


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EXHIBIT No. 40

[Smith, Putman, and Mullany testimony 8/1/74]

LESSON PLANS PREPARED FOR

"THE URBAN GUERRILLA"

AND CIRCULATED BY

SAN QUENTIN INMATES

6 3453

## Exhibit No. 40--Continued

## LESSON PLAN ONE (1)

Agitation, planned or not, always precedes revolution. And revolution...as any reader will discover, is always the final chapter in the book of oppression. The French Revolution, The Russian Revolution, The American Revolution...were all preceded by a period of agitation. The Boston Tea Party was an excellent example of this. Agitation, to be effective, must serve at least two purposes (and hopefully more). 1. It must inflict pain, however slight, and not necessarily physical per se, upon the oppressor. 2. It must be made public, in order that others who wish to overthrow the status quo, will be able to read of your exploits, and know that they are neither alone nor isolated in their actions. The rebellions of the inner-cities (Watts, Chicago, Newark, Detroit), were all forms of agitation...and although most brothers were not politically aware then as they are now, the actions served the two purposes listed above, plus many others. The power structure was frightened as never before...by a group of "Ee-Slaves." The myth of non-violence has died for all time.

## POLITICAL ASSASSINATION

Assassination, contrary to popular thought, is not a new thing in the war against oppression. Important political figures have lost their heads all through history, in order that wars be started. World War I; The Holy Crusades; The Warsaw Uprisings (although a portion of WW II), were all kicked off by means of political assassination. The most immediate assassination which we should concern ourselves with, is the destruction of police officers...or insuring great bodily harm, to as many of them as possible. While this often exposes the revolutionists to immediate retaliation, the effects of such an act are glorious beyond words, in terms of positive agitation. The police officer is the establishments first line of defence, and therefore, any pressure placed upon him, is immediately felt in the highest of quarters. As witness the latest method of political assassination in the streets of several of the cities in the country...quiet, unobtrusive killers are loose.

## EXHIBIT NO. 40--Continued

Washington has become aware of a new brand of fighter in her midst...one that she had hoped to never see in America. The 'GUERRILLA' has arrived. It is impossible to stop the guerilla, and just as impossible to take adequate precautions against him. His operating efficiency and his striking power is 100%, for he need not announce his targets, nor his expected time of arrival. When police officers have no pressure upon them, they are free to plunder, murder, rape, and commit mayhem at will. When they are under continuous pressure, they concern themselves with completing their tour of duty, and getting home safely. The most effective form of pressure to place upon a policeman or his department, is to insure that at least one a week is either killed, or suffers great bodily harm. In large cities, the most effective of guerillas will only be able to operate for three or four weeks at best...until the police department puts unbearable pressure upon the neighborhood. At such a time...he goes underground, and leaves the State for two or three months if at all possible. If his actions get sufficient press coverage, then guerillas in other cities will get the message...and begin to duplicate those actions in their own places of oppression. 'Any man worth shooting...is worth killing.' This is the first lesson that a rookie police officer is taught at police school. It must be also, the first lesson of guerilla assassination tactics. Police are like all other men in one respect. They feel that death by the gun...will always happen to somebody else, and thus, they tend to be extremely careless. Careful observation of any patrol vehicle, will offer many opportunities to assassinate its occupant. For obvious reasons, two-man patrol vehicles should be avoided. Such a strike should be as well planned as possible...and the method by which you are to make you exit from the scene...gone over two or three times. Too much caution is like too much freedom...there can never be enough of both. If there is little chance for success, then the whole strike-plan should be discarded...unless the strike is of sufficient importance to make apprehension secondary. Only the most politically aware of you will be able to assess a situation as being of great importance...and only the most dedicated of you will risk your freedom (and possibly your life), to achieve a successful strike. Unless death be certain, a strike should never be attempted while the officer sits in his patrol vehicle. An emergency radio-call, could blanket the entire neighborhood within a matter of minutes.

## EXHIBIT No. 40--Continued

This is especially true in large cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco...but not necessarily true of cities such as Denver, Detroit, Cleveland, and Seattle. The more deserted the area, the more favorable the strike. Keep in mind the do-good citizen who will break his or her neck to get to a telephone, in an effort to get you busted if they witness the crime. America is basically a land of snitches, and no plot against the establishment could be solved without their help. If it is not possible to strike in a deserted area, it might be wise to tie up the lines of police-headquarters during the actual strike. This is a very easy situation to bring about, without really divulging the actual plans of your strike. Let us assume that your strike has been planned for 2' in the afternoon, and you've gone over all plans related to those plans. At one o'clock... (or an hour before the actual strike), you get three of your comrades to phone the number of the main police headquarters. (I have in mind smaller cities like San Jose, Oakland, and Santa Monica. Bigger cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York should have eight to ten men making the phone calls). The calls should be made from public phone booth, and no fingerprints should be left. When the phone is answered at headquarters, the man in the phone booth simply lets the receiver hang. Even when headquarters hangs up it's phone, it will be useless as long as the phone in the phone booth is still dangling. The men who take the calls in the booth, should be instructed to make them about one-minute before your strike (in this case 1:55 P.M.). They will have no idea of your plan, and you will have effectively blocked all in-coming calls to the main switch-board. Such a tie-up can only be eliminated with the help of the telephone company (which would take about ten minutes), or with the hanging up of the receivers in the phone booths. By this time, your strike plan should have been completed, and your exit effected. Such assassination need not be confined to police officers, but will have an even greater affect upon District Attorneys, Court Baliffs, Judges (as witness the Marin shoot-out), Federal Attorneys, and Federal police officers (F.B.I.; Secret Service; Federal Narcotics agents; Treasury Agents; etc.) The Federal myth-makers have made it difficult for one to attempt assassination of a Federal officer...but keep in mind, it is a myth, and no more. If you are ever convicted of killing a police officer in California, you will definately be awarded the death penalty. Should you be convicted of killing a Federal Agent in any state...the most you can get is a life term. In this respect, it is far better to kill a Federal Agent than a police officer. The Federal agencies have many technical and scientific methods by which they attempt to bring an offender to trial. Sherlock Holmes and Batman do

