Salt Lake City:

Prototype Evaluation of

Des Moines Replication*

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NCJRS

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ABSTRACT

The Polk County (Iowa) Department of Court Services was "created to serve as an administrative framework for the coordination, integration and development of projects providing alternatives to the traditional institutions of the criminal justice system." Four components were organized within the Department. The two pre-trial components (release on recognizance and supervised release) predated the Department of Court Services. The two other components (intensive probation and community based corrections were implemented at the time the new Department was organized.

The basic intent of the new Department was to equalize justice and reduce the stigmatizing effects of pre-trial and post-trial incarceration. It was assumed that "the overwhelming majority (of offenders) come from uneducated, unskilled, and economically deprived portions of the population," and because of these disabilities suffer various inequities when being processed through the criminal justice system. The Des Moines Project meant to alleviate these inequities, but to retain community safety as a primary objective.

The Des Moines Project was judged successful because it crystalized two major thrusts in criminal justice policy — alternatives to confinement and system organization. Thus, it represented a potential major effort in the field if it was demonstrated that the concept could produce similar results when established in new environments. The selection of the Des Moines Project as an exemplary program reflected the assessment by L.E.A.A. that the original project was a success. The decision by the Office of Technology Transfer to fund and evaluate demonstration/replication projects was prompted by the necessity to determine the transferability of the Des Moines concept. Five sites were eventually selected for federal funding.

L.E.A.A. funded an evaluation team from Florida State University to study the replication effort in five locations. This paper summarizes evaluation findings for one site: Salt Lake City, Utah. General findings of the evaluation are:

- 1. Salt Lake City was able to implement the replication project.
- 2. SLC's version of the project was publicly justified, and eventually funded, in a manner consistent with community interest and political exigencies.
- 3. Some of the replication components underwent an evolution caused by local organizational interest.
- 4. SLC's project had an impact of caseflows as reflected in pre-trial confinement, dispositions, sentencing, failure to appear and rates of criminal behavior.
- 5. The ultimate outcome of the Salt Lake City Project served both "system" and "client" interests.
- 6. The project had an effect on the working relations between components of the criminal justice system, and upon community attitudes toward the criminal justice system.

I. BACKGROUND

The growth of Salt Lake City dates to the mitgration of Brigham Young in 1847. During the decades from 1850 to 1910, the population expanded, but growth stopped in the decade from 1910 to 1920. From 1920 to 1940, the region suffered a negative migration between census periods. But after 1940, the region enjoyed a rather modest population growth.

Salt Lake City is one of the older cities in the American west.

Its physical plant is cld, and its 2.5% increase in housing units from 1960 to 1970 is 10 times smaller than the growth rate for the Salt Lake City metropolitan area. The population of the central city declined 7.2% during the past census decade, while the entire metropolitan area grew 24.5%.

The central city differs from the metropolitan region in other ways. Table I summarizes some of these differences.

The population of the central city is older, and it contains larger proportions of foreign stock and minorities. Its unemployment rate is higher and average family income lower. The central city has proportionately more families with female heads, and proportionately fewer families have females working when the husband is present. The central city has a comparatively low owner-occupancy. Per capita expenditures in the central city are less than half the per capita expenditures for the entire metropolitan region.

Finally, Salt Lake City has a crime problem. The FBI index crimes for 1974 indicate unusually high rates of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. In all cases the central city rates are higher than the metropolitan region taken as a

Table I
Salt Lake City:
Socio-Economic Profiles

Variable	: SLC	SLC	Salt.L	Utah	USA
in de la companya de	·	SMSA	County		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
n /a 241	006.6	1	50 60 0	1 2	r 9
Pop/Sq. Mi.	296.6	52.6	60.0	1.3	5.7
% Pop Ch. 60-70	-7.2			18.9	13.3
Median Age	28.4	23.2	23.9	23.0	†28.3
% Foreign Stock	19.9		15.4	12.4	16.5
% Spanish Heritage	6.4	4.8	4.8	4.1	4.6
% Black	1.2	.7	.6	.6	11.1
% Sme Hse 65-70	50.9	*	*	*	*
Median Schooling	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.4	
% Fem Wk e. husband	50.3	60.2	58.4	61.9	
% Unemployed	5.3	4.6	4.6	5.2	
% Manufac	12.6	14.9	15.6	14.5	25.9
% Whise & Retail	24.6	23.9	24.9	21.5	20.1
% Business & Service	8.5	7.1	7.4	6.5	7.7
% Education	10.4	9.3	9.3	11.7	8.0
% Construction	4.2	5.3	5.5	5.5	6.0
% Govt.	20.2	21.3		25.2	16.1
% Prof, Tech, Manager	28.2	27.2			23.2
% Sales, Clerical	30.7	28.3		25.5	25.1
% Craftsman, Foreman	11.1	14.5	14.3	14.5	13.9
% Fam Fem Head	12.8	8.8	9.4	7.9	10.8
Median Fam Income	8815	9951	9770	9320	9586
Median White Fam Inc	8855	9971	9789	9356	9957
% AFDC of Pub Ass	*	78.2	77.7	76.6	62.9
% Ch Units, 60-70	2.5				19.9
% Owner Occ	51.0		65.7	69.4	62.9
Per Cap Exp	8.8		21.0		23.5
% Exp Pub Welfare	0.0	0.0	0.0		6.6
% Republican 64	*	*	42.9		38.5
% Republican 72	*	*	1 63.0	67.6	60.7
Crime Rate 1974	10184.7	6255.0	03.0	4950.2	4821.4
Violent Crime 74	*	(290.1	*	214.6	
Property Crime 74	*	5965.9	*	4735.6	4362.6
Murder 74	10.2	3.6	*	3.2	9.7
Rape 74	66.0		*	22.3	26.1
Robbery 74	291.2		*	75.8	208.8
Aggravated Ass 74	226.9	148.0	*	113.4	214.2
Burglary 74	2793.9	1465.1	*	1132.9	1429.0
Larceny 74	6032.5	4070.0	<i>.</i>	3272.9	2473.0
Auto Theft 74		430.8	*	3272.9	
% Ch. Property 73-74	763.9 *	430.5	*		460.6 117.5
% Ch. Property 73-74 % Ch. Violent 73-74	*	*	*	117.3	
% Our ATOTENT 19-14	**	24	36	102.9	110.5

whole. These figures compare unfavorably with similar metropolitan regions with the exception of metropolitan areas in the south.

II. SITE SELECTION

By 1974 criminal justice in Salt Lake County faced some serious problems. First, the crime rate was high and getting worse; second, public intoxication was and is handled as a criminal matter; third, weekend arrests were often held in jail for court arraignment on Monday; fourth, and as a consequence of the first three, the county jail was overcrowded; and fifth, budgetary pressures threatened to eliminate special alcohol and probation programs, thus placing further burdens on the county jail.

In late 1973, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECO) announced monetary support for replications of the court services program developed in Des Moines, Iowa. Salt Lake officials learned about the project through the LEAA Denver Regional Office and the Utah Law Enforcement Planning Agency. LEAA officials reported that \$250,000 of Institute grant money and up to \$400,000 of LEAA discretionary grant money would be made available to selected communities interested in replicating the Des Moines Community Corrections program.

State planning officials were of the opinion that the Des Moines program could help Salt Lake reduce jail overcrowding by providing acceptable alternatives for selected sentenced offenders. The State Planning Agency endorsed Salt Lake County as a replication site and the county began preparing a Des Moines replication grant proposal.

After preliminary discussions among state and local officials, a member of the Regional Planning Agency requested support from the Salt

Lake County Commissioners. The Commissioners were unwilling to firmly commit the county to the new program, but it did ask the Regional Planning Agency to prepare a federal grant application. The application was prepared with the assistance of Urban Rural Systems Associates (a technical assistance consulting firm under contract to NILECO) and a steering committee comprised of a Salt Lake City judge, a member of the Utah Board of Corrections, and several representatives from local criminal justice and service agencies.

The major purpose of the proposed grant was to reduce jail population and operating costs by providing safe community alternatives. The proposal set forth five major components, with the following functions:

1. Administrative Component

- A. Hold monthly coordination meetings with judges, legal defenders, county attorneys, law enforcement officials, and others in the criminal justice system.
- B. Gather, maintain, and disperse information necessary
 to evaluate objectives for each court services component,
 including administration.
- C. Provide 20 hours of pre-service training and at least 45 hours of in-service training per person per year for all personnel employed by the Department of Court Services.
- D. Submit an evaluation report together with recommendations for each court services project to the Court Services

 Board and the Board of County Commissioners every six months.
- E. Implement and operate the Department of Court Services

at a reasonable cost to the government entities involved.

2. Pre-trial Release Component

- A. Obtain pre-trial release of 40% of those booked into jail, excluding inebriates.
- B. See that the proportion of people released that fail
 to appear for arraignment and trial does not exceed the
 "no show" proportion for those released on bail.
- C. Obtain information from a minimum of 75% of those booked into jail that could later be used to assist these people in the following areas: (1) pre-trial release from jail, (2) bond reduction hearings, (3) pre-sentence and post-sentence treatment and services, (4) legal counsel, and (5) sentencing.
- D. Implement and operate the pre-trial release program at a reasonable cost to the Government entities involved.

3. Pre-trial Services (Supervised Release) Component

- A. Obtain the safe release of at least 65 defendants per month who would ordinarily remain in jail until trial because they do not meet ROR community "stability" criteria and cannot afford bail. "Safe" meant having rates of appearance for trial and absence of a new offense while awaiting trial on a par with persons charged with similar offenses and released on bail.
- B. Provide individualized treatment and counseling within the community setting to all persons involved in the pre-trial services program.
- C. Utilize existing community resources for treatment

- and services, averaging at least three referrals per client.
- D. Obtain a probationary sentence for at least 90% of those convicted and assigned to the program.
- E. Implement and operate the pre-trial services program at a reasonable cost to the Government entities involved.

4. Misdemeanant Probation Component

- A. Identify people referred to misdemeanant probation who are likely to commit a felony sometime in the future.
- B. Provide special services (including an agent/client ratio of 1:25) to selected misdemeanant probationers and to utilize for treatment purposes existing community resources averaging at least three referrals per client.
- C. Compare this select group of clients with a comparable group of probationers to determine if the special services did reduce felony recidivism.
- D. Implement and operate the misdemeanant program at a reasonable cost to the Government entities involved.

