

# ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION

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Program for the Study of Corruption in Local Government  
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## PREFACE

### The Project

Under a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, SRI International (formerly Stanford Research Institute) has conducted a 2-year study of problems of local-government corruption in land use and building regulation. We have found such corruption to be a significant problem in many areas in the United States and it is not likely to be insignificant in the areas we could not study. To provide a detailed understanding of how corruption occurs and how it can be prevented, SRI researched the environment in cities that had faced corruption problems in recent years, undertook an extensive literature search, analyzed the causes of corruption, identified numerous corruption prescriptions, and commissioned specialized studies from recognized experts in the field. The methods available for carrying out this study had severe limitations. As a result, the study produced not firm conclusions, but hypotheses to be tested by other researchers in other, more rigorous situations.

The results of this 2-year study program are contained in six reports, as follows:

- Volume I: Corruption in Land Use and Building Regulation: An Integrated Report of Conclusions--A summary of the environment in which corruption can occur in land use and building regulation, and possible corrective and preventive measures. Illustrations are drawn from the case studies (Volume II).
- Volume II: Appendix--Case Studies of Corruption and Reform--Documented incidents of corruption in nine cities and one documented absence-of-corruption case. In each case study, the factors that acted to allow the corruption are pointed out.

- An Anticorruption Strategy for Local Governments--This report describes a countercorruption strategy that can be implemented by city administrators to monitor the performance of employees and to increase their understanding of what constitutes corruption and how to avoid it.
- An Analysis of Zoning Reforms: Minimizing the Incentive for Corruption--This report, prepared by staff of the American Society of Planning Officials, discusses zoning reforms that can be considered by planners, zoning commissioners, and others involved in land-use regulation.
- Establishing a Citizens' Watchdog Group--This manual, prepared by the Better Government Association of Chicago, shows how to establish a citizens' group to expose corruption and bring pressure for reform.
- Analysis and Bibliography of Literature on Corruption--The results of a detailed search of books, journals, and newspapers made to identify descriptive accounts of corruption, theoretical analyses of the causes of corruption, and strategies proposed or implemented to control it.

### The Report

This analysis and bibliography does not deal with any specific hypotheses suggested in Volume I of "Corruption in Land Use and Building Regulation." Instead, it presents an overview of the literature on corruption in local government. The overview includes more than corruption in land use and building regulation, because observations made in other fields can often illuminate practices and motivations in the relatively narrow field of corruption in zoning, building permits, or building inspections.

The literature analyzed and presented here is not limited to scholarly works but includes case histories by journalists as well as assessments by lawyers and political scientists and analyses by sociologists

and others. Annotations have been added to those items in the bibliography that seemed particularly relevant to the objectives of the study. No assessment of value is implied in the presence or absence of annotation.

Also, the reader is cautioned that presence of a citation in this bibliography does not imply any decision as to the correctness of any interpretation, assignment of cause and effect, or assessment contained in the document. It is, because it is listed, a pertinent document that contains some information on corruption in local government. No further claim is made.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Projects that require years to complete and that require data to be collected from all over the country inevitably depend heavily on the contributions of many persons outside the project team. The project director and the authors of the various reports in this series take this opportunity to thank all of those who have talked, debated, and argued with us for the past two years. The project has benefited greatly from your involvement.

In addition to the grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, support has been provided by the University of Illinois (sabbatical support for John Gardiner), by the American Society of Planning Officials, by the Better Government Association of Chicago, and the executives and management of SRI International.

The six volumes of this series have benefited from, among others, the substantive contribution of the following SRI International staff: Thomas Fletcher and Iram Weinstein who have played major roles in defining and setting the initial direction for the project; James Gollub, Shirley Hentzell, Lois Kraft, Cecilia Molesworth, and Stephen Oura who have all helped shape various aspects of our work. George I. Balch from the University of Illinois and Joseph McGough and Thomas Roche from New York City's Department of Investigations have served as outside consultants providing valuable assistance.

The project has also been guided by an Advisory Committee, members of which have been drawn from the ranks of public interest groups, academia, and research. Representatives at the three Washington, D.C. meetings included Joseph Alviani, United States Conference of Mayors; William Drake, National League of Cities; Donald Murray and Nancy Levinson, National Association of Counties; Claire Rubin and Philip Singer, International City Management Association; Richard Sanderson, Building Officials and Code

Administrators International; Richard Sullivan, American Public Works Association; Nicholas Scopetta, New York Department of Investigation; Jonathan Rubenstein, the Policy Sciences Center; Geoffry Hazzard, Yale Law School; and Victor Rosenblum, Northwestern Law School. To these individuals we extend our appreciation; any frustrations their difficult role may have created were always masked by their evident enthusiasm.

Others have graciously taken valuable time to review one or more of the many working papers that underpin our final products. Elinor Bowen, Gerald Caiden, Michael Maltz, Daniel Mandelker, David Olson, and Larry Sherman have been prominent among these reviewers.

In each city studied for this project we talked with officials from throughout government service, journalists, clergymen, and citizens. While we will always honor our agreements as to confidentiality, we wish to express our gratitude to them for their comments and reactions.

Our project monitors, David Farmer and Philip Travers, justly deserve acknowledgment. They have been helpful not only in ensuring our compliance with the National Institute's rules and regulations but in helping us adhere to our research design even when we were in danger of being buried by the petty details of project work.

Finally, we could never overlook the people who put our often incomprehensible work into readable form. Edith Duncan, Sandra Lawall, and Josie Sedillo of SRI and Anita Worthington of the University of Illinois have earned more than simple acknowledgment, so let mention of their names serve as only a small token of our appreciation.

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PART ONE  
ANALYSIS

## I CONCEPTUAL AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

As part of a two-year study of problems of corruption in land-use and building regulation, an extensive search was undertaken to locate books, articles, and reports dealing with problems of official corruption. In Volume I, Corruption in Land Use and Building Regulation: An Integrated Report of Conclusions, we have presented the findings of our research on land use and building regulation corruption; this report on the literature in the field<sup>1</sup> has been prepared to assist practitioners and scholars interested in other corruption issues. The annotated bibliography of over 400 items follows this analysis of major concerns and perspectives represented in the literature.<sup>2</sup>

Corruption is a term which has been used to designate many types of undesirable activities. In the published literature on corruption, two types of definitions have been used. Some authors reserve the term for

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<sup>1</sup>Concurrent with this research project, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice supported a parallel effort by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice focusing on problems of corruption in police agencies. A comprehensive bibliography, Police Corruption: Annotated Bibliography (1976), covers literature on that topic, so we have excluded from this report most items dealing with the police field.

<sup>2</sup>Our intention in this volume has been to present the perspectives of others who have written on corruption; our own orientations and theoretical perspectives, at least so far as they relate to the land use and building regulation area, are presented in Corruption in Land Use and Building Regulation: An Integrated Report of Findings.

specifically illegal behavior, such as the common law categories of malfeasance (doing something you are prohibited from doing), nonfeasance (failing to do something you are required to do), and misfeasance (performing a permissible act in an improper fashion). Others broaden the definition to encompass deviations from social or cultural values of the community, from the "public interest," however defined, or from commonly held notions of propriety. Table 1 contrasts seven definitions found in the literature, grouped into rough categories of "broad" and "legalistic" definitions.

Table 1

DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION

Broad, Nonlegalistic Definitions (typical)	Narrow, Legalistic Definitions (typical)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The exercise of governmental power to achieve nongovernmental objectives (Scott, 1972)</li> <li>• Violation of the common interest for special advantages (Rogow and Lasswell, 1963)</li> <li>• Behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends (Huntington, 1968)</li> <li>• Improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public office due to the special position one occupies in public life (Monteiro, 1966)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public officer for private wealth (Nye, 1967)</li> <li>• The acceptance of money for doing something a public official is under duty to do (McMullan, 1961)</li> <li>• Behavior where a powerholder is by monetary rewards, not legally provided for, induced to take an action which favors whoever provides the rewards, and thereby does damage to the public and its interests (Friedrich, 1966)</li> </ul>

These definitions carry with them a number of significant implications for research. When research spans a number of jurisdictions, legal definitions of corruption may vary so that an action by an official may be legal in one area and illegal in another; variations in public expectations may similarly lead to acceptance of behavior in one area which

would produce public outrage elsewhere. Furthermore, all attempts at definition have encountered grey areas where "public" obligations shade into "private" interests--awarding jobs or contracts to relatives or the "honest graft"<sup>3</sup> derived from inside knowledge of future public investments or programs.

Different definitions of corruption are useful in different contexts. When studying an area in which standards of official integrity are poorly delineated, it is important to keep in mind that some official behavior may simply reflect the current practices of surrounding business and social communities; as indicated in Section III, below, this may be particularly common where legal standards fail to keep up with changes in the private sector. In these settings, it may well be that virtually no one conducts official business according to the rulebooks and thus that the term "corruption" is practically meaningless. In settings where the distinction between public and private behavior codes has been clearly established, however, the narrower legalistic definitions form an appropriate starting point for research. While it appears that even in the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century, there are variations in styles of official behavior, there is substantial acceptance of concepts of corruption which centers around violations of legally-defined official duties or of universally accepted ethical codes.

## II THE SCOPE OF THE CORRUPTION PROBLEM

It would be desirable to begin any analysis of the problem of local government corruption with a detailed description--or at least an estimate based on reliable data--of the nature of the problem. A data base which indicates where corruption occurs, its costs, and its victims and beneficiaries, could provide a reliable starting point for both descriptive analyses and prescriptions for reform. Unfortunately, data of this

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<sup>3</sup>The phrase was first coined by Tammany Hall politician George Washington Plunkitt (Riordan, 1963).

sort do not exist; our glimpses into the shadow world of corruption generally come only when a participant chooses to complain or a journalist or prosecutor has learned enough to substantiate his charges. The businessmen who know how corruption works, who know when they will have to build payoffs into their costs of doing business in some cities but not others, and the investigators who suspect how the system works but cannot prove it, are unlikely to contribute to the published literature. Lacking subpoena powers or undercover investigators,<sup>4</sup> analysts are forced to rely on court cases, published accounts, or unsubstantiated allegations.

The literature which attempts to estimate the magnitude of local corruption problems includes both broad-brush "overviews" and individual case studies. The overviews (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 188) tend to conclude that corruption is "widespread" or "rampant," that its costs are "astronomical," and that corrupters have "control over matters affecting the everyday life of each citizen." The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973, p. 206) concluded, "The direct costs of corruption are incalculable, but they are believed to be astronomical enough to support the wry observation of one high U.S. Department of Justice career official, who stated that 'when we finally stop payoffs to public officials at all levels in this country, we will have found the cure to inflation.'"

