


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WASHINGTON STATE'S NEW JUVENILE CODE, III:  
PLANNING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HB 371--  
A SUMMARY RELATING TO STATUS OFFENDERS,  
JULY 1, 1977 - JULY 1, 1978

Submitted to:

National Institute for Juvenile Justice and  
Delinquency Prevention  
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency  
Prevention

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NEW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH  
SERVICES

The passage of HB 371 placed upon the Department of Social  
and Health Services (DSHS) a number of responsibilities for  
status offenders which had previously been the responsibility of the  
juvenile courts.

Status Offender: a youth who has committed acts which would  
not be considered crimes if committed by an adult (for example,  
a runaway, truant, user of alcohol, curfew breaker).

Under HB 371, status offenders were removed from the juris-  
diction of the juvenile court completely and certain responsi-  
bilities for services to this group fell to DSHS. In order to meet  
the legislative intent to keep the family unit intact if possible,  
DSHS is to provide:

1. 24 hour intake services (a phone line providing access to  
help at any hour of the day or night);
2. Crisis intervention services (up to 15 hours of counselling  
available on a voluntary basis to the youth and his/her family to  
resolve family conflicts which might result in disruption of the  
family unit);
3. Temporary non-secure residential placement if necessary.

In addition, DSHS was given new responsibilities for services  
to dependent children (children who have been abandoned by parent,  
guardian, or other custodian; who have no parent, guardian, cus-  
todian; who are abused or neglected; or who refuse to remain in  
any non-secure residential placement ordered by the court) and for  
recommending sentencing standards for serious juvenile offenders

and monitoring community diversion programs for middle and first-time offenders.

#### FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PLANNING YEAR

Passage of HB 371 generated a year of planning activity that one staff veteran said surpassed by far in amount and staff time anything he had seen in his 11 years with DSHS.

A number of factors made planning for implementation of HB 371 difficult.

1. Numbers of different people, groups and agencies, and jurisdictions involved

DSHS, a state agency, was assuming responsibilities that had been the responsibility of the juvenile courts, county entities which included juvenile court judges, juvenile court administrators, prosecutors, probation officers, intake workers. Law enforcement officers--some city police and some county police or sheriffs--were also involved. In addition, many agencies provided services to status offenders, not only DSHS but also youth service bureaus, mental health agencies, drug and alcohol counselling services, and other private non-profit agencies. It was essential that DSHS include all of these groups and individuals in the planning to clarify past procedures and to identify new responsibilities and procedures under the law.

2. Lack of a good data base on status offenders

Records on status offenders, such as they were, were maintained by juvenile courts under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court system of the 39 different counties.

There was no uniform method of identification of status offenders and no way of establishing the number of youths served. If the total number of status offenders recorded was 1000, for example, there was no way of telling if the court had dealt with one youth 1000 times, 1000 different youths, or 500 youths twice.

Under SB 3116, status offenders had been removed from state institutions and now under HB 371 they would no longer be served by juvenile court (for diagnosis, temporary detentions, etc.). No one knew how many status offenders would now enter the "system" (for example, would be picked up as runaways, would be referred as truants, would call in for help), would use the system (refuse to go or not be allowed to return home and therefore need a temporary bed), or would avail themselves of crisis intervention services. DSHS had to plan for provision of new services making assumptions based on very uncertain figures and information.

3. Internal problems within DSHS

- a. The 1977-78 planning year coincided with a number of internal changes within DSHS. The agency underwent 3 changes in top leadership, was being studied with an eye to reorganization, and relied on personnel in key leadership roles who either were holding those positions temporarily or were newly appointed.

A brief chronology follows:

June 1977: Douglas Vinzant leaves directorship of the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation to become superintendent of

Walla Walla prison.

August 1977: Deputy Secretary Milton Burdman (Acting Director before Dr. Harlan McNutt who is current Director of the Department) is fired.

August 1977: A citizens' panel, convened to recommend : changes in DSHS structure, recommended the department be "realigned."

April 1978: Governor Ray fires Dr. McNutt.

The Boeing Company is asked to form a management team to study DSHS. Gerald Thomas, who had been Deputy Secretary to Dr. McNutt, is named interim director.

June 1978: Management Team recommends "regionalization." Gerald Thompson, who had headed Management Team, is appointed head of DSHS.

