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### ACQUISITIONS

Final Report on an Evaluation of the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program of the Quincy Police Department

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APPENDICES

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

In September 1977 the Quincy Police Department received an eighteenmonth, \$154,321 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to establish an Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). In its grant application, the department stated the following as its objective for the grant:

• • • to increase the effectiveness of the Patrol Division of Quincy Police Department in identification, apprehension, and prosecution of career criminals and repeat offenders in selected crime categories. • • •

To accomplish this objective, the department identified the following as the nine major tasks to which the resources of the grant would be devoted:

- Provide improvements in information and analysis provided to Patrol and other offices; (and) improve the Crime Analysis capability through computerization;
- 2. Institute a method of making allocational decisions based on several factors, including workload, area crime rates, and time necessary to perform directed patrol;
- 3. Make daily and periodic determinations for deployment of tactical and other units to impact crime;
- 4. Increase the use of Directed Patrol being performed by regular beat officers;
- 5. Continue the present crime prevention and community relations programs:
- 6. Revise preliminary investigatory procedures and provide training for patrol officers who perform this function;
- 7. Establish a system for case management with the Bureau of Criminal Investigation based on solvability factors and case assignment;
- 8. Analyze and monitor the court cases generated by this project to determine the effectiveness of preparation of cases, and its relationship to case disposition; and . . . with the cooperation of the Office of the District Attorney, (establish systems for) expediting and processing the cases generated by this project; and,
- 9. Develop a program for investigation of fencing activities. . . . According to departmental records, there were delays in hiring project staff, and a "lack of preplanning and cooperation within the department."\* As a result, during the period covered by the original grant, known as Phase I of the department's program, little was accomplished on some of these tasks.

<sup>\*</sup>Quincy ICAP Grant application, Phase II, pp. 1-2.

Phase I was completed in February 1979. As the Phase I activities were ending, the department made arrangements for an independent evaluation of its efforts, defining the scope of the evaluation as follows:

It is not possible to perform an evaluation on all of the nine (9) components of the ICAP in Quincy. During Phase I...several of the original implementation objectives were clearly unobtainable. In other cases due to budgetary considerations, it will not be possible to completely evaluate each component.\*

For these reasons the Department decided to have the evaluation concentrate on the following four areas:\*

- 1. Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) capability (Component 1)
- 2. The extent to which the CAU information is being integrated into the department's decisionmaking process, and is being used by command and line personnel to perform operations analysis and develop crime specific patrol tactics (Components 3 & 4)
- 3. The extent to which the new case report has been accepted and used as a tool in conducting preliminary investigations (Component 6)
- 4. The ICAP process, since review of the ICAP program nationally reveals that the process and development of the crime analysis capability needed to restructure decisionmaking and affect operations consumes much of Phase I grant activity\*

In January 1979, Abt Associates was awarded a \$15,000 contract to conduct the evaluation. During the past six months, Abt Associates' evaluation team has worked with ICAP and other personnel of the department, addressing various areas of concern to ICAP staff. While concentrating on the four areas specified above, we also considered other ICAP components (or "major tasks," as they were defined in the original grant application), and provided both evaluative and technical assistance services as requested by the department's ICAP manager.

The results of our evaluation activities are summarized in the following sections of this report. The evaluation's methodology is reviewed in Section 2. Findings and conclusions are presented in Section 3 and associated recommendations are provided in Section 4. Various supporting exhibits are provided in the appendices.

<sup>\*</sup>Request for Proposal: Evaluation of the Quincy ICAP.

### 2.0 METHODOLOGY

(30)

The introduction of major innovations in long-established organizations is a challenging undertaking even in the best of circumstances. Changes are usually required in the orientation and attitudes of personnel, in the systems and procedures that govern routine operations, in the data systems that provide the information needed to modify these operations, and in the organization and staffing needed to direct them. The ability of an organization to accept, assimilate, and adapt to these changes is critical. Early in 1978 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration discussed the effects of these factors on the implementation of ICAP in many locations:

"It has become increasingly clear that the future of the national ICAP program will be determined by the skill and wisdom of the individual project directors in managing the change process... Generally, each of the projects is experiencing the same basic problems:

- Frequent shifts of key personnel, as well as organizational changes initiated outside the project
- Resistance to change, generally manifested in the middle ranks and particularly among those who have been around long enough to have adjusted to the old system and have been promoted under that system
- Organizational development problems generally associated with the middle rank levels...\*

With all of this in mind, Abt's evaluation methodology cencentrated on the four areas of interest outlined in Section 1 from a process orientation.

Interviews with department personnel and reviews of project records provided data on the historical development and evolution of the program. These sources were supplemented with on-site observations to obtain a more detailed and complete picture of how the program currently operates, and how it relates to the rest of the department.

Lengthy interviews were conducted with ICAP staff and a cross-section of other personnel representing the major functional areas of patrol, investigation, and administration. In terms of their official positions, the interviewees fell into the following major categories:

<sup>\*</sup>LEAA's ICAP Status Report on Program Implementation and Development, Executive Summary, January 31, 1978.

			Number of Interviews
Chief			1
Captain			4
Lieutenant			4
ICAP Direct	or		2
CAU Analyst			9
Other Perso	nnel		_5
		TOTAL	25

The ideas and perceptions of these personnel, with regard to project goals and their formulation, how and why certain ideas succeeded, and the relevance and importance of the various ICAP functions within the department, provided a valuable insight and perspective.

Documentation on program activities corroborated many of the key points that emerged from the interviews. To the extent available, memos and attendance records related to planning and training sessions were reviewed in detail. Copies of reports prepared by the CAU were collected and reviewed for timeliness, consistency, and adequacy of data. Samples of department forms were examined as part of an overview of the departmental records systems and information flows. Activity logs and journals were reviewed and a sample of burglary incidents was analyzed to determine the relevance of solvability factors in the assignment of investigation cases, and to determine how accurately the new case report was being completed. The organization charts of the department were reviewed to identify changes in them that may have influenced the program.

Throughout the evaluation a substantial amount of time was spent observing discussions and communications of CAU staff with patrol units and the Bureau of Criminal Investigations (BCI). During these observations special attention was paid to the flow of information between the project manager and ranking officers, and to how the systems developed under ICAP complemented or conflicted with previously existing systems.

Since the evaluation was intended to be primarily a management tool, department officials and the evaluation staff agreed that feedback would be provided on a timely basis. Much of this feedback occurred through informal discussions with department personnel. However, formal memoranda were prepared on/three critical areas: organizational considerations relative to

ICAP and its position in the Department; detailed recommendations for improving the department's records and information systems; and revision of procedures for directed patrol.

With this background, it is now appropriate to consider the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, and the recommendations that flow from them.

### 3.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings and conclusions of the evaluation are presented and discussed below, grouped into the four major categories addressed by the evaluation. It should be noted, however, that although some findings and recommendations extend beyond a single category, they appear under what we considered to be their primary area.

### 3.1 Overall ICAP Planning and Implementation Process

### 3.1.1 The Organizational Integration of the ICAP within the Department was an Obstacle to Acceptance of the Program.

Five major factors have limited the organizational integration of ICAP in the department and, as a result, have hindered acceptance of the program. They are:

- 1. lack of formal recognition of ICAP as an organizational entity
- 2. treatment of ICAP as an administrative activity
- involvement of ICAP as an issue in recent union negotiations
- 4. uneven distribution of management responsibilities among the Department's command staff
- 5. failure to demonstrate the department's long-term commitment to ICAP

Each of these is discussed below.

First, although the ICAP manager has actively participated in department-wide staff meetings, including some restricted to senior personnel, the fact remains that at no time during the eighteen months of Phase I, or since then, has the Quincy Police Department's organization chart made any mention of ICAP or its staff.\* Despite recent discussions on this matter, it is still not clear that this organizational anonimity will be eliminated, and if so, when and how. As a result, it is our opinion that the program's organizational stature and status is, at best, hard to discern and, at worst, perceived to be short-term and unimportant.

<sup>\*</sup>The Department's current organization chart is presented in Appendix A.

Second, setting aside the question of formal organizational recognition, it is a fact that the ICAP manager and department management have considered the program to be a planning and research activity within the Development Services area, responsible to the captain in charge of administrative services. Based on our interviews and observations, treating ICAP as an administrative function has encouraged Patrol and BCI to view the program as a paper-pushing, data-churning effort, only indirectly related to the primary responsibilities of these units. No doubt LEAA had this problem in mind when, in a general discussion on ICAP organizational issues, it wrote the following regarding organizational placement of ICAP Crime Analysis Units:

Placement of the crime analysis unit within the organizational structure will be one of the more difficult issues faced by the executive in the implementation process. Placement of the unit should be dictated by the degree of access required between the analysis unit and user groups . . . it may well be desirable to place the unit under the direct operational control of the field operations commander . . . it can be generally stated <a href="mailto:crime analysis is more effectively located in an operational rather than administrative component.\*">crime analysis is more effectively located in an operational rather than administrative component.\*</a>

Despite the program's organizational placement problems, it is encouraging to note that a recent shift in the CAU's physical location has greatly increased its visibility to, and facilitated its communications with, sworn personnel. The fact that CAU data and files have been helpful to both Patrol and BCI activities has also done much to increase its credibility and acceptance among the department's sworn personnel. These matters are discussed in subsequent sections.

Third, the department has yet to conclude its negotiations with the two unions that represent all its sworn officers, except the chief. These negotiations have been long and hard, and appear to have created some animosity toward the ICAP. Specifically, resentment toward the Program was generated because the department argued that relief from the existing "past practices clause"\*\* was necessary in order to implement ICAP's resource allocation concepts. When negotiations reached an impasse on the past practices issue,

<sup>\*</sup>Ibid.

<sup>\*\*</sup>The clause states that changes in past practices are not a management perogative, but rather must be subject to negotiation.

union leaders blamed ICAP. For this reason, and possibly others, several sworn personnel acknowledged that acceptance of ICAP principles would be easier "if only the term ICAP could be eliminated."

