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CRIME CONTROL PLANNING BOARD

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RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT REPORT

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by

Marcy Rasmussen
William Muggli
C. Michael Crabill

with the assistance of

Barbara E. Davis

EVALUATION

of the

MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION DEMONSTRATION

ACKNOWLDGMENTS

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PREFACE

When the Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention demonstration began, the state planning agency was called the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control (GCCP&C) or the Governor's Crime Commission. In August, 1977, the agency became the Crime Control Planning Board (CCPB). In this report the agency is called the GCCP&C if the reference is before August, 1977, and the CCPB if the reference is after July, 1977. The evaluation team are members of the CCPB Evaluation Unit.

One unit within this agency was named the Community Crime Prevention (CCP) unit. The staff of this unit performed an analysis of Minneapolis crime prior to this project. Once that analysis was completed the staff utilized its findings in planning this demonstration project. Throughout the project year these people provided technical assistance to the Minneapolis CCP project in a number of ways. In July, 1978, the CCP unit became a private nonprofit agency called the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center (MCPC). The MCPC has continued to assist the Minneapolis CCP project as its second year proceeds.

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Traditional efforts to combat crime generally have focused upon the offender. In response to cries of dissatisfaction, law enforcement agencies have expanded their manpower and have developed new enforcement strategies. The goal of these strategies has been to reduce crime by increasing the risk of apprehension. Attempts also have been made to increase the efficiency of the courts in order to ensure the swiftness of punishment. Correctional philosophies have been altered, as well, to emphasize rehabilitation of inmates. Though these modifications have been innovative, they are plagued with a disadvantage even before they have begun. They are reactive crime control methods. A crime must be committed for them to come into play. It is difficult to control crime if it must be allowed to occur before taking action.

Community Crime Prevention (CCP), on the other hand, attempts to be preventive rather than reactive. It assumes that a criminal act requires a combination of criminal motivation and opportunity. The presence of opportunity may frequently precipitate crime. Thus, the purpose of CCP is to reduce crime by minimizing criminal opportunity. CCP, then, shifts the focus of crime control efforts from the criminal to the environment in which a criminal act occurs. By reducing the number of opportunities available, the offender may be forced to take greater risks, whereas traditional crime control efforts leave the initiative to the offender for

determining where and when crimes will occur.

Crime prevention is directed toward crimes such as burglary, where opportunity appears to be important. It is generally restricted to stranger-to-stranger crimes. Not only are these types of crimes more often a function of opportunity, they also appear to evoke the greatest amount of public fear. Crimes between acquaintances, including many homicides and the sale of drugs, are not as amenable to this approach. While not denying the importance of these crimes, CCP merely admits its limitations and restricts itself to opportunistic stranger-to-stranger crimes. The crimes focused upon in this project have been: residential burglary, commercial burglary, street robbery, commercial robbery, assault, criminal sexual conduct, and vandalism.

Since CCP operates to reduce opportunity for crime, it possibly may provide a less costly means of reducing crime than other approaches. The costs of crime go beyond the losses suffered by victims or residents' fear of victimization. Other costs of crime include climbing insurance rates and rising police costs which must be borne by the entire community. Crime imposes substantial indirect costs as well. These costs stem from changes in the attitudes and behavior of residents. Even though they may never have been victims of crime, residents carry the psychological scars that a community crime problem can cause. The changes, which fear of crime can induce, can range from curtailing evening activities and avoiding specific areas to, in some cases, moving out of the neighborhood. Besides the social loss of decreased involvement in the community, an economic problem may develop from the subsequent loss of revenue by area businesses. Thus, limiting criminal opportunity by reshaping the social environment is part of the CCP goal.

Another important area of concentration is reshaping the physical environment of a neighborhood. In fact, Oscar Newman, an architect, was instrumental in developing the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).[1] Newman headed a team of architects and social scientists that studied how the physical design of residential complexes affected the frequency of crime. The study indicates that appropriate building design and site planning can create what Newman calls "defensible space" thereby encouraging protective attitudes and practices on the part of residents. However, the CCP concept had been in existence for quite some time prior to CPTED. As early as 1930 the New York State Crime Commission did a study entitled *Crime and the Community: A Study of Trends in Crime Prevention by the Sub-Commission on Causes and Effects of Crime*.[2] In 1937, a study stated: "Prevention is thus another step--really the initial step--in the crime control process. A prevention program cannot eliminate all law-breaking: but it can probably do more to reduce crime than all of deterrent measures, protective devices, and enforcement agencies put together."[3] It was not until Newman's work for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) that CCP began developing into the comprehensive concept it is now. In addition to physical design, CCP incorporates a variety of anticrime resources: police, community groups, and home security strategies. CCP seeks to

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[1] U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space* by Oscar Newman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).

[2] New York State Crime Commission, *Crime and the Community: A Study of Trends in Crime Prevention by the Sub-Commission on Causes and Effects of Crime* (Albany, New York: Q. B. Lyon Co., 1930).

[3] Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Crime Control by the National Government* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Government Research of the Brookings Institution, 1937), pp. 16-17.

combine these resources in such a way as to create an environment which is least supportive of criminal activity.

It should not be presumed that CCP can replace crime control techniques already in use. However, for certain crimes, CCP does appear to offer several advantages not common to most existing strategies. First, it seeks to prevent crimes from occurring rather than to respond once they have been perpetrated. Because of this attribute it may cost less than other approaches to reducing crime. Second, it shifts the initiative away from the offender. Traditional crime control strategies allow the offender to initiate where and when crimes will occur. CCP is one way of denying this freedom. Lacking this freedom, the offender may be forced to take greater risks. Third, CCP endeavors to facilitate informal social processes. In so doing, it can provide incidental benefits to the quality of life in addition to reducing crime and the fear associated with crime. For example, it is possible through physical design or redesign to encourage inhabitants to regain a proprietary interest in their environment and to foster productive neighborhood groups.

B. HISTORY OF MINNEAPOLIS DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

In late summer of 1975, the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control (GCCP&C) received funds from LEAA to develop a crime prevention plan for Minneapolis. The first part of this plan was to document the nature of the crime problem in Minneapolis.[1] The second was to implement crime prevention strategies in selected demonstration areas. By the summer of 1976, enough information had been gathered to

[1]Douglas W. Frisbie et al., *Crime in Minneapolis: Proposals for Prevention* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, May, 1977).

allow selection of three demonstration neighborhoods: Whittier, Lowry Hill East, and Hawthorne. One year prior to this selection, the Westinghouse National Issues Center chose the Williard-Homewood neighborhood in north Minneapolis as a national demonstration site for a residential crime prevention program. Westinghouse had received a planning grant awarded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), the research component of LEAA. It in turn subcontracted to Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc. Barton-Aschman was to help plan Westinghouse's crime prevention strategies in the Willard-Homewood neighborhood. Both projects (GCCP&C and Westinghouse) were scheduled to begin implementation of project strategies early in the summer of 1977 despite the different timetables for the planning phases.

Westinghouse and Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc., reported conducting 85 meetings with "city and state officials, community organizations, business and religious communities, and key residents to expand local input concerning issues on which to have Plan focus."[1] These meetings in Willard-Homewood took place within eight months of the project's inception (May, 1975).

The GCCP&C staff held numerous meetings in the Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne neighborhoods. These meetings involved neighborhood leaders, business people, police, and others working in or otherwise having an interest in the neighborhood, i.e., local elected officials, school principals, social workers, pastors of local churches, city planners, etc. There were more than 19 group meetings in Hawthorne involving about 104

[1]Howard M. Kaplan et al., *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design--Process Case Studies Report* (Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, March, 1977), p. 5-12.

people. In Lowry Hill East there were about 20 meetings involving approximately 170 people.

The group meetings were organized by the residents themselves and took place in informal settings within the neighborhood. These interviews/meetings focused on specific crime problems and circumstances that contribute to neighborhood crime problems. Strategies for solving the crime problems in the context of the specific neighborhood environment were discussed with ways in which strategies might be implemented within the neighborhood.

Between the summers of 1976 and 1977, the Dayton-Hudson Foundation awarded monies to Whittier Alliance, a strong neighborhood organization in Whittier, to undertake a major project of neighborhood revitalization. This project was to include crime prevention aspects, but also included housing, unemployment, and community service programs as well. Since the GCCP&C and Dayton-Hudson projects would have been a duplication of efforts and the latter's project had a larger scope, Whittier was dropped from the state agency's plans. An agreement was made, however, that the GCCP&C's Community Crime Prevention unit would collaborate with the architectural firm engaged to facilitate the Whittier planning. This assistance would lend consistency to the crime prevention programs throughout Minneapolis.

Further consistency was guaranteed when the decision was made to combine the Westinghouse project with that being conducted by the GCCP&C. In one grant application to LEAA, state funds were allocated for a demonstration of community crime prevention strategies in three different neighborhoods in Minneapolis: Willard-Homewood, Hawthorne, and Lowry

Hill East.

C. SUMMARY

Traditional crime control efforts focus upon the offender. They require that a crime be committed in order to begin deterrent action. Crime prevention attempts to reduce the opportunity of occurrence for certain crimes found amenable to this approach (i.e., stranger-to-stranger crimes). The CCP approach focuses upon the environment in which the criminal act occurs. Although aspects of the physical environment were the beginning basis of this strategy, they are now only a part of the CCP program. The goal then is to limit criminal opportunity by reshaping both the social and physical environment.

The history of the planning and funding phases of this project has also been elaborated. Three neighborhoods in Minneapolis were chosen to stand as demonstration sites for a comprehensive crime prevention program. The Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne neighborhoods were selected from north Minneapolis and Lowry Hill East was chosen from south Minneapolis. The planning and implementation grants were funded by LEAA.

II. EVALUATION STRATEGY

A. GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The major goals of the Community Crime Prevention project were: 1) to reduce crime, and 2) to reduce the fear of crime.[1] The overall format of this evaluation was to examine the project's operation from the standpoint of process and impact. This approach was taken so as to follow the natural development of the project (*process*) while specifically examining the outward results upon the community (*impact*). Most frequently, one sees evaluation studies devote their attention entirely to the examination of impact. The significance of that approach is evident in its singular concern for results. On the other hand, the importance of a process evaluation lies in its ability to monitor closely the actions which are initiated by the project staff. This evaluation posture provided the opportunity for investigation of the structure and function of the various project components as they relate to the attainment of goals.

The strategy of closely monitoring process and impact was chosen because the project involved a basic innovation in delivering crime prevention ideas and, further, it existed within the political context. Innovations, by definition, break new ground, undertake new methods, and

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[1] A conceptual distinction has been made between "fear" and "concern" by researchers measuring crime-related perceptions. "Fear is the perception of one's risk of victimization, while concern is the extent crime is regarded as a social problem." See Paul J. Lavrakas, Terry Baumer, and Wes Skogan, "Measuring Citizens' Concern for Crime," *Bellringer* 8 (September, 1978), p. 8.

sometimes commit rather unique errors. Therefore, a process orientation brings sensitivity to the evaluation activities by closely examining the ongoing activities of the new program. The implication of the political context for the evaluation methodology are, as Weiss notes, threefold.[1] *First*, this project operated under the aegis of municipal government. Within this framework it would be subject to internal and external pressures which could arise out of the political arena. As a natural function of governmental decision-making, one seeks to influence and is in turn influenced by a variety of sources. The impact of those pressures was a legitimate topic for inquiry as it was related to the manner in which the program functioned. *Second*, because the evaluation was undertaken to provide insight into future decision-making, the results of this investigation become a part of the political sphere. The empirical findings of the evaluation must compete with political considerations and decisions regarding continuation, expansion, adoption, or cessation of the same or similar programs. An evaluation based upon process and impact can more effectively anticipate concerns and present results in such a way as to minimize adverse political impact upon acceptance of the research findings. *Third*, the evaluation, by its very nature, makes implicit political statements about such issues as the legitimacy of overall program goals and strategies. Realizing that, it is imperative that such statements be based upon a thorough understanding of the situation. Such thoroughness can only be accomplished through an in-depth analysis of process *and* impact.

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[1] Carol H. Weiss, "Evaluation Research in the Political Context," in Elmer L. Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds.), *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, Volume 1 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 13-26.

Given these major concerns, the evaluation strategy chosen presents an opportunity to integrate and relate activities to outcomes. Further, this strategy provides the occasion to determine the antecedents of those impacts which may not be directly stated or implied by project goals. These unanticipated consequences are usually one of the most perplexing problems that evaluators must face if they have not been able to monitor the process of implementation.

The process-oriented component of this evaluation was completed following an "illuminative" evaluation methodology.[1] It is a research approach which uses careful observation and extensive inquiry to determine how the project's structure and functions produced certain results. Use of this technique requires that field observers pay particular attention to the metamorphosis of the project. It relates the procedure of change to the resultant events rather than examining events as discrete outcomes.

To summarize:

> "Illuminative evaluation is not a standard methodological package but a general research strategy. It aims to be both adaptable and eclectic. The choice of research tactics follows not from research doctrine, but from decisions in each case as to the best available techniques: the problem defines methods used, not vice versa. Equally, no method is used exclusively or in isolation; different techniques are combined to throw light on a common problem."[2]

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[1] Malcolm Parlett and David Hamilton, "Evaluation as Illumination: A New Approach to the Study of Innovatory Programs," in Gene Glass (ed.), *Evaluation Studies Review Annual, 1976* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 140-157.

[2] Ibid. For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical antecedents of illuminative evaluation see: Martin Trow, "Methodological Problems in the Evaluation of Innovation," in Francis Caro (ed.), *Readings in Evaluation Research* (New York, New York: Sage Publishing, 1971), pp. 81-94; Earnest R. House (ed.), *School Evaluation: The Politics and*

Illuminative evaluation is a research approach asking not simply "Does it work?" but more importantly "When such a program is introduced, what then happens?" It uses techniques from both traditional and non-traditional methodologies to examine the strategies used in project implementation. This evaluation must focus upon strategies used in the project implementation because a strategy is the only aspect of the project which could realistically be transferred to another site.

Another advantage that illuminative evaluation offers is a primary concern with description and interpretation rather than measurement and prediction. The focus is upon understanding the object under study and the environment in which is exists. Accomplishing this objective requires certain flexibility in the evaluation plan which allows for exploration of new phenomena as they emerge. Such flexibility eliminates rigid constraints upon evaluators which would prevent adapting the evaluation perspective to a set of changing circumstances.

These broad statements of methodological approach were specifically implemented in a variety of ways. To begin with, the project's operational plan and organizational structure were selected as the focal point. Specifically, individual strategies used in organizing neighborhoods, conducting meetings, providing materials, and operational administration were closely examined. As understanding was gained, particular elements were singled out for closer scrutiny. In this manner, a complete picture of the structure and function of the project was

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Process (Berkeley, California: McCutcheon Publishing, 1973); James Popham et al., *Instructional Objectives*, American Educational Research Association Monograph No. 3 (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1969); W. W. Charters, Jr., and J. E. Jones, "On the Risk of Appraising Non-Events in Program Evaluation," *Educational Researcher* 2, No. 11, 1973.

constructed, issues identified, and action plans undertaken. Much of the data pertinent to these areas was gathered from observation of meetings, interviews, and structured surveys across all levels of program participation. Detailed analyses of project records provided valuable insights into the particulars of implementation. The overall goal was to accumulate as much information as possible from all reasonable sources.. More detailed descriptions of specific data sources are contained in Section C of this chapter.

This general approach to process evaluation represents a perspective by which one can make reasonable and knowledgeable judgments concerning viability of the strategies used in this project. It provides a means of examining the potential for successfully implementing this program in a different location. Furthermore, it can highlight what particular sets of circumstances offer the greatest assistance or impediments to successful implementation.

Measuring project impact did not present as many conceptual difficulties as monitoring the process of implementation. Specific types of data and analyses were required by sound experimental design. The focus of the impact assessment exactly paralleled the two major goals of the project. Restating these goals as experimental questions, the evaluation team sought to discover: 1) whether crime was actually reduced and 2) whether fear of crime was reduced?

These questions were addressed using various techniques. First of all, for each demonstration neighborhood a statistically similar census tract was chosen to act as a comparison group with regard to criminal

activity.[1] Comparison census tracts were selected using a cluster analysis routine. Comparison census tracts could not be adjacent to the demonstration areas (see Figure II.1). In addition, a zone, one census tract deep, surrounding each of the demonstration areas was selected as a control for displacement phenomenon.[2] One danger of implementing and evaluating crime prevention or reduction programs is that total crime may not be *reduced*; rather, crime merely may be *displaced* or moved to an adjacent area where the program is not in operation. In each of the demonstration, comparison, and displacement areas, crime data were collected for the period prior to as well as during the project. By comparing these pre and during-project rates, changes in crime rates in the target area could be analyzed in relation to the comparison groups and the displacement area.

Successful community programs as a rule depend heavily upon people's attitudes toward the program and its intended results. This evaluation was fortunate in having available preproject data on residents' attitudes, opinions, and behavior relating to their particular neighborhood and its associated crime problems. This information served as a baseline for measuring change after operation of the CCP program.

A distinct advantage of the availability of these types of data was that they provided specific insight regarding residents' fear of concern about crime. Such data allowed for posttest comparisons regarding project impact upon resident fear levels. It also permitted pre and posttest

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[1] See Table V.1 in Section V.B, "Selection of Control Areas," for the list of variables.

[2] Thomas A. Reppetto, "Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon," *Crime and Delinquency* 22, April, 1976, pp. 166-177.

FIGURE II.1

MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION
DEMONSTRATION AND CONTROL SITES



comparisons between neighborhoods to test for differences in perception concerning crime and fear of crime.

Of particular interest to a number of readers would be the methods used in analyzing data. What follows is an extremely brief discussion of the general approach to analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the analysis plan, the interested reader is referred to the *Evaluation of the Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Demonstration*--Research Design.

B. ANALYSIS PLAN

For the purposes of the process evaluation, project activities have been grouped into two major categories: community organizing activities and crime-related activities. These organizational labels have been chosen in a somewhat arbitrary though not capricious manner. Though they may represent false dichotomies, these labels were selected to differentiate categorically between activities aimed at forming block clubs versus activities which develop from block clubs or represent more tradicitonal methods of crime prevention. Community organizing activities encompass results of those project activities directed toward increasing community involvement. The major thrust of the project, block club organizing, is examined under this heading. In addition, efforts to establish functional business associations are included. Crime-related activities refer to improving home security through knowledge and application, and fostering a cooperative attitude toward police within the neighborhoods. These latter activities can be directly or indirectly related to the incidence of crime. Project impact is more palpable than measuring process activities. Actual levels of recorded crime as well

as levels of fear and concern pertaining to crime can be measured with some certainty.

These two general areas, process and impact, are not suited equally to the same kind of measurement. The process is measured by charting progress toward goals selected by the neighborhood, supplemented by observation. The impact assessment uses both descriptive exhibits of recorded crime and statistical models. For instance, where the crime data are sufficient to determine the opportunity rate (incidence of crime per target, e.g., targets could be residential units, commercial units, or automobiles, etc.), an analysis of covariance was performed. For crimes where opportunity rates would not be ascertained, the difference of differences of proportions test was used. The analysis of survey data on fear of and concern about crime employed the use of descriptive statistics and the difference of proportions test. The statistical measures used in the evaluation are discussed in more detail in Chapter V, Section C.

Drawing an analytical distinction between process and impact outcomes should not obscure their integral nature. In practice, the factors identified as having an effect upon process or impact were part of a single whole. However, since the Community Crime Prevention program placed major emphasis on organizing the communities for crime prevention, the evaluation distinguished between process and impact elements. Of course, the purpose of the community organizing was to reduce the frequency of crime also, through the process activities.

Recognition of the nexus between process and impact outcomes provided more than an analytical advantage. This perspective also aided

in identifying obstacles which may have slowed progress toward neighborhood goals. If a community organizing strategy fails to produce specified goals, for instance, then appropriate adjustments could be instituted to improve performance. Continuously evaluating progress toward project goals should provide some assurance that the CCP program could adapt to the particular neighborhood context.

C. DATA SOURCES

A number of data sources were used in this evaluation of a community crime prevention demonstration. First, evaluation personnel collected *descriptive information* from logs kept by the neighborhood staffs. This information included data on staff activities, block club meeting notes, and Operation I.D. and premise security survey participants. Forms were provided to the neighborhood staffs so that all three areas had comparable data.

Second, extensive *survey data* were collected from residents living within each demonstration area. Three separate surveys were conducted during the course of this project. First, personal interviews of residents were administered for the first time in 1976 while the follow-up survey was executed in 1978. This survey tapped citizens' attitudes toward crime and their neighborhood, home security, police, victimization as well as demographic information. Second, a telephone survey was administered to those people who had participated in the premise security survey service conducted by the Minneapolis Police Department. Information collected included the types of recommendations implemented, cost estimates, and perceptions of security with the new changes. Third, block club members were randomly surveyed from each neighborhood to test

their perception of the crime prevention program. Some additional questions were asked of the block captains who were included in the sample.

Third, *crime data* were collected from Minneapolis police records for all of 1977 and January through May of 1978 (17 months) in the three demonstration neighborhoods and the control areas. Baseline crime data for these same areas were collected for fiscal year 1975 (July 1, 1974, through May 31, 1975) which was prior to the implementation of this project. This crime information was very extensive concerning the crime, persons involved (suspects, victims, and witnesses), type of property taken or damaged, or amount of injury sustained by victims plus actions and confrontations of the suspect and victim. Crime data being collected for the contiguous control areas (where displacement could occur) were much less extensive and included merely location of occurrence, type of crime, and the date of occurrence. Crime information for these areas was collected for fiscal year 1975, so comparisons were possible. In addition to these crime data on the demonstration, noncontiguous, and displacement control areas, citywide and nationwide crime rates were tabulated to check for trends in opportunistic crimes. The citywide rates were compiled from the Minneapolis Police Department records division and statistics for the United States crime rates were derived from the FBI, Uniform Crime Report, 1974-1977. All data instruments appear in Appendix A (to be issued under separate cover).

D. LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

The *descriptive information* from neighborhood office logs was limited because it often was not complete. Each project staff member was responsible for recording his/her own actions and the agenda of meetings

he/she conducted. Project staff, however, concentrated their energies on the actual activities rather than on recording them, and at times the logs were incomplete or in error. Evaluators attended many meetings throughout this project, and their meeting notes often served as the principal means of resolving some of these discrepancies. Unfortunately, verification of disagreements was not possible in all cases, but where differences have occurred, mention has been made of the particulars.

The *survey data* encompassed some constraints also. Toward the end of December in 1975, a victimization survey was administered in Willard-Homewood. It was a personal interview which used many open-ended questions to assay residents' perception of crime, home security, neighborhood familiarity, and level of victimization. The open-ended format allowed maximum utility since the survey was designed to be a planning aid rather than an evaluation tool. Six months later the survey was administered (with changes) to residents of Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. The changes in the survey dealt mostly with closing the open-ended format or changing response categories. Both surveys were readministered in the spring of 1978: the Citizen Survey with the open-ended format was readministered in Willard-Homewood while the Resident Survey was executed in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. This means that no comparisons can be made between neighborhoods on those questions where responses or wording are different. About 400 randomly selected residents were surveyed in 1976 and 1978.

These surveys called for prop cards that were to be shown to the respondents on several questions. Unfortunately, these props were not preserved after the initial administration of the survey, and no record

was kept of their appearance. There is no way of telling how different the props used in 1978 were from those designed in 1976. More importantly though, there is no way of knowing what difference this would make in responses to questions with props.

The 1976 administration of the Resident Survey followed the boundaries of census tract 22 for Hawthorne. Hawthorne's boundaries extend beyond census tract 22 into part of tract 23. Since rigorous intepretation of these data requires exact duplication, the 1978 survey maintained the same boundaries as those of 1976. By the date of the posttest survey (April, 1978), Hawthorne's major organizing had occurred in the area outside the survey boundaries. How this may have affected Hawthorne's data is unknown, but care should be exercised when interpreting these survey data.

A significant number of questions in the Citizen Survey and Resident Survey dealt with crime victimization. The findings from these questions must be interpreted with extreme caution because the sample size for such questions needs to be much larger than was possible in this survey. See Chapter V (Section D, Part 2) for further discussion of the sample size required for a victimization survey.

Crime data collected for this evaluation differ somewhat from baseline crime data collected in late fall of 1975. The collection instrument is slightly different between the two collection periods (see Appendix A). Furthermore, the method of collection was not well documented in 1975, but it is known that the baseline crime data were collected at the central police station while current data were collected at the precinct level. When data were gathered earlier, the entire city's offenses

were coded, thus it made the most sense to have the data clerks working at the one place where all crimes were recorded. Data for this evaluation could be collected more easily and quickly at the precinct level. Two interns collected comparable data on the three demonstration areas as well as their respective controls. Two additional interns collected crime information for the displacement areas, also at the precinct level.

The crime of auto theft was not included in the overall evaluation analyses. It was utilized, however, as one of the crime variables in the cluster analysis used to select comparable control tracts for the demonstration areas. Technical difficulties prevented the evaluators from obtaining a thorough listing of all motor vehicles within the desired neighborhoods. The smallest geographic listing of motor vehicles was by census tracts, not blocks.

In addition, the analysis of vandalism (or damage to property as it is now classified in Minneapolis) should be reviewed with caution. Because of the difference of classification within the Minneapolis reporting system, it appears that the 1978 data collection includes damage to cars as well as to buildings. In figuring the opportunity rates only the total number of buildings was included, not motor vehicles. This would constitute a constant error rate throughout the 1978 data base.

E. SUMMARY

This evaluation examined the project's operation from the standpoint of both monitoring process and assessing impact. The process component was completed following an "illuminative" evaluation methodology. The primary concern of this methodology was description and interpretation

rather than measurement and prediction. The focus of the impact assessment paralleled the two major goals of the project: 1) to reduce crime and 2) to reduce the fear of crime. A comparison tract was selected, and an area to measure the possibility of the displacement of crime was designated for each neighborhood. Pre and postlevel crime data and survey data were analyzed using various statistical tests and descriptive statistics.

Data types and sources were described and the limitations enumerated. For the most part, data for analyses came from criminal offense reports, project records, field interviews, and surveys of residents.

III. MINNEAPOLIS DEMONSTRATION

A. DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOODS

The Community Crime Prevention unit of the CCPB applied two primary criteria in selecting the particular neighborhoods. First, priority was given to areas where the level of crime was substantial. However, the neighborhoods that were chosen were not among the highest crime rate areas (i.e., upper 10 percent) in the city.[1] Second, the areas had to represent a variety of sociogeographic settings. Criteria for the second requirement employed land use characteristics such as population density, presence of a commercial strip, judgments concerning the homogeneity of the neighborhood as well as the level of community organization. A functioning community organization had to be present also. Willard-Homewood was selected somewhat differently and at an earlier date than Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East; nonetheless, the selection criteria were basically the same.[2] These selection criteria lack the rigor desired by the evaluators, but the neighborhoods were chosen more than a year before the evaluators came on board.

Although the selection criteria emphasize the similarities among

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[1] Census tracts with extreme crime rates (upper 10 percent) may regress toward the population mean when measured a second time. This movement toward a less extreme value could be misinterpreted as a treatment effect. This danger, called statistical regression, is a threat to internal validity.

[2] Howard M. Kaplan et al., *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design--Project Case Studies Report* (Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse Electice Corporation, March, 1977), pp. 1-9 and 5-1 through 5-5.

the neighborhoods, there are other areas where distinct differences exist. The following paragraphs summarize the demographic look of each neighborhood. The variables selected tend to highlight the major differences between Lowry Hill East, Hawthorne, and Willard-Homewood. The data used to describe these neighborhoods are from the 1970 U.S. Census. The chances are great that many of these statistics have changed, but these data convey the most complete listing of demographic characteristics available. Readers should be cautious in making assumptions derived from these data since the direction and degree of change cannot be anticipated.

The population of Willard-Homewood, within the boundaries set for this demonstration, is 10,647. Hawthorne consists of 4,539 residents, and Lowry Hill East has a population of 7,248. As has been mentioned previously, these neighborhoods all extend slightly beyond census tract borders. Most demographic data are not broken down beyond the census tract level to the block level. So, in order to describe the demographic characteristics of these three sites, only data on complete tracts were used. Thus, Table III.1 lists different population figures than those given above, but allows the reader the base from which percentages were figured. This table, then, provides a concise display of different demographic characteristics between neighborhoods.

Lowry Hill East is one of the most densely populated areas in Minneapolis. The majority of the residents are renters (83 percent), while 14 percent own the unit they occupy. Lowry Hill East does not have a large percentage of older adults (just 10 percent of the residents are over 65 years of age) or of persons under 18 years old (17 percent).

However, it is interesting that young adults between the ages of 18 and 24 comprise 36 percent of the population compared to the citywide average of 10 percent. Lowry Hill East is bounded by commercial establishments on its east and west sides. There is virtually no black population.

TABLE III.1

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOODS[a]

		WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	HAWTHORNE	LOWRY HILL EAST
POPULATION		8,568	3,432	5,729
AREA		320 acres	92 acres	90 acres
HOUSING UNITS		2,596 units	1,191 units	2,706 units
POPULATION				
Negro	Frequency:	3,956	34	57
	Percent:	46%	1%	1%
Residents stable 1965-1970	Frequency:	3,000	1,414	1,312
	Percent:	35%	41%	23%
Residents over 65 years of age	Frequency:	643	405	584
	Percent:	8%	12%	10%
Residents under 18 years of age	Frequency:	3,737	1,236	974
	Percent:	44%	36%	17%
HOUSING UNITS				
Owner-occupied units	Frequency:	1,591	425	379
	Percent:	61%	36%	14%
Renter-occupied units	Frequency:	939	740	2,249
	Percent:	36%	62%	83%
Units occupied by husband-wife family	Frequency:	1,453	609	704
	Percent:	56%	51%	33%

[a]Data collected from 1970 U.S. Census (variable titles taken directly from Census). These data were computed for complete census tracts within the demonstration neighborhoods. All three neighborhoods have portions of additional census tracts, but census data are only available for entire tracts on most of the characteristics listed. Lowry Hill East data, then, are representative of tract 67 only; Hawthorne data depict census tract 22; while Willard-Homewood data display tracts 27, 28, and 32.

Most residences in Hawthorne are one- or two-family homes. A high proportion of the population is under 18 years of age (36 percent compared to the citywide average of 27 percent), while 12 percent are over

65 years old. Of the three neighborhoods, Hawthorne has the highest percentage of stable residents (41 percent). The percentage of owned and occupied residences in Hawthorne is 35, while a husband and wife are present in 51 percent of the occupied units. As in Lowry Hill East, about 1 percent of the population is black. In addition, a heavily traveled commercial strip provides the northern boundary of this neighborhood.

Willard-Homewood is principally residential, consisting of single family dwellings. Over 40 percent of the population are under the age of 18. In contrast to Lowry Hill East, this neighborhood has over 61 percent owner-occupied units. Almost 56 percent of the residential units in Willard-Homewood are occupied by both husband and wife. The black population is about 46 percent of the total population--the highest by far of the three demonstration sites. There is some commercial development in Willard-Homewood, although it is not as extensive as in the other demonstration sites.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The three demonstration areas were under the direction of the Community Crime Prevention office within the Minneapolis City Coordinator's Department. The office consisted of a demonstration manager, an architect, a planner, a graphics person, and support staff. They oversaw all activities in the three neighborhoods and served as intermediaries between the local communities and the city administration.

Each neighborhood had a crime prevention office which was staffed by a coordinator, community organizers, a local police officer assigned full time to the project, and other support staff. Most of the staff

persons in the neighborhood offices were residents of these same areas. The coordinator and organizers were responsible for contacting residents on each block within the demonstration area. The program was then introduced to the residents by the organizers who urged them to form or join an existing block club. The block club organizing concept is intrinsic to the CCP program, since community involvement is essential to this strategy. The police officer was an integral part of the CCP staff and was involved in educating the public, increasing contact with residents, conducting premise security surveys, and helping to coordinate police and CCP efforts.

The staffing in Willard-Homewood was an exception. In addition to the crime prevention staff that was hired, a contract was signed with an existing neighborhood organization WIPOG (Willard Increasing Pride On the Go) promising 40 hours per week from WIPOG staff. WIPOG is a publically funded, educational organization that has been establishing block clubs since 1972 in the Willard area. Since WIPOG is an integral part of that neighborhood and had already done considerable work there, it seemed appropriate to include this organization in the CCP project. Its block club agendas in the past had not systematically addressed crime, crime prevention, or education, but meetings were planned around activities and timely subjects which would increase neighbor involvement.

The administrative structure of the Minneapolis CCP project was decided upon during the planning phase of the project. As was mentioned earlier, block club organizing is a key component to this community crime prevention program. The neighborhood offices were set up to facilitate implementation of this component and to give the residents a place within their own neighborhood to discuss their crime problems. The offices were

staffed with persons familiar with the respective neighborhoods as well as with community organizing. The state planners decided to have the three neighborhood staffs managed by a city staff because many of the neighborhood strategies were common to all three areas and could be facilitated at the city level. In addition, the demonstration manager could aid the implementation of various environmental design strategies through coordination with other governmental agencies such as the City Planning Department, City Public Works Department, and City Housing and Redevelopment Authority. Finally, many law enforcement and administrative crime prevention strategies, as well as community resources, required coodination at the city level.

C. MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY

At the start of the project the three neighborhood staffs were asked to prepare written work plans on the basis of crime prevention objectives. The overall strategy discussed here emerged from these work plans. The objectives listed in the work plans indicate five categories of *process* outcomes: 1) *increased resident involvement*; 2) *target hardening*; 3) *opportunity reduction through environmental design*; 4) *increased awareness of crime prevention techniques*; and 5) *cooperative interaction between the police and community*. These five desired outcomes were grouped into three categories of activities (see Figure III.1) including community organizing activities, direct crime reduction activities, and indirect crime reduction activities.

Though these activities were the same, in essence, for all three neighborhoods, it must be remembered that the demonstration sites have distinct differences. The criteria used to select these neighborhoods

FIGURE III.1

BREAKDOWN OF PROCESS EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

	COMMUNITY ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES	DIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES	INDIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
■ DESIRED OUTCOME:	■ Increased Resident Involvement	■ Target-Hardening	■ Increased Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques
● OBJECTIVES:	● Block Clubs-Neighborhood Watch ● Business Associations	● Operation Identification ● Premise Security Survey ● Landlord Responsibility	● Resident Education
■ DESIRED OUTCOME:		■ Opportunity Reduction Through Environmental Design	■ Cooperative Interaction Between Police and Community
● OBJECTIVES:		● Physical Changes	● Increased Police/Community Relations

emphasize their similarities (Section A of this chapter); nonetheless, their differences should be apparent through inspection of the demographic characteristics listed in Table III.1 of this chapter. Therefore, successful implementation in one neighborhood does not guarantee success in the other areas.

As noted earlier, there were five desired outcomes which incorporate the implementation of the comprehensive crime prevention package. *Increased resident involvement*, the first *process* goal of community organizing, had three objectives, the first of which was the formation of block clubs. The neighborhood staffs tried personally to contact as many residents as possible both to relay information and to encourage citizens to participate in their block club. If the resident was not home, the organizer would leave information about the CCP program at the resident's home. Through the block club, pertinent information could be communicated to the residents, and citizens had an opportunity to question staff members about crime and to speak with police officers who regularly patrol their neighborhood.

The Neighborhood Watch Force component was instituted through the block clubs as the second objective of this outcome. Citizens were encouraged to watch out for suspicious persons and crimes in progress and were instructed as to correct procedures for calling police and recording characteristics of the suspicious person(s) or any vehicle involved. Residents were encouraged to exchange phone numbers and sometimes to give each other their schedules so that neighbors would know when they expected to be home.

Establishing business associations was the third objective of

increased resident involvement. These associations functioned in much the same manner as block clubs. Major differences concern the types of crime that were discussed, i.e., commercial burglary rather than residential, and commercial robbery rather than street robbery. Because Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East have major commercial strips within their boundaries while Willard-Homewood does not, the objective of establishing business associations was applied only to Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East.

Within the category of direct crime reduction activities there were two desired outcomes, the first of which was *target hardening* or home security changes. Under this desired outcome, there were also three objectives. The first one, landlord responsibility, was important specifically to renters. The neighborhood staffs instructed renters concerning the minimum requirements meeting the city security codes. For those renters whose buildings were not in accordance with code and who wished to do something about it, a letter could be sent to the landlord through the CCP office.

Premise security surveys were the second objective under this desired outcome. Upon the request of the resident, trained police officers surveyed a home, identifying weaknesses which may have been vulnerable to entry by burglars. Lists were made of the weaknesses and changes recommended. It was then up to the resident to decide which recommendations, if any, to implement. A subsidy, paid for through the CCP program, was included to help residents pay for security changes. The subsidy was hoped to provide added incentive toward making the changes necessary for a secure home.

Operation Identification (Operation I.D.), a procedure for marking one's valuables with an identifying number, was also one of the substrategies used in this crime prevention demonstration. If confiscated goods bear an Operation I.D. number, the merchandise can be traced to the owner.

The second of the two desired outcomes under direct crime reduction activities was *opportunity reduction through environmental design* (i.e., physical changes which would help to reduce the opportunity for crime). This proposed outcome dealt with physical changes in some of the demonstration areas. For instance, some areas were to receive additional street lights, street diverters which direct the flow of traffic in a more desirable route, or changes in alleyway access.

The third and final category, indirect crime reduction activities, also included two desired outcomes. The goal of *increasing the awareness of crime prevention techniques* among the residents was the first. The immediate objective for this was the education of the residents concerning crime prevention. Interactions through block clubs and Neighborhood Watch, business associations, landlord responsibility, and premise surveys were all to contribute to this education. Pamphlets and newsletters were also designed and disseminated to residents.

The second desired outcome was *cooperative interaction between police and community*. Police-community contacts were increased primarily through premise security surveys. According to the neighborhood work plans, the second meeting of each block club dealt with target hardening, specifically centering around premise security surveys and Operation I.D. One or two local officers attended the meeting, met the people, explained target hardening, answered questions, and took requests for premise

security surveys. If a resident signed up for a survey, he would again have contact with the police when the officer conducting the survey came to his home. Residents also got instructions from the neighborhood staff and police officers concerning crime reporting and how to be a good witness. This type of interaction was expected to contribute to the desired outcome of *cooperative interaction between police and community*.

D. SUMMARY

Selection of the demonstration areas was based upon two primary criteria. First, the level of crime had to be substantial yet not extreme. Second, the areas had to contain a mixture of sociogeographic settings. Though the three neighborhoods all met the selection criteria, they are markedly different from each other in some ways. Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East, for instance, both have major commercial strips within their boundaries, whereas Willard-Homewood does not. The latter is again different from the other two areas in population make-up. Close to one half of the population in Willard-Homewood is black, while Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East have virtually no black population. The neighborhood in south Minneapolis, Lowry Hill East, has a much higher density than the other two and over 80 percent rental units. Willard-Homewood has over 60 percent owner-occupied units, while the other northern demonstration site, Hawthorne, has over 35 percent owner-occupied units.

The administrative structure of this project was discussed also. There was a city staff which coordinated activities of the three neighborhoods. The three neighborhood staffs were composed of a coordinator, organizers, a local police officer assigned full time to this project, and support staff.

The comprehensive CCP program implemented in Minneapolis included community organizing activities, direct crime reduction activities, and indirect crime reduction activities. Under community organizing activities, *increased resident involvement* was the desired outcome. Included among direct crime reduction activities were the desired outcomes of: *target hardening* and *opportunity reduction through environmental design*. The final category, indirect crime reduction activities, also had two desired outcomes: *increased awareness of crime prevention techniques* and *cooperative interaction between police and community*. A detailed explanation of the outcomes considered desirable was provided.

IV. PROCESS EVALUATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Included in this chapter is an overview of the CCP organizational structures and strategies, community organizing activities, and direct and indirect crime reduction activities. A few preliminary remarks concerning the role of the evaluation team will serve as an introduction.

Three evaluators, each serving as the contact for one of the neighborhoods, comprised the team. Periodic visits to attend meetings and collect data on the program's progress kept communication flowing. As frequently as possible the evaluators attempted to observe events and processes occurring in the CCP project. Such first hand data gathering has the distinct advantage of testing impressions or assumptions against reality; however, there is some danger that the observer could be obtrusive, thus affecting the process.

Direct contact with the actors in any activity, however miniscule, will have some bearing on their behavior. Even if the nature of the interaction appears to be quite neutral, the contacts may result in some definite adjustment in the decision-making process. Although conversations may merely initiate the creative process in the decision-maker, subsequent program changes could be traceable to the contact. Perhaps the action would not have occurred in the absence of the evaluator's conversation.

