NEEDS ASSESSMENT STUDY:

TERRORISM IN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

FINAL REPORT

BY

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, INC.

PREPARED FOR THE

DADE-MIAMI CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL

UNDER

GRANT #78-TA-AX-0006

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the graciousness and enthusiasm of so many in Dade
County and elsewhere, who have contributed, without
any thought of reward, their time and knowledge in
the hope that these would be of value in fulfilling
the terms of the consultant's mandate. The public
and private sectors have shared in equal measure,
and the richness and variety of the experience of
all these individuals is reflected in some measure
in the final product.

It would be invidious and embarrassing to make
acknowledgements by name, and this blanket apprecia-
tion must perforce serve for all. Some may have the
additional gratification of recognizing their words
and ideas as they have been synthesized and incorpor-
ated into this report. To all, then, a heartfelt
and sincere thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

Ordinarily, a report such as that presented herein might
appropriately have been prefaced by only the briefest of introductions.
It would have sufficed to state, shortly, what the study had set out
to accomplish, the way in which the study was undertaken - its method-
ology - and how well the intended goals have been met. The body of
the report itself would have served to present, in due sequence, the
substantive material under examination. For reasons that will be
explained, something more is clearly needed here if the purposes of
this study are to be fully translated into a useful document. As a
preliminary to the study, it was seen to be necessary to investigate
precisely what was expected of it. Only in this way could it be
undertaken in a way that would be ultimately satisfactory to those
who had invested so much of their time, energies, and hopes in causing
it to be conducted. It was felt that such an examination would aid
not only in structuring the report, but in setting realistic goals
that could be reached within the time frame and by reference to the
resources available. A report of that examination is very revealing.

The study itself has occupied but a very short space of time,
a mere four months of intensive field work and the translation of its
results into the form of this final report. The time elapsed from
conception to birth has, however, been lengthy indeed; the whole
project has had a period of gestation substantially greater than that
of the Elephant's Child. The project as it was originally envisaged
has undergone several outward changes of considerable importance.

But the latent image of the original remains and a lingering
nostalgia for it permeates every aspect of the process through
which the study has passed on the way to its present state of
transformation. These facts are not set out as a mere historical
curiosity. They have a direct bearing on the form of the study
and the final report. They will be most material in measuring
the accomplishment of what was undertaken. They, therefore,
merit serious attention by reference to the documentation relative
to the grant, its award, and utilization.

The study may be regarded as a direct response to the
public concern being voiced in 1976 concerning the violence then
experienced in Dade County. The community felt strongly in need
of federal assistance to cope with the problem. Informal discus-
sion had taken place among those concerned with criminal justice
matters in the County, but the formalization of the process can
be traced to a letter dated May 27, 1977, from the Honorable
Seymour Gelber, Chairman of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice
Council to Ms. Carol Blair of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. Judge Gelber who, incidentally, had been a
member of the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorders
and Terrorism, wrote:

"Your office is to be commended for initiating a meeting
several weeks ago enabling local, state, and federal agencies
to discuss the problem of terrorism in this community. I
would hope that as a result of this meeting and your further
discussions with local officials, that LEAA would provide
funds for an assessment of needs in Dade County to combat
terrorism. The gravity of the situation was demonstrated
just two days ago by the bombing of Mackey Airlines by

anti-Castro forces."

The term "needs assessment" is used twice more in that letter and it is abundantly clear from its overall tone that federal funding was being sought to make an evaluation of available resources and to determine any further assistance that might need to be provided. There was an assumption that local resources might not be adequate to deal with the problem of terrorism in Dade County and that an objective assessment of additional needs should be undertaken with federal assistance.

This letter brought forward a favorable response from the LEAA Regional Office indicating that, "LEAA has identified $45,000 which can be made available to address the problem of terrorism in Dade County". The subtle shift of wording will be noted, for, intentionally or otherwise, a more ambitious note had already been struck. This sum was not destined to be applied to find out what needed to be done about terrorism in Dade County nor to assess needs for coping with the problem but, rather, was to be applied to address it, as though the problem, and the needs had already been identified and determined. Although nothing in the nature of a formal proposal yet existed, it was clear that this difference in language opened up the distinct possibility of a divergence from what had been originally so clearly proposed.

Some urgency was introduced into the matter by reason of LEAA requiring a formal application by July 31, 1977, as the money identified was from FY 1977 sources, but in the event, this was delayed until August because of the procedural requirements that had to be met. In the interim, a distinct change of purpose was introduced.

The identified sum was to be dedicated to "The development of an operational plan which will enable Federal, State, and local agencies to more effectively cope with the terrorism problem in Dade County, Florida." What was proposed went by the attractive designation of Terrorism Response Action Plan (TRAP), and so it was written into the federal grant application. The formal application entitled "Terrorism Response Action Plan" was entered in the LEAA processing system on August 24, 1977.

On August 31, 1977, a well founded objection to the proposal in its then existing form was lodged by Director E. Wilson Purdy of the Public Safety Department. That objection merits close attention, for it goes straight to the heart of the problem of principal concern here. Director Purdy wrote: "Review of the Criminal Justice Planning Unit grant, Terrorism Response Action Plan (TRAP), indicates that the overall objectives of the grant are needed and certainly have merit; however, the approach to the problem raises several areas of concern to this department. The use of an outside consultant to develop an operational plan which will enable federal, state, and local agencies to more effectively combat terrorism in Dade County is not feasible." Mr. Purdy went on to explain the basis for this conclusion and why, in his opinion, "Such effort is an impractical solution to the problem and would result in much lost time and effort." Those conclusions are belatedly and respectfully endorsed in full here. The change in direction from what was originally proposed had raised insupperable practical difficulties, but what had occurred does not seem to have been fully appreciated at the time either locally or by the LEAA.

Precisely what happened next is not revealed by the record, but on November 22, 1977, a most important letter was sent by Dr. Jeffrey M. Silbert, Executive Director, Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council to Mr. Perry Rivkin, LEAA. The material portion reads:

> "The project title has been changed from "Terrorism Action Response Plan (TRAP) to "Needs Assessment Study: Terrorism in Dade County, Florida:" Wherever appropriate, this new title has been substituted in the application. The primary objective of the project is the development of a needs assessment study which will enable Federal, State and local agencies to more effectively cope with the terrorism problem in Dade County, Florida. The title change is reflective of a change in tone as opposed to major substance."

It is clear that this represented a reversion to the earlier, simpler proposal, which, had it been constructed correctly along the lines indicated, would not only have given exact expression to Judge Gelber's original concept but would also have satisfactorily met Director Purdy's objections. What happened, however, was that the title of (TRAP) disappeared, but important vestiges of its substance remained.

The practical effect of this is curious. The Title and Description of the federal grant read as indicated in the letter of November 22, 1977. But the grant summary although reading under Title of Project Needs Assessment Study: Terrorism in Dade County, Florida carries under the Summary Description of Project, the following:

"To develop an operational plan for Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies which will enable them
to effectively cope with the terrorism problem that curren-
tly exists within Dade County, Florida."
This, of course, represents the retention of substance alluded to
above. Again, what had occurred seemed to have escaped notice.
Certainly, its consequences in terms of the work to be commis-
sioned were never considered.

On March 22, 1978, after the award of the grant, a meeting of
the steering committee representatives, who would be overseeing the
work to be done in accordance with its terms, was held. Nearly a
year had elapsed since the original meeting that had provided the
initial impetus for the grant, and Judge Gelber explained how the
sum of $45,000 had been awarded to Dade County. The minutes may
not do full justice to his charge to the steering committee, but
the reported burden of it is expressed in this way: "A meeting
was held on March 29, 1977, to which all the component parts of
the criminal justice system were invited to give their input.
LEAA officials felt that the agencies represented were not ready
at that time to determine how best funds could be utilized and
that, therefore, a needs assessment was required in order to
identify how the money should be spent. Dade County has been
allocated $45,000 to do this needs assessment study. Hopefully,
the study will be used nationally. This grant is not an evalua-
tion grant but rather what the perception of agencies and other
persons might be of the need in Dade County.

An outside consultant will be brought in to evaluate the total picture. This consultant will not interfere with or evaluate each process of every involved department but rather is to determine what can best be done." Judge Gelber evidently moved with consummate skill among the departmental sensibilities, but two points are worthy of special note. No mention is made of an operational plan. What is to be conducted is a "Needs Assessment" as Judge Gelber understood it and, having been the original proponent of just such a study, he must be presumed to have understood it very well. Secondly, there is a hint, though quite an evident one, that money over and above the $45,000 awarded might be obtained if the needs assessment study justified this; the $45,000 was to do that study and no more. No one reading the minutes, with no knowledge of what had gone before, would have had any inkling of TRAP or would have imagined that any consultant employed under the terms of the grant would be required to produce an operational response plan.

The next stage was the design and approval of an RFP that would be circulated among potential consultants. The RFP contained information on the basis of which the consultants would respond; in its final form, it constituted the blueprint by which the selected consultant would be guided in its works. The consultant cannot have known in advance any of the matters set out here; indeed, they were not really considered worthy of special notice by any having the material facts in their possession. The RFP is not noticeably unusual in form or content on the fact of it. It is only when it is scrutinized closely by reference to what is set out here that latent inconsistencies in objectives become

apparent. For the RFP is based, essentially on the sustaining argument of the original grant, and, as it will be recalled, this was based upon the premise that what was to be produced was a Terrorism Response Action Plan. The changes made in the wording that eventually found its way into the RFP were largely cosmetic and designed only to make a change in tone, not of substance per the letter of November 22, 1977.

The result of all this was that a considerable residue of the discarded TRAP notion nevertheless found its way almost unnoticed into the RFP giving it a peculiarly bifurcated character on any rigorous analysis. There was a clear injunction to study the needs of the system in Dade County and to produce a report indicative of what had been found in this respect. But the RFP goes much farther and, paraphrasing its intent in this regard, enjoins upon the consultant the design of a criminal justice response package. When the language of the RFP is studied critically, it will be seen that a reasonable expectation is raised, over and above an assessment of what might be needed to cope with terrorism in Dade County, that the final report will contain operational recommendations to be implemented by the agencies to which they are addressed. Whatever might have been the original intent, this is the effect of the RFP as written, this is how it was interpreted by the consultant, and this is the interpretation that has influenced this final report.

Ordinarily, none of this might have amounted to much. Whatever the wording of the mandate, any inconsistencies could have been cured through the appropriate consultation and a little common sense. But

the fatal objection to anything in the nature of an operational plan, however general, however theoretical, is that advanced by Director Purdy. It was not something that an outside consultant could do at all, as Director Purdy saw very clearly. All that consultant could do was to explore what underlineneeded to be done to cope with the problem of terrorism. Those needs, when discovered or identified, had to be addressed by those whom they concerned. The operational planning to meet the needs so discovered would inevitably fall to the lot of the agencies determined individually and collectively to be found wanting. Thus the entire project, as a result of these incurable internal consistencies divided itself naturally into a two-phase exercise, the first comprising the needs assessment properly so-called, and the second, the construction and implementation of the action response plan based on the identification of what was needed to produde it. The proposed study was really like an emulsion. While there was considerable activity, the solution produced the appearance of consistency through the suspension of its particles; at rest it was seen to be nothing but essentially incompatible oil and water.

Again, while worthy of note, these matters would hardly have commanded the energy bestowed upon them had it not been for two other vitally important circumstances. Firstly, the work comprehended by the original grant, based on the TRAP premises was intended to take place over a period of twelve months. The work, as eventually consigned to the consultant was to take only four months. This, in itself, is a clear reflection of a change in objectives, for a response plan of any value for a single agency could hardly have

been produced in that time. A needs assessment, on the other hand, addressing the system as a whole, clearly could. The second circumstance is by far the more serious. On May 11, 1978, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Peter W. Rodino, requested the chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights to conduct a study on "the twin problems of terrorism in our society and the proper governmental response to the threat of that terrorism". Pursuant to that request, Hearings were held in August, September, and October, 1978. The LEAA gave testimony at those Hearings and a resultant Subcommittee Staff Report entitled "Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism" was published in December, 1978, and released early in 1979. Appendix C of that Staff Report is a Compendium of LEAA Counter-terrorism project summaries. Contained in it is the following:

>"Needs Assessment Study: Terrorism in Dade County, Florida.
>$45,000 grant to Florida Bureau of Criminal Justice Planning
>and Assistance.
>Work performed 1978 - Present.
>The objective of this project is to develop an opera-
>tional plan for Federal, state and local law enforcement
>agencies which will enable them to develop a coordinated
>response to the problem of Terrorism in Dade County,
>Florida."

The body of the Report, itself, (p.13), contains the following narrative:

>"Another program of interest is currently taking place
>in Dade County, Florida, where the threat of terrorism

poses a potential problem because of the existence of numerous Latin American activist groups. This program has as its objective the development of an operational plan for a coordinated response by the more than 28 law enforcement agencies in the county to the threat of terrorist violence".

The concern these statements have caused the consultant is understandable. Their genesis is only clear to those who have reviewed the matters set out here. A clear public expectation of a very extensive kind has been raised in an important document that is destined to take its place among those consulted by students of the subject of terrorism and measures of response. It will now be appreciated that none of the foregoing was raised in a carping spirit nor with any desire to embarrass those responsible for the construction of the documents that have given rise to the problem. The problem clearly had to be stated as an antecedent to the study, for it has a direct bearing on the way it has been conducted. There has been no time for clarification nor a redrawing of the original mandate to produce a greater consistency of purpose. The cure in this case has necessarily been self-administered and it is to be hoped that the result has been in conformity with what has been taken to be the original intent. What has to be made clear, for the record, is that the money originally "identified" by the LEAA was for a needs assessment study. The change to TRAP came later, not vice versa. TRAP was an intermediate stage before the reversion to the original needs assessment concept.

The wide public perception of the purposes of the grant must also be noted, for here, too, expectations have been formed and the consultant must be prepared to be judged as to how far short of them the work performed has fallen. On January 11, 1978, The Miami Herald published the following: "Terrorism in Dade County and the police response to it will get a $45,000 look from a paid consultant. The U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded the money Tuesday to the county Criminal Justice Planning Unit, with instructions to "develop an operational plan for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.....to cope with the terrorism problem....." The Miami News, on January 14, 1978, tackled the matter more racily, in its usual entertaining style: "The federal government's latest weapon to fight 10 years of unabated anti-Castro Cuban terrorism in Miami is sure to leave the terrorists laughing in their blasting caps. Sparing nothing, the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded a $45,000 grant to the Metro Criminal Justice Planning Unit. Investigators from various law enforcement agencies will hire a consultant to study terrorism and develop a plan for dealing with the problem. In simplest terms, that is a lot of baloney. It is a waste of money and a transparent deception. Over the years, members of the various agencies have met many times to discuss the problem. Though cooperation has stumbled on petty jealousies, they know already most of what there is to know about terrorism and terrorists. A $45,000 grant won't change anything. Here's hoping the consultant doesn't turn out to be a rehabilitated anti-Castro terrorist. If the federal government wants to get serious about stopping terrorism, all

it takes is a decision by Attorney General Griffin Bell to throw all the resources of the Justice Department into the fight. Anything less is an invitation to terrorism". Behind the heavy humor lies a good deal of concern, and some truth. It needs, however considerable skill and discrimination to separate this from the baloney.

The overall importance of this study is not to be judged by the size of the grant. This was best expressed by Mr. Perry Rivkin of the LEAA, who told a meeting of the Steering Committee on June 28, 1978, that "though the grant is small dollar-wise, it could be very useful to the rest of the country". A heavy responsibility, therefore, rests upon the consultant to live up to the expectations that have been raised. It is certain, on the evidence cited, that these cannot be met in full. The needs assessment has been accomplished as was intended. Those who look for "an operational plan for a coordinated response by the more than 28 law enforcement agencies in the county to the threat of terrorist violence" will assuredly be very disappointed. None of this is said by way of apology, but rather as a warning of what to expect on the part of those who might have been led - or led themselves - to expect something else.

Given the national impact this report is expected to have, a word or two must be devoted to the matter of Terrorism Response Action Plans, for they are indeed TRAPS for the unwary. When some careful thought is given to the matter, it is quite evident that there can be no such thing as "an operational plan for a coordinated response" - not even for one agency, let alone twenty-eight. The reason is very simply stated: there is no one thing against which a

response might be coordinated. Instead, there are many manifestations of a very complicated phenomenon, all of which call for vastly different responses by different agencies and even different segments of those agencies. A "coordinated" response is neither possible nor even particularly desirable; what is needed is an appropriate response. When there is a hostage-taking in progress, little purpose is usefully served (save as a measure of desperation when there is nothing else) to send the Bomb Squad to deal with it. Conversely, when a bomb is discovered aboard an airliner about to take off, it would be inappropriate to send in even the most highly trained SWAT team to disarm it. The real question in all these cases reduces itself to the following: What is the nature of the incident that has occurred and do I have the means to cope with it? Does my department have a bomb squad, SWAT team or whatever - and if it does not, how and from where do I get one, when one is appropriately required? When viewed in this way, it is apparent that what was wanted, as Judge Gelber correctly recognized all along, was a "needs assessment" study. What would be needed to cope with all the different ways in which terrorism could manifest itself - and did we already have it or could we get it? And what was terrorism, anyway?

Here we come to the nub of the matter and that to which so much attention has been devoted in this report. Until some agreement could be reached on the nature of the beast, it would be premature to open discussion on the best ways of handling it. Dade County was not alone in its problem here; no agreement on the matter existed anywhere. No particular prescience was required in the consultant

to see the primacy of this issue; the work had already been done and the first task set by those who had commissioned the project was definition. There is such a thing as terrorism. This is not such a startling discovery after all. This report has taken it apart and put it back together again after carefully examining its component parts, including some of those that rarely see the light of day. Hopefully the exercise will have increased knowledge not only about what terrorism is, but about how it works. Throwing oranges at an electric clock to stop it is ineffective and messy into the bargain. Throwing heavier objects might be highly damaging, certainly wasteful - and might not work either. A little investigation might reveal that the best way of accomplishing the desired result is to find the switch on the clock to turn off the current, or, failing that, to pull the plug. It is possible to envisage circumstances where more extreme and unusual measures might be necessary to get the job done, but they are mostly so unlikely or bizarre as to require very much the same thought processes and the same ways of translating them into action. We need to find ways of doing the job efficiently and economically. Then we need to consider what tools may be required to do the job.

Terrorism is a costly and destructive business for society. Ideally, research should be devoted in large part to eradicating it, as so many other diseases that have wracked mankind have been challenged and overcome. There is, unfortunately, no discoverable vaccine that will render the body politic immune to the ravages of terrorism. In the main, we have to weather the disease, and try to

limit its destructive effects. It is not possible, even with unlimited time and resources to devise a plan for the comprehensive prevention of terrorism. While there are active terrorists anywhere, bent on going about their business, there will be terrorism. Terrorism can only be prevented altogether by detecting, then incapacitating all terrorists, everywhere. This is an undertaking of social hygene that would be antithetical to our own system, and, perhaps, to many others. This is not only an impossible task; to mess with the metasteses in haphazard, unknowledgeable fashion is likely to spread the disease in a fatal way. Some things can be prevented; but only if you know they are going to occur. The implications of this must be seen and accepted. They constitute the most controversial area of the whole business of coping with the terrorism problem. Preventive medicine calls for frequent check-ups; early diagnosis; and remedial action as soon as something treatable is found. The United States has been a very resistant and unwilling patient. So far, it has feared the measures necessary to treat the disease more than the disease itself. There have, undeniably been some incompetent, careless, and even unethical physicians in the past. No doubt if we allowed them to practice, there would be many about now who would bring their profession into disrepute. None of this is an indictment of medicine as such; the criticism must be directed at those who engage in malpractice.

The same holds true for the social medicine that must be practiced here. No amount of sugar coating on the pill is going to change its nature. There is no place for euphemism here. What is necessary for the prevention of terrorism - indispensable, in fact, -

is good intelligence. No real purpose save prudery is served by calling a law enforcement intelligence operation an "informational system". We need to temper these Victorian sensibilities to the dictates of the age. Intelligence is indispensable. The practice of the craft requires great skill and understanding if it is going to accomplish its preventive purposes without doing violence to the social organism in whose benefit the remedies are sought. Naturally this profession, like any other, lends itself to malpractice. Reporters abuse their positions and pervert their function, but journalism is not condemmed on that account. No better expression of what is to be said here can be found than that endorsed by the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals in the Report of its Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism:

> "The dangers to the United States and its fundamental freedoms come not from intelligence activity itself but from badly regulated and badly supervised intelligence activity. The potential danger to the domestic peace from having no intelligence activity at all is as frightening to contemplate as it is ludicrous to suggest. The intelligence capability to respond to terrorism must be increased, not diminished, but the increase must be accompanied by a greater oversight and accountability so that these necessary activities are conducted within the bounds of the country's Constitution, laws, and traditions."

The terrorist, by the rules of the game, enjoys the advantages of surprise and initiative - unless he can be denied their use.

The best surprise is no surprises, as the well-known Hotel advertisement has it. Guarding against surprises is an important part of the intelligence function. It gives meaning and point to the vital injunction: Be prepared. But there is a constant contest in progress here. Even with the best intelligence system in the world, the terrorist must sometimes win in the battle to keep what he is doing from being discovered while it is still in the incubation stage. If complete prevention is simply not feasible, what then? It is here that the concept of protection comes into play. The terrorist can still be frustrated in his designs, notwithstanding the failure of the early warning system, provided an adequate screen of protection can be set up against what is being attempted.

Again, a comprehensive approach is not possible on an operational level. What would serve very well as protection against some types of terrorism would be of no value whatsoever in other cases. A well-fitted ceramic vest may offer excellent protection against the penetration of the assassin's bullet and the effects of blunt trauma; but it will not help the victim at all if cyanide is introduced into his breakfast orange juice. We return, once more, to the needs assessment concept. Protection cannot be organized until the nature and direction of the threat are determined: the question must always be raised, Protection against What?

It will be seen here, when attention is given to the preamble to the definition that both prevention and protection must proceed on two different levels. This is because terrorism, the entity, is something distinct from the components of which it is comprised.

Prevention and protection against terrorism _per se_ are sophisticated _community_ exercises. They involve the creation of a climate in which terrorism cannot flourish. They involve denying it sustenance so that it can only wither and die. Law enforcement prevention and protection programs must be directed at the specific activities, the assassinations, the kidnappings, the destruction of property, and the like that go to make up the whole spectrum of terrorism. Each task involves the creation of a separate preventive, protective, and reactive plan of its own. All those entrusted with the job can do is to develop a way of working, a methodology, that, constantly refined, will enable them to do the work well. This report sets out to provide some of the materials on which such improvements as are necessary in the existing system might be based. This is a modest goal, but an attainable one.

Those looking forward to a "meat and potatoes" report are certain to find the diet provided here strange fare indeed. While it may be too rich for some tastes, hopefully a majority will find it palatable, and some may even find it pleasing. Generality should not be mistaken for vagueness. The report contains a great deal that is very specific, very concrete. But the goals set out for the consultant must be kept firmly in mind. If you are asked how to make an omelette and what might be needed to do it, your task is completed when you have stated well the recipe and the ingredients. Buying and fetching the eggs and the frying pan are other functions that the cook might not be so well suited to accomplish. But if someone wants an omelette badly enough, some _real eggs_ have to be broken and the cooking has to begin. This report provides only the recipe, but it foreshadows the culinary and the gustatory processes.

CHAPTER ONE

TERRORISM - THE DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS

During the past few years, a great deal of time and energy has
been invested in the production of a satisfactory definition of
terrorism. The definitional problems have featured frequently as
a topic of discussion at professional and other conferences, and
as a subject of learned articles and more extensive writings. The
magnitude of these endeavors and their persistence are, in themselves,
some evidence of failure in the primary purpose. What seemed
originally like a comparatively easy task has assumed monstrous
proportions, and the disatisfaction remains. For all the words
that have been dedicated to the subject, it seems that there is
always room for yet another definition of terrorism - for none of
those that have gone before seem quite suitable to meet the case.
These feelings have, therefore, given rise to a constant process
of definition and redefinition, each reflecting the authors' own
disciplines, experience, training, and orientation - as well as
their biases, prejudices, and purposes. The literature produced by
these often Herculean efforts is now very considerable; a thorough,
critical review of it would, itself, constitute a most demanding
project. Virtually everything that has been said about the problem
is useful and revealing in some way. Many have despaired of
producing anything resembling a commonly acceptable definition;
only to go on and proffer one anyway. For, however unrewarding
and painful the assignment, the real need for definition remains.
It is in this spirit that this thorny subject is approached, here,

once more. What will be attempted for the present purposes, is a brief analysis of some of the obstacles to useful definition; an attempt, systematically to overcome them; and the relation of the outcome to the problem of what can be, thereby, conceived of as terrorism within the limited geographic area delimiting the present study.

Scientific study generally is greatly facilitated by the development of an exact language, the characteristics of which meet the common needs of all engaged in critical examination of the subject matter in question. Indeed, without this preliminary undertaking, true scientific intercourse and a useful interchange of ideas are impossible. Definition of commonly employed terms, at the very least, is a prerequisite to any scientific endeavor, if for no other reason than to permit those engaged in studies of this sort to communicate the fruits of their labors in sensible form. Peer criticism is an essential part of the scientific process. It can usefully proceed only in an atmosphere untainted by prejudice and semantic confusions. Criticism is distorted and understanding obstructed where there is no prior agreement upon essential terms.

The systematic study of terrorism has been persistently plagued by the absence of any satisfactory, broadly acceptable definition of the phenomenon. Those seeking to describe it or offer opinions about it have spoken in tongues many and diverse, and the resultant confusion has made sensible, scientific discussion difficult to say the least. On yet another plane, efforts directed at the establishment of a sound basis for international cooperation and the development of a uniform system of countermeasures have been repeatedly

frustrated due to a lack of agreement on the nature and definition of terrorism. It has become axiomatic that what is terrorism to one is clearly something quite different to another. Little useful study, from the perspective of any discipline, is possible until agreement can be reached on what it is that is to be studied. Manifestations of what we choose, often loosely and promiscuously, to call terrorism have been all too frequent and unmistakeable to those experiencing them. Yet even their description in commonly acceptable language that might serve, adequately, the needs of law enforcement and the social sciences, proves to be an over-whelming and singularly unrewarding task. No analysis of this subject can be considered complete without some exploration of the reasons for this lack of an acceptable definition that might satisfy the basic needs of those having to deal with the very real manifestations of what we have come to know as terrorism. It is worth observing here that terrorism <u>is</u> something very real; the artificiality lies in the verbal processes.

The notable absence of a suitable, all-encompassing definition of terrorism continues to be a constant source of comment and some wonderment. Superficially, the task seems so simple that it is difficult to believe that it has not yet been accomplished. Thousands of words have been dedicated to the exposure of this shortcoming alone. Thus, one prolific author, Bowyer Bell, writes: "No one had a definition of terrorism. In academia, the various concerned disciplines could not even define 'terror'. There was no agreement as to the effectiveness of 'terror', or the basic

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causes of the phenomenon, or the best means of approach to analyze it. The lawyers sought recourse in law, the psychologists in the personality, the historians in the slow unwinding of the past." Another extremely knowledgeable authority, Brooks McClure, has observed: "Early in 1976, experts from the United States and Europe met in Washington for two days to discuss terrorism. When their conference ended, they found they had done little more than try to define the problem; the matter of concrete counter measures had to be left for another time. Law enforcement officials, who had attended the meeting in hopes of getting some new insight for handling terrorist incidents, came away disappointed and frustrated. This experience illustrates the first essential difficulty with the kind of violence which can be called terrorism; it has so many forms, motivations, intensities and effects that it defies simple definition." Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and one of the first United States officials at that level of responsibility to devote himself to the emerging problem of international terrorism said in 1974: "What is terrorism? Last summer, a U.N. group failed to agree on a definition of the term and became diverted by an inconclusive discussion of the causes and motives of terrorists." He wisely enjoined, further, that "Such disagreement, however, should not deter us from getting on with the business at hand". Nor has absence of agreement deterred those who have persisted in their search for a definition that might commend itself to all who are vexed by this problem. No conference on terrorism--and these have proliferated in astounding

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fashion in recent times--can now be considered a professional success
without at least a stab at this problem of definition. There is thus
no shortage of definitions; what is lacking is definition.

Definition has certainly not proven elusive, then, on account
of slothfulness or lack of diligence and application on the part of
the scholars; almost every writer who has put pen to paper on this
account has felt a compulsive urge to offer his own definition for
the enlightenment of his readers. This is part of the problem.
Everyone, it seems, has his or her own idea of what terrorism is
and there is simply too little coincidence of the various views for
them to serve as a sound basis for scientific discussion and criticism,
or professional utilization. The result has usually been some sort of
a retreat into the broadest of generalities. Some of these have been
tossed out with a certain amount of scholarly abandon that, while
beguiling and quotable, offer nothing of value to an understanding
of the subject. Cherif Bassiouni has opined that:"Terrorism is
nothing more than a strategy of terror-violence". Such superficial
observations, while adding nothing to an understanding of the problem,
have an inconvenient way of becoming embedded in the literature
through uncritical repetition. Other scholars have shown a deeper
concern for the very real problems existing. Thus, Jordan Paust,
another scholar who has done some notable work on normative analysis
of the subject, offers in a definitional context: "Terrorism is
therefore viewed as a form of violent strategy, a form of coercion
utilized to alter the freedom of choice of others." Such grand,
sweeping statements (an excellent definition of war, incidentally)

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have an inconvenient consequence of catching in their train a considerable variety of conduct that for some might arguably be terrorism but which, for others, is definitely not to be so characterized. Such attempts lack the focus and precision necessary for everyday, practical use. Clearly, much of the coercive activity of organized crime would properly fall within such a definition, and many would argue, with much justification that this is, perhaps, an outstanding example of terrorism. There is much to commend the argument. How does the elimination of witnesses in criminal cases by such forces in the United States differ from similar activity by political extremists in Spain or Italy? How does such a killing of a Judge in Milan or Turin differ from a killing in San Antonio, Texas? Yet this is not what most people would call immediately to mind when seeking instances of what might, for them, exemplify terrorism. It is not the coldly efficient Mafia hit-man who ordinarily draws upon himself the public opprobrium contained in the modern usage of the term "terrorist", nor is the very real and purposeful fear generated by his masters what causes such agonizing over the definitional aspects of the term terrorism. The reasons for this are certainly worth pondering. They are rooted in a certain slant or focus--a way of looking at events--that has developed in recent years and which has become more and more prominent as the popular media has taken hold of the subject. Again, a lone killer wielding a .44 caliber handgun spread terror through a large sector of two Boroughs of New York City in 1976 and 1977. Whatever the curious purposes of the so-called "Son of Sam" might really have

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been, his violent strategy certainly had the effect of altering the freedom of choice of others, for those who assumed themselves to be potential targets of the unknown killer so altered their conduct in some cases as to become virtual recluses. There can be no doubt about the well-attested terror generated by David Berkowitz during that period. Nor was this solely the reaction of a few individuals. The impact upon the communities affected, in psychological and economic terms, was as considerable as though they had been afflicted by a purposeful, organized campaign to that end. Indeed, political extremists acting with all the force at their command could hardly have done better, and might not have done nearly as well before interdiction took effect. Yet few would regard this lone, seemingly senseless assault as terrorism, although it is dignified as such, by association with acts of more evident terrorism like the bombings of the FALN, (the Puerto Rican pro-independence group); the killing of White Roman Catholic missionaries in Rhodesia by members of the Zimbabwe African National Union; the assassination of Siegfried Buback by adherents of the Baader-Meinhof group; and the exploits of the South Moluccans, in the "Introduction to Terrorism: Inter Disciplinary Perspectives", a collection of respectable materials on the subject. Fear on an overpowering scale, the core element of terrorism is certainly common to all these episodes, yet other key ingredients are clearly lacking. This does not seem to have been noticed by many of those who have written about the subject. And so the whole unsatisfactory process continues. Definition in this area is not a scientific matter at all. It may not unfairly be said that the

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term terrorism has become debased by the very promiscuity of its use. The entire subject of terrorism and political violence generally is too tainted with emotion and overlaid by prejudice and subjective considerations. A 1979 Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives pessimistically, but with a heartening note of realism overall, opines: "In summary, the search for a consensus definition of terrorism may well be futile." (The Definition of Terrorism: A Problem of Perspective).

Still the need for some sort of definition continues to be as urgently pressing as ever. Those who feel the pressure generally respond to it with the introduction of some degree of adjectival refinement. The evident intent is to provide increased focus and greater semantic precision. Thus we have resort to such nice distinctions as those implied in the use of the term "true terrorism." (Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism of the National Advisory Committee on Standards and Goals). Therein lies a subtle unarticulated suggestion that this latter can somehow be distinguished, almost instinctively as it were, from pseudo or imitation terrorism--quasi-terrorism-- that is somewhat like the shadow without the substance. There is really a touch of linguistic desperation about this. An immanent quality is assumed in the substantive that can only really achieve proper expression through use of the delicate pointer that is the adjective. Terrorism thus becomes the ineffable, defying worldly expression. It is the given that somehow must be understood, even though it cannot

be adequately defined. The phenomenon is not unfamiliar to lawyers who have encountered similar problems with such terms as "obscenity". Other adjectives besides "true" are frequently employed in similar fashion. For many, the adjective "political" is the most useful in this regard, and political terrorism is accordingly advanced as an independent concept, though some might argue that the adjective is superfluous in this case - and certainly adds nothing to the defin-ition - for all terrorism, properly so-called must be political by nature. Terror unallied to the political remains terror, but it is not terrorism. The use of the adjective "political", whether strictly correct or not, is not without is attractions in the practical sense, for it clearly eliminates much that by reference to a looser definition would necessarily require inclusion. Thus Hoffacker, with reference to "the business at hand" regards this for working purposes as "defense against violent attacks, by politically or ideologically motivated parties". Certainly, the adjective, surplus or not, tightens matters a great deal. It does eliminate a lot of terrorism "look-alikes". Were it possible thus to define terrorism, it would be churlish to raise mere technical objections. It is, however, not so easy to dispose of the matter. The fundamental problem of definition remains, and it is not dealt with at all simply by adding terms of description or limitation. Nothing times ten is still nothing. Unless the adjectival notion (or what it is intended to represent) is indeed incorporated as part of the definition itself, it does little more than decorate or embellish the original vacuity. What has to be tackled with

resolution is the design of the components of what might eventually
be agreed upon as a notion of terrorism itself; some elements,
including the political, might then merit inclusion while others
will certainly need to be excluded. Until this task is accomplished,
no satisfactory statement of what terrorism is, let alone a definition,
can be usefully proffered.

The most significant impediment, in a practical sense, to the
universally acceptable definition of terrorism is not of a termino-
logical or semantic , but, rather, of a political or psychological
nature. The term "terrorism" now seems to carry within itself an
inherent pejorative connotation that is simply unacceptable on
political or ideological grounds to many who would certainly entertain
no objective doubt about the terrifying character of the activity to
which the term is meant to refer. Its meaning and application can be
said to be tainted by these sentiments. Terrorism is (or, more
properly, has become) a "bad" word. Quite simply, no one seems to
want to be labelled a terrorist or to have his (or her) activities
characterized as terrorism. These evident sensibilities receive
their most vivid and direct expression in the increasingly popular
and useful aphorism: one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter. The real manifestation of terrorism, however defined, is
a recognizably ugly and unpleasant activity. For most tastes, its
description has to be prettied up and entitled something more
appealing, before its application to those whose actions we condone
can be admitted. The strength of these moral and aesthetic objections,
and their effects upon the problem of definition itself (as well as

what we do about that definition) cannot be minimized. This is no
mere sophistry. They have certainly proven to be the major obstacle
in the way of producing a definition acceptable to the majority in
the international forum. There is much to learn from this apparent
impasse. The lessons are well worth careful examination here. The
character and slant of the objections taken are, in themselves, most
instructive as to the true nature of the problem under examination.
These constitute the best clue to the difficulties experienced in
the matter of definition. The central, determinative elements in
the phenomenon of "terrorism" are not really in dispute or under
objection in any way; there would probably be broad agreement among
all parties with regard to a majority of them. <u>What is really at
issue is the application of the term constructed to embrace them so
as to describe the activities of certain groups.</u> Once this seemingly
incongruous objection is questioned, it is evident that it is the
pejorative, near-universally condemnable aspect of terrorism that is
being resisted <u>in its application.</u> If what terrorism is all about
were regarded as "good", the problem of definition would be much
simpler. To do unto others what is comprised in terrorism is
recognized everywhere as being bad - unless, like war, it can be
justified. Terrorism, so defined, is not something that in all
conscience can be allowed of as being right and proper, unless there
is a massive justification for it - <u>in which case it is not terrorism!</u>

None of this should surprise lawyers. These nice distinctions
are an essential part of the exercise of the jurist's craft. The
concepts of the Just and the Unjust War are but a legal construct,

a neat piece of professional sophistry. The Just War is an activity
that can be legally as well as morally "justified". Terrorism is a
form of war, or, more properly viewed, a distinctive weapon of
warfare, and the extension to it of these juridical precepts hallowed
by time and usage is both logical, and to be expected. From a
legalistic standpoint, therefore, there is nothing strange or
incongruous about the dualism with which the phenomenon of terrorism
is viewed. Another example of this interpretive technique can be
offered for consideration. The same action, the identical set of
physical facts, can be criminal or non-criminal according to its
association with a specific mental element. Murder and justifiable
homicide are cases in point. What is "good" or "bad" about the
matter, that is whether the activity is approved or repudiated by
the system, is not dependent upon the physical or manifested aspects
of the case alone, but rather upon the intellectual associations that
lend color to it. <u>Such fine distinctions are of vital importance to
any developed system of law</u>. It is only in the more primitive
systems (or those which have regressed for some special reason)
that absolute liability - an almost tunnel-vision focus upon the
act alone - is the rule rather than the exception. This feature,
indeed, is one of the key criteria for assessing the stage of
development reached by any particular legal system. As law advances
out of the Dark Ages, it gathers the capacity to inquire not only
into what was done but into <u>why</u> it was done. That part of the law
relating to criminal defenses - excuses, exceptions, justifications, -
is artificially constructed to give life and meaning to these

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developments. Thus the killing of a human being by another human being is always homicide and the basic, physical elements of the case - the _Actus Reus_ of the Common Law - although differing in their manifestations and modalities, are of a constant nature. Essentially, you end up with a dead human being as a result of something done by some other human being. Yet some homicides are condemned by law, while others, if not actively approved and encouraged, are at least excused or even justified. The differentiation is made on an entirely intellectual basis, by reference to status or the state of mind assumed to have accompanied the action. Much of this is so obvious and now so universal as to require little further explanation. When a political system is under severe pressure, law regresses to the primitive. Law ceases to inquire why; it becomes concerned only to determine whether a prohibited act has occurred. This is the road to the authoritarian state, to the totalitarianism of which Nazi Germany serves as the most perfectly examined example of our times. The Iran of the Ayatollah Khomeini is proceeding, however covertly, down the same road. Behind the reversion to the primitive, blanket prohibition lies the brooding specter of fear. The reaction to it is primed by an atavistic belief in the imperative need for, and singular efficacy of, fighting fire with fire. It is the very essence of extreme deterrence thinking. To admit of exceptions, on any account, is to admit to weakness. In reality, the denial of weakness after this fashion is the best evidence for its existence. The implications of all this for the definition of terrorism should not be overlooked.

<u>The true struggle over definition in the area of terrorism is,</u> <u>fundamentally, between those who claim an exception at law for</u> <u>certain manifestly harmful conduct and those who will not admit it.</u> Such an argument obviously has no place within the confines of positive law; the positivist can clearly define terrorism however he chooses. His definition, practically, can only be called in question by those who can effectively challenge his power. Definition, then, from this perspective, is no more than an exercise in power along the lines of the well-known Humpty-Dumpty principle. While this may not help us far along the road to an acceptable definition of terrorism in a practical context, it does assist in elucidating <u>the problem</u> of definition in this subject area. The basic physical elements of "terrorism", the "acts" by which it is constituted, or manifests itself, are in little need of more exact statement. About the character and nature of such activities there is little disagreement. Yet, it is self-evident that terrorism is <u>more</u> than just assassination, kidnapping, bombing, sabotage, hostage-taking and the like; these acts, alone, are recognized for what they are by most legal systems and are punishable accordingly. If it were not so, why bother with this difficult problem of definition at all? Simply stated in terms of individual crimes, these acts, <u>per se</u>, are not terrorism. Something more is needed to fix the notion of what is being sought. Terrorism is more the <u>why</u> of the matter than the <u>what</u>. <u>Terrorism is more than</u> <u>the act; it is the embodiment and revelation of the underlying</u> <u>purpose</u>. The term "terrorism" is intended to be descriptive not merely of certain fear-generating acts engaged in by human beings,

but also of the intellectual elements with which they are inevitably and inseparably associated. Here the true problem of definition is revealed in all its starkness, for there is simply no agreement about what these latter ingredients are. It adds nothing of value to argue that terrorism, unlike "political" crime, (where this is a recognized juridical entity) is _malum in se_, for that merely begs the question. There is a little legalistic sleight of hand in all this. The proponents of these violent acts might well admit that what they do _is_ horrifying, even barbaric, in the extreme, but they could still argue quite cogently, perhaps apologetically, that it is not terrorism. To appreciate the force of that argument, even to be able to refute it, requires acceptance that terrorism _is_ something more than the act itself. It is relatively easy, for example, to envisage an assassination that would _not_ be characterized as terrorism, while other assassinations clearly have an obvious terroristic purpose. To be able to define terrorism at all, it is necessary to isolate, describe, analyze, and put a name to the missing element.

The perpetual search for a simple, universally acceptable definition of terrorism may well be illusory. A definition of the facts comprising the activity may be possible, if not simple; its _application_ to situations involving them is unlikely ever to be universally acceptable. From what has already been said, the reason for this now clearly emerges. Any definition must, inevitably, contain a further, judgmental element. This is the missing, controversial characteristic. The same set of facts can simply

be characterized differently, given a radically different meaning, when viewed through different eyes. What is or is not called terrorism depends upon this award of meaning by those concerned with endowing the activity with its significance. A most pertinent illustration of what is involved is afforded by the following situation taken from another context. "Three-year old Harold kicks Mrs. Zwellbach's dog. This is a fact. In the quarrel that ensues, the problem also involves the fact that to his mother, Harold has demonstrated resoluteness of character in the face of danger. In Mrs. Zwellbach's thinking about the problem, it is a fact that Harold is a cruel, undisciplined little brat who has injured a harmless animal." What is stated in this example is exactly paralleled by the disparate views taken of terrorism. What is or is not terrorism depends less upon the nature and quality of the act than on your point of view. This is easily illustrated by reference to concrete example. For some, the three members of the Japanese Red Army, who, in 1972, mercilessly slaughtered innocent Christian pilgrims at Lod airport, were fearless, freedom fighters nobly performing their appointed duty in a righteous cause. That the dead victims included Christian pilgrims is an incontrovertible fact. That the term "slaughter," though emotion-laden, is a correct description of what occurred cannot be denied by anyone who saw the awful photographs of the carnage and its aftermath. Yet such is the quality and importance of the judgmental factor that the apologists could seriously claim that the victims were not "innocent", for their very presence in this "war zone" in the role of tourists

automatically converted them into aiders and comforters of the "enemy." Leaving aside all partizan considerations, the argument is admittedly persuasive. The worst that can be said is that it is cowardly for heavily armed men to kill unarmed, non-belligerents. But might they not then answer that these non-belligerents were themselves heavily guarded by units of the "enemy" forces? In this, terrorism strongly ressembles the concept of total war, a war in which there are no innocents and no distinction is made between combattants and non-combattants. So far as war is concerned, we have passed the mere semantic inhibitions. War is war, no matter how just or how sweetly it is made to smell. We simply have not yet reached such a position with regard to terrorism. We must, in the interests of definition, be prepared to take this step. <u>Terrorism is a doctrine of extremes</u>. There are no grey areas, only sharply divided black and white, friend and foe. Terrorism is the antithesis of moderation; the moderate terrorist, like the kindhearted terrorist, is a contradiction in terms. The lines between the contestants are sharply drawn. What is noble and glorious for one, is cowardly and barbaric for another. Values, and judgments based on them, are a matter of standpoint and perspective. This emotional overlay tends to disguise the real issue. The really important consideration lies well buried beneath the welter of rhetoric. The issue is one of effectiveness; if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing well. Total war and terrorism appeal because they seem, at least super-ficially, to be extraordinarily efficacious. <u>They seem to work when nothing else will</u>. Both are an untrammelled exercise of power.

Neither are measured; they are the epitome of all-out force. This is hardly surprising. Why, it might pertinently be asked, should any less be expected? Why should there be moderation, finesse or consideration when as a result the issue might thus be brought in doubt? That prince of terrorists, General Grivas, the legendary Dighenis, inquired why the enemy should be shot at from the front when it was so much simpler and more efficient to shoot them in the back. This is a hard argument to answer, for there are no Queensberry rules governing terrorism. It is proper to recall here that "the enemy" in this case included British servicemen's wives and children. Any definition of terrorism must fact the moral issue: When are the means simply too awful to be justified by appeal to the ends? By majority standards, the terrorist simply has a distorted moral perspective. If a universally acceptable definition of terrorism is not possible, perhaps a majority one will have to suffice.

There is an inevitable element of circularity about all the commonly employed definitions of terrorism. This is certainly the case with most definitions constructed with a normative view in mind. The use of "great fear" or "terror" as the basis of such definitions is seemingly inescapable. The wearisome circularity has an infectious character, for all thinking about the subject has seemingly become contaminated by it. The politics of definition have acquired a co-related circularity. The arguments about what terrorism is seem to go endlessly round and round, with little or no possibility of practical resolution in terms of concerted, practical counteraction. This is most material in the present

context. There is a striking reluctance, on the political level to
come to grips with the fundamental, moral issues. Yet the face of
this type of violence - whatever it might be in juridico-political
terminology - is all too easily recognizable, especially by those
who are victimized. The various manifestations of the phenomenon
are only too sadly familiar in our times. People, generally, know
the plain meaning of terror, as they have come to know, all too well,
the meaning of war; and the victims know with certitude what it is
that has terrorized them even though, save in the colloquial sense,
they may not be able to put a name to it. Terrorism is the effect
of all this on the lives of the people. While this is not much
help to the scientist, the law enforcement officer, or even the
victim, this is, in practice, not an uncommon situation. In other
fields, too, we have sometimes been unable to say what things are
and we have, accordingly, been forced to define them in terms of
what they do or how they react with other phenomena within our
experience. It has been well put by Morton Hunt that: "Physicists
no longer strive to say what the matter is; it has proven much
more productive to say how matter behaves at various energy levels."
This is probably the most sensible and profitable course that can
be followed with regard to terrorism. Instead of inquiring what
terrorism is, we can more profitably ask what these different forms
of violence and suggested violence mean, and how they affect the
immediate victims and the community generally. In this way, we
may hope to arrive at a deeper understanding of the subject so as
to develop the elements of a general theory of it. This is not to

evade the problem of definition, but, rather, to pass beyond it. This must be done in the interests of finding practical solutions to a real and continuing problem.

Terrorism has a significance for our times that clearly transcends its material impact. When one considers, for example, the terrible, annual slaughter on the roads, the armies of persons decimated each year by cancer and heart disease - to mention but two of the great killers of our time - the substantive losses on account of terrorism appear by comparison to be strikingly slight. One is called to wonder whether all the time, energy, and resources devoted to the topic are worth the effort. Yet, plainly, the concern and the reaction to the fear generated by what is called terrorism, is out of all proportion to the material toll exacted by it. This non-material impact of terrorism for those affected by it, whether they are victims in any degree or entrusted in a more detached fashion with certain response functions, is a most distinctive feature of the phenomenon. It may be observed in passing that terrorism is a most economical way of waging war on society for those having comparatively slight resources. The importance assigned to terrorism in the modern world is concerned with its socio-political nature rather than on account of its magnitude as an event or even its destructive potential. This is not easy to grasp as a matter of direct observation of case materials. The theory of response requires examination as well as the activity that gives rise to it. Terrorism is, perhaps, best understood through an oblique line of study. It is in the

reflection of terrorism rather than its substantive image that its true nature is revealed. How people, individually and collectively, "see" terrorism, how and why they react to it in the ways they do, are really most instructive. <u>Quite simply stated, terrorism is seen as an intolerable affront to authority; the reaction to it is a mirror of itself</u>. This is what gives it its contemporary importance. Terrorism poses an ineluctable challenge to the very notion of organized, political society. Terrorism is an unacceptable challenge to the state's monopoly on the use of force for social control. It is here that the essential, innate political character of terrorism is clearly revealed. Terrorism is an evident regression to an earlier stage of Man's political development. This is so whether terrorism is employed by small groups or by nation states. It is the undisguised embodiment of the doctrine: Might is Right. The only question, so far as its practitioners are concerned, is whose might shall prevail. It is for this reason that terrorism represents such an uncompromising attack upon the Rule of Law. Terrorism is a total rejection of moderation, as it is a total attack upon the law. It is as incongruous to talk about a little bit of terrorism as it is to speak of being a little bit pregnant. Thus terrorism is <u>always</u> outside the law, for by nature, it is incompatible with it. It cannot be brought within the doctrines of necessity or self-defense save by a tortured process of reasoning based on two wrongs making a right. Law is a framework <u>within which</u> those subject to it tacitly agree to resolve their differences; this must be so for the positivist and the adherent of natural law alike. Terrorism cannot

operate within such a framework; it is straining the use of even the lawyer's artificial language to speak of "regulated", or "legal", much less "justifiable" terrorism. It is a reversion to the naked, primitive power that law was fashioned to harness and bring under control. Terrorism is, in effect, a rejection of the constraints of the legal and political system designed to give man in society freedom from fear. <u>Anti-government terrorism rejects the system itself, subjecting it to an assault from outside, while state terrorism overwhelms the system from within.</u> All this may, in certain contexts, be politically acceptable; but it has nothing to do with law. Both kinds of terrorism are designed to teach a lesson to those upon whom their effects fall. But it is a lesson permitted by no system based upon the Rule of Law. Terrorism exposes raw nerves. It evokes primitive responses, regardless of whether they are effective or not. What is certain, in this elemental struggle for power, is that it is useless to appeal to any system of law to determine who is right. Each is right according to his own lights: hence one man's terrorist is another's hero. Thus Muammar Kaddafi, asked why help Idi Amin, a man who has massacred tens of thousands of his own people, can reply quite rationally and compatibly with his own standpoint, "Why not?" Terrorism is a struggle for competing values in which the only arbiter is power. Where terrorism has been successful, the victor has had to begin, hastily, a repair job designed to hide the historical facts. As history has repeatedly and invariably shown, terrorism sponsored from a position of power can only be suppressed or interdicted by a superior power.

What, then, in summary, can be said in reply to the question, "What is terrorism?" Most usefully, perhaps, the observation should be tendered that a pertinent response will depend largely upon who is asking the question and for what purpose. Within the framework of law, only a very guarded reply is possible. It is evident that within a legal context, domestic or international, a universally acceptable definition is impossible to achieve, for terrorism is, by its very nature, a supra or meta legal concept. This points up the essential artificiality not only of the definitional process, in relation to terrorism, but of law itself. From a legal perspective, the answer to the question "What is terrorism?" must be simply; whatever the lawyers say it is. One must be forgiven an excursion into the realms of legal philosophy at this point. Positive law can, in perfectly Humpty-Dumpty-like fashion, define terrorism (or, indeed, anything else) in any way it chooses - it is just a question of which is to be master, that is all. Every system of positive law contains its own, inherent power of definition. Such a system can make any given set of facts "terrorism" or "not terrorism" according to the predilections of those running the system. Thus a lawyer from the United States will have a very different notion of terrorism from his Socialist counterpart, and, perhaps, different again from that of a Third World lawyer. The lawyers' vacillations, where they occur, are not the result of a lack of power, but, rather, of a proper lawyerly caution as to how and when that power should be exercised. The lawyer, in this matter as in most others, is not the master but simply the servant of higher forces. The lawyer may be the architect, but he is not engaged

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in this matter of design and construction on his own account. Law
is really shaped by forces that are often beyond the lawyer's
control and tantalysingly beyond the reach of his own discipline.
The concept of terrorism is born in surroundings where the lawyer's
professional training and discipline offer no special guidance.
This is not an argument for some supreme natural law, to which the
lawyer can make appeal in cases such as this. It is, rather, a
sober recognition that the lawyer is scarcely master even in his
own house; too few of its appurtenances are his own and he must,
too often, be at the beck and call of his political landlords. A
lawyer can only usefully give the meaning of something that is a
part of his own, narrow system. The lawyer is thus, perhaps, the
least appropriate person to whom our general question might be
addressed. He is not really qualified to give an authoritative
answer of his own and any answer he might be tempted to give is
likely by reason of his special professional skills, to be quite
attractively misleading. The serious student of this subject must
realize from the onset that he is not going to get very much help
at all from the lawyer, as lawyer, in this matter. The meaning of
terrorism is not to be found in legalistics, just as it is not to
be found in the words of legislation. Those wishing to penetrate
to the heart of the question must address themselves elsewhere -
to the political scientist, perhaps, or the psychologist, psychiatrist
or sociologist - even where the eventual purpose of the question might
be to obtain guidance in the elaboration of some normative structure.
The lawyer cannot make normative bricks without straw and it is

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useless to send him after straw without the clearest instructions as to __what__ he must obtain and __where__ he is to obtain it. The "straw" in this case is not self-evident in nature nor are its whereabouts clear. Those who would pose the question "What is terrorism?" should, perhaps, seek the source of the straw rather than bestowing too much of their attentions upon those who are also seekers or concerned only with the finished product. This problem must be addressed in a practical, analytical way.

The following elements, the straw, then, are suggested as being the __essential__ constituents of the phenomenon labelled terrorism. They are not the only ingredients, but what is suggested here is that, in their absence, we have something that, however closely it may resemble terrorism, is really quite different from it.

(1) __Terrorism is a purposeful human activity directed at__
     __other humans.__

It is something done by human beings - whatever the material agency used for the purpose - to other human beings. This is its primary identifying characteristic. It is the relationship of the human being to something, tangible or intangible, that makes terrorism possible. However random the selection of the victims, or the interests, however seemingly mindless the act of violence, terrorism __always__ has a purpose; only its practical consequences in terms of death and destruction are an incidental and sometimes accidental product. The purpose

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of terrorism must <u>always</u> be discovered, for it is central
to its nature. In theory, it is possible to think of
forms of terrorism where, quite deliberately, no-one is
killed or injured and no property interests are destroyed.
Thus terrorism represents a conscious policy choice. It
is a crime of specific intention.

(2) <u>Terrorism operates through the generation of massive fear</u>
<u>intended to act upon the individual or collective human will</u>.

The purposeful production of intense, overriding fear
is the very core of terrorism. What is done with the fear
produced distinguishes terrorism from what it is not.
Terrorism is the systematic <u>application</u> of the fear so
generated, terror, so as to effect the terrorist's purposes.
Terrorism is a distinctive use of fear. Whatever can be
used to generate terror effectively - whether it be mere
superstition or a nuclear holocaust - must be considered
an apt tool for the terrorist's purpose. Terrorism requires
fear of a more than ordinarily intense or pervasive quality;
it needs to be persistent. Fear on this scale is like an
essential element in a chemical process; without it, the
anticipated reaction that produces the new substance does
not take place. Fear is the catalyst of terrorism. Terror
is designed to change, in some significant way, the minds
of those at whom it is beamed. It is meant to weaken
resistance to the terrorist's purposes.

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(3) <u>The creation of terror must not be incidental to some</u>
<u>other purpose, but must be the raison d'etre of the</u>
<u>activity undertaken</u>.

Many common crimes induce in their victims terror or
massive fear, of such significance that it becomes a
definitional element of the criminal figure. Nevertheless,
in such cases, the fear created is incidental to the
criminal's true purpose, although it may be essential to
effect it. Crimes such as rape and robbery have as their
objective; <u>the satisfaction of some other purpose than</u>
<u>the generation of fear for fear's sake</u>. The very real
terror to which the victim is subjected is directed
solely to the accomplishment of the particular criminal
act - the surrender of something through the overriding
of the victim's will - but once that objective is attained,
the terror generated serves no further useful purpose for
the criminal responsible for it. By way of contrast, the
terror created by the terrorist is an end in itself. It
is the activity used to create it that is incidental.
It is fear for effect. Once generated, it is <u>deliberately</u>
put to use by the terrorist. Thus it is appropriate to
refer to terrorism in terms of a reign or siege of terror.
Terrorism has a continuous character.

(4) <u>The act of terrorism must be consciously directed towards</u>
<u>the resolution of some power struggle</u>.

The view is advanced here that all terrorism is

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inherently political in the narrow sense that it is a
tactic or technique specifically adopted for the coercive
resolution of social conflict. Terrorism, like war, is
simply a distinctive, armed extension of diplomacy. The
political objective may be major and extensive, in the
sense that the power struggle involves the totality of
the body politic, as where the terrorist purpose is nothing
less than the overthrow of the existing establishment by
these means. On the other hand, the political objective
may be comparatively minor, in scope, as where terrorism
is used within the confines of an existing legal system, by
rival gangs to secure control of a certain territory, or
by a criminal conspiracy such as organized crime to
establish domination over a certain sphere of activity.
In neither case is terrorism radically inhibited by the
system, but in one case the system itself is seen as the
"enemy" by the protagonists of the terrorism, whereas in
the other, the system is substantially irrelevant. It
should be observed here that terrorism is not identifiable
by its magnitude operationally. Those engaged in its use
may deliberately limit its employment or may extend it
in similar or different fashion to other operations. Thus
a struggle may be conducted in what amounts to a hybrid
fashion with terrorism sometimes being employed and
sometimes not. The Guerrilla is not a necessary or
advanced form of terrorism; it can be fought without the
employment of terrorism at all.

(5) <u>Terrorism recognizes no authority save its own</u>.

