Abt Associates Inc.

55 Wheeler Street • Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Telephone 617-492-7100

IMPACT PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF POOR URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES. EVAL FIFTEEN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS VIS-A-VIS OWN GOALS. IDENTIFYING STRATE SUCCESSFUL, GENERATING POSITIVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS FOR POOR AND MINORITY RESIDENTS. EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR LOWERING BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF THE POOR, TO CITY, COUNTY, AND STATE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM, INDUSTRY. ASSISTANCE TO MODEL CITIES AGENCY. DESIGN OF EVALUATION SYSTEM TO ASSESS HOUSING, EDUCATION, AND IDENTIFYING GAPS IN OBJECTIVE-SETTING, PROVIDING FEEDBACK TO POLICYMAKERS TO REVISE OBJECTIVES OR RESOURCE AL DEFINING DATA REQUIREMENTS, COLLECTION METHODS **DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT** SIMULATI DEMONSTRATING PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING BY MODEL CITIES, PLAYERS REPRESENT PROCESSIN RESIDENTS, AGENCY PERSONNEL—UTILIZING AVAILABLE RESOURCES, LOCAL AND FEDERAL, FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMEI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN COMPREHENSIVE CITY DEMONSTRATION PLAN IN EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPME TION. TRAINING MBA PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN SMALL BUSINESS CONSULTING IN SOUTH AMERICA. MODULAR MANAGEMENT IN SYSTEM FOR NEWARK MODEL CITIES **EDUCATION DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE: OFFICE OF EDUC** CASTING EDUCATION PERSONNEL IN 1980S. COMPUTER SIMULATION FOR RELEVANT SCENARIOS **UNESCO** MODEL PLANNING MET FOR MINISTRY OF EDUCATION INDONESIA, TRAINING INDONESIANS IN EDUCATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, DATA BANK FOR INDONES TION **ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION** PUBLIC HEALTH TRAINING SIMULATION COMPUTER MODEL FOR RURAL DISTRICT IN DEVELOPI DOCTORS AND NURSES, TRAINING TO HEAD DISTRICT PUBLIC HEALTH TEAMS, GAIN SIMULATED EXPERIENCE **TEXAS EDUCATIO** MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FOR STATE **DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE: OFFICE OF PLANNING A TION** PLANNING, OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM EVALUATION BY SUMMER INTERNS **OECD** STATE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY AND RESEARCH IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES **VISITING NURSE SERVICE NEW YORK** SIMULATIONS OF EFFECTIVE NURSING **CITY NEW YORK** URBAN EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION SIMULATIONS **CENTER FOR STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY** ADVANCE TESTING OF ED VOUCHER SYSTEM **TRIANGLE PUBLICATIONS** TAPED MATERIALS INSTRUCTING SUPERVISORS IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS **INS NATIONAL DE PLANIFICATION DE L'EDUCATION, PARIS** SIMULATION TO TRAIN EDUCATION PLANNERS FROM DEVELOPING NATIONS S PLANNING DIFFERENTIATED STAFFING **LESLEY COLLEGE** EDUCATIONAL GAMES **BANKERS TRUST COMPANY** FC Y GROWTH. PLANNING GAME ON COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT **DEPARTMENT OF LABOR** / RAM FOR MIGRATORY WORKERS. ASSISTANCE FOR MIGRANTS OBTAINING WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT SERVI **RIOR: BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS** DEVELOPMENT OF K-12 SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM FOR INDIAN A GUIDES, CLASSROOM MATERIAL WORKSHOP TRAINING IN CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT FOR 200 TEACHERS AI SIGN OF PROTOTYPE VEHICLES OF AUTOMATIC SHORT-RANGE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. TAPE ACCESS CC





ABT ASSOCIATES INC.
55 WHEELER STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
TELEPHONE • AREA 617-492-7100
TELEX: 710-320-6367

AAI Report #77-63

# FIRST YEAR EVALUATION OF THE ILLINOIS URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION PROGRAM

Final Report



Richard Ku, Project Director
Bradford Smith, Ph.D.

22 June 1977

Prepared for the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission by Abt Associates under a contract with the City of Joliet. Points of view or opinions stated in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of either the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission or the City of Joliet.

| Richard Ku | | |
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| Contract Manager | Quality Control Reviewer | Management Reviewer |

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Urban High Crime Reduction (UHCR) Program is being funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) to test the thesis that local units of government can plan, implement and evaluate action projects designed to reduce the level of crimes of their own choosing. Each of the four participating cities (Champaign, East St. Louis, Joliet and Peoria) was to establish a Program Coordination Unit, managed by a Program Coordinator (Director), as the staff component of a Crime Reduction Council. These Councils, whose formation was required under Program guidelines, were to (a) make major policy and action decisions relating to their respective local programs, (b) generally guide the work of the staff, (c) provide coordination among the elements of the local criminal justice system, and (d) encourage cooperation and coordination among agencies or offices represented on the Council. The Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police, State's Attorney, Chief Judge, and a representative of the State Department of Corrections were required by the Program guidelines to be Council members. Up to four additional "citizen" members were to be chosen by the Mayor.

Three major objectives were specified for the local programs:

(1) To reduce burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime through rational analysis and systematic goal-oriented planning, development and implementation;

(2) To evaluate the effectiveness of various approaches undertaken by the program, for possible replications elsewhere in the state; and

(3) To increase coordination between police, courts, and corrections officials in policy development and decision-making at the local level.

In working towards these objectives, each city was to select the crime or crimes the local program was to address; develop a plan of action; and monitor and evaluate projects implemented under the plan, as well as the local program overall. The product of the work of the Crime Reduction Councils and their staff was to be an Impact Plan explaining the choice of actions recommended. This explanation was to be rooted in the analysis of target crime(s) and its (their) occurrence in the city, and in the performance of the local criminal justice system in responding to those crimes. The number of target crime categories that could be selected was not expressly limited, but ILEC felt that only one or two could reasonably be addressed in each city.

The Program design contained two options for the Impact Plan. In the first, the plan would be developed in three phases, each followed by the implementation of action projects approved for that phase. The three phases correspond to the three major criminal justice system functions: law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections. The second option was to complete an Impact Plan that analyzed all three components before applying for any action grants.

Abt Associates began its evaluation of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program in September 1976. The Peoria program had been in operation for somewhat over two-years;* the Joliet program, for almost two years; the Champaign program, a year and a half; and the East St. Louis program, a year.** No action projects were operational, although Phase I Plans had been submitted by Joliet and Champaign and had received ILEC approval. East St. Louis was planning to complete a combined Phase I/Phase II Plan by December, and Peoria was still several months from completing its Adult Master Plan and had begun collecting data for the Juvenile Master Plan.*** Major Program events are summarized in the Exhibit on the following page.

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program has been ambitious, and all of its participants are to be commended for their accomplishments within state-of-the-art, time and budget limitations. By virtue of delays, action projects did not begin operations until more than two years after the first program grant was awarded, and consequently our first year evaluation concerned itself primarily with Program processes and an analysis of baseline data for target crime(s).

Major conclusions of our assessment of Program processes are summarized as follows:

- The UHCR Program has afforded its participants valuable experience in local criminal justice planning and administration. Individuals who are outside of constituent criminal justice agencies (the UHCR Directors) are in a position to view those agencies as comprising a whole, i.e., from a systems perspective, and to make recommendations for action from such a persepctive. The exposure of UHCR

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** This does not include the period when the first UHCR grant was awarded and subsequently terminated due to inaction.

*** Planning for the Peoria program was done in Adult and Juvenile phases, across all criminal justice functions.

## EXHIBIT
## OCCURENCE OF MAJOR LOCAL PROGRAM EVENTS



Directors to operations, policies and decisions associated with the local criminal justice system is an important first step toward promoting problem definition and strategy formulation from a systems viewpoint. We believe that all the directors took advantage of this exposure to the extent that they are far more knowledgeable of their respective local criminal justice systems than are many of those who have been part of the system for a much longer time.

- The Program has provided and will continue to provide opportunities for line criminal justice agencies to test action strategies that otherwise would not be within the scope of local operating budgets of the participating cities. Innovative methods such as neighborhood team policing in Champaign and specialized prosecution in Joliet and Peoria, can be tested for administrative or policy feasibility. The cities will have had more hands-on experience with (locally) new ways of doing things.

- That cooperation and coordination within the four local criminal justice systems has improved as a result of UHCR, was unanimously agreed with in our interviews with Crime Reduction Council members. Except for Peoria, which has had regular meetings, scheduled by the Chief Judge, of key local criminal justice officials and interagency committee meetings under the Violent Crime Reduction Program, there was no regular forum for system-wide sharing of problems and ideas in the UHCR cities. The Crime Reduction Councils have served as such a forum, and according to most of their members, it has enhanced both cooperation and coordination among the various system components.

- Whether the general public should be considered as part of the local criminal justice system is debatable, although it seems reasonable to state that they are part of the system by virtue of being victims of crime or serving as jurors, witnesses, correctional volunteers, or in simlar roles. Exposure of the public to the operations, policies and decisions made within local criminal justice systems and the characteristics of crime must be seen as a Program benefit if for no other reason, because officials in the system are either elected or appointed by other elected officials. In Joliet particularly, and to a lesser degree in Champaign, there have been continuing efforts to keep the public informed through the Crime Reduction Council or the media. East St. Louis discussed this aspect of the Program, but from what we have seen, relatively little has emerged from these discussions. Peoria, by virtue of its technical posture, does not appear to have taken as much interest or initiative as have the other cities in this regard.

- Administrative factors relating to the Program are quite complex and time-consuming. To some extent, these have delayed progress of the Program and have made it difficult for local programs perperceive themselves as cohesive entities working toward common goals.

- We found that burglary and robbery trends over the past five years exhibit an increase followed by a decrease of similar magnitude in the participating cities, in other Illinois cities (including Chicago), and in the nation as a whole. This trend, occurring before UHCR action projects became operational, has serious implications for achieving or substantiating target crime reductive effects of local programs.

- Serious internal discrepancies were found within the crime reporting system of the state Department of Law Enforcement (Criminal Justice Information Services), and between this system and other crime reporting systems. While this in itself does not necessarily invalidate the data base we have constructed, it does raise serious questions as to the reliability of more detailed data which might be used in the evaluation of action projects.

- The Program has afforded its participants the opportunity to study local crime and criminal justice problems. While three of the cities may have applied their reviews of the relevant literature and their analyses of local statistical data to the derivation of action projects Peoria demonstrated in explicit documented fashion how this application occurred. The series of studies conducted by the Peoria Crime Reduction Council constitutes the basic components of a model that can be used to test the effectiveness of alternative inputs with respect to a single output measure--the level of residential burglary. Seen in this light, there can be little doubt that the data collected and analyzed under UHCR were put to an explicit set of purposes: calibrating, testing, and exercising such a model in deriving or supporting anticipated effects of action strategies or residential burglary. A unique blend of circumstances enabled the Peoria UHCR program to take full advantage of the opportunity to focus on quantitative analysis in planning and decision-making.

Our major recommendation at this point is that ILEC not proceed too quickly in attempting to replicate the UHCR Program or to undertake a similar program in other Illinois cities (or regions). We have two key reasons for this recommendation. The UHCR experience indicated a need for extensive activities in preparing local units of government for participation in such a program, or in determining the feasibility of successfully implementing such a program in given localities. Moreover, the cost-effectiveness of an analytical approach to deriving action projects for reducing target crime levels cannot be assessed fully until action projects have been operational for a sufficiently long period and data relating to these projects and their effects (as well as crime data) are available.

# 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

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This section provides an overview of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program and our evaluation of that Program. We begin with a description of the Program's basic elements and design, a summary of major Program events, a review of our evaluation activities to date, and an outline of major tasks remaining for the second and third year evaluations.

Section 2 contains our assessment of Program processes, with special attention given to the manner in which action projects are derived in each city. The selection of target crimes, performance of the four Crime Reduction Councils, and administrative concerns are also discussed in that section. Issues relating to the evaluation of action projects and the overall evaluations of local programs that are to be conducted locally are discussed in Section 3. This section highlights the role of evaluation in the planning-action-evaluation cycle.

Section 4 turns to a description of the procedure used to construct the data base of monthly counts of target crimes and to our assessments of the reliability and validity of these data. A model for describing trends in the data and identifying significant shifts is presented next. The manner in which this model will be applied in assessing the impact of the Program on target crime(s) in each city concludes this section. Concluding observations from our first year evaluation are offered in Section 5.

Several important appendices have also been prepared. Appendix A contains the data base analyzed in Section 4.2 and a description of the method we used to remove the effects of seasonal variation from the data. Summary statistics relating to the model described in Section 4.2 are given in Appendix B. Graphs of five-year trends in robbery and burglary for a number of Illinois cities appear in Appendix C. Finally, Appendix D contains extensive discussions of sources of our crime data base and discrepancies in the data.

## 1.1 Program Design

The Urban High Crime Reduction (UHCR) Program is being funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) to test the thesis that local units of government can plan, implement and evaluate action projects designed to reduce the level of crimes of their own choosing. Each of the four participating

cities (Champaign, East St. Louis, Joliet and Peoria) was to establish a Program Coordination Unit, managed by a Program Coordinator (Director), as the staff component of a Crime Reduction Council. These Councils, whose formation was required under Program guidelines, were to (a) make major policy and action decisions relating to their respective local programs, (b) generally guide the work of the staff, (c) provide coordination among the elements of the local criminal justice system, and (d) encourage cooperation and coordination among agencies or offices represented on the Council. The Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police, State's Attorney, Chief Judge, and a representative of the State Department of Corrections were required by the Program guidelines to be Council members. Up to four additional "citizen" members were to be chosen by the Mayor.

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A high degree of flexibility was offered for the establishment of local policies, operations and procedures. For example, the manner of creating a Crime Reduction Council was left to each city's discretion, as was the designation of its Chairman. The frequency of Council meetings, quorum requirements, and voting rights were also to be established by each city. The organizational placement of the Program Coordination Unit was to be a local decision. Each city was to select its target crime(s) from those indicated. If warranted by the analysis, target neighborhood(s) and target offenders could be designated in the design or selection of action projects. The rationals for these choices and the manner in which they would be coordinated in working towards common objectives were to be spelled out in the Impact Plan.

An abbreviated schematic of the Program's major organizational components appears in Exhibit 1. The Program as a whole, and particularly the work of the local Program Coordination Units, are monitored and given technical assistance by the ILEC Planning Unit. Abt Associates is under contract to the ILEC Evaluation Unit for the statewide evaluation of the Program. Action projects funded against the local Impact Plans are monitored and given technical assistance by appropriate ILEC program units, as well as by the Planning Unit. Fiscal review and monitoring of all grants is performed in accordance with standard ILEC procedures. While not shown in Exhibit 1, all grant applications and Plans are reviewed by the appropriate Crime Reduction Councils, City Councils, County Boards, ILEC Regional Offices, and ILEC.

EXHIBIT 1

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS OF
THE URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION PROGRAM



## 1.2 Chronological Summary

Funds were first allocated to the Urban High Crime Reduction Program by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission in its 1973 Comprehensive Plan. After a year-long delay, due to uncertainties associated with the appointment of a new Executive Director, ILEC took concrete actions to initiate the Program in August 1974. In Peoria, the LEAA-funded Crime Impact Program began in March 1974. At that time, the individual who is presently Director of the Peoria Crime Reduction Council prepared a Master Plan Design for that Program, which eventually served as the basis for the UHCR Impact Plan. Another individual was hired as Director in July 1974, but the Crime Reduction Council was not formed until August 1975. Joliet began its local program at that time with creation and convening of its Crime Reduction Council. A Director was selected by the Joliet Crime Reduction Council and began work in December 1974. However, the Crime Reduction Council did not meet until September 1975. A UHCR Program grant was awarded to East St. Louis in 1974, but no action was taken, and the grant was terminated. Under a new administration, East St. Louis was awarded another UHCR Grant and hired a Director in August, 1975. In Champaign, a Director was hired in April 1975, but the Crime Reduction Council did not meet until October 1975. The city of Waukegan was originally selected to participate in the Program and was one of the first to apply for a grant. However, city officials declined the award when they learned of the scope of the planning and analysis tasks envisioned. In sum, an average of about two years elapsed between the description of the Program in the 1973 Comprehensive Plan and the shaping of four local programs.

Because of the delays encountered at all four sites, additional funds are being sought from the 1978 Comprehensive Plan to provide support for Program Coordination Units beyond their present third-year grant periods. Approximately $31,000 per city may be available for this purpose. However, specific guidelines for utilizing these funds have not been developed as of this writing.

Champaign, East St. Louis and Joliet opted for the phased version of the Program, while Peoria undertook to develop a single Impact Plan covering all three phases.* A summary of accomplishments and the Program's status as of May 1977 are described below.

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* Actually, Peoria's approach involves a two-part Impact Plan--one covering the adult criminal justice system, and the other addressing the juvenile justice system.

Champaign

Champaign has completed and had approved Phase I of its Impact Plan and is scheduled to complete Phase II by July 1977. Residential burglary was selected as the target crime. A Team Policing-(Residential) Burglary Abatement Project was recommended in Phase I, and a grant award was made in December 1976 for fifteen months. The Team Policing Unit completed a three-day training course in Team Building, and it has been on the street since May 1977.

The Program Coordination Unit, consisting of a Director, a Research Assistant, and a Secretary, is supported by its third grant, which extends to November 1977. The Champaign program has spent nearly $171,000 on planning and about $153,000 on action to date.

East St. Louis

The East St. Louis program has completed its Phase I Plan, which identifies robbery and burglary as target crimes. Work towards the Phase II Plan began concurrently with Phase I, but the city's two UHCR budgets of about $187,000 terminated in March 1977, and the Phase II Plan was not completed.* Staff of the Southwest Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (SILEC--the ILEC Regional Office covering East St. Louis) recommended against a second UHCR grant, and the Program Coordination Unit has been supported by other funds available to the city since March. The Program Coordination Unit consists of five full-time staff: a Director, a Planner, a Fiscal Control Officer, a Statistician and a Secretary. While a final decision from ILEC is still pending, it appears that East St. Louis will continue in the Program, but at a reduced staff level. Action grant applications against the Phase I Plan will probably be prepared for a Crime Analysis Unit and possibly for a Crime Deterrence Squad. Phase II (adjudication) planning will be performed by SILEC, which has compiled an offender data base for the region, under a contract that will be designated in a revised (third) UHCR grant to the city.

* Due to its late entrance into the Program, East St. Louis had planned to complete both Phase I and Phase II under its first UHCR grant.

Joliet

Joliet has completed and had approved Phases I and II (law enforcement and adjudication) of its Impact Plan, which identified robbery and burglary as target crimes. Two grants have been awarded for action projects under Phase I: the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit which began operations in September 1976 and will continue under the grant until July 1977, and the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program which is expected to begin in June 1977, for ten months. One twelve-month grant has been awarded under Phase II: the Special Prosecution Unit, which began in April 1977. The Phase III Plan (corrections) is scheduled for completion by July 1977.

The Program Coordination Unit is operating under its third grant, which is presently scheduled to support it until October 1977. The staff consists of a Director, a Research Assistant, and a Secretary. Total planning budgets in Joliet amount to about $181,500, and about $155,000 has been spent on action.

Peoria

We previously alluded to the fact that Peoria UHCR Program has absorbed funds which had been awarded to the city under the Crime Impact discretionary grant from LEAA. This decision was reached jointly by LEAA, ILEC and the Peoria Crime Reduction Council. The UHCR Impact Plan (which was also to serve as the Master Plan for the Crime Impact Program) was scheduled to be completed in two parts, one relating to projects addressing objectives of the adult criminal justice system, and the other relating to the juvenile justice system. However, it proved impossible for the staff to complete the analyses of juvenile system data in time to consider the findings before having to obligate the remaining Crime Impact funds before they elapse in October 1977. Thus, the Peoria Crime Reduction Council decided to commit these funds to the projects on the basis of an analysis of the adult system alone. The Crime Impact award was for $166,000, of which about $57,500 was used for planning and about $108,500 remains for UHCR action projects for the adult system.

The Peoria program selected residential burglary as its target crime. One project in adjudication and two in law enforcement were recommended in the

Adult Plan. The Dedicated Prosecutor Project will operate from the Peoria County States Attorney's Office. A Physical Evidence Project and a Criminal Information Center will operate from the Peoria Police Department. The two law enforcement projects are scheduled to operate for six months beginning in May 1977, with a combined budget of approximately $94,500. Possible continued support of these two projects with UHCR funds will be considered after the Juvenile Plan is completed in the fall. The Council voted to support the Dedicated Prosecutor Project through November 1978, drawing about $12,000 from remaining Crime Impact funds and subsequently from UHCR funds as necessary.

The Program Coordination Unit presently consists of a Director, two Criminal Justice Analysts, two part-time Interns, and a Secretary. The staff is supported by a third-year grant which is due to expire in December 1977. Total UHCR planning expenses have amounted to about $454,500.

Exhibit 2 depicts Crime Reduction Council meetings, the arrival and departure of local program Directors, and the initiation of action projects in the four cities chronologically. The initiation of Abt Associates' evaluation of the Program is indicated by the broken line.

### 1.3. Evaluation of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program

Abt Associates began its evaluation of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program in September 1976. The Peoria program had been in operation for somewhat over two years;* the Joliet program, for about two years; the Champaign program, a year and a half; and the East St. Louis program, for little over a year.** No action projects were fully operational, although Phase I Plans had been submitted by Joliet and Champaign and had received ILEC approval. East St. Louis was planning to complete a combined Phase I/Phase II Plan by December, and Peoria was still several months from completing its Adult Master Plan and had begun collecting data for the Juvenile Master Plan.

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## EXHIBIT 2
## OCCURENCE OF MAJOR LOCAL PROGRAM EVENTS




KEY

▼ Crime Reduction Council meetings

| Employment start of local program Director or Acting Director

● Employment termination of local program Director or Acting Director

★ Approximate time of action project implementation

It was evident early on that the first year evaluation would not be able to examine the impact of any local program on its target crime(s), since the action components would just be becoming operational halfway through that time. Thus, the first year evaluation focused on two other key aspects of the Program:

- the process established in each city for administering the local program and preparing its Impact Plan; and
- the data that would be used to measure changes in the level of target crime(s).

Process Evaluation

The process evaluation was conducted in three major tasks. First, the administrative and technical evolution of each local program was reconstructed in order to understand and judge the processes that led or were leading to the development of Impact Plans. Second, the perceptions and roles of people associated with each local program were captured in face-to-face interviews. An average of over 18 such interviews were conducted in the four cities for this purpose. Third, we examined provisions made by each Program Coordination Unit for monitoring and evaluating action projects.

The first two tasks--examining the process that was undertaken in developing Impact Plans and interviewing people associated with the Program--were documented in our Interim Report (31 January 1977). Findings of these tasks were also discussed in that report, and Section 2 of the present report recasts and updates those findings.

The third task--that of reviewing and commenting on local provisions for monitoring and evaluating action projects--was begun for three action projects, all in Joliet, that were available for our review by May 1977. Findings and recommendations relating to this task, and general observations concerning the evaluation of action projects appear in Section 3.

Data Collection and Analysis

The major objective of the UHCR Program is to reduce crime. This is to be accomplished through action projects which evolve from the planning and analysis mechanisms guided by the Crime Reduction Councils. The collection and primary analysis of data relating to action projects will be done locally.

Findings of these evaluations and their relationship to changes in the crime level will be locally assessed and documented. We will perform a secondary analysis of these data and will integrate our findings with those of the analysis for which we are primarily responsible--that of the composite effect of local programs on crime levels in the cities.

Two major types of data will be utilized in measuring crime levels. The first are "official" data--crimes coming to the attention of law enforcement agencies. We constructed a series of monthly counts of crime for each crime of interest, for participating cities and for a sample of cities not participating in the Program. In constructing these series, we examined data from federal, state and local sources, and the degree of variation among sources was analyzed to determine the amount of confidence that could be placed in these measures. Preliminary findings of this task and the description of a model that will be used in assessing the program's impact on crime were discussed in the Interim Report and have been expanded and updated in Section 4 and Appendix D of the present report.

A victimization/attitudinal survey provided the other major type of data collected which will be analyzed in evaluating the UHCR Program after a follow-up survey is conducted in 1978. The methodology of the survey, a summary of its findings, and raw data tabulations are given in Victimization in Joliet and Peoria: A Baseline Survey (revised, 21 February 1977). Although the survey was conducted in only two of the participating cities, it and its follow-up companion should shed some light on the utility of a survey pair in program evaluation, by identifying changes in crime levels and community attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice system, from one interval in time to another.*

Remaining Tasks

Four major tasks remain in the evaluation of the UHCR Program. Aside from the follow-up victimization study and the associated analysis of crime:

* A telephone victimization/attitude survey was also conducted under the auspices of the Champaign Crime Reduction Council. However, documentation of the methodology and findings await a follow-up survey planned for 1978.

- The impact of the Program on the four local criminal justice systems must be studied.
- Cost-effectiveness of the Program must be assessed.
- Action project evaluation results must be examined and the data will be analyzed, to be integrated into our overall evaluation of Program effects on crime.

These will be addressed in second-year and third-year evaluations, after sufficient experience with action projects has been gained and sufficient time has elapsed for local program effects to have occurred.

# 2. AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM PROCESSES

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This section assesses the planning processes undertaken by each of the four cities in the UHCR Program. The term "planning process" refers to the first link in the planning-action-evaluation cycle that has served as a model for government programs for well over a decade. The statements which follow were drawn from our assessment of planning activities against guidelines developed for the Program by ILEC. Sections of our Interim Report which deal with local plannning processes have been updated and recast in the present section.

We begin in Section 2.1 with brief descriptions of the processes by which target crimes were selected in each city. Section 2.2 summarizes the derivation of action projects in each city. Guideline specifications for the derivation of action projects and local interpretations of the specifications are assessed in Section 2.3, and other issues relating to Program processes are discussed in Section 2.4.

### 2.1 Selection of Target Crimes

The Champaign Crime Reduction Council first selected burglary as its target crime in its 5 November 1975 meeting, based on burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime statistics compiled by the University of Illinois Psychology Department. After more detailed burglary statistics were presented at its 20 November meeting, the Council decided to focus on community awareness and education as prevention strategies for residential burglary. The Champaign Phase I Plan cited prevalence, value of property stolen, potential physical danger to citizens as other reasons for the selection of residential burglary. The Plan stated that rape, robbery, assault, and larceny had also been considered as target crimes. Low volume led to the elimination of rape and robbery, and statistics showing that assault occurred chiefly between relatives or people who were socially acquainted led to the elimination of assault. In short, residential burglary was designated as the target crime in Champaign, largely as the result of the Council's observations of statistical data.

The East St. Louis program initially chose "drugs" as its target crime (February 1976), but was persuaded by ILEC to address the drug problem in the city only if it could be demonstrated to relate to one of the five eligible target crimes. The Crime Reduction Council subsequently adopted burglary as

the city's target crime at its March 1976 meeting. However, both burglary and robbery were indicated as target crimes and analyzed in the Phase I Plan completed in December 1976, and the staff later indicated that both were indeed target crimes for the East St. Louis program. We also note that the Council frequently discussed the problem of violent crime committed by juveniles. Thus, the Council considered a number of possible target crimes, but the staff eventually prepared the Phase I Plan under the assumption that robbery and burglary had been selected.*

According to its Phase I Plan, burglary and robbery were selected as target crimes for the Joliet program because these crimes account for a substantial portion of all crime in the city, they can be affected by a concerted effort of the criminal justice system, and they represent a major concern of both citizens and criminal justice system officials. Crime Reduction Council meeting minutes indicate that the staff began focusing on robbery and burglary early in 1975, during their manual examination of police reports, and that these were announced as the program's target crimes in April 1975. Thus, the selection was essentially a staff decision that evolved in the course of collecting and organizing the data.

In Peoria, the discretionary LEAA Crime Impact Program, which was subsequently absorbed by UHCR, had robbery, assault and burglary as its target crimes. Just prior to UHCR, a number of grants were awarded to city and county agencies under the Violent Crime Reduction Program, which addressed the crimes of robbery and assault. The Crime Reduction Council staff performed studies of robbery and residential burglary which were presented at the second Council meeting (September 1975). According to these studies, the scope of the analysis was residential and non-residential burglaries together, and because residential burglary was the most prevalent and probably most feared by the public. The minutes of this meeting indicated that "causative factors for specific patterns or discernable trends in robbery" were not suggested by the robbery analysis, and the Council moved to drop robbery as a target crime. The fact that robbery was being addressed by another program was also noted as a factor, since an evaluation of the impact of UHCR on robbery in Peoria would be confounded

* Since the Council designated burglary as the target crime, we assume that the selection was a Council prerogative. The inclusion of robbery as a target crime in the Phase I Plan therefore appears to have been a staff addendum.

by this situation. In sum, it seems fair to conclude that the selection of residential burglary as the target crime for the Peoria program was based on a combination of analysis, policy and circumstance.

It should be evident from these descriptions that widely divergent criteria were applied by the four cities in arriving at their respective target crimes. The Program had been designed as "crime-specific" upon the belief that limiting the scope of crime problems to be addressed would make the planning and analysis tasks more tractable than they would be if the Program addressed the "general problem of crime." However, the Program guidelines left open questions of how many of the eligible target crimes could be locally designated, what criteria were to be applied in local selections, or whether the formal designation was a responsibility of the Crime Reduction Councils or its staff.

The above discussion indicates that the cities referred to baseline crime data in selecting their target crimes. For a program such as UHCR, there is reason for the designation of target crimes to rest on crime counts alone. Fear expressed by the public or other community-initiated concerns were viewed as valuable, by virtue of the inclusion of four "citizen" members on Crime Reduction Councils.

The fact that burglary or residential burglary is a target crime in all of the cities is not surprising. Either of these categories outpace any of the other eligible crime types in volume. Moreover, in all of the cities, enormous difficulty in compiling baseline data would have been encountered for the remaining eligible categories, which are all stranger-to-stranger crimes of violence, since victim-offender relationship is not routinely recorded on offense reports in these categories. Even if accomplished, this certainly would have delayed the planning component of the Program even further. To have devised acceptable action projects that could have been supported by one of these other crimes alone would have been difficult as well.

## 2.2 The Derivation of Action Projects

Action projects which have been funded to date are shown in Exhibit 3. Federal, state and local shares of total budget is indicated in parentheses under each project title. The derivation of these action project was traced from Impact Plans, grant applications, minutes of Crime Reduction Council meetings, correspondence, memoranda, local program materials, and discussions with people involved with the Program. These processes are organized and discussed by city in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.4 below.

### 2.2.1 Champaign

Champaign has been awarded one action project under its Phase I Impact Plan: A Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Project. The project, which began operations in May 1977, is essentially fashioned after the model described in the LEAA publication, Full-Service Neighborhood Team Policing: Planning for Implementation (June 1975), but with a strong residential burglary prevention flavor.

The Team Policing Unit consists of a Team Commander (sergeant) and thirteen officers,* and it works the Northeast section of the city. They respond to all calls for service within the target area, command authority resting with the Team Commander, except in emergency situations when the Team Commander is responsible to the Shift Commander. The Team will eventually assume an investigative function, although at the beginning, its major thrust will be on patrol and prevention activities. Team members were selected from a list of volunteers from within the department.

Efforts of the Team Policing Unit will be coordinated with other ongoing projects in the Champaign-Urbana area. One of the key features of team policing is its closer involvement with neighborhood residents than is typically found in traditional patrol. In line with this observation, the Team Policing Unit plans to make referrals to a crisis intervention project in which a full-time social worker has been assigned to each of the three police departments serving the area (Champaign, Urbana and the University of Illinois). Project LOCATE (Logically Oriented Crime Analysis Team Effort) also serves those three departments by collating, analyzing and disseminating data pertaining to calls for service and crime reports.

