

REACTIONS TO CRIME

A Critical Review of the Literature

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U. S. Department of Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice



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ABSTRACT

This essay reviews published and unpublished research on individual perceptions of crime, and individual and collective behavioral reactions to crime. It provides a set of conceptions around which existing research findings can be organized and compared. Emphasis is given to the consistency or inconsistency of findings and to an identification of variables, areas of research, and methodologies which have received insufficient attention.

Findings on perceptions of crime studies are distinguished in terms of whether they deal with values, judgments, or emotions, and the characteristic contents of crime perceptions. Individual behavioral reactions are organized in a typology which includes avoidance, home and personal protective, insurance, communicative, and participative behaviors. Collective behavioral responses are discussed in terms of crime control, crime prevention, victim advocacy, and offender oriented activities. The factors affecting perceptions and behaviors including crime conditions, personal and vicarious victimization experiences, social integration, and area characteristics are discussed.

Finally, research on the effects of individual and collective responses to crime on crime rates, personal victimization, social integration and community organization are considered.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This essay is the final product of a set of activities begun in November, 1975.¹ In the intervening time the efforts of a large number of people have assisted in its development. Since the set of issues assembled here relating to "reactions to crime" do not follow particular disciplinary lines, and because so much of the relevant research is unpublished, considerable energy was expended in literature searches and in correspondence with researchers and those responsible for developing crime programs.

Al Biderman opened his files from his earlier inventory of public opinion surveys and provided much needed encouragement at the outset. Diane Lloyd, at that time the urban affairs librarian at Northwestern, worked tirelessly to search all of the many literatures which we thought might be relevant. In the introduction to our annotated bibliography this search process is discussed in greater detail. Gail Kaplan took principal responsibility for coordinating the review and abstracting of articles. She was assisted by Paul Cassingham, Jolene Gallagher, Nancy Gaitskill, and Mike Andrykowski, Brad Berg, Marilyn Weber, Jim Brick, Paul Fainsod, Don Pilzer, Kim Baker, and Amy Hutner. Paul Lavrakas, Jerry Selig and Marcia Lipetz wrote mini-reviews of crime reporting, community studies, and crime waves respectively. Kent Hanson and Dave Conrads took over the abstracting process in its final stages.

Ed McCabe and Gail Kaplan wrote a first draft of a review essay. Working from the early draft, the abstracts, and a large number of sources that came to our attention too late to be abstracted, I reconceptualized and substantially enlarged the essay's scope. During this process the essay's length and number of references grew to five times their original size. Wes Skogan and Dan Lewis both read and gave valuable comments on Part I. Linda Englund and Heather Keppler helped summarize the survey results for Part II. A major resource in reviewing this literature was an index of major crime surveys developed with the assistance of Robert LeBailly, Heather Keppler, and Edward McCabe. Their work made the cross survey comparisons feasible.

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For the assistance, nagging, support, and criticism, I thank you all.

Fred DuBow
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¹ In addition to this essay, we prepared an annotated bibliography. Copies of this bibliography are available on loan from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service; copies of the full report are available from the Government Printing Office.

PART I. PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME

A. Introduction

Perceptions of crime and behavioral reactions to crime interact and affect each other. Much of the writing in this field assumes that perceptions of crime are important for understanding behavioral reactions to crime; attention to the influence of behavioral reactions on perceptions is less common. A final judgment on the degree and direction of influence between perceptions of crime on behavioral reactions to crime remains open. Most writing in the area assumes such a relationship, but the data discussed below are much less conclusive. We begin with a discussion of different types of crime perceptions: *values, judgments, and emotions*. These distinctions are useful in sorting out the variety of findings about people's fears, perceptions of risk, perceptions of crime rates, as well as their sense of the importance of crime as a political and personal issue. Many studies claim to deal with the "fear of crime". This term is associated with a great number of overlapping ideas. We present a typology which gives a more precise meaning to the term and distinguishes it from statements about crime risks and rates, as well as crime concerns. From types of perceptions, we turn to a consideration of the content of these perceptions. Most research on perceptions of crime concentrates on a small number of crimes and finds those which involve violence and stranger offenders to be most salient. Crime occurring in locations outside the people's own neighborhoods and experience is often perceived as more prevalent.

The final section of this part will examine factors that are believed to influence perceptions of crime. Many of the findings on this topic involve general crime conditions, individual victimization, or more indirect and vicarious experiences. Within this literature there is evidence that speaks for and against the judgment that crime perceptions are rational, i.e., that they are related to risks or to previous experiences.

We then consider the potential impact of police behavior, the media and politics on crime, but find little that is more than suggestive in the existing studies. Finally we consider the role of social integration and community values in influencing crime perceptions. These factors have received less attention in recent studies, but still appear to be among the most important

for setting a general context in which specific perceptions are placed.

A great number of surveys conducted in the past fifteen years have asked people about various perceptions, attitudes, opinions, and fears about crime. The frequency with which such questions are asked has increased to such an extent that there have probably been as many surveys conducted in the past five years as there were in all the five decades of surveys inventoried by Biderman *et al.* (1972). Unfortunately, this increased interest and effort has not produced much conceptual development or specification. Surveys have generally been conducted for fairly instrumental purposes such as evaluation, planning, or estimating opinions for news media, and relatively little effort has been devoted to determining the reliability or validity of the questions being asked. Furthermore, the majority of studies have relied on a limited repertoire of question formats and approaches. While the repetition of questions allows for comparison of responses across time and location, the wording of questions is often dissimilar enough to make such comparisons unreliable (Conway, n.d.). Some of the national opinion polls and the attitude sections of the city victim surveys, conducted by the Census Bureau for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), have retained the same questions over time and consequently these studies are the strongest sources of comparative data now available.²

B. Conceptual Ambiguities

1. *Fear*. When discussed in common speech, in the media, or in scholarly studies, "Fear of crime" refers to a wide variety of subjective and emotional assessments and behavioral reports. There is a serious lack of both consistency and specificity in these reports. Responses to questions involving potential danger to self and/or others, fear, risk, concern, worry, anxiety, or behavior

² Comparisons of two points in time in the same geographic location are somewhat more common, but rarely use the same respondents (Kelling *et al.*, 1974). Data sets of this type are found in more rigorous program evaluations such as those conducted in Hartford (Fowler, 1974), Cincinnati (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978), Seattle (Abt Associates, 1976), San Diego (Boydston, 1975), and St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg, 1974, 1975).

are at times considered to be about "fear."³ When distinctions are made, they are sometimes contradictory or vague. Consequently, reports of findings on the causes or results of "fear of crime" are difficult to interpret unless one knows how "fear" was measured (Conway, n.d.). Similarly, contradictory findings of two studies are often explainable in terms of differences in the way "fear" is conceptualized or measured. For example, in a reanalysis of survey data from Baltimore, Furstenberg (1972) found that if responses to questions dealing with personal assessments of the risk of being the victim of a crime were distinguished from reports of respondents' concern for crime as a public issue, a very different pattern of results was obtained than when both types of responses were combined in a single conception of "fear of crime." Prior analysis of this survey had reported that residents of low crime areas are more fearful than residents of high crime areas. But when Furstenberg made the distinction between concern about crime as a public issue and the assessment of victimization risk, it was found that although residents of low crime areas gave a higher priority to crime as a public issue, residents of high crime areas perceived their risk of victimization to be greater.

2. *Crime.* An accompanying ambiguity is introduced by varying uses of the concept of "crime." Again, inconsistent referents and a lack of specificity cloud discussion of the issue. Most often, respondents are asked to comment on crime in general (e.g., "Do you think that the crime rate is rising in the nation?") or to think in terms of a class of crimes such as "street crimes" (e.g., "Do you feel more afraid and uneasy on the streets today in comparison to what you felt a few years ago?"). Other studies have asked respondents about their perceptions of a series of separate crimes such as robbery, burglary, and assault. Just as law enforcement agencies are finding that analysis of specific types of crime is a more productive means of using crime information, it is also likely that an investigation of the degree to which perceptions and reactions vary with specific types of crimes may be more productive. This process can only begin when researchers become more aware of the need to specify the types of crimes being investigated in their research designs and reports.

Such qualifications do not mean that it is of no use to study perceptions and reactions to crime in the aggregate. People's thoughts about crime undoubtedly combine elements from many different categories and it is likely that crime as a generalized symbol has a salience

despite its abstractness. Nevertheless, findings can best be understood when a number of specific crime referents are being used.

C. Types of Perceptions of Crime

Over the past few years, studies have increasingly treated "fear of crime" as a multidimensional variable. For the most part, analytic distinctions have been formulated inductively from existing survey data. Furstenberg (1972) distinguishes a dimension of concern for crime as a public problem from the assessment of the personal risk of victimization. He termed the "risk" dimension as the "fear of crime." Fowler and Mangione (1974) have further distinguished assessments of risk from emotional reactions to crime. According to Fowler and Mangione, people may share a common assessment of how likely they are to be a victim of a crime such as burglary, but they may take the probability of being robbed more or less seriously and may worry or feel frightened in varying degrees. Fowler and Mangione reserve the label "fear of crime" for this emotional dimension.

We present a typology which builds upon the work of Fowler and Mangione. A more generalized conceptualization of their categories forms the horizontal dimension of Figure 1. These categories are *values*, *judgments*, and *emotions*. The vertical axis represents a continuum of perceptual references ranging from perceptions which focus on *general* judgments about crime and other people to those which are close to a person's own experiences.

Figure 1

Types of Crime Perceptions

	Values	Judgments	Emotions
General Referent	Concerns	Rates of Victimization	Fear for Others
Personal Referent	Personal Tolerance	Personal Risks	Fear for Self

1. *Values.* Individuals may have opinions about the priorities that the political process should accord to a range of social issues. Following Furstenberg (1972) and Fowler and Mangione (1974), we term these public/political evaluations of crime as "concern for crime." Concern has been measured with questions that survey the seriousness of crime and other problems. When the seriousness scores for different problems are compared, a ranking similar to that of political priorities is obtained.

Another source of data on the importance of crime and safety as public issues can be found in discussions of cultural values about what is unacceptable or deviant behavior. There are a large number of studies of de-

³ Although Rifai's (1976) study provides a number of useful innovations, it is also a good example of the confusion that can result from interchanging perceptions of risk, rates, concerns, and feelings, all of which are termed "anxiety."

viance which report differences among people, institutions, and communities in the forms of behavior they find acceptable. What is tolerated in one area or social group may be intolerable in another (Durkheim, 1958; Lane, 1968); a serious problem in one neighborhood may be an accepted part of life in another. Such findings place crime and safety in a constellation of other concerns and provide information about the relative concern for a variety of offensive behaviors.

In addition to studies of crime concerns in the United States, there are ethnographic studies by anthropologists on the perception of crime in other cultures (Selby, 1974; Edgerton, 1973; Bohannon, 1967). Such studies often emphasize the variability and relativity of ideas about deviance and crime as one compares different subcultures and cultures. But other surveys of cross cultural materials find a core of offenses which are widely, if not universally, condemned (Brown, 1952) and a high degree of agreement about the relative seriousness of offenses (Newman, 1976; Rossi *et al.*, 1974).

While people's perceptions of appropriate political priorities are likely to reflect their personal values, it is possible to make an analytic distinction between these personal values and people's ideas of what is appropriate behavior for the public in general. When data are collected on both types of perceptions, it is possible to examine how closely these two are related and to determine whether personal tolerance or intolerance of crime in one's immediate social environment conforms with the public priorities which the individual believes to exist or would subscribe to. One theme in the research literature is that residents of high crime areas are more tolerant or accommodating to crime and consequently are less concerned with crime as a public issue (Biderman *et al.*, 1967; Reiss, 1967).

In polls and surveys over the past fifteen years, crime and public safety have gone from low priority problems to ones which are ranked in people's responses as being among the two or three most serious social problems (Erskine, 1974).⁴ For example, between 1973 to 1977, crime was found to be the most important local concern in Michigan. Twenty-two percent of the respondents spontaneously mentioned crime before any other issues (MOR, 1977). Although the trend has generally been towards a greater concern for crime, there have been periods of declining concern as well. The observed seriousness of the concern for crime is also sensitive to question formats. Unstructured questions produce lower relative frequencies of reactions on questions about concerns than do structured ones (Nehnevajsa, 1977; Frisbie

⁴ Conway (n.d.) notes that the priority given to crime varies with the wording and format of the questions asked; overall, however, she concludes that crime rose as a concern of the late 1960's.

et al., 1977). The salience of crime as a national problem is vulnerable to the ebb and flow of other public issues and dramatic events.

2. *Judgments.* A large body of data from surveys and polls reports people's assessments of crime rates and the probability of victimization. At the general end of the continuum, there are reports about the following:

- rates of crime in a specific geographic location (e.g., nation, state, city, neighborhood, or "right around here"),
- comparisons of rates in an area close to the respondent (e.g., the block, neighborhood, or city) with other locations farther away (e.g., another block, neighborhood, or city),
- changes in rates over time.

Assessments of these types may consider crime in the aggregate⁵ or a specific type of crime.

At the more personal end of the continuum, individuals judge the probability of their own victimization. Questions about personal risk may be further specified as to location (e.g., "in this neighborhood") or to type of crime. As with judgments about crime rate, assessments of personal risk may include comparisons over time or place. In between the general and personal level are judgments about the risks of other people being victimized. These people may be as closely linked to respondents as members of the family (spouses, children, older relatives) or more socially distant residents of the area.

Although assessments of crime rates and crime risks are both judgments about the factual distribution of crime events, they are distinct entities. Perceptions of the amount of crime may differ substantially from assessments of personal vulnerability. Such discrepancies are found at both ends of the continuum. Some people believe they are less likely to be a victim of a crime than the average person. This is particularly striking when residents of high crime areas report lower perceptions of personal risk than might be expected. These individuals may see themselves as bigger, smarter, tougher, or more cautious than most people. An analogous phenomenon is reported in research on auto accident risks. Many people perceive an overall level of danger in automobile use, but discount their personal risks because they believe they are better drivers. Such perceptions are one reason why media campaigns portraying auto risks have not succeeded in inducing people to use seat belts while driving.

On the other hand, some individuals may perceive

⁵ Even when respondents are asked about crime in the most general terms, there is considerable evidence that most respondents answer in terms of offenses to the household and personal safety. White collar crime, fraud, or corruption are seldom cited by respondents.

themselves as more vulnerable than the average person due to some personal attribute such as age, sex, size, appearance, reputation or bad luck. This pattern is particularly noteworthy for persons living in areas with low or modest crime rates who perceive a high degree of personal risk.

Several trends appear across a number of studies that deal with judgments about crime. First, in almost all studies, regardless of when or where they were done, a large proportion of people perceive crime rates to be rising and a small minority believe the rates to be declining (Nehnevajsa, 1977; Biderman *et al.*, 1967). Garofalo (1977c) notes that the differences in the degree to which crime is perceived as increasing depend on whether the respondent is asked about the nation or local neighborhood. In thirteen of the cities included in the National Crime Survey, he found a consistent pattern of respondents perceiving greater crime increases at the national than at the neighborhood level.

Crime has not always been as much of a public preoccupation as it has been in the past 15 years, but reports from earlier periods suggest that whenever people are asked to assess trends in the incidence of crime, they are likely to report that crime has increased since a previous period (McIntyre, 1967). The tendency to see crime as increasing may provide a reservoir of support for "moral entrepreneurs" of crime (Becker, 1960), people who use the crime issue as a means to further personal or organizational mobility. Thus, although there are fluctuations in the proportion of people that particular surveys report as perceiving crime rates to be rising, there is a constant pattern of more people seeing crime as rising than declining.

A second pattern commonly found across studies is the judgment that there is less crime in one's immediate environment or neighborhood than in other locations. Biderman *et al.*, (1967) noted this pattern in a study of neighborhoods in Washington, D.C. Boggs (1971) reported a similar pattern in a study which included rural, suburban, and central city residents. Most recently, in none of the thirteen cities which were in the National Crime Survey did any racial or income group report their neighborhood to be "much more dangerous" or "more dangerous" than other neighborhoods (Garofalo, 1977c).

This pattern may result from two interrelated dynamics. First, the perception of crime is closely associated in many people's minds with activities and peoples who are strange or different from themselves. Since it is likely that the actions of residents of the immediate neighborhood are more familiar than what people do elsewhere, it would follow that people would be more worried or more intolerant of activities in

"other" neighborhoods. Secondly, much talk about crime has a certain abstractness to it and appears disconnected from actual experience. When asked to comment on the immediate environment, people are able to give a more realistic and experienced-based assessment than they can for places and people with whom they have no direct experience.

Assessments of personal risk provide the most direct indication of the impact of crime on an individual. Questions about risk take the form of asking people how they perceive their chances of being the victim of "crime" (defined in a general sense) or more typically, the victim of a specific crime, e.g., robbery, assault, burglary. Although this type of perception provides a logical link between the crime environment and individual reactions, the perception of the risk of victimization has not been as commonly studied in polls and surveys as have questions about concerns, rates, or personal fears. Perceptions of the change in patterns of risk over time look much like those reported above for changes in crime rates. People generally report that their chances of being a victim are increasing (Garofalo, 1977c), and perceptions of crime trends are strongly correlated with perceptions of risk trends. In the National Crime Survey cities data, perceived risks were more strongly correlated with national crime trend perceptions ($\gamma = .59$) than with neighborhood trend perceptions ($\gamma = .47$) (Garofalo, 1977c).

Another less direct way of measuring perceived risk are questions which ask about the perceived safety or danger of the respondent's environment. Sharp differences have been found between perceptions of risk at night and in the daytime. Across a large number of studies, a much higher proportion of people felt unsafe at night while a much smaller percentage of respondents felt unsafe during the day (Nehnevajsa, 1977).

Surveys, unless they are targeted for specific subareas of a city, generally do not permit comparison of neighborhood characteristics with the individual answers of respondents.⁶ However, where such data are available (Biderman *et al.*, 1967), it has been found that residents of poorer neighborhoods with higher official crime rates generally perceive greater risks than residents of other areas.

3. *Emotions.* The distinction between emotional reactions to a perceived situation and the perception of the "facts" or "reality" of the situation are analytically

⁶ If the address or sheet of the respondent is obtained in the interview, it is possible to do a post-hoc match-up interview with census tract and/or police crime statistics where these are available. Neighborhood characteristics including crime may then be analyzed along with individual responses (Schneider, 1976; O'Neil, 1977).

distinguishable, although in common discourse as well as in survey questions the two types of perceptions may be intertwined.

It is the emotional dimension of people's response to crime that most appropriately includes measures of "fear." Survey formats that tap this dimension include questions about "how afraid," "how uneasy" people *feel* about the occurrence of crime in general or a specific type of crime. In health behavior studies, a distinction is sometimes made between perceptions of the *frequency* of certain diseases and perceptions of the *seriousness* of such an illness if it were to affect the respondent (Rosenstock, 1966). This distinction separates perceptions of probability and assessments of the personal impact of illness and is similar to the distinction we are making between judgments and emotions.

The research on deterrence and perceptions of deterrence has fruitfully utilized the distinction between the *certainty* of being apprehended or sanctioned and the *severity* of the sanction (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs, 1975). Certainty is the probability or risk of being sanctioned, while severity refers to the seriousness of the sanction, usually measured by the length of time served in prison. These distinctions are frequently used in aggregate inter-state comparisons, but more recently a number of studies have focused on the perception of these two factors. While the conception of risk is quite analogous in the three areas, there are significant differences among these literatures in terms of perceptions of the impacts of illness and criminal sanctioning as compared with the impact of crime. The other two areas of research focus on more rational assessments of consequences for the individual (e.g., how long the prison term will be), while the crime literature concentrates on the emotional impact of crime. Rational perceptions of how much injury will be sustained due to crime or how much money will be lost are not given the same level of attention as the *direct* emotional response of fear.

Whereas perceptions of other physically or materially harmful events are treated primarily in terms of cognitive assessments of consequences, crime is discussed in terms of emotional fears as well as other impacts. There is much talk of the "fear of crime" but little about the fear of automobile accidents.⁷

Is this because people are actually more afraid of crime or could it be an artifact of research orientation? Yaden *et al.* (1976), in the only study we have found which considered perceived dangers of criminal and

non-criminal (auto accidents, serious accidents at home or away, and house fires) situations, reports that fear of auto accidents was more consistently ranked high in four Portland, Oregon neighborhoods than any of the other situations. Fears about being robbed were high in three of the four neighborhoods. Residents of the highest crime neighborhood perceived greatest danger from both criminal and non-criminal situations than the residents of the other three neighborhoods. A high crime neighborhood appears to be a threatening place to live in more respects than just crime.

Yaden *et al.* also found a strong correlation between fear of serious accidents, house fires, and street robbery at the individual level. Fear of crime may be part of a general tendency to be fearful, which may itself be a function of demographic characteristics or of the area of residence. It remains for future research to list the generality of Yaden *et al.*'s findings. If future studies contain similar findings, it will provide a strong case for the necessity to examine fear of crime in broader social and personal contexts.

If the fear of crime is greater than the fear of many other risks, the literature provides little in the way of a satisfactory explanation. Some possible explanations include: a) the characteristics of criminal acts themselves provoke fears in ways that other dangers to the personal do not, b) cultural and political definitions of risk emphasize objective harm in some cases and emotional harm in others, and c) fear of crime is an artifact of the questions and methodologies used in different research traditions. In following sections on the mass media and on the politics of crime, we will point to studies which do not consider the above alternatives, but do describe ways in which the level and content of crime fears has been manipulated.

a. *Fear for others.* Questions in the form of "How afraid are you to . . ." or "Are you ever afraid of . . ." most frequently asked in polls and surveys represent the most common approach to studying fear of crime. These questions seek to measure the extent of personal fear in a variety of real or hypothetical situations. Much less attention has been given to the fear that others will be victims of crime.

Savitz *et al.* (1977), in a study of black and white central city residents, asked mothers about both their fear of crime and their fear for their teenaged sons. They found that many of these women were more worried about their sons' safety than about their own. The mothers' greater fear for their sons corresponds with higher rates of personal victimization reported by their teenagers. Comparison of parents' fear for themselves and their children or more generally of family members for each other could add an important dimension to our

⁷ The probabilities of being killed in a traffic accident are four times as great as being murdered. Suicides and death from falls are both twice as likely as murders. If only murders by non-intimates are considered, the contrasts would be more than twice as large (President's Crime Commission, 1967b; Silberman, 1978).

understanding of crime perceptions. For some adult behaviors, the fears for their children's safety may be more salient than for their own.

Many husbands express more fear for their wives' safety than for themselves. Springer (1974) found that police perceived a park area in Seattle to be generally safe for most people and for themselves, but they were fearful of their own wives using the park in the evenings. These findings also suggest that fear for the safety of "significant others" and other social intimates may be greater than for more socially distant persons. The population involved in the Savitz *et al.* study is too unusual and the number of studies too few to make broader inferences without additional studies.

In the United States, it is generally socially less appropriate for men to admit to fears than it is for women. For some subcultures, the lack of fear is heavily linked to conceptions of manliness. For all men, but particularly for men in such subgroups, it may be particularly difficult to obtain accurate responses about their level of personal fear of crime. Researchers who are sensitive to this problem may resort to asking respondents about other people's fear, using an indirect method to gain a more reliable picture of the individual's perception of crime. Such strategies may pose other problems of inference. One study already reports that respondents perceive other people as more worried about crime than they are (Courtis and Dusseier, 1970).

b. *Fear related to specific crimes.* In most research on "fear of crime," personal offenses in public places—popularly known as "street crimes"—have been the major referent whether mentioned implicitly or explicitly (Conklin, 1975; Biderman *et al.*, 1967). Thus, the most typical question about fear is whether the respondent is "afraid," "uneasy," or "feels unsafe" on the streets at night, when alone, in the neighborhood, within a mile of the residence, or within some other geographic designation. More recent studies, however, often specify particular "street crimes" so that fears of robberies, assaults, rapes, or sexual assaults can be looked at individually. Such studies may also include questions about fear of non-street crimes, most often burglary. The relative saliency of different types of crimes varies among individuals and locales, but street crimes are consistently found to be the most frightening.

c. *Trends in fear over time.* A number of studies have examined the pattern of fear over the past ten to twelve years. These studies have relied in large part on questions repeated frequently in national public opinion polls. The periods that can be studied with this data are limited by the absence of direct questions about fear of crime before 1965.

Hindelang (1974), Erskine (1974), and Adams and

Smith (1975) all report some increases in the proportion of respondents who said they were afraid to walk alone at night near their home. The secular trend to 1975 was generally upward, but with some fluctuations (Nehnevajsa, 1977). In the past three years, there has been a leveling off and even a decline in this measure of fear (DuBow and Baumer, 1977). The increases in reported fear rose much more dramatically for the elderly (Cook and Cook, 1975) than for the rest of the population.

d. *Other emotions.* We have dealt primarily with fear in our discussion of the emotional reactions to crime. This emphasis reflects the predominant orientation in the research literature. However, there are many other emotional reactions to crime that have been described. Anger, outrage, and frustration are emotions that are rarely studied in surveys of crime perceptions but they are frequently encountered in more wholistic reports of crime situations and of individual victimizations. Similarly, studies of the personal experiences of the victims of violent crimes frequently describe feelings of violation and helplessness (LeJeune and Alex, 1973; Silberman, 1978).

4. *Interrelationships of categories.* Some studies have examined interrelationships among the three perceptual dimensions of crime, but few have looked at interrelationship between the general and personal aspects within each dimension. Furstenberg's (1971) research was particularly influential because he demonstrated the importance of distinguishing perceptual dimensions; persons who are high on one may not be high on another. He found a pattern of high concern for crime and low perceived risks in low crime areas and a pattern of low concern for crime and high perceived risks in high crime areas. He reasoned that residents of high crime areas are aware of the personal danger of crime, but are more concerned about the fundamental problems of employment, housing and health. Residents of low crime areas tended to be economically better off and had fewer problems with employment, housing, and income. For these people, crime looms larger as a public issue even though they do not perceive high personal risks. Conway (n.d.) noted a similar pattern in the survey data. Furstenberg's explanation introduces the intervening variables of socio-economic well-being to explain an inverse relationship between concern and risk. There is nothing in this data however that could support a conclusion that a rise in perceived personal crime risk, all other things remaining constant, would lead to a reduction in crime concern.

Conklin (1975) found that more residents of Port City, a high crime area, ranked crime as a problem of greater personal concern than did the residents of Belleville, a

low crime area. He notes that his findings are contrary to Furstenberg's and speculates that areas around Baltimore where Furstenberg's data were gathered were dissimilar to the suburb of Belleville. In Baltimore, areas of high concern were also areas of strong opposition to racial change; it could be that the residents of low crime areas within Baltimore were expressing their concerns about racial change through the crime issue. Expressions of concern about crime may have functioned as a surrogate for race. Direct statements about race are translated into a concern about the "problem of crime" which for many respondents may mean crimes committed by blacks against whites.

Fowler and Mangione (1974) used all three dimensions and found there was a relationship between concern and risks, but there was a much stronger relationship between personal fear (or "worry" in their language) and perceptions of the risk of personal victimization. Perceived risk was the strongest predictor of worry in their regression analysis.

Garofalo (1977c) provides us with one of the few explorations of the personal and general aspects of one type of crime perception. He found a moderately strong interrelationship between perceived neighborhood crime trends (general) and perceived risks of victimization (personal). Although few other researchers have addressed these relationships in their analyses, the necessary items are available in a number of surveys so that secondary analysis across dimensions is possible. Except for personal and general judgments this is much less true for within dimension comparisons. The most important pattern of relationships that need to be understood are exceptions to common-sense expectations that, at the individual and area level, high evaluations of concern about crime will be associated with perceptions of a high or increasing rate of crime, risks of victimization and a high level of fear.

5. *Aggregate perceptions of crime.* Except for a few remarks on cultural values our discussion thus far has focused on the individual's perceptions of crimes. If the perceptions of crime of individuals living within a given geographic area are aggregated, it is possible to describe areas as having high or low levels of fear, concern, or perceived risk. In some areas residents may have highly similar perceptions of crime while in others there may be widely divergent perceptions. Once such characterizations are made, areas of high fear or concern can be compared with areas that rank lower in these dimensions (Rifai, 1976). The level or pattern of crime perceptions of particular areas can also be used as a variable to explain individual perceptions and behavioral responses as well as collective responses (Garofalo, 1977a).

Use of aggregated measures of crime perceptions is

particularly relevant when there is an interest in reducing the fear of crime along with the incidence of crime in specific locales. Thinking about perceptions in the aggregate makes relevant a series of locale characteristics which would appear less salient when considering the crime perceptions of individuals. Relatively little consideration has been given to adapting survey instruments originally designed for studying individual perceptions to the study of patterns of locales.

D. The Content of Perceptions of Crime

Thus far, we have spoken of perceptions of crime in general and in terms of three principal types of perceptions—evaluations, judgments, and emotions. These distinctions are useful in sorting out related but distinct elements of perception, but alone they do not capture the complexity or specificity of the content of crime perceptions. People often talk about crime in very general terms, but they also may have more specific typifications in mind about what crime is, who the criminals are, who is likely to be a victim, and where crime occurs. These specific contents may vary over time, place, and social groups.

1. *Violent crimes.* When asked to specify the risk or rates of victimization, respondents in different settings report a number of different crimes as being the most common or probable (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977). In some areas, burglary or vandalism is perceived as the most pervasive crime problem while, elsewhere, robberies or other street crimes rank first. The label of a region as a "high crime area," however, is generally applied to areas with moderate to high levels of "street crime" (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977).

At any given level of perceived risk, crimes of violence generate higher levels of fear (President's Commission, 1976b). When respondents who report a high fear of burglary are probed they often reveal that it is the possibility of contact with the burglar and the potential for violence in such an encounter that is most anxiety-producing. As Conklin (1975) observes,

Judging by the types of precautions that people take, they seem to fear personal attacks more than loss of property through theft.

2. *Crimes by strangers.* Many people have relatively clear expectations of what the perpetrators of particular crimes will look like. Mugging victims in New York, however, reported surprise that their assailants were better dressed and better mannered than they had expected. The circumstances of these muggings and the appearance of the perpetrator were often so radically different from expectations that for the first few seconds, many victims did not believe they were being robbed (LeJeune and Alex, 1973). Studies of crime perceptions emphasize the

tendency of people to blame "strangers" for most crime (Conklin, 1975). For this reason, high levels of fear and perceived risk are believed to be associated with greater suspicion and fear of strangers (President's Commission, 1967b).

The characteristics of "strangers" vary with time and social setting. Strangers may be defined in terms of class, race, ethnicity, geographic origins, or some combination of these factors. The proportion of crime people perceive to be inter-racial, inter-class, or inter-ethnic tends to be much higher than what is found in either official or victimization statistics. In many areas, "outsiders" are believed largely responsible for crime, or at least most of the serious crime. Such perceptions have a strong historical basis. In 19th and early 20th century America, succeeding waves of immigrant groups were blamed for much of the crime (Sternberg, 1973), as they were in Paris during the 19th century (Chevalier, 1973). The tendency to blame immigrants for crime continued in this country until large-scale immigration stopped in the 1930's. Since then migrants from one part of the country are frequently held responsible for crime increases in other regions.

Conklin (1975) sees the tendency to blame outsiders for crime as a psychological mechanism which makes continued residence in an area easier than if neighbors were perceived as the actual threats. Suttles (1972) suggests that images of the poor in this country are associated with suspicions of an increased likelihood of being criminal. It is widely believed, but difficult to demonstrate, that fear of crime is a surrogate issue for racial antagonism. At the level of national politics, Harris (1969) suggests such a link in his account of how the "war on crime" was launched in the mid-1960's. It was heavily supported by congressmen who also opposed desegregation.

3. *Incivility.* Crime problems are most often spoken of with reference to violent and property crimes. Some researchers, however, have discovered other behaviors associated with crime which frequently upset people. According to Biderman *et al.* (1967) people are more likely to come in contact with disreputable behavior such as drunkenness, boisterousness, and untidiness than they are to victims or witnesses of crimes. Exposure to such behavior may produce considerable discomfort and violate an individual's sense of what is appropriate or civil behavior. Such inappropriate behavior may be interpreted as a sign of the social disorder and moral decay of which crime is a part and, hence, be as threatening as more victim-oriented crime.

In a Portland, Oregon survey of the elderly, a significant percentage of their reported victimizations involved non-violent confrontations in the form of harassment

and obscene phone conversations (Rifai, 1976). Eighty percent of the sexual assault victimizations reported in a Kansas city survey were obscene phone calls (Kelling *et al.*, 1974). These represented a larger proportion of reported victimizations than all robberies, assaults, and sexual assaults combined. In the National Crime Survey, the most frequently mentioned neighborhood problems were "environmental"—trash, noise, and overcrowding. Crime was cited less most frequently (Garofalo, 1977c). A survey of busriders in Washington, D.C. reported that people experienced much more annoying behavior than saw crimes (Metropolitan Washington Council of Government, 1974). Riders were particularly upset by swearing, vandalism, pushing, drunkenness and vulgar behavior (ATA, 1973).

A Boston survey found a high degree of concern over the "failure of community" as evidenced by improper behavior in public places. Street crime headed the list of inappropriate behavior, but other behaviors evoking concern were violations of public decency that are at the margins of illegal behavior. Wilson (1968b) refers to this combination of crime and other anti-social behaviors as the "urban unease."

Eisinger (1974) in a study of Milwaukee residents presents data which challenged Wilson's contention that these concerns were more important than the more traditional urban problems of unemployment, housing, and taxes. He concludes that Boston and Milwaukee differ in the degree of breakdown in community norms. Foster (1974) using a survey which included Boston, Milwaukee, and eight other cities also finds no support to generalize Wilson's findings to other cities. The relative salience of incivility as compared to more serious criminal behavior in shaping perceptions of crime remains unanswered at this time.

4. *Location of crimes.* The images of crime that people carry with them also include characterizations of where and when crime occurs (Lawton *et al.*, 1976). People consistently report that crime is more likely to occur in the night and that crime risks and rates are higher in places other than their own neighborhoods (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978; Rifai, 1976; ISR, 1975). There is much less understanding in a more specific sense of when and where crime is perceived to occur. However, in the past few years interest in people's perception of the spatial location of crime and danger has increased.

Merry (1976) asked her residents to identify the "dangerous" spots in and around a housing project where they lived and to give reasons why they thought these locations were dangerous. Adult residents reported the most dangerous area in the project to be a location where young people hung out, drank beer, and played music. However, a victimization survey gathered at the

same time did not reveal a single crime that had occurred at that location. The discomfort associated with a clash of life styles as evidenced by incivil behavior was being interpreted as signs of danger by the adult residents.

A number of surveys have asked respondents to rate the safety or danger of various locations in a neighborhood or city or to name areas that are particularly dangerous. In many large cities people perceive the downtown areas as particularly unsafe (Coutis and Dusseyer, 1970). Teenaged boys and their mothers living in Philadelphia both agreed that subways were the most dangerous places (Savitz, Lalli, and Rosen, 1977). The boys also rated the streets on the way to school and the school premises themselves as quite dangerous.

Springer (1974) had residents of the middle-class Seattle community indicate which local areas were most unsafe. A park and nearby streets were believed to be most dangerous. These characterizations differed markedly from those of law enforcement officials who saw the park and the area, in general, as having comparatively little crime. The differences were explained, in part, by different reference points. Officials compared this area with other parts of the city that had much more crime, while the residents of the area were making judgments about the relative safety of different places within the local area.

Springer (1974) employs a concept of "mental maps" in describing the differential evaluation that residents had for their neighborhood. Other researchers have also been exploring the use of maps to represent the spatial configuration of attributes of safety or danger within an area (Gould, 1974). Ley (1972) presents anxiety and stress maps for residents of black inner city neighborhood of Philadelphia.

A recent survey of Hartford residents presented respondents with neighborhood maps which they were to mark to designate dangerous and otherwise problematic areas. Such techniques may have considerable potential for yielding new insights into judgments about crime (Fowler, 1974b).

After reviewing responses to the National Crime Surveys central city attitude questionnaires, Hindelang *et al.* (1978) conclude that crime is primarily perceived of as a *nonlocal* problem. People perceive all types of crime as more serious, as increasing more, and of great public concern in places other than their own neighborhoods. They do not deny the existence of crime locally, but view it as a more delimited and manageable problem than the crime problems of other locales. In a local setting people are better able to specify particular times and situations when they could be at risk, but in areas outside their neighborhoods perceived crime risks become more diffuse.

We have described a number of ways in which the content of crime perceptions has been described. These include the type of crime, the characteristics of offenders, and the location of crime in time and space. Violent crimes, crimes committed by strangers, crimes committed at night and outside people's immediate neighborhoods tend to be associated with the greatest fear. Behaviors that are perceived as inappropriate are likely to be more prevalent than serious crimes and may contribute to the level of fear when they are interpreted as signs of social disorder.

E. Factors Influencing Perceptions of Crime

1. *The objective measurement of crime.* Before discussing the issues and findings relating the incidence of crime to perceptions of crime, we briefly review the problems involved in measuring the extent of crime. The most widely known and used measures of crime are the official statistics of crimes reported to police. Typically, when areas are characterized as being "high" or "low" in crime, reported crime statistics are used as the basis for the judgment. The findings of victimization surveys since the mid-1960's (Ennis, 1967; Biderman *et al.*, 1967) confirmed earlier suspicions that a large proportion of more serious crimes were not being reported to the police and hence were not being counted in official statistics. With the exception of murder and auto theft, area crime rates based on victimization surveys would be much higher than those based on official statistics. The relationship between reported and unreported crime rates varies in different locales and over time. The inconsistency of the relationship makes it difficult to estimate one rate from the other.

