and crime. Characterizing mental illness as a communication of personal suffering or communication of an inability to control personal behavior and by a judgment by society of unreasonable behavior, Halleck noted that these same factors are constantly present in many of the behaviors we call crime (1). Halleck links crime and mental illness by seeing them both as adaptations to stress. "The stresses that lead to mental illness are often the same stresses that lead to crime." The explanations for mental illness, then, could be modified to explain crime. But

can these explanations be modified for violence? Violence seems to go beyond legally defined criminal behavior and still is not altogether capable of being treated as mental illness. The evidences of emotional pain or distress are usually seldom seen in criminal behavior. The diagnostic category of antisocial personality is included as a mental disorder but is defined in terms of behavior patterns that are in conflict with society and where there is a lack of guilty affect.⁵ Whatever communications these individuals give of an awareness of painful affect is often suspect.

To predict that an individual (whether patient or prisoner) will commit a violent act and to specify the nature of the violent act is an extremely difficult problem. The psychiatrist functions without standards and other criteria that can be regularly verified or justified. "Clinical judgment" becomes intuitive criterion to determine the direction of the prediction. Yet, in some cases, the individual who has been sentenced for repeated aggressive and destructive criminal acts shows patterns that can become predictive of future behavior. Very often these patterns are overlooked and repeatedly such people are returned to civilian life only again to become involved in a cycle of aggressive, destructive behavior, imprisonment, and release. In most cases the *occurrence* of a violent act is extremely difficult to predict; to predict the *nature* of it becomes even more difficult. Over and above this difficulty, we really overlook what is predictable on the basis of the individual's repeated behavior. We overlook patterns that have become stabilized and reflect the only way that such an individual finds it possible to behave.

III. THEORIES OF THE ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE

An attempt to classify the various theories of the origins of violence directs our attention to some observations already noted, namely, (1) the absence of an organized body of data and theory about violence in Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis and (2) the customary treatment of violence as an extreme form of aggression. Because of this state of affairs, theories of aggression will first be discussed. If there is any point in differentiating aggression from violence, and we feel there is, then we will require this information to serve as a frame of reference for such a differentiation.

I. Origins of Aggression

A. Aggression as Primary Motivation

Within this major group are found those theories of aggression which consider aggressive or destructive behavior the direct and primary product of internal determinants characteristically present in all people; the vicissitudes of such determinants, however, vary from individual to individual.

1. Aggression as an Instinct

a. Death instinct.—The concept of Death Instinct was introduced by Freud (18) in order to explain masochism, suicide, and the compulsion to repeat past emotional experiences. He saw man possessing an urge inherent in all organic life which sought to restore an earlier state of being; that is,

through death, the organism reverted itself to an inorganic state. All destructive forms of behavior were derivatives of this inherent biological impetus toward death. Destructive urges might correspond to the processes of catabolism in body physiology. They are instinctual characteristics of all living matter.

Freud saw that in spite of this biological impetus toward death, life continues on because the Death Instinct may be redirected toward external objects, and because it can be opposed by the forces of the Life Instinct: Love tames hate!

Although Freud's ideas about sexuality and aggression derived from clinical observations, he took the liberty to go beyond such observations in formulating the Death Instinct. In the framework of Psychoanalytic Theory, Death Instinct represents a second-order or metapsychological construct, by the very fact that it does extend beyond the level of clinical observation (15, 20). For the most part, Death Instinct remains a matter of historical interest rather than a predominant conceptual theme. Some analysts such as Klein (21) and Menninger (22) hold to the idea of Death Instinct but view it more in a clinical than biological light. Many find it unnecessary because clinical observations can be adequately dealt with by a concept of an "aggressive drive." Such a concept does not suggest self-destructiveness, and is not based on the biological characteristics of living cells.

b. Aggressive instinct.—This is discussed below in section D, "Ethology."

2. Aggression as a Drive

The definition of aggression, its ultimate origins and nature, are not universally agreed upon. But for the most part, just as psychoanalysts take a stand supporting libido theory, so they support the idea of the presence of an aggressive drive. Within the framework of psychoanalytic theory, a drive refers to a state of central excitation (23) in response to stimulation. *It does not include the motor response.* Motor activity, however, does follow such a state of excitation and is mediated by a structure of the mind, the Ego, in a manner that allows for the modification by experience, by reflection, and by the nature and quality of the situation producing the stimulation. In contrast to "instincts" as found in animals, with which the concept is frequently confused, drives are not predetermined.

It could be said that aggression as a drive is already at work in the infant and influences his behavior and seeks gratification. Manifestations of the aggressive drive follow the same transition from oral to anal to phallic phases of development as does the sexual drive. Similarly, they show the same likelihood of becoming involved in the processes of *fixation* and *regression*.

During the oral phase of development, aggressive impulses are discharged by oral activity such as biting. In the anal phase, soiling or retention of feces serve this purpose. For the older child, fantasies about the penis and how it can be used contain destructive elements. Whether gratification of the aggressive drive provides the individual with pleasure remains uncertain. Freud thought not, but others (24) consider that it does.

As employed then within a psychoanalytic framework, aggression is innate, genetically determined, and supported by underlying somatic, physiological, biological, and developmental processes.

B. Aggression as Secondary Motivation or Derived Behavior

Central to this group of theories is the idea that aggression, or the need to express aggression, is not innate but is acquired. Some authors consider aggression primarily and merely a response to certain eliciting conditions; others consider aggression as a learned drive. When the latter is the case, then an internal instigating source evolves from past experiences. This instigating source then directs the expression of aggressive behavior in a manner which follows a model based upon the individual's learning experiences.

1. Stimulus-Response Theories

The most popular and well-known of these types of theories has been the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis. It is much less well known that Freud in 1915 (25) was the first to suggest this thesis. He observed that the frustration of behavior aimed at gaining pleasure or avoiding pain led to aggression in the frustrated individual. Almost 25 years later, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (26) proposed their frustration-aggression hypothesis. As learning theorists, their focus was primarily on events that provoked aggression. It was soon recognized that not all frustration (27) leads to aggression so that the hypothesis was changed to state that frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of responses, one of which may be an instigation to some form of aggression. In such a theory, variables intervening between the frustrating stimulus and the aggressive response, such as subjective experience of the person, his affective and ideational reactions are virtually omitted (28). These are by contrast the very core of the material dealt with by the psychoanalyst.

The theory is a stimulus-response one, which places emphasis on the fact that learning takes place, i.e., repeated frustrations make the learned aggressive response more likely after each occurrence. Events that provoke aggression have been of particular interest to those supporting this view. Such knowledge may represent an important source of information for us. This has been demonstrated already in the development of crisis theory and of techniques of crisis intervention (29). Crisis intervention succeeds (in part at least) because of the attempts made to understand the nature and structure of situations which can become "frustrations" to the patient and which can affect these individuals who already have major conflicts over and difficulty in the control of aggression. The interest that learning theorists have shown in the types of aggressive responses that are possible have also been of value. They may help clarify ideas about the influence of culture, society, or environment on ways of expressing aggression.

What is implied but not directly stated in the frustration-aggression hypothesis is the sequence between frustration and the ensuing aggressions. We can readily see that the frustration could lead to the affect of rage, and rage, in turn, would lead to aggression (30, 4). Pain, attack, and confinement in a limited space are examples of heightened stimulation leading eventually to a reaction of aggression (2, p. 174; 3, p. 570). In these instances, too, we assume that rage is present. In effect, then, aggression is the motor counterpart of rage. How one manages rage will determine whether aggressive behavior results. This issue, for the most part, is overlooked in the

stimulus-response type of theories of aggression such as the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

2. Aggression as Learned Behavior

Many forms of this idea appear in the literature. Most recently, for example, Ashley Montagu in an edited book (13), states his view that by nature man is not aggressive. Aggressive and violent behavior is learned. Descriptions of cultures where aggression is absent have been cited as evidence for this view. Many years ago, Margaret Mead made a similar point (31).

Montagu's arguments against an aggressive instinct are that ethological evidence for such an instinct is unreliable. Lorenz (8) is especially attacked on the grounds that his theory of aggression as innate is not supported even for lower animals. Montagu also argues that even if lower animals did have an aggressive instinct, Lorenz's procedure of applying this idea to man is naive.

Scott claims there is no evidence that spontaneous stimulation of aggressive (fighting) behavior may arise from within the body (32). There is, however, an internal physiological mechanism which has only to be stimulated to produce fighting. This internal mechanism can be kept under control, according to Scott, by external means.

Feshbach (33) assumes that hostile aggression is a learned drive; its antecedents are past exposure to punishment, and present threats to self-esteem. Other theorists such as Scott (cited above) view the noxious consequences of an aggressive act which has some purpose other than injury as one of a large number of possible reinforcers. They concern themselves only with the reinforcing stimulus conditions and the discriminative stimuli eliciting the response; Feshbach, on the other hand, contends that injurious outcomes resulting from aggression must be taken into account as an influence upon the aggressor's behavior. Any response which produces the cue, "it hurts," in others will lead to some form of reward, or non-reward, or will produce punishment or even some combination of these possibilities. These cues then serve to mediate the different sorts of aggressive responses and set the stage for reinforcement of the aggressive behavior! The cues of pain (34) may become secondary reinforcers and serve to maintain aggressive responses in the absence of other rewards. This takes place if the aggressive act succeeds in eliminating the source of frustration and evokes pain in the frustrator. The association of perception of pain in others with the removal of frustration leads the former to acquire secondary reward value.

A similar explanation is more difficult to offer in those cases where the individual experiences an impulse to do injury to someone else. The motivation to injure others may become an acquired motivation based upon the internalization of a standard which the child acquires from exposures to cultural values and from specific experiences. When considered from this point of view, the wish to injure is directly linked to the degree of punishment which the child has received, especially for being aggressive. Studies can be cited to support this (35, 36).

An important contribution that such a theoretical point of view makes is found in the derived expectation that individuals who have had a history of exposure to retaliation and counteraggression will have their aggressive

behavior reinforced by the perception of the suffering of the provocateur, and more likely will continue the behavior which injures the provocateur!

The satisfaction derived from the perception of pain can best be understood if we also take into account the observation that the aggressive act has served to compensate for a threat to the aggressor's self-esteem. Feshbach and Worchel (37) see self-esteem threat as a major source of aggression. To see someone hurt demonstrates to the aggressor that he is not helpless and does not feel worthless; this serves to increase the reinforcing quality of the perception of pain in the victim.

In summary, Feshbach emphasizes that aggression is learned and that its primary antecedents are past exposure to punishment and present threats to self-esteem.

Maslow (38) took the point of view that aggressiveness or destructiveness is an end product rather than an original source of behavior. He felt that destructive behavior derives from so many different sources that it becomes ridiculous to speak of any single urge toward destructiveness. For example, destructiveness may occur (1) incidentally, as one sweeps something out of his path to a goal, (2) as one of the concomitant reactions to basic threat, (3) where any damage to the individual or any perception of organic deterioration arouses in the insecure person feelings of threat, (4) in the insecure, authoritarian person who sees the world about him as a jungle and considers, therefore, that his best defense is "to attack." Because of these considerations, the author suggested that destructiveness be viewed as a symptom, a surface indicator of underlying trouble. The discovery of the source of the disturbance producing such a symptom is a separate task in and of itself!

3. *Aggressiveness and Destructiveness Subordinate to the Struggle for Survival and the Pursuit of Happiness* (19, p. 139)

It may come as a surprise to the reader that a well-known psychoanalyst and theoretician, Robert Waelder, should be representative of this point of view. He reasoned that it is worthwhile to recognize that there are manifestations of destructiveness which are byproducts of ego-activities or of libidinal drives, or are reactions to provocation; in such cases, it is not necessary to invoke the concept of an aggressive or destructive drive or instinct.

For example, aggression or destructiveness may appear when our lives are threatened, or our ambitions thwarted. Those who compete with us for the same love object may become victims of our aggression. In the normal attempt of the developing individual to achieve mastery of the outside world, a measure of destructiveness toward inanimate objects, or man or animal, may appear. Destructiveness may manifest itself as a byproduct of the control required of one's body, or as a byproduct of our struggle to acquire control over our mind. Also, when it is a part and parcel of oral biting, oral incorporation, anal sadism, phallic penetration or vaginal retentiveness, each a type of libidinal urge, it is not necessary to postulate its basis in an inborn drive to destroy.

C. *Neurophysiological and Neuroanatomical Basis for Aggression*

"Sham rage" was first observed by Goltz (39) in dogs in 1892. This was later studied by Cannon (40) in decorticated cats. These studies and work later done by Bard and Rioch (41) supported the idea that the hypothalamus was the center for expression of emotions. It was thought that the neocortex inhibits or facilitates aggressive behavior by its action on the hypothalamus. Later work by Bard (42) failed to support the finding that the hypothalamus was the "emotion center." "Sham rage" could be evoked even with complete transection of the brainstem just caudal to the hypothalamus. Rioch (43), in reviewing these studies, points out that "sham rage" is not a unique pattern of behavior. Three patterns of behavior appear in the decorticate animals: (1) *attack behavior*, which is evoked by nociceptive stimuli; (2) *struggle-escape behavior*, which is evoked by partial restraint; (3) *threat-escape behavior*, which is evoked by a loud high-pitched sound. Each of these are but caricatures of patterns to be found in the intact animal. The intact animal makes many moves, and responds to many different stimuli.

Some studies (44, 45, 46) demonstrated that stimulation or ablation of areas of the brain reduced thresholds for aggressive behavior, and thereby effectively changed the character of the situation which released aggression; certain aspects of the aggressive behavior were also changed from its normal appearance.

The conclusion we are led to (43) from the results of ablation and stimulation studies is that the brain does not possess centers for the production of certain patterns of behavior. Rather, what we find are mechanisms which direct the interaction of the organism with his environment toward patterns of behavior which are related to anatomically determined capabilities of the organism. The adequacy and complexity of such patterns are related to the capacity of the brain to perceive and process environmental data and make use of experience for building more complex patterns of behavior. Under circumstances of brain damage, or functional disturbances, patterns become simpler, stereotyped, and are controlled by a limited number of stimuli from the environment.

We may conclude from this that it is not yet possible to say which parts of the central nervous system are necessary for mediating patterns of aggressive behavior. Nor is it possible to say that any part of the brain is uninvolved in the repertoire of aggressive manifestations in an intact animal.

D. *Ethology*

The ethological theories of the origin of human aggression are based on animal behavior studies which are then applied to man. For the most part, ethologists have applied their findings with great care not to make sweeping generalizations about human behavior. Earlier studies of animal behavior (47) stressed species-specific characteristics. Charles Darwin (48) gave strength to the concept of innate or unlearned behavior and believed that behavioral patterns emerged through evolution. Lorenz (8) contributed the idea that an action-specific energy was available for each instinctive response. His most

recent and controversial book on human aggression states his case for instinctive fighting behavior. For him aggression is "the fighting instinct in beast and man directed against members of the same species." Inhibiting mechanisms developed in those animals that could easily kill off one another of the same species; because man could not, there was no survival benefit in inbreeding these inhibitions against violent destruction. On the other hand, man did develop, along with other animals that exhibit intraspecific aggression, a personal bond which tends to modify the more underlying and older intraspecific aggression.

Recently, Tinbergen (49) pointed out that the popularization of Lorenz has left too many readers either uncritically accepting or rejecting him without being fully aware of the present incomplete state of ethological knowledge. He argues that if Lorenz postulates an internal urge to attack and the possibility that such an attack can be spontaneous and internally induced, then what makes men attack each other? Tinbergen, in turn, hypothesizes that man still carries within him the animal heritage of territoriality. Tinbergen has not given up innateness, but he expands it to include the role played by increasing population or density. This leads to more intergroup contacts and continuous external provocation of aggression. He agrees with Lorenz that man's long distance weapons prevent the victim from reaching his attacker with signaled distress, appeasement, or reassurance. Tinbergen accepts the idea of innate patterns of behavior that interact with the environment at early stages in development. Learning takes place which is limited by internally imposed restrictions. This view is very much like the psychoanalytic point of view in its emphasis on both inherited potential and early developmental influences.

The critics of Lorenz and his important popularizer Robert Ardrey (50) argue strongly against what they consider to be Lorenz's essentially unsound thesis. Ashley Montagu's recently edited book, *Man and Aggression* (13), presents a number of essays by anthropologists and other social scientists criticizing the position of Lorenz as being no more than a hypothesis. Montagu rejects the idea of instinct as being without supporting data and feels that even if there could be a case for it in animals, it would not necessarily apply to man.

As ethological research continues, the findings seem to lead in the direction of lending support for psychiatric and psychoanalytic hypotheses. Hess (47) writes that ethology has contributed to the psychiatric study of behavior by providing a large body of experimental data on the effects of early experience and its interaction with the biological nature of man.

II. Origins of Violence

Each of the theories described above deal primarily with aggression, but are presented in such a way as to extend and apply to destructive or violent behavior. This extension frequently is implicit rather than explicitly defined and stated. The types of theories which follow have been presented by their advocates to account specifically for destructive or violent behavior. In all of these theories, aggression is understood to be a human characteristic which some think of as drive determined; others see aggression as learned via

experience. Still others do not deal with the origins of aggression. In each of the theories that follow the origin of aggression is not vital to the theory. Each tries primarily to explain violence in contradistinction to aggression.

A. Human Development and Violence

During the first year of life, the infant engages in repetitive activities which are pleasurable to him but which also may become aggressive or even destructive. Head-knocking or hair-pulling, for example, are destructive activities, while thumbsucking would not be, although indirectly it may become harmful to the infant (51, 52). While thumbsucking would be considered normal at this stage of development, biting, hairpulling, or head-knocking would not be. All of these activities have been observed many times over by students of development and by parents. What they see supports the notion of the presence in the infant of a destructive-behavior-potential manifest from the very beginnings of extrauterine life. In the normal child, aggressive and destructive urges express themselves in behavior directed away from himself and his own body and directed toward animate or inanimate objects in his environment. Only much later during childhood or following adolescence will self-destruction again become part of the normal individual's potential and then in the form of a functioning superego or conscience. Here the aggression will be directed toward the psychic portion of the individual—i.e., his ego or his "self" and not against the body. Pathological forms do occur when the superego or conscience of the individual produces rather over-severe reactions of guilt and mental anguish.

Destructive behavior in children, states Ann Freud (52), is not to be found in the aggressive tendencies themselves. It results from the fact that aggression is not fused with libidinal urges or we might say "love." References to a similar point of view by Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein, Selma Fraiberg, Mitscherlich, etc., are stated elsewhere in this paper. A *defect* in the emotional development of the child produces such an absence of fusion. The child whose parents are absent, who does not experience emotional responsiveness from adults, and who is punished by adults to the exclusion of love, will be unable to give and receive love. Experiences such as these encourage the infant and child in the free expression of destructive behavior. Destructive urges never become, or are insufficiently fused with loving urges. The infant is given no reason to modulate or modify his behavior; behavior which expresses love or restraint over aggression and destruction remains unrewarded, and therefore, excluded from his choice of responses.

A cogent point made by Anna Freud is that the destructive behavior of children cannot be controlled by force. Menninger (53) supports this view, as does Feshbach (33) whose point of view and area of professional interest is quite different from those of Menninger and Freud. These people support the notion that in childhood the approach most likely to be effective would be one directed toward changing the quality of the emotional and libidinal development of the child. Menninger points out the need to educate the child from the very beginning about his destructive capacities. He sees childhood as a time for children to be bad, and parents and teachers to be good. Not vice

versa! Otherwise, children cannot discover their inner controls and constructive outlets for their cruel and destructive, actual and potential behavior.

Feshbach agrees with this. He notes that the child comprehends and will also label events in his environment contingent to any of his behavior which produces pain in others. If the child is punished for his behavior, he learns to associate the infliction and perception of pain in others with the experience of pain in himself (resulting from his punishment). In effect, the child is being taught the principle of retaliation, and he acquires more than fear from his punishment. He observes and will imitate whoever punishes him. Stated differently, the child will learn that the infliction of pain is the response he is to give when he is made to suffer pain. Later, when in pain, whether this be physical or psychological, his most probable response is the one repeatedly demonstrated to him, and that is the expression of destructive behavior.

Violence has been a mode of behavior (54) usually neglected when it appears in the course of human development. Bettelheim observed that children are not apt to receive help from our schools (and from most child-rearing practices!) in recognizing their tendencies to act with violence, nor have they received help to develop techniques to deal with such behavior manifestations in constructive ways. He explored a classroom technique for making this possible and within the framework of a learning experience.

McNeil (55) places emphasis upon violence resulting from experiences that are part of human development. He believes violent people are the products of experiences directly affecting their development. Violence appears in the life of the individual whose parents showed him no love, whose parents portrayed life and the world as violent, and whose parents reinforced violence as preferred behavior, rationalizing it as reasonable, and natural, rather than monstrous in quality. Life experiences reinforce those from infancy and childhood, and increase the likelihood that intense anger will become coupled with poor control and result in violence. McNeil insists that to understand violence one must turn to the study of human development where it arises. Only then is there hope that violence will be controlled.

An area which is of special importance to all workers interested in child development, and to those interested in child development and its relationship to violence, is that of child abuse. Systematic study of this area has only recently begun. We may define child abuse as the nonaccidental physical attack inflicted upon children by those taking care of them (56). Violence is expressed in the form of attack on children, and the seeds are sown for future violence to grow with the development of the abused child.

Polansky and Polansky (57) distinguish between child abuse and child neglect. They describe the abusive parent as someone who has a drive or drive-derivative that seeks discharge in the direction of destroying his child. The drive or impulse may derive from resentment of the child, symbolically misplaced aggression, or may represent a defense of some sort. The effectiveness and nature of inner controls, and the quality and effectiveness of environmental support for such controls, determines whether the impulse will be acted upon and with what strength and determination. From the standpoint of the issues already discussed in this paper, it is of especial interest to recognize that witnesses to the abuse of children are frequently

unwilling to report the event to proper authorities. They fear retaliation by the guilty parent who may be their marital partner. An unconscious or conscious collusion with the abusive parent may be present. In effect, the witness who is unwilling to report child abuse is like the supporting audience or second-phase participant (see sec. B below) in a situation of group enacted violence. The child becomes a scapegoat. We would assume from our findings and considerations in other areas that without the behavior of child abuse, the parent inflicting the abuse, and the witness supporting the action, face threat to the integrity of their psychological functioning. Perhaps as Menninger (58) has pointed out, the action of abuse wards off greater disaster from the point of view of the abusing parent and witness! The fact that there are forms and degrees of socially permitted punishment of children facilitates the occurrence of child abuse in such parents or caretakers of children.

Child abuse can best be viewed as a syndrome (57) and the opinion of workers in this area is that people who abuse children are mentally ill and in need of help. Child abuse is not an isolated act, but part of the picture of general psychological disturbances. This point of view is in general agreement with the emphasis presented here about individual acts of violence. Familiar to us, and lending support to our presentation, is the observation that school or hospital staff need to repress their own unacceptable and threatening sadistic impulses, and in doing so must find it difficult to identify the battered child, especially of white middle-class families. The parents engaging in child abuse tend to be immature, deficient in level of ego functioning, show patterns of behavior like those of an oral-aggressive personality type. They show no guilt or remorse about the child and tend to repeat the same abusive acts. They seem unable to help in caring for the injured child and do not give evidence of understanding the pain experienced by the child (59, 60, 61). They often report having suffered abuse and neglect in their own childhood.

The problem of child abuse highlights the fact that an individual's character problem, his tendency to act out unresolved tensions, and deprivations from his own childhood, become the sources for aggressive and violent behavior, directed particularly toward those who cannot defend themselves. The condition of parental proneness to engage in child abuse must be recognized; identifying this is a difficult matter but worthy of research. We would expect that parental proneness to child abuse will correlate with parental lack of defense in handling the stresses arising from specific, age-adequate demands of children.

B. Violence and the Collective Experience

1. Collective Support for Violence Behavior

In a recent paper, Spiegel (62) discusses the origins of contemporary collective violence in the United States. He identifies the chief social strain involved as the incompatibility between democratic ideals and authoritarian practices. This is manifest by the exclusion of certain groups from the mainstream of privilege or function (as, for example, women or the black person) and by the functioning of bureaucracy in government. Most of the population is ready and willing to settle for violence rather than attend to the

underlying social conflicts which produce it. In this way collective support is, in effect, being given to violent reactions that take place.

Under the supporting banner of "law and order," police violence is also supported by most people. If we made it apparent that "demonstrators" are to be seen as outsiders, or "nonpersons" then we also condone the attitude that they, therefore, deserve attack.

Eissler (63) was impressed with the integrating social function of groups involved in violence. Each individual in any group finds himself bound together to the others by several forces (64): projection of the ego-ideal on to the leader, identification with this ego-ideal, and identification with all the other members of the group on the basis of sublimated homosexual impulses. The organization of a group remains intact as long as each individual feels accepted and loved by the leader. Should this relationship be disrupted, then a breakdown in the identification with the leader and in the sublimation of homosexual impulses results. The individual may then be overwhelmed by homosexual impulses and anxiety that is produced. Panic is a possible outcome of such a group disintegration. Violent action carried out by the group at such a time serves as an emergency defense against the acute danger of panic. This begins when the group members find a scapegoat on whom they may project this rejected homosexual impulse. The scapegoat is, in effect, sacrificed in order to keep the love for the leader alive. Attacking the scapegoat preserves the coherence of the group. Without attack, each individual would have to face extreme anxiety, would lose object ties, and be thrown into isolation. The dynamics of a group are such that violence serves as a defense against breakdown of the group and the individual.

Wertham (65) does not consider violence as an expression of an inborn instinct of aggression and destruction. He accounts for violence by pointing to those negative factors of personality development which contribute to it and to the characteristics of the social surroundings supporting it! From his study of murderers, he concluded that no one can kill without experiencing a transformation of values derived from social prejudgments and prejudice. For example, sharing a view of people as not being "human," and sharing rationalizations which, in effect, excuse violence. Every murder then becomes an act occurring in the context of history. Like Spiegel, Wertham also noted that society remains content with formal denunciations of violence while repressing its own lapses of social responsibility. Society doesn't abolish violence but merely adjourns it.

Although McNeil (66, 55) sees violence stemming from factors in human development, he nevertheless considers the importance of societal support for violent actions. Excuses for violence, he points out, have always been present and are taught by society, making violence acceptable.

Riots take place in stages of involvement. The first to become violent are the young who anticipate "that's where the action will be." Alcohol, or other factors, may further reduce control in these individuals, who are ready to "act out" their problems in a childish, aggressive way. The second wave of participants in violence includes those people in whom a responsive chord resounds and who see in the action the inclinations, urges, and impulses they themselves have barely been able to contain. They quickly join the action and are not aware that they look for the excuse "someone else started it!" The

riot then reaches the young people who, on occasion, slip out of character when they are swept by the tide of excitement.

The escalation of violence through legitimation has been further described by Westley (67). In group violence, the young unattached male, usually with a criminal record, who enjoys violence makes up the active nucleus of the violent action. For the violence to move onward, a supporting audience is necessary; without it, the violence dissipates rather than escalates. The supporting crowd consists of older people, usually white and blue collar workers, who are attached to their communities and families. The "curious crowd" provides the background to the earlier groups. As Westley sees it, violence requires a group willing to use violence and a supporting, encouraging audience!

The idea that violence erupts following prerequisite stages when the individual acts within a group and that the sequential stages provide collective support for the violence is highly elaborated by Smelser (68). Determinants of a social nature, but which produce an effect in each individual are described. Together, these determinants constitute a sufficient condition for the eruption of violence, as in a riot. Smelser comes close to invoking some concepts which describe the individual psychologic disruptions that must take place under the influence of such determinants, but stops short of acknowledging this.

Studies by Henry and Short (69) have described the findings that in an economic depression the incidence of homicide and aggravated assaults decrease; with prosperity the incidence rises. They explain this as due to an alteration of one's social status which produces changes in self-esteem and feelings of worthwhileness. These authors viewed homicide and suicide as responses to frustration and see the choice of action as determined by social status. People of low social status express aggression toward others; those of higher social status direct aggression toward themselves and, therefore, show higher suicide rates.

The view that socially disruptive and violent behavior is an expression of the maladaptive effort of maladjusted individuals is clearly presented by Goldin (70). He points out that the disturbance in internal psychological operations remains the final common pathway mediating the effects of social factors on personality disorders. The key to the link between the social and psychic systems is the "superego." The superego serves to regulate the individual by its capacity to distribute rewards and punishments on a psychological level. The superego, therefore, makes it possible to transmit normative order from generation to generation. The identification of the individual with satisfactory authority figures helps the development of the superego which guides behavior according to social standards.

Social conditions, at the present time, might best be described as malevolent (71). Social distress, and dysfunction are symptomatic of this. Each individual no longer can find fixed reference points within which to locate himself. Life loses meaning and value; the result is "anomic" self-destruction. If society must provide a normative structure which creates a moral authority to which members can subordinate their behavior, then in an anomic society, the hold over norms of individual conduct break down. Symptoms of impaired psychological functioning then appear. Each

individual, now lacking standards for right and wrong, suffers a weakening of the effectiveness of his superego. One result of this is the disruption in the individual's ability to resolve conflicts and maintain control over drives. Aggression, violence, and other behavior resulting from uncontrolled impulses will appear. Features which made our society "anomic" include industrialization, automation, and urbanization, each of which contribute to a sense of individual helplessness, incompetence to control and direct one's own affairs, and feelings of dehumanization and alienation in mass society. Apathy and despair appear amidst national affluence. The individual is further handicapped by not having adequate channels for discharging his drive energies. Work does not sufficiently serve as sublimatory activities. Increasingly, the individual faces impersonal sets of corporate social arrangements, as for example, universities. Violence erupts because the individual has now little choice than to "act out" his hostilities and frustrations. Violence helps the individual mitigate feeling helpless and alienated!

A statement by Leo Alexander in a book by Mitscherlich and Mielke (72) describing Nazi medical crimes describes fear and cowardice, especially fear of punishment or ostracism by the group as more important motives for violence than simple ferocity or aggression. The technique to produce this in the doctors involved was developed by Nazi SS forces. The doctors were suspect of disloyalty to the government and then, in order to clear themselves, they had to participate in crimes which served to tie them to the organization and to further medical crimes. The German medical science of Killing, "Ktenology," evolved from this. What made it possible for the German doctors to practice Ktenology was their reasoning that it was their government which determined the importance of the experiments. This relieved each of them of responsibility for fatal outcomes. The authoritarian state provided them with immunity for their crimes of violence.

2. *Violence and the Absence of Human Bonds*

Explanations of violence falling in this category essentially elaborate the idea that violence does not erupt where destructive urges are balanced, fused, or opposed by feelings of love.

Mitscherlich and Mielke (73) describe what they see as the basis for the horrible Nazi medical crimes. Their observations suggest that in a society producing an atmosphere of contempt for the dignity of man, violence can easily erupt in anyone. The doctors involved in these crimes first came to look upon their patient-subjects as a "case" or a number. Then followed the transmogrification of subject into object, man into thing, and against these, destructive urges could wreak its fury without restraint.

Fraiberg (74) following Lorenz (8) describes the view that where there are no human bonds there is no motive for the regulation and control of aggressive urges. We may, therefore, assume that where there is an eruption of violence, human bonds or ties are either absent or suspended. We now encounter with increasing infrequency the "hollow man," whose deadness within requires powerful psychic jolts to affirm his existence either from drugs (75) or from brutal acts. Jean Genet has described the exalted existential awareness that climaxes such acts, acts in which victims are chosen

indiscriminately, with no motive, because there are no human ties between the actor and his victim or any one else for that matter.

C. *Biological Theories*

The biological theories of the origin of violent behavior center about the issues of bodily mechanisms and structures producing the urges toward destruction or releasing inhibiting controls. Historically, the theory of criminal constitutionality arose in the 18th and 19th century with Gall's concepts of phrenology. Topical structures of the brain were considered to correspond to particular cranial protuberances which, in turn, corresponded to certain faculties, including criminal behavior. These faculties, being fixed from birth, could not be modified by learning. The concept of the born criminal was enhanced by Darwinian ideas of evolutionary throwbacks or fixations and hence "criminal atavism" became an explanation (76). Lombroso, by examining skulls and brains of criminals, felt they were similar to prehistoric skulls and made the conclusion that criminal behavior was based on the possession of primitive instincts. The criminal had no choice to be anything else because of the postulated inherent defect.

The contemporary biological version of criminal atavism or inborn violent predisposition is the chromosomal imbalance theory or the XYY syndrome. In 1967 Jacobs (77) studied 197 violent inmates of a Scottish prison and found 7 of these, all males, to have an XYY chromosomal pattern. The frequency of occurrence of this pattern was statistically significant. Since then, a number of studies have appeared. Montagu (78) in a recent review of the syndrome, points out that most violent crimes are committed by chromosomally normal individuals and that the XYY constitution does allow for a wide spectrum of behavioral possibilities, from the totally normal to persistently antisocial. The origin of the defect can apparently originate in the failure of proper chromosomal separation at conception and need not be hereditary. Nor is it apparently genetically transmitted. An XXY configuration has also been identified as being significantly frequent among criminal male populations (79).

The implications for psychiatry of this finding of the relationship between chromosomal abnormalities and violent behavior bear closely on the question of whether criminals are born (inherited traits or specific chromosomal defects at the time of conception) or made (with environmental influences predominating). The evidence that there are non-violent, non-criminal persons with these deficiencies and that most criminals are not carriers of the chromosome points to the need of a theory to explain both the genetic and environmental influences on behavior.⁷

Constitutionality has also been studied in connection with bodily types and their relationship to behavior patterns. The well-known studies of Kretschmer (80), Sheldon (81), Hooton (82), and Glueck (83) provide models for this kind of theory. They have been criticized primarily for methodological deficiencies (1).

Brain research has brought forth evidence for a model of aggressive behavior based on a multifaceted view of aggressive behavior. Moyer (84) has summarized the work of a number of researchers to demonstrate that certain brain areas when stimulated will initiate and others will inhibit aggressive

behavior. Brain pathways make up both aggressive circuits and suppressor circuits which can be electrically activated. In addition, endocrine sensitization of the "hostility circuits" may increase violent behavior; these hormonal imbalances can result from external environmental stimuli. Moyer refers to surgical lowering of aggression in animals by castration as a model of neuroendocrine interaction where the lowering of androgen levels converts a "raging bull into a gentle steer."

Electro-encephalographic abnormality has been studied in behavioral disorders. Hill and Pond's study of murderers showed 70 percent of them to have abnormal brain wave tracings (85). Aggressive psychopaths were also shown to have a high incidence of abnormal EEG's (86). What the meaning of abnormal EEG's is for violent behavior is uncertain except to suggest lower threshold of dyscontrol phenomena and a greater inability to pursue conventional behavior among some of those possessing the abnormal finding.

D. Violence as a Quasi-Need

The biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (87) sees destructive behavior (such as crimes of violence, the destructive mob, maniacal self-mutilation) derived from secondary or symbolic rather than primarily biological or instinctual sources. Most violent behavior, the most pernicious manifestations of aggression, are usually committed in the service of symbols and ideas. He speaks of symbols not in a psychoanalytic sense but as a manifestation of a distinct character of man, who lives in "symbolic worlds of social conventions, morals, religions, art, science" all of which transcend the psychology of the individuals who created them. These symbolic worlds have an autonomous life of their own.

While biological needs act to gratify hunger or the sexual drive, most human needs extend from a symbolic and cultural framework. "Quasi-needs" rather than basic biological needs then determine human behavior.

Violence on a grand scale such as Hitler's or Stalin's cannot be explained adequately, according to von Bertalanffy, by a study of the psychoanalytic factors in their lives. In the framework of symbolic ideology, a dictator may succeed in killing millions, while if he had been a murderer, only a few people might have been killed before he would have been apprehended. It is the symbolic component that makes the primitive biological human aggressive drives infinitely more dangerous and cruel.

Suicide, an exclusively human phenomenon, is committed when the individual's symbolic world requires it or breaks down (compare this view with Durkheim). Suicide does not occur, according to von Bertalanffy because his biological existence or survival is threatened but because his symbolic quasi-needs are threatened.

Another way of looking at quasi-needs would be as a group reinforcement or condonement of more primary drives. Astrow (88) suspects that quasi-needs refer to sublimated derivatives of more basic individual needs.

E. The Defensive Function of Violence

The most comprehensive example of this point of view is that presented by Menninger (53, 58). Menninger sees violence as a part of human nature; he

accepts the presence of an aggressive-destructive instinct. When the equilibrium of adjustment is seriously disrupted, frustrations increase, satisfactions decrease, personal alarm soars, and aggressive impulses push forth toward their goal of destruction.

Freud (89) in his book *Civilization and its Discontent*, pointed out that civilization eliminated the individual's need to settle matters of dispute by direct aggression. Violence which used to be an intimate part of life now has become institutionalized. Menninger reiterates this position and describes the routine of life as it exists today without requirements that the individual fight, kill, risk his life, or give vent to violence in any form. If violence is part of being human, it must be tightly controlled in ways involving symbolic or vicarious expressions of our violence, or must be sublimated or neutralized.

What are the events that would produce heightened psychic conflict and aggression arousal? They would include direct or threatened attacks, losses feared or sustained, injuries (psychological and physical) and pain, frustration, and disappointment. Such factors disturbing the equilibrium of adjustment come from without; but internal instability obviously can produce similar effects. Here we have in mind occurrences of a psychological nature such as unbearable psychic conflicts, weakened resistances or repressions. The tension and the equilibrium imbalance produced can be represented by five levels of dysfunction. Menninger lists these as: (1) nervousness, a slight impairment; (2) neurosis; (3) naked aggression; (4) psychosis; and (5) abandonment of the will to live. Our interest is in Menninger's third order of dysfunction, "naked aggression." In this there is a loss of ego control over dangerous destructive impulses so that behavior becomes assaultive and destructive. In the levels of dyscontrol less serious than naked aggression, it would still be possible for the individual to provide himself with some discharge of unacceptable impulses in a controlled but disguised way. Aggression would most likely be expressed by being turned back on the individual himself. Naked aggression is always found with other evidences of internal disorganization. There are a few occasions that permit the acting out of aggression, as in hunting, and prizefighting, and aggression may be the preferred behavior chosen by sound ego. For the most part, however, acts of violence reflect personal disorganization, ego failure, and the disintegration of social conformity. Violence represents a line of defense that forestalls further disintegration. As such it is an emergency control device. Violence is never completely out of control and never as devastating as it could be! The energy discharge and, therefore, dissipation accompanying the show of violence, always reduces the previously mounting tension level. The individual may "feel better" afterwards. The psychic balances have changed and it may then be possible for the individual to function at an acceptable performance level. Like the characteristics of all symptoms of psychological illness, naked aggression represents to the individual a choice of a lesser evil to avert a greater disaster.

Naked aggression, or violence, is characterized by behavior which: (1) doesn't disguise its purpose; (2) disregards customs and reality without any reaction from conscience; and (3) is based on impaired judgment, perception, and consciousness.

Eissler (63) whose point of view about violence was discussed above, also takes a stand in favor of considering violence as a defensive reaction, that is,

one which wards off what phenomenologically would be greater personal disintegration than that encompassed by the violent act. The reader is referred to the section on "Violence and Collective Experience" for this review.

McNeil (55), also discussed above, makes the point that violence represents the anguished outcry of hopeless, frightened, and insecure people, who feel alien to the society they live in and the people they live with. Violence provides these people with a way to feel better about themselves.

Others support this point of view. For example, Zilborg (90) states that the criminal acts consciously or unconsciously because he feels a desire to do injury or to *enhance his own sense of power*. Feshbach (33) discusses the importance of threat to self-esteem as a primary source of aggression. With successful retaliation, the individual's status relation vis-a-vis the perceived source of devaluation is changed. He demonstrates to himself that he is not helpless and impotent.

F. Tension Discharge and Violence

Menninger, Freud, and Goldin include in their ideas about violence the issue of availability of means by which energy-tension discharge of aggressive-destructive urges may be accomplished. Civilization, alienation, anomie, each in its own way end up limiting the outlets for aggressive-destructive behavior. These authors consider this a factor affecting the probability of eruption of violence.

G. Psychopathology and Violence

Aggressive, destructive, or violent behavior may be part of a clinical picture which is predominantly that of a neurotic or psychotic illness, or an expression of a serious disturbance in character development. Some examples follow.

Infrequently, a patient experiencing a dissociative reaction may fall prey to frenzied or violent states of dissociated behavior. This usually has a sudden onset and an abrupt end; the patient generally retains no memory of his actions (3, p. 897).

The patient suffering from a neurotic depression may demonstrate a discharge of aggression in several ways (2, p. 432). The self-depreciation of the neurotically depressed person serves to discharge guilt feelings and the pressures built up around them; the patient need not feel guilty now that he, in effect, has punished himself. When such a depressed person is frustrated, archaic hostility and violence may be generated. Such behavior mobilizes superego action against it. But the patient may discover that if the hostility is directly expressed there will be a corresponding decrease in guilt and superego actions. Regression into a sadistic, psychotic depression may appear, with violence characterizing the patient's behavior.

Suicides occur predominantly in the depressed patient, but are not confined to this clinical group. They also occur in patients who are psychotic, or suffer character disturbances, or do not demonstrate any diagnosed psychopathology (4, p. 90).

Durkheim (3, p. 1170) considered that suicide stems from three major categories of social relationships. Psychiatric attention to suicide followed

slowly. Surprisingly, Freud had little to say about suicide. He thought of self-hatred in the depressed patient as originating in the anger felt for a loved one, anger which was turned back on oneself. Suicide would be a consequence of this and requires the presence of an earlier but repressed desire of the patient to kill his loved one. Rado (91) went further. He introduced the idea that retroflexed anger and self punishment can serve as atonement or expiation having as its basis the hope to win back love and affection. Various dynamic constellations may describe the meaning of a suicidal act. For example:

- (1) *Retaliatory abandonment*: if the person feels he is to be rejected, he may do this himself, thereby achieving an illusory control over the matter.
- (2) *Retroflexed murder*: suicide results from the struggle against the wish to kill someone else.
- (3) *Reunion*: infantile dependency ties are sought and thought to be possible following death.
- (4) *Death is a rebirth*.
- (5) *Death as self-punishment*.
- (6) *Patient sees himself as already dead in an emotional sense*, so that suicide offers a sense of relief.

The catatonic schizophrenic patient develops his symptoms (catatonia) as a means of controlling homicidal rage, particularly against those who he thinks fail to love him. But the catatonia may fail; control is lost and violence will erupt (3, p. 639). Homicide in the schizophrenic patient most frequently appears as a consequence of the patient's feelings of rejection. Such patients are very sensitive to such a rejection which they experience as traumatic and to which they may reach with violence.

Cameron (2, p. 488) dramatically described the origins of aggressive and violent behavior in the paranoid patient. The background for such behavior in these patients lies in their childhood experiences which leave them with chronically frustrated rage. Such a person has a chronic expectation that others will treat him badly or deceive him. He may have been treated sadistically as a child and as a result had internalized sadistic attitudes toward himself and others. His own sadism is both denied and projected because he is unable to repress his infantile fantasies of cruelty wishes and can't avert the hostile persecution of his immature superego. With such a background, when the individual faces regression he is exposed to a flood of free and recently released aggressive energies. Should they be discharged, violence may erupt. The symptoms of a paranoid state representing a means of disposing of excess aggressive energy are:

- (1) Hostile action
- (2) Violent action
- (3) Delusions
- (4) Heightened vigilance (perceptual)
- (5) Increase in use of denial and projection
- (6) Restitutive reality via formation of a "pseudo-community"

In the paranoid patient outbursts of rage and violence may also occur (3, pp. 578, 688) in association with delusional ideas that defend against homosexual wishes. The paranoid person feels he must take steps to protect himself or must retaliate. Usually such an attack meets with a counterattack

in the form of a restraint. The patient takes this to be evidence in support of his delusions and this accentuates the possibility of violence.

Violence may appear in manic-depressive psychoses (4), and usually during depressed states because depression itself may be the result of a weakening of the repression of hate and aggressive strivings. Homicide may result; the victim is generally a loved one. The homicide is regarded as an extension of a suicidal impulse, that is, an extension of aggression to include those nearest to the self. This type of patient may kill others to spare them disgrace or agony. A patient in a state of manic excitement may become irritable, combative, and violent.

A wide spectrum of disorders of personality or character describe those individuals most frequently seen by legal or law enforcement agencies, and consulting psychiatrists because of their destructive or violent behavior. Some of the prominent types are not presented.

Those individuals who may best be described as antisocial personalities demonstrate a lack of the capacity to form significant attachments to other people. They tend to be callous and irresponsible and seek immediate pleasure without having effective capacity to delay gratification of their momentary needs. They do not readily learn to modify their behavior, and show poor social judgment. These are individuals who have failed to develop superego and ego ideals. When we study their background, we learn that they have had little opportunity to establish healthy identifications with those accepting social values of the community. Their parents may have directly taught them to resent authority. In no way have they had the opportunity to experience authority being established on a foundation of mutual affection, tenderness, and trust.

We would further consider such people as emotionally immature. They are impulsive, and may have temper outbursts or explosions of rage which could lead to defiant, quarrelsome, and destructive behavior. These early manifestations developed during their childhood become exaggerated as they leave the controls of home and school and have to meet increasing responsibility and external demands.

Johnson and Szurek (92) have described the etiology of antisocial behavior in delinquents and psychopaths. They found that the mothers of these individuals were inclined to encourage the child toward such behavior, although verbally protesting it. Mother's permissiveness served to gratify her own neurotic needs derived from her lack of current satisfactions or from her unmet childhood needs. In spite of mother's objections to antisocial behavior, the child knew that mother condoned it.

In the sociopath, we find the individual with deficient moral and ethical development. Such a person is cold, unsympathetic, has poor established emotional relationships and acts with behavior that is destructive to the welfare of social order. He cannot organize acceptable, constructive expressions of aggression; he can't tolerate frustration. He experiences mood shifts, rebelliousness, and readily reacts with acts of violence. The drive behind such acts appear intense and compelling.

There are those individuals who may act in a destructive or violent way out of a need to resolve a neurotic conflict. Such an individual is much different from the antisocial character, or sociopath, we have described above. The latter acts out of "deficiency" in character; the former, or

neurotic character, acts out of need for punishment, and as a means of allaying intense anxiety.

Finally, we briefly mention those individuals who may be described as passive-aggressive personalities. They, too, readily react to frustration with tantrum behavior. Their omnipotence and dependency may lead to antisocial, destructive behavior.

For the most part, the violent behavior associated with individual psychopathology is considered the result of the same anger or aggressive drive common to all mankind. The illness is but another factor which prepares the way for, or enhances the likelihood of, the eruption of violence. The psychopathology of these people contain features which either intensify aggressive drives, or prevent their control, or provide a stimulating situation encouraging such behavior.

IV. PSYCHOANALYTIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE

Any discussion of the psychoanalytic contributions to the study of individual violence first requires the consideration of the role of drives in general, and the concept of the aggressive drive in particular. A recent and timely article by Beres (93) emphasizes a fact which is often ignored by critics of drive theory. That is, that the psychoanalytic conception of mental functioning includes more than drive theory per se: man is distinguished not by the nature of his drives, but by how he deals with them. His capacities include the psychologic functions (or "ego functions") of delay, modification, and renunciation of the drives' demands. If drives are dismissed from the arena of human mental functioning, then the dynamic nature of human mental activity is, in effect, denied!

Drives, together with the psychic energy which is assumed to be part of them, provide the motive force capable of setting our mental or psychic apparatus into action. Sexual and aggressive drives are basic in the current dual-drive theory of psychoanalysis.

In Freud's early papers, little attention was given to aggression as compared to sexuality. Much of his earlier work was devoted to advancing his ideas of infantile sexuality. The repression of sexuality was seen as the force inducing neurotic symptomatology (94). The opposition to his views that Freud encountered may have strongly influenced him to attribute neurotic disturbances exclusively to disorders of sexual development and to put sexuality as the prime motive of human behavior (9). In the "Interpretation of Dreams" (95), Freud started to deal with hostile forces in dreams and described the implication of that portion of the Oedipus complex having to do with the little boy's manifest aggressive jealousy toward his father. Although sadism was conceived of primarily as a component of the sexual drive, its aggressive implications were nevertheless evident (96). The case of Little Hans (97) described in his "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy," highlighted the role of aggression in conflict. In his first published case of obsessional neurosis, the ambivalent conflict between love and hate was seen to provide the basis for obsessional symptomatology (98).

Nemiah (30) points out that in spite of Freud's observations of his patients' aggressive feelings and behavior in his early clinical work, aggression had no

place in the early topographical theory of the mental apparatus. In this theory, the fundamental drives were the sexual drive (sexuality or libido) and the ego drive for self-preservation. Where sexual feelings and fantasies were unacceptable to the ego, repression occurred, forcing these into the unconscious. Where repression failed, they were allowed expression in the form of derivative neurotic symptomatology, dreams, or sublimations. No theory of aggression was explicit. Although Adler (99) proposed the idea that aggression was a primary aggressive drive in 1908, Freud dismissed it because it seemed to dilute his need to emphasize sexuality.

In papers written in 1914 (25), 1915 (100), and 1917 (101), Freud considered the problem of hate turned on the self, and the role that aggressiveness could play in symptomatology. But aggression was still relegated a role as a component of ego instincts and not a drive with the same primary status accorded to sexuality.

In 1920, in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (10), Freud introduced the current dual-drive theory of sexuality and aggression. Aggression was seen as an external manifestation of the broader biological death-instinct, which sought to restore an earlier state of inorganicity to living things. The drive of aggression for Freud was considered a construct secondary to the death instinct. It is important, also, to recognize that although Freud's theory of aggression came from the interaction of clinical data and theoretical assumptions, the death-instinct theory was less grounded in clinical evidence.

Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein (24) in their discussion of aggression have written that although sexual impulses have a variety of aims, the aims of aggression are less diversified. That is, there is a plasticity to libido but a rigidity to the aggressive drive in its destructive aspects. The aims of aggression are to totally destroy objects, to fight with or to dominate objects, or to cause their disappearance.

Aggression, according to these authors, may be modified by displacement, by restricting the aims of the aggressive impulses, by sublimating the aggressive energy or by fusing the aggressive drive with libido. (Note the similarity between these modifications and Lorenz's suggestion of using displacements such as international sport and scientific competition.)

The importance of the psychoanalytic theory of aggression to violence is apparent when the safety of objects upon whom men depend is considered: pure discharge of aggression threatens the object, while libido can be fully discharged and can link the individual more closely to his important objects. In order to maintain any permanence of safe and meaningful object relations, aggressive energy must be sublimated or neutralized.

In an article entitled "The Origins of Human Bonds" (74), Selma Fraiberg has presented a current psychoanalytic view of the forces which lead to the potential for violence and destructive activity. She amplifies Lorenz's concept of the human bond to describe how in human development "diseases of non-attachment" are produced during the formative period of ego growth—and how the aggressive drive remains or becomes free to act in destructive ways in those individuals so afflicted. She takes for granted the importance of sexuality and aggression as basic drives rooted in biological processes.

The ego regulates the drives through its functions of mediating and adapting to the demands of conscience, reality, and the drives. Motivational

force is given to aggression as a drive that can be independent of external circumstances. Since the drive is "given," it cannot be abolished but can be inhibited or re-directed.

In normal development the motive for redirection of hostile impulses is love. It is because the loved person is valued above all other things that the child gradually modifies his aggressive impulses and finds alternative modes of expressing them. Structural weaknesses or malfunctions may occur during the formative period of ego development when love is absent. These manifestations differ from neurosis: In a neurosis there may be difficulties in love relationships, but there is no primary incapacity for human attachments. In psychoses there may be a breakdown of human bonds in those disorders of thinking related to loss of boundaries between what is perceived as self and not self, but this also does not imply an incapacity for human bonds.

Those individuals unfortunate in their primary incapacity for human attachments feel little pain, grief, joy, guilt, or remorse and have no clearly formed conscience. Because of their emotional poverty, an appetite for powerful sensations is created with demands for equally powerful psychological sensations. Hence, the resort to drugs, or brutal activity, experienced in a dehumanized dimension.

Fraiberg describes the clinical history of such individuals. They suffered lost and broken human connections in early childhood; they had been unwanted, brutalized, and neglected. She refers to the works of Freud and Burlingame (102), Spitz (103), Bowlby (104), and Provence and Lipton (105), who have studied the effect on children of the deprivation of mothering. Such deprivation led to the lack of early formation of human bonds and the permanent impairment of the ability to make such attachments later in life.

The period of greatest vulnerability during development is in the first 2 years of life. The love bond forms during human infancy and the regulation of the aggressive drive is dependent on the quality of these bonds. The absence or rupture of human bonds has a permanent effect on the capacity to regulate aggressive behavior. This implies that the eradication of the source of later destructive behavior could be made possible by providing stable human relationships for each child in his development.

Although the development and experiences of the child are important determinants of his future behavior, which may include crime and violence, during childhood disorderly and disruptive behavior need not reflect delinquency or criminality. Anna Freud (106) points out that the child does not demonstrate criminal intent in a legal sense. From a psychoanalytic position, he cannot be considered dissocial or delinquent until he has the ability to perceive and understand the social setting to which he belongs and can identify with the rules that govern it. When we try to assess the social adaptation of the child, we must allow him the benefit of his age; we should regard social adaptation as a gradually evolving state, bound up with the development of the drives, ego, and the superego. Social adaptation is an achievement growing out of the child's developmental advances. The absence of social adaptation or the appearance of dissocial or delinquent behavior should not be viewed as the results of specific causes such as mental deficiency, moral insanity, broken homes, or parental neglect. Instead, such behavior should be recognized as stemming from the unsuccessful

transformations of the self-indulgent and asocial trends and attitudes which are part of the child's original nature. The advantage to this point of view lies in the possibility of identifying the developmental lines which lead to pathological results. If we are ready to accept this approach, then we may go further and trace first normal development, and then those deflections which deviate from a normative pattern and produce pathological results.

The reactions of the newborn are governed by the "pleasure principle." By this we refer to the observation that the infant welcomes any pleasurable experience, but rejects unpleasurable ones and tries to reduce tension when it arises. He can manage to achieve these conditions as long as gratification of needs can be provided by his own body, as for example in rocking, thumbsucking, and various forms of masturbation. Obviously, his own body provides for limited needs, so that his mother must serve as an outside supplement to his efforts. She provides or withholds satisfactions from her infant and decides their timing and rationing. In doing so, she becomes the infant's first "object" and "legislator."

The first skirmishes between infant and mother are fought out on the battlefield of bodily care. The infant can sense mother's hostility or affection, and the mother can experience her baby as an "easy" or "difficult" child.

As infancy is outgrown, drives extend beyond the basic body needs to the main drive derivatives such as the early sexual, aggressive-destructive, and egoistic-possessive ones. The normal child seeks to gratify these drives and is inevitably restricted by the adult environment. The results are numerous acts of disobedience, naughtiness, and tantrums of the normal young child. To have the gratification of one's drives and wishes dependent upon external authority represents a moral dependence that is the hallmark of the immature. To grow to more independency and to acquire the right to judge one's own actions is the outcome of a dynamic struggle.

The earlier mentioned pleasure principle governs infancy—and while it continues to influence our unconscious functioning, our fantasy and dream life, as well as our neurotic symptoms, the reality principle must govern our ego pursuits during later childhood and adulthood. These principles imply different modes of mental functioning.

To behave or function according to the pleasure principle means accepting immediate and indiscriminate need satisfaction regardless of external conditions—and is oblivious to environmental norms. Reality principle functioning restricts, modifies, and postpones gratification. However, the advance to reality principle functioning does not guarantee socialization. Aichhorn (107) is cited as pointing out that delinquents and criminals may reach a high degree of adaptation to reality but are unwilling or unable to place this capacity in the service of social adaptation. For example, psychopaths often have an exquisite sense of reality. The growing tolerance of frustration implied by the acceptance of the reality principle is often regarded as a decisive factor in socialization. Its absence or deficit serves as a basis for antisocial behavior.

The ego functions of memory, reality testing, speech, reason, logic, control over motor functions, as they develop, are advances going beyond the chaotic states of infantile life. They are integrated into a structuralized unit with character and personality. We do not expect social attitudes where ego

functioning was not yet developed in the very young or individuals damaged by severe ego repressions or mental retardation.

By imitating the parents, the infant succeeds in trying on the role of these powerful figures who control his need and drive satisfaction. Identification follows from such limitations and is based on the wish to appropriate the desired characteristics of parents. The parents' social ideals are carried from the external into the internal world of the child where they take root as a child's *ideal self* and become a forerunner of the superego. Introjection of parental authority is added during the Oedipal period to become an effective internal legislator, the superego, which then manages to regulate drive control. It does this by rewarding a compliant ego with feelings of well-being and self-esteem and by punishing a rebellious one with pangs of conscience and guilt.

It remains a hardship for the child that his sexual and aggressive trends do not fit into adult cultural norms and that they have to be modified before doing so. Socialization, therefore, demands from the child a certain amount of alienation from and turning against what he feels legitimately to be his innermost self. The biggest obstacle in the path of successful socialization is the difficulty of combining the aims of full individual freedom (free drive activity) with compliance with social norms (drive restraint).

The multiplicity of factors involved in the socializing process is matched by the number of disorders which affect it. The failures of socialization might be more usefully thought in terms of variations of normal development rather than deviations from a hypothetical norm. External environmental demands as well as the internal influences from the side of drive, ego, and superego contribute to the final outcome.

Factors leading to later dissociation are: failure in ego development (as for example, deficits from the point of view of retarded mentality—a frequently given cause of criminality); the incorporation of parental dissociative values by normal identification; disruption of identification through separation, rejections, or other interferences with emotional ties (107, 108).

Although the qualitative factors in socialization receive more attention than the quantitative ones, the latter are no less responsible for social breakdowns. Drives may increase or wane in strength, depending upon constitutional endowments or early environmental influences (e.g., illness, anxiety, seduction, over-indulgence, or frustration).

Early childhood aggression is most frequently cited in the literature as a threat to socialization; although superficially convincing, it does not stand up. Anna Freud believes the aggressive strivings, if fused in the normal way with libidinal ones, are socializing influences that provide the initial strength and tenacity with which the infant reaches out for the object world. The aggressive strivings also underlie the ambition to appropriate parental qualities and to be independent. Aggression also lends moral strength and severity to the superego in its dealings with the ego when the aggressive strivings are deflected from objects and placed at the superego's disposal.

Aggression becomes a menace to socialization when it appears in pure culture, either unfused with libido or defused from it. The causes lie not in the aggressive drive itself, but in the libidinal processes which may not have become sufficiently developed to bind and tone down aggression or which

have lost the capacity at some time in childhood because of disappointments, rejections, or loss of love. A special danger point for defusion is the anal-sadistic stage of libidinal development where aggression reaches its normal peak. Any emotional upset at this time frees the child's normal sadism from its libidinal ties so that it becomes pure destructiveness and turns against animate and inanimate objects as well as against the self. Character change occurs in the young child and what was half playful provocativeness becomes quarrelsome, ruthless and acquisitiveness, and a preference for hostile rather than friendly relations with fellow beings.

Aggression in this defused form is not controllable, either externally by parents or internally by ego and superego. If fusion does not recur through strengthening of libidinal ties and new object relations, the destructiveness expresses itself as delinquency, criminality, and violence.

Apart from very basic moral rules which are incorporated into the superego, what is incorporated and what is expected is not an identification with each and every specific law, but an acceptance of and internalization of a governing norm in general. The criminal perpetuates the attitude of the child who ignores, belittles, or disregards parental authority, and acts in defiance of it.

V. FACTORS LEADING TO VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHIATRIC FOCUS

Events of the day, such as riots in our cities and universities, criminal acts directed against property or person, child abuse, and the assassinations of internationally important and prominent persons compel the psychiatrist's interest in violence. Certain characteristics of such events have been highlighted in our presentation thus far. These will be elaborated in this section because they help clarify the role which the individual's personal or psychological makeup plays in the configuration of the violent act and the circumstances surrounding it.

The psychiatrist's interest and focus of attention falls upon a search for the distinguishing features of the personal functioning of the persons engaged in the above acts of violence. It is the personal functioning of the individual which is the final common pathway for all experiences, all events to which he is exposed. This we hold to be true irrespective of whether the event or experience is customarily viewed as the province for study by sociologists, economists, penologists, or political scientists. The admission histories of inmates in correctional institutions so frequently describe conditions (poverty, slum environment, broken homes) which produce certain types of people who are prone to involvement in criminal activities. In our emphasis of these conditions, we ordinarily neglect the importance of the personal makeup of these individuals; we ordinarily neglect to see that criminal activities do not become part of an individual's behavior unless he has developed that type of personality structure allowing for criminality. We may try to define conditions or circumstances that precipitate violence, but should not overlook the role that the psychological state of the individual plays in mediating these conditions and the act of violence.

A. Violence Proneness

No matter what position is taken with regards to the origins of destructiveness, by the time any individual has developed to the point where major aspects of his personality have achieved some stability and definition characteristic for him, he possesses the psychologic structure to experience anger, hostility, and rage in varying degrees, and the motivational structures to react with behavior stemming from these aspects; e.g., aggression, destructiveness, and even violence. The range of such behavior varies from individual to individual. Some readily show destructive and violent behavior. Others usually do not behave destructively; but under some circumstances become destructive and violent. We feel that the work of Berkowitz (12), the report of the Nazi medical crimes (73), the formulation of Smelser (68), McNeil (66), and Westley (67) would support such a view.

The training and later clinical experiences of every psychiatrist provide him with some opportunity to examine persons who without a doubt demonstrate their unusually high propensity for destructive and violent behavior. In this respect, they appear to be highly consistent and predictable. The idea of the "violence-prone" individual tends to be supported by clinical observations. What is remarkable is the frequency with which this is overlooked by many authorities assuming responsibility for these people when they become patients, inmates of a penal or correctional institution, or clients of a social or community agency. This group of violence-prone people would fall into the psychiatric diagnostic categories that reflect character, personality pattern or trait disturbances, or "ego-pathology." Within recent years, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (109) has suggested a Model Sentencing Act which would take into account such psychopathology. If the violence-prone individual were diagnosed when first appearing for sentencing, his term of sentence would differ in such a way as to allow for specific rehabilitative efforts where possible, or longer custodial care if this seems the primary source of control appropriate to the individual in question.

B. Preparatory Basis for Violence

Before violence erupts there must be a preparatory basis for it; this may come from within the individual, from external sources, or both. The concept of violence proneness which we view as determined ultimately by intraindividual personal features, may also be considered as the internal aspect of the preparatory basis for violence. There are a variety of conditions that provide the external sources of the preparatory basis for violence.

Usually the individual or individuals-in-a-group find some justification for their acts of violence (66, 67, 68, 73, 22, 58, 62). This may be condoned by the group or society-at-large. Mass media should be suspect of contributing such support although this is not its purpose or aim. We would like to introduce the idea of an "implied group" which provides support for violent behavior. By this we mean that the fact that violent actions have already taken place provides certain people with the idea that there is a group of other people who condone, support, and participate in the same violent

behavior as that for which the present actor prepares himself. We suggest, for example, that Sirhan B. Sirhan had in his mind a supporting, but "implied group," in the assassins of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. The students at Columbia University could look to the students at Berkeley as their predecessors and supporters. Rioters of Detroit could look to the rioters of Watts and Newark as co-members of a group seeking to express their reactions in violence.

Mitscherlich and Mielke (73) have demonstrated that for acts of utter horror to prevail, disaster must have first embarked on its course from many sources. The Nazi doctors became murderers at the point where their aggressive quest for truth coincided with the ideology of dictatorship.

C. *Group Rationalization of the Effects of Violence*

Each individual who becomes involved in some act of violence has been exposed to some form of rationalization or denial of the effects or seriousness of violence. Menninger (110) points out that the public behaves like a sick patient being offered a dreaded treatment for his ailment, when it comes to instituting necessary measures to control crime. This is because society secretly wants and needs crime and gains satisfaction from the mishandling of its regulation. We may abhor violence, but we find it exciting, dramatic, and intriguing. The suffering due to violence is usually overlooked. Mass media are particularly guilty of such omissions and instead tend to exploit the dramatic essence of violence.

When police are the ones to perpetrate the violence, the explanation is usually given that they are trying to uphold the "order." The community supports the police in their view that demonstrators are "outsiders" or "nonpersons," and, therefore, deserving of attack (62).

The fact that punishment for violent behavior is the model of the usual means resorted to control violence reflects the lack of understanding of the factors contributing to violence. Wertham (65), Zilborg (90), and Menninger (110) each have tried to demonstrate that counteraggression does not stamp out aggression and counter-violence does not eliminate violence. If anything, such an approach, in effect, says "let's have more!" We must emphasize that when we speak of large scale denial or rationalization of the effects of violence, we refer not only to denial or rationalization of intrapsychic factors, but also of social, environmental, and political factors. We must also honestly acknowledge that psychiatry participates in such denial and rationalization of the importance or consequences of violence. In his discussion of Murder, Psychiatry, and the Law, Tanay (111) speaks of the avoidance by psychiatry of the study of homicide. Studies of homicide are relatively few in number (112, 113). Death, aggression, and homicide are taboo topics. Criminal law and trial procedures are designed to achieve denial of those features that characterize the murderer. The popular conception is that murder is a crime usually committed by hardened criminals and that they can be kept in check by stiff penalties, death sentences, or life imprisonment. Rarely is this the case. We maintain this conception only because the act of murder seems more acceptable and helps to deny killing as a need in itself. It further helps to prevent the recognition of murder as a form of everyday aggression. Murderers generally are law-abiding citizens, who usually kill the one they

love. They remain the same after their act of violence and rarely repeat such an act. Their insight into the "why" of their action is limited. Tanay feels that those guilty of homicide pretend to avoid punishment but unconsciously pursue it. Many of these people require a treatment approach that will soften the severity of their conscience.

D. *Escalation of Violence; Adaptation to Violence*

There is ample evidence in the history of mankind that adaptation to violence occurs. With each occasion of behaving in a violent manner, man is more apt and more ready to do so on another occasions.⁹ Recent evidence for this can be found (73, 114). We do not understand the mechanisms of this process as it occurs in the individual. A description of it is possible if we speak of "lower thresholds" for violence in the individual, or lack of inhibitions over its expression. We should suggest, however, changes within the functioning structures of the personality which may be measurable by clinical, psychological testing, or by means of comprehensive interviews. Rage prior to the expression of violence and guilt after its appearance probably become considerably attenuated. The balance between ego, superego, and the impetus toward violence probably changes.

An article describing the habituation to the stepwise escalation of war efforts (115) presents a model of what we believe takes place within each individual exposed to repeated violence. With each step of increasing involvement in the war, the next one becomes more acceptable. The total escalation is overlooked because of the "end-anchoring" effect of a shifting and increasing baseline which is used to compare the most recent escalation move. In the case of violence, the individual becomes increasingly involved in expressions of violence and on each new occasion becomes less aware of the overall increment in his involvement in violence.

E. *Dehumanization and the Anomic Society*

The individual acting violently usually sees his victim in a dehumanized way and perhaps feels that way himself. This has previously been discussed and need not be repeated here, except to point out that this plays a role in the current events we concern ourselves with here.

The effects of the "anomic society" on increasing the likelihood of violence in any individual has also been covered in section III.

F. *Individual Characteristics Before and After the Event of Violence*

Individual features differ when comparison is made of the pre- and post-violent events. Furthermore, we expect differences to appear in the individual depending on whether he acts alone or within a group.

Prior to the eruption of violence:

1. The individual acting alone is undergoing a psychologic breakdown or disruption of various psychologic functions. Violence stems from such disruption.

2. The individual acting in a group has the group support for a move, which in this case would be the expression of violence, resorted to as a

defensive maneuver. Breakdown or disruption is averted by this group action.

Following the eruption of violence:

1. The individual, acting alone, reestablishes his stability; he experiences a feeling of gratification and an effect state of excitement or perhaps exhilaration.

2. The individual acting in a group may have similar experiences. In addition, he feels an increased sense of belonging to and cohesiveness of the group.

VI. VIOLENCE: DERIVED HYPOTHESES

Aggression and concepts about its origins, manifestations, and conditions of arousal and control cannot satisfactorily be transferred to explain the phenomena of violence. Violence should be considered the behavioral manifestation of a distinct, unique psychological state or "ego-state." The balance and relationship between impulses, controls, external pressures, and affects undergo an alteration from their representative forms. When violence appears in an individual acting alone, the affect supporting his behavior must be something more than anger. We think of it as rage. The regulation and controls provided by ego and superego functions are disrupted, overwhelmed, or in some way incapacitated and made ineffective.

When violence erupts in the individual who acts as part of a group, ego and superego functions are suspended, and the group or group leader then provides these. The "cause" or purpose of the group serves to justify the transfer of such functions. Because the leader directs the actions of the group, it becomes unnecessary for the individual to impose self-restraint against the eruption of violence. Morality, judgment, and empathy are suspended and violence is justified by the very existence of the group.

Violence in the individual acting alone, therefore, is a product of a breakdown in successful adaptation. Some stabilization occurs following violent actions by an individual, but we should not confuse this state with "normal" psychological functioning. The contrast we are making is between the two psychic states experienced by an individual suffering from some form of psychopathology.

In a group, the individual may be spared suffering from a near breakdown of his psychological functioning, although a group formed for the purpose of acting violently will attract people who are disturbed in the sense that they are "violence prone."

For the individual acting alone, or in a group, conditions supporting violence are usually necessary before violence will take place. The victim or victims may provide such support, there may be an audience in favor of such actions, or the individual or group may find support in an "implied group." The support for violence may come from the very fact that violence similar to that being engaged in has previously, but recently occurred. The individual himself may have engaged in such violence, or he may know of previous episodes. In any case, there appears to be both facilitation and escalation effects.

An important feature of violence, distinguishing it from aggression, is its explosiveness. There occurs a release or outburst which is sudden and comes

very close to the limit of intensity of which the individual or group is capable. Organized aggressive plans may be closely related to violence but differs from it in that it is more rational than violence, and is deliberately directed toward the attainment of particular goals.

Following the act of violence, the individual experiences feelings which may be described as exuberance or fulfillment. This is not simply due to the discharge effects produced with the violent act; it is also related to the fact that the primary influences on the individual come from impulses and effects without the modulation that would be achieved when ego and superego functions are operative.

The "ego-state" associated with violence has some characteristics similar to those appearing with traumatic experiences. In the first place, when the individual suffers a traumatic experience, he suffers also a breakdown and disruption of his adaptation techniques so that a return to the previously established psychological balance may not be possible. A situation similar to this results with the eruption of violence. Damage and scars of varying degrees to the psychological system operative in each individual may be relatively permanent. Second, rage as an effect may be of such proportions as to overwhelm the individual. The individual's reaction is just the opposite to that occurring when a traumatic experience has taken place. A traumatic experience is passively endured. Violence, by way of contrast, is actively expressed in behavior.

It is not clear whether this takes place as described, should the individual be part of a group. He is not the sole agent of the violence in this case. The degree of commitment to the group and the availability of intellectual defenses will be factors related to whether or not the violence will produce lasting effects on the individual. The greater the commitment and the greater the intellectual involvement, the greater the psychological recovery of the individual following an episode of violence.

Once violence has been acted out, a series of events takes place not unlike that occurring when the individual has been traumatized. Future opportunities to express violence are sought in order to achieve a feeling of mastery or resolution.

In all cases of violence, we may assume that human bonds or ties are suspended, absent, or released; that is, the person inflicting violence feels himself released from ties to his victim.

The victim of violence is less likely to be specifically chosen as would be the case where an individual behaves in an aggressive manner. We see a situation where indiscriminate object choice occurs; proximity more than "cathexis" determines the selection of object or objects of violence. Motives are blurred because human ties are relatively absent. In some cases, the murderous potential may be activated by the victim in a very unspecific fashion. The victim may make a contribution to his own demise.

When group violence takes place and is supported by an underlying cause, there is also indiscriminate selection of victims. In Nazi Germany, all Jews were victims; today in the United States there are some who consider any person over 30 years of age as part of the establishment. To some blacks all white people are enemies.

There is an interesting parallel here in that an indiscriminate basis for

group unity is also present. For example, everyone under 30 is acceptable to the antiestablishment groups. Everyone who is black is more likely to be acceptable by another black.


Could it be, we might ask, that in most cases of individual or group violence a revenge-seeking fantasy is operative in the individual or that the individual plays out actively what he has believed to have happened to himself or to a group of which he is a member? As examples of this, take the case of Sirhan Sirhan. There has been some indication that his murder of Robert Kennedy was in retaliation for violence he felt was inflicted upon his people. It may also be that the individual harbors a fantasy of defending against some violent attack. For example, could expectation of H-bomb world destruction or dying in Vietnam present such a possibility? Does the individual perhaps believe that violence is a necessary action he must take against a rival?

Certain psychologic states of the individual recorded on the basis of clinical experience, social observations, and motivational research play vital roles in facilitating the transition to that "ego-state," which makes violence possible: the sense of helplessness, hopelessness, and frustration; the need to escape from madness; threatened self-esteem; psychological "anomie"; feelings of dehumanization or alienation; an intense fear and desire to hurt, both unmodulated by feelings of trust and love. The point is that these are important primarily as "facilitators" in the sense that they carry the individual over into a "frame of mind" which supports the expression of violence. Whether violence will erupt is yet another matter and depends upon the various other conditions which have already been discussed. We can be certain that violence will neither be understood, nor regulated without recognizing it as determined by many features of internal and external sources. We speak of the unique "ego-state" which we hypothesize characterizes the individual giving vent to violence; yet we know that people and their "ego-states" do not exist in a vacuum. Everyone has a personal history. In each individual these sources of influence play some role, but probably to differing degrees.

In the various types of theories discussed above (sec. III) little attention was paid to the role of *affects* in the eruption of violence. We feel that this is an oversight that leads us to an incomplete understanding of violence.

In our use of affects, we distinguish between feelings and affects in the following way: Affects correspond to a process of discharge manifest in (1) motor changes in the person's body such as those involving the secretory and circulatory systems and (2) motility in actions and behavior designed to effect changes in the outer world. Both (1) and (2) effect tension reduction related to the impulse, urge, or drive which is responsible for the affect arousal. The final expression of affect is perceived by the individual as a characteristic "feeling."

The sequence of events leading to the eruption of violence may take place as follows:



Phase II

- a. Frustration or helplessness or threat of ego disintegration, etc.
- b. which has an associated affect, which is probably "rage"
- c. inasmuch as the discharge qualities of this affect, under these circumstances is insufficient, then



Phase III

Discharge is sought in motility, action and behavior of a violent nature.

In this sequence, should the affect that is aroused be anger, then aggressive behavior will appear in Phase III instead of violence!

Affects are assigned a special role in the sequence leading to violent behavior. Affects may alter perceptual thresholds, facilitate or interfere with intellectual functioning, and alter thresholds for the appearance of certain behavior. Rage, we believe, increases the probability of the appearance of destructive behavior by reducing controls and inhibitions, and altering rationality. We are well aware from our clinical experience that affects such as rage may not be apparent in clinical observations. A variety of defensive means are available to accomplish this. The case as reported by Zilborg (90) of Albert Fish illustrates this. Flattened affect was characteristic of this man who was able to carry out murder which expressed cannibalistic fantasies. Zilborg recognized this as a virulent phenomenon leading to the paralysis of moral judgment and will. Albert Fish not only didn't demonstrate rage or anger, but also showed no signs of feelings that might have served to prohibit his actions of murder. From our point of view, then, the absence of observable affect does not mean that its affect is not present. Furthermore, the absence of observable affect usually includes absence of feelings for others, effective guilt, and anxiety. Each of these is important in making it possible to control the behavior of violence.

VII. PROBLEMS, SUGGESTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

Most individual acts of violence have some legal designation reflecting that a law has been broken. Personnel with varied functions (law enforcement, court trial, prison and/or rehabilitation) immediately become involved, and we all take their involvement for granted. On the other hand, the involvement of the psychiatrist or psychoanalyst (and for that matter, psychologist and social worker) is usually by invitation only. We grant that under most circumstances inviting the psychiatrist to become involved does not simplify issues and decisions; they become more complex, but at least closer to the truth.

We should not be satisfied with a designation for violence such as "assault and battery" or "assault with intent to kill," for example, without knowing the individual who has committed such an act. This point has already been stated many times (Zilborg, Wertham, Menninger) with regard to various crimes and is worthy of re-emphasis. Assault with intent to kill is not the same act in a psychotic individual as it is in someone suffering from a

personality pattern or trait disturbance. Both would be much different from an act of violence of an individual acting in a group. How society must respond to an individual committing an act of assault with intent to kill should depend upon the individual, not on the act alone.

Up to this point, we have not mentioned workers in other disciplines, sociologists, for example, who justifiably may take a similar stand as we do in support of involvement for their discipline. This is not because we do not see their approach and findings as important. On the contrary, we wish to go on record as supporting multi-discipline approaches to the study of violence. The challenge is to effectively apply findings and implement suggestions for action derived from each discipline that has become involved. In representing psychiatry and psychoanalysis, we naturally place emphasis upon our approach and viewpoints. It would be naive to assume that psychiatric or psychoanalytic approaches alone will take care of things. For violence to fall under the rein of reasonable control, social, political, economic, and psychological influences will have to be developed and asserted.

If we can accept the idea that any act of violence is an action defining for us further characteristics of the individual, then we must accept a conclusion that whether we accept imprisonment or psychotherapy, or rehabilitation and reeducation as the way to respond to the individual, will depend not on our view of his action alone, but on recognition of what he is like so that his behavior did erupt into violence. Furthermore, if we can accept the idea that the personality and its functioning characteristics is the final common pathway for all experiences, influences, etc., then every act of violence should be seen against the backdrop of an individual with describable personality features. For the most part, when an individual act of violence has erupted, we expect to find psychopathology of some sort. This may not be so in the case of an individual who acts within a group; the collective experiences of psychiatrists seeing such people have been insufficient to either verify or reject this point of view. If we fall back on our limited and subjective clinical experience, we would have to take a stand in favor of the view that an individual whose behavior erupts in violence, whether he acts alone or in a group, does so as an expression of personal disturbances that could be identified if the individual were satisfactorily examined.

We see violence as behavior that will erupt in the context of a unique psychologic state of the individual. Violence is different from aggression, but for all practical purposes, aggression represents drive-related behavior. We accept destructiveness as a potential of varying strength in all individuals. To argue that this is not the case in some societies is indisputably of academic value, but serves to stymie advances that may be possible from the recognition of its universal presence. But the individual does not live by drive potential alone; he learns, he experiences, he is gratified, he is deprived, he matures and develops, he is rewarded or punished, all which modify the potential toward destructive behavior in its goals, directions, strength, and gratifications.

While it is unrealistic to plan to eliminate all forms of violent behavior, it is certainly prudent, if not absolutely essential to utilize all our knowledge of human behavior to minimize its occurrence. We are impressed with the following conditions that minimize the likelihood of violence:

(1) *Strong ties to other people*; bonds of love to others help avert violence toward them.

(2) *Childhood experiences relatively free of punitive (especially physical) discipline measures or abuse*. Schooling in behavior which can become violence takes place if these do appear.

(3) *Developmental and educational experiences which reinforce the child's attachments, minimize frustrations, and encourage lenient, flexible inner controls and regulatory mechanisms* insure that the child will develop without the need for violence.

(4) *Social activism* (such as Peace Corps, civil rights activity, perhaps even movements emphasizing militant nonviolence) which enhance the individual's self-esteem, restores his sense of competence, and discharges tension energies and decreases potentially dangerous frustrations.

(5) *"Participatory democracy."* This serves to avert alienation and dehumanization and increases self-esteem and identification with units of government or agency or institution. Highly abstract, centralized units of government or institutions are so far separated from the individual that bonds of attachment to the institution or other individuals are attenuated.

(6) *Decreased exposure to violence arousal stimuli*. Individuals repeatedly exposed to violence arousal are more likely to react destructively than those spared such exposure under certain conditions.

(7) *Increased acknowledgment and awareness of the devastating effects of violence*. This requires a lifting of the suppression and removing of the denial of the presence of destructive tendencies with which everyone must cope.

(8) *Removal of political, social, and economic conditions which serve to produce what we have earlier called "facilitators" of the expression of violence*. Racial inequalities, poverty, repressive governmental actions are representative of such conditions.

(9) *Redirect aggressive impulses away from violent forms of expression and toward the assertive and adaptive or verbal forms of behavioral expression*. Athletic activities, sports events, and humor would be examples.

(10) *Provide education, rehabilitation, or psychotherapy designed to ensure the maximal development of adaptational controls* in individuals in whom biological or organic conditions exist which cannot be directly changed and which correlate with violence proneness, such as mental retardation, convulsive states, or the XYY syndrome.

(11) *Recognize the extreme danger in the belief "fight violence with violence."* This ignores the evidence that violence begets violence. In effect, the use of violent methods to control destructive behavior in others is in itself the expression of destructive urges in transparent disguise.

We conclude with an observation worth restating: Man is capable of both love and hate. On the one hand, he seeks to preserve and unite his fellow man and himself; on the other hand, he kills and destroys others or himself. "We cannot wait for biological evolution to change the nature of man's drives, his ego, and superego functions. We can only try to enhance his capacity to channel his drives with the capacities he now has in the direction of a better

social system... man has, even now, the capacity to govern himself, to integrate his drives, his ego functions, and his superego ideals and prohibitions...; that he will accomplish this before he destroys himself... [we] cannot say. In this choice lies the humanness of human beings" (93, p. 520).

FOOTNOTES

¹We are aware that societal standards determine what is to be considered emotional and even physical illness. The value judgments of psychiatry are included as determinants. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to discuss the role of society in determining norms of behavior.

²This trend has, of course, continued and much progress has been made in the area of neurobiological, biochemical, and genetic understanding of psychiatric disorders.

³The classification of mental illness going back to earliest recorded time (2600 B.C.) and extending to the present demonstrates the changing view of the violent person; it ranges from seeing him as a victim of demonic possession to the current diagnostic categorization of sociopathy (58, appendix).

⁴The actual incidence of violence is not easy to determine. Kinzel writes that the ratio of violent offenses to all offenses reported was about 16% in three widely different penitentiaries. The data suggested a constant proportion of inmates predisposed to violence (18).

⁵This category used to include psychopathic personality and sociopathic personality disturbance: "They are incapable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and are unable to feel guilt or learn through experience and punishment. . . ." (116, p. 11).

⁶In psychoanalytic theory metapsychology is distinguishable from clinical theory or clinical explanation of observable phenomena. It represents an attempt to create a personality model reflecting all features of the theory using constructs which are, by themselves, not observable.

⁷The question of moral and legal responsibility or accountability for criminal acts has been raised in a recent trial in France where the chromosomal aberration and accompanying physical and mental characteristics of an XYY individual were present in the accused murderer. The jury rejected the plea that Daniel Hugon should not be held responsible for his acts. A defense witness, Professor Jerome LeJeune, an authority on chromosomal disorders, contended that "the born criminal does not exist, but those born with chromosomal abnormalities have a 30% greater chance of becoming criminals than others." (*New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1968, sec. C, p. 5.)

⁸Other psychoanalytic writers, especially Melanie Klein and Karl Menninger have accepted the concept of a death-instinct but other psychoanalytic theorists have strongly disagreed with the need for seeing aggressive drive as a secondary phenomenon of a death instinct (20, 117, 118).

⁹The exception to this rule will be found in certain people committing homicide. Experience has shown they rarely repeat their act of violence.

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APPENDIX 24

CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE VIOLENT PATIENT

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and
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STATE OF THE ART

Evaluation of the violent patient is in an elementary state of art. Large numbers of violent people appear to exist within prisons and outside, yet there is little knowledge of their incidence, save for statistics representing "violent crimes"—murder, rape, assault, robbery. Nor are there clear criteria for the identification of potentially violent patients. The field of psychiatry has generally shunned the subject of violence, particularly as it applies to crime and the vast reservoirs of violent-prone patients who exist within prisons. It is estimated that there are at present less than 100 psychiatrists spending any substantial time in the treatment of the prisoners housed within the correctional institutes of this country (10).

Even when a physician must evaluate a violent patient, there are no uniformly recognized psychiatric diagnostic procedures to help him. Explicit procedures such as those which are used to evaluate a diabetic or a person with pneumonia do not exist. Methodologies are widely variable, depending upon the psychiatrist's orientation and background. One psychiatrist may look upon the violent act in dynamic terms and formulate treatment in those terms. Another may regard only the organic aspect of the case with minimal emphasis on psychological factors.

It is the purpose of this paper to comment on the identification of violent and violence-prone patients, to discuss what is known and unknown about their diagnosis and treatment, and to make suggestions for future work in the area of violence.

I. Definition

A. What is Meant by Violence?

The term "violence" is not relegated to the field of crime alone, but refers to assaultive or destructive acts or ideation. The term "ideation" is included because patients with fears or fantasies of violence sometimes act these out. Also, concerns about their potential for harm often bring them to a psychiatrist in the first place. Psychiatric intervention in these cases plays an important preventive role.

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II. Identification

A. Violent Patients Seen by the Psychiatrist

1. *Referred by others.*—Unlike physical illnesses where the patient complains of his symptoms, the detection of mental illness depends in large degree upon the astuteness of the sensitivities of those people who see the patient or offender long before the psychiatrist does. Such people include police officers, lawyers or judges. Those most likely to be referred to a psychiatrist are offenders who demonstrate obvious clinical illness such as blatant psychosis or marked mental retardation. Also, offenders whose violent act or crime appears to be excessively brutal, sadistic or senseless in its quality are often referred to psychiatrists. Certain crimes are traditionally thought of as "psychiatric"; these include certain sexual crimes or repeated arson.

In certain rarer situations, a group of criminals is routinely referred for psychiatric evaluation as part of a program or research interest. Such a program was carried out in a Psychiatric Clinic of the New York Court of General Sessions during the years 1932-65 (9). Another interesting group of individuals studied are those who have threatened assassination of the President of the United States (34).

2. *Self-referred.*—Referrals from outside agencies and individuals are not the only sources of violent individuals. With the increasing awareness of mental illness, emergency room psychiatric centers have witnessed the influx of large numbers of patients with a variety of psychological disorders. Among the patients using such psychiatric facilities are certain classes of people who enter with chief complaints of impulsivity, destructive ideation, or violent behavior. These have recently been termed "self-referred violent patients" (21). Such patients enter emergency room facilities with such statements as "I'm afraid I'm going to hurt someone," "I have rage attacks for no reason," or "I get violent when drunk" and so forth. A current study (22) has revealed the fact that a significant portion of such patients has extensive histories of violence. Some have often clashed with the law, been arrested, served prison sentences, owned or used weapons, or engaged in reckless driving. That such patients enter on a voluntary basis in the first place attests to the fact that they appear to view their dangerous behavior as alien and that they want help.

B. Violent Patients Not Seen by the Psychiatrist

1. *Most offenders.*—Most people who commit violent crimes are never seen by a psychiatrist. Evidence suggests that many such offenders would be found to have either psychoneurotic or personality disorders at the least. Unfortunately, these illnesses are not necessarily overt, so that few of these sick people are referred to psychiatrists. Only a small percentage of all major crime—less than 5 percent of selected surveys—is carried out by people with either psychosis or mental retardation (26).

Those participating in underworld crime, which often involves the most brutal forms of violence, do *not* appear to have flagrant mental disorders. Underworld violence is an adaptive mode of living for those who partake of it. Relatively few gangsters come to psychiatric attention; in those who do

there is a lack of distinguishing characteristics that can be called neurotic or otherwise indicative of internal conflict (2). Better and more rigorous behavioral assessment appears to be necessary for the identification, evaluation and treatment of such people.

2. *Criminals.*—Both underworld crime and crimes in general tend *not* to be thought of as "psychiatric." Nevertheless, it is all too apparent that any criminal, particularly the juvenile offender, can be identified as a potentially violent person. Seventy-five percent of persons convicted for "violent" crimes have had a previous conviction for some other charge. This fact, plus the current rates of recidivism of most crimes—well over 50 percent (43), make it evident that the first offense is the time when identification should be made. This principle of early identification of potentially violent patients has been overlooked. Instead, there are popular cries for the detection of "madmen" within society. Far more violent acts have been and will be committed by those already incarcerated than by the Specks, Rubys, or Rays who come to dramatic public attention. Indeed, all three men cited above had had contacts with the law long before their final spectacular acts of violence catapulted them into notoriety (1, 2, 20).

Even in prisons, there are readily identifiable groups of persons who repeatedly demonstrate their potential for violence. They are involved in fights or assaults on other inmates; they tend to have rage outbursts or temper tantrums. These groups are usually well known both to guards and mental health personnel. More attention needs to be turned to the psychological education of guards and other prison officials, so that these men can screen and bring to medical attention those offenders who would benefit from therapeutic intervention. Police officials, criminal lawyers, and judges could also benefit from still further education about behavior. These men constantly see violent people and are therefore in a far better position to make psychiatric referrals than the usual physician who enters the prison on his own and without guidance.

3. *Dangerous drivers.*—Another area of violent activity which rarely comes to psychiatric attention is misuse of the automobile. In one study (37) of 96 fatal auto accidents, over 40 percent of drivers surviving showed signs of paranoid thinking, depression, violence, or suicidal tendencies. More than half the drivers were disturbed about a chronic conflict with another person. Ten percent had had violent quarrels or fights within 6 hours of the accident. When matched with control drivers, the drivers involved in fatal accidents had a 50 percent higher incidence of previous accidents.

Unfortunately, there are no figures available to indicate how many of the drivers involved in the more than 50,000 annual traffic deaths in this country have come to psychiatric attention as a result of multiple accidents. A driver who is repeatedly convicted of dangerous driving practices appears to be in the same category as the average criminal: his offenses are not viewed as "psychiatric." It is evident that this problem warrants far more attention than it has received to date.

4. *Drivers who drink.*—Thirty to 50 percent of all motorcar fatalities involve drinking (40). And yet, there are no statistics available to indicate what proportions of drivers arrested for drunken driving are referred to psychiatrists. Programs aimed at mandatory medical intervention for such drivers could constitute a simple means of identifying violent patients.

5. *Patients with chromosomal irregularities.*—Recent studies (41) have demonstrated that a markedly higher rate of chromosomal abnormalities such as XYY exists among prisoners (up to 1 in 12) than among the general population (1 in 2,000). However, all such identification which has been done to date is retrospective. There are still no studies indicating which persons among the general population found to have chromosomal irregularities later become violent or violate the law. Predictive studies of people with chromosomal irregularities might serve as a new means of identifying violent or violence-prone individuals.

III. Psychiatric Diagnosis

A. What is Known Psychiatrically About the Violent Patient

A large literature exists on the dynamic aspects of the violent patient. The psychiatric understanding of this patient is usually accomplished through interviews which enable the physician to learn of the patient's childhood, early growth and development, and present level of functioning. This interview is referred to as the anamnesis. It includes, in addition to a history, a description of the patient's present mental status, prominent symptoms and defenses which help to formulate a diagnosis.

Traditionally, certain types of difficulties in early growth and development have been associated with potential adult psychopathology that can manifest itself in violence. Temper tantrums and hyperactivity indicate a low level of frustration that can contribute to impulsive behavior in later life. Stuttering or breath holding is considered indicative of anger that can not be otherwise expressed. Pyromania, enuresis, and cruelty to animals are also associated with underlying aggression and have recently been shown to be predictive of adult crime (11).

Adequacy of parental figures plays a role, not only in sexual development and identity, but also in development of conscience and attitudes toward authority. Parental brutality and seductiveness have been shown to be associated with both general forms of violence and child battering (38); parents who harm their children often have come from families where they, in turn, were beaten. This pattern can persist for several generations.

Sexual adjustment provides the psychiatrist with some guidelines for the diagnosis of violent-prone patients. Homosexuality, either in overt or latent forms, and associated paranoid states often result in assaultive behavior when sexuality is threatened or frustrated. Impotency or sterility (including surgical sterilization in males) alerts the psychiatrist to underlying concerns about masculinity and aggression. Such suppressed feelings, under appropriate circumstances, can erupt quite violently (15).

B. What Should Be Found out About the Violent Patient

The psychiatrist evaluating a violent patient needs more and different kinds of information than that listed above. He needs answers to the following queries about the patient's behavior.

1. *Use of alcohol.*—Inquiry into the use of alcohol is an important diagnostic finding. Over 50 percent of crimes involve alcohol (40); alcohol

may trigger violent behavior in a patient already prone to such forms of action. If the violent patient becomes increasingly irritable when intoxicated, he may well act dangerously when driving a car.

2. *Drug use.*—The use of drugs such as narcotics or amphetamines makes the violent-prone patient an even greater risk in society. There is evidence showing that prolonged use of amphetamines is associated with temporal lobelike psychosis (4). Such psychoses can manifest themselves in impulsivity and violence. Brain damage has also been reported in persons with prolonged addiction to amphetamines.

3. *Access to weapons.*—Whether or not a violent patient owns or has access to a weapon is also very important. Easy availability of guns may enable the violent-prone patient to become dangerous. Similarly, the violent-prone patient's occupation may entail risk for others. If the patient operates a bus or plane, he could potentially endanger the lives of his passengers. Thus, the patient's job may fortuitously provide him access to a weapon, whether this be a gun, vehicle or whatever.

4. *Previous history.*—A past history of impulsivity or violence is an important indicator of potential for further violent behavior. Questions should be asked about how the patient reacts to stress, has quarrels with employers, or handles altercations with his wife and children. If the patient has actually done bodily harm, used a knife or gun, destroyed furniture or become involved in car accidents under stress, he can be viewed as potentially violent.

Impulsive suicide attempts or self-destructive gestures, particularly when unaccompanied by depression, often indicate a potential for violence. Patients with such histories appear to be able to shift their aggression inwardly or outwardly.

5. *Previous treatment.*—An important diagnostic finding is a history of previous psychiatric contact or hospitalization for problems related to violence or impulsivity. Experience with violent patients has shown that such persons have asked for aid long before the final act of violence which brings them to the attention of the law. In addition, there appears to be some evidence for the view that the violent patient "cries for help" in the same manner as the suicidal patient. Often, a violent patient has already had a chain of past psychiatric contacts, clinic visits, or hospitalizations. Although these may have had little permanent effect on the patient's personality, they may have been quite effective in controlling momentary stresses.

6. *Special aspects of the mental status.*—The present appearance of the patient is of crucial importance in assessing his potential for harm. Acute anxiety, fears of "loss of control" or other variants on this theme are ominous and indicate danger. Incipient psychotic or flagrantly psychotic patients require hospitalization. So do patients who utter homicidal threats calmly and without anxiety; such patients are also asking for help and controls. If the patient expresses vaguer fears of doing harm, yet maintains some degree of self control and a willingness to discuss the issues involved, he may be responsive to outpatient care, provided definitive care is arranged.

7. *Common psychological conflicts.*—A core problem can often be found in the violent patient's personality. Homosexuality has already been mentioned. Intense unresolved ambivalent feelings about important figures such as parents in the patient's life often lead to an expression of hatred

which can take homicidal proportions. Such patients are unable to see both good and bad qualities simultaneously in one individual. They either love or hate the person with vigor. In other cases, patients may have strong reaction formations against dependency on other individuals such as a spouse. While seemingly independent, they have many deeply rooted needs to be taken care of. Abandonment of a spouse may thus cause intense rage which manifests itself in violent behavior. Certain other patients with paranoid features are exquisitely sensitive to any imagined slur on their character. An intolerable inner sense of low self esteem is projected outward. This defense protects them from the constant realization of their own inadequacies, and makes "others" responsible for their misfortunes.

8. *Psychological tests.*—Psychological tests may provide additional information. Projective tests such as the TAT or Rorschach may be helpful regarding the patient's potential for violence or capability for tolerating anxiety. Such tests may also give indications of underlying fantasies of aggression and help formulate a dynamic picture of the patient.

C. Critique

A low level of awareness exists among physicians regarding the identification of the violent patient. Within hospitals and clinics, violence itself is not identified by word but is usually cloaked within other diagnostic categories, such as paranoid personality, impulse character disorder, schizoid personality, or psychopath. Violent patients are less apt to be identified as candidates for treatment because they are frightening, unsavory, difficult to maintain in therapy, and considered incapable of insight. In this regard, they resemble alcoholics and are shunted to hospitals or state facilities whenever they become a menace. Unfortunately, the end stations to which dangerously violent patients are sent are usually those hospitals with the lowest doctor to patient ratios; treatment in such state hospitals is custodial, and patients are released early and without satisfactory followup.

Clear histories of violence are not routinely obtained by psychiatrists. Nor do most psychiatrists inquire about arrests, convictions, prison records, use of weapons, child or wife beatings, or dangerous driving. The physician's apparent reluctance to identify the violent patient outside a prison may relate to the former's own anxieties about uncovering dangerous behavior which he will then have to treat. More education is required to modify the widely held notion that violent patients are untreatable.

IV. Psychological Treatment

A. What is Known

1. *Individual psychotherapy.*—The literature indicates that dynamically oriented treatment of the violent patient is time consuming, arduous, and often ineffective. By virtue of his personality, such a patient is apt to miss appointments or otherwise avoid anxiety-laden material. On the basis of his background he may not understand what is to be gained by merely "talking." He is also incapable of tolerating a close relationship with another person, such as a therapist.

2. *Modified forms of psychotherapy.*—Recognizing the above difficulties, physicians must come to view treatment of the violent patient according to different conceptual models. Self-referred violent patients who use clinics or emergency room facilities can be encouraged, through either individual or group therapy, to use the emergency room during moments of stress. This form of conditioning procedure teaches patients that violence, as a mode of action, is inappropriate. At the same time, the existence of emergency psychiatric facilities gives these patients a place to come for help *before* they become assaultive or destructive. Another helpful tactic is to introduce violent patients to several psychiatrists who work in the emergency room, one of whom is likely to be available to the patient. Finally, the physician's telephone numbers can be made available to the patient so that he knows where to turn when urgent help is needed.

3. *Treatment of the possible "victim."*—Treatment of the violent patient should also take into account some form of help for the possible or potential victim. The personality factors of victims play an important role in many forms of violence, including murder. Such personality factors include self destructive urges or masochistic trends. In addition, victims usually play an intimate role in the lives of violent patients. In one study of 500 murder victims, 65 percent were found to be paramours, friends, relatives, or homosexual partners of the murderers (23). When a patient's violence involves a person with whom he is in frequent contact such as a wife, and when certain characteristics of a "victim" can be established, intervention may be an important means of preventing further violence. The victim can be made to realize the dangerous nature of his behavior.

4. *Drug treatment.*—Pharmacologic agents are important adjuncts to treatment. Tranquilizers have been shown to reduce markedly tension and anxiety, paranoid ideation, or impulsivity. Response to certain medications such as the phenothiazines (Thorazine, Stelazine, Mellaril), diazepam (Valium), or chlordiazepoxide (Librium) is often apt to be idiosyncratic. Effective forms of treatment with medication depend not only upon flexible, empirical trials with a variety of agents, but also upon titration of dose until optimal effect is obtained. Newer, long acting depot preparation tranquilizers such as fluphenazine (Prolixin) which can be injected every 2 weeks show some promise of helping the violent- or impulse-ridden person who is prone not to take his medication.

5. *Hospitalization, incarceration, and release.*—Criteria for hospitalization, already described under the diagnostic section, are relatively objective. Far less objective are criteria for the release of dangerous patients (8). Several items can be helpful. Given a patient who is no longer overtly homicidal, assaultive, or psychotic, thorough psychiatric assessment can be made of his capacity to tolerate depression. Many violent and violent-prone patients react to stress, frustration and ensuing depression by drinking excessively, driving fast or becoming outwardly assaultive. The patient's reactions to depressing day-by-day situations within the hospital or prison can give some index of his tolerance of frustration. In the case of sexual offenders, fantasies, if available, give a clue to their potential for violence. Yet all too often, those who determine the possible release of the patient have only the patient's past behavior in the prison and certain subjective impressions of him to guide them (19). Opinions of various staff personnel, guards, parole and probation

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officers can contribute to what is known about the patient. Still, such information may be far from conclusive. For example, a patient may have been a "model" prisoner and may be released early, despite the fact that no modification of underlying pathology has occurred.

6. *Followup.*—As in any medical illness, success of treatment is determined by the adequacy of followup. Court clinics already exist in some places to help those who have come into conflict with the law. Probation officials and parole officers are likewise of some help to the violent offender. Yet, this type of patient requires immediate help when conflict arises; his personality type is precisely that which cannot tolerate tension and anxiety. The violent patient must know that he has a place to turn to when problems arise. An emergency psychiatric facility can meet this need. Also, the violent patient must be made confident that someone not connected with the "law" is on his side, cares about him, and can control his behavior.

B. *What Is Not Known: Critique*

At the present time, it is not known which form of psychiatric treatment for the violent patient is the best. Within institutions such as prisons, the very concept of treatment is in direct contradistinction to punishment that the prisoner experiences by his confinement. Even though the public appears to be recognizing the need for changes in the penal system, psychiatric treatment for every prisoner is impossible with current mental health manpower. Ancillary personnel need to be trained to deal with the violent offender and offer him treatment, irrespective of the particular type—i.e., dynamic, behavioral, group.

Outside prisons, it is not known what means exist to encourage violent prone individuals to come to a psychiatric facility for help. It may be possible, through advertising (see appendix) via public media, to increase the number of "self-referred" violent patients who seek professional help. But such a move necessitates that physicians and facilities be available and equipped to handle such an influx.

V. Neurological Diagnosis

A. *What Is Known*

1. *Neuroanatomical areas implicated in violence.*—There are a number of structural abnormalities of the brain which can account for violent behavior. Limbic system dysfunction such as a temporal lobe neoplasm or epilepsy has been associated with violent outbursts in men (5, 42). Such violence can manifest itself in temper outbursts, increased irritability, and assaultive or destructive behavior resembling a seizure. For example, the recent "Texas Tower" murderer Charles Whitman was shown at autopsy to have had a tumor infiltrating into the temporal lobe (39). Other workers in the field have demonstrated amygdala dysfunction as a contributing cause of hyperactive and destructive behavior among mentally retarded children or certain epileptics (30).

2. *Tests for structural disease.*—Several different tools are used to help the physician determine if a violent patient has a brain irregularity which might cause his deviant behavior.

a. EEG: The diagnosis of temporal lobe disturbance has long been approached through electroencephalographic techniques. Not only are sleep EEG studies required to elicit spike activity from temporal lobe regions, but also repeated studies are often necessary to detect interictal abnormalities. Aids to the EEG's are electrical leads placed within the nose in the area of the sphenoid bone or inserted through the musculature covering the sphenoid bone. These nasopharyngeal or sphenoid leads, by virtue of their proximity to the temporal lobe, are helpful in increasing the yield of abnormal findings. Pharmacologic activation with such substances as scopolamine has been shown also to increase the yield of spiking (27).

It has become increasingly evident to workers in this field that the surface electroencephalogram is inadequate^A for diagnosing electrical dysrhythmias. While repeated sleep surface tracings can eventually yield positive findings, abnormalities do not necessarily correlate with behavioral manifestations. Indwelling depth electrodes have been used by several workers to determine abnormalities from deeper limbic system structures in the brain (35). Such electrodes are stereotaxically inserted via skull burr holes into the substance of the brain. They come to lie in the limbic system areas such as the hippocampus and amygdala. Recordings can then be made while the patient is awake and capable of relating his subjective feelings. With newer telemetry techniques, the patient can be mobile, and objective behavioral changes can be correlated with electrical activity within the brain (3).

An extensive literature already exists on the correlations between electroencephalographs and behavior of all types. Certain studies have found up to 50 percent of criminal populations to have EEG irregularities (17). Unfortunately, the EEG gives no etiological clarification regarding the reported abnormality; e.g., whether or not a tumor is present cannot be determined. Obviously, EEG studies of this type depend heavily on the population studied as well as the criteria for EEG "abnormality." An example of a controversial abnormality is fourteen and six per second spiking which has been shown to be correlated with violent forms of behavior. However, 14- and 6-second spiking is also present in a high population of normal young people. Yet despite these limitations, the EEG can serve as a useful diagnostic tool for the study of potentially violent people. An abnormal finding, for example, can alert the physician to further organic aspects of behavior such as seizure, brain damage, or structural changes.

b. Other laboratory tests: Neurologic evaluation of the violent patient proceeds along the same lines as those for any other patient suspected of central nervous system disease. In addition to routine hospital laboratory tests such as fasting blood sugar and serology, skull X-rays, lumbar puncture and (where indicated) contrast studies are adjuncts to the clinical diagnosis. Pneumoencephalography can be useful as a diagnostic tool for behavior disorders; in limbic system disease, it alone can often give valuable clues relating to ventricular asymmetry and temporal horn dilatation or cortical atrophy. Psychological tests such as the Bender-Gestalt or other tests of perceptual motor function enable the physician to check for signs of organic impairment.

3. *Key to possible diagnosis.*—A thorough and proper neurological history should be obtained before any of the above tests are considered, for test results are not meaningful when taken out of the context of each patient's

individual history. Before temporal lobe disorder can be confirmed, the physician must try to obtain the following information.

B. Proper Neurologic Diagnosis

1. *Brain injury or damage.*—The physician must try to ascertain if the patient has sustained brain injury or damage which has not been appreciated to date (32). The hippocampal portion of the temporal lobe is among portions of the brain most sensitive to anoxia. Hence, inquiry is made into birth injury, illnesses such as meningitis which lead to coma, and febrile convulsions in childhood. In addition, the physician will want to learn if there is any past history of convulsions in later life, syncope, head trauma, or episodes of unconsciousness. Many patients do not recall these events; some persistence is required on the part of the examiner to elicit past experiences.

All such occurrences can predispose to temporal lobe pathology, as can direct head injury resulting from childhood or automobile accidents. Ear infections can also lead to temporal lobe damage by virtue of proximity. Hearing losses or other complaints referable to the ear may alert the physician to signs of temporal lobe disease. Visual field changes due to involvement of the optic tracts which course through the hippocampus may also suggest temporal lobe damage. Memory changes may result from damage to the mammillary bodies and hippocampus. Sexual function may be affected by temporal lobe disease; alterations in libido and bizarre behavioral changes are possible.

2. *Modified seizurelike behavior.*—The classical signs of temporal lobe epilepsy may enable the physician to diagnose this disorder. Such signs include an aura of taste or smell, an ictal period of widely varying nature in which the patient detects alterations in psychological state—including déjà vu, feelings of depersonalization, dreamlike conditions, and a post-ictal state of drowsiness.

However, these classical signs of temporal lobe epilepsy may be entirely absent. Instead, the physician may be alerted to the diagnosis on the basis of many different subtle, complex and vague complaints. Such changes may be reported or verbalized in terms of alterations of feelings or consciousness. Relatives of the patient may claim that his personality has changed markedly. In other cases, the patient has a premonition that he will have a "spell" during which he will lose control, become assaultive or violent.

One clinical phenomenon often encountered is that of pathological intoxication. Alcoholic patients claim that they have "blackouts" during which they become violent. Amnesia often follows. The similarity between this state and that of psychomotor epilepsy has been described by several workers (31). It should alert the physician to an underlying seizure state.

In recent years, the concept of "subictal" or "ictal" forms of behavior has been recognized (14, 19). These labels refer to psychological events which resemble seizure states but lack clear-cut definite organic signs and symptoms. Subictal or ictal states resemble seizure states particularly because of abrupt onset and disappearance. They are accompanied by vague and "soft" neurological symptoms such as dizziness and headache. Both these types of behavior may be responsive to treatment with anticonvulsants. Hundreds of

such patients have been studied intensively by one worker (29) who reported that many patients had EEG evidence of limbic system dysrhythmias.

In many cases, neurological and psychological tests designed to detect organic impairment reveal equivocal or borderline abnormalities without localizing features. In such cases, given a history indicative of organic damage, the term "minimal brain dysfunction" (13) is often used to denote the fact that there appears to be an organic component to the patient's behavior problem, despite the fact that the component is not clearly or grossly demonstrable.

3. *Genetic clues.*—The organic workup should also include consideration of the genetic background of the violent patient. Finger and footprints for ridge count buccal smear and blood leucocyte incubation for chromosomal study, and somatotyping and genital examination all can give useful information on the genotypic and phenotypic aspects of the individual involved in violence (41).

C. The Interface of Psychiatry and Neurology

No consideration of the organic aspects of violence can be made without consideration of the psychological state. Even in clear-cut cases of grand mal epilepsy where seizure states are predominantly motor in nature, there still exist psychological precipitants. It is well known that mood influences seizures and that seizures of all kinds can be triggered off by psychological conflict and stress.

Similarly, a psychologic diagnosis does not exclude neurological concomitants, nor does a condition such as temporal lobe epilepsy exclude paranoia, depression, elation, anxiety, or any other behavioral state. Even when investigated along usual psychiatric lines of inquiry, a patient can be found to have a circumscribed psychological problem with the added component of a dysfunction of the brain.

The term "episodic" has been used by several authors to denote abrupt and often solitary outbursts of violence which may have psychodynamic significance (25) and which may also have EEG correlates (29).

D. Critique: What Is Not Known

Much remains to be learned about the organic bases for violent behavior. Also, the tools for such inquiry are still in the beginning stages. The practice of electrode implantation to diagnose temporal lobe epilepsy appears to be safe, but raises a host of unresolved moral and ethical questions.

Elementary information is lacking with regard to the organic components of violent behavior. Besides the EEG, it is not known which questions or procedures might help screen patients most effectively for the detection of brain disease.

There is no knowledge as to the incidence or frequency of temporal lobe dysfunction as a cause of violence or violent crimes. Temporal lobe epilepsy has also been linked to sexual deviation (18), but there are no data on the incidence of temporal lobe dysfunction among a group of sexual offenders.

During the year 1966, there were an estimated 1,800,000 epileptics in the United States (7). Among epileptics, conservative estimates of the incidence

of pure psychomotor seizures are about 5 percent (6). It is evident, therefore, that large numbers of temporal lobe epileptics exist, yet the behavioral manifestations of their disease continue to be unknown.

Personnel of hospitals and prisons have little awareness of the need for detection of organic components of behavior. In one study of certain patients who died in a mental hospital, autopsies revealed that 31 had limbic system tumors (24). There had been inadequate organic evaluation of the patients, even though they demonstrated a wide variety of both neurologic and psychiatric complaints. Prisoners also get inadequate organic evaluation. Another study (36) has shown that among a group of 100 criminals, 33 percent have abnormal EEG's and 67 percent have indications of organic dysfunction (seizure history, head injury, neurological signs, and "organicity" in psychological examination).

Physicians need to learn what questions to ask in order to uncover organic factors contributing to impulsivity, irritability, alterations in consciousness, temper outbursts, or frank seizure states. Physicians also must be made aware of the coexistence of psychological factors and organic conditions that can lead to violence.

VI. Organic Treatment

A. Drug Treatment

A wide variety of medications have been used in patients with seizurelike or frank epileptic conditions. Temporal lobe epilepsy has traditionally been treated with anticonvulsants such as diphenylhydantoin (Dilantin) or barbiturates. More recent evidence suggests that tranquilizers such as chlordiazepoxide (Librium) raise the seizure threshold within the limbic system, particularly the hippocampus and amygdala (28). The phenothiazines are considered to act as epileptogenic agents. However, experience with some temporal lobe epilepsy indicates that this disease, or at least certain forms of it, do not obey the same laws as other convulsive disorders. Temporal lobe epilepsy can be ameliorated by the administration of such drugs as the phenothiazines in conjunction with other anticonvulsants. As in the case of psychiatric disorders, seizurelike conditions may not be controlled until the physician has tried a variety of medications and finally discovers that agent or combination of agents which helps each patient. Finally, drug treatment of even a documented seizure disorder must relate to both the convulsive state and the underlying psychological symptomatology.

B. Surgical Treatment

For individuals whose violent behavior is caused by something like a tumor, surgery is the preferred method of treatment. In some cases of idiopathic epilepsy, several workers have reported results following focal lesions in the amygdala region of the human brain produced by radio frequency via depth electrodes (35). This procedure of amygdalotomy appears to have few technical hazards. The operation shows promise in replacing the classical temporal lobectomy operation. In this older procedure, several cm. of temporal lobe material are removed while the brain itself is

surgically exposed. Significant residual damage after lobectomy has been reported, including changes in sexual behavior, memory loss, blunting of affect (16). In general surgical procedures should be reserved for those patients tried without success on medications and therapy.

VII. Conclusions

The violent patient can be identified in prisons, hospitals and within society at large. He has a history of violent behavior or he verbalizes fears of becoming violent. Irrespective of where seen, the violent patient needs early intervention. Violence as a form of human behavior tends to be repetitive.

Psychiatric evaluation takes into account the salient features of the patient's past life and his present mental condition in assessing his risk to society. Many factors influence this risk. Alcohol, driving habits, and ownership of weapons are important. Evidence of past violence, including childhood acts, should cause the physician concern. It is imperative that inquiry be made into these areas.

Equally important is the evaluation of neurological factors contributing to the patient's violence. Impulsivity is often more than just a mode of life. It may, under close scrutiny, reveal a seizurelike disorder or a weakening of normal cerebral controls on emotional behavior. Organic workup should always be considered when a positive history of such items as head injury, convulsions, syncope amnesic states, or pathological intoxication is obtained.

Psychological treatment is incomplete without some form of adequate followup. This gives the violent patient the opportunity to obtain help in controlling impulsivity. Medication is important for psychiatric and organic conditions. Definitive surgical or ablative techniques should be reserved for patients with documented organic conditions which do not respond to conventional therapy.


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APPENDIX A

FLOW SHEET FOR VIOLENT PATIENTS



APPENDIX B
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Throughout the preceding text, many suggestions have been made regarding specific areas which could benefit from additional investigation. The following is a recapitulation of certain of these items:

- (1) Establishment of uniform psychiatric diagnostic procedures for violent patients—psychological and neurological.
- (2) Incentive programs aimed at encouraging psychiatrists to work with prison populations.
- (3) Education of paramedical, legal and penal personnel in psychological and neurological basis of behavior.
- (4) Mandatory psychiatric investigation of drivers convicted of multiple traffic violations, accidents and drunken driving.
- (5) Chromosomal studies of general populations with predictive estimates of those who may become involved in violent crimes.
- (6) Research into more valid criteria for release of dangerous patients.
- (7) Education of psychiatrists in neurological aspects of violent behavior.
- (8) Research into more sensitive techniques for assessing brain limbic system dysfunction.

APPENDIX C

The following photographs are experimental posters designed in the manner of "advertisements" to encourage violent-prone patients to enter psychiatric facilities for evaluation and treatment. Their possible use is now under study.



THIS MAN IS DRIVING
 VERY FAST
 HE DOESN'T CARE
 WHAT HAPPENS
 HE'S ANGRY
 HE'S VIOLENT
 DO YOU GET LIKE THIS?
 SHOULD YOU SEE
 YOUR DOCTOR?



THIS MAN HAS HAD
 AN ARGUMENT
 HE'S AFRAID HE MAY
 HARM SOMEONE
 HIS IMPULSES
 FRIGHTEN HIM
 DOES THIS HAPPEN TO
 YOU?
 CALL YOUR LOCAL
 MENTAL HEALTH CENTER



THIS MAN IS IMPULSIVE

HE HAS RAGE ATTACKS

**HE BECOMES VIOLENT
WHEN ANGRY**

**DO YOU HAVE THIS
PROBLEM?**

**YOUR LOCAL MENTAL
HEALTH CENTER CAN HELP**

APPENDIX D

THE SELF-REFERRED VIOLENT PATIENT

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An increasing number of patients now enter hospitals voluntarily with chief complaints of episodic violence, impulsiveness, and destructive urges. Proper evaluation of these patients is often difficult, particularly when the patient is extremely agitated. This communication furnishes guidelines for handling violent patients when they enter a hospital facility. The physician's job has not ended when the patient's acute anxiety has been abated and/or hospitalization has been arranged. If possible, the etiology of the patient's violence should also be established. Are the patient's problems caused by neurological difficulties, psychiatric difficulties, or both? This communication shows how a careful history can help the physician determine whether neurological and/or psychiatric consultations are advisable.

Because the stigma attached to mental health problems is waning, an increasing number of patients now enter the hospitals voluntarily with chief complaints of episodic violence, impulsiveness, and destructive urges. To the physician in hospital or emergency-room practice, these patients may express such complaints as vague fears of aggression ("I'm afraid I'm going to break something"), more specific homicidal ideation ("I want to kill my wife"), or descriptions of past acts of violence ("I hurt people for no reason"). Proper evaluation of potentially violent patients is often difficult. The physician is hampered by the urgency of the patient's problems and the potential danger that the patient poses for the community. If the physician makes a hasty disposition, he may never determine the actual etiology of the violent patient's behavior. And yet, there are certain diagnostic techniques which the physician can use when evaluating such a patient. It is the purpose of this communication to furnish guidelines for handling the violent patient and evaluating the etiology of his violence.

Controls

Patients entering a medical facility with complaints of violent acts or impulsiveness differ widely in accompanying anxiety. Some patients are lucid and rational; others are greatly agitated. The acutely disturbed patient requires severe anxiety as an outer manifestation of an inner fear that he will act on his impulses. The physician should assure the patient that his violent impulses will be checked and that he will be prevented from realizing these fears.

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Medication

Often, the acutely disturbed patient benefits from medication which diminishes his anxiety and reduces the strength of his fantasies. The phenothiazines remain the drugs of choice in these instances. The patient can be helped more effectively when medication has calmed him and he is again in control of his impulses.

Security

When dealing with the acutely disturbed patient, the physician should feel free to summon the aid of security personnel. He need not be afraid that this move will frighten the patient. The presence of such men helps convince the patient that his impulses will be checked and that external controls are being furnished. In addition, the presence of security personnel allays the doctor's fears. His own tensions are reduced—not transmitted to the patient—and the stresses between the doctor and patient are significantly eased.

Hospitalization

Just as the degree of agitation among patients differs, so the indications for hospitalization of violent patients vary with their acute states. The more violent the patient and the less he is in control of his impulses, the greater the indication for hospitalization. However, the patient's threats are just as important as his behavior, and the physician should take seriously threats of any kind, no matter how calmly uttered. If the patient alleges that he will harm someone, (or is afraid of harming someone) and does not elaborate on the nature or object of this potential act, he should still be taken seriously. Diffuseness of intent may mask a deep underlying conflict.

Many physicians harbor fantasies of retaliation when they hospitalize violent patients who oppose this confinement. However, our experience suggests that no such ill effects result from enforced hospitalization. Although the patient may express strong objections to enforced confinement, he usually feels genuine relief and a lessening of anxiety and impulsive thinking when told firmly that he will be placed in the hospital. The concept of hospitalization should be presented to the patient in a humane way, i.e., that the physician is very much concerned about the patient's potential danger to himself and society and that confinement will last no longer than it is necessary. Hospitalization does not mean commitment. Rather, it means limited confinement for purposes of observation. The patient should be encouraged to return to the referring facility when his difficulty is over and he has been released from the hospital. This assurance conveys to the patient the idea that the doctor is interested in him and is willing to see him again. Hence, the patient does not view hospitalization as the physician's rejection. Genuine concern on the part of the physician can make a lasting impression on the patient; it may even convert hostile and paranoid individuals into cooperative patients. Even a letter sent to the patient at the hospital reinforces the concern of the physician who initiated confinement. Enforced hospitalization when accomplished in a sympathetic way conveys to the patient the fact that someone cares enough about him to protect him from harm.

Patients who enter emergency-room facilities with a specific request for hospitalization should be taken seriously and confined according to their wishes. Often, such patients realize that dangerous impulses are breaking through and they seek some form of control.

Some patients who have agreed to necessary hospitalization change their minds while awaiting confirmation and completion of the necessary arrangements. With this reversal, the patient's acute anxiety and impulsiveness may suddenly reappear. The physician should anticipate this possibility. He can reduce these difficulties by having security personnel attend the patient during the stressful period between leaving the hospital and arriving at another facility. Finally, transportation to another hospital should always be by ambulance.

Careful History

Whether or not the violent patient requires hospitalization, it is the physician's responsibility to obtain a careful history from him. The physician must not assume that

the patient has been cured once his anxiety has abated and/or hospitalization has been arranged. On the contrary, the physician has done nothing thus far to ascertain the etiology of the patient's violence. This diagnosis is just as important as calming the patient when he is in an acute state. Several diagnostic techniques can help in the determination of the probable causes of the patient's violence.

Diagnosis

In trying to diagnose the causes of the violent patient's behavior, the physician must try to determine whether the patient's difficulties result from neurological problems, psychiatric problems, or both. For too long, physicians have treated violent patients only within the discipline of psychiatry. Malamud,¹ for example, has recently shown that patients with psychiatric complaints, including violence, are given inadequate organic evaluation.