## EXHIBIT No. 40--Continued

not exist! There is no such thing as the 'SUPER MONKEY of LAW ENFORCEMENT'. Apprehension after a strike, is totally dependant upon how many mistakes you made during that strike. The less mistakes you have made...the more difficult the apprehension. Should you make no mistakes...then all the elaborate equipment in Washington cannot apprehend you. The greatest help to law enforcement peoples in trying to solve a homicide, is MOTIVE. In political assassination, there is no motive, and thus, law enforcement is at an impasse from the very beginning. Comes now however, the very real need for SECRECY...for the Federal Authorities will spend fabulous sums of money, to obtain the identity of a political assassin. Failing this, they will disregard the 'Bill of Rights', and unleash a reign of terror on Black neighborhoods. This is good from a double view. First, it will enrage many Black Bourgeoisie, and second, it will show that the beast is frustrated, and striking back in blind anger. He is then more vulnerable, to more effective attack. With no pressure, the beast ACTS...when his life is in danger...he REACTS, oftentimes, foolishly. Federal Agents are quite easy to set up. Normally a 'Hot Tip', will bring them out of their office on the double. (A phone call to the F.B.I. concerning a big bank robbery; a call to the Secret Service concerning a counterfeiting operation; a call to the Federal Marco Dicks about the location of a stash pad; etc). Normally there will be two Agents answering such a call, so disposal plans should allow for this slight deviation. Prison guards too will offer a good target once a man is outside, and can operate in true Guerilla fashion. One should be extremely careful while preparing this type of strike...for 'ex-cons' will of course, be the number one suspects once the investigators enter the case. By following the autos of certain guards at the end of a prison's shift...one will be able to determine where that particular guard lives...or where he bowls...or where he takes his after work drink. Recent parolees should always have an air-tight alibi before indulging in this particular strike...or he should not participate in the actual strike itself. The death of a law enforcement officer need not be one who is on duty...for a pig is a pig...in uniform or out. It would be much easier to set up an off-duty policeman, then it would be for one who is currently on duty. An objective of political assassination should be to keep a constant pressure on the adversary. Consistant adversity breaks morale, and no organization can long operate without effective morale. ONLY when we realize that the victims of our political assassination are not the primary cause of our oppression, will we be able to move with the coldness so

## EXHIBIT NO. 40--Continued

necessary for freedom. Political assassination (or any other type of agitation) should be viewed as a job to be performed, and no more. It is not necessary to hate your victim...and is indeed, better that you don't. Hate clouds the thinking process, and is liable to cause an other wise cautious man, to make foolish mistakes. Mistakes, my brothers...cannot be tolerated, in guerilla warfare. Hate and anger should be avoided at all cost.

The man who approaches a policeman with a smile on his face, and in an obviously friendly mood (as witness the daring brother who took the head of the Japanese Pig in Berkeley), has a far better chance of succeeding than the brother who walks up to the policeman with a look of scorn, hate, and anger upon his face. A Brooks Brothers suit, and a Stetson hat will open doors that are forever closed to a Black leather jacket, and a Black Beret.

The assassin should know by heart, the Ten Commandments of Assassination.

1. Thy plans should be formulated and discussed with only those who will participate in their execution.
2. Thy plans should be as complete and error free prior to the strike hour.
3. One escape route, and one alternate route should be planned and actually gone through if possible, prior to the strike.
4. The weapon used or planned, should be traceable to no one.
5. After the strike, the weapon shall be discarded at once. One must not be caught with the weapon in his possession.
6. A glove should be worn, to minimize the chance of leaving fingerprints.
7. Autos should be rented (with stolen I.D.), or stolen. Care must be used in leaving no fingerprints or clues in it's interior.

## EXHIBIT NO. 40--Continued

8. Thy mind should be free of all drugs, and drink before the actual strike goes down.
9. An effort should be made to establish an alibi on the other side of town immediately after the act.
10. Once the act is complete, it is best forgotten. It should not even be discussed with those who participated in it.

## LESSON PLAN TWO (2)

## (POLITICAL BOMBING)

Bombing has become the vogue of the White radical, and is quickly being adopted by the Black guerilla. How effective is bombing to the cause of revolution? He might get a good answer to that question, by realizing that the State of California has just passed a law, making the death penalty mandatory for anyone convicted...where great bodily harm has resulted (NOT DEATH), from the explosion of a bomb. While a bomb is capable of causing great bodily harm, this is the least of the power structures concern. In fact, the power structure could care less than a damn, about the number of people who are killed or maimed in a bombing attack. Their concern my brothers, is centered around two facts only: The amount of property damaged in the explosion...and the amount of fear which the bomb causes in the general populace. The land-owning class will not support an administration which cannot seem to crack down on bombers, and the fear of the general population will often result in wide-spread panic and distrust of the powers that be. Both climates are desirable to revolution. Like the assassin, the dedicated bomber, cannot be stopped. Precaution can be taken against his effectiveness...but it will only serve to make him more cunning. The dedicated bomber will go to any lengths to achieve his objective (as witness the Viet Minh in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, who strapped high explosives to their bodies, then surrendered to the French. At a desirable moment, the 'Prisoner' would detonate the explosive charge, thus, doing his thing for freedom). Political bombing is also harmful to the economy...in that certain targets can affect the transactions of the stock market (N.Y. Stock Exchange; Midwest Exchange; Pacific Coast Exchange; and the Dow Jones Exchange). Intensive political bombing has not yet reached it's apex...but such a point is swiftly coming upon us. The news media is trying it's best to play such activity down, but still, certain tid-bits reach the public.

## EXHIBIT NO. 40-Continued

It is obvious that such news would be dangerous in the public domain, and therefore (probably on orders from those two homosexuals who run the country from Washington), it is suppressed as much as possible. Political bombing is unlike assassination in that there is no plan to kill a specific person...although, no consideration is given to persons who might inhabit the building at the time the blast takes place. Those who would plant a bomb and then notify the police that such a bomb exists, strikes me as being some kind of knick-knack. While death is not the primary object of bombing...it should not be considered as a detriment to revolution. The primary object of bombing, should be the complete destruction of a building. Secondary objectives should include financial damage, and fear to the general population. If the blast is at all effective, the primary and the secondary objectives will have been obtained. To bomb a building for other than these purposes, is not an act of revolution. Killing a large group of people however, can also be effected with the use of a bomb. In this instance, while a building is not the primary cause of the action (but may be included), the act will perform the function of the secondary objective above...only now, it becomes the primary objective: The instilling of fear in the general population. Many large corporate buildings in New York are fitted with elaborate security systems, and electronic eyes to detect bombing devices. NO BUILDING IS IMMUNE TO THE BOMBER. The bomber spends twenty-six hours a day, nine days a week to perfect his trade. No amount of "EXPERTS" working a forty hour week can match his genius. The targets which the dedicated bomber has to select from is endless...and covers every institution in the country. No matter how high a building has been built, an adequate amount of dynamite can bring it tumbling down to earth. Those who engage in this highly specialized field, normally have their own rules by which they operate. It is of course mandatory that one know his target area as much as possible. This is no problem, for in most instances, it will be a public building. Once the target has been selected and checked out thoroughly, you'll have the spot picked where the device can do the most damage. That spot should be one that is easily accessible to you, at the hour you wish to leave the device. Greatest attention should be given to the length of time you allow for your exit. Night-time blasts will have little human death and injury, while day-time blasts will have possibly, a great deal of both. The primary objective of the operator should determine the time the device will be exploded. Bombing, is of course, the most ruthless form of agitation...in that it assigns a great number of people to death. The founders of America were no less ruthless in their securing of the land, upon which this country

## EXHIBIT NO. 40-Continued

is founded. The heart of the revolutionists, is not the residence of compassion. Good-will toward ones fellow man, is completely alien to the revolutionists...and so it must be. Freedom is obtained, only by means of violence. Politicians sitting in session, cannot give freedom...they can only make a mockery of it. The bomber must be aware of these things at all times of his actions. Weakness of the mind must be to him...as non-existent as fear to the assassin. Knowledge and complete confidence of his explosive devices, must be paramount.

