

NI-70-03

68870

NI-70-030-G-7

AUGUST VOLLMER AND THE ORIGINS OF POLICE
PROFESSIONALISM

by Gene E. Carte

NCJRS

JUN 26 1980

ACQUISITIONS

Doctoral Dissertation
School of Criminology
University of California at
Berkeley

Committee:

Prof. Jerome H. Skolnick,
School of Criminology
Prof. Paul Takagi,
School of Criminology
Prof. Eugene Lee,
Dept. of Political Science

October, 1972

AUGUST VOLLMER AND THE ORIGINS OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

Abstract

Gene E. Carte, School of Criminology

This paper explores the roots of professionalism as a model for American municipal policing by focusing upon the career of August Vollmer, who served as police chief of Berkeley, California, from 1905 to 1932. By the 1920s Vollmer was established as the foremost American police spokesman, and was a strong advocate of the application of the professional model to policing.

Two perspectives are employed for the study: an intensive examination of the actual work and ideas of Vollmer, as evidenced in the Berkeley department and in his national role as an educator, police consultant, and writer; and an examination of the historical setting within which professionalism was developed. Materials used for the examination of Vollmer's career include oral interviews with his former colleagues and associates; personal papers and correspondence; and published sources. The analysis of the historical setting draws upon literature in sociology and policing dealing with American municipal government and criminal justice from the

last quarter of the nineteenth century through the 1930s.

The study contends that police professionalism arose in response to several definite historical trends: 1) the ambivalent pressures placed on policing by moral and civic reformers, corrupt municipal officials, and heterogeneous urban populations; 2) the closing of trade unionism as a method for the redress of police grievances following the suppression of the Boston Police Strike in 1919; 3) and the failure of civil service reform to meet the basic police problems of insecure tenure, political influence, and incompetence.

It is the further contention of the study that Vollmer's model of police professionalism contained within it serious contradictions. The most fundamental of these was the conflict between the detached stance of the professional and the continuing need for policing to adjust to social flux within the community. A correlative conflict was the incompatibility of the crime-fighting priority with the actual role of the policeman as a miscellaneous government functionary.

The professional model in application is studied through a detailed examination of Vollmer's work in Berkeley, where he introduced many technological and managerial innovations

these were the use of mobile patrol, recall systems, beat analysis, modus operandi, scientific detection methods, and centralized crime records. Personnel standards were upgraded through intelligence and psychological testing, formal training schools, and the recruitment of college-educated patrolmen. The Berkeley department became a training ground for policemen who joined other departments at the leadership level or entered careers as educators and writers on professional policing. The effect of Vollmer's personality and leadership skills upon the Berkeley department is explored.

Modifications of the Berkeley model are examined as Vollmer applied it during his term as police chief in Los Angeles (1923-24) and adapted it in his writings as a consultant to other urban police departments and as an advocate of centralization in nearly all aspects of policing.

The paper concludes that Vollmer constructed an effective and personal style of policing in Berkeley which was necessarily altered to meet the requirements of heterogeneous urban areas. The professional model contributed to the creation of an ideology that reinforced insularity and increased dependence upon technology and scientific management to solve police problems. Present public expectations do not

justify the continuance of a model that is founded upon detachment from social change and the preselection of priorities and police goals.

Chairman _____

Jerome H. Skolnick
Professor

The research for this study was made possible by a fellowship from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, during the years 1969 - 1971. The writer acknowledges with gratitude the support and encouragement he has received from the Institute.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION -----	1
The Professional Police Model -----	1
Professionalism in a Criminal Justice Context -----	4
Policing's First Professional -----	9
Design of the Paper -----	12
Future Research Goals -----	15
CHAPTER ONE: POLICING IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY -----	17
The Evolution of the Municipal Police Function -----	18
American versus Foreign Police Models -----	23
The Movement for Government Reform -----	33
The Effect of Civil Service Reform -----	35
Trade Unionism and the Boston Police Strike --	38
Summary -----	45
The California Setting -----	46
CHAPTER TWO: VOLLMER DEVELOPS THE BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT -----	50
1905: The Berkeley Campaign for Marshal ----	50
Vollmer's Background -----	55
Early Years of Innovation -----	57
Personnel Reform -----	67
"College Cops" -----	72
Berkeley as a Training Ground for Police Leaders -----	78
Community Involvement and Press Relations --	84
Association with Earl Warren -----	89
The Quality of Berkeley Policing under Vollmer -----	91
CHAPTER THREE: VOLLMER AS AN ACTIVE POLICE LEADER -----	97
Professional Efforts in California -----	97
National Efforts toward Police Centralization-	102
A Spokesman for Police Professionalism ----	106

The Year in Los Angeles -----	112
Vollmer's Work as a Police Consultant-----	119
The Wickersham Report -----	124
The Years as a Research Professor and Writer -----	129

CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL LOOK AT VOLLMER'S MODEL OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM -----140

Definition of Vollmer's Police Profession- alism -----	141
Changes in Police Priorities -----	143
Major Crimes -----	150
Vice Law Enforcement -----	156
Traffic Regulation -----	165
General Service -----	168
Personnel -----	172
Vollmer's View of Policing in a Changing Society -----	176
Limitations of Vollmer's Professional Policing -----	179
Summary -----	189

CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHANGING CLIMATE OF POLICE REFORM----- 197

Civic and Moral Reformers -----	198
Public Support for Police Professionalism----	207
Police Professionalism: The Changing Historical Mandate -----	214

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS ----- 219

Some Positive Aspects of Professionalism---	221
Detachment versus Participation -----	224
Centralization versus Home Rule-----	228
The Crime Fighter versus the Miscellaneous Public Functionary -----	232

APPENDIX A -----246

"Chronology of the Career of August
Vollmer"

APPENDIX B-----250

Bibliography

APPENDIX C-----259

"Changes in Public Attitudes toward the
Police: A Comparison of Surveys Dated
1938 and 1971" by Gene E. Carte

INTRODUCTION

The Professional Police Model

Professionalism of municipal police departments is supported by most leaders in the criminal justice field and has become the prevailing model for police reform. Hopeful practitioners have come to consider policing, along with corrections, probation and parole, as "emerging professions."¹ Even those who are critical of contemporary police practices tend to see professionalization as the best way to overcome the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of departments in large cities.²

Policing is an ill-defined field in itself, and the term "professionalization" has been used to signify a wide range of measures having little inherent consistency. The President's Commission described the situation aptly:

1

L. C. Loughrey and H. C. Friese, Jr., "Criminal Justice Guidelines for Educators and Practitioners," The Police Chief, XXXIV (1967), No. 8, 37.

2

"According to Mr. (Ramsey) Clark, there is no activity in modern society requiring a broader range of professional skills than police work.... 'And law is but a small part of what a policeman needs to know. He must know psychology and sociology, and be able to recognize culture differences....'" The Center Magazine, III (1971), No. 3, 17.

It is now commonplace to refer to practically any effort that is aimed at improving law enforcement as contributing toward the professionalization of the police. Thus, improved training, the application of the computer to police work, the adoption of a code of ethics, and increased salaries have all, at one time or another, been cited as contributing toward police professionalization.³

The measures that are mentioned do, however, tend to sum up the components that have become accepted as necessary for police professionalization: high personnel standards, centralized management, full use of technology, and a commitment to the uniform, impartial enforcement of the laws. To this may be added the belief that the primary role of the policeman is crime fighting, a stance that leads inevitably to many of the other measures cited.

The traditional police approach, (Herman Goldstein) finds, has been to emphasize crime control in recruitment and training and in rewarding policemen; service activities, which actually consume the majority of police time, have been viewed as burdensome and largely inappropriate for police officers. This position is still accepted widely, especially by those who would "professionalize" police work by focusing it more fully on crime control, transferring other functions to other municipal agencies.⁴

3

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 20-1.

4

Jameson W. Doig, "Police Problems, Proposals, and Strategies for Change," Public Administration Review, XXVIII (1968), 395.

This raises the problem of police function -- of determining what tasks policemen perform, and whether some or all of these tasks are amenable to professionalization.

The President's Commission expressed the accepted view:

Certainly, there is much that police do today that would not, under any definition, be viewed as constituting professional work. Directing traffic at a street intersection or enforcing parking restrictions requires stamina, but little knowledge of the social structure of the community. In sharp contrast, however, the beat patrolman assigned to police a congested, high crime area is called upon to make highly sophisticated judgments having a major impact upon the lives of the individuals involved. Such judgments are not mechanical in nature. They are every bit as complicated as the decisions made by any of the behavioral scientists and in many instances are more difficult because they must be made under the pressure of the immediate circumstances.⁵

Although critics of police professionalism remain in the minority, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the reliance on police "expertise" to cope with serious social problems. Bordua and Haurek stated the argument clearly:

(P)olice reformers have turned to organizational modernization -- technological innovation and managerial sophistication -- as cost-reducing devices. Such devices have had -- in the minds of some observers at least -- the consequence of making police work less personal, more withdrawn from parts of the community, and less sensitive to the variety of human situations.⁶

5

Op. cit., p. 21.

6

David J. Bordua and Edward W. Haurek, "The Police Budget's Lot," American Behavioral Scientist, XIII (1970); 673.

James Q. Wilson criticized police professionalism more from the view that it is an almost unattainable goal in today's cities:

Maintaining a highly professional police force is probably impossible in a city that does not have a political and civic leadership that attaches a high value to honesty, efficiency, impartiality, and the impersonal application of general rules.⁷

He discussed the difficulty of maintaining a relationship of respect between policeman and citizen, and noted:

A professional force, in principle at least, devalues citizen opinion as manifested in personal relations; professionalism, in this sense, means impersonalization.⁸

Professionalism in a Criminal Justice Context

In policing, as in other criminal justice occupations, professionalism is far different from the traditional model that is best represented by medicine and the law. This difference becomes evident when we look at a definition of the traditional or "ideal" form of professionalism:

A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning

7

James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case." In The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 139.

8

Ibid., p. 160. Emphases in original.

or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.⁹

This definition -- more a religious creed than a job description -- is obviously inapplicable to the great majority of occupations currently aspiring for professionalism, although it may serve as an ultimate goal for idealists within any occupation. Other writers on contemporary professionalism have singled out such elements as the esoteric nature of the service delivered, which the client is unable to evaluate by himself; and a high degree of knowledge combined with internalized standards of work and rewards systems.¹⁰
¹¹

Mosher has provided a liberal and useful definition of professionalism that is exactly designed for the public service

⁹

Morris L. Cogan, "The Problem of Defining a Profession," Annals of the American Academy, 297 (1955), 107.

¹⁰

Everett C. Hughes, "Professions." In The Professions in America, ed. Kenneth S. Lynn (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 1.

¹¹

Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of Professions," ibid., pp. 17-9.

employee: the professional must have a reasonably clear-cut occupational field; he should be required to hold at least a bachelor's degree; and the occupation should offer a lifetime career.¹² This practical schema omits the altruistic and esoteric elements that are associated with the traditional form of professionalism. It is an accurate description of the foundation upon which many public service occupations seek to base their claims for professional status.

This new drive for professionalism is characterized, according to Gross, by "galloping specialization, university-based credentialism, continuing education, ... prolonged adolescence, and serial careerism." Gross' article cited Gilb as "pointing out a qualitative change in the nature of professionalism: from savant to specialized expert... and from independent gentleman to a new form of hired help."¹³

The lack of independent power of these new professional groups is obvious. Indeed, the assertion of professional competence by workers within the criminal justice field may be seen as a reaction against their dependence upon the bureaucratic

12

Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 106.

13

Bertram M. Gross, "Planning in an Era of Social Revolution," Public Administration Review, XXXI (1971), 277.

structures that employ them -- as a high form of trade unionism. In Chapter One we will show how police professionalism developed after unionism was closed as an alternative, although the quest for professional status was similarly motivated by the desire to upgrade salaries, minimize political interference, ensure security of employment, and obtain social status.

Public service professionalism has also received support from political leaders and from the public. Elected officials are able to derive political protection from professionalism, a fact of major importance in policing. Most officials would rather claim professional distance for their police department than assume responsibility for all its actions. Price has outlined the support that professionalism receives from politicians because of its proven ability to

14

solve technical problems. Policy in difficult areas can be made behind a shield of professional expertise. As public life and municipal government become more complicated, citizens are also more willing to recognize special areas of knowledge over which the specialist should exercise control,

14

D. K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

in the hope that he may succeed where others have failed.

The public invariably gives more support and prestige to the professionalized agency than to the bureaucratic one that it may have supplanted: bureaucracy is associated with insensitivity, with an excessive zeal for procedure, and cannot claim that its actions are above lay judgment.

Police professionalism is a part of this larger drive for professional status in the public service occupations. There is a special element in policing, however, that makes professionalism a more dangerous choice than in other fields, and that is the inherently elitist nature of police work. The professional's claim to expertise, to the right to define his job and the techniques he may use, to "know better" than the uninitiated, remove him from the political context of his work. When professionalism as an ideology is applied to police work, it reinforces the tendency of the police to exercise discretion in difficult areas away from public view. Police elitism has the additional characteristic that policemen feel their occupation is held in low repute by the public; as an elite "pariah" they are moralistic and tend to become cynical when confronted with ambiguous instructions.

Elitism also tends to suppress innovation unless it is introduced by those who are already fully socialized into

police work. New ideas from outside sources are extremely suspect and are rarely adopted. Suggestions coming from the general public are seen as too simplistic or uninformed.

Since the alternatives already present within the police do not represent the total alternatives available, elitism becomes

15

a handicap to innovation.

Professionalism as an occupational model is a new reality in many public service occupations. It differs fundamentally from the traditional model that Cogan described above, but its aspirants seek to claim the high status and freedom from interference that professionalism connotes. Within policing, the professional model emerged in response to some very specific occupational conditions and demands that prevailed in the early years of this century, as we will show in Chapter One.

Policing's First Professional

High estimates of the skills necessary for police work were strongly voiced over fifty years ago by August Vollmer, the Berkeley police chief who did more than any other individual

15

See also Gene E. Carte, "Evaluation of Professionalism within the Criminal Justice System," Criminologica, VII (1969), for a discussion of these issues.

16

to advance the cause of professional policing. Vollmer frequently compared police work to the medical, legal and scientific professions, and wrote: "But it has not yet been recognized that the work of the modern policeman requires professional training comparable to that required for the

17

most skilled profession."

Vollmer campaigned aggressively for his goal of a professional police service, during 27 years as head of the Berkeley department and later as a writer, consultant and educator in the field. His proteges, including O. W. Wilson, have exerted an influence over later generations of police leaders. Vollmer's impact in California, which today ranks first in its development of professional police standards and

18

educational programs, was especially profound. He developed and implemented his ideas about policing across

16

August Vollmer lived from 1876 to 1955. He was elected marshal of Berkeley, California, in 1905; he became chief of the newly formed Berkeley Police Department in 1909 and retained that position until 1932.

17

The Police and Modern Society (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1936 edition), p. 231.

18

The President's Commission noted: "Perhaps more has been done collectively for police service on a statewide basis in California than in any other State." (Op. cit., p. 74.)

a span of years that saw considerable social dislocation and controversy, extending from before World War I through almost the entire Prohibition era. He entered policing when it was an occupation held in low repute by the public for its corruption and incompetence, and all his life he attempted to reverse that image by scorning politics and aggrandizing the role of the policeman. He articulated probably the best case that has been made for police professionalism, and in his own career exemplified a rare combination of high ideals, political acuity, and openness to change.

This paper intends to explore the development of Vollmer's career and ideas about policing in order to provide a historical perspective within which to evaluate police professionalism. There has been almost no critical evaluation of Vollmer's work, despite the lasting influence it has had on American police leaders in setting an idealized standard or image of police work. Vollmer's major ideas have been virtually "locked into" the police mentality since he began publicizing them on a national scale in the 1920s. The police section of the Wickersham Report, of which Vollmer was director, has been the accepted statement of modern police

19

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931).

goals since it was published in 1931. For these reasons, it is important to analyze Vollmer's own experience, to see what historical factors affected his model of policing, and to determine how successful the model was in application.

Design of the Paper

As the President's Commission noted in the quotation above, police professionalism means many things to many people. This paper will confine itself primarily to the model that evolved from Vollmer's work, a detailed examination of which will be found in Chapter Four. For present purposes, it may be described as a model that incorporates the elements mentioned above -- high personnel standards, centralized management, full use of technology, and a commitment to the uniform, impartial enforcement of the laws -- but with one crucial addition: Vollmer's model depends for its success upon the personal competence and dedication of the individual police officer. This admittedly intangible element contributed substantially to the reputation enjoyed for years by the Berkeley Police Department as probably the most modern and effective police force in the nation. Other current models of police professionalism, especially those applied in large cities, have tended to emphasize technology and management rather

than the problem of the policeman's fitness for his job.

Examples are the Los Angeles Police Department, developed
20
under the leadership of William H. Parker, and the model
21
represented by the work of O. W. Wilson.

In analyzing Vollmer's model of professionalism we will be testing the effectiveness of police professionalism in what was probably its most successful application. We will attempt to identify those elements that made it succeed where it did and, finally, to speculate upon its viability under present circumstances. Chapter One presents an overview of the kind of policing that was being practiced in American cities in the decades before Vollmer entered policing in 1905, as well as some of the historical trends that continued to exert an influence during his career. Chapters Two and Three look in detail at Vollmer's life and work, and Chapter Four presents a critique of his model of police professionalism.

Chapter Five examines the differing climates that surround police reform, by contrasting public attitudes that prevailed during Vollmer's active career with those of today.

20

Parker served as police chief of Los Angeles from 1950 to 1966.

21

Wilson's Police Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963) is considered the standard work in the field.

This chapter intends to show that several key factors present in the 1910s and 1920s -- the suppression of unionism, a general public reaction against municipal corruption, the attractions of a new era of technology -- tended to mold police reform along the lines that were so actively championed by Vollmer. These factors will be contrasted with current public attitudes that are in conflict with the mood that gave impetus to police reform several decades ago. Among these recent attitudes are a growing acceptance of public service unionism, a desire for less remote styles of policing (e.g., public preference for foot patrols), and the demands of racial and cultural groups for more representation and community involvement in the policing of their areas. Survey research material from both periods will be used to support this analysis.

Chapter Six contains a summary discussion of the suitability of Vollmer's police professionalism for present needs. Which ideas that he articulated can still provide a basis for police reform? Which have become less important, or have come into conflict with new realities and public attitudes? What new directions for reform can be suggested that will retain the best from police professionalism and adapt it for the future?

At the conclusion of the paper will be found a bibliography of Vollmer's published works, updated from a list probably compiled by himself. A chronology of important events in his career, which from internal evidence was also compiled by Vollmer, is included.

Future Research Goals

This paper is intended to serve as a starting point for a more complete biography of August Vollmer that is projected for the future. In the course of conducting the present research I have come across an abundance of material on Vollmer's career that was previously unavailable, and which exceeded the requirements for the present project. The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley is well into the process of indexing personal papers that were given to the Library after the death of Vollmer in 1955. In addition to this, papers that were formerly in the possession of the Berkeley Police Department pertaining to Vollmer's long career there have been recently transferred to the

22

One biography of Vollmer has been written, by his associate Alfred E. Parker, entitled Crime Fighter: August Vollmer (New York: Macmillan, 1961); but this work, although accurate, is largely superficial and anecdotal and does not provide material for any serious understanding of Vollmer's impact on American policing.

Bancroft Library. Finally, a volume of interviews with
colleagues and friends of August Vollmer will be published
this year (1972) by the Oral History section of the Library. 23

This volume will be published under the title August Vollmer:
Pioneer in Police Professionalism (Interviews conducted by
Jane Howard Robinson; Regional Oral History Office, The
Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley).

CHAPTER ONE: POLICING IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY

Vollmer entered policing in 1905, at a time when all public services were coming under increasing scrutiny for their inefficiency and corruption. Municipal policing was a prominent and deserving target for the criticisms of contemporary reformers, but the deficiencies of most police departments of the day were only an extension of a larger picture of general municipal corruption and public apathy. "American municipal government," wrote police scholar Leonhard Fuld in 1909, "is just now passing through a transition period. Corruption and dishonesty are found everywhere in public life and are not entirely unknown in private life. The citizens get as good a police service as they want."¹

This period of turmoil and transition produced the first serious attempts to identify the nature of American policing,² by such writers as Fuld and Raymond Fosdick, and later by Vollmer, the earliest practitioner to draw general attention to this issue. Nearly all these attempts used the police

¹ Leonhard Fuld, Police Administration: A Critical Study of Police Organisations in the United States and Abroad (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1909 edition), p. 40.

² Raymond Fosdick, American Police Systems (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1920 edition).

systems of Europe as a comparative framework.

In the following pages we will look at municipal policing as it evolved in the United States and in other countries, particularly England, and explore criticisms that arose against traditional American policing during the last years of the 19th and the early years of the 20th centuries. Changes in American policing will be examined within the context of general municipal reform, the development of civil service, and the growing trade unionism movement.

The Evolution of the Municipal Police Function

Municipal policing is the most poorly defined of the government services that organize and regulate life within a city. After subtracting a policeman's crime-fighting duties, which occupy only a small part of his working day, one is left with an assortment of tasks that become increasingly difficult to classify or to use as the basis for a rational police service. Bruce Smith wrote that the police are popularly known as those responsible for "suppressing crimes and public disorders, and regulating the use of the highways." However, this understanding:

fails to recognize the additional and sometimes burdensome regulatory duties which police discharge. The historical setting of police has a special value in this connection, and it

is worthy of note that in its early definitions, and also at various later stages of governmental development, the term has been employed to describe certain aspects of the control of sanitation or the suppression of political offenses, and has even been expanded to cover practically all forms of public regulation and domestic order.³

In other words, policing has traditionally been a miscellaneous government service that is charged with responsibility for all the duties that do not fall within the purview of other established public agencies, and is often the primary contact that a citizen has with his city government.⁴ The most "miscellaneous" of these duties are ones that have only a remote connection to the general welfare of the city.

James Q. Wilson has commented:

The "service" functions of the police -- first aid, rescuing cats, helping ladies, and the like -- are omitted from this study because, unlike the law enforcement functions, they are intended to please the client and no one else. There is no reason in principle why these services could not be priced and sold on the market. It is only a matter of historical accident and community convenience

3

Police Systems in the United States (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 15.

4

For references to recent literature on this subject, see Deborah Johnson and Robert J. Gregory, "Police-Community Relations in the United States: A Review of Recent Literature and Projects," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, LXII (1971), 95-6.

that they are provided by the police; one can just as easily imagine them sold by a private, profit-making firm ("Emergency Services, Inc.").⁵

By the last quarter of the 19th century, American municipal policing was losing some of its traditional duties,⁶ such as fire fighting and sanitation. The attempt of contemporary writers on policing to rationalize the police function was a response to the changing public expectations of what the police should do, and their efforts were in themselves an indication that police organization was in flux.⁷

For example, in the 1870s the citizens of New York City became concerned about the poor maintenance of the streets, which were traditionally cleaned by private companies who received contracts from the city. In 1872 this responsibility was placed within the police department, and although complaints continued about the quality of street cleaning, the

5

Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 4-5.

6

See Smith, op. cit., pp. 15-20; and Elmer Graper, American Police Administration (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1921 edition), pp. 3-4.

7

Rising occupational consciousness among policemen was also evidenced by the substantial number of police department histories written during this period, sponsored by department relief associations or pension funds. See Augustus Kuhlman, A Guide to Material on Crime and Criminal Justice (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1929), entries 4713-57.

situation was better than it had been before. By 1881 a
8
separate agency was given this responsibility.

A more onerous function, for policemen, was their obligation to offer lodging in the stationhouses for homeless vagrants.

For more than thirty years police authorities protested the system as one that undermined the health of the police by exposing them to disease through foul people and air. Some of the "lodgers" were individuals temporarily down on their luck, others were regulars or "bummers" who made the rounds of the station houses in good times and bad.⁹

The New York police succeeded in divesting themselves of
10
this job by 1896. Providing food and shelter for the homeless was also a controversial function of the Boston department
11
during these years.

Excepting the miscellaneous service duties that were difficult to fit within any rational framework, most police scholars perceived that the police have two basic functions that seem to call for contradictory priorities and methods.

8
James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 225-6.

9
Ibid., p. 264.

10
Ibid., p. 266.

11
Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 191-4, 206.

Fuld differentiated these functions as the preventive and the punitive, which in America "are seldom differentiated, although logically the duties of the police easily lend themselves to such a classification." ¹² The preventive aspect of police

work was accomplished by "maintaining a regular patrol of the streets day and night, by enforcing the city ordinances...

¹³ and by the regulation of street traffic..., " duties which were designed to promote the general welfare of law-abiding citizens. In punitive police work, policemen had to "ferret ¹⁴ out criminals and assist the courts in convicting them."

This side of policing, Fuld noted, was most efficient in countries where freedom of the people was weak, as in Russia or France.

In the United States, punitive operations were "least efficient."

While causes other than the personal liberty of the individual doubtless contribute to this result, yet it is easily apparent that the most effective detective work requires a constant interference with personal liberty, which is repugnant to American ideas. ¹⁵

Fuld's observation that these two functions were poorly differentiated in American policing was an accurate statement

¹²

Op. cit., p. 4.

¹³

Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴

Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁵

Ibid., p. 7.

of a problem that remained of concern when Wilson wrote¹⁶ his analysis of American police styles in 1969. One police structure, one administration, one set of personnel standards are expected to fulfil contradictory duties. Wilson described the most important police function as "order maintenance" -- the prevention or reconciliation of "behavior that either disturbs or threatens to disturb the public peace or that involves face-to-face conflict among two or more persons."¹⁷ More clear cut is the patrolman's responsibility to enforce the law, which Wilson saw as involving issues of guilt or innocence only, not the discretionary areas with which order maintenance¹⁸ must deal. Wilson's analysis was a more complex one, focusing on the role of the individual patrolman, and downgrading the political implications of the law enforcement function that Fuld had described as punitive and found most clearly in the police states of Europe.

American versus Foreign Police Models

Behind these early explorations of police function was the premise that there was a substantial similarity of function

¹⁶

Op. cit.

¹⁷

Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁸

Ibid., pp. 17, 85.

that remained constant despite national variations. Police reformers of the beginning of this century were especially prone to treat American policing as a vastly inferior cut from the same cloth as the police systems of Europe, and they often recommended modifications of American policing based on the more efficient and developed police departments on the continent and in England. Fosdick studied American policing after completing a work on the police agencies of Europe,¹⁹ and was melancholy about the contrast between the two. He wrote of the "fundamental divergencies in national conditions, customs and psychology which pile up obstacles in the way of efficient police work in America almost beyond²⁰ the conception of the average European official." These divergencies included the greater American heterogeneity, the higher rate of crime, the inefficiency of other agencies in the criminal justice process, the "red tape and technicalities"²¹ of the legal structure, and the "weak sentimentality of the community in relation to crime and the criminal."²² After

19

European Police Systems (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1915 edition).

20

American Police Systems, op. cit., p. 4. Emphasis added.

21

Ibid., p. 29.

22

Ibid., p. 43.

extolling the efficiency of European policing, he concluded:

In America, on the other hand, the student of police travels from one political squabble to another, too often from one scandal to another. He finds a shifting leadership of mediocre calibre -- varied now and then by flashes of real ability which are snuffed out when the political wheel turns. There is little conception of policing as a profession or a science to be matured and developed. It is a job, held, perhaps, by the grace of some mysterious political influence, and conducted in an atmosphere sordid and unhealthy.²³

The most popular model against which American police departments were measured was the London Metropolitan Police, originated by Sir Robert Peel in 1828, which has been traditionally recognized as the first example of a modern
²⁴
 police force. It was the most attractive model for American policing in part because it did not have the "police state" implications that came to mind when examining the efficient but less democratic police agencies of Europe and Russia. "The English police system," Fuld wrote, "combines in a peculiarly happy manner administrative efficiency with local
²⁵
 independence."

This admiration for foreign police models, however,

23

Ibid., pp. 379-80.

24

Fuld, op. cit., pp. 20-1; Graper, op. cit., p. 2.

25

Fuld, op. cit., p. 13.

led these scholars to neglect the substantial differences that were present in the development of American policing, which had evolved symbiotically with other urban institutions. American municipal police departments had traditionally existed as extensions of local political processes. Recent studies of the history of policing in Boston and New York City documented the extent to which these departments were intrinsically involved in the political life of the city, despite superficial similarities with organizational components of the London model. 26

Fuld recognized this when he said:

Police officers in the United States, though recognized by the courts as officers of the commonwealth, are considered by the people as well as in the practical administration of politics and government as municipal officers.... The American municipal police is furthermore fairly efficient in maintaining order in the city. 27

He also understood that the concept of a centralized police agency was a European import rather than a native American institution, and that metropolitan policing resulted either from the desire to secure more effective law enforcement in selected areas like liquor laws, or for partisan advantage in the continuous struggle between cities and the state legislatures. 28

26 Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885, op. cit.; and Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901, op. cit.

27

Op. cit., p. 15.

28

Ibid., pp. 15-6.

There were other basic differences between the London police style and that which developed in the United States.

Miller, in comparing the origins of the London and the New York

29

City police departments, pointed out that each had to be

defined in accord with public demands that the maintenance

of order be limited by protection of civil liberties. However,

the two cities used very different strategies to achieve this

end. In London, the police were established as professionals,

in the broad sense of the word, who were subordinate to the

rule of law. New York City police were established as amateurs

subject to the rule of the people, i. e., the local electorate.

The London police, in Miller's analysis, identified with that

country's legal system rather than adapting themselves to

popular changes within the city. They sought to maintain an im-

partial stance in relation to the law, a posture that enabled them

to retain support from middle-class Londoners who feared that

the police would become repressive agents of the aristocracy.

In this manner, traditional English hostility against the estab-

lishment of a standing semimilitary force was overcome.

Although the "bobbies" themselves were primarily working-class

recruits, their enforcement of the law protected the interests

29

Wilbur Miller, "Police and the Rule of Law: London and New York City, 1830-1870." Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Historical Association, December, 1971.

of middle-class persons who could not afford private security measures and had been easy targets of urban violence. The emphasis on due process also permitted the police to resist efforts by reformers to interfere with working-class life styles.

While espousing many of the features of the London police, American departments became closely identified with the local political leadership, whether it was Tammany in New York City or Cox in Cincinnati. This was a system that obviously invited corruption, just as the local political leadership was corrupt, and in many cities the police department deserved the bad reputation that has come down to the present in police histories. However, the police structure itself had a basis in some of the most enduring characteristics of American democracy: faith in home rule, in the "community's effective sovereignty,"³⁰ in the belief in amateur public servants.³¹ The impartial stance of London's department was rejected on the grounds that any intelligent citizen with the "face validity" of local identity could perform official public duties, including police duties. The resolution of problems³⁰

Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), p. 44.

31

Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 61-2.

of discretion, of selection of priorities, would flow so naturally from community values that they need not even be articulated.

The broad discretion that this implied was especially obvious where unpopular laws were concerned. It was relatively easy for an organized pressure group to push for state or local legislation restricting Sunday drinking, gambling and other practices, but enforcement was exceedingly lax. Fosdick called this "one of the most embarrassing phases of the whole question of law enforcement."

Mayors, administrations and police forces are more often and more successfully attacked from this point than from any other, and the consequences are corrupted policemen and shuffling executives who give the best excuse they can think of at the moment for failing to do the impossible, but are able to add nothing to the situation but a sense of their own perplexity. Of all the cities visited by the writer, there was scarcely one that did not bear evidence of demoralization arising from attempts to enforce laws which instead of representing the will of the community, represented hardly anybody's will.³²

Policemen could hardly be blamed for this situation of nonenforcement, but they were constantly exposed to charges of corruption and compromise by those groups who supported a particular law or ordinance. This became a significant

32

American Police Systems, op. cit., pp. 48-9.

component in the movement to reform municipal policing in the early 20th century, because it coincided with what Haller has described as a "series of concerted campaigns to eliminate vice and the white slave trade from American cities (in the period from 1905 to 1915)....."

In later years, the police would be the allies and leaders of the deterrent tradition (that arose during these campaigns). But during the campaigns against vice the police were cast as the primary officials whose dereliction of duty allowed the redlight districts to exist and prosper. The clash of reformers and the police was rooted in both a differing ideology and the reformers' opposition to police corruption.³³

Haller's study of the history of the Chicago Police

34

Department further supported the thesis that political activities were central, not peripheral, to the policeman's job. He asserted that the police were an integral part of the political process of the city and, while functioning in that context, had a different set of attitudes than did the reformer. Moral

33

Mark Haller, "Theories of Criminal Violence and Their Impact on the Criminal Justice System." In Crimes of Violence, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 13 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1331.

34

"Civic Reformers and Police Leadership: Chicago, 1905-1935." In Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971).

reformers of this era, because of their attitudes and the nature of their reforms, were barred from machine politics. They rejected not merely the machine and its allies, including the police, but also the values that underlay them. In attacking the police for failing to enforce vice laws, they were implicitly attacking the large constituencies that did not wish these laws enforced.

The police thus forfeited the legitimacy that middle-class support could give them, and were ultimately no stronger than the authority of the ruling political faction. The mandate of the police, being shakily rooted in the law, was transitory, and Vollmer's drive for professionalism was in part based on the desire to free policing from the insecurity and "degradation" of political servitude.

Confronted with these differences between American and foreign policing, scholars like Fuld, Fosdick and Vollmer tended to overestimate the extent to which importation of foreign models could solve the problems of American policing. They perceived little in the 19th century American police tradition that was worth saving, and established the imported models as their ideal. When Fosdick contrasted the systems of America and Europe, he described the differing American "national conditions, customs and psychology" as obstacles to

efficient police work. However, he softened his review of current American inadequacies by pointing out that American police were in a more backward stage of development:

A basis of comparison, perhaps fairer than the juxtaposition of European police and our own, is the contrast between what our system is today and what it was ten, twenty and forty years ago. Assuming that our present measurement by European standards is below our hopes, what has our own growth been?

It is this perspective which furnishes a substantial basis for encouragement. London's police department had thirty-five years of established tradition and achievement behind it when the draft riots broke out in New York in 1863.³⁶

But his general verdict was still one of condemnation:

The contrast between the old world and the new in respect to the evolution of local government leaves little to the credit of America. One turns from the history of our municipal development with the wish that most of its sordid story could be blotted out.³⁷

35

American Police Systems, op. cit., p. 4.

36

Ibid., pp. 380-1.

37

Ibid., p. 117. These early, chaotic years of American policing were viewed by even more recent police scholars as an aberration, as an era that became obsolete when the enlightened police leaders of the early 20th century, Vollmer pre-eminent among them, came upon the scene. Bruce Smith, writing in 1940, said that "the American police problem continues to be synonymous with nineteenth-century municipal corruption. Still more years must come and go before this lengthening shadow finally recedes into its obscure and inglorious past." (Op. cit., p. 106)

The Movement for Government Reform

The period during which Vollmer entered policing and forwarded his version of police professionalism was characterized by a general movement for governmental reform known as Progressivism, extending roughly from 1900 to 1916.³⁸ Contemporary criticisms of police corruption are best understood within this broader context of reform. It was inevitable that the municipal policeman,³⁹ haphazardly selected and poorly trained, would become a target for the reformers.

This was also a period of fervent moral reform, with issues like drinking and vice assuming increasing importance for reformers who wished to change what they perceived as a corrupt, political pattern of government services. Fosdick reported in his autobiographical account of these years on the great difficulty that the Wilson Administration had in its attempts to suppress prostitution in urban areas adjacent to military installations, during the national mobilization for

38

George Mowry, The California Progressives (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperback, 1963, reprinted from the 1951 edition), p. v.