Clues to Neurological Difficulties

The violent patient's behavior may be caused by a neurological disorder such as a brain tumor or temporal lobe epilepsy. The physician should inquire into such symptoms as headache or altered states of consciousness which accompany the violent act or impulsiveness. Are there subtle personality changes which have occurred over time and which may represent a slow-growing neoplasm in the frontal lobe?² Relatives may provide more information about such changes. Is there a marked alteration in sexual function or memory which suggests a temporal lobe process?³ Is there a past history of infection such as meningitis or head trauma which may have led to brain injury? Is there an impairment of intelligence or a history of learning difficulty? Is there a family history of epilepsy or a history of convulsions in childhood? Do aura or seizure-like states exist? Is there a history of repetitive rage reactions or periodically reoccurring temper tantrums which suggest temporal lobe epilepsy?⁴

If there are positive answers to any of the above questions, a neurological consultation is indicated. The neurologist may wish to perform a variety of tests, including a lumbar puncture, serial x-ray films of the skull, brain scan, or contrast studies. Multiple electroencephalograms made while the patient is asleep may be necessary to confirm the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy.⁵

Clues to Psychiatric Difficulties

Once neurological factors have been ruled out, the physician can attempt to assess the patient's psychological difficulties. A past history of parental brutality or sexual assault, enuresis, pyromania, or cruelty to animals is particularly ominous with regard to the potential for violence.^{6,7} Is the patient's job a potential hazard to himself or others? Does he, for example, drive a truck or bus or operate machinery? Has he been involved in serious automobile accidents or used a car as a means of dealing with stress? Do toxic factors such as alcohol or chronic drug use release his impulsiveness? Does he own weapons that make it easier for him to act upon his impulses? Is there a past history of serious impulsiveness? Suicide attempts may be an example of impulsive action. Is the patient seriously depressed, psychotic, or on the verge of psychosis? Positive answers to any of the above conditions indicate the need for psychiatric consultation.

Psychiatric Treatment

Our impression has been that the largest group of patients complaining of violence fall into the classification of "borderline" or "schizoid" personality types.⁸ Such patients are characterized by a history of much emotional deprivation, unstable relationships with people, and a need for immediate gratification. It is evident that patients such as these cannot tolerate insight-oriented and anxiety-producing psychotherapy. Therapy must be modified to that of a more supportive nature. A violent patient may not agree to see a physician at a regular time or for as long as an hour. But such a patient can still be helped, if the physician is flexible. He can see the patient irregularly and even for brief periods of time. An occasional interchange of 10 or

15 minutes may be enough to meet the violent patient's needs for support. We routinely give our telephone number to violent patients and encourage them to call us if they feel their impulses are getting out of hand. Drugs are a helpful adjunct of treatment. Phenothiazines have been helpful in patient who are argumentative, paranoid, or impulsive.

Goal of Treatment

Despite best efforts, it may be difficult to eradicate the problems of the violent patient by means of traditional discipline of psychiatry. Still, the physician can try through supportive treatment to ease such patient's conflicts with society. The physician can also aim to condition these patients to contact him promptly when they feel acute states beginning or impulses getting out of hand.

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APPENDIX 25

CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

By Paul Bohannon (*with the Assistance of Lawrence A. Miller)

It is as necessary for society to regulate the aggressive acts of human beings as for it to regulate the sexual acts of human beings (Scott, 1958: 25). In the processes of historical growth and cultural change, each set of social controls must be reformulated from time to time. Because we are now living at a time when the cultural reformulation of who fights whom—and who cares—is at the center of public attention and private introspection, the problem of aggression and violence has become (for the moment) central both in political life and in scientific urgency.

This paper undertakes to examine three pertinent areas: (1) the distinctions that must be made among the drives of aggression, the emotions of rage, the behavior of hostility, social relationships of violence and cultural values of bellicosity; (2) the occurrence of violent social relationships in differently structured social groups, with a more general regard for the relationship of violence to social structure and social forms; (3) violence as a learned cognitive category in different cultures, and bellicosity as a cultural value.

As Derek Freeman has pointed out (1964) man's ways of mistreating man are so various and so little studied at the present time (there is no extensive history or broadly based comparative ethnography of violent behavior or even of "cruelty," although there is a large literature on warfare and crime), that we can have only hypotheses about the subjects of violence and bellicosity rather than axioms and reasoned inferences and deductions. Here are some of our present hypotheses:

(1) We must distinguish among drives, protoemotions, emotions, behavior, social relationships, and cultural traditions. Most of the literature on the subject uses words such as "aggression" or "violence" to cover all these categories—indeed, to pole vault from one to the other. This matter calls for some preliminary definition: (a) "Drives" are universal in animals. However, the human aggressive drive in animals is non-orgastic (that is, the hydraulic or "flush-toilet" model (Klopfer and Hailman 1967: 42-3) is an incorrect way of viewing the matter).

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Therefore axiomatically to associate aggression with "destructiveness" is incorrect. The aggressive drive needs a "triggering mechanism" (or "frustration" as Dollard and his associates (1939) would have it) before it leads to action. (b) *Emotions* must be divided into two levels—those that are direct perceptions of and motoric reactions to stimuli, which (in the area on which we are focused) we shall call "rage" and which is a primitive response to penetration of the "self" (see below); these we shall call "protoemotions" (following Arieti 1967, but not following all his definitions and certainly not all of his conclusions); the second level is a more subtle emotion in which there is a recognized object for the rage—and the emotion becomes much more refined because of ambivalent attitudes toward all objects, and may be sublimated, but may also turn to anger or hate.

(2) "Hostility" is a word which we apply only to acts. Behavior made up of hostile acts presumably "results from" the emotions based on the protoemotion of rage, but can be (and often must be) studied independently of emotion or drive. "Agonistic behavior" is the ethological term which is commonly used to express this idea, but we prefer "hostility" because agonism implies not merely action, but interaction. Hostility needs a target, but it does not need a responding target; i.e., it does not need feed-back.

(3) Violence itself is a mode of social interaction, either between individuals or between social groups. The term has, for purposes of the Commission's study, been applied to destruction of property as well, but we would go back to Hohfeld's insights about property law (Hohfeld, 1923; Hoebel, 1954) and claim that ownership of property (and ipso facto damage to property) is a form of social interaction among people who "value" the property one way or another, and for whom it may have significant symbolic meaning.

Interactions of violence between people or between groups of people are culturally among the very simplest of all acts—the "rules" are unequivocal. The goals are no more complex. Violence occurs when the cultural expectations in a relationship are at an absolute minimum: there need be no cultural common understandings about the primitive (indeed, prehuman) ones of destroy and be destroyed. Violent interaction, obviously, occurs in two situations of culture: when the cultural expectations to the relationship have never grown complex enough to contain values, ideas and things beyond the will to destroy the foreign intruder, and as a kind of structural regression (which only epiphenomenally takes place in time) from more complex to more simple cultural forms.

(4) Cultural traditions all have cognitive perceptions and affective attitudes about violence. We can hypothesize (without fear of contradiction) that in all cultural traditions we will find a simple distinction between what violence is "good" and what is "bad." We can also be assured that there will be a "gray area" between the good and the bad. Moreover, we can also hypothesize (again without fear of *serious* contradiction) that all people adjudge violence as either sensible or "senseless," depending on whether or not they can empathize with

the aggressor or only with the victim. These two sets of criteria lead to a compound classification:

	SENSIBLE	SENSELESS
"GOOD"	a. APPROVED POLICE ACTION	d. "POLICE BRUTALITY"
"GRAY AREA"	b. SELF-PROTECTION; "HONOR"	e.
"BAD"	c. REVOLUTION	f. MASS MURDER; RAPING GRANDMOTHER

It seems to us that present-day public concern with "violence" is to be found within three areas of the chart: first of all, in cell *b*, there is a vast change in the United States of who is aware of what violence in the "gray areas" and there is considerable change in the needs of different ethnic or geographical populations for self-protection and self-help as against assistance from the state. Second, there is a "revolution" (cell *c*) of "bad" but perfectly sensible violence going on today, because groups that have formerly not been part of what they call the "Establishment" are making their way into it or seeking to change it. The Establishment understands this only too well—they may reject the understanding or the aims of those who are in revolution, but they do understand it. Finally, we are concerned in this country today about the excesses of "legitimate" violence (cell *d*) and do not know just where to draw the line between sensible and senseless violence on the part of the political power.

This essay is first concerned with the problem of aggressive drives, rage reactions and the difficulties of cross-species comparison in studying such phenomena. It proceeds, then, to a study of human hostile behavior and violent social relationships, with some points about the kind of violence that occurs in different kinds of social structures. It concludes with a discussion of cultural evaluations of violence and of bellicosity and associates these values, as cultural artifacts, with some others.

PROBLEMS OF CROSS-SPECIES COMPARISON

A theory of aggression has been growing for some decades now in ethology, psychoanalysis, comparative psychology on the one hand, and in political science and international relations on the other. Because of misunderstanding of what ethologists and psychoanalysts are saying (in our view, at least), there has been popularized in America in the last few years the doctrine that mankind is "instinctively" destructive (note the change of wording—from aggression to destruction; this "great leap" is universal in the popular literature and cannot be left unchallenged); the idea ends that there is no "hope" for man's fundamental decency. Merely to espouse the opposite point, as Ashley Montagu—to name only one—has done (1968), is to underscore rather than question the validity of the idea. It is not the answer that is right or wrong—it is the question. Thus, we question the validity of the idea in either form. Moral psychologists since at least William James (and moralists for centuries before) have castigated man either with the doctrine of

innate depravity or original sin or something of the sort; they have talked about "man's inhumanity to man." We want to suggest only that the association between "aggression" and "destruction" should be operationalized and investigated rather than merely assumed.

A false dichotomy has also grown up in the last few decades about the nature of the aggressive drive. A number of noted scientists have found it necessary, for reasons not entirely clear, to "choose" between a theory of "instinctive aggression" (and have, almost without exception, misattributed that position to straw men whom they have labeled Lorenz, Freud, MacDougall or some other worthy) or "aggression as a result of frustration" (which they universally, and correctly, attribute to Dollard and his coworkers who themselves nevertheless document forerunners for their ideas). A careful reading of Dollard et al. (1939) will show that they did not have such a dichotomy in mind. Their book sets out to examine whether or not the "drive" of aggression as it was set forth by Freud, was "orgastic," and they found that it was not—that it demanded a frustrating stimulus. Such a finding was not "opposed" to any drive hypothesis by them, at that time. That hostile behavior is a result of frustration does not mean that aggression is not a drive—it only means that it is a drive to rid one's self of the frustration of unwanted intrusion, when frustration is present. Here, once this idea has been supplemented by the concept of displacement, lies the key to understanding Lorenz.

We think that Lorenz can be read (unembroidered by his followers or by his own later moral admonitions and anthropomorphizations) to say: the concept of aggression is a hypothesis that there is a drive within an animal organism that accounts for its behavior in locating itself in geographical, ecological, and social space. This drive is exhibited in some animals in what appears to human observers to be an innate response (in the sense that the behavior is chemically coded in the genetic plasm of the creature) and in some other animals as a result of learning, the genetic plasm being programmed as a learning apparatus.

Aggression is, in this view, an internal drive response to a stimulus which can be experienced as external if we know enough about the causal chain—and in human beings this causal chain may become extraordinarily complex.

In order to explain our ideas of aggression and our warnings about cross-species comparison, we will start with the human animal (unlike ethologists), and will "peel away" the distinctively human characteristics. The human being is made up of a skin-cased motor apparatus. It is also a sensory apparatus, but the sensory apparatus is not skin-bounded as is the motor apparatus (short, of course, of cultural extensions like tools and weapons). We are going to call the skin-bound, acting animal the "biopsychic unit." We are going to call the sensing animal, which is not skinbound, the "self." And we are immediately going to divide the self into the "sensing self" and the "cultural self." The difference is that the sensing self has a quality of awareness; this quality is, presumably, shared among all animals, human and non-human (although, as Schnerla and many others have always insisted, each species must be understood in its own mode). The cultural self has an additional quality: awareness of awareness. We do not know whether this quality is shared with animals or not because we cannot really be said ever to

have "broken" the "code" of a non-human animal sufficiently to answer this question. Human beings, however, are aware that they are aware. They are also, of course, merely aware—at an unconscious or preconscious level. Now we can go back to Lorenz and to the drive of aggression.

Aggression

Lorenz's basic message is (if the moralizing and the anecdotes be omitted) very clear: aggression is the animal drive that is exhibited when animals position themselves in space, vis-a-vis one another, and which presumably spaces them ecologically and socially in both a species-advantageous and individual-advantageous way. After all, animals are material creatures who need subsistence and who must breed and (to whatever degree it is species specific) prepare for and care for the young. They must always adjust themselves in some sort of spatial juxtaposition to one another.

The space that we are talking about should not be translated merely into presently stylish terms of "territoriality." There is much more to it than that when awareness-of-awareness and cultural factors are added. It much more nearly resembles Kurt Lewin's (1951) concept of "life-space," for it contains both the physical spacing on the one hand and the psycho-cultural perceptions of it on the other.

Human beings perform this operation of "spacing" by means of their senses and, further, their evaluation and considerations of sensed "data." It is easiest to understand this point if we make an analogy and say that every human animal is a biopsychic unit encased in a skin, but he is also surrounded by a number of other "envelopes" or integuments (Hall, 1966). The skin itself serves not merely as a case for a biopsychic unit, but is also a sensory envelope. The skin, in fact, is used in two ways: it is the tactile envelope and is also a part of the kinesthetic envelope. The latter is more inclusive because it also includes the muscles and skeleton in relation to outside material objects: that is, weight, distance, and density are experienced with the muscles as well as with the skin (and are here called kinesthetic), whereas temperature and shape are experienced with the skin (and are here called tactile).

At a further distance from our bodies there is a "heat envelope" and we can feel, again with our skins, but in the absence of touching, something about the changes of temperature in our surroundings. When another animal that gives off heat enters our heat envelope, we are aware of it. If we have not invited the other into our envelope, we may experience this as an intrusion or invasion. There are certain activities—from sexual intercourse to riding on buses—in which we allow our heat envelope to be invaded by other persons. In situations in which we do *not* specifically "allow" this invasion, we may be aroused to great anxiety.

The next larger envelope is the "olfactory envelope" (again, the term is Hall's). The chemical sense of olfaction works to detect certain kinds of chemical changes in the environment. It is our contention that the "sensing self" as a unit includes that part of the environment which is so sensed—therefore, when foreign and especially unpleasant odors invade this environment, they are experienced as invasions of the self. Different cultural traditions display vast differences in the way in which they define, treat, and

value the olfactory envelope. Certainly all of these different treatments are learned by the mass practitioners of those cultural traditions—learned in the sense of socially habituated rather than educationally instructed. Middle-class American culture says that except for certain specific other people in certain specific situations, you should not get close enough to other people to smell them or to be smelled by them. Because the olfactory envelope is so important to us (for all that it is not usually discussed) we have developed a million-dollar deodorant industry and a multi-million dollar perfume industry. The first is designed to cut out or reduce odor in those situations in which our present social and architectural structures demand that we get within smelling range. The second is designed to please other people when they purposely or inadvertently enter our olfactory envelope. Hall has pointed out in some detail the various ways that such other people as the Arabs, the Japanese, the French, use and control the olfactory sensual envelope. And if, in social relationships, the olfactory (or some other) sense is either "intruded" upon or is left unused, the individual feels uncomfortable.

There is, further, an aural envelope: a self sensing the surrounding of sound. Since the invention of machinery, and then the discovery of the ways to transmit sound by electrical waves over a distance, the content of the sound envelope of individuals has changed vastly—and with it, of course, their evaluation of themselves. We live in the noisiest era of history: we must adjust to television commercials, sonic booms, and church bells, as well as to the barking of dogs and the quarreling of our neighbors.

Finally, there is the most extensive of the sensual fields—the visual, which has recently been expanded by television as the aural envelope has been expanded by radio. Television can be, in some situations, experienced as an invasion of the self. So are many other "sights" that come "too close."

One learns to use his visual field in exactly the same way that he learns to use his olfactory field. A middle-class American WASP has only to go to France to know that people in France stand too close to him. The reason he feels this has to do with foveal and peripheral vision. In France, one stands close enough that he can lock in, with his foveal vision, the eye of the person with whom he is having a fairly close but not quite intimate relationship. The Arabs get even closer—visually they are locked in on the pupillary reflex. The pupil expands and contracts with the emotional state, and Arabs use that reaction—not overtly or knowingly, but nevertheless they use it as a source of information, at a subliminal or parataxic level (Hall: personal communication). The American white middle-class get far enough back that they can shift their glance from one eye to the other of their "partner." This means a distance of perhaps two and a half feet. They do not focus on one eye as do the French, but switch back and forth, in order to "check out" the information that they receive from one eye with that they get from the other. To the French, that makes Americans shifty-eyed.

At every level, from the visual to the aural, to the olfactory and the heat, to the skin and the muscles, we have reactions—emotional, chemical, and perhaps social—to anything that penetrates the envelopes. We, as aware animals, want to be able to control or else to repulse what comes within any of these boundaries.

All evaluations by our senses of these phenomena are *learned*. In human beings, they are learned by cultural means, and we react to them by culturally

conditioned reflexes. No matter how "biological" a reflex in a human being, it is also culturally conditioned. And a culturally conditioned reaction can be just as "natural" and just as strong as one conditioned in any other way.

Just as the self is delimited by a series of sensory envelopes—and the perception of one's self, or identity, is closely associated with modes of sensing what is, from the standpoint of the biopsychic apparatus "outside"—there is another kind of envelope, which can be called the "social envelope." The word "envelope" may not be quite as serviceable here as in the explanation of the sensory self, but we continue to use it metaphorically in order to show the similarities.

Every human being, in the course of his maturation, learns a cultural tradition—it is what makes the human animal a human being. He may, in fact, learn several (although that is a different problem). A cultural tradition, as we use the term, is a set of repeated and learned common understandings that are, in the words of Robert Redfield (1941), "manifest in act and artifact." When a person learns one cultural tradition, he ipso facto and obviously does not learn another (and this applies to his "second culture" just as much as to his first). Cultural traditions contain ways of evaluating activities and things. The "cultural self" is that part of the culture which has been interiorized by the individual animal in the course of living—learning, maturing, experiencing. Any social envelope contains, necessarily, many cultural things and many judgments that are different from those within other social envelopes.

When one's social envelope—or "cultural field"—is entered by "foreign" behavior or things, the same kind of anxiety reaction may be aroused as when the sensual envelopes are pierced by things or beings that are unwelcome. It is as "natural" to reject unknown (and hence discomfort-producing) cultural behavior or things as it is to reject odors or sounds that penetrate unwelcomely into the self. Culture has, for over a decade now, been defined by most forward-looking anthropologists as manufactured extensions of the human creature. Culture expands our senses, gives us greater precision, greater distance, and greater "knowledge." Culture is, as part of our senses, subject to the same kind of trauma-producing invasion as is our visual field or our olfactory field. We resent things that come in, uninvited, to our cultural field.

Thus, all our senses and our chemistry and our culture, trained or inherited, demands a placement in space and especially the space in which we can get a living, in which we can behave as more or less moral creatures, and in which we can be both social on the one hand, and private and whole on the other. We need exploitable, personal and cultural space.

Aggression is, then, from our point of view, a chemically triggered physical response whenever anything unwelcome or uncontrolled and unpredictable penetrates any of these "envelopes." One of the responses, when something penetrates that we are unable to control or reject, is the protoemotion of rage. You are being impinged upon—penetrated—raped. Your integrity is challenged, and the animal reacts with an aggressive push (which may be—and, of course, may not be) experienced as rage.

Rage

When one of the many "envelopes" is ravished, there is a chemical change in the body—in the biopsychic mechanism. It is an involved set of chemical

and hormonal reactions, the study of which was first brought into some kind of order by Walter B. Cannon (1922) and since carried far beyond his pioneering efforts.

We know a great deal about rage reactions in cats and in mice, but comparatively little about them in human beings, both because we do not perform the same sort of experiments on human beings, and because of the fact that scientists have never got "rid" of the counter-observation of the human patient (neither have they really got rid of the counter-observation of the cat, but that is presumably a much less scientifically crippling difficulty). Human beings not merely experience rage—they may know that they are enraged.

Our use of the word "rage" is, obviously, a highly specific one. In our view, there are two important elements necessary to bring about "rage" as we are using the word: (1) a conditioned set of chemical capacities and "habits," and (2) an external situation that is perceived as something that is coming "too close" and is therefore dangerous. We have, in fact, a combination of a drive and a "frustrating" stimulus.

Rage is an infra-cultural signal from the perceiving self to the biopsychic mechanism that it should prepare to *do* something. Whereas the sensory and the cultural self perceives, the biopsychic mechanism acts. Adrenalin is set flowing, and after a few minutes the cortisone joins in. (We know this is a vast oversimplification, but it makes our immediate point.) Awareness leads to action.

But awareness-of-awareness can inhibit action: it can vastly affect the kind of action and can lead to inaction. A number of ethologists have claimed that human beings do not have an "inhibiting mechanism" so that even when a victim makes a sign of surrender, the aggressor pays no attention or is not moved to spare the victim; others have claimed that it was the increased distance between aggressor and victim made possible by modern technology that has allowed such signs to go unnoticed, or has at least changed the immediacy of our reactions to them. It is our argument that the human inhibiting mechanism is to be found in cultural values; if there is no inhibition, it may well be for want of adequate cultural values.

Therefore, rage does not, in human beings, lead to "automatic" discharge, but must "go through" another step—the evaluative step in which it can be sublimated or displaced. The sublimation and displacement are, of course, modes of behavior in accordance with learned values of the cultural tradition.

Anger and Hatred

If rage has a specific target (whether it be the intruding object or a displacement), then we think we can justifiably call it "anger." Rage may be suppressed and it may come out as some other emotions, or it may be controlled or it may be neurotically somatized or something of the sort. The object may, of course, also be suppressed, leading to anger as a neurotic symptom. If there is what psychoanalysts call object constancy in the object of anger, then hate may develop. Hate may, of course, be denied by the person who feels it. Hatred is an extremely complex emotion.

The biopsychic organism *may* react to rage at what Sullivan (1953: 28-29) called a parataxic level, in order to get what is threatening it out of the

integuments of the self. We can either drive it away, accommodate, or remove ourselves. As a species, and as individuals, we would perish if we could not do this. Rage, set off by a trigger from the "outside" of any of the various integuments, can have a spiraling effect on the inside, leading to action by the biopsychic animal. However, once one is aware of the awareness that is rage, then culture (or something analogous) intervenes. When something intervenes with discharge of rage, then the stage is set for the more complex emotions. Greater and greater emotional control over the acts of the biopsychic mechanism *can* result. Yet, even here, something will eventually happen in the biopsychic apparatus that leads to some kind of action: it may be action against the self rather than against the intruding object; it may be action, by transference or displacement, against some other object than the original intruding object.

It is surely obvious from what we have said that it seems not only unnecessary but downright wrong-headed to opt either for an "instinctual" theory of aggression or the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Of course aggression is a reaction to frustration. The fact that it is an "educated" drive does not mean that it is any the less a biochemical drive. But we have transferred the problem to something else: the human characteristic of imposing a cultural evaluation within the social envelope to form a link—and perhaps a block—between the perceptions of the self and the action of the biopsychic mechanism.

Hostility and Violence

It has often been said—and we think, with too vast an oversimplification—that violence is a concatenation of hostile acts. That is, behavior is made the basis—indeed, almost the cause—of sociality. The difference between hostile acts and violent interaction is in the unit which the scientist chooses to discuss.

"Hostile" is, in our opinion, an adjective that is best used to describe behavior. We can infer from hostile behavior (and from statements made about or by the person so behaving, from empathy and introspection) something of the emotions of anger, the protoemotions of rage, and the drives of aggression. But we must also see that these are all theoretical constructs to explain behavior and physiology.

However, there is another dimension. Behavior, in order to be judged "hostile," has to occur in a milieu of cultural criteria for evaluating hostility.

Hostile behavior is always such within an emotional setting (for some behavior that may be hostile in one setting may not be so in another) and within a social setting (in which suitability or appropriateness is always the gauge, and of course changes with cultures and situations).

Thus, hostility is about not merely an awareness-of-awareness, but a value judgment of the social suitability of the acts. And value judgments are undeniably part of the larger tradition—the larger tradition that both supersedes the selves and, indeed, all of the selves that share in the tradition. As Kroeber (1917) put it many years ago, culture is "superorganic."

When hostility is met with counter-hostility, then the stage is set for violent interaction.

Violence

Violence, to repeat, is a social relationship. It demands an aggressor and a victim (and, of course, both parties to the violent interaction may play both roles in many amalgams). Victim and aggressor are the social roles in the social dyad of violence. Obviously, either or both roles can be played by either individuals or by groups.

Like every other human relationship, the relationship of violence is subject to moral judgment. Human beings do not "just act." Their acts are good, bad, or indifferent. Thus, the norms and values for judging violence are part of a larger code of values for evaluating action, and they change from one social group to another. All normal human beings, as they mature, learn to evaluate and to judge the actions of others and of themselves. The evaluation is, in its simplest terms, a set or more or less overt principles of good and bad—and if they can be learned by the members of the society, they can be learned by an ethnographer.

As we see the problems, the sensing self may perceive as dangerous anything which endangers one of our envelopes or integuments—and it is probably adjudged a morally bad thing. Then, the cultural self (or the cultural aspect of the self) "holds the book" on the emotional reaction and on the act which the biopsychic creature performs (or, to put it another way, is allowed by the self at either a conscious or unconscious level to perform).

To repeat: human beings and human societies necessarily evaluate all acts by themselves and by their members. We are taught to do so—it is a part of "learning" "culture." Out of the vast range of culture that is possible, it is necessary (if you are to learn your own tradition) to learn what behavior is good and what is bad; what is rewarded and what is punished. These matters are subject to great variation, not just among societies, but among larger or smaller social groups within any greater society. Every enduring social group—from the two-group to the United Nations—has its own culture (the traits or elements of which may be widely shared in a cultural tradition, but may not be—an empirical matter than can, with sufficient definition, be handled statistically). The result is that human beings are, willy-nilly, evaluators of *all* social acts, and as a result, even of their behavior in which there is no immediate social partner or external evaluator. All normal human beings become capable of guilt to one degree or another—but what (among other things) "causes" guilt is an internalized set of cultural evaluations of social acts.

Thus, violence is a form of social interaction in which some sort of damage is inflicted by one party to the action on the other (and, of course, this includes damage to somebody's property insofar as it is an extension of somebody's integument). Violence is necessarily accompanied by an evaluation of the acts of violence.

We have, obviously, brought the idea of violence to the point that it is not only a social phenomenon, but it is also a "cognitive category."

Moreover, as Berkowitz (1962) has pointed out, there are two types of violence—that based on direct reaction to immediate frustration, and that which is "instrumental" to another end, and presumably not based on immediate frustration to which the violence itself will bring about the immediately desired object. That is to say, violent acts may be used culturally

as a means to an end as well as be reactions of the biopsychic animal to frustration of the "self." However, at a thoroughly social level, given a sufficiently long chain of causation, we are not sure that this distinction does not break down.

Cross-Species Comparison

We are now in a position to make some remarks about the difficulties of cross-species comparison which have most often been summed up merely as problems of anthropomorphization of non-human animals or the zoomorphization (a less happy word choice because human animals *are* zoomorphs—perhaps ornithomorphization would be more apt) of the human animal.

George Devereux has said well (1967: 23) what others have said less well—that the difference between animal life and other forms of life is the threshold of awareness, whereas the difference between cultural life and other forms of animal life is the threshold of awareness-of-awareness. The problem, therefore, in cross-species comparison is one of empathy. Empathy is a perfectly sound mechanism for use in behavioral sciences dealing with the behavior of human beings—providing, of course, it is checked out in a systematic manner. It is a far worse than useless part of the methodological tool-kit in studying non-human animal life. The problem of comparison among species is difficult enough without including human beings—one has to know the bases for categorization of the comparata, and that is not as easy as it sounds. When human beings are included, awareness-of-awareness must be so fully analyzed that human mere-awareness can be compared with mere-awareness of other animals. Behaviorism has tried this approach, but not, in the opinion of most, been successful as a solution. And, were you successful in getting rid of awareness of awareness, you would be getting rid of the most significant thing about human beings.

Therefore, although it is sensible for some scientists to "begin with the animal," we must also realize, obviously, that awareness-of-awareness influences the human animal profoundly and that assignment of crude categories of awareness to the more complex awareness-of-awareness leaves out the most significant thing about human beings. Species can be compared anatomically quite simply; they can be compared biotically, but less simply; they can be compared behaviorally with very great difficulty indeed; and until we actually crack an animal code, they cannot be compared cognitively at all. Chomsky (1968) and his followers have been quite specific in their statements that what we have called awareness-of-awareness is a matter of language, and most ethologists agree (though some linguists do not) that language is not merely the complexification of a pre-linguistic *Anlage* in the sounds made by animals, but rather that man has never lost the pre-linguistic types of communication and sounds (Scott, 1958, points out that all primates, including man, make the same kind of pre-linguistic sounds when something unpleasant enters their olfactory envelope), but has added to it a new form, which is the basis for the awareness-of-awareness.

The point here is this: man, as an animal, has aggressive drives; he also has emotions; he also behaves agonistically. But when he becomes aware of agonism as a category of behavior, then he is aware-of-awareness and takes a

judgmental position. That is cultural. Human violence (or any other cognitive category) must be studied by two methods: (1) those elements which are indeed shared must be explained in terms of scientific reduction—but that reduction cannot be complete (if it claims to be, the new “something” either does not exist phenomenally or else it has been explained away by a self-destroying theory); (2) we must understand everything that cannot be explained by reduction in terms of itself. So far, culture and cognitive evaluation in terms of culture have not been explained by reduction—for all that studies in biochemistry and genetics have given us much about the underpinning of what must be called “judgment.”

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE IN HUMAN GROUPS

To examine hostile behavior and violent social relationships, as they occur within a social context, we propose to classify groups by two principles which we shall call unicentric and bicentric. These are principles of social organization; both are to be found in most human societies—indeed, stable societies can be seen as a complex network of many examples using these two principles. In other contexts, we would subdivide the present category “bicentric” into multicentric and true bicentric; however, this distinction is not vital in the present context, so we have used the grosser category. The point here is that they are principles of organization, not pigeonholes.

A group is unicentric insofar as it has a single cultural tradition and a single power structure, with perhaps a single head (though such groups may be acephalous). It is bicentric insofar as it has two (or more) heads, each with its own cultural tradition, and the power structure depends on communication and accommodation between the two heads.

The unicentric group, with its single head, is easiest to envision as a pyramidal structure, although there are other types. The analogy of the primarily unicentric group is to the individual who may suffer internal contradiction or conflict, but who nevertheless is (if he is “whole”) a single individual, who acts many roles; a unicentric group may be united in a single, well defined purpose, such as a lobby or a reform organization, or as a successfully operating nation-state. We do not suggest that unicentric organizations cannot be made up of bicentric structures and sometimes utilize them, for obviously they can. That is not our immediate point—we are here interested in the fact of the “single center,” and the kind of violent conflict that may occur in a structure dominated by this principle.

A bicentric group has two or more “heads” in which cultural values and modes of action must be kept; there must be communication between these two “heads” (rather than merely communication up and down, as well as laterally in a single power structure), and there must be accommodation between the centers of decision and power. The analogy is to the married couple or to treating states in international relations.

Violence differs profoundly in groups that are primarily unicentric from what it is in groups that are dominantly bicentric. Although this difference includes a dichotomy between the in-group and the out-group, it is somewhat more than that and cuts the pie in a different dimension. From the standpoint of any individual, the bicentric group includes the in-group and the out-group; his own group (which may or may not be unicentric) within

the bicentric group is the “in-group;” “they,” of course, are the out-group. In the unicentric situation itself, there is no “out-group”; therefore, if an outgroup appears, there is by definition an in-group, and hence a bicentric system in addition to the unicentric system of the original in-group.

In a unicentric system, conflict must be resolved, but “accommodation” to an external object is not essential for there is no “other,” but only the conflicted “self.” Obviously, one of the ways in which conflict in the unicentric group can be resolved is to reduce it to a bicentric group. This is usually seen as “revolution” or “divorce” or some other form of regression to a simpler level of organization.

Violence in the Unicentric System

Violence in the group with a unicentric power system is always used (perhaps alone and perhaps among other things) as a basis for creating dominance hierarchies. The violence may occur directly in the relationships among the members of the group (intra-group dominance struggles) but the violence may also be perpetrated against outsiders, and the “coup” that it makes brought into the group as a dominance “tally,” as it were (this kind of intra-group dominance is based only on violent activity of the members toward outsiders and is hence, at another level, part of a bicentric system).

Intragroup violence as a marker in the dominance hierarchy.—Violence as a measure of dominance in the unicentric group depends on one very important factor: that the members either cannot get out of the group, or that they choose to stay in because the alternative is worse (from their point of view) than the violent struggle for dominance within the group. Although this type of dominance hierarchy resembles, superficially at least, the “peck-order” of birds, it is not common among human beings in a state of culture. Human beings tend to rebel against this kind of dominance, given any opportunity at all. It seems to us that this is the kind of dominance structure that Hobbes saw as a “war of all against all,” and that he was right in thinking that human society is organized in order to avoid it. Put into other terms, the dominance hierarchy within human groups is seldom based purely on strength and the willingness to use it in violent intra-group conflict. When it is, all societies brand it as some sort of “tyranny,” for all that there are situations in which tyranny cannot be foiled.

Some groups may depend on this form of dominance structure through violence for short periods of time, but we cannot (in the time allotted to us) find one that is stable. (It has been suggested to us that the Mafia might represent such a group, but we are not confident that such a statement is true or that it can be documented.)

Violence against outsiders as markers or tallies in a dominance hierarchy is, on the other hand, common in human societies. The Plains Indians of North America took this form of dominance to a highly involved and developed structure, as reference to the Blackfoot raids below makes amply clear.

Violence as a dominance factor in the “sub-culture” of delinquent gangs.—A problem area of immediate relevance to Americans—and also one of consuming interest to theoreticians of social action—is the juvenile gang as it exists today in American cities. It is of particular interest here because it shows some mixture of the uses of intra-group violence in a dominance

hierarchy (especially in its formation, and only much less so in its maintenance) and the way in which violence against outsiders can be used as tallies within the group.

There are, of course, two forms of juvenile gang: following the literature, one has been called the conflict gang and the other the social gang. In the present context, we discuss the conflict gang; the social gang is organizationally very different and will be discussed under a later heading.

The juvenile gang (like any social group) must have some cultural criteria, more or less peculiar to itself, by which a status hierarchy is established and maintained among its membership. These criteria, although being functionally and logically related to the subculture of the gang as a whole, need not thereby be either legitimate or "rational" from the point of view of the members of the larger or "respectable" society. Indeed, violent behavior, nominally condemned by the latter as an asocial and unsatisfactory manner of settling disputes (Cohen, 1955: 101) may form the principal basis for the status position assigned to the gang member. There are two characteristics of the gang member's sociocultural position which must be taken into account: his adolescence and his generally disorganized urban environment. Both of these factors tend to ascribe to the individual a lower status in the adult community than he both aspires to and is prepared to accept in his own eyes. Of course, the goals he aspires to need not be those held by the middle class, Cohen's well-known assertion to the contrary having been much criticized. Cloward and Ohlin have noted:

Many discontented lower-class youths do not wish to adopt a middle-class way of life or to disrupt their present associations and negotiate passage into middle-class groups. The solution they seek entails the acquisition of higher position in terms of lower-class rather than middle-class criteria. . . . The criteria people use to rank one another vary depending upon social-class positions. (1960: 92-93)

Irrespective of the cultural referent by which the juvenile's aspirations are measured, however, the frustration of those aspirations ultimately leads to the adoption of an alternative complex of criteria by which status within the subculture of the adolescent is measured. It should be noted that this complex need not be based on violence—Cloward and Ohlin have noted the so-called "retreatist subculture" (1960: 20). The fact that the status system within the "conflict" (Cloward and Ohlin, 1966: 20) or "violent" (Yablonsky, 1966: 143) gang may result from the frustration of aspirations to positions of status held within the lower-class cultural milieu does not mean that the latter is unimportant in determining the form the former takes. First of all, as Cohen has pointed out, the working class child is made to be more dependent upon his peers for the satisfaction of many "practical needs." Furthermore:

satisfactory emotional relationships with his peers are likely to be more important, their claim to be more imperious, and the rewards they offer to compete more effectively with parental expectations. (1955:101)

In addition to determining the social form in which the perpetration of violence in the lower-class conflict gang is manifest, class affiliations also serve to shape the nature of the criteria for status (i.e., violent behavior) which are adopted. Miller and his colleagues have noted that—

the lower class cultural milieu itself generates and transmits emphasis on strength, fighting prowess, toughness, and the quest of risk, all of which may achieve fulfillment in certain forms of crime, and that the cultivation of competence in individual and collective action is a highly functional component of the role of the lower class male. (1961: 296-297)

We may regard, then, the violent behavior of the conflict gang as an attempt on the part of lower-class adolescents to deal with status frustrations experienced in terms of their cultural milieu. Cohen notes (although we must read out his reference to "respectable society" unless we are willing to interpret this in relative terms) that—

The delinquent subculture . . . is a way of dealing with . . . status problems: certain children are denied status in the respectable society because they cannot meet the criteria of the respectable status system. The delinquent subculture deals with those problems by providing criteria of status which these children *can* meet. (1955: 121)

When all channels to the attainment of social status as this is defined by one's culture are perceived as being barred, when the status ascribed to one by age or background falls considerably short of the status one aspires to, "recourse to aggression and violent behavior may be perceived as a significant area of 'achievement.'" (Coser, 1967: 78) As Cloward and Ohlin have argued at length:

These adolescents seize upon the manipulation of violence as a route to status not only because it provides a way of expressing pent-up angers and frustrations but also because they are not cut off from access to violent means by vicissitudes of birth. In the world of violence, such attributes as race, socioeconomic position, age and the like are irrelevant; personal worth is judged on the basis of qualities that are available to all who would cultivate them . . . One doesn't need "connections," "pull," or elaborate technical skills in order to achieve "rep." (1960: 175)

Kobrin and his colleagues found that among street groups in a mixed ethnic neighborhood, a hierarchy of ascribed status (based on characteristics such as ethnic identity and family's residential location) existed simultaneously with a hierarchy of achieved status based essentially on violent behavior and notoriety. It is interesting to observe with regard to the achievement hypothesis presented above, that the group enjoying the lowest position in the hierarchy of ascribed status at the same time "ranked highest in fighting ability and notoriety" (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965: 2, 3). It has been widely

observed that the most recklessly violent members of a gang are those persons whose position is most marginal.

Logically, there are two types of violence distinguished by their respective targets, which might be used to establish a status hierarchy within the gang: intra- and extra-gang violence. Empirically, both forms are operative in the conflict gang, though extra-gang violence seems to be of considerably greater significance. To begin, however, with the former, Yablonsky maintains that:

A considerable amount of the gang boys' time is spent sounding, a pattern of needling, ridiculing, or fighting with other members. . . . The underlying theme of these street-corner sounding sessions is an attempt to prove one's self and to disprove and disparage others. There is a continual verbal and sometimes physical attack and defense going on, regardless of the subject. In most discussions the underlying theme is one of hostility and aggression. (1966: 147)

This would seem to validate the findings of Miller et al., which show that quantitatively the vast majority of aggressive responses, and all physical aggressive responses, are directed at members of the group rather than at outsiders (Miller, Geertz, and Cutter, 1961: 286). The latter study, however, is concerned, as the authors point out, with a juvenile group which is not essentially oriented to violent conflict. While, as they maintain, the nonviolent group studied may in fact be more representative of the juvenile gang per se, its patterns of aggressive behavior are not really comparable with the more delinquent group. A failure to recognize this difference in type has led to a good deal of unnecessary controversy in the literature because aggressive behavior in the former kind of gang appears to serve as a means of social control which would not be tolerated in the violent gang, which has (as is shown clearly by Yablonsky himself) a tendency toward shifting organization and a membership that is responsive to the immediate emotional needs of its members. Short and Strodbeck have considered this problem in some detail and have noted that although—

the level of intragroup aggression in such forms as "body punching" and "signifying" is high . . . intragroup dominance-seeking aggressive behavior by gang members, including acknowledged leaders, is not supported by group norms and is rarely resorted to by gang leaders. (1965: 195)

Similarly, Korbin states that at the age of 14-15, the leadership of an entire street group is captured by the head of the most aggressive faction who succeeds in establishing dominance—

by dint of a complete fearlessness in challenging his competitors, by literally pushing them around, by perceiving and mercilessly exposing the weaknesses and inadequacies of fellow Eagles, but, above all, by a spirited display of initiative in furnishing leadership in group expressions of its hostility and incorrigibility. (1961: 693)

It is noteworthy that intragroup violence comes into play when the structural form of the group itself is undergoing transformation, when factions are being absorbed into a single group of greater or lesser coherence. It may be argued that under these circumstances it is inaccurate to speak of intragroup aggression at all for it would seem that the boys competing for dominance are doing so not as members of the larger group (which, after all does not come into being until such dominance is established) but as leaders of their respective factions.

Why intra-group aggression is unsuitable for the maintenance of the internal organization of the violent gang is explained by Short and Strodbeck. Gang membership, they maintain, is highly fluid and leaders have not the access to the means of privileges and immunities which might serve as an incentive to maintain the coherence of the group under their domination. Furthermore, there are no external institutional pressures that might constrain members to accept group discipline. Lacking then the basis for an efficient reward or punishment system in the nature of group membership per se:

The leader cannot crassly dominate a person who is dissatisfied with the allocation of rewards within the group because of the effectiveness of the threat of splintering away. . . . The recourse to aggressive behavior toward an out-group object is viewed as being a part of the sensitivity of role requirements. Out-group aggression does not undercut the gratification that membership confers and does not expose the relationship to the threat of splintering. The foray provides excitement, a heightened need for leadership, and a non-disruptive way for the leader to exercise his aggressive skills. (1965: 196)

We may conclude, therefore, that the status hierarchy of the conflict gang is maintained—and presumably established—not by intragroup, aggressive dominance but rather by the display of aggressive skill directed at persons outside the gang itself. The position of the leader should not be thought of in analogy to the top chicken in the pecking order, for there is nothing binding the members of the group tightly enough to make them tolerate aggressive dominance on the part of their leader, and

except when other boys in the gang directly challenge their status, leaders of even the toughest fighting gangs do not engage in dominating, aggressive interpersonal relationships within the gang. Among conflict gangs the leaders are known to have the capacity to function aggressively against the other members when necessary to maintain their dominance, but the overwhelming preponderance of their action is co-ordinating and nurturant. (Short and Strodbeck, 1965: 195)

In the development of the conflict gang there emerges at the age of 9 to 10 years a core membership consisting of those children having a reputation for disrupting organized activity carried out in institutional contexts, for violating rules, etc. Korbin concludes that—

On the basis of what was learned concerning the criteria for reputability in the juvenile street world of the neighborhood, it may reasonably be assumed that these boys were in this manner attempting to bring themselves to the attention of their peers as possessing the requisite qualifications for leadership (1961: 691).

Hence from the very beginning, status in the eyes of one's peers in the context of the juvenile gang is based on one's belligerent behavior toward the outside (and particularly adult) world. As the juvenile's relationship with that world becomes more severely attenuated, and as in consequence role models which might lead to success in terms of that world become more and more remote, the juvenile seeks prestige both among his peers and ultimately from the adult world which he feels to be indifferent to him by establishing a reputation ("rep") for both himself and his group through violence. Yablonsky says that—

violence ranks extremely high in the loose scheme of values on which such gangs are based. To some boys it acts as a kind of existential validation, proving (since they are not sure) that they are alive. Boys clinging to membership in this amorphous organization also employ violence to demonstrate that they are "somebody." Gang members use violence for upward mobility to acquire prestige or raise their "rep." (1966: 6)

This is even better said by an informant, an "Egyptian King" who is quoted as saying:

If I would of got the knife, I would have stabbed him. That would have gave me more of a build-up. People would have respected me for what I've done and things like that. They would say, "There goes a cold killer." (Yablonsky, 1966: 6)

Just as "in the delinquent subculture, habitual delinquent behavior is defined as a prerequisite for acceptance in the group," however, gang violence also brings status to the juvenile from the community at large, the adult world whose values he has repudiated by default. The source of this would seem to lie not so much in the violent action of the individual per se as in the reputation for violence enjoyed by the group as a whole. The gang's purpose, *qua* gang, in seeking to acquire a "rep" is the same as that of the individual but is concerned with a broader social referent. A gang with a well established reputation is assured not only of "respectful behavior from peers and threatened adults but also admiration for the physical strength and masculinity which it symbolizes." (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 24) The latter qualities, it should be noted, are not peculiar to the subculture of the delinquent, but are shared by members of the parent lower class milieu as well. In this way the gang worker provided by the community for its own protection lends status in the eyes of the delinquent in his own way:

Confronted by the apparent insincerity of the adult world, the ideal bopper seeks to win by coercion the attention and opportunities he

lacks and cannot otherwise attract... Through the alchemy of competition between gangs, this gesture of attention by the adult world to the "worst" gangs is transformed into a mark of prestige. Thus does the manipulation of violence convert indifference into accommodation and attention into status. (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 25)

We have established that the violent behavior exhibited by the member of the conflict gang is intimately related to status frustration in terms of the values of the larger community and serves as a basis for a system of status ranking which is oriented to achievement rather than ascription. Through violent behavior the individual may gain esteem in the eyes of his peers and through the medium of the gang itself, in the eyes of the community at large. Support for this notion is provided in detail by Short and Strodtbeck who, adopting a process rather than a genetic approach, show that high status gang members tend to initiate violent actions when they perceive their status to be threatened or uncertain. The classic instance is that in which the gang leader is for some reason removed from circulation for a period of time (e.g., a brief term of imprisonment) and upon returning to the gang environment faces the ambiguous status situation which has evolved ad hoc in his absence. His immediate concern is therefore to reestablish his "rep" through the initiation of violent activities. (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965: 189)

Similarly, if the status of a nominally high ranking member is threatened in some manner, his immediate reaction is to assert himself in an aggressive way in an attempt to reaffirm his status in the eyes of his peers—and his own as well. Two examples will suffice, the latter illustrating an instance of what might well be considered "senseless violence" by both the victim and the nondelinquent cultural milieu:

(1) Commando is described by Short and Strodtbeck as an unusually daring gang youth who "instigated trouble in a way that captured attention."

The worker decided to "put down" Commando in front of the rest of the group by telling him that he was really not tough or brave... Commando reacted by being even more reckless in his actions, particularly when members of the rival gang were on the scene. He continued to demonstrate to the group that he was not chicken and that he was somebody until the worker ceased his public ridicule. (1965: 191)

(2) The leader of a gang faction serving as captain of a low scoring pool team responded to his relative lack of success by strong-arming and assaulting a man on the street in spite of the fact that he had been paid that day and had over fifty dollars in his pocket. The youth's explanation was that he "saw him coming down the street and just got him—for no reason, just got him." This is an instance of senseless violence par excellence and remains so until it is realized that the leader's status had been threatened by his team's low placement in the tournament and that strong-arming was status-conferring in the subculture of the group (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965: 193)

Legal Systems and Violence

There is, in addition to a hierarchy of power within a unicentric system, usually also a hierarchy of legitimacy. The bases of legitimacy vary widely from one culture to another, and it is not our purpose here to discuss the problem of legitimacy, which is a thorny and ancient one in political and moral philosophy. Rather, it is our intention to note some of the ways in which the "legitimate authorities," however they may be selected and maintained, use violence and threat of violence in the maintenance of the status quo. We are, for lack of a better term, going to talk about them as "legal authorities."

It would seem that there are at least four things that legal authorities can do about violence. (1) They can *use* violence; (2) they can *encourage* or allow violence; (3) they can declare certain acts of violence to be criminal, can detect such acts and punish their perpetrators; and (4) they can *ignore* violence. Our purpose here is to give examples from different cultures of each. In the last major section of this essay we will try to suggest some ways in which, in our own society, the arrangements for the handling of violence by the legal authorities is changing.

The use of violence by legal authorities: Judicial violence.—We put this item first because it is an integral part of the history of the Western world, but it is a kind of legal violence which is today not institutionalized. The best examples of judicial violence come from the history of Medieval Europe. We are not here discussing the institution of the duel, which, even when it is not "against the law," is not really a use of force by the judicial authorities—it is, rather, a declaration that the judicial authorities will accept the solution of self-help by violence between disputants. Rather we are discussing the wager of battle, in which violent interaction is the legal judicial form of settlement of disputes in which there is no clear evidence, or in which the rules of evidence make the wager of battle override other forms of evidence. The wager of battle is something like an oracle—it gives decisions in situations in which there is no empirical evidence and hence no "rational" way to arrive at decisions.

The wager of battle was a part of the institutions of all the peoples of Europe (Lea, 1892: 117). It covered the continent and was introduced into English jurisprudence as a part of the legacy of William the Conqueror. In the wager of battle, the legal decision to a dispute is settled in terms of a fight, either between the principals themselves, between principals and witnesses, between witnesses of the two principals, or between "champions" who could legally be hired by the principals. It became a sort of combination of the gladiatorial contest and the trial, which decided the issue at trial.

The authority on this institution is the great nineteenth century historian, Henry Charles Lea, who has brought together with what seems to these non-specialists as a superb piece of scholarship, the various usages and their history. He points out that although the institution of the wager of battle is pre-Christian in origin, in all cases the conversion to Christianity meant that instead of the heathen gods, the Christian God now became the divine power who would provide sufficient might to that party who, by justice, had the "right." Charlemagne himself claimed that the wager of battle was vastly to be preferred to oaths as a form of dispute settlement; many other medieval

monarchs were of the same opinion, and from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, the institution was widespread indeed. And in some legal codes (the Bavarian and the Burgundian, to name two examples) it came to supersede all other forms of evidence, although there were undoubtedly non-legitimate modes of making decisions while still avoiding the wager of battle.

A case is given by Lea in which the witnesses of an adversary were challenged in a dispute in Lessington in A.D. 888, concerning the patronage of a church:

After the testimony of one side had been given, the opposite party commenced in reply, when the leaders of the assembly, seizing their swords, vowed that they would affirm the truth of the first pleader's evidence with their blood before King Arnoul and his court—and the case was decided without more ado. (Lea, 1892: 119)

Lea continues, editorially:

The strong and the bold are apt to be the ruling spirits in all ages, and were emphatically so in those periods of scarcely curbed violence when the jurisprudence of the European commonwealths was slowly developing itself.

The matter of challenging witnesses came to that point that, in the English law of the thirteenth century, a principal could challenge even his own witness if that witness said something that might make the case go against him. The French law of the same period provided some amelioration: no witness could be forced to testify unless his principal posted a bond to see that he has not harmed or out-of-pocket—that is, the principal provided a champion for the witness and paid the champion (an honorable profession in some Mediterranean cultures, but an outcaste profession in Northern Europe).

When Charlemagne divided his empire, he specifically forbade the wager of battle in settling any territorial disputes that might arise among his heirs.

Still another example is drawn, from the year 930 in Italy:

About the year 930, Hugh, King of Provence and Italy, becoming jealous of his uterine brother, Lambert, Duke of Tuscany, asserted him to be a supposititious child and ordered him in future to claim no relationship between them. Lambert contemptuously defined the aspersion on his birth, and offered to clear all doubts on the subject by the wager of battle. Hugh accordingly selected a warrior named Teudinus as his champion; Lambert was victor in the ensuing combat, and was universally received as the undoubted son of his mother. His triumph, however, was illegally brought to a sudden close, for Hugh soon after succeeded in making him prisoner and deprived him of eyesight. (Lea, 1892: 128)

In fact, a champion was a necessary part of a diplomat's entourage in those days (and hence also used in the bicentric system). In the year 968:

Liutprand was dispatched by Otho to Constantinople on a matrimonial mission, and during the negotiations for the hand of Theophania a discussion arose as to the circumstances which led to Otho's conquest of Italy, the warlike prelate offered to prove his veracity by the sword of one of his attendants; a proposition which put a triumphant end to the argument. (Lea, 1892: 129)

According to Lea, the wager of battle was an "integral part of the ordinary law, both civil and criminal, employed habitually for the decision of the most everyday affairs." However, three classes of people were usually excused from combat: women, clerics and the physically handicapped. All could substitute a champion, with a few exceptions in the case of women. There are several cases which Lea discovered in which women could forgo the champion, and fight for their own honor. Lea found a case in an illuminated manuscript, which he dates at 1228 in Berne in which a woman was the victor. His exposition cannot be shortened without damaging it:

The chances between such unequal adversaries [as a man and a woman] were adjusted by placing the man up to the navel in a pit three feet wide, tying his left hand behind his back, and arming him only with a club, while his fair opponent had the free use of her limbs and was furnished with a stone as large as the fist, or weighing from one to five pounds, fastened in a piece of stuff. A curious regulation provided the man with three clubs. If in delivering a blow he touched the earth with hand or arm he forfeited one of the clubs; if this happened thrice his last weapon was gone, he was adjudged defeated, and the woman could order his execution. On the other hand, the woman was similarly furnished with three weapons. If she struck the man while he was disarmed, she forfeited one, and with the loss of the third she was at his mercy, and was liable to be buried alive. (153)

In conclusion, we might note that Western legal and judicial systems have come a long way since the Middle Ages.

The Use of Violence by Legal Authorities: Executive Violence

In the present state of cultural development, it is apparent that the only means of controlling a threat of violence to the community is through threat of counterviolence. The prerogative of counterviolence is, in any state society, held by the "legitimate" authorities. In a complex state society, it must be delegated to some form of police. The police are, however, also a formally structured occupational group, possessing a monopoly (*qua* group) on the legitimate use of violence. The problem is to create a situation in which the use of violence by the police authorities is consonant with the ideas of justice in the culture: in other words, to discover the threshold of tyranny.

We do not intend to cover this subject in any detail because it is to be dealt with extensively in the other papers in this report. However, it is notable that we have not found any studies (but our searches have not yet been exhaustive) directly dealing in any detail with police activities in

chiefdoms, or "primitive" states. There are many minor references and analogies to our own "police" in books about African states, for example, but none that supply sufficient information for comparative purposes here. Our statement, therefore, is based on less comparative material than we would like (but given the state of the literature and the time deadline, no more is possible).

In looking at police violence, a distinction must be drawn between the normative and occupational ends of the police. Normative ends are those with which the police are empowered as an institution of the state to provide for executing the law and protecting the welfare of the community. Occupational ends are in the service not of "the people" (nor the law nor the state) but of the occupational group per se, and the members of that group. Westley (1953, 1966) shows that the police "accept and morally justify their illegal use of violence." "Their acceptance arises from the nature of their occupational experience; the use of violence is functionally related to the collective occupational, as well as to the legal, ends of the police." (1953: 34)

Whereas the public "gives," in the abstract, a mandate to the institution of the police to use violence for normative and legitimate ends, the occupational context sometimes leads the police to "justify" it in the pursuit of the more limited goals of their occupational group. They become a "supportive audience" for the violent acts of members of their own group, providing what Westley has called "a core of violence" within the system (1966: 24). He notes that violence is committed by only a few men, but may be "sanctioned" by the entire force, regardless of official disapproval or even penalties. Thus, the police may harbor individuals "who are clearly sadists, who frequently commit brutalities repugnant to the rest of the police" and arouse the latter to "revulsion and fear." (1966: 121)

However, these repugnances by non-violent members of the police (that is, people who use it as the mandate provides) are not translated into negative sanctions because of the acceptance of violence on another level, and more particularly because of the rewards system within the occupational subculture; in some situations there may even be what Westley calls a "moral legitimation of violence which is equal to or superior to the legitimation derived from the law" (1953: 39). In short, the sadistic policeman cannot be "stopped" without calling into question the functionally necessary enforcement of law and the maintenance of the occupational group values and rewards. The public cannot also but realize that, at one level, violence must be done for violence to be countered—and we can see that "police brutality" is bred in the crannies of what the public feels as threats to itself which the police "should" "counteract." This is one of the major moral and administrative responsibilities of our time.

The Use of Violence by the Authorities—a Transitional Instance from New Guinea

This section presents an instance of legitimate violence as a sanctioned means of social control transitional between the principle of self-help and a rudimentary judicial and executive process. The examples concern the punishment of women by means of plural copulation—the term used by Berndt (1962) and a more satisfactory one than "inass rape" which this New

Guinea practice has sometimes been called. Plural copulation as a means of punishment must be understood in cultural context. First of all, there is a large component of overt sexuality in the lives of these people. The sexual urge is to be satisfied without more ado than the urge of hunger or thirst. Second, however, the ideal personality is described as being one of "aggressive self-interest" (Berndt, 1963: 155) which militates against seeing one's fellows as much more than means to one's own ends (Berndt, 1962: 147). Finally, there is a high degree of tension, often manifest in violent acts, between sexes.

In this New Guinea society, erotic adventure is classed with physical combat as the primary means for maintaining the strength of the male—a matter of considerable importance in the male scheme of values. Berndt maintains that while adultery is a common means of "relaxation or diversion" it is also one of the principal causes of intra-district dissension (1962: 147, 159).

The lascivious woman is the structural complement of the dominant male, enjoying sexual satisfaction while taking the initiative and "forcing the man as he forces her," and thus being "strong." However, having achieved that, the promiscuous woman is held by males to be deserving of punishment (Berndt, 1962: 155).

Here is a typical case: a woman escapes from her husband's home in search of sexual adventure with other males of the district. She is pursued and finally caught by her husband who publicly exposes and assaults her sexually, perhaps with the help of friends, in punishment for the offenses of adultery, elopement, and abduction. Berndt maintains that—

He was endeavoring to shame her, to hurt her because his pride was shaken; his masculinity had been called in question by her preferring someone else to him. He was reasserting himself aggressively. (1962: 163)

Just so is the structural tension between the sexes played out. The woman seeks strength and sexual satisfaction simultaneously, as her culture prescribes. In so doing, however, the masculinity of her husband is threatened and he responds by a show of aggressive sexuality against the errant wife.

In evaluating the legitimacy of this act, we must remember that punishment is administered with the approval of public opinion, that it follows the commission of an offense only if the offended party pursues and recaptures the guilty woman, and that there is no distinction between the act of judgment and that of punishment.

With British administration, however, what Berndt calls an "embryonic court" has developed from this amorphous body of public opinion. When a man feels that he has been offended he may call together a group of men who listen in an informal manner to the details of the case as it is presented by the aggrieved person lending their approval to proceed in a manner determined either by him or them.

A typical example will be sufficient to illustrate the manner in which the embryonic court proceeds. A man wishes to proceed against his wife for desertion; a court is convened by him at which the details of his wife's indiscretions are discussed. Discussion is terminated in the punishment of the

woman by plural copulation and genital injury; the punishment being in the hands of the "court." Berndt notes that—

This, on the whole, is a traditional way of exacting punishment. But the case demonstrates the main point: a body of men, comprising representatives from at least three districts, have been summoned together, have questioned the offended party, determined her guilt, passed opinion as to punishment, and administered it. (1962: 318)

Allowing or Encouraging Violence in Legal Systems

It is an American tradition of long standing—much less widespread today than it was three-quarters of a century ago, but nevertheless still to be found in many communities in many parts of the country—to keep an "unruly element" which the leaders of the community can unleash from time to time in order to short-cut the rather clumsy legal procedures that justice sometimes demands.

When the senior author of this paper was a youth of 14 in a Western community of about 2,500 people, an act of this sort occurred. The local superintendent of schools was ridden out of town on a rail—literally, and before the eyes of most of the men and boys and some of the women of the community. He had been accused of making homosexual advances to the seven-year-old son of a prominent attorney. When the boy returned home and told his mother what had happened, the boy's father was infuriated and called his friends on the telephone. Within a very short time, the superintendent had been apprehended by the "unruly element"—these were men and boys of the lower echelons of the community, led by the lesser of one of the local filling stations. Most of the boys in high school at that time knew of the proclivities of the superintendent (though few, it would seem, had discussed them with adults); they knew who his partners were (or at least, those of his partners who were their own age), and how often he took trips accompanied by these boys and young men. It seems likely that a good many adult members of the community also knew the situation.

In this particular case, the man was severely beaten by the men of the "unruly element," set onto a long pole and carried to the edge of town, the beating continuing in the process. His car had been taken there ahead of him, and he was shoved into it, with none of his belongings save the clothes he wore, and told to leave and never come back. During this time, the father of the boy who had reported the incident, the other attorneys of the town, the two newspaper proprietors and those who ran the real estate and abstract offices and the local hardware and grocery stores—who were, indeed, the "leaders" of the community—stood back and did nothing. They did not participate in the proceedings, but they made no attempt to stop them.

It seems to us that there are many instances in which the American small community behaves—or, at least, did so in recent history—in this way. Dealing with a case of this sort through legal and nonviolent channels would have been costly and time-consuming. We believe that when the small community feels that its morality, its economics or its value system are threatened, its members react in this way—by the encouragement, on the part of the authorities, for the "unruly element" of the town to do the task quickly and

"cleanly" so that the spirit and morality of the community are reinforced, and it can feel that it is strong and safe against the forces of evil.

In this as in other instances in which "popular justice" is exercised, there is a breakdown in the delegation of the means of violence on behalf of the community's well-being to the executive authority of that community. This breakdown may occur in response to the perceived inadequacy of the law, the perceived inadequacy of the enforcement of that law, or the inadequacy of delegated authority. Beginning with the first, the law is a normative institution which need not express the values of the community in which it applies: either because it was legislated at a different level (in effect, in a different cultural milieu) or because it has failed to keep pace with a changing social and ideological universe. When such values are flouted, however, the threat to the community which this engenders is just as real—and oftentimes more real—than if a "law" had been broken. Because the agents of law enforcement are not legally empowered to act under such circumstances, the community must in effect take the law (*their* law) into their own hands. The relationship of lynch-law practices to the inadequacies of the executive authority is perhaps more obvious. Where law enforcement agencies have provided insufficient protection of the community for an extended period of time, there is a natural tendency for the community to "organize" (how they do so we shall examine shortly) for its own protection. A community once made dependent on a "man-hunt" tradition (Raper, 1933: 29) for the preservation of its interests will relinquish that tradition only with the greatest reluctance (not to say violence).

Furthermore, if the community is threatened (or frustrated) by some extraordinary offense against its mores, the judicial process with its matter-of-fact, impersonal, and self-corrective attitude will scarcely be appropriate to deal with the collective rage and hatred that such a threat has engendered. Direct action is demanded. The degree to which such action is frustrated is the degree to which the emotional basis of the demand will be amplified. The greater the delay demanded by a cautious judicial system, the less such delay will be tolerated by the community. In commenting on the live cremation of a Negro accused of brutally murdering two small children, a Mobile newspaper in justification of the lynch mob's actions maintained that:

The laws of the country had never conceived that crimes [i.e., crimes such as the one allegedly committed by the Negro] could be perpetrated with such peculiar circumstances of barbarity, and had therefore provided no adequate punishment... the peculiar circumstances demanded that the ordinary punishment should be departed from. (Cutler, 1905: 108)

When sensibilities are so profoundly offended, the humanity of the punishment prescribed by law seems singularly inappropriate for the inhumanity of the criminal. Analytically, it is inadequate to provide the emotional release demanded by a community awaiting vengeance, literally steeped in hatred. That the violence done to a lynch-mob's victim transcends mere punishment, in the service of the law, is suggested by the brutal treatment often given to the corpse of the victim even after death.

Lynching is done by organized, structured groups—even if the structure is not recognized by the participants. To deal with the social structure of lynching or "popular justice," we propose a tripartite division, based on two criteria—the organization status and the legal status involved. Because all social action necessarily involves some degree of organization that is stable in time, and because the organization may or may not be recognized, some of these organizations can be called "manifest," while others are "latent."

Moreover, some popular justice is clearly extra-legal in that it appeals to violence when the legal machinery is deemed inadequate; other popular justice can best be called quasi-legal because it provides not so much a means of circumventing the law as an effective substitute for legal process. These distinctions can be represented in a four-square diagram:

		LEGALITY	
		QUASI-LEGAL	EXTRA-LEGAL
ORGANIZATION	MANIFEST	"COMMITTEE"	SECRET SOCIETY
	LATENT	?	MOB

The structure of the lynch mob seems to be universal, although its size and ferocity vary cross-culturally. First, it is widely noted that the actual violent acts are never committed by any but a very small portion of those assembled—let alone the community. Nevertheless, the community is always significantly involved in a supportive way. As the report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations pointed out, the mob in its entirety never actively participates, but is rather a mob in spirit, "divided in performance into a small active nucleus and a large proportion of spectators." (1922: 22) The maximum size for the "active nucleus" in the Chicago race riots of the twenties was observed to be no more than about fifty persons with three or four hundred other persons "aiding and abetting" them, these in turn being surrounded by a curious crowd of about 2,000 persons (1922: 22). The active nucleus seems universally to be composed of the "unruly element" of the population referred to previously in the account of the lynching of the homosexual superintendent of schools. Raper notes that:

The majority of persons known to have taken an active part in the lynchings were unattached and irresponsible youths of twenty-five or less, many of them not out of their teens... the known active lynchings were generally propertyless. In the majority of cases they were unemployed, rambling, irresponsible people, many of them with court records. (1933: 11)

Similarly, the Chicago rioters are described as young, unattached and often criminally disposed.

This "core of violence" by itself is not, however, sufficient for violence to erupt, as the following incident reported by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations dramatically illustrates:

Without the spectators, mob violence would probably have stopped short of murder in many cases. An example of the behavior of the active nucleus, when out of sight of the spectators bears this out. George Carr, a Negro, was chased from a street car. He outstripped all but the vanguard of the mob by climbing fences and hiding in a backyard. This concealed him from the rest of the crowd, who, by this time, were chasing other Negroes. The young men who had followed Carr left him without striking a blow, upon his mere request for clemency. (1922: 23)

These spectators, it is observed, were older than the actual participants, and had in general more firm ties with the community. They were, in short, respectable citizens who would not participate in violent action but who would be perfectly willing to support it. Furthermore, as the anecdote of the homosexual superintendent makes clear, it often takes the respectable element to initiate the lynch mob's action in the first place, just as it requires that the leaders of the community allow a tacit mandate to the violence once in process. To quote once more from Raper:

It would be erroneous . . . to leave the impression that all the lynchers were of the shiftless, irresponsible, propertyless type. At Scooba, Mississippi, where a double lynching occurred, the two men reported to have organized and engineered the mob from start to finish were leading people in the community and prominently identified with the local church, school, and other community activities. (1933: 11)

Another aspect of the mandate (active or passive) of the lynch mob is that the latter is accorded virtual immunity for its actions. As Raper observes, the lynch mob or man-hunt is very much "a product of community standards" and as such can scarcely be punished by that community (1933: 46). When the violence has been done grand juries can seldom if ever obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute the guilty parties, since citizens and lawmen alike deny knowledge of the identity of the participants. Denouncement of lynch mob action from the pulpit and editorial column is the exclusive prerogative of those institutions sufficiently removed from the community in which the violence occurred not to be affected by adverse popular opinion—or worse. Moreover, the mob in action possesses the means to assure consensus on the part of both participants and onlookers—this means, of course, being the threat of violence.

Having considered some of the universal structural features of the lynch mob (ignoring the problem of mob psychology which is a problem in itself), it remains to see whether each community has its own lynch tradition, peculiar in certain respects. Obviously, this tradition is not formally expressed, nor is it manifest unless it is called into play by a community crisis; it is rather a traditional way of responding to a recurring set of circumstances.

While the usual immediate occasion of mob violence against the property and persons of Negroes is the report of some specific crime, the size of the mob, along with the type and extent of its lawlessness,

will depend more upon the community situation than upon the type of crime reported. For example, the lynchings in northeast Texas were characterized by tremendous mobs which dragged and burned their victims, while to a lesser degree, the same type of mob prevailed in southeast Georgia. Over against the large and desperate mobs in these relatively new and frontier-like areas, the lynchings in the old plantation counties of the various states were carried out by small and relatively well-organized mobs which did their victims to death with dispatch, without torture before death or burning afterward. (Raper, 1933: 44)

The secret society, like the lynch mob, is essentially an extra-legal institution; it is called into play when the community is threatened in such a way that the civil authorities cannot see that justice is done, however justice is popularly defined. It differs from the mob in that its organization is manifest, formal, and persistent over time. In its local context it is basically a special purpose group existing, like the mob, not to govern the community but rather to enforce conformity with its values. Indeed, its salient characteristics—secrecy, fraternity and the lack of a formalized and publicly accessible standard by which it presumes to judge deviations—make it all but incapable of fulfilling even a quasi-legal function. It is not a civil government in embryo but is rather more akin to a primitive palace guard. Furthermore, by virtue of their secrecy and less than discriminating standards of recruitment:

The proceedings of such societies necessarily awaken mistrust and fear among the more quiet in the community, while the rogues, whose characters are not yet known, hasten to obtain admittance, both as a shield against enemies and as a cloak to cover their own misdeeds. Soon their vindictive actions and their rascalities excite the indignation of the community; a counterparty of "moderators" must be formed to check the "regulators," thus beginning a deadly struggle for supremacy. (Cutler, 1905: 6)

Such a feud, as we shall have occasion to note shortly, is structured on a bicentric principle and is a function of the absence of any overarching political authority within the community. The Ku Klux Klan was in part expanded in reaction to the Union League of the carpetbag South (Damer, 1912: 47) and similar examples may be found in the provincial histories of the mid-nineteenth century from the Ozarks (Morris, 1939: 67) to the Texas plains (Sonnichsen, 1957: 11-57).

The Ku Klux Klan, in spite of its pretensions to organization on the grand scale of an "Invisible Empire," is throughout most of its history, an agglomeration of provincial bodies acting in a common idiom. It came into being, interestingly enough, not as a regulative body, but as a social club founded in a Tennessee town with the improbable name of Pulaski. The mystery which surrounded its essentially harmless activities, however, seemed to the community to make it a vehicle admirably suited for dealing with the crisis which the defeat of the Confederacy had brought in its wake, a crisis of misrule in which "the most cherished institutions were debased" to the

purposes of the corrupt and inefficient carpetbag government (Damer, 1912: 74). The recently freed Negro, spurred on by the activities of the Union League, was, of course, seen as the primary source of threat to the community having not only been responsible for the election of the present government but also having aspirations which seriously questioned the premise of the Southern social order. Hence the effect that Klan activities had on the superstitious black did not go unnoticed but were seized upon by the community as a means of restraint in dealing with the problems "of growing irresponsibility and disorder of the recently freed negroes" (Horn, 1939: 69).

It was noticed that prowling freedmen who encountered the ghastly horsemen at night were afterwards more inclined to stay at home after dark; and this gave birth to the idea that perhaps the clan might be used as a means of subduing the undue bumptiousness and the nocturnal prowlings of some of those who seemed to be incapable of using their new-found freedom discreetly. (Horn, 1939: 18)

Hence the Klan sought and was given abundant publicity "in order to inspire respect for its powers. . . . Their appearance in public was sudden and unheralded; and they disappeared as silently and mysteriously." (Damer, 1912: 94) These dramatic appearances, however, designed to frighten some elements of the populace, gradually were supplemented by the systematic threatening of all Negroes and their white protectors and, when threats failed, by systematic violence.

The Klan did not, however, at all times and in all places function simply as an agent of ethnic terrorism, for it was somewhat adaptable to local problems and hence served in the Southwest as a repository of moral authoritarianism, exerting extra-legal force, often violent force, in order to maintain the moral status quo "which found expression in a quest for 'law and order' and a drive to maintain crumbling standards of personal conduct" (Alexander, 1965: 19). Appealing as Mecklin puts it, to the "petty impotence of the small town mind" (1963: 107) the Klan in the Southwest dedicated itself to the assistance of the authorities in the enforcement of law, using when necessary the prerogative of these authorities—violence. Assisting law enforcement, then—

meant going outside the law doing things the duly constituted authorities could not legally do. (Alexander, 1965: 57)

In Oregon, for example, where there could hardly have been said to be anything of an "ethnic problem" at the founding of the Klan in 1921, the secret brotherhood took as its purpose the assistance of the authorities in enforcing prohibition laws against bootleggers. The extra-legal uses of such an institution as the KKK at the provincial level are endless and the cloak of secrecy which it provides offers to the criminally inclined as well as to the morally indignant a means to satisfy their emotional needs under the guise of service to the community.

It remains to consider briefly the nature of the "committee of vigilance" which is a formally organized quasi-legal institution which functions with the

active support (not merely the passive mandate) of the community in the effective absence of legitimate civil authority. The committee is the governing body par excellence of the established frontier community; the example we have chosen to cite is the San Francisco Committee of Vigilance of 1851. San Francisco was incorporated by the new state legislature in 1850 but from the start was ill-equipped to deal with its rapidly expanding criminal element. Its police force consisted of only about 75 members, some among them being confederates of thieves, and its facilities were generally inadequate to deal with the magnitude of the problem which presented itself. The inefficiency of the prescribed legal process, as established in California statutes, forced mining communities to act in defiance of the law and return to the practice of lynching (only in a more summary and bellicose form than had existed prior to the establishment of civil authority). The immediate consequence of this was that—

The rogues who were driven out of the mining camps by the fear of lynch law showed an increasing tendency to concentrate in San Francisco. (Williams, 1921: 170)

The community itself relied increasingly on the activities of the lynch mob to inspire some degree of fear in the criminal element; a good deal of popular sentiment, as expressed in editorials of the time, urged the formation of some committee of public safety. As Williams notes, the Committee of Vigilance which was shortly to emerge—

did not originate, as is sometimes presumed, in the imaginations of hot-headed extremists who cowed the law-abiding community into temporary subjection. (1921: 186-187)

The committee itself was composed of a small number of prominent citizens and a majority of clerks and small tradesmen. At its formal inception, its plans were taken directly to the public to ascertain whether community support would be forthcoming for the activities of this self-appointed group which grew rapidly in numbers though was not so subjected to the degeneration of its personnel on account of its general lack of secrecy. Furthermore, there was some division of judicial and executive labor in the structure of the group and meticulous records were kept. Commenting on the latter, Williams observes that—

No one can even glance through these unique documents without receiving a profound impression of the order and system prevailing in the work of the committee. They have an air of intense sincerity; the very haste and roughness of composition precludes the idea of evidence deliberately fabricated to conceal brutality or injustice. (1921: 221)

We may conclude that such a body performed on behalf of the community those functions which would ordinarily be undertaken by the constituted civil authority. At least in this instance we have a committee fully conscious of its responsibility to both justice and the welfare of the community.

*The Detection and Punishment of (Criminal)
Violence in Legal Systems*

This topic is being covered *in extenso* by other reports in this Task Force. However, a few remarks must be made about the cross-cultural aspects of the matter. All societies label some acts as wrong (not to say "criminal") and deserving of punishment. However, the context of these acts is also always taken into consideration. "Murder," of course, is universally condemned—but the criteria for distinguishing murder from other types of homicide vary considerably from one society to the next, even in the "civilized" world, and no society condemns all homicide out of hand—every society recognizes "extenuating circumstances."

Therefore, those violent acts that are subject to punishment have been declared so by a code of customary or written law. The criminality of the acts consists not in the acts themselves, but in the evaluation of the act, in its total context within the particular cultural tradition of the society involved. To write a comparative study of this matter would be a worthy undertaking, but not one we can tackle within the time and space limits at our disposal.

Ignoring Violence in the Legal System

Many legal systems draw boundaries around certain segments of society and do not concern themselves with what goes on within those boundaries. The boundary is guarded, and becomes a sort of *cordon sanitaire* around a geographical or social group. But the violence within that group is not either used or controlled or encouraged by the authorities—it is merely ignored. In this situation, the people within the *cordon sanitaire* must provide their own systems of self-help or other regulation of the problem of violence. The phenomenon of the *cordon sanitaire* means, from the other side, that the population in general does not know about the violence that goes on *inside* the *cordon*. The "dominant" groups of society do not know about it—the police or other mechanism, by walling it off, keep it out of sight, and hence out of mind.

We shall mention three such situations in our own society, each surrounded by its own kind of *cordon sanitaire*: the ghetto, the university, and the non-delinquent boys' gang. All have the responsibility of creating systems for controlling their own violence—either by their own insistence and a sort of treaty with the rest of the community (the university, after all, has in times past been almost a separate entity from the community—a sanctuary for its own members that resembles a bicentric system in some regards) or else because the authorities of the dominant society are unable or unwilling to provide the same services within the *cordon sanitaire* that they provide outside it.

There are mountains of literature about the violence within the ghetto, where hustlers prey on each other and the populace must, to a large degree, live in fear and take care of itself. Henry Williamson (1965) has told of his own exploits as a thief within the Chicago ghetto which makes the case vividly that, although police were present, they did not do in ghetto areas the kind of job they do in middle class areas. Dollard, 30 years ago, noted in speaking of the Southern caste structure that the violent patterns of Negro

behavior in the south cannot be understood without realizing that very different standards of justice apply to the white and black groups. When the Negro's criminal action is not directed against the white citizen (in which case the law is strictly—indeed, severely—enforced) the Negro is dealt with by the law in a much more indulgent manner.

The result is that the individual Negro is, to a considerable degree, outside the protection of white law, and must shift for himself (1937: 279).

The Negro woman, for example, according to Dollard's informants, quite frequently armed herself with an ice pick or razor blade for her own protection (1937: 271) and as Raper observes—

Not infrequently Negroes reported that they, feeling that the authorities would not protect them, had provided for their own protection, sometimes resulting in a ready use of firearms in trivial matters (1933: 35).

Dollard's analogy is particularly apt:

Apparently we have here a kind of frontier where the law is weak and each person is expected to attend to his own interests by means of direct personal aggression and defense. (1937: 271)

This selective non-enforcement of the law on the basis of race (and the criteria may be income or age as well, as we shall point out) coupled with the generally inadequate institutional provisions made for mental defectives and juvenile delinquents for this segment of the population (Raper, 1933: 34) is bound to result in a continuous escalation of the crime rate, this, in turn, reinforcing the prejudice which brought about the selectivity of law enforcement in the first place. A society as obsessed as ours with the politics of gun control must realize that the only adequate substitute for self defense is adequate defense under law.

The same situation exists in the sub-society of the non-violent or non-conflict juvenile gang. The gang studied by Miller, Geertz, and Cutter (1961), the Junior Outlaws, is taken by them to be more representative of the juvenile gang at large than the extreme delinquent groups that we mentioned above, and that have indeed received the most attention. The major part of the aggressivity of the "social gang" is toward the other members of their own group (1961: 286). But they were themselves ignored by the authorities. This point was also made very explicit by Harrison Salisbury:

The police are incapable of, or not interested in, protecting one adolescent from the violence of another unless property is endangered or adult lives are affected. The youngsters take the law into their own hands just as they did in the West. Often, they are encouraged by their parents. They may be coached never to give the other fellow an even break. As the father of an active gang member said: "The Youth Board is crazy. What are they trying to do? Kids always fight on the streets. You'll never change that." (1958: 124)

What results from the effective isolation of a small group from the norms of the larger society, at least as these are embodied in civil law and its enforcement, is a kind of structural regression to an essentially primitive form of social control in which group norms and standards are enforced by the anonymous authority of public opinion.

The university is, structurally, in an almost precisely similar position, the primary difference, perhaps, being that it is de jure a quasi-independent body who "looks after its own" rather than a merely de facto group that is ignored or cordoned off. The *cordon sanitaire* around the universities was drawn in historical times—at the insistence of the universities; in response to their being sanctuaries, they were also capable in most cases of taking care of the violence that occurred within them. Students and even faculty were, in the past, not subjected to the judicial and police authorities of the outside system except in particularly heinous crimes. The university, within its boundaries, "took care of its own," including punishing its own. This boundary has also broken down. Students, in the process of gaining status in the community, have lost—or are losing—their rights to special treatment or exemption from certain community responsibilities. The redrawing of the lines of authority between the university and the community, and the new position of the students, is a part of the larger picture within which the Columbia and Berkeley "troubles" are to be viewed (Mead, 1968).

Today, in American life, the *cordon sanitaire* around the ghettos, the gang, and even the universities, is becoming a more permeable boundary. Ever larger proportions of the "outside population" are unable to ignore them. It is a combination of the awareness by the general populace of the violence within them, and a greater or lesser increase in the amount of violence within each, that has led to much of the present concern of Americans with the topics of aggression and violence. The "openness" of our society is being applied in new areas. We think that it was to this feature of American life that Karl Menninger referred when he was quoted, in early October, 1968, by the Chicago newspapers as saying that not only was it not now safe to walk down the streets—it had never been safe to walk down the streets.

Violence in the Bicentric System

Although Americans are not as sure of it in 1968 as we were in 1962, say, the modernized, developed world has learned to handle (with some lacunae) the unicentric power system, in the form of the state, and so to bring into ordered predictability both the succession to power and also the maintenance, within bearable limits, of delinquency and other deviations from the standards of the culture. There are also social units such as industrial firms and universities contained within the society (but not in themselves components of the state) which, as unicentric systems set within the unicentric system of the state, have learned to deal with their own problems, often without resort to violence or, in many cases, even the threat of it. Indeed, their right to call in the "authorities" is always present, but seldom do they have to do so.

The bicentric system is more difficult than the unicentric system. Whereas the great dangers of the unicentric system are tyranny and neglect, two grave

sources of danger to the bicentric system are garbled communications on the one hand, and on the other, uncompromisable differences of opinion or goal on the part of the two heads.


When communication between the two heads becomes sufficiently garbled that purposeful interaction within the multicentric organization (whether it be a marriage, or NATO) becomes impossible, the culture within that bicentric institution is likely to be reduced and simplified and, in its simplest form, to become violent. This process resembles a structural regression from more complex cultural modes of expressing structure to more primitive ones. On the other hand, the most complex methods may never have been built, so that violent interaction can become the norm within a bicentric system. To illustrate this point we shall examine feuds and raiding.

Feuds

Feuds may occur between two centers in a bicentric system when no unicentric system has ever been created that could settle them, when the unicentric system breaks down, leading to a structural regression toward cultural simplicity of interaction, or when the feud becomes an end in itself as a status or prestige acquiring device.

Feuding is a form of violent interaction which seeks balance of power in the absence of a superordinate system or any other means, accepted by both parties, of achieving the balance. Feuding has been called a legal mechanism (Evans-Pritchard, 1949) but we prefer to think of it as a substitute for a legal mechanism.


The legal mechanism for settling disputes, in either a unicentric or a bicentric system, is that when a punishable breach of norm occurs, some sort of counteraction on the part of the single center of power (in the unicentric system) or of one or both centers of power (in the bicentric system) swings into action to counteract the breach and return the flow of social life and culture to "correct" channels (however the "correct" be defined in that culture, which varies, is subject to comparative study, and is beside our immediate point). An "event sequence" can be charted on these three gross events:



Thus, to take an oversimple but adequate example, when a crime is committed in a city, in a certain proportion of cases the police swing into action and bring the criminal before a court, who gives him a sentence in a house of "correction."

In the feud, there is no counteraction which leads to correction. Since no counteraction is seen to be such by both parties to the feud, one sees the violent act of retribution following on the breach of norm as a counteraction; the other side sees that counteraction as a renewed breach of norm. With this

difference in evaluation of specific social acts, no "correction" can be arrived at, and the feud proceeds "forever":



Obviously, feuding is a stable relationship between two groups in a single system—a bicentric system—and it is usually acted out in terms that consist in interchanges of violent behavior (Bohannan, 1963).

Feuding occurs in many parts of the world and has occurred in the past in most others. The Hatfields and the McCoys are part of American folk tradition (and also, of course, of American history). Feuding is reported by the "old-timers" in the American southwest to have been going on as late as 1920 (and remember that the last Apache raid was in 1912). The feud has been studied among the Bedouin Arabs and among the Polynesians, to name only two well known examples far removed geographically from one another. Here we shall concentrate on the feud in the Albanian hill tribes in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. Like most other institutions of the feud, this one has a large set of common understandings beyond the mere simplicity of violent interactions. However, it is structurally simple (and culturally inefficient because it does not lead to the desired end—unless, of course, it can itself be said to be the desired end). The Albanian blood feud took place in terms of a culture in which violence itself is highly prized.

Until World War I, the northern Albanians in the mountains were organized into local groups that have often been called "tribes." These groups were, at that time, out of reach of the unicentric state, with its capital in Tiranë. Their "justice" was local justice, and it was based on "the law of one for one" (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967: 289-281 cite the Italian literature briefly; the information here is taken only from English sources, primarily Hasluck, 1954: 216-260). The Albanian word for the blood feud was *besa*, which Wolfgang and Ferracuti translate as "pacification of blood," and describe as follows:

The *besa* was a cultural tradition of the vendetta which was transmitted from generation to generation and constituted a moral code from which most Albanians from the mountain regions could not readily escape. It is a rule of life and a code of honor. . . . (p. 281)

The cultural tradition of the *besa* was set forth largely in terms of blood imagery. The act of vengeance was "to take the blood [of the original victim]"; the killer was "the blood-stained" and the avenger was the "master of the blood [of the victim]." As in many other feuding communities, there was a period of 24 hours in which there were no rules about the conduct of the counter-killing. After that, rules applied—rules that were concurred in on both sides. Both the time rules and the extension of the family or neighborhood concerned on each side of the feud were referred to by "the

rule of boiling blood." And, in some instances, blood was actually drawn from the corpse of a murdered man and put into a bottle; in the process of decomposition, the blood formed bubbles and it was said that the blood "boiled." In some areas, the time that it took the blood to "boil" was associated with the circumstances under which vengeance could be taken. Here is a case history that was collected by Margaret Hasluck early in the 20th century:

About 1890 a man who lost a lamb promised to give a cartridge to a shepherd if he found it. When the shepherd succeeded, the man went back on his promise saying that he would 'give him five' (fingers on the trigger) instead. For the moment, the shepherd let the matter drop, but later met the man and asked once more for his promised reward. Again the man refused it, not too courteously, and was immediately killed by the incensed shepherd. Unfortunately, it was Easter Sunday and the murder took place in a meadow where all the men of Theth were gathered for the festival. Immediately the dead man's *vllazni* (brotherhood) comprising all the males descended from the same ancestor, sought vengeance on the murderer's brotherhood. These were not backward in replying, and within an hour fourteen men lay dead.

In most of the tribal areas of Albania, the rule was "one for one"—a life for a life, but in others (Hasluck refers to "Lumë, a district which prided itself on its 'spirit'") the rule was two for one, therefore insuring that parity was never reached. This is not the place to go into the details of the culture of pride or might that lay behind this, as many another Mediterranean culture. The point will be important, however, in the third section of this essay.

Peace in the Albanian feud was, if it was achieved at all, achieved through the services of an intermediary. Such intermediaries are common in the absence of a unicentric system, and their task is to act as a means of communication between the embattled parties in the bicentric system, and to allow each one to have a face-saving device when the two do arrive at an agreement not to continue the feud. This characteristic is universal for settling feuds in the absence of a superordinate unicentric system. In Albania, the process was also ceremonialized and the "peace" publicly proclaimed.

Raidings

Another permanent relationship of violence that can occur in a bicentric system is a perpetual relationship of raiding. One side may raid the other, or the two may raid each other. The "booty" in a raiding situation varies vastly, but the structure of the groups within which it occurs is strikingly uniform, and their culture always includes an important cult or legend of the hero-raider. The Jibaro Indian tribes of Ecuador raided one another as well as neighboring peoples for heads to be made into trophies for heroes (Karsten, 1923). The so-called Nilo-Hamites of East Africa raided for livestock, particularly cattle and goats; although this includes "rustling," rustling is a more straight-forward kind of theft and is not a permanent and structural relationship between two social groups as raiding is. The examples we shall look into here are those of raiding for horses as practiced by the Blackfoot

Indians in the late-18th century, rising to its highest development in the middle-19th century, raiding for heads in southern New Guinea, and raiding for slaves in 18th- and 19th-century Nigeria.

The Blackfoot had traditional relationships of enmity with almost all of the tribes that surrounded them: they fought the Shoshone for at least 125 years and were in a permanent state of fighting with the Flathead, the Assiniboin and the Crow, all of whom were more or less decimated by Blackfoot raids and warfare.

The Blackfoot had a system of counting trophies or honors so that they, within their own unicentric society, established a hierarchy of wealth and prestige based primarily on raiding and warfare. Ewers (1958) tells us that the word for "war honor" meant a captured gun, and that to take an enemy's gun was the most prestigious of the honors.

The capture of a bow, shield, war bonnet, war shirt, or ceremonial pipe was also a coup of high rank. The taking of a scalp ranked below these deeds, but ahead of the capture of a horse from the enemy. The capture of a horse was too common an accomplishment to receive a higher rating. (1958: 139)

However, the most common of the violent activities of the Blackfoot against their enemies was raiding for horses. The raids were carried out by parties of warriors that seldom exceeded a dozen men—the horses were used to pay bridewealth as well as a means of storing wealth. The leader of such a party was a man of proven ability and judgment; all participants were volunteers, whom the leader could refuse. Large raiding parties are more easily detected by the enemy, and also require a greater degree of organization than the Blackfoot chose to give them.

As the raiders approached the camp of the enemy, they built a camp of their own and laid in supplies; scouts were sent ahead to locate the enemy camp and ascertain the number of people and horses. The scouts then returned and were joined by the entire group of warriors, who moved forward during the night. The attack almost always took place just before dawn—the warriors slipped into the enemy camp, untied the best horses and moved off with them—a quick escape was necessary, and usually they rode, changing horses, for at least two full days and a night before making camp to rest.

When Blackfoot parties were detected, they were usually massacred—here is an example that Ewers quotes from a nineteenth century account by Paul Kane:

This small band [of Blackfoot] seeing their inferiority to their enemies, attempted flight; but finding escape impossible, they instantly dug holes sufficiently deep to entrench themselves from which they kept up a constant fire with guns and arrows, and for nearly twelve hours held at bay this large war party, bringing down every man who ventured within shot, until their ammunition and arrows were entirely exhausted, when of course they fell an easy prey to their enemies, thirty of whom had fallen before their fire. This so enraged the Crees that they cut them in pieces, and mangled the dead bodies in a most

brutal manner, and carried their scalps back as trophies. (Ewers, 1958: 135)

After such an occurrence, the Blackfoot retaliated not with raiding, but with wars aimed at collecting scalps and guns from the enemy. However, large battles were rare, and Blackfoot tried to avoid them because the independence of individual warriors and their lack of large-scale organization put large-scale battles beyond their competence.

The relationship between the Blackfoot and their enemies was reciprocal—they lost almost as many horses as they stole. Thus, raiding for horses and the wars to which it led was a stable type of relationship—it lasted for more than a century. Importantly for us here, Blackfoot culture was also one in which the cult of the individual hero was highly developed, and in which the ideals of masculinity were expressed in terms of what we would call hostility, cruelty and atrocity. Like some of the gangs, the dominance hierarchy within the culture was based on acts of aggression carried out against external enemies.

The social organization of New Guinea head hunting tribes is of a similar nature: they are small, and in a constant state of preying on one another. More important, the cultural values of heroic daring and aggressive masculinity are to be found here even more exaggerated than in the Plains Indians. Personal names are of great importance to the headhunting peoples of southern New Guinea. A single individual may have multiple names. The most prized name of all is the "head-name" which is the name of the victim whose head has been acquired on one's behalf. Van der Kroef notes that—

every head name given to a child means that its father, uncle, or other immediate relative has traveled into the interior, and has undergone the dangers that accompany slaying the victim whose head-name is bestowed on the child. The social pressure behind the acquisition of such a name is so great that a child is derided and, indeed, feels inferior unless he possesses his own head name. (1952: 222)

Indeed, it is to the considerable enhancement of one's prestige in the community if he is able, by virtue of his skill and fortitude, to bestow head-names on those children whose fathers have no names left for them. As might be expected, the hero-raider fulfills just such a role:

many legends deal primarily with those heroes who, in addition to bringing beautiful delicacies to the community, also provided all children with extra head-names. (van der Kroef, 1952: 223)

The peoples among whom heads may be taken by the raiding party are carefully defined and failure to observe the proper boundaries results in the imposition of negative sanctions on the group as a whole.

In some instances . . . names of woods, creeks, marshes are added to the head-name of the child, to indicate where the victim was caught. It is very important that these names be kept fixed in the memory of the people, for every head-hunting village has a definite area in which it

may operate. To go beyond the limits and hurt a friendly community is *doer*, a moral wrong for which the community as a whole must frequently atone. (1952: 223)

The pattern of raiding which exists in this social universe is reciprocal, that is, the victims of a raid will often be the raiders in their turn. Vengeance, it is suggested, is often an added incentive to initiate a campaign against a hostile community but it is never the sole or even primary motivation, this being in every case, the quest for names. (1952: 225)

Slave raiding is more likely to be found in primitive states than it is in acephalous tribal communities like the Blackfoot or those New Guinea groups that we have cited. The best information is from Sub-Saharan West Africa, where, in historical times, the slaves that were brought to the New World were captured by the slaving raids of West African kingdoms. The nature of the booty exerts some structural constraints on the relationship between the relevant groups. First of all, it seems clear that slave raiding—to be distinguished from the capture of prisoners in war and the occasional kidnapping of a child (*Uchendu in* Cohen, 1966: 52)—is structured on a reciprocal basis only in the most dire and extraordinary of circumstances if at all. Were the raiding group not of considerably superior strength and/or organization than the group to be exploited, the losses which would probably be incurred on the part of the former could hardly be compensated for in slaves. Hence, among the Kanuri

The method *par excellence* for supplying slaves, especially for the slave trade, was through raids on weak neighbors. (Cohen, 1966: 48)

Similarly, Nadel maintains that one of the principal motives behind the Nupe conquest of the primitive peoples to the north in the era of the pre-Fulani kingdom was to tap the "easily accessible" reservoir of slaves (Nadel, 1942: 85) and that only after "half a century of wars and raids had denuded the country of peoples who could with no great difficulty be made slaves," did the raiding kingdoms willingly resort to more "serious" warfare to this end (Nadel, 1942: 104).

Furthermore, and for the very reason that slave raiding is not reciprocal, the relationship between the groups involved cannot really be expected to be stable over time as the raiding group often comes close to wiping out a particular victim entirely as in the case cited by Nadel.

Warfare

Organized warfare between states is not the subject of this essay, but it can be seen that (for all its complicatedness and the difficulties involved in either controlling or waging war) war is simple. Indeed, its very simplicity is what makes it difficult to deal with or control on a practical level of action. The two centers of power have opposed goals, and perhaps they misunderstand one another as well (although, of course, they may understand one another only too well). The relationship "regresses" structurally to the simplest form of culture—use of force: with minimal expectations and minimal communication.

Bicentric Systems and Unicentric Systems

A brief summary is in order about the kind of classification we have made of violence in society. A unicentric system is subject to violence as part of its mechanism for establishing and maintaining order within a dominance hierarchy, and that violence may be legal, illegal, alegal, or quasi-legal. A bicentric system is subject to violence as part of its mechanism of dispute and persuasion between two centers of power. We recognize, of course, and wish again to insist that no single "culture" exhibits only one or the other of these two structural principles.

Not only do all well balanced social systems contain aspects of both these principles, but each is the "corrective" of the other. When violence gets out of hand in the unicentric system, then a bicentric system is called into being—either by revolution, by vigilante committee, by formation of groups of self-help that can either ignore (and be ignored by) or resist (and be resisted by) the dominant group in the unicentric system. The bicentric solution to violence and conflict in the unicentric system is constantly at work.

In the same way, the unicentric system is the most common response to difficulties within the bicentric system, but it is not the only one. Difficulties in bicentric systems can be, at least in the short run, "solved" by the mechanism of the balance of power—whether that be the "peace in the feud" as Gluckman has called it, or whether it be the Cold War. However, the unicentric system is a more adequate solution (so far) to the difficulties in the bicentric system. The central police and administrative authority from the capital were extended to the feuding tribes of Albania in the early twentieth century; new degrees of police protection are being afforded to the ghettos and the universities in our own country; the formation and maintenance of the United Nations as a force for law and anti-violence in the world order is *the* arch example. The two principles form a corrective to one another.

The distinction has also allowed us to say something about the manner in which different types of societies structure their use of violence: the regulation, in short, of who may fight whom, under what conditions.

Violence as a Cultural and Cognitive Category

We are not prepared to say that violence is a species-specific characteristic, as Lorenz and some of his followers (and exaggerators) have maintained, or as Ashley Montagu has as vigorously denied. However, we *are* sure that violence cannot be carried out, in any form, without some sort of ethical and moral evaluation. It is in the nature of being a human being that all acts are submitted to perception and evaluation, whether the acts are species specific (and "natural" in that sense) or whether they are specific only to limited cultural traditions (and "learned" in that sense). The moral evaluation of species-specific action varies vastly from one cultural tradition to another—we have only to look at the various moralities surrounding human sexuality to know that.

Out of the foregoing discussion and examples, we want to examine human aggression and violence as it is morally evaluated. The ideas and values that surround bellicosity and hostile behavior have been implicit in many of the

examples we have given; here we want to make them the focal point. Bellicosity is as charged with the morality by which it is evaluated as is sexuality or economy—but it is not nearly as well studied; anthropologists and historians, like other scholars, have been much less open to or interested in dealing with it. The morality of sexuality has been overt for centuries (even when it was not “talked about” in “polite” circles, for after all, even wholesale denial of sexuality or of approved methods for beating the system was an overt morality of sex). The morality of economic man has not been so popularly perceived, but it has been the subject of scholars from Aristotle to Robert Owen and Karl Marx, and it has been mathematized in our own day.

However, the morality of bellicosity or pugnacity has never, as a subject, broken loose from the more general topics of moral philosophy as has economics. Philosophers still discuss it in terms of ethics, and behavioral scientists in terms only of drives. There is an extensive history of “war” and it is even true that the largest set of observations about bellicosity made by anthropologists is in terms of “primitive war”—and it is an undeniable fact that primitive war is anthropologically one of the least satisfactorily documented and analyzed of all human activities.

The fact that our discussion of bellicosity and of the moral evaluation of violence in different cultures must necessarily be superficial is not entirely our fault. We have not had time to chase down adequate examples, let alone samples, because the ethnographic data and the theoretical formulations are not organized for it. It is a fact of no little significance that such words as “violence” do not appear in the indices of most ethnographies, even when the reports contain extended descriptions of it. “Aggression” is better—but by no means adequate to cover even the examples that are in fact given. In short, in anthropological culture, violence has not only been avoided as a problem, it has even been avoided as an indexing category. We estimate that, in order to pick out adequate examples of violent behavior in the Human Relations Area Files, we would have to search under at least fifteen categories—from “aggression” to “law” and everything in between—even to collect our materials; the word “violence” does not appear in the index of the *Outline of Cultural Materials* (Murdock, et al., 1967). This statement is not meant as a castigation of the indexers of the Human Relations Area Files, but rather as a comment on the state of the art.

Because of this situation, however, our discussion of the evaluation of violence must focus upon two or several nuclei that are not well coordinated. We have chosen to discuss the anatomy of the violent act, and the degree to which ideas about it are shared (which must obviously include the problem of ethnocentrism), and the cult of the hero, as a violent, aggressive male.

The Anatomy of the Violent Act

Action and the cultural evaluation of action cannot be kept separate in the “real world.” But for purposes of analysis, they must be separated. We are going to examine the anatomy of the violent act under three headings: (1) the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, (2) the means of violence, and (3) the social milieu in which the violent acts are considered appropriate or inappropriate.

The Social Relationship Between Victim and Aggressor

What is needed, and what we (or anybody else) cannot at the moment supply, is a large-scale cross-cultural study of the relationship between the victim and the aggressor in large numbers of societies, together with those societies’ definitions and evaluations of violence and their stated or implied values for judging the violent acts. We can point to a few studies in which some information is available—Wolfgang’s study of homicide in Philadelphia (1958), Bohannan’s *African Homicide and Suicide* (1960)—but always a more specialized treatment than would be desired.

There are, in every society, typical victims or “targets” of violence. They may include the stranger, as a figure for displacement of rage, as in our own society. But more often the target is culturally defined, and the “worst” form of violence is that in which the wrong target is selected. The selection of a target is related to the categories of ethnocentrism within that tradition. For example, if the folk definition of human does not extend beyond the “white race” or the “Bongo-bongo” tribe, then violence against other forms of “non-human” humanity may lead to violence as the most approved method or even the only acceptable method of interrelationship. An in-group member may completely lose status by a crime within the group. The same act (now, by definition, not a “crime”) against an outsider may be laudatory or status conferring. Scores of examples of this point could be culled from the ethnographic literature. Here are two examples from Oceania: (1) From the Tanga Island group of the Bismarck Archipelago:

Of course, a state of hostility always existed between two clans . . . and if an individual of one clan strayed into the territory of the other he went in forfeit of his life, despite the fact that his clan subsection had no particular quarrel with the members of that subsection on whose land he was trespassing. (Bell, 1935: 259)

(2) The Marindese and Boetinese of southern Mew Guinea

divide mankind into three, or sometimes four categories: the *anim-ha*, i.e., the “real humans themselves; the *ikom*, other inhabitants of New Guinea, their enemies; the *poe-ikom*, neighboring friendly communities; and, where there has been contact, the *poe-anim*, or “foreigners,” those of non-indigenous origin, such as Europeans and Chinese. The *ikom* are regarded as inferior in every respect, and exist only as objects of the head hunt (*anim-bake*). (van der Kroef, 1952: 223)

The more general topic of ethnocentrism should be discussed briefly here, because it is an essential part of most human relations, not just those of violence. Ethnocentrism occurs in a psychic sense when the “cultural self” perceives a situation with which it cannot empathize directly. That situation is “strange” or “bad” because one cannot feel one’s self in it—certainly, in the violent situation, not as the perpetrator of the “outrage”—or else because one suppresses these feelings and is afraid of what is inside one. Therefore, in order to empathize cross-culturally, it is necessary to do so in terms of grosser

categories of perception than is the case when we empathize with acts and feelings of those who are most like us. Thus, we need to have—but usually do not have—a second set of categories prepared in which to understand the people who are most different from us. This lack of psychic preparation is, in our opinion, the major difficulty in cross-cultural understanding.

Of even greater moment, however, are the cultural aspects of the problem, for each culture provides a kind of overt and approved defense mechanism for its members in dealing with their problems of "self" and "others." These defense mechanisms are likely to turn up on the one hand as stereotypes of those people who are different from one's self in significant ways—and stereotypes are perhaps the most effective mode of blocking cross-cultural empathy and understanding, because they do not allow any information about the real situation to come through. On the other hand, most cultural traditions contain prescriptions about how to treat people from other cultures.

Within American society, we have a number of subcultural traditions in which stereotypes of others are systematically blocking observation of others. There are a good many American organizations established to maintain the stereotypes, and some others dedicated to breaking them down.

Ethnocentrism, thus, can be seen as a culturally fostered defense mechanism for preventing the intrusion of others into the cultural self and the perceiving self. These "others" are rejected as invaders. So much is "natural." But in a complex and heterogeneous society, it is also destructive—and the fact that it is "natural" does not mean that it is inevitable. Culture can, by its nature, extend the "natural" beyond its apparent limits.

We might note in this context a popular tendency in our own culture to refer to wartime enemies by terms which reduce the degree of their humanity—make them inhuman or a base variety of human—barbarians, Huns, mad-dog Japs, etc. This practice makes it easier to rationalize our actions against them, simply by placing them beyond the pale of humanity—we can inflict damage on those unlike ourselves that is much more sadistic and degrading than we can on those who are like ourselves. Reiteratively calling the North Vietnamese "the enemy" is another example.

Besides the ethnocentric aspect, there is also a role aspect to the selection of targets for violence. In most societies, there are some categories of persons—specific roles—that are considered to be immune to violence. We saw, earlier, that in the medieval wager of battle, the priests, the cripples and the women (on most occasions) were excepted. It is oftentimes noted also that medical men, chiefs or prostitutes are also immune to violence (although the latter two, at least, may on other occasions be its special targets). Here is an example from the Marquesas, where

the women enjoyed freedom from danger in war; and they, especially the chiefs' women, were regarded as flags of truce, and could pass from side to side at pleasure. (Williamson, 1939: 11)

The Method of Violence

It seems likely, also, that every society limits the method of violence that

can be used in any context: we referred above to the medieval Spanish cases in which men were executed for taking personal vengeance by castrating the lovers of their wives or their sisters, whereas they should have killed them, thereby working the vengeance of society.

The Arapesh (cited as a peaceful people, but who nevertheless engage in warfare) provide an enlightening situation. Death to a member of the in-group must be sought by dealing with a sorcerer from an out-group. Physical violence must not be used in the in-group, but only sorcery. In dealing violently with the out-group, either sorcery or physical violence is approved. (Fortune, 1939: 27-34)

In Mediterranean lands in the days of the Inquisition, torture was held appropriate for "crimes" of a certain sort—especially witchcraft and dealing with the devil—but not for others. The definition of which crimes are appropriate for torture would certainly vary cross-culturally. We have not been able to find a cross-cultural study of torture.

The Context of Violence

There are everywhere only certain situations or places in which violent action is allowable, according to the mores of specific cultures. This may well run all the way from our own tri-partite division of homicide into culpable, justifiable and official to formulations in primitive warfare about conditions under which certain types of act can be carried out. Thus, in San Cristoval (in Melanesia) people who are climbing trees or fishing on the sea are not attacked, even in the heaviest battles which, for these people, may involve wholesale slaughter without notice of the inhabitants of a given village:

the reason being that such fighting . . . was considered to be too cruel, and therefore it was held that fighting should be restricted to "people on the ground." There was also a rule that fighting at night was not allowed. (Wedgewood, 1930: 14)

Further restrictions exercised by these people was that the person of the chief of the opposing party was sacrosanct, and he must not be killed.

Moral judgments about violence always seem to involve the nexus of two or more of the categories we have mentioned as a part of the anatomy of violence—victim, method and context. Where victims or aggressors and means of carrying out the act are considered to be "unreasonably" conjoined, or where the context and the relationship of victim to aggressor are out of phase, then almost without exception, negative moral judgments are made—sometimes very loudly.

The "Hero Cult" of the Violent, Aggressive Male

Recently, in a lower middle class white neighborhood in Chicago, a public school teacher made a telephone call to the parents of an 11-year-old boy whose fighting in class made the work of teaching and learning impossible. His constant hostility demanded almost constant attention from the teacher, who felt that he was giving too much time to this one child and his one problem. The boy's mother, angry at being disturbed, did nevertheless come

in at the teacher's request. She listened to the teacher's story. When he asked her to help in calming and disciplining her son, the mother's question was "Does he win?" The teacher said that he thought nobody won, and that such was the wrong way to look at the matter. The mother disagreed—"Any time he don't win, you call me up and I'll come hold his glasses." Two moral positions for evaluating this child's behavior were face to face: and the teacher because of the culture of the school and of his own suburban middle-class background, did not know what to do.

We have seen, in most of the examples given in this essay, that acts of violence are often associated with the definition of masculine personality and high status. In the juvenile gangs, "rep" is built on violent acts (either within the group of the "social gang" or outside it for the "delinquent gang"). The feuding Albanians have widely accepted criteria of violence for defining a "real man." The Blackfoot warrior who was daring to the point of absurd foolishness, who could capture a gun or a horse under dangerous conditions and who was willing to risk his life but forfeit it dearly, was the most admired of all the community. *Machismo* and its equivalent in the other Latin cultures has been extensively documented.

It is our overwhelming impression that there would be a high statistical correlation between acts of violence (however they may be defined), an exaggerated division of labor and of character between males and females, with male status depending on exaggeratedly "masculine" behavior, usually measured in violence and applied over a very wide (perhaps even total) range of social behavior, and then a conferring of high status on the basis of this masculinity. The latter can be called a "hero cult."

With careful definition and extensive reference to the ethnographic literature it would be feasible to check our impression about the relationship among violent acts, hero cults, and the wide range in which cultural tradition rewards exaggeratedly "masculine" behavior. This proposition needs extensive testing, because at a superficial level, at least, it is possible to pick out exceptions to it: Southeast Asia would seem to be full of cultural traditions in which there is a lot of what we would call violence but little masculinity drive or hero cult. The matter must be examined in detail and statistically—but the overwhelming suggestion is that violent behavior is not only learned, but is admired and even demanded in those societies that show a great deal of it.

Our impression got a boost from an observation by Gorer that deserves extended examination: he has brought together a few of the most obvious examples of "non-violent" societies from the ethnographic literature: the Arapesh of New Guinea, the Lepchas of Sikkim, the pygmies of the Congo. He says that all either are, or were until recently, hunting peoples and that they have some other important traits in common [dots within square brackets indicate omissions; those without are in the text]:

They all manifest enormous gusto for the concrete physical pleasures—eating, drinking, sex, laughter—and they all make very little distinction between the ideal characters of men and women, particularly that they have no idea of brave, aggressive masculinity [...]. No child [...] grows up with the injunction, "All real men do..." or "No proper woman does..." so that there is no confusion

of sexual identity [...]. The model for the growing child is of concrete performance and frank enjoyment, not of metaphysical symbolic achievements or of ordeals to be surmounted. They do not have heroes or martyrs to emulate or cowards or traitors to despise [...]. By contrast the cannibals of the New Guinea Highlands have a highly aggressive ideal of masculinity; and so, in general, do all the peoples who prize the martial virtues and self-righteously kill their enemies as their "inferiors." (Gorer in Montagu, 1968: 34-35)

It seems clear, however, that the "hero cult complex" if we may call it so is to be found in many reaches of our own society. How to deal with it is equally clear, but very much more difficult: we must build in some sort of protections which keep it from destroying the entire cultural tradition. Since aggressivity is not an orgasmic drive, but a drive that responds to certain types of frustration or "invasion" of the sensing and cultural self, and since culture is the basis for inhibiting rage reactions to such invasion, then the need for a cultural antidote is clear. That statement is easy to make—but just what such culture may entail is a very difficult question in need of exhaustive investigation and great social creativity. Athletics are no more a substitute for aggression than they are for sex. The point at issue is how to control the situation so that non-heroes will not try to behave as if they were heroes to prove to themselves that they are not worthless. It is not the real heroes of a society that provide the difficulty—it is the inept strivings of the non-heroes in a hero society that must be controlled.

SUMMARY

The points that we have made in this paper can be summed up briefly:

(1) Violent social interaction is to be differentiated from the biopsychic facts of "aggression" and emotion. This differentiation must be done overtly and on the basis of scientific examination, not by assumption and value-laden axioms.

(2) The set of violent interactions is always found in a social context—we have made an ad hoc division of the organizing principles of social structures into unicentric and bicentric in order to isolate several uses for violence: as the maintenance of dominance hierarchies and law and/or justice within a unicentric system; as the balance and culturally simplistic means of settling disputes in a bicentric system. However, both principles are usually present in a group at any one time, and one may provide the basis for the solution to difficulties that arise in the other. Whenever there is a shift in the balance between the unicentric principle and the bicentric principle, the amount of violence in a community or state appears to participants and members of the society to be on the increase. New areas of violence are perceived by people who did not previously know about them or were able to ignore them. Moreover, violence based on one principle may be overtly used to put down violence in organizations based on the other, so that not only is violence brought to broader attention, but its gross quantity may indeed actually increase.

Another way of saying this is that when unaccustomed, and hence

unpredictable, forms of violence enter our perceptual and cultural envelopes, we do not know for sure what is happening, and therefore anxiety and perhaps fear are aroused. If either "counteraction" goes too far, we have cause to worry: that is, if the bicentric force of revolution becomes too destructive, or if the unicentric force of authoritarianism becomes too tyrannous, then our cultural and psychic modes for dealing with the problem may be insufficient. A spiral of violent interaction can result—in the name of maintaining order on the one hand, ideals on the other.

(3) Violent action in a bicentric system is a form of cultural simplification. There is some doubt in our minds about whether the culture of war is simpler and grosser than that of diplomacy or whether there is merely a high degree of agreement between the two parties to the conflict once they have made up their minds to fight. Whichever is in fact the case, the expectations, each of the other, are known, and straightforward and shared. For all the technical skills that modern warfare requires, its armamentarium of social skills is negligible.

What cannot be denied, however, is that not only do the acts of the "enemy" carry an evaluation, but the acts of one's self or one's own society are also evaluated. Both the victim and the aggressor (no matter whether the two agree about which is which or how fast the "alternating current" of violence turns) take their values and ideas back into the unicentric system—and there it is not so simple. Violence may be used as a mark of prestige, as among delinquent gangs or the Plains Indians coup-counters that have been noted above. It may, of course, also be used as a sign that one group within the system has to "tighten its grip" on the justice that the community thinks it desires—which may lead to lynch law or to police suppression of the other group.

(4) It is unfortunate, but nevertheless true, that most social theorists who have dealt with cultural variability in the forms and incidence of violence have adopted an implicitly psychological approach, assuming that different social experiences generate differential predispositions toward violent forms of expression through anxiety, frustration, compulsive masculinity and the like. There is absolutely nothing the matter with these ideas—in fact, we have endorsed some of them above—but they are not adequate to do the job, because to do that and only that is to beg a very important complex of questions: the questions of cultural tradition.

Cultural criteria must be brought in because attitudes toward violence, like attitudes toward anything else, are learned. For that reason, culture provides the triggering mechanism in human aggressive response to frustration at the same time that it provides the inhibiting mechanism which allows displacement or sublimation of that response. Cultural life is based neither on drives nor neurochemical responses, but rather on the manner in which the drives are placed in the non-random service of social structures. The quality of non-randomness is of great importance, because it defines the boundary between what is explicable in psychological terms and what must be explained in cultural terms: between pathology and cultural difference. Human society demands that the drives and emotions of aggression and anger be translated into specific patterns—some of which are violent.

(5) In every society there is a time, a target and a context which is customarily (even if not morally) appropriate for hostile behavior and violent interaction. These are cognitive categories, shared to a greater or lesser degree by members of a common cultural tradition. It is in terms of these values that the individual's action is evaluated, both by himself and by his fellows.

Violent behavior is, among other things, a learned means to certain ends defined by one's cultural tradition (instrumental violence, in Berkowitz's term). As such it may have a greater or lesser currency cross-culturally. When means and ends get out of phase—when target, method and context are socially disapproved—then violence becomes "senseless violence," and our security is threatened.

It is our opinion that the most important single point that we have made in this paper is that the values of a cultural tradition provide both the triggering mechanisms which turns aggressive rage into violent action and the inhibiting mechanism which turns it to sublimation and displacement. The human condition, in ethological terms, is one in which the releaser and inhibitor have become conjoined. But it is also one in which we naturally turn to moral systems as the means for arbitrating the two.

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APPENDIX 26

**CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES**

By Clarence C. Schrag*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING FACES OF VIOLENCE

General Perspectives

Public concern over violence is nothing new in the United States. In almost every decade of our history the mass media have advocated more stringent measures to curb an alleged increase in crime and violence, and in nearly every generation a wave of riot and rebellion has swept over the country.

Less than a generation after the American Revolution, troops were employed to subdue rioting farmers and tax protesters. Numerous deaths occurred in slave uprisings prior to the Civil War, and during the war several thousands of persons were killed in demonstrations against the military draft. In the 1870's and 1880's troops were again employed to quell the revolt of railroad workers and other laborers who sought higher wages and better living conditions. Race riots erupted in St. Louis during World War I, killing fifty people there and spreading rapidly to 26 other cities. Racial conflicts flared up again in the 1930's and 1940's, especially in Harlem and Detroit, which were forerunners of Watts and other recent disturbances. Rioting prisoners were the focus of attention in the 1950's when several lives were lost and millions of dollars worth of public property was destroyed. In addition to these internal disorders, the country has frequently been engaged in international conflicts, especially during the last fifty years.

Disturbances such as those mentioned are occasionally followed by organized attempts to alleviate the conditions believed to be causally involved. Although the success of these attempts may be denied by ensuing events, it is nevertheless clear that many persons see force and violence as necessary ingredients of social reform. When other alternatives seem inconsequential, violence may be deliberately aimed at creating a situation in which remedial measures can no longer be avoided. Thus, the exercise of violence may often be regarded as a just and worthy enterprise, a price to be paid for the attainment of higher objectives.

In movements directed at social reform, the mere threat of violence, of course, may be preferred over its overt expression. But threat tends to evoke

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Note. Superscript figures indicate references at end of appendix.

counter-threat, thereby establishing a mutual and cumulative feedback which escalates people's animosities until an uncontrolled explosion, often feared but rarely anticipated with any clarity, may be nearly inevitable. While the employment of violence as a strategy of social control is not often acknowledged, the capacity for coping with illegal violence by the use of legal force is almost universally viewed as essential to human survival.

Despite the prominence of force and violence in the chronicles of human society, however, we know very little about conflict as a social process, its frequency and distribution, or its causes and consequences.¹ Perhaps even more striking is the lack of generally accepted criteria for differentiating between legitimate and nonlegitimate conflict. The law, of course, is supposed to provide a basis for making such distinctions. But the law is often unclear or inconsistent, and there are even greater problems in the way the law is enforced by the police, the courts, and various other agencies of social control.

In addition, history has a way of justifying the use of force and violence when two parties are engaged in conflict. It makes an after-the-fact identification of the winner, accredits success to superior moral force as well as physical advantage, and in this way tends to legitimate the efforts of the victor. This is evidenced, for example, by the innumerable instances in which sacred traditions and legends describe in heroic terms the violent behavior of individuals, organizations, and nations. Accordingly, it is defeat in conflict, not the use of violence, that often determines the assignment of moral culpability.

It is therefore not surprising that divergent views are expressed on topics such as race riots, heart transplants, mercy killings, capital punishment, the Nation's military involvements, and "hard" versus "soft" lines on crime in the streets. Such divergence reflects both a lack of consensus on the meaning of concepts and a lack of reliable information concerning the probable costs and consequences of alternative methods for dealing with common social problems. And these are precisely the deficiencies that impede progress toward the control of violence in general.

Violence and Criminality

How to produce the needed consensus and information is one of our major social problems. Some people advocate stricter law enforcement and stronger penalties for law violators. They see the violent criminal as the main threat to life and security. Moreover, they view the murderer as the archetype of the violent offender, a deliberate aggressor whose behavior reflects a pervasive and usually permanent defect of character, a highly recidivistic criminal whose depredations call for severe punishment and long-term incarceration in prison. In this view, violence and criminality are treated as interchangeable concepts.

The facts, however, are that most crimes are nonviolent and most violence is noncriminal. Consider the estimated frequencies of criminal offenses in 1967, for example.² There were approximately 490,000 crimes of violence: 12,000 cases of murder and non-negligent homicide, 27,000 rapes, 200,000 robberies and more than 250,000 aggravated assaults. Yet these comprise only 13 percent of the 3.8 million serious crimes reported during

the year, or perhaps less than 5 percent if misdemeanors are included. Homicide, exclusive of cases involving negligence, makes up less than 3 percent of the crimes of violence, and less than one-half of 1 percent of the serious offenses. It is apparent that the prevention of murder, if that were possible, would not greatly diminish the crime problem.

It is also clear that the elimination of murder would have relatively little effect on the number of deaths by violence. To illustrate, table 1 presents the comparable probabilities of victimization by homicide and by several of the more common kinds of accidents. The data indicate that about one person in every 20,000 was a homicide victim in 1965. However, the probability of suicide was 2½ times as great, and deaths resulting from automobile accidents were five times as frequent.

Table 1.—Deaths from nonnatural causes, United States, 1965

CAUSE OF DEATH	ESTIMATED RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS	25
OTHER ACCIDENTS	12
SUICIDE	12
FALLS	10
WILLFUL HOMICIDE	5
DROWNING	4
FIRES	4

Source: "Accident Facts," National Safety Council, Chicago, 1966. Cited in *Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment*, Task Force, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 16.

The accidental deaths, combined, were 13 times as frequent as murder. Many accidents, of course, involve negligence and are perhaps more easily prevented than murder. For example, the National Safety Council estimated that more than half of the 49,000 deaths resulting from automobile accidents in 1965 involved either negligent manslaughter or driving while under the influence of alcohol. Negligent manslaughter, largely a traffic offense, outnumbers murder in most rural areas; in the entire country its frequency is about three-fourths that of murder, and it is increasing with greater rapidity. Yet the stigma and other penalties attached to manslaughter only rarely approach the severity of the treatment ordinarily accorded the convicted murderer.

Alcohol

Things are not always what they appear to be in the field of criminal behavior. Thus, drunkenness is usually regarded as a "nuisance" offense. In 1965 there were about 2 million arrests for drunkenness, perhaps one-third of the total number for all offenses. Treatment of alcoholics, aptly labeled the "revolving-door" policy, calls for maximum jail sentences ranging from 5 days to 6 months in most states. Records show that some offenders are arrested as

many as 18 times in a single year, and in one city six chronic offenders were arrested for drunkenness more than 1,400 times with an aggregate of 125 years served in correctional institutions.