The fourth factor influencing the integration of ICAP in the department is the distribution of management responsibilities among the department's command staff.\* In recent months a major reorganization of the department has limited the time that the captain responsible for Administrative Services has available for any administrative activities. Specifically, he is now responsible for both first half (4:00 P.M.-midnight) and second half (midnight-8:00 A.M.) shifts in addition to his administrative duties. In our opinion, it is difficult to justify such an organizational structure. Physically, it is unrealistic to expect one person to work effectively for the number of hours per day that should be devoted to these jobs; organizationally, it is difficult to justify assigning one person such a broad span of control; and interpersonally, it appears to be contributing to a deterioration of this captain's relationships with personnel throughout the department.

Because of these organizational problems, the ICAP manager has had to rely for support on the chief of the department. Although the chief has been a firm supporter of ICAP concepts, he has not had the time to "sell" the program to his senior officers. As part of the recent reorganization, a captain has been assigned full-time to ICAP, and it is hoped that he will be able to perform this function. Overall, however, it is our opinion that ICAP has had to fend for itself in an atmosphere of "benign neglect" on the part of the department's two most senior personnel.

Fifth, the program has suffered from the department's failure to demonstrate a long-term commitment to it. Initially, the program was staffed entirely by civilian personnel whose professional qualifications to recommend changes in patrol and investigative operations were openly questioned. However, with the assignment of sworn personnel to ICAP, and demonstrations that the program's concepts can improve departmental operations, such questions have become more muted and less frequent. Two sworn personnel have worked full-time on ICAP since mid-1978. Initially, a lieutenant and

<sup>\*</sup>For the ICAP Manager's position on this matter and our response see Appendix G.

sergeant were assigned, but as part of the previously mentioned departmentwide reorganization, the lieutenant has recently been transferred to BCI and
replaced with a captain. This transfer appears to have facilitated the
acceptance of case management principles among the detectives. However, it
has also tended to reinforce the impression, held by many sworn personnel,
that the program and its concepts are not here to stay—that they will
disappear as soon as the federal funds have been spent. As a result, many
officers have a "let's wait and see" attitude about the program. The department's past experience with another government-funded program tends to
reinforce this attitude. After receiving three years of funding in the early
1970s for a regional computer system serving the police departments of
Quincy and several surrounding towns, the system went out of existence when
its federal funds were exhausted.

In summary, the integration and acceptance of ICAP in Quincy has encountered several serious obstacles that continue to impede its successful operation.

## 3.1.2 Communications Links Between the CAU and Patrol Must Continue to be Expanded and Improved in Order to Insure a Broader-based Implementation of Crime Specific Patrol Tactics.

During Phase I the ICAP staff focused on establishing a close working relationship between the CAU and patrol operations. The CAU began by collecting historical data on the incidence of target crimes using reporting formats designed with the help of an outside consultant. This data was presented to patrolmen and supervisors biweekly with special reports as needed. Later on the CAU decided to update its analyses on a daily basis; and, to provide its output in the form of a notebook for each patrol area. These Car Area Books became the formal communication link between the CAU and patrol operations.

After a short while, the CAU recognized that the information in the "car books" was not being used to any great extent by the patrolmen. The CAU requested feedback from patrolmen about the utility of the information provided in the books. In response to suggestions from officers, the CAU modified the reports to include such information as suspects, and mug shots of wanted offenders.

During the ensuing months the CAU tried to reinforce the formal feedback from patrol through the use of forms for comments on the car books as well as on the D-runs. (See Section 3.3.4) Though the ICAP and CAU staff encouraged and solicited use of these feedback mechanisms, the response was usually sporadic and limited to the few patrolmen who were enthusiastic about the program. Although the forms are still available they are rarely used anymore, thereby eliminating a formal mechanism in the information—feedback-redesign loop.

Another formal communication link, regularly scheduled meetings among patrol supervisors, CAU analysts, and patrolmen, has also been virtually eliminated. Here again, ICAP staff requested planning meetings and task force meetings to design and implement critical aspects of the program, but for various reasons the attendance at these meetings was poor on the part of sworn personnel.

Because of poor results in establishing regular, open, and formal communication links with patrol, the CAU emphasized informal communication between individual analysts and patrolmen. Over the months, crime analysts focused on establishing rapport and credibility with individual patrolmen, initially working with those most receptive to ICAP and trying to broaden their base from there. Specifically, the analysts attempted to establish this rapport by trying to be as responsive and supportive as possible to patrolmen's requests for data from the CAU. Also, an evening shift for crime analysts was established to provide more access to analysts and data in the CAU.

Though this one-on-one approach is slow, it has begun to bear fruit, particulary in recent months. Two additional conditions have served to enhance the communication process, namely, the relocation of the CAU office (see Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3) and the development of a data base of information on trends, suspects, M.O.'s, etc. within the CAU. In recent months, supervisory staff from Patrol and BCI have requested and received key information from the CAU's data base. This has encouraged acceptance and more informal communication between certain supervisors and the CAU. Previously, the supervisory staff were, in general, less inclined to use the CAU data than patrolmen.

A major achievement in broadening the communication base occurred in recent months when a crime analyst began to present trend and analytical results to officers at roll call. While this is still not an institutionalized practice, the occasions where it was done do represent a major breakthrough in acceptance and integration of the CAU into a part of the patrol function. The precedent has been established so that now, when important data is discovered by the CAU, the forum of the roll call is available as a mechanism to disseminate the information and reinforce the concept that the CAU operates in support of patrol.

Throughout interviews with CAU staff, patrol supervisors and patrolmen, there was unanimous agreement that the CAU exists to support patrol operations. Also, the information presented in the car books was generally viewed as very helpful by patrolmen. However, the fact remains that meetings with patrol supervisors to review the data in the car books and to provide feedback to the CAU are not held. Further, except in the department's Special Operations Unit supervisors do not use the data to make specific tactical decisions with their men about manpower or equipment allocations.

Without the routine use of CAU data by supervisors in their daily planning, the extent to which the car books are actually used depends wholly on the interest and initiative of the individual officer. Until supervisors start using CAU data regularly, and providing feedback to crime analysts on the usefulness of the data, there will continue to be an obstacle to the wider acceptance and implementation of crime specific patrol tactics.

## 3.1.3 Acceptance of the ICAP Program Concepts and Their Implementation is Stronger Among the Rank and File than Among the Ranking Officers in the Department.

In interviews with supervisory officers in the department a general consensus emerged that the concepts of ICAP would be good for the department. Based on this information, support for ICAP could be expected from ranking officers. However, in reviewing the factors which influence the daily and long-range managerial decisions made by these ranking officers, there is little evidence that ICAP has had a significant effect on their decisionmaking.

For the most part, these officers indicated that resource allocations were made based on the volume of calls for service and on management fiat. In other words, decisionmaking is basically still reactive. Only one of the super-

supervisory officers interviewed indicated a regular use of the data generated by the CAU in his daily decisionmaking process. (There were, however, some instances when the CAU provided specific information to certain supervisors in response to their requests.) On the other hand, patrolmen more often used the CAU data in their car books in their daily patrol operations and in their D-runs.

Most D-runs are officer-initiated. Even though the approval of a supervisor is required before a D-run can be made, this involvement by the supervisor is not the same as if the supervisor were the initiator of the run. Also, daily communication with crime analysts is significantly higher for patrolmen than for managers. Based on these observations and interviews, there appears to be a disparity between the verbal support that ICAP receives from ranking officers and the changes in management practices as a result of ICAP.

Another insight into ranking officer support can be gained from attendance at ICAP sponsored training classes. Project records indicate that during the 1978 calendar year, training was offered on five separate topics under the ICAP. Department attendance at these sessions ranged from 35 to 85 percent. The group most poorly represented was the senior ranking officers of the department. Out of the five captains, one attended no sessions and the other four attended only one out of the five offered. Of the department's 15 lieutenants, the one assigned to the ICAP project had the best attendance record; he attended all of the sessions, and another attended four of the five. However, eight of the 15 were present at none or only one session. While there may have been extenuating circumstances, it is, nonetheless, true that such poor attendance by ranking officers could be perceived by the rank and file as a lack of support for ICAP.

3.1.4 The Existing Records System in Quincy Should be Restructured Along the Lines of a Management Information System Rather than a Tallying System to Record Data for Reporting Requirements such as the UCR and Criminal/Court Records.

The current records and information system in Quincy focuses on maintaining criminal history files for court appearances and maintaining criminal incident statistics for the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Both of these functions and the required supporting cross reference files needed to maintain them are necessary for the proper functioning of a police department. In addition to crime and arrest statistics other major statistics maintained by the department are

- incidence of calls for service by hour,
- incidence of motor vehicle accidents by hour,
- ambulance and wagon calls, and
- traffic citations.

Based on interviews with the senior patrol commanders, some of their lieutenants, and other departmental staff, the primary factors influencing management decisions about resource allocations are citizen complaints and calls for service. Other factors mentioned were population composition of an area (i.e., business, residential, school, park, etc.), political pressures in response to complaints from the public, and, to a lesser extent, the topographical constraints of a sector (e.g., limited access roads, water surrounding area, etc.).

There have been no major manpower reallocations or sector boundary changes since 1974,\* and it was suggested that a good supervisor will know how to allocate his resources by listening to the police radio and reading the departmental journal of activity. Using the statistics readily available within the department, managers would be hard pressed to argue effectively for an increase in manpower or equipment, or to prevent cuts in budgets due to strained municipal resources.

<sup>\*</sup>In 1974 manpower allocation and sector boundaries were revised using the Hypercube Model.

To refocus the department's records system toward generating the types of management information discussed in Section 3.1.5, the evaluation team prepared a detailed memorandum outlining recommended improvements in the design and operation of the department's primary system.\* Department management recognizes the need for improvements in this area; some recommendations are being implemented now and others are receiving further consideration as discussed in subsequent sections.

### 3.1.5 The Department's Existing Records and Information System is Unable to Provide Comprehensive Statistics on the Nature of its Calls for Service.

