

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT
OF
MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS


OCTOBER 1979

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DATE: November 9, 1979

TO : William Hogan, Commissioner
Department of Correction
State of Massachusetts

FROM: O. C. Minton, Correctional
Consultant



SUBJ: Technical Assistance to the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections

This report is the result of the technical assistance visit to the Department of Corrections. Your invitation through the National Institute of Corrections authorized our team of consultants to evaluate operations of the Central Office and those of the State Penitentiary at Walpole, Massachusetts. Our visit of September 25, 1979, obtained an overview and determined the scope of the mission, which is as follows:

1. Develop an effective classification system.
2. Review of the operations of MCI-Walpole and recommend improvements in security classification, inmate programs, food service, and other areas of concern.
3. Review the Central Office administrative structure.

A team of consultants was appointed and arrangements were made to return during the period of October 15-19, 1979.

We sincerely hope this report will be of assistance in the operation of the Massachusetts Department of Correction.

NCJRS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The National Institute of Corrections team wishes to express their appreciation to Governor Edward King, Charles Mahoney, Secretary of Human Services, and Commissioner Hogan for their hospitality and cooperation. The team is also grateful to the Department's Central Office staff, Superintendent Butterworth, and the staff at MCI, Walpole, for their assistance and professional candor.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS TEAM

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METHODOLOGY

In keeping with the scope of the mission, the NIC team members were assigned a task within their specialities. The approach to this audit was to review previous studies and reports, interview a variety of staff at the Central Office and institution level in addition to some inmates at Walpole. Operations of Walpole, the Reception and Diagnostic procedures, and area classification boards were observed. This was augmented by reviewing pertinent laws, regulations promulgated at the department and institutional level, research conclusions, the results of the internal audit prepared at Walpole in preparation of ACA Accreditation, and a sampling of inmate case files.

The team members discussed their respective findings and recommendations each evening and prepared reports which are reflected in this document.

TABLE OF CONTENT

	PAGE
OVERVIEW.....	1
<u>PART I - CENTRAL OFFICE</u>	
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.....	5
MASTER PLANNING.....	8
RECEPTION & DIAGNOSTIC CENTERS.....	10
CLASSIFICATION - AREA BOARDS.....	14
TRANSPORTATION.....	17
MCI-BRIDGewater.....	18
<u>PART II - MCI WALPOLE</u>	
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.....	19
PROGRAM DIVISION.....	23
OPERATIONS DIVISION.....	27
INDUSTRY DIVISION.....	30
MEDICAL.....	32
COMMITTEES.....	33
INTAKE & ORIENTATION.....	38
CLASSIFICATION.....	40
PROGRAM AREAS.....	47
UNIT MANAGEMENT.....	61
CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENT.....	63
FOOD SERVICE.....	98
PRISON INDUSTRIES.....	106
INDUSTRIAL ASSIGNMENTS.....	117
EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY.....	119
MAINTENANCE.....	120

OVERVIEW - WALPOLE

Corrections in Massachusetts is unique in at least two respects. Ninety percent of its inmates are within a 60-mile radius of Boston and the State has one of the lowest per capita incarceration rates in the United States. A State population of 6,000,000 people with only 3,600 inmates incarcerated is indeed unusual when compared with a State such as Florida which has 20,000 inmates in a total population of 8,000,000 people.

The comparatively small number of inmates incarcerated in Massachusetts prisons can be partly accounted for by the fact that convicted individuals can be legally held in local detention centers (jails) for up to 2 1/2 years. There are approximately 2,000 inmates in this category which gives the State about 5,600 persons confined rather than 3,600. This is still a very small per capita rate of incarceration and suggests the Massachusetts courts make greater use of community alternatives or the State laws may not be as restrictive.

The physical plant at Walpole is 25 years old and was designed to serve as the maximum security facility for the entire correctional system. It has been utilized in this manner but they are required to care for many inmates who do not need maximum security and could be more appropriately classified to other facilities in the system.

Much has been written about the inadequacy of the Walpole physical plant and some have proposed it be closed. We do not share this opinion. It is true there are shortcomings and eventually more space will have to be provided for programs, maintenance shops and industrial work opportunities. However, it is a good sound secure facility surrounded by a wall that is topped by several strands of barbed wire at least one of which carries an electric current. It has approximately 660 individual cells and the cellblocks form small secure groupings of cells so that the population can be classified into as many as 14 homogeneous groups. The physical design of the cellblocks also lends itself to the "Unit Management" concept with only minor changes should management decide to move in that direction..

Program space is severely limited and there are few opportunities to learn employable skills. A woefully inadequate maintenance program has led to unnecessary deterioration of facilities in all areas. Plumbing needs, paint, broken windows, etc., are in evidence throughout. In spite of these shortcomings, we see it as a secure manageable facility that can serve the purpose for which it was intended.

Walpole is a troubled institution beset with a multitude of serious problems relating mostly to the management of inmates. There is no single basic cause of their predicament nor will their problems yield to any simple solutions. However, if there is any single causative factor that seems to outweigh all others it is the permissiveness introduced into the system in the early seventies. It was at this time that departmental policy and philosophy allowed for the

rapid disintegration of discipline and control of inmates. This created a chaotic condition in the Walpole penitentiary and there was a rapid deterioration in the relationships between staff and inmates. The work ethic was abandoned creating a severe problem of idleness. Inmate rackets flourished to take up idle time and may well have reached the point where they are more lucrative than the pay that can be earned on an institutional assignment.

These conditions gradually drove a wedge between staff and inmates and resulted in an inmate attitude that bordered on contempt. This attitude has further deteriorated to where it can best be described as one of arrogance and at times intimidation. A hostile environment developed with these changes that produced suicides, homicides and violent behavior.

Management has been in a defensive role, putting out brush fires and pursuing a policy of containment. Frequent and lengthy lockdowns in cellblocks were used as a partial means of control but inmates responded with verbal abuse to officers, threw urine upon some and generally hurled all manner of foods, debris, and fecal matter in unbelievable quantities in some cellblocks.

Parts of Walpole would truly have to be described as a jungle. The role of the correctional officer changed from advisor and counselor to guard, and treatment personnel were generally limited to purely treatment functions and little if any custodial responsibility.

The treatment staff feels somewhat constrained in an atmosphere almost wholly dominated by discipline and control problems. This limited role has created a gap between civilian (treatment staff) and custodial personnel. Treatment jobs are further limited by inadequate space allocations for offices and programs.

Walpole's problems are further magnified by a glaring absence of work and program opportunities even if the work ethic were restored. Very few inmates have demonstrated a willingness to work and those that do expect pay and some sort of a material reward such as extra food. The excessive food carried to cells coupled with few inmates working has caused a sanitation problem in most areas of the institution. This may be one contributing factor to what appears to us to be excessive food costs in Walpole.

The picture painted for conditions at Walpole sounds exaggerated and hopeless. It is neither. In the brief time between visits (3 weeks), we were able to see improvement in several areas, a new determination to solve problems, and a new hope that has already blossomed with the recent appointment of Commissioner Hogan. We are very optimistic that this situation can be turned around and Walpole will again become a pleasant and harmonious place to work and provide a humane and rewarding experience for the inmates.

We believe the following recommendations will do much to expedite major improvements.

CENTRAL OFFICE - ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

OBSERVATION:

The present organizational structure is built on a regionalized concept of dividing correctional facilities and some functions into three areas. The net effect is to create a new and additional bureaucratic layer of staff, create a wasteful duplication of effort such as transportation and classification, and greatly impede the decision-making process. Each area is headed by an Associate Commissioner who rather jealously guards his "turf". Communication between areas appears to be strained. In addition, there is another level of Deputy Commissioners who are organized more along functional lines. The whole system seems wasteful and terribly cumbersome. It is also important to remember Massachusetts has a comparatively small Department of Corrections with 90% of its inmates within a 60-mile radius. The regionalized approach usually functions best in a system much larger and spread over a large geographical area.

We also observed the Commissioner who seems to be bogged down with an inordinate amount of routine work that could be delegated. The Commissioner should have adequate time to allow him to work on legislative and budgetary matters, make on-site visits to facilities, participate in public relations activities, do correctional system planning and evaluation, and set policy for the system. His signature should only be required on important documents.

The system needs a good number two man (such as a Deputy Commissioner), who is in daily charge of all operations, implements the Commissioner's policies


and programs, and keeps the Commissioner informed on important matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. WE RECOMMEND YOU ABANDON THE EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADOPT A FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE REGIONALIZED CONCEPT.
(SEE ATTACHED ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM).

RATIONALE:

It would be logical to centralize all functions that are presently duplicated in the three areas. It would eliminate the tendency to build a domain or protect area "turf". More importantly, it simplifies and expedites the decision-making process. It should also result in considerable savings, more efficient use of staff time, and better communications.



PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

MASTER PLANNING

OBSERVATION:

There is no comprehensive correctional master plan in evidence for the Massachusetts Department of Corrections.

RECOMMENDATION

2. DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN UTILIZING IN-HOUSE STAFF AND LIMITED OUTSIDE CONSULTATION.

RATIONALE

The Massachusetts Department of Correction was without a Commissioner for many months, there has never been a master plan, and, consequently, the Department has been like a rudderless ship. We believe the Department has sufficient talent to do most of the plan, but they should seek outside, totally objective viewpoints on the scope of the plan, to help organize the project, and to check it occasionally in "devils advocate role". This is necessary to be sure all viable alternatives are being considered and to prevent in-house blind spots. A comprehensive plan will be needed to cover such components as:

Utilization of Facilities

Inmate Population Projects

Goals and Objectives

Philosophy

Community-Based Corrections

Diversions

Female Offender

Jails

Inmate Rights

Victims

Courts

Projected Costs

Sequence of Implementation

Such a comprehensive plan will give a whole new sense of direction to the Department and should greatly enhance the stability of the system.

RECEPTION & DIAGNOSTIC CENTERS

In 1974, the Department of Corrections created and officially opened two Reception and Diagnostic Centers located within MCI-Norfolk (RDC) and MCI-Concord (NRDC). These Centers function autonomously within the institutions where they are located, except that supervision and policy is provided by respective area Commissioners to the Reception Center Superintendents.

The mission of these Centers is outlined in the Department of Corrections Order 4400.1, dated March 7, 1975, which relates to the Classification Process and the Organization of Classification. It is presently outdated as a policy since the "area concept" was initiated in 1976, however, the basic philosophy is still valid insofar as the staff is concerned. It is intended that newly committed felons be assessed and oriented to the Department's facilities and resources. The "medical model" of identifying needs and prescribing a course of action is presumed.

It is understood that the State of Massachusetts' statutes provides for the most part, two major types of sentencing structures for male offenders committed to the Department of Corrections. One, the Concord sentence is used primarily for youthful offenders which allows the minimum term to be established by the State Parole Board. The other, the state or Walpole sentence establishes a minimum and maximum term to be served. Individuals with a Concord sentence are committed to the Northeast Reception and Diagnostic Center in Concord (NRDC), and the individuals with the

State (Walpole) sentence are committed to Walpole, initially, even if a matter of hours for a brief admission and then transfer to the Reception and Diagnostic Center at Norfolk (RDC) or Concord, depending upon space availability and age of the offenders.

One of the problems of inmate classification is overcrowding in all the major facilities of the Department. Most inmates confined at these Centers had been classified and designated for institution placement. The scarcity of bedspace, however, particularly at Norfolk and Concord, prohibited their movement from these Centers. Thus, classified inmates waited as much as five-to-six additional weeks in these closed settings to be transferred to a general population where they could participate in programs. Convicted felons will wait at least an equal period of time, perhaps longer, either in jails (Houses of Corrections), or at MCI-Walpole before they are admitted to these Centers to undergo the diagnostic and reception process. It is obvious that the overcrowding impedes appropriate classification decisions when considering institution placement. It does not provide for necessary latitude to designate offenders in keeping with security level considerations and program needs. It places the Reception and Diagnostic staff in the position of managing body movement rather than what they believe to be proper classification.

In a discussion with Center staff, it was determined that the designation policy is to confine individuals in the least required security. However, often parole violators are returned to the originally designated institution rather than considering the need for security. (This often applies to halfway house failures).

It was learned that the Centers experience considerable difficulty obtaining social background reports, descriptions of the offense and prior records in a timely manner. Most, if not all, social data that is reported is unverified from the community or is obtained only from the inmate. Psychological screening is infrequent (there was no Psychologist available at NRDC at the time of this visit), educational/vocational assessments are not conducted in the Centers in most instances. Educational tests are given when the inmate apparently demonstrates an interest at the time. Medical reports are not available at the time of classification unless the Medical Department determines an extreme need for the staff to know. Consequently, the staff evaluations prepared, which reflect causal factors and program needs of the inmate, are based upon observations and intuitiveness of the staff, for the most part. At the completion of the evaluation, the Superintendent of the Center makes a recommendation to the Central Office in Boston as to where the individual is to be designated.

Without current departmental policy, the Centers, which are governed by two different area Commissioners, are functioning independent of one another. There is no communication or sharing of mutual interests or operations by the staff. Interestingly, this did not seem to be a concern of the staff. There are no standard reports prepared or procedures expected by the department. Conversely to these apparent deficiencies is that of the professional attitude of the staff in each of these Centers. They are concerned to perform as effectively and as efficiently as possible within the given constraints.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE E. CAMBRIDGE JAIL BE UTILIZED AS A SINGLE (CENTRAL) RECEPTION CENTER.
4. EXPEDITE THE PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS, OFFENSE DATA, AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION IN ORDER TO EFFICIENTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESS NEW COMMITMENTS.
5. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE RECEPTION AND DIAGNOSTIC CENTER BE DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY OF DECISION AS TO WHAT FACILITY INMATES ARE DESIGNATED.
6. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SENTENCING STATUS BE CHANGED TO COMMIT OFFENDERS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION RATHER THAN THE STATE PRISON (WALPOLE) OR CONCORD.
7. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PAROLE VIOLATOR INMATE NEED FOR SECURITY BE THE PRIMARY FACTOR IN DESIGNATION RATHER THAN THE ORIGINAL DESIGNATED FACILITY.

RATIONALE

It is believed that the facility at the E. Cambridge Jail would be a suitable Reception Center for the department. Although it does not meet all required standards, it is a new, very secure, and well-equipped jail which would provide more bed availability and efficient processing.

This central Reception and Diagnostic Center would be in a better position

to obtain required reports from the community. Diagnostic processing will be more complete and consistent as well as the reporting be uniformly prepared.

