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CRIMINAL JUSTICE MANPOWER PLANNING: AN OVERVIEW

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Contents

Chapter 3

Police Organizations 54

Chapter 4

Corrections 103

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Foreword

Human resource development and utilization is of prime importance in a labor intensive field such as criminal justice. Manpower planning is a vital ingredient to both effective development and use of human resources.

In the past few years, the Office of Criminal Justice Education and Training, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, has funded a number of projects dealing with aspects of manpower planning as applied to criminal justice. Among these were three companion projects funded at Michigan State University, Sam Houston State University, and the University of South Florida. These three projects have dealt in a coordinated fashion with several aspects of manpower planning and its applications to criminal justice.

With the publication of this report from Phase I of the Michigan State University project, important ground work is laid for understanding the current state of manpower planning in criminal justice and for making assessments about future feasible developments. It is an excellent resource, providing a sound basis for further developmental efforts among criminal justice administrators, planners, and researchers.

George H. Bohlinger III
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Preface

This overview of criminal justice manpower planning is intended to inform criminal justice managers, planners, and researchers of the current state of manpower planning in the system. The report is written to accommodate some of the needs and interests of each of these groups, and thus it is different in form from what would result if only one of the groups was the intended audience.

The findings and conclusions are based on information summarized from interviews held with nearly 250 people in over 100 agencies, and from five comprehensive questionnaires sent to more than 500 criminal justice agencies. Given the wide scope of the project, broad rather than detailed findings are presented in this overview.

The conceptual development, data collection, analysis, and writing of this and other reports was an endeavor shared among all project staff. As would be expected, however, the breadth of the project required some specialization, especially with regard to writing this report. Individual contributions in writing draft versions of the chapters were as follows: John Hudzik, Chapters 1, 2, and 5, with Steven Edwards participating in Chapter 5; Gary Cordner, Chapter 3; Tim S. Bynum, Chapter 4; Kenneth Christian and Steven Edwards, Chapter 6; and Jack Greene, Chapter 7. All project staff participated in revisions of the drafts, with final revisions being made by John Hudzik.

As noted in Chapter 1, the findings and conclusions come from Phase I of the Manpower Planning Development Project of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, funded by the Office of Criminal Justice Education and Training, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, under grant 78-CD-AX-0004. Phase I of the project entails uncovering the current state of manpower planning in the criminal justice system while subsequent phases are to concern developing, testing, and disseminating manpower planning guides.

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ix

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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview

This chapter is an overview of Phase 1 of the Michigan State University Manpower Planning Development Project. The total project, to be completed in three phases, aims to assess the needs, capabilities, and current efforts within criminal justice to undertake various manpower planning activities, and to design and to test suitable means for increasing the system's manpower planning capacity.

This Phase 1 report describes the current activity, capacity, and environment for manpower planning. Additionally, it reaches preliminary conclusions about the feasibility of further developments of manpower planning in criminal justice. Phase II, at present underway, is more fully testing these preliminary views of feasibility and will conclude with the design and testing of a new operational manpower planning guide. This second phase will incorporate assessments made in Phase 1 about current system conditions, constraints, and capabilities. Phase III will carry the design and testing activities further and to a greater level of detail, and will begin the process of dissemination.

Manpower planning has been defined in this study as determining what an agency needs to do in order to ensure that it has the right numbers and kinds of people, doing the right jobs, now and in the future. This involves collecting and analyzing data on agency missions, on required work and tasks, and on performance expectations; and it entails making projections about the future of these issues as they will be influenced by internal and external conditions. Manpower planning must also concern itself with the full range of personnel administrative processes such as recruitment, selection, assignment, and job design because these processes intimately affect an agency's ability to have the right numbers and kinds of people. Ideally, manpower planning is an integrating tool for management to analyze how all of these various personnel processes and internal and external conditions are interdependent. In turn, manpower planning can incorporate an understanding of this interdependence into the policymaking process.

The present research may largely be characterized as exploratory, reflecting the scarcity of previous research on the topic in criminal justice. The definition of manpower planning used for the project and the range of processes, issues, and

factors taken into account during the research is therefore inclusive rather than exclusive.

The interpretations and findings from Phase I allow several conclusions about the current state of criminal justice manpower planning and about the feasibility of further developing the system's manpower planning capacity. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are summarized in the remainder of this chapter, while subsequent chapters offer a more detailed appraisal.

One general finding from the study is that substantial interest exists in the system for increasing the degree to which human resources are efficiently and effectively utilized. Part of this interest has been generated by pressures internal to the system, including management's desire to improve agency performance. But there are important and growing external pressures, coming from budget review authorities, and from legislative, executive, and judicial bodies to plan and justify human resource decisions on rational criteria.

These pressures have already created a climate and capacity in much of the system to undertake some of the more elementary forms of manpower planning. Also, some agencies, the larger ones especially, have a sufficient capacity for data collection and analysis to apply a variety of manpower planning techniques to assessing present and future personnel needs and to guiding present and future decisions about personnel recruitment, selection, and assignment.

Obviously, capacities and needs for manpower planning vary greatly from agency to agency and are dependent on numerous factors, including agency size, political climate, and the agency's function in the criminal justice system. This necessitates that manpower planning development be tailored to individual agency needs, environments, and capacities. The system will not tolerate nor can it use an approach to manpower planning development that ignores these substantial variations from agency to agency in the factors that influence human resource decisions.

Although many of the individual data and analytical components necessary to manpower planning exist, there is little evidence that these components have been integrated by agencies into a coordinated approach to human resource management. Rather, data are collected and analyzed in reference to specific problems, such as a recruitment or selection problem. How these problems and the potential solutions for them relate to other personnel issues or to ultimate concerns of agency performance in meeting its goals is largely ignored. Thus, the current state of criminal justice manpower planning is piecemeal instead of integrated. A fruitful area for development of manpower planning is to turn the current piecemeal approaches into more integrated ones.

I. Background

Estimates vary, but approximately 85 percent of all criminal justice agency expenditures are personnel related. The system is thus labor intensive and, with tightening revenues, productivity is vitally dependent on increasing the effective

2

and efficient utilization of human resources. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that those conducting criminal justice research and training have been aware for quite some time of the need for efficient and effective use of human resources. For example, research into police beat design and patrol allocation, correction agency post studies, and training programs offered on a wide variety of personnel and administrative issues such as wage and salary administration, employee motivation, and entry screening are all indicative of such an awareness.

The past fifteen years have yielded substantial change throughout the entire criminal justice system. Perhaps nowhere is this change more evident than in the area of personnel. In numbers alone, for example, and during just one portion of this fifteen year period, total personnel in the criminal justice system increased from approximately 930,000 in 1971 to 1,200,000 in 1977.[1] Further, the characteristics of this labor force have also undergone significant change with women, the college-educated, and members of racial minorities increasingly being employed and affecting the system in substantial ways. The increased use of sophisticated, space age equipment like computers has forced changes in the skills required of criminal justice personnel. And perhaps most importantly, changes in the job role have made for new and sometimes confusing skill expectations of system personnel. For example, who and what are the police? Are they law enforcers, social arbitrators, crime preventers, social workers, marriage counselors, or a combination of all of the above? Perhaps the police have always been, or were intended to be all these things, but the past fifteen years have seen more and more attention paid to whether police are properly trained and suited to play all of these roles. Similar questions and issues arise in the corrections field as well, where, for example, the roles of custodial staff are being reexamined.

There have also been changes imposed by forces outside the formal confines of the criminal justice agency. The growth in criminal justice unions and their increasing militancy about issues such as job expectations, grievance and disciplinary procedures, hiring and promotional practices, and job assignment have constrained and altered traditional modes of organizational personnel management. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Affirmative Action legislation and court orders have had an immense impact on organizational hiring and promotional practices. New calls for public agency accountability in the guise of efficiency and effectiveness have compelled organizational planners to devise new means of accomplishing more— sometimes with fewer resources. And the changing social and economic composition of the population itself has meant that the system faces a changing clientele.

Criminal justice organizational responses to these pressures and changes have varied greatly, ranging from ignoring the situation and hoping it will eventually work out to mounting sizeable management and planning bureaus to guide the agency in a sea of change. Another response to these changes (and something which was at the same time a cause of the change) was the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration and its block grant program. Among the many objectives of this federal initiative were increasing system coordination, increasing management efficiency and effectiveness, and providing technology transfer and the seed money for the implementation of innovations. Although the early stages of the federal effort seemed to concentrate on the development and deployment of hardware technologies (e.g., helicopters or riot gear), subsequent foci seemed increasingly to center on softer technologies such as developing data collection and analytical capabilities, increasing management expertise and planning skills, and promoting administrative cooperation among the components of the criminal justice system.

Among these softer technologies, planning can easily be viewed as a global term, conceivably encompassing everything of relevance to the organization. Manpower planning is conceivably only slightly less global, focusing inquiry on the human component of the organization—the consumers of roughly 85 percent of the organization's expenditures.

Manpower planning and personnel administration are related but not synonymous concepts. To simplify—perhaps too much—we may say that personnel administration involves the creation and implementation of a wide variety of policies, rules and procedures that provide the framework within which personnel are selected and utilized in an organization. As such, there is a kind of here-and-now flavor to personnel administration. Manpower planning is future oriented, whether the future may be defined as tomorrow or as five or ten years from now. The linkage between manpower planning and personnel administration is in the effect that present personnel policies have on an organization's ability to attract and to retain the right numbers and kinds of people. Thus manpower planning must concern itself with these personnel processes, treating them as having an *interdependent* effect on the ultimate performance of an agency.

Devising a simple definition of manpower planning is problematic. Tom Lupton offers the following view—plea, rather—taking as his perspective what agency managers expect from manpower planning:

> Please give us, in a language we can understand, some practical tips on what we (the managers) have to do now, if in the immediate future (e.g. tomorrow) and in (say) five years' time, we are to ensure that the essential jobs in the organization are occupied by persons with skills, competencies, and other relevant personal attributes (e.g., age, sex, temperament) appropriate for the efficient performance of those jobs.[2]

Lupton's managers expect a great deal, including accurate prediction of future needs and fool-proof cause-and-effect prescriptions for how to meet those needs. Unfortunately, this is no simple task because prediction that involves human beings is at best an imprecise science, because we understand only a little

4

about the causes and the effects of human intentions and behaviors. People not only confound our ability to predict needs, they also upset our best reasoned understandings that "if I do this today, that will be achieved tomorrow, or five years from now."

Thus, one problem with manpower planning is that it often lacks an acceptable level of certainty. Another problem is that it may be an unmanageable enterprise because in our quest to increase certainty for the manager, we try to take more and more into consideration, thereby creating confusion and incomprehensible prescriptions. (Remember, Lupton's managers expect, "in a language [they] can understand, some practical tips.")

This predicament is part definitional and part methodological. On the definitional side, manpower planning can be succinctly put as "a concern that the right kinds and numbers of personnel needed now and in the future are available" and as "whatever you do try to assure that the agency has the right numbers and kinds of people doing the right things." This seems simple enough; yet, it gives rise to a series of complicated questions, to be answered in serial order, and each requiring complicated data collection and analysis before answers can be given: (1) What are and will be the goals and missions of the organization? (2) What are and will be the organization and work tasks and skills necessary to accomplish these missions? (3) What are and will be the human resources (numbers and kinds) required to complete these tasks? (4) To what extent have we met and will we meet the needs for numbers and kinds of human resources? (5) What are the alternative policies and procedures that will ensure that we acquire the right numbers and kinds of human resources now and in the future? These are good questions, but the answers are tough to find.

The methodological portion of the problem has several features. The first is the great number of factors or variables that conceivably affect human resource decision making. There are certain factors that we can predict will always have an effect on manpower (e.g., budgets). Of course, predicting exactly how such factors will have an impact at any given time is another matter. But there are other factors that enter into decisions as "wild cards"—factors that are unpredictable but nonetheless important. For example, who would have predicted twenty years ago the far reaching implications of affirmative action today? How do we estimate the effects of future technologies, of which we know nothing now, that could drastically alter the utilization and need for some numbers and kinds of human resources? Or how do we predict political decisions to alter jurisdictional boundaries, public revenues, or agency roles? Even without the wild cards, however, there are enough current and known factors requiring consideration that the job of analysis is at least very cumbersome.

Another methodological problem associated with manpower planning is that the current state of the art was developed in and for the private sector. Now, manpower planning in the private sector is not easy, but it is probably more easily done there than in criminal justice because it operates under assumptions and conditions different from what exist in criminal justice. The first is that private

5

industry seems to have an easier time defining, agreeing to, and measuring organizational goals (productivity and profit) than does criminal justice. Also, essential skills and jobs for production seem more easily defined than do the essential skills and jobs required in social service agencies such as police, courts, and corrections. In the absence of agreement now—let alone in the future— about basic agency missions and the jobs and skills required to achieve those missions, manpower planning is potentially a very unrewarding activity.

A third methodological difficulty is that much, if not all of the predictive capability of manpower planning today is quantitatively rather than qualitatively oriented. That is, much time is spent addressing the *numbers* of individuals needed as opposed to the *types* of individuals needed, and this in turn can lead to a "status-quoism" in considering needed qualitative changes in the personnel complement. Manpower projections by the U.S. Department of Labor are usually good examples of this. Understandably, however, predicting what kinds of people will be needed is immensely more difficult than predicting their numbers.

A final difficulty is that criminal justice manpower planning operates within a politically volatile area. As paying for human resources consumes the bulk of public criminal justice expenditures, resolving problems that beset these human resources can be financially and therefore politically sensitive. The policy implications arising from analytically based manpower planning can be and often are overruled in the political arena. Thus, in addition to all else, manpower planning must be properly cognizant of (some would say rational about) political realities, especially internal and external constraints on the planning enterprise.

We thus have a problem: Agency managers have a right to ask for practical tips, but it is uncertain whether we are in a position to give them. This uncertainty coupled with a question as to whether the criminal justice system is already beginning to provide or could be helped to start providing at least some help for the agency manager is what led to this project.

The Michigan State University Manpower Project—Phase I

Chapter 2 of this monograph more elaborately describes project origins, methodology and evolution. The points raised in this section are meant only to highlight this methodology and the reader is referred to Chapter 2 for more detailed descriptions of the project methodology.

The professional and research literature of criminal justice largely ignores the topic manpower planning—the most notable exception being the Congressionnally financed National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System. However, lack of discussion in the literature does not necessarily mean that manpower planning is not practiced. Also unanswered is whether criminal justice can make manpower planning a feasible undertaking, regardless whether it is currently done.

6

Briefly, Phase I sought answers for two basic questions: (1) What is the current state of manpower planning in criminal justice, and (2) what forms of manpower planning seem currently feasible in criminal justice, regardless of current practice? Both questions involve a myriad of issues including data availability, capabilities of using and analyzing data for manpower planning purposes, and policy decision-making networks as they affect the utility of conclusions drawn from manpower planning. These numerous issues were catalogued and subsequently grouped in four categories of research questions. This formed the basis for constructing the project's mail questionnaires and the site interviews. The four questions are:

1. What human resource, manpower-planning-related information is currently being collected, tabulated, and/or aggregated by agencies in the system?
2. If certain types of data are being collected, are they being used in any way?
3. Are any of a number of special data collection and analytical schemes, potentially useful for manpower planning purposes, being used by criminal justice agencies?
4. What kinds of decision-making networks do criminal justice agencies confront in reaching human resource decisions, and what seem to be the principal factors affecting these decisions?

To answer these questions, site interviews were conducted at over 100 criminal justice and non-criminal-justice agencies drawn from a national sample. Over 250 individuals were interviewed in this process. Mail questionnaires were also used to collect additional data, as well as further to explore some issues covered in the interviews. Over 500 questionnaires, involving 450 to 550 items each, were sent out; return rates across five categories of criminal justice agencies averaged 70 percent.

Data collection concentrated in the areas of law enforcement, corrections (adult and juvenile, institutional, probation and parole), state planning agencies, and law enforcement standards and training councils. Non-criminal-justice agencies included departments of civil service, budget bureaus, regional and local planning agencies, and several others. Because of time and cost constraints and for other reasons as discussed in Chapter 2, only the 250 largest law enforcement agencies were queried; the courts were not examined directly. All 50 state departments of corrections were surveyed as were all of the 50 state planning agencies and all 46 of the state police officer standards and training councils. Also surveyed were all independent state juvenile corrections authorities (N = 28), all independent state adult probation/parole agencies (N = 23), and the 65 largest local probation departments.

7

II. Findings, Conclusions and Assessments

This section summarizes the major findings from Phase I research. Several of the more detailed findings are omitted from this section and may be of interest to individual readers. Chapters 3–7 contain this information. Also, a few of the conclusions will appear to be a matter of common sense and general knowledge; yet, in many cases these conclusions receive some empirical verification for the first time in this study. Furthermore, their restatement, even though obvious to some, provides a more complete picture of the nature and environment of manpower planning in criminal justice.

The remainder of this section is divided into five parts, beginning with a series of contextual findings, followed by a presentation of findings relating to the four research questions previously mentioned.

Contextual Findings

1. Manpower planning is not a uniformly defined phenomenon in the criminal justice system. For example, many of those interviewed or surveyed associate it with manpower deployment (e.g., beat design and post studies); some associate it with issues of recruitment and selection, or with training; very few consider it to be a forecasting device linking supply and demand for human resources. Not surprisingly, respondents' definitions of manpower planning are situationally limited; that is, they define it in the context of their particular agency's prime mission, or in terms of particularly pressing personnel issues currently facing the agency.

2. There is a high level of activity throughout the system (data collection and analysis) that could support manpower planning activities, and there are several examples of sophisticated manpower planning technologies being used. However, the orientation of these activities is clearly one of solving existing problems within a personnel administration framework rather than within a manpower planning framework. In most instances, the manpower-related activities are not undertaken in coordinated, future-oriented or goal-oriented fashion. To the extent that manpower planning takes place in any fashion, it is largely crisis oriented rather than anticipatory.

3. Ideas like central planning or comprehensive systems planning, especially when applied to human resource issues, arouse political sensitivities and strongly stated concerns about federal encroachment on states and localities, and about state encroachment on localities, besides. Cooperative manpower data collection and analysis among multiple agencies are developing, but there is generally strong resistance to having these efforts develop into centralized policy and decision making with regard to human resource issues. There is a widespread preference for cooperating, even in data collection efforts, only if benefits accruing to the individual agency can be clearly stated in advance.

4. Planning directed toward the resolution of specific problems is seen as valuable; planning for the sake of planning (defined as large-scale data collection and analysis operations that only promise eventually and potentially to address agency problems) is viewed as relatively meaningless. There is an uneasiness about developing manpower planning capabilities because the payoffs in doing so seem unclear. The term "manpower planning" is not self-selling; there is little apparent hostility directed toward it but rather a "show me" attitude expressed by respondents.

5. Human resource decision making is viewed currently as a combination of both political exigency and rational analysis; the impact of rational, empirical planning on these decisions is considered to be at the margins rather than all or significantly controlling. Nonetheless, demands by political and administrative bodies outside the criminal justice system for empirical data justifying human resource requests and other human resource decisions is increasing at a rapid rate. There is a general belief among respondents that the impact of empirical data and analysis on human resource decisions is therefore increasing.

6. Both the ability and desire of agencies in the system to do manpower planning is situationally variable. Agency size is one obvious factor. Differing environmental conditions, such as degree of civil service constraints, unionism, political environment, and similar factors, affect propensity toward manpower planning. In some cases, the propensity to undertake manpower planning is not a question of its being facilitated but rather necessitated by factors such as competition for applicants, worsening economic or revenue conditions, or equal employment pressure. In other cases the propensity to plan is thwarted by environmental constraints that largely forestall any impact of planning on policy or on decision making.

7. Criminal justice manpower planning may at present be described as unevenly developed among the system's agencies and components. The collection and storage of key types of data that would be useful for planning purposes is substantially developed, but the capacity to analyze such data, and, more specifically, to undertake manpower planning analyses is somewhat less developed. Those manpower-related analyses that are undertaken are generally not done as part of an integrated human resource management process. Thus, although many of the basic ingredients necessary for manpower planning exist in several jurisdictions and to a substantial degree, they have not come together within comprehensive frameworks of manpower planning.

The Availability of Data

1. Respondents to the police and corrections surveys indicate a fairly high degree of human resource data collection. (See Tables 3.3 and 4.4 of Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.) On balance a somewhat higher percentage of police respondents report regularly collecting the sample forms of human resource data than do corrections respondents. However, the great majority of both police and

corrections respondents indicate that data on agency work loads, personnel turnover, training undergone by employees, and employee performance evaluations are *regularly* collected. On the other hand, less than 25 percent of both sets of respondents point to *regularly* collecting or receiving data on area labor markets, career orientations of the labor market, rewards offered by competing employers, or social and economic trends that may affect agency human resource issues. Reported rates of data collection falling between these two extremes are for information on employee education, employee job satisfaction and assignment preferences, characteristics of job applicants, and changing requirements of agency jobs. However, across all but three of the thirteen sample data categories, at least 60 percent of both the police and corrections respondents indicate that they *at least occasionally* collect or receive this data.

2. Although the storage and retrieval of the sampled data are currently done manually in a majority of cases, the percentage of agencies using or developing automated formats is increasing.

3. Respondents also rated each of the thirteen categories according to the perceived importance of these data to the agency. In all but three categories the average ratings are above 3.0 (0 = no importance and 5 = strong importance). Work load, employee training, and employee performance data were all rated 4.0 and above in importance, and turnover data 3.8 at the average. As is to be expected, there is some correlation between importance ratings and whether the data is already being collected.

4. Not surprisingly, collection rates are higher for factors involving internal organization issues (e.g., work loads, turnover, and employee performance data) and lower on factors external to the organization (e.g., characteristics of the area labor market and social or economic trends).

5. State-level efforts to collect and to aggregate criminal justice human resource data on a statewide basis are mixed, as reported by respondents to the state planning agency and police officer standards and training council surveys. Statewide aggregation of data related to human resources is most developed among the system components consolidated at the state level, such as prisons and probation and parole, moderately developed for local law enforcement and prosecution, and least developed for jails.

6. Efforts at state-level data aggregation were assessed across eight sample data categories (numbers of employees, race and sex of employees, job descriptions, job vacancies, minimal employee qualifications, work loads, employee educational levels, and employee ages). As could be expected, efforts seem most widely developed with regard to elementary data forms such as number of employees and less widely developed with regard to the more complicated data sets such as turnover rates, job descriptions, and work loads. Across the eight categories, however, there is a fairly promising level of aggregation, which would permit at least rudimentary manpower planning in several states, e.g., both in tracking and projecting system turnover rates. (See

Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 of Chapter 5.) At minimum, the level of data aggregation in several states is such that statewide summary reports of manpower-related data could be produced—reports that would conceivably be useful for various manpower-planning purposes.

7. With regard to the operational measures of data categories, a general conclusion is that they often tend not to have qualitative dimensions (e.g., weights have generally not been assigned to case types in measuring probation case loads). Thus, the measures used are often crude and thereby limit the data's usefulness for manpower planning.

8. Police and corrections respondents indicate variation in how frequently various forms of manpower data are collected. As previously noted, some types of data are described as "regularly collected" while other forms are described as "occasionally collected." State planning agency and training council respondents, however, indicate annual collection (with exceptions) for those forms of manpower data collected at the state level. In other words, if data are aggregated on a statewide basis, they are more often than not updated annually. This last point no doubt reflects the relatively consistent level of funding which has supported state-level data collection efforts (federal block grant funds in particular).

At all levels of government, criminal justice agencies tend to collect only the more elementary data forms on a regular basis (e.g., number of employees and simple work load information). The more complicated, involved, and expensive forms of data, such as those resulting from job task analyses, selection validation studies, and qualitative work load studies, tend to be collected once, or at best irregularly.

9. The willingness of criminal justice agencies to participate in manpower-related data collection has two aspects. The first is the willingness of individual agencies such as police and corrections to collect data about themselves for their own purposes. It is found that this is dependent on whether a specific existing or emerging organizational problem can be identified to justify the data collection. The second aspect is the willingness of these individual agencies to provide data to another agency, such as a state planning agency for whatever purpose, including statewide manpower planning. Respondents generally maintain that willingness in these cases is dependent on a number of factors. A legal *mandate* to provide the data is viewed as helpful but as not sufficient to guarantee timely and quality cooperation. Far more effective in the view of nearly all respondents is securing the *voluntary* cooperation of individual agencies. Respondent opinion indicates that voluntary cooperation, especially to improve and expand statewide data collection is best secured if the reasons for the data requests and the benefits accruing to the individual agency are made clear.

Most respondents from state planning agencies and training councils report having experienced little difficulty in the past and expect general cooperation in the future from individual criminal justice agencies in their states to provide the types of data examined in the surveys.

10. The data collectors and analyzers differ from organization to organization and from state to state. Within individual line operational agencies such as police and corrections, various units are responsible for data collection and analysis, and often, responsibilities are spread across a number of agency divisions. Planning units, budget divisions, personnel divisions, and administrative divisions may all be involved in one way or another with collecting data that is eventually useful for manpower planning purposes. In situations where data collection responsibilities are shared by a number of organizational subunits, interview findings indicate some difficulty in subsequently collating the data for analytical purposes.

11. Inferences drawn from the surveys and the interviews indicate that data networks involving initial collection and subsequent aggregation of data are fairly well developed in most states, but state-level efforts to aggregate planning-related data are not as a rule centralized in a single state agency. The more usual case is that "sector-specific" state-level agencies collect data from local agencies (e.g., police officer standards and training councils for local and county law enforcement, departments of corrections for jails, and state court administrators' offices for the courts). In some instances non-criminal-justice agencies (e.g., the state civil service) undertake some of these data collection responsibilities, either under legislative mandate or by default. This sharing of the responsibility among several state-level agencies to aggregate data from the local level appears deliberate, reflecting concerns of credibility, politics, and traditional rivalries among the system's components. Interview evidence strongly suggests that attempts to consolidate system data collection in, say, a single state agency would be met with resistance in many states and negatively affect future efforts to collect the data.

Uses of Data

1. Generally, more data is collected than is used, especially for manpower-planning purposes. Part of the reason for this is traceable to the manual storage of such data, making its use tedious. Another is the weak and still developing constituency that would ordinarily use such data in making resource-related decisions. For example, state planning agency and training council respondents indicate that local criminal justice agencies "infrequently" make requests for statewide comparative human resource data—data that conceivably would be useful to these agencies in their planning efforts. Finally, use of data is impeded by the lack of models or frameworks to instruct potential manpower planners on the application of data to planning and policy analysis. In effect, data utilization is not maximized because the potential need for and uses of data are not clear. This finding is supported through the interviews where only isolated instances of a systematic understanding of the relationship between empirical data and policy analysis are found.

2. The current uses of *regularly collected data* tend to be more elementary than sophisticated. For example, although a majority of state planning agency respondents indicate that their agencies have produced statewide reports on numbers of system employees, employee socio-economic characteristics, and agency work loads, almost 60 percent of the respondents indicate that their agencies have not forecast and have no plans to forecast future employment needs for their state. Interview data from police and corrections agencies indicate similarly elementary patterns of use of regularly collected data. Although there are some attempts to analyze trends and to make crude projections (as for example with work loads), most of the regularly collected data usually appears as simple descriptive tabular summaries. The most frequent use of these tabular presentations is in supporting annual budget requests.

3. *Specially collected data* (usually the result of one-time efforts) tend to be used in more sophisticated ways. These data are collected in response to specific questions being asked by outside funding agencies, or they are in response to other critical questions usually externally generated. An example of the latter is the large number of job task analyses spawned as a result of affirmative action and EEOC dictates. In these cases, data collection and analysis tend to follow from clearly understood policy and decision-making goals. However, survey responses indicate that many of these special studies are undertaken for agencies by outside contractors, calling into question the degree to which criminal justice agencies themselves possess sufficient expertise both to collect and to use the more complicated forms of data.

4. Much collection and use of data is induced by demand rather than by an internalized planning framework. The most current example of demand inducement is equal employment opportunity and affirmative action pressure to demonstrate the content validity of selection and promotion processes. Another example of demand-induced data collection is the special study undertaken in support of questions raised during budget reviews. Such forms of external inducement usually result in data being used to address a specific target concern (such as answering a particular question of a budget analyst), but tend not to become a component of an overall framework for human resource planning and management. In connection with this and not surprisingly, the more complicated undertakings in data collection and use are generally induced by demand.

5. Some forms of data collection and use are established through tradition, and have become internalized to varying degrees on an on-going basis in agency decision-making processes. An example is the collection of work load data and its subsequent use internally to allocate personnel resources and externally to justify budget requests. Both interview and survey data indicate that well over 90 percent of respondents collect work load data and view it as an established and important ingredient in agency management and planning. However, these data are not usually used in a planning forecasting sense but rather to document what has been done in the past.

6. To the extent that agencies have some notion of goal directed manpower planning in collecting and using data, it is with regard to *numbers*-of-people considerations rather than *kinds*-of-people considerations. For example, most agencies visited in the interviews had some integrative understanding that analysis of data on work loads and numbers of available personnel related to several management or planning issues including justifying requests for personnel, apportionment of the work load, personnel deployment, and computation of numbers of personnel needed to meet traditional standards or organizational goals. But with the exception of demonstrating that current selection and promotion practices are not discriminatory, or in designing ones that would not be, data collection and use with regard to kinds-of-people questions are a rarity.

One explanation for this, arising from the study of human resource decision-making networks, is that numbers-of-people considerations are more salient because of the annual need to justify budget requests. With the exception of concerns for equal opportunity, agencies need not generally justify the kinds of people they employ, even to civil service units in many cases. An additional explanation is that analyses of what kinds of people are needed are much more costly and methodologically difficult. Both explanations are supported by interview findings.

Data Collection and Analytical Techniques

1. Police and corrections survey respondents were asked whether their agencies undertake, in house, any of ten manpower planning activities, all of which generally involve one or another analytical technique or methodology. Roughly similar levels and kinds of in-house activities are reported by both sets of respondents, although there are differences with regard to some of the individual activities. Over 90 percent of both types of respondents report conducting employee performance evaluation, over 80 percent of both report conducting training needs assessments, and about 50 percent of both conduct job analyses. Forty percent of responding police agencies undertake job redesign, while 55 percent of corrections agencies do. Manpower inventory is conducted by 84 percent of the police agencies responding, compared to 54 percent of the corrections agencies. Half again as many of the police respondents report maintaining personnel information systems as do corrections respondents (74 percent and 46 percent respectively). About a third of both sets of respondents report undertaking selection validation. Less than 25 percent of both sets of respondents report conducting labor market analysis, career path analysis, or manpower simulation.

2. In addition to in-house activities, many respondents report having several of the planning activities undertaken for the agency by an outside contractor. About 40 percent of both the police and corrections respondents indicate using contractors to conduct job analyses, about 50 percent of both use them for

selection validation, and 38 percent of the police and 47 percent of the corrections respondents report using contractors for labor market analysis. The use of contractors, rather than conducting the activities in house, is governed by two considerations. Many of the agencies lack the technical capacity to do these things. Second, some criminal justice agencies are precluded from doing them because they are regarded as proprietary functions of other government agencies (civil service units for example).

3. With both in-house and contractually performed activities combined, 80 percent or more of both police and corrections respondents report having done job analysis, selection validation, manpower inventory, performance evaluation, training needs assessment, and maintenance of a personnel information system. Consistent with findings related to data collection, the planning activities themselves seem to be most abundant with respect to internal resource management matters (e.g., job analysis and performance evaluation) and least abundant with regard to more externally oriented matters such as recruitment (labor market analysis and career orientations information for example).

4. Interview data indicates that many of the planning-oriented activities are also demand induced. For example, personnel information systems are often required by the jurisdictional governmental unit, and selection validation is often required as a result of equal employment opportunity concerns.

5. Although the kinds and levels of activity undertaken appear substantial, interview findings do not indicate that the planning activity is undertaken in a comprehensive fashion. The particular planning activities identified as undertaken are usually in response to crises or particular demands and performed to resolve the narrowly focused problem or crisis, rather than being performed with more optimal organizational goals in mind such as planning within a comprehensive framework of securing the right numbers and kinds of personnel.

6. Interview and survey data of state planning agencies and training councils indicate an overall lower level of planning activity being conducted on a statewide basis than is reported by individual operational police and corrections agencies. There are several examples of training councils conducting statewide job analyses and salary surveys; however, there is little evidence that manpower planning-related techniques like qualitative manpower inventories, or labor market analyses are consistently undertaken or used at a state-aggregated level. Further, there is little evidence to suggest that these are viewed as priority areas for further development by state-level agencies such as the training councils or the state planning agencies.

Human Resource Decision-Making Networks

1. A complex environmental web of people, institutions, and conditions affect criminal justice human resource decision making, including those decisions regarding position authorization, filling positions, utilizations of

personnel, and the extent to which manpower planning can be and is undertaken. The differing combinations of environmental factors produce widely differing decision-making networks. The networks vary greatly by level of government and by type of criminal justice func ion. Also, even for a given type of criminal justice agency in a given type of jurisdiction, the relative impact of individual factors varies greatly from one agency to the next. As the mix of significant environmental factors varies, so do the combinations of people and institutions that subsequently become significant to a decision. Finally, not only do the networks differ from agency to agency, but the networks alter over time, sometimes without warning. The points of summary that follow are more fully explained in Section III of Chapter 3, Section II of Chapter 4, Section V of Chapter 5, and all of Chapter 7.

2. Police and corrections survey respondents were asked to rate the importance of fifteen factors in governing *increases* in the numbers of authorized personnel positions. Responses vary from agency to agency but in general respondents rate as very important agency rational planning including agency analysis and presentation of need, increases in agency work load, agency effectiveness, and increases in agency responsibilities imposed by externals (see Table 7.1 of Chapter 7). A similar set of questions using the same fifteen factors was put to respondents concerning what factors seemed most important in governing *decreases* in the numbers of authorized personnel positions. Here, respondents tend to attribute the loss of resources primarily to political factors and to deteriorating economic conditions (see Table 7.2 of Chapter 7). Beyond these generalizations about factors affecting increases and decreases, there is substantial variation from agency to agency. This, and the difference in rankings between questions on increases and decreases are indicative of a general finding that no single set of factors can be identified as "the" set of variables governing the range of human resource decisions. Also, the effect (impact) of rational planning on human resource decisions is perceived to vary according to the type of decision and the type of environmental situation. In turn, this suggests that planning models need to be composed of differing combinations of factors for differing conditions.

3. Receptivity toward a rational planning process is, in the view of most respondents, linked directly to the reputation of and leadership provided by the jurisdiction's chief executive (mayor, governor, county executive, etc.). The reciprocal relationship is seen between the agency's ability to develop a sophisticated planning process and the chief executive's ability to develop a rational planning administrative posture. Several factors confound the purity of this reciprocal relationship, however, including the tendency for "facts to be lost" as they move from the executive to the legislative branches, even though they remain on paper. Also important are the impact of agency constituency and the perception that legislative branches tend to choose the politically expedient rather than "the rationally justified" approach to decision making. Unions and employee associations are seen also as increasingly injecting themselves into

16

these decision-making processes.

4. Perhaps one of the most consistent and crucial issues raised by respondents is that of the role and impact of an active constituency for the agency. On the one hand an active constituency can force the bridging of rational and political decisions, making what the agency regards as the rational course also the one that becomes expedient to the politician. Constituencies may also have the opposite effect of constraining agency planning, as in the example of neighborhood associations resisting a police agency decision to close a local precinct house on grounds of furthering cost-efficiency or effectiveness.

Criminal justice agencies vary greatly in their abilities to attract a constituency. By all accounts local law enforcement agencies seem better able and probation agencies less able. Also, whereas respondents generally view constituencies as positive forces with regard to *external* issues (securing resources), they often view constituencies as negative or thwarting to rational processes when *internal* issues (internal allocations of agency resources) are involved.

5. Criminal justice is particularly sensitive to ideological factors since ideology plays an important role in governing the societal response to crime. The shifting tides of ideology have immediate fiscal repercussions for criminal justice agencies and also can pose long-term restrictions on programming. Respondents tend to view ideology, and shifts in it as confounding efforts to plan on cost-efficient and cost-effective bases (e.g., the contrary effect of ideology on cost-effectiveness arguments favoring community treatment instead of institutionalization).

6. Environmental "wild cards" are by definition the least predictable set of factors affecting human resource decision making. Respondents noted the occurrence of critical incidents (riots and the job related death of an employee, for example), the challenge of court suits, and the potentially negative consequences of planning itself as particularly important wild cards.

Predicting the consequences of planning is difficult, given that the "facts" gathered in support of planning are often subject to radically differing conclusions and policy-related interpretations. In criminal justice where agreement is often *not* reached about intended public service outcomes, agencies may conclude that the facts support one policy direction in pursuance of some goal while external decision makers (politicians and chief executives for example) may use the same facts to support a radically different policy because it more effectively pursues some other goal. Also as noted by several respondents, the fact gathering associated with the planning enterprise may result in finding out things that are damaging. Planning therefore becomes risky and so there may evolve a reluctance to do it.

7. The policy decision-making model that emerges from the findings is a "mixed model;" it includes a concern both for agency-based analysis and for public and private expectations. Simply increasing the system's capacity for rationally oriented decision making will not alone serve either to ameliorate the

"irrational" consequences of environmental factors or to allow for their totally accurate prediction. Rational planning will remain only one ingredient, albeit an important one, in a list of factors affecting how decisions about collective goods are reached.

8. Whereas decisions governing increases and decreases in allocations to an agency are heavily influenced by a spate of external (environmental) factors, decisions regarding the internal allocation of resources appear more susceptible to internal agency control. Especially as regards the kinds of people to employ and the internal allocation of agency human resources, respondents ascribe particular importance to internal agency analyses of job requirements and internal assessments of agency need. With the exception of equal opportunity concerns, external factors such as public opinion, political pressure, and union contracts are considered to have little or at best marginal influence. However, the impact of unions is considered to be increasing in these decisional areas. The effect of external factors such as the availability of desirable applicants and the condition of labor markets is considered to be of moderate importance.

9. An agency's ability to determine minimal qualifications for entry-level positions, and to decide whom to hire and to promote varies from agency to agency and is dependent on two factors: (1) whether other governmental agencies have proprietary interests in these areas and (2) whether the agency is located at the local or state level of government. Civil service units and standards commissions are most frequently cited by respondents as influencing these decisional areas. The effect of civil service is most strongly felt in state-level agencies.

However, the mere existence of a civil service unit is not sufficient to guarantee that it controls these processes. How much control the civil service actually has varies from situation to situation and is found to be dependent on numerous factors: the reputation and influence of the criminal justice agency, the indulgence accorded civil service regulations by politicians, and accords struck between the civil service and the criminal justice agencies. Many of the police and corrections agencies view civil service as a relatively benign force—the respondents see the criminal justice agency as making the basic decisions while civil service legitimizes these decisions by administering the process. However, a significant proportion of respondents feel otherwise, viewing civil service as essentially controlling nearly all aspects of decisions about minimal qualifications, hiring, and promotion. For these agencies the degree of internal control over allocation decisions is perceived to be weak.

III. Concluding Remarks

Providing practical tips to the criminal justice manager about what needs to be done *today* to ensure that the agency has the right number and kinds of people *tomorrow* is at the heart of manpower planning. The system's current capacity to do this may best be described as developing, but a long way from being fully

developed. Those interviewed and surveyed report that their agencies collect most of the specific kinds of data and undertake most of the specific kinds of activities related to manpower planning. But with few exceptions the manpower-related activities undertaken are not integrated, coordinated, explicitly goal-directed, or future-oriented. The development of integrated and coordinated manpower-planning approaches, building on current levels of activity, is both needed and feasible.

The development of anything approaching a "national manpower-planning model" for criminal justice will have limited utility and limited feasibility. The decentralization of criminal justice organization and the sentiment for local control make central or national planning infeasible. Furthermore, the fact that agency-based decisions reflect the differing environments in which they are cast implies that no single, grand model of manpower planning for the criminal justice system will be practical.

Within these overall constraints and realities, the human resource decision networks in which criminal justice agencies operate do not negate the feasibility of manpower planning in criminal justice. Indeed, and as noted, the displacement of decision-making power to forces outside criminal justice agencies has in many instances resulted in increasing the pressure to adopt empirically oriented planning stances. And the increasing recognition among agency practitioners that many factors affect the ability of the agency to secure and to allocate human resources has led to a growing appreciation of the need to become sophisticated in the treatment and analysis of these factors.

Agencies can do more manpower planning and become more rational in their approach to the management of human resources than they are at present. However, the realities of decision making in criminal justice are such that any planning model must assume a bounded rationality, although within this constraint a coordinated approach to rational planning can take place.

The major impediments to development along these lines are lack of money, technical capacity, and practical guides on how to do it. Money is always a problem and the vagaries of appropriation processes make prediction dangerous. The likely demise of LEAA and its planning funds is not a healthy sign. However, the finding that governmental bodies outside criminal justice are increasingly insisting that agencies use empirical data and analytical approaches in reaching decisions bodes well. Too, the fact that substantial data collection is already underway and is locally or state funded is helpful.

The problems of technical capacity and practical guides are related. In part, technical capacity is dependent on knowing how to do something. Current levels of planning sophistication are limited by the lack of any systematic sense of the kinds of data and analysis required for manpower planning when numerous internal and external factors are involved. Practical guides that serve as road maps for agencies in undertaking a more coordinated approach to manpower planning can help solve part of the problem of capacity. The difficulty is that any attempt to impose a single, rigidly prescriptive package that has as its goal a

standardization of decisions and policies from one agency to the next ignores the situational variability confronted by agencies and will fail.

Although decisions and policies resist standardization, it is possible to standardize information about the alternative approaches to analysis and planning as they relate to identifying and resolving human resource problems. The findings suggest that although there is wide variation in the policy decisions meant to resolve manpower problems, the key problems themselves vary less. In one way or another, every agency recruits, selects, trains, assigns, reassigns, promotes, and separates people. The variability is that these issues are confronted and the problems about them resolved by agencies within their own differing environments. Agencies also vary in function and size, and their needs for data collection and types of analytical techniques will be different.

The key to feasible development of manpower planning capacity is that development focus on the extant personnel problems faced by agencies. It must start with this because as the project findings indicate, the system's components seem only willing to participate to the extent that their individual problems will be treated. A single prescriptive approach would ignore these individual problems; an "alternatives" approach would ignore them much less. The first useful steps in the development of manpower-planning capabilities are conveying an understanding of the essential interrelatedness of personnel issues and then to focus on the problems generated from these relationships. From such a common or unifying perspective, alternatives available for data collection and analysis can be discussed within the perspective of individual needs and capabilities.

The fact that some agencies are already employing rather sophisticated analytical and planning techniques and others are not suggests that horizontal development is possible—namely, developing in some agencies the capabilities currently held by others. The qualifier here, however, is that variations in agency and environmental constraints will make the development uneven.

As the findings indicate, much of what is currently done in the system under the general label of manpower planning and analysis is demand induced. Internalization of these processes is thus another feasible goal. The other finding that extant manpower planning related activities are not undertaken within a comprehensive planning framework, but need to be, is another area of feasible development.

It seems reasonable that the first practical step in this developmental process be the designing of "alternatives guides" to provide the system's agencies and components with introductory road maps for doing more comprehensive manpower planning.

Notes — Chapter 1

1. Timothy J. Flanagan, Michael J. Hindelang and Michael R. Gottfredson, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics — 1979*, U.S.Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 25.

2. Angela M. Bowey, *A Guide to Manpower Planning,* 2nd ed., (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1977), taken from the foreword by Tom Lupton.

Chapter 2
The Research: Origins and Design

In the planning field, there is a temptation to start with rather sketchy data on the nature of a planning problem and then intuitively or deductively to deşign a planning framework, model, or prescription for the solution. But the sketchy empirical definition of the problem may not indeed be adequately descriptive; the resulting planning framework, although meant to address reality, falls far short.

Joe Bailey, of the School of Sociology at Kingston Polytechnic, England, wrote in 1975 of sociologists that they "have contracted to deliver nonexistent goods [because] they have agreed to participate in the solution of problems, the definitions of which are fundamentally inadequate. . . .[1] He goes on to say that planning as a field runs similar risks unless planners realize that their principal role in the foreseeable future may be less to provide information than it is to act as critics of basic assumptions and monitors of public and private interests. Although Bailey's viewpoint may be associated with a social activist philosophy, his position is indicative of the problem facing any applied social scientist researching real world problems that have been either ill defined or not defined at all.

Bailey describes planning as an emergent field; manpower planning (at least in criminal justice) is even more infantile. What we know of it, or think that we know of it, is highly speculative in several respects. First, those in the field of criminal justice cannot do more than speculate about the meaning of manpower planning. To some, it means allocating and reallocating personnel across work functions; to others, it means planning for requisite training and education. A few associate it with issues of recruitment and selection; and even fewer consider it to be a forecasting device linking supply and demand for human resources.

To the recently completed National Manpower Survey (Volume Six in particular)[2] manpower planning seems principally to concern itself with the development and use of analytical forecasting models. As with all analytical models, there is an assumption that requisite system and environmental data are available to drive the model. In most cases, this is a faulty assumption, although perhaps less so with the National Manpower Survey model because of the gross nature of the prediction it attempts and the kinds of data required.

Another problem with analytical models is that they assume that people will use them, and that decision makers will see the models as valuable tools in

addressing important problems. This is sometimes a bad assumption, or at least an untested assumption, because practitioners are often not consulted about what they consider to be the important issues. Of course, practitioners do not always understand what they need and, so, the system may not be sensitive to new innovations unless external stimulus creates that sensitivity. But the view of the practitioner as ignorant, if taken too far, is academic elitism that all too often results in recommendations or models that meet Bailey's "nonexistent goods" criterion. Most sound-thinking managers demand, and have a right to demand, that analytical models (or any research-based prescription) address problems and issues that *they* face.

There is little more than speculation in criminal justice about the purposes of manpower planning. More to the point, there is precious little information about the human resource problems that manpower planning can or ought to address. Presumably, with a better understanding of these problems, and agreement that they indeed are problems needing attention, a practical definition of manpower planning could be derived.