In recent years law enforcement agencies throughout the country have become increasingly concerned with improving the efficiency and effectivess of their operations. Any police department interested in making such improvements quickly realizes that the first step in the process is to obtain a clear picture of its current operations. This entails answering some basic questions about the levels and types of services the Department is called upon to provide. Among the questions which should be answered are the following:

- What was the total number of incidents to which the department responded in the last year?
- How were these incidents distributed among the major categories (e.g., criminal, traffic and miscellaneous)?
- Within each major category how were incidents distributed by type (e.g., breaking and entering) and subtype (e.g., commercial and residential)?
- How were the various incident types and subtypes distributed by time of day, day of week, and location within the area served by the department?
- How much time did the department spend responding to these incidents?

If a department cannot answer this last question, it cannot know how much of its primary resource--personnel time--is available to undertake activities aimed at improving departmental operations. Moreover, if a department cannot answer the earlier questions, it cannot make informed decisions on how to allocate its resources by day, shift, area, or type of activity. A department that is unable to answer such questions will have great difficulty in determining what steps it should take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.

<sup>\*</sup>A copy of these recommendations is provided in Appendix B.

The Quincy Police Department cannot answer these questions. However, it has taken the initial steps needed to do so. Based on recommendations of the evaluation team and meetings with departmental supervisors and staff, an improved complaint card was developed and put into operation in April 1979. A copy of the card is presented in Appendix C.

The data on this card will be analyzed to provide the statistical data base so necessary to resource allocation. However, before this can be done the following four operational responsibilities must be addressed:

- 1. preparation of the cards
- 2. proper completion of all cards by department staff
- 3. assignment of a unique identification number to each incident
- 4. collection and analysis of complaint card data

The <u>responsibility for preparation of the cards</u> is distributed among three groups of people as follows:

Group	Percentage of Cards Prepared	
Teleserve/CETA	50%	
Police Cadets	45%	
Police Officers	<b>5%</b>	

This causes a supervision problem because the supervisor of the Teleserve workers is a civilian while the supervisor for the cadets and police officers is the sergeant in charge of the shift.

All three groups should be responsible to a single suprvisor who should be held accountable for the accuracy and completeness of all cards.

Since introducing the cards the department estimates 30 percent of them are completely filled out.\* This would not provide adequate data for analysis. The department has to focus its efforts on getting all cards properly completed.

Based on recent experience, some decisive management action may be essential in achieving this goal. For example, most cards are missing at least one of the four times\*\* that should be stamped on them. It is not clear

<sup>\*</sup>As shown later in this section, our estimate is much lower. Only 25 percent of the card sample we analyzed had the four times that are required. Taking account of missing location and incident codes would reduce this percentage even further.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Time call received, time unit dispatched, time unit arrived, and time unit cleared.

how much of the problem is due to dispatchers failing to stamp the times, and to patrolmen failing to report them. However, on May 24, 1979, all patrol personnel were reminded by written notice that they are required to radio the dispatcher to report arrival and clear times. To determine the impact of this notice, two samples of incident cards were analyzed. The results were as follows:

	Data incident June 7	cards prepared June 19	Totals.
Sample Size (No. of Cards)	100	100	200
Number of Cards with:			
0 times stamped	1	0	1
1 time stamped	32	29	61
2 times stamped	6	23	29
3 times stamped	33	26	59
4 times stamped	28	22	50

Two key facts are clear from these statistics:

- on the average, 75 percent (150 out of 200) of the cards are missing time data.\*
- of the cards with missing times, most (61) have only one time stamped.

This is a clear indication that the dispatchers are failing to stamp cards. If the dispatchers were doing their jobs correctly, every card would have at least two times stamped. This deficiency may be a reflection of the split responsibility for the preparation of the cards, as discussed above. In any case, it is obvious that corrective action is needed in the communications—dispatch areas, just as it is needed in patrol.

When the card was being designed, it was agreed that a unique identification number would be assigned to every incident. In this way every one of them could be accounted for, and a tally kept to obtain some basic summary statistics. However, when the new incident cards were introduced, the Department reversed this decision and decided to number only incidents for which Case Reports would be prepared. This was done to avoid a potential conflict between case numbers and incident numbers. The evaluation team believes strongly that every incident should receive a unique identification number, and emphasizes that this would create no conflict with BCI if the department adopted a single numbering system as recommended previously. (See 3.1.4 and Appendix B.)

<sup>\*</sup>Similar problems are known to exist with other data items on the card.

In order to prepare for automated analysis and avoid the possibility of either missing an incident or double counting one, the complaint cards should be individually prenumbered as soon as possible.

Although complaint cards are expected to be prepared on all calls, the only cards used for analysis are those on ICAP target crimes. This means that 85-90 percent of the cards were not used for any type of analysis. Besides losing the opportunity to have the data analyzed, this practice reduces the incentive for Teleserve workers, cadets, and officers to completely fill out the card. One could rightfully question, "What is the reason for filling it out if it won't be used?"

To address this issue a simple form was developed on June 20, 1979 with ICAP staff, so that they could begin to collect and analyze manually incident data for resource allocation. The Department started using the form the next day.\*

The collection and manual analysis of the data on the complaint cards is a necessary preliminary step to any automated analysis. Manual analysis will enable the department to identify where data is missing so that appropriate corrective action can be taken. Also, through manual analysis ICAP staff and department managers will become familiar with using the information prior to any step toward automation. This should permit the department to make a more informed judgement on what types of analysis it will want a computer to make when the time comes for automation.

Further Steps Must Be Taken to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Department's Records and Information Systems. However,
the Planned Introduction of Microfilming and Computerization will not
Eliminate the Basic Problems of the Existing Systems, and is likely
to Aggrevate these Problems and Create New Ones.

The problems discussed in the previous section deserve corrective action as soon as possible. It was for this reason that the evaluation team prepared its detailed recommendations\*\* for improving the department's records and information systems. However, in our opinion, there exists a fundamental difference of opinion between department personnel and ourselves

<sup>\*</sup>A copy of the form is presented in Appendix D.

<sup>\*\*</sup>See Appendix B.

regarding how best to correct these problems. Department personnel appear to be committed to finding hardware solutions to these problems, specifically microfilm and computer systems.\* Our position, based on extensive experience in the area of records and information systems, is that an improved manual system must be fully operational before it is realistic to expect to enjoy the benefits that such hardware systems promise.

We do not believe that a microfilm system will improve the efficiency or effectiveness of the department's current records and information systems. It is far more likely that such a system will only compound existing problems. Based on our interviews there are two reasons why the Department is planning to purchase a microfilm system. First, it is included in the ICAP budget and can be purchased with ICAP funds; this is certainly not a sufficient reason for purchasing a system. Second, it may provide the impetus needed to purge the existing records system. While this may be so, there is, in our opinion, a much simpler way to achieve the Department's records purging objective. First of all, it should be noted that the department has no records retention policy that specifies the length of time that each type of record should be retained.\*\* Such a policy needs to be established and then implemented by removing and destroying every record that has been held beyond the time limit for that type of record. We think that if these two steps were taken the volume of records would be substantially reduced and there would be no need for microfilming, with its associated disruption, additional long-term costs, and staffing requirements.

The ICAP manager is very interested in using a computer to perform crime analysis functions. He looks forward to using the following two software systems which LEAA's National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service is developing with the Office of Criminal Justice Programs:

 Police Operations Support System Elementary (POSSE) which will provide for

UCR/crime reporting Calls for service analysis Offenses Jail/arrest Identification/microfilm Master name index Suspect/witness
Youth contact
Property
Personnel
Training
Manpower Allocation

<sup>\*</sup>For the ICAP Manager's position on this matter and our response see Appendix G.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Guidelines for establishing such a policy are provided in Appendix E.

Crime Analysis System Support (CASS) which will provide:
 Crime pattern detection
 Crime suspect correlations
 Target profiles
 Exception reports based on crime thresholds
 Forecast crime potentials
 Forecast crime trends
 Resource allocation

While recognizing that these systems encompass a broad range of functions which Quincy would very much like to automate, the evaluation team harbors two serious reservations about the extent to which these systems can impact the department's ICAP.\*

First, we are concerned about the applicability and availability of the systems for Quincy. For example, according to LEAA's written statements, POSSE is being designed for use by departments serving communities with populations up to 100,000. In 1970 Quincy had a population of 88,016, and by 1975 it had grown to 91,487. Clearly, this is very close to the upper limit for which the system is being designed. By the time the system becomes available, it is certainly possible that Quincy's population will exceed 100,000. One basic question, therefore, is how well the system will operate in a community with a population that is close to the maximum for which the system was designed. This question cannot be answered accurately until the system has been developed and tested, and it will be quite a while before that occurs.

According to LEAA the POSSE software is now under development, and field evaluation is not scheduled to <u>begin</u> until December 1979. CASS's software is also under development. Schedule slippages in software development efforts are commonplace and should be expected in this case. Moreover, it is hard to predict the results of the field evaluations. For these reasons, it seems likely that a year or more will elapse before the necessary software is available.

With regard to the applicability of the systems for the Quincy ICAP, there are other questions that cannot be resolved until the systems have been developed and evaluated. For example, LEAA states that it will be possible to tailor the software, in terms of codes and reporting formats, to meet the needs of individual departments. Does this mean that no changes will be

<sup>\*</sup>For the ICAP Manager's response to these comments see Appendix G.

needed in Quincy's current data collection forms (e.g., Incident Card and Case Report)? If changes are necessary, what will be their nature and extent? Will they be changes that Quincy will be prepared to make given the time and effort needed to introduce such changes successfully?