Because of the obvious ineffectiveness of current methods of control, many authorities are urging that alcoholics should be handled under civil rather than criminal procedures. Instead of being kept in jail for brief periods, they would be treated in detoxification centers operated by health officials. The centers would be staffed to provide medical examinations, emergency care for the acutely intoxicated, and a variety of social services. The patients would be encouraged to obtain further treatment elsewhere after the period of "sobering up." Centers of this kind have already been established in several cities, but their experience is insufficient for a reliable evaluation.

While the above program may afford better control over the "nuisance" offender, it is not likely to have any immediate effect in the treatment of alcoholic criminals. Persons accused of serious offenses will be handled in the usual manner, even though intoxication may be a factor in their offenses. Of course, we are not certain that drinking is a causal factor in criminality, but varying degrees of intoxication are commonly observed among persons involved in serious traffic accidents, as already noted, and alcohol also seems to be an element in many other offenses, especially in crimes of violence. Numerous studies support this conclusion. For example, a study of 882 persons who were examined immediately after they had committed felonies shows that a large majority of the assault offenders were under the influence of alcohol.³ The ratio of intoxicated to nonintoxicated aggressors was 11 to 1 for cuttings or stabbings, 8 to 1 for carrying a concealed weapon, 10 to 1 for other assaults, 4 to 1 for shootings, and 2 to 1 for murder. Similarly, an investigation of homicide in Philadelphia, involving 588 victims and 621 offenders, found that either the victim or the offender, or both, had been drinking immediately prior to the slaying in nearly two-thirds of the cases.⁴ In a more recent study in Chicago, police investigating homicides noted that the offender or victim had been drinking in 54 percent of the cases.⁵ Such findings are subject to various interpretations, and they fail to prove that the offenses would have been avoided if alcohol were not present. But they do suggest that the regulation of liquor consumption may be as important to the control of violence as it is to the reduction of public nuisances.

Control over the use of alcohol may be difficult to achieve, however. The production and distribution of alcohol is big business, a major source of employment in many communities, a profitable auxiliary service for many restaurants and recreational organizations, and a discreet but important consumer of advertising space in the media of mass communication. Accordingly, there is widespread acceptance of alcohol as a significant part of our culture. While abstinence is generally prescribed for young people, drinking may be highly valued by adults as a stimulus for congeniality, a symbol of informality at social gatherings and on festive occasions. Moderation in the use of alcohol, not abstinence, is the norm for most adults, and its primary requirement is that a person's drinking should not interfere with his performance on the job or at home. However, the restraints of moderation may be abandoned by members of all social classes on ceremonial occasions. In addition, excessive drinking may receive persistent support in some neighborhoods, especially in deteriorated areas, where the tavern is

sometimes the dominant social institution, and where criminal violence usually has its highest incidence. All of this indicates how the confusion of precepts and practices, and of personal and social responsibilities, makes the use of alcohol a complex variable in our efforts toward the control of violence.

Weapons

Another matter of significance in criminal violence is the ready accessibility of dangerous weapons, including guns, knives, blunt objects, poison, explosives, and the like. Among these weapons, firearms are the most lethal and the most frequently employed, particularly in homicide cases. In 1967, for example, nearly two-thirds of the reported murders were committed by the use of firearms, 48 percent by pistol or revolver, and 15 percent by shotgun or rifle. Guns also were employed in 125,000 robberies and aggravated assaults, and many nonviolent crimes are committed by armed offenders. In addition, nearly all of the fatal attacks against police officers are by firearms. Between 1960 and 1967, for instance, 411 officers were killed by felons, 96 percent of them the victims of shootings.

Assault with a gun or a knife is often accepted as evidence of intent to kill. Intent is sometimes difficult to substantiate because we may have to depend upon indirect and inferential information, such as the number and location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim. According to these criteria, however, there are indications that many shootings and stabbings may occur in which the death of the victim is not a clearly intended objective.

To illustrate, consider a recent study of assaults and homicides that occurred in Chicago from 1965 through 1967.⁷ In nearly half of the shootings, the assailant either missed the intended victim or inflicted only arm or leg injuries. Knife wounds were more often located in vital areas, yet nearly a third were restricted to arms or legs. Also, only 30 percent of the victims of fatal gunshot attacks received more than one wound. It seems that an assailant who is fully intent upon murder would be more likely to exploit the multiple-shot capacity of his firearm or to strike a more vital part of the victim's body.

The study also demonstrated the superior killing-power of guns over knives. While knife attacks outnumbered shootings by nearly 3 to 1, they resulted in only half as many fatalities. Although a greater proportion of knife wounds involved vital organs, the ratio of deaths per 100 attacks was five times as great for guns as for knives. It is clear that the kind of weapon employed has a great influence on the likelihood of death.

Such findings lend some credence to the idea that legislation on gun controls might tend to reduce the number of homicides, even if it fails to lessen the frequency of assault. Moreover, opinion polls suggest that for nearly three decades the public has favored the imposition of governmental controls on the sale and possession of firearms. In 1966, according to a Gallup poll, nearly 7 out of 10 persons favored the registration of guns, and 8 out of 10 said they would forbid or restrict the use of guns by persons under 18 years of age. Yet legislation was successfully resisted by an organization of riflemen until 1968, when Congress, following the assassination of several eminent citizens, took some preliminary steps toward the control of firearms.

Noncriminal Violence

Among the various kinds of violence, mass murder probably receives the greatest publicity. Recent examples are the Texas tower incident, which resulted in 15 deaths, and the Chicago slaying of 8 student nurses. Such displays of hostility get top billing in the mass media; both the events and the careers of their perpetrators are recited in detail. But these are rare occurrences by comparison with the multiple deaths that may result from ignorance and carelessness, or from the unbridled desire for economic gain.

When a bridge or a building collapses because of faulty construction or improper maintenance, dozens of persons may be killed. Scores of lives are lost by fires and explosions in mines that are operated under unsafe conditions. Other targets of public concern are poorly engineered streets and highways, air and water pollution, overcrowded airways, inadequate building codes, insanitary food processing, and resistance against safety devices on automobiles. While it is difficult to make accurate estimates, such conditions no doubt afford a greater threat to life and security than do all the murderers and psychopaths who are free on the streets.

Some of the main sources of danger are found among health products. We manufacture 25 tons of aspirin each day. Careless storage often makes the product accessible to children under 5 years of age, resulting in thousands of poisonings and more than a 100 deaths each year in this age category. And a surprising number of the children involved in accidental poisonings are repeaters, as many as 28 percent in some studies. Diet pills are a greater threat to adults, with 60 deaths attributed to overdoses, according to testimony before a Senate subcommittee. In some cases, the greatest harm resulting from misuse of drugs is found in the next generation. Thalidomide, for example, is held responsible for numerous deformities observed in children born to women who were not aware of its destructive potentialities.

Governmental action seems necessary to inform the consumer regarding the advantages and disadvantages of many health products and practices. Most legislation in this field has followed an exposé of harmful conditions. The original food and drug act was passed in 1906 after Upton Sinclair's portrayal of conditions in the meat packing industry. In 1938, following 5 years of congressional inquiry, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was passed, when it was reported that more than 100 persons died from the toxic effects of a wonder drug ingredient. This law was strengthened in 1962, following the thalidomide episode.

Despite the Federal efforts, however, the field of public health still has its shortcomings. For example, the American College of Surgeons, reporting in 1966 on emergency medical services, estimated that 20,000 people die each year in this country as a result of inadequate or improper emergency care.⁸ Malpractice is an even more serious problem. Thus, a prosecuting attorney of one of our largest counties asserted in 1966 that medical quackery kills more people than do all crimes of violence combined.⁹ Such quackery is especially hard to control, since it can often be concealed, and it exploits the public's faith in the medical profession, a faith based on the demonstrated competence of most medical practitioners.

Nor is faith in the police and in other agents of authority always warranted. It cannot be denied that acts of violence occur in law enforcement

or that the courts and other agencies of justice are sometimes corrupted by power and influence. The isolated instances of brutality are magnified by evidence of official discrimination against the poor, the oppressed, and members of racial and other minorities. For generations following the Civil War, thousands of lynchings were condoned, if not encouraged, by the authorities. More recently, evidence on the use of capital punishment reveals a similar pattern of discrimination, and this may be one of the reasons why public opinion, according to the polls, has shifted against the execution of criminals. Actually, the elimination of the death penalty would have little effect on current practice, since the number of executions has decreased consistently from around 170 per year between 1930 and 1939, to 56 in 1960, 21 in 1963, 7 in 1965, and only a few cases since then. This discrepancy between the law and the practice may reflect more fundamental problems in the administration of justice.

One problem is that the conversion from the gun law of the frontier era to a system of justice based on reason and equality is so slow and difficult that many people are apparently losing faith in the machinery of government. This change in attitude is suggested by a recent Gallup survey which found 46 percent of the respondents holding to the view that "big government" is a greater threat to the country's future than either "big labor" or "big business," whereas a similar poll in 1959 showed that both labor and business were seen as greater threats than government. Such changes in attitude may have considerable influence on the role that government can play with respect to the alleviation of social problems. In democratic societies, at least, social programs call for the government and the people to engage in collaborative efforts. However, if the people are sufficiently alienated from their government, it is not likely that voluntary collaboration will occur, or that viable alternatives to violence will be developed.

Changing Values

It may seem to the casual observer that the concept of violence needs no clarification, and that murder, assault, or the threat of physical aggression are its distinguishing features. Yet history teaches us that conceptions of violence are always changing; new categories come under the rubric and old ones are discarded in response to changes in values and knowledge.

For example, abortion was once considered a violent crime that called for severe penalties. Until recently, the law in most states permitted abortion only if a pregnancy endangered the life of an expectant mother. The result was an abortion racket in which clandestine operators performed perhaps a million illegal abortions annually, many of them leading to serious injury or death. Safe treatment was available only to people who could afford a private doctor's fee or a trip to such abortion meccas as Mexico, Puerto Rico, or Japan, while the less affluent were treated by back-alley operators who rarely had access to the sterile conditions of a hospital.

Accordingly, States like California are revising their laws to permit abortions when the mental, not only the physical, health of the mother is in jeopardy and in cases of rape or incest involving girls under 15 years of age. California's experience during the first year under the new law indicates that the number of legal or therapeutic abortions may have increased by a 6-to-1

ratio over the former 600 cases, but that around 10,000 illegal abortions may still occur annually.

Thus, further statutory changes seem likely to be made in an effort to reduce the number of illegal abortions. These may be patterned after changes noted in several other countries. The British Abortion Act of 1967, for instance, takes into account the social and economic resources of the family and permits abortion in the interest of family welfare. In addition, safe and inexpensive abortion is encouraged in some societies as a means of population control. However, some medical authorities are advocating the elimination of legal restrictions against abortion on the grounds that this should be a private matter between doctor and patient, and that any legal restrictions are likely to discriminate against the economically deprived, who tend to have high birth rates anyway. Clearly, basic changes in social values are reflected by these trends in abortion practices, and they also underscore the need for research and information in the solution of social problems.

Attempted suicide affords another example. Its redefinition, from criminal to noncriminal status, is indicated by the recent establishment of more than 50 suicide prevention centers in 17 States and the District of Columbia. Ten years ago there were 4 centers in 2 states, and suicide was treated primarily as a moral problem calling for the expression of vengeance against the offender, rather than a social problem to be handled by rational and pragmatic means.

The prevention centers provide 24-hour telephone answering and referral services to people who call for help. Much of their staffing is on a volunteer basis, and some centers operate for less than \$1,000 per year, with very few spending as much as \$50,000 annually. It is difficult at this time to estimate their effectiveness; their origin is too recent, their programs probably are too elementary, and their records are too incomplete. However, they have a significant potential, in view of the basic facts: 25,000 suicides and more than 200,000 attempts per year with the average suicide an educated, family-supporting, tax-paying male in his mid-40's, whose death deprives the family and the community of a quarter century of social and economic support.

In several States suicide is the 6th leading cause of death, and it is the third leading cause in the peacetime armed forces and on college campuses. There can be no doubt that the economic cost of suicide is greater than that chargeable to murder. These may be some of the reasons why the imprisonment of persons who attempt suicide is no longer generally regarded as a feasible policy.¹⁰

However, the redefinition of behavior does not always result in its transfer from a criminal to a noncriminal category. Sometimes new information creates new categories of crime. Thus, it seems probable that offenses such as child beating are far more visible today than they were a few generations ago. It was not until the mid-1940's that medical practitioners noted how frequently infants with arm and leg injuries also suffered from hemorrhaging within the skull. Later it was observed that multiple bone injuries were the most common form of bone "disease" in infancy. Some 15 years ago it was learned that X-rays could assist in identifying injuries resulting from the deliberate twisting and pulling of children's arms or legs, injuries that had often been attributed to falls. There followed some evidence that children

whose chronic injuries had been blamed on accidents and clumsiness did not develop new symptoms during hospitalization.

Soon health officers were cooperating with the police in identifying what has come to be known as the "battered child syndrome," reflecting mistreatment by parents or others. Today nearly 5 percent of all murders involve cases of child-beating by parents.

This illustrates how the results of research can make their way into law enforcement and public knowledge, thereby greatly increasing the visibility of certain criminal offenses. Other areas in which visibility appears to be increasing are white-collar, professional, and organized crime. If such offenses were reliably reported, the crime problem would be magnified several times; and many of our theories, which portray criminality as primarily a lower class phenomenon, would have to be drastically revised.

The Murderer

The visibility of violence varies greatly from one type of offense to another. Among the various forms of violence, murder seems to have the highest visibility, perhaps because the act requires no complex organization or special skill, and the victim cannot easily be concealed. Contrary to popular impression, however, the murderer cannot accurately be described as a depraved, deliberate, and recidivistic criminal who threatens the safety of all persons with whom he comes in contact.

Murder, as we have seen, is not distinguished by the number of lives it takes, since suicide and several forms of negligence are far more significant in this regard. What does distinguish murder is the frequency with which it involves members of primary groups, including the family, relatives, neighbors, and social partners. In nearly one-third of the murders reported in 1967, for example, the offender and the victim were members of the same family. Romantic triangles and lovers' quarrels accounted for another 9 percent, and other arguments presumably involving persons who were at least casually acquainted, 42 percent. Several studies report an even higher proportion of family members and close associates.¹¹

Murder, then, often involves people who, according to conventional expectations, are supposed to be united by bonds of love, faith, loyalty, cooperation and, in general, the intimate relationships on which human society is founded. Murder symbolizes the complete renunciation of the most fundamental of all codes of conduct, and this may account for the social stigma and the severe punishment almost universally accorded the murderer.

In most other respects, however, the murderer seems to be the least criminally inclined among all of the law violators. He usually has no record of prior offenses or juvenile delinquency. His social and personal background is similar to that found in the noncriminal population. Attempts to find a distinctive trait of character or personality have generally resulted in failure. The murderer's subsequent career, after his release from imprisonment, tends to be free of further law violations. Indeed, he ordinarily has a very low rate of parole violation, often less than 10 percent. By comparison, violation rates for robbers, larcenists, auto thieves, check forgers, and most other nonviolent offenders are usually from three to six times as high. In sum, the

prospects for the rehabilitation of "situational" murderer, described above, are very favorable.¹²

The picture, however, is clouded by evidence that an increasing proportion of our murders are occurring during the enactment of other criminal offenses, and that the offenders involved in these cases may be much poorer prospects for rehabilitation. Deaths connected with other criminal offenses may comprise around 15 or 20 percent of the total number of murders. Robbery and rape are the most likely to result in murder, although property offenses, such as burglary, may also end in assault or murder if the offender is interrupted while engaged in a criminal act, especially if he is armed when the confrontation occurs. It has been estimated that such confrontations may happen in only about 1 out of every 40 burglaries. Because of the large number of such supposedly nonviolent offenses, however, they may contribute significantly to the incidence of assault and murder.

This means that the threat of violence, including murder, is likely to increase as the number of other offenses increases, and that the risk of injury to an innocent person varies according to the kinds of weapons, if any, carried by the offenders. While the "situational" murderer is a threat primarily to his intended victim, many other criminals who are not intent upon murder may be a threat to anyone who discovers their illegal activities. The awareness of such dangers may discourage many people from reporting an offense or from assisting the police in the apprehension of an offender. As a result, the whole matter of law enforcement tends to be left increasingly in the hands of the police.

The police, of course, are better prepared than most people to deal with the usual offender. They can better protect against personal injury in most criminal cases. But there seems to be little the police can do to prevent homicide within the family or among people who have close personal relationships. The risk of murder among intimate acquaintances, like the threat of suicide and several other forms of deviant behavior, may be more responsive to the counsel of friends and professional therapists than to the deterrent force of the law. Some homicides, therefore, are a social problem that may fall largely outside the scope of police intervention, while other kinds of homicide are, potentially at least, more amenable to control by effective law enforcement. In the development of programs for the prevention of violence, it is important for the community to learn what can and what cannot reasonably be expected of the police and of other social control agencies.

II. SOME DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE

The lack of comprehensive information is the most striking fact about violence. If information is inadequate for rational planning, there is really no alternative to the perpetuation of our traditional and often ineffective methods of control. Present controls are largely crisis oriented. They do little about violence until after it occurs; and even then, the prescribed punitive response, while frequently verbalized as a threat, is infrequently carried out in practice. This failure of implementation may reflect a general lack of confidence in the prescribed policies and in the evidence on which they are founded. Accordingly, a brief review of the main evidence on violence is presented below.

Needed: A National Information System

The major source of information on nationwide crime trends is *Uniform Crime Reports*, published annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. *UCR* are compiled from data contributed voluntarily by law enforcement agencies. They provide detailed statistics for regions, States, and local areas on offenses reported to the police, arrests made, and certain characteristics of the alleged offenders. Some court data and selected information on police personnel are also included.

The reliability and comparability of these data are somewhat impaired, however, by local and regional variations in the definition of crime categories, differences in enforcement and reporting policies, and the lack of adequate record systems in many police agencies. Among the many categories of crime, only seven are reported with sufficient reliability to be included in a national index that estimates the amount of serious crime around the country. Included in the index are murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny (minimum value of \$50), and auto theft. The first four offenses mentioned are generally regarded as the indicators of violent crime.

Because of the variations in statutory definitions, *UCR* finds it necessary to formulate its own definitions in order to collate the data from different reporting agencies. The definitions of crimes are as follows:

Murder and nonnegligent homicide.—Taking a human life without due process of law. Deaths caused by negligence, e.g., driving an automobile while intoxicated, are not included. Attempt to kill is listed as aggravated assault.

Forcible rape.—Carnal knowledge of a female by force and against her will. Assault with intent to rape is included, but statutory rape without force is not.

Robbery.—Taking anything of value from a person by force or by the threat of force. Attempts are included, even if nothing of value is obtained. The two main categories are armed robbery, involving a gun, knife, or other weapon, and strongarm robbery, in which hands, arms, feet, etc., are employed as weapons.

Aggravated assault.—Unlawful attack by one person against another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury, and usually accompanied by the use of a weapon. Attempts are included; an injury need not occur if a weapon is involved.

It is doubtful that such definitions can be employed with any great reliability. One problem is the necessity of assessing the offender's intent in order to determine the seriousness of the offense, as judged by legal standards. For example, simple assault, a lesser offense, is distinguished from aggravated assault primarily by the lack of evidence that severe injury was intended. In actual practice, however, the degree of intent, and thus the seriousness of the offense, is frequently decided in the process of bargaining that occurs between the prosecution and the defense. Most criminal convictions are obtained by pleas of guilty, and a plea of guilty to a lesser

charge is often preferred over a costly court trial in which evidence of intent needs to be presented. Accordingly, the specific charges made against an offender, and those agreed upon by the contending parties, are more influenced by the negotiations than by the facts of the offense itself. Furthermore, many acts of violence occur without any elaborate and deliberate preparation on the part of the offender, as already noted.

Another problem, perhaps more serious, is that the definitions of index offenses tend to underestimate the amount of violence by failing to take into account cases of simple assault, fighting, carrying a concealed weapon, and the like. According to a recent Philadelphia study, for example, simple assault results in injury to about three-fourths of its victims, while some injury occurs in around 20 percent of all the delinquencies reported. The same study reveals that nearly two-thirds of the injuries sustained by the victims of criminal activities occur in connection with offenses classified by *UCR* as minor and therefore omitted from the national index.¹³ Yet there is little that can be done about these omissions so long as the offenses are not reliably reported to the FBI by police agencies.

In some cases the reports of law enforcement agencies are grossly misleading. Changes in the number of offenses reported are sometimes due primarily to alterations in reporting practices. One agency failed to report more than 5,000 criminal complaints in an apparent attempt to protect the community's reputation. Another noted more than a 10-to-1 increase in robberies and burglaries when reporting procedures were improved following a crime commission investigation. Increases of the same magnitude were found in still another agency when data processing, which had been handled by precincts, was centralized. The cities involved in these reporting deficiencies were Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York. Smaller communities might have even greater difficulty in obtaining the trained personnel and other resources required for a reliable and comprehensive reporting system.¹⁴

Despite the reporting problems mentioned, numerous improvements have been made in *UCR* since their inception in 1930. The number of contributing agencies has increased consistently from 400 in 1930 to 8,500 today. Because of the paucity of reports in some areas, no estimates could be made of nationwide crime trends until 1949. Until 1958, crime rates, usually presented as the number of offenses per 100,000 population, were computed by using the decennial census figures as a base, rather than the annual population estimates of the Census Bureau. This means that for 9 years after a national census was taken, the crime rates could be expected to increase annually, then to drop sharply in the 10th year, only to be followed by another series of increases for the next 9 years. Again in 1958 changes were made in the definition of rape, assault, larceny, and certain other offenses in order to increase the uniformity and comparability of the data. It is only in the past decade, however, that definitions and reporting procedures have been stable enough to warrant even the crudest comparisons of crime rates, trends, or frequencies.

Many further improvements are needed. We can here mention only the most obvious ones that call for the adoption of scientific standards in the preparation of the reports:

Better coverage.—Although 8500 agencies report some data, it appears that only a minority give information on characteristics such as the age, sex, or race of the offender, or on court dispositions, for example. Reports are of little value in constructing crime rates for specific population sectors, or for tracing criminal careers through the judicial process. Information on other variables, such as income, education, class, residence, previous criminal record, would be of great value. Also, the entire field of white-collar, professional, and organized crime is neglected.

Index of offenders.—Only the number of offenses is reported, not the number of individuals involved. And if multiple offenses occur in a single incident, only the one judged most serious apparently is reported. We need to include all offenses and allocate them to the individuals responsible, if the criminal population is to be identified for comparison with the noncriminal element. Variations in the number of offenders who are repeaters may bias the present descriptions of the offender population.

Methodology.—The reports fail in many respects to meet prevailing research standards. Problems of sampling and estimation apparently receive little attention. Tables and data presentation, in general, are cumbersome and unclear. Methods of analysis are inconsistent; robbery, for example, is sometimes treated as an offense against the person and sometimes as a property crime.

Still, the most glaring deficiency is the tendency to mix statistics with value judgments in a manner that obscures many important findings. Marvin Wolfgang stated the problem clearly several years ago in a critical review of *UCR*:

[In the reports] we are told, for example, that serious crimes "substantially" increased by 7 percent; pocket-picking decreased by 18 percent, but with no adjective; while forcible rape had an "alarming" rise of 8 percent. "Murder" in rural counties was "sharply down" by 16 percent, but offenses against the person had a "sharp" increase of 6 percent. At one time, index offenses increased "alarmingly" by 12 percent, and aggravated assault had a "sharp" increase of 7 percent, but at another time when "serious crime" went up 11 percent, no adjective was used.¹⁵

Statistics, of course, are often employed both to inform people and to propagate certain points of view. But the confusion of these functions, as illustrated above, violates one of the tenets of research and raises questions about the substantive adequacy of the reports.


Another example of propagandism is found in the current edition of *UCR*, which describes a study initiated in 1963 to obtain information on the criminal careers of federal offenders. Although the sampling and data collection procedures are not clearly specified, it appears that nearly 195,000 criminal histories have been prepared through the use of fingerprints

submitted at the time of arrest. Once an offender is identified, additional information is accumulated, providing a chronological account of his arrests, convictions, and the like.

These data can be analyzed in two ways. First, the persons released from custody in a given year can be followed over a period of time to see how many are rearrested. Of about 18,000 persons released from custody in 1963, for example, 60 percent were rearrested by the end of 1967. Second, the persons rearrested in a certain year can be traced back to 1963 to see how many had previously been arrested for the same offense. Thus, 80 percent of the 87,600 offenders rearrested in 1966 and 1967 were previously charged with the same offense.

It appears that 55 percent of the persons rearrested in 1966 and 1967 had at one time or another received "leniency," which is defined in the report as including probation, suspended sentence, parole, and conditional release. This finding has been used by the FBI's director to substantiate his criticism of "leniency," especially of probation and parole. Yet the finding actually tells us nothing about the relative merits of different treatments, since the cases in which rearrest failed to occur are excluded from the data.

More relevant to the director's position are the subsequent careers of the persons released from custody in 1963. As already mentioned, about 40 percent were free of evidence of any subsequent arrest. But there is considerable variation in the "success" rate if the method of release is examined.¹⁶



Even these data afford no sound basis for evaluating the various types of treatment. The differences in success may be primarily due to methods of case selection. For example, if the best risks are granted probation, then their better performance cannot be accredited to this type of treatment. Still, there obviously is no evidence against probation or parole in these data. People who serve their entire sentences have a much higher rate of rearrest. Moreover, these findings are consistent with the results reported in numerous other studies. The only surprise is that among the cases dismissed or

acquitted, presumably the innocent ones, 91 percent were arrested again, by far the highest rate of failure in the entire study.

To explain these findings or to assist in evaluating correctional decisions and policies, a national information system is essential. Information is needed on the main points of decision, including offenses reported, cases investigated, persons charged, trials held, convictions obtained, and sentences, methods of treatment, and discharges, as well as indicators of post-discharge behavior. High standards must be maintained in data collection and analysis if the system is to facilitate needed research. Conformity to the model of science should be expected, and conclusions that are not in accord with the evidence should be discouraged. Freedom from political interference, within the system and from outside, is equally important. Only by these devices can we begin to accumulate the knowledge necessary for the control and prevention of violence.¹⁷

Self-Reports and Hidden Offenses

More reliable information would no doubt force a revision of many current beliefs and opinions concerning criminality. For example, a popular contention is that the population can be divided into two distinct and mutually exclusive categories: A large majority of law-abiding citizens and a small minority of recidivistic criminals. However, there is growing evidence that this distinction is more fiction than fact. Much of the evidence comes from self-report studies, in which people who have never been arrested admit numerous violations of the law that could have led to criminal convictions. It consequently is clear that a person's noncriminal status does not mean he has never violated the law.


One of the earliest self-report studies presented a list of 49 felonies and misdemeanors to nearly 1,700 adults, asking them which of these offenses, if any, they had ever committed. The proportion of respondents who admitted to one or more offenses for which they could have received jail or prison sentences was 99 percent. Of the males, 26 percent admitted auto theft; 17 percent, burglary; and 13 percent, grand larceny. One or more felonies were admitted by 29 percent of the females. While some of these offenses may have been reported to the police, apparently none of them resulted in arrest.¹⁸

The finding that people are willing to report their offenses in response to research inquiries has been corroborated by numerous studies, mostly of students and young people. These studies, in addition, indicate that law violations are admitted by members of all groups and social classes, even though official reactions are largely concentrated among the lower classes and the ethnic minorities. What accounts for this discrepancy between personal admissions and official reactions is not clear. Perhaps our law enforcement efforts are concentrated in lower class areas; or, it may be that although many people violate the law on some occasion, the residents of these areas may violate them more often. Better studies are needed to answer such issues.

Several recent studies have estimated the number of hidden offenses by asking people if they or other members of their families had been victimized by crime during the previous year. When victimization was claimed, the respondents were also asked if they had reported the offense to the police,

and they were encouraged to explain their inaction if failure to report was admitted. One of the studies surveyed a national sample of 10,000 households in this manner.²⁰ In table 2 the offenses claimed by the survey respondents are compared with those listed by *UCR* in 1965.

Table 2.—Violent crimes: Comparison of national survey and *UCR* data



Sources: Philip H. Ennis, *Criminal Victimization in the United States*, p. 8, and *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1965, p. 51.

Two facts stand out in the comparison. First, the relative similarity to those reported by *UCR*, and the order of their rankings is identical. Second, the survey found a significantly higher rate of violent crimes than was reported by *UCR*. The single exception is murder, for which the frequency (about 1 case per 20,000 residents) is so low that a rate based on 10,000 households is unreliable.

The frequency of forcible rape was more than 3½ times as great in the survey as in *UCR*; assault, more than two times as great; and robbery, about 1½ times as great. The differences for property offenses were just as apparent. An important conclusion is that most offenses, including crimes of violence, are never reported to the police. Although methods of criminal investigation may have shown much improvement in recent years, the agencies of law enforcement often fail to have the public cooperation that is necessary for effective operation of the judicial system. Moreover, the official crime rate could easily be doubled or tripled if people changed their attitude toward reporting to the police, even though the actual amount of crime remained constant.

There are many possible reasons why people fail to report cases of criminal victimization. A person may feel that crime is none of his business so long as someone else is the victim. He may not want to get involved in police investigations or court trials. He may fear retaliation by the offender. Even the victim may refrain from reporting if his reputation is likely to be

endangered, as in certain sex offenses. Or he may conceal the offense because he, too, is involved in law violations, as is often the case in confidence games, protection rackets, and shady business deals. Again, he may decline to report if the offender is willing to make restitution for damages. Likewise, many businessmen are reluctant to report shoplifting or burglary if they believe it is less expensive to absorb such losses than to pay a higher insurance premium.

However, the main reason for not reporting, according to the studies cited, is the lack of confidence in law enforcement. More than half of the victims who fail to report justify their inaction by asserting that the police would be unable to help, would prefer not to be bothered, or would be uncertain of catching the actual offender.²¹ Accordingly, much of our hidden crime is likely to remain hidden so long as this negative attitude prevails, whether the attitude is justified or not.

The lack of confidence in law enforcement may have even more serious consequences. If it discourages cooperation with the police, it may make efficient police action increasingly difficult; and if efficiency suffers, this may result in a progressive reduction of confidence, a continued decrease in cooperation, and still less efficiency, in an endless cycle. This kind of feedback relationship occurred during the depression, for example, when unemployment reduced savings, which lessened the demand for goods and services, which lowered wages and prices, which increased unemployment still further, until drastic steps had to be taken to restore people's faith in the economy. Such a spiraling of reciprocal influences is fairly common in complex societies, and it may be a major factor in the escalation of wars, rebellions, riots and other forms of social upheaval.

Of course, we are not certain about the level of public confidence in law enforcement. Perhaps the best evidence comes from a recent national survey which shows around 70 percent of the respondents expressing favorable opinions about the job law enforcement officials are doing.²² Yet these respondents have a very different attitude regarding the system of law enforcement. When asked if the system really discourages people from committing crimes, 56 percent said it does not, and an additional 6 percent held that the system actually encourages crime. Apparently it is the system of law enforcement, not the officials within the system, that is the target of public demands for reform.

Trends and Variations

It is fashionable to argue that crime and violence have reached unparalleled proportions in contemporary society. In recent political campaigns, nearly all of the participants have expressed concern about the alleged breakdown in law and order and the apparent increase in lawlessness. But the evidence on crime and violence, despite the limitations already mentioned, tends to discredit the "crime wave" hypothesis. It suggests, instead of a continuous increase, an alternation of growth and decline in patterns of such complexity that judgments about long-term trends need to be made with some caution.


For example, Memphis in 1916 reported a homicide rate of 90 per 100,000 population, nearly 15 times as high as the national rate today. Other studies, especially in Buffalo, N.Y., and Chicago, indicate a gradual increase in crimes of violence from 1830 to 1860, followed by a distinct upsurge after

the Civil War. From about 1880 until the second decade of the 20th century, a gradual decrease in crimes of violence was noted, but the years immediately preceding and following World War II were marked by high rates in Memphis and elsewhere. Several studies reveal a consistent downward trend in violence from the mid-1920's until the depression.^{2,3}

Since 1930, national statistics on crime and violence have been maintained by UCR, the Office of Vital Statistics, and several other agencies. These data, in general, show a consistent decrease in homicide until about 1960, uncertain variations in rape, and marked increases in robbery and assault. The homicide rate in 1933, for example, was 9.6, more than twice as high as the mid-1950's, and several points above the current 6.1. Table 3 presents the findings since 1948.

During the ten years from 1948 through 1957, the combined rates of violent crimes increased 4 percent, less than the rate of population growth.

Table 3.—Estimated trends in violent crime, United States, 1948-67



Sources: *Uniform Crime Reports*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and *Population Estimates*, Bureau of the Census. Note changes in definition of rape and assault in 1958 as described in text.

Property offenses increased 46 percent in the same period. In these years, then, the increase in crime was due entirely to the growth in nonviolent offenses. However, the differential between violent and nonviolent offenses has been getting smaller. Between 1958 and 1964, for example, the growth rate was 46 percent for violent crimes and 66 percent for property offenses. From 1964 through 1967, violent crimes increased by 37 percent and property crimes by 43 percent, and in the latter year violent crimes comprised about 13 percent of the index total. All of these increases are considerably greater than the rate of growth in the national population, especially since 1960. The population has grown about 10 percent since 1960, whereas the reported number of violent crimes has increased by 73 percent and property crimes by 91 percent.


National trends, however, tend to conceal some important regional and local variations. Homicide rates, for example, are more than twice as high in the Southern states as in other regions. In 1967 the highest rates were in Alabama (11.7), South Carolina (11.2), Georgia (11.1), Florida (10.5), Texas (9.8), Louisiana (9.3), Tennessee (8.9), Arkansas (8.8), and Mississippi (8.7). The only states outside the South with such high rates were Nevada (10.8) and Alaska (9.6). By contrast, the New England area had a homicide rate of 2.4.

Even more striking variations are found in metropolitan areas, which include a central city and its densely populated surrounding territory. Thus, Texarkana, in 1967, had a homicide rate of 34.8, more than 100 times that of Binghamton, N. Y. (0.3). Buffalo, Milwaukee, and Denver had rates of 4.0 or less, whereas the rates for Houston, New Orleans, and Fort Worth were above 14.0. The rates in some of our largest cities were: New York, 7.0; Chicago, 9.5; Los Angeles, 7.0; Philadelphia, 6.3; and Boston, 3.2.

Generally, the rates for aggravated assault follow fairly closely the pattern for homicide. Robberies are most heavily concentrated in the states of Maryland, New York, Illinois, Michigan, California, Nevada, Missouri, and Florida, and they tend to be relatively low in most rural areas. Rapes are reported least frequently in Hawaii and in the New England States, while their greatest frequencies are in New York, Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Delaware, Florida, Arkansas, Louisiana, Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, California, and Alaska.

Violence is primarily an urban phenomenon. The highest rates, with few exceptions, are in the largest communities. Thus, communities with more than a million inhabitants, had the following rates in 1967: murder, 12.0; forcible rape, 31.6; robbery, 424.5; aggravated assault, 304.5. These are from 2 to 4 times the national average. Table 4 clearly shows the inverse correlation between the amount of violence and the size of communities. This correlation suggests that as the population becomes increasingly urbanized we may expect further increases in violence, especially in assault and robbery. Of course, the relationship holds for nonviolent crime as well, and by far the greatest increases have been in the nonviolent categories.

Urbanization is associated with population overcrowding, neighborhood deterioration, cultural heterogeneity, mobility, anonymity and many other criminogenic characteristics. Population changes are significant, since the greatest relative increases are in younger age categories that have the highest crime rates. Another factor is the growing affluence of American society,



where the production of goods and services has grown far more rapidly than the crime rate. Such productivity no doubt creates greater opportunities for criminal behavior, and it perhaps enhances people's sensitivity to inequities in the distribution of the goods and services. Still another factor is the mechanization of crime, which multiplies its social impact, and the consequential expansion of personnel and technology in the field of social control, which magnifies crime's visibility. Powerful forces support all of these changes; and unless we learn new and more effective methods of social control, it seems likely that crime and violence will increase more rapidly in the immediate future than in the past.

Some Costs and Consequences

Several attempts have been made recently to estimate the social and economic costs of criminality. Economic costs are the easiest to figure. Considering the loss of earnings, the cost of hospitalization, and the like, it is estimated that 10,000 murders may cost \$750 million per year, and robbery about \$49 million. Estimates for rape and assault were not attempted, because of the lack of information, but it is clear that offenses against the person entail financial losses to the community approaching a billion dollars per year. Yet crimes against property probably cost four times as much, and gambling, prostitution, and other forms of organized crime may cost 10 times as much.²⁴

Also to be considered are the financial expenditures involved in operating the system of crime control. In 1965 there were more than 40,000 separate police agencies employing more than 420,000 workers and operating on a budget of about \$2.8 billion. Courts and attorneys expended another \$390 million. In addition, there were about 420,000 offenders confined in correctional institutions: 220,000 felons, 140,000 misdemeanants, and more than 60,000 juveniles. The cost of operating these institutions was over \$800 million: \$2,000 for each felon, \$1,000 for each misdemeanant, and \$3,600 for each juvenile offender. Another 850,000 offenders were on probation or parole at a cost of \$196 million. These data, incidentally, show that probation and parole cost about one-tenth as much as institutional confinement, and if carefully administered they do not appear to involve any increased risk for the community.²⁵

Another study attempted to project the career costs of different types of offenders estimating the expenditures of police, courts and correctional institutions required to process an average offender over his entire lifetime. Thus, the homicidal offender spends a longer time in prison than others, but he ordinarily is committed at a relatively older age, and he has a very low rate of recidivism. By contrast, the robber tends to enter prison at an earlier age, and to serve a shorter sentence, but he has a higher rate of parole violation. Using such bases for estimation, the study concluded that the career cost of the average murderer, counting only the expenditures of the system of justice, was \$5,800. Robbers cost \$3,700, and assaultists \$2,700, while narcotics offenders cost \$10,900 per career, and forgers \$16,900.²⁶ It seems possible that with better records and some experience in making such estimates, the concept of career costs may be very useful in evaluating correctional programs.

However, the most significant consequences of crime and violence are the social and psychological ones. Fear, anxiety, and the distrust of strangers threaten to disrupt the entire social system. The distrust of strangers is especially prominent in the deteriorated areas of large cities where crime rates ordinarily are the highest. Here many people remain in their homes behind locked doors at night. They are afraid to use the streets and public means of transportation or even to talk with people they don't know. Some businesses, libraries, and recreational centers report that more people are staying away from the city center; many schools and parks are noting a decrease in the use of their facilities. Hence, the fear of violence may be a major factor in the decay of the urban neighborhood.

Distrust breeds more distrust. This may explain the numerous reports about people reacting with indifference to situations in which others are being victimized by crime. Such refusal to help or to seek the assistance of others is a symptom of the distrust and insecurity that breed on general social disorder.

While they may avoid involvements with others, many people take special measures to protect themselves from the danger of crime. For example, a national survey found 82 percent of the respondents locking their doors at night, 25 percent in the daytime also; and 37 percent admitted to keeping firearms for protection, while 28 percent maintained watchdogs. Nearly a third of the people questioned in Boston and Chicago had installed new locks on their doors because of the fear of crime, and another 10 percent had put locks or bars on their windows. Nearly 20 percent of the respondents in Boston's most crime-ridden area said they carried weapons, usually knives, when away from home.²⁷

Crime, then, is one of our major domestic problems. Only race relations is named more frequently when people are asked to identify the main problem facing the country. More females than males are concerned about crime, more Negroes than whites, more people with low incomes than with high incomes, and a greater proportion of those who have been victimized by crime than of the nonvictims.

Still, about 60 percent of the respondents felt they lived in neighborhoods that compare favorably with others in regard to the hazards of crime, and only 14 percent said theirs was an especially hazardous area. This favorable attitude held up even in neighborhoods with medium or high crime rates. Nearly three-fourths of the residents of such areas in Boston, Chicago, and Washington reported their neighborhoods were "average" or "safe" as compared with others. Around 20 to 30 percent said they would like to move to another area, however.²⁸

Thus, the public's conception of crime and violence is full of uncertainties and inconsistencies. One problem is the lack of information. For example, a California survey shows that the general public is poorly informed about legal definitions, prescribed penalties, and the like, and that the offenders are relatively better informed on these matters. An incidental finding is that the criminals, although better informed, did not seem to be deterred by their knowledge of penal sanctions.²⁹

Similar inconsistencies are reported in a survey of people's attitudes toward the treatment Negroes are getting. Police officers, teachers, social workers, political workers, merchants, and employers were interviewed in 15 American cities regarding the role of Negroes as clients, customers, students and potential employees. The findings show that although the respondents are aware of problems in the fields of housing, poverty, crime, and the like, most of them feel that Negroes are treated on a par with whites. They concede that civil disorders may have their foundations in the conditions of slum life, but they attach greater significance to the efforts of militants and to social agitation in general.

As expected, differences were found in the attitudes of the six occupational groups. Police, merchants, and employers were more inclined to deny racial discrimination, and they blamed the riots on the efforts of agitators. In contrast, the educators, social workers, and political workers

were more likely to admit that Negroes receive unequal treatment, and they accepted environmental rather than instigational theories of riot causation. Differences between cities were not nearly so great as the differences between occupational groups. To illustrate, 71 percent of the educators maintained that Negroes are treated unfairly, but only 21 percent of the police officers held this position.³⁰

The above findings tend to corroborate previous evidence of considerable public support for more repressive measures against criminals. In 1965, according to a Gallup survey, a majority of the respondents indicated that the courts are not strict enough in dealing with offenders. Only 2 percent felt the courts are too strict. In 1967, a similar Harris survey found 49 percent holding the view that the courts are too lenient, with only one percent contending they are too severe. There is also support for stronger police measures. Three-fourths of the respondents in a Washington survey agreed that the police should have authority to get tough if necessary, and a majority favored the use of canine corps or similar practices. Numerous other studies report variations on the same general theme.

At the same time, more than two-thirds of the respondents in two Gallup and Harris surveys endorsed crime prevention over catching criminals as the main police objective. About the same proportion supported the legal requirement that police may not question a suspect in the absence of counsel. In a 1967 Harris survey, 72 percent of a national sample maintained that rehabilitation should be the main emphasis of correctional programs, while only 48 percent felt that this emphasis is characteristic of current practices.

Obviously, a more consistent community policy on crime control is not likely to occur until there is more consistency in public opinion and information. Much of the difficulty, of course, grows out of vague and contradictory notions about the criminal and about the factors that cause his lawlessness. Many studies have therefore inquired into people's conceptions of the causes of crime. The most recent, perhaps, is a 1967 Harris survey. By far the majority of the respondents held moral issues and too little exercise of authority responsible for crime; parents too lax, young people have no morals, lack of religion, broken homes, people too spoiled, too much welfare, courts too lenient, and police too much restricted, were some of the crime causes most frequently mentioned. Yet relatively few people have any clear notion about practical steps that can be taken to alleviate the problem. Nor have many done anything specifically in the interest of crime control. For example, only 12 percent of the respondents in the previously mentioned Washington survey said they had actually talked with others about things they could do, and only 17 percent felt they could do anything about crime even if they tried.

Public attitudes toward crime and violence reflect, more than anything else, a sense of powerlessness, a fear of the recalcitrant stranger, and a tendency to consider others responsible for creating the problem and for strengthening the system of control. In addition, crime is often equated with instances of violence, and violence is equated with a few terrifying events. This situation lends itself to exploitation by opportunistic crime fighters, to sensational news media, and other individuals or organizations with vested interests in maintaining the distorted views that make effective social action all the more difficult.

III. THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE: SETTINGS AND ACTORS

What we know about crimes of violence comes largely from observations of people who have been arrested or convicted or committed to correctional institutions. Moreover, the traits that are observed may vary somewhat, depending upon the stage in the system of justice at which the data are collected. This system—police, courts, and correctional facilities—engulfs large masses of offenders at the point of arrest, and by a process of successive eliminations, reduces the number to a few who are eventually confined in correctional institutions. The further along this process a sample of offenders is selected, the more likely is the sample to differ significantly from the original population arrested.

From arrest records, court files, and institutional case histories, a portrait of the offender emerges which progressively highlights the effects of social deterioration in a complex, highly urbanized society. The offender who is discharged from prison, as compared with all those arrested, is more likely to be a member of the lower social classes, poorly educated, chronically unemployed, divorced or separated, from inadequate homes in underprivileged neighborhoods, and possessing a record of previous criminality. Somehow the more privileged and better qualified tend to be eliminated from the correctional cycle before they reach the prison. Thus, if we wish to identify the factors that are associated with criminality, instead of those primarily connected with reactions of the judicial system, we are better off to consider the data obtained at the time of arrest.

The Violent Offender

Considering all persons arrested, it is clear that the majority of offenders are white, male, and over 24 years of age. Adults make up the highest proportion of those arrested for fraud, embezzlement, gambling, drunkenness, and vagrancy. But for several other offenses, especially those involving aggression and violence, the peak age of criminality is under 24. Juveniles most frequently are arrested for burglary, larceny, and auto theft. For these offenses, the maximum incidence of arrest occurs in the 15-year age group, and the arrests for youngsters 15-17 years old are increasing faster than in any other age category.

In 1965, the arrest rate for persons 15 to 17 years of age was 2,467 per 100,000, while the rate for people 50 years old or over was 55. Among the violent offenders, those arrested for murder, rape, robbery or assault, the highest number of arrests occurred in the 18-to-20-year-old group, followed closely by those in the 21-to-24-year age bracket. These young adults had a rate of arrests for violence of nearly 300, compared with a rate of 24 for those 50 years old or over.

Data for 1967, from *UCR*, give a more up-to-date and detailed picture of the violent offender. Consider murder first. About 9 percent of the persons arrested for this offense were under 18 years of age, and 37 percent under 25. The maximum concentration of arrests was in the 20-to-24-year categories, which included about 20 percent of all arrests. Males comprised 84 percent of those arrested. Race, as in previous years, was a significant factor, with

Negroes accounting for 59 percent of the arrests, around 5 times the proportion of Negroes in the total population. Negroes also were victims in 54 percent of the cases.

Aggravated assault shows fairly similar findings. Persons under 21 years of age were involved in 30 percent of the arrests. Males outnumbered females about 7 to 1, and almost half of the individuals arrested were Negroes. Arrests for forcible rape were much more concentrated among the young people; nearly two-thirds were under 25, and the greatest number were 17 to 19 years old. Negroes comprised 47 percent of the total. Robbery, even more than rape, was concentrated among the young offenders; almost one-third were under 18, more than half under 21, and nearly three-fourths under 25 years of age. More than 60 percent were Negroes. Only 5 percent were females, but this is a considerable increase over their rate in previous years.

The above findings on age, sex, and race underscore the results of many earlier studies, both in the United States and elsewhere.³¹ High rates of violence, especially rape and robbery offenses, are almost universally reported for youthful offenders. Similarly, male offenders outnumber females in all studies, although some important variations in the ratio of male and female offenders are noted. In general, the proportion of female offenders tends to be relatively higher in societies that have lesser amounts of violence, and lower in societies having greater frequencies of violent crimes. This suggests that the rate of female crimes is more stable from one society to another than is the rate of male offenses. However, the most recent data for the United States indicates some increase in the proportion of females engaged in offenses against the person, and the rate of increase among property offenses is considerably greater for females than for males.

Racial differences in violent crime are even more pronounced. Among Philadelphia murderers, for example, the rate for Negro males was 41.7 per 100,000 population, more than 10 times the rate for white males (3.4). The rate for Negro females was 9.3.³² Similarly, in Cleveland, 76 percent of the homicidal offenders were Negro, although only 11 percent of the population was comprised of Negroes.³³ Again, in Houston, where Negroes accounted for less than a quarter of the population, 63 percent of the murders were committed by Negroes.³⁴

These findings, of course, do not provide evidence of any biological propensity toward violence among Negroes. In fact, the discrepancies in crime rates are about what one expects in view of the black man's cultural heritage and his disadvantages in most social, economic, and political endeavors. In other settings, his involvement in violence is remarkably low. Thus, a recent study of homicide among African natives shows an estimated rate of 1.2, among the lowest reported anywhere.³⁵

While the rates for Negroes are uniformly high in the United States, it should be noted that the rates among whites vary considerably. Homicide rates for whites in the South are 3 or 4 times as high as for whites in other parts of the country. Accordingly, the high rates for Negroes who migrate to Northern states may be largely a result of the survival of attitudes and practices transplanted from the dominant white culture of the South. Indeed, there is evidence that the homicide rates for Negroes in various parts of the country can be predicted with impressive accuracy by simply projecting the homicide rates of whites in the states where the Negroes were born.³⁶

It is a social class, not race, that explains the variations in violence within and between many American communities. And the process of urbanization plays a crucial role in the development of subcultures oriented toward violence. Urbanization often segregates people who share certain distinctive traits and centralizes them in ghettos where they develop a style of life that is conducive to violence. Poverty, family instability, and community disorganization are almost inevitable where disadvantaged and alienated people are congregated. Violence in word and deed becomes commonplace; weapons and other tools of violence become defined as symbols of status and instruments of self-preservation. One bit of evidence concerning such a subculture comes from a study of 50 Negro offenders who were convicted of weapons offenses in St. Louis. These violators explained why they carried guns; some admitted criminal intentions, but nearly three-fourths of them argued that guns were necessary for self-defense since almost everyone else was armed.³⁷

Numerous other studies show that the overwhelming majority of assaultive offenses are committed by persons from the lower social strata. Of course, most crimes, excepting the professional and white-collar varieties, may be attributed to the same classes. Still, the differences in rates between classes is much greater for aggressive offenses than for most property crimes.

Furthermore, the concentration of violence in the lower classes is observed in many societies other than the United States. Homicides in Ceylon, for example, are concentrated among the lowest ranks of achieved status, particularly among groups that see themselves as being unjustly restrained from achieving their goals, and among individuals who are hostile, alienated, and demoralized.³⁸ Comparative studies also suggest that class differences are least prominent in societies, like England, that have small amounts of homicide, while these differences are more prominent in societies that have moderate amounts of homicides, such as the United States, or great amounts, such as Mexico and Columbia.

In general, crime and violence seem to be increasing with some rapidity in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The highest rates of homicide are reported for Colombia (36.5), Mexico (31.9), and South Africa (21.8), while the lowest are found in Ireland (0.4), England (0.7), Western Germany (1.2), and Canada (1.4). Developing societies show the greatest increases in juvenile delinquency and in property offenses, but some increase also is noted in violent offenses. The processes of social and economic development tend to promote cultural heterogeneity, value conflicts, and the alienation of certain minority groups. Rapid expansion of the population places a severe strain on the economy. Industrialization tends to make a virtue of aggressive behavior. Economic and political control tend to be concentrated in small groups that have foreign interests and support. As a result, the economically advantaged and the political elite, often Western in their orientation, are frequently attacked by the lower classes, and in many places the display of violence has a distinct political connotation.

The Risk of Victimization

The main targets of criminal behavior are males, adults from 20 to 40 years of age, Negroes, and people whose earned income is less than \$3,000

per year. In general, crimes of violence have the same targets, but there are some important exceptions.

According to *UCR*, murder victims in 1967 were males 3 times as often as females, 20 to 45 years old in two-thirds of the cases, and 54 percent Negro, 45 percent white, and only 1 percent Indian or Oriental. In the Philadelphia study mentioned previously, 75 percent of the offenders and 73 percent of the murder victims were Negroes, although Negroes made up only 18 percent of the city's population. Women were offenders in 18 percent of the homicides, and victims in 24 percent. Killers are generally somewhat younger than their victims. Most murders are concentrated in the deteriorated areas, according to studies of urban crime, and both offender and victim are most likely to be members of the lower social classes.

Rape victims tend to be concentrated among females under 30 years of age. Negroes are about four times as likely to be victimized as whites, and half of the victims are from families with less than a \$3,000 income.

Robbery victims are males in about two-thirds of the cases, with the highest victimization among young adults, with Negroes involved as victims four times as frequently as whites. The highest incidence again is among members of the low-income group, and the higher the income the lower the probability of victimization by robbery.

Victimization by aggravated assault is twice as great for males as for females, is twice as great for Negroes as for whites. The victims are distributed fairly evenly by income categories and by social class.

In sum, the general findings show that the danger of victimization is greatest in the lower income groups for all index offenses except larceny, auto theft, and aggravated assault. It is greater for Negroes than for whites, except for larceny. It is greater for males than for females, except, of course, for rape. And it is greater in the young adult population than in older age categories, except for larceny against women, and larceny, burglary, and auto theft against men. The pattern clearly shows a heavy concentration of victims in the lower social classes and in the disadvantaged urban areas.³⁹

The Setting

Violence is not randomly distributed in different social settings. Murder, for example, tends to occur most frequently on weekends, in December, and in the summer. The time of day is most often between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m. This pattern suggests that violence is related to the cycles of weekday labor and of weekend leisure activities, the proximity of people, drinking after work, and so on.

Even more important is the frequency with which violence occurs among relatives and close acquaintances, in the home, and on streets near taverns and restaurants. These data deny the common notion that it is the marauding stranger who poses the greatest threat to a person's life. For example, the homicides investigated in Philadelphia were committed by strangers in only 12 percent of the cases. In one-fourth of these offenses, the murderer was a member of the victim's family, and in another third of the cases the offender was a relative or close friend of the victim.

A study of victimization in Washington, D.C., shows the same close association between victim and offender in cases of assault. Eleven percent of

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the victims were attacked by their spouse, 10 percent by other relatives, and 60 percent by acquaintances. Again, nearly two-thirds of the rape victims were attacked by persons with whom they were at least casually acquainted, including 39 percent who were victimized by residents of the neighborhood, and 14 percent by relatives or friends.

Nor do the data support the view that violence is an interracial phenomenon. Thus, a study of assault in Chicago indicates that Negroes victimize other Negroes 20 times as frequently as they victimize whites, while whites attack whites 6 times as frequently as they attack Negroes. In all, the probability of being assaulted was 8 times as great for Negro males as for white males, and 6 times as great for Negro females as for white females. In the Washington survey, only 7 percent of the homicides were interracial, while the percentages were 9 for aggravated assault and 12 for cases of rape. Robbery, in the latter study, is the only violent crime for which whites were victimized more often than Negroes, and it is likewise the only one of an interracial nature. Robberies committed by Negroes were against white victims in 56 percent of the cases.

There is also some evidence that violence is sometimes precipitated by actions of the victim. For example, the man who provokes another by threatening and cursing him may subsequently be murdered by the recipient of the provocation. In another instance a man threw a can of kerosene at his mistress during a quarrel, and died when she threw the liquid back at him, along with a lighted match. The Philadelphia homicide study estimated that 26 percent of the killings were precipitated by such kinds of actions on the part of the victim. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that conventional perceptions of violence are often distorted, that we have much to learn about its setting and the involvement of its participants before an effective program of prevention and control can be established.

IV. TOWARD A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE

The purpose of theories is to explain the facts of observation and experience, to help us understand why violence has such a high incidence among the poor, the young, the disadvantaged, the members of certain ethnic minorities, and the residents of metropolitan centers. But there is no comprehensive theory of violence today. Instead, there are numerous segmented theories ranging over a wide variety of concepts and varying greatly in their coherence and utility. We can here only briefly describe the main types of theories, which are the biogenic, the psychogenic, and the sociogenic.

Biogenic theories attempt to locate the causes of violence in the biological organism and in its behavioral propensities. Psychogenic theories, by contrast, focus on the cognitive and affective processes that are involved in the development of a social individual, and they usually describe these processes in terms of learning, reinforcement, modeling, interpersonal relationships, and the like. Sociogenic theories, again, stress primarily the structural features of the groups and organizations to which a person belongs, including their population characteristics, their division of labor, their legal and normative foundations, their distribution of rewards and penalties, their opportunity systems, and so on.

Much of the research on violence has had a narrow theoretical orientation. However, the inability of conventional social control methods to deal effectively with crime and deviance has encouraged many collaborative research efforts in recent years. As a consequence, many of the earlier theories are being revised, and the most promising revisions are those based on interdisciplinary efforts to integrate the three types of theories. Thus, the prospects for more comprehensive theories are surely improving.

Biogenic Theories

The idea that violence results from biological inferiority has widespread appeal. Certain ethnic and national groups are commonly portrayed by folklore and tradition as having strong predispositions toward violence. Accordingly, the attempt to identify anthropometric traits that are unique to violent offenders has been a major research objective for many generations.

The effort to date has not been very rewarding. Although some physiological differences between groups of criminal and noncriminal subjects have been reported by Lombroso, Eyrich, Hooton, Sheldon, and others, the differences were not consistently maintained from one group to another, and the most careful investigations, such as those of the Gluecks, revealed no significant differences between aggressive and nonaggressive individuals. Today the theory of inherited aggression is therefore supported largely on philosophical grounds, the argument being that aggression and hostility serve essential functions, such as the proper spacing of individuals over the available territory, the selection of those best fitted to survive, the establishment of a social hierarchy which maintains orderly relations among individuals and permits the younger generation to profit from the experience of the older, etc.⁴⁰ It is doubtful if theories of such generality and permissiveness can be tested by any conceivable research procedure.

This of course, does not mean that all biogenic theories should be rejected. There is little doubt that aggression, like other forms of social behavior, is influenced by experience and learning, or that the rate and efficiency of learning can be affected by physiological factors. The influence of diet, fatigue, hunger, pain, sex drive, and many similar factors has been documented in numerous studies, and there is no good reason for assuming that their impact is restricted to situations that elicit nonaggressive responses. The mechanisms of learning and adaptation are probably much the same for aggression and for other kinds of acquired behavior.

Moreover, aggression and other behaviors are certainly connected with the functioning of the brain and the nervous system. There is evidence that many behaviors, including aggression, can be either elicited or inhibited by the electrical stimulation of the appropriate brain areas. And the same effects may sometimes be produced by brain damage or lesions and by certain changes in blood chemistry.⁴¹ It therefore seems probable that some kinds of violent behavior may be capable of control by brain stimulation or by the administration of drugs and hormones. Already some degree of control seems often to be attained by chemotherapy in hospitals, correctional institutions, and psychiatric clinics; and further contributions to our knowledge of the underlying mechanisms will no doubt result from research in progress.

Other contributions to our control capabilities come from research on the

genetic processes. Some babies, perhaps 1 in 50, are born with defective gene structures which greatly increase the probability of certain diseases, such as diabetes or Mongolism. The genes, of course, are invisible, but they are clustered on chromosomes that can be observed under a microscope.

Chromosomes are transmitted from parents to offspring by a process that can best be described in statistical terms. The normal individual has 23 pairs of chromosomes, 46 in all. One chromosome of every pair is ordinarily derived from the father and the other from the mother. This means that half of the chromosomes in the father's sperm and half of those in the mother's egg cell are usually discarded in the process of reproduction. Which ones are discarded is apparently determined by chance.

Except on rare occasions the reproductive process works with sufficient efficiency to produce a normal offspring. But accidents sometimes happen which give an individual the wrong number of chromosomes, or the chromosomes may be dislocated and the usual pairings may be disrupted. One kind of dislocation has been found in Mongoloid children, who are characterized by distinctive physiological traits, a greatly retarded intellectual development, and a life expectancy of about ten years.

It is possible to identify this kind of aberration before a child is born. During its growth in the mother's womb, the human fetus sheds some of the cells of its skin, and other cells are discharged from its mouth and bladder. These cells can be extracted from the fluid in which the fetus is floating and their chromosomes can be analyzed for abnormalities that are predictive of Mongolism or other gross deformities. If severe malformation is discovered, the pregnancy may be terminated by abortion under the statutes of some societies. Denmark is one example.

Recently, a distinctive irregularity has been noted in the chromosome structures of several highly aggressive individuals. The number of such cases is small, and the evidence concerning a possible connection between violent behavior and genetic development is far from conclusive. Our criminal courts are nevertheless beginning to take note of an offender's biological heritage in deciding if he should be held responsible for crimes of violence. Whatever the merits of this legal procedure, it seems unlikely that genetic factors can account for much violence, since the vast majority of our offenders appear to be biologically indistinguishable from the rest of the population. Furthermore, acts of criminal violence are the exception, not the rule, among the individuals identified as having abnormal genetic structures, and their behavioral variations cannot be explained in terms of a constant factor such as heredity. Thus, we need to examine the variables in a person's background and experience in order to understand his violent episodes.

Psychogenic Theories

Distinctions between biogenic and psychogenic theories are rather arbitrary and often difficult to make. As an illustration, consider the theory that aggression is a consequence of frustration. The theory assumes that frustration and aggression are empirically connected because of the physical and the mental makeup of man. In this respect it is similar to the notion that violence is a consequence of defective heredity. But the source of frustration,

according to the theory, is in the organism's environment, and in this respect the theory differs significantly from the concept of hereditary aggression.

Most psychogenic theories try to identify the kinds of environmental situations that elicit violent responses. Early theories of behaviorism, for example, postulate a relationship between stimulus and response (S-R), that is based on their contiguity in time and place. If a certain response, such as violence, occurs when a given stimulus situation is present, that stimulus situation tends in the future to elicit the same response. There need be no rational or otherwise obvious connection between the stimulus and the response; the only requirement is their contiguity in time and place.

Even such an elementary theory is often useful in explaining violent behavior, especially if we recognize that verbal behavior on the part of an actor may be a significant aspect of the stimulus situation to which he responds. Consider, for example, the case of an offender who was imprisoned after he hired young children to mutilate his sex organ with knives, fingernail files, and similar objects. This offender was classified by the correctional authorities as a sex pervert with a pathological personality.

Such an official classification is not very informative, however. It does not tell us how the offender acquired his masochistic habits. The S-R theory of learning, by contrast, enables us to reconstruct the offender's career in some detail.

A young man in his early 20's, the offender had worked as a farmhand and rodeo performer. While riding a bucking horse, he experienced an orgasm. This worried him, aroused strong feelings of guilt, and led to self-doubts about his normality. The next time he prepared to ride a bucking horse, he reproduced the verbal accusations as he mounted the animal. The animal, of course, reproduced the physical stimuli, and another orgasm occurred. In a short time, apparently, the accusations, anticipations, and orgasms were established as a habit. Later the offender employed prostitutes to reproduce many of the physical stimuli, and still later he employed children because, as he said, they were less expensive and more understanding.

In recent years the S-R theory of learning has been elaborated by the concept of reinforcement. Reinforcement means that the connection between a stimulus and a response is strengthened if the response results in a more desirable state of affairs. Reinforcement theory distinguishes between two major categories of behavior, namely, respondent behavior and operant behavior. Respondent behavior is primarily reflexive in character and is mediated by the autonomic nervous system, while operant behavior is more deliberative or voluntary and is mediated by the central nervous system. Most efforts at social control are concerned with operant behavior.

Reinforcement is defined as an event that increases the probability of a given response. There are two types of reinforcing events. One is positive reinforcement, which occurs when a pleasant or desired event is made contingent upon the performance of a certain response. A child, for example, may learn that if he behaves properly he will be rewarded with money or something else that he values. The other type is negative reinforcement, which increases the probability of a response when it is removed from the stimulus situation. Thus, a sick person may learn to accept his doctor's advice in order to minimize pain, a negative reinforcer.⁴²

Evidence on the relative merits of reward and punishment is unclear. Reward appears to have an advantage in that conforming behavior leads to immediate gratification. A child does what is expected of him and is therefore rewarded. Punishment, however, is usually represented as a threat of dire consequences in the event that nonconformity occurs. Such threats, no doubt, are often accepted on faith. To test the validity of the threat, however, the actor must violate the rule; so long as he conforms, he can get no direct evidence on the integrity of the threat.

For these reasons, it appears that the deterrent effect of the law applies primarily to people who have faith in our system of justice. Such faith is not often exhibited by our law violators. Governmental officials, apparently, are also beginning to have doubts about the efficacy of severe penalties. This is reflected, for example, in a recent study of the relationship between crime rates and the length of time served in the prisons of our 50 states. The conclusion of this study is that criminal penalties are not closely associated with the incidence of crime, and that other factors no doubt have a more important bearing on the crime problem.⁴³

A better understanding of the factors involved in shaping human behavior may come from recent theories that place more emphasis on the rational aspects of learning. These theories picture the individual as a rational decisionmaker who considers the alternative possibilities in a given situation and makes a choice on the basis of the anticipated consequences of the various alternatives in his repertoire of responses. The main idea can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} (R_1 \rightarrow C_1) \\ S \rightarrow (R_2 \rightarrow C_2) \rightarrow SR \\ (R_n \rightarrow C_k) \end{array}$$

Here S refers to the situation confronting an actor; R_1 , R_2 , and R_n refer to response alternatives as the actor perceives them; C_1 , C_2 , and C_k refer to the anticipated consequences of the alternative responses; and SR refers to the response finally selected by the actor.

These theories attempt to consider the social context of behavior, the actor's goals and objectives, the feasibility and the potency of the response alternatives, the anticipated reactions of individuals and groups with which the actor is involved, and so on.⁴⁴ Among the major concepts employed in these theories are modeling and social or observational learning. Thus, an actor can learn fairly complex responses by simply observing the behavior of another person, that is, a model. Research shows that models, whether they are parents, other adults, peers, or actors observed on film, can exert a powerful influence in the acquisition of diverse behaviors, including sex roles, occupational aspirations, and mechanical or symbolic skills.⁴⁵

This suggests that deviant models may be one of the sources of motivation for crime and violence. The evidence, of course, is still too sketchy for us to be certain. But in one study, for example, children were exposed to an adult model who behaved in an aggressive manner toward a large plastic doll, striking it with a clenched fist, kicking it, and hitting it with a club. Later these children exhibited almost identical acts of violence when they had an opportunity to play with the doll. Other children, who observed a model

behave in a nonaggressive manner, rarely displayed any violence in playing with the doll.

Furthermore, the children who observed a violent model being reprimanded for her aggressiveness were less likely to engage in hostile actions than were the members of groups in which the model received no corrective reaction. It appears that the child's observation of other persons being corrected has some effect, even if the correction is restricted to the expression of self-recriminations by the model. That is, the models who reward or punish themselves seem to induce similar self-rewarding or self-punishing responses among children who engage in the same kinds of activities.⁴⁶ It follows that a child's judgment of himself and of others may be greatly influenced by his association with social models who serve as the carriers of certain judgmental standards.

The police and other agents of authority may serve as moral entrepreneurs who provide the official standards that people employ in evaluating conduct. Since nearly everyone may violate a norm on occasion, the official reaction to such infractions may be important in determining an individual's self-evaluation. If the violation is regarded by the officials as alien to the true character of the offender, he is not stigmatized very severely and is likely to avoid further transgressions. But if the transgressor is officially labeled a delinquent or a criminal, this label may become a significant stimulus to further offenses. The individual may come to accept society's assessment of him as a valid description. Once he adopts such an assessment as part of his self-concept, a career of nonconformity is almost a certainty.⁴⁷

The feedback relationship between crime and society's reaction is the central theme of the theory of differential association, one of the earliest and best documented in the annals of criminology. According to the theory, people learn the skills and attitudes that are conducive to crime as result of their contacts with patterns of criminal behavior. More specifically, the theory asserts that the probability of criminal behavior varies directly with the frequency, priority, duration, and intensity of a person's contacts with patterns of crime, and inversely with his noncriminal contacts. Contacts with crime are most likely to occur where people's perceptions of their situation are supportive of norm violations. Accordingly, many kinds of nonconformity, including crime, suicide, alcoholism, divorce, and mental illness, for example, are likely to be concentrated in certain urban areas, namely, those characterized by cultural heterogeneity, residential mobility, industrialization, overcrowding, unemployment, ethnic minorities and similar traits that tend to alienate the residents from the success-oriented norms of middle class society. Numerous studies based on both official records and self-reported offenses tend to corroborate the main claims of the theory.⁴⁸

Sociogenic Theories

We test the above theories by making observations of individuals and their relationships with one another, especially their learning experiences and their contacts with various kinds of models. Sociogenic theories, by contrast, deal with social systems, not individuals. Yet such theories may be pertinent to the study of crime and violence, since these modes of behavior may often

result from conflicts and inconsistencies in the social systems to which individuals belong.

Before examining the major theories, we need to consider the concept of system and some of the ways in which systems can be disrupted. In its broadest sense, the term "system" refers to any set of interrelated elements. The heart, for example, is a system of living cells. Each cell is a system of molecules, and each molecule a system of atoms. The heart, in turn, is a subsystem within the circulatory system, which is a subsystem within a biological organism, which is a subsystem within the ecological system, and so on. Accordingly, the only requirement in defining a system is the specification of relationships among the elements.

A system's elements may have complex relationships. Knowledge of the relationships is crucial, however, in identifying the strengths and the weaknesses of the system, or in predicting its future development. Consider the feedback relationships that connect price with demand and with supply in a free economy, for example. In this case, price varies inversely with supply and directly with demand. Thus, the influences counteract one another, resulting in a tendency toward equilibrium in the system. But if price were to vary directly with supply as well as demand, the influences would be cumulative, and the system would tend to expand without limit and perhaps to explode or to disintegrate.

Systems are sometimes deliberately designed to avoid an explosion by providing for the control of some of their elements. An example is the heating system found in many households. A thermostat senses the temperature of a room, selects the on or off position of a switch, and activates or shuts off the furnace, in this way maintaining the temperature within a fixed range of variation. Somewhat similar controls were built into the federal constitution, where the "checks and balances" and the "separation of powers" were intended to regulate the exercise of authority.

Social systems may be generally described in terms of their elements and their main subsystems. The basic elements are:

Goals and functions that specify the system's objectives or purposes.

Achievement strategies that spell out the methods by which the objectives are to be attained and state the assumptions made in selecting these methods.

Position networks that indicate the division of labor among individuals who belong to the system, the channels of communication and authority, the pattern of access to information and other resources, and the like.

Roles that detail the behavioral requirements of the members assigned to any given position, including duties and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges.

Sanctions that encourage the members' conformity to their role requirements by the appropriate allocation of rewards and penalties.

These elements, in turn, comprise three distinct but interconnected subsystems. Thus, the *normative* subsystem includes the system's plans and prescriptions, the specification of how people ought to conduct themselves. Essentially, it is a formula, or a blueprint, for attaining a desired state of

Paradigm of Social System

PARADIGM OF SOCIAL SYSTEM.

GOALS ◊◊◊ IMPLY ◊◊◊ STRATEGIES ◊◊◊ REINFORCED BY ◊◊◊ SANCTIONS

ATTACHED TO

POSITIONS

RESULT IN

ROLES

NORMATIVE SUBSYSTEM:

PRESCRIBED GOALS, STRATEGIES,
SANCTIONS, POSITIONS, AND
ROLES.

REACTION SUBSYSTEM:

ACTION SUBSYSTEM:

PRACTICED GOALS, STRATEGIES,
SANCTIONS, POSITIONS, AND ROLES.

affairs. Again, the *action* subsystem refers to the actual behavior of the members, the way the system's plans and prescriptions are carried out in practice. Finally, the *reaction* subsystem consists of the mechanisms by which the system profits from its experience and makes corrections or adaptations in its plans and its practices. Ideally, these subsystems are integrated in a coherent and rational manner.

Of course, no system is completely rational in its operation, since traditional influences and personal considerations always affect the members' activities. Yet the concept of rationality prescribes an ideal to which a society or a community may aspire and by which it may evaluate its operations at any given time. Rationality implies that a system's elements are interrelated in a logically consistent manner; that the assumptions involved in the system's plans are founded upon reliable information and knowledge; that the members' assignments are feasible and mutually compatible; and that the members' actions are coordinated in a way that produces a cumulative movement toward their chosen objectives.

Obviously, many things can go wrong with a social system. It may splinter into several warring camps, for example. Or the distribution of power and privilege may be such that many people are refused access to the resources needed to achieve their objectives. Again, the various positions or statuses assigned to certain members may call for skills and attitudes of such diversity that strain, anxiety, or rebellion may be almost inevitable consequences. Still another possibility is that the system may lack any viable processes for

solving its internal problems; the members may be related in such a way that their difficulties accumulate until the only practical alternatives are the complete overhaul of the system or the exclusion of the dissentient members. In any of these cases, crime and violence, among other forms of dissent, are the probable result.

Different theories of crime and violence focus on the various problems mentioned. The theory of criminal subcultures, for example, deals with conflicts among goals and values. Opportunity theory stresses various inequities in the distribution of goods and services. Theories of status congruence examine the effects of role strain, the contradictory expectations that apply to certain social groups and classes. Social process theories interpret crime and violence as a consequence of the immediate, dynamic, and often conflicting norms that arise in times of crisis.

Theories of Delinquent Subcultures

Theories of delinquent and criminal subcultures were developed primarily in the 1950's in connection with the study of juvenile gangs. The main argument is that the goals and strategies of the lower classes, or of certain subcultures within these classes, are importantly different from those of the middle class; that the lower classes have their own style of life, their own cultural traditions, and their own focal concerns, which attach great significance to "toughness," "living by one's wits," and "hustle" (involvement in organized crime); and that conformity to this life style implies deviation from middle class standards.⁴⁹

The tenability of this theory is open to question on the grounds that much evidence indicates support in the lower classes for the middle class norms of material success, occupational and educational achievement, and opposition to manual labor. In addition, it seems clear that many, if not most, of the lower class gang members eventually abandon their delinquent activities to adopt more conventional adult roles in marriage and occupational labor. Thus, the difference between the classes is not so much in the normative subsystem as in the action subsystem; and even in this respect, members of the lower classes seem to prefer middle-class activities if given the opportunity to participate.

Another version of the subculture theory explains gang delinquency as a solution to problems of adjustment that are shared by lower class youth whenever they are evaluated in terms of the middle class measuring rod in their homes, at school, or at work. These youths often live in families dominated by working mothers; yet their interests are oriented toward a world of masculine protest characterized by conflict and violence, drug use, and conventional crime. The working class male, rejected by the dominant middle class, turns the middle class values upside down, and constructs a subculture that stresses short-run hedonism and nonutilitarian, malicious, and negativistic behavior. In this kind of setting, the main source of strength and protection is the autonomy the gang can provide by virtue of its disassociation from middle class standards.⁵⁰

Opportunity Theory

The focus of opportunity theory is a little different. Instead of differentiating among social classes on the basis of norms and values, it examines the distributive system by which a society allocates its opportunities and restraints, its rewards and penalties. In agrarian societies, where much of man's energies are devoted to maintaining a subsistence level of living, the distributive system may be fairly simple and subject to little controversy. Survival has such high priority over most other values that goods and services may be distributed primarily on the basis of need.

However, the industrial technology of modern societies makes goods and services available in greater supply than is necessary for survival. Much of man's energy can be diverted to the production of various kinds of surpluses, and these are distributed according to criteria other than need. A concept that covers many of these criteria is power, which may be defined as the probability that the occupants of certain positions will carry. Power, of course, has many sources and many forms of expression, especially in pluralistic and technologically advanced societies.

No doubt the equitable distribution of power will be more difficult in the future than it is today, even in modern societies like the United States. One reason is the rapid growth in the size of the population. If the current rate of growth were to continue for another 2,500 years, the population of the United States would outweigh the earth. In addition, the relatively disadvantaged nonwhite population is increasing at a rate more than 50 percent greater than the rate of growth of the white population, and the American Indian has a fertility rate nearly twice that of the white population.

Similar problems are found in the distribution of wealth, education, and employment. In 1964 the median income of U.S. families was \$6,600. But it was \$4,000 more than that for college graduates. It was \$3,100 lower, on the average, for nonwhite than for white families, and it was estimated that one out of every seven white Americans and one out of every two nonwhite Americans had a "poverty level" of income, 34.6 million residents in all. One out of five families had an income under \$3,000.

Data on education and employment revealed the same kinds of disparities. For example, among persons 25 to 34 years of age, 70 percent of the whites were high school graduates, but only 42 percent of the Negroes. Yet the greatest increases in employment are among professional and technical workers, managers, and public officials, all occupations that are nearly inaccessible to untrained workers. Unskilled labor, by contrast, shows a declining rate of employment. Furthermore, the employment problems of poorly educated and unskilled persons are likely to be complicated further by trends which make college training something of a necessity for increasing numbers of jobseekers. Accordingly, there is a question whether pockets of poverty and deprivation can continue to exist in an affluent society without dire consequences for all.

One of the consequences is an inordinately high crime rate among disadvantaged groups and classes. In some of our deteriorated neighborhoods, the chances for success seem greater for illegitimate than for legitimate

methods. Opportunity theory deals with these problems by postulating the following relationships:⁵¹

The endorsement of middle class goals is nearly universal. Even though some lower class representatives may show little interest in improving their social and economic position, they endorse the middle class goals and values as normative prescriptions, while denying any anticipation of success in achieving them.

In nearly every community there exists a system of legitimate means for achieving middle class goals. However, access to these means of achievement varies from one class to another, with the lower classes being consistently disadvantaged in this respect. Moreover, perceived disadvantage, whether the perception is accurate or not, has the same functional consequences as actual disadvantage.

Within a community, there may or may not be a system of illegitimate means for achieving success. These involve crime, graft, sharp business practices, and other illicit activities. Where an illegitimate system occurs, it may or may not be integrated with the legitimate system. Integration implies that both systems can lead to success, giving the individual a realistic choice between the two strategies. However, if crime fails to produce success and achievement, the two systems are not integrated, and in this case crime serves primarily as an act of rebellion rather than a means to success.

If the legitimate and illegitimate systems are integrated, delinquent gangs provide a training ground for those youths who will eventually assume occupational roles in the field of crime. In this case we have criminal gangs. If the systems are not integrated, however, the gang members will engage in undisciplined violence, "bopping," "gang wars," and other forms of rebellious expression. In this instance we have conflict gangs.

These postulates enable us to identify three basic types of communities: Those that have only a legitimate system should be free of organized gangs; those that have integrated legitimate and illegitimate systems should be characterized by criminal gangs that socialize their members into the criminal subculture; while those that have unintegrated systems should have conflict gangs that engage in affective behavior of a violent and rebellious sort.

Another portion of the theory tries to identify the kinds of youths who are most likely to join in gang activities, whatever the type of gang. It holds that the most susceptible youths are those who feel alienated from the legitimate normative system, who blame society rather than themselves for their problems, and who deny that conforming with the legitimate norms is likely to bring them success.

Such alienation from conventional norms has two main sources, according to the theory. First, people who see discrepancies between the normative requirements for success (ability, hard work, initiative) and the practical requirements (luck, right contacts, cleverness) are likely to be alienated, especially if they feel that the practical requirements are far more important

than the normative ones. Second, people who have visible traits that are likely to arouse discriminatory reactions on the part of others are likely to be alienated. Hence, traits like race, ethnic affiliation, language difficulties, etc., may be sources of alienation which encourage involvement in gang affairs.

Opportunity theory may tend to underestimate the versatility of gangs that often incorporate some features of the criminal, conflict, and drug-use subcultures. But it provides numerous hypotheses regarding the criminogenic influences of illegitimate norms and their connection with racial, religious, residential, educational, occupational, and other variables. It makes society a partner in the causation of deviance and encourages prevention programs aimed at the revision of norms dealing with the treatment accorded minority groups and other disadvantaged sectors of the population. Several programs of this kind have recently been instituted in American cities, but studies of their effectiveness have not yet produced conclusive findings.

Opportunity and subculture theories concern themselves primarily with crime and violence. Other theories may have a far wider perspective. Most of the work on status congruence, for example, deals with noncriminal forms of deviance: political radicalism, involvement in social movements such as KKK, psychosomatic complaints, mental disorders, and suicide, among others. However, the theory's ability to predict suicide rates in various societies suggests that it may have more general applicability to crime and violence.

Theories of Status Congruence

Central to the theories of status congruence are certain assumptions concerning connections between social positions and roles. Any given individual is viewed as occupying one or more positions in each of the systems of which he is a member, that is, the family, the church, the school, the factory, the club, and so on. Each position carries with it a set of normative prescriptions, or a role, regarding the behavior of both the occupants of that position and the occupants of other positions with whom they maintain relationships. These different sets of prescriptions, or roles, may be connected with each other in various ways: they may be in complete harmony, or generally complementary, or occasionally inconsistent, or in conflict that cannot be resolved.

Status congruence implies harmony or consistency among the sets of prescriptions that are attached to the different positions a given person occupies. Discord and conflict, the lack of congruence, presumably produces discomfort, strain, or anxiety, which makes rational decisions difficult, encourages various kinds of deviant behavior, and sometimes results in mental illness, crime or suicide.

The theory also notes the importance of changes in social position, and the special problems that arise when such changes are frequent and unanticipated. In general, an increase in deviance may be expected whenever events disrupt the close articulation of positions and roles within a social system. To minimize deviance, then, a system must make provisions for orderly changes in the assignment of positions and for other modifications that seem warranted on the basis of experience.⁵²

Social Process Theories

Some of the most recent investigations of crime and violence focus greater attention on the dynamics of the interactional processes by which people move toward and beyond the brink of deviant behavior. Detailed inquiry suggests that a deliberate decision to commit an act of violence, followed by an appropriate sequence of responses leading to the act, is a rare occurrence. The path to violence does not often have clear markers; it is circuitous, and filled with options and alternates; and its contingencies are such that the traveler, when he reaches the violent terminus, frequently cannot understand how he got there.

Crime and violence, then, may sometimes be the illogical consequence of a series of decisions, each logically made. Wars, riots, and rebellions seem often to evolve in a similar manner. One party responds to a threat by raising the ante, as in a game of poker; the other responds in kind; and a feedback relationship is established which escalates the threats, or costs, and restricts the remaining options until nothing is left except the precise outcome that the whole sequence was designed to avoid. Thus, in a gang "rumble," one of the combatants displays a weapon, to which the other side responds by making a similar display along with a threatening gesture. If the first actor retreats, he loses face among his supporters. If he moves forward with gestures of his own, someone gets hurt.⁵³

We need to learn more about the games people play in times of crisis. But it is clear that normative support for deviance can often be found in middle-class society. Here, as in the lower classes, there are numerous examples of legitimate excuses or rationalizations for illegitimate conduct. Such "techniques of neutralization" include the denial of responsibility for one's behavior, the denial of injury to another, and the condemnation of one's condemners.⁵⁴

To illustrate, the denial of injury to another is one of the pillars of middle class efforts at crime control. Insurance against theft losses, for example, spread the cost of deviance in such a way that neither the offender nor the victim regards it as of any consequence. Auto theft is a case in point. It is one of our most rapidly growing offenses, and it is often the first offense for which career criminals are arrested. Yet half of these thefts involve autos that were left unlocked or with the keys inside. In addition, the pilfering of goods or accessories from cars accounts for nearly 40 percent of all reported larcenies, and the theft of bicycles, also left unprotected in most cases, accounts for another 15 percent. Similarly, much of the increase in bank robberies, house burglaries, and several other criminal offenses seems clearly related to the abundance of opportunities and the lack of protective practices or other control devices.

By reimbursing the victims of criminal offenses, our insurance policies may greatly reduce the incentive for caution, and in some cases they may even provide compensation for negligence. Thus, the misuse of an important principle of defense, namely, spreading the risks and costs, may actually encourage certain deviant acts. Violence could no doubt be discouraged if people were trained to recognize the early stages of dangerous games, such as the employment of armed threats during family quarrels, and to anticipate their unplanned but nevertheless probable consequences. Such training, along

with the clinics and other information systems needed to implement it, might do more to control violence than any practicable increase in penal sanctions.

V. SYSTEM IMPAIRMENT AND THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE

Social systems may suffer from impaired functioning for various reasons. Disruptions may result from changes in the environment, such as epidemics, mass migrations, wars, depressions and the like. Impairment may also occur because the strategies for achieving the system's objectives may be based on erroneous assumptions; knowledge may be insufficient for a viable blueprint to be formulated. Or the system may be hampered by deviant behavior among its members. Deviance means that the members may have inaccurate perceptions of their position assignments or their role requirements, or, again, they may engage in deliberate norm violations. Finally, the system may be disorganized. That is, the norms may be in conflict with one another, or there may be discrepancies between the normative and the action subsystems.

Deviance and Disorganization

Disorganization appears in many varieties. One variety is conflict between prescriptions and practices. Such conflict is evidenced by a system which is designed for a given purpose but which operates primarily to perpetuate itself. For example, our courts and other control agencies may sometimes be more interested in preserving their authority than in curbing the amount of deviant behavior. Again, our police and courts may sometimes operate under a policy of negotiated justice which makes the penalties prescribed by law a rarity in practice.

But disorganization may also occur among the normative prescriptions themselves. Goals may be inadequately defined, contradictory, or without tangible criteria for measuring the degree of their attainment. Strategies may be inconsistent, infeasible, or founded on false information. Roles may be incompatible or mutually exclusive, and so on. Such disorganization is often found in our correctional institutions, where the goals of therapy, punishment, deterrence, and social protection may be mutually exclusive, or where the norms of the offenders are in conflict with official rules and regulations.

Whenever disorganization occurs, deviant behavior, of course, is inevitable. Unless the various prescriptions are compatible, behavior that conforms to one norm must be in violation of another. It follows that the failure of an individual to conform to his role requirements may sometimes be due to defects in the social system, even though we are ordinarily inclined to blame the individual actor.

Research on deviance has been modeled largely after the germ theory of disease and its assumptions concerning single causes and specific treatments. The model is inappropriate to the study of deviance, however; the causes of deviance are mostly social, not physical, and they involve complex feedback relationships between personal and social systems. Deviance, as we have seen, has its highest incidence among people who are confronted by discrepant norms, who occupy inconsistent positions in a variety of loosely connected

groups, and who are lacking the usual social affiliations and socializing experiences.

Treatment aimed only at reforming the deviant individual is therefore likely to be ineffective. This is shown by our experience in the rehabilitation of retarded persons who may acquire considerable proficiency in a certain occupation, but who may nevertheless fail to gain acceptance in the community because they have trouble in working with other people, communicating across the counter with customers, or playing their nonoccupational roles in the broader society. Their inadequate performance, in these respects, may be partly due to the attitudes of the community's members who may ostracize the disadvantaged workers and exclude them from essential socializing activities. It is clear that treatment will have to be applied to the people who do the excluding as well as to those who are excluded.

Deviance, then, should not be defined as a property of any given person. The definition must also taken into account society's reaction to its members, especially to those who exhibit certain abnormal characteristics. This reaction, instead of being determined directly by the individual's characteristics, depend in part upon society's norms, its conception of what is desirable and undesirable, and its facilities for identifying behavior problems and dealing with them. Thus, the norms of the social system are always a factor in the definition, identification, and treatment of deviance.

In a complex, pluralistic society there are norms of sufficient diversity to satisfy people of heterogeneous backgrounds. There may be many conceptions of what is right and wrong, and even the official version of propriety may be unclear or inconsistent. Definitions of what is right or proper are changed whenever people can find an acceptable rationalization for new or formerly deviant ways of doing things. Hence, the prohibition against liquor was abolished on the grounds that "people who want to drink will do it anyway," and the same argument is used today with respect to the legalization of gambling, the registration of firearms, the intervention of our society into foreign affairs, and many other kinds of social control.

Rationalizations are sometimes accepted by the entire community, but in other cases they may be restricted to certain groups or individuals. During World War II some members of the business community violated Office of Price Administration regulations because these were regarded as "unconstitutional restrictions" and "invasions of free enterprise." Likewise, many criminal offenders are sustained in their illegal activities by the assumption that "everybody has a racket," "only suckers work," or "the real criminals never get sent to prison." Rebellion against society may often be justified on the grounds that the "establishment" is "corrupt" or "prejudiced," and the greater the resistance the rebel encounters, the greater his motivation to continue his efforts in a "just" cause. In this way the official status of deviant individuals may be legitimated for themselves and their associates.

However, rationalizations are also employed by the authorities who deal with criminals and other deviant persons. For example, crime is commonly regarded as a deliberate act for which the offender alone is responsible. It reflects a pervasive defect of character in the offender, as suggested in the motto: "Once a criminal always a criminal." Punishment and stigma are believed to benefit the offender and to serve deterrent purposes. Officials are

therefore expected to display their repugnance against the deviant act and the deviant actor.

The offender is accordingly assigned an official position characterized by the imputations mentioned. This position may restrict his activities and limit his access to legitimate opportunities for achievement. For example, there is no word in everyday language which refers to a legitimate position for ex-convicts. Offenders, of course, do achieve legitimate positions in many occupations, including law enforcement and correctional administration, but the maintenance of these positions usually requires the concealment of their ex-offender status.

Obviously, the rationalizations of criminals are not often the properties of individuals, but of groups and subcultures that endorse and reward deviance among their members. They are symptoms of social disorganization, not of personal deficiencies, and their influence is not likely to be eradicated by rehabilitative efforts directed at the deviant individual alone. Yet the rationalizations of the conformists and of the authorities are also group products, and if these rationalizations are in some ways defective, they too might encourage deviant behavior. There is evidence, for example, that both offenders and officials tend to overestimate the antisocial characteristics of the offenders, and that both groups view the officials as being more authoritarian and dogmatic than they are in fact. The spiraling of such mutual misperceptions, if unchecked, may lead nearly inevitably to conflicts that could be avoided if the factual information were more readily available.

Societal Reaction to Deviance

Society's reaction to system impairment varies greatly in time and place. But many of these reactions can be described under a few general headings. Those that seem historically to be the most important are listed below:

Toleration refers to the failure of a society to detect its members' offenses, or to the nonrecognition of the offenses detected. All forms of unofficial action may be generally included in this category.

Exclusion involves capital punishment, banishment, imprisonment, social ostracism and other methods by which a society prevents its deviant members from participating in certain activities.

Rehabilitation includes the use of therapy, training, or other reform measures in an attempt to change the deviant person while maintaining his participation in the affairs of the community.

Reconstruction implies the revision of a society's normative or action subsystems, resulting in the redefinition of deviance or the rearrangement of social positions and roles.

Toleration and exclusion are low feedback options which try to solve the problem of deviance by denying its existence or by eliminating the offender. Neither method calls for any important changes in the social system. These options tend to prevail in simple, stable, isolated societies where people are self-sufficient and independent. By contrast, rehabilitation and reconstruction are relatively high feedback options, usually calling for rather extensive revisions of the system. High feedback options are more common in time of social upheaval and in societies characterized by rapid change, an intricate

division of labor, mutual interdependence among the members, and a pluralistic culture.

Ordinarily, the low feedback methods are least disruptive of the social order. Toleration seems almost universally preferred, especially if the offenses are minor and the victims do not insist upon more strenuous measures. Even in urban societies, most crimes escape official attention or are handled in a manner that avoids the prescribed penalties. Thus, *UCR* reports that in 1967 the proportions of the offenses known to the police and cleared by arrest were: 88 percent for murder, 61 percent for rape, and 30 percent for robbery. Of those cases cleared by arrest, the proportions resulting in conviction of the offenses charged were: 43 percent for murder, and 28 percent for rape and robbery. The remainder were acquitted, dismissed, convicted of lesser offenses, or remanded to the juvenile court. It is apparent that less than a third of the murders reported result in convictions for that offense, and that less than 1 in 10 reported robberies are so convicted.

Toleration is also espoused by some people who feel that more formal action, by labeling and otherwise stigmatizing the offender, tends to encourage nonconformity. It is most frequently employed for offenses of large organizations or of professional and white-collar workers. However, even for conventional crimes, it seems to be more often employed in the middle classes than in the lower classes. This is suggested by the comparison of self-reported offenses and official actions. The self-reports indicate relatively little variation by social class, while official actions are far more frequent in the disadvantaged group.

Toleration and exclusion are close partners in the conventional methods of social control. When official action is demanded, the most common reaction is some exclusionary method, even in modern societies. This is especially true of occupations and institutions that can regulate the entrance and exit of their members. Thus, the lawyer, doctor, teacher, or minister who violates the norms of his profession is often disbarred from further membership. Although he may remain in the community, his exclusion from the profession is often complete and final. Moreover, the professions and other preferred positions are often connected by unspoken rules of reciprocity so that exclusion from one of the positions means, in practical terms, exclusion from all. The disbarred lawyer is not likely to be accepted by a medical school for training as a doctor, and even the youth who is expelled from grammar school might find his relations with religious and other institutions similarly affected.

What we have, then, is a policy of multiple exclusions which, in effect, places a ceiling upon the social positions that are accessible to people who have been rejected from preferred positions because of norm violations. There is not much evidence on the strength of these barriers against social mobility, but it seems clear that the management of the deviant's status has priority over any rehabilitative efforts, and that neither the goals nor the methods of rehabilitation are employed to any great extent in the management of our middle class institutions.

The result is that rehabilitative efforts are reserved largely for individuals whose disadvantages, apart from their deviance, are such as to prevent them from attaining even the less valued social positions. Despite the lofty

objectives they claim, rehabilitative efforts of public agencies are designed primarily to help the deviant individuals to achieve positions of marginal acceptability, not the most preferred ones. There are exceptions to this rule, of course, but they are more conspicuous than frequent. Society's position seems to be that people who need rehabilitation and other public services should not ordinarily attain a higher station in life than those who receive no special help. Rehabilitation, as a consequence, may constitute something of a barrier against outstanding achievement and self-realization. By comparison, a person who is excluded from the professions may face an obstacle of lesser magnitude.

However, the pursuit of rehabilitative measures leads almost inevitably to efforts at social reconstruction. The focus is not only on the deviant individual, but also on his family, his friends and associates, and ultimately the community. Social reconstruction involves proposals for changing the system by eliminating some of the main sources of strain and disorganization. Yet such proposals are often strongly resisted because they are likely to disrupt the established decisionmaking procedures. In addition, few societies have any real experience in the rational reconstruction of their social systems on any large scale, and efforts along these lines are only beginning. Much research and experimentation will be necessary before we can engage in reconstructive efforts with any great prospects for success.

The Concept of Justice

Essentially, the control of violence involves the development of nonviolent alternatives whose effectiveness can be demonstrated. Most of our violence is concentrated in a small segment of the population that has little faith in the nonviolent alternatives that are currently available. The theories we examined describe this sector in some detail and probably with considerable accuracy, and they suggest that, for the most part, a solution to the problem will require some efforts at reconstructing the community and its major institutions. This is a large order.

However, there are other possible implications of the theories that may have even greater significance. This is the suggestion that the concepts of crime and violence may soon be invested with new and important international connotations. Contacts among people around the world are increasing, and the content of these contacts is often instantaneously communicated. In addition, the gap between "have" and "have-not" nations is greater than the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in our society. And the gap between nations is apparently increasing. Thus, the problems connected with violence locally may soon be more pressing on the world scene.

One reason for the growing inequities on the world scene is the concentration of resources, including fiscal capabilities and managerial know-how, in a few nations. If present trends continue for another decade or two, the world's third greatest industrial power, after the United States and Russia, may be the U.S.-managed industrial empire abroad. In terms of gross national product, General Motors alone ranks ahead of nations like Argentina, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. It therefore must be considered a possibility

that such concentration of the world's resources might become the target of demands for reform on an international level that could at least equal the demands for reform at home.

The distribution of wealth, power, prestige and other values, of course, is made in different ways in different places. But the procedures for determining the legitimacy of the distribution is fairly uniform. This is by the endorsement of official authorities of government, with courts of law often serving as final arbiters, at least in modern societies. It is generally the law, then, that defines justice. But justice is not a response to a particular event, nor is it a rule stating what that response should be. Rather, justice concerns the entire apparatus by which social values are distributed, including the norms prescribing the distribution process, the way these norms are implemented in practice, and the degree of correspondence between norms and practices.

Our traditional system of justice operates under great handicaps. Its procedures are not rationalized by their consequences, but by appeal to a supra-empirical authority, usually political or religious. Furthermore, only its final decisions are ordinarily available for public scrutiny, while the aims, assumptions, and general rationale of these decisions have minimal visibility. Even the language of the law and of the courts is sometimes unintelligible, except perhaps to members of the legal profession.

Lacking public understanding and endorsement of its legal principles, the system of justice is vulnerable to charges of favoritism or discrimination. And the disproof of these charges would ordinarily entail empirical investigations that are regarded as antagonistic to the traditional conceptions of ultimate power and authority. As a consequence, the administration of justice is often viewed with distrust and suspicion, especially by our alienated minorities and other disadvantaged groups. If the norms of the system are in conflict with one another, or if they are applied in an inconsistent manner to the detriment of certain groups and classes, there can be no convincing demonstration of justice. There can only be the frustration and animosity which, in the long run, leads to rebellion against the norm-makers and the norm-enforcers.

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APPENDIX 27

INVOCATION AND CONSTRAINT
OF RELIGIOUS ZEALOTRY

By Samuel Z. Klausner†

"To every thing there is a season, and a time to every matter under the heaven:
A time to be born, and a time to die;
A time to plant and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal;
A time to break down, and a time to build up;
* * * * *
A time to love, and a time to hate;
A time for war, and a time for peace."

(Ecclesiastes 3: 1-8)

* * * * *

"The white man hates to go to war, but . . . we are not afraid to fight. Where you find a scared Muslim, he's not a real Muslim. A real Muslim has no fear at all. There's no force on earth that can destroy the Black people. The world belongs to us."—Elijah Muhammad, quoted in the *New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 24, col. 3.

VIOLENCE, RELIGION, AND ZEALOTRY

The Plan of This Paper

Violent acts can be religious acts. They can be religious in form, ends in themselves. Like the nineteenth century anarchist, "propaganda of the deed,"

*This paper could not have been written in the short span of time available for the work of the National Commission without the dedicated research assistance of Michael Bassis and Judith Thomas and the willing night and weekend secretarial assistance of Madeleine S. Klausner and Joyce A. Rothman.

The theoretical underpinning for the analysis is to be found in the author's "The Social Psychology of Courage," *Review of Religious Research*, 3: 2, Fall, 1961, pp. 63-71, and the author's "The Intermingling of Pain and Pleasure: The Stress Seeking Personality in its Social Context," in Klausner, Samuel Z. (ed.), *Why Man Takes Chances*, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1968, pp. 137-168.

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they may be dramatic symbols. They can serve religious values. Violence is enacted with awe, as if the perpetrator encountered the "mysterium tremendum." When mundane issues are imbued with religious ultimacy, limited conflict can escalate into violence. The victim of the violent act is seen as a radically evil devil, or an unthinking tool of that evil who threatens harm here and now or obstructs the road to Utopia, to paradise.

Throughout much of the history of Western religions, peace has been an eschatological hope. Earthly peace has been a respite from battle, a monastic-like "retreat." Religion, in its natural state, engenders energy, enthusiasm, is associated with the "hot spot" in the brain, to use William James' felicitous phrase. This verve can shape our physical environment, develop a competitive capitalism or, in its classical form, infuse the religious with zealotry. Buddhism would undercut this tendency by struggling to sever the ties binding the individual to the material, struggling to eliminate desire. Western man has refused the disengagement, the apathy toward the social and physical milieu entailed by Buddhist philosophy. The golden mean of classical Confucianism is also inimical to zealotry. Western man, and indeed, the Chinese as well, refuse this harnessing of energy.

The extent to which a religious tradition emphasizes violent zealotry varies according to the secular character of the elite of that society. Where society, including religious society, is dominated by rational bureaucrats, religion assumes a ritualistic character. Violence waits in the wings until summoned as an organizational force. Where intellectuals are influential, religion tends to be contemplative. The intellect chains violence and subjects it to the aegis of calculated legal process. Its perpetration is delegated. Where society is dominated by a stratum of chivalrous warriors, fate, destiny, passion and strong heroes are important. Violence is on the tip of the tongue. The religion of the peasants inclines toward magic, that embryo of engineering, applied to control the violence of wild nature (Weber, 1958).

This paper begins with the observation that Western religion has been implicated in zealous violence for all its known history. Two theoretical models and some illustrations of the way religion may invoke and constrain violent behavior will be offered in explanation of that observation. After brief working definitions of violence and of religion, it will be argued that the violent act is an extension of the socially achieving act, the productive act; that to understand that act it is necessary to grasp its meaning to the perpetrator who executes it and to the group that delegates him; that the individual perpetrator enters upon the act with anxiety; that religious institutions assist him in achieving the courage to act violently despite his anxiety; and that the social organization that delegates him develops cultural norms which legitimate the act, and organizes solidary social support for the act.

The first model of the invocation and constraint of violence identifies types of religious support for zealotry: defining issues in terms of ultimate values; specifying the location of the evil which impedes achievement of those values; providing an arsenal of principles to rationalize violent acts; and, through ritual and worship, reaffirming the social solidarity of the group behind the actor. Illustrations will be drawn from the fields of interreligious conflict, conflict between religion and the state, and participation of religion in general social conflict. The second model of the invocation of zealotry

conceptualizes the function of religious worship in reaffirming the social legitimacy of violence and in assisting the individual to mobilize his courage to face the fact of his participation in violence. The paper will conclude with a discussion of religious constraint of zealotry by control of the legitimating processes and by opposing individual or "random" violence.

Circumscribing the Topic of Violence

Working definitions of violence and of religion and of their joint offspring, zealotry, will help delimit this inquiry. Sidney Hook in his article entitled *Violence*, in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, states "in the social context, violence may be defined roughly as the illegal employment of methods of coercion for personal or group ends" (Hook, 1963, p. 264). Hook reserves the term "might" for physical coercion supported by legal sanctions. Hook's definition of violence is parochial. We do not face two sets of acts—illegal violent acts on one side and legal acts of might on the other. The same act defined as illegal violence by the victim may be considered legitimate by the perpetrator. An initial comprehension of the act is relational and should initially be grasped from the perspective of the perpetrator as well as from the perspective of the victim. Therefore, a single generic term will be retained. Violence will be this generic term. Legitimate and non-legitimate violence will be the species. Some common-sense, victim-defined species are: riot, assassination, massacre, terrorism, torture and assault. The perpetrator might add: military defense, crusade, "just" war, act of purification, act of faith, and heroic exploits. The student of the subject should not be deflected in his analysis by his identification with one or the other party.

The notion of violence, in this paper, will be restricted to acts involving coercion rather than persuasion and consensus. The term will further be restricted to acts intended to cause bodily harm to the victim or victims, or to threaten such harm if the demands of the perpetrator are not met. Psychological blows, though they wound self-esteem and may precipitate the victim into psychiatric care, will not be included. Economic blows, though they deprive a victim of his property or drive him to suicide, the control of the behavior of another through shaming; through inducing a feeling of guilt; or by reasoning; even when that reasoning involves a tacit threat other than of bodily harm, will not be defined as violence.

Violence may be part of an effort to influence a group, with the victim selected to represent that group. The violent act may, but need not, involve impulse and passion on the part of the perpetrator. A bombing raid and an artillery barrage illustrate coolly calculated acts of violence. The perpetrator may be brutally excessive as part of his dramatic demonstration. He may also have sympathy for his victim, agreeing that both he and his victim are actors in a difficult and tragic play. The perpetrator and the victim, like boxers in the ring, may even agree about the legitimacy of the violence. Victims of a terrorist bomb might not share the conviction of their attackers.

The social and individual impetuses to violence need not combine in the perpetrator. Wertham (1966), a psychiatrist, argues that violent acts cannot be attributed to human nature alone. Violence is not understandable simply by reference to individual personality. It is always part of a social process. Before anybody starts violence, others have prepared the ground. Wertham

distinguishes violence accompanied by emotion, feelings of hate, sadism, sex and other passions from a second variety which is political and bureaucratic. In the latter type of violence those who order, commission and organize, as well as those who execute the acts, have extremely little feeling for the victims, be it sympathy or hate. They are executioners.

The meaning of violence to the individual perpetrator may differ from the meaning it has for the group supporting him. The act may be an end in itself, expressive for the perpetrator. For the group, it may serve a transcendent purpose. The notion that violence has a purpose beyond itself presents a problem in the ethics of violence. The ethical question may be divided into two parts: one, whether violent means may ever be justified, and then, if justifiable violence is admitted, what are the right times and occasions and who may determine them. Violence may be absolutely rejected for social philosophical reasons, as it was by Gandhi. It may be rejected for psycho-philosophical reasons. Leon Saul (1965) associates hostility and brutality, covert and subtle, or open and direct, with the true devil, a sure sign that something has gone awry in the process of maturing. Psychopathologically motivated violence will be excluded from the present discussion.

The ethical attitudes of individuals toward violence varies with their position in the social system. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) identified a subculture of violence characterized by a willingness to resort to violence in a variety, though not in all, situations. This ethos of violence, though shared by all ages in that subculture, is most common among the young. Violence is not viewed as illicit, and therefore not associated with feelings of guilt. Sorel (1906), writing in support of the syndicalist movement in France, attempted to strip away the ethical discussion. He maintained that proletarian violence is necessary for the separation of the classes. Violent acts have the value of military demonstrations. Everything is carried on without hatred and without the spirit of revenge. Syndicalists do not propose to reform the state. They simply want to destroy it.

A Working Definition of Religion

Definitions of religion are as numerous as students of the subject. Durkheim's (1954) is a good working definition. He writes that "a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices, relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called the Church, all those who adhere to them." "Church," in Durkheim's usage, refers to the community. Sacred things are distinguished from profane according to a pragmatic test—the behavior of individuals in setting them apart and considering them forbidden, as if improper touch released their ambivalent power to heal or to harm. Ideology and rituals may be institutionalized in an organization. The beliefs, practices and sacred things pervade social action beyond the sphere of any particular organization.

This paper will, by and large, restrict itself to the narrower definition of religion as manifested through religious organizations. No social organization could be purely religious. By virtue of bringing together the activities of a number of men, political and economic realities emerge. Religious

organizations not only harbor a polity, but they maintain relations of varying intensity with environing organizations. Zealous religious drive permeates the broader social world over these boundaries connecting religious and secular organizations.

This paper will focus on the relation between religious organizations and violence in the United States. For historical depth and cultural comparison, some material will be drawn from Western and, at times, from non-Western religious life.

Religious Zealotry

The *Oxford Universal Dictionary* defines "zeal" as an "ardent feeling (taking the form of love, wrath, 'jealousy,' or righteous indignation)." Zealotry as a religious act, is exemplified by Phineas, grandson of Aaron, who, after spearing a man of Israel and his Midianitish woman, was called by the Lord "jealous for My sake" (Numbers 25: 8). "Jealous" and "zealous" are alternative translations of the same Biblical Hebrew term and enter English from the same Greek root. A sect of Jewish guerilla warriors against the Romans assumed the name of Zealots. The term was similarly applied to the apostle Simon the Zealot (Luke 6:15). The zealot acts violently in the name of God.

Both the assumption of the righteousness of the zealot and the a priori definitions of violence as evil reflect ideological biases. The zealot's service of God is his victim's affliction by the devil. A negative judgment on violence, following the ethical argument above, arises either from the perspective of non-violent or pacifist groups, for whom all violence is abhorrent, from the perspective of an established elite, against whom revolutionary violence is being directed, or from the perspective of anyone who rejects the legitimacy of a specific act of violence. These perspectives restrict understanding of the phenomenon: pacifists espouse the counter-ideology, and elites and perpetrators change.

None of the large religious groups in the United States has been pacifistic. The non-violent position has been espoused, for example, by the Quakers, the Oxford Group Movement of Moral Rearmament, the Mennonites, and by certain subgroups within larger denominations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Martin Luther King. Nonpacifist religious groups are concerned with the legitimacy of violence, of deciding which personnel may be authorized to execute violent acts, and on which occasions and for which goals. Religion in the United States has, by and large, supported public order, thus opposing such manifestations as riot and massacre, but supporting such manifestations as capital punishment and war. While religious organizations support the government as the legitimate agent of violence, some individuals within major religious groups protest violently against this authority. Some small religious groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, incorporate protest against governmental authority in their ideology.

Popular and scholarly writings on religion over the past few decades have emphasized the violence-reductive, or peaceful character of religion. In part, this is in accord with Marx's judgment that religion is the "opiate of the people" and with Freud's (1957) theory that religion sublimates the major motives of man. Scholars, such as Parsons (1951), describe the integrative

function which religion performs in moving the social system toward a common value consensus. The peaceful character of religion is also stressed by sincere partisans of religion to protect religious institutions in a situation where the principal potential for violence is pluralistically controlled and where the public ethic requires peaceful behavior on the part of subordinate institutions. Tension-reductive religious activities, as socially significant as they are, are not the focus of this paper.

The pages of history provide data on religion and violence. Billington's *The Protestant Crusade* (1938) details the slaughter of Catholics, and plots and arson directed against them in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. White theorists have generalized about the tension-reductive function of religion, but little effort has been made to derive general propositions from the historical material on religion and violence.

William James was one theoretician of stature who evolved general concepts of conflictual, energetic or change-generating aspects of religion. In his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, James distinguishes religion from philosophy in terms of the enthusiastic drive associated with the former. Max Weber (1958) applies the concept of charisma, usually associated with religious leadership, as a theoretical lever to account for social change. Rudolf Otto (1958) described the awe of facing the *mysterium tremendum*. Recently, Margaretta Bowers (1964), reporting on her long experience as a therapist of clergymen, described some intrapsychic *Conflicts of the Clergy*.

Religious institutions, religious ritual and religious beliefs, have both equilibrating and conflictogenic aspects. In the tension-reductive tradition, Freud explained the relation between religion and personality, and Marx analyzed the relation between religion and society. Marx and Freud were little concerned with the internal structure of religion. Conflict theory seems to appear among analysts of the internal structures of religious organizations and religious experience. Weber analyzed the routinization of charisma which occurs in religious organizations when the founder passes his mantle to his successor. James and Otto employed concepts of conflict in explicating the inner experience of the religiously musical personality. Bowers is concerned with the religious torment of people whose lives are committed to the church.

Religious violence draws upon some general predispositions of personality. A large number of human acts seem intended not to reduce but to increase tensions. Individuals characterized by such acts may be called stress seekers. Stress seekers affirm life by precipitating themselves into successive situations of conflict. The conflictual engagement generates within them the *élan of life*. Religious ideas, practices, and institutions serve the stress seeker as an arsenal, a source of weapons to carry on their battles or as an arena of conflict, a locale for these battles. From the perspective of the institution, the stress seeker is an available "champion" to be sent forth to "just" battles. He is the zealot.

An interplay between individual and social vitality seems to have gone on historically. The routinization of charisma after the passing of the leader has been taken as a sign of declining vitality in a religious organization. O'Dea (1961) lists the routinization of charisma as one of the sources of dilemmas of institutionalization. Routinization is necessary for organizational continuity, but with it vitalistic religious sects evolve into denominations in which order seems to displace spontaneity. The settling of religious vitality

into mundane routine action is an incomplete characterization of denominational organizations. There is no overall loss of power or vitality. Power shifts from the individual to the social group. The resulting group power is greater than the aggregate power of its individuals. In the charismatic or in the sectarian stage, the vitality, including the conflictogenic vitality, is in the individual and may form a basis for heroic action. In the organizational or in the denominational stage, it is in the social system. That system can lead individuals into broader scale social action or, more specifically, to broader scale social conflict; and, as a result, into what Wertham, above, termed bureaucratic violence.

A sect does not automatically become a denomination (Wilson, 1959). Sectarian groups, such as the Evangelical communions which enter into social interaction, seek people and bring them in, are more apt to become denominational than Adventist sects which may isolate themselves from social interaction. The history of religious violence attests to the fact that while the Adventists may have an apocalyptic, violent theology, it is through evangelism that some of the most ferocious interreligious violence has erupted. This will be documented in a later section.

While social scientists and religious leaders have been touting the stabilizing and integrative aspects of religion, the popular mind has continued conscious of conflictual aspects. Zahn (1957) analyzed 188 unsolicited letters directed to the author of a book "exposing" the role of Roman Catholics in America. The Protestant writers of these letters feared Catholic power and warned that traditional democratic institutions would be destroyed when Catholics gained domination over this country and the world. Correspondents warned that Catholics would view any means as legitimate in the accomplishment of this end and would take reprisals against those who would criticize them. Though the individual Catholic layman may be unaware of the true nature of his church, these writers contended, his absolute helplessness before ecclesiastical authority makes him a potential traitor.

The Journal of Social Issues (1956) devoted a whole journal number to the problem of religious conflict. In his editorial introduction, Don Hager described a marked increase in the public expression of interreligious tension and conflict, saying that community relations practitioners have come to view religious controversy as their most pressing community relations problem. Writing before the recent extension of racial violence in America, he was prescient with regard to the leadership role of certain religious groups in this struggle.

A feeling has been growing among some church leaders that failure to join in current social protest is tantamount to forfeiting the right of the church to continue as a salient social institution. Some scientific analysts agree. Glock (1960) writes that religious institutions, in our society, lose their status if they do not participate in conflict. Discussing the contribution of religion to social integration, Glock says that the capacity of religion to inform the secular normative structures is largely a thing of the past. One reason for this has been the churches' avoidance of conflict. Wherever choices between maintaining harmony and taking a stand on an issue which would produce conflict appears, the church most often chooses harmony. Campbell and Pettigrew's (1959) study of Little Rock ministers provides a specific illustration of ministers who did not always follow their convictions. The role

of the minister as community reformer is not institutionalized, and local leaders had told younger ministers to go slow so as not to do permanent damage to the church. These ministers were caught in a dilemma between protecting their local leadership and protecting the leadership of the church in the wider community.

THE SUPPORT OF ZEALOTRY

Religious groups are more suited than most groups in the society for providing support for violent acts, even when the acts are designed to resolve relations among other social institutions. Religious groups support violence in four ways: (1) they help convert mundane issues into matters of life and death; (2) they help designate the evil to be attacked; (3) they help provide the appointed "champion" of violence with rationales for his act; and (4) they help provide the appointed "champion" with the ability to act violently despite his fear of doom, so—by offering social support and ritual means for mobilizing courage. This section will describe the first two of the above religious supports: the ways a mundane conflict escalated to the level of violence and the norms which legitimate acts of violence by finding a devil. Later a process model of the internal activity of religious groups in generating such norms and helping mobilize energy to implement violence will be described.

The Legitimation of Violence

Matters of Life and Death

The very beliefs and rituals which integrate religious groups can be weapons against outsiders. Williams (1956) indicates that sometimes what may appear to the observer as a minor doctrinal or ritual difference between people may be instigations to total conflict. Religious schisms may center around "minor" differences. Sociologists and psychologists have argued that some religious conflicts mask more basic economic, social class or ethnic conflicts. This is no doubt the case. However, religion is no passive cover. It offers an arsenal of ideational and ritual symbols which can adhere to and inflate economic and social differences into life and death crises. In part, this follows from a mutual reinforcement of tensions making for, in Parsons' (1944) words, "a vicious circle of intensification." Because religion is, to use Tillich's words, a matter of "ultimate concern," it can absolutize a mundane issue. Violence is a legitimate means for resolving a matter of life and death.

Tiryakian (1957) documents, step by step, the way the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa legitimated the conflict between Boers and Bantus; more precisely, legitimated for the violent suppression of Bantus by Boers. Following the emancipation of slaves in the British Empire in the 1830's, the Boers, who had become dependent on slaves, moved northward toward the Transvaal. They encountered and conquered the southward moving Bantu tribes. Social contact with a subordinated people became objectionable to the white settlers. A basically political and economic conflict focused around the issue of common religious worship. The Cape Synod in 1857 passed a resolution segregating white and nonwhite congregations. The Calvinist

doctrines of predestination and the community of the elect was drawn upon to assert that Christianizing the Bantus was contrary to the Bible. The Negro was excluded by God. He was not among the elect. The Boers identified themselves with the Biblical Israelites, a chosen people who had to push into a wilderness. They associated Negroes with the sons of Ham who carried the curse of Cain (*sic.*, the mark of Cain was a protective sign not a sign of curse). After the defeat of the Boers by the British, the church became the bastion of Boer culture. At its 22nd annual meeting, the Federal Council of the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk stated that Calvinism conceived of the state as the divine creation of God, and of the authority of the state over the individual as absolute. In a later article, Tiryakian (1961), after examining the relation of religion and theology to the racial situation in the United States, says that theological principles have been equally used and, as he says, equally improperly used, to justify racial segregation or to justify racial integration. Theological principles seem to offer a flexible arsenal of weapons for conflict.

Pfeffer (1956) and Billington (1938) document this absolutizing of the mundane in the history of Catholic-Protestant conflict in the United States. The competition of immigrant with "native" labor and competition for political office were the basic mundane issues. In the American system, such issues are generally resolved within the market and the polling booth. With a religious issue attached, the competition escalates into conflict and bloodletting.

In the United States, the groups as well as the issues of religious conflict have shifted over time. In the colonial era, established Protestant churches clashed with dissenting sects. In the nineteenth century, communally accepted faiths condemned those considered socially extreme, such as Mormonism. Today the underlying motif in interreligious conflict is a difference on public issues. Religious motifs are available to express, develop and legitimate a wide range of social conflicts.

Identifying the Devil

The second religious assist to violence occurs within the framework of the absolutized issues. A conflict situation demands an antagonist for its protagonist. Religious groups are experienced in specifying the enemy. Individuals or groups may be charged as consorts of the devil, anti-Christ or heretics. One need not resort to the Middle Ages for examples. Barnett (1959) records the case of Methodist and Episcopal laymen in Texas who have declared a holy war against the National Council of Churches' position on integration, who speak of "the nine traitors of the Supreme Court" and attack seminary professors and clergymen known to be to the left of Norman Vincent Peale. Barnett characterizes these laymen in terms of a "go for broke" dedication, use of the Bible to justify their action, and intimate group meetings for mutual encouragement. This sectarian Protestant revolt is as indigenous to American Protestantism as the revival meeting. Movements of this type have revitalized Protestantism in this country from time to time. Such "violence" is verbal level. It is incipient violence in terms of the definitions in this paper.

Guthrie and Marshall (1966), using cognitive dissonance theory, essentially an equilibrium theory, describe Pennsylvania fundamentalists whose belief

system about the world contradicts that of science. They use the terms "brother" and "sister" in a brotherhood which is tenuous and filled with jealousies difficult to control. Compromise becomes difficult and new churches rather than modified doctrines emerge. Each faction feels Satan has misled the other. The enemy is in the backyard. Again, this is incipient violence.

Yinger (1963) describes the Cargo cults of Melanesia and the ghost dances of some American Indians as religious attacks on the dominant societies. The dominant societies are economic and political enemies. Religion infuses them with a devilish character. Abrecht (1961), a director of a study of the World Council of Churches, writing on Christian responsibility toward areas of rapid social change, states, "From the very beginning of the modern mission enterprise, Christians were deeply involved in social change, and it's hard to find instances in modern mission history where the coming of the Christian evangelists and missionaries did not produce social change, often at a very rapid pace" (p. 22). The very idea of a mission defines an opponent: the indigenous faith "enslaving" a populace to idols.

Religious groups not only define an enemy; they may generate an enemy. Willems (1955) illustrates this process in his report on evangelization in Brazil. Villagers see conversion to Protestantism (often from Catholicism) as a move from superstition to truth. They lose the universe of Saints and learn that their former beliefs are superstitions. Sometimes, during the period of proselytism, Catholic priests were said to instigate the people against the *Crentes* and even threaten mob action.

The role of religious culture and religious organizations in legitimating these proto-violent attitudes is understood by some church leaders; for example, Bennett (1965, p. 51), in discussing the role of the church with regard to the neglected and oppressed in our nation and the world, says that, "The churches have the responsibility to help develop forms of power among the powerless in order to counteract the pervasive power of the strong." Coleman (1956, p. 52) comments on another aspect of the same issue. When religion tells the oppressed that they are the chosen people and thereby gives them release from the values of a society which locates them so low in the eyes of themselves and others, it provides the potentialities for rebellion simply by telling each religious group it is superior.

The next section collects a few illustrations from history of religious support for violent action: instances of interreligious conflict, conflict between religion and the state and the contribution of religious leadership to extra-religious conflict.

Illustrative Examples

Religion and State Violence

Typically, the state, the political arm of society, strives to monopolize the use of violence, exercising it through its army to control external enemies and through its constabulary, to control internal enemies. The attitude of religious groups towards state violence depends on the relationship between the religious and political elites. Where they are drawn from the same class or where they see an identity of interests, as did the Russian Orthodox Josephite

monks and the Tsars following Vasili the Third (1479-1533), religious institutions support state violence, defining it as legitimate. The state, for its part, may implement violence for the sake of the religious group, as did Isabella of Castille for the Inquisition in Spain.

The attitude of a religious group to state power may change over time *pari passu* with the changing relation of its adherents to the ruling power. During the first century, few, if any, Christians would enter the Roman army. They repudiated the violent acts of soldiers. As late as A.D. 295, Maximilianus underwent martyrdom, primarily because as a Christian, he said he could not be a soldier. The pacifist strain in Christian thought began to die out early in the fourth century. The Council of Arles in A.D. 314 decreed that Christians who gave up their arms in time of peace should be excommunicated. In the Middle Ages laymen, but not the regular and secular clergy, could participate in "just" wars (Sibley, 1968).