- b. Considerable discussion and negotiation with the state employees union was caused over the issue of who was to provide the crisis intervention services--DSHS staff or community social service agencies through contract.

4. Close monitoring of 371 implementation by Legislative Committees

- a. The House Institutions Committee\* held regular meetings

\*The House Institutions Committee was placed in a difficult position in their oversight capacity. The House Committee, chiefly Chairman Ron Hanna and Mary Kay Becker, had worked on the juvenile offender portion of the bill. However, they were left with total oversight responsibility because neither of the 2 senators who had been the chief architects of the status offender portion were there. Senator Frank Woody had died in the fall of 1977 and Senator Pete Francis had resigned from the legislature in the fall of 1977. House members often felt ill-equipped to express and shape legislative intent relating to status offenders since that had not been the subject of their study.

all during the planning year overseeing the implementation planning. Certain deadlines that the regional administrators had to meet were imposed by the need of the Olympia office for information with which to testify and keep legislators abreast of the developing plans.

- b. The Legislative Budget Committee, an oversight committee composed of equal numbers Representatives and Senators, Republicans and Democrats, became interested in the issue of DSHS provision of crisis intervention services vs. contracting with private agencies for these services. LBC staff did a study of the issue and in June 1978 the Committee passed a resolution which supported contracting with private agencies for crisis intervention services to the maximum extent feasible. The effect of this resolution was to put a freeze, at least temporarily, on DSHS hiring of new staff.

5. Lack of Funds

The legislature passed HB 371 in June 1977 and purposely set the effective date forward to July 1, 1978, both to give DSHS planning time and to provide the time to develop realistic costs and a budget which could then be added as a supplement to the biennial budget in 1978 during the expected 1978 special session. (The only item in the bill that was funded in 1977 was the diversion program.)

The first request to the regional offices of DSHS (due November 15, 1977) was for an "economic impact statement" that could be turned into a budget request. However, there

was no special session called in 1978 and therefore no supplemental budget request. DSHS planners then had the added burden of trying to scare up money from other sources, borrowing (or robbing) from other programs and reworking a grant request that had been made of LEAA. The grant from LEAA had originally (January 1978) been sought for an assessment of the legislation first and some crisis intervention services second. By spring of 1978 it was increasingly clear that this was the money with which Washington State was going to implement the bill. However, receiving the grant was by no means assured and considerable lobbying, negotiation, and reworking of the grant was required with the federal agency.

#### THE REGIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

During the planning year there were two major responses required of each of the six regional office of DSHS as they worked toward implementation of HB 371. The first set of planning instructions was prepared by the Olympia office and sent to the six regions on October 4. Response was due on November 15, 1977.

The regional instructions were as follows:

1. Planning participants are to include regional and ESSO (Economic and Social Services Office: each of the 6 regions included a number of ESSO offices in towns and cities within the region) staff, juvenile courts, police, county mental health and mental retardation coordinators, Title XX planning committee representative, and other private and public agency representatives. One regional staff person

to be designated to coordinate.

2. By 11-15-77 submit to the Office of Children and Adult Services of the Bureau of Social Services (BSS) of DSHS information on: current number and characteristics of status offenders and services being provide them as well as anticipated number, type and services required.
3. By 11-15-77 submit plans for program expansion and development. Goals and objectives in the following areas:
  - a. Crisis intervention services.
  - b. Screening of new referrals
  - c. Procedures for working with juvenile probation departments and other agencies
  - d. Consultation services
  - e. Staff and foster-parent training requirements
  - f. Coordination of delinquency prevention services with ESSO services
  - g. Purchase of service
  - h. Application of Title XX program "Services to Children in their Own Homes"
  - i. Provision of special services to runaway youth
  - j. Provision of modified services to abused, neglected, and abandoned youth
  - k. Provision for confidentiality, accuracy, completeness, access to, sealing and destruction of records
  - l. Shelter care in lieu of detention

This represented a massive assignment to the regional offices which was to be completed in just over a month. The 11-15 deadline

was chosen because a commitment had been made to the House Institutions Committee that a plan for implementation of 371 would be in place by December 1, 1977. They (Olympia office) also needed this information to prepare a supplemental budget request for the expected special session of the legislature in early 1978.