From the outset each of the three evaluators had been cognizant of the danger of intruding upon the processes involved in implementing the CCP project. There is no certain way of determining the extent or quality of unintentional intervention that occurred despite the recognized need to avoid any interference. The evaluators hoped that they would be able to identify, and thereby evaluate, particular sources of influence in the conduct of the CCP program. Therefore, even if an evaluator would influence the program inadvertently, the consequence could be observed and the genesis of the influence noted. Wherever appropriate in this report, the evaluators have documented every known instance of probable intrusion in the implementation processes.

Another aspect of the evaluation which qualifies the report's conclusions was the relatively short project period. For some purposes a year may seem sufficient to demonstrate effects of a given social intervention. In theory, of course, crime could be reduced due to a one-year project. However, in the current instance it would seem probably that during the first year the CCP project could not have had much impact upon the occurrence of crime. This is, in part, due to delays in the start-up of the project as well as a number of other limitations explained further on. Nonetheless, evaluation of the implementation (*process*) can be accomplished within the course of one year.

Before describing the particular approach adopted to implement the CCP program, it is helpful to sketch the organizational structure. The demonstration manager was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the three demonstration neighborhoods worked to accomplish their respective goals. The expectation was that the central office would serve,

in part, to provide resources to the demonstration areas. These resources included managerial suggestions to coordinators, material development and supplies, support obtained from other city units (as needed), personnel services, and other tasks inherent in managing a program. The central office was expected to and did obtain technical assistance from the Community Crime Prevention unit of the CCPB.

The demonstration manager was responsible for assisting the neighborhood staffs in achieving their respective goals. Providing such assistance carries with it the possible dual accusations of interference in areas where local prerogatives should dominate or demands for stronger central leaderships. The demonstration manager's style was to allow as much neighborhood autonomy as possible while ensuring that the various neighborhood goals were being accomplished. Neighborhood coordinators did not always appreciate the particular manifestation of central office leadership. The basic tension between the desire to have full latitude locally and the need for central guidance was not resolved during the first year of the CCP program.

During August, 1977, each of the neighborhood staffs, in consultation with members of the CCPB, developed a work plan based upon objectives described in the grant application to LEAA. The neighborhood staffs were encouraged by evaluators to state several specific goals consistent with the work plan. By January of 1978 the three local staffs had completed the list of measurable goals. Progress toward these goals was monitored by the central office. An example of how the monitoring functioned, in practice, is the plan for organizing block clubs. The demonstration manager requested each neighborhood to organize a given block within just two meetings. The reason for the two-meeting format,

as stated in the demonstration manager's memo, was to quicken the pace of organizing blocks so that the neighborhoods could reach their goals. These specified goals can be inspected in Table IV.1 in Section B of this chapter. The table also provides figures which show how successful neighborhood staffs were in reaching objectives.

Each of the demonstration neighborhoods intended to create a Crime Prevention Action Council (CPAC). The CPAC's were to provide a link between the neighborhood residents and organizations and the local CCP staff, to focus on crime prevention, and to suggest ways to help implement the CCP program. In carrying out their charge, the CPAC's were to assist in finding ways to inform residents about the objectives of crime prevention and how to adopt improved security behavior.

Each CPAC had to determine how it would serve as the organizational interface between the neighborhood CCP office and the community it served. In one neighborhood the CPAC did not serve to advise the CCP staff on policy matters so much as it served as a vehicle for the staff to criticize the demonstration manager's conduct with respect to local autonomy. In some ways the CPAC's operated as microcosms of the working style of their respective neighborhood CCP staffs. If the coordinator was an activist leader, the CPAC was also likely to be active in its concerns about the crime prevention program. Conversely, if the CPAC seemed to act as a scratching post to staff members, very likely the CCP coordinator did not exhibit strong leadership. In other situations, advisory bodies tend to complement the executing agency so that if one is strong the other is not. The latter tendency did not seem to prevail in the relationship of CPAC's and CCP staffs, yet this is not to state that either body could serve to predict the behavior of the other.

In practice, the CPAC's did not really monitor the local CCP efforts. In Willard-Homewood the CPAC membership seemed to fluctuate so frequently that each meeting partially served to inform members about the nature of the CCP program. Hawthorne's CPAC was represented by low attendance and confused goals. However, in Lowry Hill East the CPAC was a functioning communication mechanism actively involved with the CCP program. Major interests throughout the neighborhood were well represented at most meetings. An active housing inspector of that neighborhood sat on the council, also. It was not possible to estimate the CPAC's functioning as the link between CCP staff and community. What is known is that CPAC membership was composed of both citizens and representatives of community groups or organizations.

Social programs seldom, if ever, are introduced without serious problems occurring during implementation. The CCP project was not free of problems. The use of grant funds to pay overtime to police officers who performed premise security surveys became the first major obstacle. The need to draft the initial grant application quickly precluded careful scrutiny of LEAA guidelines by planners. These guidelines prohibit the payment of overtime only, but monies may be used for regular salaries plus a typical percentage of overtime. Because police officers were not free to do premise security surveys during their normal shift hours, a serious problem developed.

To resolve this situation the grant money specified was used to pay part of the salary of the police coordinators working on the project, and the Minneapolis Police Department agreed to provide the services of police officers to conduct premise surveys. The time lost in resolving

the overtime issue could not be recovered. The contribution of this delay to the lag between premise security survey requests and completions seemed more serious at first than it did later in the project year.

Another police-related problem emerged in north Minneapolis sometime in early 1978. A police officer complained about the arrangement whereby residents would be referred to two locksmiths to make suggested security changes. Bids had been let for locksmiths to perform the security changes desired by residents. The resident could choose to do all of the work, or just part of it. However, if a locksmith's services were preferred, then one of the two locksmiths would be recommended by the police officer doing the premise security survey. The resident could use the recommended locksmith or any other one, but there were two advantages in selecting the one who had been recommended: the services would be performed more cheaply due to bulk purchases, and the subsidy provided to residents (described later) could be processed more rapidly.

The complaint alleged that the bidding procedures were not wholly above board. By no longer permitting police officers to supply residents with names of locksmiths, the controversy was eased. Instead, the resident could telephone the central CCP office and get the names of the locksmiths. What impact did this controversy have upon the program? It absorbed staff time in addition to police time. Legal advice was sought from the city attorney's office. Personal accusations did not make life more pleasant for some of the figures involved in this demonstration. The effect upon scheduling premise security surveys was not serious in the long run.

One of the principles of CCP is to utilize community resources

effectively to expand upon the program dollar. The material aids for this demonstration project were developed by a professional advertising agency which gave its services at no cost to the project. It has been estimated that these services totaled $30,000. However, lengthy delays in procuring these materials which were required for block club organizing (including Neighborhood Watch items such as decals, phone book covers, and other literature) was often cited as a handicap by neighborhood staffs. Completion of aids for organizing had been expected early in the program (November, 1977), but all of the items were not ready until late January, 1978. Central office and neighborhood staffs alike were unhappy about the printing delays and other production problems delaying completion of the aids.

It is difficult to assess whether or not the late arrival of Neighborhood Watch materials was merely an inconvenience to organizers (though an aggravating one) or it permanently undermined block club efforts. Did block club organizing quicken with the arrival of the materials? It appears that the pace of organization did not change with the availability of the literature. Other factors (to be examined in Section B of this chapter) were probably more crucial to block club organizing than the availability of printed materials.

During the early months of the CCP project, start-up problems hampered efforts to launch the program expeditiously. Local staffs believed office arrangements (which were delayed due to a city law requiring a rather time-consuming system of signing leases) were not always conducive to fostering high morale among themselves. Phone service was considered inadequate in the first month of the project. Perhaps most importantly,

the full staff complement was not reached until September, 1977. Start-up inefficiencies of all varieties consumed most of the first two months of the project, but by about September of 1977 the major space and personnel problems were resolved.

Another start-up problem was the resignation of the initial demonstration manager in August, 1977. The subsequent manager had been acquainted with CCP as architect to the project, but despite such first-hand experience, responsibility for providing overall leadership required some adjustment.

B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES

As noted previously, the bulk of the time and energy expended by the neighborhood staffs was devoted to what has been called Community Organizing Activities. The purpose of those activities was to increase the overall level of residents' involvement with the program and the community. Though not specifically enumerated in the project work plan, some of the staff assumptions concerning community organizing efforts were that increasing residents' involvement would contribute to: 1) a desire to be more vigilant because of shared concerns with other people in their neighborhoods; 2) a reduction in fear of crime; 3) an improvement in police-community relations; 4) a greater interest in conditions and events concerning their community; and 5) an increase in community cohesiveness.

The primary intent of these activities was to achieve greater involvement by approaching both the resident and business communities within each neighborhood. This two-pronged attack was envisioned to culminate with each neighborhood possessing a strong series of block clubs for the residents and, where relevant, viable business associations for the

commercial sector of the community.

1. Residential Organizing

In the residential sphere, the block clubs were the vehicle for the delivery of the crime prevention message. Staff efforts were consistently focused upon the formation and maintenance of block clubs. The geographic bounds of a block club differ from conventional definitions in which a block is viewed as a residential setting bounded on four sides by intersecting thoroughfares. Block clubs organized by the Community Crime Prevention program differed in that they were constituted across thoroughfares rather than within their confines. The rationale presented was that most activity, and therefore greater potential vigilance, is directed toward the front and sides of one's home. People are generally more aware of who lives across the street than who lives across the alley. Therefore, since an important part of the CCP program was recognition of people who belong on a block, organization of blocks followed forward sight lines.

From the inception of the project, two competing philosophies existed regarding the formation of block clubs. One philosophy, which shall be called the single-purpose philosophy, held that the primary intent of holding block club meetings should be to have blocks organized for the purposes of crime prevention. Other issues that exist in the community had their own importance, but they were somewhat peripheral to the specific objectives of the crime prevention program. This translated into an extremely concentrated effort of forming block clubs around the issue of crime prevention. Other community issues became topics for block club action only after the message of crime prevention had been transmitted.

The competing philosophy, the multiple-purpose philosophy, held that crime and community problems were so closely intertwined that they must be dealt with concurrently. To those professing this philosophy, the purposes of block clubs were to mobilize for community action rather than to isolate crime prevention purposefully as the single issue to be addressed during initial meetings.

At the risk of raising confusion, the two philosophies represent differences in the approach to organizing blocks--not in the ultimate utility of block clubs. Both philosophies viewed block clubs as operating beyond the narrow confines of crime prevention. The goal of self-sustaining block clubs, addressing topics of concern to a community, was widely accepted.

The disparity between the two approaches was at what point the block club began to undertake other efforts. Those most committed to the single-purpose approach would insist that other issues be dealt with after the initial business of crime prevention had been accomplished. Those most enamored by the multiple-purpose strategy would insist that other community efforts occur in their own time, superseding crime prevention topics if necessary.

The differences between the single- and multiple-purpose approaches can best be contrasted by reviewing operational differences in accomplishing the task fo block club organization. The single-purpose strategy was to conduct two meetings within each block on the subject of crime prevention. The process began by canvassing a block prior to the initial meeting of the block. During canvassing, the block organizer would go from door to door introducing the program. These efforts were directed

toward personal interaction between the resident and organizer as well as locating an individual willing to host an initial meeting on the block. Once a host was located, an initial meeting date was arranged with the host. The block was then reworked and notices of the meeting were distributed to each residence. The day of the meeting, notices were hand delivered reminding residents of the scheduled meeting.

At this introductory meeting the crime prevention program was reviewed from a historical and operational aspect. The major impact of crime in each neighborhood were synthesized and the strategies used in the program summarized. Residents were informed of the block club's role in crime prevention and were encouraged to join Operation I.D. and to sign up for a premise security survey. As the meeting concluded, a second (final) meeting time was scheduled, and one person was chosen as the block captain (liaison to the CCP staff). Typically, at first meetings, residents expressed their concerns about crime in the neighborhood and offered suggestions for action. Staff usually tried to dovetail suggestions to appropriate areas of the CCP strategies.

Second block club meetings were devoted almost totally to the Neighborhood Watch aspect of the program. Residents were informed what Neighborhood Watch could and should represent to their block. Packets of materials were distributed which contained fact sheets on reporting crimes, on being a good witness, and on residential security. All materials were enclosed within a vinyl telephone book cover which could provide a handy source of information should the need arise. Included within this packet of materials was a map of the block with all participating residents' names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The purpose of this map was to assist people in knowing their neighbors and to provide a

quick reference should a neighbor or the police need to be contacted regarding any suspicious activity. After the Neighborhood Watch component had been fully explained, the organizer would elaborate upon other purposes the block club could fulfill beyond the scope of crime prevention. Strategies for keeping the block club active were discussed and topics of mutual interest were explored. The CCP staff person would volunteer his/her services to assist the block captain in arranging for additional meetings which the block club would conduct upon its own. Topics for potential future meetings ranged from discussions with city council members to dealing with landlords. The second CCP meeting was usually the time when Minneapolis police officers from the local precinct would attend to converse with the residents about problems.

The format of meetings and the sequence of events were relatively the same for the single- and multiple-purpose philosophies. What differed dramatically was the amount of time to bring the block from initial organizing to the point of a second meeting. The thinking of the proponents of the multiple-purpose philosophy was that the crime prevention program alone did not provide a strong enough base to keep block clubs functioning beyond the second meeting. Therefore, extra efforts were expended in the initial organizing efforts. Greater time was spent in canvassing the blocks, more time was spent in finding out specific concerns of that particular block, and vigorous efforts were made to teach people community-action skills during the course of meetings. As one organizer insisted, "You must prepare these people for accepting the message of the crime prevention program." Therefore much time was spent in cultivating the ground prior to sowing seeds. Sometimes this meant that all the CCP material was not covered by the end of the second

meeting, and additional meetings would be required to deliver the program message in its entirety. The focus of efforts was upon nurturance of block clubs, slowly bringing them along until the organizer felt they possessed the wherewithal to continue on their own. Sometimes it required that organizing staff spend numerous hours in the block, cajoling and convincing people of the worth of the program, so they would attend an initial meeting.

The two approaches outlined above did not develop as attempts to subvert the thrust of the program in any preconceived manner. They appear to represent honest differences in approach to community organizing. On the one hand, you have the single-purpose advocates who feel the strengths of the crime prevention program can instill the residents with the fervor to follow through with the crime prevention program and to continue on to other areas of endeavor. Conversely, the multiple-purpose approach says you must generate your enthusiasm before you present the program. In addition, as you develop your program you provide skills necessary to carry on beyond the confines of the project. The single-purpose strategy was followed in the Lowry Hill East neighborhood while the multiple-purpose strategy was operationalized in Willard-Homewood. Hawthorne, to some degree, followed both courses depending upon the particular organizer's preference.

The emergence of the two methods of organizing blocks was due in part to delays which the project experienced in developing materials to assist organizers in their presentation. Organizing activities commenced in the neighborhoods in June, 1977. The first set of materials for block meetings was not available until late September, 1977. The materials packet for Neighborhood Watch participation was not completed until

January, 1978. The people most committed to the multiple-purpose approach felt that the delay in getting materials would be devastating to the program because it would blunt the impetus they were initially generating. Therefore, while awaiting materials, they chose to continue working with those blocks from which they had gotten some initial response. This, in effect, protracted the process of organizing because it meant meetings had to be repeated in certain blocks once materials became available. Lowry Hill East staff spent the first couple months of the project contacting businesses instead of residents since the delayed materials were for block clubs. By early fall residential organizing was initiated and most materials were then available.

At least 90 percent of all blocks in Willard-Homewood had been contacted regarding the CCP program. The comparable figure for Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East was 100 percent. The form this contact took was either via personal contact, flyers distributed during intial block canvassing, or through a bulk mailing which outlined the basic program for residents and informed them organizing would commence on the block in the near future. At least one block meeting was held on 97 percent (35) of the blocks in Lowry Hill East, 92 percent (33) in Hawthorne, and 48 percent (49) in Willard-Homewood.

Some interesting facts came to light when comparing these figures with responses to questions asked of a random sample of residents in each community. As part of the posttest Resident and Citizen surveys (see Chapter V, Section D.2), each resident was queried to determine whether or not he/she had attended a block club meeting in the past year. In Lowry Hill East, 112 of the residents surveyed lived on blocks where at least on CCP meeting had occurred prior to the survey. Of these 112,

39 (34.8 percent) reported attending the block club meeting on crime prevention. Comparable figures for Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood were 19.4 percent (14 of 72) and 30.2 percent (29 of 96), respectively. These results are perplexing considering Willard-Homewood had a considerably lower level of organized blocks than Hawthorne. A plausible explanation would be that some residents became confused over the time element of the preceding year. They may have projected further into the past and confused a block club meeting held under the auspices of an ongoing school program. WIPOG is a school program aimed at increasing community cohesiveness through the process of organizing block clubs. WIPOG had been actively organizing block clubs in the Willard area over the preceding five years. It is quite conceivable some respondents recalled attending a WIPOG meeting and ascertained it to be the block club meeting referred to in the survey.

In terms of actual participation, Lowry Hill East had an average of 11.5 people attending block meetings per block.[1] Of the total adult population in Lowry Hill East (based on 1970 Census), 10.8 percent attended at least one crime prevention meeting. The average attendance per block in Hawthorne was 5.0 persons, which is 5.6 percent of the adult population. In Willard-Homewood the average attendance at the block club meeting was 6.2 persons, which constituted approximately 7.5 percent of the adult population attending meetings.

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[1] Organizing results from Willard-Homewood combine the CCP staff as well as WIPOG efforts (recall Chapter III, Part B). The Juvenile Advocate Program was not evaluated beyond observing presentations at block club meetings. This neighborhood was the only one of the three where direct efforts to reach the juveniles occurred. With this one exception, the CCP efforts were directed toward the adult populations in these neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Watch was always envisioned to be the natural culmination of the crime prevention efforts within the blocks. It was to be a group of concerned neighbors who could offer each other some degree of crime deterrence through their collective vigilance and interest. When the program began, the plan was to include in Neighborhood Watch only those people who had joined Operation I.D. and whose home had received a premise security survey. They would also be the only people listed on the block map containing names and telephone numbers. As block participation failed to meet expectations on those two components, the above restrictions were removed. All residents who attended block club meetings were given Neighborhood Watch materials regardless of participation in the other aspects of the program. Furthermore, all block residents were included on block maps unless they indicated a preference to the contrary.

Participation in Neighborhood Watch met with varying degrees of success. A block was considered in Neighborhood Watch if all the crime prevention information was delivered to the residents regardless of the number of meetings. Of course, Lowry Hill East, following the single-purpose philosophy and presenting the program in two meetings, had a greater chance of organizing more blocks in the allotted time. The number of blocks in each neighborhood reaching Neighborhood Watch status are: 10 blocks in Willard-Homewood (10 percent), 21 blocks in Hawthorne (58 percent), and 35 blocks in Lowry Hill East (97 percent). Exact figures for resident participation in Neighborhood Watch are rather elusive. Initially, all participating residents (those attending meetings) were to be included on the block map. However, since the utility of the map depended upon its accurateness and completeness, residents were queried

for permission to be included on the map during initial canvassing. Hence, some of the persons listed on a map may not have attended a crime prevention meeting, but had allowed their names and telephone numbers to be listed with their neighbors'. A better indication of the number of people who understand crime prevention strategies and Neighborhood Watch philosophies would be the unique number of residents who attended at least one meeting. These figures were discussed previously as the percentage of the adult population that had attended at least one crime prevention meeting. In Willard-Homewood 7.5 percent of the adult population attended a CCP meeting. The corresponding figures for Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East were 5.6 percent and 10.8 percent, respectively. Table IV.1 displays the proposed goals stated by the neighborhood staffs, and the actual achievement in each area is listed.

Further clarity on block participation is provided by the Resident Survey and Citizen Survey. These surveys include posttest questions asking respondents if they had attended a CCP block club meeting or had been involved in Neighborhood Watch. In Hawthorne 15 of 102 (15 percent) respondents had attended a block club meeting, and 7 of the 15 (47 percent) reported involvement in Neighborhood Watch. In Lowry Hill East 40 of 123 (33 percent) respondents had attended a block club meeting with 32 of the 40 (80 percent) participating in Neighborhood Watch.[1] The figures for Willard-Homewood reveal 33 of the 175 (18 percent) respondents reported attending a block club meeting with 23 of the 33 (70 percent) identifying themselves in Neighborhood Watch. However, the data from Willard-Homewood are questionable. In verifying these figures, it was discovered that 18

[1]The reader will note these figures differ from those reported previously. Current figures are from all respondents rather than those respondents living on an organized block.

of the 23 people reported to be in Neighborhood Watch lived on blocks which had not been initiated in Neighborhood Watch at the time of the survey. Further, records indicate that 15 of those 18 live on blocks that were never introduced to Neighborhood Watch by the conclusion of the first project year. Clearly, there is some confusion as to whether these residents may have attended meetings in other blocks, not an uncommon activity in Willard-Homewood, or whether they were uncertain about Neighborhood Watch and made a false positive report. No such discrepancies existed in the other two neighborhoods.

TABLE IV.1

NEIGHBORHOOD GOALS CONCERNING RESIDENT INVOLVEMENT

		WILLARD-HOMEWOOD (102 Blocks)		HAWTHORNE (36 Blocks)		LOWRY HILL EAST (36 Blocks)	
		Proposed[a]	Actual[b]	Proposed[a]	Actual[b]	Proposed[a]	Actual[b]
BLOCK ORGANIZING							
Blocks organized[c]	Frequency:	73	49	36	33	27	35
	Percent:	72%	48%	100%	92%	75%	97%
Neighborhood Watch Blocks[c]	Frequency:	73	10	36	21	27	35
	Percent:	72%	10%	100%	58%	75%	97%
Average community crime prevention meeting attendance	Average:	8	6.2	27[d]	5.0	12	11.5
Average households represented per meeting	Average:	5	5.4	15[d]	3.8	—	6.3
PREMISE SECURITY SURVEYS							
Requested	Frequency:	300	252	100	123	120[e]	94[e]
Conducted	Frequency:	300	92	100	86	120	88
	Percent:	100%	37%	100%	70%	100%	94%
OPERATION IDENTIFICATION							
Requested and conducted	Frequency:	300	97	150	86	180	153

[a]Proposed goals: each neighborhood office met with an evaluator in January, 1978, and proposed the listed goals.

[b]Actual goals: the level of involvement listed was reached by June 30, 1978.

[c]A block having at least one crime prevention meeting is considered organized. Those blocks which received *all* pertinent crime prevention information and materials were considered in Neighborhood Watch.

[d]Hawthorne's proposed goals were stated in percentages. For example, this neighborhood proposed that 50 percent of block residents would attend meetings, Hawthorne's adult population is 2,924, there are 55 blocks; 50 percent of the average block population was equal to about 27. There are 1,621 residential units, again 55 blocks; 50 percent of the average number of units per block was 15. Both these figures are not realistic and obviously not much attention was paid to selecting them.

[e]Premise security surveys listed here are residential surveys. Lowry Hill East also proposed to do 40 commercial surveys and 10 complete apartment buildings. In actuality, 28 commercial surveys and 10 apartment building surveys were requested. Of these, 24 commercial surveys and all 10 apartment building surveys were conducted.

Some particularly salient pieces of information were derived from those residents who were directly involved in the program as block club members. At the conclusion of the first project year, a random sample of 97 block club members was compiled from project attendance records (approximately one-third from each neighborhood). A telephone survey was conducted with these participants concerning their impression of the Community Crime Prevention program. What follows is a discussion of some of the more pertinent responses to that survey.

Judging from the responses, the CCP staff were rather successful in conveying the message of the crime prevention program. When asked about the major things residents had learned at their block meetings, their unprompted responses were (in increasing importance): home security subsidy program, neighborhood crime statistics, premise security surveys, Operation I.D., need for improved security, and Neighborhood Watch. Further, fully 82 percent of all respondents were familiar with Neighborhood Watch. This figure is quite satisfactory considering a number of respondents may only have attended a first meeting on their block. No controls were available to cross reference responses between this item and number of meetings attended.

A striking difference between the three neighborhoods occurred on the question "What do you think is the most important part of Neighborhood Watch?" Seventy-nine percent of the respondents in Willard-Homewood affirmed that watching others' houses and looking out for each other were the most important aspects of Neighborhood Watch. The same categories were selected by 51 percent of Hawthorne respondents and 57 percent of Lowry Hill East respondents. Further, 40 percent of Lowry Hill East respondents selected knowing neighbors as most important. This compares

to 27 percent in Hawthorne and only 8 percent in Willard-Homewood. It appears that Lowry Hill East residents place greater emphasis on social aspects to achieve crime prevention while Willard-Homewood residents are more security conscious. This disparity may be related to the mobility and anonymity in each neighborhood. Lowry Hill East residents may welcome the opportunity to get to know others who have remained somewhat isolated in a neighborhood comprised of many apartments. The Willard-Homewood neighborhood has been relatively stable over the past few years, providing residents an opportunity to get to know their neighbors over time. That having been accomplished, they are more concerned about applying other specific strategies to crime prevention. In spite of the above preferences, 90 percent of block club members surveyed felt Neighborhood Watch is an effective way to prevent burglaries. Interestingly enough, the lowest percentage was 83 percent in Lowry Hill East; 96 percent of Hawthorne respondents and 91 percent of Willard-Homewood respondents felt it would be effective.

The theme of getting to know people appears to be extremely pervasive in Lowry Hill East. Ninety-seven percent of the Lowry Hill East respondents state that as a result of the CCP program they had become better acquainted with other residents on the block. This compares to 71 percent in Willard-Homewood and 50 percent in Hawthorne. For the total sample, 73.5 percent of the respondents felt they had become better acquainted with other residents. Becoming better acquainted with residents on the block hopefully could lead toward a stronger feeling of belonging to the neighborhood. Crime prevention programs of this sort work toward building cohesion in neighborhoods. A stronger bond between residents may occur once they know each other. This could help

to ensure better vigilance and prompt action when suspicious behavior is spotted. The block club survey has shown, as noted above, that in Lowry Hill East and in Willard-Homewood the vast majority of block club participants felt they know more neighbors because of the CCP program.

The Citizen Survey and Resident Survey asked a random sample of *all* residents (not just block club participants) if they felt: 1) a part of the neighborhood or 2) that it was just a place to live, in 1976 and 1978. Consistent with the above findings on the block club survey, a statistically significant increase of respondents felt a part of the neighborhood in Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood in 1978 over 1976. Hawthorne showed a slight decrease of 5 percent on that response.[1] In addition, 49 percent of the Lowry Hill East respondents felt that knowing more residents was one of the major changes which occurred as a result of the CCP program. In Hawthorne, this figure was 9 percent and in Willard-Homewood it was 14 percent. Considering only 50 percent of the Hawthorne respondents had become more familiar with other people on their block, it is conceivable that the CCP program was unable to expand much beyond the old school-related block club.[2]

When respondents were asked to comment upon the ability of their block club to operate on its own, some interesting facts emerged. Residents were asked if their block club had already met on its own; overall, 43 percent replied yes, 43 percent said no, and 15 percent were uncertain.

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[1] The findings on this and other questions from the Resident and Citizen surveys are discussed in Chapter V, Section D. The table containing figures on this particular question is Table V.24.

[2] The Hawthorne neighborhood had a school-related block club program similar to the WIPOG efforts mentioned previously in the Willard area. The Hawthorne organization was call HIPOG.

In Lowry Hill East the breakdown was yes, 56 percent; no, 25 percent; leaving 19 percent uncertain. The figures for Hawthorne were: yes, 27 percent; no, 56 percent; with 18 percent uncertain. In Willard-Homewood 46 percent said yes, 50 percent said no, and 4 percent were uncertain. In spite of these differences respondents from all three neighborhoods felt about equally certain of the chance of their block club meeting in the future. Overall, 68 percent of respondents felt there was a "50-50 chance or better" of their block club meeting again. This breaks down to 62 percent for Lowry Hill East, 70 percent for Hawthorne, and 74 percent for Willard-Homewood.

Of special interest should be block club members' perception of changes which have occurred in their neighborhoods as a result of the crime prevention program. Reported earlier were the findings relating to knowing more families in Lowry Hill East. Block club members of Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood were more negative in responding about changes. In both neighborhoods the single most frequently offered response was no change had occurred as a result of the program. In Hawthorne, 29 percent of respondents believed no changes had occurred, while in Willard-Homewood it stood at 26 percent. The figure for Lowry Hill East was 7 percent.

Slightly over 17 percent of Hawthorne residents cited less fear or less burglary as changes. This compares to 2 percent in Lowry Hill East and 6 percent in Willard-Homewood. Hawthorne residents differed again in their perceptions of security changes. Only 3 percent of Hawthorne respondents felt security had improved as a result of the CCP project. In both Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East the comparable figure was 14 percent. Overall, the most frequently mentioned changes resulting

from the program were (in decreasing order): knowing more families, people watching out for each other, better security, less fear, and less burglary.

The question of change raises the issue of impact upon crime. Respondents were specifically asked, from what they know about the program, "if crime were to decrease in their neighborhood, how responsible would the CCP project be for the decline?" No one felt the project would be "completely responsible" for the decline, though the respondents were rather optimistic. Almost 33 percent felt it would be "largely responsible," an additional 26 percent believed CCP would be about "50 percent responsible," 20 percent felt it would be "somewhat responsible," and the remaining 20 percent did not know.

What was the impact of the Community Crime Prevention program upon a sample of people who attended block club meetings? In short, rather positive. These people came away from the meetings feeling that the program would have been a strong influence should crime decline. They came away understanding the basic concepts of the program, though they did not remember with ease the home security subsidy program. Continuing, people had become better acquainted with their neighbors and felt their block clubs would continue without the impetus from the CCP staff. Finally, they walked away from the meetings feeling strongly that Neighborhood Watch could be effective in preventing burglaries. What remains unknown is the degree to which the residents actually practiced the principles of the CCP program.

Beyond merely organizing block clubs, a concern of the CCP project staff was the prospect of block clubs remaining a viable force within the

community. To this end, special provisions were instituted to provide block clubs with the opportunity to continue functioning outside the confines of the crime prevention program. Block club maintenance, as it came to be known, became an increasingly dominant theme as the project neared the end of the first year. The general method employed in addressing maintenance was to provide block leaders with some basic organizing skills and to make the neighborhood staff function as resources *to* the blocks rather than organizers *on* the block. This was to provide a means of gradual withdrawal from the block while providing support for the block club to develop its own identity. Training sessions were held to assist the block captains in adapting to their increased responsibility in operating the block clubs.

The block captain training sessions were to provide the participants with the opportunity to learn more fully the potential for block clubs as an action force in the community. Topics discussed included problem-solving with municipal agencies, community resources available for meeting presentations, methods for maintaining interest, and attendance. Particular attention was given to presenting block captains with various opportunities and strategies for assuming independent action. The assumption was that meetings concerning crime prevention could not provide sufficient attraction beyond an additional one or two meetings. Other interests had to be developed to keep block members actively involved and communicating about block concerns. Neighborhood organizers expressed a desire to infuse block captains with a respect for their own ability to accomplish results with neighborhood problems. This end would have a direct relationship to the goals of the crime prevention program. By maintaining block involvement and overcoming neighborhood problems,

the blocks could demonstrate some measures of success in an effort to combat negative feelings concerning crime and the community. For the most part, training sessions in all three neighborhoods were well received.

2. Commercial Organizing

As mentioned previously, the Community Crime Prevention program sought to involve both commercial and residential sectors of the community in its approach to crime prevention. The strategy for providing services to the business community focused upon judicious use of local business associations. Only the Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne communities specifically addressed the issue of business involvement in their project work plans. Though Willard-Homewood does contain commercial establishments, the staff, in preparing its work plan, determined not to direct its efforts to commercial activities. In Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne, two different approaches were used in attempting to conduct a program with the business community.

The Hawthorne strategy was to rely heavily upon the mechanism of an existing business organization to transmit the CCP message. The West Broadway Business Association was both long lived and highly visible. The intent was to utilize the internal structure of the business association in publicizing the CCP program. Because the business association was fully functioning and did not need any assistance in subscribing members, the premise security survey was the primary interface between the program and area merchants. Initial publicity for the program was generated through personal visits to area businesses by neighborhood staff. Further information was provided via articles in the business association newsletter. Beyond these initial attempts to provide a

description of the program and services, little else occurred of a substantive nature. In partial defense of the neighborhood staff, much of the inactivity relating to the business community appears to stem from the action of the president of the business association. It appears there were differing expectations on the part of the neighborhood coordinator and association president as to how the program should be adequately publicized. Commitment by the association president was less than overwhelming. In spite of this difficulty, presentations were made at association meetings and a number of premise security surveys were completed. Overall, the visibility of the Community Crime Prevention program in Hawthorne's business section was somewhat subdued.

In contrast, the business program was highly energetic in Lowry Hill East. Though Lowry Hill East is bounded by two highly commercial streets, there was minimal previous activity pertaining to business owners forming an association. To fill the void, one of the initial goals of the Lowry Hill East work plan was to organize and establish two associations of merchants on Lyndale and Hennepin Avenues. Commencing in July, 1977, commercial establishments were canvassed and first meeting dates set. During the course of the project the South Hennepin Business Association was formed and continued to meet on a monthly basis. The average representation at meetings was 18 establishments. The South Lyndale Avenue Business Association had an average of 16 businesses represented per meeting. Though the business associations did struggle a bit with some of the usual problems of fledgling organizations, i.e., bylaws and organizational structure, they did deal with issues of importance to the overall community. In one instance, they attempted to resolve a conflict between one of their members and residents who objected to problems created by the clientele of

that business. The associations also supported larger community activities through contributions of goods and/or services. The efforts of the CCP staff were directly responsible for the formation and early growth of these organizations. Though some contact is maintained between the CCP staff and the association, it appears both groups continue to operate as viable elements within the community.

3. Summary

The general desire to increase involvement within the residential and commercial elements of the community appears to have met with mixed results. In Lowry Hill East 97 percent of all blocks were organized and introduced into Neighborhood Watch. The results of the efforts in Hawthorne were 92 percent organized and 58 percent initiated into Neighborhood Watch. For Willard-Homewood, 48 percent of the blocks were organized and 10 percent formally participated in Neighborhood Watch.

In spite of the differences in organizing outcomes, residents from all neighborhoods who participated in the program felt positive about its efforts. Eighty-two percent of a random sample of participants were familiar with Neighborhood Watch and 90 percent of those respondents felt it would be effective in preventing burglaries. Nevertheless, when asked what changes have occurred as a result of the program, the two most frequently given responses were: knowing more families and no changes have occurred. Less burglary was the least chosen response. There is some reason to expect that the block clubs will remain viable after the project because 68 percent of the same sample replied there was a "50-50 chance or better" of their block meeting on its own. In addition, Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood showed significant increases in neighborhood identification.

Efforts at organizing the business community were attempted in two neighborhoods. In Hawthorne the attempt was thwarted by placing too much reliance upon a somewhat disinterested existing business association. This aspect of the program never achieved any forward thrust in Hawthorne. In Lowry Hill East the efforts of the staff met with quite good results. Two business associations were formed to represent the two commercial streets in Lowry Hill East. Both associations had a reasonable level of participation and continue to meet without any direction from the crime prevention program.

C. DIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

Two of the goals this project sought to achieve (target hardening and opportunity reduction through environmental design) are described as direct crime reduction activities. Target hardening (or home security changes) involved three different objectives: to encourage participants of block clubs to request a premise security survey conducted by the Minneapolis Police Department, to enroll block club members in Operation Identification, and to improve landlord responsibility concerning security of rental units. The other goal, opportunity reduction through environmental design, involved physical changes in neighborhoods. Alleyway modifications, additional lighting, and traffic diverters were planned for certain areas of the demonstration neighborhoods. Improving home security, marking valuables with an identifying number, and redesigning physical aspects of the neighborhood were expected to have direct impact on crime reduction and therefore are defined here as direct crime reduction activites.

1. Target Hardening

Premise security surveys were promoted through the block club meetings. As mentioned earlier a subsidy was available for those residents who made recommended changes. Often this subsidy was an incentive to request a premise security survey since a homeowner could receive 50 percent of the cost of making the changes up to the maximum allowable subsidy amount of $100 per residence. To estimate the importance of the security survey aspect of the CCP program, a follow-up telephone survey was administered to premise security survey recipients. This survey asked which recommendations were implemented, who had done the work, how much it cost the resident, and if he/she were more confident about his/her home security once the changes were made. The intent of the survey was to determine levels of compliance with recommended changes and factors precipitating a request for a survey.

A total of 266 residents had premise security surveys as a result of the crime prevention demonstration. Of these, 147 (55 percent) were surveyed in the follow-up.[1] Residents from Lowry Hill East made up 42 percent of the follow-up survey total while Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood residents comprised 30 percent and 29 percent, respectively. In an attempt to discover the reasons residents requested a security check of their home, the following open-ended question was included: "What prompted you to request a premise security survey?" (see Table IV.2). Over half of the premise security survey recipients gave reasons that

[1] Some surveys were in the process of being completed or were involved in procedures to obtain the subsidy when the evaluation follow-up was being completed. In addition, problems identifying discrepancies between staff records and police records emerged causing delays. These delays did not allow a number of completed surveys to be included in the follow-up.

were directly related to some aspect of the crime prevention program. Examples of the type of answers given are: block club meetings, crime prevention staff members, the crime prevention program, and the available subsidy. In Lowry Hill East 67 percent gave one of the above four answers. In Hawthorne 79 percent and in Willard-Homewood 57 percent answered in a similar manner. The answers not related specifically to this program were: thought it was a good idea, security problems, neighborhood crime reputation, past victimization, and friends had recommended it. Some of these responses are crime related, and they may possibly be related directly to this project since a crime prevention program would probably tend to provoke security consciousness. But, there is also a possibility that these responses are *not* directly related to the CCP demonstration, and so they were separated from the first set of responses.

TABLE IV.2

WHAT PROMPTED RESIDENTS TO REQUEST A PREMISE SECURITY SURVEY?[a]
(N = 147)

REASON STATED[b]	LOWRY HILL EAST Frequency	LOWRY HILL EAST Percent	HAWTHORNE[c] Frequency	HAWTHORNE[c] Percent	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD Frequency	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD Percent
1. Block club meetings	33	54.1%	23	54.8%	22	50.0%
2. Staff members	5	8.2	5	11.9	0	-0-
3. Crime prevention program	2	3.3	4	9.5	2	4.5
4. Subsidy involved	1	1.6	1	2.4	1	2.3
SUBTOTAL	41	67.2%	33	78.6%	25	56.8%
5. Thought it was a good idea	9	14.8%	0	-0-	4	9.1%
6. Security problems	2	3.3	5	11.9%	4	9.1
7. Neighborhood reputation	3	4.9	1	2.4	1	2.3
8. Past victimizations	2	3.3	2	4.8	7	15.9
9. Friend recommended it	1	1.6	1	2.4	0	-0-
10. Other reason given	3	4.9	0	-0-	3	6.8
SUBTOTAL	20	32.8%	9	21.5%	19	43.2%
TOTAL	61	100.0%	42	100.1%	44	100.0%

[a]Question from Premise Security Survey Follow-up administered to recipients of this service.

[b]Responses 1-4 indicate that the reason a premise security survey was requested was directly related to some aspect of the crime prevention demonstration. Whereas, responses 5-10 indicate other reasonable answers but do not give the credit to this particular program or its staff.

[c]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to a rounding error.

Recipients of a premise security survey listed the number of times they had been victims of a burglary, theft, or a vandalism within the past year. Table IV.3 shows that 14.3 percent of the 147 recipients had been burglarized. Some type of theft was reported by 16.4 percent of these people, and 9.5 percent of them had property vandalized.

TABLE IV.3

NUMBER OF CRIMINAL INCIDENTS WITHIN PRIOR YEAR AT SURVEYED RESIDENCE

	LOWRY HILL EAST		HAWTHORNE		WILLARD-HOMEWOOD		TOTAL	
INCIDENT	Frequency	Percent[a]	Frequency	Percent[a]	Frequency	Percent[a]	Frequency	% of Total[a]
Burglary								
0	55	90.2%	33	78.6%	38	80.4%	126	85.7%
1	5	8.2	9	21.4	5	11.4	19	12.9
2	1	1.6	0	-0-	1	2.3	2	1.4
SUBTOTAL	61	100.0%	42	100.0%	44	100.1%	147	100.0%
Theft								
0	48	78.7%	35	83.3%	40	90.9%	123	83.7%
1	8	13.1	5	11.9	3	6.8	16	10.9
2	4	6.6	2	4.8	1	2.3	7	4.8
3	1	1.6	0	-0-	0	-0-	1	0.7
SUBTOTAL	61	100.0%	42	100.0%	44	100.0%	147	100.1%
Vandalism								
0	55	90.2%	37	88.1%	41	93.2%	133	90.5%
1	5	8.2	5	11.9	3	6.8	13	8.8
2	1	1.6	0	-0-	0	-0-	1	0.7
SUBTOTAL	61	100.0%	42	100.0%	44	100.0%	147	100.0%

[a]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to a rounding error.