## LESSON PLAN THREE (3)

## POLITICAL KIDNAPPING

KIDNAP DEFINED: To carry 'ANYONE' away by unlawful force or fraud, and against his (or her) will, or to seize and detain him for the purpose of so carrying him away

Kidnapping has burst upon the international third world scene, and is as important to the release of political prisoners...as their incarceration is to the oppressor. Political prisoners in the United States today are numerous, and nothing short of this tactic will suffice to effect their release. Analytic observation of the tactics utilized by our brothers in the third world, gives to us those portions of kidnap, which are most necessary to assure success. Among our advantages, is the ever increasing need of America to 'Save Face', in the grand councils of international power. This takes on even greater significance, when the kidnap victim is the representative of a foreign government. Much thought should be given to the selection of a kidnap victim. First, he must be of sufficient importance to guarantee immediate indignation over his abduction. Naturally one of such importance will be protected by bodyguards at his every move. Death or injury to the bodyguards is of course, optional, but utmost care should be given to the well health of the primary victim. Upon his well being depends the success or failure of the entire objective. In certain cases, death to the bodyguards (and anyone else at the abduction scene) adds the necessary element of sincerity to the demands delivered by the abductors. An excellent example of this was the abduction of the West German Ambassador to Brazil in June 1970. His guard was slain at the scene. Upon demand, Brazil released forth (40) political prisoners, and flew them to freedom in the capital city of Algeria.

## EXHIBIT No. 40-Continued

Harm to the victim should not be entertained until it has become obvious that demands for his safety will not be met. At such a time, he should be executed at once. His face should be disfigured by small arms fire and pictures of the result sent to the newspapers and television studios across the country. His death should serve to alert the population of what they can expect if demands are not met for any other victim captured in the future among the many mistakes made by the Tupamaros (Uruguayan guerillas), is their failure to execute all three of their hostages when officials refused their demands. This delay allowed the government to seek dictatorial powers, on the sole promise of searching for the two remaining captives. This condition should never have been allowed.

Equal concern should be given to the approach, the actual abduction, the exit, and the quarters which are to serve as the place of detention. In August 1968, the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala was slain trying to escape capture. Obviously, he saw such an opportunity. Unfortunately for him, such an opportunity did not exist. This incident reflects on the abductors' approach planning. Had it been thorough (the planning), it is doubtful that the Ambassador would have attempted such a foolish move. Another example of faulty planning was the aborted affair of April 1970, when the U.S. Consul General in Porto Alegre (Brazil) managed to escape capture by driving through a road block. His injury was a simple wound in the shoulder. This shows one that the approach planning must be the sum total of much thought. No holes should exist in the approach. There should be not the slightest possible chance of escape, once the kidnapers move in...and should the victim attempt escape in spite of the odds against him then there should be not the slightest possible chance of survival for him.

The exit should be made as soon as the victim has been properly subdued. It may be necessary for elements of the guerilla group to remain behind in order to provide cover for the actual get-away car, but this should present no undue strain on the exit plans. The quarters which are to serve as the place of detention, should be selected for the degree of privacy it provides, and for the easy entry and exit it unobtrusively affords. Shooting tires out on automobiles, generally creates sufficient chaos to enable one to reach the designated place of detention with a minimal amount of trouble. Tying up police phone lines might also be desirable prior to the actual abduction (see Assassination). When proper thought has been applied to the stages mentioned above, then the results should be no less than the

## EXHIBIT No. 40-Continued

incidents of September 1969 (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil kidnapped. Fifteen (15) guerillas released from Rio and flown to Mexico); March 1970 (Japanese Consul General kidnapped from Sao Paulo. Five guerillas released and flown to Mexico); and later in March 1970 (U.S. Air Attache kidnapped and successfully ransomed for twenty guerillas).

Kidnapping for the purpose of assassination (such as the abduction of General Pedro Aramburu of Argentina. This was merely an act of revenge by the guerillas against a mad-dog) should not be engaged in. In such a case, it would be more efficient to simply eliminate the party in question. Preference for hostages should be male (unless a female of sufficient stature is available), middle-aged or elderly, a foreign diplomat serving in America, and of sufficient importance to arouse international concern by being abducted. The victim must be of worth, in order that the demands made by the guerillas be seriously considered. The Tupamaros made a decisive error in asking the release of 158 dedicated guerillas for the lives of three class 'E' (for expendable) foreign employees. Such employees are a dime a dozen to any government, and hardly worth the effort it normally takes to abduct them.

The theory behind political kidnapping, is to place such intense pressure on the host country, that politically no alternative exists, except to negotiate with the abductors. Had the Americans deemed necessary, they could have applied tremendous pressure on the Uruguayan government to negotiate the exchange of the three abducted men. It was swiftly decided however, that the men were class 'E'.

When the hostage is important enough, no price is too high to pay. It is within reason to assume, that one who could mastermind the abduction of the Soviet Ambassador to the United States (a most formidable task), could successfully demand the release of America's top political prisoners. Nixon would give up his wife to prevent death or injury to such a person. International pressure, as well as the need to preserve prestige would force America to negotiate at once.

Ambassadors are the highest ranking foreign representatives which are permanently assigned to a country. Being so, they are highly desirable as hostages when negotiating for the release of political prisoners. After the Ambassador comes the First Secretary, the Second Secretary, the Military Attaches, and the numerous Consuls General. An obvious advantage of concentrating on the latter, is the fact that they are to be found in most major cities. Thus, access to them would be much less difficult than it would be to an Ambassador who is assigned to and resides in security-minded Washington. With any of the above as hostages

## EXHIBIT NO. 40-Continued

however, most any reasonable demand would be met. In selecting hostages, United Nations Representatives should be overlooked (with the exception of the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.). Most third world Governments are members of the U.N. and should not be offended.

Soviet diplomats, while tolerant of guerilla warfare, in most countries, and supportive of most third world countries, should be placed in a position to be immune from kidnapping in America. After much thought and consultation however, after much study of the Jungarian students uprising (which was brutally crushed by the Soviet Government), after studying the Czechoslovakian student rebellions, (which were also crushed by Soviet might), it has been decided that the Soviets are playing the game for political advantage. Such a game of necessity, calls for certain risks to be taken.

In presenting demands for the release of political prisoners it is essential that you designate the place they are to be flown to. Mexico, while being an ideal spot for the release of South American prisoners, would be less than desirable for U.S.A. prisoners, because of the economic ties between the two countries. Cuba, Algeria, U.A.R., No. Viet Nam, No. Korea, China, and possibly Sweden would be sufficient to serve the purpose.