Recognizing the oft-proven adage of "garbage in, garbage out" we think that the editing capabilities of the system must be investigated. What specific edit checks will the systems be able to perform? Will the checks be sufficient to assure that only "clean" records (i.e., those having complete and consistent data), can enter the system? If not, what will happen when "dirty" records are entered? A computer record is considered "dirty" if it contains:

- an unallowed character (e.g., a missing or non-numeric character in a field where only numeric characters are allowed
- an unallowed value (e.g., 0 or 8 for a Day of Week code when each day has an identification number in the range 1 to 7
- inconsistent data (e.g., a clearance time that is earlier than the dispatch time

A related matter is system maintenance. LEAA has stated that computer programmers will not be needed to operate the program because records and dispatch personnel will be able to do the job for themselves. While it is certainly realistic to expect this, there is more to computer systems than simply operating them—they must be maintained too. For example, arson was recently reclassified from a Part II to a Part I offense. Who would perform the necessary reprogramming when a change like this occurs? Similarly, what happens when a departmental decision, for example, the creation of a new patrol area from parts of two existing areas, makes it necessary to change the computer programs after they are initially tailored? How much retailoring will LEAA provide, and for how long? These are some of the basic questions that must be resolved before deciding that these systems will fill the Quincy ICAP's needs.

Beyond the questions of applicability and availability, we are concerned about what ICAP personnel appear to think is necessary to prepare for a computer system. From previous discussions, it is clear that there are some serious problems with the department's existing records and information systems. We believe that these problems must be corrected, and that a smoothly running manual system must exist before computer techniques can be

introduced. It appears to us, however, that ICAP personnel expect that these problems will disappear when a computer is installed. They won't. In fact, if steps are not taken to correct the problems of the current system, they are likely to grow worse while the department is waiting for a computer.

What is needed now is a concentrated effort to correct the existing problems. The most effective way to do this is to start using the existing data (e.g., from Incident Cards), to operate manual versions of the planned computer systems. This will quickly highlight data and logic problems, and provide the experience needed to specify how the computer systems should be tailored to meet Quincy's needs. When this has been done, the department should arrange for computer processing of its Calls for Service data, using available software and the City of Quincy's computer hardware and personnel resources. This can be done for modest cost and is the only feasible way of doing the detailed analysis of Incident Card data that is needed for resource allocation. By taking such action, the department would benefit in several ways. It would emphasize the importance of obtaining clean data and it would make full use of the data now rather than waiting for the arrival of the department's computer one to two years from now. It would also give department personnel an opportunity to learn how to use such data to improve their operations.

### 3.2. Crime Analysis Unit Capability

3.2.1 The Data Produced by the CAU Has Evolved Significantly Considering the Lock of Feedback from Managers and Patrol. The ICAP Staff Should Continue to Make Every Effort to Integrate the CAU Into the Strategic Decisions of Patrol Operations.

When the CAU began generating information for patrolmen, it used formats developed by an outside consultant and prepared reports on a bi-weekly basis. These were replaced by Car Area Books that are updated daily. Since their introduction they have been modified through the feedback from patrol, to provide more information patrolmen want concerning photos of offenders, M.O.'s trends, etc. As a result the car books provide a very up-to-date summary of information on what has occurred in each sector.

Because the ICAP staff recognized the delicacy of getting its ideas accepted by patrol operations, and the risk of alienation if it appeared to be too assertive, it chose to play an extremely supportive role towards patrol by never insisting that any measure be implemented, and by being as responsive

and cooperative as possible with patrol. The fact that formal communication and feedback from patrol were somewhat limited, prevented the CAU from being more involved in developing strategies for patrol operations.

A case in point occurred in late 1978 when the CAU was identifying targets for possible D-runs. Due to the way the information was transmitted among the patrol, what began as a suggestion from the CAU to a patrol supervisor was passed on to the patrolmen as an order from CAU to do a D-run. When the CAU became aware of this and the resulting friction, it ceased making suggestions for D-runs for a while and relied instead on officer-initiated runs.

Largely as a result of the ICAP policy of being sensitive to the sworn versus civilian personnel issue the CAU acted mainly in a responsive and supportive way towards patrol. And, during the spring of 1979, this policy began to pay off because an increasing number of patrolmen saw the CAU as directly supporting them, and certain supervisors in both patrol and BCI began to use the CAU analysts on specific problems.

Now, as a result of the base that the CAU has established, the ICAP staff should attempt to involve the CAU in a more active role in daily patrol operations. One step in this direction has already begun with a crime analyst briefing a patrol shift at roll call on specific information about a target crime. This practice should, wherever possible, be expanded. Another specific step is the institution of the recommended revised D-run procedures as mentioned in Section 3.3.4.

With the successful involvement of the CAU in daily management decisionmaking, the crime analyst's occasional frustration from not seeing his valid analysis used in patrol strategies will be replaced by a sense of contribution to the department's successful implementation of ICAP.

3.2.2 The CAU Reports are Generally Considered to be Useful and Timely by the Patrolmen. Ranking Officers Consider the Data as Interesting but Have Not Integrated It into Their Daily Operating Procedures.

Based on interviews with patrolmen and street supervisors we have found that they consider the information provided by the CAU for the Car Area Books to be timely, informative, and helpful. There were no criticisms of the data provided, but some officers indicated that they were frustrated in acting on the leads generated by the data due to the workload on their beats.

However, patrol supervisors' evaluations of the data books were more mixed. Some indicated that their supervisor's book gave a good general

picture of what was going on throughout the city while others said it served a monitoring function to ask the patrolmen what he was doing about a problem in his sector. Only one supervisor out of six interviewed thought that the CAU was helpful to him in his role as a manager.

One of the possibilities suggested was that the supervisors didn't know how to use either the CAU or the data provided and also needed motivation to use the data. ICAP staff should respond to these areas with specific training and orientation, namely training classes for captains and lieutenants on the management use of CAU data, followed by similar training for sergeants in street implementation of strategies.

Further, a patrol commander suggested the possibility of intensive training of new sergeants who will be announced in the next month or two. This would be an excellent group to train in the proper use of CAU data.

## 3.2.3 The CAU Reports Should Continue the Trend Toward Correlating Suspects and M.O.'s as Opposed to Simply Reporting Trends and Patterns of Crimes.

Crime analyst interviews indicate that during the first 6-12 months of Phase I, ten percent of analyst time was spent correlating suspects and M.O.'s to criminal incidents as compared to about 50 percent currently. There are two reasons for this shift: (1) a conscious strategy by analysts to avoid mistakes in proposing suspects thereby giving patrolmen more confidence in the CAU, and (2) the additional feedback patrolmen now provide analysts on suspects' activities and locations.

The ICAP staff and crime analysts should continue to emphasize the goal of trying to identify suspects as often as possible. Rather than attempting to identify a single sure suspect, it would be helpful to patrol if crime analysts suggested, as soon as possible, a few known perpetrators of the type of crime in question. In this way, patrol can pursue the leads and narrow down the suspects with field information which may be helpful for other crimes.

A suggested forum for such suspect focusing would be a roll call where the analyst would make the facts and suspects known to the commander prior to the roll call, and then the commander would ask the assembled men whether they had any information on the suspects mentioned. The information offered verbally by the patrolmen at that time would be noted by the analyst as field intelligence and the patrol would be asked to collect all available information on the suspects during their upcoming tour.

This type of operation would achieve the following three goals:

- (1) Increase communication between patrol and the CAU
- (2) Winnow down a specific list of suspects rather than wait for additional leads to develop
- (3) Provide frequently updated field intelligence on known offenders which could be useful on other incidents

### 3.3 Use of CAU Information in the Decisionmaking Process

3.3.1 Despite the Efforts of the Department's Chief to Motivate the Commanding Officers to Integrate CAU Information into the Decisionmaking Process, There has been a Strong Resistance to Doing So. The Existence of a Strong Union Resistant to Such Change has Tended to Reinforce This Attitude.

Based on discussions with the Chief, ranking officers, patrolmen, the ICAP manager and his staff, it is clear that the chief has been a strong advocate of ICAP. However, he cannot singlehandedly make it work. The lack of general support among the senior officers, as discussed in Section 3.1.3, plus skepticism about the permanency of the program, as discussed in Section 3.1.1, combined to create a state of inertia and a "wait and see" attitude. The situation was exacerbated when the union chose to make the institution of ICAP an issue for bargaining in their ongoing contract negotiations. (The president of the patrolmen's union declined to be interviewed on the grounds that it might interfere with those negotiations.)

Because of this pervasive resistance to change among senior officers, the implementation of ICAP concepts has been difficult. Although CAU reports have been provided to commanders, they would rarely be used unless the chief was directly involved in the process. As a result, until the recent shift in patrol commanders, the basis for decisions about patrol deployment remained rough estimates based on the relative amount of call activity in a given area.

3.3.2 The Recent Relocation of the CAU Office to the First Floor, Along with the CAU's Ability to Provide Critical Data to Key Commanders have Served to Increase Informal Communication and Acceptance of the CAU.

Based on interviews with patrolmen and CAU staff, the relocation of the CAU to the main floor has helped to reduce greatly the anonimity of both the CAU and ICAP in the eyes of patrolmen. This increased visibility and accessibility has also served to increase informal communication between the CAU and patrol. Moreover, because the CAU on a few occasions has been able to retrieve key information from its files for senior officers which was not readily available through the department's central records system, some of the "wait and see" attitude and skepticism has been eroded.

3.3.3 The Recent Relocation of CAU Office to the First Floor of the Department's Headquarters and the CAU's Ability to Provide Critical Data to Key Commanders have Helped to Improve Communications Between the CAU and the Patrol Division, and to Increase the Visibility and Acceptance of the CAU Throughout the Department.

In 1975 crime analysts were located in a substation two miles from the Department's headquarters. In the summer of 1977 they moved into space on the third floor of the headquarters building, the only area available in the building at that time. Building space was allocated as follows:

Floor	Primary Functions
	Chief's office, patrol, communications
2	Investigation and records
3	Administration

By early 1978 both the ICAP manager and the Chief recognized the desirability of locating the CAU as close as possible to the patrol function which it supports. The opportunity to achieve this goal developed about the same time when it was decided that the department's communications function needed upgrading, specifically new equipment and the addition of a Teleserve capability. Such upgrading could not be achieved in the space available on the first floor. Therefore, the decision was made to transfer the entire communications center to the third floor, and to move the CAU to the former communications area on the first floor.