Most of the people who requested a premise security survey were living in single family homes (56 percent in Lowry Hill East, 74 percent in Hawthorne, and 95 percent in Willard-Homewood). In Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne about 25 percent of the requests came from residents who lived in duplexes or fourplexes. In addition Lowry Hill East had 15 percent of the requests from multiple dwellings, rooming houses, and a home/business combination (see Table IV.4). In Lowry Hill East 23 percent of the residential structures have 10 or more units. This presented special difficulties because renters had to recieve approval from their landlords to have their homes surveyed. In the interest of overall building security, entire apartment buildings were surveyed at one time. Through the subsidy program, $300 was allotted per building for 10 different apartment buildings in Lowry Hill East, and although ten apartment buildings were

surveyed for security weaknesses, *none* collected the subsidy money. (Prior to a definite rule concerning apartment dwellers, 4 single apartment units were surveyed. These 4 surveys are included in the total of the residential premise security surveys conducted.) Most often, however, residents of owner-occupied units rather than apartment units requested and received a premise security survey.

TABLE IV.4

TYPE OF HOUSING OF PREMISE SECURITY SURVEY RECIPIENTS (N = 147)

HOUSING TYPE	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Single Family				
Frequency:	34	31	42	107
Percent:	55.7%	73.8%	95.5%	72.8%
Two-Fourplex				
Frequency:	18	11	2	31
Percent:	29.5%	26.2%	4.5%	21.1%
Other Residence[a]				
Frequency:	9	0	0	9
Percent:	14.8%	-0-	-0-	6.1%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	61	42	44	147
Percent:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]"Other" category includes multiple dwellings, rooming houses, and one home/business combination.

Of the 61 residents surveyed in Lowry Hill East, 67 percent (41) had completed some of the recommended changes. In Willard-Homewood 61 percent (27) of the 44 people had completed some changes, while in Hawthorne only 38 percent (16) of the 42 premise security survey recipients had implemented any recommended changes (see Table IV.5). To the best of his/her recollection, the average amount of money these changes cost the individual resident was $67.45 in Lowry Hill East, $43.10 in Hawthorne, and $66.47 in Willard-Homewood. The total amount of money awarded through the subsidy program for security improvements in the three demonstration

sites was $2,469.70 including subsidies for businesses. When asked if they would have made the recommended changes if no subsidy had been involved, 75 percent of the Hawthorne residents answered affirmatively. In Lowry Hill East and in Willard-Homewood the percentages were 65 and 56, respectively (see Table IV.6). The vast majority of residents surveyed knew about the security problems in their home prior to receiving the premise survey as Table IV.7 portrays. Close to 69 percent in Lowry Hill East, and 74 percent in both Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood were aware of these problems. Finally, the survey asked those residents who had made some changes if they felt more confident about their home security. Of the 40 who made changes in Lowry Hill East, 68 percent (27) felt more confident (see Table IV.8). In Hawthorne 16 recipients had completed some changes. Of these people 81 percent (13) felt more confident. The number of premise security survey recipients who had implemented some changes in Willard-Homewood was 27. Of these 27, 81 percent (22) felt more confident regarding their security.

TABLE IV.5

DID RESIDENT MAKE RECOMMENDED CHANGES?[a]
(N = 147)

RESPONSE	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Yes				
Frequency:	41	16	27	84
Percent:	67.2%	38.1%	61.4%	57.1%
No				
Frequency:	20	26	17	63
Percent:	32.8%	61.9%	38.6%	42.9%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	61	42	44	147
Percent:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Question from Premise Security Survey Follow-up administered to recipients of this service.

TABLE IV.6

WOULD RESIDENT HAVE MADE SECURITY CHANGES IF NO SUBSIDY WERE INVOLVED?[a]
(N = 146)

RESPONSE	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Yes				
Frequency:	26	12	15	53
Percent:	43.3%	28.6%	34.1%	36.3%
No				
Frequency:	14	4	12	30
Percent:	23.3%	9.5%	27.3%	20.5%
No Changes Made				
Frequency:	20	26	17	63
Percent:	33.3%	61.9%	38.6%	43.2%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	60	42	44	146
Percent:	99.9%[b]	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Question from Premise Security Survey Follow-up administered to recipients of this service.

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to a rounding error.

TABLE IV.7

WAS RESIDENT AWARE OF SECURITY PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE PREMISE SECURITY SURVEY?
(N = 146)

RESPONSE	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Yes				
Frequency:	42	31	32	105
Percent:	68.9%	73.8%	74.0%	71.9%
No				
Frequency:	19	11	11	41
Percent:	31.1%	26.2%	26.0%	28.1%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	61	42	43	146
Percent:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE IV.8

DO THOSE RESIDENTS WHO MADE SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS FEEL MORE CONFIDENT NOW?
(N = 83)

RESPONSE	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Yes				
Frequency:	27	13	22	62
Percent:	67.5%	81.3%	81.5%	74.7%
No				
Frequency:	13	3	5	21
Percent:	32.5%	18.7%	18.5%	25.3%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	40	16	27	83
Percent:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When police officers surveyed homes, they ranked some of the recommended changes. This ranking was twofold in purpose: it allowed residents to know which changes were most important to ensure the security of their home, and residents could not receive subsidy money for any non-priority changes unless all priority items were implemented first. For all three neighborhoods the types of changes most often ranked highest dealt with door security (see Table IV.9). Installation of deadbolt locks were mentioned most as being the part of the door that should be improved. In Lowry Hill East, 50 percent of the recommended door changes specifically were deadbolt lock installations. In Hawthorne the percentage was as high as 57, while in Willard-Homewood, 35 percent of the door changes recommend installing deadbolt locks. The category with the next highest number of priority changes was window security. In Hawthorne, 38 percent of priority changes were window changes. Willard-Homewood window changes encompassed 33 percent of the priority items, while the Lowry Hill East percentage was 28. In addition, this neighborhood had some exterior changes recommended as priority--such as: additional lighting, address display, and security of a second-story access.

TABLE IV.9

TYPE OF PRIORITY CHANGE RECOMMENDED[a]

TYPE OF CHANGE RECOMMENDED	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	TOTAL
Deadbolt Lock Door Changes				
Frequency:	54	13	17	84
Percent:	35.8%	35.1%	21.8%	31.6%
Other Door Changes				
Frequency:	54	10	31	95
Percent:	35.8%	27.0%	39.7%	35.7%
Window Changes				
Frequency:	42	14	26	82
Percent:	27.8%	37.8%	33.3%	30.8%
Exterior Changes				
Frequency:	0	0	3	3
Percent:	-0-	-0-	3.9%	1.1%
Alarms				
Frequency:	1	0	1	2
Percent:	0.7%	-0-	1.3	0.8%
TOTAL				
Frequency:	151	37	78	266
Percent:	100.1%[b]	99.9%[b]	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Priority indicates those recommendations that must be completed to ensure the subsidy money.

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to a rounding error.

The residents who had *not* made any changes by the time this telephone survey was conducted were asked if they *intended* to make future changes.[1] In all three neighborhoods combined, 42 percent of the total number surveyed (62) had not made any changes. Of these people, 49 (79 percent) said that they intended to make some of the recommended changes. These residents were asked what type of changes they would most likely make. The majority of the respondents cited door security; namely, deadbolt locks. The next largest percentage encompassed window security changes, again related to an improved locking system.

[1]All telephone surveys were conducted at least one month following the administration of the premise security survey to allow residents time to make changes.

By January of 1978, each neighborhood staff proposed goals on facets of this program. Of interest here are the goal statements concerning the number of premise security surveys requested and conducted per neighborhood. Willard-Homewood staff members projected receiving 300 residential requests for surveys. They hoped to conduct 100 percent of these requests. The actual number of surveys that was requested within the first year was 252. Of these 252 requests, 37 percent (92) were conducted. In view of the low percentage of requests completed, it appears the Willard-Homewood staff was overzealous in projecting 100 percent completion. In Hawthorne, 100 surveys of residential units were projected. The neighborhood records indicate 123 actual requests. They had proposed to conduct 100 percent of the 100 projected. Nearly 70 percent (86) of the actual requests were completed. In addition, 9 commercial establishments requested and received a premise security survey in Hawthorne. The staff made no projection on commercial surveys, so no comparisons can be made. In the southern neighborhood, Lowry Hill East, 120 residential requests were projected as well as 40 business requests and 10 entire apartment buildings. The actual numbers of requests were for 94 residences, 28 businesses, and 10 apartments in Lowry Hill East. This neighborhood had also expected to complete 100 percent of those requested. The completion rate of 88 residential units was 94 percent of requests. For businesses, Lowry Hill East completed 24 surveys or 86 percent of those requested. All apartment building requests were completed. Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood are both located in the northern section of the city and are served by the fourth precinct of the Minneapolis Police Department. The fourth precinct conducted a total of 187 residential and commercial surveys within the demonstration year. The fifth precinct, serving Lowry Hill East, conducted 122 residential and commercial surveys plus 10 entire

apartment buildings within the same length of time. The level of participation, however, among the neighborhood households on this aspect of the crime prevention program was rather low. In Lowry Hill East, 2.6 percent of *all* residences had a premise security survey by June 30, 1978. In Hawthorne, the percentage of all households in the area which received a premise security survey was 5.3. Finally, in Willard-Homewood, 2.8 percent of all residences had a security check conducted.

Another procedure for improving security consists of engraving property with a nationally identifiable number. Since 1963 when Operation Identification began, it has been included in many crime prevention programs.[1] In addition it has been tested as an independent crime reduction strategy by several state agencies as well as the federal government.[2] These evaluations of Operation Identification tested whether or not participants were victimized less often than nonparticipants. They also evaluated the rate of apprehension and prosecution of the burglar and the rate of recovery and return of stolen property for Operation I.D. members and nonmembers. The results of these studies have been controversial. Some studies report a significant reduction of residential burglary in target areas. However, no evidence has been reported which suggests Operation I.D. increases apprehension and/or conviction of the

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[1] U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *An Exemplary Project--Community Crime Prevention Program--Seattle, Washington* by Paul Cirel et al. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977); U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Crime-Specific Analysis: An Empirical Examination of Burglary Offense and Offender Characteristics* by Carl E. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

[2] Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, Evaluation Unit, *Minnesota Crime Watch* (St. Paul, Minnesota: State of Minnesota, 1976); U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Operation Identification Projects: Assessment of Effectiveness* by Nelson B. Heller et al. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

burglar. In addition there has been no substantive evidence that marking one's property decreases the burglar's ability to dispose of the stolen property. Despite all the known evidence, Operation Identification was included as one aspect of this crime prevention demonstration. The separate effect of Operation I.D. was not evaluated; its effect was considered in conjunction with other aspects of the CCP program. Operation I.D. was promoted largely via the block club structure. Engravers and identifying stickers were made available to block club members, but the actual engraving was done by the resident. Block club participants were encouraged to mark their property, but participation was voluntary. At times participants would engrave their property but refuse to display the Operation I.D. sticker. Some residents believed that, rather than acting as a deterrent, the sticker may advertise the location of property that is worth stealing. Through this crime prevention program, 4.5 percent, 5.3 percent, and 2.9 percent of the total households engraved property in the Lowry Hill East, Hawthorne, and Willard-Homewood neighborhoods, respectively.

The extent of prior participation in Operation I.D. could not be documented since its promotion has been so widespread. However, the Resident Survey, dealing with citizen's fear of crime, included a question concerning Operation I.D. Random samples of residents were asked if they belonged to Operation I.D. (in 1976 and in 1978). Participation prior to this project can be gauged by the 1976 results. All three neighborhoods show an increase in participation from 1976 to 1978, and the increases in

Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood were statistically significant.[1] The Hawthorne neighborhood showed an increase also, but not a significant one.

As part of the premise security survey follow-up, respondents were asked if they had Operation I.D. numbers. Hawthorne residents had the highest percentage of participation; 85.7 percent of the premise security survey recipients also had marked their valuables with an identifying number. In Lowry Hill East, 75.9 percent and in Willard-Homewood, 61.4 percent of those residents who had received a premise security survey also joined Operation Identification. This difference may suggest that a select number of residents in Hawthorne have a higher level of overall participation.

As mentioned earlier, each neighborhood projected goals it would reach within the first year. For Operation I.D., the Willard-Homewood staff thought there would be 300 requests. The actual number of requests was 97. For the Hawthorne neighborhood, the projected number of requests was 150 while the actual number was 86. Lowry Hill East projected 180 requests; the actual number was 153. All three neighborhoods completed 100 percent of the actual number of requests.

As described in Chapter III, it was hoped landlord responsibility would increase by making absentee landlords aware of security problems. Subsidy monies were made available to apartment owners as an incentive to improve faulty security. Letters, citing problems in apartment buildings and interest on the part of the tenant to have better security, were

[1] Significance at the .05 level requires a standardized *Z*-score of 1.645. In Lowry Hill East the *Z*-score was 2.504. In Willard-Homewood the *Z*-score was 2.211, and Hawthorne's *Z*-score was 1.059. See Table V.42 p. 198, and the discussion starting on p. 196 for more details.

to be sent to the owner from the city of Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention program. It was hoped this action would encourage the owners of these buildings to secure their rental property.

Since the Lowry Hill East neighborhood has an unusually high percentage of rental property, it was expected to be more concerned with landlord responsibility than the other areas. At the beginning of the project, in the summer of 1977, letters were sent to all landlords in Lowry Hill East explaining the program and emphasizing the components that would benefit them most. Attempts were made to include absentee landlords in the block club meetings held on the block in which they owned property. If residents complained of weak security and landlords seemed unresponsive, letters citing specific problems were sent from the city of Minneapolis crime prevention office to the owners. If this produced no action, the CCP staff contacted the housing inspector who could issue a citation if the property did not meet the city security codes. The staff worked with the city housing inspector to alleviate security problems for the tenants.

This component of the CCP demonstration was never fully implemented in the two neighborhoods in north Minneapolis. In Hawthorne an initial attempt was made to identify absentee landlords but little else occurred. Records in the Willard-Homewood files do not exhibit any work on this objective.

2. Opportunity Reduction through Environmental Design

Physical design changes developed by the CCP city staff architect were planned for all three neighborhoods within the demonstration year. Sometimes, areas in need of change were brought to staff attention by

residents attending preprogram meetings. The city staff also surveyed a number of block club members to gain another perspective on needed environmental changes. Usually, public hearings were held before any changes were made to provide information to those interested and to allow residents a chance to react to the proposal.

Willard-Homewood had four different environmental changes planned. First, in the spring of 1978, an alley was altered. This was a special case where residents believed juveniles used the dead end as a meeting place and allegedly made transactions with stolen goods. This alley was a "T," and one arm of the "T" was closed; hence traffic could still flow in an inverted "L" fashion. The two abutting residential property owners took responsiblity for the zone which was closed. That part of the "T," then, would still be in the public domain but, practically, would be a natural barrier of shrubs and grass.

The second change planned for Willard-Homewood was installing new lights in alleyways within census tract 28 (replacing mercury vapor lamps with high pressure sodium vapor lamps which give out more light at a more efficient rate). Originally, this lighting was to include alleys in census tracts 27 and 28. Sometime in August of 1978, about a month and a half past the end of the demonstration year, these plans were altered to include only tract 28. The third change indicated that traffic was to be modified in the southern area of census tract 28. One street, running east and west, was to be made a one-way street. Traffic diverters were planned for some areas within Willard-Homewood in order to control the direction of the traffic. The fourth type of change that was planned for this area was alley barricades. East-west alleys immediately north of Plymouth Avenue, in census tract 27, were proposed to be barricaded as

thoroughfares. These alleys had been used as a shortcut between opposite one-way streets. In other cases, the alleys had been used as gathering points for individuals who allegedly disturb the desired character of the residential area.

The first change discussed for Willard-Homewood, the "T" alley, has already been completed. No public hearing was held before that change was made. Of the remaining three projected changes, public hearings have been held on two of them: the traffic diverters and alleyway lighting. All three changes were expected to be implemented during 1978. A public hearing on alleyway barricades has not been planned as of this writing.

In Hawthorne, three traffic diverters were planned to alleviate the traffic problems there. The final plan that was presented to the community seemed to offer the greatest flexibility because the diverters could offer a pathway from the Boardway area to the North Star school. These diverters would also serve to reroute traffic without severely limiting access to the neighborhood. The major intent was to shift north-south traffic to opposing one-way streets (Emerson and Fremont) and Lyndale Avenue (a major two-way street), which were designed for heavier traffic volume. This proposal was discussed with residents of Hawthorne at a public hearing on May 18, 1978. A representative from the Department of Public Works, the local alderman, and CCP city and local staff were present. The only major objection to this proposal came from a resident who lived close to an area that would receive a traffic diverter. The alderman felt that if this resident had a strong objection, then maybe other residents not in attendance would also. The decision was left pending, and as of this writing no further decisions or actions have been undertaken.

In Lowry Hill East, two diverters were planned on one north-south avenue. These diverters were positioned to create a pedestrian walkway designed to help identify Lowry Hill East as a neighborhood and to create a visual asset. The walkway would begin in the northern section of the neighborhood and would travel through a major part of the neighborhood to the park located approximately half the distance through Lowry Hill East. High pressure sodium vapor lights were planned for the blocks adjoining the walkway. In the proposal, however, these new and efficient lights were to be privately purchased by residents on those affected blocks. The CCP staff was investigating the possibility of buying these lights in bulk in order to decrease the cost to the residents. On May 25, 1978, a public hearing was held to obtain residents' reactions to the proposed plan. Though the CCP staff felt the majority of people in attendance accepted the plan, there was a substantial number opposed. It was decided, at that time, to install temporary diverters and to measure their effect via traffic counts. The temporary diverter would not be as attractive as the permanent ones would be since landscaping would not be included. By the end of the demonstration year, the environmental changes planned for Lowry Hill East, though set in motion, had not occurred.

The environmental changes scheduled to occur within the first demonstration year of this project did not occur. Minneapolis does not have much public construction underway between November and May each year, due to its severe winter. However, all planners, as well as project staff, were well acquainted with the seasonal climate of this area. Since the end of the project year, temporary diverters were erected in Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East to gauge residents' reactions before

constructing permanent ones. Residents of Lowry Hill East were mostly opposed, and those diverters were taken down within a couple of months. A study in Berkeley, California, found that: "Since the appearance of the diverters is so temporary many residents may be encouraged to oppose rather than to accept," which is apparently what occurred in Lowry Hill East.[1] Willard-Homewood residents, in the meantime, have yet to make a decision, and the temporary diverters still stand.

3. Summary

Securing one's home through target hardening and marking valuables is considered a direct crime reduction activity. Redesigning portions of the neighborhoods' environment had also been expected to reduce crime.

Neighborhood staffs projected the number of residents who would request premise security surveys as well as Operation Identification. Projections were mostly overzealous on both these strategies. Of the residential premise surveys requested, Lowry Hill East completed 94 percent, Hawthorne completed 70 percent, and Willard-Homewood completed 37 percent. In addition, 9 commercial surveys were conducted in Hawthorne and 24 in Lowry Hill East. Ten apartment buildings were also surveyed in Lowry Hill East. Premise security surveys were more easily processed for owner-occupied units. The majority of respondents included in the follow-up survey on target hardening cited reasons directly related to the CCP program for requesting the service. Most respondents knew of the security problems prior to the survey, and, surprisingly, the

[1]Donald Appleyard et al., *Liveable Urban Streets: Managing Auto Traffic in Neighborhoods* (Berkeley, California: Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, January, 1976), p. 255.

majority reported that they would have made the changes regardless of the subsidy. A range of 2 to 5 percent of the residential units in each neighborhood was surveyed through this program. Between 40 to 70 percent of those who were surveyed actually implemented some of the recommended changes.

Because of the vast number of programs promoting Operation Identification in the past, the extent of residential involvement prior to this project could not be assessed. However, random samples of demonstration neighborhood residents were surveyed in 1976 and again in 1978 on their participation in Operation I.D. Statistically significant increases in participation between the two time periods occurred in Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East. This does not necessarily mean, however, that this increase can be attributed to this program.

Increasing responsibility of landlords (especially absentee landlords) was hoped to be accomplished within the first year of this project. Lowry Hill East was the only neighborhood to work actively to achieve this goal. Results of this strategy are not easily measured or even identified. It is likely, though, that this strategy had no impact upon crime in Lowry Hill East and certainly none in the other two neighborhoods.

Physical changes of the environment in the demonstration neighborhoods were intended to reduce criminal activity. Within the demonstration year only one of the many proposed changes was implemented: an alley was modified in Willard-Homewood. Perhaps if physical redesign plans had been set in motion in the fall of 1977, the lengthy process of city and local approval could have been handled during the winter months.

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If redesign changes had been approved by early spring, the work could have been completed by the end of the project. Plans for the one alleyway which was redesigned began in late summer of 1977, and implementation occurred in the spring of 1978. Obviously, the one physical design change could not have reduced crime significantly in Willard-Homewood.

D. INDIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

1. Increased Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques

Educating residents on the subject of community crime prevention could be the first step toward a vigilant neighborhood. However, one of the primary requirements of an information program is to determine the information needs of the community. During the planning period (before the project began), many meetings were held in the three neighborhoods. Planners felt able to determine the level of crime information among meeting participants and then devised an informational package directed to these residents. Once the CCP program was underway, neighborhood organizers assessed the adequacy of the efforts devised to disseminate information about CCP. Other than the single-purpose versus the multiple-purpose approaches adopted by the individual organizers, the CCP instruction was consistent among neighborhoods. The city staff developed large poster boards containing the basic outline of the CCP program which were to be used at block club meetings to guide the organizer's presentation and to help residents follow along. However, the boards were soon discarded by most organizers in favor of a less formal presentation that included discussions with the residents. Even in Lowry Hill East, where the two-meeting format was successfully implemented, the poster boards proved too formal and tended to distract residents.

Organizers believed that block club meetings, serving as the chief avenue for disseminating crime prevention information, should remain informal. However, all activities leading to a meeting (initial contacts), as well as efforts directed toward maintenance of block clubs, were used to communicate the crime prevention message. Help from the local media was employed also. Newspapers, published through an established neighborhood organization, were used to publicize the CCP program. One edition of a local newspaper even pictured two coordinators on its front page--attired in superman- and wonderwoman-like garb. A local radio station, KMOJ, provided broadcast time to Willard-Homewood and WIPOG. Given its short broadcast range, the station was capable of reaching only the near northside of Minneapolis. Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne residents are within the station's broadcast range.

A bimonthly crime prevention newsletter was established through this program (*The Public Eye*) and was disseminated to all households in the three neighborhoods. The CCP project also received citywide publicity in September, 1977, and again in May, 1978, via the *Minneapolis Tribune*. The September article reviewed the entire program but specifically dealt with Lowry Hill East. The May article was a follow-up of the September report reviewing what the program could have accomplished. Residents were interviewed by the reporter, and different CCP materials were reproduced in the paper. At an earlier date the Minneapolis newspapers reported the selection of Willard-Homewood as a site for a CPTED project (summer 1976).

The Lowry Hill East staff members spoke at several meetings throughout Minneapolis--such as a meeting of the National Association of Business Women. They also conducted training sessions of block captains in other neighborhoods of the city and were members of panels discussing current

problems in Minneapolis.

At the outset of the CCP project, some publicity occurred at the neighborhood kickoff ceremonies. In one instance rainfall may have deterred some individuals from attending the kickoff, but the staffs were pleased with the public turnout. Community gatherings were another avenue used to inform residents about CCP. For instance, Willard-Homewood organized a holiday festival for December, 1977. Several hundred residents attended the banquet and listened to a CCP presentation, the police precinct captain, and, finally, performers presenting scenes from the play "The Wizard of Oz." In the fall of 1977, the public was invited to listen to a panel of former burglars describe their modes of operation prior to conviction. About half of the 50 people in attendance was associated with the crime prevention program or its advisory body (CPAC). On one occasion, one of the coordinators was invited to speak from the pulpit at a Sunday church service. The invitation was accepted.

Another public information activity was the spring cleanup of alleys and trash in 1978 which served to enhance contact with the community. The spring cleanup was not newly introduced by the CCP program, for it had occurred in previous years. But publicity for the cleanup was simplified by using the block clubs as a forum for announcing the event. This spring cleanup was considered much improved over previous years, since the block clubs utilized a systematic approach toward organization. This was especially true in Lowry Hill East where the majority of the blocks were organized by the date of the spring cleanup.

In addition, in Willard-Homewood there was a specific organizational mechanism designed to address the concerns of juveniles. The Juvenile

Advocate Program, sponsored by the city of Minneapolis through an LEAA grant and administered by the Urban League, received cases on the basis of referrals. These referrals came from schools, agencies serving youths, juvenile court services, churches, police, and others. The number of youths served by the Juvenile Advocate Program was not determined by the evaluators. The project coordinator of this program attended a number of block club meetings informing residents about the services offered to youths. The basic objective of the program was to assist juveniles who might have been involved in a crime or who were having problems such as chemical dependency, family, school, or personal problems. Whenever possible the Juvenile Advocate tried to help youth referrals find employment or involvement in constructive activities. This program was the only major attempt of this project to address the juvenile population. Since juveniles play such a prominent role in the criminal justice system (especially relating to opportunistic crimes), it may have been interesting for the CCP program to have focused more on juveniles.

As described above, some effort was committed to using various media to publicize the CCP project, but the neighborhood staffs relied most heavily on conveying the crime prevention message through the block club organizing process. The initial contacts of residents (by door-knocking, by leaving literature, or by phoning) provided the first opportunity to inform people about CCP. Typically, the next step in the communication process occurred at the block club meeting. The agenda of the block club meeting was concerned basically with crime prevention matters although sometimes other topics were raised at meetings depending upon the interests of the participants and the approach used by the organizers. Lasting from one to two hours, each block club meeting exposed participants

to a fairly substantial discussion of the crime prevention approach. A survey of block club participants was undertaken in August, 1978, to gauge how well individuals recalled some of the major ideas discussed in block club meetings. These findings were discussed in detail in Section B of this chapter.

The survey findings do not prove or disprove the success of the block club as a communication medium. Only comparisons of different approaches to conveying information about CCP could provide insights on the relative merits of each medium. Nor are measures currently available to test for different approaches within the block club meeting context or of other media within a given neighborhood. The only possibility for offering some conjectures is to compare block club survey findings of the three demonstration neighborhoods. If striking differences in the responses were discovered among areas, then it might be possible to speculate about the impact of differences occurring in the context of meetings.

The block club survey findings do lend support to the theory that block clubs serve as an important communication medium. Data in Section B show that the adult population attending block club meetings ranged from 5 to 11 percent depending on the particular neighborhood. Although these figures are small, the survey findings show that the vast majority of the participants remembered basic aspects of the program. Eighty-two percent of the block club participants were familiar with Neighborhood Watch, and 90 percent believed it could be a "somewhat effective" method of preventing burglaries. It is possible that a small number of well informed residents would be sufficient to enact a block "watch." Those residents cognizant of crime prevention techniques could also serve as catalysts in the process of communicating the techniques to other neighbors. The

minimum number of well-informed participants needed to function in that role can only be conjectured. However, some theoretical models exist that suggest only a few persons per block, familiar with the program and willing to take effective action, could result in a reduction in crime.[1] This idea, though unproven, has appeal. Nonetheless, the small number of residents who could play that role in the demonstration neighborhoods would have a formidable burden if charged with disseminating the crime prevention message to their neighbors.

The number of residents participating in premise security survey and Operation Identification aspects of the program supplement the block club survey as a measure of residents' commitment to program objectives. The actual number of participants was reported in the previous section of this chapter. The percentages listed here are based on the number of residential units in each neighborhood. Residents would not be an appropriate base since these two aspects of the CCP program deal with the security of the dwelling. Total residential units were used since participating block club members' units were not always available due to the manner of recording. Thus, the following figures represent the percentage of total households in each neighborhood that were surveyed or had property engraved through this program. Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood reached approximately the same number of residences, showing that 2.6 and 2.8 percent,

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[1] Anne L. Schneider and Jerry Eagle, *The Effectiveness of Citizen Participation in Crime Prevention: A Random Outlaw Model* (Eugene, Oregon: Oregon Research Institute, 1974), page two of summary states that if "as few as three persons per city block are participating in the program and if these persons are able and willing to take effective action when they see a crime being committed . . .," crime could be reduced up to 10 percent in a geographic area. It should be mentioned that these are not proven data but rather findings from a theoretical model produced by the Oregon Research Institute.

respectively, were surveyed for security purposes. Hawthorne reported 5.3 percent of its units were surveyed. The same amount of households in Hawthorne, 5.3 percent, now have property engraved through Operation I.D. Lowry Hill East reported 4.5 percent of the residential units there have marked property, and Willard-Homewood's figure is 2.9 percent.

These last figures, on premise security surveys and Operation I.D., don't give much basis for optimism concerning the program's objectives. But then, results dealing with information learned through block clubs seem extremely successful. Though many forms of media were used to transmit the crime prevention message, the main focus was through block clubs. This was where time was spent explaining details, answering questions, and presenting crime prevention strategies. However, though block club members seemed well-informed of crime prevention techniques, only 5 to 11 percent of the adult population in these demonstration sites attended meetings. These figures do not suggest that a reduction in crime could be attributable to this program.

Recall also that, in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne, the residents involved in block clubs were more interested in learning security practices than in meeting more families on their block. In fact, 252 premise security surveys were requested in Willard-Homewood although only 92 were actually conducted. Also, in Hawthorne, 123 surveys (23 more surveys than the staff projected) were requested, only 86 were conducted. It may be that WIPOG and HIPOG organizing are responsible for this difference between the north and south neighborhoods. Residents of these areas may have known each other already through past block meetings and thus were more interested in the security aspects of the CCP program. It seems as if this project missed filling an important void on the northside by not

completing more of the security surveys.

2. Cooperative Interaction between Police and Community

Developing cooperation between the police and residents (by establishing relationships which would be mutually supportive, cordial, and respectful in contrast to being antagonistic) was one of the fundamental objectives of the CCP project. The major techniques for achieving more cooperation included the attendance of police at block club meetings and other community meetings, performance by police of premise security surveys, and the presence of two police officers assigned to the CCP program.

Police officers were often invited to the second block club meeting on a given block. There were about 11 such visits in Willard-Homewood, 31 in Lowry Hill East, and 14 in Hawthorne. Often the questions police handled in a block club meeting were quite specific. For example, residents wanted to learn what could be done about problem houses in the area, or alleged drug dealers living on the block, or how police response time to calls for assistance could be reduced, and so on. Residents felt free to criticize the police or to ask almost any conceivable crime-related question.

The two officers assigned to the CCP attended numerous community or group meetings in their respective areas (Lowry Hill East and the northside). The exact count of these meetings is not available. Some of the groups were business associations, social services, or church groups.

A third way in which there was major police involvement in the CCP program was through premise security surveys. Requests for the surveys would be filled by the police. Following a request for the survey, the

time and date of the inspection were scheduled by the two CCP police officers with the assistance of organizers (in the northside). The survey was performed by the two CCP officers plus officers from the fourth and fifth police precincts.

An objective of the CCP program was to encourage contact with residents in nonthreatening circumstances. The intention was to foster more supportive behavior from the residents and to sensitize the police to neighborhood concerns about the police and crime. Most importantly, success of the CCP project depended upon close cooperation between the police and residents. The heart of the project was Neighborhood Watch. If neighbors did not watch out for one another or if the police did not respond to suspicious-person calls or crime-in-progress calls, Neighborhood Watch would come to naught. Beyond developing mutual interdependence of police and community to prevent crime, it was hoped that attitudes of the police and residents with respect to one another would become more positive.

What actually occurred during the year? Did police and community interactions become more frequent *and* cooperative? A partial answer is based upon the survey of residents; however, there is no comparable survey of police officers. The survey results are mixed for the three demonstration areas. Two of the neighborhoods, Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East, show a consistent rise in positive attitudes toward the police whereas Willard-Homewood does not (see Tables IV.10, IV.11, and IV.12).

TABLE IV.10

RATING OF THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT[a]

RESPONDENTS' RATING	LOWRY HILL EAST 1976[c] (*n* = 111)	LOWRY HILL EAST 1978[c] (*n* = 123)	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD 1976 (*n* = 163)	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD 1978 (*n* = 135)	HAWTHORNE 1976[c] (*n* = 108)	HAWTHORNE 1978 (*n* = 102)
Excellent	14.4%	17.9%	9.8%	11.1%	13.9%	16.7%
Good	45.0	53.7	41.7	31.1	35.2	46.1
Fair	20.7	17.9	25.2	30.4	27.8	19.6
Poor	6.3	4.1	9.2	12.6	17.6	9.8
Very Poor[b]			4.3	8.9		
Don't know, other	13.5	6.5	9.8	5.9	5.4	7.8
TOTAL	99.9%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

[a]This table is reproduced in detail in Chapter V, Section D (Table V.47). Frequencies and relevant *Z*-scores are included in Table V.47.

[b]Only the Citizen Survey listed the response "very poor." Therefore the data from Willard-Homewood may not be comparable to the findings from the other neighborhoods.

[c]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

TABLE IV.11

INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT BY THE POLICE[a]

TREATMENT BY POLICE	LOWRY HILL EAST 1976[b] (*n* = 111)	LOWRY HILL EAST 1978[b] (*n* = 123)	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD 1976 (*n* = 163)	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD 1978 (*n* = 135)	HAWTHORNE 1976[b] (*n* = 108)	HAWTHORNE 1978 (*n* = 102)
Very well	29.7%	33.3%	57.0%	54.8%	29.6%	37.3%
Fairly well	16.2	18.7	21.5	25.9	17.6	19.6
Not so well	8.1	6.5	8.6	7.4	11.1	5.9
No contact	45.9	39.0	12.9	11.9	37.0	34.3
Don't know, other	0	2.4	0	0	4.6	2.9
TOTAL	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

[a]This table is reproduced in detail in Chapter V, Section D (Table V.49). Frequencies and relevant *Z*-scores are included in Table V.49.

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

TABLE IV.12

CITIZEN PERCEPTION OF HOW POLICE TREAT PEOPLE IN WILLARD-HOMEWOOD[a]

	1976		1978	
TREATMENT BY POLICE	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very well	69	42.3%	33	24.4%
Fairly well	61	37.4	59	43.7
Not so well	20	12.3	27	20.0
Don't know, other	13	8.0	16	11.9
TOTAL	163	100.0%	135	100.0%

[a]This question was included in the Citizen Survey administered only in Willard-Homewood in 1976 and 1978. The question reads, "How would you rate the way the Minneapolis police in general usually treat people in this neighborhood--very well, fairly well, or not so well?"

Table IV.10 shows Willard-Homewood residents seem to rate the job done by police less highly in 1978 than in 1976. Of those respondents in Willard-Homewood who talked to the police, a higher percentage in 1978 had favorable estimates of how *they* were treated compared to 1976 (see Table IV.11). However, when Willard-Homewood respondents were asked how well the police treated people in the neighborhood, there was a sharp negative change in the two extreme response categories (shown in Table IV.12). Why is there an apparent inconsistency between responses regarding police treatment of oneself as opposed to others? What could be occurring in Willard-Homewood is that personal or phone contacts with the police have been more favorable than expected. The expectation of a more negative experience may reflect upon a residue of ill feeling abetted by the turmoil of the late 1960's and the reputation of the northside precinct. Therefore, since Willard-Homewood was the location of some turmoil, residents' attitudes toward the police may have developed a negative orientation. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be tested with findings from Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne because comparable data do not

exist.[1]

Excepting the circumstances noted for Willard-Homewood, the neighborhoods seem to have a more favorable attitude toward the police in 1978 than in 1976. Can this be attributed to the CCP efforts? Conjectural responses can be offered while recognizing that the precise source of any change is always uncertain. It must also be remembered that relatively few respondents in the 1978 survey had had contact with the CCP project. Respondents were asked if they had attended a crime prevention meeting in the last year. Lowry Hill East received the most favorable responses; 32.5 percent answered affirmatively. In Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne the figures were 20 percent and 14.7 percent, respectively. Further, these percentages of people attending block club meetings likely underestimate the number of people affected by the efforts to improve police-community relations. Other family members and friends may learn about the block club activites vicariously. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any project alone could have produced such a sharp change in residents' attitudes toward the police in just one year. Historical processes may provide an equally plausible explanation of the change.

A further confounding factor for Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne is the extent of block club organizing prior to the start of the CCP project. WIPOG and HIPOG blocks had been operating as early as mid-1972. In Willard-Homewood, three times as many police visits to block club meetings occurred before CCP (37) as during (11). For HIPOG the figures are 10 before CCP and 14 during the project.

[1]The Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne survey did not ask how well the police treated people in the neighborhood.

Most of the police visits in WIPOG blocks took place prior to the 1976 survey. Does this mean that any positive changes from 1976 to 1978 can be attributed to the demonstration activities? In part it is possible to respond affirmatively, but the case of Willard-Homewood cannot be set aside. Moreover, attitude change often requires considerable time. The CCP activities working toward improving police-community relations commenced about September, 1977, and the survey was administered in late April, 1978. It might be argued that the effects of the pre-CCP police visits to block clubs continued into the demonstration period. But there is still another qualification: the number of police visits may not have been so important as the nature of the interaction. For example, during the demonstration period all of the police visits were related to crime prevention, whereas many of the earlier contacts were not. If one assumes that people will modify their attitudes more readily when personal contact involves recommendation of a specific program of action rather than generalities, then the police visits during the CCP project may have had more impact than the many earlier ones. Additionally, it is possible residents are influenced profoundly by specific services the police may perform such as the premise security surveys.

Among the possible effects of having a premise security survey is increasing rapport between the police and resident. The householder has the chance to be in direct contact with a police officer in a nonthreatening situation, and the police are observed performing a service for the resident. A number of anecdotes concerning the experiences of people who have had a premise security survey were related to the evaluators. One of the commonalities reported was the positive feeling residents developed toward the police officer as a result of the survey. The police

also informally reported a more positive experience than expected. It would seem that the residents and police both had very favorable experiences in the interactions incident to the premise security survey. An interesting question is how much change really occurred among the police since the officers performing surveys were self-selected and probably were favorably predisposed to the CCP program?

Perhaps as important events as anything done by the CCP staffs in attempting to improve police-community relations are the changes that may have occurred in the leadership of the police precinct stations following the city election in late 1977. Especially noteworthy was the appointment of a new captain to head the fourth precinct. Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne lie within the boundaries of the fourth precinct. The new captain explicitly endorsed the CCP project objectives and embarked on an ambitious program to improve police-community relations (via meeting with groups, speaking at CCP functions including block club meetings, and starting some foot patrols, etc.). The effect of added police emphasis upon crime prevention undoubtedly complemented the CCP efforts. Trying to isolate the particular contributions of the police efforts and the CCP activities is not possible in this evaluation.

3. Summary

The most accurate gauge of the effect of the information activites is the findings from the survey of block club participants. This is the case because block clubs were the most intensive medium employed to inform residents about crime prevention. A high proportion of the respondents could recall the essential elements of the crime prevention message. The conversion of this knowledge of crime prevention techniques to an effect on crime rates was not visible by the end of the first year. Such

an effect probably was not expected.

Improving police-community relations was another long-term objective that was not expected to produce immediate results. Based upon findings from the Resident and Citizen surveys (discussed in Chapter V), residents generally had a more positive view of the police in 1978 compared to 1976. Based upon residents' observations, contacts with the police who conducted a premise security survey were characterized positively. Apparently, a desired service was performed for the resident in a manner and environment which fostered mutual rapport.

The particular contributions of other attempts to improve the quality of police-community relations cannot be isolated in this analysis. The combined effect the crime prevention activities of the police and neighborhood staffs upon development of cooperative interactions might be discernible with the passage of more time. However, by the end of April, 1978 (about 10 months after the formal start of the CCP project), residents rated the police more highly than in 1976. Police treatment of residents also improved (with some qualifications) according to survey findings.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter focused upon the processes which were designed to implement the CCP program in three Minneapolis neighborhoods. Following some comments on the role of the evaluators, the organizational structure and strategies of the primary process activities (community organizing, direct and indirect crime prevention) were described and analyzed.

Community organizing activities encompassed block club and business

association organizing. Most of the blocks in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne were completely organized (i.e., achieved Neighborhood Watch status), and about one-half of the blocks in the Willard-Homewood neighborhood had at least one crime prevention meeting. Lowry Hill East was the neighborhood where substantial effort was devoted to encouraging the establishment of business associations. The two associations created included about one-half of the establishments in that neighborhood.

Relatively few individuals or residences were affected directly by the CCP program. Even in Lowry Hill East less than 11 percent of all the adults had attended a block club meeting. Between 3 and 5 percent of residences in each area had had a premise security survey or had Operation I.D. numbers inscribed on valuables. Changes in environmental design aimed at reducing crime were notable for their virtual nonexistence.