Unfortunately, defining planning by the purposes it serves introduces thorny value problems. As pointed out by John Bryson, the prescriptive planning literature often does not make clear whose values or purposes are being served by planning.[3] Bryson has developed a typology of five planning models, all involving differing sets of values: elitist, pluralist, democratic, incremental, revolutionary. His point is that values are at the front end of planning. For example, if the purpose of planning is more smoothly to maintain the status quo, that is one thing; but what if the purpose is change? Is it intended to be fast (revolutionary) change or slower (perhaps incremental) change? Although Bryson's remarks seem primarily to be about social planning (broadly defined), and not so much about organizational planning, the two are not really that distinct because all planning has as its *raison d'etre* the attainment of values.

Criminal justice within an organizational context has been variously characterized in the last decade as a system about to fall "from the sheer input and uncoordinated processing of offenders."[4] By implication, the purpose of planning in criminal justice is comprehensive coordination. But coordination for what purpose beyond the rather nebulous intent of making justice swift and sure is not clear. The empirical evidence defining the problem is sketchy. Indeed, the whole thrust of LEAA-funded initiatives in planning has been nebulous, except to assure that planning (however defined nonempirically) precedes the disbursement of federal dollars to states and localities. The more ambitious LEAA objective is that this requirement will somehow leave behind within these state and local agencies a generalized propensity to plan (if not the capability of planning) for their own needs and to consider the effect of their individualized actions on other structures within the criminal justice system.

These LEAA objectives, not unlike the similar objectives of general federal revenue sharing, give rise to questions (largely unresolved) of whose values, purposes, or agendas are to be served by planning. For example, the National

Academies of Sciences and Engineering Report to the Advisory Committee of the Department of Housing and Urban Development found it difficult to resolve whether national, state, or local objectives should be the focus of the planned use of revenue-sharing funds.[5] Martha Derthick's minority statement in the Academies' report questioned whether "granting large sums to increase the planning and management capabilities of local governments is an adequate substitute for policymaking at the national level."[6] And she went on to say that the present academy recommendations for change "will end by combining the worst of two worlds: Federal legislative objectives will be rendered still more general, while detailed and discretionary involvement of Federal administrators in local planning and political processes will increase."[7]

We confront similar problems when dealing with the issue of the development of criminal justice manpower planning capability. The question is what we mean by it: Do we mean the construction of a "national manpower planning model" that will encompass national goals and objectives? If so, one should not be too surprised if massive state and local resistance develops, predicated on the unresolved questions about local and national priorities. Alternatively, one might assume that developing any capability that concentrates on state-defined and locally-defined objectives would be unpalatable to those who prefer a nationally defined initiative in this area, addressing problems of national scope.

Neither of the above alternative formulations seems acceptable in the absence of additional empirical information detailing the human resource problems and constraints faced by the criminal justice system. National goals and objectives for manpower planning will only appear reasonable if the problems confronted by the criminal justice system (which are largely state and local phenomena) are comparable from one state to another and from one locality to another. In the absence of such comparability, a national set of objectives or priorities is likely to lead to the misapplication of effort similar to that found in the LEAA funding of riot control. (This national priority led in some instances to the expenditure of funds to head off riots in small communities where no riots could be reasonably foreseen.)[8]

What is even more dangerous in designing a national manpower planning effort (with sketchy empirical information about the system's human resource problems) is that federally imposed regulations and priorities will fail to take significant local problems into account. States and localities may thus come to ignore the federal initiative or become inventive in ways of bending the initiative to their own needs.

The result of either of these options being chosen is an administrative nightmare in compliance monitoring. As Gibbons *et al* have pointed out, "the harsh reality of justice system conflicts may mean that [even] the goal of developing a broad, comprehensive master plan for entire state systems is largely unachievable or even completely unrealistic."[9] Our inability to define goals we can all agree on is a most serious impediment to comprehensive planning (this is Gibbons citing Banfield) and suggests the distinct possibility that we will never

arrive (or perhaps should not arrive, in a pluralist society) at a common agreement on the purposes or objectives of manpower planning.[10]

I. The MSU Project

The research procedure described in the following pages took as its primary role uncovering and describing the nature of current human resource planning in criminal justice. The assumption was that understanding the state of the art would allow: (1) a fuller appreciation of the problems and issues criminal justice faces today in manpower management; (2) an empirical basis for determining what is possible (given current conditions and potentialities) in manpower planning; and (3) a basis for making inferences about what forms of planning most closely approximate the needs of practitioners, as they view them. It is assumed that judgments about whether or not management understands its needs are better made in full view of what managers see as their needs rather than in the absence of such views.

Several general issue areas or questions were explored in an attempt to describe the state of the art. What kind of data related to criminal justice human resources are currently being collected, kept, and/or aggregated? What is being done with these data (e.g., are summary reports being produced?) and, specifically, are they being used for various analytical purposes (e.g., forecasting or analyses of reasons or causes of personnel problems)? In what kinds of decision-making networks do criminal justice agencies operate when reaching human resource decisions? This last issue is the most complex but also one of the most important, because it helps detail the kinds of constraints, realities, and potential areas of latitude criminal justice agencies face in reaching human resource decisions. Without such information, assessments of whether manpower planning and its variants are feasible would ignore such constraints.

II. Early Project Decisions

Given the preceding, the feasibility of manpower planning does not seem to rest only on a test (empirical or otherwise) of whether various manpower planning strategies or models are technically adaptable to criminal justice. Of course, this is and ought to be a concern. But it seems that the issue of feasibility turns first on the question as to whether problems faced by criminal justice can be identified and then treated with extant or to-be-developed manpower planning techniques. Identifying these problems requires more than a casual empirical understanding of existing manpower planning processes in criminal justice, of the constraints and difficulties faced by these agencies in dealing with human resource issues, and an understanding of how comparable from one agency to the next are the problems. An empirically grounded understanding of the state of the

25

art would be the beginning of a definition of the purpose of manpower planning in criminal justice and of a judgment whether various manpower-planning technologies are applicable or merely cute window dressing.

The project began during the summer and fall of 1978 with a compilation and analysis of existing general planning literature and of the manpower planning literature in particular. The purpose of the literature search was to familiarize all project personnel with a common set of understandings of the issues and approaches to planning and manpower planning. The second purpose was to begin identifying the relevant range of issues that, if empirically queried, would provide a reasonable description of the state of the art. The catalog of issues and concepts uncovered in this initial search of the literature was assembled as Working Paper #1 in early October of 1978. The paper was disseminated to personnel in the companion manpower planning grants for comment, and additional comments were solicited from the LEAA granting authority and from other knowledgeable people within the university. The working paper was discussed during two separate meetings of the LEAA granting authority and the companion grantees; information and reactions received from all quarters were incorporated into a revision of the paper. That reformulation resulted in Position Paper #1, released in December of 1978.

Position Paper #1 presented only a general framework and was intended only to do so for a number of reasons: First, the general planning literature contained only limited explication of the factors involved in manpower planning. Second, the manpower planning literature itself was found to be very limited and, with only a few exceptions, not related to criminal justice. Third, and as reflected by the literature, criminal justice manpower planning had only recently emerged as an issue, and much of what it stands for still needs to be worked out. Fourth, very few sources could be identified that detailed the degree to which criminal justice agencies currently engage in manpower planning—and without such information we could never be assured that our *conceptualization* of the issues relevant to manpower planning had any significant relationship to reality and action.

The position paper took up six issues:

1. The identification of criminal justice agencies likely to undertake manpower planning.
2. The identification of criminal justice agencies potentially receiving benefit from manpower planning.
3. The description and definition of manpower planning generically.
4. The comparison of macro-level planning and micro-level planning.
5. The linkage of manpower planning to personnel administration.
6. The identification of the primary types and sources of information required for manpower planning.

The identification of criminal justice agencies likely to undertake manpower planning resulted in two general categories of agencies. The first category was dubbed "line agencies" and comprised those whose primary mission was service delivery to the public and/or direct contact with the offender (e.g., law enforcement agencies or prisons). Planning was not considered a primary mission of these agencies except as planning served the service delivery function.

The second category, dubbed "staff agencies," was defined to include those agencies whose primary missions could be viewed as staff support to and/or policy control of aggregates of line agencies (staff agencies included, for example, state planning agencies or police training commissions); planning as undertaken by these staff agencies could be viewed as service delivery to the line agencies.

Types of Agencies and Defining Manpower Planning

The distinction between line and staff agencies had important implications in our search for a definition of manpower planning that (1) squared with generally recognized definitions of manpower planning, and (2) would be sufficiently broad to encompass the likely planning activities of both line and staff agencies. The extant literature seemed to offer only general agreement about what manpower planning was and the broad purpose it served. Some of these extant definitions are reproduced below:

> Planning means making statements about the future. It involves the analysis of past and present to construct a clear picture of a preferable future, in some specific and attainable sense. It needs to be more than speculative, and thus requires a combination of hard information and sound judgement about the meaning of that information, even in uncomplicated situations involving a few small-scale factors. In more complex situations, involving large numbers of variables which have intricate relationships, some kind of planning model must be added to hard data and sound judgement.[11]

> When we speak of a model for manpower planning in the criminal justice system, we are referring to developing a systematic way of dealing with both the short and long-range decision-making processes of acquiring, preparing, and utilizing human resources in pursuit of system goals and objectives.[12]

> A plan of any type may be defined as a predetermined course of action. Every plan should have three characteristics. First, it should involve the future; second, it must involve action; and third, there should be an element of personal or organizational

identification or causation, which means simply that the future course of action will be taken by the planner, or someone designated by him within an organization or within society.[13]

At the level of the economy, manpower planning applies the processes of planning in general to the preparation and employment of people for productive purposes. *In a free society such as ours, manpower planning aims to enlarge job opportunities and improve training and employment decisions through the power of informed personal choice and calculated adjustment to rapidly changing demand.*[14] (Emphasis added)

Manpower planning in organizations is the process by which a firm insures that it has the right number of people, and the right kind of people, in the right places, at the right time, doing things for which they are economically most useful. It is, therefore, *a two-phased process, by which we anticipate the future through manpower projections and then develop and implement manpower action plans and programs to accommodate the implications of the projections.*[15] (Emphasis added)

Corporate Manpower Planning involves:
Demand work — analysing, reviewing and attempting to predict the numbers, by kind, of the manpower needed by the organization to achieve its objectives;
Supply work — attempting to predict what action is and will be necessary to ensure that the manpower needed is available when required;
Designing — the interaction between demand and supply, so that skills are best utilized to the best possible advantage and the legitimate aspirations of the individual are taken into account.[16]

Planning in the sense of exercising forethought seems explicit enough in each of these definitions. Less explicit in all of the definitions, but nonetheless apparent, is a concern with the relationship between demand (human resources needed) and supply (availability of human resources). Presumably the *raison d'etre* of manpower planning (if we are to follow these definitions) is to anticipate imbalance between supply and demand and to take corrective action. And at least two of the definitions make it clear that both quantitative (numbers) and qualitative (kinds) human resources must be considered in the planning process.

If any of these definitions were to be accepted, or if an amalgam were to be produced, the inescapable conclusion seems to be that manpower planning needs

28

to be done at all organizational and system levels. It also seems to be a logical corollary of these definitions that certain basic or generic kinds of information would be required to permit adequate manpower planning at any of these levels.

Position Paper #1 accepted these definitions but built upon them by listing what we perceived to be the generic questions and information required of manpower planning. By this, the definition of manpower planning to be used in the project unfolded in terms of the kinds of information and decisions it included for organizations.

1. What are the goals and objectives *(organizational or system missions)?*
2. What organization and work tasks are necessary to accomplish the missions?
3. What are the human resources neeeded to accomplish work tasks (demand)?
   a. Qualitative
   b. Quantitative
4. What is the inventory of human resources currently in stock (supply)?
   a. Developed inventory: appropriately skilled human resources in stock *(demand totally met).*
   b. Undeveloped inventory: human resources in stock, not trained but capable of being appropriately trained *(demand partially met).*
5. What is the gap between requirements (demand) and developed inventory (supply), which is the measure of *unmet demand?*
6. What is the supply of human resources not in stock?
   a. Developed human resources
   b. Developable resources
   c. Undevelopable resources
7. What are the alternative means (and consequences) available to bridge the gap between supply and demand?

Whether planning takes place at the level of the individual operational agency, or at a more system-wide or aggregated level, these seven basic and generic information questions will arise. However, the purpose of undertaking manpower planning will differ depending on whether the agency is line or staff (as we have defined these terms). When a staff agency undertakes manpower planning with the purpose of addressing human resource issues outside its own needs for personnel, the scope and purpose of planning are on understanding and/or influencing aggregates of supply and demand. Line agencies will generally plan only to manipulate their own supply and demand.

Even with this definitional approach to manpower planning, however, a problem remained (and remains now and in the foreseeable future). In criminal

justice, certain issues arise that make the direct application of manpower techniques as developed in industrial situations somewhat problematic. One of the most important of these concerns the goals of the operations itself: criminal justice is often confronted with a number of competing and often conflicting goals. The choice of a primary goal and how that goal is to be achieved is value-laden. Also, goals may be intangible, and there is often no direct relationship between levels of manpower and output or outcomes.

The working definition of manpower planning developed in Position Paper #1 was intended only to focus our initial efforts. We did not address, either by way of concrete examples or specific statements, what manpower planning could accomplish, aside from the general assumption that manpower planning would seek to address the relationship between supply and demand for human resources. As we discovered, once interviews began, our conceptual definition of manpower planning needed to be supplemented with concrete examples of specific actions and purposes included in manpower planning. This was accomplished during the winter of 1979 as project staff built upon the conceptual definition with such specific examples. Sets of examples were defined for each of the sectors to be interviewed as a means of focusing those interviewed on our meanings.

There were important implications of defining manpower planning in this way; among them, the generic types of planning that line and staff agencies undertake would differ. Line agencies were most likely to plan in order to provide themselves with relevant information, strategies, and policies concerning their own particular needs. Staff agencies, on the other hand, were the ones most likely to be concerned with aggregates of agencies, with multi-agency, countywide, regional, state and/ or national efforts at gathering information and developing strategies and policies meant to influence these aggregates of agencies. For purely heuristic reasons, the planning most likely to be undertaken and used by line agencies was called *micro* and the planning of staff agencies was called *macro*.

Specifically, the intention of macro planning was assumed to be influencing aggregate supply and aggregate demand for human resources. The intention of micro planning was assumed to be individualistic, in the sense that individual line agencies would only seek to influence the demand for and the supply of human resources for their own organization. Actions of line agencies could, of course, alter aggregates, but only as an ancillary effect of attempting to influence their own agency setting. Macro planning undertaken by staff, cross-jurisdictional agencies would have as its central purpose the influencing of supply and demand for several agencies, or for whole systems. Thus, in short, the purpose of planning at the line level was assumed to be very different from the purpose of planning at the staff level.

The distinction between line and staff and between macro and micro leaves several problems. First, the typology does not provide a necessarily mutually exclusive categorizing device. For example, a state department of corrections could simultaneously be viewed as a micro-planning line agency and as a macro-

planning staff agency. Second, the distinctions do not permit us to isolate "levels of macroness" and the size of aggregates being focused upon. Third, the terms themselves (macro and micro), although borrowed from classical economic theory, do not follow (and were not intended to follow) the constructs of classical economic theory. Thus, the constructs as applied to planning had little, if any, sound theoretical grounding.

These deficiencies aside, however, the heuristic value of the distinctions between line and staff and between micro and macro allowed us to focus data collection efforts on two obviously different types of agencies, with very different reasons for undertaking planning, manpower, or otherwise. The implications were plain. Data collection about the state of the art would have to examine line agencies, staff agencies, and the relationships between the two. Not to do so would result in neglect of significant aspects of already established planning activities at various levels in criminal justice.

Preliminary Decision on Data-Collection Techniques

It seemed clear that both mail survey and face-to-face interviewing would be required to get sufficient data. It had been known from the beginning that information on criminal justice manpower planning was scarce. And, in the absence of such information, there was little assurance that we would be able to intuit what were the fundamental questions to be included in a series of mail surveys. There was also the problem that many of the issues that had to be explored required in-depth questioning of the kind not readily amenable to mail surveying, either a closed or open-ended format.

The original grant proposal had anticipated this problem and had intended that a limited number of agency site visits be undertaken as a means of identifying these salient issues. The site visits would presumably allow us to validate the saliency of subsequently developed mail survey items; the results of the interviews would also be useful later as a means of lending perspective in the analysis of survey results.

The grant proposal had allowed for approximately 30 such agency site visits around the nation and across several types of criminal justice and non-criminal-justice agencies. Conclusions reached by the end of the fall of 1978 made this estimate of 30 site visits wholly inadequate. By that time, we had already drawn up a fairly long list of issues that needed examination for state of the art and feasibility purposes. It was clear that many of these issues could not be handled well at all with only 30 site visits.

The decision was made in December of 1978 more than to double the number of agency site visits in order to examine some of these complicated issues more fully. (By the end of the project, over 100 agencies had been contacted for the purpose of face-to-face interviewing.)

Thus, during the fall of 1978, the underlying purpose of the interviews altered somewhat from that originally proposed. Whereas the original intention of the

31

site visits was almost purely to identify issues for purposes of constructing the surveys, the interviews now began to take on an information collecting function of their own. In this expanded role, the interviews were now to serve three purposes: (1) the identification of issues that needed to be addressed by the various surveys; (2) the gathering of information on issues that would not be (because they could not be) included in the surveys; and (3) the provision of corroborative, interpretative, or perspective information on certain issues that would also be examined in the surveys.

The role of the surveys remained essentially what it had been from the beginning. They would be used to determine patterns of (1) availability of personnel information in agencies; (2) information utilization; (3) manpower planning techniques that were in operation; and (4) constraints and factors confronted by agencies when reaching various kinds of human resource decisions.

Additionally, there was the assumption that the surveys and the interviews would complement one another—interviews exploring some issues in depth (with a limited N), the surveys exploring these and other issues with greater breadth (a larger N). Survey data would be cross-referenced with interview data (and vice versa) where possible.

Preliminary Decision on Site and Sample Selection

The decision was made early (during the fall of 1978) that interviews and questionnaires would need to be conducted with both line and staff agencies, and also periodically with non-criminal-justice agencies. Position Paper #1 identified (intended only as a partial listing) some 32 line agency types (both criminal justice and non-criminal justice) and 8 staff agencies of both types. These forty agency types (and conceivably others) all engage in activities having potential impact on criminal justice human resources. This large number of agency types created a problem; namely, how could 40 agency types of sufficient number each be interviewed and surveyed to provide sufficient empirical data on each? Even an N of 10 in each category would mean the necessity of undertaking 400 site interviews—a logistic impossibility.

It was clear that the time and resources allotted to the project would not permit equal examination of the functions and roles of each of the forty types of agencies. The decision was reached to survey, of the line agencies, only law enforcement and state-level correctional agencies. (Later, state juvenile institutions, state adult probation and local adult probation were added to this list.) With respect to staff agencies, surveying would only extend to the SPAs and to standards and training commissions. The reasons behind these decisions (in addition to cost and time) follow: (1) Police and corrections account for most of the employment within criminal justice (perhaps as much as 80%). (2) These two sectors (especially in contrast with the courts) have at least the folklore reputation for being the "most advanced" with respect to managerial concepts

and emergent planning strategies. (3) Law enforcement and adult corrections, although varying structurally from state to state, still have greater known structural *similarities* from state to state and region to region than what is generally known or codified about the other sectors. Such known underlying similarities would facilitate attempts at drawing meaningful comparisons among agencies within law enforcement and within corrections. (4) The SPAs are specifically charged with the responsibility of providing coordinated planning at the state level. Examination of their current activities relating to manpower planning seemed particularly essential. (5) Training and standards commissions represent an important attempt in the past decade to create state-level criminal justice agencies with the specific and avowed purpose of influencing manpower in criminal justice statewide. Finally, the selection of two line and two staff criminal justice agencies would allow some comparison within each type.

The interviews were intended to uncover as much information as possible about the kinds of manpower planning underway in criminal justice. The decision was made to focus attention and selection on those agencies with manpower planning reputations or at least strong management reputations. It was felt that if the present zenith of manpower planning were to be found, it was most likely to be in these types of agencies. It also seemed logical that agencies below a certain size would not have a planning capability of major formal proportions in place.

The issue of agency size was most perplexing when it came to the law enforcement field, and we realized that our decision to treat the larger agencies left the majority of law enforcement agencies unrepresented. It seemed clear to us, however, that project time and money precluded our being able adequately to sample from all size groupings; and it seemed we could get the most information (about project goals) by emphasizing the larger agencies.

The final selection of agencies to be interviewed and surveyed was evolutionary and depended on reputational information and leads developed both before any of the interviews began and as the interviews progressed. Also, another purpose of the interviews was to trace out decision-making networks within geographically and/or politically defined sites. At each site a number of agencies would be interviewed including non-criminal-justice agencies having decisional impact and authority over various aspects of criminal justice human resource issues. As agencies having such impact would vary from site to site, final agency selection would need to await site selection and the discovery of information (leads) in each of these sites about which agencies played significant roles. For example, even though civil service and budget units could usually be expected to have an impact on manpower decisions, one could not expect that impact to be uniform across sites, or even significant in all sites.

The actual process of selecting criminal justice agencies for site interviews was a continuous one, running from the fall of 1978 to September of 1979. However, in the fall of 1978 several variables of interest were isolated that were intended to guide subsequent site selection. (1) Reputation for manpower planning: Did the

agency have a history of planning its acquisition and utilization of human resources using empirical data, rational argument, or "advanced" personnel techniques like assessment centers or job task analysis? (2) General management reputation: Did the agency have a reputation for "sound" management, or was top management itself of high regard? (3) Political environment: Was there evidence that human resource decisions were made largely on the basis of politics, or were such decisions basically non-politicized? (4) Recent increases or decreases in personnel: Had the agency recently grown or declined significantly in authorized strength? (5) Agency size: What was the total personnel complement? (6) Geographical location: In what region of the country was the agency located?

The intention was not to weigh each of the variables equally in making site selections, nor were all of these criteria to be used to achieve variability among the group of agencies eventually selected. With few exceptions, site and reputation for management and planning would be necessary criteria in site selection. Further, agencies that had recently grown or declined significantly would be given added attention, owing to the likelihood in such circumstances of at least the *need* for planning. (The question to be examined was whether or not planning had preceded or accompanied these increases or decreases.)

The variables of political environment and geographical location were intended to produce variation. Specifically, we wanted regional variation (nationally defined) and we also sought political variation, hoping to isolate agency potential for manpower planning in a variety of political settings.

Manpower Planning and Personnel Administration

The issue of site selection and its evolution will be discussed more fully in a following section because it was in some respects a decisional issue separate from those issues resolved by Position Paper #1. But, as is already clear, many of the decisions reached in Position Paper #1 had an important bearing on which agencies came to be selected (e.g., line and staff, macro and micro planning). Two other issues addressed by Position Paper #1 also had an important impact: (1) the relationship between personnel administration and manpower planning, and (2) the kinds of information (data) that would be required to undertake manpower planning.

Although we took an inclusive definition of manpower planning to guide the project, a distinction was raised between manpower planning *per se* and personnel administration: planning and making policy are distinguishable from the process of implementing such policy through specific decisions or actions (personnel administration). Neither planning, nor policymaking, nor personnel administration ideally occur in a vacuum, nor are they removed one from another; rather, a logical sequencing of these events can be seen as in Figure 2.1.

FIGURE 2.1

THE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT PROCESS

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┌─────────────────────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────────────┐
│  Measure Supply/Demand Gaps │              │  Implement Action Programs  │
│ and Propose Alternative Solutions │         │   to Address Supply/Demand Gap │
└─────────────────────────────┘              └─────────────────────────────┘
              │                                     │              │
              ▼                                     ▼              ▼
┌────────────────────┐      ┌────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ Manpower Planning: │      │ Policymaking:      │      │ Personnel Administration:│
│                    │      │                    │      │                          │
│ Collection and     │──────▶│ Selection of a     │──────▶│ Acquire, Prepare and Uti-│
│ Analysis of        │      │ General Strategy   │      │ lize Personnel through   │
│ Requisite Infor-   │      │ for Mediating      │      │ the Design and Implemen- │
│ mation on Seven    │      │ Supply/Demand      │      │ tation of Specific       │
│ Central Questions  │      │ Gap                │      │ Processes                │
└────────────────────┘      └────────────────────┘      └──────────────────────────┘
         │                                                         ▲
         └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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The essential point of this depiction is that manpower planning and personnel administration are not conceptualized as subsets of one another. They are conceptually separable processes linked under the general heading of manpower management. Manpower policymaking is based on planning information and is the setting of broad-gauged recommendations and requirements that form the general plan of action with regard to human resources. Personnel administration also makes use of manpower information and is the specific set of decisions and actions that attempt to put policy into action. Seen in this fashion, personnel administration is the implementation of manpower planning and policymaking. Recruitment, screening and selection, training and education, assignment and reassignment, and personnel evaluation are categories of such specific actions and decisions.

This view of manpower planning within the scheme of manpower management has been earlier stated by other researchers and scholars. Cascio, for example, quoting Cresap, McCormick and Paget, views manpower planning as leading to the construction of staffing plans that in turn lead to staffing and development, the measurement of organizational performance, and the production of results.[17]

This distinction (and relationship) between manpower planning and personnel administration had obvious implications for the selection of interview sites. In particular, we would need to be concerned about identifying (and in some cases interviewing) a wide range of agencies, both criminal justice and non-criminal-justice, if we were adequately to understand the networks of agencies involved in administering personnel in criminal justice. Getting a handle on personnel administrative procedures seemed essential, as personnel administration was viewed as the "action" result of manpower planning.

Another related issue that would require clarification was the distinction between doing things associated with manpower planning and actually doing manpower planning. For example, selection validation could be considered a personnel administrative process, but it also might be associated with broader manpower planning concerns. The mere act of selection validation, undertaken to satisfy EEOC requirements, would be likely to have different policy implications than selection validation undertaken as part of an explicit future-oriented planning activity consciously linked to the pursuance of organizational goals. Data collection and analysis would have to carefully distinguish between techniques associated with planning and actually doing planning.

Kinds of Data to be Collected

Position Paper #1 partially addressed the issue of what kinds of information needed to be uncovered during the interview and survey processes. It seemed central to any description of the state of the art that several basic types of

information about what was really done in the line agencies be uncovered. These basic questions were identified as:

1. Who makes decisions in line agencies, and what kinds?
2. What kind of information is sought before making decisions and what kind of information is actually used?
3. How may agency-based decision making be characterized (e.g., systematized or nonsystematized, empirical or intuitive, anticipatory or reactive, and so forth)?
4. What variables and factors may be isolated as having impact on the various human resource decision processes?
5. How may all of the above be answered, controlling for agency type (e.g., size, function, location, political position, etc.)?

These five points, intended to be only a preliminary guide, set the foundation for later efforts specifically to define the kinds of information (empirical data) the project required. They very clearly and intentionally set a "decision-making focus" for data collection, because the conclusion had been reached that the principal issue surrounding manpower planning in criminal justice related to discovering who made which decisions and on what basis. Without such information one could hardly judge whether varying kinds of manpower-planning strategies and techniques could have any utility in the field.

The more specific kinds of information needed were further detailed in Position Paper #2 and resulted in a seventy-cell grid of types of information to be collected. The objective of this grid was to provide a logically complete construct that would guide item construction for the survey and interview schedules. Subsequently, as survey and interview items were designed and catalogued, the grid provided us with a road map of what fit where and of what was being questioned and what was not.

The grid had two axes. Axis one detailed seven basic types of actions that could be untertaken or performed in manpower planning. Axis two detailed ten basic types of manpower planning processes. State-of-the-art data collection could thus be guided by whether and how much each manpower process became subject to any or all of the seven basic types of actions or decisions.

I. The types of potential decisions and actions fall into the following groupings:
   A. Collecting certain types of human resource information.
   B. Analyzing this information.
   C. Disseminating the information, whether within the organization or outside it.
   D. Making recommendations on human resource issues.
   E. Seeking approval or support.
   F. Establishing rules, procedures, policies and/or programs involving human resource issues.

37

G. Funding (or not funding) or obtaining funding.

II. The types of processes may be summarized and categorized as:

A. **Goals:** Determining system or organization missions.

B. **Tasks:** Determining jobs and work tasks necessary to accomplishing missions.

C. **Demand:** Determining numbers and kinds of personnel needed.

D. **Supply:** Determining numbers and kinds of personnel employed or available.

E. **Recruiting:** Securing applicants for jobs.

F. **Selecting:** Choosing new employees.

G. **Assigning:** Assigning and reassigning personnel or dismissing personnel.

H. **Developing:** Providing training and education to employees or potential employees.

I. **Compensating:** Providing varying rewards and varying types of rewards to employees.

J. **Appraising:** Evaluating the performance of personnel.

Concerning the factors or variables that influence human resource decision making in criminal justice, Position Paper #2 clarified that factors meant "forces" and included both "who" and "what." Specifically, we were interested in identifying those individuals (and their positions) *who* in effect had the power, authority, or influence (using Lasswell's distinction) to affect manpower in criminal justice. We also wished to isolate those internal and external conditions like economic conditions, political environment, agency reputation, etc., that had an effect on manpower. And it was clear at this point that collecting data about such variables or factors would in large measure have to depend on "informed opinion."

Data on whether or not types of actions had been undertaken or decisions made could be relatively easily verified; data on factors or forces, less easily. It was obvious that careful selection of interviewees to provide us with accurate data was essential to both (e.g., actions undertaken and factors influencing); however, opinions being what they are, viewpoints or opinions would differ among individuals even within the same agency. This is a recurrent problem in opinion-based survey research—one rarely, if ever, dealt with in a totally satisfactory manner.

Our attempt to lessen the effects of this problem involved the following: (1) selecting interviewees who occupied positions that permitted or demanded broad knowledge of the organization rather that narrow knowledge of some minute aspect; (2) selecting interviewees who had been in their positions long enough to be able to bring a historical perspective to constructing their answers; (3) asking similar questions across the sites about factors, allowing us to distinguish general or comparable opinions across sites. In this respect, the same questions would

38

not only be asked across sites, but also both in the interviews and in the surveys. We, thus, multiplied not only the number of references to these opinions, but also used two opinion-collection devices (i.e., interview and questionnaire).

Such safety measures are hardly foolproof. By attempting to maximize the degree to which interviewees had an organization-wide perspective and a historical perspective, and coupling this with an attempt to address similar questions across agencies, we sought to protect ourselves and the project from the worst excesses of opinion data. But occupying a key position does not assure a knowledgeable understanding of the organization; longevity may only result in a colored and time-bound, hence narrow, historical perspective (Katz speaks of this as a positional lag in information owing to the isolation of the leader from key operational information);[18] and comparison of such opinions across sites or agencies might simply lead to summary views of a lot of misinformation. In sum, our approach to the problem of opinion data reduced the probability of getting invalid information, but by no means eliminated the chance of it.

The analysis of decision-making networks, as these networks applied to human resource decision making, was also addressed in Position Paper #2. Attempting to find out who takes what kind of manpower actions, and also attempting to determine who and what has influence on these actions, entails studying the interrelationships among agencies. In a sense, these relationships themselves could be taken as a set of factors that influence the nature and type of human resource actions and decisions. Network analysis of these relationships as factors was in and of itself important and deemed critical enough to warrant deliberate treatment. Understanding these relationships seemed absolutely central to understanding the current state of manpower management in criminal justice, and this seemed essential if we were to assess the feasibility of developing manpower planning capability.

With the issuance of Position Papers #1 and #2, the project moved into Phase 2, which lasted through August of 1979. Three issues occupied the project staff during this second phase: (1) operationalizing the issues and questions to be addressed in the interviews and the surveys, (2) identifying and selecting specific agencies for site interviews and for surveying, and (3) conducting the interviews and completing the surveying. The completion of these tasks was deliberately evolutionary and made to coincide with alternating stages of interviewing, survey design, interview redesign, survey redesign, selection of additional agencies for interviewing, and so forth. This exploratory approach to research design (that is, continuous redesign of instruments and samples) was essential to the project. We obviously were exploring virgin territory, and that territory itself would probably offer the best (if not the only) guide to what was relevant.

III. Exploratory Field Survey: The Mode of Data Collection

The first section of this paper proposed the difficulty of describing manpower planning in criminal justice because of the scattered and sketchy empirical

information available. The fact of the matter was that we were engaged in a project to assess the feasibility of a construct called "manpower planning," and we had little, if any, scientific knowledge of the construct as it applied to the action world of agencies, organizations, and systems in criminal justice. As Kerlinger has pointed out, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to state meaningful hypotheses for empirical testing unless the construct has such a scientific grounding.[19]

Daniel Katz made a distinction over 25 years ago between field studies that have as their purpose the testing of hypotheses and field studies that are exploratory in nature.[20] The purpose of exploratory field study is (1) to discover the significant variables that affect the construct, (2) to discover the relationship among these variables, and (3) to lay the groundwork for the eventual testing of hypotheses generated.[21] These three purposes closely approximated the intent of the present study; it could hardly be said that the objective was to test preestablished hypotheses.

Uncovering the state of the art of criminal justice manpower planning (our attempt to discover what is) is largely exploratory. Stating what seems feasible in manpower planning in criminal justice amounts, in a research sense, to stating hypotheses that then must be tested. This distinction was raised in the original grant proposal, where it was anticipated that data collection on the state of the art would be followed by judgments about feasibility, and this would be followed by a pilot test of these judgments.

As Katz noted, "The exploratory study attempts to see what is there rather than to predict the relationships that will be found. It represents the earlier state of science."[22] A traditional distinction drawn in research literature between survey research and field study is that the former is concerned with greater breadth and the latter with greater depth.[23] In theory, this is accomplished by the survey exploring a large number of cases (selected to be representative of a population) while a field study explores one case or a small number of cases in greater detail.

This distinction between breadth and depth was important to the project, as some issues needed to be explored deeply with given settings while other issues could be explored to gain an understanding of general similarities and differences. However, it seemed likely to us that the differences in manpower management from one agency to another were so great that exploratory field study (taken as a single case study) would not sufficiently deal with this diversity even at an exploratory level. Surveys of field settings, using both interview and questionnaire techniques, seemed more relevant and useful.

The questionnaire and interview techniques were designed to provide an exploratory description of field situations; that is, we had many ideas about criminal justice manpower management, but we were likewise convinced that we had many important realities or ideas to discover. As previously mentioned, the questionnaires were intended to approach exploration with some breadth while the interviews intended depth. The two would cross-feed one another.

Whereas sampling is traditionally not of much concern in field studies, it is important to surveying. We had neither the interest nor the inclination on both practical and conceptual grounds to sample representatively for the universe of criminal justice. For reasons of time and money, some sectors (as previously noted) were excluded from consideration. Of the sectors remaining, samples representative of some conceptualized population had to be drawn for both questionnaire and interview surveying.

Two assumptions guided the sample selection process. First, we assumed that the larger the agency, the greater the "need" for manpower planning. Second, the larger the agency, the greater the likelihood that manpower planning activities might be underway. The purpose of the study was not to test these assumptions but rather was to take them as the foundation for an exploration. With the questionnaire, the entire population of state adult corrections, SPAs, and POSTs were surveyed, and so sampling was not an issue. Of law enforcement and probation/parole agencies, the entire population was not surveyed, and so sampling *was* an issue. With the interviews, sampling was an issue across all sectors.

As previously noted, agency size and considerations like management reputation guided the selection of the sample. This is a nonprobabilistic approach to sampling roughly paralleling Kerlinger's description of purposive/judgmental sampling.[24] In effect, we elected to sample "subjectively" on the basis of judgment that we would get the most information about the limits of the state of the art if we paid particular attention to size and reputation. A fuller explication of the factors and procedures for selecting questionnaire recipients and interview agencies is given below.

A Multi-step Approach to Instrument Design and Site Selection

A multi-stage pilot testing of interview schedules and survey instruments was intended as the chief tactical means of conducting this exploratory study. It became clear as we moved into the actual site interviews that only certain issues and variables had saliency in a given site. There were, of course, variables that were equally salient at all sites, but a significant number of other issues and variables turned out to be site-specific. There was thus strong argument for keeping the interviews somewhat unstructured, especially so that unanticipated variables and issues would be given chance enough to surface.

To be clear, several issues were uniformly explored across all sites to assure the necessary degree of comparability, but respondents were allowed maximum freedom to respond to these issues. This relative freedom, we hoped, would accomplish two purposes: (1) our predetermined interview schedule would not unduly shunt aside significant new information about manpower planning and human resource management; and (2) such new information, when discovered, would suggest new items or new response categories that would have to be added to the closed-end surveys.

This is, indeed, what happened. Before the first set of interviews were conducted, an initial stab was taken at designing the law enforcement and SPA surveys. This was accomplished on the basis of our review of the literature and on an analysis of the data collection implications of Position Papers #1 and #2. A very small number of test interviews were scheduled in the law enforcement and SPA areas, and an initial interview schedule for each was constructed. The purpose of these initial test interviews was twofold. We sought a test of the interview schedule and our interviewing approach. At the end of the interview, however, respondents were asked to complete the draft surveys as well and specifically to address whether or not there were soft spots, missing issues or response sets, or confusing language.

At this point, it would be useful briefly to explain the process that led us to this first generation of survey and interview schedules. That process began about mid-November 1978 and was predicated on the work then nearing completion for Position Papers #1 and #2. The research questions produced in these position papers and the seventy-cell grid of information categories were used to construct a tentative list of survey and interview items as close as possible to the types of items that would eventually be used. The process followed was that each of the then five project staff members would independently develop these questions, using the research questions and the grid for a guide. Once this was done, the staff met to form composite lists for both the line and staff agencies.

After several staff meetings and substantial discussion, the questions were recategorized and a check was made to see whether the research questions and the grid had been covered sufficiently by the composite list. As could be expected, there were some obvious holes and we returned again to the independent generation of items. We met again for discussion and cross-check with the research questions and the grid and concluded that we had carried the process of item design as far as we could without external feedback. Individuals in the School (but not on the grant) and personnel from one of the other companion grants were asked in late November to comment on the direction of our question-generation efforts. This was intended as an informal feedback process, as we were not yet satisfied ourselves that all significant issues had been addressed. This round of external feedback produced only minor suggestions for the inclusion or the deletion of items. We then felt ready to attempt a first design of the actual survey instruments and interview schedules. The areas of law enforcement and SPAs were picked for this initial design effort.

Early Instrument Designs

This first effort at survey design produced an approximate 350-variable instrument for line agencies (law enforcement) and an approximate 400-variable instrument for staff agencies (SPAs). Survey length in each case approached 18 pages, and we began to have serious concerns that such length would seriously impede responses. The project staff debated in some detail whether less essential

items should be cut in order to make the survey shorter and thus increase the likelihood of a larger return. The decision was reached that each of the items seemed important in one sense or another; also, we felt some obligation to honor the conceptual development that had resulted in the grid and the items in the first place. We elected not to cut the length of the survey at this time (December), deciding that the planned upcoming pilot tests and expert opinions about the surveys would be used to gather reactions to survey length as well.

With 350 and 400 items respectively, it became apparent that we would have to develop some shorthand means of verbalizing to prospective interviewees what the survey and the interviews were about. Toward this end, a short two-page project descriptor was developed, which listed, among other things, the kinds of data or information we sought. The descriptor summarized our data requests as falling into three primary areas: (1) a series of questions concerning the availability of personnel and organizational data, whether such data existed (and in what format) and whether they were being collected or aggregated beyond the level of individual agencies; (2) questions dealing with what was done with such data collected (was it used in reaching manpower and personnel decisions or making policy, was it analyzed for trends or to make projections of varying kinds?); and (3) questions about what kind of decision-making networks the agency operated within (what kinds of constraints and/or relative freedoms did the agency have in reaching personnel and manpower decisions, and what factors and which individuals influenced these processes?).

The interviews conducted at line agencies were guided by questions organized into four major categories. The first set of questions pertained to general organizational characteristics and background information, such as size, structure, and functions. The second and third sets of questions dealt, respectively, with obtaining and filling positions, which are roughly analogous to considerations of numbers and kinds of people. Within each of these categories, questions were posed about planning activities, personnel processes, and factors affecting decisions. The final set of questions pertained to the remaining aspects of manpower planning, and to agency perceptions of constraints, capabilities, and overall feasibility. The specific questions within each of these categories attempted to repeat as much as possible the specific items and issues that would be later brought up in the surveys, the exception being those issues that could only be brought up in an interview setting.

Interviews at state criminal justice planning agencies and at police and correctional training commissions were focused both on their manpower planning activities and on their knowledge of processes and decision making in operational agencies. People interviewed in budget bureaus, civil service units, and similar government agencies were asked about their relationships with criminal justice agencies and about their perceptions of manpower policy and decision making.

One of the primary purposes of the interviews was to clarify the meaning and forms of manpower planning for agencies. In order not to steer interviewees

43

away from any activities that their agencies might have undertaken, manpower planning was defined for them in only the most vague and general terms. Manpower planning was described as "a concern that the kinds and numbers of personnel needed now and in the future are available," or as "whatever you do to try to assure that the agency has the right numbers and kinds of people doing the right things." The aim was to point interviewees in the basic direction of interest, but not overly to restrict their conception of manpower planning.

As often proved to be the case, once interviewees had been pointed in the direction of interest, they addressed many of the desired issues without actually being asked direct questions. This was sometimes helpful, as some of the issues involved were controversial (affirmative action pressures, importance of political factors, etc.), and might have been answered defensively or evasively in response to direct questions. Of course, information offered voluntarily may also have been less than fully candid, but it seemed that issues raised naturally by the interviewees usually were accompanied by less wariness and suspicion than were sensitive matters introduced by interview questions. Regardless of the manner in which issues were raised, however, clarifying and elaborating questions were posed. Also, in instances when interviewees had raised many issues more or less voluntarily, those questions that had not been fully addressed extemporaneously were asked directly.

Early Pilot Tests of Instruments

A decision was made to have at least two project staff members at each interview to facilitate note taking, to keep the flow of questioning moving, to increase the likelihood that significant issues would be properly pursued in depth, and to offer a means of validating the accuracy of interview recollection. (It had been debated whether interviews should be tape recorded, but finally we opted against this for fear that recorders would stifle responses.) As an additional precaution, however, we decided that immediately following each interview, a summary would be taped for later transcription. This summary would be a composite of both sets of interviewers' notes plus whatever else they could recall immediately after an interview. It should be noted that all of these procedures were, with only a few unavoidable exceptions, followed throughout the entire project period.

Both the interview schedules and the surveys were pilot-tested with the police agencies, the SPA, and the training commission. Two sets of experts were asked to study the surveys and to comment on them, employing their broad experience with training commissions and SPAs across the nation.

These pilot tests uncovered several areas that were in need of further attention. (1) The summary project description was viewed by the respondents as sounding too "academic" and not containing enough examples of the potential uses of manpower planning. It was felt that adding such examples would help focus potential interviewees on applications, on what was meant by manpower

planning. (2) Some items were found to be confusingly worded; there were missing options in some of the answer blocks; and some rather substantial suggestions for additions were made.

It was found that several of the interview questions repeated survey items (something we had known), and it now seemed clear that the survey items would provide the information adequately without the need to lengthen interview time. Another problem about the interviews surfaced. The schedule took nearly three hours to complete; this left little time to pursue other issues that arose. (This was more of a problem with the staff agency interview instrument than it was with the one developed for line agencies.) Also, the length of the schedule (according to those interviewed) left them with insufficient time to bring up issues they thought important and we had not queried. This seemed particularly problematic given our desire that the interviews identify issues unknown to us. Therefore, we restructured the interview process to permit more flexibility.

During the month of January, this pilot-test information, plus additional consultation with individuals familiar with criminal justice agencies around the nation, led to a month-long process of redesigning the law enforcement survey and the SPA survey, and adapting the law enforcement survey for use in state-level adult correctional institutions.

Interview Data as a Source of Survey Redesign

In late February, we undertook our first full set of site interviews. (The nature and definition of a site will be addressed in the next section.) When we returned from these interviews (and a grant meeting at the same time), additional feedback on the interview and surveying processes was fed into the continuing effort to refine the surveys. In March, two more sets of site interviews were conducted; information was fed into the redesign process; and the SPA survey was finalized and sent out. In May, a third set of interviews was conducted, and in June, a fourth and fifth set. At the completion of each of the interviews, additional information arising from them was applied to the continuing survey redesign. Also, at each of these sites, law enforcement and corrections surveys were left behind for completion and comment. Upon return, these surveys were scanned for problem areas, and these were taken into consideration, too, in the redesign.

In July, all project staff assembled for a week-long retreat in which all agency site visits were summarized verbally and in writing; at this time nearly 70 agency visits had been completed. The purpose of this review was threefold: (1) to begin analysis of the site interview data to look for emerging patterns; (2) to determine which additional agencies needed to be interviewed to fill data gaps; and (3) to determine whether any further alterations were required in the surveys.

In about a three-week period following this retreat, the law enforcement, corrections, and POST surveys, and the juvenile/ probation/ parole survey were finalized, printed, and sent out. The remaining site visits were scheduled for completion during August and September.

45

This developmental process had produced a number of changes in the various surveys (some substantial) between January and July 1979. Only moderate change in the interview format (owing to the already partially unstructured nature of the interviews) took place during this period; however, as the interviews progressed, our sensitivity to the saliency of various issues began to increase and our awareness of the need to trace out some issues became more refined.

IV. General Criteria in Agency and Site Selection

Some of the underlying principles guiding agency and site selection have been discussed in the previous section. In sum, data collection efforts were to be concentrated in law enforcement, state-level adult corrections, the SPAs, training and standards commissions, and juvenile/probation/parole. Criteria such as general reputation for manpower planning, agency size, geographical location, political environment, and recent experiences with increases or decreases in personnel were to guide selections.

Law enforcement was broken into its components of city police, county police, sheriffs, and state police; adult corrections was divided into institutional, probation, parole and juvenile; the SPAs would include treatment of the roles of SAC units; the training commissions, although primarily law-enforcement oriented, would include the limited number of training commissions (about ten at that time) involved with correctional standards. The court system, local corrections, prosecution, and public defense were omitted from systematic review for several practical and judgmental reasons already discussed.

The Use of Opinion and Demographic Data in Selecting Agencies

A modified delphi approach was used to gather information and opinions about the specific agencies within these groupings to be selected. Although not a strict delphi approach, the process entailed the generation of lists based on opinions of knowledgeable individuals (using opinions on general management reputation, reputation for manpower planning, general state of the local economy, whether the agency had recently experienced significant personnel increases or decreases, and general political climate). This information was supplemented later with expenditure and employment data to determine the personnel complement of the agencies, their budget picture, and historical patterns of personnel growth and decline.[25] Geographical location was not used as a factor in this initial generation of potential agencies for interviewing and surveying.