The victimization surveys have also been criticized for a variety of methodological reasons (Skogan, 1975; 1976a; 1976b; Biderman and Reiss, 1967) and, at this point, cannot be relied upon as valid crime measures. There is no doubt that there is much more crime than is reported to the police and appears in official statistics, but difficulties arise in trying to exactly determine the amount of this additional, unreported crime. There are considerable problems in recalling the occurrence of many victimizations and in placing the crime in a definite period of time which is required for generating incidence estimates. A "reverse records check" procedure used in San Jose indicated that a substantial number of crimes reported to police were not being mentioned or recalled by respondents who were included in victimization surveys (Turner, 1972). The prevalence of non-recall was particularly high for crimes involving victims and offenders who had a close personal relationship. Only 22 percent of the assaults reported to police involving parties who had a prior relationship were subsequently men-

tioned in the victimization survey interviews. Another reverse records check study found significantly less disparity between police reports and recalled victimizations (Sparks, 1976).

On balance, the victim surveys uncover more crimes than are found in police reports, but still underestimate crime levels. Sub-national victimization surveys pose additional problems. Victimization surveys sample residents of an area and generate data on the crimes committed against residents. To date, no procedure has been devised to include the victimization experiences of non-residents who are victimized within a given area (DuBow and Reed, 1976). In addition, as the sample size becomes smaller, estimates of the incidence of the more infrequently occurring crimes and analyses of victimization with related factors becomes problematic (Garofalo, 1977a).

For the purposes of studying reactions to crime, the major issues related to the problems of measuring crime are: a) whether use of one or the other of these two measures would lead to a different characterization of crime levels (rates) or trends (changes in crime rates) in different jurisdictions, and b) whether the relative contribution of particular crimes to the overall crime rate would change. The reporting practices of citizens do differ from one city to another. For example, Skogan (1976a) states that reporting rates for robbery varied from a high of 76 percent in Miami to a low of 52 percent in Portland and San Francisco.⁸

In their London study, Sparks *et al.*, (1977) found that residents of different neighborhoods varied in their perceptions or sensitivities to crime events. Residents of a more middle class area more frequently reported victimizations which were less serious than did residents of a working class area. As a result, the two areas were found to have similar aggregate victimization rates. This finding differed substantially from the popular image of these neighborhoods or the characterization that would have been derived from police statistics. This pattern of findings is also reflected in the results of the National Crime Survey of 26 cities. The cities that have the highest overall victimization rates—Minneapolis and Denver—would not rank as high using rates based on uniform crime reports (Boland, 1976). One explanation that has been offered is that in these cities, residents are more sensitive to crimes they encounter and therefore generate more reported incidents on the victim surveys. This explanation has not been tested, but it parallels the explanation suggested above for London.

Such examples suggest possible problems when crime

⁸ Skogan (1976a) further notes that official crime rates may be even more influenced by whether or not police record a crime that is known to them than by inter-city differences in citizen reporting rates.

rates of various jurisdictions are compared. Skogan (1974), however, found that the differences in official and survey victimization statistics in ten cities were not sufficient to change conclusions that would be drawn when a number of relationships about urban areas were tested.

Because there is little victimization data available over time, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the possible impact of using official or victim survey derived crime statistics for measuring area crime trends. Eventually the National Crime Survey data will allow comparisons at the national level, but at the level of cities or urban neighborhoods, victimization survey research to date has been a one- or two-time affair.

A comparison of two Portland victimization surveys with the official statistics for the same period (Schneider, 1976) illustrates the potential for differing pictures of crime trends. While official statistics show a rise in the burglary rate, the victimization survey found a decline in burglary victimization. The victim survey indicated that the official rise in burglary rates was due to an increase in the rate at which citizens reported burglaries to the police. The change in citizen reporting over a one year period was substantial enough to produce the trend reflected in the official statistics.

Claren and Schwartz (1976) found substantial instability in victim surveys conducted over time in Cincinnati. They suggest that these instabilities are a consequence of the varying intensities with which interviewers probe to elicit victimization accounts.

There is also a widespread belief backed by a modest number of case studies that police departments have a substantial ability to alter the number and seriousness of crimes that become officially known to the police. Offenses may be shifted between categories or may be dropped entirely. Such practices may go on at the level of a patrolman deciding whether to fill out a crime report (Black, 1970), at the stationhouse, or further along in the police bureaucracy where reports may be "unfounded." Police may consciously try to reduce crime when it is bureaucratically or politically expedient to do so (Seidman and Couzens, 1974). On the other hand, departmental reforms may alter police procedures in such a way that crimes are more consciously sought out and recorded (President's Commission, 1966). More professional police departments are generally believed to emphasize the importance of accurate records and may therefore be associated with higher crime rates (Wilson, 1968a). Skogan (1976a) has used victimization data to describe a potentially wide variation in the degree to which police departments record the crimes that citizens report to them.

Thus, research to date is inconclusive as to the rela-

tionship between official crime statistics and victimization surveys and the degree to which these two measures could be used interchangeably in studying reactions to crime. Wherever possible, research using both sources of crime data will be presented. However, the need for greater methodological explorations of the dynamics and potentialities of victim surveys clearly remains.

2. *Aspects of crime conditions that influence perceptions.*

a. *The geographic distribution of crime.* The most commonly offered explanation for high levels of concern and fear of crime is that people perceive crime rates to be high and that perceived crime rates reflect the actual incidence of crime (Figure 2). If this is the case then residents of areas with high crime rates will perceive higher risks of victimization and be more fearful than residents of low crime jurisdictions. Skogan's (1976a) finding that both the uniform crime report and victimization survey robbery rates in 26 cities were strongly correlated ($r=+0.68$ and $r=+0.78$ respectively) with residents' fear of walking the streets alone at night tend to support this line of reasoning. Conklin (1975), on the other hand, found that perceptions of crime were only correlated with fear in a high crime area. In a low crime area fear of crime was related to perceived risks.

Figure 2

crime incidence ———→ perceived risks and rates ———→ fear and concern
(actual crime rate)

Of the many surveys on crime conducted in cities and neighborhoods, surprisingly few contain data that allow an analysis of individual perceptions in terms of neighborhood characteristics like the crime rate (Nehnevajsa, 1977). Those studies that do allow for such an analysis generally report that residents of areas with higher official crime rates as more likely to perceive: a) the crime rate, b) their personal risk of victimization, and c) their fear of crime as higher than residents of areas with lower crime rates (Reiss, 1967; Furstenberg, 1972; Fowler and Mangione, 1974; Boggs, 1971; and Block and Long, 1973). Differences between the communities rather than between people accounted for differences in fears among three high crime and one low crime area of Portland, Oregon. However, when Yaden *et al.* (1973) controlled for race, he found that there were higher fear levels for whites living in the high crime areas than for whites who lived in the low crime areas.

Arguing that central city neighborhoods have higher offense (Boggs, 1965) and victimization rates (Ennis, 1967) than suburban or rural areas, Boggs (1971) found that residents of the central city are more likely to perceive high crime rates and feel in danger. However,

there are two important qualifications on these overall findings. First, residents of rural areas perceived greater risks of being robbed, burglarized and assaulted on the street than suburban residents, though crime statistics would predict the opposite relationship. Second, even though the central city residents showed higher levels of fear and greater perception of risk, half or less of the residents perceived a high likelihood of being victimized or expressed strong feelings of danger.

Fowler and Mangione (1974) find highly positive associations between perceptions of risk and worry or fear about specific crimes—burglary and robbery—with the official crime statistics for twelve areas within the city of Hartford. Similarly using crime and survey data from Minnesota, McPherson (1978) reports an association between areas with high crime rates and those with high fear rates.

Additional support for this line of explanation is found in Stinchcombe *et al.* (1977). Using national survey data, they report a higher rate of fear producing crime (robberies) in black neighborhoods and in integrated areas near ghetto areas and that persons living in these places are more likely to be afraid. This study makes explicit the linkage between high crime and largely black central city residential areas, but also considers the impact of living in a transitional integrated area. In the "integrated" areas near black ghetto areas, the analysis focuses on the level of fear of whites which is higher than for whites living in segregated areas.

Several studies raise questions about the conditions under which the relationship between crime rates and levels of fear holds. Biderman *et al.*'s (1967) study of three Washington, D.C. precincts reports findings that partly counter the general pattern reported above. In a multiple regression analysis using an anxiety index score, the precinct of residence was more highly related to anxiety than any individual demographic characteristics. While few residents of one low crime rate precinct had high anxiety scores, the residents of the other low crime rate precinct had as many "high anxiety" respondents as did the residents of the precinct with a high crime rate. They suggest that different neighborhoods may have different "climates of concern" and that these climates may influence individual perceptions independent of objective risks.

Reiss (1967) studied areas of differing reported crime rates in both Boston and Chicago. Although there was some variation in fear between high and low crime rate areas, he found that a majority of residents in all four areas perceived their own neighborhoods as comparatively safe. Reiss suggests that residents of high crime areas adapt to the objective conditions by modifying their perceptions and creating a greater tolerance for crime,

while those who have a low crime tolerance are more likely to leave the area.

In a victim survey of Toronto residents, Waller and Okihiro (1976) report higher levels of fear than would be expected for the level of crime incidence in the city. The fear levels are similar to those found in American cities which report much higher crime rates. They suggest that the fear levels found in Toronto may be the result of residents' exposure to American media, particularly television. Toronto residents may be getting their crime information from sources that project patterns of crime that do not exist locally.

Biderman *et al.* (1967) carefully demonstrate that the characterization of the three precincts as high or low crime areas according to police statistics is significantly different from what would be derived from the victim survey. The police statistics portrayed greater differences in precinct victimization rates than did the survey. The ultimate validity of either characterization is left unresolved, but their analysis suggests that the differences occur more because of the way police record crimes that come to their attention than because of citizens not reporting crimes to the police. Skogan (1976b) has made a similar point. Thus, even if a consistent pattern of relationships were found between crime rates and one or more perceptual dimensions, a question would remain of whether such a finding demonstrates a relationship between objective crime conditions and perceptions or whether it describes the importance of police crime reports in the formation of public perceptions. Even if police crime reports are inaccurate in terms of both absolute levels of crime and the relative rates of crime between different geographical areas, they could still be highly salient in influencing the perceptions of citizens. This is especially true since such statistics are one of the few means available to citizens for characterizing the crime situation of a particular area.

In summary, the findings to date indicate that incidence of crime in specific areas, to the degree that existing measures of crime reflect them, is a salient factor influencing perceptions of crime. The effect is not so strong that it is safe to assume that all or even most residents of a "high crime" area will be very afraid of crime or conversely that the residents of "low crime" areas are mostly unafraid.

b. *Changes in crime rates over time.* Trends in the incidence of crime may have effects on the perception of crime that are independent of the overall level of crime (Figure 3). As noted by Conklin (1975), Ennis (1967) reports that the perception of crime risk is influenced more by perceived changes in crime rates than by the level of the crime rates. A low crime rate that suddenly increases may engender more fear than a higher rate that

is static. Where a crime rate is static, even if high, people may adjust psychologically and behaviorally to take perceived levels of risk into account (Reiss, 1967). When people perceive the crime rate changing suddenly for the worse, they may feel particularly vulnerable and unprepared (Conklin, 1975).

Figure 3

changes in crime rates (trends) → perception of risks and trends → fear of crime

The most frequently cited evidence is at the national level over the past twelve years. During this period, national reported crime rates rose in all but a few years. In some years the increases were very dramatic. Survey and public opinion polls during this period consistently found majorities who perceived crime rates to be increasing over the previous year (Gallup, 1975; Harris, 1976) and an increased number of persons reporting fear of crime (Erskine, 1974; Berg, 1972). However, upon closer examination, the national trends data raised questions of interpretation. Hindelang (1974) found that citizen fears rose at a much slower pace than official crime rates for the 1965 to 1972 period. Although the general trend in the percentage of citizens reporting fear of crime was upward, the levels of fear did not increase steadily and did not always follow the direction of crime rates in a given year (Erskine, 1974).

In general, the relationship appears to hold better on the upward than the downward side. Increases in crime rates appear to be more influential in raising fears than decreases are in reducing them. 1972 was the first year in the past decade in which crime rates were reported to have declined nationally but no similar decrease was found in fears or perceptions of rates in that year. The household victimization rate in Michigan declined from 24 to 19 percent between 1976 and 1977 without any significant change in the perceived rate of crime (MOR, 1977). These data suggest an inelasticity in levels of fear beyond which crime increases have diminishing or no effects. Respondents who reported fear of walking the streets near their homes at night rose to around fifty percent and then leveled off or slightly declined, regardless of the fluctuations in official crime statistics. There may be a limit to the number of kinds of people who are aware of, or susceptible to, crime information that increases their fears.

A short term change in the crime rate may be more likely to influence perceptions when it is very large. A sudden increase in crime, proximate to a period of much lower crime rates, is sometimes referred to as a "crime wave." There have been few general examinations of crime waves (Bell and Force, 1956; Conklin, 1975), but

there are a number of excellent case studies. These studies share a distrust of the claims that there was an actual change in the incidence of crime. Generally, researchers characterize crime waves as situations in which people *perceive* the crime rate to have changed dramatically and that these alterations in perception are often explainable in terms of changes in the behavior of law enforcement officials or in media representations of the crime situation. One study that questions the relationship of changes in the incidence of behavior and the appearance of a crime wave is Erikson's (1966) study of witchcraft outbursts in Massachusetts. He describes how heightened fear and anxiety accompanied the accusations of witchcraft. These accusations he argues, had more to do with the changing moral concerns of the Massachusetts Bay Colony community and the behavior of enforcement officials than with changes in witch-like behavior.⁹ European witchcraft outbreaks have similarly been attributed to the entrepreneurship of various law enforcement officials (Currie, 1973).

In Davis' early study (1952) of crime waves in Colorado, he described how official crime rates were declining while residents perceived the crime rate to be rising because of increased newspaper coverage of crime. Similarly, Fishman (1977) found that an increase in news coverage of crimes against the elderly in New York City led to a great increase in fear even though the reported crime rate increases were of a far lesser magnitude than the new media reported.

A last study deserves mention because of its suggestion that, under certain conditions, diminishing crime or official crime statistics may be associated with heightened concern and fear of crime. Lane (1968) examined criminal justice records over a 100 year period and found a steady decrease in the incidence of violent crime in Boston. At the same time there was pressure to increase law enforcement efforts, as well as growing concern and worry about crime. Lane believes that citizen intolerance and sensitivity to violence increased as the likelihood of encountering violence in everyday life decreased. In other words people were more frightened of violence when it became more exceptional.

A similar thesis is proposed by Georges (1965) in his study of London in the eighteenth century. Crime and disorder were decreasing, but new standards were emerging so that there was more concern with the remaining degree of disorder. Wolin provides the most general formulation of this phenomena:

"The more successful a society is in restricting both public and private forms of violence, the

⁹ For a partially counter-view of the "reality" of witchcraft in Salem, see Caporeal (1976).

more difficulty it has in coping with or enduring violence when it does crop up" (1963:12).

The time frame within which the relationship between rates and perceptions are examined makes a considerable difference. The studies looking at relatively short time periods show a mixed pattern of relationships with a great tendency for fears and concerns to rise with increases in crime rates rather than to decline with decreases. But when longer time spans are studied, at least in the United States and England, overall decreases in violent crimes have been associated with increases in intolerance and concern.

c. *Absolute levels of crime.* Almost all examinations of the relationship between the incidence of crime and perceptions in particular geographic areas have used crime rates. However, citizens may be more influenced by the absolute magnitude or volume of crime than by rates. In the last few years, the majority of the cities with the highest crime rates in the Uniform Crime Reports are frequently not associated in people's minds with having unusually bad crime problems. In fact, many of these cities are places that people move to, in part, to escape northern and eastern cities which have long been associated with bad crime problems. These cities have included Portland, Oregon; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Phoenix, Arizona; and Denver, Colorado. All of these four are medium-sized cities with small metropolitan areas and only moderate absolute levels of crime. Some major American cities such as New York, Chicago, or Philadelphia have lower crime rates but their absolute levels of crime are high. It is the larger cities that most frequently have the worst reputations for crime. One explanation for the existence of these reputations is that the large number of crimes in these cities provides a reservoir of evidence that is used in the mass media and interpersonal communications to typify the city's crime reputation. Lower rates of crime can coexist with high levels of citizen exposure to crime news. This can occur even if the media are putting an emphasis on crime that is equal to that of media in other smaller cities. Residents of a city with smaller absolute number of crimes but a higher crime rate may be exposed to crime stories on a less regular basis, simply because there are fewer crimes to report.

d. *Key crimes.* Perceptions of crime may be influenced by a particularly dramatic or well-publicized crime, regardless of the level of crime, the pattern of change in crime rates, or the absolute amount of crime. If the perpetrator of such a crime is unapprehended, the specter of repetition of such a crime is raised. Even if the offender has been apprehended, a big crime story may cause people to perceive that their chances of being similarly victimized have increased.

In his book, *In Cold Blood* (1965), Capote describes how a dramatic killing in a small mid-western town produced a high degree of suspicion and fear until the offenders were caught and identified as non-locals (discussed in Conklin, 1975). The popular literature abounds with accounts of the "Boston Strangler," "Son of Sam," "Zebra," "Zodiac," and other highly publicized killers who reportedly terrorized various places until they were apprehended. However, we rarely have systematic data on the degree to which such crimes influenced people's perceptions or behaviors.

Within smaller communities or urban neighborhoods there may be crimes that are less widely known and receive less publicity, but still influence local residents. Conklin (1975) reviews a few studies and some newspaper accounts of such situations. In each case, there appears to have been effects on perceptions and behaviors after a dramatic crime. However, since most of these accounts are unsystematic, they provide little evidence on the extent or longevity of these effects. In-depth case studies of such incidents are rare. One study of a murder of a coed in a university dormitory found that though the incident was dramatic and highly publicized, it did not produce a heightened concern with personal security or with violent crime among the dormitory's residents (Hood and Hodges, 1974).

e. *Victimization rates.* We have discussed four aspects of crime conditions—distribution, trends, absolute amounts, and key crimes—that may be factors influencing the perceptions of individuals who live in specific geographic locations. Another way of analyzing the effect of crime on perceptions is to examine victimization rates for persons with different demographic characteristics—sex, age, race, income, residence, education—and to relate these patterns of victimization to perceptions of crime. Since victimization surveys generally collect perceptual as well as victimization data, they make it possible to study this relationship within discrete data sets.

In the criminology literature, attention has been given to a large number of socio-demographic characteristics of victims along with psychological and situational factors. A summary of these studies will not be attempted here. Instead, we will limit our observations to the major characteristics of victims as recorded in victim surveys: age, sex, race, income.

(1) *Sex.* The most consistent finding across victim surveys is that males have higher rates of victimization for almost all crime categories other than sexual assault than females (MOR, 1977; Dodge *et al.*, 1976). In the National Crime Survey, men were twice as likely as females to be victims of personal crimes of violence. Aside from rape, personal larceny with contact (primar-

ily purse-snatching) was the only crime for which women had higher rates than men (U. S. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, 1976). This same pattern holds in individual city surveys (Boland, 1976). The Texas Crime Trend Survey (St. Louis, 1976) was one of the rare studies that found no significant difference between men and women in victimization rates for violent crimes; however, the more typical pattern of greater male victimization did reappear for property crimes. Whether this is a reflection of differences in the pattern of violence in Texas or possibly an artifact of the mailed survey instrument used in the study is not discussed. The overall pattern of greater male victimization is found for different age and racial categories.

(2) *Age.* Almost as consistent as the pattern for sex is the finding that young persons have higher rates of victimization (MOR, 1977). This pattern holds for personal violent crimes and thefts. Teenagers, according to the National Crime Survey, were seven to eight times as likely to be theft victims as were those 65 and over (U.S., NCJISS, 1976). In most of the 26 cities surveyed in the National Crime Survey, robbery rates declined with age, but in Miami, Pittsburgh, and Dallas, no relationship between age and robbery was found (Boland, 1976). Again, the Texas Crime Trend Survey (St. Louis, 1976) contained an exception. No difference was found in property crime victimization rates by age.

These findings have been surprising to many who believe crime problems of the elderly to be particularly acute. As a result, age-specific victimization rates for older persons have been examined particularly closely. In a few crime categories such as robbery with injury and larceny with contact, the elderly have been found to have a high or higher victimization rates as other age groups (Lawton *et al.*, 1976). A Kansas City study found that the elderly were generally less often victimized than younger people, except for non-inner city elderly who were more likely to be victims of strong-armed robbery than younger residents of the same area (Midwest Research Institute, 1977). Using police report data, Conklin (1976) found that when non-commercial robberies were examined separately, victimization rates increased with age.

(3) *Race.* The patterning of victimization by racial characteristics is less consistent than either age or sex. Differences appear depending on the type of crime and place of residence. However, some general patterns can be discerned. Blacks in some cities have higher victimization rates than whites for violent crimes—rape, robbery, and assault—and for household crimes (U.S., NCJISS, 1976). Blacks were more likely robbery victims in 13 of 26 cities, equally victimized in 10 cities, and less

victimized than whites in two cities, Oakland and San Francisco (Boland, 1976). In a large number of cases, white households have been found to have rates of property crime victimization equal to or greater than blacks (St. Louis, 1976; MOR, 1977).

When race and sex are combined, black males have the highest victimization rates for violent crime followed by white males, black females, and white females. Young black males generally have extremely high personal victimization rates. For example, they are two to three times as likely to be robbed as their white counterparts.

(4) *Income.* There is a different relationship between income¹⁰ and victimization rates, depending on the crimes. For personal crimes of violence, income and victimization rates are inversely related. The incidence of violent crime is highest among members of lower income families for both whites and blacks¹¹ (U.S., NCJISS, 1976). For personal crimes of theft, victimization rates increase with family income. Thus, members of families with incomes over \$25,000 have the highest rates of victimization for personal larceny, both with contact purse snatching and pocket picking and without contact. For household crimes, a third pattern emerges. Burglary rates are highest for the uppermost and lowermost income groups.

(5) *Victimization rates and crime perceptions.* Even since Biderman *et al.*'s (1967) first victimization survey, there has been considerable attention given to the correspondence between the victimization rates for various demographic categories and their perceptions of crime. Conclusions about the relationship between victimization rates and fear vary with the demographic characteristics being considered and the type of crime perception.

Of the three broad types of perceptions, emotions (fear) appear to be less related to situational factors such as victimization rates than it is to personal characteristics (Fowler *et al.*, 1978).

For age and sex, most studies have found that those who perceive higher crime rates, greater increases in rates, higher personal risk, and the greatest fear are persons who are less victimized. Men are more often victimized, but women are more fearful; age is inversely related to victimization rates, but directly related to higher perceived rates and risks and fears. When the

factors of age and sex are combined, the disparity between perceptions of risk and fear and victimization rates is even greater. Older women are the least victimized but are most fearful, while young males are the most victimized and least fearful (Figure 4). Of the two factors, sex is the more powerful one; young women tend to have higher fear levels than older men (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977). Age differences have more effect on male than female levels (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978).

Figure 4

Rank order by victimization rates			Rank order by levels of fear		
Sex	Age		Sex	Age	
	Younger/Older			Younger/Older	
Female	3	4	Female	2	1
Male	1	2	Male	4	3

For other demographic categories—race, income, and education—the pattern of victimizations and the relationship to fears is less consistent. In some studies blacks, who in many contexts are more frequently victimized, report more fear than whites (Biderman *et al.*, 1967; Garofalo, 1977c; Fowler, 1974a; Kennedy, n.d.). Hindelang *et al.* (1978) report 40 percent of whites and 55 percent of the blacks felt somewhat unsafe at night in their own neighborhoods. Ennis (1967) found race an even stronger predictor of fear than sex. Black women were most fearful, but black men were more afraid than whites of either sex. The reverse was found in a study of four Portland, Oregon areas (Yaden *et al.*, 1973). In each area, expressed fear was higher among whites than non-whites.

When the fear of crime measures are primarily referring to street crimes, fear tends to be lower in higher income groups that also have lower victimization rates for robbery and assault (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978). In the National Crime Survey data difference among income groups was less among blacks than among whites. Because of difficulties of higher income blacks finding housing outside traditional high crime and predominately low income locales, they are more victimized than whites in comparable income categories who are more likely to live in lower crime areas (Wilson, 1968b).

The pattern of associations among victimization rates for demographic categories and judgments is less consistent. In some studies the findings parallel those already described for fear (Biderman *et al.*, 1967; Yaden *et al.*, 1973) but in others report fewer inverse relationship between victimization rates and perceived rates and risks. For example, in one study the elderly in a high

¹⁰ Income is defined in most of these studies as annual family income.

¹¹ There is a marked increase in victimization rates for blacks in the highest income category (\$25,000 or more) over the next lower categories, but since there are so few blacks in this category the rate may be statistically unreliable (U.S., NCJISS, 1976).

crime area perceived similar amounts of crime and risk as other age groups but they felt less safe (Conklin, 1976). In his analysis of 13 of the national crime survey cities Garofalo (1977c) reports no differences for racial and sex categories in the proportion who perceived risks to be increasing. On the other hand, there was a positive association between perceived changes in risks, age, and higher family incomes.

3. *The appropriateness of fear levels.* In the psychological literature on fear a distinction is made between fear that is appropriate and inappropriate (Sarnoff and Zimbardo, 1961). This distinction is based on the presence or absence of danger and the fears associated with the danger. The existing means of measuring the incidence and risks of crime victimization are much less precise than those used to characterize dangers in controlled experimental settings but studies of fear of crime have made implicit and explicit judgments about the appropriateness of the levels of crime fears.

There are two principal lines of interpretation of why there is an inverse relationship between victimization rates and fear for age and sex categories. These interpretations contain judgments about the appropriateness of fear. One position accepts the relationships described above as accurate and concludes that the objective crime conditions (risks) do not explain fears (Biderman, 1967; Cook and Cook, 1975). Studies of the elderly report general feelings of vulnerability and suspicion of which crime perceptions are a part (Goldsmith and Goldsmith, 1976). Similarly, the greater fears of women are discussed in terms of cultural values that underscore their helplessness. Underlying such discussions is often found the judgment that women and the elderly are *overly afraid* and that men and younger persons have more appropriate levels of fear. Such judgments are themselves based on a more general position that the fear of crime for the entire population is higher than objective conditions warrant. Crime information from the mass media is often used to explain this situation. The President's Crime Commission (1967b) took this position. It noted that the risk of personal injuries from other sources than crime are much greater, yet there is more fear of crime. People are more likely to be seriously injured by automobiles than in a crime, yet most people are more afraid of being a crime victim than an accident victim.

Silberman (1978) and Stinchcombe *et al.* (1977) both note these objectively lower risks for crime than for other risks, principally automobile accidents, but argue that differences in the conditions under which crimes and accidents occur are such that greater fear of crime is an appropriate response. Silberman's thesis is that crime victimization weakens the trust in the social order. Victims can no longer act on the premise that the strangers

they encounter in everyday situations are not threatening.

Stinchcombe *et al.* base their argument on the lack of control experienced in crime victimization as compared with automobile accidents (1977:64ff). Drivers can drive carefully, use seat belts and take other steps to reduce their accident risks, while there are fewer ways to reduce crime. At the same time, crime risks are more concentrated in time and space and hence, more noticeable. People are able to anticipate crimes and have time to be afraid.

The explanations for the greater fear of injury through crime victimization offered by both Silberman and Stinchcombe *et al.* are based on contrasts which are both untested empirically and arguable. With regard to Silberman's points after an automobile accident some drivers' trust in the reliability of other drivers' abilities can be seriously shaken. The potential danger of each passing car can be imagined. Silberman does not explain why the car situation is inherently less fearful than a street crime. The reasons that make us more afraid of crime cannot be reduced to the consequences of violent crime victimization which a minority of the population who are fearful have experienced.

Stinchcombe *et al.*'s characterization of crime victimization as less in the control of potential victims than automobile accidents may reflect popular perceptions of the risks of these two events, but may not inhere in the phenomena. There are many instances in which one driver had little or no chance to avoid an accident with another car and there are precautions that people take to reduce their crime risks that are no less likely to be effective than what drivers can do to reduce automobile accident risks. As with Silberman's explanation, Stinchcombe *et al.* have described differences in popular thinking about crime in addition to fear levels, but they have not shown that these differences are objective. Their statements may be able to be reversed, e.g., because people are more afraid of crime they feel less control over their fate as victims.

The issue of the appropriateness and rationality of fear needs to be addressed in a broad context that considers historical and cultural factors as well as objective risks and consequences. A satisfactory synthesis of such elements remains unwritten.

A second and newer position argues for the appropriateness of the higher level of fear of women and the elderly. Stinchcombe *et al.* (1977) explain the higher fear rates of women and the elderly in terms of greater vulnerability and lower self-protection efficacy. *Vulnerability* as conceived by these authors involves the potential loss of life, money, and injury. They argue that *women are more vulnerable* because, in addition to the risks they share with men, they may also be sexually

assaulted. In this sense women have more to lose than men in a violent crime encounter.¹²

The effects of vulnerability for women are confounded by a lower sense of efficacy in terms of self-defense. This *lower sense of efficacy* is in Stinchcombe *et al.*'s argument a result of the physical differences between men and women, social conditioning in which women are less likely to learn how to fight back to believe that they could successfully defend themselves. "The social factors magnify the physical ones" (1977:86). Having made the distinction between vulnerability and efficacy, the authors conclude that their data cannot distinguish the separate contributions of these two factors to the greater fear among women.

They see the sense of efficacy as related to age as well. Since the elderly tend to be weaker, their sense of helplessness in defending themselves should increase with age. The decrease in personal efficacy is offered as an explanation for the increasing fear of the elderly of both sexes (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977). Conklin's finding (1976) that the elderly living in a high crime urban area expressed more fear even though they perceived the same amount of crime as other age groups, lends some support to this line of reasoning. The fears of the elderly are based more on their view of the consequences of experiencing a crime than a different set of judgments about its prevalence. Discussions of fear of crime among the elderly (Goldsmith and Goldsmith, 1976) suggest that a heightened sense of physical vulnerability on the part of the elderly and a belief that they are more likely to be physically injured in the course of a crime contribute to the reports of greater fear among the elderly. Since they provide no direct evidence of the efficacy for each sex and age group or show that variations in feelings of efficacy within each variable are associated with fear levels, their arguments remain attractive but as yet untested hypotheses.

A second argument supporting the position that at least the fears of the elderly are appropriate is that the elderly actually have higher risks of victimization than other age groups per unit of *exposure*.

Researchers studying elderly posit that the main reason for the lower victimization rates of older persons is their decreased mobility (Antunes *et al.*, 1977) and greater caution. Victimization rates may therefore be a

¹² They also supply crime data that indicates a greater objective risk of victimization for persons living alone. Since women are more likely to live alone than men their greater fears may be, in part, a result of the risks through social isolation. The problem with this line of explanation is that it argues for the importance of objective probabilities of victimization in understanding the greater fears of women. However, in other parts of their analysis, Stinchcombe *et al.* (1977) suggest that factors other than objective probabilities of victimization are less important than certain other perceptual factors.

result of low *exposure* rather than low risk (Balkin, 1978). The elderly may actually have as high or higher rates of victimization than younger persons for the amount of time they are exposed to crime. Conversely younger males' high victimization rates may be due to their high exposure to crimes; their victimization per time exposed, however, may be no higher than for other groups in the population.

Unfortunately, crime exposure is not easily measured and there is a dearth of information on age- or sex-specific exposure rates (Lawton *et al.*, 1976). Exposure involves more than the sheer amount of time spent in public places. An adequate measure requires information on the differential risks associated with particular times and places. No study has combined all of these elements in a satisfactory way. The few attempts to examine exposure in studies of the elderly report results that do not support the assumptions made in the interpretation of the relationship between elderly exposure rates and victimization described above. Golant (1972) found that the number of trips made by the elderly to non-work destinations were surprisingly similar to those made by 55-64 year olds in Toronto. In a survey of the elderly in Portland, Rifai (1976) constructed a visibility index based on responses to eight questions about the frequency of shopping, banking, socializing, and traveling. She found that there were no significant differences between elderly victims and non-victims in terms of the degree of visibility.

Thus, by some measures, there were not differences in exposure between the elderly and another age group or between elderly victims and non-victims. One limitation shared by both studies is the lack of data on employment related exposure. The basic variation in exposure between the elderly and other persons, or amongst the elderly themselves, may be a result of whether they leave the house to go to work. Conklin (1976) found the major difference in robbery rates for different age groups to be related to employment. When robbery victimization in employment roles was removed, the elderly did not have higher rates of victimization than other groups. Exposure remains a variable of potentially high importance in understanding victimization but its actual influence remains to be demonstrated or even adequately conceptualized.

In summary, judgments about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the fear levels for different demographic categories are related to: a) overall judgments about the appropriateness of crime fear levels as contrasted with other risks, b) whether the perceived consequences (seriousness) of victimization is considered, and c) whether women and the elderly may have much higher objective levels of risk when exposure rates are used.

4. *Victimization experiences.* In the previous section, we discussed the relationship between victimization rates for various demographic categories and perceptions of crime. Here we consider the relationships between the individual's *experience* of victimization and his or her perceptions of crime. Before proceeding to discuss research findings, it is important to note two methodological problems. With few exceptions, victim surveys only inquire about the victimization experiences of respondents over a short period of time, generally six months or one year.¹³ This relatively short recall period is used to increase the likelihood that respondents will remember the occurrence and details of each victimization during the indicated period (Biderman, 1975). Recall accuracy is necessary for generating incidence measures of crime. This is the major goal of most victim surveys. When respondents are characterized as victims or non-victims, it is based only on the immediate past. As a result, many respondents who are victims at an earlier time but not during the recall year are classified as non-victims in the analysis. To the degree that earlier victimizations have effects on perceptions of crime, an analysis based only on the previous year's victimization will understate victimization effects. Similarly, when particular crimes are examined, a respondent may be classified in terms of a minor victimization in the reference year when in an earlier period he or she was the victim of a more serious crime that could have an effect on current perceptions.

A second methodological problem is the use of cross sectional data to make longitudinal inferences. Data on victimizations and perceptions of crime are collected simultaneously. The difference between the perceptions of victims and non-victims are then inferred to be a result of the victimization experience. A more appropriate methodology would be to examine changes in perceptions before and after victimization. The only large body of victimization data collected over time is the National Crime Survey, but these interviews do not include a perception of crime component.¹⁴

Most of the early victimization surveys found that fear, concern, and perceived risks of crime had no particular relation to direct experiences as a victim (Ennis,

1967; Biderman *et al.*, 1967; McIntyre, 1967; Boggs, 1971; Conklin, 1971; Fowler and Mangione, 1974; and Hindelang, 1974). Smith and Hawkins (1973) also found that victimization had no effect on either political attitudes or feelings about police. There were however some exceptions. In Kleinman and David's (1973) study of the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, black victims perceived higher neighborhood crime rates than non-victims. The Texas Crime Trend Survey (St. Louis, 1976) reported that victims were three times as likely to perceive a high risk of future victimization as non-victims. Feyerherm and Hindelang (1974) found that juveniles who had been victimized were more likely to report fear of walking in the neighborhood alone at night.

When no victimization effects are found, it is explained, in part, by the low salience of many crime experiences; survey researchers found that victims often did not recall their own victimization experiences, especially when they had not occurred in the recent past (Turner, 1972). Other researchers stress the salience of vicarious experiences through the victimizations of others in producing higher levels of fear and perceived risk amongst non-victims (Biderman *et al.*, 1967).

Whenever victimizations are analyzed in the aggregate, the predominant crimes being examined are burglaries and larcenies. Property crimes comprise over 80 percent of all victimizations. These crimes typically do not involve contact or violence between offender and victim. Anecdotal accounts would suggest that there would be likely to be larger effects from violent and contact crimes.

LeJeune and Alex (1973) conducted in-depth interviews with mugging victims in New York City. Because their sampling of victims was not random and because they did not interview a comparison group of non-victims, it is necessary to make more general inferences from their study with extreme caution. Nevertheless, they provide a rich description of changes in crime perceptions and intensified interpersonal communications about crime. Victims reported an increased distrust of other people and a great need to communicate with victims of similar incidents.

When researchers began examining the effects of violent and contact crime victimization separately, they more frequently have found differences in crime perceptions. Garofalo (1977c) first compared the crime percep-

¹³ Biderman *et al.* (1967) asked about lifetime victimization in addition to a more limited recall period. They found that the longer reference period netted a surprisingly small number of additional responses. They did not use this longer period for analyzing the effects of victimization on perceptions or behaviors. A study of the elderly in Portland, Oregon (Rifai, 1976) also asked respondents if they had ever been victims of a crime. Of the victimizations reported, 70 percent occurred more than a year prior to the interview and 18 percent happened more than 10 years earlier. Her data on victimizations more than one year before the interview were particularly useful in analyzing the effects of multiple victimizations.

¹⁴ The one other source of panel victimization data that we know of is found in the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling *et al.*, 1974). These surveys also have a number of perception of crime questions. Analysis of before/after effects of victimization will be attempted in the near future, but the potential of this analysis is limited by the small size of the repeated sample of work on victimization effects.

tions of non-victims with those of the victims of all crimes and found no differences. However, when victims of contact crimes were examined separately, they were more likely to perceive an increased risk of victimization and were more likely to be afraid to walk alone in their neighborhood than were other respondents. Block and Long (1973) report a similar pattern for robbery victims, but the differences were not significant. Stinchcombe and his colleagues (1977) found effects on fear for both robbery and burglary victims. Students who had been attacked or robbed at school perceived a greater risk of being victimized on their way and at school (National Institute of Education, 1977).

Garofalo (1977c) cautions that most of the victim/non-victim differences while significant are not particularly strong. They are often on the order of less than 10 percentage points so that it is generally inappropriate to make general designations such as that robbery victims are high in fear while non-robbery victims are not. Further, when these relationships are analyzed for different age groups, it is found that almost all of the perceptual differences between victims and non-victims occur among the elderly. For other age groups, the differences are small or nonexistent.