It is believed that with a central reception center there would be no further need for "Walpole or Concord" sentence structures. These type of sentences require offenders to be temporarily confined in facilities not always suitable in terms of proper classification and protection of society and inmate.

CLASSIFICATION

OBSERVATION:

When the Department of Correction went into the area concept (regionalized), area Boards replaced the Departmental Board which previously forwarded transfer recommendations to Commissioners to move an inmate from one facility to another. Area Boards are currently comprised of five members, three of which are treatment staff from other institutions in the system and two correctional officers from the facility in which the Board is convening. The purpose of the Board is to interview, on sight, those inmates who had been recommended for transfer by the Superintendent of the institution by way of the Institution Internal Classification Committee (ICC). The area board reviews the rationale for the transfer and provides an objective written recommendation to the area Director of Classification. Before a decision is rendered in the Central Office, the case is again reviewed by a caseworker in the respective "Area" Office who prepares a "highlight report" to the area Director of Classification.

If the recommendation is an inter-area transfer, then it is reviewed again by the other area Director of Classification. The two must concur with the transfer; if not, it is reviewed by the Department's Director of Classification for final approval. It is conceivable and, in most instances, it occurs that a final decision takes from six-to-twelve weeks when being processed through these levels of recommending agents. Often the inmate will not receive a constructive answer when his request for transfer is denied at any of the higher levels. In discussion with the staff, it was their supposition that only five-to-ten percent of the cases initiated at the institutional level are overturned by any of the reviewing bodies.

It was particularly noteworthy that there is no departmental policy outlining this elaborate procedure. It was a variety of staff's opinion that the process and recommendations are quite inconsistent which lends itself to cross-communication with the staff at the institutional level as well as the inmate. It was believed that the original purpose of the Area Board was to make objective and unbiased recommendations for inmate transfers. This implies that Superintendents and institution staff cannot make professional objective recommendations for transferring individuals to minimum or pre-release facilities prior to their eventual release. This system is so cumbersome and complex that it is dysfunctional.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE AREA BOARD REVIEW CONCEPT BE ABOLISHED.
9. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE TRANSFER PROCESS BE INITIATED AT THE

INSTITUTION LEVEL AND REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE CENTRAL OFFICE.

RATIONALE

It is believed that the staff at the respective institutions can make informed professional recommendations to a central classification board who can review and make appropriate decisions in behalf of the Commissioner. The decisions would be based upon the data forwarded by the institution, thereby eliminating the need to have any staff (Classification Board) to travel to institutions redundantly reviewing or rehashing the same issues with an inmate which were at the ICC. Traveling classification boards are a waste of time, money, and personnel talent. They are subject to "buck passing" or bureaucratic delays.

The central classification board could consist of a Director and sufficient trained staff, at least three, who are in a position to review the material and make appropriate judgments.

TRANSPORTATION

OBSERVATION:

Staff at all levels comment on the duplication of effort involved in transporting prisoners to hospitals and court appearances.

RECOMMENDATION

10. COORDINATE TRIPS FROM ALL INSTITUTIONS AT THE CENTRAL OFFICE LEVEL.

RATIONALE

A major gain in efficiency and reduction in manpower costs is quickly attainable by centralizing the transportation and escort of prisoners to hospitals and courts. Almost everyone we talked with agreed that implementation of a central plan could give 50% or more of current manhours expended in these projects. As time goes by, it may also be possible to coordinate similar kinds of hospital trips, such as dermatological, where scheduling is possible.

MCI-BRIDGewater

OBSERVATION:

The Bridgewater population is made up of three different groups of inmates. There are approximately 250-350 "walk-in" alcohol abusers, 150 sexually dangerous offenders, and 350 forensic patients. It is our understanding that the alcohol abusers sign themselves in for a period of 10 days and their population increases rapidly with the decline of outside temperatures.

RECOMMENDATION

11. DETOXIFICATION CENTERS BE PROVIDED ELSEWHERE IN THE STATE AND BE STAFFED BY TRAINED MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

RATIONALE:

Alcohol abusers are generally considered to be socio-medical problems and a prison setting does not provide the appropriate staff or environment. It costs approximately 1.5 million dollars a year to accommodate this group and the bed space is badly needed to relieve overcrowding in the system. Housing for alcohol abusers does not require the more costly security medic for an inmate population.

WALPOLE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The Chief Executive of the Prison is titled "Superintendent," and has three Deputy Superintendents reporting to him. The Supervisor of Industry also reports directly to the Superintendent as do an Administrative Assistant, a Training Officer, and a Secretary. There is no indication as to whom the Hospital reports.

In the formal structure, all social and educational services are supervised by the Deputy for Treatment. The Deputy for Operation supervises the correctional officer staff only. The Deputy for Administration oversees all financial transactions, personnel functions, mechanical operations, and food service. The Supervisor of Industries at the institutional level controls both financial and production elements of the Prison Industry. He also reports directly to the Supervisor of Industries in the Central Office. Consequently, he is responsible to two bosses.

Informally, there is a different arrangement. The Deputy of Operation makes virtually all decisions. None of the Program staff, or any of their committees, makes decisions. They make recommendations which are determined by the Deputy for Operations.

Overtime assignments are controlled solely by the Correctional staff, and so, largely, is manpower utilization. Since salaries form the bulk of the institution budget, effective financial controls seems also to rest with the Deputy for Operations.

The Industrial effort functions within Custodial restraints, determined by the Deputy for Operations, who controls the entrance of inmates into Industries and also controls their removal.

PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION

Reorganization of the administrative process is intended to shorten the span of control and clarify lines of responsibility.

Since Walpole is intended for, and functions as, the maximum security institution, the suggested change of title for the Chief Executive to Warden seems appropriate.

The proposed organization chart (Chart A) indicates that four Division Heads are directly and solely responsible to the Warden and that they have equal status. This represents several significant changes.

I. The Supervisor of Industry will no longer have dual supervision. The present split of loyalties and responsibilities is ambiguous and confusing.

II. The Deputy for Programs (also a modification of title) will be equal in administrative responsibility to the others. The present lack of authority in this Division results in make-believe programs.

III. All Division Heads will share responsibility for the administrative functions. A separate head for these areas has to result in either fiscal dominance or fiscal irresponsibility.

ADMINISTRATION




CHART A

PROGRAM DIVISION

The reorganization chart for the Program Division (Chart B) retains about the same span of control but is intended to greatly augment responsibility, define lines of authority for program efforts, and pave the way for expansion of unit management.

I. The Religious Program needs to have one responsible department head as the other departments do so that a coherent set of activities can be defined and executed. Like all department heads, he must have budgetary authority and responsibility and must define and supervise all efforts.

II. All formalized inmate training efforts need to be coordinated under one responsible department head. Support activities such as the library and recreation logically belong under this supervision also.

Other team efforts will also address education, but the support activities need particular focus.

(a) The Library

Basically, the library has, and should have, three functions - recreational reading - legal resource - academic resource. The division head, in consultation with others, needs to define the scope of each. The Supervisor of Education needs to allocate budgetary and manpower resources in line with these definitions.

In a prison, a library should not exist for its own sake any more than should a hospital, an industry, or any other area.

(b) Recreation

Nearly half of an inmate's waking hours are accounted for in recreation. Informal kinds such as conversation, letter writing, personal TV's and radios account for a great deal of this time. Programs in other areas such as religious activities, classes, and inmate groups also fill many hours. The responsibility for providing the opportunity for constructive activity for the balance falls on recreation.

A plan is needed. Purposes need to be defined. Athletic events should maximize both participation and spectator appeal. Staff supervision is necessary to insure wholesomeness and safety.

III. Classification is the particular focus of another segment of the report and so shall be minimized here. Organization, however, is critical. The division which determines an inmate's participation and assignment must have authority.

IV. Walpole lends itself reasonably well, physically, to the concept of Unit Management. This is probably the best method, in the long run, to efficiently use the staff available and to secure and maintain control over the institution. For the short term, however, the necessary antecedents do not exist.

A number of very serious personnel questions must be addressed so responsibility for this area is not a paper exercise. One of the most significant is the inequity of pay between professionals and craftsmen in the Department of Corrections and their counterparts in other state agencies. Another key area is formulating the methods and skills to manage manpower and money resources by shifting positions from one area to another as priorities and concepts change.

Staff training logically belongs within the Personnel area, also.

V. Two problem areas could be converted to assets by tight management in the area of Community Service.

Volunteer services need to be defined and selected as carefully as staff positions. The approach of finding something to do for the person who volunteers needs to be reversed to finding the proper person to perform a function that should be done. Once activities are defined, volunteers should be recruited, screened, trained, supervised and, sometimes fired. Permitting inadequate or emotionally starved people to fill their own needs at the expense of inmates is certainly a disservice to the inmates, and usually to the other parties as well.

Inmate organizations can also contribute to the social skills and civil indoctrination of the individual inmate if the aims are carefully defined and the groups properly supervised.




CHART B

OPERATIONS DIVISION

While the span of control appears small in this Division (Chart C), departments involved are crucial to the every day functioning of the institution, spend the lion's share of available funds, and provide the order and security on which all program efforts are based.

I. Security is addressed in comprehensive detail in another segment of the team report and so will be slighted here. Let it be said only that a responsible Department Head is required with clearly established areas of concern.

II. The function of the steward is largely preserved. The most notable addition is that of the canteen which would seem to fit naturally in a department which handles finances. Food Services is so large an entity that in the future it will probably be a separate department, but for the present could remain subordinate.

III. Maintenance has been established here as a separate department. The present functioning is universally acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. A department head with a major budget who is responsible for planning long and short range projects and priorities is required. The concepts of preventive maintenance, equipment depreciation, tool control, and others equally important now have neither a forum nor a protagonist.

Craftsmen need to be greatly increased in number and elevated to a level comparable to their counterparts in other state agencies. They must be required and trained to utilize and supervise inmates in maintenance functions.

Adequate shop areas will have to be provided.




CHART C

INDUSTRIES DIVISION

A separate team report covers most areas of Industry management and so they will be omitted here. The relationship between the Supervisor of Industries and the Warden, however, is a key one. It is a cardinal principle of penology that the Warden is responsible for everything that transpires within the institution which he is commissioned to operate. He must, therefore, be recognized as the only supervising authority of the Supervisor of Industries.

This approach creates some problems in solving the technical difficulties that come up in sales, production, distribution, manpower allocation, and others that are peculiar to an industrial operation, but it establishes the one practical framework within which these problems can be solved in a prison.




CHART D

MEDICAL DIVISION

We took a cursory look at hospital operations. Any detailed suggestions would require knowledge we do not have and time we did not spend. Several general observations concerning administration, however, can be made.

Physician services are provided on a contract arrangement and it is generally agreed are far superior to those provided under previous arrangements. Some problems are not managed very well, however; for example, the scheduling and transporting of non-emergency cases to outside facilities, and general sanitation.

We suggest that a Hospital Administrator's position be established. He would report directly to the Warden and supervise all hospital operations. He would be responsible for all logistical, business, scheduling, sanitation, contractual, and inter-divisional matters. In short, except for medical decisions made by doctors, he would supervise and coordinate everything in institutional medical services. The result should be better medicine and better cost control.

COMMITTEES

It is generally accepted practice in modern management that many decisions are best made by committees. Examples are Boards of Directors, Chiefs of Staff, Juries and Parliaments. Committees give a breadth of viewpoint and a forum for discussion that is essential for many decisions.

On the other hand, some concerns require command decisions because a designated executive has sole responsibility in an area and must retain sole authority. In such cases he must decide whether he wants a committee to examine issues and make recommendations, or not.

Generally speaking, Walpole does not use committees to make decisions. Those which make recommendations tend to feel that their contribution is lightly regarded and thus give perfunctory opinions. Responsible executives sometimes regard committee recommendations as emanating from unqualified or irresponsible people and, therefore, rely on other advisors.

These suggestions about committee establishment and functioning, therefore, are not to be taken in the context of existing practice, but are intended as new initiatives.

I. Finances

It is very helpful to all money managers in an institution to at least know the overall budget and even, ideally, take a meaningful part in discussing and

deciding its disposition. It is suggested, therefore, that a Budget Committee consisting of all Division and Department heads and chaired by the Warden meet quarterly to discuss and review finances. Decisions must be made by the Warden since he is solely responsible for solvency, but they should closely reflect committee thought.

Equipment Committee should review and prioritize equipment needs for presentation to the Budget Committee.

Project Committee should review and prioritize construction and maintenance needs for presentation to the Budget Committee.

The Warden might create ad hoc or permanent committees to examine and either decide or make recommendations on other financial matters.

II. Personnel

Many decisions affecting staff should have the benefit of different viewpoints. Obvious considerations in many of them are best reflected by the personnel office, the union, the financial manager, the department heads concerned, or even the chaplains.

Promotion Board should review eligibles for promotion and present applicable concerns to the selecting official.

Interview Panel should examine applicants for employment and make recommendations to the hiring official.

Training Committee should decide on best expenditure of available funds, best staff for training, and plan for future.

The Warden might create ad hoc or permanent committees to examine and either decide or make recommendations on other personnel matters.

III. Inmate Management

This is a crucial area demanding executive commitment to a whole new approach. Intelligent decisions about custody, discipline, assignment, transfer, visiting, furloughs, protection, and release are an absolute prerequisite both to the constructive development of the individual inmate and to the safe and secure institution that makes growth possible for all inmates. To be intelligent, these decisions require the highest level of responsibility. They also require the breadth of knowledge and observation that only committees can provide.

Classification Team must have several attributes that are now lacking.

(a) Consistent membership

The inmate should have the same caseworker throughout. The caseworker should have the same team.

(b) Breadth of Observation

The members of the team should be acquainted with the inmate's daily activities. They should either be staff who routinely observe him or they should contact the people who do before they meet.

(c) Management Orientation

The team members need to have training and experience in management realities. Concerns such as job vacancies, cell vacancies, custody criteria, production needs, performance expectations, etc., must pervade deliberations.

Disciplinary Committee

The discipline of the institution is the direct responsibility of the Warden. An undisciplined institution is a direct reflection on him and the clearest evidence of executive incompetence. In times of crisis or disorder, he will supervise disciplinary action himself.

In ordinary times, the responsibility and authority for discipline is delegated to the Deputy for Operations, and maintenance of discipline is a visible indication of his effectiveness. Except in periods of stress and testing, the Deputy, with the Warden's consent, will ordinarily create a committee which will consider violations of discipline and deal with them effectively.