If it becomes necessary to by-pass foreign diplomats for one reason or another, then domestic persons of sufficient reputation should be considered. In this group may be included: U.S. Senators (those conservatives who are in the public spotlight are most valuable), U.S. Representatives (same as above), top military officers (Lt. Generals and Vice-Admirals being the lowest rank one should consider), Members of the President's Cabinet (the heads of State, Defence, and Attorney General being the most desirable), the American Ambassador to the U.N., no other U.N. Ambassadors should be taken, unless it be the So. African Rep., Presidential Advisors, Members of the High Court (Mr. Justice Douglas to be given immunity) and (in the State where the particular prisoner is being held): Members of the State Senate and House (same qualifications as above for U.S. Members of Congress), Members of the State Supreme Court, the Lt. Governor (the Governor being easier to assassinate than to abduct), the State Attorney General, the State National Guard Commander, the Director of Public Safety (or the Dir. of Prisons), the senior officer of the Highway Patrol, the Police Chiefs of the State's major cities, the Sheriffs of the State's major counties

## EXHIBIT NO. 41

[Smith, Putman, and Mullany testimony 8/1/74]

PLATFORM  
OF THE  
VENEREMOS  
ORGANIZATION

APPENDIX  
THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION  
(a draft proposal)

As Communist revolutionaries, we recognize that the present contradictions of our society must be resolved by the dictatorship of the proletariat. We also recognize that this can only be achieved through armed struggle led by a democratic centralist organization guided by Marxist-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought. But our approach to all these questions has been one-sided in that it has consistently excluded the military aspect. We have seen that the United Front against Imperialism is the strategy for proletarian revolution as well as the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and we have shown the basis of the United Front in the five existing spearheads of anti-imperialist struggle. But we have acted as though this United Front was independent of the actual conditions and forms of armed struggle. In other words, we have developed our objective conditions. We have developed our theory and practice of "geocratic centralism." But we have not approached the question of organizational forms as if it made no difference that the revolutionary party in the U.S. will emerge during a period of developing fascism and armed struggle. We have in general tended to act as though the extensive military theory of Marx, Lenin, Engels, Stalin, and Mao were not an intrinsic part of the science of Marxism-Leninism but was some kind of added bonus we could pick up at the right time. This paper is an attempt to begin to develop a Marxist-Leninist understanding of armed struggle in the American revolution and what that means for our tasks.

Today the revolutionary peoples of the entire world surround and batter the monster of U.S. imperialism from every side. Trapped in the storms of people's war abroad the ruling class faces utter chaos at home. The ferocious bellicosity of U.S. imperialism comes from the agony of its death-bed struggle.

Yet we must not fool ourselves. Though the ruling class is doomed, it is still very powerful tactically. The consciously revolutionary forces at home are still small and very weak, particularly in the very, organization, and the material ability to wage even defensive fights. Lashing out in its final throes, imperialism turns its genocide abroad fascism at home.

(This lengthy thesis, which advocates urban guerrilla warfare, was put out in the Fall of 1970 by James Franklin, a leader of the pro-Chinese Communist, Marxist-Leninist, Revolutionary Union. This group, however, advocated attacks against the "establishment" only when "the time is right." After much disagreement within the Union over Franklin's proposals, he and about 125 followers left to form the "Postwarrior Organization in December, 1970.")

## EXHIBIT No. 40--Continued

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## EXHIBIT No. 41

[Smith, Putman, and Mullany testimony 8/1/74]

## APPENDIX

THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION  
PROTRACTED URBAN WAR  
(a draft proposal)

PLATFORM  
OF THE  
VENCEREMOS  
ORGANIZATION

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As Communist revolutionaries, we recognize that the present contradictions of our society must be resolved by the dictatorship of the proletariat. We also recognize that this can only be achieved through armed struggle led by a democratic centralist organization guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung Thought. But our approach to all these questions has been one-sided in that it has consistently excluded the military aspect. We have seen that the United Front against Imperialism is the strategy for proletarian revolution as well as the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and we have shown the basis of the United Front in the five existing spearheads of anti-imperialist struggle. But we have acted as though this United Front existed independently of the actual conditions and forms of armed struggle, neither influencing nor being influenced by these objective conditions. We have worked hard on developing our theory and practice of democratic centralism. But again we have approached the question of organizational forms as if it made no difference that the revolutionary party in the U.S. will emerge during a period of developing fascism and armed struggle. We have in general tended to act as though the extensive military theory of Marx, Lenin, Engels, Stalin, and Mao were not an intrinsic part of the science of Marxism-Leninism but was some kind of added bonus we could pick up at the right time. This paper is an attempt to begin to develop a Marxist-Leninist understanding of armed struggle in the American revolution and what that means for our tasks.

Today the revolutionary peoples of the entire world surround and batter the monster of U.S. imperialism from every side. Trapped in the storms of people's war abroad the ruling class faces utter chaos at home. The ferocious howlings of U.S. imperialism come from the agony of its death-bed struggle.

Yet we must not fool ourselves. Though the ruling class is doomed, it is still very powerful tactically. The consciously revolutionary forces at home are still small and very weak, particularly in theory, organization, and the material ability to wage even defensive fights. Lashing out in its final throes, imperialism turns to genocide abroad fascism at home.



At this historical moment, a revolutionary organization must develop the Marxist-Leninist strategy that the revolutionary masses need in order to win. It would be criminal to present ourselves as organizers and leaders unless we have this strategy. And the masses know this. They reject idealists as dangerous dreamers. Workers do not need to be convinced that the workers should rule the country. They want to know if this is possible, and, if so, how it could actually come about.

On the other hand, the correct Marxist-Leninist Strategy for proletarian revolution is not some hypothetical plan concocted in the privacy of a scholar's library or by a gang of conspirators in a smoke-filled hideaway. Like all correct ideas, it emerges from the efforts of the masses themselves to change social reality. The possible forms of revolutionary armed struggle in any particular time and place are determined by the actual material conditions, the development of the primary and secondary contradictions, the current levels and forms of struggle, and—key to all—how the revolutionary masses are developing consciousness of all these factors. The winning strategy in one situation may be suicide in another, and no strategy can be successful unless the masses can understand and apply it.

#### PROTRACTED WAR OR QUICK VICTORY?

Throughout history revolutionary wars have been struggles of great duration—protracted wars. The specific forms of each struggle have varied according to the relationship of class forces in each particular period of history, and according to differences in national conditions, but in each and every case the struggle was lengthy, covering years, decades, and in some cases even entire generations. Moreover, revolutionary war is protracted whether the main military struggle takes place before or after the seizure of state power. Revolutionary war is protracted because the ruling class has a deeply developed economic and cultural base as well as a monopoly on the development and use of the "legitimate" tools of force: the courts, the prisons, the police, and the armed forces. Combatting the ruling class, which is armed to the teeth, always takes time, and for a long period the revolutionary forces are always relatively weak in relation to the ruling class.

Revolutionary war in this country will also be protracted. Indeed, it already is. The ruling class is still relatively strong and the revolutionary forces are now and will be for some time relatively weak. But historically, it is the imperialists who are weak and the revolutionary masses who are strong. As imperialism is battered by national liberation struggles at home and abroad, its internal contradictions increase from day to day, moving inevitably toward the moment when the masses recognize

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this stage is to initiate attacks against the ruling class, while preserving and developing the revolutionary forces. Guerilla warfare is primarily a war of attrition, in which a relatively weaker force is able to mobilize and grow over time, moving to a position of strength. The power of guerilla warfare lies in its dialectical character; far from being the "mystical invention" of some bourgeois strategist, it wholly conforms to the dialectical development of class struggle. It develops unevenly but moves inevitably from low levels to higher levels of warfare.