* Of these, only five are covered under the grant.

EXHIBIT 3

UHCR ACTION PROJECTS AND AWARD AMOUNTS
(FEDERAL/STATE/LOCAL)

| | PHASE I | PHASE II | PHASE III |
|---|---|---|---|
| Champaign | • Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program ($137,898/$7661/$7661) | | |
| East St. Louis<br><br>(no budgets available) | • Crime Deterrence Project<br>--investigation team<br>--plain clothes squad<br>--public announcements<br>• Team Policing Project<br>• Crime Analysis Unit<br>• Public Information/ Education | | |
| Joliet | • Mobile Crime Prevention Unit ($119,700/$6650/$6650)<br>--prevention<br>--selective enforcement<br>--crime analysis<br>• Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program ($20,000/$1111/$1111) | Special Prosecution Unit ($70,578/$3921/$3921) | |

| Peoria | ADULT | JUVENILE |
|---|---|---|
| | • Dedicated Prosecutor ($12,015)<br>• Physical Evidence ($57,193)<br>• Criminal Information Center ($37,371) | |

This project was cited as an important source of information for directing the Team's activities and evaluating its impact. Finally, a project to install a computer-aided dispatch system, again serving all three departments, will be coordinated with Team operations when that system is implemented.

The Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Project had its origin in the work jointly undertaken by members of the University of Illinois Psychology Department, the Champaign Chief of Police, and the city's Community Relations Department prior to the city's participation in UHCR. The Psychology Department prepared and delivered a proposal for UHCR to the Crime Reduction Council first Director, Thomas Difanis, between the time Mr. Difanis' appointment to that position was announced and his start date.* While no specific reference is made in that proposal to team policing, the topic of the research--the nature of police-community relationships--is one of the basic features of the Team policing approach. The first documented Crime Reduction Council statement specifically referencing a team policing approach was found in the minutes of the 2 February 1976 meeting. At that time, boundaries of three target areas were described, and the Chief of Police recommended that the Council pursue a team policing model in developing the Phase I action project. He further noted that such a project would consume all funds available for Phase I. Following this, the Council "agreed" to a team policing concept and directed the staff to begin the preparation of an Impact Plan for Phase I and an action grant application for team policing.

Mr. Difanis left the program in April 1976, just prior to the completion of the Plan, and Mr. John Morrison, a staff member, completed the Plan and delivered it to ILEC on 27 April 1976. Both of these documents indicated a five-man neighborhood police team that would concurrently operate in three target areas, devoting most of its time to prevention efforts.

Mr. Neil Weisman, who had directed the Joliet UHCR program for

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* Mr. Difanis is presently State's Attorney for Champaign County and consequently a Crime Reduction Council member.

about 18 months, was recruited for position of Director in August 1976. After Mr. Weisman's arrival, the project design was revised to a full-service team policing unit which would operate in a single target neighborhood.* Major changes were:

- from a five-man team to a thirteen-man team, with the eight additional men selected from a pool of volunteers from the patrol force;
- in the equipment category, dropping of TAC II alarm equipment and adding a crime prevention van;
- from the University of Illinois Psychology Department to Project LOCATE as the primary source of crime analysis and evaluation data; and
- the addition of two citizen surveys, one conducted before Team operation began, and one after about one year, for evaluating the impact of Team Policing.

The Team Policing Unit attended a three-day training course on team building, with a particular emphasis on management styles and team decision-making. One component of the training fulfilled the important need of orienting the rest of the Champaign Police Department to the nature of team policing, in an effort to prevent it from viewing the team as an "elitist" unit, separate and somehow higher in status.

### 2.2.2 East St. Louis

The East St. Louis Phase I Plan describes four proposed action projects.** The Crime Deterrence Project, to operate in a specified police district, will consist of three major components.

- Burglary and Robbery investigation teams will work within the Investigation Section of the Police Department. A case screening procedure is envisioned which will enable these teams to work on cases having a high probability of being cleared by arrest.
- A crime deterrence squad will work specific high crime locations in plain clothes. Equipped with hand-held radios, these officers will work in unmarked cars, on bicycles or possibly on foot. Officers on the squad will respond only to robbery and burglary calls, and their precise working hours and areas of patrol will be guided by the data prepared by a crime analyst.

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* It was noted at the 23 September meeting that if the full-service version of the project were selected, it would operate in only one target area--the Northeast.

** We indicated earlier that of the projects described below, only the Crime Analysis Unit and perhaps the crime deterrence squad are being considered for funding at the present time.

- Media broadcasts will be used to develop a psychological deterrent by creating the impression that the Police Department is omnipresent.

The goal of this project is to reduce robbery and burglary by 20 percent in two years.

The second action project described in the Phase I Plan is a team policing unit that will consist of 36 police officers, covering a broad range of police expertise (patrol, investigation, juvenile matters, crime prevention). This team will be supervised by a commanding officer and will provide all police services in the target area. While improvements in police/community relationships is indicated as one project thrust, outcomes anticipated include the improvement of patrol and investigative functions as well. Aside from its size and its emphasis on robbery and burglary, the team policing project is patterned after models described in the literature.

A Crime Analysis Unit is proposed as the third Phase I action project for East St. Louis. The number of people comprising this unit is not indicated in the Plan. Unit staff will attend all team policing meetings, but its work is expected to serve all facets of the department. A manual system for recording information on offenses, offenders/criminal histories, suspects, property and victims is planned. Daily and weekly summaries of crime patterns and trends and potential crime targets will be prepared by the unit from this information. The Crime Analysis Unit will also be instrumental in converting from Set 1 and Set 2 reporting of data for Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting, and in modifying the Police Department's geocoding grid.

The final action project proposed in the Phase I Plan will focus on public information and education activities. Using both the media and civic organizations, an attempt will be made to encourage citizens to cooperate with the police in fighting crime. Block watch programs and a CB crime watchers force represent two special features of this project.

We found it impossible to trace the origins of the four projects described in the East St. Louis Phase I Plan from program documentation. No mention of them could be found in any of the written materials available for our review, outside of the Plan itself. Crime Reduction Council minutes make no reference to these projects, except inasmuch as they represent a section of the Plan. According to Mr. Stanford Scott, Director of the Program Coordination Unit, the projects were developed largely by the Police Department with the assistance of his staff.

Other action projects had been discussed at Crime Reduction Council meetings. In particular, funding for a mounted patrol within the Police Department and a Youth Services Bureau were sought in the early stages of the program. At that time, however, the Council was unaware of the planning requirements that had to precede the application for action grants.

### 2.2.3 Joliet

The Mobile Crime Prevention Unit funded against the Phase I Plan became operational in September 1976.* It consists of the three components, all supervised by a Sergeant: a Crime Prevention Team, a Selective Enforcement Team (SET), and a Crime Analyst. The Crime Prevention Team consists of patrol officers who conduct security surveys, speak at community meetings, distribute crime prevention literature, and demonstrate crime prevention techniques from a Winnebago van. High-Crime neighborhoods are identified on the basis of daily, weekly and monthly reports on burglary and robbery by the Crime Analyst. These reports are essentially listings of crime occurring in those categories noting the police zone of occurrence, the address, the type of premise, day and time.

The SET consists of seven officers. It conducts surveillances of potential robbery and burglary targets, and also performs decoy operations. Surveillance activities are supported by silent alarm equipment which can be utilized in up to fifteen locations. Decoy operations of the SET are modeled on the New York Street Crime Unit. In general, this team works in plain clothes and with unmarked vehicles. Information from the Crime Analyst is also utilized in directing SET activities.

The basic elements of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit were presented to the Crime Reduction Council in its 25 July 1975 meeting. The emphasis was to inform the citizen of what was believed to be his role in fighting target crimes. Coordination with the city's Community Relations Department was seen to be an important means of involving citizens. Although the elements of the project were spelled out in this 23 July 1975 meeting, two workshops of

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* Although the grant was awarded a year earlier, substantial delays were encountered in meeting Equal Employment Opportunity objectives, and in securing communications equipment and the mobile trailer (the latter funded under a non-UHCR grant.

the Joliet Crime Reduction Council, on 16 July and 12 May, appear to have led to its specific formulation.* The community/police crime prevention concept, reported on at the 25 June meeting of the Council, was the major outcome of the earlier workshop, while deciding on specific project elements seems to have been the major task of the Council at the 16 July workshop.

Earlier ideas for a Phase I action project were submitted to the Crime Reduction Council in the form of concept papers. These constituted a point of departure for the 12 May workshop and included the following topics: police information systems, selective enforcement, unmarked squads (x-car), and burglary-robbery investigative specialists. The investigative specialists were ultimately dropped from the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit, but specialization appeared later as the Special Prosecution Unit under Phase II (see below).

Objectives of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit were discussed at the 3 October 1975 Council meeting. These were to (a) reduce the opportunity of becoming a victim of burglary and robbery, and (b) increase the risk of arrest. One Council member cited the increased pressure of the adjudicatory process if the project were to concentrate on making arrests, and he stated that prevention would be the main thrust of the project.

Dual strategies for addressing the target crimes are embodied in the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit: crime prevention education to reduce victimization by opportunity, and selective enforcement to increase the risk of apprehension, particularly on or near the scene. A second Phase I project, which was not described in the Impact Plan, was awarded to the Neighborhood Services Division of the Community Relations Department.** This project will enable the city to rebate between 10 and 40 percent of certain expenditures for improving the physical security of households in a particular neighborhood.

First mention of the problem addressed by the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program appeared in the minutes of the 23 July 1975 meeting of the Crime Reduction Council. Poor housing construction in certain neighborhoods was cited as making it relatively easy to kick in the door in order

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* No notes or minutes were taken at these workshops.

** Grants for this project, as well as the Phase II project described later, were awarded after Mr. Weisman left his position as Director to become Director of the Champaign program. Mr. Gary Fitzgerald, a staff member, assumed the position of Acting Director and subsequently was made permanent Director of the Joliet program.

to gain entry. Also it was frequently mentioned at meetings that the prevention aspect of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit should be coordinated with the Community Relations Department.

Further support for the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program was noted at the 7 January 1976 meeting of the Crime Reduction Council. At that time, it was suggested that prevention projects be linked with related federal programs such as those funded by HUD. The HUD program is providing 10 to 40 percent rebates for general up-grading of housing to meet municipal code standards.

Training by Crime Prevention Team members will enable housing inspectors to detect key security weaknesses in homes for which inspection is mandatory under the code, and Crime Prevention Team members will perform more detailed inspections where requested. Security improvements which qualify for rebates are:

- the installation of lighting for porches, garages, or yards;
- the purchase and installation of solid core doors as replacements for hollow-core doors;
- the purchase and installation of deadbolt locks;
- the purchase and installation of ground-level window locks.

In order to receive a rebate, the homeowner is to arrange for these improvements and submit receipts indicating that the work has been completed.

The grant application for the rebate Project requested funds to cover two neighborhoods--"conservation" areas targeted for the HUD-funded housing code rebate program. Census tracts containing these neighborhoods ranked fifth and third (of twenty) in residential burglary in the first six months of 1974. Over ninety percent of housing units were built prior to 1939, compared to fifty-six percent for the city overall. Other demographic measures, such as percentage of substandard housing, median income, and percent of families receiving welfare benefits reflect poorer conditions in these neighborhoods than in the city overall. ILEC limited the project to one area, and the Crime Reduction Council decided jointly with the neighborhood. Security improvements to 100-120 homes in the Spring Creek area are expected under this grant.

According to the Phase II Plan, three key factors led to the choice of the State's Attorney's Office (SAO) to implement the adjudication action project. First was the observation that the circuit court is not suitably structured for a crime-specific project. Second, the fact that the SAO

makes charging decisions was cited as key to the entire adjudication process. Finally, computations were made to demonstrate that the full trial capability of the SAO was lower (in 1974) than that of the judiciary or the Public Defender's Office.

Other factors noted earlier at Crime Reduction Council meetings were the low salary and low incentive at the SAO, making it difficult for that office to retain experienced prosecution attorneys. It was also conjectured at one of the meetings that 30 to 40 families in the city accounted for a disproportionately large number of crimes, leading to the notion that priority be given to "repeat" offenders.

The Special Prosecution Unit that evolved from these factors consists of two Assistant State's Attorneys who will prosecute all robbery and burglary cases occurring within Will County. These individuals will handle all facets of these cases, from screening to final disposition. One Assistant is to prepare written guidelines for case screening in determining whether a complaint should be filed and if so, what the charge(s) should be. Criteria for the identification of "repeat" offenders are also to be established for the Unit. Another of the Unit's activities is to work closely with the Police Department, to facilitate the formatting of case information for case screening, and to provide up-to-date developments in constitutional interpretations or statutory changes relating to search, seizure and interrogation functions.

### 2.2.4 Peoria

As we mentioned previously, the Peoria program had initially intended to complete planning and analysis for all phases before applying for any action grants. This was to have been accomplished in two parts, one for the adult system and one for the juvenile system. Time constraints for committing Crime Impact funds (see Section 1.2) forced a decision to allocate those funds to projects recommended for the adult system only, since the analysis of juvenile data is not yet complete. Thus three action projects will begin operations in May or June 1977.

The first action project approved by the Crime Reduction Council (19 January 1977 meeting) is entitled "Dedicated Prosecution." In this project, one Assistant State's Attorney will be dedicated to the task of

increasing the speed of residential burglary cases through the adult system, particularly from arrest to indictment. In recognition of case-load fluctuations, guidelines have been tentatively established, in which cases for which an opportunity exists to reduce the time between arrest and indictment are to be assigned highest priority, and within that group, cases stemming from residential burglaries committed within Peoria city limits have priority. Probation revocation hearings for individuals previously convicted of residential burglary and processing/prosecuting non-residential burglary cases have lower priority.

Two other action projects have been approved by the Council (30 March 1977) for the Adult Plan. The first is a Physical Evidence Project consisting of two major parts. In one part, a Crime Scene Search Officer and fully-equipped mobile crime lab will attempt to collect latent prints and other trace evidence at residential burglary crime scenes.

The other part of the Physical Evidence Project will substantially expand the active suspect fingerprint file and develop a semi-automated fingerprint matching capability which would be needed to compare latent prints in the expanded file in an efficient and timely manner. This computer-assisted matching capability is semi-automated in the sense that large numbers of prints on file can be eliminated from consideration on the basis of coded characteristics that are matched by the computer to corresponding coded characteristics of a latent set of prints. Those not so eliminated would still have to be compared manually with the latent set. This part of the Physical Evidence Project will support the purchase of a computer terminal and printer (for entering codes and retrieving search results), computer programming services (to develop a "matching" computer program), and the services of a fingerprint classification specialist (to encode prints that will be contained in the expanded active file).*

The third action project recommended in the Adult Plan is the establishment of a Criminal Information Center. This unit will consist of a Sergeant, an Officer and a Clerk/Typist who will constitute a formal clearinghouse for the exchange of information related to the offense of

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* With the exception of the terminal, existing computer facilities of the Peoria Police Department will be utilized.

residential burglary. Information describing patterns of residential burglary and the modus operandi of suspects will be formatted and disseminated by the Center in a timely manner. The staff will also prepare reports to assist Police Department management in making decisions concerning policies, procedures and operations.

The derivation of action projects in Peoria occurred in three stages of the program. The first stage entailed the 90-day development of a Master Plan Design for the LEAA-funded Crime Impact Program. This work was done by L. Aubrey Moore under contract to the City of Peoria. Essentially, the Master Plan Design contained an approach to developing a Master Plan for action under Crime Impact. While work towards the Master Plan Design was in progress, Peoria learned that funds were available for UHCR, whose analytic requirements were more stringent than those of Crime Impact. Nonetheless, the product of the work outlined in the Master Plan Design would satisfy both sets of requirements. Thus, the agreement was reached that technically planning for Crime Impact would simply be absorbed by planning for UHCR. This stage occurred between March and June, 1974.

The second stage of the Peoria UHCR program began with the recruitment of Howard Rickard as Director. During this stage, some material was added to the Master Plan Design, but the approach described in that document was not executed. Moreover, the "Master Plan" failed to receive ILEC approval. We note that all three of the full-time professional staff of the present Crime Reduction Council were working on the "Master Plan" during much of this second stage, but that the Crime Reduction Council had not been formed. This stage spanned the one-year period beginning in July 1974.

The third and present stage of the program began with the formation and first meeting of the Crime Reduction Council (27 August 1975). At this time, a formal briefing was given by an Operations Research Specialist with the Peoria Police Department, who was serving temporarily as Director of UHCR in Peoria until a full-time permanent Director could be recruited. This briefing outlined the goals of the program and the approach to be taken. Copies of briefing materials and sections of the Master Plan Design were sent to Council members. The selection of L. Aubrey Moore as Director was announced at the second meeting of the Crime Reduction Council in October 1975. Mr. Moore began as Director shortly after this meeting.

The (Adult) Master Plan evolved as a series of studies, each designed to test hypotheses about relationships between actions, policies or practices of the (adult) justice system and (a) the indicence of residential burglary or (b) the behavior of adults arrested for that crime. These hypotheses are keyed to a program structure, which exhibits alternative strategies for reducing the level of target crime. Five major studies were performed in testing the hypotheses. These dealt with:

- comparisons among various categories of persons within the "target population" (i.e., arrested for a residential burglary occurring within Peoria city limits between 1 January 1971 and 1 July 1976) with respect to re-arrests, and estimates of the number of residential burglaries that would not have occurred during this period if there had been no recidivism (the Recidivism Study);
- relationships between sanctions of the (adult) criminal justice system (two sanction variables for police and one for each of pre-trial processing, verdict, and sentencing) and the number of residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by adults (Deterrence Study);
- relationships between the speed of the system (overall and between designated case processing benchmarks) and the number of residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by adults (Time Study);
- relationships between (a) the probability of not securing release on bail and the number of residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by adults and (b) the amount of pre-trial jail time associated with target (adult) arrests and the number of residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by adults (Bail/Bond Study);
- relationships between the system's identification of an response to individual social problems (e.g., drug abuse of the target population and these individuals' subsequent re-arrests for residential burglary (Diversion/Rehabilitation Study).

The studies utilized a data base consisting of information about adults arrested for residential burglary from 1972 through the first half of 1976. This data base was compiled by the staff from source records. Findings of these studies--summarized in terms of the major elements of the program structure--are quoted from the Adult Plan as follows:*

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* Adult Master Plan, City of Peoria Crime Reduction Council, pp. 10-11.

I. Reduce Opportunity

There currently exists no body of facts upon which to make a determination of whether or not, or to what extent, Reducing the Opportunity to commit residential burglary in Peoria will lead to a reduction in this offense. In order to answer this question, it would be necessary actually to implement, and of course, evaluate, a program designed to accomplish this.

II. Increasing the Risks

Action taken thus far related to the Risk of Detection has been to determine exactly what those risks are now. The Victimization Survey recently conducted in Peoria provided us with information regarding how many residential burglaries actually occur in Peoria, as distinct from the number that are brought to the attention of the Police Department.

Our analysis has indicated that, of the remaining components under this section of the Program Structure, the two most important are, in priority order: Prompt Case Disposition (particularly at the front end of the system) and Increasing the Risk of Apprehension.

III. Reduce Recidivism

Our analysis has revealed that recidivism for the offense of residential burglary is not a serious problem. Our study of Diversion/Rehabilitation practices reveal that this does not occur frequently enough to draw any conclusions regarding possible or potential crime reduction effects. Our studies do suggest that Bail-Bond practices probably do have an effect on the incidence of residential burglary in the City.*

In summary, our analyses of the facts suggest that the most important actions the Crime Reduction Council should take are to increase the likelihood that, if an individual commits a residential burglary he will be caught, and that he will be dealt with in a swift manner. The three action projects described in this plan are intended to accomplish these objectives.

The Dedicated Prosecutor Project was recommended to address the program structure objective, "Prompt Case Disposition." This recommendation, which was described as based upon discussions with the State's Attorney, stemmed from the observations that cases could best be accelerated between arrest and indictment using an Assistant State's Attorney

* Further analysis in the area of Bail-Bond practices is being undertaken.

to screen residential burglary cases and to move these cases to the Circuit Court within 30 days.

A more elaborate procedure was followed to select the two projects designed to increase the risk of apprehension. Four methods were used to develop an initial list of about 125 projects. First, an examination of target arrests (used in the studies) was made to identify key factors leading to these arrests. Next, personal interviews with more than 60 line police officers were conducted to solicit their ideas. Third, evaluative research relating to action strategies tried elsewhere was reviewed. Finally, activities of existing components of the Police Department were studied.

Based on criteria relating to administrative and management feasibility, the availability of facts to support a belief that a project could be expected to increase the risk of apprehension, the possibility of accomplishing project objectives through procedural or operational changes, time and financial constraints, and prior experience with similar projects elsewhere, several categories of action projects were presented to the Council, along with the results of staff examination of projects in these categories. From this point, three action projects were recommended: Physical Evidence, Criminal Investigation Center, and Fencing Operations. Further study indicated that substantial resources would be required to implement the Fencing Operations Project properly, and that project was subsequently dropped from consideration. In regards to the Physical Evidence Project, it was noted in at least two Council meetings that this would facilitate the prosecution function by (a) providing physical evidence in a more timely manner (thereby assisting the Dedicated Prosecutor Project) and (b) strengthening the case.

We note that during the period of development of the Adult Plan, particularly in the early stages, action projects were discussed in Council meetings, and two major opportunities arose to fund action projects under the aegis of UHCR. The first was a burglary prevention project which was in fact implemented for several months under the direction of the Peoria Police Department. This project used Civil Defense volunteers, trained by the Police Department, to conduct premise surveys and enroll households in Operation Identification. The Crime Reduction Council adopted this project as experimental, given the absence

of information relating to the "Reduce Opportunity" objective of the program structure, and the staff prepared an evaluation design for it. The project's activities were limited to a single area of the city. However, after about 25 percent of the households in the area had been contacted, the project was terminated due to a lack of manpower. No UHCR funds were requested or expended for this project.

The other major project which was seriously considered by the Council was TASC (Treatment Alternative to Street Crime). Funds for this project were available to the city from the Illinois Dangerous Drugs Commission, and the Council deliberated for several months, finally deciding in its 3 March 1977 meeting to drop TASC from consideration on the following grounds:

- There was not adequate time to gather facts necessary to design a local TASC project.
- The local drug treatment facility was operating at capacity and consequently would not be able to accommodate a large number of new referrals.
- Persons arrested for residential burglary may not qualify for the local treatment program because of the seriousness of the charge.
- Confidentiality regulations would preclude law enforcement officials from questioning an individual in treatment.

## 2.3 Assessment of the Derivation of Action Projects

Guidelines for local UHCR programs promulgated by ILEC in August 1975 contained a number of specifications relating to the derivation of recommended action projects:

- specific objectives;
- anticipated impact on target crime, goals, needs, standards, and the community as a whole;
- major project components;
- measures of project effectiveness and evaluation procedures; and
- future funding requirements.

Specific objectives were to be framed in terms of expected project accomplishments, e.g. more arrests, improved police/community relations, faster case processing, and so forth. The manner in which the attainment of these specific objectives would affect target crime, goals, needs, standards, and the community as a whole was to be described next. A parenthetical statement in the guidelines indicated that these anticipated impacts be related to the data analysis in other parts of the Plan. This was to be followed by descriptions of the actions that would be taken towards the attainment of the projects' effectiveness with respect to the their specific objectives, and procedures for assessing effectiveness, were to be specified next. The last specification was for future funding requirements for projects.

The UHCR Program was designed to promote a planning approach which would be anchored in ends rather than means. Action projects were to be selected or designed on the basis of what they were expected to accomplish with respect to target crime reduction, other goals of the Crime Reduction Council, needs and standards for the local criminal justice system, and goals of the community for the criminal justice system. This was implicitly contrasted with project justifications on a grant by grant basis, where no single set of statements toward which several actions could work in common.

Item (1) under Phase I of the Plan Format section in the guidelines asked from each local program a planning and program design, analysis and data collection plans, an organizational structure, a workplan/timetable, and a performance management system to monitor the progress of the planning

effort. Briefly, these amounted to a plan for meeting specifications for deriving action projects. Execution of this plan could therefore result in an Impact Plan for local UHCR programs. The planning and program design would provide a framework for deriving action projects in compliance with specifications, and the analysis and data collection plans would provide a methodology for developing or supporting anticipated impacts of alternative action strategies, within the framework of the planning and program design. An organizational structure, locating the staff of the Crime Reduction Council city government and describing the respective responsibilities of the Council and staff, was also to be prepared. A workplan and timetable were to be specified for performing planning tasks, and a performance management system was to have been developed to monitor the work.

Ideally, a number of action projects, that might be hosted by any agency of the local criminal justice system, would be assessed in terms of anticipated impact before recommending specific projects for funding. Implementing the Program in phases limited action project choices to within the major criminal justice functions of law enforcement, adjudication and corrections. The Champaign, East St. Louis and Joliet programs adopted this option. The Peoria program attempted to assess the impact of possible actions on a range of criminal justice system objectives, but time constraints precluded the completion of studies relating to the juvenile justice system before Crime Impact funds had to be committed. Thus some action projects were selected on the basis of adult system studies alone.

Plans for meeting specifications for the derivation of action projects were submitted as outlines by Champaign, East St. Louis and Joliet. Essentially, these consisted of objectives, tasks and responsibilities associated with the planning effort. The Joliet plan also included a program structure which outlined three major strategy objectives for reducing the level of robbery and burglary. The outlines had been formulated prior to, or during the course of planning activities, and they were included in Phase I Plans of these cities, as implied in the guidelines.

In Peoria, the plan consisted of three parts: the Master Plan Design, which had been developed for the LEAA Crime Impact Program as described in Section 2.2.4 above; a program structure; and a task outline which, among other objectives, indicated that a series of studies would be made in order to assess relationships between criminal justice system actions and the level of residential burglary.

Each city's plan for deriving action projects addressed at least one of the five items on which action projects were to have an impact (target crimes, other goals, needs standards, and the community). None of the plans, however, specified in a comprehensive and systematic manner how data analysis would be applied in assessing action project impacts on all of these items. That the plans were not comprehensive is not surprising, given the enormity of this task and the limited time frame for planning. That they also did not seem to be aware of the full implications of these guidelines indicates that the guidelines were not written as clearly as they might have been.

The plans for deriving action projects were actually submitted to ILEC for the most part as performance management systems. However, procedures were not specified in any of the cities for determining whether tasks were being carried out according to these plans. In one case, the relevance of such a system for planning activities was called into question. More generally, the intent of performance management with respect to a planning effort did not seem to have been fully understood or appreciated. The cities had little prior experience in criminal justice planning that could be tapped in establishing realistic timetables or in developing procedures for monitoring their progress. Moreover, ILEC was not altogether confident in its own estimates of the time that would be required to complete tasks in the development of Impact Plans. On balance, it seems fair to conclude that the performance management component of the Program was not implemented as anticipated, although the material submitted by the cities as performance management systems apparently guided their respective planning efforts to some degree.

Despite the absense of comprehensive and systematic plans for deriving action projects, we stated above that the items upon which these

actions were to have an impact were addressed either implicitly or explicitly to some degree in all of the cities. Statements concerning the anticipated impact of action projects on target crimes, other goals, needs, standards, and the community were drawn from three major sources:

- expertise of Crime Reduction Council members and their experience with local conditions;
- documentation of research results in criminology, evaluation findings of programs tried elsewhere, and descriptions of such programs; and
- quantitative analysis of local data describing crime and the criminal justice system.

General statements concerning the anticipated impact of projects on goals other than target crime reduction, and on needs, standards, and the community appear in the Champaign and Joliet Phase I Plans and in the Joliet Phase II Plan. These statements seem to have been drawn from the first two data sources listed above. Virtually no mention is made in East St. Louis Phase I Plan of the anticipated impact of action projects on these items. The Peoria Adult Master Plan focused solely on the anticipated impact of action projects on target crime levels, and it has relied on data from all three sources in this effort. Since target crime reduction is the major goal of the UHCR Program, the remainder of this section addresses the application of data analysis (particularly quantitative analysis) in supporting or developing anticipated effects of action projects on target crime levels.*

The Joliet and Champaign programs placed significant emphasis on the community in their Phase I Plans. Anticipated impacts of projects on the community are discussed extensively in program materials, and crime prevention through community participation was taken as a key strategy for Phase I in both cities. In Joliet, it was anticipated that target crime levels would fall as a result of community crime prevention and increasing the risk of apprehension. The latter was expected as a consequence of selective enforcement activities. In Champaign, reduction in the level of residential burglary (as well as other offenses) in the target area were anticipated from community crime prevention and improved police-community

* LEAA has more recently expressed concern about the application of quantitative analysis to the planning process, as evidenced by their support for the development and delivery of training courses in planning, analysis and evaluation.

relations, as well as from the additional police manpower that would be present in the target area in the form of team policing.

The two Phase I projects in Joliet complemented one another towards the attainment of the community crime prevention objective. The Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Project was a natural follow-up to the efforts of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit in educating the public about household security. Support for the expectation that a community crime prevention strategy, supplemented by the selective enforcement team, would lead to reduction in robbery and burglary was implied in the Plan. The observation was made that a substantial percentage of burglaries did not involve the use of force to gain entry, and that additional household security measures would either remove the opportunity or make it more difficult to gain entry, thereby increasing the chance of detection and apprehension. Further, it was believed that the presence or threat of presence of alarm equipment located on prospective burglary or (commercial) robbery targets would (a) increase the risk of being arrested on or near the scene or (b) prevent the crime from occuring due to perceived fear of being caught in the act.

The reasoning summarized in the previous paragraph appears sound in explaining expectations for the impact of the two Phase I projects on target crimes in Joliet. Its soundness, however, does not depend in any significant way on the data collected, compiled and analyzed in the Plan, except for the first observation made about the percentage of no force burglaries. Rather, the soundness of the reasoning stems from its common sense appeal and the beliefs that (a) the behavior of the public with respect to protecting itself against robbery and burglary can be modified by crime prevention efforts and (b) the behavior of would-be offenders will be altered by the operations of the selective enforcement team. The utility of other data (which are extensive) may be found in guiding project operations in serving as baselines for the evaluation of action projects.

The Special Prosecution Unit which was derived in the Phase II Plan was also associated with a significant data collection and research effort. Descriptions of agencies and groups relating to the adjudication process were embellished with insights to problems and bottlenecks in this process, drawn from discussions with appropriate officials. The adjudication of

both adults and juveniles was covered in the Phase II Plan. Statistical data relating to the flow of adult defendants arrested for robbery and burglary in 1974 was also discussed in the Plan.

Specific objectives of the Special Prosecution Unit are to increase the capability of the State's Attorney's Office to take felony defendants to trial and to effect "high-quality" prosecution of felony defendants, especially those accused of target crimes and those identified as repeat offenders. More effective prosecution can reasonably be expected to deter would-be offenders from committing target crimes or to lead to the conviction and to the incarceration of repeat offenders. Both of these outcomes could in turn be expected to result in reductions in target crime levels. However, we found no evidence that the data were used to derive or support these anticipated outcomes.

Computations made from the workload data for the State's Attorney's Office, the Circuit Court and the Public Defender's Office were in part responsible for the decision to place the Phase II action project in the State's Attorney's Office. These resulted in the observation that the full trial capability of the SAO was below that of the other two components. The additional two prosecutors to the staff under the Special Prosecution Unit grant brings full trial capability measures of these three adjudicative elements into parity. While notable in itself, this application of data analysis does not address project outcomes with respect to target crime levels. In sum, the three Joliet projects addressed two of the three major strategy objectives of the program structure described earlier, but the relevance of the data in deriving these projects was found to be limited.