Terrorism is self-justifying. Terrorism makes no appeal to higher authority. If, for the terrorist, the appointed end is right, then it follows, inexorably, that all done to attain that end, however awful, is right. The only real defense for the terrorist is an extreme, illogical extension of that of necessity; that the terrorist could no longer endure in peace that against which he was forced to fight by such means. Few terrorists feel in need of such elaborate justification. Put simply, for the protagonists of terrorism, <u>the means are always justified by the end</u>. Terrorism is thus wholly outside the legal structure and attempts to bring it within such a structure, so as to moderate its effects or to protect the innocent, are an exercise in futility. Criminal activities can be legalized, crime cannot. Terrorism is crime manifested through a distinctive exercise of criminal activities the nature of which is generally not in dispute.

Terrorism, then, is most easily recognized and understood through its various manifestations. These are, of necessity, of finite number so far as their fundamental nature is concerned. Terrorism, itself, has little room for development. There is room for inventiveness <u>only</u> with regard to modalities. Thus the massive fear that lies at the very heart of terrorism can <u>only</u> be generated through death or destruction of human beings, their attributes, interests, and property,

or a threat to engage in activities that will bring about such death or destruction. The _way_ in which these activities are designed, structured, and directed _is_ open to constant improvement, and it is in this area that we can properly speak of the changing techniques of terrorism. Terroristic progress or development is, essentially, doing the same basic things in different ways, more strenuously, against different targets, so as to produce more effective performance and an escalation of the level of fear. In this respect, too, terrorism resembles conventional warfare. When we ask, "What is terrorism?", we are really inquiring how this deadly game is played.

The techniques of terrorism include the selective killing of individuals, (e.g. assassination); especially cruel mutilation or maiming of individuals (e.g. kneecapping, cutting out of tongues, etc.); killing in exceptionally vicious and frightening ways, (e.g. bombings, poisoning, by clandestine means, etc.); killing of those closest and dearest to those it is hoped to intimidate or destroy by these means, (e.g. murder of loved ones, trusted confidants, and advisers, etc.) killing under circumstances likely to generate a high level of fear by reason of location or the means employed, (e.g. killing a highly protected official in a public place; using a great display of power to overcome the protective measures; killing by extreme stealth or mysterious means such as those recently employed against Bulgarians in exile); mutilation or desecration of the corpse of the victim such as that employed by Sicilian mafiosi and many Columbian criminals; indiscriminate killing of large numbers of people apparently by random selection, (e.g. the

placing and detonation of explosive devices in public places, restaurants, airports, terminals, especially the use of anti-personnel artifacts); systematic torture; kidnapping; hostage taking, (especially hijacking or skyjacking, which are simply mobile forms of this technique); selective or indiscriminate destruction of property, usually by means of fire or explosives; sabotage of processes upon which individual and community life depends, (e.g. interference with services and provisions; poisoning of food and water supplies; interruption of communications, etc.). And, of course, the threat to do any of these things. Doing or threatening to do these things serves as a warning to others. Uncertainty is a substantial element of all terrorism. Not knowing when or where the next bomb is to go off, who is to be the next victim, or what new tactic or technique is to be employed, is a highly effective, fear-producing way of proceeding. Hitler, a master of terrorism, declared it to be so and the lesson is well taken.

No discussion of terrorism from a definitional perspective can ignore the terrorist, for, as has been said, fundamental to the nature of terrorism is the notion of human beings doing something to adversely affect other human beings. It is pertinent to inquire what kind of human being would do such terrible things and what qualities are necessary to make a choice from among the available modalities. In character and aims, today's terrorist is no different from those of yesteryear. Nor, logically, will tomorrow's terrorist be any different in these vital respects. It takes a particular slant of mind, set of beliefs and values, to be able to engage in

this type of activity against the established order of society. The question is always raised, at least tacitly, after some particularly shocking episode: Who would do such terrible things in the name of any cause whatsoever? The general answer has already been given: those who believe the means are justified by the ends it is sought to attain. It is not necessary for definitional purposes to explore extensively the warped psychology of the terrorist. A few observations are, however, of value in this regard. A clear distinction requires to be made between those who are removed from the action - who plan, supervise, and direct - and those who engage in the direct killing, torturing, and all the other activities that go to make up the whole spectrum of terrorism. A George Habash or a Wadi Haddad (to take two well-known examples) is no less a terrorist by reason of his personal remoteness from the action; the ordering of assassination, skyjackings, the sending of letter bombs, and all the other fear-producing enterprises is perhaps even more terroristic than their moronic execution by those who simply obey. These "Generals" and "Politicians" of terrorism, too, have their conventional counterparts. The distinctions reside in the functional aspects; the different levels of command and ability; the skills, dedication, and courage, rather than in a real, qualitative difference in mentality. This is important to bear in mind in terms of responsibility. There is a quality of evil about the terrorist - at whatever level he functions, however near to or remote from the consequences he is seeking to bring about - that is shocking and repelent to the ordinary, law-abiding member of the community.

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Terrorism is abhorrent to the vast majority of people everywhere.
The reasons for such perversity in the terrorist are many and varied
and mainly the product of individual circumstances and history.
But this perversion is a constant factor that must be taken into
account in any assessment of terrorism and what it is all about.
The terrorist is, fortunately, in a minority, and it is this that
gives a definition acceptable to a majority its viability.

By reference to the constituent elements outlined above, it is
evident that even a single individual might engage in terrorism.
Individuals, properly classified as terrorists have so engaged
themselves in the past; George Metesky, the so-called "Mad Bomber"
in Manhattan and Muharem Kurbegovic, the "Alphabet Bomber" in
Los Angeles are but two examples out of many. The lone terrorist
poses peculiar response problems that will be discussed in their
place, but with respect to the definitional aspects considered,
it is to be observed that terrorism is more usually the activity
of organized groups engaged in a continuing campaign in which
terrorism forms part of some larger strategy. The terrorism option
thus becomes but another segment of a "corporate" policy in which
individual emotions, motivation, and even direction are effectively
submerged. This means that too much thought about the matters
discussed and analyzed here is simply not given by the rank and
file terrorist; like good soldiers, they just obey orders.
Commitment to a cause, to a leader, to an idea can produce a type
of blind, unquestioning obedience that is very characteristic of
many terrorist groups. The point here is that many of those who

execute these terroristic missions do not think of what they are doing as terrorism simply because their faith and hopes for guidance are invested in others who do their thinking for them. What this means, in practice, is that the operative who places the bomb may not have the slightest idea, in terms of the overall strategy, of why he is doing it; he is little more than the tool or instrument of his more astute masters. His conduct is but a graver extension of that of the mindless individual induced to shout anti-government slogans from the shelter of the crowd by those Eugene Methvin has perceptively dubbed "The Riot-Makers". That the definitional elements isolated here may not be consciously present in the minds of at least some of the principal actors in no way invalidates them conceptually nor renders them of purely theoretical value. Those who blindly follow their leaders down such paths, in the absence of those defenses ordinarily recognized by the criminal law, must have imputed to them all the motivation and purpose of the prime movers of the enterprise.

While it has been noted by many that terrorism is a collective rather than an individual undertaking, another related aspect of its nature has generally passed without remark. Terrorism is, characteristically, an assault against organized society. It owes this to its fundamental political nature. While individuals may be targeted and acts perpetrated against their persons, property, and other interests, the climate of fear intended to be generated thereby is really directed at the wider society of which that individual forms a part. The principle, "Kill One, Ten Others Tremble"

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is very much a guiding tenet for all terrorists. While it may be
proper, therefore, to speak of an act of terrorism directed at one
person, terrorism as a conceptual entity can only be directed at
the community at large. Terrorism, essentially, is a very impersonal
thing; it cannot really be otherwise. The individual vendetta is
just that and no more. Individual human life is worth nothing
against the grand concept of what is implied by terrorism. The
grand design transcends all notions of individual vengeance and
personal motivation. Terrorism, perhaps more than any other crime,
has a truly public character. It is for this reason that terrorism
gives the impression of callousness, mindlessness, a detached,
abnormal attitude towards all human suffering. The terrorist who
acts otherwise is really doing violence to his own credo or code.
There are, fortunately, comparatively few who are capable of
following this to the letter. There is an important corollary
to all this that must find its way into any definition, at least
by imputation. Terrorism is identified by its impact upon the
many not the few; it matters not that these latter suffer more
immediately and that their impressions ought, in consequence, to
be of higher account. That a targeted individual is not frightened
nor influenced in any way by the acts of terrorism directed against
him, does not affect the definition of terrorism. There are many
brave folk who stand up to the terrorist just as others are undaunted
by the rapist or the mugger. But just as rape and mugging exist
despite these displays of personal bravery, so, too, does terrorism,
for its true meaning becomes etched upon the collective mind by example.

Terrorism for the individual, human victim is a real experience, the components of which can be analyzed and described with painful clarity. For the community as a whole, terrorism is the idea of this experience, transformed, developed, and projected.

Before proceeding to a practical, definitional utilization of the elements identified, it is worthwhile giving some incidental consideration to certain well-known observations or aphorisms about terrorism that are valuable as color if not essential material for any definition. Prominent among these is the tag, Terrorism is the Weapon of the Weak, properly attributable to Brian Crozier. This pithy aphorism really encapsulates a great deal of information about terrorism and terrorists. It affirms the essential political nature of terrorism and recognizes that its employment is determined by a particular view of the power struggle. Those who see themselves in an inferior or disadvantageous position may feel impelled to resort to these means in order to redress the balance in their own favor. There is the assumption that terrorism somehow has this compensatory quality. The terrorist always proceeds from a position of perceived weakness rather than strength. This is true even in the case of state of official terrorism. The resort to terrorism is, in effect, a confession of weakness, an admission that the other side has a superiority of position or resources from which it can only be dislodged by these means. It also implicitly recognizes the choice involved in the resort to terrorism. Terrorism is not a necessary option, even for the weak. The struggle can be fought without resort to terrorism, and many ideologues have recommended that it not be

adopted as a means to the end sought. Terrorism is not the exclusive

perquisite of the Left; it goes almost without saying that Right-wing

terrorism is no less pernicious and reprehensible. What Right and

Left share in common is this belief, under certain circumstances,

in terrorism as a "make-weight" factor, as an element for closing

the gap between the opposing forces. Terrorism shares this belief

with poison gas and the nuclear bomb. It reminds us that terrorism

really is another weapon of warfare. In the extreme case, it becomes

the prop for the defense of necessity, namely that "they" were so

strong, we had no other option. Historically, such terrorism breeds

only counter-terror, reprisal and counter-reprisal. For this reason,

those who advocate the fighting of terrorism with the weapons of

terrorism itself had best give earnest consideration to the undoubted

wisdom enshrined in this oft-quoted observation.

Another useful, equally well-known observation, attributable to

Brian Jenkins, has it that <u>Terrorism is Theater.</u> Terrorism certainly

has its theatrical aspects, and the more spectacularly these are

presented on the world stage, the more successful the enterprise is

likely to be accounted. The terrorist, like the movie star, thrives

on attention and it is a matter for constant concern on the part of

those engaged in combatting terrorism that this attention-getting

activity is able, so readily, to gain the publicity it needs and

thus reach so effectively the audience at which its productions are

aimed. It is interesting and instructive to examine the notions

behind this thesis for what they reveal about the essential nature

of terrorism. It is implicit that the "audience" is to be impressed,

cowed, and dominated - but not slaughtered; when this stage is reached, terrorism is no longer theater. Thus effective terrorism has to be carefully staged, and political extremists, sensitive to the whims, tastes, and sensibilities of the audience are most careful about the productions they stage. The killing of Aldo Moro may be seen from this perspective as a production that went awry. Far from gaining adhesion and applause for the players, this cruel act produced a revulsion even among certain sectors of the audience that might have been supposed to have had a natural sympathy with the terrorists' cause, and polarized the country in a way most disadvantageous to the attainment of the terrorists' objectives. These observations have a most direct relevance for the study of terrorism in Dade County, for a similar error could well fail to have the desired effect for those engaged in these "theatrics". For the producers, the show must be carefully chosen to suit the taste of the audience, and while the whole process is essentially an educational one - those watching are to be taught a lesson by example - any suffering for the audience must be vicarious and no more. This triangular relationship is very important to a study of the dynamics of terrorism; some researchers have even gone so far as to depict it graphically in these symbolic terms. The point is extremely relevant to the victimology of terrorism and the determination of terroristic objectives and targets. It is an important factor in any threat assessment.

Closely associated with this is the notion that Terrorism is Symbolic. There is no question that much terroristic activity is of an expressive nature; that it is designed to vent itself against

targets that can be seen as representative of a hated authority or power structure against which the terrorist is supposedly struggling in the interests of all that is good and noble. Many of the most foul terroristic campaigns are often depicted by their apologists in these exaggerated, symbolic terms. From one perspective, certainly, such symbolism can be seen as little more than a Rite of Purification. Symbolic terrorism is usually intended to serve as a demonstration or as a warning; it is intended to impress without realizing its full potential for harm. Some bombings are clearly symbolic, especially where the target can be identified in the collective mind with something such as "capitalism" or "imperialism". Some hostage-takings have a symbolic character, where they are engineered to protest some state of affairs rather than to procure some more tangible item of exchange for the life and safety of the hostage. Symbolic attacks on authority tend to disguise the real nature of terrorism and the relief that the damage, of which these attacks were clearly capable, did not materialize is sometimes converted to a useful sympathy for the terrorists' cause. It should never be overlooked, however, that terrorism always has its instrumental as well as its expressive side and that the two are most usually intertwined. Thus, to take a historical example, the Storming of the Bastille has come to assume a symbolic importance of a generally favorable nature. The act itself, however, was designed primarily to liberate prisoners held by what was conceived of as a hated regime. One's view of the event is necessarily colored by which side one supported; the partizan nature of this is very evident. Given the right type of <u>propaganda</u>, anyone or anything can be converted into a symbol worthy of the terrorist's attentions.

Another useful observation, dating back to the early 1970's, and reiterated at intervals since, while reflecting upon the nature of terrorism, is more strictly relevant to its potential. It has been frequently said, with a good deal of truth, that Terrorism is a Growth Industry. Certainly, terrorism in the form the world has come to recognize it has displayed a quite remarkable, if uneven, growth during the past decade. Quantitatively, more and more people have come to engage in terrorism, so that there has developed a kind of resigned acceptance of the phenomenon; few ask, anymore, if terrorism is here to stay. Fewer still would now reply that it is not. There are a number of hidden implications, from the present point of view that are worth bringing to light. This observation tacitly treats of terrorism as though it were some clearly recognizable modern entity that has a life of its own. It is not a restricted or localized thing, but something which has come to be an unpleasant adjunct of the modern world. Terrorism seems to have aquired a universal quality; for all its vagueness, the word is appearing in languages across the globe. We speak, indeed of terrorism much as we do of television, recognizing that it has come about almost everywhere; only the "programs" are different in the various localities affected. We clearly recognize there is something we have come to know as terrorism; it is virtually taken for granted on the "I know it when I see it" principle. The only real question for most is how large a problem is it likely to become? The growth potential is frighteningly obvious when viewed against the background of possible areas of global strife and modern technological development. The implications of this for the definition

of terrorism should not go unnoticed. Will what we today call, or regard as, terrorism simply pale into insignificance once this awesome growth industry begins to realize its threatened potential? Will we need to find an entirely new terminology to describe what, within a comparatively short time, might be unleashed against us? There are already signs of the times to be observed from a discreet sampling of attitudes. The world is becoming progressively less and less frightened by "ordinary" terrorism. Many hostage-takings simply go unreported. What would have sufficed the terrorist a few years ago is, for very understandable and well-documented reasons, now insufficient to move governments or to produce that overwhelming fear - terror - necessary to influence events. It may not improperly be observed that in consequence of these trends, it is becoming harder and harder to achieve in the area of terrorism. It is this fact as much as any other that has provided the stimulus for growth. We are approaching a situation where, on an informal consensus, an event would not be regarded as terrorism unless it reached a certain level of intensity. This is a serious question for anyone concerned with definition. We are already talking, for the future, in terms of mega-terrorism to describe what might be the eventual and not too distant product of this growth industry. It is as well to keep these points in mind, for we may be reaching a point where it might seriously be questioned whether some kinds of hostage-taking, for example, are "really" terrorism. The event, though terrifying enough for the immediate victims, and meeting all the criteria suggested above, may simply not be sufficiently impressive for those who find themselves, fortunately, at the other corner of the triangle.

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With all the antecedent considerations in mind, and having particular regard to the purposes of the present study and the expectations vested in it, the following definition of terrorism is offered:

Terrorism is a purposeful human activity primarily directed towards creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence, in ways desired by the protagonist, other human beings and, through them, some course of events.

Terrorism always poses an unacceptable challenge to the principles on which organized society rests, for those acting in this way seek to arrogate to themsleves, and use in perverse ways, powers exclusively reserved to the state.

Terrorism as an autonomous concept manifests itself through the distinctive deployment of a variety of dependent criminal acts calculated to harm human life, property and other interests.

A definition of terrorism should be a standard or yardstick against which some concrete activity or event might be measured. The validity and usefulness of the present definition can, therefore, best be demonstrated against a series of examples. A number of carefully chosen examples follow:

Example 1

A criminal enterprise, concerned by law enforcement efforts to interdict its activities, undertakes the systematic elimination of witnesses.

This is terrorism. The identity and overall anti-social business of those engaged in this particular activity are immaterial to any characterization of it. These killings have a generalized admonitory

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or exemplary purpose; they are intended not only to ensure that certain persons do not testify, but to warn others not to do so under penalty of death. This deterrent characteristic of terrorism should be noted. The real purpose of the activity is to prevent, through the general climate of fear generated, members of the community from performing a vital civic duty and cooperating with the authorities in the suppression of crime. The ultimate challenge to the established power of the state is obvious and, although the activity is neither politically inspired nor directed at the overthrow of the state, it is virtually indistinguishable in substance and form from similar terroristic activities protagonized by those having more extensive political ambitions.

Example 2

A fleeing felon, surprised by a rapid police response, takes hostages to try to facilitate his escape.

This is not terrorism, notwithstanding that the hostages may be put in great fear nor that the operational modality of the perpetrator may be identical in form to that employed by political extremists in events clearly to be characterized as terrorism. Here the climate of fear generated by the event, though very real, is evanescent and of only temporary value to the perpetrator. It is created for an immediate, operational purpose, and, once that is satisfied, he has no further use for it. He has no intention of perpetuating it, building on it, extending it beyond the bounds of this particular event, nor profiting by it for the future. The fear thus created is limited to the hostages and those immediately concerned with their safety. It is not an end in itself, but, rather, an incidental means to a very limited end.

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Example 3

A militant group of inmates takes hostages in a correctional facility to protest conditions and secure the satisfaction of certain demands.

This is not terrorism, for the creation, by this activity, of the climate of fear is localized and focussed for the particular purposes of coercing the particular authorities involved in mediating the dispute. It would be otherwise were this action part of a larger, coordinated movement clearly designed to spread the anticipation or similar activity throughout other parts of the prison system. The real use to which the _fear_ so created is put is the determinant here, not whether the movement is part of a general insurrection. Similarly, if the hostage-taking were properly to be seen as part of a general movement to intimidate the authorities and modify the legitimate exercise of their control, such an event could be properly characterized as terrorism. In such a case, the hostage-taking would be undertaken _primarily_ to create the climate of fear - the real end of the exercise - rather than as a temporary expedient to secure some immediate redress.

Example 4

Drivers defying a strike order by union members are shot at and their vehicles destroyed or damaged to prevent their working.

This is terrorism. It takes place within a limited social conflict which certain parties are seeking to settle in their own favor by the use of a distinctive kind of fear-generating violence. The conflict in this case is economic rather than political in the more usual sense.

It is unimportant to the characterization that the conditions giving

rise to this activity might soon abate or that there is no wider

attempt to challenge or overthrow the established order. The criterion

for the determination of the character of the event is the distinctive,

purposeful use of a general climate of fear designed to affect a

larger community in exemplary fashion. This is not the case of

isolated reprisal against individual opponents, but rather an attempt

to reach, through fear, all drivers defying the union order even

though they are not personally touched by the actual violence. Such

action challenges the protective capabilities of the state.

Example 5

A public official is assassinated by an individual who did not

agree with that official's stand on some matter of public policy.

This is not terrorism. It is an act of private vengenance or retaliation

designed to punish an individual considered obstructive by the perpetrator.

The person undertaking this activity has, in effect, arrogated to himself

the functions of Judge, jury, and executioner. He has also written his

own laws. The primary purpose of this act is not the creation of a

reservoir of fear, but the elimination of a particular individual against

whom some grievance existed. It is immaterial that, incidentally, others

are put in fear so as to reconsider their own positions. It would be

otherwise if this were part of a general campaign to utilize the fear

generated by this killing to subdue, or alter the conduct of, like-minded

officials.

Example 6

Small businessmen are regularly forced to contribute goods or

money to the support of anti-social enterprises on pain of

suffering physical harm or economic loss if they refuse.

This is terrorism. The primary objective is the creation of a climate

of pervasive, overwhelming fear that will induce the victims to do

or refrain from doing something in accordance with the perpetrators'

wishes. It is unimportant to the characterization of the matter that

actual violence does not ensue. It is the unlawful exercise of control

through the use of fear. It is a typically unlawful usurpation by

anti-social groups of the taxing functions of the state.

Example 7

An outspoken media personality is severely injured by a bomb

in consequence of his criticism of some activities undertaken

in the community by certain organized groups.

This is terrorism. The action is not merely retributive nor meant

to incapacitate the individual harmed. It has a wider exemplary

purpose. General as well as specific deterrence is involved here.

The act is primarily designed to serve, through the fear of similar

consequences, as a warning to like-minded individuals, It represents

a general attempt to suppress the right of free speech by all rather

than violent infringement only of the rights of the immediate victim.

Example 8

A mentally disturbed individual, operating clandestinely,

spreads terror throughout the community by strangling and

grossly mutilating young women.

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This is not terrorism. The creation of this widespread climate of fear in the community at large is strictly incidental to the actor's purpose, which is simply to satisfy some dark, perverse, inner need by these awful means. The fear generated by this activity may be a source of satisfaction to the actor, but it is not harnessed by him to any coercive purpose. This is, unquestionably, terror, but it is not terrorism. The conflict such violence is directed to resolve is an internal one, within the psyche of the actor. A different view would have to be taken where what was done was consciously directed at some class of the community such as prostitutes, Jack the Ripper fashion, so as to create a general climate of fear inhibiting them in their trade. Even here, a distinction would need to be observed between such purposeful activity and that motivated purely by spite or a desire for vengeance.

Example 9

A businessman is kidnapped by an anti-social group and a ransom of $10,000,000 is demanded for his release.

This is not terrorism. The fear generated by this activity is of a focussed, instrumental kind and its wider ramifications, though very real, are largely incidental. It is primarily aimed at securing economic gain for the kidnappers in this case notwithstanding that success might assist in establishing a useful track record facilitating future enterprises. The fear created has no end in itself; it is a necessary dependent of the criminal act. A different view would be taken if the primary objective of the kidnappers were to weaken

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confidence in the government; to strike generalized fear in the business community so as to alter conduct in some way desired by the kidnappers; or to affect relations between governments, or between government and the business community.

Example 10

Rival gangs of drug dealers kill each other's operatives and destroy goods and property in a dispute over territory.

This is not terrorism. The <u>primary</u> purpose of the activity is to gain control over some business rather than to create fear; this is just an incidental product of the struggle. It is certainly possible to conceive of terrorism, as defined, being used as a weapon in such a struggle. This would have to be carefully distinguished from the use of <u>terror</u>, by one or other side. Terrorism presupposes the ability to generate the appropriate fear and use it to advantage. <u>Just</u> killing, <u>just</u> destroying goods and property would not be enough in this case, for those who engage in such a business discount these possibilities and are impervious to a level of fear that would impact upon the minds of others. There is an analogy to be seen here with conventional warfare that can perfectly well be waged without resort to terrorism.

Example 11

Police officers are systematically murdered by a subversive group claiming to be waging a "People's War".

This is terrorism. Despite its form, this is not a war at all, save in so far as it may be characterized as a war on society.

It is, rather, an intolerable attack upon the state's monopoly on the use of force for the purpose of keeping internal order, and, as such, is destructive of the very principles upon which organized society is founded. This is not an attack upon police officers as individuals. The primary purpose is to produce a climate of fear affecting the community as a whole. The object is to cause a loss of confidence in the ability of the state to afford protection to its citizenry and eventually to bring about a change in allegiance. Thus, this activity has a typically terroristic symbolic as well as an instrumental purpose.

Example 12

An organization committed to propagating notions of racial supremacy holds threatening parades in neighbourhoods predominantly occupied by those against whom its racial doctrines are directed.

This is terrorism, regardless of whether actual violence ensues or not. This was most perfectly understood by the Nazis in pre-WWII Germany, who used this to gain control of the streets as a necessary step towards political domination. The primary objective of the activity is the creation of a state of fear designed to operate on the collective mind of the greater community. The activity either provokes resistance or produces submission and is highly divisive. In either case, the necessary confidence in the state's ability to maintain public order and secure the safety of its citizenry is eroded.

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Example 13

A drug dealer, cheated by another, kills and mutilates him
as a reprisal.

This is not terrorism, although by reason of the methods employed,
it may be considered to come very close to it. The real objective
here, however, is simply private revenge and retribution against
one considered to have done come inexcusable wrong against the
interests of the actor. It is not the methods used that constitute
terrorism; rather, it is the purposes for which those methods are
employed. That such killings, particularly on account of the
horrible way in which they are executed, give rise to fear and
revulsion in the community at large is incidental to their real
purpose. If the killing were primarily designed to serve as a warning
to the entire drug dealing community of which the dealer formed a
part, a different view would have to be taken of the matter.

Example 14

An armed passenger, mouthing revolutionary rhetoric, tries to
seize control of a commercial aircraft in flight with a view
to forcing the flight commander to alter his destination.

This is not terrorism. There is a deliberate creation of a climate
of fear, but this is not the primary purpose of the activity, which
is, by this means, to seize control of a particular aircraft for
what is essentially a private purpose - however much this may be
cloaked by the utterance of political language indicating a contrary
purpose. This action is akin to robbery, where the fear is generated
to further commission of a single crime rather than as an end in
itself. The specific fear generated acquires no autonomous existence

and its purpose is exhausted once the actor's aims are accomplished. A skyjacking such as those which terminated at Entebbe or Mogadishu is quite different, although the form of its accomplishment may be very similar. In these cases, the primary purpose is to generate fear subsequently used not only as a bargaining counter to secure what the skyjackers want, but as a general challenge to government everywhere. What is threatened is air safety in general. If skyjacking of this type were successful, the air traveller could no longer rely upon the state for protection. This explains the willingness of states of widely differing political complexions (e.g. the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union) to subscribe to international agreements seeking the suppression of this crime. There is a common interest here as there was in earlier times in the suppression of piracy.

Example 15

A disgruntled public utility employee purposefully engages in the destruction of equipment and installations, depriving the public of essential services.

This is not terrorism. The fear created in the course of this systematic campaign of sabotage is not utilized by the actor to further his ends and is substantially incidental to his purposes. These are essentially retributive and the activity is in the nature of a private revenge. While the public perception of these events may aid in the attainment of the actor's objectives - for the larger community is undoubtedly injured and inconvenienced - the real target remains the utility company, and the fear generated never acquires an antonomous quality, being a mere dependent part of the criminal activity.

Example 16

A group of environmentalists, unable by lawful means to halt
construction of a nuclear power plant, initiates a campaign of
violence threatening the lives of public officials and senior
executives of the utility company.

This is terrorism. It is intended to create a climate of fear in
which those responsible for this construction might feel unable to
proceed with it due to the threat posed to their safety. While the
objective in this case is limited, the methods used to attain it are
of a generally coercive character and represent an unmistakable
challenge to the system as a whole. If the system cannot protect
these individuals, in the course of a proper exercise of their
functions, others have clearly cause for concern for their own
safety. The challenge to the power of the state is self-evident
and it poses for the community at large a choice between regulating
its affairs through the ordinary processes of orderly government
and the anarchical law of naked force.

Example 17

Thousands of homes are destroyed and many lives are lost as a
result of a campaign of arson instituted by slum landlords to
obtain compensation for debased properties.

This is not terrorism. The enormity of what has been done and the
horror it is capable of evoking cannot supply the essential elements
to give it that character. The primary purpose of this activity is
private economic gain. The toll in terms of human misery is
incidental to the attainment of the objective. Clearly, there is

a high degree of callousness exhibited towards the victims affected, but there is no intention to generate a climate of fear and utilize it for coercive purposes. The fear produced remains a dependent part of the criminal act itself and never attains, not is it intended to, any useful autonomy for the actors.

Example 18

An organization claiming to be in possession of a nuclear device threatens to detonate it in a major United States urban area unless the United States government forces down the price of OPEC oil.

This is terrorism. The credibility of the threat is not in issue here. The illustration is offered here, in dramatically escalated form, of a familiar combination of unrealistic demands, namely, in the first place, one designed to force a country, through the coercive use of fear to do what it is unable to do. As events have shown, the United States has no more control of the OPEC cartel than the government of the Netherlands has over the government of Indonesia so as to satisfy the demands of the South Moluccan extremists. In this example, demands are made, too, which, if complied with would constitute a breach of international law. The supersession of the actors own "law" for that established by international agreement and the comity of nations is clearly demonstrated in this example. The force available to ensure compliance with any agreement reached in violation of international law is characteristic of the nature of terrorism. Here the event is lifted out of the domestic

scene to show how terrorism poses a distinctive challenge not only
to the power of a single state but to the notion of government in
general.

Example 19

(a) An intensive bombing campaign is instituted in a tourist
resort by a group interested in changing the character
of the area so as to benefit its own economic interests.

(b) A group inspired by political motives initiates an intensive
bombing campaign designed to drive tourists from a resort
area so as to cause economic loss and weaken the authority
of the legitimate government.

Both these activities are terrorism. The essential nature of the
primary activity is identical in both cases and the contrasts in
objective are revealing of a difference in degree rather than one
of more fundamental character. In both cases, the primary objective
is the creation of an autonomous body of fear calculated to produce,
of itself, the desired results. Those results are, in both instances,
a transfer of control from legitimate authority to one that has to be
recognized solely by reason of a successful usurpation of power. The
real distinctions that exist between these two examples relate to the
extent to which the fundamental power of the state is challenged.
In the first instance, the challenge to government is limited; the
overthrow of the state, as such, is not contemplated. If the ends
are attained by these means, the formal structure of existing
government will remain intact. This, however, is an illusion. In
reality, if Group (a) were successful, the real power of government

would have been as effectively curtailed or destroyed as it would have been had the actions taken by Group (b) proven successful. This latter is precisely what the ETA, the Spanish Basque terrorists are trying to achieve in the campaign begun in June, 1979. It is immaterial to the characterization of either activity that the methods used might be inappropriate to attain the ends sought because those affected might be resistant to the climate of fear so generated.

Example 20

An unknown organization mails letter bombs at random all over the United States during the Christmas period. No purpose for the campaign is ever discovered.

This is terrorism notwithstanding that the identity of the perpetrators as well as their purposes remain concealed. This is, conceptually, a perfectly plausible but very difficult example, and it is offered here not only as a test of the definition but also for the insights it affords into the constituent elements of terrorism. The lethal potentiality of such an activity must be held to raise, constructively, the presumption of an intent to harm by these means; the affair, by reason of its nature, cannot be treated as a hoax. The actor should be held to account, also, for the fear generating character of the activity in which he (?) has indulged. The motivations of revenge or retribution cannot be ruled out, but they cannot be inferred save by postulating, as a target, society at large. More difficult, from a definitional perspective, is the absence of any utilization of the fear, the generation of which appears to have been the primary

objective of this activity. Most properly, this should be regarded as a form of incomplete or imperfect terrorism, which can be perfected or "cured" only when the climate of fear produced by this activity is channeled and directed by the perpetrator to some end.

From this short catalogue of examples, certain recurring similarities and differences appear. By a very slight alteration of the given facts in each case, the characterization assigne. to each example can be changed. What is indispensable to the characterization as well as what is irrelevant to it thus appears with considerable clarity.

What can be stated with a certain amount of assurance is that terrorism is not to be identified <u>solely</u> by reason of:

      (1)   The horrifying nature of the act.

      (2)   The scale or magnitude of the activity under examination.

      (3)   The identity, character, or ideology of the perpetrators.

      (4)   The methods used by the perpetrators.

      (5)   The nature of the immediate, as opposed to the ulterior, and often concealed, objective.

The trite, but nevertheless useful, observation may be offered in conclusion that it is often easier to identify and isolate that which is not terrorism than to label exactly that which is.

CHAPTER TWO

TERRORISM BY TYPES - A DELINEATION

Having settled upon a definition of terrorism, the term can now be used, with a greater degree of confidence, in connection with the present study. In particular, it now becomes possible to speak, meaningfully, of different _types_ of terrorism, to consider the identifying features of these distinct variants, and to examine their particular relevance to the overall problem of terrorism in Dade County. It is at this point that the use of adjectives to delineate more precisely the different kinds of terrorism to be studied becomes pertinent. The adjectives so employed here have been selected with some care. They are not intended as modifers of the definition in any way. Rather, these descriptive words are simply intended to categorize and aid in the sorting out process so that it might be possible to determine what kinds of terrorism are particularly prevalent in Dade County; what special measures might be necessary to cope with them; and what quantitative or qualitative changes have been observed or might be projected for the future.

Of the types dealt with at length in this chapter, only the first category requires any special, introductory mention, for the descriptive adjectives otherwise attached have all achieved some general degree of acceptance so as to make their usage almost universally understood. In light of the position taken that terrorism, as defined, is political by nature, it became necessary to secure some other description for that class of terrorism that has more usually

been referred to elsewhere as "political terrorism". Having regard to the position taken on this issue, to have simply adopted that term here would have given rise to an unaceptable redundancy of language. The idea expressed by the term had, however, to be preserved, for it is indeed an exceedingly important one. No satisfactory term has been found that would have enabled the adjective "political" to have been dispensed with entirely; the loss of meaning would have been simply too great. The term coined is, therefore, a compromise which is felt most nearly capable of conveying the idea of the kind of terrorism that it is intended to describe.

It is obviously possible to construct any number of categories or sub-categories of terrorism in this way. Most such categories, while presenting interesting opportunities for discussion and theorization are of acedemic interest only here. They represent somewhat exotic manifestations of the subject that have not been and are not likely in the future to be encountered in Dade County. The categories placed under examination for the present purposes have, accordingly, been deliberately limited to those considered to have some direct relevance to this study. Some other commonly designated types nevertheless merit a brief, passing mention. Thus while, in a different context, a category of <u>state or official terrorism</u>, often imposed at home by the very regimes given to supporting or sustaining small-group, anti-government terrorism elsewhere, might have deserved more lengthy examination, it can receive no more than a reference here. This brevity is no true measure of its overall importance. State terrorism such as that which opponents claimed took place in Iran under Shah

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Pahlevi or which is said to take place in Nicaragua under General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, to name but two contemporary examples out of many, is frequently made the excuse for terroristic reaction to it by opposing forces. It constitutes, for some a continuing spur to action. It is a common banner around which many left-wing groups the world over find it convenient to rally. It is frequently used by activist groups in this country to elicit sympathy and drum up support for causes that have little directly to do with those matters that provoke this reaction. America's streets are often decorated with leaflets and posters proclaiming torture and repression in some far-off land, and a need for action to liberate the political prisoners of a hated regime. This can be an exceedingly partizan process. William Kunstler, the well-known defender of radical causes is recently reported to have averred: "I don't believe in criticizing socialist governments publicly, even if there are human-rights violations" These general sentiments should be taken under advisement, for they can give rise to a terroristic reaction far from the scene of the state or official terrorism to which they are supposedly a response. Assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-takings, skyjackings, and bombings on this account have been not uncommon in the past. It is not difficult to imagine Dade County becoming a battleground on account of some alleged state or official terrorism that has taken place far from its boundaries. Anything that is symbolic, from a concert to an airline counter, will serve as a target. Although no further commentary is offered here, due cognizance should be taken of the matter, as its occurrence is sufficiently common to warrant this cautionary note.

Another category which ought not to be ignored but which, in the present case, cannot claim examination in depth is surrogate terrorism. Terrorism itself is often said to be a form of "surrogate warfare" and there is probably much truth in this. Certainly, some nation states in the name of some ideology or other, or in the fight against "colonialism" or "multi-national corporations" have armed and sponsored anti-government terrorist movements in parts of the world far removed from what might ordinarily have been regarded as their own spheres of interest. Thus Lybia has materially aided the leftist-thinking Provisional Wing of the IRA in its terroristic struggles in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the mercurial Colonel Kaddafi has justified this on the grounds that Lybia supports all such movements everywhere. Put another way, the Provos are fighting Lybia's battle with Lybia's money as the price for assistance in their own cause. By accepting such assistance, such groups become surrogates for the peculiar brand of world revolutionary strategy that Lybia is seeking to export. It may be observed, generally, that the large liquid surpluses available to many Arab oil producing countires and the unresolved Palestinian question have been responsible for much of this so-called surrogate terrorism. It has simply become easy to "buy" terrorists, many of whom are now, in effect, very special kinds of mercenaries. On the wider, international front, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, South Yemen, and Cuba have all acted as militant surrogates of the Soviet Union in furtherance of that country's global strategies. All of these nations have been prominent in fostering terrorist movements, arming terrorists, training them, developing their techniques and giving them sanctuary. Such terrorists have sallied forth to operate

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under the direction of their sponsors in many different parts of the world. East Germany has offered haven as well as supplying unrivalled technological support, intelligence training, and personnel, as well as many of the arms found in terrorists' hands around the world. Czechoslovakia, in accordance with this design, has supplied a large array of potent weapons from its excellent armaments industry, while North Korea and South Yemen have been prominent in providing training facilities as well as occasional sanctuary for terrorists operating in countries that may be regarded as ideologically opposed to the Soviet bloc.

From the point of view of the present study, the role of Castro's Cuba is, perhaps, of most immediate interest. Cuba has itself acted as a Soviet surrogate on a great number of occasions, and in a number of different but closely associated ways. In a very real sense, the island of Cuba is a heavily subsidized, stationary Soviet aircraft carrier, strategically anchored but a short distance from the Florida coast; only a striking and timely display of American resolve prevented it from being armed with deadly nuclear missiles. Cuba's regular army is now a necessary Soviet surrogate in the execution of that country's growingly aggressive African policy. Cuban, as well as North Korean pilots, are often to be encountered flying the most advanced Soviet aircraft where it would be inconvenient for Russian personnel to be found doing so. Castro's attitude towards surrogate terrorism has varied over the years in accordance with the dictates of his foreign policy and his own changing ambitions. It is important to recognize that, in the early 1960's, the Castro regime represented

but an insecure toe-hold for international communism in what was
otherwise an area of United States hegemony. The original fragility
of that tiny incursion has tended to be obscured by events since
that time and the aggressive role that Castro, backed by massive
Soviet support, has subsequently played on the world stage. Having
successfully consolidated and enlarged this hold on his own Caribbean
island through twenty years of hard, revolutionary work, some of the
earlier programs of subversion and terrorism Castro fomented and
promoted elsewhere in the hemisphere - almost as measures of self-
defense - have become unnecessary or have otherwise lost their appeal;
other needs and ambitions have arisen to take their place. In the
early years, Castro was actively and vigorously exporting Cuban-style
revolution to Central and South American countries; Cuban ambitions
were rightly regarded with extreme distrust almost everywhere, and
Cuba was, generally, a political outcast from the Latin American
family of nations. Although the Cuban revolution itself was but a
few years old, its advisers and "freedom fighters" had already won
a formidable reputation. The elusive "Che" was seen everywhere and
nowhere, and rumors of instant, universal insurrection abounded
from Panama to Patagonia. Following a carefully orchestrated policy,
the Cuban revolution had its own surrogate activists in focos all
over Latin America. That these efforts were successfully contained
so as to prevent a continental uprising is due in large measure to
the diplomatic and other endeavors of the United States. Such
results were, not surprisingly, purchased at a considerable price.
The types of regime that would resist Castroite take-overs have not

always been ones which would have commended themselves to human-
rights purists. This necessary policy of "Castro containment" has
left behind a legacy that has a notable impact on the state of
terrorism in this hemisphere today. The shift of policy adopted
by the present United States administration has disturbed some of
the long-established foundations of control and has unleashed potent
new forces that have to be taken into account in assessing future
needs in connection with the control and containment of terrorism.

What is certain, is that while Castro's attitude towards the
encouragement and employment of terrorism has varied in intensity,
from time to time, it has not changed very much in style or basic
ideology. It is carefully tuned to the ever-changing prospects of
the finely-balances world power scene. Castro has simply been rather
bolder - some would say more impudent - than most. When rapprochement
with the United States seemed to hold out inviting rewards for Cuba
(and some incidental relief for the U.S.S.R.), the aggressive
sponsorship of revolution and terrorism was moderated and maintained,
discreetly, at a covert operational level. This did not represent
a fundamental rethinking of the Cuban position on the sponsorship
of terrorism. Then certain Cuban impatience with the current of
events began to develop. Castro was already deeply committed to an
expansionist policy, exporting the Cuban armed revolution far
afield to places like Angola. The potential prizes - Rhodesia-
Zimbabwe, for example - seemed too high to pull back simply in the
interests of improving relations with the United States. Castro's
stature and security were such that he felt able to display not

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only obduracy but arrogance. While United States' relations with
Cuba have not yet fallen to the dangerous levels of outright antagonism
to which they had descended in the early years of the last decade, the
benefits that Castro was seeking from his fence-mending flirtation
have clearly not materialized. Little encouragement was needed, in
the present state of world events, for a policy re-thinking. Castro
has, accordingly, been persuaded - or seems to have persuaded himself -
that, for the moment, a real improvement on a substantive level of
United States/Cuban relations is neither possible nor particularly
desirable. Certainly, despite growing pressures on the home front,
it has not seemed worth withdrawing Cuban forces from Africa simply
to improve relations with the present United States administration.
He has, accordingly, albeit without much fanfare, resumed an expansionist,
interventionist posture, playing once more his familiar surrogate role
for the Soviet Union. The meeting of the Third World countries to
take place in Havana in September, 1979, must be seen against this
background. With regard to current events in Central America, Cuba
is content to wait in the wings, discreetly using to advantage its
own surrogates. The current moderation displayed in the struggle
over Nicaragua must be regarded as prompted less by any faint-heartednes
or lack of committment to the Sandinista cause than to a shrewd,
statesmanlike calculation of the benefits from non-direct participation.
Cuban presence is, once again, making itself felt, most effectively,
through its surrogates. Elsewhere, the fine hand of Fidel Castro
can be seen in many areas of the Caribbean, notably in Jamaica and
Grenada. There are considerable gleamings to be had in this area so
important to United States national security and business interests.

United States concern in this area has awakened very slowly. Cuba
has built up an exceptionally good intelligence service that is
well-financed and organized for the promotion of those forms of
terrorism that might be considered to serve Cuba's interests.
Castro's most recent public pronouncements while enjoying the
hospitality of President Portillo of Mexico leave no doubt that
he has far from retired from the accustomed "revolutionary" role
that he has, with Soviet assistance, fashioned for himself. If
terrorism is truly the Weapon of the Weak, then Cuba in its present
position correctly shows a lofty disdain for it. Cuba's role, at
the moment, is to assist, as covertly as possible, others weaker
than itself to learn to use that discarded weapon. The Cubans have
so far proven themselves masters at this game of using surrogates.

The implications of all this for terrorism in Dade County
are extensive, but they can be stated quite succinctly. The
Cuban exile population of South Florida constitutes the main focus
of opposition - perhaps, indeed, the only opposition - to the
Castro Cuban regime. The only realistic prospect of continuing
resistance to that regime comes from South Florida and, more
particularly, Dade County. There the highest concentration of the
Cuban exile population resides. For all the current, far-flung
interests of Cuba, for all the assurance that comes from an
uninterrupted twenty years in power, and a changed international
scene that inhibits any forceful move to curb the exercise of his
power, Castro cannot afford to relax his vigilance on that exile
community. Castro may well feign indifference or even disdain for

the _gusanos_. He may well enjoy the cat and mouse game he is playing

with those who, at last, have decided to treat with him rather than

continue to try to dislodge him by force. He may even see real

advantages in participating in what has come to be known as the

Dialogue. But he knows, and must always take into account, that

if serious resistance is to be mounted against him from any quarter,

it can only realistically come from the Cuban exile community and

the bulk of this, a comparatively short distance from his shores,

is to be found in South Florida and, principally, in Dade County.

The concerns and apprehensions of this popultaion that the watchful

eye of Fidel Castro is constantly upon them are not misplaced. War

between brothers can be the bitterest of all strife; the Spanish

Civil War has been over for more than forty years, but its effects

still make themselves vividly felt. Regardless of their present

material position and the inexorable passing of time, those who

have been dispossessed of their lands and property will not forgive

and forget. Fidel Castro cannot, for a moment, allow himself to

assume that they will. Through his agents he must maintain eternal

vigilance over a community that constantly renews its hatred against

el tirano, notwithstanding the passing years and the apparent

futility of the struggle. Many are now vitally concerned by the

United States Latin American policy and the happenings in Nicaragua,

fearing to see another "Cuba" brought about in the region by default.

The meaning of surrogate warfare, (though they would vehemently deny

the use of the word "terrorism") is well-known to the Cuban exile

community. Many have been surrogates themselves at a time when

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United States attitudes towards Cuba were unambivalent and its energies were directed to restoring these peoples to their own homeland. From what has been said, it is very evident that surrogate means little more than using others to do what it would be inconvenient for the prime mover openly to undertake. Surrogates and ex-surrogates abound in Dade County.

One other term must be briefly mentioned here, more for its future than its present implications. Economic terrorism is another persuasive rallying cry of the left-wing ideologue. It is, indeed, a powerfully evocative concept. It raises the ugly specter of powerful, wealth-hungry oligarchs, crushing the poor beneath a mighty yoke of fear and economic oppression. The reading of any contemporary subversive, radical literature gives a good idea of this imagined monster. It is depicted most usually in the shape of the multi-national corporation. The Brigate Rosse issued an important communique on this in late 1978. These ideas cannot be dismissed lightly in the present climate of world affairs. It was just such a notion that gave impetus to the foundation of Communism, the calling of the 1st International, and other like popular movements of the Nineteenth Century shortly after the massive social indigestion caused by the Industrial Revolution. The world is passing once more through just such a period of flatulence, brought about by a variety of poorly understood economic factors. This notion of economic terrorism, in a more up-to-date and finely focussed form, is shortly due for a dramatic resuscitation as the energy crunch bites deeper and deeper into the resources of those who have to cope with it. More and more

will be heard of economic terrorism as the scramble for the world's
dwindling reserves of fossil fuel intensifies and becomes more bitter.
For some, already, the actions of OPEC constitute a form of economic
terrorism and angry mutterings about retaliation are to be heard.
Whether such an entity as economic terrorism exists or not is immaterial
for the present purposes. What is important are the likely reactions,
in the form of social violence and unrest, that this bout of economic
indigestion is certain to cause. At the heart of this matter is a
kind of economic tyrrany through deprivation. That this is far from
being an academic matter is to be seen from the plight of South
Florida's Haitian refugees. Their status and eventual disposition
rests upon whether they are political refugees (i.e. that they have
fled their native land to seek asylum on account of some state or
official terrorism making living conditions intolerable) or whether
they are economic refugees (i.e. that they have left their homeland
in search of personal betterment in the United States). If it could
be claimed that their exodus was the result of economic terrorism,
in the sense enunciated here, they might well be thought of as
political refugees as much entitled to asylum as those subjected
to more conventionally understood types of terrorism.

Politically inspired terrorism

This is what most people automatically think of when they hear
the term "terrorism". This is certainly what the United States
Department of Justice thinks of, for it defines terrorism as
"Acts of violence associated with the ends of some political group'.

This, essentially, is what all the conferences, the research - and great part of the arguments have been about in recent years. It is not difficult to see why this should have been so. Virtually all the terrorist "spectaculars", the headline-catching events that have captured the world's attention, have been protagonized by individuals or groups claiming to act in the name of some political cause or another. So far as poeple are worried about terrorism and the terrorism problem at all, it is this that concerns them. Since the end of World War II and the great groundswell of national liberation movements, instances of politically inspired terrorism have proliferated on a truly global attention-getting scale. Media influences have, undoubtedly, assisted in the process: the PLO; the IRA; the Red Brigades; the Baader-Meinhof group; the Japanese Red Army; the Tupamoros; have all become household words even for those who have but the vaguest notion of what these associations stood for and were aiming to achieve. Indeed, one of the most distinctive developments in this field has been the labelling process. Almost all these associations have found it necessary to confer upon themselves some grandiloquent style or title, if for no other reason than self-advertisement and the claiming of credit for their nefarious exploits. Many of these names represent mere "shells", empty organizations that have nothing to show that might authenticate their substance. The numbers of "terrorist" groups by reference to this labelling process is truly bewildering. Government and private computers are full of names, initials, and abbreviated designations that, for the most part, provide little information about those who are engaged (or have been engaged) in this politically

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inspired terrorism. The collection and retailing of such data has become almost a profession in itself; there were those who could recite with pride of accomplishment the more than one hundred terrorist groups said to be operating in Italy alone during 1978, adding to their collection almost daily. This, after a while, becomes little more than a ritualistic exercise, but it is also a dangerous one from a law enforcement perspective because it tends to conceal how little is really known about these groups. A more basic look at this subject is obviously necessary.

The term "political" is an extremely elastic one. Almost every activity of man in organized society is political in a sense. Crossing the highway is a political act, for it involves the exercise of rights conferred upon the individual in virtue of the laws of the land, and the obligation on his part to conduct himself in compliance with them and in consonance with the rights of others, the exercise of which may be brought into conflict with his own. The point need not be labored. This extensive meaning of the words "politics" and "political" are not what we have in mind when we refer to politically-inspired terrorism. We are concerned, rather, with a more narrow, artificial usage that confines the term to that having to do with the conventional power structure of society, the organs of government and their relationship to the governed. Politics is a public affair. It is not concerned with the exercise of purely private powers, notwithstanding that they are conferred or recognized by the state. <u>Politics is really about who has these public powers at their command and who does not.</u> Politics, in the

sense with which we are concerned here, is all about that subtle and not so subtle inter-play between human beings who are trying to control others through the exercise of these public powers. Politically inspired terrorism, therefore, is that which is employed in an attempt to gain control of these public powers. Like war and all other exercises of force along similar lines, it is an attempt to circumvent or short-cut the regular processes by which these public powers are conferred, transmitted, or transferred. Terrorism is inspired by politics when it seems to those engaging in it that it is necessary or desirable to use this means to gain control over the exercise or functions of all or some portion of these public powers. Given the right set of conditions, almost any distribution of public powers that someone disagrees with strongly enough, and is unable to change by other means, can inspire terrorism. That terrorism of this kind is the exception rather than the rule says something for the civilizing, moderating influences of the political processes themselves and the ability of man to compromise. Politically inspired terrorism is generally the product of some inherent or developed deficiency in the political process, or a disinclination or refusal to compromise.

One other point of political theory, vital to a proper under-standing of this subject, should be touched upon here. Whatever view is taken of the nature of the state and the relationship of its organs to one another and to those over whom the attributes of government are exercised, it is axiomatic that the state, and only the state, has the power to use force, internally to keep order,

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and externally to maintain itself intact. Any other position would
amount to anarchy; it is precisely on this point that the anarchist
movement encounters some of its greatest philosophical and practical
difficulties. The only exceptions to this principle are to be found
on those occasions where the powers of the state are temporarily
withdrawn or in abeyance so that the individual is left unprotected
and, accordingly, resumes his own natural rights to self-defense
and self-help. It follows that those who have in their charge the
public powers of the state, have also at their command that monopoly
of the state in the use of force. Politically inspired terrorism
is really about who shall enjoy this awesome prerogative. Where
the powers of the state are regularly transferred among competing
parties, these exclusive powers are transmitted as a matter of
course; there is a tacit understanding as to the regularity and the
limits upon their use. Politically inspired terrorism is either
caused by or tends to produce a polarization. Instead of this spirit
of trust and compromise, there is a tendency to aggregate all the
powers of the state in a few hands and to resist any sharing of them.
A power struggle ensues and terrorism by one side or the other is
introduced to break the deadlock. What this means, in practical
terms, is that a power struggle in a dictatorship or totalitarian
state carries with it the inevitability of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, for no choice of weapons is really offered. Where
terrorism is the weapon of choice in a society traditionally open
to a variety of political processes of change, the resultant conflict
brings about a resistance that limits the political options.

There is a closing of ranks against the terrorist that forces
the state to act more and more after the fashion of a dictatorship.
Thus unsuccessful politically inspired terrorism is always in the
nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy; if that against which it
professes to be struggling does not exist at the commencement of
the struggle, it certainly will at the end. Thus, in extreme cases,
democracies are forced into states of emergency, curfews, unrestricted
search and seizure, closed trials; in short, all the ordinary proceedings
of the totalitarian state. The history of West Germany in this regard
since 1972 is a very instructive example of the process.

Politics is, then, a kind of human, social activity concerned
with the public power sharing process. Man alone on a dessert
island would have no need of politics. He would organize his
existence, as best he could, according to his own dictates. The
exercise of his will would not risk the prospect of conflict with
that of anyone else. It is the notion of society, of living together
and, most importantly, of adjusting to living together that creates
the need for politics. The moment another individual comes on the
scene to share the same space (territory), or the means to sustain
and enjoy life, a method must be devised for sharing the power that
a human being is capable of aquiring over these. In the most primitive
cases, naken power suffices as the arbiter of the question; the
stronger seizes control of all he requires or can dominate, excluding
others from enjoying the benefits of what is in dispute. This is
simply the Law of the Jungle; Might is Right. There is no moral
implication in this, it is merely the recognition of a state of fact.

The weaker party has, in these very elemental circumstances, a number of very basic choices to make. If there were anywhere else to go, he could just abandon the spoils to the conquerer. He can simply pack up and leave, going off to find, hopefully, something as good or better elsewhere that he might be free to enjoy without let or interference. The opportunities for this that undoubtedly existed in primitive times have obviously shrunk over the years so that Man has, from a political perspective, long reached the Last Frontier. This is the terrible modern-day dilemma of what have been styled "The Boat People". Alternatively, he can submit to the conqueror who, if he does not destroy him outright, may allow him to enjoy that which he does not wish to retain for himself. This is really in the nature of a dictatorship; the weaker individual is at the mercy of the other. If the dictator is benevolent and the other is not too proud to fawn or beg, the person in the weaker position may, materially, not fare too badly. What this does for the human spirit may, however, be well appreciated almost instinctively without further comment. The natural resentment at this patent emphasis on the inferiority of the conquered may be moderated by the stronger party <u>allowing</u> the weaker to enjoy certain things as a privilege, provided he behaves himself and provided he does not try to take anything that the stronger party has reserved for himself. Or, again, he can fight. If he is lucky, he will not be utterly destroyed and his capacity for continuing the unequal struggle terminated at that point. He thus lives to fight another day in the hope, perhaps vain, that one day he will overcome and win back

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that which he considers to be his own. It is not difficult to translate this simplistic analysis into concrete, practical, modern examples.

Politics is a way of avoiding the conflict and all the waste and unpleasantness that goes with it. A real political arrangement is only possible between two parties that have an approximate parity of strengths and who have a genuine respect for each other's positions. "I will be King today, and you will be King tomorrow. And I shall be King, again, the day after." Vastly different types can quite comfortably share power on that basis. The Lion can lie down quite comfortably with the Lamb - provided he knows and respects the fact that the Lamb is ever-vigilant and a regional karate champion. This is the stuff of which international agreements (and, eventually, international law) are made. This is how the general peace of the world is guaranteed. Such equivalence of strength, and the respect that goes with it, are rare indeed and even where they exist in imperfect though sufficient form for the purpose, they need constant demonstration and reaffirmation. More usually, politics is based, both nationally and internationally, upon a polite fiction. We pretend that some sort of equivalence and respect exist, simply because the majority cannot be bothered to fight over the matter. The issues cannot be seen, in real life, in the stark black and white terms in which they have been drawn here for the sake of example. There is a certain amount of leeway; it is not, generally, an all or nothing situation. Conflict is avoided in society because, by and large, people are too busy with the matter of living to be

bothered by the petty, irksome restrictions that result from a true appreciation of one's real status in life. There is enough for most to enjoy - and if they feel cheated by the comparison with the lot of others - they simply grumble and put up with it. This is the principle of political apathy or inertia, and the astute politician knows well how to control the supply to this relatively quiescent segment of society - the masses - so as to keep the level of contentment near the mark that signifies stability and lack of movement. Most people are prepared to leave the business of power-sharing and power-using to others - provided they are able to receive enough to meet a level of expectation that will keep them from breaking through the barrier of their own inertia. While this apathetic state must have very primitive explanations - it is probably little more than the patient resignation of the vanquished converted to more permanent form - it has been developed by socializing and other processes to the point of conditioning. Thus Cicero could speak of giving the masses "Bread and Circuses" to keep them from disturbing the even tenor of government, while Karl Marx could percipiently refer to organized religion as "The Opium of the People", in an allusion to the tranquilizing effect of this as employed by astute politicians. This is the "Corruption" against which the terrorists, who see themselves as undeceived purists in this, are fighting. Political agitators know that they must break this apathy so as to unleash the very potent forces residing in these normally tranquil masses. Every underground radical's pamphlets are replete with techniques for "consciousness raising" directed to these ends. What lies behind and beneath this requires further examination for the present purposes.