The absence of stronger associations in the survey data for even violent crime victimizations may be due, in part, to the inadequacy of legal definitions of crimes for describing variations in the situational contexts of crimes which may affect their influence on crime perceptions. For example, a recent Vera Institute study (1977) found that a high percentage of the cases involving robbery, burglary, and theft as well as assaults, involved prior relationships among the victims and offenders. Crimes involving people with prior relationships have a high degree of ambiguity and a great potential for conflicting interpretations of the reality. Victims of such crimes would be unlikely to have their perceptions affected in the same way as the victims of similar crimes in which there were no prior relationships with the offenders. Being robbed or assaulted by a stranger is likely to be more threatening than when it is a person known to the victim.

The *quantity* of victimizations also has been found to affect perceptions of crime. Elderly persons in Portland, Oregon who had been victimized more than once had much higher scores on an anxiety scale than single crime victims or non-victims (Rifai, 1976). When undifferentiated groups of victims and non-victims were compared, no similar relationship was found. Similarly, multiple victims of personal crimes in the eight high-impact cities perceived more (but not much more) risk of future victimization than victims of single crimes or non-victims (Garofalo, 1977c).

Before conclusions about victimization effects can be drawn with confidence, researchers must incorporate the design and methodological considerations noted above into their victimization studies. To date, our sketchy knowledge suggests that some specific types of victimizations have a modest effect on perceptions, but that no wide-scale effects are found for the majority of crimes and victims.

5. *Witnessing crimes.* In recent years there has been renewed interest in victims and witnesses of crimes. Victimization studies provide information about the distribution of victims in the population and, in some cases, about victims' subsequent perceptions and behaviors. Studies of witnesses' behavior and perceptions have been primarily focused on the question of why witnesses will or will not report a crime or come to the aid of a victim and on how victim-witnesses interact with the formal machinery of justice when a prosecution is underway (Knudten *et al.*, 1977). Studies of crime witnesses' immediate reactions to viewing a crime have generally been limited to staged non-violent crimes. We learn little about how the experience affects the witnesses' longer term perceptions of crime from such studies.

Knudten *et al.* (1975), although generally emphasizing the problems of victims and witnesses in dealing with the criminal justice system, report some data on witness perceptions of crime. They found that victims had stronger negative feelings about crime than witnesses. More generally, the closer the respondents were to the crime event, the more likely they were to have negative feelings. Few studies distinguish between the responses of victims and witnesses; they are limited to witnesses of crimes for which someone is arrested and in which witnesses have had contact with criminal justice agencies. Such studies do not allow for a consideration of the effect of observing crimes on the entire range of witnesses. Further, they provide no comparison with non-victim perceptions. Such data could be provided by a survey of crime witnesses.

The early victimization studies (Ennis, 1967; Biderman *et al.*, 1967) included questions about crimes or suspicious behavior observed by respondents. Such questions allowed Biderman *et al.* to include witnessing a crime in an index of "crime exposure," along with personal victimization and violent victimizations of family members and friends. No association was found between this index and a measure of anxiety about crime. No separate analysis of the correlates of witnessing were reported. More recent victimization studies have generally not included questions on witnessing crimes. Implicit in this decision, although untested, is the judgment that witnessing crimes is less salient than being victimized and would be less likely to be remembered accu-

rately. Anecdotal information is available that would indicate that under some circumstances witnessing a crime can be a powerful experience but, as yet, we have neither the techniques of data gathering nor the analyses that would tell us under what conditions and with what frequency such effects would be found.

6. *Vicarious crime experiences.* Most of the information that people have about crime comes indirectly through the daily press, periodicals, novels, radio and television, and interpersonal communications. Perception of crime may be more strongly shaped by the character of vicarious crime information than by their own experiences. Only a minority of the population is a victim of crime in any one year, yet everyone is exposed to stories and judgments about crime. The gap between direct and vicarious experience is particularly great for crimes of violence which are often the focus of public attention, but are relatively rare occurrences in a statistical sense. Wilson (1976) found that survey respondents' rankings of the relative danger of different areas of Portland, Oregon corresponded closely with official crime reports. Such information is often the basis for news media portrayal of areas.

There is widespread belief that the media are highly influential in shaping perceptions of crime. The President's Crime Commission (1967) took the position that the media were, in fact, more influential than direct experiences in influencing perceptions. The report based its conclusions on the fact that perceptions often are not associated with levels of crime in the local area or with personal victimization experiences. The Commission further suggested that mass media may contribute to exaggerated perceptions. In their own neighborhoods, where people can rely more on direct experiences, they were less likely to perceive crime as a serious problem than in other places where they had to rely more heavily on information supplied by other sources. There is, however, surprisingly little direct research on the contents of interpersonal and media crime information and their effects on perceptions of crime.

a. *Interpersonal communication.* There is an extensive literature on the relationship between interpersonal and mass communication that provides hypotheses about the content and effects of such communications on different categories of people. These hypotheses have not been specifically applied to crime information. In general, we expect that interpersonal communications filter, alter, and structure information made available by the media, institutional actors, and direct experiences. The role of interpersonal communications is also undoubtedly important in the incorporation of crime information into the culture of a community. We do not know, however, how often people talk about crime, what affects the way

crime information is relayed through a community or social network, or the way this information is structured. Unsystematic observation suggests that the content of the information may deal with: specific crimes that are local or personal; specific crimes which are non-local and have received media coverage; and general impressions about crime which include characterizations of places, trends, victims, offenders, causes, and solutions.

Grabner's research (1977a, 1977b) is the most ambitious effort to date to identify the sources of crime information. The mass media were found to be the most important source of information on crime dangers (Grabner, 1977b). There are few other studies that deal with interpersonal communications more than tangentially. This area of inquiry more than any other we will discuss remains to be studied.

In one of the few studies that asked respondents to specify the types of crime stories they had heard, Lawton *et al.* (1976) found that over half of the elderly residents surveyed in low income housing projects throughout the country could describe crime incidents that happened to fellow tenants. LeJeune and Alex's study (1973) of mugging victims in New York City found that victims became communication nodes for crime information. Their account of their own victimization attracted reports of related events by others. The victims became repositories of crime information within their individual social networks.

Communications studies find that people filter information and select contents which most agree with their existing perspectives. It is interesting, therefore, that a significant number of respondents in a Portland survey (Yaden *et al.*, 1973) felt that information received through interpersonal communication exaggerated the crime situation. Forty percent agreed with the statement that "all this talk about crime makes people more afraid than they need to be." This feeling was strongest in a low crime area which had proportionately more reported fear of crime than would be expected from the crime rate.

One area of research on perceptions of crime which provides some inferential data on the effect of interpersonal communication relates social integration and social interactions to crime perceptions. In Kleinman and David's (1973) study of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York, they found that blacks with more social contacts within the community were more likely to perceive higher crime rates. Within the white population, however, residents with more social contacts were more likely to perceive lower crime rates. The authors suggest that blacks who are socially integrated into the community may acquire more stories of crime incidents resulting in perceptions of more crime; whites with more

social contact, however, may be insulated from the larger community and therefore perceive lower crime rates. The effect of the social environment on the character of interpersonal communications about crime is addressed in a statewide Michigan survey (MOR, 1977). In that survey, residents of cities knew of more neighborhood crime incidents than did non-city residents. This difference is likely to be a reflection of the differential victimization rates in these environments. There is more crime in cities and hence more incidents to relate interpersonally.

Studies of crime among the elderly have been particularly concerned about the effects of social isolation on older persons. It is generally assumed that those with more social interaction will learn more about crime. But without knowing the content of that crime information, it is difficult to predict the character of the effects of increased social interaction. Gubrium (1974) studied victimization among the elderly in Detroit and found that greater social interaction was associated with greater concern about crime but lower fear. He saw higher social interaction resulting in more information about crime which led to more concern, but the accompanying supportive relationships helped diffuse fears.

b. *Mass communication.* As mentioned above, the inability of researchers to find consistent relationships between objective risks, personal experiences, and perceptions has often reinforced speculative discussions on the impact of mass media. Patterns of media reporting and portrayal of crime are frequently asserted to be key factors in changing perceptions. Saxon (1976) suggests that increased and improved news coverage is a reason for the rise in the fear of crime in the 1960's. Hindelang *et al.* (1978) explain the greater fear of other people's neighborhoods as, in part, a result of the fact that people learn about their own neighborhoods on the basis of direct experiences and interpersonal communications, but learn about other places through the mass media. The media make fewer differentiations as to neighborhoods and, as a result, people may use the worst places as referents as to what is happening in other neighborhoods. While there is considerably more research on crime and the mass media than on interpersonal communications, the degree and character of the media's impact on perceptions or behavioral reactions to crime remains unknown. In large measure, this same observation could be made of the general literature on mass communication. It has taken a massive research effort on the relatively more delimited question of the effects of television violence on children's behavior to even begin to draw grounded conclusions.

Research on crime in the mass media has largely been concerned with assessing fictional and factual portrayals

of crime. A common research design involves comparisons among the results of content analyses of crime as presented in the media, an analysis of police records, and responses to survey questions administered to persons with differing media exposure.

One common theme is that media portrayals of crime and criminals do not accurately reflect the actual universe of crime events (Davis, 1951; Dominick, 1973; and Fishman, 1977). Typically, those attempting to study fictional representation of crime conclude that television and films overrepresent violent personal crime and underrepresent property offenses. Significant underrepresentation also occurs with reference to intrafamily violence and unsolved crimes. In addition, television's model criminal is white, middle-aged, and middle-class and bears little resemblance to his real life counterparts (Dominick, 1973).

Studies of newspapers report a tendency toward distortion. Davis (1951), in an early study of crime reporting, found little relationship between the official crime rate and the extent of newspaper coverage. Similarly, Roshier (1973) found that newspapers over report: a) serious crimes, b) crimes committed by older offenders, c) crimes committed by offenders of higher socioeconomic status, and d) the probability of apprehension and conviction. Distortion in the press involving race has also been found (Dulaney, 1969; Abbott and Calonico, 1974; and Grabner, 1977a). The researchers report that newspapers overrepresent crimes involving black offenders and white victims.

Hubbard, Defleur and Defleur (1975) explored the relationship between news media and a variety of social problems. They examined the views of media (newspaper and television), officials, and citizens on a variety of social problems including crime and found no relationship between the media treatment of a particular social problem and its actual prevalence as indicated by official statistics.

One of the most detailed studies to date of the origins and development of media portrayals of crime analyzes the emergence of high media attention to crimes against the elderly in the latter part of 1976 in New York City (Fishman, 1977). Fishman describes how an emphasis in one newspaper was sequentially adopted by a competing newspaper and a television station. The actions of each of these media organs, in turn, affected the others' subsequent actions. Fishman also details the way in which the police department influenced media stories through its selection of incidents to put on the police wire. He found that police statistics revealed no change in the rate or pattern of crimes against the elderly that was commensurate with the change in emphasis found in the

media. This led Fishman to characterize the events in New York as a "media crime wave."

Although such studies consistently point to media distortion, little attention has been devoted to the process by which news is selected. A substantial portion of the existing research on news decision-making is concerned with effects of newspaper editorial policies on the selection of news (Sigelman, 1973; Breed, 1960; and Fishman, 1977).

Chibnall (1975) specifically focused on crime news selection and found a significant relationship between the crime reporter and his sources of information, i.e., the police and other criminal justice officials. The crime reporter, needing to protect his relationship with sources, may be constrained in his reporting of certain events or particular characteristics of such events. Moreover, news accounts may be overly favorable to law enforcement agencies because of the reporter's identification with his sources.

Roshier (1973) also examined the selection process implicit in crime reporting. He focused on two dimensions of selection: the competition with other news events, and the selection of a particular crime out of the pool of available and reportable crimes. Four factors were found to contribute significantly to the newsworthiness of a particular story: the seriousness of the offense; "whimsical circumstances," e.g., humor, irony; sentimental or dramatic circumstances associated with the victim of the offender; and the involvement of a well known or influential person. Roshier concluded that through this process of selection, the media tended to exaggerate problematic behavior. In a similar vein, Turk (1971) notes that in extreme circumstances, media selection of crime news may transform factual information into a "mythology" that often displaces facts.

The media may also follow a policy giving less play to specific types of crime. This may be a result of judgments about what is newsworthy, but may also involve an attempt to bolster a more positive image of the community being served. Einstadter (1977) describes how a newspaper in the old west played down crime as part of a general effort to enhance the reputation of Great Falls, Montana.

Roshier (1973) and Turk (1971) both emphasize the potential ability of the press to shape public perceptions of crime through news selection policies. As one example of such potential, Lincoln Steffens (1931), a "muck-raking" journalist at the turn of the century, described his role in manufacturing a crime wave while he was a newspaper reporter.

Knopf (1970), on the other hand, sees the press in a more passive role. By frequently selecting violent and sensational crime events, the media serve to reinforce

inaccurate views which may be rooted in non-crime related prejudices. Knopf argues that the overall effect of such reporting is to reinforce existing prejudices and maintain stereotypes.

The effects of mass media on attitudes and behavior has, for the most part, been assessed on the basis of external images of crime made available by the media. However, counting column inches given to crime (even crime occurring in the immediate environment) provides no basis for inferring how much information is actually consumed by individuals and what part it may play in the culture of a community (Berk *et al.*, 1977).

Howitt and Dembo (1975) assert that media exert no direct influence on attitudes and behavior. The influence they suggest can only be understood by examining the social and cultural content in which the media-audience relationship exists. Gerbner and Gross (1974; 1975) focused on television and came to a similar conclusion. They used the concept of "enculturation" rather than specific changes in attitudes or behavior and examined the stereotypical perceptions of social reality which television may encourage. In general, the authors report that heavy viewers are more likely to have a "television view" of the world than infrequent viewers. For example, heavy viewers overestimate the danger of violence in everyday life and express higher levels of fear and mistrust than infrequent viewers (Gerbner and Gross, 1975).

Though an accurate understanding of the effect of the media upon crime related attitudes and behavior is of considerable importance, exceedingly little is known about such effects. Quasi-experimental and correlational approaches may have more external validity but are limited by their inability to distinguish cause from effect. The absence of longitudinal studies involving sufficiently large samples has led to a limited focus on simple effects. There is a need for more complete models of the experience which can better delineate the patterns of exposure and effects on specific populations.

Davis (1951) found that citizen perceptions of the extent of violent crime and theft parallel the amount of newspaper coverage devoted to these offenses more closely than they reflect official crime rates. In this pre-television era study, 86 percent of the respondents reported that they obtained their information about crime from newspapers. Indeed, almost 25 percent gave newspapers as their sole source of information. Davis concluded that newspapers actually mold opinions rather than merely reflect them. Similarly, Abbott and Calónico (1974) found that perceptions of rape, particularly among whites, were more closely related to newspaper portrayals than to official statistics.

While both Davis (1951) and Abbott and Calónico

(1974) found a relationship between media reporting and citizen perceptions of crime, Roshier (1973) and Hubbard *et al.* (1975) found no such relationship. Roshier reported that respondent's perceptions of the relative frequency of particular types of crime were generally more similar to official statistics than to newspaper accounts. Similarly, Hubbard *et al.* found that the prevalence of various social problems as perceived by citizens was more strongly related to official agency records than to media reporting. However, Hubbard *et al.* suggest that media may significantly affect perceptions of newly emergent social problems such as drug abuse and alcohol.

Grabner (1977b) reports a higher salience for stories about crime than for other issues. She conducted a survey which tested the recall of crime stories that had appeared in the preceding four to six weeks. Twenty-four percent of those questioned recalled 85 percent of the stories to which they were exposed. These findings suggest that caution needs to be exercised in inferring the impact of the media on crime perceptions from studies in other substantive areas.

Reliance on the media for crime information may vary with characteristics of the crime environment. In Portland's low crime area, respondents appear to base their perceptions more on what they see and hear in the media than what they notice of crime increases in their own neighborhood. People in higher crime areas were about equally likely to base their perceptions on what they saw going on locally and on the media images of crime in general (Yaden *et al.*, 1973). The source of crime information had more effect on citizens' judgments of crime than on their evaluations of its importance as a public issue.

Surveys have generally found that the public does not believe that the media overemphasizes the crime problem (Grabner, 1977a). For example, in thirteen of the cities studied by the National Crime Survey, less than ten percent of the respondents thought that crime was less serious than the media portrayed, but forty percent thought it was more serious than depicted in the media (Garofalo, 1977c). This pattern of results did not vary with the race, sex, age, family, income, education, or victimization experiences of the respondents and may be a strong indication of just how influential media portrayals of crime really are.

7. *Police and other institutions.* Although mass media and interpersonal communications are likely to be principal sources of crime information, there are a large number of other organizations and actors that regularly present information and opinions about crime to the public. The most important of these is police and other law enforcement agencies. Through special programs

and in the course of everyday interactions with the public, the police transmit information and judgments on the "where, when, who, and how" questions of crime as well as suggesting what citizens can do to assist the police and better protect themselves and their neighbors.

We know very little about the content and variation in the communication of crime information that accompanies day-to-day police-citizen encounters. The immediate impact of observing police, whether in their cars or on foot, may reassure citizens (Bahn, 1974) and reduce perceived risks and fears in many contexts but it is unclear how long this effect lasts. Efforts to increase the level of patrol, however, have had inconsistent effects on perceptions of crime. When the Kansas City police force experimented with varying levels of preventive patrol, no commensurate changes in citizen perceptions were found (Kelling *et al.*, 1974). The Kansas City case may not be applicable to other situations since the police did not publicize the change in patrol levels and citizens did not perceive the difference. Team policing efforts which consistently base patrolmen in one area and emphasize community contacts have also been found to have surprisingly little impact on the fears and other crime perceptions of residents (Bloch and Specht, 1973). Schwartz and Clarren's, (1978), evaluation of the Cincinnati team policing program found that residents in the target areas saw crime as decreasing in their neighborhood, perceived police activity to be on the increase, however their fear of crime was not substantially diminished.

None of the major studies of police-citizen encounters include descriptions of the content or time, or what patrolmen or detectives said to victims or witnesses about crime (Reiss, 1971; Skolnick, 1967; Muir, 1975). Such communication is not viewed by these researchers or by the police themselves as being central to their work. It is unlikely that training in talking to people in such situations is included in the formal or on-the-job training of patrolmen. In fact, the official posture of most police departments is to limit the amount of information about crime and police action that is regularly available to the public.

The relationship between police communications and public perceptions of crime has received more attention with regard to programs of crime prevention or community relations. Such programs may include films, posters, public addresses, door-to-door canvassing, and workshops and inevitably convey descriptive information about crime and judgments about its seriousness. A frequent premise underlying such presentations is the need to teach people that crime is more extensive and serious than they think; i.e., a little bit of fear can stimulate activity. The effects of such programs on be-

havior will be discussed in a later part of this review, but in this context, it is appropriate to ask what is known about the effects of such communications on evaluations, judgments, and emotional reactions to crime. Do such programs give people more realistic perceptions of crime or do they increase the level of fear?

One of the most extensively studied crime prevention efforts was carried out by Minnesota in its Crime Watch Program. "Before" and "after" citizen surveys were conducted. The surveys showed a substantial increase in concern about crime and awareness of protective measures that citizens could take (Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, 1976). The report, unfortunately, does not consider effects on judgments and emotional reactions to crime.

In a general review of citizen crime reporting programs which were run by the police or another city agency, Bickman *et al.* (1976) address the possibility of crime awareness campaigns heightening fear. They reviewed the data available on more than seventy programs throughout the country but found only five which could provide information on the fear and other perceptions in their areas.¹⁵ In all but one case, the projects only collected perception data through surveys *before* the implementation of the program. This perceptual data was used for planning rather than for evaluation purposes.

The failure to consider fear and other perceptions as major aspects of the success or failure of citizen crime programs has resulted in lost opportunities to collect data on this important set of relations. Even the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program, which in other respects was unusually well evaluated, does not include a consideration of impacts on perceptions (Abt Associates, 1976).

In addition to crime prevention programs, information characterizing particular locales is routinely part of the communication of real estate brokers and appraisers, as well as insurance brokers and underwriters. A small part of the larger issues of financial and insurance "red-lining"—the practice of refusing to grant loans or insurance to buildings in areas that have been labeled as undesirable—involves characterizations of areas in terms of their safety. The net impact of the insurance, real estate, and mortgage messages about an area can affect the neighborhood's crime reputation among residents, prospective residents, and residents living in other parts of the city. To date, no study has sought to determine the degree to which crime is a factor in the agencies

involved with the private housing market or the impact of such agencies on the public.

Agencies responsible for public housing have more directly recognized the importance of crime and crime perceptions in decisions to move into or stay in public housing. Housing projects often have reputations as particularly dangerous areas. Efforts are underway in a number of cities to make such housing safer. Whether such efforts will also affect the crime perceptions of residents and non-residents should be an important element in any overall evaluation of such efforts (Newman, 1973).

8. *Politics.* Throughout American history, crime has emerged from time to time as a political issue at both the national and city level. Crime has become a common issue in the electoral campaigns of the past fifteen years. Police leaders have been elected mayor in several large cities and have been the focal point of elections in others. The rhetoric of such campaigns may paint the crime situation in particularly stark terms while calling for a harsher response throughout the criminal justice system. The potential effect of such political actions on citizen perceptions of crime is clear.

A great deal of attention has been given by the press to particular "law and order" campaigns, but surprisingly little attention has been devoted to them by social scientific studies of community politics and decision-making. There is an extensive tradition of research on community power in which patterns of influence on particular issues are examined. Rarely has crime or the police been included. A major exception is Wilson's study (1968a) of police politics and administration in eight cities. This study details a number of different styles of policing which it relates to the political-administrative structure and political culture of the city. Wilson argues that political pressure exerts only modest influence over the operation of the police. However, neither Wilson's nor several other recent studies of police policies (Juris and Feuille, 1973; Ruchelman, 1974) deal explicitly with the impact of police or crime politics on popular thinking about crime.

9. *Social integration.* Ever since Durkheim (1933) described the role of crime in affirming the solidarity of community, researchers have continued to probe various aspects of the relationship between social integration and crime. More than thirty years ago Shaw and McKay (1942) reported community integration with lower rates of juvenile delinquency. Maccoby *et al.* (1958) followed up on Shaw and McKay's ideas in a study of two neighborhoods in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The neighborhoods were similar in terms of residents' socioeconomic status, but one neighborhood had three times as much juvenile delinquency as the other. They


¹⁵ These five projects are the Minnesota Crime Watch in Golden Valley, the St. Petersburg (Florida) Neighborhood Alert, the Portland (Oregon) Anti-Burglary Campaign, Crime Check in Fall River, Massachusetts, and Rape, New York City.

explained the difference in delinquency rates by the degree of social integration of the two areas. In the area with the higher rate fewer residents knew each other and expressed affection for the neighborhood.

A close examination of Durkheim's study reveals that he is less concerned with actual crime than he is with societal reaction to crime. Crime is functional for the community, he reasoned, to the extent that it helps define moral boundaries for members and reaffirms the importance of shared values. The definitional and affirmative outcomes are achieved in the course of taking action against offenders. Recently, Conklin (1975) has suggested a counter-argument that the existence of crime may serve to undermine social solidarity especially when offenders remain unapprehended and crime is perceived as getting worse.

Social integration can also be examined in relation to perceptions of crime. Integration has been measured in many different ways including the degree of normative or value agreement, the degree of social interaction, the extent of functional interdependence, and the degree of mutual identification within a social group or among the residents of a particular area (Hunter, 1974). The studies that consider social integration and perceptions of crime most often include one or two but not all of the above measures of integration. These studies may be distinguished in terms of whether they examine the individual respondent's social integration (Figure 5) or the degree of social integration of an area in which perceptions are being studied (Figure 6 and 7)

Figure 5



10. *Individual social integration.* Is the extent of individual social integration associated with levels of fear and other perceptions of crime? This question has been addressed by a number of researchers. As mentioned above, social isolation is a particular concern with regard to the elderly. Gubrium (1974) hypothesized that elderly who live in age-homogenous areas have comparatively more extensive friendships than elderly living in age-heterogeneous housing. Greater friendships would mean less social isolation (greater social interaction) and less fear of crime. Sundeen and Mathieu's research (1976) on elderly residents of three types of urban neighborhoods lends support to these ideas.

The Portland elderly crime study (Rifai, 1976) used a social isolation scale based on 10 survey questions that were weighted differentially. Respondents were asked whether they lived alone, had family in the area, visited

or telephoned family members, knew and visited neighbors, and attended social groups. These are all aspects of the density of individual social interactions. There was no relationship between the degree of social isolation and whether respondents had or had not been victims of crimes, but greater isolation was related to the higher anxiety about crime. This finding was summarily a result of the greater isolation of women who are generally more fearful. Lebowitz (1975) also found that older people living alone were generally more fearful than those who were living with others in the household.

Based on intensive observations and interviews with residents of a heterogeneous public housing project, Merry (1976) found an association between the relationship residents maintained with young people who hung out in the neighborhood and the fears and perceptions of risk on the part of the residents. Familiarity could be direct and interpersonal or indirect through social networks. While it did not affect the likelihood of being victimized, such familiarity did increase the predictability (and hence the sense of manageability) of youth behavior.

Another aspect of social integration is the degree to which people feel they can rely on their neighbors. Boggs (1971) found that suburban residents were more confident that informal social controls would function to limit crime and were less afraid of crime than residents of the central city.

11. *Community social integration.* The relationship between perceptions and social integration can also be examined in terms of the degree to which the area itself is integrated. From such a perspective, one may ask whether the perceptions of residents of areas with higher social integration are different from the perceptions of residents of areas with lower integration, or whether the patterns of judgments, evaluations, and emotions about crime are influenced by the level of social integration in an area.

Figure 6




Jane Jacobs (1961) has argued that the extensiveness of social interaction in urban neighborhoods can reduce crime and fear by increasing surveillance. People feel safer because their behavior and the behavior of others is being watched all the time. In a recent paper however, Hunter and Baumer (1977) suggest that the degree of social interaction may only decrease fears when the interaction is with non-strangers. High volumes of street traffic composed of strangers is not likely to be integrat-

ing, even though the degree of social interaction may be high.

Several current approaches to crime prevention begin with the premise that the degree of social cohesion in an area will make it safer and make the residents feel safer. One approach that has received considerable attention has focused on the effects of physical arrangements that affect the use of space and the feeling of community (Newman, 1973). A study of two row house developments in New York City which had their public spaces modified found satisfaction with the projects increased and inferentially that social cohesion increased. These changes were associated by some, but not all measures with decreases in perceptions of the prevalence and fear of crime. (Kohn, Franck, and Fox, 1976).

Some researchers have measured social integration for an area and related it to the level of fear or other perceptual patterns for the area as a whole.

Figure 7



Sherman *et. al.* (1976) studied age segregated housing for the elderly. They found that social interaction was higher and fear of crime lower in the age segregated settings. Studies in Portland and Hartford included aggregate analyses of this type but neither found a relationship. Rifai (1976) reported that areas with higher social isolation among the elderly did not have significantly higher levels of fear in Portland. Fowler and Mangione (1974) did not find that their measure of community cohesiveness was related to levels of fear. However, since both studies used census tracts rather than some social area or neighborhood as the basis for their data aggregations, their findings may not be the most appropriate test of social integration.

Satisfaction with the neighborhood is not as strong a measure of social integration as others we have discussed, but it can be interpreted as one aspect of commitment to an area. In Minneapolis, the level of satisfaction with the neighborhood was not associated with levels of crime victimization, but it was related to levels of fear. Neighborhoods with higher levels of satisfaction had lower fear (Frisbie, 1977). This was particularly significant in an area with relatively high crime, but low fear. Frisbie suggests that high satisfaction with a neighborhood makes residents more tolerant of crime.

Conklin (1975) draws on a wide variety of sources to support a complex and powerful analysis of the relationship between low social integration, low social control, and high levels of fear. His argument will be discussed

further in our discussion of the effects of collective action on community integration and fear below. Although Conklin can find some support in the literature, his theory is most appropriately interpreted as an agenda for research.

12. *The culture of crime.* Conklin (1975) suggests that perceptions of crime constitute a symbolic component of the culture of an area and that more variation in perceptions exist between communities than among individuals who reside within one community. Conklin sees each locale as having a "crime environment" which consists of "myths, legends, ideas, and views about crime." In a similar vein, Biderman *et. al.* (1967) refer to a "climate of concern and worry" in each of their precincts. They note that people living in an area where there is an atmosphere of heightened anxiety are more likely to worry about their safety regardless of the objective risks. In other words, the predominant values emerging in a particular social environment may be effective in determining subsequent perceptions.

Although there may be such shared stories and understandings about crime, both studies operationalize their conception by aggregating individual data to produce area-wide measures. Areas may differ in the degree to which any definition of the crime environment is shared. Communities may be characterized by the average level of fear or perceived risks and rates, or in terms of the clustering of perceptions. Within one area there may be clusters of people at different points along a high to low continuum monitoring concern, risk or fear of crime. If these clusters are associated with some geographic or social subgrouping within the area, it may be more appropriate to analyze the climates or sub-environments of crime. The degree to which an individual's perceptions are influenced by such environments might then be related to his degree of social integration in one of these sub-environments or the degree to which he or she is influenced by more than one sub-environment. Analyses of this kind require comparable data on a number of areas and have yet to appear. If a "climate of concern" has such an impact it is likely to affect members and groups within a locale differently: the greatest impact would be expected among those who are most socially integrated (Durkheim, 1958).

13. *Interrelationships of factors that influence perceptions of crime.* We have discussed factors that are frequently thought to affect perceptions of crime. Each factor's association with perceptions was considered separately. However, an adequate explanation of perceptions involves multivariate analyses which seek to determine the relative contribution of each of these factors taken together. Such an undertaking requires data on a large number of variables within a single study. No study

has included all of the factors discussed above. The most comprehensive attempt, to date is the model proposed by Garofalo (1977c) to explain individual fear of crime. Garofalo incorporates personal victimization, risks of crime in the neighborhood, age, sex, media, and perceived protection by police into a working model of the influences on fear of crime. Fear of crime was operationalized as fear of walking in a neighborhood at night. He was unable to measure media influences, but he found age and sex and perception of the relative risks in the neighborhood to explain the largest degree of variance in reported fear.

While Garofalo's study is an important step in an understanding of perceptions, it is limited in that it seeks to explain only one perceptual dimension and, more importantly, does not include neighborhood or other aggregate level variables. These limitations are, for the most part, built into the capabilities of the survey data he was using. A more comprehensive multivariate analysis would require an integration of several different data sources.

Hindelang *et al.* (1978), although still relying on surveys of individual perceptions, have tried to move the discussion of perceptions of crime and victimizations in a more comprehensive direction. The central element in their theory of personal crime victimization is individual "life-style". By lifestyle they mean routine vocational and leisure activities. Lifestyles are ways in which people adapt to the role expectations and structural constraints that are associated with their demographic characteristics. For example, changes in mobility associated with the activities at different stages of the life cycle correspond to changes in perceptions of crime. Periods of high mobility, e.g. young adulthood, are periods of lower fear of crime. These life cycle changes are in turn affected by the structural constraints of economic, familial, educational, and legal factors.

The comprehensiveness of their model requires data beyond the limits of any existing study. Though their thinking is shaped by the analysis of survey data their model calls for a much broader understanding of individual, group, and subcultural activities than could be obtained by survey methods alone.

F. Summary

We have given considerable attention in this part of the review to delineating three different types of crime perceptions—values, judgments, and emotions. This was necessary for two reasons. First, the term "fear of crime" is used to refer to a wide range of phenomena that are quite different. By reserving this term for a type of emotional response to crime, it is easier to compare findings across studies.

Second, in a number of studies the relationships between evaluations of crime, judgments, and emotions and other variables were not the same. Factors associated with perceptions of crime rates and crime risks do not always have a similar relationship to fear. For example, the elderly may be less distinctive from the general population in terms of their judgments about crime than they are because they are more afraid.

The research on factors affecting crime perceptions suggest many complexities and incomplete understanding, but it is clear that changes in or the level of crime rates alone do not account for changes or levels of fear and perceived risk. A number of other factors come into play in shaping these perceptions. At the present time, the weight of evidence suggests that recent victimizations, even when they involve contact and violence between victim and offender, have relatively modest associations with crime perceptions. However, the methodological limitations of victimization surveys presently being used to determine the nature of these relationships are substantial and it is possible that surveys designed more specifically to explore this relationship may uncover stronger relationships.

There is very little available information on how individuals obtain and interpret information about crime. There is widespread belief that when people rely on vicarious sources of information such as the mass media they tend to see crime as a more serious problem. There is a small amount of direct evidence to support this belief, but it is far from conclusive. The most relevant indirect evidence is the consistently reported finding that people tend to see crime as less of a problem in their own neighborhoods where they can use personal experience and interpersonal communications than in other geographic locations—other neighborhoods, the city or nation as a whole—where they must rely more heavily on information from the mass media.

Running through discussions of crime perceptions are judgments about the appropriateness or rationality of the fear levels of the general population or of particular sub-categories of people. Are people more afraid or less afraid of crime than they ought to be? In an absolute sense the answer to this question does not hinge on empirical inquiry, but in a relative sense it is possible to compare various risks that people face and the levels of fear that are associated with them. Put in these terms it is clear that there is more fear of crime given a probabilistic sense of risk than is for other dangers that are more likely to occur. In this sense, one would conclude there is too much fear of crime or too little fear of these other risks. When a similar line of reasoning is used to assess the levels of fear of different demographic sub-categories, one would conclude that women and the elderly are too

afraid or men and younger persons are too unafraid.

A number of writers challenge this way of assessing the rationality or appropriateness of fear levels. They either argue that crime is fundamentally more dangerous than other bodily or material risks or they disagree with the way the probabilities of crime are calculated. The importance of this debate is not that it will result in answering the issue of the rationality of crime fears.

Rather, it has stimulated researchers to refine their understanding of crime as personal and societal phenomena.

The literature on perceptions provides considerable data on the distribution of these perceptions; the major task now is to understand how they are shaped and changed over time.

PART II. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORAL REACTIONS

A. Introduction

It is widely believed that increased fear of crime has led many people to change their behavior. The media are full of accounts of what people are doing to protect themselves and to reduce their exposure to crime. There are, however, surprisingly few systematic investigations of such behavior by social scientists and little is known about the extent and determinants of such behavior. Although most surveys of crime perceptions include questions on behavior, relatively less effort has been devoted to analyzing and interpreting the behavioral data.

The next two parts of this essay will deal with behavior—what people do. This section of the essay will consider individual behavior and the third section will discuss collective behavioral responses. The distinction between individual and collective behavioral responses is made for analytic purposes. Individual actions are always elements of collective actions and it is difficult to assign phenomena neatly to one or the other category. The distinction as we shall use it in the rest of this essay is as follows. In studies where the individual is the unit of analysis, the findings will be discussed in this part of the report. We will discuss the organizational aspects of behavioral responses under collective response. There, the unit of analysis is not the individual but a collectivity—a neighborhood, community organization, or some other group. Some confusion may arise when we discuss participation in collective activities as an aspect of individual behavior and then discuss the same collective activities in part III from an organizational perspective. Obviously, both perspectives are necessary for a full understanding of behavioral responses. As in our discussion of perceptions of crime, we will only consider studies of what individuals do in their general citizen/resident roles. We will *not* discuss the actions taken by persons in various occupational roles—bus drivers, teachers, shopkeepers, etc.

Most people use the streets of their neighborhoods to shop, to work, to recreate, to socialize, etc. They may, or may not, "take crime into account" in deciding where to do these things and how to get there. Everyone considers what, if anything, they will do to protect themselves or their residences from the risk of crime.

The range of behaviors that might be considered "reactions to crime" is quite broad; there are an endless number of activities in which people might "take crime into account" in how they act. We have developed a typology of five types of behavior which have been given some attention by researchers. There is even less agreement about terminology with regard to behavioral reactions to crime than there is with regard to perceptions. The behaviors discussed below could be divided up in a number of other ways, but to our knowledge there are no other attempts to organize the findings on individual behavioral reactions along other lines. If our typology allows the reader to see common findings in the studies discussed and to identify behaviors that are relevant but unstudied, it will have served its purpose.

In the following section, we discuss what is known about the extensiveness and distribution of these types of behaviors. At the same time, we will present available evidence on whether these behaviors are being undertaken, to any significant extent, because of crime.

Next we examine the relationship between crime perceptions and behavioral reactions to determine the extent to which variations in individual behavioral reaction can be explained by individual crime perceptions. Then, we examine the literature on the relationship of non-perceptual factors—the incidence of crime, victimization and social integration—and behavioral reactions.

Finally, we consider the possible effects on crime rates, individual victimization risks, and perceptions of crime.

B. Types of Individual Behaviors

1. *What is an individual behavioral reaction to crime?*

One frequently encountered tendency in the literature is for writers to present data about the perceptions of crime, but draw conclusions about behavior. When a large proportion of respondents reply that they are afraid to walk in the streets of their neighborhood at night, some authors assume that this is evidence that respondents are not walking on the streets at night. This may be the case, but data on perceptions does not establish it. Discussions of survey data do not always take care to distinguish (1) questions about a perception of some activity—e.g., "Are you afraid to walk on the streets of your neighbor-

hood at night?" from (2) questions about actual behavior, e.g., "Do you walk on the streets of your neighborhood at night?" or even (3) "Have you ever not walked on the streets at night because you were afraid of crime?" The first question asks about a perception, "fear." It does not ask whether the respondent walks on the street or not. A person might be afraid, but for a number of reasons goes out anyway. The second question reports a behavior. In this question the link between the answer and perceptions of crime is inferential. People may not walk on the streets of their neighborhood at night, not because of fear but because they have no need to. The third question asks about a behavior "walking on the streets at night" but it links the behavior to a perception, "because you were afraid of crime." Only the last form of the question makes explicit the association between the perception and the behavior. Only when data has the elements found in the third question can we safely state that we are dealing with a behavioral reaction to crime.