In a report titled, A Handbook on White Collar Crime (1974, p. 6) the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates total costs of bribery, kickbacks, and payoffs in this country to be three billion dollars annually. U.S. News and World Report (1973) says that "kickbacks paid by business alone are conservatively estimated by authorities to exceed five billion dollars a year--practically all of it passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices for goods and services."

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<sup>4</sup>An outstanding example of the insights which can be gained through participant observation of corruption can be found in Rubinstein (1973).

Focusing on a single industry in a single city, the New York Times estimated the cost of corruption in the building industry in New York City to come to more than \$25 million annually. The Times (Darnton, 1975) further commented that the "cost is added to the construction cost and passed on to tenants in the form of higher rentals. Its effects are even harder to measure. It undoubtedly makes for slacker enforcement of safety precautions in ghetto areas since there is little money to be made from inspections there."

The literature which has appeared serves to dramatize the importance of corruption and to make the point that payoffs which are individually small add up to problems of major importance. It demonstrates that corruption has been found throughout American history (see especially the four articles by Warren, 1952), and that it occurs at all levels of government and in many types of governmental activity. Corruption has been found in filling government positions (see the three articles by Key, 1934, 1935), in awarding government contracts (see Amick, 1976; Better Government Association, 1975; Burnham, 1970; Downie, 1973; and Wilson, 1966), in tax assessment and collection (Bow, 1966; Crile, 1972; and Phelan, 1966), in land-use zoning and inspections (Amick, 1976; Laing, 1974; Moore, 1975; New York State Commission of Investigation, 1960; Ross, 1976; Steiger, 1966; and Wilkie and Zintl, 1973), and in the administration of criminal justice (see bibliographies cited in the Introduction to the Appendix).

Finally, the literature describing various forms of corruption has been quite suggestive of both their impact on the immediate participants and the quid pro quos of individual deals, and the long-range consequences of patterns of corruption. The comments of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (pp. 206-207) concerning Criminal Justice corruption are illustrative:

There is no dollar figure that can represent adequately the debilitating effect on human life of such activities as narcotics operations, extortion rackets, prostitution rings, and gambling syndicates that are permitted to flourish because of compliant and corrupt law enforcement . . . Other, perhaps greater, indirect costs of public corruption

lie in its stimulus to further criminality . . . Public corruption makes an especially sinister contribution to criminality by providing an excuse and rationalization for its existence among those who commit crime . . . Simply put, official corruption breeds disrespect for the law.

The overview literature and case studies provide excellent sources of information about what corruption looks like. There are many reasons, however, why we should not assume that they are necessarily representative of the full range of official corruption which exists in America today. Both the overviews and the individual case studies depend almost entirely on individual cases which become known through the efforts of prosecutors, investigative commissions, or journalists; none of the items located offer comprehensive statements of the range of corruption in either individual communities or specific forms of government activities.<sup>6</sup> It is likely that the published literature contains several types of distortions:

- (1) To the extent that big payoffs are more "interesting" to prosecutors and journalists than little payoffs, the literature is likely to overrepresent corruption involving high-level officials or large amounts of money and to underrepresent "nickel and dime" payoffs to lesser figures.
- (2) Published accounts of corruption overrepresent transactions where something goes wrong--where a participant is dissatisfied and complains, where a third party cut off from a government contract "blows the whistle," where the uninspected building collapses or burns down, and the like. Conversely, less is known about corruption where everyone concerned (except the public) is satisfied.
- (3) Except in cases where something goes wrong, incidents of corruption only surface when someone goes looking for them. The someone is likely to be a journalist, a prosecutor, or citizens' group, such as Chicago's Better Government Association or the New Orleans Crime Commission. To the extent that "crusading prosecutors," newspapers with active staffs of investigative journalists, citizens' groups, and academics are unevenly distributed around the nation, we tend to learn a lot about some areas and virtually nothing about others.

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<sup>6</sup>An interesting attempt (Lasswell and McKenna, 1972), of arguable validity, has been made to measure the entire impact of organized crime syndicates on the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, N.Y.

- (4) There is some reason to believe that coverage of corruption is both episodic and contagious.<sup>6</sup> It is episodic in that there are periods in American history when there are vast outpourings of literature and court cases on corruption, and other periods where almost nothing appears in print. It is contagious in that outbreaks of corruption stories in one area seem to generate activity elsewhere; national-level scandals such as Teapot Dome and Watergate may be particularly likely to produce flurries of prosecutorial and journalistic interest at state and local levels. Unfortunately, little is known about the factors producing this uneven coverage; in particular, we know virtually nothing about the relationship between the level of media coverage and variations in the actual amount of corruption.

### III EXPLANATIONS OF CORRUPTION

As is already apparent, the literature on official corruption covers a wide variety of subject matters, and ranges from simple descriptions of individual payoffs to highly theoretical speculations. A similar diversity is found in the explanations of corruption which are explicitly or implicitly presented in the literature; in the simplest case studies, the most common "explanation" is that an individual "bad guy" found an opportunity to make a few dollars and happened to get caught. This explanation is often strongly supported by the members of the organization in which corruption is found, implying that the presence of one "rotten apple" does not prove that the rest of the barrel is contaminated. In many cases, this explanation may prove sufficient to answer the question, "Why did this person commit this corrupt act?" A more significant

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<sup>6</sup>Lincoln Steffens tells an amusing story of how he once created a "crime wave" at the turn of the century. As a young reporter working for the New York Post, he played up a crime story missed by the New York Sun's star reporter, Jacob Riis. Infuriated, Riis retaliated by dramatizing several incidents unknown to Steffens. The two papers vied to outdo each other with crime news, creating a public impression that there had been a sudden upsurge in the crime rate. New York Mayor Theodore Roosevelt negotiated a truce between the two papers, and coverage of crime was restored to its normal place in the back pages (see Steffens, 1931, pp. 285-291).

question is, "Under what circumstances is corruption more likely to occur?" This section describes some of the answers most frequently given to that question.

A. Corruption occurs when legal mechanisms and policies deviate substantially from the practices of the "real world."

Studies of corruption in law enforcement have frequently noted that the most frequent sources of difficulty are those laws which impose standards not accepted by major segments of the community, such as gambling, narcotics, traffic, and sexual behavior. On a broader level, students of corruption in developing nations have concluded that corruption is an inevitable, even valuable, device to bridge a gap between the "official" norms of a rapidly changing society and the new realities of the economic and social world. Friedrich (1966), for example, argues that the "immoral practices (of political corruption) are everywhere associated with political life, that they aid political operators in adapting formally rigid structures in evolving communal values, interests and beliefs, and that they make possible bargaining and decision-making, and thereby assist the effective manipulation of highly dynamic situations and constellations." Similar arguments concerning the functionality of corruption in transitional settings have been put forth by Scott (1967) ("Other things being equal, corruption which secures greater freedom of operation for the private sector will generally promote economic growth"), Braibanti (1962), Leff (1964), and Nye (1967).

The functionalist explanation has been applied to American corruption in attacks on the complexity of governmental forms and procedures. Writing in response to Steffens' The Shame of the Cities, Ford (1904) argues, "The growth of an extra-legal system of connecting the disconnected functions of government for administrative purposes certainly entails corruption, but it does not follow that under such circumstances it is disadvantageous although founded upon venality. Our ordinary system of municipal government is so opposed to all sound principles of business organization that it is highly creditable to our practical capacity for government that we are able to work it at all. The graft

system is bad, but it is better than the constitutional system as established by law."

Seventy years later, Banfield (1975) comes to an identical conclusion: "Every extension of government authority has created new opportunities and incentives for corruption. Over the long run, this has helped to make it appear normal, tolerable, and even laudable. Had the growth of government been accompanied by the centralization of control and certain other structural changes, the increase in corruption would doubtless have been less. But the structural changes that occurred were mainly in the 'wrong' direction: executive control has been reduced by merit system practices, recognition of public employee unions, civil rights legislation, laws requiring 'citizen participation,' 'sunshine' laws, and the like. At the same time, the extra-legal arrangements through which control was informally centralized in a 'machine' which, sometimes at least, found it advantageous to moderate and limit corruption, have in most instances been wiped out or rendered less effectual by good government reforms."

We can end our discussion of this type of explanation for corruption with a more prosaic illustration from the area of land-use regulation. Darnton (1975), in an article in the New York Times, reviewed the corruption which was endemic in the New York construction industry. "One factor often cited as promoting corruption," he noted, "is the complicated 843 page Building Code and a bewildering maze of city departments . . . The regulations constituted a 'temptation for corruption.' It is virtually impossible for a builder to erect a building within the city of New York and comply with every statute and ordinance in connection with the work."

B. Corruption is more prevalent in communities with "machine" political systems and/or citizens who place a low value on integrity.

It might be possible to locate most American political systems along a continuum ranging from machine dominance (Chicago is probably the best example among present-day large cities) to "reform" cities (e.g., Milwaukee, Cincinnati, and San Diego). In the prototypical

machine city, city affairs are controlled by a partisan political organization which allocates public jobs, contracts, and benefits to party loyalists; in the reform cities, "politics" and "administration" are separated with day-to-day operations controlled by professional administrators strictly adhering to "neutral" rules--civil service hiring of all employees, open competitive bidding on government contracts, and the like.

The literature clearly presumes the existence of these contrasting political/administrative styles, and suggests a heavier incidence of corruption in the machine cities. What is less clear, in both the theoretical literature and in the reported cases, is why this correlation may exist. A suggestive, if still unproven, line of analysis has been developed based upon assumptions about public attitudes toward issues of official integrity and corruption.