In a penitentiary, the chairman of the disciplinary committee should be the Department Head of the security force. As members, he should have two others, at least one of whom should also be a Department Head. If the third member is not a Department Head, he should be no less than an Assistant Department Head. The committee must have whatever clerical support is required.

The object of the committee is to maintain discipline in the institution. They must do so, or themselves be chastised. There is no court order or departmental regulation that prevents the objective from being attained.

Virtually all decisions concerning inmate management can be made either by the Classification Team or by the Disciplinary Committee. Should the need arise, however, the Warden might create ad hoc or long term committees to consider particular issues. It is a serious error to review and change the decisions of an inmate management committee, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Far better for them to make occasional errors and be responsible for them than to have the safety net of review and become irresponsible.

MCI-WALPOLE

INTAKE & ORIENTATION

After initial screening by a rotating correctional social worker and preliminary medical examination by hospital staff, a new arrival is eventually placed in the new man housing (block 6-7). Offenders who have "state sentences" are admitted to Walpole to await admittance to RDC at Norfolk and in some instances, NRDC at Concord when space is available. These individuals will be in this languid state unless they are assigned a job and/or in some cases moved to another housing unit when recommended by the Institution Classification Committee after 30 days if space is available in the A Section of the institution. After weeks of waiting, those inmates destined for RDC will be transferred, and if ultimately designated to return to Walpole, they will wait at least another 30-to-60 days before classified. In these usual instances, it could take months before an inmate can take advantage of what programs are available in the general population and bed space availability is one of the main problems. Interviews with correctional social workers and inmates reveals that often inmates are eligible for parole while they are in this "limbo" status and occasionally overlooked. In at least one of the two units the correctional social worker does not make routine visits to the unit. Accessibility to the social worker is by appointment only.

RECOMMENDATION

12. INMATES SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED WITHIN TWO WEEKS FOLLOWING DESIGNATION AND ADMISSION AT AN INSTITUTION.

13. INSURE THAT CORRECTIONAL SOCIAL WORKERS MAKE ROUTINE VISITS TO PROVIDE NEEDED SERVICES.

RATIONALE

Admission & Orientation to any correctional facility should be an effective and expedient process. It is essential that new commitments have the opportunity, with staff support, to adjust to their environment as quickly as possible. Idleness should be avoided. Inmates should experience a process that informs them of institutional expectations and assists them in developing their options in programmatic areas. This entails considerable staff/inmate communication which minimizes the inmate being "lost in the shuffle".

CLASSIFICATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

OBSERVATION:

The classification staff at MCI-Walpole are encompassed within the operational responsibilities of the Deputy Superintendent for Classification, Treatment, and Programs. The Department is headed by the Director of Classification who has overall supervisory responsibility for both the classification and records/clerical staff. Direct supervision of correctional social work staff is provided by a head psychiatric social worker and a head social worker. There are ten correctional social workers which includes two "Co-op students" from a local college program. The average size caseload is approximately 60 inmates.

The correctional social workers' primary duties involve interviewing new inmates on their caseload for their initial classification. They obtain background information prepared at the Reception & Diagnostic Center and present this data to the ICC with the inmate present at the committee, a program plan is developed. Subsequently, a report is prepared by the social worker. Additionally, the social workers' primary concerns are to prepare progress reports for area classification boards and early parole considerations. They also schedule inmates on their caseload for re-classification considerations or periodic program reviews. Crisis counseling is an additional aspect of their responsibility, although formal individual or group counseling is not among their specific duties.

Correctional social workers are not directly or actively involved in the parole process and they appear to be minimally involved in inmate release planning.

Correctional social workers are labeled as professional staff by the Walpole Administration. A minimum of an Associate of Arts Degree is required for this position, and they are part of the treatment staff as formalized in the institution's organizational chart. However, they have no decision-making authority, not even a vote on the Internal Classification Committee. Correctional social workers assigned to the "A Section" of the institution do not have designated office space to prepare their reports, interview inmates, or carry on other duties in keeping with their position. Additionally, in this same section, there is no designated committee room for the Internal Classification Committee to meet.

For those correctional social workers who are provided office space, the environment is not professional as it is poorly ventilated, lacks privacy, and contains a hodgepodge of abused furniture. The Administration speaks of the professionalism of a correctional social worker, but there is considerable salary disparity between the correctional social workers and the newly appointed custodial staff. This, however, is reflective of the posture of the Department and the institution in which there is a definite schism between the custodial and treatment staff (a review of Walpole's annual report 1978, recognized this problem and established a course of action to rectify the issue. It does still exist, however, in the minds of many.) The correctional social workers have been told that

"security is not their responsibility". As a result, they do not usually enforce institution rules and regulations and are not called upon to assist correctional staff in times of emergencies. The exception to this is when there have been occasions that the correctional staff is on a work strike and custodial duties must be performed in the institution. Needless to say, such required action drives a further wedge into mutual understanding between custody and treatment.

Most of the correctional social workers were interviewed, and there appeared to be a common frustration in their current circumstances. Although there has been some training opportunities in the past, there appears to be limited training and communication between the correctional social workers and their supervisors at this time. There have been no regularly scheduled meetings, and no specific departmental goals or direction. Supervisory monitoring has been primarily in reviewing reports. Daily monitoring of social work activities, i.e., inmate contact, has been lacking. Overall, observations reflect that the correctional social worker has no authority and a limited voice as a "professional". Under the current structure, there seems to be little opportunity for advancement.

The Internal Classification Committee (ICC) is composed of the Director of Classification or a head social worker as Chairman. A representative from the Correctional Services Department is assigned to this committee which may vary from a probationary correctional officer to an experienced staff member who will be on overtime two of the four days that this committee meets. A third member may be any staff member that is available

at the time; i.e., education staff, counselor, or another correctional social worker.

At the initial classification, the correctional social worker presents to the ICC members the inmate's background data and any other available data. Information obtained from the Reception Centers, in addition to that ascertained in preliminary interviews is compiled in the presentation. Often specific educational/vocational and medical tests are not available. The inmate is present at the ICC, unless he refuses to appear at which time he is advised of the recommendations of this committee. The recommendations of this committee involve cell house placement, transfers, and encouragement to the inmate to involve himself in available programs. Job assignments are determined by a separate committee referred to as a "job panel". Program plans are developed, but no decisions are rendered. This committee according to policy, only makes recommendations. Decisions are made at the Deputy Superintendent of Operations or Superintendent levels. Periodic program reviews are scheduled in which the inmate is requested to attend. Such reviews are concerned with determining his current status in whatever "program" the inmate has availed himself. Often requested evaluative reports from housing units or education department, are not available. A program review then becomes one of reviewing the inmate's central file material.

When an "A Section" inmate receives a disciplinary report, he is often placed in "lock-in" status in his housing unit until he receives due process by the disciplinary board. If found guilty, and after sanction

is fulfilled, the inmate is scheduled for another due process hearing (attorney can be present) by the ICC to determine if the inmate should remain in the A section or increase custody to the "B Section". If custody is increased, the inmate could remain idle for another 120 days in the B Section.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. THE CLASSIFICATION DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVELOP GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND HAVE REGULARLY SCHEDULED DOCUMENTED MEETINGS WITH CORRECTIONAL SOCIAL WORK STAFF.

15. ASSESS SALARY DISPARITY BETWEEN CORRECTIONAL SOCIAL WORKER AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICER.

16. ALL CORRECTIONAL SOCIAL WORKERS SHOULD HAVE DESIGNATED OFFICES.

17. ALL ICC MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD IN DESIGNATED AREAS AT SPECIFIC TIMES.

18. ALL CORRECTIONAL SOCIAL WORKERS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN CUSTODIAL PROCEDURES.

19. THE INTERNAL CLASSIFICATION TEAM (ICC) SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED, EMPHASIZING EXPERIENCE AND STABILITY.

20. ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TO BE PAID OVERTIME BY THE ICC.
21. THE ICC SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN MORE DECISION-MAKING.
22. ALL EVALUATIVE REPORTS OF INMATE BACKGROUND AND PROGRESS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ICC MEETINGS.
23. ABOLISH DUPLICATION OF DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE "DUE PROCESS" BY ICC REGARDING CUSTODY INCREASES.

RATIONALE

It is important that the classification department establish goals and formal communication within the department. It is equally important that correctional social workers be viewed as part of the professional ranks by establishing commensurate office milieu, assume custodial responsibilities and be recognized as a total correctional employee.

The Internal Classification Committee must have stable, experienced members who are in a position to make decisions relative to inmate programs, i.e., housing, jobs, and custody. Furloughs, transfers, and one-third early parole would continue to need recommendations. The Director of Classification and the Administration would be over viewers for consistencies, but the head social workers would chair the committees. Involving experienced staff from all disciplines of the institution is an effective means of achieving a balance of decisions and recommendations.

The Director of Classification will disseminate Departmental and institution policy and guidelines and ensure his staff is fully aware and trained in these necessary procedures. Regular review of team dockets and periodic monitoring of the team process would provide continuity.

Having necessary information regarding an inmate for initial classification and program reviews is paramount to effective classification. Conceivably, one of the members of the team could be responsible for obtaining this data from housing, job assignments, and program participation prior to team meetings.

OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM AREAS

The program areas called treatment areas at Walpole are under the general supervision of the Deputy Superintendent of Treatment. He has three persons reporting directly to him; the Director of Classification, Director of Counseling, and Director of Treatment. The Director of Counseling's area is staffed by professionals who have psychological orientation. Although they work for the Department of Legal Medicine rather than the Department of Corrections, they have worked out an amiable relationship with the Department of Corrections' staff. A barrier does exist between these staff and the Correctional Services Department, however. This area, because of the staff limitation, works primarily on crisis intervention situations. Although they appear to be rather effective in handling serious mental health problems, little ongoing program is available for inmates with lesser problems.

The department under the supervision of the Director of Treatment includes the academic, vocational/education, recreation, religious services, volunteer services, and inmate organizations. Much of the credit for such success as there is in these areas is due to the dedication and creativity of the staff, as the classification section is not directly involved in recruiting inmates for participation in programs. Although there is some participation in recreation, no long range program planning exists.

Inmate assignment to Industries and other details is not an effective operation and the work ethic as a program is not given primary consideration. Staff training, career development, and affirmative action are not given high priority, and these programs range from fair to inadequate.

IDLENESS

OBSERVATION:

One of the most important problem areas observed was that of idleness. Program enrollments and work assignments were not adequate to provide constructive activity for the part of the population that was available for work (Minimum A Section). Along with this, B Section and protective custody units populations were unassigned and programming limited. Less than 1/3 of the Walpole population is involved in meaningful educational and work programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

24. EXPAND EDUCATIONAL OFFERINGS BY EDUCATION STAFF ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN ORIENTATION AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS.

25. EXPAND MAINTENANCE AND INDUSTRY PROGRAM BY AN ADDITIONAL 1/3 OF THE POPULATION AND IDENTIFY WORK PROCESSES THAT LEND THEMSELVES TO AN APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING.

26. RECLASSIFY B SECTION INMATES TO IDENTIFY THOSE THAT CAN FUNCTION IN EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL, OR WORK PROGRAMS.

RATIONALE

The above recommendations would provide work programs for approximately 2/3 of the population. This would not only decrease the problems caused

by idleness but would provide the added accountability and release preparation for the inmates concerned.

RECREATION

OBSERVATION:

Primarily, the recreation program at MCI-Walpole is based upon an inmate request system. That is, if a group of inmates wish to participate in basketball, a "recreation staff member" supplies what equipment is available. There is no ongoing planned recreational program. Recreation has a limited budget, and the overall equipment needs to be upgraded. There is only one recognized recreational staff member for the Walpole population. It appears that what recreation occurs is generated by inmates.

RECOMMENDATIONS

27. ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL RECREATION POSITIONS.
28. DEVELOP AN ONGOING RECREATIONAL PROGRAM THAT ATTRACTS MOST OF THE POPULATION IN A VARIETY OF ACTIVITIES.
29. UPGRADE THE EQUIPMENT AND THE RECREATIONAL FACILITIES.
30. INCREASE THE RECREATION BUDGET SUBSTANTIALLY BY AUTHORIZING IT AT THE DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL.

RATIONALE

Recreation is an extremely constructive means of combating inmate idleness. Like any where else, most inmates structure their time in leisure activities. This is particularly critical in a correctional setting. A strong recreational program can alleviate tension and enhance the morale of the inmate population.

ROLE OF TREATMENT STAFF

OBSERVATION:

One of the most serious obstacles that prevent expansion of programming is a "mind set" that treatment people (teachers, recreation specialists, etc.) cannot adequately supervise inmate detail groups, programs, or handle other security matters such as keys. As indicated previously, such a posture creates a division between the Custody and Treatment staff that is counter-productive.

RECOMMENDATIONS

31. TRAIN PROGRAM STAFF IN SECURITY PROCEDURES AND REQUIRE THEM TO SUPERVISE ACTIVITIES.
32. REQUIRE SCHOOL PERSONNEL TO HAVE KEYS TO THEIR RECREATIONAL AREAS AND GIVE THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY, SUPERVISION, AND CONTROL.

RATIONALE

By allowing Treatment staff to become participating members in routine security activities, Custodial officers can be better utilized in units and other areas. This recognition of treatment personnel as security-minded persons would go far in the team building effort.

EDUCATION PROGRAM

OBSERVATION:

Although considerably inadequate in numerous ways, the Education area is nevertheless under-utilized as a vehicle to decrease idleness and increase constructive activities. This problem is probably related to the unstructured procedure used to enroll inmates in an academic program. At this time, it was observed that few inmates take advantage of the education program offered. Although it is a voluntary program, there are no formal methods, institution-wide, to encourage individuals to participate in this activity. It would be additionally useful to upgrade the appearance of the academic area in order to establish a constructive learning environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

33. ORIENT ALL STAFF TO THE EDUCATIONAL/VOCATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFERED AND INSURE THAT INMATES ARE COGNIZANT OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

34. REDECORATE THE EDUCATION FACILITY AND UPGRADE FURNITURE TO MAKE IT A MORE ATTRACTIVE AND POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT.

RATIONALE

Based on conversation with school staff, they have no direct contact with inmates until inmates happen to contact the principal. Early, input from educational personnel would probably increase the inmates interest in school. Research in Adult Education indicates that attractive, comfortable environments are significant elements in creating an atmosphere for learning.

EDUCATION STANDARDS

OBSERVATION:

The education director in the Central Office has not established written policy to insure standards for the field. Additionally, no departmental comprehensive plan for education exists.