All of the regions responded by November 15, reflecting various degrees of preparation and stress. All of the responses reflect the following:

1. Intent to add 371 responsibilities into existing programs
  - a. Methods of providing 24 hour intake/assessment based on the existing Child Protective Services hotline. Most regions needed to expand this service.
  - b. Plans to "rearrange" current staff: e.g., child welfare service workers would become crisis intervention service staff and Delinquency Prevention staff who had formerly been working with juvenile courts and institutions would be reassigned.
  - c. Projected need for new staff based on expanding existing programs.
2. Emphasis on training needed for staff and foster care parents.
3. Methods of coordinating planning with various segments of the community.
4. Need for new non-secure shelter beds.
5. Lack of good information on which to base staffing projections.

The second major response required from each region was due on June 1, 1978. This was to be "the plan" to implement 371 locally. This followed uncounted numbers of meetings within the Olympia office of DSHS, meetings between the Olympia office and regional directors, a number of statewide meetings with all the "players" represented, and many meetings within each region.

By the time this second report was due, a number of important decisions had been made at the Olympia office which would shape the final plan and a number of important facts were still not known.

#### IMPORTANT DECISIONS WHICH SHAPED FINAL PLAN

1. DSHS would provide Level I (intake up to one hour of service) and Level III (counselling up to 4 hours) crisis intervention services rather than contract with private agencies for them.
  - a. To control numbers of status offenders entering the system.<sup>1</sup>
  - b. To control costs thereby.
  - c. To ensure DSHS screens those cases which have potential for out-of-home placement for which DSHS has responsibility for court reports and testimony.
  - d. To ensure child abuse and neglect cases are identified and investigated.
  - e. To avoid duplication of presently existing Child Protective Service 24-hour intake system.
  - f. To ensure equitable distribution of service delivery responsibility between private and public sectors.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In testimony before the Legislative Budget Committee on June 16, 1978, Darby Brown, Acting Assistant Chief of the Office of Family, Children, and Adult Services elaborated on this point: to ensure only those cases previously referred to juvenile courts would be served and to ensure they not fund services which are presently maintained by other community agencies.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. "In discussing this issue with the Washington Federation of State Employees, we believe that they will accept a position which involves some contracting with the private sector; however, we do not believe that they will accept a position which involves purchase of the intake-assessment."



2. Level III services (more intensive counselling up to 15 hours) could be contracted out to private agencies if appropriate.
- 3.. Definition of runaways as those youths who had been reported by parents, referred by the court or police, or self-referred.
4. Definition of target of crisis intervention services as services to those youths and their families who are in conflict: i.e., where placement of child outside of home has occurred or is expected to occur within 30 days.

#### IMPORTANT FACTS STILL NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME

1. Amount of money that would be available to implement the plan. Negotiations were still going on with LEAA. (Grant would not be received until September.)
2. Private agencies with which the regional office could contract. The process DSHS had established to accept, review, and approve agencies' proposals was not yet completed.
3. Good information still did not exist on numbers of status offenders the plan would be serving--how many beds would be needed for temporary shelter and how many clients would require crisis intervention services.

The information on which DSHS was relying for their planning was based on juvenile court records in 1976 which showed the following figures for status offenders:

Runaways	45%	9,000 youth
Ungovernable (in conflict with family)	25%	5,400 "
Other non-criminal offenses	16%	3,200 "
Truancy	7%	1,400 "
Unable to adjust in school	3%	600 "
Other school problems	2%	400 "
		20,000 youth

They further estimated the need of each level of crisis intervention service:

Level I	20,000
Level II	10,300 (51% of Level I)
Level III	7,200 (72 % of Level II)

In 1976 there were approximately 10,000 status offenders placed in juvenile detention facilities in Washington State. DSHS estimated that approximately two-thirds of this population or 6,700 could remain in their own homes through the availability of crisis intervention services. The remaining 3,300 youth must be provided non-secure temporary shelter care in lieu of detention. Based on the use of existing shelter care services, DSHS estimated that the following increase in shelter care services would be required:

Foster family beds	100
Group care beds	60
Total youth served	3,300

[Source: June 5, 1978 Concept proposal to LEAA]

Each regional administrator was sent a check list by the Olympia office to structure the numbers of staff needed, numbers of beds needed, etc. as well as the numbers already in existence. Additionally, the form required a narrative description of various elements of the plan.