The revolutionary struggle in the U.S. will certainly be waged primarily in the cities. Unlike other people's wars, which inspire and teach us, ours will be fought in the urban areas. The importance of rural areas in other countries was that the majority of the oppressed and therefore revolutionary population of these countries were mostly peasants (small farmers) and rural proletariat. Therefore, since these were people's struggles, in order to rely on the masses the war had to be essentially rural in character, using the countryside to surround the seat of reactionary power, the cities. In the U.S., the revolutionary masses work and live for the most part in urban areas. Our revolutionary countryside lies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But our own revolutionary forces are based in the cities.

In order to understand how protracted war, or for that matter armed revolution, is possible in the U.S., we have to understand the special role of urban guerilla warfare. First we should understand how urban guerilla warfare has developed historically.

Capitalism developed in the cities and developed two new military tools to secure power: guns and the modern army. Arabs brought gunpowder to Western Europe at the beginning of the 14th century, and soon guns were invented, just as the merchants in the towns began piling up capital. Ever since the time that the first capitalists used guns to get political power from the feudal lords, it has been true that "All political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The feudal lords ruled the countryside, surrounded by stone walls in their castles. The bourgeoisie ("bourgeoisie" originally meant people who lived in a town) didn't have stone walls and huge tracts of land. What they did have was lots of money, and with that money they could hire workers to produce guns and gunpowder and unemployed people to fight for them. The first modern armies appeared in Italy in the 15th century. The stone walls and castles of the feudal lords fell in the face of manufactured cannons and hired armies.

From this time forward, the armies of the capitalists are mercenaries and conscripts. That is, they are either paid to fight or forced to fight. This was how modern army discipline became developed. Because severe discipline is necessary in order to hold a capitalist army together, strategy has to be built on this. Here was an army equipped with lethal weapons and

that the fundamental contradiction is that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Already the level of class struggle, in all its forms, has become more intense than anything seen at least since the 1930's. From a position of weakness the revolutionary forces are moving toward a position of strength.

But even the real and potential strength of the revolutionary forces can not change the fact that U.S. imperialism is a ferocious enemy. We stand face to face with the most dangerous ruling class in all of human history. It already has shown its willingness to use genocide against people's wars abroad and at home to combine general political repression with selective massacres. Every day the imperialists show their preparation for fascism, which will become more brazen and more vicious as resistance and revolutionary struggle increase. Again and again the ruling class will try to liquidate the revolutionary forces, which will be able to survive and grow only if they can meet counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence. To defeat this enemy we must prepare in every way for a long drawn-out struggle, a struggle that will have to overcome the sum total force that this most powerful ruling class in the history of the world is able to bring to bear.

A historical understanding of revolutionary war as a protracted struggle must be transformed into a practical strategy to defeat the dual errors of adventurism and social pacifism. Adventurism comes in many forms, but in essence it approaches revolutionary war from the point of view of single decisive actions, battles, or campaigns. While adventurism can be a destructive tendency, far more dangerous is social pacifism, which preaches the present invincibility of the ruling class, shuns armed struggle, and spreads defeatism. The most insidious form of social pacifism agrees to armed struggle in principle but puts it off to some distant time in the future. RED PAPERS 2 correctly points out: "To build the mass movement against fascism without preparing for offensive, illegal actions, is to lead the masses into an ambush." A strategic application of protracted war recognizes that only through armed struggle can the masses liberate themselves, but at the same time sees this armed struggle not in terms of glorious campaigns and actions but as the sum total of a war of attrition conducted by the masses against the ruling class.

#### URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Historically, the first stage of protracted revolutionary war has been guerilla warfare. This occurs within the period of strategic defensive, while the revolutionary forces are relatively weak and the reactionary forces relatively strong. The goal of

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fighting against its will. How could they go into combat? For three centuries the answer was: in a straight line. (Those of us who have been in the military understand how serious it still is "to get out of line.") The entire mass of infantry had to move all at once, could only move on absolutely level ground, and once locked in combat either won or lost almost at a single blow. The first American revolution changed much of this. The rebels were fighting for their own interests, and they didn't fight fair. They moved and fought in small groups. The line was powerless, faced with an invisible enemy melting away into the forests and into the masses of the people. From this point on, guerilla warfare has become increasingly important.

In the French Revolution, and even more in the proletarian revolutions of 1848 guerilla warfare moved into the cities. Early 19th century cities were overgrown medieval cities, filled with mazes of narrow streets and alleys. So barricade and street fighting was quite effective for the workers and their allies. But as the bourgeoisie consolidated its own power, they leveled the existing workers' quarters in the central cities and built in their place broad, long, straight thoroughfares which could be commanded by the artillery and machine-guns developed in the 1880's and mass produced in their factories. The armies of the state now had almost insurmountable physical advantages over the revolutionary urban proletariat. This, together with the ability of the bourgeoisie to rally urban petty bourgeoisie, led Engels to conclude that "rebellion in the old style, the street fight with barricades, ... was to a considerable extent obsolete."

The 1905 Russian revolution changed all this, as Lenin pointed out in "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising." Lenin drew several lessons from the spontaneous actions of the masses, including "As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory." First of all, "the general strike, as an independent and predominant form of struggle, is out of date." Second:

It is not enough to take sides on the question of an armed uprising. Those who are opposed to it, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly dismissed from the ranks of the supporters of the revolution, sent packing to its enemies, to the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and the conditions of the struggle will compel us to distinguish between enemies and friends according to this principle.

And then the specific conclusion. Lenin saw that "it is high time now...to review Engels' conclusions" because new class relations and new military factors had created "new barricade tactics".

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These tactics are the tactics of guerilla warfare. The organization required for such tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three or even two persons. We often meet Social-Democrats now who scoff whenever units of five or three are mentioned. But scoffing is only a cheap way of ignoring the new question of tactics and organization raised by street fighting under the conditions imposed by modern military technique.

Lenin's other writings during this period begin to develop the Marxist-Leninist theory of urban guerilla warfare and point out many practical aspects for revolutionaries. Hopefully the following quotations will lead to intensive study:

However much you may turn up your noses, gentlemen, at the question of night attacks and similar purely tactical military questions, however much you may pull wry faces about the "plan" of assigning secretaries of organizations, or their members in general, to stand on duty to provide for any military emergency--life does its own way, revolution teaches, taking in hand and shaking up the most inveterate pedants... The stationing of patrols and the balloting of squads are all purely military functions; they are all initial operations of a revolutionary organization; they are all initial operations of an insurrection, the army and constitute the organization of an insurrection, the organization of revolutionary rule, which matures and becomes stronger through these small preparations, through these minor clashes, testing its own strength, learning to fight, training itself for victory... ("The Black Hundreds and the Organization of an Uprising")... military operation together with the people are now commencing. It is by engaging in such operations that the pioneers of armed struggle become fused with the masses not merely in word but in deed... ("From the Defensive to the Offensive")

It horrifies me--I give you my word--it horrifies me to find that there has been talk about bombs for over six months, yet not one has been made." And it is the most learned of people who are doing the talking--Go to the youth, gentlemen... Form fighting squads at once everywhere, among the students, and especially among the workers, etc., etc. Let them arm themselves at once as best they can, be it with a revolver, a knife, a rag soaked in kerosene for starting fires, etc... Do not make membership in the R.S.D.L.P. an absolute condition--that would be an absurd demand for an armed uprising. Do not refuse to contact any group, even if it consists of only three persons; make it one sole condition that it should be reliable as far as police spying is concerned and prepared to fight the tsar's groups.