RECOMMENDATIONS

35. EDUCATION DIRECTOR ESTABLISH MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR INSTITUTION PROGRAMS AND INCLUDE ABE, GED, POST-SECONDARY, OCCUPATIONAL, SOCIAL, AND RECREATIONAL PROGRAMS.

36. DEPARTMENTAL STANDARDS FOR CLASSROOM SIZE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH REGARD TO STUDENT NEED AND COST EFFECTIVENESS.

37. DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVELOP A LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM AND REQUIRE EACH INSTITUTION TO DO LIKEWISE.

38. DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVELOP AN EVALUATIVE SYSTEM WHEREBY STANDARDS, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES ARE ASSESSED TO INSURE COMPLIANCE.

39. RECREATION PROGRAMS SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AT THE DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL AND THE PRINCIPAL AT THE INSTITUTION LEVEL.

40. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, WITH INPUT FROM THE PRINCIPALS, SHOULD DEVELOP A STANDARD PROGRESS REPORT SO THAT WHEN AN INMATE TRANSFERS TO ANOTHER FACILITY, HE CAN CONTINUE HIS PROGRAM WITHOUT LOSS OF TIME, OVERLAPPING, OR MISSING MATERIALS.

RATIONALE

Because inmates are transferred within the system, some standardization is necessary to keep the inmate affected from losing program continuity. This will eliminate the need for retesting and the need for receiving principals to contact the sending principal to identify the current functional level of the inmate. A planned program based on current educational profile of the department's inmates functioning levels will assist significantly in requesting and justifying resources.

PAY SCALE FOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

OBSERVATION:

The pay scale for professional staff is not commensurate with the

academic requirements demanded for employment in the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. Teacher and Principal salary schedules are far below the pay schedules found in public schools in adjoining school districts. Additionally, another serious problem relating to teachers salaries and working conditions is the 40-42 week work year. Currently, educational personnel in the Department of Corrections are re-employed for 10-to-12 weeks through consultant funds. A question currently under review by the state ethics committee raises the question of the legality of state employees receiving state consultant funds during the summer months. An adverse ruling by the ethics committee could seriously affect the year-around education programs.

Professional salaries, in addition to being unfavorable in comparison to outside counterparts, are also unfavorable when compared with the salary of correctional officers, especially when educational requirements between the two are compared. To further compound the problem, recruitment and retention of professionals is hampered and the development of a stable, professional workforce is impossible. When competing for qualified professional minorities, the Massachusetts Department of Correction suffers a serious disadvantage, also.

RECOMMENDATIONS

41. PROPOSE A SALARY SCHEDULE TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OR LEGISLATURE TO BRING PROFESSIONAL SALARIES MORE IN LINE WITH ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS AND COMPETITIVE TO OTHER STATE AGENCIES.

42. PROPOSE A 52-WORK WEEK FOR EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL WITH APPROPRIATE FRINGE BENEFITS. IN SOME STATES, CORRECTIONAL TEACHERS' SALARIES ARE BASED ON TEACHERS SALARY SCALES IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE FACILITY IS LOCATED.

RATIONALE

A competitive pay scale for professionals will serve to attract and retain well-qualified staff. Additionally, a realistic pay scale would serve to attract correctional officers with better academic qualifications if professional pay systems offered upward mobility for them. It would, no doubt, attract more minorities also.

MINORITY EMPLOYMENT

OBSERVATION:

Minorities are under-represented in all departments, and no minorities were employed in administrative roles at Walpole. Of the 20 minorities employed at Walpole, 17 are correctional officers, one a chaplain, and two teachers. Only one of the correctional officers is a Senior Officer. With an inmate population of 40-to-45% minorities, the 3.3% minorities of the staff raises a serious concern. Interviews with the department's affirmative action officer and the institution's EEO officer, indicate that racism is blatant among staff at Walpole, and black employees and inmates alike are overtly discriminated against. Although no incidents of racism were observed during this visit, the low percentage of minority staff would indicate that a problem does exist. Persons interviewed did

not link the Administration at Walpole with direct acts of discrimination but stated that circumstances would indicate that no strong affirmative action was stressed by the Administration. A review of the department's affirmative action plan indicates that a majority of the institutions in the department are similar to Walpole in minority employment. There were two significant factors identified which contribute to the absence of minorities in supervisory positions and correctional ranks and the extremely low number of minority professionals. One, the Civil Service tests for promotion had not been given during recent years for correctional officers and promotions are handled by a board that uses some rather arbitrary factors in granting interim promotions; and, two, as mentioned earlier, the pay scale for professionals is not conducive to the recruitment and retention of highly qualified minorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

43. THE DEPARTMENT'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND EACH INSTITUTION BE REQUIRED TO DEVELOP A REALISTIC PLAN.

44. COMPLIANCE WITH THE PLAN SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY ENFORCED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE.

45. THE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATION FOR A PROMOTION SHOULD BE RESUMED OR A MERIT PROMOTION SYSTEM DEVELOPED THAT UTILIZED OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, QUALITY OF EXPERIENCE, ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL, EDUCATION, AND RECOGNITION OF AWARDS.

46. ADJUSTMENT IN PAY SCALE.

47. MAINTAIN A VIGOROUS RECRUITMENT PLAN AND ESTABLISH EEO COMMITTEES AT INSTITUTION LEVELS FOR TRAINING THE SUPPORT SYSTEM TO ASSIST MINORITIES IN THEIR ADJUSTMENT TO EMPLOYMENT IN A CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THIS COMMITTEE SHOULD BE HEADED BY A SUPERINTENDENT OR DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT LEVEL STAFF MEMBER.

RATIONALE

The recruitment, retention, and promotion of minorities are essential for a better racial harmony and understanding between the staff and inmates as the current staff is not representative of the inmate population, state, or national population patterns. There exists a great amount of friction, distrust, and hostility between the institution staff and the inmate population. Minority inmates express their concerns about alleged biases. Regardless of whether there is evidence to support these allegations, an individual's concept of bias adversely affects communication.

An institutional EEO committee will place the responsibility on the local administration to take a leadership role in identifying and eliminating overt discrimination. Although the administration was not actually accused of practicing racial discrimination, it was felt that inaction on the part of the administration "let it happen".

IN-SERVICE TRAINING, STAFF DEVELOPMENT, & UPWARD MOBILITY

OBSERVATIONS:

All new correctional officers go through four-to-six weeks of security

training at the academy immediately after employment prior to assignment to an institution. After entry on duty in the institution, further formal training is almost non-existent. Treatment staff are not afforded the opportunity to attend the academy and, with the exception of the institutional orientation, no security training is available to them. There is no formal supervisory and management training available and no mandatory training established at the previous supervisory and management levels as a requirement for further promotion or following promotions. In other words, the department does little towards staff development for upward mobility.

The concern raised by several institutional and departmental employees was the practice of sending new correctional officers to the academy prior to any exposure to institutional work and the high separation rate of trainees during their probationary period. It was felt that the high investment in time and other resources of the academy could be better utilized if trainees were first assigned to institutions for a two-to-three month on-the-job training period to evaluate their suitability for correctional work and attendance at the academy for those who now show promise for this kind of work.

RECOMMENDATIONS

48. ALL TREATMENT STAFF SHOULD BE GIVEN SECURITY TRAINING.

49. MANDATORY TRAINING SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS ONE CRITERION FOR PROMOTION TO SUPERVISORY LEVEL.

50. ALL SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS BE ENROLLED IN TRAINING PROGRAMS THAT INCLUDE SUPERVISION AND GROUP PERFORMANCE, EEO, HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS, AND STAFF EVALUATIONS.

51. DEVELOP AND CONDUCT MANDATORY REFRESHER TRAINING FOR ALL STAFF ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

52. CONDUCT A PILOT STUDY TO COMPARE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS TRAINING PARTICIPATING IN OJT AT THE INSTITUTION PRIOR TO ATTENDING THE ACADEMY WITH TRAINEES WHO ATTEND THE ACADEMY PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT IN THE INSTITUTION.

RATIONALE

In order to develop a strong cohesive team, cross-training of treatment personnel in security procedures is important. Supervisory and Management training is essential to develop staff for upward mobility. Too often when promotions are based primarily on performance at a lower level, the "Peter principle" sets in. If supervisory training is a pre-requisite for promotions to supervisory levels, this screening process should serve to identify those with potential for handling the more difficult roles of supervisors. This process should insure a cadre of career professionals qualified for top management positions. When employees feel that they have the opportunity to "go to the top" in the organization, staff morale at all levels improves.

Because of the high initial training cost for sending trainees to the academy and the high turnover rate of correctional officers during their first year, a pilot study might reveal that it is the most cost effective method to provide OJT at the institutional level before the major investment of training at the academy is made.

Observation:

A method of prison management, known as Unit Management, has been evolving in prison systems over a number of years. While originally conceived as an improved method of delivery for treatment services, a recent modification in management design has been used effectively for inmate control.

Walpole's first need is for effective control, and the physical plant can be adopted to the Unit Management concept.

RECOMMENDATION

53. A GIVEN CELL BLOCK ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE INSTITUTION SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED WITH A PARTICULAR CELL BLOCK ON THE WEST SIDE, IN TERMS OF INTERCHANGEABILITY OF INMATES. INMATES ASSIGNED TO A PARTICULAR BLOCK WOULD, IF THEIR STATUS CHANGED FROM MAXIMUM TO MINIMUM, OR VICE VERSA, GO TO A PARTICULAR ASSOCIATED CELL BLOCK.

RATIONALE

While we are only suggesting the formal creation of one Unit at present, several useful organizational steps would not only improve control immediately, but would pave the way for complete unitization later. When additional units are developed in the institution, they should function in a way that will allow continuity of classification services by unit teams.

To amplify; an inmate originally placed in a particular cell block would know that if and when his status changes, he would go to another cell block and continue with the same staff. Classification staff can then be organized so that the same group or groups will process decisions for inmates in both cell blocks. Ultimately, unit management would incorporate this format and its inception now will make that transition easier. Aside from any long range benefits, it will immediately provide continuity and consistency for the classification of individual inmates.

CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENT

OBSERVATION:

This department is composed of 311 authorized security positions in its complement. The line of authority consists of:

- 1 Deputy Superintendent of Security
- 2 Associate Deputies
- 6 Assistant Deputies or Shift Commanders (uniformed and wear oakleaf)
- 16 Supervisors (uniformed and two bars)
- 52 Seniors (uniformed and one bar)
- 234 Correctional Officers (uniformed)

The correctional staff presents a neat professional appearance. The uniforms are similar to a police officer. For the most part, the staff is youthful and project an impressive image.

Many staff were interviewed during the course of this inquiry which included the deputy and most of the supervisors. It became apparent that the line staff wanted to manage their jobs and better the conditions of the institution but they felt frustration and anger. These feelings were either projected toward the Administration or toward inmates because of the lack of control and discipline. The solution to these feelings was "we need more staff". This inquiry was only able to scratch the surface of the security operations and the procedures of inmate management.

The observation and impressions derived concur that Walpole is in a recovery state. These observations and recommendations are offered in

the spirit of contributing to a proactive posture rather than reactive.

STAFF RECRUITMENT OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS

The selection committee or panel which is responsible for the hiring of new correctional officers comprises four training officers and one female supervisor from various institutions. The decorum of this interview panel was quite impressive. Forms were used to evaluate applicants following each interview and the professionalism of their approach was evident.

STAFF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

Correctional Officers are not routinely evaluated. Numerous evaluation forms of correctional officers were observed on top of file cabinets and in the Shift Commander's office. Some evaluations were over one and one-half (1-1/2) years old. The person responsible for completing an evaluation of a correctional officer is a senior officer rather than a supervisor. Some staff are not clear as to who is responsible for completing their evaluation, much less who is to review their evaluation. Personnel practices are lacking in this area as there is no accountability or follow-up. A review of these personnel procedures reveal that current evaluations were non-existent in almost every case.

RECOMMENDATIONS

54. SUPERVISORS (NOT SENIOR OFFICERS) SHOULD EVALUATE ALL CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS UNDER THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES.

55. THAT STANDARD PERSONNEL PRACTICES OF EVALUATION BY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR AND REVIEW BY THE NEXT HIGHER SUPERVISOR BE FOLLOWED.

56. THAT AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF FOLLOW-UP OF EVALUATIONS BE DEVELOPED.

RATIONALE

It is believed that there should be no questions in a staff member's mind as to who his/her evaluating supervisor is or should be. This establishes a clear line of authority for the line staff in addition to being an important ingredient to staff morale. The Performance Evaluations reflect the importance shown by the Administration towards line staff as to their worth to the total institution. Each staff member should be evaluated by established standards and the Personnel Office should have a means of following up this evaluation if this is overlooked.

PROMOTION BOARDS

OBSERVATION:

Presently, the positions of Senior Officers and Supervisors are selected by a promotion board made up of Deputy Superintendent (Administrative Section), one minority who is employed at another institution, and one female staff member who has a non-correctional officer position. The complement of this panel was to conform to Affirmative Action Plan.

The basis of selection for promotion in these correctional positions is a ten-minute interview, a performance evaluation, and an intuitive reaction by the panel members. It was evident that none of the panelists had any experience in security practices at Walpole or knowledge of supervisor requirements on a custodial force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

57. THE PROMOTION BOARD FOR SENIOR AND SUPERVISOR POSITIONS CONSIST OF THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SECURITY AS CHAIRMAN, PERSONNEL OR TRAINING OFFICER, AND ONE UNION REPRESENTATIVE.

58. DEVELOP A CHECK FORM WHICH ADDRESSES AREAS OF EXPERIENCE, EDUCATION, TRAINING, AWARDS, IN ADDITION TO CURRENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS.

RATIONALE

It is important that promotion boards be objective and select individuals for promotion upon their merit, but at the same time, it is equally important that the selecting body be cognizant of the aspects of the individual's duties and knowledgeable with reference to the positions that the individual has held in the correctional service.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF CORRECTIONAL STAFF

OBSERVATION:

This appears to be one of the most obvious problems within the management of the Correctional Services Department. Staff assignments and rosters

for the various shifts are in drastic need of revision. At the time of this inquiry, Shift Commanders were not in a position to determine how many correctional officers were needed to operate a shift efficiently. The roster presently used does not provide a hint as to what post needs how many staff. Shift Commanders have authority to utilize overtime and there is no evidence that such overtime is certified by the Deputy Superintendent or Associate Deputies. Such a practice lends itself to abuse. Each shift uses the same general roster, and it was apparent that no one reviewing these daily rosters could determine precisely who was needed for overtime and why. Moreover, there is no system developed to have a number of staff on sick and annual relief so as to cover posts when they are vacated for these reasons. It appears that if an officer calls in sick, overtime is authorized.