We define a *behavioral reaction* to crime as an action or set of actions for which the presence of crime risks is believed to be a relevant consideration. These behaviors may be conceived of as layers of an onion or concentric circles. The ones in the center are quite clearly associated with perceptions of crime. For example, people install new locks or alarm devices, or call the police about a crime. For other behaviors the connection to crime is less obvious. For example, the perceived risks of victimization may be one among a larger number of factors influencing decisions on whether to move or what mode of transportation to select.

A key question in the research on behavioral reactions is whether it is appropriate to consider a particular behavior as a crime reaction. When people buy dogs, they may buy them for protection, because they want to have a pet, or for both of these reasons combined. However, only when protection is one of the motives is having a pet a behavioral reaction to crime. Similarly, some people buy firearms for recreational purposes, others buy them solely for protection, while some may have both motives in mind. The problem is to decide how to interpret information about the purchase of a pet or a gun, or some other behavior. As we describe specific behaviors we will consider these ambiguities at greater length.

2. *Types of individual behavioral reactions.* At the present time there is no common vocabulary of behavior types. The literature includes such terms as "defensive measures" (Conklin, 1975), "self-protection" (Biderman, *et al.*, 1967), "precautionary behavior," "home defense" (Feagin, 1970), "mobilization" (Furstenberg, 1972), "avoidance," "security measures" (Conklin, 1975; Ennis, 1967) "private and public-minded" re-

sponses (Schneider and Schneider, 1977). In most cases these are labels applied to specific measures of one or more activity; in only a small number of studies do the authors define these terms beyond listing the items they have included.

Ennis (1967), developed an index of "security-consciousness" combining what he saw as efforts to protect the person and the household. He included items on locking doors at night, having a watchdog at home, owning firearms for protection, staying off the streets, and insuring life and property. All of the survey items he included described behaviors that individuals reported. The "consciousness" of the respondents, i.e., why they took the steps described in the question, is sometimes explicitly included in the question e.g., "Do you have a dog that is a watch dog?" or "Do you carry any insurance that covers any of your personal property against loss from theft or vandalism?" but, in other cases, it must be inferred e.g., "Do you lock your doors at night?"

Biderman, *et al.* (1967) constructed an index of "self-protection" which combined items believed to involve personal protection, securing a building in which one lived, and securing a building owned or managed, but not inhabited by the respondent.

We will discuss the phenomena described by Ennis and Biderman as well as other forms of individual behavior in terms of six types—avoidance, home and personal protection, insurance, communication, and participation.

a. *Avoidance.* Furstenberg (1972), in his reanalysis of a 1969 Harris Survey of Baltimore (Rosenthal, 1969), made a major contribution to the conceptualization of individual behavioral reactions. He distinguished between "avoidance behavior" and "mobilization techniques." According to Furstenberg, avoidance behavior involved "strategies to isolate . . . (oneself) from exposure to victimization" (1972,11). Examples of avoidance found in the Harris Survey included staying off the streets at night, taking taxis, locking doors and ignoring strangers. Mobilization, by contrast, was "less retreatist," more aggressive, more expensive, and more planned behavior. He included in this category survey items about the purchase of devices or services—extra locks, floodlights, bars, electric timers, burglar alarms, watchdogs, guns, and private police—all of which would protect a home by making it more difficult to enter, increasing the likelihood that a burglar would be discovered, resisted, or apprehended. However, Furstenberg does not include efforts to make a house less vulnerable central to the idea of mobilization, for he classifies using a lock as an avoidance item. The basic criterion in classifying a behavior as mobilization ap-

pears to be the expenditure of financial resources for the express purpose of resisting victimization. If this is the case, then purchases of weapons, self-defense training, escorts or other means to increase resistance while on the streets, all items not found in the Harris survey, would also be considered mobilization techniques. It would appear, however, that this conception of mobilization involves two necessary conditions. First, that financial resources be expended, and second, that they be expended to protect the home rather than to reduce exposure to victimization on the street.

We propose a conception of "avoidance" only slightly different from Furstenberg. *Avoidance refers to actions taken to decrease exposure to crime by removing oneself from or increasing the distance from situations in which the risk of criminal victimization is believed to be high.* The situations which are being avoided may be characterized in terms of location, time, or people, or some combination thereof. People avoid going to specific locations where they believe they may be victimized. Certain locations are avoided under any circumstances, e.g., "I never ride the subway." Many more locations are said to be avoided at certain times but not others. The pattern of spatial avoidance for most people differs depending on whether night or daytime activity is considered. Generally the level of avoidance goes up at night. The most dramatic example of this difference by time of day is in the use of streets in people's own neighborhoods. Relatively few people report refraining from going out during the day, but many more report doing so at night.

Avoidance may also mean reducing encounters with certain types of peoples. People may typify those to be avoided in terms of age, race, ethnicity, class, the activities people are engaging in or other appearance characteristics. Most commonly, people report avoiding interactions with strangers, youth in groups, or individuals of a different racial or ethnic group than the respondent. The above examples of avoidance behavior entailed use of the streets, but the most dramatic form of avoidance involves reducing exposure to dangerous situations by relocating one's residence, by moving to an area believed to be safer.

b-c. Protective behavior. Protective behavior seeks to increase resistance to victimization. It differs from avoidance in that this type of behavior does not entail physically removing oneself from exposure to people and places. Instead, a reduction in the risk of victimization is sought through actions which make victimization more difficult for the offender or which signal that the task will be more difficult if attempted. Not walking down a particular street or moving from a neighborhood may be examples of avoidance. Walking on that street escorted

or armed and providing better locks for a home are examples of protective behavior.

There are two principal types of protective behavior. One has to do with protecting the home or property and the other protecting the person while out of the home. All of Furstenberg's "mobilization" items are examples of *home protection*. In our conception of home protective behaviors, financial expenditures are not included as a criterion. Any action that seeks to make a home better protected whether it involves purchasing a device or merely using existing devices will be considered home protective behavior. Whereas Furstenberg considered using a lock as an example of avoidance, we will consider it an instance of home protection. Using a lock doesn't remove anyone from exposure to crime risk, but it may increase resistance to victimization attempts.

Personal protective behavior refers to actions taken outside the home, other than avoidance, to reduce vulnerability when encountering threatening situations. Personal protective behavior includes carrying a weapon, taking self-defense training and looking unafraid.

The "cost" of the behavior is not used as a defining characteristic of protection as it was in Furstenberg's distinction between "avoidance" and "mobilization" (Savitz *et al.*, 1977). There is little information available on the comparative costs of protective and avoidance behavior. Conceivably either could be quite expensive. The greater planning and expense associated with protective behavior may be more apparent than real. Protective measures often involve costs that are highly visible—the purchase of a watchdog, a lock, or a burglar alarm. However, the costs of avoidance can be as high if not higher. People may lose time and money through avoidance, they may forgo opportunities for profit, advancement, or enjoyment. A person who regularly takes taxis to avoid the perceived risks of traveling on public transportation may incur expenses far in excess of the costs of most protective devices. Similarly, the amount of planning that may be involved in avoiding certain places or modes of transportation may be substantial.

Protective behavior is "private-minded behavior" (Schneider and Schneider, 1977); it is intended to reduce the victimization rates for individuals or for their families. "Public-minded" behaviors seek to reduce the risk for a larger number of people. These will be discussed in the section on participation below.

d. Insurance behavior seeks to minimize the costs of victimization. It does not reduce exposure or resist victimization; instead it alters the *consequences* of victimization. Buying an insurance policy that covers the theft or malicious destruction of property is the most common form of this behavior. Such policies compensate victims in full or part for their losses by spreading the cost of the

loss across a large pool of insured persons. The loss is shared through the mechanism of insurance premiums.

There are other ways of reducing the "costs" of victimization besides purchasing insurance. When people decide to carry less or no money when they go out, or ask for checks rather than being given cash, they are using an informal mechanism of decreasing their losses if robbed. If people decide not to buy certain items for their home or to remove expensive items while they go on vacation, use safe-deposit boxes for valuables, engrave property for the purpose of increasing the likelihood of recovery after a theft, they are also engaging in a form of insurance behavior.

e. *Communicative behavior involves the sharing of information and emotions related to crime with others.* It typically involves recounting of crime stories about personal victimization experiences, ideas about the causes of crime or about the way to do something about crime. This category of behavior is less obviously a behavioral reaction than the four already described but there is evidence to support the observation that people do more talking than doing about crime. People may express interest, fear, or indignation, they may voice intentions to act individually or collectively, but frequently this is the extent of their "behavioral" reactions.

f. *Participation behavior involves actions in concert with others which are motivated by a particular crime or by crime in general.* Participation may take many different forms. It may be informal or formal, ad hoc or planned in advance, intermittent or continuous. Participation can be as limited as calling the police or as extensive as joining a citizen patrol. Much participative activity is unambiguously a reaction to crime while in other cases the perception of crime may be only one of several motivating factors behind the participation. Individuals may be motivated to participate in an activity such as a youth recreation program because of its effects on crime while others may think of the program solely in terms of providing opportunities for enjoyment or for the development of skill. When the latter perspective is taken, it would not be considered a behavioral reaction to crime.

C. The Extent of Individual Behavioral Reactions

We will now review what is known about the frequency and distribution of these types of individual behavioral reactions. These data come largely from surveys. These are, for the most part, the same surveys which were referred to in the discussion of crime perceptions. Such crime oriented surveys are less consistent in their inclusion of behavioral data than they are with regard to perceptions of crime. Another major source of

data are studies of particular types of behavior such as use of public transportation, gun ownership, or decisions to relocate residences. These studies may be quite detailed in their discussion of the behavior, but often do not use a reactions to crime perspective.

There are few attempts to collect the findings on one or more of the types of behavior discussed here. The typical study reports one set of data with a discussion limited to simple frequencies or basic cross-tabulations by attitudinal and demographic variables. Most of the research focuses on avoidance and protective behaviors with much less attention devoted to studying participative and insuring behavior and with almost no attention given to communicative behavior.

1. *General behavioral change.* Respondents on some surveys have been asked whether their behavior had changed or been limited in the last few years because of crime. The answers to such questions do not provide information on what type of behavioral change occurred. In the National Crime Survey and the Cincinnati team policing surveys slightly less than half the respondents report that they had made some changes, (Garofalo, 1977c; Nehnevajsa, 1977). When a similar question was asked in high crime areas, the proportion of positive replies was higher (60 percent) (Reiss, 1967). In Portland, where residents perceive a modest amount of crime,¹ the number reporting such changes was much lower (18 percent) (Kennedy, n.d.).

In the National Crime Survey and in the Cincinnati survey people perceived the behavior of others to have changed much more than their own behavior had. Garofalo (1977c) reports that 82 percent of the respondents in the 8 LEAA High Impact Cities believed that people, in general, had limited their behavior. When asked about the residents of their neighborhood, the estimate dropped to 56 percent. By contrast only 46 percent reported limiting their own behavior. The Cincinnati survey produced a similar pattern of responses (Nehnevajsa, 1977). This pattern of perceptions of individual behavioral change is similar to the one reported in our discussion of crime with regard to judgments about crime rates. People generally perceive crime rates as higher or rising faster in more distant locations than in the areas where they live. Hindelang *et al.* (1978), refer to this difference between what people do and what they believe others are doing as one of several indications that people feel that crime is a problem, but it is not *their* problem.

Females, non-whites, and the elderly report somewhat higher rates of behavior change (all just over 50 percent of the respondents) and the very young, males, and

¹ By both official police crime measures and victimization data, Portland is not a low crime city.

whites report substantially lower rates (Garofalo, 1977c; Nehnevajsa, 1977).

The lack of specificity in the general question, about what behaviors are changing makes it impossible to use these responses to assess the impact of such reactions on people's lives. The changes that are reported may represent major or minor reorderings of behavior. If surveys follow up an affirmative reply to a question about general change with a request to describe what kind of change has taken place, the utility of the response would be much greater.

a. *Establishing a baseline for change over time.*

Questions that ask about general or specific changes of behavior "over the last few years" provide a current judgment about whether things were different in the past. Reliance on retrospective recall, however, is not as reliable a way to study changes in behavior as is comparing behavior at two points in time. It is safest to treat replies to such questions as perceptions of the general state of reactive activity. They cannot be used as measures of the level of individual activity because there is no information on the level of protective or other reactive activity that the respondent was engaged in prior to the period during which his/her behavior is perceived as having changed.

b. *Survey formats may influence behavioral response frequencies.* When questions about general changes in behavior are followed up with open-ended requests for descriptions of the types of changes undergone, the rates for particular types of behaviors mentioned are significantly lower than those obtained when respondents are asked specifically whether they had engaged in the behavior (Nehnevajsa, 1977). For example, only 8 percent of the respondents in the Cincinnati survey mention avoiding neighborhoods in the open-ended question, but on closed-ended questions the pattern of responses across a number of surveys is for two-thirds or more of the respondents to report avoidance (Furstenberg, 1972; Kelling *et al.*, 1974). This difference remains even when multiple responses to the open-ended questions are included. This may mean that people don't think much about some of the actions they have taken because of crime, perhaps because the actions are infrequent or of little importance to the respondents. The implications of this response pattern will be better understood if surveys follow up open-ended questions with closed-ended questions about specific behavioral responses.

2. *Avoidance.* "Avoidance" is defined as attempts to decrease exposure to risk by placing physical distance between the individual and threatening situations. Avoidance may encompass a wide variety of

phenomena. It may involve not going to or through certain areas of a city or neighborhood, selecting a different mode of transportation such as a car or bus rather than walking or using the subway, and deciding to forgo activities such as socializing, attending meetings, shopping, and recreation. Direct questions about use of the streets and avoidance of particular areas of the city are frequently included in crime surveys; questions on the degree of avoidance associated with activities such as shopping and recreation are less common, but often are described in greater detail in studies that deal with shopping, recreation, or travel as the central interest.

a. *Some measurement problems in the study of avoidance.* Avoidance often involves the omission of an act in response to the perceived risk of victimization. A person decides not to go out at night or not to engage in some activity. To measure this behavior directly requires knowing about acts that might have but did not occur. It is easier to measure what people do, than what people might have but didn't do. A related problem is faced in deterrence research. Gibbs' definition of deterred behavior: "an omission of an act as a response to perceived risk and fear of punishment for contrary behavior" (1975:3) closely parallels our conception of avoidance. Avoidance, like deterred behavior, is an omission due to perceived risk and fear. Victimization risks are similar to punishment in that both involve financial, physical and psychological costs. There are, of course, other differences between these two types of behavior. The behavior to be deterred is usually morally proscribed while avoidance means omitting acceptable everyday behavior. Punishments are imposed by a legitimate centralized agency while crime victimization is experienced at the hands of illegitimate and decentralized actors. Specific information about the risks for both types of non-omission are difficult to obtain, although both official agencies and informal sources provide estimates.

Deterrence researchers have generally adopted a strategy of inferring the amount of deterred behavior based on measurements of crimes committed. The crime rate is conceived as a measure of the amount of behavior that the threat of punishment did not deter. A decrease in the crime rate is interpreted as an indirect measure of acts omitted. However, whether crime rates go up or down, it is never fully knowable whether the change would have been more or less without the threat of punishment.

Some studies of avoidance have adopted a similar strategy to that used in deterrence research. Measures are obtained of "non-avoidance" behavior. People may be asked how frequently they go out. High volumes of street or transit usage has been taken as an indication of "non-avoidance." However, even if people had no factor to consider other than crime risks, a given level of street or

transit usage would never directly measure how many people did not act out of fear.

One advantage this indirect method has for studying deterrence over its use in measuring avoidance is that the behavior omitted is quite clearly defined and circumscribed with regard to crime. By contrast, avoidance involves omitting a wide variety of activities that are not clearly defined.

On the other hand, use of more direct measures of avoidance may be easier than for deterrence. People are asked to characterize more easily recalled patterns of behavior rather than individual acts. For example, respondents are asked to estimate how often they decide not to go out at night because of fear. Misremembered details pose less of a threat to the reliability of such responses.

b. *Spatial and temporal avoidance.* When asked directly, a significant number of people report that there are some parts of their cities and neighborhoods where

they do not go because of the risk of victimization. The proportion of persons who report such behavior varies greatly from survey to survey and with different question formats. (See Table 1).

The range of findings in Table 1 illustrates the difficulty in generalizing across studies about the rates of avoidance of specific locations. Since Lawton *et al.*'s study of the elderly (1976), Kleinman and David's study of Bedford-Stuyvesant residents (1973) and Savitz *et al.*'s (1977) study of central city teenagers and their mothers all surveyed residents of high crime and high fear areas, it is not surprising that their respondents reported high rates of avoidance for parts of their own neighborhoods. No similar factor explains why the Kansas City and Michigan studies which included respondents living in all types of crime situations report avoidance rates that were much higher than those found in the National Crime Survey of eight high impact cities.

The lower avoidance rates found by Ennis' national

Table 1
Survey Responses on Places Avoided

Percentage Reporting Avoidance	Question Wording	Type of Population Surveyed	Reference
77	make more effort to avoid subways than before	black adults in household of 17 year old boys in Philadelphia	Savitz <i>et al.</i> , 1977
67	avoided some parts of the city b/c of fear of victimization	15 police beats in Kansas City	Kelling <i>et al.</i> , 1974
66	there were some places they would not go because of crime	state-wide Michigan	MOR, 1977
52	avoid going downtown	Detroit Metropolitan Area	ISR, 1975
44	avoid certain neighborhood streets	residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York	Kleinman and David, 1973
42	avoid certain locations in the neighborhood	elderly residents of central city low rent public housing	Lawton <i>et al.</i> , 1976
36	won't go certain places in the metropolitan area at night	8 LEAA high impact cities victimization surveys	Garofalo, 1977c
20	won't go places in the metropolitan area in the daytime	8 LEAA high impact cities victimization surveys	Garofalo, 1977c
15	didn't go somewhere wanted to b/c it was unsafe	national victimization survey	Ennis, 1967
15	avoid some parts of their neighborhood and/or the city—open-ended	state-wide survey, Maryland	Nehnevajsa and Karellitz, 1977
8	stay out of parts of city—open-ended	target area and general survey of Cincinnati	Schwartz and Clarren, 1978
4	avoid certain areas of town—open-ended	4 areas of Portland	Yaden <i>et al.</i> , 1973

survey (1967) may be a result of the question's greater specificity. Whereas most questions link not going some place to the fear of victimization, his question added the idea of the *need* of the individual to go places. Many people would not want to go near certain high crime areas, but are they really avoiding those areas if they have no need or occasion to go there? The most socially significant type of avoidance involves instances when people do not go places where they need or want to go. Conklin (1971) found that there was less street usage in an area where there was low level of crime fears and more street usage in another area with much higher levels of fear. He explains this finding in terms of the fewer resources of the residents of the high fear of crime area and hence their greater need to use public transportation and to walk. He also describes a situation in which many young women continued to hitchhike even after a series of murders of women including some hitchhikers. Some women said they continued because they couldn't get around any other way. Similarly, people may go to places where they feel uneasy, but the requirements of getting to their jobs or other important activities take precedence.

Certain types of locations are frequently mentioned as places to be avoided regardless of what the available crime statistics suggest about the probability of victimization there. Several studies report that people avoid public parks when they are alone or in the evening even though fewer crimes occur there than in surrounding areas (Malt Associates, 1971). Residents of the Ravenna area of Seattle rarely used the nearby park in the evening and were less likely to walk on the blocks closest to the park (Springer, 1974). People in Ravenna perceived the park as a dangerous place even though the official statistics and the view of the police and park officials supported a characterization of the park as a low crime area. In explaining their avoidance, people noted the lack of visibility of many parts of the park to passers-by. A robbery in a park where no one is around may be more threatening than a robbery on a crowded street (Conklin, 1975). Twenty-seven percent of the residents of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York City reported reduced use of the city parks due to a fear of victimization (Kleinman and David, 1973).

Downtown areas of large central cities are often mentioned as places that are avoided. For example, twenty percent of the Michigan respondents in a statewide survey mentioned downtown areas as places they avoid (OCJP, 1977); two years earlier 52 percent of respondents living in the Detroit Metropolitan area had reported they they avoid going downtown because of crime (ISR, 1975). Rapid transit stations also are frequently mentioned as particularly dangerous places to be avoided. In

a study of white and black youth living in Philadelphia, the subway is the location most consistently rated as dangerous and to be avoided (Savitz *et al.*, 1977). The available crime data for subways indicates that they are comparatively safe places by any one of a number of criteria (Chaiken *et al.*, 1974).

A less selective form of spatial avoidance is to stay at home and not venture forth at all. A great deal has been written in the popular press about the extent to which the fear of crime has made people captives in their own homes. Such avoidance entails a diminution in the number of times people leave their homes in the day or night and, in the extreme case, the complete curtailment of going out. Some surveys ask people to generalize about their street usage by indicating whether they go out frequently, occasionally, infrequently, or almost never; others ask people how often they went out in some specific time period such as the previous week. Either question format may be followed up with a question about whether the respondent has changed the frequency or pattern of going out. If such questions do not include a reference to crime risks, the answers may be cautiously interpreted as measures of avoidance if the behaviors correlate with responses to questions about crime perceptions asked elsewhere in the same questionnaire (Noble and Mangione, 1975).

Researchers concerned with the problems of the elderly have been particularly concerned with staying at home as a response to crime. Rifai (1976, 1977) and Lawton *et al.* (1976) confirm that a higher percentage of the elderly don't venture forth at night than other age groups. From 69 to 89 percent of elderly respondents said they "never" went out at night. However, a large proportion of these people are not going out for other reasons than to avoid crime. They may have no need or desire to go out. When Rifai probed their reasons, only one-third of the elderly respondents said that crime was a major reason for their not going out. Viewed in this light the elderly may be more the victims of old age than of crime fears:

The proportion of respondents who report that they go out less, not at all, or not unaccompanied varies considerably across surveys (see Table 2). As might be expected, larger number of people report some marginal decrease in their going out, particularly in the evening, than report staying home often or not going out at all. In most instances the major limitation on going out occurs at night. This may be due to greater fear of crime at night, but it may also be that people have more need to go out in the daytime. An adequate understanding of avoidance will only emerge when the individual's needs to go places is systematically taken into account.

c. Situational avoidance. One characteristic of the

Table 2

The Frequency of Going out of the House in Various Surveys

Percentage Reporting Behavior	Question Wording	Type of Population Surveyed	Reference
80	stay home more at night	black adults in household of 14 year old black youth in Philadelphia	Savitz <i>et al.</i> , 1977
54	limited their evening activities	15 beats in Kansas City	Kelling <i>et al.</i> , 1974
47	limited their evening activities	Baltimore citywide survey	Harris, 1969
43	stay off the streets at night	residents of high crime areas of Boston and Chicago	Reiss, 1967
39	avoid going out alone at night	high crime area residents of Boston and Chicago	Reiss, 1967
38	stay off the streets at night	residents of 3 Washington, D.C., precincts	Biderman <i>et al.</i> , 1967
36	stay in at night	North Carolina State sample	Richardson <i>et al.</i> , 1972
33	avoid going out alone at night	Bedford-Stuyvesant residents of New York City	Kleinman and David, 1973
27	don't go out at night anymore	elderly residents of Portland	Rifai, 1977
25	avoid going out alone at night	residents of 3 Washington, D.C. precincts	Biderman <i>et al.</i> , 1967
19	significantly decreased out of house activities	Cincinnati target area and citywide	Schwartz and Clarren, 1978
14	stay home more often in the evenings than before	statewide Maryland	Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977
11	don't go out after dark	4 Portland areas	Yaden <i>et al.</i> , 1973
10	limited their daytime out of house activities	15 beats in Kansas City	Kelling <i>et al.</i> , 1974
8	stay home at night	small Ohio town	Gorse and Beran, 1973
7	don't really go out at all—open-ended	Cincinnati target area and citywide	Schwartz and Clarren, 1977

places which people most often seek to avoid is that they are places where they must come into contact with large numbers of strangers. The fear of crime is often closely connected with the threatening qualities of strangers (Conklin, 1975). Strangers can be most expected to be in certain locations (Lofland, 1973) but they may also be encountered in places where they are not expected. Several studies report the efforts of people to minimize their contacts with strangers by refusing to talk with them, walking faster, and changing sides of the street to avoid encountering them (see Table 3). As with the other avoidance behaviors already discussed, there is a significant range in the percentage of respondents in different surveys who report taking measures to avoid strangers. The reason for these differences is not clear.

d. *Activity specific avoidance.* If people avoid certain parts of their cities and neighborhoods, and decrease the number of occasions on which they go out, then the frequency with which they engage in a number of specific activities is likely to decline. The popular understanding of avoidance is that crime has caused people to decrease their attendance at nighttime meetings, fewer people to go out for entertainment and dining, people to change where they shop, and people to decrease their frequency of socializing. Such changes in activity have rarely been carefully documented. Most attempts to measure these types of activities have been done with regard to the elderly (Rifai, 1977; Lawton *et al.*, 1976). However, these studies of the elderly found that they either restrict their behavior less than has been assumed

Table 3

Frequency of Other Street Avoidance Activities in Various Surveys

Percentage Engaging in Behavior	Type of Question	Type of Sample	Reference
83	more unwilling to talk to strangers on the street	black adults in household of 14 year old black youth in Philadelphia	Savitz <i>et al.</i> , 1977
75	cross street when seeing a gang of teenagers	4 Portland areas	Yaden <i>et al.</i> , 1973
48	cross the street to avoid encountering strange youth while walking	Baltimore city sample	Harris, 1969
35	don't talk to strangers	high crime areas of Boston and Chicago	Reiss, 1967
12	avoid talking to strangers	3 Washington, D.C., precincts	Biderman <i>et al.</i> , 1967
6	don't trust strangers—open-ended	4 Portland areas	Yaden <i>et al.</i> , 1973

or, when their behavior is restricted, it is often for many other reasons besides crime.

One of the few measures of this type of activity found in a general crime survey is an item in the National Crime Survey asking whether people went out for entertainment as much as they did a year or two ago. If the reply indicated that they went out less, they were asked why. Garofalo (1977c) reports that only 13 percent of the people who said they went out less gave crime as the most important reason. For others, lack of money, family responsibilities, the pressure of other activities, and health were among the most common alternative explanations. Similarly, few of the people who mentioned that they shopped outside of the neighborhood mentioned crime as a reason (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978). Courtis and Dusseyer (1970) found that only 8 percent of a sample of Toronto residents reported decreasing their socializing or going out for entertainment due to perceived crime risks.

A study of fourteen year old boys and their parents in Philadelphia's central city is particularly rich in avoidance information. Some of the boys perceived the journey to school and areas on the school grounds as so dangerous that they often preferred to stay home (Savitz *et al.*, 1977). Large majorities of the adults in the black youths' households report shopping, visiting friends, and going to the movies alone less than they had previously. This same pattern appeared in two data sets collected one year apart.

Businesses, recreation departments, and other organizations that are concerned with how and where people spend their time often carry out market surveys which elicit detailed accounts of relevant perceptions and behaviors. Although such surveys are not designed to study crime reactions, they may be good sources of such in-

formation. To date, however, there has been no effort to incorporate data from those sources into social science studies of behavioral reactions to crime.

e. Indirect avoidance: The supervision of youth. When a fuller understanding of perceptions of crime is achieved, it is likely that the perceptions of parents may be found to be highly influenced by the information they receive from their children and by the parents' perceptions of the risks facing their children (Savitz *et al.*, 1977). If this is the case, then an important aspect of parents' behavioral responses to crime is likely to be the way they supervise their children with regard to crime. Children may be shielded from information about crime. Parents may establish rules about where and when children may play, visit, or work, that may be based in part on the parents' perceptions of risks the child may encounter.

There is little research that directly investigates this process. Springer (1975) reports that the play of children in a nearby park was limited by parents' fears of gang crime there. In their survey of black adults in Philadelphia, Savitz *et al.* (1977) found that keeping children off the streets at night was the avoidance reaction most often mentioned as having been increased by adults. Over ninety percent of the respondents mentioned it. In contrast, keeping children off the streets in the daytime was the least frequently mentioned among a list of eleven activities.

The dynamics of family interaction is one of the most pressing areas of research on perceptions, victimizations, and behavioral reactions. We know that males and females, young and old, differ with regard to their perceptions and reactions, but we know very little about how the perceptions and experiences of one household

member influences another. The best example of the fruitfulness of a study which considers these relationships is the Savitz *et al.* (1977) study, *City Life and Delinquency*. It provides information on crime perceptions, victimization experiences, and altered behaviors of 14 and 15 year old boys and an adult household member. These relationships were not the major focus of the study, and the authors did not fully exploit the potential of their design for studying reactions to crime. Nevertheless, this study does provide one of the few data sources for understanding the avoidance patterns of young people. The black youth in the study reported high rates of avoidance, but these were lower rates than those of their parents. Of particular interest is the degree to which these youth tried to avoid the "turfs" of other gangs in the daytime as well as the night. At night, 83 percent report trying to avoid encounters and talks with strangers.

f. *Transportation choices.* To what extent is the use of different means of transportation influenced by perceptions of crime? Unlike many other areas of research where avoidance is possibly at work, the major providers of public transportation services have taken steps to try to answer this question. The factor of personal safety has been included in general market surveys of public transport usage and has been the principle concern of other inquiries (ATA, 1973). There is little doubt that some people choose between modes of public transportation or decide to use cars or taxis instead because of their perception of crime-related risks. The question is to what extent is crime a factor.

A study of bus riders and residents along a bus route in Washington, D.C., (ATA, 1973) found a relatively high percentage of people who were worried about their safety on buses and who preferred not to ride them because of these perceived dangers. However, among the riders, 53 percent had no alternative means of transportation and used the bus if they needed to go somewhere. Several other studies which combined a survey of transportation users with a sample of residents in the transportation service area found that personal safety considerations were major factors in deciding whether to use public transportation for only a small percentage of people (Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 1974; Schnell *et al.*, 1973; Ferrari and Trenacoste, 1974). Since these studies are characterized by response rates of 50 percent or less, it is likely that they are biased in the direction of respondents who are least satisfied with public transportation or who care least about it. The overall conclusion reached in these studies is summarized in an American Transit Association report (1973):

It is extremely difficult to establish that a given

change in ridership is caused by a single factor such as crime.

However, it did not appear that crime was even a major factor.

One of the problems in interpreting these results is that the greater frequency with which people use public transportation, the less they are concerned about their safety (ATA, 1973). Non-users were often the most concerned. The meaning of these differences is not self-evident. Frequent usage may be a result of lower levels of perceived risk, may be a result of frequent usage without incidents, or may be the result of a psychological adaptation among users who have few alternatives. More intensive interviews reveal that many riders have witnessed or been the objects of annoying or threatening behaviors (Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 1974; ATA, 1973 report of the qualitative CTA study), but exposure to such situations was not found to be related to levels of fear (Ferrari and Trenacoste, 1974).

Studies consistently find greater concern for public safety on rapid transit lines (subways and els) than on buses (ATA, 1973). The most frequently mentioned danger spots on rapid transit lines were stairways, tunnels, and platforms hidden from public view. When bus stops were in an out of the way place, they too were feared. Once on the bus, people felt relatively safe. The driver appears to be a visible source of authority and assistance. Such a visible presence is less frequently available on the subway (ATA, 1973). Regardless of the means of public transportation, people feel safest and think least about avoiding peak usage periods. It is the evenings and off-peak periods that are most frequently mentioned as times to avoid.

A Baltimore study used archival data on patronage levels to determine whether a well publicized armed robbery of a bus driver and passengers adversely affected patronage on the route where the incident occurred. Unfortunately, the quality of the patronage figures and the small number of data points considered meant that the results were inconclusive (ATA, 1973).

Tift *et al.* (n.d.) examined the micro-dynamics of avoidance in rapid transit cars. They used direct observation of behavior to study seating patterns and techniques employed by more than 3,200 transit users. They found that transit riders who find themselves in stressful and/or threatening situations act to reduce risks of victimization by regulating their interactions with others. The researchers observed methods of scanning, seatmate selection, and blocking behavior. Whenever possible, riders avoid sitting next to other passengers and when necessary, select seatmates on the basis of similar visual characteristics (age, sex, and race). Riders try to

minimize their eye contact with other riders and construct boundaries with packages and their bodies to discourage intrusion. While the study is rich in detail on passenger interaction dynamics, it is difficult to determine from their data how consequential most of these activities are for enhancing the riders' sense of security and for avoiding threatening encounters.

Almost no research was found on the use of other means of transportation as part of avoidance strategies. For many people, a decision not to use public transportation implies using a car, a taxi, or walking. In some transit studies, respondents are asked if they own or have access to a car, but we are not informed about the actual use of it. The Harris survey of Baltimore (1969) did find that forty percent of the respondents used cars or taxis on some occasions because of the fear of victimization, but the question gives no indication of the frequency of this form avoidance. Biderman *et al.*'s (1967) study of three Washington precincts also included an item on which eleven percent of the respondents mentioned using taxis at night to reduce their risks. To date, the available information on cars and taxis is too limited to reach any conclusions.

g. *Relocation decisions.* Relocation is the ultimate form of avoidance. Instead of acting on a day-to-day basis to reduce exposure to situations perceived as dangerous, relocation represents a permanent physical removal. In this sense, changing schools or workplaces is a similar macro-avoidance decision. Like most other avoidance behavior, there is no doubt that some people decide to leave one residential location or choose another on the basis of perceived safety. The question is how many people make such decisions or, more precisely, for how many people is perceived safety an important factor in moving decisions? For those persons who move but did not take safety into account, residential relocation is not a behavioral reaction to crime. We include residential relocation in this discussion even though the preponderance of evidence suggests that it is not primarily a behavioral reaction to crime, because the contrary finding is so often believed.

Although we deal primarily with residential relocation, decisions about where to work and where to send children to school might also be considered. Savitz *et al.*, (1977) found that thirty-nine percent of the black adults in their time-one survey reported trying to transfer their children to safer schools, while seventy percent reported trying not to work in "bad" areas. These two rates can be compared with the twenty-eight percent who indicated that they were trying to move to a safer neighborhood. The reported attempts to move are much higher than has been found in most other studies and the school and work relocation rates are yet higher. The avoidance rates in this study run

substantially higher than has been generally found and may be due to the fact that it is a sample of black adults from the central city. An additional factor is that the job and residential relocation questions are worded in such a way that they may be eliciting reports about predispositions rather than behavior. As we shall discuss below, many more people report a desire to move because of crime than actually relocate.

The research on residential relocation behavior lends itself to different interpretations depending on what types of measures are employed. Many people report a desire to move but have no specific intention of doing so. Similarly, many more people report an intention to move than actually do move. A number of factors including the practicalities of a move intervene between desires and actuality. At this point too little is known about the differential characteristics of actual movers and those desiring to move, or the ratio between the two, to infer much about relocation behavior from attitudinal data. This qualification may be particularly important for understanding residential relocation as avoidance behavior because those groups affected most by crime, the poor and the black, are the very groups which are least able to relocate (Droettboom *et al.*, 1971).

Rather than ask people about their desires or intentions, a more common method of understanding relocation decisions has been to ask people who have moved to indicate retrospectively their reasons for choosing where they would live. Such questions produced contrasting results in the early studies of the President's Crime Commission. Residents in three Washington precincts studied by Biderman reported that neighborhood characteristics were more important than house characteristics in choosing where they lived. The safety and moral atmosphere were the most frequently mentioned characteristics of the neighborhood (Biderman *et al.*, 1967). Reiss (1967), on the other hand, found that residents of high crime areas in Boston and Chicago based their decisions on where to move on conveniences rather than on the moral character of the area or the extent of crime. A number of more recent studies have supported the view that the safety of the area is *not* a prime consideration in where to move. For example, elderly residents of Portland who have lived in their present residences for less than ten years were asked why they had moved. Only five percent mentioned safety (Rifai, 1976).

The studies cited above asked about the features of the places people moved to. These are often termed "pull" factors. Other studies have asked about the reasons why people left their former home, or "push" factors. The National Crime Survey results from the eight LEAA high impact cities found that of those persons who had moved within the past five years, only three percent cited crime

as an important reason for leaving their old neighborhood. Even if replies about the neighborhood having gone down or bad elements moving in are included as indirect ways of talking about crime, still only ten percent of those who moved had a crime-related "push" motivation. Most people moved because they desired a better house or greater convenience (Garofalo, 1977a). A recent national survey of urban residents found that crime was the fourth most frequently mentioned reason for wanting to move out of urban neighborhoods; seventeen percent of those wanting to move mentioned it. Among residents of the large central cities, 29 percent gave it as a reason (Gallup, 1978).

The studies mentioned thus far all ask people to recall motivations which were operative at some time in the past. This allows for the possibility that past attitudes will be reinterpreted to conform with present perceptions. This is a standard problem in interpreting retrospective responses. When concern and perceptions of crime risk are part of people's present experiences, they may reinterpret their past motivations and find similar perceptions at work. If this is the case, then the low level of reported consideration of safety issues in the past is particularly noteworthy. An alternative bias, however, is that people who see crime as a problem in their present neighborhood moved there because it appeared safer. If they downplay crime as a reason to themselves or to an interviewer, it puts their relocation decision in a better light. This could result in people underreporting the importance of perceptions of safety in their relocation decision. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine the possible contribution of either of these possibilities from retrospective data.

