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operating within the international communist network. is becoming more and more evident, even from newspaper accounts, that international terrorism is well financed, highly trained, and in possession of sophisticated weaponry. It is becoming a formidable force that must receive attention as a significant national security problem in this country.

Today, the committee is fortunate to have as a witness an author and journalist who for many years has made a study of terrorism through direct observations as a newspaper correspondent. The witness is Mr. Jay Mallin of Miami, Fla., and his credentials are impressive. In 1956 to 1958 as resident correspondent for Time and Life and Miami News, he witnessed firsthand the activities of the Cuban underground and frequently met with Cuban underground leaders in covering the revolution in that country.

During the 1960's, on assignment, he came into contact with terrorist activities in Venezuela and Vietnam. He has done extensive lecturing and writing on terrorism and can best be described as an expert in the field. Mr. Mallin, it is a great pleasure to welcome you as a witness.

I understand you do have a prepared statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF JAY MALLIN

Mr. MALLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we live in a vulnerable society. We live in a society which is highly susceptible to terrorist attacks. We are vulnerable today. We are becoming increasingly vulnerable as time goes on.

The horror of terrorism has been starkly brought forth by the massacre at Ma'alot and other mass killings along the Israeli-Lebanese border; by the mass murders at Lod, Rome, and Athens airports; by the assault on the 20th Olympic games.

The greatest terror campaign of modern times was conducted by the Vietcong in South Vietnam. It is estimated that over 30,000 people were murdered in the period 1961 through 1970. In Ireland more than 1,000 people have been killed by terrorists. In Argentina there were approximately 170 known kidnappings last year alone, and more than \$100 million was paid in ransoms over a 2-year period.

Businessmen and diplomats kidnaped in Mexico. Russian doctors kidnaped in Burma. Cuban exiles killed in Miami and New York. The prime minister of Spain killed by a bomb.

In recent weeks a senator was assassinated in the Irish Republic; a ship was seized in Pakistan; airliners were hijacked in Lebanon and Colombia; and bombs have wracked London and Dublin: Terrorism is widespread throughout the world.

The United States has not escaped terror. The Patricia Hearst affair—I hesitate to call it a kidnaping—has held the headlines, but there have been other kidnappings, as well as bomb explosions and the killing of police officers.

In September of 1972 the world was stunned to hear that the 20th Olympic games, a symbol of international harmony had been made the target of an attack by political terrorists. A group of urban guerrillas belonging to the Palestinian Black September Organiza-

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tion had forced their way into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic site and seized nine hostages.

The guerrillas issued a number of demands, including one for the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Daylong negotiations took place between the guerrillas and the West German Government and eventually the government appeared to accede to the Palestinian demands. An accord was reached whereby the terrorists, together with their hostages, were to be taken to an airport and there provided with air transportation to Egypt. At the military airport, however, German snipers opened fire on the terrorists and in the resulting battle, all Israeli hostages died as well as four guerrillas, a police officer, and a helicopter pilot.

Thanks to the miracles of modern communications people in many lands were kept abreast of developments minute by minute. Americans watched television in fascination as events unfolded before their eyes. When the final holocaust occurred at the German airport, feelings of horror and revulsion against the terrorists swept the civilized world.

The question was repeatedly asked, what did the Palestinians hope to gain? Did not the kidnappings and killings do their cause far more harm than good? The actions of terrorists, however, cannot be measured in the way acts of war and revolution are appraised. Urban guerrillas do not march to the same drum that regular soldiers march to, or even rural guerrillas. Their rationales and methods are different; their immediate goals are different.

Terrorism is the weapon of the few against the many, of the militarily weak against the militarily strong. Unable to meet his foe in open combat on the battlefield, or even in the forested or mountainous areas preferred by the rural guerrilla, the terrorist strikes stealthily at his enemy's vulnerable spots. These may not be militarily important—hence are unguarded and susceptible to attack—but they provide the terrorist with the opportunity to discomfort and embarrass his enemy and to publicize his cause and his activist presence. After having seized and destroyed three jet airliners in September 1970, Arab extremists boasted that "the headlines have shown that our cause is now clearly publicized."

With much of the world's population concentrated in or moving toward urban areas, guerrilla warfare has also moved into the more heavily populated regions. The fundamental precepts of rural guerrilla warfare—hit, run, and hide, or as Thomas Edward Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, said, "Tip and run, no pushes, but strikes"—have been adapted for urban guerrilla conflict.

For the extremist—or militant, or activist—call him what you will—urban guerrilla warfare offers clear advantages over rural guerrilla warfare. If he is a city youth he can remain in the cities and need not meet the rugged demands of rural and hill fighting. In the cities there are a plethora of potential targets. The countryside offers few targets. In the cities there are opportunities for militant actions—such as the surreptitious placing of bombs—which do not necessarily entail direct personal and immediate conflict with the police.