#### SUMMARY OF REGIONAL RESPONSES REGARDING 371 IMPLEMENTATION

Overall the regional plans reflect:

1. Absorption of 371 responsibilities into current practices

- a. 24-hour intake was tied into existing Child Protective Service hotline. After-work hours and weekend coverage was developed if it had not previously existed. A number of different arrangements were made to cover after-hours (sheriff's number, private answering service, existing crisis lines). Where numbers of clients were insufficient to require full-time after-hours staffing (as occurs in Region IV, King County), caseworkers agreed to assume a rotating 24-hour on-call responsibility by use of a pager system (a beeper which the caseworker wore and which would be activated by the person taking the hotline call).
- b. Crisis intervention services: in most cases, caseworkers who had been doing child welfare service work or child protective service work now expanded their duties to include crisis intervention. Concern was expressed that, in the absence of needed funding for additional staff, existing programs would be "strained" (robbed) to absorb the new caseloads. (Regions had received minimal allocations of funds for 371 at this point.)
- c. Shelter care/foster homes: the need for additional temporary non-secure beds was met as well as possible through their existing methods of procuring foster homes or contracting for emergency beds with group homes. The regions were allotted some additional funds to provide stipends to those families who would agree to take youths on a 24-hour basis.

2. Need for additional staff

- a. To do intake/assessment and provide crisis intervention services.
- b. To find additional temporary non-secure beds.
- c. To cover areas within the region not formerly served directly (for example, Island County).

3. Community Coordination

The history of 371 is marked by the necessity and often the willingness of many different agencies concerned with youth services to work together. Frequently, regional planning committees were established to plan for 371 implementation which included representatives from the juvenile court, DSHS, schools, law enforcement personnel, mental health workers, and in some cases other representatives of private non-profit agencies. The effect was to encourage people to work together who had not always done so in the past.

4. The difficulty of locating temporary non-secure shelter

Almost every region had trouble finding enough group homes or foster homes to provide emergency non-secure beds for runaways who couldn't or wouldn't go home. They used their existing foster home advertising schemes to try to get additional families to agree to take a child day or night, 7 days a week. An additional stipend was added to the amount DSHS traditionally paid for foster care in order to entice families into this kind of service. There was general recognition that foster families "burn out" and various strategies were proposed to counter this problem. DSHS



frequently worked with churches in the community to solicit foster family volunteers from among the parishioners.

Identification of bed space in group homes was very difficult. If such a home existed in the community at all, the group homes were often reluctant to contract with DSHS for this emergency bed space because they served particular kinds of youths in an ongoing residential program and didn't want emergency crisis placements of youths who would disrupt their ongoing programs; or they were already full; or in some cases they felt the pay was too low. In some communities where no group home existed, or one existed which served only girls or only boys, DSHS regional personnel were involved in trying to bring one into existence.

The rationale for numbers of beds perceived to be needed was based on the numbers of status offenders who had previously been placed in detention. The clearly expressed intent of 371 was to maintain the family unit and keep these youths in the home unless it was impossible. In addition, the opinion was frequently expressed that the resolution of the crisis was much more difficult if the family and youth had been separated. The hard work at the regional level to locate additional beds represents both a potential conflict with the philosophy of the law and an honest lack of information about what their needs would be.

5. The goals of equity and immediacy of help would be unevenly met

371 intended to provide for equitable treatment of status

offenders around the state and immediate crisis intervention to resolve family conflicts and keep the family intact. A number of factors worked against these intents as a plan was actually put into place in the various regions.

a. Geography: a number of the regions cover huge geographical territories. In many cases, the ESSO's had to arrange for toll-free hotlines because callers (and caseworkers alike) would be calling long distance for help. One can assume that a runaway in crisis, picked up miles from the nearest ESSO and relying on the local sheriff to call the answering service which would then contact the caseworker on call who would then call the youth or the sheriff back to assess the situation, would receive crisis intervention services of lower quality and less immediately than would the King County youth who can be delivered immediately to a central intake location where caseworkers work night shifts.

b. The training and experience of the staff providing the service.

c. The actual agreements and procedures followed by law enforcement personnel, DSHS workers, court personnel. For example, in some areas, the local law enforcement officer who picks up a runaway may deliver the youth to a non-secure placement if the youth refuses to return home or his/her parents refuse to allow him home. DSHS is then notified first thing in the morning. In other regions, DSHS must authorize placement of the youth before the youth

can spend the night in an alternative residential placement.