The Champaign Phase I Plan indicated that certain patterns were exhibited in residential burglaries which make it possible to have an impact on the level of that crime "through careful planning strategies." The data analysis presented in the Phase I Plan highlighted the absence of witnesses, the proportion of no force burglaries, and the observation that theft and burglary cases are adjudicated more frequently in juvenile court than are any other offense.

Assuming that police/community relations do improve as a consequence of team policing, to the point that these problems are alleviated, the

favorable impact of this result on the level of residential burglary was assumed to follow. To our knowledge, no studies of this relationship was documented for Champaign; nor were studies of the relationships between the performance of criminal justice system components and the target crime or target offenders documented as indicated in the plan outline described earlier. This summarizes what we were able to learn from materials which alluded to the application of data analysis in formulating the anticipated impact of the Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Project on residential burglary in Champaign.

The East St. Louis Phase I Plan contains a variety of statistics relating to robbery and burglary. The major use of these data appears to have been in the description of target areas for the proposed Crime Deterrence, Team Policing, and Public Information/Education projects. We found no evidence of the use of these data in supporting the anticipated effects of these projects on target crime levels.

It should be evident from the description of the Peoria program that it differed significantly from those of the other three cities in its utilization of quantitative analysis for deriving action projects. The program structure served as a foundation for the studies that were performed by the Crime Reduction Council staff. Although Peoria and Joliet both keyed their programs to similar program structures the use of this tool differed noticeably between the two cities. In Joliet, the achievement of three major strategy objectives (reduce opportunity, increase risks, reduce recidivism) was believed to be sufficient for reducing target crime levels, and action projects were selected on the basis of their ability to achieve those strategy objectives. In Peoria, relative effects on target crime levels of achieving these strategy objectives were treated as unknown, and the thrust of the planning effort was to determine these relative effects on the basis of the local data that had been collected. Action project candidates for achieving the strategy objectives were found to have the greatest relative effect on the target crime were then considered for further study. Supplemental data were collected and analyzed to identify those projects which could most reasonably be expected to achieve these strategy objectives.

The development or support of expectations about the impact of alternative actions on target crime, from an empirical perspective, is certainly an important factor in making the best choice(s) from among those alternatives, given limited resources. Making optimal choices with limited resources is a fundamental principle of planning and the focal point of most operations research methods. The UHCR Program was designed to encourage greater emphasis than is typically found in criminal justice planning on the relative importance of this factor with respect to others. Thus, while the best mix of all these factors may vary with particular circumstances, and correctly so, one aim of UHCR was to give local units of government the opportunity to test the efficacy of stressing the analytic factor--using local data--in developing or selecting action projects to reduce the level of selected crimes.* Our conclusion is that this test can only be made in Peoria, since it was the only city to satisfy the premise of the test. The only major departure from the Master Plan Design was the selection of action projects prior to the completion of both the Adult and Juvenile parts.** Whether these choices might have been different otherwise is a point that will be addressed by the Crime Reduction Council when the Juvenile Plan is complete.

Our evaluation of the UHCR Program process suggests that a number of factors led to the conclusion just stated. The first, and perhaps most important factor, concerns the guidelines themselves. We are sensitive to the problems associated with implementing new or complex programs, and UHCR had both of these characteristics. We can only conjecture as to specific reasons why the application of data analysis discussed in this section are understated in the guidelines. If more attention had been devoted to explaining this aspect of the planning effort face-to-face or through more carefully constructed guidelines before city officials decided to participate, implementation of the Program would have probably been delayed further and some of the cities might have declined participation. In Waukegan, the fact that the Program contained a planning component at all was apparently sufficient to deter that city from participating.

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* This is discussed at greater length in Section 5.

** One might describe the apparent exclusion of the strategy objective "Reduce Opportunity" from furhter consideraton, on the basis of no factual evidence concerning its effectiveness in reducing residential burglary, a somewhat severe decision.

Several factors peculiar to Peoria led that city to stress the analytic factor in the derivation of action projects. For one, the context of the Peoria UHCR program enabled a stronger emphasis on planning activities than in the other cities. Several major action grants had been awarded to the city, easing pressure which may otherwise have been present to turn UHCR more towards action. These included the Crime Impact grant (LEAA) and the Violent Crime Reduction Program (ILEC), both described in Section 1.2. In addition, grants to train police officers in handling possibly explosive domestic problems and to link the Police Department's Computer Aided Dispatch with its On-Line Information System were awarded to the city at about the same time as UHCR. The latter led the Police Department to begin examining its various data bases and familiarized Department personnel with data available and their format. This would seem to be of benefit to the Crime Reduction Council staff in its data collection efforts.*

The leadership of the Chairman and Director of Peoria's Crime Reduction Council has been essential to the adherence by the Peoria program to its rigorous planning approach. A reading of Council meeting minutes indicates that, on numerous occasions, either the Director or the Chairman redirected discussions towards the program structure or the target crime of residential burglary. The Council was also frequently reminded that statements made in relation to factors affecting the target crime would always be subject to empirical test. In instances where decisions were made about treatment of the data or where the findings needed qualification, these were always explicitly documented.

Peoria allocated significantly more of its share of UHCR funds to planning than did the other cities. This was made possible in part by the availability of LEAA Crime Impact funds, of which about $108,500 of $166,000 was reserved for action projects. More than a half million dollars will have been spent on the planning component of the Peoria program, compared to an average of about $177,000 in the other cities. Despite the apparent lack of progress of the planning effort during its first year under the first Director, the staff was able to familiarize itself with sources and

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* Computer reports were manually validated by the staff, and offender tracking data were manually compiled. Thus, while computer-based data systems aided the staff's work indirectly, a considerable amount of manual data collection was nonetheless required.

nature of relevant data during this period. Thus, while we do not contend that the additional funding Peoria allocated to planning would have led to noticeably different planning efforts in the other cities, we do believe that it was an important factor in enabling the Peoria program to conduct its planning activities in the manner it has.

Finally, we note that meetings of key figures in the local criminal justice system were not new to Peoria under UHCR. The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court had been holding informal meetings of criminal justice system officials in his chambers, and the new Chief Judge has continued this practice. Also, a committee, consisting of representatives from the five agencies receiving grants under the Violent Crime Reduction Program, was formed to discuss issues and problems associated with that program.

We stated in our Interim Report that the UHCR Program was ambitious and we concluded that ILEC severely underestimated the orientation and level of effort that would be needed to implement the Program in four cities that had been selected on the basis of their crime problem alone. It is important at this point for ILEC to re-examine the objectives associated with the remaining planning phases in Joliet, Champaign, and East St. Louis. Particularly with all of the cities in their third and final year of UHCR (planning) grants, it is unlikely that the Program Coordination Units in these cities will dramatically shift their approach. ILEC should exercise caution not to promote the UHCR concept--with its research-type planning approach--at a pace faster than most local communities are prepared for, or before its effectiveness as a planning approach for crime reduction can be assessed.

The real question of the efficacy of data analysis to develop or support action project expectations cannot be assessed until the second and third year evaluations. The fact that it will have taken Peoria nearly three years to complete all planning activities seriously raises questions of timeliness.* As the discussion in Section 4 suggests, crime problems may begin to abate before any action can be taken towards their abatement. These issues are discussed at greater length in Section 5.

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* The excellent documentation of all aspects of the Peoria program will certainly facilitate replication efforts, but this would still involve a substantial effort in most cities.

## 2.4 Other Process Considerations

One of the objectives of UHCR was to promote interagency cooperation and coordination within the four local criminal justice systems. Such cooperation and coordination must exist as well between various levels of government (city, county, region, state), since law enforcement is largely a city-level function (although county sheriffs are represented on two of the Crime Reduction Councils); adjudication is a county or circuit level function; and corrections, other than community-based activities, is operated at the state level. This section begins by examining the organization and performance of the four Crime Reduction Councils toward these ends.

Of the four cities, only Joliet established its Crime Reduction Council by City Ordinance, and only East St. Louis drew up by-laws to regulate meeting procedures. Aside from these two formal actions, Crime Reduction Councils were established informally in all of the cities.

With regard to the East St. Louis by-laws, the major consequence has been the Crime Reduction Council's difficulty in meeting self-imposed quorum constraints, which required minimum representation from city and county members. Thus, much of the Council's business has been "unofficial." Unfortunately, Council discussions about proposed Phase I action projects took place without a quorum, with the consequence that decisions made and work undertaken were not documented.

The Joliet Crime Reduction Council has not been hampered by the formal nature of its establishment, except in one instance where a dispute arose over the prerogative of the Mayor to choose a citizen member. We have observed in Joliet, one source of potential difficulty that should be assessed carefully in replicating the Program. Because a City Council votes on all city appropriations, individuals sitting on both bodies might abstain from voting on Crime Reduction Council matters that will ultimately be considered by the City Council. This might have the effect of diluting decision-making responsibilities of a Crime Reduction Council.*

Judging from the above descriptions, the method used to establish Crime Reduction Councils does not appear to have been a major factor in local program processes. It was evident from the materials we examined and the interviews

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* In practice, this does not appear to have been a problem in Joliet.

we conducted that the Joliet Crime Reduction Council has not been reluctant to exercise its role in policy formulation. The fact that Joliet was the only city where the Council was formed first and took an active role in recruiting a Director attests to its concern that it be in control of the program. By contrast, the East St. Louis Crime Reduction Council has been slow in understanding the purpose of the Program from the time it was established, despite its formal by-laws and its regular monthly meetings.* Only a small fraction of the Council's business has been concerned with the formulation of policy toward directing the work of the staff. Our observations at three Council meetings and our reading of meeting minutes suggest that most of the time was spent discussing fiscal matters, explaining the Program design and purpose to new Council members, or discussing topics that were not directly related to the program.

The Champaign and Peoria Crime Reduction Councils were established informally. In Champaign, minutes were not taken at early Council meetings, and a Chairman has never been selected.** As recently as October 1976, concern was expressed over what was described as a lack of initiative in securing Council input to decision-making.*** We would find it difficult to justify an assertion that the Champaign Crime Reduction Council, as a body, has provided significant leadership in that program. Although the Peoria Crime Reduction Council was not formally created, nor are there formal rules of conducting business (except the traditional rules of order), our attendance at two Council meetings indicates that these are conducted in a business-like manner. Moreover, all meetings of the Crime Reduction Council in Peoria are tape-recorded, transcribed, reviewed and edited by staff and reviewed by the Director prior to their inclusion in materials distributed for the next meeting. While equally extensive procedures may have been undertaken in other cities with regard to meeting minutes, they were not disclosed during the course of our interviews.

It is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the relative roles of the Crime Reduction Councils and their staffs (the Program

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* These apparently have not been held since March 1977, due to the expiration of the city's UHCR grant.

** In December 1976, the Council agreed that the Director would lead its meetings, implying a decision not to elect a Chairman.

*** 28 October 1976 memorandum to Neil Weisman from City Manager Eugene Miller.

Coordination Units) in developing the Impact Plans. Data were collected and analyzed by staff, and findings or observations from the data were presented to Crime Reduction Councils. In Joliet and Champaign, Council requests for information were typically met, although there were exceptions. In East St. Louis, a request was made to study the relationships between "crime and drugs," but this does not appear to have been acted upon by the staff, nor were other studies cited. In Peoria, the Director generally took the initiative in designing the studies and performed more in-depth analyses, or indicated explicitly why they could not be performed, at the request of the Council.

The creation and meeting of Crime Reduction Councils has been of benefit to all of the participating cities. With the exception of Peoria (see previous section) this was the first time that representatives of all agencies comprising the local criminal justice systems have had the opportunity to discuss mutual problems and concerns, and have jointly made decisions as to how funds would be allocated. In particular, Councils have provided a forum for members to view local criminal justice activities as part of a system, and to mutually assess "downstream" affects.

ILEC procedures for administering the UHCR Program were specially tailored within the framework of its standard procedures for grand administration. The UHCR (planning) grants are monitored by the Chief of Planning, and technical assistance requests relating to this grant are made to that individual. Action grants awarded against Impact Plans are co-monitored by the Chief of Planning and the appropriate ILEC program specialist. For example, the Crime Prevention Specialist co-monitors Joliet's Mobile Crime Prevention Unit and Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program, as well as Champaign's Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program. Action project evaluation requirements have, in most cases, appeared as special grant conditions, although this was not done in every instance. Fiscal monitoring of local programs and action projects are performed in the usual manner. If any fiscal decisions or actions are pending for UHCR, the Chief of Planning is supposed to be notified. Fiscal problems encountered by the East St. Louis program suggest that this has not always been the case.

Traditional ILEC procedures have also been followed in the approval chain for both planning and action grant applications. If local match funds are involved, the City Council or County Board must approve a grant application as justification for a local appropriation. Next, the Regional Office of ILEC must approve a grant application, or more specifically, an application must receive a favorable vote from the appropriate regional criminal justice policy board.* This is to ensure that grant awards are consistent with Regional Plans. The ILEC Planning and Budgeting Committee then has final approval authority over both planning and action grant applications submitted under the UHCR Program.**

Impact Plans must also follow an approval chain. The UHCR Program guidelines state that Impact Plans must receive the endorsement of the Crime Reduction Council and the City Council. They also msut be approved by the appropriate ILEC Regional Office as compatible with Regional Plans, and the ILEC Planning and Budgeting Committee gives final approval before action grants can be awarded against recommended projects.

Because of the large number of individuals or boards administratively involved with UHCR, considerable time must elapse between the time a grant application or an Impact Plan is completed and the time it is ultimately approved. If concurrent approval is possible, then this process can take as little as one month. However, with poor timing or large agendas, several months can elapse before the approval chain is complete.

Our major comment on the administrative procedures described is that their complexity and decentralized nature work against a unified UHCR Program. While we realize that a certain degree of checks and balances is required for any government program, the treatment of administrative aspects of the Program in an essentially "business-as-usual" manner might tend to lead local Crime Reduction Councils and their staffs to view individual grants as separate entities and to lose sight of the fact that all grants support a single program. Moreover, local program Directors have no direct authority to ensure

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* For Joliet, two regional policy boards are involved: the Will County Criminal Justice Planning Commission and the Crescent Regional Criminal Justice Council.

** The Chief of Planning sits on this Committee.

that action projects are implemented as intended or described in Impact Plans. While we realize that modifications to project descriptions are almost always necessary in actually implementing a project, the individual designated as Project Director has full authority to operate a project within the limitations of the project description in the grant application and special grant conditions. If these are not tightly defined in relation to the local UHCR program, or if ILEC is not stringent in its interpretation of an action project "relating" to the intent of the project as described in the UHCR Impact Plan, there is little a Director can do to re-route project activities more in the direction of the original design.*

Two major actions relating to this issue are planned for the Peoria program. In the first, all action grants--both under UHCR and Crime Impact will be awarded to the city, even those not hosted by city agencies (such as the one for the Dedicated Prosecutor Project which will operate from the State's Attorney's Office, a county agency). Complementing this, the UHCR Director will seek to be designated as project director on all action projects.** According to the Peoria Director, these administrative conditions are essential to ensure faithful execution of the action projects and their evaluation, and that to rely on coordination and cooperation (in this instance, between host agencies for action projects and the Crime Reduction Council which consists of representatives from these) is insufficient for this purpose. These proposed actions would clearly facilitate adherence to action project activities as prescribed in the Peoria Master Plans and the evaluation plans, but they go well beyond the provisions in the guidelines. Whether these measures will be sufficient for the purpose at hand, or whether they will create operational difficulties for action projects remains to be seen.

Given that funding support for Crime Reduction Council staffs is waning, and that some action projects will outlive the Program Coordination Units (unless these are supported locally after ILEC funding terminates), the administrative measures taken in Peoria seem less radical than might otherwise be the case. Without the Council and at least one staff person, a local UHCR Program would quickly lose its identity.

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* There is an implicit assumption that Project Directors for action grant cooperate with the Crime Reduction Council and its staff. However, the only realistic way for ILEC to enforce this condition is by terminating grant funds if the condition is not met. This action is apparently difficult to justify since it is rarely taken.

** As of the present, this issue is still pending for UHCR-funded grants.

There is reason to believe that this is already occurring to some degree in Champaign and Joliet. While attending the three-day seminar to team management for the Champaign Team Policing Unit, we asked several team members about their views of UHCR and how they proposed to deal with the crime-specific aspect of the Program. In responding, they indicated little familiarity with the Program or the Crime Reduction Council and seemed not to be aware that there was a target crime. In Joliet, plans for the Selective Enforcement team to concentrate in target areas were vague from the beginning, but it was implied that these would be tightened when the team became operational. However, this seems not to have occurred to a degree that will permit valid comparisons to be made between target areas and other areas in evaluating the team's deterrent effect.* We emphasize that we are not criticizing the management of these projects per se. We are simply citing these as examples of the difficulties in coordinating action project activities with planning units under ordinary administrative arrangements.

The question of the Program Coordination Unit's involvement in criminal justice grants other than UHCR was raised by ILEC for the East St. Louis program. The decision was made that the Unit would deal solely with UHCR matters and was not to become involved in the administration of other grants or the preparation of grant proposals not directly related to UHCR. It is evident, however, that Peoria and Joliet have also been involved to some degree in activities outside the scope of UHCR.

In Peoria, the Program Coordination Unit has responsibility for fiscal management and internal evaluation of the Violent Crime Reduction Program.** Minutes of Crime Reduction Council meetings in Joliet indicated staff activity in police and court information systems, a youth service project hosted by the YMCA, a court-watching project sponsored by the League of Women Voters, and a court administrator project.***

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* Memorandum from Gary Fitzgerald to Sergeant James Grace dated 12 May 1977.

** This was part of the agreement reached when the city, ILEC and LEAA were coordinating the Crime Impact, UHCR and Violent Crime Reduction Programs.

*** These activities occurred over a year ago and seem to have abated since that time.

The distinction between ensuring coordination with related programs and becoming "involved" with them is a difficult one to make. We believe that the coordination of UHCR with related programs is of benefit, even though some UHCR staff time may have to be diverted for this purpose. The treatment of East St. Louis in this regard appears to have been an attempt to make up time for that program's late start.

Aside from their review and approval function and their ex-officio seats on Crime Reduction Councils, the ILEC Regional Offices were to have had only a samll role in local programs.* This proved to be the case in Joliet and Peoria. Staff of the East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Council (covering Champaign) expressed dissatisfaction early in the program over not being informed of Crime Reduction Council meetings and has been vocal in its opinion that the UHCR program should have involved Champaign and Urbana, an adjacent city.** Moreover, they felt that the police departments of these cities, as well as the University of Illinois Police Department (which is of substantial size) should have jointly been involved in developing the Phase I Plan. From the standpoint of geographic considerations and the geographic scope of other criminal justice programs (see Section 2.2.1), we must concur with ECICJC staff. However, we are also sensitive to the administrative difficulties that the program might have encountered if two city governments and three police departments had been involved.*** On balance, the decision to limit the program to Champaign, with special attention to be given to coordination with regional programs, was probably the most reasonable alternative.

We have already alluded in Section 1.2 to recent difficulties between the East St. Louis program and the staff of the Southwest Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (SILEC). If the tentative decision to award the city a grant for a Crime Analysis Unit and possibly a Crime Deterrence Squad and to contract

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* ILEC Regional Offices are private non-profit organizations established and funded by ILEC.

** The target area of the Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program shares a boundary with Urbana.

*** If Champaign and Urbana had been treated as a single unit, its combined rank in terms of severity of its crime problem would have disqualified it as a Program participant.

Phase II planning to SILEC staff becomes firm, it would be difficult for us to view East St. Louis as still participating in UHCR, except perhaps in a strictly administrative sense. Local planning, regardless of the approach taken, was to have been the key UHCR Program element. We believe that it would be more appropriate for the East St. Louis program staff to cull relevant portions of the SILEC offender transaction data base than for this task to be contracted to SILEC staff, and for the latter to provide technical assistance in this effort. If ILEC believes the tentative plan to be more efficient, then it should recognize that the East St. Louis program would no longer resemble the UHCR design.

# 3. LOCAL EVALUATION ISSUES

## 3. LOCAL EVALUATION ISSUES

Program guidelines specify that local provisions be made to evaluate action projects, as well as the local program overall. The first aspect of these evaluations would seek to identify differences between anticipated and actual impact of action projects and to explain why these differences occurred. Thus, actual project effects which were not anticipated or anticipated effects which failed to materialize were both to be determined in these project evaluations, and--to the extent possible--also explained. The overall local program evaluations were to address crime reduction effects of action projects in the aggregate.

After our Interim Report was delivered on 31 January 1977, it was agreed that the Crime Reduction Councils would develop evaluation plans for action projects and that we would comment on these, perhaps recommending ways in which they might be improved. The decision as to whether these recommendations would be adopted was to rest with the Councils and ILEC. This plan would afford the local programs the initial opportunity to document the design of action project evaluations and the methods by which these designs would be executed.

Since this agreement was reached, we have received action project evaluation designs for the three action projects in Joliet. Several statements of objectives and a comprehensive list of measures have been submitted in relation to Champaign's Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Project, but these have not been integrated into a plan of how the measures would be used to determine the degree to which objectives have been attained.* In Peoria, action project evaluation plans have been described as virtually complete. The Director indicated that action projects will not be implemented until their respective evaluation plans have been accepted by the Crime Reduction Council. Finally, because of the questionable state of the East St. Louis program, no action projects have been selected and consequently no evaluation plans were submitted.

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* A baseline victimization survey was conducted in Champaign, and a follow-up survey is planned, for measuring changes in victimization rates and citizen perceptions of police services. However, survey methodology and findings will not be documented until the completion of the follow-up survey next year.

The question that is central to the evaluation design for action projects is whether desirable changes in the level of target crime are observed and can reasonably be attributed, at least in part, to the project. To the extent that the relationship between project activities and the level of target crimes has been analyzed in the planning stage, an evaluation plan can begin with clear and concise statements of what a project expects to achieve in terms of its specific objectives and the impact on target crime of achieving these objectives.

For example, a project involving "saturation patrol" may be expected to bring about a reduction in shopping center robberies and purse snatches. This relationship might have been decomposed in deriving this project as follows:

(a) The saturation patrol will increase police visibility (specific objective).

(b) An increase in police visibility will discourage would-be robbers and purse snatchers from actually carrying out these acts, thereby reducing the levels of these crimes (anticipated effect on target crime).

Or, equally plausible, the following decomposition may be offered:

(c) The saturation patrol will increase the frequency of in-progress arrests (specific objective).

(d) The increase in the arrest rate will deter robbers and purse snatchers from operating in the vicinity, thereby reducing the levels of these crimes (anticipated effect on target crime).

The appropriate choice from such alternatives will depend on specific aspects of the project--e.g. whether the saturation patrol team works in uniform or in plain clothes--and on the analysis of data and judgments which led to the design or selection of the particular action strategy.

If an analysis of what a project can be expected to achieve has been performed satisfactorily during the planning stage, then the evaluation of the project amounts to a procedure for validating this analysis using data from actual project experience. This involves two stages, corresponding to (a) a determination of whether specific objectives have been met and (b) an analysis of whether the attainment of these objectives has led to a reduction in the level of target crimes as anticipated. Returning to our examples, it

must first be determined whether there is an increase in police visibility in the area of concern, or whether more in-progress arrests are made, according to pre-designated measures. Such measures might be derived directly from patrol logs or from arrest reports, respectively.

In examining the question of whether the attainment of specific objectives has led to a reduction in the level of target crime(s), the evaluator must relate the measures associated with these to target crime levels, possibly using the same methodology as was used in analyzing this relationship during the planning stage. This is generally a far more difficult determination to make because of difficulties in controlling for the presence of numerous other factors which might affect crime levels.

If the process leading to the selection or design of action projects has been centered on expectations about the impact of the project on target crime, then the setting of evaluation objectives can be achieved directly from a recasting of the expectations. The level of specificity reflected in target crime reduction goals will depend on the confidence one can place on the findings of the analysis that was performed to derive the expectations. Returning to the saturation patrol example may clarify this point. Suppose that the analysis of crime and arrest data during the planning stage indicates that as the number of arrests for target offenses increases, the number of target offenses declines.* Suppose further that a plainclothes saturation patrol is determined to be the most effective way of making arrests, also based on the analysis of data. If these relationships can be expressed numerically with an adequate degree of confidence, then the statement of objectives may be equally specified. Thus, if the analysis indicates that x plainclothes officers can be expected to produce a y percent increase in arrests, which in turn leads to a z percent decrease in the level of target crime, then target crime reduction goals and specific objective could be stated explicitly in terms of x, y and z. In this way, the hypothesis relating x,y and z that was developed in the planning stage is tested and refined in the evaluation stage on the basis of actual project experience.

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* In this example, it is clear that some condition would have to be placed on the "quality" of arrests, i.e., that simply arresting people with no cause is not sufficient to bring down the level of target crime.

This is an explicit version of the process which we believe the guidelines were intended to promote in the UHCR Program. However, since only one of the cities derived action projects in a manner that would link with evaluation in this way (although perhaps with less specificity), the evaluation of action projects in the other cities must be viewed from a different perspective. In this case, essentially the same steps must be taken, but target crime reduction goals and specific objectives will not be grounded in the analysis of data as described above. Instead, they will reflect what projects hope to accomplish, and the nature of the evidence needed to determine whether the project was successful in accomplishing its objectives must be somewhat arbitrarily selected after the project's basic activities and operations have been specified.

An example from the evaluation design submitted for Joliet's Mobile Crime Prevention Unit will serve to clarify the distinction. We observed in Section 2.4 above that the UHCR Director requested of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit Supervisor that the selective enforcement component concentrate its activities in a target area, to make it possible to assess the preventive effect of that component. This would be accomplished by comparing changes in crime counts in the target area to those in a "comparison" area not receiving selective enforcement services. This modification was recommended after it was observed that selective enforcement, supported by remote alarm equipment, failed to produce the large number of arrests anticipated when this component of the project was proposed in the planning stage.* The uncertainty about the nature of the effect of selective enforcement activities reflects our contention that this had not been studied during the planning stage. If it had been studied, or if the suggestion of the Peoria Chief of Police had been known at that time, it is unlikely that the expectation of more arrests would have been developed. Even if an analysis of the data had indicated that many arrests could be expected as a result of selective enforcement, but in

* The Director of the Joliet program also stated that the possibility of the preventive potential of the equipment was suggested by the Peoria Chief of Police who had also experienced difficulty in attributing arrests to the use of similar equipment. The Peoria experience, however, was not part of the UHCR Program.

fact few arrests were actually made, a framework would at least have been present for analyzing this discrepancy.

While on the face of it, this approach to evaluation may resemble that which evolves directly from analysis applied to the derivation of the project, the distinction between the two can be found in the relative utility of evaluative findings in subsequent planning. The continuity of the planning-action-evaluation cycle is lost if evaluative results fail to inform the next planning stage.

Having placed the concept of action project evaluations in two distinct perspectives, we can outline an approach to developing post hoc plans to evaluate an action project's crime-reductive effects. As will be seen from the discussion that follows, such a plan need not be statistically sophisticated or complex. Far more important is the clarity of the logic it contains.

An evaluation plan begins with an unambiguous statement of what a project expects to achieve in terms of specific objectives. By this we mean that objectives refer to immediate results of the project's operations, such as enrolling a certain number or percentage of households in an Operation Identification, citizens taking action to upgrade household security, making more arrests on or near the scene of a crime, reducing case processing time, reducing recidivism, and so forth. Attainment of specific objectives such as these would yield some information about the project's contribution to the program goal of reducing the level of target crime(s). In contrast, observing "significantly" fewer target crimes in areas or committed by individuals "treated" by a project during a designated period enables an evaluator to make stronger assertions about the impact of a project on target crime(s).

Setting a certain number of enrollments as a target can be monitored by a straightforward record-keeping system. Determining "significance" is generally far more difficult--depending on the nature of the evidence required. This evidence may be the outcome of a statistical test; it may reflect the informed judgments of selected individuals; or it may fall somewhere between.

The nature of the evidence needed to assert that a project has led to a reduction in target crime levels can be posed in the form of criteria which entail some measurement process. This may be a complex computational procedure,

a classification scheme (e.g., good, fair, or poor), or something in between. Again, an evaluation plan should describe the measurement process and specify the measures that will be associated with the prescribed evidence.

The next stage in the development of an evaluation plan is the specification of data needed to make the measurements, a description of the procedure for deriving measures from the data, and the number of each measure required. The nature of these data depends on the types of measures selected and ranges accordingly in complexity. Once data requirements have been determined, sources of the data must be identified. We note that the existence of data sources and the difficulty in assessing data from them typically impose severe constraints on an evaluation plan.

In order to render an evaluation design into an evaluation plan, it remains to specify tasks needed to execute the design and a timetable for this work. Briefly, this involves making arrangements to extract data from its source (including the schedule of collection and the development of data collection forms); determining computational and skill requirements for the analysis (converting data to measures and using measures to assess the evidence); making tentative provisions for dealing with problems that are anticipated and will almost surely be encountered; and delegating responsibilities for completing the tasks.

To summarize, a post hoc plan for evaluating the impact of an action project on target crime levels begins with

- specific objectives, whose attainment is believed to effect target crime levels;
- criteria for determining whether sufficient evidence exists to assert a project's crime-reductive impact;
- measures corresponding to the criteria established;
- data for deriving measures; and
- sources of data.

Adding data collection forms, analysis plans, and work plans yields a comprehensive evaluation plan for a particular action project.

It should be clear from this discussion that the elements of an evaluation plan are closely related to the design and operations of the project to be evaluated. These may limit the confidence one can place in evaluative conclusions, particularly if project design or operations have to be modified to meet unexpected needs. The loss of evaluative power can be

minimized by assessing in advance possible contingencies of this nature and accomodating them in the evaluation plan.

Responsibility for action project evaluations exhibits some variation among the Champaign, Joliet and Peoria programs. In Peoria, staff of the Crime Reduction Council will assume this responsibility in accordance with the evaluation designs they prepare. Although we have not yet seen the evaluation designs for Peoria action projects, we can reasonably assume that action project staff will be responsible for periodical completion of data collection forms developed as components of these designs.

In Joliet, the Supervisor of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit will have primary responsibility for the evaluation of that project. The UHCR Director and the Supervisor of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit will evaluate the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program, although the Planning Division of the Community Relations Department will provide some data on perceptions of neighborhood safety from surveys it has conducted for the HUD-funded rebate program. Evaluation of the Special Prosecution Unit will be the responsibility of the Unit Supervisor.

Responsibility for the evaluation of the Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program in Champaign will be shared by the Commander of the Team Policing Unit and the UHCR Director. Data for the evaluation will be drawn from Project LOCATE and the two victimization/attitudinal surveys, one of which has been completed and the other planned in about twelve months.

Program guideline specifications relating to local evaluation efforts indicate that each city is to evaluate the local program as a whole, as well as individual projects. The evaluation of local programs would seem of necessity to be the responsibility of the Crime Reduction Council and the staff. We have seen no material, however, from any of the cities, relating to this task. Moreover, the sharing of project evaluation responsibilities might make it difficult to coordinate individual project evaluations with program-wide evaluations in Champaign and Joliet.

In conclusion, we believe that further exploration of action project expectations and evaluation responsibilities are necessary before we can provide meaningful comments and suggestions for local evaluation efforts. To require the projects or the staff of the Crime Reduction Council to record data that would cover a wide range of evaluative contingencies would place a

burden on these individuals which would probably not be warranted by the utility of these data after final decisions are made concerning project evaluation plans. Records kept by these projects as a matter of course and other secondary data are likely to suffice for these evaluations.