The survey of block club participants found that the basic elements of the crime prevention message were communicated effectively in block club meetings to a majority of the respondents. The effectiveness of other means of informing residents about crime prevention techniques could not be measured.

Finally, direct contacts with police in nonthreatening circumstances seemed to produce improved attitudes of residents toward police. Anecdotal reports of residents who had a premise security survey suggest that people respond very favorably when the police provide such a service.

The total effect of the block club organizing and direct and indirect crime reduction activities was not considered in this chapter. The combined impact of these activities upon crime rates is the subject of the next chapter.

V. IMPACT ASSESSMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will assess the impact the CCP program had on crime rates and on the fear of crime in the demonstration neighborhoods. An explanation of the method used to select the noncontiguous control tracts for each of the demonstration sites is presented first. Along with the individual control tracts, an area surrounding each demonstration neighborhood was specified for the sites. Concern for displacement of crime to contiguous areas from project areas is a phenomenon not uncommon to crime prevention programs. Various factors, such as costs to the criminal involved in operating in another area, limit the possibility for displacement of crime to neighborhoods bordering the demonstration sites.[1] The probability of displacement being evident in this instance seems miniscule due to the small size of the demonstration sites in comparison to the displacement areas (refer to Figure II.1). Nevertheless, this analysis assumes displacement of crime will occur *if* the project has reduced crime in the demonstration neighborhood. Some inspection of findings will be presented for readers who may choose to reject the assumption relating to displacement.

Next, crime rate changes are discussed for each neighborhood and respective control areas through the use of descriptive statistics. To

[1] Thomas A. Reppetto, "Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon," *Crime and Delinquency* 22 (1976), pp. 166-177.

augment these exhibits, analysis of covariance was computed for four crimes which can be disaggregated by opportunity.[1] The remaining crimes which were not appropriate for disaggregation were analyzed with a difference of differences of proportions test.

Finally, a difference of proportions test was employed to assess changes in responses on surveys conducted within each demonstration area. These surveys tapped residents' fear of crime, attitudes toward neighborhood and crime, level of home security, attitudes toward police, and rate of victimization.

B. SELECTION OF CONTROL AREAS

The design for the analysis of program impact upon crime required that control[2] areas be determined. Because the demonstration neighborhoods correspond generally with census tracts, the evaluation employed census tracts as controls. To determine which census tracts provided the best matches both on crime statistics and on demographic characteristics, a cluster analysis was performed on census tracts in Minneapolis. The cluster analysis program created a distance score for each pair of census tracts based on the distances between them on nineteen crime

[1]Disaggregation is the procedure for specifically identifying an individual occurrence of crime either by location or person. Analysis of covariance requires verification of an occurrence both before and during the project. This verification can be accomplished for property crimes since addresses readily identify residential units. However, crimes against person cannot be disaggregated in this instance because it was not feasible to verify on the basis of name only.

[2]In the strictest sense, the use of *control* here does not satisfy the experimental conditions; therefore, some people would prefer to call them *comparison* areas.

and demographic variables listed in Table V.1.[1] Then the program grouped the census tracts into clusters of tracts which share similar profiles on the nineteen variables. On the basis of this cluster analysis, the evaluation team identified those tracts most similar to the demonstration neighborhoods in both recorded crime rates and demographic characteristics. For each neighborhood, one noncontiguous census tract was selected as a control. Additionally, an area within approximately one-half mile surrounding each of the experimental tracts served as the displacement control area to measure any displacement of crime. Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne shared the same displacement area because of their geographic proximity (see Figure II.1).

The candidates for each noncontiguous control were reduced to a small set through the use of hierarchical cluster analysis. Eight crime rates and statistics representing eleven demographic characteristics were used as variables in the analysis. The crime rates were crime opportunity rates for crimes reported to the Minneapolis Police Department during the period July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1975. The demographic statistics, taken from the 1970 Census, were also selected to represent criteria used in choosing the demonstration neighborhoods. Though they are admittedly dated, the census data provided the only reasonably consistent source of information at the census tract level. (See Table V.1 which lists the nineteen variables used in the cluster analysis.) The two sets of variables proved to indicate a highly complex and nonredundant relationship

[1]Though auto theft is included as one of the criteria for selection of control areas, it was not used in the subsequent analysis for program impact. Insurmountable financial difficulties developed relating to data collection of reported auto thefts. Therefore the removal of this crime rate from the analysis should be noted.

among the variables making them ideal for use in a cluster analysis.

TABLE V.1

VARIABLES USED TO CLUSTER CENSUS TRACTS[a]

DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS (from census, 1970)

1. Percentage Residents Stable 1965-1970 (15% sample)
2. Percentage Housing Units Occupied
3. Percentage Housing Units Owner Occupied
4. Percentage White
5. Mean Family and Unrelated Individual Income (20% sample)
6. Percentage Residents over 64 Years of Age
7. Percentage Residents between 10-17 Years of Age
8. Population Density (per acre)
9. Percentage of Residential Structures Built between 1965-1968 (20% sample)
10. Percentage of Occupied Units Husband-Wife Family
11. Total Population

CRIME RATES PER 1,000 OPPORTUNITIES (from police records)

1. Residential Burglary per 1,000 Residential Units
2. Commercial Burglary per 1,000 Commercial Units
3. Commercial Robbery per 1,000 Commercial Units
4. Street Robbery per 1,000 Residents
5. Assaults per 1,000 Residents
6. Sexual Offenses per 1,000 Female Residents
7. Vandalism per 1,000 Structures (25% sample)
8. Auto Thefts per 1,000 Registered Vehicles (20% sample)

[a]Based on a 100% sample unless indicated otherwise.

The selection of noncontiguous control tracts was performed in the following steps:

1. Contiguous tracts (15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 29, 33, 34, 41, 55, 56, 66, 68, 70, 77) were excluded from the analysis since they were not candidates for noncontiguous control tracts.

2. Raw data for tracts 27, 28, and 32 were aggregated, and rates and percentages were computed for those tracts as a unit, and for the 109 remaining tracts individually.[1]

3. All variables were standardized using *Z*-scoring.

4. Hierarchical clustering was performed using the Ward minimum-variance method.[1]

5. Tracts which had the tightest clustering in comparison with demonstration neighborhoods were selected for further consideration.

6. Candidate tracts were ranked by assigning a given tract one point for each variable on which its value was closest to the neighborhood under study. The tract with the highest total points would be most like the demonstration tract.

Upon completion of this ranking process, it became apparent that mechanical acceptance of the highest ranked census tract provided difficulties of its own. For instance, some tracts which ranked highly with experimental tracts had such low populations that comparisons would have been unwise. Other candidate tracts had no commercial areas within them, while two of the experimental tracts had at least one major commercial strip. In the case of Lowry Hill East, it was difficult to find a tract that had similar types of housing units of comparable proportions (the number of multiple family dwellings is extremely high in this neighborhood). The imperfect match of a demonstration neighborhood with a control tract is accounted for in part because the cluster analysis weighs all nineteen variables equally. So, as a seventh step in choosing a noncontiguous control tract, an informal system of weighting was used as follows:

7. Informal system of weighting:

   a. existence of a commercial strip required,
   b. site inspection (similar percentage of apartments, number of abandoned homes, etc.),
   c. similar level of density,
   d. similar size population (with an added

[1]See page 104 for explanation of aggregation of tracts 27, 28, and 32.

[1]The algorithm used was the stored-data approach (MANAGE, PROCI) published in Michael R. Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications* (New York: Academy Press, 1973). The algorithm is implemented as a part of the CLUSTER package adapted for the University of Minnesota by Jeffrey H. Loesch.

requirement of a minimum level of population about 2,500).

Using the criteria for noncontiguous control tracts explained above, census tract 24 was selected as the Hawthorne neighborhood's control tract. Table V.2 compares the demographic and crime statistics for Hawthorne and tract 24.

TABLE V.2

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CRIME STATISTICS FOR HAWTHORNE AND SELECTED CONTROL TRACT[a]

VARIABLE	HAWTHORNE (tract 22)	NONCONTIGUOUS CONTROL (tract 24)
Demographic Statistics (from census, 1970)		
1. Percentage Stable	41.2%	55.4%
2. Percentage Occupied	96.6	95.2
3. Percentage Owner Occupied	35.7	39.8
4. Percentage White	99.5	100.0
5. Mean Income	$7,539	$7,774
6. Percentage over 64 Years	11.9%	15.6%
7. Percentage 10-17 Years	15.0	12.0
8. Population Density	37.4	29.6
9. Percentage of Residential Structures Built between 1965-1968	1.8	7.6
10. Percentage of Occupied Units Husband-Wife Family	51.2	52.6
11. Total Population	3,432	3,023
Crime Rates per 1,000 Opportunities (from police records)		
1. Residential Burglary	112.9	51.9
2. Commercial Burglary	414.3	402.8
3. Commercial Robbery	42.9	41.7
4. Street Robbery	5.8	1.3
5. Assaults	4.9	1.3
6. Sexual Offenses	1.1	0.6
7. Vandalism	23.3	23.8
8. Auto Theft	30.2	6.6

[a]Refer to Table V.1 for complete variable name and the percentage of the sample used.

Census tract 109 was chosen to be the most comparable tract to Willard-Homewood according to the listed criteria. Willard-Homewood is actually comprised of tracts 27, 28, and 32, with portions of tracts 20

and 21. Selection of the noncontiguous control was accomplished by aggregating the crime and demographic data for tracts 27, 28, and 32. Tracts 20 and 21 were excluded because the data for the eleven demographic variables were not available at the block level. Aggregating these data for tracts 27, 28, and 32 was justified because they are as close in statistical profile as any tracts in Minneapolis. Table V.3 gives the statistics for Willard-Homewood and its selected noncontiguous control tract.

TABLE V.3

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CRIME STATISTICS FOR WILLARD-HOMEWOOD AND SELECTED CONTROL TRACT[a]

VARIABLE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD (tracts 27,28,32)	NONCONTIGUOUS CONTROL (tract 109)
Demographic Statistics (from census, 1970)		
1. Percentage Stable	35.0%	56.1%
2. Percentage Occupied	93.5	97.9
3. Percentage Owner Occupied	60.8	82.6
4. Percentage White	53.9	64.4
5. Mean Income	$7,736	$8,515
6. Percentage over 64 Years	7.6%	17.3%
7. Percentage 10-17 Years	18.9	14.0
8. Population Density	27.8	23.0
9. Percentage of Residential Structures Built between 1965-1968	1.7	-0-
10. Percentage of Occupied Units Husband-Wife Family	56.1	63.7
11. Total Population	8,568	5,321
Crime Rates per 1,000 Opportunities (from police records)		
1. Residential Burglary	102.8	52.3
2. Commercial Burglary	428.6	181.8
3. Commercial Robbery	125.0	106.1
4. Street Robbery	4.8	3.6
5. Assaults	2.9	3.0
6. Sexual Offenses	1.3	0.7
7. Vandalism	10.7	9.8
8. Auto Theft	20.1	10.4

[a]Refer to Table V.1 for complete variable name and the percentage of the sample used.

Census tract 93 was selected, in preference to other tracts, as the

best noncontiguous control tract for Lowry Hill East. Table V.4 displays the values for each of the variables for the two comparable tracts. The commercial burglary rate listed on this table for Lowry Hill East is somewhat misleading because the demonstration area included Lyndale Avenue which is not in tract 67. Therefore, crimes affecting the commercial sector are underreported for this neighborhood.

TABLE V.4

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CRIME STATISTICS FOR LOWRY HILL EAST AND SELECTED CONTROL TRACT[a]

VARIABLE	LOWRY HILL EAST (tract 67)	NONCONTIGUOUS CONTROL (tract 93)
Demographic Statistics (from census, 1970)		
1. Percentage Stable	22.9%	48.7%
2. Percentage Occupied	96.7	98.1
3. Percentage Owner Occupied	14.1	37.1
4. Percentage White	98.9	99.2
5. Mean Income	$5,896	$6,935
6. Percentage over 64 Years	10.3%	17.0%
7. Percentage 10-17 Years	6.0	12.0
8. Population Density	63.8	37.6
9. Percentage of Residential Structures Built between 1965-1968	12.6	3.7
10. Percentage of Occupied Units Husband-Wife Family	32.7	42.2
11. Total Population	5,729	4,043
Crime Rates per 1,000 Opportunities (from police records)		
1. Residential Burglary	63.8	41.9
2. Commercial Burglary	120.0	220.6
3. Commercial Robbery	70.0	58.8
4. Street Robbery	2.8	2.0
5. Assaults	2.4	0.7
6. Sexual Offenses	2.1	-0-
7. Vandalism	4.2	4.9
8. Auto Theft	20.6	6.6

[a]Refer to Table V.1 for complete variable name and the percentage of the sample used.

One criticism of community crime prevention projects has been that crime is not actually reduced, but rather it is displaced to an area unaffected by the project. To test for this, census tracts bordering each

neighborhood were designated as the displacement control areas. At a minimum, the census tracts surrounding the demonstration areas encompass a half-mile radius. Crime data were collected for these areas.

C. ANALYSIS OF CRIME DATA

Four types of data were collected for the analysis of crime rates. First, information was received from the FBI on crime rates of major cities with populations over 100,000.[1] These figures were gathered to enable evaluators to grasp national trends of crime. These data included information on calendar years 1974 through 1977. Second, Minneapolis crime rates were collected from the Minneapolis Police Department's Research Division. These data were needed to assess any fluctuation different from the national trends and from the demonstration areas. Data on calendar years 1974 through 1977 were gathered for an assessment of Minneapolis crime rates. Third, crime information of the three treatment neighborhoods and their respective control areas was gathered for the period of January 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978. These data will be compared to crime data collected prior to program implementation for fiscal year 1975. Instruments used to collect these data included extensive information on each crime committed in these areas. Fourth, crime data were collected for the displacement areas in north and south Minneapolis. These data included type of offense, location, and date and were compared to preprogram data. Displacement crime data were collected from January 1,

[1]Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974-1976). Figures presented in this chapter include only those cities which were *consistently* reported in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977. However, 1977 data were taken from the preliminary annual release document, published March 31, 1978. The final annual report had not been released at the time of this writing.

1977, through May 31, 1978.

In the following section, a descriptive analysis will utilize all four types of crime information. This descriptive treatment, however, can only give a partial picture of crime changes. Additional statistical measures will be used to assess changes in the incidents and rates of crime for the demonstration, control, and displacement areas. Analysis of covariance will be used to analyze those crimes that can be disaggregated to the opportunity level. These crimes include: residential burglary, commercial burglary, commercial robbery, and vandalism. Opportunity may be used as the unit of analysis for these crimes, since the total number of opportunities possible is available for these three areas. Crimes, such as assault, would need a list of adult residents as the total targets available. However, no such list exists. For crimes which have residents as their level of opportunity, a difference of differences of proportions test will be utilized. These crimes include: personal robbery, assault, and criminal sexual conduct.

1. Descriptive Statistics

Before the analysis of the crime data commences, some basic assumptions should be addressed. The target crime for this, and most CCP projects, was residential burglary. Although attempts were made to inform residents how to avoid all crimes, emphasis was directed toward residential burglary. Indeed, residential burglary was a major problem in the three demonstration sites. One would expect, if the program produced an effect, to witness the largest decrease in the residential burglary rate. The Lowry Hill East staff organized extensively within the business community as well. The CCP program was responsible for forming both of the

current business associations. In this neighborhood, then, crimes relating to the commercial community also should have decreased more than the remaining crimes.

Of the remaining crimes analyzed, three are considered crimes of violence: personal robbery, assault, and criminal sexual conduct. Although not usually or specifically addressed in the crime prevention presentations, these crimes could have been discussed if they had been concerns of the area residents. These three crimes and vandalism would be expected to have decreased less than residential burglary, and in Lowry Hill East, less than commercial robbery and commercial burglary also.

Below, the change in crime rates is discussed for each of the demonstration neighborhoods and their respective controls in terms of descriptive statistics. The following section explores the use of analysis of covariance and difference of differences of proportions to corroborate or qualify conclusions based upon the descriptive statistics.

a. The United States and Minneapolis Crime Rates, 1974-1977

Crime in the United States decreased 4 percent in 1977 compared to 1976. All burglary decreased 2 percent while all robbery decreased 4 percent. However, forcible rape increased 10 percent and aggravated assault increased 5 percent. Table V.5 displays crime totals for the different crime categories for calendar years 1974 through 1977. The September 14, 1978, release of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports indicates that reported total Crime Index offenses decreased 2 percent during

TABLE V.5

CRIME INDEX OF MAJOR CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1974-1977)

	CRIME INDEX TOTAL BY YEAR[a]							
	1974: 4,112,885		1975: 4,431,878		1976: 4,431,273		1977: 4,197,274	
TYPE OF CRIME[b]	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Burglary	1,213,053	29.5%	1,267,331	28.6%	1,208,504	27.3%	1,164,401	27.7%
Robbery	308,807	7.5	319,821	7.2	291,825	6.7	273,855	6.5
Assault	201,595	4.9	207,454	4.7	204,374	4.6	209,493	5.0
Rape	27,759	0.7	27,602	0.6	27,111	0.6	30,054	0.7

SOURCE: FBI Uniform Crime Report data. These figures include only those cities (with population over 100,000) which consistently reported for the years listed. Data were collected by calendar year.

[a]Crime Index total includes auto theft, larceny, homicide, and miscellaneous crimes in addition to the crimes listed in the table.

[b]The categories are defined as follows: Burglary includes residential and commercial burglary; Robbery includes business and personal robbery; Assault is aggravated assault; and Rape does not include statutory rape. All categories include attempts.

[c]Since auto theft, larceny, homicide, and miscellaneous crimes are not included in this table, but are included in the crime index total, the percentages do not equal 100.

the first six months of 1978 compared to the same period in 1977.[1] This includes a 5 percent increase in rape, 3 percent increase in aggravated assaults, 2 percent fewer robberies, and a 1 percent decrease in burglary.[2]

Minneapolis had a 5.9 percent increase for total crime categories between 1976 and 1977 (listed in Table V.6). The 1977 statistics show an increase in each crime category over 1976. Unfortunately the crime rates for the first 6 months of 1978 were not available for Minneapolis as a whole. As previously mentioned, although these figures cannot be directly compared to the U.S. crime rate, the differences should be noted. Minneapolis does not seem to be consistent with the national trends for this time period.

b. Willard-Homewood

Crime in Willard-Homewood increased 31.6 percent in fiscal year 1978 over baseline data year 1975. However, control tract 109 reported an overall increase of 41.9 percent for the same years while the northside displacement area had a decrease of 5.4 percent. The residential burglary rate fit this same pattern: in Willard-Homewood the rate increased 24.4 percent, in control tract 109 it increased 68.3 percent, while in the displacement area residential burglary decreased 2.4 percent.

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[1]The reader is cautioned concerning direct comparisons of United States crime figures to neighborhood crime figures since categories are somewhat different. For instance, the criminal sexual conduct crime rate includes forcible rape plus sodomy, incest, and molestation. Assault information for the demonstration neighborhoods includes simple, nonaggravated, and aggravated assaults. Also, the U.S. crime rate is measured by calendar year whereas demonstration crime totals coincide with fiscal years.

[2]Other crimes in addition to the four mentioned here comprise the Crime Index and contribute to the overall decrease listed here.

TABLE V.6

CRIME INDEX OF MINNEAPOLIS
(1974-1977)

	TYPE OF CRIME													
	Residential Burglary		Commercial Burglary		Personal Robbery		Commercial Robbery		Vandalism		Assault		Criminal Sexual Conduct	
YEAR	Frequency[a]	Percent	Frequency[a]	Percent[b]	Frequency[a]	Percent	Frequency[a]	Percent	Frequency[a]	Percent	Frequency[a]	Percent	Frequency[a]	Percent
1974	7,835	26.0%	2,772	28.8%	1,087	27.8%	617	34.1%	5,091	24.2%	4,163	23.5%	891	25.7%
1975	7,877	26.1	2,543	26.4	969	24.8	545	30.2	5,051	24.0	4,187	23.7	795	23.0
1976	6,931	23.0	2,069	21.5	870	22.2	279	15.4	5,438	25.9	4,608	26.1	804	23.3
1977	7,490	24.9	2,253	23.4	987	25.2	366	20.3	5,443	25.9	4,727[c]	26.7	968	28.0
TOTAL	30,133	100.0%	9,637	100.1%	3,913	100.0%	1,807	100.0%	21,023	100.0%	17,685	100.0%	3,458	100.0%

SOURCE: Minneapolis Police Department: Records Division.

[a]Number of actual offenses (includes attempts).

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]This figure does not include simple assault, only aggrevated and non-aggrevated assault. Other years listed include all three categories.

Assault followed the same pattern, except that the percentage increase in Willard-Homewood was much higher than control tract 109. For assault: Willard-Homewood's rate rose 50.7 percent, tract 109 increased 18.2 percent, and the displacement area dropped 6.4 percent. Vandalism and criminal sexual conduct rates increased for all three areas in fiscal year 1978. Another violent crime, personal robbery, increased in Willard-Homewood by 5.7 percent but decreased in the control tract and displacement areas.

Crimes related to businesses had some curious outcomes in Willard-Homewood (see Table V.7). Commercial robbery remained the same for both the demonstration area and control tract 109 (the latter's rate, though extremely small [7], was the same for both time periods). Commercial burglary was the only crime which decreased in Willard-Homewood; the percentage drop was 14.3. Except for commercial burglary and robbery, all other crimes in Willard-Homewood displayed increases in fiscal year 1978 data over 1975. This result is intriguing considering Willard-Homewood was the only neighborhood of the three which did not attempt to organize neighborhood businesses. All but two categories of crime (personal and commercial robbery) in the control tract increased also. The northside displacement area, on the other hand, decreased on all crime categories but two (vandalism and criminal sexual conduct). The interpretation of these percentage changes will be explored and discussed in Section C, Part 3, of this chapter where additional information will be presented.

c. Hawthorne

The overall crime rate for Hawthorne decreased by 1.8 percent. Control tract 24 indicated a decrease of 35.2 percent. Since Willard-

TABLE V.7

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES
FOR WILLARD-HOMEWOOD, CONTROL TRACT 109,
AND NORTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA

	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD			CONTROL TRACT 109			NORTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA		
	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$
TYPE OF CRIME	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]
Residential Burglary	291	362	+ 24.40%	82	138	+ 68.29%	538	525	+ 2.42%
Commercial Burglary	35	30	+ 14.29	14	25	+ 78.57	164	121	+ 26.22
Personal Robbery	53	56	+ 5.66	12	3	+ 75.00	107	86	+ 19.63
Commercial Robbery	26	26	0.00	7	7	0.00	47	25	+ 46.81
Vandalism	140	210	+ 50.00	40	54	+ 35.00	288	301	+ 4.51
Assault	144	217	+ 50.69	33	39	+ 18.18	376	352	+ 6.38
Criminal Sexual Conduct	14	24	+ 71.43	3	5	+ 66.67	15	42	+108.00
TOTAL	703	925	+ 31.58%	191	271	+ 41.88%	1,535	1,452	+ 5.41%

SOURCE: Minneapolis police offense report data.

[a]Time 1 = July 1, 1974, through May 31, 1975.

[b]Time 2 = July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

[c]Percentage change is the Time 1 Frequency - the Time 2 Frequency ÷ the Time 1 Frequency: $\frac{T_1 - T_2}{T_1}$.

Homewood and Hawthorne are both in north Minneapolis, they share the same northside displacement area, which had an overall decrease of 5.4 percent (see Table V.8). Residential burglary and personal robbery also decreased in all three areas. The percentage decreases for residential burglary in Hawthorne, control tract 24, and the northside displacement area were 3.4, 5.6, and 2.4, respectively. There was a drop of more than 17 percent in vandalism incidents in this neighborhood while the control tract offenses diminished by 50 percent. Vandalism increased more than 4 percent for the northside displacement area.

Both commercial burglary and commercial robbery increased in the demonstration neighborhood and diminished in control tract 24 and the displacement area. Criminal sexual conduct increased across all three areas, but the actual number of cases should be noted as it is quite small. Assault incidents increased in Hawthorne, remained the same in the control tract, and decreased in the displacement area. Three of the seven crimes monitored decreased in Hawthorne: residential burglary, personal robbery, and vandalism. These crimes also decreased in the control areas by a large percentage. Of these three crime types, all but vandalism decreased within the displacement area as well. The other four crime types (commercial burglary and robbery, criminal sexual conduct, and assault) increased in Hawthorne. All crimes except criminal sexual conduct decreased in the control tract. All but vandalism and criminal sexual conduct were reduced within the northside displacement area. The interpretation of these changes will be presented in Section C, Part 3, of this chapter.

d. Lowry Hill East

The overall crime in Lowry Hill East declined by 17 percent. The control tract, 93, showed an overall crime increase of 41.3 percent

TABLE V.8

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES
FOR HAWTHORNE, CONTROL TRACT 24,
AND NORTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA

	HAWTHORNE			CONTROL TRACT 24			NORTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA		
	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$
TYPE OF CRIME	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]
Residential Burglary	117	113	+ 3.42%	36	34	+ 5.56%	538	525	+ 2.42%
Commercial Burglary	47	63	+ 34.04	31	14	+ 54.84	164	121	+ 26.22
Personal Robbery	24	8	+ 66.67	9	1	+ 88.89	107	86	+ 19.63
Commercial Robbery	6	10	+ 66.67	6	1	+ 83.33	47	25	+ 46.81
Vandalism	108	89	+ 17.59	52	26	+ 50.00	288	301	+ 4.51
Assault	87	92	+ 5.75	26	26	0.00	376	352	+ 6.38
Criminal Sexual Conduct	6	13	+106.67	2	3	+ 50.00	15	42	+108.00
TOTAL	395	388	+ 1.77%	162	105	+ 35.19%	1,535	1,452	+ 5.41%

SOURCE: Minneapolis police offense report data.

[a]Time 1 = July 1, 1974, through May 31, 1975.

[b]Time 2 = July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

[c]Percentage change is the Time 1 Frequency - the Time 2 Frequency ÷ the Time 1 Frequency: $\frac{T_1 - T_2}{T_1}$.

while crimes in the southside displacement area decreased by 1.1 percent (see Table V.9). Residential burglary held the same pattern; a decrease in Lowry Hill East of 15.5 percent, increase in control tract 93 of 3.7 percent, and a decrease of 9.7 percent in the displacement area. Commercial robbery mirrored this prototype with a drop in the demonstration neighborhood, a rise in the control tract, and a lower percentage in the displacement area. For commercial robbery, however, the drop in the displacement area was more than 13 percent below Lowry Hill East.

Commercial burglary and assault shared a pattern of decrease in Lowry Hill East, increase in control tract 93, and increase in displacement crimes. Percentage changes for commercial burglary were down 26.0, up 11.1, and up 36.5, respectively. For assaults, the percentage changes showed a decrease of 20.8, an increase of 62.5, and an increase of 3.5, respectively. Personal robbery decreased in all areas with the highest decrease in Lowry Hill East. In contrast, vandalism increased in all areas. Criminal sexual conduct remained the same in Lowry Hill East and increased in both the control tract and displacement area.

Generally, Lowry Hill East had less crime in all categories in 1978. Vandalism showed an increase and criminal sexual conduct remained constant. Lowry Hill East's control tract, 93, portrayed the opposite image. All crimes in the control tract increased in frequency with one exception, personal robbery. The southside displacement area showed discrepant information concerning crime rates. Three of the seven crimes decreased in magnitude while the remaining four increased. Discussion of how these changes may be interpreted will be reviewed in Section C, Part 3, of this chapter along with statistical tests which indicate which changes are significant.

TABLE V.9

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES
FOR LOWRY HILL EAST, CONTROL TRACT 93,
AND SOUTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA

	LOWRY HILL EAST			CONTROL TRACT 93			SOUTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA		
	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$	Time 1[a]	Time 2[b]	$T_1 - T_2$
TYPE OF CRIME	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]	Frequency	Frequency	Percentage Change[c]
Residential Burglary	226	191	+ 15.49%	54	56	+ 3.70%	628	567	+ 9.71%
Commercial Burglary	77	57	+ 25.97	9	10	+ 11.11	107	146	+ 36.45
Personal Robbery	36	8	+ 77.78	7	5	+ 28.57	165	94	+ 43.03
Commercial Robbery	43	25	+ 41.86	1	2	+100.00	58	26	+ 55.17
Vandalism	76	99	+ 30.26	4	28	+600.00	220	296	+ 34.55
Assault	120	95	+ 20.83	16	26	+ 62.50	288	298	+ 3.47
Criminal Sexual Conduct	28	28	0.00	1	3	+200.00	56	78	+ 39.29
TOTAL	606	503	+ 17.00%	92	130	+ 41.30%	1,522	1,505	+ 1.12%

SOURCE: Minneapolis police offense report data.

[a]Time 1 = July 1, 1974, through May 31, 1975.

[b]Time 2 = July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

[c]Percentage change is the Time 1 Frequency - the Time 2 Frequency ÷ the Time 1 Frequency: $\frac{T_1 - T_2}{T_1}$.

e. Summary

In review, Tables V.7, V.8, and V.9 display changes in recorded crime between 1975 and 1978 for the demonstration sites and their control and displacement areas. On closer inspection of these tables, it can be noted that the direction of the overall change in crime was reflected in the change for residential burglary (compare Figures V.1 and V.2). Willard-Homewood and control tract 109 showed an increase in residential burglary and the overall crime rate between 1975 and 1978. The northside displacement area exhibited a slight decrease in both of these categories. The Hawthorne area had less overall crime in 1978 than in 1975 as did control tract 24. Lowry Hill East showed a decline in crime also, but control tract 93 displayed substantial increase. In the southside displacement area, crime decreased slightly.

The difficulty in interpreting this information without the aid of simplifying techniques seems obvious. This is the reason other statistical measures have been applied to analyze the crime data. Wherever a notable difference between demonstration and control area incidence of crime seems apparent, the statistical test will serve as an interpretive aid. The reader will have to decide how much confidence to place in the results when descriptive statistics differ from the other findings. For example, if the incidence of crime decreased in the demonstration area at the same time that it increased in the control and displacement areas, it could be said that the CCP program had a positive impact on the reduction of crime. However, the percentage change may not be large enough to result in a significant value with regard to the analysis of covariance and/or difference of differences of proportions test. Should more value be placed on covariance or simple percentages? Since the covariance

FIGURE V.1

PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
IN THE DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOODS
AND CONTROL TRACTS



FIGURE V.2

PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF TOTAL CRIME
IN THE DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOODS
AND CONTROL TRACTS



calculus encompasses controls, one may lean toward accepting the values of this computation. Still it is intuitively compelling to believe that percentage changes, in the direction consistent with the program, have credence. However, in this instance, interpretation of the crime data is not quite so easy because the demonstration areas, as a whole, do not show a consistent trend.

2. Analysis of Covariance

The major portion of this section deals with a statistically sophisticated procedure. The reader who is interested in a detailed technical discussion of the analysis and results is urged to read the entire section on analysis of covariance. The reader who is not interested in the technical details of the analysis may prefer to read just the italicized paragraphs which follow and continue on to Part 3, Difference of Differences of Proportions.

The analysis of covariance suggests that by June, 1978, the demonstration neighborhoods experienced significantly lower opportunity rates for some crimes. This occurred in Lowry Hill East for residential burglary and commercial robbery; in Hawthorne for residential burglary and vandalism; and in Willard-Homewood for commercial burglary.

Like any statistical procedure, the proper application of analysis of covariance depends upon the data's meeting certain requirements or, as methodologists call them, assumptions. To perform an analysis when the assumptions are violated means the statistic has been inappropriately applied and its conclusions suspect. In analyzing these data used in analysis of covariance, it was discovered that one assumption was consistently violated. That assumption states that there should not be any significant

relationship between the independent variable (in this case, neighborhood) and another variable which the analysis uses as a control (in this case, level of crime before the project). Because that assumption did not hold true, the results of the analysis of covariance should not alone serve to confirm or disconfirm the presence of program impact upon crime. This means that the use of the analysis of covariance should be supplemented by other measures. In the following section, the difference of differences of proportions test is employed to measure program impact.

Whereas the previous section presented a description explanation of the crime data for the three neighborhoods, this section examines these data for statistically significant differences. The statistical tool used was analysis of covariance. The analysis was selected because in this instance it was necessary to "control for" the level of crime before the project was implemented. The level of crime, as most are aware, can vary dramatically from one geographic area to another. To analyze the data appropriately for the time the project was in operation, it was necessary to look at the new crime rate in relation to the old crime rate. Analysis of covariance took into account the old crime rate when it looked for differences in the new crime rate.

Analysis of covariance was proposed as the primary analytic method for crime data which could be disaggregated. To utilize analysis of covariance appropriately, a number of assumptions underlying this model had to be met. These assumptions are: 1) a normal distribution of scores within each population, 2) homogeneous error variances within populations, 3) error terms for the pretest score should not be serially correlated with the error terms of the posttest scores, 4) dependent variable must be an interval level variable, 5) there must be independent random samples

within populations, and 6) there must be no significant independent variable-covariate interaction.

While the first assumption was obviously violated in this intance, the extremely large sample size makes this assumption very robust. Judging from the nature of the second and third assumptions, random error will play a large role thereby sustaining the assumptions. The fourth assumption was clearly met by using the number of occurrences of crime as the dependent variable. Theoretically, the fifth assumption was tenuous. Because all crimes are not reported, using reported crime would not necessarily provide a random sample of all crime. It could quite conceivably provide a representative sample and, given the large sample size, serve as an adequate population estimate. The final assumption was one that is frequently not examined by evaluators and was tested prior to conducting the analysis of covariance. For a more indepth discussion of the analysis of covariance model as it relates to the project, the interested reader is referred to *Evaluation of the Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Demonstration*--Research Design.

Before proceeding into a discussion of the results of the analysis of covariance, a preparatory comment needs to be issued concerning the structure of the analysis. The analysis is based upon what is considered an opportunity rate--that is, how many times does a victimization occur in relation to the actual number of opportunities present. In some cases, crime opportunity rates are more accurate indicators of the level of crime than rates per thousand population. Those crimes which have structures or vehicles as targets, such as homes for residential burglary, cars for auto theft, or businesses for commercial robbery, are better described using crime opportunity rates. For example, Community A has 1,000 residences,

a population of 2,500, and 150 residential burglaries occurred there last year. Community B has 1,000 residences, a population of 1,500, and 100 residential burglaries last year. In Community A the burglary rate per 1,000 population is $\frac{150 \text{ burglaries}}{2,500 \text{ persons}} \times 1,000 = 60$, the rate per 1,000 opportunities is $\frac{150 \text{ burglaries}}{1,000 \text{ residences}} \times 1,000 = 150$. In Community B the rate per 1,000 population is $\frac{100 \text{ burglaries}}{1,500 \text{ persons}} \times 1,000 = 66.7$, the rate per 1,000 opportunities is $\frac{100 \text{ burglaries}}{1,000 \text{ residences}} \times 1,000 = 100$. Using a population-based rate, Community A has less of a residential burglary problem than Community B. However, using the opportunity rate, it can be seen that Community A while having 6.7 *fewer* burglaries per thousand population, has 50 *more* burglaries per thousand residences. If a resident were concerned about residential burglary, it would be a mistake to select Community A as a homesite over Community B. While this situation is definitely contrived, it does point out potential inaccuracies of population-based crime rates when population does not reflect the opportunity.

The crimes of residential burglary, commercial burglary, commercial robbery, and vandalism were chosen for the analysis of covariance application. The method employed was to determine the total number of each crime for a baseline period of fiscal year 1975 (minus June, 1975) and a project period of fiscal year 1978 (minus June, 1978). Because of the strong possibility of multiple occurrences at the same location, a unique street and address identifier was used to generate a data file which contained the total occurrences for each specific address within the neighborhood. The 1975 and 1978 data files were matched so that it was possible to determine which locations had either pre or during-project

occurrences of crime or occurrences at both times. Therefore the pre and during-project occurrences were interval-level variables with a value of zero or greater (usually zero or one) to signify the number of occurrences per address of that crime at each time period.

The analysis of covariance procedure required that each specific location be matched for pre and during-project occurrences of each particular offense. This matching was accomplished using the location identifier as a sorting and matching key. Where a match was not feasible because a crime did not occur at one of the two times, a dummy match was created to signify no occurrence to the computer program performing the analysis of covariance. The dummy variable was required because of the structure of the analysis of covariance. The analysis examines differences between neighborhoods on the during-project level of crime controlling for the preproject level of crime. The intricacies of this analysis necessitate that both a pre and during-project score be available. Therefore, if there was an occurrence at pretest but no occurrence during the project, a dummy score of zero had to be generated for the during-project score.

For analysis of covariance to be properly conducted, it is necessary that the covariate by independent variable interaction be nonsignificant. That is to say, the incremental impact of the covariate (preproject level of crime) is the same for each neighborhood tested. There should be no pronounced deviations of the covariate for any one neighborhood. Testing for interaction is accomplished using multiple regression techniques. Such procedures were employed as a prelude to computing this analysis of covariance.

As can be seen in Table V.10 almost all independent variable covariate

TABLE V.10

ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE: COVARIATE MEANS AND INTERACTIONS

NEIGHBORHOOD	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY			COMMERCIAL BURGLARY		
	Pre-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	During-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	Significant Interaction Present[b]	Pre-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	During-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	Significant Interaction Present[b]
Lowry Hill East	6.64	5.61	YES	33.77	25.00	YES
Lowry Hill East--Control	3.32	3.44		13.24	14.71	
Lowry Hill East--Displacement	3.71	3.35		10.29	14.04	
Hawthorne	6.40	6.18	NO	51.65	69.23	NO
Hawthorne--Control	3.18	3.00		43.06	19.44	
Hawthorne--Displacement[c]	5.42	5.29		29.55	21.80	
Willard-Homewood	8.83	10.98	YES	23.64	20.27	YES
Willard-Homewood--Control	4.78	8.04		21.21	37.88	
Willard-Homewood--Displacement[c]	5.42	5.29		29.55	21.80	

NEIGHBORHOOD	COMMERCIAL ROBBERY			VANDALISM		
	Pre-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	During-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	Significant Interaction Present[b]	Pre-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	During-Project Opportunity Rate[a]	Significant Interaction Present[b]
Lowry Hill East	18.86	10.96	YES	2.09	2.73	YES
Lowry Hill East--Control	1.47	10.97		0.24	1.65	
Lowry Hill East--Displacement	5.58	2.50		1.22	1.65	
Hawthorne	6.59	10.99	YES	5.63	4.64	YES
Hawthorne--Control	8.33	1.39		4.32	2.16	
Hawthorne--Displacement[c]	8.47	4.50		2.75	2.87	
Willard-Homewood	17.57	17.57[d]	YES	4.07	6.10	YES
Willard-Homewood--Control	10.61	10.61[d]		2.24	3.03	
Willard-Homewood--Displacement[c]	8.47	4.50		2.75	2.87	

[a] Rate per 100 opportunities.

[b] Significant independent variable-covariate interaction.

[c] Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood shared the same Displacement Control Area because of geographic proximity.

[d] Though the distribution of occurrences differs, the total number of occurrences are identical for both time periods.

interactions were significant. This situation is not unusual considering the extremely large sample size used in a number of instances. The sample size is so large that small differences begin to assume statistical significance. This impact is brought about by having the large number of degrees of freedom produce an extremely small residual mean square. The minuscule of the residual mean square merely serves to magnify the size of the main effects and interaction mean square terms.

Presence of the significant interaction terms presents some difficulty with respect to examination of differences controlling for the covariate. It is quite possible that violation of this assumption may be tolerated in certain instances. Pechman, in one of the few studies concerned with analysis of covariance interaction effects, found that the sample distribution of the *F* statistic differed little from the theoretical distribution unless the departures from homogeneous regression slopes were extreme. This work suggests that, as the situation departs from homogeneous slopes, the analysis becomes more conservative with respect to Type 1 error. This implies that, if a significant interaction is present, the overall test may well become more rigorous in terms of falsely labeling a difference as significant. Further, Pechman's work suggests that the robust nature of the assumption is undiminished by a quasi-experimental setting in which the distributions of the covariate (or covariate means) differ by group.

Another assumption of concern for analysis of covariance is the linear nature of the overall regression slope. The assumption was tested using multiple regression and dummy variables to represent the quadratic, cubic, and quartic functions of the prelevel score. These functions represent the nonlinear components of the prelevel score. If inclusion of

these functions in a multiple regression analysis dramatically increases the precision of the prediction equation, one can assume the presence of a nonlinear (nonadditive) relationship between the variables in the equation. In five of twelve separate tests (for each of four crimes by each of three neighborhood groupings), the R^2 change associated with the addition of the higher order functions proved to account for the largest proportion of the variation. The increase in R^2 ranged from 0.16 to 0.50. Further, in two additional instances, the second largest R^2 change was due to the higher order functions. The increases in R^2 for each of these two instances were 0.20 and 0.23. The existence of these curvilinear relationships casts serious doubt upon the utility of analysis of covariance in those situations.