This relocation has had a positive effect on the relationship of the CAU to the department as a whole. Both patrolmen and CAU staff stated that the move has helped to reduce the anonomity of the CAU and ICAP. Moreover, the proximity and visibility of the CAU to patrol personnel has definitely increased the quantity and quality of information which they exchange.

Again, senior patrol and investigation personnel are becoming considerably more cooperative and communicative with the CAU as a result of its demonstrated information retrieval capabilities.

# 3.3.4 Directed Patrol is Recognized as a Potentially Productive Patrol Activity. However, Few Patrolmen are Involved in Developing D-run Tactics, and There has been Substantial Variation from the Traditional Process for Defining and Initiating D-runs.

In October 1977, the previous ICAP director tried to introduce directed patrol in Quincy. No formal training was provided for the patrolmen and, though the concept was pushed, it failed after a brief (couple of months) try.

In late summer of 1978 the sworn personnel attached to the ICAP staff undertook the reintroduction of the directed patrol concept. Training for small groups of officers was conducted by ICAP's sworn personnel. When the directed patrols began, the first men to perform them were "hired," that is, paid extra, so as not to deplete regular manning on patrol. Because hiring raised issues of favoritism and other problems, it lasted less than one month. In late 1978 the Special Operations Unit a group of a dozen officers, was established to support night patrol in peak load situations, and it began making D-runs as part of its regular duty.

The level of D-run activity since that time is summarized below.

		D-Runs	Initiated by	y Total	D-Runs
Period	Total Weeks	CAU	Patrol	D-Runs	Per Week
10/3/78-11/14/78	<u> </u>	35	3	38	6.33
11/15/78-1/11/79	8	18	0	18	2.25
1/12/79-2/11/79	4	22	4	26	6.50
2/12/79-3/17/79	<b>5</b>	23	2	25	5.00
3/18/79-6/6/79	11	4	7	11	1.00

These statistics highlight the fact that in recent months the average number of D-runs made per week has fallen dramatically from a high of 6.5 per week from mid-January to mid-February of this year, to one per week for the eleven-week period that ended in early June. During this eight-month period, there was a basic change in the way D-runs were assigned. From October 1978 to January 1979, D-runs were assigned based on direct recommendations from the CAU. In January 1979 control of D-run assignments was transferred to Patrol Supervisors. According to CAU Personnel "this change greatly contributed to the diminishing success of D-Runs," and presumably to limited interest in performing them.

As stated earlier, prior to the recent reduction in D-runs, the procedure was usually for the CAU to suggest a D-run to patrol supervisors. The CAU also recommended the specific tactics to be used during the run. If the supervisor approved, which was usually the case, he assigned the run and the specific tactics to one of his men. In the case of an officer-initiated

D-run, the patrolman usually requested supervisory approval for the run and designed his own tactics which were then discussed in varying degrees of detail with the supervisor. On occasion, these tactics were no more than having the time approved to put the final touches on an investigation which led to an arrest. (Out of a total of 29 arrests made on all D-runs, 13 were made by one patrolman on six runs. The result is that 45 percent of the arrests were accounted for by patrol which made less than 15 percent of the total number of runs.)

This practice of supervisor approval of both CAU-and patrol initiated D-runs represents a departure from the traditional ICAP concept of D-run strategy development. The process starts with the CAU's identification of a crime pattern or trend, followed by discussion of the pattern/trend with patrol supervisors, development of an appropriate strategy by patrolmen and supervisors, and implementation of the strategy, and feedback to CAU on the effectiveness of this strategy.

As part of its technical assistance activities, the evaluation team provided detailed recommendations on how ICAP should try to increase the involvement of patrolmen in developing directed patrol strategies.\*

## 3.3.5 A Statistical Analysis of Data from a Sample of Burglary Incidents Demonstrated that Solvability Factors are an Appropriate Means of Prioritizing Follow-up Investigations.

Traditionally, the department's Bureau of Criminal Investigation has taken the position that it should provide some follow-up on every case that it receives, even when it is clear that there is no chance of solving the case. This attitude has been based on the belief that, since the police function is supported by tax dollars, every taxpayer is entitled to receive service even if the service provided is unlikely to be effective in solving his specific case.

With this philosophy, it is understandable that when the ICAP staff proposed using solvability factors for prioritizing cases to receive follow-up investigation, it encountered reluctance and skepticism. To counter these attitudes all the B & E cases for January 1979 were analyzed to determine how well solvability factor scores could be used to predict the cases that

<sup>\*</sup>A copy of the recommendations is presented in Appendix F.

the department would solve. The analysis demonstrated clearly that cases with high scores were generally solved, and those with low scores were not. Furthermore, the analysis highlighted the fact that some solvability factors are clearly more important than others. Specifically, cases in which witnesses could identify suspects or vehicles (factors 16-23 on the department's case report) were solved more than half the time. The results of this analysis and the transfer to BCI of the lieutenant who had been assigned to ICAP for almost two years have contributed to a gradual shift in the bureau's attitude on using solvability factors to prioritize cases for follow-up.

- 3.4 Acceptance and Use of New Case Report Form
- 3.4.1 The New Case Report Form is in Use Throughout the Department. It is Generally Considered a Major Improvement Over its Predecessor. However, Additional Training in Proper Completion of the Solvability Factors Section is Essential Before Attempting to Use Solvability Factor Scores to Prioritize Cases Deserving Follow-up Investigations.

Based on interviews with patrolmen, detectives, and commanding officers, the consensus is that the new report form is a good one--a significant improvement over its predecessor. However, close examination of the sample of forms used in the solvability factors analysis (Section 3.3.5) showed that errors are frequently made in completing the solvability factors section of forms on criminal incidents. Most of these errors appear to be traced to misunderstandings by reporting patrolmen on what constitutes the presence or absence of a solvability factor in specific situations. The following questions reflect the uncertainties that many patrol personnel appear to have with regard to solvability factors. The first question is what constitutes a significant M.O.. For example, is the presence of a broken window a significant M.O.? Second, if two suspects are described as 20-year old white males, is that specific enough to constitute the presence of a solvability factor? Until uncertainties such as these are resolved for all personnel, there will continue to be problems in prioritizing cases based on solvability factor scores.

### 4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

During the eighteen months of Phase I, the Quincy ICAP has progressed from a foncept and set of objectives to a functioning program. A Crime Analysis Unit produces timely information for use by patrolmen in their daily car books; a new case report form has been designed and implemented to facilitate case management within the Bureau of Criminal Investigations; the CAU is achieving greater acceptance by the BCI, patrol, and departmental management; and organizational changes in the command rank of both day and night patrol commanders have enhanced the likelihood that the CAU will enjoy even greater acceptance by, and integration into, patrol operations. Moreover, the relocation of the CAU to the main floor of the department's headquarters has increased the visibility and acceptance of the unit by the rank and file patrolmen. These accomplishments were made in the face of several obstacles, not the least of which were the conservative attitudes of some sworn staff and a strong resistance to change, especially among the ranking officers.

Several factors have contributed to these achievements. A substantial part of the success is due to the perseverance and professionalism of the ICAP director and his staff. The commitment of the chief to the ICAP concepts despite strenuous union objections has also played a major role.

The following recommendations are presented to help the department improve its ICAP even more:

### 4.1 Integration of ICAP into the Department

The need to make ICAP an integral part of the Quincy Police Department is an essential one for smooth operation of the CAU. The steps that have been taken (relocation of CAU office, informal meetings between units, etc.) have helped, but the following additional steps are necessary.

### 4.1.1 Organization Chart

In order to place the ICAP staff and the CAU within an organizational structure that is clear-cut and identifies the unit as an operational rather than an administrative one, an organization chart should be designed for the Quincy Police Department that will identify all senior staff members, their areas of responsibility, and the organizational relationships that exist among them. This will aid in the eliminating the anominity of ICAP and its staff by illustrating the important and integral role they now play in the functioning of the department.

A second step in this ICAP integration process would be to place supervision of ICAP functions with senior sworn personnel who have the ability and the commitment to implement the program's concepts. This move will provide a stronger link between ICAP and the other department units.

### 4.1.3 Increased ICAP Participation

The practice of crime analysts suggesting possible suspects in target crimes should be used more often. This practice provides immediate leads for patrol operations to follow-up and generates field intelligence on known offenders which may relate to other incidents. In addition, if such suggestions eventually lead to convictions, the importance of ICAP in the eyes of patrol will be intensified.

Procedures for directed patrol should be restructured to incorporate more officer-developed tactics for addressing target crimes. This move will illustrate the sincerity of the ICAP staff to make substantial improvements to benefit the department.

### 4.2 Improved Communications

The following recommendations for improved communications are also suggestions that will increase the effectiveness of ICAP. Therefore, while the recommendations outlined in this section have the power to improve intra- and inter-unit communication, they should also be considered program improvements and aids in integrating ICAP into the department.

#### 4.2.1 Training of Supervisors in Use of CAU Data

ICAP staff should develop a training class for patrol supervisors to explain to them, in detail, how the data produced by the CAU can be used by them to develop crime-specific strategies. It may often be the case that supervisors do not know how to use the CAU or the data it provides, rather than that they are just not interested in the program.

The ICAP staff should run separate sessions for captains and lieutenants on management use of CAU data, followed by similar training for sergeants on street implementation of strategies.

These training sessions should be conducted by sworn personnel who are proven successes in using this type of data. This may mean using supervisors from other city police departments with ICAP's rather than in-house staff.

In addition, there should be department-wide training sessions when needed. (See Sections 4.1.3, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.)

### 4.2.2 Establishment of Regular Meetings

Once training is completed and supervisors begin to use the CAU data in their strategic planning, formal communication links with the CAU should be established through regularly scheduled meetings of the patrol commanders, lieutenants, sergeants, and crime analysts to identify the usefulness and inadequacies of the data and strategies.