Walpole uses two methods to verify payroll. A time clock card and a shift roster. Each weekend, the Shift Commander pulls all the time cards, and compares them against the shift rosters. He again forwards the roster and cards to the Treasurer's office (Business). They are reviewed and sent to Mr. Leppert, Programs Development Specialist, to check for discrepancies, and then sent back to the Treasurer's office for final review before payroll is submitted.

MCI-Walpole overtime expenditures for the fiscal year 1979 averaged approximately \$20,000 a week. The annual costs was close to one million dollars. The facts indicate that so far this fiscal year (the first 13 weeks), overtime is averaging 2,700 hours per week at Walpole which equates to \$27,000 a week or a projected Budget increase to one and one-half million dollars.

Sick leave is commonly abused and most staff feel that they are entitled to take 15 days off they earn per year. The state system allows an accumulation of sick leave from year-to-year, however, if it is not used, it is lost. There is not any incentive to accumulate sick leave because it is not accredited at the end of a career.

RECOMMENDATIONS

59. UTILIZE ONE ROSTER FOR EACH SHIFT DESIGNED FOR THAT SHIFT. IT SHOULD CLEARLY IDENTIFY WHAT POST MUST BE FILLED AND ONLY THE AMOUNT OF LINES ADJACENT TO THE POST SHOULD BE FILLED.
60. THE SUPERINTENDENT OR DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SECURITY SHOULD BE THE FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY IN THE USE OF OVERTIME.
61. UTILIZE A FORM DENOTING A JOB COVERED BY OVERTIME, THE REASONS FOR THE OVERTIME, THE DATE, THE SHIFT, AND THE TIMES INVOLVED.
62. DAILY ROSTERS SHOULD BE TYPEWRITTEN IN BLACK INK. ANY OVERTIME SHOULD BE IN RED (OR CONTRASTING) INK SO THAT OVERTIME CAN QUICKLY BE DENOTED.
63. WALPOLE OVERTIME ANNUAL EXPENDITURE BE REDUCED BY AT LEAST 50% IN FY-80 AND FURTHER REDUCE IN FY-81 BY ANOTHER 50% UPON INSTITUTING AN EFFECTIVE ROSTER PROCEDURE. THEREAFTER, NOT EXCEED \$100,000 PER ANNUM WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE COMMISSIONER
64. ASSIGN ONE PAYROLL CLERK WHO IS PERIODICALLY AUDITED TO HANDLE THE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STAFF PAYROLL.

65. PURSUE LEGISLATION TO ALLOW FOR SOME FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR A STAFF MEMBER WHO ACCUMULATES SICK LEAVE THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER.

RATIONALE

It is necessary to determine what constitutes critical minimum on each of the shifts of Correctional Services at MCI-Walpole. At this time, it appears that this has yet to be decided. A realistic roster for each of the shifts can assist management in determining the critical minimum which brings about more effective monitoring of the various shifts in addition to determining overtime. Monitoring by the Administration of the shift managements, as well as approving overtime, is absolutely essential.

The overtime expenditures at MCI-Walpole is not only excessive, it is unreasonable and reflects poor utilization of manpower..

BID SYSTEM

OBSERVATION:

The "bid system" is based upon seniority. It allows a staff member to choose his job assignment and remain in that position until a promotion, retirement, or resignation occurs. It permits the correctional officer to have the same days off throughout the remainder of his/her career.

From an operational position, the "bid system" permits the experienced officers to secure assignments for the remainder of their careers, divorced from inmate contact, and leaves the more difficult assignments to the new or least experienced staff.

The "bid system" places the same staff in the same environment for long periods of time and staff becomes less and less responsive to rule infractions and unsatisfactory conditions. Staff's association with the same inmate each day takes on a new meaning in which familiarity effects authority. During the course of this inquiry, "horse play" between staff and inmates was observed. Unit officers will avoid shaking down their assigned areas because "we have to work with these inmates each day and we don't want to make them mad." This attitude prevailed too frequently among staff interviewed.

The "bid system" impedes staff from becoming aware of the total operation of the Correction Department. Thus, inexperienced staff by virtue of being in the same assignment can be promoted to supervisory positions with limited knowledge.

RECOMMENDATIONS

66. MODIFY THE "BID SYSTEM" BY DEVELOPING A MASTER ROSTER EACH SIX MONTHS AND REQUIRE STAFF TO ROTATE JOBS, SHIFTS, ETC. ALLOW CORRECTIONAL STAFF TO BID FOR JOBS BUT REQUIRE THAT ASSIGNMENTS BE ROTATED; PARTICULARLY ROTATING STAFF OUT OF THE TOWERS AT LEAST EVERY SIX MONTHS.

67. DEVELOP POSITIONS THAT ARE UTILIZED FOR RELIEF IN SICK AND ANNUAL SITUATIONS ON EACH SHIFT SO THAT OVERTIME IS MINIMIZED OR ELIMINATED.

68. UTILIZE SPLIT SHIFTS 6:00 A.M. TO 2:00 P.M.; 2:00 P.M. TO 10:00 P.M. MOST INMATE ACTIVITIES EXIST BETWEEN THE HOURS BREAKFAST AND 10:00 P.M. IN THE EVENING. THE CORRECTIONAL STAFF NEED MORE COVERAGE WHEN THESE ACTIVITIES ARE IN PROGRESS.

POST ORDERS

OBSERVATION:

Post Orders reviewed were more often vague and outdated. Many were written in April 1977, and only a few copies were available on the various posts inspected. Most staff admitted that they had not read them and a few copies that were available were of poor quality in terms of readability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

69. REWRITE POST ORDERS FOR ALL CUSTODIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR ALL STAFF TO READ AND SIGN THAT THEY HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THEIR POST ORDERS.

70. REQUIRE SUPERVISORS TO CO-SIGN POST ORDERS WHICH VERIFIES THAT THE STAFF UNDER THEIR SUPERVISION HAVE READ THEM AND THAT THEY AUDIT THE POST ORDERS AT A MINIMUM OF EACH SIX MONTHS TO DETERMINE THEIR APPLICABILITY.

STAFF MEETINGS

OBSERVATION:

With the exception of a meeting called by the Treasurer or Superintendent, scheduled staff meetings at Walpole are almost non-existent. Such lack of communication impedes the sharing of information from the Administration to Supervisory levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

71. IMPLEMENT A MONTHLY MEETING AMONG SHIFT COMMANDERS ATTENDED BY THE SUPERINTENDENT AND DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENTS, AND OTHER CONCERNED DEPARTMENT HEADS WITHIN THE INSTITUTION. MAINTAIN MINUTES OF ALL SUCH MEETINGS WITH A COPY OF MINUTES TO BE FORWARDED TO THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR REVIEW.

72. HAVE A GENERAL STAFF MEETING EVERY THREE MONTHS OPEN TO ALL STAFF. THE SUPERINTENDENT SHOULD USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE OUTSTANDING STAFF PERFORMANCE, GIVE OUT AWARDS OR COMMENDATIONS, AND DISCUSS NEW POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND PROCEDURES.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SHIFTS.

OBSERVATION:

There is a dichotomy between correctional staff. Each staff member views his shift as a separate and independent function. There is no formal log passed from one Shift Commander to the next. The only form

of communication is from word of mouth. The only existing log of information is in the inside control room, and it lacks any specifics of problems the Shift Commander may have experienced during his tour of duty on that day.

There are no existing logs maintained in the housing units.

RECOMMENDATION

73. FORMALIZE A SHIFT COMMANDER'S LOG BOOK TO PASS ON INFORMATION FROM ONE SHIFT TO ANOTHER. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT AND THE SUPERINTENDENT SHOULD READ AND INITIAL THIS LOG DAILY.

74. MAINTAIN HOUSING UNIT LOGS.

RATIONALE

A formal Shift Commander's log outlines chronologically the activities of the institution on a day-to-day basis. It provides information for all concerned, particularly for the Administration, as well as all Shift Commanders. It is the official log of the institution. Additionally, cell house logs prepared by the cell house officers on the various shifts is a means in which information can be passed from one housing unit officer to another in a formal manner, and it provides a record for future reference.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

OBSERVATION:

Aside from inside telephones in the housing units, correctional officers have difficulty registering emergencies to a central location or maintaining communication with a control room when correctional officers are located in other parts of the institution away from telephones. Presently, this institution has a poor communication network, particularly in the perimeter security towers. Portable body alarms are not available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

75. PURCHASE A BASE STATION RADIO TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER FOR THE INSIDE CONTROL ROOM.

76. PURCHASE PORTABLE UNITS AND ASSIGN EACH UNIT TO BE CARRIED BY THE SHIFT COMMANDER, MAXIMUM CORRIDOR SUPERVISOR, MINIMUM CORRIDOR SUPERVISOR, 10 BUILDING SUPERVISOR, REAR GATE OFFICER, AND ANY OTHER AREA NEEDING IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION.

77. PURCHASE BODY ALARMS FOR ALL INMATE HOUSING UNITS AND AREAS SUCH AS HOSPITAL, EDUCATION, AND INDUSTRIES, AND ALL AREAS WHERE INMATES WORK OR WHERE THEY ARE INVOLVED IN PROGRAMS.

78. For security purposes, perimeter security towers should have intercom system between each tower and this intercom system would be interfaced with the control room to alert staff of any problems involving the perimeter security.

RATIONALE

The acquisition of additional communication equipment would enhance the security of the institution by increasing its communication capability. Portable body alarms available to specific staff members on sensitive posts, particularly in the housing unit areas, provides reassurance for communicating immediately if any problems arise in a specific section of the institution. It is particularly important to have all towers in communication with a central point, as well as among themselves, for the purposes of forwarning any attempt of breaching the perimeters.

INMATE DISCIPLINE

OBSERVATION:

The discipline procedure is in keeping with policy. However, it is noted that the members of the committee comprises a Senior officer as Chairman, a correctional officer who is selected from the evening shift is paid overtime, and a rotating "civilian" staff member who is temporarily assigned. A disciplinary officer is charged with the responsibility of

investigating incident reports and determining if the reports warrant a major or minor consideration period..

The inmates currently have the right to be informed of the charges, hire an attorney, or request a student attorney, call witnesses, including the reporting officer (if it does not jeopardize the correctional goals), and record the hearing on tape. Throughout this process, the inmate may be dead-locked in his housing unit regardless of his threat to the security and orderly running of the institution as Walpole does not have a disciplinary segregation to place disruptive violators.

RECOMMENDATIONS

79. THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REVIEW THE COMPOSITION OF A DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AS TO ITS KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN BEING ABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

80. THAT THE PROCEDURE OF INMATES CROSS-EXAMINING REPORTING OFFICERS BE ELIMINATED. (THE REPORT, ITSELF, SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.)

81. THAT A SEPARATE UNIT, A DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION 9), BE USED TO CONFINEDISRUPTIVE INMATES SO AS TO REMOVE THEM FROM THE GENERAL POPULATION AND INSURE AN ORDERLY RUNNING OF THE INSTITUTION. BUILDINGS 9 & 10 ARE MOST SUITABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

RATIONALE

In a correctional facility, particularly in maximum security institution, there is no one committee or administrative procedures that has a more profound effect on the atmosphere of control than the disciplinary committee. All members of the committee must be cognizant of the daily climate of the population and the concerns of the Administrative staff.

HOUSING UNITS

OBSERVATIONS:

Walpole's physical plant has many advantages. It is a well constructed maximum security institution that has rapidly deteriorated primarily due to inmate destruction, lack of enforced discipline, and little, if any, preventive maintenance. The sanitation in all the units would be rated from fair to deplorable. Personal property is excessive, nuisance contraband is quite evident, and without many exceptions, the individual cell doors were covered with blankets, paper, or cardboard, or the windows of the doors were painted allowing only a small peep-hole for the officer to peer through for count. With the extensive personal property, contraband, collection of newspapers, magazines, and food waste present in the

cells, most of the housing units are fire and health hazards. Unit officers are reluctant to patrol the tiers, give personal shakedowns, or search cells. It is believed that this would lead to confrontations with inmates. Post orders mandate that five cells in each unit are to be shaken down each day. By all indication, this is not occurring. Several staff members stated that neither an inmate nor a cell could be searched without prior approval from the Shift Supervisor.

MAXIMUM UNITS (CELL HOUSES 1 THRU 8)

OBSERVATION:

Walpole is sectioned into two separate facilities; Maximum (B Section) and Minimum (A Section). The Maximum section has inside cell construction, and each unit has 45 single cells. The inmates assigned to these units are limited in program participation. They do not work and are considered recalcitrant or protection cases (except inmates in the new man houses 6-7).

In two of these housing units the scars of previous disruptions were evident by the remains of human excrement staining the walls. General sanitation in these units is deplorable in that inmates throw their trays and other objects as a form of protest. The heating and ventilation in these cell houses are very poor. In some sections of the unit, it is very cold in the winter and too warm in the summer. Both staff and inmates agree that this is one of the major problems in the units. The exhaust fans have not been operational for some time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. IDENTIFY ONE MAXIMUM SECURITY CELL HOUSE, PREFERABLY THE ONE CLOSEST TO 9 BUILDING WHICH CAN BE USED FOR MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES. THE UPPER TWO TIERS ARE TO BE ENCLOSED WITH HEAVY CYCLONE FENCE AND SECURITY DOORS AT THE END OF EACH RANGE. REPLACE PORCELAIN TOILETS WITH STAINLESS STEEL SECURITY-TYPE FIXTURES IN THESE TWO UNITS.

NOTE: IMPLEMENTATIONS OF OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REPORT MAY DIMINISH OR ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR CYCLONE FENCE.

33. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE OF THE EIGHT HOUSING UNITS IN THIS SECTION, THE REMAINDER ARE IN NEED OF PAINTING AND INTENSIVE CLEANING.

34. EXCESSIVE INMATE PERSONAL PROPERTY SHOULD BE SENT HOME OR DESTROYED. THE GUIDELINES AS TO THE AMOUNT OF NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, BOOKS, AND OTHER SUCH ITEMS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND DISSEMINATED TO INMATES SO THAT THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY.

35. THE COVERING ON BARS AND WINDOWS IN THE CELL HOUSE SHOULD BE PROHIBITED.

36. AN EXTENSIVE ELECTRICAL REHABILITATION PROJECT SHOULD BE INITIATED AND EACH CELL SHOULD HAVE A SECURITY LIGHT AND ONE OUTLET INASMUCH AS INDIVIDUAL TELEVISIONS AND RADIOS ARE PERMITTED.