5. Rehabilitation Facility Component

- A. Protect the community from additional crime during the correctional process by keeping new arrests for program clients below 13%.
- B. Provide an opportunity for vocational rehabilitation, job advancement, and steady meaningful employment for every person committed to the facility.
- C. Provide individualized treatment and counseling within

the facility for every person committed to the facility.

- D. Utilize existing community resources for treatment and services, averaging at least three referrals per client.
- E. Implement and Operate the rehabilitation facility at a reasonable cost to the Government entities involved.

The grant proposal aimed to do more than relieve the overcrowded jail. It proposed delivery of services to needy clients, and it proposed increased criminal justice coordination in Salt Lake County. In his report to the county commissioners on July 1, 1974, the county auditor argued that the proponents of the Des Moines project did not adequately take into account these other functions which had not been publicly aired or clarified by professional staff members within the local law enforcement and criminal justice community.

Most political observers in Salt Lake agreed that the jails were overcrowded. They believed a program to address this need would meet with little political opposition, particularly if it promised to reduce jail operating costs. However, interviews with CJS staff indicated that an attempt to increase coordination among the various criminal justice agencies would seem likely to raise opposition. In addition, community surveys indicate that a project emphasizing "rehabilitative," as opposed to "retribute," justice would also incur considerable popular objection. At least one member of the three man Board of Commissioners was notably opposed to the replication project (because it would expand county correctional responsibilities and would probably result in increased financial obligations). A second commissioner was, for the most part, indifferent. Proponents of the project chose to emphasize the jail reduction function which had the greatest political support. Had all three functions

been publicly aired, the chances of gaining commissioner approval for the proposal might have been considerably less.

III. SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

Criminal justice personnel in Salt Lake County generally supported the grant proposal. However, law enforcement officials objected to the project's general philosophy. Their criticism centered upon the plan to release defendants from jail soon after admission. (Ultimately, the jail staff did support the project, issuing favorable press releases during the bail bondsmen strike.) Neither law enforcement nor jail personnel organized to oppose the proposal.

Some judges and court personnel were actively supportive. (One judge served on the steering committee and also assisted the project during implementation. He actively intervened in a serious problem involving staff dissatisfaction.) The judges and court personnel generally agreed that a project like Des Moines should be tried in Salt Lake County. However, they viewed the project as a temporary solution to the overcrowded jail and thought more time was needed to develop a more permanent solution.

The bail bondsmen offered the most vocal and organized resistance to the grant proposal. An attorney was even retained to represent them. They especially criticized the ROR program, claiming that it would attract "safe risk" clientele, leaving them with clients more likely to forfeit bond. (Their fears were not unfounded. Once the project began, three bonding offices closed, and the bondsmen went on strike for 18 days. The strike ended with an agreement between the bondsmen, sheriff, and county attorney. The agreement provided: (1) the right to assess a prisoner's cash before bonding; (2) bench warrants for bond clients failing to ap-

pear; (3) prisoners calling a bondsman were not released on ROR until the prisoner could talk to the bondsman; (4) ROR signs and advertisements were to specify that release is available only if qualifications are met; (5) ROR personnel were not to have judicial authority, i.e., they could only recommend release to a bail commissioner; (6) provision of a "stay bond" between conviction and sentencing should the bondsman chose to discontinue the bond; and (7) adherence to state law regarding payment of bond forfeitures. The court services staff did not oppose the agreement, as it did not appear to significantly alter the ROR program.)

The State Department of Corrections also opposed the grant proposal. State officials publically argued that resource constraints prevented their supplying promised match money. According to some observers, the Department of Corrections felt that the intensive probation program and the community corrections facility interfered with state authority in corrections. (This jurisdictional dispute had a serious impact on later attempts to implement the project.)

The county commissioner asked the county auditor to review the grant proposal, and he in turn prepared a detailed analysis of the project and its likely impact. This report, presented at a July 1, 1974 Commission meeting, concluded that a local correctional alternative and a bail reform program would indirectly reduce the period of incarceration and hence the need for future jail space. However, the auditor also recommended that the state/local jurisdictional dispute be resolved before a final decision was made.

At their July 1 meeting, the commissioners voted (two against one) to approve the proposal and accept responsibility for administering the project. Support for the project was based on the need to reduce jail

overcrowding. However, they did not resolve the jurisdictional questions.

Dissenting Commissioner McClure cited this failure and also argued that
the Commission had ignored the question of long-range follow-on funding.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

On July 10 the county commissioners placed the Des Moines project under the general supervision of the Director of Social Services. The commissioners also agreed to advertise for a project director. The director was selected on September 16. (The new project director had been a legal advisor with the Los Angeles Police Department for 20 years and after his retirement worked for the Los Angeles Superior Court.)

A Pre-trail Release On Recognizance (ROR) program existed in Salt Lake before the Des Moines replication. The new project director, therefore, was asked to incorporate this program into the new court services project, and the ROR program director and the eight screening officials were retained. (Each screener worked twenty hours a week, with interviews held seven days a week.)

Pre-trial services, which provided Supervised Pre-trial Release, was scheduled to begin in February, 1975. More clients were accepted than anticipated, however, and consequently an attempt was made to begin the program earlier. The service program director was hired on November 1 but due to a budget freeze the first two counselors were not hired until January. A secretary was hired in February; a third counselor, case side, and a university intern were hired in March, and on January 1, 1975, the project leased a facility to house the pre-trial services program.

During November and December, 1974, the service program director sought

to establish working relations with community service agencies, including the Drug Referral Center, Alcohol and Drug Problem Units, The University of Utah Alcohol and Drug Abuse Clinic, The Utah State Employment Security, The Utah State Bar Association, and the Granite Mental Health Unit. Many of these agencies were not particularly cooperative, arguing that they were already operating at full capacity and could not afford to accept new cases. Most of these objections were eventually resolved, and the first case referral was made on January 9, 1975.

The Misdemeanant Probation Program fared less well. Two problems delayed implementation of this program: money and a jurisdictional dispute. The Utah Division of Corrections decided it could not honor its commitment to supply matching funds. Eventually, an agreement between the Utah State Division of Corrections and the Court Services Project resolved the funding and jurisdictional crisis. The State Division of Corrections agreed to provide "in kind" assistance to misdemeanant probation, sharing with it state personnel and office space. On July 1, 1975 the Misdemeanant Probation Program finally began, staffed by three state probation officers, one of who served as Director of Misdemeanant Probation.

Two problems plagued the rehabilitation facility: location and legal custody of its residents. The rehabilitation facility needed space to house 40 males and 10 female residents. The facility was eventually housed in a wing of the old county hospital, using space made available by the County Commissioners. The last major problem centered upon legal custody of the facility's residents. The sheriff had custody over jail prisoners, but his legal responsibility for facility residents was unclear. To resolve the custody issue, the sentencing judge was required

to order the release of jailed inmates to the rehabilitative facility.

The program director for the rehabilitative facility was appointed in March 1975. The program director had a staff of 15 counselors, an assistant director, and several volunteers. The rehabilitative facility received its first clients on June 1, 1975.

A year had passed before all project programs were in operation.

The county auditor, several local criminal justice personnel, and some politicians blamed the project director for inadequate administration.

(He was later removed.) But other sources also impeded the Des Moines Replication: (1) The State Division of Corrections, through the jurisdictional dispute and the decision not to honor its funding commitments; (2) the county auditor's hiring freeze, (3) an extremely complex funding formula with consequent uncertainty in financing,

(4) lingering questions on the legality of the county's correctional responsibilities. Finally, the project did not have a strong political base in Salt Lake. The jurisdictional dispute brought attention to the project's role in developing a county-level alternative to corrections, and Salt Lake officials did not want to publicly debate or to assume the financial burden of a county-level corrections program.

None of these impediments prevented implementation of the replication project. Salt Lake County's version of the Des Moines project did work, but its functions extended far beyond reducing the jail population. The Court Services Project was innovative and it caused several adjustments within the criminal justice process in Salt Lake County.

V. OPERATION

The administrative division of Salt Lake's Court Services Project performs several functions. It prepares the budget, oversees staff selection, produces a quarterly report for local justice agencies, and compiles a semi-monthly report for the judges. These reports were assembled independent of the LEAA evaluation. The staff training function fares less well. In-service training relies upon joint volunteer-staff programs. Staff attenuance at these sessions is poor. Finally, the administrative division gathers cost information similar to that compiled in Des Moines. The operating costs in Salt Lake appear consistent with those reported for the program in Des Moines.

Pre-trial release screeners are physically housed in the county jail. They attempt to interview 75% of those booked into the jail. The interviewers explain pre-trial release to the perspective client and administer a profile questionnaire. The questionnaire awards points for stable community ties, which are based on such factors as residency, employment, and prior record. Recognizance release is immediately granted to misdemeanants who score at least five points and to 3rd degree felons who score at least seven points. Grant guidelines prohibit release of public intoxicants arrested within the city limits, and the courts prohibit release of defendants held for non-judicial reasons, including military and immigration charges and agency "holds." Those not qualifying for immediate release are informed of the pre-trial services program and given the opportunity to make bail following booking.

Considerably less than 40% of those booked into jail (excluding public inebriates) are released through the pre-trial release program.

Approximately 42% of those eligible for ROR are released. Project staff report a failure to appear (FTA) rate of 3% to 3.5%. This figure includes only "willful" failures, excluding those who fail to appear for reasons such as illness or administrative error. Since FTA rates for defendants released on bond include both deliberate and non-deliberate failures, direct comparisons cannot be made with official data.

Pre-trial supervised release counselors may interview those not released on ROR or bail. This interview follows a request by a judge or by a PTS counselor. A recommendation is then made to pre-trial services based on the verified ROR questionnaire and the counselor's subjective opinion of the prisoner. If Pre-Trial Services accepts a recommendation for release under supervision, the county attorney is given written notice at least 24 hours before a bonding hearing. Then, if the recommendation is not opposed, pre-trial services outlines a tenative service program to the presiding judge at the hearing. If the judge approves, the prisoner is released to the custody of a pre-trial services staff member. The prisoner remains under staff supervision pending the judicial disposition, receiving psychological testing and referrals to community agencies. At the time of sentencing, pre-trial services prepares a "progress report" for the consideration of the presiding judge.

Considerably fewer than 65 people per month are released to the supervision of Pre-Trial Services. Several months into the program, about 18 people per month were so released, and during the last quarter of 1975, pre-trial services supervised 113 cases (65 were felonies). During that quarter, 4 defendants willfully failed to

appear for a court hearing, and 8 were arrested for new charges. (These figures were compiled by the project staff.)