Before this, it had been decided that all 50 SPAs, all 46 law enforcement standards and training commissions, and all 50 state departments of corrections would be surveyed. Thus, "choosing agencies" from among these meant making selections for the interviews. For law enforcement, however, the effort would be

useful for selecting survey as well as interview sites. Position Paper #2 indicated that between 100 and 200 law enforcement agencies would be surveyed; as things turned out, nearly 250 law enforcement agencies were sent surveys.

We began the site selection interview process with some folklore information about general agency reputations and supplemented this with information about agency size. We also informally solicited a number of opinions from knowledgeable individuals (academics, practitioners, and members of professional or research organizations). These people were contacted either by phone or in person and had explained to them the purpose of the project and the initial set of criteria we wished to employ in making site selections; they were then asked to name agencies around the nation that they thought met these criteria in one way or another. From this initial effort at information gathering, 29 law enforcement agencies, 25 correctional agencies, 12 SPAs and five training commissions were identified as potential sites. Expert opinion coincided with our original assumption that the larger departments would have stronger management reputations or be more likely to engage in varying forms of manpower planning. In part, such opinion may reflect the visibility that larger departments have, but it also seemed to substantiate the assumption that larger departments have more need for more sophisticated planning and management techniques.

For the law enforcement and corrections sectors, this first-generation list of potential agencies was put into a questionnaire and returned to the experts for further opinion on each of the agencies in the composite lists. Six questions were asked of the experts about each of the agencies listed:

1. How would you rate each agency in terms of whether it generally has been at the forefront of developments or has been considered a leader in the field over the last several years?
2. What is the overall quality of current top management in each of the agencies listed below?
3. To what degree do the agencies listed below undertake planning with respect to manpower and personnel issues?
4. In changes over the last few years in agency size (number of positions, budgets, etc.), what has each agency experienced?
5. For each agency, please consider whether personnel staffing below the level of top management is made primarily on a political basis (e.g., partisan politics or the whims of the top administrator) or whether it is made primarily on a nonpolitical basis (e.g., as in having a strong civil service or a "professional" orientation).
6. What are the seven to ten agencies you would most strongly recommend for site selection? Feel free to include agencies not previously listed.

This opinion information was combined with demographic information on each of the identified departments. Additionally, as no law enforcement department mentioned by any of the experts had fewer than 500 employees, this number was used as a preliminary cut-off point for our generation of a prospective list from which interview sites would be drawn. (Additional departments would be added later for purposes of surveying.)

All of the information on corrections and law enforcement (opinion as well as demographic) was then sifted to produce a series of rankings of departments which, by our criteria, appeared most suitable for interviewing. Specifically, the criteria taken into account, and used to produce six different ranking schemes, were the following:

1. **Agency Size:** Based on 1976 FTEs, with a scale running from 1 to 9, with increments of 500 FTEs, starting at 500 FTEs.
2. **Agency Clout:** Based on 1976 data and including agency expenditures as a percentage of total jurisdiction expenditures; for the police, the scale ran from 1 to 5, with 5 percent increments; for corrections, the scale ran from 1 to 6, with increments of 1 percent.
3. **FTE Change:** Percentage change in FTEs, 1971–1976, with a scale running from 1 to 9 and with 1 percent increments.
4. **General Agency Reputation:** Average of expert responses to the general reputation question on the site-selection survey, with a scale running from 0 to 9.
5. **Reputation of Agency Top Management:** Average of expert responses to the top management question on the survey, with a scale running from 1 to 9.
6. **Agency Personnel/Manpower:** Average of expert responses to the personnel/manpower question on the survey, with a scale running from 1 to 9.
7. **Final Expert Recommendations:** Whether the expert recommended the site as one that should be visited, with a scale running from 0 to 9.
8. **Agency Mentioned by Others:** Whether the agency was mentioned positively by other people contacted by project personnel; police were given a maximum of one extra point in such cases and corrections a maximum of three extra points.

The criteria were considered individually and also through various combinations, producing six different ranking schemes. It should be pointed out that all such law enforcement and corrections agencies ranked in this scheme were sent surveys (in addition to other agencies within each of these types). However, not all of the 29 ranked law enforcement agencies were subsequently interviewed, for reasons that will be explained momentarily. Of the 29 ranked law enforcement agencies, 9 of the top 10, 15 of the top 20, and 18 of the top 29

48

were interviewed. In corrections, 6 of the top 10, and a total of 8 of the 25 ranked agencies were interviewed.

Although this complicated ranking scheme was not used for the selection of SPAs and training commissions, similar criteria were employed. Of the 12 SPAs initially ranked, six were eventually interviewed (as well as others). Of the five training commissions initially ranked, all five were interviewed (as well as others).

The Selection of Agencies for Interviews

We have previously described the selection of interview sites as evolutionary. Although this is largely an accurate statement, it would be misleading to assume from it that there were no clear directions set before any of the site visits began. The preferred selection criteria, the collection of demographic and expert opinion data, and the production of the ranking schemes on identified criminal justice agencies were all completed by mid-January. We had also firmly decided on a geographical representation that would include the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, South, West, Southwest, and Midwest for all of the types of criminal justice agencies we would be interviewing. Finally, to maximize the use of travel funds, it had been decided that agency site interviews would be clustered (insofar as possible) within travel circles that would permit the maximum number of agency visits while minimizing travel cost and time.

By mid-January and after sifting through numerous factors and much information, it seemed reasonable that our purposes for conducting site interviews could be achieved by concentrating interview efforts in seven geographical areas, five of which corresponded to state boundaries and two of which extended into three states each. At each of the seven major sites, interviews of several law enforcement agencies, adult corrections, SPAs, and training commissions would comprise the minimally acceptable interview group. Additionally, other agencies of special importance within these jurisdictions would be interviewed, depending on information secured either before or during the interviews conducted with the four core agency types. In many cases we were able to identify these other agencies needing contact while setting up interviews with the core agencies. In other cases, the importance of additional agencies became evident only during the course of an interview. The criteria used in determining whether other agencies should be interviewed were the following: (1) Did these other agencies (primarily non-criminal-justice agencies) seem to have a significant impact on issues of criminal justice manpower? (2) Were there other criminal justice agencies that could be identified within the site confines that met our criteria or reputation in management or planning? (3) If there was available interview time and if there were other agencies (not necessarily meeting our criteria) recommended by interviewees, we would attempt to schedule them. Applying these criteria, several others of these agencies were included for interviewing in each site. Although the types of other agencies differed from site

49

to site, they included departments of civil service, budget, probation and parole, regional criminal justice coordinating councils, and city and state departments of administration.

Including non-criminal-justice agencies in the interview sample was directed toward tracing out network relationships among agencies with respect to human resource decision making. In some instances, we felt reasonably confident that the information we received from the criminal justice agencies themselves sufficiently drew the picture of the relationships they had with other criminal justice and non-criminal-justice agencies. In other instances, we were not so confident and thus scheduled interviews with these other agencies.

In July, with some 60 percent of the site interviews completed, we examined interview data secured to date and made final decisions about which of the remaining agencies within each site required a visit. The objective of this review was to make the information from each site as complete and reliable as possible; the review focused attention on missing data and contradictory data that needed treatment. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that by July, one site was already complete and at least a dozen interviews had been completed at each of five sites. There was only one site, at this point, at which no interviews had yet been conducted.

The remainder of the interviews were scheduled for completion during July, August, and September. At those sites where interviews had already been held, the follow-up interviews were primarily with non-criminal-justice agencies such as budget bureaus and departments of civil service. In some cases, however, additional criminal justice agency interviews were scheduled on the basis of information received during the first interview round.

Between February and the end of September, over 100 agency interviews had been held. In most instances, several individuals had been interviewed in each agency. The kinds of officials interviewed in agencies varied somewhat. When the interviews were being arranged, whether directly or through a locally knowledgeable and influential intermediary, it had been indicated that the officials interviewed ought to be in a position to discuss personnel-related decision making and policymaking, both in terms of internal processes and external considerations. Whenever possible, more than one person per agency had been interviewed, sometimes in joint interviews and sometimes separately. The number of interviews in each agency had ranged from one to five. Also, in a number of instances interviews had been conducted with former top administrators and policymakers in the agencies.

During interviews conducted within the same geographical site, and with multiple interviews within the same agency, issues and themes raised by one interviewee had been pursued with others. With respect to basically objective kinds of considerations, such as the availability of types of data or the extent of unionization, this procedure provided a limited test of reliability. For more subjective kinds of considerations, such as the salience of rational and political factors in determining budget allocations, the information from several vantage

points made it possible to compare and to contrast perceptions.

All interviewees had been guaranteed anonymity, and they were also assured that the study was not intended to produce any specific manpower projections or restrictive planning models. Instead it was emphasized that the aims of the study were to find out what agencies were at present doing in manpower planning, and to find out about the factors and constraints that affect manpower decisions and policies.

V. Data Analysis and Compilation of Findings

The field data collected by the end of September, 1979 included 349 returned surveys of 450 to 550 variables each and approximately 1000 pages of typed interview field notes. Survey return rates for each of the five areas were as follows:

1. State Planning Agencies:	35 of 50 returned (70 percent return rate)
2. Police Standards and Training Councils:	40 of 46 returned (87 percent return rate)
3. State Departments of Adult Correction:	38 of 50 returned (76 percent return rate)
4. Police Departments:	164 of 250 returned (66 percent return rate)
5. State and Local Adult and Juvenile Probation and Parole:	72 of 116 returned (62 percent return rate)

Work began immediately in organizing and analyzing these data. Surveys were coded and computerized, and initial frequency runs on all the surveys were completed by the end of November. The interview field notes were divided into six major geographical sites, and one project member was assigned lead responsibility in producing a manageable summary of findings for each of these groupings. The resulting interview summaries varied in length from 20 to 50 typed pages and offered a convenient capsule view of the most salient points raised in the interviews. Special attention was devoted to addressing the data questions enumerated in Sections I and III (the last part) of this chapter. Other project members reviewed the draft summaries before they were put into final form.

The computerized survey data and the interview summaries became the primary data base on which subsequent analyses proceeded. (The original interview field notes were consulted as needed.) Initial analysis concentrated on reviewing and synthesizing findings within individual criminal justice agency sectors (e.g., police, planning agencies, corrections, etc.). In each of these cases, interview and survey data were combined in the subsequent written analysis.

Chapters 3 to 7 are a result of these efforts. General conclusions have been presented in Chapter 1.

Notes — Chapter 2

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21. Kerlinger, op. cit., p. 388.
22. Katz, op. cit., p. 74.
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Chapter 3
Police Organizations

In this chapter, manpower planning in police organizations is examined. In the first section, some of the basic characteristics of the structure and organization of policing in America are reviewed, because of their important implications for manpower planning. Following the review, the design of the police component of this study is described. Next, the findings of the study are presented in sections pertaining to current practices, conditions and constraints, factors affecting manpower planning, and police agency ability to attract and to retain needed kinds of people. After the presentation of findings, policy implications and the feasibility of manpower planning in police organizations are discussed.

I. Police Organizations and Personnel

Police organizations in the United States are numerous, vary widely in size, and are extremely labor-intensive. The President's Crime Commission estimated in 1967 that 40,000 police departments operated in this country, with agencies at every level of government.[1] Apparently this figure was a serious overestimation, but the number of agencies is still considerable; more recent studies have placed the number of police departments at 25,000,[2] 20,000,[3] and 17,000.[4] Estimates of the number of people publicly employed in police protection also vary, but the figures have generally increased over time. The Crime Commission estimate in 1967 was 400,000;[5] the annual survey of criminal justice expenditure and employment conducted jointly by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Bureau of the Census reported for 1977 a figure of 645,000 full-time equivalent police protection employees.[6] The National Manpower survey of the Criminal Justice System projected that in 1985 state and local police protection employment would reach 718,000.[7]

On the basis of these estimates of number of police organizations and employees, it is easy to compute an average agency size, which would seem to be in the range of 30 to 40 full-time-equivalent employees; but this figure is somewhat misleading. For example, the 34 largest city police departments (which comprise only about two-tenths of one percent of such agencies) employ over one-third of all city police employees.[8] Also, the relatively few state and

federal police protection agencies tend to be much larger than the typical local police department. Consequently, the "average agency" has far fewer than 30 or 40 employees. One estimate for all city and county police agencies is that about two-thirds employ fewer than ten employees each.[9] Some support for an estimate of this magnitude is provided by the results of a recent national survey of sheriffs' departments, which indicated that the median size for such organizations (which also includes jail employees) was 13 sworn personnel.[10] In general, the population of police organizations in this country can be characterized as including a rather small number of large agencies and a large number of rather small agencies.

Personnel costs account for the largest portion of police agency budgets, by far. In 1977, it was estimated that payroll costs represented 86 percent of total expenditures for police protection by state and local governments.[11] The results of a survey also conducted in 1977, of 50 large city police departments, indicated that the average salary budget portion of the total agency budget was 81.8 percent, with figures for individual cities ranging from 47.8 percent to 96 percent.[12] Except in years of unusually high capital expenditures, personnel costs seem to exceed at least 80 percent of total costs for almost all police agencies.

The composition of the police protection labor force certainly varies somewhat from one agency to another, but some generalizations can safely be offered. One is that the majority of police personnel occupy sworn positions. Almost all sworn employees start their careers in the same job classifications (variously termed police officer, patrol officer, trooper, deputy sheriff, etc.) and compete with each other in the same promotional track. The 1977 survey of large city agencies found that about 80 percent of police employees were sworn, and that of these, about 83 percent were police officers or detectives, 12 percent were sergeants, and five percent were lieutenants or above.[13] The figure of 80 percent sworn personnel is supported by the 1974 National Manpower Survey estimate that 78 percent of all police protection employees were sworn.[14] That survey forecast increasing civilianization in law enforcement, but the projection for 1985 was still that 75 percent of police personnel would be sworn.

The majority of personnel resources in local police organizations are allocated to the basic functions of patrol and investigations. The National Manpower Survey estimated that 59 percent of police and sheriffs' department employees were "directly engaged" in one of these two duties.[15] The study of large city agencies found that about 56 percent of sworn personnel were assigned to patrol units, and about 12 percent to detective units.[16] Police agencies at other than the local level vary in their allocation of personnel because of their varied missions; some state police agencies, for example, perform predominantly traffic-related functions, while many other state and federal agencies perform only specialized investigative functions. Data for these kinds of agencies are not readily available, but it seems likely that the majority of their personnel also start at a common classification (agent, investigator, etc.), compete along a common

promotional track, and are assigned primarily to basic line functions (traffic enforcement, investigations).

Policing in America is primarily considered a local responsibility, and most police employees work for local agencies. In 1977, 11.1 percent of all police protection employees worked for the federal government, 14.5 percent for states, 15 percent for counties, and 59.4 percent for towns, cities, and other municipalities.[17] If counties are included within the category of local jurisdictions, almost three-quarters of all police employees work at the local level. It should be noted that this accounting does not include those employees of sheriffs' departments whose duties are primarily jail- or court-related, and thus is not inflated by such personnel.

Some information on the basic characteristics of police employees is available. With respect to sex, the 1977 survey of large city police departments found that five percent of sworn employees at the rank of police officer were female, with a smaller percentage of women at higher ranks.[18] Earlier, the National Manpower Survey had estimated that in 1974 only two to three percent of total sworn police employees were female.[19] In general, minority racial group members are also under-represented among police employees, especially in the south and in state police agencies.[20] Large city agencies usually have the highest proportional representation of minority employees, but such jurisdictions also have the greatest minority populations, both by total and proportion. For those large city police agencies reporting such data in 1977, the average proportion of black sworn employees at the rank of police officer was 16.4 percent, while the figure for Spanish-surnamed employees was 7.7 percent.[21] Both groups were more underrepresented at higher ranks than at the police officer classification. These average figures should be interpreted cautiously, as the variation in minority employment was substantial, and a number of agencies did not report data for race.

Finally, the educational attainment of police employees has increased considerably in recent years. As the National Manpower survey noted,

> The pattern has been especially marked in the last five years. The proportion of sworn personnel with less than a high school education was 37 percent in 1960, 19 percent in 1970, and only 10 percent in 1974. The proportion of sworn personnel with some college attainment went from 20 percent in 1960 to 32 percent in 1970 and to 46 percent in 1974.[22]

The 1977 survey of large city agencies found that 20 percent required some college education at the police officer level and that 44 percent provided some form of incentive pay for college credits earned.[23]

Several entities and factors in the environments of police organizations influence their personnel practices and manpower planning. Among these are civil service systems, budget bureaus and processes, police employee unions or

associations, and equal employment opportunity/affirmative action considerations. A recent study of civil service influence on police agencies in medium- and large-sized cities found that over 85 percent of the agencies had civil service coverage for at least some of their sworn ranks, and that for three-quarters of these the coverage was the same as for other local employees. For civilian police positions, 83 percent of the agencies were covered by civil service, with the coverage in 91 percent of the cases being the same as for other local government employees.[24] Budgets also have a strong influence on police personnel matters, because police departments are so labor-intensive. In fact, Heaphy has argued that severely limited resources are the storngest impetus for change in policing today.[25] The full extent of police unionization is not reliably known, but a recent study of 98 police labor contracts found that a variety of personnel practices are commonly affected by such agreements.[26] Finally, EEOC considerations, whether recognized voluntarily by police agencies or imposed through legal action, have clearly influenced personnel processes and decision making in many departments.

Efforts significantly to change police personnel practices have often been less than overwhelming successes. Personnel matters that seem routine and mundane are also closely tied to the security and safety needs of employees. Referring to a massive attempt at organizational reform within the Dallas Police Department, Wycoff and Kelling state that "it now seems unquestionable that an effort at personnel reform raises an extremely complex and volatile set of issues."[27] Similarly, Guyot's study led her to conclude that "reforms which make minor modifications of the present rank structure have not succeeded in achieving even their limited goals."[28]

The general case for police manpower planning has been presented by Ring and Dyson, both of whom have direct experience with the activity.

> The intent of a human resource planning capacity with a police agency is to conduct applied personnel research, supported by an appropriate data collection effort, in order to isolate and define obstacles to cost-effective utilization of human resources, to determine viable alternative solutions to those problems, and to generate the necessary information and analysis on which police management can base feasible objectives and appropriate decision making.[29]

From the literature it seems that several police departments have undertaken fairly comprehensive attempts at manpower planning over the last decade. These would include the New York Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office, the Ontario Provincial Police,[30] and the Dallas Police Department. In addition, many police agencies have adopted one or more components of manpower planning, such as job analysis[31] or manpower allocation,[32] in response to particular felt needs.

However, the actual extent of manpower planning in police organizations is not at present known, nor are the factors affecting it well understood. The purpose of this study is to shed some light on these two matters.

II. Design of the Police Component of the Study

The police component of the Manpower Planning Development Project included both interviews and a mailed survey. Most of the interviews preceded the mailing of the survey, and a major purpose of the interviews was to explore terminology and items to be included in the survey. It was also expected that the interviews would provide detailed information about decision making and planning in police organizations that would be useful in its own right and in the interpretation of survey responses.

The police agency interview sample was selected on the basis of expert opinion, department size, and geographic representation, as described in Chapter 2. Interviews were conducted at 36 police agencies located in eleven states. Because all those interviewed and their organizations were granted anonymity, the specific police departments at which interviews were conducted cannot be identified, but a general description of the interview sample is presented in Table 3.1.

The interviews conducted at police departments were partially structured and partially unstructured. To some extent, information was sought from interviewees about the effects and importance of a set of factors previously identified as likely to be salient. On the other hand, interviewees were encouraged to specify other kinds of considerations that influenced personnel matters in police agencies, and questioning was responsive to particular situational characteristics.

As noted in Chapter 2, one of the primary purposes of the interviews was to clarify the meaning and forms of manpower planning for police agencies. In order not to steer interviewees away from any activities that their agencies might have undertaken, manpower planning was defined for them in only the most vague and general terms. Manpower planning was described as "a concern that the kinds and numbers of personnel needed now and in the future are available" and as "whatever you do to try to assure that the agency has the right numbers and kinds of people doing the right things." The aim was to point interviewees in the basic direction of interest, but not overly to restrict their conception of manpower planning.

With the aid of interview information and additional expert opinion, the mail survey was developed. In its final form, the police agency survey was 20 pages long, with 45 rather complex questions that became, in the analysis stage, 461 variables. The survey questions were designed to collect a considerable amount of information about the environments of police agencies, and particularly about factors affecting the budgetary and human resource experiences of police organizations. Data were also collected concerning current personnel processes

58

Table 3.1
Description of Police Agency Interview Sample

Characteristics	N	Percentage
Governmental Level		
City	20	55.6
County	6	16.7
State	7	19.4
Federal	1	2.8
Other	2	5.6
Geographic Region*		
Northeast	7	19.4
Middle Atlantic	5	13.9
Southeast	5	13.9
Mideast	7	19.4
Midwest	0	0.0
Southwest	3	8.3
West	8	22.2
National	1	2.3
Agency Size (1976 Full-time Equivalent)		
2000+	18	50.0
1000–1999	7	19.4
500–999	6	16.7
200–499	5	13.9

*The geographic regions were composed as follows:
  Northeast - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont
  Middle Atlantic - Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C.
  Southeast - Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
  Mideast - Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
  Midwest - Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
  Southwest - Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
  West - Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington

and manpower planning efforts in the sample police departments.

The only criterion used in the selection of the police agency survey sample was agency size. The kinds of formal manpower planning activities of interest for this study seemed unlikely to be found in very small agencies, many of which do not have units or employees whose primary responsibilities are planning or personnel management. Larger agencies are more likely to have such specialist units, they are less able to operate informally through the chief's personal knowledge of all employees, and they have to make more personnel-related decisions.

The survey sample included the 49 state police agencies (Hawaii is not regarded as having a state police) and the 201 largest city and county police departments, according to the number of full-time-equivalent employees in 1976, for a total sample size of 250 police agencies. The smallest local police department included in the sample had 241 full-time-equivalent employees in 1976, and all but three of the state police agencies exceeded this minimum size. The survey sample represents only about 1.5 percent of the total population of police agencies in the United States, but the sample agencies employ about 50 percent of the nation's police personnel.[33]

The number of sample police agencies and the survey response rates by government level, geographic region, and size of organization are presented in Table 3.2. From the total sample of 250 police agencies, 164 completed surveys were received—an overall response rate of 65.6 percent. The response rates for different subsets of the police agency sample vary somewhat, but for no category is the response rate less than 50 percent.

III. Findings .

The findings for the police component of the study are presented in four sections. Discussed first is the current practice or "state of the art" of manpower planning in police organizations. Next, findings pertaining to the nature and magnitude of a number of conditions and constraints that might influence police manpower planning are described. In the third section the relationships between these factors and the conduct of manpower planning in police agencies are examined. In the final section some tentative findings and indirect information about the contribution of manpower planning to police agency ability to attract and to retain needed kinds of people are presented.

Current Practice

Several preliminary questions in the police agency survey sought information about general planning activity. Over 90 percent of the responding police departments reported having a position or unit specifically responsible for planning activities. A majority of the respondents indicated that in their agency

60

Table 3.2

Police Agency Survey Sample and Response Rates

Characteristics	N in Sample	N of Responses	Response Rate
Governmental Level			
City	152	94	61.8%
County	49	31	63.3%
State	49	39	79.6%
Geographic Region*			
Northeast	32	17	53.1%
Middle Atlantic	24	12	50.0%
Southeast	66	47	71.2%
Mideast	43	35	81.4%
Midwest	20	14	70.0%
Southwest	22	16	72.7%
West	43	23	53.5%
Agency Size (1976 Full-time Equivalent)			
2000+	33	26	78.8%
1000–1999	39	32	82.1%
500–999	57	37	64.9%
100–499	121	69	57.0%
TOTAL	250	164	65.6%

*The geographic regions were composed as follows:
Northeast - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont
Middle Atlantic - Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C.
Southeast - Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
Mideast - Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
Midwest - Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
Southwest - Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
West - Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington

the planning unit had the primary responsibility for preparing grant applications, updating agency forms and policies, collecting and analyzing agency work load data, analyzing agency operations, and developing new agency programs. The planning unit was also the unit most likely to have primary responsibility for responding to outside requests for information and evaluating agency programs.

Police survey respondents were specifically asked about manpower planning data collection in their agencies. The responses for the 13 categories of information posed in the survey are presented in Table 3.3. Over 90 percent of the agencies reported that they regularly collect employee performance, personnel turnover, and employee education information. Over 40 percent reported regularly collecting employee assignment preference and applicant characteristics data, and 30 percent regularly collect information on the changing requirements of agency jobs.

A majority of the police agencies reported that they occasionally collected or received from another source information on social and economic trends and on characteristics of the area labor market. About a third or more of the respondents also occasionally collected or received data on employee job satisfaction, changing job requirements, employee assignment preference, competing employers' rewards, labor market career orientations, and applicant characteristics.

The only two categories of manpower planning information for which a majority of the sample police agencies did not either regularly or occasionally collect or receive data were rewards offered by competing employers and career orientations of the labor market. About 40 percent of the police agencies also did not collect or receive information on employee job satisfaction and characteristics of the area labor market. Slightly less than a quarter did not get data on applicant characteristics and changing job requirements.

Agency respondents were also asked to rate the importance of the types of information on a 0 to 5 scale, as reported in the right-hand column of Table 3.3. In general, the police agencies rated as important those kinds of manpower planning information that they collected or received, and as unimportant those types of data that they did not have available. Also, the most highly rated kinds of information were the ones most likely to be regularly, rather than occasionally, collected. The most highly rated categories of information were work load, employee training, employee performance evaluations, and personnel turnover. The lowest rated kinds of information were labor market career orientations, labor market characteristics, and rewards offered by competing employers. The one piece of information that was rated more highly than its present availability would suggest was employee job satisfaction.

Police survey respondents were also asked to indicate the extent to which their agencies undertook ten component activities of manpower planning. The responses for the ten activities are summarized in Table 3.4. The vast majority of respondents indicated that their agencies had undertaken performance

Table 3.3
Extent of Manpower Planning Data Collection and Information Importance for Police Agencies

(N Varies between 129 and 164 City, County, and
State Police Agencies because of Missing Data)

Information Types	Regularly Collect Such Information	Occasionally Collect, or Receive from Another Agency, Such Information	Do Not Collect or Receive Such Information	Average Rated Importance of the Information (0=No Importance, 5=Strong Importance)
Work Loads Performed by the Agency	90.9%	7.9%	1.2%	4.6
Personnel Turnover Rate	79.1%	18.4%	2.5%	3.8
Training Undergone by Employees	90.3%	8.5%	1.2%	4.0
Employee Educational Attainment	68.9%	26.2%	4.9%	3.2
Employment Assignment Preferences	47.5%	42.6%	9.9%	3.1
Employee Performance Evaluations	84.1%	11.0%	4.9%	4.0
Employee Job Satisfaction	13.5%	46.0%	40.5%	3.0
Characteristics of Applicants	44.1%	32.3%	23.6%	3.1
Characteristics of Area Labor Market	9.3%	50.6%	40.1%	1.9
Career Orientations of Labor Market	5.5%	33.0%	61.5%	1.5
Rewards Offered by Competing Employers	9.9%	39.8%	50.3%	1.9
Changing Requirements of Agency Jobs	30.3%	47.5%	22.2%	3.0
Social and Economic Trends that May Affect the Agency	21.9%	62.2%	15.9%	2.9

Table 3.4
Extent of Manpower Planning Activity
Undertaken by Police Agencies

(N Varies between 159 and 162 City, County, and
State Police Agencies because of Missing Data)

Activity Types	Undertaken by the Agency	Undertaken for Agency by Contractor or Other Government Unit	Not Undertaken but Would Be Useful	Not Undertaken nor Likely to Be Useful
Job Analysis	50.4%	38.5%	9.9%	1.2%
Selection Validation	32.5%	50.9%	15.4%	1.2%
Manpower Inventory	83.9%	3.7%	9.9%	2.5%
Performance Evaluation	92.7%	1.8%	4.9%	0.6%
Personnel Information System	74.2%	13.8%	10.7%	1.3%
Labor Market Analysis	7.3%	37.7%	34.6%	20.4%
Career Path Analysis	22.6%	12.0%	57.9%	7.5%
Manpower Simulation (e.g., Personnel Processing and Career Path Models)	13.2%	6.9%	69.8%	10.1%
Job Redesign	39.5%	15.6%	33.7%	11.2%
Training Needs Assessment	86.4%	1.8%	11.8%	0.0%

64

evaluation, training needs assessment, manpower inventory, and personnel information systems. In addition, about half of the agencies had undertaken job analysis, 40 percent had undertaken job redesign, and about a third had done selection validation. Of the remaining activities, less than a quarter had undertaken career path analysis, 13 percent had done manpower simulation, and 7 percent had conducted analyses of their labor markets.

Besides being asked which activities had been undertaken by their agencies, respondents were asked if manpower planning activities had been conducted for their agencies by contractors or other government units. For about half of the sample police agencies, selection validation had been done by a contractor or other government unit. Over a third of the agencies had also had job analyses and labor market analyses conducted for them by others. In addition, 16 percent of the police agencies had job redesign done for them, 14 percent had personnel information systems externally provided, and 12 percent had career path analyses conducted for them by others. Less than ten percent of the respondents indicated that manpower simulation, manpower inventory, training needs assessment, and performance evaluation had been conducted for their agencies by contractors of other government units.

The distinction between manpower planning activities undertaken by police agencies and those undertaken for them by contractors or other government units may be an important one. At least three interpretations or explanations of the distinction might be relevant. One possibility is that police agencies might not undertake manpower planning activities themselves if they lack the technical capacity to perform them. This explanation would seem to be at least partially accurate, as the three activities most frequently performed for police agencies by others—selection validation, job analysis, and labor market analysis—all require special skills and knowledge. A second possible interpretation is that police agencies might be precluded from performing certain manpower planning activities, because they are regarded as proprietary functions of other government agencies. This explanation also fits the responses rather well, as most civil service or jurisdiction personnel units regularly conduct job analyses and test validations, and departments of labor or economic development ordinarily perform labor market analyses. A third interpretation is that agencies undertake themselves the manpower planning activities that they regard as most important, and leave to others the less important activities. To examine this explanation, it is helpful to consider the responses shown in the two right-hand columns of Table 3.4.

The two manpower planning activities that the fewest respondents rated as "not likely to be useful" were training needs assessment and performance evaluation. These were also the two activities most frequently undertaken by police agencies themselves, indicating that agencies may be more likely to undertake themselves the activities deemed most important. Consistent with this view, the activities most frequently rated as not likely to be useful were ones that relatively few police agencies had undertaken themselves. Not consistent with

65

this explanation, however, was the response pattern for job analysis and selection validation; these activities seemed to be regarded generally as useful, but were also frequently done for police agencies by contractors or other government units.

The overall pattern of responses suggests that all three interpretations have some merit. Activities such as performance evaluation and training needs assessment are usually undertaken by agencies themselves because they are seen as important, they do not require highly specialized skills, and they do not infringe on the turf of any other government units. Activities such as job analysis and selection validation are also seen as important, but they do require special skills, and they fall within the domain of civil service units, so that they are often done for police agencies by others. The same is true to some extent for labor market analysis, except that fewer police agencies perceive its usefulness, so that when it is undertaken at all it is very likely that a contractor or other government unit will be the provider.

Three of the manpower planning activities—manpower simulation, career path analysis, and labor market analysis—had not been undertaken by or for a majority of the responding police agencies. A fourth activity, job redesign, had not been conducted by or for 45 percent of the agencies. Of those respondents indicating that their agencies had not undertaken these activities, nor had them performed for them, a majority reported that each would be useful if undertaken. Such a sentiment was particularly strong with respect to career path analysis and manpower simulation, with the "not undertaken but would be useful" option checked by a majority. For these two activities in particular, it would seem likely that agencies regard them as important but lack the technical capabilities to undertake them.

The response patterns in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are generally consistent. For example, employee training and performance evaluation data are among the most regularly collected and most important information types, and training needs assessment and performance evaluation are the manpower planning activities most frequently undertaken by police agencies. Labor market analyses are much less likely to be undertaken, and most likely to be seen as not useful; similarly, among the least important and least available types of data are characteristics and career orientations of the labor market. All of the parallels between data and activities cannot be so clearly drawn, but the two measures seem consistent.

The general pattern of responses indicates that the sample police agencies have available a substantial amount of manpower planning data, and that they undertake or have conducted for them a considerable level of manpower planning activity. With respect to both data collection and activity, the sample agencies seem to be most active with respect to internal resource management matters (performance evaluation, training, work load). Activities and data collection pertaining to more externally oriented matters such as recruitment (labor market analysis, career orientations information) were engaged in much

less frequently by the sample police departments. Also, information gathering and activity related to less conventional kinds of police administrative concerns (job satisfaction, career path analysis, job redesign) were undertaken less frequently than those in support of more conventional concerns.

Several of the categories of manpower planning activity and data collection were not independent of legal considerations facing police agencies. Two of the activities—job analysis and selection validation—are major elements of efforts to demonstrate that personnel processes do not discriminate against women, racial and ethnic minorities, or other protected classes. As such, the substantial extent to which the police agencies undertook these activities may have been out of necessity, rather than choice or perceived intrinsic importance. Curiously, however, those kinds of activity and information most pertinent to assessing the availability of and locating female and minority applicants (data on labor market characteristics and analysis, and career orientation) were among the least frequently utilized.

One qualifier to these survey findings that should be noted is that the data collection categories and activity types were not described in any detail in the survey. As a result, respondents had only the category labels for direction, and the meanings of these may not have been universally understood. For example, job analysis may have defined a specific psychometric technique for one respondent, but only a general class of work-load studies for another. Based on information from the interviews, this situation is not thought to have caused a great deal of confusion or seriously threatened validity, but it should be kept in mind.

The finding of considerable manpower planning effort in police agencies was generally corroborated by the interview data collected for the study. In most of the police agencies visited those interviewed reported that many data were available and considerable manpower planning activity was going on along the lines of the component information categories and activity types used in the survey and just presented. These component data and activities are integral elements of manpower planning, but it is probably not correct to infer from their presence an integrated or comprehensive approach to manpower planning. In order to do comprehensive manpower planning, a police agency would need most of these kinds of information, and would need to undertake most of these kinds of activities. However, the finding that the extent of such manpower planning data collection and activity is considerable does *not* demonstrate that most police agencies undertake comprehensive manpower planning. In order to do manpower planning comprehensively, an agency would have to conduct these specific activities within a planning framework of goals, analysis, problem identification, design, choice, implementation, and evaluation. The survey data provide no evidence about whether police agencies collect data and undertake manpower planning activities within such a planning framework.

Information collected from project interviews and from the literature, however, strongly suggests that police manpower planning is not so

comprehensive. Rather, it seems more likely that particular manpower planning activities are initiated in response to crises or particular demands, instead of as part of an integrated and explicitly goal-directed human resource management system. In most of the police agencies at which interviews were conducted, for example, activities such as training, recruiting, performance evaluation, and work-load analysis were routinely conducted; but interviewees did not seem to sense that these and other activities were interdependent and all related to the need for right numbers and kinds of people doing the right things. These individual activities may have been performed very competently but for narrow and less than optimal purposes, instead of as part of a conscious effort to contribute to the attainment of the organizational goals.

An example of demand-induced manpower planning in police agencies is provided by job analysis and selection validation. Agencies have largely undertaken these activities in response to equal employment opportunity/af-firmative action pressure to demonstrate the content validity of selection and promotion processes. Similarly, much of the manpower planning data collected by police agencies is needed to satisfy requirements related to equal employment opportunity or to justify budget requests. Along this line, interviewees generally indicated that government budget officials and legislative officials were increasingly requiring empirical justifications of police agency budget requests, creating an additional demand for manpower planning kinds of data. These sorts of external demands and requirements may account for some portion of manpower planning activity and data collection in police agencies; moreover, they tend to generate specific component efforts, without supplying or requiring any kind of planning framework for integration or coordination of the activities.

In general, police agency interviewees had some notion of goal-directed manpower planning with respect to numbers of people, but not with respect to kinds of people. Most police agencies visited had analyzed their work load in such a way that they knew its magnitude and temporal and geographic distribution. With this minimal information they could deploy their employees so as to apportion the work load equitably, and they could also compute the numbers of people needed to meet traditional standards (time per event, response time, minimum number of units available at any given time, etc.). Although these standards are not demonstrably valid, and many are accepted without reflection, they do bear some resemblance to the missions of the police agency, and provide benchmarks for determinations of numbers of people.

By comparison, at present the purposes of manpower planning for kinds of people in police agencies are largely externally-imposed. Most of the attention to kinds of people is directed at finding female and minority applicants, or at demonstrating that current selection processes do not discriminate against such applicants. Beyond these concerns, interviewees did not report much planning that had to do with *kinds* of people in their agencies. It seems highly probable that considerations of *numbers* of people are most salient because of the annual need to justify budget requests for numbers of allocated positions. Budget and

appropriations officials appeared to be very significant others, and increasingly important in times of limited growth. On the other hand, police agencies are not required to justify their kinds of people annually, or even very frequently, except with respect to equal employment opportunity issues. In keeping with this situation, police agency interviewees seemed considerably less concerned about their relationships with civil service officials than about their relations with budget officials. And such concern as was evidenced was primarily related to filling vacant positions promptly, which was more of a numbers-of-people than a kinds-of-people issue.

The most reasonable interpretation of the survey and interview findings would seem to be that police agencies are at present engaged in a substantial amount of manpower planning activity, but not much manpower planning. A great deal of data are collected, analyses are performed, and programming is undertaken, but primarily in response to specific internal needs, external demands, and crises. Few agencies seem to have a conception of manpower planning as goal-directed, as a component of overall planning and management, and as an integrating framework for the component activities and data collection.

Conditions and Constraints

A variety of characteristics of police organizations and their environments were expected to have some influence on the extent of manpower planning data collection and activity undertaken. Information about these conditions and constraints, or factors, was sought with the police agency survey. The primary factors about which information was collected, and the scheme used for analysis of relationships, are presented in Figure 3.1.

The factors shown within the box on the left-hand side of Figure 3.1 were expected to affect the extent of manpower planning done by police departments. For the police agencies responding to the survey, the average agency size was 932 full-time sworn allocated positions, while the median size was 518. Three-quarters of the responding agencies had fewer than 1,000 full-time sworn allocated positions. Survey respondents were also asked to indicate how much the number of positions allocated to their agencies had changed during the past two years. Thirty-one percent of the agencies reported decreases in the number of positions, 21 percent reported no changes, and 48 percent reported increases in size. With respect to magnitude of size change, without regard to direction, about two-thirds of the police agencies reported no change or change less than five percent, and almost 90 percent reported that the number of positions allocated to them had changed by less than 10 percent during the past two years.

Information on agency level for the police survey respondents was presented in Table 3.2. Of the 164 agencies responding to the survey, 57 percent were city police agencies, 19 percent were county, and 24 percent were state police agencies.

69

FIGURE 3.1

MODEL OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE EXTENT OF MANPOWER PLANNING
DATA COLLECTION AND ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

Another survey question asked respondents to report the general economic conditions in their jurisdictions during the last two years. Five response options were available, ranging from "growing rapidly" to "declining rapidly." Over 50 percent of the police agencies reported moderate growth in economic conditions in their jurisdictions, and an additional 12 percent reported rapid growth. About 13 percent indicated economic decline, and 25 percent reported stable economic conditions.

Equal Employment Pressure

One of the external factors that was expected to influence manpower planning in police agencies was equal employment opportunity pressure. A survey question asked respondents to indicate the extent to which their agencies were under pressure to increase employment of women and/ or minorities, with response options ranging form "no pressure" to "very strong pressure." The responses to the equal employment question are presented in Table 3.5. Almost 90 percent of the respondents indicated that there was at least moderate pressure on their agencies to increase employment of women and/ or minorities, and over half indicated strong or very strong pressure.

Table 3.5

Equal Employment Opportunity Pressure on Police Agencies
to Increase Employment of Women and/ or Minorities

(N=163 City, County, and State Police Agencies,
with Data Missing for 1 Agency)

Reported Equal Employment Pressure	N	Percentage
No Pressure	6	3.7%
Weak Pressure	11	6.7%
Moderate Pressure	54	33.1%
Strong Pressure	44	27.0%
Very Strong Pressure	48	29.4%

This survey finding that most police agencies are faced with at least some equal employment opportunity pressure, and that a majority of departments are confronted with strong or very strong pressure, is consistent with information collected during interviews. The majority of police agencies visited were operating under either court orders, consent decrees, or serious affirmative action plans that required increases in the employment of women and/or minorities. The plan agreed to by one department went so far as to establish hiring quotas for blacks, orientals, Spanish-surnames, Indians, and females. In another state, several police agencies reported intense competition for qualified minority applicants; these agencies were consequently below their authorized personnel strengths, because they could not get enough minority employees to satisfy quotas. Several police departments also reported that their equal employment opportunity efforts had generated reverse discrimination suits, some of which had been upheld in the courts.

Union Constraint

Another external factor believed to affect manpower planning in police organizations was union constraint on personnel processes and decisions. Respondents were asked in the survey to indicate the extent to which six personnel matters were affected by formal agreements and/or contracts with employee associations or unions. The personnel matters listed were the initial selection process, the promotion process, assignments/transfers, allocations to units or shifts, the disciplinary process, and changes in working conditions. The responses to the question are summarized in Table 3.6. The most frequently constrained personnel matters in police agencies appear to be the disciplinary process and changes in working conditions, while the least affected by unions is the initial selection process. Also, a majority of the police agencies not at present affected by union contracts or agreements feel that none of the personnel matters is likely to become a collective bargaining issue in the future.

Information from interviews at police agencies suggests that the influence of unions varies considerably, and also that such influence is not limited to contract agreements. In some states, police employees were reportedly only loosely organized, without union status or collective bargaining authority. In other states unionization among police personnel was widespread, with collective bargaining an almost universal undertaking. Several police departments reported specific contract language that constrained personnel practices, particularly with respect to transfers, discipline and working conditions. In one county police department, for example, management flexibility in manpower assignment and deployment had recently been limited through the union contract. The new process required that employees receive prior notification of transfers, and that they receive credit for extended travel time necessitated by changes in assignment. In a large city police department, assignment to

Table 3.6
Extent of Union Constraint on
Personnel Matters in Police Agencies

(N for Personnel Processes and Decisions Varies between
140 and 142 City, County, and State Police Agencies
because of Missing Data)

Personnel Matters	Completely Mandated in Contract or Agreement	Partially Mandated in Contract or Agreement	Not at Present Affected but Likely to Be an Issue for Future Bargaining	Not Affected and Not Likely to Be an Issue
Initial Selection Process	0.0%	4.9%	12.0%	83.1%
Promotion Process	5.7%	15.6%	31.9%	46.8%
Assignments/Transfers	5.7%	31.9%	26.2%	36.2%
Allocations to Units or Shifts	4.3%	20.6%	28.4%	46.8%
Disciplinary Process	17.8%	37.1%	13.6%	31.4%
Changes in Working Conditions	13.6%	37.1%	22.9%	26.4%

specialized units was solely on the basis of seniority (for those intersted), as a result of union negotiation. And in a smaller city police department, the union contract contained language prohibiting changes in the working conditions of employees, which resulted in nearly all new policies and programs being adjudicated through the grievance machinery.

It was also clear from the interviews that police employee unions or associations constrained personnel processes in ways other than through collective bargaining for contract provisions. For example, several police unions had brought reverse discrimination law suits against their police agencies in response to equal employment opportunity/affirmative action activities. In addition, in some states and localities police associations or unions are sufficiently powerful to be significant factors in politicial or administrative arenas beyond their relationships with police management. For instance, in one large city the police union was instrumental for many years in maintaining

legislation that mandated equal allocations to the three patrol shifts, despite the obvious unequal distribution of work load throughout the day, and despite the efforts of police administrators to have such legislation eliminated.

Civil Service Control

The extent to which police agency personnel processes and decisions were controlled by civil service or jurisdiction personnel units was also expected to influence manpower planning in police organizations. Questions were asked in the survey about civil service and three personnel matters: determining minimum qualifications for entry-level positions; deciding whom to hire; and deciding whom to promote. For each of these matters, respondents were asked to rate the importance, on a 0 to 5 scale, of civil service/jurisdiction personnel units. The survey responses for the three measures are presented in Table 3.7. In general, the determination of minimum standards was most influenced by civil service, followed by the decision about whom to hire, and then by the decision about whom to promote. The civil service was generally judged fairly important in determining minimum qualifications, and moderately important in the other two personnel matters.

Table 3.7
Extent of Civil Service Control Over
Police Agency Personnel Matters

(N=164 City, County, and State Police Agencies)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Average Rating
		(Scale: 0 [No Importance] to 5 [Strong Importance])					
Civil Service Influence in Determining Minimum Job Qualifications	21.3%	0.6%	4.9%	10.4%	11.6%	51.2%	3.4
Civil Service Influence in Deciding Whom to Hire	30.5%	1.8%	9.8%	12.2%	9.1%	36.6%	2.8
Civil Service Influence in Deciding Whom to Promote	35.4%	3.0%	6.1%	12.8%	11.0%	31.7%	2.6

It is interesting to note that for each of the three personnel matters, the two modal responses were the extreme values of no importance and strong importance. This suggests that most police agencies perceive themselves either as virtually independent of civil service, or as totally dependent and controlled by civil service. These kinds of responses are consistent with the interview findings. A number of police agencies visited reported being in complete control of their personnel processes (state police agencies, in particular, seemed to have this kind of independence). Other agencies reported that civil service units controlled the creation of job descriptions, selection tests, and eligibility lists. The most common mixed model seemed to involve civil service consultation with police agencies during the development of job descriptions and tests, combined with a "rule of three' procedure by which police agencies were not required merely to accept civil service lists of eligible candidates. Even in this mixed situation, however, civil service units are able to define the pool of eligibles from which police agencies must choose, and thus their role is an important, if not wholly controlling, one.