39

Selection was logical in political terms. The city was divided into police districts and the recruit was required to live within his district. He was sponsored for his job by a political figure.

40

World War I. Federal authority confronted a multiplicity of local governments which did not pretend to share the priorities of Federal law enforcement monitors. Extensive coercive measures were required before the cities joined reluctantly in the move to "clean house."

"Fit to fight" became a slogan which swept the country, and by the end of 1917 I was able to report to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that every red light district in the United States had been closed -- a hundred and ten of them; that the venereal disease rate was the lowest in our military history; and that drunkenness among the troops on leave no longer represented a serious situation.⁴¹

Confronted with the reluctance of local police to honor the priorities of reform, police critics did not hesitate to identify politics as the greatest enemy of policing. Breaking the connection of the police with the partisan political apparatus of the city was seen as the only means of introducing change and increasing the efficiency of local policing. Fosdick, in another context, wrote of the political interference in policing:

Another factor, perhaps more important, is responsible for the constant alteration in our police machinery. It is summed up in the word politics.... There is scarcely

40

Raymond Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958).

41

Ibid., p. 147.

a city in the United States in which the police department has not been used as the ladder by which political organizations have crawled to power.⁴²

The Effect of Civil Service Reform

The reformers and middle-class interests who protested most vigorously against municipal corruption singled out political patronage as the greatest evil. This was the foundation of the movement to adopt systems of civil service at many levels of government. "By denying politicians the spoils of office, the argument ran, civil service would drive out the parasites and leave only a pure, frugal government behind."⁴³

The thrust of this reform, embodied in the Pendleton Act of 1883, was clearly moral, not merely designed to increase efficiency in public service. "Its prime objective is to remove from American politics the degrading influence of the patron-

age system."⁴⁴ Wiebe commented on the faith of the age in simplistic solutions:

Because most reformers conceived the world as an orderly affair where societies, like planets, normally functioned according to

42

American Police Systems, op. cit., p. 115.

43

Robert Wiebe, op. cit., pp. 60-1.

44

From the 1891 report of the Civil Service Commission, as quoted in Wiebe, ibid., p. 61.

rational laws, they had customarily looked for that one gear askew, that one fundamental rule violated, as an explanation for America's troubles.⁴⁵

Mosher referred to civil service reform as "essentially a negative movement designed to stamp out a system which was
46
'a disgrace to republican institutions' -- to eradicate evil."

Nowhere was the "disgrace" of the spoils system more obvious to reformers than in municipal policing, which in many cities operated as the coercive arm of the dominant political faction. Although civil service was obviously more applicable to some branches of government than others, it was commonly believed that it would be the best method for removing the evil of politics from law enforcement. This development was accepted reluctantly by police leaders because they had little to suggest in its place, but they were quick to note its deficiencies in a police context. Graper wrote half-heartedly of the benefits that civil service had brought to policing:

Under the present conditions of party politics, provision must be made to remove, as far as possible, the police service from the influence of partisanship and favoritism, and the civil

45

Ibid., p. 62.

46

Mosher, op. cit., p. 65. Internal quotation from Dorman B. Eaton's Civil Service Reform in Great Britain, 1879.

service system has at least eliminated, where honestly applied, the grosser abuses which almost invariably prevail where the system is not in force. Moreover, the system is continually being improved.⁴⁷

He also spoke of the more constructive aspects of civil service, in efficiency rating and standardizing duties, grades and salaries, but conceded: "Unfortunately these improvements have not been reflected in police service to such an extent as in some other fields of municipal administration."⁴⁸ In the crucial matter of civil service competitive examinations, Graper called them "a very defective basis for making promotions in the police service."⁴⁹

During this same period, Raymond Fosdick, while granting the need to protect police chiefs from capricious political interference, said that civil service "has too-often proved a bulwark for incompetence and neglect.... Too often, too, it has served as a respectable cloak for political juggling, defeating its own purpose, and bringing the whole cause of reform into disrepute."⁵⁰

47

Graper, op. cit., p. 70.

48

Ibid., p. 71.

49

Ibid., p. 81.

50

American Police Systems, op. cit., p. 260.

CONTINUED

1 OF 7

Other areas of government service employed the civil service system with varying success, and were able to introduce more constructive reforms in conjunction with it. (For example, the U. S. Post Office.) Policing, however, more subtly intertwined with politics, less clearly defined in function, more difficult to evaluate in terms of performance, found at best a minimum protection from abuse through civil service. This has been recognized for years, and was a concern to police administrators at the time that Vollmer entered the field in 1905.

Trade Unionism and the Boston Police Strike

The second major employment trend of this era was the rapid growth of unionism. Police social groups and benevolent associations had come into existence around the turn of the century. Boston's Social Club, for example, was founded in 1906.⁵¹ They were a natural outgrowth of traditional close ties of policemen as an occupational group, and these groups worked informally to obtain better compensation and working conditions.⁵² They also served to uplift police morale; a

51

Richard Lyons, "The Boston Police Strike of 1919," The New England Quarterly, June 1947, p. 151.

52

Graper, op. cit., p. 311.

serious problem in an occupation that received little public support and had conflicting demands placed upon it. However, the benevolent associations failed to exert enough influence with political leaders to correct the deplorable working conditions that plagued most municipal police departments. In effect, during the early years of this century policemen were being asked to perform more efficiently and to loosen their traditional ties with political organizations, yet were not rewarded with commensurate increases in pay and working conditions.

An article in a police magazine in February, 1919, commented sympathetically upon the growth of police unions:

It is evident that the police throughout the country are sympathetic toward unionizing. The movement began in the autumn of last year, and has gathered momentum ever since. But for the war, which acted as a stop gap, police unions might have been by this time an established fact. With the passing of the world conflict the arrested union tide is again moving forward. What is behind the surge? Economic conditions.

* * *

Since the municipalities won't listen to his just plea, (the policeman) is compelled to take matters in his own hands. Unions have always fought for the rights of labor. So the policeman naturally turns for help in that direction.⁵³

The Boston Police Department was the first aggressively to assert its right to collective bargaining, and it was
54
severely suppressed. The American Federation of Labor had begun to grant police charters in 1919, and by September of that year granted charters to 33 municipal police departments.
55
Boston's application included by far the greatest number of members -- 975 out of a force of 1544 men. The next largest proposed police union was 135 members from
56
St. Paul, Minnesota. "According to Samuel Gompers many policemen and policemen's organizations had been making
57
appeals to the Federation for charters for many years...."

The first recorded attempt by police to unionize occurred in 1897 when a group of special police in Cleveland petitioned the A. F. L. for a charter. At that time, the A. F. L. went on record as being opposed to police unions on the grounds, "it is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize

54

Material on the Boston Police Strike is taken largely from Lyons' article, cited above.

55

Graper, op. cit., pp. 311-2.

56

Ibid., p. 312; total membership figure of the Boston P. D. is taken from Lyons, op. cit., p. 160.

57

Graper, op. cit., pp. 312-3.

militiamen, as both policemen and militia-
men are often controlled by forces inimical
to the labor movement."⁵⁸

Lyons showed that the move of Boston policemen to
unionize was born of desperation, after attempts to improve
working conditions and to raise salaries through ordinary
political channels had failed. Since 1913 salaries had risen
an average of 18%, but the cost of living had risen 86%.
Policemen were working an average of 87 hours a week. They
were required to live in the stationhouses while on duty, and
conditions there had been investigated and judged to be unsan-
itary as early as 1909, but the city made no attempt to improve
them.⁵⁹ It is also of interest to note that during this same
period efforts were being made to enforce antisaloon legisla-
tion, thus depriving policemen of an informal source of income⁶⁰
that had supplemented their meager wages for years.

Formal application for a charter was made to the
A. F. of L. on August 10th by the members of the Boston

Social Club, the police fraternal organization, and it was
⁵⁸

M. W. Aussieker, Jr., Police Collective Bargaining
(Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1969), p. 1.
⁵⁹

Lyons, op. cit., pp. 148-9.
⁶⁰

Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1962), p. 263.

61

granted the next day. Members of the department who attended a meeting called by the police association voted unanimously to affiliate. The police commissioner responded by bringing charges against 19 police union leaders for violating new regulations that prohibited affiliation with outside organizations. These regulations were apparently only enacted when the commissioner became aware of the impending affiliation with the A. F. of L. As the situation worsened, an official citizens' committee recommended a compromise that required the police to give up their A. F. of L. affiliation but recognized their right to have a departmental union and specified that no action would be taken against the union leadership.

This compromise was acceptable to the policemen but was rejected by the commissioner, who proceeded to suspend the 19 defendants from duty. It was this rejection that precipitated the strike, which was approved by an 1134 to 2 vote of the membership. Governor Coolidge soon called out the entire State Guard, who combined with volunteer units to comprise a force of over 7000 men, after disorders broke out in the city that local officials were not prepared to meet. All the

62

61

Lyons, op. cit., p. 151.

62

Ibid., pp. 162-3.

striking policemen, comprising three-fourths of the department, were subsequently dismissed, and police unionism was dead in Boston and, as Lyons pointed out, in every other American city for years to come.

63

Since the Boston strike, police leaders and the public have regarded police unionism as inherently illegitimate.

(The strike provoked Coolidge's well-remembered statement, in reply to an appeal by Samuel Gompers: "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere,

64

anytime.") However, thoughtful observers at the time recognized that the efforts to unionize were based in real grievances, and that suppression of unionism would have to be followed by an alternate system of redress. Fosdick wrote the year after the strike: "(The community) cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which other workers have, and at the same time

ignore their just claims because they are pressed merely by

65

argument." Graper mentioned the fear that a unionized police would not act impartially during labor disputes:

63

Ibid., p. 168.

64

Quoted in Graper, op. cit., p. 318.

65

American Police Systems, op. cit., p. 321.

In times of industrial trouble as well as in other times the public depends upon the police for protection. However, it is unreasonable to expect policemen affiliated with labor unions whose members may be on strike to enforce the law impartially under such circumstances. 66

Vollmer reacted strongly against police unions, in a statement made in October of 1919:

My opinion is that it would be just as sensible for policemen to join forces with the Bankers, Producers or Manufacturers Associations as to become identified with the American Federation of Labor. Such an affiliation is utterly impossible. The policemen should organize for the amelioration of their condition and this organization should be federated into one national body. Backed by State and National associations each municipal group would have at their disposal the very best talent to present their claims to the public and their legislative representatives. 67

The suppression of police unionism in Boston produced a lasting effect. Twenty years later, Bruce Smith referred to the new growth of interest in police unions and commented: "The Boston police strike of 1919 raised so many disturbing issues it is not surprising that the prospect of further unsettlement should produce grave concern in official circles." 68

66

Graper, op. cit., p. 319.

67

From "'No Divided Allegiance,' Say Chiefs," Policeman's News, October, 1919, p. 49.

68

Op. cit., p. 320.

Summary

We have seen that the American municipal police were fundamentally different from the model so frequently cited of the London Metropolitan Department. The latter had evolved a style of policing that was procedurally restrained in order to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the middle class. Legal powers were stressed, political involvements were considered inappropriate. In contrast with this, American cities developed amateur police forces that were loyal not to the rule of law but to the rule of the local electorate. When the movement for reform grew, in municipal government and by extension in policing, the policeman was placed in an untenable situation: he was expected to become an efficient, impartial enforcer of the laws, while in reality he remained beholden to the local political process that had sustained him. This was especially true to the degree that reforms were being pressed by those to whom Staughton Lynd referred as "moral authoritarians," i.e., those who hold that "the human being is infinitely malleable in relation to changes in environment."

69

These reformers were a real threat to police chiefs, as evidenced by the trouble they caused for Vollmer's friend in the

Quoted in Murray Levine and Adeline Levine, A Social History of Helping Services (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 25.

Oakland Police Department, Walter Petersen. They spear-headed a defamation campaign in 1916 against Petersen while he was running for the presidency of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.⁷⁰ The leader of the campaign was the minister of an Oakland church.

The theme of subsequent police reform has been to reject entirely the traditional style of American policing. Reformers saw little of value that they wished to retain and, more serious, did not believe that any features of this amateur policing reflected true necessities of the heterogeneous municipalities in which it flourished. Vollmer, Fosdick and Smith singled out the involvement of policing in the political process as its most illegitimate characteristic, and their reforms were directed toward detaching the police entirely from politics while at the same time improving their technological efficiency.

The California Setting

Vollmer's career as a police chief and reformer took place in a part of California that was fully affected by the political excesses of that era. Although Berkeley, as a headquarters for the "moral authoritarians," was relatively

70

Proceedings of the I. A. C. P., 1916. See the discussion following Petersen's paper, "The Chief of Police -- The Goat for the Sins of Society," pp. 44-7.

untainted, Oakland and San Francisco were dominated by corrupt machine politicians. Every area of the state was run for the profit and convenience of big business, most notably the Southern Pacific Railroad. ⁷¹ A biographer of Abraham Ruef, the San Francisco boss until his downfall in 1908, wrote:

The political scene, as Ruef found it in the 'eighties, was hardly attractive to young men of principles. The machinery of boss politics in San Francisco had the general characteristics of the institution as it had evolved in most large American cities. It had been part of the transit of civilization from the East to the Pacific Coast. In California, the subservience of politics to big business was especially facilitated by the dominance of a single great corporation in the state's economy (the Southern Pacific Railroad). ⁷²

Wiebe described America during this period as "a nation of intense partisanship and massive political indifference." ⁷³ The political forms of the day were rooted in lives that were "narrowly circumscribed by a community or a neighborhood." Issues that concerned people beyond these narrow limits were irrelevant, so long as local ethnic problems received their due. Machine politics easily manipulated

⁷¹ Mowry, op. cit., pp. 10-22.

⁷²

Walter Bean, Boss Ruef's San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), p. 4.

⁷³

Op. cit., p. 27.

these feelings.

San Francisco at the turn of the century was the scene of an intense political battle, "where muckraking newspapermen joined forces with business and professional groups to battle one of the most ruthless and graft-ridden city machines in the state,"⁷⁴ that of Boss Ruef, who had gained control of the city's political apparatus in 1901. The reformers initiated court action against the machine in a series of trials that took place between 1906 and 1909. Dramatic press coverage of these events, which triggered a "statewide campaign against political corruption,"⁷⁵ dominated the front pages of the newspapers read by August Vollmer and other Berkeley citizens during his early years as marshal. The police department in San Francisco received publicity for sharing in the graft⁷⁶ and vice protection of the machine. Confronted with this skein of corruption, California reformers crusaded for clean government and rejected the class implications of traditional municipal politics, scorning both the excesses of big business

74

John Owens, Edmond Costantini, Louis Weschler, California Politics and Parties (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 33.

75

Ibid., p. 33.

76

Bean, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

and the clamor of labor interests.

Within this context August Vollmer developed his views about professional policing, a solution that spoke to immediate issues like corruption and inefficiency, and also offered the policeman an alternative way to improve conditions within his occupation.

CHAPTER TWO: VOLLMER DEVELOPS THE BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The events of Vollmer's life and career are the subject of this and the following chapter. Within this chapter we will discuss Vollmer's local career in Berkeley, in particular his development of the Berkeley Police Department from a small force of deputy marshals to the "college cops" of the 1920s and 1930s. Chapter Three will deal with Vollmer's national career as a police leader, author and educator.

1905: The Berkeley Campaign for Marshal

In 1905 a group of prominent Berkeley citizens sponsored a reform ticket to challenge incumbent Marshal Kearns. At this time Berkeley was a town of 20,000 persons, many of whom earned their living in San Francisco or Oakland but were alarmed by the corruption and lawlessness that prevailed there and wished to protect their community from the encroachment of these influences. It was a staid, progressive, temperance-minded community, where churches and theological

1

Alfred Parker, Crime Fighter: August Vollmer (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 42.

schools carried some weight in public affairs, and where the academic and professional people living around the University of California campus lent an atmosphere of intellectual accomplishment to the town.

The position of town marshal was, on a much smaller scale, similar to that of sheriff. It was political in nature (in Berkeley the marshal stood for election every two years) and covered a loosely organized body of services. Bruce Smith referred to the position of marshal as "not primarily devised for what we now know as police work.... The police agencies of the villages, boroughs, incorporated towns, and other small municipalities are usually brought into existence in response to some local need having only a remote connection with crime control."

Berkeley was governed by a board of trustees at this time, until a new city charter was adopted in 1909 that established a mayor/council form of government. The town

² W. P. A. Writers' Program, Berkeley: The First 75 Years (Berkeley, Ca.: The Gillick Press, 1941).

³ Police Systems in the United States (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 85.

⁴ W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit.

charter of 1895 set down the duties of the marshal that were in effect when Vollmer ran for the office in 1905. It mentioned first "the suppression of any riot, public tumult, disturbance of the peace or resistance against the laws or public authorities...." ⁵ The marshal was granted the same authority as that given by the state to sheriffs, and was entitled to perform the fee-based services that constables provided in other townships. He issued licenses and collected funds associated with the licensing of business within the town. (Under the previous charter of 1878, the marshal was the general tax collector for the town. A separate position was created for ⁶ this function in 1895.) He was also responsible for maintaining the town prison.

Although Berkeley was a quieter town than its neighbors in 1905, gambling and opium dens operated openly and were virtually ignored by the authorities. The current force of deputies was inadequate for the job of policing the growing town, and consequently Berkeley had acquired a

⁵
Charter of the Town of Berkeley Adopted March 5, 1895 and Ordinances of the Town of Berkeley from Organization of the Town April 1878 (Berkeley Advocate Book and Job Printing Office, Opposite Berkeley Station, 1897), pp. 25-6, 112-5.

⁶
The Act Passed by the Legislature of California at the Session of 1877-8 Incorporating the Town of Berkeley, Alameda County. Approved April 1, 1878 (Berkeley: Printed and Published by Wm. Henry Chapman, 1878), p. 39.

reputation for having poor police protection. Vollmer wrote, soon after becoming marshal:

...we should have the best police department in the U. S., especially when we consider: First, The class of people who make their homes here. Second. The nearness of two large cities which harbor many criminals. Third. That two trans-continental main lines run through this town. Fourth. The ease with which it is possible to hide here, and the many different routes that may be taken to leave after having committed a crime.⁷

One major complaint against incumbent Kearns was his failure to enforce the "one mile law," which specified that no alcoholic beverages were to be sold within a one-mile radius of the University campus. This law was openly violated and Kearns claimed that it was unenforceable without an increase in the staff of deputies. Vollmer's slate promised an increase from the current force of three deputies to a force of nine. (Berkeley became a totally dry town in 1907.)⁸

The offer to run as marshal was made by Friend Richardson, editor of the Berkeley Daily Gazette, later governor of California from 1922-26. Another sponsor

7

W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., p. 127.

8

See the news stories in the Berkeley Advocate, February to April, 1905.

9

Parker, op. cit., pp. 38 ff.

was the local postmaster, George C. Schmidt, for whom Vollmer had worked for the previous five years as a letter
10
carrier. Vollmer's campaign was aggressively championed by the Gazette, which editorialized:

Gus Vollmer is a man of mental acumen and sagacity and his service in the army has particularly fitted him for the job of hunting down and apprehending criminals. He is a man of great physical powers. He has the physical strength to cope with any criminal and besides he has the necessary grit and courage.¹¹

The Advocate commented in a similar vein:

Strength definite and high purpose: Resolution -- these are written in the face of August Vollmer. They speak in his admirable physique and ring in his earnest voice. They are plain to the eye of the trained observer in his every action.

This man is a Berkeley Product and Known of Berkeley men. He is ambitious to make a record for himself and the record will be good.

We have no hesitancy in saying that August Vollmer is at least five times a better man for marshal than his opponent. Let the comparison be rigid, and upon all points,¹² then record your verdict on April 10th.

10

Mary Johnson, The City of Berkeley: A History (Typewritten MS in the Berkeley Main Library dated April 1942), p. 117; Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, in press).

11

Quoted in Parker, op. cit., pp. 41-2.

12

Berkeley Advocate, April 6, 1905.

Vollmer campaigned hard throughout the town on his own, soliciting votes from the people with whom he had become popular during his years as a volunteer fireman, and won¹³ election by a margin of three to one. He took office on April 15, 1905, at the age of twenty-nine.

Vollmer's Background

Vollmer was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on¹⁴ March 7, 1876. His German-born parents, John and Philippine Vollmer, owned a grocery store in New Orleans. John Vollmer died of a heart attack when his son was eight years old, and the mother subsequently sold the store and took her family -- August, an older adopted sister, and a younger brother -- to her home village in Germany to live. Vollmer attended German schools for two years, until his mother brought the family back to New Orleans.

There he enrolled at the New Orleans Academy, where he took a vocational course in bookkeeping, typing and shorthand.¹³

Parker, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁴

Information on the life of August Vollmer and the development of the Berkeley Police Department is taken in part from the following sources: Interviews in August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.; Albert Deutsch, The Trouble with Cops (New York: Crown Publishers, 1955); and Parker, op. cit.

This was the only formal education he received past the grade school level. Shortly thereafter the family relocated to San Francisco because, according to Vollmer, his mother was disturbed by the violence and crime in New Orleans. In the same train they took to San Francisco rode the widow of New Orleans' police chief, who had recently been murdered by the "Black Hand."

The Vollmer family moved to a house in Berkeley, on Bonita Street, in 1891. Vollmer worked at miscellaneous jobs in the Bay Area until, in 1894, he opened a coal and feed store with a friend in Berkeley. He was also active in the formation of the North Berkeley Volunteer Fire Department, and was awarded the town's Fireman Medal in 1897.¹⁵

The store prospered and Vollmer felt that he had settled upon a career as a businessman, until the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898 and drew him, along with many other patriotic young men, to enlist in the army. He sold his interest in the business to his partner and left for a year of service in the Philippines.

Vollmer arrived in the Islands shortly before the Spanish were expelled from Manila. His company did police duty in

15

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," probably compiled by August Vollmer. Reprinted as Appendix A.

Manila and then served on river patrols against rebel guerrilla forces, engaging the enemy a number of times. He came to admire the organizational skills of the professional army corps, and frequently referred to his army experiences in later years when discussing the strategy
16
of police operations.

When Vollmer returned to Berkeley he was uninterested in resuming his career in business, and he seemed undecided about what he wanted to do. The position as letter carrier suited his gregarious temperament and made him well known and popular throughout the town, but it was not a position that would in itself lead to a future career. However, its value in bringing him to the attention of local policy makers paid off in 1905 when he was selected to run for marshal. He had a reputation for honesty and courage, but no one could have foreseen from his past record the amount of directed energy and determination that he would invest in his new job.

Early Years of Innovation

Vollmer became town marshal under circumstances that were, for an innovative man, ideal: organization in the marshal's office was rudimentary, and the staff was so small --
16

Parker, op. cit., p. 142.

including only three deputy marshals -- that there had been no
¹⁷
 nighttime patrol. His efforts were supported by the news-
 papers and other important interests. Berkeley itself was a
 small town with manageable problems, whose citizens as
 a whole supported the laws and were eager to protect their
 community from corruption. It was a town where new ideas
 could be tried, where voters were willing to support bond
 issues for improvements, and where no significant political
 forces opposed the development of a professionalized police
 department. Vollmer's later efforts in other cities, although
 relatively effective, were never as successful as the model
¹⁸
 he constructed and nurtured in Berkeley.

Vollmer retained the title of marshal until 1909, when
¹⁹
 the city officially incorporated and adopted a new charter.
 He was appointed to the newly created position of police chief
 and freed from the need to run for re-election every two years.
 This marks the formal beginning of the Berkeley Police
 Department, although its style had been substantially estab-
 lished during Vollmer's very first years as marshal.

¹⁷

Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁸

See especially the discussion of his year in Los Angeles,
 pp. 112-9.

¹⁹

Johnson, op. cit., p. 120.

Two weeks after Vollmer's election, Berkeley's board of trustees appointed six full-time police deputies to begin service on May 1, 1905, at a salary of \$70.00 a month.

During 1905 and 1906 Vollmer introduced a series of innovations that, although superseded by later technology, encapsulated most of his basic ideas about effective law enforcement.

First he put his force of deputies on bicycles for greater mobility and speed in answering calls. This was not the first time that bicycles had been used by an American police department -- New York City was using them around 1885 -- but it was the first instance of beat patrolmen using them for regular rounds as well as for dispatching purposes.

Second, he installed an alarm system that was funded by a special \$25,000 bond issue that he initiated and campaigned successfully for in the town. This system, modified after a crude one that was being used in a section of Los Angeles by a private detective named Jack Foster, consisted of red lights placed in the center of key intersections that flashed in a code to patrolling officers. The alarm system had two effects: it reduced the response time to distress calls and

20

Ibid., p. 120.

21

James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 263.

increased the control of headquarters over men out on the beat. If an officer did not answer an alarm within a certain period of time, he was required to submit a written report stating the reasons for his failure to do so.

Third, Vollmer set up an efficient system of police records, with the considerable assistance of Officer Clarence D. Lee, who before entering police work had been secretary of a San Francisco business. Lee's methodical business sense was responsible for the success of many of Vollmer's early managerial reforms. The value of well-kept police records was a central theme in Vollmer's policing, and he later lobbied aggressively for state and national records bureaus.

Finally, Vollmer was the first American police administrator to adopt the modus operandi system; first devised by L. W. Atcherley, a constable in Yorkshire, England. With the assistance of Lee, Vollmer simplified Atcherley's system

Interview with William F. Dean, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

See the discussion on pp. 98-103.

August Vollmer, "Revision of the Atcherley Modus Operandi System," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, X (1919), 229.

by reducing the categories of information used in order to

26

produce a more workable set of data. The system was soon

effective in solving a number of local crimes, and overcame

the initial doubts of established police officers. Although

modus operandi is a commonplace concept in police work and

the public imagination today, when Vollmer first used it in

Berkeley and later in Los Angeles he was criticized by other

policemen for being too "theoretical" in his approach to

27

crime solving. Traditional American police work did not

concern itself with the "nature" of the criminal nor did it

analyze similarities between crimes in any systematic way,

although experienced investigators may have done so on an

individual basis. The introduction of modus operandi into the

Berkeley department is early evidence of Vollmer's interest

in the use of social science techniques to solve problems, an

interest that was first directed toward the psychology of the

criminal and later used to develop standards for police officers.

The public and other police departments regarded these

new ideas with skepticism, but as the small Berkeley depart-

ment began to build a reputation for effectiveness they received

26

Ibid., pp. 230 ff.

27

Parker, op. cit., p. 145.

sympathetic attention in the press. Newspapers and magazines in the area soon discovered that the Berkeley department was "good copy," and thereupon gave Vollmer a wider hearing than would be normal for such a small city force.²⁸ Vollmer himself was a skillful publicist, and took care to ensure that the department maintained good relations with the press. They reciprocated by helping him to build a national reputation very early in his career.

Although Berkeley had enjoyed a congenial rate of growth in these early years, an event took place in April of 1906 that radically accelerated the pace of development. The San Francisco earthquake was followed by a fire that devastated that city, sending thousands of refugees on ferries across to the East Bay.²⁹ Berkeley did not suffer major damage on its own, but within a few days added at least 15,000 people to its population.³⁰ (Estimates of the refugee population in Berkeley ranged as high as 50,000.)³¹ Some displaced

people stayed with friends and relatives, but a large majority
28

Interviews with Rose Glavinovich and John D. Holstrom,
August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.
29

W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., pp. 83-6.
30

Ibid., p. 85.
31

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 116.

was housed in tent camps throughout the city, primarily on the university grounds.

To cope with the situation, Vollmer put an advertisement in the Gazette calling for veterans of the Spanish-American War, 600 of whom he deputized; he later deputized almost 1000 more citizens to assist in keeping order in the camps and managing the distribution of supplies.

Vollmer undoubtedly drew upon his military experience in many ways during this crisis. He recounted later that there was an impression among many people that martial law was in effect under his direction, a rumor that he felt worked in his favor.³² Food hoarding or stealing was the most serious problem with which he was concerned, and he told of confronting several thieves who had been brought into his headquarters and ordering a deputy who was present to take them outside and shoot them, an order which he had no authority to give. Other citizens interceded for them, and they were released. Vollmer credited this bluff with reducing the level of crime within the camps.

Although many people returned to San Francisco during the next weeks, enough stayed in Berkeley to double its

33

population. So severe had the fire been in San Francisco's business district that Berkeley also received a considerable impetus to its commercial growth:

It is not Christian to seek advantage in another's misfortune, but there is nothing to be ashamed of in profiting by such misfortune if it comes unsought. There is no doubt but the greatest impulse that has come in Berkeley's history toward its commercial development has had its beginning in the destruction of the business section of San Francisco by earthquake and fire on April 18th.³⁴

It was this influx of population and capital that made Berkeley a "boom town" during those years, leading to its incorporation in 1909 and a broad range of civic improvements in which the police department shared. In effect, Vollmer was required to turn his force of marshals into an urban police department virtually overnight. By 1907 the new police force had grown
35
to include 26 regular officers and one special officer.

During the next years, roughly through 1921, Vollmer continued to attract attention for his use of science and technology to fight crime. The first use of a "lie detector" in

33

Parker, op. cit., p. 69.

34

Warren Cheney, "Commercial Berkeley," Sunset Magazine, December, 1906. Quoted in W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., pp. 83-4.

35

Johnson, op. cit., p. 120.

crime investigation took place in the Berkeley department in
³⁶
 1921. This particular machine was built by John Larsen,
 who was trained at the University of California in physiology.
 Vollmer asked Larsen to work on the project after reading
 an article by William Marston of Boston, detailing his own
 experiments in this area. Leonarde Keeler, who was a
 student at Berkeley High School at that time, assisted Larsen;
 after later efforts of his own, Keeler secured the patent for
 the polygraph and became its best-known specialist. Larsen
 became a psychiatrist and continued to work in the area of
 criminality, but he later expressed disappointment over the
 uses to which the lie detector was being put:

I originally hoped that instrumental lie
 detection would become a legitimate part
 of professional police science. It is little
 more than a racket. The lie detector, as
 used in many places, is nothing more than
 a psychological third-degree aimed at
 extorting confessions as the old physical
 beatings were. At times I'm sorry I ever
 had any part in its development.³⁷

Motorcycles had replaced the officers' bicycles, and
 were in turn replaced by automobiles in 1914. (Vollmer himself

³⁶

W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., p. 128.

³⁷

Quoted in Deutsch, op. cit., p. 150.

38

never learned to drive a car.) The street alarm system was replaced by a primitive car radio system in 1921, which was updated over the years into a more sophisticated two-way radio communications network. In 1921 the Berkeley department also acquired the country's first single-fingerprint system and handwriting classification

39

system.

Although Vollmer was active in upgrading the technology of the department up to the time of his retirement in 1932, it is remarkable that the substantive innovations occurred within two or three years of his entry into police work. He took office as marshal in April 1905, and by the end of 1906 had already made his most famous applications of technology and scientific management to policing: increased efficiency through mobile patrol and alarm systems; centralized police records; and the adoption of the modus operandi system, which reflected Vollmer's lifelong interest in the application of criminal psychology to police work.

 39

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

39

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

Personnel Reform

As important as these innovations were, they formed only half the basis for the new policing. Other police leaders would doubtless have discovered their relevance to police work, although they may not have been as successful as Vollmer in propagandizing for them. Vollmer's most far-reaching contribution was in the area of personnel reform, where he focused upon the qualifications and competence of the individual police officer. Professional policing began when Vollmer decided, rightly or wrongly, that the police officer required significantly special skills to do his job, skills that could not be learned on the beat by a recruit who was indifferent to the "higher purposes" of policing. Vollmer's almost visionary belief in this goal was clear from his actions and writings over the years:

My fancy pictures to me a new profession in which the very best manhood in our nation will be happy to serve in the future. Why should not the cream of the nation be perfectly willing to devote their lives to the cause of service providing that service is dignified, socialized and professionalized. Surely the Army offers no such opportunities for contributing to the welfare of the nation and yet men unhesitatingly spend their lives preparing for army service.⁴⁰

In 1908 he began the Berkeley Police School, the first formal training for police officers in this country. This school "became the prototype for the establishment of in-service training schools in the larger departments of the state, and served as a basis for future academic programs."⁴¹

Many departments did not even have informal police training at that time. An Oakland police chief who joined that department around the turn of the century told of reporting for duty the first day after being notified by his city councilman that he had got the job. He was assigned to a beat, given a revolver and nightstick, and told to "keep law and order in that district on foot, of course."⁴² These conditions prevailed in most American police departments at the time that Vollmer entered policing, and it was the image of the "dumb cop" who obtained his position through political patronage that Vollmer was most determined to change. The idea of an educated policeman was ridiculous to many people, including policemen themselves. The public generally held the police in low esteem, and personnel standards within

41

John P. Kenney, The California Police (Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1964), p. 74.

42

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 226.

most departments were correspondingly low.

In the first Berkeley Police School, which deputy marshals attended while off duty, classes in police methods were taught by Vollmer and Walter Petersen, Chief of Inspectors in Oakland. Petersen, who later became chief in Oakland, gave Vollmer much practical advice during his early years as marshal. Sanitation laws, made especially relevant by a bubonic plague scare, were taught by William Helms, a professor in the university's Parasitology Department; Prof. A. M. Kidd of the School of Law taught criminal evidence. Other courses included first aid and photography. Of the need for such schools Vollmer wrote:

A school for the special training of police officers is a requirement of the times. Those authorized and empowered to enforce the laws, rules and regulations which are intended for the better protection of the public should have some knowledge of the fundamental principles underlying human actions, more especially those actions which are commonly designated as criminal or contrary to law and order.⁴⁵

In tracing his interest in the need for policemen to be

43

Parker, op. cit., pp. 81-2.

44

Ibid., p. 83.

45

August Vollmer and Albert Schneider, "The School for Police as Planned at Berkeley," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, VII (1917), 878.

educated in scientific investigation, Vollmer frequently cited a crime that occurred early in his days as marshal, in 1907, in which his failure to obtain a conviction was a great disappointment.⁴⁶ A man had been found dead, an empty bottle of poison in his hand, and the coroner's jury ruled the death a suicide. Dissatisfied with the ruling, Vollmer consulted with his friend Dr. Jacques Loeb, a biologist at the university, who located information for him on the effects of the poison involved, potassium cyanide. In such a case, he said, the poison would cause an instant relaxing of the muscles and the bottle could not have been retained in the grasp of the dying man, and therefore must have been placed in his hand afterwards. Vollmer received independent information about a relationship the dead man had been involved in that offered further evidence that the death had in fact been a homicide.

This new information was presented to the county grand jury and, although Vollmer was confident that it would rule in his favor, the original ruling of suicide was upheld. The jury cited the carelessness of the police investigation -- the failure to obtain statements from witnesses and to preserve

46

This story is related in both Parker, op. cit., pp. 72-6; and Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 117-8.

the evidence -- and decided that it could not rule a homicide when the most crucial piece of evidence -- the bottle actually in the dead man's hand -- had not been conclusively proved.

This single case summed up for Vollmer his frustration in using old-fashioned methods of police investigation, and he came to recognize the difficulty of obtaining criminal evidence with these methods that would be upheld in court. Scientific analysis of the type of poison used should have been a routine part of the investigation process, and the officers should have been specifically trained in the handling of evidence at the scene of a crime. The help that photography could have lent in this case was especially obvious.