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In the countryside, guerrillas must eventually prove themselves by combat with units of the regular army. Rural guerrilla warfare requires a great deal of physical exertion over a long period with few gratifying results.

In urban areas, guerrillas can commit spectacular acts and, if they have not been identified by the authorities, can return to "normal" lives until the time comes for their next violent action.

Psychological impact is the key element in the thinking and planning of terrorists. The members of the July 26 revolutionary movement in Cuba in the late fifties were masters in using terrorism to attract attention to their organization. On one occasion a mighty explosion destroyed part of a vital electrical conduit and downtown Havana was blacked out for more than 2 days.

When a modern city is darkened, there is no electricity, no lights work, no elevators move, no water runs—believe me, attention is drawn to the organization that has done this.

Another day, 40 bombs exploded around Havana within a 15-minute period. Again, this makes quite an impression on the population.

On still another occasion Juan Manuel Fangio, the world auto racing champion, was kidnaped and held for several days. No demands were made; the kidnaping in itself served the rebels' purposes. And in another action, guerrillas led by Raul Castro kidnaped and held no less than 48 Americans and two Canadians. This, too, created quite an impression, not only nationally but internationally as well. The Americans were seized to protest supposed U.S. arms deliveries to the Cuban Government. There was also a considerable side benefit in that mass kidnaping demonstrated how powerful the rebel forces had become, controlling extensive territories which the Government forces could not enter.

The guerrillas wisely treated their captives well, and it did not hurt the rebel cause at all when, after the captives had been released, they spoke highly of the rebels. An immediate and long-range aim of terrorists is to win the support of the populace amidst whom they are operating. Citizens can provide material and financial support, intelligence, and shelter. Citizens can engage in passive resistance programs against a government, and if they support the movement represented by the terrorists, they will later, hopefully, support the government that the revolutionary movement will set up once victory is achieved.

But note the word "terror"; it connotes fear. And if you terrify the citizenry at the same time that you frighten the government, the citizens are not likely to support you. Terrorists are faced with the problem of carrying out their activities without turning the population against them. You set off bombs in crowded places, as in Ireland, you kill and mutilate innocent persons, and you surely do not make friends.

The Cuban clandestine movements, waging war against dictator Fulgencio Batista, succeeded superbly in undermining the Government while at the same time winning support of the population. They kidnaped, yes, but they did not mistreat their victims or hold

them for long lengths of time. They exploded bombs, yes, but they hurt a minimal number of people.

I once asked Faustino Perez, one of the underground leaders, whether the bombs being set off didn't turn Cubans against the rebels. He replied that they didn't. I asked why. He replied simply, "Our bombs do not have metal." They were not intended to hurt anyone. Spectacular explosions publicized the rebel cause, showed the weakness of the police, but injured few people.

Fidel Castro's guerrilla victory has been well publicized. Far less publicized is the fact that if the clandestine urban movements had not carried out a highly sophisticated terror campaign which eventually paralyzed the Government, Castro today would still be sitting under a tree in the hills.

One of the characteristics of terror activities is the killing of police officers. In South Vietnam the police were a priority target of terrorists. Not only were individual policemen shot but even police headquarters were attacked. In the Dominican Republic, at the time of the 1965 uprising, so many police were attacked and killed by terrorists that the police disappeared from the streets of the capital city. In Uruguay, too, at the height of the Tupamaros campaign, the police were a specific target of the terrorists.

During the past few days, two brave police officers have been killed in Miami. Many others have died in the line of duty in recent years in this country. During the 10-year period 1963 through 1972, 786 police officers were slain. Of these, 63 were killed from ambush; that is, they were the victims of terrorists.

The killing of police is not merely a matter of striking at a hated enemy by dissident groups. There is a hard purpose behind this tactic. Police are a symbol of the existing order; they are also a major support of that order. To attack the police is to deal psychological as well as real blows against the existing establishment. Weaken the morale and effectiveness of the police and you weaken the entire civil structure.

Sixty-eight years ago the Bolshevik leader, Lenin, laid down the basic rules for terrorism: "The first objective is to kill individuals such as high officials and low-ranking members of the police and the army. The second objective is to confiscate money from the government as well as from private persons." On another occasion Lenin counseled: "****Assassinate a spy or blow up a police station*** attack a bank to expropriate funds for an insurrection. Let every squad learn, if only by beating up police."

Terrorist activities are not restricted to the less developed areas of the world. A bomb in London or Rome is just as fatal as a bomb in Saigon or Santiago de Cuba. In fact a lot more damage can be done in London than in Santiago and a lot more people may be killed.