A superior, but more costly, way to study these relationships is to conduct longitudinal research on residential mobility. Duncan and Newman (1976) asked people about their intent to move in 1970 and then re-interviewed people two to three years later about their actual moves. Less than half the families who stated that they intended to move did so within the next three years. The principle reasons for moving were "consumptive," having to do with the house or its location rather than jobs. The characteristics of the house also played a larger role than neighborhood characteristics, one of which would be safety. Droettboom *et al.*, (1971) re-interviewed households after three years, as well as the residents who moved into the houses that had been vacated. They found no significant effect of the perceived seriousness of the crime problem on mobility patterns. Perceptions of crime were related to dissatisfaction with one's neighborhood but this dissatisfaction was seldom sufficient to make residents move. Such studies support the conclusion that residential relocation is

not avoidance behavior to any substantial degree.

This conclusion is further supported by the research on "white flight." Crime rates and the influx of racial minorities are often believed to have been principal causes of the rapid out migration from central cities to suburbs. These are termed "push" factors; in contrast, "pull" factors would include characteristics of the suburbs that made them appear more attractive. This "common sense" interpretation—supported by rising crime rates and rapid suburbanization—is examined across cities with varying crime rates. Crime, along with racial factors, appears to have a small effect on moves to the suburbs (Frey, 1977).

American cities deconcentrate at about the same rapid rate whether or not low status minority group members are present in large numbers and whether or not the incidence of crime in the central city is high (Guterbock, n.d.:154).

In addition, residents of smaller cities with lower crime and fear of crime levels report as great an interest in moving out of cities as do residents of large central cities (Gallup, 1978).

An inference that should *not* be drawn from these findings is that relocation would not reduce victimization. Larger cities have higher victimization rates than smaller cities and suburbs have lower rates than central cities. This pattern of relations is pronounced for robbery, but less so for burglary (Wilson and Boland, 1976). Areas within a city also have considerable variations in their victimization rates (Repetto, 1974). Thus, Wilson and Boland (1976) argue individuals could reduce their risks by relocating. They add that this strategy would only be effective if a few people employed it. If everyone from high crime areas moved to lower risk areas the lower risk areas would be transformed. Furthermore, as a practical matter most families are limited by the high costs or comparatively low benefits of moving.

h. Social distribution of avoidance behavior. Thus far, we have discussed the overall frequency of various types of avoidance behavior; now we turn to a consideration of the variation in rates of avoidance behavior for different social categories.

1. Sex and age. On almost any measure, women and older persons report more avoidance. Their worlds are more constrained (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977; Kelling *et al.*, 1974; Kleinman and David, 1973; Furstenberg, 1972; Biderman, 1967; Reiss, 1967; Garofalo, 1977c). This pattern is, in large part, a result of their greater perceived risk and fear (to be discussed more fully in a later section on perceptions and behavior), but may also be a consequence of their social roles. There are fewer pressures on or necessities for women and the

elderly to go out and to engage in various activities; when there are, they show lower levels of avoidance. For example, Furstenberg (1972) finds that working women show less avoidance than nonworking women. The working elderly similarly are found to report lower levels of avoidance.

(2) *Race*. The pattern of avoidance behavior by race is less consistent (Biderman, 1967). Garofalo (1977) found no variation by race on several measures of avoidance. Some studies have found modest associations with non-whites or blacks (depending on the study) reporting higher rates of changing or limiting their behaviors, staying home or avoiding strangers, (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977; Richardson *et al.*, 1972), while others have found whites avoiding certain parts of the city at higher rates (Reiss, 1967). The strength of these associations, where they exist, are generally not as strong as those for sex or age. The pattern of responses may indicate that non-whites are more cautious about how they act in their own neighborhoods, but whites are more likely to avoid certain neighborhoods other than their own. Since blacks are more likely to live in high crime areas, this may mean that both blacks and whites practice avoidance with regard to black areas. An areal interpretation of these data is supported by Furstenberg's (1972) analysis. He found that the association between race and avoidance disappeared when place of residence was controlled.

(3) *Education, income and place of residence*. A large number of studies consistently report inverse relations of avoidance behavior with education and income (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977; Kelling *et al.*, 1974). The strengths of these relationships tend to be low to moderate. As with race, there is some indication that these relationships may be a result of the areas people live in. It is not their education or their low incomes, but the fact that people with these characteristics tend to live in areas with higher crime rates (Furstenberg, 1972). A study of the elderly in three urban neighborhoods found that those elderly who lived in the central cities reported higher rates of avoidance (Sundeen and Mathieu, 1976). The central city neighborhood residents had higher crime and fear rates. Researchers on crime and the elderly have suggested that the high rates of fear and avoidance of the elderly is, in part, due to their over representation in low income-high crime areas.

Hindelang *et al.* (1978) suggests that the differences by age and income in going out at night may be more a matter of lifestyles than the fear of crime; those who have decreased going out have a range of reasons in which crime is rarely dominant.

In summary, we have found a wide variety of avoidance behaviors that have been studied. Careful examination of the data often leads to the conclusion that percep-

tion of crime can only be linked to the behavior in a small proportion of the population. A significant factor in understanding avoidance behavior is the degree to which an individual needs or wants to take a certain action. Often necessity overrides fears and no avoidance results. Where a need or desire to take an action is absent, the significance and meaning of avoidance is more problematic.

3. *Protective behavior*. Both protective and avoidance behavior are oriented toward reducing risks. Protective behavior involves activities which seek to reduce the risk of victimization by increasing the ability to deter or to resist victimization. The essence of avoidance is withdrawal, the physical removal or increase in distance from threatening places and situations. Protective behavior is what people do to deal with the perceived risks when they cannot or will not physically avoid them.

Protective behavior includes increasing the appearance that one can resist. There is a *symbolic* aspect to resistance. It has received little attention and no careful study to date. Certain actions may not actually offer greater resistance, but they may signal that such resistance would be offered were an attempt made. A person may strive to look aggressive on the street, go out with a large dog, or display a burglary alarm sticker on the window of his home in order to reduce victimization risks. Such acts are intended to signal that different kinds of resistance will be offered, but there may be no substance behind these threats. The aggressive looking individual may not be inclined to offer resistance, the large dog may be very timid, and the home may not have an alarm system.

Nevertheless, such symbols may deter victimization if untested. A measure of the deterrent effectiveness of protective behavior is the degree to which fewer attempts are made on persons, homes, or cars visibly displaying such symbols. For example, one could study the extent to which persons who walk large dogs are attacked less than people walking alone in the same or similar areas. Or somewhat less directly, are big people victimized less than small people? One relationship that is available in the existing literature can be reinterpreted as a measure of the deterrent effectiveness of one such symbol. It is generally believed that men are better able to physically defend themselves than women. Men are believed to be physically stronger and less socialized into a physically passive role (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977). While sex is not an example of a behavioral reaction or a type of protective behavior, sex differences are an example of how resistance might be symbolized. Viewed in this light, sex may not be a powerful symbol of resistance since the general finding of victimization surveys is that males are victimized at higher rates than females. However, such

data are an inadequate test because they don't take a number of related factors into account. If we had measures of exposure to risk rates, it is likely that males are more exposed to risks than females and that for similar levels of exposure females may have greater victimization rates. Without such exposure data, however, the symbolic deterrent effectiveness of "maleness" or any other protective symbol is difficult to determine.

Increasing age could similarly be regarded as a symbol of decreased ability to resist. Like sex, the victimization data available does not support such a finding, but the victimization rates might look very different if exposure rates were measureable and held constant. Thus, with regard to the nearest analogies, the existence of a symbolic effect remains undemonstrated.

There are some suggestions in the crime prevention literature that putting a sticker on windows of a home to indicate that the residents are participating in a property engraving program or have installed a burglar alarm helps deter victimization whether or not the engraving and the alarm installation takes place. These suggestions usually appear in the form of an admonition to residents that they will receive added protection when they apply the window stickers as well as do the activity described on the sticker. We have found no studies that measure the distinctive effects of the stickers. Of course, theoretically they could only be effective as long as most people, including potential offenders, believed them. If it was known that the stickers were merely symbols, they would lose their effectiveness and could also undermine the credibility of the homes where the occupants actually took the actions indicated on the stickers.

Earlier we distinguished two main types of protective behaviors: home and self protection. The distinction made here is analytic, but there is some indication that they are empirically separate clusters of behaviors as well. Keppler (1976) analyzed individual behavioral responses in the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment surveys (Kelling, *et al.*, 1974) and found that avoidance, self-protection and home protection measures formed separate clusters of activity.

a. *Home protection.* Efforts to make homes more secure have received widespread public attention. These behaviors have been studied in general crime surveys, in victimization surveys, and in surveys assessing the impact of programs seeking to increase the level of home protection. All of these studies examine home protection as an individual activity. There is also information available on the industries that have grown or been established to manufacture security devices or offer security services. These latter studies will not be considered here except to acknowledge that they offer information about the level and distribution of financial outlays for home protection.

There are two different types of activities included in home protection. They are addition of security devices and services and home defense activities. This distinction has not been made explicitly in previous studies, but is useful for comparing findings across studies.

(1) *Security devices and services.* A large number of products can be purchased for home protection; the most common ones are door locks, window locks and bars, timers, burglar alarms, and outside lights. Firearms and other weapons can also be considered security devices, but there are more complex explanations involved in their ownership than for the other devices listed above. Firearms may be owned for sports, for souvenirs, for a hobby, as well as for protection. Whereas locks and alarms are purchased for little else than securing a home, a firearm purchase would have to be examined more closely before such a connection could be made. Second, firearms and other weapons may be carried on the person outside the house and may therefore be an aspect of self-protective as well as home protective behavior. Similar complexities are encountered in assessing dog ownership. They may be purchased as pets, for security, or for both purposes. As protectors they may secure a home or a person on the street.

Purchases of security devices installed in a house or apartment and, to a lesser extent, dogs, firearms, and other weapons, are infrequent, "onetime" events. Once a person has a new lock or alarm, he or she is unlikely to buy another. People may acquire more than one gun, dog, or lock, but, except in rare cases, the numbers purchased will have a very narrow range. When respondents are asked if they have installed a new lock, alarm, etc., in the past year or some other discrete time period, the answers may be misleading if one infers that people who answer "no" are less well protected. A person answering "no" may have purchased the device at an earlier time or may live in a home where such devices were installed by a previous owner or tenant.

The marking of possessions with an identification number is not a purchase but can be treated along with the purchasing of security devices. To the extent that this is done to decrease the likelihood of being burglarized, it is another form of home protection (as a means of recovering stolen articles, it is a form of insuring behavior). Whatever deterrent effectiveness such marking has, it is presumably increased by displaying a sticker to that effect on doors and windows. Both the marking and sticker display have the characteristic of being "onetime" events.

Although there are variations in the extensiveness of home protective behavior over time and space and among various social categories, there are some important similarities as well. The proportion of persons who

report having made some type of home protective purchase in the last few years across a large number of surveys is consistently less than half and generally around forty percent. The forty percent figure has appeared in city level data from populations as divergent as Washington, D.C., (Berg, 1972), San Diego, (at two different points in time, Boydston, 1975) and the state of Michigan (at several points in time, OCJP, 1977; Christian, 1973). Somewhat lower rates of aggregate home protective purchases were found in Toronto (25 percent, Curtis and Dusseyer, 1970) and Portland (6 percent on an open-ended question, Kennedy, n.d.). In Baltimore, 25 percent of the respondents in the 1969 Harris Survey reported making home protective purchases in the preceding two years; the proportion increased to one-third if the previous five years were considered. Twenty-five percent had taken two or more protective measures (Furstenberg, 1972).

By far, the most frequent devices obtained for home protection are door locks. With one exception (13 percent in North Carolina, Richardson *et al.*, 1972), every survey examined found that between 25 and 40 percent of the respondents reported changing or improving door locks (see Table 4). No other devices installed in people's houses are mentioned by more than 10 percent of the respondents in any of the surveys investigated. This includes window bars and locks, (5 to 6 percent in Curtis and Dusseyer, 1970; Harris, 1969; Christian, 1973) outside lights, (2 to 11 percent, Schneider, 1975; Yaden, 1973; Harris, 1969; Christian, 1973) and alarms (1 to 8 percent in Curtis and Dusseyer, 1970; Christian, 1973; Richardson *et al.*, 1972; Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977; Yaden, 1973; Harris, 1969; Mangione and Nobie, 1973; Maxfield, 1977).

Table 4

Proportion of Survey Respondents Who Changed Door Locks in "Last Few Years"

Percentage	Sample Population	Source
40	Detroit	ISR, 1975
39	Cincinnati	Schwartz and Clarren, 1978
38	Kansas City	Kelling, <i>et al.</i> , 1974
34	Bedford-Stuyvesant, N.Y.C.	Kleinman and David, 1973
34	Portland	Schneider, 1975
32	Maryland	Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977
29	Baltimore	Harris, 1969
26	Toronto	Curtis and Dusseyer, 1970

The variation in the proportion of respondents reporting owning guns and dogs is much greater than for other home protective devices. This may be explained by differences between guns and dogs and these other devices.

Unlike locks and alarms they have multiple uses, only one of which is security. Both may contribute to self as well as home protection. The proportion reporting owning guns ranges from a low of 4 percent in Maryland (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977) to a high of 43 percent in Detroit (ISR, 1975). While Detroit has had a reputation for high rates of gun ownership, these figures may be higher in part because the question in Detroit did not specifically ask whether the firearm was owned for protection. In a number of other studies where gun ownership for the purpose of protection is specified in the question, over one-third of the respondents report owning guns (Table 5). Some of this variation in firearm ownership responses is due to question variations. Higher ownership rates are found with forced-choice questions asking whether the respondent owns or has purchased a gun for protection. The lower rates are found with open-ended questions such as, "Do you do anything to protect yourself . . . ?"

Gun ownership is the protective behavior which has received the most scrutiny by researchers. The study of firearms for protection is part of a larger set of issues about firearms ownership patterns in this country (New-

Table 5

Percentages of Survey Respondents Reporting Ownership of Firearms for Protection

Percentage	Location of Population Sample	Source
43	Detroit	ISR, 1975
39	Lincoln (small Ohio town)	Gorse and Beran, 1973
38	Michigan	OCJP, 1977
36	National	Ennis, 1967
35	Kansas City (fifteen beats)	Kelling, <i>et al.</i> , 1974
34	Portland	Schneider, 1975
34	Portland	Kennedy, n.d.
14	North Carolina	Richardson <i>et al.</i> , 1972
10	Hartford (target areas)	Mangione and Noble, 1975
6	Portland (four areas)	Yaden <i>et al.</i> , 1973
4	Maryland (open-ended)	Nehnevajsa and Krelitz, 1977
4	Toronto	Curtis and Dusseyer, 1970

ton and Zimring, 1969). There are an estimated ninety million privately owned firearms in the United States, twenty-five million of which are estimated to be handguns (National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1970). Over the past fifteen years, several surveys found that about half the households in the United States own at least one firearm (Erskine, 1972; Wright and Marston, 1975), Kennedy, n.d.). While the absolute number of firearms owned has been rising, the proportion of families who report possessing a weapon has remained relatively constant.² The propor-

² There are indications that some groups are underreporting firearm ownership in more recent surveys (Seidman, 1975). Erskine (1972)

tion of firearms owned that are handguns, the type of gun typically associated with protection, increased ten percent. The major increases in handgun ownership appear to come from families who already own long guns (Stinchcombe *et al.*, 1977). Those who were armed are now better armed.

(2) *Home defense activities.* Besides the purchase or possession of various protective devices, people protect their homes in a number of other ways. They may change the frequency and conditions under which devices are used, e.g. how often they keep their doors locked at night, or using a number of techniques to make a vacant house appear occupied. These home defense activities often require attention to detail and planning, but rarely involve significant financial outlays. For most people, some home defense is an aspect of everyday life. These activities are analogous to general avoidance behaviors in that they can be a part of everyday behavior at a number of different points. In this respect, one type of avoidance, relocation, is more akin to purchases of security devices in its comparative infrequency and "one-time" quality.

The proportion of people who report taking some home defense precautions is very high; it is so heavily skewed on some items that analysis of the reasons why people do or do not take these behaviors becomes difficult. For example, the evaluation team of the Minnesota Crime Watch found that even before the program was implemented, close to 90 percent of the state's residents sampled took steps to secure their homes when going out for awhile, when going to bed, or when going away for a longer period of time (Governor's Commission, 1976). The rates of such behavior were so high that it would be difficult for any program, which included increasing the use of such precautions as one of its goals, to show much impact.

In some studies, the proportion who report taking some specific forms of home defense are equally high. In Portland (Maxfield, 1977) and in Detroit (ISR, 1975), over 90 percent of the respondents surveyed report *always* locking their doors at night. Ennis (1967) found almost as high a percentage in his earlier national survey (84 percent). In Washington, D.C., 85 percent of those surveyed locked their doors when they were home (Clotfelter, 1977).

notes that despite large sales of firearms, the proportion of families reporting possession of a firearm fell from fifty-one percent in 1959 to forty-three percent in 1972. She speculates that as gun ownership became more controversial, people were more reluctant to report ownership. De Sola Pool (1968) found a dramatic decline in the proportion of blacks admitting gun ownership during the 1960's. In 1960 fifty-eight to sixty percent of blacks and whites reported gun ownership. By 1965, only twenty-eight percent of the blacks reported owning guns while the proportion of whites remained unchanged.

Very large proportions of respondents also report always locking their doors when they go out for a short time (over 75 percent in Portland, Schneider, 1975; and Minnesota, Governor's Commission, 1976), and keeping the door locked during the daytime (Schneider, 1975; ISR, 1975). Other activities, such as locking windows at night and leaving lights or radios on when going out, are not as frequently performed as keeping doors locked, but the overall picture is one of a significant amount of home defensive behavior with most respondents performing more than one activity.

Springer (1974), in an unusually comprehensive study of reactions to crime, used several methods to check on at least one of the defensive behaviors reported. In the course of his interviews, he asked people whether they kept outside and porch lights on at night. He later observed the distribution of lit porch lights by driving through the area. The geographic distributions of responses and observations were quite similar.

On those less frequent occasions when people go away for long periods of time, they supplement the types of home defensive behaviors already mentioned with requests for assistance from other persons. Neighbors are asked to watch the house, the police are notified, a house sitter is obtained, or deliveries stopped. There are fewer studies systematically inquiring into such behaviors, but the existing data suggest that these precautions are not taken as frequently, but they involve other persons more than regular home defense activities do. More people will request a neighbor to look after their home when they are away for a long period of time (Springer, 1974) than will participate in a day-to-day neighborhood surveillance program.

Thus, home defensive measures appear to be quite pervasive. Some caution is needed in interpreting these results, however, until the possibility of response biases in survey formats are given closer attention. The extremely high rates at which people report they always lock their doors under various conditions conflicts with police reports on the proportion of burglaries taking place where doors are unlocked. People may be overgeneralizing or exaggerating their behavior. If this is the case, people may be giving socially desirable responses or hiding their unprotectedness from suspect interviewers.

b. *Self-protective behavior.* Self-protective behavior is what people do when they are outside their homes to deter or resist victimization. Such behavior may compliment or replace avoidance as a response to risks of using public streets and transportation. According to survey results, going out when accompanied by another person is the most common form of self-protective behavior. In most studies, it is considered a

form of avoidance, especially when asked in terms of the extent to which people will not go out unless accompanied. It is unclear to what extent being accompanied makes people feel that they are less likely to be victimized or merely relieves their anxiety by providing someone to share it with. Going out with others is the only self-protective behavior which, by itself, is taken by more than 10 to 15 percent of the population.

Less than 10 percent report carrying something for protection when going out in Portland (Kennedy, n.d.), Hartford (Mangione and Noble, 1975), Kansas City (Kelling *et al.*, 1974), and nationally (McIntyre, 1967). One of the few exceptions is Kleinman and David's (1973) finding that 14 percent of the residents of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York City carry a gun when they go out.

These self-protective behaviors are difficult to analyze because they generally are undertaken by such small proportions of a population. They present the problem opposite of skewed distributions for home defense activities.

We have found no study which measures the extensiveness or prevalence of behaviors which seek to reduce victimization through manipulating the image that a person presents to others. None of the writings which urge people to look more self-assured and aggressive, or to appear modest in possessions, provides more than anecdotal information on the degree to which such behavior is practiced or its effectiveness (Samuel, 1975). Tift *et al.*, (n.d.) describe the social signals and tactics of rapid transit users to reduce interaction. Goffman (1971) provides a more general framework in which to understand relations in public. He describes how preparedness for attack varies with one's position in the social structure. In general, middle-class people are less wary than lower-class people.

Some commentators have compared the frequency of avoidance behavior with the infrequency of device purchases, in Furstenberg's terms "avoidance" and "mobilization," and concluded that people do more about, and are therefore more afraid of, street crimes than household or property crimes. However, when the full range of home protective and self-protective behavior is considered, it is obvious that by some measures (those of home defense) people do as much to protect their homes as they do to avoid dangers in public places.

c. Demographic correlates of protective behavior. Many of the reports from which the data on the extensiveness of protective behavior has been drawn contain only limited cross-tabulations by demographic characteristics. As a result, the picture of who takes what types of protective behavior is less clear than it is for either perceptions of crime or patterns of avoidance behavior.

The major exception to this generalization are studies of gun ownership.

The demographic correlates of the two forms of home protective behavior appear to be somewhat different, and both are quite unlike what is found for self-protective behavior. Different strategies are pursued by different types of individuals. There is more available data on the demographics of home security devices purchases than about either home defense or self-protection. Sex, income, education, homeownership and length of residence are correlated with purchases of protective devices, while the findings for age and race are inconsistent.

(1) *Sex and home protection.* The strongest and most consistent finding is that women purchase or install these devices more frequently than men. Biderman (1967) found that women take more of the precautions included in his combined index of self-protection. Furstenberg's (1972) reanalysis of the 1969 Baltimore survey and Kleinman and David's (1973) survey in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York City both found that women were more likely to install door locks. The relationship between sex and device purchases is moderately strong. Since many of the respondents lived in a household with an adult member of the opposite sex, it is likely that the devices purchased were influenced by or a result of the other person's perceptions or behavior. To the degree that this influence is present, it would make it more difficult to find a relation between sex and these behaviors. This would suggest that the sex variable is even more powerful than has been reported thus far. Comparisons of men and women living alone would provide a more precise estimate of the effects of sex on device purchases.

Home owners and persons with higher incomes and more education are more likely to have purchased and installed locks, timers, alarms, etc. (Schneider and Schneider, 1977). Furstenberg (1972) and others have suggested that this pattern is explained by the greater resources available to such people and the greater value of the material objects they have to lose. Education may appear as a correlate of income. None of the analyses has been complex enough to examine its effect independent of income.

The social characteristics of people who are more likely to take home defense actions are close to those of people who are more likely to engage in avoidance behavior. Women, blacks, the elderly, the poor and less educated people are more likely to engage in home defense activities.

The characteristics associated with self-protection are quite different from the correlates of home protection and avoidance. Males, young people, and, to a lesser extent, blacks are more likely to carry guns, learn self-defense,

and carry other weapons (Furstenberg, 1972; Kleinman and David, 1973; Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977; Kelling, *et al.*, 1974). Findings for race and income are inconsistent.

Except for gun ownership, studies have not addressed the relationship between specific types of protective behavior and place of residence. Furstenberg (1972) reports that when place of residence was held constant the relationship between race, income, and education disappeared. Both Berg (1972) and Boggs (1971) report that people in central cities engage in more protective or precautionary behavior than those living in the suburbs. In contrast, gun ownership is much heavier in rural areas and in the south. This remains true for handguns, an indirect measure of guns obtained primarily for protection, but to much lesser extent.

In our earlier discussion, we included gun ownership for protection in a description of purchases for home protection. In many people's minds, this is probably their principal purpose as far as protection is involved. However, when the social correlates of gun ownership are examined they indicate a set of relationships that appears to combine elements of home and self-protection. Contrary to popular belief, gun ownership is more characteristic of middle and upper income people than it is of the lower or working class (Wright and Marston, 1975). Outside the south, 75 percent of the white Protestants earning over \$20,000 a year own weapons! In larger cities, handgun ownership is heaviest among the upper income brackets. Males are much more likely to own guns generally, and for protection, than females. Wilson and Schneider (1978) find a strong association between being young and owning a gun or some type of weapon. Purchasing a gun for the purpose of resisting an intruder is more aggressive than other home protective behaviors. It is closer to the psychological dynamics of self-protection. However, gun owners are more likely to have higher incomes than those who take self-protective measures.

4. *Insuring behavior.* The proportion of respondents reporting financial outlays for insurance varies with survey question formats. When people are asked whether they have insurance which covers them in case of theft or vandalism, more than 75 percent of the respondents in three surveys answered affirmatively (Maxfield, 1977; ISR, 1975; Conklin, 1975). In Conklin's study of burglary, he reports that, of the 14 percent who didn't have insurance, most said they would get it if they could afford it or were able to obtain it. Other studies have asked questions using the format frequently found for investigating home purchases. When asked whether anyone in the household has bought theft insurance or increased their insurance coverage in the past year or two,

affirmative replies were found to be much lower, running in the 20 percent range in Portland (Maxfield, 1977) and in the 10 percent range in Washington, D.C., (Clotfelter, 1977). Similarly, if people are asked specifically whether they have "theft" insurance rather than whether they have insurance which covers thefts, lower levels of insurance behavior are found. This pattern of "ever" responses in the above 70 percent range and "last-year-or-two" responses in the 20 to 30 percent range is quite similar to what we observed for household purchases. Although we have not seen any data, we would expect that, like household purchases, insurance behavior increases with income. Unlike other forms of home protection, the inaccessibility of insurance may increase with perceived or actual risk. Residents of areas with reputations for high levels of crime sometimes find that insurance companies refuse their requests to purchase insurance. One of the bases for refusal is that the applicant's chances of being victimized are too high. Problems of this kind are most common in areas inhabited by the poor and minorities, but, on an individual basis, it could happen to anyone.

There has been concern in recent years with the possibility that insurance companies "redline" certain areas in the same way lending institutions have (Keenan, 1978). When an area is insurance "redlined," it means that residents of the area are refused policies on the basis of the insurance companies' perceptions of the risks found in the area rather than their assessment of the individual's own likelihood of being victimized. This is one of the many crime-related issues that has been an impetus for collective responses to crime.

Another means of reducing the costs of victimization is to reduce what is available. Persons may go out without a purse or wallet, take less money, and in extreme cases decide not to buy an item for their homes for fear that it will be stolen. Springer (1974) reports that several forms of loss-minimizing behavior were practiced by Ravenna residents, but he does not report frequency estimates or the social characteristics of those who engaged in these activities. LeJeune and Alex (1973) report similar behaviors were taken by mugging victims after their victimizations. In her survey of elderly residents of Portland, Rifai (1977) found that 9 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women do not carry a wallet or purse to avoid having them taken. It is likely that the elderly engage in such practices at higher rates than other groups in the society.

There is a scarcity of material available on this form of loss minimization, and no conventions in question format or data interpretation have developed. This may be another topic for which the extensiveness of the behavior found would vary greatly with whether people were asked

if they did it "regularly," "in the past year," or "ever".

5. *Talking about crime.* Everyone talks about crime and what to do about it. Scattered through the literature on reactions to crime are somewhat more detailed accounts of talking about crime, but we have no reasonable measures of the frequency and distribution of such behavior. This type of behavior is mentioned here to sensitize researchers and policy planners to the role that such communication may play.

a. *Talk as behavioral response.* An inference that can be drawn from several studies is that the major thing people do about crime is to talk about it. This talk, for many people, may not reflect or lead to any other behavioral reactions. In their survey of four areas of Portland, Yaden *et al.* (1973) found that a majority of his respondents believed there was more "talk" about crime than seemed warranted. In that study, there was a popular recognition of the inflating effects of conversations about crime. In McDonald's (1971) study of Oakland bus drivers, he suggests that the drivers' talk about crime gave a distorted picture of the extent of protective behavior they were likely to engage in. Less than half of those who reported a heightened worry about victimization were doing anything about it. Some of this inaction may have been due to the constraints of company regulations against carrying weapons, but McDonald believes that the external constraints are not a sufficient explanation.

Many surveys report no gap between fears expressed and reported responses. This can be interpreted as another instance where people want to talk about crime, in this case to interviewers, but may not feel it necessary to do anything personally about it.

b. *Talk as catharsis.* One explanation for talk not grounded in subsequent action is its cathartic effect. People may express diffuse fears that are insufficiently focused to suggest a course of action (Lazurus *et al.*, 1974). Both Conklin (1975) and Lejeune and Alex (1973) describe robbery victims as spending a great deal of time talking about crime. Conklin suggests that victims probably talk "to reduce inner tensions and to share their experience . . . Talk helps them place the traumatic experience in perspective and restore a damaged social reality" (1975). One of the principle functions of many neighborhood and community meetings about crime may be that they provide an opportunity for exchanges of crime stories.

c. *Talk as a means of communication.* The research on crime perceptions, as noted earlier, does not provide estimates of the relative importance of interpersonally received crime information in comparison with other information sources. It is believed to be highly influential, but this judgment is speculative.

6. *Participative behavior.* Depending on how "participation" is conceptualized, it encompasses various types of individual behavioral reactions to crime. At the core of participation as we use it here is the idea that individuals act in concert with others; their behavior is not taking place in isolation, but is undertaken jointly with other people. The most common conception of participation centers on involvement with formal programs and organizations. When people take part in a program or join an organization, they are participating. Participation can also be conceived of on a smaller scale. It can refer to the behavior of a few people acting jointly without a formal program or organization. Participation of this sort includes bystander interventions and informal social control.

Participation has been characterized as "public-minded" behavior (Schneider and Schneider, 1977; Wilson, 1976), meaning that it involves general rather than individual interests. Olson (1971), however, argues that participation can also be conceptualized in terms of self-interests. Both of these formulations emphasize psychological dispositions; what people intend to do. Some would argue that people participate for an enormous number of reasons and what is more important is whether individual or collective interests are served. In other words, a person may participate in a crime prevention program for selfish reasons but act in such a way that the whole community benefits. These two formulations contrast subjective and objective characterizations.

In the literature on political participation, there are similarly contrasting approaches to the question of whether a person's behavior influenced a decision. This question can be answered in terms of whether the person *thinks* he influenced the decision or in terms of some external judgment about the effect of his participation on the decision. These types of issues have not received much attention in discussions of participation as a behavioral reaction to crime, but they are likely to be encountered when participation is studied more intensively.

Participation is the individual aspect of organized collective responses to crime. All collective responses involve individuals who participate, but explanations of collective responses are not reducible to explanations of individual behavior. Participative behavior and collective responses involve different units of analysis and different variables. Characteristic individual level explanations of why people vote, report crimes, and participate in crime programs involve individual perceptions, incentives, experiences, and demographic characteristics. Typical collective response explanations of why elections were won, why and how organized programs were or were not effective involve characteristics of

neighborhoods, of organization of neighborhoods, their resources, leadership, and programs.

We will discuss five types of participative behavior: informal, crime reporting, voting, programmatic, and organizational. Only in the area of crime reporting are there enough studies to be characterized as a "literature."

a. *Informal participation.* Informal participation is a subset of the wider range of behaviors known as informed social control. Social control is the process by which persons are influenced to conduct themselves in conformity with social expectations (Davis, 1962). Most social expectations to which conformity is sought do not involve laws or even rules. They encompass customs, social conventions, and cultural values. Informal participation, as we use it here, refers to situations in which there are violations of law or closely related norms. Social control may be exerted unconsciously or deliberately; informal participation tends to be deliberate. Social control includes positive and negative sanctions, rewards and punishments. Positive sanctions such as flattery, praise, and payments are used to reinforce appropriate behavior; negative sanctions such as ridicule, rejection, threats and physical coercion are used to discourage inappropriate behavior. Informal participation, since it is a response to inappropriate or illegal behavior, most often involves negative sanctions. Social control may be informal or formal. When sanctions are imposed by designated officials they are formal and when they are applied by any members of a group they are informal. In summary then, informal participation as used here refers to joint citizen behavior that is a reaction to perceived attempts or actual violations of the law.

Suttles (1972) notes that mechanisms for dealing with outsiders may be distinct from those that regulate the behaviors of intimates, acquaintances, and neighborhood residents. The forms of informal participation generally dealt with in the literature are concerned with reactions to the behavior of strangers. Two aspects of this type of participation are surveillance and intervention.

(1) *Surveillance.* Surveillance is the observation of a home or people on the street for suspicious, inappropriate, threatening, or unlawful behavior. Surveillance is most meaningful when it is followed up with an intervention if certain activities are observed. In most instances, however, the absence of suspicious activity makes intervention unnecessary. When this is the case, the only behavior actually engaged in is surveillance.

The 1973 and 1975 Hartford surveys included a number of detailed questions about surveillance and informal cooperation among neighbors (Mangione and Noble, 1975). These surveys focused on the observations of the stranger's behaviors. Respondents were asked

whether they were able to recognize strangers in their neighborhood. Over half of the city-wide sample and 70 percent of the target area sample reported that it would be "pretty hard" for them to recognize who strangers were. This response may indicate a low level of community integration or a high degree of transient usage of the streets in the respondents' neighborhoods. But it also provides some insight into the obstacles that might be encountered by a person who seeks to be a conscientious surveillant, if most people have trouble deciding who belongs and who doesn't.

The Hartford surveys went on to ask respondents whether they had seen a stranger whose behavior was suspicious during the past year. Around 70 percent reported having had such an experience. On the average, those who had noticed suspicious behavior recalled 3 or 4 occasions! The earliest victimization surveys (Biderman *et al.*, 1967; Reiss, 1967) included a question on whether the respondents had ever seen what they thought was a crime occurring. The responses to this question, however, were not in these reports. Since there is a tremendous ambiguity and variability involved in people defining situations as suspicious and a high possibility that people will forget many such incidents, such questions are more useful as measures of what people experienced that was salient enough to remember rather than as incidence measures.

Survey questions that deal explicitly with surveillance as informal participation typically ask respondents whether they make any arrangements with neighbors to watch each others' homes. Springer (1974) reports that a majority of the residents surveyed in the Ravenna area of Seattle asked neighbors to watch their homes when they went away on vacations and a significant number had worked out regular cooperative surveillance agreements. In Hartford, over half (53 percent) of the citywide respondents reported participating in such arrangements; 32 percent on a regular basis and 21 percent on specific occasions. The overall rate in the target community was somewhat lower (39 percent) and most of the people who used such arrangements only did so for special occasions (Mangione and Noble, 1975).

The combination of cooperative surveillance with a willingness to intervene has been termed "protective neighboring" by Schneider and Schneider (1977). They developed an index which included whether the respondent had asked, and had been asked by, a neighbor to watch each other's homes while they were vacant, whether the respondent thought his neighbors would be willing to watch his house while he was away, and whether he thought his neighbors would intervene if he were being victimized. This index includes two questions about behaviors and two questions about the re-

spondents' perceptions of what their neighbors would do. The paper focuses on correlates of behavior, but presents no distributions for the individual items or scores on the index.

(2) *Intervention*. The most highly influential discussion of surveillance and intervention in the contemporary literature was presented by Jane Jacobs in her book *The Life and Death of American Cities* (1961), and elaborated in subsequent essays (Jacobs, 1976). She argues that informal participation, both surveillance and intervention, is extensive in multi-use urban neighborhoods.

The sidewalk and street peace of cities is not kept primarily by the police. . . It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, enforced by the people (1976:53).

She reasons that the presence of people on the streets provides "natural" surveillance. When the streets are heavily used throughout the day, it gives "natural proprietors"—residents and businessmen—of the area reasons to watch the streets. These two groups are both available for surveillance and intervention if needed.

Jacob's general orientation has been developed by Newman (1973) into strategies for manipulating the use of space to promote safety and the feeling of security by increasing natural surveillance. Newman, like Jacobs, is interested in surveillance that is part of routine behavior. He reasons that intervention is more likely where people feel the area in which activity is taking place "belongs" to them. Such feelings of territoriality will in turn lead to a greater likelihood of intervention. In an evaluation of the environmental design changes made in the Clauson Point Housing Project, Kohn and his fellow researchers (1976) asked whether the residents were willing to question strangers on the project's grounds and whether they had done so. They found that residents were more willing to intervene in this manner than those residing in other projects, but the degree of willingness to intervene was still fairly low. The residents of Clauson Point were resigned to having to accept the movement of a large number of non-residents through the project.

Jacobs' own data on interventions is rich but anecdotal. It provides no sense of the relationship between surveillance and intervention or the degree of variation that may exist within and among neighborhoods. Springer (n.d.) attempted to test Jacob's ideas, but had difficulty developing an operational measure of social control. His use of the proportion of houses facing the street of an area as an index of social control itself would need testing.

In Hartford the most common response to seeing suspicious strangers was to ignore them. Over half of the

city-wide sample and two-thirds of the target area sample reported doing nothing (Mangione and Noble, 1975). When you consider that people are more likely to remember such ambiguous situations if they did something and would somewhat over-report intervention if it were socially acceptable, these data suggest the extensiveness of non-intervention when surveillance is not deliberate. An indication of the social acceptability of intervention is the greater frequency with which the Hartford respondents reported that their neighbors would intervene than they reported for themselves.

Combining responses to several sequences of survey questions about respondent's exposure to crime as a witness and what they did about it, Schneider and Schneider (1977) constructed a "bystander helpfulness" index in which a ratio of interventions to opportunities to intervene was generalized. Since they provide no marginals, we do not know how extensive the intervention was, but the scale represents an important conceptual advance in how intervention might be measured.

Social psychological studies using laboratory and field experiments in which persons are exposed to staged incidents also find a substantial gap between perceiving that a crime is taking place and intervening. Such studies of intervention in crime situations are part of a larger body of research on bystander intervention under a variety of crisis situations (Latane and Darley, 1970). Only recently have these studies included crimes. Bystander intervention has been categorized as "direct" or "reportorial" (Darley and Latane, 1968). Direct intervention refers to situations in which bystanders personally and directly supply aid to the victim or sanction an offender. Reportorial intervention is indirect and refers to notification of a third party, usually the police, with the expectation that assistance will be provided. The more numerous reportorial studies will be discussed in the next section on crime reporting. Here we will consider those which deal with direct intervention.