Vollmer was rather awed by the amount of technical information that could be used in crime investigation, an attitude that he developed in part from his association with scholars at the university. Prof. Loeb, one of the friends who had convinced Vollmer to run for marshal in 1905,⁴⁷ had a keen interest in scientific policing. He exposed Vollmer to literature in the area, principally to the works of Hans Gross,⁴⁸ a German forensic scientist.

47

Parker, op. cit., p. 41.

48

Ibid., p. 78. Gross' best-known work is Criminal Psychology (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1968, reprinted from the 191

In 1916 Vollmer came into contact with Dr. Albert Schneider, a professor in the Pharmacy School who had been doing work in forensic medicine. He agreed to give lectures in the police school, and later that year joined the department as a full-time criminologist.⁴⁹ He established the first scientific crime laboratory in the United States, which brought valuable publicity to Vollmer's department as a center of modern police work.

"College Cops"

Vollmer's zeal in educating the police officer began to outstrip the technical orientation of the police school, and in 1916 he initiated a relationship with the University of California, establishing the "first police training school in a university."⁵⁰ This took the form of summer session courses taught by Vollmer, which were held continuously (except for one year) until 1931.

Vollmer's summer courses, attended by both working policemen and students, included such topics as The Problems of Crime, Methods of Police Investigation, Medical Examination

49

Parker, op. cit., pp. 88-9.

50

Allen Gammage, Police Training in the United States (Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1963), p. 61.

of Criminals and Delinquents, and Legal Relations Involved

51
in Criminology. Vollmer was an impressive and talented

lecturer, and his courses grew to an average of 50-100

students. One of the students in his 1930 class, who later

joined the Berkeley Police Department, described the methods

that Vollmer used to interest his students in criminal justice:

As a student I was tremendously impressed with the personality of the instructor, and highly interested in his presentation of a subject about which I knew nothing. In addition to his own presentation, even as long ago as 1930, he, as professors today, used a visiting lecturer. I clearly recall that one of the highlights of that six-week summer session was the visiting lecturer who was a recently released inmate of San Quentin whose subject was "safe burglaries." We were fascinated by a live safe burglar, who was an able speaker, and much more interested in the professor's remark that later in the afternoon he was going to arrange for this man to open a safe, about which we would probably read in the daily paper. This turned out to be so; he went down in the afternoon and was able to easily manipulate the City Clerk's impregnable safe and open it.

Needless to say, as young people we were impressed. After graduation in 1930, and based entirely I think on the personality of Vollmer...I decided to become a policeman and did so in 1931.⁵²

51

Ibid., p. 61.

52

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

It was a logical step to go from an interest in educating police officers to an interest in recruiting officers who were already educated in academic subjects, and then training them in the technical aspects necessary to become professional policemen.

(Vollmer) realized that it would be far better to have established educational institutions train police students in the arts and sciences than to have the police department attempt to duplicate the training after the recruits entered the police service. Moreover, he believed in the importance of coordination of on-the-job experience with university academic training.⁵³

Consequently, in 1918 the Berkeley department began to recruit college students by placing an advertisement in the campus newspaper.

A number of Vollmer's most talented proteges entered the department under this program, which came to fruition during the 1920s. Dr. Jau Don Ball, a Berkeley psychiatrist and associate of Vollmer, was retained to screen the applicants for suitability. Ball had performed similar work with the U. S. Army during World War I. The Army Alpha intelligence test, which was developed during the war, was also used. During the 1920s other police departments began to use this test:

Average scores varied widely among departments ranging from high (A ratings) in Berkeley where the average score was 149 to a low (C rating) in Detroit where sergeants averaged scores of only 55.⁵⁴

The challenge of meeting high entrance standards was doubtless an important factor in attracting college students into an occupation with traditionally low status. By 1921, according to one estimate, there were a dozen college-student policemen out of a force of 28 or 30 men.⁵⁵ Another inducement was the high pay that the department offered: in 1923 salaries were \$170 a month plus \$30 for the use of the officer's car.⁵⁶ (Officers used their own cars on duty until the 1950s, when a fleet of police vehicles was purchased.)⁵⁷ There was also a mild recession during the early 1920s that forced some students to find jobs while attending college, and had contracted the job market for those who were graduating.⁵⁸

54

Richard H. Blum, Police Selection (Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1964), p. 99.

55

Interview with O. W. Wilson, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

56

Interview with William F. Dean, op. cit.

57

Personal interview with John D. Holstrom, 1970.

58

Interview with O. W. Wilson and John D. Holstrom, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

Some of the students left the department after they graduated and entered other careers, as was expected; but many decided to stay in police work and, under further tutelage from Vollmer, became influential on their own in police administration and related fields. These early "college cops" included George Brereton, police educator and former head of the California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation; William F. Dean, general in the U. S. Army; Walter A. Gordon, ex-governor and judge in the Virgin Islands and head of the California Adult Authority; V. A. Leonard, police educator and writer; John D. Holstrom, chief of the Berkeley department from 1944 to 1960, and later a police consultant; and O. W. Wilson, police administrator and educator.

These early members of the Berkeley Police Department were strongly influenced by Vollmer, years later referring to his impact on them in terms that attest to his power as a leader. One said that Vollmer "just mesmerized you," and described his former chief's impact on his life as follows:

He epitomized what I consider the prerequisite qualities for leadership. I've always felt and believed this and that's why I have his photograph hanging up in my study. I owe him a

great deal for the examples he set and I've tried to follow, not well, but I've tried.⁵⁹

Another described him as a "truly impressive personality,"
60
with a "commanding presence." O. W. Wilson, who left the Berkeley department after four years to become police chief in another city and evolved over the years into the foremost police administrator of his generation, gave credit to Vollmer's great impact on his career and ideas about policing. In discussing his best-known book, Police Admin-
61
istration, Wilson commented: "(T)his book, while I wrote it, reflected Vollmer's principles and philosophy and I went through the book thoroughly with him, chapter by chapter, so that I would say that it reflects August Vollmer rather than
62
O. W. Wilson."

Walter Gordon was one of Vollmer's first college recruits and also the first black man to serve on the force. Gordon was well known in Berkeley, having been a star football player, and he entered the department to earn his way through law school. Complaints were made when Gordon

59

Interview with William F. Dean, op. cit.

60

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

61

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

62

Interview with O. W. Wilson and John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

was first assigned to a white residential neighborhood, but Vollmer refused to treat Gordon in any special way because
63
of his race. (The 1920 Census gave Berkeley a total population of 56,036, with 507 blacks, 337 Chinese, 911
64
Japanese and 115 Mexicans.)

Berkeley as a Training Ground for Police Leaders

Vollmer's success as a police administrator stemmed largely from his intelligent selection and management of personnel. This success was in part based on theory and in part a function of his own personality. Very early in his career as marshal, he decided that modern techniques of crime investigation and prevention required a more skilled and sensitive police officer. His fascination with psychology, as seen in his ideas about the criminal mind and crime

63

See the discussion of Gordon in Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 123-5. Gordon also had contact with Earl Warren during this period, who recognized his abilities and later appointed him as head of the new Adult Authority when Warren became governor. Gordon left the Berkeley department to enter law practice after he finished school, although Vollmer strongly urged him to continue a career in policing. (Interview with Walter Gordon, Earl Warren Oral History Project, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

64

Johnson, op. cit., p. 47A.

65

prevention, naturally affected his ideas about personnel.

In 1919 he published an article in a police journal entitled

66

"The Policeman as a Social Worker," in which he outlined

his conception of an officer who worked to prevent crime as

part of a team with community social agencies and schools.

A 1921 recruit later paraphrased Vollmer as telling the new officers:

You're not to judge people; you're just to report what they do wrong. Better still, you can prevent people from doing wrong; that's the mission of a policeman...I'll admire you more if in the first year you don't make a single arrest. I'm not judging you on arrests. I'm judging you on how many people you keep from doing something wrong. Remember you're almost a father-confessor; you're to listen to people, you're to advise them.⁶⁷

It was a natural corollary of this philosophy that Vollmer introduced modern psychological screening into recruitment, and insisted that his officers display competence in a wide range of fields. By 1930 recruits were receiving 312 hours of

68

work within the police school. Their first course covered a catchall of topics, those with which many police training

65

See the discussion below, pp. 144-7.

66

The Policeman's News, June, 1919.

67

Interview with William F. Dean, op. cit.

68

Gammage, op. cit., p. 9.

programs began and ended: physical culture, military drill, the use of firearms, rule and regulations, ordinances, first aid, geography, and civics. Other courses dealt with Criminal Law and Procedure, Criminal Identification, Police Psychiatry, and Police Organization and Administration. Instructors were drawn from within the department and from the faculty of the University of California. The Wickersham Report, of which Vollmer directed the police section, described this school program:

Heretofore, the training has been intensely practical, devoted entirely to the mechanics of the problem and little or none at all to the personal element. In this respect lies one of the great weaknesses of our present schools. It is much in error to assume that the function of our police deals only with the actual prevention of a crime or violation, or the conviction of a violator. The causes leading to criminal acts are not of immediate origin, but usually of long standing. Juvenile delinquency is commanding an increasing amount of attention and the mental quirks of the human mind are gradually being unfolded, until in our present age the criminal is not considered as a rascal with the heart of a devil, but a person who is in need of assistance and care. The type of individual who is the policeman's great problem is not the stabilized human but one who, through heredity, environment or training has become a misfit intellectually or morally. To him the policeman must address himself. To do so requires a knowledge of the fundamentals of human psychology and the place which psychiatry occupies in this complicated process of knowing human beings.

The first police school to realize this important element in the policeman's training is at Berkeley, California....⁶⁹

Berkeley's high standards also applied to the recruitment process, which an enthusiastic writer of the 1930s praised:

Every known form of scientific device is utilized to test such qualifications as physical fitness, character, temperament and intelligence so necessary to the highest type of police service. It is essential that the applicant be at least a high school graduate and be in perfect physical condition. He must pass an intelligence examination equivalent to that required of commissioned officers in the U. S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps. It is also necessary that he pass the examination on state laws, rules of evidence, laws of arrest, topography of the city and other related subjects. Prior to the appointment, psychiatric and laboratory tests are given to determine the physical and mental condition of the applicant.⁷⁰

Beyond this, a job seeker might be weeded out before even receiving an application blank: "(They) are furnished only to

69

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 76-7.

70

From "Civic Affairs," as quoted in William Warren Ferrier, Berkeley, California (Berkeley: Published by the Author, 1933).

those who, by personal interview, satisfy the Chief of Police or personnel officer of the Police Department that they possess the qualifications set down by the department."

71

The other aspect of Vollmer's successful management of his officers came from his own personality. Vollmer's skills as a leader were more frequently cited by his colleagues and associates than any other characteristic that was attributed to him. He was consistently described as a man who inspired others to become better in their personal careers than they had thought they were able, and he viewed his department as a training ground for police leaders who would proselytize throughout the country for the ideals of professional police service.

One of Vollmer's great attributes was his extraordinary ability to encourage other people to develop ideas and to develop practices. He didn't care very much who got credit for doing something so long as it was done. He had faith in people. To send O. W. Wilson, a young patrolman, to a California city to become a police chief and that sort of confidence in people was evident time and time again. I remember asking him on an occasion when I saw a very flowery letter of reference that was given to only a mediocre Berkeley policeman recommending him for a position. I asked the Chief how he could possibly in good

71

Frank M. Boolsen, A Preliminary Study of Police Personnel (Master's thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1937), p. 61.

conscience give this man the kind of recommendation he did. His response was, you never can tell what a man is able to do, but even though I recommend ten, and nine of them may disappoint me and fail, the tenth one may surprise me. He said, "The percentage is good enough for me, because it is in developing people that we make real progress in our own society."⁷²

Vollmer maintained contact with a large number of these early associates, giving them practical advice about police administration and their own personal careers. O. W. Wilson commented about the help that Vollmer gave him during his years as chief at Wichita: "Anytime I was confronted with a problem I'd write him a letter. Administration by correspondence they'd call it."⁷³

This force of personality did more to ensure the success of Berkeley policing during Vollmer's tenure than did mere techniques of crime detection or police management. His honesty and high standards were legendary among his officers and citizens in the community, and inevitably became blurred with the professional police "ethic" that, to endure, would have to exist apart from the police administrator who originated it.

72

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

73

Interview with O. W. Wilson, op. cit.

Community Involvement and Press Relations

A successful police department maintains its credibility within the community, and Vollmer was tireless in ensuring that credibility, forming and joining betterment groups, opening lines of communication between the department and citizen organizations. He urged his officers to study public speaking and took every opportunity himself to address groups and ask their support for the reform of policing through education:

I have dined for the starving Chinese, I have lunched for the Armenians, I have breakfasted for the unemployed. In fact, on every occasion where one could be gathered around an eating table I have been there doing my job with the knife and fork, lending my support to the occasion, little as it might be.⁷⁴

Most of Vollmer's community work centered on the prevention of juvenile crime. It had long been obvious that it is better and cheaper to prevent a crime than to deal with it afterwards, but Vollmer was one of the first police leaders to make crime prevention, especially among youth, a high and organized priority.

In conjunction with the psychiatrist Dr. Jau Don Ball, Vollmer in 1919 initiated a study in Berkeley's Hawthorne

74

Letter from Chicago to Acting Chief Jack Greening, Jan. 8, 1930, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

Elementary School that was designed to predict juvenile delinquency. Various social agencies cooperated with the police in administering "mental, physical and social examinations" to 200 children.⁷⁵ Although there is no evidence that the results of the Hawthorne study were used in any systematic way, and they remained unpublished until Vollmer⁷⁶

discussed them in his 1949 book The Criminal,⁷⁶ the alliance of community groups that conducted it was the genesis of a coordinating council through which school, health, welfare, labor and police officials combined efforts to deal with youth problems.⁷⁷

In 1925, a Crime Prevention Division was organized within the department under the supervision of Mrs. Elisabeth Lossing, a social worker who had participated in the Hawthorne study. This division operated essentially as a social welfare agency within the police department, focusing on the problems of juveniles (boys under twelve and girls under twenty-one) but including emotional and domestic problems as well. The program became well known as the first attempt to bring professional social workers into a police

75

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 136.

76

(Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1949), pp. 417-23.

77

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 136.

CONTINUED

2 OF 7

department on a full-time basis. Boys between twelve and twenty-one years of age were supervised under a separate program.
78

Crime news was a far more prominent topic in the daily newspapers during the years when Vollmer was chief than it is today, and crime reporters were important members of the press. This was also a period in California history when newspapers were a major factor in reform movements.
79

Vollmer's relation to the press was a great asset to him. He had the skills of an accomplished politician in dealing with the newspapers, and never underestimated their value as allies. Several years after becoming chief, Vollmer had a policy disagreement with Friend Richardson of the Gazette, one of his original supporters, that led to a series of bitter attacks upon him in news stories. Vollmer maintained silence during this time, never attempting to defend himself publicly against the charges, and eventually Richardson, respecting his endurance, initiated a truce. Vollmer referred frequently to this incident when advising his officers on press relations,
80

78

W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., p. 129.

79

George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), pp. 21, 87-8.

80

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

warning them against fighting unfavorable publicity in the
⁸¹
 newspapers. Far from having to fight newspapers, Vollmer
 early established good rapport with the local press by main-
 taining close relations with editors and reporters and grant-
 ing unprecedented access to police files.

Full-time reporters were assigned to the Berkeley
 department from five or six of the local dailies: San Francisco
Chronicle, San Francisco Examiner, Daily News, Berkeley
⁸²
Daily Gazette, Oakland Post Inquirer and the Oakland Tribune.
 The last paper, owned by the Knowland family, probably had
 the greatest political influence. It was represented by
 Rose Glavinovich, who joined the Berkeley police press corps
 during World War I, its only woman member, and covered the
 department through the time of Vollmer's death in 1955. She
 was a close friend to Vollmer, receiving occasional special
 tips about stories that were unrelated to policing (Vollmer was
 careful to treat all newspapers equally in their access to police
⁸³
 news), and serving from time to time as an unofficial police
 woman.

81
 Personal interview with John D. Holstrom, 1970.

82
 Interview with Rose Glavinovich, op. cit.

83
Ibid.

During the years when the department was housed in the basement of the municipal building, the press shared the squad room with working police officers. Vollmer maintained a system of open files, whereby the press could have access to police records so long as they respected notations⁸⁴ that requested no publicity on some stories. The innovations that were being introduced by Vollmer provided continuous good copy for the reporters, and they reciprocated by publicizing them generously.

He just made the news. He started innovations and they were news. It just naturally worked out as news. He was very conscious of the value of publicity, not as personal publicity, but for the ideas and ideals he had in police work.⁸⁵

Vollmer knew how to use his relationship with the press to further his goals. During the term of the first city manager of Berkeley, John F. Edy, Vollmer wanted to raise officers' salaries. He arranged to "plant" a story in the Tribune with the complicity of Glavinovich that implied that many "college cops" were leaving the department because of poor pay. At that time, the students were graduating from college and leaving the department to take up other career

84

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

85

Interview with Rose Glavinovich, op. cit.

interests, and this was a natural development, contrary to the implication in the story. Vollmer's program of recruiting college students as policemen had brought widespread publicity to the city, and Edy was incensed to read this distortion. He suspected that it was a concocted story, but could not prevail against the support that Vollmer had secured in the city council, and the requested pay raise was granted.

86

Association with Earl Warren

Because of the Berkeley department's reputation for honesty and efficiency, assistant deputy district attorneys for Alameda County were sent there to get their early experience. In this way Vollmer met Earl Warren, who was assigned to Berkeley in 1923. This was during one of the most productive periods for the department, and Vollmer and Warren cooperated on several projects. After 1925, when Warren was elected district attorney, he moved against the bootlegging, prostitution and gambling interests in Emeryville and Oakland in dramatic raids that established his reputation in California. Most of the police departments in the county were corrupt, to the extent of operating their own bootlegging

86

Ibid.

87

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

businesses and warning gambling houses when raids were
88 imminent. It was unlikely that Warren would have been
as successful without the help of the Berkeley department,
because he had a staff of less than a half-dozen men and
needed police assistance to carry out the raids, which at one
time involved storming a building that occupied almost a
89 whole city block. Warren routinely used between 25 and
40 of Vollmer's men, especially in Emeryville. Dozens of
people were arrested during these raids and taken to the
90 Berkeley jail because it was "more secure."

Warren was also dependent on Berkeley for technical
91 help, especially in photography. Gathering evidence during
the raids that would stand up in court was a serious problem,
because so many of the judges were corrupt as well. Vollmer's
department had been refining the use of police photography,
which Warren used to collect strong evidence.

Warren's ideas about policing were greatly influenced
by Vollmer, who "excited his interest in a host of problems

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid.

90

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

91

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

relating to law enforcement and the need for improvement." ⁹²

They later worked together to set up education programs in

the state and to develop state law enforcement agencies. ⁹³

Their leadership "did much to bring together police and associated groups for the purpose of achieving common objectives.

It was largely through their efforts that major programs were conceptualized and initially implemented." ⁹⁴

The Quality of Berkeley Policing under Vollmer

Vollmer's most creative work with the Berkeley police department occurred in the 16 years between 1905 and 1921. One writer referred to the period from 1918 to 1925 as the "Golden Age" of Berkeley policing, ⁹⁵ when many of the ideas introduced earlier had come into fruition, when the department's most illustrious graduates were working as patrolmen, and when Vollmer had already achieved a secure reputation as the country's foremost police spokesman. However, during the 1920s he directed more of his own energies toward influencing policing on a state and national scale, and spent

92

Kenney, op. cit., p. 24.

93

Ibid., pp. 23-5.

94

Ibid., p. 113.

95

Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 122-3.

increasing periods of time away from Berkeley. He maintained his control over the department through correspondence with the acting chief, and also campaigned successfully for a \$3 million bond issue for police improvements in
96
1924.

During these years Berkeley was, by today's standards, an extremely enlightened police department.

We had rules and regulations, but some of them were flexible. There were some that were not flexible. Dishonesty was inflexible! On force, the rule was very simple. I heard it from him when I was a police recruit. It was that no Berkeley policeman should ever strike any person, particularly a prisoner, except in extreme self-defense; and then he said, if you ever do, you have just resigned. You needn't bother to come in and discuss it and this one he meant.⁹⁷

Another officer recalled:

If you fired your gun you would have to get up before the whole group on Friday (in the weekly police meetings) and give the factors of what happened and then there was a decision made by the men from the standpoint of this way or this way; right or wrong. No matter how you fired the gun or why you had to fire it, even if it was an injured dog or something like that. That was a part of the training -- responsibility for firing a firearm -- that

96

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

97

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

might have saved some people's lives,
but of course it might have cost a policeman
his life.⁹⁸

Gratuities were also forbidden, and the rule seemed
99
to have been effectively enforced. Vollmer's success in
keeping his department honest stemmed in part from his
prior success in keeping gambling, prostitution and bootleg-
ging out of the city. He had moved against the Chinese
gambling establishments very soon after becoming marshal,
and they never returned to any significant degree.

In the prohibition era as a college student I
knew that a bootlegger, unless he was stupid,
wouldn't come to Berkeley. The lads in the
fraternity houses on Piedmont Avenue met
them on College and Claremont because that
was outside of Berkeley. There were no
prostitutes in Berkeley. I only remember
two who were living here, but working some-
place else, when I was a Lieutenant. I
required them to come in at ten o'clock one
night and told them to depart Berkeley at
eight o'clock the next morning and they did.
That year might have been 1938, for example.
Prostitution, we didn't have; gambling, we
even succeeded in stopping card games in
the Catholic church. Nobody has ever done
this except us that I know of, except Bill Parker,
who was chief of police of Los Angeles, and
got the Archbishop to give him a hand.¹⁰⁰

98

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

99

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

100

Ibid.

Berkeley had a tradition of temperance, rooted in the concentration of churches and theological schools that exerted an influence over Berkeley morals for many years, and Vollmer enjoyed a consensus of public support in keeping vice from the city. However, he had a low opinion of the Volstead Act and other impractical laws:

The unwillingness of the people to face the facts about vice, their inability to exercise reason and judgment in dealing with it, and their faithful and reverential devotion to the idea that the problem can be solved with the passing of repressive laws, have been the greatest handicaps to an intelligent treatment of vice as one of the most important problems of society.¹⁰¹

At one time, Berkeley was credited with having the highest drunk rate in the country, because nearly all cases¹⁰² were reported and handled by the police department. But Vollmer was opposed to the jailing of drunks, and had them¹⁰³ taken to their homes if they had one. Vollmer became acquainted with the city's habitual offenders, and had a habit of visiting the jail in the mornings to see how the prisoners

101

August Vollmer, The Police and Modern Society (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1936 edition), p. 81.

102

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

103

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 120.

104

had been treated. (His interest in jail reform came to the fore during his year in Los Angeles, where he agitated for the construction of a more modern jail facility.)

For a number of years Vollmer held weekly meetings which all officers were required to attend, sessions that were informally referred to as the "Crab Club."

For instance, if you had anything against any man in the department you said it right there in front of him and after it was over it was forgotten; you didn't go out and squawk about the man or degrade somebody in the department or say anything about him. 105

These meetings were primarily instructional, and were the means by which most young patrolmen were exposed to Vollmer's ideas, especially after the department grew and Vollmer became relatively less accessible. During the summers, guest lecturers were brought in, primarily psychiatrists and articulate criminals who shared their expertise with the group. It was during the Friday sessions that instances of the use of firearms would be discussed.

Berkeley was, in a sense, Vollmer's laboratory for new ideas, and he succeeded in building a department that had the support of the community and enjoyed favorable

104

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

105

Ibid.

national publicity. Inevitably, somewhat uneasy relationships developed with neighboring police departments when unflattering comparisons were made between them and Berkeley, and the "college cops" were not warmly received in Oakland or San Francisco. "Two things you didn't say, one was you didn't emphasize you were from Berkeley, and you certainly didn't emphasize that you went to the university...." If his innovations were less applicable to the problems of a major urban police force, they had at least received a beneficent trial in the smaller city of Berkeley. Once he had established the Berkeley department, he lobbied for police reform in many places. There is no doubt that his lobbying was effectively heard, but the prognosis for Vollmer's ideas in communities less imbued with the reform spirit was in question.

CHAPTER THREE: VOLLMER AS AN ACTIVE POLICE LEADER

From his home base in Berkeley, Vollmer worked within California and later on a national scale to promote his ideas about professional policing. He was active in such established police organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the California Police Chiefs Association, and recognized their value in mobilizing police leaders to reform law enforcement and to exert pressure on the government for favorable legislation. Vollmer's skills as an organizer and publicist were responsible for starting numerous police and civic associations, and for setting up governmental agencies in criminal justice. His influence in California was especially marked, his ideas having been credited with helping to form the "basic philosophy for today's police associations."

Professional Efforts in California

The California Police Chiefs Association was founded in 1906. Although there is no direct evidence that Vollmer was

1

John P. Kenney, The California Police (Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1964), p. 22.

instrumental in organizing this group, he was elected presi-
²
 dent in 1907. This association and its descendants have
 been a strong force in California law enforcement by estab-
 lishing police standards and educational programs, and by
 influencing state legislation as it affects the field. In 1921
 the original association merged with the Sheriff's Association
 to form the California Peace Officer's Association, and
 ceased to exist as an independent organization; the Sheriff's
 Association continues to function to deal with problems
³
 pertaining to that office.

Vollmer's early efforts in these organizations were
 directed toward establishing central files for criminal records.
 A belief in centralization -- of records, of administration, of
 police agencies -- was a natural corollary of Vollmer's enthu-
 siasm for the application of scientific management and techno-
 logy to policing. He had the scientist's faith in the power of
 information, and believed that a mobile society would always
 be poorly policed if information did not cross local boundaries.

Within the Berkeley department, Officer Lee and
 Vollmer had developed an efficient system of records maintenance,

2

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," probably
 compiled by August Vollmer. Reprinted as Appendix A.

3

Kenney, op. cit., p. 23.

and the successful use of modus operandi obviously depended upon the amount and quality of data that were available. At this time there existed almost no formal mechanisms by which California police chiefs and sheriffs could distribute or receive information on criminal activity in their and other jurisdictions. A rudimentary state agency, the State Bureau of Criminal Identification, had been set up by the legislature in 1905, but it was primarily designed to serve ⁴ major state agencies and did little to assist local police.

This first state agency operated in part out of ⁵ San Quentin Prison. Records of incoming and discharged prisoners were considered the logical first step in keeping track of criminal activity. The San Quentin agency distributed this type of identification data to large police agencies, but did not serve as a central repository of information.

The idea was exactly the opposite of a centralized identification bureau, inasmuch as the purpose was to take many fingerprints of any incoming prisoners and distribute those prints to some 17 law enforcement agencies in the 11 western states.⁶

4

Ibid., p. 22.

5

Interview with Thomas P. Hunter, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, in press).

6

Ibid.

A former Berkeley policeman recalled that before the new state agency was established, the Berkeley department had to take 19 sets of fingerprints when it booked a felony prisoner, which were sent to nearby jurisdictions where the prisoner may have committed another offense.

Police officials lobbied for the expansion of the Bureau but met with little support in the legislature, which in 1909 failed even to vote appropriations to continue existing operations. This defeat is credited with unifying police officials in their determination to exert greater influence in Sacramento.

Vollmer became a "veritable one-man lobby" for the proposed agency, for which bills were introduced in 1913 and 1915.

His own draft bill called for a "Bureau of Police and Criminal Identification of the State of California," and he attempted to include provisions for state policing in the final bill.

Both the 1913 and 1915 bills passed the legislature but were vetoed by Governor Hiram Johnson, apparently under pressure from labor groups who feared that the agency would develop into the state police organization that Vollmer envisioned.

7

Interview with A. L. Coffey, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

8

Kenney, op. cit., p. 22.

9

Ibid., p. 51.

10

Ibid., p. 48.

"The history of the years immediately preceding these events reveals that state police had been used in other states for strikebreaking and fledgling unions in California were determined that this should not be the case here."¹¹

In 1917 a bill was finally approved that created the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, "the latter word added to encompass a broader scope of activities as had been conceived by August Vollmer and other law enforcement officials."¹² Kenney has suggested that labor interests supported the 1917 bill after being assured by police leaders that the agency would not evolve into a state police organization.¹³ The new governor was William D. Stephens, and Vollmer urged him to sign the bill by "setting forth the argument that it would be helpful in catching spies and subversives, inasmuch as World War I was under way at the time."¹⁴

Vollmer served as president of the first Board of Managers of the new agency, and a Berkeley policeman,

¹¹

Ibid., p. 53. For further discussion of Vollmer's ideas on state policing see pp. 103-4, 183-5.

¹²

Ibid., p. 54.

¹³

Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁴

Ibid., p. 53.

C. S. Morrill, was appointed superintendent. Since that time at least two other former Berkeley policemen have headed the agency.
15

National Efforts toward Police Centralization

This California agency was the first fruit of Vollmer's zeal to bring greater centralization into policing, a dominant theme throughout his career. In his 1922 address as president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police he commented:

A national bureau of criminal records and crime statistics is imperative, and a workable plan for such a bureau should be devised at this meeting. Migratory criminals are causing an endless amount of trouble, and property stolen by them is hopelessly lost due to the lack of a centralized bureau of records.¹⁶

Four years earlier he had been instrumental in forming a special I. A. C. P. committee to persuade the Federal

15.

George H. Brereton was chief of the BCII from 1945 until the late 1950s; Alfred L. Coffey is the current chief (1971). (J. D. Holstrom, "Supplement: Some Sources of Information," compiled for the August Vollmer Historical Project, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, 1971.)

16

Reprinted as "Aims and Ideals of the Police," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XIII (1922), 256.

government to create a "National Police Bureau," to serve as a repository for fingerprints, photographs and other

17
criminal data. These efforts led to the formation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1925. There is little direct evidence concerning the influence of Vollmer upon Bureau Director J. Edgar Hoover, although it is obvious that many of Vollmer's ideas about personnel standards and police techniques have been present in the F. B. I. for years. One former Berkeley policeman related that in 1925 or 1926 Hoover visited the Berkeley department, and the policeman was assigned by Vollmer to escort Hoover
18
on a tour of various police departments and state facilities.

Vollmer may well have been one of the police leaders who made a compromise with labor unions in 1917 about the future intent of the state identification bureau, but he was himself always a strong advocate of state policing. He tried to interest various branches of the state administration in the idea of unifying all enforcement functions in one agency, but was unsuccessful: California's regional splits and opposing

17

Albert Deutsch, The Trouble with Cops (New York: Crown Publishers, 1955), p. 139.

18

Interview with Gene B. Woods, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

19

interests were far too strong. In the Introduction to a book he co-authored on the subject of state policing he speculated on:

"...the creation of a state Ministry of Justice to which would be delegated the complete management and control of all police, local and county, in a state. This may seem too novel, and too far removed from established customs of police administration, but there are some very definite trends toward state control of police...."20

It is thus evident that Vollmer had little concern for the principle of local control in policing as a priority or value in itself. When he was hired as a consultant to the police department in Kansas City, Mo., in 1926, he engineered the removal of the department from the control of the corrupt city government to an independent state commission, as the best method of introducing viable reform. 21

The need for some degree of centralization is the inevitable response of an administrator to the multiple, often overlapping enforcement agencies within the United States. 22

19

Vollmer and Alfred E. Parker, Crime and the State Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), pp. 155 ff.

20

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

21

See below, pp. 120-2.

22

See Vollmer and Parker, op. cit., pp. 8-9, for a listing of some of these enforcement agencies.

Vollmer was also active at a time when techniques of identification had become greatly more sophisticated -- fingerprinting and photography, for example, -- and led naturally to the creation of central repositories. In the 1930s Vollmer's zeal in this area resulted in the Berkeley City Council authorizing the opening of a fingerprint identification file for all Berkeley residents, and urging general cooperation. By 1941 the police department had a file of more than 56,000 civilian fingerprints, "the largest in the country outside the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

The ultimate form of centralized record keeping is the national registration of all citizens, and Vollmer believed that a registration system would be the ideal way for the government to fight crime and control undesirable elements. In a 1934 article he outlined the advantages of "Universal Registration" in a list that extended from controlling aliens and sex perverts to preventing bigamy and screening

23

Mary Johnson, The City of Berkeley (Typewritten MS in the Berkeley Main Library dated April 1942), p. 121.

24

W. P. A. Writers' Program, Berkeley: The First 75 Years (Berkeley, Calif.: The Gillick Press, 1941), p. 132.

25

Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXV (1934), 650-2.

civil service applicants. "Communists, anarchists, may be followed from place to place and their activities noted" ²⁶ and "Injured and unconscious persons may be identified."

A Spokesman for Police Professionalism

The International Association of Chiefs of Police was the police group in which Vollmer was most active during his career. His efforts to use the I. A. C. P. to press for a national police bureau have been mentioned above. In 1922 he was elected president, and because the annual convention was held that year in San Francisco, he was able to show other police leaders what he had been doing in ²⁷ Berkeley. Vollmer's address to the convention, entitled ²⁸ "Aims and Ideals of the Police," outlined several practical reform measures that he urged his colleagues to adopt in their own departments or to press for on a state and national level. First he discussed recruitment standards, and noted that in addition to patrolmen a modern police department must

26

Ibid., p. 652.

27.

Alfred E. Parker, Crime Fighter: August Vollmer (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 122-3.

28

Op. cit.

hire "stenographers, filing clerks, typists, photographers, identification and handwriting experts, and other skilled professionals." ²⁹ Requiring all police personnel to "start at the bottom and work (their) way up through promotional examinations" had proved to be "wholly inadequate." He continued: "Our work in the community is much more important than is generally believed by the public and experience has taught us that only the very best human material can ³⁰ render the type of service rendered."

Other reforms he outlined were:

a) Increased use of policewomen, especially in the ³¹ "vast field of pre-delinquency." (Berkeley's own Crime Prevention Division was organized in 1925, and its first policewoman -- a psychiatric social worker -- was hired at ³² that time.)

b) Police schools for training purposes, wherein the content "may vary slightly in different communities, but the

29

Ibid., p. 252.

30

Ibid., pp. 252-3.

31

Ibid., p. 253.

32

Margaret Dietrick, History and Development of the Crime Prevention Division of the Berkeley Police Dept. (Master's thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1950), p. 13.

fundamentals in the police school curriculum should be
³³
 identical in all departments."

c) "Modern equipment, such as signal devices, wire-
 less telephony and telegraphy, automobiles, motorcycles,
 motorboats, gas bombs, traffic devices, signs and towers,
³⁴
 and laboratory apparatus." A common theme in Vollmer's
 writings, and one that revealed his basic orientation as a
 crime fighter, was the notion that the police must "compete"
 with the criminal element, which "uses every new invention
 and is usually a league in advance of the police because of
³⁵
 that fact." And again: "We must be prepared to meet the
 criminal with better tools and better brains than he possesses
 if we hope to command the respect of the community that we
³⁶
 serve."

d) Greater emphasis on crime prevention, which he
³⁷
 described as "our principal function." In keeping with the
 theories of the day, he declared: "Human beings are not

33

"Aims and Ideals of the Police," op. cit., p. 253.

34

Ibid., p. 253.

35

Ibid., p. 253.

36

Ibid., p. 254.

37

Ibid., p. 254.

exempt from biological laws and the increase of insanity, feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, degeneracy, prostitution and criminality indicates a polluted blood stream." The policeman has a greater responsibility than others in gaining awareness of these factors and using them to prevent criminal acts.