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These polite fictions must be resolutely torn aside. The
modern world simply does not provide for this civilized interchange
among equals or near equals; all government is, whatever the fiction,
a benevolent dictatorship - or worse. The alternative - and this
exists practically, in many parts of the world today - is anarchy,
or no government at all. Democracy probably did not survive the
demise of Athens - if it ever had any real, as distinct from idealistic,
existence. A manifest dictatorship at least has the merit of intellect-
ual honesty about it. Those who are subject to it know that they are
in a position of patent inferiority; the evidence for this is constantly
about them. Their choices are limited, in essence, to submission or
resistance. Most choose the former, with a little leavening of the
latter wherever they can find some elasticity or weakness in the
system. Benevolent dictatorships are simply those that allow a
greater latitude to their subjects in the hope of reducing the
resistance quotient. Sometimes they can be extremely successful
in this regard. So-called democracies are simply benevolent dicta-
torships by another more palatable name, although it would be offensive
to many to countenance it. It is government by the cumulative power
of the many reposing in the hands of the few. This power, notionally,
has been "voluntarily" surrendered by the many in return for a variety
of "rights" over its future exercise. In fact, this power has generally
been transformed and transferred by default; apathy prevents both
an inquiry into how it has happened or any action to change this
state of affairs. The range of contentment with these arrangements
runs from very high in countries like the Western Democracies to

exceedingly low in the under-developed countries that have tried to adopt the forms without the substance or have had these imposed upon them by external forces. The fact remains, however, that these arrangements are, stripped of all adornment, a practical dictatorship by a majority or by a minority - more usually the latter. This proposition can be practically translated into concrete, contemporary terms. The Socialist Workers Party has about as much chance of having a meaningful say in the exercise of the public powers of the United States according to its own ideas of government as El Poder Cubano has of taking over the direction of General Motors. Politics, mainly, is not about power-sharing any more; that has already been decided in most cases as a historic matter. It is about power-conferring according to ritualistic formulae that are designed, mostly, to hide the truth. There is nothing essentially wicked about this, nor even immoral; it is simply a matter of practical necessity. But there are some who will not accept this nor the rationale of the premises upon which it is based. These are the protagonists of politically-inspired terrorism.

Politics is, then, mainly a fictional process created to give the illusion of a real give and take in this matter of public powers. By and large, most people are content with the fiction. It allows them to organize; it allows them to ventilate their feelings in relief-giving but nondestructive ways; it allows them to choose to follow leaders in whom they can repose their confidence for a greater or lesser period of time. And it gives them the illusion

that they have the real power to remove, by these same peaceable
means, these leaders when they are no longer felt to be capable
of truly representing the interests of those who have elevated them
to power. A good political system is one which preserves this illusion
in high measure, producing thereby a high degree of harmony and
stability in the exercise of the public powers necessary for the
business of government. A bad system is one in which this process
is seen for the illusion it really is. Politics is not a single,
one time event, but a continuing process that runs through a number
of very distinct phases. The degree of contentment must be distributed
adequately through these different phases so as not to impose undue
strain on any part of the system as a whole. Politics is really a
kind of escape valve to take off certain pressures that are inevitable
where any group of persons tries to live, work and share together.
Thus the political process involves a great deal of talk. Any system
that seeks to limit this is in danger of exposing the reality that
lies behind the illusion. Translated into practical terms, this
process involves the right of assembly, the gathering of the mass
of the people to talk about some matter and, perhaps, to decide upon
a course of action; it involves the creation of sub-groups, political
parties that can represent the interests of those who can find some
common ground upon which to work together; it involves elections,
the choosing of representatives, for time alone dictates an economy
of talk; it involves a type of constituent assembly where those
invested with the appropriate public powers can do more talking
about the way in which they are exercised. It is small wonder that,

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with all this talk, the average member of society should become confused or indifferent. Leave it to the politicians! While matters proceed more or less satisfactorily, while the expectations of the many can be broadly satisfied, and the disappointments of the few brought under control within the system, the political process works well. When the system starts to malfunction, either as a matter of natural wear and tear or by reason of some induced operational defict, the process is called in question. The strength of a political system lies in its ability to respond to this questioning so as to function once more to the broad satisfaction of those who are involved, at all levels, in its processes.

Politically inspired terrorism is that which is aimed at disturbing the political process so as to bring about a different distribution of the public powers it has been designed to allocate. It may be on a general or a localized scale. It may have national, regional, international, or even global implications. Ideologically, it may be of any complexion and it may be generated to keep power or to seize it from others. Terrorism begins where the talking ends. Politics is talk precedent to action; terrorism is action precedent to another kind of action. The politically inspired terrorist is one who despairs of making his voice effectively heard, within the system, in the formulation of some action. He substitutes his own action to make the point. It is the cry of the politically inspired terrorist that, "You will not hear our voices, then you must hear our bombs". The Voices of Guns, of which the SLA spoke so pathetically in its communiques, expresses the same idea. It is worth pondering

what such terrorists did before the advent of such noise-makers for
it tells much about the distinctions between the Old terrorism and
the New. The politically inspired terrorist is simply the protester
elevated to another dimension. Some remain content with the oppor-
tunities the system offers them for ventilating their grievances.
Others are content to escalate their protest, in non-violent fashion,
even outside the system, and to suffer for it if necessary as a form
of additional protest. Others feel the futility of such personal
sacrifice without the prospect of a commensurate reward. It is they
who lay their hands once more upon the powers that others are content
to allow to remain within the realm of the state. These are the
terrorists. There is probably a little bit of the terrorist in most
people; there is a great deal, but not yet enough, in the protesters.
In the vast majority, the feelings as well as the will to act are
suppressed for a wide variety of reasons: morality; respect for
the rights and interests of others; fear; apathy; or even plain
cowardice. Many of these ordinary folk get a vicarious pleasure
from the actions of the terrorist who dares to do what they would
like to do but cannot bring themselves to engage in. It is these
who give, even in negative fashion, aid and comfort to the terrorist.
This was expressed in another context by David Abrahamsen who opined
that society hates the criminal yet loves his crimes. The politically
inspired terrorist may have lingering self-doubts, he may be a cynic
or even beyond disillusionment. But he has moved from the field of
theory to the camp of action and it is there that his challenge
must be met - or the battlefield abandoned to him.

Before pressing on, it is worth observing that apathy in the body politic is not simply a malaise that affects the great mass of the governed. While this inertia is an important factor that must be weighed and incorporated into any political calculation, the apathy of those who have these public powers entrusted to them must also be taken realistically into account. This apathy, its extent and strength are extremely important to the terrorist. By gaging this with accuracy, he knows how much resistance he might expect to meet. Those who enjoy power and have enjoyed it relatively undisturbed over a long period tend to become over-confident. They are disinclined to believe in the magnitude of the threat posed by the opposition or to take early measures to provide against the threat. Some believe in their own invulnerability. Others believe in the aura of protection cast about them by their own benevolence and magnanimity; who would want change under such circumstances? Some are simply myopic, while others do not want to see the threat that is plainly emerging before their eyes. Besides, there are usually so many other problems that require attention. The threat of the political activist who is prepared to offer not merely a challenge to the established order of things, but to actually break out from his own prison of apathy is one which is not generally in contemplation until the signs make themselves too evident to be ignored. In those systems where powers are widely and thinly distributed so as to spread the load of responsibility for their exercise among a large number of different elements, there exists another kind of apathy that translates itself into a slowness of

response. Our modern democracies require extensive processes of consultation as a prelude to action. Such political societies are simply not geared for the immediate and effective response that more elemental, totalitarian societies can generate. It has been pertinently said that "If Moses had been a committee, the Children of Israel would still be in Egypt". While this result may have given a totally different complexion to modern Middle Eastern problems, the essential idea contained in the statement is worthy of serious thought. The Romans perceived the political problem with their usual clarity. When danger of a high order threatened, the Consuls, with their divided powers, ordinarily providing the safeguards of checks and balances on each others excesses or eccentricities, were replaced by a Dictator. He, taking once more into his hands the undivided power of the state, was able to meet the dangers with whatever might be neeeded for the purpose. There is an inherent inertia in the collective decision-making process. The terrorist, whose decisions on this level have already been made, counts on this advantage. The more stable the society, the more widely distributed its essential powers, the slower it is to react. Politically inspired terrorism is a critical activity often finely focussed upon the ponderous machinery that ordinarily serves society in non-crisis conditions. The necessary adjustments to such machinery cannot be rapidly made. The choice lies between abandoning the machine in a crisis, or preparing some auxiliary or supplementary organism to defend it when it comes under attack. The appropriate choice cannot be usefully made once the attack is underway.

The politically inspired terrorist is, by necessity, the Outsider.
He cannot work within the system by this means for he intends to take
it over or replace it. In a sense, every terrorist of this genre
is the Outsider trying to work his way in. Some manage, during the
span of their careers, to make the transition successfully from
terrorist to respected statesman. This is only another way of
saying that terrorism is a means to an end, in this case, the attain-
ment of political control through means other than those provided by
the regularly established political process. There is this fundamental
incongruity about politically inspired terrorism; those who resort
to it must, of necessity, erect their own value system, their own
judgment in these matters above those of all others; yet, because
they need, indispensably, a political constituency for what they
are purporting to do, they have to seem altruistic. The politically
inspired terrorist always claims to be acting on behalf of others,
not selfishly in his own cause. This is, ultimately, the criterion
by which he must be judged. This incongruity takes on a deeper
significance when it is set against what has been said of the basic
nature of terrorism. For despite the "bad" connotation that terrorism
has acquired, especially in recent times, the politically inspired
terrorist is constantly trying to depict himself and what he does
as being essentially "good". There endeavors have not been without
their measure of practical success. The sympathies of the general
public can often be quite usefully engaged. Even where the terrorist
cannot expect the active support of the community, an unwillingness

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to assist the authorities might be all that is necessary to give

him an operational edge. There is, however, a more tangible side

to all this than mere sentiment. The politically inspired terrorist,

because - at least in some circles - he can be regarded as "good"

in this way can count on certain advantages that have been translated

into definite legal benefits. The Common Law, of which the United

States system is a substantial beneficiary, did not recognize the

concept of political crime. Many other legal systems do so, and

acts of terrorism that are politically inspired can often be brought

beneath the protective umbrella of this notion so as to afford the

perpetrators the very real benefits of asylum and protection from

extradition. A particularly strong tradition exists in this regard

among Latin American countries. Whatever the formal position, the

United States has not been impervious to these sentiments. Skyjackers

in the early days, using this desperate means to flee from behind

the Iron Curtain, were not unwelcome in the United States. As late

as 1979, rather than accede to the extradition to Poland of a

skyjacker who had seized control of one of that country's airliners

and had the misfortune to land in West Berlin, the expensive and

incongruous expedient of reviving (after 25 years of somnolence)

the Supreme Tribunal of the Allied High Commission was adopted. The

result is that a United States judge has the anomalous and juristically

ridiculous task of giving this politically inspired offender his

"day" in court. On the same subject, it may be observed that the

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is expressly

prohibited by its charter from exchanging information about political

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criminals. All this has some very important consequences for the suppression of politically inspired terrorism. It means that the chameleon-like consideration of "political expediency" can sometimes prevail, even over the plain words of the law and other important principles of policy. Politics, it is said, can produce strange bedfellows. Politics, in this sense, is another name for the expression of self-interest. This is different at some times from what it is at others. Thus it may have been politic at one time for the United States to lend itself and its resources to those engaged in covert operations against Fidel Castro's Cuba. At a later date, it may have seemed politic not merely to have denied these same facilities but actively to have cooperated with the Cuban authorities to frustrate such operations.

All this is very difficult for law enforcement. It creates uncertainty and confusion. It would greatly simplify matters were it possible to state, unequivocally, that one is unconcerned about a person's politics, all that matters are his crimes. Unfortunately, on a realistic basis, this is simply not the case. We are, practically, forced to recognize politically inspired terrorism as a distinct variant requiring special treatment. In some cases, the association of the term "political" is regarded as an aggravation; this motivation is seen as so threatening to the state and its functions that those who engage in it must receive condign punishment. It is more usual, however, that the politically inspired terrorist is regarded as something in the nature of "honorable"; trials are turned into circuses, and public sympathy serves to secure a lighter

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sentence than would otherwise have been meted out. The law enforcement officer cannot afford to ignore the political. He must be acutely tuned in to its implications. This is very unsettling, for these considerations make an already difficult task just that much harder. It is small wonder that law enforcement tries to disregard the political and to concentrate on the actual breaches of the criminal law that may have occurred, homicide, wounding, kidnapping, extortion, criminal conspiracy or whatever. This is not myopia nor tunnel vision; it is a practical, operational necessity. The practical proglems are not really occasioned by the completed crimes that are the overt manifestation of what has been called terrorism. This activity has, however, a tri-partite formation, developing from a planning and preparation phase, through an execution phase, to an aftermath. All terrorism, in that initial phase is a clandestine activity, and politically inspired terrorism perhaps more so than most. It requires association among those who are seeking to agree among themselves on the performance of acts which are manifestly outside the law; any hint of these in their developed state would lead to measures directed to frustrate them and to apprehend the perpetrators. It is only when the overt, execution stage is reached that the work can see the light of day. There is a special problem for law enforcement in those countries where political association is not only permitted but is actively encouraged as part of the continuing political process. When do such associations directed at bringing about political change pass from the permissible to the reprehensible and, onwards, to the illegal? It would seem that, if the plain

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words of the law were followed, there should be no real problem in making such a determination. Important rights of association and free speech are enshrined in the United States Constitution and other laws clearly protect the free exercise of fundamental "political" rights. The sensitivity of these issues is not lost on any experienced law enforcement officer. It is a fact of history that public revulsion at what was considered an un-American use of police powers has in recent years substantially impeded the investigation into the nature of many matters that might constitute the vitally important planning and preparation phase of an act of politically inspired terrorism. It is not merely a question of when these activities might be criminal but rather of when it might be permissible to commence investigating them. This is among the thorniest issues confronting law enforcement in this field today. It is substantially clouded and befogged by the "political" issue.

Politically inspired terrorism does not, (nor, indeed, does any other type) spring fully-fledged from the nest. The planning and preparation phase may be short or long but, by inexorable logic, it must have a beginning. From a law enforcement perspective, that beginning is not a matter of inspired revelation. No law enforcement officer is endowed with the remarkable prescience or insight to be able to say, "I sense that planning and preparation for some act of terrorism has begun"; not even in a Conrad novel was such a fantastic claim ever advanced. What begins as a suspicion, fed by the patient professional processing of often unrelated information, burgeons into a certainty as the necessary inquiries are made and the connections

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established. It <u>may</u> all begin as a hunch, a gut-feeling or a
professional reaction to something quite unconnected with the
matter at hand; an experienced officer will often "scent" something
worth following up in this way. But at this stage, the matter is
nothing more than an unformulated idea; certainly nothing so concrete
as a probability to be tested by reference to specific lines of
enquiry. How can one advance the matter further, to know whether
it is worth serious pursuit or whether the whole idea should be
discarded. It is here that one comes into headlong collision with
the "political" in this arena. Linda Valentino, a one-time anti-war
activist now working for the American Friends Service Committee is
investigating "the new breed of domestic police spy". People (In
Her Own Words, June 11, 1979). "Surveillance", says Valentino,
"is only justified when there is probable cause to believe that
someone is involved in criminal or violent activity". When, it
might be pertinently enquired, does such a belief arise and, more
importantly, how? It does not come into being by some spontaneous
process of creation. Terrorists do not advertise their preparatory
activities; indeed, they take the greatest of pains to conceal them.
A senior IRA member has said, "Informing, that can very often lead
to execution". Other terrorist organizations are no less severe
on those who provide information to the authorities. Even the most
balanced civil libertarian can hardly imagine that information about
such activities is going to be volunteered; this is rather like
expecting an unsuspected drug smuggler to make a voluntary return
of his illicit gains to the Internal Revenue Service. One is left

with the inescapable conclusion that <u>some</u> sort of preliminary police work is <u>always</u> necessary to raise the belief. What sort of police work is required to raise this "probable cause to believe"? The answer can only be, "Exactly the same kind that would be necessary to enquire into the matter itself".

There is, in all this, the righteous belief that "political" activities ought not to be the subject of surveillance at all. But politically inspired terrorism is always preceded by activities that could claim immunity from surveillance on these dubious grounds. There is little doubt that the clamor by sincere civil libertarians over the years that has resulted in the severe curtailment of law enforcement intelligence activities has enormously aided this kind of terrorist, for it has simply made an extremely difficult police task that much more difficult, if not impossible. The partial nature of what is suggested is revealed by Ms. Valentino's own words: "I'm all for anything that helps the police keep an eye on organized crime. I think that also applies to groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Weathermen and the American Nazi party". Enough is contained in that short statement not only to demonstrate clearly what is meant by "political" but also to reveal a great deal of the speaker's own political beliefs. A couple of useful observations on its content may be usefully made. At what point in time did a "probable cause to believe" arise in the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army so as to have justified surveillance of that organization? When the matter is critically reviewed, it will be seen that it would certainly

not have been soon enough to have saved the life of Marcus Foster
nor to have prevented the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst. What kind
of surveillance of such a group could possibly have been contemplated?
It conducted little, if any, of its business by telephone and it was
too small and too nervous to have made penetration feasible. But -
and this is the heart of the matter - it remained completely unknown
until it announced itself after the execution phase of its first
successful operations. It must be simply recognized that the label
"political" attached to any activity confers, of itself, no special
immunity from enquiry; there are licit political activities and,
just as surely, illicit ones. When the one shades into the other
is either a matter of conjecture - or a matter of established fact.
The latter is only possible when the question is properly posed and
subjected to the appropriate scrutiny. Comparatively few political
activists become terrorists. In the first instance, there is nothing
about them or their behavior to distinquish them from the mass of
which they form part. They do not advertise their intentions to
make the transition from assertive but law abiding political indi-
viduals to violent criminals; they would, indeed, be extremely
foolish to do so. They take great care to camouflage their intentions
to engage in acts of terrorism, and all the "underground" manuals of
instruction tell them how they should go about doing this. Serious
terrorists, indeed, become less and less overtly "political" and
avoid anything in the nature of a confrontation likely to draw upon
themselves the attention of the authorities; the Italian terrorists
offer many good examples of these changes. Given that politically

inspired terrorism is among the most serious kinds encountered
and is that which must, in these days, be taken to have inspired
the highest level of public concern, it is a most serious question
for law enforcement as to when and by what methods these transfor-
mations from law abiding activist to prospective terrorist might
be observed. Those who advocate waiting until the execution phase
are giving the terrorist the opportunity to strike a death blow at
society. What principle of politics, it might be asked, prompts
such generosity?

Non-Politically Inspired Terrorism

This is the category of terrorism described under the rubric
"Non-political terrorism" by the Report of the Task Force on Disorders
and Terrorism. In substance, this activity is not radically different
from what is so delineated in that Report. A change of nomenclature
is, however, rendered necessary by the view taken here of the funda-
mentally political nature, in the wider sense explained, of all
terrorism. In view of the careful distinctions that have been drawn
here to enable an accurate and useful structuring of what has been
called "Politically inspired terrorism", it is obviously needful
to construct a suitable title for that which is no less terrorism
but which is motivated by other than political considerations in the
narrow public sense that has been fully described. Here, the assault
upon authority and the public powers vested in those who wield them
on behalf of the state is no less pernicious or dangerous, but it
is limited in its direction and extent. No supersession of the
political authorities is contemplated as a consequence of resort

to this type of terrorism. The object is not the overthrow of government and its overt replacement with another kind of political system favored by the protagonists of terrorism. The attack on authority is more subtle, more carefully disguised, less direct, but nevertheless just as insidious and destructive of the bases on which the legal exercise of the powers of the state rests. All the real elements of terrorism, substantive and methodological are there. The employment of terrorism by these non-politically inspired groups differs not in overall strategy or tactics but, rather, by reference to its ends. Essentially - and this is the really distinguishing feature - this end is individual or collective gain in the private sense. It is this that serves to characterize this type of terrorism as non-politically inspired more than anything else. Although this kind of terrorism has this underlying "private" purpose, the proper exercise of public powers is vitally affected by it. Ordinary crime is a challenge to society and a defiance of the system of control, containment, and repression erected against it. This kind of terroristic crime goes a step further. It is not merely carried on "in spite of" the measures society has taken to protect itself. It, in effect, carries its war into the enemy's camp; it is a crippling attack on the effectiveness of the protective measures themselves.

The prime manifestation of this kind of terrorism is that engineered and directed by those anti-social groups that tend to be somewhat inconveniently lumped together under the title of organized crime. There is, of course, no such entity as "organized

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crime" in a monolithic sense. There are organized groups of criminals
engaged in criminal enterprises of a broadly similar nature in
different parts of the United States and the rest of the world. It
is their organization, their methodical way of going about their
business that really marks them out for special attention rather
than their cohesiveness or group structure. Organized crime is
much more than an idea; it is an activity, and a thriving one at
that. It is worth noting here two points made in the Report of the
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
Task Force on Organized Crime (pp. 7/8):

> "Organized crime has economic gain as its primary goal,
> though some of the participants in the conspiracy may have
> achievement of power or status as the objective".

> "Organized crime employs predatory tactics such as intimidation,
> violence, and corruption, and it appeals to greed to accomplish
> its objectives and presence it gains".

The Task Force perceptively observed that:

> "Organized crime does not include terrorists dedicated to
> political change, although organized criminals and terrorists
> have some characteristics in common, including types of crimes
> committed and strict organizational structures.
> Although violent acts are a key tactic of organized crime,
> the use of violence does not in itself mean that a group is
> part of a confederacy of organized criminals. Organized crime

groups tend to be politically conservative, desirous of main-
taining the status quo in which they succeed, contrary to
terrorist groups dedicated to radical political change through
violent acts."

There are a number of points that should be made here, not by
way of modification, but as commentary and reinforcement of what was
then stated by that Task Force. The connection of organized crime
with politically inspired terrorist groups goes well beyond similar-
ities of organization and method, or even imitation. There is
considerable evidence of actual interchange of personnel and what
may be termed "technology transfers". The extremely lucrative nature
of many kinds organized crime activity tends to attract those who
have simply a general propensity for and commitment to violence
rather than to a cause, in the interests of which it is generated.
Certain kinds of skills are extremely useful to terrorists of any
type and, in a thin market, such talents are avidly sought by those
who have employment for them. It is, therefore, relatively easy
under certain circumstances for operatives at the direct action
level to make what amounts to lateral transitions as and when the
opportunities for them occur. Too much value ought not to be placed
upon organized crime's traditional "conservatism" as an inhibitor
to these movements. The conservatism of the leaders, which may have
a certain ideological flavoring to it, is very different from the
conservatism of the led which, almost everywhere, has a blind,
unthinking quality about it that can be surprisingly changed, given

the right catalyst. This is well illustrated by the case of Italy, where the early, inexpert, but enthusiastic politically inspired terrorists augmented their ranks from among the great kidnapping industry that had long flourished in that country. The same thing has happened in Columbia, where kidnapping for profit had long been endemic. The terroristic operations of organized crime, in particular kidnapping, can quite compatibly co-exist with similar though unrelated operations undertaken by politically inspired terrorists. Not only does this hamper and confuse the law enforcement response and the public understanding of the events, but facilitates the movement of operational personnel between the two. The conservatism of organized crime is not a manifestation of partisan politics, but, rather, a strongly expressed preference for the status quo. In truth, organized crime is happy with any political system that will allow it to go about its business with a minimum of hindrance. It is only antagonistic to that which seeks to suppress it or radically alter its style.

Terrorism and organized crime are, then, natural partners. It must not be assumed that those organized for the undertaking of these various, profitable criminal activities are constantly engaged, at the same time, in the business of terrorism. Like their legal counterparts, those engaged in these nefarious pursuits are, in good American fashion, strictly in the business of Business. Organized crime is concerned principally with the illicit enrichment of those going about the different activities comprising that business. But organized crime has not only to contend with the forces of law

and order. It is an intensely competitive business in which the prizes are disproportionately large for those who are able to grab them. The business has often to be imposed, by force, upon an unreceptive or frankly unwilling clientele. Organized crime is a sordid business where fear rules through the knife, the gun, and the bomb. In a very real sense, the organization of those who have set themselves up to profit by these criminal activities represents a parallel or shadow society. Its enforcement methods mirror those of regular society but with none of the checks and balances, none of the restraints or inhibitions. Whereas the regular system of organized society relies, in the first instance, upon an ingrained, innate disposition towards obedience among those associated for the purposes of communal living, with the use of force to ensure compliance with the necessary norms as a last resort, organized crime must perforce reverse the process. Organized crime has no track record; it must build one. Once this fearsome reputation is established - and experience has shown that it can be built up very quickly - a nod or lift of the eyebrow suffices to suggest the presence of the iron fist in the velvet glove. Organized crime has no more use for force for its own sake than has regular society, but its structure is more fragile, its hierarchy less secure, and its enforcement needs more urgent and immediate. Organized crime may, therefore, be compared to those political regimes that are obliged to govern through fear rather than by reason of a willing acceptance of the majority of their peoples. Their organization, methods, and objectives are really strikingly similar. It is for

this reason that organized crime cannot exist in a totalitarian
society; they simply have each other's measure, but the regular,
political system is the stronger of the two. For both, terrorism
is a necessary weapon in the struggle to establish and maintain
control over their captive population. For both, this activity
is virtually endemic and ineradicable, coloring all the operations
undertaken. It is the closeness of this to the surface, the ever-
present threat of violence beneath the veneer of tranquility, that
gives in the case of organized crime·the impression that terrorism
is a much larger part of its over-all activities than it really is.
Terrorism is used by organized crime as a substitute for the regular
methods of law enforcement available to democratically organized
political societies by reason of the voluntary acceptance of
authority by a majority.

What this means, in practice is that the activities of those
engaged in organized crime must be subjected to careful scrutiny
so as to be able to distinguish what is terrorism - as it has been
defined in this study - from what is not. Many activities of
organized crime will involve the use of violence but they will
lack the essential characteristics that are associated with such
criminality so as to be able properly to designate them as terrorism.
It is the failure to make these necessary distinctions that lies
at the heart of the arguments about whether what organized crime
does (or, more properly, what organized criminals do) is or is not
terrorism. The matter is complicated because the thrust of the
terrorism of organized crime is bifurcated. It is directed on the

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one hand at those who are antagonistic to it or are unwilling to participate with it in this business. That, for all practical purposes, is the great mass of the regular law abiding citizenry and their chosen authorities. The other thrust of terrorism is against those who must be regarded as comprising this parallel society itself in some way, either as clients or partners in the business of crime. Notwithstanding that the latter is a distinct class, bound together by common interests and purposes, it does not cease on that account to be a part of the former. Those involved in the business of organized crime remain a part of lawfully organized society, like it or not; and the protection established by that society extends to all members of it regardless of the rules they may, illicitly, have established for themselves. To a certain extent, all the terrorism in which organized criminals engage is of a truly defensive nature. This, too, distinguishes their employment of this activity from its use by politically inspired terrorists. Whether against their own or against others, the resort to terrorism has this protective character. Organized crime is content to remain part of the wider society; it is not trying to take over government on its own account. Terrorism is a reaction to government and is only directed against it when there seems to be no alternative or when some impulsive operator allows matters to get out of hand. So far as regular authority is concerned, organized crime would rather switch than fight, for its leaders know that, in a fight to the finish, they cannot hope to win. The other thrust of terrorism is sometimes more aggressive, but it is

still of an essentially defensive nature. It is the weapon employed
to keep this parallel society in line. The "enforcer" is this society's
policeman. Like all law enforcement "authorities", his jurisdiction
is carefully spelled out and limited by a variety of considerations.
He creates the appropriate respect for his office through the threat
of or the actual use of violence. The purposeful creation of a
climate of fear is very necessary to the maintenance of order in
this society. The parallel with what is done by politically inspired
terrorists is evident. But, once again, the real comparison is
with those political regimes that use terrorism to keep themselves
in power. Only in the narrow framework of the organized crime world
itself do we see the comparison with the politically inspired terrorist
in his aggressive mode. This society has its wars, its struggles for
supremacy, in short, its own politics. Terrorism is a weapon, too,
in these wars. But it should not be overlooked that they, like
conventional wars, can be fought without resort to terrorism. Many
have to be fought in this way because the 'enemy' - other organized
criminals - are just that much harder to frighten.

Organized crime may, therefore, be seen as in a constant state
of competition for available resources, territory and anything
necessary to further its business. This is not very different from
the situation facing the ordinary business community and, even more
strikingly, the community of nations. We see that the larger, older
established states have learned, after a fairly lengthy period of
conflict and jockeying for position to live together more or less
peacefully and to respect ech others' territorial integrity and

spheres of influence. Alliances have sprung up out of mutual need,
mainly in the interests of attaining some rough parity that will
guarantee the status quo and peace among nations. These facts of
international geo-politics have their counterpart in the nether
world of organized crime. The old established organized crime
families in the United States and Canada have, like nation states,
seen many upheavals and changes of leadership over the years. Some
have disappeared, to have their interests and territory swallowed
up by more powerful rivals, while others have, for all their fragility
compared with the nation state, survived virtually intact into the
present era. Organized crime is no longer _Cosa Nostra_ any more
than the United Nations is what it was in 1945. New power centers
have sprung up, new interests have been added, and new groups have
come into the business to exploit the increasingly profitable fields
of drugs, gambling, prostitution, pornography and loan sharking.
It has not been easy to maintain organization and an orderly spoils
system in the face of these developments. The newer entrants to
the field have sometimes been difficult to discipline and to integrate,
satisfactorily, into the order of things. Organized crime, above
all, requires this internal orderliness to attain maximum efficiency.
Indeed, the famous Apalachin, N.Y. meeting of 1958 may be seen as an
attempt to create a sort of "United Nations" to regulate and bring
order to organized crime in the Continental U.S.A. Such an attempt
might have had considerable success had organized crime remained
largely controlled in all its aspects by one ethnic group. Inevitably,
burgeoning business has attracted powerful and aggressive "outsiders"

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who have not felt themselves bound by the constraints that impelled
the earlier attempts at power-sharing. Prominent among these
relatively new entrants to the field as powerful, independent
entrepreneurs have been the Hispanics.

Much of the conflict, and a great deal of the terrorism associated
with organized crime, can be attributed directly or indirectly to the
traffic in drugs, which has burgeoned enormously in the last few years.
The financial returns from trafficking in drugs of all kinds and,
in particular, in heroin, marijuana, and lately, cocaine, are truly
staggering. This extraordinarily high liquid cash flow creates very
attractive opportunities for those engaging in these activities and,
not unnaturally, has drawn in a share of that criminal talent that
might otherwise have been engaged elsewhere. The stakes in these
operations are very high and they naturally draw not only the risk
takers, but those who are prepared to use extreme violence to gain
and maintain their share of the spoils. The size of the stake, the
unsettled nature of the power centers involved, and the general
aggressiveness of those engaged in this business, all sharpen the
prospects for conflict. The possibilities for conflict in this area,
are, indeed, endless. Conventional business is dependent, to a large
extent, upon the formation of an enduring climate of trust. Relation-
ships are established and cemented over the years that permit of
growth quite independently from any quarantees to maintain intact
the interests of those engaged in the business. None of this is
possible in this area of illicit activity. Trust is a rare commodity
indeed and the whole business has to be conducted against a background

of vigorous, continuing interdiction by law enforcement authorities.
Great fortunes and great power are to be won and lost here. The
international traffic in hard drugs has a feverish atmosphere about
it reminiscent of the nineteenth century Goldrush or the early days
of Prohibition. There is plenty of opportunity for terrorism here
and, in a rapidly changing scene where the new is striving to change
places with the old, it must be very much borne in mind that Terrorism
is the Weapon of the Weak, or those that perceive themselves to be
weak. There are no scruples here inhibiting its use; only its
effectiveness is in question. The Old Guard will ruthlessly use
terrorism to protect its entrenched interests just as certain states
will do so against political movements for change directed against
undermining their influence or overthrowing them. By the same
analogy, the Outsiders will employ terrorism, where they see it to
their advantage to do so, to improve their position, much after the
style of politically inspired terrorists out to seize control of the
powers of the state. In applying the analogy and sorting through
the tangled, confused web of fact, the greatest caution must be
used. There is much conflict, public and private, <u>but in these</u>
<u>great drug trafficking struggles, there is comparatively little</u>
<u>terrorism as it has been defined here</u>. This central fact is deserving
of the most careful attention. There is considerable, professional
law enforcement controversy as to whether the activities of organized
crime as a whole merit inclusion in a study of terrorism at all,
and, more particularly, whether there is an identifiable entity
that may be delineated and termed for convenience "<u>drug related</u>
<u>terrorism</u>". Others have argued, cogently, that these activities

are the very essence of terrorism. Views on these matters are often diametrically opposed and very difficult to reconcile. There is a great deal of truth in both positions. The problem lies in the isolation and separation of that truth from what has hardened into definite, and not always helpful, professional positions on the question.

What the media is now calling the Cocaine Wars of '79 are an excellent case in point and may serve as a clinical example. The extraordinary number of drug related killings that have occurred in South Florida during the first half of 1979 have produced an under-standable wave of concern in the community. While allusions to "Dodge City", "Chicago in the 1920's" and other lawless times and places abound, a careful analysis of the cases shows that if this is indeed a "drug war", it is not being fought between carefully drawn up forces, nor even modeled along the fluid lines of "guerrillas" protagonized by political extremists. The pervasive impression of "lawlessness" is an accurate one. These struggles lack the "organization" that characterized the "territorial" wars of New York and New Jersey, for example. They resemble, quite strikingly, the anarchy that followed the fractionalization of Italy's left-wing terrorist groups in the period 1977/78. What is proceeding at the moment is a violent scrimmage that neither the "enforcers" of organized crime nor the law enforcement apparatus of society can do very much to stop. There is unprecedented violence, the use of sophisticated automatic weaponry, killing in particularly fear-producing ways; none of this is in any doubt. But is this terrorism? The answer

that must be given is not as ambivalent as it might seem at first
sight. Some of it is, while some of it is not. Such confusion as
exists is the result of failure to separate terrorism as a distinct
entity from the dependent crimes that are its outward manifestation
and motive force. A great many of the killings are simply the
fruits of war; it is natural that they should cause concern, massive
fear even, but this is incidental to the purposes of those mounting
the campaign. The real purpose behind many of the killings is to
reduce the "enemy" forces - as is the case in any war - and to keep
the "enemy" out of the terrority to be defended. That exceptionally
violent methods have to be used to this end does not - of itself -
make their employment terrorism. Other killings, too, are primarily
for the purpose of elimination, but they are more personally oriented -
the victim simply knew too much, and that knowledge had become
inconvenient for those who ordered or undertook the killing. Yet
other killings are in the nature of a vendetta. They have a retri-
butive, vengeful basis but may be related to the wider, relatively
impersonal aspects of war - any of the "enemy's" soldiers would
have done equally well as a victim - or are directly connected with
something the victim himself (or herself) has done or failed to do.
Those who cheat, hold back money or drugs, adulterate the product,
or interfere in matters that are especially sensitive to others in
this violent, volatile trade are clearly subject to exemplary
punishment if caught. Other personal motives, such as arguments
over women and other relationships, also lead to killings that help
to swell the overall statistics. All of these killings can be done

in quite horrible ways using the methods commonly used by terrorists, politically as well as non-politically inspired.

A small percentage of these killings can, on a proper use of the proposed definition, be classified as terrorism. Those are the cases where the primary purpose of what is done is to produce a climate of overwhelming fear that is an end in itself. That end, essentially, is control, just as regular law enforcement efforts are designed to produce an overall climate favoring general deterrence. Although, percentage-wise the amount of drug related violence that can be regarded as terrorism is small, it is still considerably larger, at the present time, than politically inspired terrorism in South Florida. The importance of this needs no underlining in the context of the present study. In a sense, the terrorism is a pointer to what is really happening; it is a significant indicator of the way the struggle for control is proceeding. A number of basic facts can be asserted. The current struggle is mainly between two Hispanic factions, the one Cuban and the other Columbian; all others are really outsiders. The Cubans, like many of their brothers in the United States are no strangers to organized crime. Pre-Castro Havana was one of the great centers of organized crime activity and South Florida, because of its geographic proximity to Cuba, has long been familiar with the Cuban Connection. Although, from time to time, organized crime adopts a patriotic pose, it is, by necessity, made up of hard-nosed, if corrupt businessmen. As it was self-evident that Castro was not going to be good for that kind of business, organized crime, along with the bulk of good, generally

law-abiding Cubans forced out by the new regime, settled where it felt it might best pick up the threads once more, namely in Dade County. Already well established in that area in many ways, Cuban organized crime quickly settled down in its new surroundings and began, confidently, to build a base in what promised eventually to become a predominantly Hispanic area. Organized crime in the United States came heavily into the drug traffic at a comparatively late stage. Early in the present decade, the potentiality of cocaine as a part of this highly profitable business seems to have been realized by only a very few writers who had a specialized knowledge of the Latin American scene. It is this substance, and the tremendously increased use of it in the United States in the last few years that has given Dade County its notorious pre-eminence as a transhipment area and, incidentally, given rise to the extraordinary violence associated with this traffic. This is not a war over "territory" in the conventional sense. Rather, it is a war over business and the "right" to do a particular kind of business in a peculiarly advantageous way. The Cubans who have had a head start in this business and have the advantage of playing on what has become their home ground, are now fighting hard to retain their business against the incursions of determined and experienced rivals. Law enforcement and the rest of the community have become, in a certain measure, the unwilling witnesses of this grisly struggle.

A most material interpolation is necessary at this juncture. There is no such thing as a <u>Latin American</u> terrorist or a <u>Latin American</u> criminal any more than there is a <u>Latin American</u> law. Each country of Central and South America is very distinct in culture,

temperament, and the general contribution it has to make to the greater family of nations. Even adjacant countries show wide differences in style and character; in the present context, it is interesting to compare the _Tupamaros_ of Uruguay with the _Montoneros_ of Argentina. The Cuban is as much a stranger to the _Altiplano_ of Peru and Bolivia as any _gringo_; the failure of Ernesto "Che" Guevarra's campaign in these countries is as much due to that as to that ex-Argentinian's romanticism. Of all the countries of Latin America, where both political and personal violence is endemic, the record of one country, Columbia, stands out from the rest. _La Violencia_ that raged in that country between 1948 and 1956 claimed, by the official count, more than 200,000 lives; the true total of victims was probably very much higher. Columbia is a land of violent contrasts. Much of its territory has been under the direct control of criminal elements since long before _La Violencia_ and it is unlikely that, given the nature of the terrain and the resources available, any government in that country will ever be able to claim authority over these areas. The only real law is that of the gun. Left-wing political terrorism has erupted sporadically and dangerously; if not very enthusiastically. Kidnapping in that country has been brought to at least as fine an art as in Italy; the prospects of survival for the victims are probably not quite as good. Columbian criminals are known and greatly feared throughout South and Central America. This fear is, on good evidence, well justified. Columbian criminals are daring and efficient, and show a degree of viciousness that is almost entirely absent in their counterparts from other Latin American

countries. They have long been active in the fabrication and trafficking of cocaine in their own country and the laws for the suppression of these practices have proved largely ineffective, in part because of long habituation to the use of the coca leaf by all the autoctonous peoples of the Andean region. A particularly high grade of marijuana is also grown in Columbia and, as buyers from the North began to appear on the scene, a thriving trade in these drugs devevoped. For a long while, the Columbians were content to remain in the role of producers and couriers, for both of which they were extremely well suited. As the market began to expand, however, and its great potential was at last realized, Columbians began to look not only for a larger share of the market, but for a change in role. For this, they had to enter the United States and establish themsleves in a convenient area where they could not only cope with the law enforcement interdiction efforts, but also the plain logistics of the operation. Thus they were quickly brought into conflict with the already established Cubans, who were already operating this aspect of this lucrative trade. A meeting between the Cubans and Columbians is said to have been held in December, 1977, to work out some sort of accommodation and a kind of "most favored nation" status for Cuban dealers. Whatever agreement was arrived at, it does not seem to have settled matters.

The "war" is still in a relatively primitive stage. Most of the casualties so far have been Columbian, and relatively expendable "peones" at that. There is no evidence yet by way of retaliation of characteristic Columbian terrorism, which is very distinctive and easily recognizable, but this must surely come. The Columbians

have now established a bridgehead into South Florida and they appear
to be as undeterred by their Cuban opposition as they are by the
efforts of law enforcement to deny them entry and the opportunity
to traffic. Some of the ruthlessness and daring of these Columbians
has been vividly demonstrated in Dade County in the last few months.
If they begin a serious campaign of terrorism in connection with this
drug traffic, casualties will be high and the strain on law enforcement
considerable. But there are other, more extensive implications in
all this for a study of terrorism that need to be examined. There
is the question of the possible connections between this non-politi-
cally inspired terrorism and the more feared politically inspired
terrorism that generally succeeds in gaining the major share of the
public attention. The politically inspired terrorism indigenous
to Columbia is distinctly left-leaning. The terrorists operating
in that country belong to a loose coalition of leftists bearing
many labels and of many different orientations. Their policies and
objectives would make them natural antagonists of the Cuban exile
community on a purely political level. Given the dominance in Dade
County of the Cuban exile community and the strength and depth of
the feeling against the Castro regime and all it represents, this
would seem to be a most hostile pond for extremist fish of another
political hue to enter. There would, on the face of it, be no
protective cover and many predators with which to contend. The
growing strength of the Columbian community and changing feelings
in the United States towards Latin American problems in general may
well shatter that illusion: the anti-Somoza demonstration at the

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beginning of July, 1979, is a significant pointer. So too is increasing immigration, legal and illegal, from other disturbed central American countries, notably El Salavador, Guatemala, and Panama. There is no discernible involvement of politically inspired Columbians in the current drug related conflicts, but personnel at this low level are interchangeable and information from the Columbian authorities on the point is frankly unreliable, for they simply do not have the resources or ability even to cope with this problem domestically, It will not be overlooked, too, that Castro has had long years of cooperation with many elements of the Columbian Left. At the moment, the drug trade is far too lucrative and engaging to leave much time or energy for anything else, but this Columbian foothold might well open the way for a different type of politically inspired terrorism from that with which this community has tradition- ally had to cope. Some of this could well be financed from the "excess profits" of this extraordinary drug trade.

This latter point is one which is directly relevant to another that can be conveniently mentioned in the present context. The traffic in guns in Dade County, both licit and illicit, is extra- ordinarily high. The ease with which weapons of all kinds can be bought over the counter is noteworthy; this is an area where a Ruger 22/10 can be bought in Woolworths. The prices of this striking array of weaponry are commensurate with the ease of purchase, but these top prices are undaunting to those engaged in these criminal activities. In fact, the huge amounts of cash permit not only the purchase and stockpiling of weapons of all types, but all manner of

other kinds of equipment useful in avoiding detection or in frustrating law enforcement interdiction endeavors. This is particularly so in the case of electronics and specialized marine equipment. In 1973, the radical criminologist Richard Quinney devoted much time and effort to documenting the efforts of the LEAA to improving the technology of the nation's police forces (Critique of Legal Order). An up-date from the other side would now clearly be in order. So far as guns are concerned, there are two aspects of this problem deserving of attention. There are, in consequence of this traffic, tremendous numbers of weapons, especially handguns, in private, unauthorized possession in Dade County. Not only does this fact have an understandable impact on the psychology of law enforcement. It leads directly to the casual, cavalier use of firearms to settle each and every argument. A drug trafficker without a firearm is like an alligator without a tail. There is another, even more sinister aspect to this proliferation and availability of weaponry in Dade County. There is a thriving traffic in weaponry that is directly related to events elsewhere. As in the case of drugs, Dade/Miami is a conveniently located transhipment point. There is an interesting fact revealed by BATF studies which if further pursued might be very informative about the nature and purposes of this trade. Guns purchased south of the Broward County line apparently find their way down to Latin America, while those purchased to the north end up travelling North into the United States. The proximity of many gun shops close to Miami International Airport and the thriving "Saturday afternoon" trade done by them gives an interesting impressionistic idea of the

potential of the problem. Gun running, though not commanding the profits generated by the traffic in drugs, and involving a somewhat inconvenient commodity to handle by size and weight, is nevertheless extremely attractive from a business point of view. Weaponry of all kinds is to be sold for cash at a very high premium in all countries in Latin America. The exact connection between drug smuggling, the trade in weaponry, and the equipping of terrorists and insurgents has never been established. Some authoritative studies have been done and many conjectures offered. Professional views differ on this, with some discounting the magnitude and importance of the trade - if it exists at all - with others taking the view that a thriving business involving drugs for guns takes place. The magnitude of gun sales in Dade County certainly suggests a sizeable outlet elsewhere.

A number of other varieties of non-politically inspired terrorism merit serious consideration and most were dealt with briefly in Disorders and Terrorism. Recently, considerable problems have been experienced with rival gangs of "Bikers". Law Enforcement authorities in Canada have recently expressed the view that in terms of power, potential, and criminal activity, these associations are but a very short distance behind Canada's traditional organized crime "families". The struggle for power between the "Outlaws" and "Hell's Angels" has given rise to a considerable wave of terrorism that has already caused much concern to Canadian law enforcement authorities. There are evident signs of the spreading conflict in Florida and these developments are deserving of close attention. The "Bikers" are not, by nature, criminal associations, but the character of their

organization and their attitudes to life, society, and regularly
constituted authority easily lead them into conflicts with the law
and with each other. As far as their potential for terrorism is
concerned, all that has been said about organized crime in this regard
is equally applicable to them.

Closely allied to the "Biker" phenomenon is another, which has
shown considerable potential for the generation of non-politically
inspired terrorism in the past and will doubtless, given current trends,
show a considerable increase for the future. "Cult" terrorism can be
a particularly ugly and bizarre phenomenon as evidenced by many events
from Manson to the People's Temple at Jonestown. These cults are
microcosms of regular society, in which terrorism is used as a means
of control Occasionally, it spills over into the regular community,
as in the case of the Tate/La Bianca killings and the assassination
of Congressman Ryan, where the cult feels itself able, or impelled,
to attack society in general. Even a socially oriented organization
such as "Synanon" can become perverted so as to engage in terrorism
when its leaders feel peculiarly threatened and have the power and
the means to threaten others in their turn.

Youth gangs, especially in large urban areas that have suffered
a period of deterioration, can present a serious terrorism problem.
They have the typical power struggles evinced by organized crime,
and the "Bikers", and show much of the organization of the former
and the colorfulness and viciousness of the latter. Neighborhoods
can be terrorized by such gangs so as to fall completely under their
control and this is especially so where they operate in areas heavily

populated by the elderly, who are unable, physically, to resist their

demands or otherwise control their incursions. The fear created by

these gangs is very real and part of a deliberate plan of control

and domination in which personal enrichment through extortion plays

a large part. These gangs are often heavily engaged in drug traffic,

are no strangers to firearms and other weaponry, and are a fertile

recruiting ground - a sort of junior league - for more advanced forms

of crime. Their potential for politicization, agitation, and eventual

terrorism can be well appreciated from a study of the Young Lords in

the 1960's. Such youth gangs are expecially attractive to the

Hispanic culture.

Some of the most violent, non-politically inspired terrorism

that has taken place in the United States is related to labor disputes.

Strikes and lock-outs have produced violent reactions that have left

their mark upon the community for generations. In a time of fragile

economy and poor labor relations, the possibilities for such terrorism

are very considerable and recent evidence suggests that it could

present a serious problem in many areas in the near future. Terroristic

sabotage is another by-product of these labor disputes.

A final class of non-politically inspired terrorist meriting

special mention is the mentally disturbed or psychopathic individual

who engages in his own, lone war on society in general, or some segment

of it in particular. Such individuals have obvious reason to see

themselves as "The Weak" and resort to terrorism is a natural outcome

of their struggles. Individuals such as Metesky and Kurbegovic may

be seen in this light; both were pursuing essentially private ends

by means of a public campaign of terrorism. The fictional protagonist of the events depicted in "Black Sunday" may be seen as another typical example, notwithstanding his association with politically inspired terrorists used by him in an instrumental fashion to accomplish his purposes.

International or transnational terrorism.

Terrorism truly knows no frontiers. It is unhampered by those jurisdictional considerations that are often so restrictive for those who have to cope with it. It is international, in the sense that its manifestations can embrace any and all countries according to the intent or purpose of the terrorists. The term is more usually employed in a narrower sense. International terrorists are those who have some objective in one part of the world which they are seeking to realize by operations taking place in another. They do not restrict their attacks to those against whom their struggle is principally directed. Thus the terrorists who seized the Air France A300 Airbus and redirected it to Entebbe, were primarily concerned with coercing the State of Israel into releasing incarcerated Arab prisoners. They involved a great many other nations by reason of the mixed nationalities of the passengers, the international airspace through which the aircraft travelled and, finally, Uganda which suffered an armed attack in consequence of allowing the aircraft to land in its territory. The terrorist group, too, was international in composition. The term transnational (sometimes loosely employed as a synonym for international), is more properly reserved for a

cohesive group of terrorists having a definite national identity but which carries out its operations against its adversary on foreign soil. The Arab terrorists who carried out the operations at the Munich Olympic games in 1972 can best be seen in this light.

International, politically inspired terrorism has become a serious and growing problem since the end of World War II. The attention this problem commands, at the present time, has been very largely the result of the many exploits of terrorists falling properly within this classification. One broad distinction may be made within this group between those terrorists having some definite territorial objective and those which do not. Groups like the IRA and the PLO are clearly engaged in a struggle that has, as its ultimate objective, securing control of a definite territory. The terrorism associated with that struggle would, presumably, be exhausted once control of that territory had been achieved. All the actions of such groups, whether undertaken within that territory or extending beyond it have this limited military and political aim. A majority of these groups fall within this class. Other terrorists have no such identification with a purpose of this kind but are simply bent upon the pursuit of such anarchistic goals as "World Revolution". The number of groups, world-wide falling into both categories is truly enormous and constantly changing; the annual CIA study of the phenomenon gives a good idea of its dimensions and the level of activity maintained at any particular time by each group. There is no true "Terrorist International" although cooperation at a command and operational level does exist among some groups.

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There is a certain amount of relatively low-level "technology transfer" and some interchangeability of personnel on an individual rather than an institutional basis. For obvious reasons, little trust exists among international groups, and contacts tend to take place mainly in training centers designed primarily to give military instruction to insurgent groups such as those in South Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.

Of particular concern to the United States are foreign short or long term residents who are using their status and shelter in this country to plan, prepare, and undertake operations either on United States soil or elsewhere against their adversary. The plurality of United States society, its relatively liberal immigration policies, and the number of students it has welcomed over the years have encouraged such developments. Among current problem groups might be mentioned the Croatians and Serbs, whose struggle against the Communist regime in Yugoslavia is likely to intensify rather than abate, and who have a long history of resort to terrorism to attain their political ends, and the Iranians, whose unsettled political situation at home is likely to lead to further violence abroad.

International or transnational terrorism poses especially difficult problems for United States law enforcement authorities. While the incidence of such terrorism up to the present has been comparatively slight, the potential for a "spectacular" is always there. These possibilities are always increased at times of national and international tension, of large international gatherings, and

when events lending themselves to expressive or symbolic terrorism take place. The age of rapid transportation and relatively slight documentation checks also encourages these possibilities. Intelligence processes are hampered not only by the ordinary restrictions imposed by the system itself, but also by the lack of adequate linguistic capabilities and access to informational sources. Something occurring half a world away can influence events in Dade County in very dramatic fashion and unless the information is rapidly available and the appropriate connections made among its different elements, an unexpected episode of terrorism can easily occur here for which no proper response provision is available. This contingency imposes not only a serious burden upon any strategic informational system but requires, too, a more than usually sophisticated analytical capability to be able to interpret accurately the information drawn into and processed by the system. This is generally beyond the capability and resources of most local law enforcement intelligence units, which must rely, accordingly, on associations of which they are members such as LEIU or FIU, informal contacts, and the federal government. The quantity and quality of information available to any local law enforcement authority at any particular time is dependent upon the diligence of those engaged in the operation and their ability to make the reliable, confidential contacts that will supply them the "foreign" intelligence that they are unable to obtain by direct means from outside their own areas of jurisdiction. It is especially important to keep a daily eye on world events, and to understand how these may relate to happenings occurring in the immediate jurisdiction. By reason of its geographic location,

its importance as a center of communication, finance, tourism and trade, Dade-Miami is especially in need of a constant flow of accurate, properly processed information that will enable law enforcement authorities to respond quickly and appropriately to any threat of international or transnational terrorism.

Domestic terrorism.

This term refers to those groups of politically inspired terrorists that are indigenous to the territory in which they operate. Those operating within the continental United States would, therefore, have a purpose connected with the struggle for the public powers of that country and not with matters concerning external affairs or relations with other countries. This poses, superficially, a problem of classification with the Cuban exiles and, more acutely, with groups using terrorism to promote Puerto Rican nationalism. Some of the operations undertaken by Cuban exile terrorists, such as the killings that have taken place over the years in Dade County have been clearly of a domestic nature, though indirectly concerned with the hopes of mounting an offensive against a foreign power, namely Cuba. The application of the United States Neutrality Act would be in point here. Other operations by these Cuban exile terrorists that have taken place overseas, while mounted from within the United States must be regarded as incidents of international terrorism. Having regard to the scale, nature, and operational direction of the terrorism undertaken by Puerto Rican nationalists as well as by reference to its targeting, the view is taken here that it ought properly to be regarded in its entirety as domestic terrorism.

Domestic terrorism in the United States has been of sporadic occurence and has not reached the proportions of that experienced in other similarly developed countries having stable, long-established political systems. There have been various, impressionistic but inconclusive guesses as to the reason for this. There have been very few organized, politically inspired terrorist groups active domestically and those which have operated, like the New World Liberation Front, and the George Jackson Brigade have been of local rather than national importance. Other groups like the Weather Underground and the Black Liberation Army were the product of historical undercurrents and other circumstances that combined to give these groups a comparatively short life and very little prospect of any success. Despite the affinity of many radical groups in the United States for foreign terrorist movements and the support and sympathy for them betrayed by the mass of underground literature devoted to the constant and often strident criticism of the United States system, there is no evidence of any active links with such groups. This is probably due to a general, all-pervading suspicion on the part of such foreign groups and fear of exposure, penetration, and interdiction. Foreign groups seeking to operate in the United States are unlikely to seek permanent links with domestic groups until these are able to prove themselves more conclusively in the struggle against the United States authorities.

The prospects for domestic terrorism vary according to the prevailing state of affairs internally, just as international terrorism is tied to foreign relations and events outside of the United States. The civil disorders of the 1960's and early 1970's that spawned so many "promising" groups that might have graduated to various forms of domestic terrorism abated with a suddeness that

left these associations bereft of direction and purpose. They simply failed to develop along those extreme lines. The anti-establishment groups have been struggling vainly to find a common unifying issue since the end of the Vietman war and the demise of the Nixon administration. Despite a series of attempts, the old fervor has simply not been recaptured. The energy crisis and, in particular, the concern over the development of nuclear power have given new impetus to these endeavors and there are signs of a reawakening that hold out possibilities for those whose desire and life's work is the causing of social dissension. There is a very heavy mass of social apathy for these subversive elements to move and it is this, perhaps, more than anything else that stands in the way at this time, of the emergence of a really viable and dangerous domestic terrorist movement. The potential is clearly there, but the critical mass needs an enormous stimulus before it will produce the type of social explosion that would give rise to this kind of domestic terrorism. There are presently no signs of that kind of stimulus from within the system itself. One area that needs constant vigilance is concerned with racial issues. This is still, together with labor, one of the most volatile areas of American society, and recent indications of polarization on these matters should be watched with care. The Hispanic community, too, is a growing political influence and the numbers of illegal immigrants that must be reckoned among this population, as well as its increasing vocalization of its "rights" are also causes for concern if these expectations cannot be met in a way satisfactory to those raising them. It has almost invariably been observed that the theoreticians and potential leaders of terrorist movements are

drawn from the privileged rather than the deprived classes. There
is no current shortage of "Chiefs" in the world of domestic terrorism;
what has been lacking up to the present is a supply of enthusiastic
"Indians". This may well change if racial issues are brought to the
fore once more as a result of the hardships produced by the energy
crisis and a deteriorating employment situation. It is pertinent to
observe, too, that monitoring the activities of incipient domestic
terrorist groups has become increasingly difficult against a back-
ground of restrictions on law enforcement information gathering and
the purging, sealing, or destruction of valuable files that would
have provided necessary continuity on these activities.

"High Technology" Terrorism.

The subject deserves a special mention in any delineation of
terrorism by types although, obviously, it is open to use by any of
the aforementioned if their resources and degree of development will
permit. So important was this regarded that a specially commissioned
Appendix on the subject was included in Disorders and Terrorism.
This is, obviously, too, the direction of the future, although much
that was reviewed in that Appendix was capable of immediate imple-
mentation by many of the groups active at the time it was written.
It is interesting to note that, in the three years that have passed
since that survey was prepared, there have been no notable advances
toward the developments foreshadowed therein. Despite the availability
of so many of these new techniques of destruction and, especially,
parallel developments in the fields of conventional warfare, there

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has been no attempt by terrorists, individually or collectively, to turn these to account. The knowledge is certainly there, and it has been well publicized. The means to put it to use are also available to those who would seek them out. Yet terrorism, world-wide, remains fundamentally in the Dark Ages. The reasons for this happy state of affairs can only be the subject of speculation. It would be imprudent to assume that they will continue indefinitely. Those who see them-selves in the role of "The Weak" will assuredly try to compensate for their inadequacies by availing themselves of what modern tech-nology has to offer. Such technology has the capability of narrowing the gap quite drastically. It means, practically, that fewer persons are needed to challenge significantly the powers of the state. In the extreme case, a single individual, properly equipped can, by the skillful use of what is available to him, take on a large and powerful nation, which finds itself powerless to use to advantage those defenses that would ordinarily serve it quite well against a more worthy opponent. If this notion is considered fanciful or hyperbolic, consider for a moment the Presidents, Chancellors and Prime Ministers who have already been forced to treat with relatively ill-equipped hostage-takers, for the moment, holding the balance of power in ways that would have proven inconvenient to challenge. Are we going to deny this power to one who has a nuclear device? Or are we simply going to deny that he has such a device?

There is no need to re-do here the work that was so well done by the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, nor to advance further what was outlined in the LEAA sponsored study entitled "Facing

Tommorow's Terrorist Incident Today", authored by Robert Kupperman.
The potential dangers need no restatement. The real purpose of
inclusion of this pregnant category is admonitory. The world's
response systems, and those of the United States in particular, have
been geared hitherto to the anticipation of terrorism of a certain
intensity level. While there has been a natural desire, wherever
possible, to move preventively so as to minimize the harm that might
ensue from the commission of acts of terrorism, the failure to do
so has not hitherto had fatal or even especially grave consequences
for the system or society itself. Most responses, indeed, have been
reactive; once the particular act of terrorism has occurred, society's
response has been to contain it, and to restore law and order as
quickly and effectively as possible. Even at the highest level of
terrorist activity experienced, these reactive approaches have
sufficed to contain potential harm within acceptable tolerances.
If the message of what has been said about "High Technology"
terrorism is correct, these "fire-brigade" approaches will not
suffice; the potential conflagration will be so great and immediate
that it will engulf society. It is essential, therefore, that the
fire-setter, the terrorist, be caught before he has time to apply the
match or even to set up the metaphorical materials of his endeavors.
Once the credible threat of a nuclear device secreted by terrorists
in a large urban center has been made, it will be too late to do
anything, save to treat with the terrorists for what they are demanding
in the time that may be allowed for the purpose. The overwhelming
importance of preventive intelligence becomes evident as well as the

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need for a thorough and sophisticated system of threat analysis and
target identification so that the best possible protective measures
can be taken. It is vital that this need be recognized. Only in this
way can a reversal of present attitudes towards intelligence gathering,
processing, storage, and dissemination be reviewed and altered as
appropriate. The amount of intelligence currently available to law
enforcement authorities in the United States on the potential for
"High Technology" terrorism and the capabilities of those who might
engage in it is parlous in the extreme. This fact alone points up the
urgency of the problem and the need to move quickly to improve the
system's response capabilities to meet this realistically anticipated
threat.