Misdemeanant probation is now an adjunct to the Utah State Adult
Probation and Parole Department. It does not function like its counterpart in Des Moines. In Des Moines, the probation component supervises parolees from Fort Des Moines (the rehabilitation facility) as well as defendants granted probation. In Salt Lake, the Misdemeanant Probation Program does not deliver post-trial services beyond those delivered by state probation and parole.

The residential facility receives referrals from attorneys, probation officers, friends of the defendant, jail officials, and, infrequently, judges. One of two counselors interviews prospective inmates for an initial screening. Candidates must: (1) have at least one month of their jail sentence remaining or, (2) if not already serving a custody sentence, be convicted of a non-violent offense. Eligible subjects who pass screening are recommended for admission. The judge presiding at sentencing then determines whether or not placement is in order.

The rehabilitation facility has no security devices, and all subjects have private rooms. The average time of residency is 60 days. The facility serves as an alternative to jail confinement and offers its clients specialized treatment and counseling services. The facility is primarily an educational and work release center.

VI. COMMUNITY IMPACT

Political observers in Salt Lake argue that the Des Moines project does not have a strong philosophical base in the community. They claim cultural norms in Salt Lake favor retribution over rehabilitation. Pro-

ject proponents do not favor public debate and tend to emphasize the need to reduce jail overcrowding rather than the provision of special scrvices.

The project received considerable attention in the press and electronic media. Attention was generally focused on relieving jail pressures, less frequently on rehabilitation. In January 1975, 17.4% of the community had heard of the project and another 9.0% thought they may have heard. In January 1976, 20.0% of the community had heard of the project. Table II summarizes the sources of this information.

TABLE II

Percent of Community Aware of
Project Through Various Media

Sources of Information	January 1975	January 1976
Papers	27.3%	35.3%
TV & Radio	49.8%	39.2%
Friends & Neighbors	13.7%	11.6%
Relatives & Spouse	5.4%	7.8%
Work Associates	2.0%	6.0%

Our data suggest that the formal media coverage did not highlight the service functions of the Des Moines project. Informal contacts among friends, neighbors, relatives, spouse, and work associates, however, did include discussion of these functions. Most of those who discussed the project were recipients of services or acquaintances of recipients (directly or indirectly), and these people (approximately 41% of those who heard about the replication) were considerably more favorable toward the project than the community as a whole.

In January of 1975 and 1976 community respondents were informed of "an expanded court and probation services program for defendants accused of a crime. The project involves pre-trial release, pre-trial services, misdemeanant probation, and a rehabilitation facility." In 1976 respondents were also told that "the project aims to provide alternatives to bail, reduce the jail population, and provide offenders with extra attention." Table III summarizes the community responses. The first column ranks attitudes toward the programs (1975 and 1976), while the second ranks attitudes toward the project goals (1976).

TABLE III

Attitude &	Toward Overall	Toward Overall	Toward
Comments	Program	Program	Program
(% of Respondent)	1975	1976	Goals 1976
**Negative	16.7	19.8	19.6
General Negative	1.9	2.8	2.4
Unworkable	1.9	.8	2.4
Crime Control	10.5	15.0	12.0
Inequitable	1.4	.4	4
More Costs/Bklog	.5	.8	2.4
Poor Administrators	•5	0	0
**Positive	63.1	40.4	46.5
General Positive	50.2	27.5	28.5
Workable	0 .	1.2	1.2
Need Help, Rehab.	11.0	8.1	10.4
Due Process	.5	0	. 4
Equitable/Jail Bad	0	0	4.8
Save Money/Cut Bklog	1.4	3.6	.8
Try It	0	01	.4
Neutral	20.1	38.8	33.7
Uncertain	12.4	13.4	13.7
Depends/Crime, Crimnl	1.4	17.0	10.0
3rd Alternative	0	2.8	6.8
Need More Info	.5	2.8	2.0
Depends/Cost, Lniency	4.8	.4	.4
Depends/Effect on CJS	.5	0	0
Depends/Supervision	0	1.2	.4
Depends/Supervisors	.5	1.2	.4

Descriptive	0	 8	 8,	
No Bail/Spec. Programs	0	.8	0	
Comparisons Made	0	0	. 4	
Location/Facilities	0	0	. 4	

Negative comments toward the project and its goals remain under 20% in both years. However, the majority of these negative comments address the "rehabilitative" function of the project. There is a sharp drop in positive comments from 1975 to 1976. (most of the positive comments were vague statements of approval) and there is a sharp increase in qualifying statements like "it depends upon the crime or criminal."

Comments provided on project goals are particularly illuminating.

Approximately 10% of the community, many of whom were recipients or acquaintances of recipients, favored the service function. About 12% disapproved the service function, and another 10% indicated that services should be restricted to certain types of offenders.

The project may have had an indirect impact on the community.

Tables IV through VII illustrate this possibility. Community attitudes toward the police remained relatively consistent from 1975 to 1976 (see Table IV), but community attitudes toward the courts significantly improved during this period (see Table V). This result may not be directly related to the project, however as in January 1975 several people chose to withhold comment on the courts due to bitterness over a mass murder case in another Utah City. Table VI illustrates a significant improvement in the community's assessment of probation. Comments indicate that attitudes toward probation improved from 1975 to 1976, particularly among probation recipients and their acquaintances. Table VII shows no appreciable change in the community's attitude toward crime. Consistent with the unusually high crime rate, Salt Lake City residents considered

Table IV

Community Attitude Profile Toward Police 1975-1976

Police - T1

Code ********* (125) 1. I Strongly Agree ************ (58) 2. I Agree I 3. ******* (44) I Neutral I ****** (25) 4. I Disagree ***** (19) 5. I Strongly Disagree 9. **** (14) I No Response (missing) 40 80 120 140 200 Frequency Police - T2 Code 1. I Strongly Agree ************************************* 2. I Agree I ******* (17) 3. I Neutral I ***** (10) 4. I Disagree ******** (19) I Strongly Disagree I ** (2) 9. I No Response (missing) ..I.........I 80 100 Frequency

215

Table V

```
Courts - T1
Code
1.
  ***** (7)
  I Strongly Agree
2.
  ************* ( 24 )
  I Agree
  3.
  I Neutral
  ******* ( 41 )
  I Disagree
  5.
  I Strongly Disagree
  9.
  I (missing)
  Frequency
Courts - T2
Code!
  ******** ( 18 )
  I Stronly Agree
  ********** ( 59 )
2.
  I Agree
  ******************************
3.
  I Neutral
  ****** ( 13
  I Disagree
  *********** ( 30 )
5.
  I Strongly Disagree
9.
  ********* ( 21 )
  I (missing)
   I
   Frequency
```

(0

Table VI

```
Relation - Tl
Code
   I
   *** ( 10 )
1.
   I Strongly Agree
   ****** ( 22 )
2.
   I Agree
   I
   ******** ( 62 )
3.
   I
     Neutral
   I
4.
   ****** ( 43 )
   I Disagree
   ****** ( 34 )
5.
   I Strongly Disagree
9.
   ******** ( 114 )
   I
     (missing)
      120
   Frequency
Relation - T2
Code
   ******** ( 24 )
1.
   I Strongly Agree
   2. .
   I Agree
   ***********************************
3.
   I
     Neutral
4.
   ****** ( 14 )
   I Disagree
   ******* ( 20 )
5.
   I Strongly Disagree
   ******** ( 19 )
9.
   I (missing)
            Frequency
```

Table VII

```
Crime - T1
Code
                 teleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferteleferte
1.
                  I Strongly Agree
2.
                 I Agree
                 ************************ / 29 )
3.
                 I Neutral
                 1
                 ********** ( 31 )
4.
                 I Disagree
                 I
5.
                 I Strongly Disagree
                 ******* ( 16 )
9.
                  I (missing)
                  I.....I....I.
                                                                                        40
                                                                                                                                 60
                                                                                                                                                                        80
                                                                                                                                                                                                           100
                                                    20
                 Frequency
Crime - T2
Code
1.
                  **********************
                  I Strongly Agree
                  2.
                  I Agree
                  I
3.
                  *** ( 4 )
                  I Neutral
4.
                  (49) *****************
                  I Disagree
                  ******* ( 29 )
5.
                  I Strongly Disagree
9.
                  ***** ( 5 )
                  I (missing)
                              20
                                                                                                                                 60
                                                                                                                                                                                                           100
                  Frequency
```

crime a serious problem.

VII. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT

The Des Moines replication is an innovative project in Salt Lake, but it appears to have brought minimal structural changes to established criminal justice agencies. Pre-trial release was incorporated under the project umbrella, but the State Board of Corrections maintained control over local probation. Still, the project did affect changes in the Salt Lake County criminal justice system. Table VIII illustrates some of these changes.

TABLE VIII

CJS Agency Reactions Toward
Replication Project

	Law	Enf.	Cour	ts	C. Co	orr.	Other	CJS
	75	76	75	76	75	76	75	76
Influence decisions	2.2	3.1	2.2	2.4	2,4	2.8	3.0	2.4
Share information	2.0	2.9	2.0	2.4	2.4	2.0	2.2	1.9
Get info. from proj.	2.1	3.2	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.7	2.8	2.5
Proj. keeps agreements	2.2	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.6
Police aid project	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.8	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.0
Courts aid project	2.2	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.8
Probation aids proj.	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.1
Local Gov't. aids proj.	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.8	2.5	1.9
Reg. contact w. proj.	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.2	2.2	3.3	2.1	2.3
Contacts procedural	3.1	2.7	2.3	3.2	3.1	4.7	2.9	3.1
Contacts productive	2.2	2.8	2.2	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.2
Contacts guarded	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.5	3.3	2.5	3.1	3.3

(Scores are averages from all respondents in a given agency on a battery of questions administered in 1975 and 1976. Scale ranges from 1 to 5; scores below 3.0 may be considered positive, scores above 3.0 negative.)

All criminal justice agencies agree that the Court Services Project received considerable support from the courts, probation ("in-kind" ser-

vices), and local government. All agencies appeared to share information with the replication project, and all agreed that the contacts were generally productive. Law enforcement was somewhat less willing to share information, and both law enforcement and the courts became somewhat less enthusiastic about their "productive relations" with the project.

In 1975 law enforcement officials reported that they could get information from the Des Moines project, but by 1976 they indicated it was much more difficult. The same officials also reported considerably less influence over project decisions and said the project did not always keep agreements.