The propagandists must supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs, give them an elementary explanation of the type of the work, and then leave it all to them. Squads must at once begin military training by launching operations immediately, at once. Some say at once undertake to

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in the cities of the U.S. between the summer of 1964 and the spring of 1968. Why this is true, despite the fact that the Russian proletariat was only 12 years away from victorious revolution, we shall examine in more detail later. But one factor was the physical nature of those Russian cities compared to that of our own cities today.

The neatly laid out central cities of late 19th century Europe could not accommodate the waves of people swept from the land into the factories. By the middle of the 20th century, European cities were once again beginning to provide some advantages for proletarian and anti-fascist forces. This made possible the urban guerilla fighting in Madrid, the seven-month defense of the Warsaw ghetto, and the steadily growing underground resistance in Paris and other French cities, which probably could have liberated France in a year or two without the Anglo-American invasion. Most major American cities in the last third of the 20th century provide much greater physical advantages for the revolutionary forces.

An important counter-insurgency theorist for the enemy, Colonel Rex Applegate, argues that urban jungles are far more difficult terrain for their forces than any tropical rainforest or mountainous region. Jungles or even mountains are essentially two dimensional, and are subject to saturation bombing with napalm, phosphorous, and explosives. But cities like New York or Chicago, with their high-rise apartments and multi-layered underground systems, are three-dimensional jungles. Furthermore, rural guerillas can never be completely integrated with large masses of people, because the rural population itself is spread out in small villages and farms. The urban guerilla, on the other hand, swims in a real ocean of the people.

We see both advantages operating in the recent successful ambush of two pigs in Chicago. The guerillas fired from a huge high-rise apartment complex, and were even able to prevent three attempts by massed pigs to recover the bodies of their fallen fellow citizens. The enemy had no idea exactly where the fire was coming from. They did not have the option of returning massive fire, because to do so would have further revolutionized the thousands of people in the apartment complex, not to mention the effects on the city, the nation, even the world. Even in searching for the guerillas, the pigs had to kick in literally hundreds of doors.

No other society in history has been so overwhelmingly urbanized. The industrialization of agriculture has poured the population of the countryside in wave after wave into the cities.

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kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank to confiscate funds for the insurrection... But the essential thing is to begin at once to learn from actual practice; have no fear of these trial attacks. They say, of course, degenerate into extremes, but that is an evil of tomorrow, whereas the evil today is our inertness, our doctrinaire spirit, our learned immobility, and senile fear of initiative. Let every group learn, if it is only by beating up policemen: a score or so victims will be more than compensated for by the fact that this will train hundreds of experienced fighters, who tomorrow will be leading hundreds of thousands.

("To the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee")

The contingents may be of any strength, beginning with two or three people.

They must arm themselves as best they can (rifles, revolvers, bombs, knives, knuckle-dusters, sticks, rags soaked in kerosene for starting fires...) Under no circumstances should they wait for help from other sources, from above, from the outside; they must procure everything themselves...

It must not be forgotten that the chances are 100 to 1 that events will take us unawares, and that it will be necessary to come together under terribly difficult conditions.

Even without arms, the groups can play a most important part: 1) by leading the mass; 2) by attacking, whenever a favorable opportunity presents itself, policemen... and seizing their arms; 3) by rescuing the arrested or injured, when there are only a few police about; 4) by getting on the roofs... and showering stones... on the troops, etc. Given sufficient push, an organized and well-knit combat group constitutes a tremendous force. Under no circumstances should the formation of the group be abandoned or postponed on the plea of lack of arms...

Further, revolutionary army groups should under no circumstances confine themselves to preparatory work alone, but should begin military action as soon as possible... The groups can and should immediately take advantage of every opportunity for active work, and must by no means put matters off until a general uprising, because fitness for the uprising cannot be acquired except by training under fire. ("Tasks of Revolutionary Army Contingents")

We should remember that Lenin wrote all this during the 1905 Russian revolution, which was defeated. In fact, the urban proletarian forces in Russia in 1905 were not capable of maintaining the struggle nearly as long as the Black rebellions

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The shift has been particularly rapid for the Black and Brown peoples. Within four decades for the Black nation, and within two for the Chicano and Puerto Rican people, the majority has moved from the countryside into the very centers of the cities. The Black and Brown nations have abruptly shifted from peasant nations to what may be the first two nations in history to be predominantly composed of urban industrial proletariat.

Armed revolutionary acts, including the ambushing of dozens of pigs, all across the country seem to indicate that the Black nation is in a transition from the mass spontaneous uprisings of 1964-1968 to the first stages of organized guerilla warfare. The forms of struggle of Brown people may develop even more rapidly. Within hours of the pig attack on the Chicano Moratorium, several pigs were skillfully ambushed. In this context, key problem for white revolutionaries is well stated in Red Papers 2: "A primary manifestation of white chauvinism among revolutionaries is the marked tendency to consider armed struggle the domain of Blacks and ideological struggle the domain of Whites. Somehow, white skins are assumed to be too valuable to sacrifice to a pig's bullet, while Black and Brown minds are seen as unable to cope with the theory of Marxism-Leninism." But of course the problem is not primarily the attitudes of white revolutionaries, but in the extremely uneven development of the revolutionary consciousness of the Black and Brown masses on one hand and the white masses on the other. Recognizing that the American revolution will be protracted, urban, and irregular allows us to start dealing with the specifics of this problem.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECAYING EMPIRE

A unique feature of this particular decaying empire is that two of the nations it oppresses, the Black nation and the Chicano nation, exist within its own heartland. Although many people of these two nations work as an agricultural proletariat, Blacks in the South and Chicanos in the Southwest, the majority of both Blacks and Browns live in the great cities and work in the most advanced industries. The heart of the American economy remains the auto industry, from which depend steel, oil, rubber, glass, machine tools, and many service and finance branches. The overall membership of the United Automobile Workers is now over 50% Black. Actual production workers are probably 65-80% Black. Detroit itself is overwhelmingly a Black city. The industrial proletariat in San Jose and Los Angeles is largely Chicano, in New York largely Puerto Rican. In all sections of the country and in all the basic industries, Black and Brown workers are increasing as a percentage of production workers.

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The industrial proletariat of the imperialist homeland to a large extent consists of people from the internal colonies. Furthermore, Washington, the capital itself, the rotting brain of the great Babylonian world empire, is 80% Black, and every government office is largely staffed on the lower levels by Black workers.