Where state and religious values or interests contrast, the state may use violence to suppress a religious group. A state dominated by one religion may thus suppress a minority religious group. In this way, European states suppressed the partially religiously motivated peasants' uprisings. Luther, already aligned with certain German princes, declaimed against the murdering hordes of peasants.

Some minority religious groups in the United States have refused to legitimate the state. The government used armed force against the Mormons in Utah during the early days of their settlement. The Mormons, for their part, having had their fill of nonbelievers in Missouri and Illinois, treated Gentiles in their midst with severity, and were reluctant to obey officials and laws they deemed inequitable. In 1857 President James Buchanan thought only a display of force could bring order in Utah. The Mormon war resulted (Furniss, 1960).

Jehovah's Witnesses, an Adventist group, refuse to support the government and opposed state violence while anticipating a cataclysmically violent end for all but the "elect." The Mennonites, a purist sect, not only question the legitimacy of state violence, but resist educational and patriotic intrusions into their culture as well.

While the German Protestant Church was no major obstacle to the advance of National Socialism, it did, along with the Catholic Church, maintain a modicum of institutional autonomy. Churchmen drew a line of demarcation between the ideology of the church and the violence of the National Socialist state in spite of the high degree of correlation between the attitudes of the two institutions (Hunt, 1949). But, these cases of opposition or non-support of state violence are exceptional. By and large, American churches have supported state violence as long as it was implemented procedurally.

Current discussion about religious support of state violence centers on the issue of military participation. The church and the military have been intertwined immemorably. Religious groups have maintained their own military detachment such as the Swiss guards at the Vatican. When religion and state were inseparable, as in ancient Egypt, there religious and military concerns mingled naturally. In America among the Pueblos, the war cult involved a war priest who seems to have been expected to lead in the field or at least to contribute magic. Two war captains represented the twin war gods. Even the police force was semireligious (Ellis, 1951).

Conscientious objection, the case of a non-supportive relationship, has usually been treated by the larger churches as an issue of individual conscience, irrespective of the content of that conscience, rather than as an issue of the church's position on violence. Conscientious objectors in the United States have been largely Protestants. Few Jews and Roman Catholics have taken a pacifist position (Olmstead, 1960). The current issue is not pacifism but "special" objection to "this" war. Again, violence as such is not the issue but rather the legitimacy of a particular instance of state violence.

The role of the military chaplain bridges these two institutions. In a sense, he represents the church in the armed forces. Students of the subject have asked how the chaplain resolves his role conflict (Burchard, 1954). He is expected to refrain from killing as a representative of the church committed to the sanctity of life. Yet, he is part of an organization in which killing is an accepted means to its goal. This conflict may be more a product of the researcher's logic about the incompatibility of the two ideologies than a real experience of the chaplains. At some stages in his military socialization, the chaplain may be confused as to whether he is a representative of the church to the military or of the military to the church. Probably, with longer military experience he tends toward the latter function. Indeed, Swomley (1964), Ch. 14) maintains that the function of the chaplain is to spread the military version of religion in civilian churches.

When political factions within a state clash, both may claim the fealty of the same religious group (Lipset, 1964). A single religious group may fulfill its integrative function for one political faction, generating common loyalties and purposes, while contributing to divisiveness and segregation of that faction from other groups (Desai, 1963). Lines of cleavage on political issues with religious groups need not follow the common denominational alignments. Southern Baptists are closer to Missouri Synod Lutherans than they are to Northern Baptists in some social attitudes (Glock and Stark, 1965). A number of attitudinal subgroups coexist in each denomination. Churchmen may agree on doctrinal tenets and basic affirmations about man and society and even on the official pronouncements on, say, race relations, while taking different positions on specific situations of social conflict. This was the case with the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-56, the student sit-ins of 1960, the freedom rides of 1961, and the Black Muslims (McCoy, 1964). Denominational churchmen were found on both sides of the conflict. The small sect is less subject to this ambiguity.

An example of leaders within a single church supporting opposing sides is illustrated by the participation of Catholic priests in racial conflicts. The *New York Times* of February 12, 1966 (p. 30, col. 3), reported that leaflets were distributed near more than a hundred Roman Catholic churches on behalf of a priest who sought to discourage the racial integration of a large area of Chicago's Southwest side. On March 7, 1968 (p. 29, col. 3), the *New York Times* reported that the Mayor of Omaha named two "very militant Catholic priests" as having led a group of fifteen Negro youths who tried to disrupt a Wallace rally. Omaha was beset by two nights of civil disorders, following the clash between policemen and Negro youths at the rally. The Mayor claimed that a group of priests and nuns were responsible for having organized the demonstration.

Despite the ambiguity, the issues are absolutized and the enemy specified

for both parties to the conflict. The parts of sacred things, no matter how many times divided, still retain the qualities of the whole. Each church faction can experience its position in ultimate terms despite the illogical implication of competing ultimates.

Examples have been presented of intergroup violence. Capital punishment exemplified official state violence perpetrated, usually, on an individual. Procedures for arriving at the occasion are set forth and the character of the occasion and its immediate consequence are predictable. Much of the ritual character of the occasion, the low status of the executioner and myth about the criminal corpse, are more magical-superstitious than religious (Strom, 1942). The overriding mood and its legitimation have tended to be religious. Certain religious leaders have raised objections to the practice. Since 1957, twelve of the major Protestant denominations have officially urged abolition of capital punishment. These include the Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists and the United Church of Christ. At the moment these are official pronouncements not backed up by any large scale movement to abolish capital punishment. The modal position among pastors and laymen today may not be far removed from that stated by Colton (1842) in a sermon in Philadelphia in 1842. Basing himself on the text of Genesis 9:6 "whoso sheddeth blood, by man shall his blood be shed," the Reverend declared that willful murder ought invariably in all circumstances be punished with death. No penalty lower than capital bears any real proportion to the offense of shedding blood. This is implied in a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, "without the shedding of blood, there is no remission of sins."

Ethical aspects of religious organizational support of state violence are explicitly debated. Opinions on the "ought" vary as greatly as the actual behaviors. On the one hand, the values of the separation of church and state are touted as a major contribution of the liberal democratic as opposed to the totalitarian state. Separation is interpreted in many ways. The Soviet principle of separation leaves the state in control of strategic religious facilities such as the printing of Bibles. American separation does not extend into the fiber of the culture. Beth (1955), writing on this matter, says that even the most uncompromising advocates of separation of church and state such as Roger Williams, John Locke, and Jefferson have realized that a total separation, in the sense of absolute elimination of the possibilities of conflict, is impossible because Christianity as well as the state claims the right to control the acts of man. Separation is an important principle not because it ends conflict but because it minimizes it. The very notion of separation engenders opposition in some quarters. Reist (1964), examining the sociological basis for separation, argues that only by direct involvement in the political life of the nation can the church succeed in working its way towards the fulfillment of the task which its faith generates. What in fact must occur is the development of a healthy tension between the church and the nation at large. This is in fact what does occur.

Zealotry for the Social Weal

The support of religious groups is also available for extreme action in connection with nonreligious social issues. Factionalism within the church or changes in attitude over time may imply differing conceptions of the

legitimate occasions for violence. Religious action on the racial question, as noted above, illustrates opposing zealotries in the same church.

Gunnar Myrdal (1944), in his epic study of Negroes in America, found the church an expression of the community. Few Christian churches, he said, have ever been, whether in America or elsewhere, spearheads of reform. Another writer (Nelson, 1944), of the same period, concurs that except for the impetus which religion gave to the antislavery movement and its continuing philanthropy, the period since the Civil War has proved almost completely barren of any determined effort initiated and sustained by the religious community to solve the problem of Negro-white relations in America.

By the 1960's, the situation had changed. Movements within the Protestant and Catholic churches were aiming for integration. The Roman Catholic church took the lead in moving toward local parish integration, and has made significant strides in parochial school integration as well (Roy, 1964).

The lines between social-economic attitude and denominational membership have also changed. During the first half of the twentieth century, Catholics tended to side with economic conservatism in the United States. Partly under the influence of the social encyclicals, liberal Catholics today have become critical of the competitive system (Wilson, 1962).

Protestant positions have also shifted. Formerly conservatism and orthodox theology went together. Today the neo-orthodox movement in Protestantism is conservative theologically but liberal politically (Williamson, 1962).

Over the years, most American religious groups have been, in varying degrees, conservative with respect to the labor-management issue. A well-known study by Liston Pope (1942) shows how such an issue can escalate into violence. The religious institutions in the community played their part in the escalation. The church in the milltown of Gastonia emphasized personal virtues, producing efficient workers, but not managers. Few ministers demonstrated interest in social amelioration. No statements were issued about child labor, the mill village system or wages and hours. The sects proposed withdrawing from the world, discouraging social activity. In sermons, individual conversion and private virtue were demanded as fundamental requirements for the growth of the church and the correlative correction of social institutions. When, in 1929, the millworkers struck, a low proportion of church members were found among the strikers. Yet the strikers who were sometimes led by outside people were apt to become alienated from the strike because of their organizers' indifference to religion. The strikers held their own religious services, led by a lay preacher who had joined them, and sang spirituals and hymns at strike meetings. Ministers of the regular churches held the mills to be a blessing to the community. They abjured workers to look to the employers with gratitude and patience, and to seek redress through individual and not through collective action. The established churches and the lay preachers legitimized opposing positions through sermons and prayer meetings. Before the strike was over, violence had claimed several lives.

As the church has begun to draw leadership from among the disadvantaged, class conflict has been introduced into its own ranks. Among

Unitarian-Universalists, for example, a Black Caucus confronted white members of the church with Black Power demands to call an emergency conference on rioting in Negro ghettos, to establish an affiliate Black affairs council. This council would have a "clear majority of Blacks" and provide for self-determination for Negro Unitarians. The Church's Board of Trustees squelched the Caucus, and appointed, instead, a Commission on Religion and Race (*New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1966, p. 32, col. 3).

More extreme positions may be assumed by factions within a church having access to their own religious facilities. Black militants in Detroit were able to meet at the Shrine of the Black Madonna of the Central United Church of Christ to develop a plan for an independent Black government in five southern states and for demanding "reparation" of several billion dollars for injury due to slavery and subsequent discrimination (*New York Times*, Mar. 28, 1968, p. 50, col. 4).

Sometimes the parish clergyman is the activist facing resistance of the higher leadership on the one side and of the parishioners on the other side. In a study of clergy involvement in Civil Rights, Jeffrey K. Hadden found that in six major Protestant denominations, the clergymen were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the general principle of social justice for Negroes in America. Yet, three out of four laymen in these denominations said that they would be upset if their minister were to participate in a picket line or demonstration. Half agreed that "the clergy should stick to religion and not concern themselves with social, economic and political questions" (*New York Times*, IV, 7: 1). Staff members of the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania experienced pressure from above and they were warned by their Bishop to stop advocating civil disobedience or face possible dismissal. This statement was prompted by the call of one priest to young men to burn their draft cards. The Bishop said, "It is one thing to minister to those whose concern leads them to challenge a law or its administration as unjust. It is another thing to encourage them to break the law. Such encouragement is prohibited" (*New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1967, p. 7, col. 1). Parishioner pressure against liberal parish clergy is further illustrated by the dismissal by the Board of Deacons of the minister and two assistants from the Tatnall Square Baptist Church in Macon, Georgia, after the three had advocated an "open-door" policy and tried to seat an exchange student from Ghana. When, after the dismissal, the student from Ghana made his second attempt to attend services, the church received a bomb threat.

Cleavage between religious leadership and the parishioners, while occurring, as illustrated above, is not typical. More typically, they agree about the definition of the issue and the enemy and about the legitimacy of the use of force. Religious leaders may participate in preparation for the use of violent means. A Harlem clergyman organized an armed militia, and advised local residents to buy guns to protect themselves against "criminalization." The pastor has a pistol permit, and says he always carries a .32-caliber pistol with him, even in church. In a similar situation Harlem residents have rallied in the St. Charles Roman Catholic Church to demand police protection. One of the leaders proposed forming an auxiliary civilian police with civilians riding in prowl cars and freeing uniformed police to patrol on foot (*New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1967, p. 3, col. 1). The civilian anti-crime patrol, called the Maccabees, organized by Rabbi Samuel Schrage in the Crown Heights

section of Brooklyn, is another illustration. Negro leaders have called this a vigilante group directed against Negroes. The Maccabees' civilian car patrol was not welcomed by the Police Department but was accepted by the Minister's Movement of Brooklyn and Long Island, a Negro clergymans' group (*New York Times*, June 26, 1966, Sec. 1, p. 75, col. 4).

These illustrations suggest, but do not prove, an increasingly activist position by some religious leaders with respect to certain issues of social conflict. The word "assassin" appeared in this very context. In eleventh century Persia, a secret society of the Ismaelite sect of Islam tried to exert social control through assassination. They would feed "hashish" to a select band of young men, and the Grand Master would give them a glimpse of the sensual joys awaiting them in heaven . . . until they were ready, even at the cost of their lives to do his bidding. The Crusaders, another group of religious zealots, modified the term "hashishin" into the European term "assassin" (Lerner, 1935).

Zealotry in Pursuit of Infidels

Wars among the gods and their respective clients are recounted in the mythic past. Violent church leadership attacking other religious groups is a recurrent event in European history. Pope Innocent III's 12th century "crusade" against the Albigenses is one historical example. When General of the Church Simon De Montfort won a rich province and his soldiery plundered the city, the issues were described in ultimate terms. The enemy was characterized in extremes; charged with being enemies of God addicted to incest and sodomy. Massacre seemed only proportionate to the crime. When the soldiers wished to stop the slaughter because some good Catholics might perish, the papal legate answered them, "Kill! God will know his own."

The King gave the first signal for the St. Bartholomew's Massacre in 1572, which accounted for 50,000 lives, and earned the congratulations of other Catholic powers. The Sorbonne defended the achievement, and Pope Gregory XIII celebrated it by striking a medal.

In all of these acts, religious motivation is mixed with the economic or political. The massacre of Catholics by Cromwell in Ireland was seemingly economically motivated, but religious rationales removed the victims from the range of scruple and sympathy. They were God's enemies, despisers of the holy sacraments or idolators. Russian Orthodox Church leadership was implicated in anti-Jewish pogroms. Religious elements, such as the "Blood libel," raised the conflict to its ultimate frenzy (Brailford, 1935). More recently, in Belfast, the Reverend Ian Paisley, moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church and also a leader of Northern Ireland extremists, conducted a virulent campaign against the country's Catholic minority, involving, among other things, a procession beginning at the church, carrying anti-Catholic placards. The marchers were pelted with rocks by Catholics (*New York Times*, July 7, 1966, p. 11, col. 3).

America has known violent persecution of Catholics, Mormons, and Hutterites among others. Glock and Stark (1966) found that certain types of orthodox Christianity foster anti-semitic attitudes. American anti-semitism had the leadership of such preachers as Gerald Winrod and Gerald L. K. Smith, at the same time that liberal Protestants, evolving a philo-semitic

stance, supported moves for the admission of Jewish refugees and expressed sympathy for Jewish national aspirations in Palestine.

A great deal has been written about the relationship between religion and prejudice (e.g., Vanecko, 1966; Cody, 1960). The relationship may be either positive or negative depending upon the meaning to the person of his religious involvement. If individuals are deeply involved in their religions for "intrinsically" religious reasons, then religiousness and prejudice tend to be negatively correlated. However, if their involvement is intense, but it is for "extrinsic" reasons—such as conformity to a general norm or practiced for an ulterior aim—then involvement is positively correlated with prejudice. Feagin (1964), for instance, using this distinction, originally suggested by Gordon Allport, found that extrinsic religion is related to prejudice while intrinsic is not. Behavioral science expositors of Allport sometimes assume a value stance regarding intrinsic religion as a "truer" faith. However, both are practiced faiths and both equally "true." Intrinsic religion seems more relevant for managing individual inner turmoil. Extrinsic religion is more socially oriented. The attitude of prejudice is one instance of a social attitude, specifically a conflictual social attitude, and so becomes associated with extrinsic religion.

Protestant Fundamentalists in the United States have, at times, harbored severe prejudice against other religious groups. The derisive term "fighting Fundamentalists" has been applied by their opponents. Fundamentalism tends to be apocalyptic, prophetic, critical of modern life, and apprehensive of the future. Fundamentalists have fought such issues as the teaching of evolution and sinfulness in the mass communications media. They respond to critics of their activist position by noting that the Bible exhorts Christians to fight a good fight and to war against "spiritual wickedness in high places" (Ephesians 6: 12) (Moberg, 1962, p. 283).

Interreligious clashes may contribute to the development of the contending groups. A student of the Black Muslims argues that their Black Supremacy ideology may help purge the lower-class Negroes of their inferiority complex (Essien-Udom, 1962). Pressure upon the American Catholic minority during the 19th century has been said to have furnished the hammer and the anvil by which a distinctive American Catholic cultural unity was created and could absorb later immigrants (McAvoy, 1948). While some conflict, and perhaps some violence, may have positive functions for the contending groups, a high degree of conflict must be destructive. As Toynbee (1947) notes in his *Study of History*, challenge and response can be the historical dynamic, but a society can wither from an excess of challenge.

Perhaps the most famous case of interreligious conflict illustrates this point. Runciman, a recent historian of the Crusades, concludes that it was only in some aspects of the political development of Western Europe that the Crusades left a mark. Apart from the widening of the spiritual domain of Rome, the chief results of the Crusades for Western Christendom were negative. The Crusades were the principal cause for the decline of the Moslem world. High ideals were besmirched by cruelty and greed, enterprise and endurance by blind and narrow self-righteousness, and the Holy War itself was nothing more than a long act of intolerance in the name of God (Runciman, 1954).

Zealotry Among the Dispossessed

The state is the main guardian of violence. Religious groups either legitimate its power, compete with it for the control of violence, or withdraw. The contemporary state implements violence through specialists—through its police and military. Historically, religion and state were not always differentiated. The king was priest, as in ancient Egypt, or the king acted in the name of religion, as in ancient Israel (Weber, 1952). Warriors were religious warriors, or in Weber's terms, charismatic war heroes. Weber characterizes Nazirites as ecstatic warriors and the Nabiim as magical ecstatics standing on the periphery of the battle. In pre-prophetic times, the spirit of Yahwe was not an ethical power nor a habitual religious state but was an acute demonic super-human power of varying, most frequently frightful, character. The savage charismatic warrior heroes of the Israelite tribes knew themselves to be seized by this force. The warrior knew, for example, that the god he implored and the enemies' god were different.

Nowadays, this description seems to fit some religious cults or more extreme sects. With the differentiation of state and religion, and with increased rationalization and bureaucratization, the religious warrior image is strongest in the religions of the dispossessed. Cult and sect members tend to be economically disadvantaged, socially estranged from the broader community or culturally different from the milieu in which they reside—sometimes they are the dispossessed in all three of these senses. (Some are "dispossessed" psychologically, but in view of the decision not to deal with the psychopathology of violence, they will not be treated here.) The National Council of Churches estimates that some 6 to 7 million Americans belong to cults and sects, which, although they include a wide variety of beliefs, have in common a recognizable deviation from the common forms of Protestantism and Catholicism. Some of the more exotic ones, such as those that find their mecca in southern California, attract people cut off from their own communities, and drawn to the thrills of a new chance (Mathison, 1960). Through these cults the socially dispossessed become spiritually possessed.

Cults have proliferated among American Negroes, but still they include but a small proportion of the Negro population. Among the larger, less esoteric and secretive cults are the United House of Prayer for All People, the Church of God, the Black Jews, the Moorish Science Temple of America and the Father Divine Peace Mission Movement. A student of the problem suggests that the Negro community today is, with respect to religion, splitting in two directions. Increasingly, Negroes are becoming cultists, but also, increasingly, they are becoming Catholics (Johnston, 1956). Most cults are neither more violent nor violence prone than the religions of the majority.

At times, though, a cult breaks into the news with some violent act. A Haitian was accused of killing a woman, also from Haiti, who, he believed, had placed a voodoo curse on him. He had asked her to cure him. She said that she could not, and he retorted that he was not going to die alone (*New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 18, col. 3).

Much discussion of the role of cults and sects of the dispossessed in social action has rested on a model of psychological compensation and sublimation—as, indeed, has much of the discussion of the social relevance of religion in general. The highly-charged atmosphere of cultic ritual is said to

drain off energies or turn them inward. In this respect cults are inimical to relevant social action, especially violent action. This orientation informs some classic studies of the sociology of religion. Gilbert Murray (1925) writes of the failure of nerve in ancient Greece. When one turns, he says, from the great writers of classical Athens—Sophocles or Aristotle—to those of the Christian era, there is a difference in tone; there is a rise of asceticism, of mysticism and in a sense, a pessimism, a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life, and of faith in normal human effort, a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation, and indifference to the welfare of the state. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and to enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures; but rather, by means of a burning faith and a contempt for the world and its standards, by ecstasy of suffering and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins. The best feed-ground for superstition, says Murray, is a society in which the fortunes of men seem to bear practically no relation to their merits and efforts.

Under stress the cult may move in either an activist or a passive contemplative direction. In broad historical perspective, Toynbee (1956) has noted that the founders of the higher religions have arisen chiefly from the members of the disintegrating society, whose normal human sufferings have been intensified to an abnormal degree at the social breakdown and disintegration resulting from the failure of parochial community worship. By parochial community, Toynbee means the deification of the nation. Founders of the higher religions can emerge from a group submerged in a parochial community, that is, from being uprooted from one's home, and becoming a refugee, exile or deportee who has been wrenched out of his ancestral framework. The infliction of such extreme suffering on a grand scale is a self-indictment of the society in which these atrocities are committed. Both Buddhism and Christianity, says Toynbee, accept suffering as an opportunity for acting on the prompting of love and pity.

Some but not all cults of the dispossessed are prompted by love and pity. In studies of American Indians, messianic movements, the Ghost Dance and the Peyote cult are linked to hard times, times of deprivation. Scholars consider these phenomena among the deprived as alternatives to environmentally oriented action (Barber, 1941). Another sociological study notes that Indians developed Peyotism, Shakerism and The Great Message as a striving for personal reformation and reorganization of the social system when they realized that physical resistance no longer could be realistically hoped for (Voget, 1957).

In a study of a miraculous healing movement in Puerto Rico, Tumin and Feldman (1955) rely on a similar model. They describe predisposing elements for believing in the appearance of the Virgin on this occasion. The believers, who had aspirations for improvement through both natural and magical means, were rural dwellers who worked hard with little recreation, had low education and were subject to widespread, enduring illnesses. This movement arose against the background of a religious ideology which is a relatively inactive and devitalized feature of the culture.

Glock (1964) associates the formation of most religious groups with some perceived deprivation. Of course, all acts are motivated by some sense of lack. Glock argues more specifically that religious resolutions rather than other

institutional resolutions of a problem posed by a deprivation are likely to occur when the nature of the deprivation is inaccurately perceived, and where those experiencing the deprivation are not in the position to work directly at eliminating the causes. Religious resolutions, he continues, are likely to compensate for feelings of deprivation rather than to eliminate its causes. Sects are responses to economic deprivation, churches to social deprivation, and cults to psychic deprivation.

The mechanism of projection may be resorted to as an alternative to sublimation. What cannot be hoped for in the present is projected into an eschatological future, thus diverting concern away from action in the present. Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, emphasize eschatology, in their case a cataclysmic end of the world succeeded by the millennium. Cohn (1955), a prominent student of this group, categorizes them as a typical proletarian movement with a system of esoteric knowledge, a doctrine of rejection of the world, and a description of a millennium as its responses to a feeling that social disputes can no longer be arbitrated through a common governmental institution. Sublimation, compensation or projection are but a few of the possible responses to a frustrating situation. These particular responses are conceived in the image of coping. In such a frame of reference, human acts are simply responses to environmental events.

Alternatively, man may initiate action on the environment. His behavior is then a way of shaping events about him. Experimental evidence raises doubts about such a theory of compensation. The hypothesis that extensive religious training would lead one to express less anger toward his environment and more likely turn it in upon himself was tested experimentally and not substantiated (Bateman and Jenson, 1958). The observation that cultic activities emerge under perceived deprivation is, no doubt, correct. The inference that they are compensatory, in the sense that compensation truncates rational action to erase the deprivation, is probably too limited an explanation.

Cults might better be viewed as incubators of future action, a rear staging area from which later challenges to the system may be launched. William James (1902) speaks of a religious enthusiasm producing contempt of danger. The annals of martyrdom relate the triumph of religious imperturbability.

A study of the Negro church of some two decades ago suggests this training function. Fauset (1944) says that the Negro church represents the one institution among Negroes in the United States where we are privileged to observe the seeds of revolt, so inherent in the institution of slavery, taking root and sprouting. Indeed, the American Negro church viewed historically provides numerous vivid examples of the Negroes' capacity to revolt. The cult is a graduate church. It heightens the sense of the esoteric within the group. Little more than a decade later the Negro revolt spilled into the public arena, its leadership drawn from the established as well as the protest churches and its political forms resembling some cultic precursors.

The cult generates the energy and the know-how to act though the opportunity for action may be delayed. It also serves to locate the evil. The cult develops spiritual rapport among its devotees. And, sometimes, hostility toward nonmembers, particularly unsympathetic or critical observers.

The intense atmosphere of the cult is like the religious atmosphere of the most primitive people (Jones, 1939). A report of a meeting of the Mighty I

Am cult in Chicago is illustrative. The authorities gave the leader some difficulties and, as a response, he shouted to his flock that he was calling down a curse on all Chicagoans. And he did. He sent down the "cows and pigs and lambs you have deprived of life in your stockyards to haunt you." As he yelled each new threat, his followers would cry in unison: "Annihilate! Annihilate! Annihilate!" (Mathison, 1960).

If a cult is thought of as a training ground for later action, it does not always follow that those involved in these preparatory activities will be the same individuals who later implement the violence. It is not only the preparation of individuals which is taking place. It is the preparation of a social structure, of a social system. In the particular case cited above, seven-eighths of the "annihilators" were elderly women, hardly soldiers of vengeance. Sometimes the small social structure of the cult may be a device for energizing a much larger system. In this sense the Black Muslim movement among American Negroes may be viewed as a general Negro revitalization movement (Laue, 1964).

The previous sections dealt with religious legitimations of violence. It was argued that religious groups justify violence by escalating issues to life and death matters and by specifying the locus of evil. Individuals experience anxiety when called upon to execute violence. The following sections show how religious groups enable individuals to act violently despite their fears. Specifically, it will be argued that participation in religious ritual helps engender individual courage to commit a violent act. The ability of ritual to do this is an extension of a general function of ritual in providing courage to act. For that act to become violent it must usually be accompanied by the legitimating process described above.

The generic question is, how does an occurrence in a social group influence a personality event? The answer will be that it does so, essentially, in two ways. First, through religious ritual, norms legitimating violent acts are reaffirmed. The individual's behavior is supported with reference to these norms. The previous pages illustrated the character of this support in turning matters into ultimates and incarnating an opponent as the devil's disciple. Second, religious ritual assists the individual in converting his fear of the potential conflict into an enthusiastic thrust toward the act. This happens, in part, through the reaffirmation of norms. From the actor's point of view, this implies strengthened commitment to the group and its norms. The group, in turn, affirms its solidarity behind the actor. On the motivational level a transformation of energy occurs. The energy which has been bound up in fear is transformed to an enthusiasm. The individual is symbolically carried through a series of experiences similar in form, but in reverse order, to those through which his personality was evolved.

A Background Note From Personality Theory

This articulation between personality and society will be explicated in terms of Talcott Parsons' (1955) model of personality development. This model conceives of personality as evolving through successive differentiations in the structure of motivation occasioned by successive encounters of the individual with role partners. The reverse process is one of dedifferentiation of the structure of motivation again through an encounter with role partners.

To set the stage for this theoretical model, a few words are in order regarding Parsons' theory of personality development.

Parsons begins with an image of the neonate's undifferentiated motivational flow. As the neonate invests objects in the situation with motivational significance, part of his formerly undifferentiated personality is structured or differentiated relative to this external object. The unit of structured personality is referred to as an internalized object. Each internalized object is the role complement of the situational object. The child experiences the external object as an element of behavior "expected" of him. The complementary internalized object is a "disposition" to behave in terms of these expectations. In stable social relationships, there is a balance between the expectations and the dispositions.

The neonate, originally physiological organism, does not discriminate in any symbolic sense between itself and others. Strictly speaking, without apprehended "others" there is still no "self." The distinction between needs which are immediately satisfied and those that suffer delay in their satisfaction provides the first hint of otherness. A first differentiation takes place with this "realization" of otherness. "Other" is associated with the satisfactions upon which he is dependent, and "self" is organized about those he can meet autonomously. A segment of the personality has been organized in terms of the self-other relationship, around the "dispositions" of the self and the "expectations" of the other. This first differentiation takes place along the dimension termed by Parsons "specificity/diffuseness." The introduction of "specificity," in place of prior "diffuseness," implies that the world can now be related to in separate "specific" segments. Previously, the relation between neonate and world had been global. In Freudian terms, this parallels the oral stage of development.

From the diffuse "ground" of mother-child identity, the relatively segmented "figure" of a self-parent role emerges. The role is segmented in two senses. First, the self-parent relation is separated from the remaining relations; and, second, the behavioral dispositions of self become distinct from the behavioral expectations of parent. Social interaction is now possible.

The primary ability to organize situational objects, to cathect specific aspects of the situation, has been established. However, the child can organize only according to the law of feeling. Situational objects are discriminated as the liked and disliked, the needed and the annoying. The child's emotional expression, originally unfettered, is confronted with expectations of control. New demands are made and disciplines imposed. The child encounters situations where affect is to be inhibited, and he becomes aware of a new distinction in his object environment.

Under the impact of this demand, the parental situational object is now seen as fulfilling two functions, in effect being two objects: a sanctioning agent demanding "conformity" is differentiated and stands alongside the "nurturing" agent. Simultaneously, one part of the self is cathected in a complementary way as being disciplined and another part as being nurtured. The sanctioning agent expects and rewards disciplined or controlled performance. Correspondingly, a new disciplined self, characterized by dispositions to respond "adequately," is differentiated from a former autonomous self. In most cultures, expectations of instrumental conformity tend to be associated with the father and the nurturant expectations with the mother.

These new distinctions tend to focus around the sex role. The mother and father emerge as two distinct roles from the former parental figure, while in a complementary fashion, the child discriminates between behaviors of male and female children with reference to his own identity. Both child sex models are internalized by all children, but there is a strong cultural pressure to grant primacy to one over the other in accord with the child's gender.

The former two-role system has now differentiated into a four-role system. These are the four basic roles of the nuclear family. This differentiation takes place along what Parsons terms the affectivity/affective neutrality dimension. New affectively neutral, emotionally restrained relationships are distinguished, and the affective, emotional roles are segregated in specific contexts. In Freudian terms, this process begins in the anal and concludes in the Oedipal phase.

With perception no longer so completely under emotional control, the way is prepared for logical or theoretical thinking. At this stage, the child still categorizes objects in terms of their relations to the child. Through participation in the wider subsystems of peer and school groupings, he learns ways of categorizing according to more general rules. Father is no longer simply his parent but is also classed as an instance of the general category "man." The child learns to differentiate between the family members who are grouped with him by "blood ties" and other children who belong with him according to general age and sex criteria. The child now can cathect according to general principles, by universalistic standards. This new differentiation of categories of objects, of role partners, takes place along what Parsons terms the universalism/particularism axis. New relations based on universalistic standards emerge from the previous particularistic ground.

Yet, true theoretical thought requires still another step. Though objects may be classed objectively by universalistic rules, they are still seen only according to their inherent characteristics, their qualities, characteristics which they sustain through all situations. With exposure to school, later to the occupational structure, the child learns that new classifications may be based on the performances of objects. Pupils may be grouped in school on the basis of their scholastic achievements. One may enter a professional category through training. Role partners need no longer be grouped simply by given attributes but may also be grouped according to their functions. This differentiation is along what Parsons terms the performance/quality dimension. New relations based on performances become possible.

Each step in the differentiation of personality depends on the prior step. The performance/quality distinction would not be possible unless the child had universalistic standards by which to judge performance. The universalism/particularism differentiations depend on the ability to inhibit affective expression in the relations universalistically defined. Affective neutrality could be distinguished from affectivity because a prior ability to relate specifically or segmentally, rather than diffusely, had already defined sectors of emotional restraint.

As each branching occurs, the prior steps do not disappear but remain as "ground" or context for the new differentiation. The discriminated mother and father figures are still joined to the common parental figure from which they derived. The common source relates them as a collectivity or a "we" with respect to the child. He has gained mother and father but not lost his parents.

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The Achievement of the Courage To Be Zealous

General Principles

Parsons' model of personality development reveals how conflicts among social "expectations" may be reflected in conflicts among the internalized "dispositions" which complement them. An external value conflict is experienced as an internal need conflict. When the realization of one value implies the frustration of another value, the problem of the approach/avoidance conflict, the individual requires some special motivational encouragement to act despite the frustration. The individual faced with executing a violent act is faced with overcoming some rather deep needs. He may not only fear retribution but, more importantly, may fear the infliction of harm on another. S. L. A. Marshall found that only 25 percent of infantrymen in battle fire their weapons. Some do not fire even when being overrun. The fear of killing, rather than the fear of being killed, is the common cause of battle failure (Marshall, 1947). Further, courage is also needed when some role or value is so highly differentiated, especially along the affectively neutral and universalistic axes that the self is radically removed from its situation. This is the problem of apathy. Motivational commitment to the role, enthusiasm for its realization, is limited.

Courage to quash either anxiety or apathy is achieved by symbolically carrying the personality back to less differentiated levels to prepare it to enact some value or role on a more differentiated level. The conflicts between need dispositions may be undercut by returning to the source of both of the differentiated dispositions in a prior less differentiated need disposition. Broad motivational energy underlying both of the conflicting values is then mobilized and focused on that role or value to be enacted. This seems to be the psychological correlate to Tillich's (1952) ontological faith absorbing doubt. The notion is not new to social science. It is implied in the concept of ambivalence.

"Going back" along the genealogical tree of personality is not a process of desocialization. Once a differentiation takes place in the socialization process, it is irrevocable. The "return" is not a matter of destroying differentiations but of holding certain differentiations in abeyance. That differentiation which determines the role or value to be realized remains a constant context. Were this not the case, religion would be, as Freud saw it, a regressive phenomenon. It would be simply a going back to childhood patterns of behavior. The individual would return to primary narcissism with its oceanic feeling. The thesis of this paper is that the energy of prior levels is tapped and made available for enacting later differentiated roles or values. The regression is but a means to the ultimate progression. In the language of ego psychology, it is a regression in the service of the ego. Since pathologically motivated violence is excluded from consideration here, the violent act with which we are concerned is an ego-controlled act.

According to the model, personality differentiation occurs through the individual's participation in a series of differentiating social systems. The achievement of courage, the invocation of zealotry, is accompanied by a process of social dedifferentiation. Dedifferentiation of the personality structure comes about through participation in a series of dedifferentiated social structures. Religious worship, ceremonies, prayers are such dedifferentiating activities.

The rituals, rites and ceremonies function to carry the worshippers back along the path of social dedifferentiation. As the structure recedes, motivational energy is released and becomes available for the realization of the feared act of violence. At the same time, the group is reaffirming the norms which support that violence. The order in the dedifferentiating ritual must exactly reverse that of differentiation. First, the quality/performance distinction is placed in abeyance. Then, order, the universalism/particularism, affectivity/neutrality, and, possibly, specificity/diffuseness distinctions slip away. Each new dedifferentiation requires that the preceding ones have taken place. This is not unlike the "value added" concept in economics which has been applied so skillfully to social and psychological analyses (Smelser, 1963). The degree of courage, zealotry or the intensity of motivational energy which becomes available depends upon three factors: how far back the dedifferentiation goes, the number of times the worshipper goes through the series of stages, and the number or scope or depth of the values/needs touched by the intended act.

Four Steps Toward Socio-Religious Dedifferentiation

Various forms of worship function to promote dedifferentiation along each of the four dimensions. Each religion may have different acts of worship to realize dedifferentiation, or some particular stage of dedifferentiation. On the other hand, a given act may function at several stages of dedifferentiation.

The focus of this discussion has been on the mobilization of energy in the individual. From the perspective of the social community in whose context this is realized, the outcome is crystallized in a norm legitimating the violent act. The community affirms its consensus around this individual. Thus, through religious ritual, support for violence is attained on three levels: the psychological level in which the energy of courage is mobilized; the social, in which the solidary supportive group is manifest; and the cultural, in which the legitimating norm is manifested. Earlier, this paper illustrated the use of legitimating norms. Here, we are concerned with formal aspects of their evolution.

Who may worship and who may not.—The first step is to set aside the quality/performance distinction, the last, most mature differentiation of the personality. This is accomplished in the decision made on eligibility for membership in the worshipping group. Performance becomes irrelevant to the acceptability of a member. The criteria for belonging refer to inherent qualities of the individual—his being of the "elect" or of a particular lineage. This is not so much the beginning of the ritual to promote religious zealotry as a precondition for it.

Dedication to the belief system has a function here. A belief is considered

an ascriptive and inherent criterion. People do not bring themselves to believe. They either do or do not believe. The world is divided between believers and nonbelievers. By assent to a common set of beliefs, individuals declare that they possess the signs of eligibility for membership in a common group.

Initiatory rites belong here. Initiation does not principally depend on a performance on the part of the initiate. It depends on a judgment by other members of the group that he possesses the identifying quality. The initiating acts in themselves do not make an individual a member. In the case of the Indian lad who must spend 3 days in the desert, it is not the performance which counts. It is the fact of submitting and allowing something to happen to him, of laying himself open to an experience. The appearance in a dream confirms his adulthood. Similarly, the initiate who walks on hot coals, and the Bar Mitzvah who demonstrates his ability to read scripture do not gain membership by virtue of their performances. These performances are signs by which the group may judge whether or not the initiate possesses the necessary qualities for membership.

The quality based acceptance of the individual is paralleled by the separation of the object of the incipient violence. The first preparation for the impending act of violence is the separation of the victim from the community. That takes place at this stage.

Achieving brotherhood and antagonism.—The next dedifferentiation is along the universalism/particularism dimension. The ascriptive basis of membership in the worshipping community has been established. Ritual acts now demonstrate solidarity among the members. With the credentials of those present established, emphasis shifts to their relations to one another. Classification according to universalistic standards recedes. The brotherhood of all believers becomes primary.

Physical convergence of members of the tribe or the assembling of the congregation demonstrates their dedifferentiated character, their particularistic unity. Pilgrimages to Lourdes, Mecca or Jerusalem have this as one function. The congregants become as one in the sight of God.

Ethical behavior based on brotherly love contributes to this dedifferentiated solidarity. Differences in ethical obligations to a brother and to a foreigner point up the particularistic aspect of the ethical decision. Acts of charity contribute to this particularistic integration. And charity is defined in this context by its departure from universalistic standards. Even obligatory alms establish a particularistic relationship between the giver and the receiver. Subjected to universalistic standards, they become taxes.

Declarations of dedication to the belief system also contribute to integration here. On the previous level they were signs of membership. Here they assert that those who believe in the same things are bound together in these beliefs.

Rhythms of religious ritual are also dedifferentiating. Moving in rhythm, members of a group pattern their relationship in time and space. The larger rhythms of the yearly religious calendar guide the people converging upon and diverging from the place of worship. Rhythmic worship is orderly worship which enables people to move in harmony. The rhythm of prayer joins the voices of the worshippers into one voice. The poetic structure of many prayers encourages this harmony. Group chanting and singing,

worshippers rising and bowing at the same time, transforms congregants into a congregation.

The group being dedifferentiated is not limited to the physically present one. Ceremonies link in space and time those physically distant from one another. The larger rhythms of religious life assure the worshippers in one community that those in another land are participating, if not simultaneously, at least at a corresponding time. Moslems bow low in prayer at the same appointed times each day, and assemble at the mosque when it is for them Friday noon. Common text and common language of prayer are other ways of uniting adherents in removed communities. All Moslems open their morning devotion with the same words, "Allah is great" and "Allah is merciful." The Arabic language, whether understood or not, is ubiquitously the language of prayer. An Urdu-speaking Moslem can pray alongside a Turk.

Social dedifferentiation in historical time takes place. Tradition preserves forms of devotion through time. Present, past and future worshippers join in contemporaneity without simultaneity. Revelation occurring in previous time is relevant to the present. Hallowing common ancestors creates togetherness in time. Myths of origin show worshippers that they are brothers grown from the same roots.

Suffering is an important social integrator. A person suffering for the sake of another gives up a part of his self to that other and merges with him. When several suffer to realize the same values, each devotes a part of himself to the collective. In this mutual suffering, each is giving his self for the other. Realization of the value is a joint realization of that devoted part of each person.

Sacrifice is the religious model for suffering. In sacrifice, a possession, a part of the self, is laid upon the altar. It is been either entirely destroyed, that is, consumed by the deity, or partially burned and the remainder shared by some or all the worshippers. The model is that of communion (Smith, 1956) whereby God and man become one through God eating man. The social group absorbs the individual. Rituals of confession and commitment fulfill this function in a contemporary Protestant setting. The feast presents the reverse image. In the feast the totem animal is consumed. Man and God become one as man absorbs the manna of the deity. Man eats God. In many rituals these two forms alternate. First there is sacrifice; then feast. First God eats man; then man eats God.

This order of sacrifice before feast, atonement before rejoicing, is found in most cases. Why cannot the order be reversed with rejoicing preceding sacrifice? The answer seems to stem from the requirement that dedifferentiation proceed in given steps. While rejoicing together promotes particularistic relations, its primary function is emotional release on the next level. Until the worshippers have gone through the particularistic step and become brothers, it is difficult for them to drop emotional inhibitions. When the order is reversed and affective release precedes solidarity, the sacrifice has less the character of communion than of guilt offering.

Ascetic rites and taboos also dedifferentiate. They too are sacrifices requiring denial of part of the self. Asceticism and taboo also discipline the emotions until solidarity is achieved. They prevent premature movement to the next level. They also have a function at the prior level, at which abstinence from a type of food may signify membership.

Prayers of thanksgiving, thank-offerings, and grace said when food is already on the table seem to create a problem from our point of view. They do not precede an act for which courage is needed, but follow a successful action. Thanksgiving and adoration may be thought of in two ways. On the one hand, they have a "pattern maintenance" function, preserving already achieved courage. In this sense, they fit the model of feast following sacrifice. The American Thanksgiving may be thought of in this light as providing strength to face the winter. On the other hand, thanksgivings and adorations may be considered celebrations which are primarily tension-reductive rather than tension-productive. Then they become not true religious rites but rather expressive ceremonies, as recreational activities. Thanksgivings and celebrations come in so many different garbs that they deserve a special analysis.

Piacular rites also contribute to social dedifferentiation but in a more roundabout way. Death is the supreme differentiator. Malinowski (1955) and Warner (1937) argue that death excises a role occupant leaving a gap in the social structure. Consequently, the group assembles to reassert its solidarity. The problem seems more severe. Warner notes that it is not the removal of just one role occupant. The immediate reaction to death is the social withdrawal of the bereaved as well. The dedifferentiating motif of burial and mourning ceremonies is a response to a whole set of unfulfilled roles. Death, as a differentiating force, is courage preventive. The spirit of the deceased is often intuited as evil or devilish. The sadness associated with piacular or mourning rites seems related, in part, to this confrontation with courage prevention, with the devil. Warner, in his study of Murngin society, notes that when a victim is judged to be dying because of magic, the community withdraws from him. Isolation hastens his death. This gives further insight into the piacular. Mourning is not intended to retrieve the victim but to make sure that he is completely removed. Having turned into an evil spirit, he is a courage preventor who must be separated so as not to endanger the courage of the survivors. Another way of handling this is to define the deceased as a martyr—a positive image around which the group can rally. This is especially important in an atmosphere of violence where death is common.

At this stage, the already segregated intended victim is defined as evil and his obliteration not only justified but needed. The universalistic standards are set aside and the particularistic relation of hate put in their place.

Releasing affect, the precipitant of violence.—With the establishment of group solidarity and particularistic loyalty, the breakdown of emotional restraints becomes less dangerous. Dedifferentiation may now take place on the affectivity/affective neutrality dimension. An inhibition may be thought of as an emotional secret. In a system of universalistic relationships, these restraints are functional. They protect the status occupant against conflicting demands of his various role partners. They also contain impulsive release, a necessity for the accomplishment of instrumental action. In a society of brothers, secrets and inhibitions are disturbing. They are a barrier to dedifferentiation. A series of rites functions to place affective neutrality in abeyance and encourage affective expression. Ordinarily, this does not lead to complete unreserve or orgiastic expression. Were emotion to dissipate wildly, it would not be available for the realization of the act. Emotion is released under controlled conditions. It is released and simultaneously gathered up

and channeled. This is possible because the diffuse/specific discrimination has not yet been placed in abeyance. Emotion is released toward segmentally defined aspects of the structure, released and channeled toward the specific role or value to be realized.

The lack of humor in worship is striking. Courage achieving is everywhere a serious business. Durkheim notes this as "respect." James (1929) calls it "solemn," and Otto (1958) writes of the "mysterium tremendum." The reason may be that humor is tension releasing. To laugh during a religious service would inappropriately release the tension and prevent its being channeled into the desired act. Where humor appears, it is associated with laughing away evil spirits or other disturbing elements. It is a way of frustrating the courage preventing forces.

Confession is another way of breaking down emotional barriers. Public confession in the early Christian Church is more broadly socially dedifferentiating than Confession before a single confessor or in privacy to God. Confession, of course, functions at the previous level to achieve particularistic relations. Its relevance here depends upon brotherhood already having been achieved.

Incense plays on the gentler emotions. Light, color, fire, and stained glass excite. Dimness casts visual environmental constraints into vagueness.

The rhythmic and musical aspects of ritual, uniting people particularistically at the above level, here function to encourage affectivity. Dancing appears in many religious rites. Previously, movement *together* led to solidarity. Now *movement* together evokes emotion. Rhythmic rites approach a climax with a quickening beat and less distinct risings and fallings. Pulsations become indistinguishable. Rhythmic structure recedes. Rhythm is then less able to bind and channel emotion and the worshipper is brought to the edge of the next phase. This is the optimum point for the act of violence.

Most religious invocation of zealotry stops at this point. To place specificity in abeyance would mean that the emotion released could no longer be channeled into the new act. The characteristic of the mystic is that he does continue the dedifferentiation along the specificity/diffuseness dimension. Commitment is complete. God and man become one.

Ecstasy and pitfalls in the invocation of zealotry.—There are two polar dangers in courage achieving. If it goes to the mystic extreme, to the point where no differentiations are recognized any longer, then motivation will be dissipated through an ecstatic experience. There is high courage but no act. No realization of the role or value is possible. In some ecstatic cultic experience this occurs, and, as mentioned above, the function may be preparatory. It is not necessary that the violent act eventuate immediately from the ritual. The ritual may be a training ground. On the other hand, if the differentiated structure becomes overly rigid or the social distance between the differentiated social statuses very great, then the attempt to achieve courage in this way will fail at the universalism/particularism stage. It becomes impossible to realize the brotherhood. There is neither courage nor an act.

To avoid this latter pitfall, churches in highly differentiated societies tend to attract members from a restricted range of social statuses. The extremely wealthy and the extremely poor do not attend the same church. This religious stratification is reinforced by cultural factors. There is a need for consistency

between the culture of the religious institution and that of the various social classes. In the upper classes, the universalism/performance motif is more strongly institutionalized than in the lower classes. The "hallelujahs" of the Pentecostal sects are too culturally inconsistent with the life of the upper classes. The dedifferentiating rite must be more restrained. As a consequence, the upper classes are less volatile in their violence than are the lower classes.

Contradictory requirements of differentiation and dedifferentiation may produce a problem for religious organizations. As the religious institution expands, the exigencies of organization encourage the growth of bureaucratization. The church becomes a highly differentiated group with a series of hierarchically ordered statuses of its own. It becomes more and more difficult for the church to fulfill its courage achieving function. At some point a group of members no longer able to achieve courage in this institution break off from the church and form a sect. They may also break away and form a political cell with a quasi-religious form. If, however, by this time, the norms legitimating violence and the social solidarity supporting it have been firmly established in tradition, then a cold, methodical, instrumentally controlled violence—so familiar in modern technological society—may be supported with even more terrible consequences.

THE CONSTRAINT OF ZEALOTRY

Religion enables the violent act by assisting the individual to develop the courage to face the anxiety involved in such an act. This is achieved by providing solidary social support and legitimating norms. The effective exercise of violence requires that it be subject to certain constraints. In fact, effective functioning of the social order requires constraint of violence. As Hobbes (1928) said, a war of all against all would make life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." How do religious institutions constrain zealotry?

The very same factors which invoke the violent act are also associated with less intensive events. Herein lies the church's dilemma in constraining zealotry. The conception of radical evil in Western religion, used in locating a victim for violence, has also been linked to Western man's achievement of environmental control. Religion does not create violence any more than guns kill. A gun makes the hand more potent. Religion enters as a social magnifying glass. It enlarges social conflict into a life and death issue.

The real question in the control of violence is that of dealing with the basic sources of social conflict—the differences of interests, the inequities in the distributions of social benefits and the character of social justice. It is not violence as such on which interest should focus. The legitimation of violence is the issue. In a society in which the governing polity is accepted as legitimate by all sub-groups, the very need for violence is vitiated. In this sense, religious deterrence to violence emerges out of the prophetic ideal of social justice.

Religion invokes violence and it also demands peace. Violence and peace are two sides of life—"there is a time for peace and a time for war." This paper has analyzed one side—the support and invocation of violence. Another paper could be written on the role of religion in the maintenance of peace. The relative extent to which religion, or a given religion, invokes violence or peace is a topic worthy of research. The data are not in.

Certain religions prevent conflicts from escalating into violence by disengaging from the world. The Buddhist conquest of desire takes this path. A consequence of this disengagement is that the work of the world remains undone. Religion can also escalate an interest in building into vibrant entrepreneurial activity. Another way to truncate violence is to continue the steps toward the achievement of courage. With dedifferentiation cutting back as far as the specific/diffuse distinction, the energy is dissipated in an oceanic mysticism. Here again no violent act can emerge—but again, the world's work is not done.

The violence abetted by religion is social violence. Religious institutions tend to be intolerant of idiosyncratic acts of violence such as those occurring as part of crime for individual profit. Religion's principal mechanism for sapping the roots of such idiosyncratic violence is found in the tradition of the cure of souls, of spiritual healing. Like its progeny, modern psychotherapy, the spiritual director bids the individual return to the fold and to adjust to social norms. The traditional religious means for the cure of souls involves an examination of conscience. In this examination, the individual is enabled to measure his own position against that of the broader norm. Confession opens the problem to public view aiding both the "penitent" and the spiritual director to have a clearer image of the deviance. Through such a process, the idiosyncratic activist position can shift into one of dependency. Through this dependency, the spiritual director is able to work toward a more adjusted or pacific attitude. In a sense, this reverses the procedure which enables the violent act. It points toward resocialization.

A second mechanism in the constraint of violence operates on the cultural level. In the process of enabling violence, religious culture associates the conflict issue with its own ultimates. Rather than making the issue an absolute, it may juxtapose, but not associate, the issue with the ultimate and so relatively reduce the power of the issue. It may relativize the mundane conflict by placing it in a larger context of meaning. Here, such terms as patience, balance and seeing things in proportion are appropriate.

Perhaps the significant movement of religion toward the containment of violence has been the displacement of the ecstatic in religion by formal rational law. Talmudic law did not eliminate the principle of capital punishment but set such conditions for its enactment that it became an unlikely occurrence. The development of religious law does not remove violence from society, but provides procedures limiting the conditions under which it may legitimately take place. Within the rule of law, personal vigilante action is displaced by effective legal action to redress grievances.

On the social level, religion may deter violence by stressing universal values. Rituals and beliefs may lead to an ever-widening area of peaceful relations—to the ideal of brotherhood. The ideal of brotherhood cannot erase conflict any more than pleasure can erase pain. It can, however, form an overriding consensus which serves to retain differences within limit. This ideal can rarely be realized purely within the religious system. Brotherhood must involve an actual identity of interests or complementarity of interests within the broader society.

This paper has intended neither to condemn nor to approve religious institutions because of their implication in conflict and in violence. The social impact of religion is not necessarily negative because of its implication in

conflict. Simmel (1955) and his later expositor Coser (1956) have documented the eufunctions of social conflict. It is through a process of competition or of conflict that social change comes about, that the individual personality develops to a new level, and that the social and personality system move toward internal integration. A Darwinist would not be alone in maintaining that conflict is part of the social and psychological growing process. Perhaps one of the factors in the staying power of religion has been its ability to serve as an endless resource of material for conflict and for violence. Ideational material, ritual material, the material of justification and rationalization, the material of internal group integration, the material of enemy specification and of motivational mobilization—all of these resources are couched in that imperativeness that can derive only from a sense of the ultimate.

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APPENDIX 28

**THEORIES OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

By Mark H. Haller*

PREFACE

The chief focus of the paper is two-fold: to describe changing American attitudes toward crimes of violence and crimes against property in the cities during the 20th century; and to indicate some of the effects of those attitudes upon law enforcement institutions.

There are, however, several factors that should be noted about the emphasis of the paper. To begin with, it has obviously been impossible to chronicle the history of law enforcement institutions in some fifty states and hundreds of cities and counties. Hence the chief focus of the paper is upon changing American attitudes toward criminal violence, while changes in law enforcement institutions are discussed as examples of the sorts of reforms that persons with particular attitudes wished to bring about. The paper presents a history of attitudes and their implications, not a history of the police, courts, prosecutors, prisons, and parole boards.

In addition, the paper deals primarily with crimes against persons and property that involve elements of violence. It has been impossible, however, to deal solely with such crimes. Many theories about juvenile delinquency pretend to explain many sorts of delinquency, not just delinquency linked to violence. Many criminal justice reforms were intended to deter or rehabilitate all sorts of criminals, not just those criminals inclined to violence.

Furthermore, because other consultants have reported on current theories of violent behavior, I have placed my chief emphasis on the period before 1940.

Finally, given the limited time available to prepare the report, the report makes no pretense to completeness. There was no opportunity to consult even a substantial part of the literature that is immediately available concerning American attitudes toward urban crime. The footnotes are suggestive rather than exhaustive, and the paper does little more than suggest the major trends and major changes in American attitudes toward criminal violence in the 20th century.

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**THEORIES OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

American attitudes toward criminal violence during the 20th century generally fall into three intellectual traditions. The first is the legal deterrence tradition. According to this tradition, criminal activity results from a breakdown in law enforcement and can be prevented by catching criminals and making their punishment swift, certain, and severe. A second tradition is psychological. According to this tradition, criminal behavior and criminal violence stem from psychological aberration; hence prevention or rehabilitation can be brought about most effectively by providing facilities for psychological diagnosis and for treatment of those psychological ills for which treatment is possible. The final tradition is sociological. This tradition holds that illegal behavior is rooted in the social relationships, social structure and value system of gang, neighborhood, or other groups to which the criminal belongs. Prevention of criminal behavior, then, involves changes in values, expectations, and social relations of the criminal individual or criminal groups.

The three traditions are not necessarily incompatible. Yet each tradition, during certain periods or to certain persons, has advanced beliefs that made it incompatible with the other traditions.

Throughout the 20th century—particularly since the early 1920's—the deterrent tradition has had highly vocal adherents who were critical of the psychological and sociological traditions. They have viewed many of the programs for rehabilitation to constitute the "coddling" of delinquents and criminals and thus to be a blunting of the punitive and deterrent aspects of law enforcement. At various times and in various places, adherents of the deterrent tradition have criticized the juvenile courts for their leniency, have felt that parole and probation programs allow criminals to escape their proper punishment, and have feared that rehabilitation in prisons or reformatories might turn those formidable institutions into country clubs.

The psychological and sociological traditions have usually emphasized prevention and rehabilitation and have had only limited sympathy with a punitive emphasis in law enforcement. Often campaigns to institute rehabilitation programs have been opposed by those committed to deterrence and have therefore involved direct confrontations between advocates of punishment and advocates of rehabilitation.

Yet the psychological and sociological traditions, while both usually stressing rehabilitation, have occasionally taken forms that were intellectually incompatible with each other. In general, psychological explanations of criminal behavior trace the criminal behavior to aberrant emotional development. On the other hand, some sociological theories have traced criminal behavior to the social relations and value systems—the deviant subculture—of criminal individuals and have argued, as a result, that the criminals' social relations rather than their psychological make-up led to illegal behavior. Thus, it might be as psychologically normal for an adolescent in one neighborhood to be captain of the football team as for an adolescent in another neighborhood to be a leader of a delinquent gang. Because such a delinquent was not motivated by psychological problems, he would not need

psychological counseling but rather some alterations in the social structure underlying his criminal behavior.

The three traditions have not only been rooted in differing and often incompatible intellectual beliefs but have often been supported by differing groups with an interest in crime prevention and law enforcement.

The deterrent tradition has generally had far wider support than the other traditions. In a way, it represents the formal legal theory underlying law enforcement and has appealed to the common sense notion that individuals will shun crime in order to avoid the penalties of committing criminal acts. Penalties have been attached to crimes by the legislature in order to deter the forbidden behavior. The more serious the behavior is seen to be, the more severe the penalty attached to the behavior. The death penalty, the most feared of punishments, has been reserved for those crimes that the legislature most wished to deter. Hence, in times of public alarm over crime, many groups in the society become concerned that the law enforcement system is not performing its deterrent functions. During such periods, the police will be under increased pressure to make arrests; the courts will be under pressure to find defendants guilty and to give them severe sentences; and the legislature will often be under pressure to pass laws increasing penalties and making it easier for the police and courts to function vigorously.

Thus, the deterrent tradition enjoys a wide spectrum of public support. The tradition has enjoyed strong and continued support from police officials at the local and national levels. Indeed, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has long been a highly publicized, nationally famous spokesman for the police viewpoint. Similarly, Harry J. Anslinger, who served as Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics from its founding in 1930 until his retirement in 1962, spoke nationally for a generally punitive approach to problems of narcotics addiction and distribution.¹ The deterrent view has also had strong support among prosecutors, some judges, and some correctional officials. Local bar associations, particularly through the 1930's, viewed with distaste the apparent inefficiency and corruption of urban criminal court systems and generally worked for reforms that would make justice more certain and severe. Business leaders, frequently faced with problems of crime ranging from shoplifting and embezzlement to hijacking and bank robbery, have had a continued concern with the quality of local law enforcement. Over the years, local leaders have often provided some of the strongest support for vigorous and effective law enforcement.

The psychological and sociological traditions, while lacking the broad public support of the deterrent tradition, have nevertheless drawn strength from their wide support among the "experts." The psychological and sociological traditions have dominated the academic and research professions interested in crime—including psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and professors of social work. These traditions have generally had wide acceptance among those who staffed the rehabilitation services, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and probation officers attached to the courts, as well as psychiatrists, sociologists, and social workers within the correctional institutions. The John Howard Associations—and other organizations working directly with prisoners—have also stressed rehabilitation. Because children have often been perceived to be more

malleable than adults, a variety of groups have undertaken preventive work among youths and have supported programs for rehabilitation. Such organizations have included social settlements, YMCA's, church groups, and so forth. The result has been that the criminal justice system for youths has, in its formal organization, been much more oriented toward social and psychological rehabilitation than the adult system. Indeed, in its formal organization, the law enforcement system for young delinquents has followed a predominantly rehabilitative model, while the adult law enforcement system has remained, in its formal organization, predominantly deterrent.

Because those committed to the psychological and sociological traditions have included almost all scholars actually engaged in research into the causes and prevention of crime, there have, historically, been some interesting effects. For instance, because almost all of those engaged in research have been outside the deterrent tradition, there has until quite recently been virtually no research into the degree to which law enforcement can reduce crime by deterrence.² (The sole exception to the lack of research has been the long controversy over the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent.) In addition, textbooks and courses in criminology have usually been much concerned with social and psychological roots of criminal behavior and with programs for rehabilitation. Finally, the experts, because of their recognized position as experts, have generally played an important part in surveys and investigations of crime conditions and criminal justice institutions. Hence, studies that began under demands to make law enforcement more deterrent have often resulted in recommendations aimed toward rehabilitation.

The report thus far has stressed the existence of relatively separate traditions. The purpose of the report will be to examine some of the important historical developments of each tradition. Before beginning, however, it is important to make clear that the traditions have often been mixed and have seldom appeared in pure form. Most individuals involved in reform of the criminal justice system have accepted elements from each of the traditions.

Furthermore, there have been psychological and biological theories of criminal behavior that held the criminal to be incurable. Such theories have ruled out the possibility of rehabilitation and, as a result, have often called for lifelong institutionalization for such persons in order to protect society. Such measures were not advocated to deter criminal behavior (since incurable criminals could no more be deterred than they could be rehabilitated); nevertheless, such programs could often gain support from those interested in a punitive and deterrent system of criminal justice. Reformers from all traditions could often unite on certain programs. This was particularly true of campaigns to increase the "efficiency" of law enforcement by eliminating corruption, insulating criminal justice officials from political influences, and raising the standards of training and competence of officials (often through civil service procedures). Such goals were equally sought by those for whom "efficiency" meant swifter and more certain punishment and by those who wished to raise the training of court and correctional personnel so that rehabilitation would be more likely to result. In short, the recurring campaigns for efficiency in the criminal justice system have been joined by

many persons who did not examine too carefully what the *ends* of efficiency should be.

THE DETERRENT TRADITION TO 1940

The first systematic and nationwide development of the deterrent tradition in the 20th-century United States occurred in the period from 1905 to 1915 during a series of concerted campaigns to eliminate vice and the white slave trade from American cities. The campaigns against the redlight districts of the cities would appear, on the surface, to be little concerned with criminal violence. Nevertheless, a major factor that gave impetus to the movement was a widespread belief, based on considerable evidence, that many prostitutes had not willingly entered the profession but had been victims of white slavers. The vision animating the reformers was that innocent country girls and unprotected immigrant girls were introduced into brothels through the wiles of white slavers who might drug them, rape them, or deceive them into adopting a life of sin. Hence, the city was seen to be a dangerous place for young girls; and the campaigns against white slavers and the redlight districts were designed to destroy the evil businesses that trafficked in young girls.³

In later years, the police would be the allies and leaders of the deterrent tradition. But during the campaigns against vice the police were cast as the primary officials whose dereliction of duty allowed the redlight districts to exist and prosper. The clash of reformers and the police was rooted in both a differing ideology and the reformers' opposition to police corruption.

Many police officials believed that segregated vice districts were easier to control and supervise and that efforts to eliminate prostitution would cause a scattering of vice throughout the city. Police officials, in short, disagreed with reformers concerning the uses to which law should be put. As the antivice crusade mounted in Chicago, for instance, the police in 1910 issued a series of regulations in the hope of heading off the campaign. Although operating or frequenting a house of prostitution was illegal, Chicago police regulations prescribed that "no house of ill-fame shall be permitted outside of certain restricted districts, or to be established within two blocks of any school, church, hospital, or public institution, or upon any street car line." Children between the ages of 3 and 18 were not allowed in the districts; no persons were to be held in a house by force; and open soliciting was forbidden. Furthermore, "short skirts, transparent gowns or other improper attire shall not be permitted in the parlors, or public rooms," and "obscene exhibitions or pictures shall not be permitted." In 1912, when the Chicago city council held hearings to decide whether to eliminate the segregated districts were preferable to the scattered and underground prostitution that would occur under a policy of enforcement.⁴

More important than the ideological differences between reformers and police were the investigations which, in city after city, uncovered the widespread corrupt relations between police and vice. The investigations revealed systematic and organized payoffs both to the policeman on the beat and to the captains and police chiefs. (The investigations also showed the close relationship of vice and politics that led politicians to use their influence with the police in the interests of favored houses.) Hence, the campaigns against the redlight districts became, in effect, campaigns to divorce the

police from corrupt politics and to eliminate corruption from the police departments. In city after city, church groups, social settlement workers, and civic-minded business leaders conducted campaigns to eliminate police corruption and to secure enforcement of the laws against prostitution. In many cities the reformers were successful in their efforts to eliminate the open vice districts that had long existed.⁵

The anti-vice crusade also produced some general efforts to analyze the police functions and to reorganize the urban police departments along lines that gave police better training, greater civil service protection, and improved transportation and communication facilities. A crucial figure in this development was Raymond B. Fosdick, a New York lawyer and civic reformer. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who had helped to lead the anti-vice crusade in New York City and had founded the Bureau of Social Hygiene to institutionalize the campaign, asked Fosdick in 1912 to study the police systems of Europe in order to obtain some guidance for the reform of American police systems. When Fosdick completed that study in 1914, Rockefeller asked him to survey the American police systems. Fosdick's two books became classics in an ongoing movement—continuing to the present day—to “professionalize” American police departments.⁶ Such men as Bruce Smith of the National Institute of Public Administration in New York, and August Vollmer, the reform police chief in Berkeley, Calif., achieved considerable fame in the 1920's and 1930's by their activities in studying various American police departments and recommending specific reform programs.⁷

Thus, perhaps the most important impact of the campaign against vice was the impetus it gave to the *gradual* professionalization of American urban police. The period before World War I was probably the low point in public respect for the police. Thereafter, while scandals would periodically be uncovered, the police would seldom be the main object of the reform by those within the deterrent tradition. Instead, the police joined in the tradition, and helped to divert attention upon the courts and parole boards as the primary factors chiefly responsible for undermining effective law enforcement.

In the 1920's, the deterrent tradition reached maturity both as an articulate philosophy concerning law enforcement and as an organized movement to reform the criminal justice system. The obvious cause for this development was the breakdown of urban law enforcement that accompanied prohibition. Not only was there the widespread flaunting of law—by bootleggers and customers—in the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages, but the prohibition era, with the accompanying publicity for organized criminal gangs and with the open wars between the gangs, showed the inability of law enforcement to control criminal organizations. Prohibition, however, was not all that brought on the apparent crisis in law enforcement. Statistics during the period immediately after World War I indicated a rise in crime. During the 1920's, business leaders believed that crimes against property, from bank robbery to shoplifting, were increasing. Hence, businessmen and other civic leaders launched concerted drives in many cities and towns across the nation to increase the severity of law enforcement. In short, while the failure to enforce prohibition laws was the major problem for those who regarded prohibition to be a noble experiment, for other

Americans the failure of prohibition was merely symbolic of a larger crime crisis that threatened life and property in American cities.⁸

The 1920's, like the 1960's, were a period when public alarm over crime and law violation made enforcement an issue upon which both local and national politicians had to take a stand. The 1920's, too, were a period when newspapers, through their handling of news and through editorials, kept crime at the forefront of public attention. The deterrent tradition, then, reached maturity in the 1920's in response to a general feeling that cities were a dangerous place in which to live.⁹

The central tenet of the deterrent tradition was that “today the greatest outstanding menace in America is crime” and that the chief reason for the crime menace was simply explained: “Because in this country crime, to a great extent, goes unpunished.”¹⁰ As the *Chicago Tribune* declared in 1925, “Inevitability of punishment is the greatest deterrent to the commission of sin. So the criminologists long have expounded.”¹¹ In stressing that crime arose because criminals no longer feared punishment, the ideology usually rejected more general social explanations for crime. As Raymond Moley, a leading academic expert on American criminal justice, declared:

The startling crime rate in the United States is probably due to defects in the administration of justice. Certainly it seems unlikely that any of the current guesses as to the causes . . . , such as “the aftermath of war,” the high tide of immigration, or the effects of the Volstead Act, are to be seriously credited.¹²

In rejecting other causes for the crime crises, the deterrent ideology rejected much of the ideology of rehabilitation. A Chicago paper stated, in a fairly typical outburst, “The main cause of crime is not poverty or distress,” and concluded: “There is too much mawkish sympathy for the criminal.”¹³ And a business leader stated: “So much soft-hearted sympathy has been mixed with the application of the lawful force in this community that it has become so feeble as to practically lose its effect.”¹⁴

Yet in stressing the importance of law enforcement as a deterrent of crime, many advocates of the deterrent tradition were reflecting more general fears that the disciplines and controls of society were loosening. Family discipline, they repeatedly declared, had broken down. (“It is the degeneracy of American home life generally which is now bringing forth a great number of offenders against the laws of society.”¹⁵) The traditional role of the churches in inculcating moral principles was vanishing. In general, then, the social bonds that provided discipline and guidelines to control behavior were slackening.

The evidence for a loosening of social bonds seemed all too apparent in the 1920's. The “jazz age” and the bewildering behavior of youth that accompanied the age were symptoms of the loosening of social bonds. (“The jazz age is what is leading many adolescents to commit . . . murders . . . passions are ungoverned.”) For others, the threat lay in the strange ways and “un-American” values of the immigrant groups which dominated the ethnic political machines of the cities and seemed to reject traditional American moral values. The most virulent form of this feeling was the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's, which adopted a slogan of “Law and Order,” castigated Catholics and immigrants, used force and threats to reestablish traditional American.

virtues, and had wide influence throughout the United States in the early 1920's. Yet this was also the period when a broad spectrum of public opinion supported the immigration restriction and the end of America's role as a home for oppressed from other nations. The Operating Director of the Chicago Crime Commission explained in 1929 that crimes in Chicago were the result "of the great experiment of the melting pot." The crimes would cease when immigrants adopted American values, for "Americans understand each other and talk a common language of ideals."¹⁶

The campaigns for law and order in the 1920's, then, represented the reality of the dangers of urban living. But the campaigns can also be seen to have had symbolic importance. For some Americans, society was seen to be held together by the discipline of family, church, and law which upheld the traditional American virtues. Those virtues seemed threatened in the 1920's. And thus the demands for law enforcement represented a desire to reestablish the traditional disciplines in an age when youth and immigrants appeared not to respect those traditional virtues.

(It was, of course, the representatives of urban immigrants and rebellious youths of the 1920's who took least seriously the campaign for law and order. To some extent, they appear to have recognized the symbolism of the movement and to have discounted the genuine dangers of urban life. This was analogous to the way that representatives of rebellious youth and urban blacks today reject the campaign for law and order and thereby show their recognition of some of the symbolic functions of the campaign.)

So far as specific programs were concerned, the major focus of the deterrent tradition in the 1920's was the criminal courts.¹⁷ Yet during the 1920's the demand for law and order faced a growing dichotomy between the programs that were advocated and the information that became available about the criminal courts. The highly publicized demands for severity focused upon features of trial procedure and appeals—upon easy bail, the plea of insanity, unwillingness of juries to convict, reversals of convictions by higher courts because of "technicalities," and support of the death penalty. During the same period, however, numerous studies of criminal procedure revealed that trials played a minor role in the disposition of criminal cases. Instead, most cases were either dismissed before trial or else disposed of by a plea of guilty after bargaining between the defendant and prosecutor. In the 1920's, reformers discovered the mass production and bargaining nature of urban criminal justice but, on the whole, did not know what to make of what they discovered.

The widespread public alarm over crime did lead in 1925 to a National Crime Commission in order to stimulate and channel the public concern. Its formative meeting took place in the offices of the United States Steel Corporation in New York city and was characterized by one participant as "the crusade of organized business against organized crime." The National Crime Commission worked for gun control, tried to encourage formation of state crime commissions throughout the country, and undertook a number of studies of specific problems in the area of law enforcement. The National Crime Commission had little influence and was soon overshadowed by the Wickersham Commission, established by Herbert Hoover in 1929 as an

official government body to survey crime and law enforcement in the United States.¹⁸

Probably the leading organization committed to and important in developing the deterrent tradition of the 1920's was the Chicago Crime Commission. The Chicago Crime Commission was founded in 1919 by the Chicago Association of Commerce after a particularly flagrant payroll robbery. Under the dynamic leadership of Henry B. Chamberlin, the Operating Director, the Crime Commission became an important influence in shaping law enforcement in Chicago and in propagandizing for an efficient and punitive system of criminal justice.¹⁹

Chamberlin placed observers in all of the felony courts of Cook County to report on the day-to-day activities of judges and prosecutors. He also established contacts with various officials, including judges, the State's Attorney, parole officials, and the police chief. The Crime Commission was appalled to learn the criminals would sometimes receive as many as seventy continuances and, in effect, never be brought to trial. The Commission was also disturbed to learn that bond was often not forfeited when a defendant failed to appear for trial. By publicizing the scandalous conditions, the Crime Commission exerted pressures for reform. The Crime Commission also became concerned that parole was being granted too easily. Again, the Commission publicized cases that appeared to represent undue leniency and exerted continuing pressure on the parole board. In addition, the Crime Commission maintained generally warm relations with the Chicago police chiefs and, during the period from 1919 to 1935, worked with the police department to bring about reforms. The Crime Commission was instrumental in securing appropriations to increase the number of police, worked to improve police communications and transportation, and advised the department on efficient administration.²⁰

The early 1920's was a period of intense debate concerning the death penalty. The deterrent tradition in general, and the Chicago Crime Commission in particular, vigorously supported the death penalty. Soon after the Crime Commission began operations, the Commission discovered that there was a backlog in the trial of homicide cases. As a result of Crime Commission pressure, a special murder court was established in Cook County to process the cases. The result was a record number of convictions and a record number of death penalties. The next year (1920), according to Crime Commission statistics, the murder rate in Cook County dropped by 136. To advocates of a deterrent system of criminal justice, the lesson was clear. And the lesson was that severity, not sentimentality, would protect the community from violence.²¹ When Jane Addams and other social reformers attempted in 1920 to win a commutation to life imprisonment for a seventeen-year-old condemned murderer, the Crime Commission and the *Chicago Tribune* were bitterly opposed. (Said the *Tribune* on December 4, 1920: "No appeals were made . . . except sentimental appeals . . . If she had succeeded, she would have saved one life, probably at the cost of two or three.") When Clarence Darrow, by stressing the psychological and sociological roots that led Leopold and Loeb to murder Bobby Franks and thereby persuaded the judge not to impose the death penalty, this case became a symbol of all that was wrong with the sentimental theories that

excused the criminal from responsibility for his crime. Chamberlin warned: "When Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb, youthful millionaire murderers, were let off with life terms in jail, other 'youthful morons' took courage."²²

Another response to demands for vigorous law enforcement was the establishment in 1926 of the New York State Crime Commission by the legislature, after a request by Governor Alfred Smith. The State Commission, which was chaired by legislator Caleb H. Baumes, had a membership drawn from the state Senate, from the state Assembly, and from private citizens appointed by the Governor. That same year, the legislature passed the so-called Baumes Laws. These laws provided that a person convicted of a felony for the fourth time would receive a mandatory life sentence, that there would be greatly increased penalty for a second felony conviction, and that conviction for a felony while armed would lead to an increase of the sentence by five to ten years for the first offense, 10 to 15 years for a second offense, and 15 to 25 years for a third offense. The state Crime Commission reported a marked decrease in crime as a direct result of the new laws.

Thus not only was demonstrated the effectiveness of the Baumes Laws, but at the same time that foolish bubble—that punishment is not a deterrent to crime—was pricked for all time; for, no clearer demonstration could have been had of the extent to which the criminal world keeps itself in touch with changes in the penal laws and gives them a willing ear when such laws are of sufficient moment to have any consequences for them.²³

Other States during the period made sentences for crimes more severe and more inflexible as a major step to control violent criminal behavior. In New Jersey in 1926, for instance, the legislature passed a law prescribing flat prison sentences rather than the maximum and minimum sentences that judges had previously imposed. The intention was to remove discretion for granting parole from prison authorities and thus to increase the severity of sentences.²⁴ In other States, too, this was a period when sentences were lengthened, when judicial discretion was limited, and when stiff extra sentences were added when a defendant committed a crime while armed or was convicted for a second felony.

During the 1920's, the desire to strengthen law enforcement resulted in a number of state and local studies of the criminal justice institutions. The goal was to learn how the system might be strengthened so that the criminal would be more likely to be caught and to receive punishment. The first important study was The Cleveland Crime Survey (1922), directed by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter (with guidance from Raymond Moley).²⁵ The survey staff undertook a detailed statistical study of the disposition of criminal cases to determine at what stage, from preliminary hearing through to trial, the cases were disposed of. Similar statistical studies of court dispositions became a standard procedure for many subsequent studies of criminal justice in other cities and states. The statistical studies cast considerable doubt on the relevance of many of the programs advocated by those who adhered to the deterrent tradition and had sponsored the studies.²⁶

As the chart for felony cases in Cook County in 1926 clearly shows, criminal trials represented a very small portion of dispositions in serious criminal cases.²⁷

Chart I—The disposition of 13,117 felony cases in Cook County in 1926. Figures are percentages of total felony cases.

Complaints (N equals 13,117)	100.00
<i>Preliminary Hearing</i>	
Eliminated at preliminary hearing	56.5
Bound over to grand jury	43.50
<i>Grand Jury</i>	
No indictments	13.4
True bills and held for trial	30.10
<i>Trial Court</i>	
Nolle prosequi, dismissed for want of prosecution, and discharged	5.16
Stricken on account of other indictment	4.22
Miscellaneous eliminations	2.61
Total not tried	<u>11.99</u>
Tried by court and acquitted	1.71
Tried by jury and acquitted	1.63
Found insane03
Total tried but not convicted	<u>3.37</u>
Felony waived and plea of guilty to misdemeanor	5.06
Felony waived and convicted by court of misdemeanor	1.88
Plea of guilty to lesser offense	4.31
Total convicted of lesser offense	<u>11.20</u>
Plea of guilty as charged	2.60
Tried by jury and convicted as charged94
Total convicted as charged	<u>3.54</u>

Most cases were eliminated during preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing. Even among those cases bound over for trial, most were disposed of without trial. Among those defendants found guilty, most pleaded guilty, often to a charge less serious than the original charge. Most convictions were not the result of trial but the result of plea bargaining. The defendant (or his lawyer) bargained with the prosecutor. The goal of the prosecutor was to secure a guilty plea, and the goal of the defendant was to obtain a reduction in the charge or, at least, a promise of a relatively light sentence. Thus, the studies of the 1920's revealed that the urban criminal justice systems operated by wholesale elimination of cases before trial and by plea bargaining rather than trial to secure convictions. In large part, such procedure resulted from impossible load that faced the court system of American cities. Neither the courts nor the prosecutors had sufficient personnel to try more than a small proportion of the persons charged with crimes; hence there were institutional pressures to dispose of cases in ways other than trial.²⁸

The studies, sponsored by persons hoping to find ways to make criminal justice more certain and severe, often undermined some of the cherished beliefs of those adhering to the deterrent tradition. The deterrent tradition stressed that criminals were escaping just punishment by pleading insanity; the statistics showed that almost no criminals pleaded insanity. The deterrent

tradition regretted that criminals escaped conviction through the ignorance and gullibility of juries; the studies showed that there were few jury trials—indeed, few trials at all. The deterrent tradition declared that criminals escaped punishment by being released on “technicalities” through appeal; the studies showed that virtually no criminals appealed and that, among those who did, relatively few won reversal on technicalities.

Nevertheless, if the studies generally did not support the program advocated by the deterrent tradition, the studies were by no means reassuring to persons desiring a criminal justice system that deterred crime. After all, the studies showed that most persons charged by the police with serious crimes were not even indicted, while those held for trial frequently bargained their way into reduced charges and reduced sentences. The legislative intentions with regard to conviction and sentencing were regularly and routinely disregarded in the criminal justice systems of urban America. Urban criminal justice, as a system for punishing and deterring crime, appeared to be a shambles.

Those committed to the deterrent tradition reacted in two divergent ways to the discovery of the mass production, plea bargaining characteristics of urban criminal justice. One reaction was to ignore the studies and to continue the attacks on easy bail, insanity pleas, ignorant juries, and legal technicalities. At least in the newspapers, political speeches, and popular articles, this was doubtless the dominant reaction.

The other reaction was an attempt, on the part of local bar associations and other knowledgeable groups, to change the nature of urban criminal justice. During the 1920's and into the 1930's, in a number of states, there were efforts to simplify indictments and to eliminate the grand jury in those states that required grand jury indictments. In general, the belief behind such campaigns was that the needless complexity of indictment procedures and the unnecessary delays involved in grand jury hearings, worked to the advantage of the defense and brought the elimination of cases that should in fact have gone to trial.²⁹

There were also efforts to reduce the plea bargaining system of criminal justice. Yet these efforts were doomed to failure. They were based on the assumption that incompetent men rather than institutional necessities underlay plea bargaining. Plea bargaining was believed to result from partisan influence, corruption, and incompetence of the judicial and prosecuting personnel. Hence, the campaigns assumed that improvement of personnel, without providing greatly increased resources, could alter criminal procedures. Perhaps the best example of this was the determined campaign of the Chicago Crime Commission, beginning in 1928, to reduce plea bargaining in the felony courts of Cook County. The Crime Commission demanded the removal of the three judges of the criminal courts who granted the most felony waivers. The campaign, which extended over several years, not only failed to secure the removal of the three judges but, given the large number of felony cases each year and the designation of but seven judges to dispose of them, could not have altered the system of disposition in any significant respect.³⁰

By the end of the 1920's, the deterrent tradition, then, had become a fairly consistent set of interrelated assumptions and programs. It would be well to summarize that ideology. Of central importance was the notion that vigorous and severe law enforcement could prevent crime and that the high

rate of theft and violence in the cities stemmed from a breakdown in law enforcement. Generally the fault was believed not to lie with the police; instead, police officials were often allies and leaders in the demands for greater severity for criminals. The focus of concern, then, was upon the courts and parole boards, which were seen to release or coddle the criminals captured by the police, and thus to make fruitless the hard work of police officers. Furthermore, blame for failure was generally upon the formal and public aspects of criminal procedure: easy bail, ignorant juries, sentimental psychiatrists and social workers who asked for easy sentences or helped a defendant plead insanity, appeals courts that released guilty men on technicalities, and unrealistic parole boards. The informal and largely invisible mechanisms by which most criminal cases were disposed received scant attention. Finally, the language of many advocates of sterner law enforcement often suggested that they were concerned not simply with crime and violence but with a range of behavior that departed from the traditional American virtues. The demand for law and order symbolized a hope for a restoration of the old virtues.

During the 1920's, like the 1960's, law and order had been a salient issue upon which politicians necessarily took stands and which dominated much of the domestic news coverage. In the 1930's, with the coming of the depression and the repeal of prohibition, the issue of crime became less important. Yet the deterrent tradition remained an important influence shaping programs for criminal justice reform and always ready to re-emerge whenever the issue of crime became a crucial public issue.

REHABILITATION TO 1940

The psychological and sociological traditions, with their general emphasis upon prevention or rehabilitation, have often worked in conjunction with each other. Hence, the best way to handle the two traditions is to examine a history of the efforts to understand the social and psychological roots of crime and violence and to describe some of the major efforts to introduce rehabilitation into law enforcement institutions. There are essentially four points during the defendant's interaction with law enforcement at which programs for prevention and rehabilitation may be introduced: (1) a preventive program before the individual engages in crime or before his behavior has come to the official attention of law enforcement officials; (2) within the court system to advise the judge concerning disposition and to oversee court supervised probation; (3) within the prison and parole system so that the criminal may be rehabilitated for his return to society; and (4) after the defendant's release in order to prevent recidivism. The major focus of the current paper will be upon law enforcement institutions: the courts, the prisons, and parole. To attempt any sort of history of preventive activities before a youth becomes delinquent would involve a history of all the institutions that service youth: the family, the schools, churches, a neighborhood organization, and so forth. Such a history is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper.

As the 20th century opened, one of the most important movements to introduce rehabilitation into the formal structure of the court system got its start and soon spread rapidly. This was the movement to establish juvenile

courts. Legislation authorizing the first juvenile court passed the Illinois Legislature in 1899; on July 1, the first juvenile court in the United States was established in Cook County. In a relatively short period of time, the juvenile court system was adopted in the urban areas of the North and West; only more slowly did such institutions spread into rural areas and the Southern States.

The formal purpose of the juvenile court procedures was to allow the judge to act in the interests of the delinquent child, in order to bring about reform and rehabilitation. The juvenile court was not a criminal court but a civil court, and there were no prosecutors or defendants. Instead, a boy or a girl could be brought into court if believed to be dependent or delinquent. If the judge agreed, he could make the youth a ward in chancery and then had available a fairly wide variety of dispositions: he might put the child on probation with his parents, place him with a guardian, or assign him to an appropriate public or private institution, including a reformatory.³¹

The social settlement workers and elite members of Chicago's women's clubs, who were instrumental in securing passage of the juvenile court law, did not act on the basis of sophisticated academic theories concerning juvenile delinquency. Instead, the need for a juvenile court was a "commonsense" response to the facts of delinquency as reformers saw the facts. Very often, in their experience, delinquency was a product of intolerable home conditions—an alcoholic father, a mother ill or absent from the home because of work, a broken family. Sometimes a youth, arrested for a minor crime, would be fined and then would be jailed because he could not pay the fine. In jail he would learn the ways of crime from older inmates. There developed a belief on the reformers' part both that America's cities were a morally dangerous atmosphere in which to raise young people and that the young, if provided with the proper guidance and discipline, could be changed and reformed. Hence they favored a court which, once it found that a juvenile needed help, could then have flexibility in deciding what sort of help should be imposed.³²

Because of a belief that young persons should be saved from the perils of urban life and because of a faith that a juvenile court could act in the interests of the child, the juvenile court was authorized to take jurisdiction not simply over children who had committed illegal acts but also children whose behavior suggested that they were falling prey to the temptations of urban life. In Illinois a juvenile could be declared delinquent if he

is growing up in idleness or crime; or knowingly frequents a house of ill repute; . . . or frequents any saloon or dram shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or patronizes or visits any public pool room or bucket shop; or wanders about the street in the night time without being on any lawful business . . . ; or uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane, or indecent language in any public place or about any schoolhouse.

The language of the law, quaint though it may sound today, suggests the sorts of influences that reformers believed would lead a youth from innocence into serious crimes and violence.³³

Nevertheless, although the beliefs that led to the establishment of the juvenile courts in American cities were based upon the generous impulses of

those who worked with urban youth, the reformers shared a conviction that there was expert knowledge that could be used to understand and treat delinquent youths. After the establishment of the juvenile court in Chicago, for instance, the settlement house workers who had been instrumental in its establishment, took part in the choice of the judge to preside over the court and in the hiring of probation officers to investigate the backgrounds of the delinquents and to oversee their rehabilitation. Then in 1909, at the urging of Julia Lathrop and her associates, the reformers brought about the creation of a Juvenile Psychopathic Institute attached to the court. The Institute was under the direction of Dr. William Healy and represented a conviction that medical and psychiatric knowledge could be brought to bear upon the problems of delinquency. The Institute had the dual purpose of providing advice with regard to individual delinquents referred by the court and also to study the causes of delinquent behavior. Because of the able directorship of Dr. Healy, the Institute more than lived up to the expectations of the reformers. And William Healy became the most influential expert on juvenile delinquency during the first third of the 20th century.³⁴

Furthermore, the establishment of clinics attached to the juvenile courts spread to other major cities. Thus the judges of the juvenile courts could often rely upon the advice of persons with claims to expert knowledge in understanding and treating juvenile delinquency. In their formal organization, then, the juvenile courts were molded to the rehabilitative ideal: the procedure was designed to operate in the best interests of the child, and expert advice was available to make this possible.

What were some of the implications of the establishment of juvenile courts? By now, it has become a truism that the early proponents of the court, convinced that the court could act in the best interests of the youthful offender, abandoned the normal protections that, in a criminal court, would be available to a defendant. After all, since the juvenile court acted in order to rehabilitate the delinquent and not to punish him (or, if it did act to punish him, did so for his own good), there was nothing to protect the offender from. And the complex adversary procedures of the criminal court, it was feared, might interfere with rehabilitation. Nevertheless, while a court might find a youth delinquent and send him to a reformatory for rehabilitation, to the youth it might well appear that he was being found guilty of a crime and was being punished. It is clearer now that the coercive aspects of trial and imprisonment in a reformatory do require greater procedural protections; and the U. S. Supreme Court has recognized this in its 1967 decision *In re Gault*.³⁵

Another implication that followed from having special institutions to handle delinquent youths and from the relatively vague definition of what constituted delinquency was that, as the resources available to juvenile courts increased, the number of juveniles who would become enmeshed in the formal law enforcement mechanisms also increased. In Cook County between 1913 and 1914, for instance, the number of delinquents referred to the court rose from 1,956 to 2,916—an increase of nearly 50 percent in the juvenile delinquency rate for the county. This did not represent a startling increase in youthful crime; it represented, instead, an increase by twenty-three in the number of probation officers. With more probation officers, the law enforcement machinery could handle more juveniles.³⁶ And therefore many

youths found themselves being taken to police stations and being held for trial, when formerly they would not have become enmeshed in the formal enforcement machinery.

A final implication of the founding of the juvenile court system was what it indicated concerning American attitudes at that time toward childhood, as well as what it indicated concerning the complex relationship between the deterrent and rehabilitative traditions. The interesting fact is that the early establishment of juvenile courts aroused virtually no articulate or organized opposition. By 1900 a broad spectrum of American opinion apparently accepted the general belief that the young were often not responsible for delinquent behavior but were victims of circumstances; furthermore, that the young might be reformed. Indeed, the juvenile court system was not the first recognition that youths should receive special and separate treatment when they violated the law. Many of the states in the North and West had established reformatories for youths and young adults; many of the city and county jails had special schools and facilities for the young. Thus the juvenile courts were only an extension of a trend to provide, at least on paper, a law enforcement system that relaxed the punitive features and looked toward the rehabilitation of the young.³⁷

The lack of opposition to the juvenile court system, however, also indicates the absence of an organized and articulate punitive tradition in 1900. By the 1920's a number of groups and individuals served as watchdogs of the criminal justice system to make certain that its deterrent effect was not undermined by sentimentalists intent upon coddling hoodlums. The lack of concerted opposition suggests the importance of the 1920's in creating the institutions and ideology that gave the deterrent tradition an ongoing influence in the reform of criminal justice.

It is one of the ironies of history that, at the time when law enforcement for juveniles was being modeled on a rehabilitation ideal, there developed an essentially biological theory of delinquency which held delinquency to be hereditary and incurable. Between 1905 and 1920 an important, perhaps dominant, theory of delinquency among American psychologists, medical men, and other experts was that most delinquency stemmed from hereditary feeble-mindedness. Since delinquency was conceived to result from the feeble-minded youth's inability to handle his emotions or the complex world in which he lived, the delinquent could not be rehabilitated. Instead, he should be kept in a custodial institution for life. And prevention lay in forbidding the feeble-minded from having children, thereby preventing them from passing on their hereditary defect to succeeding generations.

The most important single factor leading to the pessimistic interpretation of delinquency was the introduction of the Binet intelligence tests in the United States in 1908. When large samples of delinquents were tested for intelligence, anywhere from forty to ninety per cent appeared to test at a feeble-minded level. American criminologists were willing to accept these findings as conclusive, however, because the findings came at a time when many American scientists already accepted biological and hereditarian explanations of criminal behavior.

A dominant medical view during the late Nineteenth Century was that various behavioral aberrations—from feeble-mindedness and insanity to crime, alcoholism and eccentricity—were the result of physiological, especially

neurological, defects. Because behavioral aberrations were rooted in physiological aberrations, they could be passed from parents to children like any other physical characteristics. And the behavioral aberration might take on a different characteristic in each generation, so that insanity in one generation might appear as criminality or eccentricity in another. Since many forms of crime were seen to be hereditary and physiological, many medical men held out little hope for reform and rehabilitation.³⁸

A generally hereditarian and biological interpretation of criminal behavior was strengthened in the 1890's by the impact of the Italian or positivistic school of criminal anthropology. The leading criminal anthropologist was the Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso. As a result of studying the physical characteristics of criminals, Lombroso and his school concluded that criminals differed from normal individuals. They tended to have a primitive brain, an unusual skull shape, long arms, prehensile feet, hairy body, flattened nose, and furtive eyes. Indeed, different types of criminals had different types of physical characteristics. (Murderers, for instance, had glassy eyes, a hooked nose, large cheeks and jaws, long ears, dark hair, and canine teeth.) Criminals, Lombroso believed, had inherited the physical and behavioral characteristics of the savage stage of human evolution. Criminal anthropology so fit the biological theory of crime advocated by American physicians that it was widely accepted and had quite a vogue among American criminologists and physicians. Many studies appeared to show that American criminals, too, exhibited the characteristic "stigmata of degeneration" and were the hopeless victims of their defective heredity.³⁹

During the same period, superintendents of asylums for the feeble-minded had become convinced that virtually all feeble-mindedness was hereditary and that those who were feeble-minded, if allowed to remain in the larger society, would almost inevitably enter upon a life of crime and constitute a danger to the community. Walter E. Fernald of Massachusetts, the most respected asylum superintendent of the period, stated in 1904 a view that would have had unanimous endorsement of all experts:⁴⁰

The adult males become the town loafers and incapables, the irresponsible pests of the neighborhood, petty thieves, purposeless destroyers of property, incendiaries, and very frequently violators of women and little girls. It is well known that feeble-minded women and girls are very liable to become sources of unspeakable debauchery and licentiousness which pollutes the whole life of the young boys and youth of the community. They frequently disseminate in a wholesale way the most loathsome and deadly diseases, permanently poisoning the minds and bodies of thoughtless youth at the very threshold of manhood. Almost every country town has one or more of these defective women, each having from one to four or more illegitimate children, every one of whom is predestined to be defective mentally, criminal, or an outcast of some sort.

Asylum superintendents suspected that a large proportion of the incorrigible criminals in the nation's jails and prisons were, in fact, feeble-minded persons who should, instead, receive life-long custodial care in an institution for the feeble-minded.⁴¹

The biological and hereditarian explanations of feeble-mindedness, insanity, crime, and other behavioral traits led to a movement in the late Nineteenth Century to prevent such persons from contaminating future generations by having children. The vogue of criminal anthropology led to demands that diagnostic centers be established in prisons so that the hereditary criminal types might be recognized and segregated. Experts in the field of feeble-mindedness urged that there be greatly expanded facilities for the care of the mentally retarded so that the feeble-minded could be given life-long custodial care and thus not have the opportunity to bring children into the world. And, finally, there developed in the 1890's a concerted campaign for the asexualization of the criminals and feeble-minded in order to prevent procreation.

Until the late 1890's the only method of asexualization was the removal of the testes or ovaries. Hence asexualization was often advocated during the 1890's not only for its effect in preventing procreation but also as a deterrent and as a therapy. Many physicians and criminologists became convinced that crime was a medical problem and that asexualization constituted a method of preventive medicine. They generally took a pessimistic attitude toward rehabilitation of criminals. "In the consideration of such a vital question as the management of the criminal class," one physician warned, "the sentimentalist and his natural ally, the preacher, have joined hands on the question, and to them the world has looked for reformation for which it has waited in vain."⁴²

Advocacy soon led to action. In both Michigan and Pennsylvania there were efforts to pass laws providing for the asexualization of the feeble-minded and criminals. In several institutions for the feeble-minded, superintendents experimented with the castration of some of the youths in their care.⁴³ By 1900, however, there were operations available that would render the individual sexually sterile but would not affect the internal hormones and thus would not have the physical effects that resulted from removal of the testes or ovaries. The operations were salpingectomy for women and vasectomy for men. Apparently the new operation was first used in the United States for eugenic reasons by Dr. Harry Sharp, physician at the Indiana Reformatory at Jeffersonville. There in 1899 a 19-year-old inmate came to Dr. Sharp and requested to be castrated in order to break himself of the habit of Masturbation.) (All sorts of evils were then believed to follow from masturbation.) Dr. Sharp, instead, performed vasectomy. When the operation proved successful, he performed the operation on 76 more youths during the course of the year and also became an advocate of laws requiring the sterilization of criminals and other defectives. In 1907, at Dr. Sharp's urging, Indiana became the first state to pass a sterilization law.⁴⁴

At the time that the Binet IQ tests were introduced into the United States in 1908, then, there was a solid tradition that held crime to be hereditary and to be linked to feeble-mindedness. Alfred Binet developed his IQ tests in Paris in 1905 in order to distinguish mentally retarded children in school classes, so that such children could be placed in special classes. Henry H. Goddard, a psychologist at the Training School for the feeble-minded at Vineland, N.J., made an English translation in 1908 and began using the tests in the Training School in order to classify the youths according to their trainability. Goddard soon became a convert to the new tests and was convinced that the tests measured innate intellectual ability, independent of learning and

environment. Within a few years, many psychologists were using the tests for studies of intellectual ability. By the time of World War I, the vogue of mental testing was sufficiently strong so that nearly all army recruits were given intelligence tests, and army assignments were often made on the basis of the test results.⁴⁵

In 1911 Goddard tested 56 wayward girls between the ages of 14 and 20 found that 52 were feeble-minded. Later that year, he studied 100 delinquents chosen at random in the detention home in Newark; 66 percent were "distinctly feeble-minded." Other psychologists in other parts of the country tested groups of delinquents. Some found that more than 90 percent of delinquents were feeble-minded; few reported results as low as 25 percent. Tests of adult criminals and prostitutes also appeared to uncover large proportions of feeble-minded persons.⁴⁶

In other ways, Goddard contributed to a belief in the menace of feeble-mindedness. In 1912, he published *The Kallikak Family*. The book reported on a study of two families in New Jersey, both bearing the same name. One family had, since the Revolutionary War, produced educated and valuable members of society; the other, during the same period, had produced crime, pauperism, and prostitution. Goddard maintained that both families were descended from the same common ancestor, a Revolutionary soldier who had fathered an illegitimate child by a feeble-minded girl and later had fathered other children after marrying a Quaker girl of good family. From the feeble-minded girl had come the degenerate Kallikaks; from the Quaker girl had come the long line of upstanding citizens. This, Goddard maintained, was further evidence that feeble-mindedness was hereditary and underlay criminal and deviant behavior. In 1914 Goddard published another book, *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences*, in which he supplied hundreds of family pedigrees in an effort to demonstrate that nearly eighty per cent of feeble-mindedness stemmed from hereditary causes. The concern with the menace of the feeble-minded led, in the decade after 1910, to innumerable state surveys to determine the extent of the menace. Each survey came to the same conclusion: that the feeble-minded constituted an unexpectedly large proportion of the population, that they underlay much of the problem of crime and delinquency, and that ways needed to be found so that the feeble-minded could be kept in custodial institutions and prevented from having children.⁴⁷

From these studies came the labeling of a specific criminal type, variously called a psychopath, constitutionally inferior, or (most commonly) defective delinquent. Such persons were both dangerous to the community and incorrigible. Because reform and rehabilitation would not work for such delinquents, the only solution was their diagnosis and life-long custodial care. Not only did psychologists and other criminologists stress the incurability of such delinquency but some, at least, used the defective delinquent to explain the embarrassing fact that reformatories often did not turn delinquents from their evil ways. That juvenile offenders often returned to crime was "responsible for a large part of the adverse criticism of our institutions for juvenile offenders," one reformatory superintendent declared. "The only way in which this criticism can be met properly is by producing data showing that a large majority of these failures were due to mental defect on the part of the inmates and not to faults in the system of training."⁴⁸

As a result of the widespread belief among experts that delinquency often reflected feeble-mindedness, the clinics attached to the juvenile courts often conceived it to be their main function to administer IQ tests in order to diagnose feeble-mindedness. Indeed, the clinics and juvenile diagnostic centers were often established not so much to provide advice on rehabilitation as to uncover defective delinquents. Thus, although the juvenile courts had been established in a faith that youth might be rehabilitated, the clinics and diagnostic centers frequently became a source of propaganda for the proposition that most delinquents were incurable. Even Dr. William Healy, director of the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute of the Cook County Juvenile Court, believed in his early years that mental retardation was the major factor explaining delinquency.

In Ohio in 1912, a study appeared to show that over 50 percent of the delinquents in reformatories were feeble-minded. As a result, the state established a Bureau of Juvenile Research with Dr. Thomas H. Haines as Clinical Director. The purpose of the Bureau was to diagnose delinquents committed to State institutions by the courts. Of the first 1,000 delinquents referred to the Bureau, Dr. Haines found 570 to be feeble-minded. Dr. Haines worked in his own and adjoining states to secure lifelong custodial care for the multitude of defective delinquents who appeared to constitute the bulk of the juvenile delinquency problem.⁴⁹

Similarly in California, a psychologist undertook to study the delinquents in the Whittier State School. He found that 53 percent were feeble-minded or borderline. Shortly afterward the Whittier State School established a Department of Research under the direction of the psychologist who had undertaken the original study. The Department of Research became a center for propaganda about the menace of the feeble-minded; in 1920 it became the California Bureau of Juvenile Research.⁵⁰

The myth of the menace of the feeble-minded led not only to increased diagnostic facilities in the courts and reformatories but also to other programs of prevention and control. There was, for instance, a concerted, nationwide campaign to increase institutional facilities available to care for the feeble-minded. The purpose was to remove the mentally retarded from the community and also to prevent them from bearing children.⁵¹ A second campaign was to secure state laws permitting or requiring the sexual sterilization of persons with hereditary behavioral aberrations, including criminals, the mentally ill, and the feeble-minded. After the first such law in Indiana, 15 other States passed sterilization laws prior to American entrance into World War I. Most of these States were in the North and West—states that had juvenile courts, reformatories, and institutions for the care of the insane and feeble-minded. These states, of course, had the psychologists, psychiatrists, and other experts to lobby for such laws, and these were also the states that prided themselves on their progressive welfare measures. By 1931, some 30 States had passed sexual sterilization laws. In most States, however, the laws were hardly enforced at all.⁵²

The myth of the menace of the feeble-minded was relatively short lived as a dominant explanation for delinquent behavior. For a variety of reasons, the myth declined rapidly in the period immediately following World War I. One factor was the findings from the mental testing of recruits during the war. By the standards then used for deciding that a person's IQ score placed him in

the feeble-minded range, approximately 50 percent of the American recruits were found feeble-minded. This clearly suggested a need for different standards and made the earlier finding of large proportions of feeble-minded among delinquents a good deal less impressive. During the 1920's, psychologists increasingly recognized the environmental factors that influenced test results and became a good deal more tentative in their interpretation of the tests. During the period after the war, officials in institutions for the feeble-minded, by experimenting with programs of supervised release from institutions, found that feeble-minded persons were by no means doomed to a life of crime. Although many persons continued to think of feeble-mindedness as a major factor in crime, by the early 1920's such an explanation was no longer a dominating and pervasive one.⁵³

Out of the extension of psychiatric and psychological services in the courts and out of the decline of the myth about feeble-mindedness, there developed a more eclectic view of the roots of delinquency. A crucial figure in this development was Dr. William Healy, whose 1915 book on the *Individual Delinquent* became the standard source. The eclectic approach drew upon developments in many fields of study. Medical advances provided the Wassermann test for syphilis, and expanding knowledge of endocrine disorders, and new discoveries in the field of nutrition. Psychology not only developed a more critical use of intelligence tests but rapidly developed tests for personality traits and for vocational aptitudes. Professional social work contributed the casework method of assembling information on the home life, school success and other factors in a delinquent's background. Psychiatry pioneered in therapeutic methods that drew upon Freudian theory and also developed techniques of community mental health. In the many clinics attached to the courts and in the many child guidance clinics established in the larger cities for preventive work, a multidimensional approach during the 1920's replaced the earlier and pessimistic approach.⁵⁴

At the time that the myth of the menace of the feeble-minded declined, there arose in the United States a theory of urban delinquency that was heavily sociological and that largely ignored psychological factors in the explanation of delinquency, crime, and other behavioral aberrations. The theory grew out of the studies of urban life influenced by the school of sociology centered at the University of Chicago. At Chicago, Profs. Robert Park and Ernest W. Burgess put many students to work exploring the varied aspects of the city's life. The result was a new understanding of the social structure and social relations of urban life; out of this came a new understanding of urban delinquency and crime.⁵⁵

Chicago urban sociologists followed an ecological approach to urban social structure. In the city of Chicago, for instance, a number of factors, especially economic factors, determined the patterns of land use, and these in turn underlay the social structure of the diverse areas of the city. The central city was devoted to important business and commercial uses. Surrounding the expanding central city were areas characterized by urban decay. In such areas were rooming houses, skid row, and other marginal activities. There also were the least desirable residential neighborhoods, often the point of entry to the city for European immigrants and other new arrivals. Progressively farther from the central city, the residential areas grew progressively better. These patterns were broken by waterways and railroad lines, along which were

factories and warehouses and around which clustered some of the poorer residential areas. The city consisted, then, of a series of concentric rings and was divided into numerous "natural areas"—meaning that they were not planned. These areas varied widely in the physical characteristics, social characteristics, and culture. Persons living in different natural areas of the city—even though they lived in the same city—could be widely separated from each other in life style and in values. Persons living relatively near to each other might have little contact with or understanding of each other.


The scholars most important in developing a theory of delinquency based upon an ecological approach to the city were Frederic Thrasher and Clifford R. Shaw. Thrasher, in a study of 1,313 boys' gangs in Chicago, found that the gangs clustered in the poorer residential neighborhoods that surrounded the center of the city and surrounded the factories along the waterways and railroad tracks. Shaw, in plotting the residences of the city's juvenile delinquents, found a similar pattern. They argued, therefore, that juvenile gangs and delinquency were characteristic of the social structure and values of certain types of neighborhoods.⁵⁶

Delinquency stemmed from two divergent characteristics of urban slum neighborhoods: social disorganization and social organization. Delinquency areas, according to Shaw, were "characterized by marked physical deterioration, poverty, social disorganization." They were populated chiefly by newly arrived immigrant groups, with "confused cultural standards, where traditions and customs of the immigrant group are undergoing radical change under the pressure of a rapidly growing city and the fusion of divergent cultures." As a result of such social disorganization, the institutions that normally provided socialization and social control—the family, church, and school—were unable to operate effectively.⁵⁷

While stressing social disorganization, scholars like Thrasher and Shaw have nevertheless been crucial in defining delinquency as a group phenomenon linked to the social structure and values that did exist within the marginal residential neighborhoods. Thrasher, of course, described the important functions of the gang in providing the boys of the slums with values and social activities. He also showed how the gang could socialize the slum youth in the ways of crime. Shaw, similarly, pointed out that in Cook County more than 90 percent of youthful crime involved more than one youth. Delinquency was group behavior. Criminal careers often started at a very young age and, as a boy grew older, he would become involved in criminal behavior that was increasingly serious and skilled. The younger boys took older criminals as their models for behavior.

Shaw stressed that delinquency was rooted in the social organization and disorganization of the city and not in ethnic traits brought from the old country. Although immigrants and Negroes predominated in delinquency areas, within the same immigrant group there was a high delinquency rate among those living in deteriorated neighborhoods and a low rate among those in more stable neighborhoods and a low rate among those in more stable neighborhoods. As an immigrant group improved its standing and moved to better sections of the city, the delinquency rate dropped markedly. Thus, the Germans and Irish, who moved out of the poor neighborhoods from 1900 to 1925, showed a decline in delinquency, while the Poles and Italians, who replaced them, showed a notable increase.⁵⁸

Native Derivation of Fathers of Delinquent Boys



John Landesco, also a student of the Chicago school of sociology in the 1920's, studied the gambling, bootlegging, prostitution, and racketeering in Chicago during the period. He found that the gangster often grew up in the same neighborhoods that produced juvenile gangs and that the gangster maintained his roots in the community. The gangsters played an important part in the ethnic social life, had wide contacts among politicians, police, and other segments of legitimate society, and were often admired figures within their neighborhoods. In publishing *Organized Crime in Chicago* in 1929, Landesco stressed that the gangster was "a product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment . . . That is the reason why the good citizen and the gangster have never been able to understand each other. They have been reared in two different worlds."⁵⁹

The theory of delinquency and crime that arose from the studies of the Chicago sociologists stressed the social relations of the deviant, not his psychology, in explaining the illegal behavior. As Landesco expressed it (paraphrasing Gabriel Tarde), "certain individuals become criminals in much the same way that other persons become policemen."⁶⁰

Criminal behavior was not basically a reflection of psychological problems or aberrations. Hence there was little that could be expected from psychological counseling in the reformatories and prisons. Since criminal behavior reflected the social relations and values of the criminal's social world, the criminal was likely to continue his behavior if he returned to that social world. The problem of crime in urban America could be met chiefly by changing social relations and values of those neighborhoods that were characterized by a high rate of delinquency and crime.

The new sociological theory had implications chiefly for preventive work within urban neighborhoods, in order to reduce the tendency of youths to adopt criminal ways or in order to assist convicted delinquents and criminals to return to society without returning to a life of crime. In fact, under Clifford R. Shaw, a number of sociologists became involved in the early 1930's in an experimental delinquency prevention program known as the Chicago Area Project. The Project, established in three Chicago neighborhoods, was designed, as Shaw expressed it, to achieve "the organization of the local neighborhood to deal effectively with its own problems." The Project theory was that social workers and other persons from outside a community, because they were not part of the community and often had quite different values, could not work effectively for delinquency prevention. But they might help groups within the neighborhood to organize in order to work with youths in the neighborhood, provide models of behavior for neighborhood youths, and establish neighborhood activities and services for youths.⁶¹ Out of the Chicago Area Project there arose the theories and techniques that Saul Alinsky and others have since applied in order to organize neighborhoods for the solution of a broad range of urban problems.

In addition to programs for preventive work, the sociological theory also led to a specific proposal for the reform of the way in which parole decisions were made. The proposal arose out of apparent scandals in the granting of paroles and pardons in Illinois in the early 1920's. After several years of intense criticism of the alleged corruption and leniency that characterized the handling of parole and pardon in his administration, Governor Len Small in 1926 appointed Hinton C. Clabaugh to be superintendent of the Division of Pardons and Paroles in Illinois. Clabaugh, who had been a businessman and an active member of the Chicago Crime Commission, immediately announced a policy of greater strictness in the granting of parole. He also appointed an expert committee to investigate the system and to make recommendations for reform. Among those appointed to the committee was Ernest W. Burgess of the Chicago Department of Sociology. As so often happened, the appointment of a committee of academic experts meant that the recommendations differed from the punitive goals that brought the committee into being.⁶²

The lengthy committee report that resulted was an important document in the history of parole. In the historical section of the report, some of the assumptions that had led to the appointment of the committee were exploded. For instance, the parole system, far from reducing the time that criminals spent behind bars, had in fact resulted in an increase in the length of time actually served. "The actual time served by the criminal in penitentiaries and reformatories is longer under sentences fixed by the Parole Board than when flat sentences were fixed by the courts." (Furthermore, the period of Governor Len Small's incumbency—the period when the parole system had come under the most intensive and vitriolic criticism for leniency—was the period when the proportion of paroles granted per total prison population was lowest for any period since parole had first been established in Illinois in 1897.) Hence a system of parole that had been intended to introduce flexibility into sentencing for purposes of rehabilitation had had the unintended effect of making sentencing, on the whole, more punitive.⁶³

The most significant recommendation of the Committee report was that parole decisions be based upon scientific prediction. As a result of research undertaken for the report, the committee concluded that a number of background factors concerning the defendant were statistically correlated with success and failure on parole. A prisoner was more likely to succeed on parole, for instance, if he was married rather than single, if he had committed his crime alone rather than in a group, if he had held a steady job rather than having been only occasionally employed, and if he was a first offender rather than a repeater. Indeed the committee isolated some 21 such factors and found that, if a prisoner had a positive score on 16 to 21 of the factors, there was a 98.5 percent chance that he would succeed on parole. If, on the contrary, he had score of four or less, then he stood a 76 percent chance of violating parole. The committee recommended, therefore, that a prediction table be prepared for each prisoner whose case came before a parole board, so that the board might make an informed and "scientific" decision. Under such a policy, a parole board could provide parole for those who had a good chance of rehabilitation, while keeping incarcerated those for whom the outcome on parole was doubtful.⁶⁴

Parole prediction was a proposal that arose directly from a sociological rather than psychological view of criminal behavior. It assumed that the most important factors governing success or failure on parole were the prisoner's social relations outside the prison. Thus the best prediction could be made not on the basis of a psychiatrist's evaluation of the prisoner's psychological state on the time of parole decision but upon a broad range of factors of which the psychiatrist's recommendation would be just one.

The theories of delinquent behavior that developed out of the research of Thrasher and Shaw in the 1920's have continued until the present to have wide influence upon scholarly efforts to understand delinquent behavior.⁶⁵ The theories have also influenced action programs. These programs have included community organization for delinquency prevention, parole prediction, and a variety of community programs for parole supervision. The programs have had in common the goal of prevention or rehabilitation with only minimal emphasis upon problems of psychological disturbance.

CONCLUSION

By the mid-1920's, then, the three traditions for explaining criminal violence had reached a relatively mature and enduring form that has persisted with relatively little change to the present. The deterrent tradition, during the 1920's, developed an ideology, a program, and an organizational basis. While there have been some changes in emphasis in the 1960's, as well as some changes in the supporting public, the tradition retains much the same form as it had 40 years ago. The psychological tradition took on an eclecticism in the 1920's which has continued to influence the practitioners of diagnosis and therapy within the law enforcement institutions. Finally, the sociological theories that emerged in the 1920's have been criticized and modified during the last forty years but remain nevertheless a central explanation around which much of current research revolves.

When viewed historically, the programs advocated during the current century on the basis of various theories of criminal violence have often been

unrealistic. The programs have frequently stemmed from an unrealistic understanding of criminal justice institutions, from an unrealistic view of what could be achieved through criminal law enforcement, or from an unrealistic assessment of the actual impact of a given program upon the juvenile and adult defendants brought into the criminal justice system.

Since the 1920's, advocates of the deterrent tradition have focused their attention almost entirely upon aspects of the criminal justice system which, if changed, would not make law enforcement significantly more deterrent. Even if one were to grant that the courts should convict a larger proportion of defendants and impose stricter sentences, the causes for the failure to convict and for the lenient sentences in the cities do not lie primarily in soft-hearted judges or legal technicalities that favor defendants. The causes lie in the large number of defendants relative to the resources for trying and incarcerating them. Hence, many cases must be dismissed at preliminary hearings and others settled by plea bargaining. To avoid such informal dispositions, it would be necessary to increase substantially the resources for the urban criminal courts, prosecutors, public defenders, and correctional facilities. Yet few advocates of the deterrent tradition have worked for such goals. They have preferred to criticize soft-hearted judges and legal technicalities rather than commit the resources (meaning tax funds) necessary to operate a more deterrent court and correctional system.

Furthermore, the logic of deterrence would suggest that, if a person who commits a crime is seldom caught, there will be only limited deterrent effect in punishing those few who are caught. It has long been known that a large proportion of crimes are not reported to the police and that the police clear by arrest a relatively small proportion of reported crimes. The logic of the deterrent ideology, therefore, should have brought a strong movement critical of the police and demanding better performance by the police. (And, of course, in the 1960's there have developed demands for more vigorous use of police in riot situations.) In general, however, the police have managed since the 1920's to shift the responsibility for lack of deterrence from themselves to the courts, parole boards, and the rehabilitation facilities. Thus, the failure of the police has been perceived to lie not in the police but in the "legal technicalities" that interfere with good police work. And there has been little public or political movement for a searching examination of the adequacy of police training, competence, and techniques.

Finally, given the importance of deterrence as a goal to be achieved by criminal justice, relatively little research has been done to test the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions.⁶⁶ Advocates of the deterrent tradition have shown little interest in such crucial questions as: whether deterrence could be more effective against some sorts of crimes rather than others; whether deterrence might be more effective against some sorts of criminals rather than others; whether some types of behavior now regulated through criminal sanctions might be better regulated in other ways so that law enforcement sources might be committed to those sorts of behavior that are most likely to be controlled by deterrence. As a result of the historical split between advocates of deterrence and the scholarly community, relatively few studies have been undertaken to explore, in a useful way, the best uses to which the punitive features of criminal justice might be put in order to reduce crimes of violence in the cities.

In short, advocates of the deterrent tradition during the 1920's became locked into a set of assumptions that have made their criticisms and programs, in crucial respects, irrelevant to the criminal justice system as it actually operates.

There have also been ways that, during the Twentieth Century, the rehabilitation traditions have misperceived the impact of their programs upon criminal justice institutions. The rehabilitation traditions have been based upon two assumptions that, at least in the early part of the century, were not adequately examined. One assumption was that the criminal justice framework could be used for rehabilitation. The other assumption was that there existed expert knowledge and techniques so that delinquents and criminals could be adequately diagnosed and an adequate rehabilitation program provided. Only recently have there been fairly searching criticisms of both of these assumptions by scholars within the rehabilitation traditions.

During the first third of the current century, advocates of rehabilitation were successful in securing programs that introduced rehabilitation experts at certain points within the criminal justice system. The facilities have been provided chiefly at those points in the system where a decision concerning the defendant would be made: advice for the judge in determining sentence; diagnosis of those sentenced to correctional institutions in order to determine what institution or program would be most suitable; and advice to parole boards when the offender criminal was a candidate for release.

Yet, although decisions were made as though criminal justice institutions might act to rehabilitate the individual, the actual rehabilitation services have been relatively few and far between. While many persons after conviction were placed under the guidance of a probation officer or, after serving a portion of their sentence, were placed under the guidance of a parole officer, in fact the guidance was at best minimal. Most parole and probation officers were responsible for so many persons that they could only go through the motions. At the same time, the correctional institutions in the United States have not had sufficient staff to carry on useful rehabilitation programs. In 1934, only 13.4 percent of the correctional institutions in the country even had a full-time psychiatrist, and Michigan did not hire its first full-time psychiatrist for its correctional institutions until 1936.⁶⁷ It is not unfair, therefore, to suggest that the criminal justice institutions took on a facade of rehabilitation with, in fact, little in the way of rehabilitation programs actually in operation. The various diagnostic facilities often decided what would be the best rehabilitation program for a particular defendant, but the program did not actually exist. Hence, even if there were programs that might aid in rehabilitation—a question which is still open—such programs were not really in effect.

The advocates of rehabilitation, however, have often assumed that the criminal justice institutions could or did provide rehabilitation and thus have not critically examined the actual impact of their reforms upon the defendants. The juvenile courts had the effect of increasing the number of juveniles who were brought within the law enforcement system and, at the same time, deprived juveniles of certain procedural protections—on the assumption that the courts could act in the interest of youthful delinquents. The parole system may have actually increased the length of sentences and thus made law enforcement more punitive—on the assumption that parole

could provide rehabilitation. The sexual psychopath laws have created the possibility that some persons, guilty of a crime that would have brought a minimal sentence or even probation, might be placed in an institution for life—on the assumption that psychiatrists could adequately determine who needed institutionalization and when an institutionalized person was ready for return to society.

While, in recent years, many scholars have come to question some of the assumptions upon which the rehabilitation ideal has been grafted upon the coercive system of criminal justice, historically the advocates of rehabilitation have often exhibited a faith in rehabilitation that greatly exceeded the realities of the American system of criminal justice and the state of knowledge concerning the roots of criminal behavior.

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APPENDIX 29
BEHAVIOR CONTROL*

By Perry London†

1. THE ADVENT OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL

Behavior control is the ability to get someone to do what one wants. From antiquity till almost now, the only means for doing this have been powers to coerce and to persuade, and these have always been gross in their application or unsure in their effects. This is changing now; means are developing in psychology, surgery, biochemistry, and electronics that will soon make possible very precise control over people's individual actions, thoughts, emotions, and wills. Most of the scientists and other specialists responsible for this still do not see their tools as parts of a general technology for controlling behavior and certainly have not designed any grand strategies for "taking over" the lives of individuals or society. Even so, when the facts of today's embryonic technology of behavior control are assembled, it is clear that the ability exists already to manipulate human beings systematically. And it is petty compared to the precision that will be possible only a few years from now.

Traditional psychotherapies, for example, are also methods of manipulating values and attitudes towards conventional norms of conduct, and of releasing feelings of great intensity, whose expression can change the course of people's lives. Behavior therapists are learning to attack specifics of individual behavior with ever increasing precision, "burning out" traumatic fears by creating internal explosions of anxiety, and retraining chronic lusts, from homosexuality to enuresis, to respond faithfully to the manipulation of critical signals by a behavior control expert. These are the weakest of the individual control techniques that are developing. The biochemical and neurophysiological substrata of behavior are being discovered at even greater speeds, and the technology that results from these discoveries is developing

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faster and more powerfully even than are psychological methods. The profusion of "tranquilizing" drugs already on the market represents the bare beginnings of an industry which will soon produce drugs capable of much more precise control over moods and emotions and, soon thereafter, over important parts of intellect such as memory. Electronic miniaturization and skillful brain surgery increasingly exploit modern discoveries of the exact locations in the brain where various behavioral functions are managed; already radio controls over epileptic seizures, sexual desire, speech patterns, and mood are operational. The long range possibilities of this technology are enormous.