# 4. ANALYSIS OF TARGET CRIME DATA

## 4. ANALYSIS OF TARGET CRIME DATA

This section describes and analyzes the data that will ultimately be used to examine crime trends in relation to local programs. It is important to recall that all of the data referred to in this section relate to crimes coming to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Section 4.1 reviews the manner in which a complaint made to law enforcement officials eventually becomes a "statistic" -- it appears in a crime count. This section ends with a brief description of our construction of the data base of target crime(s) for each of the UHCR cities and observations concerning the level of confidence we place in the data. Section 4.2 presents an analysis of time trends in the data and the method we will use to analyze shifts in these trends when action projects are operational. While constructing the data base for each city, we encountered a number of inconsistencies in the various sources of crime data available to us. These are described at length in Appendix D.

### 4.1 Data Origins

Beginning in 1972, law enforcement agencies in the state have been submitting monthly crime and agency statistics to the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS). Among the data submitted are those that fulfill the reporting needs of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting system (UCR), including monthly data for Return A and the Supplement to Return A. These offense and clearance statistics had previously been reported directly to the FBI, on standard forms, by local and state law enforcement agencies. Offense and clearance counts are tallied on Return A for the standard crime categories of the UCR system. The Supplement to Return A provides a more detailed examination of property crimes, including among others, breakouts of residential and non-residential burglary of the type and value of property stolen. Data compiled from these two forms constitute the core crime statistics in the FBI's annual report--Crime in the United States.

CJIS views the statistics it forwards to the FBI as part of its data base that is used to produce the annual report--Crime in Illinois. We therefore sought to tap the Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) system in

order to construct a trend of monthly offense counts for each of the six target crimes selected by the UHCR cities. This data base had the advantages of being recognized as "official" by the state, being stored on computerized files at a single location, and covering a five-year period. Five years is adequate to calibrate a descriptive model of monthly crime trends. Such a model and its use in evaluating the effects of UHCR on target crimes are discussed in Section 4.2.

In order to assess the reliability of the numbers that would eventually play a significant role in our evaluation, we traced the data back to its origins--reported incidents to the four police departments.* While in each of the four cities, we determined the flow of information from a complaint made to the police to the inclusion of that complaint in official crime counts. Figures 4-1 through 4-4 are schematic representations of this flow.** They have in common a reported incident as initial input and three I-UCR reports as final output.

The suggestion has often been made that the police can adjust crime statistics to suit their own needs. While our observations in this regard are by no means conclusive, it appears highly unlikely that the four police departments would readily adjust their crime statistics for nefarious purposes. Problems of data accuracy are more likely to be due to increasing demands for more detailed data for planning and research purposes. All four police departments complained of a lack of suitable personnel to meet these demands.

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* The accuracy, reliability and validity of crime statistics is repeatedly challenged in the media and the literature. Moreover, the question of data quality was raised in a number of interviews we conducted as part of our UHCR process evaluation.

** Forms appearing in the schematic were reproduced in Appendix C of our Interim Report.

## FIGURE 4-1
## CHAMPAIGN DATA FLOW



## FIGURE 4-2
## EAST ST. LOUIS DATA FLOW



**FIGURE 4-3**
**JOLIET DATA FLOW**



**FIGURE 4-4**
**PEORIA DATA FLOW**



Figures 4-1 through 4-4 indicate that the four departments have similar paper flow procedures for crime reports. The Peoria Police Department prepares, from its On-Line Information System a tape file which it forwards to CJIS each month. The I-UCR system then reads this file directly. Until March 1977, the Joliet Police Department keypunched the data and prepared a monthly printout for CJIS. In turn, CJIS keypunched the data from the printout, for entry into the I-UCR system. Since March, Joliet data are entered on line each day into the I-UCR system from a computer terminal in the Police Department. The Champaign and East St. Louis Police Departments forward two forms each month to CJIS. This method is the predominant one, and standard reporting forms have been designed by CJIS for this purpose.

The basic form is called Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1. This is a four-page form which has preprinted offense categories listed, and the preparer enters tally marks and makes monthly counts within the various categories. The categories are compatible with (though more detailed than) those on Return A used in the UCR system, and monthly counts made from this form comprise the official Return A data. The other form is called Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 and collects data for inclusion in the Supplement to Return A of the UCR system. Thus, more detailed information on the value of property stolen by offense category is recorded on this form by local agencies. Since data describing individual offenses are listed down the page, there are as many pages as are needed to accommodate the number of offenses reported in a given month.

CJIS has also designed a form called Offense Summary-Set 2. The format of this form resembles that of the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form, but it also captures all of the relevant offense-related information entered on the Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1 form. Thus, the Offense Summary-Set 2 form is a "composite" of the two Set 1 forms.

Since January 1975, the computer printout sent to CJIS by the Joliet Police Department is entered into the I-UCR system in the format of the Offense Summary-Set 2 form, and as mentioned previously, the information has been entered daily from a terminal since March 1977 (in Set 2 format). The monthly file submitted to CJIS by the Peoria Police Department is compatible

with the two Set 1 forms, and the Champaign and East St. Louis Police Departments submit the completed forms themselves each month.*

We note that CJIS is encouraging law enforcement agencies in the state to convert from the two Set 1 forms to the Offense Summary-Set 2 form. This is viewed as a first step toward reporting in the manner of the Joliet Police Department since March 1977--daily via computer terminal. The East St. Louis and Peoria Police Departments are exploring this alternative at the present time.

Three monthly reports are compiled by CJIS from the data on the forms described above:**

- Offense and Clearance Trends;
- Property Analysis; and
- Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police.

Offense and Clearance Trends reports are compiled from Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1 forms and constitute Return As, which are submitted to the FBI The other two reports are compiled from Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 forms and constitute Supplements to Return A, which are also forwarded monthly to the FBI.

The Offense and Clearance Trends report breaks target crimes of interest into the following categories: robbery, burglary-forcible, burglary-nc force, and burglary-attempts. The Property Analysis reports that were available for our review contained data for the first three of the categories, but the printout explicitly states that attempts are not included.*** Monthly

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* We note that CJIS collects more detailed data than are requested by the FBI, and that local agencies may produce more detailed data than is used by CJIS. Nonetheless local and state systems are in theory compatible with the UCR system.

** These output reports are compiled either from the two Set 1 forms or the single Set 2 form. The description of the output reports is cast in terms of the two Set 1 forms because these are used by three of the four UHCR cities, and cross-checks for internal consistency could be made. (See Appendix D.)

*** Our assumption is that this is because no property is stolen in attempts. While this is true by UCR definition, our analysis of the data suggests that reporting practices for attempts and property values are quite complicated. (See Appendix D.)

Return of Offenses Known to Police reports break out target crimes of interest into robbery, residential burglary and non-residential burglary. The relationship between input forms and output reports discussed is summarized in Exhibit 4. The construction of target crime data bases is described by city below.

Champaign (Residential Burglary)

The natural counts to use would be those for residential burglary appearing in the Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports. We noticed, however, that totals for residential and non-residential burglary were considerably lower than the totals of forcible, no force and attempted burglaries in the Offense and Clearance Trends reports for the years 1972 and 1973,* and somewhat lower in 1974. We therefore applied a factor, equal to the ratio of total burglaries taken from the two reports, to the residential burglary count for each month in those three years to obtain the counts for our data base. That is, for each of the 36 months, we estimated the number of residential burglaries as:

$$ERB = RB_{mr} \times \frac{TB_{oct}}{TB_{mr}} \quad ,$$

where

ERB = the estimated number of residential burglaries;

$RB_{mr}$ = the number of residential burglaries indicated in Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports;

$TB_{oct}$ = the total number of burglaries indicated in Offense and Clearance Trends reports;

$TB_{mr}$ = the total number of burglaries indicated in Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports.

Counts appearing in Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports were used in the data base for 1975 and 1976.

East St. Louis (Robbery and Burglary)

Monthly counts for robbery and burglary were taken directly from the Offense and Clearance Trends reports in all five years. One minor adjustment

* A description of internal I-UCR inconsistencies and a discussion of possible explanations can be found in Appendix D.

EXHIBIT 4

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN I-UCR INPUT FORMS
AND OUTPUT REPORTS FOR CRIME REPORTING

| OUTPUT REPORTS ← / INPUT FORMS | OFFENSE AND CLEARANCE REPORT-SET 1 | OFFENSE ANALYSIS INFORMATION-SET 1 | OFFENSE SUMMARY-SET 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| OFFENSE AND CLEARANCE TRENDS | | | |
| • Robbery | | | |
| • Burglary - Forcible | X | | X |
| • Burglary - No Force | | | |
| • Burglary - Attempt | | | |
| PROPERTY ANALYSIS | | | |
| • Robbery | | | |
| • Burglary - Forcible | | X | X |
| • Burglary - No Force | | | |
| MONTHLY RETURN OF OFFENSES KNOWN TO POLICE | | | |
| • Robbery | | X | X |
| • Residential Burglary | | | |
| • Non-Residential Burglary | | | |

was made, however. The reports for January and May 1972 showed 338 and 0 burglaries, respectively. Counts indicated for those two months in the FBI's Return A were 185 and 183, respectively. Although the total for the two months was 30 more in Return A than in the I-UCR Offense and Clearance reports, the two matched within random error in other months of 1972. Therefore the FBI figures were used for January and May 1972.*

Joliet (Robbery and Burglary)

As with East St. Louis, we used monthly counts of robbery and burglary from 1972-1976 Offense and Clearance Trends reports in our data base. Counts of zero were found in the burglary-attempt category in December, for the years 1972 through 1975. Comparing the Offense and Clearance Trends reports with the Property Analysis reports indicated that the counts in this category had not simply been inadvertently tallied into one of the other two burglary categories (i.e., burglary-forcible and burglary-no force matched within random error). We therefore estimated values for burglary-attempt for December 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 as the average of counts in this category for October, November, January and February of those respective years.

We also found the same value (102) in the burglary-forcible and burglary-no force categories for December 1974. Again, because of the close correspondence between these two categories in the Offense and Clearance Trends and Property Analysis reports, we used the number appearing in the latter (16) in our count for burglary-no force that month.

Peoria (Residential Burglary)

As was the case for Champaign, we sought monthly residential burglary counts for 1972 through 1976 in Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports. However, we found zeros listed under that category in 1972, 1973 and 1974, despite the fact that figures were available for 1973 through 1976

* Further discrepancies in offense counts from different data bases for East St. Louis are described in Appendix D.

from the On-Line Information System of the Peoria Police Department.* Work performed by the staff of the Crime Reduction Council was used for 1972 monthly residential burglary counts. They had recompiled monthly residential burglary counts for 1973 through 1975 by reviewing source documents (offense reports and supplements of the Peoria Police Department). Although this resulted in the identification of between one and five percent more monthly offenses in that category, there was generally a close correspondence between the two sets of figures.** Since there is no assurance that monthly counts beyond 1975 will be recompiled by the Crime Reduction Council staff in this way, we decided to use its data for 1972 only, and to use On-Line Information System data for 1973 through 1976 in our data base.

The data base resulting from the procedures described above is presented in Appendix A. Some differences exist between this data base and the one constructed for the Interim Report--mostly for Champaign and Joliet. None of the 1976 I-UCR data were available when the Interim Report was being prepared. We therefore obtained offense counts for the first six months of 1976 from the four police departments. Since the Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports were not available when we were preparing our Interim Report, other methods were used to estimate residential burglary counts in Champaign. In Joliet, figures supplied for the first six months of 1976 erroneously included offenses that were subsequently determined to be unfounded. This was discovered in our examination of the Offense and Clearance Trends reports, which contain offense counts before and after unfounded cases are removed. Differences between figures used in the present report and the Interim Report are listed in Appendix A.

The changes we found necessary to make between figures used in our Interim Report and the present report, and observations documented in Appendix D pose serious questions about the reliability of data that reflect a

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* We were unable to account for the reason these figures failed to appear in the CJIS printout in 1973 and 1974.

** These differences are described in Appendix D.

greater level of detail than appears in Offense and Clearance Trend reports. It is probably safe to assume the "correctness" of counts appearing in these reports, relative to those appearing in Property Analysis reports and Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports.

Judgments about the validity of Offense and Clearance Trend report counts, however, depend on a far more intensive auditing effort than was possible within the scope of the Program evaluation. In order to assess the reasonableness of the actual procedures used to measure levels of crimes coming to the attention of law enforcement officials, considerable time on site would be required to make necessary observations. We believe that the data base constructed as described in this section is accurate within this limitation. To recapitulate, the data base consists of monthly counts of the six target crimes in the four UHCR cities for the years 1972 through 1976.

## 4.2 Analysis of Crime Trends

*There is no evidence to indicate, nor reason to believe, that the rising level of crime in _____ will undergo an undesigned abatement in the foreseeable future. Indeed, an examination of crime patterns during recent years, both in _____ and in comparable metropolitan areas, indicates a strong trend characterized by a constantly accelerating rate of increase.*

*- A UHCR Impact Plan (August 1975)*

Our approach in analyzing trends in target crimes in relation to UHCR Program activity is to formulate a descriptive model of monthly crime counts that will detect significant shifts in the trends, if they occur, over periods when action projects are operating. The five years of baseline data and two to three years of data when projects are operating imply the need for a model that could describe crime trends over a seven to eight year duration. Thus, the major underlying assumption of our approach is that the model would have been valid over the latter two to three years if action projects had not been operational.

We began calibrating our model by adjusting the raw monthly counts (see Appendix A) for seasonal variation. These are variations that occur in regular sequence at specific intervals of time, in this case, months. There is good reason to believe that the level of the target crimes may in part be the result of seasonal factors such as climate conditions, number of days in the month, holidays, or whether students are in school. The number of target crimes has been seasonally adjusted so that changes which occur between consecutive months can be ascribed to other than seasonal factors. Additionally, seasonally adjusted values produce smaller standard errors of estimate--the standard deviation of the difference between observed values and values computed from the model. This will allow greater sensitivity in detecting program effects.

Seasonal variations were removed using the ratio-to-moving-average method.* Centered twelve month moving averages represent the hypothetical values which would be observed in the absence of any seasonal variation.

* Definitions of terms and a worked example of this technique appear in Appendix B.

Specific seasonals for each month are obtained by dividing the number of reported crimes by the centered twelve month moving average. The medians of the four specific seasonals for each month, called typical seasonals, appear in Table 4-1 for each of the target crimes.

Typical seasonals give information about the usual effect of a season (i.e., month) on the particular number of crimes in that season. For the data in Table 4-1, the typical seasonal of .68 found for February in Champaign for residential burglary indicates that in February the number of crimes is 68 percent of that of the "average month." These percentages by themselves may be of some value in allocating resources toward the reduction of target crimes.

In order to determine what the trend would have been if there had been no seasonal variation, the number of reported crimes is divided by the typical seasonal. For example, there was a count of 31 residential burglaries in Champaign in February 1973. Dividing this figure by .68 gives an adjusted value of 46 for February 1973. The set of adjusted values used in the analysis that follows contains the theoretical monthly number of reported crimes that would have occurred in the absence of any seasonal variation.

After the number of reported crimes was seasonally adjusted, the monthly counts were corrected for secular trend. The secular trend is that characteristic which extends consistently throughout the entire period of time under consideration. An attempt was first made to account for time in a linear fashion. In equation (1), t refers to month, a and b are parameters estimated from the adjusted data, and $\gamma(t)$ denotes the count in month t as calculated from the equation:

$$\gamma(t) = a + bt \qquad (1)$$

An examination of Figure 4-5 through 4-10 suggests that all target crimes exhibit a recent downturn. For Champaign we plotted the incidence of residential burglary for the years 1973-1976 since no trend was evident with 1972 included, but the examination of the scatter plot showed residential burglary decreasing over the last two years.*

* The trend lines are meant to be descriptive; our intent is not to model all of the data exactly.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

TABLE 4-1

TYPICAL SEASONALS FOR 1972-1976 FOR THE SIX TARGET CRIMES

| | Champaign | East St. Louis | | Joliet | | Peoria |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Residential Burglary | Robbery | Burglary | Robbery | Burglary | Residential Burglary |
| January | 1.12 | .97 | 1.03 | 1.21 | .91 | .87 |
| February | .68 | .80 | .92 | .98 | .79 | .82 |
| March | .85 | .90 | .94 | .88 | 1.01 | .92 |
| April | .98 | 1.04 | .88 | .64 | .90 | .89 |
| May | 1.16 | 1.06 | .88 | .72 | 1.06 | .90 |
| June | .99 | .92 | .84 | 1.28 | 1.22 | .92 |
| July | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.19 | 1.13 | 1.32 | 1.22 |
| August | 1.20 | 1.11 | 1.18 | 1.22 | 1.22 | 1.10 |
| September | 1.07 | .88 | 1.05 | .92 | .91 | .93 |
| October | 1.04 | 1.29 | 1.13 | 1.01 | .84 | 1.07 |
| November | .96 | .90 | 1.04 | .88 | .91 | 1.10 |
| December | .94 | 1.07 | .92 | 1.14 | .92 | 1.26 |

FIGURE 4-5
MONTHLY RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY TREND IN CHAMPAIGN




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends reports and Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE 4-6
MONTHLY ROBBERY TREND IN EAST ST. LOUIS




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE 4-7
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN EAST ST. LOUIS




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE 4-8
MONTHLY ROBBERY TREND IN JOLIET




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE 4-9
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN JOLIET




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE 4-10
MONTHLY RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY TREND IN PEORIA




Data Source: Program Coordination Unit (1972)
Peoria Police Department: On-Line Information System (1973-1976)

Because of the recent downturn in all six target crimes, a quadratic term was added to capture this pattern. The terms comprising the resultant equation are as before, with $b_1$ and $b_2$ replacing b as parameters:

$$\gamma(t) = a + b_1 t + b_2 t^2 \qquad (2)$$

The addition of the quadratic term in equation (2) provided a significant increment of information ($p < .001$ for all target crimes). This indicates that the quadratic component accounts for monthly variance in the number of crimes over and above what is accounted for by a straight line. Substantively, this implies that time relationships are more suitably represented by curves depicting a recent decline for the six target crimes.*

We continued our attempts to include exogenous economic variables that would reflect local economic conditions in our model. Our attempts to obtain data on monthly unemployment rates prior to January 1975 were unsuccessful.** We also attempted to estimate the effect of retail sales on the number of monthly crimes, but a visual examination of scatterplots indicated a steady increase in retail sales, leading us to conclude that no substantively meaningful relationship would be found. We will continue our attempts to include exogenous variables in the second and third year evaluations.

Finding a declining crime rate for all six target crimes suggested that an explanation for the decline may not lie solely with local socio-economic or criminal justice system conditions. Therefore, crime trends were examined in seven non-UHCR cities in Illinois. Graphs shown in Appendix C reveal similar trends for robbery and burglary in most instances.***

Declining crime trends in these other Illinois cities prompted us to examine crime trends for Chicago and the entire state of Illinois. As shown in Figure 4-11 and 4-12, Chicago has shown a 33 percent decrease in the

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* A discussion of tests of significance, the equations describing these curves and other summary statistics are given in Appendix B.

** Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, Labor Force Information Report (Illinois Department of Labor), May, 1976.

*** Where monthly counts were sufficiently large, typical seasonals were calculated and appear in Table C-8 of Appendix C. In our judgment, cases where the average monthly crime count was less than ten were more confusing than illuminating, so five robbery trends are drawn from yearly, rather than monthly counts.

FIGURE 4-11
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN CHICAGO




FIGURE 4-12
YEARLY BURGLARY TREND IN CHICAGO




Data Sources: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1975
Uniform Crime Reports: 1976 Preliminary Annual Release

number of robberies and a 24 percent decrease in the number of burglaries between 1974 and 1976. As can be seen from Figure 4-13 and 4-14, similar trends are exhibited by the state. We note that while Chicago accounts for more than 70 percent of the state's robberies, only 32 percent of the burglaries reported statewide are reported to Chicago authorities.

The Uniform Crime Reports' 1976 Preliminary Annual Release shows that cities with populations between ,000 and 250,000 exhibited a 14 percent reduction for robbery (down 10 percent for all cities) and a 6 to 7 percent reduction for burglary (down 5 percent in all cities from 1975). The 1972-1976 crime trends for robbery and burglary in the United States are shown in Figures 4-15 and 4-16.

The set of circumstances that has led to a reduction of robbery and burglary in the United States and Illinois is very likely to be in part the same set of circumstances that has led to a reduction of target crimes in the four UHCR cities. A decrease in the number of robberies and burglaries also occurred nationally from 1971 to 1972, but, as shown in Figures 4-15 and 4-16, quickly began to increase again from 1972 to 1975. Can we again expect a rise in the number of robberies and burglaries? Can we extrapolate the downward trend to even lower levels? It can be said without great risk that the downward trend will level off at some point and will perhaps begin to rise again. Nevertheless, why has the level of robbery and burglary been decreasing over the last couple of years? The explanation for these decreases is elusive.*

Crime trends are notoriously not easily linked to socioeconomic conditions. The decreases are taking place too rapidly to be accounted for by the decreasing number of city-dwelling, young, adult males responsible for much of the property crime in the United States. Theories about changes or differences in crime rates are generally more applicable in comparing geographic areas than they are in accounting for pervasive societal level

* That this may remain so is suggested in the Campbell and Stanley book, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, on page 42: "It also seems imperative that the X [the independent variable(s)] be specified before examining the outcome of the time series. The post hoc examination of a time series to infer that X preceded the most dramatic shift must be ruled out on the grounds that the opportunistic capitalization on chance which it allows makes any approach to testing the significance of effects difficult if not impossible."

FIGURE 4-13
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN ILLINOIS




FIGURE 4-14
YEARLY BURGLARY TREND IN ILLINOIS




Data Sources: Crime in Illinois: 1975
Preliminary Release, Criminal Justice Information Services: 1976

FIGURE 4-15
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN THE UNITED STATES




FIGURE 4-16
YEARLY BURGLARY TREND IN THE UNITED STATES




Data Sources: Crime in the United States: 1975
Uniform Crime Reports: 1976 Preliminary Annual Release

changes in crime rates. Whether this is the case will be the subject of our assessment of the impact of action projects on the target crime rates in the second and third year evaluations.

The possible effect of the local UHCR action programs will be assessed using a dummy variable in the model. Thus the final equation for our model is:

$$\gamma(t) = a + b_1 t + b_2 t^2 + b_3 x \qquad (3)$$

where x is a dummy variable, and other terms are defined as before. The dummy variable x is assigned the value 0 for months that action projects are not operational, and the value 1 when they are.

The change in the level of target crime is measured by the value of the coefficient for the effect variable ($b_3$), estimated from the data points.* If the coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero, then we would be in a position to state that the target crime(s) had dropped significantly. However, caution would have to be exercised in attributing such an observed change (even if it is statistically significant) to program effects. Other factors (such as those that might be driving the present decline in robbery and burglary) may have changed at the same time, in which case their effects would have also been captured in the effect variable. The argument that such a reduction was due to the Program would then rest on a judgment of project performance and on specific qualitative and quantitative project characteristics.

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* This is equivalent to the significance of increases in "explained" variance due to the dummy variable.

# 5. CONCLUSIONS

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program has been ambitious, and all of its participants are to be commended for their accomplishments within state-of-the-art, time and budget limitations. By virtue of delays (reviewed in Section 1.2), action projects did not begin operations until more than two years after the first program grant was awarded, and consequently our first year evaluation concerned itself primarily with the planning and evaluation elements of the planning-action-evaluation cycle discussed in Section 2.3. We begin our conclusions with a review of general benefits of the Program to local units of government and local accomplishments, and proceed to a discussion of lessons for ILEC derived from the UHCR experience. The Program is next viewed from a broad perspective, and this leads into a discussion of outstanding issues relating to the trade-off between studying a problem and taking action against it. The section ends with recommendations for continued evaluation of the Program over the next two years.

Possibly the greatest single benefit the UHCR Program has afforded its participants has been in the form of general experience in local criminal justice planning and administration. Individuals who are outside of constituent criminal justice agencies (the UHCR Directors) are in a position to view those agencies as comprising a whole, i.e., from a systems perspective, and to make recommendations for action from such a perspective. The exposure of UHCR Directors to operations, policies and decisions associated with the local criminal justice system is an important first step toward promoting problem definition and strategy formulation from a systems viewpoint. We believe that all the Directors took advantage of this exposure to the extent that they are far more knowledgeable of their respective local criminal justice systems than are many of those who have been part of the system for a much longer time.

A second benefit the Program has provided and will continue to provide to the participating cities is in the form of opportunities for local line criminal justice agencies to test action strategies that otherwise would not be within the scope of local operating budgets. Even outside of the crime-specific context of the Program, innovative methods such as neighborhood team policing in Champaign and specialized prosecution in Joliet and Peoria, can be tested for administrative or policy feasibility. The cities will have had more hands-on experience with (locally) new ways of doing things, which will

contribute eventually to improved system performance.

That cooperation and coordination within the four local criminal justice systems has improved as a result of UHCR, was unanimously agreed with in our interviews with Crime Reduction Council members. Except for Peoria, which has regular meetings of key local criminal justice officials scheduled by the Chief Judge and interagency committee meetings under the Violent Crime Reduction Program, there was no regular forum for system-wide sharing of problems and ideas in the UHCR cities. The Crime Reduction Councils have served as such a forum, and according to most of their members, it has enhanced both cooperation and coordination among the various system components. Whether crime has been affected or the administration of justice has improved are two major topics of subsequent evaluation activities.

That the general public should be considered part of the local criminal justice system is debatable, although it seems reasonable to state that they are part of the system by virtue of being victims of crime or serving as jurors, witnesses, correctional volunteers, or in similar roles. Exposure of the public to the operations, policies and decisions made within local criminal justice systems and the characteristics of crime must be seen as a Program benefit, if for no other reason, because officials in the system are either elected or appointed by other elected officials. In Joliet particularly, and to a lesser degree in Champaign, there have been continuing efforts to keep the public informed through the Crime Reduction Council or the media. East St. Louis discussed this aspect of the Program, but from what we have seen, relatively little has emerged from these discussions. Peoria, by virtue of its technical posture, does not appear to have taken as much interest or initiative as have the other cities in this regard.

We view the opportunity which the Program has afforded its participants to study local crime and criminal justice problems, as a general Program benefit, but with certain reservations. We concluded in Section 2.3 that, while the other cities may have applied their reviews of the relevant literature and their analyses of local statistical data to the formulation of action strategies, Peoria demonstrated in explicit documented fashion <u>how</u> this application occurred. The series of studies conducted by the Peoria Crime Reduction Council constitutes the basic components of a model that can be used to test the

effectiveness of alternative inputs with respect to a single output measure--the level of residential burglary. Seen in this light, there can be little doubt that the data collected and analyzed under UHCR were put to an explicit set of purposes: calibrating, testing, and exercising the model.*

The collection, organization and analysis of statistical data have provided a description of crime and criminal justice system operations in the other three cities and have assisted their Crime Reduction Councils in identifying new problems or in reconfirming the presence of problems already known to exist. As discussed in Section 2.3, we found little evidence in the other three cities that statistical data were used to inform the selection of action projects on the basis of anticipated outcomes.

Two related questions of significance to ILEC emerge from these findings. The first concerns the trade-off between planning and action: at what point does studying a problem and analyzing possible consequences of alternative solutions cease to be an effective use of ILEC funds with respect to that agency's objectives and to local objectives? The second question seeks to determine whether there are other good reasons for allocating ILEC funds in order for local units to collect data from other than secondary sources (e.g., Uniform Crime Reports, annual agency reports, data from studies performed in other contexts), again with respect to both ILEC and local objectives. It has been suggested, assuming an ILEC/local objective concerning a reduction in the level of a certain type of offense, that the UHCR Program be perceived as an experiment from which answers to the first question may be posited. If these answers indicate that the trade-off weighs heavily in favor of action, and the second question is also answered in the negative with respect to both ILEC and local objectives, there would be little reason to continue funding local planning units.

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* These uses of the data are conceptually similar to the manner in which cost and workload data are used by Alfred Blumstein's JUSSIM (Justice Simulation) model in generating resource requirements for the criminal justice system. (See for example, Blumstein, Alfred, "Management Science to Aid the Manager: An Example from the Criminal Justice System," Sloane Management Review (Fall 1973), pp. 35-48.

There are a number of issues surrounding the question of the trade-off between planning and action that can be discussed while awaiting results with respect to the effect variable--the level of target crime(s). It can be argued that the research-oriented approach taken in Peoria is best left to researchers, whose work is not directly linked to funding decisions on action programs and projects. Under this argument, local communities (and for that matter, State Planning Agencies) would decide whether a research project with general applicability was relevant to their planning needs and, if so, would use its results in the planning process-at most tailoring them to local conditions if possible. Furthermore, the encouragement of widespread local research/planning efforts are likely to lead to repeated duplication of effort, especially if local objectives are similar as in UHCR. Thus, the argument concludes, even if dramatic effects on target crimes could be demonstrated in a city which developed research questions and rigorously studied them during the planning stage, this outcome could also have been reached if the research funds had been allocated elsewhere.

The major weakness of the foregoing argument is its failure to appreciate the gray areas of social research. Because there is a dearth of theory, the need for repetitive empirical studies is great. Therefore, duplication (or more correctly, replication) of effort is desirable, as long as full advantage is taken of prior research design and methodological considerations.*

The strength of the argument presented against a strong research orientation in local planning deals with its feasibility within the context of more general local conditions. A unique blend of circumstances, discussed in Section 2.3, enabled the Peoria UHCR program to take full advantage of the Program's emphasis on rational planning and decision-making. Whether one could reasonably expect to find a comparable set of circumstances in most local communities in Illinois or elsewhere is open to question. Strong research talent placed in a socio-political environment that is unfamiliar with, or hostile to social research, especially if it is a prerequisite to action, is not likely to be tolerant of the time and effort involved, and is likely to view the whole endeavor as a bureaucratic exercise. Such a reaction would almost certainly undermine the effort.

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* This highlights the importance of thoroughly documenting research design, methodology and findings--a task that was executed with great care in Peoria.

Another argument favoring a planning approach with a limited research orientation concerns timeliness. Indeed, as observed in the note under the heading of Section 4.2, a problem can begin to abate while it is being researched, to the point where the findings might fail to apply to the problem at its new level. For example, in Peoria, increasing the risk of apprehension may only affect residential burglary levels when this is above some threshold (indeed, if at all). The apparent decline in residential burglary due to other factors may bring the level below this threshold by the time action projects are implemented to increase the risk of apprehension. Or, residential burglary may be replaced in the interim by other problems achieving higher priority. Thus the problem which these action projects address may "disappear" before the actions can be taken. This will always be a risk in the absence of knowledge about the manner in which factors outside the criminal justice system affect crime levels.

Concerning the second major question, whether there are good reasons for acquiring data beyond those that have been traditionally found in secondary sources, we offer two responses in the affirmative. Statistical data which describe the occurrence of crime and the operations of the criminal justice system are essential to research studies in this area, regardless of whether such studies are done locally in the design and selection of action strategies or independently from action programs. As these data begin to be compiled and organized for more communities (or other geographic levels of aggregation), research studies will be strengthened by an expanded capability for comparative analysis and replication of results.

A second important use of the data is that of measuring the performance of the criminal justice system. The establishment of local or national standard performance measures will enable criminal justice managers to assess the efficiency and to some degree, the effectiveness of individual agencies and the system as a whole.* This application of statistical data is seen as an important factor in achieving the objective of improving the criminal justice system.

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* There is a danger in implementing performance management systems. Once "acceptable" levels of performance are learned by those whose performance is being assessed, there may be a tendency for performance levels to consistently be reported as "acceptable" or better. This might be the result of the threat represented by performance assessment or the subconscious desire to report results that are anticipated.