Banfield and Wilson (1963) argued that some groups within communities are more likely than others to react to public issues on the basis of a "public-regarding" value system, acting on the basis of support for "the public interest" rather than for the personal benefits which they might derive from a policy or program. Those who hold "private-regarding" values, Wilson (1966) later argued, attach "a relatively low value to probity and impersonal efficiency and relatively high value to favors, personal loyalty, and private gain." Various and inconclusive efforts have been made since that time to test this hypothesis in terms of variations in patterns of voting on local referenda, the structure of governments, and various public policy outputs, and to identify the class, ethnicity, educational, etc., characteristics of persons espousing the two value systems. In general, this literature suggests that the public-regarding ethos is more frequently held by upper-middle class persons with higher educational levels; critics of the Banfield-Wilson hypothesis argue that what they term "public-regardingness" is in fact private-regardingness on the part of the upper-middle class. Good government, nonpartisanship, civil service, and the other elements of the reform movement, they argue, have been adopted to protect the interests of

groups in the process of losing control of city government to working-class political organizations.<sup>7</sup>

The ethos theory can be applied to the problem of corruption in two forms. Directly, it can be argued that some people want corruption or, more probably, want those goods and services which, being illegal, are only made available when officials are induced not to enforce the law. Indirectly, it can be argued that some people want a style of politics which has a consequence of tending to tolerate corruption on the part of officials. Unfortunately, there is little data available measuring either the prevalence of such attitudes or their relative frequency in machine and reform cities.<sup>8</sup>

Several further aspects of "public opinion" must be noted, since they contribute to the growth of corruption. First, the public tends to pay little attention to the workings of government unless they see it affecting them personally. Even if they follow the workings of legislative process on television and in the newspapers, the mundane details of implementing public policies are of little interest to most people. "Low visibility" may be the best way to describe the day-to-day decisions

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<sup>7</sup>For the various points of view in this debate, see: Wilson, James Q., and Banfield, Edward C. Public regardingness as a value premise in voting behavior. American Political Science Review, December 1964, 58, 876-887, and Political ethos revisited. American Political Science Review, December 1971, 65, 1048-1062; Lineberry, Robert, and Fowler, Edmund P. Reformism and public policies in American cities. American Political Science Review, September 1967, 61, 701-716; Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Field, John Osgood. Political ethos and the structure of city government. American Political Science Review, June 1966, 60, 306-326.

The methodological and conceptual validity of the "ethos" research is attacked by: Hennessy, Timonthy. Problems in concept formation: The ethos 'theory' and the comparative study of urban politics. Midwest Journal of Political Science, November 1970, 14, 537-564; Durand, Roger. Ethnicity, 'public-regardingness,' and referenda voting. Midwest Journal of Political Science, May 1972, 16, 259-268; and Miller, Abraham H., and Bennett, Stephen E. Communication. American Political Science Review, September 1974, 68, 1265-1271.

<sup>8</sup>Much of the survey literature on public attitudes toward gambling and corruption is reviewed in Gardiner (1970, chap. 4). The surveys summarized are listed on pp. 47-48.

of tax collectors, inspectors, police, prosecutors, and even most judges as they handle the problems which have proven most susceptible to corruption. Second, the public tends to think of corruption as a problem whose impact is rather narrowly confined: while the average citizen may find protection payments by a bookie or pusher to be regrettable, he is unlikely to think of them as financing moves by the syndicates into legitimate business, narcotics, labor racketeering, or the other operations which have been initially funded from gambling profits. Third, the public may tend to be cynical regarding the possibilities of reform when it believes that corrupters have captured control of political processes. A 1971 survey of Illinois residents produced the startling finding that 75 percent of the respondents felt that underworld elements were currently corrupting or securing important favors from politicians: the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission which sponsored the survey concluded that this corruption "seriously impaired the image of the criminal justice system and the effectiveness of this system in preserving law and order" (IIT Research Institute and Chicago Crime Commission, 1971, p. 3; see also Gardiner, 1970, chap. 4).

Several nationwide surveys have attempted to measure the extent to which respondents feel that local corruption is a significant problem. In 1972 and 1975, polls conducted by the American Institute for Public Opinion (Gallup), a national sample of adults was asked what they considered to be the worst problem in their communities. Corruption in local government was mentioned by 4 percent of the respondents in 1972. However, only one percent of the respondents in the 1975 poll considered corruption in local government as the worst problem in their communities. While the corruption problem may not be judged as "the worst problem" in most communities, nevertheless, it was considered to be a serious problem by most people as demonstrated in another survey conducted in 1973.<sup>9</sup> In this survey, 60 percent of the respondents considered corruption at

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<sup>9</sup>Harris Poll, April, 1973. Question: "How serious a problem do you think corruption is on the . . . local level--very serious, somewhat serious, or not really serious?"

the local level to be a serious problem. Of this group, 52 percent viewed the corruption problem as "very serious" and 48 percent considered it to be a "somewhat serious" problem. From yet another survey conducted in the same year, some insight is gained into the public's perception of the comparative incidence in government and business in the criminal or unethical activities that can be termed as corruption<sup>10</sup> (see Table 2). Although specific questions asked did not focus directly on local governments and business, it is interesting to note that over 50 percent of the respondents felt that many or most businessmen, politicians, and other government officials engage in unethical or illegal activities. Furthermore, these data suggest that the public perception of these activities is that they are essentially reciprocal in character, that public officials and businessmen engage in illegal or questionable practices that are mutually profitable but fundamentally contrary to the interests of the public.

In the same Roper survey, the respondents were also asked for their opinions regarding unethical or illegal practices of private citizens. Slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents felt that many or most people engage in such practices as cheating on their income taxes or taking time off from work on the pretense of illness.

While it is not possible to make direct causal inferences between the illegal or questionable practices of private citizens, on the one hand, and corruption on the part of the business community and public officials on the other, the above data may suggest that, to some extent, corruption in government is a function of public tolerance for such crimes, which in turn, is related to the prevalence of questionable and often illegal behavior of private citizens. A true test of this theory, of course, would require direct measures of public tolerance of various forms of official corruption.

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<sup>10</sup>Roper, November, 1973. Question: "There is increasing talk these days about the ethical and moral standards in our society. We'd like to know how widespread you think certain questionable practices are. First is (read items). Do you think that is true of most, fairly many, not too many, or very few (people, business people, etc.)?"

Table 2

PERCEIVED PERVASIVENESS OF A SELECTED NUMBER  
OF QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES IN OUR SOCIETY

	Percent of Respondents Who View The Practice to be True of:				
	<u>Most People</u>	<u>Fairly Many People</u>	<u>Not too Many People</u>	<u>Very Few People</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
1. <u>People</u> in government taking payoffs in return for favors.	22	36	18	12	12
2. <u>Business corporations</u> making illegal contributions to political campaigns.	21	35	21	10	13
3. <u>Business corporations</u> making payoffs to government leaders.	18	31	23	13	15
4. <u>Business people</u> who have expense accounts padding them.	31	37	15	7	10
5. <u>People</u> cheating in some way on their income taxes.	17	35	27	15	6
6. <u>People</u> taking time off from work on the pretense of illness.	17	38	25	14	6
7. <u>Policemen</u> taking payoffs from lawbreakers.	8	20	31	30	11

Source: Roper Public Opinion Survey, November 1973 (N = 2020)

- C. Corruption is more frequently engaged in by persons who feel deprived of adequate monetary or status rewards.

One of the explanations of corruption which is most frequently offered in popular discourse is based upon the character of the participants. We should have expected that Councilman Jones would turn out to be a crook, the argument runs, because he came from the wrong side of the

tracks, his parents were poor, and he didn't get a good education. A moment's reflection will indicate the superficiality and inadequacy of this approach: in addition to the thousands of public officials and employees who come from disadvantaged backgrounds yet do not become corrupt, we might note the high-status officials (such as the lawyers central to the Watergate scandals) who do become corrupt.

While the literature on the psychology of corruption is especially poorly developed, we might note the potential utility of two concepts, deprivation and socialization. Analyzing American politicians (at the national level) who have abused public office in various ways, Rogow and Lasswell (1973) postulated the following distinction: gain politicians enter into political careers to compensate for the financial deprivations which they perceived in their youth; game politicians seek prestige, power, or affection in compensation for status deprivations of childhood. Obviously, careers in public service can provide both sorts of rewards, since most employees are compensated as well as their private sector counterparts and, depending on their positions, acquire a measure of status through their control over the actions of outsiders. What is missing from the Rogow-Lasswell argument, then, is an explanation of when and how individual employees and officials will conclude that the satisfactions of public life are inadequate compensations for their perceived past deprivations, thus impelling them to seek illegal gains and/or power.

At least two social scientists have attempted to describe the processes by which individuals will attempt to rationalize their drift into illegality. Eliasberg (1951) discusses corruption in terms of the thought processes through which a person passes before he knowingly commits an act of corruption. He says that "the one who is bribed rarely succumbs to mere greed. It is not the 'homoeconomicus' who is endangered by corruption. He, after figuring what profits his unlawful action could bring, will think of his risks and finally, like a good businessman, will feel that he must be indemnified for such risks." Eliasberg (1951) concludes that such rationalization is commonly the way one who corrupts or is corrupted, usually proceeds. In "The Respectable Criminal,"

Cressey (1965) discusses three psychological processes as they relate to the crime of embezzlement. They are: (1) the feeling that a personal problem is unshareable, (2) the knowledge of how to solve the problem through a violation of trust, and (3) the ability to rationalize the corrupt act.

A second psychological process likely to affect the incidence of corruption is that of socialization--learning and adapting to the value system of one's surrounding environment. As individuals move into new roles, whether they be state governors or city councilmen, state purchasing officer or city building inspector, they quickly become aware of the expectations of their superiors, the attitudes of their peers, and the demands made by the outsiders with whom they will deal. In some cases, the employee rejects or fails to recognize what is expected of him. In yet a third set of positions, the employee concludes that there are no clear norms, and that he will be praised for some actions and condemned for others, but that there is a large undefined gray area in between.

The socialization argument--that corruption results from basically honest people moving into situations which do not reward honesty--certainly has its limitations, because there are many public servants who do not become corrupted by corrupt environments. The Knapp Commission (1972) in New York City, for example, concluded that only a few of the corrupt officers were "meat-eaters," aggressively seeking out shake-down opportunities. Furthermore, the theory cannot tell us how the corruption first started, or whether some persons predisposed to become corrupt might seek out a corrupt environment. But the argument raises two questions when we seek to understand the presence or absence of corruption in an agency: First, does the agency truly stress the importance of integrity in training and retraining employees, or do the employees correctly conclude that the orientation lectures on honesty are simply window-dressing before the training instructor gets down to the "real" work of the organization? Unless the agency follows up the training program homilies with reinforcements (e.g., swift and certain punishment at the first infraction), new employees will be quick to realize

that the "real" code of behavior is less rigorous. Second, and perhaps less obvious, we must ask whether the agency has a "real" mission which it can ask its employees to pursue. If the mission is so vague or the agency is so underfunded that the employees feel useless, they may well turn their attention to whatever corrupt opportunities are available. If the organization can develop a sense of purpose and pride of accomplishment, however, the resulting esprit de corps may well provide ammunition against temptation.<sup>11</sup>

D. Corruption is more frequent in settings where the perceived benefits outweigh anticipated risks of detection and punishment.