The public can furnish a thousand different reasons for the crooked act, but the wise policeman remains silent, ventures no opinion, knowing that every factor must be investigated before an intelligent explanation can be given for the individual's failure to conform to the rules made to govern our conduct.³⁹

e) The police should contribute their share toward solving the problem of "unnecessary delay and miscarriage of justice in criminal trials."⁴⁰

f) "Uniform national and even international laws, uniform classification of crimes, simplified court procedures, better methods of selecting and promoting properly trained jurists, are modern requirements...."⁴¹

g) Police investigators should abandon "trial and error"

38

Ibid., pp. 254-5.

39

Ibid., p. 254.

40

Ibid., p. 255.

41

Ibid., p. 255.

methods of crime solving for more efficient scientific techniques and crime laboratories, enlisting the aid of "microscopists, chemical analysts, medico-psychologists, and handwriting experts."

h) Centralization and improved methods of maintaining police records. "A bureau of records, if properly organized, is the hub of the police wheel."

i) Universities should be petitioned to devote more time to the "study of human behavior, its bearing upon political and social problems, and for the training of practical criminologists, jurists, prosecutors, policemen and policewomen."

This speech was a good reflection of the components that Vollmer believed were necessary in order to build a professional police organization. His first priority, as always, was the selection and training of competent personnel. He believed that the more philosophical problems would be naturally solved if the police were to hire only the best people, to "skim the cream of society" for police work.

42

Ibid., p. 255.

43

Ibid., p. 256.

44

Ibid., p. 256.

45

Ibid., p. 253.

At the beginning of the speech Vollmer reviewed the varying functions that were assigned to the police, saying: "Legislative bodies seem somewhat confused at times⁴⁶ regarding the purpose and function of the police." It was time for expert policemen to "discuss this fundamental question and prepare a form which may be helpful to⁴⁷ legislators in the future." But he never returned to this complex issue of defining the police function, except to say: "When we have reached a point where the best people in society are selected for police service, there will be⁴⁸ little confusion regarding the duties of the members."

Although there were American scholars discussing police issues at that time, Vollmer was the only actual police administrator of stature to obtain a hearing both among his colleagues and in academic and legal circles.

Elmer Graper, writing in 1921, called Vollmer "one of the⁴⁹ most far-sighted and progressive police leaders in America."

46

Ibid., p. 251.

47

Ibid., p. 252.

48

Ibid., p. 253.

49

American Police Administration (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1921 edition), p. 319.

Fosdick published his landmark work on American policing
 50
 in 1920, in which he referred favorably to Vollmer's work
 in several instances and gave some information about the
 crime-fighting success of the Berkeley department:

In this period (between 1908 and 1915) the
 population increased from 37,000 to 64,000.
 The total membership of the force was
 increased in this time by but five men.
 Reports and complaints of crime or other
 conditions requiring the attention of the
 police increased only 14% as against a
 73% increase of population. The value
 of property reported stolen was \$20,789.47
 in 1908 and \$14,892.91 in 1915, a decrease
 of 28%. These figures indicate the value of
 corrective and preventive work done by the
 department in increasing the effectiveness
 of each member of the organization through
 improved methods of operation.⁵¹

The Year in Los Angeles

The 1920s marked the real beginning of Vollmer's
 national career as a police spokesman and consultant, and
 during these ten years he spent as much time away from
 Berkeley as he did at home. His first job as a police consul-
 tant occurred in 1915, when he conducted a survey of the

50

Raymond B. Fosdick, American Police Systems (Montclair,
 N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1920
 edition).

51

Ibid., p. 311.

52

San Diego Police Department, but his most ambitious tenure in another city took place in 1923 when he accepted a one-year job as head of the Los Angeles Police Department.

This was a period when real increases in crime and additional burdens of graft and corruption resulting from the hopeless task of enforcing the Volstead Act had produced epic problems of police inefficiency in many cities. When middle-class and business interests began to feel threatened by these problems, a citizens' movement emerged that was embodied in the crime commissions that were set up in many cities. The prototype was the Chicago Crime Commission, which was formed by the Chicago Association of Commerce when dissatisfaction reached a peak after the Winslow Brothers payroll robbery in the summer of 1917.

The Commission described itself as follows:

It is not a reform organization. It is not a debating society. It is a business proposition created because of the conditions which it faces and it is determined to

52

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

53

See Virgil Peterson, "The Crime Commission," Conference on Criminal Law Enforcement, Conference Series No. 7, University of Chicago Law School (March 2, 1951), 74-7.

54

"The Chicago Crime Commission," editorial in the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, X (1919), 8.

accomplish results by methods which it is believed will be welcomed by capable public officials willing to do their duty.⁵⁵

The Los Angeles Crime Commission was formed by business and insurance interests following a period of soaring property loss due to crime, so far out of control that the city had been threatened with loss of theft coverage by the insurance companies.⁵⁶ Los Angeles was a city of 800,000, and the political factions that ran the city had created a police department that was filled with incompetence and dishonesty. One of the greatest police problems was the graft that came from open illegal gambling. Much as he had done in his first years as marshal, but on a larger scale, Vollmer moved against the gambling houses, receiving information from undercover police groups that he established and singling out honest officers to direct the operation.

But Los Angeles corruption was too well entrenched to be seriously threatened by this type of clean-up campaign. True to the principle that Vollmer followed throughout his career he invested most of his energy in personnel reform, in an attempt to upgrade the general level of police leadership.

⁵⁵
⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 11-2.

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 140.

A strict civil service system was in effect in Los Angeles municipal government, but served more as a retrenchment than a vehicle for reform. Vollmer bypassed the system by requiring all officers to take intelligence and psychological tests that, according to one account, discovered that many of the officers were "low-grade mental defectives," and showed that "three out of every four cops were unfit for police work." ⁵⁷ From the information provided by these tests Vollmer promoted a number of capable junior officers and established stricter entrance requirements for future recruits.

Following the Berkeley model, Vollmer also initiated ties with the educational community. A police school was started within the department and extension courses in police administration, designed for middle management staff, were established at the University of Southern California. He also introduced a number of technical and managerial reforms, including beat analysis, modus operandi, and an improved traffic control system. It was in Los Angeles that he first used the Hollerith card system, which he had seen at the

⁵⁸
U. S. Census Bureau in Washington. The Hollerith system

57

Ibid., p. 141.

58

Parker, op. cit., p. 135.

is a manual version of the key-punched computer card, and works on the same principle to arrange a mass of data into retrievable classifications. Its application for modus operandi and other police records was obvious. Vollmer also worked almost as a military commander to bring down the level of crime in the city. Previous police efforts had been ineffectual against a wave of bank robberies. Vollmer plotted the pattern of robberies on a city map and concentrated a large force of men against this one problem, with remarkable success, by predicting where the next holdups would occur and deploying his men accordingly.

59

These actions generated considerable opposition from established factions in Los Angeles, which at one point tried to force his resignation by requiring him to take a civil service examination for the position he already held. Vollmer took the examination, received the highest score, and kept his job.

Perhaps the most tangible outcome of Vollmer's year in Los Angeles was a detailed analysis of the department that he wrote, including a series of recommendations designed to increase efficiency and raise personnel standards.

59

See Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 140-3; also Parker, op. cit., pp. 131-48.

The report was ignored for over 20 years but was revived in 1949 and used as a guide for restructuring the department.

The Crime Commission that brought Vollmer to Los Angeles "also concerned itself with rewriting those portions of the Criminal Code wherein manifest weaknesses were contributing to the growth of crimes of violence." Through the initiative of the commission, "the entire penal code of the State of California was virtually rewritten and adopted." ⁶⁰ The city's newspapers were strongly in support of these measures, which taken in combination resulted in a significant decrease in the crime rate. However, the commission failed to realize how difficult it would be to maintain its successes: after its term expired, it considered its job done and ceased to operate. With this organized citizen pressure withdrawn, the old political factions quickly re-established their control over city services, including the police department.

As a part of this larger picture, Vollmer's term in Los Angeles was not wholly successful, in that he was unable to implement basic reforms that survived his absence. But he was correct in aiming his efforts at improving personnel

standards, and he left a cadre of committed officers within the department with enough power to exert greater influence over operations in later years when they had assumed leadership positions. His report was a practical analysis of the department's inadequacies and potential for improvement. If Vollmer had stayed in Los Angeles, it is doubtful that even a man of his forceful personality could have prevailed against entrenched corruption in the way that he did in Berkeley. Without the community ties that validated and sustained his actions, Vollmer was merely a capable and honest administrator, not an influential citizen who could shepherd his ideas through the city forums.

One observer has noted that, in Berkeley, Vollmer
61
"pushed crime north and south." He created an enclave of effective law enforcement, a haven from the urban centers that surrounded it. No such strategy was possible in a city of 800,000 that existed as the primary urban center for a very large region, especially in a city as disordered geographically as Los Angeles. Crime could not be pushed north or south, it could only be deferred or moved to another part of the city itself. It was inevitable that the most durable of Vollmer's innovations in Los Angeles were the techniques and procedures

61

Interview with John D. Holstrom, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

that could bring increased efficiency into a department that had to police a large, decentralized city. The other side of his concept of policing -- crime prevention through personal community involvement, the image of service -- had very limited application in that setting.

Vollmer's Work as a Police Consultant

Vollmer did not actually serve as police chief in any other city but he did conduct numerous surveys of municipal police departments, perhaps as many as 200. ⁶² These surveys became a systematic method by which Vollmer was able to introduce his ideas into departments all over the country, and their continued impact upon modern police administration should not be underestimated:

His police survey techniques and the kinds of principles he applied in formulating and diagnosing the problems of municipal police departments and in making recommendations for their improvement were the fundamental bases out of which the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the International City Manager's Association produced a series of textbooks in municipal administration.⁶³

⁶²

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 116.

⁶³

Interview with Milton Chernin, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

Other members of the Berkeley department participated in these studies, and at one time after Vollmer's retirement it was a policy for the current chief to require every officer of the rank of lieutenant and above to perform at least one survey. This same chief and a fellow officer attended weekly seminars for a year at Vollmer's house, entirely on the subject of conducting police surveys. Under Berkeley's influence, the I. A. C. P. established a Field Service Division in 1957 that now does the bulk of these professional studies of municipal police departments.

In 1926 Vollmer conducted surveys of the police departments in Havana and Detroit, and in 1928 conducted a survey in Kansas City, Mo. The Kansas City department was an extension of the Pendergast political machine, which had permitted crime and corruption to bring virtual chaos to the city. Property insurance rates were the highest in the country, at \$66 per \$1000 of property valuation. Vollmer did not attempt to reform the existing department, which he described as follows:

64

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

65

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

66

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 143.

Hampered by lack of modern equipment, miserably compensated for arduous and dangerous duties, unprotected by pension provisions, unsupported by the press, pulpit and public, ridiculed and berated by other law-enforcement officials, kicked around by unscrupulous politicians, it is remarkable indeed that the policeman has been able to maintain any semblance of law and order in this growing community....

Just so long as the special privilege seekers retain control by operating through unprincipled politicians, the law-enforcement officials will be impotent and prevented from performing their sworn duties.⁶⁷

Instead, he recommended that the department be removed from local political control by setting up a special police commission, under state authorization. This style of police control, known as metropolitan policing, had precedents in New York City in 1857 and Boston in 1885,⁶⁸ in both instances following long-term struggles between state and city. In Kansas City, reforms were attempted under the new structure but were short-lived: the state courts ruled that the commission was unconstitutional, and local political officials regained control. (Years later this department was among those investigated by the Kefauver crime

⁶⁷

Quoted in Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 143-4.

⁶⁸

See James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 96-9; and Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 217-9.

commission.)

Vollmer's remarks, quoted above, are interesting from another perspective: They heap scorn upon politicians, "press, pulpit and public," but have no unkind words for the policeman himself, as if in all of Kansas City, he alone was decent and hardworking. This is a persistent characteristic of Vollmer's writings, and perhaps one of the reasons why he received a relatively sympathetic hearing among police leaders and line officers when an outside critic, more vocal in attacking the police themselves, received none.

(In a later survey of the Dallas Police Department, Vollmer wrote:

The Dallas Police Department ranks among the best in its class for integrity, efficiency and economy, notwithstanding the fact that it is housed in forbidding, unclean and unsuitable basement quarters; undermanned; underpaid; overworked; insufficiently equipped; never commended by the public for thousands of difficult and dangerous duties, speedily and satisfactorily discharged; unjustly criticized by the public and officials for slight and sometimes accidental errors; and finally that it is charged with the responsibility of solving the most difficult social problems that are presented to the Municipal Government. Dallas citizens have every reason to be proud of the accomplishments of their splendid Police Force.)⁶⁹

69

Report of Dallas Police Department Survey (City of Dallas, Texas, March-April 1944), p. 1.

Later major surveys were made by Vollmer in Chicago (1928); Minneapolis (1930); Gary (1930); Santa Barbara (1934); Portland (1934); Syracuse (1943); Dallas (1944); and Portland (1947).⁷⁰

The Chicago survey was made at the request of the Illinois Commission for Criminal Justice, at a time when organized crime had produced classic chaos in that city's law enforcement. Vollmer wrote a lengthy report on operations within the police department and suggested practical reforms, but the ruling political factions were little inclined to reorganize the department and few real changes were made.⁷¹

However, this survey brought Vollmer into contact with Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, who asked him to accept a two-year position as professor of police administration. Vollmer did so, leaving Berkeley in 1929 and returning in 1931, shortly before his formal retirement from the police department.⁷²

During this absence and other leaves from his Berkeley post, Vollmer left John A. Greening, his successor, in charge of the department. Even during long absences, Vollmer maintained an active control over departmental affairs. Letters

⁷⁰

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

⁷¹

Deutsch, op. cit., p. 146.

⁷²

Ibid., p. 146.

written to Greening from Chicago are full of specific advice about handling problems of personnel and routine police operations.
73

The university setting was, for Vollmer, the ultimate forum for his ideas about policing. In Chicago he followed the pattern of his summer courses at the University of California, teaching working policemen and regular students, attempting to have both a practical and an academic impact. He also assisted in organizing the Chicago Regional Peace Officer's Association and the Illinois State Identification Bureau, and supervised a survey by his students of all police departments within a fifty-mile radius of Chicago.
74

The Wickersham Report

While at Chicago Vollmer was appointed to direct the police section of the Wickersham Report, formally known as the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
75

73

W. P. A. Writers' Program, op. cit., p. 131. Correspondence between Vollmer and Greening is included in Vollmer's personal papers at the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

74

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," op. cit.

75

Report on Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931).

This commission was set up by President Hoover to report on the status of law enforcement near the end of a decade in which Prohibition and social turmoil had demoralized and reduced the effectiveness of the nation's agencies of criminal justice. The disparity between the rhetoric of enforcing Prohibition and the reality of resistance to it made police either preys to graft or seemingly ridiculous. The Wickersham Report was similar in scope to the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which also dealt with police problems after a period of social upheaval and resultant criticism of the criminal justice system. 76

The police section that Vollmer directed focused upon police personnel and internal organization. His two research assistants, David G. Monroe and Earle W. Garrett, who were attached to the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, did most of the research and actual writing of the report; Vollmer wrote the chapters on the Police Executive.

This appointment represented the high point of Vollmer's influence as a national police leader. The Wickersham Report laid down standards and recommended

76

See Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

reforms that have remained relatively unchallenged in the policing field. It provided forthright documentation of the general low standards of policing and the disaffection of the public with their police agencies. The Berkeley model had few imitators, and almost none in the large urban centers. At the conclusion of the study, Vollmer listed ten recommendations that, like his speech before the I. A. C. P., reflected his view of the minimum standards that were necessary for professional policing:

1. The corrupting influence of politics should be removed from the police organization.
2. The head of the department should be selected at large for competence, a leader, preferably a man of considerable police experience, and removable from office only after preferment of charges and a public hearing.
3. Patrolmen should be able to rate a "B" on the Alpha test, be able-bodied and of good character....
4. Salaries should permit decent living standards, housing should be adequate, eight hours of work, one day off weekly....
5. Adequate training for recruits, officers, and those already on the roll is imperative.
6. The communication system should provide for call boxes, telephones, recall system, and... teletype and radio.
7. Records should be complete, adequate, but as simple as possible....
8. A crime-prevention unit should be established if circumstances warrant this action and qualified women police should be engaged to handle juvenile delinquents' and women's cases.
9. State police forces should be established in States where rural protection of this character

is required.

10. State bureaus of criminal investigation and information should be established in every State.⁷⁷

The second recommendation, a corollary of the first, was a central theme in current criticism of police operations. Police executives were hired and fired at will by political leaders, and the primary value that many police leaders saw in civil service reform was the protection that it gave to the police chief. The introduction to the report established this priority at the start:

The chief evil, in our opinion, lies in the insecure, short term of service of the chief or executive head of the police force and in his being subject while in office to the control by politicians in the discharge of his duties.⁷⁸

Vollmer himself was strongly opposed to the capricious tenure of most police chiefs, and he felt that a capable chief needed security of office in order to build an effective department. As a strong leader himself, he knew the importance of leadership in an organization that had a paramilitary structure. He also felt that policing was demeaned by the appointment of "cronies" who had no knowledge of police skills.

Not infrequently the chief is wholly incompetent to discharge the onerous duties of his position. He may lack experience, executive

77

Op. cit., p. 140.

78

Ibid., p. 1.

ability, character, integrity, or the confidence of his force, or all of them put together. We have the classic instance shown in this study where the mayor of a large city announced publicly that he had appointed his tailor as chief of police because he had been his tailor for 20 years and he knew he was a good tailor and so necessarily would make a good chief of police.⁷⁹

The report cited Milwaukee as a city having efficient law enforcement, and commented:

The citizens there lay it to the fact that the city has had only two chiefs of police in 46 years and no control over the chief is even attempted by the politicians since the effort was made many years ago to remove a chief who claimed the right to act independently, freed from the dictation of politicians.⁸⁰

Politics being the greatest danger to professional policing, the chief was the link through which political domination would either enter or be blocked from corrupting police operations. Because this defect -- of politically beholden police chiefs -- was so obvious, little attention was paid at that time to the line officer's role as an independent political agent.

79

Ibid., p. 3.

80

Ibid., p. 3.

The Years as a Research Professor and Writer

In 1931 Vollmer returned to Berkeley from Chicago and resumed his position as police chief. In less than a year -- in June of 1932 -- he retired, at the age of 56, after 27 years as either marshal or chief of the Berkeley department. There is some indication that his retirement was precipitated by a dispute over police salaries, although it is equally likely that he had been planning to retire soon in any event. The Depression was forcing the city to cut back on salaries, and Vollmer told the city manager that he would quit if police officers were included in the cutback. The salaries were in fact lowered shortly thereafter,⁸¹ and Vollmer retired within a few months.

Although Vollmer made it a point of etiquette in succeeding years not to revisit police headquarters unless expressly invited by the new chief, he continued to exercise considerable influence over department affairs from his home⁸² on Euclid Avenue in the Berkeley hills. He took a direct hand in the professional careers of his former associates and continued his own work in policing through consultation, writing and teaching. Between 1932 and 1937 he was a

81

Interview with Albert L. Coffey, op. cit.

82

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

full-time research professor at the University of California, after taking a year off for a tour around the world during which he visited police agencies in many countries.

The Rockefeller Foundation had funded a project at Berkeley in the administration of criminal justice, which was conducted by the Bureau of Public Administration and the Department of Political Science. ⁸³ Vollmer's work was sponsored under this grant, which also brought Herman Adler, psychiatrist and criminologist from Illinois, and Hugh Fuller, an expert on criminal statistics, into the program. A new group major in criminology was being offered by 1933, and Vollmer taught courses in police administration in addition to his research.

Vollmer had a considerable respect for the power of higher education, and believed that schools of police science were a major tool in the effort to professionalize policing. California's present lead in police training, both in-service and academic, is primarily due to his influence. In 1930 he agreed to work with Earl Warren, then District Attorney of Alameda County, to set up a police science training program at a university or college. This resulted in the development of an extension program at the Junior College

at San Jose, affiliated with the San Jose Teachers College, which soon became a two-year academic program in police science and administration. A Berkeley police officer, George C. Brereton, was recruited to head the program, which included internship experience with the San Jose Police Department. In 1935 this program became the San Jose State College Police School. A similar program⁸⁴ was established at Los Angeles Junior College in 1934.

The most ambitious academic program for which Vollmer worked resulted from his contacts at the University of California. The group major whose students he taught during the 1930s was one stage of this evolving program. Since 1916, he had been lecturing on police science during most summer sessions; these lectures continued until 1931. Over the years Vollmer had lobbied for a regular curriculum in police administration at the university, and a committee was formed in 1931 to develop such a program. The members were: Vollmer; Prof. A. M. Kidd, School of Law, who had lectured in the earliest sessions of the Berkeley Police School; Dr. Adler; and Prof. Carl Schmidt of the Biological⁸⁵ Sciences Program. The group major was approved in

84

Kenney, op. cit., p. 99.

85

Ibid., p. 91.

1933, and by 1939 had become a part of the Political Science Department. A master's program was approved in 1947, and a separate professional School of Criminology came into existence in 1950, headed by Vollmer's protege, O. W. Wilson. The school began offering a Doctor of Criminology degree in 1963. Vollmer had envisioned such a school for more than 30 years, and by 1950 had friends in positions of importance who could support the venture: Robert G. Sproul, then president of the university; and Monroe Deutsch, provost in charge of the Berkeley campus. The Berkeley program ultimately went far beyond the technical police training that was established in other parts of the state. Vollmer hoped that an academic criminology program would serve as a laboratory for new ideas and a sophisticated training ground for police leaders.

In addition to his teaching, Vollmer produced a high output of writing during the 1930s, including his books Crime and the State Police (co-authored with Alfred E. Parker) and Police and Modern Society. Before considering these

86

Interview with John D. Holstrom, op. cit.

87

Ibid.

88

Op. cit.

89

(Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1936 edition).

works it is relevant to review the writing that Vollmer did over the years for various scholarly and professional journals. Vollmer agreed with the academic principle that an idea or experiment that is unreported is doomed to oblivion, and he lost no time in publicizing such innovations within Berkeley or California policing as were successful. A large number of these articles appeared in the Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, published at Northwestern University and now known as the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science. Vollmer's association with the American Institute began in 1917, when he was elected president of the California chapter, and in the following year he became national vice-president. He was perhaps drawn into the institute by his friendship with Prof. A. M. Kidd of the University Law School, who was the California representative on the committee for new members in 1917.

This interdisciplinary journal was a natural forum for Vollmer's ideas. Perhaps his first mention in its pages occurred in November, 1916, when the Notes and Abstracts section contained a piece from a Chicago newspaper entitled

Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, VII (1917), 782.

CONTINUED

3 OF 7

91

"Police Work a Profession, Not a Job," that urged the Chicago Police Department to upgrade its program of police training:

Berkeley, California has led the way in exacting and furnishing still higher police training. Prompted and assisted by the University of California, which is located in that city, courses have been given during the past seven years in elementary psychology and physiology, in the rules of evidence and the principles of criminal law, in the relation of physical defects to crime and in the social causes of delinquency. Chief of Police Vollmer thinks police work is "more a profession than a job" and that the policeman's training should be more like that of the doctor and the lawyer. "Inefficiency and all the ills that follow in its wake may be expected," he thinks, until this professional status is recognized by the public and prepared for by the press.⁹²

Vollmer became an associate editor in March, 1917, and in the same month co-authored an article with Albert

93

Schneider on the Berkeley Police School. In subsequent

years he published articles on criminal identification,

modus operandi, police selection procedures, crime preven-

94

tion, and many other topics.

91

Ibid., VII (1916), 622-4.

92

Ibid., p. 622.

93

"The School for Police as Planned at Berkeley," ibid., VII (1917), 877-98.

94

See the bibliography of Vollmer's works reprinted as Appendix B.

Crime and the State Police was published in 1935. As we have seen, state policing was a lifelong interest for Vollmer. During 1920-21 he was a member of an American Institute of Criminal Law committee that surveyed the movement to establish state and metropolitan police.⁹⁵ His 1935 book, researched and written with a graduate student in the criminology program at the university, set forth the need for state police agencies to coordinate crime fighting in rural areas and in cases where an offender moves from one police jurisdiction to another. Although the book presented little new information, a reviewer of the day praised it highly "(a)s a means of popularizing the idea of the state police."⁹⁶

The Police and Modern Society was published a year later, in 1936. This was Vollmer's most complete exposition of his views on the police role and the organizational structure necessary to fulfil it. In his preface he commented that writers in many fields had taken it upon themselves to

95

The chairman of this committee was P. O. Ray, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. The report of the committee was entitled "Metropolitan and State Police." Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XI (1920), 453-67.

96

Review by Lane W. Lancaster, ibid., XXVI (1935), 803.

point out the weaknesses in police departments "on a purely theoretical basis," but: "No consideration of these problems as the policeman on patrol daily encounters them has as yet been offered by the man with practical experience in the field." ⁹⁷ He placed the blame for police deficiencies in his very first sentence: "The police services of the United States have traveled just as far toward the control and prevention of crime as the public will permit." ⁹⁸ And a few pages later he established his consistent first priority: "The poor quality of the personnel is perhaps the greatest weakness of police departments in the United States." ⁹⁹ The book dealt with six areas: major crimes, wherein the policeman's role as a crime fighter is most clearly defined; vice control, his most unpopular task and an area in which legislative repression ¹⁰⁰ "has failed miserably in execution;" traffic, which Vollmer ¹⁰¹ reluctantly admitted into the ambit of police functions;

97

Op. cit., unpaged preface.

98

Ibid., p. 1.

99

Ibid., p. 3.

100

Ibid., p. 81.

101

"(T)he responsibility for the solution of traffic problems, including the safety of people using the highway, is in every instance placed with the police department and, try as they will to change this condition, responsibility is more than likely to remain with them indefinitely." (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit., p. 18.)

general service; crime prevention; and personnel. Vollmer's ideas as developed in this and his other books will be more fully explored in Chapter Four.

Besides contributing his own efforts toward building a professional police literature, Vollmer encouraged his officers and associates to write articles and books about the technical and administrative aspects of policing. He became acquainted with Charles C Thomas, a publisher based in Springfield, Illinois, who specialized in medical books, and convinced him to begin a series in law enforcement.

102

Since that time, the Thomas firm has published most of the technical police literature that is used for reference by municipal police departments.

In 1937 Vollmer retired from the university and spent his time studying, conducting police surveys, writing and corresponding with associates and police officials about police problems. He maintained intimate contact with the operations of the Berkeley Police Department, and it was during this period that he conducted the seminar on police surveys with two members of that department. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s he exerted a personal influence over his colleagues and younger police officers by advising

102

Interview with O. W. Wilson, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism, op. cit.

them on their careers and assisting them in their own research and writing projects. The present chief of the Oakland department, Charles Gain, met Vollmer during the early 1950s when Gain was a young patrolman, and was so impressed by his personality and ideas that he returned several times for long discussions about policing. He remembered Vollmer admonishing him: "The first thing to decide is whether you want to be a cop or a police administrator."

103

In 1949 Vollmer's last major work, The Criminal, was published. This book viewed the problems of crime from a greater theoretical distance than did his earlier books, which focused on police administration. Vollmer considered The Criminal to be his best book, and although time has made it less relevant to police scholars, it is of considerable interest to those who wish to evaluate Vollmer's ideas in the context of his beliefs about the origins of crime. It was the culmination of his lifelong interest in criminal psychology, an interest that began in his first year as marshal and was modified through the years by his growing awareness of the elusive problem of defining crime itself.

104

103

Personal interview, January, 1972.

104

(Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1949).

During the early 1950s Vollmer's health began to deteriorate. He was afflicted with Parkinson's Disease, which interfered increasingly with his ability to function without assistance. He then became aware that he had cancer, and confided to several close friends that "he would never become a bed patient, a person who would be helpless and a concern to other people." ¹⁰⁵ In accordance with these feelings, he committed suicide with his service revolver, ending his life in 1955 at the age of 79. Although he had been married twice, his second wife dying in 1946, Vollmer had no children.

Vollmer's personal impact upon his associates and junior officers probably contributed more to the continuance of his ideas than did his formal work as a police administrator and writer. He had a profound influence on the ambitions and views of several generations of Berkeley policemen who became police leaders on their own. In a field in which leadership abilities are traditionally pre-eminent, Vollmer was the outstanding leader of the first half of this century, and his own skills doubtless affected the image of police administration that he created.

CHAPTER FOUR: A CRITICAL LOOK AT VOLLMER'S MODEL OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

In this chapter we will define August Vollmer's model of police professionalism and examine the shift in police priorities that it represented. Vollmer's most complete discussion of his ideas is found in his book ¹ The Police and Modern Society, written in 1936. It is divided into six major sections -- major crimes, vice enforcement, traffic, general service, crime prevention and personnel -- which correspond with the categories into which Vollmer divided police functions and problems. This framework will be used to explore Vollmer's attitudes toward policing and the role that he envisioned for the modern professional policeman. The discussion in the latter part of the chapter will show that Vollmer's model of professionalism contained within it a serious contradiction between the crime-fighting priority, which led to an emphasis on centralized management and technology, and the community-based service functions which Vollmer considered essential if policing was to maintain the respect and support of the public.

As a model detached from reality, Vollmer's professionalism seems to present a complete picture of the policeman's ¹ (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971).

role. Within his writings he dealt sensitively with nearly all aspects of police problems. Yet, although he recognized these problems, his model failed to meet them in a realistic way. In other words, he operated from a conception that denied the eclectic character of policing, just as the analogy to British policing denied the uniqueness of the American experience. This resulted in a system of policing that, although seemingly complete, was inappropriate in its particular applications. In analyzing Vollmer's writings we are not conscious of what is incorrect but of what is missing, i.e., the sense of local immediacy that surrounds actual police work.

Definition of Vollmer's Police Professionalism

Vollmer himself never clearly defined what he meant by professionalism in policing. James Q. Wilson has offered an apt summary by writing that Vollmer's professionalism² emphasized "efficiency, law enforcement, aggressive street patrol and honesty." Vollmer was "a pioneer in new concepts of traffic law enforcement, the use of scientific crime detection procedures, the development of a motorized police force, and the use of research in determining the proper assignment of

2

As contrasted with order maintenance.

3
police manpower to patrol beats."

Wilson perceived that Vollmer was not a "stern and doctrinaire exponent" of law enforcement to deter crime, "preoccupied with technical and administrative aspects of police work;" he called this "not a portrait but a caricature." 4
Wilson was also correct in pointing out the inconsistencies that arose in Vollmer's work by virtue of his being both a 5
skeptic and a reformer.

Our own definition of Vollmer's professionalism centers upon its most prominent feature, the individual professional policeman. The skills and dedication of the policeman were the most important factors in all of Vollmer's work for police reform. In this model, police professionalism rests upon the role of the educated, aware and honest policeman, who has a detailed knowledge of his beat or area of assignment. This policeman understands and can use modern technology to increase his efficiency in meeting his primary responsibility of suppressing serious criminal activity. He is detached from local politics, especially in the realm of vice law enforcement. He is an efficient and aggressive crime fighter who understands

3
Introduction to The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. v.

4
Ibid., p. vi.

5
Ibid., p. x.

the multiple requirements of evidence collection. He is able to deal equally with all social and economic classes, gaining their respect and cooperation without recourse to personal identification with any particular class.

Because of this emphasis on the individual policeman, Vollmer was always concerned first with personnel reform, within the context of administrative and technological innovation. New techniques of scientific crime detection and the rational allocation of patrol resources presupposed the recruitment and training of policemen who would be competent and fair in exercising their skills.

Changes in Police Priorities

Police professionalism was an attempt to reorder the existing priorities of municipal police departments. The style of policing that Vollmer hoped to replace was basically
6
that of the watchman, who operated as an arm of the dominant political faction and was relatively passive in meeting his

6
James Q. Wilson described the watchman style as follows: "In some communities, the police in dealing with situations that do not involve 'serious' crime act as if order maintenance rather than law enforcement were their principal function.... I shall call this the 'watchman' style, employing here for analytical purposes a term that was once -- in the early nineteenth century -- descriptive generally of the mission of the American municipal police." (Varieties of Police Behavior, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 140.)

obligation to control crime. Vollmer's first shift away from this style was his assertion that aggressive crime fighting was the primary, although not the only, function of the police. The professional's emphasis on technology and management skills naturally flowed from this shift in priorities.

Vollmer's emphasis on crime prevention was merely the other side of this aggressive stance against crime. In a sense, he was calling on the policeman to "know his enemy." He was strongly influenced by theories being developed in the behavioral sciences that promised to provide more sophisticated answers to the problem of crime causation and criminal identification, just as technology was providing remarkable answers to problems of communication, transportation and information gathering.

In this respect, Vollmer was part of a larger reform movement that was looking for new ways to meet social problems. Haller has identified three historical traditions that arose in response to concern with crime in this century: the

Vollmer was especially influenced by the works of Hans Gross, a German forensic scientist who was best known for his Criminal Psychology (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1968, reprinted from the 1911 edition).

The question of the climate of reform within which Vollmer worked is examined in detail in Chapter Five. It is referred to here briefly in connection with Vollmer's dual emphasis upon crime fighting and crime prevention.

tradition of legal deterrence, wherein strong law enforcement is emphasized; the psychological tradition, which explains crime in terms of personal aberration; and the sociological tradition, which looks to the social relationships and values of the criminal. The latter two traditions emphasize prevention and rehabilitation rather than the sanctions of the criminal law.

9

As we will see later in discussing vice law enforcement, Vollmer's entry into police work in 1905 coincided with the call from moral reformers for greater use of deterrent measures against the problems of vice in urban areas. But his career was clearly a blend of the deterrent and the psychological/sociological traditions, which dated from the movement around the turn of the century to establish juvenile courts. The emphasis of these nondeterrent traditions upon prevention and rehabilitation was in line with Vollmer's personal interest in exploring the causes of crime.

One of his early statements on the connection between

policing and social action to prevent crime occurred in his

9

Mark Haller, "Theories of Criminal Violence and Their Impact on the Criminal Justice System." In Crimes of Violence, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 13 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1328.

10

Ibid., pp. 1339-40.

article "The Policeman as a Social Worker," which was
 11
 published in a police journal in 1919. In it he described
 his view of the policeman as the "ultimate" crime fighter,
 as one who understands crime causation and works to prevent
 its occurrence:

The policeman is learning that dependency, criminality and industrial unrest have a common origin, and that upon him rest far more important and far greater obligations than the mere apprehending and prosecuting of law breakers. He is fast learning that dealing with criminals after the evil habits have been formed is a hopeless task as far as the eradication, or even lessening of crime is concerned. 12

This is naturally a far more sophisticated and important task
 13
 than the policeman had been traditionally expected to perform.

11

The Policeman's News, June, 1919. The paper was originally delivered before the previous meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in New Orleans.

12

Ibid., p. 11.

13

Vollmer cited three case histories in this article which illustrated the new theories of crime causation. The first was that of a young girl arrested for stealing who was taken to a "psychopathic clinic" and found to be "somewhat retarded mentally." Experts believed that "adenoids and enlarged tonsils might be responsible for the defect." The second case was a boy arrested for burglary who was judged to be normal and was sent to relatives in the country for rehabilitation. The third case was a middle-aged man who was arrested for burglary and subsequently found to be a "medical problem.... (T)he prisoner was a neurasthenic with morbid impulses; the result of over work and financial worries." (Ibid., pp. 12, 42.)

Vollmer's suggestion was that:

we raise the educational and intellectual standard of our police departments, elevate the position of the policeman to that of a profession, eliminate politics entirely from the force, and secure the people's confidence, sympathy, respect and cooperation.¹⁴

These "twin" functions -- crime fighting and crime prevention -- were to be the first priorities of police work. The other functions that Vollmer distinguished were the enforcement of vice laws, traffic regulation and performance of general service tasks.