37. A VENTILATION EXPERT SHOULD BE CONTACTED TO EVALUATE THE HEATING AND COOLING CONDITIONS OF THE CELL HOUSES.

MINIMUM SECURITY CELL HOUSES (CELL HOUSES 1 THRU 3)

OBSERVATIONS:

These cell houses are located at the opposite corridor from the maximum security cell houses. They are cleaner and project some semblance of order. All cells have a solid door with four section windows, however, most of the windows are covered with paint, paper, or some type of cloth. Excessive contraband and personal property is apparent in most instances. Most inmates have televisions and radios. One unit was painted with various revolutionary writings on the walls and various types of revolutionary flags.

One unit is in the process of recovering from a previous disturbance in which the locking devices of the unit were destroyed. These locking devices are still in need of repair.

RECOMMENDATIONS

88. REPAINT ALL UNITS WITH SIMPLE, BRIGHT COLORS AND UNCOVER CELL DOORS AND WINDOWS.

89. REQUIRE STAFF TO COMPLY WITH POST ORDERS BY PATROLLING TIERS AND SEARCHING CELLS.

90. REPAIR ALL LOCKING SYSTEMS AND IMPLEMENT SYSTEMS OF PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE OF THE LOCKING SYSTEM.

RATIONALE

Bar and window coverings are rationalized to exist because of inmate privacy which is believed to be respected. However, the extent in which these coverings exist in the housing units at Walpole far exceed the rights of inmates in confinement in a maximum security institution. These coverings suggest that inmates are in control of the institution as well as their particular cell. The extensive personal property is another indication that no parameters are established by the Administration as to what is permitted. It is imperative that MCI-Walpole designate one other housing unit as an institution segregation unit and that at least 1 or 2 units be designated for inmates who have demonstrated their inability to function with a minimum of supervision. The cyclone fencing of the tiers is for the protection of other inmates as well as staff in that it prohibits missiles being thrown off the tiers upon persons on the flat.

BUILDING 9

OBSERVATION:

Building 9 was formerly "death row", but is currently used to confine protective custody inmates (PC's). It is apparent that this particular security unit is wasted both in space and manpower. The staffing pattern on a regular day shift is one supervisor and one senior officer and five correctional officers for what is commonly referred to as protective cases. The operation within this unit reveals that the staff has a

"three-man order" that states that at no time during the day will less than three staff members walk the range when the grill is open to the cells.

RECOMMENDATIONS

91. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE NUMBER OF INMATES OUT OF THEIR CELLS ON THE VARIOUS RANGES BE LIMITED TO TWO AT A TIME, THEREBY INSTEAD OF 7 STAFF MEMBERS ON THE DAY SHIFT RUNNING 9 BUILDING, IT COULD BE REDUCED TO FIVE.

92. CONVERT 9 BUILDING TO A DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION UNIT FOR MCI-WALPOLE AND REMOVE PROTECTION CASES FROM THAT FACILITY.

93. INMATES IN DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION STATUS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TV'S, RADIOS, OR OTHER LUXURY-TYPE ITEMS, AND LIMIT PERSONAL PROPERTY TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM.

94. REPLACE PORCELAIN TOILETS WITH STAINLESS STEEL SECURITY-TYPES AND REPAIR LIGHT FIXTURES WITH SECURITY LIGHTS.

10 BUILDING

OBSERVATION:

This housing facility has solid doors that close if inmates become disruptive. It is currently being renovated. The staffing pattern within this unit is extremely generous for the number of inmates confined there. In discussing the management of unruly inmates, it appears that both the Administration and staff are reluctant to control recalcitrant

inmates with the use of CN gas, but rather prefer physical force which lends itself to injury for both inmates and staff.

This unit is presently using a level system to reward good behavior, and it appears that the philosophical approach as indicated by staff is the use of "behavior modification" philosophy.

Somestaff referred to this unit as the "Commissioner's Building", but is most commonly referred to as the "Departmental Segregation Unit" (DSU). Individuals confined within this facility are designated by departmental review board. It is under-utilized at this time, and it is believed that there is sufficient need for control of other inmates in Walpole which could be considered for this segregated facility.

The staff in 10 Building is permanent and far exceeds the number needed to control this area. Many wasted manhours exist in this area which seldom has to confront more than one inmate at a time, and these inmates are in handcuffs. Moreover, the Administration has built individual recreation facilities within the units which are commonly referred to as "kennels" and this name describes what these individual recreation areas appear to be.

RECOMMENDATIONS

95. REDEFINE THE DEPARTMENTAL POLICY AS TO THE USE OF 10 BUILDING IN WHICH WALPOLE CAN UTILIZE THIS FACILITY AS A LONG TERM CONTROL UNIT FOR EXTREME DISCIPLINARY CASES.

96. CONTINUE TO USE THE LEVEL SYSTEM BUT AVOID TERMINOLOGY OF "BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION".

97. REASSESS THE STAFF COMPLEMENT WITHIN THIS UNIT AS IT IS PRESENTLY BETWEEN 14-TO-18 ON A DAY SHIFT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT EIGHT OFFICERS COULD MANAGE THE PROGRAM DEMAND REQUIRED IN THIS UNIT.

98. DISASSEMBLE THE "KENNELS" AND REPLACE WITH THREE SPACIOUS YARDS ENCLOSED WITH CYCLONE FENCE. THESE YARDS SHOULD HAVE SOME RECREATIONAL ITEMS SUCH AS BASKETBALL GOALS, PUNCHING BAGS, ETC.

99. USE INDIVIDUAL SEGREGATION SHEETS TO DOCUMENT DAILY ACTIVITIES OF INMATES CONFINED WITHIN THE UNIT.

SAFETY & SANITATION

OBSERVATION:

Other areas of this report have mentioned the need for an upgrading of sanitation in the control of pests within the living units as well as other areas of Walpole. The guidelines in a policy should be established in prohibiting inmates from maintaining pets in their cells. Sanitation generally involving the personal property, the overloading of electrical systems, all has been alluded to previously to describe a hazardous condition at this facility.

There are no systematic checks being made of emergency entrances into these living units. It is essential that these entrances be secure and operational in case of emergency.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

100. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A SAFETY AND SANITATION OFFICER BE APPOINTED TO IMPLEMENT A DAILY SYSTEM OF PEST CONTROL AND MONITORING OF SANITATION AS WELL AS MAINTAIN A PROGRAM OF MONITORING SAFETY FEATURES OF THE INSTITUTIONS PARTICULARLY THE EMERGENCY EXITS.

101. ALL EMERGENCY ENTRANCES OR EXITS BE INSPECTED AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH AND THAT THE INSPECTIONS BE DOCUMENTED. THE EMERGENCY KEYS BE UTILIZED IN MAKING THESE INSPECTIONS TO INSURE NATURAL WEAR AND COMPATIBILITY OF THE KEYS.

102. PROVIDE MORE EMERGENCY EXIT KEYS FOR EASY DISTRIBUTION IN THE CONTROL ROOM.

103. PROHIBIT INMATES FROM KEEPING PETS IN THEIR CELLS.

SECURITY

There are a number of security procedures and features which need to be elaborated upon and others highlighted which may enhance the operation of the institution and provide for a more secure environment for all concerned. It is believed that a system would be helpful in developing a method whereby security windows and outer buildings are inspected routinely and these inspections are documented. It would be of assistance if a shakedown crew was assigned on the PM shift to do in depth shakedowns of work areas, hospitals, education department, and all other areas of the institution. Shakedown crews could be assigned for the purposes of irregular searches of cell houses, as well as inmates. This, too, can

be monitored and logged. Walpole, not unlike other correctional institutions in our country, has experienced its share of introduction of narcotics into its general population. There are a variety of methods of searches, checks and balances which can occur that may stem the tide of such introduction. One further dimension of such preventative action would be a urinalysis survey of inmates on a random basis which could identify the possible users of this contraband.

Another concern with reference to security is inmate accountability. There are four official counts taken each day at 7:00 a.m., 11:45 a.m., 5:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m. From 10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m., counts are taken every 30 minutes. It was learned, however, that some unit officers do not enter the upper galleries of the housing units during these night hours. All counts are administered with the inmate locked in the cell. The only exception to this procedure would be for those few inmates permitted to "out count".

Inmate idleness is predominant due to the lack of work assignments. Detail kits are not utilized on those work details that are operational nor is there a pass system. It is believed that inmate accountability occurs only assurance at count time. The only inmate photographs available are located in the inmate's central file outside the control center and in the Deputy Superintendent's office.

RECOMMENDATIONS

104. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A SHAKEDOWN CREW BE ASSIGNED ON THE PM SHIFT TO DO IN DEPTH SEARCHES OF WORK AREAS, HOSPITAL, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,

AND OTHER AREAS OF THE INSTITUTION AND THAT THESE SEARCHES BE DOCUMENTED. SHAKEDOWN CREWS COULD BE UTILIZED AT OTHER TIMES FOR CELL HOUSE SEARCHES AS WELL AS PERSONAL SEARCHES.

105. THAT A SYSTEM BE DEVELOPED WHEREBY CELL HOUSE WINDOWS AND OTHER SECURITY DOORS BE INSPECTED ROUTINELY FOR TAMPERING AND THAT THIS BE DOCUMENTED AND MONITORED.

106. THAT A URINE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM BE INITIATED AND IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCOURAGING THE INTRODUCTION AND USE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS.

107. THAT DETAILED KIT CARDS BE PROVIDED FOR ALL DETAIL SUPERVISORS WHICH INCLUDE AN INMATE PHOTO, NAME, REGISTER NUMBER, AND HOUSING LOCATION. THAT A SIMILAR ID CARD BE MAINTAINED IN THE HOUSING UNIT AS WELL AS IN THE VISITING ROOMS.

108. A PASS SYSTEM SHOULD BE INITIATED WHICH WOULD PERMIT AN INMATE AUTHORIZED PASSAGE FROM HIS WORK ASSIGNMENT TO OTHER AREAS.

EMERGENCY PLANS

OBSERVATION:

A state correctional manual addressing escapes, riots, hostage, fire control, bombing, etc., is kept in the Superintendent's office. At this time, only one manual is available.

RECOMMENDATIONS

109. SUGGEST THAT ALL EMPLOYEES BE REQUIRED TO BECOME THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMERGENCY PLAN AND THAT THESE PLANS BE REVIEWED ANNUALLY. A COPY SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYEE REVIEW IN THE CONTROL CENTERS. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THESE PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL.

FRONT ENTRANCE SECURITY

OBSERVATION:

The physical structure and front entrance procedures seem to be adequate. All visitors and staff must pass through a three-door security sallyport with a gun tower officer providing supervision and control on the two inner doors. After presenting ID and reading contraband declarations and signing the same, all visitors along with staff submit to a walk-through metal detector. This sensitive system sometimes requires the removal of belts and shoes. Carry through items are closely scrutinized. Visitors are also stamped for black light identification. However inmates passing through the front entrance along with the escorting officer circumvent the security system. The reason given is that the inmate is wearing restraints but no reason is given for the escorting officers. The inmate is escorted through the receiving unit where no metal detector is available.

The front entrance security requires that all staff submit to this cursory search and "sensitive metal detector". Any staff who has regular access to the facility would avoid bringing in any metal device. It

does not exclude other types of contraband. Therefore, it is deemed an unnecessary exercise which has little impact on the monitoring of staff entering and leaving an institution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

110. THAT STAFF PERSONNEL NOT BE REQUIRED TO WALK THROUGH A METAL DETECTOR.

111. ALL INMATES ENTERING THE INSTITUTION PROPER BE INSPECTED FOR CONTRABAND ITEMS. RESTRAINTS SHOULD BE REMOVED IN SALLYPORT AND INMATES SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE WALK-THROUGH METAL DETECTOR.

112. OUTSIDE VISITORS AND PERSONS ATTENDING GROUP ACTIVITIES OR INMATE FUNCTIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO WALK THROUGH THE METAL DETECTOR AND HAVE THE BLACK LIGHT INK USED.

113. INMATES ASSIGNED TO THE FRONT END LOBBY OF WALPOLE SHOULD BE FROM THE NORFOLK CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION. AN INSIDE INMATE SHOULD NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THIS AREA, AS THIS PLACES UNDUE PRESSURE UPON SUCH AN INMATE TO INTRODUCE CONTRABAND INTO THE INSTITUTION.

REAR ENTRANCE

OBSERVATION:

The rear entrance (vehicle entrance) is operated from an armed tower which has good visibility of the entire search procedure. Their entrance

is equipped with inter-locking vehicle gates. There are no inmate ID cards. Inmate pedestrian traffic is not allowed. However, it was learned that on occasion, the front end assigned inmate is allowed passage. Proper security procedures were utilized for the passage of vehicles. However, the gate officer must also serve as the escorting officer. This necessitates the closing of the vehicle entrance each time a vehicle enters the institution. It was noted the truck weight scale has not been operational for a year or more. This scale is utilized to weigh raw materials entering the institution and scrap materials being removed from the facility. All traffic through the rear gate is logged.

RECOMMENDATIONS

114. AN ADDITIONAL OFFICER FOR ESCORT PURPOSES SHOULD BE PROVIDED THIS MOST IMPORTANT POST TO INSURE SECURITY AND PREVENT TRAFFIC TIE-UP.

115. THE TRUCK SCALE SHOULD BE REPAIRED AND MADE OPERATIONAL.

CONTROL CENTER

There are two control centers at Walpole, one is located at the front of the Administration Building, and the other is located within the institution. Both control rooms were found secure. The armory and security officer are located in the outer control center, as well as a small key cutting machine (security officer also performs as a lock smith), the mail room, and the communication system (TBX). The outer control center is responsible for identifying all visitors; i.e., inmate and institutional. They also

operate the outer security door to the three-door sallyport security entrance. The control center staff are responsible for monies received from the enormous amounts and variety of hobbycraft items. A running account of new commitments and transportation of inmates to and from courts, hospitals, etc., is maintained and communicated to the inner control center. A base station and three portable radios and the emergency keys for the institution are also located here. It was observed that the outer control center is over staffed by one position on the day watch and two positions on the evening watch.

The inner control center also serves the needs of security and inmate population. Three security doors which form the sallyport entrance are controlled from this area. Key issuance and official counts are administered from this area. A few items of emergency equipment are stored in this area; i.e., the batons, helmets, gas masks. Keys are issued on a paper chit, however, several key hooks were without key or chit. It was also determined that not all keys are turned into the central key location. The reason given for such departures from normal procedures was pilferage. Inmate visitors for maximum security inmates, the protection unit, and for the departmental segregation unit are accounted for upon passage through this area. The other control center is over staffed by at least one position on each of two shifts, the day and evening watch.