This simple cost/benefit statement can be broken down into three components:

- (1) What benefits are anticipated from specific transactions or patterns of corruption?
- (2) What is the perceived risk of detection?
- (3) If detected, what punishment is likely to be imposed, if any?

It must once again be noted that no "real" data are available with which to test this hypothesis, either in its individual components or in toto. While it is possible to identify the quid pro quo in individual payoff schemes which have been uncovered, the numbers of persons detected, and the punishments imposed on those who were convicted, we have no sense of the denominators which would be appropriate, which would permit us to say that a potential corrupter or corruptee should anticipate an X percent chance of being caught or a Y percent chance of going to jail. Moreover, we have no sense of the accuracy of information available to potential participants: are they likely to overestimate or underestimate the "real" costs and benefits involved?

The following section of this paper discusses specific suggestions which appear in the literature for the reduction of corruption, many of

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<sup>11</sup>The process of socialization to corruption in a police setting is discussed in Rubinstein (1973) and (1975, p. 20).

which are designed to increase risks or decrease benefits. Without duplicating that analysis at this point, we might note several consequences and limitations of the explanation offered above:

- (1) The efficacy of proposed control mechanisms must be calculated in light of anticipated benefits from corruption: where potential payoffs are enormous, even the most draconian preventive measures may not prevent attempts at corruption. Conversely, mild threats may be sufficient to scare off the "nickel and dimers."
- (2) We do not know the accuracy of information available to participants about detection and punishment risks, or how they will react to conditions of uncertainty.
- (3) We do not know what weights participants put on different risks and benefits. While we can think of a hypothetical official weighing a \$10,000 payoff against a 20 percent chance of detection and a 50 percent chance (if detected) of going to jail, we would still need to know more about how much that individual valued the \$10,000 or how much the individual feared the humiliation of detection or imprisonment. Presumably, \$10,000 would be more attractive to the pauper than the millionaire and jail would involve less of a loss of reputation, but we know enough greedy millionaires and proud paupers to make us cautious. Further detailed information would allow us to make better guesses about the "break-even" points for individuals in different situations, and to suggest a greater variety of risk increasing mechanisms appropriate for different types of individuals.
- (4) Ultimately, we do not know the validity of the rationality assumptions underlying this approach, at least as "rationality" is conceived in ordinary discourse. While much corruption is directed toward simple economic gain, some corruption may take place for symbolic reasons ("nobody appreciates what I'm doing for the city--I'll show them!") or simply as a game ("I bet I can make \$100 out of this and no one will ever catch me!") or for reasons of personal spite ("I'm going to get even with those contractors/Republicans/rich doctors, etc."). For purposes of designing control strategies, however, it may be necessary to assume that most participants in corruption are sufficiently rational to react to mechanisms which will affect these cost/benefit analyses.

#### IV PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CORRUPTION CONTROL

The explanations of corruption which have been discussed focus at times on the individual participants, at times on the acts of corruption, and at times more broadly on the settings in which it occurs. The recommendations which have been made to reduce the incidence or costs of corruption are related to these explanations in various ways. While space is not available to spell out the details of each proposed control mechanism, we can indicate the analytical approaches used.

##### A. Reduce opportunities and/or incentives for corruption.

Consistent with the basic cost/benefit hypothesis outlined above, three approaches have been offered to reduce the benefits associated with corruption. One alters the "economics" of the situation, broadly defined; a second changes decision-making standards and procedures; and the third shifts decision-making authority to persons who presumably would be less susceptible to corrupt temptations.

1. "Change the Situation." In a thought-provoking article based upon illustrations from the awarding of government contracts, Rose-Ackerman (1975) notes that the profitability of offering bribes to decision-makers can vary depending on the presence or absence of competition among both suppliers and consumers, differentiation among products which the government might select, and the threat posed by sanctions which might follow upon detection. Changes in market conditions, she concludes, may have a greater effect than changes in penalty structures.<sup>12</sup>

Extending the scope of this analysis to government regulatory activities, we immediately note that regulation creates an incentive to corruption: to the extent that profits will increase if the firm can escape either the standards (the wall must be this strong) or the procedures (you must have this many permits or that many inspections) of

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<sup>12</sup>She expands this analysis in Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, in preparation).

regulation, there is an incentive to offer bribes up to the level of the increased profits. The question therefore presents itself whether the social gains from regulation equal the social costs of the corruption which it induces. If not, the logical consequence would be that the regulatory approach should be altered or abandoned. Following the Knapp Commission's exposure of payoffs to the New York police by construction firms, for example, the Police Commissioner temporarily decided to discontinue police inspection of construction sites. Several other applications of this analysis quickly come to mind: reduce the number of forms required of permit applicants (see Darnton, 1975), reduce paper processing time, transfer the burden of meeting performance goals to others who already have a comparable or greater stake in the outcome (those who finance construction projects, engineering architects, etc.), and so forth. In sum, this line of analysis focuses the question whether corruption-generating situations can be restructured to produce equivalent social goals with decreased incentives to corruption.

2. "Change Standards and Procedures." It is frequently argued that the ways in which governments conduct their business generate opportunities for corruption (see examples offered by Amick (1976), and Kolesar et al., 1974). This can arise under two opposite conditions--excessive rigidity and detail, generating incentives for bribing their way out from under "red tape," and excessive vagueness, leaving decision-makers essentially free to do whatever they want. A further corruption-inducing characteristic of decision-making is secrecy: when no one can ascertain what decision-makers are doing or the standards which they are employing, the path is open for corruption.

The remedies proposed under this heading are straightforward, if somewhat contradictory. The most frequent recommendation is for openness--for competitive awarding of government jobs and contracts, for specification of the criteria which will be applied (and stated justifications for deviant applications), and for disclosure of any contaminating influences (political campaign contributions, financial interests in affected industries on the part of decision-makers, etc.) (See the

extensive literature on conflict of interest and financial disclosure laws cited in the Appendix.) The conflicts arise with regard to the specification of standards and procedures: on the one hand it is argued that the delegation of discretion to officials, whether traffic policemen, zoning commissioners, or purchasing agents, creates an unnecessary invitation to corruption. On the other hand, it has been argued that corruption arises from "excessive" specifications of procedural detail. The question, of course, is wherein lies the happy medium.

3. "Change the People." The explanation offered earlier that corruptible people are sometimes put in tempting situations naturally leads to recommendations that different people be given these jobs. At times, this amounts to the simple prescription (simpler in conception than in application) that no one be allowed to make decisions affecting matters in which she or he has a personal interest. Other proposals call for the greater use of "professionals" in decision-making roles, e.g., that trained planners make preliminary or final decisions in zoning cases (see Lauber, 1975), that trained assessors or accountants handle tax disputes, and the like. It is somewhat less clear why "professionals" should be less corruptible than "amateurs," but the argument is made nonetheless. Finally, it is argued that greater attention should be paid in the process of selecting applicants' backgrounds and behavior in other positions; little has been done to develop a methodology for measuring this trait.<sup>13</sup>

B. Increase the risks associated with corruption by increasing the number and effectiveness of mechanisms for detecting and punishing violators.

The prescriptions made under this heading have a dual intent: first, to the extent that potential corrupters and corruptees will rationally assess the risks associated with corruption (i.e., be less likely to

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<sup>13</sup>See Shealy, Allen E., Police integrity: The role of psychological screening of applicants, New York: John Jay College Press, 1976, for one approach to psychological testing of applicants.

engage in it as risks increase), they will have a substantial deterrent effect. Second, even where violators proceed ignorant of or in spite of the increased risks, these mechanisms will increase the likelihood and speed of detection, reducing the costs of corruption and minimizing the development of patterns of extended corruption. While their purposes are similar, they are directed at agencies in differing relationships to the participants in corruption: the agencies within which they operate, other government institutions, agencies of the criminal justice system, and private groups and individuals.

1. Internal Agency Mechanisms and Procedures. Recommendations for improving the performance of government agencies in policing their own ranks against corruption can be grouped under two headings. The first involves style-setting, openly establishing official integrity as something expected of everyone in the organization,<sup>14</sup> built into training curricula, practiced by agency leaders, and reinforced in the day-to-day allocation of positive and negative incentives. Except for those few rotten apples who will steal whenever they get the chance, the argument runs, most people will respond to positive encouragements and disdain temptation. Conceptually, this approach both reduces the attractiveness of a bribe (material benefits are offset by group loyalties) and increases the risk of being turned in by one's colleagues.

The second heading provides agency management with a set of specific tools to increase their ability to detect actual or potential corruption. Included under this heading are a long list of procedures, most of which add up to "good management"--be careful whom you recruit, specify what they are supposed to do, and keep track of how well they are doing it. (See the elaborations of these points in Falcon, 1971.) When applied to the specific problem of corruption prevention, several difficulties with

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<sup>14</sup>The development of an agency "Code of Ethics" may be useful, either for reducing possible ambiguities (are free lunches or Christmas presents consistent with official duties?) or simply for raising the level of employee sensitivity to corruption issues.

these theories arise: In some cases, the manager can't specify exactly what he wants his employees to do--the Police Chief or Director of Inspections must rely on the exercise of discretion by their subordinates, and it is often difficult to identify among instances of non-enforcement those cases which were probably secured through a payoff. Nonetheless, it is argued that auditing mechanisms--reviewing the "paper trail" left by decision-makers, having a second group review a sample of decisions made by the first, etc.--can alert managers to trouble spots.

2. External Investigators. As a control over situations where line managers are unsuccessful in coping with corruption or are themselves corrupt, a number of recommendations have been made to create independent investigatory agencies. New York City, for example, has an independent Department of Investigation, with authority to conduct investigations throughout city government and prepare both audit reports and cases for prosecution. The European mechanism of the ombudsman has also been advocated as a corruption control mechanism as well as a vehicle for handling citizen complaints against the bureaucracy (Gellhorn, 1966; Reuss and Anderson, 1966). The independent investigator models offer the virtues of specialized staffing and freedom from agency politics and loyalties, although not all are free to take on elected officials (mayors, councilmen, etc.) if that is where corruption lies. This problem can be handled through the appointment of ad hoc investigating commissions, such as the Knapp Commission established to investigate charges of corruption in the New York City Police Department.