6. There would be considerable discretion in the intake system

One of the intents of 371 was to provide a uniform method of dealing with status offenders. The pre-371 system had been marked by the amount of discretion the person dealing with the youth had. The intake worker at juvenile court, the probation officer, etc. all had a variety of techniques and placements available to them and they decided which would best serve the needs of the particular youth. Passage of 371 removed status offenders from the juvenile court system entirely, but provided for services which were to be available statewide to runaways and families in conflict on a voluntary basis. Once the youth comes into contact with the system by turning for help to the police or DSHS himself, by parent reporting, or by the police deciding that the youth is in immediate danger, what actually happens at the first intake call could be decisive in determining the success of the crisis intervention.

During working hours, when the DSHS offices are open, all calls are handled immediately by a Child Protective Service worker or another caseworker who has training in handling crisis calls of this type.<sup>1</sup> After work hours and on weekends,

<sup>1</sup>A potential philosophical conflict exists between the intent of the legislation to provide services focused on family needs versus provision of those services by caseworkers whose focus has been on the needs of the child. (A DSHS official describes the pre-371 system as "placement oriented.")

this 24 hour coverage is handled in a number of very different ways, depending on the community. (According to a DSHS administrator, most runaways run at night or require night-time services.) The following represent some of the ways after-hours coverage is provided:

- a. Crisis calls received by local police, town marshalls, sheriffs who are to call Mobil-Communication, a commercial service, which will activate the pager which DSHS standby worker carries.
- b. Commercial answering service receives call, pages DSHS worker on call.
- c. Commercial answering service receives call, calls either CPS worker or Crisis Intervention worker depending on the nature of the call. Both of these workers are on call and discretion apparently rests with answering service to decide which to call.
- d. DSHS run and staffed 24 hour crisis line.
- e. Private, non-profit 24 hour crisis line which then refers to DSHS.
- f. Answering service calls DSHS on-call supervisor who will use a list of caseworkers who are available if immediate action is needed.

It is hard to imagine how this system would work without discretion on the part of the person answering the phone. In rural areas, where calls are infrequent, it certainly would not be cost-effective to pay a trained social worker for day and night intake services when the calls might be very few. The quality of service, however, will be greatly affected by the variety of intake procedures.

7. The impact of DSHS's decision to provide Levels I & II (original intake and assessment/intervention up to a total of 4 hours of service) themselves<sup>1</sup>

In most areas of the state the caseworkers who work in the local ESSO's have agreed to rotate on 24-hour duty to cover the need for round-the-clock crisis intervention services. One will be first to be called, with a second for back-up. This extra duty generally will last for a week at a time. The burden that will be potentially placed on the DSHS staff seems considerable.

8. Contracting out with private agencies for provision of services

A number of problems existed at the local level relating to contracting with private agencies for some crisis intervention services.

- a. At the time the local offices were submitting their implementation plans, decisions about which agencies were approved for contracting with by the regional office had not been made in Olympia.
- b. In some communities, DSHS might have preferred to contract out for some services, but no private agency proposal had been received.
- c. A number of local offices had discussed referral of youths with private agencies, but there was no mention of reimbursement for services which would result from the referral. This reflected DSHS's intent to assure that "the existing network of community agencies remains intact."<sup>2</sup> A translation

<sup>1</sup>In some communities, no requests to contract had been received. The local office by necessity had to plan to provide all services. Or in some areas, no private agencies existed or were readily available.

<sup>2</sup>Memo to regional administrators from Jim Anderson dated 4-25-78 (see #9).

of this phrase is that DSHS was anxious that present sources of funding for community agencies not be supplanted by state funds--or stated more bluntly, DSHS feared that private agencies would "recycle their whole caseload and get DSHS to pay."<sup>1</sup>

- d. In Region IV, the community advisory group which had been brought together to plan for implementation of crisis intervention services had recommended that all crisis intervention services be contracted out. In this case, the policy decision in Olympia directly conflicted with the local proposal.