Of the remaining five tests (vandalism in all three neighborhood groups and commercial burglary in Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood), all demonstrated significant *F* ratios for interaction. Because of the uncertainty regarding the robust nature of the assumptions addressing the impact of interaction, the results are reported with caution. Analysis of covariance summary tables are presented in Appendix Tables B.1 through B.12.

The analysis of covariance does not reveal any consistent trend pertaining to a reduction in criminal activity resulting from the community crime prevention program. As shown in Table V.11, on three occasions one of the demonstration neighborhoods had a significantly higher number of occurrences per opportunity than did the respective control areas. For the two remaining cases, a control area had either a higher or lower number of occurrences. In commercial burglary the adjusted mean for Lowry Hill East was significantly higher than its two controls. The control

census tract chosen for Willard-Homewood also had a significantly higher number of burglaries per opportunity than did the demonstration or other control area. For the crime of vandalism, in two instances (Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood) the demonstration area had a higher number of per opportunity occurrences than did its appropriate control areas. In Lowry Hill East the census tract selected as a control experienced significantly fewer incidents of vandalism per opportunity than did Lowry Hill East or the other control area. Quite simply, there was no evidence in the three areas suitable for analysis of covariance that the demonstration areas had a significantly lower crime level per opportunity than the control areas.

TABLE V.11

ADJUSTED MEANS FOR: DURING-PROJECT OCCURRENCES PER OPPORTUNITY[a]

TYPE OF CRIME	ADJUSTED MEAN	GRAND MEAN
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY		
Lowry Hill East	0.287[b]	0.157
Lowry Hill East--Control	0.147	
Lowry Hill East--Displacement	0.131	
Willard-Homewood	0.190	0.229
Willard-Homewood--Control	0.369[b]	
Willard-Homewood--Displacement	0.223	
VANDALISM		
Lowry Hill East	0.025	0.018
Lowry Hill East--Control	0.005[b]	
Lowry Hill East--Displacement	0.018	
Hawthorne	0.054[b]	0.025
Hawthorne--Control	0.028	
Hawthorne--Displacement	0.025	
Willard-Homewood	0.073[b]	0.039
Willard-Homewood--Control	0.024	
Willard-Homewood--Displacement	0.031	

[a]Each group of entries represent a significant difference as determined by analysis of covariance procedures contained in Appendix B.

[b]Probability less than .01.

The impact of the program becomes even more suspect when one examines the amount of variation attributed to each variable used in the analysis of covariance. As can be seen in Table V.12, only a small proportion of the total explained variation is not accounted for by the number of pretest occurrences. In vandalism the amount of variation explained by prelevel occurrences is striking. This could possibly suggest that certain types of locations are highly susceptible to repeat occurrences. One might expect that, if program effects were present, they would be manifested by the preproject occurrences accounting for less explained variation than is now the case. At this point the reader should be cognizant that the preproject occurrences account for a major portion of the total explained variation; yet this analysis of covariance reports significant differences between neighborhoods. Can these two seemingly disparate conditions coexist? Indeed. For as the raw preproject average is used to adjust the during-project average, small but significant differences are brought to light. The fact that a large sample size exists also serves to heighten the impact of what, on the surface, appear to be small absolute differences.

TABLE V.12

VARIATION ACCOUNTED FOR IN ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE

TYPE OF CRIME	TOTAL EXPLAINED VARIATION	VARIATION DUE TO PRE-PROJECT LEVEL	UNEXPLAINED VARIATION
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY			
Lowry Hill East	22.6%	21.6%	77.4%
Hawthorne	18.9%	18.7%	81.1%
Willard-Homewood	13.1%	12.1%	86.9%
VANDALISM			
Lowry Hill East	52.2%	51.7%	47.8%
Hawthorne	62.3%	61.2%	27.7%
Willard-Homewood	57.5%	57.0%	42.5%

In summary, there is some concern over reporting many of the results for analysis of covariance because of the presence of a significant factor-covariate interaction term. Research offers some hope that the interaction may not prevent examination of main effects scores, so results for the analysis are reported. The analysis of covariance results would not support the assumption that the program reduced crime. Further, there is some concern as to the nature of the relationship between variables so as to render the analysis of covariance moot. Given these concerns, the analysis of covariance procedure cannot address with certainty the issue of program impact upon crime. Inferences as to program impact must be derived from the following section dealing with difference of differences of proportions analysis.

3. Difference of Differences of Proportions

The difference of differences of proportions (DDP) test was computed on all crime categories; however, it was the primary statistical test for crimes of personal robbery, assault, and criminal sexual conduct. For the crimes of residential burglary, commercial robbery, commercial burglary, and vandalism, it was intended to supplement the results of the analysis of covariance.

The DDP test measures, from pretest to posttest (actually during-project measurement), the significance of the change in crime rates for each demonstration area as compared to its appropriate control. This test was also calculated for each demonstration area and its respective displacement area. The result of this test is a standardized measure called a *Z*-score. A *Z*-score of 1.645 would indicate a statistically significant difference between pre and posttest crime at the 0.05 level. The direction of the effect is predicted to be a reduction in crime.

Hence a positive *Z*-score of 1.645 or greater indicates that crime has decreased proportionately more in a demonstration neighborhood than either its control or displacement area. Or, a significant *Z*-score also could indicate that crime in a demonstration area increased proportionately less than its control or displacement area.

The DDP formula[1] is:

$$Z = \frac{(p_{s1} - p_{s2}) - (p_{s3} - p_{s4})}{\sqrt{\frac{p_{u1}q_{u1}}{N_1} + \frac{p_{u2}q_{u2}}{N_2} + \frac{p_{u3}q_{u3}}{N_3} + \frac{p_{u4}q_{u4}}{N_4}}}$$

where

p_{s1} = crime rate in demonstration neighborhood, pretest
p_{s2} = crime rate in demonstration neighborhood, posttest
p_{s3} = crime rate in control (and displacement) area, pretest
p_{s4} = crime rate in control (and displacement) area, posttest
p_{ui} = highest crime rate in census tract under analysis
$q_{ui} = 1 - p_{ui}$ (i = 1 to 4)
$N_1 = N_2$ = number of crime opportunities in demonstration neighborhood, and
$N_3 = N_4$ = number of crime opportunities in control (and displacement) area.

The p_s's above refer to sample proportions while the p_u's refer to population proportions. The population proportions, however, are estimated directly from the crime rate statistics. Using the highest crime rate in the analysis tracts as an estimate of the p_u's is the *most conservative estimate of the actual numbers*. This estimate is conservative because it reflects the deviation from the highest crime rate. The closer the population proportion of crime is to 0.5, the less likely

[1]The computational formula is included for the interested reader. Many readers may wish to proceed to the next paragraph where the conceptual discussion continues.

the calculated *Z*-score is to be significant. Researchers often use 0.5 as the population proportion because it is the *most conservative possible estimate*. Using the highest crime rate in the tracts under analysis may be less conservative than 0.5 but *it is more realistic* since it is an actual crime figure. Ideally, the demonstration neighborhood would have a significantly larger reduction in crime than the control tract or the displacement area. The control tracts should mirror the crime trend exhibited throughout the city, independent of the project. A classical outcome for the control tract would be a crime rate that remained the same. Additionally, the crime rate in the displacement area should be significantly higher than the control tract. This representation of program success would look like:

DEMONSTRATION	CONTROL	DISPLACEMENT
Decrease in crime	No change in crime	Increase in crime

In this instance, displacement would be evident. The program probably has reduced crime in the demonstration area while crime remained constant in the control tract. In each of the demonstration, control, and displacement areas, the crime rate logically could decrease, remain the same, or increase. Hence, there are 27 (3^3) possible outcomes of this project. Eleven of the 27 possibilities indicate program success. Table V.13 lists these eleven crime rate patterns.

The tabled results of the DDP test for each neighborhood coincide with the narrative review (see tables V.14, V.17, and V.18). The percentage change columns depict the magnitude, as well as direction of the change, with arrows denoting the direction of the percentage change in crime. The *Z*-score results are presented in a slightly different manner.

TABLE V.13

ALTERNATIVE CRIME RATE PATTERNS INDICATING PROGRAM SUCCESS AND/OR DISPLACEMENT

Rules of Interpretation Applicable to Table V.13.

The basic predictions were that the CCP program would reduce crime in the demonstration neighborhoods and that some crime from the demonstration neighborhoods would be displaced to the displacement control area. Several subsidiary statements arose from these major predictions: 1) The crime rate in both the displacement and control areas should be significantly higher than in the demonstration neighborhoods. 2) The crime rate in the displacement control area should be significantly higher than in the control tract.

PATTERN NUMBER	DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOOD	CONTROL TRACT	DISPLACEMENT AREA	INTERPRETATION
1.	Decrease	Same	Increase	Displacement seems evident; the program probably has reduced crime in the demonstration area while crime remained constant in the control area. This may be described as a classical outcome.
2.	Decrease	Increase	Increase	This outcome is next in rank to the classical case. If the crime rate in the displacement control area has increased significantly more than the rate in the control tract, then the program probably reduced crime in the demonstration area.
3.	Decrease	Decrease	Increase	Displacement seems clear but any impact of the program on reducing crime in the demonstration area could occur only if the percentage decrease in crime in the demonstration area is greater than the percentage decrease in the control tract.
4.	Decrease	Same	Same	No displacement because the change in the crime rate in the displacement control area should always be higher (more crime) than in the control tract. This is true because the displacement control area is as much a control as the control tract with but one exception: The displacement control area will likely show a higher rate of crime because of displacement. For the same reason, the program did not have an effect on reducing crime.
5.	Decrease	Increase	Same	This case is somewhat ambiguous because there appears to be displacement. Yet, the interpretive rule adopted here indicates the crime rate cannot be higher in the control tract than in the displacement control area.
6.	Decrease	Decrease	Same	Both displacement and a reduction in crime would occur if the percentage decrease in the control tract is less than the percentage decrease in the demonstration area.
7.	Decrease	Increase	Decrease	This case is somewhat ambiguous also. It would indicate displacement if the percentage decrease in crime rates is greater in the demonstration area than in the displacement control area. The program apparently has no effect on reducing crime however, because the crime rate has decreased in the displacement control area while rising in the control tract.
8.	Decrease	Same	Decrease	No displacement likely since the crime rate has remained the same in the control tract but decreased in the displacement control area. Program impact on reducing crime might occur if the percentage decrease is greater in the demonstration area than in the displacement control area.
9.	Decrease	Decrease	Decrease	The program may have reduced crime if the percentage decrease in the demonstration area is greater than in either of the control areas. Displacement is possible if the percentage decrease in crime is greater in the control tract than in the displacement control area.
10.	Same	Increase	Increase	Crime may have been reduced by the program if the percentage increase in the displacement control area is greater than in the control tract. Displacement would also occur using the same reasoning.
11.	Increase	Increase	Increase	The program may have reduced the rate of increase in crime if it can be shown that the percentage increase in displacement and control areas are higher than in the demonstration area. Displacement might be present if the percentage increase in the displacement control area is higher than in the control tract.

A positive *Z*-score indicates that crime in the demonstration area either decreased more or increased less than its control areas. A negative *Z*-score represents the opposite; that is, crime decreased less or increased more in the demonstration area as compared to its controls. Shaded areas on these tables call attention to situations which portend project success.

Some readers may reject the use of the displacement area as a strict control area. Of course, utilizing it as such creates a more conservative analysis which the evaluators believed was desirable for the demonstration year. However, the displacement areas are quite a bit larger than any of the demonstration sites which may have seriously hindered significant results between these areas. Since that is a distinct possibility, inspection of the crime changes--*excluding the displacement areas*--will be presented at the conclusion of each neighborhood's findings.

a. Lowry Hill East

By reviewing Table V.13 with Table V.14, "Crime Rate Changes in Lowry Hill East," the reader can assess which crimes were successfully addressed by the program. In Lowry Hill East, each crime category fit one of the eleven patterns of success in terms of the direction of change. For example, residential burglary fell into pattern number 7 of Table V.13. Residential burglary incidents decreased in the demonstration neighborhood, increased in control tract 93, and decreased in the contiguous displacement area. The interpretation of pattern 7 indicates that the CCP program did not reduce crime since it declined in the displacement area and increased in control tract 93. However, displacement may have occurred

TABLE V.14

CRIME RATE CHANGES IN LOWRY HILL EAST

TYPE OF CRIME	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES[a]			*Z*-SCORE RESULTS OF DIFFERENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS TEST ON CRIME RATES[b]	
	Lowry Hill East	Control Tract 93	Southside Displacement	Lowry Hill East–Control Tract 93	Lowry Hill East–Southside Displacement
Residential Burglary	+ 15.49	+ 3.70	+ 9.70	0.86	0.81
Commercial Burglary	+ 25.97	+ 11.11	+ 36.45	1.14	2.62
Personal Robbery	+ 77.78	+ 28.57	+ 43.03	1.69	1.43
Commercial Robbery	+ 41.86	+ 100.00 (1,2)[c]	+ 55.17	2.28	1.19
Vandalism	+ 30.26	+ 600.00 (4,28)[c]	+ 34.55	0.77	-0.34
Assault	+ 20.83	+ 62.50	+ 3.47	1.50	1.47
Criminal Sexual Conduct	0.00	+ 200.00 (1,3)[c]	+ 39.29	0.29	0.53

[a] Shaded cells indicate the change is toward program success, i.e., decrease in crime.

[b] Shaded cells here indicate a statistically significant *Z*-score in the direction of program success. A *positive Z*-score of 1.645 or higher *signifies* that the *decrease in crime* in the demonstration neighborhood is significantly lower than in the comparison area.

[c] These percentage changes were calculated on a small number of cases; the actual numbers appear in parentheses.

if the percentage decrease in the crime rate was greater in the demonstration area than in the displacement area. Indeed, displacement is a possiblity since residential burglary decreased 15.5 percent in Lowry Hill East and decreased only 9.7 percent in the southside displacement area. However, the difference between the two crime rates was not significant. Nonetheless, the percentages may indicate the emergence of a displacement effect. With the passage of more time the possibility of such a pattern may become clearer.

The crime rate changes for personal robbery fit pattern number 9. The interpretation states that the decrease in the demonstration area had to be greater than either of the control areas. This stipulation was partially met since the percentage changes indicate that Lowry Hill East decreased more than either of the control areas. However, the *Z*-scores indicate that there was a significant decrease only in the demonstration area as compared to tract 93 (*Z*-score 1.69).[1] The interpretation further states that the decrease in control tract 93 must be greater than in the displacement area; which was not the case. Control tract 93 decreased 28.6 percent while in the displacement area personal robberies dropped by more than 43 percent. If these decreases were reversed so that crime in tract 93 had reduced more than the displacement area, a difference of differences of proportions test could be computed for significance. Since the pattern was not fully met, however, it would not be productive to compute this test.

Assault and criminal sexual conduct are the other crimes in which

[1]Measures of association remain very low in spite of significant findings.

individuals represent the level of opportunity. Assault, in Lowry Hill East, fit crime rate pattern number 2 which is next in rank to the classical case. Crime decreased in the demonstration area and increased in both the control tract and displacement areas. If the crime rate in the displacement area increased more than in control tract 93, than the program probably reduced crime in the demonstration neighborhood. However, control tract 93 had a larger increase than the displacement area so the decrease in Lowry Hill East cannot be said to be a direct effect of the crime prevention program. For these same reasons, displacement of assault incidents probably did not occur.

Criminal sexual conduct corresponded to pattern number 10. Lowry Hill East's rate was the same in fiscal year 1978 as in fiscal year 1975. Crime in control tract 93 increased 200 percent. (This large percentage change occurred because of the small number of cases: 1 in fiscal year 1975 and 3 in fiscal year 1978.)[1] Crimes in the displacement area increased, also, nearly 40 percent. For the program to have affected the demonstration neighborhood, crime in the displacement area should have increased more than in the control tract. This was not the case. Using the same reasoning, displacement would have been possible. Hence, the crime rates for criminal sexual conduct do not reflect program success or displacement in Lowry Hill East.

Commercial burglary matched pattern number 2: it decreased in Lowry

[1]These small numbers do not affect the calculations of the difference of differences of proportions test since pre and posttest crime rates are proportioned according to the number of existing opportunities. Opportunity rates are figured by dividing the number of incidents by the number of opportunities. Percentage changes, on the other hand, do not control for population.

Hill East while it increased in both control tract 93 and the displacement area. The increase in the displacement area must be more than the increase in the control tract area according to the interpretation of that pattern. Indeed, this was the case for commercial burglary in Lowry Hill East. A DDP test was computed between tract 93 and the displacement area resulting in a *Z*-score of 0.28. Although this *Z*-score indicates a non-significant increase in the displacement area compared to the control area, the importance of the existence of the pattern should not be dismissed. More importantly, a significant *Z*-score of 2.62 was found between Lowry Hill East and the southside displacement area. This means that not only was the direction of the difference indicative of program success and displacement but the magnitude of the change was significant. The crime rate pattern for this crime, commercial burglary, may well suggest program success and displacement.

Commercial robbery matched pattern number 7. Crimes of this type decreased in Lowry Hill East, increased in control tract 93, and decreased in the displacement area. This pattern did not reflect a displacement phenomenon. The percentage decrease was not greater in the demonstration site than in the contiguous displacement area. Interestingly, a significant *Z*-score (2.28) was obtained between the demonstration neighborhood and control tract 93. This could have resulted in program success *if* the displacement area had increased even more than tract 93. Of course the displacement area did not increase at all; in fact, the number of commercial robberies decreased more than 50 percent leaving a somewhat ambiguous pattern. In Lowry Hill East then, the commercial robbery pattern of changes was not indicative of program success or displacement.

Vandalism was the only crime category of the seven which increased in Lowry Hill East. Vandalism also increased both in tract 93 and in the displacement area. This pattern corresponded to crime rate pattern number 11. For possible program success, the percentage increases in both control areas had to have increased more than in Lowry Hill East. This stipulation was met, indicating possible program success. However, neither of the *Z*-score calculations was significant. Hence, though the direction of the change fit the interpretation of pattern 11, the magnitude of these changes cannot be interpreted as much more than chance fluctuation. Displacement did not occur because the percentage increase within the displacement area was not larger than tract 93.

When the displacement control was ocmitted from the analysis five unique success patterns remain. Table V.15 displays these five patterns accompanied by the interpretations of the *Z*-scores.

TABLE V.15

ALTERNATIVE CRIME RATE PATTERNS INDICATING PROGRAM SUCCESS[a]

The basic prediction was that the CCP program would reduce crime in the demonstration neighborhoods: the crime rate in the control tract should be significantly higher than in the demonstration neighborhood.

PATTERN NUMBER	DEMONSTRATION NEIGHBORHOOD	CONTROL TRACT	INTERPRETATION
1.	Decrease	Same	The program has probably reduced crime if the decrease in the demonstration neighborhood was significantly lower than in the control tract.
2.	Decrease	Increase	Crime decreased in the demonstration area while it increased in the control tract suggesting possible program success if the difference reached significance.
3.	Decrease	Decrease	If crime decreased significantly more in the demonstration area than in the control tract, then program success would seem evident.
4.	Same	Increase	Program impact would seem evident if the increase in the control tract was statistically significant compared to the demonstration area.
5.	Increase	Increase	In this instance the increase in the control tract must be statistically significant in comparison to the demonstration area.

[a]Significance was computed using the difference of differences of proportions test.

Table V.16 depicts the results of the analysis for Lowry Hill East when the displacement control area is excluded. Comparing this table with Table V.14 the reader can note that the reduced number of success patterns did not seem to change the direction of the results in Lowry Hill East. All crime types again fit one of the designated patterns. However, there were two major changes in the analysis when assessing the magnitude of the change. First, commercial burglary was considered the most successful pattern found in this evaluation when the displacement control was included, and although the direction of the change in crime still depicted a pattern of success, with displacement eliminated, the pattern included no significant *Z*-scores and thus did not reflect program success. Second, the opposite occurrence appeared for commercial robbery. With displacement included, program success was negated because the displacement decrease was more than that in Lowry Hill East. However, when it was eliminated from the analysis, program success was indicated by the direction and magnitude of the change and was supported by a significant *Z*-score. With the exception of these two changes, the analyses did not seem to produce very different results for Lowry Hill East.

TABLE V.16

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF CRIME RATE CHANGES IN LOWRY HILL EAST
(Omitting the Displacement Control Area)

CRIME TYPE	PERCENTAGE CRIME RATE CHANGES: Lowry Hill East	PERCENTAGE CRIME RATE CHANGES: Control Tract 93	PATTERN NUMBER[a]	*Z*-SCORE RESULT OF DIFFERENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS TEST ON CRIME RATES[b]
Residential Burglary	+ 15.49	+ 3.70	2	0.86
Commercial Burglary	+ 25.97	+ 11.11	2	1.14
Personal Robbery	+ 77.78	+ 28.57	3	1.69
Commercial Robbery	+ 41.86	+ 100.00	2	2.28
Vandalism	+ 30.26	+ 600.00	5	0.77
Assault	+ 20.83	+ 62.50	2	1.50
Criminal Sexual Conduct	0.00	+ 200.00	4	0.29

[a] See Table V.15.

[b] Shaded cells here indicate a statistically significant *Z*-score in the direction of program success. A *positive* *Z*-score of 1.645 or higher *signifies* that the *decrease in crime* in the demonstration neighborhood is significantly lower than in the comparison area.

Of the three neighborhoods, the crime rate changes for Lowry Hill East were the most promising. Successful program impact cannot be stated, however, even in Lowry Hill East. In the DDP analysis, with the displacement area included as a control, there were no significant results for both control areas on any one crime type. Even in the subsequent analysis, excluding the displacement area as a control, only two significant *Z*-scores were obtained. These two *Z*-scores occurred for crimes that were not considered target crimes for CCP. The target crime of residential burglary did not achieve significance in either analysis. These points indicate that the crime prevention program probably did not have an impact on crime rates at the time of measurement.

However, it has been stated earlier that due to the many start-up delays, it seemed improbable that significant changes would have occurred by the end of the demonstration year. Nonetheless, the results in Lowry Hill East are promising since all seven crimes fit a pattern of success, and five of the seven crimes actually decreased in the demonstration

neighborhood. The percentages alone, then, tell an important story concerning the first year evaluation but it must be reiterated that even in Lowry Hill East the crime rate changes did not indicate program success.

b. Willard-Homewood

Of the seven crime types studied, only three indicated possible program success and/or displacement. One of these three was the category of criminal sexual conduct. All three areas (Willard-Homewood, control tract 109, and the northside displacement area) reported more sex-related crimes in fiscal year 1978 than in fiscal year 1975. The interpretation for the corresponding pattern 11 states that the percentage increase of control tract 109, as well as the displacement area, must be higher than the demonstration neighborhood. If this had occurred, it may have indicated that the program reduced the rate of increase in Willard-Homewood. However, the increase in control tract 109 was less than in the demonstration area, negating this possibility. The *Z*-scores also indicate that the differences were not significant as Table V.17 displays. The interpretation further states that displacement may be present if the percentage increase was larger in the displacement area in comparison to control tract 109. Indeed, the percentage was higher in the displacement area but not significantly higher (*Z*-score = .53).

The two other crimes (personal robbery and assault) which were to be analyzed using the DDP test did not reflect any of the eleven patterns indicating program success and/or displacement. In fact, the majority of the categories did not reflect program success or displacement. Vandalism, however, fit pattern 11 described above. All three areas reported increases in vandalism incidents between testing periods. However, program success was not indicated since the largest increase occurred within

TABLE V.17

CRIME RATE CHANGES IN WILLARD-HOMEWOOD

TYPE OF CRIME	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES[a]			Z-SCORE RESULTS OF DIFFERENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS TEST ON CRIME RATES[b]	
	Willard-Homewood	Control Tract 109	Northside Displacement	Willard-Homewood-Control Tract 109	Willard-Homewood-Northside Displacement
Residential Burglary	+ 24.40	+ 68.29	+ 2.42	0.84	-2.57
Commercial Burglary	+ 14.29	+ 78.57	+ 26.22	2.07	-0.73
Personal Robbery	+ 5.66	+ 75.00 (12,3)[c]	+ 19.63	-1.16	-0.94
Commercial Robbery	0.00	0.00	+ 46.81	0.00	-0.78
Vandalism	+ 50.00	+ 35.00	+ 4.51	-1.26	-2.87
Assault	+ 50.69	+ 18.18	+ 6.38	-1.73	-3.37
Criminal Sexual Conduct	+ 71.43	+ 66.67 (3,5)[c]	+ 108.00 (15,42)[c]	-0.47	0.00

[a] Shaded cells indicate the change is toward program success, i.e., decrease in crime.

[b] Shaded cells here indicate a statistically significant Z-score in the direction of program success. A *positive* Z-score of 1.645 or higher *signifies* that the *decrease in crime* in the demonstration neighborhood is significantly lower than in the comparison area.

[c] These percentage changes were calculated on a small number of cases; the actual numbers appear in parentheses.

Willard-Homewood. Displacement did not occur either since control tract 109 experienced a higher increase than the displacement area.

The one other crime category which fit a pattern indicating program success and/or displacement was commercial burglary. This crime type fit pattern 7 which states that there must be a decrease in the demonstration area while commercial burglaries increase in the control tract and decrease in the displacement area. This case is somewhat anbiguous. It could indicate displacement if the decrease in the demonstration area were larger than in the displacement area. This did not occur. The displacement area received the largest decrease--26.2 percent. Apparently, the program had no effect on reducing commercial burglaries either since there were fewer reported in the displacement area than in the noncontiguous control tract. This is a unique case in Willard-Homewood. It was the only crime category which received a positive significant *Z*-score. The *Z*-score of 2.07 indicated that Willard-Homewood's commercial burglary rate was significantly less than that of control tract 109. That pattern alone would have indicated program success but for two qualifications. First, when the displacement area was included in the picture, it nullified the possibility of program success, because the decrease in the displacement area was lower than in Willard-Homewood. Second, although there are commercial establishments in Willard-Homewood, the CCP staff in that area determined *not* to direct its efforts toward commercial activities. In other words, crimes relating to the business segment of the community were not expected to change significantly in Willard-Homewood since they were not included in the treatment.

As noted in Section C, Part 1.b, of this chapter, crime in Willard-Homewood, on the whole, increased. The only crime that decreased was

commercial burglary. Commercial robbery remained the same across both times. Of the three crime categories that fit one of the patterns indicting success and/or displacement, only criminal sexual conduct met the criteria needed to indicate displacement. This occurred since the displacement area had a larger increase than the control tract. Though the percentage changes were calculated on a rather small number of cases and the difference was not found to be statistically significant, the pattern was otherwise consistent with the model.

When the displacement control was omitted from the analysis, residential burglary and assault fit patterns of success in addition to the original three crime types. Eliminating the displacement area as a control also produced one possible program success (commercial burglary--see paragraphs above). Other than this difference, it appears that excluding the displacement area did not create many changes in Willard-Homewood.

c. Hawthorne

In Hawthorne, personal robbery reflected pattern number 9, a decrease in all three areas. For the program to illustrate an effect, the demonstration neighborhood would have had to experience a larger decrease than either of the control areas. The *Z*-score between the displacement area and Hawthorne was 1.47, not quite significant but indicating change in the desired direction. However, control tract 24 reflected a larger decrease than Hawthorne both in the percentage change and in the *Z*-score (-0.17). Displacement may be possible since the percentage decrease in the control is more than in the displacement area (see Table V.18). The *Z*-score computed between control tract 24 and the displacement area was 0.97, not significant but, again, in the direction desired

TABLE V.18

CRIME RATE CHANGES IN HAWTHORNE

TYPE OF CRIME	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CRIME RATES[a]			*Z*-SCORE RESULTS OF DIFFERENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS TEST ON CRIME RATES[b]	
	Hawthorne	Control Tract 24	Northside Displacement	Hawthorne–Control Tract 24	Hawthorne–Northside Displacement
Residential Burglary	↓ 3.42	↓ 5.56	↓ 2.42	0.04	0.10
Commercial Burglary	↑ 34.04	↓ 54.84	↓ 26.22	-4.00	-3.43
Personal Robbery	↓ 66.67 (24,8)[c]	↓ 88.89 (9,1)[c]	↓ 19.63	-0.17	1.47
Commercial Robbery	↑ 66.67 (6,10)[c]	↓ 83.33 (6,1)[c]	↓ 46.81	-1.30	-1.34
Vandalism	↓ 17.59	↓ 50.00	↑ 4.51	-0.82	1.39
Assault	↑ 5.75	0.00	↓ 6.38	-0.20	-0.56
Criminal Sexual Conduct	↑ 106.67 (6,13)[c]	↑ 50.00 (2,3)[c]	↑ 108.00 (15,42)[c]	-0.54	-0.30

[a] Shaded cells indicate the change is toward program success, i.e., decrease in crime.

[b] Shaded cells here indicate a statistically significant *Z*-score in the direction of program success. A *positive* *Z*-score of 1.645 or higher *signifies* that the *decrease in crime* in the demonstration neighborhood is significantly lower than in the comparison area. No positive significant *Z*-scores were achieved in Hawthorne.

[c] These percentage changes were calculated on a small number of cases; the actual numbers appear in parentheses.

by the program.

Criminal sexual conduct fit pattern number 11. All three areas showed an increase in crime. To imply success, Hawthorne's increase should have been less than either of the controls. Neither the percentage changes nor the *Z*-scores bear out this stipulation. Displacement may have occurred since the percentage increase is higher in the displacement area than in tract 24. However, when the DDP test was computed between these control areas, the result was a *Z*-score of 0.41, nonsignificant but in the desired direction. Assault, the other crime for which residents serve as the level of opportunity, did not fit a pattern that indicated program success or displacement.

Vandalism in Hawthorne fit crime rate pattern number 3. The demonstration area and control tract 24 decreased while the displacement area showed an increase in vandalism incidents. Displacement seems likely in this case. Program success cannot be demonstrated because the decrease in the demonstration area was less than the decrease in the control tract. Hawthorne experienced a 17.6 percent decrease in vandalism incidents while tract 24 had a decrease of 50 percent. The *Z*-score of 0.82 supports the interpretation of these percentage changes.

Residential burglary also indicated a pattern of possible success in Hawthorne. It fit pattern number 9 which shows an overall decrease for all areas concerned. All percentage changes were relatively small in this crime category, as are the *Z*-scores. Nonetheless, the stipulation was that Hawthorne's decrease had to be greater than the control areas' (it was greater in one and less in the other) to indicate program success. Hence, program success should not be assumed. Displacement possibly would

have occurred if the percentage decrease was greater in the control tract than in the displacement area. According to the percentage changes this did not occur, so the DDP test was not computed.

The Hawthorne neighborhood had four crime types that fit a pattern of success when displacement was included in the analysis. The final outcome resulted in three of the patterns indicating a possible displacement effect. Having eliminated the displacement control from the analysis, the four patterns of success remained, but none of them indicated program success.

d. "Hawthorne Effect"[1]

As noted earlier, the CCP project began formally July 1, 1977. The planning which preceded the actual implementation included contacts with community groups and residents. It is possible that those contacts motivated residents to adopt some aspects of the crime prevention strategies even before July of 1977. The adoption of such behavior before the CCP program was launched could quality the effect of the treatment upon the crime rate. The possibility of a "Hawthorne effect" was investigated by analysis of crime data for the first six months of 1977 and 1975. This check for a "Hawthorne effect" was performed only for Lowry Hill East because that neighborhood experienced the greatest percentage reduction in residential burglary during the demonstration period (although

[1]Use of the term "Hawthorne effect" should not be confused with the Hawthorne demonstration neighborhood. Suppose, for example, that neighborhood residents heard about the development of the CCP project. If the interest and concern of residents in crime prevention led them to undertake crime prevention strategies independent of CCP project activities and if crime were reduced as a result of these strategies, the effect would be independent of project activities. It would be an example of the "Hawthorne effect." Use of the term is retained because of its widespread recognition among the scientific community.

not significantly lower). Residential burglary alone was selected because the CCP efforts were directed primarily at this crime. Table V.19 shows the recorded residential burglary incidents for the six comparable months of 1977 and 1975 in Lowry Hill East.

TABLE V.19

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY INCIDENTS IN LOWRY HILL EAST AND CONTROLS[a]

	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS						
	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	TOTAL
LOWRY HILL EAST							
1975	29	15	10	11	17	20	102
1977	10	13	9	13	16	10	71
CONTROL TRACT 93							
1975	6	4	4	6	4	1	25
1977	5	5	4	5	3	5	27
SOUTHSIDE DISPLACEMENT AREA							
1975	50	41	34	51	62	64	302
1977	42	35	39	52	77	46	291

[a]The difference of differences of proportions result between Lowry Hill East incidents and Control Tract 93 incidents was a Z-score of 1.42.

A month-by-month inspection of residential burglary in Lowry Hill East shows a reduction for five of the six months in 1977. More than 60 percent of the total reduction for the six months occurred during January. Most of the remaining decline in residential burglary took place in June. Do these findings establish the existence of a "Hawthorne effect"? Or was the reduction in residential burglary due to other influences? The comparable crime data for the control tract show a slight increase (8 percent), whereas the displacement area rate declined somewhat (4 percent). Compared to the 30 percent drop in Lowry Hill East, the control and displacement figures are minuscule. These figures suggest that the decline of residential burglary in Lowry Hill East was

due to some influence not present in the controls. Residents may have adopted crime prevention behavior as a consequence of the contacts which preceded the formal start of the CCP project.

On the other hand, the fact that the largest decline in residential burglary occurred in the first month of 1977 casts doubt on the "Hawthorne effect" as a cause. Even if all of the Lowry Hill East residents who had become acquainted with the crime prevention strategies had adopted all of the recommendations, it seems unlikely this could have produced the results observed for January of 1977. However, since no other factor can be identified, the "Hawthorne effect" should not be dismissed as a cause of decreased residential burglary. Despite the substantial percentage drop during January through June, 1977, the change did not prove to be statistically significant (Z-score = 1.42). Therefore, the probability that the residential burglary rates dropped by chance is more than 5 percent.

e. Summary

Eleven patterns of crime rate changes suggestive of program success and/or displacement were identified during the initial phase of the evaluation. Inspection of the direction of the change in crime rates for the demonstration, control, and displacement areas guided selection of a matched pattern. Once a pattern was chosen as reflecting the actual change in a particular crime rate, additional stipulations directed the analysis. The interpretation of each pattern then was based on the magnitude of the differences. Finally, the results of the difference of differences of proportions test indicated whether or not the change was indeed statistically significant. Table V.20 displays the Z-score results for each neighborhood on all crime categories.

TABLE V.20

DIFFERENCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS OF CRIME RATES
BETWEEN DEMONSTRATION/CONTROL AND
DEMONSTRATION/DISPLACEMENT

	LOWRY HILL EAST		HAWTHORNE		WILLARD-HOMEWOOD	
	Demonstration/ Control	Demonstration/ Displacement	Demonstration/ Control	Demonstration/ Displacement	Demonstration/ Control	Demonstration/ Displacement
TYPE OF CRIME	*Z*-score[a]	*Z*-score[a]	*Z*-score[a]	*Z*-score[a]	*Z*-score[a]	*Z*-score[a]
Residential Burglary	0.86	0.81	0.04	0.10	0.84	-2.57
Commercial Burglary	1.14	**2.62**	-4.00	-3.43	**2.07**	-0.73
Personal Robbery	**1.69**	1.43	-0.17	1.47	-1.16	-0.94
Commercial Robbery	**2.28**	1.19	-1.30	-1.34	0.00	-0.78
Vandalism	0.77	-0.34	-0.82	1.39	-1.26	-2.87
Assault	1.50	1.47	-0.20	-0.56	-1.73	-3.37
Criminal Sexual Conduct	0.29	0.53	-0.54	-0.30	-0.47	0.00

[a]A significant difference of proportions is indicated by a *Z*-score of 1.645 at the 0.05 level. A *positive* *Z*-score of 1.645 or higher is indicative of a *significant decrease* in crime within the demonstration area as compared to the control or displacement area. Shaded *Z*-scores depict program success.

In Lowry Hill East, all seven crime rates fit one of the eleven patterns. Three crime categories did not reflect the needed requirements as stated in the interpretation of their pattern. Commercial robbery, assault, and criminal sexual conduct crime rates were not indicative of either program success or displacement. Residential burglary rates did not suggest a program effect, but displacement seemed a possibility although no significant *Z*-scores were obtained. Vandalism did not portray any displacement phenomenon, but possible program success did exist (again, no significant *Z*-score supported this possibility). Personal robbery rates also suggested a possible program effect, and one significant *Z*-score between Lowry Hill East and tract 93 was obtained. Displacement of personal robberies does not seem likely though. Crime rates for commercial burglary revealed the most successful pattern found in this evaluation. Program success was suggested and partially supported with one significant *Z*-score. Displacement also was implied for commercial burglary.

In Willard-Homewood, three crime categories matched a pattern suggesting displacement or program effect. Two of these three did not fulfill the interpretation of their pattern and did not support either area of success. Criminal sexual conduct possibly portrayed displacement effects, but no significant *Z*-score corroborated this possibility.

Four crime categories in Hawthorne displayed changes which corresponded to patterns listed in Table V.13. Personal robbery and criminal sexual conduct experienced changes which suggest displacement of crime. *Z*-scores did not corroborate this supposition on these crime categories. Vandalism changes also indicated displacement, but this case was somewhat more pronounced than the previous two mentioned. Both the direction and the magnitude of the changes support displacement. However, the

corresponding *Z*-score (between the displacement area and Hawthorne) was not significant.

These interpretations of the crime statistics seem to reflect the level of neighborhood involvement discussed in the previous chapter on process evaluation. Lowry Hill East organized the largest proportion of residents, had the highest average attendance at block club meetings, initiated and maintained business associations, and had more cases of possible program success. Hawthorne had the next highest participation of residents and blocks. Crime changes in this neighborhood were more favorable than Willard-Homewood but less so than Lowry Hill East. Willard-Homewood displayed little possibility of success since crime rates rose. The results of the DDP test indicated less favorable program success, as would be expected, according to the level of organizing.

Despite these similarities, it must be reiterated that conclusions of program success or nonsuccess on the basis of data from one year are premature. Since the possibility of displacement of crime seemed minuscule, due to the noncomparative sizes of the areas under analysis, further inspection of the crime data relative only to the demonstration areas and noncontiguous control tracts was undertaken. This additional analysis did not markedly change the conclusions of the initial analysis. It became obvious that, at times, the change in the displacement area crime negated success patterns between one of the neighborhoods and its respective control tract. However, this was not consistent between crime types or neighborhoods. Although the initial analysis should be more conservative than the subsequent examination with the displacement area omitted, very few additional changes were identified that indicated possible program success.

The evaluators feel that special note should be taken of the *direction* of the changes rather than the magnitude and significance. At this point, the changes in data may indicate, at best, an emerging pattern that could, in time, culminate in program success. Nonetheless, the possibility is great that these changes resulted from chance or natural fluctuations as is supported by the few significant *Z*-scores.

D. SURVEY OF RESIDENTS--ANALYSIS OF FEAR OF CRIME

In 1976, residents of the three demonstration neighborhoods were surveyed concerning attitudes toward crime, home security, the police, crime victimization, and other questions about personal background. In April of 1978, the same neighborhoods were surveyed once more. The two survey instruments were identifical except for a few additional questions in 1978.

The 1976 and 1978 survey findings will be compared below. Although the survey instruments were almost identical for the preproject and during-project administration, there were two slightly different questionnaires for each period. The Citizen Survey was first administered in the Willard-Homewood neighborhood. This questionnaire was patterned after a survey conducted in Hartford, Connecticut. Prior to surveying Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne, some changes were introduced in the Citizen Survey instrument, and this new questionnaire was labeled the Resident Survey. For the 1978 posttest, the 1976 Resident Survey was administered largely unchanged in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. The 1978 posttest in Willard-Homewood used the 1976 Citizen Survey with a few questions added. Most of the questions in the Resident and Citizen surveys can be compared directly. The analysis below will indicate which questions in the Resident

and Citizen surveys are not comparable.