Despite Vollmer's reordering of priorities, and his recognition that some aspects of police work were more amenable to professionalization than others, he viewed the policeman as a total entity who was rightly responsible for a wide range of tasks that had little inner consistency. With the significant exception of vice law enforcement, Vollmer was jealously protective in keeping these functions in the police jurisdiction, and he opposed the idea that certain police functions should be transferred to other agencies. After mentioning the movement to establish "citizen's police" for patrol duties, he wrote:

14

Ibid., p. 42.

No matter how unsatisfactory the regular police force had seemed, however, these alternative suggestions were still less effective. The truth is, there is no substitute for policemen in the performance of the great number and variety of duties required of the protective and law-enforcing arm of government. 15

In Berkeley, Vollmer was proud that during his tenure as chief there had been a decline in private policing to the point where, in 1918, fewer than five security guards were employed in the city, including large industrial buildings. He considered it fitting that the regular municipal police should assume total responsibility for watchman functions. A

15

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 216. However, Vollmer expressed contradictory views about traffic law enforcement. In the Illinois Crime Survey he recommended that the traffic function be removed from the Chicago Police Department (Illinois Association for Criminal Justice, Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1968, reprinted from the 1929 edition, pp. 367-8). In the Wickersham Report he concluded that traffic was likely to remain a police responsibility, and would require increasing attention from police executives (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Police, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931, p. 18). In The Police and Modern Society and other writings, Vollmer treated traffic problems as a high priority in police administration and encouraged experimentation in the technical aspects of traffic regulation.

16

At that time Berkeley had 65,000 inhabitants. "At present (1918) there are only four (private policemen) and two of these are engaged solely to turn lights on and off, to adjust awnings, and to do other chores in the business quarters of the city." Editorial entitled "A Progressive Police System in Berkeley, California," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, IX (1918), 320.

Berkeley policeman considered it a personal failure during those years if anyone other than himself were the first to
17
turn in an alarm when a fire broke out on his beat.

In short, Vollmer's professional policeman did everything. He solved complicated crimes through his skills in scientific detection, he performed the numerous lesser functions of community public safety, he enforced the law fairly and efficiently, and he maintained a constant and comprehensive communication with the people who lived and worked on his beat. Those impediments that stood in his way were usually the fault of inexperienced lawmakers or an uncooperative public.

Although Vollmer was sophisticated in his knowledge of the haphazard, miscellaneous nature of a policeman's job, he looked for answers to problems of function in the constant upgrading of the policeman's skills and in his autonomy from political entanglements. "When we have reached a point where the best people in society are selected for police service," he asserted, "there will be little confusion regarding

17

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, August Vollmer: Pioneer in Police Professionalism (Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, in press).

18

the duties of the members." This approach masked serious contradictions between the concepts of centralized management and local involvement, between the technology of crime fighting and the skills of a community-based watchman.

19

The Police and Modern Society is a fairly definitive statement of Vollmer's philosophy, and we will examine its main points in some detail. Our discussion will correspond with Vollmer's division of police functions into the following parts: police responsibility for handling major crimes; vice as a police problem; traffic law enforcement; and general service to the community.

Major Crimes

It was in this area that Vollmer most strongly voiced the need to have policemen who would be professionally equipped to fight back an "alien" element, the criminal. Solving crimes like homicide, kidnapping, robbery and burglary requires skills that far surpass those of the average citizen. The professional policeman is expected to view any unusual occurrence with a higher degree of sophistication

18

"Aims and Ideals of the Police," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XIII (1922), 253.

19

See pp. 183-9.

and detachment than the untrained citizen. What appears to be a routine death must be treated as a potential homicide or suicide, and the officer must use modern methods of crime detection and data analysis to evaluate the evidence he collects. Beyond this, he must be aware of the legal requirements surrounding his investigation so that he does not jeopardize possible prosecution.

A look at any of Vollmer's works shows that he approached crime solving with the enthusiasm of a detective
20
story fan. His accounts of the major crimes that occurred during his career reflected his personal interest in the challenge that they offered to the police, and it is in confronting major crime that Vollmer's professional seems most confident and alert, most able to exercise the skills of his true calling. Vollmer used these case histories to illustrate measures that he favored adopting to assist the police in crime fighting, some of which he was able to introduce into the Berkeley department. The scientific crime laboratory, motorized policing and sophisticated communications devices are examples. There are early stories about how the first

20

James Q. Wilson wrote of this enthusiasm: "The practical police officer's love of anecdote weakened his account of criminal patterns. His chapter on 'Major Crimes' emphasizes the bizarre, the professional, and the psychotic to the neglect of the commonplace." (Introduction to The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. x.)

alarm system and bicycle patrols outwitted burglars who entered homes in the Berkeley hills while the owners were
 21
 at work in San Francisco.

But the most far-reaching of the measures that Vollmer advocated to fight crime were improvements in record keeping and methods of criminal identification. His efforts to introduce these measures on a state and national
 22
 level have been discussed in the preceding chapter.

It is significant to emphasize here, however, that these reforms were designed primarily to assist the policeman in his prime function of crime fighting. Vollmer frequently described a criminal case of homicide or robbery that stretched across several states, and did not fail to point out that centralized files, accessible to all the jurisdictions involved, would have assisted in apprehending the criminal much earlier. One such case involved a man who married over a dozen women and murdered many of them. Vollmer commented:

Had it been necessary for Watson to identify himself at the time of his first bigamous marriage, the first murder would probably have been averted, and even if he had been

21

See Alfred E. Parker's account in Crime Fighter: August Vollmer (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 58-60.

22

See pp. 98-103.

successful in killing the first woman, it would have been impossible for him to pass into another state without the knowledge of the police. The assistance that a system of checking the movements of persons traveling from one state to another would give to the police in their attempts to solve homicides and apprehend murderers must be obvious.²³

Vollmer's support for a universal registration system was a further expression of his belief in the use of centralized
24
records to assist the police, but he seemed to be unaware of its political implications in the area of personal liberties. In his view, the professional policeman could not be construed as a political agent who applied selective coercion against the population, so what possible objection could law-abiding citizens have to measures that would permit the police to fight everybody's enemy -- the criminal?

When higher rates of violent crime are found within certain racial groups, this also presents no problem to the effectiveness of the professional approach. After citing statistics on the high homicide rates in Southern cities having "huge Negro populations," Vollmer said:

The inference seems inescapable that the Negro contributes enormously to this unenviably high murder rate.... •

23

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 24.

24

See pp. 105-6.

... The leaders among these colored citizens of our country attribute the lawlessness of the Negroes to the brutal and unintelligent treatment accorded them by the white people. Since community prejudices change very slowly, homicides in the southern states will probably continue to give the police much trouble.²⁵

He also discussed the higher incidence of property crime and resistance to police investigations in poor neighborhoods:

On the basis of a strong hatred and contempt for persons of wealth, it is not difficult to set up an ethical code which permits and encourages stealing from the possessors of worldly goods. Since the police are established for the protection of property as well as of persons, it follows, naturally, that they should be placed at the head of the list of enemies; and the man or boy who can outwit, injure, or kill a policeman becomes a hero in the eyes of the district's inhabitants.²⁶

The fact that an educated, efficient, aggressive professional would be called upon to exercise his skills to a greater degree in a poor or minority community than in white middle-class and wealthy communities was not seen as a fundamental problem. What American would not come to respect a skilled professional? For Vollmer, the inherent antagonism that these groups felt toward policemen simply

25

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

26

Ibid., p. 69.

reinforced the need for the policeman to be detached from local community identification. He believed that the demonstration of professional expertise was the surest way to gain the respect of these alienated segments of the community.

Motorized policing, which met some resistance when Vollmer first introduced it into Berkeley, served to separate the policeman from the local community mechanically. Professionalism would supposedly re-establish that connection in an organic way. In his lifetime Vollmer witnessed the overwhelming impact that the automobile came to make upon American culture, and how it changed both crime and policing. He constantly stressed the new mobility of criminals and the inability of a locally-based constabulary to maintain knowledge²⁷ of their whereabouts. This was especially true in his²⁸ writings on the need for state police forces. But in mobilizing his policeman to fight major crime, Vollmer was interfering in the ability of that policeman to perform his other functions as well; he never drew a distinction in organizational terms between crime patrol and watchman patrol. He did not believe that a completely motorized police force would be

²⁷

Ibid., pp. 28-9. Vollmer here presented tables showing a correlation between rising automobile registration rates and robberies between 1910 and 1930.

²⁸

See pp. 103-4.

seriously hampered in performing the functions that rest upon local contact. (It is reasonable to speculate that, in the Berkeley department, many of these problems were worked out in the weekly meetings that influenced so much of day-to-day police policy.)

29

Vice Law Enforcement

Professional policing operates best under a system of rational laws that are endorsed by a consensus of the population. Difficult as this may be to obtain in any area of the law, where vice is concerned these criteria are endemically absent. It is not surprising that Vollmer considered vice law enforcement to be the most disagreeable part of police work. He was pragmatic in his understanding of the futility of using police coercion to affect people's personal behavior, and considered vice to be a social problem requiring educative answers, not legal ones.

Indeed, Vollmer's writings portray the zealous moral reformer as almost as great an enemy to society and policing as the hardened criminal:

Extremists never see conditions as they exist, especially if it is a problem concerned with vice. They are blinded by their prejudices,

their assertions are usually based on desire or theory rather than on facts, and their biased attitude is only the logical outcome of their gross ignorance of the true conditions.³⁰

Vollmer's long career in policing had its beginnings in the antivice crusades of the early years of this century, and his strong revulsion against political interference in policing was rooted in his memory of the wholesale corruption that surrounded vice law enforcement. In this reaction, Vollmer was one of many Americans whose concern for police reform dated from the excesses of those days. The police found themselves caught between the demands of moral reformers and the corruption of local political administrations, and Vollmer believed that the only escape from this dilemma was by extricating the police from both local politics and vice law enforcement.

These antivice crusades took place between 1905 and 1915. Haller has described their effects:

The antivice crusade also produced some general efforts to analyze the police functions and to reorganize the urban police departments along lines that gave police better training, greater civil service protection, and improved transportation and communication facilities.³¹

30

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 82.

31

Op. cit., p. 1332.

Among the figures who were prominent in this effort to upgrade policing were Raymond Fosdick, Bruce Smith and August Vollmer.

Thus, perhaps the most important impact of the campaign against vice was the impetus it gave to the gradual professionalization of American urban police. The period before World War I was probably the low point in public respect for the police. Thereafter, while scandals would periodically be uncovered, the police would seldom be the main object of the reform by those within the deterrent tradition. Instead, the police joined in the tradition, and helped to divert attention upon the courts and parole boards as the primary factors chiefly responsible for undermining effective law enforcement.³²

Vice law enforcement led to the most serious problems that Vollmer faced as a police chief in Los Angeles and as a consultant in other cities: political corruption and police graft. Unenforceable laws opened up opportunities for dishonesty on all levels. It was obviously the greatest threat that existed to Vollmer's vision of a professional police service. Berkeley itself was known as a strait-laced community during those years and, except for the less "righteous" elements in West Berkeley, seemed to provide an unusual consensus that enabled Vollmer to maintain a "clean" home base. For example, Prohibition laws seem to have been effectively

enforced in Berkeley, and there are accounts that gambling
 33
 and prostitution were also largely absent. Opportunities
 for vice in nearby San Francisco and Oakland doubtless
 assisted in keeping Berkeley pure, and Vollmer was able
 to maintain standards of honesty within his department to a
 greater degree than a chief in a large city could have hoped
 for.

The entanglements that resulted from vice law enforcement were a crucial factor in Vollmer's early conviction that only professionalism -- with its detachment from political corruption -- could save policing from the low state to which it had fallen. He was strongly influenced in this belief by his association with Walter J. Petersen of Oakland, who was a captain in that city's police department when Vollmer became Berkeley marshal in 1905, and who later became Oakland police chief. Vollmer credited Petersen with providing much of the early direction and practical advice that the younger man needed when he first entered policing, and from Petersen he learned of the pitfalls that a police executive encountered in enforcing
 34
 vice laws.

 33

See p. 93.

34

Parker, op. cit., pp. 81-2.

Petersen's attitudes toward vice law enforcement were expressed in his paper, "The Chief of Police: The Goat for
³⁵
 the Sins of Society," which was delivered before the 1916 meeting of the I. A. C. P. in Newark, New Jersey. In it he said:

If all the citizens of a city had the same standard or morality, were ready to obey all the laws on the statute books, and support recognized authority, the work of a police chief would be simple and easily performed, but because there are many standards of morals and because some citizens are willing to obey certain of our laws and are determined to disobey others, the work of the heads of our police departments becomes complex and difficult.³⁶

And further:

It is a popular fiction that majorities rule our cities, but as a matter of fact the majorities of our cities are so much concerned with making money and living, that they, the majority, permit the minority to rule, and when the minority has placed men into office all the majority can do is to complain about it and wait for another chance to get even for those sins of omission in public affairs that is so prevalent in American municipalities.³⁷

35

Published in the Proceedings of the I. A. C. P., 1916, pp. 38-44.

36

Ibid., p. 38.

37

Ibid., p. 41.

His view of the zealous moral reformer was similar to that of Vollmer:

(The police chief) should not be concerned if a crowd of hysterical women denounce him or unsexed men abuse him.³⁸

When Chief Petersen delivered this paper in Newark he was under attack by reform groups in Oakland for failing to enforce drinking and prostitution laws in certain areas of the city. Leaders of these groups circulated a letter attacking Petersen to all members of the I. A. C. P. during its meeting that year, in which Petersen was an unsuccessful candidate for president of the association.³⁹

Vollmer's own opinions about the solution of vice problems reflected his realistic and nonpunitive approach. Of prostitution he wrote: "Statistics show that arrest for prostitution is ineffective in eliminating this vice."⁴⁰ He favored public health involvement to control venereal disease, and said: "The moral aspects of prostitution must be left in the hands of parents, clergy, and public educators."⁴¹

Writing about the large-scale gambling raids that

38

Ibid., p. 43.

39

See the discussion in the Proceedings, op. cit., pp. 44-7.

40

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 90.

41

Ibid., p. 92.

characterized the era, and which he himself conducted in Berkeley and Los Angeles, Vollmer commented: "Thus goaded to action by charges brought by pulpit and by press, the police are made the unwilling agents through whom futile injustices are inflicted upon thousands of innocent people."⁴² He considered gambling law enforcement such a threat to the integrity of the police that he suggested its total removal from the regular police function. In this area, enforcement of the laws -- even on a professional basis -- destroyed the ability of the policeman to maintain credibility with the public.

No municipal police, and no county or state police charged with the enforcement of any of the laws dealing with major crimes and traffic, should ever be permitted to play any part in the enforcement of gambling regulations....By removing from the regularly constituted police forces the responsibility for the enforcement of vice laws or regulatory measures, the politicians, especially those of the underworld type, immediately are bereft of their power to influence the actions of those whose preeminent duty and function is the protection of society from professional criminals.⁴³

Vollmer's bitterness was probably due in large part to his experiences in Los Angeles, where politicians, judges

42

Ibid., pp. 95-6.

43

Ibid., pp. 99-100. Emphasis added.

and underworld figures responded to his efforts to enforce gambling laws by seriously hampering his ability to bring any worthwhile reforms into the police department.

His objections to Prohibition laws were similarly based upon the difficulties that they presented to the police department in performing its other duties. Writing shortly after Repeal, he approved of maintaining some regulation over the liquor industry to prevent the widespread abuses that led to the antisaloon movement, but because of the potential for corruption recommended that any enforcement should be assigned to a separate agency. "Repression in any form should by all means be taken away from the police, who are charged with the responsibility of preventing crime, and assigned to a new agency."⁴⁴

Vollmer's comments on drug abuse resemble many of the nonpunitive positions taken in regard to this problem today:

In the popular notion the number of criminals that use drugs is greatly exaggerated.... However, the total number of crimes committed by addicts is large -- not major offenses, but numerous minor crimes committed by a few drug users.... Major crimes committed by "drug-soaked fiends" are comparatively rare.⁴⁵

44

Ibid., p. 108.

45

Ibid., p. 109.

He considered the problem a medical and educative one:

Because of the pitiable plight of addicts and their forlorn and sickly appearance when they are brought into the court, the judge's sympathy is aroused and he will not, as a rule, commit them to penal institutions.... (J)udges have learned from years of experience that nothing is accomplished by putting them in jail. The eradication of drug addiction by short jail sentences has proved a futile effort. 46

He recommended that the crime-producing aspects of drug abuse be controlled by establishing drug dispensaries run by the government:

The first step in any plan to alleviate this dreadful affliction should be the establishment of federal control and dispensation -- at cost -- of habit-forming drugs.. With the profit motive gone, no effort would be made to encourage its use by private dispensers of narcotics, and the drug peddler would disappear. New addicts would be speedily discovered and through early treatment some of these unfortunate victims might be saved from becoming hopelessly incurable.

Drug addiction, like prostitution, and like liquor, is not a police problem; it never has been, and never can be solved by policemen. 47

In summary, Vollmer felt that enforcement of vice laws created disastrous problems within a police department. It opened the way for wholesale corruption of policemen; it led

46

Ibid., pp. 109-10.

47

Ibid., pp. 117-8.

to "revolving-door" tenures for police executives; it consumed an inordinate amount of police time and manpower; and, most serious, it jeopardized the relationship of respect and cooperation between the policeman and the citizen.

Vollmer perceived this need for public credibility of police policies most clearly where vice laws were concerned. He dreamed of a legal system that would leave the police free to pursue their "real" work, the suppression of serious crime. His hostility toward vice law enforcement provided the impetus for his concept of professional policing, in which the policeman would operate free of the entanglements of political corruption and organized crime, and above the factionalism produced by diverse moral codes.

Traffic Regulation

Although Vollmer saw that traffic law enforcement had some resemblance to vice law enforcement, in the sense that both endangered public goodwill,⁴⁸ he took a much different tack toward the former problem. Writing of the difficulty of solving traffic and parking problems, he said:

48

John A. Gardiner's study showed the ambivalence of the public toward traffic law enforcement. See his Traffic and the Police (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 113.

Rarely does it occur to the faultfinding public that, even if the police wanted to do anything about the conditions complained about, the people would be the first to protest and the last to give their support. Policemen have come to believe that, whatever they do about traffic, they are "wrong." One of the common responses to the policeman's request to observe the regulations is: "I'm not doing any harm. Why don't you catch a few burglars for yourselves instead of bothering good citizens?"⁴⁹

The professional policeman's willingness to accept a responsibility for traffic enforcement and not for vice enforcement was based on several factors. One was the lower visibility and degree of political interference, and another was the strong argument that could be made for the use of professional and engineering standards in solving traffic problems. It was clearly an area where a body of neutral expertise could be developed and applied.

Certainly no buttons, signs, signals, safety stations, or other traffic devices should be installed, no traffic regulatory or control measures should ever be passed by legislative bodies, no traffic education program should ever be initiated, and no traffic enforcement should be undertaken until it has been justified by the facts collected by competent engineers.⁵⁰

49

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 137.

50

Ibid., pp. 139-40.

Vollmer understood that policing rested upon community acceptance. "Public support can never be commanded; it is always a free contribution which is given only when laws are reasonable and have the public approval.⁵¹" But in the area of traffic he was willing to commit the professional policeman to a course of positive action, despite the negative effects that enforcement often produced in the community.

Vollmer's police professionalism thus became increasingly oriented toward technological and organizational efficiency in patrol, crime investigation and traffic law enforcement, and increasingly neutral or withdrawn in areas like vice where community attitudes are more volatile. This change affected the policeman's relationship to the community and required a political stability, or at least a slow evolution of change in community attitudes, that Vollmer himself saw as unrealistic. This was especially true in urban areas where neighborhood life was strongly influenced by the larger economic and social issues that affected the country, such as changes in employment rates and the internal migration of the poor to the cities.

51

Ibid., p. 148.

General Service

It was in discussing the general service functions of the police that Vollmer most directly touched upon the conflict between professional priorities and diverse community needs. As a practicing policeman he had a keen understanding of the sometimes tedious tasks that consumed much of the policeman's day, and of the conflicting and nonrational demands that the public makes upon the policeman, but he did not use this understanding to temper his vision of a police service that could be constantly refined and professionalized.

Under the heading of general service he included the following tasks: enforcement of Federal, state and local laws that are not classified as major crimes; missing person searches; lost animal and property searches; disposition of dead bodies and investigations of deaths; first aid to the sick and injured; investigations of suicides; handling the insane and feeble-minded; riots due to strikes, subversive activities and racial disagreements; inspection of businesses and health conditions; and miscellaneous public complaints.

52

There are other nonspecific duties that fall under the category of general service that Vollmer called the "numerous

miscellaneous or routine duties...required by the rules and regulations of all police departments." These are the
⁵³
"fundamental requirements of police work." They include the maintenance of a positive police presence and a general community emergency service, or the basic watchman duties that policing never abandons; and the maintenance of information about changes in the area where the policeman is working.
 "Besides all else that he may be, the patrolman is always
⁵⁴
 the eyes and ears of the police executive...." "Patrolmen must become familiar with every part of their beat by regu-
⁵⁵
 larly and inconspicuously patrolling the streets...."
 "While on patrol duty, policemen are required to observe
⁵⁶
 license numbers and occupants of motor vehicles...." and so forth.

These general services and miscellaneous tasks conflict with Vollmer's concept of police professionalism to the degree that the professional must have a self-selected set of priorities. The police executive may recruit and train his officers to be crime fighters, but in daily operations

⁵³
Ibid., p. 217. Emphasis added.

⁵⁴
Ibid., p. 217.

⁵⁵
Ibid., p. 219.

⁵⁶
Ibid., p. 220.

must reconcile this priority with the overwhelming volume of demands that do not involve serious crime. However, Vollmer did not move from this realization to a belief that general service functions should be transferred to a different sort of policing agency, as has been suggested by the President's Commission in its division of police functions⁵⁷ into three areas. Except for vice law enforcement, Vollmer expected to resolve these conflicts of time and training by upgrading the level of personnel who would face them. He did not want to see police influence and access to information reduced, even in connection with duties that had only a tangential relation to crime fighting. Writing of missing person searches he said:

This particular police task belongs on the borderline between the enforcement and the nonenforcement groups, but so many instances of criminality are associated with disappearances that it would be impossible and unwise to assign this duty to any other department. It is extremely doubtful that any other agency can operate more efficiently than the police do in locating missing persons and in identifying the bodies of dead persons which at first are unrecognized.⁵⁸

57

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 122-4.

58

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 169.

Order maintenance during strikes, riots and disasters was similarly seen by Vollmer as within the proper sphere of the civilian police. He made the following criticism of the use of military forces for riot control:

Men who have been trained in the art of war apply the principles of war to police duty, and when exasperated by the guerrilla tactics of the rioters, they make laws of their own for the occasion. Their lack of knowledge of the laws applicable in such situations is likely to produce disastrous results. Occasionally they do not understand the limitations of their powers and may go beyond the limit that is prescribed by law or is necessary for the preservation of order.⁵⁹

Vollmer did not interpret the actions of the state in these instances as being politically coercive. Vice law enforcement epitomized for him the danger of involving the police in politics, in futile factional disputes which brought corruption and incompetence. Police actions in riots and strikes were more neutral and also more effective. He did not express concern that the use of police in riots and strikes would jeopardize their image as neutral professionals in future contacts with the communities involved. It is likely that these functions, not creating the internal demoralization that vice law enforcement did, seemed to interfere less with the

policeman's neutrality as a crime fighter, even though their effects on the community were similarly coercive.

Personnel

Vollmer's professionalism rests upon the creative use of modern technology and a level of competent personnel that excludes the less intelligent individual but also the more introspective or philosophical. The professional policeman should be aggressive and honest, but not committed to any particular interpretation of the political and economic distribution of power in the community he polices. When faced with competing values and with conflicts in function, he must maintain a high level of neutrality in order to preserve public support within the broader community. (This means, however, that he will inevitably be more supportive of the status quo.)

Thus, professionalism leads to the classic search for the "perfect man" rather than to a body of evaluative knowledge that places policing within a political and social context or bases it upon a community's sense of social justice. Policing in this model depends for its success upon the caliber of the individual officer, whom Vollmer described with fanciful hyperbole as follows:

The citizen expects police officers to have the wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the strength of Samson, the patience of Job, the leadership of Moses, the kindness of the Good Samaritan, the strategical training of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, and, finally, an intimate knowledge of every branch of the natural, biological, and social sciences. If he had all these, he might be a good policeman.⁶⁰

On a more realistic level he continued:

The qualifications just listed seem impossible of attainment for the personnel of any service. The list makes it undeniably evident, however, that society needs and must somehow obtain truly exceptional men to discharge police duties. Policemen must be possessed of superior intellectual endowment, physically sound, and free from mental and nervous disorders; they must have character traits which will insure integrity, honesty, and efficiency; their personality must command the respect and liking of their associates and of the general public.⁶¹

He contrasted these exceptional men with officers having low intelligence and working within department having low morale, who "join the ranks of the work-dodgers and become members of the useless, parasitical group of municipal ornaments."⁶²

60

Ibid., p. 222. Emphasis in original.

61

Ibid., pp. 222-3. Emphasis added.

62

Ibid., p. 223.

This emphasis on personnel rather than on structural methods for delivering police services makes Vollmer's work as a police consultant and advisor on police/community problems seem predetermined, regardless of the particular community or political setting in which he conducted his survey. His analyses of the departments in Kansas City, Minneapolis, Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles and Havana are all strikingly similar: police should be removed from political restraints, the power of the police executive should be strengthened, technological innovations should be introduced, and better trained police officers should be recruited.

Personnel reform was a constant theme of his career as a police chief, both in Berkeley and during his year in Los Angeles. Vollmer was brought to Los Angeles as a reform chief at a time when the police department was undergoing considerable criticism, not only for inefficiency and lax law enforcement, but also for police brutality and misuse of police power in labor disorders. (The Wickersham Report contained an example of the "third degree" being used in a special room in Los Angeles Police Headquarters.) All of

63

· National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 144.

Vollmer's important efforts in Los Angeles were directed toward improving the level of personnel. He introduced intelligence testing, enrolled middle-level police executives in classes at the University of Southern California, and strengthened the command structure of the department. His efforts to link the department with a reform power base in the community were minimal, perhaps because he doubted the strength of those forces, but more probably because he wanted to disentangle the department from all political involvements. The factionalism of Los Angeles politics seemed to call for a pure application of the principle of professional detachment. In any event, the sustaining community support that Vollmer manipulated so shrewdly in Berkeley was unattainable in this harsher climate. Personnel reform and new technology became his entire program in Los Angeles, and the community involvement that was responsible for his success in Berkeley had to be sacrificed as a workable goal. This stance was doubtless reinforced by the constant and bitter political attack that Vollmer was subjected to in Los Angeles, the only city besides Berkeley in which he functioned as an active police chief.

The popular memory of Vollmer as the father of the "college cops" is not a superficial judgment. He did

not need to understand the American police experience within a political and economic context when he could attract into policing the exceptional individuals who patrolled Berkeley's streets during the 1920s.

64

Vollmer's View of Policing in a Changing Society

Vollmer was clearly ahead of his times in his perception that the police would have to work increasingly with all classes in society, not merely the working and lower classes. Rapid urbanization and the advent of the automobile were key factors in this change, and Vollmer was aware that the police would be operating at a higher level of visibility. The use of third degree techniques and the routine violation of due process may be tolerated when applied almost exclusively against minorities, the poor, and recent immigrants; but these tactics are not tolerated when applied against the middle and upper classes or against the children of these classes. Policemen who followed only the traditional, expedient methods of order maintenance would be poorly prepared to function in this new atmosphere. Vollmer's own strong opposition to the third degree was only partly based on humanitarian motives: he was primarily concerned that it

jeopardized the prosecution's ability to obtain a conviction, and that it demeaned the police in the eyes of the public. In other words, it was ineffective in the long run.

Vollmer was also correct in perceiving that the automobile and other technological aids had escalated the level of sophistication in crime, and that the police had to possess the same aids if they were not to be left behind. He saw that the new mobility of criminals prevented the police from treating crime as a local phenomenon which they could control by knowing the population of their own and surrounding jurisdictions. Efforts to centralize law enforcement, to improve communications and information gathering, were logical responses to these changes.

Vollmer knew that America in the 1920s and 1930s was undergoing many confusing changes that threatened to limit the ability of the policeman to exercise his skills in a stable environment. But there also seemed to be new areas of expertise that would help him to understand these changes, and to manipulate rather than be manipulated by them. Vollmer's lifelong efforts for crime prevention through work with the young are an indication of his faith in this new expertise. The survey at the Hawthorne Elementary School was an example of the kind of program that he wanted to involve the police in

on a routine basis.

Vollmer's work with juveniles and his attempts to link police efforts with those of other social agencies made him a part of the progressive social movement that was effecting reforms in many aspects of American life. Much of his renown with the social and legal scholars of the day came from his enthusiastic endorsement of new social science techniques in matters of police personnel, juvenile handling, and the treatment of offenders. His contacts within Berkeley's academic community provided him with new methods for improving police standards at a time when the police were becoming a more visible target for criticism. The introduction of psychological and intelligence testing into the Berkeley department provided one good example of this. He was fully a part of the movement to reinterpret crime as a symptom of a deeper social malaise, to deal with it within a total social context rather than as the narrow concern of a punitive police force. His good credentials as a progressive reformer gave added weight to aspects of his professional model that may be seen, from today's perspective, to have been more rigidly determined by the particular concerns of the day.

Limitations of Vollmer's Professional Policing

Although it is possible to trace an evolution in Vollmer's thinking in relation to crime causation and the work of the police, his basic approach was fixed as early as 1919: the movement toward a detached, centralized, disciplined police force operating under strong personal leadership. From his article "The Policeman as a Social Worker"⁶⁶ through to his 1949 book The Criminal,⁶⁷ one can see his emphasis on upgrading police personnel, improving police skills in understanding the criminal, and preventive community work in cooperation with other agencies.

But the value that Vollmer placed on community involvement came inevitably into conflict with the professional's detachment from local political processes. This is the aspect of professional policing that has elicited the greatest criticism today. A policeman who is a detached crime fighter has difficulty in maintaining the level of local community involvement that Vollmer outlined for him in his writings. He becomes, at best, an outside expert in his relations with different community groups; at worst, if he is poorly recruited and trained, he becomes an alien agent

⁶⁶

Op. cit.

⁶⁷

(Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1949).

of the state's coercive power. Silver, writing of the growing concern over social disorder, commented as follows on the changed police role:

Violence, criminality, and riot become defined not only as undesirable but as threatening the very fabric of social life. Police forces come to be seen as they were in the time of their creation -- as a sophisticated and convenient form of 68 garrison force against an internal enemy.

Professionalism, under these circumstances, resembles increasingly the military model that Vollmer saw as inappropriate for police work. In the quotation above on riot 69 control, he touched upon the crucial difference in orientation and training between the military and the police. He rightly feared that the military man would be unskilled in the techniques of avoiding confrontation, and would resort to belligerence prematurely.

There never was and never will be a substitute for a body of men trained to meet emergencies intelligently, dispassionately, and courageously. 70

But Vollmer failed to perceive the extent to which his

68

Allan Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 22.

69

See p. 171.

70

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., p. 185.

view of the policeman as a crime fighter would involve that policeman increasingly in the military analogy. Police professionalism as it has developed since Vollmer, especially in its more recent applications in urban settings, has come to resemble the professionalism of the army itself. The professional's detached status limits his contacts with groups to the extent that he becomes unaccustomed to the give and take of local political and social change. But Vollmer believed that the professional must remain detached to prevent seizure of police power by partisan interests. Underlying this conviction is the implied one that social conflict cannot be resolved or contained without the existence of a strong police presence, that friction among groups will destroy the social order if a detached police force does not curb the tendency toward anarchy.

Friction between classes and between races, and between those of differing political, social, or religious beliefs, seems to be a universal law. As long as this is true, there will be need for police to preserve order, protect lives and property, and finally, to preserve the integrity of the state and nation. Whatever else may be said of the American police, this fact should be more widely known; namely, that without the police and the police organizations, with all their many defects, anarchy would be rife in this country, and the civilization now existing on this hemisphere would perish. The American police are justified, if for no

CONTINUED

4 OF 7

other reason than because in their hands rests in large measure the preservation of the nation.⁷¹

Therefore we can see that Vollmer's reforms were based on two beliefs which came inevitably to achieve primacy in his model of policing. First was the belief that social conflict among groups cannot be resolved without positive police presence, at least in a mediating capacity. His philosophy contained but did not credit the historical view that the police are involved in imposing majority values upon subgroups through the use of coercion and selective enforcement of the laws.⁷² He believed that the police could maintain social and cultural neutrality while keeping the peace through the exercise of their professional skills.

Second, Vollmer believed that the crime-fighting function had to determine the basic organizational structure of the police department, from recruitment through deployment of patrol resources. All other functions would be served within this framework, all management decisions would be made compatible with this goal.

71

Ibid., p. 185.

72

In a contemporary setting, Skolnick has written of minority groups coming "to regard the police as a hostile army of occupation enforcing the status quo." See The Politics of Protest by Jerome Skolnick (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), pp. 268-9.

The conflicts that arose between these beliefs and Vollmer's repeated insistence that the professional policeman should maintain a benevolent involvement in the community can be illustrated by contrasting Vollmer's writings on state policing with the other aspects of his professionalism. In Crime and the State Police he made the following startling assertion:

At the outset, the ideal to be sought is a single state police force and complete elimination of village, town, municipal, county and all miscellaneous state police forces. Until this ideal can be attained, smaller police units ought to be taken over by the state with the provision that larger municipalities may avail themselves of state police services on a cost basis.⁷³

How can this structure possibly be reconciled with the following depiction of the policeman's idealized work, which implies a police style that reflects local variations and an intensive knowledge of local characteristics?

His intimate knowledge of the character of the people residing on his beat makes it possible for him to acquaint immigrants living therein with the laws of this country, protect them from petty political and business grafters, as well as from other unscrupulous persons, and help them to become decent, law-abiding citizens.⁷⁴

73

By August Vollmer and Alfred E. Parker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), p. 208.

74

"The Policeman as a Social Worker," op. cit., p. 12.

The contradiction is a real one. Vollmer's commitment to state policing was the logical outcome of his concept of the crime-fighting professional. Centralization of police authority tends naturally to culminate in the idea of a super-police agency that will not be hampered by local jurisdictional boundaries or by local disputes. In reaching this point, Vollmer's vision of a well-rounded professional who maintains a benevolent relationship with the people on his beat, who gains their respect and cooperation through his judicious enforcement of the law and through efforts to assist them in their contacts with government, is irretrievably lost. One wonders how Vollmer would have reacted if his own carefully nurtured Berkeley department had been superseded in its recruitment and operations policies by a state police agency based in Sacramento.

The Wickersham Report, written four years earlier, took a more moderate position on state policing:

Home-rule principles have a broad basis in the traditions of our people, and this is probably a healthful sign. Whatever functions the local community can carry on for itself in an efficient and adequate manner it should be permitted to perform; this applies to police protection, most of the problems of which are local and lend themselves best to solution by the community authorities.⁷⁵

But this statement (not written by Vollmer) does not reflect the degree to which Vollmer felt that uniform standards should be applied to policing in all its aspects.