Quasi- or Pseudo-Terrorism.

This subject, again, received adequate treatment in Disorders
and Terrorism and there is no call to supplement what has already
been said concerning it. This is an artificial, but no less dangerous,
manifestation of the forms of terroristic activity. It lacks only
the purpose and drive that give that activity its distinctive
characteristics. There is, in these days, a large amount of this
imitative terrorism brought about by the wide dissemination of
knowledge about what terrorists do, how they do it, and what responses
are made to this activity by the authorities. Hostage-taking affords
the commonest example of the contagious character of some of these
terroristic activities and how their forms are put to use by others
having no real intention to create a general climate of coercive fear

for its own sake. There is a great deal of such terrorism and law enforcement has coped with it quite successfully over the years even before it was given the name it now bears so as to be recognized for what it is. To be taken hostage by a fleeing felon or a mentally disturbed individual is just as terrifying (and can be just as fatal) for the victim as being taken hostage by a politically inspired terrorist. Only the approaches to the resolution of the matter are different and require different understandings and training for their implementation. Because United States law enforcement authorities have acquired considerable experience with, and an enviable measure of success in handling, this type of pseudo-terroristic activity, it would be easy to become over-confident in relation to the prospects of handling incidents of terrorism properly so-called. Large numbers of police officers and others have now been trained in the United States in the handling of hostage-taking incidents and in the delicate art of what has come to be known as "hostage negotiation". Many have attended several schools and have received the best available instruction in the subject matter. But quasi-terrorism is very different indeed from its true derivative. For one thing, the stakes are so very much higher in the latter, and the operatives more readily expendable. The words of the Task Force in this regard bear repeating: "Caution must, therefore, be exercised in applying the lessons of the one experience to the other".

CHAPTER THREE

A SHORT HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN DADE-MIAMI

Writing a short history of anything is always a most challenging task. The significant adjective is an injunction to be brief, but the question is always, what to omit? Writing history is a revealing of the past, a bringing to light of things that have been forgotten, or the calling into prominence of things, the significance of which was not appreciated in their time. This historian is in an advantageous position, in some ways, for he is able to review matters with a completeness and detachment that was not possible for those who lived through the events. Yet, withall, the historian's work is only a reconstruction, lacking the life and vividness of the real happenings he seeks to depict. He is, after all, only the interpreter of his sources and the imperative "Be brief!" enjoins on him a selectivity authorized only by his own good judgment. It is all too easy for the most diligent historian, with all the time and space necessary for completeness, to do violence to the Truth. He who engages to write a short history will almost certainly fall into error. This must not be regarded as a fatal deterrent. Proper consideration of the problems posed by this study demands a history; there is neither time nor space for an extended one. What follows, with all its faults, must suffice for the purpose. The first dilemma, as always, is where to begin? Nowhere does terrorism have a neat, precisely documented beginning. Even the most seemingly authoritative statements can be misleading. The Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Civil

and Constitutional Rights states: "Terrorism is not new. It can be traced to an ancient Arab group, the Society of Assassins, and the French Revolution's 'Reign of Terror'". Some six hundred years separate these two unconnected matters. While terrorism may not be traceable with such pristine certainty, the authority on which part of this statement rests can. Professor Bernard Lewis, in his book The Assassins (1968) wrote: "In one respect, the Assassins are without precedent - in the planned systematic and long-term use of terror as a political weapon......they may well be the first terrorists". Brevity, therefore, has its price. Categorical statements of this kind must always be viewed with suspicion.

It is simply not possible to say when terrorism in Dade County began; probably there has been some terrorism as defined in this study, ever since the County was extensively settled. What is certain is that it did not become a community or a law enforcement problem of any magnitude until comparatively recently. Terrorism in South Florida generally, and Dade County in particular, whether of the politically inspired or non-politically inspired variety, is historically tied in a very direct way to relations with the island of Cuba. Although Dade-Miami has enjoyed a constant interchange with other neighboring Caribbean peoples, notably those of the Bahamas, it is Cuba that has left its deepest impress upon this portion of the mainland, and has so radically altered its culture and outlook on life. From the start, the reasons have been over-whelmingly political. The island is very close to the continental United States, well within small boat range. From the time of the liberation of the island, as a consequence of the Spanish-American

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war, the military and political interests of the United States have
been evident, and only the good faith of President Theodore Roosevelt
stood in the way of an outright annexation of the island. Even today,
as the United States plans its withdrawal from the Canal Zone of
Panama, it maintains a naval base at Guantánamo on this otherwise
communist-held island. Cuba has always been a vibrant, progressive
island by comparison with its neighbors. But for all the brightness
and liveliness of its people, its infectious rhythms and Caribbean
setting, Cuba in the 1950's was a backward country, raddled by
corruption and vice, and in the grip of a cruel dictatorship. The
tourist drawn by the bright lights and the good life of Havana saw
little of this and cared even less. Organized crime had a strong
hold on the island's vice and American business an equally firm grip
on its fragile economy. Not even a fervent patriotism, a strong
communist party, and the makings of effective labor organization
seemed likely to disturb that. Yet resistance to Batista grew, both
at home and abroad, and Dade County began to experience, without
realizing it, a foretaste of what was to come. There was plotting
and gun-running, and much traveling to and from the island. Miami
was a logical jumping-off point for any operations against the
regime then in power, and a convenient place to return to for R & R
when a period of revitalization was necessary, or when things simply
became too hot. Then, at the end of the Eisenhower years, there
appeared a young man called Fidel Castro who was destined, among
other things to change the way of life of Dade County forever.

Fidel Castro has been in the public eye for a long while. He
has rarely shunned publicity; indeed, at times, he has actively

courted it. Still he remains, in many respects, an enigma; the
definitive biography of Fidel Castro has still to be written.
For those Americans who had as little stomach for Fulgencio Batista
as their counterparts today have for Anastasio Somoza, the sudden
advent of this loquacious, energetic mountain fighter, permanently
dressed in fatigues, did not seem a bad thing. From what was known
of him, he did not seem noticeably anti-American and there was some
evidence, at least, that he might comfortably adjust to living
within the United States' sphere of influence. His opponents,
meanwhile temporarily defeated, had crawled off to South Florida
for what most felt certain would be a very short stay before the
next round, which was sure to go in their favor. By mid-1959, there
began a definite leftward drift on the part of Castro, disconcerting
and confusing to many in charge of United States' policy, and frankly
alarming to many Cubans who had either remained helpfully neutral
or were even actively siding with the new regime up to that point.
A steady stream of Cuban refugees began to join those already in
Dade County. It is interesting to review the progression of that
migration. The rich, the intelectuals, the opposition politicians
came first; they had long enjoyed close ties with South Florida.
Then, after a while, came the middle classes. And finally, as the
floodgates opened, the small entrepreneur and on down to the lowest
strata of the community. Castro was not long in crossing his Rubicon.
In 1960, he expropriated American businesses and, with little economic
alternative, cast himself firmly into the Soviet camp. This was
enough to show the United States where it really stood, and the huge

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exodus of refugees was enthusiastically welcomed into South Florida
as an earnest of the United States' intentions to topple the Castro
regime, restore American business to its former glory, and to send
these grateful Cuban citizens back victorious to their homeland.
There is no need here to catalogue the miscalculations and disasters
that prevented those good intentions from bearing the desired fruit.
Much money and energy was expended in organizing to that end and
the fugitive Cuban community that by 1962 had grown to over 150,000
could hardly complain at that time that it had been betrayed or
that the United States was half-hearted in the execution of its
trust. As late as December, 1962, President Kennedy welcoming back
the 1,113 Bay of Pigs prisoners exchanged for $30,000,000 worth of
medical supplies could promise to return them their battle flag in
a "Free Havana". The battle lines were clearly drawn, and only the
Soviet Union and the threat of World War III stood between Castro
and the fulfillment of that promise. That it was never fulfilled,
cost not only a great deal in United States prestige and security;
it conferred permanent residence status upon what was to swell to
an alien community of over half a million in South Florida, nearly
all of whom came to settle in Dade County.

The transition from a small, visiting contingent, grateful for
shelter, but eager to recover its homeland, to a dispossessed people
condemned to perpetual exile was not easy to make. The period of
transition was not abrupt, and there were encouraging signs that
the United States, in the first years, had not lost its resolve.
Castro was everywhere depicted as the enemy; any dealings with

him - or even visits to him - were regarded as treasonable by
official U.S.A., just as, on different grounds, they were so
considered by the Cuban exile community. More to the point, the
United States was lending considerable covert aid to the exiles
in their efforts to organize themselves into a military force
capable of fighting its way back into power. Hundreds of United
States case officers "managed" their Cuban charges, who were taught
the rudiments (and sometimes more) of the skills it was felt they
would require to win back their island home. This was an exciting,
if not very productive, time. Enthusiasm ran high and the Cubans
were convinced that they had a real prospect of military and political
victory. Although no state of war existed between the United States
and Cuba, the legal niceties of the Neutrality Act and other provisions
prohibiting the raising or training of foreign forces on United States'
soil in time of peace were discreetly ignored. Few had cause to
question either the rightness of what they were doing or the interests
in which they were doing it. This is not the place to examine or
stand in judgment upon the adequacy of what was then done or even,
with hindsight, to evaluate the prospects for success. Two observations
must, however, be made, as they have a bearing on the subsequent turn
of events. The United States never really created an effective army
in exile. Of Cuban bravery and military capacity, there can be no
doubt. It was simply never organized into an effective fighting
machine. Either Castro's real strength was hopelessly misjudged -
a simple, but not uncommon, intelligence failure - or those engaged
about the direction of the business were ambivalent from the start.

The second point is perhaps even more serious. The anti-Castro movement lacked any real leadership that might have given it cohesion and led to recognition of a government in exile. There were many leaders, but no one leader, who might have given the movement a real cohesiveness and purpose. Once the general disillusionment set in, both these facts made the absorbtion of the Cuban exile population by the South Florida area a much easier and less painful task that it would otherwise have been. The Cubans brought many things with them to the United States including a distinctive culture and a burning hope for return. What they did not bring was an organized political structure that was going to carry over the "old ways" in a fashion likely to conflict with the democracy into which they were being slowly and almost imperceptibly absorbed. The result, once the United States had effectively withdrawn from a fight for which it had shown so little enthusiasm in the first place, was a period of drift. Some of the brave but unrealistic soldiers came back again and again to tilt Quixote-like at the Windmill. This became an exercise in ego-building rather than a purposeful, military one. A structure of "fighters in exile" began to emerge but, because of the hopelessness of the struggle, it had no accompanying political ethos out of which a nation in exile, a real political entity could coalesce. The bulk of the community slowly and painfully adjusted to the reality of a new life in an alien land. And a new, and more realistic "politics" grew gradually out of this adjustment.

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It is difficult to explain, in a few words, how a large, alien community came so successfully and completely to take over, so peacefully, a large chunk of desirable United States territory. The success can, perhaps, be best explained by claiming this result as a happy accident. Because it was never intended, it happened in a way that aroused no opposition or even awareness of the process by which it occurred. The Cuban community itself was too numbed, too disappointed at its loss to be evincing interests in conquest elsewhere. Although it clearly did not happen overnight, the South Florida community has, as it were, only just awakened to the fact that two major cities in Dade County, Miami and Hialeah, have more than 50 percent of Cuban residents in their populations. Overall, the Latin population of Dade County is about 33 percent and rising. The real "Cuban problem" for the area is only just beginning, and the Dade County Cubans - these new, permanent residents of the United States - are going to have to contribute substantially to finding some of the answers that will be required. All of this is directly material to the terrorist problem in Dade County; not only that which is already a part of history, but that which is yet to present itself in the future. New leaders, new politics are emerging to engage the new social problems that arise out of acquisition and integration rather than dispossession and the desperate maintenance of a separate, national identity. This is a painful, somewhat unnatural process. Once the all-sustaining hate is removed, what is there to rush in and fill the vacuum? A community that builds too long on its xenophobia grows up warped, with an inbuilt propensity for social

conflict. The case of Northern Ireland is very much in point. In particular, the changing needs of the community that the new politics must serve will assuredly give rise to something that has, superficially at least, been largely absent hitherto. The unique nature of the struggle against Fidel Castro gave the Cuban community in exile the appearance and form of a one-party state. That "party" was intensely conservative, even reactionary. Of necessity, that one party was opposed to communism in any shape or form. It could not tolerate even the suggestion of "fellow travelers". The defense of its very being as an entity depended upon it. Freed from that yoke of necessity, the "new" politics will be able to develop its own right, left, and center. There will be painful moments while it does so, but do so it must, if the chronic deformation that has stunted the growth and social happiness of Ulster is to be avoided in Dade County. This has profound implications for the future of terrorism in Dade County, for some of the basic assumptions about whether a certain kind of politically inspired terrorism, left-wing terrorism in a broad sense, can or might flourish in a community that has been traditionally antagonistic towards it will be severely challenged.

Some other pertinent observations concerning the character of this "invasion" lie within the discretion of the historian touching upon the present subject. The high concentration of Cubans in the South Florida area is, itself, the product of accidental circumstances rather than design; or perhaps, with hindsight, the product of a miscalculation on the part of the social engineers of the time.

After their initial reception into the United States, it was assumed that these political refugees, like so many others in the past, would disperse throughout the United States and would be absorbed and integrated into comparatively distant population centers. This simply did not take place, and any move in that direction was soon reversed. These were a Caribbean people, whose affinity for the sun and the sea, from which many had garnered a living, was met by the climate and topography of Dade County more perfectly than any other place to which they might have migrated. Besides, it was the closest point to their beloved homeland, a convenient place for the return that virtually all confidently expected. Moreover, South Florida and its people were good to these "visitors" and there were none of the acute problems of housing, employment, and racial tensions that might have been anticipated in the areas to which they had been notionally assigned. The population growth and its implications for the area, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically, were simply not foreseen. By and large, these exiles were a likeable people. They were industrious, respectful of certain important American values, and, above all, commitedly anti-communist. What was less apparent, at the start, was that this was not only a community in a strange sort of limbo; it was also a community hermetically sealed from any real interaction with the native community into which it had been transplanted. That community, relatively small and easy-going, watched these strange happenings somewhat bemused but with little real concern. After all, it never anticipated having to live with the problem in perpetuity. The Cuban community seemed to ask for comparatively little and its

troubles, internally, were largely its own. It neither sought publicity for them nor shared them with outsiders. All Americans really needed to know about these pecr:c, so it seemed, was that they were against Castro - and that had commended itself strongly to the governments of the day. It was with something of a shock, therefore, that the other residents of Dade County woke up one day in 1973 to the fact that they were now, by ordinance, a bilingual community. This may seem, at first sight, to have very little to do with terrorism. In reality, it has a great deal to do with the perceptions of terrorism in this community.

There has been very little assimilation by the original community of this strange human burden imposed upon it by force of circumstances. Rather, the Cuban community has grown and developed on its own to the point where, cuckoo-like, it is forcing the native fledgling from the nest. For many of those who have witnessed, at first hand, these developments over the years, the Cuban community remains as mysterious and incomprehensible as when it came; only now it is larger, more obvious, more powerful - and clearly here to stay. This mystery was not merely the result of a linguistic, or even a cultural barrier. It was more that there was really little to share of interest to the majority of the "old" community. The curious, complicated politics in which the Cubans seemed to indulge, their pathological hatred of Castro and his regime and everything that went with being a Cuban in exile, were just too much for the outsider to grasp - unless some special motive existed for making a study of these things. It is quite likely that, until some sort of homeostasis was reached, the two communities could have grown up harmoniously, side by side,

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without ever having a greater understanding of each other's ways - had it not been for the violence. This, and the way in which it was portrayed and perceived, were what really brought the Cuban community under scrutiny by those who had so unconcernedly allowed it to grow up in their midst. Had the Cubans brought with them an unusually high rate of common crime, or even a reputation for hot-blooded "Latin" violence, it is unlikely that this would have caused such concern. It could have been more readily explained and, perhaps, understood in terms of America's overall, horrendous crime problem. But this violence was "political" and was related to a politics that was both foreign and disconcerting. Moreover, it began to manifest itself at a troubled time in United States' history, at a time when self-examination was already beginning to turn to self-doubt. Talk of terrorism, world-wide, was already hanging heavy in the air. The American role in Vietnam was being seriously - and often violently - questioned at home. And the purposes and methods of many American agencies, most notably the CIA, were being vigorously probed and "exposed" by the growingly vociferous "New Left". The "received" image of Castro for the larger popultaion of the United States - all, that is, save the Cuban exiles - began subtly to shift. Castro's achievements, in education, social security, anti-corruption and the like, began to be touted, gaining ready acceptance in a population that had already embarked upon a most extraordinary process of self-flagelation. This left the Cuban exile community in a somewhat incongruous position, namely that of maintaining its undying opposition to the Cuban Communist leader from a sanctuary that was coming,

increasingly, to perceive him in a more and more favorable light.
While part of that community remained confused and mainly anxious to
bury the past - though not without grief - and get on with the business
of living, others hardened their resolve and vowed to continue the
unequal fight even though they had to do so alone.

This history of these events can be divided into a number of
convenient, if arbitrary, periods. The first period, during the
presidency of John F. Kennedy, had seen the arming and training of
large numbers of Cuban exiles by the United States for what was to
be a serious military assault to retake the island and overthrow the
newly established Castro regime. The apt terrain of South Florida
began to take on some of the appearance of an armed camp as thousands
of the exiles were trained in skills ranging from the rudimentary
to the quite sophisticated that it was hoped would serve them in their
various tasks. In the present context, too much ought not to be made
of the training by the United States defense forces and the CIA of
this "Secret Army". Certain romantic notions always cling to such
episodes and are purveyed to a public, avid for adventure, and,
in the main, not too well informed about what such work is really
all about, in a way calculated to excite and exaggerate the destructive
potential of such a force. While some covert specialists, with
extraordinary skills, are selected and trained for operations of this
kind, the majority (who had no special qualifications to commend them
for the purpose beyond their nationality and enthusiasm) were given
a training little different from that received by many inducted into
the United States' forces at that time, and in some ways less intensive

or comprehensive. The United States was not producing, as is sometimes suggested by those given to such hyperbole, a "race of super-terrorists" who, once the employment for which they had been trained had failed to materialize, would turn upon the community at large with their newly acquired skills. Naturally, the skills taught had an anti-social, domestic use to which they could be put. But the same argument could be extended with equal accuracy to all those who served with the United States forces, for example, in Vietnam - and the hidden slur would be just as great. The United States was training soldiers to fight an irregular war with the skills necessary to wage such a struggle. It certainly was not training "terrorists" as such, nor endowing those whom it trained with terrorist attitudes and philosophies. These facts should be borne in mind because, due to the climate of the times and certain, occasional, journalistic license, they have achieved a prominence and significance beyond what they might properly bear. The failure of the Bay of Pigs operation and the death of President Kennedy imposed a severe check on these developments, but did not signal the end of the period. United States sponsored raids on Cuba continued well into the period of the Johnson presidency, but the writing was already on the wall. While the Cuban community was beginning its slow and painful readjustment to political reality, many of these "surrogates" for the United States in its "war" with Castro were having to start to rethink their own position.

The first thought for many - as it is so often in such circum-stances - was to carry on the fight alone. The words of one who had trained and fought alongside these exiles in earlier times, give a

good picture of the situation: "Without U. S. support, however, we were virtually powerless to conduct any cohesive, meaningful action. Government agencies, including the F.B.I., the Coast Guard, and Border Patrol and various Florida law enforcement departments had tightened their surveillance of exile activities, thus adding immensely to the difficulties of mounting clandestine military operations. In the absence of the stabilizing, unifying influence of the Kennedy's and the CIA in Cuban affairs, dissension prevailed among various exile political and paramilitary organizations." (Bradley E. Ayers, "And They were the Pros, Part II", Soldier of Furtune, March, 1978). What happened next was a logical development for those who, on any appraisal of their own position could only, in relation to their adversary now victorious on so many fronts, including the United Nations, consider themselves as the "Weak". Again, the words of the same writer take up the story: "It was in this atmosphere of discontent and seething frustration in the Miami Cuban community that a handful of highly trained exiles turned to violence on their own. They were labeled as militants, at first, then called radicals. Now they are referred to as international terrorists". The Years of Disillusionment for the Cuban exile militants carried many portents for the future of United States' policy generally, and the change in the United States' world role. The 1965 intervention in Santo Domingo, while constituting an important and necessary check to Castro in the Caribbean, alienated support for the United States in much of Central and South America; these countries were but slowly recovering from the shock of John

Kennedy's death, which affected them very greatly on an emotional plane. Serious terrorism outbreaks were occurring in Columbia and Argentina, while Peru and Bolivia both faced a serious problem of insurgency in the interior. Much of this activity was being actively fostered by Fidel Castro, and this CIA trained "Secret Army" had, for some of its members at least, the prospects of useful employment elsewhere. But, for most, the noble fight was over; if they continued alone, as many vowed, it was without the official blessing of the United States and with even a stern hint at suppression. This latter seemed to be directed at denying United States soil and, in particular, South Florida, to the exiles as a staging ground or launching point for attacks on Cuba that were already attracting international criticism. Relatively overt, paramilitary operations being no longer possible, these "militants" turned to terrorism, much of it of a symbolic or expressive nature. Virtually all of this was planned and prepared in Dade County, but many of the most significant operations were undertaken elsewhere, some of them overseas.

The year 1968 saw a significant upswing in the violent activities of these Cuban exiles who, by now, were beginning to be identified by the evocative names they had assigned themselves. This was a significant year for political violence on many fronts. In the United States, the anti-war protest was at its height and campuses from Berkeley to Columbia University burned (in some cases literally) with radical fervor. Students took to the streets in London and Rome, and the mighty Charles de Gaulle was nearly toppled by a student/workers coalition. A mishandled protest gave rise to the formidable West

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German terrorist movement. Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy
were assassinated and the decision of President Johnson not to run
for re-election paved the way for Richard Nixon to the White House.
By comparison with these and other portentous events occurring
elsewhere on the world stage, the efforts by the Cuban exiles to
keep their case before the public were puny indeed. Reviewing the
numerous bombings, in Dade County and elsewhere, as well as attacks
on shipping in coastal waters, during the period 1968-1972, one is
struck not only by its lack of coherence, but also by its overall
ineffectiveness. The devices used, their half-hearted employment
lack seriousness when set in their wider historical context. This
was a time of terrorist "spectaculars". Skyjacking was at its height;
the PLO and PFLP were trying to take the world by storm; and the IRA
had begun a savage, deadly campaign in Northern Ireland and the U. K.
Little, if anything the Cubans did, or attempted to do, could compare
with all this, but it is natural that, in a climate of heightened
awareness about terrorism and its potentiality that some of this
concern should have rubbed off on this "alien" outgrowth of this new
community in the United States. El Poder Cubano had, on a dispassionate
evaluation, little more than symbolic or nuisance value, but it alarmed
many by its actions in many parts of the United States, and served to
keep the exile cause alive if not in very good shape. Perhaps its
most spectacular and effective exploit, the shelling of a Polish
freighter in the Port of Miami was overly ambitious and what led to
the temporary abatement of the incipient terrorism in the form in
which it then presented itself. A pediatrician-turned-terrorist,

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Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, was convicted of this, and it is a material note of history that the American elections of 1968 were coming up, and the federal government was, at that time, in a much stronger position to take the necessary measures against these groups than it was subsequently; J. Edgar Hoover was still Director of the F.B.I. During this time, there was much talk and comparatively little action among Cuban exile groups for it is evident that little agreement existed among the proliferation of comparatively shortlived associations. This is, incidentally, characteristic of politics in Latin America generally, only one party, APRA, being able to claim anything like a solid history of continuity over many years. Castro agents were active, too, creating fear and dissension, and there did not exist that climate of trust and purpose in which effective counter revolutionary action against Castro might have been developed. These groups were united only by their pathological hatred of Castro and a fierce determination to regain possession of their island. They had no political philosophy in common, running the spectrum from extreme right-wing, not unfairly characterized as fascist in the strict sense, to those inclining towards the position of liberal democrats. There was plenty of room for ideological and personal disagreement, and petty jealousy, and great opportunity for Castro to engage in tactics of divide and conquer.

In 1970, there occurred an event far from the center of these activities that was to have a profound effect upon their subsequent development. Politics in Chile had been swinging steadily leftward for more than a decade and only massive intervention by the Chilean

Right, covertly assisted by various United States interests, public
and private, had frustrated a constitutional take-over of power by
the coalition of communists led by Salvador Allende. Allende finally
triumphed through the ballot, and the prospects of another Cuba in
mainland South America seemed very strong indeed. Moreover, the
Peruvian military government that had seized power in October, 1968,
was noticeably left-leaning and, unlike any of its predecesors, was
making overtures to the new government of Chile that could have had
far-reaching developments for the security of the hemisphere.
"Advisers" from Castro's Cuba were already pouring into the area and
an all-out offensive on American business and other interests seemed
imminent. The Cuban exiles took on a new lease of life. Suddenly,
their aspirations once again matched the value of their skills. In
1972, with the Allende government already heading towards deep trouble,
Dr. Bosch disappeared from Miami in violation of his parole. A
significant link with Chilean Rightists, themselves, at that moment
in the political wilderness, was already in the course of being
forged. While these events did not give the Cuban exile movement
the real cohesion that it needed to become an effective political
force in the fight against Castro, it did provide it with the fuel
necessary to propel it along the road towards an expanded campaign
of terrorism. With the overthrow of the Allende regime, the new
Chilean government of Augusto Pinochet found itself in the eye of
an international storm whipped up by left-wing elements everywhere.
It came, in 1973, when the Nixon administration was under severe
pressure over Watergate, and the American public had embarked upon

that extensive process of soul-searching that was not only to reveal

all sorts of "wrong-doing" on the part of government agencies at home

and abroad, but to end in a severe cramping of law enforcement styles

and capabilities. Into all this, the rejuvenated militant Cuban exiles

leaped with enthusiasm. The Cuban exile terrorist movement, aided

now by an "official" Chile, anxious to improve its image abroad and

get rid of its enemies at the same time, embarked on an ambitious

program of expansion. The time was no more opportune than it had ever

been, but hatred of Castro was still strong and ingrained in the

main Cuban exile population and the means were now being provided by

a sponsor; the Cuban exiles were - albeit in their own interest -

surrogates once more. In the extensive campaign of terrorism promoted

by the Cuban exiles from 1973 onwards, there is no evidence of direct

Chilean participation in anything undertaken in Dade County. This

is only to be expected, for the Chileans were using the Cubans who

needed only encouragement and material support. This period spawned

a variety of groups with imposing sounding titles and rejuvenated

others. Some had imposing charters and tables of organization. The

identities of many of these "militants", acting in one way or another,

became a matter of public knowledge. An air of excitement is clearly

apparent, on any view of the materials relating to the times - especially

1973 - 1975, and those participating in these activities, in the planning

and preparation phase, clearly expected a dramatic intensification

and widening of the struggle. It seems that the broad intention was

to attack selected Cubans, especially those in some way connected

with government, in various places around the world. In addition, the

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property of those engaged in commercial and other relations was to be the subject of this offensive. The overall objective seems to have been to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Castro government. It cannot have been expected that these offensive demonstrations would result only in mild protest from Castro. Clearly, it has to be anticipated that Castro would retaliate - and the only logical target for that retaliation would have been the large exile community lodged in Dade County. It is a standard terrorist tactic the world over to provoke retaliation from the opponent, usually the government against which the struggle is waged. The retaliation falls, inevitably, on the innocent who, it is theorized, can then be subjected to intensive propaganda designed to mobilize their fears and anger and marshal these against the enemy. That such retaliation did not take place can be attributed either to the lack of concern displayed by Castro and his contempt for these unworthy opponents, or to his own excellent understanding of the principles of terrorism as a weapon of war. Whatever the case, in this regard, Castro simply did not rise to the bait.

In fact, Castro seems - whatever he might have been doing behind the scenes - to have treated most of these attacks with a lofty, statesmanlike disdain. However he may have felt on a personal level, he allowed nothing to stand in the way of his steady progress towards normalization of relations with the United States. The dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Union should never be underestimated. Whatever else Castro may be, he is certainly a realist. While correctly appraising Cuba's value to the Soviet Union, he is under

no illusions about how little leverage, in a political sense, he
really has. Unlike so many other client states, Cuba cannot play
off the great powers one against the other. Cuba must - for all her
seeming independence in foreign affairs - dance to the Russian tune.
It has to be assumed that Castro was acting in this matter, as in
others, to the orders of his Russian masters in accordance with their
overall strategy. The bombings, the attacks on shipping, the threatened
and actual kidnappings and assassinations brought indignant rhetoric
and diplomatic denunciation, but no reprisals that might have occasioned
a rupture in the softening of the United States' position with regard
to improving relations with Cuba. Castro was clearly determined to
play a waiting game while these interesting"negotiations" with the
United States were in the balance. The resignation of President
Nixon in August, 1974, does not seem to have had any marked effect
on the resolve of the Cuban exile militants to continue their campaign.
As long as a Republican administration remained in office, they could
be reasonably assured that they would not be too vigorously pursued
for the unyielding hard line they were committed to taking against
Castro. Moreover, Castro himself now seemed to be taking a somewhat
different line and had commenced, in secret, the expansionist policy
of former years. Now, (doubtless, again, under instructions from
Moscow), Castro began secretly dispatching troops to Angola in breach
of a tacit understanding to the contrary that had been reached with
the United States. In that same year, 1975, Cuban exiles began
stepping up their offensive against selected targets outside of the
United States and there seemed to be clear indications that these

activities were being directed by Dr. Orlando Bosch Arvila, now a fugitive from federal justice. Dr. Bosch who was travelling extensively in Central America, the Caribbean, and Venezuela on a Chilean passport appeared to be directing or coordinating these activities through Acción Cubana, a successor to El Poder Cubano. In June of the following year, an attempt was made to unify the movement against Castro and to give it some of the cohesiveness it had earlier lacked. As a consequence, a group known as Coordinación de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU) was formed following a meeting in the Dominican Republic. This had the effect of creating something in the nature of an ad hoc "general staff" and was needed for the greatly increased activity that was now anticipated as a result of this "pooling" of resources. However patient and forebearing Castro might have felt up to this point, and however disinclined to take his opponents seriously in their increasingly vigorous attacks upon his interests, he was shortly to be presented with a terroristic episode of unprecedented magnitude and ferocity that he could not afford to ignore. On October 6, 1976, a Cuban airliner plunged into the sea off Trinidad killing all seventy-three persons aboard. A bomb had been placed aboard the aircraft, evidently in the checked luggage. This was terrorism of a totally different kind, and many in the Cuban community who had secretly admired and, in their own various ways, supported the brave "freedom fighters" must have found it difficult to suppress a shudder at the thought of the innocent victims hurled to their deaths in this way. Such acts are easy to rationalize for the fanatic; but those less committed have an

understandable difficulty with them. This act, which brought bitter denunciation from Castro and an evident resolve to do something about the matter, led to the arrest of Dr. Bosch and three accomplices by the Venezuelan authorities. They remain, for the moment, in prison in Venezuela awaiting the determination of their situation by the relatively unhurried processes of Venezuelan criminal justice. This act of international terrorism may be regarded as the watershed of the Cuban exile movement's campaign to date.

From 1974 onwards, a series of homicides of persons who had played some significant role in the struggle against Castro or as leaders of the exile community took place in the United States. These events, like all homicides, are significant from a law enforcement point of view, but their precise connection with the terrorism under discussion here is far from clear. The overall impact of these deaths, by reason of the personalities involved, the manner of the killings, and the treatment the matter received in the media, all contributed to create a "climate of terrorism" in Dade County. Nothing that is said here should be taken as denying the gravity of the matter, nor of suggesting that these killings should not have given rise to the highest level of public concern. What is suggested is that their purport and place in the general scheme of things may well have been misunderstood. As it was, they went to swell the growing toll of statistics that suggested the Cuban exile "terrorists" were getting out of hand and that Dade County was becoming an area having a distinctive and perhaps matchless terrorism problem. Naturally (and quite rightly), the killing, under still largely

unexplained circumstances, of seven prominent Cuban exiles in two years, all in some way or another connected with the militant movement against Castro, was going to alarm and disconcert the community. But was it terrorism? An indiscriminate classification by association with other events of the times is understandable, but unhelpful for those who are trying to attain a deeper understanding of the matter. The matter is further complicated by reason of the fact that undoubted acts of terrorism were occurring in Dade County during this time, as they were elsewhere, in consequence of activities undertaken by various elements of the Cuban exile community. Of these, one, by reason of its nature and consequences, merits special attention here. A bomb placed under the automobile of Emilio Milian, a Cuban exile journalist and newsdirector for Miami Radio Station WQBA exploded on April 30, 1976, severing both his legs. This was an undoubted act of terrorism that seems to have been intended both to silence an outspoken critic of the tactics to which the militants were now resorting and to serve as a stern warning to others. This act, more than any other, brought home the nature of terrorism to the larger, law-abiding Cuban exile community, as well as the other non-Cuban residents of the area. They could understand, condone, perhaps even applaud the campaign designed to strike at Castro wherever his interests might be found. Indeed, it still seemed, to many Cubans, unpatriotic not to do so. But an act of this sort, directed at a peaceable member of their own community revealed this violence for what it really was. It led to an unprecedented questioning of what was being done. If the prime purpose of the intensified terrorist campaign was to raise the

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level of fear in Castro's Cuba, it clearly was not having the desired effect. There is no doubt, however, that the bombing of Emilio Milian had a formidable effect on the Cuban exile population and on the climate of opinion, generally, in the United States. Unprecedented pressure on law enforcement was brought to bear by responsible members of the community to bring those responsible to justice and to increase protection for those who might be similarly targeted in the future. The federal government was strongly urged to lend its resources to the search for the culprits and to make serious endeavors to eradicate terrorism from the Cuban exile community. There were many who took the view, even if it was not articulated in such strong and direct terms, that the federal government, having been responsible - albeit with good purpose and a long while back - for the creation of this monster, it was now incumbent upon those presently in office to destroy it or, at the very least, curb its activities. Yet the attitude towards terrorism, as such, remained ambivalent. Extreme fanaticism for a cause is not poorly regarded in a Hispanic community. There were still those who saw little wrong with the making and placing of bombs - provided it was not done so close to home. As one was to put it in connection with a later incident, "If the bomb had something to do with Cuba, why didn't they put it in Cuba?"

The strenuous campaign begun by CORU and the loose coalition that had existed before it was formed, ran roughly from March through October, 1976. It is worth recalling, for the purposes of measurement and comparison that during this time, until the fatal

explosion aboard the Cuban airliner, an impressive catalogue of violent incidents had occurred: February 27, a bombing attack against the Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica; April 5, two Cuban fishing boats machine-gunned and sunk, one fisherman killed; April 22, two officials of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon killed by a bomb; July 5, Cuban Mission to the United Nations bombed; July 9, a suitcase bomb waiting to be placed aboard a Cuban airliner exploded in a luggage cart at Kingston, Jamaica; July 10 Cuban Airlines office in Barbados bombed; July 11, bombings at Bridgetown, Barbados of an office, boat, and automobile owned by BIWI airlines; July 17, (an exceptionally busy day) bombing of an automobile belonging to a Cuban diplomat in Bogota; bombing of an office of Air Panama in Bogota; machine-gun attack against Cuban Embassy in Bogota; July 23, attempted kidnapping of Cuban Consul General at Merida, Mexico; August 9, kidnapping of two Cuban Embassy officials in Buenos Aires; August 18, Cuban Airlines office in Panama bombed; September 1, bombing of Consulate of Guayana in Trinidad. No attempt is offered here to evaluate the effectiveness of that campaign, but the list speaks for itself as to the truly terroristic nature of what was being done. This small group of determined militants was engaged in an international operation of considerable proportions, directed by persons well known in Dade County and maintaining close links with the Cuban exile community there and elsewhere. The way in which the unsolved homicides of people like Donestevez Dominiguez (found shot at his place of business April 13, 1976) and Gonzalez Cartas (discovered shot in a field outside Miami, May 29, 1976) were viewed in the community was substantially colored

by the impact of these other events taking place overseas. Whether there was, in fact, any material connection between them and what that connection might have been was unimportant and uninfluential in forming the views of those whose exclusive diet in these matters was comprised of media accounts embellished by local rumor-mongering. Whatever the intent of the perpetrators, a climate of fear was generated in Dade County that helped to establish the "track record" of these various Cuban exile groups. The names of these groups, and their initials so frequently brought to the public notice, began to take on a substance that must have been not unpleasing to those engaged in these activities. At the same time, there was rising concern among local law enforcement authorities on account of the extension of these violent activities in this international fashion, beyond the scope of the resources available to cope adequately with them. Contemporaneously with the events listed above, that concern was vividly, yet realistically expressed by Lieutenant Tom Lyons and Investigator Raul Diaz of the Dade County Public Safety Department in testimony given before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on May 6, 1976. It is particularly important, in any review of the history of this subject, to see how matters appeared, at that time, to those who were daily engaged with the law enforcement problems presented. The difficulty of determining the nature of the threat posed and in accurately evaluating its magnitude came over very clearly, and the lack of real information available to these officers so as to be able to cope with the problem as well as to be able to respond to the Sub-Committee's concerns is very strongly apparent.

Another most material happening, that was to have far-reaching consequences, occurred in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976. A car carrying Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the United States under Salvador Allende, and two companions, exploded while traveling around Sheridan Circle only a few blocks from the Chilean Embassy. An explosive device that had been placed in Dr. Letelier's automobile was detonated by remote control killing Dr. Letelier and his companion Ronni Moffit, who was hit by a shard of metal, wounding also her husband, who had been travelling in the back seat. That such an event could have been protagonized by foreign interests in the heart of the nation's capital was exceptionally shocking to many and had very frightening implications for security during the United States presidential election, then little over a month away. The operation had been carried out with great precision and showed an unusual degree of sophistication and expertise. It was evidently the kind of operation that those having some sort of "official" backing can accomplish more readily than those who do not. What was even more shocking than the event itself to many people, who had no vested political interest in the affair, was the apparent inability of the appropriate law enforcement authorities to penetrate to the heart of the affair and to assign responsibilities in the matter. It was recognized that prosecution of the perpetrators might prove difficult, but the not unnatural suspicion that the Chilean government of General Pinochet might somehow be directly involved gave the investigation an extraordinary political importance as well as its delicate character. There were other more sinister suspicions

that were being planted and propagated by those whose campaign in all matters of this kind was now swinging into full gear. There were ugly suggestions that agencies of the United States were themselves involved in this affair, and that much of the mystery surrounding it and the apparent inability of law enforcement to solve it to the public satisfaction were part and parcel of a deliberate cover-up such as the public was now accustomed to seeing exposed by the new and most effective profession of "investigative journalism". This was at a time when United States involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende was coming to light, and the CIA's role in that as well as the Agency's earlier involvement with the Cuban exiles was brought before a public deliciously thrilled by these discovered "wrongdoings" of its public servants. Encouraged by a constant media campaign, itself fueled by an understandable desire to find what was evidently a most extraordinary story, it was not difficult for the public to see deadly assassins of DINA stalking the streets of the District of Columbia as they were persuaded, at that time, that the agents of SAVAK were wont to do. The whole matter was given substantial credence by the identity and character of the victim. Of all the Chileans in exile, Dr. Letelier probably constituted the biggest thorn in the side of the Pinochet government which was not only fighting to pull together an economy that had been plunging recklessly downhill since long before Salvador Allende took charge of the nation's destiny, but also trying to improve its image, internationally, after a brief but cruel and bloody revolution against a constitutional government. There was not too much sympathy for

Chile, outside of the United States at that time, and sympathy within the United States was most delicately poised in advance of that country's presidential election. Orlando Letelier, from a base in a leftist Washington, D.C. "think tank" was using all his great diplomatic skill and personal charm, as well as his considerable economic knowledge, to attack the Chilean government in those areas where it was likely to hurt most. It is probably not exaggerating to aver that this former ambassador was the most dangerous foe of the Pinochet government anywhere in the world. Into all this was introduced the suspicion not merely of Chilean government involvement and CIA complicity, but the very real possibility that the assassination might have been actually accomplished by Cuban exiles, acting alone or in concert with Chileans for the purpose. Viewed against the background of what was happening elsewhere, the fingers of suspicion cannot be said to have been irresponsibly pointed.

It is unnecessary to retail here at any length the painstaking investigation that led to a substantial uncovering of the facts of the Letelier case and the remarkable expedition with which the actual perpetrators were apprehended, taken into custody, and tried. To those accustomed to viewing these things on a superficial basis, it did much to reassure the American public as to the capacity of its law enforcement apparatus when faced with a difficult problem such as this case presented. The extradition, trial, and conviction of the Chilean agent Michael Townley and the subsequent apprehension, trial and conviction of his two Cuban exile accomplices was impressive in the extreme and certainly did much to allay public concern that

there lurked in society's midst a class of protected persons "that the law simply could not reach". The event served to confirm the connection between the Chileans and the Cubans that was behind much of the violence of 1976, but that is not the purpose of its statement here. The real significance of these matters goes much deeper and has a considerable relevance for the subject matter under consideration in this study. The true significance of the event becomes clear when reference is made to the words of Lieutenant Lyons in his testimony referred to above (pages 631/632); "This is probably one of the most complex areas that we have to deal with. It is made even more so with the lack of substantive information of an international nature because this is, as we have been stating, an international type of crime. When the CIA is not allowed to furnish us information because of reasons of security and privacy or even internal controls on their reports, it makes it just that more difficult for us to piece together just what is occurring in our Latin American community." It is quite clear that in the Letelier case, all these inhibiting considerations were swept away in the interests of establishing the credibility of the long arm of United States criminal justice once it had been decided to extend it in this matter. Without the appropriate directive at the highest level of responsibility, it would have been impossible to have identified those responsible, much less to have brought them to justice before a court of competent jurisdiction in the United States. This is an encouraging example of what can be done provided there exists the desire to do it. Clearly, those who perpetrated this crime had reason to believe that

the formidable arm of the United States would not be raised against them. At a different time in the nation's history, it might well not have been. This serves to highlight the "political" nature of the administration of justice in this area and the very real concerns it raises for law enforcement personnel. It serves to give point and substance to the arguments of those who claim that if similar facilities were made available in some of the cases that have occurred in or have been the concern of the law enforcement authorities in Dade County, these too would be cleared in similar fashion. The argument is a strong one, and while no attempt is made to adjudicate upon it here, it is clear that while there is even the suspicion - justifiable or otherwise - that official information is being held back from those charged with investigating these cases, public conficence in the probity of the investigation is not well served, and the confidence of law enforcement in its own abilities is weakened. The belief that there is a class of "protegidos" to whom the United States is in some way indebted or by which it is compromised by association, is one that dies hard in the Cuban exile community. It is one which substantially colors the views taken of some of the events described and it is one that has dangerous and continuing implications for law enforcement in the area of terrorism. Fact is much less important than cynical belief in these delicate matters.

The real beneficiary of this violence that began and substantially ended in 1976 was, as is so often the case, Fidel Castro. It provided a convenient excuse and something of a smokescreen behind which he was able to hide some of the major shifts of policy in which

he was then engaged. Some of the CIA attempts on Castro's life (a few,
bizarre in the extreme) had now become public knowledge. There were
others that the Cuban leader had been inclined to take more seriously.
He was now, especially following the crash of the Cuban Airliner, able
to point to all this violence with great indignation, some of it
probably quite real, and to claim that the CIA was once more master-
minding these strikes. None could deny that at one time or another,
many of those engaged in this violence, including Orlando Bosch had
once had the closest associations with the CIA. The real unproven
question raised by Castro at this time was whether these associations
continued and what they portended. Certainly, to the unbiased, Castro
raised a good prima facie case. He was able to point to a certain
cordiality of relationships existing between Bosch, a rabid, self-
confessed perpetrator or intellectual author of a variety of terroristic
activities, and high officials of the Venezuelan government known to
have or to have had links with the CIA. He was able to demonstrate
the connection between these relationships and those known to exist
between Bosch and the government of Chile. He could argue quite
convincingly that these would never have been established without
some assistance from a third party such as the CIA. Whatever the
truth of these involved matters, Castro acted with a certain amount
of expeditious concern and not only capitalized, propaganda-wise on
the events, but succeeded in curtailing Bosch's welcome in Venezuela.
Bosch and his companions were arrested by the Venezuelan authorities
and are incarcerated at the present time awaiting the outcome of
judicial inquiry into various matters imputed to them. There are

persistant rumors that this matter may be drawing to a close and that Orlando Bosch may shortly be released in Venezuela. The abatement of this violence during Bosch's incarceration since 1976 can hardly be coincidental, and the possibility of a renewal of the violence on his release - following the earlier precedent in his case - cannot be discounted. He continues to have important links with the exile community in Dade County and while a warrant is out for his arrest in connection with his parole violation, his return to the area after he is put in liberty by the Venezuelans cannot be ruled out. In any event, his release and a subsequent return to his former activities is certain to have repercussions in Dade County regardless of where he might eventually settle and make a base. Bosch has, in the past, shown an informed sense of political timing and he is likely to have learned from past errors.

While these events of a violent nature have been taking place, life for the Cuban exile community has proceeded on a more prosaic but ultimately more useful level. Twenty years is quite a long time on this scale of events, time enough to put down firm roots in new soil and time to be radically affected by the dramatically increased tempo so well explained by Alvin Toffler in "Future Shock". This is no longer a "refugee" community in the conventional sense; the United States and the rest of the world have a much more pressing refugee problem on their hands in 1979. The trauma of the old upheaval is still painfully evident and many adjustments have yet to be made. But both the United States and the Cubans themselves have become substantially reconciled to the fact that this is their new, permanent

home, and "this" means Dade County. By any standard, it is one of the most extraordinary transplants of modern times. What all this holds for the future is not a task to be examined here, but there are already signs that it will be, so far as the problem of terrorism is concerned, quite drastically different from the past. New community leaders are emerging and these, though ever mindful of the legacy of disillusionment and dispossession that these exiles cannot yet shake off, are courageously engaging in what may be termed a "politics of reconstruction". It is based less on consuming hatred for a remote adversary from the past than on a real desire to capitalize upon this community's tremendous potential for the future. It recognizes the historical facts and makes no apologies for them; but it is not weighed down by them either. This is a community that had become genuinely concerned about its own potential for self-destruction. It had seen the possibility of internecine violence in its midst and wanted no part of it. It had become concerned even about taking the traditionally "patriotic" view of supporting violence abroad, while condemning it in the United States. The events of 1976 had clearly shown that the distinction could not always be so neatly made. The community had made great material progress, beyond the wildest dreams of some. They had shared, and shared fairly in what were mainly "good" years for those who lived in the United States. Most would have had to think very carefully before opting for a return to Cuba, on the assumption that their homeland had been recovered and scoured forever of communist influence. Further progress, materially and spiritually depended to a large extent upon a quiet acceptance of matters as they are. And this,

naturally, forces an unpleasant but necessary recognition of Castro and all he stands for and has come to symbolize for the exiled population. This is a very hard thing indeed to do, but it is not unique. The same choice faces the Arabs with regard to the existence of the State of Israel. The "fanatics" among the Cuban exiles may very appropriately be compared with those in Islam who cannot and will not ever accept the consequences of the stroke of history that brought the State of Israel into existence. Others have shown themselves more malleable and although risking their political positions and perhaps even their very lives, have decided upon an accommodation with their adversaries that they hope will redound to their own greater advantage. Such choices are never easily made. They are even more difficult to translate into terms of practical politics. They are a fertile breeding ground for terrorism. Nevertheless, the Cuban exile community towards the end of 1978 made that choice, with all the consequences, good and bad, that it entails.

The present situation has been a long time in the making. With hindsight, it serves to explain some of the events of earlier times and to rationalize some of the violence of 1976 in terms of a brittleness designed to resist the inevitable. Indeed, what occurred in 1977 may have been, at least in part, a reaction to the violence of 1976. On September 1, 1977, the United States and Cuba established "Interest Sections" in Washington and Havana, marking a renovation of direct, diplomatic contact between the two countries for the first time in sixteen years. Meanwhile, unadvertized talks were proceeding between some influential members of the Cuabn exile community and the Castro government. The principal topics of discussion were the release of

political prisoners held by the Castro regime and the re-unification of families. A group of young exiles of the Antonio Maceo Brigade visited Cuba in that same year to work as volunteers, talk with Cuban officials, and see relatives. At a news conference on September 6, 1978, Castro made a dramatic offer, inviting members of the "Cuban community abroad" to "A Dialogue" aimed at setting the stage for a comprehensive program of freeing the political prisoners, reunifying families, and allowing exiles to return as visitors to the island. This conciliatory gesture by Castro was regarded with the greatest of suspicion by even the most interested members of the community, but the benefits and hopes it held out were too great to be resisted save by the most intractable. The "two Cubas" thus began the process of dialogue which, while not leading to a political reconciliation as such, was to change completely the premises upon which the exile community had based much of its existence. The changes were rapidly translated into practical action. In the first three months of 1979, nearly 22,000 exiles had traveled to Cuba, and it was confidently expected that more than 100,000 would do so before the year's end. The effect this has had on the community as a whole is profound. This has been a time of confusion and agonizing choices for the "Cuban community abroad". The Miami Herald in an evocative article on the subject published April 8, 1979, described the situation as giving rise to a choice between "Blood and Politics". It is, perhaps, rather the fashioning of a new kind of politics. A clear majority, judged by its conduct, is in favor of the change, of some sort of dignified rapprochement that will allow the two communities

to live after their separate fashions but yet remained united by the ties of blood rather than bitterly divided by the dictates of politics. Yet others remain unreconciled to the changes that twenty years of history have wrought and are, if anything, further hardened in their resolve to fight in to the bitter end. There is a certain Latin pride involved here that can make no concession to the victor; indeed, it will not even concede him his victory. This spirit is expressed in a letter published in U.S. News and World Report, May 28, 1979, and is worth pondering in the present context:

> "Exiles insult the dead, the incarcerated, every tragic victim of the Caribbean satrap when they visit Castro's Cuba for any purpose other than to help overthrow the abominable regime. Confiscation of private property, end to freedom of assembly and of the press, government by ukase, church worship a treasonable act, debased living standards - this and more has been Castro's Cuba. Self-respecting Cubans can never condone it or reconcile with this political, social and economic wasteland of tyranny and poverty."

The principal vehicle through which this attempted accommodation with Castro is being approached is a loose coalition of interests that has titled itself The Committee of 75. This group of community representatives has a dangerous and daunting task before it. Again the comparison with President Sadat of Egypt invites itself. A sudden, bold initiative has challenged fundamental assumptions and has polarized opposition. The Committee of 75 has twenty years of hatred and suspicion to overcome and it has but a fragile constituency

to which to appeal. Like President Sadat, it will be judged by
results. In a community that has traditionally given little credit
for altruism and has seen enough political speculation in the past
to make it truly cynical, it may be difficult to live up to expectations
of the kind raised. But for those who have chosen to be a part of
this endeavor, there is now only the road forward, for there can be
no turning back. A high price has already been exacted for the
progress made. A member of the Committee, Carlos Muñiz, aged 26,
a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, a tour operator in Puerto
Rico promoting visits to Cuba was murdered in San Juan on April 28,
1979. The precise connection between the death of this young man
and the intricate politics of the moment is far from clear, but it
is really unimportant for the present purposes. What is significant
are the interpretations being given to his demise, the speculation
surrounding its implications for the safety of others, and the impact
of all this on the community. It would be premature to jump to
conclusions regarding this matter or even positively to assign political
motives to this killing. The experience of the past suggests that
it is all too easy to forge links that are stronger than the best
available evidence can bear. One is tempted to enquire why, if this
indeed was an attack upon the Committee of 75 through this member
of it, a more prominent member of it was not chosen for the purpose
and why the killing was not carried out in Miami where, one would
have supposed, it might have had the most fearful effect upon the
community. Most certainly other members of the Committee have been
harrassed and threatened both before and after the death of Muñiz,

but, so far, none has been physically attacked. This cannot be on account of the protection these people are assumed to enjoy, for few have bodyguards and their overall security is not such as to give them adequate protection against the type of attacks that have taken place in the past. These observations should not be taken as detracting in any way from the very real assessment of danger that each of these individuals must face as a result of his or her participation in the work of this Committee. All must have been aware of this when they took upon themselves, voluntarily, these obligations for the community as a whole. But a hysterical, overreactive approach is unlikely to be of much protective value. Just such an approach is that taken by The Miami Herald Editorial of May 5, 1979, under the title "Terrorism Among Cubans Calls for Immediate Action". The florid language of that article can hardly have contributed to lowering the tensions existing in a polarized community and can only be calculated to increase whatever apprehensions are currently felt. It is, of course, an undisguised appeal for federal assistance and, in so far as this might be appropriate to the case, the appeal is only to be welcomed. It will be interesting to see if it is sustained if it is carried to its logical conclusion. It is material to cite in full one portion of the Editorial having a bearing on this: "Only Federal authorities have the resources fully to combat terrorism linked to Cuban politics. The conspiracies involved, if any, almost certainly are both interstate and international. Suspects and witnesses are scattered over thousands of miles. Local authorities can only help; they cannot solve the problem". This language, from a different standpoint, is strikingly like that contained in the Lyons testimony to which reference has

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been made. The real issue involves the ability to obtain and utilize information; it is not a narrow jurisdictional one. Would the Herald and other concerned media interests support such a needed move to expand the law enforcement intelligence system? This is a public relations matter which needs to be carefully addressed.

Good cases are spoiled by latent or patent exaggeration. Some statements take on an overpowering flavor from the context in which they are set. The same editorial dealing with "Terrorism" reports that "Federal and local law enforcement authorities investigated more than 100 bombings and six political murders in South Florida between 1973 and 1976." The inference is surely that all this constituted unassailable evidence for a "wave of politically inspired terrorism" that "must not be permitted to return". While all would agree that everything must be done to keep the community free from violence of any sort, such uncritical statements are unpersuasive and unhelpful to the case. When these bombings are considered on a case by case basis, many are seen to be the result of private matters, some were done for self-advertisment and others had criminal extortion as their purpose. It is not necessary to examine here, in detail, each of the six "political" murders to which reference is made, but most if not all can only be regarded as such in the sense that the victim had at some time or another been engaged in politics. Certainly few if any of these individuals to whom allusion is made were killed because of their politics. It is far from clear what enhanced federal involvement is being sought here. Unless there is evidence of a violation of a federal criminal statute, it would be grossly improper

for state and local law enforcement to be superseded. It is just such a supersession that the Herald Editorial seems to call for and it does great disservice to the proper law enforcement authorities having jurisdiction over the matter and raises unwarranted expectations in the larger readership that cannot be expected to appreciate these niceties. It cannot help abate the understandable concerns of the community or to lower the climate of terrorism by weakening public confidence in the capabilities of its law enforcement system.

Since that controversial Editorial was published, much of its substance has already taken on a moot quality. The matter has simply been overtaken by events of a much grimmer kind than those presaged by the writer of the Editorial. Dade County has been struck by an unparalled wave of non-politically inspired violence beside which anything done by militant Cuban exiles in their hey-day pales into insignificance. Recent though these events are, they still belong to history, but they represent the "tail" of the immediate future; the beast is but a little way ahead. How much of this violence can be properly described as terrorism must await a more leisurely examination of the evidence. A pattern is certainly forming already, and what is known gives cause for the greatest public concern. Politically inspired terrorists operating in the Cuban exile community were, in the main, very careful not to alienate their "constituency". They did not engage in indiscriminate or even incautious killing; their victims were carefully chosen and dispatched with a minimum of danger or even inconvenience to the general public. The message of fear was clearly written, but it was carefully addressed and was not specially

broadcast throughout the community. There was much boasting, much
ugly rhetoric, but the average Cuban resident of Dade County had
little to fear from even the most rabid militant, in the sense of
some direct assault upon his person or property. Politically inspired
terrorism reaps relatively high dividends in terms of the fear
quotient for the expenditure of comparatively little real effort.
The current drug-related violence carries with it a high degree of
involuntary involvement for the citizen at large. The killings that
took place in Dadeland Mall in July, 1979, were reckless in the extreme;
anyone who had the misfortune to be in the vicinity at the time of
the action was quite likely to have been targeted. Once started,
these "wars" are exceedingly difficult to stop. The words of the
Editorial of May 5 can be nicely adapted with but little variation
to the present situation; only they are even more apposite when so
amended. There it was said: "The danger, as this community learned
to its sorrow in 1975, is that a wave of politically inspired terrorism,
once unleashed, takes on a momentum of its own." The only recommended
addition to make that observation germane to the present situation
is the word "non" before "politically-inspired". A full history of
this wave of violence will make interesting professional reading.
It will certainly be most productive of knowledge concerning non-
political terrorism and its impact on a community such as that of
Dade County. What is highly significant is the new dimension that
has been added to the terrorism picture by the incursion of "outsiders",
violence-prone individuals who are not a part of the now-stable
resident Hispanic community.