Competition for Applicants

One set of survey questions asked respondents to rate five other kinds of employers on the extent to which they compete with the police agency for qualified job applicants. The responses to these questions are summarized in Table 3.8. The other kinds of employers listed were non-criminal-justice governmental agencies, other criminal justice agencies, industrial operations, private security companies, and non-industrial operations. The response possibilities were a scale of 0 (no competition) to 5 (strong competition). The police agency respondents indicated that their primary competitors for qualified applicants were other criminal justice agencies, followed fairly closely by industrial operations and other governmental agencies. In general, little competition with non-industrial operations (farming, merchandising) or with private security companies was reported.

During interviews at police agencies, the type of competing employer mentioned most frequently as important was other police departments. In the metropolitan areas of one state in particular, several major police agencies (including the state police, a large city police department, and two large county police agencies) reported directly competing with each other for qualified people, and especially for minority applicants. The situation was such that these agencies were "raiding" each other for minority employees, through offers of higher pay or other inducements. In a major city in another state, the city police department reportedly competed with the transit authority and housing authority police agencies, again primarily for minority applicants. In general, the police agencies visited were concerned about competition for minority employees, but otherwise reported an overabundance of qualified applicants.

Table 3.8
Competition with Other Employers
for Qualified Job Applicants

(N Varies between 159 and 161 City, County,
and State Police Agencies because of Missing Data)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Average Rating
	(Scale: 0 [No Competition] to 5 [Strong Competition]						
Non-Criminal-Justice Governmental Agencies	13.0%	10.6%	15.5%	29.2%	14.9%	16.8%	2.7
Other Criminal Justice Agencies	8.8%	5.6%	10.6%	20.6%	25.6%	28.8%	3.4
Industrial Operations	12.4%	10.6%	19.9%	20.5%	19.3%	17.4%	2.8
Private Security Companies	47.8%	29.8%	14.9%	5.0%	0.6%	1.9%	0.9
Nonindustrial Operations	28.9%	27.0%	23.3%	14.5%	4.4%	1.9%	1.4

The factors shown on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1 were also expected to be related to the extent of manpower planning undertaken in police agencies, but in a more reciprocal fashion than for the organizational and environmental characteristics just discussed. These reciprocal factors are largely police agency perceptions of the predictability and rationality of decisions affecting their human resource management. Such perceptions may influence police decisions about how much manpower planning to undertake, but the perceptions in turn are probably influenced by planning already undertaken.

Influence

Two questions in the survey asked respondents about their agencies' ability to influence changes in numbers of allocated positions. One question referred to general influence in bringing about increases in numbers of positions, while the other pertained to influence in minimizing decreases in allocated positions.

Overall, the respondents indicated that their agencies were quite influential; three-quarters reported at least a moderate amount of influence on minimizing decreases, while over 90 percent felt themselves at least moderately influential in bringing about increases. Apparently police agencies wield more influence with regard to increases than with decreases, although, as noted, the degree of influence reported is considerable in either case.

This apparently high level of influence on the budget is not entirely consistent with information collected during interviews at police agencies. Officials interviewed at a number of police departments did not feel that their agencies were at all influential. Several agencies felt, for example, that decisions concerning numbers of positions were actually made by budget analysts on the basis of unspecified criteria. These budget analysts were seen as fulfilling a role of budget cutting, and the police departments reportedly exercised little or no influence over them. Also, one county police agency indicated that they had recently received an increase in positions because "it was their year"—by which it was meant that they had *not* influenced the decision, and that they would subsequently be required to wait several years before their turn came up again. This theme of periodic increases unrelated to influence or rational argument was voiced in several other interviews as well.

The experience of a large western city police department illustrates an instance of no influence over, and no opportunity to anticipate, a change in the number of allocated positions. The city was facing some fiscal difficulties, and all agencies were instructed to plan for austerity and cut-backs. The top administrators of the police department actually regarded their agency as somewhat overstaffed anyhow, and prepared a budget including a 10 percent reduction in expenditures. The reduction was facilitated by a civilianization program that had been previously inaugurated, which had increased the use of civilian personnel in clerical and staff positions, while returning trained and more highly paid sworn personnel to operational duties. Following the preparation of the reduced police budget, however, the city administration independently signed an equal employment opportunity consent decree that called for an increase of 600 sworn employees in the police department. The new hiring was intended to focus on minority applicants, so as to bring the personnel characteristics of the police agency more in line with those of the community. The police department, having planned for a 10 percent reduction, suddenly found itself required to recruit and select 600 new employees, from specified minority classes. Moreover, the city could not afford the costs of the 600 new sworn police employees, and so the police department was instructed to lay off a large number of its civilian personnel. Consequently, most of the newly hired sworn employees were eventually assigned to clerical or staff positions previously filled by (less expensive) civilians.

Not all police agency interviewees reported such horror stories, however, or such a lack of influence over changes in numbers of positions. Several state police agencies, for example, reported cultivating relationships with their governors

and legislators, to their eventual budgetary benefit. One such agency had become the pet program of a powerful state senator, and as a result had exercised considerable influence during his tenure. Another state police agency used older, experienced, but still uniformed troopers to "evangelize" before the legislature at budget time, apparently with great success.

Anticipation

Another pair of questions inquired about police agency ability to anticipate increases and decreases in numbers of allocated positions. It was expected that agencies able to anticipate such changes would be more likely to undertake manpower planning, and that agencies doing manpower planning would be more able to anticipate such changes. Most respondents indicated that their agencies were at least somewhat able to anticipate changes in numbers of allocated positions. Of the police agencies, 95 percent reportedly were able to anticipate increases in positions at least one month ahead, and 61 percent to foresee increases at least seven months ahead. Anticipation of decreases was not as prescient: only about a third as many agencies as were able to foresee *increases* a year in advance were able to forecast *decreases;* and more than twice as many could not anticipate decreases at all or could anticipate them less than one month in advance. Still, even with respect to decreases in positions, almost 90 percent of the agencies were reportedly able to anticipate changes at least one month in advance.

The issue of anticipation is not independent of influence, as agencies with little or no influence over changes in numbers of positions are probably more likely to be caught by surprise. The previous example from the western city police department is illustrative of a case in which substantial planning had been undertaken, but in which a political decision by a higher authority was unanticipated and entirely negated the plans that had been developed. In a large eastern city, a severe fiscal crisis had been forecast by many analysts and observers, but officials in the police department and other agencies were still caught off guard by the magnitude of the problem when the crisis finally came to a head. Again, planning had been undertaken, and in this instance the economic situation had been correctly forecast by many analysts, but still the police agency was unable fully to anticipate the severity of the budgetary crisis.

In general, however, the budgetary experiences of police departments are more predictable than is suggested by these two examples. Most changes in numbers of positions are by small increments, and the nature of the government budget cycle allows police agencies to anticipate changes at least a few months in advance. Even in instances in which agencies experience relatively little influence over their budgetary experiences, the regularity of the budget cycle permits some degree of anticipation.

Rational and Political Factors

Again on the subject of increases and decreases in numbers of allocated positions, agency respondents were asked about the importance of rational and political factors. Specifically, the questions were about the importance of "agency analysis and presentation of needs (rational planning)" and of "political factors" for increases and decreases in numbers of allocated positions. The responses are summarized in Table 3.9. Overall, respondents rated rational agency planning as important in increases, but not in decreases. The average importance rating for rational planning was twice as large for increases as for decreases. Political factors were rated moderately important in both increases and decreases in numbers of positions. Politics were rated as somewhat more important in decreases, but the difference between the ratings was not as large as it was for rational factors.

There was considerable variance among interviewees in their estimation of the importance of rational planning for changes in numbers of positions. The

Table 3.9
Importance of Rational and Political Factors
for Changes in Numbers of Allocated Positions

(N Varies because of Missing Data)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	Average Rating	N
	(Scale: 0 [No Importance] to 5 [Strong Importance])							
Importance of Agency Analysis and Presentation of Needs for Increases	3.4%	4.8%	12.9%	21.1%	26.5%	31.3%	3.6	147
Importance of Agency·Analysis and Presentation of Needs for Decreases	33.3%	18.2%	8.1%	20.2%	13.1%	7.1%	1.8	99
Importance of Political Factors for Increases	13.9%	7.6%	16.0%	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	2.8	144
Importance of Political Factors for Decreases	9.9%	8.9%	6.9%	21.8%	36.6%	15.8%	3.1	101

example noted earlier from the western city, in which the police department planned for a reduction and instead was authorized to hire 600 new sworn employees, is an extreme instance of the irrelevance of rational planning. In another city, police officials reported that funding decisions were made without regard for "whether we do a good job and present relevant and factual information." By contrast, though, two other police departments in the same state reported that their rational arguments were given careful attention at budget time, and that rational planning did influence their funding.

To some extent, police perceptions of the importance of rational factors are undoubtedly self-centered; that is, if the police get what they ask for, they perceive budgetary decision making as rational. In this regard, the perceptions of the rational basis of police requests clearly vary by vantage point. One state police agency, for example, regarded its budget proposals as tightly justified, but felt that budget analysts cut them arbitrarily, and that the legislature ignored rational arguments in favor of narrow judgements of self-interest. The budget analyst responsible for the state police, by contrast, saw very little rationality in the alleged planning and analysis supporting budget requests. In his view, the state police budget preparations were "all politics and no science."

An important theme commonly enunciated during interviews was the "receptivity to rational argument" or the general "climate of rationality" in the jurisdiction. Political decision making with respect to agency funding seemed to be regarded as more "rational" in some sites than in others. Some police officials described their environments as such that rational arguments were lost or forgotten by the time that funding decisions were made, while other police departments reported fiscal allocations heavily dependent on empirical analysis and justification. Frequently, this climate or receptivity seemed to be closely tied to a single strong government official (city manager, governor, et al) whose decision making was demonstrably influenced by the analysis and plans prepared by jurisdictional agencies.

Several examples of the importance of political considerations for police agency funding decisions were identified during interviews. In a number of sites, as noted, the state police indicated that they had established close relationships with governors and legislators, and that these relationships aided their fiscal requests. In a midwestern state, one city police department was completely dominated by local partisan politics, and the state police felt that their rational arguments were paid little heed at budget time. The state police agency had not had any increase in personnel in almost a decade, apparently because of the political power of the state sheriff's association. Annually, their budget requests for increases were approved by the department of public safety, cut back by the governor, and eliminated by the legislature, where the rural sheriffs exercised the most influence. The sheriffs opposed the expansion of the state police on the grounds that the saliency and power of county law enforcement would be endangered.

Two eastern police departments reported going outside of the government machinery in order to increase political support for funding requests. In each case, the support of various community groups was cultivated in order to offset unfavorable preferences of elected or appointed government officials. In one city in particular, the reform-minded chief of police clearly threatened the operations of the traditional political machine, and funding for the agency was jeopardized. The chief was able, however, to gain the active support of business and good-government groups, and thereby to force the hand of the mayor and council with respect to police funding (at least for the time being). In this instance, the chief used rational arguments to win the support of the community groups, after which the police funding decision was made on the basis of political group versus political group.

A number of the interviewees recognized that budget decision making is inherently and properly political, thus limiting the role and impact of rational planning and analysis. In general, though, the police officials made a distinction between larger political decisions and narrow self-interest politics. Clearly, the distribution of revenue between the police department and board of education is a political decision and the role of formal rationality may be limited. On the other hand, campaign-year promises to increase police personnel, or legislative domination by rural interests that would emasculate the state police and aggrandize the sheriffs, appear less politically legitimate to the interviewees.

The previous four sets of questions all dealt with numbers of positions, and the responses seem fairly consistent. Police agencies had a greater influence on getting increases in positions than on preventing decreases; they were better able to anticipate increases, and for increases, rational factors were rated more important than political factors. Police agency influence on and power to anticipate decreases were not as great; and for decreases, political factors were rated more important than rational factors. When increases in numbers of positions are awarded, they are usually preceded by police agency requests for increases; thus, agencies see themselves as influential in causing the increases, they had the opportunity to anticipate them, and they see the increases as rational and based on their requests. Decreases, on the other hand, are ordinarily opposed by police agencies; thus if they come to pass, they reflect a lack of influence, are more difficult to anticipate, and are perceived as resulting from political factors rather than rational planning.

Kinds-of-People Considerations

Another set of questions in the police agency survey asked about the importance of a variety of considerations in determining the kinds of people to employ in police departments. Responses to these questions are summarized in Table 3.10. The first two considerations, analysis of job requirements and assessment of agency needs, were taken to represent an internal and rational dimension in decision about the kinds of people to employ. The responses for

81

these two items are very similar, with over 86 percent of the respondents rating each consideration as at least somewhat important, and less than 7 percent rating them as "of no importance." The next two items—availability of desirable applicants and labor market conditions—were termed external rational considerations. Both matters were rated as fairly important, with applicant availability especially salient.

Table 3.10
Importance of Various Considerations
For Kinds-of-People Determinations

(N Varies because of Missing Data)

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Of No Importance	N
Importance of Analysis of Job Requirements	47.2%	39.6%	6.3%	6.9%	159
Importance of Assessment of Agency Needs	44.4%	42.5%	6.9%	6.3%	160
Importance of Availability of Desirable Applicants	59.6%	29.2%	5.6%	5.6%	161
Importance of Labor Market Conditions	25.6%	40.6%	20.0%	13.7%	160
Importance of Political Pressure	5.0%	11.9%	38.1%	45.0%	160
Importance of Equal Employment/ Affirmative Action	56.8%	30.9%	10.5%	1.9%	162
Importance of Public Opinion	10.7%	34.0%	33.3%	22.0%	159
Importance of Specific Court Cases/Injunctions	22.5%	18.8%	22.5%	36.2%	160
Importance of Union Policies	0.0%	9.2%	20.3%	70.6%	153

Five survey questions asked respondents to indicate the importance of external political considerations for determinations about kinds of people. These items were viewed as political in the sense that they reflected concerns about the kinds of people that *should* be employed in police agencies, without particular regard to job analyses or agency needs assessments. The five external political considerations offered were political pressure, equal employment opportunity/affirmative action, public opinion, specific court cases/injunctions, and union policies. Except for equal employment, respondents generally rate the considerations as not too important. Union policies and political pressure were rated especially low, with over 80 percent of the response for each being either "not very important" or "of no importance." The rated importance of public opinion and court cases was somewhat higher, but over half of the respondents rated each as not very important or of no importance for kinds-of-people determinations. Equal employment opportunity/affirmative action considerations were rated very important, however, in determining the kinds of people to employ in police agencies. This suggests that in police organizations, analysis of job requirements and assessment of agency needs are important for determining the kinds of people to employ, but that these internal rational considerations operate within a framework defined by the availability of desirable applicants and by equal employment opportunity/affirmative action concerns.

As discussed previously, the police agencies included in the study seemed to regard considerations of *numbers* of people as much more salient than considerations of *kinds* of people. During the interviews, the only kinds-of-people concerns that consistently arose related to equal employment opportunity issues. With regard to these issues, police agencies reported strong pressure to increase their employment of women and minorities, and most had undertaken special recruiting and selection activities to find and to hire such people. A number of the agencies also indicated that the increasing numbers of college-educated people in the labor market were reflected in their applicant pools, especially in these times of relatively limited employment opportunities. Few agencies, however, seemed actually to have recognized that there were kinds-of-people determinations to make. Instead, they relied on untested tradition, assumptions, and conventional wisdom, except as outside pressures mandated special considerations.

Factors Affecting Manpower Planning

The items described in the previous two sections pertaining to current manpower planning efforts in police agencies and to conditions and constraints were subjected to multivariate analysis as suggested in Figure 3.1. Two dependent variables—extent of manpower planning data collection and extent of manpower planning activity—were created through recoding and combination of the individual items presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.[34] The independent variables were either single items (agency size,

agency size change, agency level, economic conditions, equal employment opportunity pressure) or combinations of items (union constraint, civil service control, competition, influence, anticipation, rational and political factors affecting numbers of positions, and internal rational, external rational, and external political considerations affecting kinds-of-people determinations). All of the variables were treated as at least ordinal in nature, except for the nominal agency level (city, county, state) item, for which dummy variables were used. The multivariate techniques utilized assume interval-level data, but the methods are robust, and their use seems particularly justified in an exploratory study like this.[36]

Two multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 3.11. For one analysis the dependent variable is the composite measure of reported manpower planning data collection, and for the other the dependent variable is the composite measure of reported manpower planning activity. For both analyses, city agency and county agency dummy variables are used to represent the agency-level variable.

The overall relationships between the set of factors affecting extent of manpower planning and the two dependent variables are both statistically significant at the .05 level, with about the same strength of association in each case. Although statistically significant, the coefficients of determination (R^2 values) are not very large (.14 and .16), indicating that the factors affecting extent of manpower planning in police agencies do not account for or explain a great deal of the variance of the dependent composite measures of manpower planning data collection and activity in police organizations.

With the extent of manpower planning data collection as the dependent variable, the only statistically significant regression coefficient is that for union constraint. The coefficient is negative, indicating that with all of the other factors statistically controlled for, more union constraint on personnel matters is associated with less manpower planning data collection. The three next largest coefficients—competition, economic conditions, and agency size change—are each positive. Thus, with other factors controlled for, more manpower planning data collection tends to be associated with more competition for applicants, better economic conditions, and greater recent changes in numbers of allocated positions in the police agency. These three factors and union constraint also had the largest bivariate correlation coefficients with extent of manpower planning data collection, and controlling for other factors did not appreciably change the size of their coefficients.

The coefficients for the other five independent variables with extent of manpower planning data collection as the dependent variable were all less than .10. The agency size coefficient was .09 indicating that larger police agencies collect somewhat more manpower planning data than do smaller agencies. The regression coefficient for equal employment pressures was −.02 suggesting that there is no direct or clear relationship between degree of pressure to increase employment of minorities and extent of manpower planning data collection in

Table 3.11
Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Extent of Manpower Planning Data Collection and Activity in Police Agencies

(N=121 City, County, and State Police Agencies)

Factors	Standardized Regression Coefficients	
	With Extent of Data Collection Dependent	With Extent of Activity Dependent
Agency Size	.09	.03
Economic Conditions	.14	.03
Agency Size Change	.13	.27*
Equal Employment Pressure	−.02	−.18*
Union Constraint	−.20*	−.06
Civil Service Control	−.02	.04
Competition for Applicants	.16	.21*
City Agency Dummy Variable	.02	−.12
County Agency Dummy Variable	−.08	−.07
Multiple R	.37	.40
R²	.14	.16
Adjusted R²	.07	.09
F	1.94	2.30
Significance	.05	.02

*P < .05

police agencies. Another negligible regression coefficient was that for civil service control. The simple correlation for this variable with extent of data collection had been −.12 and statistically significant, but the regression coefficient was only −.02. It would seem that although police agencies faced with more civil service control over their personnel processes tend to collect less manpower planning data, other factors (such as union constraint) account for more of the variance in data collection when all of the factors are considered simultaneously.

The regression coefficients for the city and county agency dummy variables are both rather small. No coefficient is shown for state police agencies, as the use of dummy variables is always limited to one less than the number of values of the nominal variable. In an analysis such as that shown in Table 3.11, the effect of state agencies (the excluded value of agency level) is subsumed within the regression constant. In order to explore the effects of all three agency levels, separate regressions were computed, using the other two possible pairs of dummy variables (county and state, city and state). The three pairs of agency-level coefficients with extent of manpower planning data collection dependent are as follows:

City Agencies	.02		.11
County Agencies	−.05	−.09	
State Agencies		−.02	.08

From these coefficients it seems clear that, with other factors statistically controlled for, city agencies tend to collect slightly more manpower planning data, county agencies slightly less, and state police agencies fall somewhere in between.

The regression coefficients with extent of manpower planning activity undertaken as the dependent variables are shown in the right-hand column of Table 3.11. The coefficients for agency size change, competition for applicants, and equal employment pressure are statistically significant, with the activity measure dependent. The coefficients for agency size change and competition are positive, indicating that, with other factors controlled for, police agencies experiencing greater recent changes in numbers of positions and agencies facing more competition for qualified applicants report undertaking more manpower planning. The equal employment pressure coefficient is negative, indicating that police agencies facing more pressure to increase their employment of women and minorities tend to undertake less manpower planning. The magnitudes of all three of these coefficients are larger than were their simple correlation coefficients.

The bivariate correlation coefficients for economic conditions, union constraint, and civil service control with extent of manpower planning activity were each statistically significant, but the regression coefficients for these factors are considerably smaller. The directions of association for economic conditions and union constraint do not change in the regression analysis, but the zero-order negative coefficient for civil service control becomes positive, though weak, in the multivariate situation. With all of the factors used together, it is apparent that

86

these three factors decrease in importance with respect to manpower planning activity, while agency size change, competition for applicants, and equal employment pressure increase in importance. Agency size is unimportant in both contexts.

The city-agency and county-agency dummy variables both have negative regression coefficients in the analysis presented in Table 3.11. As noted in the analysis of data collection, the three agency-level values cannot all be tested in the same regression computation using dummy variables. Each pair of agency dummy variables, then, was tested separately with the other seven factors, in order to clarify the effect of agency level on extent of manpower planning undertaken in police agencies. The three pairs of agency-level coefficients were found to be as follows:

City Agencies	.12		−.04
County Agencies	−.07	.03	
State Agencies		.10	.07

These coefficients seem to indicate that, with other factors statistically controlled for, state police agencies undertake somewhat more manpower planning activity, and city agencies somewhat less, with county agencies in the middle somewhere.

These multiple regression analyses pertained to the left-hand side of Figure 3.1. The factors examined were believed to be, on logical grounds, primarily causally related to the extent of manpower planning in police organizations. The remaining factors, from the right-hand side of Figure 3.1, are believed to be more reciprocally related to the extent of manpower planning undertaken by police departments. These factors, largely perceptual, may both affect and be affected by the extent of manpower planning undertaken.

Relationships between the reciprocal factors and extent of manpower planning in police agencies are presented in Table 3.12. Simple zero-order correlation coefficients are shown in the first column, while partial correlation coefficients, with other factors controlled for, are shown in the second column. The two factors most strongly related to extent of manpower planning are internal rational and external rational considerations for kinds-of-people determinations. The more important that a police agency perceives these considerations (analysis of job requirements, assessment of agency needs, availability of desirable applicants, and labor market conditions) to be for determining the kinds of people to employ, the more manpower planning that is undertaken. Influence, anticipation, and rational factors affecting numbers of positions are also positively related to extent of manpower planning, although not strongly, particularly in the partial correlation analysis. Those police agencies that see themselves as more influential and better able to anticipate changes in numbers of positions, and that rate the importance of rational planning more highly, are somewhat more likely to be found engaged in more manpower planning, but the relationships are not very strong.

The relationships between the two political factors variables and extent of manpower planning undertaken by police agencies are rather weak. Both partial

87

Table 3.12
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between
Extent of Manpower Planning Activity and
Factors Reciprocally Related to Extent of Manpower Planning

(N Varies between 137 and 162 City, County, and
State Police Agencies because of Missing Data)

Factors	Correlation Coefficients with Extent of Manpower Planning Activity	
	Pearson Bivariate Correlation	Partial r with All Others Controlled
Influence	.12	.03
Anticipation	.16*	.12
Rational Factors and Numbers of Positions	.14*	.03
Political Factors and Numbers of Positions	−.07	−.04
Internal Rational Considerations and Kinds of People	.26*	.19*
External Rational Considerations and Kinds of People	.23*	.17*
External Political Considerations and Kinds of People	.04	−.05

*$P < .05$

correlation coefficients are negative, indicating that greater perceived importance of political considerations for determinations of numbers and kinds of people is associated with less manpower planning in police departments. This is the kind of relationship that had been anticipated, as police agencies viewing such decisions as dominated by political concerns might come to see manpower planning as an exercise in futility. The negative coefficients are very small, however, and far from statistically significant.

88

Agency Ability to Attract and to Retain

Two questions in the survey asked respondents to characterize the abilities of their agencies to attract and to retain the kinds of people believed needed. The responses for these two questions are presented in Table 3.13. Over 90 percent of the survey repsondents indicated that their agencies were at least somewhat able both to attract and to retain needed kinds of people, and nearly half reported that their agencies were attracting and retaining the kinds of people needed "to a great extent." The reported ability of police agencies to retain people was slightly better than their ability to attract needed kinds of people, but the difference was very small.

Ultimately, it would be expected that the manpower planning of police agencies contributes to the ability of those agencies to attract and to retain the kinds of people they need. In both of the preceding multivariate analyses, the focal or dependent variable was extent of manpower planning, but in this section the dependent variable is agency ability to attract and to retain, with extent of manpower planning as an independent variable. As shown in Figure 3.1, the factors affecting manpower planning in police agencies, and the extent of such activity, were all expected to influence the ability of police departments to attract and to keep the kinds of people believed needed.

It is important to recognize that the dependent variable for this analysis incorporates only the subjective judgments of officials working within the sample police agencies. Neither the assessment of the kinds of people needed by the police agency, nor the assessments of agency ability to attract and to retain such people, were made on the basis of any specified criteria. Thus, some agencies reporting higher ability to attract and to retain may have had lower standards;

Table 3.13
Police Agency Ability to Attract and To Retain the Kinds of People Believed Needed

(N Varies Due to Missing Data)

	To A Great Extent	Somewhat	Very Little	Not At All	N
Ability to Attract Kinds of People Needed	43.8%	48.8%	7.4%	0.0%	162
Ability to Retain Kinds of People Needed	49.4%	45.7%	4.3%	0.6%	164

conversely, agencies reporting lower ability to attract and to retain may have had higher criteria for establishing what kinds of people were needed. The measure of agency ability to attract and to retain needed kinds of people, then, should not be viewed as in any way a direct or "true" measure of the quality of the work force, but rather as a measure of agency satisfaction with the kinds of people employed, which should indirectly be related to actual qualitative characteristics of employees.

The results of a multiple regression analysis with agency ability to attract and to retain needed kinds of people as the dependent variable are shown in Table 3.14. Overall, the factors have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, and account for a sizable portion of the variance in reported police agency ability to attract and to retain. The coefficients for three of the factors are statistically significant and negative, while one factor has a strong and significant positive relationship in the multivariate analysis. The negative factors that individually are statistically significant are equal employment pressure, competition for applicants, and the city agency dummy variable. The one large positive coefficient is for the extent of manpower planning. The regression coefficients for agency size, economic conditions, agency size change, and the county dummy variable are all negative and of moderate size, although not statistically significant.

In order to clarify the effect of the agency-level variable, within the constraints of the dummy variable procedure, additional regression analyses were performed with the remaining two combinations of agency levels. The three pairs of dummy variable coefficients for agency level, with ability to attract and to retain dependent, are as follows:

City Agencies	−.30		−.18
County Agencies	−.10	.15	
State Agencies		.25	.10

Reported police agency ability to attract and to retain the kinds of people needed seems to be affected by several factors. City police agencies, agencies faced with more competition for qualified applicants, and agencies faced with more equal employment opportunity pressure report considerably less ability to attract and to retain. Also reporting somewhat less ability to find and to keep the kinds of people needed were larger agencies, agencies presented with better economic conditions, and agencies experiencing greater recent changes in numbers of positions. On the other side of the ledger, state police agencies were somewhat more likely to report satisfaction with their ability to attract and to retain needed kinds of people.

Most important for this study, the extent of manpower planning undertaken by police agencies was positively related to their reported ability to attract and to retain the kinds of people needed. In the multivariate analysis, with other factors controlled for, the coefficient for extent of manpower planning was statistically significant and reasonably large (.22). Although the dependent variable is a measure of agency satisfaction rather than a measure of the quality of the work

Table 3.14
Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Police Agency Ability to Attract and to Retain the Kinds of People Needed

(N=121 City, County, and State Police Agencies)

Factors	Standardized Regression Coefficient with Agency Ability to Attract and to Retain Dependent
Agency Size	- 16
Economic Conditions	-.10
Agency Size Change	-.09
Equal Employment Pressure	-.19*
Union Constraint	.01
Civil Service Control	.05
Competition for Applicants	-.25*
City Dummy Variable	-.30*
County Dummy Variable	-.10
Manpower Planning Activity	.22*
Multiple R	.51
R^2	.26
Adjusted R^2	.19
F	3.77
Significance	.00

*$P < .05$

91

force, this finding that police agencies doing more manpower planning report being better able to attract and to retain the kinds of people needed is an important one.

In addition, it is very interesting that in the multivariate analysis for agency ability to attract and to retain, the coefficients for union constraint and civil service control are negligible. Union constraint, in particular, was earlier found to be negatively associated with extent of manpower planning in police agencies, and civil service control had strong negative coefficients for county agencies. Despite the fact that these conditions may tend to depress the extent of manpower planning in police organizations, though, they seem almost completely unrelated to the reported ability of police agencies to attract and to retain needed kinds of people.

IV. Policy Implications and Feasibility

The best description of present efforts in police organizations is that a considerable amount of manpower-related activity is undertaken, but very little manpower planning. Police officials responding to the survey reported that their agencies collected most of the specific kinds of data and undertook most of the specific activities about which questions were asked. This high level of effort was generally corroborated by information collected during interviews at a variety of police organizations. Despite this high level of activity, however, the orientation in police agencies was clearly one of problem solving within personnel administration, rather than one of manpower planning. In most instances, the manpower-related activities undertaken were not integrated, coordinated, explicitly goal-directed, or future-oriented. Instead, they tended to be disjointed efforts aimed at solving narrowly-defined current human resource problems.

The kinds of manpower-related data collection and activity police departments most often undertake are those pertaining to internal resource management (for example, work load data, performance evaluations, training needs assessments, and manpower inventories). Activities and data collection directed toward more externally-oriented matters such as recruitment (labor market analysis, career orientations information) were engaged in much less frequently by the sample police departments. Also, information gathering and activity related to less conventional kinds of police administrative concerns (such as job satisfaction, career path analysis, job redesign, and manpower simulation models) were undertaken less frequently than those in support of more conventional concerns. The most radical manpower-related activity (job redesign) and the most externally-focused (labor market analysis) were the activities characterized as not useful by the most agency respondents.

The manpower-related activities of police departments do not seem to be undertaken within the framework of a planning process. Instead of being aimed at reducing the discrepancies between goals and the present state, manpower planning efforts are directed at avoiding or ameliorating problems that achieve

92

recognition as "evils" or undesirable conditions. Very little effort at forecasting is undertaken, so that the implicit assumption is that the future will be much like the present. A large portion of the characteristics of the police organization and its environment are taken to be fixed or given, so that many problems are seen as not amenable to rational analysis, and the range of alternatives considered in planning and problem solving is narrow. Also, the search for alternatives seems to be problematic, localized, and sequential, with the objective being to identify a satisfactory alternative quickly and cheaply. The search for alternatives, and the estimation of their likely effects in policing, are further limited by the general inadequacy of knowledge of cause and effect in relation to strategies about numbers of people, kinds of people, and utilization.

A part from the planning question, the manpower activities of police agencies also exhibit some serious deficiencies in comparison to rational models of problem solving, decision making, or management. The different facets of human resource activity tend to be taken up disjointedly, because of the cognitive complexity of the whole problem of numbers and kinds of people and how to use them, and because of the division of labor in police departments. As a result, activities that are clearly interdependent on a conceptual level are performed nearly independently in practice, with little coordination or integration. The cognitive and organizational motivations behind such disjointed activity are reinforced by external demands and pressures on police agencies, which tend to result in specific manpower problem-solving activities aimed at the resolution of narrow issues.

The current limitations on manpower planning in police organizations that seem to be the most fundamental and intractable are the following:

1. Dissensus and conflict about the goals of the police and the means available to achieve them.
2. Lack of cause-and-effect knowledge linking what the police do (including the numbers and kinds of people they utilize) with outputs and outcomes.
3. Dependence of the police on their environment for resources, authority, and work flow.

The consequence of these limitations is that the police cannot have any clear conception of what they are supposed to achieve; given whatever notions of objective-attainment or problem-avoidance that they do have, the police cannot determine what strategies to adopt; and to the extent that the police are able to justify the adoption of certain strategies, to implement them they need the cooperation of elected executives, legislators, equal employment regulatory agencies, police unions, and civil service agencies. It should be noted, however, that the severity of these limitations may vary from one issue to another, from one locale to another, and over time. For example, conflict over the goals of the police may be much greater in New York City than in more homogeneous

Suffolk County, Long Island.[37] Some police departments are relatively independent of civil service units, and some police agencies are very influential with their funding sources. The supply of theory and knowledge about policing should increase over time, and knowledge in some areas, such as how to improve the physical capacities of police employees, may be more advanced than in other areas, such as the improvement of the mental fitness of police personnel. In spite of this variance, however, these limitations seem fundamentally to hamper the ability of the police to determine the "right numbers and kinds of people and how to use them."

Other current constraints on police manpower planning seem less fundamental. In particular, the disjointed approach to manpower problem and planning activities in police organizations seems to be the result of the narrow vision and the crisis orientation of police management generally, in conjunction with the traditional division of labor among training, personnel, planning, and operations. It would seem that this problem of disjointed manpower decision making in police agencies arises much more out of convenience and convention than out of intractable conditions and constraints. Other organizations have been able to develop integrated approaches to human resource management, and there is nothing obviously unique about police departments that would prohibit their doing the same.[38]

The overall conclusion about the feasibility of manpower planning for police organizations is therefore mixed. On the one hand, police agencies could do more manpower planning and be more rational in their approach to human resource management than at present. On the other hand, the police are fundamentally limited in the extent to which "right numbers and kinds of people and how to use them" can be determined or achieved. The improvements that can feasibly be made are considerable, particularly with coordinated or integrated approaches to manpower problem solving and decision making. Also, to some degree the limitations that have been termed fundamental are not invariable, and manipulation of them may be possible and beneficial. Goal consensus, certain knowledge, and police independence are not likely or perhaps desirable, but less dissensus, less uncertainty, and greater cooperation and cohesion between the police and their environment may well be. For these reasons boundedly rational manpower planning and comprehensive human resource decision making would seem to be feasible for police organizations.

An important consideration in the question of the feasibility of manpower planning for the police is situational variability. All police departments need to think about and take action with regard to the numbers and kinds of people needed and how to utilize them. But the extent to which these actions are undertaken formally, the capacity to perform them, and the potential consequences of the activities are all situationally determined. Very small police agencies, for example, have no less need than the New York Police Department for right numbers and kinds of people, but in making such determinations they may not require as formal or sophisticated a manpower planning process, and

their access to manpower planning expertise may not be equal to New York's.

The impacts or effects that result from manpower planning also vary from one situation to another, in part because of differences in environmental conditions facing police organizations. The extent to which police agencies are able to implement manpower-related programs is influenced by civil service control, union constraints, equal employment pressure, and similar concerns. The impacts of such programs are further influenced by factors that include competition for applicants, labor market and economic conditions, and the attractiveness of police employment, all of which vary situationally.

The varying influence of organizational environments was most clearly observed when police agencies were compared with other kinds of criminal justice agencies included in the larger study. Police departments generally had more powerful and vocal constituencies than did other criminal justice agencies, with resulting contingencies and constraints. With the aid of their constituencies, the police were generally more influential than the courts or corrections in budget decision making about numbers of allocated positions. On the other hand, though, the police felt constrained to continue traditional service delivery patterns, in order not to upset their allies. Support for more police is easy to mobilize, as compared to support for more probation officers or more correctional treatment programs. But the police are also often unable to change routine practices or to alter precinct boundaries because of their concerned and alert constituents, whereas a probation agency could probably make wholesale changes without being noticed by the public.

A final source of situational variation in the practice of manpower planning by the police is the saliency or criticality of issues. Almost all of the police departments responding to the mail survey, for example, reported being under pressure to increase their employment of women and minorities, but for some the pressure was probably more immediately salient and motivating. The saliency of manpower problems and processes for resolving them also varies by agency size, economic conditions, and other basic characteristics of police agencies and their environments. For a very large agency, the task of securing up-to-date information about current employees is often a pressing problem and a difficult undertaking, while such information is common knowledge in a small agency. In the small agency, though, attracting applicants with advanced education and skills may be an impossible dream, while large agencies have a surplus of such applicants. Despite the fact that all police organizations must be concerned with numbers and kinds of people and how they are used, then, the saliency of problems and practices varies, as do the formalization of, the capacity for, and the potential consequences of manpower planning.

There are several ways in which most police agencies could substantially enhance their manpower planning efforts. At a specific level, agencies could increase their monitoring of current conditions, problem analysis, forecasting, and evaluation, (and they could cease regarding so many organizational and environmental characteristics as fixed). With more openness and encouragement

of change in police organizations, the amount of searching done to find new alternatives could be expected to increase.[39] If the planning process were engaged in more explicitly, it might also be possible to reduce the extent to which unexamined assumptions (such as that the future will be just like the present, or that all managers must be promoted from within) permeate and hamstring manpower planning in practice in police agencies.

Police organizations could also benefit from a broader approach to manpower-related problems and activities. Most agencies still seemed to be operating with a narrow personnel administration outlook, although elsewhere the personnel function in business and government has greatly expanded in recent years. The procedural and "vacancy-filling" concerns of personnel administration remain important, but with the broader approach attention is also given to manpower policy and to the integration of the various manpower activities. It is with an appreciation of this more policy-oriented approach to human resource management that the need for manpower planning becomes apparent. With the narrower view, the principal concerns are following procedures and reacting promptly to demands and crises. With the wider policy view, however, comes the realization that decisions have to be made about the numbers and kinds of people to employ, and how to utilize them. Recognition that there are such decisions to be made may well be a key to the development of manpower planning in police agencies.

Besides this expansion of the personnel function, police agencies could benefit from closer linkages between human resource management and the overall management of the organization. As one example, the forecasting stage within manpower planning needs to take into account any intended changes in organizational structure or operational strategies. In general, the scope of manpower planning is so great that it needs to be fully integrated with all of the other management processes.[40] This is especially true for police agencies because they are so labor-intensive, making manpower planning a central form of planning, and because individual employees have considerable authority and discretion, so that decisions about kinds of people to employ and how to use them have great social significance.

Beyond these exhortations to police organizations to do better, there are several strategies that might be employed to increase and to improve manpower planning by the police. One would be for civil service commissions and/or general jurisdiction personnel units to encourage, to require, and to assist police agencies to adopt the broader, more policy-oriented approach to the personnel function. A recent study found that civil service commissions playing a regulatory role tended to constrain personnel innovation in police agencies, while commissions playing a policy formulation role tended to promote innovation.[41] In the present study, these two roles were not differentiated, which could explain the generally weak relationships found between extent of civil service control and manpower planning efforts in police agencies. As the principal personnel administrators in most jurisdictions, civil service units have

the opportunity to set the tone for human resource management in government agencies, and they have some authority to reinforce their suggestions. Instead of only promulgating forms, rules, and procedures, civil service commissions could take the lead in developing manpower planning and a policy orientation to the personnel function.

Political leaders, including elected executives and legislators, could also encourage manpower planning by police and other government agencies. The choice of the chief of police is an important source of influence, and the management ability and leadership of the chief seem to be important factors affecting police organizations and their relations with the environment.[42] In the budgetary process, political officials have another opportunity to encourage manpower planning efforts. In their written justifications and at budget hearings, police agencies can be required to present evidence in support of their requests. In one jurisdiction visited during the study, a project was found, operating out of the mayor's office, that sought to improve the program evaluation and cost/benefit capabilities in each of the various criminal justice agencies. As a concommitant, though, assistance was also being provided to budget decision makers so that they could more knowledgeably evaluate proposals and ask the right kinds of questions. The project was in its early stages, but observers and participants reported that more planning was being done in the criminal justice agencies and that more informed decisions were being made during the budgetary process.

In line with earlier arguments, enhanced manpower planning cannot replace and should not be allowed to replace the political aspects of government decision making. The intent of the project just described was not to make allocative decision making scientific, but only better to inform such decisions about alternatives and about the likely consequences of particular choices. More generally, it would seem that political leaders could encourage manpower planning in police departments without abandoning their responsibilities. At present, in many jurisdictions police agencies never have the opportunity to introduce empirical justifications for their budget requests, and in others they are convinced that such justifications are never examined by political decision makers. These kinds of situations seem to discourage manpower planning efforts, which in turn contributes to the lack of information available for budgetary decision making.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the criminal justice State Planning Agencies (SPAs) could also contribute to the enhancement of manpower planning in police organizations through their planning, grant-letting, coordination, technical assistance, and standards-promulgating functions. In the past, LEAA and the SPAs have funded a great many manpower-related programs and activities, but they have generally not adopted for themselves or required of grant-receiving police departments an integrated approach to manpower planning and decision making. One SPA, for example, was found to be using the term manpower planning to describe the

funding category that included personnel-related projects, but it was used as a label only, with the projects themselves being traditional and disjointed ones in training, education, manpower allocation, and the like. The same SPA had previously analyzed the criminal justice human resources in its state, in order to prioritize its funding practices; but LEAA had refused to allow the SPA to allocate Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) funds on the basis of the analysis and priorities. The actions of both LEAA and the SPA, then, tended to discourage manpower planning, despite vocabulary and protestations to the contrary.

Manpower planning could just as easily be encouraged by LEAA and the SPAs, given the monetary inducements that they have to offer. They could actually fund manpower planning efforts in police agencies, and they could require that other manpower-related grants be clearly part of a manpower planning process. Before funding a job analysis, for example, they could require evidence that the project was part of a larger effort to determine the kinds of people needed in the police agency, and not just a reaction to outside pressure or a faddish adoption of scientific methods. Many police departments would not be able to comply with the new manpower planning approach immediately, of course, and would need instruction and assistance. With such developmental effort, however, it would seem that LEAA and the SPAs could, through judicious allocation of their funds, encourage police organizations to undertake manpower planning and a broader approach to human resource management.

Should the proposed cuts in LEAA funding be approved, the opportunities for the agency and the SPAs to promote police manpower planning through direct grant-letting to police departments would be diminished. Several avenues of influence would still be open, however. The current proposals largely maintain LEAA funding for research, and some of these dollars could be used for manpower planning development. Evaluative studies of the effects of manpower-related activities and manpower planning systems would be useful to police agencies, as would research on the consequences of different numbers and kinds of police personnel and different strategies for utilizing them. Through their own data-gathering activities, LEAA and the SPAs could also improve current knowledge about police human resources, while at the same time causing police agencies to take notice of the types of data that manpower planning would require. Within their states, SPAs are well placed to coordinate and to influence the activities of higher educational institutions, statewide associations, and departments of labor as they affect police employment. In addition, the SPAs could work with and through the state-level police training and certification commissions in an effort to integrate the traditional police concern for training within a broader human resource development and manpower planning framework.

Finally, there is a need for continued conceptual development, and technical development, of manpower planning as a management program and as a set of methods and techniques. There are a few books and articles that are instructive

98

about how to do manpower planning and that are understandable by the general reader, but much of the literature is verv technical and mathematically sophisticated. Also, much of the literature is written for the private sector, rather than for government agencies, which raises some problems of relevance and comparability. The literature specifically pertaining to manpower planning for police organizations is very scarce. Because manpower planning is a somewhat vague and amorphous program, spanning conventional organizational and disciplinary boundaries, it is not obvious to everyone what it is and how it should be done. Thus, police departments would probably find it useful if guides to police manpower planning could be developed and disseminated.

Notes — Chapter 3

1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (New York: Avon Books, 1968), p. 239.
2. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Police* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 101.
3. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 5.
4. See David J. Farmer, "The Future of Local Law Enforcement in the United States," *Police Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1970).
5. President's Commission, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, p. 239.
6. U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System: 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 5–7.
7. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two*, p. 2.
8. Census data cited in *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two*, p. 5.
9. Census data cited in *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two*, p. 5.
10. National Sheriffs' Association, *County Law Enforcement: An Assessment of Capabilities and Needs* (Washington, D.C.: National Sheriffs' Association, 1978).
11. Computed from *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System: 1977*, pp. 196, 207.
12. John F. Heaphy, ed., *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1978).
13. Heaphy, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey*, p. 10.
14. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two*, p. 2.

15. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two.* p. 1.
16. Heaphy, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey,* p. 9.
17. *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System: 1977.*
18. Heaphy, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey.*
19. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two,* p. 3.
20. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two,* p. 2.
21. Heaphy, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey.*
22. *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two,* p. 3.
23. Heaphy, *Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey,* p. 14.
24. George W. Greisinger, Jeffrey S. Slovak, and Joseph L. Molkup, *Police Personnel Practices in Forty-Two American Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Public Administration Service, 1978).
25. John F. Heaphy, "The Future of Police Improvement," in *The Future of Policing,* ed. Alvin W. Cohn (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1978), pp. 273–95.
26. Steven A. Rynecki, Douglas A. Cairns, and Donald J. Cairns, *Police Collective Bargaining Agreements: A National Management Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1978).
27. Mary Ann Wycoff and George L. Kelling, *The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1978).
28. Dorothy Guyot, "Bending Granite: Attempts to Change the Rank Structure of American Police Departments," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 7, no. 3 (September 1979): 253.
29. Peter S. Ring and Frank Dyson, "Human Resource Planning," in *Police Personnel Administration,* ed. O. Glenn Stahl and Richard A. Staufenberger (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974), p. 46.
30. H. H. Graham, "Manpower Development in the Ontario Provincial Police," *The Police Chief,* August 1976, pp. 30–35; and H. H. Graham, "Ontario Provincial Police Promotional Process," *The Police Chief,* January 1978, p. 47.
31. Robert N. Brenner and J. T. Duncan, *Police Job-Task Analysis: An Overview* (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, draft, 1978).
32. See, for example, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Science and Technology* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967); J. Chaiken, T. Crabill, L. Holliday, D. Jacquette, M. Lawless, and E. Quade, *Criminal Justice Models: An Overview* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976); Jan M. Chaiken, *Patrol Allocation Methodology for Police Departments* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977); and

Richard C. Larson, ed., "Police Deployment," *Management Science* 24, no. 12 (August 1978): 1278–1327.

33. The 201 city and county police departments in the sample had a total of 227,187 full-time-equivalent employees in 1976. Comparable figures for the state police agencies are not available, as employment data for states include other enforcement agencies in addition to the state police. However, the responses of the 39 state police agencies that returned completed surveys indicate that an average size of 1,000 employees would probably be a conservative estimate. Using this estimate, the sample police agencies account for 276,187 full-time-equivalent employees as of 1976. The total number of police protection employees reported for state and local governments in 1976 was 556,926. Thus, the sample agencies employed approximately 50 percent of state and local police agency personnel in 1976.