Moriarty (1975) studied bystander responses to staged thefts. In separate field experiments on a beach and in a restaurant, the situation called for the bystander to challenge or stop a thief. In both experiments slightly more than half of the respondents who noticed the theft intervened. Substantial differences in intervention rates were found between persons whom a confederate had asked to watch the item that was stolen and those who were not asked. Over 90 percent of the subjects who made a commitment to watch the objects intervened while less than one quarter of those who made no commitment did so.

A few surveys have asked whether respondents would be willing to intervene in various hypothetical situations. Hackler *et al.* (1974) and Maccoby *et al.* (1958) asked

whether respondents would intervene in situations involving inappropriate juvenile behavior. Maccoby found that adults in both high and low delinquency areas were reluctant to involve themselves in the affairs of other people's children when they were not victims but were in a position to intervene. The weakness of such studies lies in the difficulty in making inferences about actual intervention from responses to hypothetical questions (Deutscher, 1973).

An assumption underlying the models of intervention proposed by Jacobs and Newman is that there is some social cohesion in the areas where natural surveillance is working (Conklin, 1975). Implicit in their argument is the notion that a bystander who becomes aware of a crime will believe such acts are wrong and will feel an obligation to do something. These conditions would most likely be met in an area with a high degree of social integration.

The importance of the relationship of social cohesion to informal participation is widely shared in the criminological literature. One widely held interpretation of the higher crime rates in urban areas is that urbanization and industrialization have resulted in a decline in community integration which, in turn, has decreased the effectiveness of informal social controls (Clinard, 1974). There is considerable disagreement among urban researchers on the extent to which social cohesion and community life are still present in American cities (Hunter, 1978), but there is more agreement that, to some extent, informal controls persist and continue to be important in the maintenance of order. In several studies in Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1942) linked the prevalence of juvenile delinquency to the degree of social disorganization in various parts of the city. They reason that social instability, large immigrations of minority groups, and geographic mobility resulted in the breakdown of informal controls.

This connection has led researchers to present data on social stability, social integration, and social interaction as *indirect* measures of the state of informal social and informal participation, i.e. if there is social integration there is likely to be informal participation. These social measures are correlated with crime rates with informal participation as the unmeasured intervening variable (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Maccoby *et al.*, 1958).

Our understanding of informal participation is hampered by a paucity of data. The prevailing ideas about its prevalence, effectiveness and relationship to social integration need testing.

b. *Crime reporting.* Crime reporting is the most frequently studied and best understood form of participative behavior. It is a form of informal participation in that most crime reporters are private citizens. It differs

from the other types of informal participation in that it seeks to mobilize an official response. The major research strategies for studying crime reporting have been victim surveys and social psychological field and laboratory experiments.

Victim surveys, besides providing self-reports of criminal victimization, ask respondents whether they reported the crime to the police. If the reply is negative, they are asked why they didn't report. In most victim surveys, about half or less of the victimizations are reported to the police.³ Reporting rates vary for different types of crimes. Personal crimes tend to be reported more often than property crimes. The best predictor of whether a crime will be reported is its seriousness (Hindelang, 1975; Skogan, 1975; Schneider, 1975). Personal crimes involving weapons, injuries, force, thefts involving larger sums of money, and all completed crimes (as opposed to "attempts") are more likely to be reported. However, a substantial proportion of even the most serious offenses are not reported. Schneider (1975), using the Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness scale to rate victimizations, found that 16 percent of the most serious property crimes and 33 percent of the more serious personal crimes were never reported to the police.

It has often been suggested that the personal nature of many victim-offender relationships accounts for low rates of reporting crimes against the person. Victims would not want to involve the police or have the offender sanctioned. Skogan (1975), however, notes that the effect of this variable on reporting is less dramatic than has been assumed. The majority of incidents, even when offenders are strangers, go unreported. In most categories, reporting of crimes committed by strangers was only 4 percent higher than for crimes committed by relatives or acquaintances.⁴

³ It is difficult to ascertain the truthfulness of respondent indications that they reported to crime. If reporting is seen as socially desirable behavior than there would be some tendency for respondents to say they had reported victimizations when they had not. A pilot "forward records check" sought to determine how many of the crimes victims claimed they had reported could be found in police records (Schneider *et al.*, 1977). There are major difficulties in finding records of crimes that are not organized by the victim's name, and may have their dates and characteristics misremembered. In addition, there is no way to know if a crime was reported but the police chose not to record it. The best estimate is that 32 percent of the crimes that victims said they reported were not found in police records.

⁴ The reverse records check study conducted in San Jose found that a large proportion of personal crimes that had been reported to the police were not mentioned by victim survey respondents (Turner, 1972). This was particularly true when there were prior relationships between the victim and the offender. This finding suggests the possibility that victims disproportionately relate personal victimizations among relations which were reported to the police. At present, there is no method to estimate the proportion of victimizations that are neither reported to the police nor to the victim survey.

The reasons respondents give for not reporting crimes are congruent with explanations based on attributes of the crimes. These will be discussed in the later section on perception and individual behavior.

Victim surveys rarely ask victims who did not report a crime to police whether they did anything else. Without such information, inferences that non-reporting means no action may be incorrect. A victim may perceive alternative forms of personal intervention or places to report as more effective for dealing with some types of crimes. In such a case, victim actions would more usefully be interpreted as taking another course of action rather than as inaction. In the National Crime Survey, 10 percent of those who said they had not reported their victimization to the police gave as their reason that they had reported it to another person or agency (Hindelang, 1975). These replies do not include victims who found another course of action but didn't give this as their reason for non-reporting. For example, a victim who believes that the police would be uninterested or ineffective might give these reasons to the interviewer for non-reporting. At the same time, this person may have gone to some other person or agency for assistance. Preliminary analysis of a victimization survey in a non-Western setting where many alternatives to police involvement were perceived by crime victims points to the importance of such considerations under some circumstances (DuBow, 1976). Such alternatives may be particularly salient when victims know the offender and when they are integrated into a community (O'Neil, 1977). To understand this phenomena more fully it would be useful if victim surveys would include questions on what victims may have done before or in lieu of reporting the crime to the police.

Witness reporting of crimes is primarily studied through social psychological experiments like those on bystander intervention discussed in the previous section. The witness role has yet to receive much attention from survey researchers. In the earliest victim survey, respondents were asked whether they had witnessed what they thought might be a crime. The responses were used in an index of "exposure to crime"; no separate frequencies were given (Biderman *et al.*, 1967). In the Hartford surveys, between 18 and 30 percent of the city-wide sample (in 1973 and 1975 respectively) reported calling the police when they saw suspicious strangers (Mangione and Noble, 1975). Another 25 percent said they checked out the situation but did not report it. The replies to this question, because of recall and social desirability biases, probably overestimate the proportion of such incidents in which respondents called the police. They also suggest that other forms of intervention (in this case "checking out" the situation) may

be equally as common as reporting to the police. As with victim responses, it will be important in future survey investigations of witnesses to explore the role of interventions other than reporting.

The laboratory and field experiments on witness intervention yield widely divergent results on the likelihood of crimes being reported. When experimental manipulations are introduced, rates of reporting can be made to vary from almost zero to 75 percent (Bickman and Green, 1975; Gelfand *et al.*, 1973). The nature of these manipulations therefore makes them inappropriate for estimating witness reporting rates in the population. The value of such studies lies in identifying factors that may influence frequencies of reporting.

Situational variables, as in other bystander interventions, were found to be most influential in determining rates of crime reporting. Witnesses are more likely to report when they are alone (Bickman, 1975; Darley and Latane, 1968). The disabling effect of the "diffusion of responsibility" among other real or presumed bystanders is not found when the bystanders know each other even when they do not know the victim (Latané and Darley, 1970). Attitudes towards offenders had no effect on crime reporting (Gelfand *et al.*, 1973) but did influence the likelihood of direct intervention (Moriarty, 1975). Bystanders are also more likely to report a crime when they know the victim or had had previous contact (Latané and Darley, 1970; Bickman and Rosenbaum, 1977).

The experimental literature on bystander interventions is subject to criticism on methodological grounds. The extrapolation from experimental to real life situations is problematic. The number of subjects involved in these studies is frequently small and often not representative of the general population. The type of crime that most people fear is personal attack; however, most experiments involve less threatening offenses such as shoplifting.

c. *Voting.* Over the past fifteen years and at earlier points in our history, "crime" and "law and order" have been widely discussed political issues. There have been numerous "law and order" political candidates and a number of policemen have run for elected office. When voters take such issues into account, it is a reaction to crime. Voting is a more common behavior than the other types of participation we are discussing, but it is unclear how often voting is a reaction to crime. Voting studies have found that factors other than the issues discussed often play a major role in determining individual voting decisions. This would suggest that crime may have less effect on actual votes than the candidates' words would lead one to believe. To date, we have found no in depth studies of law and order elections.

d. *Collective participation.* Collective participation

refers to taking part in the activities of formal organizations and agencies that have programs designed to address some aspect of the crime problem. The two most common forms of collective participation are through programs or through organizations. Participation in programs generally entails being the *recipient* of programmatic attention. Such participation often takes the form of being a "client" or being "served" by a program. Programmatic participation can be private or public-minded. Individuals can decide to participate solely in terms of their own interests as when they agree when asked to engrave their possessions. Such participation is likely to be consumptive; the individual receives messages or resources, but has little influence in, or effect on, the program's character. Programmatic participation most often involves attending a meeting or otherwise being brought into contact with a program which seeks to educate and encourage people to take certain preventative measures.

Organizational participation, as we will use the term, means active involvement and/or membership in some group or organization. The individual in such circumstances is more in contact with the development or administration of the anti-crime effort. It involves sociability, dealing directly with other people. Organizational participants are more likely to conceive of anti-crime programs as their own. They may play the roles of "giver" and "doer" as well as "recipient." Even when a community crime effort is targeted at people individually, organizational participants, to the extent that they are involved in implementing the program, are helping others besides themselves.

The above characterizations provide a language to help describe the existing research. In practice, programmatic and organizational participation may overlap to a lesser or greater extent. Organizational membership need not mean active involvement in an organization and there are instances in which participants in programs assume a public-minded stance and influence a program's administration.

Data on the extensiveness and social composition of collective participation is sparse and mostly unsystematic. Surveys cited in previous parts of this essay that dealt at length with perceptions of crime and other types of individual behaviors, with few exceptions, do not include questions about programmatic or organizational participation. For example, the National Crime Survey interview schedule has questions on avoidance, perceptions of crime, crime reporting and overall behavioral change, but none on collective participation. Few of the general crime surveys are of much use. The most useful survey data on programmatic participation comes from evaluations of specific community crime prevention pro-

grams such as those conducted in Seattle (Seattle, 1976; Mathews and Van der Hyde, 1976), Portland (Schneider, 1975), Hartford (Mangione and Noble, 1975; Fowler *et al.*, 1978), and the state of Minnesota (Governor's Commission, 1976). A second source of data on organizational and programmatic participation are case studies of particular programs. There are in-depth studies (Nelson, 1967; Cohen, 1973; Reed, 1979) and studies that deal with a number of cases together. The latter group can be further broken down in terms of those that synthesized existing data (Bickman *et al.*, 1976; Yin *et al.*, 1976; Heller *et al.*, 1975) and those that collected their own data (Marx and Archer, 1971; Heidt and Etzioni, 1973; Mattick *et al.*, 1974; Washnis, 1976; Gibbs *et al.*, 1977).

Research on programmatic or organizational participation tends to use the program or the organization as the unit of analysis. This focus provides data on how many people belong to or participate in "X", but doesn't give a picture of how many people engage in one form of collective participation or another. Evaluations of crime programs such as Operation Identification provide estimates of how many people or what proportion of some "target" population participated (Schneider, 1976; Heller *et al.*, 1975; Mattick *et al.*, 1974). They are useful for the evaluative purposes for which they were designed and for understanding collective responses. They will be discussed at greater length in Part III of this review. Such studies, however, provide an overall view of individual participation in various collective activities. They generally cannot provide information on what other collective responses participants or nonparticipants are involved with in one program at a time.

We have found no study that attempts to develop an understanding of all types of programmatic and organizational participation present in some locale. A few studies inquire about organizational participation at the neighborhood level. Nehnevajsa and Karelitz (1977) describe a statewide survey from Maryland in which respondents were asked whether they had joined a citizen's group to cope with crime in their neighborhoods. Three percent of the respondents replied affirmatively. O'Neil (1977) asked Chicago residents whether they were involved in a neighborhood group which was doing something about crime or the police. Thirty-five percent were involved with neighborhood groups and 17 percent said these groups were doing something about crime. The higher rates in the latter survey may be explained by the high level of community organization activity in Chicago. Organizations at the neighborhood level are less often found in rural towns, suburbs, and smaller cities, all of which would have been included in the state-wide Maryland survey.

The difference may also be a result of differences in question wording. The Maryland survey asks about "joining" a citizen's group while the O'Neil survey asked people whether they were "involved." It may be that joining signalled membership in a more formal sense than was implied by the term "involved." Involvement may be a broader net with which to pick up collective participants. It is not possible to generalize from these two studies and they raise a number of important questions about how to elicit information about collective responses which must be faced by future researchers.

Program evaluations tend to ask people whether they are aware of and have participated in a particular program. There is a high correlation between programs that appear to be particularly ambitious and well thought out and those that have received careful evaluations. As a result, the survey data dealing with programmatic participation comes disproportionately from places which probably have above average programmatic participation rates. One of the best analyses of programmatic participation is found in Schneider's evaluation of a neighborhood-based anti-burglary program in Portland, Oregon (1975). This program used local and block-level meetings to educate citizens about home protection and to encourage them to engrave household property. She found that within the city of Portland:

- 27 percent had engraved property
- 12 percent had displayed an anti-burglary sticker in a door or window
- 10 percent attended a crime prevention meeting
- 7.5 percent had taken part in citizen watches.

Twice as many people engraved property as applied stickers. The deterrent effect of engraving property, in theory, comes primarily from displaying a sticker. Otherwise a potential burglar would not have a way to know that property had been marked until he had already entered illegally. Engraving equipment could be obtained privately or borrowed from a friend; stickers, however, were given out by the crime prevention program. Their use implies an identification with the crime prevention program. The rates of property engraving may overestimate the impact of the antiburglary program. For many of the people who did not display stickers, engraving may have been an instance of individual home protection rather than programmatic participation. The proportion of Portland residents who could be characterized as programmatic participants is therefore somewhere between the lower proportion who displayed stickers and the higher proportion who engraved property.

Heller *et al.* (1975) did not conduct their own citizen surveys, but they did collect data from close to 100

Operation Identification programs throughout the country. They found a wide range of participation levels claimed by different programs. For property marking programs, the household is typically the accounting unit. All household members are affected by the engraving procedure and the display of stickers, but only some may have been involved in the decision to engrave. Thus, the household participation rates will overestimate the proportion of the target population who are participating. The majority of programs involved less than 5 percent of the households in their target areas; 70 percent had fewer than 10 percent participation (Heller *et al.*, 1975). There were a few programs with more than 25 percent of the households participating.

Minnesota Crime Watch is a statewide program which concentrates on citizen education, encourages and facilitates home security checks and property marking. In a multi-year effort, the program claims to have "enrolled" 8.6 percent of the state's households in the security check program and 10.6 percent in Operation Identification (Governor's Commission, 1976). In Atlanta an anti-burglary program reported that 71 percent of the households receiving security surveys (which is 23.5 percent of the city's households) implemented at least one security recommendation (Touche, Ross, 1976). After reviewing studies of programmatic participation, Balch and Gardiner (1978) conclude that there is major non-utilization of crime prevention activities by citizens. Their focus on programmatic participation, however, missed many informal and collective forms of participation.

Thus far, we have focused on studies of programmatic participation. In cities like Portland and Seattle, a governmental agency implemented an anti-crime program using a trained staff to make contact with citizens in target neighborhoods either directly or through local meetings. In such programs there is no organizational participation for local residents unless they are stimulated to start a block level surveillance organization as a result of their contact with the agency's program. Another model of collective participation is through a neighborhood or functional group. In Hartford, the comprehensive crime program included the development of community organizations in the target area. In many more communities, the organization comes first followed by an interest in crime.

(1) *Measurement problems in programmatic participation.* In any study of behavior, there is always a source of error when the bases of measurement are self-reports (Reiss, 1972). Independent estimates of the behavior are needed to determine the extent of the error in particular cases. There have been few attempts to perform such checks for reports of individual behavioral reactions.

Two that we have found, both dealing with programmatic participation, found substantially lower rates of actual participation than were initially assumed. Mattick *et al.* (1974) found that a large proportion of the people who police departments in Illinois claimed had participated in Operation Identification or who reported themselves as participants had not actually engraved their property. As a check, the research team visited a sample of "participants" and asked to see some engraved items. In Seattle, a telephone survey as a six month follow-up for households "participating" in the homes security check program found fewer than 50 percent had taken any protective measures suggested in the survey (Seattle, 1976). A similar pattern was reported in Minnesota (Governor's Commission, 1976). This figure does not mean that Seattle's program was ineffective; it has reached more people than almost any other community crime program. Rather, its careful inquiry into programmatic participation suggests a general inflation of reported levels that is likely to be true for most programmatic and organizational participation.

The participation types discussed in Bickman *et al.*'s (1976) report on citizen crime reporting programs, while concentrating on programs which more closely fit the Seattle-Portland model of agency initiation, include a number of instances where the organizations running the programs are private citizens' groups. All of the studies of citizen's patrols also have an organization as the central mechanism through which participation occurs. Only a limited amount can be said about the participation levels through organizations. They have found that:

- There is typically a small core of highly active people, a slightly larger number of somewhat active people, and a still larger number of members who are marginally active.
- The total number of organizational participants is rarely over 1,000, but more typically less than 100.
- Participation intensities are much higher than for programs.

In their survey of citizen patrols, Yin *et al.* (1976) estimate that of the cross section of groups contacted, about ¼ of them had memberships in each of the following size categories: less than 25, 26 to 50, 51 to 75, greater than 75.

(2) *Extensiveness and intensity of participation.* In most areas of voluntary participation there is an inverse relationship between the intensity of involvement and the number of people taking part. Fewer people are willing to commit larger amounts of time and effort. This is clearly the case with regard to collective participation in anti-crime efforts. Thousands of people in the city of Chicago have taken a few minutes and expended a small amount of money to buy a whistle, but only a few have

given the time needed to run a Whistle Stop program (Reed, 1979). In Portland, people were more than twice as likely to mark their property as they were to attend a crime prevention meeting or participate in a neighborhood surveillance program (Schneider, 1975).

In these gross terms it is easy to describe the extensiveness/intensity trade-off, but there is little data collection that would permit a more detailed understanding of general levels of participation and the relative proportion of people who are willing to be involved in different levels of intensity. For the most part, participation is treated in a gross dichotomous way. Either a person is a participant or not. One example of how to inquire into intensity with survey techniques is found in the 1975 Hartford survey (Mangione and Noble, 1975). There respondents were asked whether they had attended neighborhood meetings to discuss neighborhood problems. Those who replied affirmatively were then asked how many meetings they had attended in the past year. Over 50 percent had attended more than three meetings. If we assumed that persons who came to more than one or two meetings had more than a passing interest in the affairs of the group, then it is possible to distinguish levels of activity beyond the dichotomous participant/nonparticipant distinction. Observations and case methods are particularly well suited to investigate the quality of different levels of participation. In this instance they would help answer what it is that people did when they attended meetings. Used jointly the survey and observation techniques provide a qualitatively and quantitatively fuller picture of participation.

(3) *The meaning of collective participation rates.* When the standard of 100 percent participation is used to measure most mobilizations of individual resources for collective efforts, most efforts will appear to have fallen far short of this goal (Etzioni, 1968). Full participation is rare and can only be obtained at tremendous costs, which may include a substantial restructuring of individual activities.⁵ Full participation may not only be unobtainable, but it is socially undesirable or unnecessary. Social programs can have significant effects with much less extensive involvement, particularly if a small proportion of those involved are highly active. There may be good reasons why many people would choose not to participate. They may prefer alternate means of achieving the same end, may find participation too costly or unreward-

⁵ The Chinese claim nearly total participation in political discussion and action. This level of involvement is achieved, in large part, because it has become a major societal goal. Political discussion and education may be given priority over work and even family demands (Townsend, 1967). And yet, even in China only 3 to 5 percent of the adult population are members of the Communist party (Schurman, 1973).

ing, or may find the program's goals inapplicable or contrary to their interests.

In the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program, households in the target area were contacted individually by community organizers. Forty percent of those contacted participated (Seattle, 1976).⁶ The project planners recommend 30 percent participation as a reasonable goal for such a program (NILECJ, 1977). The determination of appropriate participation levels is complex. It involves a consideration of available resources, the relative importance of the program goals, and the minimal number of people necessary to have the program succeed. For a citizen's patrol, 1 percent of the residents of a neighborhood or building may provide an abundance of personnel. For a neighborhood, the active involvement of 10 percent of the adult households is likely to be an adequate basis for an extremely strong community group. People who are committed to long term organizing often count successes in terms of the training and mobilization of a few dozen people in a year.

There is no one participation standard applicable to all types of collective action. Some measures obscure the important issue of intensity and quality of participation behind the veil of quantity and extensiveness. Case studies are important for what they tell us about the importance of leadership and other qualitative aspects of the behavior of that small number of highly active individuals. On the other hand, the case study is vulnerable to an overemphasis on the unique qualities of an organization and its leadership. Future studies of collective participation would do well to combine case study techniques with a comparative approach.

e. Social distribution of participation. Except for the findings on collective participation, studies either fail to consider the social correlates of participation or the findings are that social characteristics do not vary with types of participation. The social psychological research on intervention and crime reporting concentrates on the manipulation of situational variables rather than on bystander characteristics. In fact, in many such studies, the researchers seek to get as homogeneous a population as possible to control that source of variation. Those studies that have dealt with the demographic characteristics of witnesses have found inconsistent relationships for reporting (Bickman *et al.*, 1976). The research on victim crime reporting shows little difference by victim characteristics. Women are slightly more likely to report than men, younger victims (those under 20) report crimes at substantially lower rates, and persons with very high incomes are more likely to report property offenses and

less likely to report personal victimization (Skogan, 1977; 1976b).

Schneider and Schneider (1977) present the only data we have found on the social characteristics of surveillance behavior. As discussed earlier, they constructed a "protective neighboring" scale based on willingness to participate with neighbors watching each other's homes. They found that those with higher incomes, longer residence in the community, and home ownership were more likely to score high on protective neighboring. This set of factors indicates a close connection between informal participation and stake in the community that would tend to support the underlying assumptions in the surveillance models of Jacobs and Newman.

(1) *Collective participation.* In contrast with the fragmented picture of the extensiveness of collective participation, there is relatively more data available on the social characteristics of collective participants than for any other type of participation.

Sex

Females, particularly black females, participate in collective responses at higher rates. O'Neil's (1977) data show this pattern for Chicago, and Washnis (1976) found this in some of the block clubs he contacted. In the Maryland crime survey, however, no differences by sex were found in the rate of participation in neighborhood groups dealing with crime (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977).

Race

The pattern is quite consistent. Blacks participate in a variety of collective activities at higher rates than whites.

1) They are more likely to join neighborhood groups with a crime concern (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977).

2) They participated in the Portland anti-burglary program, either by engraving their property or attending crime prevention meetings, at twice the rate for whites (Schneider, 1975).

3) They were more likely to form and participate in citizen patrols (Marx and Archer, 1971; Washnis, 1976).

*Education
Income*

No clear pattern of findings.

The data here are sparse but suggest that program participation (at least of the anti-burglary variety) may be positively correlated with income while organizational participation is negatively correlated.

1) Throughout Minnesota and in a national sample of Operation Identification programs, there were higher rates of par-

⁶ By the end of 1976, they had "serviced" more than 10,000 households.

ticipation for middle and upper middle class persons (Governor's Commission, 1976; Heller *et al.* 1975; Wilson and Schneider, 1978).

2) Participation in neighborhood groups concerned with crime was higher among lower income people in the Maryland survey (Nehnevajsa and Karelitz, 1977). The first findings for property marking programs would be explained by the perception among higher income people that they have more property to protect or they may have a greater belief in the efficacy of this type of measure. The second finding is less expected. Much of the research on other types of participation indicates that participation increases with income (Verba and Nie, 1972). Without additional studies it is impossible to determine whether the Maryland population has some unusual characteristics, or the characteristics of participants in neighborhood or crime groups is different than for civic or political participation. Since crime rates are generally higher in lower income areas, these findings may reflect the level of perceived risk or fear. Both home ownership and residence in a single family dwelling are correlated with higher levels of participation.

1) Renters, even if they lived in single family detached homes in Seattle were much less interested in participating in an anti-burglary program than were homeowners (Abt, 1976).

2) Homeowners were more likely to belong to block clubs (Washnis, 1976) and to neighborhood groups active on crime issues (O'Neil, 1977).

3) Residents of single family dwellings participated more in the Minnesota Crime Watch (Governor's Commission, 1976).

4) Homeowners were more likely to display an anti-burglary sticker in Portland (Wilson and Schneider, 1978).

This variable is strongly correlated with participation in neighborhood organizations (Hunter, 1974; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). Only two studies report the relationship of this variable with collective crime participation. In the Minnesota Crime Watch and in the Portland anti-burglary program it was positively

correlated with participation (Governor's Commission, 1976; Wilson and Schneider, 1978). These last two variables suggest that those with the greatest stake in neighborhoods will participate in collective responses more frequently.

Married persons participated in block clubs (Washnis, 1976; O'Neil, 1977) and in the Minnesota Crime Watch more often than single or divorced persons (Governor's Commission, 1976).

This may be yet another indicator of having a stake in the community. O'Neil's data go further and show that having children is even more strongly correlated with collective participation than marital status.

Marital Status

D. Crime Perceptions and Individual Behaviors

In this section and the next, we examine factors that may influence individual behavioral reactions. We report here on correlational studies in which the direction of causality cannot be established but, except in a few cases, the direction is assumed. First, we will examine the relationship between perceptions and individual behavior and in the following section we will look at non-perceptual factors other than demographic characteristics, discussed in the previous section, on the extent of individual behaviors.

Since we have outlined three principle types of perceptions and six types of individual behavior, many of which have subtypes, there are a large number of relationships which could be examined here.⁷ Not all of these have been studied to date and some have received much greater attention than others. Table 6 provides a reference to the number of relations that will be discussed in this section. We will organize our discussion in terms of the types of individual behaviors (the vertical axis in the chart) and cover the various types of perceptions for each. We have placed an "x" in each box where a relationship is reported in the literature. Following this generally sorting out the data, we consider some

⁷ There is a tendency in the social science literature to overreport significant relationships and underreport ones that were not significant. As a result, in many instances one does not know whether a researcher has not examined a particular relationship or has examined it but found nothing to report. This has led to a suggestion that there be a journal devoted to the reporting of findings that weren't significant. We have tried to include as many findings of no relationship as we could glean from reports, but we suspect that there are many others that we have missed. This section should be read with a note of skepticism. We believe that it overemphasizes studies in which the frequency of a relationship between perceptions and behaviors has been formal.

Home Ownership

Length of Residence

Table 6

*Available Data on Crime Perceptions and Types of Individual Behavioral Reactions to Crime**

	Evaluations	Judgments		Emotions	Other Perceptions
		Rates	Risks		
General Changes in Behavior		X	X	X	X
Avoidance	X	X	X	X	X
Home Protection Purchases	X	X	X	X	X
Home Protection Home Defense				X	
Self Protection	X	X	X	X	X
Informal Participation					
Crime Reporting		X	X		X
Collective Participation			X	X	X

* X's appear where relationships are available in the research literature. They do not indicate a particular strength or statistical significance of the findings.

possible models of the relationship between perceptions and behavior.

1. *General behavioral change.* People were asked whether they had changed or limited their behavior in the past year (or few years) because of crime. The only extensive consideration of the relationship between this reported behavior and perceptions found a strong positive correlation with the fear of crime and positive but moderate correlations with the perceived risk of robbery and assault and for judgments about neighborhood crime trends (Garofalo, 1977a). Only 20 percent of those who felt very safe walking in their neighborhoods at night report having limited their behavior while 73 percent of those who felt very unsafe did ($\gamma = .55$). Another strong set of positive correlations was found for those who perceived that others had changed their behaviors. A similar relation between limiting behavior and fear was found in the Portland anti-burglary survey and the Cincinnati Comsec survey (Maxfield, 1977).

2. *Avoidance.* The studies reported here deal, for the most part, with spatial and temporal avoidance. Surveys of residents in Philadelphia (Savitz *et al.*, 1977), Portland, Cincinnati, and Kansas City (Maxfield, 1977) and eight cities in the National Crime Survey (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978) all found a positive relationship between fear of crime and avoidance behavior. The studies differ slightly in measures of the independent and dependent variables. For example, Savitz *et al.* (1977) used a combined index of fear of a number of specific crimes.

Conklin (1976) states the same relationship in aggregated form; people living in communities with a high level of fear take more avoidance (defensive) measures. Furstenberg (1972) finds a close relation between perceived risk of victimization and avoidance and more modest correlations with perceived neighborhood crime rates and trends. He found no relationship for levels of concern (evaluations). Hindelang *et al.* (1978) examine a number of specific behaviors, such as shopping and going out for entertainment, for patterns of avoidance that might be linked to the fear of crime. They conclude that there is a relationship but that it is sometimes missed by questions which ask only about gross shifts in behavior. He argues that perceptions about crime change "less what people do than how they do it." As we discussed earlier, women and the elderly, the two categories that have consistently higher levels of fear, also engage in most forms of avoidance more often.

3. *Protective behavior.* The general pattern of findings reported for general behavioral change and avoidance is not found consistently for the different types of protective behavior. Only two studies found a relationship between fear and protective behavior. Savitz and his colleagues (1977), using a combined index of fear, find a positive correlation between fear while at home and self protective measures other than carrying a gun. Ennis (1967) combined avoidance, insurance and protective behavior in an index of "security consciousness" which he found was related to both perceived risks and fear. On

the other hand, Furstenberg (1972) found no relation between perceived risks or rates and home purchases (what he called "mobilization"); Maxfield (1977) found no relation in the Portland anti-burglary survey with home purchases and a weak relation to home defense activities. Wilson (1976) examined the bivariate relations between home and self protection with fear of violent and property crime, perceptions of crime trends, risk, concern as well as attitudes towards police and feelings of political powerlessness. He found none of these relations to be significant. Kim (1976) reanalyzed the Hartford 1975 survey using Baumer's (1977) dimensions of fear factors and found no relationship between fear of personal attack and self protection. And finally, Sundeen and Mathieu (1976), in their study of the elderly in three communities, find only a small association between fear and home protective behavior.

The first two studies cited which found perception/behavior relations may both be special cases. Ennis' "security consciousness" index does not examine protective behavior in isolation from avoidance and insurance behavior. It may be that these other two behaviors are causing the entire index to show a relationship. Only if the protective items were analyzed separately and still found to have a relation to fear could this be called a counter finding. The Savitz study cannot be dismissed on similar methodological grounds. However, its survey sample was comprised of central city youth and adults in their households. Respondents on this survey scored consistently higher on avoidance and fear than respondents on any other survey. It may be that in this particular setting a relation existed between fear and protective behavior that does not exist under most other conditions.

A number of studies have noted that the levels of protective behavior are surprisingly low when compared with the high levels of fear or perceived risk of the same population. Elderly residents of low income housing projects reported high levels of fear, but their home and self protective behaviors rarely exceeded locking their doors (Lawton *et al.*, 1976; MRI, 1977). A similar conclusion was reached by an earlier report of the President's Crime Commission (Biderman *et al.*, 1967). In a study of bus drivers in Oakland, California, McDonald (1971) noted a similar dynamic. Those drivers who had been victims of a crime took more precautions than those who had not but almost half of those who had been victimized took no precautions at all. He concludes that their expressed worry was much greater than their "real" worry (as indicated by their behavior). In a study of burglar alarm business, Siegel (1978) describes how the salesmen accentuate people's fears as a technique to increase the chance of getting a sale.

Conklin (1975) provides a sensitive discussion of the

cues and cognitive processes that are at work in individual behavioral reactions. He argues that the more people identify with the victims of a highly threatening crime, the more they will avoid and take protective measures.

a. *Gun ownership and usage.* We have separated the discussion of firearms ownership from our general consideration of protective behavior because it has some unique relations to perceptions and because it has received a great amount of attention. The sales of long guns doubled between 1962 and 1968; in the same period, sales of handguns quadrupled. In the last decade more than 10 million handguns were sold in this country, more than one-third of all handguns produced or imported for civilian use since 1900. Fear of crime, civil disorder, and the anticipation of stricter firearms laws are generally given as the reasons for this dramatic behavior (Newton and Zimring, 1969).

A Minnesota study found that carrying a weapon or gun was related to perceived risks (Frisbie *et al.*, 1977), but all surveys of individuals who own guns show that they are less fearful (Maxfield, 1977). Wright and Marston (1975) report such a finding from the NORC General Social Survey and speculate that the causality may be reversed. Gun ownership may decrease the fear of crime. If this is the case, then this benefit of gun ownership would suggest an added resistance to efforts at gun control.

A reanalysis of this data by Stinchcombe *et al.* (1977) argues forcefully that this association is spurious. Gunowners predominately live in rural areas where there is less crime and less fear of crime. In addition, most gun owners are men who have lower levels of fear than women, who are rarely gun owners. Both of these two characteristics contribute to the apparent relationship of gun ownership and fear. When this relationship is examined within particular neighborhoods, no relation between the two are found. Thus, the relation between gun ownership and fear resembles other types of protective behavior.

Several other studies support and elaborate Stinchcombe's argument. Gorse and Beran (1973) studied victimization, perceptions, and behavioral reactions in a small, Ohio town. The town's residents perceived very little risk, but a very high proportion owned guns for protection. Furstenberg (1972) reports a relation between a sense of social distrust and gun ownership in the city of Baltimore. This sense resembles attitudes described as prevalent in rural residents' attitudes towards outsiders. Gun owners are more likely to believe that they have to be prepared to defend their homes than non-gun owners (Feagin, 1970).

4. *Participation.* Reanalyzing the Hartford data, Kim

(1976) found a moderately strong correlation between those who asked their neighbors to watch their homes and fear of property crime. The fear levels of those who did not use informal surveillance was lower than those who did but, among the informal participants, those who used surveillance occasionally had no different fear levels than those who used it regularly.

The relationship between victim crime reporting behavior and perceptions has been studied from two types of survey questions. The most common form are the reasons victims give for not reporting their crimes to the police. These responses may help explain non-reporting, but do not necessarily explain reporting behavior. No comparable questions could be asked of citizens who reported, but it is possible that they have perceptions that are quite similar to non-reporters. The reporters may be taking a different course of action than non-reporters because of some other factor, such as the seriousness of their victimization, rather than because of a difference in perceptions.

Questions about the reasons for non-reporting have been a part of victim studies since their inception (Ennis, 1967). The most frequent reason given on the original NORC nationwide survey and on the subsequent National Crime Surveys is that the police would be ineffective. Fifty-five percent of the non-reporters on the NORC survey (Ennis, 1967) said the police couldn't do anything or wouldn't catch the offender. Thirty-five percent of the national crime survey non-reporters replied that nothing could be done about the crime (Skogan, 1976b). One-third of non-reporters in a Seattle victim survey also gave this reason (Hawkins, 1973; Hindelang, 1975). The second most prominent reason is the belief that the incident was not a police matter (34 percent—Ennis, 1967). If this reason is combined with replies that the matter was not important enough to report, then 34 percent of the national crime survey non-reporters gave the same similar perception. Twenty-nine percent of the Seattle survey non-reporters said that the incident was not worth the time it would take to get involved (Hawkins, 1973). This reason may be both a comment on police and the criminal justice system's effectiveness or on the unimportance of the victimization.

Skogan (1975) points out that some of these beliefs about the effectiveness of the police are correct. There is a high correlation between the proportion of victims who reported that the police could do nothing and the clearance rate for the particular crime. Only 19 percent of the victims of assault, a crime with a high clearance rate (63 percent) felt the police could do nothing; but for burglary, a crime with a much lower clearance rate (18 percent), 48 percent of the respondents said the police could do nothing. The reasons that witnesses give for not

reporting are only slightly different. The most frequently given reasons were that they didn't want to be involved (31 percent), that they believed the police had been called (13 percent), that they were uncertain (11 percent) or that nothing could be done (9 percent) (Biderman *et al.*, 1967).

A second way of studying reporting and perceptions is to compare responses to attitude questions that reporters and non-reporters have answered. When Hawkins (1973) examined perception of police ineffectiveness, he found that these perceptions did not explain reporting. "When someone needs a cop, they are likely to call him even if they hold negative attitudes towards the police" (1973: 439). In contrast, Schneider (1975) reports that persons who believed in the efficacy of the police in apprehending offenders and who generally trusted the police were more likely to report their victimizations. People's self rated ability to understand local issues was also strongly related to reporting.

Conklin (1975) proposes several interesting hypotheses about the relationship between changes in perception and crime reporting behavior: (a) if citizen perception of police effectiveness decreases, they will report fewer crimes and (b) as people take less responsibility for crime prevention and assume a defensive posture toward crime, they will tend to report less crime and otherwise assist victims. Both of these hypotheses are congruent with what is presently believed, but they have not been specifically tested. The most appropriate design would be to examine the relationship between perceptions and behavior over time.