9. Problems in developing Community Agreements

In a memo to regional administrators from Jim Anderson, Acting Director of the Bureau of Social Services dated 4-25-78, the following instructions were given:

The department's Regional and Community Services Offices (formerly called ESSO's) will complete and maintain written agreements with local courts, police, schools and other agencies. The purposes of these agreements are to clarify the mutual roles of all involved agencies, establish a common understanding of the target groups to be served by each agency, and prevent duplication of services as well as fill in gaps in service.

<sup>1</sup>Comment from high-level DSHS official who had considerable planning responsibility for 371 implementation.



The regional offices had a very difficult time with this assignment generally. A quote from a regional plan gives an indication as to the reasons.

This has been a giant task for ESSO's (also now called Community Services Offices: CSO's) with minimal guidance from the State Office as to what constitutes an "agreement." ...As the individual plans indicate ESSO's have not been able to complete all agreements with the dozens of organizations and agencies they deal with, but all necessary contacts have been made.

#### 10. Relationship with law enforcement personnel

Some specific difficulties surfaced because of the necessity for DSHS personnel to authorize temporary alternative placement for the runaways who had been picked up by the police and couldn't or wouldn't return home. How and where this authorization procedure was to take place was unclear.

Pasco ESSO: "We will ask the local law enforcement agencies to keep a child after hours, pending the arrival of a caseworker. If necessary, face-to-face interviews will be conducted in the Pasco office or the Richland out-station. Transportation of the client to either the interviewing point or placement point will be worked out on a case-by-case basis with the referral contact."

Yakima ESSO: "We have asked the local Yakima Police Department for space to keep a child after hours, but find

they are not able to tie up their officer's time waiting for the caseworker to arrive nor are their reception/office staff able to provide the observation necessary. However, the law enforcement agencies have agreed to take children wherever we designate and are eager to establish written procedures."

Other ESSO's planned to handle this on the telephone and some seemed to allow the police to place the runaway for the night and call them in the morning.

#### 11. Truancy Services

Services to truants is a low priority. Regional memos to school districts are very specific that all school resources are to be used first, that truancy cases are not considered to be crisis cases unless truants meet criteria for families-in-conflict, that DSHS will only give 3 counselling sessions to truants which the student or parent must request, and that school personnel are expected to stay involved.

#### SUMMARY OF THE PLANNING YEAR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE OLYMPIA OFFICE, DSHS

An interview with a DSHS official who had a great deal of responsibility for developing the implementation plan provides an interesting summary.

1. Lack of funds was a major factor. The effect was to cause DSHS to define the population to be served in an exclusive manner.

- a. Status offenders were defined as runaways or youth in conflict with their families (youth who had been placed out-of-home or where such placement was imminent).
  - b. Only those kids who had previously been served by juvenile court would be served.
  - c. Runaways and families in conflict would be served only if referred by self, parent, police, or court.
2. DSHS must be in control of the intake/assessment process to be sure the program didn't exceed budget capacity, especially since they were working only with a "paper budget" and not with an actual appropriation.
  3. Legislative monitoring was intense, and from the DSHS point of view, slowed down the planning process as legislators began to question the specifics of the plan more and more, especially related to the issue of contracting out for services.
  4. 371 program requirements did not represent new services. From his perspective, DSHS had been providing these kinds of services for years. They just needed to build on existing programs.
  5. The "revolving door" syndrome could become a problem with status offenders now because of the voluntary nature of services and the fact they don't provide outreach services (for example, street level open door drop-in centers). DSHS must wait for runaways or their families to avail themselves of services.
  6. The planning process was generally a good one. If it had to

- to be done again, some people should be included in the planning process who had actual experience working at the program delivery level.
7. Statewide there will be a problem to turn a placement-oriented system into one focusing on keeping the family intact.
  8. Contracting out of crisis intervention services to private agencies would have caused loss of control over intake. In his opinion, it also is conceptually and programmatically not feasible. The bulk of the intake action is at night when private agencies are not open. Also, once a youth or family member makes contact within the system, they won't accept a referral to another agency.
  9. The 3 levels of crisis intervention services was, among other things, a budgeting device. Level III was included to appease those who felt strongly about contracting out.
  10. Working out the issue of DSHS provision of services vs. contracting out was difficult with the state employees union. The compromise was reasonable.
  11. Community involvement in the planning was unprecedented. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provided money to bring in consultants from all over the country. The Washington Council of Crime and Delinquency and the Homebuilder Project (Tacoma) provided consultants also.

**END**