34. Each category of manpower planning data collection could assume one of three values: regularly collect such information; occasionally collect, or regularly receive from another agency, such information; or, do not collect or receive such information. To create the composite variable, the values for the thirteen categories were summed and averaged. The average scores were computed from only those individual items with valid values, so that missing data were not treated as synonymous with the "do not collect or receive" response. For those agencies that failed to respond to more than half of the information types, no composite score was computed, and their case was treated as missing data for the composite variable. See Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,* 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 119–20.

The manpower planning activity categories were recoded to three values as follows: undertaken by the agency; undertaken for agency by contractor or other government unit; not undertaken. The composite variable was then created using the same procedure described above.

35. All of these composite variables were created using the summing and averaging procedure described in footnote 34. Reliabilities for these and the two dependent variables were tested, using Cronbach's Alpha, with values ranging from .50 to .87. For the exploratory purposes of this study these were considered satisfactory.

36. See Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 247–306; Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, *Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), pp. 47–48 and 441–51; and David F. Greenberg, *Mathematical Criminology* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, 1979), p. 24.

37. See James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968).

38. George W. Greinsinger, Jeffrey S. Slovak, and Joseph L. Molkup, *Civil*

Service Systems: Their Impact on Police Administration (Washington, D.C.: Public Administration Service, 1979).

39. Jack R. Green, Tim Bynum, and Gary W. Cordner, "Environmental Influence on Decision Making in Criminal Justice Organizations." Paper presented at the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual Meeting, Oklahoma City, March 1980.

40. See John Bramham, *Practical Manpower Planning* (London: Institute of Personal Management, 1974); David J. Bell, "Manpower in Corporate Planning," *Long Range Planning* 9 (April 1976), pp. 31–37; Norbut F. Elbert and William J. Kehge, "How to Bridge Fact and Theory in Manpower Planning, *Personnel,* November-December 1976, pp. 31–39; and Keith Ray, "Managerial Manpower Planning: A Systematic Approach," *Long Range Planning* 10 (April 1977), pp. 21–30.

41. Greinsinger, Slovak, and Molkup, *Civil Service Systems: Their Impact on Police Administration, p. 5.*

42. National Advisory Commission, *Police,* pp. 117-119.

Chapter 4
Corrections

This chapter examines manpower planning in correctional organizations. After a brief introductory discussion of certain aspects unique to correctional organizations, the design of the correctional component will be presented. The study's findings will then be discussed, following a format similar to that used in presenting findings about police organizations.

Correctional services in the United States are provided under a wide variety of organizational structures. This fact makes for several crucial distinctions that must be considered not only in the issue of manpower planning but in the study of correctional organizations in general. Perhaps the clearest distinction is the level of government. To a large degree, the provision for correctional services is a state-controlled or at least a state-coordinated function, with all 50 states having a state-level correctional organization. The area of the greatest decentralization is probation, with many states opting for local probation departments directly responsible to the local judiciary. Other states have a combined state and local responsibility for probation services—in that state funds are allocated to local governments to provide these services under their auspices. Still other states have some local jurisdictions that maintain probation departments, while the state provides these services to the remaining communities. Finally, some states have state-level organizations that provide these services for the entire state.

Although each state has something generally called a department of corrections, what that unit provides is quite various and problematic. In some states there exists a centralized department of corrections that provides for institutional as well as field services on both the adult and juvenile level; in other states these functions are administered through different organizations. Each different manner of organizing can exert a significantly different impact upon manpower issues. Whether an organization is able to attract and to retain desired applicants may be less a function of its being a correctional organization than of its being involved in institutional or field services. Thus, while the present discussion concerns manpower planning in correctional organizations, there may be substantial discrepancies between organizational levels and functional responsibilities. Data collected from the surveys of correctional agencies were analyzed with regard to these distinctions, and findings from such comparisons are presented in this chapter.

The corrections component of the Manpower Planning Development Project also included both a set of interviews with correctional agency personnel and a mailed survey. The interview sample was selected on the basis of expert opinion, agency size, and geographic representation, according to the methodology described in Chapter 2. Interviews were conducted with representatives of eight state-level adult correctional agencies, three state-level juvenile correctional agencies, and three local probation agencies in eight states. The format employed for these interviews followed that described for law enforcement agencies and was designed to explore the patterns of influence and relationships viewed as important in funding for personnel, as well as current agency activities in the manpower area.

The survey sample was selected on the basis of type of organization, function, and size. All 50 state departments of adult correction were sent questionnaires. In many cases this organization represented a consolidated agency with divisions for both institutional and field services. In states in which an autonomous state-level agency existed for juvenile corrections (N=28) or probation and/or parole (N=23), surveys were distributed to this organization as well. Finally, local adult probation departments employing over 50 probation officers (N=65) were included in the sample. A total of 166 questionnaires were distributed, and 110 were returned: a response rate of 66 percent. Table 4.1 presents the breakdown of

Table 4.1
Distribution and Return of
Corrections Survey By Geographic Region

Region	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation	Total
Northeast	6/7	2/3	3/4	6/8	17/22 (77%)
Middle Atlantic	4/4	1/3	3/3	8/13	16/23 (70%)
Southeast	12/12	3/7	2/6	1/2	18/27 (67%)
Mideast	6/9	4/4	3/3	9/14	22/30 (73%)
Midwest	5/8	1/5	1/3	1/1	8/17 (47%)
Southwest	2/4	1/2	1/1	2/4	6/11 (55%)
West	3/6	3/4	1/3	16/23	23/36 (64%)
Total	38/50 (76%)	15/28 (54%)	14/23 (61%)	43/65 (66%)	110/166 (66%)

104

the distribution of all responses to the corrections questionnaire by agency type and geographic region.

The same questionnaire used for law enforcement agencies, with minor modifications of example, was used with the correctional agencies. Thus, comparisons across all agency types may be made and will be presented in this chapter.

The format for the analysis of the data collected on manpower planning in correctional agencies will follow that presented in the preceding chapter. Thus, four major issues will be explored: current practices in manpower planning in correctional organizations, the condition and constraints that potentially influence manpower planning, the relationship of these factors to the actual carrying out of manpower planning, and the relationship of manpower planning to correctional agencies' ability to attract and to retain desired employees.

I. Current Practices

Although the existence of a formal planning unit within the agency is not a precondition to doing planning, such organization may facilitate the gathering and analyzing of information about agency activity. Fifty-four percent of the respondents indicated that their agency had a formal planning unit; however, as Table 4.2 indicates, there are sizable differences between one type of agency and another.

Here we clearly observe that the state-level agencies, particularly adult corrections and probation and parole, were much more likely to have a unit whose specific responsibility was planning than were the local probation departments. To a certain degree this relationship was a result of agency size, although we may hypothesize that the funding of local probation agencies is such that having a planning unit is for them much more of a "luxury."

Table 4.2

Possessing a Planning Unit by Type of Agency

	State Adult Corrections		State Juvenile Corrections		State Probation/ Parole		Local Proba- tion		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Does not have a planning unit	23.7	(9)	57.1	(8)	21.4	(3)	69.8	(30)	45.9	(50)
Has a planning unit	76.3	(29)	42.9	(6)	78.6	(11)	30.2	(13)	54.1	(59)

105

There also appear to be differences among agency types in the work of such a planning unit. Respondents were asked to indicate what agency subdivision had primary responsibility for ten planning-related functions. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the involvement of the planning unit varied greatly among the four types of agencies. Although over three-fourths of the state probation and parole agencies report having a formal planning unit, there appears to be varying responsibility delegated to that unit. The areas in which planning units in adult and juvenile correctional agencies have the greatest involvement include preparing grant applications and evaluating agency programs. In addition, there is little involvement of planning units in probation agencies. Such a finding does not indicate that probation departments are not preparing grants and evaluating programs, but that where these activities are performed they are conducted by other agency divisions. The reader is encouraged further to inspect Table 4.3 for additional variations.

In addition to the corrections surveys, site interviews were conducted with over a dozen corrections agencies. Some interviewees characterized their planning unit as being the force for creativity in the organization, a unit that was responsible for the introduction of new ideas as well as for monitoring the progress of the agency. Interviewees noted some amount of activity in the area of preparing grant applications and analyzing agency work-load data, but little planning-unit involvement was reported in the more forward-looking areas of developing new programs or forecasting future employment needs. This would seem to be supported by Table 4.3 findings.

Manpower-Related Data Collection

Respondents were asked to indicate whether certain types of manpower data were collected by their agencies, and they were asked to rate the importance of these data, regardless of whether such were currently being collected. The responses for the thirteen categories of manpower data are presented in Table 4.4. (Little difference was noted between agency types: so data presented are from all correctional respondents.)

The category of information most often indicated as being regularly collected was the evaluation of employee performance (81.5 percent). Over 70 percent of the respondents indicated that they regularly collected data on employee training and agency work load, and 66 percent of the agencies stated that they kept data on their turnover rates. Over 60 percent of respondents indicated that they did *not* collect or receive information concerning the career orientation of the labor market or the rewards offered by competing employers, and over a third of all respondents indicated that they did not have information on employee job satisfaction, characteristics of applicants, and characteristics of the area labor market.

Besides being asked about the *availability* of types of data, respondents were asked to rate the *importance* of each of the categories of information. Not

106

Table 4.3
Planning Unit Responsible
for Tasks by Type of Agency

Types of Responsibilities	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
Updating agency forms and policies	16.7%	23.1%	0.0%	2.3%
Aiding in development of agency budget requests	13.9%	30.8%	0.0%	2.3%;
Preparing grant applications	51.4%	15.4%	7.1%	16.3%
Developing new agency programs	22.2%	7.7%	0.0%	9.3%
Evaluating agency programs	43.2%	33.3%	7.1%	14.0%
Anticipating future employment needs (e.g., numbers of personnel needed)	8.6%	8.3%	0.0%	4.7%
Collecting & analyzing agency work-load data and analyzing agency operations	35.1%	23.1%	7.1%	18.6%
Collecting and analyzing agency personnel data	8.1%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%
Responding to outside requests for information	27.0%	0.0%	7.1%	11.6%
Overseeing and/or analyzing training needs and programs	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	7.0%

Table 4.4
Extent of Manpower Planning Data Collection
and Information Importance for All Corrections Agencies

Information Types	Regularly Collect Such Information	Occasionally Collect, or Receive from Another Agency, Such Information	Do Not Collect or Receive Such Information	Average Rated Importance of the Information (0=No Importance, to 5= Strong Importance)
Work load performed by the agency	76.4%	20.7%	2.8%	4.6
Personnel turnover rate	66.4%	31.6%	1.9%	3.9
Training undergone by employees	78.5%	21.5%	0.0%	4.1
Employee educational attainment	51.9%	39.8%	8.3%	3.4
Employee assignment preferences	33.3%	43.9%	22.9%	3.1
Employee performance evaluations	81.5%	13.8%	4.6%	4.4
Employee job satisfaction	13.2%	49.1%	37.7%	3.3
Characteristics of applicants	21.7%	41.6%	36.8%	3.1
Characteristics of area labor market	3.7%	49.6%	46.7%	2.0
Career orientations of labor market	1.9%	30.2%	67.9%	1.6
Rewards offered by competing employers	2.9%	33.4%	63.9%	1.7
Changing requirements of agency jobs	29.6%	54.7%	15.7%	3.3
Social and economic trends that may affect the agency	16.7%	59.3%	24.1%	2.9

surprisingly, several categories of information that were collected were rated highly, while several of those not collected were seen as less important. However, several categories not generally or regularly collected were seen as moderately important. Less than a third of all respondents reported regularly collecting data on employee job satisfaction (13%) and characteristics of applicants (22%); yet these categories received a mean importance rating of higher than 3.0 (0 = no importance; 5 = strong importance). It may be recalled that 91 percent of police agencies indicated that they regularly collected this information. This difference is even more striking in that the rated importance of the information was similar for both correctional and police organizations, and among types of correctional agencies.

Comparing these results with those from the police agencies (Table 3.3), we note that in no information category did the percentage of correctional agencies regularly collecting data attain the level of police agencies. For instance, while 76 percent of correctional agencies indicate that they regularly collect work-load data, 91 percent of police agencies report this level of data collection.

Manpower Planning Activities

Corrections survey respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which their agencies undertook the ten manpower-planning activities discussed in the previous chapter. Responses to this item are presented in Table 4.5. A large majority of respondents indicated that their agencies had done performance evaluation and training needs assessment, while about half indicated they had done a job analysis, manpower inventory, and job redesign. Forty-six percent of the agencies reported having a personnel information system, while 29 percent had conducted selection validation. Less than a fourth of the respondents had undertaken career path analysis, 11 percent had conducted manpower simulation, and only three percent reported doing a labor-market analysis.

Respondents were also asked to indicate whether each of the activities had been performed for the agency either by a contractor or by another governmental unit. About half of the respondents reported that their agency had selection validation and labor-market analysis conducted for them. Forty-four percent had outside agencies or contractors conduct a job analysis, and 38 percent a personnel information system. In addition, over 20 percent had manpower inventory and job redesign externally provided, while 18 percent had career path analysis, 16 percent had manpower simulation, and 14 percent had training needs assessment conducted by others. Less than 10 percent had performance evaluation conducted by outside contractors or by other government units.

Since these results are similar to those from police agencies, the interpretations presented in the previous chapter may also be appropriate for correctional agencies. The decision as to whether a manpower-planning activity will be conducted by the agency or performed by another governmental unit or outside contractor was viewed as largely a function of technical capability,

Table 4.5
Extent of Manpower Planning Activity
Undertaken by Correctional Agencies

Activity Types	Undertaken by the Agency	Undertaken for Agency By Contractor or Other Government Unit	Not Undertaken but Would Be Useful	Not Undertaken Nor Likely to Be Useful
Job analysis	51.4%	43.9%	3.7%	.9%
Selection validation	29.1%	49.4%	19.4%	1.9%
Manpower inventory	58.7%	21.3%	15.4%	4.8%
Performance evaluation	90.5%	5.8%	3.8%	0.0%
Personnel information system	46.1%	38.2%	13.7%	2.0%
Labor market analysis	2.9%	47.1%	30.4%	19.6%
Career path analysis	19.8%	17.9%	51.5%	10.9%
Manpower simulation (e.g., personnel processing and career path models)	11.0%	16.0%	56.0%	17.0%
Job redesign	54.5%	22.2%	18.2%	5.1%
Training needs assessment	82.5%	13.6%	3.9%	0.0%

proprietary functions, and importance of the activity to the agency. As with police respondents, respondents to the correctional survey indicated that those items that were viewed most likely to be useful (performance evaluation and training needs assessment) were the activities most likely to be conducted by the agency staff. Conversely, activities rated as not likely to be useful were not often conducted. Furthermore those manpower activities seen as useful but involving

some degree of technical skill or potential turf infringement (job analysis, selection validation, personnel information system, manpower simulation) were often performed for the agency by others.

There is one major difference between the responses to the police survey and the correction survey in this area. Thirty-eight percent of the correctional respondents indicated that they had a personnel information system maintained for them by another agency while only 14 percent of police respondents fell into this category. Twenty-one percent of correctional respondents indicated that outside sources had provided a manpower inventory for them, as compared to only four percent of the police respondents. This finding can generally be explained by the fact that a larger portion of respondents for corrections were from state-level agencies, and these activities are more likely generally to fall under the purview of centralized civil service systems.

As with the police agencies, three of the activities were identified as being performed by or for the agencies by half or fewer than half of the correctional respondents: labor market analysis (50 percent), career path analysis (38 percent), and manpower simulation (27 percent). Of the agencies not having these forms of analysis, a majority indicated that each of them would be useful.

Manpower simulation and career path analysis were identified as highly useful by both police and correctional respondents. It may be that although these two undertakings are viewed as important by criminal justice agencies, the agencies lack the technical capabilities or the resources to do these things or to have them done for them.

Respondents to the correctional survey, like police respondents, indicated some degree of consistency between the types of data that they have available (Table 4.4) and the forms of manpower analysis that are conducted (Table 4.5). For example, respondents reported that the data most frequently collected were about training undergone by employees and the evaluation of employee performance. Such a finding is consistent with the reports that planning activities most frequently conducted were the evaluation of performance and the assessment of training needs.

While these responses indicate that correctional agencies have considerable data available and conduct a moderate amount of planning-related activity, a definite pattern emerges in the types of data and activities in which the agency becomes involved. As with police agencies, correctional agencies apparently are more active with respect to traditional concerns of internal resource management such as training and performance evaluations, and apparently less involved with external considerations such as labor-market analysis or career trends or nontraditional forms of planning activities like job satisfaction and career path analysis.

Although this level of data and activity are reported by correctional agencies, such information tells us little about their use and how they relate to the character and quality of correctional administration. While the interviews with correctional administrators confirmed the existence of these types of data and

manpower activities, there was little evidence to suggest that these were integrated into a coordinated manpower plan. The interviews (see Chapter 7) revealed that when planning was conducted it was generally a response to crises or predilections of particular administrators or funding sources rather than being an on-going coordinated approach to the management of human resources.

Conditions and Constraints

In the examination of the underlying conditions and constraints facing correctional agencies, the same model of analysis was used as was used in the survey of police agencies (Figure 3.1). To set the stage for this section, portions of the survey dealing with agency size, changes in agency size, and condition of the economy are discussed first. For the adult correctional agencies responding to the survey, the average size was 1,374 full-time allocated positions, with the median being 604. The average state-level probation/parole agency had 331 positions while the median was 276. State-level juvenile agencies averaged 1,262 full-time positions with a median of 390, while local probation averaged 239 with a median of 102. Respondents were also asked to indicate how much the number of positions allocated to their agency had changed over the past two years. Table 4.6 presents the responses to this item for each agency type. Although the

Table 4.6
Percentage Change in Number of Positions
in Last Two Years, by Type of Agency

Percentage Change	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
	(N=34)	(N=14)	(N=14)	(N=43)
Greater than 10% decrease	0	14%	0	12%
Between 1 and 10% decrease	6%	21%	21%	26%
Stable	3%	7%	0	19%
Between 1 and 10% increase	47%	50%	64%	37%
Greater than 10% increase	44%	7%	14%	7%

majority of all types of correctional agencies indicated that they have grown, growth in the state adult correctional agencies has been the greatest, with 44 percent of the agencies reporting growth greater than 10 percent.

Apparently, correctional agencies were experiencing a much greater fluctuation in numbers of personnel than law enforcement agencies. While 10 percent of the respondents to the law enforcement survey indicated that their agency had had a change in number of positions greater than 10 percent (without regard to direction) in the last two years, 26 percent of the correctional agencies reported this magnitude of change.

Respondents were asked to indicate their perception of the general economic condition of their jurisdiction over the past two years. Five response options, ranging from rapid growth to rapid decline, were available. Forty-nine percent of the respondents felt that their area had grown moderately, 14 percent rapidly. Nineteen percent indicated that they viewed their jurisdiction's economy as being stable, and 18 percent thought they were experiencing some form of economic decline.

Equal Employment Pressure

As hypothesized in Figure 3.1, the extent of manpower planning undertaken by agencies might be seen as conditioned by the extent of equal employment pressure. Table 4.7 indicates the degree of such pressure as perceived by the various respondents. Although a majority of respondents in each agency type reported at least moderate affirmative action pressure, state adult correctional

Table 4.7

Extent of Affirmative Action Pressure
by Type of Agency

Degree of Pressure	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
	(N=37)	(N=14)	(N=13)	(N=42)
No pressure	13%	0	23%	19%
Weak pressure	11%	7%	8%	12%
Moderate pressure	22%	43%	23%	43%
Strong pressure	22%	36%	38%	19%
Very strong pressure	32%	14%	8%	7%

agencies reported the greatest pressure, with 32 percent indicating that they were under pressure. This influence for correctional agencies appears to be primarily a state-level phenomenon, with 52 percent of all state agencies indicating that they were under strong or very strong pressure while only 26 percent of the local probation agencies fell into these categories. Since 56 percent of all police agencies report this level of pressure to employ women and minorities, there is some degree of consistency for these findings, with local probation departments being an exception. This finding is consistent with interview information from state-level correctional administrators, many of whom reported efforts to recruit and to employ minorities and women.

Union Constraint

Another factor potentially influencing manpower planning is union constraint on personnel processes and decisions. Survey respondents were asked to indicate the effect of agreements or contracts with employee unions or associations upon six personnel matters: initial selection process, promotion, assignment, allocation to shift, discipline, and working conditions. The responses for all types of correctional agencies are presented in Table 4.8. As did respondents to the police survey, correctional administrators reported that the areas in which there was the greatest union activity were the disciplinary process and changes in working conditions, and the least affected was the initial selection process. Although similar responses were noted for each of the types of correctional agencies, the organizations representing employees in state adult correctional agencies and local probation agencies appeared to be more active. For example, with regard to employee discipline, 42 percent of respondents from local probation agencies and 21 percent from adult correctional agencies reported that these matters are completely mandated by contract or agreement, while only eight percent of juvenile and probation/parole agencies reported this level of union or association activity. The influence of employee associations and unions in correctional agencies apparently varies greatly. With regard to the issues of promotion, assignment, and allocation, about a fourth of the respondents indicated that these were partially under union control, a fourth indicated that they were likely to become an issue, and two-fifths felt that they were not likely to be concerned with these issues in the future.

The interviews conducted with correctional administrators also suggested a similar variation in the level of union influence. The most often mentioned areas of such activity were discipline and assignment. Of additional importance, however, was union activity in regard to salary and manning level. In these areas the union negotiations would more directly involve the funding authority rather than the correctional agency. Any gains made by the union in these areas would most likely benefit the agency either directly through increased numbers of personnel or indirectly through offering higher salaries that may improve the agency's ability to attract and to retain desirable employees.

114

Table 4.8
Extent of Union Constraint on
Personnel Matters in Correctional Agencies

(N=99)

Personnel Matters	Completely Mandated in Contract or Agreement	Partially Mandated in Contract or Agreement	Not at Present Affected but Likely to be an Issue for Future Bargaining	Not Affected and Not Likely to Be an Issue
Initial selection	3.0%	10.1%	19.2%	67.7%
Promotion process	6.1%	25.3%	27.3%	41.4%
Assignments/ transfers	8.1%	31.3%	25.3%	35.4%
Allocations to units or shifts	7.1%	22.2%	28.3%	42.4%
Disciplinary process	26.5%	26.5%	17.3%	29.6%
Changes in working conditions	14.1%	37.3%	23.2%	30.3%

Civil Service Control

Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 0 to 5 the importance of the civil service unit in their jurisdiction in determining entry-level qualifications, whom to hire, and whom to promote. The mean response for each agency type is presented in Table 4.9. Clearly the influence of civil service is greater for all agency types in determining minimum job qualifications, and the influence in this category is particularly strong for adult and juvenile state-level agencies. Moderately influenced was the decision concerning whom to hire, and least influenced was the promotion decision. In each decision area, the influence of the civil service unit was strongest for state juvenile correctional agencies and weakest for local probation agencies. As with police agencies, the rating of civil service influence was bimodal—that is, respondents generally rated themselves as being strongly influenced by it or not influenced at all.

Table 4.9

Extent of Civil Service Control Over
Personnel Matters, by Type of Correctional Agency

Mean Responses on a Scale of
0 (No Importance) to 5 (Strong Importance)

	State Adult Correc- tions	State Juvenile Correc- tions	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
Civil service influence in determining mini- mum qualifications	4.0	4.7	3.2	3.0
Civil service influence in deciding whom to hire	2.9	3.6	2.9	1.7
Civil service influence in deciding whom to promote	2.5	2.9	1.5	1.6

Competition for Applicants

How much competition the agency experienced for job applicants was also viewed as potentially affecting the conduct of manpower planning. Corrections survey respondents were asked to rate five other types of employers as to their degree of competition with the correctional agency for qualified personnel. The mean responses to this set of questions for each agency type are presented in Table 4.10. The response options ranged from 0 (no competition) to 5 (strong competi- tion). Each type of correctional agency indicated that its primary competition for qualified personnel came from other criminal justice agencies, and the respondents from adult correctional agencies perceived this competition as being strongest. Every type of agency perceived a moderate degree of competition from other governmental agencies, and all viewed competition from industrial operations as third in importance. Respondents in agencies involved in institutional corrections reported more competition from non-industrial operations and private companies than did those primarily involved in field services. Several interviewees indicated that competition for personnel in institutional corrections was a function of the economy and the location of the correctional facility. In good economic times, competition (and thus turnover)

Table 4.10
Competition for Personnel,
by Type of Correctional Agency

Mean Response on a Scale of
0 (No Competition) to 5 (Strong Competition)

	State Adult Correc- tions	State Juvenile Correc- tions	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
Other criminal justice agencies	3.8	3.5	3.1	3.2
Non-criminal-justice governmental agencies	3.2	3.0	2.5	2.3
Industrial operations	3.1	2.5	1.9	2.3
Private security companies	1.5	1.3	.6	.7
Nonindustrial opera- tions	2.0	1.8	.4	.8

would be high in that employees could often find "better jobs." On the other hand, in hard times there would be less competition as present employees would have few other job opportunities.

This section has presented some of the descriptive findings about a number of factors that were viewed as conditions that may either facilitate or constrain manpower planning in correctional organizations. We will later examine their actual affect on manpower planning. However, from the data presented here it is apparent that a number of correctional agencies (particularly those involved in the operation of adult correctional institutions) have over the past two years had substantial increase in the number of allocated positions. In addition, respondents from these agencies reported much affirmative action pressure and competition for qualified personnel. These factors would seem to indicate an environment that was ripe for the exercise of manpower planning. However, as was pointed out in a number of interviews, the correctional enterprise is not conducted in a political vacuum. There are a number of other internal and external factors that can intervene in this environment to influence the pay-off from planning. In the previous chapter these elements were termed reciprocal factors because of their potential interaction with the agency and its operating

environment. The following section presents a description of the results concerning these elements.

Influence of Reciprocal Factors

A set of reciprocal factors that may influence planning are identified on the right-hand side of Figure 3.1 (Chapter 3). This group of factors is largely the perception of the correctional respondents about the rationality and predictability of decisions affecting the allocation of funds for human resources to their agency. As was noted in regard to the police survey, such perception may influence the level of manpower planning, but it is also likely to be influenced by the level of planning currently conducted.

Several survey items asked respondents to indicate how much influence they had in bringing about changes in the number of allocated positions. Ninety-five percent of the correctional respondents indicated that they felt that they had at least a moderate amount of influence in bringing about increases: 62 percent of the state probation and parole agencies felt that they had great influence, and 49 percent of adult agency respondents reported such a degree of influence. While a substantial number of respondents indicated that their agency had had no experience with decreases in number of positions, 71 percent of the 67 respondents to this item indicated that they had at least moderate influence in minimizing the size of the decrease.

The interviews with correctional personnel did not confirm this level of perceived infuence over funding decreases. Such an anomaly points to the difficulty of tapping perceptual opinion on an item so laden with social desirability. For the most part, interviewees expressed the view that they were operating in a highly political environment and that decisions were rendered more on the basis of political ideology and expediency than upon the basis of agency-determined need. For example, one large state correctional agency reported having been funded to construct a population-prediction model in order to plan for the construction of new correctional facilities. At the same time, the legislature also funded a similar study to be conducted by an independent contractor recommended by an anti-prison-construction group. Not surprisingly, the two studies produced different results and the legislature in a fiscally conservative mood approved the no-new-construction position. Another department reported the continued submission of a carefully analyzed post plan specifying additional staff needed to achieve a necessary manning level. This request was rejected for a number of years until a chief executive sensitive to correctional needs was elected and the same request was funded without question. Chapter 7 will further elaborate on these issues.

Also related to the issue of increases or decreases in the number of allocated positions is the amount of lead time given to agencies in order to plan for changes in staffing levels. Respondents were asked to indicate in general how far in advance they were able to anticipate changes in level of funding for personnel.

Five response options were available: over a year, seven to twelve months, one to six months, less than a month, and not at all. Sixty-three percent of the respondents to the corrections survey indicated that they were able to anticipate increases at least seven months in advance. This was greatest for state-level probation/parole agencies with 77·percent indicating a seven-month lead time, and for adult correctional agencies with 69 percent reporting this level of advance notice. Apparently correctional agencies do not have as much advance warning when *decreases* are forthcoming: only 41 percent indicated that they have over seven months to plan for such changes. Again, state juvenile agencies and local probation had the least time to plan: 68 percent of local probation agencies and 60 percent of state juvenile corrections reported that they had six months or less lead time to prepare for decreases.

Besides being asked about the degree of influence and anticipation of change in numbers of allocated positions, respondents were asked to indicate the importance of several factors in the funding decision for increases or decreases in the number of positions. Two of these factors centered upon rational ("agency analysis and presentation of needs") and political aspects of the funding decision. Respondents were asked to rate this series of factors for importance on a scale of 0 (no importance) to 5 (strong importance). Table 4.11 presents the mean scores for these rational and political factors in increases and decreases for each agency type.

All types of correctional agencies viewed the analysis and presentation of agency needs as being quite important in influencing *increases* in allocated positions. Although politics and rational factors were noted equally by respondents from state juvenile agencies, respondents from all other agencies felt that the rational factors were more important than political considerations. On the other hand, while some correctional agencies rated analysis and presentation of needs as being important to *decreases* in personnel (particularly those indicating that they were arguing that a particular function be transferred to another agency), political factors were seen as exerting more influence in situations resulting in a decrease in personnel.

Several difficulties arise in the interpretation of these findings. These mean scores represent an *average:* thus, one respondent may have considered decisions in his environment to be highly political, and another respondent considered such decisions to be greatly influenced by agency-need-determined arguments. The average score for the two respondents would seem to reveal that the importance of these two factors was about equal—when in fact one environment could be characterized as highly political and the other highly rational. There is some indication that this type of distribution occurs within the present sample. For example, 42 percent of the respondents from state-level probation/parole agencies indicated that politics was not important in the decision to increase number of positions, while 58 percent of the agencies indicated that this decision was highly political (rated 4 or 5) in their jurisdictions. Similarly with regard to the decreases due to political factors, 24 percent of the state adult correctional

Table 4.11

Importance of Rational and Political Factors
For Changes in Numbers of Allocated Positions

Mean Responses on a Scale of
0 (No Importance) to 5 (Strong Importance)

	State Adult Correc- tions	State Juvenile Correc- tions	State Probation/ Parole	Local Probation
Importance of agency analysis and pre- sentation of needs for increases	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.9
Importance of agency analysis and pre- sentation of needs for decreases	2.8	2.5	.9	2.3
Importance of politi- cal factors for increases	2.7	3.7	2.7	2.6
Importance of politi- cal factors for decreases	2.9	3.5	3.6	3.4

agencies indicated that their considerations were of no importance, while 55 percent stated that they were of great importance (rated 4 or 5).

The zero-order correlations between these factors further illustrate this concept of environment. Table 4.12 presents the correlation between several factors influencing increases in the number of positions. These data indicate that those respondents who viewed the "needs-based" agency arguments for increased numbers of positions as important also rated lower the importance of such environmental factors as critical incidents, politics, law suits, and public image. Conversely, those who saw these environmental factors as being of major importance rated lower the influence of agency planning efforts. In addition, those who viewed the planning process as influential said they had more influence over the allocation their agency receives. Likewise, those saying that politics were very important more often felt that they had less influence in the allocation process.

Table 4.12
Correlation of Factors of Influence in Increases
in Number of Positions in Correctional Agencies

	Critical incident(s)	Public image of the agency	Political factors	Agency analysis & presentation of needs	Lawsuits
Public's image of the agency	.42*				
Political factors	.47*	.56*			
Agency analysis and presentation of needs (rational planning)	-.31*	-.10	.27*		
Lawsuits	.59*	.31*	.33*	.05	
Agency influence	.14	-.12	.30*	.36	.16

*P < .05

A difficulty in interpreting this outcome lies in the perceptional nature of the data. The findings are the sum of the perceptions of the individuals completing the questionnaire—and, of course, different individuals in the same agencies may believe that different patterns of influence are operating. On the other hand, the findings may represent a real difference in environments. That is, some agencies may find themselves in an environment in which agency-determined needs arguments may have major impact while in other environments such a strategy would prove ineffective.

The interviews with correctional administrators tended to confirm this environmental perspective and somewhat to dampen the optimism of survey respondents concerning the impact of agency analysis. While all those interviewed emphasized the need for planning for internal allocation of resources and the management of the agency, several remarked that the pay-off from such an exercise was likely to diminish as one moved away from decisions directly under the control of the agency. One particular indirect benefit of such a planning effort was noted by one administrator who commented that a well-coordinated planning effort at least gives the impression of a well-run and efficient agency, which enhances the reputation and credibility of the

administrator, which in turn increases the ability of the agency to obtain increased allocations for personnel.

Although we may speak of local chief executives and administrators who make decisions on primarily political or primarily rational arguments, political and rational criteria are by no means mutually exclusive. To indicate that a decision is made upon political grounds is by no means to say it isn't rational. In fact one administrator commented that (rational) planning was a way of justifying a political decision that had already been made. The funding decision cannot be characterized as simply rational or political; it should more appropriately be viewed as a process that is in different situations influenced by different factors. For example, many correctional administrators noted the importance of critical incidents in either opening or closing the funding gates. For institutional corrections, a riot was likely to bring forth a substantial increase in the agency budget, while for field services a heinous crime committed by a person under community supervision would be likely to bring about a cut in funding. Furthermore, several correctional administrators noted the importance of legal decisions that mandated a certain level of funding as appropriate for correctional programs and staff. Chapter 7 will further elaborate upon this pattern of relationships.

Also of concern in the correctional agency survey was the level of influence that the rational factors and political considerations had in the determination of the *kind* of people to employ. Respondents were asked to indicate the importance on a scale from 1 (of no importance) to 4 (very important) of a group of factors potentially influencing the kinds of people employed in their agency. Table 4.13 presents the responses from all types of correctional agencies. The first two items—analysis of job requirements and assessment of agency needs—represent internal and rational dimensions of this decision and received the highest rating of any of these factors. Over two-thirds of the respondents indicated that these were very important. The next two items—availability of desirable applicants and labor-market conditions—represented external and rational factors. While both these factors were viewed as fairly important, their influence was apparently second to that of the internal rational considerations. The remaining items in Table 4.13 represent external and political influences on the decision about what kinds of people should be employed in correctional agencies. Except for equal employment concerns, this final group of items was viewed as being of little importance in this decision.

When these results are compared to those obtained in the police survey (Table 3.10), several interesting points emerge. Initially apparent is the greater importance of the internal factors for the correctional agencies. While 71 percent of correctional respondents indicated that an analysis of job requirements was very important, only 47 percent of police respondents indicated this level of importance. Although *external rational* factors were rated similarly, there were several differences in the importance of *external political* factors. While 57 percent of police respondents indicated that equal employment issues were very

Table 4.13
Importance of Various Considerations for Kinds-of-People Determinations for All Correctional Agencies

Items	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Of No Importance
Importance of analysis of job requirements	71.2%	22.1%	4.8%	1.9%
Importance of assessment of agency needs	69.8%	22.6%	6.6%	.9%
Importance of availability of desirable applicants	54.7%	34.0%	8.5%	2.8%
Importance of labor market conditions	25.7%	42.9%	24.8%	6.7%
Importance of political pressure	3.8%	12.6%	44.7%	38.8%
Importance of equal employment affirmative action	29.5%	57.1%	7.6%	5.7%
Importance of public opinion	3.8%	14.4%	46.2%	35.6%
Importance of specific court cases injunctions	11.7%	14.6%	29.1%	44.7%
Importance of union policies	4.0%	16.0%	21.0%	59.0%

important, only 30 percent of the correctional respondents indicated this degree of importance. Another major difference between these two types of agencies was in the area of public opinion. Forty-five percent of the respondents from police agencies ranked public opinion as important in determining the kind of people to employ, while only 18 percent of the correctional respondents indicated that public attitude influenced them this much.

123

In interviews with corrections administrators, issues similar to those in the police interviews emerged. However, corrections interviewees indicated a greater concern over the *numbers* of people than the *kinds* of people that were employed. This was particularly the case with administrators of agencies involved in institutional corrections who indicated that they were having significant turnover problems. While corrections administrators were obviously concerned with getting qualified personnel, high turnover rates and burgeoning institutional populations tended to focus their immediate attention upon getting and keeping critical staffing levels.

Factors Affecting Manpower Planning

As outlined in Figure 3.1, a multivariate analysis was conducted to study the effect of the previously described items upon manpower-planning data collection and manpower planning. The present analysis uses coding and operationalization of concepts that were used in the police survey. Two multiple regression analyses were conducted, and the findings are presented in Table 4.14. In each analysis, dummy variables were employed to represent adult, juvenile, and local probation agencies.

The overall strength of the relationships between this group of variables and the two dependent variables is not large, with the R^2 values being only .08 and .16. Thus, a great deal of the variation in the collection of manpower data and the performance of manpower activities by correctional agencies is left unexplained by this set of factors. Not only are the equations themselves not statistically significant, but none of the individual variables reached an acceptable level of significance. However, with only 74 cases in the analyses, in some cases this lack of significance may be a result of sample size.

Nonetheless, several variables have comparatively strong standardized regression coefficients, indicating their importance relative to other variables in the equation. Having the strongest relationship with manpower data collection is equal employment pressure: controlling for all other factors, the greater the perceived equal employment pressure, the greater the manpower data collection. Close behind in importance are union constraint, civil service control, and agency size change. Thus, more manpower data collection tends to be associated with more union constraint, greater change in agency size, and less civil service control. Such findings seem to indicate that the agencies rapidly changing in size and under affirmative action pressure and union constraints are more likely to have a greater amount of manpower data. In addition, those agencies not having a strong civil service system were more likely to have manpower data.

These findings are at some variance with those from the police survey. While the importance of agency size change was similar in both magnitude and direction for police and correctional agencies, different results were obtained for a number of other influences. The differences were particularly striking with equal employment pressure, union constraint, and competition for applicants.

Table 4.14
Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors
Affecting Extent of Manpower Planning Data Collection
and Activity in Correctional Agencies

Factors	Standardized Regression Coefficients	
	With Extent of Data Collection Dependent	With Extent of Activity Dependent
	(N=74)	
Agency size	.02	.15
Economic conditions	.05	-.11
Agency size change	.15	.05
Equal employment pressure	.19	.13
Union constraint	.16	.11
Civil service control	-.15	.04
Competition for applicants	-.03	-.18
State adult corrections agency dummy variable	.02	.08
State juvenile corrections agency dummy variable	-.03	.14
Local probation agency dummy variable	.09	-.08
Multiple R	.29	.41
R^2	.08	.16
Adjusted R^2	-.06	.03
F	.580	1.24
Significance	NS	NS

Note: None of these coefficients is statistically significant at the .05 level.

While police agencies were more likely to collect manpower data if they had much competition for applicants, correctional agncies were more likely to collect such data if they were under equal employment pressure and union constraints. In addition, although those correctional agencies indicating that they were under high civil service control were less likely to have manpower data, this variable was of negligible importance for police agencies.

With regard to doing manpower planning, again, no individual variable was statistically significant. The strongest relationship noted was with competition for applicants, with agencies feeling greater competition engaged in less manpower planning. Other comparatively strong positive relationships were found with agency size, equal employment pressure, and union constraints. In addition, a moderately strong coefficient was found for state juvenile agencies, indicating that this type of agency was more often involved in these activities. There was a negative correlation with economic conditions, indicating that planning is more likely to come as economic conditions worsen. Manpower-planning activities were more often undertaken by large agencies that were operating in an environment characterized by declining economic conditions and affirmative action and union pressures.

It was hypothesized that if correctional agencies faced high turnover rates and significant competition for applicants, a situation would be created in which manpower planning may not only be facilitated but perhaps necessitated. Such expectations were confirmed by results from the police survey in which the competition variable was found to be significantly positively related to the amount of planning. These same results were not confirmed by the corrections survey. Although the "competition for applicants" variable had one of the strongest beta weights, it was in a negative direction—indicating that the greater the competition for applicants, the less likely planning.

The relationships with extent of manpower planning and the factors on the right side of Figure 3.1 are presented in Table 4.15. In the first column, zero-order correlations are presented, while the partial correlation coefficients, controlling for all other variables in that table, are presented in the second column. The factors most strongly associated with planning were internal and external rational and external political considerations in kinds-of-people determinations. That is, the stronger the influences the agency perceived over what kinds of people to employ, the more the planning. The importance of these factors diminishes when all other factors are controlled for and a stronger relationship with anticipation emerges. The more agencies are able to anticipate changes in personnel, the greater the manpower planning activity.

Agency Ability to Attract and to Retain

Two questions in the survey asked respondents to characterize the ability of their agency to attract and to retain the kinds of people believed needed. The responses to these questions for each agency type are presented in Tables 4.16 and

126

Table 4.15
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between Extent of Manpower Planning in Correctional Organizations and Factors Reciprocally Related to Extent of Manpower Planning

Factors	Correlation Coefficients with Extent of Manpower Planning Activity	
	Pearson Bivariate Correlation	Partial r with All Others Controlled
Influence	-.06	-.01
Anticipation	.12	.17
Rational factors and numbers of positions	.16	.01
Political factors and numbers of positions	.08	.11
Internal rational considerations and kinds of people	.24	.15
External rational considerations and kinds of people	.26	.16
External political considerations and kinds of people	.25	.16

Note: None of these coefficients is statistically significant at the .05 level.

4.17. Table 4.16 indicates that the correctional agencies involved in community or field services appear more often to be able to attract desired applicants than are agencies primarily involved in insitutional corrections. Although we note from Table 4.17 that in each agency type a lower percentage of respondents reported being able to *retain* desired individuals to a great extent, local probation appears to be the most able.

Table 4.16
Ability to Attract
Desired Applicants, by Type of Agency

Ability	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation Parole	Local Probation
	(N=37)	(N=14)	(N=14)	(N=42)
Very little	16%			
Some	60%	57%	36%	38%
Great	24%	43%	64%	62%

Table 4.17
Ability to Retain
Desired Individuals, by Type of Agency

Ability	State Adult Corrections	State Juvenile Corrections	State Probation Parole	Local Probation
	(N=38)	(N=17)	(N=14)	(N=42)
Very little	11%			2%
Some	78%	71%	64%	41%
Great	11%	29%	36%	57%

In Figure 3.1, the manpower-planning activity of an agency was hypothesized to be related to the ability of that agency to attract and to retain desired applicants and employees. Table 4.18 presents the results of a regression analysis of the effect of the factors affecting manpower planning, and the extent of planning activity upon the agency's ability to attract and to keep the kinds of people it needs. Overall, these factors are significantly related to the perceived ability to attract and to retain, with 35 percent of the variance explained by this group of variables. Only one of the independent variables is, however, statistically significant—competition for applicants. As one might expect, as

Table 4.18

Multiple Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting
Correctional Agency Ability to Attract and to
Retain the Kinds of People Needed

Factors	Standardized Regression Coefficient, with Agency Ability to Attract and to Retain Dependent
	(N=74)
Agency size	.14
Economic conditions	.02
Agency size change	.10
Equal employment pressure	.02
Union constraint	.14
Civil service control	-.22
Competition for applicants	-.29*
State adult agency dummy variable	-.21
State juvenile agency dummy variable	.00
Local probation agency dummy variable	.11
Manpower planning activity	.09
Multiple R	.59
R^2	.35
Adjusted R^2	.23
F	2.99
Significance	.00

*$P < .05$

competition for applicants increases, the ability to attract or to retain decreases. Also of moderate strength, although not statistically significant, was civil service control, with those under more control seeing themselves as less able to obtain and to keep the employees they would like. Another one of the strongest relationships was observed with the dummy variable for state adult corrections agencies, with these agencies much less often seeing themselves as able to attract and to retain desirable individuals than other correctional agencies. In addition, larger agencies, agencies experiencing larger change in size, and agencies having stronger unions were better able to obtain desirable employees. Contrary to our hypotheses and findings for police agencies, the extent of manpower planning was not strongly associated with the ability to attract and to retain. While the coefficient for this variable was in the expected direction, it was quite small and did not approach statistical significance.

II. Conclusions

While the data from the survey and interviews with correctional administrators indicate that there is considerable manpower data collected, little evidence was found of comprehensive manpower planning. Agencies often reported being involved in traditional management and administrative concerns such as training, employee performance evaluation, and analysis of work load data. However, these activities were most often conducted by separate agency divisions of personnel, training, and research, and were not integrated into a comprehensive planning approach. However, a number of agencies did indicate a desire for the development of approaches (such as manpower simulation, career path analysis, and labor market analysis) that would begin to coordinate and unify these traditionally distinct areas.

As with police agencies, planning in correctional organizations tends to be oriented toward crisis management. Perhaps this is due to the fact that in these agencies crises are never in short supply. However, in some cases where interviewees indicated that coordinated planning efforts had been attempted, there was little external response to these plans until some form of crisis arose. In a number of cases needs-based arguments had been submitted to funding authorities for several consecutive funding periods; only after a crisis of some form (e.g., riot, lawsuit, adverse publicity) had arisen were funding authorities responsive to the agency's arguments.

There are two major areas in which manpower planning may have an effect in correctional agencies. The first of these is the internal allocation decision—that is, how are existing resources to be optimally allocated? The second concerns the external allocation decision—to what degree do the needs-based arguments produced by manpower planning affect the resources that are appropriated to the correctional agency? With regard to the internal allocation, there appears to be a great deal of data available as well as a desire on the part of a number of correctional administrators to implement comprehensive manpower planning

techniques. With regard to the influence of manpower planning upon appropriations, it is crucial to realize that correctional agencies operate in a highly political environment, and while some of these environments are perhaps less political than others, the funding of correctional agencies and perhaps all criminal justice agencies is to a large degree based upon ideological grounds.

The dilemma posed by growing prison populations illustrates this distinction. Population prediction tools can be (and have been) designed to forecast the future commitments to prison institutions, which may be used by correctional agencies to plan for the population increase. Faced with future increases exceeding prison capacity, the department may wish to adjust current policies or assignments. Such alterations may include shortening the length of institutional incarceration and increasing the use of community placements, or pursuing a more vigorous parole policy. In this regard manpower and population simulation techniques promise to be quite useful for correctional agencies.

Another potential strategy the correctional agency faced with growing population may employ is a campaign for the construction of new prison facilities. While population prediction techniques may aid in the agency's justification for these institutions, it is unlikely that such an argument would constitute the deciding factor in this decision. The construction of such a facility affects a wider range of interest than department policy, and such a decision is likely to be made more in accord with social values and state politics than according to the perceived needs of the department of corrections. Thus, while manpower planning techniques may constitute an effective tool for correctional management and administration, it is unlikely that they will have a great effect in major budget appropriations to the organization.