These meetings should be held at least monthly, but possibly biweekly, to allow for a reasonable amount of data to be collected for presentation of trend and analytical results. They should follow an agenda of regular topics such as the following:

- outline of strategies being employed
- presentation of strategy impact on crime reduction, arrests, etc.
- feedback from patrolmen, including recommended strategy changes
- reevaluation and reprioritization of efforts over next period
- allocation of resources on targets
- approval of strategies to be used

#### 4.2.3 Briefing of Patrolmen

Because the patrol division has shown increased trust in the program, ICAP staff should take advantage of this development by attempting to involve the CAU In a more active role in daily patrol operations. This can be accomplished through expansion of the current patrol briefing practice. By briefing patrol shifts at roll call on specific information about a target crime, the crime analyst will have daily contact with patrolmen—an aid in improving communications—and the fact that the unit is working for the patrolman will be reinforced.

In addition to affording analysts the opportunity to offer patrolmen crime information, this briefing could be used to institute revised D-run procedures.

### 4.3 Development of a Management Information System

Primary factors influencing management decisions about resource allocations are citizen complaints and calls for service. What must be achieved is the development of a management information system which will provide the department with a total picture of the levels and types of services it is called upon to provide. Based on this picture, improved resource allocation decisions can be made.

### 4.3.1 Suspect Focusing

The use of CAU reports that correlate suspects and M.O.'s to criminal incidents, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, should be continued and employed on a regular basis in order to avoid mistakes in proposing suspects.

### 4.3.2 Solvability Factors

The use of solvability factors to prioritize cases for follow-up should also be a regular department procedure since analysis has shown that such factor scores can be used to predict the cases that the department is likely to solve.

However, because it has been learned (through the examination of the new case report form) that uncertainty exists in the department regarding what constitutes the presence of a solvability factor, department-wide training is necessary to increase uniformity in the proper identification of these factors.

### 4.3.3 Improved Incident Cards

The incident card that was developed in April 1979 is being analyzed to provide the statistical data base necessary for supervisors to make intelligent resource allocation decisions. However, in order for this to be accomplished, the question of who will be responsible for full and accurate completion of all complaint cards must be answered.

We suggest that these cards be pre-numbered as soon as possible. We strongly urge that every incident receive a unique identification number. The manual data analysis begun in June should continue and, as soon as possible, senior management should be trained in how to use this data for resource allocation. Again, this type of training is probably available from other ICAP cities. Following manual analysis the department should begin the introduction of computer analysis.

### 4.3.4 Records Retention and Computerization


Rather than invest in microfilming, the department should substantially reduce its volume of records through the development and implementation of a records retention policy.

Policies should be adopted immediately to assure that complete Calls for Service records are being correctly prepared on all calls, and that the detailed recommendations for improving the department's manual records and information system are implemented.

The City of Quincy's existing computer facilities and resources should be used to analyze Calls for Service data, until LEAA's planned systems become available. At that time the department should decide whether the benefits of those systems are sufficiently greater than their costs to justify introducing them. In the interim the department will have valuable information for use in resource allocation—information that is virtually impossible to accumulate through manual processing techniques.

Appendix A

Organization Chart of the Quincy Police Department



#### Appendix B

Recommendations for Changes to the Records and Information Systems in the Quincy Police Department

# Recommendations on Changes for the Quincy Police Department's Records System

April 2, 1979

On February 14, 1979 John McDonnell and I met with Captain Nestor to discuss the Incident Card we redesigned for the Quincy Police Department. During the conversation questions arose about the scope and nature of recommendations we would be making about procedures and systems within the central records area. As a result of these questions we think it is appropriate for us to outline the recommendations we think will improve both the records system and information flow throughout the Department.

These recommendations are presented as highlights and do not attempt to describe the daily operational details and procedures to achieve them. Discussions and guidelines on how to accomplish these goals would, of course, require much more elaboration than a letter allows. However, our objective is to first present the ideas in summary form, and then meet with you and relevant members of the department to discuss both the desirability of these ideas for the Quincy Police Department and the mechanics of implementing them.

Our goals in these recommendations are to reduce redundant activities, simplify and speed up the process of data storage and retrieval, and not increase the cost of performing the records function, particularly in terms of staffing requirements.

- 1. Establish one numbering system to work throughout the department. Under such a system the number assigned to an incident or service on the Community Incident Card would be the only reference number ever given to the incident. This same number would be used to file the incident in Central Records. If that incident required follow-up investigation activity in the Bureau of Criminal Investigations, no separate case number would be assigned as is the current practice. Instead, the incident would be logged into a BCI activity journal or log according to the same number as on the incident card. Since the log would keep track of how many cases are currently in the workload there would be no need to assign a new case number to record the activity performed on the incident. (A sample of a type of log as described for the BCI is discussed under #5 below).
- 2. Redesign and expand the scope and function of the Depatment's Daily Journal to satisfy three needs: providing broad statistical tallies on types of services rendered; facilitating supervisory control over report quality and submission, and providing the Central Records Area with a check list to insure receipt and filing of all reports. This new log would replace both the current daily journal and the caselist.

A sample format for such a log is presented in Attachment 1 to give you a rough idea of the concept. Should you decide to adopt such a log it would, of course, be modified and designed in conjunction with you and your staff to meet the specific needs of the Quincy Police Department.

3. As already agreed, redesign the Community Incident Card. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of exactly how much of what type of activity the department performs, it is first necessary to be able to account for all the activity. To accomplish this, we recommend that each service performed by the department be given a separate incident card and be logged. To avoid duplication of incident numbers we further recommend that the community incident cards be numbered in advance of their use in the dispatch area. Whether the numbers are put on by a printer when the cards are ordered, or by a staff member of the Department on a periodic basis, makes little difference in our opinion.

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Instituting such a procedure will of course increase the number of cards issued initially because there are probably some services which currently may not be counted in your statistics. Some services that departments tend to overlook are: routine escorts, responses to alarms, presentations at local civic groups and schools, transportation of prisoners, etc. The rule of thumb should be: every time a man or car moves to perform a service, that service should be given a number and logged.

Another use for the complaint cards is to provide written documentation for minor complaints, on which complete incident reports would not normally be prepared. After a reasonable storage period (perhaps 90 days), those cards representing incidents for which a written report exists could be destroyed while the balance could be stored as reports in a separate file drawer for some appropriate period of time (perhaps one year).

4. Produce a monthly departmental statistical summary using data generated from the incident log. Such a report would serve to provide a quick synopsis of broad trends of activity within the Department and thereby set the tone and direction for more in-depth research. This data would complement the statistics generated by the CAU. A sample of such a summary report is shown in Attachment 2.

Additionally, the figures presented in the proposed monthly summary are easily graphed on the enclosed graph samples (Attachment 3). These graphs should be kept cumulatively each month showing year-to-date totals and also by individual monthly totals to identify peaks and valleys in activity levels.

5. In addition to a Department-wide incident log, I recommend establishing an activity log and monthly report for major bureaus within the Department, such as the BCI. Such a log would permit routine management functions such as simple statistical analysis of workload and case monitoring and additionally, provide the source for responses to questions on Bureau clearances, types of crime activities, etc.

A sample of such a log format for the BCI is presented in Attachment 6 and the associated monthly activity report format in Attachment 7. As mentioned, the specifics of these logs and reports would be developed in conjunction with you and the Bureau using them.

6. Modify the current filing system in central records so that all incident reports are filed numerically according to the incident numbers specified on the Community Incident Card. All incidents, regardless of whether they are solved by arrest or not, can be filed this way. While the current practice of filing arrest cases according to the arrestee's personal criminal history file may assist in preparing court cases within the department, this practice makes the location of files dependent on knowing (a) the name of the arrestee and (b) whether the arrestee's file is in with those pending trial (even if the trial pending is not for the particular case in question).

Also, the filing of other incidents according to either the victim if it is a case, or according to type of crime adds to the complication in the records area. While this current filing system apparently is geared to the monthly Uniform Crime Report, the proposed system would tally most of this information for the uniform crime report on the BCI log.

7. Modify the current index card cross reference system so that in place of the current two index cards (filed alphabetically according to victim and numerically according to case number) a single card is made for all persons involved in incidents. This card would be filed alphabetically according to the person's name. The card should indicate the person's name, address, and phone number, the date of the incident, a letter code indicating the person's relationship to the incident (e.g., W = witness, V = victim, A = arrestee, etc.) and the incident number.

This index card can be a continuous one indicating the history of the person's interaction with the department or a separate card can be prepared for each incident.

The best cross reference system would be the most comprehensive one with a card for all persons on all incidents. However, the department will have to make a decision about the cost of preparing cards for an all-inclusive system and the staff available to prepare them.

- 8. Replace the current active arrest file with a court file tickler system to keep track of pending court dates.
- 9. Begin a systematic process for purging outdated records.
- 10. Review and purge the outstanding warrant file.

While it might be desirable to institute some or most of these ideas, the timing of any changes will be very critical to the success or failure of the recommended change. It will of course be impossible to attempt to institute a number of these changes all at once.

Therefore we have broken the recommendations into three groups: (a) one sequence which can be begun in the near future; (b) a second sequence which could be begun after the first set are already digested and operating relatively problem-free; and (c) a group of actions which can be done as independent activities. This last group does not require that any of the ideas in "a" or "b" be done.

- a) Early series of modifications:
  - 1. Redesign the Community Incident Card.

Since this step has already begun it is a logical place to begin. Training of staff to properly complete the cards involves mainly communications center people so this can be done as a separate effort without disrupting patrolmen's daily activities.

2. Redesign and expand the scope of the Daily Journal.

Again this affects primarily those who prepare the journal and then the supervisors who use the journal. This is also a separate group which does not necessarily change the daily patrol functions for the officer on the beat.

3. Produce a monthly department-wide statistical summary.

The statistics for such a report would come directly from the proposed redesigned daily log. Therefore the tallying of these statistics would only take a short time each month for one staff member.