The questions discussed above can be addressed in more detail on the basis of our evaluative findings in the second and third years. Outcomes of the Program are not likely to produce sufficient conditions for the reduction of selected crime. By contrast, evaluative findings may support the contention that certain conditions are necessary. Such findings would take advantage of the difference between the approach taken in Peoria and the other cities. In order for this to be possible, the Peoria program must exhibit the same approach in developing its Juvenile Impact (Master) Plan as used for the Adult Plan, and project evaluation designs must be sound and faithfully executed. If residential burglary in Peoria declines significantly (according to our model) when action projects become operational, and project evaluations find this outcome to have occurred as anticipated (e.g., more arrests, faster time from arrest to indictment), but target crime(s) in the other cities do not decline significantly, it would be reasonable to attribute--in part--this reduction to the manner in which the strategies and projects were selected. Whether such an outcome warrants the cost, time and effort involved returns to the first question discussed earlier. In any event, benefits from compiling statistical data will accrue in the manner described.

Problems encountered in the course of the UHCR Program yield several valuable lessons. As described in our Interim Report and reiterated in Section 2.3 and 2.4, every city displayed a degree of uncertainty during the first several months as to expectations for the relationship between planning and action components. The initial timetable for the Program drastically underestimated the amount of time that would be needed to collect, compile, organize and analyze source data envisioned in the guidelines, even under the best of circumstances. Delays that would stem from the grant and Plan review processes and other administrative factors did not seem to have been taken into account. Moreover, a realistic assessment of the ability of cities, which were selected on the basis of the severity of their crime problem to perform in the Program, did not seem to have been made by ILEC.

One of the main reasons for these shortcomings was the absence of an ILEC staff member designated to give top priority to monitoring the Program and provide technical assistance.* Other responsibilities of the Chief of

* A full-time staff member might not have been necessary for accomplishing these tasks. We are suggesting only that one individual should have been assigned the tasks as a primary responsibility.

Planning, such as ensuring the timely completion of annual comprehensive plans for the state, preclude this individual from devoting as much attention to UHCR as was necessary to provide a solid foundation for a program as novel and complex as UHCR. It would have been desirable for an ILEC monitor to have begun prior to the awarding of UHCR grants, to allow more time for the preparation of Program guidelines and for briefing city officials more carefully about the Program design and expectations.

We realize that this was not done for UHCR because other delays in implementing the Program made it necessary to expedite activites toward implementation once the decision was made to proceed. However, the retrospective analysis just given might be applicable to other programs similar to UHCR which may be planned for the future.

The chief difficulty with taking shortcuts to facilitate the progress of a program involving both planning and action (e.g., concurrent approval of an Impact Plan and an action project recommended in the Plan) is that under those circumstances, grantees have a propensity to perceive the Plan as a compliance document rather than a working plan. This perception can be aggravated by pressure to secure action funds. It may be possible that this type of problem is unavoidable under the present policies and procedures of ILEC. We see no technical reason, however, why special procedures could not be established to facilitate the development of a program such as UHCR, which involves both planning and action components.

With regard to the issue of conducting reconnaissance with prospective grantees, a more difficult problem is encountered. Negative consequences of such reconnaisance may be that the prospective grantee chooses not to participate--as was the case with Waukegan--or that the granting agency decides that a particular program is not well-suited to a prospective grantee. The danger associated with the first oucome is that of the program terminating because of a lack of interest. The problem with the second outcome is that the prospective grantee in greatest need might be denied program funds.* Moreover, reconnaisance activities would not likely limit themselves to technical considerations. Particularly for a program of the magnitude of UHCR, political factors would almost

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* While the concept of need hinges on value judgments, the situation in which those having the least need are best-suited to perform successfully is not uncommon. This is a dilemma faced by many social programs.

certainly play a role.*

Having cited possible problems associated with our reconnaissance recommendation, there are at least four key criteria that should underlie reconnaissance activities. Past performance on grants and the nature of prior grant problems encountered constitute one means of assessing a prospective grantee's potential for performing successfully on a new grant. For example, a prospective grantee which has always had difficulty preparing and submitting progress reports would not be expected to perform well in a program where close monitoring and documentation of progress is required. Need, as discussed above, is clearly another important criterion. Political and economic factors--sometimes unstated, but usually present--should be taken into consideration, as these may affect performance in a program in subtle, yet important ways. Finally, and this is particularly relevant to UHCR, the state-of-the-art for work that will be undertaken in a program should be carefully assessed before expectations for performance are formulated.

Decisions resting on the findings of reconnaisance activities could range from abandoning a program altogether to tailoring the program design specifically for individual grantees. Regardless of how these decisions are made from the criteria discussed above, the granting agency would be better prepared to handle problems that occur once program grants are awarded, and a well-conducted reconnaisance would minimize misunderstandings and resultant frustrations.

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* In theory, such factors did not exist under UHCR since participating cities were selected solely on the basis of their ranking worst with respect to crime.

# APPENDIX A

## AN EXAMPLE OF USING THE RATIO-TO-MOVING-AVERAGE METHOD TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF SEASONAL VARIATION

## APPENDIX A

## AN EXAMPLE OF USING THE RATIO-TO-MOVING-AVERAGE METHOD TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF SEASONAL VARIATION

The ratio-to-moving-average method makes use of the fact that if monthly observations are affected by fluctuations related to months (e.g., climatic conditions), then a twelve-month moving average will remove these fluctuations. Raw crime counts are tabulated in Table A-1. Table A-2 provides the calculation used to compute the specific seasonals for robbery in Joliet. The first twelve-month moving average ($\gamma_1$) appears in column (4):

$$\gamma_1 = \frac{20 + 10 + 7 + \ldots + 10}{12} = \frac{154}{12} = 12.8.$$

It is centered between June and July of 1972. The second twelve-month moving average ($\gamma_2$),

$$\gamma_2 = \frac{10 + 7 + 14 + \ldots + 18}{12} = \frac{152}{12} = 12.7,$$

is centered between July and August of 1972. In order to obtain an average centered in July, we use the mean of $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$:

$$\frac{12.8 + 12.7}{2} = 12.8.$$

These centered twelve-month moving averages are listed in column (5) of Table A-2; they represent the hypothetical values which would be observed in the absence of any seasonal variation. The specific seasonals are computed by dividing the number of robberies by the centered twelve-month moving average and multiplying by 100, e.g., for July of 1972, we have

$$\frac{20}{12.8} \times 100 = 156$$

The remaining specific seasonals have been computed and are listed in column (6) of Table A.2. Table A-3 reorganizes the results of Table A-2 by month. The median value for the four years is found for each month. The median is used in order not to give undue weight to a few specific seasonals which might be excessively low or high, as compared with the rest. The mean of the twelve medians is 97.6, i.e.

$$\frac{118 + 95 + 86 + \ldots + 111}{12} = \frac{1171}{12} = 97.6 .$$

Because typical seasonals are usually defined in such a way that their mean is 1.00, the set of medians obtained must be expressed as index numbers whose base is the average of these medians. For January we find the typical seasonal to be

$$\frac{118}{97.6} = 1.21.$$

The typical seasonal of 1.21 indicates that in January the number of robberies in Joliet is 121 percent of that for the "average" month over the five year period 1972-1976.

TABLE A-1

INCIDENCE OF TARGET CRIMES BY MONTH FOR 1972-1976

( ) Original figures when they have changed from the Interim Report.

| Year and Month | Champaign Residential Burglary | East St. Louis Robbery | East St. Louis Burglary | Joliet Robbery | Joliet Burglary | Peoria Residential Burglary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1972 | | | | | | |
| January | 68(57) | 47 | 185 | 20 | 55 | 97 |
| February | 52(39) | 48 | 183 | 10 | 69 | 109 |
| March | 57(42) | 48 | 199 | 7 | 60 | 117 |
| April | 77(58) | 39 | 142 | 14 | 73 | 131 |
| May | 80(69) | 48 | 183 | 14 | 72 | 106 |
| June | 49(42) | 52 | 209 | 13 | 99 | 111 |
| July | 64(46) | 57 | 291 | 20 | 130 | 157 |
| August | 69(51) | 76 | 313 | 10 | 114 | 134 |
| September | 73(59) | 45 | 274 | 10 | 74 | 123 |
| October | 49(63) | 52 | 309 | 11 | 73 | 137 |
| November | 60(51) | 57 | 285 | 15 | 86 | 144 |
| December | 55(48) | 60 | 209 | 10 | 76(66) | 131 |
| 1973 | | | | | | |
| January | 56(46) | 60 | 261 | 18 | 92 | 129 |
| February | 31(26) | 51 | 283 | 17 | 90 | 120 |
| March | 29(24) | 48 | 242 | 18 | 102 | 147 |
| April | 74(62) | 64 | 239 | 26 | 108 | 136 |
| May | 67(55) | 59 | 212 | 16 | 134 | 129 |
| June | 57(49) | 61 | 191 | 26 | 118 | 147 |
| July | 63(62) | 85 | 282 | 21 | 158 | 197 |
| August | 80(75) | 68 | 363 | 31 | 133 | 169 |
| September | 60(57) | 73 | 345 | 26 | 159 | 208 |
| October | 60(58) | 86 | 301 | 35 | 135 | 171 |
| November | 56(83) | 45 | 261 | 18 | 151 | 175 |
| December | 44(40) | 54 | 193 | 21 | 165(150) | 207 |
| 1974 | | | | | | |
| January | 50(48) | 84 | 195 | 27 | 163 | 126 |
| February | 41(41) | 71 | 221 | 29 | 179 | 127 |
| March | 56(56) | 85 | 261 | 24 | 212 | 160 |
| April | 46(47) | 83 | 238 | 15 | 133 | 138 |
| May | 74(73) | 80 | 263 | 25 | 204 | 142 |
| June | 64(68) | 82 | 267 | 33 | 251 | 147 |
| July | 69(72) | 109 | 347 | 11 | 253 | 208 |
| August | 83(89) | 89 | 309 | 28 | 194 | 206 |
| September | 64(68) | 97 | 304 | 19 | 125 | 147 |
| October | 77(74) | 109 | 327 | 31 | 127 | 179 |
| November | 68(71) | 142 | 326 | 29 | 145 | 213 |
| December | 80(84) | 129 | 333 | 37 | 128(204) | 245 |
| 1975 | | | | | | |
| January | 93 | 87 | 317 | 32 | 110 | 266 |
| February | 67 | 69 | 270 | 24 | 102 | 211 |
| March | 71 | 79 | 245 | 19 | 115 | 160 |
| April | 59 | 97 | 238 | 16 | 122 | 211 |
| May | 84 | 66 | 207 | 13 | 140 | 205 |
| June | 65 | 109 | 207 | 32 | 184 | 226 |
| July | 68 | 79 | 302 | 30 | 171 | 234 |
| August | 83 | 101 | 263 | 30 | 193 | 258 |
| September | 73 | 60 | 217 | 28 | 142 | 179 |
| October | 68 | 116 | 254 | 13 | 129 | 208 |
| November | 56 | 79 | 195 | 13 | 104 | 216 |
| December | 56 | 100 | 247 | 27 | 152(139) | 263 |
| 1976 | | | | | | |
| January | 87(88) | 97 | 244(228) | 29(32) | 135(156) | 140 |
| February | 39(39) | 87 | 196(183) | 13(14) | 101(123) | 133 |
| March | 43(42) | 54 | 232(211) | 13(14) | 153(166) | 149 |
| April | 64(68) | 52 | 193(179) | 4( 4) | 161(186) | 121 |
| May | 43(44) | 80 | 227(205) | 12(12) | 149(163) | 149 |
| June | 53(52) | 56 | 185(167) | 14(14) | 170(181) | 127 |
| July | 55 | 81 | 194 | 23 | 156 | 243 |
| August | 66 | 49 | 248 | 13 | 144 | 200 |
| September | 49 | 46 | 176 | 33 | 152 | 135 |
| October | 39 | 54 | 229 | 20 | 177 | 122 |
| November | 47 | 58 | 191 | 17 | 121 | 162 |
| December | 69 | 54 | 236 | 18 | 157 | 128 |

TABLE A-2

CALCULATION OF SPECIFIC SEASONALS FOR THE NUMBER OF ROBBERIES IN JOLIET FROM 1972 TO 1976

| Year and Month (1) | Number of Robberies (2) | 12-Month Moving Total (3) | 12-Month Moving Average (4) | Centered 12-Month Moving Average (5) | Specific Seasonals (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1972 | | | | | |
| January | 20 | | | | |
| February | 10 | | | | |
| March | 7 | | | | |
| April | 14 | | | | |
| May | 14 | | | | |
| June | 13 | 154 | 12.8 | | |
| July | 20 | 152 | 12.7 | 12.8 | 156 |
| August | 10 | 159 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 77 |
| September | 10 | 170 | 14.2 | 13.8 | 72 |
| October | 11 | 182 | 15.2 | 14.7 | 75 |
| November | 15 | 184 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 98 |
| December | 10 | 197 | 16.4 | 15.9 | 63 |
| 1973 | | | | | |
| January | 18 | 198 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 109 |
| February | 17 | 219 | 18.3 | 17.4 | 98 |
| March | 18 | 235 | 19.6 | 19.0 | 95 |
| April | 26 | 259 | 21.6 | 20.6 | 126 |
| May | 16 | 262 | 21.8 | 21.7 | 74 |
| June | 26 | 273 | 22.8 | 22.3 | 117 |
| July | 21 | 282 | 23.5 | 23.2 | 91 |
| August | 31 | 294 | 24.5 | 24.0 | 129 |
| September | 26 | 300 | 25.0 | 24.8 | 105 |
| October | 35 | 289 | 24.1 | 24.6 | 142 |
| November | 18 | 298 | 24.8 | 24.5 | 73 |
| December | 21 | 305 | 25.4 | 25.1 | 84 |
| 1974 | | | | | |
| January | 27 | 295 | 24.6 | 25.0 | 108 |
| February | 29 | 292 | 24.3 | 24.5 | 118 |
| March | 24 | 285 | 23.8 | 24.1 | 100 |
| April | 15 | 281 | 23.4 | 23.6 | 64 |
| May | 25 | 292 | 24.3 | 23.9 | 105 |
| June | 33 | 308 | 25.7 | 25.0 | 132 |
| July | 11 | 313 | 26.1 | 25.9 | 42 |
| August | 28 | 308 | 25.7 | 25.9 | 108 |
| September | 19 | 303 | 25.3 | 25.5 | 75 |
| October | 31 | 304 | 25.3 | 25.3 | 123 |
| November | 29 | 292 | 24.3 | 24.8 | 117 |
| December | 37 | 291 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 152 |
| 1975 | | | | | |
| January | 32 | 310 | 25.8 | 25.1 | 127 |
| February | 24 | 312 | 26.0 | 25.9 | 93 |
| March | 19 | 321 | 26.8 | 26.4 | 72 |
| April | 16 | 303 | 25.3 | 26.1 | 61 |
| May | 13 | 287 | 23.9 | 24.6 | 53 |
| June | 32 | 277 | 23.1 | 23.5 | 136 |
| July | 30 | 274 | 22.8 | 23.0 | 131 |
| August | 30 | 263 | 21.9 | 22.4 | 134 |
| September | 28 | 257 | 21.4 | 21.6 | 129 |
| October | 13 | 245 | 20.4 | 20.9 | 62 |
| November | 13 | 244 | 20.3 | 20.4 | 64 |
| December | 27 | 226 | 18.8 | 19.6 | 138 |
| 1976 | | | | | |
| January | 29 | 219 | 18.2 | 18.5 | 156 |
| February | 13 | 202 | 16.8 | 17.5 | 74 |
| March | 13 | 207 | 17.2 | 17.0 | 76 |
| April | 4 | 214 | 17.8 | 17.5 | 23 |
| May | 12 | 218 | 18.2 | 18.0 | 67 |
| June | 14 | 211 | 17.6 | 17.9 | 78 |
| July | 23 | | | | |
| August | 13 | | | | |
| September | 33 | | | | |
| October | 20 | | | | |
| November | 17 | | | | |
| December | 20 | | | | |

TABLE A-3

CALCULATION OF TYPICAL SEASONALS FOR THE NUMBER OF ROBBERIES IN JOLIET FROM 1972 TO 1976

| Year | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May | Jun. | Jul. | Aug. | Sep. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1972 | | | | | | | 156 | 77 | 72 | 75 | 98 | 63 |
| 1973 | 109 | 98 | 95 | 126 | 74 | 117 | 91 | 129 | 105 | 142 | 73 | 84 |
| 1974 | 108 | 118 | 100 | 64 | 105 | 132 | 42 | 108 | 75 | 123 | 117 | 152 |
| 1975 | 127 | 93 | 72 | 61 | 53 | 136 | 131 | 134 | 129 | 62 | 64 | 138 |
| 1976 | 156 | 74 | 76 | 23 | 67 | 78 | | | | | | |
| Median | 118 | 95 | 86 | 62 | 70 | 124 | 111 | 119 | 90 | 99 | 86 | 111 |
| Typical Seasonal | 1.21 | .98 | .88 | .64 | .72 | 1.28 | 1.13 | 1.22 | .92 | 1.01 | .88 | 1.14 |

# APPENDIX B

## SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EQUATIONS DESCRIBING THE SIX TARGET CRIMES

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EQUATIONS DESCRIBING
THE SIX TARGET CRIMES

This appendix presents a summary of statistics and equations for the quadratic model of trends and patterns in the monthly counts of target crime over the five-year period 1972-1976. This model was described in Section 4.2, and construction of the 60-month data base was described in Section 4.1. In Table B-1 these are organized by city and by target crime for both raw counts and seasonally adjusted counts.

Multiple R is the conventional multiple correlation coefficient. Essentially, this is a measure of the simple correlation between observed and calculated values of the dependent variable. This is the positive square root of $R^2$, which is a measure of the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is "explained" by the model.

The adjusted $R^2$ is $R^2$ adjusted for the number of independent variables in the equation and the number of observations. It is a more conservative estimate of the percent of variance explained by the model, especially when the sample size is small. The formula is

$$\text{Adjusted } R^2 = R^2 - \left(\frac{k - 1}{N - k}\right)(1 - R^2)$$

where k is the number of independent variables in the regression equation, N is the number of cases, and $R^2$ to the right of the equals sign is the unadjusted $R^2$. Adjusted $R^2$ may become negative or undefined when $R^2$ or the number of cases is small.*

The standard error of the estimate is also conventionally defined as the standard deviation of residuals about the values calculated from the equation.

The column labeled "Mean of the Absolute Value of the Residuals" can be interpreted as an "average error" around values generated by the model. It has been suggested that this statistic is a more appropriate measure of the goodness of fit of the data to the model than are R, the adjusted $R^2$, and the

* Norman H. Nie, et al, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 358.

standard error of estimate because it does not disproportionately weigh observations farther from the curve generated by the model.*

Equations describing the model are given in the right-most column of Table B-1. The letter t refers to the index for one of the months in the period under investigation. The dependent variable $\gamma(t)$ is the model's estimate of the crime count for month t. Numerical values in the equation are parameter estimates made from least squares fits of the model to the data sets for the target crimes indicated.

* Richard A. Berk, Michael Hennessy, and Richard McCleary, "Descriptive Distortions in Covariance Based Statistics," Social Science Research, 5 (1976) pp. 107-126.

TABLE B-1

SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EQUATIONS DESCRIBING THE SIX TARGET CRIMES

| | Multiple R | Adjusted $R^2$ | Standard Error of Estimate | Mean of the Absolute Value of the Residuals | Equation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Champaign | | | | | |
| Residential Burglary | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .48 | .19 | 13.3 | 10.4 | $Y(t) = 13 + 2.9t - .04t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .55 | .27 | 11.1 | 8.2 | $Y(t) = 11 + 3.0t - .04t^2$ |
| East St. Louis | | | | | |
| Robbery | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .67 | .44 | 17.2 | 13.9 | $Y(t) = 28 + 3.5t - 0.5t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .66 | .41 | 17.7 | 12.3 | $Y(t) = 24 + 3.5t - 0.5t^2$ |
| Burglary | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .53 | .25 | 44.3 | 36.0 | $Y(t) = 194 + 5.7t - .10t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .62 | .37 | 34.2 | 26.0 | $Y(t) = 196 + 5.6t - .10t^2$ |
| Joliet | | | | | |
| Robbery | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .52 | .24 | 7.0 | 5.7 | $Y(t) = 8.7 + .96t - .01t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .51 | .24 | 6.9 | 5.2 | $Y(t) = 9.6 + .94t - .01t^2$ |
| Burglary | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .66 | .42 | 33.5 | 26.3 | $Y(t) = 54 + 5.5t - .07t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .71 | .49 | 29.0 | 21.8 | $Y(t) = 56 + 5.2t - .07t^2$ |
| Peoria | | | | | |
| Residential Burglary | | | | | |
| Unadjusted Data | .62 | .37 | 35.1 | 28.1 | $Y(t) = 85 + 5.7t - .08t^2$ |
| Seasonally Adjusted Data | .66 | .41 | 30.4 | 22.1 | $Y(t) = 90 + 5.6t - .08t^2$ |

# APPENDIX C

## ROBBERY AND BURGLARY TRENDS IN SEVEN ILLINOIS CITIES

FIGURE C-1
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN ARLINGTON HEIGHTS




Data Source: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1976

FIGURE C-2
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN ARLINGTON HEIGHTS




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-3
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN DECATUR




Data Source: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1976

FIGURE C-4
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN DECATUR




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-5
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN ELGIN




Data Source: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1976

FIGURE C-6
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN ELGIN




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-7
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN OAK LAWN




Data Source: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1976

FIGURE C-8
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN OAK LAWN




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-9
MONTHLY ROBBERY TREND IN OAK PARK




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-10
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN OAK PARK




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-11
MONTHLY ROBBERY TREND IN ROCKFORD




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-12
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN ROCKFORD




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

FIGURE C-13
YEARLY ROBBERY TREND IN SKOKIE


Data Source: Crime in Illinois: 1972-1976

FIGURE C-14
MONTHLY BURGLARY TREND IN SKOKIE




Data Source: Offense and Clearance Trends Reports, Criminal Justice Information Services

TABLE C-1

TYPICAL SEASONALS FOR ROBBERY AND BURGLARY
IN SEVEN NON-URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION PROGRAM CITIES
FOR THE PERIOD 1972-1976

| | ROBBERY | | | | | BURGLARY | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Oak Park | Rockford | Arlington Heights | Decatur | Elgin | Oak Lawn | Oak Park | Rockford | Skokie |
| January | 1.12 | 1.38 | .72 | .95 | .85 | .99 | .89 | .90 | .84 |
| February | .76 | .72 | .75 | .83 | .91 | .53 | .82 | .74 | .70 |
| March | .80 | .75 | .94 | 1.03 | 1.03 | .78 | .94 | .95 | .71 |
| April | .95 | .85 | .97 | .96 | .86 | .99 | .74 | .91 | .67 |
| May | .82 | .81 | .83 | 1.00 | .90 | 1.01 | 1.05 | .97 | 1.14 |
| June | 1.18 | .84 | 1.27 | 1.12 | .97 | 1.16 | 1.26 | .93 | 1.41 |
| July | .99 | .74 | 1.40 | 1.25 | .98 | 1.59 | 1.24 | 1.24 | 1.44 |
| August | 1.05 | 1.16 | 1.27 | 1.22 | 1.28 | 1.37 | 1.44 | 1.28 | 1.28 |
| September | 1.16 | 1.23 | 1.16 | .89 | | .84 | 1.04 | 1.00 | .91 |
| October | 1.30 | 1.41 | .99 | .94 | 1.23 | 1.00 | .95 | 1.08 | 1.12 |
| November | .79 | 1.14 | .93 | .82 | .98 | .95 | .76 | .96 | .84 |
| December | 1.07 | .97 | .77 | 1.00 | .98 | .79 | .85 | 1.01 | .91 |

# APPENDIX D

# COMPARISONS AMONG DATA SETS

APPENDIX D

COMPARISONS AMONG DATA SETS

Collecting data from several sources provided us with an opportunity to compare and evaluate the reliability of the data, if not their validity. We first compared CJIS data on robbery and burglary with FBI data for the years 1966-1971, and no discrepancies were found. This was expected because the I-UCR file for the years 1965-1971 was simply a copy of the UCR data file.

For the years 1972 through 1976 the flow of information began to reverse with CJIS now forwarding the local data it had collected to the FBI.* For the most part, there was a good match between the Illinois Offense and Clearance Trends reports and the UCR Return A data. However, there were a few exceptions worth noting:

- the FBI had no monthly data for Joliet for the years 1972 and 1975;
- the I-UCR showed fifteen more burglaries than did UCR in the month of December for Joliet in both 1973 and 1974;
- there was a difference between I-UCR and the UCR in January and May 1972 for East St. Louis, mentioned in Section 4.1; and
- finally, Table D-1 indicates that for East St. Louis in 1972 and 1973, there were considerably more robberies shown by I-UCR than by UCR. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that parallel reporting systems to the state and the FBI were in effect during that period, and it took some time to match crime classification definitions.

A comparison was made in Table D-2 for Joliet, between the Offense and Clearance Trends reports and the 1976 Joliet Police Annual Report. The discrepancies were of sufficient magnitude to be of some concern. Discussions with personnel in the Joliet Police Department indicated that the figures in the Annual Report were in error. The events that led to the figures published in the Annual Report could not be reconstructed. Figures from Offense and Clearance Trends reports were also compared with figures

* East St. Louis continued to report to the FBI directly until May 1974.

TABLE D-1

COMPARISON OF TWO DATA SOURCES FOR 1972 AND 1973 ROBBERIES IN EAST ST. LOUIS

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1)

(2) Uniform Crime Report, Return A

| | 1972 | | | | 1973 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ |
| January | 47 | 47 | 0 | 0% | 62 | 60 | - 2 | 3% |
| February | 48 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 51 | - 3 | 6 |
| March | 48 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 69 | 48 | -21 | 30 |
| April | 41 | 39 | 2 | - 5 | 97 | 64 | -33 | 34 |
| May | 99 | 48 | 51 | -52 | 96 | 59 | -37 | 38 |
| June | 162 | 52 | 110 | -68 | 76 | 61 | -15 | 20 |
| July | 60 | 57 | 3 | - 5 | 114 | 85 | -29 | 25 |
| August | 153 | 76 | 77 | -50 | 86 | 68 | -18 | 21 |
| September | 50 | 45 | 5 | -10 | 108 | 73 | -35 | 32 |
| October | 57 | 52 | 5 | - 9 | 123 | 86 | -37 | 30 |
| November | 60 | 57 | 3 | - 5 | 68 | 45 | -23 | 34 |
| December | 66 | 60 | 6 | - 9 | 58 | 54 | - 4 | 7 |
| TOTAL | 891 | 629 | -262 | -29% | 1011 | 754 | -257 | -25% |

TABLE D-2

COMPARISON OF THREE DATA SOURCES FOR 1975 AND 1976 ROBBERIES AND BURGLARIES IN JOLIET

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense Summary-Set 2)

(2) Joliet Police Annual Report: 1976

(3) Crime Analyst, Mobile Crime Prevention Unit

| | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Month | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (3)-(1) | (3)-(1)/(1) |
| Robbery | January | 32 | 29 | -3 | - 9% | 29 | 26 | 30 | -3 | -10% | 1 | 3% |
| | February | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 12 | 13 | -1 | - 8 | 0 | 0 |
| | March | 19 | 17 | -2 | -10 | 13 | 10 | 14 | -3 | -23 | 1 | 8 |
| | April | 16 | 15 | -1 | - 6 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 25 |
| | May | 13 | 12 | -1 | - 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 | -3 | -25 | -2 | -17 |
| | June | 32 | 29 | -3 | - 9 | 14 | 12 | 14 | -2 | -14 | 0 | 0 |
| | July | 30 | 29 | -1 | - 3 | 23 | 21 | 18 | -2 | - 9 | -5 | -22 |
| | August | 30 | 32 | 2 | 7 | 13 | 11 | 11 | -2 | -15 | -2 | -15 |
| | September | 28 | 21 | -7 | -25 | 33 | 28 | 36 | -5 | -15 | 3 | - 9 |
| | October | 13 | 17 | 4 | 31 | 20 | 24 | 20 | 4 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| | November | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 21 | 14 | 4 | 24 | -3 | -18 |
| | December | 27 | 29 | 2 | 7 | 18 | 19 | 26 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 44 |
| | TOTAL | 277 | 267 | -10 | - 4% | 209 | 197 | 211 | -12 | - 6% | - 2 | - 1% |
| Burglary | January | 110 | 99 | -11 | 10% | 135 | 138 | 150 | 3 | 2% | 15 | 11% |
| | February | 102 | 90 | -12 | 12 | 101 | 102 | 101 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| | March | 115 | 95 | -20 | 17 | 153 | 146 | 165 | - 7 | - 4 | 12 | 8 |
| | April | 122 | 100 | -22 | 18 | 161 | 170 | 175 | 9 | 6 | 14 | 9 |
| | May | 140 | 119 | -21 | 15 | 149 | 137 | 152 | -12 | - 8 | 3 | 2 |
| | June | 184 | 150 | -34 | 18 | 170 | 147 | 168 | -23 | -14 | - 2 | - 1 |
| | July | 171 | 162 | - 9 | 5 | 156 | 134 | 157 | -22 | -14 | 1 | 1 |
| | August | 193 | 184 | - 9 | 5 | 144 | 115 | 116 | -29 | -20 | -28 | -19 |
| | September | 142 | 134 | - 8 | 6 | 152 | 156 | 146 | 4 | 3 | - 6 | - 4 |
| | October | 129 | 103 | -26 | 20 | 177 | 173 | 165 | - 4 | - 2 | -12 | - 8 |
| | November | 104 | 85 | -19 | 18 | 121 | 109 | 116 | -12 | -10 | - 5 | - 4 |
| | December | 139 | 126 | -13 | 9 | 157 | 148 | 157 | - 9 | - 6 | 0 | 0 |
| | TOTAL | 1651 | 1447 | -204 | -12% | 1776 | 1675 | 1768 | -101 | - 6% | - 8 | 0% |

compiled from original police records by the Crime Analyst of the Department's Mobile Crime Prevention Unit. There were several notably large monthly differences between the figures, due in part to different interpretations of what constitutes a robbery or burglary.

Another opportunity to compare source documents with official police statistics occurred in Peoria. As shown in Table D-3, the Peoria Program Coordination Unit reported up to five percent more residential burglaries per month by rechecking original police documents. More widely discrepant monthly figures were found between the Peoria Police Department's On-Line Information System and the residential burglary count supplied by CJIS in 1975 and 1976 (see text below and Table D-13).

Another reliability check was made between reports compiled from the two input formats for reporting crime statistics: the Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1 form and the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form. The first form has offense classifications listed along the left-hand margin and crimes are presumably tallied on this form as they occur. The second form has case or incident numbers listed along the left-hand margin. As noted in Section 4.1, more detailed information on offenses is entered on this form.

Tables D-4 through D-7 compare monthly counts appearing in Offense and Clearance Trends reports (compiled from the Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1 forms) and Property Analysis reports, for robbery, burglary-forcible, and burglary-no force for the years 1972-1976.* The differences between the two sets of figures are provided and are also expressed as percentage errors by dividing the differences by the figures in the Offense and Clearance Trend reports (the official counts).

For Champaign (Table D-4), Offense and Clearance Trend reports for robbery are, with few exceptions, higher than are counts from Property Analysis reports for all years. This is also true of the burglary-forcible and burglary-no force categories through the first half of 1973. From that point on, the difference seems to be within random error.