Chapter 5
Comprehensive Systems Planning

The concept of criminal justice planning includes a diversity of orientations, ranging from the operational planning activities of individual agencies such as police, courts, and corrections, to what has been referred to as comprehensive systems planning. This chapter focuses on the shadowy form of comprehensive systems planning, its past, its present condition, and its likely future. Since criminal justice State Planning Agencies (SPAs) were intended to be the focus of comprehensive planning under provisions of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, part of the discussion will center on the role of the SPAs in comprehensive planning—statewide manpower planning in particular.

Section one of the chapter is a short discussion of the meanings of planning. Sections two and three discuss the historical forces shaping criminal justice systemic planning, and their effects since 1968. Section four reports data from the Michigan State project relating to issues of statewide manpower planning activities. The fifth section draws inferences about the future on the basis of the preceding, paying particular attention to implications for systems manpower planning.

I. The Meanings of Planning

It should be observed at the outset that the term *planning* suffers from competing definitions. The term *comprehensive* generally lacks even a single compelling definition, because (as will be argued) there is no meaningful definition of it that can be applied to criminal justice. Finally, the term *system* evokes great debate as to whether there even is such a thing as a criminal justice system.

Robert Dahl views planning as "any deliberate effort to increase the proportion of goals attained by increasing awareness and understanding of factors involved ...."[1] Friedmann and Hudson see planning as "an activity centrally concerned with the linkage between knowledge and organized action."[2] Ewing views planning as "the job of making things happen that would not otherwise occur."[3] For Wildavsky, planning is "the attempt to control the future by current acts."[4] Kaplan understands planning to be the facilitating and rationalizing of decisions,[5] and Gamm sees it as a predecision control process.[6]

132

Regardless of particular twists that these and other theorists have given to the definition of planning, common meanings emerge. First, there is recognition that planning is future oriented, that it somehow links present actions to future conditions. Second, there is either implicit or explicit mention of a conscious process of gathering information in support of making such assertions about cause and effect. And third, there seems to be agreement that planning is action oriented, primarily intended to affect the real world of things rather than simply the world of ideas. This last point seems aptly, if bluntly, made in a 1979 report of the National Academy of Public Administration. NAPA was charged with reviewing the current condition of planning in criminal justice and noted that "planning differs from academic analysis, which mainly seeks understanding, in that planning aims toward getting something done."[7]

Although we may generally agree that planning means something close to what is noted above, there remain several unresolved issues. Among these is the role of planners and the distinction between normative and instrumental planning.[8] Instrumental planning assumes goals as givens, and analysis is limited to an examination of the means to be employed in achieving the goals; normative planning assumes that both goals and means should be subject to analysis and evaluation.

Although for many, the distinction between normative and instrumental planning is fanciful, it raises the important question of whether planners in a political system should rightly become involved in a normative process of public goal setting. Even the whisper of normative planning linked to the concept of comprehensive system raises grave concerns in the criminal justice community, where a layered and fractionated grouping of semi-independent agencies all seem more interested in increasing their relative independence from one another than in achieving "comprehensiveness."

Concerns over the normative aspects of planning are not far removed from the more explicit association of planning with control. Hayek and Popper (in reaction to the excesses of fascist state planning) linked systematic and comprehensive planning to limitations of individual freedom.[9] Federally funded initiatives to create state-level comprehensive planning in criminal justice, coupled to block grant programs, invoked similar concerns over control (although it is control of the fragmented justice system more than individual rights that seemed to be at issue).

II. Comprehensive Criminal Justice Planning Since 1968

Before 1968 and the Safe Streets Act, criminal justice planning in any system-comprehensive sense was nonexistent, although some thirty states had begun to use Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) money to organize skeletal planning operations.[10] A concerted effort to organize such planning began with the Safe Streets Act and included federal block planning and action grants to states and localities under the preconditions of establishing criminal justice state

planning agencies and annual state comprehensive plans. The Safe Streets Act evolved most directly out of conclusions of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), which found a cumbersome justice system greatly in need of comprehensive planning. The block grants to crime control were one of the final additions to the Johnson administration's "Great Society" program, which had included similar funding arrangements for health, housing, community development, and employment.[11]

The federal initiative in crime planning was nebulous except to assure that planning (however defined) preceded the disbursement of federal dollars to states and localities. The more ambitious Safe Streets objective was that these requirements would somehow leave behind within the states and localities a generalized propensity (if not capability) to plan for their own needs and to consider the impact of their individualized actions on other structures within the criminal justice system.

By 1970 several problems were apparent. Federal (LEAA) guidelines for comprehensive plans were only partially instructive and hardly educational as to the meanings and applications of comprehensive planning. The guidelines did not distinguish between what was meant by comprehensive planning and what a comprehensive plan should contain.

Other problems also emerged. The SPAs and their commissions were law-enforcement dominated, a circumstance that largely precluded system-wide considerations. The annual rush to complete a state comprehensive plan, thereby releasing earmarked block and action grants, usually resulted in nothing more than short-range planning and the ignoring of long-range implications. And the requirements of state-level review of local plans and federal review of the state plans raised prickly questions of federal control and encroachment. Indeed, the Federal Safe Streets initiative represented, for many, a particularly virulent form of normative planning with all of the implications trumpeted by Hayek and Popper.

Issues of control aside, the more serious consequence of the mad and uninformed rush to establish planning was that the state and local-level planning efforts could hardly be characterized as comprehensive, but rather as functionally fractionalized.[12] State plans were largely a "cut and paste" of disparate local wish lists, reviewed at both state and federal levels with little regard to systems-wide or comprehensive planning issues and linked almost entirely to the disbursement of federal dollars.

As a further impediment to comprehensiveness, the SPAs and LEAA organized into divisions reflecting the traditional functional components of the criminal justice system. Not only was comprehensive planning ill-defined, but there seemed to be no organizational structure capable even of talking about it.

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mayor Roman Gribbs of Detroit summed up the problem in noting that the Safe Streets process assured only that everybody got something—to the detriment of dealing with the real crime problems that communities faced.[13] Gribbs represented one side of a fairly

134

clear division of opinion between the localities on the one hand and the SPAs and LEAA on the other. This division was exemplified in the 1975 opinion survey of SPAs and local units of government concerning the objectives of the Safe Streets Act.[14] SPA respondents ranked "provid[ing] states and local units of government with a comprehensive criminal justice planning capacity" as the number one objective, while local governments viewed the number one objective of Safe Streets as "provid[ing] funds to supplement state and local criminal justice budgets." Such local views were further reflected in their desire to have LEAA funds follow the more flexible general revenue-sharing format, eliminating what they considered to be the contrivance of comprehensive planning.

The 1973 amendments made to the 1968 act resulted in several LEAA administrative responses, one of which was to advocate the development of state standards and goals through a nationally funded initiative. The purpose of such state standards and goals was to bring together disparate elements of the criminal justice system and to produce a plan (with clear short- and long-range objectives) in a comprehensive fashion. Unfortunately, the resulting products to this day have been largely viewed by the operational community as pie-in-the-sky pronouncements, largely ignored in any programmatic sense, and allowed the prime role of collecting dust.

By 1977, nearly a decade of planning capability development had passed and evaluations of the degree of comprehensive planning achieved were hardly laudatory. In its January 1977 report on the block grant program, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations noted:

> Rarely are the criminal justice activities of state and local agencies planned and coordinated with the activities supported by the SPAs. For the most part, SPA planning in the states visited is project-based and lacks a well-defined set of goals against which to measure individual projects. Although project-based planning can be a very effective means of allocating resources to achieve a successful rate of project implementation, without a broader frame of reference within which to judge the merits of individual programs, the risk of supporting lower-priority objectives or activities with conflicting purposes inevitably arises.[15]

The commission also noted that the planned disbursement of federal funds generally followed from one of three—or a combination of the three—different "planning" approaches. One approach was crime-data driven, in that criminal statistics were analyzed to single out crime areas for funding. Another approach was dollar-balance driven, in the sense of setting minimums and maximums for functional or jurisdictional areas. The third approach was a bottom-up process based on a cut-and-paste of indications from local and state agencies of their needs. None of these approaches seems to be in keeping with terms such as

systematic, long-range, comprehensive, or coordinated. But at the same time, no better alternative seemed on the horizon. The principal difficulty, as noted by the commission, was "the relative limited use of criminal justice data and analysis."[16] The problem, it seemed, was *not a reluctance* by the SPAs to use data but rather the overall lack of data and the reluctance (or inability) of decision makers to use such data.

Probably the most serious impediment to defining what was meant by comprehensive criminal justice planning was the division of opinion in the field about whether planning should be oriented toward improving systems or toward reducing crime.

> System improvement planning, the most common approach used by the SPAs, seeks to enhance the quality of the components of the criminal justice system and the management of the flow of cases and people through it. Directing planning efforts toward system improvement rather than crime reduction has been a continuing bone of contention for those concerned about the program. The uneasy compromise eventually adopted by Congress in the 1973 amendments called upon the program to promote planning for "strengthening and improving the criminal justice system" in order to reduce crime.[17]

The effect of this dilemma was to cloud how the term comprehensive planning was to be operationalized; it did little to help differentiate between intermediary and final objectives to planning. And whether one subscribed to systems improvement or crime reduction or a combination of these as ultimate objectives, cross-component planning seemed to be only weakly served.

The operationalized meaning given to criminal justice comprehensive planning in the first decade of the LEAA initiative seemed to have the following aspects. First, planning was short run, generally coinciding with the annual comprehensive plans and federal fund disbursement. Second, planning was grant oriented, tied to largely discrete awards of federal funds. Third, normative planning in the guise of standards and goals was attempted, but there is little evidence of serious attempts to reach these goals through the conscious application of specific operational means (there are of course notable exceptions, as with the Law Enforcement Education Program and its intent to facilitate the college education of police). Fourth, planning had a component orientation rather than a system orientation, with only lip service being paid to the concept of systematically taking into account the interactions among the components and resulting effects.

The term comprehensive seemed to have meaning only in a process sense; that is, emphasis was given to the fair distribution of federal funds among the criminal justice components and to cross-component representation on planning boards,

but the collection and analysis of data that would permit consideration of the interactions and effects among components were generally ignored. Practice seemed to have little to do with Richard Bolan's concept of planning as *both* a thinking process and a social process.[18] Missing, too, were Gibbon's three core elements of criminal justice knowledge: (1) a detailed understanding of the underlying causes of crime, social forces, and factors involved, and crime patterns; (2) a detailed understanding of the criminal justice system in operation, of the networks of linkages, interactions, and decision-making centers; and (3) a knowledge of the internal workings of the system and its components. In the absence of such elements, a basis for comprehensive planning did not appear to exist.[19]

Gibbon's core elements are a big order, and it would appear to be a herculean task to achieve such knowledge. Indeed, the knowledge base for comprehensive planning is difficult—some believe impossible—to amass.[20] Blair Ewing, former acting director of the LEAA National Institute, concludes that incremental, process-oriented planning is more appropriate for criminal justice than is comprehensive planning, owing to the fragmentation of the system and the lack of a suitable knowledge base.[21]

III. A Recent Assessment of SPA Planning

A 1979 report of the National Academy of Public Administrators concludes in its introduction that "comprehensive criminal justice planning is coming of age—it is an area of state government management where heartening progress and innovation is apparent."[22] The locus of progress and innovation is seen to be the SPA. The NAPA report, based on a nine-state study, notes that criminal justice planning is really just beginning in most states, but may be increasingly characterized as having a systems-wide perspective, policy outputs that move beyond the grant-letting function, and concern for coordination of the criminal justice components within the state. SPA planning efforts in the nine states studied are characterized as having organized forethought and coordination.[23] Development since 1968 is seen as substantial, given the magnitude of constraints, and the system is viewed now as being at a tenuous threshold of further significant development.

The evidence supporting these assertions is sketchy but seems to rely primarily on several findings from the nine-state interviews. Among these findings are that SPA personnel have increasing professional research and planning expertise; the broad involvement of all the criminal justice components in the planning process is regularizing; analysis and empirical identification of problems increasingly precede SPA fund disbursement and decision making; and SPA ties to operational agencies are solidifying.

The narrative of the NAPA report makes it difficult to separate empirical evidence from normative assertions of preferred planning formats. Indeed, empirical finding and normative assertion are constantly mixed throughout the

report, leaving one with less than a clear picture of the current state of the art of planning. The report taken as a whole, however, leaves the impression that movement toward some notion of comprehensive, coordinated planning, moving beyond the letting of federal dollars, has been achieved.

NAPA points to several extant problems that continue to impede further progress in this vein. The first and most obvious is the diffusion of authority in the criminal justice system, which makes the collection and analysis of data and its use in system and component decision making highly problematic. Second, the concept of comprehensive planning has itself suffered and is viewed as "administrative gobbledygook" because of past time-wasting adventures such as developing standards and goals. Third, the "intractable" nature of criminal justice problems makes the linkage between planning and the impact on crime an empirical nightmare. Fourth, the "persisting image of planners as federal" impedes the impact of planning on state systems.[24]

If the NAPA study makes clear that there has been some progressive development in planning capabilities from that noted before 1975, it makes less clear exactly what the nature of that development has been. For example, the NAPA finding that analysis and empirical identification of problems increasingly preceded decision making is given some support through a number of individualized anecdotes from the nine states. But it is less clearly established that empirical analysis affects decision making, even though preceding it. If empirical analysis and planning do not affect decision making, questions about whether planning takes place become academic, because the value or worth of planning beyond its being an intellectual exercise depends on impact in the operational world.

Specific causal linkages between empirical data and their impact on planning, and the impact of planning in turn on decision making, are difficult to establish. Usually, we are confronted with the opinions of planners and decision makers that linkages either exist or do not exist. And as pointed out by Cohen and Garet, even the more methodologically sophisticated approaches to evaluation may serve to cloud conclusions because of the "internal logic of applied research," which through "competing conceptions of methodology and validity ensure conflicting interpretations of the results of applied research."[25]

Although survey- or interview-based opinion data have limitations, they are not without value. Martin Rein cites as an example a pioneering study of Caplan *et al* that gives some interesting findings about whether linkages between empirical analysis and decision making have existed in public bureaucracies.[26]

Caplan and his colleagues at the University of Michigan have broken ground with an empirical study on this question. They interviewed 204 people who held important positions in the executive branch of the United States government between October 1973 and March 1974. The study distinguishes between data-based ('hard') and non-empirical ('soft')

information and concludes that 'rarely is policy formulation determined by a concrete point-by-point reliance on empirically grounded data.' Only 13 percent of the respondents could cite five to ten instances of use with good supporting evidence. However, there were numerous examples of the use of soft information, which led the authors to conclude that 'knowledge is used at the top levels of government decision making and probably to a greater extent than most experts in the area of utilization would expect.' These findings make it clear that the issue remains unsettled.

If Caplan's conclusions are generalizable, we would expect, in all but a few circumstances, not to find point-by-point cause and effect evidence of a relationship between planning and decision making in criminal justice. And if Rein and White are correct in their 1977 article on policy research, we might find it useful to include indirect measures of impact such as expenditures and requirements for planning and evaluation-related research, in addition to expressed opinion.[27] Such indirect measures are based on the supposition that if decision makers authorize expenditures for or require planning, they must think it useful. The use of indirect measures seems to characterize the basis for the NAPA conclusion—specifically, the statement that empirical analysis precedes data collection is followed by an assumption that it therefore affects decision making.

IV. Assessments Based on MSU Findings

Among the several issues explored in this study, two are of immediate interest here: (1) Were requisite data for manpower planning purposes being collected and aggregated at state levels? (2) Were such data being used for planning purposes, in making policy, or reaching decisions about human resources? The answers to these questions offer some additional empirical understanding of the present nature of criminal justice planning and its impact on decision making.

Interview and survey data from the manpower study permit several generalizable conclusions about the level of empirical data collection, its use for planning purposes, and the impact of "rational" (empirical) planning on system decision making. From analysis of interviews held with eight SPAs as well as interviews held with state and local police agencies, correctional agencies, and with civil service and budget departments, the general opinion seems to be that rational, empirically based planning marginally affects system decision making. One SPA director noted for example that "this state has a sophisticated planning process which loses its sophistication during budget allocation processes." An allied theme encountered in several states was that "the governor, and the legislature in particular, make decisions in response to crisis rather than to objective data presentation or long-range planning." The remarks most

frequently centered on a view that decision making was a combination of both rational and political arguments, but that in general, rational argument took a back seat to political exigency.

The comments above refer to a general feeling about the impact of empirical data and rational planning on varying types of decisions reached outside the organization (for example, general budget appropriations or personnel position authorization). As one state corrections official noted, "As budget requests move up the institutional ladder to the budget office, governor and legislature, facts tend to get lost among higher considerations of total dollars available." However, the same official felt that decisions on programs and budget allocations that remained wholly within the department were more directly influenced by facts and "objective" planning. The idea that decisional areas under internal organization control are much more susceptible to rational planning than are external decisions was echoed during most of the interviews with state-level personnel.

It was not clear whether this distinction between impact on external decisions and on internal decisions can be objectively supported. The view that external decisions are less susceptible to rational argument may be sour grapes—a result of not having programs or funds approved. It is also conceivable that interviewee bias might allow internal decisions that are essentially "political" to be seen or defined as rational.

Another problem with interpreting such interview data is that political decision making and rational decision making are fluid and, often, overlapping concepts (one man's rationality is another man's politics). Most of those interviewed tended to associate "rational" with empirical data and with varying forms of cost/benefit analysis. Politics, on the other hand, they tended to associate with public opinion, vote swapping, and the sway of powerful interest groups. Although this may represent a suitable distinction for some, it leaves undealt with the problem that politics is essentially a process of determining *whose* cost and *whose* benefit.

There are other findings from the broad range of interviews, however, that *indirectly* indicate that rational planning, supported by analysis of empirical data, is increasing in influence, both externally and internally. The first is ample interview evidence of a strongly increasing trend on the part of external administrators and politicians (governors, mayors, legislators, and budget officials) to "demand" empirical evidence in support of budget requests and programmatic changes. The second is an apparent rapid increase in data collection related to management or planning within criminal justice agencies.

One concrete indicator of external demand for empirical data is movement of states and localities toward variants of program budgeting (PPB and ZBB) that require heavier reliance on empirical definition of program performance, work load, and problem identification. There is also substantial evidence that external requests for longitudinal data and analysis, such as crime-trend analysis, or

inmate population longitudinal projections, are increasingly numerous. Such longitudinal data collection and analysis are a prerequisite of long-range planning.

There is only occasional evidence from the interviews that decision-maker requests for data are comprehensive in nature; that is, for the most part, data requests concern the particular agency itself rather than cross-sector analyses of impact and problem areas. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, one SPA director took note of an SPA initiative to measure the impact of tax-cutting measures on all components of the criminal justice system. Although the resulting analysis was largely discrete in that sectors were analyzed separately, the final analysis represented a cross-sector comparison of likely effects. The intention was to continue such analysis longitudinally, but this seems to have now fallen through.

In an interview with another SPA, note was taken of the agency's recent involvement in analyzing the cross-sector effects of recently passed minimum-sentencing legislation in the state. The state's department of corrections had previously estimated effects in other sectors as well. It is also interesting to note that some members of this state's legislature had informally requested that the SPA undertake a longitudinal analysis of the effects of the law on subsequent crime levels in the state.

In sum, we did uncover examples of comprehensive or cross-sector data collection and analysis, but they were exceptions instead of the rule. There is more substantial evidence that empirical data collection for planning and decision-making purposes is coming of age in criminal justice only in the sense that there are largely individual agency and individual sector efforts.

Two questions follow this conclusion, however. First, is the need for empirical data collection and analysis being internalized in criminal justice agencies, or is it merely response to external demands? Second, what is the level of sophistication in data collection and analysis?

Neither question has a simple answer, in part because there is great variation among sectors and among agencies. Interview results indicate a general trend toward internalized agency appreciation of empirical data, but there is also great variance. For example, an SPA director and a department of corrections planning director in one state (separately interviewed) took great pains to detail individual efforts to develop highly sophisticated work-load and performance measures, when external decision makers seemed satisfied with what was already available. Both efforts apparently evolved out of increasing internal dissatisfaction with existing data available for planning. In another state, however, the POST assistant director resisted any notion that quantitative law enforcement training needs should be projected empirically. "We don't have to be concerned with that for a variety of reasons: First, the training academies run themselves; and second, we are always going to fill the academies anyway."

Two such extreme positions make it difficult to assess trends in internalization of empirical data collection, especially given that the manpower study was not longitudinal. It does, however, seem clear from the interviews

(with only a few exceptions) that the level of empirical data collection on performance measures and work loads and the use of crime-trend data have increased across the sectors dramatically over the last few years. Typical responses with regard to such issues were, for example, that "we started collecting this a few years ago," or "we have just begun collecting it." No doubt LEAA grant funds have facilitated this development and a cut-off of federal funds will slow the trend. It will not stop it, however, as it seems clear that there is increasing internalized system awareness of the benefits of having empirical data. Also, decision makers external to the system seem increasingly to demand it.

The question of types of data and quality of data now being collected is only partially answerable from the interviews. The following may be noted: (1) Data collection about performance measures and work loads, where undertaken, seems largely to use elementary quantitative measures such as traffic citations, cases, arrests, and inmate population counts. Qualitative measures of work loads or performance are much more rare, but there are examples (e.g., qualitative measures of case difficulty in case-load assignment). (2) There is less than clear agreement within the operational community that more sophisticated data collection measures will prove beneficial. In one state, for example, it was found that several of the agencies interviewed had experimented with elaborate manpower allocation formulas and found that far simpler ones yielded the same results. The state police in this state, in particular, had found that a simple formula using traffic accidents and Part 1 crimes was sufficient for their needs, although they had tried, and continue to consider, more sophisticated systems.

We believe that there is a general skepticism in the operational community that more sophisticated data collection (beyond that already being done) will lead to improved results. There was little open hostility expressed at the thought of increasing the level of sophistication, but there was a "show me" attitude prevailing throughout most of the interviews.

In addition to interviews, SPA survey results are partially instructive on issues of quality and type of empirical data collection currently underway in the system. It should be borne in mind, however, that the results to be summarized are taken from a 550-variable survey that addressed itself explicitly to issues of manpower planning.

In one of the larger sections of the survey, SPA respondents were asked to indicate whether certain types of empirical data were now being collected and tabulated about criminal justice agencies in their state. Among other things, it was hoped that analysis of these responses would allow estimation of how much aggregate state-level data collection of the kind that might support system-wide, comprehensive manpower planning was taking place.

Respondents were particularly asked whether certain types of data were being aggregated and by whom. They were allowed to differentiate their responses according to whether they "knew positively such data was being collected," or they thought "it probably was being collected," or they thought "it was not being collected," or they "didn't know." Of eight types of data for which

responses were requested, four of these seem particularly central to comprehensive, statewide analyses. Responses for them are reproduced below in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 averages these findings for each criminal justice sector, across the four information categories.

Table 5.1
SPA Responses Concerning Whether State Agencies
Currently Collect or Tabulate Selected
Kinds of Manpower Information

Type of Information	Sector or Type of Agency	Responses in Percentages* (N = 34)			
		Definitely Yes	Probably Yes	No	Don't Know
Does a state agency	Local Police	15	6	68	12
have information	Prisons	71	18	3	9
about the number of	Jails	3	6	62	24
job vacancies occur-	Prob; Parole	71	12	9	9
ring in...	Courts	44	15	15	26
	Prosecution	21	12	41	26
Does a state agency	Local Police	38	15	38	9
have information	Prisons	82	9	3	3
about required min-	Jails	21	9	47	15
imal employee quali-	Prob/ Parole	73	12	3	9
fications for jobs	Courts	47	23	6	21
in...	Prosecution	24	24	24	24
Does a state agency	Local Police	29	15	38	18
have information on	Prisons	50	32	3	15
work loads, case	Jails	27	17	41	9
loads or other mea-	Prob/ Parole	56	29	6	9
sures of agency work	Courts	56	26	6	12
levels in...	Prosecution	24	24	38	14
Does a state agency	Local Police	32	12	38	18
have information on	Prisons	44	21	3	32
ages of employees	Jails	9	9	47	29
in...	Prob/ Parole	41	21	3	35
	Courts	21	18	18	44
	Prosecution	15	9	29	47

*Missing or spoiled responses are not reported, although percentage breakdowns were calculated with them taken into consideration. Therefore, row totals will in some cases fall short of 100%. Also, the percentages have been rounded.

Table 5.2
Average Percentage Responses Across the
Four Information Categories By
Criminal Justice Sector, Using Table 5.1 Data

System Component	Definitely Yes	Probably Yes	No	Don't Know
Local Police	28.50	12.00	45.25	14.25
Prisons	61.75	20.00	3.00	14.75
Jails	15.00	10.25	49.25	19.25
Prob/ Parole	60.25	18.50	5.25	15.50
Courts	42.00	20.50	11.25	25.75
Prosecution	21.00	17.25	35.00	27.75

From both Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be noted that there is substantial variation not only in responses among the SPAs but also with regard to the degree of state-level data aggregation across system components. Information collection for prisons and probation/ parole, and to a lesser degree for the courts, seems to be the most developed, probably owing to their consolidated nature. Data collection concerning local police, prosecutors, and to a very large extent jails seems most underdeveloped, reflecting the largely fragmented nature of these sectors.

The local law enforcement findings are most interesting. Although law enforcement is not consolidated, there has been a decade of sustained research in law enforcement and nearly a decade of development of state-level training and certification commissions. Both of these latter developments would normally require the development of systematic data collection operations, and one might be somewhat surprised that law enforcement data collection is not more developed than it apparently is.

One particular finding of the interviews may offer partial explanation of this. Interviews with law enforcement agencies, and with SPAs and POSTs, indicate that they are fairly tired of answering requests for information. This "burn out" seems not only linked to an overload of requests but also to experience that filling such requests "usually results in little positive pay-off to the agency."

Another interesting finding from Table 5.2 is the percentage of SPA responses falling in the "don't know" column; these ranged from 14.25 percent to 27.75 percent. This raises questions about the ability of SPAs to minimally keep themselves informed of data collection and research ventures within their state.

Such a question becomes even more compelling if we also note the percentage of responses falling within the "probably yes" category (which was defined for respondents as: "you think it has been done or is being done, but you are not certain"). Uncertainty in response therefore effectively ranged from a low of 26.25 percent to 46.25 percent (combining the "probably yes" and "don't know" categories), which raises more than a casual question about the ability of SPAs to act as clearinghouses concerning research-related events in their states. It should also be noted that several respondents in picking the "probably yes" option were unable to identify, by name, the state agency "probably" collecting the information.

As a convenience for the reader, Table 5.3 summarizes findings across the entire eight sample information categories. It presents the combined "definitely yes" and "probably yes" category percentage responses for each information category by each sector. As previously noted in conjunction with the analysis of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, there is variation by both information category and criminal justice sector. Job vacancy, minimal employee qualification, work load, and employee age information were treated in detail in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.3 summarizes responses on these four information types in addition to the remaining four types. A detailed analysis of these four remaining information categories, similar to the analysis and presentation of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, indicated similar patterns of response.

Table 5.3
Collapsed "Definitely Yes" and
"Probably Yes" Categories, in Percentages

Information Type	Police	Prison	Jails	Prob. Parole	Courts	Prosecution
Number of Employees	91.2	100.0	64.7	94.1	94.1	70.5
Information on Race and Sex	47.1	82.3	38.2	79.4	61.8	50.0
Job Duty Description	35.3	99.5	26.5	85.2	64.7	38.2
Job Vacancies	20.6	88.2	8.7	82.4	58.8	32.4
Employee Qualifications	52.9	91.2	29.4	85.3	70.6	47.0
Work Loads	44.1	82.4	44.1	85.3	82.4	47.0
Education Levels	55.9	67.6	20.5	61.7	41.2	32.3
Age of Employees	44.2	64.7	17.6	61.8	38.2	23.5

There remain questions about which state-level agencies are responsible for those data that are collected. Table 5.4 is a summary of SPA notations of state agencies involved in collecting the four information types identified in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Summary results are reported for local police, prisons, jails, and courts

Table 5.4
State Agencies Identified As Doing the Data
Collection for Selected Criminal Justice Sectors
Using Table 5.1 Data Categories
(N = 34)

Collecting State Agency*	Local Police	Prisons	Jails	Courts
Department of Public Safety	11%**	2%	--	--
POST	39%	--	6%	--
SAC, SPA***	44%	14%	37%	9%
Civil Service	5%	7%	4%	4%
Corrections	--	73%	27%	--
Jail Board	--	--	25%	--
Court Administrator	--	--	--	87%
Professional Associations	2%	--	--	--
Social Services	--	4%	--	--
Health	--	--	2%	--

*For all state agency categories, agencies similarly defined functionally but with different names from state to state were combined under a common rubric. In instances where the SPA cooperated with another state agency in data collection, only the SPA was identified in the table as the collector.

**Percentages reported are an average score calculated as follows:

Total number of times the specific agency was mentioned across all four information categories

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Total number of all agencies specifically identified across all four information categories

***Statistical analysis centers (SACs) are the data collection and analysis arms of SPAs in many states; in some states, the SAC and the SPA are administratively separated. They were analyzed as a single unit in Table 5.4, however, for purposes of convenience.

only. Also, Table 5.4 is another possible way of measuring how much of a data base there is for comprehensive planning purposes.

Results from Table 5.4 indicate a mixed pattern of state agency involvement in data collection and aggregation efforts. They also indicate a variable pattern of SPA involvement across the sectors, heaviest with regard to local police and jails, and lightest with regard to prisons and courts. One interpretation of this pattern is that the SPA has moved into the less developed data collection areas of police and jails and has left prisons and courts alone so as not to duplicate existing efforts by these state-level agencies.

The level of SPA involvement in collecting local police and jail data should not be overrated, however, as data collection in these two sectors is comparatively low. For example, from Table 5.2 we note that (on the average) across the four information categories only 40.5 percent of the SPA respondents indicate that anyone was collecting local police information in their state. Thus, the 44 percent level of SPA involvement in police-related data collection reported in Table 5.4 is really only a 44 percent involvement among the 40.5 percent of respondents reporting that the data were in any way collected. Such reasoning may be used to estimate similar actual levels of SPA involvement in data collection by combining the average percentage responses for the "definitely yes" and "probably yes" categories as reported in Table 5.2, and multiplying that by the SAC/SPA involvement figures as reported in Table 5.4. Results of this are reported in Table 5.5.

The last row of figures in Table 5.5 indicates a relatively low level of involvement among the SPAs in efforts to collect the four kinds of data on a statewide basis. (On the average, 17.82 percent, 11.45 percent, 9.34 percent and

Table 5.5
Estimate of SPA Data Collection for Selected
Criminal Justice Sectors, Across the Four Information Categories
(N = 34)

	Local Police	Prisons	Jails	Courts
Average percentage across information categories of SPA respondents indicating information is collected by any state-level agency	40.50	81.75	25.25	62.50
Average percentage SPA involvement in collection activities	44.00	14.00	37.00	9.00
Percentage of SPA involvement as a percentage of data collection among all state-level agencies	17.82	11.45	9.34	5.63

5.63 percent of the SPA respondents indicate SPA efforts related to local police, prisons, jails, and courts respectively.)

As already noted, low involvement levels may well be related to a desire to avoid duplication of existing efforts of other state-level agencies. This was a theme frequently encountered during the interviews with SPA personnel. However, it alone does not account for lack of SPA involvement, because more local police and jail data collection, by the SPAs for example, would at present fill important data collection voids. Alternative propositions are that the SPAs either do not view it as their role to act as primary data collectors within individual system components, or that they feel uncomfortable doing so or unable to do so. The interviews with SPA personnel gave some support to all of these. There was strong preference indicated in most, if not all, of the SPA interviews for working through and with sector-specific state-level agencies like a POST or a jail commission in gathering requisite data from local agencies. In several interviews this was called more of a necessity than a preference because of issues of access to the locals. Corresponding views were expressed by those interviewed in other types of state-level agencies.

This finding raises questions about the NAPA conclusion that the SPAs are establishing strong linkages to the locals—direct linkages, in particular. The interviews do bring out numerous recent attempts by SPAs to form cooperative ventures with other state-level sector-specific agencies in gathering data from local agencies. But there are many fewer examples of the SPAs attempting to go to the locals directly and alone. Perhaps the route of cooperative venture is intended as a very fruitful SPA strategy to solidify its credibility with the locals, by using the credibility and contacts of others.

In interviews with local agencies, issues of SPA credibility emerged indirectly in a variety of contexts, and directly in responses to questions about how the locals perceived the SPA in their state. Responses varied from "what's the SPA?" and "they don't do anything for us" to they have a very good reputation in this state and have periodically assisted us." The general tenor of interview remarks, however, seems to be more passively positive (neither negatively inclined, nor supportive of the SPA). This may well be a product of the SPA's reputation as a source of additional income on the one hand, but as an agency that had few other visible triumphs on the other.

SPA respondents on the survey seemed more generous in evaluating their agency's reputation with the locals than was suggested by interview data from non-SPA agencies. In one large section of the survey, for example, SPA respondents indicated in general that other criminal justice agencies in the state viewed the SPA as a source of "advice, information, assistance, and standards." They viewed their relationships with these other agencies as largely "cooperative" and "somewhat influential." Concrete examples of cooperation and influence were not solicited in the SPA survey, but when locals were queried for such examples, responses (when made) concentrated in the area of the SPA's letting federal grants.

148

SPA survey results are also instructive of SPA views about their preferred role in data collection. One section of the survey asked respondents to indicate (in an open-end format) which state-level agencies *should* be primarily responsible for collecting certain kinds of statewide data. The question was asked for six basic categories of manpower planning data, and for each category the SPA was asked to respond separately with regard to local police, local/county jails, and the courts. Table 5.6 summarizes findings on two of the information categories. The findings for these two categories are roughly representative, however, of

Table 5.6
SPA Views Concerning Which State-Level Agencies
Should Collect Information of Certain Types from Certain Sectors

Type of Information	Sector	Percentage Breakdowns in SPA Responses Indicating Preferred State Collecting Agency* (N=34)	
Employee Turnover Rates	Local Police	POST or equivalent	33%
		SAC SPA	47%
		Other	20%
	Local County Jails	Dept. of Corrections, Jail Services	38%
		SAC SPA	41%
		Other	21%
	Courts	Court Administrator	68%
		SAC SPA	26%
		Other	6%
Work Loads or Measures of Work Levels Performed	Local Police	POST/State Police	29%
		SAC, SPA	50%
		Other	21%
	Local County Jails	Dept. of Corrections, Jail Services	47%
		SAC/SPA	41%
		Other	2%
	Courts	Court Administrator	74%
		SAC/SPA	24%
		Other	2%

*Agencies mentioned only once or twice, reflecting oddities of particular state governing structures, were combined under the rubric "other." Like agencies with different names from state to state were combined as in Table 5.4.

similar findings for the remaining eight information categories as reported in Table 5.3.

We note from Table 5.6 a fairly distinct division of opinion between the view that SPAs should play a primary data-collection role and the view that sector-specific agencies (POSTs, departments of corrections, and court administrators) should take the responsiblity. Such division is no doubt partially reflective of SPA reticence (previously discussed) either to duplicate existing data-collection efforts or to go it alone and approach local agencies directly.

The question remains, however, whether SPA respondents view the collection of certain data as important, especially to SPA agency missions. The answer would allow some estimation of how important SPAs think empirical data to be; it might also allow some inference about SPA interest in planning from an empirical base. Table 5.7 is a breakdown of SPA responses about the importance of certain kinds of information. Respondents were also asked to indicate how much such information the agency has.

Generally, it appears that there is a fairly high appreciation of the importance of empirical data. It also seems clear that importance ratings are not conditioned by whether the SPA currently has such empirical data. Indeed, there are several cases where importance ratings are consistently high while availability of the information is relatively low. An inspection of individual cases shows that only two SPAs consistently rated these data categories as of little importance. Table 5.7 also indicates some discrimination between types of empirical data; some are obviously viewed as more important than others.

Number of employees, job vacancies, work loads, and minimal employee qualifications (variables on which Tables 5.1 to 5.2 are based) all receive fairly substantial importance ratings. This would seem to dispel notions that the low levels of SPA involvement in data-collection efforts for these information categories (as reported in Table 5.5) are predicated on SPA estimations of unimportance.

Summary Points

In the interest of brevity, only a portion of the SPA survey and interview data has been summarized in this section; specifically, four of the eleven SPA survey sections were given tabular summarization above, while the remaining data are not reported, but are used to form the basis for some of the other statements following. Several conclusions about state-level planning-related efforts can be made. In some instances, these conclusions are based on additional data from the interviews and other surveys (e.g., the POST survey).

The NAPA conclusion that "criminal justice planning is coming of age" seems to be premature, or perhaps a misleading choice of terms. "Coming of age" would seem to imply a firm foundation of structure and experience for criminal justice planning, which does not yet seem to be established in the system. The foundation seems more experimental and searching. NAPA's qualifying

150

SPA Views Concerning the Importance of Certain
Kinds of Information and the Extent to Which
They Have Such Information: In Percentages

Type of Information	Importance of Information to SPA Missions (N=34)			Extent to Which SPAs Have Such Information (N=34)		
	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Much or at All	Fairly Complete	Somewhat Complete	Little or None
1. Number of employees in various job classifications	41.2	50.0	8.8	27.6	35.7	36.7
2. Race and/or sex of employees according to various job classifications	11.8	52.9	35.3	12.1	36.4	51.5
3. Education levels attained by employees	29.4	61.8	8.8	12.1	33.3	54.5
4. Job vacancies occurring or data on turn-over rates	42.4	39.4	18.2	6.1	24.2	69.7
5. Records of training undergone or received by employees	50.0	41.2	8.8	9.1	45.5	45.5
7. Written job descriptions or job statements	20.6	32.4	47.1	0.0	21.2	78.8
8. Statements of minimal qualifications required for various job classifications	17.6	55.9	26.5	6.1	21.2	72.7

151

conclusion that the foundation seems "tenuous" is given stronger support by findings reported in this section. Finally, NAPA's conclusion that the SPAs are viewed as a "locus of progress and innovation" also seems too strong a statement. The findings from the manpower study, as reported, indicate that the SPAs have a fairly constant view of themselves as progressive and innovative, but this view is not strongly shared by other criminal justice agencies interviewed. As was noted, though the agency views of the SPAs cannot be characterized as negative, they are merely passively positive.

Several additional points of summary may be made about general findings from the Michigan State Manpower Project.

(1) State-Level Data Collection: Survey responses indicated a mixed pattern of state-level efforts to collect and to aggregate criminal justice human resource data on statewide bases. Across the data categories of Table 5.3, there is a fairly promising level of effort to aggregate, which would permit at least rudimentary manpower planning in several states, e.g., projecting system turnover rates. (The eight sample data categories are numbers of employees, employee race/sex, job descriptions, job vacancies, minimal employee qualifications, work loads, employee educational levels, and employee ages.) As would be expected, efforts seem most widely developed with regard to the more complicated data sets such as turnover rates, job descriptions, and work loads. Also as expected, the operational measures of the data categories tend *not* to have qualitative dimensions (e.g., assigning weights to case types in measuring probation case loads). For those data aggregated at the state level, however, respondents generally indicate that they are "current, complete, and detailed" ("detailed" meant "for entry and higher positions").

State-level aggregation of these data types is most developed among the system components consolidated at the state level such as prisons and probation/parole, moderately developed for local law enforcement and prosecution, and least developed for jails. These variations aside, however, several states now have the capability of producing summary reports across the eight identified data categories, and these reports would conceivably be useful for eventual manpower planning. Interview and survey data suggest further that several states intend to collect more manpower planning-related data.

(2) State-Level Data Collectors: Both interview and survey data indicate only a moderate role for the SPAs in collecting and aggregating the sample types of manpower-related data. Indeed, data collection is generally not centralized in any single state agency. The more usual case is that "sector-specific" state-level agencies collect data from local agencies (e.g., POSTs for local and county law enforcement, departments of correction for jails, and state court administrator offices for the courts). In some states, non-criminal-justice agencies (e.g., the state civil service) serve as the principal data collectors. There is ample interview evidence to suggest that these arrangements are not accidental; specifically, securing local agency cooperation in state data-collection efforts is tied to an

assumption that these sector-specific agencies have greater credibility with local agencies and can thus better assure compliance in collection efforts.

(3) **Opinions about the Availability of Manpower Data in Local Agencies:** SPA and POST survey data, as well as interview data, consistently indicate that "all" or "most" local criminal justice agencies, across all system components, have the eight sample types of manpower data in "accessible form." We have inferred from the interviews that "accessible" generally signifies "organized file drawers" rather than computerized access.

Furthermore, and as previously noted, a large majority of SPA and POST respondents indicate that local criminal justice agencies would be willing to provide the data for state-level aggregation efforts, except, perhaps for the problem of the rising level of local agency "burn out" with regard to filling external requests for data. A state agency's request for data would be most assuredly complied with when the request was accompanied by an account of how the data were to be used, as well as evidence that supplying the data will eventually benefit the local agency (for example, that the local agency will be given comparative statewide data on which to assess its own condition).

These views are in accord with other findings that manpower planning data collection is more likely to develop under mutually beneficial voluntary arrangements than where compliance is mandatory. And interview and survey data indicate that voluntarism will produce data of higher quality than will mandates.

(4) **State-Level Manpower-Planning Activities:** Data collection is in advance of planning. More data appear to be collected than are used, especially for manpower planning purposes. Although a majority of SPA and POST respondents indicate that they produce varying kinds of statewide summary and comparative reports based on the information collected from locals, there is little evidence that these reports are used in more sophisticated planning activities. For example, a majority of SPA respondents indicate that they have produced reports on numbers of employees, employee socioeconomic characteristics, and agency work loads; however, almost sixty percent of the SPA respondents indicate that they have not forecast and have no plans to forecast future criminal justice employment needs for their states.

There is of course scattered evidence of more sophisticated planning—several of the POSTs conduct statewide job task analyses, some departments of corrections use turnover data and inmate populations to forecast personnel needs and the like. There is no evidence, however, that manpower-planning techniques like job analysis, employment forecasting, labor market analysis, qualitative manpower inventories, and so forth, are consistently utilized at a state-aggregated level. Furthermore, there is little to suggest from either the surveys or the interviews that these are viewed as priority areas for further development by state-level "staff" agencies like the SPAs or POSTs.

There is evidence of a trend among SPAs and POSTs and other state-level agencies toward increasingly taking actions that have an impact on local agency

human resource issues (e.g., recommending or requiring minimal staffing levels, setting minimal training and entry-level requirements, or specifying recruitment and selection methods). But there is only occasionally an indication that the employment of specific manpower planning methodologies like job analysis or market analysis has preceded such actions.

(5) **State-Level Views on the Utility of Manpower Planning:** The impact of rational, empirically based planning on policy decision making is considered by respondents to be marginal. Policymaking is viewed as a combination of both political exigency and rational analysis, with the latter taking a back seat to the former. Interview data suggest, however, that increasing demands are being placed on criminal justice agencies by external decision makers to support policy recommendations with empirical data. Empirical data collection at the state level has, as viewed by respondents, increased greatly in the past decade. Also, from both the SPA and POST surveys we note that respondents say they believe that the sample manpower-data categories are important to their agency missions. This would seem to support the notion that agencies are growing to appreciate the role empirical data can play in the making of decisions.

There were mixed views expressed in the interviews about whether the use of manpower-planning techniques like job analysis, labor market analysis, or various forecasting techniques will lead to improved results. As noted, some SPA and POST respondents have plans to undertake such analyses, and some are already doing them. The modal response, however, reflects a "show me" attitude (rather than hostility) here. The respondents express a fairly high degree of acceptance of the collecting of empirical data related to manpower, but they express much more skepticism about the utility of the analytical planning techiques themselves. Indeed, respondents were generally noncommital about the thought of increasing their level of manpower planning analysis—in part, no doubt, a reflection of an uneasiness or lack of understanding about the payoffs.

(6) **Opinion about Which State Agencies Should Do Statewide Manpower Planning Analysis:** The bulk of respondent opinion clearly disfavors the creation of a single state agency charged with manpower data collection and manpower analysis responsibilities. The use of the state-level sector-specific agencies, such as POSTs for law enforcement and corrections for jails, is clearly the route respondents prefer. The only consistently approved-of role for state agencies such as the SPA or civil service (which have no sector-specific ties) is one of technical assistance.

The notion of comprehensive systems-wide criminal justice manpower planning is much less attractive than is the notion of sector-specific state-level planning. Even this, however, raises concern over issues of state infringement over local control.

The issue of local control is a serious ideological impediment to state-level manpower planning—an issue that must be carefully handled, especially if such planning results in state-level policymaking. A synthesis of opinions expressed in the surveys and interviews clearly denotes a preference for any state-level

manpower-planning activity to be informational rather than resulting in state-level policies.

V. The Future of Criminal Justice Systemic Manpower Planning

Forces that have affected the past can be expected to affect the future, unless altered. From section two of this paper, those past forces of import were identified as a fragmented system, a failure to know and to understand the operational meaning of comprehensive planning, the association of comprehensive planning with federal grants and priorities, SPA reliance on project-specific planning, and isolation of the SPA from the operational community.

The NAPA study and the recently collected manpower-planning data suggest some alteration in these forces to the likely advantage of cross-sector planning. In general, we can note a now pervasive understanding that comprehensive planning is not something simply achieved, as was apparently assumed in the 1968 legislation. This is a useful and essential first step. The apparent professionalization of SPA staff, as reported by NAPA, seems also a helpful step toward giving something more than lip service to the concept of planning. Decreasing federal funds, or their elimination, may well bring surviving SPAs more closely into the realm of state and local problem solving and out of the primary role of federal grantsmanship. And the apparent increase in the use of empirical data for planning purposes as reported by NAPA and as noted in the manpower study would seem to offer the opportunity of basing system planning on objective data rather than on intuition and folklore.

Other impediments to developing empirically based system planning seem less alterable in the foreseeable future. Formal system fragmentation continues and will continue for some time to come. Although NAPA and the manpower study both point toward contact and discussion among levels and components of the criminal justice system, there is only scattered evidence in the interviews to suggest that such contacts have yielded significant cooperation in action. Cutbacks in available federal planning dollars will almost certainly have some negative effects (e.g., elimination of some SPAs and staff cutbacks in others, at least in the short run). Funds available to finance data collection will decrease, and reductions in staff are likely to decrease the amount of data collection initiated under the SPAs, even if new data-collection funds are located.