All history, like cartography, is a compromise. It is largely a matter of perspective how it is reported and what is made, by way of exposition and commentary, of those reports. Some things are drawn larger than life, while others appear unduly small. Much depends on the historian's purpose. Here the objective has been to provide a tool by which the dimensions of the problem might be usefully examined. It is material to enquire as to what was, in the past, called terrorism by law enforcement, by the media, by the public. How serious a problem, in retrospect, was this? What might have been done to alter the course of history, to reduce the impact of this on the life of the community? A review of history allows for such speculation, a sort of "Monday morning quarter-backing"; "those who do not learn the lessons of the past are compelled to repeat them in the future." There are many such lessons to be drawn upon for the purposes of the present study. Firstly, there is the danger of taking the narrow view; those who are in the trenches generally see very little of the battle. It is understandable that those actually involved in the action should see a larger and less meaningful portion of the canvas than those who are able to stand back and take a more expansive view. The historical perspective offers useful correction to the narrow view formed at the time. It is useful to recall that while Miami was suffering from the politically inspired violence of 1975, that is now so vividly recalled by some, that it was not alone in these matters. On October 27, 1975, ten bombings were carried out by the FALN in an attempt to gain attention for Puerto Rican independence and the release of Puerto Rican "political prisoners". On October 31,

1975, the very day Rolando Masferrer Rojas was assassinated in Miami, the New World Liberation Front was blowing up a storage building in California in support of Puerto Rican independence, while the Emilio Zapata Unit was bombing a Safeway store not far away. It is little comfort to the inhabitants of Dade County to know that others are suffering the same problems, though for different reasons, elsewhere. But it is very necessary for those organizing and directing the response to keep the wider picture in mind. In the struggle against terrorism it is always necessary to avoid overraction. To overreact emotionally and materially is to play into the terrorists' hands. The first serves only to alarm the community and to heighten the level of fear, thus doing the terrorist's job for him. The second is simply wasteful and the mistake has been repeated over and over again. Whole armies have been tied down by a handful of terrorists. The indiscriminate use of manpower and material does little to curb the problem and may, on occasion be positively dangerous; the Howard Johnson incident which took place in New Orleans on January 7, 1973, is a case in point. General Grivas pointed out that you do not hunt field mice with tanks; a cat will do the job much better. <u>A needs assessment study must be primarily concerned with finding the right kind of cat for the job and training it to do its work well</u>. The lessons of history, if well learned, can serve as useful orientation for the future.

<u>An overview of past terrorism by types</u> - <u>A summary</u>
<u>Politically inspired terrorism</u>

This has been, until recently, by far the commonest kind of terrorism occurring in Dade County. It has been almost exclusively

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Cuban in origin and related to matters of interest to the Cuban community in exile. Quantitatively, bombing has predominated, but there have been political killings and widespread extortion to finance these militant movements. Kidnapping and hostage-taking have not been featured activities in Dade County. Some skyjacking out of Miami took place during the period when this crime was more prevalent, and although Cuba was a destination, political motivation so far as it related to the Cuban exile struggle was not in point. Discriminating analysis of violent events involving the Cuban exile population in Dade County shows the number that can be positively assigned to this category to be much smaller than is the case impressionistically.

Non-politically inspired terrorism

This has not constituted a significant problem in Dade County until comparatively recently. The "old" organized crime interests, concerned mainly with gambling, money-lending and vice settled their disputes in an orderly way. Their impact on the community at large was of an insidious but non-threatening character. Such "terrorism" as existed was largely an internal matter. The narcotics trade has radically changed this picture and the fact that this, in Dade County, is now largely in Hispanic hands has disturbed the overall position considerably. A power struggle is proceeding for control of the drug traffic engaged in from this area and this is giving rise to a great deal of violence, some of it of a terroristic nature. An exact appreciation of its kind and quantity cannot be usefully made

at this time, but it is safe to opine that it currently presents a more serious problem for the community than does its politically inspired counterpart.

International or transnational terrorism

Some of the politically inspired terrorism protagonized by the Cuban exile groups has had this character. Operations have been planned and prepared in Dade County that have been executed in other countries. Operations have been planned and prepared elsewhere and executed in Dade County. There have been links and movements that have substantially passed beyond the jurisdictional, if not the investigative bounds of local law enforcement authorities. There have, so far, not been activities of an overt nature by other international, politically inspired terrorists in the Dade County area. No information has revealed planning or preparatory action by any Palestinian group, Iranians, Puerto Ricans, or any of the many active Left Wing Latin American groups. The recent, non-politically inspired terrorism has been of a transnational type involving mainly Columbians.

Domestic terrorism

This, again, has been almost exclusively related to internal struggles within the Cuban exile community or in protest against United States' policies with regard to Cuba. Most of the terrorist bombings that have taken place in Dade County can be so classified. The bombings by Rolando Otero Hernandez in March/April, 1975, are typical examples of what might be assigned to this category.

No black or white-anglo groups have been active in Dade County for
many years. It should be recalled, in an historical context that
although El Poder Cubano was organized and operated out of Dade
County, its domestic terrorist activities especially during 1968,
were nationwide. On July 19 of that year, it was responsible for
three bombings in Los Angeles, for another on August 3 in New York
City, and yet another in Miami on August 17.

High technology terrorism

There has been no evidence of anything that could be so
characterized in the Dade-Miami area. This is not particularly
surprising, as there has been, as yet, very little manifestation of
such developments. Most of the terrorism taking place in Dade
County or associated with it in any way has been, technologically
speaking, of a comparatively low order. This is not due to any
backwardness or lack of knowledge in the community. The potential
is clearly there, for the Letelier bombing was indicative of
considerable skill. It is also interesting to note that Florida
Power and Light employs an unusually large number of Cuban engineers.
While there have been no threats involving this type of terrorism
in Dade County, it is worth recalling that on October 27, 1970,
in Orlando, Florida, a 14 year old science student demanded
$1,000,000 and a safe conduct or he would explode a hydrogen bomb,
of which he submitted a credible diagram.

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Quasi terrorism

There has been a lower incidence of this type of criminality in Dade-Miami than in many other comparable population centers elsewhere. Quite strikingly, there have been very few hostage-taking incidents and this seems to have followed the pattern established by politically inspired terrorists. The Dade County Public Safety Department, the City of Miami Police Department, and the City of Miami Beach Police Department all have excellently trained SWAT teams that have had very little employment in this regard during the last few years.

CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARDS THE FUTURE: THE CHANGING FACE OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH FLORIDA

Introduction

What follows is a brief excursion, by way of speculation, into
the future. Or, more properly, an attempt to link a projection of
the uncertain future with the known past. Just as the lessons of
the past provide some guidance to the needs of the future, so too
must a realistic appreciation of that future serve as orientation
for what must be done now, in the present. To a large extent, these
are the assumptions upon which the estimate of needs is based. If
those assumptions are wrong, that estimate, too, will be incorrect
and will need revision. The size and shape of the problem will
determine the size of the needs.

Too much talk about terrorism is based upon times past; conference
agendas are full of learning about terrorist associations that have
long since ceased to exist. There is an unhealthy fascination with
labelling. The problem lies not in the talk, nor in the instruction
that might be derived from it, but, rather, in the use to which it
is put. We are, so far as terrorism is concerned, in grave danger
of fighting the next war with the outmoded, unsuitable weaponry and
tactics of wars past. Unless we are able to evaluate, correctly,
the changes that are constantly taking place in terrorism itself and
the uses to which it is being put, we must be content to concede the
advantages of surprise and initiative to the terrorist. Such a
reactive approach cannot serve the community well. There is a real

need for an _anticipatory_ approach. Those who are concerned with the development of operational responses to terrorism must be constantly asking a series of questions. Is there more, or less terrorism, quantitatively, qualitatively? In the Dade-Miami area, nation-wide, globally? How does what is now being experienced differ from what has gone before? How well did we cope with what has gone before? How well were we _perceived_ as coping? What do we need to cope with the new problems that are emerging? Can we, realistically, expect those needs to be met? Law enforcement, like other branches of government is entering a period of intense competition for scarce resources. It is evident that there will be across the board reductions rather than budgetary increases. There is little sense in assigning unrealistic priorities. And perhaps, most importantly, we should be giving some thought as to _who_ is going to ask those questions and _who_ is going to develop the answers to them. Some of the questions are raised and answered by a study such as that undertaken here, but, operationally speaking, this enquiry must be an ongoing process if it is to serve the continuing needs of those to whom our counter-terrorism strategies are confided. This is a _need_ that precedes all other needs, for it is only by the undertaking of such an exercise on a continuing basis that those operational needs can be determined and the means to satisfy them established. It is quite clear that this is a very special responsibility. It calls for special skills and specialized knowledge. Perhaps, most significantly, it calls for a degree of leisure that the press and hustle of everyday operational activities does not ordinarily allow. What is needed _now_ is but a preparation for what might be needed ater. We need to establish a present

structure that, drawing upon the experience of the past can anticipate the future. As that future becomes the present and then recedes into the past, we need a vehicle that can keep up with the times.

Terrorism in Dade-Miami must be seen in a wider context. Because of the peculiar nature of the problems that have been experienced in the past, there is a tendency to take a somewhat parochial attitude towards the subject. This is not merely unrealistic in a world that is undergoing a rapid metamorphois; it ignores the obvious changes that have already and are continuing to take place in South Florida as elsewhere. Terrorism is a curiously cyclical phenomenon. While it does not seem to follow any predictable pattern, even on a very localized basis, there are clearly periods of great intensity followed by lulls, during which it seems as though the problem might disappear of its own accord. These lulls, as experience has shown, are very deceptive and can lead to a weakening of defenses that can be expensive for society when terrorism is once again on the upswing. The pattern of terrorism in Dade-Miami is a very good example of the cyclical tendencies. The period during which the framework for the present study was being developed was one of relative tranquility compared to the violent times that had preceded it. There are signs that the present relatively tranquil period may, once more, be giving way to a period of intense violence. These local cycles are a part of the larger pattern or trend. While events in South Florida may lag behind developments elsewhere, or may on occasion precede them, there is generally a discernible relationship between the two. There is, it may be said, an overall climate that favors terrorism. The year 1968 which saw a great deal of terrorism everywhere, brought a heavy wave

of terrorism to South Florida. The year 1975 which was also a bad
year for terrorism in Dade County, was another year of intense terrorism
overall. Terroristic activity is once again increasing and the current
year seems to be the start of a new cycle.

There has been a distinctly chilling note about this latest wave
of terrorism that marks it out from earlier cycles. It has been
characterized by an unusually high number of assassinations. Earlier
types of terroristic activities, particularly those involving kidnapping
and hostage-taking were designed to set up bargaining positions. The
overall lack of success of this strategy has forced the terrorist,
world-wide into a much more nihilistic posture. Now the act of
destruction itself puts the community on notice; the demands, where
they are made at all, follow the act. There is, generally, much less
concern for human life being shown and this is a worrying sign. If
terrorism is to become less symbolic and more instrumental, the toll
in terms of human life and property damage is going to rise considerably.
So far, the impact of these developments has not been significantly
felt in Dade County, but on the theory espoused above, it inevitably
will. There are small but notable indications that the process here
may already have begun.

A brief look back

It is important to recall that over the last decade, terrorism
in South Florida, as expressed in terms of politically inspired violence,
has been intimately and almost exclusively related to events and
personalities connected in some way with Cuba. Everything - past,
present, and future - is inescapably tied to the fact. The genesis
of the peculiar type of terrorism prevalent in this area, its history

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and development have tended to reflect the shifts of power, the changes in attitudes and relationships that make up the whole complex of the United States' position with regard to world communism in general and Cuba in particular. Terrorism here, perhaps more so than elsewhere, has been shaped by the lives and fortunes of a few known individuals.

The bulk of those who were forced to flee their homes and fortunes in the wake of the downfall of Fulgencio Batista found safe, if somewhat grudging refuge in South Florida, in the main within the confines of the Dade-Miami region. Having regard to the temper of the times (and a true appreciation of this necessarily involves a rather sophisticated, if awkward translation backwards to a more naive and trusting era), this mass exodus can hardly have been considered by either the United States, or the refugees, as other than a temporary if inconvenient upheaval. There was no thought then of the creation of a new "Free" Cuba on United States soil. Indeed, these displaced Cubans had it on the highest authority, that of the President of the United States, that their misery would soon be alleviated and that they would, in the not too distant future, be returned, victorious, to their rightful homes upon the island. This was the premise upon which all Cubans, high and low alike, conducted themselves and their affairs. They were entitled, at least the more optimistic, to see themselves as welcome transients in South Florida, as victims of world communism against which the United States stood like a mighty bulwark, and as willing protagonists in the small segment of that struggle involving the recovery of their homes and interests. That this was a genuine

belief there can be no doubt. Any cynicism is the product of attitudes that have developed since that time. They cannot have been regarded as overly sanguine in this. United States business interests had suffered heavily through expropriation; the national security of the United States was dramatically threatened by this aggressive intrusion of the Soviet Union into the Caribbean, but a stone's throw away from the continental United States: and perhaps most important of all, world confidence in the United States and its capacity to throw a protective mantle over the free nations of the glove was running high, coloring attitudes and allegiances. These facts are central to any examination of subsequent developments in the subject area under consideration and any projection of their course into the future.

The political violence that subsequently affected the Cuban community in South Florida, and the geo-social context in which that community is now set, can only be understood by accepting that, since the fall of Batista, Cuba has been in a continuing state of civil war. It is a civil war that has continued with greater or lesser intensity notwithstanding that, from a relatively early point in time, Fidel Castro - for one side the Liberator, for the other the Tyrant - secured undisputed control of the island, in the fullest sense of the word, and that, as a consequence, the warring sides became physically and incongruously separated by natural barriers that have tended to obscure and complicate the true nature of the struggle. The Anti-Castro Cubans found themselves in an awkward position, both morally and materially, as well as geographically. They were not simply in the position of a displaced ethnic group, offered asylum on friendly

soil upon condition that they desist from all attempts to recover their homeland. Their position was quite the reverse.

Indeed, at the start, there was little ambivalence in the United States' official attitudes and policies towards these unfortunate, disorganized, but well-intentioned refugees from communism. They were actively encouraged to continue the fight from South Florida. Moreover, they were given the means to do so. They came to look upon the United States not merely as a friend and benefactor, giving shelter and aid in time of need, but as a willing if covert ally in a struggle to regain their homeland from a hated usurper. To all intents and purposes, these Cuban exiles became United States surrogates in their own cause. Everything that was done to and for the Cuban community in South Florida at that time has to be seen in that light. The impact of that has been lasting and irreversible. Just as the United States has on countless other occasions preferred one side over another in a civil war, so, too, did it act in this case. And its actions were materially expressive of that preference notwithstanding that, for policy reasons, it did not encourage the formation of a regular, anti-Castro Cuban army on its own soil or formally recognize a government in exile. It did withhold recognition from Castro and, breaking off diplomatic relations, embarked upon an often bitter struggle to make his continued government of Cuba untenable.

Many militant anti-Castro Cubans lent themselves enthusiastically to the cause. They created a political ethos for the whole Cuban population out of this cause. They trusted the United States and its policy-makers; in this, they were not alone, for so did the bulk

of the free world at that time, as witness the United Nations' voting patterns. Many of these Cubans were recruited and trained by United States' agencies in sophisticated techniques of irregular warfare and espionage. This cannot, in any way be regarded as reprehensible or imprudent save by the ideologically biased. Indeed, Castro, having consolidated his hold upon the island was, with Soviet and other help, rapidly doing much the same thing on the other side. Moreover, he had begun, early, to show the signs of embarking upon that aggressive export of subversion and revolution that has carried Cuban "advisers" far from the fertile fields of Latin America into Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. If objection against United States' policy in arming and training anti-Castro Cubans be raised at all, by those who truly have the national interests at heart, it must be that it was not pursued with sufficient vigor and enthusiasm to permit them to triumph in this civil war in which they were engaged so as to recover their homeland and depart from United States' soil. It was doubtless assumed, at least before 1965, that they would somehow emerge victorious. A defeated army is always in a highly volatile and dangerously unstable condition until it can, like a long-dormant explosive device, be safely dismantled and reabsorbed in its component parts, into the community. But the pregnant question here was: Whose community? For, by its espousal of the fortunes of the losing side, the United States had committed more than mere moral or material resources to the struggle; it had committed an important portion of its territory, namely South Florida, to the resettlement and reintegration of this beaten, frustrated,

disappointed, alien community. <u>Whatever may have been the original intention, the United States has, effectively, created the "New Cuba" on its own soil.</u> It says a great deal for the resilience and might of these United States that this task was accomplished, in the main, so effectively and smoothly. The aberration of Cuban exile terrorism is a small, but inconvenient price to pay for the accomplishment.

Dade County Terrorism - the basic assumptions

These are the facts upon which all consideration of the problems of terrorism in Dade County historically rest. They have had a powerful influence upon all responses. Because terrorism in South Florida was the outgrowth of a purely Cuban problem, the solutions to it had to be seen in exclusively Cuban terms. From a practical point of view, this meant the employment of Cuban law enforcement officers, the development of Cuban sources of information and a distinctive orientation of the system to addressing <u>Cuban</u> terrorism. All the talk about the "internationalization" of the problem meant no more than this: that the Cuban exile terrorist network of operations had somehow extended itself beyond Dade County, beyond Florida, beyond the rest of the continental United States; but it remained, as ever, a Cuban problem, with the same cast of characters, the same history, and the same future as before. The parameters for consideration of terrorism in Dade County were, therefore, very narrowly drawn. Indeed, it was the understanding of at least some of those concerned with the initiation, development, and orientation of the present study that it would be concerned only with the type of Cuban terrorism that had been experienced in the past. Some

question had even been raised in discussion whether the term "Latin" was not too wide. Although, finally, it was agreed that terrorism by other ethnic groups would be covered by the final report, it was clearly the feeling that this would be secondary to "Latin" terrorism, in which Cuban terrorism would predominate. This very narrow view does not meet the demands of the changing times. The first and most urgent need that has been identified, therefore, is for a widening or enlarging of the philosophical, policy, and operational underpinnings of the study itself. Planning for the future must realistically take account of the changes that are foreshadowed in this report and what they portend in terms of terrorism for Dade County. This will require not only a change of attitudes towards the problem, but also a reassignment or reallocation of resources to cope with it.

Shaping up for the future

It has to be recognized that substantial changes have taken place in the Dade-Miami Latin community since the last serious outbreak of Cuban terrorism. In particular, the community has changed from a still uncertain, closely-knit band of exiles fighting, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, a civil war, to one in which a new, distinctive "reconstruction" type politics is evolving. The war is not over, and may never be over for some. But the rest of the community has found leaders who are patiently forcing it back to the business of living as a real ethnic unit once more. The pains of this process, and the individual and collective trauma of this vast ethnic and cultural imposition that South Florida has had to bear as a consequence cannot be seen in isolation from the other portentous happenings of the last

decade. This narrow parochialism cannot be allowed to throw the larger picture out of focus. What has occurred in South Florida, in terms of development and growing pains, though a microcosm of the world stage, contains important elements for a reasoned understanding of the whole. The "new" Cuban politics has been fashioned out of these elements. Time has not only not stood still; it has been in an accelerating cycle that has brought confusion and often chaos in its train. The events of the Seventies have been bewildering everywhere, perhaps more so for the inhabitants of the United States than for others. Traditional values, loyalties, and expectations have been upset. An unhealthy cynicism has become apparent in many areas of public and private life. In particular, directly relevant to the present subject, a sort of crisis of confidence has developed throughout the Western world which has led to a protracted period of self-doubt and general disillusionment. It does not help that this has long been predicted by Marxist ideologists.

Terrorism is but one manifestation of the symptoms of this generalized socio-political malaise. In the United States, the nation has passed from a position of virtually unchallengeable military power and the moral and political leadership of the free world, through a series of intensely humbling experiences, to an accommodation with an increasingly unpleasant reality that perhaps betokens the fact that things will never again be quite as good as they were. Moreover, people are now positively expecting them to get worse. The threat of World War III casts a more intense shadow than ever before; positions are becoming increasingly polarized as the drifts and

deliberate movements of power become even more urgent; new technology
is not making up the shortfall in the world's ever diminishing supply
of exploitable resources, particularly in the field of energy; the
nation has passed, with considerable bruising, through the crises of
race, Vietnam, and Watergate, and many of the crucial issues remain
unresolved. The whole world is in an hiatus of readjustment, and
Americans, for whom the 20th Century seemed to promise so much and
for whom the 21st Century held out even greater promise, are fearful
and ill at ease.

The premises on which American power rested have altered.
Against this background, the changes and postures with relation to
Cuba are not difficult to understand. It is not that gunboat diplomacy
is right or wrong; it is just that, in a changing world, it is simply
no longer possible. Oil, and events in the Middle East have brought
that home to the American people as a whole. The immediate problem
considered here remains: how do you tell more than half a million
souls now resident in Dade-Miami that the world - their world - has
changed? How do you tell them that they will never recover their
homeland, that they must, somehow, like other minorities before them
be absorbed by that great and comforting sponge, the United States?
How do you tell them that the United States, too, is changing and that
great country of which they had certain original images no longer
holds out the promise for them that it did? Who do you tell these
people they are; how do you resolve their identity crisis when many,
in the United States, are still grappling, individually and as a
community - often not very successfully - to do just that for themselves?

How do you reconcile those who will not be reconciled? This lies very close to the heart of the terrorism question. How do you make it less painful for the rest of the community while the balm is being applied? Most important, what should that balm be? These are some of the underlying questions that must be seriously faced for anyone seeking to examine the present problems of terrorism in South Florida and the future direction matters are likely to take.

Perhaps the most significant factor to be considered with regard to these developments is the effect of the passage of time. Many born into Cuban families here have only a communicated knowledge of their homeland as it was and of the events leading up to their dispossession. These are native born Americans of Cuban ancestry. The pregnant question for the future is: Where will their eyes and passions be fixed when they are of an age to influence events? There are "generation gap" matters to ponder here. Will the hatred of Castro wane with time or will it be unchangingly transmitted from father to son. Will those who have only "Castro in the Seventies" as a point of reference see him in a different light? Passage of time alone does not provide a clear answer. The movement for a Free Ireland is more than two hundred years old and its flame burns as brightly today in the hearts of third generation Irish in Boston and New York as it does among the people of Londonderry. The IRA is a formidable resistance movement at home and in exile. It is not simply a question of integration and opportunity; it is the disquiet of a soul not yet put to rest.

The conservative is one who resists change. By this definition, Cuban exile politics is, and always has been conservative. But

there is a more unrealistic current beneath all this: Cuban politics
in exile have been based on a desire not simply to conserve the present,
but to revert to the past. This can only appeal to youth if it becomes
downright reactionary. This is what fascist movements are all about.
In Europe, we have seen the aspirations of the South Moluccans, whose
case, in many ways, is similar to that of the Cubans, erupt into violence
protagonized by a generation that never knew the Spice Islands as its
home. Can the same thing happen to Cuban youth? There are intricate
sociological, cultural, ethnic, and political patterns to be traced here.
Are the Cubans, and particularly Cuban youth, different from others
who have refused to be weaned from the path of violence? The traditional
strength of the Cuban family is a factor to contend with. If their
fathers tire of the struggle, will they become alienated and even
despise them as the Baader-Meinhof generation has done? Will guilt
play a part in forming the "new" politics as it has done in West
Germany, Japan - and even to some extent in Israel? Or will the
constantly changing kaleidascope of events provide a sufficient
supply of fuel for a new and different "Free Cuba" movement that may
yet, productively, absorb the energies of a new generation still
fighting the continuing Civil War?

And what will happen to these energies if they do not? Will
there be an accommodation between those on the mainland and those on
the island similar to that reached of late by the Egyptians and
Israelis - and will this produce an even more bitter determination
to continue the fight, underground, on the part of those for whom
any compromise is weakness and whose intransigence overides both

history and any other consideration of a more practical kind? The implications of the contacts begun by the Antonio Maceo Brigade are material to consider here. Capitalism at its best holds out many attractions; it is more than a match for anything Castro's Cuba has to offer. But what about Capitalism in Crisis? How will it seem to those exposed to the insidious propaganda from the Left that is always so attractive to youth? These are the questions that must be asked with regard to the future of Cuban political violence in the South Florida area, and they must be asked against a complex background of world developments in the field of terrorism in order to obtain meaningful answers. Law enforcement must draw up its inventory of needs according to the answers that are given.

There are clear signs that the Old Guard is wearying of an increasingly unprofitable struggle. Time alone has exacted its toll; some are now old indeed. Many are putting, albeit covertly and cautiously, their talents and resources to other more satisfying or materially worthwhile pursuits. While they have not become the Big Fishes in the Small Pool that they might have expected had they been able to remain in a pre-Castro Cuba, America has been good to many of these in terms of position and power. Power positions, even in exile, have their gradations and are never static. Many have reconciled themselves to achieving position and power in the community in which they now find themselves, effectively abandoning the fruitless struggle to return and reestablish themselves in their homeland. They have become a part of the United States' political scene and more and more will take that road in the future. Others have mirrored - as

in all communities - that effort in the anti-social, antithesis of
acceptable society; a distinctively Cuban sub-culture has grown up
with its own values, its own hierarchy. This is only to be expected;
the only unusual element in the process is that it has taken place
here, on United States' soil. It is not surprising that many "old
soldiers", the dissillusioned, embittered veterans of the Civil War,
should have found their solace and a use for their skills not in
the service of their new community, but in its opposite. This is,
as much as anything, a sign of the times. It is facile and superficial
to blame their erstwhile patrons for having taught them the anti-
social skills of bomb-making, assassination, etc. that they now
profess and exercise to the community's detriment. This is really
no more sensible than criticizing all such preparation for war.
There are many more natural born United States' citizens who have
been taught similar skills. Some of those, too, have turned to
terrorism. No country can guarantee the continuing loyalty,
respect, and restraint of its soldiers upon discharge; indeed,
many have the greatest of difficulty in doing so while the battle
still rages.

This training for killing and the black arts has assumed a
disproportionate value for some in evaluating terrorism in Dade
County. It is easy to over-emphasize the importance of the fact
that some who have turned their hand to terrorism were taught
their trade and encouraged in their skills by agencies of the United
States. This really misses the point entirely and, it is suggested,
those who would seek the answers to these problems in some half-
suspected secret dossiers of the United States' government agencies

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are quite misguided and sure to be disappointed. Unless it is
seriously averred that these agencies are continuing to support and
promote the now perverted acts of their proteges, these antecedents
are really quite immaterial. We know that these people were trained
in such utilizable skills by agencies of the United States, and,
mostly, we know who and what they were. Who and what they now
are - and what they intend to do with their skills - must, from a
law enforcement perspective, be solved by other, more conventional
means. There is probably very little that former case officers have
to contribute to the solution of present problems that may be caused
by their charges. There has been internecine warfare among the
Old Guard, some have wearied, while others have simply changed the
direction of the struggle. Some have remained loyal to their ideals
and to their former friends and patrons, while others have not.
There is certainly nothing untypical in all this, and, broadly
speaking, the way of keeping detailed account of these changes is
the same here as anywhere else; within the overall picture, a careful
mosaic of information on individuals must be maintained. This is
not easy - in some cases it verges on the impossible; but it is
police work. Another Letelier case might - under certain circum-
stances - produce an override of some of the factors that make
investigation of some of these matters so extraordinarily difficult.
But this would have to be an extraordinary event indeed.

There is a matter of public perception here that is material
to consider, for it has, in turn, an effect upon the attitudes
and even the operation of law enforcement. There is a persistent

belief, that has certainly not been discouraged by those who seek to benefit from it, that the old CIA connections somehow remain valid and viable so as to cloak the terroristic activities of a few "die-hards" in a film of respectability and protection from investigation. Such beliefs are an unconscionably long time dying and no amount of official denial is likely to dispel them. They are certainly not going to be dispelled by Castro, whose purposes they serve very well, for he can claim, when it suits him to do so, that the CIA is still out to kill him. While there are many who are not influenced by these notions in their extreme form, there are, nevertheless, many who feel that the federal government has not been as anxious as it might have been to see some of the Cuban exile "militants" brought to justice. It is these feelings, more than anything else, that prompts the constantly reiterated appeal that the federal government do more to combat terrorism in Dade County. However misplaced these feelings and the expression of them might be, it would be unwise to fail to take accout of them in any assessment of needs. There is a well-fostered perception, both public and private, that what is urgently needed is more federal help, more federal intervention. Whether that is justified, whether it is even allowed by law, are questions that have to be considered and addressed. The Letelier case is an awkward precedent to which the more energetic can appeal as showing what <u>can</u> be done when the order is given at the highest federal level. The nice distinctions of jurisdiction in these cases can seem less important to the lay public than the end result.

The persistence of the terrorist "tradition" in Dade County

Many events contribute to change the character and direction of the political struggle as it expresses itself most extremely in terms of terrorism. As terrorists grow old and tired, disillusioned, or even plain converted, they drop out of the business altogether or become Elder Statesmen, counsellors and advisers. Terrorism is not uniformly a profession of failure. As some grow sleek and fat, they seek other outlets for their talents, and their interest and connection with terrorism becomes token or peripheral. Terrorism requires a high degree of commitment. Yet there remain a few who are in this grim business because they know or desire no other. Patriotism and the nature of the struggle lend a convenient dignity, by way of rationalization to what they are doing. But, were those labels unavailable, they would doubtless do such things anyway, for they inhabit a world where these kinds of activities are necessary concomitants of the power struggle and their peculiar skills and proclivities are at a premium. Of such qualities, mercenaries are made, and the profession is relished for what it is rather than for its political associations or what it brings.

Law enforcement will always have to contend with representatives of this class whether it is described in terms of the professional adventurer, the political assassin, or the contract killer of organized crime. Here, it is just that the contemporary situation in South Florida is both favorable to the employment of these talents and finds available a pool of skills that are no longer usable in the areas for which they were legitimately developed. Such usefully endowed

individuals do not disappear or go into retirement. If there were no longer a call for what may loosely be called "terrorists" - those purposefully utilizing the techniques of violence for coercive objectives - in the political arena in South Florida, these people would be truly unemployed in this way and would have to redirect this awful capability elsewhere. The only real openings would probably be in the parallel world of organized crime, where such talents are always needed and are used, though less prestigiously, in much the same way.

There are ample indications that the changing face of the Civil War has produced just such a transfer of talent and energy. It is probable that much of the present drug associated violence and other locally observed phenomena stem from these vagaries of the job market, as well as the other more complex factors that have been mentioned. The importance of this from a law enforcement perspective is twofold: it presents a continuing crime problem; and it perpetuates and hones the skills of an active group of violence-prone individuals ready for whatever action the future shifts of history might dictate. These skills are not only receiving constant polishing; with but little adaptation, they can be as well used in one market as in another. Dade-Miami thus remains the repository of a unique pool of "terrorist" talent; its future utilization is dependent upon a number of factors that transcend the purely local issues as they might be more narrowly perceived.

This "tradition" of terrorism in the Dade County Cuban community is an important factor to reckon with in any needs assessment for it is an enduring element. In the early days, it was not merely a well

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thought of thing to belong to groups that were engaged in actions
against Castro; it was imperative for anyone who hoped to amount to
anything in the community's eyes. It was important to be seen as
a "veteran" - even of a failed action. These were representatives
of a community pride and a carthasis for its pain. This type of
action, whether it be seen as "war", "militancy", or just plain
"terrorism", was "good" in the eyes of a large segment of the community.
Consequently, whatever private reservations one might have had, this
type of activity was never condemmed in public. And certainly, no-
one contemplated cooperating with the authorities to put an end to
it. The community was one large "Safe Haven" into which the operative
could disappear after his job had been done. The tradition, and the
facilities that its practical manifestations offered are very similar
to those that were (and still are to some extent) enjoyed by the IRA.
There are, indeed, many similarities with the IRA that are worth
pondering, although the traditions of the Irish group go back so much
further in time. Both are, esentially, military groups, organized
along strict military lines. Their job is to fight a clearly identified
enemy, not to concern itself with politics. Much has been made of
the "working class" origins of the IRA, by comparison with other
groups which have been more heavily laden with "intelectuals" and
others of a higher social strata. While the Cubans have been "officered"
by "intelectuals", their ranks have contained a high proportion of
"working class" operatives and this, too, is in conformity with the
"military" character of the operation. Discipline, in the Cuban groups,
is tight as it is in the IRA; both administer their own "penal code".

And both have had increasing difficulty in coming to crips with change
and, in particular, carrying along with them their respective civilian
populations in what seemed to many an unnecessary prolongation of the
struggle.

What has happened, in both cases, has been a spurning of that
struggle in the "civilian" population. Because the "tradition" of
terrorism is more recent in the Cuban exile community, it is more
fragile. It is easier for these people to see the terrorists in their
midst for what they really are. The year 1975 may be regarded as the
turning point in that regard. What keeps the terrorist "safe" now
is not public esteem, but fear of reprisals. <u>That fear can be overcome</u>
<u>only if there is confidence in law enforcement to provide the appropriate</u>
<u>degree of protection to those who cooperate with the authorities</u>.
This means, in effect, some sort of witness protection. The real
problem - and this is not merely a legal one - is how best to give
such protection. These efforts are gravely hampered when the authorities
<u>seem</u> powerless to identify, apprehend, and prosecute the perpetrators of
some terrorist action. It is not that successful prosecution itself
puts down terrorism, but rather that it contributes to the creation
of a climate of public confidence in which cooperation with the
authorities can take place.

Terroristic modalities

A study of the choice of weapons used by terrorists is always a
useful gage of the character of those who employ them, their strength,
and purposes. Some idea of the evolution of terrorism in South
Florida can been seen from a study of bombings, namely who was bombed,

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for what ostensible reasons, and how. The protagonists, for the
reasons already mentioned, are relatively unimportant for this purpose.
The bomb is truly the Weapon of the Weak. It is the epitome of
"non-confrontation-style" terrorism. However sophisticated, however
distinctive, it is clandestine and designed to protect those employing
it from falling into the clutches of the "enemy". It is a form of
"long-range warfare" as opposed, for example, to hostage-taking which
involves a frontal attack upon the "enemy" and a real contest of
strength to be able to bargain a way out of the situation created.
Bombing is what is undertaken by terrorist groups that are not strong
enough to engage in other forms of warfare. Groups like the PLO that
are unsuccessful in engagements involving confrontation style tactics
are invariably driven back to this type of activity just to keep in
the game. Bombing has been the predominant type of Cuban exile
terrorism. They have engaged in very little "confrontation-style"
terrorist (as distinct from their purely military operations)
activities and most of these have been undertaken abroad. Much of
this bombing, judging by the power of the devices used, their construc-
tion, and the targets against which they have been used, is symbolic
rather than instrumental. For very good reasons, it has to be. These
bombs "have something to do with Cuba": put for rather obvious reasons,
they cannot be placed in or delivered to Cuba.

This is a real confession of weakness that it is both difficult
and inconvenient for the terrorist to make. They have, therefore,
sought out representational targets of Cuba overseas, or those doing
business with Cuba in some way. Until comparatively recently, not

too many of these existed in South Florida. Some of the anger and frustration of 1975/76 was directed at the United States (and United States' targets), but this country and its interests have never yet been seen in the light of a real enemy. The shifting attitudes of the public at large in the Cuban community itself has now provided a new focus for attack. As this community starts to do business with Cuba, to reopen old relations and to establish new ones, placing bombs in this community will have something to do with Cuba: the 1979 bombing of the Padrón cigar factory can be seen in that light. Only community reaction can prevent more of this bombing in the future.

War - and terrorism is a form of warfare - is the cutting edge of politics. The political game in the Cuban exile community has now entered upon a very interesting phase involving much change, in which the prizes are very high for some, while the personal risks are correspondingly great. The Dialogue, of which much is now heard in the community, is an attempt to secure by political means what could not earlier be gained by force of arms. It is also the manifestation of an entirely new "politics" that is designed to win over and harness the community's potential. If the Dialogue succeeds, those who have participated in it will become the new leaders. It is a courageous attempt to grapple with the new and emerging realities of world power shifts as they affect both the Civil War, and the United States, as well as the total, complex Cuba problem. It can be seen in short-sighted terms; a surrender of national identity, pride, the spoils of victory, for a handful of political prisoners and the reuniting of a few families. From an individual point of view, perhaps, this

is the right way to look at things, and those who fought for so long for even news of their own prisoners of war in the hands of the Vietnamese can well understand such feelings.

But there are wider implications of the establishment of this Dialogue; it is not simply an ad hoc aid and rescue mission. There is the potential of releasing an enormous quantity of political energy of truly explosive force as a result of what is being undertaken. It opens old wounds; it raises new questions; and, above all, it exposes once again the tortured uncertainties of who these Cuban people are and what they are doing in South Florida. It raises critical questions of political choice. It is not merely that there are those who would like to turn back the clock and others who realize that it is impossible to do so. The leadership and direction of the Cuban people who departed the island are now at stake; and it is these, in human terms, that are such vital and vulnerable targets of terroristic enterprise. Who is to wield the real power reposing in the Cuban community is the burning issue here. It may be that Dialogue will defeat Castro as armed struggle could not; it may be that Castro's own problems, his current over-extension, militarily, of Cuban forces coupled with internal unrest, will be exacerbated by what Dialogue might bring. But there are those who cannot see the wood for the trees, and, even if they were left free of all external influences, would still opt for struggle rather than accommodation. The Old forces are locked in battle with the New.

The parallels with the Middle East are again all too clear to need statement here. Communication is very important to politics.

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What is really important is how these things are presented. If a
power struggle develops in the Cuban community here, as it surely
will, and it is capable of being powerfully fed and developed by
organs of mass communication that have had long years of practice
in purveying effective, unreasoned hatred, it will give rise to
terrorism of which the events of the past will be but a pale shadow.
The Latin press is a most dangerous element that must be taken into
account. It has for too long been neglected and ignored by the
larger community as being of exclusive interest to the Cubans.
Much of what is published goes far beyond the bounds permitted by
responsible journalism and would not be tolerated in the United
States in organs of wider dissemination. We are living through the
Year of the Assassin, and the effects of this might well manifest
themselves among the Cuban community here according to the way,
among other things, in which the actions of the Committee of 75
and those associated with it are interpreted. So far, that inter-
pretation has been pretty much left to the Cuban community; not
much has been said by the larger, non-Hispanic community of the
United States, which cannot really afford to ignore or stand aside
from events in South Florida in this way. What affects the Cuban
community affects Dade County as a whole. Can the Cuban community
in the United States absorb the effects of Dialogue, develop and
grow as a result? Or is this likely to be divisive to the point
of explosion? The ill-intentioned, including those who view the
interests of the United States more or less inimically from positions
overseas, will be not unaware of the opportunities offered. The

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match can as well be applied to the tinder by Castro as any other. Those who view with incredulity the presence of active Castro agents in Dade County run counter to law enforcement and community experience. The breaking up of the old Rightist-Centrist hold on Cuban exile politics opens up interesting possibilities of a "New Left" especially among youth. Clearly, a delicate situation now exists needing careful analysis if trends are to be understood and machinery for coping with them established. <u>It is essential that this not be seen as just a Cuban problem</u>. The new "heat" produced by events in Central America is going to bring many strange creatures out of the wood.

The terrorists of yore: Where have they gone?

The old "terrorist" groups have not simply disappeared. They have realigned themselves in accordance with the times; there have certainly been changes of personnel and orientation. They continue to play on public sympathy for the old cause. Some still collect funds, although these obviously have no immediate functional value and probably go, in large measure, for personal enrichment. But a definite malaise has come over the terrorist movement that is translated into an operational lull. What is lacking, at the moment, here as in so many places elsewhere, is a viable issue to overcome the present operational inertia. For all that it has stirred up, the Dialogue, as such, does not seem to present such an issue. There is a lack of purpose among the established groups which is contributing to the present hiatus. The struggle against Castro has lost a lot of its fire. But terrorism is an irrational subject. It is idle to tell

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the terrorist that other weapons in the political arsenal are so much more effective. What Arab terrorist would have been daunted or diverted by the sound argument that the Oil Embargo of 1973 was much more effective than his own miserable efforts? What Cuban terrorist will desist on the grounds that Dialogue may yet bring Castro to his knees, or at the very least, cause him more embarrassment than a few bombs? Terrorists are not that easily discouraged; they thrive on adversity. The Terrorist always hopes that his enterprise may really ressemble a successful episode of "Mission Impossible". The "old style" Cuban exile terrorist is waiting in the wings and is likely to respond to the most unlikely of calls. He certainly cannot be written off as an anachronism.

Terrorism is ecumenical. It is not suggested, here, that there exists an international brotherhood of terrorists, exchanging ideas, weaponry, and know-how; whether there is or not is irrelevant to what is considered here. What _is_ influential is the global climate of terrorism; how it is perceived in its effectiveness and techniques elsewhere may well affect the pattern of terrorism in Dade-Miami in the near future. South Florida terrorism is but a small part of the world picture. Terrorism - particularly successful terrorism - is extremely contagious. Terrorist "spectaculars" are widely reported. They make news, as they are intended to do. Events in Europe and the Middle East can have a revitalizing effect on the present sluggish climate of terrorism here. There is no need to look for or to postulate any direct connection between the two. Even events that are not directly associated with terrorism can have an impact or

stimulate the waiting terrorist to action. An air crash can demonstrate the vulnerability of aviation so as to encourage terrorism, particularly bombing, against airlines. Natural disasters suggest replication to the nasty mind. Non-politically inspired violence can encourage the other, politically inspired variety. They tend to feed off each other. Terrorism can turn any fear-producing violence to its own account. The international character of Dade-Miami and the transient nature of much of its tourist population must not be overlooked. Tourism itself is becoming an increasingly attractive target for terrorists, as the Basques in Spain are now demonstrating.

In terms of needs, this translates, practically, into two things. <u>Someone, capable of doing the job, must monitor the pattern of terroristic enterprize elsewhere on a constant ongoing basis</u>. That person must have the ability to understand and interpret those events in terms of what might happen in consequence in Dade-Miami. Secondly, there must be some regular machinery set up to provide for selected information from areas outside the jurisdiction to reach those dealing with these matters in Dade-Miami. <u>Official information, in a pre-digested form must be readily available to whoever is doing this job</u>. Perhaps the best source of such information is that regularly collected, processed, and disseminated to selected recipients by Air Force O.S.I. That information could, without too much difficulty be made available to Dade-Miami. Its interpretation and further dissemination are something that need careful planning within the resources available to the Dade-Miami criminal justice community.

Terrorists of the future

In seeking to predict the future patterns of terrorism in South Florida, the wider picture must be carefully studied. As well as the "Old Guard", we must take account of the "Young Turks". These are the "up and coming" terrorists of the future. Any needs assessment must try to envisage them, their goals, and likely patterns of action. It is material to enquire: Are these the legitimate scions of the ancient lineage, as the I.R.A. were so faithfully and for so long? Or will they be of a different, bastardized breed, deriving their spiritual and practical formation from elsewhere, as did the Provisional Wing of the I.R.A? For all the "cantina" talk of Castro's G-2, Left-wing Cuban terrorism has not so far surfaced as a problem in Dade-Miami. The young, influenced by events in Central America as much as by the patriotism of their fathers might well show a noticeable swing to the Left. There is, as yet, no clear guidance on this, but law enforcement intelligence must grapple with this issue quickly if unpleasant surprises are to be avoided. Ample pools of recruitment for left-wing causes exist among the young, whose views are less set than those of their forebears. What is needed as a catalyst for new associations is some precipitating event near at hand or perhaps more further afield.

Formerly, the only avenue of expression was that which led back to Cuba. Some of the young have taken that route in the past because there seemed no other available in so rigid a community. Some, in the future, may prefer to stay and fight on the territory of the "New Cuba". It is quite likely that any new groups will have quite

different allegiances, support, and arms. It is also possible, given the experience of the I.R.A., that the Old and the New may continue to exist side by side, thus presenting a somewhat confusing picture of activity. Once more, the answers to the questions posed are to be found in a study of concrete individuals rather than with abstract theorizing and trite ideology. But the intelligence gathering apparatus must be available to cope with the changes. Someone must be sensitive enough to see the changes as they are occurring.

"Latin" terrorism in the '80's

What are the likely developments over the next few years with regard to Cuban politically inspired terrorism? Will it once again be on the rise after this lull, and, if so, what form will it take? Who will be its leaders? In particular, how are the wider political changes that are taking place in the community likely to affect the terrorism picture? While the fact that the Cuban population of Dade-Miami is now more than 33 percent and growing must weigh heavily in any consideration of the problem, and that the "Cuban Civil War" has occupied the energies and monopolized the thoughts of many residents for twenty years, Latin terrorism in Dade-Miami cannot now be seen solely in Cuban terms or even in terms of politically inspired terrorism. There are now new motivations and a new cast of characters on center stage. Even the narrowest vision of the Cuban Exile has been enlarged dramatically by the events of the last few years: those of the last few months have been positively explosive in this broadening of perspectives.

Firstly, this enlargement ought to be considered in an Hispanic context, not only on account of the heavy Latin population concentration of the area, but because of the strategic location of the community in relation to South and Central America and the countries of the Caribbean. It is truly a meeting point of two distinct cultures. It is a point of entry and congregation for many from all over the world; its international airport is among the busiest anywhere. This huge Hispanic community attracts; like calls to like, and differences of nationality and politics are slight by comparison with a shared culture, language, and tastes. United States policy towards Latin American countries will vitally affect events in Dade-Miami, where the bulk of the long-time resident Cuban population of South Florida is to be found. The end of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua will have profound effects not only on the demography, but on the emotional climate of Dade County. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala may well yet go the way of Nicaragua, and the direction to be taken by the Sandinistas is as yet an unknown. While there is as little real cohesiveness in Latin America as there is in Islam, there are, nevertheless, emotional ties that bind in a distinctive way so that an injury to one is felt as a wounding of all. Relations between the United States and Latin America in general have not always been sensitively handled in the past, and the current situation is pregnant with the possibility of misunderstanding and mismanagement that might have serious repercussions in the Dade-Miami area.

Dade County can expect, then, to be increasingly affected by the thorny problems presented by Central America. Anti-Castro Cubans

will be especially interested to see what attitude is assumed towards the Sandinistas and whether the United States will allow an extreme left-wing movement supported by Castro to take charge in Nicaragua. Present State Department policy is bewildering to many Latins. Cuban exiles, who have found allies in Chile in the past can be expected to look for others of like persuasion in Central America. Guatemala is in a particularly sensitive position and there is a growing Guatemalan population in South Florida. The rising power of Mexico, a product of the global energy crisis, the growing "Chicano Power" at home, and a more strident anti-Americanism cannot help but have their effect on the already delicate situation in the Hispanic community in Dade County. It is possible that Mexico's dreams of oil wealth may be over-stated. In that case, some of the euphoria may change and anti-United States feelings will intensify and perhaps be replaced by even more ugly signs of disappointment.

The new government of Venezuela has inherited an awkward problem from the old in the person of Orlando Bosch. What is done with regard to his release - and the position of Venezuela in OPEC must be borne constantly in mind - can have a most important bearing on the future of terrorism in Dade County. Countries, like people, are judged by the company they keep. It will be remembered that the interventionist policy of Venezuela in Nicaragua (along with Panama) has been responsible for the downfall of Somaza and anti-communist Cubans will draw their own conclusions. Dade County will continue to be a focus for these problems, and as time goes by, will become more and more of an Hispanic melting-pot. Law enforcement must be prepared to cope

with the changes this will bring. In particular, the differences and antagonism between different nationalities must be understood. The problems cannot be solved by lumping all these people together as "latins". Law enforcement employment policies will eventually have to reflect this.

There must be injected into these calculations for the future the fact that astronomical quantities of drugs and money are now being moved through South Florida, almost exclusively by Latin Americans, mostly Cubans and Columbians. Terrorism as political violence pales before the dimensions of the terrorism this business is capable of generating, but a form a symbiosis between the two ought not to be ruled out. A real struggle for power is now under way among those trying to secure control of this lucrative drug trade. This will be a war to the finish with no holds barred, and it will have ugly repercussions for the community until one side clearly emerges victorious. Having regard to the characteristics of the contestants, it is certain that terrorism will play an increasing part in this "war" as it proceeds. The money will attract plentiful recruits to this war from among the ranks of the unemployed "soldiers of furtune". Most of the casualties suffered up to now have been by the "invaders", the Columbians. Retaliation by them is only to be expected and a new and very distinctive form of terrorism by these people, well versed in such acts is to be anticipated. Dade County Medical Examiner's Office may be expected to show some interesting examples to students of these matters over the next few months.

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There is a greater need than ever for federal, state, and local law enforcement cooperation in this area. Its sensitivity for those whose special area of responsibility it is is well appreciated and respected. The need for secrecy is also well understood; informants lives are ever on the line. But unless all the agencies concerned can work together efficiently and with the requisite trust, goodwill, and commonsense, they are simply going to fall over each other, and the miscreants will escape in the melée. This is an area where public confidence is very much at stake. The criminal justice system must not be seen to fail. The sensitivity and vulnerability of the South Florida area make it an attractive terrorist target for many politically inspired Latin groups. The fact that so many seemingly uncontrolable criminal enterprises are also conducted out of the same area must be regarded as encouraging for politically inspired terrorists and ominous for those entrusted with the responsibility for countering their activities.

The wider, international view

Then, again, the vulnerability and attractiveness of South Florida as a terrorist target must be seen in even wider, international terms. It is an area of high population density, especially Dade-Miami. It harbors some extremely valuable civilian and military resources that by their very nature are not easy to protect. Palestinian terrorism is again on the rise. It tends to strike where it can, and, especially, where it can find a world audience. With informational resources so fully committed to the management of the local Cuban terrorism problem, the possibilities of monitoring an Arab terrorism that has not yet

materialized have received but slight attention. This is less a matter of priorities than resources. Miami Beach, where the problem has considerable relevance, does not have the resources in its Police Department for an expanded endeavor of this kind. It is a threat that can materialize with frightening suddeness and little or no advance warning. Meeting it in time, rather than reacting to it after it has occurred is largely dependent on the receipt and interpretation of "foreign" intelligence.

It must be frankly recognized that on a number of prime counts, Miami offers a very attractive target in any extended war between Arabs and Jews. Some of the possibilities have been pointedly high-lighted recently by the inauguration of El Al flights to Miami International airport and the opening of one of the few street-level El Al offices anywhere in Miami Beach. Arab disappointment and resentment at the latest turn of events in the Middle East has expressed itself in an increasingly violent form against innocents, as witness the attack on airline passengers at Brussels. The hostage-taking in Turkey in July, 1979, showed a singular disregard for life. For many reasons, not least the large resident Jewish population in Miami Beach, the area is particularly attractive as a target for Arab extremists. The dangers must be regarded as heightened when there are large conventions or when a prominent visitor is in the area. It would be unwise to rely overmuch on the excellent Israeli information sources for early warning about such eventualities as Arab terrorism. The effect of some "foreign" occurrence on the overall terrorism picture is always worth pondering, for where this

has happened in the past, it has sometimes had a triggering result well beyond its anticipated goals. Thus, a wave of Palestinian terrorism elsewhere might suggest Miami as a good target in the campaign. Contagion on an even wider basis should not be ruled out.

Coming closer to home

In any speculation on the future course of politically inspired terrorism in this area, one other consideration should be taken into account. Politically inspired terrorism in South Florida has been, traditionally, limited by reason of there having been, for those engaged in it, a clear, identifiable enemy, El Tirano. Victims were picked because they had something to do with the struggle against Castro's Cuba. United States' victims of the struggle have been few, incidental, and, in the main, regretted. In the general, this was a "foreign" war on United States' soil. As times and perspectives change, views of the target may become blurred and out of focus, so that more and more Ronni Moffits can be expected. In non-politically inspired terrorism, the identity and ethnic background of the victim may not matter at all. If the real enemy of the politically inspired terrorist ever becomes perceived as the United States, the whole picture will change and it will not be fanciful to see the possibility of Arab/Hispanic collaboration in terroristic enterprises that now seem quite unrealistic to even the most advanced or paranoid thinkers. There are obvious connections. It will be recalled that Israel was a prominent supplier of arms to Somoza and the Arabs had already begun trafficking with the Sandinsta opposition. The two sides can be expected to intervene further in other Central American

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countries where the struggle between Right and Left persists.
In ideological terms, the State of Israel is now firmly (if incon-
gruously) identified with the Right, and the Arabs with the Left.
The United States cannot realistically expect to win "Brownie Points"
for its handling of affairs in Nicaragua any more than it might have
expected plaudits from the Ayatollah Khomeini for its belated with-
drawal of support from the Shah. Latins suspect - whatever the truth -
that the United States has a secret deal to keep leftists out of
power in Niaragua; if the Sandinstas were personally installed in
Managua by President Carter, that impression would persist. It is
not difficult for the left-wing terrorist to see the United States
as the real enemy, and the presence of unpopular leaders and former
leaders of Latin American countries in Miami, and the visitors they
will undoubtedly receive, heightens the possibilities for future
terrorism in the area.

Domestic terrorism, politically inspired and non-politically
inspired in Dade County can be expected to follow the national trend.
The effects of imitation by reason of "spectacular" events occurring
elsewhere and being extensively reported in the news media should
be carefully monitored. The various protest movements that are
still trying to find a "cause" worthy of their energies have not yet
given rise to terrorism, but one in particular, that concerned with
stopping the use of any form of nuclear energy should be watched
with care. After the Three Mile Island accident, the movement
gathered force and a considerable amount of uncritical public support.
The Karen Silkwood verdict was symptomatic of the same tendency.

Many felt there was a real prospect of riding the popular groundswell to a triumphant conclusion; some notable politicians have, indeed, staked their political futures on it. Many of these more optimistic expectations have fallen victim to the march of events.

In fact, this whole business affords a good example of how quickly and unexpectedly matters can now change course. The current energy crisis has caused even the most fearful to reconsider and to choose between ill-understood matters of safety and a very real prospect of energy blackouts and rising prices. What looked, but a month or so ago, like a "shoe-in" for the anti-nuclear lobby has suddenly become a tight race. This is unlikely to check the anti-nuclear campaign; indeed, it can be expected to intensify. What it will do - and it has already done so - is to dampen public support, which will now be thrown, albeit hesitantly, in favor of continued nuclear programs subject to more stringent safeguards. For the fanatics, this will be a bitter blow and may be expected to call forth moves towards extreme solutions. What can be realistically expected for the future is plant sabotage, either from within or without designed to halt production and raise again the level of public concern. In the worst case, it might not unreasonably be anticipated that there might be an attempt to reproduce the "accident" that crippled the Three Mile Island plant. Dade County cannot expect to remain immune from what might occur nationally in this regard.

Another area of domestic terrorism of a non-politically inspired character requiring attention is that arising out of labor disputes. Historically, some of the worst terrorism in the United States can be

traced to these causes. The deteriorating economic situation, the recession, is certain to give rise to increasing labor problems. The potential for violence in today's volatile social climate was fore-shadowed by the independent truckers strike; it is worth recalling that just such a strike contributed to produce the demise of the Allende government in Chile. There are a number of areas where terrorism could arise out of labor disputes. The Florida Power and Light strike of a few years back produced considerable bitterness and some violence. Contract negotiations in that industry are again due in the fall, and the present climate is not good for a settlement satisfactory to labor. Unrest in this area is particularly prone to have a domino effect.

More or less?

The signs point to increased rather than diminished terrorism in Dade County in the future. There is ample motive as well as opportunity for terrorism of many kinds in a vibrant and vulnerable community. Much of what can be presently said is speculative, for no law enforcement agency presently has the resources to engage in a systematic, in-depth study of the problems that have been outlined. As time passes and more hard data is accumulated, some of these hypotheses will be discarded, others will be formulated and introduced, and some speculation will materialize in the shape of events to be interpreted and understood. Hitherto, the greater part of what is known or suspected has been developed operationally with little or no time for the luxury of long-term strategic contemplation. Planning has been informed by instinct and experience. Yet this is an

essential, on-going exercise that must be undertaken. There is a
real need for informed, ongoing speculation as to future trends.
How else can the changing dimensions of the problem be measured?
How will we know when we are committing the right blend and amount
of resources to the solution of the problem? To understand the
complex, changing face of terrorism in South Florida (or elsewhere),
much more is needed than the pedestrian tabulation of group nomen-
clature and the keeping of statistics on incidents. Analysts should
not be reduced to the status of clerks if they are to perform their
true function. It takes minds that can grasp the parallel between
The Dialogue and a hostage negotiation - and the intricate dynamics
of both. It needs vision and a range of technical knowledge extending
well beyond Florida or even the rest of the United States. And it
needs the means and dedication to keep these capabilities usefully
up to date. These are real needs that must be met so as to introduce
flexibility into the response system. A daunting but necessary task
is the design and development of these capabilities. Only in this
way can the changes be perceived and acted upon as they are occurring
rather than as an interesting but socially sterile, historical
exercise.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATING THE MAGNITUDE OF TERRORIST THREAT

Introduction

What any given community <u>needs</u> to deal with the problem of
terrorism is dependent, in the first instance, upon the size of
the threat. The difference between the resources actually avail-
able to meet the threat, as it is determined by some process of
measurement, and what resources it is assumed will be required to
meet it, (if these exceed what is presently available), constitutes
the system's needs. Clearly, resources may be more than adequate
to meet any reasonably imaginable threat; there is a surplus capa-
city in the system. In this case, the evaluation or assessment
determines there to be no needs requiring satisfaction. The com-
munity in such a case has all it requires to handle the problem of
terrorism; all that remains is for its resources to be properly
applied towards its solution. Seen from this perspective, a needs
assessment study is reduced, in form, to a rather complex accounting
problem.

Measuring available resources is a tedious but somewhat routine
task for anyone familiar with criminal justice systems. One might
almost say that there is "standard equipment" for dealing with pro-

blems of this nature. The various organs of the criminal justice system need no elaborate statement here. There are police agencies for investigating these matters, apprehending terrorists, collecting evidence in their case, and bringing them before the courts for trial. There are prosecutors and defenders concerned with ensuring the regularity of the trial process and aiding it along towards an adjudication of the matter by an officer of competent authority and jurisdiction, a judge. There is a correctional system into which the sentenced terrorist might be committed to be handled according to the penal policy of the system. Each of these familiar organs has its own structure, procedures, personnel, and other resources to enable it to function. And all operate under color of some law that assigns responsibilities, and functions, and provides for interaction among the different agencies and with the community at large. It can be said, shortly, that Dade County has all these things and more for the handling of terrorism. The federal system, with overlapping responsibilities in some cases, is similarly constructed.

Clearly, nothing is lacking here from any formal catalogue of resources. There are no "needs" in this department. But a true needs assessment study must be concerned to provide a more penetrating review. It must ask three questions of the system in order to tell how well it might perform:

(1) <u>Are the laws, substantive and procedural, adequate for the purposes</u>? Do they provide sufficient powers for those who have to do the job of handling the terrorist problem in any of the agencies of the criminal justice system? Is there a "surplus" of powers? Has the system gone in for "overkill" so that these laws are oppressive to the community?