A similar pattern for robbery appears for East St. Louis (Table D-5). We note the small counts in the burglary-no force category for all years. Despite the apparent jump in this category beginning in 1974, the ratio of no force to forcible burglary is significantly lower than in the other three

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* The Property Analysis reports (compiled from Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 forms) exclude burglary attempts.

TABLE D-3

COMPARISON OF THREE DATA SOURCES FOR 1973 THROUGH 1976
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN PEORIA

(1) Peoria Police Department: On-Line Information System
(2) Peoria Program Coordination Unit
(3) Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police (from Offense Analysis Information-Set 1)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (2) - (1) | $\frac{(2) - (1)}{(1)}$ | (3) - (1) | $\frac{(3) - (1)}{(1)}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1973 | | | | | | | |
| January | 129 | 130 | | 1 | 1% | | |
| February | 120 | 120 | | 0 | 0 | | |
| March | 147 | 148 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| April | 136 | 138 | | 2 | 1 | | |
| May | 129 | 130 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| June | 147 | 148 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| July August | 197 | 202 | | 5 | 2 | | |
| August | 169 | 171 | | 2 | 1 | | |
| September | 208 | 210 | | 2 | 1 | | |
| October | 171 | 176 | | 5 | 3 | | |
| November | 175 | 176 | | 1 | 0 | | |
| December | 207 | 210 | | 3 | 1 | | |
| Total | 1935 | 1959 | | 24 | 1% | | |
| 1974 | | | | | | | |
| January | 126 | 131 | | 5 | 4% | | |
| February | 127 | 128 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| March | 160 | 167 | | 7 | 4 | | |
| April | 138 | 141 | | 3 | 2 | | |
| May | 142 | 144 | | 2 | 1 | | |
| June | 147 | 150 | | 3 | 2 | | |
| July | 208 | 209 | | 1 | 0 | | |
| August | 206 | 207 | | 1 | 0 | | |
| September | 147 | 148 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| October | 179 | 185 | | 6 | 3 | | |
| November | 213 | 214 | | 1 | 0 | | |
| December | 245 | 250 | | 5 | 2 | | |
| Total | 2038 | 2074 | | 36 | 2% | | |
| 1975 | | | | | | | |
| January | 266 | 270 | 268 | 4 | 2% | 2 | 1% |
| February | 211 | 215 | 213 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| March | 160 | 160 | 169 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 6 |
| April | 211 | 214 | 213 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| May | 205 | 206 | 203 | 1 | 0 | - 2 | - 1 |
| June | 226 | 227 | 217 | 1 | 0 | - 9 | - 4 |
| July | 234 | 240 | 241 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 3 |
| August | 258 | 271 | 256 | 13 | 5 | - 2 | - 1 |
| September | 179 | 184 | 190 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 6 |
| October | 208 | 212 | 206 | 4 | 2 | - 2 | - 1 |
| November | 216 | 217 | 206 | 1 | 0 | -10 | - 5 |
| December | 263 | 263 | 247 | 0 | 0 | -16 | - 6 |
| Total | 2637 | 2679 | 2629 | 42 | 2% | - 8 | 0% |
| 1976 | | | | | | | |
| January | 140 | | 168 | | | 28 | 20% |
| February | 133 | | 134 | | | 1 | 1 |
| March | 149 | | 154 | | | 5 | 3 |
| April | 121 | | 153 | | | 32 | 30 |
| May | 149 | | 119 | | | -30 | -20 |
| June | 127 | | 129 | | | 2 | 2 |
| July | 243 | | 240 | | | - 3 | - 1 |
| August | 200 | | 199 | | | - 1 | 0 |
| September | 135 | | 140 | | | 5 | 4 |
| October | 122 | | 123 | | | 1 | 1 |
| November | 162 | | 170 | | | 8 | 1 |
| December | 128 | | 127 | | | - 1 | - 1 |
| Total | 1809 | | 1856 | | | 47 | 2% |

cities. Aside from two cases where it appears that data were available for only one of the reports and the other occasional large differences, the only pattern that seems to be exhibited in the burglary categories is the greater frequency of higher counts from Offense and Clearance Trend reports.*

The discrepancy between counts from Offense and Clearance Trend reports and Property Analysis reports, as were found for robbery in Champaign and East St. Louis, also exists for Joliet (Table D-6). Differences between these two sets of counts seem almost random for the two burglary categories. The discrepancy seems to abate for the burglary categories in 1975, except for the months of September through December 1975.** This abatement can largely be accounted for by the shift to the single Set 2 format for reporting in the burglary categories, but this does not seem to have affected robbery. CJIS was unable to provide an explanation for a discrepancy which occurred even with the use of a single reporting format.

As with the other three cities, Table D-7 shows that Offense and Clearance Trend counts consistently exceed Property Analysis counts for robbery by a large margin. This is also true of the counts in the two burglary categories until 1975. From this point on, counts from these two sets of reports seem to reverse, but by a smaller margin.

On the basis of these tables, one may conjecture that Property Analysis report values are generally smaller because cases where no property was stolen were not entered on the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form. We will return to this point in the sequel.

In order to contrast simple frequency counts of offenses with some other measure of crime, we attempted to develop trends reflecting the value of property stolen. We therefore asked CJIS to prepare a special printout showing the distribution of offenses by the value of property stolen for 1972 through 1976.*** We specified the seven categories used in the Sellin-Wolfgang Scoring System:

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* The discrepancy of 606 forcible burglaries in December 1975 (and possibly others) can probably be attributed to a keypunch or transposition error in the preparation of that month's Property Analysis report.

** The discrepancies in Joliet for September through December of 1975 were due to a crash effort to catch up on work that had accumulated during the year.

*** We express our gratitude to CJIS staff without whose cooperation this investigation could not have been made.

TABLE D-4

COMPARISON OF TWO CRIME INCIDENCE REPORTING FORMS FOR THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN FROM 1972-1976

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1)

(2) Property Analysis (from Offense Analysis Information--Set 1)

| | | 1972 | | | | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | $\frac{(2)-(1)}{(1)}$ |
| Robbery | Jan | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0% | 2 | 4 | 2 | 100% | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0% | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0% | 8 | 7 | - 1 | -12% |
| | Feb | 5 | 4 | - 1 | -20 | 7 | 5 | - 2 | -29 | 6 | 4 | - 2 | -33 | 12 | 11 | - 1 | - 8 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 17 |
| | Mar | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 14 | - 4 | -22 | 8 | 6 | - 2 | -25 | 8 | 7 | - 1 | -13 | 7 | 6 | - 1 | -14 |
| | Apr | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 8 | - 3 | -27 | 2 | 1 | 1 | -50 |
| | May | 13 | 10 | - 3 | -23 | 7 | 6 | - 1 | -14 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 6 | - 2 | -25 | 5 | 4 | - 1 | -20 |
| | Jun | 7 | 6 | - 1 | -14 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | - 1 | -25 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 9 | 1 | -10 |
| | Jul | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | - 1 | -33 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 9 | - 3 | -25 | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 |
| | Aug | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 7 | - 3 | -30 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 14 |
| | Sep | 9 | 6 | - 3 | -33 | 6 | 5 | - 1 | -17 | 7 | 5 | - 2 | -29 | 7 | 5 | - 2 | -29 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| | Oct | 7 | 4 | - 3 | -43 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 | - 1 | -17 | 5 | 4 | - 1 | -20 |
| | Nov | 6 | 5 | - 1 | -17 | 5 | 4 | - 1 | -20 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | Dec | 12 | 10 | - 2 | -17 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | - 1 | -20 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | - 1 | -25 |
| | TOTAL | 88 | 74 | -14 | -16% | 79 | 71 | - 8 | -10% | 67 | 56 | -11 | -16% | 95 | 83 | -12 | -13% | 77 | 71 | - 6 | - 8% |
| Burglary Forcible | Jan | 55 | 46 | - 9 | -16% | 39 | 26 | -13 | -33% | 39 | 37 | - 2 | - 5% | 59 | 59 | 0 | 0% | 59 | 57 | - 2 | - 3% |
| | Feb | 41 | 28 | -13 | -32 | 20 | 15 | - 5 | -25 | 25 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| | Mar | 58 | 40 | -18 | -31 | 23 | 16 | - 7 | -30 | 37 | 37 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 37 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| | Apr | 48 | 32 | -16 | -33 | 41 | 35 | - 6 | -15 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| | May | 49 | 40 | - 9 | -18 | 41 | 30 | -11 | -27 | 50 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jun | 49 | 41 | - 8 | -16 | 34 | 28 | - 6 | -18 | 39 | 40 | 1 | 3 | 29 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 34 | 1 | 3 |
| | Jul | 44 | 32 | -12 | -27 | 36 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 42 | 1 | 2 | 39 | 39 | 0 | 0 |
| | Aug | 57 | 41 | -16 | -28 | 33 | 32 | - 1 | - 3 | 51 | 49 | - 2 | - 4 | 42 | 41 | - 1 | - 2 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sep | 45 | 33 | -12 | -27 | 47 | 46 | - 1 | - 2 | 34 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 34 | 1 | 3 | 35 | 36 | 1 | 3 |
| | Oct | 32 | 53 | 21 | 66 | 51 | 47 | - 4 | - 8 | 34 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 49 | 41 | - 8 | -16 | 52 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 55 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 37 | 0 | 0 |
| | Dec | 48 | 41 | - 7 | -15 | 32 | 28 | - 4 | -13 | 60 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 |
| | TOTAL | 575 | 468 | -107 | -19% | 449 | 391 | -58 | -13% | 483 | 480 | - 3 | - 1% | 487 | 488 | 1 | 0% | 433 | 431 | - 2 | 0% |
| Burglary No Force | Jan | 22 | 18 | - 4 | -18% | 24 | 26 | 2 | 8% | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0% | 33 | 32 | - 1 | - 3% | 42 | 43 | 1 | 2% |
| | Feb | 21 | 18 | - 3 | -14 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| | Mar | 15 | 13 | - 2 | -13 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 25 | 1 | 4 | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| | Apr | 37 | 32 | - 5 | -14 | 38 | 30 | - 8 | -21 | 16 | 17 | 1 | 6 | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 43 | 1 | - 2 |
| | May | 36 | 33 | - 3 | - 8 | 31 | 29 | - 2 | - 6 | 34 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 41 | 1 | 2 | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jun | 22 | 20 | - 2 | - 9 | 23 | 21 | - 2 | - 9 | 33 | 32 | - 1 | - 3 | 33 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jul | 27 | 19 | - 8 | -30 | 34 | 33 | - 1 | - 3 | 30 | 31 | 1 | 3 | 32 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| | Aug | 28 | 22 | - 6 | -21 | 43 | 39 | - 4 | - 9 | 37 | 38 | 1 | 3 | 42 | 43 | 1 | 2 | 29 | 28 | 1 | - 3 |
| | Sep | 27 | 25 | - 2 | - 7 | 30 | 27 | - 3 | -10 | 21 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 45 | 1 | 2 | 21 | 22 | 1 | 5 |
| | Oct | 19 | 13 | - 6 | -32 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 4 | 30 | 31 | 1 | 3 | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 21 | 18 | - 3 | -14 | 25 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 14 | 1 | 8 |
| | Dec | 20 | 18 | - 2 | -10 | 14 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| | TOTAL | 295 | 249 | -46 | -16% | 316 | 298 | -18 | - 6% | 287 | 290 | 3 | 1% | 375 | 378 | 3 | 1% | 281 | 282 | 1 | 0% |

TABLE D-5

COMPARISON OF TWO CRIME INCIDENCE REPORTING FORMS FOR THE CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS FROM 1972-1976

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1)

(2) Property Analysis (from Offense Analysis Information--Set 1)

| | | 1972 | | | | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) |
| Robbery | Jan | 47 | 0 | -47 | -100% | 62 | 61 | - 1 | - 2% | 84 | 70 | -14 | -17% | 87 | 85 | - 2 | - 2% | 97 | 80 | - 17 | - 18% |
| | Feb | 48 | 43 | - 5 | -10 | 54 | 54 | - 0 | - 0 | 71 | 71 | - 0 | - 0 | 69 | 65 | - 4 | - 6 | 87 | 85 | - 2 | - 2 |
| | Mar | 48 | 54 | 6 | 13 | 69 | 64 | - 5 | - 7 | 85 | 88 | 3 | 4 | 79 | 79 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 42 | - 12 | - 22 |
| | Apr | 41 | 41 | 0 | 0 | 97 | 97 | 0 | 0 | 81 | 86 | 3 | 4 | 97 | 88 | 1 | 1 | 52 | 22 | - 30 | - 58 |
| | May | 99 | 60 | -39 | -39 | 96 | 91 | - 5 | - 5 | 80 | 83 | 3 | 4 | 66 | 62 | - 4 | - 6 | 80 | 61 | - 19 | - 24 |
| | Jun | 162 | 54 | -108 | -67 | 86 | 85 | - 1 | - 1 | 82 | 86 | 4 | 5 | 109 | 97 | -12 | -11 | 56 | 51 | - 5 | - 9 |
| | Jul | 60 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 108 | 98 | -10 | - 9 | 109 | 109 | 0 | 0 | 79 | 71 | - 8 | - 8 | 81 | 60 | - 21 | - 26 |
| | Aug | 153 | 81 | -72 | -47 | 86 | 85 | - 1 | - 1 | 89 | 85 | - 4 | - 4 | 101 | 98 | - 3 | - 3 | 49 | 41 | - 8 | - 16 |
| | Sep | 50 | 45 | - 5 | -10 | 108 | 98 | -10 | - 9 | 97 | 99 | 2 | 2 | 66 | 59 | - 7 | - 7 | 46 | 36 | - 10 | - 22 |
| | Oct | 57 | 54 | - 3 | - 5 | 121 | 114 | - 7 | - 7 | 109 | 101 | - 8 | - 7 | 116 | 110 | - 6 | - 5 | 54 | 50 | - 4 | - 7 |
| | Nov | 60 | 74 | 14 | 23 | 68 | 66 | - 2 | - 3 | 142 | 131 | -11 | - 8 | 79 | 75 | - 4 | - 5 | 58 | 50 | - 8 | - 14 |
| | Dec | 66 | 108 | 42 | 64 | 58 | 57 | - 1 | - 2 | 139 | 134 | - 6 | - 5 | 100 | 96 | - 4 | - 4 | 54 | 49 | - 5 | - 9 |
| | TOTAL | 891 | 674 | -217 | -24% | 1015 | 972 | -43 | - 4% | 1160 | 1132 | -28 | - 2% | 1042 | 994 | -48 | - 5% | 768 | 627 | -141 | - 18% |
| Burglary Forcible | Jan | 174 | 0 | -174 | -100% | 245 | 258 | 13 | 5% | 167 | 176 | 9 | 5% | 268 | 279 | 11 | 4% | 219 | 218 | - 1 | 0% |
| | Feb | 173 | 171 | - 2 | - 1 | 261 | 283 | 22 | 8 | 201 | 213 | 12 | 6 | 235 | 246 | 11 | 5 | 173 | 271 | 98 | 57 |
| | Mar | 181 | 185 | 4 | 2 | 219 | 218 | - 1 | - 0 | 229 | 238 | 9 | 4 | 211 | 217 | 6 | 3 | 199 | 202 | 3 | 2 |
| | Apr | 132 | 121 | -11 | - 8 | 233 | 234 | 1 | 1 | 210 | 220 | 10 | 5 | 206 | 212 | 6 | 3 | 171 | 79 | - 92 | - 54 |
| | May | 172 | 175 | 3 | 2 | 141 | 151 | 10 | 7 | 233 | 233 | 0 | 0 | 181 | 188 | 7 | 4 | 201 | 196 | - 5 | - 2 |
| | Jun | 197 | 202 | 5 | 3 | 177 | 192 | 15 | 8 | 225 | 228 | 3 | 1 | 123 | 129 | 6 | 5 | 157 | 159 | 2 | 1 |
| | Jul | 268 | 273 | 5 | 2 | 268 | 267 | - 1 | 0 | 235 | 237 | 2 | 1 | 249 | 256 | 7 | 3 | 172 | 175 | 3 | 2 |
| | Aug | 102 | 292 | -10 | - 1 | 108 | 344 | 11 | 1 | 364 | 369 | 5 | 2 | 248 | 270 | 22 | 10 | 218 | 222 | 4 | 2 |
| | Sep | 259 | 259 | 0 | 0 | 311 | 311 | 0 | 0 | 253 | 211 | -16 | 6 | 141 | 149 | 8 | 3 | 155 | 156 | 1 | 1 |
| | Oct | 286 | 283 | - 3 | - 1 | 277 | 285 | 8 | 3 | 281 | 280 | 5 | 2 | 220 | 224 | 4 | 2 | 208 | 209 | 1 | 0 |
| | Nov | 1 | 244 | 243 | 0 | 233 | 234 | 1 | 0 | 285 | 283 | - 2 | - 1 | 169 | 167 | - 2 | - 1 | 167 | 160 | - 7 | - 4 |
| | Dec | 136 | 220 | 84 | 13 | 178 | 172 | - 6 | - 3 | 296 | 297 | 1 | 0 | 215 | 801 | 686 | 282 | 222 | 223 | 1 | 0 |
| | TOTAL | 2343 | 2429 | 89 | 4% | 3134 | 3216 | 82 | 3% | 2951 | 2993 | 42 | 1% | 2514 | 3230 | 686 | 27% | 2262 | 2270 | 8 | 0% |
| Burglary No Force | Jan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 12 | 7 | - 5 | -42% | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0% | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0% |
| | Feb | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - 1 | -100 | 10 | 6 | - 4 | -40 | 14 | 13 | - 1 | - 7 | 10 | 9 | - 1 | - 10 |
| | Mar | 4 | 6 | 2 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 | 11 | 8 | - 3 | - 27 |
| | Apr | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - 1 | -100 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 | 16 | 15 | - 1 | - 6 | 8 | 4 | - 4 | - 50 |
| | May | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 9 | - 4 | -11 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jun | 4 | 5 | 1 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 4 | 20 | 16 | - 4 | -20 | 10 | 9 | - 1 | - 10 |
| | Jul | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 25 | - 2 | - 7 | 26 | 21 | - 5 | -19 | 7 | 6 | - 1 | - 14 |
| | Aug | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 19 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 16 | - 3 | -16 | 8 | 7 | - 1 | - 12 |
| | Sep | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 12 | - 2 | -14 | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 | 18 | 14 | - 4 | -22 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| | Oct | 3 | 0 | - 3 | -100 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 25 | 12 | 10 | - 2 | -17 | 10 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 9 | 7 | - 2 | -22 |
| | Dec | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 13 | - 2 | -13 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 11 |
| | TOTAL | 11 | 20 | 9 | 82% | 40 | 37 | - 3 | - 8% | 198 | 180 | -18 | - 9% | 199 | 176 | -23 | -12% | 98 | 86 | - 12 | -12% |

TABLE D-6

COMPARISON OF TWO CRIME INCIDENCE REPORTING FORMS FOR THE CITY OF JOLIET FROM 1972-1976

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1)

(2) Property Analysis (from Offense Analysis Information--Set 1)

| | | 1972 | | | | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975* | | | | 1976* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) |
| Robbery | Jan | 20 | 17 | - 3 | -15% | 18 | 15 | - 3 | -17% | 27 | 27 | 0 | 0% | 32 | 29 | - 3 | - 9% | 29 | 24 | - 5 | -17% |
| | Feb | 10 | 22 | 12 | 120 | 17 | 14 | - 3 | -18 | 29 | 23 | - 6 | -21 | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 11 | - 2 | -15 |
| | Mar | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 16 | - 2 | -11 | 24 | 21 | - 3 | -13 | 19 | 16 | - 3 | -16 | 13 | 9 | - 4 | -31 |
| | Apr | 14 | 12 | - 2 | -14 | 26 | 27 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 | 16 | 15 | - 1 | - 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| | May | 14 | 12 | - 2 | -14 | 16 | 13 | - 3 | -19 | 25 | 21 | - 4 | -16 | 13 | 12 | - 1 | - 8 | 12 | 9 | - 3 | -25 |
| | Jun | 13 | 11 | - 2 | -15 | 26 | 23 | - 3 | -12 | 33 | 29 | - 4 | -12 | 32 | 29 | - 3 | - 9 | 14 | 12 | - 2 | -14 |
| | Jul | 20 | 21 | 1 | 5 | 21 | 25 | 4 | 19 | 11 | 14 | 3 | 27 | 30 | 27 | - 3 | -10 | 23 | 20 | - 3 | -13 |
| | Aug | 10 | 5 | - 5 | -50 | 31 | 23 | - 8 | -26 | 28 | 23 | - 5 | -18 | 30 | 29 | - 1 | - 3 | 13 | 11 | - 2 | -15 |
| | Sep | 10 | 8 | - 2 | -20 | 26 | 23 | - 3 | -12 | 19 | 18 | - 1 | - 5 | 28 | 30 | 2 | 7 | 33 | 26 | - 7 | -21 |
| | Oct | 11 | 12 | 1 | 9 | 35 | 30 | - 5 | -14 | 31 | 29 | - 2 | - 6 | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 15 | 14 | - 1 | - 7 | 18 | 15 | - 3 | -17 | 29 | 25 | - 4 | -14 | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 |
| | Dec | 10 | 9 | - 1 | -10 | 21 | 20 | - 1 | - 5 | 37 | 32 | - 5 | -14 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 4 | 18 | ** | | |
| | TOTAL | 154 | 150 | - 4 | - 3% | 273 | 244 | -29 | -11% | 308 | 276 | -32 | -10% | 277 | 265 | -12 | - 4% | 191 | 162 | -29 | -15% |
| Burglary Forcible | Jan | 39 | 41 | 2 | 5% | 69 | 70 | 1 | 1% | 130 | 127 | - 3 | - 2% | 80 | 80 | 0 | 0% | 100 | 101 | 1 | 1% |
| | Feb | 39 | 76 | 37 | 95 | 67 | 67 | 0 | 0 | 149 | 149 | 0 | 0 | 66 | 66 | 0 | 0 | 73 | 73 | 0 | 0 |
| | Mar | 32 | 30 | - 2 | - 6 | 77 | 76 | - 1 | - 1 | 158 | 155 | - 3 | - 2 | 79 | 79 | 0 | 0 | 102 | 102 | 0 | 0 |
| | Apr | 36 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 85 | 83 | - 2 | - 2 | 104 | 104 | 0 | 0 | 71 | 71 | 0 | 0 | 97 | 98 | 1 | 1 |
| | May | 28 | 27 | - 1 | - 4 | 92 | 91 | - 1 | - 1 | 159 | 160 | 1 | 1 | 93 | 93 | 0 | 0 | 84 | 84 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jun | 41 | 41 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 84 | 4 | 5 | 173 | 173 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 112 | 0 | 0 | 97 | 97 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jul | 59 | 62 | 3 | 5 | 101 | 106 | 5 | 5 | 179 | 181 | 2 | 1 | 104 | 104 | 0 | 0 | 90 | 90 | 0 | 0 |
| | Aug | 69 | 70 | 1 | 1 | 102 | 98 | - 4 | - 4 | 123 | 129 | 6 | 5 | 119 | 119 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 75 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sep | 46 | 40 | - 6 | -13 | 103 | 100 | - 3 | - 3 | 90 | 92 | 2 | 2 | 100 | 114 | 14 | 14 | 112 | 112 | 0 | 0 |
| | Oct | 43 | 36 | - 7 | -16 | 97 | 95 | - 2 | - 2 | 89 | 93 | 4 | 4 | 82 | 102 | 20 | 24 | 129 | 129 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 60 | 61 | 1 | 2 | 120 | 126 | 6 | 5 | 106 | 108 | 2 | 2 | 79 | 82 | 3 | 4 | 95 | 95 | 0 | 0 |
| | Dec | 52 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 133 | 128 | - 5 | - 4 | 102 | 94 | - 8 | - 8 | 111 | 124 | 13 | 12 | 119 | ** | | |
| | TOTAL | 544 | 572 | 28 | 5% | 1126 | 1124 | - 2 | 0% | 1562 | 1565 | 3 | 0% | 1096 | 1146 | 50 | 5% | 1054 | 1056 | 2 | 0% |
| Burglary No Force | Jan | 11 | 13 | 2 | 18% | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0% | 23 | 24 | 1 | 4% | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0% | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0% |
| | Feb | 16 | 28 | 12 | 75 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 12 | 1 | 9 | 21 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| | Mar | 17 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 37 | 0 | 0 |
| | Apr | 29 | 30 | 1 | 3 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 17 | 1 | 6 | 23 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 51 | 53 | 2 | 4 |
| | May | 27 | 25 | - 2 | - 7 | 35 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 31 | 1 | 3 | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 47 | 1 | 2 |
| | Jun | 35 | 33 | - 2 | - 6 | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 55 | 56 | 1 | 2 | 35 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 45 | 0 | 0 |
| | Jul | 47 | 44 | - 3 | - 6 | 44 | 43 | - 1 | - 2 | 46 | 47 | 1 | 2 | 52 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 40 | 1 | 2 |
| | Aug | 29 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 16 | - 1 | - 6 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 33 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sep | 18 | 25 | 7 | 39 | 29 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 29 | 2 | 7 | 31 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| | Oct | 20 | 19 | - 1 | - 5 | 21 | 20 | - 1 | - 5 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 30 | 2 | 7 | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| | Nov | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 19 | 3 | 19 | 21 | 21 | - 2 | - 9 | 18 | 19 | 1 | 6 | 13 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| | Dec | 14 | 16 | 2 | 14 | 17 | 14 | - 3 | -18 | 102 | 16 | -86 | -84 | 28 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 21 | ** | | |
| | TOTAL | 279 | 295 | 16 | 6% | 265 | 262 | - 3 | - 1% | 435 | 351 | -82 | -19% | 328 | 333 | 5 | 2% | 361 | 365 | 4 | 1% |

*Both columns of the 1975 and 1976 figures are based upon the Offense Summary--Set II report.

**December Property Analysis Report was not available.

TABLE D-7

COMPARISON OF TWO CRIME INCIDENCE REPORTING FORMS FOR THE CITY OF PEORIA FROM 1972-1976

(1) Offense and Clearance Trends (from Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1)

(2) Property Analysis (from Offense Analysis Information--Set 1)

| | | 1972 | | | | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) | (1) | (2) | (2)-(1) | (2)-(1)/(1) |
| Robbery | Jan | 31 | 22 | -11 | -33% | 30 | 24 | - 6 | -20% | 38 | 22 | -16 | -42% | 19 | 17 | - 2 | - 5% | 31 | 33 | 2 | 6% |
| | Feb | 23 | 22 | - 1 | - 4 | 26 | 23 | - 3 | -12 | 32 | 25 | - 7 | -22 | 12 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 36 | 29 | - 7 | -19 |
| | Mar | 22 | 22 | - 0 | - 0 | 27 | 21 | - 6 | -22 | 23 | 22 | - 1 | - 4 | 11 | 10 | - 1 | - 3 | 35 | 32 | - 3 | - 8 |
| | Apr | 38 | 33 | - 5 | -13 | 36 | 28 | - 8 | -22 | 31 | 24 | - 7 | -23 | 49 | 46 | - 3 | - 6 | 28 | 25 | - 3 | -11 |
| | May | 39 | 33 | - 6 | -15 | 25 | 22 | - 3 | -12 | 35 | 26 | - 9 | -26 | 24 | 23 | - 1 | - 4 | 40 | 33 | - 7 | -18 |
| | Jun | 31 | 27 | - 4 | -13 | 12 | 10 | - 2 | -17 | 31 | 20 | -11 | -35 | 15 | 10 | - 5 | -14 | 27 | 25 | - 2 | - 7 |
| | Jul | 46 | 38 | - 8 | -17 | 33 | 26 | - 7 | -21 | 34 | 24 | -10 | -29 | 16 | 31 | - 5 | -14 | 33 | 11 | - 2 | 6 |
| | Aug | 33 | 31 | - 2 | - 6 | 27 | 25 | - 2 | - 7 | 46 | 39 | - 7 | -15 | 55 | 48 | - 7 | -13 | 25 | 23 | - 2 | - 8 |
| | Sep | 39 | 34 | - 5 | -13 | 24 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 31 | -11 | -26 | 16 | 14 | - 2 | - 6 | 41 | 33 | - 8 | -20 |
| | Oct | 20 | 17 | - 3 | -15 | 42 | 30 | -12 | -29 | 59 | 41 | -18 | -31 | 41 | 38 | - 3 | - 7 | 35 | 29 | - 6 | -17 |
| | Nov | 49 | 47 | - 2 | - 4 | 17 | 26 | -11 | -10 | 44 | 36 | - 8 | -18 | 17 | 15 | - 2 | - 5 | 25 | 23 | - 2 | - 8 |
| | Dec | 39 | 33 | - 6 | -15 | 32 | 29 | - 3 | - 9 | 42 | 26 | -16 | -38 | 35 | 27 | - 8 | -23 | 21 | 18 | - 3 | -14 |
| | Total | 412 | 359 | -53 | -13% | 351 | 288 | -63 | -18% | 457 | 336 | 421 | -27% | 350 | 412 | -38 | - 8% | 375 | 336 | -39 | -10% |
| Burglary Forcible | Jan | 108 | 79 | -29 | -27% | 146 | 103 | -43 | -29% | 139 | 93 | -46 | -33% | 264 | 263 | - 1 | 0% | 159 | 175 | 16 | 10% |
| | Feb | 101 | 89 | -12 | -12 | 138 | 110 | -28 | -20 | 110 | 84 | -47 | -16 | 226 | 226 | 0 | 0 | 121 | 129 | 8 | - 7 |
| | Mar | 102 | 74 | -28 | -27 | 161 | 133 | -28 | -17 | 104 | 116 | -68 | -17 | 198 | 201 | 3 | 2 | 129 | 140 | 11 | - 8 |
| | Apr | 123 | 93 | -30 | -24 | 172 | 121 | -51 | -30 | 166 | 103 | -63 | -38 | 180 | 180 | 0 | 0 | 127 | 127 | 0 | 0 |
| | May | 120 | 92 | -28 | -23 | 137 | 101 | -36 | -25 | 149 | 104 | -45 | -30 | 206 | 205 | - 1 | 0 | 109 | 110 | 1 | - 1 |
| | Jun | 124 | 108 | -16 | -13 | 151 | 123 | -28 | -19 | 119 | 95 | -24 | -20 | 197 | 197 | 0 | 0 | 104 | 108 | 4 | - 4 |
| | Jul | 179 | 144 | -35 | -20 | 205 | 163 | -42 | -20 | 187 | 127 | -60 | -32 | 201 | 201 | 1 | 1 | 191 | 193 | 2 | 1 |
| | Aug | 121 | 119 | - 2 | - 2 | 206 | 142 | -64 | -31 | 186 | 121 | -65 | -35 | 238 | 239 | 1 | 0 | 166 | 168 | 2 | - 1 |
| | Sep | 96 | 85 | -11 | -11 | 178 | 122 | -56 | -31 | 175 | 117 | -58 | -33 | 203 | 205 | 2 | 1 | 123 | 137 | 14 | -11 |
| | Oct | 114 | 98 | -16 | -14 | 168 | 118 | -50 | -30 | 164 | 109 | -55 | -34 | 155 | 157 | 2 | 1 | 113 | 114 | 1 | - 1 |
| | Nov | 112 | 102 | -10 | -23 | 177 | 123 | -54 | -31 | 208 | 127 | -81 | -39 | 178 | 178 | 0 | 0 | 121 | 138 | 17 | -14 |
| | Dec | 148 | 116 | -32 | -22 | 201 | 146 | -55 | -27 | 263 | 153 | -103 | -39 | 230 | 230 | 0 | 0 | 134 | 134 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 1469 | 1199 | -269 | -18% | 2040 | 1507 | -533 | -26% | 2069 | 1354 | -715 | -35% | 2465 | 2474 | 9 | 0% | 1597 | 1673 | 76 | 5% |
| Burglary No Force | Jan | 31 | 27 | - 4 | -13% | 58 | 51 | - 7 | -12 | 33 | 27 | - 6 | -18% | 65 | 66 | 1 | 2% | 43 | 47 | 4 | 9% |
| | Feb | 34 | 32 | - 2 | - 6 | 50 | 41 | - 9 | -18 | 45 | 36 | - 9 | -20 | 55 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 48 | 51 | 3 | 6 |
| | Mar | 61 | 56 | - 7 | -11 | 64 | 60 | - 4 | - 6 | 54 | 43 | -11 | -20 | 40 | 41 | 1 | 2 | 63 | 67 | 4 | 6 |
| | Apr | 51 | 45 | - 8 | -15 | 54 | 47 | - 7 | -13 | 72 | 54 | -18 | -25 | 63 | 67 | 4 | 6 | 82 | 84 | 2 | 2 |
| | May | 31 | 27 | - 4 | -13 | 70 | 65 | - 5 | - 7 | 65 | 57 | - 8 | -12 | 86 | 89 | 3 | 3 | 65 | 66 | 1 | 2 |
| | Jun | 52 | 45 | - 7 | -13 | 56 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 107 | 98 | - 9 | - 8 | 132 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 99 | 101 | 2 | 2 |
| | Jul | 35 | 34 | - 1 | - 3 | 72 | 58 | -14 | -19 | 98 | 76 | -22 | -22 | 152 | 152 | 0 | 0 | 136 | 137 | 1 | 1 |
| | Aug | 53 | 50 | - 3 | - 6 | 60 | 57 | - 3 | - 5 | 106 | 84 | -22 | -21 | 139 | 138 | - 1 | - 1 | 101 | 104 | 3 | 3 |
| | Sep | 66 | 63 | - 3 | - 5 | 106 | 93 | -13 | -12 | 48 | 32 | -16 | -33 | 97 | 101 | 4 | 4 | 46 | 53 | 7 | 15 |
| | Oct | 55 | 54 | - 1 | - 2 | 64 | 59 | - 5 | - 8 | 101 | 73 | -28 | -28 | 113 | 114 | 1 | 1 | 57 | 59 | 2 | 4 |
| | Nov | 51 | 48 | - 3 | - 9 | 46 | 37 | - 9 | -20 | 66 | 53 | -13 | -20 | 105 | 105 | 0 | 0 | 55 | 61 | 6 | 11 |
| | Dec | 20 | 18 | - 2 | -10 | 43 | 36 | - 7 | -16 | 64 | 55 | - 9 | -14 | 72 | 73 | 1 | 1 | 39 | 40 | 1 | 2 |
| | Total | 546 | 499 | -47 | - 9% | 741 | 660 | -81 | -11% | 853 | 688 | -171 | -20% | 1119 | 1133 | 14 | 1% | 834 | 870 | 36 | 4 |

- under $10;
- $10 - $250;
- $251 - $2000;
- $2001 - $9000;
- $9001 - $30,000;
- $30,001 - $80,000;
- over $80,000.