RECOMMENDATIONS

116. DEVELOP A KEY BOARD SYSTEM AND ISSUANCE WHICH WILL INSURE ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESTRICTION OF KEYS.

117. MAINTAIN A SMALL AMOUNT OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE INNER CONTROL CENTER FOR IMMEDIATE USE.

118. PBX SHOULD CONTROL ALL TELEPHONES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SUPERINTENDENTS.

119. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS ALLOCATED BY AT LEAST ONE ON ALL SHIFTS FOR BOTH OUTER AND INNER CONTROL CENTERS.

TOOL CONTROL

OBSERVATION:

The institution's industrial complex and mechanical shops are without tool control.

RECOMMENDATIONS

120. INITIATE AND IMPLEMENT A TOOL CONTROL PROGRAM FOR SECURITY AND ECONOMIC REASONS.

121. ALL TOOLS SHOULD BE INVENTORIED, MARKED BY SHOP CODE, PLACED ON A SHADOW BOARD, AND MADE SECURE. ALL TOOLS SHOULD BE ISSUED BY A "CHIT SYSTEM".

122. THE TOOLS SHOULD BE PLACED IN TWO CATEGORIES; CLASS A, TOOLS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES ONLY AND USED UNDER STRICT SUPERVISION, CLASS B, TOOLS ISSUED TO INMATES SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED FOR. TOOLS SUCH AS FILES AND HACKSAWS SHOULD BE SECURED IN THE CONTROL CENTER AT THE END OF EACH DAY.

RATIONALE

Tool control is one of the basic security requirements at a correctional institution. Properly monitored, it minimizes the manufacture of weapons, the use of tools for escape purposes and weapons, and minimizes cost for replacement. These recommendations will enhance sound security management.

TOWERS & PERIMETER SECURITY

OBSERVATION:

A 22-foot concrete self-standing wall, topped by five strands of electrical charged wire (approximately 240 volts) and seven armed towers provide the perimeter security. In the front and rear towers, pedestrian and vehicle, armaments include a 45 caliber machine gun. Only one tower was visited during the audit. The tower was in excellent condition. All equipment was accounted for and in good condition. However, it was alleged that in some towers the level of sanitation and conditions of equipment was below acceptable standards. The perimeter lighting provided by lights atop the walls seemed inadequate for proper supervision and surveillance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

123. MONTHLY INSPECTIONS BE MADE OF ALL TOWERS TO INSURE THE EQUIPMENT IS BEING PROPERLY CARED FOR AND ACCOUNTABILITY EXISTS. SUCH INSPECTIONS WOULD MOTIVATE HIGH STANDARDS OF SANITATION, AND INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED.

124. IMPROVE PERIMETER LIGHTING BY REPLACING 100 WATT LIGHTBULBS WITH 200 WATT BULBS ATOP THE WALLS.

125. REPLACE MACHINE GUNS AT FRONT AND REAR ENTRANCE WITH SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES SUCH AS THE MILITARY M-14.

ARMORY

OBSERVATION:

The Armory is located within the outside control center which provides excellent security. A locked security door separates the Armory from the control center. The security officer or his assistant issues and maintains all equipment. All equipment is stored in an orderly fashion. The weapons checked were clean and lightly oiled. The chemical agents (tear gas) were in date, and the supply on hand is adequate. An inventory of all weapons and related equipment is maintained in a central log book. All issuance of equipment is logged. The portable cutting torch is stored outside the institution along with a fire truck.

RECOMMENDATIONS

126. THAT MACHINE GUNS BE REPLACED BY SEMI-AUTOMATIC WEAPONS SUCH AS THE M-14.

LOCK SHOP

OBSERVATION:

Only an abbreviated lock shop exists at Walpole. A few key blanks and a small key cutting machine are located within the outside control center. Security and sanitation was found to be good in this area. All major lock work or key replacement is accomplished by sending the broken items back to the factory. The Armory Officer handles all minor and key work requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS

127. CONVERT A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER POSITION TO A LOCK SMITH AND PURCHASE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN INSTITUTIONAL LOCKS AND KEYS. SPECIALIZED TRAINING WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE LOCKSMITH.

RATIONALE

An experienced and well trained lock smith at a security institution is essential for the maintenance of a locking system. A staff member can be trained to perform this assignment which would enhance security, reduce repair, and be in a position to remedy and replace defective locking systems when needed.

CLOTHING SERVICES

Each inmate is initially issued two sets of trousers, shirts, underwear, coat, and one pair of shoes. The clothes are not marked because the marking machine has been broken for some time. An inmate marks his own clothes with a marking pen or other device. Replacement clothing is issued each six months as needed. The laundry washes towels, sheets, and pillow cases on a weekly basis by housing unit rotation. A housing unit laundry inmate handles all inmate clothing. Such clothing is washed on as needed basis. It is reported that if an inmate does not provide payment to the laundry, his clothes will not be ironed and/or not be returned.

RECOMMENDATIONS

128. THAT THE CLOTHING MARKING MACHINE BE REPAIRED AND UTILIZED.

129. THAT THE LAUNDRY SERVICES BE SUPERVISED AND THAT PAYMENT FOR SUCH SERVICES BE DISCONTINUED.

VISITING ROOM

OBSERVATION:

There are four visiting rooms at Walpole designated by a stratification system; i.e., maximum, minimum, departmental segregation, and protection unit. All visitors are processed through the front entrance, however, some visitors are passed on flimsey ID, such as school ID cards. Visitors

must deposit all carry in items in a bus station type locker system. The visitors sign a declaration statement upon entering and departing the institution. All visitors must pass through a walk-through metal detector and are marked for identification by the black light system. Inmates are notified by the outside control center of the visit. They report to the inside control center prior to being admitted to the visiting room. No picture card ID is made of the inmate. Inmates are given a brush shakedown upon entering the visiting room. It was noted that in the maximum visiting room, the inside entrance to the visiting room was not locked. This would allow any inmate to enter the visiting room at any time. At the completion of the visit, the visitors are released first and then all inmates are given a modified strip search which does not include cavity search.

RECOMMENDATION

130. PROPER IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE EXPECTED BEFORE VISIT IS PERMITTED.
131. INMATE ID PHOTO CARDS SHOULD BE UTILIZED BEFORE PERMITTING AN INMATE ACCESS TO THE VISITING ROOM.
132. THE VISITING ROOM ENTRANCE DOOR SHOULD BE KEPT LOCKED AT ALL TIMES.
133. A COMPLETE STRIP SHAKEDOWN SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED AT THE COMPLETION OF EACH VISIT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND INTO THE INSTITUTION.

OVERVIEW OF FOOD SERVICE

The Food Service Department at Walpole is under the supervision of the Institutional Chief Steward. The Storekeeping (Warehouse) and Chief Cook report directly to him. Good sanitary practices are lacking throughout the Department. Organization of staff, domestic workers and inmates is almost nonexistent. Purchasing for this department is done on an as-needed basis. There is no cycle menu or quarterly budget. This department operates on a day-to-day or weekly basis. "As Fed" menus indicate that only one good meal with meat is presented daily. The satellite feeding program is substandard. Too many staff eat the noon and evening meal in the Staff Dining Room without surrendering a meal ticket. The same is true of staff working in other areas where meals are delivered to them. Inmate workers from other areas are permitted access to the kitchen area during non-meal periods at which time they are permitted to get milk, fruit, etc., which they carry out of the department. There is no shakedown of inmates departing the production areas. The Food Service staff, for the most part, do not want inmates assigned as workers in production areas. At present, all food production is done by the eight civilian cooks.

FOOD SERVICE

OBSERVATION:

The processing and payment of institutional purchase orders is excessively slow and vendors are reluctant to do business. They have to wait sometimes 3 or 4 months for payment.

RECOMMENDATION

135. SPEED UP PROCESSING AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE ORDERS BY THE CENTRAL OFFICE.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would make more vendors interested in doing business and should lower food service operational costs.

OBSERVATION:

There is no quarterly food service budget or cycle menu.

RECOMMENDATION

136. DEVELOP A QUARTERLY FOOD SERVICE BUDGET AND CYCLE MENU. INSTITUTE A STUDY TO CONSIDER PURCHASING OF FOOD ITEMS BY THE CENTRAL OFFICE. THIS WOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE THE LATE PAYMENT PROBLEM.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would greatly help in lowering operational costs by buying in large amounts as opposed to the present "purchasing on an as-needed basis." A cycle menu would insure a nutritionally adequate diet for inmates and alleviate one day a week where a staff member is involved in writing a weekly menu which at the present time depends on what food items are in the storeroom.

OBSERVATION:

There is no shakedown of inmates departing the food service production areas. Also, the electric grill door from the Main Corridor to staff dining room and food production areas is, for the most part, unlocked,

RECOMMENDATION

137. ALL INMATES DEPARTING THE FOOD SERVICE PRODUCTION AREAS SHOULD BE SHAKEN DOWN. THE ELECTRIC GRILL DOOR SHOULD BE LOCKED AT ALL TIMES. THIS DOOR IS CONTROLLED BY THE INSIDE CONTROL ROOM SO THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN KEEPING IT LOCKED.

RATIONALE

The above recommendations would greatly reduce the amount of food inmates are taking from the food service production areas, thereby lowering food costs.

OBSERVATION:

Additional meat items are given to inmates when they request them at the end of the meal.

RECOMMENDATION

138. DISCONTINUE SERVING EXTRAS AT MEAL'S END. HAVE PRODUCTION OF WELL-ACCEPTED RATIONED ITEMS MORE IN LINE WITH INSTITUTIONAL INMATE COUNT.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would help to reduce food costs.

OBSERVATION:

No position descriptions or areas of responsibility for staff or inmates.

RECOMMENDATION

139. DEVELOP POSITION DESCRIPTIONS OR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR STAFF AND INMATES.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would help to organize staff and inmates as to jobs and areas of responsibility and would help to reduce idle time.

OBSERVATION:

Eight civilian (staff) cooks do all the production work for all meals. Fifteen domestic help and 25 inmates do cleaning, serving, plating diet meals, and set up and serve in the staff dining room.

RECOMMENDATION

140. DISCONTINUE THE USE OF DOMESTIC HELP AND REPLACE THEM WITH INMATES. HAVE THE STAFF SUPERVISE ALL PRODUCTION AND SANITATION OF THE DEPARTMENT WITH THE INMATES DOING THE WORK.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would free civilian cooks to train and supervise inmates in all phases of food preparation. This would reduce operational costs because domestic help would no longer be utilized.

OBSERVATION:

Sanitation is substandard throughout the entire department.

RECOMMENDATION

141. DEVELOP A DAILY SANITATION CHECK SHEET TO BE FILLED IN BY THE CHIEF COOK THAT IS ALL INCLUSIVE FOR THE DEPARTMENT WITH COPIES TO BE SENT TO CONCERNED INSTITUTIONAL EXECUTIVES UPON DAILY COMPLETION.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would up-grade the sanitation of the entire department.

OBSERVATION:

There is evidence of rodent infestation in the storeroom.

RECOMMENDATION

142. DEVELOP A PROGRAM FOR CONTINUOUS RODENT PREVENTION.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation when developed should alleviate the rodent problem that presently exists.

OBSERVATION:

The satellite feeding program is substandard

RECOMMENDATION

143. BY PRE-PLATING MEALS IN THE FOOD SERVICE DEPARTMENT THEN ISPORTING IN REFRIGERATED CARTS WITH MICROWAVE OVENS FOR REHEATING IN THE SATELLITE UNITS WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE OVER-PRODUCTION AND GREATLY IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF MEALS.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would lower the possibility of a food borne disease being contacted by inmates in the lock-up units.

OBSERVATION:

Inmate unit workers, etc., are permitted to "score" on fruit, milk, etc., in the food service. Observed inmates leaving the department with fruit, milk, etc. Was informed by staff that inmate workers are rewarded in this manner throughout the institution.

RECOMMENDATION

144. DISCONTINUE THIS "PAY-OFF" SYSTEM.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation should lower operating food costs.

OBSERVATION:

The Staff Dining Room serves the noon and evening meal; 175 to 200 plus staff members eat daily. Meal tickets cost 96¢ each. Meal ticket collections amount to only approximately \$30.00 a day. A staff member from the storehouse collects money during the noon meal. He is positioned at a table at the entrance of the Staff Dining Room; no one collects for the evening meal.

RECOMMENDATION

145. ALL STAFF PARTAKING OF MEALS BE REQUIRED TO PURCHASE A MEAL TICKET IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OR THE INSIDE CONTROL ROOM, SIGN AND DEPOSIT SAME IN A SECURE BOX LOCATED IN THE STAFF DINING ROOM. THIS SHOULD BE MONITORED BY THE CHIEF STEWARD OR CHIEF COOK AND NOT THEIR DESIGNEE DURING THE NOON AND EVENING MEALS.

RATIONALE

The above recommendation would reduce the food budget by approximately \$55,000 per year.

PRISON INDUSTRIES

OBSERVATION:

There is a lack of revenue for operating capital within the Industries Operation.

RECOMMENDATION

146. PLACE A VERY HIGH EMPHASIS ON GETTING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE PRESENT LAW TO ALLOW THE REVENUE FROM THE SALE OF AUTO LICENSE PLATES TO BE RETURNED TO THE INDUSTRIES OPERATION AS OPERATING CAPITAL.

147. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ALLOWING INDUSTRIES TO BILL THE MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRY DEPARTMENT FOR A MORE REALISTIC SELLING PRICE PER PLATE. FROM THE LIMITED VERSION OF THE STATE USE LAW THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO THE TEAM, THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE BOTH LEGAL AND FEASIBLE.

OBSERVATION:

There is no stable inmate work force in Industries.

RECOMMENDATION

148. INCORPORATE INTO THE NEW CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, CHANGES THAT WILL INSURE THAT INDUSTRIES GET A STABLE, AS NEAR TO FULL-TIME, WORK FORCE AS

POSSIBLE.

149. AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE MUST BE MADE AT THE INSTITUTION LEVEL TO REMOVE THOSE INMATES WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO INDUSTRIES BUT WHO DO NOT WORK, FOR WHATEVER REASON, AND ARE CARRIED ON THE INDUSTRIES ROSTER AS "UNASSIGNED".