Project relations with the courts were more comfortable than with law enforcement. Contacts between the project and the courts became less procedural and more "open." Overall, city court personnel were supportive of the project. (J.P.'s were not favorably disposed.)

Tensions between community corrections and the other court service programs have been increasing. Community corrections personnel saw local government as less supportive and found it increasingly difficult to get information from the other programs, with contacts increasingly guarded. Contacts between the other programs and the rehabilitation facility tended to decrease, and normal procedural contacts became minimal.

At the end of 1976, the project's "honeymoon" with other criminal justice agencies was about over. Latent antagonisms between the project and law enforcement were surfacing, and state efforts to control the correctional facility tended to isolate the facility from the other Des Moines programs. This in turn reduced political support in local government. The courts alone remained a major ally of the replication project.

VIII. CLIENT IMPACT

Every community generates a client flow into criminal justice that generally differs from the client flow in other communities. These differences result from: 1) varying demographic characteristics; 2) different cultural factors; 3) different statutory provisions; and 4) different emphases in law enforcement. The client impact of a Des Moines replication project centers upon the types of clients coming into the criminal justice system. Table IX compares the profiles for the general CJS client population in Salt Lake County and for those recommended for OR and SR. Table X illustrates the relative percentages of charges in each crime category for each client group.

Relative to the general Salt Lake client flows, several factors distinguished those defendants recommended for ROR and SR. ROR and SR recommendations tended to favor young Caucasions. Clients who live alone were also over-represented, while American Indians and defendants living with parents were under-represented.

Compared to the Supervised Release recommendations, ROR recommendations (i.e., release without supervision) favored defendants living with a spouse and children, those from the upper occupational strata, those with stable residential patterns, those who appeared less likely to change jobs, those with higher incomes, those not likely to be unemployed, and those with higher educational achievements. Release on recognizance recommendations tended toward clients with favorable social and economic circumstances, when compared to the total client profile and when compared to SR recommendations.

Compared to ROR, SR was more typically recommends for those living alone, those from lower occupational strata, those with less stable residential

Table IX
Personal Profiles of Client Populations

Characteristics	All CJS Clients	Recommended For OR	Recommended For SR
AVE. AGE	31.3	27.6	28.5
SEX: Male	90.1%	86.3%	89.2%
RACE: Spanish AM.	5.3%	6.9%	4.8%
Black	6.9%	6.4%	7.3%
Anglo	76.1%	83.9%	82.4%
Am. Indian	11.7%	2.8%	5.5%
LIVING: Alone	7.1%	1,3.9%	22.6%
Spouse or CH.	36.9%	37.3%	19.2%
Parents	36.4%	23.9%	26.0%
Relatives	2.2%	4.6%	6.8%
Friends	18.1%	18.7%	24.0%
OCC: Professional	5.2%	6.1%	6.6%
Managerial	6.7%	9.7%	1.9%
Clerical	3.2%	6.1%	3.8%
Crafts	17.4%	21.2%	17.0%
	11,6%	12.1%	12.3%
Operatives	36.0%	21.8%	37.7%
Laborers	1.2%	.6%	.0%
Farmers	8.5%	13.3%	11.3%
Services	6.2%	6.1%	9.4%
Students	4.1%	2.4%	. 0%
Military Housewife	.9%	.6%	. 0%
AVE. MO. PRESENT RES.	45.2	54.9	34.1%
AVE. NO. MOVES 1 YR.	1.0	.8	1.2
AVE. NO. JOBS 1 YR.	2.4	2.1	3.4
AVE. INCOME 1 YR.	\$7497	\$7903	\$6952
AVE. MO. UNEMPLOYED	7.5	5.5	10.0
% NO STEADY EMP.	18.2%	10.0%	25.9%
AVE. EDUCATION	11.5	11.9	11.2

Table X
Offense Profiles of Client Populations

Percentages

Offense	Total	OR	SR
Rape	.2	0	0
Robbery	1.4	.4	2.6
Aggravated Assault	1.3	.4	4.7
Burglary	3.6	1.4	14.2
Grand Larceny	1.6	1.1	5.2
Auto Theft	1.1	1.4	3.4
Battery	1.6	2.8	2.1
Forgery	1.7	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	4.3
Fraud	.9	.4	2.2
Stolen Property	. 8	. 7	3.4
Vandalism	.6	1.4	2.2
Weapons	1.3	1.8	. 9
Prostitution	3.6	10.3	1.7
Sex Offenses	1.1	2.8	1.7
Narcotics	4.9	5.7	5.2
Gambling	.1	0	0
Offenses Against Fam	n: •2	0	.4
DWI	1.1	7.1	. 9
Liquor Violations	1.4	7.1	.9
Public Drunkenness	30.8	6.4	2.6
Disorderly Conduct	1.4	3.5	1.7
Vagrancy	.5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	.9
Other Not Traffic	4.2	7.4	7,,3

Table X (cont.)

Loitering	. 2	•4	0
Driving W. Sus. Lc.	3.7	6.0	5.6
Speeding	.5	.7	.4
Driving W/O Licenson	≥ 1.8	4.3	3.0
Reckless Driving	.1,	•4	.9
Kidnapping	.2	0	0
Cont. Deling. of M	inor .2	.4	.4
Parole Violation	1.1	0	1.7
Fugitive	•5	0	1.3
Petty Larceny	8.2	17.0	9.5
Failure to Appear	4.0	1.1	2.2
Resisting Arrest	1.2	2.5	1.7
Assault of Police (off2	0	. 9
Hitchhiking	.1	.4	.4
Tresspassing	1.1	1.4	2.2
Murder	.2	0	0
Manslaughter	.1	0	0
Driving W/O Plates,	Reg2	.4	0
Hit & Run	.1	.4	.9
Jaywalking	.1	0	.4
Perjury	.1	.7	.4
Arson	.1	0	0
Embezzlement	.1	0	0
Suspicion	.5	0	0
AWOL/Deserter	2.6		0
Hold by Judge	2.3	0	0

Table X (cont.)

Federal Intransit	.9	0	0
Contempt of Ct.	.1	0 .	0
Other Holdn	.9	0	0
Committed	.1	0	0

Note: Most traffic and Justice of the Peace cases were excluded from this analysis.

and employment characteristics, those who are poorer, and those who were less educated. Compared to total client profiles and the ROR recommendations, SR tended toward the socially and economically disadvantaged.

Over 60% of criminal justice clients in Salt Lake City are young adults (under 30), most are unmarried, and most have highly unstable residential and employment patterns. These young adults are most likely found at the lower levels of the occupational strata. Although most have some form of employment, their income is considerably lower than the city as a whole. These young adults are not well integrated into the social structure of Salt Lake County, and the SR program tended to impact heavily on this particular group.

Some additional comparisons highlight this point. Of those living in the community, less than 4 months, 40% were recommended for SR compared with only 16% of those living in Salt Lake more than one year. Of those unemployed, 34% were recommended for SR, compared with 27% of the intermittently employed and only 9% of the steadily employed. Of those with no income, 54% were referred to SR, compared with 28% of those citing other sources of income and 18% of those deriving income from their own employment.

Table X demonstrates the crime profile for defendants referred to ROR and SR pre-trial release in Salt Lake County, compared with the crime profiles for those referred to OR and SR.

Recommendations for OR release include disproportionately more charges for prostitution, driving while intoxicated, liquor law violations, disorderly conduct, driving without a license, and petty larceny. Burglary and public intoxication are noticeable under-represented.

(By policy, OR release is not immediately granted to public inebriates,

although the courts can allow such release at arraignment.) Recommendations for Sueprvised Release include disproportionately more charges for aggravated assault, burglary, grand larceny, auto theft, forgery, traffic in stolen property, and vandalism. Public drunkenness and prostitution are noticeably under-represented, and compared to ROR recommendations, recommendations for SR involve higher proportions of serious crime.

(30% of all SR referrals are charged with burglary, 18% with narcotics violations and 15% with auto theft).

A sizeable minority of all recommendations for OR release involve liquor offenses. Given the overcrowded jails, it would appear that OR release before arraignment could be profitably employed for certain inebriates.

Table XI summarizes the types of services delivered to SR defendants. Almost all (94%) received some services, and 75% received multiple services. (These services were primarily job training or placement and psychological counselling: 46% of the SR clients received employment counselling, 44% received vocational counselling, and 85% received some psychological counselling.) Psychological counselling and transportation services were provided directly by SR staff, while 30% of employment counselling and 95% of vocational counselling services were provided by other community agencies.

Most SR subjects do not become clients of the traditional service agencies in Salt Lake until they break the law. SR acts as a direct referral in these cases, identifying those needing services. Clients completing the program received an average of 26.6 hours of service, 17 of these hours being provided by staff personnel. Almost half of the clients completing the program (45%) secured new jobs. However, delivery

Table XI

Supervised Release: Total Services Delivered and Program Success*

Primary Arrest Allegation	Proportion of Clients
Robbery	3%
Burglary	30%
Auto Theft	15%
Forgery	8%
Stolen Property	5%
Sex Offense	2%
Narcotics	18%
Fraud	3%
Non-Felony	12%
Mon-relony	12/6
ACTIVITIES	
	9/ - C 011
Types of Activity	<pre>% of Clients Participating</pre>
and a second	00/
Social Athletic	0%
	0%
Musical	0%
Religious	1%
Political	0%
Professional	5%
Service	13%
Other	_ 5%
Number of Services Provided	Proportion of Clients
None	6%
One T	19%
Two	21%
Three	27%
Four +	27%
LYUK I	4110

Tables are based on 190 clients served.

Table XI (cont.)

SERVICES DELIVERED

Type % of Cla	Lents Served	Average Hours* of@Service a	% of Services From Outside Groups
Employment	46%	1.98	30%
Education	5%	.71	100%
Vocational	22%	2.41	95%
Transportantion	44%	1.19	4%
Lodging	13%	5.65	48%
Financial	7%	.01	92%
Family	3%	•	100%
Psychological	85%	1.64	9 %
Drug	12%	.91	100%
Alcohol	12%	.52	95%
Medical	4%	1.16	100%
Legal	45%	.06	100%
Religious	0%		***

NONE: Average hours of service was calculated on a bases of all defendants on supervised release, not on the bases of all defendants receiving a given type of service.