CJIS then prepared a printout (referred to as the Property Value report) showing the monthly count in each category for 1972 through 1976. We realized that fixed categories fail to account for inflation over time, but the results described next precluded us from experimenting beyond this preliminary test.

Tables D-8 through D-13 summarize the monthly counts appearing in the various reports. In theory, the following columns should match in the tables:

- Robbery

  (1) and (2) and (3) and (8)*

- Burglary

  (3) and (8) and (16)
  (5) and (11)*

and columns (3) and (8) in the burglary tables (D-8, D-10, D-12 and D-13) and Columns (1) and (2) of the robbery tables (D-9, D-11), yield the same comparisons as were made previously.

We described in Section 4.1 that for Champaign (Table D-8), columns (5) and (11) did not begin to match until June 1974, and that prior to this time, column (11) was noticeably smaller than column (5), necessitating our estimates for residential burglary in Champaign for 1972 through the first half of 1974. Column (17), which shows the difference between column (5) and

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* CJIS staff indicated that this should be the case if the two Set 1 forms are being completed properly. This is consistent with the UCR Handbook, published by the FBI, which on p. 54 indicates that the counts in the column, labeled Number of Actual Offenses of the Supplement to Return A should be the same as those in the column of Return A having the same label. The latter indicates that attempts are included in these counts. The Offense Analysis Information form does not contain specific instructions on this point.

column (11) indicates that the absence of attempted burglaries from column (11) does not entirely account for the differences in 1972 and the first half of 1973 because column (3) is larger despite the fact that it does not include attempts. Column (12) suggests that burglaries where no property was stolen were not recorded on the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form during that period, but the jump in count in the Less than $10 category in May/June 1974 suggests that such cases continued not to be recorded until almost a year later.* The near-match between columns (3) and (11) from July 1973 to May/June 1974 is therefore inexplicable on the basis of the data in these tables. From July 1974 through December 1976, columns (5) and (11) match within random error, although column (16) exceeds both columns (5) and (11) by a few cases during this period. This latter discrepancy may reflect the omission of the appropriate code on the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form for multiple items stolen in a single burglary.

For robbery in East St. Louis (Table D-9), the match is within random error between columns (2), (3) and (8) for all years, as expected. The match between common values in these three columns and the values in column (1) is reasonable for 1972 through 1975 but for a few months where column (1) is noticeably larger than columns (2), (3) and (8) and one month (December 1974) where the reverse is true. However, in 1976 values in column (1) consistently and substantially exceed values in columns (2), (3) and (8). This discrepancy cannot be explained from patterns in the data. Discrepancies in burglary counts for East St. Louis (Table D-10) exhibit a pattern similar to that in Champaign. Column (17) indicates that Offense and Clearance Trend reports have larger counts than do Monthly Return of Offenses known to Police reports. However, the data exhibit no patterns that might explain the reason why this is the case.

Aside from unusually large counts for robbery in the Less Than $10 category in Joliet in 1975 (Table D-11), there are no obvious discrepancies appearing in the table. Random, but sometimes substantial, discrepancies for burglary appear in the Joliet data (Table D-12) until the city switched to the simple Offense Summary-Set 2 form in 1975. Except for the month of February, burglary counts in the Less than $10 category are lower in 1972 than

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* Staff of the Champaign Police Department claim that they have always recorded these.

in other years, suggesting again that for burglaries in which no property was stolen, the case was not recorded on the Offense Analysis Information-Set 1 form.

Finally, as noted in Section 4.1, the residential/non-residential breakout was not available in Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports for Peoria in 1972 through 1974. Counts in the Less Than $10 category--column (13)--jump significantly in January 1975, suggesting that before then, cases where no property was stolen were not included, but have been included since then.* Corresponding to this shift is a shift in the difference between columns (5) and (11), expressed in column (17) Interestingly enough, in 1975 and 1976, counts in column (11) (Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police reports) exceed those in column (5) (Offense and Clearance Trend reports). The jump in question seems to be echoed in the improved match between columns (3) and (8), neither of which contain attempts.

The comparisons made above substantiate the belief that reporting practices changed in Champaign in May/June 1974 and in Peoria in January 1975 with regard to cases where no property was stolen. In both cities, it appears from the data that the shift was from not recording such cases to recording then, notwithstanding the fact that Champaign claims to have always recorded them, and Peoria claims to have never recorded them. Aside from these, discrepancies between these two columns appear to be of a random or tranposition nature or in the form of multiple items not being properly identified, as column (16) exceeds column (8) in most of these instances. This latter situation was termed impossible by CJIS staff.**

Because of the foregoing analysis, we abandoned our immediate plans to develop trends weighted by the value of property stolen. In the absence of definitive answers to questions raised about agency reporting practices and the I-UCR system, we would have had little confidence in the findings.

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*Peoria Police Department staff contend they have never recorded such cases.

**We note from Table D-12 that the problem would appear to rest with the I-UCR system since it persists in Joliet through the years 1975 and 1976 despite their use of the single Offense Summary-Set 2 form.

TABLE D-8

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR BURGLARY IN CHAMPAIGN FROM 1972-1976

| Year and Month | Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1: Offense and Clearance Trends | | | | | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1: Property Analysis | | | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police | | | Property Value | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Burglary--Forcible | (2) Burglary--No Force | (3) = (1)+(2) | (4) Burglary--Attempt | (5) = (1)+(2)+(4) | (6) Burglary--Forcible | (7) Burglary--No Force | (8) = (6)+(7) | (9) Residential | (10) Non-residential | (11) = (9)+(10) | (12) Less than $10 | (13) $10-250 | (14) $251-2000 | (15) More than $2000 | (16) = (12)+(13)+(14)+(15) | (17) = (5)-(11) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 55 | 22 | 77 | 6 | 83 | 46 | 18 | 64 | 53 | 12 | 65 | 9 | 35 | 21 | 0 | 65 | 18 |
| Feb | 41 | 21 | 62 | 9 | 71 | 28 | 18 | 46 | 34 | 12 | 46 | 2 | 30 | 14 | 1 | 46 | 25 |
| Mar | 58 | 15 | 73 | 3 | 76 | 40 | 13 | 53 | 40 | 13 | 53 | 4 | 35 | 14 | 1 | 54 | 23 |
| Apr | 48 | 37 | 85 | 8 | 93 | 32 | 32 | 64 | 53 | 11 | 64 | 3 | 43 | 18 | 1 | 65 | 29 |
| May | 49 | 36 | 85 | 25 | 110 | 40 | 33 | 73 | 53 | 20 | 73 | 1 | 59 | 13 | 1 | 74 | 37 |
| Jun | 49 | 22 | 71 | 10 | 81 | 41 | 20 | 61 | 37 | 24 | 61 | 2 | 46 | 13 | 0 | 61 | 20 |
| Jul | 44 | 27 | 71 | 17 | 88 | 32 | 19 | 51 | 37 | 14 | 51 | 6 | 38 | 7 | 1 | 52 | 37 |
| Aug | 57 | 28 | 85 | 11 | 96 | 41 | 22 | 63 | 45 | 18 | 63 | 2 | 50 | 11 | 0 | 63 | 36 |
| Sep | 45 | 27 | 72 | 20 | 92 | 33 | 25 | 58 | 46 | 12 | 58 | 0 | 39 | 19 | 2 | 60 | 34 |
| Oct | 32 | 19 | 51 | 16 | 67 | 53 | 13 | 66 | 48 | 18 | 66 | 11 | 26 | 29 | 0 | 66 | 1 |
| Nov | 49 | 21 | 70 | 7 | 77 | 41 | 18 | 59 | 46 | 13 | 59 | 1 | 40 | 18 | 2 | 60 | 18 |
| Dec | 48 | 20 | 68 | 8 | 76 | 41 | 18 | 59 | 43 | 16 | 59 | 2 | 38 | 19 | 0 | 59 | 17 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 39 | 24 | 63 | 13 | 76 | 26 | 26 | 52 | 38 | 14 | 52 | 1 | 38 | 13 | 1 | 58 | 24 |
| Feb | 20 | 10 | 30 | 9 | 39 | 15 | 10 | 25 | 20 | 5 | 25 | 0 | 16 | 9 | 0 | 25 | 14 |
| Mar | 23 | 17 | 40 | 7 | 47 | 16 | 16 | 32 | 20 | 12 | 32 | 0 | 26 | 6 | 0 | 32 | 15 |
| Apr | 41 | 38 | 79 | 14 | 93 | 35 | 30 | 65 | 53 | 13 | 66 | 2 | 39 | 25 | 1 | 67 | 26 |
| May | 41 | 31 | 72 | 22 | 94 | 30 | 29 | 59 | 42 | 17 | 59 | 2 | 40 | 17 | 1 | 60 | 35 |
| Jun | 34 | 23 | 57 | 17 | 74 | 28 | 21 | 49 | 38 | 11 | 49 | 3 | 33 | 13 | 1 | 50 | 25 |
| Jul | 36 | 34 | 70 | 19 | 89 | 36 | 33 | 69 | 49 | 20 | 69 | 9 | 51 | 9 | 0 | 69 | 20 |
| Aug | 33 | 43 | 76 | 26 | 102 | 32 | 39 | 71 | 56 | 15 | 71 | 4 | 52 | 15 | 0 | 71 | 31 |
| Sep | 47 | 30 | 77 | 12 | 89 | 46 | 27 | 73 | 49 | 24 | 73 | 7 | 49 | 17 | 1 | 74 | 16 |
| Oct | 51 | 27 | 78 | 20 | 98 | 47 | 28 | 75 | 46 | 29 | 75 | 6 | 47 | 22 | 0 | 75 | 23 |
| Nov | 52 | 25 | 77 | 24 | 101 | 52 | 25 | 77 | 63 | 14 | 77 | 3 | 43 | 31 | 1 | 78 | 24 |
| Dec | 32 | 14 | 46 | 14 | 60 | 28 | 14 | 42 | 31 | 11 | 42 | 3 | 28 | 11 | 1 | 43 | 18 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 39 | 16 | 55 | 18 | 73 | 37 | 16 | 53 | 36 | 17 | 53 | 7 | 34 | 14 | 0 | 55 | 20 |
| Feb | 25 | 16 | 41 | 13 | 54 | 25 | 16 | 41 | 31 | 10 | 41 | 5 | 27 | 12 | 0 | 44 | 13 |
| Mar | 37 | 15 | 52 | 21 | 73 | 37 | 15 | 52 | 40 | 12 | 52 | 3 | 39 | 11 | 0 | 53 | 21 |
| Apr | 26 | 16 | 42 | 29 | 71 | 26 | 17 | 43 | 28 | 15 | 43 | 2 | 31 | 10 | 0 | 43 | 28 |
| May | 50 | 34 | 84 | 17 | 101 | 50 | 34 | 84 | 67 | 24 | 91 | 14 | 56 | 23 | 1 | 94 | 10 |
| Jun | 39 | 33 | 72 | 19 | 91 | 40 | 32 | 72 | 64 | 27 | 91 | 29 | 48 | 14 | 0 | 91 | 0 |
| Jul | 33 | 30 | 63 | 28 | 91 | 33 | 31 | 64 | 69 | 23 | 92 | 37 | 45 | 13 | 1 | 96 | - 1 |
| Aug | 51 | 37 | 88 | 21 | 109 | 49 | 38 | 87 | 83 | 25 | 108 | 28 | 66 | 16 | 1 | 110 | 1 |
| Sep | 34 | 21 | 55 | 28 | 83 | 34 | 21 | 55 | 64 | 19 | 83 | 37 | 39 | 9 | 1 | 85 | 0 |
| Oct | 34 | 30 | 64 | 32 | 96 | 34 | 31 | 65 | 77 | 20 | 97 | 36 | 47 | 16 | 0 | 99 | - 1 |
| Nov | 55 | 16 | 71 | 19 | 90 | 55 | 16 | 71 | 68 | 22 | 90 | 24 | 51 | 15 | 0 | 90 | 0 |
| Dec | 60 | 23 | 83 | 20 | 103 | 60 | 23 | 83 | 80 | 23 | 103 | 28 | 61 | 18 | 0 | 107 | 0 |
| 1975 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 59 | 33 | 92 | 30 | 122 | 59 | 32 | 91 | 93 | 27 | 120 | 45 | 63 | 21 | 3 | 132 | - 2 |
| Feb | 44 | 25 | 69 | 13 | 82 | 44 | 25 | 69 | 67 | 15 | 82 | 25 | 42 | 17 | 1 | 85 | 0 |
| Mar | 37 | 24 | 61 | 21 | 82 | 37 | 25 | 62 | 71 | 13 | 84 | 31 | 47 | 10 | 0 | 88 | - 2 |
| Apr | 30 | 31 | 61 | 13 | 74 | 30 | 31 | 61 | 59 | 15 | 74 | 19 | 47 | 9 | 0 | 75 | 0 |
| May | 35 | 40 | 75 | 30 | 105 | 35 | 41 | 76 | 84 | 23 | 107 | 38 | 50 | 19 | 0 | 107 | - 2 |
| Jun | 29 | 33 | 62 | 25 | 87 | 29 | 33 | 62 | 65 | 22 | 87 | 37 | 35 | 17 | 0 | 89 | 0 |
| Jul | 41 | 32 | 73 | 22 | 95 | 42 | 32 | 74 | 68 | 28 | 96 | 31 | 46 | 19 | 1 | 97 | - 1 |
| Aug | 42 | 42 | 84 | 13 | 97 | 41 | 43 | 84 | 83 | 14 | 97 | 23 | 60 | 20 | 3 | 106 | 0 |
| Sep | 33 | 44 | 77 | 25 | 102 | 34 | 45 | 79 | 73 | 31 | 104 | 38 | 59 | 11 | 0 | 108 | - 2 |
| Oct | 34 | 31 | 65 | 20 | 85 | 34 | 31 | 65 | 68 | 17 | 85 | 32 | 48 | 8 | 0 | 88 | 0 |
| Nov | 46 | 16 | 62 | 27 | 89 | 46 | 16 | 62 | 56 | 33 | 89 | 33 | 37 | 19 | 2 | 91 | 0 |
| Dec | 57 | 24 | 81 | 21 | 102 | 57 | 24 | 81 | 56 | 47 | 103 | 37 | 54 | 18 | 0 | 109 | - 1 |
| 1976 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 59 | 42 | 101 | 24 | 125 | 57 | 43 | 100 | 87 | 37 | 124 | 38 | 66 | 22 | 0 | 126 | - 1 |
| Feb | 31 | 16 | 47 | 14 | 61 | 31 | 16 | 47 | 39 | 22 | 61 | 25 | 29 | 13 | 0 | 67 | 0 |
| Mar | 30 | 20 | 50 | 18 | 68 | 30 | 20 | 50 | 43 | 25 | 68 | 25 | 31 | 12 | 0 | 68 | 0 |
| Apr | 27 | 44 | 71 | 14 | 85 | 27 | 43 | 70 | 64 | 21 | 85 | 25 | 48 | 14 | 0 | 87 | 0 |
| May | 20 | 28 | 48 | 19 | 67 | 20 | 28 | 48 | 43 | 23 | 66 | 23 | 28 | 16 | 0 | 67 | - 1 |
| Jun | 35 | 16 | 51 | 23 | 74 | 34 | 16 | 50 | 53 | 20 | 73 | 29 | 37 | 9 | 0 | 75 | - 1 |
| Jul | 39 | 19 | 58 | 18 | 76 | 39 | 19 | 58 | 55 | 22 | 77 | 27 | 38 | 17 | 1 | 83 | - 1 |
| Aug | 46 | 29 | 75 | 16 | 91 | 46 | 28 | 74 | 66 | 24 | 90 | 25 | 37 | 28 | 1 | 91 | - 1 |
| Sep | 35 | 21 | 56 | 13 | 69 | 36 | 22 | 58 | 49 | 22 | 71 | 14 | 42 | 15 | 1 | 71 | - 2 |
| Oct | 28 | 17 | 45 | 9 | 54 | 28 | 17 | 45 | 39 | 15 | 54 | 13 | 29 | 12 | 2 | 56 | 0 |
| Nov | 37 | 13 | 50 | 10 | 60 | 37 | 14 | 51 | 47 | 14 | 61 | 14 | 27 | 21 | 1 | 63 | - 1 |
| Dec | 46 | 16 | 62 | 19 | 81 | 46 | 16 | 62 | 69 | 12 | 81 | 30 | 35 | 18 | 2 | 85 | 0 |

TABLE D-9

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR ROBBERY IN EAST ST. LOUIS FROM 1972-1976

| | Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1 | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1 | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Property Value | | | | | |
| | Offense and Clearance Trends (1) | Property Analysis (2) | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police (3) | Less than $10 (4) | $10-250 (5) | $251-2000 (6) | More than $2000 (7) | Total (8) | (1)-(3) (9) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 47 | 0 | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| February | 48 | 43 | 43 | 10 | 28 | 5 | 0 | 43 | 5 |
| March | 48 | 54 | 55 | 11 | 37 | 7 | 0 | 55 | -7 |
| April | 41 | 41 | 41 | 8 | 30 | 3 | 0 | 41 | 0 |
| May | 99 | 60 | 61 | 10 | 44 | 7 | 0 | 61 | 38 |
| June | 162 | 54 | 54 | 15 | 32 | 7 | 0 | 54 | 108 |
| July | 60 | 60 | 60 | 20 | 31 | 9 | 2 | 62 | 0 |
| August | 153 | 81 | 81 | 32 | 44 | 5 | 0 | 81 | 72 |
| September | 50 | 45 | 45 | 15 | 25 | 5 | 1 | 46 | 5 |
| October | 57 | 54 | 54 | 13 | 39 | 2 | 1 | 55 | 3 |
| November | 60 | 74 | 74 | 19 | 42 | 13 | 0 | 74 | -14 |
| December | 66 | 108 | 108 | 29 | 65 | 14 | 2 | 110 | -42 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 62 | 63 | 63 | 16 | 42 | 5 | 1 | 64 | - 1 |
| February | 54 | 54 | 54 | 19 | 30 | 5 | 0 | 54 | 0 |
| March | 69 | 64 | 65 | 30 | 33 | 2 | 0 | 65 | 5 |
| April | 97 | 97 | 97 | 51 | 37 | 9 | 0 | 97 | 0 |
| May | 96 | 91 | 91 | 39 | 45 | 7 | 0 | 91 | 5 |
| June | 86 | 85 | 86 | 27 | 53 | 6 | 2 | 88 | 0 |
| July | 108 | 98 | 110 | 39 | 60 | 11 | 1 | 111 | - 2 |
| August | 86 | 85 | 85 | 23 | 53 | 9 | 0 | 85 | 1 |
| September | 108 | 98 | 98 | 24 | 66 | 8 | 0 | 98 | 10 |
| October | 123 | 114 | 114 | 29 | 68 | 17 | 0 | 114 | 9 |
| November | 68 | 66 | 66 | 14 | 47 | 5 | 1 | 67 | 2 |
| December | 58 | 57 | 57 | 15 | 37 | 5 | 0 | 57 | 1 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 84 | 70 | 70 | 17 | 48 | 5 | 1 | 71 | 14 |
| February | 71 | 71 | 71 | 28 | 21 | 22 | 3 | 74 | 0 |
| March | 85 | 88 | 88 | 30 | 43 | 15 | 0 | 88 | - 3 |
| April | 83 | 86 | 86 | 31 | 49 | 6 | 1 | 87 | - 3 |
| May | 80 | 83 | 83 | 28 | 49 | 6 | 1 | 84 | - 3 |
| June | 82 | 86 | 86 | 34 | 49 | 3 | 0 | 86 | - 4 |
| July | 109 | 109 | 109 | 54 | 48 | 7 | 2 | 111 | 0 |
| August | 89 | 85 | 85 | 46 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 86 | 4 |
| September | 97 | 99 | 99 | 61 | 29 | 9 | 3 | 102 | 2 |
| October | 109 | 101 | 101 | 71 | 26 | 4 | 0 | 101 | 8 |
| November | 142 | 131 | 131 | 68 | 54 | 9 | 0 | 131 | 11 |
| December | 129 | 123 | 123 | 66 | 50 | 7 | 0 | 123 | 6 |
| 1975 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 87 | 85 | 85 | 56 | 20 | 9 | 0 | 85 | 2 |
| February | 69 | 65 | 65 | 32 | 28 | 5 | 0 | 65 | 4 |
| March | 79 | 79 | 79 | 48 | 23 | 8 | 0 | 79 | 0 |
| April | 97 | 98 | 98 | 56 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 98 | - 1 |
| May | 66 | 62 | 62 | 38 | 21 | 3 | 1 | 63 | 4 |
| June | 109 | 97 | 97 | 52 | 37 | 8 | 1 | 98 | 12 |
| July | 79 | 73 | 73 | 35 | 32 | 6 | 1 | 74 | 6 |
| August | 101 | 98 | 98 | 71 | 22 | 5 | 0 | 98 | 3 |
| September | 60 | 56 | 56 | 38 | 14 | 4 | 0 | 56 | 4 |
| October | 116 | 110 | 110 | 76 | 30 | 4 | 0 | 110 | 6 |
| November | 79 | 75 | 75 | 47 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 77 | 4 |
| December | 100 | 96 | 96 | 57 | 30 | 9 | 0 | 96 | 4 |
| 1976 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 97 | 80 | 80 | 48 | 27 | 5 | 0 | 80 | 17 |
| February | 87 | 85 | 85 | 46 | 31 | 8 | 0 | 85 | 2 |
| March | 54 | 42 | 42 | 23 | 15 | 4 | 0 | 42 | 12 |
| April | 52 | 22 | 22 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 22 | 30 |
| May | 80 | 61 | 61 | 27 | 29 | 5 | 0 | 61 | 19 |
| June | 56 | 51 | 51 | 31 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 51 | 5 |
| July | 81 | 60 | 60 | 40 | 18 | 2 | 0 | 60 | 21 |
| August | 49 | 41 | 41 | 20 | 16 | 5 | 0 | 41 | 8 |
| September | 46 | 36 | 36 | 22 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 10 |
| October | 54 | 50 | 50 | 32 | 13 | 5 | 1 | 51 | 4 |
| November | 58 | 50 | 50 | 22 | 23 | 5 | 0 | 50 | 8 |
| December | 54 | 49 | 51 | 31 | 16 | 4 | 0 | 51 | 3 |

* Not Available

TABLE D-10

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR BURGLARY IN EAST ST. LOUIS FROM 1972-1976

| Year and Month | Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1: Offense and Clearance Trends | | | | | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1: Property Analysis | | | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police | | | Property Value | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Burglary--Forcible | (2) Burglary--No Force | (3) = (1)+(2) | (4) Burglary--Attempt | (5) = (1)+(2)+(4) | (6) Burglary--Forcible | (7) Burglary--No Force | (8) = (6)+(7) | (9) Residential | (10) Non-residential | (11) = (9)+(10) | (12) Less than $10 | (13) $10-250 | (14) $251-2000 | (15) More than $2000 | (16) = (12)+(13)+(14)+(15) | (17) = (5)-(11) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 174 | 0 | 174 | 11 | 185 | 0 | 0 | 0 | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | 185 |
| Feb | 173 | 0 | 173 | 10 | 183 | 171 | 0 | 171 | 115 | 56 | 171 | 40 | 64 | 67 | 8 | 179 | 13 |
| Mar | 181 | 4 | 185 | 14 | 199 | 185 | 6 | 191 | 122 | 72 | 194 | 61 | 58 | 75 | 3 | 197 | 5 |
| Apr | 132 | 0 | 132 | 10 | 142 | 121 | 2 | 123 | 92 | 33 | 125 | 44 | 44 | 37 | 3 | 128 | 17 |
| May | 172 | 0 | 172 | 11 | 183 | 175 | 1 | 176 | 109 | 67 | 176 | 55 | 62 | 59 | 1 | 177 | 7 |
| Jun | 197 | 4 | 201 | 8 | 209 | 202 | 5 | 207 | 136 | 71 | 207 | 83 | 68 | 56 | 3 | 210 | 2 |
| Jul | 268 | 0 | 268 | 23 | 291 | 273 | 0 | 273 | 201 | 74 | 275 | 106 | 82 | 87 | 4 | 279 | 18 |
| Aug | 302 | 0 | 302 | 11 | 313 | 292 | 0 | 292 | 201 | 91 | 292 | 117 | 91 | 84 | 3 | 295 | 21 |
| Sep | 259 | 0 | 259 | 15 | 274 | 259 | 0 | 259 | 220 | 40 | 260 | 91 | 77 | 92 | 6 | 266 | 14 |
| Oct | 286 | 3 | 289 | 20 | 309 | 283 | 0 | 283 | 207 | 76 | 283 | 111 | 85 | 87 | 2 | 285 | 26 |
| Nov | 0 | 0 | 0 | 285 | 285 | 248 | 6 | 254 | 191 | 63 | 254 | 82 | 70 | 102 | 6 | 260 | 31 |
| Dec | 196 | 0 | 196 | 13 | 209 | 220 | 0 | 220 | 161 | 67 | 228 | 71 | 72 | 84 | 2 | 229 | -18 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 245 | 0 | 245 | 16 | 261 | 258 | 0 | 258 | 186 | 72 | 258 | 83 | 107 | 68 | 1 | 259 | 3 |
| Feb | 263 | 1 | 264 | 19 | 283 | 283 | 0 | 283 | 228 | 56 | 284 | 89 | 115 | 80 | 0 | 284 | - 1 |
| Mar | 219 | 0 | 219 | 23 | 242 | 218 | 0 | 218 | 169 | 49 | 218 | 87 | 84 | 47 | 0 | 218 | 24 |
| Apr | 222 | 1 | 223 | 16 | 239 | 229 | 0 | 229 | 190 | 40 | 230 | 95 | 87 | 48 | 1 | 231 | 9 |
| May | 193 | 0 | 193 | 19 | 212 | 203 | 0 | 203 | 159 | 44 | 203 | 72 | 80 | 51 | 3 | 206 | 9 |
| Jun | 177 | 0 | 177 | 14 | 191 | 192 | 0 | 192 | 124 | 68 | 192 | 66 | 90 | 36 | 1 | 193 | - 1 |
| Jul | 268 | 4 | 272 | 10 | 282 | 267 | 4 | 271 | 197 | 76 | 273 | 91 | 130 | 52 | 0 | 273 | 9 |
| Aug | 338 | 0 | 338 | 25 | 363 | 348 | 1 | 349 | 251 | 98 | 349 | 135 | 141 | 73 | 1 | 350 | 14 |
| Sep | 314 | 14 | 328 | 17 | 345 | 319 | 12 | 331 | 235 | 97 | 332 | 143 | 122 | 67 | 0 | 332 | 13 |
| Oct | 277 | 2 | 279 | 22 | 301 | 285 | 2 | 287 | 227 | 60 | 287 | 98 | 125 | 64 | 1 | 288 | 14 |
| Nov | 233 | 4 | 237 | 24 | 261 | 234 | 5 | 289 | 202 | 37 | 239 | 68 | 115 | 56 | 1 | 240 | 22 |
| Dec | 178 | 4 | 182 | 11 | 193 | 172 | 4 | 176 | 132 | 44 | 176 | 54 | 80 | 42 | 4 | 180 | 17 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 167 | 12 | 179 | 16 | 195 | 176 | 7 | 183 | 121 | 62 | 183 | 62 | 69 | 52 | 2 | 185 | 12 |
| Feb | 201 | 10 | 211 | 10 | 221 | 213 | 6 | 219 | 155 | 64 | 219 | 84 | 91 | 44 | 0 | 219 | 2 |
| Mar | 229 | 17 | 246 | 15 | 261 | 238 | 16 | 254 | 190 | 64 | 254 | 100 | 99 | 55 | 4 | 258 | 7 |
| Apr | 210 | 17 | 227 | 11 | 238 | 220 | 16 | 236 | 175 | 61 | 236 | 95 | 91 | 50 | 3 | 239 | 2 |
| May | 233 | 10 | 243 | 20 | 263 | 233 | 10 | 243 | 175 | 68 | 243 | 80 | 102 | 61 | 2 | 245 | 20 |
| Jun | 225 | 27 | 252 | 15 | 267 | 228 | 28 | 256 | 167 | 89 | 256 | 100 | 102 | 54 | 4 | 260 | 11 |
| Jul | 298 | 27 | 325 | 22 | 347 | 304 | 25 | 329 | 232 | 97 | 329 | 129 | 116 | 84 | 19 | 348 | 18 |
| Aug | 264 | 19 | 283 | 26 | 309 | 269 | 19 | 288 | 213 | 75 | 288 | 113 | 94 | 80 | 4 | 291 | 21 |
| Sep | 259 | 15 | 274 | 30 | 304 | 243 | 14 | 257 | 183 | 74 | 257 | 114 | 95 | 51 | 2 | 262 | 47 |
| Oct | 284 | 17 | 301 | 26 | 327 | 289 | 16 | 305 | 238 | 67 | 305 | 134 | 106 | 66 | 2 | 308 | 22 |
| Nov | 285 | 12 | 297 | 29 | 326 | 283 | 10 | 293 | 228 | 65 | 293 | 118 | 113 | 62 | 1 | 294 | 33 |
| Dec | 296 | 15 | 311 | 22 | 333 | 297 | 13 | 310 | 247 | 63 | 310 | 122 | 104 | 85 | 0 | 311 | 23 |
| 1975 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 268 | 24 | 292 | 25 | 317 | 279 | 24 | 303 | 224 | 79 | 303 | 116 | 103 | 84 | 13 | 316 | 14 |
| Feb | 235 | 14 | 249 | 21 | 270 | 246 | 13 | 259 | 175 | 84 | 259 | 128 | 79 | 52 | 1 | 260 | 11 |
| Mar | 214 | 15 | 229 | 16 | 245 | 217 | 14 | 231 | 169 | 62 | 231 | 116 | 66 | 49 | 0 | 231 | 14 |
| Apr | 206 | 16 | 222 | 16 | 238 | 212 | 15 | 227 | 151 | 76 | 227 | 103 | 73 | 51 | 2 | 229 | 11 |
| May | 183 | 13 | 196 | 11 | 207 | 190 | 9 | 199 | 134 | 65 | 199 | 97 | 65 | 37 | 0 | 199 | 8 |
| Jun | 174 | 20 | 194 | 13 | 207 | 180 | 16 | 196 | 132 | 64 | 196 | 97 | 64 | 35 | 1 | 197 | 11 |
| Jul | 248 | 26 | 274 | 28 | 302 | 255 | 21 | 271 | 206 | 70 | 276 | 118 | 87 | 71 | 3 | 279 | 26 |
| Aug | 218 | 19 | 237 | 26 | 263 | 240 | 16 | 256 | 189 | 67 | 256 | 110 | 90 | 56 | 3 | 259 | 7 |
| Sep | 184 | 18 | 202 | 15 | 217 | 189 | 14 | 203 | 152 | 51 | 203 | 92 | 69 | 42 | 3 | 206 | 14 |
| Oct | 220 | 15 | 235 | 19 | 254 | 224 | 14 | 238 | 177 | 61 | 238 | 109 | 73 | 56 | 1 | 239 | 16 |
| Nov | 169 | 10 | 179 | 16 | 195 | 167 | 11 | 178 | 135 | 43 | 178 | 77 | 59 | 42 | 0 | 178 | 17 |
| Dec | 215 | 9 | 224 | 23 | 247 | 821 | 9 | 830 | 772 | 58 | 830 | 79 | 693 | 58 | 2 | 832 | -583 |
| 1976 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 219 | 9 | 228 | 16 | 244 | 218 | 9 | 227 | 166 | 61 | 227 | 112 | 69 | 47 | 0 | 228 | 17 |
| Feb | 173 | 10 | 183 | 13 | 196 | 271 | 9 | 280 | 212 | 68 | 280 | 130 | 92 | 61 | 0 | 283 | -84 |
| Mar | 199 | 11 | 210 | 22 | 232 | 202 | 8 | 210 | 150 | 60 | 210 | 94 | 72 | 43 | 3 | 212 | 22 |
| Apr | 171 | 8 | 179 | 14 | 193 | 79 | 4 | 83 | 56 | 27 | 83 | 37 | 24 | 22 | 3 | 86 | 110 |
| May | 201 | 4 | 205 | 22 | 227 | 196 | 4 | 200 | 147 | 53 | 200 | 98 | 58 | 44 | 1 | 201 | 27 |
| Jun | 157 | 10 | 167 | 18 | 185 | 159 | 9 | 168 | 118 | 50 | 168 | 75 | 60 | 33 | 3 | 171 | 17 |
| Jul | 172 | 7 | 179 | 15 | 194 | 175 | 6 | 181 | 132 | 49 | 181 | 80 | 66 | 35 | 1 | 186 | 13 |
| Aug | 218 | 8 | 226 | 22 | 248 | 222 | 7 | 229 | 162 | 67 | 229 | 125 | 68 | 36 | 3 | 232 | 19 |
| Sep | 155 | 6 | 161 | 15 | 176 | 156 | 6 | 162 | 124 | 38 | 162 | 75 | 57 | 30 | 1 | 163 | 14 |
| Oct | 208 | 7 | 215 | 14 | 229 | 209 | 7 | 216 | 158 | 48 | 216 | 85 | 73 | 58 | 1 | 217 | 12 |
| Nov | 167 | 9 | 176 | 15 | 191 | 160 | 7 | 167 | 138 | 29 | 167 | 68 | 65 | 34 | 1 | 168 | 24 |
| Dec | 222 | 9 | 231 | 5 | 236 | 223 | 10 | 233 | 187 | 44 | 233 | 116 | 65 | 52 | 0 | 233 | 3 |