(2) <u>Is each segment of the criminal justice system organized in a way that will allow it to cope adequately with the problem of terrorism</u>? Is it set up in the "right" way? Are its personnel knowledgeable and trained to handle their respective responsibilities? Are there any "inhibitors" that prevent it from functioning properly?

(3) <u>Does each segment of the criminal justice system have what it needs to do its own job in this regard</u>? Is it large enough? Does it have the right components? Does it have enough material resources? Does it have enough money?

It is evident that any such examination is strictly predicated upon knowing the size of the problem with which the system has to cope. Until this is determined, no meaningful inventory of resources, save in a purely formal way, can be undertaken; it would serve little purpose simply to list an array of statistics; this agency has so many persons, so much money, etc. The size of a police department,

for example, its budget and resources are easy to determine from the appropriate founts of information. What these do not tell is which of these resources should be committed to the fight against terrorism, in what proportion, and how they should be organized and applied for the purpose. First, you need to know the size of the problem.

The magnitude of the terrorism threat is not self-evident. There is no common standard of measurement whereby, looking casually at a community, one can say "there is so much terrorism" in any useful sense. There is no unit of measurement that would enable such an evaluation to be made. But unless the dimensions of the problem can be ascertained, at least in rough and ready fashion, no needs assessment can be made, for the needs, as they are defined above, could never be determined. The first "need" , therefore, is some method, however, "quick and dirty", for measuring the terrorist threat.

Enough has already been said about terrorism and its nature to make it clear that measurement cannot be undertaken simply by reckoning over a period the number of assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-takings, bombings, and the like. This really gives no accurate measure of terrorism at all. Nor can measurement usefully be undertaken, for these purposes, by the historic method. What was needed to cope with the problem yesterday might be quite different from what is required to cope with the problem today - and the needs thrown up by tomorrow's problem may well be different again.

What follows makes no claim to scientific or technological purity. It is acknowledgedly a "quick and dirty" method of proceeding.

It does not furnish a unit of measurement. But, properly used, it does provide a useful "picture" from which the dimensions of the threat and its nature can be appreciated, a picture sufficiently clear at least to be able to serve the purposes of determining what might be required to deal with what is shown by it.

The Capability Assessment

Given an acceptable understanding of what is embraced by the term "terrorism", there are <u>two</u> principal factors that need to be taken into account in order to be able to make a meaningful risk assessment. The <u>first</u> factor is concerned directly or indirectly with the <u>CAPABILITY</u> of those who would engage, for whatever purposes, in this distinctive form of extraordinary violence. A considerable complex of elements would need to be examined in this regard. The <u>CHARACTER</u> and <u>PERSONAL QUALITIES</u>, as well as the <u>MOTIVATION</u> and <u>DIRECTION</u> of those who might engage in this activity would require the closest scrutiny. Their <u>MATERIAL RESOURCES</u>, <u>RELATIONSHIPS</u>, and <u>ORGANIZATION</u> must be subjected to similar examination. Some of the data generated would be the product of scientific or quasi-scientific inquiry while some would, necessarily, be speculative. Essentially, it would be directed, in the first instance, toward the construction of a <u>PERSONAL PROFILE</u> of those engaged, or likely to be engaged in terroristic activity and this exercise would be concerned with making an <u>individual</u> assessment of the potential threat by reference to the subject's record, proclivities, and special aptitudes and skills, as well as taking account of such features as availability and commitment.

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The _collective_ assessment would be concerned, fundamentally, with the evaluation of organizational strengths and weaknesses. To be of real value, such an exercise involves amassing an enormous quantity of reliable, detailed information concerning INDIVIDUALS and their ASSOCIATIONS. While this work is rarely performed with anything like the rigor and thoroughness that science would demand, it is a routine police task. It is an essential and very demanding exercise, the importance of which in the area of terrorism cannot be overstated. Constraints are placed upon the development of this _capability_ assessment by the law and by a host of practical factors, not least of which is a conscious endeavor on the part of the subject, and any group to which he or she belongs, to prevent law enforcement agencies from learning those facts that would permit a better appraisal of his or her potential for harm and intentions in this respect. It is unnecessary, for the present purposes, to explore the complexities of this exercise, or to examine what might be acceptable from a legal and public relations standpoint so far as this undertaking is concerned. It will suffice, here, to say that NO meaningful assessment of a terroristic threat can be undertaken without due attention to the _human_ and _material_ capacities of the individuals involved and the strengths and weaknesses of the groups to which they belong. Information must be collected and analyzed for the purpose.

A methodical examination of any particular situation may usefully be approached by posing two general questions with regard to the actors: _What are they trying to do?_ and _can they do it?_ A useful assessment of the risk posed by terrorists must first establish, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what it is they are trying to accom-

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plish. Having determined the goal, it may then be inquired whether the human and material resources are available to attain it. Making such a determination, even with the fullest knowledge of the available resources - qualitative as well as quantitative - is rarely a simple matter. It involves a technical judgment of what may be needed to do the job. Many factors may complicate the calculation and these are often of an intangible nature, such as the degree of determination required in pressing home an attack and other factors relative to human and non-human performance possibilities. Yet the terrorist is in no better position in this regard, for these are precisely the operational calculations he ought to be making to gage the prospects of success. The central problem lies in the very real gap that often exists between the terrorist's calculations and the true possibilities of success inherent in the situation. Terrorists will often attempt the impossible. They would probably not be deterred even were the impossibility of attaining the desired goal demonstrated for them a priori with a high degree of conviction. Sometimes this obstinacy is born of desperation, while at others - perhaps a majority of cases - it results from a lack of clarity as to purpose and objectives. The terrorist is simply not sure of what he is trying to do. This is particularly the case where the goals are very ambitious and the long and the short term objectives become confused in the mind of the actor. Consequently, any calculation by the opposing side is, necessarily, of an artificial character, supplying, as it does, by speculative means, the missing elements of the terrorist's own equation. The material point, here, is that even in these cases, the terroristic act will end up among the statistics

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and must be taken into account both in assessing prospective action and the magnitude of the threat. The whole matter really turns upon whether the means to attain the end are there or not. If there are no explosives, if no-one is capable of making a bomb, if the will to kill is blunted by idealism or squeamishness, or if the force to overcome the elements of protection is just inadequate, the job cannot be done. Whether it may be attempted is only relevant in the other, statistical connection. This can be readily demonstrated by reference to concrete examples. Thus, if what the terrorists want to do is bring down a commercial airliner with a heat-seeking missile, the answer to whether they can do it is in the affirmative if:

     (i)   they have such a missile and launcher in good working order;

    (ii) they have someone to operate it efficiently;

  (iii) they are able to operate within the effective range of the weapon; and

   (iv) the requisite target presents itself at the right time and place.

Whether they will be able to do what they intend depends upon a variety of circumstantial factors limited only by the range of the imagination. Whether they would want to, is another matter again. The link between CAPABILITY and INTENTION becomes apparent and this is clearly of constant importance to any risk assessment to be undertaken by the means suggested.

Except for purely analytical purposes, it is not really useful to pose these questions in the abstract. No real idea of the mag-

nitude of any given threat can be obtained in this way. To inquire, generally, whether a terrorist group might assassinate the President of the United States, take over a nuclear power station, bomb an aircraft, or hijack an oil tanker can only, in the main, be productive of speculative answers. It gives little real indication of capability. Most terrorists could do these things, if a series of requirements were met in their case. Such questions are only really of operational value if they can be raised in specific situations for which adequate hard information is available. There is a real, operational distinction between formal capability and the ability to translate this into terms of terroristic action. Nor is it useful for operational purposes to frame the questions too broadly. To ask whether Cuban exile terrorists could interrupt or destroy the Dialogue with the Castro regime is too unfocussed to attract any more than a generally unhelpful, speculative answer. Of course this may be the ultimate, hoped-for result of specific terrorist actions, but it is more productive, in assessing the reality of the goal and the means available to attain it, to inquire, firstly, what might be required to bring about such a breakdown of this initiative? Would killing one or two members of the Committee of 75 suffice? Ten, perhaps? Or more? Would there come a point at which such killing would be, in itself, counterproductive and would destroy the very prospect of success? In the latter case, it could certainly be said that terrorists could not do the job by the chosen means. The point of useful, productive terroristic action had been passed; the capability is then exhausted. The question then arises whether they have any other means at their disposal.

The link between capability and intention in this matter is
important. It is apparent that the matter cannot be approached
on the footing that "If they can, they will", for experience shows
quite clearly that although the capability is plainly present, it
might not be utilized while, conversely, many operations are under-
taken when the requisite capability is just not there. This is the
true interaction of capability and intention. Strategic and tacti-
cal intelligence must, therefore, be focussed not only on whether
the purely formal capability for undertaking some terroristic enter-
prise exists, but also on whether there is the necessary will to
employ it in the undertaking in question. There is thus an intel-
lectual as well as a material component presented for evaluation,
and this is by far the most difficult element concerning which in-
formation must be obtained. While it may be relatively simple to
demonstrate what terrorists would like to do (objectives), and to
assess their formal capability, in terms of human and material
resources of doing it, what they will do cannot be sensibly determined
until it has sufficiently manifested itself in some overt fashion.
What is stated here is simply the classic problem of evidencing a
conspiracy. A somewhat simplistic truism is worthy of statement here.
It is virtually impossible to assess the magnitude of a threat that
remains concealed in the mind of the actors until it is, practically,
transformed into a terroristic enterprise. Capability, as such, is
but a portion of the risk equation. There can only be speculative
planning against such an eventuality and preventive or protective
measures to frustrate the possible act or minimize the harm that
might flow from it. This in itself, by a type of Heisenberg effect,

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is another element that must be recast into the calculation. But, in the nature of things, most, if not all, terrorism likely to afflict Dade County will be conspiratorial. It will, therefore, be susceptible to revelation by the appropriate police methods, if these can be used. In assessing the magnitude of the threat, therefore, it is material to inquire into the effectiveness of these methods and the resources available to employ them here, for the capability of the individual and the group will be limited IN ACTION by the extent of the response capabilities and the performance of those engaged in counter-terrorist activities. In other words, the size of the threat is directly related to the effectiveness of the defenses that are or can be erected against it.

Terrorism should always be studied in a particular historical context as well as by reference to geographic factors. The size and seriousness of the terroristic threat is greatly influenced by such elements. What can be done today may not be possible tomorrow. What might have been possible, in the different political climate of years back, may be out of the question in today's changed world. All terrorist potential for action has to be viewed against the background of these changes. Time does not stand still for the terrorist. New opportunities for action present themselves as the old fade from view. The CAPABILITIES of individuals and groups are fundamentally affected by the passage of time. The heroes of World War II are now aging beyond the point where they might profitably repeat their exploits of yore, and many would be frankly bewildered by the technological advances that have made what they then did unrealistic or even downright impossible. For this reason, recent media criticism

of the GS-9 on the grounds that it is trying to incorporate former
SS and Nazi paratroopers into its ranks is frankly nonsensical.
Yet labels and essential identities remain, like empty bottles after
the content has been consumed. For the purposes of threat assessment
relative to terrorism, it is a real question whether these old
bottles can be (and are being) refilled with the equivalent or superior
content. And all the while, new bottles, new products, are appearing
on the shelves. It is evident, from even the most superficial study
of Cuban exile terrorist groups that their composition, power balance,
and capabilities have changed quite radically over the years. Even
their constancy of purpose can be called in question, for men as well
as times have changed. It would, therefore, be illusory to judge the
present capability of these individuals and groups in the South Florida
area on the basis of what they have done in the past. A recent track
record is important, but history gives an aura, not a real measure of
capability. The magnitude of the current and future threat of such
groups is obscured by labelling. What they are capable of now
must be evaluated by reference to the present composition of the
groups and their leadership. Useful threat assessment demands close
study of the mutations. Again, this is a matter of good police work,
not academic study of the matter. The Cuban exile terrorist groups
that operated in and out of South Florida showed a high degree of
motivation, good organizational capability, and much technical
skill. Many of these skills were officially developed with these
individuals were seen in a different light by reference to U. S.
policy. To what degree do those characteristics remain with the

individuals and groups in existence today? Are standards falling, or are the technological advances of recent years, combined with the effects of a changed political situation producing an even more deadly breed of terrorist? These are material questions for any investigation of <u>present</u> terrorist capability in this area. Are the means available to supply the information on which useful answers might be based? What might be needed to supply more accurate answers? In particular, how might the vitally important information relating to <u>INTENTION</u> be obtained, given the unpopularity or even impermissibility of certain counter-intelligence techniques such as penetration? In short, can this exercise be performed satisfactorily with present resources or some redeployment of them?

The Vulnerability Assessment

The <u>second</u> factor that must be studied in relation to a terrorism risk assessment is suggested by the illustration given above of the shooting down of a commercial airliner. Given the capability, there must still be a <u>TARGET</u>. It is in the study of potential targets of a highly vulnerable nature that some useful guidance as to future <u>possibilities</u> for terrorism may be obtained. The making of an inventory of this kind is free from some of the objections that might be raised against the kind of evaluation that has to be undertaken relative to the first factor. The existence, in a particular area, of a vulnerable and attractive target does not mean that it <u>will</u> be attacked; but the <u>absence</u> of such a target means, logically, that it cannot. The range of terrorist options is clearly limited by this <u>AVAILABILITY</u> factor. The possibilities of attack may be increased or diminished by a number

of other factors, some of which, such as contagion or imitation may have much more than local relevance. If similar targets elsewhere are being attacked for reasons that are relevant to local issues in the South Florida area, the prospects for action here, and, consequently, the vulnerability of some particular target, must be considered to have increased. Thus, skyjackings tend to bring other skyjackings in their train, and well-publicized bombings bring on a veritable rash of threats far from the scene of the original event. The potential for truly innovative behavior should never be overlooked. Logically, a trend has to begin somewhere. The fact that many highly vulnerable potential targets have never been attacked is no guarantee that they will not be attacked in the future. To succumb to the opposite view is to.dwell in a false sense of security. Once their potential has been successfully exploited, it is to be expected that attacks on such targets elsewhere will develop and escalate. Attacks against them will diminish as counter-measures take effect and as terrorists fail to reach their goals by these means. What follows is a brief review of potential terrorist targets, in general, the basic attractiveness of which, or something in their nature, makes them especially vulnerable. Vulnerability, in the sense of the ease with which they can be attacked, can be decreased or increased by reason of protective measures taken or neglected, and while this factor is not taken into account for the present purposes, it is obviously most material for the purpose of assessing the magnitude

of the terrorist threat when evaluated from the standpoint of
identified prospective targets. A proper assessment, from this
perspective, would require a detailed physical survey of each target
in the South Florida area and the protective arrangements applicable
in each case. Clearly, such an exercise ought to be a part of any
comprehensive, on-going evaluation of the risks presented by terrorists
in this area. This list, then, is of a general character, a catalogue
of possibilities, and is not arranged in any special order of priorities.
It may usefully, however, serve as a basis for roughly evaluating -
from this perspective - the magnitude of the risk in the South Florida
area by those more familiar with the details relating to the targets
in question. It has also formed the basis of the evaluation on which
the present needs assessment rests.

Geographic Considerations

One general observation may be made here, in the light of which
all these targets and their relative degree of vulnerability should
be more closely examined. The State of Florida has, itself, a natural
vulnerability that must be taken into prudent account by reason of its
being a long peninsula, relatively narrow, and low-lying. No extensive
description of its physical characteristics is necessary here, but
it will suffice to indicate that these put many of the essential
supplies and services upon which it depends at peculiar risk. The
attractiveness and vulnerability of many of these targets is increased
simply on this account. Terroristic interference with these targets
is certainly facilitated by geographic considerations. And Dade-Miami
lies towards the soughern extremity of this exposed peninsula. These

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considerations cannot be absent from the minds of those planning terroristic enterprises nor should they be far from the thoughts of those having responsibility for the design and implementation of counter measures.

A Catalogue of Targets

Refineries and large fuel storage repositories; LNG storage

As the inevitable fuel crisis deepens and widens, the existing stocks will become increasingly precious and represent a vital margin of safety for the nation's economy and ability to function. Their attractiveness as a target for those wishing to do the nation harm need hardly be stressed. Designed, in the main, for an earlier age, these storage facilities are highly susceptible to terrorist attacks not then envisaged, for they are sited in relatively accessible places, lightly guarded, and they are, by nature, very vulnerable to fire and explosives. The containers themselves are simply vessels for storage and have no heavy protective element built into them. Sabotage of such facilities, both from within and without, is comparatively easy and now a very real possibility. Apart from the spectacular effects of an attack upon such a target and the potential material and human losses involved, the economic loss of such a vital resource at a time when domestic stocks are dangerously low could be catastrophic. In local terms, a well-planned destruction of fuel stocks could temporarily paralyze activity in the South Florida area.

For reasons not difficult to understand, this would hardly be, at this time, a preferred target of Cuban exile terrorists. But

oil and its exploitation have always been a controversial issue in Latin American and Caribbean terms, and matters could well come to a head on that account. Individual oil companies imprudent enough to enter into arrangements with Castro's Cuba, (a very real, if indirect possibility following the recent visit of Castro to Mexico), could well attract reprisals against their facilities that would reflect in the overall picture. Conversely, the threat of Cuban-inspired terrorism (surrogate or otherwise) is always present, and events in the Caribbean may well lead to attacks upon the United States and its oil interests. The vulnerability of the South Florida oil supply and the national position in this regard would, accordingly, offer interesting possibilities for the terrorist aggressor. Other left-wing terrorist groups simply acting as "spoilers" cannot be left out of account.

Congressional hearings have drawn attention to the awful potential for disaster in massive proportions involving the transport and storage of liquid natural gas. The potential for mass destruction is enormous, particularly where the operations take place near densely populated areas. Safety precautions, both with regard to storage and handling, currently leave much to be desired. These potentials have been well publicized, and it must be expected that the more sophisticated terrorists will be fully aware of them. Little technical knowledge is necessary to exploit these possibilities.

Again, it may be observed that action by Cuban exile groups in this regard likely to put in peril the more than half a million Cuban

residents of this area may be discounted, but the potential for action by other groups uninhibited by this factor should not be overlooked. The production of such a disaster, by any one of a number of means, is well within the capability of many groups. The material question is not, therefore, <u>could</u> they, but <u>would</u> they? It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which certain groups might undertake such action. The prospects would be dramatically increased if and when it happens elsewhere. This is a future possibility that needs special consideration with regard to the rise of any really determined domestic terrorist group.

Power stations, especially nuclear generators

The general vulnerability of these targets stems, once more, from the overall energy crisis. The events of the last few months, in particular the grave problems encountered at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, have focussed attention, dramatically, on the inherent vulnerability of nuclear reactors. Nuclear power has never lacked for opposition but, hitherto, this opposition has not possessed much cohesion and focus. The May 6, 1979 demonstration in Washington, D.C. provided tangible evidence of a distinct change in this state of affairs in the United States. Elsewhere, notably in France, West Germany, and Spain, protest has already assumed much larger proportions. Generation of electricity by means of nuclear power is under increasing pressure from militant radical groups in many parts of the world. It is not being unduly alarmist to predict violence in the United

States on this account within a very short while. The popular swing away from the anti-nuclear movement on account of the energy shortage may accelerate this. This is a sober reading of current events. Most pertinently, the inherent weaknesses of the plants themselves, and the comparative slenderness of the protection that can be reliably accorded them has been critically exposed. There is no longer a need to imagine attacks by heavily armed commandos. They are now seen to be far from the impregnable behemoths they were depicted to be; the truly knowledgeable have always known how sensitive these plants were to the attentions of the skilled saboteur. The industry will be under a constant cloud; more public pressure can, therefore, be expected for closure, but increasing sabotage, encouraged by these pressures, must also be expected. External assault remains a possibility, but the greatest damage is likely to be done from the inside. Any dramatic, irreversible interference with the coolant or the system through which it passes could produce the disaster feared at Three Mile Island. Such an operation is well within the capability of many terrorist groups <u>or even individuals</u>. Some, at least, are unlikely to be deterred by the unpredictable nature of the consequences. It may be offered as a general rule that <u>any disaster attributable to accidental or natural causes can be reproduced by terrorist action.</u>

Nuclear powered generators in the South Florida area cannot expect to enjoy immunity from these general trends. It is, once more, unlikely that they will be targets of Cuban exile groups although the special skills and expertise of these might be turned

to account by others for whom these targets are of more particular
interest. Commercial public utility operations are, at the moment,
very sensitive to anything that may cause them to suffer any
interruption of their processes, and they are far from anxious to
draw attention to inadequacies in their security arrangements.
For this reason, there may exist or develop a dangerous tendency
to conceal these inadequacies and to be less than ordinarily candid
or cooperative with public law enforcement agencies. Now, more
than ever, good security depends upon effective collaboration between
the public and private sectors and <u>especially on good background</u>
<u>checks of those employed at these sensitive facilities</u>. This latter
point generally gives some serious ground for concern.

   Two other points are worth making, for they ought to be given
due weight in any risk assessment as far as this industry is
concerned. As more and more nuclear reactors are taken off line,
supplies will be substantially reduced, operating capacity will be
critically lowered, and a heavy, perhaps over-heavy burden will be
placed upon other, conventional generating plants. As this point
is reached, supplies to consumers will be quite severely curtailed,
brown-outs and partial black-outs can be expected. South Florida
is certain to be affected on this account as much as anywhere else
in the country. Once more, as supply reaches these dangerously low
levels, any interference with normal operations will produce severe
hardship and damage to the system. Labor problems can exacerbate
an already delicate situation. The consequences might be quite
disproportionate to the magnitude of the effort required to produce

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them. This will, again, enhance the attractiveness of the electricity supply industry as a whole for those terrorists seeking to strike a blow at specific interests or at the United States generally. The second point is less dramatic but no less important. As the energy crunch bites deeper, the utility companies - never overly popular - will become increasingly subject to public criticism and an object of militant agitation. Electricity bills will be much higher, service will be worse, interruptions, for the reasons stated, will become of common occurrence. <u>All this is likely to make itself felt as early as this summer</u>. The general unpopularity of electricity companies may well give rise to direct action that can only worsen the situation. All this is ripe for exploitation by anyone geared to take advantage of the possibilities. In any event, vulnerability to terrorist action must be considered to have been substantially increased by reason of these circumstances. Again, no very extensive technical knowledge is necessary to engage in this type of destructive activity.

Power and transmission lines

If the generation of electricity is seen to have more than its share of security problems, its conveyance to the consumer is evidently in even worse state. Transformers, sub-stations, power lines, pylons, all the essential elements of the grid system are pitifully exposed to terrorist attack. Moreover, most of these elements are highly visible and easily accessible to the public. There have already been precedent-setting attacks by irate farmers

in some northern states. It is unnecessary to repeat the arguments introduced above, beyond comment that they are equally applicable to this aspect of the industry's operations. What must, however, be given special consideration is the peculiar geographic configuration of the State of Florida and the situation of some of the vital power lines on which South Florida depends for the receipt of its supply. Interference with power lines does not take a great deal of manpower, knowledge, or other resources; the technology of the system can be made to work against itself. Unless there are adequate back-up provisions, much of South Florida could, at a crucial moment, be plunged into darkness. The resultant chaos and economic loss are not difficult to imagine. The effect of such a blackout was seen in the City of New York in 1977. A terrorist inspired interference would be much more severe and difficult to put to rights. Terrorist capability to undertake this type of operation certainly exists. Many groups that would hesitate to attack a generating facility might well chance their arm against a transmission system. Non-politically inspired terrorists, expecially those acting in consequence of a labor dispute are even more to be feared.

Port terminals and docks, especially those concerned with the loading, unloading, and storage of volatile or explosive materials

Any sort of port operation is extremely vulnerable to terroristic action. Ports are generally easy to enter, have innumerable places where people and things might be hidden, hold very substantial amounts

of merchandise and other substances, often in the most open of conditions and for long periods, and have a constant flow of waterway traffic. They are, too, often neglected or run-down areas. The Port of Miami is an intricate complex of waterways and is located close to a major urban center with unrestricted access roads. It covers an extensive area and gives rise, by its character, to a number of incidental transit problems. New and projected port works enhance the hazards. Ships and facilities present easy and inviting terrorist targets from public roadways. The potential for terrorist attacks on shipping in this area is high, and there are historic precedents here from a time when modern technological advances were not yet freely available to many of the terrorist groups operating in South Florida. If seaborne trade with Cuba out of Miami becomes significant, it may again attract Cuban exile terrorist attention. In any event, the dangers from fire and explosions caused by hazardous substances is considerable, and a complete assessment of the potential should be made. It is worth considering the potential for damage to the City of Miami and Miami Beach if hazardous materials stored or in transit within the dock area or aboard ships anywhere in the waterway complex were attacked by terrorists. A comparatively small explosive charge carried by a light projectile, well-directed, could produce a veritable holocaust as some tanker and grain carrier explosions have shown. These are far from exotic possibilities and require comparatively little imagination or resources.

Tunnels and Pipe lines; mechanical transport of dangerous substances

The transportation of hazardous materials, whether by vehicle or through pipelines, whatever the distance involved, offers many

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opportunities for the terrorist. Pipelines are especially attractive targets, for they are highly visible, require comparatively little effort to fracture, and have considerable potential for causing other ancillary damage in consequence of their rupture. The Alaska pipeline (protected, incidentally, by a Miami-based company) has been the subject of extensive congressional study. Recent pipeline breaks have demonstrated the potential for harm. An LNG pipeline fracture in Canada in March, 1979, produced a near holocaust. The transportation of dangerous substances by rail - a daily occurrence in Florida as elsewhere - is a godsend to the terrorist. There is an in-built vulnerability of high order. Rail lines are easy to sabotage and tanker cars are notoriously unstable. One only has to consider the consequences of the 1979 derailment in North Florida to appreciate the potential. If, instead of a derailment, a substantial explosion were to occur, the area of initial destruction would be considerably enlarged and the eventual area of contamination no less extensive. Such an explosion would be relatively easy to produce with quite unsophisticated devices.

Road transport is scarcely less vulnerable and many of these vehicles carrying highly dangerous substances are routed through or extremely close to major population centers. It is sobering to contemplate that a massive explosion followed by a spreading contamination of the area could be produced by a single terrorist using a hand-held weapon firing easily obtainable ammunition. Comparatively little technology is needed for the design and execution of such a scenario; there is simply a built-in vulnerability factor that can be turned against the system.

Many terrorist groups must be accounted presently capable of undertaking such an enterprise. Again, it is unlikely that Cuban exile terrorist groups would engage in this type of terrorism unless the specific situation were perceived by them as having some pro-Castro implications or their particular expertise were specifically engaged for the purpose by some other group desirous of using a surrogate to do what it could not - or would not do on its own. It may also be observed in passing that tunnels have many uses for the terrorist. They may be utilized for destructive purposes, or for gaining access to other areas. Disused tunnels are used for storage (a considerable quantity of human remains has recently been discovered in a disused New York tunnel system). Every serious urban terrorist movement has sought to use a tunnel system where this has been available; the very term "going underground" reflects this. Most seriously, in many areas it is simply not known where these pipelines and tunnels are or who owns them. This represents a very serious problem in case of an emergency.

Nuclear and other waste disposal systems

Recent events in the United States and elsewhere have generated much public concern regarding the very real health and environmental hazards posed by reason of our seeming inability to dispose safely of the by-products of the nuclear, petrochemical, and other industries. The disastrous contamination of the Love Canal in upper New York State; the pervasive radio-active contamination in Colorado now threatening suburbs of Denver; the deteriorating state of nerve gas

canisters in Utah impeding their removal and safe disposal; the revelations concerning the generally employed disposal methods of Hooker Chemical, Inc. certainly justify the level of public concern now being manifested. Overseas experience, especially the contamination of Seveso, near Milan, Northern Italy, raises the specter of a barren land with no prospects of being reclaimed. The Nuclear waste problem is seemingly intractable. The material itself is difficult to handle, difficult to store in containers proof against deterioration, and has a danger-life of thousands of years. Worldwide concern is being felt on this account; plans to store West Germany's nuclear waste in old salt mines had recently to be abandoned. Spain's ambitious plans to build more nuclear reactors are being vigorously challenged on this account. Vast quantities of deadly chemicals are being produced that differ only, in terms of the hazard they present, by reason that the dangers they pose are of slightly shorter duration. The environment of South Florida is particularly prone to contamination from such sources on account of its character, water content, and soil condition. The delicate ecological balance of the Everglades, for example, with all that signifies for the region (and the continent as a whole) could be irretrievably upset by a planned contamination using some of these unwanted and easily procurable waste materials. A recent article on pentachlorophenol (The New Yorker, May 21, 1979, pages 25/26) merits attention.

Water supplies, in particular, could be gravely threatened by these means. A recent study published by the Urban Institute points out that all of New York City's water supplies enter the city through

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two forty year old tunnels that cannot be cleaned or replaced save
at exorbitant cost. The tunnels offer easy access to unauthorized
persons and many of our urban centers are similarly vulnerable.
Terrorists have tentatively experimented with such exotic ideas
in the past (Chicago and Philadelphia are cases in point), but
inappropriate substances such as LSD were employed or in contemplation.
Properly employed by terrorists, substances such as that which con-
taminated the Love Canal could rapidly render the Dade-Miami area
uninhabitable and cause a great many deaths in the process. The
cleansing process might well, at the moment, be technically impossible.
The knowledge and the capability are there and the substances are not
difficult to procure. Many have been simply abandoned and can be
lawfully collected without rousing any suspicion. Such terrorism
is relatively easy and economical, and involves no confrontation.
It has many of the best fear-producing ingredients such as uncertainty
of authorship. The possibilities make putting mercury in oranges
(protagonized by anti-Israeli terrorists in Europe in 1977/78) seem
almost infantile by comparison.

Once more, the Cuban exile group must be discounted as possible
protagonists of this type of terrorism for reasons suggested earlier,
but other terrorist organizations may be less good-natured and uninhibited
by the considerations restraining the Cubans. Certainly the production
and storage of any of these materials constitute a special hazard on
this peninsula. It is not fanciful to believe that terrorists are
aware of the potential. This is a most likely field for a "domestic"
terrorist group to make a beginning. The knowledge and focus are there;

the issues are being constantly brought before the public in a dramatic way (the Karen Silkwood case is an example); there is now much imaginative and suggestive literature on the subject.

Airports and airfields

The South Florida area has an extraordinary concentration of airports and airfields capable of serving and servicing aircraft of all kinds. It has two major international airports and a number of smaller airports capable of handling jet traffic. It has an Air Force base capable of handling the largest jet aircraft. Air traffic in the region has reached a very high density, and Miami International Airport is one of the busiest in the world. Large numbers of people, huge quantities of freight, and aircraft of all types are at the airport at all times. It is exceptionally exposed, and many of its operations can be viewed from unobstructed public areas.

Airports are especially inviting targets for terrorists, and one need only recall the Lod massacre, the Palestinian attacks at Orly, Zurich, Athens, and Rome to appreciate not only their continuing attractiveness, but also the difficulties in providing satisfactory security under even the most normal of circumstances. It would be otiose to detail here all the many possibilities open to terrorists, but a number may be singled out for special comment. Airports, airlines, and their operations are very vulnerable to bombings and bomb threats must, accordingly, be taken very seriously. Some airlines currently receive three to five threats a week. Wearied by a long series of hoaxes, an airline may decide not to evacuate its

terminal or recall an aircraft. Should there be a real explosive device aboard an aircraft or in a crowded waiting area on that occasion, the resultant disaster would have consequences on air travel far beyond the range of the immediate area of the explosion. Public areas, particularly around ticket counters and baggage areas are very difficult to control. Those at Miami Internation Airport are more difficult than most. Good security does not begin at the access point to the ramps. Such bomb threats are endemic in the South Florida area, and the number of small airlines that fly the Caribbean and fly to Central and South America attracts not only the serious terrorist, but also the "crank" caller, the imitator, and others having a disruptive purpose. This is a serious security problem and is not likely to diminish. Any large-scale terrorist operation against an airport or an airline in this area is certain to generate a number of "after-shocks" similar to those produced by an earthquake. It is still frighteningly easy to introduce a large explosive device into an airport terminal, and even onto an aircraft. (The effect of an explosion produced by an illegally parked car or panel truck filled with quite conventional materials, fertilizer and oil, for example may be pondered).

While progress has been made over the years in preventing weapons being taken aboard aircraft, the system is far from perfect. It suffers all the defects of low-grade personnel, improperly used equipment, boredom and simple inattentiveness. A terrorist group would have little difficulty in rounding up hostages in the busy lounges of the Miami International Airport and using them to gain access to aircraft;

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they would not even have to contemplate passing through a security
check to initiate such an operation. Another Lod massacre could
easily be staged by heavily armed terrorists entering the arrival
baggage areas from the street; they have no need to travel aboard
an aircraft to reach their operational objective. It must be borne
in mind that current circumstances make for an intensification of
Palestinian terrorism against travelers overseas (as witness the
recent attack in Brussels). Current failures of the Palestinians
in the political arena are separating out, once more, the "hard-
liners" and fanatics. Terrorism inside Israel has proved costly
to those engaged in it and has been largely negated by stringent
Israeli security measures. Palestinians in the past have shown
themselves more than willing to use surrogates (Japanese were used
at Lod). This presents a serious intelligence problem. The inau-
guration in the Spring of 1979 of El Al flights to Miami must, on
this account alone, give rise to some concern. Not only are the
El Al facility at the Airport and its aircraft a prime target, but
so are all passengers in transit, wherever they may be identified
as such, as well as all crews and especially, their transportation
(Vide London, 1978), the hotels in which they stay - and the El Al
office in Miami Beach. The large Jewish population of the area also
increases the attractiveness of the target for Palestinian sponsored
terrorists. Too much reliance ought not to be placed on the ubiqui-
tous Israeli security services (this was a mistake made in Iran by
United States intelligence agencies), and, in any event, local law
enforcement authorities cannot abdicate their responsibilities in

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this way for potential victims of Arab terrorists may well be inno-
cents who have no direct interest in the Arab/Israeli conflice. An
alliance among "anti-Imperialist", anti-Israeli terrorists not neces-
sarily of Arab origin should not be overlooked.

For many years, there has been a soundly based fear that terror-
ists might try to shoot down a commercial airliner using either a
conventional anti-aircraft rocket or a more sophisticated electronic
or heat-seeking missile. (It should not be overlooked that a well-
aimed .50 caliber machine gun might do the job almost as well). Ter-
rorist groups are known to be in possession of such weaponry, which is
easily concealable and not difficult to operate. Attempts to operate
such weaponry in Europe have been frustrated on a number of occasions
and even the threats to use it against a particular airline must be
taken very seriously, (the case of the threats against Lufthansa Air-
lines in November, 1977, after the prison death of Andreas Baader will
be recalled). The successful destruction of two civilian aircraft by
terrorists in Rhodesia has proved the feasibility of the project and
must be taken as definite encouragement to those who might attempt a
similar operation in or near an urban setting. The damage produced
by a crash on the Dade-Miami urban area would be horrendous, as the
crash of the American Airlines D.C. 10 at Chicago in late May dramati-
cally demonstrated. From a terrorist's perspective, such an operation
is peculiarly attractive. It is essentially clandestine; involves no
immediate, direct confrontation; it is extremely economical both as
to personnel and resources; the damage inflicted in human and material
terms could be very high (the aircraft alone is worth millions); the

subsidiary effects, through the loss of confidence in air travel and the seeming inability of the authorities to protect the airways, would be considerable; and such an operation is relatively easy to carry out. The Dade-Miami area would be a very attractive place to mount such an operation. Air traffic is very dense; easily observed; landing and take-off are mainly over heavily populated urban areas; there are many facilities for concealment (the weapon could even be operated from a boat); and the area is a major port of entry. Miami International Airport has a public perimeter road on which many cars are parked daily "observing" the air traffic. Random runway use affords no absolute protection.

Again, Palestinian terrorists come to mind as prime candidates for such an operation, but their use of other groups or individuals to preserve the cover of the operation should not be discounted. Actions by other groups, particularly left-wing Latin Americans, cannot be ruled out, and it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which Cuban exile groups (particularly well placed to undertake such an operation) might decide that such an action served their cause. They have experience in the operation of such weapons and there is a precedent in their use of them against shipping.

While skyjacking has diminished, world-wide, since the early 1970's, it is quite clear that the menace that it represents has not entirely disappeared. The reasons for its decline - so far as terrorists are concerned - certainly cannot be attributed to improved security measures or treaty arrangements. Under certain circumstances, it still represents a perfectly feasible terrorist action and

prime targets, in South Florida area, for political extremists, would
be the airlines of those Central American countries where local guer-
rilla activity is presently intense and where the current rate of
embassy seizures may well lead to a widening of the conflict in order
to force the hands of the governments concerned. These terrorists
will be encouraged rather than deterred by what has occurred in
Nicaragua. Many of these smaller airlines are peculiarly vulnerable
and comparatively lightly protected. The large, international car-
riers, with their important, multi-national passenger lists remain
an attractive target. Latin American terrorists have had a certain
amount of success, particularly with regard to the release of politi-
cal prisoners, as a result of skyjackings. Airline security in the
Dade-Miami area is not such as to warrant confidence that a well
orchestrated terrorist skyjacking could not take place, and there
are obviously many ways in which this could be done. It cannot be
stated with certainty - or even a great degree of optimism - that
preventive and deterrent measures are such as to preclude a terror-
ist operation of this kind. Cuban exile groups would have little
to gain, at the moment, from a skyjacking of this kind; other opera-
tions would better serve their purposes. The festering concern
among certain sections of the Cuban exile community at the outcome
of the Letelier case should not be lightly brushed aside. Attempts
to release those who received long sentences should not be discounted.
If all else fails, a skyjacking could well be attempted. Other groups
of left-wing orientation come more readily to mind and, perhaps, at
the moment the greatest threat in this regard may be seen as posed by

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the Sandinistas and their associates and sympathizers, and the various anti-government Salvadorean groups. It could not be predicted with certainty that such actions would be confined to the aviation of the nations concerned, and aircraft from Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica might well be equally at risk. Aircraft of major carriers doing business in the area might also be targeted and major United States' airlines such as Pan Am, Braniff and, now, Eastern, are particularly vulnerable.

One other type of skyjacking must be prudently considered. The use of a commandeered aircraft as a missile has been contemplated on a number of occasions (the attempts to launch skyjacked commercial aircraft at the White House (Sam Byck) and the Oak Ridge nuclear facility will be recalled). Such a skyjacking has always been of particular concern to the State of Israel and a French airliner that had wandered off course over the Sinai was shot down by the Israeli Air Force in the belief that such an attempt against an Israeli city was underway. This type of suicidal skyjacking obviously has great possibilities from the terrorists' point of view, for it would be capable of causing immense destruction if carried out in the "right" place. Few of the deterrents against other types of skyjacking would be effective. While obviously an act of desperation, there are always candidates for such suicidal missions if they are seen as worthwhile in the over-all scheme of things; people who want to become "Stars in the Belt of Orion" can always be found. Such possibilities here should not be overlooked. General aviation lends itself particularly well to this type of enterprise; there is

much of it scattered about the South Florida area, and it is comparatively lightly guarded. Quite a small aircraft, especially if explosives are carried aboard, will suffice. Corporate aircraft may be targeted for this purpose, and there always exists the possibility of a skyjacking being initiated at a lightly protected airfield before the scenario is moved to one of the major airports. There have been comparatively few attacks on aviation, general or commercial, designed to gain control of a particular individual but this cannot entirely be ruled out as a terrorist modality. If an individual is worth seizing, from a terrorist perspective, the "kidnapping" might as well be done this way as any other. Above all, skyjacking is a peculiarly "contagious" form of terroristic activity. If it begins once more, on a serious scale, and particular forms of it are seen to bring certain results, especially for Latin American groups, it cannot be expected that South Florida will escape the problem.

Writers of works of fiction are often in advance of terrorist trends, and it is possible that these imaginative works may even encourage some operations. The setting and content of the novel (and film) Black Sunday should not be overlooked by those concerned with terrorism in South Florida, and while the use of the blimp by terrorists in precisely the way indicated is not over likely, some of the ideas suggested by the novel may well have relevance for future terrorist operations in this area.

One further possibility should be considered. Chaos in the skies could be produced by the seizure of a major Air Traffic Con-

trol Center. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in the busy skies above Dade-Miami were such an event to take place. These Centers are lightly protected and probably owe their current "immunity" to their comparatively low visibility.

Military, Naval, and Air Force Installations

These are visible signs of the nation's ability to defend itself against any act of external aggression and, as such, are always an inviting target for any group attacking the United States. To a certain extent, these constitute "legitimate" targets for terrorist groups and challenges to United States' power and presence overseas have led to attacks on installations and personnel such as those which have occurred recently in Turkey. More of these must obviously be expected, especially where the country in which troops are stationed is in a disturbed state. Such attacks in the United States have been comparatively rare, but cannot be ruled out in times of heightened national tension or when there is involvement by federal armed forces in civil disturbances.

Of greater current importance from the perspective of assessing the terrorist risk is the fact that these installations harbor highly sophisticated weaponry and material of incalculable value to organized political extremist groups and others. There has been, for example, a recent well-publicized attempt to steal "Red-eye" missiles from bases in Utah. There exists a continuing risk that military bases will be raided to obtain weapons and explosives that are not available from civilian sources. Both security and accountability overall leave much to be desired.

The South Florida area has a number of bases that are exposed to attacks of this sort as well as to the ever-present dangers of sabotage. The area is of vital importance to the defense of the nation as a whole and to the Caribbean area in particular. That importance will increase as the provisions of the Panama Canal Treaties take effect and if the political situation in the Caribbean area shows signs of further deterioration or "Cubanization". It is also an important "staging point" for any contemplated offensive action in Central and South America and groups interested in insurrectionary activity in any of those countries might well be tempted to obtain military hardware from conveniently located bases in South Florida to facilitate such operations. Even relatively small quantities of military explosives in the hands of well-trained terrorists could make a decisive difference in some of the struggles in progress.

The scale of such a threat is obviously most directly related to the effectiveness of the over-all security measures at these bases and, in particular, the arrangements in force for the safeguarding of sensitive weapons systems, hardware, and explosives generally. An overconfident view of these arrangements should not be taken, for it is easy for the armed forces during peace time to become lax in such matters. Disciplinary problems in the Services, as well as acts of sabotage of sensitive equipment point to the fact that the loyalty of members of the armed forces, in these highly politicized times cannot always be taken for granted. Disaffected servicemen are an important source of recruits for terrorist movements; indeed, the IRA encourages service in the British Army for the training and experience it provides.

Women are often used for recruiting purposes. An accurate assessment
of the risk outlined here in general terms can only be sensibly under-
taken by those having access to the necessary information, much of
it appropriately classified, but the relevance of the problem to the
total security picture in the area and the responsibilities of the
other agencies should be constantly borne in mind. There is a real
need for an accurate security survey to be undertaken in this sensitive
area.

Public transport systems. Bridges; causeways; tunnels; garages;
marshalling yards; and maintenance facilities

Under certain circumstances, public transport systems and
related services constitute a prime terrorist target. In many
parts of the world, the placing of bombs in bus and train terminals
is a common occurrence resulting not only in loss of life and
substantial property damage, but also in a deprivation of use of
the system itself. It is a preferred tactic of those groups that
are relatively weak or in the early stages of organization. It
can, however, be a precursor of more serious terrorism. Such
terrorist activity has occurred in many parts of the United States,
but not at a level that would presently warrant serious concern.
Such systematic attacks are really part of a more advanced phase
of urban warfare than is the sporadic form of interference that
has been the experience in this country to the present. This is
really but a reflection of the level of domestic terrorism generally,
and while this state of affairs continues, the level of risk to
these potentially vulnerable systems will remain low.

The greatest risk, at the present, is probably from violence related to labor disputes. Those having an inside knowledge of the workings of such systems are in the position to do them the greatest harm. These transportation systems have not, so far, been significant targets for terrorists operating in or out of the South Florida area, and there are no positive indications that this is likely to change in the near future. Nevertheless, these systems - on which the community relies so heavily for the maintenance of orderly life - remain extremely vulverable to those terrorists who would disrupt them. They are in constant use, largely unprotected, and easy to damage. The fact that they have not hitherto been a prominent terrorist target is probably due more to terrorists not particularly wanting to act against them than to any inability to do so.

Any risk assessment in this regard must be sensibly predicated on the possibility of a change in style, tactics, and objectives of domestic terrorist groups, or the possibility of some trans-national group operating intensively against United States' interests in this way. In the absence of a greatly increased level of activity, these facilities, despite their inherent vulnerability, are unlikely to be subjected to more than "nuisance" attacks. Attacks on these systems have a disruptive purpose rather than causing massive damage or large numbers of casualties. In advanced phases of urban guerrilla warfare, they have as a prime purpose the interference with the movement of those forces that would be deployed against them. It is difficult, at present to see who would benefit by such a systematic campaign of disruption. It can hardly be considered, presently, as

greatly to the advantage of a transnational terrorist group to undertake attacks of this kind. Attacks against these targets are certainly within the capability of most groups, and many individuals, and there may be some random, uncoordinated activity. This, in turn, might prompt further action because of the contagion factor.

In one important respect, the South Florida area is peculiarly vulnerable, namely on account of its numerous bridges and causeways. A serious traffic accident at the beginning of June, 1979, on the Seven Mile Bridge completely severed road travel along the Keys for many hours. A terrorist bomb could have produced the same result. A widespread, coordinated terrorist attack on these bridges and causeways would certainly cause havoc, but is unlikely under present conditions. More likely is the blowing up of a bridge or causeway to effect the spectacular removal of a person or persons for whom no other means of attack have been found feasible. Bombs detonated by remote control are becoming more and more popular among terrorist groups. The possibility of an attack in this way upon El Al crews and passengers in transit should not be disregarded, and for this reason, it would certainly be preferable for crews and personnel of this airline always to be housed as close as possible to the airport and certainly not in Miami Beach.

Communications, especially telephone systems

A great deal of the quality of modern life depends upon the ease and effectiveness of communications systems and much of this, particularly the telephone system, is taken for granted. The

disruption caused by some accidental interference with communications systems is certainly a pointer to what would occur if this were brought about by terrorist action; what happened in South Manhattan in early 1975 on this account is a good illustration. Major communications centers are very susceptible to destruction by fire or explosion, while the cables by which transmission is effected are highly exposed over long distances and can be quite simply cut. They are prime targets of the saboteur. Although these systems must be regarded as a highly vulnerable target, simply by reason of their importance and delicate nature, they do not, up to now, seem to have attracted much terrorist activity. It is possible that it is felt by some extremist groups not actually engaged in all-out warfare that attacks upon these systems would lack the dramatic quality that many terroristic enterprizes require. Where they do take place, they are more likely to be regarded as a necessary adjunct to the carrying out of some other operation rather than as an end in themselves. Communications were cut, for example, in the Moro kidnapping.

One point is worth special attention. The forces opposed to the terrorist depend, to a large extent, upon the effectiveness and protected nature of their own communications systems to enable them to operate at the proper level of efficiency. It has been observed that those running big drug operations now have equipment capable of monitoring even the most guarded of police frequencies. There is no reason to suppose that any

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really serious terrorist group would be any less well-equipped in this respect. Only in the event of a substantial increase in the level of terrorist activity generally would it be necessary to consider the level of threat posed by this type of target, but the geo-physical area of South Florida and its potential isolation from the rest of the State by reason of a well-planned attack upon its communications systems should always be taken into account in any overall risk assessment. There is certainly no need, on the past record, to regard this as an especially sensitive target for any of the groups that have traditionally operated in this area. The potential for harm, however, is clearly there and only a slight shift of emphasis would expose this target in quite critical fashion.

Private industry, particularly large industrial complexes or plants of a sensitive or unique nature

American industry, so far as it represents the outward manifestation of the power and prosperity of the American capitalist system is obviously the bête noir of all those who are ideologically opposed to it. That business and industry in the United States have so far been spared the brunt of the terrorists' attentions has certainly not been due to any sympathy or tender-heartedness on their part. It is not easy to explain, in rational terms, the terrorists' current hesitation. If and when terrorists decide to launch an attack upon United States' interests (and nothing in the nature of a fully concerted, coordinated effort is suggested here),

industry, and particularly manufacturing plants, will certainly be among the most prominent of the chosen targets.

Levels of vulnerability obviously vary as much as the plants and processes themselves, but those connected with the defense industry and those which have some peculiar "propaganda" value will be more likely to be selected than others. The probability of terroristic action against industry in general is clearly linked to the state of stability or unrest existing in the community at any particular time. Pressures by environmentalists and other interest groups can, given certain conditions, be transformed into acts of terrorism against selected industries. For this reason, it is more likely that a domestic group, such as the New World Liberation Front would choose to act in this way than would a foreign controlled terrorist group. For reasons already discussed, some plants, such as those operated by the petro-chemical industries, are extraordinarily vulnerable to sabotage by terrorists. Such attacks are not only designed to impede the ordinary industrial process and to cause a degree of economic loss, but have additionally the potential for widespread havoc. It will be remembered that an industrial accident in a chemical plant at Seveso, Italy, was responsible for a number of deaths and the irreversible contamination of a substantial area that can no longer be used for any purpose whatsoever. Such a disaster is not beyond the capability of many terrorist groups to reproduce on a similar or larger scale, and South Florida is not short of targets that would make such a result possible.

This is certainly looking to the future, for there is no evidence
that any terrorist group has contemplated, let alone engaged in,
such an ambitious project. Again, it cannot be said that this present
abstention is due to any lack of capability or even awe at the
consequences. It can only be concluded that the time has not been
seen as "right" for this type of operation by those who would carry
it into effect. It would take but a slight change of circumstances
to increase the possibilities of such action. This enlargement
of the possibilities must be judged by reference to national and
even international considerations rather than by purely local factors.
Certainly the initiative for action against industrial targets in
South Florida area is unlikely to come from known terrorist groups
that have acted in the area. Although the expertise of some of
their personnel may be sought if this eventuality comes to pass.

Symbolic targets and those of historical significance

Terrorism is by nature a highly visible, symbolic activity.
It has an important expressive as well as an instrumental side.
Terrorism that is meant to focus attention upon something that is
violently opposed will often choose a symbolic target to publicize
its grievance and elicit public support for its cause. Symbolic
targets are often hated representations of something, the elimination
or destruction of which, if widely known, is not only popular in
itself but likely to bring the perpetrators into welcome prominence,
to give them the character of heroes. Thus, under certain conditions,
attacks on prisons are popular, a manifestation of the "Bastille

Syndrome". Such targets have an obvious appeal for terrorist groups, and where they do not ordinarily exist, there is a tendency to "manufacture" them artificially when it is felt that the circumstances call for this. Attacks on symbolic targets can get rid of a lot of repressed anger without doing too much damage and, usually, without loss of life. They also serve the purpose of polarizing feelings in the community and allow those ordinarily uncommitted to violence to share vicariously in the actions, feelings, and aspirations of their more militant brethren. Many terrorist movements begin by attacking symbolic targets before moving to more deadly works.

There are few obvious targets of symbolic significance, at this time, for terrorists who are operating or might, in the near future, operate in this area. There are as yet no statues erected of Fidel Castro, but it is not difficult to imagine what might happen to such a monument were it set up in this community. Symbolic targets of a less obvious order must be looked for and, given present sentiment in the community, these cannot be considered to be in short supply. Anything of a material character connected with the Dialogue and what it has come (or might come) to signify would serve as a symbolic target. The Padrón cigar factory might be seen as falling into this category. Given the volatile nature of Latin emotions, the traditional license given to all segments of the press, and the all too easily generated malice directed against persons and institutions, symbolic targets are not difficult to identify or manufacture. Indeed, over-assiduous use of this extended "freedom of the press" or misdirected employment of it

might well cause those indulging themselves in this way to become symbolic targets; press buildings, radio and television stations, as well as individuals associated with them, are all common symbolic targets for terrorists so minded.

Some symbolic targets are simply attacked on the "Mount Everest principle", because they are there. While no obvious target of this sort in the Dade-Miami area suggests itself at the moment, it should be remembered that symbolic targets are creatures of their own time and mean different things to different people. Against a pattern of dramatically rising fuel costs, the offices of the large oil companies and public utilities might become symbolic targets. This would afford a dramatic form of extreme social protest without the inconvenience, for the community, that curtailment of supplies following the destruction of a refinery or a power station might have. It is in the light of these considerations that the presence of the El Al office in Miami Beach must be examined. Its destruction, say by leaving a car-full of explosives outside the premises, would constitute a considerable propaganda victory for the perpetrators, (any resultant deaths would probably be unintended, but not necessarily regretted) but would not have much material effect upon El Al's operations. Attacks of this sort are mainly attention-getting devices. It must be concluded that, at this stage, the probability of attacks of a symbolic nature by existing, organized, or incipient terrorist groups is quite high. Almost anybody can object to almost anything. And it takes comparatively little to push those objections over the threshold into actual violence.

Federal, State, and local government facilities

These are obvious terrorist targets, the vulnerability of which will vary according to the climate of the times. In times of considerable disatisfaction with government, such as occurred during the Vietnam war, the bombing of buildings associated with the hated authorities by groups such as the Weather Underground became a tactic designed to focus and sharpen public concerns. The terrorist saw himself (or herself) as the cutting edge of a broad-based social protest movement. That particular groundswell has been entirely lost since the war came to an end and militant groups have not so far found an issue under the banner of which they might march united once more against government. This has not been for the want of trying. There are, however, ominous signs that reveal the banked fires glowing close to the surface. The anti-nuclear demonstration in Washington, D.C. on May 6, 1979, brought out between 50,000 and 100,000 participants, according to which estimate is consulted. Other, more local issues, such as some labor disputes show clearly that violence is easily organized and even more easily provoked. It is never difficult to canalize such violent impulses and to direct them at that hated, symbolic target, "The Government". As the effects of a deteriorating economy continue to make themselves felt, more and more of these concerns will be directed at government in general, and it is certain that some of them will be channeled specifically against the more obvious signs of government buildings and, particularly, those associated with the police power of the state.

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Direct attacks on government buildings, hostage-takings, and
other confrontation-style terrorism such as has been seen in other
nearby countries recently is difficult to envisage in South Florida
at this time. What is much more likely at this time is the type of
clandestine bombing campaign calculated to force evacuations and
to disrupt government business in general. On a local footing,
trials of issues upon which a degree of anti-government feeling
can be generated might well induce a bombing campaign directed
against the courts. The death penalty has been shown to be an
issue capable of generating the strongest emotions. The public
nature of the trial process in this country makes the courts and
judicial personnel extremely vulnerable to attack by extremists.
Certain types of criminal litigation tend to stir up the community
rather than putting issues to rest. As has already been mentioned,
the recent conviction of the three Cuban exiles for their participation
in the assassination of Orlando Letelier seems sure to present a
continuing problem that may well find expression by way of acts of
terrorism by anti-Castro sympathizers directed against government.
Much bitterness surrounds this case, the way the government proceeded
and, in particular, the role of Townley, the government's chief
witness and the manner in which he was subsequently treated by
comparison with the Cuban participants. Those whose sympathies are
engaged are unlikely to allow these matters to rest and it may well
be that their grievances will find violent expression in the
Dade-Miami area. At best, they will become martyrs whose deed

will inspire others bent on following the same path. The possibility of the action being planned outside the Dade-Miami area, or planned here and executed elsewhere, underscores the need for a coordinated, national approach to the exchange of information. In summary, it may be said that government is always a highly visible and usually vulnerable target for terrorism, but that local as well as national issues have a tendency to intensify, quite rapidly, the extent of this vulnerability. While, at the moment, the level of vulnerability of government facilities in South Florida area is still quite low, this might change, dramatically, with considerable rapidity and comparatively little warning.

Hospitals and Schools

For the more vicious type of terrorist, these constitute a most inviting target, for they are lightly protected, easily damaged, and full of relatively helpless people. Terrorists are not noted for their humanity and the horror and repulsion produced in the community would not be a deterrent to action if other purposes were seen to be served thereby. The fact that hospitals have not been attacked probably says less about terrorists as people than about their motivation and what they consider to be their self-interest. This is but a slender measure of security in which to confide and the basic vulnerability of the hospital to terroristic attacks of all kinds remains. Hospitals are not granted immunity because terrorists consider them to be in any way sacrosanct. They must, realistically, be seen as very easy places in which to

assassinate someone, from which to kidnap people, in which to take hostages, or in which to leave the odd bomb. A bomb threat against a hospital poses very serious problems relating to evacuation and the disruption of the ongoing process of caring for the sick. Malicious fires are another hazard of an especially grave kind in any hospital environment. Any serious terrorist campaign aimed at mass destruction of life and property or designed to produce a high degree of chaos is certain to target hospitals.

Much of the horrifying quality that causes the attack on hospitals to be put out of decent contemplation attaches in as large, if not larger, measure to terroristic activity directed against schools. Yet these, too, are extremely vulnerable, and attacks upon them might well be productive of the type of results that, under certain circumstances, terrorists groups might desire. It is very hard for the authorities to maintain a hard-line against terrorists holding a school. To suggest that terrorists might refrain from attacks on schools and young children is not only contrary to experience (consider the South Moluccans at Beilen, and the Palestinians at Ma'alot) but also to ascribe to them a humanity and considerateness that are both incongruous and incompatible with the nature of terrorism and those who undertake this activity. The possibility of such future attacks and, especially, the holding hostage of large numbers of children must certainly be rationally contemplated. If, as in the case of hospitals, it is presently considered to be a remote likelihood, this is due not to any essential lack of vulnerability in the institution itself or any

particular strength in the matter of school security, but rather because, under present circumstances, such targets are low on the terrorists' order of priorities in this country. Terrorist attacks on schools and hospitals pre-suppose either a massive intensification of the level of terrorism generally or a more than ordinarily desperate quality in those acting. While neither possibility should be disregarded out of hand, the probability of South Florida hospitals and schools becoming targets of terrorists in the near future cannot be regarded as very high.