As Red Papers 2 points out, this means that the oppressed peoples have a special, and leading role in the overall struggle of the proletariat and the United Front against Imperialism. The main military aspect is an extreme contradiction for the imperialists. Weapons and tactics that can be used against Hiroshima or Ben Tre can hardly be employed against the empire's centers of industry and government, and if the imperialists move to open genocide at home they will have to begin with their own clerks, typists, and maintenance men.

This decaying empire is driven by its own internal contradictions. Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism, in which the least productive and most parasitic form of capital, finance capital, becomes dominant. It becomes increasingly less profitable to invest surplus capital in the mother country, so the imperialists are driven to the suicidal course of looting the entire world, not to provide for any basic human needs, but to produce all that is inherently useless, wasteful, and destructive. Rising capitalism used evil means to create necessary goods and services; decadent capitalism destroys resources to create new evils. The features of this decaying capitalism create the conditions of the armed struggle that will overthrow it.

In 1930, Stalin saw that a new feature had emerged in most capitalist countries, shaken by imperialist wars, the socialist revolution in the U.S.S.R., and the national liberation struggles of the oppressed nations. He pointed out that where before there were reserve armies of the unemployed, there were now "Permanent armies of the unemployed." (Political Report of the C.C. to the 16th Congress of the C.P.S.U., June 27, 1930) As we are just beginning to understand, this has a profound influence on class relations. A reserve army of the unemployed is clearly part of the proletariat. In boom times they work; during crises they don't. People in the reserve army are constantly seeking employment. But when the crisis becomes permanent, as it has been since 1929, a new social stratum appears, a mass of people who know that they will never have steady work. In America, the permanent army of the unemployed has been mostly Black, Brown, Yellow, and Red, but more whites are now joining its ranks, particularly in Appalachia, the Pacific Northwest, and some cities, notably Chicago. It may or may not be correct to call these people "lumpen-proletariat," but it's clear that

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they have different relations to other classes than did the lumpenproletariat of Marx's day during the rise of industrial capitalism. At that time, the lumpenproletariat was a relatively small group of individual failures and misfits from all classes, for one reason or another excluded from a rapidly expanding industrial proletariat. There may have been reason for the proletariat to scorn the lumpenproletariat. But in the present period, that of the permanent stagnation of capitalism, class relations are different. The working class as a whole is being increasingly loaded with back-breaking debts, public and private. Workers not only have to pay for the imperialists' wars, but for the trashy commodities that they themselves are forced to produce and consume. At any moment they may expect to enter the ever-growing reserve army of the unemployed, which consists largely of Third World people, youth, and women. And every month, tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands give up hope of finding a job, disappear from the unemployment statistics, and move from the reserve army to the permanent army of the unemployed.

It is incorrect to make the contradiction between employed and unemployed workers into a class contradiction, let alone an antagonistic contradiction. The question for revolutionaries is not whether to organize in the factories or in the streets. The question is how to unite the entire working class so that the desperation of the streets can be combined with the power that exists at the point of production. And that is the key question not only for organizing, but for material struggle.

Decaying imperialism is based on a vast structure of debt, which it literally owes to the future. The historically falling rate of profit has forced capitalism not only to count its chickens before they are hatched but actually to eat the eggs. The great secret of deficit financing is simply how to steal profits from the future. In principle deficit financing borrows from future profits, invests this as capital, and thus, by providing a bigger capital base, creates greater future profits than there would have been if the borrowing had not taken place. But as the rate of profit falls in the super-saturated domestic economy, the borrowed future profits are used increasingly to finance imperialist wars and domestic repression, both of which are, to say the least, extremely unprofitable. Instead of expanding the actual capital base, deficit financing now undermines it. And this irrational and downright fiendish use of resources and people everywhere stimulates revolutionary ideas and actions.

During the period of rising capitalism, in 19th century Europe or early 20th century Russia, material attacks on capitalist industry or centers of finance could not do any real damage to capitalism itself. Capitalism was bound to develop anyhow, and it

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was the very development of growing capitalism which produced revolutionary contradictions. Furthermore, there were not enough productive facilities to satisfy the needs of the people, so physical destruction of any industrial equipment was against the immediate interests of the people. The situation is very different now. Capitalism is not only decaying but extremely vulnerable. The falling rate of profit leaves huge corporations like Chrysler, Lockheed, and General Dynamics on the brink of ruin, and even topples a monster the size of the 8-billion dollar Penn Central, largest transportation enterprise in the world. Every material blow hastens its downfall. And in its overblown condition, literally forcing us to consume its insane overproduction, most of its productive facilities do us more harm than good. Sabotage thus becomes an integral part of the strategy of protracted war unfolding first through urban guerilla warfare. The social pacifist argument that certain particular acts of sabotage (or window breaking) will not destroy imperialism is merely the opposite side of the adventurist view that these particular acts will bring the empire to its knees. Sabotage must be based on the principle of protracted war: the accumulation of small acts, engaged in by more and more people, constitutes strategic action.

Decaying imperialism is vulnerable to material attack not only as an economic system but also as a physical entity. Its utility systems are delicate, overstretched, indefensible, and absolutely vital. In 1969, a single circuitbreaker in a Niagara Falls power station caused an extended total power failure in New York and four other middle Atlantic states. Now there are "brownouts" caused by the normal summer overload. The movement of water supplies in or garbage out of the cities is constantly on the verge of breakdown. The point here is not the actual level of these services, which is still very high compared to most of the world, but the fact that they are in irreversible decay. This is not the era of expanding capitalism, extending vital new lines of transportation and power. It is the era of decadent capitalism, which congests itself in masses of unnecessary roads provided unneeded vehicles that poison the air and which forces people to go into debt to buy needless appliances to consume electricity it can barely produce.

Although it would be adventurism to think that the empire could be quickly destroyed through an attack on its complex system of power, transportation, and communication, we should recognize that large areas can be instantly paralyzed by such simple acts as the blocking of freeways and bridges, the destruction of power stations, and the disruption of communications. This can be especially critical where urban centers are linked with suburban centers or satellite industrial areas. Such acts must be seen in terms of the special characteristics of the U.S. struggle.

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#### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRUGGLE

Throughout the struggle, the revolutionary forces will always be in close proximity to the reactionary forces. It must be understood that in this country urban areas are at the same time the base for revolutionary political power and the bastions of the ruling class. This situation has several disadvantages for the revolutionary forces. The ruling class will defend itself ferociously in the city. It will be able to mobilize its coercive methods and forces more quickly than if it had to prepare and sustain campaigns in rural areas. We will always find the enemy breathing down our necks. But the revolutionary advantages are greater. The ruling class will always be surrounded by the revolutionary masses. They will be subject to more direct attack than if the struggle were primarily in the countryside. They will have extreme problems in engaging in full scale warfare in cities which are their most important possessions. Operating in full integration with the enemy will give the revolutionary forces excellent opportunity to have complete knowledge of the plans and preparations of the reactionary forces.

All this points to the extremely high priority of developing underground skills and capabilities. As Lenin points out, "the struggle against the political police requires special qualities; it requires professional revolutionaries" (What Is To Be Done?). Survival and victory will depend on identity papers, hiding places, etc., etc. This is not in contradiction to the action of the masses. Quite the reverse. One of Lenin's main points in What Is To Be Done? is that "the active and widespread participation of the masses depends on the existence of an organization made up of professional revolutionaries, 'no less professionally trained than the police,' which is able to 'centralize all the secret side of the work.'"