The advent of behavior technology in our society will not come from some Orwellian tyranny like *1984*, but from the natural efforts of existing agencies of social control to improve their work by using it. The new technology will operate through old, familiar institutions like schools, prisons, residential treatment centers, hospitals, and courts, all ancient honored regulatory devices men have created to control people's behavior. These conventional institutions of social control have never made much use of technology because they have not had much technology around to use. Now that it is developing at an ever expanding rate, it is virtually certain that they will take advantage of it in order to function more efficiently. What ends will be served by doing so depends on the uses to which society puts its control agencies; it does not depend at all on the technology.

In some ways, these developments certainly promise good things, like the elimination of mental illness, crime, and even war; the prospect of achieving these goals by scientifically controlling behavior is an appealing one. But the same arts which can be used to restrict such evils might stifle freedom too, and if the refined management of individual behavior does that, then the cost of having it may exceed the profit to be gained. The enormous risks involved make it very important for intelligent people of good will to plan, carefully and considerately, how to use these tools with the least threat to human freedom and the most promise of promoting the general welfare. That they will be created and used, one way or the other, for one purpose or another, is a certainty.

There is probably little point today, if there ever was one, in debating whether or not behavior control technology is feasible or desirable. No such choice is any longer possible. This technology, at this point in history, is scientifically inevitable, socially necessary, and psychologically prepared for. What remains is to determine the characteristics of this technology, the rules of implementing control, and the purposes which it should serve.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF BEHAVIOR TECHNOLOGY

Any true technology is both deliberate and precise, involving the capacity to control the *variety, intensity, domain, and duration* of effects. Such a technology for controlling behavior originates in medicine, not politics, and its originators are more interested in its curative than in its creative applications. They want to attack disease, not society.

They have found two main ways of doing this: (1) by controlling the *information* processed by the senses, and (2) by controlling the physical mechanisms which underlie the senses. Control by information is familiar to

everybody because it includes most of the communication and persuasion methods common to our civilization, ranging from propaganda to education. It also includes such methods, however, as psychotherapy, hypnosis, and conditioning. Control of physical mechanisms is done mainly by drugs and by surgery. Because they work directly on bodily processes, I have called drug and surgical controls "coercive," meaning that their physical effects are fairly certain. Since educational and persuasive methods do not impose so directly on body processes, but rather on communication to the senses, I have named them "information" controls.

3. CONTROL BY INFORMATION: PSYCHOTHERAPY

Information control technology begins with verbal information, as applied in Insight psychotherapy and its corollaries. Psychotherapy is a technologically primitive means of behavior control compared to what comes after it, but it is significant because it works under conditions of maximum disadvantage to any controlling agency. Neither coercion by police power nor continuous charge over rewards and punishments, such as parents have, are ordinarily available to a psychotherapist. His operations are relatively pure attempts to influence with limited resources, chiefly with language.

Psychotherapy is an extension of education as well as of persuasion which, in the ethical perspective of our age, is regarded as the antithesis of control through coercion. It may be the closest thing extant to an agency for individual control that satisfies the modern morality of freedom and individual choice.

Most psychotherapeutic problems involve some aspect of the victim's behavior which seems to be "out of control," either from his own point of view or that of some other presumably responsible people, like the inability to refrain from drinking too much, or from taking drugs, or to restrain sexual impulses, or violent ones, or the urge to steal, and so forth. This gives psychotherapy obvious relevance to problems of criminal justice.

The profusion of "schools" and "systems" of psychotherapy reduces, for most purposes, to two types: Insight therapies and Action therapies. Psychoanalysis is the prototype of Insight therapy. Action therapy derives from the work of Pavlov in Russia and of E. L. Thorndike in the United States, both working at the same time that Freud was formulating psychoanalytic theory in Vienna.

The chief differences between the therapies are found primarily in their respective technical activities and secondarily in their somewhat different objectives and effects. *Insight* methods aim to foster understanding into the "problem-relevant" aspect of a person's life: Action tries to produce specific changes in his behavior.

Insight therapies argue that disordered behavior is the result of peculiarities inside the individual. To treat them, the therapist explores the inner states that underlie the surface difficulties, especially the relationship between motivations and behavior, on the assumption that understanding them will give the patient greater control over his behavior. The therapy aims particularly at those aspects of behavior which have not been fully conscious.

The influence of the Insight therapist operates through the subtle methods he uses to guide the patient through therapy. Subtlety is at once the greatest

asset and liability of Insight therapy. When it works, its methods may produce profound and lasting changes in the patient, of feelings, attitudes, values, and activity, for which he feels solely responsible. When it fails, he may have wasted his time, energy, and money—and it often fails because its very gentleness makes no impression or makes wrong impressions on the patient's life.

Insight therapy is a weak form of behavior control technology. It is clearly a poor means of symptom control. Studies of its effectiveness have proved equivocal, by and large; a few report fair results; others show little evidence that therapy "works" in the sense of removing symptoms. It does function, on the other hand, as a very general, nonspecific method of behavior control, which tends either to radically alter people's life styles or to leave them quite unaffected. It is much more likely that a person will give up his career as a result of Insight therapy than that he will lose a nervous tic, more reasonable to expect he will move away from home, shift his political position, or alter his suicidal intentions, as a result of psychoanalysis, than that he will give up drugs, alcohol, homosexuality, or kleptomania.

Action therapies do not concern themselves much with motivational states, but tend to focus on the treatment of the symptoms themselves. They place the responsibility for treatment entirely in the hands of the therapist whose job is to make a *planful* attack on symptoms of disorder without regard to whether any self-understanding comes about. Most symptoms, they believe, are learned or "conditioned" habit patterns, to be treated by special forms of training or conditioning.

The main differences between the systems, in terms of control technology, reside in their relative efforts to exert *specific* controls over individual behavior. The kind of treatment attempted by Action therapists is usually more specific to a particular kind of problem than is the case with Insight therapies. One method of Action Therapy, for example, *Counterconditioning*, is used to relieve sexual problems, such as homosexual arousal, essentially by training the patient in antagonistic feelings.

Behavior Shaping is used for chronic conditions which require broad changes in activity, including some symptoms of neuroses and psychoses and behavior problems like stuttering, juvenile delinquency, school failure, and social maladjustment. It works essentially by manipulating rewards, increasing them when the incidence of desired behavior increases and withholding them to decrease the occurrence of undesirable behavior.

The technique requires more ingenuity and inventiveness than do most therapies, and usually takes longer to work than do other Action therapies. Some impressive results have nevertheless been achieved with behavior shaping methods.

4. SECOND GENERATION INFORMATION CONTROLS: CONDITIONING

Action Therapy techniques are extensions of "conditioning methods," which offer many more possibilities for behavior control than have been indicated above. Operant conditioning (Behavior shaping) is used for the systematic manipulation of *voluntary* behavior. It is presently being used to shape complicated behavior in training programs for the mentally retarded and in hospital wards for chronic psychotics. Sophisticated electronic

equipment helps provide complete control of the institutional environment. Television cameras, for example, enable teachers and/or nurses to observe a patient's every act (or potentially, a prisoner's). Electronic consoles allow detailed information about the behavior to be fed into computers which translate it according to preprogrammed schedules and instantaneously activate machinery which signals the patient and distributes rewards into slots and troughs positioned near him on the wall. In hospital wards, systems of this type are called "token economies" because the reward used is poker chips which function like money.

It is possible also to substitute telemetric for television observations, and to use punishment as well as reward in such training programs. Telemetric equipment permits physiological measures to be transmitted by radio signals; computers can receive the information by various means and act on it just as they would respond to buttons pushed by hand. Changes in blood pressure or heart rate resulting from emotional arousal, for example, could electrically signal a computer which would activate facilities that reward or punish the person according to his internal state. This is essentially the same principle on which brain stimulation control devices work, but it operates at a different physiological level and without irreversible invasion of the physical organism. It is also less precise and dependable. As electronic communication and programming systems become more sophisticated, however, the possibilities for operant conditioning through environmental control will become increasingly elaborate, especially when combined with drugs.

"Classical" conditioning makes possible the control of *involuntary* behavior, including control of emotion, mood, smooth muscle functioning, and some cognitive and sensory processes. Immediately relevant to practical applications is the fact the classical conditioning can be used to induce embarrassment, revulsion, pleasure, anger, and so forth. Counterconditioning, mentioned above, is an instance of classical conditioning used to reduce sexual impulses. Similar techniques have been used to treat alcoholism, and are being experimented with to break habits like smoking, drug use, and over-eating. *It is entirely possible that classical conditioning can eventually be used to inhibit aggressive or other antisocial impulses even in individuals with lifelong habits of social deviance.* Behavior control by classical conditioning is not as well developed as operant techniques at the present time, but future developments in drugs and psychosurgery will certainly enhance its potential.

5. CONTROL BY COERCION: DRUGS AND SURGERY

People have been forcing their wills on each other since time immemorial, but all the methods devised for this purpose can be grouped into a few classes. Historically, coercion has depended chiefly upon the fear of punishment, which is administered essentially in only two ways: by *frustration* or by *pain*. It is these which give punishment meaning.

Punishment is a primitive and inefficient means of behavior control, chiefly because you cannot punish somebody till *after* he has erred or transgressed. Ideally, control should operate to prevent transgressions in the first place. Thus, *frustration* punishments, such as jail or bondage, can do little more than prevent the repetition of misdeeds by the same person, and that unreliably. Pain can be used to elicit information or confessions from

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people, but for little else. The utility of both kinds of punishment as control methods has been largely indirect, limited to their ability to frighten people who have not yet done anything wrong; it is the *fear* of punishment, that is, the fear of being deprived or hurt, which has classically been used to coerce people.

There are fewer obvious practical or moral restrictions on the extreme use of fear than of pain, so it can function as a more durable, agonizing, and compelling means of control. Even so, the potency of fear ultimately depends on people's experience and sensibility of pain, and the biology of pain is sufficiently peculiar, full of seeming irregularities, and little understood, to make control through the agencies of pain undependable.

Fear is aroused by *threat*. The potency of physical threats probably comes mainly from the sense of their permanence or irreversibility. Most people have only experienced physical pain as a very transitory condition and would probably have difficulty even imagining what continuous pain for a long time might be like. Most likely, the fear of pain becomes most extreme when it is translated in people's minds as the threat of death, which is more frightening because it is permanent and irreversible than because it is physically painful.

The contemplation of death is fearful to many people because it promises to do away with their essential selves, that is, to end their existence. In the same way, the more any threat anticipates the permanent alteration of our selves, the more fearful is our experience of it. For this reason, structural changes in our bodies are more frightening to contemplate than many other far more painful things. It is said, for example, that criminals convicted of sexual offenses, when given the choice of penalties, will invariably prefer long imprisonment to sterilization, even though the latter is painless and has no noticeable effect on behavior. For most of us, the selves we know are safest and most cherished, with all their faults, and are deeply entrenched in the environment we all know best, our own bodies.

The use of pain and threat as socially acceptable means of coercion has been given much of its ethical rationale, practically till today, by the widespread, maybe even universal belief in the efficacy of pain as an agent of education and healing as well as punishment. The instructive character of pain is used to rationalize punitive social controls as instruments of training and reform. It is only a small step in logic from the punitive to the instructive view of pain, and both perspectives are neatly maintained by the belief that pain has a *shriving* function, that is, that painful scourging and suffering cleanse the individual of sin and leave him innocent again. This belief has been prevalent enough till now to maintain punitive methods of dealing with criminals and social deviants despite their inefficiency for controlling most behavior.

Coercive behavior controls of the future will not depend upon the manipulation of pain or of threat, but on manipulation of the physiological processes underlying the behavior to be controlled. The two most important methods for this purpose are drugs and brain surgery.

The advent of behavior controlling drugs can probably be dated from the introduction of tranquilizers into widespread psychiatric use in the early 1950's, though tranquilizing, energizing, and narcotic drugs of many kinds have existed for a much longer time. All such drugs, of course, are behavior control devices.

Less is known about current drugs than would seem to be the case either from the ease with which doctors sometimes prescribe them or the exorbitant prices which the public is made to pay for them. In some cases, they have no demonstrable effects at all; in still others, the effects are just the opposite of those usually expected. A hyperactive child, for example, who is absolutely uncontrollable by means of tranquilizers or sedatives, may be considerably calmed by benzedrine, one of the most powerful energizers. No good reason for this phenomenon is known, and the selection of particular drugs for particular conditions is often done on a rudely empirical basis.

The evidence for the utility of strong tranquilizers is better than that for the weaker ones, but it is still quite mixed. Since tranquilizers have been used, the rate of discharge from psychiatric hospitals has risen, the resident patient population has declined, and patients are more manageable while in the hospital. Despite their limitations, therefore, drugs have provided a major service in psychiatric care.

Judging from their effects alone, current drugs do not suggest a particularly effective, let alone obnoxious kind of behavior control. Some tranquilizers have little more power than aspirin, and both tranquilizers and energizers which are clearly powerful are also limited in their capacities. The potential of drugs as behavior control devices, however, is enormous. In the near future, drugs will be available for the manipulation of emotion and mood and of some aspects of memory and intelligence.

Tranquilizers have laid the groundwork of popular acceptance for future drugs by their continued acceptance among both laymen and medical people, which is far more significant than their initial popularity. In addition to being cheap and powerful, drugs have the unexcelled virtue of being administered orally, generally as pills. Pills are obviously less frightening and painful than either shocks or shots, they appear not to insult the body, and nothing could be easier to administer. The most important characteristic of tranquilizing drugs for behavior control, however, is that they are generally *synthetic*, which means in turn, that they have some promise for being *specifics*.

A Synthetic is simply a drug invented in the laboratory rather than obtained from natural sources. A specific is a medicine which, to quote Dubos "... acts almost uniquely against a structure or an activity peculiar to the organism or function to be affected." Specifics tend to meet the criteria of technology proposed earlier. The ability to synthesize specifics confers tremendous power to interfere with metabolic processes, once these are understood and the manufacturing capabilities for the drug are at hand. The latter is no small problem but is diminishing all the time.

The specific effectiveness of a drug does not necessarily depend on its being produced synthetically, of course, but its widespread use probably does depend on somebody's being able to produce it in large quantities at reasonably low cost. For the time being, skills at synthesizing drugs still exceed the ability to specify their action. The invention of new drugs will propel the discovery of new possibilities for their use, including possibilities for increased control over behavior.

The practical virtues of drugs rests in their transitory effects and ease of self administration. These tend to make drug usage more rather than less voluntary. It is no easier to force somebody to swallow a pill than it is to make him submit to electric shock. The coercive power of drugs only begins

after they are taken, and whether they are taken or not has nothing to do with their chemical properties. By the same token, even powerful excitatory drugs like epinephrine (adrenalin) do not dictate just what behavior will result from their arousal of the autonomic nervous system or even what feelings other than sheer excitement or irritability will pervade consciousness from merely taking the drug. As Schachter and Singer have demonstrated, the drug only arouses the body, but the cognitions that accompany that arousal determine whether the person will experience anger, fear, tenderness or something else. Even should a careful controller manipulate the situation so that the victim is first emotionally aroused by the drug, and then given ideas which convert that arousal to anger, direct the anger at somebody, and provide the motive, opportunity, and equipment to kill him, there is no sure telling what will happen. The *act* of aggression is not the same as the *impulse* to aggress; it depends on ordinarily complicated individual histories of aggression as much as on motive and opportunity—and there is no such thing as a take-gun-and-shoot-Joe-in-the-heart center in the human nervous system, though there is an aggression center in the brain. Pills for *inhibiting* certain kinds of behavior, like aggression, by acting on appropriate brain centers, have much more prospects for success than do pills for *eliciting* specific behavior, because there are usually many ways to do some things but only one way not to.

What finally limits most of the coercive control of drugs over behavior is the same thing that ultimately limits the coercive utility of pain—it must be processed through the central nervous system, including the brain, and its effects may be vitiated or nullified by the cerebral cortex, the phylogenetically most advanced part of the brain that controls critical human faculties like language. Whatever their potency, drugs cannot, in any absolute fashion, exercise precise control over the parts of the brain which steer the very motives of behavior. Such absolute controls require direct intervention in the structures of the brain. This is now possible by a combination of surgery and electronics which makes it possible to control the behavior control mechanisms of the brain.

"Brain implantation," the placing of electrical or chemical stimulating devices in strategic brain tissues, has been used in individual cases to relieve several human miseries and to experiment on the survival and social motivations of lower animals. Radio brain controls have already been used successfully on people for changing speech patterns, controlling seizures, and inducing various thought patterns, hallucinations, and pleasant shifts of mood. More elaborate controls of complex social behavior have been exerted on monkeys. On still lower mammals, like bulls, cats, and rats, aggression, hunger, thirst, and pleasure have been manipulated so dependably that the very lives of the animals could be expended at the whim of the experimenter by maintaining the stimulation to the point of collapse. These methods seem to work with something like total reliability, and are sufficiently straightforward in theory and in practice so that their future development and sophistication are virtually guaranteed. Developments in mapping the brain, in modern surgery, and in the miniaturization of electronic equipment now make it possible to plant small radio transceivers in some brain centers and then to control the activity of these centers by radio signals to them.

(Experiments with chemical stimulation are also underway, but are not yet practically applicable.)

The limits of surgical control are unclear, but there is no doubt that it will eventually be possible to control very refined human behavior by means of it. Delgado foresees the likelihood of soon implanting a small computer in the brain which can be used effectively to raise intelligence. There is no doubt that further refinements hold out great hope for helping people with mental retardation, organic brain conditions, and perhaps psychoses as well. They hold out other possibilities, too, which are helpful only to the people doing the controlling, not to those controlled.

6. THE MEANING OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL

The medical origins of coercive controls make it easy to overlook their nonmedical implications: their use is not limited to curing medical disorders. Once the metabolic basis of any behavior is known, for example, and the engineering skills are at hand, drugs theoretically can be produced for interfering with it, whether it involves physiological impairment, social deviance, or anything else. The groundwork for such interference is already laid by the use of tranquilizing drugs for psychological disorders, a use which, however justified, is notably different from the use of drugs like antibiotics. Penicillin, for example, tends to be sufficiently specific so that it will attack any of several organisms without disturbing most metabolic processes. This means that a patient who has pneumonia is likely to be helped by it and one who does not is likely to be unaffected. The drug may help, but probably won't harm. A strong tranquilizer, on the other hand, calms people down, and is equally prone to do so whether they are mentally disturbed or not. The domain of its action is clear enough, but the definition of the disorder which requires any action may not be.

The move from what are clearly physiological impairments to what are clearly not is a subtle one only because we are accustomed to the idea that what doctors treat, including head doctors, is illness, and illness implies, for most of us, physiological malfunction rather than social malfeasance. The more the definition of disorder rests with people who are not the immediate victims of it, however, and on behavior rather than anatomy or physiology, the more tenuous it becomes, especially if they are the same people who select and administer the cure. As the synthesis of specific drugs yields pills which pacify aggressive impulses, expand or erase memory, and otherwise manipulate a variety of intellectual and emotional functions which are now, for the most part, outside the direct control of anybody but the one in whom they occur, the ethical problem of who shall administer them to whom, and when, becomes more complicated. The problem arises particularly in connection with social deviance.

In the past, legal systems could do very little about social deviance other than punish it. Imprisonment and mutilation were the only certain preventive methods, so all that legislators and courts had to decide was whether to use them, and how much. Broadening the spectrum of dependable control devices broadens the problems of decision which society's agents must face. Totalitarian states are likely to use coercive behavior controls as prophylactics

or preventives as well as for "treatment" of any kind of political or social deviance the government fears to risk. In democratic countries, these controls are unlikely to be used prior to the commission of first offenses or to "cure" political deviance, both of which infringe on civil liberties. They are likely to be used on criminals and on the mentally ill, however, as preventives against recidivism. In both kinds of society, the same kind of question arises: Would not *political* deviants be better off docile than dead? Is not assassination a less humane method of control than implantation or, for that matter, imprisonment? But by the same token, why should social deviants be incarcerated in prisons or mental hospitals if, by safe and certain means, they can be provided with treatments which will make any kind of external restraint unnecessary? One can retort that they would really only be substituting one restraint for another, replacing the jail around their bodies with one inside their head. But for some people at least, this can be dismissed as academic sophistry—everybody carries some jails inside their heads if they live in a modicum of harmony with other people, and the restraints that are provided by drugs or brain implants operate at the very level of motivation, so their "victim" does not *want* to do what is forbidden, rather than feel unable to do it. Any corrective system, any mandatory treatment, any *ex post facto* measure one takes to prevent recurrence of unacceptable behavior, is a form of control. Once restraint has been elected as the means of control by society, perhaps it is better, after all, to restrain motivation than movement.

Most people do not even realize, at the present time, the extent to which coercive behavior controls have already advanced. The *1967 Task Force Report: Science and Technology* to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice does not even mention specific coercive controls in its discussion of crime corrections and preventions (ch. 4) though the report's authors are obviously sensitive to the existence of such devices and concerned about them:

... their availability raises grave questions about their social value, and there is doubt whether any of them would be acceptable in a free society. As with many technological devices that raise such value questions, decisions whether or not to use them, even experimentally, must be carefully weighed. (p. 45)

The fact of the matter is that such devices are already being used in clinical medicine, and are experimental only in the sense that they are not yet used by very many people on very many things. If decisions about their use in medicine have been "carefully weighed," then the balance has swung in their favor, and will continue to do so even more as it becomes apparent that they provide a tremendous boon to sufferers from many clearly medical maladies.

The problem which must now be faced is that the uses of the future will come, at first, from the uses of the past, which will have been entirely and justifiably medical. Applying brain implantations to uncontrollable seizures or uncontrollable sex impulses, for that matter, may be unexceptionable as long as the desires of the patient and the doctor coincide. But when the condition which is subject to correction is a form of behavior rather than the action of a microbe or a wild gene or even the squiggle on an

electroencephalogram reflecting some damage to the brain, then the line between the social deviation which is illness and that called crime, is a very narrow one. And the distinction between correction and punishment may be just as difficult. Nothing better illustrates the failure of our society to cope with this problem so far than the ambivalence of legislators and psychiatrists alike about the entire category of *crimes without (external) victims*, like prostitution, sexual deviation between consenting adults, or the use of narcotics.

In most respects, the problems posed by the availability of coercive controls in the future differ from those of the past chiefly by being more sharply put. It is no mere academic exercise to offer therapy or jail as the alternatives available to a homosexual when it is absolutely certain that the "therapy" will rid him entirely of his sexual proclivity. A legal precedent already exists in a case where a woman who produced too many children out of wedlock was given the alternatives of sterilization or jail. However repugnant such a situation may sound to Americans at this time, it can easily be softened by experience as custom soothes conscience to sleep and increasing numbers of ex-deviants report on their satisfaction with their new status. When sufficient such reports have accumulated, moreover, so that almost nobody chooses jail as the alternative, a confluence of economic pressures can then do away with jails which, however great the benefits from that, also does away with the choice, and leaves the cure as society's *only* response to the crime.

As a practical matter, it seems most likely that the authorization of behavior controls by courts and legislatures will be rationally related to the criteria that have long been used to determine the severity of punishments and the extent of restraints applied to criminals. For the most part, these have been (1) the severity of the act, (2) the extent of its reversibility, once it has occurred, and (3) the predictability of its recurrence. The interaction of these factors determines the extent to which society demands control over the future of a criminal, even if it has no wish to punish him. The use of behavior control techniques can be scheduled according to that demand, because they can be classified parallel to crimes, by and large, in terms of their dependability (predictability), potency (severity), and permanence (reversibility). Psychotherapy is the mildest method of behavior control, in these terms, and surgery the most powerful, with drugs and conditioning methods occupying intermediate positions. Since the voluntary use of psychotherapy and mood changing drugs is already widespread, their mandatory use as corrective devices will probably be easily accepted by the public. This may lay the groundwork for social acceptance of more permanent methods like brain implantation.

The new technology of coercion may be most startling or threatening because of its precision, but the most important problem it presents may finally concern the nature of its assault on behavior rather than its potency. Both drugs and surgical controls are effective primarily, not in the manipulation of overt behavior, but of the underlying moods and motivations which produce it. In changing those, they have effectively changed the meaning of coercion from its historical connotation as a psychological concept to a new idea, which is physiological. The traditional implication of coercion is the violation of Will in compelling some behavior; in the new

technology, coercion is the subversion of Will in compelling some body process. But virtually all of our concepts of individual liberty and social responsibility, its antagonist and counterweight, have been based on the assumption that human beings retain inviolate some faculty which ultimately enables them to judge their intercourse with others and, in judging, ultimately to oppose the rest. In view of this idea, the main subjective means of measuring just how coercive something is concerns the source of motivation and its strength. If I think the motive for doing something comes from within me, I consider it voluntary; if the motive comes from someone else, then I feel it is forced upon me, especially if it involves something I do not want to do. If the motive is weak, then source alone goes into the definition. If the motive is strong enough, it makes no difference where it comes from—most people will see themselves as victims, whether of external coercion or internal compulsion. The latter is translated by lawyers as "irresistible impulse."

The paradoxical thing about chemical and surgical coercions, from this definition, is that their main function can be said to be that of internalizing motivations so that people will themselves desire what we want them to. The practical issue of coercion has to be resolved before the pill is swallowed, because afterwards, the corpus delicti will testify only for the defense.

The great conundrum created by the new technology is that it makes possible the nullification of all those human rights which are predicated on individual consent. Once consent can be flawlessly engineered, then doctrines like the Nuremberg code, which begin by saying "The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential" to do medical research on him, become meaningless. And if the treatment of an individual's body is not subject to his own jurisdiction in any meaningful way, then nothing else can very well be—for nothing else is so surely or inviolably himself and his rightful possession, if anything is, than his own body.

Even here, government and the common welfare have already made serious inroads and established precedents and prerogatives which make the individual's body processes subjects of social scrutiny and control.

Relatively few people see the intrusions of government into personal biology of the kind involved in blood tests and vaccinations as objectionable, specially since they do not sacrifice any individual's bodily health to any alleged common good. Some coercive behavior controls such as drugs may have similar positive intrusive characteristics, permitting concepts like "irresistible impulse" to take on new meaning and to be subject to voluntary control instead of jail. Even with such benevolent potentials, however, coercive controls represent a new degree of intrusion, which also potentially undermines the very basis for disputing what is proper and what is not.

The fundamental moral issues in using any kind of behavior controls do not change, of course, no matter what technology develops around them. They are now, as ever: By what right may one man curtail another? And within what limits? And who is to decide? Who executes the judgment? And who takes the mantle, or fasces, or scepter, or holy oil or oath, and from whose hand, to transmit or change the massed experience of endless human struggle with these same imponderables? The new technology helps to sharpen the question, and perhaps to lend it urgency by making it more answerable in fact with each new radio device or chemical. But de facto answers to questions of power are not enough for decent men—so we must

study how to force these powers into decent harmony with our individual and common lives.

7. THE ETHICS OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL

Any practical ethics of behavior control, to be just, cannot be absolute. Even when the uses of power were few and gross, one could not easily say which exercise of power over behavior was immoral. Now, when the tools of power are becoming so many and so delicate that ordinary instruments of social control like law are insufficient to administer them, it is still harder to know how they can be wisely managed, and by whom. An absolute ethic is bound to be disastrous, in any case, because it must anticipate either too much or too little evil from a technology whose details cannot yet be forecast or its impact known.

The trouble with absolute ethics is not only that they will be unjust, but that they are impossible to mount in a technological society by any means short of tyranny. The march of technology is a function of concrete physical and psychological needs, not moral ones. The ethical issues of technology come after the machinery. Often enough, new situations need new ethics, as old rules become patently dysfunctional as practical guides to conduct. Ethics are expediences for defining good and bad behavior, conveniences which serve limited purposes for limited periods. They evolve in practice, and the pace of their development is set more by changing circumstances than by reflection or decree.

All the ethical problems of behavior control finally revolve around the concept of freedom, political freedom in particular, that is, the freedom of individuals to engage other people cooperatively, antagonistically, or not at all. This problem becomes increasingly difficult as society becomes increasingly technological and complicated, making people more interdependent, so that anybody's exercise of an individual option to remove himself from society threatens to compromise the welfare of everybody else. When that happens, the utility of concepts such as freedom becomes doubtful, and even their meanings can become vague and attenuated. Freedom, for example, means being able to do what you want. Since freedom in all things is not allowable, it gets coupled with terms like "responsibility," which means doing what you must instead of what you want. Obviously, most people believe that individuals should be free in some respects but not in others. The problem is, which are which?

For most of history, the struggle for freedom has been concerned with restricting the power of rulers over the actions of their subjects. This was achieved, almost always, by force, and maintained by some machinery of government.

The problem of freedom has shifted ground in modern times. Where it was once the problem of compelling action or overt behavior of one or another kind, the Nuremberg code changes it to one of compelling consent; it forbids people to coerce the consent of others as an improper restriction of freedom. The development of behavior control technology shifts the problem one step further because it concerns the engineering of consent, not its coercion. There is relatively little in the ethical tradition of the West to adequately prepare us

for handling this problem because, till now, it has always been very hard to engineer consent.

"Political man," the hypothetical creature on whom Western democracy is based, is individually responsible for his behavior, i.e., is able to decide how to act by means of his individual consciousness, which is under his own control and no other. The nature of consciousness, however, its control, and their relationship to responsibility is not always obvious. Just what "having control" means is also subject to great problems of interpretation. Criteria of criminal insanity like knowing right from wrong, for example, or distinguishing them at the time of a crime, have never worked very well to define responsibility to the hypothetical body of individuals who, considered together, make "society."

There has always been a dynamic tension between the notions of freedom and responsibility; each implies a mode of conduct which contradicts the other. The blending of the two in some permanent harmony has always been the subject of *utopias*, societies which do not exist. But we have always assumed that social deviance and social responsibility were the chosen behavior styles of individuals in control of themselves, and in control at the deepest level of awareness, that of their own desires. It is at that level that behavior technology challenges the utility of these concepts by making it possible to populate utopia with automata who are free at every level of behavior except that of desire.

For the "statistical moralist," who places the general welfare ahead of individual desires, the problem of freedom versus responsibility has always and only been one of social deviance, and how it should be treated. But he too believes, no less than does the individual moralist, that people's happiness depends upon their sense of having their desires fulfilled. It probably does, and just this enables control technology to unhinge the utility of individual morality—for it enables people to be thoroughly socially responsible and happy about it at the same time.

But the extreme of social responsibility is ultimately statism, and its promotion is finally identical with tyranny. If any single idea distinguishes democratic and totalitarian societies in this age, it is probably the concept of the state; to tyrants, it is an entity around which men's lives should be devoted. To free men, it is a fiction, both convenient and dangerous, for discussing the regulation of the multiple and cross purposes of people.

Liberty, in the age of technology, must have an ethic to defend it, and not depend on the illusion that any "natural" benefits of technology will work in its behalf.

The Ethics of Awareness

Behavior control technology represents refinements of power which have never been common before. Not only will it be possible to restrict or enslave someone more thoroughly than the most ruthless tyrants ever have, but it may be possible to get him to like it. From some points of view, such use of power might be justified, even compassionate, because it protects people against the pain which they would have if they felt suppressed and their Will defied. An ethic of individual liberty finds such exorbitant control generally unacceptable. Even if people choose their slavery, nobody has the right to

enslave them, any more than I am entitled to murder somebody on the mere grounds that he asked me to.

The meaning of behavior control is that some people have power over others. The meaning of freedom is that people do not have power over each other. The ethical problems of behavior control revolve around these simple meanings, regardless of how elegant the technical apparatus of power becomes. So perhaps do the solutions. If technology endangers freedom by giving people refined power over others, then the antidote which safeguards freedom is to seat more refined power within the endangered self, that is to facilitate individual self-control, not only in its conventional meaning of inhibiting impulses, but in its broader connotation of guiding one's own behavior from within. Such individual control must be guided not only by Will, which finally reduces to desire, impulse, or emotion, but by "awareness," a concept which involves more and higher processes in the brain.

The only ethic of freedom which is ultimately defensible in modern society is one which limits freedom as well as advocating it, and the only ideology which will permit such a doctrine is the ideology of "awareness." The apotheosis of awareness is the absolute exercise of control, i.e. of freedom only within channels of restraint, ideally channels selected and dominated by the individual himself. Ideal control is self control.

This modern ethic of individual liberty has often been stated simply in two principles, a positive one of action and a negative one of restraint: (1) People are entitled to do what they want up to the limit that (2) they may not hurt others. What hurting others means is not always clear—but the same fundamental assumption always operates in this ideology: it is that life is precious, that it is only evident once for each individual, and that there is no such thing as a group life. The ideology of awareness promotes the life of the Willful actor, and protects the lives of the individuals around him as well.

Awareness is the main instrument evolved for the control of life, replacing, in the advanced state it has achieved in human evolution, much of the biological armor which lower organisms require in their battle for survival. The armamentarium of human invention is an expression of the power placed in man's hands as a result of his great capacity for awareness. Till now, the direction of his awareness has been upon the things around him. Behavior control technology has itself arisen from men's awareness of the relationship between his surroundings, his own body parts, and his subjective experiences of mood and thought, which he has called mind. The solution to the problems of behavior control requires further focusing of human awareness on the subjective self, not to the exclusion of its surroundings, but for the expansion of its own contents. Awareness refers to the frontal processes in the cerebral cortex by which man plans and controls his behavior, including his plans for controlling behavior. There is no solution to general awareness but that of increasing personal awareness, no answer to behavior control technology but increasing the technical ability to control one's own behavior.

Knowledge has always been one of the best guardians against exploitation by others, just as it has always been one of the best tools for manipulating others. People who know their rights are not easily deprived of them, just as people who study the weakness of others are not easily prevented from using them. The technology of behavior control holds as much promise for serving

the ethics of freedom by enhancing awareness as it threatens them by compromising will. Just as the need for social limitations in some things is clear in a modern society which values individual freedom, the nature of some social instructions will probably have to change as new machinery makes old mores obsolete. The ethics of awareness argue that social limitations should be vested within the individual rather than in external controlling forces.

If awareness is to be the chief instrument of social control, society must operate through the medium of education rather than coercion, of persuasion rather than law. The chief burden of social conformity falls upon the individual rather than upon enforcement agencies. And insofar as the latter retain responsibility for the control and rehabilitation of individuals, their work would be directed increasingly at seating the means of control within the individual himself rather than on making him a ward of society.

Self control means choice, not inhibition. A social system predicated on individual awareness and control must ultimately be reconciled therefore, to the right of the self-controlled self to act in ways which depart from current conventions and which are presently forbidden only because they offend the tastes of others, without damaging them more palpably. So too do pairs of individuals have rights to make contracts repugnant to others, provided they do not infringe on them. Infringement is difficult to define and has long been a practical issue at law, but the principle involved is clear nevertheless: There are no such things as "crimes without victims" in this ideology, for it is only the existence of victims which makes possible the definition of crimes.

In a society which forgoes coercion, some individual expressions are clearly worse than others, that is, clearly infringe more upon other people. A practical ethic therefore emerges. It argues, for example, that if aggression cannot be controlled, murder should still be avoided. It permits a hierarchy of undesirable conditions, in which suicide is preferable to homicide, and verbal aggression better than battery. If society is intolerable, it argues, withdrawal is better than wanton destruction, and temporary means like alcohol are better than enduring ones like psychosis. The guiding principle, at all events, is clear: Individual awareness is the main instrument for control of behavior, which should be vested internally and not in the hands of other people. Thus the ethic of awareness, the ideological instrument of liberty in a scientific world.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some aspects of behavior control technology are sufficiently established to be usefully incorporated by existing criminal justice and correction systems. Psychotherapy, mood-changing drugs, and some conditioning methods are suitable alternative or adjunctive rehabilitation procedures for a variety of offenses. They are appropriate alternative penalties for offenses where imprisonment is not necessary for the protection of society, so that probationary, voluntary correctives are in order. Precedents exist in the mandatory counseling or treatment required by some domestic and juvenile courts and the "safety classes" required of some traffic offenders. For offenses requiring mandatory restraints, these methods are useful adjuncts which may reduce length of incarceration and/or recidivism.

Since more advanced control methods are proliferating, research facilities

should be established now to study the potential uses of these methods and the legal, ethical, and practical problems which will arise in connection with their use.

APPENDIX 30

**CONTEMPORARY PROGRAMS FOR
CONVICTED JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
PROBLEMS OF THEORY,
PRACTICE AND RESEARCH**

By LaMar T. Empey*

INTRODUCTION

o The Framework for Analysis

There are two striking and highly contradictory things about the phenomenon called juvenile delinquency. On one hand, there are repeated allusions to the seriousness of the problem and demands from the public that "something be done." On the other hand, it is a fact that, despite all its wealth and resources, the United States has devoted very little attention to a disciplined assessment of juvenile crime and ways to go about correcting it. "More than 200,000 scientists and engineers," said the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967a: 1), "have applied themselves to solving military problems and hundreds of thousands more to innovation in other areas of modern life, but only a handful are working to control the crimes that injure or frighten millions of Americans each year."

There is nothing new about this state of affairs. It has been cited repeatedly, not only by the recent Crime Commission, but by many other observers as well (Wheeler and Cottrell, 1966; Gibbons, 1965; Empey, 1967a). But unless it can be changed, the problems may simply grow worse, not better. The lack of investment in scientific research and correctional experimentation probably results from a general tendency to view research on correctional problems through a different prism from that through which research in the physical and natural sciences is viewed. While most people would never be so presumptuous as to suggest that they know the solution for cancer, they would not hesitate to suggest answers for delinquency. Thus, they are disinclined to support the use of funds for research or even to consider it as a useful tool in the quest for solutions. They fail to recognize that answers, if there are any, may only come like answers in the biological or

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physical realm through a heavy investment in the painstaking and deliberate methods of science, that the only way to interrupt the wandering and bewildering evolution of corrections may be to adopt a more systematic and careful approach.

This particular state of affairs poses a number of problems for any analysis such as this which is concerned with a review of contemporary efforts to deal with the convicted juvenile offender. Because of the pressing need for solutions, there is always a tendency for those who need solutions to believe that answers may already exist and only need to be disseminated. Having adopted this stance, they are anxious for descriptive analyses which spell out action implications without any attention to the complex theoretical and scientific issues involved. This paper, however, will resist the temptation to respond to that point of view and will be concerned as well with the complex issues that make any panaceas seem highly unlikely.

The analysis will be divided into three parts. The first part will be concerned with delinquency in general and will address four major questions:

1. Who is the delinquent? What is delinquency?
2. What should be the basic goals of juvenile corrections?
3. How relevant to basic problems and correctional goals are the theories which underlie contemporary programs?
4. What evidence is there relative to the success of existing correctional programs?

The second part will be devoted to an examination of contemporary correctional programs but, rather than simply providing an inventory of those programs, it will be concerned instead with the theoretical bases, operational characteristics and research evidence that relate to the general programmatic approaches that have been applied to juveniles. The analysis will be analytic rather than descriptive.

Finally, the third section will be a summary and conclusion section designed to indicate wherein there seems to be major discrepancies (1) between that which is known and that which is unknown, and (2) between that which is now being accomplished in correctional programs and that which seems to be necessary if rehabilitation and control are to be effective. Hopefully, the analysis might indicate major gaps in existing knowledge and suggest directions for the future.

PART I: GENERAL CORRECTIONAL PROBLEMS

Question 1: Who Is the Delinquent?

The evidence is clear that the convicted delinquent with whom correctional programs have traditionally been concerned is most likely a member of the lower-class. Arrest records, probation reports, reformatory data, and demographic studies, over the years, all seem to confirm this conclusion (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Dirksen, 1948; Wattenberg and Balistreri, 1950; Burgess, 1952; Cohen, 1955; Eaton and Polk, 1961). The major report of the President's Crime Commission (1967b: 56-57)

concluded that, "delinquents tend to come from backgrounds of social and economic deprivation. Their families tend to have lower than average incomes and social status . . . It is inescapable that juvenile delinquency is directly related to conditions bred by poverty."

Does this mean, then, that if correctional efforts are successful in changing the lower-class offender that delinquency will be controlled? As a matter of fact, the evidence does not support this conclusion. There is considerable room for disquietude.

Analyses of undetected lawbreaking and of court statutes and practices, as well as official records, suggest that there is a vast difference (1) between the body of offenders who are officially defined as delinquent and the larger number of juveniles who actually break the law, and (2) between the number of delinquent acts that are officially listed and the number that are actually committed. Such analyses suggest that, even if our legal and correctional agencies were totally successful in rehabilitating all juveniles whom they process, delinquency would, by no means, be controlled. By way of illustrating this conclusion, consider the factors that distort the accuracy of official records. Some are well known; others are more subtle and difficult to deal with.

The Questionable Accuracy of Official Records

The questionable accuracy of official records is a well-known fact (cf. Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964). As the Children's Bureau (1965: 1) puts it:

[Delinquency] statistics are affected by several factors. For example, the ages of children and the types of cases over which courts have jurisdiction are established by state law and often vary in different states and sometimes vary within the same state. This discrepancy affects the number of cases reported and, consequently, the comparability of the reports from various courts. Also, the number of children's cases reported by these different courts is influenced by the organization and scope of other agencies. For example, many community agencies suggest cases and refer them to other agencies rather than to juvenile courts; in other communities the juvenile court is one of the few agencies providing social services to children; and in places where social services for children are well established, the juvenile court is sometimes only one of many agencies dealing with children and is used only when its judicial authority is needed. Furthermore, whether or not a child ever comes to the attention of the court is often decided by varying community and parental attitudes toward the child's behavior.

Because of these and other limitations (many of which are not statistically assessable), juvenile courts statistics, when taken by themselves, cannot measure the full extent of delinquency, dependency, or neglect; and they can be particularly misleading when used to compare one community and another. They do, however, indicate how frequently the juvenile court is utilized in dealing with such cases.

Ambiguity of Court Statutes, Policies and Cues

But beyond the mere mechanics of official record keeping, the accuracy of official records is affected by other factors as well, factors that are highly idiosyncratic in character. Members of the juvenile justice system—police, courts and correctional people—are not automatons who respond uniformly and impartially to all juveniles, as the ideals of a rational legal system would suggest, but are people whose changing policies and private philosophies affect their administration of justice. For example, Piliavin and Briar (1964: 209-210) note that, except for the most serious offenses—robbery, assault, grand theft, etc.—the actual violation committed by a juvenile generally played an insignificant role in the disposition of it by the police. The police usually reacted, instead, to “cues which emerged from the interaction between the officer and the youth, cues from which the officer inferred the youth’s character.”

Similar observations have been made about the decision-making of the judiciary, and the ambiguous statutes under which they work (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967c: 25).

The provisions on which intervention . . . is based are typically vague and all-encompassing: growing up in idleness and crime, engaging in immoral conduct, in danger of leading an immoral life. Especially when administered with the formality characteristic of the [juvenile] court’s procedures, they establish the judge as arbiter not only of the behavior but also of the morals of every child (and to a certain extent the parents of every child) appearing before him. The situation is ripe for over-reaching, for imposition of the judge’s own code of youthful conduct. One frequent consequence has been the use of general protective statutes about leading an immoral life and engaging in endangering conduct as a means of enforcing conformity—eliminating long hair, levis, and other transitory adolescent foibles so unsettling to adults. One need not expound the traditional American virtues of individuality and free expression to point out the wrong-headedness of so using the juvenile court; it is enough to reflect that the speed with which such fads come and go is equaled only by the strength of their resistance to outside attack.

Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as the *Gault* decision (George, 1968) may, in the long run, eliminate some of the idiosyncratic decisionmaking about which the Crime Commission Report complained, but institutional change of the type implied by that kind of decision is relatively slow in coming. The definition of who is delinquent, therefore, is, and may always remain, obscured by idiosyncratic decisionmaking. But even beyond that, other factors will also operate to question the accuracy of official records. Consider another body of evidence relative to undetected delinquency.

Undetected Lawbreaking

Delinquent behavior, in official terms, is defined by two essential

elements: (1) it is behavior that violates the legal norms of society; but (2) in order for it to become official, it must also evoke official responses from one or more of the various elements of the juvenile justice system (Cloward and Ohlin, 1963: 3). Delinquency, then, in official terms, does *not* occur until officials respond. This actually means that official delinquency and actual lawbreaking are two vastly different things. A recent summary of the literature (Empey, 1967b: 27-32) indicates the following:

(1) The amount of undetected delinquency is great and the degree of apprehension is low, likely less than 10 per cent.

(2) When self-reported information on illegal acts is obtained from middle- as well as lower-class juveniles, the relationship between lower-class membership and delinquency is reduced considerably, especially in smaller cities and towns. Middle- as well as lower-class adolescents are involved in a considerable amount of illegal behavior. Even if lower-class delinquency were controlled, adolescent lawbreaking would still be widespread.

(3) The fact that officials are charged by juvenile court law to respond to poor home and family conditions, neglect and truancy, as well as criminal behavior, may distort the epidemiological character of delinquency and overstress the relationship of lower-class membership to delinquency.

(4) Lower-and middle-class juveniles may tend to commit different kinds of delinquent acts and many of those committed by the middle-class are serious.

Implications for Corrections

There are two major implications that emerge from this question as to “who is the delinquent?” The first has to do with the obvious ambiguity of the phenomenon we call “delinquency.” Short (1960: 366-367) has pointed out that delinquent behavior is not an attribute—i.e., “something which one either is or is not, such as male or female, or something which one has or has not, such as measles or mumps.” This is an obvious, but often ignored fact. Given the catchall character of the legal statutes which define delinquency, there are virtually no nondelinquents. The ambiguity of these statutes, plus the evidence regarding undetected delinquency, indicates that almost every adolescent has committed acts which, if detected, could have resulted in official arrest and adjudication as delinquent.

Furthermore, the notion that the most delinquent boys spend all of their time in deviant activities is erroneous. Only the smallest of time segments is spent by them in such activities, with the remainder involved in conformist behavior. For example, in observing “typical,” “tough” city gangs over a 2-year period, Miller (1965: 109, 111) found that assault—the kind of activity about which communities are most concerned—was extremely uncommon. In fact, two-thirds of the male gang members who were observed were not known to have engaged in *any* assaultive crimes over the two-year period and 88 per cent were never charged with such activity. Even among

the most violent of gangs, then, violence is not a common activity. Instead, verbal aggression seems to be the much more common mode of behavior, accompanied by the distinct tendency on the parts of gang boys to avoid actual violence if they can do so without a loss of status and "honor."

The implications of these findings, both for the control of lawbreaking and for the rehabilitation of offenders, are profound. On one hand, the fact that law violations among adolescents are widespread means that even if all correctional programs were entirely successful, all lawbreaking would not be controlled. On the other, even if all adolescent lawbreaking could be detected, there is reason to doubt the wisdom of responding to all of it through legal means. Tannenbaum (1938: 12-21), many years ago, expressed concern over what he called the "dramatization of evil." It was his opinion that many boys who engage initially in mischievous and annoying behavior do not see themselves and that behavior as especially bad, certainly not delinquent. They are made worse, however, by any community which, in hurrying to bring sanctions against them, first defines them as "delinquent" and then causes them to turn to delinquent group associations as a last refuge. Under such circumstances, they find themselves increasingly cut off from association in conventional settings. As Murphy, Shirley and Witmer (1946) once put it: "Even a moderate increase in the amount of attention paid to [all undetected lawbreaking] by law enforcement authorities could create a semblance of a 'delinquency wave' without there being the slightest change in adolescent behavior."

One must always wonder to what extent the current "delinquency wave" is a function of this very phenomenon and, whether, if attention was focused upon it by other than legal agencies, such attention might be a more important means of control. This is not to suggest that harmful, certainly not criminal, activity should be ignored but it does raise the question as to whether other than legal means might not be a more effective device for the reduction and control of illegal activities, means directed to causes rather than to symptoms.

In support of this conclusion, a brief review of the international scene reveals that an increase in delinquency is not confined merely to the United States, but is an international problem which other countries have been unable to prevent or control. A recent U.N. report (Kvaraceus, 1964: 6) concluded that—

Even when statistics on delinquency are judged with the greatest reserve—for no neat rows of figures can fully express the extent of the problem—their meaning is clear: delinquency is increasing everywhere. The offenses range from stealing, vandalism and property offenses, petty extortion and gambling to violent behavior, rowdiness, truancy, immoral or indecent conduct, drinking and drug addiction.

The implication is clear: If delinquency is to be controlled, it will probably have to involve communities and agencies other than those who were formerly charged with correcting the adjudicated offender.

In addition, the fact that delinquency is not an attribute, an all-or-none phenomenon, means that some of our traditional ways of viewing the delinquent will have to be changed. That is, the traditional tendency to locate

the sole source of difficulty *within* the offender, to see him as either wicked or emotionally disturbed, tends to locate the source of difficulty too much within the individual and to ignore the societal contexts from which delinquency springs. It seems likely, instead, that many lawbreakers, even if not officially defined, tend to be more "normal" than "abnormal" when measured in terms of mental pathology. It is somewhat meaningless, therefore, to say that "delinquents" are like this, while "nondelinquents" are like that. Instead, actual law-violating behavior is a more or less thing. Juveniles are not either delinquent or nondelinquent; they are more or less delinquent.

All of this muddies up the traditional, punitive and treatment approaches which have been used in corrections. It suggests the need to pay attention to a wide variety of social as well as personal phenomena:

(1) Delinquency may not just be a lower-class phenomenon. It may be widespread among all adolescents, or at least is beginning to spread to all segments of the adolescent population.

(2) The seeming universality of delinquency suggests that it may not be a highly personalized and perhaps pathological deviation. It may be indicative, instead, of a group kind of behavior in which deviant traditions develop among large segments of the youth population in response to prevailing and ill-defined problems within society itself.

(3) The widespread character of delinquency may be indicative of increasing youthful rebellion throughout the world. It seems, in fact, to be taking on political meaning. "Young people," as Polk (1968: 2) suggests, "are not only talking revolution, they are beginning to act." If this is the case, and if more and more young people are drawn into the legal net, the impact on corrections will undoubtedly be profound. In fact, it seems clear that it is impossible for one, narrowly defined and highly formalized legal agency in society to deal with all of these problems, to attempt to control a societal-wide phenomenon, especially if they are expected to act only after illegal acts are committed. The whole field of prevention would be ignored.

These three conclusions, relative to who is the delinquent, have important relevance for the definition of correctional goals. Whose responsibility is it to deal with juvenile lawbreaking as a whole? What does it mean to try to "correct" and to "control" delinquency if indeed it is as widespread as indicated here? Even further, what kinds of systematic knowledge do we have? How adequate is the theoretical base upon which effective correctional programs might be built? First, consider correctional goals as they have been traditionally defined.

Question 2: What Are the Goals of Juvenile Corrections?

Existing correctional practices are like a stalagmite on the floor of a cave. Despite the fact that new layers have been added to the basic pillar, despite the fact that they add new dimensions to it, they are not independent of the

structure. The old and the new are congealed into a solid, often undifferentiated whole. Thus, if one seeks to discover clear and unambiguous correctional goals, one will be disappointed.

The historical and undifferentiated layers of the correctional stalagmite can be conveniently summarized as a succession of three R's: revenge, restraint, and reformation (Glaser, 1964a). *Revenge* was the primary response to lawbreaking prior to the eighteenth century but was gradually replaced during that, and the following century, by an emphasis upon *restraint*, by the use of imprisonment as the major method for correcting offenders.

When it became apparent that imprisonment would neither work successfully nor would be appropriate for many offenders, adult as well as juvenile, a third major change occurred in correctional philosophy. In the late-19th and early-20th centuries, *reformation* became an important objective. Attention was focused upon the mental and emotional makeup of the offender and efforts were made to alter these as the primary sources of difficulty. Finally, we may be on the verge of yet another revolution in which a fourth concept will be added to the list of R's: *reintegration*. But more will be said on the reintegration issue later. First, let us consider the traditional stalagmite in terms of its triple emphases upon revenge, restraint and reformation.

The reform revolution, of which the juvenile court and the concept of *parens patriae* was a consequence, emphasized the idea that greater justice could be done if both the entire character of the offender and the larger set of circumstances that led to his act could be taken into account when deciding his fate. It suggested that crime is not always a deliberate defiance of social norms, but may be an unconscious response to personal problems; the offender may be sick rather than wicked. His violation of rules may be more an illness than a conscious choice to do wrong. In practical terms, however, the reform revolution placed correctional workers on the horns of a dilemma. It produced a deep-seated and pervasive conflict; namely, the conflict between the older and punitive tradition of revenge and the newer tradition of reform through individualized treatment. These two traditions are inherently contradictory and reflect the conflicting images of man which are found embedded in the correctional stalagmite, indeed in society as a whole.

Since we are concerned primarily in this analysis with juveniles, the history of the juvenile courts since their beginning at the turn of this century provides an excellent case study in the conflict that was generated. On one hand, the reform ideology suggested that the purposes of the juvenile court were "to understand the child, to diagnose his difficulty, to treat his condition, and to fit him back into the community" (Dunham, 1964: 338-339). The child should recognize that he is not being tried for a crime, but rather that the court is acting in lieu of his parents, that it is interested in inquiring into the circumstances which led to his difficulties and insuring his continued welfare. Above all, the child should be treated for his problem rather than punished for his crime.

Presumably, this point of view opened the door for "scientific justice" and the individualization of treatment. Furthermore, because the medical analogy seemed so well suited to the problem, it was quick to appear in the literature, aided and abetted, as Dunham (1964: 344) suggests, by the growing importance of the Freudian point of view. "From the study of neuroses and

their emotional manifestations, it was, then, but a short jump to the viewing of delinquent behavior as a symptom of some underlying emotional conflict." The delinquent act was symptomatic of some conflict within the child's personality. Consequently, just as the doctor seeks to restore the physically sick child to health, so the reform ideology urged that a clinical team be utilized to restore the delinquent child to behavioral health, to reduce the delinquent symptoms which have produced his difficulties.

The sharp contrast of this philosophy to that of the revenge and constraint philosophies of earlier periods is obvious. The classical, legal perspective suggests that the legal order is fundamentally an authoritative order deriving its meaning from traditional moral code of society. As Even (1965: 285-286) puts it,

An implicit assumption of this view is that the exclusive function of law is to reinforce the mores and to provide a uniform and predictable procedure for the evaluation and punishment of deviance. That is to say, the function of law is social control and the major problem is one of designing legal sanctions to minimize deviance and maintain social stability.

Thus, one can well appreciate the furious character of the conflict that has been occasioned by efforts to convert the juvenile court into a type of social agency, with traditional, legal procedures deemphasized or eliminated and various treatments introduced in order to "cure" the child. Even if "treatment" were the most likely method of correcting the offender, it is unlikely that the broad-based desire to punish him would be satisfied. The basic philosophical conflict between punishment and reform ideologies remains unresolved and is even heightened under present conditions of youth and racial unrest.

In recent years, the problem has been dramatized by several Supreme Court decisions which substantiate the pervasive conflict between treatment and punishment goals. The court suggests that the juvenile may have gotten the worst of two possible worlds: he has been provided neither with the constitutional protections of the adult, nor has he received the tender, loving care supposedly inherent in the special provisions of the juvenile court (George, 1968). It is a matter of fact that it is much easier to convict a juvenile than an adult and once he is convicted, he is not likely to receive much better care.

Court decisions imply that legal procedures should be increased in the juvenile court in order to protect the rights of the juvenile, but how this will ultimately be reconciled with the agency functions of the court is difficult to say. How steps can be taken to insure constitutional procedures and yet retain an informal, clinical aura, even if desirable, have not been determined.

Public reactions to this conflict in general, and not just to the juvenile court, reflect ambivalence and bewilderment. In a recent national survey of public opinion, the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training (1968: 1) discovered that people were highly conflicted regarding the administration of justice and unable to recognize the contradictions inherent in their own opinions. "One must conclude," says the report,

"... that the public feels that the corrections system is currently inadequate. At the same time, the public is not eager to bring about change..."

This public reaction clearly reveals the horns of the dilemma upon which corrections is pinioned. So long as the stalagmite upon which corrections is based has contradictory branches emphasizing both punishment and correction, we cannot logically expect correctional workers to be consistent in their methods of dealing with lawbreakers. As Cressey (1968: 31-34) puts it, "Correctional workers are called upon to play a game that they cannot win." Their dilemma probably illustrates one of the major reasons that the reform philosophy has not produced a notable improvement in the effectiveness of correctional organizations. Since societal norms are disorganized, correctional goals and practices reflect this disorganization.

As if these problems were not enough, as if correctional goals were not already terribly confused and contradictory, our analysis of "Who is the delinquent?" suggests that, even if correctional goals could be clarified and explicitly pursued, many problems in effectively controlling delinquency would still remain. So long as correctional efforts are directed primarily to dealing with the *convicted* offender, the widespread problems of undetected delinquency will remain. Major correctional efforts will not even be devoted to dealing with them. What, then, are the implications inherent, not only in this conclusion, but in the whole analysis of the goals of juvenile corrections?

Implications of Goals Analysis

There are three major implications inherent in the foregoing analysis:

(1) Correctional goals are badly in need of clarification. An indispensable element in implementing any successful correctional program would be a clear specification of objectives. The process for determining the relevance of any means for addressing correctional problems can be determined only after a set of objectives have been defined and a choice of priorities made among them. One of the major reasons for the failure of many correctional endeavors in the past has been the lack of such a statement and a ratification of it by key persons, the public and its representatives as well as members of the juvenile justice system.

When objectives are not made explicit, there is no logical means for choosing one approach over another, one kind of staff over another, one program component over another. It would not make much sense, for example, to initiate innovative, correctional programs unless basic and conflicting objectives can be reconciled. Such programs, by themselves, have little meaning unless they are placed in a conceptual framework and are explained by some system of logic.

(2) If efforts at controlling delinquency are to be successful, and this means a heavy emphasis upon preventative as well as rehabilitative efforts, efforts must be made, as Wheeler and Cottrell (1966: 50) suggest, to provide coordination of services between all the possible agencies and especially that there be some unit where firm direction

and leadership can be lodged. This is necessary if we are to arrive at rational program priorities. Delinquency is too serious a problem to be lodged in a labyrinth of separate bureaucratic settings with little in the name of logic, program, or coordinating mechanism to tie them all together. This does not mean that a new division or department is necessarily essential. It does mean that a mechanism must be found for guiding the development of the field in a responsible and orderly way. Only then can we anticipate that the federal leadership needed in so many areas of concern for delinquency can really emerge.

(3) The community and its basic institutions should themselves be made the target of change. Much of our discussion to this point has implied that all correctional problems are not inherent in the character of the offender, but in the character of legal and correctional agencies as well. The labeling and stigmatizing processes of society which are derived from an historical emphasis upon punishment and revenge must somehow be addressed and perhaps revised. A growing chorus of writers have been concerned not only with traditional emphases upon revenge, but upon the stigmatizing effects even of current treatment practices. They have been concerned because of the failure of these approaches to address the problem of redefining the delinquent's social position and with it his own conception of himself.

Tannenbaum (1938: 31) suggested that "the process of making the criminal is a process of tagging, describing, emphasizing, making conscious and self-conscious; it becomes a way of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and evoking the very traits that are complained of." Merton (1957: 421-436) described the process as a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Lemert (1951: 75-76) coined the term "secondary deviation" to describe the outcome of the process—that is, to note that it may add to whatever delinquent tendencies the offender may have brought with him to the correctional scene. Thus, even though we might define the offender as "sick," rather than "wicked," we may do little to discourage the notion that he is permanently disabled, either in his mind, in the minds of correctional personnel, or in the minds of society. Although the community investment in keeping him in a deviant status is sustained, the problem of affecting a rite-of-passage back into a nondelinquent status may be seriously hampered. Thus, it is not escape from, but better integration within the community that the offender needs. One major problem for any correctional program, therefore, is in finding ways by which to integrate the offender into ongoing, community life.

It seems without question that more attention will have to be devoted to the devising of strategies by which community involvement and change might be accomplished. At the very least, more effective means must be devised for linking correctional programs and their people, staff and offenders, with external systems—families, schools, employers, and recreational resources.

Question 3: How Relevant Are Contemporary Theories to Existing Correctional Problems and Goals?

"One rather common view regarding the treatment of offenders," says Gibbons (1965: 15)

is that once an appropriate structure is provided for rehabilitative efforts, including larger budgets, smaller caseloads, wider use of probation, better classification programs, more trained workers in corrections, higher salaries, and the like, dramatic reductions in recidivism will quickly follow. This is a position of unbridled and undue optimism, for there is little empirical basis for such a faith. Improvements in correctional structure could have little effect upon recidivism until improvements are also made in the practice theory of treatment, and even then, dramatic reductions in delinquency and criminality may be unlikely.

The complex problems which have already been cited in this analysis, some of which have scarcely been identified let alone addressed, attest to the accuracy of Gibbons' observations. If the list of alternatives for responding to delinquency were narrow, well defined and supported by empirical evidence, the task of selecting among them for program innovation would not be difficult. But this is not the case. The choice of alternatives is broad, ill-defined, and lacks adequate supporting evidence. There is an obvious need for disciplined, logically valid and testable theories upon which to build broader and more comprehensive programs which seem to have greater promise for addressing the problems of delinquency. How well, then, does correctional theory measure up to this need? How adequate is it for the complex tasks that must be addressed?

"The main task of any theory," suggests Schrag (1967: 229), "is to construct a calculus of relationships among classes of events such that the derived statements are (1) logically valid, (2) accurate in their claims regarding observable data, and (3) useful in describing, explaining, and controlling the course of the events with which they are concerned." Existing theories of delinquency, as judged by these criteria, are weak, especially when one is confronted, as we are here, with the problems of control as well as explanation. There are two reasons for this state of affairs: first, theories of delinquency, like those in social science in general,

... lack the abstract and powerful vocabularies, the precise rules of grammar, and the technical dictionaries that are necessary for translating the philosophy of science into viable procedures for handling their distinctive problems. This means that there are no authenticated methods for resolving controversies over the definitions of concepts, the acceptability of assumptions and theories, or even the identification of problems that are unique to [delinquency] as a specialized field of inquiry (Schrag, 1967: 244).

The result is that few, if any, delinquency control theories meet the criteria suggested by Schrag.

Second, most existing theories of delinquency are employed largely for heuristic or descriptive purposes, not for the purposes of explanation and control. They have been of greater interest to scientists as a stimulus to the investigation of the causes for delinquency than to practitioners as the basis for constructing correctional models. Thus, despite a number of critics who lament what seems to them to be an excessive emphasis upon the use of theory in corrections, the facts are that correctional theory does not even meet minimal scientific standards. There are several reasons for this state of affairs.

Attempts to construct and use correctional theory, in any formal sense, have been negligible because of a general distrust of theory. Theory is generally seen by most people, including those responsible for running correctional programs, as being totally abstract and divorced from reality; it does not seem to be applicable to everyday problems. As a matter of fact, they are partially correct in their assessment of the issue.

They are correct in the sense that most existing delinquency theory does not seem to have immediate relevance for them. The reason, as explained above, is that most theorists are concerned more with the logical functions of theory, on an abstract level, than with developing lower-level formulations for guidance in some action or research process. The problem that is created, thereby, is especially acute for the practitioner (cf. Empey, 1964). Theoretically derived strategies which he could use for attacking delinquency problems would require not only a careful specification of the factors with which he should be concerned, but with a further specification as to how those factors might be manipulated in order to achieve his stated objectives. Since it is often difficult for even the scientist to translate the symbolic representations utilized by theory—concepts, terms, propositions—into phenomena that are readily observable in the everyday operation of society, it is even more difficult for the action person to conceive how they could be used in any correctional program.

Yet, it is a mistake to assume that practitioners do not use theory. Although they do not do their theorizing in a very sophisticated manner, most of them have explanations for delinquency—explanations which are not only theoretical, in the sense that they have not been verified, but which tend to become highly rationalized belief systems. These belief systems are intellectual prisms which dictate perception and determine what those who use them will see and on what they will concentrate their efforts. Perhaps even more important, these prisms not only determine what they look for, but what they *overlook* (Glaser, 1956: 433). In other words, most practitioner explanations do precisely what a formally derived theory does: it defines certain factors as important, focuses attention upon them, and explains what the product of interactions among these factors will be. What, then, do correctional people focus upon?

There is no single answer. It all depends upon the general prevailing ethos that tends to characterize any particular correctional organization. In their correctional study, for example, Street, Vinter, and Perrow (1966) found a wide variation of correctional practices and interpreted these varied practices to be a function of differences in the general character of the organizations studied. Furthermore, in any particular organization, the way in which a particular person views the delinquent will depend heavily upon the

correctional role he plays. If he is a custodial officer, he will be inclined to see the offender as devious and in need of control. If he is a teacher, he will see the offender as educationally deficient and in need of training. And if he is a therapist, he will view the offender as emotionally maladjusted and in need of therapy. The point is that correctional organizations, themselves, often have confusing and disparate goals, confusing and contradictory emphases which often make the problem worse, not better. The result, too often, is increased cynicism and deviance on the part of the inmate who must somehow survive in an amazingly difficult organization.

Before leaving the subject, a word should be said about the training which professionals in corrections have received. If there is any one practice theory which has characterized the training received by clinical personnel in their professional training, it has been based upon crudely articulated behavioral propositions which suggest that offenders are emotionally maladjusted and in need of individual therapy (cf. Gibbons, 1965: 7). These propositions imply that lawbreakers are "acting out" their emotional problems. The difficulty is, however, that as our knowledge has expanded, it has become obvious that such propositions are inadequate as a total explanation and that if they are to be used, they must be articulated more effectively with a broader body of theory designed to explain the many social and cultural factors associated with delinquency which were mentioned above. Although social factors, and the problems of reintegrating the offender into the community, have begun to creep into the intervention strategies of some correctional programs, this material has not been prominent in comparison to the mass of traditional, psychogenic "theory."

Many other problems of a complex nature could be cited relevant to existing correctional theory. Enough has been said, however, to indicate that there is a vast difference between the traditional and often vague explanations which have been used to guide correctional practices in the past and scientifically adequate theories. By way of summary, then, let us consider what the implications are that emerge from this analysis.

Implications of Theory Discussion

There are three major implications which emerge from the discussion of correctional theory:

(1) There are vast differences between the ill-defined and conflicting conceptual frameworks which are presently guiding correctional practices and scientifically adequate theories.

(2) An examination of correctional practices throughout history reveals our preoccupation with understanding why a particular person becomes delinquent and what must be done to change *him*. This is an important perspective, but it is one-sided. Official statistics which reveal that members of ethnic minorities, the working classes, and the poorly educated statistics which reveal widespread delinquency throughout the whole adolescent population, implies that delinquency is a two-sided coin. It represents not only some form of psychological alienation on the part of the offender, but inadequacies in fundamental, societal institutions as well. If correctional programs are to become more relevant therefore, we must develop theories which fit all the parts of

the delinquency picture and not just one facet of it. Indeed, if our theories fail to keep in mind the whole, we are not likely to find a satisfactory explanation of the part.

(3) The need for comprehensive theory extends to legal and correctional organizations themselves. Police, court and correctional agencies are all parts of a single, complex system of justice. Yet, we do not have single explanatory themes by which to understand this total system or the parts of which it is comprised. Quite aside from the personal characteristics of the offender, a knowledge of the way these interrelated parts function is imperative if efforts at the control and rehabilitation of delinquents is to become a more systematic and rational process.

Question 4: What Evidence Is There Relative to the Success of Existing Correctional Programs?

It was pointed out earlier that correctional efforts in this country have been characterized by a wandering kind of evolution. Most of our reforms have been the result of an uneasy series of compromises between punitive aggression and rehabilitative empathy (Morris, 1966: 628-630). Correctional units such as probation, training schools and parole have not been considered on any comprehensive basis as constituting a single system. Instead, new practices such as casework, psychotherapy, remedial education, or group counseling have all been added piecemeal to existing operations and, rather than replacing older philosophies and techniques, have simply supplemented them. Corrections has grown like Topsy. As a result, it is difficult to tell whether new practices contribute to, or only confuse, older objectives and practices.

Consider again the programmatic layers—punishment, reform, and now reintegration—which have accumulated upon the contemporary correctional stalagmite. Begin with punishment. We are ignorant of the extent to which punishment actually deters. In gross terms, the persistence of delinquency seems to belie punishment's effectiveness. Yet, to be quite accurate, we do not know just what its effects are. It seems likely that punishment does sometimes deter, that it does sometimes educate, but when and how? Perhaps the problem is not one of determining whether punishment deters, but of determining the conditions and degree to which its benefits either exceed or are less than its liabilities.

Similarly, we lack precise information regarding the effects of the reform revolution. "The viability of the reform idea," as Lemert (1967: 31) suggests, "can be traced to a repressive, puritan psychology reinforced by the propaganda of the mental hygiene movement of the early twentieth century, which helped to produce child guidance clinics, school social work, and juvenile courts." But, concludes Eysenck (1966: 29):

[W]ith the single exception of the psychotherapeutic methods based on learning theory, results of published research with military and civilian neurotics, and with both adults and children, suggests that the therapeutic efforts of psychotherapy are small or non-existent, and do not in any demonstrable way add to the non-specific effects of routine medical treatment, or to such events as occur in the patients' everyday experience.

While such a comment is made about a large and somewhat different population than delinquents, it has extreme relevance for the latter because it reflects the serious gaps in knowledge which confront us.

Our problems stem from the fact that we have failed to approach correctional problems in any way resembling a scientific approach. We have failed to provide means either for avoiding repetitive errors or for pinpointing reasons for successes where successes have occurred.

Yet, as Wheeler and Cottrell (1966:44) point out:

No responsible business concern would operate with as little information regarding its success or failure as do nearly all of our delinquency prevention and control programs. It is almost possible to count on one hand the number of true experiments in which alternative techniques are compared; the number of systematic, though non-experimental, evaluations is not a great deal larger. We spend millions of dollars a year in preventive and corrective efforts, with little other than guesswork to tell us whether we are getting the desired effects.

It would certainly be hoped, therefore, that a greater use of funds for scientific investigation would provide some more conclusive answers.

Implications for Corrections

In terms of its implications for corrections, the lack of scientific investigation suggests the need for three kinds of research (Wheeler and Cottrell, 1966: 43-45).

(1) The first would be the establishment of information systems by which statistical data, both national and local, could be gathered and used to implement long-term planning and to keep the public informed. Rational and comprehensive planning depends upon adequate, statistical information regarding trends in the amount and types of delinquency and, since it does not now exist, planning must operate in a vacuum. For example, the work of such commissions as the one on the causes and prevention of violence cannot even begin to establish the parameters of the problem accurately because sound data are not available.

(2) Research on the nature and operation of legal and correctional systems, themselves, is badly needed. "For years," says Cicourel (1968: 331), "sociologists have complained about 'bad' statistics and distorted bureaucratic record-keeping, but have not made the procedures producing the 'bad' materials we label 'data' an object of study." Even though recent advances have suggested that the responses of society to juvenile delinquency may be themselves problematic, little has been done to make those responses the object of study. It seems likely that many problems are created by those responses as well as solutions. The process by which this occurs should be examined. Research of this type would itself require attention to two matters:

There is a need for detailed information on the reasons for referral to juvenile courts, on the length of time spent in detention facilities, on the reasons for the dispositions made by the court, on the personnel who work with juvenile delinquents, and on the character of the

training schools and other facilities. All these things call for a collection of local, state, and regional data in a national center which can provide statistical analysis and report the results (Wheeler and Cottrell, 1966: 43).

Such research might be labeled *outcome* research and would be of inestimable value in assessing the effects of existing programs on delinquency rates, on cost per inmate, on recidivism and on other outcome criteria.

The second subtype of system research that is needed might be labeled *process* research. It would be concerned with the study of the process by which outcomes were achieved. That is, with the way in which legal and correctional systems operate, in addition to what juveniles do, to produce the success or failures of existing programs. Almost nothing is known about the way in which the policy decisions of authorities, their staffing patterns and beliefs, and their interactions with offenders result in the outcomes that are observed.

(3) Finally, much more basic and experimental research is needed, both on the factors which produce delinquency and on the kinds of theoretically based and innovative programs that might be developed to deal with it. Modern society is in a rapid state of change and if it is to adapt to that change, a continuing flow of information is needed, not only on the nature of the delinquency problem itself, but on the kinds of institutional modifications that will be required to keep pace with it. Such research cannot always occur within the strictures of existing legal and correctional arrangements, but will require new kinds of financial and other supports by which it can be carried out. Hopefully, it might contribute to policy decisions designed to relate changes in the rates and kinds of delinquency to a more flexible societal response.

PART II: MAJOR APPROACHES TO CORRECTIONS

This section of the paper is not devoted to an inventory of existing, correctional programs. Instead, it is concerned with an analysis of the different frames of reference that have been applied to juvenile corrections and to the programs in which they have resulted. Although there may be many variations on the major themes that are presented, the major themes will be adequate to pinpoint key issues, especially in light of the problems that were raised above. By submitting major themes to this kind of an analysis, problems left unaddressed, as well as addressed, will be highlighted.

Probation and the Casework-Approach

The historical trend since the mid-19th century has been away from imprisonment and toward the use of community alternatives for offenders. Probation, especially for juveniles, has been the most common alternative. It is a disposition which is available to courts in virtually every jurisdiction.

Probation was introduced initially as a humanitarian measure, not as a scientific endeavor to discover more effective rehabilitative techniques. Early proponents wished simply to keep first offenders and minor recidivists from undergoing the corrupting effects of jail (cf. Glueck, 1933: 228). They were

volunteers—ministers and others—whose untrained efforts to help guide and moralize with their probationers were considered adequate. Their philosophy was that the offender was a deprived, perhaps uneducated youngster, who needed help in adjusting to his environment. Their orientation was social in nature.

During and after World War I, as Empey (1967a: 31-31) points out, a marked change occurred in this orientation.

As probation work continued to expand, there was an ever-increasing demand for professionally educated people, especially trained social workers, to serve as probation officers. And the training of social workers, in turn, was profoundly influenced by the introduction of psychiatric and especially psychoanalytic theory. This theory was preoccupied with the individual and his emotional makeup, and the training of the professional caseworker reflected this concern.

More and more the offender was seen as a disturbed person in whom emotional healing was necessary, and the ability of the probation worker was judged in terms of his capacity to offer psychiatrically oriented therapy. Thus, both the philosophy and administration of probation became a highly complex admixture of psychotherapeutic theory and the older concern with helping the offender to adjust economically and socially to his environment. It remains that way today. The ideology of probation is broad and amorphous, one of generalized beneficence. Ideally, it is supposed to help the offender with all phases of his life, as well as monitoring his capacity for discipline and self-control. Yet, in practice, the individual officer may be expected to maintain a caseload of from 75 to 200 probationers, to conduct pre-sentence investigations, to maintain extensive paper work, and perhaps to carry out other functions as well. It is obvious that the ideology of beneficence has not been reconciled with probation in practice.

It would be fair to say in summary that probation as a correctional device for helping and supervising the individual exists more in form than in substance. Evidence indicates that as a rule very little actual time can be spent by a probation officer with any single offender.

Despite these limitations, probation is widely used. It is used for the preponderant majority of all juveniles and not insignificantly for young adults who are first-time felons. Between one-third and two-thirds of the latter received probation. In many jurisdictions, probation is a county function, in others a city or particular court function, and in others a state function. At the same time, however, there are few central record repositories by which to follow up court dispositions for evaluating probation effectiveness.

Given this brief outline, how might probation be evaluated in terms of the four major questions that were raised earlier: how relevant is probation as a device for controlling the ambiguous phenomenon we call delinquency? How relevant are the correctional goals of probation? What is the nature of the theory upon which probationary practices are based? What is the evidence as to the success of probation?

Probation and Delinquency Control

By definition, probation is concerned with rehabilitation, not prevention. Its main function is to deal with offenders who have been officially defined as delinquent, not potential lawbreakers. To be sure, it is useful as a preventive device insofar as it prevents recidivism. But any controls it may be able to exert will result more from its work with convicted than with undetected lawbreakers. This means, therefore, that if society wishes to control delinquency, probation as it is now organized cannot be expected to exercise that function.

The Nature of Probation Goals

Although the ostensible goal of probation, since its very inception, has been with helping rather than punishing the juvenile, his responses and those of his parents to court action reveal a marked ambivalence. Most offenders do not see the court and its probation agencies as sources of help, but as administrators of punishment (cf. Baum and Wheeler, 1968: 166; O'Keefe, 1948: 31-35). They do not perceive probation and other clinical services as something designed to help, but to punish them. Thus, the conflict alluded to earlier between the traditional concept of punitive versus treatment justice is remarkably well-documented, not just among correctional people and the public in general, but among juvenile offenders themselves.

The fact that this perception exists speaks to the well-known complaint of treatment people that offenders are "unmotivated" to want to change. It indicates why, unless such perceptions by society as well as the offender can be changed, efforts to correct the offender will be difficult. Traditional and simultaneous values favoring both punishment and rehabilitation are in such marked contrast to each other that even the offender is affected by them. The situation is not conducive to much optimism.

A second major difficulty has to do with the administrative and paper work functions of the probation officer (cf. Diana, 1960). His common complaint is that he has to spend so much time preparing court petitions, conducting investigations, writing personal histories of dubious value, and presenting cases in court, that he has no time left to supervise or assist the offender. To make matters worse, the physical location of probation offices is often so far removed from the probationer that actual distance makes supervision difficult, if not impossible (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967d: 30). This situation prevails not only in the large city but in rural areas as well. One officer may be responsible for offenders spread over large geographical areas, sometimes over several different counties. Clearly, the juvenile court, as indicated by its administration of probation services, falls far short of its own ideals.

Adequacy of Probation Theory

There are two problems associated with the generic casework theory upon which probation is based. The first has to do with the problem noted earlier in which the administration of probation becomes a highly complex admixture of psychotherapeutic theory and concern with helping the

offender to adjust economically and socially to his environment. Historically, the emphasis upon individual treatment, and the correction of emotional maladjustment, has tended to ignore the compelling pressures that are exerted upon the offender by persons living in his community, by the social groups to which he belongs, by the overall culture and, within it, a host of dissonant subcultures. It is this subcultural and cultural matrix from which the offender comes that prescribes his goals and his standards of conduct. And it is this matrix which heavily influences whether he will become a success or a failure, a criminal or a law-abiding citizen (cf. Empey, 1967a: 4).

Consequently, because casework theory has not been concerned historically with institutional and subcultural, as well as individual and familial, change, the probation officer does not have an adequate theoretical base upon which to organize new attempts at intervention.

A second major theoretical problem with which probation must contend is the somewhat incompatible functions which it is expected to perform. Traditional casework theory does not prepare the probation officer both to assist and treat the offender and at the same time to act as an authority figure. Such a stance is difficult to maintain and traditional theory has not provided adequate guidelines by which the officer can be assisted in dealing with hostile persons who are involuntarily assigned to him. The professionally trained probation officer "is not prepared to function within the special structure of corrections in which he is both a representative of the punitive social control system as well as a helper" (Gibbons, 1965: 224-225). This problem extends not only to the possibility that the probation officer might not only have to re-arrest the offender for some new offense, but to censor him for the use of alcohol, staying out late, or being insubordinate in some way to parents or school officials. Not only does the offender have trouble with this situation, but the probation officer himself experiences considerable identity conflict. It seems obvious that new theoretical formulations are needed by which to define the role of a probation officer in somewhat different terms than the traditional casework definition.

Research Evidence on Probation

The research evidence relative to probation effectiveness is both surprising and revealing. On one hand, a number of studies have indicated that despite all the foregoing problems, probation seems to be effective. In a summary analysis of 15 probation studies conducted in a variety of jurisdictions, England (1957: 667-677) reported success rates which varied between 60 and 90 percent. A survey of probation effectiveness in such states as Massachusetts, California, New York, and a variety of foreign countries provides similar reported results with the modal success rate about 75 percent (cf. Grunhut, 1948: 60-82).

"These findings," says Empey (1967a: 32):

are not totally valid because they were not obtained under controlled conditions nor were they supported by data which distinguished among the types of offenders who succeeded or the types of services that were rendered. Nevertheless, the success rates were rather uniform and relatively high and cannot, therefore, be discounted totally. They are

the product of a variety of kinds of probation administered in different times and places. Even when interpreted skeptically, therefore, they raise some real issues relative to current policy and practice which can only be answered through extensive use of research.

The issues that are raised are these (Empey, 1967a: 32):

1. *What proportion of those now being placed on probation could do just as well on a suspended sentence without any supervision?*— Given the fact that probation is able to supply minimal service, if any, suggests that many offenders may be "self-correcting." Once having been detected and adjudicated guilty, they may not be likely to get in trouble again. Still others might be dissuaded from further delinquency merely through exposure to the limited surveillance which probation supplies.

There is some provocative evidence in support of this conclusion. In their study of over 2,200 delinquents assigned by several juvenile courts to probation, McEachern and Taylor (1967) noted that dispositions of cases fell into four general categories: (a) apprehended offenders who were dismissed by probation departments at intake and received no treatment, (b) offenders who were placed on informal probation without hearing, but who received some treatment, (c) offenders who were made wards of the court but received no treatment, and (d) those who were made wards of the court and received treatment. In following up the recidivism rates of those assigned to these different dispositions, they discovered two significant things. First, they found that those delinquents who were made formal wards of the court (categories (c) and (d)) improved significantly more than those who were not (categories (a) and (b)). But, second, and more important, they found that those delinquents who were *not* given treatment, that is, were never contacted by a probation officer, improved more than those who were. The group who committed the fewest offenses during the period of followup were those who were made wards of the court, but given no treatment. The authors did not present further data or conjecture to explain these findings but the possibility cannot be ignored that many offenders, after being sanctioned by the court, may be best able to improve without intense supervision.

As Wheeler and Cottrell (1966: 37-38) suggest:

The court procedures, may be enough to deter the offender from further unlawful activity. He may be less likely to repeat an offense if there is no correctional program put into effect in his behalf. It is precisely this possibility that led the framers of the New York Family Court Act to allow for "no disposition," following the determination of fact. Relatively little use has been made of this alternative so far, but there is feeling that its use could be systematically increased. This, one very real and possibly very meaningful alternative is simply to invoke no disposition whatsoever.

Certainly such findings should be provocative of further study. Evidence is badly needed as to whether or not arrest, court adjudication and supervision contribute to the development of a delinquent career or whether only parts of this process may be helpful. The important thing would be to determine some balance between the danger of excessive legal and supervisory control versus the dangers of no control whatsoever.

The need for investigation is further reinforced by the conclusion which Berelman and Steinburn (1968) reached regarding the effectiveness of several casework-oriented delinquency *prevention* experiments which have been tried. Even though these projects were oriented to preventing delinquency, their results, based largely on traditional casework practices, merit attention. They concluded that—

for approximately the past thirty years, delinquency prevention experiments, broadly defined, have yielded but one dismal result: it is yet to be demonstrated that the provision of a preventative service is any more effective in reducing delinquent behavior than no service at all is. This conclusion appears inescapable in light of the control procedures which have distinguished these experiments. But, before pessimism is accepted as the only possible response to these findings, both research procedures and the services rendered subjects in these experiments should be examined with considerable care.

This conclusion, as the authors suggest, does not merit acceptance of the notion that all efforts at community intervention should cease. It suggests, instead, that *outcome* research is not the only kind of research that is needed. Much more information is needed about types of offenders and the kinds of processual happenings that occur within delinquency programs. This need is illustrated by two additional questions which follow.

2. *How can one identify those who do not require intensive supervision in order to prevent their future violation of the law, and, more important, how can one identify those who do require intensive supervision?*—Obviously, current correctional systems cannot provide the answer. Knowledge-building resources are lacking. Yet, if probation and other casework services are to be improved, some kind of quality control is needed. Hopefully, through research, it might become possible to identify those offenders who are most likely to fail, and, conversely, those who do not require extended surveillance. Probation departments could then concentrate upon that segment of the population for whom probation is most appropriate (cf. Empey, 1967a:33).

3. *Is it not possible, given the disarray of existing research evidence, that many offenders who are now commonly committed to institutions rather than receiving probation might be dealt with safely and effectively in the community?*—If the majority of probationers can succeed without much intensive supervision, then perhaps many of those who are incarcerated could do well in the community if

supervision were intensified. As Kinch (1962) has suggested, it would be safe to assume that different delinquent types do exist and that, furthermore, these types will vary in their responses to different kinds of treatments, some successfully responding to one kind of treatment, some responding successfully to other assignments. The problem is that typological research is primitive. Very little theory and investigation has been conducted.

In summary, this review of probation reveals a host of startling and contradictory issues which can be answered only by systematic investigation. On one hand, the evidence indicates that probation, as a helping and supervisory device, is highly limited. Its main function, instead, has been that of carrying out the formal rituals of legal and professional processing. On the other hand, the majority of offenders assigned to probation are successful. They do not recidivate. Why? In what way and for whom should probation operate?

Incarceration and Its Impact

The second major approach to juvenile corrections has been incarceration. In commenting upon the use of incarceration as a correctional device, Wheeler and Cottrell (1966: 37) express a common opinion. "The first principle," they say,

is that traditional forms of incarceration in correctional institutions should be avoided insofar as possible. Such institutions, it is believed, are of dubious value as rehabilitative mechanisms, especially with the inadequate staffing and facilities found in most of them. Extended periods of incarceration in such institutions may prove to be positively damaging to a youth and may reduce the likelihood that he can be rehabilitated. In addition to the stigma attached to assignment to a correctional institution, which may become a serious barrier to the offender's return to a normal social life, there are such added hazards as the loss of contact with conventional society and intensified contact with other offenders. Not only is this form of treatment potentially damaging to the subjects, but the cost of such standard correctional programs is much greater than that associated with most of the alternatives to incarceration. From these considerations, it is clear that this alternative should be used only as a last resort.

That this opinion carries considerable weight and is widely shared is supported by recent figures which reveal that the majority of offenders are not confined, but are in the community either on probation or parole after incarceration (cf. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967d: 1-2). Among adults, the ratio is 2 to 1—857,000 are under supervision in the community, while only 426,000 are confined—while among juveniles, the difference is even greater, a ratio of 4 to 1—285,000 in the community, with 63,000 confined. Yet, given the prevailing climate of public ambivalence regarding violence and juvenile crime, and given the public's residual faith in punishment and confinement as

control and rehabilitative devices, the above conclusions and statistics merit careful consideration. Why should eminent authorities on one hand decry incarceration as an effective device, while the public is inclined to be somewhat supportive of it? A review of our four major questions will help to answer some of these questions but will also highlight the need for more comprehensive theory and research investigation.

Relevance of Incarceration for Comprehensive Delinquency Control

On one hand, it is obvious that incarceration as a device by which to control widespread juvenile delinquency is no more, and is perhaps less, effective than probation. The reason is that incarceration is concerned only with adjudicated offenders, not with potential or undetected lawbreakers. As a consequence, its utility as a direct control device can be measured only in terms of its ability to prevent recidivism. Nevertheless, there is a strong and prevailing belief that incarceration is an effective albeit indirect control device because it acts as a deterrent to would-be violators (cf. Empey, 1967a: 1-2).

The rationalist philosophers of the late-18th and early-19th centuries provided the intellectual foundation for our modern reliance upon a theory of social control through punishment. In rejecting the supernaturalism of prior history, they based their corrective policies on the belief that men are rational beings who operate on a pleasure-pain principle, doing that which gives the greatest pleasure and avoiding that which gives them pain. They suggested, therefore, that the purpose of punishment is *not* revenge; its purpose is deterrence. As a consequence, the classical school of criminology, indeed many of our contemporary laws and sentencing procedures are based upon the following set of beliefs: (1) that reactions to crime should be based on a rational, pleasure-pain principle: light punishment for light crimes, heavy punishment for serious crimes, making sure in each case that the pain of punishment slightly exceeds the pleasure of crime; (2) that it is the certainty and the swiftness of punishment, not its severity, which will determine the success or failure of any effort to control crime; and (3) that by utilizing imprisonment and establishing, by statute, a prescribed punishment for each kind of offense, lawbreaking can be controlled most effectively.

The wide acceptance of this theory of social control is easy to detect in modern society. The classical theory of deterrence, with its rationalistic underpinnings became one of the most important bases upon which legal and correctional practices were based. In fact, the writing of many theorists reflected the belief that punishment provides a deterrent effect which serves to maintain social solidarity. Thus, it is not easy to discard the notion that punishment and incarceration are effective control devices.

Whether or not this theory is correct, especially the belief that punishment actually deters potential lawbreakers, is still a matter of continuing debate that remains to be resolved. But whatever may be discovered, there is no denying the popularity of the social control theory of deterrence and the relative simplicity of the objectives that it imposes upon correctional organizations. These objectives are widely accepted and are relatively clear and straightforward: the offender is to be punished and society is to be protected. Imprisonment will not only be humane, but will also deter other rational people from crime. It will be a lesson that crime does not pay.

Yet, the theoretical and ideological bases which gave rise initially to the use of imprisonment as a control device included numerous weaknesses which began, almost from the beginning, to question the theoretical adequacy of the classical school. Both the punitive theory of deterrence and imprisonment have been the subject of attack by correctional and legal scholars almost since their inception. A review of our remaining questions helps to indicate some of the problems that have been noted.

Relevance of the Goals of Incarceration to Delinquency Control

There are inherent difficulties in using places of incarceration as a corrective device. They are what Goffman (1961) calls "total institutions." The total institution, he says, "is a social hybrid, part residential community, part formal organization . . ." which attempts both to punish and, at the same time, to reform the offender. It is a striking example of the problems posed by conflicting punitive and reform ideologies. It is so full of logical contradictions that, while it effectively suppresses the offender, it does little to change him. Why?

The reasons are not difficult to discover (cf. Cloward et al., 1960; Cressey, 1961). Conditions of imprisonment, even among such nondelinquents as prisoners-of-war or mental patients, almost inevitably seem to produce group responses similar to those of delinquents. Captivity, quite aside from one's delinquent or nondelinquent history, quickly precipitates a kind of group climate in which resistance to change by inmates is heightened. The deprivation of liberty, especially for delinquents, only seems to confirm prior, negative perceptions of authority and to heighten resistances to change.

The reason is that places of confinement are typically caste systems (Empey, 1968: 5-6). Inmates and authorities are divided into discrete groups, and even though the ostensible role of corrections is to have offenders adopt the same values, expectations, and patterns of behavior as staff members, structural conditions in a caste system make it difficult, if not impossible for them to do so.

The reform revolution in corrections, with its emphasis upon individualized treatment, has generally been considered to be an antidote to the caste-like character of correctional organizations and the punishment philosophy out of which they grew. But, paradoxically, there are many who feel that the reform ideology may only have reinforced, not weakened traditional philosophies and practices. A careful review of the organizational character of "treatment-oriented" correctional programs reveals that they are often castelike in nature. Even though their announced objectives and some of their practices are different from traditional, custodial institutions, many of the same problems remain. On the other hand, there are theoretical arguments in favor of places of incarceration. In order to examine these conflicting, theoretical positions, let us move to the next section which is devoted to that issue.

Theoretical Adequacy of Theories of Incarceration

There are two general theories favoring the efficacy of incarceration. The first has already been mentioned; namely the belief that punishment is an

effective device for changing people and at the same time of utility in deterring others.

The second theory favoring incarceration, or at least removal from the community, is based upon more complex, theoretical foundations. In general, this theory suggests that the offender can benefit from a moratorium, from separation from the complex forces which have led to his delinquency in the first place. By providing in a single setting for all of his needs, he can be helped to change, emotionally, educationally, and otherwise, in a protected and safe environment. His problems are of such a nature that correctional organizations must provide substitute resources for training and help in lieu of those which exist already in the community. More will be said upon this later.

The theoretical point of view which opposes incarceration generally emphasizes three major problems: problems arising from the caste-like character of places of incarceration; problems arising from the nature of role relationships, even in treatment-oriented centers; and, finally, the separation of the offender from the community. Consider these problems one at a time.

Contemporary, social-psychological theory emphasizes the idea that an individual's self-concept and behavior are not separable from the social relationships in which he lives. Consequently, the caste-like character of places of incarceration may only reinforce a negative self-image for the offender. The reason is that the most notable consequence of a caste system is to keep the two castes separate (Empey, 1968: 5). While both castes may have complementary relationships of some kind, there is no expectation that membership between the two will be common. "Once an inmate, always an inmate"; "once an authority, always an authority." Membership in a place of incarceration places the offender in a kind of no-man's land where he is accepted neither by staff members as one of them, nor by the public as one of them. Consequently, the only place he has to turn for a sense of identity and a definition of purpose is to his fellow inmates. Theoretically, at least, this is precisely what we do not want to happen. We want the reverse to happen; we would like the offender to identify with prosocial points of view and take on the conformist characteristics of the nondelinquent, authority caste.

The difficulties for the inmate in doing this illustrate the inherent contradictions of punishment versus reform goals. So long as the primary goal of any system is to punish the offender by maintaining exclusive, superordinate-subordinate relationships between authority and inmate castes, a caste arrangement makes sense. But if the goal of that system is to reduce social distance between the two groups so that they might ultimately share the same goals, aspirations and means, then a caste system does *not* make sense. Applied to corrections, this means that successful change among inmates will require organizational arrangements by which members of the inmate group can adopt new roles and take on the perspectives of a nondelinquent, noninmate person. Only in this way could it be expected that the offender could stop conceiving of himself as delinquent and be stimulated, instead, to conceive of himself as nondelinquent.

In commenting upon places of incarceration, many observers have been pessimistic regarding the effectiveness of such places unless radical changes occur (cf. Schrag, 1961: 329; Polsky, 1962). Conditions have been such as to

make it a matter of honor among prisoners not to collaborate with their captors in the interest of change, just as society, in general, considered it a matter of honor for prisoners-of-war not to collaborate with their captors during the Korean conflict. Organizational traditions have made collaboration between staff and inmates, in the interest of reform, difficult.

Some of the same problems are inherent in treatment-oriented places of incarceration. The reason lies in the tendency for the treatment, like the punishment, philosophy to locate the primary source of difficulty within the offender. The problems of change have not really been considered in social-psychological and organizational terms. As a consequence, the treatment philosophy has never seriously challenged the social functions of punishment and indicated the extent to which caste-like, correctional organizations may seriously hamper efforts at rehabilitation.

The tendency for offenders to view whatever is done to them as punishment rather than treatment was alluded to earlier. Part of the reason for this perception lies in the fact that treatment personnel, even if highly trained (and they are in short supply in most juvenile training schools), have a symbiotic relationship with clients which is subtle and paradoxical (cf. Empey, 1967c: 237-328). The status of the professional, his "helping" role, his very place in the whole scheme of things depends heavily upon the client remaining in a subordinate relationship to him. The paradox is, therefore, that although the professional role ostensibly exists to help the client, it is in fact, one which relies upon a superordinate-subordinate relationship. As a result, it is difficult for the client to change unless his relationship to those above him change also. Organizational arrangements are not available by which to encourage him to stop conceiving of himself as "delinquent," "inmate," or "patient," and to conceive of himself, instead, as "non-delinquent," "employee," or "student."

Efforts are beginning in some correctional institutions to move inmates step-by-step into new roles—roles which connote change in some desired direction, which carry with them new expectations and rewards, and which decrease the stigma associated with an offender or inmate status—but these efforts have been limited. There are few correctional organizations which provide means by which the offender can be anything other than inmate or patient. It is difficult, therefore, for him to conceive of himself in any other terms.

In commenting upon the responses of adults to these conditions, Irwin and Cressey (1964: 225-245) have noted three kinds of group adjustments. The first group they label as "thieves." These are career or sophisticated offenders whose commitment is to criminal subcultures outside of the prison and for whom the prison experience is simply an occupational hazard. They attempt to do their time in the most comfortable way possible. Incarceration for this group may be the most feasible method of protecting society.

The second group they label "convicts." Convicts are offenders who have long records of confinement in institutions which are likely to have begun at an early age. They have become so conditioned to institutions that it has become a way of life for them. They are uncomfortable in a free world. Paradoxically, therefore, the only way this group may be rehabilitated is to place them in a correctional program in which they have to struggle with the problems of freedom.

Finally, the third group is designated as "legitimate." This group is made up of offenders who identify with legitimate points of view both outside and inside the prison. Consequently, they are isolated both from "convicts" and "thieves." The major implication for this group is that they may not have needed prison in the first place. Other alternatives involving a minimum of surveillance, but also maximizing help with occupational, educational or personal problems, may have been far more constructive. One obvious point, therefore, is that research is badly needed by which to identify these three groups and to do a more effective job of providing meaningful alternatives for them.

Finally, perhaps the most devastating criticism of imprisonment in a theoretical and practical sense has to do with the removal of the offender from the community. The crux of any treatment program has ultimately to do with its ability to help the offender adjust to the community, not to a reformatory. Yet, the decisions which lead to success in "doing time" are not of the same type needed for successful community adjustment. Existing conditions of the kind just described may actually be more effective in cementing the offender's ties to a delinquent system than in destroying them. One cannot really talk about increasing an offender's community adjustment unless actual opportunities are made available for him, not just in an isolated correctional setting, but in the community at large. The problem of rehabilitation is a two-sided coin. On one hand, it is obvious that the delinquent, himself, must be motivated to change. He must discard delinquent beliefs and rationalizations and replace them with new beliefs and rationalizations. He must make the kinds of personal changes that will make a conventional community adjustment possible. On the other hand, he cannot accomplish the job by himself, nor can an isolated correctional unit accomplish it either. Not only must any program provide ways by which to motivate offenders to want to achieve in a conventional sense, but do a better job of providing legitimate alternatives as well. A major problem for any program, therefore, is in transferring the changes which might occur within that program to the other major areas of a delinquent's life. It seems unlikely that the isolated, correctional institution can accomplish this by itself.

Evidence Regarding Effects of Incarceration

Despite all of the criticisms which have been levied against incarceration, there is little hard evidence to support the view that the sheer avoidance of institutionalization will result in more successful adjustment. It is a lamentable fact that national statistics on recidivism after incarceration are not available. Instead, Costner's review (1968: 14-15) of the subject reveals the following kinds of evidence.

A review of recidivism among juveniles in Federal institutions revealed that slightly over 40 percent were reimprisoned. This was the highest rate of reimprisonment among federal institutions. The rate of reimprisonment for juveniles in nine institutions of the California Youth Authority ranged from 31 to 64 percent. However, as Costner (1968: 15) pointed out, "these violation rates were also found to be closely correlated ($r=0.87$) with violation rates expected on the basis of the 'base expectancy' scores of inmates assigned there, i.e., expectations for parole success based on the

background factors at the time of commitment (cf. Beverly, 1965). This suggests that if the various institutional programs had any effect at all on parole violation rates, all the varied programs had essentially the same effect.

Glaser (1964b: chap. II) is sharply critical of this kind of information. First of all, he points out that the only conclusive way to find out how many offenders eventually return to incarceration is to follow, for a number of years, all those released in a given period. Too much information is lost simply by observing parole revocation rates or counting the number of offenders who have been incarcerated at some prior time. What happens in the latter case is that two- and three-time losers tend to accumulate in a reformatory or prison because they get longer sentences and are much less readily paroled than first-timers. Consequently, when the focus is only upon those who are incarcerated, we get a biased sample, one which overestimates failures and underestimates successes.

A second way which has long been used in science would be to make a direct test of the effects of incarceration by using a random assignment of comparable cases to institutional and noninstitutional programs. We might then be able to judge the effects of incarceration much more systematically. As will be seen later, some new programs are doing this.

In addition, Street (1965) has cautioned against overgeneralizing about the negative effects of incarceration. He found, for example, that while inmates in juvenile institutions which have the traditional punitive orientation do exhibit the classic problems that were mentioned above. He also found that institutions that were characterized by a minimum of social distance between inmates and staff members exhibited no such patterns. One might infer, therefore, that the outcome rates of these various institutions might vary considerably. If staff and inmates are close and working together, it might be expected that they would do better upon release than those in which both groups were sharply divided by inmate and official castes. As a matter of fact, the evidence is not yet available to support such an inference.

As Costner (1968: 17) points out, several juvenile institutions in California have attempted to reduce social distance and increase rehabilitation rates by utilizing various forms of group discussion, group therapy and "therapeutic community" concepts. Yet, he says,

of the three California studies evaluating this general type of program that have been undertaken, none has demonstrated more favorable parole outcomes for boys in these special programs than for boys in the conventional institutional programs. . . . No significant differences were found in parole performance between controls and those in the experimentally varied counseling programs. Thirty months after release, the proportion returned to custody, the proportion removed from parole by revocation or bad discharge, and the per cent of total possible months spent out of custody were very similar for the control and treatment groups at each institution (cf. Seckel, 1965).

In yet another California youth institution, one group of offenders were assigned randomly to a special program emphasizing group therapy, individual therapy, living-unit meetings and special academic and supervised work programs while another group was assigned to regular institutional programs.

Yet, twelve months after release, the recidivism rates for these two groups were almost identical (cf. Costner, 1968; Fremont Project, 1965).

Such findings as these are as perplexing as they are distressing. They are analogous to other kinds of research in the behavioral sciences which indicate that under some circumstances, experimental groups may evidence a change in basic attitudes and satisfactions in their relationships with others, yet in terms of some hard criterion variables, they do not differ from control groups. Besides outcome measures of the type just discussed, therefore, we also need much more research on the processual and organizational character of correctional organizations themselves. We need to discover what goes on within programs as well as reviewing their ultimate effects. In the past, *process* research has been almost totally non-existent, even though its purpose would be that of examining the program stimuli that are supposed to produce whatever changes occur. Because of its absence, program operation has been like a mysterious black box, a black box whose internal machinery remains eternally a mystery. Rather than relating the black box to outcome, we have devoted most of our attention to explaining success or failure in terms of age, social class, personality or ethnic status of the offenders involved. This is amazing. It is analogous to trying to understand how steel is produced from several raw materials without knowing what goes into the manufacturing process. We simply do not know in any systematic way whether programs are operating consistent with theoretical design or not and consequently, we do not know where to turn to correct basic problems. If steel companies operated this way, they would still be producing the kinds of lead that corrections is producing.

It must be admitted, however, that when one observes inconclusive findings like those just described, he is inclined to harbor the suspicion that no matter what goes on in total institutions, similar lamentable results may be observed. Even so, the inclination to suspicion must be resisted. A better alternative would be to turn to a policy which emphasizes comprehensive planning accompanied by systematic research and evaluation. The goal would be to develop a correctional system in which types of offenders were matched successfully with types of programs.

On one hand, society must be protected against the incorrigible offender. But, on the other, it should not make the problem worse by locking up those who would do better in the community. The need to isolate types of offenders works both ways. As well as identifying those who must be kept out of community programs, it is equally important to identify those who should be kept in them.

A coherent system of alternatives would range from nonsupervisory measures such as fines and the suspended sentence, through increasingly structured community programs, to total incarceration. Hopefully, such a system would result in a more effective and economically efficient allocation of correctional resources. It is possible that a heavier concentration of community alternatives might be run at no extra cost simply by reducing the number of people who are incarcerated.

Efforts to apply new techniques and to increase the number of community alternatives are now taking place. Let us move in our analysis, therefore, to the consideration of some of the innovations that are occurring, both in and out of institutions. They will help further to elicit what must be done if a

coherent system of correctional alternatives is to be related to different types of offenders.

Differential Treatment

The suggestion is not new that efforts should be made to match types of offenders to types of programs. It expresses an ideal long-since derived from clinical medicine. As Warren (1967: 1) expresses it:

One of the few agreed-upon "facts" in the field of corrections is that offenders are not all alike. That is, they differ from each other, not only in the form of their offense, but also in the reasons for and the meaning of their crime. . . .

If one accepts the notion that offenders are different from each other in their reasons for their law violations, the implication follows that attempts to change the offender into a nonoffender will vary in ways which are relevant to the cause. Ideally, the goals of treatment will relate in some direct manner to the causes of delinquency, and the treatment methods will relate specifically to the goals for the various offender subgroups.

Before proceeding to an analysis of recent developments in differential treatment, a moment should be taken to consider the attention that has been paid to the relationship between personality and criminality in correctional theory. As was mentioned earlier, the reform revolution in corrections relied heavily upon the notion that delinquency is a psychological problem, largely independent of any given culture and in need of treatment directed primarily on an individual level (cf. Alt and Grossboard, 1949). The language of medicine crept into the lexicon of words used in thinking about correctional methods. Such terms as "diagnosis," "pathology," "symptom," "prognosis," "treatment," and "cure" occurred in abundance in the literature having to do with delinquents (cf. Hakeem, 1958).

As was mentioned earlier, a number of criticisms have been made of this point of view because of its failure to account for the widespread character of delinquency, the influence of social and cultural factors on delinquency, the likelihood that it is not an attribute which one either has or does not have. But, in addition, an increasing body of evidence has documented the limitations of a strict personality frame of reference. After examining 113 different research endeavors which attempted to differentiate offenders from non-offenders on the basis of personality traits, Schuessler and Cressey (1950) came to the conclusion that such differentiation could not be documented. Similarly, Hathaway, Monachesi and Young (1960), after many years of endeavoring to relate personality and criminality in some direct way, concluded that personality factors by themselves are relatively weak predictors of lawbreaking behavior. These factors, they said, ". . . are much less powerful and apply to fewer cases among the total samples than would be expected if one reads the literature on the subject."

In their study of the relationship of personality factors to runaway behavior from juvenile institutions, Lubeck and Empey (1968) concluded that the problem may lie, not so much in the total lack of utility of

personality measures, but in the static classifications which personality measures have supplied; that is, they have failed to account for the impact on personality of experience in different situational contexts. Their study indicated that personal response will not be unidimensional, but will vary as organizational structure varies. When dramatic shifts occur in the social situation in which individuals find themselves, the various measures of personality characteristics assume lesser or greater predictive power. They reflect the interaction between personal and social systems. It is an awareness of this fact that is represented in emerging correctional programs, especially in efforts to implement differential treatment.

Current Differential Treatment*

The correctional approach based upon differential treatment which has probably drawn more attention in recent years than any other is the Community Treatment Program sponsored by the California Youth Authority and directed by Marguerite Q. Warren (cf. Warren, 1964; Community Treatment Project; Warren, 1968). This program began initially as an alternative to incarceration and has been followed since by several experiments within institutions as well. This approach is founded on a classic, clinical design prescribing specific types of treatment for specific types of offenders, but it departs from traditional personality classifications and defines offenders according to personal maturity levels.

The maturity typology includes nine subtypes of delinquents classified according to the modes of behavior which typify their interactions with the world. The nine delinquent subtypes fall into three larger groupings, including low, middle, and high maturity delinquents. Each of the larger groupings, and to some extent the subtypes within it, calls for distinctly different approaches to treatment and control. Goals for treatment are individualized in terms of the maturity levels of the delinquent subjects. For example, the maturity classification system "focuses upon the ways in which the individual is able to see himself and the world, especially in terms of emotions and motivations; i.e., his ability to understand what is happening between himself and others as well as among others" (Warren, 1968). Presumably, therefore, if a delinquent were fixed at some low level of maturity, efforts would be made to increase his capacity to relate to others in an effective rather than a delinquent way.

Each experimental delinquent is diagnosed prior to admission to the project and, on the basis of the diagnosis, is assigned to a parole agent who is thought to be skilled in working with that type of delinquent. Thus, types of delinquents are matched with types of agents. Each agent carries an average caseload of eight to 10 wards. His contacts with those wards may vary from two to five times weekly and may involve full-day as well as part-time programming for them. A given case, for example, may require—singly or in combination—surveillance and firm discipline, individual counseling, psychotherapy, family group therapy, guided group interaction, occasional confinement, or foster home placement.

The effort to make treatment consistent with design has extended to the

*The analysis in this section as well as in the following section on "Group-Oriented Programs" draws heavily on the following source: LaMar T. Empey, *Alternatives to Incarceration*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 40-43.

development of specially designed group homes for particular subtypes who need them. For the type of client who makes his way by manipulating others, a specific home has been set up and is run by a married couple who are trained to frustrate such behavior by exerting firm controls. For the delinquent who needs a considerable amount of assurance and freedom, placement would be in another home designed to operate warmly and permissively. Such homes will operate only for special cases, since most wards will probably continue to live at home.

The community differential treatment project has the advantage of working in the community rather than in an institution. The problems with which it works are those which any young person faces in his daily life rather than the more artificial ones of a total institution. In this way, therefore, this particular program must struggle with community as well as offender resistances to change. Its goals cannot be realized without interaction with the community.

In summary, the classification design of this program is extremely complex. It calls for the differential diagnosis of offenders into subtypes, the selection and training of agents to work with these subtypes, the definition of a treatment plan for each of the subtypes, the development of a host of program resources to be used singly or in combination for the different subtypes, and perhaps even the development of specialized homes in which certain wards would be housed.

The Community Treatment Project is utilizing experimental and control groups by which to compare outcome rates. All subjects come from a common pool of eligibles who have been assigned by the courts to the Youth Authority for what traditionally has been an institutional experience. However, the design permits the random assignment of experimental subjects directly back to the community, while only control subjects are assigned to an institution. Comparative effectiveness of the two programs is being assessed both by parole performance and by attitudinal and behavioral changes.

Differential Treatment Theory

Before proceeding to a review of research findings, a word should be said about the theory underlying the maturity level classification. According to Warren's (1968: 10-11) description:

Seven successive stages of interpersonal maturity characterize psychological development. They range from the least mature, which resemble the interpersonal reactions of a new born infant, to an ideal of social maturity which is seldom or never reached in our present culture. Each of the seven stages, or levels, is defined by a crucial interpersonal problem which must be solved before further progress toward maturity can occur. All persons do not necessarily work their way through each stage, but may become fixed at a particular level. The range of maturity levels found in a delinquent population is from maturity level 2 . . . to maturity level 5. It should be stressed that interpersonal development is viewed as a continuum. The successive steps, or levels, which are

described in the theory are seen as definable points along the continuum.

Of the many issues which can and will be discussed about this provocative and complex theory, two may be mentioned briefly here. The first has to do with the fact that "maturity" is often a difficult phenomenon to define. It is relative to time, place and culture. What may represent "maturity" to some, may not represent "maturity" to others. The problem becomes even more complex when one attempts to operationalize it for treatment or research purposes. The maturity classifications which are used in the differential treatment project are extremely complex and will have to be made the subject of considerable research and refinement before complete confidence can be placed in their capacity to distinguish among juveniles in terms of concrete and objective criteria.

Second, even though the maturity concept emphasizes the individual's interpersonal relations with others, it can suffer, if care is not taken, like the personality concept from too singular an emphasis upon the individual. The whole field of mental health, as well as corrections, has been confronted with this problem. Szasz (1956: 279), for example, has been sharply critical about the confusion of social, ethical, medical and legal concepts. He has accused the helping professions of adopting too narrow a view of reality and of assuming that some departure from that view by an offender constitutes a distortion of reality (or perhaps in this case, maturity). The offender's perspective, the lens through which he perceives the world, may be the product of his social and cultural position within that world. His tendency to order the same set of facts into different logical categories may be the product of his socialization in a particular environment, rather than immaturity, as measured by some universal scale. The practitioner must guard, therefore, against interpretations which fail to account for frames of reference which are different from his own. To be sure, successful readjustment on the part of the offender may require some change in maturity level, but it may also require a better awareness both of the unique perspectives which he brings to the correctional scene and of the ways that community institutions, themselves, require change if preventative or rehabilitative efforts are to succeed with him.

Reckless (1955) has also called attention to the fact that the race and social class membership of offenders are by their very nature, categories to which people belong quite apart from whatever their maturity or personality levels may be. He calls these "categoric risks" because they reflect differential crime rates among different segments of the population and reveal to some degree the differential responses of officials to different classes of offenders. These categoric risks, by themselves, are predictive of success or failure, quite apart from the personal makeup of the individual, because they also determine how successful he will be in his relationships with others in a competitive achievement-oriented society. How all of these factors relate, then, to personal maturity levels requires further, theoretical explication.

Research Evidence Regarding Differential Treatment

Efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of the differential treatment program

reveal many of the complex problems which are encountered in any correctional research. The latest reported figures show that only 28 percent of the experimentals as contrasted to 52 percent of the controls have been parole failures within 15 months on parole (failures include all revocations of parole, recommitments from the courts and unfavorable discharges). The figures for 24 months of community exposure time on parole similarly favor the experimental group, 38 percent vs. 61 percent failure. This difference in favor of the community program is highly significant in statistical terms.

A basic problem with placing complete confidence in recidivism figures of this type lies in a complex number of subtle issues to which attention must be paid. First, these measurements of failure rates occurred while significant numbers of the experimentals and controls were still on parole. Definitive figures cannot be determined until parole has been completed. This is especially important for the experimental groups since parole supervision has been extended to cover a period of years in many cases and results in efforts at control which themselves strongly determine success and failure rates.

As progress reports have noted (Community Treatment Project After Five Years: 6), "part of the differences in failure rates can be explained by differences in decisionmaking with regard to parole restoral following an offense." Several factors have entered into these differences (Palmer and Warren, 1967: Part I, 11-12):

... experimentals have their parole suspended more frequently than do controls. Suspensions refer to temporary, rather than permanent, revocations of parole and usually result in a short period of detention.

... Parole for experimental cases is rarely revoked on a permanent basis for minor offenses while the same is not true for control cases. Controls are revoked fairly often for such minor offenses as placement failure, poor home or school adjustment, truancy or runaway. An examination of the severity of offenses revealed further that "the controls had been revoked or unfavorably discharged in connection with offenses which had been of significantly *less serious nature* when compared with experimental offenses."

... The followup also indicates that the average number of offenses which had taken place during parole was significantly greater for the experimental than for the control group.

The fact that control subjects have been revoked for lesser reasons than experimentals, and yet that the average number of listed offenses was greater for experimentals, while on parole, probably says more about the differential response of treatment personnel to delinquent behavior than about the behavior itself. For example, even though experimentals may have been more delinquent on occasion than controls, their lower revocation rate may be a function of the experimental program, itself. The caseload size and treatment planning is considerably different from regular parole. Experimental agents are able to increase contact and surveillance or to develop new treatment plans for the offender as the need arises, while the same may be less true for regular parole. Furthermore, the decision to suspend rather than revoke parole obviously seems to involve subjectivity on someone's part, and since it seems almost certain that intensive community programs will be used

increasingly in the future, more attention will have to be paid both to the treatment and legal issues that are involved. It is not clear in this case, for example, whether experimentals were really any less delinquent than control groups while on parole. The difference in revocation rates may simply reveal differences in correctional approaches by experimental and control staff members. Whether or not one or the other approach is most effective will have to await further data which provide information on all subjects after they have been released from parole.

Some of the problems just mentioned might be clarified if complete arrest statistics were available. It seems likely that the failure rates mentioned above are possibly clouded too much by parole agent decisionmaking. Information on the frequency of arrests, and their severity, from all agencies of control, might help to clarify the picture. Arrest data are closer to the point of offense and the frequency and severity of offenses which lead to those arrests are often cloaked in data on court hearings and revocation.

These problems also speak to the exhausting complexities of program evaluation under present conditions. In most cases, adequate funding and staffing resources are not great enough to make the necessary followups. Much of this could be solved if sound information systems were available.

On the other hand, what may turn out to be the most significant aspect of this differential treatment approach is some indication that the most dramatic differences in effect appear when the various delinquent subtypes are considered separately. Some subtypes seem to do better in an institution, while others do better in the community (cf. Warren, 1968). The further explication of these differences and what led to them could be of inestimable value to corrections.

The differential treatment concept, based upon maturity levels, has had tremendous impact in California and elsewhere. It has suggested the possibility of treating a large proportion of the delinquent population in the community in lieu of incarceration. It has led to an experiment in San Francisco in which the differential treatment model is being compared to a group-oriented model (of the type which will be mentioned below) and to traditional institutions. It has stimulated two projects within institutions which have been concerned with developing differential treatment environments more conducive to the needs of specific subgroups within the delinquent population. It has stimulated efforts to more effectively match types of clients with types of workers. Finally, it has made a valuable contribution to the emerging emphasis upon community experimentation and the need for reintegrating the offender more effectively into the community.

Group-Oriented Programs

Based upon a much different set of causation and correctional premises, group-oriented programs have become very common in corrections. The prototype for group-oriented, but small residential centers, is the Highfields Program which was begun in 1950 (cf. McCorkle, Elias and Bixby, 1958; Weeks, 1958). Highfields limits its population to 20 boys, ages 16 and 17,

who are assigned directly from the juvenile court. Boys live informally in an old home without the usual institutional guards and detailed routine.

Highfields was established on the premise that with intensive group methods, known as "guided group interaction," rehabilitation could be accomplished in three or four months. Programming is simple and designed to emphasize the problem solving, the decision-making, and the control effects of the group.

During the day, the boys work at a nearby mental hospital. In the evening, the total population is broken into two groups of 10, each of which then meets for a daily group meeting. Formal rules are few. Control, instead, is exercised informally through the development of a group culture which presumably decreases distance between staff and offenders and sponsors the offender in a more active, reformation role. Rather than just *receiving* treatment, he is expected to administer it, along with others, as well. The idea is that individuals are best helped who themselves become capable of helping others. These are the principles which underlie Alcoholics Anonymous and Synanon, the private center for drug addicts run by drug addicts (cf. Yablonsky, 1965).

The general Highfields model has been widely adopted by public correctional agencies in other places, in New Jersey, New York, and Kentucky. Perhaps the most significant variation on the basic theme has been its application in the community where boys who would otherwise be incarcerated continue to live at home rather than in an institution. Two of the earliest of such programs were the Provo Experiment (Empey and Rabow, 1961) and Essexfields (Elias and Pilnick, 1964). A third, The Silverlake Experiment (Empey, Lubeck and Newland, 1966), although residential in nature, kept boys in the community where they attended school, went home on weekends, and so on. All three programs were similar in the sense that they were built around group techniques, were used for older offenders, ages 15 to 18 years, and were used as community alternatives to incarceration.

Although there is some danger in treating the conceptual and organizational characteristics of these group programs as one, that will be done in the interest of time and space. Four general assumptions, as stated for the Provo and Silverlake Experiments, have tended to underly these group programs: (1) that most older delinquents who are eventually processed through the courts are from lower income homes; (2) that the lives of these offenders have been characterized by failure in such conventional institutions as the school or world of work; (3) that this failure is productive of a high degree of strain for them; and (4) that membership in a delinquent group develops as an alternative means for acquiring many of the social, emotional and economic goals which are acquired by other young people through conventional means. The beliefs, rationalizations and points of view of the delinquent groups, it is hypothesized, become important determinants of juvenile, deviant behavior. Delinquency is best understood as a group phenomenon which is collective rather than private, peer supported rather than lonely.

In responding to these theoretical assumptions regarding causation, the following assumptions for intervention were adopted. A program should try: (1) to make the delinquent group the target of change—that is, attempt to change shared standards, points of view, rewards and punishments; (2) to give

the delinquent group a stake in what happens to its members by permitting participation with staff in solving problems, exerting controls, and making basic decisions, and (3) to open up conventional opportunities to delinquents in the school, the world of work and other conventional institutions. Reformation on the part of offenders is seen as only one side of the rehabilitative coin. Certain aspects of the community will have to be changed if offenders are to be successfully reintegrated.

In implementing these assumptions, the Provo, Essexfields, and Silverlake Programs were generally the same. Program activities included gainful employment in the community, school, and daily group meetings built around the technique of guided group interaction. This technique as mentioned above varies considerably from traditional group psychotherapy in the sense that all group members, not just staff, are responsible for defining problems, dealing with difficult questions, and finding solutions. Considerable power is shared with offenders. An effort is made to provide means by which offenders can assume more responsibility for their lives and to reward them for help that they are able to give others. The offender is sponsored in an active, reformation role rather than in a passive one in which he is acted upon by others.

The fact that these programs were located in the community meant that the problems with which the groups were struggling were those that confront them in their daily lives: families, friends, school, work, leisure time. It was reasoned that this is one very important strength of a community over an institutional program. The artificiality of institutional life is avoided and concentration can be placed upon the problems of successful community reintegration rather than upon adjustment to institutional norms.

In terms of theoretical adequacy, this approach has not as yet attempted to define types of offenders and to differentiate treatment based upon subtypes. Instead, the daily group discussion is used as a diagnostic device by which to identify the *behavioral* problems of offenders and to define new ways of behaving for them which will be less problematic. The main emphasis is upon the need for dynamic analysis based upon the assumption that individual characteristics will change from time to time, altering the kinds of behavioral responses that are needed. Furthermore, it is assumed that the problems to be addressed are less characteristic of personality than of the peer relationships, the attitudes and rationalizations which support a delinquent rather than a nondelinquent adjustment.