Three of the four studies which consider the relationship between perceptions and collective participation find that participants perceive higher risks and are more fearful. Although most people reported that they did not get together with their neighbors to talk about or combat crime, those who perceived a high risk of robbery were more likely to. Twenty-three percent of a Portland survey who perceived high risks had gotten together while only 9 percent of those who perceived low risks had done so (Yaden *et al.*, 1973). However, no difference was found in participation rates for those with high and low perceived risk of burglary. In her reanalysis of the Hartford 1975 survey, Kim (1976) found that all types of fear were related to attendance at crime prevention meetings. Nineteen percent of the most fearful and 9 percent of the least fearful had attended such meetings. Conklin (1971) found a correlation between levels of fear and organizational involvement.

The one exception to these findings is based on reanalysis of O'Neil's data (1977). DuBow and Baumer (1977) found participants and non-participants in neighborhood crime efforts were indistinguishable on

almost every perceptual measure in a survey which included questions on fear and perceived risk. Their dependent variable encompassed a range of participation behaviors, anti-crime and police-related activities of neighborhood groups, that only overlaps slightly with types of collective participation described in the other three studies.

5. *Perceived efficacy of behavioral responses.* A rational model of behavior would include the assumption that people are more likely to engage in behaviors which they believe to be effective. Rituals, traditions, and other factors attenuate this relationship, but it is nevertheless an important one to examine. Although based on minimal data, a set of relationships between perceived efficacy and some behavioral responses emerges which may have important policy implications if accurate.

In three separate surveys, respondents reported a high degree of pessimism about the efficacy of their ability to protect themselves (Furstenberg, 1972). On the 1973 Hartford survey, respondents who reported taking certain protective actions were asked to evaluate their efficacy. For most protective actions, less than half of people taking the action were optimistic about its effects. Presumably those not engaging in such activities are even more pessimistic (Mangione and Noble, 1975). In their 1973 survey of Portland neighborhoods, Yaden *et al.*, (1973) found a high level of pessimism expressed about what individuals can do about crime. The combined picture drawn raises a host of questions. Can these perceptions of an individual actor's efficacy be changed? Do these perceptions correspond to some reality? If they do, what is the status of programs which encourage such behaviors? None of these questions can be answered adequately from the existing data.

One important exception to this pessimistic view are very high feelings of efficacy about collective participation. In Hartford, about 90 percent of the residents interviewed felt neighbors trying to do something about crime would make a difference (Mangione and Noble, 1975). If this pattern is more generally found, then the public is likely to be more receptive to collective involvement than to appeals to increase protective behavior.

6. *Explanatory models using perceptions.* The analysis of individual behavioral reactions and crime perceptions is still at a rudimentary stage. Many studies report bi- and tri-variate relationships and lack a conceptual framework. Some econometric models have been proposed (Clotfelter, 1977; Ehrlich and Becker, 1972), but these have as yet not been matched with an appropriate data set. There is no study that has reached the sophistication of the one Garofalo (1977b) has proposed for the fear of crime. Without a directly relevant literature to draw upon, researchers will either have to pro-

ceed inductively or draw on theoretical literatures in fields of inquiry deemed analogous.

One relationship implicit in many programmatic discussions of perceptions of crime and individual behavioral reactions is whether increasing individual fears will enhance the likelihood that the person will adopt some protective or participative behavior. The data presented above provides some support for the generalization that people who are more afraid are more likely to engage in a number of behavioral reactions.

The measures of fear used in most crime studies are too crude to address a question of whether too much fear is counterproductive. Balch and Gardiner (1978) cite experimental studies in psychology to argue that this is probably the case with behavioral reaction. Much of this research (Leventhal *et al.*, 1967; Janis and Tewellegger, 1962) deals more with the amount of fear aroused in various messages, rather than characterizing the fears that individuals already had.

One of the most promising models may be derived from the study of precautionary health behavior. Rosenstock (1966) presents a model of why and under what conditions people take action to prevent, detect and diagnose disease. He proposes a model which links personal characteristics and behavior. The model begins with an understanding that health decisions are made through a series of stages or phases. It includes two classes of variables (1) the psychological state of readiness to take a specific action and (2) the extent to which a particular course of action is believed to be effective in reducing a health threat. Readiness to act is operationalized in terms of the individual's (a) *perceived susceptibility or risk* of contracting a condition, and (b) *perceived seriousness* of the health threat. The perceived effectiveness of a particular action is derived from *an assessment of the benefits and costs* it entails. Rosenstock adds one further consideration: an *integrating event or cue* is needed to give impetus to the behavior. This might be a bodily state, the impact of the media, or interpersonal interaction.

All of these variables have analogies in reactions to crime. Risk is already an important research concept and seriousness may be considered the affective dimension, i.e., how worried a person is about a given crime happening to him. There is much less of a research tradition on the perceived costs and benefits of particular courses of action. One difference between the health and the crime fields may be the differential availability of information or images of the costs and benefits of different behavioral reactions.

Rosenstock argues that the appropriate way to test such a model is prospectively. Data on perceptions and behavior is obtained at time one and then again at a later

time. Such a design allows the analyst to make some predictions about the behavior at time two which could later be checked. Rosenstock undertook one prospective study to test his model and found that perceived risk, but not perceived seriousness and benefits, related to subsequent behavior (Rosenstock, 1966). Whether this model or others are developed to understand behavior, the value of prospective or panel approach is clear. With such data the possibilities increase substantially for disentangling perceptions and behavior.

Research on the psychology of stress may offer some important dynamic sophistications that have not yet been considered in behavioral reactions to crime research. Lazarus and his colleagues (1974) have attempted to outline a range of possible coping strategies for dealing with stress in general. They distinguish between *direct action* to change the situation and *intrapsychic coping* to reduce emotional stress by changing one's interpretation of the situation. Their analysis emphasizes the complexity and continuous feedback between behavior and appraisals.

Applying these understandings to crime, we might ask what relations exist between perceptions of possible strategies to reduce risks, attempted behaviors, and perceived risks. It may be that people cope with crime by discussing their perception of crime risks when efforts to reduce it have failed. Weinstein (1977) suggests that such processes may help to explain the low perceived risks of highly victimized young males. Even when males did feel at risk, they were much less likely to take action.

E. Non-Perceptual Factors and Individual Behavior

A large number of non-perceptual variables could be studied in connection with individual behavior. We shall discuss four that appear to be particularly prominent in the research literature. They are (1) the interplay of individual behavioral responses, (2) crime risks, (3) victimization experiences and (4) social integration.

1. *The interplay of individual behavioral reactions.* Thus far, we have treated individual behaviors separately. Here we review what is known about the relationship or lack of relationship among them. We will review two survey analyses, two discussions based on case studies, and one theoretical analysis. Once again we return to Furstenberg's (1972) highly influential paper in which he developed the concepts of avoidance and mobilization behavior. As we discussed previously, we renamed and slightly redefined his mobilization variable as purchases for home protection. Furstenberg found no relationship between avoidance and mobilization. Evidence from a number of different sources suggests that

the purchase and installation of devices for home protection is unlike avoidance and many other individual behavioral reactions in terms of who, and under what conditions, they are most likely to be undertaken. Few inferences can be made from the dynamics of this form of home protection to other types of behavioral reactions.

In a second influential body of papers, Anne Schneider has explored a wide variety of central questions in unusually thoughtful and thorough ways. In a recent paper, she and Peter Schneider explain the relationship between attendance at a block or local level crime prevention meeting, a form of collective participation, and a number of other forms of behavior (Schneider and Schneider, 1977). They discuss their findings in terms of the "impact" of attendance on these other behaviors but, since we feel the issue of causal order for these variables is unresolved, we will talk in terms of correlations. The meetings, attendance at which is the main independent variable in their analysis, were conducted under the auspices of Portland's crime prevention bureau. The bureau identified hosts for block meetings from house to house canvasses, from volunteers and from prior hosts. These meetings were one time affairs. They were not typically attended by people who were already part of some block organization and, although people were encouraged to work together to set up surveillance programs, most groups probably did not meet again. Their analysis therefore, examines the correlates of attendance at a single meeting. If the correlates found here do represent the causal order they assert, then the impact of such a seemingly minor event is quite remarkable.

Attendance at these meetings was strongly correlated with awareness of neighborhood surveillance⁸ and participation in "protective neighboring", the sharing of responsibilities for watching each other's houses with neighbors, bystander helpfulness, home protection and insurance, the use of anti-burglary stickers, and recent improvements in devices for home protection. These relationships were significant after controlling for income, length of residence, homeowner status, crowdedness, upkeep of neighborhood, age, and prior victimizations. The correlations with the participatory behaviors were stronger than they were for home protective behavior. An alternative explanation of their findings is that people who participate in one form of collective activity are more likely to participate in others.

⁸ In several different papers participation or helping with neighborhood surveillance is referred to. An examination of the original interview schedule for their survey only yielded a question about the respondent's awareness of a citizen watch program in the neighborhood. Therefore, this variable would more accurately be conceptualized as a perceptual measure instead of a behavior.

In an earlier paper, Schneider identified an interrelation between collective programmatic participation (in the crime prevention-property marking program) and crime reporting (Schneider, 1975). Participants in the crime prevention program were more likely to report a burglary than were nonparticipants. This finding confirmed earlier speculations that participation in crime programs could increase reporting, making it more difficult to evaluate the program impacts from official crime reports.

Heidt and Etzioni's (1973) study of four citizen patrols and Yin *et al.*'s (1976) examination of a large national sample of patrols both yield some observations on the intercorrelation of behaviors. Yin *et al.* found that the activities of neighborhood and building patrols did *not* generate other types of collective activities. Etzioni notes that the majority (60 percent) of patrol members reported recent changes in their behavior because of crime and specifically mentioned purchasing and/or installing home protective devices.

Finally, two economists with a general interest in criminal justice issues attempted to construct a model of the relationship between insurance and self-protective behavior (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Their analysis is carried out at a highly abstract level and the behaviors in question are not specifically behavioral responses to crime. They seek to address and elaborate on an argument of the economist Kenneth Arrow (1962). He has postulated that insurance may create a "moral hazard" by decreasing self-protection and increasing the likelihood that a hazardous event will occur. If, for example, a motorist drives more recklessly because having insurance coverage he feels he has less to lose, Arrow's point is made.⁹ Ehrlich and Becker explore a range of hypothetical conditions and determine that there is no definite relationship between the availability of insurance and self-protective behavior. The relationship, they argue, would depend on whether insurance costs are responsive to the amount spent on self-protection. They have no data with which to test their hypothetical relationship, but their essay suggests a productive direction which investigators might pursue.

2. *Crime and individual behaviors.* The risk of victimization may be estimated in a number of ways. From official or victimization statistics, estimates may be made by examining the differential rates for various demographic categories, by characterizing the rates of victimization for various statuses or activities, or by looking

at geographic rates. The studies we will cite all characterize the crime rate of the area in which the individual is living and relate this to individual behaviors. Furstenberg (1972) and Boggs (1971) both discuss certain characteristic individual behavior patterns in high crime areas. They both use official crime rates to characterize areas. Furstenberg finds that high crime areas have somewhat higher rates of avoidance, but he adds that only half of the high crime area residents could be characterized as high on avoidance; another quarter were low. Conversely, one quarter of the residents of low crime areas were high on avoidance behavior. These findings, he comments, show a relationship between objective risks and avoidance but there is enough elasticity in the relationship for perceptions of risk and fear to intervene.

He also finds that the high crime communities had slightly lower rates of home protective purchases. Boggs (1971) combines avoidance and protective measures in the broad category of "precautionary behaviors". She finds these are more prevalent in high crime communities.

Both Wilson (1976) and Clotfelter (1977) derive individual risk rates from victimization rates for the areas in which a survey respondent lives. They then use these rates as an objective measure of risk. This technique is coming into wider use among victim survey researchers (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978), but must be used with caution. The subunits of cities for which researchers may want to develop victimization rates may contain too few respondents and hence too few victimizations to allow for reasonable victimization rate estimates. This may be a problem in Clotfelter's study. He reports that people living in higher victimization rate areas take more protective measures than those living in lower crime rate areas. Wilson (1976) looked at the residents of areas with lower victimization rates and found that they had high rates of protective behavior. The seeming contradiction between these latter two studies may, in part, be explained by the difference in the way they were conceptualized. Clotfelter included a range of behaviors including avoidance in his conception of protection, while Wilson's variables have to do solely with home protection. If this is the case, then the findings are consonant with the ones described above.

With the exception of home protection purchases, avoidance and other forms of protective behavior are generally higher where crime is higher. However, it is important to bear in mind that even in the highest crime areas, as many as half the residents may not engage in the behavior.

3. *Victimization and individual behaviors.* There are a large number of studies reporting on the relationship between victimization experiences and individual be-

⁹ Of course, the reverse effect is also possible. Drivers with insurance may be more concerned about their driving if they are worried about an accident resulting in higher insurance premiums or a policy cancellation.

haviors. Following our discussion in Part I, it is important to specify whether the victimization effect is being assessed generally or in terms of specific types of victimization. All of the studies which found no relationship between victimization and one or more behaviors were using a generalized victimization measure, but not all studies which used a general victimization measure found no relationship. Garofalo (1977c) reports no relationship between general victimization and a general limitation in the respondent's behavior, but he does find one for victims of contact crimes.

a. *Avoidance.* The two studies of victimization and avoidance behavior that find no relationship both used generalized measures of victimization. Furstenberg (1972) found no relationship with avoidance even for recent victims of serious crimes. Savitz *et al.* (1977) analyzed victims of family and personal crimes and found no relationship with avoidance or self-protection.

Two studies of elderly victimization both find less mobility among victims but, since most elderly are not highly mobile, victimizations were not related to much lower rates (MRI, 1977; Rifai, 1976). By contrast, the Safe School Study (NIE, 1977) found that school-aged victims of assault and robbery were much more likely to avoid restrooms and other places at school and were two or three times as likely to report staying away from school for fear of victimization.

In-depth studies of robbery victims show particularly extensive effects on their subsequent behaviors. Three quarters of the robbery victims whom Conklin (1971) interviewed increased their avoidance in one way or another. Lejeune and Alex (1973) interviewed mugging victims in New York City who reported increases in avoidance particularly for circumstances resembling those in which they were victimized.

b. *Home protection.* Only one study of home protective purchases found no relationship between victimization and behavior. Scarr *et al.* (1973) describe burglary victims who report greater caution, but their behaviors were no different from non-victims. Both studies of elderly victimization (MRI, 1977; Rifai, 1976) report extensive and immediate purchase and installation of home protective devices. Finally, a strong relationship between burglary victimization and home protective purchases was found in the high crime areas of Baltimore (Furstenberg, 1972).

c. *Self protection.* All of the studies of self-protective behavior and victimization with the exception of Savitz *et al.* (1977) found a relationship with those who are victimized reporting more self-protective behavior. McDonald (1971) conducted a survey of bus drivers in five cities. Those that had been robbed while driving were more likely to take self protective meas-

ures, but even victims took relatively few. McDonald speculates that their low rates of self-protection may, in part, be due to restrictions placed on the drivers by company regulations prohibiting drivers from carrying most weapons.

From the over-all view of victimization portrayed in the Safe School Study (NIE, 1977), it is not surprising to learn that assault and robbery victims are likely to carry something with them to school for protection. The effects of these early victimizations may also influence later decisions about self-protective behavior. Those who own guns disproportionately report that they were assaulted and/or beaten at some time in their past (Wright and Marston, 1975).

d. *Communicative behavior.* Studies of both burglary (Scarr *et al.*, 1973) and muggings (Lejeune and Alex, 1973) report increases in the search for information about crimes and communication with others about their victimization experiences. New York mugging victims tend to attract the victimization accounts of others and become short-term repositories of contemporary crime stories.

e. *Collective participation.* A victimization experience may mobilize an individual to engage in public-minded behavior. There are no studies which compare the collective participation rates of victims and non-victims; however, two sources of information on collective participants suggest a possible association with prior victimizations. Portland residents who participated in the city's crime prevention program reported a prior burglary victimization as the most common reason for deciding to participate (Schneider, 1975). From interviews with members of citizens patrols in New York, Heidt and Etzioni (1973) learned that the patrol members had unusually high victimization rates before joining the patrol.

4. *Social integration and individual behavior.* Implicit in much writing about community life is the close connection between social integration and informal social control. Put somewhat more elaborately, greater social interaction, higher agreement on values, and a high commitment to a community will all increase the willingness of people to intervene and be responsible for the maintenance of social order (Conklin, 1975). For some authors, the ties between one or more elements of the idea of social integration and informal social control are so close that they are used interchangeably. At the heart of Jacobs' (1961) analysis of patterns of urban interaction is the notion that increased surveillance means increased informal social control. Perhaps, because it is so widely believed, we have few studies that attempt to test the relationship.

Maccoby *et al.* (1958) looked at the relationship be-

tween community integration and juvenile delinquency in two neighborhoods in Cambridge, Massachusetts. They measured integration in terms of the degree to which residents of each neighborhood knew each other well or by name and expressed affection for the area. An intervening variable in their study was the willingness of residents to take action when children were acting inappropriately. Residents of the more integrated area, which was also the area with a lower juvenile delinquency rate, were more willing to take informal action against children. The study is less useful for this discussion because it only reports on a predisposition to act rather than a behavior and it does not include other important dimensions of social integration. Finally, it doesn't report the effect of the degree of integration on the willingness to intervene of specific individuals.

Using length of residence as a weak measure of integration, Schneider *et al.* (1977) found that it was inconsistently related to crime reporting for shorter periods of time, but those who lived at the same address for six or more years were more likely to report minor and major offenses.

F. Effects of Individual Behaviors

Most of the individual behaviors we have discussed are undertaken to reduce individual or collective victimizations and their costs. In this section we will discuss what is known about the effects of individual behaviors. We will consider the effects of individual behavior reactions on (1) individual victimization rates, (2) crime perceptions, and (3) crime rates. All of these variables which are considered here as consequences have just been discussed as independent variables influencing individual behaviors. Since so many of the studies we have cited are cross-sectional surveys, they are not the strongest designs on which to make inferences about the causal direction of relationships. Although this difficulty is acknowledged by most researchers, they continue to use the language of causality or temporal sequencing in their discussions. In some cases, the temporal ordering of the variables is not in doubt but, in most cases, it is arguable. Aside from the experimental studies of crime reporting and bystander intervention, there are only a handful of works which employ a longitudinal design. In general, the writing on the consequences of individual behavior is long on hypotheses and theories and short on findings.

1. *Individual victimization rates.* We know very little about the effectiveness of most individual behavioral reactions in reducing personal victimization. We have already presented a number of studies which correlated victimization and individual behavior, with victimization considered as an independent variable. Since most of the

studies are cross-sectional and do not ask respondents whether they changed their behavior since the victimization, we could present the studies, over the protests of most of their authors, as dealing with the effects of individual behaviors on victimization. Viewed in this light, the studies would support the argument that individual behavioral reactions either have no effect on victimization or they increase it! The degree of discomfort that most people would have with that interpretation highlights the problems of causal inference from these data. What is needed is a major effort to collect longitudinal, particularly panel, data.

There are five studies which report a correlation between participation in a property marking program and lower victimization rates. The reductions ranged from a high of 45 percent in Portland (Schneider, 1975) to a low of 7 percent in Denver. The other three programs were in St. Louis (25 percent reduction), Phoenix (32 percent reduction) and Seattle (33 percent reduction) (Heller *et al.*, 1975). These findings can be questioned on the grounds that (a) the households which marked their property may have done a number of other protective activities that affected their lower victimization rates or (b) that they had a lower victimization rate before they marked their property.

The only study which provides some answers to these questions was conducted in Portland in 1977 (Wilson and Schneider, 1978). They worked with a sample that was largely cross-sectional, but had a small subset of respondents who had been interviewed in a previous survey in 1974 (Schneider, 1975). Wilson and Schneider (1978) reasoned that it is the application of a sticker to the door or window of a house, rather than marking property, that acts as a deterrent; hence, they used the display of a sticker as their independent variable. They found a significant difference in the burglary victimization rates for participants and non-participants. Those who displayed no sticker had a victimization rate of 9.7 as compared with 5.3 for participants.

Unlike other such studies, Wilson and Schneider were able to go further with their analysis of effects by using the subset of their survey which was a panel. They found that the burglary rates for participants who had or had not been burglarized in 1974 was not significantly different. For nonparticipants, however, those who had not been burglarized previously experienced 4.6 burglaries per hundred, while those who had been burglarized previously had a 1977 burglary rate of 21.4 per hundred, nearly three times the rate of the participant groups.

Their findings qualify and elaborate our knowledge about the effects of this type of participation. For people who were not victimized in 1974, they lost nothing by not displaying a sticker. Their burglary victimization rate

is actually slightly lower than for participants. However, the payoff came for former victims. They were able to break a pattern of victimization to a much greater extent than were non-participants.

Questions still can be raised about the first alternative explanation mentioned above. Those who displayed stickers may have taken some other measures that would have decreased their vulnerability. Wilson and Schneider examine this relationship for the entire sample.¹⁰ They found low correlations between the use of stickers and other protective measures and suggest that "different strategies are being pursued by different types of individuals" (1978:20). No other studies of the effectiveness of individual behaviors has been found.

a. *The possibility of individual crime displacement.*

If individual behaviors are found to reduce individual victimization rates, there is a possibility that crime risks will be increased for those who do not take precautions. This phenomena is known as individual displacement. Attention has been given to geographic (Repetto, 1976) and temporal (Chaiken *et al.*, 1974) displacement in the past when evaluating the effects of crime programs, but more recently the possibility of individual displacement has also received attention. Once again the work of Anne Schneider stands out. In a paper with Jerry Eagle (1974) they present a "random outlaw model" which seeks to estimate the displacement effects of private security behavior. They point out that the payoff for those taking protective action is likely to be highest when not very many other people are doing the same. At that point, those who do are relatively less desirable targets for offenders. As the proportion of those taking individual protection in a neighborhood increases, the relative "undesirability" of such participants from a criminal's perspective decreases as he has to go to greater effort to find someone who has not taken precautions. This provocative model has yet to be fully tested. However, in the 1977 Portland Survey described above (Wilson and Schneider, 1978), a second subsample was included to test displacement effects. A group of residents each living one block from a participant in the crime prevention program was sampled to see whether their victimization rates due to possible displacement effects were different. These data have not yet been reported.

2. *Individual behavior and perceptions of crime.* Does engaging in any individual behaviors change perceptions of crime? Does it increase or decrease concern, judgments about crime rates or risks, or about the causes of crime, and the fear that crime engenders? Few of these

relationships have been studied directly. As we did with the relationship between victimization and behavior, we first suggest that the studies presented earlier on perceptions as possible influences on behavior could be reread for what they might reveal about the effects of behavior on perceptions. Briefly, what they suggest are that: 1) avoidance behavior makes people more afraid (Hindelang *et al.*, 1978; Maxfield, 1977; Savitz *et al.*, 1977) and perceive more risk (Furstenberg, 1972); 2) areas in which there is a high degree of avoidance may be more fearful (Conklin, 1975); 3) a combination of protective behaviors (Savitz *et al.*, 1977) and avoidance, insurance, and protective behavior increase fear of crime and perceived risks (Ennis, 1967); 4) informal surveillance by neighbors increases fear of property crime (Kim, 1976) and 5) home protective purchases have no particular effect on perceptions.¹¹

The relationships just outlined, on their face, appear plausible. The least expected is the lack of effect of home purchases on fear or perceived risk. A common theme in much popular writing about reactions to crime is that people are "fortifying" their homes and that this reaction is making them more fearful. The data on the extent of protective behavior does not support the characterization of "fortification" for most of the population and, hence, the lack of relationship with modest amounts of home protection is understandable.

There is considerable belief among organizers of collective crime responses that certain programs make people less afraid. Reed (1979) describes this possibility for participants in the WhistleStop Program in the Hyde Park area of Chicago. He reports that the carrying of whistles makes people more willing to go out at night, and this increase in mobility reduces fear.

3. *Geographic crime rates.* The behavioral reactions of an individual citizen are unlikely to have a noticeable effect on the crime rate for an area. The aggregated effects of individual actions, even uncoordinated actions, can. If an area was particularly high or low in the number of people engaging in avoidance, protection, or participation, it is likely that the victimization rate for the area would be affected. The only behavior for which we have studies of these effects is collective participation in crime programs; these will be discussed in Part III. In this section, we will discuss two provocative models of some possible negative effects of types of individual reactions to crime.

Clotfelter (1977) poses the question of whether increased avoidance behavior will reduce the natural

¹⁰ A more focused examination of the protective behavior of participants and nonparticipants who had been prior (1974) victims would have added additional insight.

¹¹ The reader should be reminded that the authors cited in this paragraph with the exception of Kim did not suggest this direction of causation.

surveillance on the streets, thus making them more dangerous. He terms this the "isolation effect". He points out that this is a possible result of those types of avoidance which make it more difficult to see or be seen on the streets. He suggests that the increases in the risk of victimization for those venturing out may be greater than the individual gains from avoidance. If this were the case, he suggests possible government policies to reverse this situation. The government might subsidize people to go out at night by lowering public transit costs, easing parking restrictions in the evening hours, providing free or low cost entertainment and similar ideas.

John Conklin's book *The Impact of Crime* (1975) provides valuable insights on many of the topics covered in this essay. His central concern however, is the relationship between crime, reactions to crime, and community life. Conklin elaborates with great force a scenario in which increased fear of crime leads to increases in avoidance and protective behavior. These behavioral changes in turn lessen the degree of social interaction, decrease interpersonal trust, and generally decrease social solidarity. A decrease in social interaction and the previously mentioned individual reactions both contribute to a decrease in informal social control which in turn produces the conditions under which crime is likely to increase. This cycle of social disorganization, fear, and crime is highly evocative. Conklin is able to measure only fragmentary results to support his argument. He admits that it remains to future researchers to provide systematic tests of the relationships he posits.

Either in the form Conklin suggests or in modified forms applicable to policy decisions, these relationships provide an important agenda for research on reactions to crime that deserves close attention by researchers and government agencies. We need to know whether the protective measures being advocated by many crime prevention programs affect social interaction, social cohesion and informal social control. If such unintended consequences occur, it would be sufficient grounds to stop government support for or even to discourage such behavior.

G. Summary

We have covered a great many issues and findings in Part II. In this summary, we will highlight some themes that cut across the topics discussed.

- Research on behavioral reactions is very fragmented. Studies deal with one or a few such behaviors at a time. Future studies which consider the range of options and strategies which individuals

engage in would be particularly useful. Such studies should increase our understanding of how these behaviors fit together and what patterns are associated with people living in certain locales.

- There is considerable evidence that peoples' behaviors are less affected by crime perceptions than is often thought. We found that for decisions about transportation usage, home relocation, recreational patterns, and going out at night (for the elderly), crime risks are minor considerations.
- Our understanding of avoidance behaviors would be enhanced if the perceived necessity to engage in certain behaviors is taken into account. Its importance is suggested by the finding that women and the elderly who work outside the home are less likely to engage in avoidance than those who do not.
- Of the relatively undemanding behaviors that people could engage in such as home defense, avoidance, and installing locks, they are already doing quite a lot. An expansion of their home protective behaviors may mean a major increase in effort. At present generally people do not perceive crime as that major a personal problem. At the same time they are pessimistic about the efficacy of more protective and avoidance behavior reducing their risks. There is evidence that some types of individual behaviors under certain conditions can reduce risks and fears, but these effects have not consistently been shown.
- It is questionable whether people should significantly increase the quantity of their avoidance behaviors. These behaviors are often based on stereotypes which are often only loosely related to actual risks. Further, there is a possibility that such behaviors may increase fears and, by lessening social interactions in public places, increase crime rates.
- There is a consistently reported relationship of higher area crime rates, greater levels of fear of crime and more avoidance, general behavioral changes and participation, but not for protective behaviors. Home protective purchases and self-protective behaviors are related to a different set of factors and dynamics than the other types of behavioral reactions.
- A relationship between social integration and informal participation (social control) is widely assumed and consistently linked to crime rates, but the amount of direct evidence supporting these assumed relationships is small.

PART III. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO CRIME

A. Introduction

Collective responses, as we define them, are efforts of private citizens acting together to deal with crime. In this part of the essay, we are concerned with the behavior of collectivities: neighborhood groups, organizations, and programs. We do not include organized responses of criminal justice organizations, officials, or professionals. Collective responses may be *informal*, such as a group of neighbors assisting each other without recourse to an organization, or *formal*, such as an anti-crime program of an organization. There are citizen responses at the national, state, and city levels; in this review we will concentrate only on local responses, where there are the greatest numbers of people involved.

The efforts of private citizens acting collectively to "do something" about crime have become increasingly prominent over the last ten years. The majority of individuals and households respond alone, but many citizens also take part in a large variety of collective responses. Such efforts were once met with suspicion and skepticism; now they are enthusiastically received by the media, governmental agencies, and most private citizens. This enthusiasm is based in large measure on a frustration with the inability of criminal justice institutions by themselves to control crime. Few rigorous evaluations or other types of systematic studies have been done of collective responses to crime; those that have been done speak more of their promise than of results. Within the professional literature there are a number of theoretical formulations that support or cast doubt upon the likely success of such collective efforts.

Since there is far less research on collective than on individual responses, this part of the essay will be less of a review and more of a presentation of the authors' own ideas than either of the first two parts. We begin with a discussion of the types of studies available on collective responses. We then present an historical overview of the role of collective responses to crime and summarize the explanations for the increase in collective responses in the past 10 to 15 years. The variety of approaches and forms of collective responses have not been sufficiently studied to identify the most salient characteristics. Hence, instead of presenting a typology, we discuss several dimensions along which responses differ. We

then consider specific conditions related to the emergence and stability of particular responses. Finally, we review the criteria and available evidence on the effects of collective responses.

B. Sources of Data on Collective Crime Responses

There is no research tradition on collective responses to crime. Ideas and information can be obtained from six principle sources, none of which is extensive. First, there are evaluations of crime programs. These evaluations almost always involve programs that have received federal or state funds. The programs are, for the most part, run by government agencies or professional staffs although they may have a local focus. The principal questions that such evaluations address are whether the program was implemented, how efficiently was it operated, and to what extent did it have any impact? The principal goal of these programs is usually a reduction in area-wide or participant victimization rates. Secondary objectives may include changes in perceptions such as fear, perceived risk, or attitudes towards the police.

The second source of information are studies which provide an overview of a large number of programs. In some cases these reviews are little more than catalogues of programs while, in other cases, they present a limited amount of original data. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice sponsored reviews of existing programs and knowledge in the areas of crime reporting (Bickman *et al.*, 1976), operation identification (Heller *et al.*, 1975), and citizen patrols (Yin *et al.*, 1976). These reviews each collected information on as many as 100 projects, gave somewhat greater attention to a dozen or more, and were able to add a modest amount of data to what program participants reported. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) and several private organizations such as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1969) have put out general discussions of citizen involvement programs and community crime prevention ideas which include brief descriptions of the most noteworthy programs.

Third, there have also been several studies that use original data to describe a range of citizen involvement programs. Washnis (1976) visited a wide range of pro-

grams throughout the United States. The Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group examined forms of citizen involvement in community crime prevention as well as the courts and corrections in Cook County (Gibbs *et al.*, 1977). These latter two studies are distinctive for their emphasis on private citizens groups which typically were not dependent on governmental funding. Knopf (1970) reviewed the functioning of a number of youth patrols.

The fourth source of data are in-depth case studies of particular organizations or type of response. The most often studied type of activity has been citizen patrols. Cohen (1973), Nelson (1967), and Marx and Archer (1976) all studied patrols whose principal goal was not crime reduction. These patrols represented efforts by minority communities to deal with tensions with, and the weaknesses of, the existing law enforcement system. Reed (1979) examined the first Operation WhistleStop program in the Hyde Park area of Chicago; he emphasized the interaction between a specific crime program and community dynamics. A number of researchers have examined the operation of the community-based Chicago Areas Project which seeks to reduce delinquency (Finestone, 1976).

A fifth source are studies which examine a variety of efforts to deal with crime in one community or neighborhood. Springer (1974) examined individual and collective responses in the Ravenna area of Seattle. Christian (1973) described citizen and criminal justice programs and their interconnection in a Michigan community. Suttles (1968, 1972) analyzes the informal means that four slum neighborhoods use to provide security for residents. Finally, there have been several theoretical discussions of the dynamics and potentials of collective responses. The Center for Social Policy and Community Development (1976) issued a report which suggests limits on the ability of individual neighborhoods to deal with crime dynamics that may be rooted in more large scale social changes. Arthurs (1975) suggests a reconceptualization of the principal purposes of community crime prevention efforts.

A sixth source of information on collective responses are surveys on crime and other topics which include questions on participation in formal or informal collective responses.

C. Collective Responses to Crime: The Historical Context

Prior to the past 150 years, the responsibility for defining and maintaining law lay directly with the local community and its citizens. At the time there were few government officials and their major means of enforcing laws was through reliance on private citizens or on the clumsy apparatus of the militia. On a day-to-day basis,

private citizens were routinely involved in the process of defining acceptable order and in responding to breaches of that order. Most disruptions of order were handled informally; mediation among the parties and their kin, frequently involving the payment of restitution, was commonly used. When it was necessary to capture, adjudicate, and sanction offenders, the tasks were, for the most part, in the hands of the citizenry.

This was also the case in other societies before the development of the institutions of the state (DuBow, 1978; Spitzer, 1975; Schwartz and Miller, 1964). The development of the state has generally been accompanied by 1) the redefinition of offenses from private wrongs among community members to public wrongs punishable by the state (Jeffrey, 1957); and 2) the development of professionals to enforce, formulate, and adjudicate the law (Nelson, 1967). A central requirement for a stable state is the maintenance of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1954). An important aspect of developing this monopoly is the slow assumption of the responsibility for the enforcement of law by the state. This shift in responsibility from the community and lay persons to the state and law enforcement officials has been legitimated, in large measure, by the claim that the state was better able to maintain the "peace" and could do so more justly and efficiently than alternative institutions.

In America in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, citizens continued to be involved in law enforcement through such systems as "hue and cry," the night watch, the constabulary, and the private prosecution of crimes before justices of the peace (Richardson, 1974), but changes in the scale and mobility of the society led to conditions under which the underlying sense of public responsibility was breaking down (Lane, 1971). At an earlier time, the night watch had been the shared responsibility of the established citizenry, but by the late 18th century both the night watch and the constabulary had become occupations that were reimbursed privately. The notion of order as the responsibility of every citizen gave way to growing feelings that direct involvement was an inconvenience that could be avoided by paying others to do the job. Private prosecutions, once a common occurrence, were becoming more difficult to induce without the payment of treble damages to those prosecuting cases (Nelson, 1967).

With monetary rewards becoming an important element in the maintenance of order, it is not surprising that the system was vulnerable to corruption and inefficiency. In this context, publicly supported urban law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors were attractive alternatives. The immediate cause for the introduction of urban police in several eastern American cities was the

outbreak of riots which were perceived by the established classes as beyond the ability of part-time, non-professional police to handle (Lane, 1971; Silver, 1967).

Unlike the watchmen whose principal responsibilities had been dealing with incidents they encountered and apprehending offenders on the run (Brown, 1963), the new police were charged specifically with the prevention of crime. The initial role of the police was primarily to deal with large-scale civil disorders, but slowly their mandate enlarged. Whereas they first were oriented toward preserving property and the order of the established classes, they gradually assumed responsibility for preventing or intervening in all types of crimes among all groups in the society. The early emphasis on the maintenance of order changed in the twentieth century to include the investigation of crimes and apprehension of criminals.

It is not surprising that such a course of development paralleled decreasing citizen involvement in the maintenance of order. The increasing role of the police and other criminal justice officials interacted with large-scale forces in the society, such as urbanization, to weaken the idea of citizen competence and responsibility for dealing with crime. The processes we have been tracing did not proceed uniformly throughout the society, nor were they always accepted without resistance.

Vigilantism was a distinctive collective response during the period of transition in American history. Brown (1970) distinguishes two phases. During the first phase, involved citizens assumed responsibility for law enforcement functions when state institutions were absent, unresponsive or ineffective (Dimsdale, 1866; Gard, 1949; Stewart, 1964; Brown, 1975). There was vigilante activity of this type in every frontier state; it existed on an *ad hoc* basis or for longer periods of time until official law enforcement mechanisms were established (Shinn, 1965; Hollon, 1974). Beginning with the San Francisco Committee of Vigilance of 1856 (Brown, 1975), vigilante groups began to deal with the inadequacies of the law enforcement apparatus within established cities. Throughout the first two-thirds of the 19th century this type of vigilante group flourished and was generally looked upon favorably. It did not undermine law, but stood in its place or sought to uphold it.

The second phase of vigilante groups emerged in the middle of the 19th century. It was comparatively more violent and functioned where the law enforcement system was already established. Its principal focus was the control of racial and ethnic minorities. Such groups conducted illegal activities approved of by members of dominant racial and ethnic groups (Sennett, 1969). The spectre of lawlessness of this second phase of vigilantism has had a strong influence on contemporary fears about

citizen involvement in law enforcement, but in both phases there were moments of excessive and uncontrolled violence.

Brown (1975) finds similarities between modern urban "vigilantism" (citizen patrols) and the first phase of frontier vigilantism. He notes that both modern and frontier groups seek civil order and residential security and that both exhibit less of an inclination to use violence than groups in the second historical phase. However, he asserts that both vigilante forms are inappropriate in modern cities where established law enforcement agencies exist.

There are undoubtedly excesses of vigilante groups of the first type but a legacy which emphasizes these excesses may be, in large measure, a result of their being characterized subsequently by a professionally dominated legal system. Whether the excesses of these popular groups are any greater than those perpetrated by officials in the name of the law has yet to be established. Their characterization as excessive may be as much a result of their competition with the state for the right to define and control crime as it is a reflection of the behavior of such groups. Taylor (1976) urges a critical rethinking of the role of such collective responses in England and the U.S., particularly to explore them as "self-help" actions where law enforcement effectiveness is limited. He supports Burrows (1976) in seeing certain democratic aspects in such responses that are disregarded at a cost.