The 1976 and 1978 surveys used stratified random samples. Approximately an equal number of men and women were interviewed.[1] The total number of respondents for 1976 was 382 and for 1978, 360.[2] The breakdown by neighborhood is shown below:

	1976	1978
Hawthorne	108	102
Lowry Hill East	111	123
Willard-Homewood	163	135
TOTAL	382	360

Usually, a sample size of approximately 400 would be large enough to allow one to draw inferences from findings because the distribution would rapidly approach normality. This assumption holds true in these surveys, also, *except* in the segment of the questionnaire dealing with victimization. Since criminal victimization is a relatively rare event, the number of respondents likely to report a victimization would be quite low. In fact, an *n* of 10,000 or more is recommended for victimization

[1]The sampling plan as described by the contractor was as follows:

> The sample was pulled from the 1970 Minneapolis Census. The sex and the ethnic quota was figured in relation to the census figures for each tract within each neighborhood--Lowry Hill, Hawthorne, and Willard-Homewood. Each census tract was divided into clusters which represented residential blocks in each neighborhood. A personal visit to each neighborhood by a member of the WINONA staff deleted sparse clusters that could not produce the required interviews. The remaining clusters were then used for the sample. The interviewers were given a starting address which was the second house from the South corner of the block on the west side of the street and working North. They were to interview 18 years and older residents and only one per household. The interviewers were allowed to make appointments with any individual for a later time at their convenience.

[2]The total number of residents interviewed was 400. However 40 of those were in a census tract not sampled in 1976. Hence, these 40 were excluded from the analysis.

CONTINUED

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surveys.[1] Given the lack of statistical confidence on this aspect of the surveys, the findings on victimization will be treated only as suggestive. The sample size is sufficient for statistically reliable results for the remaining portions of the survey, however.

The evaluators attempted to replicate all aspects of the 1976 questionnaire for the 1978 survey. However, at times, the documentation of the pretest survey techniques was inadequate to do so. Better documentation hopefully would have existed had the 1976 surveys been considered as potential pretests. However, possession of prophetic skills is rare among researchers and others--the establishment of the demonstration project could not have been known in 1976.

Despite some gaps in the archives relating to the pretest survey, the essential aspects are known. Verbal communications with individuals involved in the 1976 project provided the necessary background wherever written documentation seemed insufficient.

Survey findings are presented in several different formats. Tabular exhibits of frequencies with corresponding percentages dominate the analysis of survey findings. The descriptive statistics are supplemented by the difference of proportions test. This test was used because there were no controls available--just the demonstration areas were sampled for both the 1976 and 1978 surveys.

This test of significance determined whether or not changes in the percentage of respondents giving a particular answer to a particular

[1]U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Local Victim Surveys: A Review of the Issues* by James Garofalo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

question were significant between the 1976 and 1978 surveys. The appropriate formula is:[1]

$$Z = \frac{p_{s1} - p_{s2}}{\sqrt{p_{\hat{u}} q_{\hat{u}}} \sqrt{\frac{N_1 + N_2}{N_1 N_2}}},$$

where

$$p_{\hat{u}} = \frac{N_1 p_{s1} + N_2 p_{s2}}{N_1 + N_2},$$

and

$q_{\hat{u}} = 1 - p_{\hat{u}}$,
p_{s1} = proportion in pretest giving particular response to question,
p_{s2} = proportion in posttest giving same response to same question,
N_1 = sample size for pretest,
N_2 = sample size for posttest,
$p_{\hat{u}}$ = best sample estimate of the true proportion (in the population) that would give that response to that question if asked (assuming the correctness of the null hypothesis that both samples are from the same population, i.e., that there was no change in fear of crime),
$q_{\hat{u}}$ = best sample estimate of the true proportion that would *not* give that response to that question, if asked.

This test assumed that both the pretest and the posttest questionnaire had been administered to independent random samples of adult respondents in the neighborhood. (The null hypothesis was that both p_{s1} and p_{s2} were estimates of the same population parameter, $p_{\hat{u}}$. If the null hypothesis was rejected, one could conclude that the demonstration project reduced fear of crime and that p_{s2} was estimating a different parameter than was p_{s1}.) A one-tailed test of significance was used. This required a calculated *Z*-score of greater than or equal to 1.645 to

[1]The computational formula for the difference of proportions test is included for the interested reader. Many readers may wish to proceed to the next paragraph where the conceptual discussion continues.

allow one to reject the null hypothesis. For any questions with multiple possible responses, the tests performed on these responses were not independent of one another, but the overall results ought to be clear as to whether fear of crime had been significantly reduced.

In the absence of controls, the major threat to the internal validity of the analysis of survey findings was the inability to separate the possible effects of history upon the responses. The unreliability of the results from the victimization questions has been noted above. Although impossible to measure, the effects of slight differences in the questions for the Citizen and Resident surveys should not be overlooked.

The surveys contain many questions that were not analyzed here due to space constraints. Only the questions which were most directly related to the categories listed below were included in the discussion:

- Community Cohesiveness
- Indicators of Fear
  - chance of victimization
  - dangerous situations
  - crime problems
- Discussion of Victimization and Reporting Rate
- Home Security
  - Operation Identification
  - security devices
- Community Attitudes toward Police

1. Community Cohesiveness

A fundamental assumption of CCP has been that where residents have stronger bonds to one another there should be fewer incidents of crime. The difficulty with testing this assumption occurs when attempting to devise a measure(s) of cohesion. Indices of cohesion might include residents' sense of identification with the area, the practice of people helping one another, or how readily residents recognize one another (or, conversely, how readily residents recognize strangers). Both the 1976

and 1978 surveys contained questions which may have provided insights on neighborhood cohesiveness. Of sole interest were possible differences in the responses between the two periods.

If a neighborhood is to be labeled cohesive, residents must be able to recognize some of the other block residents. The number of recognizable families needed to achieve a minimal level of cohesiveness is unknown, but comparisons of responses for the two reporting periods may have indicated the possibility of a trend toward greater or fewer families being recognized. A difference of proportions test showed a significant difference for Hawthorne but not for the other two neighborhoods. Table V.21 shows the number of responses for each category of the relevant questions and the associated *Z*-score from the difference of proportions test.

Apparently fewer respondents in the 1978 survey compared to the 1976 survey recognized more than ten other families. In the 1978 survey, more respondents were able to recognize one to four families. A possible reason for the decline in the number of families recognized could be a mobility problem. This could be assessed by checking the length of residence of respondents in both samples, but the findings did not support such a conjecture. Table V.22 exhibits the fact that all response categories had markedly similar percentages between 1976 and 1978 surveys. Lowry Hill East displayed the largest change in the percentage of residents living in the neighborhood more than one year (response categories 3 and 4), that of a 4.9 percent decrease. Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne both showed a decrease in the number of respondents living within the neighborhood more than one year, also, but these changes were approximately 2 percent. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the rate of mobility was an important factor which could account for residents' inability to recognize as many

TABLE V.21

NUMBER OF FAMILIES RECOGNIZED[a]

NUMBER OF FAMILIES RECOGNIZED	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Z-score[c]
None	2	1.8%	4	3.3%	—	2	1.9%	2	2.0%	—	4	2.5%	6	4.4%	—
1 or 2	13	11.7	22	17.9	-.81	15	13.9	21	20.6	-1.29	20	12.3	20	14.8	—
3 or 4	16	14.4	21	17.1	—	17	15.7	18	17.6	—	18	11.0	23	17.0	-1.50
5 to 10	34	30.6	42	34.1	-.41	37	34.3	52	51.0	-2.45	49	30.1	41	30.4	—
More than 10	45	40.5	33	26.8	1.13	36	33.3	9	8.8	4.33	67	41.1	44	32.6	1.50
Don't know, NA	1	0.9	1	0.8		1	0.9				5	3.1	1	0.7	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.1%	135	99.9%	

[a]Question A2—Resident Survey, Question A4—Citizen Survey: "How many families do you know personally or do you recognize on sight as living in this neighborhood?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]Z-scores of 1.645 or higher indicate a level of significance. In this case, negative Z-scores show results favorable to GGP objectives. Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

TABLE V.22

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD[a]

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
Less than 6 months	17	15.3%	17	13.8%	—	11	10.2%	9	8.8%	—	18	11.0%	16	11.9%	—
6 months to 1 year	18	16.2	28	22.8	-1.24	11	10.2	13	12.7	—	19	11.7	16	11.9	—
More than 1 but less than 5 years	26	23.4	27	22.0	—	28	25.9	27	26.5	—	36	22.1	30	22.2	—
More than 5 years	50	45.0	51	41.5	—	58	53.7	52	51.0	—	90	55.2	72	53.3	—
NA, other								1	1.0				1	0.7	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.1%		108	100.0%	102	100.0		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A1—Resident Survey, Question A2—Citizen Survey: "How long have you lived in this neighborhood?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

families as reported in 1976 (unless there had been a sharp rise in intra-neighborhood mobility). Of course, one does not easily unlearn to recognise people; hence the decline in 1978 was the result of mobility, *but* the rate of mobility was just as high in 1976 as in 1978.

It is reasonable to expect that residents who know one another would be more likely to extend material assistance to one another as opposed to strangers. In other words, the findings appearing in Table V.21 should suggest that on the basis of more families being recognizable in 1976 than 1978, there should be a decreased tendency for families to help one another in 1978. Table V.23, in fact, shows a different pattern. A marginally higher percentage of 1978 respondents said more people were willing to help one another than in 1976. However, these changes were so minute as to be insignificantly different. Of course, the relationship between residential longevity and the capacity to recognize neighbors cannot be fixed. Still, for a given individual, the longer the residence in a given area, the greater the number of families that will be recognized.

Perhaps the single strongest indicator of cohesiveness could be the extent residents identify with a neighborhood. Feeling a part of the neighborhood seems stronger evidence of identification than considering the area only as a place to live. Both the 1976 and 1978 surveys asked respondents to state whether they felt a part of the neighborhood or viewed it just as a place to live. Table V.24 indicates the Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East residents feel more a part of the neighborhood in 1978 than in 1976. The results for the two areas were also significant. Hawthorne residents showed a slight decline in feeling a part of the neighborhood. The decline was not statistically significant however (Z-score = 0.67).

TABLE V.23

NUMBER OF NEIGHBORHOOD FAMILIES THAT COULD BE ASKED A FAVOR[a]

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
NUMBER OF FAMILIES	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
None	14	12.6%	18	14.6%	—	12	11.1%	11	10.8%	—	22	13.5	24	17.8%	—
1 or 2	33	29.7	43	35.0	-0.86	36	33.3	41	40.2	-1.04	47	28.8	43	31.9	—
3 or 4	23	20.7	23	18.7	—	38	35.2	29	28.4	1.06	23	14.1	30	22.2	-1.92
5 to 10	25	22.5	25	20.3	—	13	12.0	15	14.7	—	32	19.6	23	17.0	—
More than 10	14	12.6	10	8.1	1.13	8	7.4	6	5.9	—	38	23.3	15	11.1	2.74
Don't know, NA	2	1.8	4	3.3	—	1	0.9			—	1	0.6			—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	99.9%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A3—Resident Survey, Question A5—Citizen Survey: "How many families in this neighborhood do you know well enough to ask a favor if you needed something?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

TABLE V.24

NEIGHBORHOOD IDENTIFICATION[a]

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
RESPONSE CATEGORIES	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score
Feel a part of the neighborhood	63	56.8%	84	68.3%	-1.82	59	54.6%	51	50.0%	0.67	78	47.9%	83	61.5%	-2.34
Place to live	43	38.7	34	27.6	1.81	44	40.7	46	45.1	-0.64	85	52.1	52	38.5	2.35
Don't know, other[c]	5	4.5	5	4.1	—	5	4.6	5	4.9	—					—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A4—Resident Survey, Question A7—Citizen Survey: "Would you say you really feel a part of the neighborhood here, or do you think of it more as just the place you live?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]The Resident Survey provided for "Don't know," or "other" responses. The Z-score values were not calculated for these responses.

These findings seem partially incongruent with the data known about resident mobility. The neighborhood with the highest mobility also had the highest level of identification. (Lowry Hill East had the highest score for both 1976 and 1978 with a *Z*-score = -1.82.) The most stable area, Willard-Homewood, started with the lowest level of identification, but the posttest responses resulted in the higest *Z*-score (-2.34). The data for Hawthorne are inconclusive since the changes were not significant (although the findings suggest a decline in identification). At least two interpretations of the survey responses were possible. The first suggests that length of residence is not as important as other factors in building neighborhood identification. A second interpretation proposes that the question may be a poor measure of identification since one would have predicted lower scores for Lowry Hill East compared to Willard-Homewood (mobility is much higher in Lowry Hill East).

The first interpretation seems more appealing since it may mean longevity was not an prominent an influence as the quality and character of the attachment to a geographical area. Whatever effects CCP had in Lowry Hill East in promoting greater identification must be qualified to some extent because of the high pretest score. In fact, Willard-Homewood had the highest degree of "improvement" during the two testing periods. There might have been some kind of calling effect which would make it difficult to raise the level of identification once a certain high level had been achieved. How do these points account for the experience in Hawthorne? The results in 1976 for Hawthorne were almost as high as the ones for Lowry Hill East, but responses in 1978 showed a decline. Since about 50 percent of the pretest respondents in each neighborhood reported feeling a part of the neighborhood, perhaps that level could be considered the

norm. Then, any substantial improvement in identification could be attributed to some intervening effects. In this instance, the CCP programs in Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood may have been the intervening influence. Therefore, a probable reason Hawthorne may not have experienced an improvement in identification was that the CCP efforts were less effective there.

A second interpretation of the findings might suggest that the question did not measure neighborhood identification. Whether or not one chooses a different working definition of identification than the one applied here, it is clear that respondents in two of the neighborhoods underwent significant growth in the percentage of individuals saying they felt a part of the neighborhood. Therefore, the data here indicate Hawthorne residents have not changed their level of identification despite efforts of the CCP staff to develop a greater sense of a real identity. Although Lowry Hill East may have seemed to be the most difficult area to bring about higher identification, it seems possible that Hawthorne residents were more resistant to such change even where effective implementation of CCP organizing occurred. Finally, the fact that much of the block club organizing in Hawthorne occurred outside the boundaries of the survey area might have resulted in an underestimation of the effectiveness of the CCP activities (recall "Limitations of the Data," Chapter II, Section D).

Another way of assessing how well residents know the inhabitants of their area was to determine how easy it was to recognize strangers. The survey findings for such a question appear in Table V.25. The responses do not seem to be consistent with some of the other data cited. For example, Hawthorne residents reported that it was more difficult to recognize a stranger in 1978 than in 1976. Since more families were reported

TABLE V.25

EASE OF RECOGNIZING STRANGERS[a].

IS IT EASY OR HARD TO RECOGNIZE A STRANGER?	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score
Easy	49	44.1%	37	30.1%	2.22	51	47.2%	41	40.2%	1.02	75	46.0%	86	63.7%	-3.12
Hard	60	54.1	76	61.8	-1.19	53	49.1	55	53.9	-0.66	87	53.4	49	36.3	2.95
Don't know, other	2	1.8	10	8.1	—	4	3.7	6	5.9	—	1	0.6			—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	108	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A5--Resident Survey, Question A8--Citizen Survey: "In general, is it easy for you to tell a stranger from someone who lives in this area, or is it hard to know a stranger when you see one?"

TABLE V.26

CONSISTENCY OF RESPONSES FROM TABLES V.21, V.22, V.23, V.24, V.25

FINDINGS FROM THE TABLES	LOWRY HILL EAST 1978 Compared to 1976[a]		HAWTHORNE 1978 Compared to 1976[a]		WILLARD-HOMEWOOD 1978 Compared to 1976[a]	
Feel a part of the neighborhood	More	+	Fewer	–	More	+
Number of families who would help	Fewer	–	More	+	Fewer	–
Number of residents living in neighborhood more than one year	Fewer	–	Fewer	–	Fewer	–
Number of families recognized by respondents	Fewer	–	More	+	Fewer	–
Difficulty in recognizing strangers	More difficult	–	More difficult	–	Less Difficult	+
FINDINGS[b]	Inconsistent		Inconsistent		Inconsistent	

[a]Findings for a given neighborhood would be consistent if all the signs (+ or –) were the same.

[b]Positive changes indicated by a plus (+) sign, are compatible with the objectives of the Community Crime Prevention project, but do not necessarily demonstrate program success.

be examined first.

A central objective of the CCP project was to bring the residents' perceptions of the likelihood of being victimized into closer correspondence with the recorded levels of crime. National victimization surveys have shown that people tend to exaggerate the chances of being victimized. The CCP hope was to reduce fear of crime in order for residents to develop more positive images of their neighborhood. With a reduction of fear, it was hoped people would modify their behavior in ways which could serve to help prevent crime. For example, as people come to appreciate the extent or incidence of certain kinds of crime, they may spend more time in their yards or walking around the block. This activity improves the surveillance of the neighborhood and may discourage burglaries.

The data from the 1976 and 1978 surveys were based upon five main questions and related follow-up questions. Responses provide information about the likelihood of victimization, assessment of whether or not the area has become a better or worse place to live, dislikes concerning the neighborhood, and the areas which respondents were afraid to go to during the day and also after dark.

Respondents were requested to estimate the chance of each of eight situations happening to them during the next year. Table V.27 presents the responses concerning eight hypothetical situations. The difference of proportions test scores and the rate of crime for 1976 and 1978 can also be noted. Inspection of Table V.27 shows a continuing discrepancy between crime rates and residents' prediction of the occurrence of such crimes. In no instance was the crime rate as high as predicted by respondents. From 36 percent of the individuals surveyed in Lowry Hill

TABLE V.27

CHANCE OF BEING VICTIMIZED[a]

CHANCE THAT SOMEONE WOULD:[b]	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent[c]	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent[c]	Z-score
BREAK INTO YOUR HOUSE/APARTMENT WHEN NO ONE IS HOME?															
No chance	6	5.4%	14	11.4%	-1.64	12	11.1%	12	11.8%	—	12	7.4%	14	10.4%	—
Less than 50-50 chance	56	50.5	63	51.2	—	40	37.0	32	31.4	0.85	54	33.1	45	33.3	—
50-50 chance or better	44	39.6	43	35.0	0.73	53	49.1	58	56.8	-1.12	89	54.6	62	45.9	1.55
Don't know, other	5	4.5	3	2.4	—	3	2.8			—	8	4.9	14	10.4	—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	
BREAK INTO YOUR HOUSE/APARTMENT WHEN SOMEONE IS HOME?															
No chance	32	28.8%	60	48.8%	-3.13	50	46.3%	51	50.0%	-0.54	49	30.1%	69	51.1%	-3.69
Less than 50-50 chance	69	62.2	56	45.5	2.56	41	38.0	38	37.3	—	86	52.8	52	38.5	2.46
50-50 chance or better	7	6.3	6	4.9	—	14	12.9	12	11.8	—	26	15.9	12	8.9	1.80
NA	3	2.7	1	0.8	—	3	2.8	1	1.0	—	2	1.2	2	1.5	—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.1%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	
TAKE SOMETHING FROM YOU ON THE STREET BY FORCE OR THREAT?															
No chance	31	27.9%	51	41.5%	-2.18	37	34.3%	36	35.3%	-0.15	41	25.2%	35	25.9%	—
Less than 50-50 chance	57	51.4	56	45.5	0.90	42	38.9	35	34.3	—	76	46.6	59	43.7	—
50-50 chance or better	18	16.2	12	9.8	1.46	23	21.3	26	25.5	—	41	25.2	38	28.1	—
Don't know	5	4.5	4	3.3	—	6	5.5	5	4.9	—	5	3.0	3	2.2	—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	99.9%	
BEAT YOU UP OR HURT YOU ON THE STREET?															
No chance	34	30.6%	52	42.3%	-1.85	44	40.7%	43	42.2%	—	33	20.2%	53	39.3%	-3.62
Less than 50-50 chance	52	46.8	60	48.8	—	43	39.8	35	34.3	—	89	54.6	52	38.5	2.77
50-50 chance or better	20	18.0	7	5.7	2.94	17	15.7	16	15.7	—	36	22.1	28	20.8	—
Don't know	5	4.5	4	3.3		4	3.7	8	7.8	—	5	3.0	2	1.4	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	99.9%	135	100.0%	
BREAK INTO YOUR CAR?															
No chance	6	5.4%	16	13.0%	-1.99	13	12.0%	15	14.7%	—	19	11.7%	33	24.4%	-3.02
Less than 50-50 chance	43	38.7	49	39.8	—	31	28.7	34	33.3	—	51	31.3	30	22.2	1.76
50-50 chance or better	39	35.1	36	29.3	2.68	49	45.4	43	42.2	—	71	43.5	59	43.7	—
Don't know, NA	23	20.7	22	17.9	—	15	13.9	10	9.8	—	22	13.5	13	9.6	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	163	99.9%	

VANDALIZE YOUR CAR OR PROPERTY?															
No chance	14	12.6%	16	13.0%	—	13	12.0%	15	14.7%	—	14	8.6%	22	16.3%	-2.02
Less than 50-50 chance	44	39.6	65	52.8	-2.02	41	38.0	35	34.3	—	52	31.9	33	24.4	1.56
50-50 chance or better	40	36.0	37	30.1	0.96	50	46.3	49	48.0	—	81	49.7	68	50.4	—
Don't know, NA	13	11.7	5	4.1	—	4	3.7	3	3.0	—	16	9.8	12	8.9	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	
SEXUALLY ASSAULT OR MOLEST YOU?															
No chance	35	31.5%	52	42.3%	-1.71	59	54.6%	47	46.1%	1.23	52	31.9%	77	57.0%	-4.35
Less than 50-50 chance	50	45.0	47	38.2	1.05	29	26.9	29	28.4	—	80	49.1	33	24.4	4.37
50-50 chance or better	16	14.4	11	8.9	1.32	8	7.4	16	15.7	-1.89	25	15.3	19	14.1	—
Don't know, NA	10	9.0	13	10.6	—	12	11.7	10	9.8	—	6	3.7	6	4.4	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	99.9%	

[a]Question A23—Resident Survey, Question A28—Citizen Survey: "Now I'd like to read some other possible situations and I'd like you to tell me how likely it is, during the next year, that this situation will happen to you. Is there no chance of the situation occurring, less than a 50-50 chance, about 50-50 chance, or better than 50-50 chance of the situation occurring? (The Citizen Survey added, 'or almost certain to occur.') Let's try the first situation. How likely is it that this situation will occur?"

[b]Frequencies for the category "50-50 chance or better" were obtained by adding the responses "about 50-50 chance" to "or better than 50-50 chance." The "or almost certain" responses, occurring only in the Citizen Survey, were not included.

[c]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

East to 57 percent in Hawthorne believed their chances of being burglarized were 50 percent or more, but the residential burglary rate recorded by the police actually ranged from about 6 to 11 percent in the three demonstration areas. For most of the crimes, this response pattern was found; yet, for the category of "no chance," the survey estimates were lower than the recorded rates. "No chance" seems absolute since we know some crime always will be present. The "no chance" responses did show a rise in the 1978 survey for all but a few instances. Some of the changes from 1976 to 1978 were significant according to the difference of proportions test. Hence, residents continue to overestimate the frequency of crime, but the degree of overestimation declined in many instances.

Significance of findings for other categories of responses can be seen in Table V.27. Only two of the crimes show significant results for respondents who reported the chance of being victimized was "50-50 chance or better." In most instances, the posttest percentage predicting that victimization would be a "50-50 chance or better" declined or increased only slightly. Significant *Z*-scores occurred for Lowry Hill East for street assault and breaking into cars.

Comparing categories of crime common to Tables V.7 through V.9 and Table V.27, it became clear that residents' prediction of victimization was far higher than the recorded incidence of crime; however, the discrepancy between recorded crime and residents' estimation of victimization was not as great in 1978 as it was in 1976. Such a trend was exactly what was sought as one of the major objectives of the CCP project. The decreased expectation of becoming a crime victim was compatible with the CCP objectives but may not have been a consequence of the program. Some evidence from a Harris poll shows that there has been a national decline in fear

of crime in the past few years.[1] Comparable findings for Minneapolis as a whole were not available. Unfortunately, we cannot dismiss or affirm the possibility of the residents' reduced fear of victimization as merely mirroring the national or city trends because the surveys were not administered in control areas. The inability to reject some of the threats to the internal validity of these findings should not conceal the fact that the likelihood of being victimized was estimated to be lower in 1978 as compared to 1976.

Changes in residents' predictions of the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime could be expected to be reflected in their characterization of the neighborhood. Several survey questions in the Citizen Survey were designed to discover respondents' perceptions of the area in which they resided (no similar questions appeared in the Resident Survey). As the responses to these questions are presented, consistency with the data from the previous paragraphs concerning chances of becoming a victim will be explored for Willard-Homewood.

The first question of this series was designed to elicit a general assessment of the neighborhood. Specifically, the resident was asked to estimate whether or not the area was a "better place to live," a "worse place to live," or "stayed about the same" during the last couple of years. There was a sharp increase in the percentage saying the area was a better place to live than in the past. Table V.28 indicates that the increase was statistically significant (Z-score = -2.08). A little more than 40 percent said the neighborhood stayed about the same for both survey

[1] Source: "Fewer people now worrying about crime," Harris Survey cited in *Minneapolis Star*, May 9, 1978.

periods. The percentage believing that Willard-Homewood was a worse place to live declined a little more than 5 percent (from 15.3 to 9.6 percent). Did the CCP program have any effect on residents' improved image of their area? According to follow-up responses, the CCP efforts did not have much effect on creating more positive images of Willard-Homewood. If an individual indicated that the area was a better place to live, he/she was asked what had improved. By far the most frequently mentioned item was improvement to property (Z-score = -6.95). In 1976, 19.1 percent cited that reason and 40.4 percent did so in 1978. Only 6 percent stated that lower crime accounted for life getting better in Willard-Homewood (part of the "other" category on Table V.28). Aside from the "other" category, the next highest factor mentioned was "kids are growing up" (see Table V.29). Some respondents said that people were friendlier in 1978 compared to 1976. The CCP impact would likely occur concerning the level of crime and possibly may be related to friendliness. Improvements to property cannot be attributed to the CCP project unless alley cleanups and lock installation constitute such changes. Even if respondents intended to mean such factors, the number of individuals affected would not be as substantial as found in the survey results. It seems safe to conclude that few individuals perceive the reason for Willard-Homewood being a better place to live as the result of the CCP program. Of course, the program may have worked to create a more favorable climate which predisposed residents to contemplate and then make changes in their property or smooth personal contacts.

TABLE V.28

QUALITY OF LIFE IN WILLARD-HOMEWOOD[a]

PRESENT QUALITY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMPARED TO THE PAST	1976 SURVEY Frequency	1976 SURVEY Percent	1978 SURVEY Frequency	1978 SURVEY Percent	Z-score
A better place to live	42	25.8%	50	37.0%	-2.08
A worse place to live	25	15.3	13	9.6	1.47
Has stayed about the same	72	44.2	58	43.0	---
Haven't lived here that long	21	12.9	14	10.4	---
NA	3	1.8			---
TOTAL	163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]This question appeared only in the Citizen Survey (A10): "In general, during the past couple of years, do you think this neighborhood has become a better place to live, a worse place, or has it stayed the same?"

[b]Nonsignificant *Z*-scores are not always reported.

TABLE V.29

CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN WILLARD-HOMEWOOD[a]

CHANGES FOR THE BETTER	1976 SURVEY Frequency	1976 SURVEY Percent	1978 SURVEY Frequency	1978 SURVEY Percent	Z-score[b]
Kids are growing up	---	---	7	14.9%	---
People are friendlier	13	27.7%	6	12.8	1.80
Improvement to property	9	19.1	19	40.4	-2.25
Commercial facilities	10	21.3	4	8.5	1.74
Other	15	31.9	11	23.4	---
TOTAL	47	100.0%	47	100.0%	

[a]This question appeared only in the Citizen Survey (Question A10a): "What about the neighborhood has gotten better/worse?"

[b]Nonsignificant *Z*-score values are not always reported.

Given the predictions of people (about their chances of being victimized and, in Willard-Homewood, the belief that the quality of life has improved), were residents more or less afraid of certain areas within their neighborhood? The items in the survey instrument which provide evidence on this question were slightly different for the Citizen and Resident surveys. Hence, direct comparisons between the instruments must be done with caution. With that caveat in mind, the findings are shown in Table V.30. However, since both Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East used the Resident Survey,

TABLE V.30

DO DANGEROUS AREAS EXIST IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD[a]

EXISTENCE OF DANGEROUS AREAS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
Yes	51	45.9%	57	46.3%	—	60	55.6%	52	51.0%	—	77	47.2%	58	43.0%	—
No	47	42.3	59	48.0	-0.87	39	36.1	47	46.1	-1.47	84	51.5	77	57.0	-0.95
Don't know, NA	13	11.7	7	5.7	—	9	8.3	3	2.9	—	2	1.2	—	—	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	99.9%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A18--Resident Survey: "Are there any areas in this neighborhood that seem dangerous to you?" Question A20--Citizen Survey: "Are there any areas in your neighborhood where you feel afraid to go alone after dark?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]None of the Z-score values are significant.

comparisons can be made between them. Just a slightly lower percentage of 1978 respondents said they were afraid to go alone to certain areas of the neighborhood after dark (48 percent in 1976 versus 43 percent in 1978). The question which was similar for Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne produced mixed feelings; for Lowry Hill East, there was a slightly higher percentage of 1978 respondents saying there was a dangerous area in the neighborhood; for Hawthorne, the 1978 percentage declined about 8 percent.

Thus, for the three neighborhoods, there has been a reduction in *overall* fear of being victimized. However, there has been little change in the level of fear felt about other areas within the neighborhood. But how about people's feelings of what may be dangerous situations? Numerous situations were described to respondents, and they were requested to estimate how dangerous these might be. The Willard-Homewood survey responses were recorded on a ten-point scale and the Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne response categories were "dangerous" and "not dangerous." Therefore, direct comparisons between neighborhoods may not be justified. Wherever interneighborhood findings are discussed, the basis for making comparisons will be indicated.

About 90 percent of the respondents characterized seven out of the 28 situations as *not* dangerous (see Table V.31). This finding applies to all of the neighborhoods for both the 1976 and 1978 surveys. Table V.31 lists situations which indicate nondanger to the majority of the respondents in the three neighborhoods. Yet daytime situations that were judged to be safe by most looked quite different at night. For example, 96 percent of the Lowry Hill East respondents indicated walking around the neighborhood alone during the day was not dangerous whereas the comparable

TABLE V.31

DEGREE OF DANGER OR NONDANGER ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS SITUATIONS[a]

DEGREE OF NONDANGER FOR THE SITUATIONS LISTED[b]	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey[c]		1978 Survey[c]			1976 Survey[c]		1978 Survey[c]			1976 Survey[c]		1978 Survey[c]		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[d]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[d]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[d]
Walk with someone at night	83	74.8%	105	85.4%	-2.04	69	63.9	74	72.5	-1.34	129	79.1%	107	79.3%	—
Wait for bus alone during the day	101	91.0	119	96.7	-1.83	94	87.0	89	87.3	—	129	79.1	125	92.6	-3.27
Wait for bus with someone during the day	103	92.8	121	98.7	-2.12	100	92.6	97	95.1	-0.75	128	78.5	127	94.1	-3.81
Wait for bus alone at night	43	38.7	65	52.8	-2.16	40	37.0	25	24.5	1.96	96	58.9	83	61.5	—
Wait for bus with someone at night	85	76.6	105	84.5	-1.53	68	63.0	66	64.7	—	114	69.9	98	72.6	—
In neighborhood park alone during the day	83	74.8	106	86.2	-2.21	84	77.8	72	70.6	1.19	130	79.8	108	87.4	-1.75
In neighborhood park with someone during the day	84	75.7	113	91.9	-3.39	88	81.5	82	80.4	—	131	80.4	123	91.1	-2.59
In neighborhood bar alone during the day	60	54.1	78	63.4	-1.44	56	51.9	40	39.2	1.85	65	40.0	85	62.9	-3.94
In neighborhood bar with someone during the day	61	55.0	83	67.5	-1.96	66	61.1	51	50.0	1.62	67	41.1	87	64.4	-4.01
In neighborhood bar alone at night	46	41.4	50	40.7	—	27	25.0	12	11.8	2.46	54	33.1	68	50.4	-3.02
In neighborhood bar with someone at night	56	50.5	70	56.9	-0.98	44	41.7	31	30.4	1.70	65	40.0	85	62.9	-3.94
Use of neighborhood facilities alone during the day	95	85.6	121	98.4	-3.67	98	90.7	92	90.2	—	139	85.3	124	91.8	-1.73
Use of neighborhood facilities with someone during the day	108	97.3	121	98.4	—	102	94.4	94	92.2	—	140	85.9	128	94.8	-2.54
Use of neighborhood facilities alone at night	63	56.8	95	77.2	-3.33	51	47.2	54	52.9	-0.83	122	74.9	108	80.0	-1.04
Use of neighborhood facilities with someone at night	90	81.1	111	90.2	-1.82	80	74.1	77	75.5	—	29	79.1	116	85.9	-1.53
In your yard or front of your home alone during the day	110	99.1	123	100.0	—	104	96.3	97	95.1	—	145	88.9	131	97.0	-2.59

[a]Question A24—Resident Survey, Question A29—Citizen Survey: The question wording is very similar in both surveys; however, the responses were recorded on a 10 point scale for the Citizen Survey whereas respondents were to indicate only if the situation was dangerous or not dangerous on the Resident Survey. The question for the Resident Survey: "I will read you some possible situations and I'd like you to tell me whether or not you think it's dangerous."

The similar question from the Citizen Survey is: "I will read some possible situations and I'd like you to tell me how dangerous you feel the situation to be. For example, if the situation is not dangerous at all, you could answer 0 (zero). As the situation becomes more dangerous, you could go up the ladder to a more dangerous level. If you said 10, the situation would be very dangerous."

[b]The responses from the two survey instruments cannot be compared given the nature of the different coding schemes used. For this table the 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 responses in the Citizen Survey were considered as "not dangerous" and 6 through 10 as "dangerous" responses.

[c]"Only those frequencies and percentages which indicate that the respondent did not consider the particular situation dangerous are included here."

[d]Nonsignificant *Z*-score values are not always reported.

nighttime estimate was 39 percent (not shown on the table). This pattern holds true for most of the instances.

Of more interest was whether or not there had been significant change in results for the two time periods. Two of the neighborhoods, Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East, show a reduction in residents' estimates of the dangerousness of the 28 situations. Out of the 28 circumstances, responses were more positive (i.e., situations not as dangerous as in 1976) for 24 in Willard-Homewood, 20 in Lowry Hill East, and 5 in Hawthorne. The highest percentage for the "not dangerous" response was almost evenly divided between Lowry Hill East (15 out of the 28) and Willard-Homewood (13 out of 28). Hawthorne not only had the fewest (5) positive changes but did not have the highest rate for any situation. Hawthorne results are substantially below the other neighborhoods' responses for most of the 28 situations.

The largest relative change occurred in Lowry Hill East. These findings for Lowry Hill East might be explained by the extent of block club organizing achieved. If block club organizing produced such a result, why did Hawthorne have more negative results than Willard-Homewood? Hawthorne organized a higher percentage of blocks than did Willard-Homewood, but this was not reflected by the interview evidence about dangerous situations.

As noted above, in two of the neighborhoods, respondents reported that there seemed to be less danger in 1978 for the 28 situations stated to them. What was the pattern of responses relating to specific crimes? The findings were not consistent among the three neighborhoods as Table V.32 portrays.

TABLE V.32

CRIMES OR CRIME-RELATED ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED TO BE A BIG PROBLEM IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD[a]

CRIME OR CRIME-RELATED ACTIVITY	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[b]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[b]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[b]
Residential Burglary	28	25.2%	24	19.5%	1.05	32	29.6%	26	25.5%	0.66	41	25.2%	44	32.6%	-1.41
Vandalism	21	18.9	14	11.4	1.61	28	25.9	23	22.5	0.57	43	26.7	38	28.1	—
Groups of teenagers around in the streets or park	5	4.5	9	7.3	-0.90	28	25.9	16	15.7	1.82	18	11.2	28	20.7	-2.26
People using illegal drugs	16	14.4	19	15.4	—	25	23.1	18	17.6	0.99	26	16.0	26	19.3	—
Stealing cars	6	5.4	3	2.4	1.20	14	13.0	16	15.7	-0.56	20	12.4	26	19.3	-1.64
Commercial Robbery	27	24.3	21	17.1	1.36	14	13.0	13	12.7	—	19	11.7	24	17.8	-1.49
People selling illegal drugs	16	14.4	14	11.4	0.69	21	19.4	15	14.7	0.90	23	14.2	23	17.0	—
Drunken men	5	4.5	9	7.3	-0.90	18	16.7	7	6.9	2.19	6	3.7	21	15.6	-3.56
Groups of men in the streets or parks	6	5.4	5	4.1	—	5	4.6	2	2.0	—	6	3.7	20	14.8	-3.38
Street Robbery	9	8.1	6	4.9	1.00	15	13.9	7	6.9	1.65	20	12.4	18	13.3	—
Street Assaults	7	6.3	4	3.3	1.08	17	15.7	6	5.9	2.27	19	11.7	18	13.3	—
Prostitution	14	12.6	9	7.3	1.36	5	4.6	2	2.0	—	4	2.5	13	9.6	-2.68
Rape	18	16.2	6	4.9	2.85	5	4.6	7	6.9	—	4	2.5	12	8.9	-2.43

[a]Question A24—Resident Survey, Question A30—Citizen Survey: "I am going to read you a list of crimes and crime-related problems that exist in some areas. For each, I want you to tell me whether it is a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in this neighborhood (Citizen Survey: in the neighborhood or area where you live)."

[b]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

Table V.32 displays those crimes or crime-related activities considered to be big problems in the neighborhood. For Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne, the few significant *Z*-scores indicate residents felt certain crimes were not as big a problem in 1978. Out of the 13 crimes or crime-related situations shown in Table V.32, 10 experienced a reduced percentage in Lowry Hill East and 11 categories in Hawthorne were lower in 1978. Willard-Homewood responses indicate all 13 categories were a bigger problem in 1978 (three were significantly higher). Despite the higher percentage of 1978 Willard-Homewood responses stating that the crimes listed were a big problem, fewer residents believed overall crime increased, and more believed crime decreased. Tables V.32 and V.33 may not be contradictory because a particular category of crime might still be considered a big problem although overall crime may be perceived to have declined.

But these observations do not account for the different patterns of responses for Willard-Homewood contrasted with the other two neighborhoods. The findings in Table V.32 show significance for only three situations in Willard-Homewood--and those situations involve activities not directly addressed by the crime prevention project. Hence, although the trends of the percentages shown in Table V.32 were quite different among the three neighborhoods, very few of the changes were statistically significant. Therefore, the contrasting patterns in Willard-Homewood could be due to chance fluctuations.

Based upon the data shown in the various tables, residents tended to think life in their neighborhoods was not as dangerous in 1978 as it was in 1976. Most of the 28 situations described to residents were considered less dangerous in 1978 by residents of Willard-Homewood and Lowry

TABLE V.33

ESTIMATE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME TREND[a]

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
HAS CRIME:	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
Increased	38	34.2%	12	9.8%	4.55	31	28.7%	23	22.5%	1.03	35	21.5%	15	11.1%	2.34
Decreased	14	12.6	32	26.0	-2.58	9	8.3	18	17.6	-2.02	20	12.3	35	25.9	-3.01
Remained the same	28	25.2	44	35.8	-1.75	43	39.8	49	48.0	-1.27	69	42.3	66	48.9	-1.14
Haven't lived here that long	5	4.5	9	7.3	-0.90	8	7.4	1	1.0	2.29	13	8.0	10	7.4	--
Other, etc.	26	23.4	26	21.1	--	17	15.7	11	10.8	--	26	15.9	9	6.7	--
TOTAL	111	99.7%	123	100.0		108	99.9%	102	99.9%		163	100.0	135	100.0	

[a]Question A9--Resident Survey, Question A13--Citizen Survey: "Within the past year or two do you think that crime in this ('your' in Citizen Survey) neighborhood has increased, decreased, or remained about the same?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

Hill East. Hawthorne responses were mixed--some situations were considered more dangerous in 1978 and others not as dangerous as in 1976. However, these expressions of anxiety about various situations do not provide much insight into the specific kinds of danger the respondents may have had in mind when answering the questions. The purpose of the questions, which provided the data for the section just completed, was to measure changes in residents' concern for their safety in different situations. In the next section, data will be presented concerning respondents' estimates of whether or not certain crimes present problems in their neighborhood.

As observed earlier, responses to the victimization questions demonstrate a substantial discrepancy between perceived likelihood of becoming a victim of crime and the actual chance of suffering a crime (recall Table V.27). Although the discrepancy between a predicted occurrence of crime and the crime rate was still large in 1978, there was a more realistic assessment than in 1976. What shape do the residents' predictions assume in going from the likelihood of personal victimization to the crime trends within the neighborhood? The data reported in Table V.33 were consistent with the victimization findings since most of the changes reported indicate respondents believed crime had not increased but had decreased or had remained the same.