Writing of recruit training he said:

Why should recruit-training schools be maintained by police departments, and how can uniformity of action or procedure ever result when so many units of the same region are all training their officers differently? . . . It would be to the advantage of police forces and prospective candidates for the service if state police institutes were established where young men might receive professional training in the various branches of police science. . . . The state police institute should be the center for all state police activities; it should have facilities for the centralization of crime and criminal records, police communication service, and complete scientific laboratory equipment. . . . Crime-prevention activities on a state-wide basis should also be directed from such an institution. . . .⁷⁶

Vollmer's belief in centralization was especially marked in his work in Los Angeles and as a police consultant in other cities. In Kansas City he supported the establishment of a metropolitan police force, in the belief that only state control could salvage that department from local political corruption.⁷⁷

76

The Police and Modern Society, op. cit., pp. 232-3.

77

See pp. 120-2.

As we have seen above, Vollmer expected to resolve conflicts in police functions by recruiting exceptional individuals into the police service and training them in the use of a wide variety of sophisticated techniques. ⁷⁸ The Berkeley Police School became an early model for other professional training programs around the country. ⁷⁹ Police professionalism, in his view, could master the new knowledge that was being developed in technology, management and the behavioral sciences, and apply it toward solving police problems.

Vollmer's belief in the fruits of education led him to two conclusions: that the professional policeman would be distinguished from his predecessors by the level of his formal training, both before and after recruitment; and that new ideas from the universities could provide valuable insights into the causes of crime and the means for preventing it. Vollmer himself was strongly influenced in reaching both conclusions by his contacts with faculty members at the University of California, and throughout his life he was an insatiable reader of works on the behavioral aspects of crime, on medicine and the law.

Education imparted both dignity and independence to

78

See pp. 172-3.

79

See pp. 68, 79-81.

the professional policeman. It gave him the means to be an efficient crime fighter and elevated his occupation beyond the reach of partisan political interests. This belief by Vollmer that education could liberate the policeman, could raise him to a less assailable position in the social order, was rooted as much in his own temperament as in any objective evidence he saw for the need to improve police training. A former colleague of Vollmer's when he was a research professor at the University of California during the 1930s has suggested that Vollmer's own lack of formal education led him to overestimate the benefits that social science, particularly psychiatry, could give to policing.

He had a conception of the policeman as being so much more of a social worker than a preventer of crime or the suppresser of criminals through their arrest and conviction, that he was inevitably led into this whole area of what are the personality attributes of a person who would make an excellent policeman.... During all his life, he read avidly and studied avidly in this area of personality development, including an attempt to find out what the biological, sociological, psychological, anthropological components of personality analysis and development were. In all of these areas it seemed to me that Vollmer suffered from the fact that his own formal education had never given him an adequate knowledge base....I had the feeling often times that he was beyond

his depth in this kind of study which he pursued relentlessly and that he often turned for guidance and counseling in these areas to men who might not have been the best minds in that particular area but whose advice and counsel he took perhaps with more trust than was justified.⁸⁰

In constructing a crime fighter who would also be a benevolent crime preventer, Vollmer was equating the reliability of the policeman's technical aids with the assistance that he could expect from theories of crime causation. Vollmer's most enduring legacy to policing has been his understanding of police administration and of the efficient use of police resources. His larger understanding of the policeman as a professional who is competent to deal with social problems has failed, in part because Vollmer expected too much from education and, correspondingly, from the policeman who acquired it. The centralized police model discussed above is a direct descendant of Vollmer's practical innovations in police management, manpower allocation, scientific detection and criminal identification. Further levels of competence in this professional model -- the policeman as a crime preventer, as a benevolent protector of the community, as a respected and believable agent of the state --

fall down at the point where they depend upon the policeman's ability to overcome his orientation as a crime fighter and even as a member of a particular cultural group or class: in other words, where they expect him to bridge the conflicts in his role through his own superiority as a person.

When Vollmer described the future professional policeman as "the cream of the nation,"⁸¹ he was expressing a hope that policing would become the kind of service that would attract large numbers of superior individuals. But this is a risky basis upon which to formulate a practical program of police reform. The limitations in Vollmer's model of professionalism have become apparent as it has been applied in ordinary settings with the normal proportions of ordinary officers and police leaders.

Summary

Vollmer's model of police professionalism, as seen in his writings, centers upon the concept of the policeman as a crime fighter. Centralization and rationalization of authority are favored to increase efficiency, through the use of technology and the identification of offenders and crime

patterns. Strict recruitment standards, including intelligence and psychological testing and sophisticated training programs are intended to upgrade the occupation to a professional level.

The diversion of police resources to meet the priorities of local political factions is seen as entirely illegitimate. A detached role is also dictated by the awareness that increased social mobility, and the "motorization" of America through the automobile, force the police into routine contact with all classes of society. The policeman operates in a more visible atmosphere, and his skills must be sophisticated and impartial enough to earn him the respect of the broader community.

Vollmer's stress on crime prevention, especially through work with juveniles, linked his police reforms with the progressive reforms being enacted in other parts of the criminal justice system. It allied him with groups which are traditionally critical of the overextension of police power. Within this progressive context, Vollmer's concept of the educated and detached police professional was accepted as an intrinsic factor in the larger reform.

The new emphasis on education and management skills raised the debate about police power from the "streets"

to the colleges, masking the daily realities of police work behind discussions of sophisticated techniques. Political awareness of the role of police power was replaced by the search through science and management technology for the "one best answer." The policeman himself was transformed from a public functionary performing miscellaneous community services into a detached crime fighter.

A more immediate way to understand the conflicts that arose from this transformation may be seen in Vollmer's own career. In a sense, he espoused two models of professionalism: one through his writings and work on a national level, and the other through his actions over a quarter-century in Berkeley. Much of Vollmer's influence derived from his record of accomplishment in that city, where (as we have seen in the preceding chapters) the department enjoyed considerable public support. During those years, Berkeley was policed efficiently and at a reasonable cost, and built up a reputation for modern technical competence. Officers trained in the Berkeley department frequently moved to positions of
82
influence in other cities.

What kind of policing achieved this record? First let us look at the setting: Berkeley differed in several crucial

regards from the municipalities where policing was better known for its lapses than its successes. It was a small, geographically compact city. Since before incorporation in 1909, it had a reputation for moderate affluence, serving as a select housing area for business and professional people who worked throughout the Bay Area. It enjoyed prestige as the site of a growing university, as well as of several theological schools. Berkeley citizens prided themselves on their commitment to reform before Vollmer was ever recruited to run for marshal, and matched their zeal for "good government" with their support for temperance and other moral reforms.

This was an ideal base upon which to build police reforms. Vollmer brought his famed innovations into a city that could afford them, and where political factionalism of a nature to threaten his tenure as chief was largely absent.

What were the actual features of the policing that he introduced into Berkeley? First, he recruited locally. His early policemen were either long-term Berkeley residents or, in the case of the college cops, were students at the

83

Berkeley campus. Second, the style of policing that he expected from his officers was intensely personal. They were expected to know their beats thoroughly, and to accept responsibility for preventing crime by maintaining a close watch and developing personal acquaintance with the residents. One ex-Berkeley policeman remembered that he and his colleagues considered themselves the "chiefs" of their beats, in terms of providing a broad range of services and using their own judgment to resolve problems.

84

Third, Vollmer allied his department firmly with the moderate reform elements in the city. He involved the department in numerous local betterment associations, and was personally involved in many aspects of Berkeley life. It is hard to envision a police chief operating less as a detached expert than Vollmer did in Berkeley. He possessed exceptional skills in publicizing his department, and we have evidence of his ability to use this skill to promote the

83

In 1971 the writer inquired at Berkeley Police Headquarters about membership in the police auxiliary and was discouraged on the grounds that the department did not want university students in the program because they were not "permanent residents" of the community. (Interview with Lt. J. R. Crooke, Community Relations Officer, Berkeley Police Department, 1971.)

84

Interview with Willard E. Schmidt, op. cit.

interests of the department in political circles.

The final factor to be mentioned is Vollmer's skill as a leader. For 27 years Vollmer operated as the active chief of the Berkeley department; when he left the city temporarily for commitments elsewhere he wrote detailed letters of instruction to the acting chief and never allowed his national work to make him a figurehead chief at home. In an occupation in which command leadership is an often crucial factor, Vollmer's own high standards were responsible for keeping the department honest and alert. His colleagues were intensely loyal to him, and the internal operations of the department reflected the personal approach that his own personality generated.

When Vollmer abstracted a new model of professionalism from his Berkeley experiences and his studies, many of the features mentioned above were minimized or omitted. It was obvious to him that the Berkeley style could not be duplicated in a hostile or unstable political atmosphere. Problems of size alone jeopardized its application in cities like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. But it is unlikely that he appreciated the extent to which his

success in Berkeley depended upon the personalized policing that he constructed there, possibly because he was too close to its workings; it was difficult to weigh these factors in the same scale as flashing alarm systems and automobile patrols.

Although throughout his career he wrote about the primacy of crime prevention, Vollmer's recommendations for centralized policing and technical aids in crime fighting came to overshadow it on a practical level. He could transfer to Los Angeles or Detroit a modern system of record keeping, intelligence testing or squad car deployment, but he could not transfer the public support that Berkeley gave him, nor the scale of its problems, nor the basic stability of its political processes.

In his writings on professionalism Vollmer was never able to resolve this contradiction between the policeman as a crime fighter and as a credible local functionary. He effected a limited resolution in Berkeley through his own leadership, but the scheme that he constructed for application in other cities was never successfully put to a test. During his year in Los Angeles Vollmer was presented with a different social and political climate. The measures that he introduced there were more indicative of his professional

model at work in a modern city than was the showcase
Berkeley department.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHANGING CLIMATE OF POLICE REFORM

The previous chapter dealt with Vollmer's police professionalism as a model in itself. This chapter will explore the climate of public opinion that surrounded police reform in Vollmer's day, and will contrast it with attitudes of the present. It is our contention that police professionalism arose in response to pressures from two directions: external pressures from reformers who wanted the police to reorder their priorities to conform with middle-class values; and internal pressures to improve working conditions and to remove policing from controversy.

Vollmer was fully a part of the reform movement of his day that developed in reaction to the political corruption and police incompetence that we have described in Chapter One. His major ideas about policing were in accord with the expectations of business and professional segments of the population. We will analyze the shift in public concern between that period and the present, and will speculate upon the significance that this shift holds for policing.

Civic and Moral Reformers

Widespread demands for police reform in major American cities erupted at about the time that Vollmer became marshal of Berkeley in 1905. The reformers were a combination of groups having different goals, whose efforts were ascendant at different periods or sometimes coincided, over the course of the next thirty years.¹

In general, there were two types of reformers who were involved in the effort to change policing and other parts of the criminal justice system. The moral reformers concentrated upon the evils of poor social conditions and of vices like liquor, prostitution and gambling, and advocated a policy of active meddling into the lives of those groups -- usually the lower and working classes -- whom they saw as harboring or being misled by these evils.² The civic reformers

¹ Material in this section is largely dependent on the analysis of Mark Haller, in his "Civic Reformers and Police Leadership: Chicago, 1905-1935" (Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971); and "Theories of Criminal Violence and Their Impact on the Criminal Justice System" (Crimes of Violence, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 13. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

² See Anthony M. Platt's The Child Savers (Chicago: University of California Press, 1969), for a study of the motivation of social reformers who established the juvenile courts and other delinquency control measures.

were interested in improving the efficiency of police departments in their role as protectors of personal safety and property.³

Writing of Chicago reform groups between 1905 and 1935, Haller described the difference between these goals:

The moral reformers, then, advocated that police resources be mobilized against gambling, prostitution, obscenity, and liquor law violation -- activities concentrated in the poor neighborhoods and appearing to victimize primarily the poor. Other members of the civic elite -- especially business leaders, lawyers, and the city's newspapers -- believed that the police should be concerned chiefly with crimes against persons and property: assault, shoplifting, burglary, and robbery.⁴

During Vollmer's early career, from 1905 to 1920, moral reformers provided the noisiest pressure for changes in policing, through their attack upon police involvement in political corruption and upon lax enforcement of vice laws.

5

In discussing the deterrent tradition, we have seen that

3

Haller has used the term "civic reform" to include both these goals. For our purposes, "moral reform" connotes the goal of active vice suppression and the amelioration of problems like poor schools, dilapidated housing, high disease rates, etc.; "civic reform" connotes the general improvement of police services for business and middle-class interests.

4

"Civic Reformers and Police Leadership...", op. cit., p. 42.

5

See pp. 144-5.

police departments came under considerable pressure during these years for their "complicity" in allowing vice to proliferate. In some cities, competing vice operations were owned by different political factions, and the police were rightly accused of enforcing the vice laws in accordance with political affiliation. In Chicago, according to Haller:

(t)he police acted under the further constraint that some of the regularized criminal activity in the city operated with close ties to politics. Those who ran prostitution and gambling, as well as saloon keepers, and, in the 1920s, bootleggers -- all had ties to politicians through friendship, money, and political services. Even many pickpockets, burglars, and other professional thieves were associated with political factions. Hence policemen had to learn which criminals, for political reasons, could not be seriously pursued.⁶

Vollmer's first task after taking office in 1905 was a series of raids upon Chinese gambling establishments in Berkeley, a goal which was prominent in the minds of his backers. Many had Chinese servants who were frequenting these establishments, and it was suspected that stolen property was being exchanged there.⁷ But although he was effective in suppressing open and illegal vice in Berkeley,

6

"Civic Reformers and Police Leadership...", op. cit., p. 40.

7

Alfred E. Parker, Crime Fighter: August Vollmer (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 42-4.

Vollmer shared with other practitioners a skeptical attitude toward the use of law enforcement to curb vice. His primary concern was the way in which vice laws linked the police to political corruption.

Vollmer's own beliefs were much more attuned to the goals of the civic reformers, who gained increasing prominence during the 1920s. Civic reformers brought Vollmer to Los Angeles, and in other cities set up the crime commissions that paid for his surveys of police departments. A National Crime Commission was established in 1925 and was described by one participant as "the crusade
8
of organized business against organized crime." Haller has suggested that in Chicago the business-minded civic reformers were more successful in the long run in their efforts to reform the Chicago police than were the moral
9
reformers. The Chicago Crime Commission, which operated from 1919 to 1935, concentrated on police administrative reform and "ignored almost completely the corrupt
10
relationships that the police had with vice and gambling...."

8
Haller, "Theories of Criminal Violence...", op. cit., p. 1334.

9
"Civic Reformers and Police Leadership...", op. cit., pp. 45-6.

10
Ibid., p. 47.

It was during the decade of the 1920s that concern about "lawlessness" reached a peak.

The 1920s, like the 1960s, were a period when public alarm over crime and law violation made enforcement an issue upon which both local and national politicians had to take a stand. The 1920s, too, were a period when newspapers, through their handling of news and through editorials, kept crime at the forefront of public attention. The deterrent tradition, then, reached maturity in the 1920s in response to a general feeling that cities were a dangerous place in which to live.¹¹

President Hoover appointed the Wickersham Commission at the end of this decade to investigate the problem of law observance. Prohibition played an obvious part in this crisis, by involving large numbers of Americans in law-breaking and by exposing the police to an impossible and ambivalent enforcement task. Prohibition laws were enforced lethargically through much of the 1920s, and when Hoover instituted a drive for honest and efficient enforcement after 1928, the damage was probably too great to be undone. Radical enforcement at an early stage would probably have led either to
¹²
 success or rapid repeal.

11

Haller, "Theories of Criminal Violence...", op. cit., p. 1333.

12

See Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 212-4.

The Wickersham Report, published in 1931, had two volumes that related directly to policing: Report on Police, which dealt with police problems in terms of organization, personnel and technology; and Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, which documented the widespread use of the

13

third degree and other abuses. Just as the 1960s witnessed a rising concern over abuses of police power, in race relations, political and social protest, and a concern over the faulty structure of police organizations, the reformers who gained prominence in the 1920s were reacting against both police brutality and incompetence. The recommendations for police reform that concluded the Report on Police codified the accepted view of these reformers, both in and outside of policing, as to the nature of the police problem and the priorities for change. Removal of police from politics came first, secure tenure for police leaders second, and various measures for upgrading

13

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931). The response of the police to these two volumes on policing was an interesting reflection of their attitude toward reform. The Wickersham Report was strongly denounced by some participants in the 1932 meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, but they were referring only to the report on police brutality. There was no criticism of the report directed by Vollmer, which accused police leadership of incompetence and backwardness. (See the Proceedings of the I. A. C. P., 1932.)

personnel standards and technology comprised most of the
14
balance of the ten items listed.

Vollmer's early actions in Berkeley and the reforms
he advocated in other forums had become the accepted model
for police reform by the 1930s. The work of Fosdick, who
compared American municipal policing with European forms
and condemned without reservation the political connections
of most police departments in this country, represented the
principal critical evaluation of American policing from a
15
scholarly perspective. Fuld's work was also in this tradi-
16
tion, and by the late 1920s Bruce Smith was working with
17
police leaders in their efforts to refine police organization.

Vollmer was one of the few practitioners of stature to con-
tribute to this reform movement. His formulation of the

14

See pp. 126-7.

15

Raymond Fosdick, American Police Systems (Montclair,
N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1920
edition).

16

Leonhard Fuld, Police Administration: A Critical Study of
Police Organisations in the United States and Abroad (Montclair,
N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1909 edition).

17

Smith's principal work was Police Systems in the United
States (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), originally published
in 1940. He worked with several crime commissions during
the 1920s and directed the report by the Chicago Citizen's
Police Committee entitled Chicago Police Problems (Montclair,
N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1969, reprinted from the 1931 edition).

problem in his early days in Berkeley contained within it the concerns to which reformers addressed themselves over the next thirty years. Aided by the backing of a reform-minded community and by exposure to the academic climate at the university, he had a head start in identifying the issues that policing would face for years to come.

But there were alternative directions in which police reform could have gone. Police departments were as influenced by the surge of trade unionism after World War I as were other occupations, and unionism was a reasonable solution to many internal police problems: insecurity of tenure, open political interference, low pay and poor working conditions. Working under conflicting pressures from the public and local government, policemen had developed an occupational consciousness and had come to resent being blamed by moral reformers for nonenforcement policies over which they had little control.

However, if many policemen saw unionism as an acceptable method of upgrading their occupation, they had almost no support from the public or from government officials, or from their own executives. Organized labor was too weak to overcome the strong resistance that these early attempts for police unionism met.

The civil service movement also had considerable impact upon policing, but failed to solve the basic problems of incompetence and political interference. There was virtual unanimity among police leaders and scholars that civil service, although useful in small part to regularize the recruiting and promotion process, was inadequate to address these larger problems. Policing remained too ill defined and sensitive an occupation to regulate through measures that were better suited for a purely bureaucratic agency.

The professional model held greater promise for police reformers because it was based upon a total detachment from political manipulation, and because it offered a positive program for improving police services. During an age in which "lawlessness" meant -- to some moral reformers -- both police operations and increased criminal activity, professionalism was seen as a way to tighten internal control of police operations and to wage an aggressive campaign against the criminal violence and excesses that had alarmed many citizens.

The growing acceptance of police professionalism in the years between 1905 and 1930 was thus a factor of forces

that were operating from two directions: dissatisfaction within policing over poor working conditions and ambivalent pressures for law enforcement; and middle-class demands that policing be less brutal and more effective. Prohibition and traffic laws had brought the middle class into routine contact with police for the first time. Moral reformers worked in the early years of the century to combat the evils they saw in the cities; after 1920, civic reformers from business and the press became ascendant in an elitist movement that tried to wrest control of policing from its traditional political base in the poor working-class districts of large American cities.

19

Public Support for Police Professionalism

The events that shaped the development of police professionalism also created a climate of public opinion that generally supported this avenue of reform. The actions of moral and civic reformers reflected attitudes that many citizens held about the proper relationship between the police and other segments of the community. During Vollmer's active career, the strongest of these attitudes was a rejection of politics and political influence in public service agencies.

19

See Haller, "Civic Reformers and Police Leadership...", op. cit., pp. 39-40.

There has been a limited amount of direct research into public attitudes toward policing that will help to trace changes between those years and the present. The best survey that is available from the 1930s appeared in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, with which Vollmer was connected. It grew out of efforts by Spencer D. Parratt, a political science professor at Syracuse University, to devise a rating scale for police departments that would take
20
citizen attitudes into account.

Parratt had reacted strongly against a rating scale for police departments that was published in the Journal by Arthur Bellman, an associate of Vollmer, which was based entirely on internal criteria and explicitly denied the right
21
of citizens to evaluate their police departments. In

introducing his rating scale Bellman had written: "It is the
20

"A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938). For a more detailed look at this study see also the writer's "Changes in Public Attitudes toward the Police: A Comparison of Surveys Dated 1938 and 1971," submitted to the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1972. (This paper appears as Appendix C to the present work.)
21

"A Police Service Rating Scale," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVI (1935). Bellman cited Vollmer for his advice and assistance in the research that developed the rating scale. Parratt criticized the scale in "A Critique of the Bellman Police Service Rating Scale," ibid., XXVII (1937).

responsibility of police bodies to do the job entrusted to them
 22
 to the best of their ability, regardless of public attitude."

Obviously, a police leadership that held such a view of
 police accountability would see little need to measure the
 attitudes of the public toward specific police policies. As we
 have seen in the preceding chapter, the professional ideology
 tended to encourage this detachment from citizen involvement.
 Vollmer himself, however, was sensitive to the criticisms of
 the Bellman rating scale and encouraged Parratt to continue
 23
 his own research.

Parratt summarized his findings as follows:

Citizens' opinions about police are in terms
 they can understand. They consider effective
 policing involves conscientiousness, honesty,
 freedom from politics, military bearing,
 modern equipment and the various items indi-
 cated in the scale. While they have definite
 opinions on these matters, they indicate few
 suggestions as to how these can be accomplished. 24

He found that the public wanted a police force that was disci-
 plined, effective, well equipped and nonpolitical. In devising
his scale for use by the "expert police administrator," Parratt
 22

"A Police Service Rating Scale," op. cit., p. 75. Emphasis
 added.

23

See the correspondence between Vollmer and Parratt during
 March, 1936. (Personal papers of August Vollmer, Bancroft
 Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

24

"A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning,"
op. cit., p. 755.

was hoping to ally him with citizen opinion in forming policies

25

for his department. He believed that an objective measure

of police functioning would prevent partisan political interests

from obscuring the nature of police policies. "There can be

no mumbo-jumbo of the politician whenever more explicit

26

devices can be utilized." The expertise of the administrator

would be combined with an enlightened understanding of public

opinion, an alliance that would effectively bypass the political

process.

The profile of policing that emerged from the study

coincided to a large extent with Vollmer's model of police

professionalism. Policemen should treat the public with

respect; they should be neat and military in their appearance;

they should have no contaminating contacts with politics,

should possess at least average intelligence, and should take

"professional interest" in their work. Little concern was

expressed for the rights of minority groups as such. Harsher

treatment was endorsed for ex-convicts, Negroes, aliens,

radicals and gangsters; "due process" did not emerge as a

positive value, despite occasional responses to the contrary.

25

Ibid., p. 755.

26

Ibid., p. 756.

Above all, there was almost no interest in citizen participation in the policy making process. Respondents seemed to accept or even to favor the notion of an expert police department that would fight crime and would be isolated from corrupting political influences. They wanted the police to be more decorous in conduct and appearance, and more efficient in combating crime; they seemed more interested in civility than in civil rights or civil liberties. They were not concerned with police conduct in areas that did not affect them directly. They were uninterested in the larger issue of the just use of police power against all citizens.

Since Parratt's study there has been little scholarly concern with police issues, and almost no research into
27
general citizen attitudes in this area. Recent research

has focused more on the attitudes of policemen than of
28
the public. There are several reasons for this lack, including a deficiency in public knowledge about police

27

Arthur Niederhoffer reported that "in the twenty-five year period from 1940 to 1965 only six articles remotely concerned with the police were published in the American Journal of Sociology and the American Sociological Review, the two major sociological journals." (Behind the Shield, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967, p. 4.)

28

Among these are John H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work: The Relevance of Police Recruits' Backgrounds

policies that produces ignorance or indifference rather than informed opinions. The 1967 President's Commission
29
occasioned some research into citizen attitudes, and there have been other studies that concentrated upon the
30
attitudes of minorities.

The writer conducted a recent survey of citizen leadership attitudes toward policing that was designed to explore some of the issues that are raised by police pro-
31
fessionalism. In particular, the survey had three purposes: to determine the extent to which citizens felt they

and Training," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley, 1967); Neal A. Milner, The Court and Local Law Enforcement (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971); William A. Westley, Violence and the Police (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970); and James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, op. cit.

29

See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 144-8.

30

See David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Burton Levy, "Cops in the Ghetto: A Problem of the Police System," American Behavioral Scientist, II (1968); and Elinor Ostrow and Gordon Whitaker, "Black Citizens and the Police: Some Effects of Community Control," 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

31

See Gene E. Carte, "Changes in Public Attitudes toward the Police," op. cit.

should be involved in the policy making process; to gauge their approval or disapproval of specific police practices; and to construct a picture of the priorities that they considered important for their police departments.

Several general conclusions emerged from the data. First was a high level of desired involvement in the policy making process that implied a limitation on the prerogatives of professional expertise. Desire for involvement was especially high in areas like drug and alcohol abuse and riot control. It was lower in traffic law enforcement and police personnel policies, although in all cases, more than 70% of the respondents wished to be involved in policy planning.

Second was an increased sensitivity to the issue of police relations with minority groups. It would be surprising if this were not the case, considering the shifts in race relations since World War II. However, the study documented the high extent to which citizens were concerned about improving relations between the police and minority groups, and with the need for greater representation of minorities on police forces.

A third conclusion was the surprising acceptance that respondents expressed toward the recognition of police worker rights, including the right to unionize. Collective bargaining

with the city was supported by over half of those responding, and almost half also supported national union affiliation and participation in partisan politics.

The data conflicted with Parratt's finding that citizens wanted police who would be sensitive to their needs but essentially apart from other aspects of community life. The "double standard" of police practices against varying groups that Parratt's respondents espoused was also not present in the more recent study.

Police Professionalism: The Changing Historical Mandate

The moral reformers of the early years of this century were not reacting merely to isolated issues of vice and moral excess. They were part of a struggle between traditional rural American values and the new dominance of urban centers. Skolnick has argued, in an article entitled "Morality and Social Dominance," that the zeal of these reformers was as rational as the self-interest and concern with property crime that motivated the civic reformers.

(S)een from the viewpoint of the prohibitionist advocate of, say, the early twentieth century, the issue of national prohibition was not merely a question of drinking; it involved a test of strength

between conceptions of social order: on the one side, the social order associated with the villages, and farms, and sectarian and fundamentalist Christianity; on the other side, the threat posed by the ever increasing social influence and style of life of the cities, of industrialization, of a Romanized and Anglicized Christianity, and of immigration. Thus, for the prohibitionist, legalization of social drinking represented the subversion of a way of life.³²

The clash between moral reformers and urban life placed the police in a particularly ambiguous position. The most basic impulse behind the shaping of Vollmer's model of police professionalism was the desire to remove policing from this partisan battleground, to prevent it from being used as a corrupt and passive pawn in the power struggles within the cities. The neutrality that the professional ideology imparted was sufficient to shift attention from the police to other institutions. Moral reformers, although convinced that policing was in need of reform, were less likely to place it in the camp of the "forces of evil" with which they warred. As Haller has pointed out, "the police joined in the (deterrent) tradition, and helped to divert attention upon the courts and parole boards as the primary factors

32

In Society and the Legal Order, ed. Richard D. Schwartz and Jerome H. Skolnick (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 85-6.

chiefly responsible for undermining effective law enforcement.³³ Moral reformers in the psychological and sociological traditions focused their attention upon issues of poor schooling, weak family structure, inadequate medical care, and crude forms of economic exploitation in the world of work.

Of more lasting influence in the drive for municipal change were the civic reformers who organized in protest against violence and rising property crime, and accordingly against the governmental institutions that were failing to protect their middle-class constituency. Vollmer's professionalism was fully attuned to these demands, in promising to bypass the disreputable machinery of partisan politics and to fight crime aggressively and effectively. Vollmer was himself a civic reformer in his reaction against the traditional corruption of municipal government and his skepticism of the goals of moral reformers.

These were trends that affected policing from the outside. They coincided with a rise in occupational consciousness within policing that brought pressure for improved working conditions. When unionism was ruled out as a

33

"Theories of Criminal Violence...", op. cit., p. 1332.

possibility, professionalism became the most promising

34

alternative. Parratt's study showed that the characteristics of the professional image were in accord with citizen expectations. More recent concern that has arisen over issues of citizen participation and cultural diversity within policing seemed remote at a time when diversity was considered a threat to impartial policing and citizen participation meant the co-opting of police power for the furtherance of special goals.

Above all, the earlier period was marked by a fear of lawlessness that seemed to have eroded the faith of middle-class citizens in the functioning of local government. The writings of moral and civic reformers, of police scholars like Fosdick and Vollmer, reflected this conviction that the due process of the political machinery was not to be trusted.

More recent research has not shown a similar tendency toward the endorsement of independent police functioning. A criticism of the insularity of the police was implied in the judgment that there was insufficient minority representation

34

Although Vollmer scorned the idea of an alliance between policemen and the American labor movement, his own suggestion was for a national police group that could present a united front in presenting its claims to the public and government. See p. 44.

on police forces. Very little of policing was to be left to the "experts," and in policy areas of considerable controversy -- drug abuse, riot control -- there were high demands for citizen involvement.

Professionalism brought insularity into policing when it tried to protect it from corruption and from manipulation by diverse moral codes. Although most police departments only partly reflect the idealized model that Vollmer constructed, professionalism has provided them with an ideology that encourages them to function independent of local social conflict and with only formal direction from elected government. During the 1920s and 1930s, this tendency was an understandable response to the concerns of reform-minded citizens. It no longer enjoys this legitimizing support, and recent attacks upon the police as an institution are evidence that, as in earlier decades, policing is changing at too slow a pace.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

August Vollmer originated the idealized model of police professionalism with which we have been primarily concerned. By the 1930s, it had become the accepted model for police reform, although few of the police leaders who followed Vollmer adhered to the model in its entirety. As it began to be applied in large urban areas, under the direction of police reformers like O. W. Wilson, V. A. Leonard and William Parker, it evolved into a managerial approach that minimized the elements of crime prevention through positive community action and the role of the policeman as a committed public servant that Vollmer had stressed. This evolution was perhaps inevitable because, as we have seen, Vollmer's model contained within it serious contradictions that became apparent when it was applied away from the specialized setting in which it was developed.

Skolnick has described this managerial approach as one that emphasizes "rationality, efficiency, and universalism."

This view envisages the professional as a bureaucrat, almost as a machine calculating alternative courses of action by a stated program of rules, and possessing the technical ability to carry out decisions irrespective of personal feelings.¹

1

Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 236.

He noted that most police scholars have "tended to subscribe to reforms based upon the managerial conception of 'professional.²' "

These elements of rationality, efficiency, and universalism were all present in the composite picture of Vollmer's professional policeman that we described earlier:

In this model, police professionalism rests upon the role of the educated, aware and honest policeman, who has a detailed knowledge of his beat or area of assignment. This policeman understands and can use modern technology to increase his efficiency in meeting his primary responsibility of suppressing serious criminal activity. He is detached from local politics, especially in the realm of vice law enforcement. He is an efficient and aggressive crime fighter who understands the multiple requirements of evidence collection. He is able to deal equally with all social classes, gaining their respect and cooperation without recourse to personal identification with any particular class.³

Because the technical aspects of this description are more accessible to everyday police administration than the intangible aspects of commitment and benevolence, it is a short step from the paternalistic crime fighter that Vollmer envisioned to the managerial view wherein, according to Skolnick, the professional is seen as a "bureaucrat, almost

2

Ibid., p. 236.

3

See pp. 142-3.

as a machine," who bases his judgment upon technical skills.

In the following pages we will attempt to identify the elements of Vollmer's professional model that are still desirable goals for police reform, or that have become an established part of the vocabulary of modern policing. We will then discuss and present alternative approaches to three key elements of police professionalism that have tended to retard rather than advance further changes in policing: detachment; centralization; and the crime-fighting priority.

Some Positive Aspects of Professionalism

There are several aspects of professionalism that met real needs at the time they were being developed, and are considered by the public to be legitimate answers to ongoing police problems. The most obvious of these is the professional approach to traffic regulation, which has become the accepted method for dealing with a complex problem. Traffic regulation is largely a technical, systemic concern, one that is amenable to utilitarian values. It favors an impersonal approach that maximizes system benefits and measures the individual policeman's efforts against the standard of efficiency.* The public has come to take for granted the existence of a body of expertise in traffic regulation and engineering that was unknown in

the early years of this century, and it was policemen in the professional tradition who saw the need for rationality in traffic regulation and developed the skills to supply it. It is reasonable to suggest that the traffic function, which consumes a considerable part of the resources of many police departments, be assigned to a separate municipal agency which is organized primarily around this task.

The public would also not give up technological competence and efficiency in the investigation of violent and other serious crime. The modern crime investigator, having access to a scientific crime laboratory, has a secure position in all future policing. It is a genuine specialty requiring specialized study and drawing upon a body of expertise that includes sophisticated contributions from medicine, the physical and biological sciences.

Most police departments currently have access to these scientific facilities through their state police or through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There is little need for a municipal department to retain line personnel who are skilled in scientific analysis or forensic medicine, or to insist that successful line officers develop these skills. The existence of this definable specialty should not affect the personnel standards and functional organization of an entire department.

Criticisms of police professionalism need not imply a return to the imprecise and uninformed techniques of crime solving of the last century. The technical skills that officers within a local department should retain -- in photography, for instance -- do not require a high degree of advanced training and need not be used as a standard for recruitment.

The other elements that we would preserve from Vollmer's police professionalism are less easy to define. He and some of his contemporaries introduced an ethic of honesty and dedication to counter the cynical view of policing that had grown up in its earlier years. Policing was demoralized when Vollmer entered it, and he was part of a movement that imparted some dignity and high purpose into police work. Although tensions remain high between policemen and many segments of the public, and police morale constantly reflects these tensions, the occupation is not considered as disreputable as many citizens of the last century viewed it.

4

Although James Q. Wilson is correct in his statement that for "the individual officer, the police problem is largely a morale problem" ("The Police and Their Problems: A Theory," Public Policy, XII (1963), 189-216), the police department that consciously faces the racism and elitist policies that produce hostility should be able to maintain at least the same level of morale as other governmental bureaucracies.

In sum, professionalism has upgraded the occupation of policing in many ways. It has served as a vehicle for many specific reforms or innovations that would have met an indifferent reception in the old-style departments where efficiency was a low priority and where little concern was given to the welfare of the individual patrolman. The more basic problems within the professional model emerged when it ceased being an unarticulated approach for reform and became a rigid ideology.

5

Detachment versus Participation

Although the professional model was in part a response to the positive challenge of technology, it was equally a defensive reaction against the conflicting pressures under which policemen were working. By defining police tasks in a hierarchy with crime fighting at the top, by responding to technology and upgrading the level of personnel, professionalism forced a certain type of structure in which detachment was seen as the primary weapon for defending the police from both politicians and the public. It was central to Vollmer's philosophy, and was endorsed by the leading

5

See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), pp. 222-3.

police scholars of the first half of the century.

The issue of detachment contains within it the question of civilian control of police actions. Political decision making at the local level is the only procedure available to the American citizen for the visible or self-evident control of his local police. Unlike the European or English models discussed by Miller,⁶ the American police have historically been closely associated with political decision making, both formal and informal, rather than with rule by law. Accountability of the police must be political, because the unclear nature of their enforcement duties makes legal accountability difficult.