Even so, it remains a matter of evidence rather than theory as to whether these assumptions are valid. It seems highly possible that the group approach is inappropriate for some offenders. Therefore, until efforts are made first, to identify and differentiate delinquent types, and, second, to determine whether program impact varies according to type, it will be difficult to assess the precise effectiveness of the group approach.

Research Evidence Regarding Group Programs

The outcome research on these group programs has been inconclusive. In order to test the effectiveness of the Highfields Program, its graduates were compared to a group of boys who had been committed to the New Jersey State Reformatory for males at Annandale. A lower percentage of Highfields

than of Annandale boys recidivated (37 vs. 53 percent). However, the results of the comparison have been debated because both groups were not randomly selected under experimental conditions such as they were in the Community Treatment Program, the Provo and Silverlake Experiments (cf. Tappan, 1960: 502-505). Without such selection, there is some doubt as to whether the groups are comparable. For example, the Annandale boys tended to be a little older, perhaps more experienced in delinquency, and from poorer social backgrounds than the Highfields boys. As a consequence, the most appropriate conclusion is that Highfields has been proven neither less nor more successful than regular incarceration. What is significant, however, is that at least similar results were achieved at much less expense both in monetary terms as well as time saved in the lives of the delinquents. The stay at Highfields was only 3 or 4 months and many of the negative aspects of institutionalization were avoided.

An experimental design was used in the Provo Experiment. Boys who were assigned to the experimental program were compared to two control groups, one of which was left in the community on probation, and a second which was incarcerated in a training school. The initial design was such that all three groups could be drawn randomly from a common population of persistent offenders residing in the same county.

As a background for comparing the three groups, a study of court records was made prior to the introduction of the experiment. This study revealed that only about 50 percent of the kinds of persistent offenders who were assigned to the program were succeeding on probation. It will be recalled from the success and failure rates presented earlier for probation that this was a lower success rate than the case for probation in general. It explains why the more intensive experiment was started.

The experiment improved the success rate. Six months after release, only 37 percent of those who were initially assigned to the Provo Experiment, 16 percent of those who eventually completed the program had a record of arrest. Of those who had been arrested, none had been incarcerated. But these were probably not the most interesting findings.

During the same period, the failure rate for the control group under regular probation had gone down almost as precipitously. From its original failure rate of around 50 to 55 percent, the probation department had lowered this rate to almost the same figures as those for the experimental group: 27 percent for all those who were initially assigned to probation, and 23 percent for those who completed it.

Apparently the introduction of the experiment, and the research which accompanied it, had some influence on the operation of court and probation personnel. This reduction in the overall failure rate from 45 to 27 percent was significant. Apparently there was a halo effect, not uncommon in social experiments, which affected everyone concerned and not just the offenders who were subjected to the experimental stimulus. Such findings, of course, indicate the importance of conducting process research by which to identify the factors at work in such circumstances.

In striking contrast to the success for the community groups, the failure rate for those boys who were incarcerated was much higher. Fifty-eight percent had been arrested after 6 months, as contrasted to 27 percent for the boys in the community. This finding, however, is subject to the same kinds of

criticism as the Highfields and Annandale findings. The reason is that the experiment was never able to fill the control group that was to have been randomly selected and assigned to the training school. The reason is that the judge of the juvenile court was disinclined to commit even persistent offenders to the reformatory. It seems likely that this inclination was affected by the presence of the experiment and resulted in his use of community alternatives in lieu of incarceration. As a consequence, a sample of boys from the training school, who were similar on 20 characteristics to those in the community, were selected as the training school control group. Although when compared on these 20 characteristics, the three groups did not differ considerably, it is still difficult to say whether the two groups were totally comparable. The vast differences in failure rate may have been decreased had they been more comparable.

Other things about this experiment are significant. First, a 4-year followup on all experimental and control groups is almost completed and results will be made available. Second, the costs for community treatment are strikingly lower than the costs of incarceration. At the time of the experiment, the annual cost at the training school was approximately \$2,595 per year per boy. The corresponding cost for the experimental group was \$1,108. Since the average length of stay at the training school was 9½ months, as compared to only 7 months for the experiment, the actual cost per boy was \$2,015 as compared to \$609. The estimated cost for supervising persistent offenders on probation was somewhere around \$200 per boy. These differences highlight one real possibility for financing innovation. By removing more offenders from incarceration, and the excessive costs incurred thereby, it might be possible to staff and finance more community experiments at no added cost. The objective would be to develop community vs. institutional controls (Empey, 1966).

The Essexfields Experiment did not benefit from randomly selected experimental and control groups. Instead, it made a comparison of 1,210 youths who were assigned by the Essex County Juvenile Court to one or another of four different treatment programs: probation, group centers (three residential, short term, group therapy institutions), Essexfields, and Annandale, the State Reformatory. Selection for comparison was based upon the following subject criteria: male, 16-17 years of age, no psychosis, severe neurosis, or serious mental retardation, and no prior commitment to a correctional institution. Overall recidivism rates were as follows: 32 percent for probation, 45 percent for group centers, 48 percent for Essexfields, and 55 percent for Annandale, the State Reformatory (Stephenson and Scarpitti, 1967: 94-95). Since assignment to these programs was not random, it is possible only to conjecture about these findings. Two possibilities are suggested: (1) they may reflect the fact that more serious offenders were assigned to Annandale, Essexfields and the group centers than to probation; or (2) they may reflect some deleterious effects from institutional supervision, even if in the community.

The Essexfields research made a valuable contribution by noting the number of offenders who failed in each program and who were referred back to court: probation, 28 percent; Essexfields, 23 percent; group centers, 27 percent; Annandale, 2 percent (Stephenson and Scarpitti, 1967: 48). In-program failures refer to those offenders who return to court as unsuitable

for their various placements, or because they have gotten into additional trouble. Obviously, Annandale, the Reformatory, unlike community programs, did not have the option so common to community programs, of removing those who are not succeeding. Interestingly enough, the eventual recidivism rates for those who did not complete probation (76 percent) were the highest for the three community programs. The next highest was for the group centers (55 percent) and lowest for Essexfields (48 percent). These figures suggest, of course, that probation was successful in ridding itself of high recidivism risks by returning high risk boys to the court for further disposition. The group centers and Essexfields seemed somewhat less inclined to do this (Stephenson and Scarpitti, 1967: 94-95).

Finally, the findings for the Silverlake Experiment are somewhat inconclusive leaving as many unanswered questions as answered ones. In this case, however, experimental and control groups were randomly selected. The experimental group, it will be recalled, was assigned to live-in residence in Los Angeles, while the control group was assigned to a private, open, but total institution in the country. In terms of overall success and failure rates, boys who completed both programs did relatively well. After a 15-month followup, approximately three-fourths of both groups are succeeding. The problem is, however, that only about one-half of each group completed their respective programs. The remainder were either defined as in-program failures or ran away. This means, therefore, that both programs could be said to be discarding their most difficult cases, or that the most delinquent boys were running away of their own accord. Actually, process research indicates that this may not be the case. In a study of critical incidents in the experimental residence, Empey and Newland (1968) found that there was a considerable sharing of information regarding sensitive and difficult critical incidents, that the majority of these critical incidents were precipitated by a minority of the population, and that their number had declined over time. A program culture seemed to develop which was increasingly efficient as a mechanism for social control. Yet, there was some indication that, because of complex pressures, the approach to critical incidents both by staff and delinquents may have been overly formal, overly punitive. The data suggested that some boys may have been defined as failures by staff and peers or were driven out of the program for reasons other than serious delinquency.

Similarly, a study of runaways by Lubeck and Empey (1968) revealed that structural changes within both experimental and control settings often produced personal strain among offenders. In the experimental residence, personal strain seemed to be the product of an increasingly cohesive system which may have been overly rejecting of the marginal delinquent, while in the total institution, it was disorganization due to a change in treatment philosophy. They concluded, therefore, that the basic issue "may not be that of change vs. no change, or strain vs. no strain, but that of developing a better fund of knowledge by which to construct correctional strategies which can better anticipate and deal with strain."

Finally, although a complete analysis of recidivism data has not been completed at Silverlake, some striking findings have been discovered regarding the ability of experimental and control programs to reduce delinquency. In their preoccupation with whether or not individuals recidivate, correctional and research people have often overlooked the possibility that, even though

significant proportions of the offender population may once again get into trouble, their overall involvement in delinquency may have reduced significantly. That is exactly what unpublished data from the Silverlake study indicate. After comparing the *total number of offenses* committed both by experimental and control groups 15 months prior to their assignment to either program, with the total volume of offenses they committed in the 15 months after release, the following reduction in offenses was found: for experimentals, a reduction of 76 percent; for controls, a reduction of 72 percent. Similarly, in the 15 months prior to commitment, the mean number of official offenses per boy for the experimentals was 2.89, and for the controls, 2.83. Yet, in the 15 months following release, these figures declined to 0.70 for experimentals, and 0.79 for controls. In other words, there was a net change of -2.19 offenses per boy in the experimental group, and -2.0 offenses for controls. These are striking findings, indicating that these two programs may have had highly significant results in reducing delinquency, even though traditional measures did not indicate this. Such information suggests that we may only be beginning the task of finding sound measures by which to assess the effectiveness of correctional programs. Such figures as these would provide grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. They seem to indicate the need to avoid treating recidivism as an either-or thing and to determine, instead, the degree of progress offenders make away from delinquency and toward conformity.

Learning Theory and Education Therapy

A recent development has emphasized the idea of administering correctional programs based upon educational, rather than medical models. Learning theory and the application of recent innovations in education have been applied to work with juveniles in two recent pilot programs (Cohen, 1968).

The educational model provides an interesting contrast to the older medical model. Whereas the medical model emphasized pathology and the need to help the offender return to a previous state of health, the educational model emphasizes learning deficiencies, both intellectual and interpersonal. While the medical model was concerned with treating the patient as if he were sick or disabled, the educational model attempts to remedy learning deficiencies.

According to Cohen et al. (1968), delinquents have two basic problems: (1) they are deficient in basic skills and behaviors necessary to be successful academically and vocationally and (2) they lack the kinds of acquisitional and attitudinal patterns by which the needed skills can be acquired. Traditional, educational procedures, both in the community and in correctional institutions have not been adequate as a means of helping offenders to remedy these deficiencies. Yearly promotions, classroom grading, and diplomas are not appropriate goals for learning problems of this type. What must be done, instead, is to "reinforce" the desired behavior by more immediate and meaningful rewards: social recognition, peer approval, money, and creature comforts which money will buy, and which all people seek.

In translating these assumptions into practice at the National Training School for Boys in Washington, several steps were involved. First, each

offender's program was based upon the results of a large series of tests given not only upon his arrival, but throughout his stay in the program. It was his major performance, orally and academically, which determined the program he would receive. Second, he was given a set of programmed instructional material based on his present repertoire and its deficiencies. He worked on his own level and progressed at his own speed. Third, learning was elaborately reinforced. One method was a system of points—each point being worth 1 cent—by which the individual was rewarded for the completion of academic subjects and the passing of examinations. These points could be translated into money by which students could gain immediate gratifications, cokes, snacks, or cigarettes, intermediate goals such as buying their own meals rather than institutional fare and recreational privileges, or long-range objectives in which they could buy such things as their own clothing. By working hard in the program, a student proceeding at his own pace, could greatly enhance his standard of living. He could wear civilian clothing, eat non-institutional fare, enjoy the privacy of his own room, and do other things of this type. If he did not wish to work he was put on "dole." He had to live on institutional fare, wear institutional clothing, suffer the other indignities and deprivations of institutional life. The student was paid off not only in material things, but with recognition as well. Staff and others worked hard to bring any accomplishment to the attention of everyone.

It is quite apparent that this approach is ideologically polar to punishment. While punishment stresses the administration of discomfort for those who do wrong, learning theory emphasizes the importance of reward for those who do right. By reinforcing acceptable behavior, this approach hopes to demonstrate to the offender that a strong investment of effort on his part can be immediately and directly rewarded. New skills and more successful relationships with people will ensue.

In evaluating any program of this type, three questions must be asked: How workable is it by others? Did it achieve its primary goals of increasing educational and social skills? Was it successful in preventing recidivism after release? According to Cohen (1968: 38-41), the answer to the first two questions is affirmative. The technology that was used in the National Training School could be learned and used by others. It is something which other correctional organizations could use. Whether or not this is true, and is monetarily feasible remains to be seen. Second, academic, social, and attitudinal behaviors among the youths in the study were markedly improved. Those who had been past failures, who had been difficult or impossible to teach, had in fact learned a great deal. Third, no post-release data were provided. The eventual impact of the program upon recidivism was not assessed.

Despite the demonstrated achievement of subjects in learning and social skills, the real test of any program such as this must inevitably occur in the community. Its effectiveness will be determined by the degree to which it prepares the subjects to function outside of a special learning environment and in a competitive setting where rewards are less apparent and in which it is necessary to defer gratifications, often for a considerable period of time. What is needed, therefore, is not only a followup study concerned with the recidivism rates of subjects in such an experiment, but the possibility of introducing such techniques for offenders into the community. The idea of

redesigning teaching techniques and reward systems so as to encourage acceptable behavior should not be limited to correctional schools, nor should it be limited solely to academic pursuits in the public schools. The two must be joined in some way. More careful designs for reinforcing achievement and learning, especially for students who perform poorly under present conditions, should become a part of public school strategies. Such efforts could then be used not only for the purposes of preventing juvenile deviance, but of helping those who are already in trouble.

PART III: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

In the general review of juvenile corrections, four basic questions were examined:

1. Who Is the Juvenile Delinquent?

Definitive answers cannot be given to this question. There is no precise, national information system on delinquency; there is a lack of research evidence on the actual operation of the juvenile justice system; the statutes which define delinquent behavior are ambiguous and imprecise; and juvenile lawbreaking, itself, is widespread, internationally as well as nationally.

Such findings seriously question the adequacy of the approaches that have been used traditionally to control delinquency. Since lawbreaking behavior is widespread, this means that delinquency is not an all-or-none thing, an attribute which juveniles either have or do not have, it is a more-or-less thing in which most adolescents participate. The implications are that, even if all efforts which are now directed to rehabilitating convicted offenders were successful, adolescent lawbreaking would not be controlled. This fact clearly indicates the limitations of taking a strictly legal approach. If delinquency is to be controlled, significant changes will have to be made in many other societal institutions as well.

2. What Are the Goals of Juvenile Corrections?

Correctional workers are asked to play a game they cannot win. Correctional goals are so disorganized, reflecting society's vestigial concern both with revenge and reform, that efforts to be successful are seriously hampered. Coupled with the likelihood that only a minority of adolescent lawbreakers even enter the legal net, this means that two things should probably be done. Greater attention should be paid to preventative and rehabilitative efforts by community institutions and to means by which a more comprehensive and rational approach can be made. "Delinquency," as Wheeler and Cottrell (1966) indicate, "is too serious a problem to be lodged in a labyrinth of bureaucratic settings with little in the name of logic, program, or coordinating mechanism to tie them all together."

3. How Relevant Are Contemporary, Correctional Theories?

Contemporary theories designed to guide efforts at intervention are primitive by any standard of scientific adequacy. They lack the precise rules of grammar, the abstract and powerful vocabularies, the systematic logic of sound theory. They have been directed primarily to the understanding of why

Contemporary Programs for Convicted Juvenile Offenders:

a particular individual becomes delinquent, tending to ignore the widespread character of delinquency or the societal and cultural matrices out of which they grow. They do not even take into account the role of the official agencies—the police, courts, and correctional organizations—which respond to delinquency, thus failing to explain the total system of which delinquent behavior, per se, is only a part.

4. What Is the Evidence Relative to the Success of Existing Correctional Programs?

We have failed to approach correctional problems in any way resembling a scientific approach. The lack of investment in correctional research and experimentation, indeed research on social problems in general, probably stems from a value stance which views such research from a different perspective than that from which research in the biological and technological realms is viewed. While society has been willing to expend untold sums on the study of military problems, space exploration, physical disease and automobile design, it has expended only a pittance on correctional problems.

Part II of the analysis was concerned with major approaches, old and new, which have been used in corrections.

The historical trend has been away from imprisonment to community alternatives. Probation has been the most common community alternative. Despite undeniable evidence that the supervisory and helpful services provided by probation are severely limited, because of excessive caseloads and bureaucratic responsibilities, it seems to work for the majority of offenders. This finding raises important research questions: (1) What proportion of the offender population need no supervision? (2) How can those offenders who do need supervision be distinguished from those who do not so that services can be made more efficient? (3) How many offenders now committed to institutions might be safely and effectively dealt with in the community?

Incarceration as a correctional device was evaluated next. Despite the protection which incarceration seems to provide for society, it was pointed out that because of the liabilities imposed by caste-like places of incarceration, because of the conflicting objectives they are expected to realize, and, because of their isolation from the free community, serious questions can be raised about their long-range utility either as protective or correctional devices. Many argue that attempts to rehabilitate in a total institution are futile. Yet, despite these criticisms, the kinds of precise information needed to pinpoint institutional deficiencies, or to indicate when and for whom incarceration may be desirable, are lacking.

Several recent experimental alternatives to incarceration were considered next: differential treatment, group oriented programs, or learning theory approaches. These latter experiments provide the major share of empirical data available on correctional effectiveness. A conservative estimate would be that these studies show that community alternatives are no better nor no worse than incarceration. However, their results are probably achieved at much less expense to society and at far less pain to the offender than incarceration. On the other hand, a liberal interpretation would be that not only are community alternatives less expensive, they are more effective.

It is obvious that before this distressing and perplexing set of findings can be replaced with some kind of order, three things will have to be done:

First, society will have to commit the necessary resources to build an adequate knowledge base by which more effective solutions can be suggested. A search, possibly no less expensive and no less time-consuming than that involved in current space exploration or the search for solutions to cancer, will be required. An adequate effort would involve the acquisition of the following kinds of knowledge:

- (1) Statistical knowledge on delinquency trends and the effectiveness of overall correctional efforts—an adequate information system is needed;
- (2) Knowledge about the nature and operation of legal and correctional systems themselves, on their structures, policy and decisionmaking procedures, their impact on offenders and public alike;
- (3) Knowledge derived from basic research concerned with delinquency causation and youth behavior in general; and
- (4) Knowledge derived from experimental research devoted to trying new techniques and assessing their impact.

Second, some effort must be made to lodge Federal responsibility for leadership in this knowledge-building task in a single unit. A mechanism must be found for guiding research and program development in an orderly and rational way.

Finally, the social-engineering task of implementing new approaches to youth deviance can proceed simultaneously with, and in fact be a part of, the knowledge-building task. Just as there is a reciprocal benefit gained from the interdependence of theorists, scientists and engineers in space exploration so there can be reciprocal benefit gained from a similar arrangement in this area. Youth deviance and rebellion is not simply a problem of social control to be solved by police or court action, but must involve a wide range of social scientists and practitioners from a variety of fields.

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APPENDIX 31

VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
JUVENILE GANGS

By Malcolm W. Klein*

INTRODUCTION

This report attempts to summarize what has been learned about juvenile gang violence in America during the past four decades. We shall take violence to mean all unlawful acts which involve damage to persons or property. Included are the use of the threat of damage and/or the display of dangerous weapons as such a threat. Excluded are offenses damaging only to the offender (drug use, alcohol use, etc.) or involving "willing victims" (homosexuality, pushing of drugs, etc.). By violence, then, we mean to include principally homicide, manslaughter, assaults, gang fighting, robbery, rape, arson, and vandalism. Further, we are concerned only with such offenses committed by or against members of juvenile gangs.

Because the nature and level of gang violence is in part a function of the nature of gangs, this report will first undertake a brief descriptive summary of the gang phenomenon. This will be followed by a review of major attempts to explain the existence of gangs and the violent behavior of their members. This will be followed by an analysis of empirical data currently available on gang violence. Finally, we shall look at the few intervention programs which (a) have been aimed *specifically* at ameliorating the *gang problem* and (b) have been empirically evaluated by competent research teams.

Before proceeding to these tasks, several precautionary notes are in order. First, the word "gang" has not been a precisely defined term. Thrasher (73) has applied the term to pre-adolescent play groups and college fraternities, to groups ranging in size from three to two thousand members. DeFleur (14) has generalized findings from incarcerated members of neighborhood cliques to delinquent gangs. Rafferty and Bercher (56) have described as a "gang" a small clique in a boys' institution which formed around a particular therapeutic program. Part of the problem is of course semantic and arbitrary. For the purposes of this report, we shall use the term "gang" to refer to any denotable adolescent group of youngsters who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation by others in their neighborhood, (b) recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably with a group name), and (c) have been

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involved in a sufficient number of delinquent incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from neighborhood residents and/or enforcement agencies. This is not meant as a definitive denotation of the label, gang. It is merely designed to say that a group is a gang when it is reacted to as a distinctly antisocial group of genuine concern and accepts itself as a group apart. This is nothing more than a confirmation of contemporary lay usage of the term.

A second caution has been aptly stated by Short: "the universe of gang members is one of largely unknown dimensions, and no census of gangs is likely to be complete for any length of time, so variable are the definitions and so shifting in character are these phenomena" (61, p. 10). To judge from the available literature, the gang varies widely on a broad range of dimensions, the importance of which is not subject to much consensus. Thus we are dealing with a somewhat inconsistent phenomenon and must necessarily draw conclusions with considerable hesitancy.

Third, the gang literature is featured by far more speculation than confirmed fact. Mythology abounds not only among gang members but also among those who work with gangs. This report will concentrate on those speculations which are striving for *theoretical* rather than intuitive explanations, and those facts which have been derived from controlled observation rather than from personal experiences of the many worthy practitioners in the gang arena. This still leaves us with more speculation than fact, but at least the speculations will be focused on knowledge building and the facts will be subject to empirical validation (36).

Finally, the reader is warned of a potential source of bias in this report. The author and his colleagues have been engaged in action-research programs with gangs in Los Angeles for the past 6 years. The impressions and data gathered in the Los Angeles projects, although they confirm data from several other major gang projects, are given some prominence in this report even where they are not specifically cited. This simply cannot be avoided. In fact, the similarity of the Los Angeles findings to those in such settings as New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia bodes well for any conclusions drawn. Nevertheless, the reader is reminded that this report is the product of a particular interpreter whose views have been molded by a very specific set of investigative circumstances.

I: THE NATURE OF JUVENILE GANGS IN AMERICA

A. Location

Although there are a few descriptions of juvenile gangs in middle class settings (24, 31, 54), it is clear that the gang problem is primarily an urban, lower class phenomenon. The middle class groups described to date are generally short-lived aggregations with a minimal orientation to delinquent values.

Two types of urban areas have emerged as the primary spawning grounds of gangs. The first was described forty years ago by Thrasher, but the description is still appropriate in the 1960's:

In nature foreign matter tends to collect and cake in every crack, crevice, and cranny-interstices. There are also fissures and breaks in the

structure of social organizations. The gang may be regarded as an interstitial region in the layout of the city (73, p. 20).

The second gang area is the "stable slum" in which population shifts of the past have slowed, permitting the development of neighborhood patterns and traditions over a span of years. Most typical of these areas are the Negro and Puerto Rican slums of the East and the Mexican-American "barrios" of the Southwest and California cities. As Bernstein (1) and others have suggested, the shifting, interstitial or transitional areas spawn the more spontaneous gang structures, often pitting groups of different ethnic backgrounds against each other. The stable slum, on the other hand, more often produces the large, vertically structured gang cluster which has proven most resistant to intervention attempts. These two types of urban, lower class areas—transitional and stable slum—do not account for all gangs in the city, but the evidence to date strongly suggests that they do contain the majority of them.

B. Race

Mirroring the urban distribution of gangs is the racial and ethnic composition of most gangs. The gang is primarily a minority group phenomenon which reflects the population of the ghetto. While Yablonsky (81) reported his "violent gangs" to be racially mixed, the majority of writers (13, 34, 49, 65, 69, 73) have described relatively "pure" groups—all-Negro, all-Mexican, or all-white along lines of national, racial, or religious origin. By the same token, most but by no means all intergang fights are between groups of the same type. Gang conflict is typically among groups of like background.

C. Age

Thrasher included in his descriptions groups of prepubertal boys as well as adult criminals. Whyte (76) and Kobrin (41) have reported on young adult gangs. However, most gangs under study have consisted primarily of teenagers. Some of the age ranges reported have been 10 to 25 (30), 12 to 22 (57), 11 to 25 (11), and 12 to the early 20's (34, 37). The age structure has been described as shaped like a turnip (34); very few boys at the upper and lower age ranges, the majority being in the 16- to 18-year-old bracket. However, this range within *one* gang structure is only applicable to the age-graded vertical gang; smaller gangs typically encompass only a 2- or 3-year age span. It seems fair to say, overall, that entry into gang life is a post-pubertal act while withdrawal occurs as the member approaches the age of majority.

D. Sex

Of over 1,000 groups included in Thrasher's monumental survey, only half a dozen were female groups. If this was a valid estimate for the 1920's, then a dramatic change has taken place. While it is still true that female gangs as independent, self-originating, and self-perpetuating units are highly unusual, female "auxiliaries" to boys' groups seem quite common in all major cities. Klein (34, 37) reports one or two such groups associated with each male gang cluster in Los Angeles. Miller (49) cited two of seven groups in Boston as

female. Geis (21) cites a New York Youth Board estimate of three female for every eight male gang members, an increase over the period of the Youth Board's existence.

Evidence from an independent study in Los Angeles suggests that these girls' groups usually consist at first of the sisters and girlfriends of male gang members, but soon take on a more diverse membership as the girls recruit new members among their own friends. The female gang is smaller (from 5 to 25 members), less seriously delinquent, and less stable than its male counterpart. It forms in response to the male structure and dissolves as the boys' group loses cohesion. While it is a common myth that girls are at the root of much (some say most) male gang fighting and delinquency, preliminary analyses of the Los Angeles data suggest that this is not indeed the case. In fact, in many ways girls are the most effective instruments of positive intervention currently available.

E. Structure

The structure of the juvenile gang, due to its variability and the several dimensions which comprise it, is perhaps the most difficult aspect to describe. Among researchers, there is less than unanimity on the typical gang structure.¹

The major dimensions along which gang structure has been described are age, size, subgrouping, level of involvement, leadership and role differentiation, and sex. Restricting ourselves to the first four of these dimensions, we can discern two *modal* patterns of structure, and several variations deriving from these.

The first structural pattern is that of the "spontaneous" (1) or "self-contained" (57) gang. It may include from 10 to 30 members within a 2- or 3-year age range and is more likely to appear in areas of transition. It is not a permanent grouping, seldom lasting more than a year or two. Sometimes it is a splinter group, having broken off from a larger gang cluster to pursue a particular interest pattern (social or criminal). Members know each other on a personal basis, although core and fringe levels of involvement can be distinguished. Bernstein's nine-city survey (1) suggests that these gangs are predominant, and perhaps increasingly so.

The second pattern, variously termed vertical, area, traditional, or cluster, is far more complex. Examples have been cited by Klein (34, 37), Hardman (26), Miller (49), Thrasher (73), Kantor and Bennett (30), MacIver (13), Bernstein (1), the New York City Youth Board (59), Spergel (70), Cohen and Short (10), and Short and Strodbeck (66). The essential feature of this pattern is the inclusion of from two to five subgroups within an overall cluster. Thus there may be a small group of 12- and 13- year-olds, a larger group of 14- and 15-year-olds, a still larger group in the 16- to 18-year-old bracket, and a smaller disintegrating group of older boys. Each subgroup has a sense of self identity and a specific name as well as a strong identification with the overall cluster as a superordinate structure.

¹When the author presented a diagram of the structure of traditional Los Angeles juvenile gangs to one colleague in Chicago, he was told that this structure was either a wild distortion or a Los Angeles peculiarity. When he then presented the same diagram to a second colleague doing gang research less than a mile away from the location of the first, he was told that it represented Chicago gang structures quite perfectly.

Such a structure may include as many as 100 or 200 boys over a period of only 2 years. Cliques form within the larger subgroups, and the observer can differentiate between these cliques, a more inclusive "core" membership and an even larger fringe membership. Nor does this three or four "generation" description conclude the picture, for the gang cluster often has a neighborhood tradition that goes back from 10 to 40 or even 50 years (34, 37, 49, 73)!

The Youth Board (57) has suggested that this age-graded cluster pattern was the predominant one in the 1950's. All five gangs studied in Los Angeles were of this type, although several "spontaneous" groups also appeared and disintegrated during the study period. Whether or not this larger pattern predominates is probably less important than the fact that it exists in almost all cities, and, because of its potential for disruption, has been the target of most intervention programs.

Three other structures deserve mention here. The first is the small clique of from three to a dozen or so boys, sometimes part of a larger structure and sometimes an independent unit, which evolves into a *patterned* delinquent group around criminal or retreatist (drug use) interests. These boys have abandoned the adolescent pattern in favor of a concentrated involvement in adult crime patterns. Such groups, fortunately, are relatively uncommon. (65)

In contrast, many writers have noted a "horizontal" pattern consisting of temporary alliances across neighborhoods between normally independent gangs (44, 57, 66, 70, 81). A good description of this pattern has been provided by Mattick and Caplan:

For the most part, however, the youngsters of the area, aside from a few isolates, are aggregated into cliques or loose local groups having tenuous and transitory relations with one another. On occasion several of these local groups combine in temporary and informal federations for purposes of socialization or athletics, or for purposes of defense or attack, and then dissolve again into their original local groupings (44, pp. 26-28).

Mattick and Caplan provide examples of a core group of 15 to 20 boys which might, in the above pattern, expand to 150 to 200 boys at particularly critical times. Often, however, such federations exist more in fantasy than in fact (81).

The final pattern—from its name one might judge it to be the critical one in this report—is the "violent gang" described by Yablonsky (80, 81). Although Yablonsky does not report any of his data, he distinguishes the violent gang from other forms (social and delinquent) on the basis of size, cohesiveness, normative structure and leadership. The violent gang, he says, is a "near-group" characterized by diffuse role differentiation, limited cohesion, impermanence, minimal consensus on norms, shifting membership, emotionally disturbed leadership, and limited definition of membership expectations. This account is in many ways a caricature of the descriptions of other investigators (C. F. Miller, Klein, Short, and Strodbeck) with a strong additional emphasis on psychopathic behavior, especially among gang leaders whom he describes as megalomaniac, delusional, and self-appointed.

Yablonsky claims that his analysis is based upon "direct appraisal of over

one hundred gangs" (81, p. 147). Aside from the disbelief which this claim has engendered among other researchers, there is the additional problem that no one else has observed the violent gang as described by Yablonsky. Rather than describing a typical pattern as he suggests, it seems that Yablonsky may have generalized far too much from two groups he studied in depth, the Egyptian Kings and Balkans. The former had a "brief but intense life history of a few weeks," although their roots went back 2 years. The latter were studied "over the eight month period of their existence." Yablonsky notes further that one major gang fight seems enough to break up these groups. Jansyn (28), Klein and Crawford (38), Short and Strodbeck (66), Thrasher (73), and Gordon (23) among many others have noted the contrary tendency for intergang conflict to *solidify* the gang. Additionally, most practitioners and researchers alike have found that the gang psychopath seldom exerts genuine leadership, that gang leaders are far more often relatively stable youngsters known for "holding their cool."

In summary, then, the "violent gang" is seldom seen and is in any case of short duration. It contributes little to the overall level of gang violence and its description therefore contributes minimally to a reasoned analysis of violence in gangs.

F. Size

As is clear from the foregoing, gang size is highly variable, both within and between gangs. Spontaneous gangs have been cited with memberships of 35 (19), 30 (49), 6 to 15 (70), and 25 (81), as averages. Vertical gang clusters are generally larger when the subgroups are taken together, with maximums variously set at 92 (11), 100 (53), and 118 (37). Over a period of 2 or 3 years, as many as 200 boys and 50 girls may reasonably be said to have affiliated with such a group.

On the relatively rare occasions when several groups coalesce across neighborhoods, it may be fair to suggest a total membership of several hundred active members. Thrasher's figures of 2,000 members, or the figure in the thousands currently projected for the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago, suggest that the interest in large numbers has been acquired at a sacrifice to any meaningful definition of the term, "gang."

G. Leadership

With the major exception of Yablonsky, most researchers have described gang leaders as relatively stable, "cool" youngsters who have earned their group status through a variety of abilities—fighting prowess, coolheadedness, verbal facility, athletic abilities, or inheritance from older brothers (13, 34, 57, 65, 73). Additionally, some (34, 57) have emphasized that gang leadership does not reside wholly within one or two individuals but is in fact shared by many depending upon the group's activities and the context of the moment. Leadership, in this view, is a group function: the arrest and incarceration of known gang leaders does not often lead to gang disintegration because the leadership functions are then assumed by other members. Leadership is not the primary clue either to gang organization or to gang dissolution.

H. Cohesiveness

There have been two major concerns with respect to cohesiveness: (a) how cohesive is the gang and (b) how is cohesiveness related to delinquency. With respect to the first, earlier writers (73, 76) stressed the esprit de corps, face-to-face relations, and general camaraderie to be found in juvenile gangs. More recently, however, gangs are found to be rather loosely structured with varying but generally low cohesiveness (34, 37, 54, 70, 81). A recent analysis by Gordon (23) suggests that cohesiveness is not only a function of neighborhood factors but also a function of, and limited by, the very set of social disabilities that lead to gang formation in the first place. In any case, it is clear that the size and subgrouping of the vertical gang cluster militates against high cohesiveness—many of the members know each other only by sight, and sometimes even this is lacking.

It is also generally agreed that cohesiveness and delinquency go hand in hand, but the nature of the relationship is in some doubt. While Klein and Crawford (38) see increased cohesion leading to increased delinquency, the opposite relationship has been suggested by Jansyn (28) and by Gordon (23). While the effects are obviously interactive, the predominant direction may decide the most fruitful direction for intervention programs (37); shall we concentrate our efforts on directly reducing cohesiveness or on directly reducing delinquency?

I. Types of Gangs

The final descriptive category is highly relevant to the question of gang violence, but also highly confusing. It has been the understandable practice of writers in the gang arena to derive meaningful typologies of gangs. Among these have been the following:

- (a) Social, delinquent and violent (81);
- (b) Diffuse, solidified, conventionalized, criminal, and "secret society" (73);
- (c) Criminal, conflict, and retreatist (8);
- (d) Theft, conflict, and addict (10);
- (e) Non-problem, problem, and conflict (13);
- (f) Area and spontaneous (1);
- (g) Vertical, horizontal, self-contained, and disintegrative (57).

As can be seen, there is much in common among these typologies, but also there are many differences as the various writers have employed different dimensions in their typologies; e.g. group structure (f) and (g), type of behavior (a), (c), (d) and (e), or a combination (b). Numerous empirical attempts to verify the existence of gangs with separate delinquent orientations have proven fruitless for the most part (32, 65), revealing that gang members engage in a wide variety of offenses in cafeteria style (36).

Because the so-called conflict gangs have been the usual targets of intervention programs, even these have been dissected into different types. Spergel (70) has found conflict gangs to manifest the structural differentiation between vertical, horizontal, and small, independent forms.

The New York Youth Board (58) has described conflict gangs as active aggressive, passive aggressive, and defensive gangs. Gannon (20), describing these same New York groups, has divided them simply into fighting and defensive gangs. What is not clear is whether these typological differences actually mirror qualitative differences between the gangs themselves or merely nominal distinctions for the convenience of the typologists. The paucity of data available on gang structure and behavior makes such clarification difficult, but the best guess would be that structural differences between gangs may be greater than differences in delinquency patterns.

Summary

The foregoing materials make it abundantly clear that *the* gang does not exist; rather, gangs come in a wide variety of forms. While there is said to be a relationship between gang form and the level and type of gang delinquency, this relationship is somewhat ephemeral. Violence, in one form or another, can be expected from any gang, but since some gangs are more permanent than others, it may be crucial to concentrate efforts in those gangs with established traditions in which violence is a matter not of weeks or months, but of decades. The vertical gang, being a cluster of subgroups which perpetuates itself for many years, presents itself as the most important target for intervention. Fortunately, its general structure is now sufficiently well described that intervention efforts can perhaps be more rationally designed than has previously been the case (37).

II: THE CAUSES OF GANG VIOLENCE

If the description of juvenile gangs leaves one with a mild sense of confusion, an analysis of the reasons for gang existence and gang behavior certainly provides no relief. Gangs, as is true of so many other social phenomena, are the product of a complex society and are as complex in causation as the society itself. We have long ago passed that point in our understanding when one could say gangs come from poverty, or the basic problem is in the family, or "if only there were more respect for authority," and so on.

As difficult as the task is made by etiological complexity, it is further complicated by both definitional and conceptual problems of which one is of particular importance to this report: are the causes of *violence* in gangs synonymous with, overlapping, or independent of the causes of *gang formation and perpetuation*? Similarly can acts of violence (or acts so labeled by the official agents of society) be explained by the same "causes" as those attached to the concept of aggressiveness?

The distinction between aggressiveness and violent acts has been made by some writers, but often the two notions are insufficiently distinct. Of more concern is the failure in many instances to distinguish between the causes of gang formations and the causes of particular forms of gang behavior, including those we have subsumed under the heading of violence. Some writers simply haven't concerned themselves much with the distinction. Others, such as Thrasher and Yablonsky, have suggested that conflict and gang formation are almost necessary to each other (Thrasher—the group

becomes a gang through conflict; Yablonsky—the gang is the best medium for the expression of the members' aggressive impulses). Still others like Cohen and Short, Spergel, and Cloward and Ohlin, have tried to handle the problem by suggesting the existence of conflict subcultures or conflict gangs, thus separating these out from other combinations of gangs and forms of delinquency. Nevertheless, one clear finding in the present report is that the necessary connections between gang formation and violent behavior remain unclear, especially with respect to the question of a common etiology.²

It is not the intent in this report to attempt a new or integrated theory of the etiology of gang violence. A recent review of criminological theories (32) suggests that currently available approaches fall far short of acceptable criteria, and the author is not so foolhardy as to believe he can single-handedly alter the situation. What *will* be attempted here is an *organization* of approaches into a simple *paradigm* which may facilitate the understanding of gang violence as a complex social phenomenon.

It is suggested, on the basis of a review of relevant literature, that there are four major categories of factors which, in combination, predict to the emergence and prevalence of gang violence. No single writer's work falls neatly into just one of these four categories—no writer has been that parochial. Nor are the four categories mutually exclusive by any means. Rather, we are suggesting four somewhat discriminable *emphases* with one of these being commonly cast as a medium through which the factors in the other three become translated into the behavior referred to as violence. Figure 1 presents this causal paradigm.


The four categories of factors generally thought to produce gangs and gang delinquency are labeled Individual Needs, Opportunity Systems, Cultural Norms, and combination of mediating variables dealing with Group Process, Cognition, and the Action Context. This latter category emphasizes a matrix of traditional *social-psychological* variables. Because it is the medium through which the factors in the other three categories are translated into gang behavior, we shall refer to it henceforth as the Social-Psychological Medium.

Before proceeding to a coverage of each category, the reader is reminded of the interactive relationships between them. As indicated by the arrows in figure 1, these four sets of factors influence each other and act in combination through a common medium. Additionally, the product of these interactions—gang violence—also "returns the favor" to some degree (broken arrows in fig. 1) as the existence and level of gang violence itself affects the factors bringing it about, especially group processes. What we are describing then, even in this very simple diagram is a totally complex, interdependent etiological system in which gang violence is shown as the end point only because it is the object of our inquiry.

A. Individual Needs

The interest in individual dynamics as determinants of gang behavior has taken two broad forms, one stressing psychodynamic factors and the other stressing the normal "Sturm und Drang" of adolescence. Although these two

²This point has been stated quite nicely by Miller et al. (53), who were specifically concerned with aggressiveness within the gang.



contributions are theoretically in some conflict, a common denominator is to be found in their view of gang behavior as *expressive of basic individual needs*.

The psychoanalytic literature, while voluminous with respect to individual delinquency patterns, is strangely silent in the area of gang delinquency. Johnson (29), for example, has suggested that group delinquency belongs more to the sociologist than to the analyst. Presumably, however, the basic model would still apply of an instinctual aggressive drive occasionally overpowering learned constraints as a result of inadequate interpersonal developments within the early family structure.

In this general tradition, Gerrard (22) has suggested that the core member of the gang exhibits two concurrent etiological patterns.

First, says Gerrard, the core member grows up in an unresponsive family which leads to a generalized feeling of hostility or indifference on the part of others ("response insecurity"). This in turn leads to a significant lack of restraints on behavior which normally would be based on anxiety, sympathy, or the desire for the good will of others.

Second, the core member develops inferiority feelings about his own conventional skills resulting from inadequate family guidance and rewards. In combination with "response insecurity," this leads to "...the resultant

feeling that interests and self-esteem can be realized only through acts of aggression."

The final step in Gerrard's reasoning is to posit that these traits and causative agents are located more prominently in slum areas. This results in a cohesive, aggressive, acting-out "contraculture" as exemplified in the juvenile gang.

How appropriate such notions may be is touched upon by a recent review of psychometric studies attempting to relate individual needs and traits to violent behavior:

Often, these studies have been poorly planned and poorly executed, with fundamental faults in design, sampling, and administration. However, from an analysis of their results, we obtain the general picture of a personality characterized by egocentrism and lack of emotional control. The murderer can be described as an explosive, immature, hyperthymic person who is unable to establish social contact. He displays a deficit of conscious control and a strong need for the immediate gratification of impulses (79, p. 143).

Similar impressionistic statements can be found in the gang literature (8, 27, 33, 35, 73, 81), all suggesting that the committed gang member has brought the seeds of aggressive behavior with him to the gang setting (68). Gordon (23) has provided the best analysis to date of the processes by which these psychogenetic variables interact with the social-psychological medium of the gang around conflict behavior.

Gordon provides support for Thrasher's original conception of conflict as a prime cohesion builder for the gang. He indicates that the gang member is characterized by serious social disabilities stemming from individual deficiencies. These social disabilities hamper the establishment of good interpersonal bonds between gang members, and intergang conflict functions as a substitute source of cohesiveness for the members.

Working in the same context as Gordon, Leon Jansyn (28) has gone even further to suggest that when group solidarity is at a low point, members of the group *deliberately* engage in delinquent activities designed to pull the group back together again. Although Jansyn's data are subject to alternative explanations or may refer to specific rather than common situations, this general progression of explanation from Thrasher to Gordon to Jansyn makes Yablonsky's description of the special "violent gang" look good.

Yablonsky (80, 81) refers to violent gang members—especially the leaders—as being "sociopathic," meaning by the term a severe impairment of the ability to establish mature interpersonal relationships. The gang, Yablonsky feels, is "all-inviting" to the social misfits and defective personalities who can only achieve status through the use of violence. The gang provides a "channel to act out hostility and aggression to satisfy the continuing and momentary emotional needs of its members." The gang member "looks for an easy, quick, almost magical way of achieving power and prestige" and the gang "is an ideal vehicle for acting out the desire for status" (81, p. 4).

It seems clear that Yablonsky has drawn *in caricature* a picture of the gang as a collection of disturbed youngsters which may be implicit in the extremes of the psychogenetic approach. We might contrast this now with another

approach also based on individual needs but contrasting as to the derivation of these needs. The transition is neatly provided by Pfautz (55) in an article attacking Yablonsky's basic conception of the gang.

Pfautz emphasizes the fact that the gang is an *adolescent* phenomenon. Adolescents are in a social limbo and "seek collectively by violence to define a place in physical space, the last refuge of society and of self." This view fits well with those of Erik Erikson (15, 16) from a psychoanalyst's viewpoint and of Bloch and Niederhoffer (3), who take a cross-cultural perspective. Elsewhere, this approach has been labeled "adolescent striving" theory (32). Some of Thrasher's explication of the gang as an outgrowth of spontaneous play groups in the search for adventure and excitement also fits within this approach, but his view is far less "naturalistic" than those of Erikson and of Bloch and Niederhoffer.

Since Bloch and Niederhoffer were concerned explicitly with *gang* behavior, we take our text from them, remembering that they exemplify a popular approach. The first postulate of this approach might be characterized as "adolescence is adolescence." This amounts to a denial of large differences in adolescent phenomena according to class or society. "... adolescence produces certain remarkable similarities in the group behavior of the young person striving for manhood (3, p. 10)." This postulate is then supported by the citation of ten different practices of adolescents in other cultures which have their equivalents among gangs in America, with the additional suggestion that the group processes within the gang crystallize these practices into more dramatic form.

The base cause, however, the primary concern of the adolescent period, is the striving for manhood. "When a society does not make adequate preparation, formal or otherwise, for the induction of its adolescents to the adult status, equivalent forms of behavior arise spontaneously among adolescents themselves..." (3, p. 17). In other words, Bloch and Niederhoffer hypothesize a substitution of form for substance. The symbols of manhood are adopted to compensate for or to symbolize to one's self and peers the longed for status of manhood; "... when adolescent youths, as in our own society, find it difficult to enter the adult status, for reasons of delay, social or technical obstacles, or because of the lack of an orderly, facilitating process, they will attempt to embrace the symbolic equivalents of the adult behavior denied them" (3, p. 29).

These "symbolic equivalents," say Bloch and Niederhoffer, include a wide range of delinquent behaviors which, to the boys themselves, seem expressive of adult status and autonomy. Erikson reaches a similar end point by stressing adolescence as a "psycho-social moratorium" during which the youngster must test himself as a man—indeed, in encouraged to do so by adult society—often using tests which, when detected, may result in being labeled delinquent. In either case, the expression of essentially individual needs is the basic thrust of the argument.

In sum, then, both the psychogenetic theorists and the adolescent striving theorists place the boy in the gang because of strong individual needs which can be satisfied through gang participation. These needs involve principally self-esteem, self-expression, and status. We shall see them referred to time and again as this report progresses.

B. Opportunity Systems

The second category of causative factors lies in the structure of society, and as with the first category, are often translated in terms of status deprivation. The earliest statement of the problem is Thrasher's: "The gang develops as a response to society." Since society has not provided adequately for the slum dweller's needs, "the gang solves his problem, offering him what society has failed to provide" (73, p. 177).

Cohen (9) has suggested that the disadvantaged position of the lower class boy leads to a "reaction formation" (note the borrowing of the psychoanalyst's phrase) which "... should take the form of an 'irrational,' 'malicious,' 'unaccountable' hostility to the enemy within the gates as well as without: the norms of the respectable middle class society" (9, p. 133). This in turn leads to a collective solution called the delinquent subculture which—

... is a way of dealing with the problems of adjustment we have just described. These problems are chiefly status problems: certain children are denied status in the respectable society because they cannot meet the criteria of the respectable status system. The delinquent subculture deals with these problems by providing criteria of status which these children *can* meet (9, p. 121).

In the same tradition, Short (63) has stated:

Peer groups in the lower class often come to serve important status functions for youngsters who are disadvantaged according to the success criteria of the larger society's institutions (schools, churches, places of business, etc.). Peer groups become the most salient status universe of such youngsters (63, p. 161).

We note in this approach a rather severe departure from those in our first category. The emphasis is upon class differentials and the deprivations of the lower class in which most gangs are to be found. However, there is not much here to differentiate between reasons for gang formation and gang violence. For this we must turn to the rather elaborate theory of Cloward and Ohlin.

Cloward and Ohlin (8) have combined several critical notions into a comprehensive sociological theory of gangs. Basic to the theory is the assertion that opportunities for youngsters—illegal as well as legal opportunities—are differentially distributed in the social class structure. If, as is the case for many lower class residents, access to the legitimate opportunity system is blocked, then in neighborhoods with accessible illegitimate opportunities a criminal subculture (and criminal gangs) will develop.

Where such illegitimate opportunities do not exist or are not accessible, the disadvantaged youngsters will resort to a conflict subculture and conflict gangs. A third type of gang, a retreatist (drug use) group, will develop when neighborhood and personal factors prevent the first two. The Cloward and Ohlin thesis is of course far more intricate than this brief statement suggests, but for our purposes this will suffice.

Cloward and Ohlin developed their scheme without reference to firsthand data. Other researchers have since confirmed several aspects regarding the opportunity systems but have failed to confirm the existence of separate criminal, conflict, and retreatist groups (32). Thus the general structure of the theory has been supported, but not the final predictions for which it was designed.

One partial exception to this latter statement has been provided by Spergel (69) whose findings and general approach represent the essence of the opportunity system approach. Although he described areas encompassing racket, theft, and conflict subcultures (retreatist activities were found in all three), it is the conflict area Spergel called "Slumtown," which concerns us here.

Slumtown, as compared with other lower class sections of the city, was the most disadvantaged. "It was," notes Spergel, "without doubt, one of the most congested and physically deteriorated sections of the city" (69, p. 13). It was:

Lowest in occupational status of male bread-winners, with ten per cent unemployment;

Lowest in median family income; Highest on indices of social breakdown (public assistance, home relief, ADC, infant mortality, delinquency, venereal disease, etc.);

Highest in population density.

This characterization of the area is reflected among the area's delinquents. Again as compared with those in other high delinquency areas, Slumtown youngsters in trouble were younger, newer residents, were less educated, were less often employed and when employed, at lower wages.

Nor were their objective disadvantages the whole story. Spergel notes that the slumtown delinquents had the lowest income aspirations, the lowest occupational aspirations, and the lowest income and occupational expectations. Even so, the gap between their expectations and aspirations was still large. Their orientation to adults was lowest as were their adult contacts, while their peer orientations were highest. In line with the thinking of Cloward and Ohlin, Spergel notes finally that these youngsters were "... as much estranged from the adult criminal system as from the adult conventional system" (69, p. 20).

These characteristics of the conflict-oriented delinquents, especially the aspiration and expectation levels and the adult contact data, have received independent validation from the work of Short and his colleagues (65). The conclusions from the two separate investigations are strikingly similar. The earlier quote from Short is mirrored by Spergel:

In such an area many gang youths with high aspirations create for themselves as special kind of opportunity—gang fighting (69, p. XVI).

A pattern... develops which makes the reputation, or "rep," as a gang fighter equivalent to the attainment of a success-goal (69, p. XVI).

The gang or peer group provides the means... by which some kind of success status may be obtained (69, p. 29).

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If these blockages to the opportunity system are related to the development of conflict orientations in the gang, does their removal relate to a reduction in conflict and thus confirm a causal relationship? The evidence is very scanty, but a few writers have claimed this to be the case. For instance, Geis (21) cites Marshall's attribution of a decline in Negro fighting gangs, to both civil rights activism and increase in retreatism. That is, both legitimate and illegitimate opportunities have increased and led to a decrease in gang fighting. Gannon (19, 20), as a result of a youth worker survey in New York City, has noted a considerable decrease in the number of fighting gangs, attributing the decline to increased sources of status provided by the provision of new job and educational opportunities during the period of the "war on poverty." Finally, Klein and his associates (37) found that comparing working and nonworking periods for the same gang members yielded delinquency rates that were only half as high during the working period.

C. Cultural Norms

If we define the phrase "cultural norms" quite broadly to symbolize general belief systems, tolerances, and control levels on behavior associated with large societal groups, then another approach to gang and violence causation can be discerned. Although less distinct than the two previous categories, this third direction nevertheless has a distinctive flavor, namely the characterization of gang behavior as "normal" within its own cultural context.

For instance, Bordua (4) has summarized Thrasher's explanation of gang emergence as being primarily a function of the participation of essentially normal boys in a "seductive" environment permeated by conflict and struggle. Hayes and Hogrefe (27) see the level of gang violence as a function of the violence level of the local community. It mirrors among youth the behavior norms of the adult community. Even Albert Cohen, in a view that seemingly conflicts with his reaction formation hypothesis, states that within the lower class, "... fighting is more likely to be recognized as a normal, natural, and legitimate" response (9, p. 101).

But several other writers have stressed that it is not sufficient that violence levels merely promote gang behavior. In addition, there must exist a tolerance level or, more specifically, a breakdown or lack of existing norms. Kobrin's analysis (40) indicates that in transitional urban areas, conventional and criminal value systems exist in open opposition, leading to a relative absence of controls on aggressive behavior. Although from a very different viewpoint, Yablonsky (81) lays some stress on the same explanation, that areas of transition (e.g. rural to urban) do not develop strong community control systems. He adds the additional comment that in such areas an adult-youth schism develops and further operates against the abilities of adult control mechanisms to affect youth behavior sufficiently. Finally, Matza (45) indicates that what he terms the "draft" of urban adolescents into delinquent episodes is directly related to the removal or temporary absence of restraints.

If it is true that aggressive behavior is more "normal" or accepted in gang-producing areas, and if it is also true that such areas are featured by

insufficient controls upon behavioral "excesses," there may well be an underlying support system that tends to perpetuate this situation. Several influential writers have described such support systems in cultural or value terms. For instance, Matza and Sykes have suggested that within the lower class such values as "the search for kicks, the disdain of work and a desire for the big score, and the acceptance of aggressive toughness as proof of masculinity" may be nothing more than the elevation of secondary middle class values to a more primary status (46, p. 715).

In a similar vein, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (79) posit a general *subculture of violence* which, by their description, is an infracultural complex, a normative system which not only fosters and legitimates violent actions, but contains norms, both prescriptive and proscriptive, helping to govern the use of violence. Seven corollary propositions are offered in support of this thesis which, in its simplest form, approaches the "sick society" hypothesis of many citizens and political figures.

Another cultural system has been suggested by Karacki and Toby (31) in their analysis of a middle class gang, but it seems equally applicable to the lower class situation. This system is a pervasive *youth culture* with its emphasis on (a) immediate gratification, (b) loyalty to peers, and (c) assertion of masculinity. In the absence of strong commitment to adult goals and values, youngsters "tie in" to a youth culture which, if correctly characterized by the three values stated above, certainly carries the seeds of group delinquency.

The most influential cultural approach to gang delinquency has been put forth by the anthropologist, Walter Miller (48, 53). Miller describes a *lower class culture* determined by its socio-economic setting and the predominance of female-based households. Central to the lower class culture are "focal concerns" of trouble, toughness, "smartness," excitement, fate, and autonomy. Boys raised in this setting, lacking strong father figures in the home yet bombarded with exposures to these focal concerns, seek to practice the male role and assert masculinity outside the home.

Miller stresses that the aggressive behaviors exhibited under these circumstances are *not deviant*, but perfectly normal expressions of basic cultural content. Further, they are very functional in preparing the youngster for adulthood within the working class setting. The gang provides an ideal setting for this behavior.

If gang behavior is "normal," then how is it that it also results in high delinquency rates? The answer, Miller suggests, is that normal behavior in the ghetto is defined as deviant by the agents of middle class society. Thus, in some ways lower class delinquency and especially gang delinquency is the result of conflicting interclass conceptions of what is appropriate or tolerable behavior. The essence of this argument is in the divergent views of police behavior in the ghetto as harassment or vigilance.

D. The Social-Psychological Medium

It is clear that many of the variables subsumed under the first three categories of Individual Needs, Opportunity Systems, and Cultural Norms can have a rather direct effect on levels of delinquency and sometimes on

particular forms of delinquency. However, we are concerned more specifically here with those offenses committed by members of juvenile gangs. As the gang is a form of group (however loosely structured it may be) and groups have properties and processes above and beyond those of its members taken separately, group process variables have been receiving increasing attention in investigations of gang delinquency. It becomes increasingly clear that the gang acts as a transmitting and transmuting medium for individual, social, and cultural factors in delinquency causation.

How closely gang violence and group process are related and in what fashion, has been discussed by many. At one extreme is Yablonsky who sees the two as almost synonymous—violence was the essence and the very purpose of the gangs he observed. Moving somewhat away from this extreme one finds Thrasher's conceptions that a boys' group cannot become a gang in the absence of conflict either with other groups or with societal agents. Thus conflict helps to create the gang, but beyond this intergang conflict then serves to maintain cohesiveness within the gang.

It is this latter conception, violence or conflict as a reinforcer of gang cohesiveness, that was mentioned earlier as receiving the attention of Gordon and of Jansyn. In a sense, then, the gang may *require* aggressiveness from its members. Cloward and Ohlin have maintained that a boy cannot maintain his membership in a delinquent gang without the commission of delinquent acts. Violence is required of conflict gang members.

While this view seems to represent an overstatement of observed fact, others have observed the gains to the member of engagement in assaultive behavior. Spergel (69) reports that if things have been "quiet for too long," a crisis is often invoked which calls for fighting and, through this, status confirmation (cf. Jansyn, *supra*). Most writers are agreed that fighting is a status-conferring behavior in the gang for, as Cohen and Short have written about conflict groups, "... 'heart' or courage in fighting is the most highly prized virtue and the most important determinant of the position of gang members within the gang as well as that of the gang among other groups" (10). When a gang leader's status within the group is threatened, he may revert to either verbal or behavioral violence to reassert it (65, 81).

The variety of connections between group process and gang delinquency—especially of the violent type as defined earlier—can be suggested by the additional items in the following list:

- (1) Gang process crystallizes factors leading to violent behavior.
- (2) The gang legitimates the expression of aggression (8, 9, 57).
- (3) The gang inadvertently leads to violence because of a "shared misunderstanding" that leads each member to assume that peer norms call for greater involvement than he himself would undertake (57). Combined with status anxiety that prevents members from testing the limits of the presumed group norms for fear of seeming "chicken," this may result in commitment to mutually undesired activities (10, 57, 66, 81). As Spergel has described it, "a dozen youngsters suddenly find themselves walking down the street to a fight, and eight or ten or even all of them, individually, may be wondering why he is there" (70, p. 115).

(4) The gang permits or, through mutual reinforcement and acceptance, reinforces the commission of delinquent (especially violent) acts (12, 17, 53, 71, 73, 74).

(5) The gang is a medium for the status-deprived boy to seek peer group status. Tough, aggressive, fighting postures provide such status (almost all writers have stressed this critical point).

(6) The gang helps to bring about attention to immediate as opposed to long-range consequences of activity. Thus it increases risk taking and exposure to violence-producing situations (64, 71, 75).

All this is not to say that the gang merely hangs around the corner encouraging its members to "get out and be violent." On the contrary, the gang more commonly does nothing so much as wonder what to do. Sometimes, in fact, it acts as a constraining force on its members, prohibiting or discouraging behavior which would result in discomfort for the group as a whole (27). But the milling-around character of gang activity, the restrictions on "acceptable" activities, the search for status, the sense of injustice felt by many, and the dependence on each other for companionship and social structure all combine to set off processes which, often inadvertently, transmute delinquency potential into delinquent action, violence potential into violent action.

Summary—The Place of Status

In reviewing the literature relevant to the sources of gang existence and gang violence, we have suggested that no single source can be judged paramount. Rather, gangs and gang violence are a part of a complex system of individual, social, cultural, and group process variables. The gang is not so much the *result* of these variables as it is a selected *aspect* of them. Gang violence is seen as a particularly disturbing manifestation of this complex system.

Yet, Western modes of thinking insist that for each effect there must be a cause; there must be some one factor above all which, if changed or manipulated, would reduce the problem of gang violence. For those so inclined, the literature does indeed reveal one common thread which is presumably causally related to gang violence. This thread is the concept of *status*.

It may already have occurred to the reader that many of those quoted throughout this report have referred to status in one form or another as a highly salient variable in explanations of gang formation and behavior. The major contributors to the literature on gangs—Thrasher, Cohen, Short, Cloward and Ohlin, Bloch and Niederhoffer, Miller, Yablonsky, Spergel, The New York City Youth Board—have made status a central concept in their formulations. The Youth Board, for instance, lists twenty-five separate kinds of provocation leading to gang fights. Of these, a minimum of fifteen seem directly related to status achievement.

But what does status mean? An analysis of the essence of status to different writers hardly leads to clear understanding. Self-esteem, manliness ("machismo"), reputation as a fighter, acceptance as an adult, leadership, acceptable social skills, social advantages, class position, prestige—all these

and more appear to be included in the concept of status. The only agreement, in fact, seems to be that gang members are status deprived and derive substitute status either through gang membership or through the violent or aggressive activities that are associated with such membership.

Will attempts to provide status outside the gang yield positive results? There are at present insufficient data to answer the question. Further, a preliminary question must be answered; What kind of status should be provided—jobs, self-esteem, educational achievement, or what? Without some answers to this question, we cannot approach the rational investigation of the effectiveness of providing status for the gang member or the potential member. Meanwhile, it seems a bit naive to turn the common concern with status into a presumption that status deprivation comprises a prime causative agent of gang delinquency.

III: THE PREVALENCE OF GANG VIOLENCE

Prior to looking at the data available on gang violence, it would be well to remember what is meant by the phrase. Violence, as a word, has connotations of viciousness which do not necessarily accompany the *acts* which are covered in this report. Assaults are more often minor than major; gang fighting seldom involves massive confrontations between warring hordes; robbery often means purse snatching or veiled threats accompanying theft; rape is often an invited act, subtly or otherwise; gang vandalism often means writing gang names on playground walls or throwing stones at the windows of condemned tenements.

We must also note that the difficulties normally associated with criminal statistics (42, 78) apply equally well to those on gang offenses. Gang statistics are usually taken from one of two sources, the police or the reports of "detached workers" assigned by social agencies to work with gangs. Occasionally, court or probation data are also employed.

In Los Angeles, analysis of worker reports proved highly unreliable, while comparisons of police and probation data revealed considerable comparability despite only an approximate 60 percent overlap between the two sources (34). In Chicago, a study of police and worker reports by Wise (77) disclosed serious differences, with the workers being far more aware of gang offenses than the police. Thus the data to be reported below must be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive.

A. Size of the Problem

It is virtually impossible to know how many gangs are active at any point in time nationally. The larger cities consistently yield reports in the hundreds, with total membership amounting to several thousand per city. In Los Angeles, the census tract in the Group Guidance Project with the highest number of gang member addresses yielded an estimate that only 6 percent of the 10- to 17-year-old age bracket were gang affiliated. Cloward and Ohlin, in one of their very infrequent data statements, report, "there is no evidence to suggest that the conflict subculture is more widespread than the other subcultures . . ." (32, p. 171).

Thus, without meaning to belittle a vexing problem, one is led to conclude that gang delinquency constitutes a minor portion even of big city delinquency which in turn is only one of many serious problems of urban America. The place of the gang in the professional literature and in the mass media is way out of proportion to its contribution to our social ills.

B. Gang Violence and Other Offenses

Perhaps the most impressive fact about gang members' delinquency involvement is the "cafeteria style" which it exhibits. Rather than specializing in specific kinds or even broad categories of offenses, gang members tend to involve themselves in a wide variety of difficulties. This finding holds for studies in New York (57), Boston (51), Philadelphia (58), Chicago (65, 77), and Los Angeles (34).

How common are the various kinds of offenses? Thrasher (73) found theft to be most common, followed by burglary and robbery. Vandalism was merely a secondary companion to these offenses, while personal violence is hardly mentioned. Robin (58), while noting that 67 percent of the gang members known to the Philadelphia police had at least one assaultive charge against them, found only 23 percent of all the charges to be against persons (i.e., assaultive or violent in some way).

In Boston, Miller's data (50, 51) revealed assaultive behaviors to be one-half to one-third as common as theft, and only 14 percent of the thefts were directly from persons. Property damage was one-quarter as common. If court charges were used, these proportions were even lower. Similarly in Los Angeles (34, 37), the offenses we have included under the term violence accounted for 10 to 13 percent of the total. Gangs are *not* primarily assaultive or violent in their delinquent behavior and, what is more, the greatest part of their time is spent in nondelinquent activity.

C. Seriousness

How qualitatively serious are the offenses of gang members? The Myerhoffs' middle-class groups (54) were found to be very low in violence and destruction. Short (64) reports for Chicago gangs, "... malicious and negativistic behavior [is] relatively rare among our groups" (p. 27). Spergel (69) reports, as a further example, that armed robbery was very uncommon in all three areas in his study.

Miller's analysis of the Boston data are the most complete yet undertaken and seem to typify the observations of other observers. In an intensely studied gang called the Junior Outlaws, Miller and his associates (53) report that most aggressive acts were verbal-*physical* attacks on persons and property constituted only 7 percent of these. Miller concludes that gangs "... provide an arena in which aggression is played out, its force dissipated in a continuing, persistent, low-level flow, directed at members of the group itself" (60, p. 75).

Within all of the gangs under study by Miller, there were no murder or manslaughter charges. Weapon use was unusual; a gun was never used (this statement is unusual—other cities report higher incidence of weapon use. In 2 years the Ladino Hills Project in Los Angeles saw three deaths by gunfire).

There were very few instances of property damage, and in each case only minor damage resulted. "The average weekend of highway driving in and around Port City produces more serious bodily injuries than two years of violent crimes by Midcity gangs" (51).

In 2 years, Miller's project witnessed only one full-scale gang fight while in 14 other instances the gangs found a way out (in Los Angeles, a 4-year project with four large gang clusters also witnessed only one large group conflict). As Miller noted, "the fact is that genuine gang fights, collective assaults on adults, and similar types of gang crime are relatively rare in any given city in any given year" (50, p. 29).

Noting that most aggression is verbal rather than physical, that there is far more smoke than fire, Miller concludes:

While members of slum street gangs engaged in violent crime to a greater degree than middle-class adolescents, violence was not a central preoccupation of the gangs, and most "violent" crimes were of the less serious variety. Cruel or sadistic violence was rare; violence was seldom "senseless" or irrational. Property damage was relatively uncommon (51).

Miller's findings and conclusions generally fit with the impressions of other careful observers, although usually one does witness more weapons involvement. The author has had three gang members killed during his studies. One of his associates had to "hit the deck" when a group she was with was fired upon by a rival gang. The author himself was twice threatened with physical attack, and one of his workers had a gun pointed between his eyes. Miller may have been a bit lucky, but the relative rarity of the truly violent act can easily account for these minor discrepancies.

One other significant finding with respect to offense seriousness should be reported. In Los Angeles, Klein and Martin (34) undertook a statistical analysis of offense seriousness over time. Somewhat surprisingly, it was found that the average seriousness of offenses did *not* increase with subsequent offenses or increased age (at least up to the age of 18). That is, a boy's tenth offense was, on the average, no more nor less serious than his first. Since first offenses are committed at lower age levels, it also follows that offense seriousness was not related to age. On the other hand, the time period between subsequent offenses declines steadily, as confirmed by Robin with Philadelphia police data (58), and we can conclude that gang members get into trouble more rapidly, but not into more serious trouble, as their offense career develops.

E. Victims

Although newspaper reports suggest that gangs prey on innocent victims, those who have observed gangs at firsthand find this largely a myth. Bernstein (1) cites a report by the Group Guidance agency in Los Angeles which indicates that 88 percent of assaults by gang members were against other juveniles, 80 percent against gang members. For Chicago gangs, Short reports, "it is probably true that most aggressive behavior on the part of even the most conflict-oriented gangs takes place within the gang rather than between gangs" (62, p. 19).

Miller's Junior Outlaws committed 70 percent of their aggressive acts within the gang, with very few against adults (53). Among all of Miller's gangs, 73 percent of all assault participants were age peers of the same sex and 71 percent were of the same race. "These data," concludes Miller, "thus grant virtually no support to the notion that favored targets of gang attacks are the weak, the solitary, the defenseless, and the innocent" (51). Through experience, the author has learned that when he receives a report of an assault by a gang member under study, the "victim" is usually equally at fault in precipitating the event.

F. Variations by Gang Characteristics

Just as gang structures were found to be quite variable, so is the level of gang violence. Wise (77) reports large differences in delinquency involvement among 14 Chicago gangs. Short and Strodbeck (65) found conflict behavior to be more variable than any other behavior category among the gangs in their study. Spergel (69) reported gang fights to be four times as frequent in Slumtown than in the second highest area in his study.

In Los Angeles, differences in assaultive offenses between four Negro gang clusters were found by the author to be almost nonexistent, but the resort to violence was much higher among Mexican-American gang members. While the Chicago data reveal more assaultive offenses among Negro than among white groups, Miller found just the opposite in Boston. Both sets of data reveal more assaultive acts at lower class levels, although the Los Angeles data do not provide confirmation. All agree, however, that violence is a male problem; female gang members rarely become involved in assaultive behavior. Overall, we must conclude that the more important finding is not the consistency according to member characteristics but the variability over all gangs.

G. Progression to Adulthood

Although the need is great, there has been no truly careful study of gang members as they move on into adult status. How many settle down and how many continue into "careers" of crime is unknown. Robin concludes from his work that "... these individuals were persistent and dangerous offenders, ... a large proportion of them became even more serious adult offenders" (58, p. 24). Miller has disputed this finding (50) which does not generally fit with the fact that delinquency rates peak several years prior to adulthood. Elsewhere, Miller remarked, "... involvement in violent crimes was a relatively transient phenomenon of adolescence, and did not presage a continuing pattern of similar involvement in adulthood" (51).

The fact that Robin's data were taken from police files and would therefore reflect the pattern of core members out of proportion to their numbers in the gang may explain part of this conflict. However, until a good followup study is undertaken, the question of the future criminal and conventional career pattern of gang members will remain a matter of speculation.

H. The Decline of Gang Fighting

More and more these days, one hears that gang fighting is on the decline. The author has heard numerous reports to this effect pertaining to Los

Angeles, especially in Negro areas. Mexican-American gangs, always in the majority, seem to be continuing their traditional pattern.

Bernstein (1), in a survey of officials across the nation, concludes that the level of gang conflict has indeed declined, with large-scale "rumbles" being replaced by "japping" or planned attacks on a rival member by a small number of boys. Bernstein notes, however, that "peace has not broken out in our slums" (p. 43). Conversations this author has had with other researchers suggests that any current decline in gang fighting may be more cyclical than permanent, and more a function of the reports from New York City which have been disseminated widely and rapidly. Samuels (59), Gannon (19, 20), and Grosser (25), have all commented on the New York trend.

Gannon's analysis yields a 40-percent reduction in conflict incidents in the early 60's, with the traditional fighting gang adopting a more defensive posture. Geis (21) quotes Kenneth Marshall's observation that conflict is giving way in Harlem to civil rights activism and drug use. In a statement which claims the impossible, and must be taken principally as a public relations pronouncement, Grosser indicates that a decline in gang fighting may not be an unmixed blessing:

By the early sixties, the combined efforts of the New York City Youth Board and Police Department succeeded in eliminating the fighting street gang. The conditions which produced the deviance remained untouched: the youth were involved at best (and rarely) as clients, and at worst (and frequently) as criminals; the neighborhood community, not at all. As a result, new, but less visible forms of deviance developed largely around the use of narcotics (i.e., Ohlin and Cloward's retreatist model). This new deviance, by any measure, has proven infinitely more costly than the old. It was to avoid pitfalls such as these that innovative comprehensive programs with strong community bases were evolved (25, p. 70).

Recently released data from Philadelphia present an even more discouraging picture. From 1962 to 1968, that city has manifested a significant decrease in gang fights and rumbles. But during the same period there has been a drastic increase in gang-related stabbings, shootings, and killings (43). It is quite conceivable that the "japping" pattern of deliberate, planned small scale assaults, if it is indeed becoming a new norm, is far more serious in consequences than the old style of gang fight. Perhaps, as Hayes and Hogrefe (27) have suggested, the gang contains its own proscriptive norms which serve to mitigate serious violence which might jeopardize its autonomy. Such norms might lose their effectiveness in the "japping" pattern.

Summary

Gang violence exists; it exists in almost every large urban area; it represents a continuing social problem and is curiously resistant to change efforts. However, it seems clear that the public view of gang violence as an ever present, widely threatening phenomenon simply does not fit the facts. The likeliest victim of gang violence is the gang member himself. The general

public is bothered by the myth more than by the realities of gang behavior. Violence constitutes a small portion of gang activity and is commonly of low seriousness in its physical consequences. If the truth be known, the greatest damage caused by gang members is to their own futures as husbands, fathers, and breadwinners. Although we must legitimately be concerned with the gang's threat to its own neighborhood and with the societal costs of gang control, it remains true that juvenile gangs constitute a greater problem and challenge for the social welfare agency than for the enforcement agency. The gang member is the victim of his own gang membership.

IV: PREVENTION PROGRAMS

Approaches to gang intervention have taken many forms, although only one of these has been identified as a "pure" gang approach and as such, has led to careful empirical evaluation. Before turning to this primary approach, generally known as a "detached worker program," the context can be set by considering a few others, which range from the most specific to the most general.

For instance, the well-known Mobilization for Youth Program (MFY) in New York has attempted to restructure the social organization of the Lower East Side through community participation and special programs to involve residents in expanded opportunities. Within the comprehensive and diffuse activities of MFY, gang members are the recipients of all the programs initiated, including contracted detached work service, but little special attention is devoted to them specifically because of their gang membership (2). They are expected to benefit in a manner similar to that of other youths in the area. No specific evaluation has been reported.

The Los Angeles Youth Project, similar to others in the nation, was an attempt to bring about agency coordination in the delinquency area. It was hoped that strengthening existing welfare agency programs and coordinating them would lead to more effective control procedures, including those aimed at gang behavior. No specific evaluation has been reported.

The Chicago Area Projects, developed on the basis of the pioneering work of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, were aimed at developing local community organizations to fill in the lacunae of social control in inner city areas. Included in the Area Projects were the first detached work services, but the major thrust was in developing indigenous leadership and neighborhood organization. No specific evaluation has been reported (39).

Youth for Service in San Francisco is basically a detached work program, but with a special twist. The distinctive feature of this program is the involvement of gang youth in service projects throughout the community—cleanups, repairs, and so on—which provide status, a sense of community identification, self-esteem, and a good image in the eyes of residents. An unpublished review of the program by researchers at the Berkeley campus of the University of California questioned the effectiveness of the program, but otherwise no specific evaluation has been reported. The same holds true for a recent leadership training program carried out by Youth for Service.

More or less standard detached work programs have been employed throughout the nation in such cities as Philadelphia, El Paso, San Antonio,

New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Gandy's report on the Hyde Park Project in Chicago (18) suggested a certain level of success with less delinquent youngsters, but the evaluation was not methodologically sound. Evaluations of the enormous program of the New York City Youth Board have been limited to impressionistic accounts (13, 57) and to surveys of the opinions of the workers (19, 20). This has represented an inexcusable waste of an opportunity to develop rationally designed prevention strategies. The detached work program of Chicago's Metropolitan YMCA was the source of the very important research carried on by Short and his colleagues referred to throughout this report. However, the research program was concerned with "basic" research and made no attempt at evaluating the effectiveness of the program as a whole or any of its component parts (11).

Although varying in form, detached work programs are grounded in one basic proposition: since gang members do not ordinarily respond well to standard agency programs inside the agency walls, it is necessary to take the programs to the gangs. A detached worker spends his time with the gang members in *their* own setting—the street corner, alley, taco stand or playground where the boys hang out. Around this simple base of a worker reaching out to his client, other programmatic thrusts then take form—club meetings, sports activities, tutoring and remedial reading projects, leadership training, family counseling, casework, employment training and job-finding, and so on (1, 2, 7, 11, 13, 17, 34, 37, 44, 49, 52, 57, 70, 72). In addition, there is often a community organization component built into the program in recognition of the fact that gangs do not exist in a vacuum, but in a context permeated by adults and adult organizations (2, 34, 44, 47, 52, 70).

Nevertheless, the common denominator is the detached worker. The primary agent of change is supposed to be the detached worker. The primary change mechanism is the rapport established between worker and gang member. The primary goal is to bring gang and society back together into a workable style of life, for there is an obvious isolation between the gang and conventionalized society due, as Thrasher has noted, to "... this barrier of unsympathetic social blindness, this inability of either to enter understandingly into the life of the other" (73, p. 180).

Both Spergel (70) and Bernstein (1) have provided useful discussions of the basic goals and formats of detached work programs. For our purposes, however, a brief description of the elements of a few of these programs will suffice to define their nature and assess their impact. As noted earlier, these projects are chosen because (a) they concentrated specifically on the gang problem, and (b) they were subjected to careful empirical evaluation. Most other gang projects have *assumed their own success* in the absence of public documentation.

A. The Roxbury Project

This program, evaluated by Walter B. Miller (47, 49), took place in Boston between 1954 and 1957. It involved a staff of seven workers assigned principally to seven gangs, Negro and white, male and female. There were four major components: work with local citizens' groups, interagency relations, family casework, and detached work with the gangs. Detached work was the major thrust, involving intensive relations between the workers and

205 gang members. A strong component of the detached workers' activities was in the employment and educational arenas.

Miller describes the project's excellent accomplishments in implementing the detached worker operations as judged by the heavy participation of the gang members with the workers. Using delinquency data from the workers and official agencies, however, he notes that the overall impact on delinquent behavior was nil. There was no significant reduction in the number of disapproved acts, in legal violations, or in court appearances among the gang members as compared with "control" gangs not receiving intensified service. In fact, there were a number of increases in delinquency among (a) males as opposed to females, (b) younger boys as opposed to older boys, and (c) more serious as opposed to less serious offenses. Miller concludes not only that the illegal behaviors of the gang members were resistant to change attempts, but that the adult institutions and agencies in the area acted as major impediments to change.

B. The Chicago Youth Development Project

This was a five year program (1960-1965) carried out by the Chicago Boys' Clubs with preliminary evaluation by Hans Mattick and Nathan S. Caplan. It differed from the Roxbury project in several respects: (a) it had a far heavier community organization component; (b) it involved more youngsters including non-gang members; (c) it made greater use of feedback procedures, employing research data about the program in developing and modifying its approach.

Final evaluative statements on the CYDP have not been published, but both Mattick and Caplan have reported to professional audiences, for quotation, their conclusions that while the project succeeded in implementation, it failed in delinquency reduction. Many employment opportunities were developed, new techniques devised, worker-youth relationships established (7), and so on, but delinquency rates were not reduced. In fact, it is believed that those boys most intensively served manifested the greatest increase in delinquency. A dramatic illustration of processes leading to this ultimate failure has been provided by Caplan (5, 6).

C. The Group Guidance Project

This was a four year program carried out under the auspices of the Los Angeles County Probation Department between 1961 and 1965. Similar in form to the Roxbury Project, it involved four Negro gang clusters (sixteen subgroups) with total male and female membership of approximately 800 youngsters. Evaluation was undertaken by the author and his colleagues.

The Group Guidance Project laid heavy stress on group programming via weekly "club" meetings, outings, sports and other special activities, remedial reading and tutoring projects, and parents' clubs. Implementation in terms of group programming was quite successful, but efforts in employment, education, and community organization were minimal. The program was also complicated by a bitter dispute between the action agency and local enforcement agencies.

The evaluation (34) revealed that the project was clearly associated with a significant *increase* in delinquency among the gang members. This was found

to be most true in the gangs most intensively served and, mirroring Miller's findings, among members at the lower age levels. The increase was primarily in those offenses which are ordinarily committed with companions but not with offenses more often committed by oneself. The evaluation suggested that the increase in offenses was at least in part attributable to the high level of group programming and the gang recruitment to which this led.

D. The Ladino Hills Project³

Noting that in previous projects intensity of service seemed related to delinquency increases and that group programming seemed to work against program goals, the author and his colleagues mounted an 18-month program (with a six-month followup) with a Mexican-American gang cluster having approximately 140 members. The project was designed to reduce gang cohesiveness through the cessation of group programming and the provision of alternative activities. It was hypothesized that cohesiveness reduction would in turn lead to delinquency reduction (37).

Overall, project implementation was judged to be reasonably successful, and a reduction in cohesiveness of eleven to forty percent was achieved, depending upon the index employed. The entry of new members into the gang (male, but not female), was completely stopped. Delinquency rates (number of offenses per member) did not change during the project period, but the steady reduction in the size of the gang led to an overall reduction in the number of offenses of 35 per cent. These trends continued through the followup period despite the withdrawal of project staff.

It may seem remarkable to some that the only four projects with careful evaluations yield such equivocal or even negative findings. This brief review, of course, does not do justice to the intricacies of the action and research methods employed—we have summarized 14 years of work in just a few pages. But let the reader be assured that in each of the four cases a determined effort was mounted and sustained by the project staffs. Failure to reduce gang delinquency cannot be explained by lack of program implementation. In fact, the very existence of research evaluations, putting the action staffs "under the gun," probably led to more persistent action efforts than is ordinarily the case. There can be no escaping the conclusion that detached work programs, as constituted in the recent past, do not represent an effective approach to the reduction of gangs, or the "violent" activities associated with gangs. They may inadvertently *contribute* to gang violence.

Where do we turn now? If programs designed specifically to reduce gang delinquency and concentrated directly upon gang members do not succeed, what can? Certain hints can be gleaned from these and other programs. Some alternative suggestions have been offered. Some others may be in order.

Perhaps we can summarize the present difficulties as falling into five general areas.

A. Theoretical Underpinnings

Most gang prevention programs have been either totally atheoretical or blandly eclectic. This results in a good deal of inconsistency, random or

³ This is a pseudonym.

uncoordinated programing, and uncertainty as to the meaning of seeming successes or failures of program components. Frequently, it also means the launching of a program without a clear understanding of its goals and how to measure their attainment. For instance, the use of delinquency reduction as the ultimate criterion of success in the four projects reviewed above was highly acceptable to the researchers, but not to the workers whose concerns are more with welfare matters and attitude change. Until social practice programs are guided by a consistent intervention model with reasonable theoretical bases, they will continue either to flounder or to add little to our ability to undertake social change.

B. Enormity of the Problem

By the time a hundred boys and girls become affiliated with a juvenile gang, they have been subjected to from 12 to 18 years of formative processes from the family, the neighborhood, and the society. They continue to be bombarded by the contemporary factors of group and social processes even as we work with them. All the factors discussed in section II of this report and others as well are acting on the gang member to produce the affiliations and behaviors society decries.

Arrayed against this veritable army of psychological, social, and cultural forces is the detached worker and the few resources at his disposal. David beat Goliath, but at least he had a slingshot. How would he have fared against a hundred Goliaths? How conceited we are to expect one worker, however reinforced, to overcome substantially the combined forces of family, neighborhood, and society. In a gang of one hundred boys, the detached worker can reasonably expect to devote ten to fifteen minutes per week per boy on the average, yet from this we expect the twin miracles of fundamental attitudinal and behavioral change. In light of the other problems to be enumerated here, this appears to be an unfair challenge.

C. Absence of Specific Techniques

Miller reported that of fourteen threatened gang fights in the Roxbury Project, only one took place. The experience in Los Angeles was similar, as research observers personally witnessed a number of threatened confrontations that failed to materialize. In the area of intergang conflict, the workers do have specific techniques designed to avoid the fight. One of these is his mere physical presence as a witness. Another is his availability as a messenger to enforcement agencies, forewarning them of a fight about which the boys have told him in the hope that he would prevent it (52). Another technique (of questionable value) is the "truce meeting" between representatives of the warring factions.

But how many other, analogous techniques are in the workers' repertoire? There really are none specifically pertinent to burglary, vandalism, statutory rape, curfew violation, drug use, and so on. On a more general level, the aforementioned Youth for Service program and the Chicago YMCA have mounted carefully designed leadership programs (11); the YMCA and Group Guidance programs developed extensive tutoring and remedial reading programs (34); others have attempted civil rights involvement, youth coffee

houses and a host of other standard and innovative approaches designed to reform, teach, occupy, involve, or train gang members with respect to non-gang behaviors.

Unfortunately, these "techniques" are very general, of unknown pertinence to delinquency prevention, and almost invariably undertaken without evaluation of their impact. In the absence of techniques specifically related in a known fashion to delinquency reduction, programs have evolved more and more activities of a less specific nature. If they don't necessarily reduce delinquency, at least it is felt these projects are "morally" good, sound in welfare philosophy, and give the workers a sense of accomplishment and their administrators further justification for agency continuation and expansion. But this is not delinquency prevention.

D. Inappropriate Techniques

How would a rational worker go about meeting and maintaining rapport with as many as a hundred youngsters much of whose lives is street-oriented? Being on the street himself is not sufficient; too many boys are missed that way. The worker has little choice but to encourage *group* gathering—club meetings, outings, and so on. In this way he can get to know most of the boys, maintain contact with them, and use existing group processes to his own advantage. But the gathering of the group, the reinforcement of gang *qua* gang identification, and the solidification of gang structure which may result from this process inadvertently works against the goal of delinquency reduction.

As Spergel has noted, "... the presence or absence of the worker on the corner is a powerful stimulus in creating, maintaining, or dissolving the group structure. The worker tends to attract young people and to become an essential person in the organization of the group" (70, p. 33). Cloward and Ohlin, Miller, Yablonsky, and Klein have all commented on the worker as a source of status for the gang. The Klein analysis (34) has gone beyond this to demonstrate the likelihood that removal of a worker eliminates a major source of gang cohesiveness and may precipitate a partial dissolution of the gang.

Another tendency revealed by the Los Angeles data is for the worker to turn his attention from older boys leaving the gang to younger groups which are seen as the "natural inheritors" of the gang traditions. In working with these younger subgroups, the workers inadvertently create a self-fulfilling prophecy and perpetuate the traditional gang cluster structure.⁴ That this process *can* be interrupted has been demonstrated (37), but it goes against the normal grain of the worker.

A third inappropriate technique has been revealed by Caplan (5, 6). He refers to "backsliding" as a serial process in which a given level of worker output brings youngsters up to the brink of important behavioral change, but then is followed by a backing away or reversion to an earlier status. Faced with this setback, the worker redoubles his effort only to have the youngster

⁴It may be worth noting, in this regard, that the average age of gang members served by the New York City Youth Board decreased by 1½ years after Youth Board Service was initiated (57, p. 29). The Youth Board workers may inadvertently have been providing a funnel into the gang for younger boys in the neighborhood.

revert even further. The process has even been observed by Caplan through three such cycles. The data indicated that whereas 80 percent of the boys manifested initial desirable change, only 4 percent "terminated in successful changes that were characterized by post-project autonomy" (5, p. 231).

Other less dramatic and less destructive practices have been described elsewhere (34). The fault, of course, lies not in the workers' or their programs' lack of concern or dedication. These are uniformly laudable. The fault lies, as indicated earlier, in our combined failure to devise, test, and implement workable, theoretical intervention models that could distinguish between helpful and harmful "tactics." Lacking such models, we continue to spin wheels and yet feel the sense of progress.

E. Lack of Leverage

It was mentioned earlier that the enormity of the delinquency and gang problems represents an overwhelming adversary to detached work programs. Looking at the other side of the coin reveals that the leverage on the problem is a function also of the resources available to these programs. The many variables covered in section II of this report are not uniformly subject to direct change by the activities of detached workers.

The psychological propensities of gang members, the stresses and strains of the adolescent period, the opportunity structure of the neighborhood and community, and the normative structure of class and subculture are, for the most part, beyond the reach of the street worker. He has few of the necessary resources or in many cases an understanding of which resources would be most useful.

Further, the worker works in a vacuum, detached not only from his own agency but from others with a prevention mandate. He is often alienated from enforcement officials because of conflicting intervention philosophies. Thus Miller (47) was able to conclude that the greatest resistance to delinquency reduction lay not in the youngsters but in the recalcitrance of the adults in the community's agencies and institutions. Thus Berstein (1) was able to suggest that "public" delinquencies (fights, vandalism) prove more amenable to change than "private" delinquencies (sex, drug use), and Cooper could report about spontaneous attacks by small groups of boys that "the detached worker's control over these is pretty much limited to the times when he is present, or when one of the youths . . . is willing and able to act as his representative" (11, p. 188). Too many of the factors which bring boys to the point of gang membership and conflict are not within the capability of a detached worker program to manipulate.

Summary

While most gang prevention programs remain unevaluated in a proper fashion, it is highly significant that the evaluated programs have proven only slightly successful, ineffective, or even contributory to gang delinquency. They have been shown to employ inadequate resources in combating an entrenched foe. Some of their normal and almost necessary practices have acted as boomerangs, effectively increasing gang cohesiveness and delinquency.

Although new, modified approaches to detached work could now be mounted on the basis of the lessons learned from the past, one is inclined to predict that, at best, new programs of this sort could only represent "holding actions." If the data from Philadelphia are at all valid, even the reduction of large scale intergang conflict may have the inadvertent effect of increasing more individually determined violence of a most serious kind (43).

At this point, perhaps, it is anyone's guess as to where we should turn. The accumulated data on levels of gang violence suggest strongly that any new effort will in any case be directed at a relatively minor facet of the urban ills of our nation. Gang violence, it must be admitted, is *not* now a major social problem. In determining future directions we must, as Yablonsky has pointed out, distinguish between "the necessary strategy for broad social change and the practical tactics of local control" (81, p. 237).

Irving Spergel, who has most successfully bridged the gap between research and action involvements with juvenile gangs, has probably best summarized the present situation. We close this report with his conclusions:

It is, perhaps, unlikely that social work, through either casework or group work (or street-club work), or combinations of these methods, even on a large scale, will effect substantially the character or reduce the incidence of gang fighting in the neighborhood containing the conflict subculture. At best, the social worker's efforts are supplementary . . . social work cannot offer a significant program of intervention.

. . . only as the larger conventional society opens the floodgates of opportunity and provides a massive program whereby adequate schooling, good jobs, better housing, and health and social services of a broad range and high quality are more fully available to low-status groups will delinquency of the conflict variety drastically be eliminated or transformed (67, p. 45).

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APPENDIX 32

DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

By Richard Blum*

INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on the relationship between the use of drugs and the occurrence or nonoccurrence of violent behavior in human beings. The drugs of primary concern here are psychoactive ones employed socially or illicitly, for example alcohol, heroin, cannabis (marihuana, hashish), stimulants and hallucinogens, and those employed under medical supervision, for example sedatives, tranquilizers, morphine, and the like. Mention will also be made of chemicals which are not generally considered psychoactive but which do affect behavior by virtue of how humans react to their effects, tear gas as an example. In this report animal research will occasionally be mentioned in order to call attention to possible but as yet unelucidated factors influencing drug effects in humans, nevertheless the thrust of the report bears on the role psychoactive drugs play as a component in exacerbating, altering, or inhibiting violent acts by individual human beings.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:
FACTORS LIMITING PRESENT KNOWLEDGE

It is well to realize that, as one asks what scientific research has to tell us about the relationship between violence and drugs, the concern about

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violence per se has been generated earlier and more intensely in the public among political leaders than among the social and biological scientists. What this means is that public and political concern over violence has for the most part preceded information-seeking about it so that, at the moment, worry outweighs facts, and beliefs which may prove to be erroneous are more likely to be widespread than are reliably established conclusions. This is not to say that individual investigators or social philosophers have not been studying individual violence; one is grateful, for example, for the fine work of Von Hentig (1948) or Wolfgang (1958) on homicide, Durkheim (1897) on suicide, or of Von Wissman, Wolf, Francois and Von Mueller (1891) on cannabis, politics and warfare among the Baluba, yet large-scale endeavors focusing on violence are just now emerging. Consequently the violent offender, while well known to victims, the police, the prison guard and, indirectly the taxpayer, is comparatively unknown to biological and social scientists. That this will change, given the social demand and the subsequent provision of more trained personnel and of research funds, is clear. In the meantime we must all make do with limited data.

Another problem in factfinding about violence or about drugs linked to violence is that as times change so do the characteristics of persons using drugs or engaging in violence. At the same time as expanding number of new drugs appear so that investigators must always be attending to a dynamic rather than static scene. Consequently what was found to be true yesterday may no longer be the case today, a point nicely documented by O'Donnell (1966) in his study of the shift in the frequency of criminal records prior to narcotics arrests as a function of the recency of the year of addiction. Furthermore with regard to the phenomena constituting violence there is uncertainty as to the trends themselves; in 1966 Glaser, Kenefick and O'Leary, drawing on statistics for preceding years, argued for a decline in homicide and other violent crimes in the United States (excepting rape which they link theoretically with property crimes as the "theft of sex"). They contend that violence disappears with increases in education and urban sophistication and when it does occur, occurs primarily as a socio-cultural way of life associated with the protection of reputation (see also Esselstyn, 1967). A "subculture" view of violence is elaborated in a more recent work by Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967), one which incorporates individual as well as socioeconomic and cultural factors. Their argument takes note of the possibly increasing accuracy of police records and especially metropolitan police records so that as population migration to the cities continues there will be a differential increase in crime reporting of violent crimes in the urban sector. Beattie and Kenney in Wolfgang (1966) discuss the general problems of crime reporting which fails to identify the seriousness of offenses within categories (a methodologically impressive solution for which has been proposed by Sellin and Wolfgang [1964]) and the disproportionate rise in reporting of serious crimes as compared to less serious ones. Until improvements in classification and reporting are made, Beattie and Kenney argue that one cannot rely on any trend data. (For a review of general reporting problems and suggestions for a Federal role in their improvement, see Blum, 1968a.)

On the other hand, the available statistics, especially the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI, continue to show an increase in crime,

including violent crime. In 1967, a 16-percent increase in violent crime over 1966 had been reported; in 1968 a 19-percent over the previous year was reported (report by J. Edgar Hoover, March 1968). Both of these increases exceed the rate of population growth per se and one questions whether such dramatic increases can reflect just urban migration and police records and reporting changes. When one does look at smaller populations over time in order to control for reporting bias, it does appear that the rising trend of violence, or at least of that violence among strangers which is not handled informally, is increasing. Little (1965) in an important work in England examined rates among adolescent offenders and found that about one quarter of the increase in offenses there was attributable to rising recidivism. Another portion of the rise was attributable to demographic changes, in this instance in a growth in the absolute number of youths in those age groups at highest risk of committing offenses, and finally, 50 percent was attributable to a greater number (rate) of first offenders. Little's presumption was that more first offenses were being committed, not that simply more were being identified and/or made a matter of public record.

In general, one must be cautious about relying on incidence statistics—the typical police reporting device—if these are not expressed as rates. To learn that there has been an increase in absolute numbers of, say, 50 percent in homicides using poisons in one city is insufficient. One also needs to know if the rate of homicide has changed, if the proportion of homicides using poisons has changed, and if either the city characteristics or police methods and records have changed. Another caution pertains to the reliance upon case history reporting of the sort ordinarily done by practitioners who deal with humans face-to-face whether these be physicians, policemen or journalists. A rash of cases of, for instance, middle-class heroin use as reported by a city newspaper may be taken to mean a grand increase in the rate of heroin use, yet inspection may reveal that these cases are but few in number and do not represent any large scale change in drug use patterns. There may even be a circular effect in such reporting, whether it be medical, judicial, or to the lay public, for observers (and speechmakers) become sensitized to such cases, look for them more assiduously and then in reporting them contribute to the impression of an epidemic. Epidemic there may be, but possibly only one of case reporting, of anxiety or of sensationalism. For example, in the earlier Crime Commission Task Force Reports (Blum, 1967b) there was documented such a spiraling circle of reporting and feared abuse of amphetamines by vehicle drivers associated with accidents, the contributors to which were scientists, public officials and the mass media. That false epidemic of amphetamine-induced vehicle accidents occurred during the same period that a real increase in amphetamine-induced psychoses was occurring; yet it was some time before normal communication within medical channels led to the realization of this real area of widespread amphetamine danger. The moral to this account is that reporting which is premature or sensational can lead to misimpressions whereas conventional case reporting, although a slow process, can contribute greatly to understanding especially if it generates epidemiological and experimental studies.

Returning to trends which we take to be real, it appears that as with the violent crimes so with new psychoactive drugs, we live in a period of actual increase and also increased public sensitivity. It is evident that the number of

persons using psychoactive drugs either legitimately, as in the medically supervised employment of tranquilizers, or illicitly, as in the case of heroin, unprescribed morphine, barbiturates or stimulants, cannabis, the hallucinogens or the diverse materials which can be sniffed (glue, gasoline, etc.) is not only increasing but that no plateau is in sight. Increased use of course has two components, that which is simply experimental and which does not continue and that which becomes regular and in some cases a matter of drug dependency. It is not to be assumed that trends of increase are themselves constant or irreversible, for example until recently there was much decline in illicit opiate use in the United States (see, for example, O'Donnell, 1966) since the Harrison Act, the shift in alcohol use in the middle class from spirits to wine or beer and the recent statistics showing a decline in cigarette smoking among some groups. We are now watching a reversal of the opium-heroin trend; for example, in our own work with students (Blum and Associates, 1969b) there is evidence of an increase in opiate use among middle-class youth, a finding duplicated by journalistic and clinical observations. These new opium smokers and heroin users still constitute but a few cases, however alarming the appearance of any new cases may be; on the other hand the largest increase in illicit drug use is of marihuana; for example, in our own work in an 18-month followup study on one campus we found an estimated increase from 21 percent experiences with marihuana to 57 percent. A corresponding threefold increase in regular use (as opposed to simple experimentation) also appears to have occurred, from 4 percent to an estimated 14 percent. Smaller increases in amphetamine and hallucinogen use were also recorded. In high schools the picture appears to be changing as rapidly with considerable evidence for a rapid extension of illicit drug use down to junior high school and even elementary grades (in metropolitan California). There is inferential evidence that the use of the more potent substances, hallucinogens and tranquilizers, as well as the notably toxic volatile intoxicants (glue, gasoline, etc.) may have a larger pool of potential regular users in high school than in college. One would attribute this, should further trends bear out our findings, to less adequate information, immaturity, and poorer impulse control in this population of young people. In other groups shifts in use patterns are also noticeable, for example Smith (1969), Tinklenberg (1969), and others describe increasing amphetamine use among dropouts and hippies in drug meccas such as the Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco and our own normal population data (1969a), while based on small samples, suggests an expanding use of legitimate as well as illicit drugs among young people throughout the population.

These shifts which statistics reflect mean that the research worker—as well as the educator, narcotics enforcement officer, or judge—is always to some extent behind the times in his estimates of the extent of drug use or its consequences; whatever point in time an investigation is made will be past history by the time the data are processed and reported. That may not matter as long as the study observations are analytic in the scientific sense, that is as long as they identify variables and regular relationships which link drugs to conduct such that predictions can be made. For example, in our own work

with students it is clear that higher family income and political liberality are positively linked to experience with marihuana. As long as one has good information on family income among students and on their political predilections, one can begin to estimate drug use prevalence even without conducting another survey. Of course the accuracy of such estimates increases the more one has identified the features in the situation and the person which are correlated with one or another kind of illicit drug use. One must forever be on guard, however, for the environment itself can change into new forms and, presumably, new styles of personality can emerge as the result of changes in child-rearing techniques. Thus none of the analytical and theoretical knowledge available as of 1955, for the "quiet" generation of students, allowed prediction either of the drug epidemics of the 1960's nor of the emergence of confrontation politics—left and black militancy. Although it is evident that these trends are linked, their beginnings were not generally foreseen in the 1950's because these events reflect recent changes in the American environment itself as well as a possible change in the personal ties of American youth. (See Eva Blum, "Horatio Alger's Children" in Blum & Assoc., 1969b.) Whether taken as a problem or a principle, it appears that any investigation of drugs-linked-to-violence cannot escape the influence of the broader social scene. Thus we are in the position of having to identify dozens or more of factors which influence drug use and drug effects, of identifying other factors which are linked to the emergence and social definition of violence and then having to specify for any given person or situation which are the primary contributing features. For longer ran prediction or understanding, one must know what the consequences might be of different "mixes" (i.e., interaction effects) of these factors; and, in addition, one must have insights—or better, foresights—into the new factors which are being created as part of historical process. Such foresight is not within the ordinary scope of the social or biological sciences which depend upon observations on the past or current forms of nature—including human nature and social environments—and thus are ill-prepared to predict to new forms even if rather better prepared to predict to new outcomes when only known variables are operating. Lest the former be unclear, it can be rephrased by saying that the processes of mutations in human personalities or environments are as yet ill understood, that the prediction of directions of social change is not one of the great successes of the social and behavior sciences, and that the analysis of past relationships between drugs and violence, while itself immensely helpful in the understanding of analogous behavior, is no guarantee of wisdom about what the future will bring.

These broad difficulties aside, we are beset by problems of method and scope in the work done to date. These are the same as encountered in other scientific endeavors and include problems of instrumentation and methodology, of sample or population selection, and of the adequacy of concepts applied as bases for inquiry or in explanation of results. Offsetting these common difficulties are several assets, the greatest of which has been the dedication and competence of large numbers of citizens who have, as scientists, law enforcement officers, physicians, or community leaders

dedicated their intelligence and effort to the task of fact-finding and the development of perspectives. One must be impressed by the rapid growth not only of the number of citizens concerned, professionally or socially, with fact-finding but with the increasing sophistication of their methods. In the 2 years since the literature review and data analysis conducted for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (hereafter referred to as the Crime Commission), there has been a notable development; scientists are more elegant in their work and more constrained in their conclusions, legislators are seeking more information from a wider variety of sources and are proposing more flexible public policies with which to deal with that drug use which is harmful, and the support for new research, development and application programs from local, state and Federal governments has grown remarkably. Examples of the latter are the new Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs and the Center for Drug Abuse of NIMH.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: CURRENT MYTHS AND MISUNDERSTANDING

There is another set of difficulties which hinder understanding and policy making when the capabilities for factfinding exist and even when the facts exist, these are prevalent and persistent misconceptions about drugs and violence. The sources for these myths and misconceptions can be found in uncorrected historical notions, e.g., the myth that the Assassins took marihuana which in turn propelled them into murdering or in overresponding to insufficient information, e.g., belief in the inevitability of physical addiction following any use of heroin or the acceptance of a high risk of violence among LSD users based on a few well publicized cases. Several more basic misbeliefs also persist, to illustrate: one belief has it that drugs *cause* behavior and another that drug effects are highly predictable. These are incorrect. Psychoactive drugs can only modify bodily processes and capabilities already present, thus while drugs may contribute to conduct—and strongly so—they are not, at least not yet, capable of adding unique dimensions to performance nor of compelling any particular type of performance. They may reduce performance, e.g., alcohol impairs driving skills, they may alter it as one sees in the disturbances in sensation which accompany LSD use, or they may enhance it, as the amphetamines may do in stimulating task efficiency or in combating fatigue effects. Yet drugs do not *compel* any particular social conduct, be it humor or murder. It is certainly true that as dosage increases for the more powerful agents that singularities of outcome are indeed predictable, but these are all in the direction of performance decrement and physiological damage as witnessed in alcohol or morphine stupor, amphetamine shock, cannabis (tetrahydrocannabinol) delirium, barbiturate poisoning and the like. As dosage decreases to that normal range which is usually prescribed for or self-employed by people who want to be able to function, then predictability decreases and the drug's specific effects are compounded by other strong influences such as the motives and personality of the user, the behavior of others, the kind of situation, the expectations the user has of the drug and so forth. It is also the case that drug effects vary with the dosage, manner and frequency of

administration, presence of potentiating or antagonizing agents, concurrent health and nutritional status, and so on.

Relating these facts to violence it becomes clear that no drug presently known will inevitably cause violence, for violent acts are necessarily complex acts, a sequence of events, which involve intentions toward and impacts on other people. People do violent things; under certain circumstances drugs may increase the likelihood of their doing violent things, but it is the human and not the drug which acts violently.

It is, nevertheless, difficult to refrain from attributing to drugs more than their fair share of the action. There is a tendency to make the drug rather than the person the object both of concern and of responsibility. There is a tendency to animate drugs as though they contained a devilish force, a demon which could possess the person and force him to be evil. Certainly there is experience aplenty to convince us that much harm has been unleashed in the course of drug use; the alcoholic driver who maims on the highway, the drunken fellow who kills in an argument, the paranoid-reacting amphetamine dealer who shoots a suspected police informer or the heroin addict who knifes a victim in the course of robbery. Each is a too common event and in each a vicious act occurs in association with and quite possibly partially as a result of psychoactive drug use. But there was nothing in a drug to "will" or to dictate the violence, there is only a modification of judgment and self control in the drug taker which, in that person and in that situation, can lead to violence. Although that point is readily granted, the logic of animism—or the illogic of demonism—whichever it best be called, erupts again and again in public discussion. Elsewhere (Blum & Assoc., 1969a) that demonism underlying some conceptions of drug action has been more fully speculated upon; for our purposes here it is necessary to state that there is a burden of illogic and emotionality which encumbers drug policy considerations and that an important component in that difficulty is the assumption about drugs as crime-causing agents to the exclusion of interest in how it happened that the person took a drug and how it happened that he acted as he did after taking it.

When the act is a violent one, it must also be kept in mind that the evaluation of what happened cannot look only at the drug, the drug taker, the history, the setting and the victim, all of which can be shown to contribute to the sad history of hurt. The reporter or observer himself must not be forgotten, whether he be police officer or journalist reporting single cases or a scientist analyzing dozens of them. For in the matter of violence there is a pervasive problem of definition, that is, who says the act is a violent one of the sort to be included in our classifications, worries or ruminations? The implication when we speak of violence is of harm, and further, of moral disapproval if not criminal violation. Yet clearly much that is physically aggressive among humans receives widespread approval even if hurt is an outcome. Prize fighting, football, auto racing, collegiate brawls, and going to war for a good cause are examples. Even when drugs are implicated, favorable assessments of violence may be found, as for example when bomber pilots take amphetamine to reduce fatigue on long combat missions, when two gang youths high on alcohol have a street fight to the entertainment of the onlookers, or when prison wardens use tear gas to quell mutinies. These are the problem cases, for the most part the violent events of which we

disapprove and which constitute our criminal statistics, the Class I crimes of violence in the FBI system of uniform crime reporting, are by agreement considered reprehensible. This may be true even though some victims may be less innocent than heretofore believed, a reevaluation brought on by the recent studies of victim-precipitated or victim-participating crime (Wolfgang, 1966). One must say the same about drug users, even the increasing number of very young ones, their innocence may not be assumed either; rare is the young person "hooked" by the manipulations of some sinister stranger in the school yard. The prevalent pattern is one of learning to take drugs from one's peers and elders, doing so out of a willingness to go along and the hope that something interesting will happen. Something of the same pattern of sociability and escalating involvement applies to much that is violent crime, excepting assassinations, robberies and other crimes where the victim is a stranger. For the larger part individual violence appears to be something that happens among participating acquaintances, as in most homicides, rapes and assaults. Since drug use is also something one usually does with one's acquaintances—whether drinking, smoking "pot" or "dropping acid"—it should not be too surprising to find that there is an association between some forms of drug use and some forms of violence for both are primarily—although not always—events among acquaintances. It is this kind of association which complicates the evaluation of the specific effects of drugs as violence precipitators.

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS: HISTORICAL DATA ON DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

A comprehensive review of the history of psychoactive drug use, including historical events linking drugs to violence, is not possible in this paper. However a recent review exists (Blum & Assoc., 1969a) to which the reader is referred. For our purposes here it will be well only to specify the several kinds of relationships which have been alleged or demonstrated historically. Probably because of the way that events are recorded—or historians write—most of these are military and political rather than individual events. As the earliest manufactured drug it is fitting that alcohol appear first in relation to violence. Egyptian records* describe carousings at which the revelers, becoming drunk, fill victims to robbers against whom they were unable to defend themselves. A big city policeman with Skid Row experience could corroborate this relationship between drug-induced stupor and robbery; for the robber the victim became an easy target. Frequency is another matter; neither the pre-Christian Egyptian records nor modern city police departments can tell us how often intoxicated drug users are robbery victims. Another Egyptian account suggests that some beer drinking was simply an excuse for people of like-minded views to get together; the problem arose (for the Pharaohs) when these worthies happen to use the occasion to plot against the regime. So it was, or—given the uncertainty of the record—so it may have

*Reference citations in this section will be, for simplicity's sake, to the secondary text (Blum & Assoc., 1969a) which contains citations of basic documents or studies.

been, that in certain settings (a few particular temples) social drinkers plotted political violence and so their gatherings were suppressed. Much later, in the beginning of the 13th century, coffee drinking in Middle Eastern sultanates was also prohibited for the same reason, for the newly founded coffeehouses became places that men gathered to talk and then to complain about politics and, finally, to consider revolt. Subsequently only on pain of death in parts of the Mideast would a man run a coffee house. Two other Egyptian observations link alcohol to violence; one is an early "public health" notice which noted that heavy drinking led to death (as it does through suppression of autonomic nervous system functioning) and so called for controls over sales. Another regulation had a different intent; soldiers drinking beer before battle led to military disasters, consequently soldiers were prohibited from such drunkenness—although later they were given a wine ration—much after the fashion of rum in the British Navy. In Babylon alcohol sales were also controlled, presumably because of widespread ill effects from intoxication. In a ritual link to violence, the Scythians, at the time of Herodotus, had their king give wine at an annual banquet to those men who had slain in battle. Warriors who had slain many men received two cups of wine. Perhaps that was not enough wine per year to quench the Scythian thirst, for Herodotus also reports that Cyaxares of Persia regained his land from its Scythian conquerors by inviting them (one presumes only the commanders were invited) to feast and after they were drunk did slaughter them. The wheel of history turns ironically though, for later it was the Persians who drank too much and for this were punished by their Roman conquerors, this time it was the punishment which was violent; to be tied with a cord through the nose to a stake in the public square. Elsewhere drunkenness offenses also evoked a violent response; legend has it that a Chinese emperor executed two of the royal astronomers for missing an eclipse while drunk. As a weapon Judith used alcohol, among other devices, to charm Holofernes who, drinking too much, lost his head as well as his heart to her. As an intentional weapon after Judith—and she is the first woman recorded to use it so—alcohol remained prominent in warfare. The Illyrians left poisoned wine for their enemy to drink, during the Gallic Wars the Romans waited for the Gauls to drink themselves into stupor before attacking, and during the First Punic War a Roman general blamed his defeat upon his soldiers' drunkenness. Conversely a Byzantine commander faced with his soldiers leaving the ramparts for town, set up wine booths there to stay their desertion. Babur, the Mogul emperor, feared defeat in battle because of their drunkenness (even though they were Moslems) and himself resorted to cannabis. Although history is full of other anecdotes, we sample only two more, both American. One is the Whiskey Insurrection of Pennsylvania which occurred in 1794 when Federal officers tried to collect revenue on spirits and which led first to the tarring and feathering of the tax collectors and secondly to the use of Federal troops to suppress the moonshiners. Another Federal control endeavor ended not so happily—the Great Experiment of prohibition, enacted in 1919, could not combat the thirst of the 1920's and led, so many would claim, to the first organized crime in America associated with the illicit distribution of drugs, an organization which did then and does now employ violence in many forms, as the backup for extortion, as a sanction for controlling employees, and as a device for eliminating competition.

Opium is another early known drug which was used medically and religiously in the Eastern Mediterranean, although not socially. With that employment its use as a weapon was acknowledged before Christ; it was given in heavy doses to poison, a use to which it is still put today in the United States. It is nowhere (that we can find) historically linked to individual violence but rather to relaxing, exhilarating, or dulling effects. On the other hand great international violence has been associated with opium in the case of the Opium Wars. The commerce in opium to China was a rich one for Britain, India, the United States, and to a lesser extent other Western trading nations. The Chinese, suffering inroads by the hated foreign devils, watching a population of the poor and hungry become further emaciated as they took to the pipe rather than food, and conscious of an immense gold drain in an unfavorable trade balance, prohibited the drug's importation, a challenge which led the English to the two Opium Wars of 1842 and 1858. Heroin, developed in 1898, was a more powerful substitute for opium and was and is quickly adopted by opium-smoking populations. Not only potent but easily smuggled, heroin traffic entered wherever attempts to suppress opium use occurred. In the United States and, to a lesser extent in western Canada, the use of heroin was early adopted by delinquent or disordered populations ready to employ an illicit drug whose effects were not compatible with ordinary competitive living. Thus in these countries, although apparently not elsewhere, an early tie was made between asocial or antisocial elements and the use of heroin. They represent an extreme group, even among opiate users for, as has elsewhere been shown (Blum, 1967c), most opiate users in the United States are conventional citizens who receive opium derivatives or synthetic analogs as medical patients in pain.

Cannabis appeared later on the scene, both in its reported use and in its reputed ill-effects. Employed prior to the time of Christ by the Scythians (and no doubt by others, only Herodotus is one of the few observers of early drug use who has come down to us), it got its first bad marks in the West during Crusader times when about 1090 the Old Man of the Mountain, a religious-political leader, was alleged to have used cannabis either as a reward for his band of revolutionaries or as a means to induce trance during which they embarked on their assassin and guerrilla activities. Others later blamed the fury of the Golden Horde on hashish; both of these stories are without foundation but are of considerable importance as illustrations of how a mystique of violence can come to be attributed to drug use in the absence of fact. Much later, in 1856, an anonymous American magazine article was the first of the American addict "true confessions" genre—preceded in Europe of course by European accounts such as that of DeQuincey—to take up the fantasy line. In it an American with a Damascene past takes hashish and in his fantasies believes himself to have killed his fiance, a dream which the writer reports mirrored his true fiance, even though the setting of use involved a male friend so that some triangular passions present themselves as possibly sufficient reason for anger.

Three other cultural-historical cases link cannabis to violence, albeit one in reverse and the other symbolically. Observations by several investigators suggest that in cultures requiring action and competitiveness cannabis is inappropriate, for its passivity runs counter to culture themes. Alcohol on the other hand is the aggressors' or competitors' drug so that even within a

community (Carstairs, 1954) those able to enjoy a calm or reflective life use cannabis and the hustling merchants drink alcohol. The other case is that of the Baluba of the Congo Kassai region, observed in 1883-85. A new chief had come to power and, understanding the potential for firearms just newly introduced there, sought to gain guns. The elders resisted but the new chief subdued them; still he was faced with dissidence and an unruly tribe. Since cannabis was used religiously by neighboring tribes the chief thought it might be useful to him in the formation of a new state religion, one which would help him unite his tribe around new symbols and rituals. Initiated into the new faith as "sons of hemp" his warriors were taught cannabis' use as the new fetish; they also smoked it before going into battle—a practice extant in central Africa. An ubiquitous substance, it was also used to punish criminals, for they were made to smoke until they lost consciousness. The gifted chief, Kalamba, succeeded in his programs; one which the observers said was developed with a conscious awareness of the symbolic value of a mind-altering drug. One is tempted, as an aside, to wonder what stature this chief would have had had that same political genius been born to rule a major nation. Another case of symbolic cannabis use is found among the Jamaican Ras Tafarians. Originally a religious group with the belief that cannabis was sanctified by God, political dissidents and delinquents took to themselves the external practices of the cult (smoking cannabis, not cutting their hair, not bathing). Some of these engaged in guerrilla warfare, other idlers and marginal folk—called "beardmen" or "dreadlocks"—have become advocates of violence both politically and in criminal acts, as for example robbery. In this case one finds a parallel to developments in certain hippie neighborhoods in modern America where LSD using "flower children" formed a culture which proved attractive to the psychologically ill and unstable and to predators. These latter, assuming the dress of the love generation, have proven to be quite a different basket of flowers. To illustrate, in San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury there were 17 homicides in the first two months of 1969.

There are a variety of stimulant substances, most mild and naturally occurring such as tea, coffee, and khat, but a few more potent, as is cocaine derived from coca nowadays and the manufactured amphetamines. We have already noted that the violence associated with coffee was because the Middle Eastern coffee houses where it was introduced and served came to be places where political critics gathered to talk of social change. The disruptions they planned could have been no more violent than the capital penalties laid upon coffee drinkers and coffee house owners by the conservative rules. That such plottings and extreme responses were not an inevitable result of coffee drinking (should there be any reader still clinging to the *ergo hoc propter hoc* rule for drug effects) may be seen in the popularity during a later period of time of the English coffee houses where an unoppressed population met to talk of politics, art and business without prompting any executions or revolutions. Cocaine, a rather more potent material than coffee, has been clearly implicated in untoward individual reactions, although that is not to say that there yet exists any information on the rate of violent outcomes for cocaine use given data on dosage, type of person and type of setting. Widely used socially, medically, and in home remedies in the late 1800's, its association with violent outcomes appears to have been limited to the United States (unless simply our survey of documents has been more provincial than

we thought) and then in the case of delinquent or disturbed asocial persons. The amphetamines, a 20th century product without a history of social use, are not easily discussed historically. Their use as euphorants outside medical practice was observed in the 1930's in the United States, and for many years the Swedes have experienced their social use among workers and students. England and Japan and continental countries have also experienced the increasing involvement of delinquent and rootless youth in amphetamine use, a feature which increases the likelihood of socially disapproved conduct emerging in association with use of any drug.

The hallucinogens which include LSD, peyote, mescaline and the like (and in which class cannabis may be considered) alter sensations as well as moods and thoughts. Although religious, medical and social uses for these substances are well documented, any early relationship to violence is not. Some scholars contend that the Berserkers, fierce Scandinavian warriors, were experiencing altered consciousness as a consequence of eating hallucinogenic mushrooms; but Sir Walter Scott argued that the Berserkers were heavy drinkers. Among Siberian tribes hallucinogenic mushroom eating was observed by a number of 19th-century travelers who disagreed remarkably about what happened and why. One observer spoke of the degrading "toadstool habit" implying the tribesmen to be licentious thieves who amongst their additional graces took too much rum as well. Other observers confirmed either debasement or religious ecstasy, depending on one's sample and bias; most agreed that the tribesmen were heavy users of tobacco, alcohol and tea besides. In making this point the Koryak and Chuckchee observers did what some moderns fail to do, to note that behavior cannot be attributed to one drug of special interest when the fact is that the group in question is using a variety of different psychoactive drugs. As we shall see, the major pattern of illicit use in the United States today is of multiple drug use—among youngsters, for example, unlawful tobacco and alcohol use is likely to accompany marijuana smoking, and/or glue sniffing, barbiturate-amphetamine combination experimentation, and the like. Datura (jimson weed) is another hallucinogen with a history of varied use and outcomes. Among some South American Indians it was given to slaves and women prior to their being buried alive during the funerals of their masters, presumably to produce a fear-suppressing stupor. In India it is said to be used by the Thuggee to stupefy their victims prior to robbery; in South Africa it was used by criminals there in the same robbery-facilitating way. An overdose can kill, but since Indian Thugs may kill their victims anyway, the choice of a pharmaceutical weapon was a matter of convenience. Mandrake, another hallucinogen, was used by Hannibal in warfare; simulating retreat, he left his camp's wine jars spiked with mandragora. The enemy, celebrating the capture of the camp, drank deeply, went to sleep and were captured. Caesar is said to have used the same strategy in campaigns against Sicilian pirates.

As for the other major classes of psychoactives, sedatives and tranquilizers, theirs has no ancient history apart from the opiates, alcohol, cannabis or hallucinogens whose varied effects can produce sleepiness, relaxation, stupor or death. The medically employed sedatives and tranquilizers are recent developments whose link to violence will be considered later in this report.

HISTORY: SUMMARY COMMENT

The most striking impressions derived from any review of past—or current—use of mind-altering drugs are as follows: one is the wide extent to which these drugs have been employed everywhere; secondly, the frequency with which new drugs are considered dangerous or that frequency which strangers who observe the drug habits of others characterize novel drug effects with disapproval; thirdly, the speed with which new drugs are nevertheless adopted for religious, medical, social and—in heterogeneous or disorganized societies—individual use the relative safety with which most of these substances are employed, and, finally, the variety of intentions and expectations which can accompany their employment. The latter is not surprising for given man as a tool-using animal, and given chemicals as a tool for modifying behavior, then men will seek to modify themselves or others with drugs that can accomplish the purpose. Thus we find historically and in connection with violent acts that drugs have been used to kill, to stupefy victims prior to intended robbery, rape, assault, or execution, and to disable groups or armies so that they cannot function in battle. At the level of self-inflicted untoward effects one finds that drugs have unintentionally led to death or disability including the production of vulnerable states, i.e., stupor, intoxication, weakness and presumably, although not documented for early times, dependency—and the like which can then be exploited by predatory others. Drugs have also been used in intentional self-harming ways, whether suicide or debasement. All of these uses may be termed directly detrimental or destructive. Another style of drug use in connection with violence has been to enhance or sharpen aggressiveness, whether that be by stimulation or the suppression of fear. Here one finds the typical "bottled courage" employment of a variety of substances including alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines and, possibly, the hallucinogens used by warriors and soldiers prior to combat. Presumably but again not easily found in historical documents, one would expect similar fortification of the failing resolve—i.e., anxiety suppression—among individuals setting out on more lonely tasks, whether bold knights, highwaymen or the executioners themselves. A third set of events linking drugs to violence are less emphasized in those formal histories which attend to major events rather than individual reactions, yet whether in Egypt, Babylon, Greece, Rome, Gaul, Persia, China, or elsewhere, there was a hum of comment—especially in the literature of lives—on the individually adverse reactions which, focusing on the intoxicated state, primarily arising from alcohol but also from hallucinogens and stimulants, tell of rowdiness, fighting, mayhem, rape, and what-have-you. One finds that our forefathers and their neighbors were also liable to the release of aggression and sexuality as drugs dampened control mechanisms, whether by acting in the brain or on social circumstances. Frank drug-induced madness is also described, but insofar as we presume the madman harms others, his actions must also be deemed in the service of aggression. A fourth class of events which links drugs to violence involves largely symbolic sociological or indirect processes. Here one finds an association between particular groups of people and the use of a particular drug and the events are such that the people, during the course of their habitual living or in the expression of their self interest or ideologies, engage in conflicts which sensitize either the observers

the Arab progressives drinking coffee and plotting social change, the cult Ras Tafarians smoking ganja and calling for back-to-Africa movements, or the cult hangers-on calling for guerrilla warfare whilst engaging in individual robbery or small scale civil disturbance, or the early American or Canadian drifters and delinquents who in adopting heroin into their already anti- or asocial life style combined at least two kinds of crime—opiate use itself plus property-and-person offenses—and, drawing the interest of observers, began a debate which is as yet unresolved as to the possible causal effect of each type of crime on the other.