3. Criminal Justice Agencies. The agencies of the criminal justice system, both state and federal, have extensive deterrent and reactive capabilities which are unevenly applied to official corruption. Some enforcement and prosecution offices are regularly "making" corruption cases, others rarely do. While the explanation for these disparities may lie in political and resource problems (an elected prosecutor may not want to indict a leader of his party, or may conclude that the public would prefer that he concentrate on his felony caseload), there

are also certain legal and strategic issues which prosecutors have to cope with. As with other forms of white collar crime, corruption is often unlikely to involve victims who wish to testify or tangible evidence. Where a potential victim chooses to cooperate with the prosecutor, not all states will allow the use of secret recordings of the transaction. Some judges and juries feel uncomfortable convicting the official when the businessman offering the bribe has been granted immunity. As Edelhertz (1970), Hyland (1975), Stern (1971), and Suskin (1975) point out, however, the legal bases for action are generally there (both directly for corruption and indirectly for tax evasion), should the motivation and evidence be present.

Two final court-related issues might be noted. The first related to penalties to be imposed; on the one hand, it is at times argued that the penalties provided in corruption statutes are trivial in connection with the violations of trust involved; on the other hand, there can at times be unjustly excessive penalties when a co-participant is given immunity or when there will also be forfeiture of job and pension rights. It has been proposed that legislation should be developed to provide a greater variety of sanctions to be imposed by both courts and internal disciplinary bodies. (See "White Collar Justice," 1976.) The second issue concerns civil court opportunities. One relevant tactic, supplanting or supplementing criminal procedures, is the taxpayers' suit to recover the amount of bribes received by officials; a second is the taxpayer suit to nullify the official action for which the bribe is paid. If the official fears losing the bribe or the businessman fears that the contract or zoning variance won't be upheld, the potential for action by outsiders may compensate for the inadequacies or inertia of criminal justice agencies.

4. Citizen Action. The prescriptions presented above focus on increasing the ability and/or motivation of official agencies to combat corruption. While they are the only mechanisms which can actually punish officials or change the operative policies of public agencies, a number of articles show the importance of extra-governmental agencies and

individuals in "blowing the whistle" on official corruption. Investigative journalists (see Kimball, 1974; and Weinberg and Weinberg, 1961), citizens' watchdog agencies such as Chicago's Better Government Association (see Phelps, 1971, p. 1), and private citizens (see National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals<sup>16</sup>) have frequently been able to uncover corruption overlooked or condoned by the official agencies. While they lack official investigative powers, they have often been able to assemble enough information to force officials and prosecutors to take notice.

C. Increase Public Expectations Regarding Official Integrity.

Ultimately, changes in the level of official corruption in a community may depend upon public definitions of the standards of integrity demanded of its officials. The prescriptions noted above can be effective if they are used, which cannot be taken as a given. The sparse evidence on public attitudes toward corruption reviewed earlier suggests that sensitivity to the issue varies among different groups, among different parts of the country, and among different periods in American history. Moreover, we must recognize that integrity is but one of a number of characteristics expected of a government; to the extent that citizens also want their governments to be democratic (responsive to influences from many sources), inexpensive, libertarian (minimally intrusive in private affairs), fragmented (operating through many levels and agencies, each independent of the others), and substantively effective ("getting the job done"), we perhaps should not expect to find a

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<sup>16</sup>The commission has developed a questionnaire of 74 items which "are offered to assist citizens in determining whether official corruption or an atmosphere that is conducive to official corruption might exist in their State or City government." However, the staff of the Sacramento Bee, in attempting to answer selected questions from the questionnaire concluded that "many of the questions were hardly the kind an average citizen could answer without a detailed examination of the backgrounds and private dealings of some officials." (See How To Detect Corruption in Local Politics--A Guide for Citizens, 1973.)

higher level of insistence upon integrity (Banfield, 1975). Since scandals and reform movements (Gardiner, 1970, chap. 5) have been intermittently successful in pointing out the impact of corruption and raising public expectations, we should not rule out the possibility that public sensitivities can be at least temporarily increased.

PART TWO  
BIBLIOGRAPHY

## INTRODUCTION

This compilation of citations and annotations is intended to provide a comprehensive listing of works on local government corruption other than police corruption, to serve the needs of researchers and students interested in the problems of local government corruption.

Using a number of existing bibliographies, covering the literature from 1881 to 1965 as a starting point, an exhaustive literature search was conducted to update and complete these existing bibliographies. The search included both manual and on-line computerized files. The major indexes that were searched include:

<u>Manual Indexes</u>	<u>Years Searched</u>
Sociological Abstracts	1965 - 1976
Index to Legal Periodicals	9/67 - 1976
Index to Urban Documents	1974 - 1975
Recent Publications on Government Problems	1975 - 1976
Urban Affairs Abstracts	1974
Public Affairs Information Service	10/63 - 1976
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature	3/63 - 1976
Social Sciences Index	4/64 - 1976
Selected RAND Abstracts	1965 - 1976
Bibliographic Index	1966 - 1976 (except 1972)
Monthly Checklist of State Publications	1964 - 1976

<u>On-Line Indexes</u>	<u>Years Searched</u>
NTIS	1964 - 1976
Social Science Citation Index	1972 - 1976
Dissertation Abstracts	1861 - 1976
Congressional Information Service	5/76
Sociological Abstracts	1963 - 1964
Smithsonian Science Information Exchange (SSIE)	Current file
<u>New York Times</u> Information Bank	1969 - 1976

Listed below are examples of the descriptors used in the literature search. More than 60 such descriptors were used, singly and in combination:

Bribery	Payoffs
Corruption	Scandals
Employee theft	Local government
Extortion	Inspections
Graft	Land use regulation
Gratuities	Building regulation
Kickbacks	Public officials
Investigations	Control
Deterrence	Ethics

The bibliography does not include articles that are primarily concerned with organized crime, corruption in law enforcement, political patronage, or political finance.<sup>1</sup> Most of the articles that are included

<sup>1</sup>As indicated in the text, this report does not cover the extensive literature on corruption in criminal justice. Major items in this literature are listed in:

- Gardiner, John A., and Olson, David J. (Eds.). Theft of the city: Readings on corruption in urban America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974, esp. pp. 430-432.
- Organized crime: A bibliography. The Police Chief, 1971, 38, 48-55.
- Price, Barbara R. Police corruption: An analysis. Criminology, 1972, 10, 161-176.
- Sherman, Lawrence W. (Ed.). Police corruption: A sociological perspective. Garden City: Anchor, 1974, esp. pp. 325-332.
- Police corruption: Annotated bibliography. New York: John Jay College, 1976.

deal with, or can be directly applied to, the problems of corruption in local government's land-use regulation functions.

A variety of materials are included in this bibliography. Books and journal articles account for the majority of the entries, but also included are PhD dissertations, government publications, newspaper articles, and monographs. Approximately 400 pertinent citations have been selected for inclusion in this bibliography. Of these, about one-third have been selected as especially interesting or pertinent to the scope of the project and have been annotated.

It is, of course, difficult to estimate the extent or nature of relevant items that were not identified during this search process. We believe that we have located virtually all related items in the "open" literature. It is likely, however, that two sources are underrepresented: official reports, and books. It is quite probable that a number of state and local government agencies, including investigating commissions, have prepared studies and reports on specific corruption problems that either were not published or else did not appear in the sources we have consulted. Where books were published directly concerning corruption, we have listed them; there may well be relevant information contained in other books which document the political systems of individual cities or states, or which focus on specific governmental problems such as welfare, purchasing, taxation, and the like. Finally, since our focus is on corruption at the local level, we have not generally searched for or cited the literature on corruption in American national government, such as the analyses of Watergate.

Insofar as possible, the items in the bibliography have been arranged in categories paralleling the discussion in the text; inevitably, a number of books and articles related to more than one heading but were assigned to the most appropriate category. Except for a few notable exceptions, most works published prior to 1960 have been listed in a separate category. The categories used are:

- Definitions of Corruption
- The Scope of the Corruption Problem

- General Descriptions and Estimates of the Magnitude of the Problem
- Case Studies of Local and State Corruption
- Explanations of Corruption
  - Economic and Political Explanations
  - Explanations Based upon Public Attitudes
  - Psychological Explanations
- Corruption Control Mechanisms
  - Conflict of Interest and Disclosure Laws
  - Prosecution Strategies
  - Extragovernmental Mechanisms
  - Land-Use Regulation Policy
- Literature Published Prior to 1960.

## DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION

Bailey, Stephen K. Ethics and the politician. Santa Barbara: The Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1960.

Brasz, H. A. Some notes on the sociology of corruption. Sociologia Nederlandica, Autumn 1963, 1, 111-125.

Brasz attempts in his article to arrive at a sociological definition of corruption. Some of the necessary elements of a corrupt act include the misuse of a derived power, and the pretense of remaining loyal to the source of the derived power while using that power for self-benefit.

Bresnahan, John M. Corruption and its roots. America, March 9, 1974, 30, 171-172.

Gwirtzman, Milton S. Is bribery defensible? The New York Times Magazine, October 5, 1975, pp. 19ff.

Gwyn, R. J. The shape of scandal. New York: Clerk, Irwin & Co., Ltd., 1966.

Kirk, Russell. The Greeks had a word for it, the persistence of political corruption. The Center Magazine, January 1974, 7, 2-7.

Lasswell, Harold D. Bribery. In Seligman, Edwin, Ed. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan, 1930, 690-692.

This is a very brief definition of the term bribery accompanied by a look at some of the sociological conditions in which bribery can and does exist.

Wilson, James Q. Corruption is not always scandalous. The New York Times Magazine, April 28, 1968.

This article discusses the tendency for charges of corruption to be blown all out of proportion by newspapers and the opposition party. The author points out that charges of corruption, whether true or not, are a political ploy often used to embarrass the opposition; by the time the truth is revealed, it is often too late to repair the damage that has been done to a person's public image.

## THE SCOPE OF THE CORRUPTION PROBLEM

### General Descriptions and Estimates of the Magnitude of the Problem

Alatas, Syed H. The sociology of corruption. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1968.

Amick, George. The American way of graft. Princeton, NJ: The Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 1976.

George Amick surveys how corruption occurs in state and local government. He discusses a wide variety of types of corruption and offers recommendations and solutions to the problem of government corruption.

Bell, Daniel. Crime as an American way of life. Antioch Review, Summer 1953, 13, 131-154.

Burnham, David. How corruption is built into the system and a few ideas for what to do about it. New York Magazine, September 21, 1970, 3, 30-37.

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Byron, W. J. Three ingredients of graft. American, December 18, 1971, 125, 532-533.

Cook, Fred J. The corrupted land: The social morality of modern America. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Corruption in politics how widespread? U.S. News and World Report, June 4, 1973, 74, 20-23.

This article focuses on the extent to which corruption has spread in the United States. Some specific cases of government corruption are cited as well as a discussion of general public attitudes toward politics and corruption and current efforts to prevent corruption in government.