DURG AND ALCOHOL USE IN PROGRAM

Proportion of Clients

Illegal Use			7%
of Drugs			
Illegal Use			
of Alcohol			10%

NEW CRIMES ALLEGED WHILE A PROGRAM CLIENT

Proportion of Clients

None	83%
Robbery	3%
Burglery	4%
Auto Theft	2%
Fraud	1%
Minor Offenses	7%

of such services does not always prevent recidivism. 7% of the SR clients were found to have used drugs; 10% used alcohol excessively; and 9% were rearrested--Most for serious crimes. (Of 17 rearrested. 3 were charged with rape, 7 with burglary, 4 auto theft, and 1 fraud) Table XII summarizes these factors.

Defendants placed on Supervised Release in Salt Lake have the more serious criminal charges and tend to have serious social problems. Under these circumstances, the SR record may be considered as not too unfavorable. About 30% of all SR subjects failed to complete the program, with a third of these failures charged with new crimes and a quarter found to be using drugs or alcohol excessively.

Commitment to the residential facility and placement on intensive probation are court-ordered sentences. Like supervised release, both the residential facility and intensive probation seek to provide services for their clients. About half of those sentenced to the residential facility were convicted of serious crimes; a few were parole violators; and around 40% were convicted of lesser crimes (e.g. driving while intoxicated and shoplifting.)

Of those sentenced to the residential facility, over three quarters were unemployed. In addition, 78% were from the lowest occupational strata, although only 20% of the clients had families on public assistance. Most were young adult offenders, without families, with low educational achievement, a low or modest income, and few job skills.

Table XII summarizes these characteristics and indicates the major services provided to residential facility clients. Most (65%) received employment services, and another 19% received vocational

Table XIII

RESIDENTIAL FACILITY

Client Profile by Crime Charged

Type of Crime*	% of Clients
Serious Off.	40%
Non-Serious Off.	36%
Parole Viola.	8%
Unknown	16%

Personal Characteristics

Type of Characteristic	Proportion or mean
Age (average)	27 years
Race White	66%
Spanish American	19%
Black	10%
Male	91%

Activities while a Program Client

<u>Type</u>	Percent
Social	32%
Athletic	21%
Musical	0%
Religious	8%
Political	1%
Professional	12%
Self-Improve	48%
Service	3%
Other	4%

The terms "serious" and "non-serious" are used in a subjective sense to indicate relative severity. Serious offenses were murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, forgery, fraud stolen property, weapons, sex offenses, and narcotics. Non-serious offense included driving while intoxicated (20% of total clients) and shoplifting (7% of total clients).

Table XIII (cont.)

Services Delivered

<u>Type</u>	•	Percent Receiving	TödaliHödrss %	hoursimote Paid byid Courty Services: s
			<u> (average)</u>	Oct 1 Designation
Employment.		66%	6.40	21%
Education		?1%	4.50	53%
Vocational		1.9%	4.22	53%
Transportation		77%	1.28	2%
Financial		9%	.75	25%
Family		13%	1.01	20%
Psychological		42%	3. 95	60%
Drug		7%	2.23	50%
Alcohol		20%	3.71	47%
Medical		18%	.70	69%
Lega1		5%	.44	25%
Religious		4%		100%

Program Outcome - Employment

Status At	Status At		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Beg. of	Term. of		Own Employ.	
Program	Program		Reported As	Other Income a
	Unemployed*	Employed	Income Source	Source or None
Unemployed*	32	43	46	34**
Employed	0	18	18	0

Program Outcome - Occupational Level

Reported Occupational	Occupational	Occupational	Occupational
Level at Beg. of	Level Unchanged	Level D	Level Increased
Program	at Termination	at Termination	at Termination
None	9		8
Unskilled	21		9
Semi-Skilled	15	7	1
Skilled	11	6	
Sales Professional	3 1		

Includes: unemployed and unemployed part-time. (Numbers are total of clients.)

Twenty-Six reported no income source.

Table XIII (cont.)

Program Outcome -	Education				
Student Status At Time Of Entry	Student Status At Termination	Not a Student		Part Time	Full Time
Not a Student		76		7	. 6 - 1 - 1 - 1 ₁
Part-Time				1	5
Full-Time		3			
Program Outcome -	Public Assistance				
Status at Time Of Entry	Status at Time of Termination				
		No Publi Assistar		Self Only	Dependents
No Public Assis.	***	75		3	1
Self Only		6		1	
Dependents		7		1	4
Status at Time Of Entry	Status at Time of Termination	Known Use of YES	Illega Drugs NO		wn Excessive of Alcohol NO
Know Illegal Use of Drugs YES NO		4 4 76	/ ₄ 4 76		
Known Excessive Use of Alcohol YES NO				14 6	24 54
Alleged New Offen	se While a Program C	lient			
Type of Charge	<u>% of</u>	Clients			
None Burglary Larceny Narcotics Misdemeanors		77% 2% 1% 3% 17%			

training. Most of the clients were also provided transportation to work. Employment counselling and transportation was primarily provided by facility staff, while other services were provided on a referral basis by other agencies. In the latter area, 63% of the residents received special education services, 60% psychological counselling, and 47% alcohol counselling.

The rehabilitation facility appears to have had a significant impact on its clients. Of the study sample of 98 clients, 75 were unemployed when they entered the facility and 43 of these were employed when they left. All those employed when entering the program were employed when leaving. By termination, 5 part-time students were registered full time, and 13 other clients became students. At termination, only 10 subjects were on public assistance. However, there was no appreciable improvement in job skills. In fact, counselors reassessed job skills downward as they became more familiar with actual client capabilities.

Drug and alcohol violations on the part of residents were high. Some improvement in the use of alcohol was offset by a slight increase in the use of drugs. About 6% of the residents were charged with serious offenses while at the facility (2 with burglary, 1 with larceny, and 3 for narcotic violations). An additional 17% were charged with various misdemeanors. (Clients of the residential facility appear to have lower recidivism rates than those released from prison or jail. Considering only the more serious offenses, 14% of residential facility clients were accused of a new serious crime within a year from their referral, compared with 30% of jail or prison releases, and 21% of probationers over the same period of time.)

Unlike the residential facility, intensive probation never became an important sentencing alternative in Salt Lake County. Table XIII presents information on 25 clients sentenced to intensive probation.

As the intensive probation staff did not provide adequate information about their program, this study sample is small and interpretation must be limited.

Unlike the supervised release and residential programs, 70% of intensive probation clients were charged with less serious offenses. Probationers were slightly older than SR or rehabilitation facility subjects and also had a higher proportion of Caucasians. Many of the probationers were unemployed. Services delivered to intensive probationers were also noticeably less than those delivered to residents of the rehabilitation facility. Still, 44% received employment related services, 24% vocational counselling, 24% psychological counselling, and 32% alcohol counselling. Approximately 25% of the probationers received no services and 68% were provided with more than one service.

At least 16% of the probationers were rearrested while under supervision. This rate compares favorably with the residential subjects and those released from jail or prison. However, intensive probationers appear to be "safer risks" in that they were sentenced for relatively minor offenses.

IX. SYSTEM IMPACT

The Des Moines replication effort in Salt Lake seems to have altered client flows through the criminal justice system. Points of impact include dispositions before arraignment, after arraignment, after trial, and after sentencing. The Des Moines programs may also have affected

Table XIII

Intensive Probation - Client Profiles

Conviction Charge	% of Clients	<u>Characteristic</u>	% of Mean
Manslaughter	4%	Age (Years)	29
Burglary	16%	Race	
Larceny	8%	White	88%
Auto Theft	4%	Spanish American	4%
Other Less Serious	68%	Black	8%
		Male	72%

Activities

Within Program	% of Clients	Number of Service	es % of Clients
		Supplied	
Social	8%		
Athletic	0%	Zero	24%
Musical	0%	One	8%
Religious	12%	Two or More	68%
Political	0%		
Professional	12%		
Self Improvement	60%		
Service	4%		
Other	8%		

Services Delivered	% of Clients	% of Clients	
by Project	Receiving Servi	ceWhile Program	
		Participant	
Employment	44%		
Vocational	25%	None	84%
Transportation	12%	Burglary	4%
Lodging	8%	Assault	4%
Financial	8%	DIJI	4%
Family	4%	Shoplifting	4%
Psychological	24%		
Drugs'	4%		
Alcohol	32%		
Medical	4%		
Legal	4%		
Religious	4%		
Other	0%		

judicial decision-making at the points of arraignment, trial, and sentencing. In addition, the programs appear to have altered failure to appear rates and recidivism.


Figure I illustrates the case flow and jail status of defendants booked into the Salt Lake County Jail. (Defendants receiving a police citation are not held in custody until arraignment and therefore, are excluded here.) A bail commissioner (desk sergeant), using a "Uniform Bail Schedule," can set bail for misdemeanants. Such misdemeanants are then interviewed by ROR screeners, and a recommendation is made to the bail commissioner regarding ROR release. Misdemeanants may receive such ROR release, pay cash bond, seek bondsman assistance, or remain in jail. (Public inebriates and those arrested for non-judicial offenses are ineligible for ROR.)

Misdemeanants arrested within Salt Lake City appear for arraignment before one of two city courts, depending upon the alleged offense.

Those arrested in Salt Lake County (outside city limits) appear before one of twelve justices of the peace. If the misdemeanant faces a minor charge and does not request a trial, cases are quickly terminated at arraignment. Trial dates are set for those requesting trial.

At the arraignment, judges usually continue ROR, bail, or bond for non-custody defendants. For those held in jail, the judge may order recognizance release (as distinct from pre-trial services release), bail, jail, supervised release, or specialized custody to handle severe alcohol or drug problems. If the defendant is indigent or qualifies for legal defender's assistance, the judge may appoint counsel at arraignment, but such legal defense is not normally available for misdemeanants.






^aIt was impossible to determine jail status for 8% of the defendants.

b Defendants remaining in jail includes transfer cases.

^CThis is a low estimate of the percent remaining in jail for one day or more. A high estimate would be 70%.


Figure I-b
Processing^d



dApproximately 12% of all cases had no record of processing.

eonly defendant receiving sentences are included.

DATA COLLECTION FLOW WITH SAMPLE PERCENTAGES SALT LAKE COUNT



Following trial and conviction or a plea of guilty, the misdemeanant will likely receive one of the following sentences: jail term, assignment to the residential facility, intensive probation, regular probation, fine, or restitution. The sentence may also include special treatment conditions or a combination of sentencing options.