THE MODERN SCENE: TASK FORCE REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS

The organization of this section is dictated by the existence of a Crime Commission Task Force consultants' reviews of the relationship of particular drugs to dangerous behavior as of 1966-67. Excerpts from those Reports²—section summaries—presented here are followed by supplemental observations designed to make the summaries current, to expand upon or modify conclusions based on additional data, and to focus particularly on violence. As in those reports drug-related violence will include suicide and accidents.

Alcohol and Violent Crime:

Crime Commission Task Force Consultants' Summary

Arrests for alcohol use account for more than half of all reported offenses in the United States. Surveys of offenders reveal that the offender has more often been drinking prior to the commission of certain types of crimes than other types. For example, in big city homicides either or both victim and killer have been drinking in the majority of cases. Alcohol is also implicated in other crimes of violence, and in unskilled property crimes. Some offenders do report they were drinking before the crime; some offenders committed for crimes other than alcohol use are found to have alcohol problems. Studies of delinquent youths suggest a strong likelihood of heavy and illicit drinking as part of their pattern of asocial or antisocial conduct.

Future work will probably confirm the existence of various groups whose alcohol use patterns over time are linked to crime in different ways. In some of these groups—e.g., delinquent youths—alcoholic excesses will be part of, but not central to, general maladapted and antisocial behavior. In others one expects alcohol use to facilitate misbehavior and, in some cases—e.g., homicide—to be a critical unleashing element which is necessary for criminal outcome. In yet other groups alcohol use will be a chronic later life problem after other

² Referenees cited in material quoted from the *Task Force Reports* do not appear in the Bibliography but are to be found in the *Task Force Reports*.

kinds of criminality have terminated; for still other groups alcohol addiction will accompany or precede a kind of misfit adjustment which will include petty criminality or, in some, will be limited to skid row life and only to crimes of alcohol per se. Rare to the point of uniqueness will be the case of the nondrinker turned criminal by a single exposure to alcohol or the case of the normal moderate or heavy (nonproblem) drinker who, with no history of personal or social troubles, commits a criminal act when drinking.

Supplemental Observations

The "future studies" envisioned in 1967 have yet to reaffirm all of the conclusions drawn from the work available in 1967. Those studies which are new do affirm what had been found before and, happily, extend it. Abroad a Mexican appraisal (De la Vega Llamasa, 1966) indicates that alcohol, compared to marihuana and other narcotics, is most often implicated in male criminality. A study in France (Muller, 1966) shows alcohol involvement in 50 percent of the acts of homicide, 78 percent of assaults, and 87 percent of robberies as derived by a random sample of arrested offenders. A German review (Ullrich, 1967) reports a rising rate of juvenile offenses in which the offender had been drinking and in Argentina (Herrera, 1966) alcohol and in particular alcoholism have been identified as major contributing factors in several crimes of violence, those of vengeance and passion, as in response to adultery, and those involving insult to self-esteem, that is a challenge to manliness arising out of social drinking among male companions. (See Blum and Blum in *Society and Drugs*, 1969, for a similar observation in rural Greece.)

In the United States with reference to juveniles a number of studies have appeared. In our own work with college students (Blum and Assoc., 1969b), relying on self-reports of ill effects as gathered through interview or recorded in daily drug diaries, 63 percent of all drinking students (which is most students) have experienced some ill effects; 2 percent say they have engaged in (unspecified) criminal (nondriving) offenses as part of a drinking occasion. A much larger proportion, 19 percent, report occasions on which they have lost self-control, 8 percent do specify that they got in fist fights because they were drinking; and 6 percent report unfortunate sexual incidents arising out of drinking occasions. Heavy drinkers report more such unhappy outcomes to drinking than do moderate drinkers. In a college study of Negro students (Maddox and Williams, 1968) it was found that unlike less well educated drinking Negro males, the drinking college student was unlikely to get in trouble with the police. Another investigation (Williams, 1967) compared collegiate problem drinkers with other students and found that the problem drinkers were more aggressive as well as (our inference) less controlled and sociable. These are characteristics suggesting a proclivity to violence among problem drinkers as opposed to students who use alcohol without difficulty. Another study of youth, this time of wards committed to the California Youth Authority (Molof, 1967) compared assaultive versus non-assaultive offenders and found that drinking delinquents had committed significantly more crimes of assault than the nondrinking delinquents.

These studies on youthful samples are particularly important—and elevate concern with alcohol use correlatively—because assault (the personal attack) is not only the most frequent among the crimes of violence in the United States but the majority of those convicted are between 18 and 24 (Ohmart, 1967). There is a further trend for offense rates to be rising in this youthful population. Ohmart argues that the problem of youthful crime is therefore central to violence prevention in general. On the basis of the relationship shown between both higher rates of drinking for assaulting youths and for the likely disproportionate contribution to aggressive crime of those particular youths with incipient or developed alcohol problems, it appears evident that any endeavor wishing to control violence and in particular assault must focus on the significance and evolution of drinking and of problem drinking among predelinquents and must, further, concern itself with the control of that drinking which is situationally a contributor to violent offenses.

Among adult studies, that of Roebuck and Johnson (1962) compares drinking-and-assaultive Negro convicts with other Negro offenders to find that the drinker-assaulter group had many significant differences in background and childhood from others. Our inference is that the findings suggest a more inadequate or neurotic family interaction among the alcohol involved offenders compared to a pattern of outright criminal or disintegrated family backgrounds among the general sample. Perhaps the most important study in recent years of families and life histories in association with both alcoholism and crime is that of Robins (1966) who followed up thirty years later children seen in child guidance clinics comparing them to controls. Neurotic children were found to grow up and lead normal lives but those children early diagnosed as antisocial produced a remarkable life history of arrests, alcoholism, welfare dependency, divorce, psychiatric hospitalization, child neglect and poor job histories. Robins found that 94 percent of the children who, by adulthood, were diagnosed as sociopathic personalities were arrested as adult offenders compared to 34 percent of the psychiatrically treated children judged without disease as adults and 17 percent of the controls. Sixty-three percent of the former had been last arrested for a major crime, that is a Part I offense, some of which involved violence. Consider for example that among those 14 patients unavailable for followup because of death, two had been shot by the police, one had been found murdered in an alley, two were suicides and one had died from acute alcoholism. More had died from accidents than had controls. The significance of the Robins' findings for alcohol use is twofold; one is that whereas most (68 percent) of the child patients still psychiatrically disordered as adults and diagnosed as sociopaths (or alcoholics) had serious alcohol problems, only 7 percent of the controls had such problems. Other drugs played a less important role in their lives, although again drug problems were confined to the psychiatrically diagnosed sociopathic group among whom 10 percent had been addicted to opiates, barbiturates, or bromides and another 5 percent had used without addiction. No controls had experimented with self-administration of these substances. One sees that both crime and alcohol problems are part of a larger conglomeration of troubles; these troubles are concentrated among people called sociopaths and these sociopaths are drawn heavily from among children who were early identified for their antisocial conduct. Specifically among the antisocial male children 16 percent had been arrested by the time of followup

for burglary, 14 percent for robbery, 2 percent for rape, and 1 percent for murder. One must assume that the rate of commission of unreported violent felonies for this group of consistent offenders was much higher. No male controls were arrested for any of these crimes. The other link to alcohol in the antisocial child grown to sociopathic adult is in his background. What factors in the family at the time of the person's original (childhood) referral predicted his becoming a sociopath with all that diagnosis' implications for alcoholism and violence? "More than half of the severely antisocial children who had a drunken father were diagnosed sociopathic personality as adults. This combination of multiple antisocial symptoms plus an alcoholic father yields the highest rate of sociopathy which we have yet encountered" (Robins, p. 161). Consider further that when both mother and father were sociopathic or alcoholic, the chances for the child to be a sociopath (with attendant violence risks) were greatest. On the other hand, when either parent was free of psychiatric illness, the child was likely to emerge as a normal non-criminal person. In Robins' careful study we see how alcoholism is indeed closely linked to crime and violence risks, for not only do the two go hand in hand within an individual but the individual's own life development is highly predictable on the basis of whether *his* parents suffered a similar alcoholic-sociopathic life style. In the 19th century this would have been called a hereditary taint; although a genetic component is unlikely, it is a tragedy of self-perpetuating cross-generational human failure.

It is not to be assumed that the phenomena of family failure associated with violent crime and drug problems in parents and offspring is specific only for alcohol; to the contrary a similar pattern has been suggested for certain populations who, as adults, are found to use heroin (See Chein, Gerard, Lee, and Rosenfeld, 1964.) As the Robins' work indicates, it would appear that the children growing up in certain familial and neighborhood environments are predisposed to crime and that among these a segment of unknown proportion constitutes a potential pool for the damaging use of psychoactive drugs. Even if the accidents of exposure and personal predilection lead individuals to the abuse of different drugs, there can still be remarkable similarities in their personal ties and their appraisal of the role of the drug in their lives. Hill, Haertzen, and Davis (1962), for example, show that on the MMPI, one of the best of the psychological tests, there are far more similarities than differences when institutionalized alcoholics, heroin addicts and person or property offenders are compared. All of these groups had in common a high psychopathic component; that is, disinterest in the rights or feelings of others and a willingness actively to pursue their selfish wishes at the expense of others. Given such a basic personality trait, it is not surprising to find that some of these men commit crimes of violence. The population here studied was of course an institutionalized one which means that these men could not be assumed to be like uncommitted or unconvicted drug users, for the routes to confinement are dependent upon a number of other features. It is also the case that just as continued drug use within a deviant group can lead to changes in views and conduct which may be reflected on subsequent psychological testing (the masking effect in the assessment of drug dependent persons), so too the experience of being confined may account for some of the psychopathic components measured by Hill et al., for it is often the case that incarceration increases rather than decreases

criminal predilections. In the case of predilections to violence that seems to be so, for Walker, Hammond, and Stear (1967) in a study of over 8,000 Scottish cases found that the probability of future convictions for violence increases sharply with each successive conviction for violence.

There are a few other recent studies which should be noted as one considers alcohol in relationship to violent crime. Voss and Hepburn (1969) in a Chicago study have confirmed the Wolfgang (1958) homicide findings showing the prevalence of the presence of alcohol in homicide perpetrators and victims. It was more often present in cases involving female victims, a point interpreted by the investigators as in keeping with the high Chicago proportion of homicide victims as robbery victims (34 percent of all male homicide victims were killed while being robbed) to the effect that alcohol is a component of interactions among acquaintances. In an important study of rape, Amir (in Clinard and Quinney, 1967) has found that alcohol was present in one-third of the rapes; in most of these instances both victim and offender had been drinking. Alcohol was more often associated with rapes committed by whites on whites compared to Negro-Negro crimes. If rapes are classified according to the degree of violence, it is found that alcohol is associated with the more violent rapes and also with "sexual humiliation" (presumably a gentle way of saying forced fellatio). Violent drinking rapes more often involved Negro offenders or victims. With regard to another type of crime, one symbolically if not actually violent, pyromania, clinical observations by Robbins and Robbins (1967) suggest that arsonists are likely psychotic or mentally defective and that alcoholism is likely to be a component.

Alcohol and Traffic Accidents: Crime Commission Task Force Consultants' Summary

Drivers who drink are more likely to be involved in traffic accidents than those who don't drink. Drinking drivers account for a high percentage of all accidents, including fatal accidents. Control studies (an inadequate number thereof) show that these same drivers when not drinking do not cause accidents. The role of alcohol as a cause of accidents is strongly implicated. It is further found that a considerable proportion of drinking drivers are simply not normal drinkers "with a heat on," but problem drinkers as such. The problem drinkers are strongly implicated in serious and fatal accidents. Reviews of the histories of drinking drivers killing people show that many or nearly all of them have had previous arrests for drunken driving. These problem drinkers—and problem killers—are poor people who are assumed to be (evidence is lacking) less likely to carry insurance and less likely to be insured, thereby compounding the disasters they create.

Work on blood alcohol and performance shows that drinking even small amounts can interfere with driving. As blood alcohol levels rise, performance decrement is greater. This greater likelihood of driver error corresponds to increasing severity and frequency of accidents as blood levels increase. There is probably no other area in the field of drug research and related dangerous behavior where the role of a drug as a precipitating factor in dangerous behavior is so clear. Given the 49,000

deaths and 1,800,000 injuries during 1965 in motor vehicle accidents (National Safety Council figures) this is also one of the prime areas where remedial action is dictated.

Supplemental Observations

The major addition to the summary is to give the number of traffic fatalities and accidents and injuries in 1968 compared to 1965. Instead of 49,000 fatalities there were 55,500 fatalities; instead of 1,800,000 injuries, there were 2 million. Since the alcohol and driving research had by 1966 clearly demonstrated the need for controlling the heavily drinking driver and, in particular, the alcoholic driver, what is remarkable is the lack of state (with the exception of Pennsylvania) or Federal legislation in this direction. Great Britain took a wiser course in passing the Road Safety Act in 1967 to control the drinking driver (penalties can include loss of license, a fine or imprisonment if roadside tests show high alcohol levels). Newspaper accounts³ reported a 40% reduction in traffic accidents in the early months of the new law's operation. As far as research is concerned, that which emerged since 1966 has reaffirmed earlier work. Little, in a 1968 review, confirms that alcohol reduces driving skills, that accident risks increase with alcohol blood levels, that drinking drivers contribute disproportionately to highway accidents and that alcoholic drivers are overrepresented in accidents which involve alcohol. In our own study of students and drug use outcomes (1969b) we find that 5 percent of the students claim driving accidents as a consequence of their drinking; 3 percent report arrests and the same 3 percent report being booked and jailed for drunken driving. In a detailed and important Federal study (1968 Alcohol and Public Safety Report) the Department of Transportation reported to the House Committee on Public Works that alcohol accounted for a large part of the traffic accident, injury, and fatality problem. The report also finds that teenagers and young adults are likely to be involved in accidents when drinking—a finding likewise reported by the General Assembly of Connecticut (1967). Moderately drinking adults (we presume ones who are experienced drivers with good records) do not contribute disproportionately to the rates. The report recommends that constitutionally acceptable methods for screening highway users suspected of drinking be developed and calls attention to the British safe-driving legislation. It notes that recent findings show that an appreciable percentage of those whose licenses have been suspended or revoked for alcohol-related offenses continue to drive, thus warning that even if licenses for alcoholics per se or for any heavily drinking driver were revoked, some portion of these drunk-but-lethal unguided highway missiles would continue to decimate their driving fellow citizens. In a psychological-psychiatric investigation Selzer and Weiss (1966) and Selzer, Rogers, and Kern (1968) examined fatal driver histories and found such drivers to be highly identifiable compared to controls. Such features as rage, depression, paranoid ideas, suicidal proclivities, past incidents of violent behavior and more intense violence, more prior accident histories, acute upsets in the period just prior to the accident and alcoholism were all associated with the increased probability

³ We have not been able to obtain better statistics

of causing a fatal accident. In this study, as with others, one sees how psychopathology, alcoholism, and violent acts—whether criminal, social, or highway—are often interrelated. The authors for their part recommend stricter driving controls.

**Alcohol Use and Suicide: Crime Commission Task Force
Consultants' Summary**

Alcoholics attempt and also complete suicide at a rate much higher than the nonalcoholic population. Drinking by nonalcoholics also appears to precede much suicidal behavior. Although alcoholism itself may not cause suicide—since the history and life circumstances of the drinker undoubtedly are necessary elements for a suicidal outcome—the presence of alcoholism is a strong warning of suicidal risk. Before suicide is accomplished, many alcoholics will themselves give warning of their intention, either through threats or attempts. There is a possibility that suicide will best be accomplished only when the drinker is not seriously intoxicated (blood level below 0.20) unless his choice of “weapons” is acute alcohol poisoning itself.

At the present time data on poisoning is insufficient to allow national estimates of the frequency with which alcohol is used as an intentional poison. One can call attention to the value of gathering national statistical data on poisoning by type of person, setting, poison, and outcome. One can also point to the need for considerably more information on the suicidal efforts among “normal” persons and the role that drugs, including alcohol, play therein.

Supplemental Observations

With the establishment in the National Institutes of Mental Health of a Center for Studies of Suicide Prevention, there has been an impetus toward suicide research and prevention. In the United States and simultaneously in England and continental nations an increasing number of investigations have appeared. For example, an English study (Whitlock and Schapira, 1967) shows a temporal association between drinking and suicide attempts. In a 2-year period it was observed that 32 percent of all patients admitted to hospital for attempted suicide had taken alcohol before the attempt. Nearly all of these patients sought likewise to kill themselves via drugs. It is consistent that suicidal persons employ drugs both to alter their consciousness and to destroy it. Another English study of untreated alcoholics (Kendell and Staton, 1964) employed a followup procedure several years after their initial referral and rejection for treatment. The suicide rate in the group was found to be 58 times higher than that expected. Seiden (1967) has done a study of San Francisco, the suicide capital of the United States, and finds that the city is also the alcoholism capital as well. Seiden links the two as interdependent and proposes that “alcohol consumption probably facilitates suicidal attempts by overcoming inhibitions, reducing judgment and depressing the organism physiologically” and that secondly, “it may be employed as a suicidal means, particularly in various synergistic combinations such as alcohol and barbiturates.” From all of these studies, the illustrative

ones cited here and the many not cited, one draws the conclusion that the presence of alcohol problems is a warning signal of tremendous import to those interested in the prevention of violence, whether that violence be assaultive, in traffic, or self-destructive.

Opiates and Violence: Crime Commission Task Force Consultants' Summary

At the present time most known opiate addicts have been delinquent prior to their being identified as users and most continue to be arrested after release from hospitals and prisons. Changes in the association between delinquency and opiate use occur over time and differ among cultural subgroups. At present there is a tendency for individuals after release to experience an increase in arrests over preaddiction experience, these arrests primarily being for narcotics offenses and secondarily in connection with crimes against property. There is no evidence that opiates are a cause of crime in the sense they inevitably lead to criminality, but there is no doubt that among addicts with a delinquent life-style drug use is part and parcel of their other activities, crime included.

There appears to be no solid ground for extreme anxiety or outrage over the current dangers posed to the community by opiate use; claims for the inevitability of either dependency or dramatic increases in individual criminality in consequence of opiate use are much exaggerated. On the other hand there is no evidence that opiates are “good for you” except in the short-term reduction of anxiety in medically controlled settings. Consequently even though opiate use by anxious delinquents, or others seeking escape from one or another form of distress, can be considered self-medicating in the sense that their felt distress is temporarily reduced, their choice of “medications” creates further difficulties for them which are likely to be of a physiological as well as a social and legal nature. Insofar as their opiate use leads to effects which incapacitate them socially, or perpetuates membership in asocial or antisocial groups, that use also poses serious problems for the community at large. There can be no question that identified addicts are a group deserving of public attention. Their opiate use is a signal their own distress and a warning of the existence of what can be a long-lasting asocial or antisocial trend.

Supplemental Observations

The work alluded to in the foregoing summary included Finestone's 1957 study showing an increase in property crimes but a decrease in crimes of violence after addiction onset and O'Donnell's (1966) Kentucky study which shows no change in the rate of violent crimes before and after identified addiction (remaining at a 5 percent to 6 percent prevalence rate) for these Lexington USPHS Hospital cases. O'Donnell's work (1967) also indicates interestingly, that some of the post-addiction crime of the Lexington addicts occurs during opiate abstinence periods but while they are drinking alcohol! The earlier caveat, that multiple drug use is the rule rather than the exception among humans, must be kept in mind. The weight of other studies available

by 1966-67 supported the thesis that individuals do not become increasingly violent after addiction even though they can remain criminal. There was also evidence from the period prior to 1966 that opiates suppressed aggression and sexuality in some cases so that it was argued that by becoming an addict an already delinquent person reduced his risk of engaging in violent crime. Other writers not cited in the Task Force Report, for example Radin (1966), maintain a similar aggression-reduction thesis. Some social scientists contend that any observable rise in criminality, including violence attendant upon it, is attributable to the criminalizing impact of a law which makes offenders out of persons who would otherwise simply be ill, defining addiction, of course, as a disease. Schur (1965) has been a staunch proponent of the patient rather than criminal view of the addict, and Gillespie, Glatt, Hills, and Pittman examining England in 1967 report that Britain, which long enjoyed freedom from addiction worries under the addict-is-a patient system, yet is free of strong pressures which lead the addict to resort to crime, nevertheless find in England, abuse, an illicit market, and delinquent conduct among the rapidly increasing number of youthful heroin users in England. Indeed if there has been any recent major development which must be underscored, it is the continuing skyrocketing of English heroin use from a low of a few hundred in the 1950s to an estimated several thousand now and with a prediction of many thousands more within the next few years (Belly, 1966; Jeffery, 1969). We have not seen reports linking these new cases to any increase in crimes of violence.

At the same time that the English are experiencing a rise in heroin use it appears that the United States is undergoing a similar trend and, as in England, among middle class or upper class rather than lower class youth. Our own high school and college data show opiate (primarily smoking opium) use in the metropolitan middle (as well as lower and upper) class and further suggest a recent and rapid increase in that use—including heroin—a development so far unrelated to any reports of violence or full-blown addiction among the student drug explorers, although a goodly minority are concerned about developing dependency. These outcome data coupled with the impressions of those well acquainted with "junkie" populations (see Mills, 1966) and with results of research (Winick, 1967; Chambers, Moffett, and Jones, 1968; O'Donnell, 1967; Abrams, Gagnon, and Levin, 1968; Bates, 1968) continue to support the evidence that from opiate use there arises no compulsion to violence and that should violence occur in association with addiction, it must be linked to personality, social and economic as well as pharmacological factors. Nevertheless some journalists, law enforcement personnel, physicians and others, shocked by illicit drug use in general and the known cases of middle-class heroin use in particular, have been alarmed not only on behalf of the user's health and reputation, but have feared that a life of crime and violence might inevitably also ensue. That concern appears to have been augmented by the attention rightly given in homes, the press and public forums, to the rise in violent crime and to the identification, in some metropolitan areas, of narcotics addicts as apparently disproportional—and recent—contributors to robberies in particular. It may not always be recognized that these offenders are drawn from the larger pool of young urban males, primarily minority group members, who comprise not only the most visible and active crime-on-the-street type offenders, but

contribute a disproportionate share of heroin addicts as well. This point has often been made and appears strongly in the various reports of the President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Robins and Murphy (1967) show, for example, that about 51 percent of the Negro males living in St. Louis had used drugs illicitly, 13 percent having employed heroin. Given the widespread social and personal distress of the poor urban Negro and his highly visible involvement in crime, it is easy to understand how causal relations can be deduced between heroin and crime even if these were to be scientifically unsupported.

What is required, as one seeks better understanding of the events which link behavior under the influence of the opiates to the range of biological and social factors, is the realization of multiple influences on behavior, of shifts over time and interaction effects among variables, and of unavoidable uncertainty given the limitations of investigatory methods. One must also realize, as Ball, O'Donnell, and Cottrell (1966) have shown, that among addicts there exist discrete groups each with its probable set of life styles, some criminal and some not, and that even within these groups there is diversity. Some of these differences may one day prove to be genetically based (Kalow, 1967).

With regard to recent research there are several sets of findings which are of particular importance in considering the relationship of opiate use to violence. One is a study by Ball and Snarr (1969) which followed up on Puerto Rican addicts released from Lexington USPHS Hospital. Half of all addicts originating in and admitted to Lexington from 1935 to 1962 were located. About one third of those interviewed had not been continually addicted post-release and so gave an opportunity for comparison, in crime and work adjustment, to those who continued to use opiates. Those who were abstinent were rarely arrested, those who were addicted were arrested often, the arrest rate for the latter group being five times greater than the former. Among continuing addicts criminal behavior increased the longer they lived, i.e., the longer post-release; conversely the abstinent group showed marked decreases in arrest rate. This by the way, along with the work of Robins, shows that the applicability of the "maturing out" theses of the Gluecks (1960) applies to less than a majority of drug-involved offenders. As Ball and Snarr write, "the life course of opiate addiction . . . is toward greater social disability as the years go by." The authors do not separate, in their analysis, crimes of violence from property crimes without force. However, Ball (personal communication, 1969) states that most of the offenses were theft without force or violence but that robbery and homicides were committed by the continuing addict sample so that "heroin use is a contributory factor with respect to crimes of violence for a minority of opiate users." What would be very interesting to learn from the standpoint of predicting which released addicts will be at risk of continued criminality, which at risk of violence, and which likely to be abstinent, would be the differences in preaddiction personality and background and in post-release environment which distinguish between the abstinent, the criminal but nonviolent, and the violent criminal addict. It would also be very useful to rely on self-reports of criminality—the dark number—rather than to rest only on the official data which markedly underreports the actual offense rates of any population.

A second body of data has been made available to us courtesy of

California Youth Authority (Roberts personal communications, 1969). In an important continuing study Roberts and his colleagues have examined type of violence in relationship to kind of drug use among the wards (sentenced delinquents) of the Youth Authority. Out of a total of 5,470, only 6 youths used only narcotics although 107 used opiates and other illicit drugs. Comparing all delinquents involved with (use, sale, etc.) opiates (with or without other illicit drugs) to other drug-involved wards and to those not using drugs illicitly (excluding technically illegal but socially sanctioned use of alcohol and tobacco) one finds that 22 percent of the opiate involved⁴ wards showed (on rap sheets) or admitted in interviews to minor violence (presumably fights and the like) and about 7 percent to major violence (presumably armed robbery, rape, etc.). Delinquents involved with other illicit drugs but not with opiates have a life history prevalence percent of 24 percent for minor violence and 5 percent for major violence whereas the nondrug involved youths showed for minor violence 18 percent and for major violence 8.4 percent. The differences among the groups are slight enough to ignore; they certainly show no dramatically greater or less risk of violence among opiate involved youths compared to other delinquents. Re-analysis of the same data by Roberts and his colleagues, which more finely discriminates among non-involved, involved nonusers, experimental, occasional and regular-habitual users by kind of drug use and type of offense, shows that actual users of opiates participate slightly more often in robberies than do non-users of opiates who may use other drugs. (Recall that among Youth Authority Wards alcohol was shown to be a significant predictor of violence with the regular-habitual users twice as often involved in robberies as nonusers [15 percent vs. 8 percent].) They contribute no more to assault or rape than do others and appear to contribute to a less than expected degree to homicide.

A comparison of offenses of opiate versus marijuana users in relationship to crimes against person and property has been made available to us by the FBI based on data in the *Careers in Crime* file. These are records of criminals, as of 1966, who had come in contact with a Federal investigative process, an *N* of 7,920. Heroin users averaged a longer criminal career (from first to last recorded arrest) than did marijuana users, they had somewhat more nondrug criminal offenses recorded, and although the proportion of violent crimes to other nondrug offenses was about the same in both groups (26 percent of all heroin-user crimes, 28 percent of all marijuana-user crimes) the absolute number of violent crimes attributable to heroin users was greater because of their overall recorded incidence of offenses. Comparing these groups against all offenders in the file, *N* > 150,000, whose average was 23 percent violent crimes and an average of five arrests per person, it is evident that for those offenders identified in Federal records, those further identified as heroin users contribute more offenses than do marijuana or nondrug offenders and, further, the heroin users contribute overall to a higher absolute number of violent crimes.

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has also been kind enough to make available data from their files. Inquiry there focused on the

⁴ The Youth Authority "involvement" classification includes 1 percent who had not actually taken opiates and one-third who did not take them regularly.

special problem of violence arising from apprehension and arrest. Using a systematic sampling of all 1968 opiate and marijuana cases (228/1,997), it was found that there was little difference in the frequency with which opiate violators as contrasted with marijuana violators were found to be carrying guns on their person (or within reach) at the time of arrest. About 10 percent of all such arrests found the violator to be armed (9.7 percent opiate-user violators, 10.6 percent marijuana violators). This compares to 2.8 percent of those arrested for dangerous drug violation (from 1966 to 1968) who were armed. All of the armed violators were male. Resisting arrest occurred more often among heroin than marijuana violators, at a rate five times greater; however, only 2.6 percent of the sample overall resisted arrest. Proportionately more Negroes were armed than were Caucasians, 7.6 percent to 4.7 percent. More armed violators had prior criminal records than did the unarmed ones, 85 percent to 64 percent; the armed violators were slightly younger than the total sample average (27 compared to 29 years old), and the rate of resisting arrest was higher for armed violators (about 8 percent) than for unarmed violators (2.2 percent). From this latter it is happily clear that most armed offenders nevertheless do not resist arrest although it would appear that the risk both of resisting arrest and, by inference from the presence of a weapon, of serious hurt occurring in the process, is greater for the armed drug offender group.

We now turn to a problem which, like the apprehension of the drug offender by an officer, is situational. The question has to do with the changes in the level of risk of violence which are a function not of opiate use per se nor of any associated criminal life styles or psychopathic personality traits, but rather of immediate specific drug effects and in particular those associated with withdrawal or the abstinence syndrome. The latter is what occurs when a person is deprived of a substance upon which he is physically dependent, as can occur with opiates, barbiturates and alcohol.

Observations by robbery victims, police officers and others have raised the question of whether the person undergoing withdrawal and simultaneously engaging in criminality is more likely to hurt someone because of irascibility, nervousness, lack of impulse control or the like which is an immediate and specific feature of the withdrawal itself. It is the question of the "nervous junkie with an itchy trigger finger." Regrettably we have found no direct observations bearing on this point, although some related observations are at hand. Some clinicians (Kramer, personal communication, 1969) call attention to the psychological components even in this situation, as for example a sense of desperation should anxiety about withdrawal be great or anger if the addict believes someone is "holding out" on him by not supplying available heroin. Tinklenberg (personal communication, 1969), in clinical contact with addicts, agrees that some may suffer from a shaking and shooting reaction which implies being armed and shooting but not intentionally but rather as part of withdrawal muscular agitation. On the other hand some data suggest that "shaking" might also occur during the chronic use of opiates. Haertzen and Hooks (1969) in an important study do compare the chronic heroin state to the withdrawal one by giving various tests and self-rating devices to Lexington addicts in both phases. During chronic opiate use (morphine was the drug employed) addicts are relatively unmotivated for physical, mental, social or sexual activity, that demands on them for activity produce

irritability which is likely to be expressed, and resentment is easily aroused. Compared to either no-drug or acute (one time) administration, the morphine addict has more jerking muscles. In either chronic or acute phases addicts are likely to feel disgust for people they are close to (family members). However, no changes in personality psychopathy are ascertainable compared to the no-drug phase. Haertzen and Hooks report that the subjective effects found upon withdrawal after chronic use include psychological changes in the direction of depression, hypochondriasis, hysteria and compulsiveness and that physically the addict becomes weak, tired, unmotivated, tense, unhappy, restless, impatient, irritable and inefficient. These changes are unpleasant and diffuse enough to show that no inevitable and compelling paranoid or aggressive reactions occur; on the other hand the distress, tension and hyperirritability are such that one can imagine situations arising in which, once an act such as armed robbery has been undertaken, the on-going physiological state could contribute to pulling a trigger that would not have been pulled had the same fellow been abstinent or, at somewhat more risk of violence, under heavy chronic dosage. Haertzen and Meketon (1968), in another contribution to our understanding of the effects of withdrawal, have found a similarity both in the acute effects and in withdrawal reactions of alcoholics compared to heroin addicts. They call attention to the substrate of hostility and low frustration tolerance found to be exhibited by institutionalized addicts and alcoholics which is independent of immediate drug effects. The investigators warn that high levels of these feelings observed during drug use or upon withdrawal may simply be the addict as his "natural self."

Given our present uncertainty about the magnitude of any increase in risk of violence attendant upon withdrawal in persons already prepared to engage in armed robbery, one can turn to animal studies for instances of what is possible when drugs and live things mix. Dogs when given morphine ordinarily become sleepy, so do most people. Rats when given morphine usually become excited, so do a few people. These differences in response are basic (see Beecher, 1959) and could involve genetic as well as psychological components (Kalow in Walstenholm and Porter, 1967), although it is well to note that morphine seems to have two contrasting effects, one depressing and one excitatory which can be obtained within, as well as shown between, species or individuals (Goodman and Gilman, 1965). Boshka, Weisman and Thor (1966) observing morphine withdrawal in grouped animals found that withdrawal distress led to spontaneous aggression or fighting behavior. How it occurs pharmacologically that withdrawal releases the excitatory component of morphine effect is uncertain; what is of interest here is that there is evidence in man for increased irritability during opiate withdrawal and that in animals during withdrawal spontaneous fighting takes place. It is possible that some humans undergoing withdrawal show parallels with other animals, parallels that bear on an increased risk of aggressiveness during drug-use cycles. This possible link to violence deserves further study.

There is another relationship between the opiates and violence which is direct and unequivocal. It is derived from the fact that large doses of opiates produce death. Sometimes the user inadvertently kills himself when he is unaware of the strength of the heroin he is using and injects too much. Insofar as illicit peddlers do not conform to any truth-in-packaging conventions, the heroin addict faces the risk of accidental death. One may

speculate that some of these deaths may have a suicidal component. We have not come across work on suicide via overdose among addicts, but would propose that given their painful and self-destructive life style, depression and suicide must occur with greater frequency than would be expected in a normal population. Not all deaths from overdose are accidental or suicidal. Some are homicides. To kill an addict with an overdose is a convenient device, one likely to escape detection should a coroner's office be careless in examining the needle for fingerprints or in considering the injection posture of the victim. Brownlee (1964), an Eastern heroin peddler, describes another means for murder; his assignment was to kill an informer by giving him a heroin capsule filled with strychnine. As was set forth in the history section, the substitution of a lethal for a non-lethal drug is an old practice among men intent on murder.

The emphasis so far in this section has been on the role of opiates or an addictive life style in the emergence of violence. It is time now to consider the use of at least some opiate drugs as means for the treatment of the addict and, as a corollary, the reduction in his criminality including violent crime. One form of drug-maintenance treatment is simply to provide limited doses of heroin, morphine or a related substance to addicts so that they need not become criminal to maintain a supply. This approach, begun with the narcotics clinics in the United States after the Harrison Act and continuing until this day in England, has been successful with some patients, presumably those interested in leading a near-ordinary life. English experience appears to have been satisfactory as long as the supplied population were well-motivated, nondelinquent and not immersed in the drug life. With the advent of a new population of drug-oriented youth, the English experience has been less satisfactory, the full history of which we cannot devote ourselves to here except to note that increased control over distribution—through clinics rather than optionally in private practice—has been inaugurated, along with an expanded inpatient and outpatient treatment effort. This latter endeavor has not been without its tribulations, including the problem of violent and abusive behavior by the addict in the treatment setting. Thus in an exchange in the *London Times* in 1968, Adams (1968) complained that violent patients (violent personalities, not violent because of drugs) posed a treatment burden and wondered if police stations might not be a more suitable supply center to which addicts might go for their drugs. Bewley and Willis (*Times* letters, 1968) argued in reply that the medical duty was to care for heroin patients in spite of their violence on the ward. Similar problems have been encountered among heroin addicts in the U.S.; Sapira (1968) notes self-destructive as well as angry behavior and contends that sophisticated psychological handling by the physician can manage these problems. That uncooperativeness among opiate addicts is not limited to those from lower class origins has been shown by Modlin and Montes (1964) in observations of morphine addicted physicians.

Dole and Nyswander (1966) in a number of papers have reported on the efficacy of methadone, an opiate, used to block narcotic-euphoriant effects of heroin. They report that 2-year followups demonstrate that properly administered this blocking agent can practically eliminate heroin use and drug-related street crimes (robbery, burglary, peddling, possession, etc.) in their volunteer patients. In a recent report on an ongoing study (Dole,

Robinson, Orraca, Towns, Searcy, and Caine, 1969) Dole and his colleagues present data to show that addicts recruited from New York jails prior to release show a similar success. Among 12 treated addicts (randomly assigned) none were readdicted one year later and none had been convicted of crimes against person or property, although one had been arrested for carrying a weapon. Among the 16 controls, 15 were readdicted after 12 months and 15 had been charged with offenses including 11 burglaries, one assault and one murder. Dole states that methadone treatment "can achieve significant reduction in crime." These are important and dramatic findings, but they are offset by contradictory ones, for example, Sapira, Ball and Cottrell (1968) working with Lexington addicts found some who used methadone without medical supervision; these were in a drug-involved sample with unstable work histories. Methadone addiction itself is inferred to be uncomfortable but the drug itself does not necessarily lead to abstinence. These authors find "no evidence to support the belief that methadone abuse per se facilitates subsequent rehabilitative efforts." As Cole (1968) in his excellent review for the Task Force on Narcotics and Drug Abuse comments, inconsistencies in results of methadone may be attributable to psychological and social factors in the treatment setting and in the relationship between the doctor and the patient. That is a principle which seems to apply to most psychotherapeutic endeavors and certainly to those centered around the use of a drug in treatment or in the treatment of drug-using patients. The same expectations of varying results depending on the patient, the setting, and the relationships involved can be applied to experimentation with Cyclazocine, a long-acting opiate antagonist used in the treatment of addicts. At present the success of treatment with addicts is still linked to their personal and social characteristics (O'Donnell, 1968) and as with many other forms of drug abuse and delinquency (as with mental disorders), success is the greater the more healthy the person and his background were to begin with, thus intervention with addicts to reduce violence appears most likely to succeed in those cases where drug involvement, delinquent life styles, and emotional disorder were minimal before addiction. That is not a heartening statement, for most criminal addicts cannot be described as coming from healthy settings or being well-adjusted persons. To this pessimism may be added evidence from the flexible policy experiment of Israel (Wislicki, 1963) which has tried several systems for addicts; maintenance doses, a program failing when criminal addicts exploited it and sold drugs to nonregistered persons at black market prices (as now happens in England); clinic maintenance, rejected because it was felt to create shame in addicts by forced attendance, and finally institutional care with rehabilitation efforts, an endeavor described as failing, for after 5 years readdiction occurred in 97% of the addicts.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to expand on treatment problems or to examine the issues related to treatment success and failure. Suffice it to say that the rehabilitation of any person heavily involved with dependency producing drugs—whether alcohol, hallucinogens, opiates or others—is exceedingly difficult, especially if the definition of success is complete abstinence and complete freedom from criminality. Whether one considers drug dependency in any form as an illness or as one aspect of a maladapted, delinquent or simply disapproved life style, the patterns of use are chronic and the associations with criminality and violence—including accidents and

suicide—are greater than for nondrug dependent persons. Some number of competent and dedicated persons in medicine, the social sciences, corrections, the courts, social agencies and other fields are dedicating themselves to the treatment of drug-dependent persons, but given the present state of the art, no miracle cures are around the corner. The preferred mode is prevention, yet realistically prevention implies a dramatic restructuring not only of cities—to reduce urban poverty and disadvantaged lives—but of families, so as to eliminate the cross-generation sociopathy described by Robins (1966)—of personalities—the general delinquent-maladaptive-addictive syndrome, and perhaps of human genetics and biochemistry as well, for the fact is that most humans take psychoactive drugs socially and only some respond badly to them. Given limitations of medical-psychological and social capabilities either to prevent or to cure, one may resort to punishment instead. Yet as Chambliss (1967) has found in his review, for those offenses symptomatic of a life style of crime simultaneously involving addiction and emotional satisfaction, there is little hope that punishment will deter. For many addicts one must accept, it appears, methods which only serve to control partially through supervision (parole, other close settings) or through isolation, as in jail. Alternatively one may counsel tolerance except for acts which are destructive, thus freeing the law from many of its present criminal codes pertaining to drug use and possession per se, a proposal made by Packer (1968) and also argued in terms of social cost by Kaplan (1969, in press). It is unrealistic to expect the police to control distribution without penalties for possession, consequently one cannot easily demand of law enforcement that it control dealing and while use per se is ignored. Thus the social cost of legitimizing drug use will be an unknown increase in use and in physical, social, and psychic disability among an unknown proportion.

Amphetamines and Violence: Summary of the Task Force Consultants' Report

Research done to date directly contradicts the claims linking amphetamine use either to crimes of violence, sexual crimes, or to accidents. For example, a careful search of reports reveals no case of an airplane accident attributable to amphetamines. Truck accidents, commonly attributed to high rates of use by truckers, upon careful search reveal—using Senate hearing data as a base—that in 1957 (the year for which statistics were presented) of 40 truck accidents with amphetamine use by the driver implicated, only 13 were described as being due to driver-performance error presumably due to amphetamines. These 13 cases were out of 25,000 truck accidents filed for that year, .0005 percent (James Fort, 1964). Experimental work leads to findings like those of Miller (1962) reporting no detrimental effect on driving within normal dosage ranges or Murray (1960) finding that driving skills may be improved, especially for fatigued persons or those with depressed performance due to other drugs (e.g., barbiturates, alcohol).

With regard to crime the San Diego Narcotics Detail in a background study of offenders found those arrested for dangerous drug violations (including amphetamines) had no history of other criminal violations,

Scott and Wilcox (1965), in a very careful study, compared amphetamine-using delinquents with nonusing delinquents in England and found no differences in overall delinquency rates. But there were no crimes of violence, no road accidents, and no firearm possession violations in the amphetamine-user sample. In another study amphetamines were given to delinquents as part of a treatment effort and under these drugs the boys were found to show better adjustment and better work compared to delinquents not so treated (Eisenberg, 1963, and Pasamanick, 1951). Regarding sexual offenses, an observational study (Scott and Wilcox, 1965) shows loss of sexual interest among amphetamine-using youngsters. A review of the literature and of all evidence submitted to Government hearings shows no verified case of sexual offenses arising out of amphetamine use. This does not exclude delinquent sexual behavior among youths who, as part of their pattern of maladapted behavior, also use amphetamines. There is some evidence that judgment can be impaired by use in some cases and that risk-taking may increase; again the personality and social context are likely to be major factors influencing actual behavior.

With reference to dependency and physiological ill effects, the evidence supports their occurrence. Twenty percent of a sample of users studies showed dependency, but withdrawal symptoms (physical) occur rarely (Kiloh and Brandon, 1962). In a Boston hospital study of drug abusers (Schremly and Solomon, 1964), the abuse (dependency) of amphetamines and barbiturates (the up-and-down cycle) was observed in a few cases. The suggestion is made that several drugs will be found to be used sequentially or in the "multihabituation" pattern whenever amphetamines are involved in dependency. One clinical study of three medically supervised patients using heavy amounts of amphetamines indicated that neither dependency nor behavior toxicity need occur. General observations on amphetamine use would confirm the view that dependency is by no means inevitable but rather appears to occur only when some prior personality disturbance is present. Further research is much needed to find out just what kinds of persons are at risk of becoming dependent on drugs. The work of Chein and his colleagues on heroin ("The Road to H") provides an excellent example of what can be done.

Psychosis is an outcome not often mentioned by those alarmed at amphetamine abuse. Nevertheless psychosis does occur and, unlike crime and accidents, seems to be a genuine risk. Breitner (1963) describes cases of psychoses after use of amphetamines prescribed for weight control and for mood elevation. He suggests, as does Brandon, and also Beamish and Kiloh (1960) that many cases admitted as paranoid psychoses may be unrecognized cases of toxic reactions to the amphetamines. A general assumption is made by many psychiatrists, one insufficiently substantiated by research, that psychotic reactions to drugs occur only when there is recognizable prior personality disorder.

Supplemental Observations

A number of important contributions have been made to the scientific literature in the last few years. In addition there has been a rise in the illicit use of amphetamines by young people and, concurrently, an increased concern over the abuse potentials of the amphetamines, especially methamphetamine. That public and medical concern is intensified by reports of increasing cases of intravenous injection of the amphetamines, not only because of the potent action of the injected materials but because of the risk of other infection (hepatitis, abscess, etc.) and because of the propensity for drug-interested persons to substitute drugs using the same vehicle for administration, i.e. substituting DMT or heroin once amphetamine injections has been learned. There is, further, an emotional revulsion which can accompany the public's consideration of self-adopted use of hypodermic syringes; that emotional intensity can be matched by the obsessive interest which the needle user himself displays.

Kalant's (1966) excellent review remarks on the epidemic use of the amphetamines as part of a pattern of multihabituation and attends carefully to the psychotic reactions which constitute a risk to the user. The prevalence of paranoid ideas (suspiciousness, delusions of persecution) in chronic users is notable. In many cases the pre-existing personality syndrome was that of the psychopathic character. Given the asocial and acting out characteristics of that personality coupled with the fear of and anger toward others which occurs in paranoid reactions, given further the general performance decrement which can occur with sustained high dosage use (erratic activity, irritability, loss of judgment, aggressiveness) as part of the intoxication syndrome, it is no wonder that there is worry about spreading amphetamine use and worry about the violence potential of users. Considering the impact of the drug, Kalant approvingly cites McCormick (1962) to the effect, "no other group of drugs can affect or change character and personality traits to a greater degree than the amphetamines" (p. 94). On the other hand, the difficulty in attributing all behavior change to a particular drug becomes evident when it is stated "amphetamine abusers have a high incidence of addiction to or abuse of alcohol and other drugs" (p. 95). Individual cases of criminal acts (none violent) are noted by Kalant and, in describing the amphetamine epidemic in Japan he cites the association between lower social class status and delinquency histories among illicit users of the drug. In our own work with high school and college students, we found (Blum and Assoc., 1969b) in 1966-67 from 11 percent to 25 percent with some amphetamine experience depending upon the college and, on a followup, detected a slight increase in the prevalence of use and also the beginning of intravenous injection. Up to one-fifth of the high school students' sample had amphetamine experience and it is our impression that some increase in that number may be expected in the coming years. For the most part amphetamine use among these student samples is irregular and some of it occurs as part of task orientation, that is to combat fatigue while studying. Among those students using amphetamines, the most common bad outcome which they describe is emotional upset—occurring at one time or another among one-third. Two percent describe loss of control. None say they have engaged in crimes, accidents or violence.

Describing an increase among amphetamine use among hippies, or more specifically, among young people now living where hippies used to live—in San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury—Roger Smith (quoted in *San Francisco Examiner*, 1969; see also Tinklenberg, 1969, in press) describes a pattern very different from that of the college students. He attributes violence there (recall 17 homicides in a recent two-month period and an untold number of robberies, rapes, etc.) to the combination consisting of illicit drug dealing among a crowd who are jittery, commercially unsophisticated, paranoid, bizarre, inadequate and the like. Given the current ethic, one involving, says Smith, carrying a gun, cheating drug customers, and seeking revenge when cheated among a population already emotionally disturbed prior to any drug use, one sees a sufficiently volatile brew to generate a good deal of violence. Tinklenberg and Stillman (1969) also emphasize the violence of the speed freak along with his irritability and unpredictability. "Chronic methamphetamine users without marked mental disorders have a predilection for assaultive behavior" they write, citing the interview and impression data of Smith and Meyer (1969, in press) and they agree it is linked to illicit dealing and gun carrying among social groups of young men with few skills, poor backgrounds and some with already identifiable aggressive philosophies, for example some of the motorcycle gangs, militant blacks, emotionally disturbed revolutionaries and the like.

Ellinwood (1967) has compared amphetamine "addicts" and other addicts at Lexington and has found that the former were more sociopathic, resentful of authority, and had a higher incidence of prior psychiatric hospitalizations and juvenile delinquencies. They were also more antisocial, schizoid or paranoid in personality structure, and on the MMPI tested higher than other addicts on psychopathic deviance as well as other features. Ellinwood's institutionalized sample would certainly fit in with those that Smith and Meyer observed. Kramer, Fischman and Littlefield (1967) have also called attention to the new (and ugly) look in drug abuse, pointing out that the amphetamines, easily manufactured and distributed illicitly, offer potentials for addiction (not yet proven in the physical sense) and relapse comparable to cocaine (another potent stimulant). They too describe the paranoid reactions and hyperactivity and warn about the violence potential, although among their cases not much violence had in fact occurred. Griffith (1966) also calls attention to violent outcomes in the social use of amphetamines, claiming three incidents among prior non-users which were dangerous to others among a sample of 43 interviewed. Kosman and Unna (1968) in an excellent review also point to the dangerous psychoses which may emerge given the paranoid features of the amphetamine toxic psychosis and the now common intravenous injection route. They note that psychotic reactions are more prevalent with methamphetamine than with d- or del-amphetamine.

Contrasting with human clinical observations, amphetamines may produce inhibition in animals. Citing Uyeno (1967b) they note sluggishness in mice upon acute or chronic administration and decreased excitability and hostility in the cat (the latter on a hard-to-measure psychological construct). Their review also calls attention to the synergism between barbiturates and various stimulants to produce hyperactivity (and in man, euphoria) and they note that in animals the effects are not immediately reversed when the drug is withdrawn. Karczmar and Scudder (1967) call attention to the strain and

species differences in amphetamine reactions and they confirm the drug's inhibiting effect on the exploratory and aggressive behavior of mice. Expanding upon our knowledge of variables associated with these differential reactions, Welch and Welch (1966) have shown that aggressiveness among mice given d-amphetamine declined the larger the number of animals together; these effects of group size and other stress-related variables on drug effects have elsewhere been shown. In an animal investigation with a most interesting implication for those many humans who use both amphetamines and marijuana (among students 50 percent of the pot smokers had also used amphetamines), Garriott, King, Forney and Hughes (1967) showed that both natural and synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol (the most active marijuana ingredient) exaggerated (potentiated) the effects of amphetamine. Thus although marijuana is a depressant in some of its action (see later discussion) in potentiating amphetamines rather than antagonizing them, it may act more like those barbiturates which, as noted, act synergistically rather than antagonistically to amphetamines. One may speculate that the chronic speed freak may become even more agitated if simultaneously he takes marijuana.

Turning now to the rich data of the California Youth Authority supplied by Roberts one can compare institutionalized delinquents who have employed dangerous drugs (primarily amphetamines) with other drug users for types of crimes committed. Two hundred and seventeen out of 5,470 youths had used only dangerous drugs (this figure is probably low and may conceal some multiple drug use), whereas 599 had used dangerous drugs along with other substances. Twenty-one percent had committed crimes of minor violence, 6 percent crimes of major violence. This compares to 16 percent minor and 7.5 major violence percentages committed by the delinquents not using any drugs illicitly except for alcohol—and again keep in mind the alcohol-using youths were the more violent. Examined for particular crimes by degree of dangerous drug use, one finds that more non-users of dangerous drugs commit 2 percent more robberies than do users; users however—at any level of use—seem more often involved (again only a 2 percent difference) in assaults—and a few more homicides.

Concern with the role of amphetamines in precipitating violence should not lead to overlooking their role in medical treatment aimed at precisely the opposite effect. For some years psychiatrists and other physicians have employed stimulants in the treatment of certain hyperactive "behavior problem" children and adolescents. That work will not be reviewed here except to give a recent example. Van West (1969) has reported that institutionalized juvenile psychopaths respond well to a strict regimen of bedtime and awakening accompanied by morning doses of the stimulants, dextroamphetamine or methylphenidate. For short periods these wards have made good adjustments without imposed routines of sleep or medication. The contrasts occurring when the same drug (or family of drugs) soothes one savage breast and activates savagery in another must be attributed to the usual constellation of pharmacological, social and psychological variables which comprise the so-far identified factors determining drug outcomes. One assumes that in the case when amphetamines reduce agitation and potential violence, the controlling factors are supervision, controlled dosage, the shared expectation of physician and patient (the delinquent is in a more etiquette preserving role when he is with a doctor) that a good effect will occur, others

present also expect reductions in agitation and give no encouragement to acting out, and it is also likely that the treated delinquents differ from the wild and woolly ones in a variety of family and class features generally associated with seeking and receiving medical care. Beyond this the specific effects of the drug on hyperactive children may well be pharmacologically different, as is accounted for by early theories of action. (For general discussion of theories of action, see Mandell and Spooner, 1968') The broader principle is that drugs which alter the mind can create inner environments where intervention by others seeking to induce a variety of forms of conduct may be facilitated, thus one can give alcohol or cannabis to enhance sociability, to encourage mysticism or to seduce; one can give opiates to addict or to cure, and in the case of amphetamines one can intervene to enhance or suppress violence. The drug, the intentions of the user; and the expectations of those with him will all be factors in producing complex behavior outcomes.

Tranquilizers, Barbiturates, and Violence: Summary of the Task Force Consultants' Reports

In a study of 1963 suicides, Berger (1966) found 12 percent used analgesics and soporifics. Of these, barbiturates accounted for 75 percent and tranquilizers an unknown portion of the remainder. It is clear that overdoses can lead to death and that purposefully or accidentally (as for example, in potentiation with alcohol), tranquilizers have been used in suicide, but would account for less than 2.5 percent of all suicides occurring in the United States. Given enough equivalence in overall production in tranquilizers as opposed to barbiturates so that both classes of drugs are readily available, it is clear that barbiturates are preferred over tranquilizers as suicide means. In a study of New York City adolescents the Poison Control Center found tranquilizers used in 12 percent of the attempts in which one or another chemical was employed (Jacobziner, 1965). (Aspirin was used in 35 percent, barbiturates in 35 percent.)

Dependency data is spotty; clinical studies make it clear that withdrawal symptoms do occur, so that tranquilizers may be classified as physiologically addicting drugs (Ewing, 1958; Hollister, 1960). Autopsies and clinical observations indicate that an unknown proportion of persons are habituated. In a careful study of Boston hospital patients (Schremly and Solomon, 1964) out of 100,000 admissions six cases of tranquilizer dependency were found. Admitted patients were lower class persons; a hospital serving a different social clientele might have yielded higher figures.

There is no reliable evidence to the effect that tranquilizers are associated with antisocial behavior. Behavior may change and some observers may disapprove of changes, but crime itself has not been shown to occur. One may keep in mind Dr. Jonathan Cole's statement that "behavior toxicity, like beauty, may be chiefly in the observer's eye" (1960). Behavior toxicity is a broad term and can be used to describe any form of presumably deleterious conduct.

With regard to traffic accidents clinical descriptions have stated that Librium is associated with accidents (Murray, 1960). In simulated

driving experiments contradictory findings emerge. Marquis (1957) found no impairment of driving ability, Loomis and West (1958) with a better experiment, found tranquilizers did impair performance, chlorpromazine, for example, by nearly 70 percent. Various doses of several different compounds given in test situations by Miller et al. (1962) showed some impairment with tranquilizers, but not judged to be serious for transient use. Chronic heavy dosage is thought to be a genuine hazard to driving. Frank (1966) has cited a study showing that a group of patients receiving a tranquilizer for 90 days had 10 times more traffic accidents than the population at large. In considering driving or other tasks where accidents can occur, one must note that the particular condition of the person as well as dosage and kind of drug play a role; "norms" or standards of acceptable driving skill are also but poorly established. For a nervous person a tranquilizer might improve performance over prior driving; old age appears to lead to considerably reduced driving skill, so that a good middle-aged driver on a tranquilizer might perform better than that same person at age 70 driving without any drugs. We have been unable to find simulated flight studies showing the effect of tranquilizers on flying skills.

Barbiturate suicide is the most frequent suicide device used by women. Of all suicides in one county (Los Angeles) barbiturates accounted for about 20 percent (annual report of coroner of Los Angeles County, July 1965-1966).

A review of national statistics (Berger, 1963) shows drug suicides accounting for 12 percent of the annual total, 75 percent of these employing barbiturates. Suicide itself appears on the increase (about 16,000 in 1954 reported compared to about 21,000 in 1963—many are not reported at all) and drug suicides are becoming an increasing proportion of all suicides (5 percent in 1954, 12 percent in 1963). Barbiturates have risen in preference accordingly. Of attempted adolescent suicides in New York City, 33 percent used barbiturates (Jacobziner, 1962). In addition, poisoning and accidental deaths occur, some of which cannot be distinguished from suicides. For example, in 1965 New York reported 3,000 deaths due either to accidental or intentional overdoses (Medical Society of New York County). In 1958, over 1,100 cases of barbiturate poisoning were reported in New York City. Accidental overdose can occur (Fort, 1964 (b)) because of sleepiness or confusion following an initial dose after which further doses may unwittingly be taken (Berger, 1966).

Other than arrests for dangerous drug use as such there are no verified cases (at least coming to our attention) of any crimes against person or property occurring because of barbiturate ingestion. Dangerous drug use and arrests for that use appear to be increasing (Fort, 1964).

Regarding accidents there is not yet sufficient knowledge about the barbiturate role. Neil (1962) notes that "statistics are not available on the effect of drugs (other than alcohol which is associated with up to 50 percent of fatal accidents) on the overall accident rate." Inferential experimental evidence strongly suggests impairment of functioning in response to barbiturate use (Von Felsinger, 1953). For example Miller

(1958) using simulated driving apparatus found that barbiturates produced impairment in driving skill. One hundred mg. twice daily produced impairment as great as that accompanying blood alcohol levels of 150 mg. ("drunk") usually associated with great performance decrement. California Highway Patrol researchers (1964) have sought further data on drug use and traffic fatality but found research difficulties in detecting barbiturates in hospital and accident settings. Quick and reliable determination methods would be useful. A German study (Wagner, 1961) of over 2,000 drunken drivers found that 11 percent admitted taking other drugs as well within the last 24 hours, mostly barbiturates. Sixty-seven percent of all the (drunken) drivers had had accidents; 70 percent of the alcohol plus other drug group had accidents, not a statistically significant difference. Concentrating on the alcohol plus sedative group (only 23), 77 percent had had accidents. The upward trend, even if not statistically significant, demands notice and is compatible with other studies on summation and potentiation with combined depressant drugs.

Dependency including physiological addiction is clearly present in chronic barbiturate use. Isbell found that 0.8 g daily for 6 weeks or more will produce severe addiction and in 60 percent of the cases toxic psychosis or delirium. Withdrawal symptoms resemble those produced by alcohol abstinence; alcoholics sometimes substitute barbiturates when alcohol is not available. In a Lexington (USPHS hospital) survey about 23 percent of the addicts there also were using barbiturates (Hamburger, 1964).

Among the nonbarbiturate sedatives from which one may expect increasing problems are glutethimide compounds (Doriden). Clinical reports of psychological distress, physiological dependency, neurological disorder and death are accumulating (Lingl, 1966). Since psychotic reactions have been observed, the possibility of dangerous behavior occurring in connection with use or withdrawal from Doriden cannot be ignored. These findings lead to the general statement that many of the problems associated with barbiturates will occur with other sedatives.

Supplemental Observations

Several features not emphasized in the preceding summary should be noted with regard to the tranquilizers and sedatives. One is that the strong tranquilizers assist in inhibiting violence insofar as agitated or otherwise emotionally disturbed persons receiving these substances under medical guidance experience sufficient relief of distress to reduce their tension and activity so that incipient violent or disruptive behavior does not take place. The experience of mental hospitals following the period after the introduction of tranquilizers was a happy one, showing that the agitation and other extreme symptomatology of patients could be reduced via drugs (and new methods of patient management) so that large numbers of patients left hospitals to live once again in the ordinary world. One should keep in mind that the capabilities of modern tranquilizers to subdue patient agitation or distress also had environmental effects which were reinforcing, that is as

hospital staffs became more confident about their patients they could respond with more therapeutic and less custodial interests. The principle here is that secondary drug effects include not only the drug taker's own reactions to his altered state of mind but include the reactions of others to his changed conduct.

Given the widespread use of tranquilizers by Americans, both those with recognized mental illness and those suffering from various degrees of "normal" tension or nervousness, one would expect that there would be considerable scientific evidence showing how these chemicals have controlled or prevented violence, antisocial behavior or other interpersonal disruption among a variety of populations, whether delinquent, mentally ill or otherwise. We have been able to find far fewer investigations than anticipated. Gottschalk, Gleser, Goldine and Fox (1964) have shown that treatment in an experimental situation within an institution does serve to reduce hostility. Their patients were delinquent boys receiving small doses of chlordiazepoxide whose language was observed. Along with hostility, anxiety-related words and expressions were reduced. Rosenberg (1966) employed thioridazine on disturbed adolescents and reported clinically that it reduced overt hostility and aggressiveness in hospitalized patients. Smith (1965) used trifluoperazine in treating children 4 to 17 and reported some improvement in many including the reduction of anxiety and aggressiveness. Similarly, Alderton and Hoddinott (1964) employed thioridazine with nine children showing behavior disorder with hyperactivity. Their observations on a three week followup were to the effect that aggressiveness and destructiveness were reduced. Ferguson, Ban, Lehmann and Lee (1967) compared the effects of two tranquilizers in a double blind study of antisocial behavior among male patients. One drug, propericiazine, led to reduced physical aggressiveness whereas another, chlordiazepoxide, led to reduced verbal aggressiveness. One looks forward to more such studies, hopefully employing placebo controls on a variety of patient and offender populations observed over time in ordinary life settings. Appleton (1965) concerned with controlling patient violence within an institution, examined the use of massive doses of chlorpromazine and warned against over-use of tranquilizers which while reducing staff anxiety and danger precludes effective therapeutic intervention to assist the patient. The broader point here is that tranquilizers used in massive doses ("snowing") can indeed prevent violence in controlled settings but in doing so they do not alter either the personal or social factors which generate the violence potential. They therefore function neither in preventive nor therapeutic ways but rather are in the—sometimes necessary—service of static suppression of violence.

We have not been able to locate research which reports on the use of tranquilizers among treated and untreated non-institutionalized persons to compare rates of violence or criminality. Cole in his paper (1968) calls attention to the presumption of inhibition of violence among released or remitted mental hospital patients and notes that the necessary research has not been conducted. This is not to discount the clinical or experimental observations which constitute the basis for confidence among prescribing physicians; it is to say that an area on the border between criminological and psychiatric investigation has not yet attracted wide attention. There are two studies which are provocative, both by Rapoport and Lassen (1965, 1966).

These investigators showed that contrary to early beliefs, released male mental hospital patients were not more peaceful than ordinary citizens but had in fact about the same rate of arrest for both Part I and Part II offenses as would be expected in a normal population. That population of Maryland State patients, most of whom were alcoholic or schizophrenic, did show that discharged patients committed more robberies and would thus be considered at greater risk of violence. Whether or not these patients were being prescribed tranquilizer drugs, whether or not they took the drugs if they were prescribed, whether other crimes were averted by drug-induced activity inhibition, one does not know. In a parallel followup on female patients the same investigators found that the females were more assaultive both before and after hospitalization than would be expected for a normal population. The authors conclude that drugs are not effective in controlling antisocial behavior. That conclusion seems overpessimistic barring data on the actual prescriptions given and the medications taken by these released hospital populations and lacking an active control group basis for comparison.

A second feature more visible today, and not emphasized in the Crime Commission review, is that as an increasing number of young people experiment with drugs used illicitly which include especially the barbiturates and barbiturate-amphetamine combinations (Japan as well as England and the United States has recorded a spreading problem; see Japanese Justice Ministry, 1964), there is an increase in the number of observations to the effect that these drugs may produce increased irritability rather than sedation (Kramer, personal communication, 1969). Kramer has observed this and suggests that it could be one element in interpersonal situations which become violent. In the Haight-Ashbury, barbiturates are now injected and the person using intravenous barbiturates is described by the street people as irritable and dangerous. In our work with students (1969b) one finds little illicit barbiturate or tranquilizer use and little interest in these drugs for social or pleasure-seeking experience. As far as outcomes reported, it is interesting to see that some students attribute exaggerated insomnia to barbiturates and to tranquilizers and a few have suffered emotional distress attendant to taking barbiturates but not tranquilizers.

Animal studies also show the capability for barbiturates to increase agitation and aggression; Silverman (1966) found that social aggression in mice was increased and their flight response decreased. Yen, Stanger and Millman (1959) had earlier compared certain barbiturates with several tranquilizers and found that isolation-induced aggression in mice was reduced by chlorpromazine, less so by meprobamate and little by phenobarbital. Tedeschi, Tedeschi, Tedeschi, Cook, Mattis, and Fellows (1959) studied the effect of various compounds on foot-shock-induced fighting in mice and found for example that meprobamate was more effective than phenobarbital in reducing fighting (without overwhelmingly sedating the animal). Later, Chen, Bohner, and Bratton (1963) showed that both meprobamate and pentobarbital reduced foot-shock-induced fighting in mice. These are inconsistencies which make those who do their research on humans at least feel comfortably at home. More than that they suggest that fighting which arises from foot shock may differ from that arising from isolation in its susceptibility to pharmacological modification by one or another agent. The principle extrapolated to human experimentation calls attention to the

importance of situational and motivational variables in affecting response to drugs. Later, Crisman (1966) showed that both imipramine and chlorpromazine can, in low doses, increase monkey aggressiveness. Kostowski (1966) looked at aggression in ants and how it was affected by tranquilizers and barbiturates. Neither affected ant conduct whereas both reduced mouse aggressivity. Again extrapolating principles rather than drug action, one is reminded that species and individual differences are important in evaluating drug effects. As far as the real risks posed for human violence by either barbiturates or tranquilizers, these are clearly low. Yet that some individuals will respond to barbiturates with agitation and possibly increased aggressiveness must be borne in mind and one can conceive of situations where that mood change will be a component in producing disruptive or violent conduct. Although the criminological evidence is lacking, inference from the psychiatric data in the meantime allows the presumption that more human aggression is controlled by tranquilizers and barbiturates than is evoked by them.

We are fortunate in having available a recent study by McGrath (1967) which compares adolescent barbiturate users with narcotics users, assaulters and auto thieves. McGrath's systematic sample of 16- and 17-year-old New Jersey boys without obvious psychiatric illness or a history of convictions were examined along psychological, family and social dimensions. The major differences were that barbiturate users were mostly white (90 percent), whereas whites comprised only 67 percent of the heroin using group, 31 percent of the auto thief group, and 26 percent of the assault group. Clearly, drug use per se was mostly a white race activity, especially barbiturate use, among Essex County convicted youth. The barbiturate users came from more stable families higher on the socioeconomic scale; Negro assaulters were from the most unstable and the poorest families. On the MMPI all subjects had similar test profiles but those of the barbiturate users were the most normal. Regarding criminality, the white heroin users were the least delinquent initially although after addiction they become more delinquent—primarily property crimes. The Negroes were much more involved in violence so that the white groups—and necessarily the mostly white drug users—had a low rate of violent crimes. Auto thieves have the fewest aggressive crimes recorded; heroin and barbiturate users are in the midground. The drug users do steal more after drug use is begun; they likewise show a reduction in violence. Interestingly, many of the heroin users, nonnarcotic crimes had earlier involved alcohol or barbiturate use, thus the heroin users were more involved in a variety of drug use and in related drug offenses. Barbiturate users, crimes against person also decrease over time while, as with heroin users, their illicit drug involvement and subsequent drug-related arrests increase. McGrath observes that the alcohol arrests diminish as users become involved in the "harder" drugs. Alcohol's early importance implies an addiction liability in these individuals prior to their initiation of heroin and to a lesser extent—barbiturate use. McGrath also suggests that the assaulters also drink but when they do, they get in fights and are arrested for assault, not drunkenness.

As far as the major forms of violence other than criminal, that is, accidents and suicide, data emerging since the Crime Commission Reports confirm findings extant in 1966-67. An important study by the Traffic Psychology

Institute of the Traffic Safety Board in Vienna compared the effects of several tranquilizers on driving using normal dosage rates. The results showed that there was no adverse effect on driving. Thus the controversy over driving safety continues. The evidence supports the presumption that tranquilizers taken in normal doses by persons who do not exhibit the characteristics associated with traffic accident risk (alcoholism, rage, preceding upset, prior bad driving history, etc.) (see Selzer et al., 1968) do not pose a traffic safety risk. Presumably persons taking heavy chronic doses and persons showing other risk features do present a driving risk.

Suicide information continues to improve, thanks in part to support and stimulation from the newly established NIMH Center for Studies in Suicide Prevention. Barbiturates and barbiturates-potentiated-by-alcohol exact a heavy toll of lives and such poisonings continue to constitute the majority of suicides. Although tranquilizers are not the preferred suicide weapon, there are increasing cases of such self-administered poisoning. The latter risk may well be associated with the access by mental patients to tranquilizers under prescription or in hospital. It is important to keep in mind that the suicide rate for mental patients is much higher than for well persons. MacDonald (1964) reports it to be 34 times higher, so that one must expect that they will use materials at hand for suicide. Thus the physician managing psychiatrically ill patients, including those in remission, must bear in mind the danger of their employment of drugs for suicide efforts. For those concerned with the prevention of violence, the area of by far the greatest importance which involves barbiturates and tranquilizers is suicide prevention.

Marijuana and Violence: Crime Commission Consultants' Summary

Studies in India (Chopra) and North Africa (Asuni; Lambo) show that cannabis psychoses occur in association with heavy use of potent forms of cannabis. Dependency is also described, as is apathy, reduced work, and social effectiveness, etc. These effects may be due, in some measure, to the vulnerability of the using population (already hopeless, sick, hungry, etc.). In the United States neither cannabis psychosis nor cannabis dependency has been described, although marihuana may be one of a variety of drugs used in the multihabituation (Cohen and Ditman, 1962) pattern, where a person takes many different drugs and appears dependent, but not on any one of them. Case history material suggests that many identified heroin users have had earlier experiences with marihuana, but their "natural history" is also likely to include even earlier illicit use of cigarettes and alcohol. The evidence from our college students and utopiate and news articles is clear that many persons not in heroin-risk neighborhoods who experiment with marihuana do not "progress" to "hard" narcotics.

With regard to crime, other than the violation of law occurring by virtue of acquiring and possessing marihuana, there is no reliable evidence that marihuana "causes" crime. One Brazilian study (Andrade, *Bull. of Narcotics*, 1964) observed 120 marihuana-using criminals and concluded their criminal actions were not a result of their drug use. A Nigerian study (Asuni) suggests that those who are at risk of hashish use are also at risk of criminality because of their primary social and

psychological characteristics (being members of frustrated underprivileged groups living in urban areas with opportunities for committing crimes). In Nigerian hospitals with patients with histories of cannabis psychosis or use, there was no relationship of use to crime. In Indian studies (Chopra) a negative relationship has been suggested, for with heavy cannabis use stupor occurs during which the commission of crimes is unlikely. Among populations of students, artists, and other more "privileged" pot smokers in the United States there is no recent evidence of associated criminality; similarly in the famous "La Guardia Report" (1940) in New York City marihuana was not found to be either criminogenic nor associated with criminal subgroups. With regard to traffic accidents, data are lacking. One study by Wendt (1954) in the United States using a cannabis-like compound suggested that motor performance was not impaired but that the ability to shift attention was reduced. Effects are no doubt related to dosage but no studies on varied dosage using driving tasks have been done.

Supplemental Observations

The two major developments since the Crime Commission reports have been in the continued increase of illicit marijuana use among young people and the availability of cannabis and the tetrahydrocannabinols for use in laboratory studies of the effects of the drug. Neither development has led to data suggesting any statistically demonstrable relationship between taking marijuana and experiencing an increased risk of engaging in interpersonal violence. Our data on students (Blum and Assoc., 1969b) confirm the rapid increase in illicit use, for example some high schools and colleges in metropolitan areas show more than 50 percent of their students with marijuana experience with up to one-fourth using it regularly. Even so violent outcomes are rarely reported, either in absolute or proportional terms. About 4 percent of those using say they have, at one time or another, suffered loss of self-control under the influence of the drug, and one percent describe auto accidents, unfortunate sexual incidents, or criminality which they attribute to the acute effects of the drug. No fist fights or other such activity are reported by any of the marijuana smokers. Blumer (1967) also observes quiet behavior among social groups using marijuana.

Laboratory studies are beginning to be available which are consistent with an interpretation that not only does cannabis not precipitate violence, but that some components of its action are depressant such that aggression is inhibited. Weil, Zinberg and Nelson (1968) gave marijuana cigarettes to naive and experienced smokers and concluded that its effects were mild. As Goodwin (1969) points out, one-time administration of a socially conventional dose cannot lead to generalizations about long-term effects, especially those resulting from the use of more potent forms such as hashish or synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol, but one does see that in the controlled laboratory setting there is evidence for what most users have long contended, that marijuana used in mild doses yields mild effects. Tinklenberg and Hollister (personal communication, 1969) in other laboratory work are finding that "our experimental data . . . demonstrates a marked decrease in all types of goal-directed physical activity." Cannabis effects are shown to be dose related, as would be expected. Hollister, Richards and Gillespie (1968)

show that in their low range of dosage (341 and up micrograms/kilo) the effects are to make laboratory subjects sleepy and happy; in higher ranges psychotomimetic (toxic psychoses) effects emerge including dreamlike states and depersonalization; however, neither agitation nor violence appear. Indeed, using the Clyde Mood Scale, the Hollister subjects report a decline in aggressiveness. This is correlated with a demonstrable physical weakness. Isbell, Cordetsky, Jasinsky, Claussen, von Spulak and Korte (1967) have done similar work also using tetrahydrocannabinol and their findings also show euphoria and at high doses distortions of perception, hallucinations and other psychotoxic effects. Again in the laboratory setting these are not associated with violent outcomes. These are, however, clinical reports of idiosyncratic responses to cannabis which suggest that some individuals experiencing the altered consciousness induced by cannabis may become disturbed and assaultive. Tinklenberg (personal communication, 1969) reports several cases where "a few normally placid subjects had to be restrained to abort possible assaultive behavior." These were during high dosage experiments; in one case Tinklenberg observed assaultive behavior in a low dose subject with no history of prior psychiatric disorder. One can imagine then that occasionally violent behavior would emerge in the uncontrolled setting of illicit use; Munch (1966) reports a few such cases; however, they are a mixed bag of questionable case writing and contamination with alcohol use. Andrade (1964) analyzing comparable offenders sent to hospital after crimes reportedly committed under the influence of cannabis, found that in each case there was pre-existing personality disorder and concluded that the offense was primarily related to that disorder rather than cannabis; however, the role of the production of disordered behavior cannot be ruled out by after-the-fact analysis of the kind made by Andrade.

The possibility of a dual potential in cannabis (as in morphine) is raised by animal work, for example Veira, Aguiar, Alencar, Sfabra, and Tursch (1967) injecting a hashish derivative into rats found that low doses (50 mg/kg) provoked excitation and aggressive behavior whereas higher doses caused a general depression, indifference to environment, and sleep. At very high doses (350 mg/kg) death was induced. Santos, Sampaio, Fernandes and Cartini (1966) induced fighting behavior in mice via isolation and observed that cannabis extracts had a differential effect depending upon the time after administration, maximal suppression of aggressiveness occurred 1 to 2 hours after administration of the drug; full recovery did not take place until after seven hours. These investigators, by using fighting and nonfighting strains of mice also indicate that cannabis effects may vary by strain, a variant which extrapolated to humans not only is consistent with the individual differences earlier noted, but suggestive of genetic-biochemical variables as well as psychological and social ones as influencing cannabis effects.

Turning to observations on identified drug-using delinquents, the California Youth Authority data (1968) comparing marijuana users, at various levels of use with nonusers of marijuana, yields no demonstration of remarkable differences in rates for violence. In this case it is also evident that the arrested marijuana users are not less implicated in violent crimes so that there is no evidence of a violent crime suppressant capability of the drug as employed by this population of visible and thus presumably indiscrete youths. We have already referred to the statistics provided by the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs regarding arms possession among arrested violators. Recall that marijuana violators were armed as often as heroin violators and considerably more often than dangerous drug violators. (One must not rely on this data as representing a permanent state of affairs; times are changing and as the amphetamine-user observations suggest, the prevalence of weapons among stimulant users is likely to be increasing.)

The Hallucinogens and Violence: President's Crime Commission Task Force Consultants' Report

Psychosis following LSD is verified (Bium and Associates, 1964; Cohen, 1962; Downing, 1966); there is no adequate estimate of the frequency of psychosis as a function of incidence of use. Mescaline psychoses are also verified. Some psychotic reactions are temporary, many are now "treated" at home by the subject's friends; counteracting tranquilizers (e.g., thiorazine) are now sold on the black market as part of the LSD "trip" equipment. Other psychotic reactions require long-term hospitalization. The most recent study available to us, that of Ungerleider, Fisher, and Fuller (1966) studied 70 post-LSD psychiatric admissions during a 6-month period in a Los Angeles medical center, these patients representing 12 percent of all admissions during that period. One-third of the LSD patients were psychotic on admission; two-thirds of the patients required more than 1 month of hospitalization. Recently reported in California (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 1966) is teenage use of jimsonweed (*Datura stramonium*), a substance employed by Luiseno and Chumash Indians to achieve visions. Deaths among these Indians occurred following overdose (Harner, 1966) and overdose among contemporary youth may also be expected to lead to illness or death. Suicide attempts are hard to distinguish from bizarre behavior occurring under LSD, for example jumping from windows because "I can fly," so it is that although suicidal feelings are reported and clinical workers describe attempts, there is no sound data on the probability of suicide attempts as a function of dosage, setting, personality, incidence of use, etc.

Crime associated with hallucinogen use appears to have been minimal. Police reports before a California legislative committee emphasized disturbances of the peace (1965) rather than felonies. Occasional accounts of homicide (see *New York Times*, June 5, 1966; also Geert-Jorgensen, 1964), violence, resisting arrest, etc., have not been subject to followup case studies. It would appear that insofar as decent citizens take hallucinogens their behavior will remain lawful. We may expect that with the expansion of hallucinogen use to delinquent groups—and perhaps because it is now unlawful in some States, so that its use becomes criminal—a greater frequency of crime will be reported. A tangential remark is offered here. It is the person, not the drug, which is "responsible" for criminal acts. When an already delinquent youth takes LSD and commits yet another delinquent act, it may well be that the timing or expression of the delinquency is shaped by the drug-induced state of mind, but—as an example—aggression will not be a drug phenomenon. Generally speaking, one would expect (although

the scientific evidence is far from adequate) that well-integrated people under heavy drug doses will not do things contrary to their ordinary conduct. Less mature, more neurotic or otherwise less well integrated persons would seem to be more vulnerable to the acting-out of impulses, the temporary expression of conflicts or of being persuaded by others to misbehave. Consequently, one's review of crimes reportedly committed under drug influence must attend to the prior criminal and sociopsychological history of the offender. It is also necessary to have regard for the role of clouded judgment or reduced muscular coordination in producing behavior (e.g., a traffic accident leading to manslaughter) that is criminal. There can also be long-run changes associated with drug use, as for example, the clouding of judgement associated with habituation and drug stupor or in psychotic personality change, where criminal acts may conceivably occur (e.g., smuggling marijuana, perjury, theft) as part of a poor judgment syndrome.

With regard to vehicle accidents and hallucinogens, there have been no studies and no verified reports in spite of some remarkable "I was there" accounts. Experimental work showing slowed responses and reduced information processing make it highly likely that accidents will occur when under hallucinogen influence. This expectation should be tested in laboratory studies.

With regard to the other claims about hallucinogens—dependency, social and work decrement, divorce, etc.—the scientific sources are reliable but samples are small and insufficient followup studies exist.

Supplemental Observations

There have been no major findings with regard to the hallucinogens which contradict early trends or reports. What has been occurring socially, as with the other illicit drugs, has been an expanding use among young people and along with that a continuing number of medical users and police reports of adverse effects including occasional suicide and assault. Given the potency of LSD and related ages the remarkable thing has been the relative infrequency of "bad trips" coming to official attention and, more striking, the relative infrequency of bad outcomes reported by the users themselves. Our student data (Blum and Assoc., 1969b) suggest that by 1969 over one-fifth of the students in some high schools and colleges will have experimented with hallucinogens with the likelihood that more regular users will be found in high school than in colleges as epidemic use spreads to the less well-informed, less mature, and more daring younger students. Self-reports among the college level students indicate as responses rather common emotional upset, whereas 6 percent report loss of self-control and 5 percent psychoses (these are reactions extending beyond the acute drug stage but are nevertheless usually self-terminating). As hallucinogen use increases among less stable and more delinquent youths, a larger number of antisocial incidents associated with drug use must be anticipated. Similarly suicidal reactions of the sort suggested by Keeler and Reifler (1967) will occur. Smart and Bateman (1967) describe, in addition to suicide, homicide attempts and note that these bad reactions may occur even in controlled setting. Joyce (in Rose, 1968) cites work by

Shulgin, Bunnell and Sargent with the hallucinogen TMA which was found to cause "unexpectedly anti-social responses" of such an order that "provocation would have precipitated homicidal violence." No wonder that McGlothlin (1967) and others have continued to warn about the hazards of LSD use. Although LSD users balance these warnings with the avowal that the probability of a dangerous outcome following any one trip is very low, which is correct (excluding any possible hidden tissue or genetic damage which remains uncertain), there seems little question that any use poses an additional risk of danger which is not justified unless remarkable benefits could also be shown. Such benefits are a master of debate but those professionals who employ conventional standards for judging drug effects would say that such benefits have not been demonstrated.

There is an increasing body of animal research on the effects of hallucinogens and on mechanisms of action. Illustrative of animal work linked to a concern with violence in humans are the continuing series of studies by Uyeno and his colleagues (Uyeno and Benson, 1965; Uyeno, 1966a, b; Uyeno, 1967a, b, c) which focus on dominance behavior. These show that LSD, psilocybin and mescaline can inhibit isolation-induced attack behavior in mice, and that effects increase with dosage. LSD also inhibits dominance behavior in food competition situations in mice and rats and in sexual behavior in mice. LSD increases submissiveness of monkeys as a function of increasing dosage. On the other hand, Silverman (1966), observing the social behavior of rats found that LSD intensified aggression and mating, plus overall activity. Kostowski (1966) also found mouse aggressivity to increase. These contradictions in rodent findings should not be the basis for consternation for they imply the complexity of identifying all of the influences of drug outcomes even in animals whose lives can be well controlled. One presumes that animals, as in man, genetic, concurrent physiological, psychological and social variables operate together to influence the probability of aggressive or violent LSD outcomes compared to more benign ones.

As far as statistics linking actual histories of violence with hallucinogen use, we are again fortunate to have the California Youth Authority data, courtesy of Roberts (1968). These show slight tendencies for regular or habitual hallucinogen users to be involved less often than infrequent users or nonusers in robberies, but not to show noticeable differences in rates for homicides, assault, burglary, and rape. Keeping in mind that the hallucinogen users are very likely to be users of other drugs as well, one's safest conclusion is that hallucinogens—primarily LSD—clearly do not insulate delinquents from acts of violence and neither do they predispose them to particular violence. This is the same conclusion that may be drawn for many of the other drugs for this large sample of identified offenders with the probable exception of alcohol.

Other Psychoactive Drugs and Violence

The earlier consultants' Report of the President's Crime Commission stated in regard to substances such as glue, gasoline, paint thinner, nitrous oxide and other volatile intoxicants which are inhaled that "Although violence appears rare, some of the intoxicated children have been assaultive or suicidal. Physiological damage does occur. Hard-core sniffers do appear to be

troubled persons interested in drug use and susceptible to further drug experimentation on a road that may lead to further dependencies. Mild dependency to sniffing intoxicants may occur." The use of these materials and other special substances continues to be an adolescent phenomenon concentrated among maladapted and disturbed youngsters. Accidental death by poisoning continues to be a risk associated with their use.

To be briefly noted is the possibility that new families of chemicals may be developed which have a greater probability of producing violence than do any of the substances now available. Thus Koff and Langfitt (1966) observed a rage reaction in cats induced by tremorine (dihydrochloride salt of 1,4-dipyrrolidino-2-butyne). This response appeared among 53 percent of their animals and was individually reproducible. Among animals responding less intensely with only irritability, the administration of atropine methylnitrate invoked rage while atropine sulfate abolished it. These findings, plus the availability of more potent forms of drugs in this family, draw attention to the risk that substances will one day become available to humans which will have greater violence risks, even though it is presumed that social and ego controls of humans are capable of modifying some of these specific effects. It should also be remarked that other pharmaceutical substances now available may play a role in facilitating impulse generation and impulse release in humans. Stutte (1967) for example has observed, in a clinical note, that the hyperproducing of male sexual hormones or their administration may be associated with increased aggressiveness. One would anticipate no general effect but rather that some individuals with predisposing backgrounds and social situations and, possibly, biochemical idiosyncrasies, will be at risk as chemicals are developed which intensify those neurophysiological processes associated with agitation, rage, sexual or aggressive expression.

Multiple Drug Users and Violence

It has already been emphasized that most users of illicit drugs, like those using only licit ones, do not restrict themselves to one substance but ordinarily use a variety of psychoactive agents. In our work on normal populations (Blum and Assoc., 1969a) and students (Blum and Assoc., 1969b, 1964) the existence of both general predilections to drug use and of specific subclasses or factors of use has been shown. This fact leads to caution in after-the-fact statements about the influence of particular drugs when people have been using a variety of drugs. It also can lead, conversely, to research on people who use constellations of drugs and an attempt to define these syndromes, types or drug-use clusters. For example, the statistics of the California Youth Authority allow for consideration of clusters as well as experience with particular drugs. In one follow-up study (Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, 1967) Los Angeles delinquents using any non-opiate illicit drug (except alcohol and tobacco) were grouped and followed for from 4 to 6 years. It was found that over half of those originally arrested were not arrested again. It was found that those arrested on drug charges were more often arrested on nondrug charges (than other arrestees) yet also that many with drug arrests did not become involved in other criminality. The findings show that nonopiate drug users once arrested as youths more often than not do not become identified in later crimes of any

sort and they do not "progress" to opiates. As we have already seen from other Youth Authority data, there is no evidence to support any strong relationship between any form or combination of drug use and the occurrence of violent as opposed to non-violent crime.

In another important study addressed to drug users as a class, Kulik, Stein, and Sarbin (1968) examine the patterns of delinquency among institutionalized California boys. Using a checklist method for self-reporting of crimes to identify dark number offenses and employing sophisticated statistical analysis, the investigators obtained evidence for four dimensions of antisocial behavior, one of which was drug usage. The other dimensions were delinquent role, parental defiance and assaultiveness. The drug cluster embraced use of narcotics, marijuana, amphetamines and glue sniffing as well as marijuana dealing. Subsequent pattern analysis revealed seven types, several of which included drug use as an activity. The drug-using delinquent could be described typologically and emerged as more often Mexican-American from broken homes with some history of assault but was not as assaultive as the gang assaulter. More important than the typological differences may be the high intercorrelations among the four dimensions of (California) delinquency. The investigators state that the intercorrelations suggest "that characteristic styles of delinquency emerge, not from a vacuum, but from a background of general misbehavior. The pattern analysis also shows that 'pure' types are rare."

The Drug Dealer and Violence

Many if not most regular users of illicit drugs may be assumed to have engaged in traffic if by that is meant some illicit distribution of drugs for money. The special problem which is posed for anyone concerned with violence is the extent to which such illicit dealings foster risks of harm which arise out of the underworld nature of dealing; high profits and competition for those profits, no legal sanctions, and no recourse to law over disputes, the involvement of sociopathic and psychopathic characters, the clouded judgment in those undergoing acute drug states, the interest of organized crime (Cosa Nostra) in the drug trade, etc. It will be recalled that Smith (1969) observing the speed scene attributed the violence there to the illicit marketplace aspects combined with the personalities of the speed freaks and the violence precipitating effects of amphetamines. Certainly narcotics enforcement officers are familiar with the grim violence of the heroin underworld just as in earlier days. Prohibition was accompanied by mobster activities and the further development of organized crime. Even the world of the addict using conventional drugs can be a violent as well as tawdry one: witness fights, robberies and the rest on Skid Row. Violence in the illicit marketplace is by no means limited to drug transactions; it exists in other vice areas as well; gambling and prostitution or whenever unscrupulous and aggressive men compete to exploit others outside the constraints of inner conscience or external order.

In our own work we are investigating the drug dealer; his background and circumstances, the marketplace in which he works, and criminal career as it evolves. For this report we have gathered some of our preliminary findings relevant to potential violence in the illicit drug bazaar. The sample of 315 is

limited to California dealers, some of whom were incarcerated but most of whom were free and working dealers. Two-thirds were male, most were 20 to 35 years old, more than half had some college education, about half had no legitimate occupation, the great majority were single, most were white, and most came from families where neither parent had any criminal record. Discussing those aspects of their life linked to violence risk, over one-fourth said they were worried about getting hurt or killed because of their being dealers. Asked why, they most often said it was due to revenge from others whom they had cheated (ripped, burned). A second large group said they feared the drug users with whom they came in contact because these were often irrational or dangerous people. Two-thirds of our dealers said they had observed unhappy or frightening changes in other dealers over time, most often the development of emotional problems or family troubles; secondly, progression to addicting drugs but in some cases violence, specifically dealers dying from overdose (reported by 3 percent), dealers being killed (1 percent), or dealers becoming criminally violent (armed robbery, etc.) (5 percent so reporting). Asked about the most dangerous part of their own work, most (62 percent, spoke of being arrested, but 2 percent were more worried about getting killed. Most dealers described their business as involving agreements with others and some degree of organization; less than one-sixth were loners, not part of some illicit business even if quite informal organization. Ten percent of these dealers stated that their arrangements were with the Mafia or another organized crime syndicate either for drug supplies or protection. Most of the dealers (61 percent) had never been arrested for any drug arrest; of those arrested for drug offenses, about half had more than one conviction. About half had non-drug-offense arrests, usually two or more. Asked if they ever carried a gun, 15 percent said "yes." Asked if they had ever used their guns, those carrying them said "yes" in 93 percent of the cases!

Trying to tap rebelliousness and asocial conduct, we asked dealers if they ever broke the law just for the pleasure of it. Nearly half said "yes." We also inquired about whether they stole drugs, either for their own use or for resale. Fifteen percent admitted to such thefts. Those who admitted theft indicated they stole drugs with some regularity, most often from illicit suppliers (labs, importers, growers), but sometimes from other dealers or from their own customers as well as from legitimate sources (less than one-quarter of them say they have burgled or robbed legitimate enterprises or straight citizens). We asked about the drug scene itself, if it had changed and if so, how. Nearly two-thirds of the dealers said the drug scene changes were in the direction of increasing violence; half believed there was more Mafia involvement and three-quarters said that more dealers were carrying guns.

These answers, limited to California dealers willing to speak to our interviewers (most of them dealers themselves) and representing a certainly biased sample from among perhaps 2,000 dealers approached during this last year, must be considered rough estimates at best of what is happening on the illicit drug scene. Even so it appears clear that the majority of our dealers do not live in fear of their lives, most do not carry guns, and most do not need to engage in robbery or burglary to get drugs or money. (Some state they make \$500,000 a year or more!) On the other hand most dealers do not like what they see happening to other dealers, nor to the drug scene itself. An important minority of dealers—15 percent by their own admission and

probably higher if the modest fellows' fibs are discounted—do carry guns, do use those guns, do rob (rip off) their customers, fellow dealers, and suppliers and a minority are involved with the Mafia or something akin to that. Witness further that the majority of these dealers have not been identified by arrest as drug dealers; many have never been arrested for anything at all and those who have been, serving short sentences to be sure, have obviously not been deterred from what is for some a profitable business, and what is for many—in terms of their values—an honorable profession serving the public need.

We have conducted a few special interviews with professional criminals who are foreign residents involved in the drug traffic from Asia, Europe, and Mexico-Central America to the United States. These men, wiser to be sure in the ways of the world than our "idealistic" middle class dealers, do not claim their own goodness nor the social value of drugs. They do agree with our California dealers that the rising market for illicit drugs accompanied by efforts to suppress production and traffic have made the market more lucrative and thus more competitive in recent years and that increasing violence on an international scale among syndicates is occurring. One has only to see George Patterson's film, "The Opium Trail" (Hong Kong, 1967), to see the deployment of armed force (in Southeast purchased military forces) to protect one trafficker from another. Our respondents link (some) illicit drug traffic with illicit arms traffic, no surprise given smuggling talent and the unethical competition, and they describe the permeability of the American borders to smuggling of arms, drugs, fugitives and other contraband. Whereas law enforcement personnel conventionally estimated that 10 percent of the contraband is seized, our major foreign dealer said that 5 percent of his shipments were seized. Based on these limited interviews, our concern is with the increase in organized violence in international drug traffic and with the theft and smuggling of military arms, as well as hand guns, which are then employed in criminal warfare.

It is well to note, whether reviewing the California or foreign cases that the great proportion of crimes, violent and otherwise, appear to be directed against their fellows in the drug world, not against property nor persons who are square. Just as homicides occur most often among family and acquaintances, just as crime-on-the-street finds the neighbor of the offender, i.e. fellow slum dwellers, the most common victim, just as the executions and beatings conducted by organized crime appear to be directed at competitors, disobedient "family" members or customers involved with Mafia services, so do we now find that the violence in the drug world finds its perpetrators and victims coming from the same scene. This does not, of course, mean that the straight or establishment world goes unscathed, but it does mean that most of the pain and violence that is part of drug trafficking goes unreported and unnoticed by the straight world. That the pain and violence is part and parcel of the fact that drugs are themselves outlawed and thereby bring a high price—since the demand is great—seems hardly to be denied given a laissez faire economic philosophy in the underworld—subject to the modification by syndicates or The Syndicate as a potential monopolist. Yet the free enterprise of the illicit marketplace when it takes its unkind forms is also an expression of the amorality and/or psychopathology of the people attracted to the drug scene; they form as well as are formed by the anarchistic environment and

their emerging violence is not a creation of economics, rather it is an expression of one set of human capabilities, the darker kind, as these are nurtured in a bizarre environment. And lest that drug scene be thought only a jungle, it is not, for our dealers are, in part, idealists who believe in drugs as good things and who believe in themselves as doing good things by bringing drugs to people who want them or who, not wanting them, must be given a chance through experience to come to want them. The square world will likely discount such far-fetched idealism with its unlikely benefits and its violent correlates. It is easy to reason that those of whom one disapproves must be bad and their ideals false if their ideals are not one's own. Yet, reflecting, are there many men anywhere who do not act—by their own admission—righteously and according to their ideals, no matter what it is they do and how much hurt they bring? Even as it is in the square world, so it is in the drug scene—only more so.

Drugs and Violence: Chemical Warfare

In considering the drug scene and idealism and the irony of violence used in the pursuit of self-interest or simple animal aggression disguised as a universal social good, it is appropriate to consider another link between drugs and violence; namely, the employment of psychoactive and other chemical agents as weapons, lethal or otherwise, in warfare and in civil disturbance. Since the focus of this report is on drugs and individual violence, it is inappropriate to dwell at length on the variety of agents and the diverse means of their employment. Robinson and also Joyce (in Rose, 1969) present a review of the chemical and psychedelic weapons. These include vomiting gases and circulation lachrymators (tear gases), choking gases, nettle gases (skin irritants), blood gases (poisons which block oxygen circulation), vesicants (which burn or blister the skin), G-agents and V-agents (nerve gases which interfere with neurochemistry) and incapacitating agents which include hallucinogens (the U.S. Army reportedly also worked on cannabis), emetics, convulsants, paralyzants, hypotensives (to cause fainting), laxatives and the like. A U.S. Department of Defense manual (1966) gives further details on types and use of these chemical munitions and the tactics employed for offensive use or defense preparation and response. An Army Field Manual (1967) provides further data on chemicals whose effects range from mild irritants (CN) through disorientation and hallucinations (BZ) to convulsions and death (GB).

Whether these drugs are to be considered as tools of violence, steps toward peace, a necessary deterrent to enemy action, or more humane alternatives to explosive or nuclear munitions depends upon the intent of the user, his rhetoric, the chemical drug and dosage which is employed, and the long-range as well as immediate impact not only of the chemicals themselves should they be used, but of the knowledge that they exist and may be employed. Some work, for example, has been done on how people react not to the gases but to their labels. Milburn with Burgdorf for example (personal communication, 1966) indicate that "tear gas" may be considered less potent by college students than the vague "non-lethal gas" label but that both gases are distinguished from hard weaponry and their use not considered a dramatic escalation in conflict.

Compared to the psychoactive drugs used socially and individually, whether illicitly or not, the potential impact of chemical weaponry is staggering. The issue here is not individual aberrancy or the criminality of population subgroups, but rather of peace and war and the processes which determine these. Once again the chemicals are subordinate to the human processes and to the larger issues, but once again the chemicals, as tools, weigh mightily in the hands of those who employ them.

Drugs and Violence: Civil Disturbances

Some of the agents useful in warfare can also be employed to quell civil disorders within a nation. Within the last several years with the advent of extreme American left and right, and of black and white militancy, public attention has increasingly been drawn to the non-lethal chemical weapons as these have been employed by the police in their confrontations with demonstrators. The aerosol irritant sprays have been a center of controversy and while there are many chemical variants, the issue has centered about Mace which contains alpha-chloroacetophenone, an eye, mucous membrane and lung irritant. An effective crowd control device as long as it can be delivered, its use has sparked considerable antagonism on the grounds of its having permanent damaging effects. On a reactive level it is also the case that demonstrating groups understandably respond negatively to aggressive police action to control or disburse them. The psychological shock of police action, whether Mace, clubs or the flying wedge can prove most unsettling for demonstrators, especially middle class youths whose upbringing eschews violence and who, in confronting the police, are not prepared for the physical response which their civil disobedience may provoke—or which, alas, may be unprovoked and thus merit the charge of brutality. On a symbolic or strategic level it must be recognized that the use of Mace can exacerbate antagonistic reactions in groups already frightened of or hostile to the police. Whether it is the police action itself, as Hersh (1969) contends, "... the use of Mace and tear gas by the police has often turned a demonstration into a riot," with hostile motivation on the part of authorities where the use of Mace is itself governmental violence, "a punitive weapon in the hands of the police" (Hersh) or whether the Mace action provides a focus for crowd emotions and an opportunity for some protesters to practice impermanent martyrdom is a question which requires analysis of each confrontation occasion. In any event a safe chemical can still be a dangerous one to use if it serves to polarize the citizens (including dissident ones) and their police. As a very wise Federal judge is reputed to have commented, "The only really safe chemical tactic to use in riot control is cloud seeding. Nobody can take umbrage at a rainstorm."

A number of evaluations of Mace have been conducted (Leong, 1966; Powers, 1966; and MacLeod, Villarreal, and SeEVERS, 1968) each of which concludes that when used as instructed (not in closed rooms, several feet from the target, where the target has freedom for reflexive blinking, where target persons may wash afterwards) Mace is safe and effective and, further, that in spite of widespread use there is little evidence of damage to eyes, skin or lungs. Both the Department of Justice and the Food and Drug Administration concur and have approved its use. Hersh reviews the contrary

evidence, citing clinical findings by an ophthalmologist, Rose, and a California Department of Public Health report describing cases of conjunctivitis, blistering, skin burns, corneal scars and dermatitis attributed to Mace.

There seems little doubt that such damage can and has occurred but it is also the case that the rate of such damage considered as a proportion over all persons being sprayed with Mace as targets is low. The issue however is clouded (an aerosol cloud?) if one attends only to specific hurt or nonhurt, for as long as Mace or other weaponry is employed in confrontations between groups both of whom feel they are righteous, there will not be consensus about the other fellow's goodness if either employs physical force on the other. The broader issue must be kept in mind and that is whether or not such antagonistic confrontations can be prevented in large measure by professional police handling on the one hand and a sense of citizen responsibility on the other. It is apparent that the violent or abusive use of chemicals, including those termed alternatives to or suppressants of violence, need not occur when humans act with understanding, self control, empathy and good intentions toward one another and thus avoid the other-controlling, destructive, or escapist functions which the harmful use of behavior-affecting drugs and chemicals represents.

SUMMARY

A brief survey of history, current social practice and recent laboratory work with humans and animals has shown a variety of links between drugs and violence. Employed as releasers or facilitators, psychoactive drugs can in some individuals and in some settings release assaultive or self-destructive behavior and can be important components in accidents. Drugs can also be used as tools of violence, as weapons in homicide, as devices to control or exploit others, or in warfare to incapacitate or kill. In terms of available data, the demonstrable correlation in the United States between illicit drug use and criminality is a function of a larger syndrome of acts which are at best shortsighted and immature and at worst hopeless and savage but which express life styles in which both criminality and drug abuse are but a portion. These actions, criminal or drug-using, have their own effects on lives; most of which effects are not salutary, so that for many persons with chronic histories of drug abuse or crime there is increasing social disability. This disability need not be violent in the sense that others are harmed. There is also impressive evidence that most youthful illicit drug use is not associated with ill effects and much of it appears to be self-terminating—certainly violent outcomes are rare indeed when calculated in terms of their prevalence among populations of otherwise non-delinquent persons who do use illicit drugs. In absolute terms the drug most often implicated in violence is alcohol—these findings pertain to homicides, to assault, to suicide, to traffic accidents and no doubt to other offenses. Alcohol does not stand alone; its abuse is usually associated with a variety of psychological and familial disabilities not the least of which is predilection in exposed delinquent populations for the abuse of other drugs.

There is also evidence that the drugs which most people use safely, even if illicitly, and which some people use and in doing so become violent, are also

capable of benign effects. Thus almost every substance for which hurtful or violent outcomes are claimed is also claimed to have benefits and thus have led to widespread approved use of psychoactive substances in medical practice. An exception are the hallucinogens which, while claimed as beneficial by illicit users, have not yet been demonstrated to be actually beneficial. Cannabis is currently in this status. The benign effects claimed for most classes of psychoactive drugs—and for drugs used as weapons—include the control of violence. The contradictions in effects are more apparent than real; powerful agents can affect behavior; how they affect it depends on how they are used and by whom, in what settings and in what amounts. Effects are also specific by drug and class of drug so that in refining predictions one must say which drug family and which particular agent is under consideration. There appears to be no potent psychoactive agent which cannot be abused by its users or others administering it for their own ends, yet on a scale of values the tranquilizers seem least associated with unpredictable and undesirable behavioral outcomes and most associated with reductions in agitation, tension, and other feelings and behavior which presumably link to interpersonal distress. The amphetamines, while medically very useful, are not widely claimed to suppress violence—except the behavior disorders of some children and teenagers and they do have, in illicit use in uncontrolled settings, potential for unleashing bizarre and aggressive actions. The hallucinogens are also associated clinically, although not massively in terms of prevalence, with untoward reactions some of which include suicide and assault. The opiates, widely used in medicine and rarely used illicitly, unless current trends continue, have received widespread attention, probably because of the correlative life styles which show many criminals using them and the likelihood of those who use them remaining criminal. Cannabis, the most widely employed illicit drug, appears to suppress activity although the rare case will show a contrary assaultive response. The barbiturates do not appear to be widely used among delinquent populations and their use, among delinquents or others, is rarely linked to violence except for suicides in which the barbiturates play a major and frightful role. Some change in this pattern may occur as asocial persons inject barbiturates and amphetamines together or in sequence. There are a variety of other substances, such as volatile intoxicants (glue, thinner, etc.) which are in some use—especially among young and maladapted teenagers—but while these can be associated with accidental deaths there is little evidence to show them implicated as violence precipitators. On the whole, then, it may be said that the emergence of violence is rarely attributable only to the influence of drugs and, indeed, with the exception of alcohol, the absolute number of cases in which there is even an association between acute drug effects and violent conduct is low. In larger perspective there is certainly an association between illicit drug use and criminality, including violence, and in looking at lives it must be presumed that chronic illicit drug use does not facilitate rehabilitation or act as an immunizer against various kinds of destructive or damaging acts. Nevertheless when one compares illicit drug users as such as against other unskilled criminals, say assaulters as the extreme example, it will be evident that the user is not more violent and generally he will be found to be less violent than the offender with a chronic history of aggressive actions.

These generalizations apply, and only imperfectly, to populations of drug

users as they have been studied to date. They do not apply to the special cases which constitute the combination of drug use and drug merchandising which is the typical dealer. There is strong evidence that drug dealing is increasingly linked to violence; be this weapons carrying and weapons use, syndicate or other "protectionistic" associations, or robbing of one's fellow drug users and dealers. Since much police action is directed at dealers, there are special dangers in the apprehension of the offender by the police. The evidence to date points to the concentration of violence by and against dealers within the drug scene and much less often, toward the square world outside. As drug use continues to expand and as more sociopathic individuals are attracted both to that use and to dealing, one must anticipate a continued increase in the violence risk within the drug scene and, insofar as present laws are kept on the books and enforced, an increasing risk to narcotics law enforcement personnel. Insofar as these men are armed, and to the degree they are precipitous, they of course present a violence risk to illicit users as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that educational programs conducted factually and by well-trained personnel begin in elementary school and present children with up-to-date evidence on the effects of drugs, and on the significance of the use of illicit drugs.

It is recommended that programs of education be made available for parents so that they may better teach their own children how to use socially and medically employed drugs cautiously with full regard for the risks and the benefits of the range of psychoactive substances.

It is recommended that means be developed for bringing to physicians, pharmacists, narcotics officers, teachers and others who have particular responsibilities in distributing or teaching about drugs, the most up-to-date information about drug effects and the significance of drug use.

It is recommended that full support be given to programs of research and evaluation as these are being carried on by agencies such as the National Institute of Mental Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as well as by state and local agencies.

It is recommended that special briefings and workshops be held for journalists, radio and television commentators, science and police writers, etc., so that they may not only be well informed on drug matters but in the hopes that a cadre of well-informed journalists will serve as an influence on the mass media which will dampen sensationalism, and that inaccurate and misleading reporting which leads to the furtherance of myths and misunderstandings about the relationships between drugs and violence.

It is recommended that early regular use of illicit drugs or of parentally unsupervised use of alcohol or tobacco in youngsters be taken as a danger signal warning not only of the risk of increasing involvement in drugs but also as a danger signal for the development of delinquent careers with potentials for violence. Parents, physicians, teachers, the police and other adults in a position to observe children's and teen conduct must be alert to the

probability of exposure to, experimentation with, and in some few cases, incipient dependency on psychoactive drugs. These observers must be assured of the importance of communicating with and understanding children and young people so that drug use is something that can be talked about rather than hidden and lied about. When it is found that inimical habits of use are developing, there must be knowledge on hand as to what community resources exist to assist the child *and* his parents. Necessarily these requirements imply a growth of community programs in medicine, mental health and related fields, programs which are on-the-streets where the at-risk users themselves are to be found. Legislative actions must facilitate identification and referral, including nonpunitive as well as punitive handling (the latter only as a later resort), and support for community programs of education, support to parents, and development of medical, social and psychological facilities to intervene preventively and therapeutically.

Major revisions in the drug laws must be considered, including minimizing criminal penalties for exploratory drug use but providing a wider range of alternatives for youthful users identified as at risk of trouble. Since it is evident that current sanctions against traffic are not effective one must recognize the limitations of the deterrent effect on persons once they are involved heavily in the drug life. If there is to be deterrence, it must be an intervention in childhood and adolescence and, presumably, with reconstructive rather than only punitive channels emphasized. There can be little questions that punitive options must nevertheless be retained as must be long-term controls over persons identified as posing risks to others because of their involvement not only in drugs but in antisocial actions.

Since alcohol remains the number one problem as far as a link to violence is concerned, there must be legislation and social planning which will control the problem-drinker; his driving, his opportunities for suicide, and his opportunities for assaults and other crimes against persons.

It is particularly important to realize that the children and teenagers who drink without learning from their moderate parents how to do so safely, constitute a special problem occurring in large numbers and with dire potentials. Stronger controls over alcohol sales to teenagers are in order and there are needed a variety of treatment (occasional, day-care, night-care and total institutional care) facilities to which the early alcohol-involved and other drug-involved or uncontrolled youngsters can be referred. The need for such facilities implies the failure of families to provide environments where drug moderation is taught or where youthful conduct can be controlled; and while the intervention of government is necessary to replace family functions which are no longer performed, it would be heartening to look forward to massive social-psychological-moral efforts to reconstitute those now failing families so that they may once again function to rear psychologically healthy and socially constructive children.

Of the developments indicative of future risks, the growth of illicit drug dealing accompanied by increasing willingness to carry and keep handguns is the most disturbing. Violence in the marketplace of vice is a serious problem and requires complex steps, not the least of which will be better control over organized crime, approved alternatives other than illicit dealers for people who feel they must have drugs in order to survive, means other than arrest

and incarceration to reach the growing number of illicit dealers and to enlist their own anxieties in the service of either their entering legitimate careers or at least seeking care for their often-noted emotional disorders.

As a corollary to the increasing armed violence in the drug scene, it is apparent that the handgun is paramount and that there exists ready access to weapons through legitimate or underworld channels. Laws to eliminate the handgun entirely from use in the United States—with very heavy penalties for violation—are in order. There should be provisions for payment on surrendering weapons. Compulsory registration of rifles and shotguns may also be in order.

A special problem exists in the link between drug traffic and arms traffic, that an accident of the ubiquitous interests of the professional smuggler-criminal and of the rising need for weapons in organized drug traffic. Given the present permeability of our borders, it is clear that stronger controls are in order, as for example increased competency among Bureau of Customs personnel, increased staff for the Border Patrol, and so forth. Improved security is also called for in National Guard armories, gun stores, and other weapons-storage facilities, for guns stolen from these facilities fall into the hands of drug traffickers.

Although it is apparent that the problems of individual criminal violence linked to drug use are associated with the more bedeviling problems of sociopathy, urban slums, psychological disturbance, and the like, one must not ignore an ethical or moral component which implies a lack of commitment on the part of one man to the welfare of another. Given the failure of some families to inculcate these principles, there is reason to further moral education through other instructions. Aside from churches which are aimed at the moral development of the child and a new kind of school teaching which emphasizes through participation and individual exploration the nature of the human community—and what that community requires if each of its members is to survive and be joyful—may very well be in order. It is proposed that massive demonstration programs be undertaken in schools, in recreational programs, and in youth organizations to recruit pre-delinquent youth and to educate them to the concepts of community and their own role and responsibilities therein. These institutions may also serve as places to identify the most asocial or distressed youths and to channel them into special service programs. Implicit here is a large scale infusion of competent and dedicated personnel into work with America's youth of all races, places and strata. Also implicit is that all Americans must be willing to rededicate themselves to the ideal of a democratic community which functions without exploitation, racism, or rampant self-interest and which, as a nation-community, reaffirms with personal warmth and enthusiasm the value of each one of us to each other.

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APPENDIX 33

ACCIDENTS AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: ARE THEY RELATED?

By Julian A. Waller, M.D.*

I. SUMMARY

Accidental injury is unintentional injury resulting from rapid release of energy from nonbiologic sources. Injury from violence is intentional injury to one's self or to others from such energy release.

Measuring the Size of the Problem

Approximately 112,000 deaths a year are attributed to accidents, 21,000 to suicide, and 12,000 to homicide. An estimated 50 million nonfatal accidents are believed to occur annually, whereas there are 200,000-500,000 suicide attempts and at least a half million nonfatal assaults. There is much variation between communities in methods for classifying these three categories of injury, however, and in criteria for reporting them. With few exceptions, therefore, accurate information about the frequency of injury, the category of injury, and factors involved, including characteristics of individuals involved and the role of alcohol, is available only from special scientific investigations.

Comparative Distributions of Accidents and Violence

Fatal accident rates are highest among the young and the elderly; those from homicide are highest among young adults; and death rates from suicide are highest among the elderly. Fatal accident and homicide rates are higher among nonwhites, whereas suicide rates are higher among whites. Fatal accidents and violence are more common among men than women, and tend to occur during evening and nighttime hours and on weekends.

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Characteristics of Persons Involved in Accidents

By and large, the prevention and control of injury—whether unintentional or intentional—has been directed at the general public under the assumptions that all are at equal risk of injury-producing behavior, and that all are equally capable of modifying such behavior if the motivations, or the deterrents to deviant behavior, are made strong enough. Research has shown that the more serious the injury, the more likely is it that these assumptions are incorrect. Specifically, such research has demonstrated the following:

(1) Alcohol—often in very high blood concentrations—is the most important single human factor yet identified in serious and fatal accidents and in homicides, and is frequently found in suicide as well. Many of the individuals with these high blood alcohol concentrations have alcoholism or otherwise use alcohol excessively and have had such identifiable patterns for several years previously. Persons with injuries in which alcohol is a factor very commonly have histories of violent behavior as well.

(2) Patterns of suicidal behavior, low tolerance to frustration, aggressive behavior and poor control of hostility have been identified among persons with serious accidents. It is not known, however, how often such patterns are associated with the use of alcohol or are related to accident-producing behavior in which alcohol is not a factor.

(3) Persons with sociopathic behavior patterns appear to have excessive contacts with police agencies because of violent behavior, and various other offenses including frequent traffic citations. It is not clear, on the basis of research to date, whether they also have higher accident rates than do other persons of similar age.

(4) Drivers with chronic medical conditions have been identified as a specific group with high accident risk but *without* concomitantly high risk of involvement in violence.

(5) The high crash experience of teenage drivers appears to reflect several factors, such as aggressive behavior, the processes of learning how to drive, to drink, and to perform other adult activities, and other factors, both human and environmental. With the exception of alcohol, the actual contribution of these, either alone or in combination with other factors, is not currently known, however.

(6) Among some children with excessively frequent injury, aggressive behavior, hyperactivity, and low tolerance to frustration have been indicated to be injury factors. Parental indifference to—or even support of—injury-producing behavior has been implicated as well. Normal patterns of development, however, also appear to be involved in some accidents to children.

(7) A study comparing persons who accidentally shot themselves or others with those whom they shot and with persons not in gun accidents found that the shooters more often were previously known to the police, had arrests for violence or for alcohol, and had previous highway crashes and traffic citations.

Prevention and Control of Injury

Several options exist for reducing both the frequency of injury-producing events and the toll of death and disability from these events. It is possible to prevent the marshaling of hazardous energy itself, to prevent or modify its release, to remove man from the vicinity of the hazard, to interpose barriers which will block or modify the action of the energy on man, and, finally, to provide prompt and effective care to those who have been injured.

Three major obstacles to achieving effective programs for injury control—and whose correction deserves highest priority—are the need for—

(1) Improvement of the quality of information available from official sources about the frequency of injury, whether it is unintentional or intentional, and factors associated with its occurrence.

(2) Recruitment, training and retention of well qualified members of the injury control team, such as police, judges and magistrates, coroners, probation and welfare personnel, and ambulance crews, and

(3) Early identification and rehabilitation of persons who are likely to have persistently excessive involvement in accidents and violence.

II. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

At a recent meeting of the American Medical Association (1),* the frequency of “violence on the highway” was compared with that of “crimes of violence.” In actual practice if one person fatally injures another person by accident the injurer commonly is considered, from the legal point of view, to have committed involuntary homicide. The criminal and civil codes of law in other ways also blur to a substantial degree the distinction between accidents and crimes of violence.

Organizations such as National Safety Council, on the other hand, carefully attempt to limit their activities to situations where there is no conscious intent to create property damage, injury, or both. It is necessary to distinguish, therefore, as to what is accident and what is violence. In what ways and among which individuals are they related phenomena? Among which individuals are they unrelated? To what degree are methods which are appropriate for the prevention or control of one appropriate for the prevention or control of the other? The answers to these questions are the subject of this report.

In comparing injury resulting from accident and from violence the following definitions will be used:

Accidental injury is injury resulting from rapid release of energy from nonbiologic sources in the course of activities in which there is no conscious intent to create injury to the person or property injured. Thus, unintentional injury from contact with bacteria or viruses would be excluded, whereas unintentional injury from chemical, thermal, kinetic, radiation or other energy would be included provided the release of such energy occurred over a short time period. Injury from such energy released over a longer time

*Numbers in parentheses indicate source references in app. I. Superscript numbers indicate annotations in app. II.

commonly—and arbitrarily—is considered in other categories, for example, occupational illness, or damage from air or water pollution. Injury resulting from combative sports such as boxing, wrestling or hunting would be considered unintentional because the stated goal of the first two is to score points rather than to injure, whereas the stated goal of hunting is to injure game rather than people.

Injury from violence for purposes of this discussion is injury resulting from activities in which there is *conscious intent* to hurt others or their property or to injure oneself. Assault, rape, homicide and suicide would be considered acts of violence.

III. MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM

About 112,000 people are reported to have died in the United States in 1967 as a result of accidental injury (2), and an estimated 50,000,000 people were unintentionally injured severely enough to seek medical care or to lose a day or more of usual activities (2). About half of the deaths, but less than 10 percent of the nonfatal injuries resulted from highway crashes, whereas a quarter of the deaths and almost half of the nonfatal injuries were from accidents in or around the home (2).

According to official sources 22,000 people died in 1967 as a result of suicide, and an estimated 200,000-500,000 each year make suicide attempts that do not result in death (3). Homicide took the lives of over 12,000 in 1967, and at least a half million persons were assaulted nonfatally² (4).

Important questions must be raised about these figures, however. To what extent is there underreporting or overreporting of such events? To what extent is there misclassification between events?

Among fatalities, there probably is fairly complete reporting of the total number of all deaths believed by the certifying investigators to be accidents, homicide and suicide combined. Among such reported deaths, however, substantial error in classification is believed to exist. At present, accurate information usually is available only from special scientific studies. A recent investigation (5) of fatalities in single vehicle crashes, for example, suggests that where complete autopsies are not routinely performed—a situation common in most states—as many as 10 percent or more of fatalities in certain types of highway crashes may be erroneously attributed to accident although the correct cause of death is heart attack or other nontraumatic reason.

Conversely, Edland (6) has reported that 13 out of 86 crash fatalities that were listed as accident in Kansas City Mo., should have been listed as suicide. He notes that these individuals were immature and unstable with past records of failure, marital and family disharmony and poor work records. He also states that "with one exception all of the fatalities followed quarrels with wives, sweethearts, or other family members, or employers. The exception was a pimp whose life was in danger. The investigators were only able to have one of these deaths certified as suicide." Edland states that—

suicides in one area are often viewed as accidental deaths in another. Various public officials with training varying from extensive to none are charged with this responsibility: often superimposed upon which are various religious, social, and community pressures tending to influence

the criteria. . . . It is the attitude of the certifying official, not the victim, upon which the statistics of suicide depend.

One pathologist is of the opinion that it is common practice to record as accidental all deaths from poisoning by central nervous system depressants in which there is no suicide note and in which the blood alcohol concentration is 30 mg percent (0.03 percent by weight) or higher, even in those cases where there is considerable suspicion of suicide (7). Shneidman believes that as many as 50,000 fatal suicides occur annually but that at least half are disguised by the listing of another cause of death on the death certificate (3).

Relatively little is known about the frequency with which homicide is misclassified as accident or vice versa although individual case reports of such events appear periodically. An entire body of literature, however, has developed about the "battered child" where such misclassification is believed to be rather common. This type of misclassification is noteworthy because laws have been passed requiring physicians to report battered or otherwise maltreated children to the police. Such laws provide official recognition that there is considerable reluctance to state that the injuries involved are intentional, even where there is strong suspicion or evidence that this is the case. As one investigator (8) notes, "to some physicians the idea that the parents abused their child is so repugnant that they deny this possibility even in the face of clear-cut evidence." In one state, only half of the cases of child abuse suspected by physicians were reported to the authorities (9).

Another example of misclassification is that in which, because of legal custom, accidental events are listed as homicide. In California, all coroners except one list as "homicide" deaths in which one person accidentally shoots another. In one county only such deaths are reported as "homicide (accidental)" (10). Because of these obvious problems of misclassification, Shneidman has proposed that deaths might more appropriately be classified as intentional, subintentional, and unintentional (11).

Even greater question exists about the accuracy of estimates of the frequency of events that do not result in death. Nonfatal accidents, with the exception of highway crashes, work injuries and some recreational injuries, are not reportable. Even where reporting does occur differences between states and communities in official criteria for reporting make it difficult, at best, to arrive at meaningful comparative estimates. Furthermore, as a study from California showed (12), a substantial proportion of relatively minor events may not be reported even where reporting is required. The best estimate of nonfatal accidents resulting in injury is based on National Health Survey interviews.

Estimates of nonfatal suicide attempts are particularly unreliable because few are willing to admit to unsuccessful suicide attempts, and because many of those that are described may purposely be called accidents. Furthermore, all incompleting attempts cannot be classified equally but must be separated into true attempts at self destruction and those that are simply suicide gestures.

There is now good documentation (13, 14) that at least in some jurisdictions official police statistics may list fewer than half of reportable crimes of violence, such as aggravated assault and forcible rape. FBI figures

for unaggravated assault are available for 4,566 jurisdictions covering only about three-quarters of the population of the United States (4).

The absence of consistently accurate information about the frequency of injury-producing events is a serious roadblock to measuring either the problem or the effectiveness of methods for dealing with it. An even more serious roadblock, however, is that there probably are important socioeconomic, racial, age related and other biases which result in selectively greater under or overstatement, or misclassification, of injury-producing events in specific segments of the population. Such biases may make it difficult or even impossible to decide with any degree of accuracy in which areas or among which population groups greatest program efforts must be placed.