Crawford, K. G. The pressure boys. New York: Arno Press, 1974.

Cressey, Donald R. Crime and criminal justice. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.

This is a collection of articles that deal with the problem of crime and some of the recent laws and criminal justice reforms.

Of particular interest are the articles that deal with the effects of government corruption.

\_\_\_\_\_. Theft of the nation. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

This book includes a chapter on corruption of the law enforcement and political systems. The chapter analyzes the relationships that exist between organized crime and the police and government officials.

Cruz, N. The corruptors. Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, Co., n.d.

Etzioni, Amitai. The danger behind revenue sharing. The New York Times, January 30, 1971, p. 27, col. 1.

Falcon, William D. Combating corruption in government, guidelines for public officials and citizens. Unpublished, December 1971, 79 pp.

Gardiner, John A., and Olson, David J. Theft of the city. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971.

This is a collection of articles that examine various aspects of corruption as well as misconduct of elected and appointed government officials. This book also studies the influence of organized crime on corruption in local government.

Goodman, Walter. All honorable men. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963.

Goodman, Walter. A percentage of the take. New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1971.

Greider, William. The corrupt politician: An American perennial. Washington Post, December 26, 1976.

Halsey, Margaret. The corrupted giant; a speculation on American politics and morals. London: Macdonald, 1963.

A handbook on white collar crime, everyone's problem, everyone's loss. Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1974.

This handbook takes a very practical approach to the problem of white-collar crime. The handbook discusses some of the more common white-collar crime schemes, how they operate, and how they can be detected. Also included are a number of countermeasures that can be used to prevent white-collar crime from occurring.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (Ed.). Political corruption: Readings in comparative analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.

IIT Research Institute and Chicago Crime Commission. A study of organized crime in Illinois. Chicago: Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, 1971.

Kickbacks as a way of life: How widespread in U.S. U.S. News and World Report, October 29, 1973, 75, 38-40.

Experts have estimated that the total amount of kickbacks paid in the United States each year could total more than \$5 billion. Examples of some of the methods in which these kickbacks are paid are cited as well as some of the reasons kickbacks are accepted, and some possible preventive measures.

Lockard, Duane. The 'great tradition' of American corruption. New Society, May 31, 1973, 24, 486-488.

Using Watergate as a backdrop, the history and reasons for corruption in America are discussed. Some of the reasons for corruption that are explored in the article are the politician's exploitation of the masses, the ethnic character of the American people, and the attempt by the American people to legislate morality.

McCahill (Ed.). Stealing: A primer on zoning corruption. Planning, December 1973, 39.

Miller, Nathan. The founding finaglers: An account of the corruption in the U.S. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1976.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Community crime prevention. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Pertinent sections of this book include a questionnaire on public attitudes towards corruption, a definition of corruption, and the promotion of integrity in government. Included within these sections are standards and goals to help eliminate conflicts of interest; standards of zoning, licensing, and tax assessment; and standards for maintaining integrity in the local prosecutor's office.

On corruption in our society. Congressional Record, July 29, 1975, pp. H7804-7805.

Payne, P. S. R. The corrupt society. New York: Praeger, 1975.

Political morality, responsiveness, and reform in America, Vol. 14, Studies in the social sciences. Carrollton, GA: West Georgia College, 1975.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The challenge of crime in a free society. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

Rawls, Wendell. Indictments on rise for public officials. New York Times, February 11, 1977.

Report of the national conference on organized crime, October 1-4, 1975, Washington, D.C. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975.

Rothchild, John. Revenue sharing with the rich and the crooked. The Washington Monthly, February 1972, 3, 8-12.

In light of President Nixon's revenue sharing program, Rothchild takes a look at corruption on the local level. Citing a variety of indictments, he attempts to show that corruption is a fairly widespread, if somewhat ignored, phenomenon and that the revenue sharing program will probably fall prey to the sticky fingers of those in local government.

Rubenstein, Jonathan. City police. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Police, the simple steps to corruption. Psychology Today, January 1975, p. 20.

Shapiro, Susan. A background paper on white collar crime, considerations of conceptualization and future research. New Haven: Yale University, 1976. Preliminary draft.

Smigel, Erwin O., and Ross, H. Laurence (Eds.). Crimes against bureaucracy. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970.

Stuart, Jesse. Thirty two votes before breakfast. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974.

Tolchin, Martin and Tolchin, Susan. To the victor...: Political patronage from the clubhouse to the White House. New York: Random House, 1971.

Wade, J. (Ed.). The extraordinary black book. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, Pubs., 1970.

Waldo, Dwight. Reflections on public morality. Administration and Society, November 1974, pp. 267-282.

Wilson, James Q. Corruption: The shame of the states. The Public Interest, Winter 1966, 28-38.

Woodin, George B. The shady side of America: A roundup of the scoundrels, deceivers and corrupters over 400-odd years before Watergate. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

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All-American city, Indianapolis. The Progressive, January 1976, 40, 38-39.

Armbrister, T. Embattled crusader of Conway County; newspaper editor E. H. Wirges charges corruption against political bosses. Saturday Evening Post, November 19, 1966, 239, 25-29ff.

Balk, Alfred. Invitation to bribery. Harper's Magazine, October 1966, 233, 18-24.

Banfield, Edward C. Political influence: A new theory of urban politics. New York: Free Press, 1961.

Barry, Robert. To slug a meter: A study of coin fraud. Criminologica, February 1969, 6, 40-47.

This article takes a look at the drastic increase in the use of slugs in the New York City parking meters. As a result of the statistics presented it is possible to draw some conclusions as to public attitudes towards corruption and petty larceny.

Bates, James L. The origins of teapot dome; progressives, parties and petroleum, 1909-1921. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963.

Bender, Wilbur J. The corruption problem. National Civic Review, March 1966, 60, 130-135.

Better Government Association. BGA finds huge state fair waste, illegal contracts. BGA Newsletter, May 1975.

. A white paper on kickbacks to local government officials by chemical specialty salesmen. Chicago: The Better Government Association, 1976. Unpublished.

This is a lengthy paper examining the paying of kickbacks and gift giving to local government officials in Illinois by salesmen of chemical products.

Bow, W. J. Scandal in California. National Civic Review, 1966, 60, 305-309.

This article takes a look at the tax assessment scandal that began in the late 1960s in California. The author lists some of the indictments that came out of the ever-widening investigation, and he also touches on some of the suggested reforms that were drawn up, in order to try and prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future.

Brown, A. Theodore. The politics of reform: Kansas City's municipal government, 1925-1950. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1956.

Callow, Alexander B., Jr. The tweed ring. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Castleman, D. R. Louisville election frauds in court and out. National Municipal Review, December 1927, 16, 761-769.

Cater, Douglass. The wide-open town on the Chattahoochee. The Reporter, February 24, 1955, 12, 22-27.

Cony, E. Builders and boodle. Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1961, p. 1.

Cook, Fred J. The corrupt society; part X; silent partners of Billie Sol Estes. The Nation, June 1-8, 1963, 196, 485-497.

Cookingham, L. P. Inside story of Kansas City. National Municipal Review, December 1948, 37, 586-591.

Correcting a drift toward corruption. Business Week, October 20, 1973, p. 34.

Maryland's public works scandal indicates a focusing of corruption in the contracting procedures with design professionals. This article points up the fact that more and more professionals believe that corruption is a problem within their ranks. Some possible solutions to the problem, suggested by the professionals themselves, are also included in the article.

Corruption a la Maryland. Fortune, October 1973, 88(4), p. 128.

This is a short editorial that offers some possible reforms for contract letting on the state level. These suggestions are made as a result of contract scandal in the State of Maryland that involved Vice President Agnew. The reforms include screening boards for consultants desiring state contracts and self-control by members of any profession that normally does business with the state government.

Corruption, busting public servants. Time, April 23, 1973, pp. 16-17.

A brief synopsis of several occurrences of political corruption is given. The increase in the number of corruption cases in the Seventies is attributed not to an increase in corruption but a decrease in the public's willingness to tolerate corruption.

Crile, George. A tax assessor has many friends. Harper's Magazine, November 1972, 245, 102-111.

This in-depth article delves into the corrupt practices of the tax assessor's office in Gary, Indiana.

Dillion, R. H. J. Ross Browne and the corruptible west. American West, Spring 1965, 2, 37-45.

Dorman, Michael. Payoff. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1972.

Downie, Leonard. The contractors, their politics and influences. The Washington Post, September 30, 1973, sec. POT, p. 23.

This article details some of the contracting scandals that have occurred in and around the Washington, D.C. area. Included among those mentioned are Prince George's County Executive, Dale Anderson, and County Commissioner Jesse Baggett.

\_\_\_\_\_. Mortgage on America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.

Edsall, Thomas B. Money and morality in Maryland. Society, May/June 1974, 11, 74-81.

The author in this article examines some of the causes of governmental corruption that are inherent within the government structure itself. He also makes the point that most reforms are only superficial and temporary and do not in the long run change the basic government structure that encourages the promotion of special interests, which in turn, leads to corruption in government.

Friedman, Saul, and Lane, Tony. Boom times led to corruption in Maryland. The Detroit Free Press, August 12, 1973.

This is a brief discussion of the payoffs and corruption in the construction industry in Maryland. Some of the people being investigated include Vice President Agnew and some of his friends.

Gardiner, John A. The politics of corruption--organized crime in an American city. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.

This book is an in-depth examination of the social, political, and organizational conditions within an eastern industrial city that made it possible for organized crime to take over and control local government for a period of 40 years.

Gardiner, John A., and Olson, David J. Wincanton: The politics of corruption. Task force report: Organized crime. Washington: U.S. Task Force on Organized Crime, 1967, pp. 61-79.

By tracing the growth of corruption in a town where the citizens tried to have easy access to gambling without domination by organized crime, the authors show how easily corruption can spread in this type of situation.

Governor and the mobster: With report by D. Walsh. Life, May 2, 1969, 66, 28-32A.

Hichborn, Franklin. System: As uncovered by the San Francisco graft prosecution. Montclair, NJ: Smith, Patterson, Publishing Corp., 1969.

Housecleaning: Scandal in Jacksonville City. Newsweek, September 26, 1966, 68, 34ff.

How to detect corruption in local politics--A guide for citizens. The Sacramento Bee, December 30, 1973.

The Sacramento Bee has conducted a study of government in Sacramento to determine if an atmosphere conducive to corruption exists. The study was conducted by applying some of the 74 questions drawn up by a national advisory commission to the city and county governments of Sacramento.

Hutchinson, John. The anatomy of corruption in trade unions. Industrial Relations, February 1969, 8, 135-150.