- b) Later series of modifications.
  - Establish one numbering system to operate throughout the department.
  - 2. Modify the Central Records filing system to file reports numerically according to the one numbering system mentioned above.
  - 3. Modify the current index card cross reference system to contain an alphabetically filed card for each person involved in an incident.
  - 4. Establish a court date tickler system to replace the current active arrest file.
- c) Independent activities
  - Establish a daily activity log and monthly report for major bureaus within the department.
  - 2. Begin a systematic process for purging outdated records.
  - 3. Begin a systematic process for purging and updating outstanding warrants.

Appendix C

Community Incident Card

#### ABT ASSOCIATES INC.

55 WHEELER STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

TELEPHONE . AREA 617-492-7100

TWX: 710-3201382

February 21, 1979

Mr. Donald Hansen
Research and Planning Division
Quincy Police Department
442 Southern Artery NW
Quincy, MA 02169

Dear Don:

Enclosed is the revised master for the proposed Community Incident Card.

Hopefully you will be able to move this along quickly to get printed copies into operation.

Cordially,

Philip J. Matyi

cc: Captain Nestor Lt. MacDonald

Natura of Incident:			Priority: 1. Emergency	2. Urge	ınt 3.□	Routine	Incident	lumber
ncident Location:	Street		Section of City				Report:	
Reported By: Name		Address	Ar	τ.≢	Phone:		ved:	Yes No
Complainant/Victim	Name (Individual, Firm	, Business) Address			Phone:		Receiv	
Additional Details: (	Use Back of Card If Ne	cessary)					spatch.	
							ed.	
	QUINCY POLICE	DEPARTMENT COM	MUNITY INCID	ENT CARE	<u>)                                    </u>		Š	
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	1 2			4. V	Ved.	7. Oat.	<u> </u>	
Call Received By:		Call	Dispatched By:				Approved	By:

Appendix D

Activity Summary Report

	Month	Day	Voor		
DATE					

# QUINCY POLICE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY SUMMARY SHIFT

PAGE	-	 	

TIME CALL REC'D	SECTOR	TAKEN BY			NATURE OF INCIDENT		ELAPSED TIME IN MINUTES
THE UALL HES S				CRIMINAL	MOTOR VEHICLES	GENERAL SERVICES	(DISPATCHED - CLEARED)
		(Jegger)	Auto Refire	7   Sept   Sept	10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	Cining Company of the	Motor Vehicle
	-						
	OTALS FOR						
10	OTALS FOR S	oniri -					

Appendix E

Sample Records Retention Policy

#### TAP NEWSLETTER

Technical Assistance Project for the Local Law Enforcement Agencies of Connecticut Volume 1, Number 2

February 7, 1977

More than half of the fifty requests for TAP assistance received to date have been concerned with Records and Information Systems. Almost all of the departments requesting assistance in this area have one problem in common — they are being "buried in paper." Because the problem is so widespread, this issue of the TAP Newsletter is devoted entirely to police records retention policy.

Presented below are the minimum retention requirements for the most common records of police departments. These requirements have been developed by the Police Subcommittee of the Connecticut Records Management Committee, and have been published by the Connecticut Public Records Administrator. It must be emphasized that these requirements pertain to police records — not court records, for which there are other requirements.

In addition to listing the minimum retention requirements for the major types of police records, this Newsletter also provides a sample letter which should be used when requesting permission to destroy police records which no longer need to be retained. This letter must be signed by the police chief and the administrative head of the municipality. Once approval to destroy records has been granted, it is suggested that a sworn police officer witness the destruction and attest to it by signing a copy of the letter. This copy should be retained by the police department.

It is hoped that this Newsletter will provide valuable reference information for Records Section staffs; and, that many departments will start to reduce their paperwork problems by adhering more closely to these minimum requirements.

Type of Record		etained in addition rrent Year
Abandoned Vehicle Reports		1
Accident Reports:  Motor Vehicle Other		5 3
Ambulance Call Records		1
Annual Report		See Reports
Arrest Records (Blotter, Cards, Log, Slips, et	c.)	7
Bazaar, Bingo or Raffle Permi	Records	See Permits
Cash Bond Receipts and Record	S	3, audited
Case Files, Closed: Homicides Felonies All Others		Permanent 6 3
Complaints, Records of: Criminal Non-Criminal		.6 1

Court Transmittals	1, audited
Criminal Identification Records (fingerprints, mug shots, etc.)	No requirement
Daily Activity Records (Blotter, Log, Slips, etc.)	
Firearm Permits, Records of:	10
Identification Records	No requirement
Investigations, Reports of:	See Case Files
Missing Persons Reports: Satisfactorily Closed All Others	1 Permanent
Parking Authority Claim Checks or Stubs Revenue and Expenditure Records	Destroy after audit 3, audited
Parking Violation Records	1, audited
Permit Records: Bazaar, Bingo or Raffle	1, audited
Permit Records: Bazaar, Bingo or Raffle  Personnel Records:  Employment History Records, Originals Employment History Records, Duplicates Leave, Attendance and Training Records Time Records, Detail	Permanent
Personnel Records: Employment History Records, Originals Employment History Records, Duplicates Leave, Attendance and Training Records	Permanent 1 after termination
Personnel Records:  Employment History Records, Originals Employment History Records, Duplicates Leave, Attendance and Training Records Time Records, Detail	Permanent 1 after termination 1 after termination 1
Personnel Records: Employment History Records, Originals Employment History Records, Duplicates Leave, Attendance and Training Records Time Records, Detail  Radio, Telephone or CJIS Records	Permanent 1 after termination 1 after termination 1 2 See PA 74-163, GS 54-76, and
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Personnel Records:  Employment History Records, Originals Employment History Records, Duplicates Leave, Attendance and Training Records Time Records, Detail  Radio, Telephone or CJIS Records  Records Erased by Statute or Court Order  Reports, Departmental: Annual (Record Copy) Interim Special Administrative	Permanent 1 after termination 1 after termination 1 2 See PA 74-163, GS 54-76, and GS 54-90  Permanent 1

If you have any questions about the retention of police records please contact the TAP Coordinator, Ed Hendricks, at 566 - 3500, or the State's Public Records Administrator at 566 - 5007.

Non-Reportable Cases

Wrecker Call Records

Appendix F

Recommendations on Restructuring
Directed Patrol Procedures

MEMORANDUM: June 20, 1979

TO: Don Hansen, Quincy ICAP Director

FROM: Phil Matyi

RE: Restructuring Directed Patrol Procedures

In order to encourage greater involvement of patrolmen in developing strategies for directed patrols and to increase their participation in making these runs, the following procedure is recommended:

- Crime analysts identify a trend in crime (this need not be a headline generating series but might be as simple as a notice of certain events occurring in the city, an unusual crime, repeated complaints by citizens, etc.).
- An analyst will bring this to the attention of the patrol supervisor prior to the roll call and discuss with the supervisor the utility of bringing this up at roll call. (Initially discussion with the entire patrol may not be the best way to introduce this practice because of the peer pressure on officers to resist new ideas when in larger groups. As a result, a smaller unit, such as the sargeant and men patrolling just the area in question may be more effective).
- Once the supervisor (lieutemant, sergeant, etc.) agrees to the idea, some broad but specific approaches to the problem should be agreed upon betwen him and the crime analyst just prior to the presentation to the men. These will be generic ideas to be thrown out as needed to encourage participation and suggestions from the patrolmen. Questions like . . "Should we use foot patrol or cars for this problem?" . . "Should we do the activity hourly, every five hours or at what intervals?"
- At the meeting (roll call, etc.) the supervisor should introduce the problem with a general description such as . . "you may be aware that there has been a series of auto thefts recently at the Quincy MBTA station.

  (Name) one of our crime analysts, is here to give us some specific details that he/she has been able to piece together up to this point.
- The analyst will present as many clues and observations as have been identified keeping the tone one of giving facts to the patrolmen for their use. For example:

MEMORANDUM: June 20, 1979
Don Hansen, Quincy ICAP Director

Page Two

during the last wEek six cars have been stolen from the parking lot. None have been recovered. The kinds of cars were

. The times they were taken were between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. We know one car was taken between 3:30 and 4:15 p.m. because the owner came back after a short time to get something in the trunk. The M.O.'s are unclear, but two people reported they forgot to lock their cars.

The only persons reported around the scene by the victims were some youngsters on skate boards. We did get an FIR that the station attendant saw two-to-three teenagers hanging around after 2:00 p.m. but we couldn't get a description.

We have no strong suspects but our files indicate that past offenders in repeated thefts of autos were: juveniles \_\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. We know that these people are still in Quincy because none have been found guilty of past charges yet.

- The supervisor should then ask the group if they have any specific information which they think might relate to this. Verbal responses should be solicited and the crime analyst should take notes because the information is the equivalent of a field information report. Some examples are: any information on the list of names presented, additional suspects, observations in passing the lot, discussions with people in the neighborhood, etc.
- Now that available information is collected the supervisor should ask "what do you men suggest as some ideas of how we can address these crimes?" The suggestions should be prodded by the general ideas developed in paragraph 4 above.

The crime analyst should take notes on the suggestions offered by the patrolmen. The discussion on the specific strategies should initially be among the sworn personnel so they get the idea that it is their suggestions not just the supervisor or crime analyst. Perhaps the suggestions could be listed on a blackboard or easel pad.

- From the suggestions offered the best one(s) agreed upon by the men would be witten down as a D-run(s) to be performed at the argeed upon intervals. The crime analyst should prepare the D-run form on the spot, have the supervisor both sign it and assign it to the appropriate officers.
- At the next meeting the supervisors (with the crime analyst in attendance) should report back to the men whatever results were reported on the D-runs. Any additional crimes

MEMORANDUM: June 20, 1979

Don Hansen, Quincy ICAP Director

Page Three

would be noted with the specifics of what occurred. Also, the general question about "has anyone uncovered additional information on this crime?" should be asked and the data added to the FIR file of the analyst. D-runs should be reassigned as on the previous night. This procedure should continue until the next review session (see below).

• At the end of some reasonable time period (perhaps one week) the supervisor, crime analyst, and patrolment should make a review of the effectiveness of the strategies used. At this meeting the crime analyst will present an update of the facts with all the FIR information and any additional crimes since the first meeting.