Booking procedures for alledged felons are similar to those for misdemeanants. However, felony bail is set by the prosecutor or judge on an arrest or bench warrant, or by the presiding judge at the time of arraignment. Felony bail is seldom set prior to arraignment.

Accused felons are scheduled for arraignment the morning after arrest, although delays of 2-3 days are common. The defendant faces two alternatives at the initial arraignment: a plea of not guilty or a dismissal of charges. Judges set bail for those pleading not guilty, set the preliminary hearing date, and may also consider reports submitted by the pre-trial service screeners. These reports facilitate bail reduction services where deemed appropriate, and they are based on the same forms used to determine ROR eligibility for misdemeanants.

The preliminary hearing determines whether the defendant will be bound over to a second arraignment in district court. If bound over, the defendant faces the following options: dismissal, plea of not guilty, guilty plea, or plea to a lesser charge. (If the lesser charge is a misdemeanor, the defendant enters the misdemeanant flow.)

Those pleading not guilty face trial. Following conviction the judge may order a 30, 60 or 90 day prison term to "evaluate" the offender before sentencing. Convicted felons face "indeterminate" sentences under Utah law, and sentences range in increments from 0-5 years,

5-10 years, etc., in the Utah State Prison. The Utah Board of Corrections determines the actual amount of time served within each category.

Other sentencing provisions include jail terms, assignment to the residential facility, probation, intensive probation, fines, restitution, or a combination of one or more of these options.

X. CASE FLOWS

Case flows and jail status for more serious offenders were analyzed for a forty week period between November 24, 1974 and September 15, 1975. Analyses are shown for the total case flow proportions over the 40 weeks, and for the individuals passing through the criminal justice system during this same period. (See technical appendix *** for a discussion of the methodology.) Only cases from city criminal courts are included in the analysis.

The first potential impact of the Des Moines programs concerns client disposition before arraignment. This impact is dependent upon the ROR program inasmuch as bail commissioners have authority to grant ROR release to all misdemeanants with the exception of public inebriates. Defendants released on their own recognizance are drawn from three groups: those remaining in jail until arraignment, those posting bail before arraignment, and those dismissed before arraignment.

Approximately 10% of all groups were released on their own recognizance. Most of these clients came from the bail release category, a few from those who might otherwise remain in jail, and almost none from among those dismissed before arraignment. Eventually about 15% of the groups were released on their own recognizance prior to arraignment. Of the additional 5% gained over 41 weeks, most came from the bail release category, but a significant minority came from

those otherwise remaining in jail. The 5% gain was inflated by the bondsmen strike. During the strike the ROR program was expanded, although later it was somewhat reduced.

The proportion of dismissals before arraignment increased from 11% to 18% during the time period monitored. Most of these dismissals involved first offense public inebriates. City judges informally agreed to release public inebriates after booking, providing the inebriate had not faced a similar charge within the past year. During the bondsmen strike, this proportion rose a couple percentage points, thus freeing more jail space for those not released on ROR. (The jail proportion jumped, then declined, during the strike. After the strike there was a further reduction in jail population for a few weeks while the bondsmen made up for lost time.)

Table XIV examines the pre-arraignment status of clients over a 41 week period. (Auto - correlations index the amount of change in jail, bail, and ROR proportions across the 41 weeks.) While the proportion of ROR releases increased over time, the proportion of clients remaining in jail and the proportion released on bail decreased. At pre-arraignment, ROR appears to impact more heavily on the bail release group than upon those in jail. This was partly an artifact of the bondsmen strike, during which time bail releases decreased, then after the strike increased and then decreased again.

TABLE XIV

Jail Status Over Time

	AVE.	1st 13 Weeks	2nd 14 Weeks	3rd 14 Neeks	Auto- Correlation
Pre-Arraignment Status, including Dismissals					
Jai1	60%	66%	58%	57%	44*
ROR	12%	10%	11%	15%	.43*
Bail Bail	13%	13%	<u> 15% </u>	11%	13
Pre-Arraignment Status, Excluding Dismissals					
Jail .	71%	75%	69%	68%	31**
ROR	14%	11%	13%	18%	.48*
Bail	15%	15%	18%	13%	07
Jail · 1 Day	42%	43%	40%	42%	02

^{*} Significant .01

Excluding dismissals before arraignment, Table XIV indicates that the total proportion of suspects kept in jail until arraignment never fell below two-thirds. There was also very little change in the proportion of clients remaining in jail for more than one day before arraignment. (A significant minority were public inebriates with prior arrests for intoxication.) However, there was a significant change in the average number of pre-arraignment jail days during the 41 week study period: .96 to .77 (significant .05). Some of this decline occurred following the bondsmen strike.

Before arraignment, the ROR program had a greater impact on bail release than it had on jail retention. Initially, the ROR subjects tended to be the better bail risks, but over time the program was cautiously extended to include higher risk cases, including those making

^{**} Significant < .05

bond through personal indebtedness and those considered bail risks.

Its impact on these groups, however, was relatively slight. Two factors that limited the impact of ROR on pre-arraignment jail proportions were: limited authority to release defendants before arraignment and the exclusion of public inebraites.

Comparisons of April 1974 data with those of April 1975 highlight the impact of the new ROR program. (OR at arraignment existed in Salt Lake before the Des Moines Replication.) In April 1974, 44% of court defendants were released on bail while 16% were freed on personal recognizance. In April 1975, after the pre-arraignment ROR program was introduced, 33% were released on bail and 29% on recognizance. The increase in ROR releases consisted of those released on bail (11%) and those who might otherwise have remained in jail (2%). In short, the ROR program impacted heavily on the traditional bail release group and only had slight impact on those ordinarily remaining in jail.

Analysis for the individual defendants provides a slightly more favorable assessment of the ROR impact before arraignment. During the 41 week monitoring period, ROR reduced the likelihood that a misdemeanant would remain in jail by 10%. The program also reduced the likelihood that a misdemeanant would remain in jail more than one day, but by only 3%. The average length of time a misdemeanant could expect to spend in jail was reduced by about one third of a day. Across the 41 weeks, misdemeanants were 14% more likely to gain ROR release, but the likelihood of bond release decreased by only 2%. Most of the remaining 12% resulted from a decreased likelihood of misdemeanants remaining in jail before arraignment.

The release rates are specific to the crime charged and the accused

offender's past record. For example, felons are virtually never released prior to arraignment. For prostitution/commercialized vice, 66% were released - two out of every three released were on personal recognizance (half of the remaining cases were never arraigned). The release rate was also high for narcotics violations (54%) but here almost three of every four releases were by bond. Considering suspects charged with public intoxication, almost half are dismissed prior to arraignment. Most of the remainder are detained in jail, although a minorily are released on bail. Finally, about one-third of shoplifters are released on recognizance; one-sixth are released bail. Overall, release rates are crime specific.

On the other hand, the ROR program did little to reduce the traditional biases of bail against the socially and economically disadvantaged. An unemployed misdemeanant was 17% more likely to remain in jail than a man with a \$5,000 yearly income, and 28% more likely than a man with a \$10,000 yearly income. (The overall likelihood of a misdemeanant remaining in jail is 64%; hence these figures are quite significant.)

Table XV summarizes some of the biases of the ROR program at pre-arraignment.

Table XV

ROR Program Client Characteristics

	EST. INCOME	LKLIHD UNEMP.	RECID.	% IN CATEGORY
Misdemeanants				
Jail	\$1943*	64%**	.31*	64%
ROR	\$3863**	30%*	.08*	17%
Bail	\$3211***	43%	.41*	19%
Petty Larceny				
Jail .	\$2036	62%***	.11	49%
ROR	\$2924	40%	.11	33%
Bail	\$3962	32%	.13	18%
Narcotics				
Jail	\$2444	53%	.09	52%
ROR	\$3638	33%	.14	12%
Bail	\$3109	40%	.10	36%

^{*} significant at .01

ROR clients were considerably more advantaged than those remaining in jail and were also usually more advantaged than those released on bail before arraignment. The bias appears to rest upon the Vera-Manhattan scale used to determine ROR eligibility and the current handling of public intoxication cases. This scale is not likely to reduce differential treatment before arraignment, given its emphasis on strong community ties.

The Des Moines project had greater and more favorable impact after arraignment. Judges may continue ROR, grant ROR, continue or grant bail, grant SR, or remand to jail at arraignment. Compared to the proportion of clients receiving ROR before arraignment, the proportion of defendants receiving ROR at arraignment was only slightly higher (11% to 12%), during the 41 week study period. This gap increased by about 5% (15% to 20% higher, on the average). Supervised Release accepted about 7% of all defendants at arraignment, taking most of its clients from those who

^{**} significant at .05

^{***} significant at .10

would otherwise remain in jail. In addition, over the 41 weeks monitored, the total proportion of subjects on SR increased from 5% to 9% Table XVI summarizes post-arraignment status.

Table XVI

	Ave. 41	1st 13	2nd 14	3rd 14	Autô- Correlation
	Weeks	Weeks	Weeks	Weeks	
Jail	43%	56%	31%	43%	32**
ROR	18%	12%	19%	22%	.42*
SR	7 %	5%	6%	9%	.24
Bail	33%	28%	44%	27%	08

* significant < .01

** significant < .05

Table XVI conceals two sets of changes that occurred over the 41 week period. First, judges made earnest attempts to reduce jail populations by shifting some of those who would have remained in jail into SR and onto bail. Some of those who would normally receive bail release were in turn granted ROR. Second, the bondsmen strike made judges less cautious about using the SR program, which expanded by about 50% during the strike. The expected increase (based on the cautious attitude of judges before the strike) was only 17% for the final 14 week study period.

Table XVII summarizes ROR recommendations and SR referrals made by jail interviewers. The table suggests that SR compensates for some of the biases found in the ROR program. Those ineligible for ROR before arraignment (and likely to have difficulty securing bail) do have an alternative to incarceration at arraignment. Hence the Supervised Pre-trial Release program does address the differential release status of Salt Lake City offenders. SR tends to serve recent arrivals to the community, those with prior adult convictions, the unemployed,

Table XVII

Recommend			

Recommended	Lives with wife and Children	Lives with Parents/ Relatives	Lives with Children	I.ives with Friends(s)/ Alone	
ROR	74%	71%	50%	66%	
SR	16%	20%	36%	25%	
NONE	10%	8%	15%	9%	
$\chi \stackrel{?}{6} = 67$	V = .16				

Recommendation by Criminal Record

	No Prior Convictions	No Conviction Last Year	Convictions Last Year		
ROR	79%	64%	48%		
SR	12%	25%	38%		
NONE	9%	11%	14%		
$\chi_4^2 = 104$	V = .21				

Recommendation by Employment Information

	One Year Steady Employment	Intermittant Employment	Unemployed		
ROR	83%	63%	53%		
SR	9%	27%	34%		
NONE	8%	10%	14%		
$\chi \frac{2}{4} = 96$	V = .19				

Table XVII (cont.)