Furthermore, in order to make comparisons as to the frequency of injury among different groups, it is necessary to know not only how often such persons are injured but how often they are engaged in activities in which they are exposed to risk of injury. Such information rarely is available. Some studies of highway crashes or citations report rates per unit miles of driving exposure. One study has reported on ski injury rates per 1,000 man-days of skiing (15). For the most part, however, rates, when given, are per 100 persons irrespective of the frequency with which these persons are exposed to the hazard in question. Men, for example, have higher crash rates per 100 drivers than do women, but the difference disappears when rates are compared per unit miles of driving (16, 17).

In one study of homicide (18) it is noted that differences in the frequency of homicide according to age may be related to the fact that certain age groups "engage more frequently in particular activities such as drinking and gambling—activities which are conducive to quarreling and violence," or that the distribution of murder according to time of day follows the pattern of leisure time available for interaction between people. But we do not know how often particular groups are engaged in these activities believed to be associated with high risk of assault and murder. Until official or commonly available sources of data can be counted upon as being more consistently accurate, the best information will continue to come from special studies and from the relatively few medical examiners' offices in which complete autopsies and complete social histories are regularly obtained.

COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIDENTS AND VIOLENCE

One measure of the degree to which accidents and violence are similar is the extent to which they follow similar patterns of distribution in the population. Such patterns are compared below for fatalities only since, as was noted, information about nonfatal events is sparse and usually of unknown accuracy.

Table 1 shows fatality rates per 100,000 population from all accidents, highway crashes, suicide and homicide in each 10-year age group among whites and nonwhites (predominantly Negro) age 15 or older. Among whites, the peak accident and fatality rates are among the young and the elderly, and the peak homicide rates are among the young.

Among nonwhites, total accident rates rise with increasing age, whereas crash and suicide rates tend to be fairly level among almost all age groups.

Table 1.—Fatal accident, highway crash, suicide and homicide rates per 100,000 population according to age among whites and nonwhites age 15 and older, United States, 1956 (19)

Age	Whites				Nonwhites			
	All accidents	Highway crashes	Suicide	Homicide	All accidents	Highway crashes	Suicide	Homicide
15-24	61.9	45.5	3.6	3.3	60.5	35.0	5.8	31.3
25-34	46.2	28.7	12.6	5.2	71.9	38.5	9.8	61.4
35-44	42.6	23.5	17.6	4.8	78.1	33.2	9.2	51.5
45-54	51.1	24.5	22.0	3.9	84.0	33.4	8.6	34.4
55-64	61.5	28.2	25.4	3.3	94.2	36.3	8.3	21.4
65-74	88.1	35.0	23.1	2.3	123.3	40.6	8.4	16.0
75-84	204.3	46.8	25.4	2.2	145.9	29.3	9.1	9.4
85 and older	636.0	41.5	26.0	1.9	305.3	28.4	7.4	7.4

Homicide rates are highest among the young. The overall accident, crash fatality and homicide rates are higher among nonwhites than whites, whereas suicide rates consistently are lower among nonwhites.

This table suggests that accidents, suicide and homicide, at best, are only tenuously related. As will be described later, among certain groups, especially persons who use alcohol heavily, important relationships do exist among these three forms of injury. However, among other groups such relationships do not exist. Crude measurements such as the national death rates sometimes may obscure important relationships because such rates represent a combination of patterns of many different groups of people with widely divergent life styles, and of many different factors that affect not only the rate of injury but also the likelihood of survival after injury.

As shown in table 2, men consistently more often die as a result of all accidents, crashes, suicide and homicide than do women. Information about the days of the week, or hours at which suicides occur is not available. Such information has been collected, however, for highway crashes and homicides in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (18, 20). As seen in tables 3 and 4, fatal highway crashes and homicides both tend to occur disproportionately on weekends and during evening and nighttime hours.

Table 2.—Fatal accident, highway crash, suicide and homicide rates per 100,000 population according to sex among whites and nonwhites age 15 and older, United States, 1965 (19)

	Whites			
	All accidents	Highway crashes	Suicide	Homicide
Males	75.1	37.1	17.4	4.4
Females . .	34.0	13.9	6.6	1.6
	Nonwhites			
	All accidents	Highway crashes	Suicide	Homicide
Males	98.6	39.7	7.7	40.1
Females . .	37.3	12.8	2.5	10.0

One study (21) showed that communities with high death rates from highway crashes also have high death rates from violence, and high rates of crime, whereas those with low death rates from crashes have low crime and violence rates. The author of this study states that "whatever factors play a part in the positive correlation of suicide-homicide, other crimes, and accident death rates, there is no reason to doubt that aggressive, hazardous driving is likely to be characteristic of persons similar to those who have suicidal or homicidal or both tendencies—and vice versa."

Although the distributions of accidents and violence according to age and race suggest rather limited relationships between such events, the distributions of these types of injury according to sex, time and place suggest that some important relationships may exist. Haddon, Suchman, and Klein (22) have observed that results of analyses such as these are interesting but that—

Table 3.—Percentage of fatal highway crashes and homicides occurring each day of the week

Day of week	Highway crashes	Homicides
Monday	15.0	8.6
Tuesday	10.8	8.9
Wednesday	11.8	8.9
Thursday	10.8	11.3
Friday	15.2	15.6
Saturday	18.0	27.0
Sunday	18.2	19.6
Total percent	99.8	99.9
Number	(499)	(652)

Highway crashes occurred in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955-57 (20).
Homicides occurred in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1947-53 (18).

Table 4.—Percentage of fatal highway crashes and homicides occurring at different times of day

Hour	Highway crashes	Homicides
Noon-3 p.m.	9.3	7.6
3-6 p.m.	14.5	12.4
6-9 p.m.	17.7	19.0
9 p.m.-midnight	18.2	23.3
Midnight-3 a.m.	16.1	20.2
3-6 a.m.	9.5	9.2
6-9 a.m.	9.5	3.5
9 a.m.-noon	5.2	4.8
Total percent	100.0	100.0
Number	(496)	(622)

Highway crashes occurred in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955-57 (20).
Homicides occurred in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1947-53 (18).

they are subject to the same criticism that might be leveled against any conclusions based on purely statistical correlations without ancillary evidence. Covariation of group rates is insufficient evidence of causality, because independent factors may be responsible for the differing rates, or both may result from a common cause rather than one from the other. Furthermore, group rates may not be indicative of individual relationships.

As will be shown, ancillary evidence does exist linking accidents and violence among specific population groups.

V. CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS

For many years there have been attempts to identify characteristics that distinguish individuals who are involved in accidents from those who are not, and especially to identify those who are involved on frequent occasions.

Among the major flaws of many of these studies has been the failure of the investigators to recognize that environmental, social and other factors may play as important a role in the initiation and outcome of accidents as do human factors in individuals. Contrary to what has been frequently suggested, *accidents are not an unusual phenomenon with unique laws of causation. They can be studied and controlled by means of epidemiologic and other scientific methods as effectively as can any other area that has concerned the medical and other scientific professions.*

Investigators often have assumed that a single human factor—for example, “accident proneness”—may explain a broad range of injury experience, but they have failed to realize that, conversely, a single class of accident may be the result of several major patterns of human-environmental interaction just as are many other types of phenomena. It cannot be over-emphasized that, *although accidents and violence appear to be related phenomena for certain groups of individuals, no such relationship exists for other groups.* In addition, relationships may exist only for certain limited time periods instead of invariably being constant over many years. In this section characteristics of several population groups will be described. Some have greater than average risk of involvement both in accidents and violence. Others, on the basis of currently available information, have high accident risk only. Still others appear only to have excessive involvement in violence.

A. Alcohol and Alcoholism

The ingestion of alcohol is the single most important human factor yet identified among accidents that result in death to persons age 15 or older. It is also commonly associated with homicide and suicide. Table 5 shows examples of the frequency with which alcohol is found among persons responsible for injury events, those with responsibility undetermined, those believed not responsible, and persons not involved in such events. Alcohol is present among persons in injury-producing events, whether accidental or violent, much more often than among persons not in such events. With certain exceptions to be discussed later, those initiating injury of any particular type more often have alcohol, and have high alcohol concentrations, than do those who are classified as “victims” of that type of injury.

There is now considerable evidence that problem drinkers and others who use alcohol excessively comprise a substantial proportion of persons in accidents involving alcohol (27, 30-32). Among such persons accidents and violence are highly correlated. Such correlation is found much less often among persons whose accidents do not involve alcohol and who are not problem drinkers.

This evidence is of two types. In the first, arrest records and contacts with community service agencies have been compared for drivers who have crashes or citations involving alcohol and for drivers who have crashes or citations without alcohol, or who have incident-free records.

Table 6 shows some results from one of these studies (30). Almost two-thirds of the drunken drivers, and half of the drivers in crashes involving alcohol and hit-and-run crashes met the criterion used for problem drinking, namely, two or more previous arrests involving misuse of alcohol. These

Table 5.—Frequency of alcohol and of blood alcohol concentrations of 100 mg percent (0.10 percent by wt) and higher among persons involved in fatal injury producing events and persons not involved in such events¹

	Percent with alcohol	Percent with 100 mg percent (0.10 percent by wt) or higher
Persons believed responsible for initiating fatal injury events:		
Drivers, single vehicle crashes (23)	63	55
Drivers believed responsible for two-vehicle crashes (23)	49	39
Pilots in private plane crashes (24)	35	20
Drownings (25)	61	45
Poisonings ² (25)	75	71
Suicides ² (25)	36	26
Persons charged with homicide (26)	54	Unknown
Fatally injured persons whose responsibility for event is unknown or not investigated:		
Drivers, responsibility unknown (23)	24	17
Pedestrians (23)	49	42
Fires (25)	63	58
Miscellaneous accidents (25)	24	22
Persons whose fatal injuries were believed to result from the action of others:		
Drivers believed not responsible (23)	26	14
Passengers (26)	42	26
Victims of homicide (26)	53	Unknown
Persons not involved in injury events:		
Drivers on road at similar times and places to fatal crashes (28)	21	3
Pedestrians on road at similar times and places to pedestrian fatalities (29)	26	7
Persons who died of “natural” causes (25)	14	7

¹Ref. 1 is from 41 California counties in 1966; ref. 24 is for entire United States during 1963; ref. 25 is for Sacramento County, Calif., 1964-65; ref. 26 is for Philadelphia, 1948-52; ref. 27 is for Sacramento and Alameda Counties, Calif., from 1960-67 and San Francisco County, 1950-67; ref. 28 is for New York City, 1959-60; ref. 29 is for New York City, 1959.

²It is quite likely that the proportion of suicides involving alcohol is higher than that noted, whereas the proportion of unintentional poisonings involving alcohol is lower since, if alcohol is present, many deaths involving poisoning are routinely listed as accidental instead of suicide.

drivers also significantly more often had previous arrests for violence than did drivers with incident-free records or incidents not involving alcohol. Among the drunken drivers it was noted that—

almost three quarters of their many arrests involved drinking. Their marriages often were in a state of dissolution because of excessive drinking. Among drunken drivers, arrest reports commonly observed that the person had been arrested for assaulting his wife, when he

arrived home intoxicated and she began scolding him for his alcoholic pattern.

Drivers with arrest warrants for ignoring traffic citations also had highly deviant patterns with respect to violence and other offenses. Characteristics of this group, however, will be discussed later.

In another related study (33), arrest records were compared for drivers age 15 or older, with different blood alcohol concentrations, who died as a result of single vehicle crashes. Table 7 shows the proportions of drivers with arrests for different types of violence among persons who died with little or no alcohol present, with high blood alcohol concentrations, and with extremely high concentrations. Table 8 shows the proportions of drivers with such arrests among persons with and without previous arrests for public drunkenness. Drivers with high alcohol concentrations, and drivers with previous drunkenness arrests, more frequently had histories of arrests for violence than did those with low concentrations or without drunkenness arrests. In each blood alcohol group, more drivers with previous drunkenness arrests had been arrested for assault, disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, or resisting arrest than had drivers without drunkenness arrests.

The fact that the deviant behavior begins at a fairly early age and appears to continue rather predictably is of major importance for the early identification of injury-producing behavior patterns and for prevention of further difficulty. As noted in the first study (30):

In a majority of cases, the pattern of difficulty with the use of alcohol could have been identified at least five years earlier, and usually contact had been made with some community agency before the person had reached the age of 25 or 30. Such initial contact usually expanded

Table 7.—Percentage of persons with previous arrests for crimes of violence, and with crashes during the previous 3 years among drivers with different blood alcohol concentrations who were fatally injured in single vehicle crashes, California, 1963-64 (33)

Previous record	Blood alcohol concentration		
	Less than 50 mg percent (0.05 percent by wt)	50-150 mg percent (0.05-0.15 percent by wt)	Greater than 150 mg percent (0.15 by wt)
Assault, homicide, manslaughter	1.6	6.0	8.5
Rape or intent to rape8	1.2	1.4
Disturbing peace, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest . . .	3.3	6.0	8.1
Vandalism, malicious mischief, property damage	1.6	.0	3.3
Highway crashes	18.7	39.8	29.4
Number of persons . .	123	83	211

Table 6.—Percentage of men known to community service agencies, with two or more previous arrests involving alcohol, and with previous arrests for violence among men with no crashes or traffic citations, with citations for moving violations, with crashes involving alcohol or hit-and-run crashes, and with arrests for driving while intoxicated and related offenses, Oakland, Calif., 1965 (30)

	No crashes or citations	Citations for moving traffic violations of all sorts except drunken driving	Crashes not involving alcohol	Arrest warrants for ignoring traffic citations	Crashes involving alcohol or hit-or-run crashes	Arrests for driving while intoxicated and related offenses
Previously known to community agencies	19	34	39	68	76	87
2 or more previous arrests involving alcohol	3	8	14	29	50	63
Previous arrests for violence*	5	8	9	37	36	27
Number of persons	150	131	117	19	33	150

*Violence in this case refers to actual assault upon another person. Arrests for drunken and disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and similar offenses as well as for sex offenses are listed separately.

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Crimes of Violence

Table 8.—Percentage of persons with previous arrests for crimes of violence, and with crashes during the previous 3 years among drivers with and without previous arrests for public drunkenness who were fatally injured in single vehicle crashes, California, 1963-64 (33)

Previous record	Without public drunkenness arrests	With public drunkenness arrests
Assault, homicide, manslaughter	3.3	13.3
Rape or intent to rape	1.0	1.8
Disturbing peace, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest . . .	2.0	17.7
Vandalism, malicious mischief, property damage	1.0	5.3
Highway crashes	29.8	34.5
Number of persons . .	304	113

rather rapidly into multiple contacts with many agencies as the person and his family became more deeply engulfed in the deluge of alcohol-related problems.

Despite the availability of such information, an impression that a drinking problem existed was considered in less than a quarter of the drunken drivers, and a medical diagnosis of alcoholism was made in less than 10%. At times the diagnosis was missed because an agency worker shared with the general public the mistaken impression that alcoholism exists only where a person is grossly intoxicated almost every day, or meets the image of the "skid row bum." The need for, and the potential of, inservice education of professional agency personnel on the subject of alcoholism is obvious.

In the second type of study life experiences of persons with known alcoholism have been identified. Brenner (34), for example, has reported that the death rate per 100,000 man-years from accidents of all types combined among alcoholic persons is 7.0 times that expected for a nonalcoholic population of similar age and sex. The death rate from suicide in the alcoholic group is 3.5 times that expected. The death rate involving homicide was not reported. It may also be important to examine the effect of alcoholic behavior on the accident and violence patterns of families of alcoholic persons (35).

The studies relating alcohol to accidents and violence help to explain some of the similarities of these types of injuries that were noted in the section on Comparative Distribution. As seen in table 9, the distribution of arrests for drunkenness according to day of week parallels the distribution of fatal highway crashes and homicides. In similar fashion, the preponderance of fatal crashes and homicides during evening and nighttime hours, among males, and during the young adult years also is believed to reflect the greater use of alcohol in the evening and at night, and the greater use in frequency and quantity per sitting among young males.

The heavy drinking patterns that have been described among Negroes (36) and American Indians (37) may explain, in part at least, higher homicide rates among nonwhites, and higher fatal crash rates for nonwhites during the young adult and middle adult years of life. Perhaps nonwhite teenagers and oldsters have lower fatal crash rates than whites of similar age because they may be less likely to own and to drive cars for socioeconomic and other reasons.

Table 9.—Percentage of fatal highway crashes, homicides, and arrests for drunkenness occurring each day of the week*

	Highway crashes	Homicides	Drunkenness arrests (white males)	Drunkenness arrests (Negro males)
Monday	15.0	8.6	11.0	7.8
Tuesday	10.8	8.9	12.2	6.6
Wednesday	11.8	8.9	11.3	6.4
Thursday	10.8	11.3	11.1	7.6
Friday	15.2	15.6	16.6	17.6
Saturday	18.0	27.0	26.8	36.6
Sunday	18.2	19.6	11.1	17.4
Total percent	99.8	19.9	100.1	100.0
Number	(499)	(652)	(19,657)	(22,486)

*Highway crashes occurred in 1955-57, Cuyahoga County, Ohio (20); homicides occurred in 1947-53, Cuyahoga County, Ohio (18); drunkenness arrests occurred in 1961, Atlanta, Ga. (36).

B. Aggression

Aggressive behavior and "accident proneness" or unconsciously intended accidents appear to be important factors in the accident experience of some individuals and at certain times. In many accidents these factors appear not to be relevant, however. The concept of "accident proneness" has been promulgated since 1926 as an entity responsible for many, if not most, accidents (38). Karl Menninger (39) has referred to purposive accidents which he feels "are similar to other forms of self-destruction with motives including aggression, self-punishment, and propitiation (the principle of sacrifice)." Franz Alexander (40) has said that—

in most accidents there is an element of intention, though this intention is by no means conscious. In other words, most accidents are unconsciously intended. They belong to that category of phenomena which were described by Freud as the errors of everyday life such as misplacing an object, forgetting to mail a letter and carrying it for days in one's pocket, misspelling or mispronouncing a word. Freud showed convincingly that such errors are not accidental in the strict sense of the word but are unconsciously intended.

More recently it has been recognized that such patterns may be applicable only to certain types of situations and to certain crisis periods in the lives of individuals but that they are not as widely relevant as Alexander suggested.

Studies about the role of aggressive behavior as a subconscious factor in the initiation of accidents are closely related to the concept of accident proneness. The aggressive patterns described in many of these studies are identified by means of psychological tests or interviews. Other studies have reported demonstrated patterns of aggressive behavior in real life. In one study (41) drivers with crashes have been reported to have significantly less control of hostility, less tolerance of tension, and to be more aggressive than drivers without crashes.

Higher crash rates were found in another study (42) based on both attitudes and previous behavior, among persons with histories of suicidal preoccupation or attempts, chronic depression and self-deprecation, low frustration tolerance, chronic or frequently recurrent rage or resentment toward others, and destructive or aggressive behavior when drunk, but not when sober. This study is of particular importance because it suggests that, among persons with alcoholism, those who have these traits may have higher crash risk than do persons without these behavioral patterns. Other studies (43, 44) have suggested that some groups selectively become more reckless in their driving behavior when under the influence of alcohol than do others. According to one investigation (31) many of the fatal crashes involving alcoholic persons were directly preceded by quarrels, and 39% of alcoholic drivers in these fatal crashes had previous histories of "more than one unprovoked physical fight after age 18." Only 3 percent of non-alcoholic drivers in such crashes and 9% of drivers not in fatal crashes had such histories.

There can be little question that aggressive behavior plays an important role in the accident experience of some individuals, at least as measured by their crash experience. Much diversity exists, however, in the definitions and methodology used in many of the studies. It is not possible at this time to state whether the patterns of aggression that have been described are largely associated with alcohol and alcoholism, or whether other groups have accident patterns in which aggression in the absence of alcohol plays a major role. Also, on the basis of currently available information it is not yet possible to say what proportion of accidents or of fatal accidents involve individuals who at that time also have high risk of involvement in violence.

C. Sociopathic Behavior

Persons with sociopathic behavior appear to be excessively involved in acts of violence and to have frequent citations for traffic offenses. It is not clear, however, whether they also have excessive accident rates. The development of a sociopathic behavior pattern has been described as follows (45):

Typically [the sociopathic child] is characterized by an emotional immaturity reflected by his impulsive and instant response to his feelings . . . Certain lines of conduct particularly of a socialized nature are never learned . . . Frequently these preadolescent psychopaths steal, run away, suffer from enuresis, are destructive, quarrelsome, sulky, deceitful, obstinate, defiant, boastful, shameless and erratic. Antagonism or open rebellion against a dominating parent may be shown. The adolescent resists the ideals and mores of his family and

tends to socialize at a lower level. With approaching maturity and the weakening of the restraining forces of the home and with the increase of responsibilities and of environmental contacts and demands, the earlier tendencies become outspoken manifestations . . . In spite of the fact that his conduct is so inadequate or so hostile from a social standpoint the psychopath is satisfied with it. He shows few feelings of anxiety, guilt or of remorse and is unable to profit either from experience or punishment . . . The psychopath lacks purpose, aim and foresight, is deficient in sense of responsibility and lives for the moment . . . He does not, either, build up a sense of social values as normally should occur through the process of identification . . . The demands of instinct are not adjusted to the demands of society.

As was noted in the section on Alcohol and Alcoholism a small group of drivers was identified with arrest warrants for ignoring traffic citations (30). These drivers exceeded all other groups in the study described in proportions of persons with arrests for violence, sex offenses, illegal use of drugs, theft and miscellaneous offenses. This group of teenagers and young adults had active histories of antisocial behavior going back to preadolescence or early adolescence. About three-quarters of them had previous citations for moving traffic violations during the 3 years previous to the study—about twice that expected for their age group. Surprisingly, however, only 12 percent had highway crashes during this time, a proportion that did not exceed the expected crash experience. Similar observations have been made for persons with previous arrests for illegal use of drugs in a different study (17).

The role of the sociopathic pattern in the occurrence of accidents and in the relationship between accidents and violence has barely been explored using appropriate scientific techniques. Therefore, any conclusions are largely tentative because adequate data are not yet available. It would appear on the basis of the scanty data that at least some persons with sociopathic patterns are excessively involved in acts of violence and in driving behavior that results in frequent flaunting of traffic laws, frequent citations, but not in excessive accidents when compared with persons of similar age.

This group does present serious problems to motor vehicle authorities because of the frequency with which they are identified as negligent operators. Furthermore, because of their pattern of flaunting authority, there is a distinct possibility that their contacts with police personnel may frequently result in high speed vehicular chase with the resultant hazard of crashes involving the offender, the police, or an innocent third party (46). As has been demonstrated in one study, (47) a sizable proportion of persons in hit-and-run crashes may have sociopathic patterns. Nothing is known about the patterns of nonhighway accidents among persons with sociopathic behavior.

D. Chronic Medical Conditions

Persons with chronic medical conditions have greater than average accident experience but, on the basis of present information, do not have concomitant high violence experience. Most of the information about this group is based on driving records. It has been shown that drivers with cardiovascular disease,

diabetes, and epilepsy have significantly higher crash rates and different types of crashes than do drivers of similar age without these conditions (17, 44, 48) and that most, if not all, of the higher crash experience of elderly drivers occurs to those with chronic medical conditions. (49). Elderly drivers without these conditions have crash rates fairly comparable to those of healthy middle age drivers. The scanty information available about the nonhighway injury experience of persons with medical conditions suggests that, in the nonhighway setting also, such persons are at greater than average risk of unintentional injury (50, 51).

In one study (17), drivers with medical conditions who were adjudged to have poorest attitude toward following their medical regimens or toward driving with revoked driving licenses had somewhat (but not significantly) higher crash and citation rates than did those with good attitude. The preponderance of persons with chronic medical conditions are in age ranges where violence against others is infrequent. Death from suicide is more frequent in these age ranges, however, and some studies have found poor health to be an occasional reason for committing suicide (52). However, no information currently suggests a consistent relationship between accidents and violence among persons with high risk of accidental injury related to medical conditions.

E. Teenage Behavior

The relationship of injury and teenage behavior is discussed separately because teenagers consistently are reported to have excessive crash experience either per number of drivers or per unit of miles driven, and because driving by teenagers is associated in the minds of many with overt display of aggressiveness. Careful analysis of teenage injury experience illustrates the multiple causative factors—both human and environmental—involved in accidents, as well as many of the pitfalls existing in the evaluation of relationships between injury and underlying factors.

Difficulties in defining the relationship begin with the quality of information available. Klein (53), for example, states that—

a major problem stems from the fact that most studies of teenage driving use a quantitative rather than qualitative approach and involve population samples chosen for their proximity or their administrative convenience rather than from theoretical considerations. Despite all that we have learned about the inadequacy, the inaccuracy, the biases, and the irrelevance of police records and motor vehicle data much research relies exclusively on such data—in the hope, apparently, that if one uses large enough numbers, the truth will emerge.

In illustration he notes that—

in the case of minor accidents, for example, the teenager is not personally or financially responsible enough—or sufficiently skilled in social interaction—to settle matters amicably at the side of the road. Hence, accidents which between adults would involve nothing more than an exchange of license and insurance information are more likely,

when a teenager is involved, to become matters of official record. The same phenomenon seems likely to occur in connection with violations. The respectably dressed, middle-aged, middle-class driver is far more likely than the leather-jacketed uncombed teenager to be able to talk his way out of a summons, even though both commit precisely the same violation. In both accidents and violations, then, the same kind of behavior and the same frequency of involvement is likely to be more heavily reported and more severely punished when it is manifested by the minority group, and the extent of teenage culpability for accidents is at least in part an artifact of minority-group prejudice by judge and jury.

A second problem lies in the frequent assumption that the teenage group—or any other group, for that matter—is homogeneous with respect to driving behavior and injury experience, as well as many other factors. Klein notes that the testing of permissible limits of action laid down by the dominant group—

may involve the single individual who shuttles back and forth between highly conforming and highly deviant behavior in order to discover the scope of his repertoire or it may involve different individuals, some of whom are consistently hyperconforming while others live at the very margin of permissible behavior. . . . If there is a teen-age driving problem, it may well be that these margin-testers contribute the bulk of the teenage accident figures.

He further states that “this concept does not depend on an individual-characteristics sort of explanation, since any adolescent may at any time be led by transitory situational factors to test or challenge authority, regardless of his personality configuration.”

It may be true that any teenager (or any other person, for that matter) may at any time get into a transitory situation in which he becomes a margin-tester. It must also be realized, however, that those who engage in such testing most frequently or most consistently are likely to be most over-represented with respect to the unwanted outcome of such behavior. As has already been demonstrated, the sociopathic group often represents a specific identifiable group of young persons with consistent or frequently recurrent highly deviant behavior and with frequent arrests as a result.

The teenage characteristic of alternately conforming and deviant behavior may also be attributable to the learning process rather than—or in addition to—aggressiveness or lack of caution. Behavior in the teenage group such as “speed in excess of conditions” or “following too closely” and consequent crashes *may* be as much the result of inexperience with what is demanded by the conditions and by one’s own abilities as it is the result of consciously going beyond the limits of safety.

Such “testing”—and learning—behavior is not necessarily limited to teenagers. It has been reported (54), for example, that in Europe where first driving licenses were common among affluent middle-aged persons, the highest crash rates were among these middle-aged. As the average age for first license in Europe has progressively dropped over the past several years the

highest crash rate has progressively dropped to younger and younger age groups.

A part of the higher crash experience of teenage drivers, therefore, may be attributable to the learning process rather than to true aggressive behavior. Furthermore, since many teenagers are first learning how to drink alcoholic beverages at the same time as they are gaining driving experience, they may be at double jeopardy because, in essence, they are performing two experiments simultaneously. This learning process may be made even more difficult because, for economic reasons, teenagers often own older cars which may have less adequate handling characteristics.

An important question, however, is what types of teenagers are likely to engage in single or multiple experimentation and under what circumstances. Some information is available indicating the role of peer influences in drinking behavior (55) and in driving behavior of teenagers, and assessing the responses of drivers during the teen and early adult years to frustration and hostility-provoking situations (56). About all that can be said on the basis of currently available information is that many factors, including aggression, are involved in the accident experience of teenagers. The proportion of accidents among teenagers attributable to any specific factor (with the possible exception of alcohol) acting either alone or in combination with other factors, is not known with any degree of accuracy. Almost no information is available about the non-highway-accident experience of teenagers.

F. Injury to Children

In order to determine—insofar as injury is related to behavioral patterns—at what point in life, and how, such behavioral patterns develop it is appropriate to ask to what extent and in what ways accident and violence experience are related in children. It is necessary to know what characteristics of children might be associated with accidents and/or violence, and also what parental characteristics might be associated with injury to children, excluding the battered children discussed earlier in which presumed accident actually is intentional violence.

In several studies (57-59) children with high accident experience have been found more frequently to be hyperactive, aggressive, or unable to tolerate frustrations than are children of similar age, sex, and community with low accident experience. Some observations from one of these studies (57) are shown in table 10. Children with high accident experience in one time interval tend to continue to have high accident experience in subsequent intervals also (60).

A study by Mellinger and Manheimer (61) is of particular interest because it examines the frequency with which children in high, intermediate and low accident groups are likely to be exposed to hazards in addition to personality characteristics of these children. Specifically these investigators ask, to what extent is high accident experience a function of exposure to risk, of aggressive behavior which frequently involves acting out, of maladjustment as distinct from acting out, or of a combination of these factors.

They conclude that the interaction they observed "strongly suggests that maladjustment is after all an important factor in accident liability—to the extent that the child has behavioral characteristics which are otherwise

associated with high liability."³ Their study also "lends some support to the view that high accident liability does not inevitably originate in emotional maladjustment, and that otherwise "normal and healthy" behavior can increase accident liability."

It would appear that, beginning fairly early in childhood, a number of behavioral factors, as well as environmental factors not discussed here, are associated with accident experience, and that aggressive and maladjustive behavior is one of these. The exact proportion of accidents related to such behavior, however, is not currently known.

Table 10.—Percentage of children with various behavior patterns among boys and girls with low, intermediate and high accident experience, Oakland and Berkeley, Calif., 1941-60 (57)

Pattern	Boys			Girls		
	Accident type			Accident type		
	Low	Intermediate	High	Low	Intermediate	High
High activity level	24	31	41	24	34	39
Frequent roughhousing	20	25	33	9	21	27
Daring	30	43	51	20	32	46
Discipline problem .	35	37	54	24	29	29
Fights with peers . .	39	43	60	26	41	42
Show off	26	34	46	20	31	42
Stubbornness	25	40	37	23	44	43
Low frustration tolerance.	19	30	36	24	31	37
Impulsiveness	38	45	52	32	44	56
Careless, unreliable	40	43	52	31	51	53
Good school achievement	50	43	32	51	37	34
Counseling sought for behavioral problem	10	21	27	12	9	16

Relatively little is known about the role parental behavior plays in accident experience of children. Some studies suggest that parental inattention and ill health (58, 62), and casual attitude toward accidents (59) are factors among children with high accident experience. The relationship between such parental behavior and child neglect or maltreatment—a more subtle form of parental aggression than direct assault—appears not to have been explored.

One fascinating example has been observed by Klein (54) of apparent acting out of frustrations by parents through promotion of hazardous recreational activity for their children. He has found that children who engage in highly hazardous go-cart racing have been directed into this sport by fathers who are employed in jobs bereft of functional risks. According to Klein, these fathers "lead lives of noisy desperation" by engaging in nonfunctional risks through ownership of cars and boats with higher horsepower than the national norm. Furthermore, they engage vicariously through their children in nonfunctional risks such as go-carting. Somewhat similar behavior in a religious context has been described among parents and children in the serpent-using religious sects in Appalachia (63). The entire role of parental

attitudes and behavior in the development of attitudes among children toward violence, aggression, and risk taking requires much further exploration.

V. SEVERITY OF INJURY AND DEVIANCY

One of the commonly overlooked important facts about injury is that factors contributing to the occurrence of serious injury and those involved in minor injury may be vastly different. Among highway crashes, for example, alcohol is found in about one out of every six drivers in crashes of all degrees of severity combined (64), but it is the major single human factor associated with severe to fatal crashes. Alcohol in extremely high concentrations is associated very frequently with fatal crashes of automobiles into bodies of water, with other drownings, and with fatal fires. This may well be because alcohol contributes not only to the initiation of the event but also to the inability of the person to extricate himself once submersion or fire has begun. Fatal crashes differ from minor ones in other important factors also. They are much more likely to occur at night, on weekends, and in rural areas than are minor crashes (2).

As was noted earlier, among suicides one must distinguish between the usually nonfatal suicide gestures and the more commonly fatal true suicide attempts. These may involve different types of individuals, different circumstances (including different frequency of alcohol ingestion) and different motivations. One study (26) has suggested that homicides in which alcohol is a factor tend to involve more extensive violence (for example, multiple stabbing) than do those without alcohol.

The differences between factors common to minor injury and those common to serious injury are important because they explain why many persons, on the basis of their experience with the much more common minor events, make inappropriate judgments about the nature of serious events. Persons who have responsibility for planning and implementing injury control programs that may include the entire range of severity must remember that different factors may influence each end of the spectrum.

VII. CONCEPT OF THE INNOCENT VICTIM

It is commonly assumed where one person injures another through accident or violence that the injured person usually is an innocent victim. This assumption probably is correct in circumstances where the injured and injurer do not know each other and have come into contact almost by chance. For example, in two vehicle crashes—

drivers believed to have been killed as a result of the actions of others have not usually been drinking. When they have, their blood alcohol concentrations are more frequently similar to those of non-involved drivers than to those of drivers responsible for fatal crashes. For example, almost 80% have *no* alcohol present in their blood. In such crashes it is often a surviving other driver who has been at fault. As one medical examiner has stated, "Of greater seriousness is the realization

that 44% of the *innocent not at fault* dead drivers were killed by drinking drivers!" (65)

Where the injured and the injurer do know each other, however, it is apparent that the person injured frequently was not merely an innocent victim, but rather was an active participant in the events that led to either accident or assault. One medical examiner (66) has observed that three quarters of passengers fatally injured in his county over a twenty year period were in vehicles in which their own driver was responsible for the crash. It is commonly suggested that when a driver has been drinking heavily, the passenger should substitute for him at the wheel. As seen in table 5, high blood alcohol concentrations are common among fatally injured passengers, and two studies (67, 68) have shown that drivers and their passengers usually, but not invariably, have similar blood alcohol concentrations.

With respect to homicides one investigator (26) reported that "it is *significant* that of these 374 cases in which alcohol was a present factor nearly seven-tenths were those involving the presence of alcohol in *both* the victim and the offender." He further states, "in many cases . . . , the victim is a major precipitator of the homicide and the fact that he had been drinking prior to his own death is of no small consequence in causing the offender to strike out against him."

Some investigators prefer not to use the term "victim" because of the frequency with which the injured has actively participated in events which lead to his being injured by another person. This term carries with it connotations of innocence which clearly are inappropriate in light of present knowledge. Certainly, any attempts to gain control of the problem of injury, whether from accident or violence, must take into consideration the fact that those injured by others frequently—but not invariably—are not merely innocent bystanders.

VIII. SOME INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG GUN ACCIDENTS, HIGHWAY CRASHES AND VIOLENCE—A PILOT STUDY

The relatively few studies of relationships between accidents and violence leave many important questions unanswered. Most of the studies involving adults have been concerned with highway crashes only. Little information is yet available about relationships in single individuals or in groups between highway crash experience and other accidents, or about relationships of nonhighway accidents to violence. Furthermore, the relationship of either accident or individual violence to group violence—for example, rioting—has not been explored. This last question, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.

The automobile has often been referred to as an instrument of violence and aggression. As has been demonstrated, there is a correlation for certain individuals between crash behavior and individual acts of violence. If a similar relationship exists between nonhighway accidents and violence the most likely place to find it would be among individuals with accidents involving guns, a known instrument of violence. A pilot study was carried out, therefore, to compare certain characteristics of all Vermont residents age 18

or older involved in gun accidents during 1967 with a random sample of persons of similar age and sex who have drivers' licenses but who had not been involved in gun accidents.⁴ Both shooters and those shot were studied.

The question of the population having guns and therefore at risk of shooting obviously is important in a study such as this. During 1967, 102,000 hunting licenses were sold to residents in a total state population of 420,000. Over 95 percent of these licenses were to males, age 10 or older (69), who comprised a population of about 165,000. It is estimated that at least two thirds of male drivers have hunting licenses, and that guns are available to even more than two thirds of male and female drivers. To a large extent, therefore, the comparison between persons with gun accidents and those with drivers' licenses is a comparison between two groups of gun owners, one of which has gotten into trouble and the other of which has not.

About half of the gun accidents reported involved at least one Vermont resident age 18 or older. Two of these residents were fatally injured, but most accidents resulted in minor injury only. They were reported to the police by physicians or hospitals in compliance with a law requiring reporting of all gunshot wounds treated. Twenty-seven percent of the injuries occurred during hunting, 41 percent during target practice, 9 percent while cleaning guns, and 24 percent during transportation, examination of the weapon, or other activities. Thirty-three of the 30 four-shooters were men.

Three basic patterns appeared to exist. The first pattern involved preteen or young teenage hunters who became overly excited upon seeing game and prematurely fired their guns. This pattern suggests error during the learning process. The second type of situation appeared to involve true accidents or random events in which individuals shot others who were hidden by heavy underbrush *beyond* the game that had been sighted. These persons were hit only because the shooter missed the game and because neither party was previously aware of the presence of the other. In a few cases weapons misfired, and the scattered shot or pieces of the ruptured weapons injured bystanders. In the third type of situation, shooters were engaged in activities that were grossly careless or foolhardy or, occasionally, were suspected to be motivated by intent, even if semiconscious, to injure themselves or others.

The arrest and driving records of the shooters, the shot, and the uninvolved drivers are shown in table 11.⁵ It is apparent, *at least with respect to this one type of nonhighway accident*, that individuals who initiate the injury-producing event are substantially overrepresented in highway crashes and citations, in contacts with the police, in crimes of violence, and in crimes involving alcohol, when compared with those who were shot and with uninvolved drivers. Among the shooters, every person with alcohol arrests also had arrests for violence, and most persons with arrests for violence had arrests involving alcohol. Two shooters, but no persons in the other two groups comprising over twice as many persons, had drunken driving arrests.

Of particular interest was the fact that guns were involved in several of the violence arrests among shooters, and that a number of the gun accidents involved rifles with extremely sensitive or "hair" triggers, or occurred during target practice involving Western style "fast draw" with revolvers. Both patterns suggest that owners of the weapons are individuals with aggressive personality patterns.

Table 11.—Percentage of persons with nonhighway arrests of various types, highway crashes and traffic citations among persons involved in gun accidents of all degrees of severity as shooters or as those shot, and among drivers without gun accidents, Vermont, 1967

	Drivers without gun accidents	Persons shot by someone else	Shooters of selves or others ¹
Nonhighway arrests and investigations	14	15	41
Nonhighway arrests	14	15	38
Arrests and investigations of violence	5	8	32
Arrests for violence	5	8	29
Arrests involving alcohol (includes driving while intoxicated)	5	8	21
Highway crashes in previous years ²	29	20	50
Highway crashes since first licensed ²	37	40	61
Traffic citations in previous 3 years ²	24	30	50
Traffic citations since first licensed ²	39	50	65
Number of persons	94	13	34

¹ Differences between shooters and drivers were significant at p less than 0.05 or less using χ^2 , except for 3-year crash record where $p = 0.06$. Sample of persons shot was too small for testing.

² 18 shooters and 3 persons shot did not have drivers' licenses. These persons and those matched with them were not included in the crash and citation analysis which is based on N's of 26 shooters, 10 shot, and 72 uninvolved drivers.

This study does not answer questions about relationships between highway crashes or violence and the broad range of nonhighway accidents, but it does demonstrate that such relationships exist for many persons involved as shooters in gun accidents. Furthermore, it identifies other factors among gun accidents such as the learning process and truly accidental circumstances. As has been observed earlier, and demonstrated again here, patterns of alcohol misuse and violence commonly—although apparently not invariably—are closely associated.⁶

IX. PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INJURY

As long ago as 425 B.C., Hippocrates recognized that injury from accident or violence is the result of rapid transfer of energy to the body in amounts incompatible with health (70). This concept is basic to understanding and control of the phenomenon, whether injury be unintentional or intentional. Traditionally, outside of the military, the main emphasis in control has been placed on regulation of human behavior. By and large, this approach to the prevention of injury has been aimed at the general public under the assumption that all are equally capable of modifying such behavior of the

motivations or the regulations are made strong enough. The fallacy of these two assumptions has been demonstrated throughout this report. It is abundantly clear that characteristics of many of the individuals involved either as injurers or as those injured in both accidents and violence are such that relatively limited amelioration can be expected from regulation of human behavior alone. In reality several options, described below, are available for reducing the problem.

A. Conceptual Model

Several authors have described the variety of approaches possible for understanding and reducing the toll from accidental injury (71-74). To a large degree these are applicable to the control of intentional injury also. In order to reduce not only the *frequency* of injury-producing events but also the toll of *death and severe disability* from such events it is possible and appropriate to initiate action at *any* point in the injury process where reduction in the *frequency or severity of the end result* can be achieved.

Haddon (72) has stated, for example, that—

In general, measures directed against accidental or deliberately inflicted injuries attempt: *first*, to prevent the marshaling of the hazardous energy itself, and *second*, if this is not feasible, to prevent or modify its release. *Third*, if neither of these is successful, they attempt to remove man from the vicinity, and *fourth*, if all of these fail, an attempt is made to interpose an appropriate barrier which will block or at least ameliorate its action on man.

A *fifth* approach, not listed by Haddon, is the provision of prompt and effective emergency health services to those who have been injured in order to prevent unnecessary death or disability to persons with serious or life threatening injuries which, in absence of good care, might result in death or permanent damage.

The first step—prevention of the marshaling of hazardous energy—involves, for example, prohibition of the production of instruments of violence such as guns, fireworks, knives, etc. The second step—preventing or modifying the release of energy—can be approached either through the regulation or motivation of people directly (both the potential injurer and the injured) to bring about behavior change with respect to the moderate uses of sources of energy, or through changing the nature of the task to be performed or the milieu of performance. With respect to alcohol, for example, regulation has included laws concerning the manufacture of alcohol, who may use it, the quantity that may be consumed, and when and where alcohol may be obtained or served (65). Simultaneously, efforts have been directed toward voluntary compliance in maintaining moderate drinking practices. These efforts—as well as most other efforts to regulate or motivate people—remain of unknown value because, with few exceptions, they have not been subjected to evaluation using appropriate scientific techniques.

An alternative method of prevention is modification of the task to be performed or of the milieu of performance. It must be recognized that alcohol impairs decision making processes, and that many who drive cars or who use other consumer products but who are not under the influence of

alcohol may be handicapped permanently or temporarily by medical conditions, fatigue, unfamiliarity or other factors. In order to minimize the harmful outcome of such impairment specific tasks can be simplified and standardized from one place or one brand or another. On the highway, for example, a traveler (65) recently wrote in frustration that—

at several key decision points, there was no indication of which way to turn . . . It was only after we turned correctly that [a] small sign appeared. . . This sign is no help; it is a reward. . . This lack of good signs, and the plethora of misleading ones, contrasts directly with Toronto, where . . . the signs are placed well enough ahead to allow the necessary lane maneuver.

Nader (76) has written about the hazards of nonconformity of gear shift patterns on different automobile models, even by the same manufacturer.

The effect of peers in changing the social milieu for drinking was noted earlier (55). A recent program of the New York City Police Department (77) is aimed specifically at preventing the initiation of acts of violence by changing the social milieu in rapidly escalating emotional confrontations between individuals. This technique commonly is used in the prevention of riots, and such crisis consultation is a basis for suicide prevention centers.

An example of the third approach—removal of man from the hazard—has been described in a study (78) reporting that areas with off-street playgrounds have lower frequencies of injury to child pedestrians than do similar areas without such facilities. The pedestrian safety standard of the National Highway Safety Bureau requires “procedures and equipment to reduce vehicle-pedestrian ‘conflicts’ including control devices, land use planning, pedestrian bridges and better lighting” (79). Such programs do not change the nature of people or of the sources of hazardous energy, but they do separate the person from the energy.

The fourth approach—interposing appropriate barriers to block or ameliorate the action of hazardous energy on man—is applied in the case of unintentional injury through the use of energy absorbing steering columns and stronger windshields in cars, and of median barriers and breakaway signs on highways, through tempered or laminated glass in patio doors, through soft surfaces in playgrounds and gymnasiums, and through attempts to strengthen bones in the elderly by means of dietary fluoride supplements in order to avoid hip fractures. Redesigning cars, roads or playgrounds doesn’t change aggressive behavior, but it does reduce the frequency of injury resulting from such behavior.

Further examples of interposition of barriers to the transfer of hazardous energy for control of both unintentional and intentional injury include exercise conditioning of athletes, police and others, use of helmets by motorcyclists and by police, and use of gas masks by workers in hazardous environments as well as by riot forces. As demonstrated by De Haven (80), the energy absorbing qualities of impacted surfaces sometimes have prevented persons intent on committing suicide from achieving their purpose.

The fifth step—provision of emergency health services—cannot reduce the *frequency* of injury, but it can reduce the *severity* of injury and the *frequency of death and disability*. In illustration, almost four times as many

persons die of every hundred injured in rural crashes as in urban crashes. This difference occurs despite the fact that the fatally injured in rural crashes appear to have died from injuries that often are less serious than those resulting in death in urban crashes (81). It is believed that, especially in rural areas, many of those deaths occur simply because emergency health services are less available and, when available, are less adequate. One study of persons attacked by sharks (82) indicates that improvement of emergency health services *at the accident scene* can markedly increase the survival rate. With respect to intentional injury, progressive improvement over the past several wars in the emergency services capability of the U.S. Armed Forces has resulted in a progressive improvement in the survival rates of those injured (83).⁷ As has been documented in at least one study (84), however, with respect to heroic efforts to save life, in some communities "there seems to be a rather strong relationship between the age, social background, and the perceived moral character of patients and the amount of effort that is made to attempt revival when 'clinical death signs' are detected (and, for that matter, the amount of effort given to forestalling their appearance in the first place)." In the case of injuries from violence, perceived moral character may indeed play an important role in the quality of emergency care provided.

B. Suggestions for Implementation

Three major problems stand out in the implementation of these five phases of prevention and control. The first is the common lack of good information from official sources about the extent of injury attributable to various causes and to various population subgroups. Without such information it is impossible to compare the extent of the problem between areas or to evaluate the success of specific programs in individual areas. In illustration, one group of investigators (85) noted that "one city had a suicide rate approximately one-third of that recorded for Los Angeles. A visit to that city revealed that the authorities certified cases as suicide only if there was a verifiable, handwritten suicide note. (In Los Angeles about one third of the suicidal victims leave such notes.)" Closely related is the sparsity of appropriate evaluation of either existing or proposed programs for the prevention and control of injury, whether intentional or unintentional. Of highest priority is the establishment *and implementation on a routine basis* of standards for evaluation, designation, and recording of cause of death and injury and factors involved, including the determination and recording of alcohol concentrations in blood, breath or other biologic materials.

A second problem, which is integrally involved in the first, is the current inadequacies in many communities in selection and retention of personnel concerned with all aspects of injury, whether intentional or unintentional, and in the quantity and quality of training available to them. The castigation of police for these inadequacies has become vogue in recent years. The problem, however, is much broader, including recruitment and training of qualified judges and magistrates, coroners, ambulance crews, personnel of sheriff's probation and welfare departments and others. It is difficult to suggest where *practical* improvements can begin because poor pay scales and lack of incentives are so widespread—although by no means universal—and are so

interwoven with the already overburdened tax structure of those communities that most need help.

Three possible places for improvement are through the greater subsidization and availability of short term training programs, through minimum training requirements in each state (Vermont, for example, only recently passed legislation requiring training for all police officers. None had been required before although personnel in many—but not all—departments did have training), and through better pay scales and training for middle management personnel. This latter proposal, if implemented, could give greater incentive for new staff to seek advanced training, and could provide a better quality of supervision of those having direct contact with the public without suddenly imposing a major tax burden on communities by raising all salaries. Unfortunately, in communities with haphazard personnel selection, individuals with personal propensity for violence occasionally are employed to control violence (86).⁸ Better quality at the middle management level may help to keep such persons and their effects to a minimum.

The third area of concern is the early identification and rehabilitation of individuals who are at persistently high risk of injury from accidents and violence. As has been documented throughout this report, such persons frequently begin to get into trouble at an early age, commonly have difficulties with alcohol also, and often become known beginning with the initial stages to a variety of community service agencies.

With few exceptions, not enough scientifically evaluated information is available as yet to recommend tried, proven, and practical proposals for child rearing in order to prevent the development of such behavior patterns. There is enough information to recommend programs to respond to the initial "red flags" of trouble by teenagers and young adults. Such programs can include psychiatric consultation, alcoholism clinics, suicide prevention centers and other forms of institutionalized crisis consultation, to assist the police, welfare and probation departments. These would be coupled with training programs for the community agency personnel who would use them for referral and advice. The methodical and widespread development of such programs with particular emphasis upon the young offender deserves a high priority.

APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX II

ANNOTATIONS

1. The term "accident" is used throughout this report even though it is a misnomer. True accidents are random events. The events which are discussed here have unintentional outcome, but they are not randomly distributed according to population or environmental factors involved. Furthermore, the term has taken on connotations of luck, "acts of God," and even of moral retribution for misdeeds, all of which erroneously suggest unique causation different from other types of harmful events and hamper consideration of the phenomenon as one appropriate for scientific investigation. Wherever possible, "accidents" on the road have been referred to in this paper as highway crashes, a purely descriptive term with no etiologic connotations. Unfortunately, a similar descriptive term is not available at present for unintentional injury occurring in other settings, and the term "accident" therefore has been used despite its inappropriateness.

2. In 1967, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation there were 12,100 cases of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 27,100 cases of forcible rape and 253,300 cases of aggravated assault. In addition, 229,928 other assaults were reported from 4,566 agencies representing about three quarters of the nation's population. Additional forms of violence not included in the estimate of people assaulted include, from 4,566 agencies, 109,299 cases of vandalism, 8,058 of arson, and 550,469 of disorderly conduct.

3. Italicized portions of this and subsequent quotations represent the working of the original author.

4. The comparison group of drivers in this study was obtained by choosing the driver's license of the first person of same sex and within 10 years of age (preferably within 5 years) alphabetically in front of and behind the license of the accident-involved person. If the first appropriate name reached was a person of same last name and same address as the accident case, the next appropriate license was sought in order to avoid matching members of the same immediate family. For those persons who were not licensed, the first appropriate licenses were chosen in front of and behind the place where the accident case license would have been if he had been licensed.

5. This is one of the few studies examining characteristics of individuals who are in accidents in predominantly rural areas. The similarities between figure 11 and figures 6 and 7 in several characteristics of those who initiated accidents or have drunken driving arrests or crashes involving alcohol are striking, despite the important differences in population density, racial configuration, climate, and innumerable other factors. Uninvolved persons also are similar from one geographic area to another. The definition of violence used in figure 11 included assault, disorderly conduct, breach of peace, vandalism, and related activities, similar to those listed in figure 7.

6. Members of a current project on alcohol and highway safety have noted that, among persons routinely stopped at roadblocks for research purposes, those who have visible guns in the car and who state that they are going hunting also most often state that they have been drinking and subsequently turn out to have relatively high blood alcohol concentrations when compared with other drivers routinely stopped.

7. One fatality among hunters in Vermont involved a man who was shot in the chest, and who died an estimated 10 to 20 minutes later after exhibiting progressively severe shortness of breath. First aid procedures were instituted only at the last minute. Although no autopsy was done the anatomical site of injury and the manner of death suggest that this person might have had a tension pneumothorax and died because no one attempted to prevent air from being sucked through the wound and consequently from collapsing his lungs.

In sharp contrast, I had previously seen a similar hunting injury in Vermont in which prompt application of pressure to the wound limited the entrance of air and permitted the person to be transferred over a period of 2 hours to the hospital where he underwent surgery and recovered. The shooter in the second case was reported to have previously shot two other persons in hunting "accidents." Although much might have been done to prevent this third *shooting* from occurring, the provision of appropriate emergency care after the fact of the shooting prevented a *death* from occurring.

8. In reviewing the previous police records of persons arrested for drunken driving in Oakland, Calif. (3), I came across several cases in which the initial entries in the police record included clearance for employment as deputy sheriff or police auxiliary, and later entries consisted of arrests for misuse of alcohol, some of which involved violence.

APPENDIX 34

COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES.

By Gilbert Geis*

INTRODUCTION

Social self-interest, combined with impulses of compassion, decency, and justice—all these elements lie behind the spread of programs providing financial redress for victims of violent crime. An attractive political idea, particularly in a period of intense public concern with "crime in the streets," victim compensation offers an opportunity for the state to make known in a tangible manner its concern for innocent victims of violence. As a way-station on what may become a path to public assistance for all persons put in need by injurious circumstances not of their own making, compensation for criminally-inflicted injuries can be afforded precedence over other deprivations because of the state's obligation to protect its citizens implicit in its assumption of the police power. Such uncertain reasoning aside, however, the concept may be said to rest most fundamentally on the fact that a hardship exists which can be readily and relatively inexpensively remedied.

Two jurisdictions within the United States—California and New York—had begun compensation programs at the time of the report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967. Foreign programs existed in New Zealand and Great Britain. The President's Commission took note of public opinion polls which indicated widespread support for the establishment of systems of compensation for victims of criminal violence,¹ entered its endorsement of "the general principle of victim compensation, especially to persons who suffer injury in violent crime," and put forward the observation that "the experiments now being conducted with different types of compensation program are valuable."²

The President's Commission further indicated that various Federal victim-compensation bills had been introduced into Congress, but that none had come to public hearing. It believed that "such hearings would provide a national forum for a much needed debate over the philosophy, assumptions, and potential advantages and disadvantages of such programs generally, and the relative merits and design of a program on the federal level in particular."³

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To date, however, the various Federal bills remain stranded in the Judiciary committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The only bill introduced into the upper house, that authored by Senator Yarborough,⁴ added eight co-sponsors in the Congressional session following the report of the President's Commission,⁵ but no other progress towards its passage has been achieved.

An article which appeared as an Appendix to the Commission's Task Force Report: *Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment*⁶ addressed itself to some of the more provocative questions facing the concept of victim compensation.

Of those items discussed, the problem of finding a satisfactory rationale for victim compensation is of particular note. Two basic philosophies serve as an ideological base for recent legislation to compensate victims of crime. The first suggests that compensation is founded on the State's failure to successfully prevent the crime which led to the injury. The second argues a welfare doctrine. This doctrine rests on the notion that people in need, especially those in need due to circumstances which they could not avoid, are entitled to public assistance. The Appendix to the Commission's Report concludes that neither of these positions offers sound theoretical justification for victim compensation.⁷ It credits Rupert Cross with the most attractive rationale:

... If there is a widely recognized hardship, and if that hardship can be cheaply remedied by state compensation, I should have thought that the case for such a remedy was made out, provided the practical difficulties are not too great. The hardship in these cases is undoubtedly widely recognized...⁸

The impact of victim compensation was seen as speculative with regard to penal policy. The article noted that victim compensation might lead to a more favorable public attitude towards prison rehabilitation programs especially in relation to remuneration and conditions of labor. On the other hand, it pointed out that greater concentration on the plight of victims might create deeper resentment towards criminals. While it was noted that successful prosecutions may decrease, due to the potentially more charitable attitude of a compensated victim, such prosecutions could conceivably increase because a conviction would virtually insure the victim a right to compensation.⁹

After consideration of whether or not victim compensation is a desirable social action form, the article strongly endorsed the concept despite the speculative nature of its impact. At the same time it stressed the compelling need to assess adequately the programs which are put into operation.¹⁰

Compensation measures have now been enacted in Hawaii, Maryland, and Massachusetts, bringing to five the total operative programs in the United States, with legislation pending in about a dozen additional jurisdictions. California, quickly disenchanted with ingredients of its pioneering venture in the United States in victim compensation, responded to widespread criticism by removing administration of the program from the Department of Welfare and locating it in the Board of Control, the agency responsible for dealing with claims against the state. The California legislature, however, provides less than \$100,000 a year for victims, a sum in sharp contrast to the more than \$1 million appropriated in New York and the \$3 million provided each year for support of the British victim compensation scheme.

Abroad, the Australian state of New South Wales has joined New Zealand and Great Britain in inaugurating compensation programs. In Canada, two of the country's ten provinces—Saskatchewan and Newfoundland—have also begun victim compensation systems. In 1968, Ontario established a Law Enforcement Compensation Board to aid persons injured while assisting police officers, employing the rationale that such persons by their acts became employees of the Crown, and thus eligible for Workmen's Compensation. Only one claim was made to the Board in its first eight months of operation and that, involving a taxi-driver injured while trying to secure police aid to prevent his being robbed, was denied. In terms of its coverage, therefore, the Ontario program can hardly be classified as a bona fide enterprise providing assistance for crime victims.

The present report attempts to review and bring up to date the catalogue of information regarding compensation to victims of violent crime which was provided in the Appendix to the report of the Assessment Task Force of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.¹¹ The past two years have seen, besides additional jurisdictions joining the roster of states with operative programs, the accumulation of experience and insight within settings which in 1967 had only barely begun work with victim compensation.

As part of the review of the development of victim compensation the report will also present a summary of the discussion, debate, and recommendations emerging from the First International Conference on Compensation to Innocent Victims of Violent Crime, convened by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in Los Angeles, December 3 and 4, 1968. The Public Systems Research Institute, School of Public Administration, of the University of Southern California hosted and co-sponsored the conference, which brought together representatives from Great Britain, Canada, and four of the five American states with victim-compensation programs.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Though contemporary victim compensation legislation is basically a phenomenon of the last 5 years, the roots of such legislation can be traced back into antiquity. The idea of offering reparations to innocent victims of crime is very much a part of the history of man. In order to understand the current legislative trend properly, it is important to place the concept in historical perspective.

The earliest scheme for compensating victims of crime was established by the ancient Babylonians. In the Code of Hammurabi, which is believed to date back to about 1775 B.C.,¹² the Babylonians imposed communal responsibility for certain crimes committed by unknown persons. The Code reads, "If a robber has not been caught, the robbed man shall declare his lost property in the presence of the god, and the city and governor in whose territory and district the robbery was committed shall replace for him his lost property." It further declares that "if it was a life that was lost, the city and Governor shall pay one mina of silver to his heirs."¹³

The Old Testament reveals that a similar practice existed among the early Hebrews in that they provided compensation for those victims sustaining

personal injuries. If a man was so injured, the perpetrator of the offense was to pay the victim for his loss of time and cause him to be thoroughly healed.¹⁴

The practice of compensating victims of crime was also found among the Greek, Roman, and ancient German peoples.¹⁵ Homer, in the *Ninth Book of the Iliad* describes a conversation between Ajax and Achilles. Ajax criticizes Achilles for not accepting Agamemnon's offer of reparation. He reminds Achilles that even a brother's death may be composed by a payment of money and the wrongdoer, having paid his fine, is free to remain home with his people.¹⁶ Tacitus reports that among the ancient Germans "even homicide is atoned by a certain fine in cattle and sheep; and the whole family accepts the satisfaction to the advantage of the public weal, since quarrels are most dangerous in a free state."¹⁷

For the early Anglo-Saxons crime was basically by and against the family. Family atonement followed crimes and resulted in what later became known as blood-feuds,¹⁸ though eventually, money payments were fixed for injury. The advent of Christianity and the feudal system saw the end of the blood-feud, which was replaced by an extensive system of compensation,¹⁹ similar to that which existed among the Franks, who earmarked compensation payments for every kind of crime from simple theft to murder.²⁰

These early systems of compensation were gradually replaced by government-run criminal prosecutions which left the victim only civil remedies by means of which he could collect for his injuries. The compensation which was originally given to the victim for his injuries was turned into a fine paid by the criminal to the State.

In the early 10th century, Jeremy Bentham noted the plight of the victim and suggested this rationale for compensation:

Has a crime been committed? Those who have suffered by it, either in their person or their fortune, are abandoned to their evil condition. The society which they have contributed to maintain, and which ought to protect them, owes them, however, an indemnity, when its protection has not been effectual.²¹

The subject of victim compensation received much attention at several International Prison Congress meetings which took place towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. At the Paris meeting in 1895 the following resolution was adopted:

The Congress believes that there is a reason to take into serious consideration the propositions which have been submitted to it with regard to allowing the injured party a portion of the earnings realized by the work of the prisoner in the course of his detention, or with regard to constituting a special fund derived from fines from which aid should be granted to victims of penal offenses; but thinking it does not possess at present the elements which are necessary for the solution of these questions, the Congress decided to refer them to the more profound study of the next International Prison Congress.²²

The Brussels meeting which followed in 1900 sidestepped the issue and enunciated the following rather innocuous position:

The Congress adopts again the resolution of the Congress of Paris to facilitate by reforms in procedure the legal position of the Party seeking relief by civil action.²³

The support of two noted Italian criminologists Raffaele Garofalo and Enrico Ferri in the beginning of the 20th century added much towards renewing interest in victim compensation. Garofalo stated, "It will be a long step in advance when the State comes to regard as a public function, the indemnification of the person injured by criminal delict."²⁴ Ferri concluded that it was the government's responsibility to make certain that the victims of crime were properly compensated for their injuries.²⁵

Public and professional interest in victim compensation was decisively stimulated in the mid-20th century by the zealous work of Miss Margery Fry, an English magistrate and social reformer. She stated in her book *Arms of the Law*²⁶ published in 1951, "We have seen that in primitive societies this idea of making up for a wrong done has wide currency. Let us once more look into the ways of earlier man, which may still hold some wisdom for us." Miss Fry's book and an article which she prepared shortly before her death, at age eighty-two, for *The Observer*²⁷ in 1957 provided the impetus which finally led to the adoption of contemporary victim compensation legislation.

FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS — STRUCTURES

The longer experience of foreign jurisdictions with programs compensating victims of violent crime suggests their examination prior to a review of programs in the United States. It must be borne in mind, however, that a fundamental tenet regarding victim compensation is that specific ingredients must be tailored to the social and political climate of the site where a program is mounted. Factors such as the level of crime, the age distribution of the population, historical traditions and national ethos, as well as the presence or absence of cognate programs all inevitably enter (and sometimes quite subtly) into determination of program elements and evaluation of program outcome.

The following is a brief description of the structures of the existing foreign programs. Comments concerning these programs are treated separately after the structures are outlined.

New Zealand

Near the turn of the century, the British introduced victim compensation in New Zealand among the Maori. This was accomplished by enacting into law the customary tribal method of arranging such matters: the substitution of pecuniary restitution for imprisonment for selected criminal acts.²⁸ It was not until the beginning of 1964, however, that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, adopted in late 1963, became effective on a nationwide scale in New Zealand.²⁹

The scheme is administered by the Crimes Compensation Tribunal which

consists of three members, one of whom must be a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court of not less than 7 years' practice.³⁰ Judge A. P. Blair is the present Chairman of this tribunal which provides a hearing for all claims filed.

An application may be filed by the victim if he is injured, or by his dependents, if the victim was killed, if any of the following offenses are involved: (1) rape; (2) attempt to commit rape; (3) sexual intercourse with a girl under twelve; (4) indecency with a girl under twelve; (5) indecent assault on a girl between twelve and sixteen; (6) indecent assault on woman or girl; (7) indecent assault on a boy; (8) indecent assault on a male; (9) murder; (10) attempt to murder; (11) manslaughter; (12) wounding with intent; (13) injuring by unlawful act; (14) aggravated wounding or injury; (15) aggravated assault; (16) assault with intent to injure; (17) assault on a child or by a male on a female; (18) common assault; (19) disabling; (20) discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent; (21) acid throwing; (22) poisoning with intent; (23) infecting with disease; (24) endangering transport; (25) abduction of women or girl; and (26) kidnapping. The claim must be filed within one year after the death or injury, but this period may be extended for good cause.³¹

An award may cover the following losses: (1) expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the victim's death or injury; (2) pecuniary loss to the victim as a result of total or partial incapacity for work; (3) pecuniary loss to dependents as a result of the victim's death; (4) other pecuniary loss resulting from the victim's injury and any expenses which in the opinion of the Tribunal it is reasonable to incur; and (5) pain and suffering of the victim. But no compensation for pain and suffering may be awarded if the victim is a relative of the offender.³²

The award may be adjusted by the Tribunal if the victim has received payments from the offender or has recovered monies under the Transport Act of 1962, the Workers' Compensation Act of 1956, the War Pension Act of 1954 or under other relevant circumstances.³³ The offender may be ordered by the Tribunal to pay all or part of the compensation after an investigation of his financial position.³⁴

Great Britain

After many years of public and Parliamentary debate, an experimental scheme for the compensation to victims of violent crime was announced in both Houses of Parliament on June 24, 1964³⁵ and went into effect on August 1, 1964.

The scheme is administered by a body known as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, which consists of a Chairman and five other legally qualified members appointed by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland after consultation with the Lord Chancellor. The Chairman of the Board since its inception has been Sir Walker Kelly Carter, Q.C. The Board is assisted by a staff which conducts a preliminary investigation of all applications.

An application for *ex gratia* payment of compensation will be entertained by the Board if the claimant has suffered personal injury as the direct result of a crime or while helping the police, arresting an offender or suspected

offender or preventing or trying to prevent a crime from being committed. In addition, the following prerequisites must be met: (1) the injury sustained has resulted in at least three weeks loss of earnings or is one for which not less than 50 pounds sterling compensation would be awarded; (2) the circumstances were reported to the police without delay or have been the subject of criminal proceedings in the courts; and (3) the applicant is prepared to submit to a medical examination. If the injuries result in a death, a husband, wife or dependent of the victim may file an application for compensation. No claim is permitted in respect to injuries resulting from offenses committed against a member of the offender's family.

Once an application is received the staff makes an investigation of the claim. The data collected by the staff is then submitted to a single member of the Board. This Board member makes a determination and notifies the claimant. If this claimant is dissatisfied with the decision he may request a hearing before three other members of the Board.

If an award is made it will be assessed on the basis of common law damages and will usually take the form of a lump-sum payment. More than one payment may be made, but only where a provisional medical assessment can be given in the first instance. If the victim is alive the compensation is limited as follows: (a) the rate of loss of earning cannot exceed the average weekly earnings as published in the Ministry of Labour Gazette at the time the injury was sustained; and (b) there is to be no consideration of exemplary or punitive damages.

If the applicant receives a payment from another public source, or is awarded damages in an action at common law, the compensation is reduced by that amount.

Canada

With the rationale that it was recognizing its responsibility to victims of violent crime and with the hope that its program would encourage citizens to render assistance to the police, the Province of Saskatchewan adopted a victim compensation scheme³⁶ on April 1, 1967, with an effective date of September 1, 1967.³⁷

The program is administered by the Crimes Compensation Board which is composed of three members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The chairman of the board is presently a solicitor, James Eremko. None of the members of the Board need be a lawyer.

An application may be filed by the victim if he is injured or by his dependents if such person is killed, if any of the following offenses are involved: (1) breach of duty to take reasonable care of explosives; (2) intentionally causing injury with explosives; (3) rape; (4) attempted rape; (5) abandoning child; (6) causing harm to apprentice or servant; (7) criminal negligence; (8) causing death by criminal negligence; (9) causing bodily harm by criminal negligence; (10) murder; (11) manslaughter; (12) attempted murder; (13) causing bodily harm with intent; (14) administering noxious thing; (15) overcoming resistance to commission offense; (16) setting traps; (17) interfering with transportation facilities; (18) drunken driving; (19) impaired driving; (20) dangerous operation of vessel; (21) assault, attempted assault; (22) assault with intent; (23) kidnapping; (24) performing abortion; (25) robbery, and (26) intimidation by violence and threats. Where a person

renders assistance to any law enforcement officer in Saskatchewan and, as a result is injured or killed in an incident involving any of the above offenses, that person is also covered by this program.³⁸

All applications must be filed within one year of the date of injury or death and the incident from which the injury resulted must have been reported to the police within a reasonable time in order to be covered by the program. No claim will be accepted if the injury or death resulted from an act or omission of a member of the person's family living with him.³⁹

The Board reviews each application and the claimant is given an opportunity to appear before it at a public hearing.⁴⁰ There may be no appeal from Board decisions. There has been no maximum payment limitation fixed for awards. Compensation may be awarded for the following matters: (1) expenses actually or reasonably incurred as a result of the death or injury; (2) any pecuniary loss to the victim; (3) pecuniary loss to dependents as a result of the death of the victim; and (4) pain and suffering.⁴¹ In awarding compensation the behavior of the victim during the incident and his or her dependents financial need must be taken into account by the Board.⁴² Any amount received by the victim or his dependents pursuant to other Canadian legislation or recovered from the offender by the victim or his dependents may be considered by the Board and the sum deducted from the payment.⁴³ If compensation is provided for the victim, the Attorney General may seek reimbursement from the convicted offender.⁴⁴

The Saskatchewan Attorney General's office reports that 24 applications for compensation have been received to date. Of these five awards have been made and three are pending.⁴⁵

Legislation almost identical in content has recently been adopted in the Province of Newfoundland⁴⁶ but an effective date has yet to be chosen.⁴⁷

Australia

Although there has been recognition on a state and federal level of the desirability of some form of victim compensation legislation, only New South Wales has enacted such legislation in Australia.⁴⁸ The program adopted in New South Wales underwrites an order of compensation made by the courts under the Crimes Act of 1900.⁴⁹

The Crimes Act of 1900 gives criminal courts the power to make orders for payment to an aggrieved person, by providing compensation for injury or loss sustained through or by reason of the commission of an offense.⁵⁰ The court can order a sum, not exceeding \$2,000, be paid out of the property of a convicted offender as compensation to a victim sustaining loss or injury by reason of the commission of a felony or misdemeanor.⁵¹ If the court is one of summary jurisdiction the sum to be paid must not exceed \$300. There is, of course, no guarantee that the offender will pay the awarded compensation, therefore, prior to the initiation of the new provision, this Act was barely utilized.

The new Criminal Injuries Compensation Act allows the victim to make application to the Under Secretary for payment to him from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of any sum awarded under the Crimes Act.⁵²

Once application is made, the Under Secretary must submit a report to the Treasurer which includes: (1) the amount applied for in the application and

(2) any amounts which the applicant has received or is entitled to receive under any other legal remedies available to applicant.⁵³ The final disposition resides with the Treasurer.

This new legislation became effective on January 1, 1968. The Office of the Under Secretary reports that it is too early to evaluate the success of the program and to date few applications have been submitted.⁵⁴

FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS — COMMENTS

England

The ease and smoothness with which the British program of compensation to victims of violent crime has run during the four and a half years since its inauguration must stand as the major point to be made regarding it. Begun with some foreboding about the possibility of widespread fraud, surrounded by suggestions that its administration would bog down in adjudicatory complexities, and bothered by uncertainties regarding possible costs, the British program has to date proceeded through the awarding of more than 10,000 claims with neither untoward events nor meretricious consequences having become manifest.

Three major "surprises" regarding the British program are reported by Sir Walker Carter, Q.C., who has served as chairman of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board since its establishment.⁵⁵ The first concerns the difficulty the Board has experienced in bringing the program fully to public attention. At the moment, some 7,000 applications are being made to the Board annually, representing a considerable increase over the earliest years. Nonetheless, applicants represent only a fourth of all victims of crimes of violence in England, Scotland, and Wales, and probably represent—as the Board has concluded on the basis of a special survey undertaken in Birmingham—only about half of the persons eligible for compensation. Contributory negligence would eliminate some claimants and failure of loss to reach the compensable minimum of 50 pounds sterling would render other victims ineligible for aid. Persons of means, it has been found, are not apt to apply for victim compensation grants, and some persons prefer to forget the episode which victimized them rather than revivify it by a request for compensation.

Attempts to disseminate information as widely as possible regarding the availability of compensation have been hindered by the Board's policy against identifying recipients, though on occasion newspapers have been able to determine the persons receiving grants from details of the cases reported anonymously in the Board's summary of its work. In its latest report, the British Board notes its efforts and concern to have the scheme known to all potential claimants:

The Lord Chief Justice of England and the Lord Justice General of Scotland were good enough to bring the matter to the notice of the judges of the superior courts and we addressed a letter to the presiding judges of Crown Courts and Quarter Sessions. The police and the courts between them are in touch with all the victims and their help has no doubt led to the increase in the number of applications we received The press both national and provincial have drawn

attention to the operation of the Scheme and both radio and television have played their part. We are very grateful for this help for we feel sure that no one would wish the victim of a crime of violence to suffer because he had not heard of the existence of the Scheme.⁵⁶

The small number of persons injured while assisting the police has also come as a surprise to the administrators of the British program. All told, some thirty-three persons have received awards for such acts, constituting less than one-half of one percent of the total of compensation grants. Law enforcement cases represent 16 percent of the Board's total caseload. There were 505 applications from police officers in the year ending on the first of April, 1968, compared to 307 the previous year, and 107 from civilians who were injured while attempting to arrest an offender, or prevent a crime, as compared with 125 the year before.

Finally, the Board had not anticipated the large number of cases it would receive in which the injury was inflicted by one child upon another. The first amendment to the British program after its inauguration had provided for awards in such instances, altering the original stipulation that they were excluded because they did not constitute "crimes" in the legal sense of the term. Two instances involving youths, presented in the Board's 1968 report, indicate ingredients of such offenses as well as the manner in which the Board approaches them:

B. 172. The applicant aged 13 and his friend were playing with home-made fireworks in the street when one went off prematurely and injured the applicant's right eye, resulting in permanent loss of vision. There was no prosecution and the single member held that though inflicted accidentally the injury was directly attributable to a breach of Section 140(2) of the Highways Act 1959, relating to the unlawful use of explosive in the highway. He assessed compensation at 2,251 (pounds sterling) and reduced it by 50 percent of the applicant's share of responsibility.⁵⁷

A. 457. A boy aged 10 was in a field near his home, watching a group of boys playing with home-made bows and arrows, when one of them aimed and discharged an arrow at him which struck him in the eye, injuring it so seriously that it had to be removed. A charge of assault against a boy who discharged the arrow was dismissed, but a single member was satisfied that the injury was within the scope of the Scheme, and made an award of 2,500 (pounds sterling).⁵⁸

The British indicate that they have had no problems regarding the absence of a ceiling upon the amount that they might award, a concern that permeates consideration of victim compensation statutes in the United States. Most awards—some 82 percent—have been for amounts less than 400 pounds sterling, with only six percent exceeding 1,000 pounds sterling. The average amount of an award has been 363 pounds sterling. The British compensation scheme, however, bears a considerably lesser burden than programs in the United States would have to carry because of the existence of comprehensive medical and hospital social insurance programs in Britain which provide free services for many victims of violent crime. The limited use of firearms is also

believed to keep down the seriousness of criminally-inflicted injuries. Impressionistically, the administrators of the British program believe that most cases involve injuries from blows and from what is colloquially known as "putting the boot in."

The British also report little difficulty with awards for "pain and suffering," a category generally not compensable in American statutes. About 10 percent of British claims involve requests for compensation on such grounds, and they are examined with particular intensity by the Board, with legal precedents then being brought to bear to determine the financial value of the distress suffered. Considerably more trouble has arisen in efforts to weigh contributory negligence and to assess fractional shares of blame. Some guidelines to Board policy appear in the following kinds of instances in which reduced awards are apt to be made, though the Board reports its inability to reach consensus regarding the precisely proper manner to deal with such events:

Cases in which a man is carrying on an adulterous relationship with a married woman and is attacked by her husband or a member of her family.

Cases in which the applicant's behaviour was

- (i) immoral, e.g., he went with a prostitute and was attacked by her protector;
- (ii) foolhardy, e.g., while drinking in a low-class public house he flashed his money and was subsequently robbed on the way home while he was in a drunken condition or he wandered round Soho for no good reason in the early hours of the morning;
- (iii) negligent or irresponsible in that he took no steps for his own safety, e.g., having had money demanded from him in a public house he fails to leave but continues drinking there.⁵⁹

The requirement that the injury for which compensation is claimed be "directly attributable" to a criminal act is interpreted rather broadly in the British program, as the following case indicates:

H. 62. We entertained applications by the widows of three members of the Fire Service, who lost their lives fighting a fire in an underground Royal Air Force installation. The fire was started deliberately, and the persons responsible pleaded guilty to arson. Two of the firemen died several hours after the fire started, when they lost their way in the smoke, and their oxygen supply ran out. The third died in a vain attempt to rescue them. We decided that the interval of time and the mischance of the oxygen supply did not break the chain of causation and that the man who lit the fire must have foreseen that efforts would be made to put it out and that those who undertook the task would be exposed to great risk.⁶⁰

Procedurally, the British indicate particular success with the use of a single member of the Board to evaluate claims. In 93.8 percent of the cases the applicant has accepted the amount granted him by the Board member, while

sixty-two percent of the applicants, rejected by a single Board member, do not pursue their claim further, though they would have nothing to lose from doing so.

It had been presumed that the decisions of the Board, being a matter of grace, would not be subject to review by the courts. In 1967, however, the Queen's Bench Division declared that the Board was performing a quasi-judicial function affecting the public, and that it therefore of necessity had to come under judicial scrutiny. It was held that "the court had jurisdiction by way of prerogative order to supervise the discharge of these functions, notwithstanding that the Board did not derive their authority from statute and that their administrative functions, by way of payment, were the distribution of bounty."⁶¹ The case involved a constable who had suffered blindness in his left eye after being shot in the face by a suspect he was about to question. A few days later, he committed suicide. The Compensation Board, charged with subtracting from its awards other monies derived by the claimant from public funds, reduced the widow's benefit by the amount of her police pension. The court upheld this decision, but subsequently a new rule was promulgated for the Compensation Board by the Secretary of State providing a formula for such cases, so that civil servants would not be unduly disadvantaged vis-a-vis persons who had received monies from other than public sources.

Canada

Two of Canada's ten provinces now have programs of victim compensation, with both the Saskatchewan and the Newfoundland schemes incorporating diverse elements of the plans operative in Great Britain and New Zealand. The possibility of awards for pain and suffering, the reduction of grants in terms of the victim's contributory negligence, and the omission of family offenses from compensation are provided for in both Canadian programs. There is also a stipulation that resembles American legislation, indicating that "the financial need of the person who was injured or of the dependents of the victim" shall be taken into account in determining awards.⁶² Rather similar enactments are presently being considered in Nova Scotia, Manitoba and British Columbia. In addition, the Institute of Law Research and Reform in Alberta recommended in December, 1968 adoption of a compensation program and creation of a special fund to provide awards up to \$10,000 above the compensation maximum for persons injured while helping the police or attempting to prevent a crime.

The most notable developments in Canada in recent years regarding compensation, however, concern not legislation but appear in two reports prepared under academic leadership. The first, issued by the Legislative Committee of the Canadian Corrections Association, chaired by Thomas G. Feeney, Q.C., Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, advocates a major departure from extant victim compensation schemes.⁶³ Warning that the Association is "not a little apprehensive that the diversity of schemes under review by the various provincial legislatures will result in a haphazard handling of the problem of compensation to victims of crime in Canada," Dean Feeney's committee urged uniform legislation for Canada. The inclusion of property losses as compensable and the omission of need standards for recovery as a criminal victim stand out among the proposals of the Canadian

Corrections Association. The Association report puts the matter this way: "Legislation must provide a scheme of compensation in each province to cover loss or injury sustained by any person, regardless of his financial position, as the result of any crime under the Criminal Code of Canada." It is pointedly noted that "such a scheme is not a piece of welfare legislation." Losses from offenses committed by members of the victim's family upon him and losses from motor vehicle injuries are both to be included within the proposed compensation program. Further provision is also made to allow grants to persons mistakenly prosecuted or convicted of any federal or provincial offense.

The advantages seen for the approach blueprinted by the Canadian Corrections Association are the following: 1) Compensation may overcome public apathy in relation to both the victim and the criminal and may help law enforcement by encouraging the laying of criminal charges; 2) availability of compensation encourages members of the public to prevent crimes; and 3) additional information on what crime is costing its victims may lead to increased interest in preventative programs.⁶⁴

Stress is also placed in the Canadian proposal upon involving the offender in restitution proceedings. It is recommended that "legislation should be framed to provide that all assets a criminal possesses may be seized as restitution."⁶⁵ The proposal suggests exploration of the advisability of making conviction for certain indictable offenses an act of bankruptcy, though it warns against loading the offender with a restitution debt that he cannot discharge, thus hindering his rehabilitation and depriving his family of the necessities of life.

Empirical underpinning for programs contemplating compensation for victims of criminal violence is supplied by the second major item recently reported from Canada. Losses suffered by victims and their attitudes and actions regarding compensation are presented by Professor Allen M. Linden of the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University on the basis of a 1967 questionnaire study. The sample included all victims of violent crime in Toronto during the previous year, with the exception of survivors of homicide victims. One hundred and sixty-seven usable questionnaires were returned, constituting 40 percent of the total victim group. Two percent of the respondents indicated that they had collected money from the offender as a result of injuries suffered in a crime of violence. Fourteen percent had considered suing the offender, but only five percent went so far as to contact a lawyer. Many believed that their private rights had been extinguished by state prosecution of the case, while a large number indicated that they had not pursued avenues of recovery because they "had had enough."⁶⁶

Some 74 percent of the sample had suffered an economic loss because of personal indisposition from the offense in which they were involved, with the category of loss—whether medical, hospital, or loss of earnings—varying by the offense. In regard to medical costs, for instance, 82 percent of the rape victims, 24 percent of the robbery victims, and 81 percent of the wounding victims indicated that they had had to pay medical bills as a consequence of their victimization. Forty percent of these recovered all of their expenses, 16 percent part of the expenses, while 38 percent received no reimbursement. Fifty-two percent of the victims suffered property losses, with 67 percent of these deprivations remaining unreimbursed, a finding tending to countervene

the common argument that compensation should be restricted to personal rather than property losses because the latter generally are covered by insurance.

The losses of the surveyed victims of crimes of violence in Toronto during 1966 were found to be comparatively small, coming to an average out-of-pocket total of \$251. Interpreting this result, Linden offers the following observation:

An analysis of these figures disclosed that, if one were to consider those losing over \$100 to be in need of financial aid, there would have been only 45 individuals or 26.7 percent of the respondents that would qualify. These latter persons are the ones upon whom society must, of course, focus. The other victims of crime, the vast majority, are either looked after under present regimes or lose too little financially to cause grave concern. It must not be forgotten, however, that this study has omitted consideration of the homicide cases, where the need for aid is apt to be the most pressing.⁶⁷

Linden goes on to point out that "the great bulk of those victimized by crime could have their economic costs serviced rather inexpensively," though he grants that admission of compensation for pain and suffering would inject more uncertainty into cost estimates. Finally, he reports that, not surprisingly, some 93 percent of the victims favored establishment of a compensation scheme aimed at assisting people like themselves. "Naturally, one might expect those who suffer a criminal attack to be more receptive to reform in this field than the general populace," Linden notes, adding "Nevertheless, these figures are some indication that an important segment of the public, that is, those who themselves were victims of crime, approve of the concept of reparation for crime victims."⁶⁸

Australia

A major shortcoming of the approach to compensating victims taken in the Australian state of New South Wales in 1968⁶⁹ is believed to inhere in the necessity for a court prosecution if the victim is to receive assistance. As Chappell notes:

This means that the only victims who may, be grace, receive compensation in New South Wales are those injured in a crime in which the offender is apprehended, and brought before a criminal court. If, as is quite often the case, the offender remains undetected, the unfortunate victims will be no better off than he was without a State compensation.⁷⁰

In addition, the possibility that the compensation program will put the prosecutor in an ambivalent position appears to lie with the Australian legislation. "It is conceivable that the prosecution could be placed in the invidious position of both presenting the Crown's case against the offender in relation to the offense with which he is charged, and against the victim in relation to certain injuries which the State disputed were attributable to that offense," Chappell notes.⁷¹ "This might lead to disparaging questioning of

the victim by the prosecution, whether on re-examination, or even as a hostile witness. Such questioning could result in the impression being given to a jury that the State was unsympathetic to victims of crime and concerned to minimize the guilt offenders—an impression which might, in turn, wrongly influence the jury in reaching a verdict."⁷²

JURISDICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES—STRUCTURES

In the United States, California's pioneering legislation has now gone through three years of experience, while the New York victim compensation statute has been in operation approximately eighteen months. As noted earlier, victim-compensation measures have recently been enacted in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Hawaii, and bills are pending before the legislative sessions of approximately a dozen additional states. Specific provisions of the American programs are noted below, followed by a discussion of the experience of these programs.

California

Victim compensation in the State of California emerged with the impetus received from a specific situation which aroused strong emotion and public concern. San Francisco Superior Court Judge Francis McCarty was angered by the case of an unmarried 50-year-old woman who was robbed and beaten by two men. The incident resulted in a loss of more than \$1,000 to the woman, most of which went toward hospital and medical bills.

Judge McCarty in a letter to a State Senator urged the adoption of legislation to provide compensation to victims of such crimes.⁷³ The law which was the outgrowth of this situation became the first victim compensation program enacted in the United States.⁷⁴

This original legislation provided assistance to the family of a person who dies as the result of a crime of violence and to the victim and family of any one incapacitated as a result of such a crime. The program was administered by the Department of Social Welfare which established criteria for payment in substantial conformity to the criteria established for payment of aid to families with dependent children. It also created an Indemnity Fund in the State Treasury, composed of fines paid by persons convicted of a crime of violence resulting in the injury or death of another. The proceeds of this fund were to be used towards the payment of the aid provided for under the legislation.

This pioneer United States victim compensation legislation program was subject to wide-ranging criticism. The criticism was succinctly summed up by Judge McCarty who regarded the program as very weak, though better than no law at all.⁷⁵

In 1967, the California legislature in response to much debate, repealed the initial welfare legislation and enacted the victim compensation program as part of the California Government Code.⁷⁶ The change was motivated by "an effort to broaden the coverage of the program and remove the Welfare 'stigma' imputed to one receiving aid under the program."⁷⁷

The coverage of the legislation is specifically earmarked for needy residents who are victims of crime committed within California or another state of jurisdiction.⁷⁸

The program is administered by the State Board of Control, General Andrew A. Lolli, Chairman. A claim may be filed with the Board within one year of the death or injury.⁷⁹ Once the claim is filed the Attorney General's office conducts an investigation into the facts of the claim including the claimant's financial condition. After this phase of the investigation is completed, a public hearing is set.

At this public hearing there is a review of the nature of the crime committed, the circumstances involved and the need of the claimant. The approved claim cannot exceed the amount necessary to indemnify or reimburse the claimant for necessary expenses incurred for hospitalization or medical treatment, loss of wages, loss of support or other necessary expenses directly related to the injury. There is no provision made for pain and suffering. Five thousand dollars is the maximum amount that can be awarded. Attorneys' fees may be awarded over and above the compensation payment but cannot exceed 10 percent of the sum.⁸⁰

If the State does pay a claim it is subrogated to the rights of the claimant against any person causing the damage or injury. Any convicted person may be required to pay a fine in order to defray the cost of the compensation program; this legislation also continues the existence of the Indemnity Fund in the State Treasury.⁸¹

As of October 31, 1968 there were 306 claims filed requesting \$2,957,549.86 in aid. Eighty-three of these were denied and 38 have been granted totaling \$46,025.20 in payments. Of the remaining, 159 were awaiting an Attorney General's report, 14 requested a continuance and 12 were set for a hearing before the Board of Control.⁸²

California has a second program which provides aid to private citizens incurring injury or property damage in preventing the commission of a crime against another, in apprehending a criminal, or in naturally assisting a peace officer to prevent crime or apprehend a criminal. The legislation entitled "Indemnification of Private Citizens" is part of the Penal Law and is also administered by the State Board of Control.⁸³

As of October 14, 1968, 31 claims have been filed under this good samaritan legislation totaling \$462,228.60. Sixteen of these have been allowed totaling \$20,701.07 in benefits, 8 have been denied and 7 are still under investigation.⁸⁴

New York

New York State established its program to provide compensation for the innocent victims of violent crime in August of 1966.⁸⁵ This legislative action was precipitated by widespread public concern for safety from violence which gained momentum from the fatal subway stabbing of Arthur Collins in October of 1965. Mr. Collins had attempted to eject from a subway car a disorderly man annoying two women. During the incident, he was stabbed to death in front of his wife and 15-month-old daughter. Collins was earning \$6,000 a year at the time of his death and his wife and child were left without a source of income.

Governor Rockefeller appointed a three-man Committee on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime late in 1965 to hold hearings and

recommend legislation. The present compensation program was the outgrowth of the intensive study conducted by that Committee.

The New York plan is conducted by the Crime Victim Compensation Board.⁸⁶ The Board consists of a Chairman and two members, each of whom must be lawyers; it is assisted by a permanent staff.

An application for compensation may be filed by the following persons: (1) a victim of a crime in which personal injuries were sustained on or after March 1, 1967; (2) a surviving spouse or child of a victim of a crime who died as a result of such a crime; or (3) any other person dependent for his principal support upon a victim of a crime who died as a direct result of such crime. No person responsible for the crime or an accomplice of such person or a member of the family of such person is eligible to receive an award.⁸⁷

All claims must be filed with the Board within 90 days after the occurrence or the death of the victim. This limited time period may be extended upon a showing of good cause for a period not to exceed one year after the occurrence.⁸⁸

This is an investigation of each claim by the Compensation Board staff. A medical examination of the victim may be required by a doctor chosen by the Board and at the Board's expense. Once the investigation is completed, if the claim is found to merit consideration, it is assigned to one Board member for review.

To permit an award the Board member must find that: (1) a crime was committed; and (2) this crime resulted in personal physical injuries to the claimant or the death of the victim; and (3) police records establish the crime was reported within 48 hours (this may be waived for good cause shown); and (4) the crime resulted in "serious financial hardship" to the victim or claimant.⁸⁹ If the Board member cannot make a determination, he may call a hearing at which time the claimant will be given a reasonable opportunity to appear with counsel and witnesses, if he so desires.⁹⁰ Within 30 days of the decision by a single Board member the claimant may apply for full Board consideration.⁹¹ Within 30 days of a final decision by the full Board the Attorney General may commence a proceeding in the Appellate Division to review the decision of the Board.⁹²

In order to receive compensation the claimant must have out-of-pocket expenses for medical or other services of at least \$100 unreimbursable from other sources or loss of earnings for at least two continuous weeks. No more than \$100 a week can be awarded for loss of earnings and if claimant earns less than \$100, the compensation will be based upon actual earnings. The maximum payment for loss of earnings and/or loss of support is \$15,000.⁹³ If the claimant receives payment from or on behalf of the person who committed the crime, or under an insurance program mandated by law, or as an emergency or receives payment from a private insurance company, this will be deducted from the claimant's allowance for loss of earnings.⁹⁴

The report issued by the Crime Victim Compensation Board in April, 1968 lists a total of 274 claims received up to February 29, 1968. Of these claims, 80 were found to be ineligible. The remaining 196 (151 personal injuries and 45 deaths) were accepted and subsequent investigations led to decisions in 99 cases. Forty-three of the 99 claimants received awards and 56 claims were disallowed.⁹⁵

In his testimony before the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on October 31, 1968 Stanley J. Van Rensselaer, the Chairman of the New York Board reported that 1157 claims were filed between March 1, 1967 and October 15, 1968.

Of these 141 claimants were granted awards and 146 claimants were denied compensation. The average lump sum payment for personal injury was \$1410, the average award involving a death provides \$3,000 annually and \$4071 is the average sum granted for a protracted disability. Payments for funeral expenses average \$800.

Of the 146 claims denied, the following is a list of the reasons for their denial:

Reasons	Number
No crime committed	19
Not reported within 48 hours	6
No principal support	8
Minimum requirements not met	50
No serious financial hardship	49
Motor vehicle	2
No one eligible	5
Late filing (over 1 year)	1
Provocation	2
No report to the police and refusal to furnish financial statement	4

A representative of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence attended and participated in the hearings before the Crime Victim Compensation Board on November 1, 1968 in New York City. The hearings were informal and each claimant was given an opportunity to present and explain his claim in detail. The approach of each of the Board members was forthright and the background research work done on the cases prior to the hearings themselves seemed to be very thorough.

Hawaii

The Hawaiian bill to provide compensation to victims of crime did not evolve from a particular event but rather received its most significant impetus from the discussions and ideas initiated by Governor John A. Burns and a few State Senators.⁹⁶ The bill, which was approved June 6, 1967 and became effective on July 1, 1967,⁹⁷ created awards to victims of crime not out of "mercy or sympathy" but because the government recognized its duty to protect the people from the consequences of crime.⁹⁸

The Hawaii program is administered by a three-man Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission.⁹⁹ The Commission's members were sworn in on July 30, 1968 with John Jubinsky, a Honolulu attorney, chosen as the Chairman. Under the statute, at least one member of the Commission must be an attorney.¹⁰⁰

An application for compensation may be filed within eighteen months after the incident leading to the claim by the following persons: (1) a victim of a crime committed after July 1, 1967; (2) any person responsible for the

maintenance of such victim, where such person suffers pecuniary loss or incurred expenses; and (3) any dependents of a deceased victim.¹⁰¹

Under the Hawaiian statute each claimant is given a hearing before the Commission. Any person aggrieved by a final decision of the Commission on the sole ground that the decision was in excess of the Commission's authority or jurisdiction, may file an appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawaii within thirty days of that decision.¹⁰²

A compensation award not to exceed \$10,000 may provide for: (1) expenses actually or reasonably incurred as a result of the injury or death; (2) loss of earning power as result of the injury incurred; (3) pecuniary loss to the dependents of the deceased victim; (4) pain and suffering to the victim and (5) any pecuniary loss directly resulting from the death or injury.¹⁰³ The Commission may allow a sum for reasonable attorneys' fees not to exceed 15% of the award if it is over \$1,000.¹⁰⁴

The act specifically lists fifteen crimes which are defined as violent. They are: (1) arson; (2) intermediate assault or battery; (3) aggravated assault or battery; (4) use of dangerous substances; (5) murder; (6) manslaughter; (7) kidnapping; (8) child-stealing; (9) unlawful use of explosives; (10) sexual intercourse with a female under sixteen; (11) assault with intent to rape or ravish; (12) indecent assault; (13) carnal abuse of a female under twelve; (14) rape, and (15) attempted rape.¹⁰⁵

Under this program a private citizen who incurs injury or property loss in preventing the commission of such a crime, in apprehending a person who has committed such a crime, or in materially assisting a peace officer is eligible for a compensation award.¹⁰⁶

It is important to note that the Hawaiian legislation does not set financial need as a criteria for determining an award. However "... the Commission may consider any circumstances it deems to be relevant ..." ¹⁰⁷ in making its decisions and this provision could conceivably cover a consideration of financial circumstances.¹⁰⁸ Since the program is untried at present it remains to be seen how the Commission members will interpret the scope of the law.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts program for compensation to victims of violent crime was first recommended by the Special Commission on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes appointed in 1966. The Commission began its investigation by reviewing the extensive body of literature on the subject and was initially impressed with the apparent unanimity of support for some type of a compensation program.¹⁰⁹ As a result of its study and subsequent public hearings the Commission submitted legislation which was enacted in January of 1968.¹¹⁰

The program adopted in Massachusetts is unique in that it is the first to place the administration of the plan within the scope of the judiciary. Each claimant must bring his claim in the district court within the territorial jurisdiction in which he resides.¹¹¹ It is important to note that a judge who has heard the claim sit in on a criminal case involving matters related to the claim.¹¹² The claim may be brought up for a rehearing in matters of law in an appellate division of each district court.¹¹³

An application for compensation may be submitted by the victim of a crime or in the case of death of the victim, a dependent of the victim. No

person responsible for the crime or an accomplice of such person or a member of the family of such person is eligible to receive an award.¹¹⁴ All applications must be filed within one year of the incident or not later than ten days after the death of the victim, whichever is earlier (these times may be modified for good cause shown).¹¹⁵

Upon the filing of a claim, the investigation of it is the responsibility of the Office of the Attorney General. A hearing is set and both the claimant and Attorney General or his representative may present evidence and testimony.¹¹⁶ At present Howard W. Glaser, an Assistant Attorney General, is responsible for all matters concerning victim compensation handled by the Massachusetts Attorney General's office.

The victim may not receive an award unless he has incurred an out-of-pocket loss of at least \$100 or has lost two continuous weeks of earnings or support. The maximum recovery cannot exceed out-of-pocket loss, together with loss of earnings or support resulting from injury or death, and in no event shall an award exceed \$10,000.¹¹⁷ The statute specifically excludes recovery for pain and suffering.¹¹⁸ The award may be reduced by the amount of any payment the claimant receives or will receive from the offender, or from public funds or under private insurance programs.¹¹⁹ If the claimant accepts compensation, the state is subrogated to his rights to the extent of this compensation.¹²⁰

Though enacted in January of 1968 the statute only covers those victims of crimes committed on or after July 1, 1968.¹²¹ As of October 31, 1968 only five claims had been filed. Two of these were murders and three involved assault and/or robbery.¹²² A proper evaluation of this unique approach is impossible at this time.

Maryland

Maryland became the fifth state to adopt victim compensation legislation when Governor Spiro T. Agnew signed Senate Bill No. 4 on May 7, 1968. The program is now being organized under a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board headed by A. Owen Hennegan, Chairman.¹²³

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board is composed of three members; one member must have been admitted to the practice of law in the State of Maryland for not less than five years preceding his appointment.¹²⁴

A person is eligible for coverage under this plan if he fits into one of the following categories: (1) a victim of a crime; (2) a surviving spouse or child of a victim who dies as a direct result of such crime; (3) any other person dependent for principal support upon such a victim; (4) any person who is injured or killed while trying to prevent a crime or an attempted crime from occurring in his presence or trying to apprehend a person who had committed a crime in his presence or had, in fact, committed a felony; (5) a surviving spouse, child or any other person dependent for principal support upon any person who dies as a direct result of trying to prevent a crime or attempted crime or trying to apprehend a person who had committed a crime in his presence or had, in fact, committed a felony. No person found to be responsible for the crime or an accomplice of such person or a member of their families is eligible for coverage.¹²⁵

The claim must be filed by the claimant not later than 90 days after the occurrence or not later than 90 days after the death of the victim. The time

for filing may be extended, however, for a period not exceeding one year for good cause.¹²⁶

Each claim is assigned by the Chairman to an individual Board member who is to see that a full investigation of the claim is conducted. If he can make no decision based on his findings, he may order a hearing on the matter.¹²⁷

Within 30 days of the notification of a decision by a single Board member, the claimant may apply for a hearing before the full Board.¹²⁸ Within 30 days of the final decision by the full Board, the Attorney General may commence proceedings in the Circuit Court of the county or the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City to review the decision.¹²⁹

To make an award the Commission must find the following: (1) a crime was committed; (2) this crime resulted in personal injuries to the claimant or the death of the victim; (3) police records establish the crime was reported within 48 hours (this may be waived for good cause shown); and (4) the claimant will suffer a serious financial hardship if not granted the award.¹³⁰ No payment may exceed \$30,000.¹³¹

The Maryland program is now at the organizational stage as stated at the outset and there are no available data on the number of claims filed to date.¹³²

Federal Legislative Proposals

The idea of victim compensation on a federal level is somewhat limited due to the narrow criminal law jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Despite the restricted scope of any such legislation, there have been a number of programs proposed in the Congress. Among the bills before the 90th Congress Senator Ralph W. Yarborough's Senate Bill 646¹³³ received the most attention. Besides this proposal there were nine bills introduced in the House of Representatives. Foremost among these House bills was H.R. 632 offered by Mrs. Edith Green of Oregon. All of the proposals were sent to their respective Judiciary Committees and have remained there without further action to date.

For the purposes of this article a brief study of some of the main features of the Yarborough proposal may prove helpful.

The scope of the program is to include only special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This would include the District of Columbia.¹³⁴

The program would be administered by a three-man tribunal appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The tribunal to be known as the Violent Crimes Compensation Commission would have a chairman who has been a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State for at least eight years.¹³⁵

The act provides for compensation from injury or death resulting from: (1) assault with intent to kill, rob, rape or poison; (2) assault with intent to commit mayhem; (3) assault with a dangerous weapon; (4) assault; (5) mayhem; (6) malicious disfiguring; (7) threats to do bodily harm; (8) lewd, indecent, or obscene acts; (9) indecent act with children; (10) arson; (11) kidnapping; (12) robbery; (13) murder; (14) manslaughter; (15) attempted murder; (16) rape; (17) attempted rape; (18) or other crimes involving force to the person.¹³⁶

An award of compensation may be made: (1) to or on behalf of the injured; (2) in personal injury cases involving a pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred for the maintenance of the victim; or (3) in death cases to dependents of the deceased.¹³⁷

An application for an award must be filed within two years of the injury or death. Payments not to exceed \$25,000 may be ordered for: (1) expenses incurred as a result of the injury; (2) loss of earnings; (3) pecuniary loss to dependents; (4) pain and suffering and (5) any other reasonable pecuniary loss.¹³⁸ Attorney's fees are to be regulated by the Commission.¹³⁹

Title IV of this proposed legislation provides for an offense giving rise to an award for compensation. This does not preclude the right of any person to recover damages from any other person by a civil action for the injury or death.¹⁴⁰

All decisions of the Commission are reviewable on appeal though no trial *de novo* of the facts shall be allowed.¹⁴¹

JURISDICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES—COMMENTS

The commentary will concentrate primarily on the general result of experience with victim compensation in California and New York, unusual elements of the laws in the remaining states, and the more notable suggestions that have been put forward in reports of study groups and investigatory committees in the United States during the past few years.

California

The California program of compensation to victims of violent crime continues to be regarded as the poorest and most haphazard scheme in existence. In 1966, when the program was placed within the State Department of Welfare, applicants for compensation were handled in essentially the same manner as persons applying for welfare assistance, being subject to most of the indignities traditionally associated with state aid; suspicions regarding the veracity of their claim, overlong delays in processing papers, excessive waiting periods in inhospitable offices, condescension and pressures pushing toward an early return to work and cancellation of benefits.¹⁴² Little attention was paid to specific crime-related aspects of a case, such as contributory negligence, since the claimant received only a few dollars more than he would have gotten under regular welfare programs, and he was usually placed on the victim compensation rolls either to relieve a county of a portion of its welfare expenses or to help a person not otherwise qualified for relief on grounds such as insufficiently long residence in the state.

Typical of the criticism directed toward the California program is that of Professor Edwards, who describes it as "iniquitous," and notes that "[i]n tying the question of reparation to what appears to be a rigorous means test . . . the State of California has acted in a manner incompatible with its reputation in the field of corrections as a progressive and humanistic society."¹⁴³ The scope of the California program has been severely limited by an annual appropriation of only \$100,000, an amount that could cover only 40 families a year.¹⁴⁴

Largely in response to widespread disapproval of its placement of victim

compensation within its welfare system, California in 1967 transferred administration of the program to the State Board of Control, the agency which considers tort claims against the state. Major change in the law was the addition of a clause requiring district attorneys to notify victims who might be eligible for compensation of the existence of the program, thus providing in California a possible resolution of the communications difficulty that has frustrated administrators of other victim-compensation programs. The district attorneys throughout California, however, fearful of suits based upon their failure to provide proper notification, have been pressing for removal of this requirement from the law.

Approximately 60 claims were awarded during the 23 months that the victim compensation program operated under welfare auspices. In the year following November, 1967, when the program was relocated, approximately 350 applications for compensation have been filed, and 40 grants have been made, invariably to persons demonstrating serious financial need. At the moment, nearly 30 claims are being filed each month. Investigators from the Attorney General's office, who look into tort claims against the state, were assigned the extra duty of investigating compensation applications, and by the end of the first year they were almost six months behind in their work. The Indemnification Fund, unique with the California program, has received less than \$5,000 in the three years of its existence from fines assessed by judges against offenders. All told, the characterization by a participant in the International Conference on the Compensation of Innocent Victims of Violent Crime, after he had heard reports regarding the operation of the California program, does not seem unreasonable: Speaking of the work of the California legislature in the field of victim compensation, he observed "Never have so many done so little for so few."

New York

It had been hoped that New York would not follow California by inserting a strenuous need provision when it enacted its victim compensation law. "If New York does have a moral obligation to compensate," one writer noted, "it has it to all of its citizens and there should not be a requirement that financial need first be established."¹⁴⁵ Nonetheless, to secure passage of the act, its sponsors inserted the provision that "serious financial hardship" would have to be demonstrated for an applicant to become eligible for compensation for expenses or losses associated with victimization. Reports indicate some unease with the hardship provision within the New York Board, partly because it appears unfair to penalize a victim who has been frugal and saved money, and help one who might have dissipated considerable sums during the previous years. To soften the hardship provision somewhat, the New York program interprets need prospectively, so that a victim may be given the opportunity to return to the Board at a time when his funds have been exhausted by expenses associated with the crime that produced his application. The New York program operates with a budget of \$1.1 million, and will request \$1.5 million during the 1969 legislative session.

Between March 1967 and December 1968, the New York Crime Victims Compensation Board processed 1,400 claims, utilizing a single-member hearing procedure, with disputed decisions being put before three members of the Board. A provision permitting the state to appeal Board decisions to the

courts had not been used during the period of the program's existence. Seven investigators look into claims, and hearings are held either in New York City, or, if the applicant lives upstate, in the town where he resides. Adequate broadcasting of the program to bring it to the attention of all possible claimants still bedevils the New York program. Leaflets have been sent to hospitals and to police precincts, and all legislators have been informed about the program. The appearance of several successful applicants on radio broadcasts and television programs sent the number of claims up for some weeks afterwards, but soon thereafter it fell back to the earlier level.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts program to compensate victims of violent crime, which began on July 1, 1968, differs radically from those operative in New York and California by providing that awards are to be made by the district court in the jurisdiction where the claimant lives. The case for a court-located program was thoroughly argued by the Special Commission on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, which reported to the Massachusetts legislature in July, 1967. Compensation, the Commission maintained, involves a "broad consideration of . . . intangible social and ethical factors" and the courts are the "most expert" determiners of such issues, since "they have built up a body of knowledge and experience in dealing with similar matters."¹⁴⁶ The courts were also seen as standing in the best position to follow rules of precedence, and to "develop the application of received and tested principles" as the basis for making compensation awards. The courts would also allow the claimant to press his case with a judicial body in his own neighborhood, providing a hearing that would be "more personal and would not have the stigma attached to it of a powerless citizen trying to fight an anonymous governmental bureaucracy."¹⁴⁷ The Commission believed that addition of compensation cases would represent an increase of less than one-half of one percent in the work of the district courts in Massachusetts.

Applicants for compensation are required to pay a \$5 filing fee to have their claim considered, and judges must indicate in writing the grounds for their decision. The first Massachusetts grant was made on December 9, 1968 to a 17-year-old boy who was awarded \$548.60 for expenses from a fractured jaw suffered during a gang attack upon him. His assailants had not been apprehended.¹⁴⁸

Maryland and Hawaii

Neither of the remaining two programs in the United States, those of Maryland and Hawaii, had considered their first case by December of 1968. Maryland's program differs from the others in that awards are to be determined by the three-member Criminal Injuries Compensation Board in accordance with the schedule of benefits provided in the state's workmen's compensation law. That law has a maximum payment of \$30,000, the highest allowance in any of the states with victim compensation programs, but Maryland, like most American jurisdictions, includes a need provision for victim compensation, indication that the Board should reject an application if it finds that "the claimant will not suffer serious financial hardship" as a result of his injury. Such a need provision is notably absent in the Hawaii

legislation, though the Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission is instructed that in determining an award it "may consider any circumstances it determines to be relevant."¹⁴⁹ The Hawaii law includes awards for pain and suffering and provides a penalty for attorneys who charge an applicant more than 15 percent of the amount he receives as compensation. The statute presently allows a maximum award of \$10,000; in 1965, when the victim compensation measure was delivered in the Hawaii legislature, it was believed that the \$25,000 ceiling in the bill was largely responsible for its downfall.

Other Jurisdictions

Various legislative committees and other investigatory groups have put forward recommendations regarding compensation during the past years that differ in some measure from items included in operative programs. In Illinois, for instance, the Commission on Compensation to Victims of Violence recommended that at least one member of the Compensation Board be licensed to practice medicine in the state. The Illinois Commission specified that benefits payable to the victim or his dependents by virtue of insurance policies held by the victim should not be deducted from an award.¹⁵⁰ It also noted the endorsement of victim compensation by law enforcement agencies during Commission hearings, and placed on record a resolution from the 1966 conference of the National Association of Chiefs of Police supporting "reasonable indemnification to the victims of violent crime and/or their surviving kin."¹⁵¹

Finally, in Minnesota, where a Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement, Administration of Justice and Correction has been reviewing existing and desirable measures for dealing with crime, the Law Enforcement Task Force in its preliminary report in March 1968 recommended enactment of a victim compensation measure that would include a provision for determining the future course of programs affording financial help to crime victims. "In the original legislative appropriation for victim compensation," the Minnesota Task Force report noted, "a sum of money should be designated for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the Act." The Task Force pointed out the importance of such an appropriation in the following terms:

Since this is a new concept in Minnesota law, it would seem wise to test the effectiveness and impact of the law from the beginning by appropriating a sum of money to be used for research. At the end of two years of experience with the law a report based on the research should be submitted to the legislature for review.¹⁵²

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPENSATION TO INNOCENT VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME

The most poignant moments during the first international conference on victim compensation, held in Los Angeles in early December, 1968, came when Mrs. Myrlie Evers, widow of Medgar Evers, a slain civil rights leader, addressed the meeting. She spoke eloquently and passionately, with barely-controlled emotion, of the tragic circumstances which surrounded the days and months of her life following the death of her husband.

"We lived with a constant knowledge that this might happen," Mrs. Evers said. "But when the time comes you are totally unprepared for the shock, for the emptiness afterwards." The Evers' had been living on their income, trying to make ends meet. After the death of her husband, Mrs. Evers received money from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, for whom he had worked, and contributions from private citizens, which allowed her to finish her education at Pomona College in California, and to take a job there assisting deprived persons to gain equal opportunities and achieve self-respect.

"We were fortunate. We had help. We had people who cared," Mrs. Evers told the conference participants. She spoke on behalf of other victims of violent crime, more anonymous than herself. "My concern," she said in an endorsement of compensation programs, "is with that man, that woman, those children—the ordinary people—who need help in a moment of crisis." She stressed the value of compensation for young people in a victimized family. "I cannot overemphasize the impact of a crime of violence upon the young people who survive the victim," she noted, with reference to her own situation. Her oldest child, having seen his father die on the doorstep of their home, had difficulty "overcoming this nightmare." He slept with a toy rifle at his bedside to protect his mother, sister and brother, and only with time was he able to express his feeling of shock and loss. "But so many fall by the wayside," Mrs. Evers said. Financial help can save such people for the country, which needs all the talent it can get. Otherwise, "the kids grow bitter, grow cruel, drop out, and see no need for doing their best, for no one seems to care."

It was in terms of the human and personal context provided by their keynote speaker that the delegates, representing Great Britain, Canada, and four of the five victim-compensation programs in the United States, exchanged views regarding key issues, problems and prospects surrounding compensation.¹⁵³ Participants discussed questions such as whether financial hardship and need provisions should be included in compensation schemes or whether all citizens, and possibly non-residents and aliens as well, should be eligible for grants. Maximum and minimum awards that should be stipulated, administrative arrangements, questions of attorney's fees, and issues of federal as compared to state programs were among the agenda items at the two-day conference.

Notable among the decisions reached by the conferees was a strong stand against the inclusion of need or financial hardship requirements as prerequisites for compensation.¹⁵⁴ It was agreed that ideally programs must rest on the absolute right of all citizens within a society to receive financial recompense for physical injuries inflicted upon them as a result of a crime of violence. Representatives from most of the jurisdictions granted that their programs included clauses restricting compensation to persons demonstrating hardship, and in some instances showing extreme need, but these restrictive clauses were viewed primarily as the result of political necessity. It was believed that they hindered rather than contributed to the philosophical foundation upon which victim compensation should rest. In addition, these clauses tended to antagonize claimants who suffered serious losses, but who were required to exhaust any means they might have before they could be helped. Hardship provisions were described at one point as an "iniquitous

idea that should be exorcised." It was suggested, however, that the elimination of such provisions might follow upon the experience of a jurisdiction demonstrating that elimination of need provisions would not be unduly expensive.

With some reservations, the conferees agreed that a victim's "pain and suffering" should not be recompensed. It was suggested that this idea could be juxtaposed with views about financial hardship to indicate the true aim of a compensation program, that of helping victims recoup financial losses ensuant upon criminal injury rather than attempting to assuage losses less measurable in monetary terms.

Agreement emerged at the conference regarding the necessity of establishing a ceiling on the award available to a victim of a violent crime or his survivors, in the event of his death. Awards might vary in relation to the standard of living previously enjoyed by the victim, providing they did not exceed the preestablished maximum figure. Criticism was directed to the California program, which allows no more than \$5,000 to a violence victim, a figure believed to be unrealistic. Reimbursement of out-of-pocket medical expenses was seen as an essential ingredient of any compensation program, including the necessity to pay for employment of household help required as a consequence of criminally-inflicted injury. There would be no maximum on this part of the award. It was agreed, however, that a limit should be placed on compensation for loss of earnings or similar indispositions. The recommendation of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency that monthly payments be related to the median income of families in the relevant geographical area was viewed as a useful formula. For the United States, the ceiling of \$30,000 on awards specified in the Maryland legislation was regarded as reasonable.

There was some division among the conference participants regarding the necessity for including a minimum figure below which no awards would be made. Some persons believed that it would be unduly harsh to deprive applicants of very limited means of the right to submit small claims. Others pointed out that the cost of processing even the smallest claim may be at least as expensive as the cost of a full investigation of claims for maximum awards. The British program, after almost five years of experience with victim compensation, has found that its average investigation cost for a claim is 32 pounds of sterling. It was stressed, though, that a large number of recipients of very small claims could be of great political value as supporters of compensation programs, and it was suggested that it might be possible to do other than full investigations of all claims for very small amounts. A warning was also voiced that requiring a minimum amount for awards provides a built-in incentive for applicants to try to reach that figure.

Creation of separate compensation boards to administer the programs was believed to offer the most beneficial approach to victim compensation. Already overburdened court calendars and intolerable delays in many jurisdictions in providing required assistance to applications were seen as barriers to the efficient operation of a compensation program located in the courts. The possibility of a spirit of easy informality in a board-run compensation program was believed to lend itself most effectively to the required exchange of information between the applicant and those reviewing his request for aid. The British approach, on appeal by three other members

of the board, was regarded as likely to prove the most successful administration approach to weighing applicant claims fairly and decently.

Participants in the conference concurred that at least in its initial stages a victim compensation board required legal expertise to establish the correct orientation of the program. Statutory interpretations, adjudication of claims, determination of the monetary value of "pain and suffering" when provision for compensation for such injury appears in the statute, and similar matters with which legally-trained persons have had experience, were seen as necessitating their inclusion. The need for adequate financial resources for consultation with medical experts was also stressed as vital in the operation of a compensation program. Stress was placed on the necessity of attractive salaries for board members in order to gain the services of talented persons. Absent adequate legislative appropriations, the idea of well-paid-part-time board members was preferred to a reduction in the qualities of its personnel in order to have a full-time board.

Jurisdictional arrangements in the United States were also considered. The necessity for the Federal government to assume a role of leadership in victim compensation measures was emphasized. "Such is the tax structure in the United States." One participant noted "that the obligation of the Federal government is overwhelming." Details of pending Federal legislation were not reviewed, but it was believed that a Federal victim compensation law, confined to the District of Columbia and Federal territories, might arouse other state jurisdictions to enact compensation laws. Absent schemes in all state jurisdictions, difficult questions of reciprocal rights would arise, when, for example, a resident of a compensating state was injured by a criminal act in a jurisdiction without a compensation program. Public hearings by the Federal Congress, which now has almost a dozen acts pending in committee, were seen as providing a national forum to generate interest and ideas regarding the best arrangement for making reparations to persons suffering injury from criminal violence.

Emphasis was also placed upon the importance of exploration by the appropriate division of the Federal Department of Justice of the possibility of incorporation of a victim compensation provision in the Civil Rights Act. In part, this recommendation stemmed from the earlier recital to the conferees by Mrs. Myrlie Evers of several cases of extreme hardship growing out of criminal violence visited upon persons seeking to gain equal rights for themselves or for members of minority groups. The Civil Rights Act, in the words of Professor Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School, was an "imaginative" and "socially creative" method of dealing with certain crimes of violence. A necessary corollary of the Act might be the provision of compensation to victims of violence when that violence represented a denial of civil rights. Advantages seen for such a program, were it to prove feasible, could be that it would "bring pressure to bear upon states which have inverse equality of treatment." Such a Federal program might also remove inflammatory cases from local compensation boards, and set them within the Federal jurisdiction which has already accepted responsibility for prosecution of the act giving rise to the compensation claim.

In regard to attorney's fees, the conferees, in large part lawyers themselves, were unable to reach a specific recommendation. Each jurisdiction was seen as having unique traditions in regard to the practice of law, which required

specially-tailored answers to the question of fees. It was agreed, however, that the California program which provides a maximum fee of ten percent of the applicant's award for his attorney, with the fee calculated over and above the amount granted for injury, offered the most acceptable solution. Provision for attorney's fees, it was suggested, would induce members of the legal profession to take an active interest in victim-compensation plans, and would in part solve the problem of making certain that all persons who might qualify for compensation became aware of their right to do so. Adding the fee to the award itself would serve to protect the applicant's interests. Attorneys were also viewed as likely to provide an important service to the compensation board by acting as a buffer between it and an unsuccessful applicant by explaining to that applicant the deficiencies in his claim.

In summary, it was clear that the principle of victim compensation was enthusiastically accepted and endorsed by the conferees. As noted, an overriding consensus emerged with regard to the philosophy behind such programs. The inherent right of the individual within a responsible and responsive society was regarded as the fundamental foundation for the establishment of schemes to compensate victims. Such compensation was seen as aiding the individual to resume as well as possible his proper place in the social structure, and as contributing to the morale and the integrity of the society itself.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To conclude this article the authors would like to make five specific recommendations regarding programs for compensating victims of violent crime.

1. Victim compensation must be regarded as a right for all citizens and, therefore, financial hardship or need requirements should be eliminated from all existing programs and not included in future programs.
2. The Federal government should adopt a plan for compensating victims of violent crime which will cover all the territories and the District of Columbia. Bills presently before their respective Congressional Judiciary committees should be given open public hearings to determine which proposal would most successfully accomplish this goal.
3. The Congress and the Department of Justice should give serious and immediate consideration to the matter of providing compensation to all persons physically injured by violators of any Federal Civil Rights legislation.
4. All future programs adopted to compensate victims of violent crime should be administered by a separate Board which deals exclusively with victim compensation.
5. Maximum or minimum awards should be left within the discretion of the Board and should not be regulated by statute.

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S.646	Yarborough
H.R.632	Mrs. Green - Oregon
H.R.684	Holland
H.R.714	Horton
H.R.4869	Hathaway
H.R.5391	Matsunaga
H.R.5392	Bell
H.R.13208	Schweiker
H.R.16756	Brown, Calif.
H.R.16864	Roybal

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 151. Id. at p. 3.
 152. Minn. Governor's Comm'n on Law Enforcement, Administration of Justice, and Corrections, Preliminary Rpt. Law Enforcement Task Force VI-A-4. (1968).
 153. Participants in the conference were: Sir Walker Kelly Carter, Q.C., chairman, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Great Britain; Allen M. Linden, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto; Stanley L. Van Rensselaer, chairman, and Claire E. Canning, executive secretary, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, New York; Willard A. Shank, Assistant Attorney General, California; A. Owen Hennegan, chairman, and Harry S. Swartzwelder, Jr., member, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Maryland; John Jubinsky, chairman, Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission, Hawaii; Tully McCrea, western director, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco; Norval Morris, School of Law, University of Chicago; Gilbert Geis, Department of Sociology, California State

- College, Los Angeles; John Schulz, School of Law, University of Southern California; Herbert Sigurdson, senior research associate, Public Systems Research Institute, University of Southern California; Seymour Pollack, M.D., director, Institute on Psychiatry and Law, University of Southern California; Bertram Griggs, regional administrator, California Department of Corrections; Donald J. Mulvihill, co-director, and Richard A. Weiner, attorney, Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Washington, D.C.
 154. The discussion and recommendations emerged from group discussions and should not be regarded as carrying either the personal or official endorsement of any individual participating in the conference.

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