The supervisor will then ask the men whether the current D-run procedures should be modified and how they should be modified with some explanation of why.

• This procedure of fact: presentation by the crime analyst, specific strategy development by patrolmen, and feedback updating with strategy modification should continue until either the incidence of events is determined to be effectively controlled, arrests are made, or higher priority incidents demand a refocusing of manpower.

It is my opinion, as we discussed, that this approach to D-runs will reinforce the nature of teamwork between the CAU and patrol, will allow patrolmen to see that their input has a major influence on how police work will be done and will encourage a spirit of teamwork targeting on a specific goal.

Appendix G

Comments of the ICAP Manager on the Evaluation Report and the Response of the Evaluators



### City of Quincy, Massachusetts Police Headquarters

Address All Communications To Chief of Police

August 6, 1979

Mr. John J. McDonnell ABT Associates Inc. 55 Wheeler Street Cambridge, MA 02138

Dear Mr. McDonnell:

During the meeting held at the Quincy Police Department on Thursday, July 5, 1979 I voiced several opinions concerning the evaluation report draft that you submitted for our Phase I ICAP Grant. As we have agreed, the opinions expressed herein will be included in the appendix of the report.

I will review the points I made in order of their relationship to the sequence of the evaluation text. In section 3.1.1, the evaluators chose to censure management decisions regarding personnel assignment. While it is within the scope of their objectives to assist the department in improving ICAP and therefore the management process, it may have been an injustice to do so in the manner they have chosen. To be more specific, listed among the "obstacles to acceptance of ICAP" was the "recent" departmental reorganization. The conclusion drawn by the evaluator is that this single management decision is or has been a major obstacle in the acceptance of ICAP. Even though ICAP has been a functional entity for nearly two years, the reader is led to believe that a decision made barely three months ago has led to implementation problems.

Rather than discussing the reorganization with management, the evaluator has attempted to interject these comments into the body of the ICAP evaluation. Absent from this style of technical assistance is a thorough explanation of the reasons that led to the departmental reorganization or an appreciation for the complex infrastructure of any urban police department. For reasons that need not be elaborated upon, inclusion of this issue within the ICAP report was ineffectual in assisting ICAP implementation. Simply stated, a complex issue was somewhat misrepresented.

In section 3.1.6, the evaluators discuss the issue of information hardware. It is an acknowledged fact that microprocessors, microfilming and other "hardware" are not in and of themselves a solution to outdated or outmoded records systems. Quincy, like all of the existing ICAP sites is committed to developing the best possible manual systems prior to discussion of "hardware" solutions. This viewpoint has been made clear on many occasions by the Project Manager. Further, the Department has been taking the first steps toward eventual computerization. These measures include processing of a new incident card and seeking technical assistance in developing the records system. Quincy has also shown an interest in POSSE as a cost-effective alternative to developing an independent system. This developmental pace is condoned by LEAA, and on-site technical assistance by the Minnesota Crime Prevention Institute will facilitate the evolution of a manual system that is adaptable to POSSE.

Rather than highlight this new plateau, the evaluator has resorted to generalizations in evaluating POSSE. With an informational foundation restricted to a two page summary of POSSE, provided by the Project Manager, the evaluator has soundly critiqued the proposed program. This commentary on POSSE was not a surprise, since the evaluator has previously discussed this with the Project Manager. What is surprising is that the evaluator fails to mention that each objection that has been raised, was properly dislodged upon further examination. Usually, information provided by Roger Crutchfield or Paul Wormeli of the POSSE Project assisted Project Management in determining POSSE was a viable objective.

One new fact that is somewhat apocryphal was added by the evaluation team to further enhance their assertion that Quincy did not understand the pitfalls of computerization. It was reported that "the ICAP manager is very interested in using the computer to perform crime analysis functions". At no time was is suggested that CASS would be added to POSSE. Project policy is that Manual Crime Analysis should serve Quincy's needs for some time to come. Additionally, it is also ficticious that ICAP personnel "expect records room problems to disappear" with the installation of a computer. A careful review of project implementation plans would reveal that the Quincy ICAP has laid a strong foundation for eventual changes leading to computerization.

I must close by stating that during the evaluation period I gave ABT every opportunity to "participate" in the management of change by "living in the system". Due to constraints imposed by the personal limitations of their staff and often mentioned "financial restraints", the offer was never accepted. As a result ABT has produced a report that is somewhat limited in the scope and detail necessary to adequately document the Phase I ICAP experience. On balance, Project Management acknowledges the difficulty in producing such a report and asks that these comments be accepted in the spirit of constructive criticism.

Sincerely yours,

Donald W. Hanser

Donald W. Hansen ICAP Project Manager

DWH/mr

cc: Ms. Joan Mullen, Vice President

Mr. Phil Matyi, Special Consultant, ABT

MEMORANDUM: August 15, 1979

TO: Quincy ICAP Evaluation File

FROM: Philip J. Matyi and John J. McDonnell

SUBJECT: Comments of the ICAP Manager on the Evaluation Report

In his letter of August 6, Quincy's ICAP manager discusses three major points related to our report:

- o "Abt has produced a report that is somewhat limited in the scope and detail necessary to adequately document the Phase I ICAP experience";
- o "the evaluators chose to censure management decisions regarding personnel assignment . . . a complex issue was somewhat misrepresented";
- o Quincy "is committed to developing the best possible manual systems prior to discussion of hardware solutions."

In considering the first point it is important to understand the stated purpose of the evaluation. As noted in Section 2 (p. 4) of our final report, "the evaluation was intended to be primarily a management tool." This purpose was thoroughly discussed and agreed upon during our initial meeting with officials of the department, and documented in our January 15, 1979 letter report\* to the chief regarding the meeting:

- . . . our objective is not to document the status quo, but rather to develop recommendations for the future . . .
- . . . the evaluation is intended primarily to be a management tool that can be used to make the ICAP a more effective and integrated component of the Quincy Police Department.
- . . . we intend to provide feedback on a timely basis, in keeping with the evaluation's intended function as a mangement tool. . . . we intend to submit our (findings and recommendations) throughout the project. . . .

In short, the Project Director's comment on the issue of scope is particularly puzzling in view of our agreement that we would not be primarily concerned with producing a documentary of Phase I experience.

<sup>\*</sup>A copy is attached

The second point addresses the distribution of management responsibilities among the department's command staff, and its influence on the integration of ICAP in the department. Obviously, the recent reorganization has not been a major obstacle in the acceptance of ICAP, and we did not mean to imply that it had been. However, in our opinion, the new organization may well become a major obstacle. We felt obligated to address this issue in our report because of the importance we placed on the use of the evaluation as a management tool that might influence future management decisions. Only time will tell whether the discussion of this issue within the report was "ineffectual." At present, such a conclusion seems premature at best. While admitting that this issue is complex, we do not believe that it was misrepresented in any way.

Finally, although the ICAP Manager has on several occasions voiced his commitment to "developing the best possible manual systems prior to discussion of 'hardware' solutions," the department's actions often seem to contradict such claims. For example, we recommended that the department establish a records retention policy that specifies the length of time that each type of record should be retained and that the policy be fully implemented <a href="mailto:before">before</a> deciding to purchase a microfilm system. Such a records retention policy has yet to be established let alone implemented—but a Request for Bids has already been issued for the purpose of purchasing a microfilm system.

In the area of manual records systems, similar inconsistency emerges. On the one hand, Quincy "is seeking technical assistance in developing records systems." On the other hand, although Quincy received such assistance from us over four months ago (see Appendix B of the report), our recommendations were generally ignored. To our knowledge only two of our ten recommendations have received any attention. One recommendation concerning the Community Incident Card confirmed the department's decision to introduce a new card, a decision which had been made before our evaluation began. The other recommendation that received some attention was related to the need to accumulate monthly departmental summary statistics. ICAP personnel began this task last month, independent of the department's central records activities.

We continue to believe in the validity of our reservations regarding the computer systems which Quincy looks forward to using. We deny that any of our reservations were "properly dislodged upon further examination," as claimed by the ICAP manager. These reservations will persist for us until the systems become fully operational in Quincy.

We believe that the report presents a balanced view of the program's achievements; that it addresses problem areas deserving prompt attention; and, that it recommends specific and feasible responses for each problem area.

## ABT ASSOCIATES INC. 55 WHEELER STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138 TELEPHONE AREA 517-492-7100

TWX: 710-3201382

January 15, 1979

Chief Francis X. Finn Quincy Police Department 442 Southern Artery Quincy, MA 02169

Dear Chief:

The purpose of this letter is to summarize Phil Matyi's and my understanding of the agreements reached during our initial discussions of January 12th with you, Don Hansen, and other members of the department, regarding our evaluation of the Quincy ICAP.

First, we will be performing a process, as distinct from an impact evaluation. It will be based on information collected through interviews and observations, and will involve no statistical analysis of departmental performance data. Details of the evaluation methodology will be presented in draft form for review and comments by January 25th, with the final version being delivered by January 31, 1979.

Second, our objective is not to document the status quo, but rather to develop recommendations for the future.

Third, the evaluation is intended primarily to be a management tool that can be used to make the ICAP a more effective and integrated component of the Quincy Police Department. We will, therefore, consider not only the internal activities of the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU), but also the actual and potential linkages between the CAU and other departmental activities—especially patrol, investigation and communications.

Fourth, we intend to provide feedback on a timely basis, in keeping with the evaluation's intended function as a management tool. Therefore, rather than submit all of our findings and recommendations at the conclusion of the evaluation, we intend to submit them throughout the project. In this way the impact of the recommendations can be maximized and their implementation delays minimized. Our final report, therefore, is likely to contain no surprises, since it will primarily be a compilation of earlier reports.

If I have any misunderstanding on these matters, I would appreciate your letting me know as soon as possible.

John me alonnell

John McDonnell
Project Director

cc: Donald W. Hansen, ICAP Director
Lt. Neil MacDonald
JM:aq

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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