Recommendation by Income Source

	Own Employment	Other	None
ROR	72%	60%	27%
SR	18%	28%	54%
NONE	10%	11%	19%
$\chi_{6}^{2} = 67$	v = .16		

Recommendation by Residential Characteristics

	Year or Longer	Six Months Or More	Four Months Or More	Less Than Four Months
ROR	77%	64%	44%	39%
SR	16%	26%	38%	43%
NONE	7%	10%	17%	18%
χ = 123	V = .22			

and those without a source of income.

In contrast, ROR recommendations concentrate among "safer risks." ROR seeks to release people who are not likely to commit a crime while awaiting trial, and people who are likely to appear for scheduled court dates. To effect this policy, ROR release recommendations are concentrated among the more stable residents who are employed and without prior convictions. (A man with one prior arrest is 9% more likely to remain in jail, and 7% less likely to receive ROR. These figures are relatively high, because the likelihood of receiving ROR in only 17% for all clients combined.)

The Des Moines project also reduced failure to appear rates in Salt Lake City. This appears to have been due, at least partly, to ROR interviewers supplying better defendant information to the judges and the SR staff closely monitoring the appearance of their SR subjects. Table XVIII summarizes the failure to appear rates for misdemeanants before arriagnment, after arraignment, and felons after arraignment. The proportion of defendants actually charged with failure to appear, or convicted of failure to appear, is considerably smaller than the failure to appear rates. Note that suspects released on bail are more likely to be charged with FTA, an indication of a higher rate of willful failures to appear among defendants released on bail.

Table XVIII

	TOTO A	sr	na TT	AVE.	INC.	AVE.	UNEMP.
Misdemeanants	FTA	5 IL	BAIL	FTA	NO FTA	FTA	NO FTA
			*				
Pre-Arr.	£ 01	/ ·	4 60	40000	+0.00	140	5 451
FTA	6%	N/A	15%	\$2993	\$3589	41%	36%
Companion Ch.	1%	N/A	6%				
Conv.Comp.Ch.	1%	N/A	4%				
Misdemeanants							
Post-Arr.							
FTA	15%	18%	18%	\$2691	\$3235	43%	40%
Companion Ch.	1%	0%	1%		• 11		
Conv. Comp. Ch.	1%	0%	1%				
Felony -							
Post-Arr.							
FTA	15%	10%	16%	\$3420	\$3220	41%	44%
Companion Ch.	1%	2%	1%		•		
Conv. Comp. Ch.	1%	2%	1%				
international design and the second							

The data on unemployment and income provided in Table XIX indicate that neither variable had a strong impact on failure to appear. In fact, the slight tendency among poorer and unemployed misdemeanants to fail to appear was reversed among those charged with felonies.

Program reports from Salt Lake City indicate that 2% of the ROR subjects and 16% of the subjects SR were re-arrested during the pretrial period. Our data support these figures and indicate that the re-arrest rates tended to rise for both ROR and SR subjects over the course of the 41 week follow-up period. Part of this slight increase was due to the expanded use of the programs, and part was due to program changes resulting from the bondsmen strike.

The SR program, and to a lesser extent the ROR program, reduced the probability that a defendant would remain in jail after arraignment. However, the programs were not entirely successful in erasing the differential impact on offenders. Among misdemeanants, for example, SR received a poorer clientele than those remaining in jail. (ROR

received more economically advantaged clientele, followed by bail.)

Unemployed misdemeanants are more likely to remain in jail and are

less apt to receive ROR. Recidivists facing misdemeanant charges are

also more likely to remain in jail and are less likely to receive SR.

In the case of felony charges, the economically advantaged are more

likely to be released on bail, and the economically disadvantaged are

more likely to be placed on Supervised Release. Felons placed on SR

tend to be unemployed, while those receiving bail tend not to be

unemployed. Again, recidivists are more likely to remain in jail.

Table XIX summarizes these findings.

Table XIX

	EST, Inc.	Liklind Unemp.	Recid.	%In Category
Misd. (N=739)				
Jail	\$2484	57%***	.22	46%
ROR	\$3398	37%	·12***	20%
SR	\$2319*	37%*	.02**	3%
Bail	\$2980	45%	.18	30%
Felon (N=381)				
Jail	\$2345	57%	•15*	44%
ROR	\$2798***	55%**	.09	8%
SR	\$1579	66%	.04*	13%
Bail	\$3808	38%	.03	35%
* Significant	•01			
** Significant	. 05	*** Signi	gicant at .1	.0

Note: Recidivism is a proxy variable discussed in chapter four. It should not be interpreted as a proportion.

We found no evidence in Salt Lake that the Des Moines programs affected the client's likelihood of pleading guilty or demanding trial. Economic factors also appear to be unrelated to this decision.

The Des Moines programs (as well as certain social and economic

factors) also appears to have had some effect on sentencing decisions. The most important determinants of sentence are charge and prior criminal history. For example, incarceration following conviction varies widely [burglary (25%), narcotics (12%), public intoxication (80%), shoplifting (22%), and prostitution/commercialized vice (8%)! as does a sentence for probation. Across all crime categories examined, recidivists are more likely to receive a jail term (for narcotics, the likelihood of going to jail is increased by 12%, for larceny 28%, and for drunkenness 11%).

Our evidence indicates that those who remain in jail are more likely to receive jail sentences, independent of charge or criminal history, since those remaining in jail tend to be more disadvantaged than those released on bail or ROR (and in some instances, SR), the social and economic release bias carries into the sentencing decision. There are at least three possible explanations for the program impact at sentencing. First, the ROR interviewers provide judges information that allows some "filtering" of clients at arraignment. Hence the release status at arraignment may be an indicator of things to come. Second, the SR referrals are sometimes credited for performance in service programs while awaiting adjudication. And, third, some judges may use release status as an indicator of a defendant's general overall status, i.e. compared to other defendants facing the same charge who are released before adjudication.

Table XX summarizes the impact of release status and economic status at sentencing. Patterns reported here tend to persist when charge is held constant.

- 38 -

Table XX

	EST.	LIKLIHD		LIKLIHD	% IN
Sentence	Income	Unemp.	Recid.	In Jail	Category
Felonies:					
Confined	\$2454***	57%	.19**	66%*	21%
Probation	\$3819	46%	.08	30%*	44%
Fine	\$3993	32%	.04	32%***	13%
Misdemeanors:					
Confined	\$1345*	73%	.51*	92%*	42%
Probation	\$3298***	42%	.10*	37%*	20%
Fine	\$3477***	38%	.07*	43%*	32%

^{*} significant at .01

Finally, we examined the possible impact of the Des Moines programs on recidivism. Our sample for recidivism contained 261 cases. Table XXI summarizes the relations between original crime, subsequent crime, and the sentence received for the original crime.

Recidivist rates were generally high for all sentencing categories, except intensive probation (37%) and fines (43%). Of the three forms of incarceration, those sentenced to jail had the highest recidivist rate (77%). The residential facility followed with 65%, and the prison releases had a rate of 58%. The recidivism for the residential facility was quite high, given that the community corrections staff were sometimes quite selective in their recommendations.

However, if only subsequent serious crimes (felonies) are examined, the recidivism picture changes. Here the residential facility fares better than prison or jail. Intensive probation falls between those incarcerated and those receiving regular probation or a fine. The intensive probation subjects tend to be the more serious offenders, including those released from the rehabilitation facility and those who

^{**} significant at .05

^{***} significant at .10

received SR before adjudication. Hence this figure (16%) is also promising.

XI. COSTS AND BENEFITS

When the Des Moines replication was proposed in Salt Lake County, its proponents argued that it would be cost effective. By releasing clients from jail, cost savings were expected to accrue both to the county government as well as to defendants whose alternative was incarceration. The former was expected to benefit as there would be less need to use the jail for pre and post trial confinement. The latter would benefit by not being required to post bail and not suffering the opportunity costs associated with jail. In addition to these short run savings, it was argued that the replication project would reduce recidivism, and thereby decrease the necessity of jail and the criminal process in the long run.

Thus, the replication project was expected to be cost effective. An evaluation of the replication must attempt to assess whether this intention was actually realized. This estimation is especially crucial, since limited public resources may dictate that continuation of the Court Services Project may hinge on the demonstration of cost savings, or at the least, a suitable return to the county's investment.

An estimation of cost effectiveness is necessary to the evaluation. Unfortunately, given the present state of the arts, precise cost estimates are impossible. It is necessary to settle for "ball park" estimates, and though these estimates are not always as satisfactory as precise dollar figures, they are dictated by several considerations. First, cost analysis depends crucially on an accurate assessment of program impact, e.g., the number of jail days saved, the number of criminals rehabilitated, etc.

However, the estimates of program impact that have been presented here are subject to errors, especially when the estimates are extended beyond criminal misdemeanants and felons to justice of the peace and traffic cases.* Additionally, many costs are subjectively measured. The cost to a defendant of remaining in jail is one example. The best that the evaluation team can do with such estimates is to indicate how they were calculated and allow the reader to make adjustments as he sees fit.

With these two caveats in mind, this chapter now turns to cost estimation. There are several savings that can be attributed to the Des Moines replication:

- 1. savings in the reduction of pre-arraignment jail usage
- 2. savings in the reduction of post-arraignment jail usage
- 3. savings to the defendant in the following:
 - a. reduced requirement to post bail
 - b. fewer days spent in jail pending trial and the associated lost income.
- 4. savings in the reduced use of the jail for a correctional alternative

This information can be used to calculate cost savings. These calculations have been done for criminal misdemeanor and felony cases. Exclusion of justice of the peace and traffic cases appears appropriate since the data show no change in handling these cases.

^{*} The sample from justice of the peace and traffic courts indicated a much weaker trend than did the evidence from city and county courts. In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that the replication had very little additional impact on these cases. More importantly, use of the jail is subject to vagaries that cannot be identified, let alone controlled. It is just a presumption that observed changes can be attributed to the Des Moines Project.

I Di and Si correspond, respectively, to days and savings]

 $S_4 = [50 \text{ beds } \times 365 \text{ days } \times 6.66] = 121,545^{+}$

+ Assumes full occupancy.