The most serious impediment to cross-sector planning—the complicated nature of criminal justice problems—will certainly remain. Actually, however, it is not so much the complicated problems that provide the major impediment as it is the lack of suitable structural arrangements and techniques permitting cross-sector problem analysis.

This brings us full circle to the comment that we made earlier that the term "comprehensive planning" is an operationally ill-defined concept in criminal

155

justice. Three operational definitions seem possible. The first defines "comprehensive" in a very limited sense and, in line with past practices of several SPAs, as the fair (equitable) distribution of federal grant money among system components. A second option is to define "comprehensive" as central planning, with authority vested in a state-level agency to do just that. The third option is to define "comprehensive" as coordination, based on the recognition that fragmentation is a fact of life and that decision making in the system is itself decentralized and fragmented.

Comprehensive planning defined as central planning does not appear to be a viable option for criminal justice in the forseeable future. In part this is due to the ideological association of central planning with control; specifically, it seems precluded by our basic political beliefs:

> Everything we know about American government, and especially about the separation of powers doctrine, argues against centralized comprehensive planning and in favor of fragmented functional planning located throughout the various branches and subdivisions of government. *Fragmentation is not the problem to overcome: The dysfunctions resulting from fragmentation should be the target.*[28]

Even if central planning were politically feasible, it would remain a practical infeasibility in the foreseeable future because there is little evidence to suggest that state agencies (SPA or otherwise) have staff and authority enough to accomplish it across all system components and at all levels. And in an era foreshadowed by economic uncertainty at best, it seems most improbable that staff and funds will be made available to agencies like the SPAs even to attempt it.

Comprehensive planning as the fair distribution of federal dollars is, with the likely stopping of the flow of federal dollars to the states, illogical. But even if the dollars continue to flow, one gains the impression that the SPA comprehensive planning apparatus established in many states in response to the LEAA initiative was little more than window dressing, merely to qualify for federal dollars. In these states, the SPA planning apparatus was never drawn into the key decision-making structures of these states and to this day effectively remain isolated from the major corridors of power and influence.

Comprehensive planning as coordination, however, seems to be a viable option for the future, but it is just as likely (and is probably certain) that any movement in this direction will vary greatly among the states. The ideological acceptability of coordinated criminal justice planning would at face value seem more appealing to the states than would the more threatening idea and term, central planning. Indeed, the groundwork for such a view seems to have been laid in the 1976 publication of the Council of State Governments, where it was noted that:

Planning is not inherently more valuable because it is centralized. A public policy on criminal justice planning should (1) place high priority on developing a sound planning capacity at every significant decision-making point, and (2) supplement those diffused planning capacities with a mechanism for ameliorating the dysfunctions which fragmented power must inevitably produce....

A policy of building a criminal justice planning capacity at strategic points in government does not necessarily mean abandonment of a comprehensive perspective. The need for a systemwide perspective seems now to be so well established among planners that the presentation of policy or program strategies without regard to their impact upon other agencies would in all likelihood be regarded as unprofessional. All planners, wherever situated, can take a comprehensive perspective even though they are typically instructed to develop strategies for the attainment of limited objectives.[29]

The Council points out that in its view "coordination is as much a public policy objective as it is a formal process."[30] By this it apparently means to imply the creation of a mentality that recognizes that system components affect one another and that planning within each of the components must be cognizant of such effects and plan for them. Findings from the manpower study, as well as from the NAPA study, would seem to confirm the Council's view that ignoring systems-wide implications would be viewed as unprofessional. Thus, the mentality already exists (probably a development of the last five years) to think in terms of such implications. The question, however, is whether or not thinking will move to the level of action.

At an operational level, the basic underlying assumption of systems theory is that maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of each component of the system individually is not necessarily consonant with maximizing system efficiency and effectiveness. Thus the purpose of maintaining a systems-wide perspective is one of making component efficiency and effectiveness conditional on that of the system. This is an appealing thought, and it certainly has applications in certain applied production or service delivery areas. However, its application to the criminal justice system is much more problematic, owing to the competing value preferences expressed as system and component goals. A full-blown systems approach, as might be exemplified in a truly comprehensive system-planning effort, might well prove to mitigate the effects of fragmentation if competing values were capable of resolution. Experience would seem to dictate, however, that such resolution has proved to be highly problematic.

The 1976 Council report offers an alternative perspective on what may be possible in the future:

157

> What is needed in order to deal with fragmented decision
> making is a method of interfacing the decisions of separate
> agencies or units of government so that such problems as
> duplication of services, unequal funding, and discontinuities or
> conflicts in policies can be minimized.[31]

This alternative appears to focus on dealing with the obvious dysfunction of fragmentation rather than on some notion of a comprehensive response to dysfunction. NAPA findings indicate that this is the nature of current planning capability development in the nine NAPA states, and the findings here would agree that where development is taking place, it follows this less global and more program-specific or problem-specific approach.

Thus, we may note that action toward comprehensive planning seems to be developing among some of the SPAs, but in a project-specific sense. And it is in this sense that coordinated planning in the criminal justice system will continue to emerge, if it continues at all. At an action level, such development is likely to continue in established veins—namely, research, technical assistance, grants-in-aid, and limited program-review and budget-review authority. In some states these functions will be carried out by an SPA-type agency located within a superagency of justice that includes the state-level operational criminal justice agencies like the state police and corrections. In other states, the SPA will remain structurally separated from the operational sector and be housed either in the governor's executive apparatus or in the budget bureau. Although there is little empirical evidence to suggest that one structural arrangement or another would necessarily facilitate the development of coordinated planning, it would logically seem best served within the superagency where at least some aspects of coordination would be made explicit. Integration of the judiciary will, however, continue to be problematic.

As Skoler has pointed out, concerns over mounting costs, the proliferation of programs, and duplication have led to an increasing trend among the states to reorganize structurally.[32] The course of reorganization seems set toward the creation of superagencies and the combining of agencies with similar service-delivery functions. The degree to which SPA-type planning agencies fill a key staff role in superagencies will determine the extent and level of development that system planning achieves in the foreseeable future.

But there are dangers inherent in such developments. The first is that structural association of SPAs with state-level superagencies may serve further to isolate the SPAs from local criminal justice agencies. The second is that movement of the SPA from the governor's executive apparatus to a justice agency may isolate the SPA from direct and influential contact with the chief executive. Third, amalgamation within a justice agency will not guarantee meaningful coordinated planning; only commitment to coordination by key decision makers will.

What is the future of criminal justice manpower planning? If the past and present are any indication, planning will continue slowly to emerge as a viable tool in managing the criminal justice enterprise. The rate and nature of emergence will vary greatly from state to state and will be dependent on the following factors: (1) the amendment of local views that comprehensive or coordinated planning is synonymous with normative planning and control; (2) the degree to which SPAs (or similar agencies) are able to establish a track record and positive image built on planning-related technical assistance and research; (3) the degree to which economic and budgetary constraints force increased efficiency through an appeal to coordination.

There seems little doubt that criminal justice manpower planning has a future and that the importance of systems planning will grow. But it likewise seems clear that unexamined notions of systems planning—notions like "comprehensiveness"—will be replaced by the more down-to-earth notion of coordination directed at specific problems.

It seems most improbable that anything approaching a "national manpower-planning model" for criminal justice will have utility or feasibility. On purely practical grounds, the notion is normally resisted because of problems of local and state control. There is the further technical difficulty that data-collection and data-analysis capabilities differ greatly from state to state and locality to locality, as do the nature of manpower problems and the mix of decisional constraints. This seems most clear with regard to any attempt to impose a rigid prescriptive package that has as its goal a standardization of decisions and policies.

Although decisions and policies will resist being standardized, it seems probable that planning or analysis schemes can be standardized at least at an informational level through a nationally led dissemination effort. Such a dissemination effort might most profitably begin with the design of "conceptual guides" on how to do varying forms of manpower planning, followed by training in their use.

It is often ignored that two different people—and even more so, different agencies in differing environments—using the same data and analytical techniques can come to radically different policy conclusions. This is one reason why decisions and policies resist standardization. Yet, the current vogue of techniques like job analysis and assessment centers is evidence of willingness within the system to use "standardized" planning and decisional techniques. Their use also suggests that many problems are similar from agency to agency, thereby permitting some standardization in analyzing them.

The problem, of course, is that agencies have widely differing analytical needs for and abilities to afford the varying forms of analysis. Standardization of analysis, therefore, must permit choosing from among alternative analytical schemes in an effort to fit agency and environmental conditions best.

Certain notions of "comprehensive manpower planning" also seem infeasible. We speak specifically of complex schemes centrally to prescribe and to manage the details of multidimensional data collection and analysis for

manpower-planning purposes. The issues involving manpower are so complex and numerous and the factors that effect manpower planning and decision making are so varied that it is well beyond both our technical and conceptual understanding to deal with them under any imagined unified and comprehensive analytical scheme. What seems far more feasible and of far greater utility is to consider two separate yet interrelated foci for criminal justice manpower planning: macro planning focusing on obvious system dysfunction arising out of fragmentation, and micro planning focusing on the needs of individual operational agencies.

There is little if any system support of planning for planning's sake. The operational community is problem-focused in the sense that it seeks resolution of specific, existing problems, and perhaps it also seeks a framework for anticipating significant emerging problems. Data collection and analysis will only be supported by the operational community if they relate to such realities and take into account constraints posed by the environment. Our data suggest that although there is wide variation in the policy decisions meant to resolve manpower problems, the problems themselves vary less (e.g., everyone confronts personnel selection issues). Thus, standardization of the way we examine certain extant or predictable problems is perhaps the most fruitful means at our disposal for designing manpower-planning conceptual guides.

Macro- and Micro-Planning Foci

The foci of macro planning are the problems faced by "staff agencies" in deliberately seeking to influence aggregates of other agencies (e.g., POSTs with regard to law enforcement agencies, or SPAs with regard to various aggregates of state agencies). Unfortunately, our data indicate that macro planning, at the state level, for example, is fragmented. The usual case is that each sector-specific state-level agency is invested with significant policy and decisional authority for each of the respective local functional components. Data collection and analysis for manpower-planning and policymaking purposes also tend to be similarly decentralized. This leads to great confusion over roles and authority between these sector-specific state-level agencies and agencies like the SPA that are supposed to "resolve" system dysfunction (e.g., over who, for example, is to addre: the issue of police role definition—the SPA or the POST). It is overly simple, especially at the state level, to assume that manpower planning, data collection, and analysis can be authoritatively centralized in most states in a single agency like the SPA. This seems only feasible in those states that have, or will come to have, a superagency. In such cases, there is probably only an "in-house" need structurally to differentiate aspects of macro planning (e.g., court, corrections, law enforcement manpower planning). Where superagencies of justice do *not* exist, however—which is by far the more usual situation—macro planning functions will have to be shared by a number of semi-independent state-

level agencies (e.g., SPAs, POSTs, departments of corrections, and court administrators).

The currently most feasible option in decentralized state systems involves a division of labor between an agency such as the SPA (*but not necessrily the SPA*) and the sector-specific state-level agencies. The SPA would have two prime roles: (1) providing manpower-planning technical assistance to the sector-specific agencies, and (2) data collection and analysis meant to resolve obvious system dysfunction or to provide data related to system environmental concerns such as labor market analyses. Technical assistance would include dissemination and employment of standardized techniques related to manpower missions, goals and problems, and for collecting and analyzing requisite data. Our interview and survey data indicate that these are the two roles most acceptable to the SPAs themselves.

The sector-specific agencies would have three prime roles: (1) as principal data collectors and collators of manpower data within their respective sectors (this would build on rather than replace existing practice); (2) as focal points for manpower planning related to providing technical assistance (through established delivery systems) to local agencies; and (3) as state-level macro planners for their respective components. Manpower problems that cut across traditional system components would require the coordinative effort of an agency like the SPA.

This division of labor seems most feasible because it builds on current practices and capabilities, it recognizes that many of the manpower problems currently confronting the system differentially affect the various components, it recognizes the semi-independent status of the components as confirmed by constitutions and legislation, and it allows the components themselves some independence in focusing on their own particular problem areas.

A word of caution, however, as the division of labor is not neat and clean. For example, labor market analysis for the state's law enforcement agencies might well involve not only a POST or an SPA but also a department of labor. As one moves from issue to issue or state to state, individual accommodations will need to be struck.

Exact operational definition of what we mean by standardization of analytical techniques and data collection is impossible without additional work. However, it is clear that macro or aggregative planning requires standardization of certain data sets (e.g., turnover, career mobility, qualitative characteristics of employees, etc.). This will have implications at both the macro and micro levels of planning. Standardization of analytical techniques does not necessarily mean proposing a specific set of methodologies for standardized use; rather, it may mean standardizing understanding of alternative techniques with regard to (1) data and analytical requirements of alternative techniques, and (2) spelling out the costs, uses, and limitations of these alternatives.

Manpower planning within the individual operational agency should take a micro approach—by which we mean that data collection and analysis should

focus on the individual agency, its needs, and its problems. However, there are issues of interface between macro and micro planning that affect the individual operational agency. The first is that efficiency in data collection would dictate that, insofar as possible, data collected for macro and micro planning purposes be compatible. Thus, some data sets should be standardized from agency to agency. Other data sets may relate to the specific problems or needs of an individual agency and these do not need to be compatible.

The same point applies to issues of standardizing specific manpower-planning analytical techniques. For example, if job analysis has implications both for individual agencies and statewide, one would hope for sufficient standardization in the technique, as employed from agency to agency, to permit meaningful comparisons.

Standardization does not mean that everyone collects the same data through employment of the same techniques, with no variation. Instead it means bridging the somewhat arbitrary distinction between micro and macro planning purposes so that certain aspects of data collection and analysis can simultaneously and efficiently serve both purposes.

Notes — Chapter 5

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Chapter 6
Manpower Training and Entry Standards

As noted in Chapter 1 and elsewhere, agencies in the system tend to define manpower planning colloquially, in the context of their particular missions or current problems. One of these definitions, a popular one, is that manpower planning first and foremost concerns itself with training and minimal employee entry standards. Although this is a narrow definition of manpower planning compared to the one used in the Michigan State University project, it focuses attention on an important area of recent manpower planning-related development in the system—police officer standards and training councils (POSTs).

The contributions of POSTs to the area of human resource management have been mentioned in previous chapters, but the purpose here is to devote more detailed attention to certain aspects of POST roles. This is important because the POSTs may be engaged in a form of systemic planning discussed in Chapter 5, and also because their planning efforts have authoritative policy implications for aggregates of agencies. The chapter first traces the historical development of these state-level agencies and then discusses the current roles and perceptions of POSTs as statewide human resource policy and planning units for law enforcement. Finally, the implications of these developments are discussed.

I. Development of Peace Officer Standards and Training Councils

August Vollmer, often referred to as the father of law enforcement education, was the first American police executive to call for the help of university educators to develop job-related police training programs.[1] In 1908, in cooperation with the University of California, he initiated a course on evidence collection for officers in the Berkeley Police Department.[2] Such a radical departure from the usual apprenticeship or on-the-job training for new police officers did not go unnoticed.[3]

Under a 1917 California statute, the California Bureau of Criminal Indentification and Investigation was created, and the State Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, was authorized "to arrange for and organize schools at convenient centers in the State for training peace officers in their powers and duties and in the use of approved equipment and methods for

detection, identification, and apprehension of criminals."[4] However, as with the history of much law enforcement legislation, the act provided no funds, nor was any subsequent legislation passed to appropriate funds for conducting a statewide police training program.

It was not until 1935, at the convention of the Peace Officers Association of the State of California, that a resolution was adopted providing for a committee to assist in formulating a statewide training program for peace officers. The resolution further provided that the committee obtain the cooperation and assistance of the State Department of Education. The committee was composed of representatives of the peace officers' association, the sheriffs' association, the district attorneys' association, and the justices' and constables' association. Nominations for membership on the committee were made by the Peace Officers Association of California to the Department of Education, which appointed the committee members. The committee developed its programs with the guidance of the Bureau of Industrial Education of the State Department of Education, and came to be known as the California Program for Peace Officer Training, the predecessor of the modern-day police officer standards and training councils, POSTs.[5]

The central feature of the California Program was a cooperative enterprise between the government agencies, the local schools, and the Department of Education, for the purpose of providing organized training for law enforcement officers of all agencies within the state. Unlike current POSTs, the coordinating and administrative unit of this first statewide police training program was the Department of Education.

Before the organization of the California Program for Peace Officers, program development in law enforcement education and training had been strictly "armchaired"—formulated on the basis of hunches and imagination, and by reference to what someone else may have done, quite independent of any consideration of the tasks to be performed. From the standpoint of education and training, this was "unscientific" in its approach to the training problem, and ineffective with respect to results.

The professional educators from the Department of Education, with their prior experience in vocational education, brought a new level of sophistication to police training. They pointed out that an effective training program necessitated a detailed analysis of the job itself. Recognition of this need led to a pioneering effort to study police work scientifically. "In 1933, two years prior to the establishment of the coordination committee, the State Department of Education published a *Job Analysis of Police Service,* based on 'an analysis of duties performed in the various divisions of the Police Department of the City of Los Angeles.'[6] This document was then followed in 1934 by the *Instructional Analysis of Police Service* which attempted to present a training curriculum based on the evidence in the previous report.'"[7] Though the California effort was rudimentary by present standards, it was an effort by the police and professional

educators to study police work and to develop relevant training programs and manuals.[8]

During the next ten years, primarily because of World War II, the California Program for Peace Officers made limited progress in developing statewide training. But after World War II, both law enforcement education and training mushroomed. The presence of large numbers of military veterans and the availability of the G.I. Education Bill gave impetus for the development of two- and four-year programs in law enforcement. Likewise, police training revived. Zone schools were organized to provide training facilities for law enforcement officers in small cities, towns, and counties; basic training was made available to virtually every new police officer. The California Technical Institute of Peace Officers' Training was designed as an advanced school for police officers. Two-week institutes were conducted at the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of California, Los Angeles. Instructor training courses also were provided for police training instructors. Supervisory as well as administrative training was made available to meet various levels of police officer training needs.[9]

Despite these strides made in law enforcement education and training in California in the first half of the century, several individuals and commissions reported on the deficiencies in the law enforcement community. O.W. Wilson, as Dean of the School of Criminology, University of California, Berkeley, in his address to the 1953 Conference of the League of California Cities in San Francisco, emphasized a lack of education and training as one of the primary weaknesses in police departments that contributed to unsatisfactory police service. His address, "Can the State Help City Police Departments?" left no doubt that the state had to take a more active role in the education and training of its police officers.[10]

In a section entitled "Suggestions for Action by State and Local Governments" of the Kefauver Committee's *Third Interim Report of the Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, May, 1951,* the committee noted the need for "the provision of better methods of recruiting and training local and state police officials."[11]

In the Final Report of the American Bar Association Committee on Organized Crime, September, 1952, the House of Delegates of the ABA adopted the recommendation of its Committee on Organized Crime that each state create a Police Council. The Model Police Council Act, drafted by the Committee, stated that the purpose of any Police Council should include "more effective selection and training of police personnel."[12]

Among the recommendations in the *Final Report of the California Special Crime Study Commission on Organized Crime,* May 1953, was the following:

> That the Legislature authorize a study to be begun by competent experts in the field of police training and adminsistration to formulate suitable standards of training,

organization and administration for city and county law enforcement agencies and to recommend appropriate methods of inspecting and reporting to the public upon the efficiency of such agencies.[13]

The aforementioned individuals and commissions provided the impetus for the creation in 1959 of the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training—POST. The State of New York established its Municipal Police Training Council soon thereafter. These were followed by the creation of POSTs in Oklahoma, Oregon, and New Jersey in 1961, and Arkansas in 1963. "The turning point for law enforcement and likewise for POSTs came in 1964, when it became clear that local efforts were deficient, that state and local authorities lacked for necessary funds, and that the public was agitated . . . ."[14] President Lyndon B. Johnson's response came in his first presidential message on crime, in which he stated that the federal government would "seek to exercise leadership and to assist local authorities in meeting their responsibilities."[15] He proposed a commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and a bill to establish a modest grant program in the U.S. Department of Justice to finance innovative programs in law enforcement.

This Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 authorized the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance to finance state and local law-enforcement training and innovative demonstration projects. In the three years it operated, it made awards to several police education and training programs. During this time, POSTs were established in an additional seventeen states.

In 1967, the President's Commission released its findings in a report entitled *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* and in nine subsequent task force reports. Among the Commission's important proposals and prescriptions were the recommendations for organizations and operations of state commissions.[16] The Commission relied heavily on the International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Police Standards Council Act.[17] Guided by this act and with the assistance of funds through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, an additional sixteen states established POSTs bringing the total number to 39 by 1972.[18]

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals attempted for the first time to formulate national criminal justice standards and goals for state and local levels. The Commission's report on the police recommended: "Every state should enact legislation establishing a State Commission to develop and administer state standards for the training of police personnel." The report further stated: "The State should provide sufficient funds to enable this commission to . . . employ a full-time staff large enough to carry out the basic duties of the commission."[19] Though these basic duties were not specifically outlined, POSTs since 1973 have taken their initial mandate and expanded their role beyond the narrow confines of training. This expanded role has not always been voluntary, but has, in part, been brought about because of

167

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines.[20] POSTs have been placed under considerable pressure, from their constituencies and EEOC, to validate their minimum employment standards and training requirements. These factors have forced them to take a more active role in manpower planning.

What can be observed from this summary of developments is that basic concepts enunciated well over fifty years ago have undergone steady development. But it is probably only in the last ten to fifteen years that the development has been concerted and nationally broad based. Most importantly, the establishment of state-level administrative units (POSTs) has provided a focus for those seeking further developments. But the mere existence of the POSTs has also meant that there is a bureaucracy now established to initiate development itself—it need not, and often does not, wait for an external focus to create the pressure for change. The current nature and extent of the involvement of POSTs in statewide efforts at manpower planning, their evolving role and perceptions follow in the next section of this chapter.

II. Current Role and Perceptions

Currently, forty-six of the fifty states have POSTs. As part of the project, mail questionnaires were sent to all POSTs and forty usable surveys were returned. Additionally, site interviews, each three or more hours long, were conducted at eight POSTs. The data and conclusions reported in this section are based on these mail questionnaires and site interviews. Some supplementing information was gathered from other sources to help complete the report.

The POST survey was nearly twenty pages in length and collected data across nearly 500 variables of interest. Space allotted to this chapter does not permit equally full treatment of all the data and findings. We have, however, sought to summarize the more pertinent findings, giving an overview of current POST manpower planning related efforts—especially as these efforts relate to statewide planning and policymaking efforts.

Among the several issues examined in the Michigan State University POST study, two are of particular importance: (1) Are requisite data for manpower planning being collected and aggregated at the state level? and (2) To what extent are data being used in making policy or reaching human-resource decisions? But before these issues can be examined, it is necessary briefly to summarize the current roles and functions of the POSTs.

In general, all POSTs have followed the various commission recommendations and have established basic training programs for entry-level police officers. While most of the POSTs are empowered to set minimum mandatory training requirements, some, such as the California POST, have been able to convince police departments through economic incentives that training is necessary; as a result, they have nearly 100 percent voluntary participation in their training programs. Besides setting training standards, 50 percent of POSTs surveyed in the MSU project indicated that they are also empowered to set minimum

employment standards for law enforcement agencies in their state, other than training standards.

Though most POSTs are empowered to mandate training requirements and many are setting minimum employment standards, more than two-thirds (68%) of the respondents indicate that manpower planning as defined by us is not a mission of their agencies. In fact, when asked if they had a position, unit, or individual formally or informally engaged in manpower planning, more than three quarters (78%) said no, and almost as many (73%) had no plans to establish such a unit. However, about two-thirds (62.5%) of the respondents indicated that statewide manpower planning for law enforcement should become a mission of POST.

One possible conclusion from this, supported by interview findings, is the POSTs are defining manpower planning in a nonsystematic fashion. That is, they are more into the "what's happening now?" mode, inclined to focus on manpower issues as they arise, and do not perceive a need to do long-range planning, such as needs forecasting. Even though the respondents indicated that they had no current plans for comprehensive manpower planning they noted that when and if it should be done, they should do it for the law enforcement sector.

Just how involved in manpower planning issues POSTs have become was the theme of a large section in the MSU POST survey. Specifically, it was concerned with whether POSTs or another state-level agency or agencies (public or private) currently collect, tabulate, or have certain kinds of law enforcement employee data on a statewide basis. We wanted to know whether a state agency or private organization had information on: (1) the number of employees in law enforcement; (2) descriptions of police job duties; (3) the number of job vacancies; (4) required employee qualifications; (5) projected retirement dates of employees; (6) educational levels attained by employees; (7) training received by employees; and (8) projected work loads, case loads, or other measures of agency work levels. Additionally there was a concern with (a) identifying the principal agencies that have or collect this information and (b) the quality of this information—that is, whether it is *current* (data are regularly updated such as yearly), *complete* (data include most or all agencies), and *detailed* (data are on both entry positions and higher positions).

A summary of POST responses to the manpower planning information questions for three levels of law enforcement agencies is presented in Table 6.1. As noted, for *state* law enforcement agencies, POSTs indicate that information concerning number of employees, job vacancies, employee qualifications, and training records are more often collected than other types of information. Data on job descriptions, projected retirement dates, and educational levels appear to be less frequently collected.

For *county* and *local* law enforcement agencies, a similar high level of data collection exists but only for information on the number of employees and training records. For job descriptions, job vacancies, employee qualifications, retirement dates and educational levels, POSTs report only moderate levels of

Table 6.1
Percentage of POSTs Reporting that
Certain Types of Data are Collected
By a State Agency

(N=40)

Type of Information	State Law Enforcement	County Law Enforcement	Local Law Enforcement
Number of Employees	90%	85%	88%
Job Descriptions	68%	38%	40%
Job Vacancies	95%	15%	15%
Employee Qualifications	83%	38%	45%
Retirement Dates	63%	25%	25%
Educational Levels	53%	50%	53%
Training Records	90%	83%	90%
Work Load Measures	18%	5%	5%

Note: Percentages in this table have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

information collection. Most interestingly, for all three levels of law enforcement, information on work load measures is the kind least collected.

As for the principal agencies that collect this information, either the POST or the State Personnel Office is most generally listed regarding state law-enforcement-agency data. For county and local law-enforcement-agency data, POST is identified most often as the agency collecting and possessing the information.

Concerning the quality of the information, the respondents reported rather consistently across all three levels of law enforcement that information on the number of employees, job vacancies, employee qualifications, and training records was very high on the qualitative measures of currentness, completeness, and detail. The quality of information on job descriptions, projected retirement dates, and educational levels was not reported to be as high. Information on work load measures was the lowest reported category for all law enforcement agencies.

Besides the manpower planning issues presented in Table 6.1, several other areas were explored in the POST survey to determine whether the capacity for

170

manpower planning was present at the state level. The importance of law-enforcement-employee data to the respondents is shown in Table 6.2. Almost all of the POSTs felt that having the following types of data was important or very important to their agency mission: number of employees in various job

Table 6.2

Perceptions of Post Respondents of the Importance of Certain Types of Data to Agency Missions and Whether the Data are Possessed by the Agency

(N=40)

Type of Information	Importance to Your Current Agency Missions			Do You Currently Have or Receive Data?		
	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not at All	Fairly Complete	Somewhat Complete	Little or None
Number of Employ-ees in Job Classifications	68%	22%	10%	50%	18%	32%
Job Descriptions	37%	48%	15%	8%	17%	75%
Job Vacancies/ Turnover	43%	45%	12%	8%	22%	70%
Employee Qualifi-cations	60%	25%	15%	13%	17%	70%
Retirement Dates	15%	38%	47%	3%	—	97%
Educational Levels	63%	37%	—	35%	22%	43%
Training Records	93%	5%	2%	53%	27%	20%
Work-Load Measures	5%	50%	45%	5%	3%	92%
Compensation Packages and Fringe Benefits	8%	35%	57%	8%	5%	87%
Provisions of Employee Contracts	5%	30%	65%	—	5%	95%

Note: Percentages in this table have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

171

classifications, records of training received, educational levels, job descriptions, employee qualifications, and job vacancies and turnover. A majority of the POSTs also reported that projected retirement dates and work load measures were important or very important to their mission. In general, they did not consider provisions of employee contracts and compensation-package information important—which is curious, given the increasing importance of both in managing law enforcement agencies.

Most of the respondents reported that they currently had information on the training received by employees in law enforcement agencies. In addition, a majority of the POSTs reported that they had information on the number of employees in various job classifications, and on the education of those employees. Of the remaining manpower personnel data that POSTs reported as important to their current agency mission, fewer than 30 percent had data on job descriptions, employee qualifications, and job vacancies, and fewer than eight percent had data on projected retirement dates, work load measures, provisions of employee contracts and compensation packages.

Though POSTs generally perceive such manpower data as important to their missions, this importance is not heavily reflected by their having the data. But they are becoming active in certain manpower activities beyond mere data collection. For example, 70 percent of the POSTs reported that they analyze training needs; another five percent reported that this was done for them by a contractor. Twenty percent reported that training needs were not assessed, but such assessment would be useful. Only three percent reported that this was neither done nor was likely to be useful to them.

The manpower activity, apart from training, that was reported by 50 percent of the POSTs as being done, and by another 40 percent as being useful, was job analysis. Ten other selected manpower activities, and POSTs' responses about their usefulness and their involvement in them are reported in Table 6.3. In general, more than two-thirds of the respondents noted that they are either involved in all of these activities or that the activities would be useful to them. The great majority of the selected manpower activities are not currently being done but are reported as being potentially useful.

In summary, we can say that the primary mission of the POSTs is training, and that a growing share of them is empowered to develop minimum employment standards for state, county, and local law enforcement agencies. Also, POSTs are either themselves collecting or have knowledge of some of the law enforcement employee information that they feel is important to their mission. However, the majority of the respondents reported that their manpower planning activities are generally limited to training needs assessment and job analysis, or to auxiliary forms of data collection and analysis related to training.

III. The Role of POSTs in Manpower Development

To formulate a clear understanding of the potential role POSTs may play in

Table 6.3
Selected Manpower Activities
Conducted By or Useful to Posts

(N=40)

Manpower Activities	Done by Your Agency	Done for You by a Contractor	Not Done But Would Be Useful	Not Done nor Likely to be Useful
Job Analysis	40%	10%	40%	3%
Selection Validation	28%	5%	55%	3%
Manpower Inventory	43%		40%	8%
Training Needs Assessment	70%	5%	20%	3%
Performance Evaluation	20%		65%	5%
Personnel Information Systems	10%		75%	5%
Labor Market Analysis	5%		58%	33%
Career Path Analysis	10%		73%	13%
Manpower Simulation	3%		68%	23%
Job Redesign	5%	3%	60%	23%
Analysis of Turnover	10%		70%	3%
Manpower Needs Assessment	13%		63%	15%

Note: Percentages in this table may not sum to 100% because of missing data.

the development of human resources for law enforcement, it is necessary at this point to reflect on what has previously been addressed. POSTs are comparatively new organizations, and their historical development, for the most part, has been a response to national and state crises and to the recommendations of various national commissions. POSTs, in the past, have been fairly innocuous, sometimes content to set minimum training hours and sometimes more aggressive as in setting minimum employment standards—requiring applicants,

for example, to possess a high school diploma or general education certificate (GED) for entry-level positions in law enforcement.

More recently POSTs, because they are legislatively constituted bodies with a mandate to provide law enforcement training and, in many states, have an additional mandate to establish minimum employment standards, have accepted the role of leader in creating employment standards for their constituencies. When POSTs decide to move beyond their traditional role of certifying minimum training hours, they would seem to have the potential for further impact on broader manpower issues.

The current trend of some POSTs appears to be an abandonment of the armchair rhetoric about what it takes to be a peace officer, in favor of the more empirically-based approaches to the development of standards and training. Such efforts were noted in Table 6.3 where some POSTs are currently undertaking or contracting out such activities as training needs assessment, selection validation, manpower inventory, and job analysis.

Although they operate with a legislative mandate that dictates to the law enforcement community, POSTs must be responsive to that constituency, which in turn, is attempting to meet fair employment guidelines and court decisions. The manpower activities that POSTs currently undertake have been given impetus by the needs of their constituencies, the fair employment guidelines, and their legislative mandates to provide minimum employment and training standards for law enforcement. The effects of these manpower planning activities on policy development are far-reaching. However, for the sake of brevity, we will narrow the present discussion to just one manpower planning activity and its broader systemic implications.

One activity the POSTs report that they currently undertake is job analysis. As shown in Table 6.3, 50 percent of the POSTs have already done a job analysis, and another 40 percent indicate that job analysis would be useful to their mission. Briefly, this means that POSTs are using one or more job analysis techniques to ascertain exactly what police officers do in their state.[21] Once these police activities are documented and a data base is established, an analysis of the task data is undertaken to identify the knowledges, skills, abilities, and other personal characteristics that an individual must possess to do the job of a police officer effectively. The analysis is followed by a development phase, which consists of the construction of testing instruments for selection of candidates and the development of training content and training evaluation instruments. The final two phases of the job analysis—implementation and control—involve the incorporation of the selection and training criteria and processes into the employment and training system, and the monitoring of the results for purposes of feedback and control. The end results of job analysis efforts of POSTs will be the mandating of selection and training standards, which will be based on job-related data, and which will conform to federal and state fair-employment regulations and related case law.

An important implication of this multi-step process is that several distinct

processes (job analysis, test and selection validation, etc.) have the potential of becoming a set of interrelated processes—as they should be. This may offer a partial solution to the problem mentioned in Chapter 3 that individual police agencies often do many of the same things, but in a nonsystematic and unlinked fashion. POSTs would generally seem to exist with a sufficiently broad mission mandate to coordinate many personnel processes, from the basic research to the policy-implementation phases. Yet, mandate notwithstanding, two problems remain. First, POSTs' attempts to make policy on a statewide basis bring up issues of local control. Second, although POSTs may be able to conduct research in support of their specific mandates, there is no guarantee that the right research is done, or done correctly.

For example, the policy implications for job analysis are extensive. On the basis of what police officers and their supervisors *say they do*, POSTs define the tasks of a police officer, and then the role. Given the role and tasks, they select and train officers to perform the tasks and, therefore, the role that has been defined by the tasks. We now have data-driven as well as a data-based methodology for the selection and training of police officers, but it may result in the institutionalization of the status quo, as will be explained shortly.

From all indications, the current interest in job analysis is likely to increase, for several reasons. Professional guidelines on test use prepared by the American Psychological Association and Division 14 as well as the 1970 EEOC guidelines and the 1976 revision of those guidelines all emphasize the importance of job analysis. The recent upsurge in job analyses of police work has been the result of legal pressure. The general pattern of events has usually begun with a claim by aggrieved parties that the police selection process unfairly discriminates against their obtaining employment. Through the courts or EEOC, the key issue has been job-relatedness. In order to examine the job-relatedness of the selection process, a job analysis is performed; this is to determine what the job is and what requirements it makes of workers. The courts and EEOC have used job analysis findings in their decisions on the job relatedness of selection processes.

The systemic implications of these processes are immense, beginning perhaps with law enforcement and criminal justice education programs. The educational programs that have a preprofessional orientation—that is, whose graduates are planning to go from an associate's or bachelor's program into an agency—may find that they are not competitive in the job market, because of the fact that their criminal justice education program has not adhered to prescriptions set forth by the POST council in consequence of a statewide job analysis.

How could a POST dictate such policy? The answer is that if a POST conducted a job analysis following established procedures, and promulgated entry-level standards based on the job analysis, the courts today would probably uphold the standards. A law enforcement or criminal justice education program may neither meet the POST standards nor wish to change to meet their prescriptions. The result could be that prospective students may elect to ignore programs that conform to POST council mandates.

In order to trace more fully how a manpower planning technique like job analysis can affect law enforcement and criminal justice education programs, we can follow the effects of job analysis in two POSTs. These states are already moving in the direction of using job analysis data to set minimum employment, education and training standards. The most advanced has already established academic and skills objectives for law-enforcement applicants. The academic objectives based on a job analysis were developed with the cooperation of the two- and four-year law enforcement and criminal justice education programs. A majority of this state's law enforcement and criminal justice educators have included in their degree-granting programs the academic objectives—that is, what a police officer needs to know—that can best be taught in a college setting.[22]

The second state has recently completed the first phase of an analysis of the jobs of law enforcement officers, and is currently in the second phase, an effort to identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other personal characteristics an individual must possess effectively to perform as a police officer. The thrust of this effort has been to encourage an integrated police education and training model through which prospective police officers complete basic police training as a part of their two- or four-year educational program.[23]

These two states under mandates from their legislatures are establishing preservice law enforcement education and training programs at colleges and universities. Their POSTs are setting policy for the recruitment and selection of police officers, as well as for their training.

There is little question that these two POSTs, and others like them, are significantly affecting overall manpower supply, demand, and development. The impact on other system agencies, especially at the local level, affects both finances and personnel policy. In both states, important local and varying preferences have had to be accommodated.

Yet, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the underlying research models guiding job analysis and subsequent policy development in many states have a status quo bias. POSTs approach manpower planning as personnel engineering; after they define the position of police officer, they develop a process, to select the person best qualified to fit that description. The result is that the process of job analysis drives the development of standards; the standards remain static and POST activities tend to maintain the status quo.

Continued reliance by POSTs on scientific methodologies to standardize processes for the recruitment, selection, and training of police officers ignores many other aspects of manpower planning and the environment of law enforcement. POSTs continue to build on the structure of what a police officer is now and to assume more of the same for the future. At best they operate with a crisis orientation and do not focus on the changing needs of law enforcement and the community. Some hear the alarms but do not know where to dispatch the emergency vehicles.

IV. Conclusion

There is little question that POSTs, which began only a few years ago to provide much needed training for new police officers, have acquired the potential for manpower planning and development, and will become a human-resource planning force in the future. Evidence of such development are the products of the pre-employment programs. In one state there is a POST that in cooperation with criminal justice educators has developed and published academic objectives and goals for potential law enforcement officers in their pre-employment educational program. In another state there is a process prescribed by POST that criminal justice education program prsonnel must follow for their graduates to be eligible to be certified as law enforcement officers upon graduation.

POST councils have historically concerned themselves with training law enforcement officers, an essential element in the development of a state manpower planning program. Fair employment guidelines have alerted us to a concern for providing all persons with the opportunity to be recruited, selected, and trained for jobs they can do. The courts have ruled that arbitrary, artificial barriers and qualifications unrelated to job performance may not be a part of any employment process. Job analysis specialists have validated methodologies for documenting what a worker does in a job and for prescribing the necessary knowledges, abilities, skills, and other personal characteristics that a worker must possess to do the job well. Courts have accepted the concept of job analysis as a method for determining the bone fide occupational qualifications for the position of law enforcement officer. And POSTs are using job analysis to set minimum employment and training standards.

The potential of POST involvement in human-resource planning as shown in the job analysis example indicates a major relocation of the recruitment, selection, education, and training of police officers. POSTs are becoming directly involved with the law enforcement labor pool, taking over the traditional manpower activities once reserved for police departments. However, their approach to the police personnel process remains conventional.

POST manpower-planning programs must consider the social service context of policing, analyses of the labor pool, and the effects of standards on fair employment guidelines. A failure to face these and other critical manpower issues such as employee turnover, the effects of education on performance, and career and retirement planning will result in social, economic, and legal challenges, while a concerted effort toward total manpower planning by POSTs will cause them to be an emerging manpower-development force in the future of law enforcement.

It would seem that manpower data collection and analysis by POSTs are evolving out of an ever-widening understanding that training and minimal employee qualifications involve several personnel and planning issues. This widening process would seem to be in midstream, however. For example, our data indicate that in the last few years in particular, a majority of POSTs have

177

come to appreciate the linkage between setting training requirements and job analysis. Yet, a third of the respondents saw no use in doing labor market analysis, and only five percent indicated that they have done it. In many areas, the nature of the labor market may do more to determine who becomes a police officer than will minimal training standards.

The interviews conducted with the eight POSTs make it especially clear that limited finances and, in some cases, limited perspectives are the chief impediments to further developments in POST manpower planning. Finances are always problematic as, for example, the addition of labor market analysis to job analysis will add sizable costs. Yet, it is the issue of limited perspective that may in the long run pose a more serious threat to development. Specifically, we observed in several of the interviews a tendency to dismiss the importance or utility of several kinds of data collection and analysis because the interviewees did not see them as clearly and directly related to prime POST missions such as developing training standards. The case cited in Chapter 5, where the respondent saw no need to forecast needed training slots, is one example of this. Another example comes from Table 6.3, where we can note that job redesign has been undertaken by only eight percent of the respondents, and nearly 25 percent of the respondents viewed job redesign as not having utility in any event.

Another perspective issue involves the previously noted POST orientation toward the status quo. Specifically, questionnaires and interviews convey a consistent picture of POST research and policymaking as oriented toward the here and now, and assuming the future will be the same. We find little evidence that forecasting in any meaningful sense is part of the research/policymaking effort.

If further development of manpower planning is to take place in the POSTs, a greater appreciation of the interrelatedness of various personnel processes must be understood. It must also be better understood that forecasting should be a continuous process, one not done once and then not done again. However, it should be kept in mind that although POSTs are based on ideas originated more than 50 years ago, real development has been rather astounding for such a short period. It remains to be seen, however, whether this development will continue in terms of increasing levels of planning sophistication.

Notes — Chapter 6

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Chapter 7
The Environment of Manpower Decision Making

The acquisition and use of public resources by government agencies will remain a major political issue in the years to come. Current economic trends suggest that whereas the 1960s and 1970s were regarded as the golden era of public sector expansion, the 1980s might better be characterized as public bureaucracy's dark ages. Some of the problems that confront public sector organizations are, no doubt, related to two economic conditions facing government. First, it is apparent that state and local tax revenues are shrinking. Second, and perhaps more crucial, is the effect of inflation on existing government resources; existing tax revenues purchase less now than in previous years. Compounding this already bleak economic outlook is a growing militancy among taxpayers, suggesting that the public will not accede to governmental requests for increased resources.

Amid such economic conditions and the consumer demand for agency accountability, criminal justice agencies are coming under increasing pressure to "rationalize" the processes by which they secure and use public funds. Since resource acquisition and use in the public domain generally translate into personnel costs, much of the concern for rationalizing internal agency processes is focused on position allocation and personnel deployment. By rationalizing the process of resource acquisition (position allocation), criminal justice agencies seek to gain some measure of certainty about their external environment, thereby increasing the likelihood of organizational stability.[1] By rationalizing the internal utilization process (personnel deployment), these agencies seek to increase their ability effectively and efficiently to consume public resources. Simply stated, organizational survival and public accountability are enhanced when the organization exercises control over how it obtains resources and how it puts these resources to use.[2]

All organizations face some degree of uncertainty imposed on them by factors in their external environment, and each through a variety of processes seeks to gain some advantage over external conditions.[3] Further, as organizations attempt and succeed in influencing their external environments, so too do environments influence the development and pursuit of organizational goals.[4] It is this reciprocal interdependence between organization and environment that characterizes the public domain policymaking process.

In considering the environment as an influence on agency decision making, two types of external factors are viewed as affecting organizational outcomes. The first, environmental constraints, are relatively fixed factors in the agency's environment; they are, perhaps, the easiest to predict and thus to control. Such environmental factors affecting criminal justice agencies as city or county charters, the division of labor and authority between bureaucratic agencies, the definition of service clientele, union contracts, labor availability, existing statutes, and certain local population characteristics would be included in the concept of environmental constraints. Each is readily identifiable for some observable period of time; and each is, therefore, subject to organizational prediction and manipulation. In contrast to environmental constraints, contingent factors external to the organization are less predictable and, hence, pose a greater threat to organizational certainty. In criminal justice, such factors as sudden changes in public ideology, an externally publicized organizational crisis, or a major shift in municipal, county, or state commitment to criminal justice funding are indicative of these environmental contingencies.

Environmental constraints and contingencies define the context in which the organization pursues and uses resources. Further, these constraints and contingencies affect the planning process, which is ultimately linked to the policy and decision-making process.[5] Where predictability is enhanced through planning, environmental uncertainty is reduced; where predictability is difficult, both planning effectiveness and organizational certainty are reduced.

Models describing the policymaking process in government are generally cast between two polar positions. At one end of the policymaking continuum is what can be termed the rational-analytical model. It is characterized by such attributes as comprehensive analysis, means-ends relationships specified *a priori,* and values explicitly defined for alternative means of goal achievement.[6] Under this view, the policymaking process is consumed with such tasks as problem definition, alternative development, value determination for alternative means of action, and choice based on the utilitarian dictum.[7] Hence, rational policymaking is the *sine qua non* of public bureaucracy, divorcing the private individual from the public bureaucrat.

In recent years government agencies have increasingly been pressured to embrace the rational-analytical model of policymaking and decision making. Governmental decision making has, as a result, shifted toward the use of planning information as a basis for agency action. As early as 1965 with the federal adoption of a planning programming budgeting system (PPBS), the federal government hailed the era of planning as a major force in organizational action.[8] These planning developments have eventually found their way to state and local levels of government as well.

As a major organizational response to increasing agency control over environmental uncertainty, the rational-analytical model, as embodied in the adoption of planning as a central component in the management process, has been incorporated into most criminal justice agencies. Planning as an

organizational process, then, has been associated with helping to clarify policy options, providing for agency efficiency in economically austere times, while providing for active program development in times of greater economic prosperity. Hence, planning and the rational-analytical model of policymaking and decision making have greatly affected the structure and management of government services, including those in criminal justice. Consequently, effective administration and planning have become synonymous in criminal justice, and agency administrators generally testify to the utility of planning as a tool for rationalizing the decision-making and policymaking process.