This article discusses the problem of corruption and organized crime in labor unions. Some of the areas touched upon are the rise of corruption, reasons for corruption, types of corruption, sociological background, and responses and solutions to the problem of corruption in labor unions.

\_\_\_\_\_. The imperfect union: A history of corruption in American trade unions. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972.

Illinois, State of. Report of the Crime investigating commission, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report regarding charges of corruption in the Illinois General Assembly. Springfield, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report on charges of legislative corruption made by one Oscar A. Weil. Chicago: Legislative Investigating Commission, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. General Assembly. Statement of Prentice H. Marshall and Harlington Wood, Jr., regarding charges of corruption in the Illinois General Assembly. Springfield, 1963.

Katz, Harvey. The Hodge scandal. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963.

Kleim, Frederick C. The muckraker: Writer Drew Pearson stirs new storms as he probes officials' acts; [Senator Thomas J.] Dodd and California politician sue, but an editor calls him 'a real public servant.' Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1966, 167, pp. 1ff.

The Knapp Commission report on police corruption. New York: George Braziller, 1972.

Kolesar, John, Harder, Ralph, and Scholl, Jay. Blueprint for scandal: The engineering business in New Jersey. Princeton, NJ: The Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 1974.

Kwitny, Jonathan. Adversary relationship: U.S. attorney in New Jersey, after two years, nears deadline in investigating Representative Helstoski. Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1974, 184, pp. 1ff.

\_\_\_\_\_. The outcast: A detective's efforts in breaking a big case weren't appreciated, but James Challendar [of the New Jersey state police] is back on hubcap patrol. Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1974, 184, pp. 1ff.

, Laing, Jonathan R. Aiming high: Corrupt officeholders are the special targets of 'big Jim' [James R.] Thompson; U.S. attorney in Chicago, member of a 'new breed,' has sent scores to jail. Wall Street Journal, December 24, 1974, 184, pp. 1ff.

\_\_\_\_\_. 'The 2% club' kicking back pay is way of life in Indiana for employees of state. Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1971, p. 1.

This article discusses the existence of a system in Indiana where holders of patronage jobs pay 2 percent of their salary every month to the political party that controls their particular job.

Losers on the road: Indictment of top officials for running traffic-fine racket in Greenwood Village, Colorado. Time, April 23, 1965, 85, 46.

Malone, J. The corruption of Harold Hoskins. New York: Charterhouse Books, Inc., n.d.

Massachusetts, State of. Crime commission comprehensive report, May 17, 1965.

Massachusetts, corruption is commonplace. Time, May 15, 1964, 83, 39.

Massachusetts: 137 indictments. Newsweek, May 18, 1964, 63, 38-39.

Massachusetts: Still more scandal. Newsweek, October 19, 1964, 64, 40.

Mayor in the dock. Newsweek, December 29, 1969, 74, 21-22.

Meyer, Lawrence. The fine line between contributions and bribes. The Washington Post, March 15, 1973, Sec. A, p. 18, col. 3.

Mitgang, Herbert. The man who rode on the tiger: The life and times of Judge Samuel Seabury. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963.

Mollenhoff, Clark. Despoilers of democracy: The real story of what Washington propagandists, arrogant bureaucrats, mismanagers, influence peddlers, and outright corrupters are doing to our federal government. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

Moore, Thomas J. Spreading it around, how vigilant citizens, their energetic alderman, two supporters of free enterprise, their champion of justice under law, and an envelope stuffed with cash cost you and me millions. Chicago Magazine, March 1975, 24, 103-107.

This article takes a behind-the-scenes look at the payoffs and dealings involved in getting a zoning change granted in Chicago. This rezoning alone was responsible for at least a \$4 million increase in the value of the land.

New Jersey city under indictment. Time, December 26, 1969, 94, 10-11.

This article is a brief review of some of the events that led to the indictment of Hugh J. Addonizio, mayor of Newark, NJ, on charges of extortion and income tax violation.

New Jersey, State of. Local government conflicts of interest and code of ethics study commission; Public hearing [pursuant to SCR 60 (OCR) of 1972]: Held: Trenton, New Jersey, December 8-13, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Public hearing [pursuant to SCR 60 (OCR) of 1972]: Vol. 4, Held: Trenton, New Jersey, February 21, 1973.

New York City. Control of inspection in the city of New York, a report to the mayor by the corporation counsel, the commissioner of investigation and the acting city administrator on behalf of the commissioners of the departments of air pollution control, buildings, fire, health, hospitals, licenses, marine and aviation, markets, police, public works, purchase, real estate, sanitation, water supply gas and electricity, and welfare. February 2, 1960.

New York, State of. Corrupt practices in New York city's department of buildings. Commission of Investigation, December 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_. An investigation of bingo operations in New York state. Commission of Investigation, December 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. An investigation of the New York city school construction program. Commission of Investigation, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. Seventh annual report of the temporary commission of investigation of the state of New York to the governor and the legislature of the state of New York. Legislative Document 100, March 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_. Summary of the activities during 1960 of the temporary commission of investigation of the state of New York. February 1961.

Noggle, Burl Lee. Origins of the Teapot Dome investigation. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, September 1957, 44, 237-266.

O'Connor, Len. Clout, Mayor Daley and his city. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1975.

This book discusses in detail the rise of Richard Daley to political power and how he managed to control and maintain power in Chicago for two decades. The author gives a detailed

behind-the-scenes look at the workings of the political machine in Chicago and shows how control of the machine equals control of the city.

Outbreak of graft. U.S. News and World Report, July 17, 1961, 51, 54-56.

Penn, Stanley. Behind the mails, how problems plagued building of post office in Hudson County, N.J. Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1972, p. 1.

This article details some of the accusations and indictments resulting from the building of a post office in New Jersey. The partnership that owns the building is claiming that political kickbacks have reduced their return on their investment from 10 percent to less than 2 percent.

Penn, Stanley. Graft's old syndrome: It takes two. Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1968, p. 18.

Pennsylvania, State of. 1973-1974 report, Pennsylvania crime commission. Office of the Attorney General, June 30, 1974.

Perry, E. The story behind Phoenix City. American Bar Association Journal, December 1956, 42, 1146-1149.

Phelan, J. When I looked in those files, my eyes popped; California tax scandal. Saturday Evening Post, September 10, 1966, 239, 23-29.

Porambo, Ron. No cause for indictment: An autopsy of Newark. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971.

Sections from Porambo's book deal with the corruption and the Mafia connections in Newark, New Jersey during Hugh Addonizio's term as mayor. Also included is a look at police involvement in promoting and permitting corruption in the city, as well as permitting Mafia activities.

Price, Barbara R. Police corruption: An analysis. Criminology, 1972, 10, 161-176.

Public construction probed in several states. ENR, September 13, 1973, pp. 9-10.

This article takes a brief look at kickbacks in the construction industry by citing a number of cases of bribery or extortion on public construction contracts.

Public corruption. Economic Crime Digest, January-February 1976, 3, 64-67.

Rakove, Milton L. Don't make no waves, don't back no losers, an insider's analysis of the Daley machine. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

Rappeport, Michael. Political numbers: New Jersey: The people close their eyes. The Washington Monthly, February 1972, 3, 37-38.

This article reports on the lack of awareness of the New Jersey population regarding corruption in their state government. Reasons cited for this are inadequate media coverage and a highly dispersed population. These reasons are in turn cited as contributing to the high level of corruption in the New Jersey government.

Reichley, A. J. Big shakedown in Baton Rouge. Fortune, August 1, 1969, 80, 96-99ff.

Rezoning involve millions of dollars; how even-handed? St. Petersburg Times, February 24, 1974.

This article takes a brief look at the "consistent" record of the Pinellas County, Florida, commissioners on zoning matters. Cited are cases of reversals on earlier decisions with no explanations, ignoring planning staff recommendations, and hints of political favoritism.

Riordan, William L. Plunkitt of Tammany hall. New York: Dutton, 1963.

Ross, Philip. The bribe. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

This is the story of Burt Ross, the mayor of Fort Lee, New Jersey. On the basis of his testimony, seven men were convicted of bribery charges and sent to prison. The book tells the story of the attempted bribe and Burt Ross's struggle against organized crime in his town.

Schuck, Peter. The curious case of the indicted meat inspectors. Harper's Magazine, September 1972, pp. 81-88.

This is a detailed examination of the meat inspection process and the pitfalls inherent in it in light of the indictment of 40 USDA meat inspectors in the Boston area for "accepting things of value."

Simon, Paul. The Illinois legislature: A study in corruption. Harper's Magazine, August 1964, 229, 74-78.

State library controversy; investigation of kickbacks to state officials. American Libraries, March 1974, 5, 121-122.

Steffens, Joseph Lincoln. The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1931.

In a chapter entitled "Los Angeles and the Apple," Steffens develops his theory that corruption in government is everywhere and that business must participate in this corruption if it is to survive. He goes on to draw the conclusion that in order to eliminate corruption, man must work for the common welfare instead of against it and the way to do this is to remove the offer of a reward and abolish privileges.

. The shame of the cities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957.

In a chapter entitled "Tweed Days in St. Louis," Steffens discusses the growth of corruption in the city of St. Louis at the turn of the century. Steffens shows that in St. Louis the corruption came from the top, the socially elite and the wealthy. He then goes on to discuss the purge of the city government by Joseph W. Folk, then Circuit Attorney for the city.

Steiger, Paul E. New York, Los Angeles strive to halt payoffs to building inspectors. Wall Street Journal, December 7, 1966, p. 1.

This article surveys the methods that are being used by both Los Angeles and New York to help eliminate graft on the part of their city inspectors.

Sufrin, Sidney C. Graft: Grease for the palm and grease for the wheels. Challenge, 1964, 13, 30-33.

Walton, Mary. West Virginia: The governor tooketh. The Washington Monthly, February 1972, 3, 13-23.

This provides a brief overview of the corruption of the Barron administration of the 1960s in West Virginia. The author makes the point that corruption in politics is not limited to just a few select rascals in a few areas but can be found everywhere.

When a state opens its own war on crime (Florida's anti-crime crusade; role of Governor Kirk's private investigators in dealing with alleged corruption of public officials. U.S. News and World Report, May 22, 1967, 62, 61-62.

When a state tries to clean itself up; Massachusetts. U.S. News and World Report, February 7, 1966, 60, 46-48.

Wilkie, Curtis, and Zintl, Terry. Want rezoning? 'It helps to have friends.' The Wilmington Evening Journal, December 3, 1973.

## EXPLANATIONS OF CORRUPTION

### Economic and Political Explanations

Anderson, Jack, and Kalvelage, Carl. American government: Like it is. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1972.