Westley wrote of this defensive insularity of the police in connection with the "increasing reliance on violence and secrecy by the police" that follows sharp criticism:

Professionalization, which has been the major goal of modern police administrators during the past two decades, has the effect of insulating the police from public pressures.... Yet we must be wary, since insulation from political influence without other methods of integration, such as a positive relationship to the community, can mean insulation from all of us, and if the goals of the police should vary from

6

See pp. 27-9.

those of the citizens, it can become a very serious problem.⁷

When detachment is combined with an emphasis on technical expertise, the citizen becomes not only an amateur, but incompetent as well. He is prevented from participating in police policy making on the double grounds that participation would be "illegitimate interference" and would be based merely on ignorance.

Even many observers who call for more citizen participation in policing do not challenge the fundamental structural detachment of the police organization. Into this category fall the "citizen education" and other liaison committees that have been formed from time to time to provide an input from the community into policing. Parratt's view is a good example of this response to the problem of detachment.⁸ He believed in an alliance between police administrators and citizen opinion, presumably through such technical devices as his public opinion survey. He did not challenge the right of the police administrator to be a detached expert, but merely attempted to develop a method for channeling citizen views to him.

7

William A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970), pp. xv-xvi.

8

See pp. 209-10.

The alternative to detachment is a system of citizen participation that includes both formally structured civilian control over police policies, and informal control through the decentralization of policing into community-based units. Existing official mechanisms for reviewing police decisions and determining police policy have proved inadequate in reflecting the attitudes of citizens toward their police departments. Recent survey research has indicated that citizens desire a level of participation that far exceeds that which is possible through formal municipal government. In many cities, officials can only manipulate police policy by hiring and firing police leaders, who must be drawn either from within the department or from similarly professionalized departments. Routine decision making within the department is relatively inaccessible.

Participation should also work in two directions: from the citizen to the police, and from the police to the political processes. The public is rightly apprehensive of political involvement by policemen when the police department itself remains detached and autonomous. But this is a denial of the citizen rights of policemen as individuals and as an organization; it is only natural to expect that a policeman should want a voice in the processes that affect him.

When routine citizen control of policing is established, objections to political activities by policemen will lose their rationale. A department that has an open recruitment policy and consciously maintains representation from all segments of the community is unlikely to become so entrenched in a single ideology as to endanger the ability of others to participate. Policemen are already involved in issues of their own working conditions through various forms of police unionism, which is no longer a threat but
 9
 a reality.

Centralization versus Home Rule

In 1909 the police scholar Fuld observed:

Among a free people most agencies of the government are decentralized, decentralization being a technical term for local home rule. We are, therefore, not at all surprised to find that the English police system was originally decentralized.¹⁰

Decentralization or home rule is a tenet of democracy that does not necessarily produce efficiency in government, and often works against it. Efficiency became an early goal

9

See M. W. Aussieker, Jr., Police Collective Bargaining (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1969).*

10

Leonhard F. Fuld, Police Administration: A Critical Study of Police Organisations in the United States and Abroad (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1909 edition), pp. 17-8.

of police professionalism and, buttressed by public fears of crime, was rarely questioned. Vollmer was entirely right in pointing out that local jurisdictional boundaries interfered with the efforts of police administrators to fight crime and maintain the public order.

The positive value of home rule is often overlooked in this type of analysis. Local autonomy has been one way for a community to ensure that its department was responsive to local priorities rather than to centralized state or national goals. Except in areas like traffic (and even in this case there are considerable local variations), police professionalism has been unable to change the fact that routine police tasks remain overwhelmingly local in their orientation.

This misperception of goals that is encouraged by police professionalism produces its own kinds of inefficiency. Many departments, by adhering to the professional ideology, expend their resources upon goals that are minimally related to the work they are called upon to do. In one municipality in southern Alameda County, California, the police department used Federal money to train and equip a "Special Occurrences" or riot squad, although the city had never had a civil disturbance and had no indication that one was expected. The squad was used several times in a neighboring city where disturbances

CONTINUED

5 OF 7

did occur. The citizens of the home community, however, never received any direct benefit from this diversion of men and resources. The chief indicated in an interview that the highest priority for his own city was traffic control. It may be true that the citizens of this city, if polled, would have supported the use of their police to suppress disorders in a neighboring city, rather than to handle local problems. But the polling itself would have enlivened and informed the city's political discussions, and given ammunition to critics of local traffic operations.

The local orientation of most police tasks is the first casualty of centralization in policing. A further casualty is the principle of home rule itself, which is intrinsically related to the problem of detachment. A centralized police department is by necessity detached; mechanisms for connecting it to the community will always be artificial and a posteriori, having little impact upon the overall organization of the department or the actions of its personnel.

Due to this tradition of home rule, and the jealousies of the local jurisdictions, there has been little formal centralization of police departments along the lines that Vollmer proposed. The problem of police centralization on this level

exists primarily within single jurisdictions like large, heterogeneous cities, where neighborhoods or ethnic communities demand increased power over policing in their areas. The first goal in this direction is local minority recruitment, which is only a technical device to ensure increased power through physical representation. The second goal is a structural decentralization of the police department itself, in which local communities will have control over routine police policy but can avail themselves of centralized facilities for a minimum of technical services.

The more subtle form of centralization is present in the adoption of the professional ideology by departments having widely varying priorities. Riot squads in homogeneous middle-class suburbs is one example; police supervision of school crossing guards in Harlem is another. Overall, the professional ideology tends to shape a department's priorities irrespective of local conditions, to encourage recruitment and training practices that are unrepresentative as well as inefficient.¹²

12.

The application of this ideology to police management surveys becomes clear from the statement by a prominent police consultant that he could survey a city's police department without ever visiting it, if he were supplied a few facts which he knew from his experience to be crucial indicators of the nature of the police organization.

The formal centralization of policing that Vollmer advocated has not occurred for several reasons, one of the strongest being the opposition over the years of organized labor to a structure that could be used against efforts to organize and strike. But ideological centralization has succeeded in creating an atmosphere wherein decisions are based on professional police theory and values rather than the actual results obtained.

Misner documented this in his study of policing at the
13
1964 Republican National Convention at San Francisco.

Area policemen later expressed the opinion that their efforts at the convention had been a failure, even though the press and political leaders on all levels had praised them at the time for using restrained tactics that contributed to maintaining peace at the convention.

The Crime Fighter versus the Miscellaneous Public Functionary

Research into policing has long established that very
14
little of the policeman's job involves actual crime fighting.

¹³Gordon E. Misner, Police Minority Group Relations at the 1964 Republican National Convention (Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1967).

14

See James F. Ahern, Police in Trouble (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1972), pp. 168-9; and John Webster, Police Task and Time Study (Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1968).

At present, only about two out of every ten police calls are related to crime fighting; the other eight are calls for other types of community services. Even the staunchest advocates of professionalism have recognized that policing is predominantly a miscellaneous function.

15

But Vollmer and others believed that, in the interest of police effectiveness in fighting crime, the police department should be organized around the crime fighting function. Other tasks were seen as necessary but regrettable intrusions into this function. A policeman today is monitored by his superiors in terms of the arrest or citation activities he performs, and little incentive is provided for performing other types of work. For example, both Washington, D. C., and St. Louis attempted to set up detoxification centers that would be served by patrolmen on the beat. These efforts were sabotaged by the officers because they disturbed internal

16

15

See August Vollmer, The Police and Modern Society (Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1971, reprinted from the 1936 edition), pp. 217 ff; and Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the United States, (2d ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 15-20.

16

See David C. Perry and Paula Sornoff, "Street Level Administration and the Law: The Problem of Police-Community Relations," Criminal Law Bulletin, VIII (1972), 45-7.

reward systems within the department that were based on
17
"good" arrests.

Organizing the police around crime fighting involves an inherent contradiction, in that the crime they are best able to suppress is regularized criminal activity or organized crime. Yet most of organized crime depends upon the existence of a market for its services -- gambling, prostitution, alcohol and drugs -- within the community. If this market exists, there is unlikely to be community support for genuine police suppression of the regularized criminal activity.

On the other hand, crime that is more individual or disorganized will adapt its shape to meet whatever requirements the organizational structure of the police imposes upon it. The best defense against a good organization, in this sense, is no organization at all, which may well characterize the structure of much juvenile crime today. The "hit-or-miss" criminal activities of small groups of juveniles in cities like New York is an example of the type of crime with which a

17

See Raymond T. Nimmer, Two Million Unnecessary Arrests (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1970), pp. 116-8.

18

"crime-fighting" police department is ill equipped to cope.

Beyond this, the crime-fighting function rests upon a particular definition of the type of crime that the police will fight, a definition that is determined by centralized police authority. This denies the police the more positive functions they might be able to perform in poor or minority communities. When "important" crime is defined as the types of crimes committed by poor or minority groups, very little policing is directed against middle-class crime. Thus a centralized, crime-fighting police unit within a minority community focuses upon crimes committed by, not against, the local inhabitants. More sophisticated crimes like housing violations and merchant fraud are ignored or referred to the city bureaucracy. This is an inevitable consequence of Vollmer's definition of the police as a crime fighter, although it conflicts directly with his advice of more than fifty years ago that the policeman could "protect (immigrants) from petty political and business grafters, as well as from other

19

unscrupulous persons...."

18

For an excellent description of this kind of disorganized juvenile crime, see "The 'Rat Packs' of New York" by Shane Stevens. The New York Times Magazine, November 28, 1971.

19

"The Policeman as a Social Worker," The Policeman's News, June 1919, p. 12.

What would be a more realistic orientation to replace that of the professional crime fighter? We would suggest a leveling of functions that would place all the policeman's services on approximately the same scale; he could as rightly be judged for his efforts in referring drunks to detoxification centers as for apprehending a burglar. The miscellaneous, nonrational nature of public demands upon policing is an indisputable fact: why not organize policing around this reality, and at the same time keep it based in local priorities? Those specialized functions that a modern police department requires -- sophisticated traffic engineering or crime detection-- can be supplied by centralized agencies or by personnel who enter the department laterally.

An accompanying change would be a decrease in the importance of the overall police function. Professionalism, as seen through the words of Vollmer and most of his successors, makes high promises about the ability of the police to control crime and maintain social order if only the public will grant the mandate and supply the necessary funds and autonomy. Part of the ideology of professionalism is the existence of an expertise that can cope with many social problems, or that can reduce levels of violent crime. These claims -- often forwarded in the context of the drive for increased status and

better working conditions for policemen -- are obviously exaggerated, and professional policing bears some of the responsibility for public ire when crime rates are not contained.

The inherent contradiction in singling out the police as providers of social order is the historical fact that municipal police can only exist when a state of social order is already in effect: their existence presupposes the state
 20 they claim to provide. During times of civil unrest or more visible political turmoil, when the fundamental political order is either held to principle, questioned, or challenged, Vollmer's ideology encourages the public to become angry and to "turn upon" the police for failing to maintain order, instead of looking at the larger and more persistent problems within the society. It is at these times that, according to
 21 Westley's description, the police turn to "violence and secrecy." They are defending themselves against demands that they cannot fulfil, and they interpret this failure as resulting from the hostility of the public.

 20

See the discussion by T. S. Smith, in "Notes on Democratic Control and Professionalism in Police Systems" (Working Paper No. 90, University of Chicago Center for Social Organization Studies, 1967).

21

Op. cit., p. xv.

When local conditions lead to a state of riot or civil disorder, as defined by government officials, the most effective organization to meet that state of disorder would be a centralized military body, either the army or the national guard. The military possesses entirely different strategies than the police for dealing with disturbances, and its presence is a clear indication to the whole community that a crisis of order exists. It is not being asked to deal with a situation in which it itself is a key factor, as the police are, even if only in a symbolic way. Being organized in a centralized, military fashion, soldiers will also not encounter the problems of individual accountability that policemen always face. Westley recommended that there should be a "decrease in the duties leading to violent confrontation with the public, for example, riot control." He favored the use of the national guard over the army because it is a "broad citizen group."

The ultimate justification for the use of the military, however, is not tactical but political: disorders of this extent are an indication of a challenge to the state's authority. Whether one interprets that challenge as legitimate or illegitimate, it is deceiving to view it as a "police problem." When state

suppression of that scale is required, it should be open and obvious, should interfere with business and bus schedules, should become an unavoidable part of the total life of the community. Inability to contain such a situation should not be seen as a failure of local policing, anymore than the police of Vollmer's day "failed" to enforce liquor and gambling laws.

Opponents of the view that policing should be local, participatory and oriented to community priorities point to two dangers: that a community will use its police department to resolve conflicts with other communities; and that within heterogeneous communities, the majority will use their control over the police to suppress internal minorities. These are dangers that neither statesmen nor police executives have been able to resolve in a democracy. The struggle between competing groups, between the wishes of a majority and the rights of a minority, are constantly shifting aspects of American political life. James Q. Wilson, in opposing community-based policing, wrote:

When a community is deeply divided and emotionally aroused, the proper governmental policy is not to arm the disputants and let them settle matters among themselves; it is, rather, to raise the level at

which decisions will be made to a point sufficiently high so that neither side can prevail by force majeure but low enough so that responsible authorities must still listen to both sides.²³

In some situations, as with bitter racial conflicts in the South, this may be the best policy. Its efficacy in these cases, however, does not make it less an abrogation of the rights of local authority.

But the suppression of internal minorities and the use of police power to further special goals is as likely to occur on the state and national level as in local communities. It would be absurd to argue with a black community that a white centralized police force should stay on its streets because the larger community is worried about the rights of the non-blacks who live there. A balance must be struck, and police professionalism in its traditional form has become too autonomous, too rigid in its goals, too insulated from the community to work toward that balance.

Wilson's analysis shares in part the elitist point of view -- the fear of the democratic process -- that underlies

23

Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 290. Wilson referred to community-based policing as the "communal model." See his discussion on pp. 286-99. For a critical evaluation of his argument, see Gene E. Carte, "In Defense of Alternative Policing: A Reply to James Q. Wilson," Criminal Law Bulletin, VIII (1972).

professional policing. It overlooks the reality of American history and is reminiscent of the fears the Whigs expressed when Andrew Jackson was elected President. On the contrary, no profound social conflict has ever been resolved or mitigated in the United States except by letting the disputants "settle matters among themselves." The history of the labor movement, for example, shows no evidence of benevolent government stepping in to raise the level at which decisions are made.²⁴ The argument can only be maintained by asserting that for some serious problems, like race relations and poverty, the stakes are too high to allow the democratic exchange process to function. Wilson has also suggested that the areas where community-based policing is proposed do not have the values sufficient to maintain it:

Some advocates of communal law enforcement seem inclined to defend the model precisely on the grounds that it avoids the "middle-class bias" of the legal code and the moral order. If by "middle-class bias" is meant a concern for the security of person and property and a desire to avoid intrusions into one's privacy and disturbances of one's

24

If anyone did attempt to mediate this conflict, the effort was very unsuccessful. See Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character and Outcome," Violence in America by Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969).

peace, it is not clear why such a "bias" is a bad thing or, indeed, why it should be called a "bias" at all.²⁵

This implies that minority neighborhoods do not value "security of person and property," nor do they wish to avoid "intrusions into one's privacy." A look into any black, Puerto Rican, or Mexican-American community will quickly show the opposite. These are precisely the values that the community wants respected and for which they do not receive protection under professional policing.

The middle-class concern for person and property has proven itself to be remarkably class specific, in that it is only invoked when middle-class persons and property are threatened. Police violence and drug abuse, to cite two topical instances, only became issues of widespread concern when the victims were middle-class people. Many blacks are bitter over the new call of crisis over police problems and uncontrolled drug use, because blacks received little help from the government or the middle class in dealing with these problems when they were largely confined to poor or black areas. This neglect by the larger society implies that somehow the victims deserved their fate, or that the parents did not care if their children became drug addicts, or that

the entire subculture was so deficient as to make specific abuses a moot point.

Profound social conflicts can only be resolved when the groups involved have access to the democratic exchange process. There is no other mechanism in the United States for problem solving. Vollmer's professional policing, by placing order maintenance above the rights of all groups to have such access, perpetuates the very situation that is used to justify its existence. Although the police are not an important institution in themselves, their position as the maintainers of this inequity makes it imperative that control of policing be dispersed.

The risks involved would be greatly reduced if the importance of the police function were lowered to its traditional level. Municipal policing has much more to do with mediation and service functions than with riot control. Should neighborhoods break into open and extensive conflict, the United States is well supplied with military organizations which would be available to institute truly professional, legalistic control for the duration of the emergency. The only real decision that a policeman has is the power to arrest. All the long-term, more serious penalties of the criminal justice system cannot be invoked without the cooperation of the courts.

Centralized police departments in large American

cities have more in common with standing armies than with historical policing. Their size alone undermines the entire rationale of civilian police. It is futile to expect that any amount of tinkering with police functions, or any quest for democratic policemen with law degrees, could bring policing into line with the expectations of the community. The same impasse is evident in large city school systems, which are under attack from all sides for being entrenched, inefficient, and for failing to educate children.

Police cannot be expected to be accountable to a broader level of citizen interests unless those citizens receive some power over the police department. Citizens cannot be expected to participate in government services if the structure of those services excludes all but the most legalistic of outside influences. Finally, policing cannot be made local if its important policy decisions are made at a higher level.

Conflicts will remain, and it is futile to suppose that any agency will be able to resolve them. Clarence Darrow came to terms with the contradictions of democratic theory when he wrote, in discussing a bitter strike at the Los Angeles Times in 1911:

I, for one, have never believed in violence, force or other cruelty. I hate pain and suffering for others as well as for myself. I had long been a non-resistant at heart, and had preached it as far as I could, but had learned that in the forces of life, clash and conflict were inevitable. My sympathy and experience had placed me on the side of those who had the hard tasks and the ill-conditions of life. Personally, I would go to any extent possible to prevent violence and disorder, but, when it came about, then I was for and with my side; for I sensed and learned the motives that moved men, and I believed that in the long sweep of time they were fighting for the amelioration and welfare of mankind. I knew that these endless conflicts had always been fraught with grief and distress, but Nature seems to provide no other way.

APPENDIX A

"Chronology of the Career of August Vollmer," probably compiled by Vollmer in the late 1940s. Reproduced in the following pages without alteration.

AUGUST VOLLMER

- 1896 - Assisted in organizing North Berkeley Volunteer Fire Department.
- 1897 - Awarded Berkeley Fireman medal.
- 1898 - Private G Battery U. S. Artillery (25 battles and engagements).
- 1900 - Postal service.
- 1905 - Elected Town Marshal.
- 1905 - Installed complete bicycle patrol service.
- 1906 - Installed first red-light recall system.
- 1906 - Installed first centralized police record system.
- 1906 - Installed first Modus-Operandi system.
- 1907 - President California Association of Chiefs of Police.
- 1907 - Organized movement for reinstituting Calif. State Bureau of Ident.
- 1907 - Member Berkeley Charity Organization.
- 1907 - President Berkeley S. P. C. A.
- 1908 - Organized Berkeley Police School.
- 1909 - Appointed Chief of Police.
- 1909 - Vice-President National Playground Association.
- 1913 - Organized motorcycle patrol service.
- 1914 - Organized first automobile patrol service.
- 1914 - Member of State Recreation Inquiry Commission.
- 1914 - Organized Berkeley Junior Police.
- 1915 - Conducted San Diego Police Department survey.
- 1916 - Reorganized Berkeley Police School (see Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
- 1916 - Lecturer in criminology program during U. C. Summer Session.
- 1916 - Vice President California Mental Hygiene Society.
- 1917 - President Board of Managers of the State Bureau of Identification.
- 1917 - President State Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
- 1918 - Vice President American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
- 1918 - Lecturer in U. S. Army school for intelligence officers.
- 1919 - Assisted in organizing Hawthorne School study of potential offenders.
- 1919 - With Doctor Jau Don Ball, Prof. Brietweiser and Doctor Virgil-Dickson began informal group meetings which became foundation for coordination council movement.

- 1920 - Assisted in organizing Alameda County Traffic Safety Commission.
- 1921 - Vice President International Association of Chiefs of Police.
- 1921 - Installed first* fingerprint system in this country.
- 1921 - Installed first handwriting classification system in this country.
- 1921 - Installed first instrument for the detection of deception by police.
- 1921 - Member of the Board of Directors Alameda County Health Center.
- 1922 - President International Association of Chiefs of Police
- 1923 - Chief of Police in Los Angeles (on leave from Berkeley).
- 1923 - Assisted in organizing L. A. Academy of Criminology.
- 1923 - Assisted in organizing L. A. Child Guidance Clinic.
- 1923 - Organized extension courses in police administration at U. S. C.
- 1923 - Reorganized L. A. Police Department (see survey report).
- 1924 - Lecturer at U. S. C. Summer Session (with President Von Kleinschmidt).
- 1924 - Organized bond campaign to equip police department at cost of three million dollars.
- 1924 - Installed first aluminum street markers in America.
- 1926 - Distributed patrolmen according to beat formula developed with aid of members of Berkeley Police Department.
- 1926 - Assisted in organizing Berkeley Safety Traffic Commission.
- 1926 - Surveyed Havana Police Department.
- 1926 - Served as Consultant for Detroit Police Department.
- 1927 - Surveyed Chicago Police Department. See report of Illinois Crime Survey.
- 1927 - Police Consultant for National Crime Commission. See report.
- 1928 - Kansas City, Missouri, police survey.
- 1929 - Police Consultant for National Law Observance and Enforcement Commission.
- 1929 - Member U. S. Federation of Justice.
- 1929 - Professor of Police Administration at Univ. of Chicago, (two year leave of absence from Berkeley Police Department).

*single fingerprint system.

- 1929 - Harmon Foundation Medal for contributions to social science.
- 1929 - Organized National Conference to Expedite Uniform Crime Reporting.
- 1930 - Assisted in organizing Chicago Regional Peace Officers Association.
- 1930 - Organized movement to create Illinois State Identification Bureau.
- 1930 - With Doctors Ralph Webster and Harry Hoffman formed Chicago Academy of Criminology.
- 1930 - Minneapolis police survey.
- 1930 - Gary police survey.
- 1930 - With students in my classes made a survey of all police departments within fifty miles of Chicago.
- 1931 - Professor of Police Administration at University of California.
- 1931 - Assisted in organizing Police School at San Jose State College.
- 1931 - Benjamin Ide Wheeler award.
- 1932 - Retired as Chief of Police.
- 1932 - Assisted in organizing course for peace officers at L. A. Junior College.
- 1932 - With Kidd, Adler, Schmidt and others assisted in organizing criminology curricula at University of California.
- 1932 - Trip around the world studying police methods.
- 1934 - National Academy of Sciences Public Welfare Medal "in recognition of the application of scientific methods in police administration and crime prevention."
- 1934 - Santa Barbara police survey.
- 1934 - Lecturer Police Administration at University of Hawaii Summer Session.
- 1934 - Member of the Board of Directors East Bay Regional Park District.
- 1934 - Portland police survey.
- 1935 - Piedmont police survey.
- 1937 - Retired from the University of California.
- 1938 - Member of Inter-State Crime Commission.
- 1939 - California Prison Association President.
- 1943 - Syracuse police survey.
- 1944 - Dallas police survey.
- 1947 - Portland police survey.
- 1947 - Member National Academy for Advancement of Criminology.

APPENDIX B

Bibliography

The following bibliography of August Vollmer's publications is an updated and revised version of a list that Vollmer probably compiled in the 1940s.

1917

San Diego Police Survey, June 1, 1917.

"The School for Police as Planned at Berkeley," with Albert Schneider. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, VII (1917), 877-98. Reports on the reorganization of the Berkeley Police School in 1916. Includes bibliography of materials used.

1918

"The Convicted Man -- His Treatment While Before the Court," The National Police Journal, II (1918).

"Criminal Identification Bureau," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, IX (1918), 322-5.

1919

"California State Bureau of Identification," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, IX (1919), 479-82. Reports on the new bureau that Vollmer had been instrumental in establishing.

"The Policeman as a Social Worker," The Policeman's News, June 1919. Also printed in The National Police Journal, IV (1919). An early statement of Vollmer's view of the policeman as a crime preventer.

"Revision of the Atcherley Modus Operandi System," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, X (1919), 229-74. Describes the system that Vollmer and Clarence D. Lee constructed for use in the Berkeley department.

1920

"Bureau of Criminal Records," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XI (1920), 171-80. Describes a model system for maintaining criminal records.

"Statement of Personal Beliefs," Proceedings of the International Association of Chiefs of Police for 1920, pp. 122-3. General statement of philosophy of policing.

1921

"Modus Operandi," National Police Bulletin, I (1920), 2-3.

"Practical Method for Selecting Policemen," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XI (1921), 571-81.
Contains statement of Vollmer's strong belief in higher educational standards for policemen.

1922

"Aims and Ideals of the Police," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XIII (1922), 251-7. A reprint of Vollmer's address as President of the I.A.C.P. for 1922.

"Narcotic Control Association of California," ibid. (1922), 126-7.

1923

"Pre-delinquency," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XIV (1923), 279-83.

1924

Los Angeles Police Department Survey, 1923-4. Pp. 241. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.) Letter of submittal contains a statement of Vollmer's philosophy of policing.

1925

Detroit Police Department Survey, December 15, 1925.

1926

"Adequate Equipment and Efficient Personnel Essential for Success in Police Administration," American City, XXXVIII (1926), 111-2.

Havana, Cuba, Police Survey. National Police Department General Report, August 31, 1926.

"The Policewoman and Pre-delinquency,"
The Police Journal, XIII (1926), pp. 32.

"Prevention and Detection of Crime as Viewed
by a Police Officer," Annals of the American
Academy, CXXV (1926), 148-53.

"Treatment of Second Termers and Recidivists,"
The Police Journal, XIII (1926), 15-8. Calls for
classification and rehabilitation for first offenders,
harsher treatment for recidivists.

"We Can Prevent Juvenile Crime!" Sunset, LVI
(1926), 32-3.

1927

"Criminal Statistics," The Police Journal, December
1927, pp. 10-5.

"The Recidivist from the Point of View of the Police
Official," Journal of Delaware, II (1927), 72-87.

"Statistics on Criminality," Peace Officer, V (1927),
7-8.

1928

"Coordinated Effort to Prevent Crime," Journal of
the American Institute of Criminal Law and Crimin-
ology, XIX (1928), 196-210.

"Police Organization and Administration; With
Discussions," Public Management, X (1928),
140-52.

"Vice and Traffic -- Police Handicaps," University of
Southern California Law Review, I (1928), 326-31.

1929

"Criminal Investigation," Encyclopedia Britannica
(14th ed.) XII, 558-9.

"The Police (in Chicago)," chap. VIII in The Illinois Crime Survey. Chicago: Illinois Association for Criminal Justice, 1929. (Reprinted by Patterson Smith, Montclair, N. J., 1968.)

"Science in Crime," La Critique, IV (1929), pp. 5.

Survey of the Metropolitan Police Department of Kansas City, Missouri. Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, March 1929. Pp. 165.

1930

"Meet the Lady Cop," Survey, LXIII (1930), 702-3.

"Police Progress in Practice and Principles," International Association Identification Proceedings, XVI (1930), 54-6.

"The Scientific Policeman," The American Journal of Police Science, I (1930), 8-12.

Survey of Police Department, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Minneapolis: 1930. Pp. 192. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

1931

"Abstract of the Wickersham Police Report," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXII (1931), 716-23.

"Case Against Capital Punishment in California," Special Message to California State Legislature, April 1, 1931.

"Is the Third Degree Ever Necessary? Police Officials Give Their Views," Western City, VII (1931), 27-8. Interviews with police chiefs from Portland, Tacoma, Pasadena, Los Angeles, and Berkeley.

"Outline of a Course in Police Organization and Administration," American Journal of Police Science, II (1931), 70-9. Includes bibliography.

Report on Police. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Vol. XIV. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931. (Reprinted by Patterson Smith, Montclair, N. J., 1968.) Vollmer served as director of this volume and authored the chapters on the Police Executive.

1932

Introduction to Lying and Its Detection: A Study of Deception and Deception Tests by John A. Larson. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1932. (Reprinted by Patterson Smith, Montclair, N. J., 1969.)

"Police Administration," Public Management, XIV (1932), 21-2.

1933

"Police Beat," Proceedings of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, XL (1933), 304-18.

"Police Methods Need Changes," Oakland Tribune, October 19, 1933.

"Police Progress in the Last Twenty-Five Years," Proceedings of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, XL (1933), 319-27. Also printed in Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXIV (1933), 161-75.

Review of Rural Crime Control by Bruce Smith. Columbia Law Review, XXXIII (1933), 1471-3.

1934

"Curriculum for Peace Officers, Los Angeles Junior College," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXV (1934), 138-40.

Development of the Curriculum in Police Organization and Administration. Typewritten MS dated March 1934. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

Lectures in Police Administration. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, mimeograph publication, June 26, 1934. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

"Police Administration," Municipal Yearbook 1934, pp. 77-9.

Review of Private Police by J. P. Shalloo, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXIV (1934), 982-3.

Survey of the Police Department, Santa Barbara, California. Typewritten MS dated April 21, 1934. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

"Trends in Adult Guidance with the Misfits," The Vocational Guidance Magazine, XIII (1934), 50-1.

"Universal Registration," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXV (1934), 650-2.

"Vestigial Organs: The Diminishing Effectiveness of the Grand Jury and the Preliminary Hearing as Aids to Justice," State Government, VII (1934), 91-4.

1935

Crime and the State Police, with Alfred E. Parker. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935. Pp. 226. Contains strong advocacy of state policing and centralization of police facilities.

"What Can Bar Associations Do to Improve Police Conditions?" State Bar Journal of California, X (1935), 44-6.

1936

The Police and Modern Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936. Pp. 253. (Reprinted, with an Introduction by James Q. Wilson, by Patterson Smith, Montclair, N. J., 1971.) Vollmer's most complete analysis of police problems.

A Survey of the Piedmont Police Department. Typewritten MS dated 1936. (I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

1940

Foreward to Police Interrogation by Lt. W. R. Kidd.
New York: R. V. Basuino, 1940.

1942

"Criminal Investigation," chap. III in Elements of Police Science, ed. Rollin M. Perkins. Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1942.

1944

Report of Dallas Police Department Survey. City of Dallas, Texas, March-April 1944. Pp. 195.
(I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

1947

Police Bureau Survey, City of Portland, Oregon.
Portland: University of Oregon, Bureau of Municipal Research and Service, 1947. Pp. 217.
(I. G. S. Library, University of California at Berkeley.)

1949

The Criminal. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1949.

1950

Preface to Daily Training Bulletin of the Los Angeles Police Department by W. H. Parker, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department, 1950. (Reprinted by Chas. C Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1958.)

1951

Police Organization and Administration, with John P. Peper and Frank M. Boolsen. Sacramento: California State Dept. of Education, Bureau of Trade and Industrial Education, 1951. Pp. 217. Written and prepared for use in connection with the California Peace Officer's Training Program.

1953

Foreward to Public Relations and the Police by G. Douglas Gourley. Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1953.

Introduction to The Instrumental Detection of Deception by Clarence D. Lee. Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1953.

1954

Foreward to Are You Guilty? An Introduction to the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States by William Dienstein. Springfield, Ill.: Chas C Thomas, 1954.

Foreward to Police Work with Juveniles by John P. Kenney and Dan G. Pursuit. Springfield, Ill.: Chas. C Thomas, 1954.

NOTE: Many of the above papers, and further material not listed, were presented over the years by Vollmer at annual meetings of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Refer to the Proceedings of the I. A. C. P. during these years for complete information.

APPENDIX C

"Changes in Public Attitudes toward the Police:

A Comparison of Surveys Dated 1938 and 1971"

by Gene E. Carte.

The following paper reports upon research into citizen attitudes toward the police that was conducted in Alameda County, California, in 1971. The research is compared to a study that was conducted in the mid-1930s into similar attitudes.

This paper has been submitted for publication to the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1972.

This paper reports upon two surveys that sought to determine what the public expects from their police departments. The first survey was reported in an article by Spencer D. Parratt that was published in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in 1938.¹

The second survey was conducted by the writer during 1971 in Alameda County, California. The following pages will describe Parratt's work in some detail, and will contrast it with selected findings from the more recent survey which showed that significant changes have occurred over the years in the public's view toward police organization and practices.

1938: Demands for Competence and Civility

Parratt's work was done at a time when the new creed of policing was professionalization, as codified in the 1931 Wickersham Report and in the efforts of August Vollmer, Bruce Smith, and other police leaders. The demoralizing effects of municipal corruption, the legacy of Prohibition, and generally low standards within policing had produced renewed calls for "police reform." These reform measures commonly included the increased use of

1

"A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning," XXVIII (1938).

technology, better police training, and efforts to detach policing from the potentially corrupting influences of local politics.

Parratt wished to devise a rating scale by which police departments could be evaluated in terms of their responsiveness to "what is desired or approved by an effective sector of citizen opinion."² He was critical of attempts to rate police departments solely on internal criteria, which erred in "disregarding the fundamental and seeking to measure the composite.... The present state of police knowledge and technique calls for digging founda-³tions."

The Parratt rating scale was based on a complicated methodology that began with random samplings of citizen opinion and resulted in a list of 126 statements (Police are "usually dependable;" "seldom dependable;" "do not smoke on duty;" etc.) grouped into eight categories. Judges of the statements were asked to rate, on an 11-point scale, whether the practice represented by each statement

2

Ibid., p. 739.

3

"A Critique of the Bellman Police Service Rating Scale," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVII (1937), 899.

increased or hindered police effectiveness, with a⁴ hypothetical neutral position of 5.5. Fifty-three judges or raters were used to evaluate the items, including:

ten practicing lawyers, five public administrators not involved in police work, five judges, . . . ten professional men and women who had quite ordinary contacts with police, eight professors or graduate students of political science and public administration, ten prisoners in a county jail, the chief of police of Syracuse, a sheriff and an ex-sheriff, and an assistant warden in a state penitentiary.⁵

Although this was admittedly a small and unrepresentative group, dominated by professional and academic persons, the items themselves had been chosen after several random samplings of citizens. The specific index values that Parratt published are thus subject to limited generalization, but in combination with the nature of the items themselves can provide insight into public attitudes at that time.

Table I (following this page) illustrates the public endorsement of higher personnel standards: better intelligence and education; good judgment; "Dress to command

⁴

Op. cit. p.742. The research used the standard Thurstone psychophysical scale.

⁵

Ibid., p. 743.

TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONNEL

Identifying Number	Statement Phrasing	Index of Effec- tiveness	Index of Ambiguity
<i>(A)—Physical Condition</i>			
100	Too fat to perform duties efficiently.....	1.6	2.1
101	Usually in good physical condition.....	8.4	1.6
102	Mostly in poor physical condition.....	1.4	1.6
<i>(B)—Intelligence</i>			
103	Mostly men of ordinary intelligence.....	7.8	2.8
104	Majority of men of more than ordinary in- telligence	8.9	2.3
105	Mostly men of low or inferior intelligence..	1.1	1.7
<i>(C)—Education</i>			
106	Mostly men having at least elementary school education	8.1	2.5
107	Usually men of little or no education.....	1.5	1.9
108	Usually men of high school education.....	9.0	2.8
<i>(D)—Mental Traits</i>			
109	Usually conscientious in performing duties.	8.2	2.1
110	Mostly men having less than ordinary ambi- tion	3.4	2.2
111	Usually dependable	8.3	2.2
112	Seldom dependable	2.4	2.4
113	Make quick and intelligent decisions.....	10.2	1.6
<i>(E)—Appearance</i>			
114	Smoke occasionally when on duty.....	5.0	1.7
115	More concerned with appearance than per- formance of duties	2.2	2.6
116	Usually dress to appear spic and span.....	7.6	2.3
117	Dress to command public respect.....	9.1	2.0
118	Habitually dress sloppily	2.3	2.3
119	Seldom have military bearing and appear- ance	3.9	2.1
120	Do not smoke when on duty.....	7.0	2.3
<i>(F)—Professional Interest</i>			
121	Have slight professional interest in work..	1.9	3.7
122	Have moderate professional interest in work	7.2	2.5
123	Have high professional interest in work....	10.5	1.2

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 745.

public respect;" and "Have high professional interest in work." Values associated with professional policing are reflected even more strongly in Table II: policemen selected for personal merit and ability; military forms of discipline; modern, specialized training; modern equipment and scientific detection facilities. Parratt observed:

Again...appears the citizen insistence upon giving extreme values to descriptions of situations outside of his immediate capacity to evaluate because of lack of technical understandings. Thus, few citizens could determine the elements constituting "merit and ability" in the selection of policemen. A department would seem to find citizen support when these are thought to exist.⁶

Table III shows the concern for impartial law enforcement and political neutrality.

The remaining five tables deal more directly with the policeman's work and the nature of his contacts with citizens. Parratt's interpretations of the general consensus of opinion in this area are illuminating:

The very high ratings given tactfulness and courtesy in dealing with the public reflects experience with traffic enforcement to a considerable extent....The consistently high ratings given crime prevention activities seem to be instructive for police guidance and should, if a sample of significant opinion in a city indicates, provide an opportunity for progressive policing to improve status in

TABLE II
SELECTION, DISCIPLINE, TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

Identifying Number	Statement Phrasing	Index of Eftec- tiveness	Index of Ambiguity
<i>(A)—Basis of Selection</i>			
124	Members selected for personal merit and ability	10.2	1.3
125	Members usually selected for personal merit and ability	8.4	1.6
126	Members seldom selected for personal merit and ability	2.6	2.6
<i>(B)—Departmental Discipline</i>			
1	Always have military bearing and appearance	9.0	2.8
2	Operate under fairly good discipline.....	7.8	2.5
3	Operate under poor discipline.....	2.7	2.0
4	Operate under rigid military discipline....	9.5	2.9
5	Very disorderly and undisciplined.....	.8	1.0
<i>(C)—Training</i>			
6	Mostly poorly trained men.....	1.2	1.9
7	Without scientific training in modern police methods	1.8	2.0
8	Use out of date police training methods....	1.8	2.3
9	Use practically no police training methods..	1.4	1.6
10	Use modern police training methods.....	10.0	1.4
11	Specially trained to give advice to boys and girls	10.2	1.4
12	Specially trained to educate public how best to protect property	10.0	1.6
13	Specially trained to recognize situations which may lead to crime.....	10.4	1.3
<i>(D)—Equipment and Facilities</i>			
14	Make use of modern equipment.....	10.3	1.3
15	Do not understand use of modern equipment	2.0	2.7
16	Have experts available having facilities and understanding of scientific methods of handling difficult crimes	10.4	1.3

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 746.

TABLE III
INFLUENCE OF POLITICS

<i>Identifying Number</i>	<i>Statement Phrasing</i>	<i>Index of Effec- tiveness</i>	<i>Index of Ambiguity</i>
17	Active as political party workers.....	1.8	2.2
18	Lose jobs by refusing to obey orders of po- litical bosses9	1.6
19	Membership changes when new political party comes into power.....	.9	1.6
20	Apprehend criminals indiscriminately, with- out regard for pressure brought by in- fluential forces	9.9	1.5
21	Customarily use influence to help political party in power	2.2	2.6
22	Show favoritism to politicians.....	1.0	1.4

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 747.

TABLE IV
PUBLIC AND PRESS RELATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION

Identifying Number	Statement Phrasing	Index of Effec- tiveness	Index of Ambiguity
	<i>(A)—Standards of Tact and Courtesy</i>		
37	Lose temper easily when dealing with public	1.6	1.9
38	Habitually tactful in dealing with public...	10.2	1.4
39	Civil in dealing with public.....	9.2	2.3
40	Courteous in regulating traffic.....	9.4	2.1
	<i>(B)—Response to Criticism</i>		
41	Take criticism from members of public grudgingly	3.2	2.4
42	Make effort to obtain suggestions from members of public	8.3	2.6
43	Resent suggestions being made by mem- bers of public	2.1	2.7
	<i>(C)—Efforts to Educate Public: Crime Prevention</i>		
44	Seldom conduct campaigns on dangers of traffic violations	2.9	2.8
45	Make effort to gain confidence of boys and girls	10.1	1.5
46	Make consistent effort to educate public in how best to protect property.....	9.9	1.7
47	Conduct regular campaigns on dangers of traffic violations	9.7	1.7
48	Seldom try to educate public in means of crime prevention	2.1	2.4
49	Watchful to prevent child delinquency.....	10.2	1.4
	<i>(D)—Press Relations</i>		
53	Change strictness of traffic enforcement when newspapers protest laxness.....	3.9	3.5
54	Make serious effort to suppress crime only when newspapers complain	1.5	2.0
55	Keep newspapers posted upon every step taken in trying to solve crimes.....	1.6	3.2
56	Carefully censure information given news- papers when attempting to solve crimes so as not to interfere with solution.....	10.0	1.4
57	Give newspapers brief statements of out- come of investigations of crimes, but not until after solution has been achieved...	9.6	1.9
58	All information to newspapers released by head of department	9.9	1.7
59	Operate independently from newspaper pub- licity	8.6	2.1

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 749.

TABLE V
INVESTIGATION AND APPREHENSION: STANDARDS OF ENFORCEMENT

<i>Identifying Number</i>	<i>Statement Phrasing</i>	<i>Index of Effec- tiveness</i>	<i>Index of Ambiguity</i>
50	Change traffic enforcement spasmodically..	1.7	2.1
51	Accept bribes for fixing parking violations..	.7	1.3
52	Make practice of fixing traffic tickets for friends of members of department.....	1.8	2.3
76	Occasionally arrest innocent persons.....	4.2	3.0
77	Inconsistent in making effort to apprehend petty criminals	2.9	1.9
78	Usually tolerate petty criminals, without making serious effort to apprehend them.	1.6	2.4
79	Usually follow up all telephone calls report- ing suspected crimes	8.0	2.3
80	Try to enforce laws which public opinion most supports	8.5	2.4
81	Rarely get their man in difficult cases.....	1.3	1.5
82	Never slow and superficial in investigating suspected crimes	9.9	1.7
83	Do not understand use of scientific methods in investigating suspected crimes.....	1.5	2.0
84	Seldom use up-to-date scientific methods in apprehending criminals	2.1	2.6
85	Keep close contact with underworld by means of ex-convicts acting as stool pigeons	7.2	3.0
86	More likely to arrest the agents than the principals or head men in organized crim- inal activities	2.3	2.3
87	Seldom able to return stolen property to owner	1.9	2.0
88	Careful not to arrest innocent persons.....	9.3	3.0
89	Usually apprehend criminals in difficult cases	9.7	1.6

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 750.

citizen opinions....

The statements are indicative of a variety of police practices, and probably the outstanding characteristic of the ratings is that even the statements considered most conducive to effectiveness rate somewhat below the values accorded to courtesy, crime prevention, and professional interest in work and training.⁷

With these results, Parratt was able to reinforce his contention that citizens were more interested in civility, crime prevention and an image of professionalism than in measures of efficiency, high though the latter stood in their scale of concerns. But if many citizens were dissatisfied with their police, they did not express an overwhelming desire to be involved more actively in police affairs. The statement "Make effort to obtain suggestions from members of public" received a high rating, but lower than many other statements relating to courtesy, police work with juveniles,⁸ and relations with newspapers. Citizen involvement for its own sake was not seen as a high priority.

Specific attitudes toward police treatment of minority groups and suspects were surveyed in Tables VI and VII. Parratt noted in connection with Table VI: "Police effectiveness

7

Ibid., p. 748.

8

See Table IV.

TABLE VI
TREATMENT OF GROUPS AND MINORITIES

<i>Identifying Number</i>	<i>Statement Phrasing</i>	<i>Index of Effec- tiveness</i>	<i>Index of Ambiguity</i>
23	Usually fair in dealing with employers.....	8.5	2.3
24	Usually fair in dealing with strikers.....	8.8	2.8
25	Usually fair in dealing with farmers.....	8.6	2.5
26	Force merchants and business men to buy tickets to entertainments as means of re- taining good will	1.7	2.1
31	Use harsher methods with ex-convicts than with other persons	4.6	3.2
98	Unfriendly to ex-convicts	2.9	2.7
99	Make honest and consistent effort to help ex-convicts to go straight.....	10.3	1.4
27	Use harsher methods with Negroes than with other persons	4.0	2.9
28	Interfere with radical meetings only when public order is threatened.....	8.9	2.2
29	Feared by boys and girls.....	2.3	2.8
30	Liked by boys and girls.....	9.4	2.4
32	Use harsher methods with aliens than with citizens	4.6	3.4
33	Use harsher methods with radicals (com- munists for example) than with citizens..	5.4	3.9
34	Use harsher methods with "gangsters" than with other persons	8.0	2.9
35	Use harsher methods with those suspected of murder than of other crimes.....	6.4	3.4
36	Break up radical meetings with clubs and tear gas whenever such meetings are known	2.8	3.6

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 751.

TABLE VII
TREATMENT OF SUSPECTS AND WITNESSES

<i>Identifying Number</i>	<i>Statement Phrasing</i>	<i>Index of Effec- tiveness</i>	<i>Index of Ambiguity</i>
60	Always careful to explain a suspect's legal rights so that he understands them before asking questions to gain information.....	6.6	3.9
61	Deliberately mislead suspected criminals as to their legal and constitutional rights to gain information or force confessions.....	1.1	2.1
62	Disregard constitutional rights in the interest of efficiency	3.0	3.7
63	Seldom treat suspected criminals civilly...	3.7	2.7
64	Occasionally promise leniency to suspected criminals to force confessions.....	4.6	3.4
65	Use whatever degree of force found convenient	6.2	3.9
66	Usually respect constitutional rights of suspected criminals	7.4	2.6
67	Never treat suspected criminals brutally...	6.9	3.8
68	Treat suspects civilly	8.4	2.5
69	Sometimes use third degree on witnesses to gain information	1.3	2.0
70	Careful to use no more force than necessary	7.9	2.6
71	Occasionally beat suspects to death trying to force confessions6	1.3
72	Ask suspects leading questions to gain information	8.6	2.6
73	Habitually treat suspected criminals civilly	7.2	2.9
74	Always respect constitutional rights of suspected criminals	9.1	3.5
75	Often conscienceless and brutal in performing duties8	1.5

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 752.

TABLE VIII

Vice

Identifying Number	Statement Phrasing	Index of Effec- tiveness	Index of Ambiguity
90	Make effort to keep prostitutes in segregated areas	8.7	3.1
91	Make practice of protecting bootleggers when they have influence.....	1.4	1.7
92	Confiscate and destroy illegal slot machines	8.9	2.4
93	Make practice of protecting prostitution when operators pay bribes.....	.9	1.6
94	Make effort to have prostitutes medically examined	8.9	3.2
95	Arrest prostitutes only when reformers rouse public opinion	2.0	2.4
96	Ignore the operation of illegal lotteries.....	2.3	2.3
97	Make effort to suppress betting on horse racing only when reformers protest.....	2.7	3.2

Taken from "A Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning" by Spencer D. Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1938), 753.

is considered to warrant harshness in something like rough proportion to the discredit in which the class of suspect happens to fall.⁹ Considerable ambiguity was also present in responses to these statements. Harsher treatment for ex-convicts, Negroes, aliens and radicals showed virtually a neutral response, and harsher treatment¹⁰ for "gangsters" won high approval.

Of Table VII, Parratt wrote:

No other classification of statements presents the confusion evidenced in this one. For example, statement 74 receives a high rating (9.1) as consideration that constitutional rights should always be respected. Statement 62, by contrast, should be rated at an opposite extreme. But this is not the case. This disregarding of constitutional rights in the interest of efficiency is considerably nearer the neutral point than the extreme of ineffectiveness or hindrance to effectiveness.¹¹

In other words, although respondents expressed a normative value of high support for constitutional rights, when the element of efficiency was added the response became ambiguous. The statements in this table covered a considerable range of police brutality, and the overall results were also ambiguous. Two statements -- "Use whatever degree of

9

Op. cit., p. 750.

10

See Table VI.

11

Op. cit., p. 751.

force found convenient" and "Careful to use no more force than necessary" -- received relatively high index scores, 6.2 and 7.9 respectively. Responses to these and other statements seem to indicate an attitude that brutal treatment of suspects and witnesses is necessary for effective police work, although it should be kept to as moderate a level as possible. This attitude is obviously inconsistent with the high scores given to the more positive statements: "Treat suspects civilly" (8.4) and "Always respect constitutional rights of suspected criminals" (9.1).

From all these data Parratt drew conclusions for the "expert police administrator:"

Manifestly, as evidenced by nature and scope of response by citizens to the general questions used in obtaining statements of opinions about police functioning, the citizenry have no understanding about how characteristics or practices it considers essentially related to effective policing can be made operative. Citizens' opinions about police are in terms they can understand. They consider effective policing involves conscientiousness, honesty, freedom from politics, military bearing, modern equipment and the various items indicated in the scale. While they have definite opinions on these matters, they indicate few suggestions as to how these can be accomplished.¹²

He found that the public wanted a police force that was disciplined, effective, well equipped and nonpolitical. In

devising the scale for use by police administrators, Parratt was hoping to ally them with citizen opinion in forming policies for their departments. He believed that an objective measure of police functioning would prevent partisan political interests from obscuring the nature of police policies. "There can be no mumbo-jumbo of the politician whenever more explicit devices can be utilized. The basic problem of police administration, from this perspective, is the facilitating of the long term self-interest of the administrator to alignment with the approved standards of citizen opinions." ¹³

In other words, the expertise of the administrator would be combined with an enlightened understanding of public opinion, an alliance that would effectively bypass the political process.

The attitudes expressed in the Parratt study were a good barometer of middle-class opinions toward police practices. The profile of policing that emerged from the statements coincided to a large extent with the traditional model of police professionalism. Policemen should treat the public with civility and respect; they should be neat and military in their appearance; they should have no

contaminating contacts with politics, should possess at least average intelligence, and should take a professional interest in their work.

Little concern was expressed for the rights of minority groups as such. The responses reflected a tolerance of harsher treatment for ex-convicts, Negroes, aliens, radicals and gangsters which conflicted with other responses claiming high regard for constitutional rights. "Due process" did not emerge as a positive value, despite occasional responses to the contrary.

Above all, there was almost no interest in citizen participation in police policy making as a value in itself. Respondents seemed to accept or even to favor the notion of an expert police department that would fight crime effectively and would be isolated from corrupting political influences. Indeed, this was Parratt's own view of the long-term solution to problems of policing in a democracy. Once the police administrator was equipped with an understanding of public opinion, such as this scale was designed to give, he could respond to these expectations by applying his expertise to internal police operations. The traditional political processes to which the administrator was by law beholden were seen as retarding police reform, not providing

a useful vehicle for it.

To conclude this discussion of Parratt's work, it is interesting to return to the ambiguity of response that he found concerning use of police force. Previous years had witnessed considerable publicity and outcry over the use of third degree and other illegitimate police tactics. The third degree itself received no endorsement from
14
Parratt's respondents, but other statements in Tables VI and VII showed either a high tolerance for "harsher
15
methods" or active support for them.

But these were methods primarily to be applied against minority groups. The disparity between these responses and those calling for the policeman to be civil and respectful to citizens was further illustration of the limitations of the reforms that these citizens were endorsing. As a group they had experienced increased contact with their local policemen through traffic enforcement and, a few years earlier, the use of police to enforce Prohibition laws. As a result they wanted the police to be more

14

It is mentioned by name only in statement 69, Table VII.

15

Parratt had done other work on public attitudes toward the third degree. See "Approval and Disapproval of Specific Third Degree Practices," by Herman C. Beyle and Spencer Parratt. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, XXVIII (1937).

CONTINUED

6 OF 7

public officials.

Several general conclusions emerged from the data. First was a high level of desired involvement in the policy making process that implied a limitation on the prerogatives of professional expertise. Desire for involvement was especially high in the areas of drug and alcohol abuse and riot/civil unrest. It was lower in traffic law enforcement and police personnel policies, although in all cases, more than 70% of the respondents wished to be involved before the stage of formal policy implementation.

Second was an increased sensitivity to the issue of police relations with minority groups. It would be surprising if this were not the case, considering the shifts in race relations since World War II. However, the study documented the high extent to which citizens were concerned about improving relations between the police and minority groups, and with the need for greater representation of minorities on police forces. Two separate questions were asked concerning
17
police priorities. One asked respondents to rate each of a list of 28 items as being of high, medium or low priority for the police. Within this context, "Police/minority group relations" rated third and "Increased minority recruitment"

rated seventh. The other question asked respondents to choose the three highest priorities from this same list of 28 items.

"Police/minority group relations" was chosen by more respondents than any other single item, and "Minority recruitment" appeared seventh.

A third conclusion was the surprising acceptance that respondents expressed toward the recognition of police worker rights, including the right to unionize. Fifty-eight percent favored collective bargaining with the city, and almost half favored affiliation of policemen with a national union. The question purposely excluded the right to strike, in an effort to prevent this single controversial factor from determining the outcome. A tolerance of police participation in partisan politics was also expressed by 44.5%.

Table 1 (following this page) shows the comparative involvement scores for the nine policy areas that were distinguished within the questionnaire. Parratt's data indicated that citizens wanted the police to be responsive to their wishes, but not necessarily to include the public in the routine policy making process. The present research was designed to determine in some detail the nature of involvement that citizens now wanted. We have already pointed out the desire for a generally high level of involvement that respondents indicated.

TABLE 1: Comparative Involvement Scores for All Policy Areas

	Informal Involvement	Formal Involvement	Knowledge of Policy	No Interest	Blank	TOTAL
Moving Traffic	29.2%	41.9%	6.9%	17.5%	4.5%	100%
Parking/Pedestrians	36.4%	38.8%	6.5%	14.8%	3.6%	100%
Active Patrol	37.8%	40.4%	8.4%	9.6%	3.8%	100%
Quiet Patrol	35.6%	39.5%	9.8%	8.6%	6.5%	100%
Weapons Policy	38.5%	39.5%	8.4%	8.1%	5.5%	100%
Personnel	35.4%	36.6%	10.5%	11.0%	6.5%	100%
Public Meetings	40.9%	39.7%	4.5%	6.0%	8.9%	100%
Riot/Civil Unrest	43.8%	35.9%	6.0%	4.8%	9.5%	100%
Drug/Alcohol Abuse	45.5%	35.9%	6.7%	5.7%	6.2%	100%

QUESTION: "Circle the stage at which you feel you should be involved in policy formation for this problem area."

Total Sample: 418.

The column labelled "Informal Involvement" is a good indicator of the variations among policy areas. By expressing the least interest in being involved in traffic policy formation, respondents implied that this was an area for the genuine exercise of police expertise. This conforms with other evidence that placed traffic enforcement in a distinct category when compared with all police functions. Drug/alcohol abuse occupied the opposite extreme, with a surprising 45.5% of respondents expressing interest in involvement during the informal or planning stages of policy making. This suggests that most citizens did not consider drug and alcohol problems to be a police concern in the sense that other law violations are.

Tables 2 through 11 display the attitudes of respondents toward a wide range of police practices. Alternatives covering the area of patrol are found in Tables 4 and 5, and indicate that respondents preferred a highly visible, nonmechanical form of patrol. Helicopter patrols were controversial for both day and night use.

Police use of lethal weapons (Table 6) emerged as a sensitive area of policy making. Little support was present for any tendency toward "disarming" the police, although most respondents favored a limiting criterion upon lethal

TABLE 2: Policy Preferences -- Moving Traffic

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Enforcement as source of city revenue	6.0%	39.7%	54.3%	100%	0.2%
Strict enforcement	48.1%	3.1%	48.8%	100%	22.5%
Warnings, not cita- tions, to locals	14.8%	13.6%	71.5%	100%	1.2%
Favor local residents	13.4%	15.6%	71.1%	100%	1.0%
Favor local business	8.1%	19.1%	72.7%	100%	0.0%
Enforce in relation to traffic flow	69.6%	1.4%	28.9%	100%	32.3%

QUESTION: "What kind of traffic policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 3a: Policy Preferences -- Parking

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Parking enforcement source of revenue	11.0%	35.9%	53.1%	100%	1.0%
Strict parking enforcement	50.7%	3.6%	45.7%	100%	29.7%
Parking: favor local residents	18.9%	12.4%	68.7%	100%	1.4%
Parking: favor business	17.2%	14.4%	68.4%	100%	0.2%
Parking: favor traffic flow	56.5%	2.4%	41.1%	100%	24.7%
Metermaids under PD, not revenue dept.	40.3%	6.1%	53.7%	100%	Not computed

QUESTION: "What kind of parking policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418, items 1-5; 231, item 6.

TABLE 3b: Policy Preferences -- Pedestrians

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Enforce ped. laws to limit undesirables	24.9%	13.9%	61.2%	100%	1.7%
Strict pedestrian enforcement	38.8%	3.3%	57.9%	100%	18.5%
Ped. laws: favor pedestrians	39.0%	1.4%	59.6%	100%	6.5%
Ped. laws: favor traffic flow	42.6%	2.4%	55.0%	100%	10.3%
Ped. laws: favor shoppers	28.7%	4.1%	67.2%	100%	1.7%
Ped. laws: favor drivers	13.9%	7.4%	78.7%	100%	0.5%

QUESTION: "What kind of pedestrian policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 4: Policy Preferences -- Active Patrol (Daytime and Evening)

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Most experienced officers on duty	28.2%	1.0%	70.8%	100%	Not computed
No routine patrol; respond to calls	16.0%	6.7%	77.2%	100%	"
Highly visible police presence	68.2%	3.6%	28.2%	100%	"
"Invisible" police presence	16.7%	10.5%	72.7%	100%	"
Foot patrols	40.7%	2.2%	57.1%	100%	"
Helicopter patrols	25.6%	24.4%	50.0%	100%	"

QUESTION: "What kind of daytime and evening patrol do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 5: Policy Preferences -- Quiet Patrol (Nighttime)

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
No routine patrol; respond to calls	10.5%	10.3%	79.1%	100%	Not computed
Routine business area patrol	84.0%	0.0%	16.0%	100%	"
Routine residential area patrol	86.8%	0.2%	12.9%	100%	"
Most experienced officers on duty	34.4%	1.4%	64.1%	100%	"
Helicopter patrols	15.1%	23.0%	61.9%	100%	"
Foot patrols	22.5%	5.2%	72.3%	100%	"

QUESTION: "What kind of nighttime patrol do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 6: Policy Preferences -- Lethal Weapons

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Community acceptance	22.7%	12.0%	65.3%	100%	2.9%
Ensure arrest of felon	45.9%	6.5%	47.6%	100%	0.7%
Use on political agitators	7.2%	23.0%	69.8%	100%	0.0%
Use on known felons	35.9%	5.7%	58.3%	100%	0.0%
Use according to officer's judgment	48.6%	9.1%	42.3%	100%	11.0%
Defense of self or others	52.6%	2.6%	44.7%	100%	11.0%
Routine patrol unarmed	14.6%	17.9%	67.4%	100%	1.4%

QUESTION: "What kind of firearms policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

weapons use ("Defense of self or others" rated higher than "Use according to officer's judgment"). When the adversary was identified as a "felon," acceptance of lethal weapons use was high. The alternative "Community acceptance" received only moderate support, with enough respondents strongly opposed to make it a controversial item. Use of nonlethal weapons (Table 7) produced no controversial items. "Safety of all participants" was a clear consensus choice.

The support of respondents for minority recruitment is evident in two of the alternatives that appear in Table 8. "Minority member" and "Like those with whom he will deal" both received high levels of acceptance and low or moderate opposition. The two most popular alternatives in this question were "High moral character" and "More education," which are nonspecific, normative choices. The third most popular alternative was also the only controversial one: "Local resident." Local residency requirements did not enjoy the general support that minority recruitment did. One surprising finding was the reaction to "Military experience," which was opposed by more respondents than any other alternative.

Although the question on police worker rights elicited differences of opinion among respondents (Table 9),

TABLE 7: Policy Preferences -- Nonlethal Weapons

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL
Community acceptance	15.2%	12.6%	72.3%	100%
Scientific research on effectiveness	35.1%	1.7%	63.2%	100%
Safety of all participants	63.6%	0.9%	35.5%	100%
Safety of police officer	52.2%	0.9%	45.9%	100%
Ensure arrest of felon	50.6%	0.9%	48.5%	100%

QUESTION: "What kind of nonlethal weapons policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 231. The balance of the 418 respondents were asked to select only one item. When their responses are combined with corresponding responses made by the sample of 231, the following results were found: "Safety of all participants" was the highest preference for 36.8% of the total sample, and "Safety of police officer" was the next highest, with 10.0%. "Community acceptance" scored lowest, with 4.3%.

TABLE 8: Policy Preferences -- Recruitment

	Favor this alternative	Strongly oppose	Left blank	TOTAL	Favor <u>only</u> this alternative
Minority member	40.7%	2.9%	56.4%	100%	0.2%
Older, more mature	16.3%	3.3%	80.3%	100%	0.7%
Like those with whom he will deal	25.4%	7.2%	67.4%	100%	0.7%
High physical prowess	22.5%	4.5%	72.9%	100%	0.2%
Local resident	33.0%	10.5%	56.4%	100%	0.2%
Military experience	10.5%	11.5%	78.0%	100%	0.0%
More education	63.2%	0.7%	36.1%	100%	1.4%
High moral character	79.4%	0.2%	20.3%	100%	5.9%

QUESTION: "What kind of recruitment policy do you favor? (You may check more than one. If you are STRONGLY OPPOSED to any item, please write NO before it.)"

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 9: Policy Preferences -- Police Worker Rights

	YES	NO	Blank	TOTAL
Senior officers choose work shifts	43.8%	47.4%	8.9%	100%
Senior officers choose work assignments	27.8%	61.0%	11.2%	100%
Collective bargaining with city	58.1%	33.5%	8.4%	100%
Affiliate with national union	49.8%	38.0%	12.2%	100%
Affiliate with local labor council	42.6%	48.1%	9.3%	100%
Participate in partisan politics	44.5%	49.5%	5.9%	100%

These items were presented in a simple YES - NO format.

Total Sample: 418.

it revealed strong support for most aspects of police unionism. As mentioned before, the right to strike was explicitly excluded. There was somewhat greater support for affiliation with a national union than with a local labor council, probably from fear that police neutrality in local labor disputes would be jeopardized. The level of support for participation in partisan politics was also significant, considering the traditional distrust of police involvement in politics. Overall, this question reflected a significant evolution of citizen attitudes toward the worker rights of policemen, especially in view of the almost unanimous opposition that public and political leaders have maintained against police unionism.

Attitudes toward local responsibility for civil order were measured in the two-part question displayed in Table 11. An overwhelming majority of respondents favored local government as the routine maintainer of civil order, which suggests that the tradition of home rule in policing has not declined. In the specific matter of determining when a state of civil unrest or emergency exists, a sensitive issue at a time when political and racial protests were occurring, local judgment was also overwhelmingly endorsed. However, almost twice as many respondents favored leaving this

TABLE 10: Policy Preferences -- Public Meetings

	YES	NO	Blank	TOTAL
More restrictions on "time and place" rules	34.0%	49.8%	16.2%	100%
Organizers should bear cost of policing meeting	55.7%	35.2%	9.1%	100%

These items were presented in a simple YES - NO format.

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 11: Policy Preferences -- Civil Order

a) What level of government should be routinely responsible for maintaining civil order?

FEDERAL	<u>2.2%</u>
STATE	<u>4.5%</u>
REGION	<u>3.3%</u>
COUNTY	<u>4.5%</u>
LOCAL	<u>79.2%</u>
Blank	<u>6.2%</u>

TOTAL: 100.0%

b) Who should decide when a state of civil unrest or emergency exists?

STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT	<u>3.6%</u>
REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT	<u>7.0%</u>
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT	<u>50.4%</u>
STATE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	<u>3.8%</u>
LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	<u>28.3%</u>
Blank	<u>7.0%</u>

TOTAL: 100.0%

Total Sample: 418.

decision up to local law enforcement officials than to local political leadership. This reflects a greater trust in the neutrality of police leaders during times of crisis than in political leaders. Few respondents chose the alternative "State political leadership," which was where the decision actually rested under current law.

As described above, two methods were used to ascertain the ranking of police priorities (Table 12). Although the order varied between the two lists of priorities, the items appearing were almost identical. The second list may be considered a truer ranking than the first, because it was constructed from a competitive method of rating. Three separate high priority areas are easily discerned from these ratings: police relations with minorities; drug abuse; and violent crime, which is present in the item "Nighttime crime patrol" as well as "Violent crime."

A method of cluster analysis was applied to the data on priorities in order to condense the 28 items into
18
priority clusters. Seven clusters emerged (not listed here in order of intensity of priority): drug and alcohol abuse; community unrest, including items of racial and

18
Using a program based on Robert C. Tryon and Daniel E. Bailey's Cluster Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

TABLE 12a: Highest Priorities Facing the Police Today

	High Priority	Medium Priority	Low Priority	No Police Concern
1. Violent crime	332 (79.4%)	55 (13.2%)	10 (2.4%)	0 (0.0%)
2. Juvenile drug abuse	260 (62.2%)	78 (18.7%)	41 (9.8%)	16 (3.8%)
3. Police/minority group relations	256 (61.2%)	102 (24.4%)	34 (8.1%)	6 (1.4%)
4. Increased police training	247 (59.1%)	126 (30.1%)	15 (3.6%)	2 (0.5%)
5. Drug abuse	244 (58.4%)	94 (22.5%)	35 (8.4%)	21 (5.0%)
6. Nighttime crime patrol	241 (57.7%)	130 (31.1%)	23 (5.5%)	0 (0.0%)
7. Increased minority recruitment	182 (43.5%)	138 (33.0%)	64 (15.3%)	11 (2.6%)
8. Juvenile vandalism	173 (41.4%)	182 (43.5%)	39 (9.3%)	1 (0.2%)
9. Civil unrest	153 (36.6%)	114 (27.3%)	89 (21.3%)	29 (6.9%)
10. Firearms regulation and control	152 (36.4%)	135 (32.3%)	86 (20.6%)	19 (4.5%)

Obtained from a cumulative, noncompetitive rating of 28 separate police problems.

Total Sample: 418.

TABLE 12b: Highest Priorities Facing the Police Today

1. Police/minority group relations: -----	177 (42.3%)	chose this as one of the three highest priorities.
2. Juvenile drug abuse: -----	145 (34.7%)	
3. Drug abuse: -----	140 (33.5%)	
4. Violent crime: -----	113 (27.0%)	
5. Nighttime patrol: -----	111 (26.6%)	
6. Increased police training: -----	82 (19.6%)	
7. Juvenile vandalism: -----	69 (16.5%)	
8. Minority recruitment: -----	67 (16.0%)	
9. Coordination of police and court operations: ---	62 (14.8%)	
10. Civil unrest: -----	45 (10.8%)	

Obtained by asking respondents to choose the three highest priorities from a list of 28 separate police problems.

Total Sample: 418.

political unrest; general safety, including patrol and miscellaneous police functions; minority group relations; small business crime; nuisance control (mufflers, animals, etc.); and vice control. Of equal interest to these groupings were the two exceptions: traffic policies did not share commonality with the pattern of groupings; and violent crime appeared as a constant factor of concern.

These seven priority clusters are all problems for which the police role is to find some balance between conflicting values, or to regulate activities at some acceptable level, rather than to work for total suppression. Traffic and violent crime were excluded from this generalization, traffic being seen as a detached or noncommunity service, and violent crime a truly "alien" or outcaste activity.

The data from this study provide several important contrasts with the Parratt study and, by extension, with the traditional model of police professionalism. Definite limitations were favored on the use of technology, primarily in the mobility of patrol. Local levels of control were endorsed, and significant, although not majority, support of local residency requirements for policemen was expressed. The high approval of minority recruitment conflicted directly with the professional stance that the "best man" should be

hired, regardless of identification with particular community subgroups.

The approval of police union activities, beyond signaling the reversal of years of public opposition, confirmed the image of the police as a worker group having the same rights of organization and negotiation as other occupations.

Most of all, the data conflicted with Parratt's finding that citizens wanted police who would be sensitive to their needs but essentially apart from other aspects of community life. The conflict was expressed clearly in the desire by the 1971 respondents to be involved in the informal, planning stages of policy formation. This was especially true of policy areas that were controversial or rated as high priorities, such as drug abuse. Indeed, the only policy area that seemed compatible with traditional professionalism was traffic control, wherein respondents expressed a general consensus of opinion about policy alternatives, and a low desire for routine citizen involvement.

The current public opinion is thus not supportive of insularity in police policy making, which James Q. Wilson has described as the accepted procedure in contemporary policing:

In sum, the prevailing police style is not explicitly determined by community decisions, though a few of its elements may be shaped by these decisions. Put another way, the police are in all cases keenly sensitive to their political environment without in all cases being governed by it.... The policies described in this study -- handling petty offenses and traffic violations, treating juveniles -- are, with very few exceptions, determined by the police themselves without any deliberate or systematic intervention by political authorities.¹⁹

The "double standard" of police practices against varying groups that Parratt's respondents espoused was not present in the more recent study. The Alameda County respondents did not express a view of policing as affecting primarily themselves. They believed that the police should be responsive both to the law and to the interests of minority groups.

Conclusions

Current efforts for police reform adhere largely to the traditional professional ideology of police organization. Parratt's research indicated that the main features of this ideology -- detachment from politics, better police training, and increased technology -- were consistent with the expectations of a certain sector of public opinion in the 1930s. By

19

Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 230-1.

that time policing no longer operated on the periphery of the lives of most middle-class citizens: the growth of traffic regulation and the increased interdependence of urban life had made policing more visible. Citizens who would previously have been unconcerned with police actions began to form opinions about police conduct and effectiveness. They wished their police to conform more closely with middle-class standards of education and appearance, and they reacted strongly against municipal corruption by endorsing an almost complete separation of police from politics.

The later survey indicated a different spectrum of concerns. Although citizens continued to expect a certain standard of technological competence and quality of personnel, they expressed an overall desire for the police to be more representative of the various communities they served. Citizen participation in policy making was viewed as a positive goal, and the data indicated a sympathy with the worker rights of policemen.

These contrasts suggest that many of the motivating factors behind the development of professional policing have changed. Professionalism has brought a necessary raising of standards into municipal policing, and has served

as a vehicle for the introduction of much-needed technological and managerial reforms. But its inherent autonomy has interfered with its ability to change to meet new citizen expectations. It is clear that the public endorses a more aggressive program of minority recruitment than most police departments now pursue. Citizen involvement at a routine level of policy making is also supported. Little evidence emerged from the later survey to support the claim of professional policemen that police operations should be determined and evaluated on a largely internal basis.

These shifts in concern are significant because they involve an occupation that has become increasingly insular, in response not only to its professional ideology but also to rising public pressures for effectiveness and greater representation. This insularity threatens to increase existing antagonism between the police and segments of the public, unless police leaders recognize the degree to which citizens would support their efforts for a more flexible approach to police policy making.

END