These calculations are subject to two assumptions. First, the numbers used compare release rates at the beginning of the evaluation period with that at the end. The cost savings assume no effective transitional period, thereby over emphasizing the actual savings. Second, the calculations ignore the fact that the project was in operation prior to the evaluation (the ROR component). Thus, the incremental savings may not reflect the

=67800

^{*} Estimates by County Auditor. Other estimates are taken from the data base.

dollar savings from starting the program from "scratch." According to the County Auditor, the rate of release increased even prior to the project. BAIL ROR/SR RELEASES JAN/FEB 1974 $-\Delta\,325 \qquad +\Delta\,454 \qquad +\Delta\,129$ JAN/FEB 1975

If this increase in releases is indicative of decreased jail use prior to the project, the reduction in jail use is 774 suspects beyond that estimated above. The County Auditor did not give any information about how this total should be allocated between pre-arraignment and post-arraignment incarceration. But if we assume 10 days per defendant, then this would generate an additional \$50,000 in savings ($S_1 + S_2$).

As crude as these estimates are, they indicate that the replication project was not cost effective if we calculate cost savings as the sum of S_1 , S_2 and S_4 . However, it is evident that the savings covered a significant proportion of the cost of the grant, and perhaps reduced the necessity of constructing a new jail. In addition, there is evidence that the quality of justice was improved, that the delivery of services was enhanced, that recidivism may have been reduced, and that real costs and opportunity costs were reduced for defendants. These savings were significant and cannot be ignored by cost analysis.

In addition, evaluating the cost of a jail day at \$6.66 appears low. Evaluating jail days at closer to \$8.00 per day would yield cost savings approximately equal to incremental program costs. Finally, whether these results were "worth" the expense cannot be determined objectively.

SUMMARY

Salt Lake City has both a crime problem and an overcrowded jail. However, the political climate of Salt Lake does not favor experimental programs such as the Des Moines Project. The program was successfully introduced, but primarily due to the federal monetary incentive. During its first year of operation, the project gained some support among the disadvantaged neighborhoods of Salt Lake and the project did introduce both formal and informal changes to the criminal justice system. The impact of Supervised Release was particularly impressive, and the delivery of services after adjudication was noteworthy. The project also helped to introduce a number of changes in pre-trial release procedures with ROR impacting heavily on bail release and SR impacting on many who might otherwise have remained in jail. In addition, the project's impact on both failure to appear rates and recidivism shows some promise. Finally, the programs have returned some benefits to the county in terms of jail day monetary costs.

Table XXI

Crime for which the defendants are arrested initially	Crime for which the defendants were rearrested	Correctional Program in which the defendant was Sentenced						
		Prison	Jail	Comm.	Probation	Inten. Prob.	Fine	
All Crimes	All Crimes	58% 12	77% 13	65% 71	55% 97	37% 19	43% 49	
All Crimes	Serious Crimes	33% 12	23% 13	18% 71	11% 97	16% 19	6% 49	
Serious Crimes	All Crimes	55% 11	67% 3	46% 22	55% 33		0% 4	
Serious Crimes	Sérious Crimes	36% 11	33% 3	14% 22	21% 33		0% 4	
Lesser Crimes	All Crimes		80% 10	79% 14	55% 64		47% 45	
Lesser Crimes	Serious Crimes		20% 10	36% 14	6% 64		7% 45	

	Misdemeanors			Public In	Public Intoxication			Petty Larceny		
	Jail	ROR	Bail	Jail	ROR	Bail	Jail	ROP.	Bail	
Constant	62 (1.69)	-1.61 (3.61)	.20 (.50)	.13	-4.31 (2.38)	.52 (.43)	-1.15 (1.32)	12 (.13)	75 (.77)	
Income	89×10^{-4} (3.10)	(2.15)	.56x10 ⁻⁴ (1.76)	(.11) .12x10 ⁻⁴ (.14)	1.56x10 ⁻⁴ (1.40)	-1.06×10^{-4} (1.11)	(1.32) 73×10^{-4} (1.07)	.15x10 ⁻⁴ (.21)	.71 (.97)	
Employ	.21 (2.21)	61 (2.76)	077 (.37)	.62 (1.09)	.48 (.62)	-1.02 (1.64)	.75 (1.65)	52 (1.08)	55 (1.01)	
Student	67 (3.22)	.60 (2.49)	.34 (1.47)	.20 (1.32)	1.47 (1.96)	-1.10 (1.60)	67 (1.34)	.71 (1.39)	19 (.32)	
Age	.038 (7.59)	030 (4.81)	030 (5.45)	.0027 (.11)	018 (.42)	.34 (.13)	.031 (2.45)	032 (2.16)	0051 (.34)	
Sex	.76 (5.40)	55 (3.40)	46 (3.10)	18 (.43)	.18	.15 (.33)	1.17 (3.50)	86 (2.76)	42 (1.18)	
Race	.59 (4.89)	(3.90)	28 (2.04)	.44 (1.10)	-1.73 (1.64)	.013	.52 (.15)	104 (.28)	.071	
Time	012 (2.95)	.023 (4.81)	C051 (1.14)	73 (.62)	.030 (1.73)	0062 (.50)	012 (1.19)	.016 (1.48)	0043 (.37)	
Recid	.75 (5.36)	-1.00 (4.48)	41 (2.69) 2070	33 (.64)	.36 (.58) 129	.11 (.20) 237	44 (1.21) 441	.17 (.45) 418	.34 (.93) 323	
-2 log likelihood N of Cases	2511 2221	1764 2221	2221	247 183	183	183	352	352	352	

Notes

Specification of the regression equations are discussed in chapter 4. Generally, the method of maximum likelihood was used to estimate the parameters. The logistic CDF was used:

P (Y) = 1 / 1 + $e^{-\dot{\alpha} - \Sigma \beta_2^2 X_2^2}$ where Y is the dependent and X the independent variable

Asymptotic t ratios are reported in parenthesis.

Table A-II Regression Results on Post Arraignment Jail Status

	Misdemeanors	3			Felonies			
	Jail	Bail	ROR	SR	Jail i	Bail	. ROR	SR
Constant	26	21	.2.10	-3.72	.88	-1.60	5.21	.42
	(.45)	(.35)	(3.31)	(4.23)	(.93)	(1.67)	(3.84)	(.34)
Income	.081x10 ⁻⁴	.21	∜ 31	-2.97	.94	.64	1.58	.86
	(.18)	(.45)	(.65)	(3.76)	(1.41)	(.99)	(1.95)	(1.00)
Unemployment	•70	20	.36	.1.66	080	52	1.08	.26
	(2.34)	(.64)	(1.15)	(3.74)	(.16)	(1.17)	(1.96)	(.48)
Student	58	.0032	.62	23	33	.60	1,19	.58
	(1.79)	(.009)	(1.86)	(.54)	(.62)	(1.07)	(1.71)	(1.01)
Age	.026	0081	.015	.051	- 044	.0058	019	.13
	(3.51)	(2.04)	(1.75)	(3.58)	(3,03)	(.42)	(1.19)	(3.64)
Sex	.41	38	.31	1.49	.41	. 69	.45	.43
	(1.91)	(1.71)	(1.30)	(3.67)	(.85)	(1.28)	(.85)	(.83)
Race	24	46	.53	2.63	049	.73	.50	2.97
	(.39)	(.66)	(1.58)	3.43	(.04)	(.55)	(.31)	(1.14)
Time	021	.0030	.022	.028	024	.0090	.024	.018
	(3.17)	(.44)	(2.97)	(3.06)	(2.59)	(.99)	(1.90)	(1.60)
Recid	• 32	.020	44	-1.76	.99	41	38	-1.73
	(1.51)	(.20)	(1.62)	(3.25)	(2.60)	(1.07)	(.97)	(2.81)
-2 log likelihood	962	900	711	177	494	469	198	263
N of Cases	739	739	739	73 9	381	381	381	381

Notes

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Specification of the regression equations are discussed in chapter 4. Generally, the method of maximum likelihood was used to estimate the parameters. The logistic CDF was used:

P (Y) = 1 / 1 + $e^{-\alpha}$ \mathfrak{B}^{X} ; where Y is the dependent and X; the independent variable Asymptotic t ratios are reported in parenthesis.

Table A-III Regression Results on Sentencing

	Misdemeanors			<u>Felonies</u>			
	Incar	Probat.	Fine	Incar	Probat.	Fine	
Constant	-2.80	1.12	-1.56	-1.12	2.65	-3.45	
	(4.99)4	$(4.10)_{-2}$	(3.17)_4	(.86) _4	(2.04)	(1.97)	
Income	-1.28x10 4	.78x10 ⁻²	.66x10 ⁻⁴	-1.53x10	.17x10 ⁻⁴	1.74	
	(2.67)	(1.38)	(1.81)	(1,69)	(.21)	(1.50)	
Unemployment	-1.65	.31	13	80	.15	.25	
	(.58)	(1.15)	(.56)	(1.27)	(.27)	(.32)	
Student	-1.06		.31	-1.66	.54	.91	
	(3.00)	(1.82)	(1.17)	(1.66)	(.70)	(.95)	
Age	.049	36	037	.050	036	028	
		(4.73)	(6.30)	(2.82)	(1.96)	(1.01)	
Sex	.42	56	.37	025	.014	013	
DCA			(1.88)		(.022)	(.17)	
Race	.58	47	54	0057	38	.20	
No.	(3.94)		(3.40)	(.014)	(.94)	(.38)	
Time	025	026	.037	0080		.036	
Line		(4.34)		(.63)	(2.86)	(2.18)	
Recid	1.47	58	-1.67	.91	39	88	
Recid	(8.97)	(2.72)	(7.27)	(2.01)	(.82)	(.92)	
Plea At Arr.	1.13	68	014	41	-1.65	1.67	
fied At All.	(5.00)	(3.33)	(.08)	(.71)		(2.49)	
Plea After Arr.	.55	.89	-1.60	19		-1.23	
Ilea Alter Mize	(2.08)	(4.14)	(6.59)	(.52)	(3.31)	(2.72)	
	1.67	77	88	1.14	-1.09	82	
Jail	(9.98)	(5.03)		(3.74)	(3.59)	(1.72)	
-2 log likelihood	1405	1267	1548	275	287	158	
-2 10g likerinood	1624	1624	1624	252	252	252	

Notes: See notes previous table

END