Areas of significant public congregation, especially convention centers, sports, and entertainment complexes

Any area where large numbers of persons are gathered together at any one time must be regarded as vulnerable to terroristic attack. Parts of the country where tourism features as a prominent part of the region's economy have special problems. Such areas, among which South Florida must be prominently counted, generally make ample provision for the accommodation and enteratinment of visitors. Dade-Miami has several facilities capable of accommodating upwards of 5,000 people, including the Orange Bowl, which can hold over 80,000 persons and the Miami Beach Convention Center, able to hold 25,000 persons. These latter are high-visibility facilities designed to attract major national events, often of a controversial character. Both have, in the not too distant past, been associated with episodes of extraordinary violence, the Orange Bowl through the book and movie Black Sunday and the Miami Beach Convention Center with the national political conventions in 1968 and 1972, both years of great turbulence and civil unrest.

As the world moves inevitably closer to the possibility of mega-terrorism, such large congregations of persons will offer increasingly inviting targets for the purposes of some terrorist spectacular such as that protagonized in Black Sunday, or for the purpose of engineering some massive hostage-taking episode. On a more mundane level, even an ordinary bomb threat (the working terrorist's "bread and butter") must have most serious consequences by reason of the disruption of events, evacuation, and possible panic. Given a carefully orchestrated campaign along these lines, the area's capacity to satisfy tourists' and other visitors' needs would be substantially impaired and considerable economic hardship would result.

Sporting events are particularly vulnerable by reason of the partisan emotions generated, and the latent possibilities for violence can be exploited by subversive groups with only a comparatively slight degree of personal involvement. This, again, is an area where the contagion factor (and the role of the media) is of some importance. Spectator violence and terrorist-inspired disturbances at political gatherings are extremely newsworthy happenings and tend to receive extensive and often extremely dramatic media coverage. The contagion possibilities are significantly heightened by such treatment. Happenings elsewhere are quite likely to generate events of a similar nature in the South Florida area. The probabilities are enhanced by the prevailing mood of the country and by reason of the increasing polarization of politics, a phenomenon that is likely to become more and more manifest as the 1980 Presidential election approaches.

It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the risk in relation
to such targets in the South Florida area in isolation from the rest
of the country. Present terrorist groups in the area do not offer
any special threat, on an analysis of their history and propensities.
It is more likely that, if this type of target becomes popular else-
where with terrorists, "outsiders" will be attracted to the South
Florida area by reason of the abundance of such targets and the
opportunities offered. The Dade-Miami area certainly does offer
exceptionally attractive, well-sited targets for a terrorist
"spectacular" designed to capture the popular imagination after the .
fashion of the Munich Olympics hostage-taking, and the availability
of close convenient air escape routes is another factor to take
into consideration. Again, the strategic position of the Dade/Miami
community and its close connection with Latin American affairs must
be taken into account. There is a growing air of desperation in
many Latin American, especially Central American, countries that is
driving political extremists to engage in forms of confrontation-style
terrorism that have become relatively unpopular elsewhere. It will
be recalled that the numerically largest hostage-taking to date,
3,000 persons approximately, occurred in Nicaragua. Those taking
the dread step towards mega-terrorism will certainly be desperate
and there is no lack of that quality of desperation among the many
Latin Americans who have struggled for so long and so fruitlessly
to effect transfers of power by the use of a lesser degree of
violence. The Cuban exile community has not yet come to that pass,

and the dispersal of some of its more dangerous energies through assimilation, the passage of time, the opening up of other opportunities, as well as the engagement of its anti-social elements in activities such as drug trafficking and gun running will probably ensure that it never does. But the qualities inherent in other groups of left-wing leanings ought not to be overlooked, for they will, in the main, be contemptuous of the very circumstances that have tended to divert the Cuban exile community from the path of extreme violence in pursuit of a political cause.

Any area of high population density

There are two aspects to be considered here. Many of the considerations expressed in the antecedent paragraphs hold good for this subject. Large numbers of people, however they are grouped together and for whatever purpose, constitute a vulnerable target for terrorists. Where such people are packed together in a relatively small urban area, they offer singular possibilities for the terrorist whose design it is to produce the maximum number of casualties with the minimum expenditure of energy and resources. Where the area includes a substantial amount of extremely valuable real estate, the importance of the target is obviously greatly increased. There is a great population concentration of this kind in the Dade-Miami area. Miami Beach, in particular, contains not only a dense population but also some of the nation's most impressive hotel properties closely packed and attracting, during the season, large numbers of visitors from other parts of the country and

abroad. The fact that this aggregation of people and property lies directly beneath some of the world's busiest air routes is another element to be introduced into any calculation relating to its vulnerability to terrorist attack. While the threat of urban terrorism that preoccupied so many students of the subject during the late 1960's has not materialized in the forms then envisaged, these population concentrations and what can be done to them by terrorists still represent a threat that cannot be ignored.

The second aspect that needs consideration is the use of the dense urban area as protective "coloring" or as a safe area for the terrorist. Given a compatible or complacent population, he can "lose" himself in its midst, recruit help, collect funds, and generally carry on his work from a protected base of operations. The character of terrorism in the South Florida area has, in the past, tended to reflect these latter considerations. Cuban exile terrorists have been able to do their work because they operated within, and out of, a mainly friendly, supportive Cuban community of half a million persons concentrated within the narrow confines of Dade-Miami. By and large they were compatible with that community in all essential respects; language, appearance, aspirations, and objectives. While this fundamental compatibility is not likely to change as far as the extremists among the Cuban exiles are concerned, their methods, objectives, and targets may gradually put more and more distance between them and the community of which they are a

part. This is a common development in the history of terrorism and
is something like what has occurred during the past twelve months
in Northern Italy. The waters in which the terrorists have swum
so comfortably in the past have now grown distinctly chillier.
This will clearly have a number of consequences with regard to the
vulnerability of the community as a whole, perhaps the most important
of which will be that the terrorists it has harbored somewhat
indulgently in the past may turn upon it so that it sees itself
to have nursed a viper to its bosom. The Dade-Miami Cuban community
is at a crossroads, as much, probably, on account of assimilation as
anything else. There are already signs of this estrangement that
could betoken increased intra-community violence in the future.
In the short-term, the consequences could be very unpleasant for
many individuals, but, in the long run, the process is likely to
lead to an eradication of Cuban exile terrorists from the community.
Still, the old hatreds remain, and the strong, deep divisions are,
in the short-term, likely to produce the kind of strife foreshadowed
by the media commentary on the death of Carlos Muñiz at the end of
April, 1979.

People

This, the most vulnerable target of all, has been reserved
for treatment last, although it has, by implication, been interwoven
through all that has gone before. However terrorism may be defined,
it is, essentially, something people do to other people. It is an
activity intended to act upon the human mind. People, not things,

are terrorized, forced to do things out of fear that they would not otherwise do. Things, property interests, tangible and intangible, are the subject of the terrorists' attentions only on account of their relationships to people and because of the value they are assumed to have for some person or persons. At bottom, then, vulnerability can always be translated into terms of personal vulnerability, for it is people who own or control things, make decisions, enter into relationships, and influence the course of events.

Every act of terrorism, therefore, however it is designed or oriented, constitutes an attack upon people. When the act is aimed specifically at some human being so as to injure him or her in a physical or psychological way, the terrorism can be said to be direct, whereas if the individual is struck at through his or her relationships or property interests, it will be of an indirect character. Most acts of terrorism have, at one and the same time, both a direct and indirect nature. The instant victim of an assassination or kidnapping suffers a direct act of terrorism against his or her person; but others associated with the victim suffer indirectly, more or less according to the closeness and strength of their relationships to the immediate victim.

To the terrorist, this indirect suffering is often the more important of the two. Terrorism is of an exemplary character; it is intended to teach somebody an unpleasant lesson, to make an example of them. It is the oblique or indirect side of terrorism that is its most pervasive, its most extensive. If a powerful

leader is assassinated, the whole community is subdued. Although
in no way directly threatened, others, quite remote from the event,
begin to feel insecure and to ask themselves, "If they could not
protect a powerful person like (the victim), how can I feel safe?"
One kidnap victim can strike fear in the hearts of a hundred others
who inquire, "Who may be next?" Terrorism, like paranoia, feeds on
uncertainty. The dynamics of terrorism have been well understood
by rulers since time immemorial; in modified form, they represent
the raw elements of every system of social control. Those who
cannot rule by love must perforce resort to fear.

In another sense, terrorism is all about power. This dark
side of the power struggle is concerned, in the words of Humpty
Dumpty with "Who is to be master". Politics is a technical trans-
formation of brute force into some form of acceptable accommodation.
Politics represents a delicate kind of balancing act, an attempt to
find some sort of social equilibrium. It is rarely possible to
accommodate all points of view, all interests within the social
framework; the strongest simply take charge and bend the framework
to their will. The result is that some are excluded (or exclude
themselves), while the great majority set about making themselves
as comfortable as possible within the framework as it exists. From
time to time, pressures build from within to alter the framework.
Sometimes this alteration can be accomplished quite peacefully to
everyone's satisfaction without damage to either the socio-political
framework or the existing power relationships themselves. Where a
majority feels satisfied with things as they are or with compara-

tively slight modification, these adjustments can usually be made quite comfortably. Good politics is the art of compromise. But there are always some who will not comprise. If their uncompromising goal is simply to change matters to their own satisfaction, they can only do this by capturing the power base of the community from within, by force if necessary. This is revolution, bloodless or otherwise according to the amount of resistance to their designs. Or, if the basic structure of the framework is too strong and exclusive, they can only break in and seek, forcefully, to move from a position of weakness to one of strength by influencing the apathetic, uncommited, or just plain contented mass within. This is the terroristic alternative, the power play through fear. Its manifestations can be observed throughout the world wherever terrorist campaigns have been waged.

As has been illustrated in previous chapters, terrorism in South Florida has, for nearly two decades, been dominated by the power play within the Cuban exile community. The political facts of life of this large and vibrant community continue to dominate the scene within Dade County. For the most part, any assessment of the terroristic risk here has to take detailed account of the "politics" of the Cuban exile community and must, in particular, assess the vulnerability of its leading personages to direct and indirect attack as well as evaluating the effects of such activity upon the community as a whole. For well understood historic reasons, the power play within the Cuban exile community is presently more delicate and more open to shifts and upsets than it has been for

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some time. This is a sensitive period of adjustment, in which positions and standing have yet to be consolidated. Because of the delicacy of some of the accommodations proposed and the intensely personal bases upon which they rest, there is clearly room for a forceful approach to tip matters a different way. Consequently, certain individuals find themselves in a crucially exposed position, so that their removal might seem to be a "solution" to a situation in which no compromist of principle might otherwise be possible.

Many who have associated themselves with the Dialogue, and, in particular, those comprising the Committee of 75 are very exposed to the attentions of extremists, those who reject all compromise. If their removal is seen as a way of altering the current of events, it can be expected that those who have not hesitated to use such methods before, will not hesitate to use them again. The best protection a public fugure can enjoy is that no one should wish to harm him. If the reverse is the case, no amount of physical protection, hardware or bodyguards, is any guarantee against the determined attacker. If the idea of the Dialogue can be "institution-alized", made an ineradicable part of the aspirations of the Cuban exile community, it will eventually be seen by the organized opposition that the removal of a few leaders is not going to change matters. This will not, of course, deter the odd, irrational fanatic, perhaps worked upon by the commonly available "hate" propaganda of the Latin press, but the present vulnerability of

certain individuals such as Bernardo Benes and the Reverend Manuel Espinosa would be reduced. Time is an important factor in any calculation relative to personal vulnerability. What is eventually seen as inevitable _may_ come to be accepted; while it remains in the balance, the forceful solution continues to be an attractive alternative.

There are two further points worthy of consideration before leaving this topic. In assessing vulnerability in terms of this Cuban exile political scene, there is no real need to ask "Why?"; there are reasons enough. Similarly, it is hardly necessary to inquire "Who?", for relationships have crystalized to the point where potential victims can be sufficiently identified. In the absence of hard information, the "When?" and the "Where?" can attract only the most speculative of answers. National and international, as well as local developments will have an effect on this. It is more profitable to inquire "How?", for the factors entering into analysis are more certain. Nothing could be served by a kidnapping or hostage-taking; there is nothing really about which to bargain. Economic issues are not really relevant to the nature of the conflict. The "how?" comes down fairly conclusively to assassination - but how? The Cuban exile community has, in the past, bred some formidable and highly skilled assassins, who have not hesitated to kill for a cause they believed to be right. They have shown themselves, moreover, capable of a high degree of technological sophistication in the use of explosive devices; the Cuban exile community must still number among its ranks some

of the finest bomb-makers in the country. Bombs are effective, involve no confrontation, and their message is clear and identifiable, with little real need for a claiming of responsibility ex post facto. The threat of the bomb continues to weigh heavily in this community and while a shooting cannot now be ruled out, it seems reasonable on historic and other evidence to suggest that some of the present uncertainties will eventually be resolved by the bomb rather than the gun. Such violence will certainly beget other violence. It ought not too readily be assumed that the anti-Castro Cuban terrorists will just "give up". The hatreds run too deep for that. Even the possibility of an attack on Castro himself cannot be altogether ruled out.

The second point that needs careful consideration is the undoubted diversion of such awful talent into other criminal enter- prises that make use of similar terroristic techniques. Procedurally, the methods of organized crime differ in no way from those of the political extremist; only the motivation distinguishes one from the other. This was highlighted by the assassination in San Antonio, Texas, of a Federal Judge during the last week in May, 1979. How did such a killing differ from the assassination of Judges in Italy and Spain by political extremists? It is as much terrorism whether the tongue is cut out to silence the witness and serve as a grim example to others, as it is to do the same thing for the purpose of silencing a political opponent. Political extremism calls for a remarkable personal or ideological commitment to be able to engage in such horrible activities; organized crime is an easier task master

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on the conscience, offering the prospects of material gain. The close connection between the two, particularly with regard to the personal qualities necessary to do such things is, however, inescapable. It is also a fact that - especially in the present circumstances - political terrorism simply does not pay very well, either in material terms or by way of power and glory. Organized crime activities, on the other hand, are very profitable. Millions of dollars pour into Miami daily in connection with the drug trade alone. It is little wonder that the good "bomber" or the unscrupulous individual handy with weaponry might be attracted to these avenues of employment; he might even rationalize that he is simply honing his skills until they can be more properly employed in the "cause". Of course, such extrication eventually becomes quite unrealistic, even if it were ever feasible, but it does mean that this whole question of terrorism and vulnerability cannot now be looked at sensibly as though these two operations, that of organized crime and that of the organized political movements, were something quite distinct. The human factor alone makes such separation, even for the purposes of analysis, quite unreasonable. This is something that gives the terrorism risk assessment in South Florida a quite unique character.

Although the terrorism picture in South Florida is thus overshadowed by the Cuban issue, particularly so far as people are concerned, any assessment of the magnitude of the threat in this area must take account of the aspirations and potential of other groups that might perceive this area as a useful battleground. This is not a "territorial" question in the conventional organized crime sense, although for the reasons set out in the preceeding

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paragraph, this cannot be ignored. There are definitely territorial questions to be taken into account. Other Latin groups might well still be inhibited or find it unwise to act in or out of the Dade-Miami area, particularly those of a left-wing or pro-Castro Cuban persuasion. This must not, however, be taken as altogether precluding such activity. The Provisional and Official wings of the I.R.A. were able to operate quite distinctly and sometimes antagonistically in Belfast. This area offers many advantages as a base for Latin American groups of all kinds and they would be able to blend into the general Hispanic community without too much difficulty. It cannot necessarily be assumed that information about such groups would automatically emanate from the Cuban exile community or even that there would be widespread knowledge of their existence. Dade-Miami is a very easy area to enter and leave and extremely conveniently placed for undertaking certain operations. One would not have to be a resident in the area to engage in terroristic activities here.

The problems associated with the Middle East cannot be ignored although they have not yet surfaced in this area in crucial form. Palestinian and Latin American terrorists have collaborated in the past; there is no reason to suppose that they will not do so in the future. The current presence of the Shah of Iran anywhere within easy reach of Miami is a large factor in any personal vulnerability calculation. The open "contract" on his person announced by the Islamic courts is likely to attract professionals and amateurs,

rational and fanatic alike. Arrangements for his protection as well
as for his elimination can only be usefully mounted out of the
Dade-Miami area, and both may be expected to make use of local
resources. There may well be a "spin-off" from such arrangements.

The magnitude of the threat - the Media factor

In conclusion, a few more observations on the role of the media
in relation to these problems are in order. It may or may not be
true that we are what we eat, but it certainly is not true that we
are what we read, or what we see or hear depicted by the electronic
media. Yet, the media is most influential, perhaps decisive, in the
formation of our impressions about many of the most important matters
affecting our daily lives. Our individual and collective views
about many things are often derived in large part, originally or
through others, from what is disseminated concerning them in the
media. Few people are so discriminating as to be able to resist the
imposition of these blanket impressions. They are generally accepted
without too much resistance or testing and they become woven into the
tapestry of life. Thus, the magnitude of the threat of terrorism,
for most people, at most times, and in most places, is very much
what the media tells them it is.

It is obviously unfair, and patently incorrect, to regard
terrorism as a mere invention of the media. But looked at quite
soberly, it is evident that most people's knowledge of what terrorism
is, whether there is a lot of it going on or otherwise, and whether
much more can be expected, is mainly derived from the media. And,

undeniably, the media can make a lot out of nothing, just as it can reduce something quite substantial to negligible proportions. This is a very considerable power indeed, and it is as often denied as it is admitted by those who wield it. No deliberate policy of deception by media professionals is suggested here. It is simply that facts are not merely facts; presentation alters perceptions. The way in which the facts of terrorism are served up to the public determines the degree of attention they pay to the subject and the amount of importance they accord it in their lives. For most people, the true answer to the hypothetical question, "When did you realize there was a lot of terrorism going on in South Florida?" would probably be, "When I read about it in the Miami Herald", or "When I heard about it on the Six o'clock News."

Public concern is stimulated, enlarged, allayed, or diminished by the actions of the media. Terrorism is, by nature, designed for media attention and exploitation; it has all the ingredients necessary to capture the avid attention of the reader, listener, or reviewer. In fairness, it must be said that the media could not ignore the subject even if it chose to do so. Indeed, ignoring it might be a most unwise procedure. In any event, the media is not a monolithic entity with a solid uniformity of criteria. It is, rather, a large and highly competitive industry, dependent for its prosperity and continued well-being on a fickle public that, in the main, desires to be entertained rather than educated and informed.

There is also the element of the self-fulfilling prophecy to take into account in all this. Spotting a trend and then writing

about it can be quite intoxicating. Especially if the writer is talented, convincing, and possessed of the means to reach a large audience with his words. If you write enough about terrorism (or speak about it enough to a large enough audience) you will create the impression that there is a great deal of it going on. Who would deny that there _is_ a great deal of terrorism if Walter Cronkite says there is? The belief that terrorism is a serious problem and is likely to increase _needs_ no rational explanation for such a malleable public; it needs only a firm pronouncement from a recognized authority. If it is declared to be so, it is so. And, almost inevitably, it _becomes_ so if the authority has a sufficiently large and faithful following.

These dynamics cannot be left out of account when a more realistic, quasi-scientific appraisal is being attempted. The magnitude of the terrorist threat is not necessarily what the pundits of the media _say_ it is. But a great many people will believe it to be so regardless of evidence from other sources to the contrary. If public concern is thus raised to a sufficiently high level, there will be demands for action, that _somebody_, _somewhere_, do _something_ about the problem. The need to respond - and to respond meaningfully - will then become something of a problem in itself. The Miami Herald editorial of May 5, 1979, entitled "Terrorism Among Cubans Calls for Immediate Action" should be read and understood with these considerations in mind.

A very special media problem exists in the Sourth Florida area. The Latin press, spoken and written, owes its formation, sensibilities,

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and direction to a culture very different from the one in which it has been implanted. It is capable of expressing, extremely vividly, some of the most profound of human emotions. It reflects, very accurately, the character and temperament of the peoples it serves. It is capable of playing upon the emotions of its audience with the tone and delicacy of a finely tuned instrument. More than the United States' media generally, it is able to whip up public concerns and fears. In so doing, it undoubtedly enters into excesses that would be regarded as unprofessional, if not downright illicit, in the English language press. Much of this distilled hatred and malice is directed against named individuals who are thus made the butt of public ridicule and scorn for actions that have displeased those who control these powerful organs of communication.

It is difficult to judge how effective these campaigns of hate really are in forming public opinion and even more difficult to guess how what is purveyed might affect some already biased or unhinged mind so as to stimulate some vicious action against the individuals towards whom these vituperative articles and lampoons are directed. They are, nevertheless, a factor to reckon with in the overall climate of opinion regarding terrorism and the possibility that they might be responsible for generating some terroristic action or at least targeting certain individuals cannot be discounted.

CHAPTER SIX

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

This chapter is headed not by an interrogative, but, appropriately, by a Leninesque declaration of purpose. It represents in spirit a statement of identified needs and an indication of how it is felt those needs should be met. In a way, this is the most gratifying part of the report to be committed to paper; in another, it is the most difficult. For the greater part, the report has dealt with that which has been shaped, or is likely at some future time to be shpaed, by others. Here the consultant alone must take responsibility for the design of what is suggested. It is upon this chapter, ultimately, that the work as a whole will be judged. It is no accident that this part of the report was the very last to be written. All that has gone before has in some way or another contributed to its formation.

It should be pointed out here that this entire undertaking has been inspired by a traditionally Scottish sense of cost-consciousness. Not meaness, but prudence and good husbandry of resources must be the watchword in these troubled times. The traditional American approach to a problem in times past has been to throw money at it. Provided the aim was true and the target not too absorbent, this sometimes worked. But the practice has left behind an unfortunate legacy. Commitment, especially federal commitment, has tended to be judged by the size of the purse thrown into the ring. The country has come upon leaner times - for the moment - but the old attitudes persist.

It would be unfortunate indeed if this report and its recommendations were to be judged by those outmoded standards. If it were felt that terrorism could be more effectively prevented or contained by employing huge sums of money for counter-measures, the expenditures would be unreservedly advocated in this report. <u>It would be grossly improper to urge such expenditures simply to give the impression of concern</u>. Conversely, it would be a great mistake to imagine that concern is absent because no exorbitant demands of this sort are presently levied upon government. What money is available to cope with terrorism must be wisely not prodigally spent.

The prevention of terrorism presently has a very low priority for government in the United States at every level. Having been spared, so far, terrorism of the type and intensity that has plagued other countries having stable political systems and a high standard of living, the problem has just not seemed to warrant great attention nor much by way of expenditure of resources. On a short-term view, that is not an inaccurate assessment. By comparison with other social problems currently engaging the nation's energies and taxing its human and material resources, terrorism has, fairly, to be ranked very low in the order of priorities. Those who are engaged in combatting what is nevertheless a real and urgent problem are understandably concerned about where they stand in these rankings. It is not merely a matter of feeling unappreciated; it is sometimes a very real question of whether the job can be done at all with the resources that, in the present climate of opinion, are devoted to it. These feelings must be appropriately taken into consideration.

It is understandable that those trying to hold the Thin Red Line with too few troops and too little ammunition should be heard to complain, "What will it take to wake this country up to the problem of terrorism and what is really needed to cope with it - a major catastrophe?" The short, honest, and unwelcome answer is that it will take nothing less. Perhaps the most important lesson of the present study is that it is not possible to reduce what might be needed to cope with terrorism, at any postulated level of intensity, to simple monetary terms. It would have been thought that this lesson had already been learned from some of the mistakes that have been made in the fighting of crime generally. But, clearly, it has not. It would be all too easy, were catastrophe to strike, to commit X million dollars to the struggle against terrorism. They would surely all be expended - and quickly - on all sorts of hardware and software, weaponry and gadgetry - but the expenditure would not conquer terrorism any more than similar profligate spending has served to hold down crime. Money, as such, is meaningless in this struggle. A blank check cannot be written for the fight against terrorism. The real needs must first be identified on a prudent, realistic scale. Then, the account must be presented and met, if battle is to be joined.

These, then, are parsimonious proposals, and will doubtless be disappointing both to those who feel they are already doing too much with too little, as well as to those who measure performance in terms of largesse. Some expenditure is necessary; there is no Free Lunch. But this is a parsimony dictated by realism. It is also intended

to serve as a future caution. It may be that sometime, in the not too distant time to come, "catastrophe" indeed will strike. Somebody may then "identify" funds to cope with the problem on a scale beyond anyone's wildest dreams today. It is to be hoped that these cautionary words will then be recalled and that the money will be prudently spent without regard to its amount but, rather, by identifying what is needed to cope with the problem and then paying for it in that order. That way not only will save money; it will also avoid the emergence of "imagined" needs stimulated by the availability of the real means to satisfy them.

The economics of counter terrorism is a complicated subject, but the other side of the coin must not be neglected. To engage in terrorism costs money, often a very great deal of money. One of the first things any serious terrorist organization must attend to is the financing of its campaign. It must build up a war chest. The idea of the ragged anarchist, burning with revolutionary fervor, living on charity and hopes of a better world for all, probably did not survive the turn of the century. Many of today's terrorists, politically inspired and otherwise, are exceedingly fond of the "good life" and all that goes with it. This is not to suggest that all, or even a great many terrorists are "in it for the money". But the nature of the business, its hazards, and attitudes towards money and property in general encourage the spending of money rather than its thrifty hoarding. Traditionally, terrorist operations have been financed by making the rich pay for them. Bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, all go to feed the movement and to impoverish the "enemies"

of the cause. These traditional methods are still widely in use today. The sometimes astronomical ransoms paid by multi-national corporations to secure the safe return of kidnapped executives have gone to make coping with terrorism just that much more difficult for those on a tight budget. Where the problem becomes very serious, legislation has sometimes been used to forbid the payment of ransom. This is never effective and does little more than work individual hardship.

More modern methods of financing terroristic operations present even more serious problems for law enforcement. Much terrorism is now "officially" financed, in the name of some "liberation" movement or other surrogate enterprise that can be supported to advantage by the paymaster. Such contributions may range from comparatively small sums of "seed money" to huge, on-going subventions that rival some countries' national revenues. Arab terrorist movements, in particular, have done well from generous sympathizers who have donated or diverted surplus oil revenues to their account. This has enabled some terrorists, at least, to live in the lap of luxury. It has also meant the ability to pay operatives, provide for their living expenses and travel, maintain all the administrative superstructure of the movement, and obtain the most sophisticated equipment for carrying out operations. It is very hard for financially parched government counter-operations to match what such movements can do. In particular, it makes anything in the nature of penetration of such well-financed groups extremely difficult.

The other main source of financing is less "respectable" but capable of generating even higher revenues. The traffic in drugs is exceedingly profitable. Extraordinary sums of hard cash are very quickly generated by it. Much of this has to be "ploughed back" into the business and a great deal of the rest goes for the personal enrichment of those who control the trade. But a great deal also goes to support the sub-culture of violence that is a necessary concomitant of the business. Big drug operations have an enviable capability for handling, moving, and concealing very large sums of money. The capacity to subvert the regular financial system upon which the community depends is quite considerable. While only a comparatively small part of this money goes to fund terrorism as such, this is still large enough to attract a great many violence-prone individuals for whom this may be the best, if not the only, game in town. In the absence of a cause that can give equally well-paying and regular employment, some have no other recourse but to lend their skills to the vicious and violent practices to which this traffic gives rise.

While it is not suggested here that without money there would be no terrorism, it is abundantly clear that there would be much less if the money supply dried up. Countries facing a serious manifestation of the problem have long realized that. The puzzling immunity from really large scale domestic terrorism in the United States has given rise to a great deal of lay and professional speculation. No attempt is made here to formulate any firm position on that interesting

subject. What is tossed out for consideration is the thought that
what might be lacking for the most part is money. Vast amounts would
certainly be needed, for this is a vast country, a veritable continent.
The money is simply not there and the methods conventionally used to
generate such sums are either unavailable or are not being employed.
Bank robbery and kidnapping on the scale necessary have been effectively
countered by protective measures and good police work. Those who
grant massive subventions and "aid in kind" to other terrorist surrogates
around the world either have a poor opinion of these embryo United States'
groups or, more likely, do not trust their "purity". This leaves the
drug trade - and this is firmly in the hands of those who are in the
game for profit reasons rather than ideological reasons. Thus, the
good old American system is working to advantage here and although this
may be a cynical view, it is clear that the operations of organized
criminals are effectively denying politically inspired terrorists their
only useful source of massive funding in this country and diverting
much talent for what might otherwise be a different kind of struggle.

All this, naturally, has its price. Law enforcement struggling
against budgetary restraints on all sides has a hard time keeping up
with those having apparently limitless cash resources to buy all the
latest anti-law enforcement technology available. In a contest where
cash counts, law enforcement is destined to lose and federal aid
could not contribute to equalize the position let alone give law
enforcement the needed superiority. There is an even more sinister
side to consider. Huge sums of money such as those created by the
illicit trade in drugs find their way inevitably into the community

where they go to fuel an already inflationary economy. They are converted into legitimate goods and services that the community as a whole comes to enjoy. This is a process of slow contamination that creates a real sense of dependency. If all this money were skillfully and surgically removed, it might cause a fatal collapse. There are some very deep questions here deserving of an extended study of their own. What is certain is the relationship of all this to the forms of extreme violence that border upon terrorism or go to nourish it. Control of the money supply is the key to the successful control of large-scale terrorism.

This is not a problem peculiar to Dade County. There is a general need to do something effective about this. But the problem has assumed critical proportions in this area. Evidence points to huge sums of money passing through local banks and other financial institutions that is extremely difficult to account for by reference to legitimate business sources. This money is already filtering down through the system in a way that makes a cleansing process difficult and perhaps dangerous to the economic health of the community. Yet while this money remains available, it is there to bankroll the violence that is already of concern to those whose job it is to protect life and property. The best prevention against terrorism would be to turn off the spigot, to cut off the supply of money that makes it possible. Terrorism on a small scale would always be possible, for terrorists, like others, can learn to operate on a shoe-string budget. But it would even up the "war" and reduce the struggle to manageable

proportions for law enforcement authorities that are feeling more and more the diminishing of their own effectiveness as the taps are tightened.

This is an identified need. It is vital to any whole-hearted scheme of prevention. As terrorism rises in intensity and the level of public concern rises with it, the demand for prevention will grow. If the source of the money, in this case the drug traffic, cannot be effectively suppressed, a method must be devised of blocking the conduit of these funds to those whose business is violence. As the money supply dries to a trickle, so will the violence, for it is clear that, at the moment in Dade County, there is little else to sustain it. There are linkages here that law enforcement must discover and at which it must strike. No specific recommendation is offered here as to how this might be done; what is urged is that it be done if the community is serious in its desire to prevent terroristic violence, whether it be politically or non-politically inspired. This financial imbalance between terrorism and counter-terrorism must be redressed in society's favor. It is not going to be redressed by society itself spending more on the problem.

The Myth of Protection

Anyone who has ever engaged in the provision of protective services knows that a state of perfect security is impossible to achieve and, even were that not so, it would certainly be impossible to maintain. The determined assailant, if he is patient enough, will always get through whatever barriers are erected to keep him out.

Protection against terrorism is no different in this sense from
protection against any other form of violent criminality. Protection
is a last-ditch stand to keep out the invader, the predator, after
efforts at prevention have failed. Public law enforcement has
protective as well as preventive functions, and these are sometimes
prominent in their exercise and, all too frequently, in their failure.
But in the main, people have to protect themselves - or pay others to
do the job for them. The growing problem of terrorism, the shifting
of the financial burdens implicit in the fundamental notion of pro-
tection have given rise to a huge "private security" industry that
has necessarily assumed many of the burdens that would otherwise have
had to be shouldered by an already heavily laden public service. No
value judgements are offered here concerning the wisdom of that shift;
it is simply offered and accepted as fact. But the implications of
that shift in terms of the real quality and effectiveness of the
consequent protection have to be carefully examined.

Public law enforcement is greatly outnumbered by those working
in the private sector to provide protection against terrorism for
those who are assumed, or who assume themselves, to need it. Any
needs assessment study that neglected that fact and failed to give
it due weight in a study of this kind would be hopelessly deficient.
The public - and even those who do not pay directly for these services
themselves are affected by them in very important ways - has come to
rely on the private sector for a very large measure of the protection
against terrorism it currently enjoys. It may be positively averred

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that the greater part of the protection that the public, not only in Dade County, but elsewhere throughout the United States and the rest of the world, enjoys is provided by private security forces. Little of their work is coordinated among themselves. As is to be expected in a highly competitive industry, the services of which are much in demand, there is little real cooperation among its different parts. And interface with public law enforcement leaves a great deal to be desired. With specific reference to terrorism, it must be asked: How good is the protection provided?

Since 1975, certainly, business has blossomed, with many new entrants to the field. Moreover, many of the old-established private security companies have "discovered" terrorism and have broadened the range of services that they traditionally offered so as to encompass it. This, in the main, has been done in a very unplanned, unsystematic fashion. The sudden needs have created a demand that had to be filled without a great deal of time for very much prior study of the problems. The market was truly of enormous potential and there seemed to be more than enough work for everyone. The periodic upswings of terrorism throughout the world gave rise to much specialization, such as executive protection, and the field provided splendid opportunities for many embarking upon a second career after service in public law enforcement or the armed services. Altogether, a great deal of money was being spent on protection against terrorism, but its cost was being concealed by reason of its being paid for directly by those purchasing the services. But all this has, sensibly, to be added back to find out the cost/benefit factor relevant to the overall drive for security.

Protection, naturally, can only be as good as those who provide
it. In general, it is a business calling for the delicate exercise
of very special skills and the employment of expensive human and
material resources. These were really much more scarce than the
recent avalanche on to the field would have suggested. The result,
not unexpectedly, has been a great deal of unsatisfactory performance
and a very low level of real protection. In the words of one who has
very good judgment and is in a position to exercise it, "There are
a lot of charlatans in this field". This is very unfortunate, indeed,
for there are a great many others who render excellent, perhaps unique,
protection that it would be quite beyond the resources of public law
enforcement authorities now, or in the future, to provide. In assessing
the quality of the services provided, and the level of protection
offered, one must be careful not to give too high a weighting to the
unsatisfactory performers and, consequently, to overlook the solid
contribution made by those who do their job conscientiously and well.

By and large, any needs assessment must be made by reference to
standards of performance. A facility may have been guarded for years
by a most inefficient security service, yet have suffered no problems
with terrorists. This is rather like throwing bread crumbs in the
back yard to keep away tigers; if there are no tigers, the measures,
to the uncritical, may seem to be curiously efficacious. In this
matter of providing protection against terrorism, for reasons that
have already been considered, private security has, to the present,
been largely unextended. There simply has not been a realistic test

of the system, either in segments or as a whole, to see how well it might perform under substantial fire. This cannot be accounted any great deterrent to an evaluation of the kind necessary here. There are plenty of reliable indicators of performance that point to what might happen in a real crunch.

The conclusion is inescapable that protection against terrorism is, in the main, purely pro-forma. We have allowed ourselves to be deceived by appearances, so that we imagine that we enjoy a higher level of protection than that which has actually been made available. This is particularly the case where a duty has been publicly imposed on some entity to provide protection that must be satisfied by resort to the employment of private security services. Many examples might be offered for detailed consideration here, but one will have to suffice. The wave of skyjackings that affected United States airlines during the early 1970's led to the rapid introduction of many programs for the protection of the traveling public. Some of these, like the Sky Marshals and the famous treaty with Cuba were comparatively shortlived. Others such as airport searches of passengers and hand-carried articles, are with us yet. These massive and unprecedented measures, many of which represented considerable and, to many, offensive intrusions into traditional rights of privacy seemed to offer a very satisfactory level of protection. As skyjacking dramatically tapered off and finally ceased altother, many began, quite prematurely, to pronounce the problems solved by the measures taken. These pundits were very surprised indeed when skyjacking began, in 1978/79, to take on a new lease of life. It was soon

seen, even on this evidence, that these long-standing security measures really provided an appallingly low level of protection indeed. This, of course, had been painfully apparent to some experts for a long time; the others simply preferred to bask in the comfort of the Tigers and Breadcrumbs fallacy.

A majority of those who have perpetrated skyjackings in this latest wave have had dummy or make-believe weapons or devices - or no weapons at all. All have been rank amateurs, who offered no such test to the system as organized politically inspired terrorist might. But there is a point in all this that ought not to be overlooked. If we were truly confident as to the efficacy of our protective measures, we would have known, of a certainty, that none of these amateurs was armed - because none <u>could have</u> passed our magnetometers, our searches with such devices. To even suspect the contrary, to take the precaution of heeding the skyjacker, this would be a confession of failure in our protective screen. And such confessions are, indeed, now heaping upon one another fast and furious. In truth, perfect protection simply could not be conferred in this way. This is not to say that the screening system served no purpose; indeed, it was highly valuable. <u>What was utterly wrong was the mistaken degree of reliance that we had come to place upon it</u>.

There is no call to extend the criticism here beyond noting that anyone who passes regularly through airport searches and pays the requisite attention to the matter can only be impressed with their inconsistency and often perfunctory nature. They vary in rigor

and effectiveness not only from airport to airport, but from ramp to ramp within airports. At some ramps at Miami International Airport, for example, it is possible to pass through the security check without a pass or an airline ticket; at other ramps only ticketed passengers are allowed to pass the check point. The distinctions are quite arbitrary, and the reasons for them unknown to most security employees and airline counter personnel. To fulfill a federal requirement, we now have relatively poorly paid and motivated personnel operating equipment that is often barely functional. Yet there are those who are persuaded (and would persuade others) that on this account, we continue to enjoy a high level of protection in this department. Clearly, there is a human failure here, which, in turn, produces a systems failure. If real protection is desired, then clearly there are some obvious needs to receive attention. The illustration is chosen because it is of common experience and the protection was specifically introduced to counter a serious terrorist threat. The same needs (in consequence of similar defects) could be demonstrated to exist throughout the whole network of similar protective systems we have erected across society.

When it is considered exactly what it is that private security forces are now responsible for protecting in the United States, the lacunae that are exposed on even the most cursory and superficial survey are truly frightening. It is essential to raise standards in this vital area of protection. The greatest needs are in the fields of selection, supervision, and training. The National Advisory

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Committee Task Force on Private Security has set important goals for
the necessary improvement of these private security services. It
is evident that they are not even being met, for the most part, in
the spirit, let alone the letter. Selection of personnel for some
of our most sensitive instalations presently leaves a great deal to
be desired. In particular, the expense and delay in performing
adequate, let alone superior, background checks has admitted all
sorts of doubtful individuals to the ranks of even the most reputable
forces. A much higher standard of performance is required here,
especially for personnel that may be assigned to especially sensitive
instalations such as nuclear power plants. There is an urgent need
for a new, faster, and more thorough security check of all individuals
employed by private security companies.

Supervision again is not a function performed with the thorough-
ness that the responsibility invested in it demands. This is part
of a more general labor malaise, but it cannot be tolerated if the
goal is even adequate protection. Most failures in this area are
human failures, and they can almost always be traced back to a lack
of proper supervision. The "terrorist" is simply able to outsmart
the security operative because well designed procedures have not been
correctly followed. If any of this seems exaggerated, observe,
randomly, over a period and in different locations, the checking of
security passes; if a picture of a gorilla were substituted for that
of the bearer, it would go unnoticed in most instances. Procedures
should be simplified so that low-level operatives' decision-making is

reduced to an absolute minimum. And where any discretion is exercised, it should be closely supervised. The rule must be: Keep it simple. Otherwise, Murphy's Law is sure to determine the operation of the process.

Training is essential for proper job performance. Unless the operative is taught correctly how to do the job, the chances of it being performed even reasonably well are slight. Providing protection against terrorism is a serious business. In general, too little training is given and too much of that is "on the job" training that scarcely merits the description bestowed on it. Private security should be viewed as a worthwhile career and constant training and re-training for the assumption of greater responsibilities should be available to all who are qualified to benefit from it.

The interface between public law enforcement agencies and private security organizations must be improved. Both are providing protectives services after their own fashion and both are engaged in unceasing struggle with a common enemy. Both have a great deal to contribute to the efficiency of each other's operation; to an increasing extent, they are now interdependent. While cooperation between some public agencies and private security firms, at some levels, may be excellent, these lines of trust and understanding have generally been established on a very personal basis. There is a need for a formalization, an institutionalization, that will draw the public and private sectors together more closely.

It is, therefore, recommended that an informal public/private security working group on terrorism be established experimentally in Dade County. This larger group, when established, will work through small, specialist sub-committees to improve standards of performance and secure the optimum degree of cooperation. It would be appropriate for invitations to participate to issue from the office of the County Manager, and for him or his designee to chair meetings of the working group. This working group will have not only important coordinating functions relative to the provision of protective services, but can also assist in providing the material on which the suggested on-going threat assessment in Dade County can be based.

Legislating against Terrorism

There is an ill-informed view, in some quarters, that if only there were more laws against terrorism, the problem would be of a lesser magnitude. This is generally a lay impression and it is not sustained by any critical study of the subject. The question has been re-examined here with particular reference to the problems of Dade County and <u>the position is advanced that no special legislation to deal with terrorism is required</u>. In the present climate of opinion, that legislation which might be helpful in combatting the problem is unlikely to commend itself to legislators sensitive to constituency opinion, and that which might be passed is not really helpful to a solution of the problems. If legislation were to be of any value at all in this difficult area of law enforcement, it would necessarily have to be enacted at a national rather than a State level.

Legislation may be broadly categorized as substantive, that
which creates and structures the normative concepts themselves,
against which human conduct is measured for conformity or otherwise;
or procedural, that which facilitates the operation of different
components of the system of justice. No new substantive legislation
need be contemplated even at a national level. The concept of
terrorism is an extremely elusive one, and attempts to reduce it
to a normative form have rarely been successful and never serve
the real purpose that is desired by the exercise. There is no need
for the creation of a separate, autonomous crime of terrorism.
Nor is there any real need for the creation of a separate category
of terroristic crimes meriting special treatment by the criminal
justice system. Each of the dependent activities that go to make
up what has been defined as terrorism is a serious crime in itself.
What is needed is not a further accretion of criminal law, but the
rigorous enforcement of that which already exists. Most serious
terrorism involves criminal homicide in some degree. Such homicides
are quite adequately sanctioned by existing law and provide for a
satisfactory range of penalties to meet the appropriate policy in
each case.

The question of the application by law of the death penalty is
one which is frequently discussed whenever a wave of terrorism gives
rise to serious concern in the community. The death penalty - the
meting out of like for like - certainly gives a singular satisfaction
to those who may have suffered a peculiarly barbarous, inhuman assault

upon their person, property, and other interests. Whether it should
or should not do so belongs to another phase of moral or ethical
discussion inappropriate here. It is of some interest that the
United Kingdom Parliament, in July, 1979, once more refused to reinstate
the death penalty, despite a considerable increase in terrorism and
a strong public demand for its reintroduction. The death penalty
in Florida has become a controversial issue in 1979 with the resumption,
after many years, of executions according to law. No opinion is
expressed here concerning its possible application against terrorists
or its effectiveness in such cases. It should be noted, however, that
the carrying out of the death penalty is always a highly emotional
matter and creates sympathy for the person to be executed on a non-
rational basis. Such executions can very well serve the terrorists'
purposes in a symbolic sense and can be counter-productive for the
administration of justice. Mandatory death sentences can be very
dangerous in some circumstances, such as hostage-taking and kidnapping,
for they leave the perpetrator no way out save death now - or later.
Death now, taking as many victims as possible along, might well be the
choice in such cases. If the death penalty is imposed in any case
involving terrorism, it would be advisable for the execution to take
place as quickly as possible. This simply cannot be done under the
United States' system of criminal justice at the present time, and the
resultant delays while all the proper forms and procedures were adhered
to would not only provide a fertile ground for terrorists (and their
inevitable sympathizers) to make damaging propaganda, but might well
lead to further terroristic activities designed to thwart the ends of
justice and to secure the release of those under sentence of death.

Much existing legislation from the federal level down to county ordinances is presently under-utilized. It is certainly in no need of supplementation. Legislation concerning arms and explosives, for example, is more than ample, yet the number of persons carrying concealed weapons in Dade County in violation of - or open defiance of - the law is extremely high. No purpose would be served by further regulation of the matter. None of this can be attributed to ignorance of the law on the part of the miscreants; the terrorist is well aware of the system's laws and the shortcomings in their application. For the most part, it is difficult to enact into law any deterrent measure that might have an impact on terroristic crime. The experience of other countries that have suffered serious campaigns of terrorism should be noted and the mistakes that have been made through the enactment of draconian but largely unenforceable laws should be avoided. The law itself falls into disrepute when, despite its quantity and the constant engagement of the activities of the legislators, it is seen to be ineffective and of no consequence to the terrorist.

There are many useful improvements in the law relating to the procedural aspects of the administration of criminal justice that might have merited serious attention. All these would have required federal or State action and are, strictly, beyond the scope of a study concerned with the problems of Dade County to explore save in a most tentative way. It may usefully be observed here that those cases of abuse of powers that have apparently shocked the nation's

conscience during the last few years, have invariably been the result of the powers of the representatives of the state being so narrowly and incongruously drawn that they have, in many instances, simply been prevented from doing their properly appointed jobs. Some have, improperly - foolishly - felt obliged to exceed their given powers in what they conceived to be the national interest. This is always a very dangerous situation in which to place any public servant and many have paid a high price for their disregard of the limitations placed upon them by law. This is hardly a matter for public congratulation save by those who take a perverse delight in witnessing the downfall of loyal, though misguided, public servants. Better by far is the sensible extension of the appropriate powers to enable the job to be effectively done and the creation of a proper supervisory mechanism that will ensure that these extended powers are kept within their assigned bounds.

There are many suggestions that might have been offered in this connection. Better legislation in connection with search and seizure, more accurately and extensively spelling out the limits and intent of the United States Constitution, might have been most helpful to law enforcement authorities in dealing with terrorism. The laws relating to surveillance and intelligence gathering information generally are in urgent need of reform along the lines suggested by Standards 5.3 and 5.4 prescribed by the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. It is clear, too, that both the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act have had an unduly

inhibiting effect on law enforcement activities and have resulted in the suppression of much that is needed to combat terrorism. Law enforcement intelligence activities should be tightly regulated by legislation and a provision made for strong and effective oversight. But the legislation must be sensibly and realistically drawn so that those who have to do this difficult work have the legal means at their disposal to ensure its adequate performance.

There is a real, and, outside the law enforcement community, unappreciated need for strengthening certain police powers to cope with the problem of terrorism. At the moment, the opposite point of view, fueled by interpretations of Watergate and other matters prevails. Dade County, like the rest of the United States would benefit from a jucidious reversal of the present trends. But it would be overly sanguine to hope that, given the climate of opinion that exists today, such a change might be in the offing. Accordingly, while a duty is clearly felt to give voice to these needs, no legislative recommendation on the point is felt to be in order. There is one aspect, however, of this matter of legislation that need emphasis here. A number of Congressional committees have now held hearings on matters connected in some way or another with terrorism. Some have been considering specific, proposed legislation, while others have pursued their inquiries with a broad, legislative goal in mind. They have taken expert testimony from a wide variety of sources and have inquired into a great many matters on which legislation might have been enacted. One issue that has been brought consistently to the attention of

the legislators is the need for improved powers to enable law enforcement authorities to engage adequately in the intelligence function. No assistance has been forthcoming as yet from the law makers who have either not appreciated the urgency of the matter or have chosen, as politic, to ignore it. It is small wonder that many in law enforcement should now feel that they are "beating on the wind" in raising this issue and despair of ever persuading law makers to do anything constructive about it.

There is, however, another side to this coin that those who have fought, perhaps over-zealously, to place law enforcement authorities in strait-jackets over the matter of intelligence should consider. It is, incongruously, now easier for private individuals to maintain an intelligence operation than it is for public law enforcement authorities, within the domain of which it ought properly to fall. As a result of the continuing restrictions placed upon the public sector, and the various inhibiting factors that have most effectively restricted law enforcement intelligence capabilities, the private sector has taken over some of the functions for which a demand exists. Private "intelligence" agencies have come into being, paralleling other developments in which private security has, perforce, had to supplement its over-extended brethren in public law enforcement. Some of these agencies staffed by former government professionals go about their difficult work in a serious and responsible manner. They are carrying out a necessary function that public agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to fill. More and more intelligence concerning subversive and violence-prone groups is being generated, processed, stored, and

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disseminated by these private organizations. Their useful work proceeds quietly beyond the public scrutiny unimpeded by much of the legislation that has proven so destructive to official endeavors in this area. It is ironic that the efforts of civil libertarians and well-meaning "do-gooders" should have contributed to the production of this unofficial intelligence community. No judgment is offered on the proprieties of the matter here, but it is quite evident that, like the mutations they are, these new organisms will prove to be a very resistant strain. It is unlikely that they will be regulated out of existence as their unfortunate brethren in the public sector have almost been. That being the case, perhaps another look at this whole question of intelligence, by those who truly have the public interest and well-being in mind might be in order.

Surely it is better to have these vital functions well performed by agencies under the public control and responsible to the public they serve, than to consign them to private agencies that, however ethical and responsible, are, essentially, outside the mechanisms set up for regulatory purposes? It can hardly be in the public interest that stringent laws are enacted and elaborate charters drafted so as to prevent the F.B.I. from conducting domestic intelligence gathering activities concerning, say, Jane Fonda, only to have the job done elsewhere by some "private" means that are beyond the reach of those laws and regulations. Yet this is what this intensive, well-managed campaign against law enforcement intelligence activities has brought about. It is a familiar contemporary argument about regulation and

deregulation in another context. It is always amusing and sometimes ironic to note how those who are most anxious for the regulation of others are the least anxious to have those regulations applied in their own case. It is not suggested here that these private agencies be interfered with in the work they have necessarily, under the circumstances, made their own; it is very doubtful that any form of regulation would or could do the job. It it did, something even more sub rosa would assuredly take their place. The remedy, quite simply, is to restore the intelligence gathering function of the public law enforcement agencies, allow them to perform it efficiently, and create the proper oversight to prevent abuse. The "market trends" will change of their own accord.

All this has a special relevance for the State of Florida and Dade County. This is a state which has legislated a philosophy of openness in government to a quite extraordinary degree. This is not the place, nor is it the prerogative of the consultant, to argue with or discuss that philosophy; it is simply treated here as a fact, the relevance of which to the present topic must be considered. What is very evident to the discerning is that these laws, intended for the better protection and enlightenment of the people of the State are of most unequal application. The activities of the government are indeed carried out in the full glare of the Sunshine, while those of others remain most decidedly in the shade. It is just such a situation that has led to a withdrawal of government, a sort of shyness about performing certain necessary functions under the bright lights, and

has allowed those enjoying the advantages of the shade to assume them in their stead. Some of these activities of private individuals and associations are of very definite public interest and deserve, in accordance with the philosophy that has motivated the enactment and enforcement of the Sunshine Laws, to be brought out into the open. Law enforcement is simply being placed under an unfair handicap in this.

There is something in the nature of an unhealthy contest that is proceeding here quite against the public interest. This doctrine of instant and universal "discovery" should be applied equally and to all - or it should be applied a great deal more discriminately and sensibly than it is at present. The main offenders, understandably so, are the representatives of the press. It is surely no less interesting to the public (and certainly healthy for it to know), say, the secret communications of some editor bent on securing a Pulitzer prize - the Story behind the Story - that might reveal all sorts of unsavory motivation, than it is for the public to be titilated with the relatively pedestrian content of the desk blotter of the Public Safety Director. Yet if journalists were restricted in their activities, if their sources were probed, their secret stores of information brought out into the Sunshine to be shared and spoiled by all who might choose, they would most assuredly scream to high heaven - and the Supreme Court. And they would be right, for in this way they could not do their job. Is it too much to ask of them that they recognize that the job of the law enforcement

intelligence officer is exactly the same, only what he gleans in the course of his work goes not for publication but, after the most careful process of filtration, for the making of cases? If it be argued that a damaging residue remains in the law enforcement intelligence system after these functions have been fulfilled and that these "discards" might yet hurt innocent individuals, is not the same true of journalism?

Law enforcement has been far too reticent in making its views known with regard to these matters. There has been a great deal of "locker-room" grumbling, but, generally, the public has received only one side of the story and that has been presented in most partizan fashion. The storm whipped up by Watergate has caused a great deal of damage, and wise lawmen (as well as lawmakers) have bowed their heads, oriental-like, before the wind. Law enforcement must no longer be seen as personally and professionally defensive about these matters; too much, for all of us is at stake. The case for an _improved_ law enforcement intelligence capacity must now be taken vigorously before the legislatures in the State and across the country. Law enforcement _must_ do this job, because only those whose work it is can explain to those unfamiliar with it what tools they _really_ need to do the job. This is not a lobbying exercise in the ordinary sense of the term, for it is the public interest rather than some sectional interest that is being served. Law enforcement, that is advancing the case, is really only providing technical assistance. Many private and quasi-private associations of intelligence officers now exist; a good one exists in the State of Florida. These are excellent vehicles

for bringing these needs before the law makers and they should be used for the purpose with increasing vigor in the future.

There is one useful and, apparently, little considered legislative advantage that might be used in Dade County in an emergency. It is one which for a variety of reasons would need to be utilized with the greatest caution and only by those sufficiently informed in its scope and potency. Title XLIV, the Florida Criminal Code, Chapter 775 contains a very interesting provision at 775.01. This states that "The Common Law of England in relation to crimes, except so far as the same relates to the modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full force in this state where there is no existing provision by statute on the subject." The full significance of this is probably only immediately apparent to one sufficiently trained in the Common Law of England, but despite the seemingly slight awareness among practitioners of its scope, the provision can have far reaching effects if it is applied, particularly in the case of criminal conspiracies, criminal mischief, and criminal libel not otherwise reached by statute.

Terrorism and the Courts

Before baking Rabbit Pie, one must first catch the Rabbit. What follows necessarily assumes that, when called for, the Rabbit will be made properly available to the Cook. It may be observed, for the record, that Florida's State Courts have, in the past, shown themselves to have been noticeably better Cooks than their brethren in the federal system. Pursuing this whimsy a little further, it may be suggested that what is necessary to produce a fine dish is a competent, exper- ienced Cook, a good, well-equipped and managed kitchen, a sound recipe,

sharp knives - and a Rabbit. A good cook does not mind performing under the gaze of the curious - some even welcome it. But none will tolerate interference or advice in the kitchen while the work is in progress.

The State of Florida has sound, competent jurists well versed in the law and well able to handle cases involving terrorism. Again, this statement is based on the past record, and changing times, a greater level of intensity, and a change in those who would be tried, may well bring problems in their train that would severely test a system used to more regular ways of proceeding. Given the present level of terroristic activity and what might be prudently anticipated in the near future, no recommendations for change are offered in this report. The main job of the Courts is to provide a trial that is not only open and fair, but one that is manifestly perceived to be so. The task of the terrorist is to see that they are unable to do so. This was brought to a fine art in West Germany and had the effect of forcing serious changes in the system that have produced adverse comment from many, not ordinarily unsympathetic quarters. The traditional system here ought to be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate any changes that might eventually become necessary. To this end, it is suggested that careful attention be paid to the implementation of Standards 7.7 and 7.8 recommended by the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism. These recommendations were designed with just such considerations in mind as those expressed above.

Trials involving terrorism related issues require, above all, the provision of a secure, sanitized environment, in which the matter can be tried, detachedly, according to law. When some particularly heinous crime has been committed, involving, perhaps, the horrible deaths of large numbers of innocent victims, sentiments of a most unjudicial character will be running high in the community. It is a test of strength of that community that "Lynch Law" should not be allowed to prevail and that the community not work itself into such a state that the matter must be taken out of its hands for trial elsewhere. When this happens (as it does all too frequently in other matters), this is a confession of failure. Good, upright jurists must submerge their natural revulsion in a sea of professional detachment and must guide the lay public, from whom the jurors must be selected, by their example. Sensationalism and community hysteria are always to be avoided and experience must be the best guide on how to do this. The terrorist must never be allowed to capitalize, not only on his crime but the reactions to it. The majesty - and calm - of the law must be seen to rise above the frenzy and anger of the terrorist so that society perceives clearly which is the better example to follow.

Once again, the Florida "Sunshine" ethos poses problems that must be faced. Precedent suggests that a trial of terrorists in Dade County would find many glued to their television sets day after day in the hope of seeing something dramatic occur. Terrorists are past masters at converting courtrooms into the equivalent of the

Barnum and Bailey side-show. This can easily turn into a most unsavory
spectacle that is designed to bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. Should the public be allowed to watch these antics on
television in their own living rooms, as a more active few would
certainly witness them in the courtroom? The answer given here is
that they most certainly should; any attempt to prevent them from
so doing would lead to the suspicion - doubtless quite unwarranted -
that the government had something to hide. What this does impose upon
the "players" is an obligation to learn to perform well. There is
an educational value in a trial (as the communists have learned well).
It is not suggested here that productions be staged, but rather that
the performers give earnest, private consideration as to what their
respective roles demand of them so as to give the public the measure
of satisfaction it _needs_ to keep it healthy and a part of the proceedings
rather than turning some into morbid and degenerate _voyeurs_.

The physical security of the premises used for terrorism trials
is something that requires special, expert attention. Few facilities
were designed with such contingencies in mind, and only a small part
of any courthouse building will be used for the actual trial while
the other business on hand will proceed as normally as possible else-
where on the premises. Crowded facilities impose special strains,
for, if the matter is serious enough, there will almost certainly
be more than symbolic interference with the trial. This should always
be seen, for these purposes, as being in the nature of a contest
between the terrorist (and his organization) and society. The

larger, non-involved public will be watching, more or less interestedly, to see how this struggle will develop and end. Any discomfiture, any "tweaking of the nose" of the law will be greeted with glee by certain segments of the audience. Courtroom disturbances, defendants dragged kicking and screaming in handcuffs from the court, judges attacked in crowded passage-ways, all the trappings of a "brutal police state" are grist to the terrorists' mill. Such tactics and worse have to be expected.

If the courtrooms have to be accepted as they are with but minor modifications (and this, realistically, must be the case), then we must do the best we can to make them safe and adequate for the purposes at hand. This involves controlling access and movement within, preferably on a "pass" system, and providing safe passage for all engaged in the business at hand. It is stressed here that what is done to these ends is less important than how it is done and how it is perceived to be done. Diligence and efficiency are the keynotes. If searches are instituted they must be patient, thorough, impartial, and polite. If lawyers object (as many will certainly do), perhaps the judge might himself set a reassuring example by setting aside, for a moment, his primary role and submitting to search like the rest. In important cases, the issue of passes should be tightly controlled and they should be carefully scrutinized, not perfunctorily glanced at and the bearers waved through to the secure area. If this is done with the "right" touch, it can not only have the effect of improving the personal security of those involved, but can also help to promote a healthy sense of public confidence in and approval of the system.