How can the survey findings from Willard-Homewood, where residents believe crime *decreased*, be reconciled with the fact that crime *increased*? The apparent contradiction in these two data may be explained by recalling the wide discrepancy between the recorded crime rate and predictions about being victimized. Even if the estimates of victimization could decline sharply, they still likely would remain much higher than the recorded

incidence of crime, so large is the discrepancy. Therefore, the Willard-Homewood respondents' expectations of crime are still a good deal higher than the current occurrence of crime. In all of the neighborhoods, the percentage responding that crime decreased was significantly higher in 1978.

Consistent with the foregoing responses, the percentage stating crime increased was not as high as in 1976 (the *Z*-score for Hawthorne was not significant, however). One-third to one-half of the respondents suggested the crime rate has remained the same; this was substantially higher than in 1976.

It was not possible to establish a direct link between the activities of the CCP program and the belief of the residents surveyed that the crime picture had improved. Of course, the CCP efforts worked to achieve such an outcome. Indeed, the findings were statistically significant in a direction supportive of favorable CCP impact.

It may be easier to estimate whether or not crime had increased or decreased than to list the specific kinds of crimes which have changed. The survey item which requested respondents to state whether or not there was an increase or decrease in crime was followed by another question which sought answers which would specify the crime as shown in Table V.34. Between 76 and 91 percent said they were thinking of specific crimes in stating that crime had increased, decreased, or remained the same. This table does not separate the information based upon whether the respondents said crime increased or decreased. More importantly, could residents list the specific crimes imagined in the question? Most, in fact, could identify the crimes (see Table V.34).

TABLE V.34

HAVE SPECIFIC CRIMES INCREASED OR DECREASED?[a]

DID YOU HAVE SPECIFIC CRIMES IN MIND WHEN YOU SAID CRIME IN-CREASED OR DECREASED?	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score
Yes	46	86.8%	40	90.0%	-0.63	38	82.6%	31	75.6%	0.80	41	74.5%	40	80.0%	-0.74
No	6	11.3	3	6.8	0.76	1	2.2	10	24.4	-3.11	13	23.6	10	20.0	0.45
Don't know	1	1.9	1	2.3	—	7	15.2	—	—	—	1	1.8	—	—	—
TOTAL	53	100.0%	44	100.0%		46	100.0%	41	100.0%		55	99.9%	50	100.0%	

[a]Question A10—Resident Survey, Question A13a—Citizen Survey: "Were you thinking about any specific kinds of crimes if you said you think crime in this ('your' for Citizen Survey) neighborhood has increased/decreased?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

TABLE V.35

NEIGHBORHOOD DANGER AS A FACTOR IN CONTEMPLATING A MOVE[a]

IS DEGREE OF DANGER A FACTOR IN THINKING ABOUT MOVING?	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score
Yes	18	16.2%	9	7.3%	2.09	21	19.4%	10	9.8%	1.96	28	17.4	14	10.4%	1.92
No	90	81.1	114	92.7	-2.65	86	79.6	90	88.2	-1.69	133	82.6	116	85.9	-0.99
NA	3	2.9	—	—	—	1	0.9	2	2.0	—	2	—	5	3.7	—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question A11—Resident Survey, Question A22—Citizen Survey: "Is this neighborhood dangerous enough to make you think seriously about moving elsewhere ('somewhere else' in Citizen Survey)?"

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

(see Table V.35) were significant for Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. A slight increase in the "not applicable" responses explains why Willard-Homewood results were not significant. (In dichotomous categories, if one category is significant, the other one will also be significant--but with different signs.)

In general, the survey findings concerning crime problems are consistent with the objectives sought by the CCP efforts. The basis for this statement will be presented in the summary of this section appearing in Table V.36. Except for Willard-Homewood responses for the first category, all of the data shown on Table V.36 indicate reduced importance of crime. Residents believed crime has been decreasing in their neighborhoods, and a lower percentage of respondents in 1978 think they should move because the area seems too dangerous.

TABLE V.36

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS CONCERNING CRIME PROBLEMS[a]

COMPARED TO 1976 WHAT IS THE CRIME PICTURE IN 1978 FROM RESIDENTS' VIEWPOINT	LOWRY HILL EAST	HAWTHORNE	WILLARD-HOMEWOOD
Concerning 13 types of crimes or activities, how many are as big a problem in 1978?	10 are not as big a problem	11 are not as big a problem	13 are a bigger problem
Has crime increased, decreased or remained the same?	Decreased	Decreased	Decreased
Is the neighborhood dangerous enough to make one move elsewhere?	Lower percentage said yes	Lower percentage said yes	Lower percentage said yes

[a]Based upon Tables V.32, V.33, V.35.

Although the data shown in Tables V.32, V.33, and V.35 fairly consistently indicate progress against crime (as perceived by residents), very few of the findings were statistically significant. As noted in an early section, consistent patterns in responses may lend credulity to otherwise nonsignificant results. Accordingly, it may be possible to conclude that

residents' impressions of the crime picture seem a little brighter in 1978. This conclusion is also consistent with the data on victimization. Table V.27 presented evidence which showed respondents had a lower expectation of becoming a victim of crime in 1978. These predictions of a lessened chance of victimization did not reflect a significant reduction in recorded crime. In one instance (residential burglary in Willard-Homewood), the crime rate increased substantially although residents believed their chances of becoming a victim of burglary declined. As was noted earlier, despite the decline in respondents' estimates of the likelihood of victimization, the discrepancy between recorded crime rates and prediction of victimization remained large.

The decline in the level of expected victimization is consistent with a major goal of the CCP project--to reduce the fear of crime. Reducing fear of crime to correspond exactly with the recorded occurrence of crime was not posited as a goal nor would it have been realistic to do so. Another objective of the project--encouraging people to report all crimes or suspicious activities--should have operated to narrow the gap between prediction of victimization and recorded crime. Whether or not increased reporting of crime occurred will be the subject of the next section.

3. Victimization and Reporting Rate of Crime

The number of crime incidents was collected for each of the neighborhoods as well as for the controls. As noted in previous sections, the overall *decrease* in crime in Lowry Hill East was 17 percent. Hawthorne *decreased* slightly by 1.8 percent and Willard-Homewood *increased* by 31.6 percent. Since one of the objectives of the CCP project was to encourage residents to report suspicious activities and crime-in-progress occurrences, an increased reporting rate could have accounted for a rise

in recorded incidents in 1978 compared to 1975. It is impossible even in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne that an increased reporting rate could have lessened the amount of decreased crime. Insight on the possibility of a change in the reporting rate might be provided by comparing the incidence of victimizations for the two years as reported in the surveys. If the rate of victimization would change differently than recorded crime incidents, this result would suggest qualifying the trend in recorded crime. Since the CCP program predicted a rise in reporting rates, recorded crime rates should be adjusted in making comparisons with years when reporting rates were lower.

Serious reservations about the use of responses to the victimization questions were noted in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter. The fundamental problem with this section of the surveys is an insufficiently large number of respondents. Nevertheless, the results of the survey will be presented with the serious qualification that the victimization findings likely may have occurred by chance at least 10 to 20 percent of the time.[1]

The data in Tables V.37, V.38, V.39, and V.40 show that the reporting rates for all crimes together declined for Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne but increased for Willard-Homewood. Inspection of individual crimes shows that rates differed widely, but there were really too few incidents to justify a crime-by-crime comparison. To reiterate, the victimization findings should be viewed with the knowledge that they did not meet very satisfactory confidence limits. Despite these serious qualifications,

[1] U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Local Victim Surveys: A Review of the Issues* by James Garofalo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 19.

the reporting rates, as ascertained from the surveys, are presented. Tables V.37, V.38, V.39, and V.40 show that the reporting rates can be compared to recorded crime rates. For every crime category listed on the tables, the recorded crime rate was lower than the rate projected from survey findings. Direct comparisons between recorded crime rates and rates based upon surveys were fraught with reservations and should not be used to derive definitive conclusions. However, comparing survey findings for 1976 and 1978 seems more defensible.

Although the reporting rate for all crimes taken together declined in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne, the rate for residential burglary rose slightly. Hawthorne's reporting rate was 79.2 percent in 1976 and 81.8 percent in 1978. Since it seems unlikely that all incidents will ever be reported, a question arises as to what a realistic goal might be. It may be possible that Hawthorne's rate for burglary was near the maximum. If that was the case, then the CCP attempts to increase reporting might serve to reinforce existing behavior rather than to change behavior. Only about one-third or fewer of the vandalism incidents were reported in 1978. This represents a decline from 1976. Residents' unwillingness to inform the police about vandalism coincided with a sharp increase in the number of incidents. At least concerning vandalism, residents were not influenced much by the CCP efforts to promote reporting of crime or suspicious activities.

TABLE V.37

CRIME REPORTING RATES IN LOWRY HILL EAST

	CRIME DATA DERIVED FROM SURVEYS						PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CRIME					
	1976 Survey			1978 Survey			1976 Survey			1978 Survey		
CRIMES	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]
All crimes	73	28	38.4%	94	33	35.1%	---	---	---	---	---	---
Residential burglary	14	9	64.3%	14	10	71.4%	429	276	226	387	276	191
Assault	5	1	20.0%	4	2	50.0%	326	65	120	235	118	95
Vandalism	8	3	37.5%	28	8	28.6%	262	98	76	827	236	99

[a]These data were derived from Question Da: "The following questions refer only to things that happened to you in this neighborhood during the last 12 months--between _____ and today."

[b]If, in response to Question Da, respondents indicated a victimization occurred then they were asked whether or not the incident(s) was reported to the police.

[c]The number of crime incidents projected was derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an illustration of the computation):

1. The number of incidents noted in the survey as a proportion of the total number of residents sampled (i.e., for 1976, 14 incidents divided by 111 = 12.6%).

2. The proportion of incidents occurring in the survey is multiplied by the total number of opportunities in the neighborhood (i.e., for 1976, 12.6% x 3,404 = 429 is the projected number).

[d]The number reported is derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an example): The number projected is multiplied by the percentage reporting incidents to police, e.g., for residential burglary in 1976: 64.3% x 429 = 276.

[e]This is the actual number of incidents recorded by the police as found on offense reports for 1974-75 or 1977-78. The surveys cover periods comparable to the periods used for collecting offense data. For example, the 1976 Resident Survey administered in August, 1976, requested respondents to recall victimizations that had occurred during the 12 months ending with the date of the interview. The offense data for 1974-75 covered the period from July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1975. The 1978 survey was administered in late April, 1978, and the crime data collected for the period July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

The figure for "all crimes" is not available because offense data were not collected for all the crimes listed in the survey.

TABLE V.38

CRIME REPORTING RATES IN HAWTHORNE

	CRIME DATA DERIVED FROM SURVEYS						PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CRIME					
	1976 Survey			1978 Survey			1976 Survey			1978 Survey		
CRIMES	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]
All crimes	100	55	55.0%	118	52	44.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Residential Burglary	24	19	79.2%	11	9	81.8%	360	285	117	175	143	113
Assault	5	2	40.0%	2	0	0.0%	234	93	87	99	0	92
Vandalism	25	10	40.0%	33	11	33.3%	396	158	108	555	185	89

[a]These data were derived from Question Da: "The following questions refer only to things that happened to you in this neighborhood during the last 12 months--between _____ and today."

[b]If, in response to Question Da, respondents indicated a victimization occurred then they were asked whether or not the incident(s) was reported to the police.

[c]The number of crime incidents projected was derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an illustration of the computation):

1. The number of incidents noted in the survey as a proportion of the total number of residents sampled (i.e., for 1976, 24 incidents divided by 108 = 22.2%).

2. The proportion of incidents occurring in the survey is multiplied by the total number of opportunities in the neighborhood (i.e., for 1976, 22.2% x 1,621 = 360 is the projected number).

[d]The number reported is derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an example): The number projected is multiplied by the percentage reporting incidents to police, e.g., for residential burglary in 1976; 79.2% x 360 = 285.

[e]This is the actual number of incidents recorded by the police as found on offense reports for 1974-75 or 1977-78. The surveys cover periods comparable to the periods used for collecting offense data. For example, the 1976 Resident Survey administered in August, 1976, requested respondents to recall victimizations that had occurred during the 12 months ending with the date of the interview. The offense data for 1974-75 covered the period from July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1975. The 1978 survey was administered in late April, 1978, and the crime data collected for the period July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

The figure for "all crimes" is not available because offense data were not collected for all the crimes listed in the survey.

TABLE V.39

CRIME REPORTING RATES IN WILLARD-HOMEWOOD

	CRIME DATA DERIVED FROM SURVEYS						PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CRIME					
	1976 Survey			1978 Survey			1976 Survey			1978 Survey		
CRIMES	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number of Crimes[a]	Number Reported[b]	Percent Reported	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]	Number Projected[c]	Number Reported[d]	Actual[e]
All crimes	165	58	35.2%	179	77	43.0%	—	—	—	—	—	—
Residential Burglary	22	12	54.5%	20	14	70.0%	445	243	291	488	342	362
Assault	6	2	33.3%	6	4	66.7%	392	131	144	473	316	217
Vandalism	28	8	28.6%	23	7	30.4%	592	169	140	587	179	210

[a] These data were derived from Question Da: "The following questions refer only to things that happened to you in this neighborhood during the last 12 months--between _____ and today."

[b] If, in response to Question Da, respondents indicated a victimization occurred then they were asked whether or not the incident(s) was reported to the police.

[c] The number of crime incidents projected was derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an illustration of the computation):

1. The number of incidents noted in the survey as a proportion of the total number of residents sampled (i.e., for 1976, 22 incidents divided by 163 = 13.5%).

2. The proportion of incidents occurring in the survey is multiplied by the total number of opportunities in the neighborhood (i.e., for 1976, 13.5% x 3,296 = 445 is the projected number).

[d] The number reported is derived as follows (residential burglary is used as an example): The number projected is multiplied by the percentage reporting incidents to police, e.g., for residential burglary in 1976; 54.5% x 445 = 243.

[e] This is the actual number of incidents recorded by the police as found on offense reports for 1974-75 or 1977-78. The surveys cover periods comparable to the periods used for collecting offense data. For example, the 1976 Citizen Survey administered in January, 1976, requested respondents to recall victimizations that had occurred during the 12 months ending with the date of the interview. The offense data for 1974-75 covered the period from July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1975. The 1978 survey was administered in late April, 1978, and the crime data collected for the period July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978.

The figure for "all crimes" is not available because offense data were not collected for all the crimes listed in the survey.

TABLE V.40

COMPARISON OF CRIME RATE PERCENTAGES BASED UPON OFFENSE AND SURVEY DATA[a]

	LOWRY HILL EAST				HAWTHORNE				WILLARD-HOMEWOOD			
	1976		1978		1976		1978		1976		1978	
CRIME	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent	Offense Data Percent	Survey Data Percent
Residential Burglary	6.64%	12.61%	5.61%	11.38%	6.40%	22.22%	6.18%	10.78%	8.83%	13.50%	10.98%	14.81%
Personal Robbery	0.50	0.90	0.11	1.63	0.47	1.85	0.16	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.53	0.74
Vandalism	2.09	7.21	2.73	22.76	6.31	23.15	5.20	32.35	4.07	17.18	6.10	17.04
Assault	1.66	4.50	1.31	3.25	1.72	4.63	1.81	1.96	1.35	3.68	2.04	4.44

[a]Offense data were collected from police offense records. The Resident and Citizen surveys are the sources for the survey data. Using Residential Burglary in Lowry Hill East as an example, the crime rates were computed as follows: 1) 226 incidents (see Table V.37) divided by 3,404 (number of residential units) yields a rate of 6.64 percent, and 2) the rate derived from the survey is found by dividing 14 (see Table V.33) by 111 (sample size); with a result of 12.61 percent.

4. Home Security

Clearly, it would be difficult to assess program impact upon attitudes and perception. It would not be as difficult to measure some of the activities attributed to the CCP intervention. Tangible yardsticks were available for measuring the project's impact upon survey participants' adoption of Operation I.D. and/or various security devices for the home. The evidence on Operation I.D. points to a rather sharply increased participation for Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood; Hawthorne was also higher but not as dramatically. The data appear in Table V.41.

The level of participation in Operation I.D. rose substantially from 1976 to 1978. The increase was significant for two of the neighborhoods (Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East). The number of Operation I.D. requests generated through the block club meetings did not alone account for the rise indicated in the surveys. Generalizing from the survey to the population in each neighborhood, the number of Operation I.D. participants would be as illustrated in Table V.42. The number of actual Operation I.D. requests occurring during the CCP project also can be found in that table.

TABLE V.41

OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PARTICIPATION[a]

VALUABLES ARE ENGRAVED WITH OPERATION IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	*Z*-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	*Z*-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	*Z*-score
Yes	18	16.2%	37	30.1%	-2.50	19	17.6%	24	23.5%	-1.06	39	23.9%	48	35.6%	-2.21
No	93	83.8	84	68.3	2.76	89	82.4	77	75.5	1.23	124	76.1	85	62.9	2.48
Don't know	---	---	2	1.6	---	---	---	1	1.0	---	---	---	2	1.5	---
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question B3—Resident and Citizen Surveys: "Here is a list of some things people have to protect their homes. Which of the things on the list do you (and your family) have to protect your home?" One of the items on the list is: "Have your valuables engraved with an Operation Identification number in case they are stolen."

TABLE V.42

ACTUAL AND PROJECTED OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PARTICIPATION[a]

NEIGHBORHOOD[b]	1976 SURVEY: Number of Operation Identification Participants	1976 SURVEY: Percent Participating	1976 SURVEY: Projected Number of Participants[c]	1978 SURVEY: Number of Operation Identification Participants	1978 SURVEY: Percent Participating	1978 SURVEY: Projected Number of Participants[c]	TOTAL INCREASE IN PARTICIPATION[d]	OPERATION IDENTIFICATION REQUESTS VIA THE COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROJECT[e]
Lowry Hill East	18	16.2%	439	37	30.1%	814	375	153
Hawthorne	19	17.6%	206	24	23.5%	280	74	86
Willard-Homewood	39	23.9%	574	48	35.6%	852	278	97

[a] Actual number of participants is derived from the surveys (see Table V.41). The percentage of respondents participating in Operation Identification multiplied times the number of residences in the neighborhood yields the projected number of participants. (The rate of participation being discussed here is actually the number of residential units that have engraved property).

[b] The survey was conducted in whole census tracts in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. The area sampled in Willard-Homewood included whole census tracts 27, 28, 32 and part of 20. However, in the analysis above tract 32 was excluded because it was not surveyed in 1976 (the responses in tract 32 were almost identical to remaining tracts). The number of residences in the areas that could be surveyed is as follows (based upon the 1970 census).

Lowry Hill East (tract 67)	2,706
Hawthorne (tract 22)	1,191
Willard-Homewood (tracts 27, 28 and part of 20)	2,397

[c] This figure derived from the survey percentage participating projected to neighborhood participation.

[d] The increase is obtained by subtracting the 1976 projection from the 1978 projection.

[e] The areas surveyed in 1978 are somewhat smaller than the demonstration neighborhoods. This was necessary in order to conduct the survey in the same area as in 1976. The consequence for this table is that the number of Operation Identification requests could exceed the increase in participation within the smaller boundaries of the tracts surveyed (as in Hawthorne).

The number of Operation I.D. requests arising from the CCP project was lower than the increase projected based upon the frequency in the neighborhood samples. In one case (Hawthorne), the projected number deviated only slightly from the requests handled by the Hawthorne CCP staff. For the other neighborhoods, the discrepancy between the sample percentage increase and requests through the CCP staff was substantial. Therefore, ti would seem much of the increase in Operation I.D. cannot be attributed to the CCP program intervention. It was not possible to determine how much of the difference between total growth in Operation I.D. participation and CCP generated requests might be due to spinoffs from the staff activities. In other words, some of the residents who adopted Operation I.D. may have been motivated to do so through vicarious exposure to the CCP message. Some of these residents may have inscribed the Operation I.D. numbers without making use of the CCP equipment.

It was difficult to account for the lower level of Operation I.D. participation in Hawthorne compared to the other neighborhoods or the fact that the increase was not statistically significant. The Hawthorne CCP staff used the same approach as in Willard-Homewood to provide block club participants with engravers for Operation I.D. Moreover, the Hawthorne staff organized a higher percentage of blocks than Willard-Homewood. Why was there less improvement in Hawthorne then? The apparent contradiction may be resolved simply: the eastern portion of Hawthorne was not included in this survey, yet those were the very blocks organized earliest. Additionally, the first blocks organized *required* Operation I.D. participation as a condition for achieving Neighborhood Watch status. About 50 of the Hawthorne respondents lived in blocks not organized by the date of the survey. These factors may account for the lower increase in Operation

I.D. participation in Hawthorne but do not help much in explaining why the increase from 1976 to 1978 was so large for the other neighborhoods.

The sharp increase in the percentage of Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood respondents who participated in Operation I.D. in 1978 can be partially attributable to CCP block club activities. Only about 25 percent of Lowry Hill East's projected increase occurred through the CCP program; the comparable figure for Willard-Homewood was 25 percent and for Hawthorne was 80 percent. The difference between the numbers projected and actual Operation I.D. requests should not be taken as definitive since the projected figures were conjectures. Nevertheless, the relativly low number of Operation I.D. requests arising through the CCP project contrasts with the percentage of survey respondents who said they participated in Operation I.D. The latter figures, of course, serve to help implement one of the strategies of the CCP project, even if the source of the motivation to participate in Operation I.D. occurred from the police, general community education, or other non-CCP organizations.

Like Operation I.D., it was relatively easy to measure something like the devices used in the home to improve security. Doors and windows seem to be the obvious targets for security improvement in most residences. The survey explored this aspect of home security in great detail. Several hypothetical scenarios were related to the respondents who were then asked what action, if any, was taken in those circumstances.

But first, the status of the dwelling's security was determined. The resident was asked to indicate what things the home had to protect against intrusion. Table V.43 shows that the percentage increases for 1978 in various kinds of home protection were significantly larger in 5 out of

TABLE V.43

SECURITY DEVICES USED TO PROTECT HOMES

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
TYPE OF PROTECTION	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[a]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[a]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[a]
Deadbolt locks on all doors	67	60.4%	76	61.8%	--	54	50.0%	46	45.1%	--	71	43.6%	74	54.8%	-1.93
Special locks on all windows	11	9.9	25	20.3	-2.20	16	14.8	27	26.5	-2.10	44	27.0	39	28.9	--
An alarm that rings	6	5.4	3	2.4	--	3	2.8	3	2.9	--	8	4.9	10	7.4	--
Silent alarm	0	0.0	0	0.0	--	3	2.8	0	0.0	--	2	1.2	2	1.5	--
Gun	16	14.4	14	11.4	--	29	26.9	22	21.6	--	55	33.7	52	38.5	--
Other weapons	50	45.0	54	43.9	--	37	34.3	58	56.9	-3.23	56	34.4	57	42.2	-1.38
Automatic timers	13	11.7	23	18.7	-1.48	12	11.1	20	19.6	-1.71	19	11.7	16	11.9	--
Trained dog	5	4.5	3	2.4	--	7	6.5	2	2.0	1.70	11	6.7	15	11.1	-1.34
Ordinary dog	27	24.3	29	23.6	--	45	41.7	40	39.2	--	62	38.0	57	42.2	-0.74
Bars or wire mesh on all doors	0	0.0	0	0.0	--	1	0.9	1	1.0	--	0	0.0	3	2.2	--
Bars or wire mesh on all windows	1	0.9	2	1.6	--	1	0.9	0	0.0	--	4	2.5	2	1.5	--
Private guard	1	0.9	4	3.3	--	1	0.9	1	1.0	--	8	4.9	4	3.0	--

SOURCE: Question B3 of both surveys (see the text of the question in the footnote of Table V.41)--Operation Identification.

[a]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

the 36 possible instances. Inspection of the table shows that some of the devices used for protection were quite prevalent in 1976 and increased slightly--if not significantly--by 1978. For example, almost 39 percent of the Willard-Homewood respondents said they owned a gun for protection in 1978. Almost one-half of the respondents from each neighborhood indicated they have other weapons for protection. A high percentage have ordinary dogs as a deterrent (23.6 percent in Lowry Hill East, 39.2 percent in Hawthorne, and 42.2 percent in Willard-Homewood).

The CCP program promoted a security survey of premises. The police officers who performed the surveys looked for weak points in the security of the dwelling; doors and windows were of particular interest. If the officer detected weaknesses, recommendations would be offered, such as installation of deadbolt locks on doors or special locks on windows. (In Chapter IV, Section D, the premise security survey procedure was discussed in detail.) The question arises as to the impact of premise security surveys, together with the other information provided by CCP organizers, on residents' behavior. The surveys, in 1976 and 1978, provide one measure of this impact. In Table V.43 a comparison can be made of the percentage of respondents saying they have deadbolt locks on all doors. The survey findings reveal no pattern other than that the most intensively organized neighborhood had only a slight increase (Lowry Hill East with 60.4 percent in 1976--61.8 percent in 1978), whereas the least intensively organized area had the largest increase (Willard-Homewood had 43.6 percent in 1976--54.8 percent in 1978, Z-score = -1.93). Hawthorne experienced a slight decline (50 percent in 1976--45.1 percent in 1978). The high percentage of respondents in Lowry Hill East having deadbolt locks was accounted for partially by the presence of a large number of

apartment units. Rental units were required to have deadbolt locks on certain doors (those leading directly to a public area) under a Minneapolis ordinance.

Special window locks were not required by the city except for basement and first floor rental units. Hence, relatively few residents had such locks on all windows before the CCP project existed (Willard-Homewood was highest with 17 percent). Both Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne experienced a substantial and statistically significant increase in percentage of residents having special locks on windows. Table V.43 also shows that Willard-Homewood, though its increase was not significant, still had the highest percentage of special locks on windows in both 1976 and 1978. The sharp increase in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne seems to be the consequence of the CCP efforts.

Of course, having security locks on doors and windows may not mean the residents use the devices regularly. Fortunately, data were available from the surveys on the extent of usage. Several questions in the survey were intended to ascertain residents' usage of various security devices or measures in specified circumstances. For example, did people lock all their doors whether leaving the home for a short time or for longer? Has there been any change in residents' usage of such devices? Responses to these questions are analyzed in the paragraphs following.

The CCP project organizers tried to get residents to improve their usage of existing security devices as well as to install additional locks on doors and windows, where necessary. For Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne, the respondents made fuller use of locks in 1978. In many instances the changes were statistically significant. More security-conscious behavior

was evident judging from most of the devices respondents mentioned. Table V.44 indicates that for many of the instances, which were addressed by the CCP program, there were increases in the use of security measures in 1978. Contrasted with 1976, the differences were significant in many instances. Hence, the improved security behavior was not likely to have occurred by chance and may well have been due to CCP project efforts.

In view of these response patterns, it may be surprising to discover that a lower percentage of respondents in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne reported having made arrangements to "watch" one another's house in 1978 than in 1976 (see Table V.45). Moreover, the increase in Lowry Hill East was not significant. Although none of the changes appearing in Table V.45 were significant, the more important finding may be that around 70 percent of all residents have, at one time or another, "watched" a neighbor's residence. This extent of "watching" may be approaching a practical ceiling. If that were true, it may not be necessary to devote additional efforts to promotion of the watch program, other than maintenance.

Perhaps more important than whether or not the respondent has ever watched a neighbor's residence would be how frequently this occurs. About one-third of the respondents said they watch their neighbor's houses all the time. The change from 1976 to 1978 was significant for Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne--but in opposite directions. A significantly higher percentage of Lowry Hill East residents indicated they now watch neighbor's homes, whereas a significantly lower percentage of Hawthorne residents did so in 1978. Willard-Homewood responses were virtually unchanged. Apparently, part of the shift in the responses for the first category ("watch all the time") was mirrored by a shift in the second category ("watch just on special occasions"). Except for Lowry Hill East, there

TABLE V.44

USAGE OF HOME SECURITY DEVICES

PROTECTION USED IN VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
Gone for a while[a]															
Lock doors	104	93.7%	121	98.4%	-1.87	103	95.4%	100	98.0%	-1.05	159	97.5%	130	96.3%	—
Lock windows	62	55.9	81	65.9	-1.57	64	59.3	87	85.3	-4.75	152	93.3	114	84.4	2.47
Leave dog outside	3	2.4	4	3.6	—	13	12.0	6	5.9	1.54	12	7.4	17	12.6	-1.51
Leave radio or TV playing	29	26.1	44	35.8	-1.60	33	30.6	49	48.0	-2.58	51	31.3	59	43.7	-2.21
Notify persons	22	19.8	35	28.5	-1.55	32	29.6	45	44.1	-2.18	35	21.5	37	27.4	-1.18
Set timers to turn lights on after dark	11	9.9	20	16.3	-1.44	8	7.4	20	19.6	-2.60	14	8.6	15	11.1	—
Leave outside lights on at night	29	26.1	40	32.5	-1.07	44	40.7	35	34.3	0.96	72	44.2	55	40.7	—
Leave inside lights on at night	72	64.9	96	78.0	-2.22	81	75.0	85	83.3	-1.48	127	77.9	112	83.0	-1.10
Gone for a weekend or longer[b]															
Lock doors	95	85.6%	120	97.6%	-3.36	98	90.7%	101	99.0%	-2.69	141	86.5%	131	97.0%	-3.19
Lock windows	81	73.0	95	77.2	—	88	81.5	86	84.3	—	135	82.8	111	82.2	—
Leave outside lights on	13	11.7	23	18.7	-1.48	19	17.6	24	23.5	-1.06	22	13.5	24	17.8	—
Leave inside lights on	58	52.3	58	47.2	0.78	62	57.4	75	73.5	-3.70	87	53.4	83	61.5	-1.41
Have someone reposition drapes and shades	22	19.8	30	24.4	—	22	20.4	30	29.4	-1.51	41	25.2	59	43.7	-3.37
Have and use deadbolt locks on doors	65	58.6	99	80.5	-4.09	62	57.4	77	75.5	-2.77	77	47.2	87	64.4	-2.97
Set timer to turn lights on after dark	14	12.6	23	18.7	-1.13	12	11.1	22	21.6	-2.06	22	13.5	22	16.3	—
Don't give out information about absence on telephone	55	49.5	88	71.5	-3.45	55	50.9	29	28.4	3.71	26	16.0	35	25.9	-2.11
Stop newspapers	45	40.5	56	45.5	-0.77	39	36.1	52	51.0	-2.18	72	44.2	61	45.2	—
Stop deliveries	43	38.7	46	37.4	—	29	26.9	56	54.9	-4.13	78	47.9	61	45.2	—
Have lawn mowed/walk shoveled	40	36.0	56	45.5	-1.48	38	35.2	66	64.7	-4.27	106	65.0	75	55.6	1.65
Stop mail or have neighbor collect mail	74	66.7	91	74.0	-1.22	65	60.2	90	88.2	-4.61	121	74.2	100	74.1	—
Have police check house	18	16.2	21	17.1	—	19	17.6	20	19.6	—	—	—	59	43.7	—

[a]Based upon Question B4 of the Resident Survey: "On this card are things you might do when you go out for a while. When no one will be left at home, do you . . .?"

Question B5 of the Citizen Survey (Willard-Homewood) is similar: "Now tell me from the card the things you might do when you go out for a while at night. When no one will be at home during the night do you . . .?"

Although the questions in the two surveys are similar any comparisons suggested should be done with caution.

[b]Based upon Question B5—Resident Survey, Question B6—Citizen Survey: "Here's a card listing some steps people might take to secure their home/apartment when they go away for a weekend or a longer vacation. Do you . . .?"

[c]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

TABLE V.45

"WATCHING" NEIGHBORS' HOMES

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
SURVEY QUESTIONS	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score
Have you ever "watched" a neighbor's residence?[a]															
Yes	68	61.3%	83	67.5%	-0.99	83	76.9%	74	72.5%	0.73	127	77.9%	97	71.9%	1.36
No	43	38.7	38	30.9	1.25	24	22.2	26	25.5	—	36	22.1	37	29.4	-1.06
Other	—	—	2	1.6	—	1	0.9	2	2.0	—	—	—	1	0.7	—
TOTAL	111	100.0%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	
How often do you watch neighbors' residences?[b]															
All the time	26	23.4%	47	38.2%	-2.44	50	46.3%	35	34.3%	1.77	48	29.4%	39	28.9%	—
Special occasions	43	38.7	35	28.5	1.65	33	30.6	38	37.3	-1.03	76	46.6	57	42.2	0.76
Don't know, NA	42	37.8	41	33.3	—	25	2311	29	28.4	—	39	23.9	39	28.9	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.0%		108	100.0%	102	100.0%		163	99.9%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question B6—Resident Survey, Question B7—Citizen Survey: "Have you and any of your neighbors ever made an arrangement to watch one another's residence ('houses' in Citizen Survey) when you are not at home?"

[b]Question B7—Resident Survey, Question B8—Citizen Survey: "Do you do that all the time, or just on special occasions, such as vacations?"

[c]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

was a drop in the total percentage of respondents who indicated they watched homes all the time or on special occasions (this was consistent with the "no" response to the question of whether or not a home was ever "watched").

A primary objective of the block club organizing was to promote Neighborhood Watch--stressing the importance of regular observation and surveillance of one's locale. Except for Lowry Hill East, there was no evidence from the survey that can demonstrate a program effect leading to more involvement in watching neighbors' homes. The decreases in Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood seem contrary to the CCP organizing. In fact, the Neighborhood Watch aspect of block club organizing did not bear much fruit in these two neighborhoods until late in the demonstration year. The first blocks in Hawthorne to achieve Neighborhood Watch status tended to be outside the boundaries of the area surveyed. However, this does not explain why fewer people in 1978 watched homes. Similar arguments apply to Willard-Homewood. By the time the survey was completed probably only one block was in Neighborhood Watch. Is it possible that the residents in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne believe less strongly that watching neighbors' homes can be an effective way to prevent or reduce crime? The data in Table V.44 indicate that equivalent percentages of residents in the three neighborhoods use certain kinds of security devices. Consequently, there appears to be a similar commitment to maintaining security in the home.

Is there a difference in the residents' expectations of the utility of going beyond individual action to joining together with others to prevent crime? Indeed, comparing the findings of Table V.46 to Table V.45, it was not possible to conclude that a higher percentage of Lowry Hill

East residents compared to Willard-Homewood residents believe joint action could be an effective way to prevent crime. Hawthorne responses showed a more negative stand with more clustering in the second category (joint action would make "some difference"). Therefore, based upon results shown in Table V.46, the higher participation of "watching" Lowry Hill East was not due to a stronger belief in the usefulness of joint action.

The Citizen Survey featured some items which did not appear in the Resident Survey. Two examples bear directly on this section. Willard-Homewood residents were asked to estimate how much difference self-protection would make in preventing property crimes. A slightly higher percentage in 1978 reported that self-help would make a difference. However, the increase was not significant. Joint activity was thought to be more productive in Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood (only Willard-Homewood had significant results). Again, Hawthorne did not fit the pattern and experienced a decline in the proportion of people who said joint action would make a "great deal of difference." Table V.46 also shows that a significantly greater percentage in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne thought joint activity could make "some difference." The comparable finding for Willard-Homewood shows a significant decline. In other words, the sum effect in Willard-Homewood was no change (adding the two positive categories).

Perhaps the interesting figure may be the percentage of respondents who said joint activity among neighbors would *not* help prevent crime. In Lowry Hill East, there was a sharp decline (from 17.1 percent to 3.3 percent); in Hawthorne, a decline from 16.7 percent to 9.8 percent; and in Willard-Homewood, a negligible increase (from 7.4 percent to 8.1

percent). Only in the case of Lowry Hill East was the change statistically significant. Focusing on the positive responses alone, residents believe overwhelmingly that cooperative action on the part of neighbors will make some difference or a great deal of difference in preventing crime. Hence, the percentage of most interest seems to be the negative one.

During the period between the two surveys, there were significant changes within each of the positive response categories for the three neighborhoods based upon residents' estimation of the utility of neighbors cooperating to prevent crime. It was reasonable to conclude that the CCP program, operating to encourage people to support one another in crime prevention, had some effect on the survey results.

If these findings from a sample of *all* residents suggest some effect of the CCP program, it might be expected that the results from the telephone survey of block club participants (see Chapter IV, Section B) would be even more convincing. In response to the question of how responsible the CCP project would be for a possible decline in crime, the telephone survey found that close to 33 percent felt it could be "largely responsible," 26 percent believed it would be about "50 percent responsible," and 20 percent felt it would be "somewhat responsible." Therefore, the individuals most directly involved in the CCP activities believe overwhelmingly that the program would be at least partially responsible for any decline in neighborhood crime levels.

Up to this point, much information has been considered concerning attitudes of individuals toward a variety of security or crime matters. Perhaps the most obvious of all actors involved in the crime prevention

picture--the police--have not been mentioned yet in thie analysis of the survey. The following section will examine respondents' attitudes toward the police.

5. Community Attitude toward Police

Aspects of police-community relations compose this final section of the analysis of the survey. The first question requested people to rate the job being done by the Minneapolis police in their neighborhood. Next, they were asked to list ways the Minneapolis police could improve. Finally, respondents who had talked with the Minneapolis police--for any reason--were asked to describe how well they were treated by the police.

Table V.47 presents the findings as to the personal rating of the Minneapolis Police Department. There is no clear-cut change for most of the findings except for Willard-Homewood responses. Combining the two categories--"excellent" and "good"--there was a substantial and significant decline since 1976. For the other neighborhoods, there were positive trends although independently they were not statistically significant.

The only significant value was the decline in "good" responses for Willard-Homewood. The percentage of Willard-Homewood "excellent" or "good" responses was about 20 percent below Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne in 1978. The recent history of the north side would suggest that some tension between police and residents would persist. However, why has Willard-Homewood experienced a decline in positive attitudes toward police, whereas Hawthorne has not? Also, findings from 1976 would have been expected to be less positive than in 1978 because the riots of the late 1960's were closer in time. Since the Willard-Homewood population

TABLE V.47

RATING OF THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT[a]

RESPONDENT'S RATING	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent[c]	Z-score[d]	Frequency	Percent[c]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[d]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[d]
Excellent	16	14.4%	22	17.9%	--	15	13.9%	17	16.7%	-0.56	16	9.8%	15	11.1%	--
Good	50	45.0	66	53.7	-1.33	38	35.2	47	46.1	-1.61	68	41.7	42	31.1	1.88
Fair	23	20.7	22	17.9	--	30	27.8	20	19.6	1.39	41	25.2	41	30.4	-1.00
Poor	7	6.3	5	4.1	--	19	17.6	10	9.8	1.64	15	9.2	17	12.6	--
Very poor[b]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	4.3	12	8.9	-1.62
Don't know, other	15	13.5	8	6.5	--	6	5.4	8	7.8	--	16	9.8	8	5.9	--
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	100.1%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question C1--Resident and Citizen Surveys: "Overall, how would you rate the job being done by the Minneapolis Police Department in your ('this'--Citizen Survey) neighborhood?"

[b]The Citizen Survey, but not the Resident Survey, listed the response category "very poor." Therefore, the data from Willard-Homewood may not be comparable to the findings from the other neighborhoods.

[c]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[d]Nonsignificant *Z*-score values are not always reported.

is about half "minority," whereas the other demonstration areas are almost entirely "majority," it may be understandable that it would take longer for the police and community relations to improve compared to other areas (findings from national surveys indicate that blacks tend to rate the performance of their local police less highly than do whites).[1] Still, the survey results in 1976 were more positive than 1978 despite the passage of two years and the existence of the CCP program.

The age distribution of Willard-Homewood respondents in 1976 and 1978 did not account for the decline in positive attitudes toward the police (see Table V.48). Only two age categories (26 through 35 and over 65) were substantially different for the surveys. The youngest group (under 25) probably would have the least positive attitudes toward police, yet their percentage of the total surveyed was almost unchanged. (According to national surveys, younger individuals tend to rate police performance lower than older individuals.)[2] Moreover, the changes in age distribution were very similar for all three neighborhoods.

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[1] James Garofalo, *Public Opinion About Crime: The Attitudes of Victims and Nonvictims in Selected Cities* (Albany, New York: Criminal Justice Research Center for U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service), applications of the National Crime Survey; Victimization and Attitude Data Analytic Report SD-VAD-1, p. 28.

[2] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

TABLE V.48

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WILLARD-HOMEWOOD RESPONDENTS[a]

AGE GROUPINGS	1976 SURVEY Frequency	1976 SURVEY Percent	1978 SURVEY Frequency	1978 SURVEY Percent[b]
Under 25	30	18.4%	25	18.5%
26-35	43	26.4	50	37.0
36-45	24	14.7	20	14.8
46-55	16	9.8	14	10.4
56-65	22	13.5	17	12.6
Over 65	27	16.6	8	5.9
NA	1	0.6	1	0.7
TOTAL	163	100.0%	135	99.9%

[a] Question E1 of the Resident and Citizen surveys.