The struggle will be characterized mainly by small unit operations on a constant and expanding basis, punctuated by mass uprisings. Since the revolutionary forces will be operating "integrated with the enemy," it will be difficult, except in the final phase of the struggle, for relatively large military formations to come together. On a day to day basis the fight will be characterized by ambushes, acts of sabotage, and interdiction of supply and communication facilities, and executions by small units using their ability to quickly concentrate and disperse to harass and create havoc among the enemy. But since the revolutionary struggle is a war of the masses, and given the deterioration of the entire system, periodically the essentially guerilla character will take on insurrectionary form with strikes, mass demonstrations, rioting, and even mass armed uprisings. As the situation becomes more desperate for the ruling class and the contradictions become more acute, the spacing between such up-

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risings will probably be shortened, and their development will become generalized so as to erupt in many areas simultaneously. The week of mass uprisings in April, 1968, was an example of this.

For most of the struggle, the main emphasis in operations will be against the police, and other forms of para-military fascist formations. The use of the serious or extended situations. The contradiction for them is that even under a complete system of fascism a military occupation of major urban areas will leave the reactionary forces spread thin, and will be disruptive of the economic stability forces to initiate actions and disengage, thus throwing the state apparatus into a continual confusion. Since the military forces will be unreliable over long periods of time, because they are proletarian and multi-national, the main burden of counter-revolution will fall on the police. Historically, the police have never been able to smash revolutionary movements unless backed by the military. The development of a coordinated revolutionary surge in urban centers can tax the police to their limits, throw them into confusion, isolate them, and lead to their eventual destruction. This will be particularly true in periods in which uprisings are frequent and widespread, keeping whatever military forces can be brought to bear diffused.

In the formative and intermediary stages the main combat arena of the revolutionary struggle will be in and around Black and Brown communities, as it is the revolutionary peoples of the internal colonies who are the vanguard in the fight against U.S. imperialism, for their national liberation, and for the establishment of socialism. One disadvantage of this is that the main battlefields will often be so well defined that they can be surrounded and cut off from the rest of the urban area, both politically and militarily. This isolation must be broken by the strategy of United Front against imperialism and the development of guerilla capabilities throughout the rest of the city, capable at first of diversionary acts.

#### THE PEOPLE'S ARMY

Chairman Mao teaches us that: "Without a people's army the people have nothing." This statement contains the heart of a people's revolutionary war. Small groups of even the most heroic revolutionary fighters cannot expect to win lasting victories over the ruling class, let alone overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. A people's army expresses the military might of the masses. It is a fighting force that can take the operations of individual units and guide these in the strategy for overthrowing the ruling class.

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the main and essential force, the organization must have the following: (1) a fighting core around which a Red Army can grow; (2) a pool of military cadre that can train and give direction to other groups, fighting units, and the masses; (3) a unified political and military leadership (4) cadre among the masses, having their confidence and trust. Without each and every one of these the organization will be unable to provide effective leadership for the struggle.

As the general revolutionary struggle will unfold around an anti-imperialist united front, so will its highest political form--armed struggle--also take on the character of a united front. This united front must consist of both a strategy capable of integrating the independent actions of all classes, strata, and groupings and actual alliances among armed revolutionary groups.

A united front military strategy must be based on a thorough summation of the practice and potential role of all forces. Their strengths and weaknesses must be assessed in terms of the needs of protracted urban guerilla struggle. The areas to be considered are class background, relationship with the masses, level of organization, fighting ability (both actual and potential), and ideological comprehension of the character of the revolution. There must also be consideration of where independent actions by other groupings can be integrated into the overall strategy, and where such actions are likely to diverge. The central feature of this strategy must be to integrate as broad as possible a military base under proletarian leadership in all campaigns and actions.

The crucial link will be the development of a strong, class-conscious Red Army under the command of a revolutionary Communist Party fully integrated with and leading the struggles of the masses. Out of both political and military necessity, this Red Army must be able to act as an independent force. Operating within the United Front strategy, the Communist Party must be able to initiate military action at crucial times, unencumbered by the weaknesses of other groups, but must also be able to participate in both temporary and lasting alliances.

The Red Army must be the core of the people's army in order to infuse this broad formation with the means and will to carry the struggle through to its conclusion. As the core of the fighting forces, it will attempt strategic leadership, material support, and cadre for other forces in the revolution. But for some time to come, the Red Army will be Black and Brown revolutionary fighters with various organizations. In this situation, it will be the duty of the Red Army to fully support these Black and Brown fighters by mobilizing its own forces and those of other groups. Only when the Communist Party is established with Black and Brown and other proletarian leadership, can the Red Army

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The growth of a people's army, like the development of protracted guerilla war, must be viewed dialectically, as Lenin did. Large-scale, well coordinated revolutionary armies are not created overnight. They must come from the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In its most elemental form, the revolutionary army begins from the need of the masses to defend themselves against the economic and military terror of the bourgeois dictatorship. Two-thirds of the thousands of bombings in the U.S. in the last year were in labor struggles at the point of production. More and more people from oppressed classes and strata are seeking to arm themselves for self-defense. The qualitative change comes when the need of the masses to defend themselves becomes integrated into the practice of revolutionary organizations, so that armed struggle is no longer just a matter for individuals, but a mass question. However, even in an organized mass way, armed self-defense is incapable of completing the revolutionary task, and in time will even become less useful for defense. Once the people are armed and willing to defend themselves, and even their neighbors, friends, and fellow workers, it must be shown that the only real defense is to destroy the enemy. To destroy the enemy requires offensive action and an organized military force.

For revolutionary Communist organizations to develop fighting arms capable of defeating the enemy, two major questions will have to be answered. First, what is the precise relationship between the Red Army, which is the fighting force of the Communist organization, with other revolutionary fighting units? Second, how can a standing revolutionary army be maintained in a situation normally advantageous for only small military formations?

A people's army is a diverse formation that may represent the combined forces of several revolutionary organizations, independent military and political groupings, with a class composition of the proletariat plus elements of the petty bourgeoisie and lumpenproletariat. The uniting force is a common understanding that the bourgeois dictatorship is merciless and must be overthrown. However, among these groups there will be differing notions as to the direction the struggle should take, with the representatives of the 'revolutionary' petty bourgeoisie and lumpen refusing to acknowledge the proletariat as the only class with the ability to carry the struggle through to its successful conclusion. Given the diffuse character of a people's army, it must be the role of the fighting formation of the vanguard of the proletariat--the Communist Party and its Red Army--to use the strength of these other groups, which is their willingness to dog battle with the forces of reaction, while overcoming their weaknesses by being prepared to give direction to the struggle.

If the revolutionary Communist Party is to be the general staff of the struggle, and its fighting arm the Red Army

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achieve its military leadership.

(Note: The appendix is a retyped copy of the original "military strategy" paper. Page references are to the original and therefore may be slightly different than the retyped copy. Usually they are the same, but where different, they appear on the page after the one cited.)

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**END**