The personal security of those involved in the trial of terroristic
crimes is the axis around which the whole system turns. This goes
well beyond the courtroom and it exposes, unfortunately, a dark side
of American life that must be fully recognized and admitted for what
it is. This is a universal problem in the administration of criminal
justice, but terrorism raises the issues in an exaggerated and critical
form. If witnesses are afraid to come forward, there can be no trial.
In all serious cases of terrorism, politically and non-politically
inspired, the first target is the witness; this is the general, invariable
rule from Turin to Dadeland. If witnesses cannot be eliminated, they
must be intimidated. The problem for society is how best to provide
protection and relieve, realistically, the fear that must otherwise
inhibit testimony. It is a cardinal principle of a system like that
which enjoys currency in the United States, that testimony must be
voluntary, whether it proceed from an accused or from an accuser. The
latter aspect tends, all too often, to be overlooked. If testimony
that can be given is tainted by fear, it distorts the proceedings into
which it is introduced. Testifying against those who terrorize the
community is a formidable business; it is hardly surprising that
volunteers should be few - and their actions suspect. It is not
necessary to go far afield to countries like Italy that have, in recent
years, experienced the problem in especially acute form. There are
plenty of apposite illustrations closer to home. The answer of the
United States' federal system seeking to cope with the problems posed
by organized criminals has been the creation of a witness protection

plan designed to encourage material witnesses to provide testimony in return for protection. This is the best and perhaps the only solution that can be offered in this area. That the system may have the defects exposed by 60 Minutes is no condemnation of the concept, but only of the way in which, through human frailty of the order to which reference has already been made in its place, the scheme has sometimes operated. Such defects can and should be cured. But the system and the services upon which it depends are enormously expensive. They may be likened to some very exceptional life-preserving machines that are in use in our hospitals for only a very few fortunate patients. Witness protection, frankly, is a luxury that can be extended to only a very limited number of worthy recipients; worthy, that is, not in a personal sense but rather on account of their intrinsic value to society in these matters. A general extension of the service to cases involving terrorism is simply not possible. While the system can and should provide what protection it can for those who testify in cases involving terroristic violence, no unrealistic expectations should be held out. The witness, however valuable his or her testimony should be "told it like it is". Only by crushing and eradicating terrorism can a satisfactory level of protection be given to all. The vicious cycle has to be broken. This must mean a few brave souls risking themselves and all they hold dear for the community. If enough can be persuaded to do so, and the risks are recognized and rewarded for what they are, the terrorist will be crushed beneath this weight of social solidarity. It is to be fervently hoped that this will receive some of the publicity that will certainly be accorded the more controversial recommendations made in this report.

All who share in the responsibility for exercising this function on society's behalf are exposed to some degree of risk. In some cases, the risk quotient may be extremely high. There may well be attempts to eliminate judges, jurors, and prosecutors and to intimidate others by example; the term "hung jury" may well take on a more sinister meaning in a terrorism trial as, too, might the expression "hanging judge". Such thoughts, though not openly expressed, can rarely be far from the minds of those having to engage themselves with these disagreeable matters. The risks must be realistically appraised. At best, the protection that can be provided by public agencies can only be of a relatively temporary nature, and only as good as the officers providing it. In times of acute personnel shortages and given the nature of the job, not too much must be expected of this. The patient, vengeful terrorist will find a way through this type of protection without too much difficulty. Those who are affected by these hazards must be prepared to take an unusually high share of the burdens of protecting themselves upon their own shoulders. A police cruiser stationed outside the house may be comforting to the occupants and a deterrent to some miscreants, but who save the intended recipient would think to check out the mailbox to see if a rattlesnake sans rattle has been secreted therein by some "well-wisher"?

There are sensible limits to the protection that can be given and these can be modestly extended in specially sensitive cases or in ones where information suggests a hazard against which some specific precaution should be taken. But, ordinarily, what will be needed will be some sort of "self-protection". One word of warning may

appropriately be offered here. Some judges and prosecutors have taken to carrying firearms on account of the threat posed by terrorism and their involvement with it. Judicial office, as such, confers no special competence in this regard; only those thoroughly familiar with firearms should carry them at all, and but a very few of those should rely on them for protection. Indeed, they may not only be more of a hindrance than a help in a pinch, but reliance on them may be like wearing protective clothing while practising the martial arts, a real impediment to the learning of sound, defensive measures. Those who do carry weapons should reflect that terrorists will not only most certainly outgun them, but will have the advantage of surprise. A .38 special is convenient (and, perhaps, comforting) to carry, but is most always outranked and outperformed by an Ingram.

No procedural changes are recommended in this report. But there is one matter that should pertinently be raised here. As the Latin population of Dade County rises towards a real majority level, as indeed is likely within but a short space of time, it ought to be remembered that Latin American countries (and here a generalization is conveniently made) have no tradition of, and in some cases, a positive aversion to, jury trial. The "Latinization" of Dade County has necessarily involved the acceptance of the traditions of the State of Florida in this respect as in so many others. The trying of "Latin" terrorists by a court in Dade County may present some problems in this regard in the future, notwithstanding the tradition that is slowly building in the community. Jury service is educational and allows the selected representatives of the community to take a

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singular responsibility for the collective attitude towards terrorism.
Every endeavor should be made to familiarize those, upon whom these
grave responsibilities rest, with their importance and the niceties
of their exercise.

There is an important professional responsibility to avoid
sensationalism in these cases. Sensationalism will certainly be
energetically sought by the friends of terrorism; it is little short
of disgraceful that it might be aided and abetted by those whose duty
it is to uphold dignity of the law. There is simply no place for the
"political" lawyer in Dade County and there ought not to be elsewhere.
The issues, more especially in cases involving politically inspired
terrorism ought to be tried strictly according to law and not according
to the personalities of the case. All parties professionally involved
in the cause should abstain from making declarations concerning the
matter; whatever other purpose they may serve, they certainly do not
assist in the adjudication of the case. A trial of the defendant in
the press, no matter how skilfully, tastefully, and objectively
conducted, is no substitute for a trial at law. The media, too,
must be sensitive to its responsibilities in cases involving terrorism
and should abstain from presenting matters in a lurid light just to
capture an audience; it is all too easy, instead, for the media itself
to be captured on these occasions.

Terrorism, jails, and correctional facilities

Those upon whom rests the responsibility for handling alleged
terrorists awaiting trial, or convicted terrorists awaiting disposition,

have an extremely arduous task to perform. Where terrorism assumes
sizable proportions, their job is one that few would envy. They
have not only the difficult and sometimes dangerous problems of
handling these offenders in a closed environment, but have, them-
selves, been targeted for reprisals in their homes and on the streets
by those who support the terrorist cause. Fortunately, no problem
of that magnitude presently exists in Dade County or anywhere in the
Florida correctional system. But it is necessary to keep such
eventualities in mind for future reference should the scale of the
problem then warrant it. This whole subject received very full and
informative treatment at the hands of the National Advisory Committee
Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism; indeed, two substantial
chapters of the Report were devoted to the topic. There is little
need, here, to add to those recommendations beyond urging a careful
study of them by those to whom they are addressed, and their
consequent prudent, progressive implementation.

One or two matters of particular concern to Dade County should,
however, receive some special mention in this place. The custody and
confinement of terrorists or suspected terrorists always gives rise
to special problems of security. The trapped terroist ever harbors
thoughts of escape, and his confederates, on the outide, will often
be as much concerned with plans for his liberation as they are with
plans for other operations. Escape from custody is not only a
desirable end in itself; it represents a victory over the system
that can have particularly useful propaganda value. The capture

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of a terrorist may be an important achievement for society; but if he cannot be securely held by the system, he is not only free to fight on, but confidence in the system itself suffers a cruel blow. Violent people will use violent means to break out of the net when caught. There are indications in the number of escapes and attempted escapes of persons in confinement in South Florida of a likely trend in this direction in the case of an increase in terrorism resulting in a corresponding increase in the number of terrorists committed to the custody of the authorities. Bizarre and violent escapes are to be provided for in which, possibly, fully automatic weapons of heavy calibre as well as explosives are likely to be used. Prisoners in transit from one place of confinement to another offer, in most cases, the best prospects of rescue and additional precautions are needed in such cases. No terrorist or suspected terrorist should ever be moved by those having control and custody of such a person without notification to the appropriate police authority having jurisdiction over the places through which that individual may pass in transit. Proper liaison should be established with all law enforcement authorities in Dade County for the purpose.

The control and custody of terrorists and suspected terrorists in confinement is a serious business indeed. There is no room for error, and routines should be established that leave as little room for it as possible. It is axiomatic that no escapes take place from custody without some faulty procedures, an improper "bending" of

good ones, some human error, or the corruption of those entrusted

with security functions. The same can be said of the introduction

of contraband items into places of reclusion. Terrorists are often

ruthless, unscrupulous, manipulative, and cunning. It is always

wise to give them credit for all these qualities even where they are

not manifestly displayed. Moreover, many will have considerable

wealth at their disposal that will enable "favors" to be bought.

The greatest care must be exercised to insulate those responsible

for security from the influences of a pernicious campaign designed

to corrupt with the end of escape for the terrorist in mind.

Special precautions must be taken with visitors. Sooner or later

every terrorist must cause trouble - or cease to be a terrorist.

If the system can bring about the latter result, it has indeed

done its work well.

A brief word must be said here about a very special problem

facing Dade County correctional and jail services. This is a product

of the drug related violence to which reference has already been

made elsewhere. Nothing that is said here, or, indeed, in other

places in this report, should be taken as derogatory of the Columbian

people as a whole. But Columbian criminals are indeed a special

breed, justifiably feared by all who have to deal with them.

Columbians engaged in terrorism, particularly that related to the

traffic in drugs are the most fearsome of all. Their potential

for a rich variety of violence should never be underestimated by

those having to deal with them. If these alien criminals come to

be apprehended, processed, and detained in Dade County for any length of time and in any sizable numbers, their special propensities should be taken into account by those charged with their control and custody. Those sentenced to long terms in prison as a consequence of their illegal activities in this county constitute a special risk that must be handled with a due degree of care.

Terrorism and the Community

No preventive or protective measures against terrorism can be effective without adequate community approval and support. A law enforcement apparatus that has to fight terrorism on its own, without the appropriate assistance from the community it serves, is fighting a losing battle. In the most serious of cases, it can only go the way of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Law enforcement must always be sensitive to the needs of the community. But if the battle against terrorism is to be won, the community must also be sensitive to the needs of law enforcement. The bridge between the two, between those who stand as defenders of the community and its interests and values, and those who would otherwise face destruction, is provided by the media. The press, in all its manifestations has a truly awesome responsibility in this regard. It can be unreservedly said that public attitudes towards those trying to cope with the problem on society's behalf are formed and confirmed in very large measure, by the media. The media accordingly stands charged with the duty of unequivocally settling its own position on the important issues involved and discharging its public responsibility in these matters

to the best of its ability. This is something the communications media must do for itself. No government can or should try to influence or interfere with the process.

It is often, correctly, pointed out that in a pluralistic society such as that represented by these United States, there is really no such thing as "The Press". The mass media and entertainment industry is composed of individuals and associations that through the exercise of their profession and art give untrammelled expression to the widest range of ideas. This is healthy for a society that values independence and any restriction upon it would be truly cause for alarm. But even in this country, such extensive freedom of the press has its limits and these, while occasionally transgressed, are generally respected by all responsible journalists in the interests of promoting and preserving the public harmony that makes the exercise of this great profession possible on so grand a scale. Although, then, there is no "press" as a monolithic entity, there are commonly shared opinions about what is good and what is bad, what should be advocated and what should not. Leaving aside, for a moment, all legal questions, it can be said that "the press" in Dade County, (as it is almost everywhere else) is against terrorism. While reporting of incidents may vary from time to time and place to place, the message to the community - and quite rightly so - is that terrorism - anyone's terrorism - is a bad thing and ought to be repressed. Any member of the press taking a contrary view must be regarded as aberrant.

Media management of the subject of terrorism is rather like the practice of government by crisis. When there is a lot of terrorism

going on, media attention is engaged by it and this in turn captures that of the public. Naturally, these "spectaculars" draw an audience; but they present, when too much attention is paid to them, a distorted picture of events. No news on the terrorism front is good news, but, unfortunately, it cannot make prime time or secure banner headlines. There is much good news all the time, and if that could somehow be conveyed to the larger, undiscriminating public audience, a real service would be rendered to the community. It is not that law enforcement successes should be given undue prominence, nor that there should be exultation over the failure of terrorists. Rather, the quiet triumph of society over these occasional spells of violence should be placed in proper perspective. This requires an uncommon journalistic skill, but it is for this rather than garish sensation-alism that Pulitzer prizes are really reserved, though rarely awarded.

The community, as a whole, must find the means to come to terms with the terrorism problem. It must learn that it cannot rely for protection upon the efforts of a devoted few. It, too, must play its part to rid itself of this menace. Community leaders must start to guide opinion on these matters. For too long, the Cuban population of Dade County remained silent out of a sense of loyalty to those felt to be true soldiers in the unending fight against Castro. There are encouraging signs of change, but the community and its newly formed attitudes have not yet been put to the acid test. This period of relative tranquility ought not to be wasted. Now is the time for community leaders to be patiently building stock that can

be drawn upon in a crisis. The community must learn in these moments the responses that are expected of it. This is not something in which government can properly engage, although it should always be ready to assist. With proper preparation, the seeds of terrorism will fall upon very stony ground indeed.

A proper sense of realism needs to be created in the community about this problem of terrorism. False expectations ought not to be raised by those who should know better. The public should not be panicked in this matter, but nor should it be lulled into a false sense of security. If disaster should strike at some time in the future and the community is badly hurt in consequence, there will inevitably be recriminations. These will fall, certainly in the first instance, upon the law enforcement community. Questions will be asked why these things were not foreseen, why a higher level of protection was not available, etc. Some of the answers to such questions are already given in this report in advance of any disaster produced by terrorists. It would be wise for these matters to be placed, in the appropriate form, before those whom they concern. In this way, a proper scale of expectation might be produced and the community, hopefully, will learn what is expected of it so that it might do whatever is necessary on its own behalf to safeguard itself against this menace.

Terrorism: Federal Involvement

This has been, and continues to be, a matter of considerable interest and concern to the inhabitants of Dade County. That concern

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stems partly from curiosity, a desire to know with some degree of certainty what the federal authorities do and can do in this matter, and partly from a desire for reassurance. There is a real need to know that Uncle Sam will be there with the Big Stick if the Wolf should present itself before the gates. Most people feel fairly confident that, in the event of a serious threat from some foreign enemy, the federal forces would be swiftly and effectively deployed to meet it. No expense would be spared to safeguard these United States and its inhabitants from any act of external aggression. The threat of terrorism, not so far experienced on a considerable scale in this country, leaves people uncertain as to the degree of federal involvement and the seriousness of its committment. It should be stressed here that these concerns, where they are felt, are not so much the result of what the government has or has not done in this field, as a consequence of a general ignorance of federalism and just who is responsible for doing what. If the matter is difficult enough for those whose roots have long penetrated the soil of this continent, it will be readily seen how puzzling the matter has been at times for those whose residence in South Florida goes back a mere twenty years.

An event of critical importance served to focus national attention upon this matter of federal response. The daring rescue in 1977, by the West German Border Guard in Mogadishu, Somalia, of the passengers and crew of the skyjacked Lufthansa flight 181 left a profound impression in this country as it did elsewhere.

The question was immediately raised: did the United States have a similar capacity for such an undertaking should it become necessary? Eager journalists, scenting a good story, rapidly got wind of Project Blue Light. For a while, interest in federal involvement centered on the spectacular; many wanted the country to prove itself by force of arms, and sought reassurance that the capacity was there if needed. The much more pertinent issues, such as whether federal intelligence capabilities had satisfactorily survived the storm and whether a properly coordinated response among all the agencies potentially involved was possible, were not addressed by those looking for hot "news". Other events on the world scene soon distracted the news hounds who raced off after a different scent, allowing these pertinent but unspectacular matters to sink back into their normal, everyday obscurity.

The best and most recent account of the federal government's organizational, policy, and operational responses to terrorism is that prepared by the Staff of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. It is brief, to the point, and states all the essential facts in authoritative fashion. There is no need for more than that reference to it here. No attempt will be made to abbreviate it here, for it is not the federal response capabilities as such that are under examination but only the relevance of them, in all their aspects, to the problem of terrorism in Dade County. The material facts, for the present purposes are that the entire federal response system underwent a quite radical reorganization in

late 1977 as a result of which there was created the Interagency
Working Group to Combat Terrorism (replacing the old Cabinet
Committee to Combat Terrorism), under the Special Coordination
Committee of the National Security Council. The Working Group
performs its functions through five committees, the structure and
purposes of which are set out in the Staff Report. On paper, the
arrangements look very good indeed, but they have not yet been
tested in a severe crisis and it is possible that some of the
cumbersomeness would be eliminated in a serious situation by the
essential operational decisions being taken at the National Security
Committee level itself.

The crisis management structure, sensibly, is based upon the
lead agency concept. This means that, given certain eventualities,
responsibility for the management and direction of an operation
would fall to the lot of one designated agency with all the others
taking a subordinate position. Broadly, with small exceptions
that need not be of concern here, the lead agency responsibilities
are shared between the Department of State and the Department of
Justice. State assumes lead agency status for all cases of terrorism
affecting United States' interests which occur outside United States'
jurisdiction, while those which occur within the United States are
the responsibility of the Department of Justice. The responsibility
for executing the operational response in this later case is vested
in the F.B.I. It will be observed that while the Department of
Justice has an operational arm for the execution of its mandate,
the Department of State does not. Hence the interest in Project
Blue Light.

Of material interest to Dade County are the arrangements for interface with State and local law enforcement agencies in the event of a crisis involving violations of federal as well as State statutes. It is provided that the federal response will be moderated to respect the principle of States' rights so that, in general, the matter will always be handled by the appropriate State and local authorities, with the federal agencies available to counsel and assist where called upon. Only if the incident assumes proportions beyond those for which the State and local authorities have management capabilities, will the federal government, through the Department of Justice, assume jurisdiction in the case. The management of the incident will then fall to the F.B.I. on the basis of concurrent jurisdiction. The response would be directed from the Department of Justice through a specially assembled Task Force under the Deputy Attorney General. Ultimately, where the case is of sufficient gravity to warrant the step being taken, the National Security Council would become directly involved and it is conceivable that certain decisions might have to be taken by the President himself. Again, it is evident that while this represents an excellent "paper" arrangement, there are plenty of opportunities for jurisdictional conflict and command confusion. The effectiveness of the arrangements depends very much upon confidence and understanding among those who have perforce to learn to work together in a crisis upon very short notice. A "heavy-handed" or overbearing approach by those to whom these weighty responsibilities are assigned could have quite fatal results. The system has not yet had its baptism of fire.

The foregoing is all predicated upon the development of a
terrorist incident of the kind that would activate or trigger the
federal response system. In practice, there are a host of federal
agencies operating in or out of Dade County that have some sort of
on-going interest in the subject of terrorism. Their involvement
is far less clear-cut and their relationships with the State and
local authorities with which they share these interests and,
sometimes, jurisdiction, are less well defined. Indeed, knowing
who to call when, and for what purpose is a very important factor
in the management of so much of this unspectacular work. For the
most part, it is not the Department of Justice or F.B.I. Headquarters
that have any interface with the authorities in Dade County, but
the local field office of the F.B.I. and the local U.S. Attorney.
Only a very small part of their energies are devoted to the problems
of terrorism in Dade County. The Department of State, in its lofty
function as lead agency, is very remote indeed from Dade County, but
State does maintain an office of security in Miami, and the agent
in charge is in constant contact with local law enforcement agencies
to coordinate executive protection for the many dignitaries passing
through Dade County and for whose safey the Department of State is
primarily responsible. The U.S. Marshal's service has a growing
interest in terrorism and important protective functions. It has
an intelligence officer in Miami who concerns himself with the
monitoring of Cuban exile groups. The Secret Service has an
important interest in terrorism and has to rely to a very large

extent upon local intelligence sources for it has no capability of
its own in Dade County. It, too, must coordinate its protective
work with local law enforcement.

A host of other agencies has peripheral or occasional interest in
terrorism. Most of these agencies have mainly regulatory functions,
but they are brought into contact with these matters in such a way that
they have developed a useful specialist capacity that they would be as
reluctant to relinquish as they are sometimes to acknowledge. There
is plenty of opportunity for inter-agency rivalry here, some of
which in the past has given rise to small but significant problems.
Most of these are susceptible of solution with common sense and
good will, but these have proven to be singularly lacking on occasion.
Some agencies are extremely jealous of their prerogatives, while
others operate, in these matters, in a sort of "cloak and dagger"
fashion, which, while attractive to the press when discovered, is
unhelpful to the fostering of the spirit of co-operation necessary
for a really co-ordinated operation. In practice, most of this
comes down to a question of personalities. Where matters have gone
awry, it has generally been the result of a clash on a personal
level; where matters proceed on a satisfactory footing, as they do
most of the time, the credit must go to the individuals involved
rather than the system. <u>The importance of this cannot be over-
emphasized</u>. One federal agent referring to a contact in Dade County
opined that "When that man leaves, all cooperation with federal
agencies will leave with him." This may be an extreme position,
but it points up a danger that needs urgently to be addressed.

As a first step, from the federal end, each agency should appoint a liaison officer for the matter of terrorism, having a degree of permanency, experience, and interest in the subject. The identity and functions of that officer should be communicated to all other agencies, State and local authorities. These officers should be responsible for extablishing a firm and friendly working relationship with their counterparts, exchanging information of mutual interest, and giving an idea of the aid and counsel their respective agencies can provide in this matter.

One matter of jurisdictional conflict has caused concern in the past and, until it is corrected, will continue to cause problems in the future. BATF and F.B.I. have jurisdiction in the matter of bombings that is difficult even for the expert to unravel. Both agencies have important technical facilities that are made use of by local authorities in Dade County and elsewhere. If important evidence finds its way to the "wrong" agency, there can be inconvenient delays, as well as the possibility of error that might affect the outcome of the investigation and any subsequent prosecution based upon it. Whatever the eventual resolution of wider matters affecting the relationship between BATF and F.B.I., this is a matter which can receive immediate attention so as to simplify procedures and obrviate the possibilities of confusion. Given the lead agency status of the F.B.I. in the matter of terrorism, it is recommended that local authorities coordinate all investigations of bombings through the F.B.I. in the first instance, regardless of their nature. The F.B.I. should then assume responsibility for

involving BATF where this seems appropriate. It might be better were the responsibilities of BATF in this regard eventually passed to F.B.I. but this involves the consideration of wider issues than are germane here.

The question of information flow among federal agencies, and between them and State and local law enforcement agencies in the matter of terrorism is one of constant concern. There is sometimes a great deal less relevant information to be exchanged than will generally be admitted, but at other times, information that is useful and important to agencies in Dade County is unavailable on an ordinary basis simply because no mechanism for its transmission and receipt has been established. Some agencies like the D.E.A. that obtain some useful information relative to terrorism in the course of their ordinary work are reticent about revealing or exchanging it on the grounds that it is more important to protect sources and preserve them to serve the "proper" work of the agency. Information is regularly exchanged on a "need to know" basis, but there is clearly some reserve in this regard due to Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requirements. The main problem is the delay caused by the procedures that must be followed. Information of certain types, from certain agencies cannot be obtained directly, but must be requested through the F.B.I. Information flow in the other direction is as good as circumstances will allow, but clearly, where its quality and the arrangements for exchange are above average, this can be traced, in every case,

to some special relationship of confidence, over and beyond institu-
tional considerations, that has been developed by the individuals
concerned. Clearly, too, such a system is extremely fragile,
exclusive, and, essentially, extra institutional. A system constructed
in this way is never a good one, no matter how well it might work for
the moment.

Local law enforcement agencies in Dade County have, obviously,
the greatest of difficulty in developing useful information concerning
terrorism of an international or transnational nature. It is some-
times difficult enough to get information from outside the State
of Florida. Federal assistance of some kind with this problem is
essential, for there exists in the law enforcement community at a
local level the not unfounded belief that such information, often of
a most useful kind, is available somewhere in the system if only a
method existed for discovering and obtaining it. Information of a
kind not ordinarily available from "open" sources relative to the
operations of terrorist groups overseas, the activities of which
might affect Dade County at some future time, is obviously very
important. The oversight, though not the actual destination of much
of this material, lies with the National Security Council and, for
the most part, with the Department of State. This information does
not ordinarily filter down to those to whom it would be useful in
Dade County. Somebody clearly has a "need to know" who has "a
need to know".

Something must be said here about federal involvement in research
into the problem of terrorism. It is proper to recall that the present

study is funded by the federal government through a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. There is, as has been mentioned, a tendency to regard federal funds of all kinds as being abundant and doled out in large amounts for projects considered worthy by the petitioners. There is a tendency to look at this area of involvement as a measure of federal interest in the problem generally. In terms of actual dollar expenditure, the committment of the federal government overall has not been large. What is most significant, perhaps, is that very little of the available money has gone to agencies outside the federal government and that which has, invariably, resulted from grants made by departments within the LEAA other than that which has any form of terrorism as a major area of responsibility. <u>This is the only grant of its kind awarded to date to a State agency for the present purposes.</u> In essence, the LEAA, certainly in times past, allowed itself simply to play the role of banker to other agencies of the federal government anxious to develop their own capabilities in this area. It is small wonder, then, that, from a local perspective, the commitment of the federal government should seem exceedingly small indeed.

Reviewing the LEAA funding policy in the area of terrorism, it is evident that much that can be appropriately criticized stems from a lack of exercise of independent judgment in the deploying of what funds were available, and a lack of internal coordination in the award of funds; one part of the agency simply did not know what other parts were doing in the same subject area. To some extent,

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these defects have been addressed, but it is as yet too early to say whether they have been corrected. This perfunctory post-mortem is only useful in so far as it reveals matters that might be useful in the future. Two real needs are identified, both of which have a relevance to Dade County. Approximately $1,000,000 was granted by the LEAA, on a most haphazard basis, to fund three very worthwhile training programs in the area of terrorism from which a great many State and local law enforcement officers across the country have greatly benefitted. No arrangements were made for the necessary continuance of these programs which, apart from those conducted by the F.B.I., constituted the only ongoing training for law enforcement officers in this field. Had these programs been planned more systematically, by one truly informed of the problems, proper arrangements would have been made for continued funding and the further development of the programs. Terrorists are not going to remain forever on the plateau; neither should the government. It is obvious that these very necessary programs will have to be revived in the future, hopefully under new management at the LEAA, and it is strongly urged, for reasons that will be apparent from a reading of this entire report, that one such progam be administered out of Dade County.

One other recommendation is offered here that would substantially benefit Dade County and all areas where terrorism is a problem and federal help is needed. The LEAA is no stranger to the concept of technical assistance. Some of its most worthwhile programs in the area of criminal justice administration make use of it. Many of the

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problems brought to light in this report are eminently worthy of attention from some sort of federal tachnical assistance program. It would be easy to administer; would make the best use of available funding and identified experts; would promote a true "technology transfer"; and would show real federal concern in a way that little else can. Moreover, the idea would take comparatively little by way of implementation, for the experience and methodology are readily at hand. Such a concept represents no novel departure, but it would, at t single stroke, eliminate some of thos aspects of past performance that have merited less than a passing grade. The implementation of such a proposal, properly streamlined administratively, could be extremely cost effective and would bring great and easily forseeable benefits in its train.

Terrorism: The Police Response

What is expounded now, has cast a very long shadow before it. Indeed, everything that has been said, to the present, has somehow been permeated by hints of what was to come. It is impossible to talk sensibly of responses to terrorism withoug according that of the police its proper primacy. That it comes here, artificially, at the end is not the result of a desire to cause suspense, but rather because the road had first to be paved for what is hoped will be the crowning edifice. Many of the identified needs have already pointed clearly in this direction, what comes now is a practical suggestion for the satisfaction of those needs. From every perspective from which the problems of terrorism in Dade County were viewed, the

same needs, in much the same guise were encountered. It is clear, then, that they are real. If they can be met as suggested, it would be idle to suggest that the problems of terrorism will disappear; but the claim can be justifiably made that the law enforcement machinery to cope with them would be enormously improved.

There are a great many police agencies in Dade County. Some are large, well trained, staffed, and equipped. Others are exceedingly small; too small to cope, unaided, with most of the manifestations of terrorism that have been discussed. Yet terrorism, like the lightning that is so common in Florida, can strike anywhere and many of these smaller agencies have prime, inviting, vulnerable targets within their jurisdictions. What is required to cope with terrorism, in any of the forms it might assume, is the ability to invoke an appropriate response from whatever agency might best be in a position to provide it. In plain terms, this means knowing where to look for help when it is needed and not being too proud to ask for it. There is a place for the smaller agency in this scheme of things. It has personnel on the spot, familiar with local problems and features as outsiders are not, and it can gather indispensable intelligence. But such agencies must learn when they are out of their league and gracefully yield to those who have the resources to supplement their own efforts.

Every police agency in the area has something to contribute to the fight against terrorism. All do not contribute in the same degree, but, rather, according to their means. Nor is there an even gradation, from the highest to the lowest; there is "bunching"

at the top and at the bottom. An appropriate response to an act of terrorism by any agency involves knowing what to do, and when and how to do it. What to do may involve, in the very first place, calling for help to do the job. It is not possible to lay down in advance, for each agency, what it ought to do, when and how it should do it for each type of terroristic incident. Nor, in the main, is such a time-consuming exercise necessary. An agency having no Bomb Squad, faced with a bombing surely needs no telling that it must call for assistance from an agency that does have the requisite specialist capacity. More, it is a question of knowing who has what and how to obtain it in a hurry when it may be needed. Somebody has to do the job. It is recommended that each agency designate a Terrorism Liaison Officer responsible through the proper chain of command to undertake the tasks that have been broadly outlined here. Every officer so assigned should make himself (or herself) familiar with the identity of his or her counterparts throughout the system and throughout the federal system. Wherever possible those designated should be experienced officers likely to remain in these posts for a long while. Changes should reported as they occur.

Coordination of responses really comes down to this: that all agencies in Dade County devote the correct resources, in the correct measure and blend to meeting the specific terroristic activity that might present itself. In the past, many of the efforts to do just that have foundered not so much out of ignorance but on a real desire, prompted by important local considerations to maintain agency autonomy and independence. There has been a great resistance to anything that

might have smacked of consolidation. There has also been a certain amount of competitiveness on the part of the larger agencies to catch and hold onto whatever "glory" might accrue from the successful handling of terrorist incidents. This has given the impression of some of the agencies operating with one eye on the terrorist and the other on the media and any "rivals" that might get in on the act. Naturally, the larger agencies were able to get the lion's share of the "spoils" but not without a few torn and bitten ears among themselves. No plan can prevent this; any that did would be surely circumvented. It may simply be said here that a little of the right competition among agencies is healthy. Too much and of the wrong kind can only lead to bruises that ought to be inflicted on the terrorist not those who, after all, are on the same side. The lead for this healthy state of affairs has to come from the top.

The lead agency concept, as developed for the federal system, has been given very careful consideration for adaptation in some such or modified form in Dade County. The idea, which might well work most successfully elsewhere, has been reluctantly discarded for purely local reasons in Dade County. The lead agency would, inevitably, have had to be the Public Safety Department of Dade County, as much by reason of the legal authority vested in the Director of that agency as in its size and the quality of its resources and personnel. A formalization of the arrangements needed for the purposes would have given rise to a number of inconveniences which, rather than promoting goodwill and vital cooperation, would inevitably

have militated against them. What must be avoided, at all costs, in a serious situation is an operational wrangle as to who is in charge, whose policies will prevail, and what will be used to do the job. All possible contingencies cannot be foreseen, but there should be an early meeting of those principally concerned to determine how best to avoid operational problems on account of these jurisdictional and other forseeable tangles.

Dade County Association of Chiefs of Police is a flourishing and most useful group, holding frequent meetings allowing for frank, professional interchange in an atmosphere of "give and take" where fraternal good fellowship prevails. It is recommended that this report be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of that Association and that some of the salient suggestions contained in the present section be introduced for the consideration of the members. Sub-committees can then be set up to consider ways of implementing some

of these recommendations involving the assignment of special duties, and the provision of cooperation and sharing of resources. The Association can have a most useful role to play in this and the forum it provides for a discussion of the real underlying problems will enable useful solutions to them to be found in keeping with the spirit it is hoped to promote.

A note of realism, painful though it may be, has to be inserted here. Law enforcement agencies in Dade County have seen a steady shrinkage in terms of personnel devoted to the combatting of terrorism. Some agencies have shrunk to about a third of their former size in terms of line personnel dedicated to these tasks. This is discouraging

and prospects of further cuts must be realistically anticipated for planning purposes. We must simply learn to do a better job with less. But it must also be realized that there are physical limits to what any given number of persons can do. To the point here, is the fact that experience in this difficult area cannot be created over-night. If experienced officers are allowed to depart, if they are assigned to other work, even on a part-time basis, this whole operational capability will simply be lost. It is not subject to some process of instant re-creation when danger threatens once more. We need urgently to consider now, in this time of fiscal crisis, how best we can preserve what we have as well as ways of using it to better advantage. It is recommended that the larger agencies, where the problem is more acute, form a small management committee to examine carefully the proposals that follow and to consider what might be required to implement them.

All roads, it is said, lead to Rome. Inevitably, all lines of inquiry in this area lead back to the imperative need for intelligence. Here more careful consideration has to be given to some of the problems foreshadowed elsewhere. Much has already been said about the flow of information and clearly this must always be an area of concern. But before information can flow anywhere it has first to be obtained. In dealing with terrorists, this is not so simple as it may appear to the unintiated. Terrorism is an activity conducted beneath a heavy cloak of secrecy in its preparation and planning stages. Law enforcement officers are unlikely to be invited to

attend these "development" sessions. Even were tried and trusted counter-terrorism techniques such as penetration of suspected terrorist groups in favor once more, it would be exceedingly difficult as well as highly dangerous for law enforcement officers to engage in these activities. Moreover, the question must be acutely raised in the light of what has been expressed about budgetary limitation. Who is going to do this job? There is not merely a shortage of skilled personnel able to do the job and survive. The ability to do it at all presumes that the identity of the officer is unknown to members of the group he has succeeded in penetrating. There are now comperatively few officers in Dade County engaged in intelligence work of any kind whose identity and functions are unknown to those whose activities are under surveillance. Many of the best officers are exceedingly well-known indeed. Penetration can only, effectively, be undertaken by sworn personnel brought in from outisde, "new boys", or informers. If the technique is used at all in these times, it will invariably be the informer who is introduced into the group. The value of the information obtained by these means can only be as good and reliable as the informant himself.

The pivot of any intelligence system is the working field or street agent. So far as terrorism is concerned, these may well be an endangered species. Squads in Dade County engaged in such work are now reduced to a bare minimum and are likely to be reduced still further. This circumstance reveals an extraordinary short-sightedness or a complete lack of understanding about the nature

of the work and the qualities required to perform it. Law enforcement intelligence agents require about four years of apprenticeship before they become really effective in their work. By dedicating themselves to these labors, they are often - and this is especially true of Dade County - sacrificing their prospects of advancement in the service. They are forced to make a most invidious choice: that of remaining in an occupation that gives them great personal and professional satisfaction and in which they have become very proficient; or moving on to some - for them - less desirable field of activity simply to retain their prospects of promotion. Fortunately for Dade-Miami, and unfortunately for the individual officers concerned - some have chosen to make the sacrifice. The efficiency of the system depends upon these people for, in many cases, their supervisors, whose career patterns have lain elsewhere, and who have come and gone on the "revolving door" principle, are very much dependent upon them. The knowledge of these lowly placed officers, indispensable to the continued running of the system is being purchased very cheaply and it is unconscionable that this should continue. It is recommended that this be given priority in any departmental management study so that a proper career structure in intelligence, taking account of the necessary apprenticeship, is rewarded.

The other functional component of the law enforcement intelligence system is the analyst. It is the analyst who abstracts, refines, pieces together, and interprets that information that is drawn into the system by the field agent. Good analysts require a great deal

of training and a certain sensitivity for the work they have to undertake. It would be fair to say that the position of intelligence analyst as it is presently conceived in Dade County has been debased. Those who fill these so-called analyst positions are little better than record-keepers, mere clerks. This deprives the system of one of its vital components, for the skills the analyst can bring to bear on the intelligence problem are quite different from those that characterize the field agent. The post of intelligence analyst has to be recognized for what it is, a highly skilled and responsible position. It is better to have fewer analyst positions and to fill them at the appropriate level of skill and responsibility, with a commensurate scale of renumeration, than to fill these important slots with lower-grade personnel who cannot carry out the functions that the system requires. Urgent management attention is required for this, too, if the system is to be re-oriented to meet these needs.

The consultant was mandated to provide, through this study, "A vehicle by which all agencies that deal directly with terrorism can come together and discuss common problems and possible solutions." So important was this considered, that more time and thought has been devoted to it than any other single issue with which this report is concerned. There are many types and shapes of vehicle, with very varying degrees of performance and price tags. With all that has been said in this report of economy, it might have been felt that a Toyota would have been appropriate for the occasion. It was made clear at the outset that thrift not miserliness would be the guiding

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principle here. A sound application of that doctrine dictates a prudent splurge here; the chosen vehicle should be a Cadillac, not some relatively cheap foreign import. What is needed here is a vehicle with a long road life that will be aesthetically pleasing, require little maintenance - and do the job superlatively well. Having been enjoined, so strongly, not to be spendthrift in any other department, Dade County surely deserves no less?

It was quite apparent, when the problem was carefully examined, that yet another committee would simply not do the job expected of it. There have been committees before, there are committees now, and, doubtless, there will be committees in the future. Even a committee patterned after so prestigious and useful a group as the Interagency Working Group to Combat Terrorism would not serve the purpose here. But the problems remain, for they are not susceptible of solution by meeting and talking about them, even if the discussion ends in agreement to do something to change matters. The popular solution of creating a committee is little more than procrastination. What was require was some sort of a vehicle capable of meeting the following criteria:

(1) It had to be a body with a satisfactory degree of substance and permanence. It could not be a group of persons meeting occasionally for a few hours. It needed a permanent staff.

(2) It had to be capable of actually accomplishing some definite task. It was not sufficient that it provide a forum where there might be just more talk about what to do.

(3) It had to make full use of the human and material resources available in Dade County and, if possible, serve as a pilot or feasibility model that could be "cloned" for use elsewhere.

(4) It had to be a regular component of the law enforcement community so as to enjoy official standing and the requisite degree of credibility.

(5) It had to have clear objectives and a feasible plan of operation so as to be able to function as quickly as possible.

(6) It had to have the capacity for growth, so that it could begin as a relatively modest operation and then assume more functions as experience with it began to build.

(7) It had, ideally, to have a unique quality and purpose of its own, but also be capable of taking over a number of already existing law enforcement tasks in the terrorism field.

(8) It had to be capable of rendering a real, needed service to law enforcement in Dade County.

(9) It had to cost relatively little to set up, be inexpensive to maintain, and worthy of the initial investment.

With these specifications in mind, the following rudimentary proposal is offered. It is stressed that this is an extremely flexible idea that can be converted, if accepted in principle, into something concrete as the details are worked out by those

whose task it is to find the means of implementing it. It should be realized, however, that very little additional work is needed for what is suggested to materialize; it is more than just a toad waiting for a kiss from a fairy princess.

It is recommended that there be created the Dade County Institute on Terrorism. It will be housed in a facility to be provided by the Department of Public Safety of Dade County and will function under its Director, assisted by an Advisory Board composed of members appointed by State and local law enforcement and selected federal agencies. It will be staffed, in the first instance, by sworn officers and civilian personnel seconded for duty from their respective law enforcement agencies in Dade County. Such equipment as may be necessary will be assigned to the unit from participating agencies.

The Institute will have a Director seconded from the Public Safety Department and will establish a staffing pattern to accomplish its minimum assignments and will develop an operating budget.

The Institute will have operational, training, and research functions in the area of terrorism response.

Operationally, it will function as a county-wide intelligence clearinghouse, collecting, processing, storing and disseminating information concerning domestic and international terrorism from all available sources. It will service the intelligence needs, in this regard, of all the agencies in the area. It will be especially charged with the development of regular channels of

information according to law. It will serve as a point of reference and coordination for all operations against terrorists undertaken in Dade County. It will be available to assist, counsel, and provide special resources to any agency needing to supplement its own response capabilities in this way. It will be available to assist incident commanders in the management of resources during any emergent crisis. It will serve as a central communication center for the management of major incidents.

It will serve as a center for in-service training in counter-terrorism techniques in all the various identifiable specialties. Existing departmental resources in the different agencies will be concentrated under the aegis of a single Institute for the purposes of offering the most up to date training. As resources develop, outside specialists may be employed on special projects. Ideally, training and re-training should be a constant, ongoing process.

Research will be undertaken into all aspects of terrorism and the Institute will build a comprehensive library of relevant classified and unclassified materials. Research is essentially an arm of strategic intelligence.

What is proposed is a reallocation and reassignment, on a county wide scale, of existing resources and functions and a serious upgrading of them to meet the needs identified in the present report. The undertaking is feasible and well within the present capacity of the various agencies to be involved. It is a very worthwhile endeavor offering a challenge that can be confidently met. There

is a clear precedent for such an undertaking, though on a less
ambitious scale, in the Dade County Organized Crime Institute.
Such a vehicle, it is suggested, might well merit federal assistance
as a useful prototype, and the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council
should explore the possibility of obtaining funding for the purpose.

CONCLUSIONS

This report has been prepared in response to a very special
mandate. While it contains, hopefully, much of general interest
that has emerged, incidentally, in the course of a brief but inten-
sive study, its prime purpose must be kept firmly in mind. The
study aimed at identifying what a certain community would need to
responde to terrorism. In accordance with the mandate, certain
realistic needs have been identified and articulated in a defir te
form; the report has simply given shape to what many, in a good
position to know, have been thinking and feeling about the problem
for a long while.

With the concrete expression of these needs, this part of the
process is over. But there would be little of practical value, for
all the time, effort, and money consumed, were the exercise to be left
truncated in this way. Something more is required of those who have
commissioned this study, who have participated in its conduct and
direction, and seen its results take shape. The needs identified by
this study must be satisfied in a material sense; a detailed blue print
for their satisfaction implemented. The work cannot be considered
complete until the needs shown by this study to exist have been met.
If this goal were perfectly achieved, we should be able to say, at some
not too distant time, in response to a similar assumption to that which
impelled this study. "There is nothing further that we need to hand'e
this problem, we have everything we require". Until that happy, if
utopian moment is reached, the task comprehended by this topic must be

considered still capable of further endeavor. This is truly but the end of the beginning, rather than the beginning of the end. New needs might well make themselves felt in the future, but their pressure and demand have not yet signified their presence. All those that could be reasonably and realistically anticipated have been included here.

The American trade union leader, Samuel Gompers, was once asked what his members wanted. He replied tersely and unequivocally, "More". This study could easily have been approached in just such a spirit, with perhaps a little technical elucidation as to more of what and how much. Such an approach would have been out of keeping with the times. It shows neither discrimination nor taste, and would have justly called forth upon its authors the criticism that so rightly attaches to what has been picturesquely called "The gimme generation". <u>It is a conclusion of this study that many needs can be met through a better utilization of existing resources</u>. We must simply learn to do a better job with what we already have. The criminal justice system is in no present danger of being overwhelmed by terrorism. But there is a real likelihood that, in a serious crisis, uncoordinated responses could result in confusion and loss of control. The system requires an elimination of some of the slack, a removal of a link here and there to give a more vigorous driving force rather than the introduction of fresh elements into an already overcrowded scene. Terrorism is one area where, from a response perspective, more is not necessarily better.

Among the very real needs identified are some intangibles, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized, but which are exceedingly difficult to translate into practical measures of response. Much of

terrorism itself is on this Plane. It is a war of nerves. It is also a war for the allegiance of the uncommitted or, more exactly, to bring under control those who vacillate between a desire for the real protection conferred by the state and the equally real and sometimes closer fear of the terrorist's bullet or bomb. Dade County has, in the past, experienced these dilemmas, which are symptomatic of the larger crisis of confidence that has affected so much of government. This is a very serious matter indeed, for it gives the terrorist a decided edge. Government must be seen to cope effectively with terrorism whether it be of the politically inspired or the non-politically inspired variety. Every terrorist incident that is resolved in society's favor increases confidence in the authorities and brings with it dividends of cooperation and trust. The belief that the government is unenthusiastic, for whatever reason, in the pursuit and prosecution of terroristic crimes, is one that must not be allowed to take root. This has been a very special problem with respect to Cuban exile terrorism and it requires careful professional attention. In this area, as in so many others, nothing succeeds quite as well as success. If cases are cleared, if those accused of terroristic crimes are successfully prosecuted, the result is a vote of confidence in law and order that, more than anything else, brings about an abatement of terrorism.

Another intangible may be truly regarded as the lubricant that keeps the machinery of response running. For the better handling of many of the situations that have been considered in the course of this study, nothing more is needed than goodwill and a modicum of common sense on the part of those entrusted with the duties of response. This is not something that can be supplied by legislation or other administrative fiat. Yet, in many cases, its absence threatens the very success

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of the response. When the ship is on its way to the bottom, it is hardly helpful to begin an argument over who is on watch. Disputes, curiously reminiscent of Fiddling While Rome Burns, have all too often bedevilled the handling of terrorism. Where matters have proceeded smoothly, to the discomfiture of the terrorist, there has invariably been a high degree of cooperation and understanding among those called upon to respond. The evidence for this is overwhelming. This is _not_ a plea to put aside jurisdictional niceties in a crisis. Far from it; the better these are known and respected, the fewer the problems that are likely to arise. What must be avoided is the mad scramble for some imagined glory on the one hand, and an excessive caution, prompted by an esoteric but well-known professional ingredient referred to as CYA, on the other. There is enough "glory" in the well-handled case for all to share, and in the well-handled case, too, there is no reason to cover anything. These things begin at the top; Command sets the Tone. Some unhelpfulness stems from plain ingnorance. Knowing what the other fellow does and why he does it is always helpful. There is a need to teach this in a non-threatening fashion.

Yet another intangible is that connected with the need to appreciate the real meaning of the change in the "feel" of terrorism in Dade County. It is not facetious to suggest that Dade County has become "comfortable" with the Cuban exile terrorism it has long known and with which it has learned to cope. Politically inspired terrorism in Dade County has always meant Cuban politics, and international terrorism simply had to do with the activities of Cuban exile terrorists abroad.

Law enforcement responses were structured in accordance with these premises. Those premises have now undergone a subtle shift, but, for many, the attitudes they generated and the structure to which they have given rise has not. There is a strong if not always articulated resistance to change. There is a feeling that because the terrorism problem in Dade County has always <u>been</u> Cuban that it will <u>remain</u> Cuban. Where, it might be asked, is the firm evidence for change, where are these other Latin terrorists, these Palestinians and others that might present a problem? It might validly be asked where, too, at the moment, are the Cuban terrorists against whose possible re-emergence so many preparations are still erected? The distinction can only rest on the principle of "It has happened before" as against "It has never happened here". This is but a variant on the old academic saw, "Nothing should ever happen for the first time." Its operational implications are even more incongruous for they are akin to a patient with cancer being told by his doctor, "Wouldn't you rather have pneumonia, we know how to deal with that".

There must be a widening of vision to cope with reasonable contingencies. Clearly, some terrorism that <u>might</u> occur is not reasonably forseeable. But it does not pay to have such a high degree of specialization that probable events are overlooked. The need is for a change in outlook, that the operational changes might smoothly and efficiently follow.

The need for a proper level of preparedness is paramount. While preparation must sensibly match the magnitude of the apprehended threat,

it cannot await its materialization. Some assumptions have to be made on which to base an assessment of needs. No attempt has been made here to spell out with exactitude the anticipated threat to Dade County from any particular type of terrorism. Instead, a method has been suggested by which such an assessment can, at any time, be made. The usefulness of the method depends upon the availability of data and of personnel trained and organized in its use. Recommendations on both counts have been made. One fundamental assumption has been made: Terrorism, everywhere, is going to present increasingly difficult problems for law enforcement, and Dade County is going to experience its share of these problems. Terrorism is not a self-limiting disease. It is not going to go away on its own account. Because of its nature, it will show peaks and valleys; but the overall trend is upward. Terrorism, because of its basic affinity with deterrence, shows a tendency to develop a spiral of escalation. Because the assumption is made that it is going to continue and to escalate, the assumption is also made that it will continue to evolve qualitatively. There is a real need to monitor and understand the changes, and to translate them for the purpose of designing effective responses. This is an extraordinary law enforcement task, but a law enforcement task nonetheless.

Prevention is better than cure. The prevention of terrorism <u>should</u> be the first goal of every community. Preventive medicine has a bitter taste, but it <u>must</u> be swallowed if it is agreed that prevention is what is to be sought. For prevention means pre-empting the terrorist, stopping him in the planning and preparation stage rather than waiting

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until he has embarked upon the execution of his project. There can be no compromise about this. If the job is to be done, the means must be created - and used efficiently - to prevent the terrorist from doing what he is setting out to do. The terrorist can only be stopped i.e. prevented, if the authorities have knowledge of what he is about to do before he does it. This means that the authorities must have the means to obtain and utilize preventive intelligence. This is an inescapable conclusion and its consequences are plainly accepted. In the words of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism: "A proper balance must be struck between the right to be free and the right to be secure". Prevention is going to encroach upon freedom: A lot of prevention is going to encroach on a lot of freedom; the matter is that simple. The alternative is quite as simple. We can give up all talk of prevention and just concentrate upon the cure. The bitterness of that medicine may be quite immaterial, for the patient may be simply in too bad a condition to swallow at all.

Terrorism is a social disease. It is not a law enforcement problem; it is a community problem. If the community as a whole does not or will not face up to its responsibilities, law enforcement cannot make up the shortfall. If members of the community do not come forward with information about terrorism, if they will not cooperate in the prosecution of terroristic crimes, then the terrorist will be free to go about his business with impunity. The community has a clear, if agonizing, choice in this matter: it can stand by those who act in its name; or it can surrender to the fear that the terrorist has generated to subvert it.

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Again, the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism: "The Community

must repudiate terrorism". Several ways of encouraging the community

and organizing it to give expression to that repudiation were considered.

After much thought, they were rejected. This is an initiative that

must come from the people, not from government. Government must be

responsive to the community's concerns. It must be seen to do its job

well, so as to inspire confidence in the community. But the people

must, themselves, band together to cast out the terrorist. There are

encouraging signs that the Cuban exile community, at least, may at

last have decided upon the exercise of its responsibilities in that

regard. Repudiation of the terrorist and his ways is hard and dangerous

for those who must "Bell the Cat". But ultimately, it affords the

best and most lasting protection to the community.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

NEEDS ASSESSMENT STUDY:

TERRORISM IN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

CHIEFS OF POLICE PREPARED FOR THE

DADE-MIAMI CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL

This report of the Needs Assessment Study of Terrorism
in Dade County, Florida by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police is an extensive analysis of the
definition, potentialities, activities and nature of
the problem of terrorism in Southeast Florida.
Contained in this report are a number of consultant
recommendations. The following is a summary of those
recommendations articulated in Chapter Six, "What
Is To Be Done?"

SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR TERRORISM

The first concern expressed by the IACP consultant in a series
of recommendations contained in Chapter Six, "What Is To Be Done?"
is a concern regarding control of the supply of money. Although the
report contains no specific recommendation as to how this might be
done, it is suggested that, from a prevention standpoint, it is
necessary to "turn off the spigot". In other words, unspecified
measures should be taken to reduce or cut off the supply of money
that could be utilized by terrorist groups for the funding of
terrorist activities.

PRIVATE SECURITY

This report also discusses the on-going shift from public police
to private protection/private security. The author contends that
public law enforcement has not in the past nor probably will in the
future be able to handle the vast problem and concerns relating to
terrorism. Therefore, there is a necessity to rely upon the private
sector to provide individual and facility security. However, along
with this emphasis on private security is a need to upgrade the
quality of the private security involvement. For private security to
be effective in the area of terrorism, it will be essential to raise
private security standards. These standards would include compre-
hensive security checks of all employees of private security companies,
the proper supervision of private security employees, and a
substantial and significant interface between private security
organizations and public law enforcement agencies having terrorism
responsibilities. The consultant's report recommends that private
security standards should be raised in the area of selection,

supervision, and training. The consultant also recommends an informal public/private security working group on terrorism to be established in Dade County with the County Managers' involvement to insure coordination at the highest levels.

LEGISLATION/INTELLIGENCE

After a review of appropriate federal, state, and local legislation, the consultant recommends no special legislation to deal with terrorism. The report also states that there is no need for the creation of a separate autonomous "crime of terrorism". What is not needed is a further accretion of criminal law, but rather the rigorous enforcement of what already exists. The report suggests a need to strengthen certain police powers to cope with the problem of terrorism. One of the areas in need of strengthening is the intelligence capability of all law enforcement agencies on the federal, state, and local levels. The consultant suggests the necessity to restore the intelligence gathering function of public law enforcement agencies in order to allow them to perform the intelligence function efficiently and yet create the proper oversight to prevent abuse.

COURT AND WITNESS SECURITY

Another area of concern expressed in Chapter Six by the IACP consultants is a concern regarding the safe environment and adequate security of our courtrooms. The consultant recommends that steps should be taken to insure that the process, functions, and facilities of the courts are manageable, and that adequate security and protection is provided for personnel and witnesses. Without an

effective witness-protection plan and proper security, it will be difficult to get witnesses to testify in terrorism cases. Such testimony is imperative to the prosecution of terrorists.

JUDICIAL-MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS

The consultant also recommends that our court system and the media work together to avoid sensationalism in terrorism trials. It is recommended that all efforts should be taken to keep politics out of the trials and that we should continue to maintain our system of justice in the United States with trial by law and not trial by press. It is also recommended that there be a better education of juries and jurists into the court system functions and responsibilities.

CORRECTIONS

Another concern considered by the report is the control and custody of terrorist prisoners. The consultant recommends a system of liaison and coordination between correction and law enforcement agencies in the area of the control and custody of arrested subjects who have been convicted of or charged with terrorist-related activities. It is suggested that should terrorist prisoners be transported, that proper notification be provided all law enforcement agencies in the respective jurisdictions. In addition, the security of terrorist prisoners should be improved significantly in order to prevent escape and to effect the interdiction of contraband.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION AND SUPPORT

Significant concern is expressed in the report regarding the community and its involvement in a program to prevent and suppress terrorism. The author suggests that there must be adequate community approval and support for the prevention and/or protection against terrorism. It is essential that the criminal justice system have community assistance, and that the community understands its role. Community leaders must start to guide opinion on these matters. The community must learn proper responses, develop a sense of realism in terms of the problem, and not be panicked nor lulled into a false sense of security.

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

The report suggests several areas of improvement at the federal level of involvement in response to the problem of terrorism. It is recommended that each federal agency appoint a liaison official for the matter of terrorism. Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been designated as the lead agency in matters relating to terrorism, it is recommended that all local authorities coordinate investigations of bombings through the F.B.I.

Federal assistance of some kind is necessary in developing and disseminating terrorism information to local law enforcement personnel and agencies. Part of the problem in the past has been the lack of a systematic structure and formalization of these inter-agency relationships. Thus, our failures or successes in

the past have been dependant upon the personalities of the individuals
working for their respective federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies. By providing structure and systematic working relationships,
the continuity of the coordination could continue regardless of the
individual personalities of the personnel involved.

LEAA

The report suggests that the funding for terrorism training
programs should have been continued throughout the United States,
that such training programs should be provided in the future, and
that one such training program on terrorism should be administered
in Dade County. The report also suggests that LEAA technical assis-
tance be provided to officials in Dade County to begin to implement
some of the recommendations contained in this report.

LOCAL POLICE RESPONSE

In the area of the police response to the problem of terrorism,
the author recommends that each agency in Dade County designate a
Terrorism Liaison.Officer. The coordination of response to terrorism
would provide that all agencies in Dade County devote the correct
resources in the correct measure and blend to meet the specific
terroristic activity that might present itself. What must be avoided
at all costs in a serious situation is an operational wrangle as to
who is in charge, whose policies will prevail, and what will be used
to do the job. The consultant recommends that this report be placed
on the agenda of an early meeting of the Dade County Association of
Chiefs of Police, that some of the salient suggestions be introduced

for consideration by the membership of that organization, and this organization appoint subcommittees to consider ways of implementing some of these recommendations involving the assignment of special duties and the provision of cooperation and sharing of resources.

The consultant also recommends at the local level that larger police agencies should form a small management committee to examine carefully the proposals of this report. It is also recommended that a proper career structure in intelligence be given priority in any departmental management study. This recommendation is based upon the concern of current management practices regarding the transfer and assignment of intelligence personnel. Finally, the consultant recommends that the post of Intelligence Analyst be recognized for what it is.

DADE COUNTY INSTITUTE ON TERRORISM

The final major recommendation of the IACP is the creation of the Dade County Institute on Terrorism. It is recommended:

1. That such an institute be housed in a facility provided by the Dade County Public Safety Department

2. That its personnel, equipment, and operational functions be under the direction of the Director of the Dade County Public Safety Department

3. That an Advisory Board be created composed of members appointed by State and local law enforcement agencies and selected federal agencies to provide assistance and guidance to this Institute

4. The Institute should be staffed by officers and civilians assigned by appropriate and respective law enforcement agencies in Dade County

5. Equipment should be assigned from participating law enforcement agencies.

The consultant recommends that this Institute on Terrorism have three functions and responsibilities: Operations, Training, and Research. In support of the research and training activities of such an institute, the consultant recommends the creation of a comprehensive library of relevant classified and unclassified terrorism materials. The report states: "What is proposed is a reallocation and reassignment, on a County-wide scale, of existing resources and functions and a serious up-grading of them to meet the needs identified in the present report". "The undertaking is feasible and well within the present capacity of the various agencies to be involved."

DADE-MIAMI CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL

Finally, the consultant suggests that the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council explore the feasibility of obtaining funds for the purpose of creating this Dade County Institute on Terrorism.