[b] Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

Respondents could have rated the police department positively because of its technical proficiency or some other criterion; thus, the rating may not reflect the character of the human relations occurring between residents and police. Therefore, respondents were asked to indicate how well they had been treated by the police. Table V.49 shows that in 1976 a high percentage of respondents said they were treated "very well" or "fairly well." Such high percentages in the 1976 survey limit the possibility of achieving statistically significant differences in 1978. A sharp shift within these categories ("very well" and "fairly well") might have produced significance, however. In fact, the increase in the most positive category occurred in two of the neighborhoods. The only decline for all positive responses was for Willard-Homewood with a drop of 2.2 percentage points. This is consistent with the findings concerning Willard-Homewood residents' rating of the Minneapolis police (see Table V.47) with the drop in some of the positive categories and an increase in the negative.

TABLE V.49

TREATMENT BY THE POLICE[a]

	LOWRY HILL EAST					HAWTHORNE					WILLARD-HOMEWOOD				
	1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey			1976 Survey		1978 Survey		
TREATMENT BY POLICE	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent[b]	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Z-score[c]
Very well	33	29.7%	41	33.3%	—	32	29.6%	38	37.3%	-1.18	93	57.0%	74	54.8%	—
Fairly well	18	16.2	23	18.7	—	19	17.6	20	19.6	—	35	21.5	35	25.9	-0.89
Not so well	9	8.1	8	6.5	—	12	11.1	6	5.9	1.10	14	8.6	10	7.4	—
No contact	51	45.9	48	39.0	1.07	40	37.0	35	34.3	—	21	12.9	16	11.9	—
Don't know, other	—	—	3	2.4	—	5	4.6	3	2.9	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	111	99.9%	123	99.9%		108	99.9%	102	100.0%		163	100.0%	135	100.0%	

[a]Question C5—Resident Survey; Question C8—Citizen Survey: "How would you say you were treated by the police ('policeman'—Citizen Survey)—very well, fairly well, or not so well?" The responses from the two survey instruments are not comparable because the period of contact with police was 12 months in the Resident Survey but was open ended for the Citizen Survey.

[b]Where percentages do not equal 100, it is due to rounding.

[c]Nonsignificant Z-score values are not always reported.

Improvement in community attitudes toward its police force was not likely to occur within a few months. The brief period of this project's efforts at improving police-community relations could not be expected to produce substantial changes. The small percentage changes do suggest movement was occurring in the direction of the CCP objectives, however. As noted earlier, it would be difficult to show any program effect in Willard-Homewood because of WIPOG block organizing which occurred throughout the four or five years prior to the CCP project.[1] In the section describing block club activity, it was shown that the police had made many visits to block meetings in Willard-Homewood. Many of the meetings involved discussions of crime prevention. Other meetings were held throughout Willard-Homewood related to this project as early as January, 1976.

In addition to the preproject organizing influences, the changes in the Minneapolis Police Department may also have been crucial. With the election of a new mayor, a new police chief was appointed. The chief took office in early January, 1978. The precinct captains also changed in the two precincts which include the demonstration areas. The new captain of the fourth (north Minneapolis) precinct embarked on a vigorous effort to improve relations with the community. He explicitly endorsed the CCP project and its various strategies. Foot patrolling was initiated for a portion of each officer's shift. This captain addressed several block club meetings as well as various community organizations.

Undoubtedly, the combined effect of these police activities was difficult, if not impossible, to isolate from the CCP efforts of the neighborhood staffs. This evaluation did not attempt to measure the separate

[1] WIPOG organizing was discussed previously in Chapter III, Section B.

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contributions of the police and CCP staffs beyond documenting the respective activities. The net effect of all factors which could influence residents' attitudes toward the police has been slight. During the two years between the 1976 and 1978 surveys, there have been some improvements in two neighborhoods' rating of the Minneapolis Police Department. The individuals who had some contact with the police had a more positive assessment in 1978 of how well they were treated (Willard-Homewood responses were down 2.2 percent for the most positive category but up 2.2 percent for the two positive response catetories combined). Only one of the changes was statistically significant. In sum, as of the 1978 survey (April, 1978), there was scant evidence to suggest much progress had occurred in police-community relations in the three demonstration neighborhoods.

E. SUMMARY

The results of the analyses for program impact are equivocal at best. From fiscal year 1975 through fiscal year 1978 (project year), the crime raates declined in two of the three demonstration neighborhoods. In Hawthorne the overall decline was 2 percent. At the same time, Lowry Hill East experienced a 17 percent decrease in crime. For Willard-Homewood, the opposite was true; they witnessed a 31 percent increase over those years.

The findings of the statistical analyses correspond to the equivocal results demonstrated with the descriptive presentation of crime data. While Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East experienced declining crime rates across the two time periods, the pattern of difference between each neighborhood and its control areas would not support any *conclusive* statements

alluding to program success. The same holds true for Willard-Homewood with its large increase in crime. No consistent pattern was discerned between neighborhoods, nor were statistically significant differences present. Given these data, one has to assume there has not been program impact upon crime, although it should be reiterated that the Lowry Hill East results showed promise of possible future success since most of the crime rates declined.

Beyond the occurrence of crime, to what extent may the program have fostered changes in community attitudes and behavior? While causal relations cannot be drawn such that any change would be attributed to the CCP project, positive changes in areas of program focus may be taken as suggestive of program influence. Based upon random surveys of area residents in 1976 and 1978, some hypotheses concerning the program were tested.

Generally, people still fear crime more than the recorded level of crime should dictate. There was little change in the level of fear expressed in each neighborhood though people did believe there was less chance of being victimized in 1978 as compared to 1976. People still perceived night to be the time of greatest personal danger. Though there was some lessening of concern, burglary was still the most frequently mentioned problem in each neighborhood. Importantly, in 1978, significantly more residents (as compared to 1976) responded that crime had decreased over the past year. Also, during 1978, fewer people reported a desire to move elsewhere because of a crime problem in their neighborhood.

It also appears residents in the three neighborhoods became somewhat

more security conscious in 1978. There was a reported increase in the use of Operation Identification, deadbolt locks, window locks, and other security measures. Residents even felt more strongly that joining together could have some impact upon preventing crime. The image of the police improved to a slight degree in two neighborhoods while in the third it declined significantly.

In the final analysis, one must state what the level of success was concerning residents' fear of and concern about crime. No one element of this section can point to a particularly successful aspect of the CCP program. Consistently significant results *between* neighborhoods and often *within* neighborhoods did not exist. A number of factors may have contributed to this result. First, the level of participation was rather low (recall that, at most, 5 to 11 percent of the demonstration areas' residents attended at least one CCP block club meeting). Second, measuring attitudinal changes as a result of a one-year, voluntary social program may be difficult to accomplish. Third, the criteria used to judge success in the reduction of the fear of crime were conservative: as the reader examined the previous paragraphs, the majority of findings presented certainly were compatible with CCP project objectives. The evaluators agree; the findings seem to suggest program success but not in a consistently significant manner. Thus, there was evidence that this project achieved a level of diffusion to the community concerning its general message of crime prevention and home security. However, these results did not indicate program success in reducing the fear of or concern about crime, nor did the results demonstrate consistently significant reductions in crime.

VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMUNITY ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES

1. Residential Organizing

FINDINGS:

a. Some level of community organizing was present before the project began. It was discerned from a random sample of block club participants that almost 22 percent of those interviewed had attended block club meetings before the project--these meetings were not based on crime prevention. Slightly over 31 percent of the residents of north Minneapolis had attended meetings as compared ro just under 7 percent for south Minneapolis.

b. Community organizing efforts at the block level met with different levels of success. Staff were to *contact* an occupant(s) of each residence in the neighborhood concerning CCP and upcoming meetings. Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne staffs both contacted 100 percent of their blocks while Willard-Homewood staff reached 80 percent. A block was considered *organized* if it held at least one CCP meeting. The percentage of blocks organized per neighborhood was 97, 92, and 48, for Lowry Hill East, Hawthorne, and Willard-Homewood, respectively. The program objective was to organize each block to *Neighborhood Watch* status meaning *all* CCP information had been transmitted, and residents, with their new-found knowledge of crime prevention and of who their neighbors were, had begun to be vigilant of their surroundings. The Lowry Hill East staff succeeded in bringing 97 percent of their blocks to Neighborhood Watch status. Hawthorne's staff reached 58 percent of their blocks while only 10 percent of the blocks in Willard-Homewood received all the information considered important to this program.

c. The average attendance at CCP meetings ranged from 5 persons in Hawthorne to 12 persons in Lowry Hill East. Willard-Homewood had an average of 6 persons per CCP meeting in attendance. Information was also collected regarding the average number of different households present at those meetings.

Persons representing an average of 6 households in Lowry Hill East, 4 households in Hawthorne, and 5 households in Willard-Homewood were present per meeting. Of the adult population, 11 percent represents the unique adult participation level (a given adult was counted only once even if more than one meeting was attended) in Lowry Hill East. In Hawthorne, 6 percent of the adults attended at least one crime prevention function while the comparable figure for Willard-Homewood was 4 percent. With the exception of Lowry Hill East, the outcomes in the neighborhoods reflect either low turnout or low percentage of blocks organized. (Some of the experienced community organizers who worked in the Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood areas do not consider these figures to be exceedingly low in light of what they consider to be the characteristics of the neighborhoods.)

d. The methods used in canvassing a block and distributing notices of meetings were timely and offered reasonable coverage.

e. In most instances, residents found the block club meeting to be enjoyable and informative. Evidence indicates that the block club strategy is a sound device for delivering the community crime prevention message.

f. The multiple-purpose strategy of organizing block clubs does not seem to offer any particular advantage over the single-purpose strategy. There appear to be no differences in longevity in the length of time measured between block clubs organized under the two different strategies. In addition, the multiple-purpose strategy requires greater expenditure of staff time per block club.

g. There were few attempts by residents to formalize block clubs. They were interested in having one person serve as a block club captain or liaison to the CCP staff but expressed no strong desire to implement any official structure.

h. Of a sample of block club participants, 73 percent felt they had become more familiar with people on their block.

i. As a result of this project, a number of residents became actively involved in their community for the first time. They acquired skills in effectively dealing with municipal agencies and undertaking efforts for neighborhood improvement.

j. Forty-three percent of a sample of block club members report that their block club has met on its own, and 72.5 percent feel there is a 50 percent or better chance for their block club to meet on its own.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Organizing block clubs should remain as an integral part of the community crime prevention concept. At the time of initial canvassing of a block, staff should solicit volunteer help to assist in efforts to organize the block. These volunteers should be relied upon more and more heavily as the implementation plan for that block nears completion. After conducting the required number of meetings, staff should continue to act as a resource to the residents but should not attempt to organize additional meetings because of the time involved in pursuing that activity.

b. There will always be a certain number of block clubs in each neighborhood which will fail to meet on their own. For residents of those clubs who would wish to continue being active in their general community, the neighborhood organizer should provide information on block clubs which remain active.

c. It would be best to continue the block clubs as informal organizations. To make them more than that might merely create another layer of community organizations which compete for public attention and action.

d. Because the block club format is potentially a very effective political device, particular care must be exercised in the manner in which staff recommended block clubs' becoming involved in the community. The potential for abuse of these block clubs by politically motivated staff is very real. Political candidates may covet access to this type of grass-roots movement in an attempt to build a system beneficial to their own aspirations. Any actions of a political nature should be initiated by the residents so that charges of political cronyism could not be leveled against any staff member. These cautions should not serve to inhibit any resident from gaining greater attention to serve his own political ambitions. They should merely serve as policy for staff to prevent them from using their positions for personal advantage.

e. Staff leadership, at the neighborhood level, is of utmost importance for effective delivery of the CCP program. Supervision and direction should be

better organized and committed to action to prevent the program from losing momentum.

2. Crime Prevention Action Councils

FINDINGS:

a. The Crime Prevention Action Councils (CPAC) were intended to be citizen advisory boards to each neighborhood staff for the purpose of assisting in setting neighborhood program priorities and directions. In only one case did a CPAC follow that intended role.

b. The CPAC in Willard-Homewood tended not to provide policy-oriented recommendations to that Community Crime Prevention staff. It saw itself in the role of reaffirming policies or staff decisions rather than initiating new approaches.

c. Throughout the project, the CPAC in Hawthorne remained an underutilized group. Some members were openly concerned that the Council make-up was not truly representative of the larger community. Because of this concern, they felt the Council could not speak for and reflect the true desires of the community. These constant concerns and discussions prevented the Council from ever achieving its potential as an advisory group. There was also some resistance on the part of certain CPAC members who felt the neighborhood staff was a bit too directive in dealing with the Council. In *some* instances, the apprehensions of Council members were substantiated.

d. The CPAC members in Lowry Hill East never questioned their legitimacy; they understood their purpose and acted accordingly. Council members made recommendations concerning both policy and specific operational topics. They became public advocates for the community and spokesmen when community issues arose concerning crime problems. For the most part, their activities were appropriate to the original intent of the project plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. The CPAC's should be continued and encouraged. Given the right blend of active people and an understanding of the scope of the Council, it can be an effective means of ensuring citizen input at the neighborhood level.

b. Based upon team observations, it appears the CPAC can most effectively operate at the neighborhood rather than citywide level. Important local issues can assume highest priority rather than being

forced to compete for attention with issues from other neighborhoods.

c. To prevent needless proliferation of community level organizations, the CPAC should be an organization with a predetermined life span, operating only while active organizing takes place. As the issue of crime prevention begins to diminish among block clubs, the CPAC should be disbanded.

3. Neighborhood Watch

FINDINGS:

a. Neighborhood Watch was perceived by participating residents to be the most important part of the Community Crime Prevention program.

b. Block club members who were interviewed felt the most important part of Neighborhood Watch was being vigilant concerning what happens in the neighborhood. Following that was: actually knowing your neighbors and arranging to watch one another's homes when they are away.

c. Almost 90 percent of a sample of block club participants felt that Neighborhood Watch would be an effective strategy in preventing burglaries.

d. The Neighborhood Watch aspect of the program did have an impact upon all three neighborhoods. A sample of block club participants reports that as a result of Neighborhood Watch they are more familiar with other people who live on their block.

e. Though Neighborhood Watch was well received by block club participants, the number of people involved still represents a small fraction of the community.

f. Compared to residents of the two north neighborhoods, people involved with Neighborhood Watch in Lowry Hill East had more favorable comments about the interpersonal aspects of the program. A much higher percentage of respondents in Lowry Hill East (40.5 percent versus 20.2 percent) felt that knowing neighbors was the most important part of Neighborhood Watch.

g. Based upon the results of a community survey and visual inspection, few residents displayed Neighborhood Watch stickers. The small number of people displaying stickers made it impossible to determine if stickers acted as a deterrent to burglary.

h. Some residents expressed concern and refused to allow their names to be used on block maps. It appears this had little impact upon establishing Neighborhood Watch in any block.

RECOMMENDATIONS: a. Given the constraints of less than one year's data and the overall low level of block club participation, it is impossible to state with any certainty that Neighborhood Watch had any impact upon neighborhood crime. To answer that question specifically requires data over a longer period of time. During the upcoming year, crime levels should be monitored in each neighborhood to discover the contribution Neighborhood Watch may make to any reduction in crime.

b. Due to the above constraints, one must respond to the effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch on an intuitive level. Based upon a logical examination of the problem, Neighborhood Watch *could*, without a doubt, be an effective deterrent. Its total impact would depend heavily upon the amount of participation within the block. It would seem that involvement of more than four or five families would be required to make the concept work. This number is pure speculation based on a concern for time and visual coverage of the full block. It would be appropriate to test this hypothesis empirically with data covering at least two years. In addition, with this type of longitudinal data, analyses could be undertaken to examine for effects of decreases in block involvement.

c. Block club members should be encouraged to commence Neighborhood Watch as quickly as possible after the first or second block club meeting. Intuitively, it seems that the more meetings held before starting Neighborhood Watch, the greater the tendency for its importance to become submerged in other issues the block may choose to explore.

d. Also intuitively, block maps given to people participating in Neighborhood Watch should include information on residences located across the alley in addition to across the street. This would allow the residents to have reference to all areas around their dwellings rather than only to the front.

4. Commercial Organizing

FINDINGS: a. The organizing efforts in the commercial sector of

Lowry Hill East met with much success. Two business associations were established on the two major commercial strips within that neighborhood. These associations met on a monthly basis during the demonstration year with the CCP staff in attendance. Since then, they have continued to meet on a regular basis without the CCP organizers. In addition, 28 businesses were surveyed for security weaknesses during the project year, and more continue to request them.

b. An existing business association was present in Hawthorne. The CCP staff was to work with this existent association to help publicize the program and conduct premise security surveys of the businesses. Expectations differed between the business association's officers and CCP neighborhood staff and little cooperative action occurred.

RECOMMENDATION: An increased attempt to involve the commercial sector of neighborhoods should be made by the CCP staff. The value of educating both the residential and commercial components of a community on the topic of CCP, as well as target hardening, should be great.

B. DIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

1. Target Hardening

FINDINGS: a. The premise security survey service offered in conjunction with this project had a number of initial problems. Premise surveys were conducted by off-duty police officers (on overtime status). The original grant allocated the use of LEAA funds for the payment of these police officers, which was discovered to be against LEAA guidelines. This prevented any premise security survey from being completed until the project was 5 months old.

b. There were severe problems in coordinating premise security surveys in the Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood neighborhoods. The difficulties the officer assigned to the project had in contacting people and coordinating other officers' schedules made for long delays in delivery. The problem was alleviated as the neighborhood staffs were permitted to assume more duties in coodinating this aspect of the program. However, the officer who was assigned to the project in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne appeared to have greater difficulty (than the sergeant assigned to Lowry Hill East) in

getting fellow officers to conduct premise security surveys. It appears difference in rank had a direct bearing upon this situation.

c. When the premise security survey was described at block club meetings, the reaction was immediate and positive. Most people who signed up did so without much hesitation. Of those people who did participate, there appeared to be no reluctance to having police officers enter their homes to conduct the premise surveys. There was no way to determine to what extent this factor may have inhibited those who *did not* request a premise security survey.

d. The rather long delays that some residents experienced between sign-up and completion of a premise security survey did not disenchant people such that they ceased participation in the program. The conclusion is that people felt this aspect of the program was so appealing that they were willing to tolerate long delays and some irritation in order to receive it.

e. Almost 72 percent of the residents who responded to a premise security follow-up questionnaire stated they were aware of the security problems in their home prior to the premise security survey.

f. The most frequently identified home security problems from the premise security surveys performed on block club participants' homes pertained to inadequate door and window security (98.1 percent).

g. A total of 57 percent of residents who had premise security surveys made at least some of the recommended changes by the conclusion of the first project year.

h. Of the residents who made some recommended changes, 36 percent would not have done so were the subsidy program not available.

i. Over the course of the first year, a total amount of $1,931.10 was disbursed to 48 residential participants in the subsidy program. The average subsidy amount was $40.23.

j. The association of several locksmiths with the program was positively received by most residents.

k. A particularly difficult area for the program to address was home security in rental units. The

interest of the program was to secure buildings rather than single units (apartments) of a building.

l. In terms of the total number of residential units in each neighborhood, very few premise security surveys were undertaken.

m. There was some resistance on the part of community members to using Operation Identification window and door stickers. Some people's observation was that Operation Identification stickers would not act as a deterrent, and in fact, a number of people believed that they merely advertised the presence of property worth stealing.

n. Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East both reported significant increases in the number of residents with engraved property in 1978 over 1976.

o. Still, however, a fairly low percentage of all residents in the three areas has Operation I.D. even after the demonstration year.

p. Little, if any, action was directed toward increasing landlord responsibility. Lowry Hill East has the most rental property and did the most work in this area.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Program staff, rather than the police liaison officer, should arrange for scheduling of premise security surveys. Having police officers schedule premise security surveys is not the best use of an officer's time because quite often it took two or three telephone calls to contact the resident.

b. The police department should examine the feasibility of having officers conduct premise security surveys as a part of their regular shift rather than on overtime status. Perhaps this would eliminate some delays and allow the surveys to be conducted in a less costly manner.

c. The positive reaction of both police and residents indicates that police officers should continue to conduct premise security surveys. Though civilian security technicians could, no doubt, perform as good a job in a more timely fashion, the value of this type of police visibility in the community serves a useful purpose.

d. It would be advantageous to get many police officers involved with the total delivery of the program. Therefore, it is important that police

administration at the city and precinct level encourage officers to become involved in the CCP program by conducting premise security surveys and attending block club meetings.

e. Other communities undertaking a community crime prevention program may wish to seriously consider implementing a rental security ordinance. This ordinance may include the use of deadbolt locks on all doors to a public area.

f. Though a small number of people participated in the subsidy program, it should receive some consideration for continuation. It does provide a means of increasing security in the homes of those who have the most to lose in a burglary--the lower income families. While data do not exist to determine the number of low income families using the subsidy or use of the security equipment after installation, the subsidy should receive some consideration for continuance. Should this effort be undertaken on a citywide basis, it could require the commitment of large resources to this aspect of the program. To make most effective use of the funds, it would probably be necessary to earmark monies categorically for certain income levels.

g. It would be advantageous to continue the practice of affiliating several locksmiths with the program. The quality of installation and price guarantees would prevent unknowing citizens from being hoodwinked by any unscrupulous individuals. If this practice were to be continued, an active monitoring process should be instituted.

h. Even though other evaluation studies have raised serious questions as to the utility of Operation Identification, it should remain a part of the Community Crime Prevention program. It does not involve much staff time, and people might continue to view it as the only possible means of recovering stolen property. There does not appear to be widespread reluctance on the part of residents to participate, and the potential benefit should be considered. Effective responses to residents' objections should be developed.

i. More work should be coordinated with the city inspections department to provide residents with viable alternatives concerning unresponsive landlords.

2. Opportunity Reduction through Environmental Design

FINDINGS:

a. The organization of the crime prevention block clubs played an important and visible role in enlarging the scope of traditional alley- and spring-cleanup programs in the neighborhood. Block club members cleaned their own blocks first, and then some of them volunteered to help in other areas.

b. Only one physical change of a minor nature was actually implemented during the course of the demonstration year. Since the conclusions of the first-year efforts, two changes have been undertaken with respect to traffic diverters. One set of diverters has already been removed due to residents' objections, and the second set remains under review.

c. The installation of temporary traffic barricades reaffirmed the experience of other cities such as Berkeley, California. The erection of temporary traffic barricades, because of their unsightly nature, contributed directly to the vocal nature of public reaction which resulted in scrapping the traffic diverter plan. This situation occurred in Lowry Hill East and served to repudiate earlier community support voiced at a public hearing. Permanent modifications, if done in place of the temporary barricades, likely would have lessened the controversy because of their greater aesthetic appeal.

d. The progress of the physical design aspect of the program was blunted by indecision in the course of the political process. At crucial points in time, initial delays in preparing designs and securing coordination with other city departments occurred. In addition, less than convincing presentations of traffic diverter plans to citizen groups and stubborn individualism on the part of some residents slowed the process even more.

e. Uncertainty, on the part of the city staff regarding the scope of the physical design changes, aggravated a situation in which timeliness was crucial to installation of any physical changes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. A clear work plan for physical changes should be constructed, as much as possible, before project implementation. Without good prior planning, the overwhelming nature of attempting to achieve community consensus and governmental coordination can thwart the program.

b. Physical changes should be implemented, as soon as

reasonable, after project starting date. Promises of physical changes over a long period with no activity weaken project credibility.

c. If at all possible, never undertake an environmental change in which a temporary construction must remain for an extended period of time.

d. When preparing to undertake any physical changes, it is imperative that the staff identify, early, the individuals outside of the project whose consent will be required to authorize the change. As an example, in Minneapolis, local aldermen submit traffic diverter plans to the city council for approval. Gaining the active support of the local aldermen during the initial stages of the project may have provided more positive results.

C. INDIRECT CRIME REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

1. Increased Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques

FINDINGS: a. The public education materials prepared by the Community Crime Prevention program were well conceived and professionally done.

b. The Community Crime Prevention program was able to develop a CCP newsletter and to utilize community newspapers as public information vehicles. The community newspapers distributed in each neighborhood regularly carried crime prevention articles prepared by the CCP staff.

c. The program appeared to attract a reasonable amount of major newspaper coverage so that a larger number of community residents were exposed to the message of the program.

RECOMMENDATION: It is important that the project continues to capitalize upon all avenues of dissemination. In this regard, the project has done an effective job. Given the fact that it was to operate in only three areas, radio or television spots, for the most part, would have been impractical. The only effort which needs to be expanded would be the use of the schools as a vehicle for disseminating crime prevention information to school-age children.

2. Cooperative Interaction between Police and Community

FINDINGS: a. There appeared to be direct mutual benefit from

having police officers attend block club meetings and conduct premise security surveys. Many times this was the first opportunity for a resident to interact with a police officer in a nonthreatening situation. From this interaction, both parties tended to develop some feeling of mutual respect.

b. Residents of two neighborhoods rated the police department higher in 1978 compared to 1976 (63 to 72 percent of the respondents rated the department good or excellent in 1978). The comparable rating for the other neighborhood was 52 percent in 1976 and 42 percent in 1978. From 86 to 93 percent of all the respondents who had some contact with the police said they were treated very well or fairly well--this is an increase from 1976. However, residents attending block club meetings often expressed deep frustration at calling to report some criminal activity and being rebuffed by an unconcerned attitude on the part of the police.

RECOMMENDATIONS: a. If work schedules permit, the police department should actively support and encourage officers to attend block club meetings.

b. The staff of the Community Crime Prevention program should become more acutely aware of the functioning of the juvenile justice system. In many instances, residents expressed dissatisfaction with police performance because of incidents involving juveniles. If residents had a better understanding of the operation of the juvenile justice system, they might be less inclined to blame officers for the existence of any particular problems.

D. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

FINDINGS: a. Start-up inefficiencies plagued the first few months of the project. Besides the problems caused by misinterpretation of LEAA guidelines relating to payment of police overtime and by the delay of materials, two other problems occurred: the original demonstration manager resigned toward the end of the second month with the project architect replacing him as manager; and the lengthy procedures necessary to secure office space (and supplies, i.e., telephones, etc.) within each neighborhood caused the local staffs initial organizing delays.

b. This project suffered from the disharmony created by a series of conflicts between the demonstration manager and some of his field staff. These conflicts were sometimes related to specific procedural disagreements and other times dealt with personality conflicts. Both types of conflicts, however, were aggravated by poor communication.

One of the procedural problems involved the method of organizing used by the northside offices. For the purposes of this report, the evaluators identified two organizing concepts; the single-purpose strategy and the multiple-purpose strategy (refer to Chapter IV, Section B.1, for explanation of these terms). The demonstration manager instituted a formal system of block club organizing which supported the single-purpose strategy while the northside coordinators insisted the strategy they had been using (the multiple-purpose strategy) was the appropriate method for their area. The multiple-purpose strategy created a less efficient means of organizing blocks since more meetings were held per block, yet the coodinators felt the enhanced quality of the meetings justified this loss of efficiency. No data exist to support this assertion, howeve . Data were available concerning the extent of block club organizing, and indeed, the northside areas had lower organizing levels than the southside area which implemented the single-purpose strategy.

The manager's intent by instituting this formal system was to provide assistance and to increase efficiency; however, some staff interpreted this action as a rejection of their expertise, a lack of understanding of the concepts of community organizing, and an attempt to restrict their latitude in presenting the program to the neighborhoods.

c. This failure in communication was heightened when the manager devised a means of monitoring staff activities and identifying inefficiencies. The staff perceived the record-keeping duties imposed by this system as an inconvenience rather than a management tool. Eventually, the demonstration manager grew frustrated with the individuals who were most resistant to his program decisions and tried unsuccessfully to secure their resignations. Failing in this attempt, he simply withdrew from the conflict and allowed them to go about their business as they wished. The result was that during the last half of the project year, there was little active positive leadership shown toward the

two northside offices.

The northside field staffs quite frequently felt ignored and reported that the demonstration manager seldom initiated contacts with their offices and appeared quite unconcerned about their welfare. Their reaction to this situation did not facilitate accomplishment of program objectives in any positive manner either. The attention of one of the northside coordinators seemed to be distracted to other activities which were of uncertain applicability to block club organizing. Time was spent contemplating organizing strategies which were never committed to paper or implemented. One of the manifestations of this working style was the the assumption of some duties by the WIPOG director which could have been considered part of the coordinator's responsibilities. For example, the weekly staff meetings were essentially under the guidance of the WIPOG director (block club meeting assignments, as well as other matters, were decided upon in the weekly meetings).

The situation was no less perplexing in the other northside office. The coordinator wished to act decisively and efficiently in completing neighborhood organizing. However, she needed (as well as desired) some degree of direction from the demonstration manager. Many times the evaluator observed her seeking clarification about methods used in organizing the neighborhood and managing the office. What was puzzling was that her actions did not always correspond to the advice she received. It was as if she had a different opinion than the manager and tried to follow his advice for action as well as her own. The result was that many times the course of action she undertook had its own set of built-in inefficiencies which reflected her uncertainty. For example, she expressed the desire to follow the two-meeting format, but many times she conducted more than two meetings on a block.

Both the manager and these coordinators apparently employed whatever political leverage was possible to rally support for their individual interpretations of what was best for the project. The amount of influence wielded by the northside coordinators outweighed that held by the manager in some instances; this forced him to act against his own desires. The evaluators feel that the CCP program suffered in these two areas because of these procedural and interpersonal conflicts. Conflicts

arose in the third neighborhood in south Minneapolis, also, but the coordinator of that area and the manager were able to resolve their problems effectively.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Start-up problems often occur in projects of this nature; however, care should be exercised to alleviate any unnecessary delays. Committed staff should be hired, and needed facilities arranged for within the time frame designated by the grant. Managers, especially, should spend ample time determining the most efficient manner of accomplishing project goals. Staff members' opinions should be solicited so that final decisions are a result of a collaborative effort rather than being viewed as edicts.

b. Methods to achieve efficiency and accountability should be determined during the planning phase of the project. Staff should be made well aware of responsibilities, and monitoring procedures should begin with the implementation of the project. Performance reviews should be encouraged on a regular basis throughout the project so that an individual employee may assess his/her own standing.

c. All project staff should attempt to resolve differences among themselves within the confines of the project. Attempting to seek remedies through political influence can often result in undermining the purpose of the project. Carrying problems outside the legitimate lines of authority merely serves to polarize issues rather than provide reasonable solutions.

E. IMPACT UPON CRIME

FINDINGS:

a. The results provide no clear-cut answers to questions concerning program impact upon crime, for although there were no consistent trends within or across the three neighborhoods, the evaluators believe the period of actual project operation was too brief to expect any consistent changes.

b. Crime in Lowry Hill East declined in all categories except vandalism and criminal sexual conduct: *the overall decline was 17 percent.* Lowry Hill East's control tract (census tract 93) showed an increase in all categories except personal robbery. The area selected to measure displacement of crime showed even more discrepant data--three crime types decreased while the remaining four

increased over the period of measurement.

c. The statistical tests applied to the data revealed that crime decreased significantly more in Lowry Hill East as compared to its control area for personal and commercial robbery. Crime also decreased significiantly more as compared to the displacement area for commercial burglary. Although these three crime types revealed statistically significant decreases over time for at least one of the control areas (none of them showed significance over both control areas simultaneously), they did *not* meet additional assumptions required of the statistical tests which would have indicated program impact upon crime. Nonetheless, this neighborhood displayed the most consistent pattern of decrease in crime of the three demonstration areas.

d. In Hawthorne, only the crimes of residential burglary, personal robbery, and vandalism decreased: *the overall decrease was less than 2 percent.* In control tract 24, all crimes except assault and criminal sexual conduct decreased. All crimes except vandalism and criminal sexual conduct decreased in the displacement control area. There were no significant statistical differences in crime rate changes between Hawthorne and the two areas used for comparison.

e. Crime in Willard-Homewood increased with the exception of commercial burglary and commercial robbery: *the overall increase in crime was over 31 percent.* All crimes increased in the control tract 109, also, except personal and commercial robbery. In the displacement control area, crime decreased except for vandalism and criminal sexual conduct. The only significant decline demonstrated was for commercial burglary indicating that these burglaries decreased significantly more in Willard-Homewood than in its control tract 109.

f. An alternative crime analysis was conducted omitting the displacement area as a control. Surprisingly, this less conservative analysis did not change substantially the results of the earlier analysis in any of the three neighborhoods.

g. Given the lack of consistent crime changes, it is impossible to make blanket statements concerning the ability of the Community Crime Prevention concept to reduce crime. The most that can be said is that the results from Lowry Hill East are *suggestive of some degree* of success in reducing crimes while Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood results remain discrepant.

RECOMMENDATION: Continued monitoring of crime rates, using the same data instruments, should be encouraged. Assessment of crime rate changes in the demonstration and control areas occurring within the second year of the project should provide a more accurate picture of CCP impact.

F. IMPACT UPON FEAR OF CRIME

FINDINGS:

a. All three neighborhoods reported *inconsistent* findings to questions assessing neighborhood cohesiveness.

b. There was a statistically significant increase in 1978 compared to 1976 in the number of residents in *each* neighborhood who believed crime had decreased.

c. Residents were asked how many of 13 types of crimes or activities were considered big neighborhood problems. In 1978, 10 of the 13 were considered not as big a problem in Lowry Hill East, 11 were considered not as big a problem in Hawthorne, and all 13 were considered bigger problems in Willard-Homewood than in 1976.

d. There was a statistically significant decrease in the number of respondents who felt the degree of danger in their neighborhood was great enough to consider moving elsewhere in 1978 as compared to 1976. Of course, crime is just one factor of many that may motivate people to move.

e. Residents' perception of personal victimization continues to be substantially higher than police records indicate; however, in 1978, respondents' perception of the possibility of being victimized was lower than that found in 1976. Hence, although the perceived level of victimization remains disproportionately high in comparison to the rates recorded by police, the level reported in 1978 indicates a more realistic picture of crime may exist in each of the three neighborhoods. These data, however, should be viewed with caution since the victimization findings may not meet satisfactory confidence levels.

f. Residents were asked to indicate their victimization history from the previous year and were then queried as to whether or not each crime they listed had been reported to the police. Based upon survey findings, the reporting rates for all crimes taken

in total declined in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. At the same time, the reporting rate of all crime occurrences increased in Willard-Homewood. Looking specifically at residential burglary, this project's target crime, all three neighborhoods showed an increase in reporting rates in 1978 compared to 1976. Again, these findings may be suspect due to unsatisfactory confidence levels.

g. According to the neighborhood surveys, the number of Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood residents participating in Operation Identification increased significantly. Hawthorne's participation increased also, but not significantly. However, the number of Operation I.D. requests generated through the block club meetings did not alone account for the rise indicated in the surveys. In fact, in two of the three neighborhoods, the discrepancy between the sample percentage increase and requests through the CCP staff was substantial. Therefore, it would seem much of this increase in Operation I.D. participation cannot be attributed to the CCP program intervention.

h. Residents were asked what devices the home had to protect against intrusion. The percentage increases in various kinds of home protection were significantly larger in 5 out of the 36 possible instances. An increase was noted in 10 additional instances of home protection devices although these increases were not significant.

i. From the finding above, it can be noted that there were increases in 15 of the 36 instances of home security devices. Residents were next queried on their usage of these security measures. Data indicate that for many of the instances which were addressed by the CCP program, there were increases in the use of security measures in 1978. At times, these differences were significant when contrasted with 1976 findings. Hence, the improved security behavior is not likely to have occurred by chance and may well be due to CCP project efforts.

j. In contrast, a lower percentage of respondents in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne reported making arrangements to "watch" one another's houses in 1978 than in 1976. Moreover, the increase in Lowry Hill East was not significant. Except perhaps for Lowry Hill East, there is no evidence from the survey that can demonstrate a program effect leading to more vigilant behavior. The decreases in Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood seem contrary to CCP organizing efforts.

k. Respondents were asked to rate the Minneapolis Police Department. Combining the categories of "excellent" and "good," there was a substantial and significant decline in positive attitudes since 1976 in Willard-Homewood. There were positive trends in the other neighborhoods although they were not statistically significant.

l. Residents were asked how they were treated by police in all three neighborhoods. Of those Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East respondents who had contact with the police, more answered positively in 1978 than in 1976. The only decline for all positive responses was in Willard-Homewood.

m. Evidence has shown that there was some degree of diffusion to the communities concerning crime prevention techniques. The majority of the survey findings were compatible with CCP project objectives; however, often these findings were neither consistent nor significant. Consistency was lacking both within neighborhoods at times and often between neighborhoods. Hence, these results did not indicate a reduction in the fear of or concern about crime (recall, however, residents' perception of victimization declined in 1978 but not significantly).

RECOMMENDATION: Since many results were in the direction desired by the program, the evaluators recommend that future testing of residents' perceptions would seem most beneficial. The Resident and Citizen surveys were administered in April of 1978. Even in Lowry Hill East, organizing to the Neighborhood Watch status did not fully begin until January, 1978 (due to materials delay). This means that these surveys were administered less than six months after the project became fully operational. Thus, an additional survey could produce more accurate information on the actual impact the CCP project may be able to produce on residents' attitudes concerning crime. This survey need not replicate the entire questionnaire but could include only some of the more important sections in order to reduce costs.

APPENDIX A

(to be issued under separate cover)

DATA INSTRUMENTS

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE TABLES

TABLE B.1

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: LOWRY HILL EAST RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00151	2	.00076	19.00[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.07872	1	.07872	1,987.00[b]
Neighborhood × Covariate	.01749	2	.00875	218.75[b]
Residual	.90339	21,974	.00004	
TOTAL	1.00111	21,979		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.2

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: HAWTHORNE RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00100	2	.00050	10.00[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.32019	1	.32019	6,403.80[b]
Neighborhood × Covariate	.00002	2	.00001	.40
Residual	.67931	12,671	.00005	
TOTAL	1.00052	12,676		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.3

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: WILLARD-HOMEWOOD RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00293	2	.00147	29.40[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.30733	1	.30733	6,146.60[b]
Neighborhood × Covariate	.00345	2	.00173	34.60[b]
Residual	.68331	14,930	.00005	
TOTAL	.99702	14,935		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.4

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: LOWRY HILL EAST
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00334	2	.00167	2.88[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.21344	1	.21344	368.00[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00935	2	.00468	8.07[b]
Residual	.77389	1,330	.00058	
TOTAL	1.00002	1,335		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.5

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: HAWTHORNE
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.02894	2	.01447	12.69[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.14690	1	.14690	128.85[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00242	2	.00121	1.06
Residual	.81039	712	.00114	
TOTAL	.99865	717		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.6

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: WILLARD-HOMEWOOD
COMMERCIAL BURGLARY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.02916	2	.01458	12.79[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.08803	1	.08803	77.22[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00965	2	.00483	4.24[c]
Residual	.86940	763	.00114	
TOTAL	.99624	768		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

[c]Probability less than .05.

TABLE B.7

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: LOWRY HILL EAST
COMMERCIAL ROBBERY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.01926	2	.00963	14.16[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.02134	1	.02134	31.38[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.05529	2	.02765	40.66[b]
Residual	.90617	1,330	.00068	
TOTAL	1.00206	1,335		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.8

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: HAWTHORNE
COMMERCIAL ROBBERY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.02137	2	.01069	14.25[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.37920	1	.37920	505.60[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00881	2	.00441	5.88[b]
Residual	.53349	712	.00075	
TOTAL	.94287	715		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.9

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: WILLARD-HOMEWOOD
COMMERCIAL ROBBERY[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.13209	2	.06605	68.80[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.00232	1	.00232	2.42
Neighborhood x Covariate	.12699	2	.06350	66.145[b]
Residual	.73174	763	.00096	
TOTAL	.99314	768		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.10

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: LOWRY HILL EAST VANDALISM[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00272	2	.00136	17.00[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.51786	1	.51786	6,473.25[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00010	2	.00050	6.25[b]
Residual	.47790	5,823	.00008	
TOTAL	.99948	5,828		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.11

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: HAWTHORNE VANDALISM[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.01540	2	.00770	70.00[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.61201	1	.61201	5,563.73[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00456	2	.00288	26.18[b]
Residual	.37621	3,342	.00011	
TOTAL	1.00818	3,347		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

TABLE B.12

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: WILLARD-HOMEWOOD VANDALISM[a]

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	*F* RATIO
Neighborhood (adjusted for covariate)	.00770	2	.00385	35.00[b]
Covariate (Preoccurrences)	.54429	1	.54429	4,948.09[b]
Neighborhood x Covariate	.00450	2	.00225	20.45[b]
Residual	.42502	3,920	.00011	
TOTAL	.99151	3,925		

[a]Analysis of Covariance computed using Sum of Squares equal R^2 function from multiple regression analysis.

[b]Probability less than .01.

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