OBSERVATION:

There is a lack of accountability and control of inmates assigned to Industries. The present accountability system provides for a door check count to be made by a correctional officer located in the central Industries Business Office with rosters of inmates by shop assignment, as the inmates report to work in the morning. If an inmate fails to report to work, this correctional officer attempts to locate the individual by telephone and if location is made, an entry is made on the officer's roster. There is no check made as work force leaves the Industries area for the noon meal. The only check that is made as the workers return from the noon meal is if the correctional officer sees them and checks them off on the rosters. There was no evidence that any cross check was made between the officer who maintains the roster, the shop supervisors (instructors) or the correctional officers located in the various work areas.

RECOMMENDATION

150. AN EFFECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR INMATES ASSIGNED TO INDUSTRIES SHOULD BE DEvised AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SHOULD INVOLVE

THE INDUSTRIES PRODUCTION SUPERVISOR (INSTRUCTOR) TO A MUCH LARGER EXTENT.

OBSERVATION:

The complete area of materials handling from the procurement of raw materials to the shipment of finished goods warrants a thorough review and overhaul.

Under the present method of procurement, there are excessive levels of approval required to commit anything for purchase. As an example, a request to procure an item would originate with the Production Supervisor (instructor) of the using shop, passed to the institution Supervisor of Industries for approval, routed to the "White House" (located on the Walpole MCI grounds) for next approval, then to the Industries Central Office to be routed to the State Comptroller's Office (for certification of funds) then finally is routed back to the State Purchasing Agent's Office to be put out for bids. Requests for procurement were noted that were 60 and 80 days old.

Raw materials are stored in a variety of places. Metal stock (aluminum) for auto plates is stored on the metal shop floor, the warehouse, and in a cage area next to it, or in the Sign Shop. As raw materials are received (i.e., aluminum coils), they are received and invoiced at the vendor weight, size and quantity documentation. The only stated reason for rejection was for coils being "double stacked" (two or more pallets with coils stacked together) with the resultant stack exceeding the weight capability of the lifting and handling equipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

151. THERE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED A QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM, PROPERLY STAFFED AND EQUIPPED TO INSPECT AND ACCEPT OR REJECT, INCOMING RAW MATERIALS AS WELL AS OUTGOING FINISHED GOODS.

152. CONTROLS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO ALL STORAGE AREAS AND TO IMPLEMENT RIGID ISSUANCE AND DOCUMENTATION CONTROL PROCEDURES.

153. DEVELOP A METHOD OF COLLECTION, SAVING, SORTING, AND DISPOSAL OF SCRAP METAL FROM THE METAL (AUTO PLATE) AND SIGN SHOP.

OBSERVATION:

There was no evidence of the use of safety shoes, eye protection, hearing protection, or gloves in the Metal Shop, Sign Shop, or Print Shop. (The Brush Shop was shut-down due to a lack of raw materials.) The supervisor of Industries indicated that the foundry operated with full safety gear issued.

RECOMMENDATION

154. MACHINE GUARDING: THE PRESSES USED IN THE METAL (AUTO PLATE) SHOP HAVE AUTOMATIC FEED, TWO-HAND SWITCH CONTROLS. PRESSES AND SHEARS IN USE IN THE METAL SHOP SHOULD HAVE PROTECTIVE CAGE GUARDS AROUND THE EXPOSED RAM AREAS.

155. FIRE PROTECTION: THERE SHOULD BE AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN THE INDUSTRIES AREA. THERE ARE MULTIPLE AREAS IN WHICH CARDBOARD, PACKING MATERIALS, AND A WIDE VARIETY OF PAPER PRODUCTS MUST HAVE ADEQUATE FIRE PROTECTION.

156. EQUIPMENT: SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO UPDATING THE PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT IN ALL SHOPS BUT IN PARTICULAR, THE METAL SHOP. THE EQUIPMENT BEING USED IN THE AUTO PLATE SHOP IS LABOR INTENSIVE, PARTICULARLY THE DIE BLOCKS AND PRESSES USED IN THE EMBOSsing PROCESS BUT IS NOT COST EFFECTIVE. WHEN NEW EQUIPMENT IS CONSIDERED, ADDITIONAL PRODUCT LINES (I.E., METAL FOOD SERVING TRAYS, METAL BOOK ENDS, ETC.) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PRODUCTIVE ITEMS TO MAKE A MORE COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION.

OBSERVATION:

During a visit to the Industries area on October 16, 1979, a visual count was taken during a walk-through in the morning and again in the afternoon. This chart shows the location, number of assigned inmates, and a rough count of those inmates at work:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>A.M. (On hand)</u>	<u>P.M.</u>
Storeroom	5	-	-
Brush	4	-	-
Sign	6	3	2
Print	20	9	8
Auto Plate	67	16	13
Business Office	4	3	2
Foundry	20	8	No check

Inmates who were noted in the "unassigned leisure area" were 14, 11, and 13 at various times.

RECOMMENDATION

157. WITH FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES, BASED ON FULL EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION AND AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIALS, APPROXIMATELY 105 INMATES SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

OBSERVATION:

Ratio of staff (instructors)/correctional officers to inmates.

During the tour of the Industries area on October 16, 1979, correctional officers were noted in the following locations in addition to the Industries staff:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of Corr. Ofcrs.</u>
Business Office	1
Storeroom	1
Auto Plate Shop	1
Brush Shop	2
Print Shop	2

RECOMMENDATION

158. CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS IN THE INDUSTRIAL AREA SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

OBSERVATION:

On a visit to the Industries Central Office on October 17, 1979, a review was conducted of the weekly visitation logs submitted by the 3 State Use Industries Agents (salesmen). Recognizing that not every visit would result in a sale/order, and looking ahead from 14-to-21 days on the incoming order register (which is kept in four large ledgers, entered by the name of the source (i.e., city, county, state department, and all entries by hand), there was very little evidence of direct linkage from the sales effort to actual orders.

The Director of Industries outlined a plan to have a new illustrated catalog of Industries products ready for distribution in the near future. The method of distribution had not been finalized, but the Director has very good plans to use old customer orders, state agency mailing lists, and directories of state and local use agencies as sources of information.

RECOMMENDATION

159. A COMPLETE MARKETING SURVEY SHOULD BE MADE PERHAPS WITH THE AID OF A CONSULTING FIRM. BOTH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS NEED TO BE ANALYZED.

OBSERVATION:

Business, Financial Management, and Records keeping.

At every office visited throughout the Industries system, it was noted that all records, files, reports, and financial documentation was prepared

by hand and in many cases appeared to be duplicated effort.

In the case of accounts receivables, for example, a check is received in payment for an order at the Industries office at MCI-Walpole. This check is deposited in an account in a local bank. Entries are made in at least two ledgers and two forms are prepared. On a weekly basis, other forms are prepared, a check is issued, drawn on the local account together with other forms which are prepared to identify the orders being paid and the total sum being paid. This entire package is then forwarded to the Industries Central Office.

The manner in which these checks and reports are integrated with those received from other Industries locations is unclear.

An attempt was made to track the process of handling these receipts through and out of the Industries Central Office, but due to a staff training session which was in progress during this visit, this was not possible.

RECOMMENDATION

160. THE CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES DIVISION SHOULD GIVE STRONG CONSIDERATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW FISCAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM COULD BE PATTERNED AFTER A SISTER STATE OR FEDERAL AGENCY HAVING A MORE PRESENT DAY STATE OF THE ART METHOD. AN OUTSIDE CONSULTANT ORGANIZATION WITH EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN THIS AREA COULD BE HIRED. THE BENEFITS RESULTING FROM BETTER PROCUREMENT, RAW MATERIALS CONTROL, BETTER FUNDS FLOW, AND CONTROL AND STAFF TIME SAVED WOULD MORE THAN OFFSET ANY COSTS INVOLVED.

OBSERVATION:

Role of Industries employees in the overall institution organization.

RECOMMENDATION

161. THE SUPERVISOR OF INDUSTRIES SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN ALL PHASES OF THE INSTITUTION MANAGEMENT. INDUSTRIES SHOP MANAGERS SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED WITH ALL PHASES OF INMATE CLASSIFICATION. INDUSTRIES STAFF, AS A WHOLE, AT WALPOLE, SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE AREA OF INMATE CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE IN THE WORK AREA. THERE APPEARS TO BE COMPLETE RELIANCE ON THE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE INDUSTRIAL AREA TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE.

OBSERVATION:

Tool and equipment control.

RECOMMENDATION

162. A STRICT METHOD OF TOOL CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL AREA AT MCI-WALPOLE. A REGULAR SCHEDULE OF INVENTORY FOR BOTH ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONDITION IS NECESSARY. "SHADOW BOARDS" (A BOARD IN WHICH THE OUTLINE OF A GIVEN TOOL OR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT IS DRAWN AND IN TURN WHICH MUST BE KEPT SECURE) MUST BE PREPARED FOR ALL TOOLS ASSIGNED TO ALL INDUSTRIES SHOPS.

163. IN PLACE EQUIPMENT SUCH AS GRINDERS, SANDERS, AND BUFFERS (ALL OF THOSE ITEMS WITH METAL CUTTING CAPABILITY), MUST BE SECURED AND CLOSELY MONITORED BY STAFF PERSONNEL.

OBSERVATION:

Lack of documentation supporting periodic financial statements.

Support documentation to cover cost to manufacture, cost of sales, and net operating costs appears sorely needed. In reviewing monthly financial reports in an attempt to focus on the net cost to manufacture a single license plate, for example, the lowest level to which costs could be tracked was to the order level.

RECOMMENDATION

164. A METHOD MUST BE DEvised WHEREBY A UNIT COST CAN BE DETERMINED. A UNIT COST STATEMENT COVERING MATERIALS, LABOR, AND OVERHEAD SHOULD BE PREPARED ON EVERY ITEM MANUFACTURED IN INDUSTRIES. WITHOUT THIS BASIS TO CALCULATE OVERALL COSTS, THE INDUSTRIAL OPERATION, AS A WHOLE, CAN NEVER BE EXPECTED TO BECOME A SELF-SUSTAINING OPERATION.

OBSERVATION:

An apparent lack of basic apprenticeship programs.

RECOMMENDATION

165. ANY EMPLOYMENT OF INMATES IN A CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES OPERATION

SHOULD HAVE AS ONE OF ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVES A TRAINING PROGRAM WHEREBY AN INMATE IS RELEASED WITH A SKILL OR TRAINING WHICH WILL MAKE HIM OR HER A MORE PRODUCTIVE MEMBER OF SOCIETY. ONE METHOD OF ACHIEVING THIS IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS. THESE PROGRAMS CAN BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF LOCAL UNION COUNCILS, STATE DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND THE US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. AN ACTIVE APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAM COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE PRINT SHOP AT MCI-WALPOLE WITH A MINIMUM OF EFFORT AND COULD, IN TIME, PAY DIVIDENDS IN BOTH PRODUCT AND PERSONNEL.

INDUSTRIAL ASSIGNMENT

OBSERVATION:

The current tradition at Walpole holds a job in industries in very low esteem. The opportunity for individual profit is higher in other areas where rackets flourish and peer approbation is also higher for illicit income. Inmates are required to accept assignment in industries in order to qualify for later consideration in other jobs.

RECOMMENDATION

166. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REVITALIZATION OF ALL AREAS OF THE INSTITUTION, A NEW SET OF CRITERIA SHOULD GREATLY APPLY TO INDUSTRIAL ASSIGNMENT. THE DECISION TO PLACE A MAN IN INDUSTRY SHOULD BE MADE BY THE CLASSIFICATION TEAM CONSIDERING SUCH FACTORS AS INDIVIDUAL NEEDS, PREFERENCES, AND INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE PRACTICE OF COMPELLING MEN TO PUT IN TIME IN INDUSTRY BEFORE PROGRESSING TO OTHER ASSIGNMENTS. AN UNDERLYING EXPECTATION ASSUMES THAT WITH VERY FEW, NECESSARY EXCEPTIONS, EVERY MAN WILL HAVE SOME JOB.

RATIONALE

A major goal at Walpole will be to drastically reduce the pervasive idleness. As inmates are compelled to engage in some productive activity, and as opportunities for racket income are reduced, the alternative of relatively high pay in a job where useful skills are learned will become more attractive.

We also anticipate that the members of a classification team, interacting regularly with an inmate on realistic concerns about his future, will be able to reach better decisions with him about his job involvement than the current assignment process can.

EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY

OBSERVATION:

Inmate idleness is a major problem at Walpole. There are few inmates assigned to maintenance work details and only a limited number can be placed in educational/vocational training programs. Prison industries provides work for approximately 100 inmates, but the actual number is somewhat lower than 100 because of periodic down-time or higher priorities elsewhere in the institution.

RECOMMENDATION

167. GRADUALLY DEVELOP NEW INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT/TRAINING FOR A MINIMUM OF 200 INMATES.

RATIONALE

In a penitentiary setting, it is normal to employ anywhere from 25% to 50% of the total inmate population in industrial programs. These programs must be carefully selected after thoroughly researching the market. It goes without saying that there must be an adequate long-term market for the products selected. In addition, the production process should involve employable skills and in initial capital investment that is not too high. Production, quality, quantity, and speed should equal that of outside industry and modern equipment should be utilized. Careful planning will be necessary to provide both production and warehouse space.

MAINTENANCE

OBSERVATION:

The physical plant (buildings) and grounds are in a poor state of repair.

RECOMMENDATIONS

168. SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE MAINTENANCE STAFF, PROVIDE ADEQUATE SPACE TO HOUSE NEW MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND EMPLOY INMATES IN AN ON-THE-JOB TRAINING STATUS IN EACH SHOP.

RATIONALE

We regarded maintenance deficiencies as a major Walpole problem. None of us had ever seen such a meagre maintenance staff or such wholly inadequate space for shops and supplies in an institution this size. The wood working shop has reasonable space and equipment, but the others are jammed into a tiny and poorly equipped building. Technical assistance should be requested from NIC to survey maintenance needs and help determine the size, staff, and skills required. It appears to us there should be a minimum of approximately fifteen maintenance foremen to perform such jobs as Plumbing, General Foreman, Electrician, Welder, Painter, General Mechanic, and Carpenter.

Even a minimum staff such as outlined above would provide badly needed work/training opportunities for at least 65 inmates.

In all probability, a new building would have to be planned, but the cost could be minimal if the staff and inmates would do the construction.

To what ever extent possible, recruitment of these people should come from existing staff and in lieu of correctional positions. By supervising inmate details, they relieve the Custodial burden inside and the Maintenance staff should have Custodial training if they are to manage inmate details.

END