It should be emphasized that there have been other less dramatic forms of collective responses to crime before, during, and since the period of peak vigilante activity. There is a long tradition of involvement by citizen's groups in moral crusades against vice (Gusfield, 1963), in monitoring policy activity through crime commissions (such as those in Cleveland and Chicago), in prison reform, and in the prevention and treatment of juvenile offenders (Platt, 1969).

In the 1930's, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay founded a pioneering delinquency prevention program based on the premise that juvenile delinquency was a product of neighborhood disorganization rather than individual pathology (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Their *Chicago Area Project* attempted to organize low income areas through the use of indigenous leaders and self-help community organizations that would promote the welfare of juveniles (Korbin, 1959). The organizations they stimulated did not address broader social issues that were, in large measure, responsible for local social disorganization. Shaw and McKay subsequently admitted that their project was constrained by the conservative outlook of the businessmen on their board of directors (Snodgrass, 1976). Their project was highly influential

in its emphasis on indigenous leadership and work in the community. It fostered field contact with gangs, and social work outreach (Sorrentio, 1975; 1977). The project had its greatest success in areas with moderate delinquency and some social stability. The CAP succeeded where it could build on existing institutional strengths; it was less successful, however, building them itself (Finestone, 1976).

Despite the general trend away from lay involvement in law enforcement, there are a number of conditions which work against its disappearance. First, the state and criminal justice system do not claim to control all aspects of social life. Citizens, in practice, still exert considerable control over what activities come to the attention of officials through decisions to call or not to call the police (Black, 1973). As much as 80 percent of the crimes police record come to their attention as the result of citizen reports (Reiss, 1971). As we noted in the previous discussion of reasons for non-reporting, citizens determine that many crimes are too unimportant, inappropriate, or outside of police competence. Some of these crimes may receive the attention of localized and informal collective organizations.

Second, the criminal justice system has developed institutionalized forms of citizen cooperation. There is a tradition of police auxiliaries, citizen assistance with probation, and other ways in which citizens work for criminal justice agencies.

Third, some groups don't like the character or emphasis of criminal justice activities. They may take collective action to alter these practices. In the late 1960's, and to a lesser extent in the 1970's, minority groups have been concerned about their treatment in interactions with the police. A major component of citizen patrols in the late 1960's was monitoring police activities (Marx and Archer, 1971). Other groups have organized to change prosecutorial policies, patrol patterns, sentencing, and corrections.

Fourth, collective action has been stimulated in periods when rising crime led citizens to perceive the criminal justice system as limited or ineffective in its ability to solve the problem. An important aspect of this response, which is beyond the scope of this study, is the rapid increase in the use of private police by business and other private and public institutions (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971). The business of private policing has grown rapidly to the point where the number of private police outnumber the public ones. This increase may be interpreted as a dramatic vote of no-confidence in the ability of the public police to meet the security needs of the private commercial sector. It is in some respects a return to the responses of an earlier period, before the rise of professionalized public police, when individuals hired

their own police for general protection (Spitzer and Scull, 1977).

D. General Causes of Contemporary Collective Responses

Although more specific factors may be at work in influencing the development of particular collective responses in a given city or neighborhood, the emergence of such responses throughout the society in the past 10 years suggests some more general processes at work. Four factors are suggested in recent writings.

1. *The rising levels of crime and fear.* We have described the increases in crime rates for most of the period since 1964. The overall rise in rates is dramatic. Whether or not the official statistics reflect actual increases in crime of this magnitude cannot be determined, but regardless, these statistics have been highly influential in shaping the belief of officials and citizens that there is a severe and growing crime problem. Sometimes, the degree to which either group subscribes to the existence of a crisis may exaggerate the perceptual data, but there is no doubt that concern, perceptions of rates and risks, and fear have increased.

2. *A sense of the limits of the criminal justice system.* Survey reports show overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards the police, and significantly more critical evaluations of courts and corrections. However, there is considerable evidence that criminal justice professionals and, to an increasing extent criminal justice officials, believe that there are limits to what state action can accomplish. In recent years, there has been a general disillusionment with the efficacy of many major societal institutions. Reports citing the inability of the schools to teach (Coleman *et al.*, 1966), the hospitals and doctors to provide health (Illich, 1976), parallel the studies of the criminal justice system which doubt the ability of corrections (Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks, 1975), the courts, or the police (Kelling, 1978; Newton, 1978) to accomplish their goals. There is a growing sense of the limits of criminal justice institutions. This may be a legacy of overexaggerated claims of earlier periods of growth and professionalization. While citizens retain relatively positive attitudes towards the police and more critical perceptions of courts and corrections, the idea of limitations can be found in the pronouncements of officials and lay people alike (Caplan, 1973). This has led citizens' groups to think seriously about what they can do to augment and replace the efforts of the official system.

3. *The criminal justice system is actively encouraging citizen involvement.* To a significant extent, criminal justice officials have retreated from former claims of the exclusive competence of professionals to get the job

done (Van Til, 1975) and now stress the importance of citizen cooperation in crime reporting, crime prevention, and the prosecution of offenders. This stance is doubled-edged. On the one hand, it acknowledges the limitations of the official system and the valuable role that citizens can play. On the other hand, it provides a new explanation for why the goal of crime reduction is not being met. Now it can be said that the reason, in large or small part, is the result of insufficient citizen cooperation and involvement. Significant amounts of federal funds have been made available at all levels of government to encourage programs of citizen involvement. These funds have gone to support programs run by governmental agencies as well as citizen organizations at various levels.

4. *The contribution of the "Community Movement"*. Since the civil rights movement, there has been major growth of community organizations (Bell and Held, 1969). This has included the welfare rights movement, a large number of minority organizations, as well as a neighborhood movement drawing major support from whites and homeowners. Communal groups have always played a role in American politics, but beginning with the Kennedy administration the fostering of participation became a goal of government policy. Although it has not been the central concern of such groups, many of them have sought to address some aspect of the crime problem as part of a broader agenda.

E. Dimensions of Collective Responses

There are a number of dimensions along which collective responses vary. There are a few attempts to classify all or some of these in typologies but none has adequately dealt with the range and central characteristics of these responses (Bickman *et al.*, 1976; Yin *et al.*, 1976). Too little is known about the dynamics of salient characteristics of these responses to develop a single framework to classify and compare findings. Instead we present a series of distinctions which are useful in distinguishing different types of collective responses.

1. *Orientation towards the crime problem: control, prevention, victim advocacy*. There are a large number of different issues that citizens have sought to address as a response to the problem of crime. We can classify responses in terms of how they seek to address the problem of crime. Other categories have been suggested and overlap with the ones used here.

The professional criminology literature often distinguishes between crime prevention and crime control. The former, as we shall use it, refers to actions that seek to address the underlying social, economic, and environmental factors that foster crime. These may include lack of employment, poor housing, poor recreation

facilities, inadequate youth supervision and the absence of social cohesion. Such phenomena create incentives and opportunities for committing crimes. Crime control refers to the identification (surveillance) of potentially illegal behavior and intervention to apprehend, adjudicate and sanction wrongdoers.

A third set of responses are concerned with victim service and advocacy. A major development of the past decade paralleling and overlapping with the growth of collective responses has been the growing recognition of the needs of victims of crime (Drapkin and Viano, 1974). The "victim movement" has given birth to its own research journal, *Victimology*, several dozen books and articles, and a variety of programs to help the victims of specific crimes like rape or wife abuse, to compensate victims of violent crimes, to restitute victims of property crime, and to address the problems of the victim/witness in dealing with the criminal justice system. Many of these programs are institutional responses and are outside the scope of this essay; others however, have a strong citizen or community based character.

a. *Crime control*. Among most frequently studied collective crime responses are those that stress surveillance of homes and streets and the rapid reporting of crimes and suspicious behavior. These responses frequently take the form of neighborhood, building, or youth patrols, residential and street surveillance programs, or other programs that facilitate or reward reporting (Bickman *et al.*, 1976). In the late 1960's and early seventies many citizen patrols were more concerned with monitoring police activity (Marx and Archer, 1972), but currently most concentrate on surveillance, reporting, and service rather than direct intervention or monitoring (Yin *et al.*, 1976). Other responses of this type concentrate on street protection more directly. They educate people in self-defense or provide escort services, most typically for the elderly.

Some groups seek to control crime by pressuring the criminal justice system to be more responsive to local problems. Meetings and demonstrations may be used to articulate concerns to the police while court monitoring or judicial elections have been used to put pressure on judges, usually to be more severe in some or all cases (Gibbs *et al.*, 1977).

(1) *Informal crime control*. Those studies that focus on formal organizations miss a type of informal crime control that functions in many locales. Based on a three year study of a low income area on the near West Side of Chicago, Suttles (1968; 1970; 1972) describes how individuals go about obtaining a secure environment. They may select residential areas where the character of neighbors is shaped "by the costs of living and the presumed reputability of people so heavily rewarded by

society" (1972:235). This strategy is more available to higher income people. A second approach is to develop relations with one's neighbors to the point where they share a "personal covenant to look after one another" and exempt each other from general suspiciousness with which others are greeted. This approach is most often used by people whose minority status, low income, and other ties to an area make it difficult for them to move. People in such areas collectively create security through a combination of segregation and defense of neighborhood boundaries. The "defended neighborhood segregates people to avoid danger, insult, and the impairment of status claims" (1972:264). This defense combines: 1) avoidance behavior, restricting activities to places within the neighborhood and certain times of day and limiting exposure to risks in "outside" areas, and 2) the activities of informal groups to police the boundaries of the area against outsiders and, to a much lesser extent, regulate behavior among residents of the neighborhood. In the lower class area he studied, the primary defense groups were youth gangs and organized crime.

Ties to organized crimes are used mostly to augment the credibility of threats and could be used by any residents. The gangs, although they varied somewhat in composition and structure amongst the Italian, Puerto Rican, Mexican and Black communities, were all formed along racial or ethnic lines and were composed of local males usually in their adolescence (1972).

Brown (1975) argues that modern vigilante groups are unneeded because there is no breakdown or absence of formal legal means of control. Those who looked at formal crime control activities report few documented instances of vigilante activity during the recent upsurge in collective responses (Bickman *et al.*, 1976; Yin *et al.*, 1976). In contrast, Suttles finds that the police do not adequately deal with the needs of some parts of the city and, as a result, a form of vigilantism has emerged.

"Like early settlers on the American frontier, residents in the four slum communities were forced to take on themselves some or all of the functions of the police, the courts, and civil adjudicators. As with frontiersmen, their behavior became that of vigilantes dispensing homemade justice and exercising grass roots power" (1972:190).

According to Suttles, these forms of informal social control challenge the legitimacy of formal institutions and provide a modicum of security at the price of accentuating differences and promoting divisiveness amongst urban groups.

To our knowledge no subsequent studies have listed or elaborated the concept of the "defended neighborhood" in other locales. Suttles's ideas provide a rich and impor-

tant agenda for future research on informal social control.

We have little research on the role of youth gangs and other informal associations among groups of neighbors, relatives, or friends which may function with more or less consciousness to regulate inappropriate and illegal behavior. Suttles describes the social mechanisms that operate to deal with outsiders, but are the social arrangements to deal with community members and outsiders in other settings different in other cities? Are such informal control processes only found in low income areas, in ethnic enclaves, or in areas of high social integration? Research, most likely entailing comparative ethnographic studies, is needed to expand our scope of examples and allow for a more analytic approach to these questions.

b. *Crime prevention.* Crime prevention activities can cover the whole range of factors which people believe cause crime. Among the most common collective responses of this type are programs to employ and otherwise occupy youth, and residential "target hardening". Residential and commercial anti-burglary programs, in addition to mutual house surveillance programs mentioned in the previous section, generally include educational meetings and materials urging people to obtain better locks, adopt a variety of home defense techniques such as using timers on lights, leaving lights and radios on when away, locking doors, etc., and often provide the tools and assistance for property engraving. Police departments may conduct house security surveys to provide specific suggestions about "target hardening" to a limited number of home owners or, more frequently, they assist local groups in carrying out their own educational programs (ITREC, 1977). Other groups have identified the problems of drugs, decaying housing, abandoned buildings, unlit streets, neighborhood bars, adult bookstores and movie theatres, prostitution, and unemployment. Activities around these issues are less often studied as collective crime responses because these activities are generally not funded by criminal justice sources and are not carried out principally by local organizations primarily concerned with crime problems. These activities may not be labeled as responses to crime. Nevertheless, the tie of such concerns to crime prevention may be clear in the minds of those involved in such activities. Research which excludes these types of activities misses much of what people think of as collective responses to crime.

c. *Victim advocacy and services.* The typical form of this collective response provides services to the victim (Cain and Kravitz, 1978; Newton, 1976). A few programs attempt to act as advocates to press the victim's interests on the criminal justice system and other agen-

cies (DuBow and Becker, 1976). While victim/witness services are more often provided by governmental agencies, citizens groups have pressured prosecutors and gone to court to assert victim and community concerns. The citizen groups that deal with the victims of rape, other sexual assaults, child abuse and wife battering generally operate on a city-wide or area-wide basis in order to attract enough cases and volunteers (Brodyaga *et al.*, 1975).

2. *Particular crime vs. general crime focus.* Collective responses vary by whether they deal with one type of crime or a range of crimes. If there is a single crime focus in the crime control programs, it tends to be burglary or robbery. In the case of on-going neighborhood organizations, they may deal with different types of crime one at a time. A common belief among program planners is that a program that focuses on a particular crime is more likely to succeed (Goldsmith, 1975); it is certainly easier to evaluate. The approaches to the problem can be broad or "comprehensive", but the targeted activity narrow. To date we know of no study that has put this belief to a test.

3. *Ad hoc vs. organized responses.* Almost all studies of collective responses describe activities that are conducted by organized groups. Organized responses are larger in scale, and have greater longevity, stability and visibility than *ad hoc* ones. An *ad hoc* response is closely related to informal social control activities. It may be a spontaneously developing group of people, such as the residents of a block, who join together briefly to respond to a crime problem. *Ad hoc* responses may lead to the formation of a more formal, organized effort, or they will dissolve as the group.

It is difficult to study *ad hoc* responses and small scale organizations like block clubs. They are unlikely to have names, records, or even addresses. Because these collective responses are small in scale, relatively informal and frequently short-lived, it does not mean that they cannot be effective. It may be that such responses are temporarily and situationally tailored to complement more individually centered informal social control efforts. Such possibilities cannot be evaluated without studies that focus on this phenomena. A first step for such studies will be the development of a methodology to map and sample them.

4. *Agency vs. local initiation.* Collective responses can be distinguished by whether they are initiated by a government agency or by a neighborhood or community organization. Both types of responses can take place in the local neighborhood. The Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program is an example of a government program with a strong neighborhood focus (Seattle, 1976; Abt, 1976; NILECJ, 1977). In that program a city

agency hires community organizers to work in targeted neighborhoods to establish block groups, conduct home security surveys, engrave property, and encourage the formation of local surveillance groups. The organizers are employees of the agency; they move from area to area setting up meetings and stimulating local activity. A similar framework is being used for the SAFE program in San Francisco. Programs of this type may limit their local contacts to a single block meeting as in Portland (Schneider, 1975), may focus on getting local block clubs on their feet (Seattle, 1976), or may provide longer term support to neighborhood groups (Fowler *et al.*, 1978). Unless these efforts result in groups of people acting together, we do not consider it a collective reaction to crime.

Locally initiated and directed collective responses may be organized at the block or neighborhood level or be run by a local functional or social organization. Though such neighborhood programs often borrow ideas and programs from what is being done elsewhere, a locally initiated and run program may be more likely to tailor its program to the particular needs of the area than an agency's program which may be implemented in a number of different locales. A locally initiated response may have more resident support than one introduced from the outside, but if there are cleavages among local groups, and one group initiates the program, then it may only receive support from one part of the residents of the locale.

Agency-initiated programs are more likely to be funded externally than locally initiated programs. This implies an added strength to agency programs, but at the same time makes them vulnerable to the uncertainties of funding. Most local organizations are continually in danger of having insufficient funds, but their adaptation to this reality may allow them to continue through the highs and lows of funding.

The experience of the "War on Poverty" would suggest that citizen influence in externally initiated programs tends to be minimal even when such participation is defined as an important aspect of the program (Morris and Rein, 1973). Local voluntary organizations vary in the degree to which leadership and influence are shared. The regular core of activists tends to be small, but the control of the responses is much more likely to be local than agency initiated.

The agency/locally initiated distinction overlaps with the distinction made in Part II between programmatic and organizational participation. Programmatic participation means receiving a program's services, information, or stimulation. Organizational participation means involvement in the development and/or implementation of a response. Organizational participation in agency-

initiated programs would appear to be lower than for locally initiated programs. There will also be substantial programmatic participation in locally initiated programs, but the chances appear greater that there will also be a significant amount of organizational participation. Government-initiated programs are more likely to have trained, full time staff who can devote time to supporting collective efforts on a regular basis. While some community groups have paid staff, they all must rely heavily on volunteers. Because volunteers have other jobs, families to care for, and other extensive commitments, their efforts tend to be more sporadic and limited by time. The cast of local control by citizen volunteers can be lacking of a sustained response.

5. *Crime vs. multi-issue orientation.* The groups or organizations responsible for particular collective responses may focus only on crime issues or may have concerns and programs in a number of other issue areas. A collective crime response is less likely to be the impetus for the start of multi-issue organizations; more typically, such organizations add a crime response at some point after they have already dealt with other issues (Reed, 1979; Krendel, 1977). By definition, this is not the case with crime-focused organizations. Within the general area of crime concerns, they may initiate more than one response, but their existence depends on the continuation of crime as an issue. Among multi-issue organizations, the priority given to the crime response and its connection to other issue responses will affect the success and character of the crime response. Although it appears more likely that locally initiated crime responses will be undertaken by multi-issue organizations, it may also occur among agency-initiated programs. Housing and transportation authorities may add crime as a secondary area of response.

6. *Three general types of collective responses.* The comments in the above two sections are based more on our own research than on the existing literature. We present these ideas and the three general types as issues which other researchers and policy makers may find useful.

We have discussed a number of dimensions separately. They could conceivably be combined in a great number of different ways. However, there appears to be three permanent clusters of attributes described in the literature or observed in our research:

- Government initiated and funded crime-focused responses which stimulate local collective efforts with an emphasis on programmatic participation.
- Locally initiated crime responses by multi-issue, territorial organizations that may or may not receive funds specifically for collective responses to crime.
- Locally initiated crime specific organizations.

F. Correlates of Collective Responses

What conditions explain the emergence, stability, and impact of a collective response to crime? With phenomena as varied as the collective responses we have described, it would be surprising to find many conditions that apply to all of them. The literature supplies no such generalizations. Findings are fragmentary. We first discuss what is known about the emergence of collective responses and then we consider their operation and stability. The final section of Part III deals with questions of impact.

1. *The emergence of collective responses.* This section deals primarily with conditions under which locally initiated collective responses emerge. The factors tied in with agency-initiated programs generally involve political processes and policy decisions at the city and national level. Often a program is conceived of at the city level and the target areas selected subsequently. In other cases, the government program is developed with a particular area in mind. There are no longitudinal studies of the emergence of collective responses. Since all the studies are essentially cross-sectional, only some of the correlations can be safely interpreted as having a causal direction. Our own research suggests that *some form of collective response is present in most urban areas*. Questions of emergence need to be thought of not in terms of the presence or absence of responses, but rather in terms of their extensiveness, intensity, and specific content.

a. *Crime patterns.* Are collective responses more likely to emerge in areas with higher crime rates? Do specific types of crimes generate collective responses more than others? Are crime rates, levels, trends, or dramatic incidents more influential on the likelihood and character of responses? These are just a few of the questions about the relationships between crime patterns and collective responses for which there are scarcely the beginnings of answers. With regard to citizen patrols, Yin *et al.* (1976) note that they appear to exist across a broad spectrum of neighborhood types. Some patrols are begun *in response* to crime problems while others are begun *to prevent* a crime problem from developing. The diversity of motive suggests that the pattern of crime itself is unlikely to be determinative. None of the other surveys of collective responses have found clear relationships with crime rates, but such surveys are often hampered by the lack of complete crime data.

Since there is a tendency for reported crime rates to be higher in lower income areas and since research on voluntary participation finds a positive relationship with economic status (Bell and Force, 1956; Verba and Nie, 1972), one might expect there to be an inverse relationship between area crime rates and collective response rates. Henig (1977), in a study of neighborhood organi-

zations in San Francisco, found that there was a small negative association between the presence of neighborhood organizations and the crime rates. But when the presence of crime-oriented neighborhood organizations are examined, then they are positively related to crime. The impetus for organization appears to be in a set of social demographic and structural factors, but the nature of the crime problem in a neighborhood may affect whether that neighborhood's organizations undertake a crime response. The number of aggravated assaults in the neighborhoods was the best predictor among the crime variables of the number of crime-oriented organizations in the neighborhood, but significant correlations were also found for robberies, residential burglaries, and simple assaults.

b. *Aggregate perceptions of crime.* Neighborhoods and urban localities can be characterized in terms of their aggregate levels of fear, attitudes toward crime and the police, or other perceptions. These are collective level variables that can be linked to collective responses just as individual perceptions can be related to individual behaviors. This sort of approach would allow characterizations of locales as high or low fear areas, or areas that show strong or weak support for the police. Use of aggregate level perceptual measures in analyzing collective responses is uncommon. One example of what such an analysis might look like could start with Marx and Archer's (1971) finding that blacks are more likely to see citizen patrols as a good idea than are whites. If this meant that there was more support for patrols in certain predominantly black parts of Boston, it might help explain why over 60 percent of patrol members were black.

We do not know for individuals or for areas what levels of fear are most and least conducive to action. Fear could debilitate or stimulate responses. One possibility is that the relationship is curvilinear, i.e., there are fewer collective actions when there are very high and very low fear levels.

The role of crime as an issue around which to organize a community action has not received specific attention. In the major social science community studies, researchers have not reported crime as a major concern of community groups and collective responses. In a study of community mobilization in a number of different neighborhoods, Mollenkopf (1973) found that issues that intruded into the lives of a cross-section of the residents of an area were more likely to be embodied in collective responses. Groups which had an issue to fight against were better able to sustain themselves than groups which chased issues that called for a more positive response. If Mollenkopf's findings are relevant to collective responses to crime, it would mean that collective responses to stop a practice of a criminal justice agency would be

more likely to mobilize people than efforts to develop an affirmative policy.

c. *Social integration.* As we have mentioned earlier, discussions of the role of "community" in dealing with crime have become an extremely prominent part of the "crime prevention" literature. There is believed to be an inverse relationship between the strength of informal controls and the emergence of formal ones (Schwartz, 1954; Durkheim, 1933; Suttles, 1968). As informal controls weaken, formal ones emerge. This process has been cited as a principal reason for the emergence of formalized courts and police agencies. Even if this process is broadly correct, it doesn't provide an understanding of the roles that the collective responses of local organizations might play. Such responses are more formalized than informal controls, but less so than official enforcement agencies. They may be *responses to the weakening of formal institutions on the one hand, or to the weakening of informal controls on the other.* Before such questions can be answered a means of measuring the strength of informal social controls is needed. We have already discussed a tendency to substitute measures of social integration for direct measures of informal control, and to assume these as measures of informal control.

As with studies of fear, there is a small amount of evidence to suggest that *collective crime responses may be most active in neighborhoods that are at neither extreme of social integration.* Highly cohesive neighborhoods may be able to rely primarily on informal social controls and highly disorganized communities may not have the capacity for collective action. Areas of moderate social integration may have the need and the ability to organize formally. Yin *et al.* (1976) report that patrols were most frequently found in racially mixed areas.

Participants in collective responses appear to come disproportionately from the more stable (married, homeownership, long-term resident) members of an area. These characteristics are also associated with greater individual social integration. These people may become motivated to act when their relatively stable worlds are threatened.

d. *Demographic characteristics of locales.* Research on individual participation in collective activities other than crime responses consistently finds that participation increases with income and education (Bell and Force, 1956; Verba and Nie, 1972; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). Much of the research on participation deals with many organizations and activities that are not contained within local neighborhoods; but those studies that have focused on local community organization participation report similar findings (Hunter, 1974; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974).

An important distinction made in these studies is between individual and area characteristics.

In their study of four areas of San Francisco, Bell and Force (1956) found that residents of higher economic status areas were more likely to participate in formal voluntary associations than were residents of low economic status areas when education and income were controlled. Hunter (1974) reports a similar finding for Chicago. Bell and Force suggest that since the higher income areas also had higher rates of participation, there may be a social norm of participation in such areas that has an effect independent of class and education. Henig (1977) reported more neighborhood organizations in areas with higher incomes and more owner-occupied residences. An additional possibility not considered in their study is that there are more voluntary associations or that they are more visible in the high income areas thus making participation easier for all local residents.

The use of area characteristics must be used cautiously to avoid the inferential pitfalls of ecological correlations, but when used correctly they shed light on area effects. For example, Hunter (1974) finds that blacks living in higher economic status areas participate in local voluntary organizations to a greater extent than whites living in similar areas or than blacks of similar economic status living in ghetto areas.

None of the studies of participation which consider area characteristics has focused on collective responses to crime. They do, however, suggest a number of hypotheses and strategies of analysis for future researchers to address. The Center for Social Policy and Community Development's (CSPCD) report on community crime prevention (1976) does not provide data on this relationship but postulates that ideological communities—where middle class, racially mixed populations consciously are attracted to an area because of its mixed character and nearness to major institutions such as universities or hospitals—will be more amenable to collective responses than highly integrated working class urban villages or minority ghettos. While the CSPCD report may be right in its explanation of the organizational ability of ideological communities, there is growing evidence that *blacks, including blacks living in ghettos, are more willing to become involved in collective responses to crime* (Marx and Archer, 1971) and that predominantly black areas are more likely to have active collective responses to crime¹ (O'Neil, 1977; Henig, 1977).

2. *The stability of collective responses.* A general problem of voluntary organizations is the sustaining of effort over time. Can the collective response continue,

¹ Because of the correlation with race, there is a smaller but significant inverse relationship of income and the presence of collective responses to crime (Henig, 1977).

can it hold the interest of participants, and can new participants be recruited? The assumption of most funding sources and organization activists is that stability is a mark of success. In many cases, where a sustained effort is required, stability of an organized effort is crucial, but the emphasis on organizational stability may preclude consideration of situations where the discontinuation of a response, because it is successful or ineffective, is an appropriate course of action.

Three major studies of citizen patrols have all discussed stability as an ever present problem. Marx and Archer (1971) studied patrols in the Boston area. They found that the life span of patrols was related to:

- a continuing crisis which demonstrated the need for the patrol,
- the presence of charismatic leadership to define the organization's mission and inspire commitment,
- the emergence of a formal organization with financial support.

Yin *et al.*'s (1976) review of residential patrols identified three similar factors—personnel, affiliation with a community organization, bureaucratization and added a fourth, a workable relationship with the police. Heidt and Etzioni (1973) adds one further factor, the generation of rewards and incentives so members feel effective and appreciated.

We have descriptions of on-going responses. Rarely do these descriptions include information on responses' origins; they never describe a response's demise. Full natural histories of on-going and discontinued responses, when available, can serve as the basis for more data based discussions of both their emergence and stability.

G. Effects of Collective Responses

Are the efforts that go into collective responses worthwhile? Are the effects sufficiently encouraging to warrant government support of such efforts? These questions, like others in this part, remain unanswered. Participants in such responses tend to give enthusiastic and highly positive assessments of their activities. Closer examination of the bases for such enthusiasm often finds some compelling anecdotes and unsound measures of effects. More careful evaluations have either found few effects or are inconclusive.

1. *Crime impact.* For many responses the formal goal or informal desire is to lower the crime rate or remove a particular crime problem. For large scale responses, an important complication in interpreting official crime statistics is that participation may produce an increase in the likelihood of crime reporting. If this occurs, then what are actually stable crime rates could appear to be rising due to increased reporting. The first indication that this was more than a theoretical possibility was reported

by Schneider (1975) in her evaluation of the Portland anti-burglary program. Those who cooperated with the program reported burglaries at a significantly higher rate than non-participants. She estimated that changes in reporting were sufficient to alter the overall trend of the city's burglary rates. Subsequently, similar increases in reporting were noted in Seattle where there was an extensive community crime prevention program (Abt, 1976).

If official crime rates show a decrease in crime and there is no reason to suspect a regression from a recent peak in the crime rate or that the crime reporting rate has declined, they may be used with somewhat greater confidence to support the conclusion that the collective response reduced crime. The likelihood of using official or victimization statistics to evaluate small-scale responses is hampered by substantial methodological problems even if the costs of a victim survey were not an obstacle (DuBow and Reed, 1976). Small populations generate few crimes per unit of time. Small numbers make it difficult to determine trends with any confidence.

To date, the specific effects of collective crime responses on crime have not been investigated. For the few programs that have had substantial evaluations, almost all have found no area-wide reductions in crime or their findings are ambiguous or inconsistent (Gibbs *et al.*, 1977; Washnis, 1976; Bickman *et al.*, 1976). In Hartford, burglary rates were reduced and rising robbery rates stabilized, but this comprehensive crime prevention program involved several elements other than a collective response (Fowler *et al.*, 1978). It was not possible to disaggregate the effects of the several components of this program.

Bickman *et al.* (1976) argue that crime reduction is an inappropriate measure of impact at least for crime reporting/surveillance programs, because these programs intervene in such a small part of the overall process that one might theoretically predict would lead to crime reduction.

Many programs and organizations would be ambivalent or neutral toward attempts to evaluate their success more rigorously. If participants share a belief in a response's success and this belief aids the continuation of the organization and/or program, a more rigorous evaluation might be seen as posing a threat more than an aid for the group involved.

2. Crime perceptions. It is common for participants to perceive collective responses as having reduced crime. This judgment of the effectiveness of these actions may reduce fear (Reed, 1979; Christian, 1973) and increase pride. It is often less difficult and less expensive to measure changes in perceptions than it is to get reliable victimization data. For these reasons, changes in percep-

tions may become increasingly prominent evaluation parameters. There is no evidence to report on the impact of collective responses on fear. However, we will mention three less obvious dynamics that need to be considered in planning and evaluating a collective response.

- Fear may be reduced, whether or not there is a measurable change in the crime rate.
- Fear may be increased by the increase in information about crime which a response brings to people. Program activists often may use the tactic of convincing people that crime is a more serious problem than they thought as a means to mobilize them. Whether or not it has that behavioral effect, it may increase fear.
- Fears and perceived risks may be realigned with the existing realities as more information is provided by a collective crime response.

Collective responses may affect a number of other perceptions. They may change citizen perceptions of the police. In many police crime prevention programs, the only effect that can be shown is an improvement in citizen evaluations of the police (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978). On the other hand, a number of commentators have noted a possible decrease in feelings of government legitimacy when citizens perceive the need to act on their own behalf to provide security (Wilson and Boland, 1976).

3. Crime displacement. An important element in any overall assessment of the impact of collective responses to crime is the question of displacement: has the existence of a response shifted the problem of crime to another place, time, or activity (Newton, 1978; Repetto, 1976). In Part II of this essay, we considered this question with regard to the possible shift in the risk of victimization from participants to non-participants in collective responses. The existing discussions of that issue are generally based on anti-burglary programs where the displacement is from one household to another. The methodological issues in studying other than interpersonal displacements are better understood. The crime rates for contiguous areas and times or for other types of crimes within the same area can be examined. If the pattern of relationships between the different rates changes after the programmatic intervention, the explanation may be that displacement has taken place.

Most of the published studies of displacement have been part of the evaluation of police and other programs not involving significant citizen participation. They have frequently found evidence of effects. Increases in manpower in New York's 20th precinct (Press, 1971), on New York subways (Chaiken *et al.*, 1974), and in the Nashville saturation patrol study (Schnelle *et al.*, 1975)

all strongly indicated displacement effects as did the Cincinnati COMSEC team policing experiment (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978), a Kansas city street lighting evaluation (Wright *et al.*, 1974), and a study of a juvenile curfew in Detroit (Hunt and Weiner, 1977). Some Operation Identification programs were examined. When programs show no impact on burglary rates, there is no point in studying displacement (Mattick *et al.*, 1974), but rates were reduced in Seattle, St. Louis, Phoenix, Denver, and many communities in Minnesota. Among these, displacement to other than targeted areas may have taken place in Denver and St. Louis (Heller *et al.*, 1975). On the other hand, a particularly careful study of the Seattle program found no displacement to other types of crimes to nonparticipants or to adjacent neighborhoods (NILECJ, 1977). A comprehensive agency-initiated community crime prevention program in Hartford, which included activities of neighborhood organization, found that key crime rates were affected and no displacement effects occurred (Fowler *et al.*, 1978).

A consideration that has *not* been included in displacement studies, to date, is the possible effects of *perceived displacement* whether or not it has actually occurred. The fears of non-participants, or of residents of areas adjoining neighborhoods with a highly active collective crime response, may all be worth considering. For example, would an elderly escort program increase the fears of the elderly who must go out at times when they cannot be escorted? Will residents who cannot afford new locks be frightened when they see that their neighbors are doing so? Stenzel (1974) studied the possible displacement of crimes to the suburbs as a result of St. Louis' High Impact Anti-Crime Program. His study sought to address the fears of suburban officials who were aware of rising suburban crime rates and suspected a link to the central city's program. Stenzel found no displacement effect, but failed to note that the High Impact Program itself appeared to have little effect on crime within the city.

4. *Social integration.* There is considerable agreement among activists, commentators, and policy makers that one key to reducing crime through collective responses is to foster social cohesion, to build community. Programs which stress the involvement of large numbers of local residents participating through grass roots organizations such as block clubs often are conceived of as efforts to build community and fight crime at the same time. The relationship between these two goals remains unstudied.

There is reason to doubt whether the creation of local organizations can, in the short run, have a substantial effect on the patterns of social interaction and social cohesion in a community. Particularly active participants

may feel better integrated, but these effects are attenuated for those who are less active and are likely to be minimal or non-existent for non-participants. Some of the confusion in this interpretive model may be the failure to disentangle the effects for different levels of involvement. In other respects the model may underestimate the inertia of established social practices.

5. *Community organization.* Many collective responses are carried out by local territorial groups such as block clubs, neighborhood or community organizations. For most of these multi-issue groups, crime is one of several issues on which they will act either simultaneously or sequentially. A major unanswered question is whether collective responses to crime strengthens these organizations and affects the realization of their other goals. In some cases, the concern with crime is clearly secondary; it may be used by the organization to attract members and to obtain funds for the entire program of the organization. Whether people who are recruited on the basis of an interest in crime are later redirected or whether the crime issue can be used to achieve other organizational goals remains to be studied.

Several authors have suggested a further, more political set of criteria for understanding many collective responses. Cohen (1973), in her analysis of the Minneapolis Indian Patrol, emphasizes its symbolic importance. It functioned to represent the American Indian Movement ideology that Indians could help each other and that the movement could offer protection against oppressive institutions like the police. Knopf (1970), in her review of a number of youth patrol programs, underscores their value in demonstrating that opposing racial groups could work together. In both of these instances, the crime content of the response was secondary to a broader political statement that was being made.

Perhaps the most provocative formulation of collective crime responses as essentially political acts is provided in a paper by Arthurs (1975). She interprets collective responses as efforts by local groups to gain control over the definition of acceptable behavior and as prevention of the automatic criminal justice response to criminal or anti-social behavior. The two basic requirements for a community to handle its own crime problems are that it accept and retain troublesome behavior within its networks and that it develop mechanisms to handle this behavior.² She urges thinking of the analogy to self-regulation by trade or occupational groups.

The strains of decentralization, deprofessionalization, and community control appear in a good number of the collective responses, but as yet they have received little overall articulation.

² For an analogous argument at the individual level see Christie's (1977) provocative essay.

H. Summary

This part of the review has been particularly frustrating to write for there are so few findings to report. Instead, we have provided a set of key variables, described some lines of inquiry, and suggested what our own research might indicate. What might appear at first as a fair amount of research on community crime prevention turns out to be primarily studies of programs run by the police and other agencies to impact on citizens. Relatively few studies consider the collective actions of citizens in organizations at the local level.

Although there are no quantitative studies to support the belief, there is widespread argument that the number of collective responses to crime has greatly increased over the past 10 to 15 years. These responses have either emphasized crime control (surveillance and reporting) or crime prevention (residential target hardening or efforts to deal with the causes of crime). Responses dealing with causes have received much less attention than crime control or target hardening approaches.

Two highly relevant types of responses which also need to be brought into collective crime response are informal social control and *ad hoc* responses. These phenomena are difficult to study but provide an important part of the context in which more formal responses operate.

Comparative studies which consider the histories of ongoing and discontinued responses provide a framework in which many of the questions about how

responses emerge, develop, succeed, or fail can best be understood. For many other questions, such as the relationship between informal and formal collective responses, in-depth studies of all collective responses within specific locales is needed.

Perhaps the single most important set of relationships that need study involve collective responses to crime and the degree of social integration. A major assumption shared by researchers and policy makers is that collective crime responses can help increase the sense of community which, at the same time, will support informal social control processes that will reduce the incidence of crime. Though appealing, these relationships have not been substantially studied nor confirmed in the existing studies.

I. Final Remarks

This essay has sought to accomplish several interrelated tasks. It has described a set of issues and relevant literatures in a field of inquiry called "Reactions to Crime." It has reviewed studies that addressed relevant topics, has commented on issues where such findings were lacking, and has suggested a range of topics and research strategies for further work in this field. Summaries appear at the end of each part of the report. Whether or not the reader is convinced that there are a set of unifying questions in this topical area, the essay seeks to provide a vocabulary for talking about comparable data across studies that have too often been encumbered by conceptual confusion.

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