* Not available.

TABLE D-11

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR ROBBERY IN JOLIET FROM 1972-1976

| | Offense and Clearance Report-Set 1 | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1 | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Property Value | | | | | |
| | Offense and Clearance Trends (1) | Property Analysis (2) | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police (3) | Less than $10 (4) | $10-250 (5) | $251-2000 (6) | More than $2000 (7) | Total (8) | (1)-(3) (9) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 20 | 17 | 21 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 21 | 3 |
| February | 10 | 22 | 22 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 0 | 22 | -12 |
| March | 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 0 |
| April | 14 | 12 | 12 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 2 |
| May | 14 | 12 | 13 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 2 |
| June | 13 | 11 | 11 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 2 |
| July | 20 | 21 | 21 | 1 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 21 | -1 |
| August | 10 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| September | 10 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 2 |
| October | 11 | 12 | 13 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 14 | -1 |
| November | 15 | 14 | 14 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 1 |
| December | 10 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 1 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 18 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 3 |
| February | 17 | 14 | 14 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 3 |
| March | 18 | 16 | 16 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 16 | 2 |
| April | 26 | 27 | 27 | 2 | 21 | 4 | 1 | 28 | -1 |
| May | 16 | 13 | 13 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 3 |
| June | 26 | 23 | 23 | 5 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 23 | 3 |
| July | 21 | 25 | 25 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 0 | 25 | -4 |
| August | 31 | 23 | 23 | 2 | 16 | 5 | 1 | 24 | 8 |
| September | 26 | 23 | 23 | 5 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 3 |
| October | 35 | 30 | 30 | 5 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 30 | 5 |
| November | 18 | 15 | 15 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 15 | 3 |
| December | 21 | 20 | 20 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 22 | 1 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 27 | 27 | 27 | 13 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 27 | 0 |
| February | 29 | 23 | 23 | 12 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 28 | 6 |
| March | 24 | 21 | 22 | 6 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 23 | 3 |
| April | 15 | 14 | 14 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 1 |
| May | 25 | 21 | 21 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 21 | 4 |
| June | 33 | 29 | 29 | 8 | 20 | 2 | 1 | 31 | 4 |
| July | 11 | 14 | 14 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 16 | -3 |
| August | 28 | 23 | 25 | 5 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 5 |
| September | 19 | 18 | 18 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 1 |
| October | 31 | 29 | 29 | 4 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 29 | 2 |
| November | 29 | 25 | 25 | 5 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 4 |
| December | 37 | 32 | 32 | 8 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 34 | 5 |
| 1975 * | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 32 | 29 | 32 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 0 | 33 | 3 |
| February | 24 | 24 | 24 | 9 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 25 | 0 |
| March | 19 | 16 | 19 | 10 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 3 |
| April | 16 | 15 | 16 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 0 | 16 | 1 |
| May | 13 | 12 | 13 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 1 |
| June | 32 | 29 | 32 | 15 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 32 | 3 |
| July | 30 | 27 | 30 | 12 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 3 |
| August | 30 | 29 | 30 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 31 | 1 |
| September | 28 | 30 | 28 | 21 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 33 | -2 |
| October | 13 | 13 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 0 |
| November | 13 | 13 | 13 | 9 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 0 |
| December | 27 | 28 | 27 | 7 | 20 | 1 | 0 | 28 | -1 |
| 1976 * | | | | | | | | | |
| January | 29 | 24 | 29 | 7 | 17 | 5 | 0 | 29 | 5 |
| February | 13 | 11 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 2 |
| March | 13 | 9 | 13 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 4 |
| April | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| May | 12 | 9 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 3 |
| June | 14 | 12 | 14 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 2 |
| July | 23 | 20 | 23 | 8 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 3 |
| August | 13 | 11 | 13 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 2 |
| September | 33 | 26 | 33 | 7 | 21 | 5 | 1 | 34 | - |
| October | 20 | 20 | 20 | 4 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 20 | 0 |
| November | 17 | 16 | 17 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 19 | 1 |
| December | 18 | ** | 18 | - | 11 | 1 | 0 | 19 | |

* Figures are based upon the Offense Summary-Set 2 report.
** Not Available

TABLE 3-12

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR BURGLARY IN JOLIET FROM 1972-1976

| | Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1 | | | | | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Offense and Clearance Trends | | | | | Property Analysis | | | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police | | | Property Value | | | | |
| Year and Month | (1) Burglary--Forcible | (2) Burglary--No Force | (3) = (1)+(2) | (4) Burglary--Attempt | (5) = (1)+(2)+(4) | (6) Burglary--Forcible | (7) Burglary--No Force | (8) = (6)+(7) | (9) Residential | (10) Non-residential | (11) = (9)+(10) | (12) Less than $10 | (13) $10-250 | (14) $251-2000 | (15) More than $2000 | (16) = (12)+(13)+(14)+(15) | (17) = (5)-(11) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 39 | 11 | 50 | 5 | 55 | 41 | 13 | 54 | 31 | 27 | 58 | 16 | 35 | 7 | 0 | 58 | - 3 |
| Feb | 39 | 16 | 55 | 14 | 69 | 76 | 28 | 104 | 83 | 49 | 132 | 50 | 59 | 23 | 0 | 132 | -63 |
| Mar | 32 | 17 | 49 | 11 | 60 | 30 | 17 | 47 | 33 | 25 | 58 | 14 | 35 | 9 | 0 | 58 | 2 |
| Apr | 36 | 29 | 65 | 8 | 73 | 36 | 30 | 66 | 41 | 28 | 69 | 14 | 39 | 16 | 1 | 70 | 4 |
| May | 28 | 27 | 55 | 17 | 72 | 27 | 25 | 52 | 38 | 16 | 54 | 3 | 34 | 17 | 2 | 56 | 18 |
| Jun | 41 | 35 | 76 | 23 | 99 | 41 | 33 | 74 | 45 | 30 | 75 | 9 | 50 | 16 | 2 | 77 | 24 |
| Jul | 59 | 47 | 106 | 24 | 130 | 62 | 44 | 106 | 76 | 30 | 106 | 10 | 69 | 27 | 1 | 108 | 24 |
| Aug | 69 | 29 | 98 | 16 | 114 | 70 | 29 | 99 | 66 | 33 | 99 | 10 | 61 | 28 | 2 | 101 | 15 |
| Sep | 46 | 18 | 64 | 10 | 74 | 40 | 25 | 65 | 42 | 24 | 66 | 4 | 36 | 25 | 3 | 69 | 8 |
| Oct | 43 | 20 | 63 | 10 | 73 | 36 | 19 | 55 | 44 | 18 | 62 | 18 | 32 | 12 | 0 | 62 | 11 |
| Nov | 60 | 16 | 76 | 10 | 86 | 61 | 16 | 77 | 55 | 22 | 77 | 15 | 34 | 28 | 0 | 77 | 9 |
| Dec | 52 | 14 | 66 | * | 66 | 52 | 18 | 70 | 46 | 22 | 68 | 7 | 45 | 16 | 1 | 69 | - 2 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 69 | 12 | 81 | 11 | 92 | 70 | 12 | 82 | 54 | 28 | 82 | 21 | 43 | 18 | 1 | 83 | 10 |
| Feb | 67 | 16 | 83 | 7 | 90 | 67 | 16 | 83 | 61 | 29 | 90 | 36 | 44 | 10 | 0 | 90 | 0 |
| Mar | 77 | 12 | 89 | 13 | 102 | 76 | 12 | 88 | 63 | 37 | 100 | 40 | 40 | 20 | 3 | 103 | 2 |
| Apr | 85 | 18 | 103 | 5 | 108 | 83 | 18 | 101 | 78 | 30 | 108 | 27 | 54 | 27 | 2 | 110 | 0 |
| May | 92 | 35 | 127 | 7 | 134 | 91 | 35 | 126 | 83 | 45 | 128 | 26 | 66 | 36 | 3 | 131 | 6 |
| Jun | 80 | 28 | 108 | 10 | 118 | 84 | 28 | 112 | 81 | 37 | 118 | 34 | 63 | 21 | 2 | 120 | 0 |
| Jul | 101 | 44 | 145 | 13 | 158 | 106 | 43 | 149 | 103 | 58 | 161 | 58 | 77 | 26 | 0 | 161 | - 3 |
| Aug | 102 | 17 | 119 | 14 | 133 | 98 | 16 | 114 | 76 | 47 | 123 | 43 | 62 | 18 | 2 | 125 | 10 |
| Sep | 103 | 29 | 132 | 27 | 159 | 100 | 29 | 129 | 83 | 66 | 149 | 45 | 71 | 33 | 3 | 152 | 10 |
| Oct | 97 | 21 | 118 | 17 | 135 | 95 | 20 | 115 | 64 | 61 | 125 | 25 | 61 | 39 | 1 | 126 | 10 |
| Nov | 120 | 16 | 136 | 15 | 151 | 126 | 19 | 145 | 98 | 59 | 157 | 49 | 72 | 36 | 1 | 158 | - 6 |
| Dec | 133 | 17 | 150 | * | 150 | 128 | 14 | 142 | 107 | 51 | 158 | 64 | 64 | 30 | 1 | 159 | - 8 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 130 | 23 | 153 | 10 | 163 | 127 | 24 | 151 | 112 | 49 | 161 | 53 | 77 | 31 | 1 | 162 | 2 |
| Feb | 149 | 11 | 160 | 19 | 179 | 149 | 12 | 161 | 118 | 59 | 177 | 95 | 64 | 21 | 0 | 180 | 2 |
| Mar | 158 | 31 | 189 | 23 | 212 | 155 | 31 | 186 | 149 | 55 | 204 | 92 | 83 | 34 | 1 | 210 | 8 |
| Apr | 104 | 16 | 120 | 13 | 133 | 104 | 17 | 121 | 88 | 44 | 132 | 58 | 61 | 23 | 0 | 142 | 1 |
| May | 159 | 30 | 189 | 15 | 204 | 160 | 31 | 191 | 145 | 60 | 205 | 70 | 107 | 46 | 2 | 225 | - 1 |
| Jun | 173 | 55 | 228 | 23 | 251 | 173 | 56 | 229 | 175 | 75 | 250 | 83 | 117 | 52 | 3 | 255 | 1 |
| Jul | 179 | 46 | 225 | 28 | 253 | 181 | 47 | 228 | 162 | 92 | 254 | 104 | 124 | 38 | 4 | 270 | - 1 |
| Aug | 123 | 46 | 169 | 25 | 194 | 129 | 46 | 175 | 133 | 68 | 201 | 70 | 98 | 37 | 2 | 207 | - 7 |
| Sep | 90 | 26 | 116 | 9 | 125 | 92 | 26 | 118 | 78 | 49 | 127 | 37 | 63 | 29 | 5 | 134 | - 2 |
| Oct | 89 | 26 | 115 | 12 | 127 | 93 | 26 | 119 | 79 | 52 | 131 | 46 | 52 | 34 | 2 | 134 | - 4 |
| Nov | 106 | 23 | 129 | 16 | 145 | 108 | 21 | 129 | 71 | 75 | 146 | 36 | 52 | 58 | 2 | 148 | - 1 |
| Dec | 102 | 102 | 204 | * | 204 | 94 | 16 | 110 | 95 | 27 | 122 | 34 | 58 | 31 | 4 | 127 | 82 |
| 1975 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 80 | 11 | 91 | 19 | 110 | 80 | 11 | 91 | 60 | 50 | 110 | 41 | 48 | 21 | 1 | 111 | 0 |
| Feb | 66 | 21 | 87 | 15 | 102 | 66 | 21 | 87 | 75 | 27 | 102 | 46 | 34 | 22 | 1 | 103 | 0 |
| Mar | 79 | 15 | 94 | 21 | 115 | 79 | 15 | 94 | 77 | 38 | 115 | 51 | 48 | 16 | 1 | 116 | 0 |
| Apr | 71 | 23 | 94 | 28 | 122 | 71 | 23 | 94 | 91 | 31 | 122 | 62 | 43 | 17 | 1 | 122 | 0 |
| May | 93 | 24 | 117 | 23 | 140 | 93 | 24 | 117 | 98 | 42 | 140 | 67 | 47 | 26 | 0 | 140 | 0 |
| Jun | 112 | 35 | 147 | 37 | 184 | 112 | 35 | 147 | 113 | 71 | 184 | 113 | 56 | 15 | 2 | 186 | 0 |
| Jul | 104 | 52 | 156 | 15 | 171 | 104 | 52 | 156 | 131 | 40 | 171 | 83 | 64 | 24 | 1 | 172 | 0 |
| Aug | 119 | 46 | 165 | 28 | 193 | 119 | 46 | 165 | 137 | 56 | 193 | 95 | 79 | 19 | 1 | 194 | 0 |
| Sep | 100 | 27 | 127 | 15 | 142 | 114 | 29 | 143 | 96 | 46 | 142 | 88 | 44 | 28 | 1 | 161 | 0 |
| Oct | 82 | 28 | 110 | 19 | 129 | 102 | 30 | 132 | 97 | 32 | 129 | 63 | 51 | 40 | 2 | 156 | 0 |
| Nov | 79 | 18 | 97 | 7 | 104 | 82 | 19 | 101 | 77 | 27 | 104 | 49 | 47 | 27 | 1 | 124 | 0 |
| Dec | 111 | 28 | 139 | * | 139 | 124 | 28 | 152 | 110 | 47 | 157 | 77 | 79 | 26 | 2 | 184 | -18 |
| 1976 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 100 | 20 | 120 | 15 | 135 | 101 | 20 | 121 | 105 | 30 | 135 | 52 | 60 | 23 | 1 | 136 | 0 |
| Feb | 73 | 18 | 91 | 10 | 101 | 73 | 18 | 91 | 66 | 35 | 101 | 39 | 46 | 16 | 1 | 102 | 0 |
| Mar | 102 | 37 | 139 | 14 | 153 | 102 | 37 | 139 | 114 | 39 | 153 | 59 | 68 | 26 | 2 | 155 | 0 |
| Apr | 97 | 51 | 148 | 13 | 161 | 98 | 53 | 151 | 128 | 33 | 161 | 51 | 77 | 36 | 1 | 165 | 0 |
| May | 84 | 46 | 130 | 19 | 149 | 84 | 47 | 131 | 116 | 33 | 149 | 58 | 69 | 23 | 2 | 152 | 0 |
| Jun | 97 | 45 | 142 | 28 | 170 | 97 | 45 | 142 | 125 | 45 | 170 | 62 | 76 | 32 | 1 | 171 | 0 |
| Jul | 90 | 39 | 129 | 27 | 156 | 90 | 40 | 130 | 109 | 47 | 156 | 61 | 79 | 18 | 2 | 160 | 0 |
| Aug | 75 | 33 | 108 | 36 | 144 | 75 | 33 | 108 | 107 | 37 | 144 | 60 | 58 | 26 | 0 | 144 | 0 |
| Sep | 112 | 31 | 143 | 9 | 152 | 112 | 31 | 143 | 113 | 39 | 152 | 44 | 74 | 34 | 0 | 152 | 0 |
| Oct | 129 | 28 | 157 | 20 | 177 | 129 | 28 | 157 | 132 | 45 | 177 | 77 | 62 | 38 | 2 | 179 | 0 |
| Nov | 95 | 13 | 108 | 13 | 121 | 95 | 13 | 108 | 94 | 27 | 121 | 62 | 38 | 21 | 2 | 123 | 0 |
| Dec | 119 | 21 | 140 | 21 | 161 | * | * | * | 132 | 29 | 161 | 81 | 46 | 34 | 2 | 163 | 0 |

* Not Available

TABLE D-13

COMPARISON OF FOUR REPORTS FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES FOR BURGLARY IN PEORIA FROM 1972-1976

| Year and Month | Offense and Clearance Report--Set 1: Offense and Clearance Trends | | | | | Offense Analysis Information--Set 1: Property Analysis | | | Monthly Return of Offenses Known to Police | | | Property Value | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Burglary--Forcible | (2) Burglary--No Force | (3) = (1)+(2) | (4) Burglary--Attempt | (5) = (1)+(2)+(4) | (6) Burglary--Forcible | (7) Burglary--No Force | (8) = (6)+(7) | (9) Residential | (10) Non-residential | (11) = (9)+(10) | (12) Less than $10 | (13) $10-250 | (14) $251-2000 | (15) More than $2000 | (16) = (12)+(13)+(14)+(15) | (17) = (5)-(11) |
| 1972 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 108 | 31 | 139 | 15 | 154 | 79 | 27 | 106 | | | 108 | 13 | 57 | 38 | 1 | 109 | 46 |
| Feb | 101 | 34 | 135 | 17 | 152 | 89 | 32 | 121 | | | 121 | 12 | 77 | 32 | 0 | 121 | 31 |
| Mar | 102 | 63 | 165 | 14 | 179 | 74 | 56 | 130 | | | 130 | 10 | 80 | 40 | 4 | 134 | 48 |
| Apr | 123 | 53 | 176 | 13 | 189 | 93 | 45 | 138 | | | 139 | 19 | 79 | 41 | 0 | 139 | 50 |
| May | 120 | 31 | 151 | 22 | 173 | 92 | 27 | 119 | | | 121 | 8 | 79 | 34 | 0 | 121 | 52 |
| Jun | 124 | 52 | 176 | 17 | 193 | 108 | 45 | 153 | | | 158 | 23 | 105 | 30 | 0 | 158 | 35 |
| Jul | 179 | 35 | 214 | 32 | 246 | 144 | 34 | 177 | | | 184 | 40 | 108 | 36 | 2 | 186 | 62 |
| Aug | 121 | 53 | 174 | 20 | 194 | 119 | 50 | 169 | | | 172 | 42 | 97 | 33 | 0 | 172 | 22 |
| Sep | 96 | 66 | 162 | 18 | 180 | 85 | 63 | 148 | | | 150 | 21 | 101 | 28 | 0 | 150 | 30 |
| Oct | 114 | 55 | 169 | 18 | 187 | 98 | 54 | 152 | | | 157 | 32 | 83 | 42 | 2 | 159 | 30 |
| Nov | 132 | 53 | 185 | 27 | 212 | 102 | 48 | 150 | | | 150 | 31 | 83 | 36 | 1 | 151 | 62 |
| Dec | 148 | 20 | 168 | 18 | 186 | 116 | 18 | 134 | | | 136 | 22 | 83 | 31 | 0 | 136 | 50 |
| 1973 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 146 | 58 | 204 | 21 | 225 | 103 | 51 | 154 | N O T A V A I L A B L E | N O T A V A I L A B L E | 155 | 27 | 85 | 42 | 3 | 157 | 70 |
| Feb | 138 | 50 | 188 | 24 | 212 | 110 | 41 | 151 | | | 156 | 27 | 97 | 32 | 3 | 159 | 56 |
| Mar | 161 | 64 | 225 | 32 | 257 | 133 | 60 | 193 | | | 203 | 32 | 118 | 52 | 3 | 205 | 54 |
| Apr | 172 | 54 | 226 | 22 | 248 | 121 | 47 | 168 | | | 172 | 25 | 105 | 42 | 2 | 174 | 76 |
| May | 137 | 70 | 207 | 29 | 236 | 103 | 65 | 168 | | | 171 | 23 | 105 | 43 | 2 | 173 | 65 |
| Jun | 151 | 56 | 207 | 28 | 235 | 123 | 56 | 179 | | | 184 | 33 | 104 | 47 | 1 | 185 | 51 |
| Jul | 205 | 72 | 277 | 35 | 312 | 163 | 58 | 221 | | | 224 | 27 | 134 | 63 | 3 | 227 | 88 |
| Aug | 206 | 60 | 266 | 27 | 293 | 142 | 57 | 199 | | | 204 | 22 | 123 | 59 | 2 | 206 | 89 |
| Sep | 178 | 106 | 284 | 28 | 312 | 122 | 93 | 215 | | | 218 | 24 | 143 | 51 | 2 | 220 | 94 |
| Oct | 168 | 64 | 232 | 30 | 262 | 118 | 59 | 177 | | | 180 | 16 | 103 | 61 | 2 | 182 | 82 |
| Nov | 177 | 46 | 223 | 33 | 256 | 123 | 37 | 160 | | | 164 | 10 | 99 | 55 | 1 | 165 | 92 |
| Dec | 201 | 43 | 244 | 33 | 277 | 146 | 36 | 182 | | | 186 | 12 | 111 | 63 | 4 | 190 | 91 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 139 | 33 | 172 | 31 | 203 | 93 | 27 | 120 | | | 125 | 17 | 70 | 44 | 5 | 136 | 78 |
| Feb | 130 | 45 | 175 | 24 | 199 | 83 | 36 | 119 | | | 124 | 12 | 67 | 51 | 5 | 135 | 75 |
| Mar | 184 | 54 | 238 | 28 | 266 | 116 | 43 | 159 | | | 161 | 17 | 98 | 52 | 1 | 168 | 105 |
| Apr | 166 | 72 | 238 | 26 | 264 | 103 | 54 | 157 | | | 160 | 18 | 106 | 44 | 2 | 170 | 104 |
| May | 149 | 65 | 214 | 27 | 241 | 104 | 57 | 161 | | | 163 | 19 | 113 | 38 | 1 | 171 | 78 |
| Jun | 119 | 107 | 226 | 20 | 246 | 95 | 98 | 193 | | | 195 | 21 | 136 | 45 | 3 | 205 | 51 |
| Jul | 187 | 98 | 285 | 31 | 316 | 127 | 76 | 203 | | | 206 | 18 | 144 | 54 | 2 | 218 | 110 |
| Aug | 186 | 106 | 292 | 41 | 333 | 121 | 84 | 205 | | | 209 | 12 | 144 | 58 | 0 | 214 | 124 |
| Sep | 175 | 48 | 223 | 47 | 270 | 117 | 32 | 149 | | | 153 | 14 | 84 | 58 | 1 | 157 | 117 |
| Oct | 164 | 101 | 265 | 32 | 297 | 109 | 73 | 182 | | | 186 | 17 | 120 | 52 | 5 | 194 | 111 |
| Nov | 208 | 66 | 274 | 29 | 303 | 127 | 53 | 180 | | | 180 | 21 | 101 | 60 | 3 | 185 | 123 |
| Dec | 262 | 64 | 326 | 32 | 358 | 159 | 55 | 214 | | | 215 | 17 | 117 | 82 | 4 | 220 | 143 |
| 1975 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 264 | 65 | 329 | 44 | 373 | 263 | 66 | 329 | 268 | 105 | 373 | 157 | 133 | 84 | 4 | 378 | 0 |
| Feb | 226 | 55 | 281 | 30 | 311 | 226 | 55 | 281 | 213 | 97 | 310 | 130 | 100 | 85 | 5 | 320 | 1 |
| Mar | 198 | 40 | 238 | 24 | 262 | 201 | 41 | 242 | 169 | 96 | 265 | 114 | 80 | 76 | 8 | 278 | - 3 |
| Apr | 180 | 63 | 243 | 41 | 284 | 180 | 67 | 247 | 213 | 75 | 288 | 129 | 99 | 60 | 1 | 289 | - 4 |
| May | 206 | 86 | 292 | 22 | 314 | 205 | 89 | 294 | 203 | 113 | 316 | 118 | 137 | 63 | 3 | 321 | - 2 |
| Jun | 197 | 132 | 329 | 22 | 351 | 197 | 132 | 329 | 217 | 134 | 351 | 110 | 175 | 68 | 4 | 357 | 0 |
| Jul | 200 | 152 | 352 | 37 | 389 | 203 | 152 | 355 | 241 | 150 | 391 | 139 | 177 | 77 | 6 | 399 | - 3 |
| Aug | 228 | 139 | 367 | 35 | 402 | 229 | 138 | 367 | 256 | 146 | 402 | 158 | 168 | 79 | 5 | 410 | 0 |
| Sep | 203 | 97 | 300 | 33 | 333 | 205 | 101 | 306 | 190 | 149 | 339 | 131 | 126 | 82 | 10 | 349 | - 6 |
| Oct | 155 | 113 | 268 | 47 | 315 | 157 | 114 | 271 | 206 | 112 | 318 | 136 | 108 | 74 | 4 | 322 | - 3 |
| Nov | 178 | 105 | 283 | 36 | 319 | 178 | 105 | 283 | 206 | 113 | 319 | 129 | 117 | 73 | 7 | 326 | 0 |
| Dec | 230 | 72 | 302 | 39 | 341 | 230 | 73 | 303 | 247 | 94 | 341 | 147 | 98 | 98 | 11 | 354 | 0 |
| 1976 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jan | 159 | 43 | 202 | 22 | 224 | 175 | 47 | 222 | 168 | 79 | 247 | 102 | 81 | 70 | 7 | 260 | -23 |
| Feb | 121 | 48 | 169 | 21 | 190 | 129 | 51 | 180 | 134 | 67 | 201 | 74 | 70 | 60 | 2 | 206 | -11 |
| Mar | 129 | 63 | 192 | 22 | 214 | 140 | 67 | 207 | 154 | 75 | 229 | 85 | 78 | 67 | 7 | 237 | -15 |
| Apr | 127 | 82 | 209 | 32 | 241 | 127 | 84 | 211 | 153 | 90 | 243 | 93 | 64 | 89 | 11 | 257 | - 2 |
| May | 109 | 65 | 174 | 22 | 196 | 110 | 66 | 176 | 119 | 79 | 198 | 74 | 78 | 47 | 4 | 203 | - 2 |
| Jun | 104 | 99 | 203 | 19 | 222 | 108 | 101 | 209 | 129 | 99 | 228 | 34 | 103 | 42 | 6 | 235 | - 6 |
| Jul | 191 | 136 | 327 | 38 | 365 | 193 | 137 | 330 | 240 | 129 | 369 | 150 | 156 | 66 | 6 | 378 | - 4 |
| Aug | 166 | 101 | 267 | 32 | 299 | 168 | 104 | 272 | 199 | 105 | 304 | 123 | 117 | 64 | 1 | 305 | - 5 |
| Sep | 123 | 46 | 169 | 18 | 187 | 137 | 53 | 190 | 140 | 68 | 208 | 73 | 86 | 54 | 2 | 215 | -21 |
| Oct | 113 | 57 | 170 | 29 | 199 | 114 | 59 | 173 | 123 | 79 | 202 | 88 | 76 | 38 | 1 | 203 | - 3 |
| Nov | 121 | 55 | 176 | 30 | 206 | 138 | 61 | 199 | 170 | 60 | 230 | 80 | 75 | 82 | 4 | 241 | -24 |
| Dec | 134 | 39 | 173 | 11 | 184 | 134 | 40 | 174 | 127 | 57 | 184 | 78 | 59 | 56 | 4 | 197 | 0 |

END