Banfield, Edward C. Corruption as a feature of governmental organization. Journal of Law and Economics, December 1975, 18, 587-615.

Banfield describes the various circumstances under which corruption thrives in government, and offers a scheme for minimizing corruption on all levels. He then proceeds to show why his scheme is unworkable in government because of the structure of government itself.

Banfield, Edward C., and Wilson, James Q. City politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Ben-Dor, G. Corruption, institutionalization, and political development: The revisionist theses revisited. Comparative Political Studies, April 1974, 7, 63-83.

Boyarsky, Bill, and Boyarsky, Nancy. Backroom politics: How your politicians work and why your government doesn't in city halls and state-houses throughout America. Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher, 1974.

Braibanti, Ralph. Reflections on bureaucratic corruption. Public Administration Review, Winter 1962, 40, 357-372.

Chambliss, William J. Vice, corruption, bureaucracy, and power. Wisconsin Law Review, 1971, 4, 1150-1173.

This article takes a look at the relationship that exists between vice, corruption, and the political and economic structure of "Rainfall West." The author draws the conclusions that vice is supplied not just by members of the criminal community, but also by members of the business and political community. Corruption is often overlooked in favor of an emphasis on the element of organized crime in vice, but corruption is a very important part of the criminal community's struggle for power and economic control and as such should be studied and controlled.

Friedrich, Carl J. Pathology of politics: Violence, betrayal, corruption, secrecy, and propaganda. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Political pathology. Political Quarterly, January 1966, 37, 70-85.

This article puts forth the idea that corruption, or "immoral practices," in moderation is good for a political system by helping it to remain responsive to a fluid and changeable society. Only when corruption appears in excessive amounts can it do real harm to a political system. A major point made by the author is that "corruption" is not really corrupt unless it does damage to the public and its interests.

Hinderaker, Ivan. Political party officials: Responsiveness to the public. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 1966, 363, 28-35.

Hinderaker briefly explores the new political environment in light of the new power groups, labor, minorities, etc., and the new types of government policy. The main thrust of the article is that not all men are corruptible, but there are those who will take advantage of a situation if given the chance. It is up to the public to decide what will and will not be tolerated and to see that its wishes are enforced.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political development and political decay. World Politics, April 1965, 17, 386-430.

The first part of this article is a theoretical discussion and definition of political development and decay. The author then goes on to say that the protection of the public interest leads to development whereas the emergence of private interest as the dominant force leads to corruption and political decay. He concludes by offering some suggestions for strengthening institutional and political development and preventing decay and corruption.

\_\_\_\_\_. Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Key, V. O. Methods of evasion of civil service laws. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, March 1935, 15, 337-347.

The patronage system has always been a part of many political power structures and it is also a contributing factor to the problem of local government corruption. This article looks at ways in which political machines can and do avoid compliance with civil service laws in order to maintain their systems of political patronage.

\_\_\_\_\_. The techniques of political graft in the United States. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1934.

Lasswell, Harold D., and McKenna, Jerome. Impact of organized crime on an inner city community. Washington: National Technical Information Service, 1972. (PB 213 391)

Leff, Nathaniel. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. The American Behavioral Scientist, November 1964, 8, 8-14.

The author argues that corruption is not always bad and can actually have positive effects in the areas of promoting economic development and counteracting bad government policies.

Levy, Joan J., and Leinwand, Gerald. Political corruption: Prelude to Watergate. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1974.

Leys, Colin. What is the problem about corruption? The Journal of Modern African Studies, August 1965, 3, 215-230.

This article looks at corruption by comparing and contrasting the differing concepts of corruption found in Western nations with those of the emerging African nations.

Loveman, Brian. The logic of political corruption: Studies in political theory and policy analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University, Department of Political Science, n.d.

This paper outlines the structure of political corruption, its consequences, and potential strategies to reduce the costs imposed by corruption on individuals. It is the author's belief that more emphasis should be placed on mitigating the consequences of corruption rather than focusing exclusively on deterring corruption.

McKittrick, Eric L. The study of corruption. Political Science Quarterly. December 1957, 72, 502-514.

McKittrick takes a look at corruption from the sociologist's point of view. He feels that it is a natural outgrowth of the process of assimilation and socialization of minority and politically excluded groups. He makes the point that the way to study corruption is from a historical perspective. By looking at the cyclical nature of corruption we should be able to better deal with corruption in the future.

McMullan, M. A theory of corruption. Sociological Review, July 1961, 9, 181-201.

This paper argues that the level of corruption in a government is in direct relationship to the differences between the attitudes, aims, and methods of the government and the society it governs; the greater the difference the higher the level of corruption will be.

Monteiro, J. B. Corruption: Control of maladministration. Bombay: P. C. Manaktala and Sons, Ltd., 1966.

Nye, J. S. Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. The American Political Science Review, June 1967, 61, 417-427.

Nye approaches the topic of corruption in developing nations in three ways. First, he looks at what he considers to be the three possible benefits of corruption. He then examines the argument that the costs of corruption far outweigh any possible good. Finally, he combines these two ideas into a discussion of the conditions that affect the probability that the good will be outweighed by the costs of corruption.

Organized crime: A bibliography. The Police Chief, 1971, 38, 48-55.

Park, R. E. Effects of graft on economic development - An examination of propositions from the literature. Washington: National Technical Information Service, 1969. (AD 689 245)

Pashigan, B. Peter. On the control of crime and bribery. Journal of Legal Studies, 1975, 4, 311-326.

This is a theoretical discussion of the interrelationships between a criminal act, bribery, and the fines imposed for both. A series of mathematical formulas are given to illustrate the interrelationships between these three areas.

Police corruption: Annotated bibliography. New York: John Jay College, 1976.

Price, Barbara R. Police corruption: An analysis. Criminology, 1972, 10, 161-176.

Proal, L. J. C. Political crime. Montclair, NJ: Smith, Patterson, Publishing Corp., 1973.

Protess, David L. Banfield's Chicago revisited: The conditions for and social policy implications of the transformation of a political machine. The Social Service Review, June 1974, 48, 184-202.

This article looks at the effects a strong political machine can have on the implementation of social policy. Conditions for reform of the machine are also examined.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 1975, 4, 187-203.

\_\_\_\_\_. Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Schmidhauser, John, et al. Political corruption. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975.

Scott, James C. Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Corruption, machine politics, and social change. American Political Science Review, 1969, 63, 1142-1159.

\_\_\_\_\_. An essay on the political functions of corruption, Asian Studies, December 1967, 5, 501-523.

James Scott presents thoughts on the development and the role of corruption as a normal and healthy part of the governmental process. It serves as a viable alternative to violence on the part of a group that has been excluded from the political process and can become a democratizing force in a closed government. He concludes by saying that in some cases corruption can actually be a positive force in political development.

Sherman, Lawrence W., (Ed.). Police corruption: A sociological perspective. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1974.

Smelser, Neil J. Stability, instability and the analysis of political corruption. in Barber, Bernard, and Inkeles (Eds.). Stability and social change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp. 7-29.

Wraith, Ronald, and Simpkins, Edgar: Corruption in developing countries. London: Allen and Unwin, 1963.

#### Explanations Based Upon Public Attitudes

Durand, Roger. Ethnicity, 'public-regardingness,' and referenda voting. Midwest Journal of Political Science, May 1972, 16, 259-268.

Erskine, Hazel. The polls: Corruption in government. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1973-1974, 37, 628-644.

This article takes a look at the results of a variety of opinion polls on corruption in government. The time span covered by the polls ranges from the Roosevelt era through the Nixon years.

Gardiner, John A. Public attitudes toward gambling and corruption. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1967, 374, 123-134.

This article is based on a survey done in 1966 on public attitudes toward corruption in "Wincanton," and the voting patterns following exposure of government corruption.

Hennessy, Timothy. Problems in concept formation: The ethos 'theory' and the comparative study of urban politics. Midwest Journal of Political Science, November 1970, 14, 537-564.

Lineberry, Robert L., and Fowler, Edmund P. Reformism and public policies in American cities. American Political Science Review, September 1967, 61, 701-716.

Miller, Abraham H., and Bennett, Stephen E. Communication. American Political Science Review, September 1974, 68, 1265-1271.

Peters, John G. Politics and corruption: The view from the state legislature. Prepared for delivery at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977.

Political ethos revisited. American Political Science Review, December 1971, 65, 1048-1062.

Regan, D. E., and Morris, A. J. A. Local government corruption and public confidence. Public Law, Summer 1969, pp. 132-152.

Wilson, James Q., and Banfield, Edward C. Public regardingness as a value in voting behaviour. American Political Science Review, December 1964, 58, 876-887.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Field, John Osgood. Political ethos and the structure of city government. American Political Science Review, June 1966, 60, 306-326.

#### Psychological Explanations of Corruption

Cressey, Donald R. The respectable criminal. Criminologica, May 1965, 3, 13-16.

The psychological processes that precede an act of embezzlement are discussed. The three major aspects are feeling that the problem can't be shared, knowledge and opportunity, and verbalization and rationalization.

Eliasberg, Wladimir. Corruption and bribery. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, September/October 1951, 42, 317-331.

Eliasberg's theory is that the proper way to approach the problem of corruption is through psychological and sociological analysis, and not by studying the means and the economic factors. He feels that corruption occurs as the result of a universal need for recognition and the separation of political power and economic power.

Harris, Mary B., Liguori, Ralph A., and Stack, Conrad. Favors, bribes, and altruism. The Journal of Social Psychology, 1973, 89, 47-54.

This article reports on three experiments that were performed to try to determine the effects on altruistic behavior of offering contingent or noncontingent bribes.

Horn, J. Simple steps to corruption: Theories of C. Bahn. Psychology Today, January 1975, 8, 20-21ff.

Kauffmann, Duane. Incentive to perform counterattitudinal acts: Bribe or gold star. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 19(1), 82-91.

This article reports on the results of a psychological experiment testing the effects of a monetary incentive (bribe) on the performance of counterattitudinal behavior.

Police, the simple steps to corruption. Psychology Today, January 1975, pp. 20ff.

This is a very brief article on a report by psychologist Charles Bahn on the process of "socialization to corruption" that occurs within police departments.

Robin, Gerald D. The nonshareable problem theory of trust violation. Criminologica, February 1970, 7, 48-57.

Gerald Robin discusses and examines Cressey's theories about the psychological processes involved in committing "respectable crimes." Robin's findings generally support Cressey's theories, but he does not offer complete acceptance of them at this point.

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## CORRUPTION CONTROL MECHANISMS

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