The more materially developed a society is, the more vulnerable it is to terrorist attack. One has but to look about a modern city and he will see an abundance of potential targets. Aqueduct pumping stations and conduits, power stations and lines, telephone exchanges, post offices, airport control towers—all these form part of a city's nervous system.

Killings and kidnappings are forms of terrorism, and, because of the human elements involved, they receive the most publicity, but sabotage is also a form of terrorism. Its primary purpose is to cause material damage, but like the other forms of terrorism, it also is aimed at generating publicity for the terrorists.

One man can destroy a computer. One man can destroy a power generator and black out part of a city. One man can shoot down a plane. The capture of Palestinian guerrillas outside Rome who were planning to bring down a passenger plane with a rocket was an awesome and terrible indication of what terrorists with sophisticated equipment can accomplish.

As the communication, transportation, industrial, and innumerable other types of equipment of our times become more and more complex, they also become more and more susceptible to attack. Machines can be broken, and it often takes no more than a hammer to destroy a machine. Sugar poured into the gas tank of a car will stall that car, and sugar poured into a number of vehicles will jam a transportation system. Sand thrown into the grease box of a freight car will ruin the bearings, and the moving or removal of rails can derail a train. Electric lines can be cut, tacks can be thrown on highways, gasoline storage tanks can be set afire, bombs can be placed in airports and in radio and television stations. Ours is indeed a vulnerable society.

And what of the ultimate sophistication in terrorism, the little-mentioned but very real danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists? In March 1973 a guerrilla group seized temporary control of a nuclear station in Argentina. The incident was a clear warning of what may happen in the future.

More and more nations are achieving nuclear capabilities, more and more nuclear energy is being utilized for commercial purposes, more and more nuclear raw materials are being transported in this country and abroad. According to some estimates, within 25 years or so the annual production of plutonium in the United States will reach 600,000 pounds.

Plutonium is the essence of atomic bombs. Even of itself it is extremely dangerous: put a sufficient quantity, unshielded, on a roof top, and the lives of thousands of people would be endangered.

With the proper knowledge, and this is readily available in libraries, and the proper equipment, and this can be obtained too, and the proper raw materials, terrorists can build simple but devastating nuclear weapons. And even if a terrorist group of itself is unable to build an atomic bomb, let us not forget that there are nations which have actively aided terrorist bands and which might not stop at providing nuclear weapons. Raul Castro once stated, "It is my dream to drop three atomic bombs on New York."

Gentlemen, take heed. This is not science fiction. This is reality.

Combating terrorism, and better yet, preventing terrorism, is a whole new ball game. It requires new knowledge, new understanding, new concepts, and new skills. The traditional methods used to catch common criminals are not adequate to handle a terrorist situation. The criminal is out to make money; the terrorist is out to

destroy an entire social system. The terrorist is often young, well educated, from the middle class, and idealistically motivated—whether one agrees with the ideals is another matter.

The criminal picks his individual victim, whether it be a man to be robbed on a dark street or a bank from which funds are to be embezzled. For the terrorist, all of society is the victim, because the terrorist seeks to tear down the existing society and construct one more to his liking.

In combating the terrorist, therefore, authorities must realize they are engaged not only in a cops-and-robbers affair, but in an ideological struggle. It is on those terms that the battle must be fought, and it is on those terms that the battle can truly be won.

If there is widespread terrorism, there are social causes, and the state must recognize these and resolve them.

If there are isolated incidents of terrorism, the authorities must handle these so that small groups are not nurtured into large groups.

The authorities must understand the motivations and techniques of terrorists, and they must be able to cope with them without infringing on the civil rights of the general citizenry. Terrorism is the tyranny of fear. It must not be replaced with the tyranny of repression.

Gentlemen, I would suggest there are four broad areas in which the Federal Government can justifiably and fruitfully move to counteract the threat of political and criminal terrorism. Terrorism in this country has been, to date, largely sporadic. Nevertheless, it clearly does exist and there are signs it is growing in intensity, and if this country should go through a period of economic depression resulting in social unrest, terrorism may well increase to a significant degree.

I would suggest, therefore, that thought be given to the following:

One, vastly increased efforts by the Federal Government to acquaint State and local police forces with the nature of terrorism; how to try to prevent it; what to do about it when it occurs. I believe the logical organization for undertaking this task is the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice.

Two, establishment of a central information bureau. This would have no police powers. Its function would be to gather all obtainable information about terrorist groups and activities abroad as well as in the States. This information would be made available to all law enforcement agencies, Federal as well as State and local. In addition, this bureau would prepare pamphlets or booklets of instructions for private individuals and companies concerned that they might become the targets of terrorist activities.

Three, establishment of an independent entity which would be responsible for the security of all nuclear materials. This would include mining areas, manufacturing and power facilities; means of transportation, and finished products, except weapons actually in the hands of the Armed Forces. The agency would be in direct charge of security at all Federal facilities. It would supervise security at private installations. It would be in close contact with law enforce-

ment agencies, Federal as well as local, in order to be kept abreast of terrorist activities and possible threats to the Nation's nuclear systems.

Four, a greater effort to acquaint the military with the problem of terrorism. Terrorism is a form of unconventional warfare, and the military must be more familiar with it than I believe they are. The military in a number of countries, notably in Northern Ireland, Uruguay, and Argentina, have had to participate in efforts to quell terrorist movements. I don't believe American military need or will be called upon to undertake a similar effort in this country, but military installations and personnel are a favorite target of terrorists; military attachés are subject to attack, and it is conceivable that American forces operating abroad will at some time be faced with the problem of terrorism.

In a word, gentlemen, I think a great deal more effort must be given to minimizing the terrorist threat. It is a very real threat. This honorable committee recognizes the peril. In recognizing the danger you are already halfway toward thwarting it. I am certain that you will continue to do all possible, within constitutional limits, to enable this country to meet this danger.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mallin, for your statement and your appearance before the committee today. Certainly you have set forth in very frightening tones the potential dangers of terrorism and the vulnerability of our modern society to terrorism. I think you have posed the danger if there are to be increasing incidents in this country and abroad and we fail to take the necessary steps to control them, then we could very well experience, from waiting too late, and working under stress and strain, the tyranny of oppression that you talk about.

I think it is necessary that we get all the facts we can about terrorism and take those steps within our constitutional framework to see that it does not become so great that we overreact.

I have a number of questions I wish to direct to you but first I will recognize Mr. Zion.

Mr. Zion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mallin, your excellent background certainly qualifies you as an expert on the subject.

In your remarks you mentioned the Symbionese Liberation Army and said you quote, hesitate to call it a kidnaping, end quote. Why would you hesitate to call it a kidnaping?

Mr. MALLIN. Unless she is captured I think we will never know. But there have been doubts on this all along. For instance, I understand that one of her credit cards was sent to her parents. I find it difficult to believe she had a credit card in her nightgown when she was captured.

Second, well before she supposedly joined the group, one of the SLA tapes said she had been given a weapon to protect herself in case the FBI raided the headquarters.

Third, Patricia Hearst had a troubled background. She had a violent quarrel with her parents before the kidnaping and broke

with them. She came from the socioeconomic strata which, ironically, now produce a great number of terrorists: the twenties age-group, highly educated, well-to-do.

I think there was enough doubt in the beginning. Even then I wouldn't have said it was not a kidnaping. In view of subsequent events such as her participation in a bank robbery, however, I find it difficult to believe she was not a part of the SLA from the beginning. I mention the document in which a number of persons were listed. She was on the list: "Patricia Hearst, dark of the moon." I maintain she may have been initiated into the SLA in the "dark of the moon."

There are several psychologists and psychiatrists who claim she has been brainwashed. This is hokum. I witnessed brainwashing in 1959 in Cuba when an entire populace was subjected to it. I was there. You couldn't read a paper, see a movie, without being subjected to it. When you picked up your phone to dial a number, you got a political message before your call was sent through. There is nothing magical about brainwashing. Only those receptive to it can be affected.

I will point out a specific case. A number of black prisoners in Korea who were subjected to brainwashing pierced their eardrums rather than be subjected to it any further. Brainwashing is not a type of thing that can be carried out by groups like the SLA in such a short period of time.

All of this makes me doubt the authenticity of the kidnaping of Patricia Hearst.

The bank robbery—I can't imagine any terrorist band taking a kidnaped victim into a bank unless she is actually part of the group. Whether a gun is held on her or is not held on her, it is too tricky a situation. I don't buy that she was not a part of the band at that time.

Mr. ZION. You mention that frequently people who associate with subversive organizations come from the upper class.

Mr. MALLIN. Middle and upper classes.

Mr. ZION. In previous testimony we have had, it was stated that terrorists come from the middle class. Previous testimony and your own indicates most terrorists come from the middle class and certainly Patricia Hearst wouldn't have that as a background.

Mr. MALLIN. It is hard to pinpoint that specifically, but in Uruguay, for instance, which had the largest terrorist organization outside of Vietnam, 90 to 95 percent were college-educated young people from the upper economic class.

Mr. ZION. I believe you quoted a terrorist stating, "the headlines have shown that our cause is now clearly publicized." To what extent do you think coverage by the media excites or brings on terrorist activity?

Do you think the media might, in some respect, be responsible for it?

Mr. MALLIN. As a member of the media, I have to deny the media is responsible. A primary purpose of terrorism however, is publicity and propaganda and that is achieved through the media. The media

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