At the other end of the policymaking continuum is incrementalism, a process that makes successive limited comparisons of policy options without necessarily considering the entire policy issue. As such, incrementalism relies heavily on the political process either to support or to reject the outcome decision. "Partisan mutual adjustments" guide the incremental approach to public sector policymaking, and political "conflict is reduced by an incremental approach because the area open to dispute is reduced."[9] Thus, the incremental approach to policymaking and decision making is generally associated with partisan politics. But incrementalism is not merely particularistic and devoid of objectivity; rather, it recognizes certain limitations to the underlying assumptions inherent in the rational-analytic model described above. Proponents of the incremental approach to policymaking point to a number of problems inherent in the rational-analytical model—problems that are argued greatly to affect the model's usefulness for policymaking.[10]

A major criticism of the rational-analytical policymaking model relates to the adequacy of information about social policy issues and the further inability of decision makers to account for all possibilities and to identify all policy alternatives. In this regard, limited information about both the dimensions of social problems and societal values for the use of particular policy options is believed greatly to affect the rational model. March and Simon's (1958) administrative man is characterized as making decisions among satisfactory alternatives rather than optimal ones, indicating the difficulty in identifying and specifying the entire range and intensity of policy considerations. As these authors illustrate:

> To optimize requires procedures several orders of magnitude more complex than those required to satisfy. An example is the difference between searching the haystack to find the sharpest needle and searching the haystack to find a needle sharp enough to sew with.[11]

Other scholars of the administrative decision-making process, most notably Herbert A. Simon (1957), identify the constraints on optimal decision making—such factors as time, money, inability to separate fact from value, incomplete communications, and individual expectation. Each of these factors greatly

affects the decision maker's ability rationally (using the criterion of efficiency) to define and to select from policy alternatives.

In addition to inherent limitations on decision making imposed by inadequate information and the capabilities of the decision maker, Lindblom[12] argues, there is a general resistance to analysis in policymaking due to such irrationalities as personal beliefs and feelings about policy outcomes that supersede analytical considerations, and a recognition that the biases of the policy analyst are hard to separate from the analysis and ultimate recommendations. Hence, the intangibles of political life and a suspicion about the value premises of planners themselves have led to criticism of the rational-analytical model of policymaking and decision making.

Obviously, between the extremes of the rational-analytical model and the incremental approach are a number of "mixed models." These "mixed models" recognize the competition between the rational and incremental models and attempt to incorporate objective planning within a limited range of "subjectively" determined policy options.

In criminal justice, resource allocation and use involve political and other nonscientific considerations beyond the empirical information generated through the planning process. The addition or deletion of a judgeship in a county is a major political decision whether or not sufficient "objective" and, hence, "rational" information exists to arrive at the same conclusion. Similarly, changes in police deployment practice involve "community" considerations that affect outcomes. Community-based treatment programs in corrections face similar "community" scrutiny, whether or not cost-effective arguments can be made. As a result, environmental conditions put real constraints on the agency's ability to secure and to use resources, and to use planning as a method for affecting these decisions.

The current study attempts to examine the decision-making environments of criminal justice agencies, with particular concern for identifying the constraints and contingencies affecting resource acquisition and utilization in police and correctional agencies. Implicit in this analysis is the examination of the policy and decision-making networks confronting these criminal justice agencies and the role that planning and rational analyses have on the outcomes of decisions about resources.

I. Design and Methodology

The data reported here are derived from the broader research effort aimed at assessing both the "state of the art" and the feasibility of manpower planning in criminal justice.[13] As mentioned in previous chapters, the broader research effort focused on three interrelated questions about criminal justice agency-based manpower planning: (1) What information is currently collected within criminal justice agencies that would lend itself to manpower planning efforts (e.g., the

collection of turnover statistics, work-load projections, skill-bank information, etc.)? (2) What activities are currently undertaken by criminal justice agencies in the manpower area (e.g., job task analyses, personnel needs assessments, recruitment programs, specialized training, etc.)? and (3) What factors in the criminal justice agency's environment are likely to affect agency human-resource acquisition and use? The data reported here are concerned with the last question—that of environmental influence in agency decision making, particularly those decisions related to the securing and use of human resources.

As the focus of the present inquiry is on the extent to which factors external to the criminal justice agency influence the resources the agency receives and the manner in which the agency uses these resources, the selection of research sites was designed to identify the network relationships encountered by the agency that potentially affect this decision-making process. In identifying each of the research sites, a number of criteria were employed.

An initial determination was made to concentrate primarily on law enforcement and correctional organizations (including probation at both the local and county levels) as the focal agencies for the inquiry into environmental influences. Court organizations were explicitly excluded for two reasons. First, court agencies account for only a small percentage in total manpower employment throughout the criminal justice system; and, secondly, wide variation in court structure was thought to limit the potential for generalizing beyond a few particular case settings only.

Once the determination was made to concentrate effort in law enforcement and corrections, a number of criteria were used to select those agencies in which interviews were to be conducted. First, the size and the general reputation of an agency in manpower planning were designated as primary determinants. Second, such things as the general administrative reputation of an agency, the extent to which an agency had recently had substantial increases (or decreases) in agency personnel,[14] and the social and economic climates of the cities under consideration[15] were examined. Further, a list of agencies was prepared and sent to a panel of knowledgeable persons in the criminal justice field, who rated the agencies on several dimensions.[16] The results of the expert panel recommendations were then compared with those obtained through previous data collected. Finally, sites were selected to maximize city, county, and state variation.

Data for this paper are derived from a series of structured interviews. A large block of interviews was conducted within five (5) major cities.[17] These interviews involved top-level decision makers in such agencies as municipal and county police departments, city and county bureaus of the budget, civil service agencies, criminal justice agency-based planning units, mayor and county executive offices, city and county departments of corrections, and city and county departments of probation. Over 100 people from these cities and from surrounding or contiguous communities were interviewed.

Structured interviews were also conducted at the state level, primarily in state

departments of corrections and state-police or highway patrol agencies. As was the case for the metropolitan areas described, interviews also included personnel from state departments of civil service and bureaus of the budget. The state-level interviews, of about 70 people, were conducted in seven states.[18]

As the primary focus of this analysis was on identifying those factors and/ or network relationships that potentially affect the acquisition and use of criminal justice agency resources, a procedure known as "snowball sampling" was used.[19] A variant of the sociometric technique, this procedure identified the focal agencies of concern (law enforcement and correctional agencies) and a number of agencies (e.g., civil service) that were believed to affect the outcomes of interest. Individuals within the identified agencies were then asked to identify critical actors in the decision-making process and the affects these "externals" were likely to have on outcomes. In many instances the identified individuals were then contacted and interviewed about the same series of issues. Also, field notes were cross-referenced by interviewers within sites.

Each individual interview was reviewed and placed in relation to all other interviews conducted at the research site. Where respondents identified the same factors, cross-referencing of notes was possible; where respondents disagreed on major issues, further interviews were conducted, or both opposing opinions were noted. In general, the consensus among respondents within sites was remarkable, as most respondents substantially agreed on the major factors affecting the processes in question.

Finally, the results obtained through each site analysis were compared and, where possible, aggregated across the research sites. This procedure allowed an analysis of trends confronting all of the research sites, as well as the identification of factors differentially affecting either types of criminal justice agencies or agencies in geographically disparate regions of the country.

As previously indicated, the central thrust of this project was the identification of factors affecting decision making about the acquisition and use of resources. The structured interview approached these issues by asking respondents:

1. To describe the basic mission and function of their agency as well as the internal structure of the agency. This information provided a general frame of reference for the interviews and began to sensitize agency personnel about the intent of the research.[20]

2. To describe the general agency experience in securing agency resources. What factors facilitate the securing of such resources? What factors hinder this process? Who are the important actors in this process and why? What effect have these actors had on the process, and what influence does the agency have in this process?

3. To describe the agency's most recent experiences in securing or preventing the loss of agency resources. Who influences the process?

What were the outcomes? How does this compare with the agency's general experiences?

4. To describe how the agency decided what kind of resources it needs and how it will use these resources. What factors internal and external to the agency affect these decisions?

Nested within these four broad questions, of course, were numerous follow-up questions that were designed to elicit greater detail. Data about the other research issues of interest were also collected. On the average, an individual interview took an hour and one-half to two hours.

The analysis that follows is primarily concerned with exploring those factors identified with the acquisition and use of resources in law enforcement and correctional agencies. Responses have been aggregated to intensify the identified trends, and examples illustrative of the responses also are reported.

II. Findings and Discussion

Data collected through the structured interviews conducted with decision makers of the various research sites provide the basis for a qualitative analysis of the agency decision-making process. To facilitate the analysis, individual responses have been aggregated under six broad concepts that emerged in the interviews. These six topic areas include: (1) the role of constituency, (2) the local climate for rationality, (3) the role of ideology, (4) the relationship of acquisition and use to agency work load, (5) the importance of the reputation of the agency and the agency administrator, and (6) the "wild cards" in the environment.

While there is no doubt that issues discussed under each of these broad concepts are interrelated, each issue set will be discussed independently in an effort to assess its separate effects on the agency decision-making process. For the purposes of analysis, the separate processes of the acquisiton and the use of resources will be examined together. Where appropriate, examples of factors affecting each will be discussed.

The Role of Constituency

Perhaps one of the most consistent and crucial issues raised by all of the respondents was that of an active constituency supporting the agency. In each of the research sites, the existence or nonexistence of a constituency was identified as a major factor affecting the agency's ability to generate new resources or at least to ward off budgetary cuts (loss of allocated personnel positions). Wildavsky's political admonishment to find and to use an active constituency[21] was indeed on the operational agenda of the agency administrators interviewed.

But the issue of constituency goes far beyond simply identifying a service population and occasionally using it to gain an advantage with a funding source.

To be sure, cultivating relations with clientele receiving the service is important; nevertheless, other actors were identified as also being politically salient constituents. And just as important as the existence of a constituency, it was found, is that many agencies lacked an active lobby, while others only recently have seen an active constituency emerge.

The diversity of constituency was clearly an important factor in decision making in criminal justice resource acquisition. Beyond the general service population, which we will consider below, two types of constituency issues emerged: (1) the existence of a prior political decision as embodied in the chief executive or legislature (including city or county councils) as a constituent force, and (2) the emergence of a crescive constituency.

Prior commitment on the part of the executive or legislative bodies in each of the jurisdictions studied was mentioned with great regularity as an active influence in the acquisition of resources. The general line of reasoning was that the chief executive or legislature was predisposed to take an active interest in the agency, and that where there was such an interest, resources generally followed. It was not at all uncommon for agency decision makers to describe the legislator who saw the agency as a "pet" interest or one who would "take the agency under his wing" and help guide it through appropriations. These findings are consistent with what we have already experienced in crime control policy since the 1960s. Where "law and order" were major local political issues, resources generally flowed to criminal justice.

Obviously, agencies seek out such constituent relationships with chief executives and the legislature. But the implications of these constituent relationships for an agency-based presentation of need are important to consider, for in many instances they actually preempt the planning process. One example will be highly illustrative of this point. (The example is not atypical, for numerous such examples were reported from various sites.) A major department of corrections had, for a number of years, conducted internal assessments of needs with regard to the number of fixed posts needed adequately to provide security in the correctional facility. For a period of about seven years the department had each year requested that about 300 new positions be authorized on the basis of such analyses. Each year the request had been denied. In the eighth year the department resubmitted essentially the same request, based on essentially the same analysis, and the positions were authorized. The major factor in the approval of the request, in the view of the department, was an announced political commitment by the chief executive of the jurisdiction before the request was made. In fact, respondents indicated that the chief executive had actually directed the department to resubmit the request for the increases and after negotiation had actually granted more positions than were requested. Without such a commitment (prior political decision) the agency would have been denied the positions requested—or so the respondents believed.

What is important for our consideration from this example is the profound effect a prior political decision or predisposition to a particular policy outcome

has on both the resources received by the agency and the quality of the arguments made by the agency in justifying the allocation of such resources. In the example cited, the quality of the information presented was not substantively different from previous years; what had changed was the relationship with the chief executive.

Closely allied to our consideration of legislative and executive constituent relationships is what can be termed the development of an emerging constituency or the crescive lobby. In the previous example, a constituent relationship formed to aid the agency in securing funding. In many instances such support groups were described as highly transitory, rising to support the agency in one year and disappearing the next. Many correctional agencies found themselves in this type of situation. As many respondents put it, "This was our agency's year"[22]—meaning that in years to come other agencies would have the more favored status with external decision makers and as a result receive a greater share of the resources. As one of the interviewed succinctly put it, "The legislature has become tired of us being at the head of the line with our tin cup." In such circumstances, obviously, the agency's ability to acquire resources will be diminished.

Beyond identifying membership differences in constituent groups, the interviews made it clear that criminal justice agencies vary greatly in their ability to attract a constituency. Law enforcement agencies, by all accounts, benefited the most from the general public constituency relations, and corrections and probation the least. Visible police service is likely to remain a major local government (municipal and county) function; and where the police are in danger of losing appropriations, "taking their case to the public" was likely to have more successful results than if corrections or probation attempted to muster public support. Probation lacked any identifiable constituency, and was generally the least able to secure resources or to ward off cuts. Institutional corrections also had constituency problems, lacking a strong and powerful enough group to muster clout with funding agencies. Corrections was, however, more likely to be in the position of having the crescive constituency as previously described or at least a loose coalition working on its behalf.

Part of the problem that corrections and probation faced in the absence of an identifiable constituency is related to ideology—itself a topic of study to be considered later. Another problem in considering constituent relations is the level of jurisdiction of these agencies. Corrections, as a state-level agency, lacks the "local control" issue that police, courts, and sheriffs enjoy. This is also true of probation, which tended to be funded partly by the state and partly by the county. While corrections attempted to claim constituent relations with the "locals" where institutional activities are located, they clearly lacked the clout the state police generally enjoyed. The state police, in contrast to state corrections, counted among their constituents the governor, the legislature, and the citizenry living near state police posts. Most respondents believed that these differences in constituent relations had greatly affected agency resources.

188

When it comes to an agency's controlling the internal allocation and the rationalization of the use of organizational resources, the relationships often mentioned as agency strengths in acquiring positions became weaknesses. Almost every police department indicated that at one time or another it had made a highly rational argument for closing a precinct house or state police post. In each case it was suggested that empirical data had been collected (such as work-load or crime data) and analyzed. On the basis of such an analysis, it was deemed efficient to close the particular facility. But respondents reported strong community resistance to these proposals, to the point where the station houses remained open even though underutilized. This scenario was repeated in many interviews and was viewed as a major factor influencing the internal allocation process in law enforcement. Corrections departments having no such constituency felt less constrained in internal allocation by this particular set of factors.

An active constituency was identified as an important factor affecting the acquisition and the use of resources. As criminal justice agencies seek to rationalize their process of securing and using public resources, constituencies begin to define the boundaries of the decision-making process, as agencies with large and active constituencies have greater leverage in the political process. But negotiation for agency resources is also expected to take place through the exchange of objective arguments (rational planning) that link needs to requests. In the consideration of this aspect of environmental relations, the climate for rationality is discussed below.

The Climate of Rationality

The second group of factors respondents identify as greatly affecting resource decisions can be grouped under the term *the context of rationality*. The context of rationality has reference to the general receptivity of governmental decision makers to the planning process in general and to the use of analytical objective arguments in particular. Under this general rubric fall such considerations as the general leadership of the chief executive, the competency and interest of the legislature, the role of political expediency, and the effect of unions.

The general climate for the acceptance or rejection of the planning process and rational arguments is, in the view of most respondents, linked directly to the leadership provided by the jurisdiction's chief executive. The tone-setting ability of the chief executive was indicated as a major force in the agency's belief in planning, the kinds of data presented, and the level of sophistication of that presentation. Where the administrative posture of the jurisdiction was incremental, criminal justice agencies approached the acquisition process on an incremental basis; where the executive set a planning tone, agencies followed suit.

As criminal justice agencies at the municipal and county levels, and to some extent the state level, are large consumers of local revenues while at the same time

being potentially politically volatile, chief executives in most jurisdictions were described as carefully overseeing the offices of these agencies. Municipal police departments indicated that their relations with the chief executive were indeed close, while corrections agencies felt that part of their major role was to "keep the agency's name off the front page of the press." Both types of agencies readily admitted that executive oversight was a common feature of administrative behavior. This oversight, then, was generally identified as setting the tone for agency operations, including the manner in which resources were requested. Use, on the other hand, was less directly affected by the tone the executive set; other political exigencies affected this process, instead.

Where the chief executive of the jurisdiction was identified as setting the tone for rationality, the legislative body was generally viewed as less directive and often needing to be led along the process. In this regard, at least three aspects of legislative competency and interest were questioned by the respondents. First, most respondents pointed to what was termed a "limited time horizon" with respect to agency needs and planning and the legislative process. As most elected legislators, including city councils, were constantly seeking reelection or trying to create for themselves a large and vocal constituency, the temporal perspective of these political actors was viewed as incongruent with agency time projections. Simply stated, agencies and politicians have different time horizons chiefly because of differing survival needs.

Supporting this general incongruity between the time horizons of agency administrators and legislators were two important operational issues that arose in the interviews. The first relates to a perceived "loss of fact" in planning detail as proposals move from the agency to higher-level political decision makers. The second relates to the curious practice in many jurisdictions of requiring some form of zero-based or planning/ programming budget for executive review, while maintaining essentially a line-item budget for legislative hearings.

About the first issue, that of loss of fact in budgets, respondents throughout the research sites complained that where elaborate efforts and often inordinate time and resources were required to prepare agency requests for additional resources, the information rarely reached the level of decision, being discarded along the way for other considerations. While agencies were required to submit the information, legislatures were generally predisposed to use other criteria in decision making. When city, county, and state administrators in non-criminal-justice agencies were asked to comment on this issue, they essentially agreed that legislators lost "facts" at budget time. Further, even when city managers or mayors were viewed as setting the tone for rational arguments, it was clear that much of such information was discarded in dealings with the legislature or city council. While reams of information might be brought to budget hearings, rarely was such information a major determinant of policy outcome. In general, respondents felt that rational decision making and the use of planning were important features of internal agency processes of program evaluation and needs assessment. When such arguments were taken outside of the agency, however,

information was generally left behind and political saliency became a controlling factor.

These findings about the loss of budget detail are further supported by the use of different budget formats for the executive and for the legislature. In almost all interviews, respondents pointed to lack of legislative sophistication in the use of the budget request to assess agency effectiveness. While many agencies were required by chief executives to provide detailed budgetary information in variants of the planning/programming budget format, legislatures generally received such information in the traditional line-item budget format. Hence, where agencies may have developed expertise in rationally developing programming needs statements, legislatures were, in the main, prepared to approach the same process through the incremental, line-item expenditure process. Clearly, such disincentives for program-oriented planning embittered agency leaders, while supporting the conclusion of others that factors outside the information provided by the agency normally have a greater effect on policy outcomes.

This issue of legislative intent regarding the establishment of the context for rationality is directly related to our previous discussions of constituency, as this context is greatly affected by the effects of political expediency. Where legislatures were not predisposed to accepting or using objective agency statements as a basis for resource decisions, what was politically expedient generally defined decision outcomes. Agency resources were characterized as rising and falling with public sentiment, and less on the basis of objective arguments.

One perspective on this phenomenon held by many agency administrators was that currently it was most expedient politically to deny all requests for resources, given variations of the "Proposition 13 Movement," rather than to consider the objective arguments of the agency. Even when the agency could make cost-effective arguments for increased resources, administrators believed that the "austerity" philosophy that permeates local and state government would supersede such arguments. As one state planning director indicated, "Planning is essentially the process of collecting data to support a political decision which has already been made." Since the current political climate would seem to dictate conservatism in governmental spending, any arguments, rational or other, will be looked upon with disdain.

A personnel director in a city had another perspective, indicating that "perhaps resource acquisition ought to remain a political decision." This once again underscores the idea that public goods and services are by definition "political" and should be susceptible to political pressure.

A final set of issues to arise under the concept of the context of planning pertains to the role of unions in this process. Clearly, union contracts affected aspects of agency need, particularly where personnel were concerned. But beyond the general question of union rights over against management rights were questions about how the union affected the political process and the apportioning of the economic pie.

Many respondents identified unions and employee associations as rapidly

191

increasing their political clout and directly affecting the process of acquiring and using resources. Most comments about police unions were negative, despite the fact that on many occasions unions were identified as having helped the police administrator secure a particular policy outcome. In one jurisdiction, police association members canvassed the entire community, a large municipality, and successfully lobbied against a reduction in work force. In another jurisdiction, the police employee association successfully challenged the county administrator's claims that the county was insolvent and secured a raise for police and other county personnel when none had been proposed.

Corrections agencies generally evaluated employee associations less negatively than did the police, but were quick to add that most of these associations were less likely to become actively involved in the management of the institution. One kind of agency completely resistant to unionism, at least in the research sites examined, was the state police. In general, these agencies had either no collective employee representation or one that the state police itself managed. In either case, collective bargaining was not thought to be a factor affecting state police policymaking.

The discussion of the context or climate of rationality in decisions about the acquisition and use of resources reveals that a number of factors affect the milieu in which these decisions take place. The general leadership of the chief executive, the competency and interest of the legislature, and the effect of unions each was viewed as providing such a context for decision making. Implicit in much of this discussion is the underlying ideology operant in the planning process and in the actors involved in this process. And the consideration of ideology as it affects decision making is related to our previous consideration of political expediency as well.

Ideology and Decision Making

The role of ideology has been identified by Miller[23] as being related to at least three areas of crime-control policy: locating responsibility for criminal behavior, creating policies for dealing with offenders, and creating policies in criminal justice agencies. Obviously, these three areas are highly related in that beliefs about the causes of crime ultimately affect the policies designed to deal with such behavior. In the interviews conducted, ideology was approached with respect to three issues: (1) the utility of planning, (2) fiscal accountability and (3) normative supports for particular agency policies.

In the previous section, we considered the role of political expediency as it affected resource acquisition in criminal justice. As each agency and the funding source had different beliefs about the utility of planning, it was noted that official beliefs tended to play down the role that data-oriented arguments could have in determining the distribution of municipal, county, and state resources. Further, while the official position was that each agency tried to epitomize the Weberian

bureaucracy in rational, analytical decision making, privately most agreed that an incremental political environment would persist.

Supporting these general beliefs about the utility of planning was the official ideology about the development of the budget and fiscal accountability. Respondents in many of the criminal justice agencies studied said that the pervasive belief among both administrators and the legislature was that budget requests were intentionally inflated. The reasoning behind this belief was that agencies would intentionally inflate their budgets to reduce the overall effect of expected cuts. What is interesting are the dual problems such a belief entails. First and most important, it creates an extreme disincentive for agency administrators realistically to appraise their agency's situation and to present an accurate account of needs. If in fact appropriating agencies "discount" budget requests for overzealous administrative inflation, agencies that take the most judicious measure of their needs will be consequently disadvantaged in the allocation process as their budget may be cut beyond what the agency can truly tolerate. Secondly, an administrative atmosphere where deceit and downright fraud seem to be conditions of agency survival is antithetical to the avowed purposes of government service. The resultant cynicism of many of the respondents may have indeed been created in such environments.

Beliefs about fiscal responsibility and the utility of planning influence the internal administration of the agencies as well, by affecting intermediate decisions about strategies for securing resources. But these strategies need the normative support of the broader community, and it is in this area that ideology was thought to have a tremendous effect on resource distribution.

Ideology plays an important role in criminal justice agencies' being able to secure resources by creating normative sponsorship for particular agencies or policies while excluding others. A number of examples are illustrative of this influence. In recent years corrections and probation have, perhaps, been affected the most by the general shift in ideology among the citizenry. The passage of determinate sentencing in a number of states, the use of court watchers, and the general "get tough" orientation of American politics toward criminal offenders has resulted in a general lessening of normative support for such programs as community-based corrections and probation. Even when these services can be argued to be "cost effective" in terms of the number of tax dollars per inmate, the general philosophical support for dealing with the offender in other than an institutional setting has abated. Instead, previous moratoriums on correctional building programs have been relaxed and the institutionalization of offenders has resurfaced as a major societal response to crime.

Similarily, the police, despite their inability to reduce the actual levels of crime, continually threaten the community with the escalation of crime should visible police services be reduced. As a result, the shifting tides of ideology have immediate fiscal repercussions for criminal justice agencies as well as for long-term restrictions in programming. This general ideological problem obviously

affects the agency's ability to create a constituency and to use that constituency to increase agency resources.

Related to the issue of ideology described above are two issues that are continually brought up in the discussion of the provision of municipal and county services: local control and visible service. Local control was mentioned as a major factor affecting beliefs about how criminal justice services were to be provided. Local identity with the agency providing the service was constantly identified as "a basic feature of this part of the country"—no matter where the interview took place. Municipalities and counties want control over law-enforcement policy and will generally resist any attempts to have things otherwise. The fact that American law enforcement is divided among over 20,000[24] agencies attests to the determination to have local control in the provision of police protection.

Local control of other criminal justice agencies was generally not an issue. Corrections is provided on a state level, and local probation tends to be attached in one manner or another to the court system. This was generally viewed as reducing the local control issue in probation. Also, as previously indicated, neither corrections nor probation enjoys the normative sponsorship of the community; hence, the community is less likely to want especially much control over these agencies.

Associated with the general issue of local control is the more particular issue of visible service provision. Police agencies were viewed by many as sacred cows in the resource acquisition process—meaning that they were generally in the "front of the line" to receive a large proportion of the available resources. Police agencies were, however, viewed as perhaps the most identifiable service provider in many communities. Corrections, by contrast, is minimally visible. Also related to the issue of visible service provision is the issue of exactly whom the "community" expects to be cut in austere times. As one respondent in a municipal bureau of the budget indicated, "Public reaction to municipal spending such as Proposition 13 referendums is not directed toward the police, fire officials, public works or blue-collar services; but rather these frustrations are directed at the pencil-pushing bureaucrats," those unseen and believed to be unnecessary drains on the public dole. As a result, direct service provision and local control tend to separate the line agencies in municipal, county, and state government from the ancillary services of much of what is called government.

The Effect of Work Load

In considering agency work load as a factor affecting resource acquisition, two major issues surfaced in the interviews. The first is the issue of effects created by added responsibilities and the agency's ability to link its growth to some environmental work factor. The second pertains to certain conflicts between what the agencies considered rational arguments for budget increases and what

the funding agencies viewed as rational, including the unchallenged assumptions in these arguments.

With respect to work load and increased responsibility, it was clear that agency growth and demonstrated ability to obtain additional responsibilities were highly related. In a number of instances the agency did not desire the new responsibility; rather, it was imposed on the agency by externals. License regulation was often cited by police agencies as an imposed increase in responsibility that resulted in new resources coming to the agency. Also many state departments of corrections had "inherited" other programs in the general corrections area, and in some instances the consolidation of correctional programs brought increased resources to the agency.

In addition to these added responsibilities either imposed on or desired by the agency, most administrators sought to link the agency's *raison d'etre* to some production factor in the external environment. The kinds of service delivery and work load linkages sought by criminal justice agencies followed fairly directly from the kinds of activities they performed.

Police agencies generally cite calls for service, crime rates, traffic accidents, response times, and special events as criteria for assessing the production norm. Probation and parole relied primarily on case loads and activities associated with client-oriented service provision. Correctional institutions based their production norms on such factors as number of inmates, required services, and security posts dictated by the nature of the physical facility of the institution. Each to one degree or another linked increases in any of these areas to needs assessed in such a way as to secure resources. Depending on the climate for rationality within the particular jurisdiction, as previously reported, these measures had some effect on the decision outcomes.

The effect of such production norm arguments was mediated by a number of factors, including the disparity between what the agency considered the quality of its data and what the budget agency saw the quality of the argument to be and the underlying assumptions inherent in agency operations. About variances in the degree of confidence placed in agency-based assessment of needs—degree of confidence both of agency administrators and of budget review personnel—a clear pattern of response emerged.

Representatives of criminal justice agencies generally attributed a great deal of rationality to both their analysis and presentation of need. By contrast, representatives of budget agencies, who do most of the review of the justification of agency needs, attributed much less rationality to such needs assessments. For example, numerous budget officials indicated that much of the agency justification process was all politics and no science. Further, budget agency respondents raised serious questions regarding criminal justice agency consideration of the basic missions and roles that are the underlying assumptions of these agencies.

The issue of examining the underlying assumptions of agency existence and operational service delivery was seriously questioned by many budget analysts as

well, and also by some of the criminal justice agency representatives themselves. What was generally criticized in this regard was that the basic functions and activities of personnel in the criminal justice agencies did not seem to be regularly subjected to planning and analysis. That is, the utilization of police manpower for patrol and investigative work, of parole and probation officers for casework treatment, and of correctional officers for providing security seemed to be accepted by these agencies as given and necesary. Rarely did agencies examine the basis of the work performed, relying instead on the existing production norm (the validity of which ought to have been in question) as the standard of performance. Although implicit in production norms is some standard of service or desired outcome, individuals associated with budget review took these underlying premises less for granted than did agency administrators. One anlayst characterized the police as "blue mice" being deployed on sundry tasks and in manners inconsistent with any norm of production. This analyst also questioned whether correction's use of fixed posts as a method for determining work loads was as viable as corrections agencies would have them believed to be.

These comments were, no doubt, related to the positions the budget analyst and the agency administrator occupy in the negotiation process. Obviously, these actors have uncomplementary roles in that one is seeking added resources for the agency while the other is trying to mediate among competing demands of many agencies. In this interaction, the competition is increased between absolute needs as perceived by the agency and relative needs as perceived by the bureau of the budget. Yet, serious questions by budget analysts about the quality of the rational arguments provided by criminal justice agencies were not raised for other city and county agencies. For example, analysts indicated that departments of education were perhaps the most rational—constantly reconsidering goals and objectives—or at least creating the perception of such analysis.

Reputation and the Acquisition of Resources

Respondents at each of the research sites identified both the reputation of the agency and the agency's administrator as important factors affecting the acquisition and use of resources. At a point, these two reputations are somewhat inseparable, because administrators set the tone for agency image. Such attributes of the agency's administration as technical capability, political astuteness, willingness to take on the power structure, and in some instances personal charisma were mentioned as characteristics that affected decision outcomes.

A number of factors act independently to create the impression of leader or administrator quality. The general line of reasoning expressed by the respondent was as follows: First, the agency administrator has convinced others that he/she is competent and able to provide for an effective administration. This is largely perceptual on the part of others. Second, the agency through rational planning or any other means creates the image (real or imagined) of efficiently allocating and

using resources. This external agency image then creates a certain confidence in the agency administrator, which is then translated into political clout with funding agencies. As a result of this process, the administrator is more likely to achieve results (acquire more resources) in the political arena. Some variations on this theme were presented. One respondent, for example, saw the need for a somewhat "suicidal" administrator capable of pursuing the "public interest" and willing to take on the power structure to do so. Another, by contrast, saw just about everything as negotiable, thereby avoiding any direct confrontations with the power structure. One respondent commented that the budgetary process (resource acquisition) is and ought to remain a political process, and that, perhaps, planning is not important enough to supersede political decisions. In sum, all respondents, in one way or another, attributed a great deal of impact to the personal characteristics of the leader. As one respondent said, "It all turns on who's in the chair."

Where respondents saw the leader as being viewed as inefficient by outsiders, yet as not warranting removal from office, resources were withheld from the agency. This raised a serious question about how much the leader can actually lead. Perhaps the previously mentioned characterization of the suicidal leader was the extreme statement of a concern among some of the leaders interviewed about their capacity to control their agency's destiny. One respondent, on the other hand, opinioned that being an effective administrator in criminal justice meant keeping the agency's name off the front page—clearly the other end of the continuum. In a cynical remark, this repsondent offered that perhaps the best possible strategy for a criminal justice manager to keep his job was that he maintain a balance between being so efficient that he alienates everyone in the agency and being so inefficient that he is accused of corruption or mismanagement. Clearly, the statement recognizes the diverse interests that shape criminal justice agency policy.

Environmental Uncertainty—The "Wild Cards"

All organizations face some degree of uncertainty in environmental relationships, and most attempt to mediate this uncertainty by constantly monitoring the environment and searching for information to predict environmental behavior. Despite such efforts, contingent factors in the organization's environment have a way of affecting the behavior of the organization and its desired outcomes. In the present study, three types of contingent environmental variables are considered.

Perhaps the most frequently cited factor affecting criminal justice resource decisions was that of the critical incident with the resultant public fear of crime associated with such an incident. Critical incidents include prison disturbances, public riots, the killing of a police or correctional officer, a particularly heinous crime, or a "crime wave." Each of these events was identified by respondents as

greatly affecting the resource acquisition process; each respondent also identified the role the media play in the process.

In general, respondents agreed that the critical incident was responsible for massive infusion of resources into the problem area despite economic conditions, public ideology, or political considerations. The critical incident, of course, alters public expectations and political positions and paves the way for increased resources to criminal justice agencies.

In terms of the differential effect of the critical incident on criminal justice agencies, a number of interesting patterns were identified. First, it was clear that the critical incident had swift and immediate implications for law enforcement agencies, while being somewhat delayed for corrections. In general, the police were quick to receive resources at the time of crisis as public furor was generally a major reaction elicited by the incident. Corrections by contrast, lacking the direct public constituency, was less likely to receive resources directly; rather, what generally folowed correctional crises was the development of a special commission or governmental panel to "look into the problems of corrections." Thus, the critical incident did not generally elicit immediate relief in corrections. Probation, perhaps, suffers the greatest from critical incidents, particularly if a probationer commits a crime that evokes public feeling. Clearly, probation services can be decimated by a public outcry against crimes committed by persons on probation. Again, probation, lacking an adequate constituency, cannot defend itself against such attacks.

The second environmental contingency identified by respondents is "environmental irrationality." Under this concept fall a number of behaviors, two of which will be discussed here—externally evoked resources due to court action and externally evoked resources due to other governmental agency actions.

The first set of identified irrationalities confronted by criminal justice agency administrators is related to the courts. In many instances, agency administrators indicated that the court system was making resource allocation policy for municipalities, counties, and states through decisions reached in civil litigation. Corrections agencies have received the largest attention from court litigation, and several court cases have increased resources in corrections by adding new programs or increasing the scope of inmate rights. In this respect, litigation about contact visitation, correctional mail policies, and religious, medical, health, and educational rights of inmates has caused correctional agencies to be granted increased resources. Where such inmate rights have been contested and court decisions support inmate grievances, correctional systems found these legal remedies greatly to affect resource acquisition. In a sense, the courts are, perhaps, today the crescive lobby for correctional agencies.

Law enforcement agencies have also been subject to legal decisions pertaining to affirmative action, union rights, and civil litigation arising from individual and class action suits. When these suits are resolved the police often find themselves in possession of additional resources, usually in the form of increases in numbers

of allocated positions. Such things have happened despite agency-based planning, perception of need, and objective arguments that increased resources are unwarranted.

One example will help clarify. In one of the research sites, it was reported that the police agency had done some internal assessment of the capability of the work force in the department. Somewhat independently, the court was hearing a case that involved discrimination in hiring. The department's position was that in actual numbers the agency could and should sustain a moderate reduction in work force. The court suit resulted in the city signing a consent decree to increase the police department by some 600 positions. This obviously left the department in the awkward position of planning for an increase of substantial magnitude when in fact it had been anticipating a reduction. To complicate the matter even more, a determination was made at the budget bureau in conjunction with city administrators that, in an effort to offset the great gain in police personnel, the department would reduce its clerical jobs and, if necessary, place police personnel in these positions. Thus the department gained personnel where it needed them the least (at least according to the administration of the agency), in patrol, while at the same time sustaining a major reduction in clerical personnel, which it certainly had not desired nor anticipated. Administrators in this department saw these events as totally irrelevant to the department's stated and planned personnel actions.

The final issue to be addressed in this section pertains to the real and imagined costs associated with rational planning and the resultant reluctance of agencies fully to embrace the planning position. To this point, implicit in the discussion was a model of rational planning and of all the external factors (politicians, chief executives, legislators, critical incidents, etc.) that forced the decision away from "objective" rational criteria into the incremental world of politics. But rationality itself has costs, particularly when public service agencies cannot often agree on intended service outcomes.

A major factor distinguishing between public and private bureaucracy is the absence of a valid external bench mark to assess organizational effectiveness.[25] Collective public goods and all that is implied in the provision of public services seriously limit the quantification of such services.[26] Furthermore, as previously indicated, many agencies take both their existing mission and operational delivery system as givens, failing to reevaluate underlying assumptions. The interaction of these factors has serious implications for the extent to which public service agencies, including those in criminal justice, desire to be rational, given costs associated with doing so. Again an example will help clarify this issue.

In one jurisdiction a police agency undertook a major work-load study. After measuring individual officer behavior, it was clear that a large proportion of officer time was not directly accounted for, as this time was generally assigned to patrol. At appropriations time, this information was used to attempt to persuade the funding source that the agency was inefficient and overstaffed: "The police spend fifty percent of their time doing nothing." In effect, the agency's analysis

was being used to reduce agency resources. Agencies fearing such reprisals are often reluctant to undertake planning, because the results may tell them something they either don't want to know or don't want publicized. This is not to be taken that the agency is deliberately trying to deceive the public. Rather, as agency missions and goals are often hard to measure, the risk associated with such measurement may preclude an agency from involving itself in such forms of analysis. Instead the agency may prefer to deal in the incremental political world where the risks are rarely zero-sum. Corrections agencies indicated similar problems in defining success, and when analyses were made of correctional goals, similar risks were identified.

The information collected about the effect of crisis and environmental irrationality suggests that these are factors over which the agency has little control. The hidden costs of rationality, by contrast, are within the agency's control but are likely to affect agency-based planning negatively.

Perceptions of Influence in Acquiring and Losing Resources

In addition to the data collection through the structured interviews conducted in the five metropolitan areas and the seven states, there was a mail survey instrument distributed to a sample of 250 law enforcement agencies, 50 correctional agencies, and 116 departments of probation and juvenile authorities. Data collected through this instrument that pertain to the agency's evaluation of the importance of various factors affecting the acquisition of personnel positions are also reported here. These survey items asked respondents to rate the importance of numerous factors as they were perceived to affect the agency's receiving increases or decreases in authorized positions.

Survey respondents were asked to rate fifteen factors for their effect on both increases and decreases in the number of authorized positions allocated to the agency.[27] Seven types of criminal justice agencies responded, including local police, sheriffs, county police, state police, institutional corrections, state-level probation and parole, state-level juvenile authorities, and local probation departments. Average ($\overline{X}$) responses for each agency across the fifteen survey items provide the basis for a ranking of items by their perceived influence. Also, the weighted averages for each type of institution (police versus correctional agencies) were rank-ordered and are reported. The results of these rankings are reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

The data reported in Table 7.1 pertain to agency evaluations of the importance of factors affecting *increases* in position allocation. In general, all agencies responding rated as very important agency rational planning, increases in agency work load, agency effectiveness, and increases in agency responsibility imposed by externals. Clearly, the general tone set by such a ranking projected the idea that rational analysis and increases in work load greatly affect increases in authorized positions.

At first glance, these findings are somewhat suspect, as the responses could be

Table 7.1
Agency Ranking of the Importance of
Factors Affecting Increases in
Authorized Positions, By Type of Agency

Factor	City Police (N = 80)	Sheriff/ County Police (N = 29)	State Police (N = 35)	*Average Police Rankings	Institutional Corrections (N = 36)	State Prob/ Parole (N = 12)	State Juvenile (N = 11)	Local Prob. (N = 36)	*Average Corrections Rankings
Agency Scandal	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	14.5	15
Economic Conditions	5	5	8	8	11	8.5	11.5	8	8.5
Agency's Public Image	6	8	6.5	5	6	10	11.5	9	8.5
Union Activities	12	13	14	12	13	13.5	14	11.5	13
Agency Effectiveness	5	2	4	2	3	3	6	5	4
Crime Level (UCR)	3	6.5	10.5	4	10	5	7.5	7	7
Public Fear of Crime	1	4	9	3	12	8.5	7.5	10	10
Critical Incident	11	11	10.5	11	7.5	12	9.5	11.5	12
Political Factors	8	9	5	9	9	6	2	6	6
Agency Planning	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Lawsuits	13	12	13	13	5	11	9.5	13	11
Decreased Funding Given to Another Agency	14	14	12	14	14	13.5	15	14.5	14
Increased (Advocated) Agency Responsibility	7	6.5	6.5	10	7.5	7	5	3	5
Increased (Imposed) Agency Responsibility	9	10	3	6.5	4	4	4	4	3
Increased Work Load	10	3	2	6.5	2	2	2	2	2

*Police and Corrections average rankings are based on the weighting of individual agency types.

Table 7.2
Agency Ranking of the Importance of Factors Affecting Decreases in Authorized Positions, By Type of Agency

	Type of Agency								
Factor	City Police (N = 60)	Sheriff/ County Police (N = 19)	State Police (N = 20)	*Average Police Ranking	Institutional Corrections (N = 18)	State Prob/ Parole (N = 7)	State Juvenile (N = 10)	Local Prob. (N = 30)	*Average Corrections Ranking
Agency Scandal	15	15	14	15	10	9	12	14	13
Economic Conditions	1	1	1	1	1.5	1	2	2	2
Agency's Public Image	4	6	3.5	6	7	3.5	6.5	5.5	5
Union Activities	14	13	13	12	15	12	15	12	14
Agency Effectiveness	9	9.5	7.5	5	6	3.5	3.5	9	6
Crime Level (UCR)	6	9.5	10.5	3	10	5.5	8	8	9
Public Fear of Crime	10	4.5	10.5	10	14	14	11	11	11
Critical Incident	12.5	12	12	13	13	15	13	15	15
Political Factors	2	2	2	2	1.5	2	1	1	1
Agency Planning	3	3	7.5	4	4	9	9	3	3
Lawsuits	12.5	14	15	14	12	9	14	13	12
Increased Funding Given to Another Agency	11	11	5.5	11	10	7	10	10	10
Decreased (Advocated) Agency Responsibility	7	7.5	9	8	8	12	5	7	8
Decreased (Imposed) Agency Responsibility	5	4.5	3.5	7	3	5.5	3.5	5.5	4
Decreased Work Load	8	7.5	5.5	9	5	12	6.5	4	7

*Police and Corrections average rankings are based on the weighting of individual agency types.

construed as self-serving, in that agencies would be expected to claim some measure of responsibility for securing resources. Closer examination of both the variation in rankings between agencies or across agency types (police versus corrections), however, reveals that agencies demonstrated a great deal of sensitivity to their particular environments. For example, local police ranked first the public's fear of crime as a factor affecting agency resources, while the sheriff and county police agencies rated it fourth and the state police rated it ninth. This finding is consistent with interview data that suggest that local crime issues were more likely to affect local police resources. As both the county and state levels of policing are less affected by "local control issues" and have less of a direct constituent relationship, public fear of crime is more likely to be translated into municipal police resources. The rankings by the various types of agencies on the issue of fear of crime support this interpretation.

Related to the public's fear of crime is the actual reported crime level (UCR) and its effect on resource acquisition. The rankings of the affect of crime level are consistent with our previous findings about fear of crime. Local police agencies reported a greater affect of crime level on securing resources (ranked 3) than did county (6.5) or state (10.5) police agencies. Further, county agencies reported greater influence of crime level on resources than did state police agencies.

About differences among police agencies on other factors affecting resource acquisition, it is interesting to note that the state police were more likely to perceive increased resources as resulting from increases in work load and responsibility than were sheriff and county police or local police. In the interviews, state police consistently indicated that the addition of such responsibility as license regulation brought resources to the agency. By contrast, the local police were already responsible for most functions pertaining to law enforcement and, therefore, were less likely to acquire additional responsibilities. Also the geographic authority of various levels of policing was described as greatly affecting increases in work load. Where the state police have large service delivery areas, work load increases would understandably result in the need for more personnel. Where city police agencies have restricted service delivery areas, and where the economy is tighter, increasing individual officer productivity rather than increasing the size of the work force has generally been of great importance. This latter point, regarding the effect of economic conditions on police resources, is supported by the data reported in Table 7.1. Local- and county-level police agencies ranked the economy as more important in affecting resources than did the state police (ranking of 5 for city and county police versus 8 for state police).

In terms of the variation among correctional agencies regarding the acquisition of resources, a number of interesting patterns also emerge. First, it is clear that probation (both local and state) was more sensitive to economic conditions than were either institutional corrections or juvenile authorities (ranking of 8 and 8.5 versus 11 and 11.5, respectively). Secondly, comparisons of correctional agency rankings suggest that institutional corrections were more

concerned with the agencies' public image (ranked 6) while state probation and parole were concerned with both crime levels and public fear of crime (ranked 5 and 8.5, respectively). This finding is consistent with those previously reported of institutional correctional agencies' trying to keep the "agency's name off the front page" and probation departments' being greatly affected (usually negatively) by public fear of crime. While local probation ranked public fear and UCR somewhat higher than did state probation and parole, both public fear and UCR were of greater importance to both of these agencies than to institutional corrections.

Both institutional corrections (adult) and juvenile authorities rated critical incidents higher than did either state probation and parole or local probation. Finally, it is clear that lawsuits have a greater affect on correctional agencies than police agencies, and that institutional corrections and juvenile authorities are more affected by suits than are probation and parole. This finding supports the interview data previously reported and the general trends in correctional law. Challenges to correctional practice have focused on institutional conditions and inmate rights and would understandably affect institutional settings to a greater extent than probation and parole. The survey findings are also consistent with the interview findings regarding agency ability to secure resources and the factors that *positively* affect this process.

The second aspect of the mailed survey was directed toward providing information on the other aspect of environmental effect—namely, the identification of the relative importance of factors as they *negatively* affect resource acquisition in criminal justice. Table 7.2 presents the rankings of the same 15 factors reported in Table 7.1 but with assessments of their negative impact on the securing of agency resources.

Agency rankings of the negative influence of various factors on resources reveal that respondents attributed loss of resources primarily to political factors and economic conditions (generally ranked either first or second by each agency). Again, first appearances suggest that agencies are likely to shift the "blame" for resource reduction to factors outside their immediate control (economy and politics). But it is precisely these contingent factors, as discussed in our introduction, that greatly affect the agency's long-term certainty. Further, the political side of resource acquisition has been previously characterized as providing the "context of rationality." Therefore, while agencies are likely to attribute resource acquisition to effective planning and to attribute reductions to politics, both behaviors can be interpreted as occurring in a context that either supports planning or rejects it.

Beyond the general description of economic and political conditions negatively affecting resource acquisition, patterns emerge across agencies, demonstrating the variability of environments confronted. For example, law enforcement agencies generally indicated that agency planning resulted in reductions (average ranking of 4 across all police agencies) and that the level of crime also affected resource reductions (ranked 3).

Within types of agencies, similar patterns emerge as earlier identified for

increases in resources. Local police, for example, identify agency image, decreased work load imposed on the agency, and level of crime as affecting resource reductions. County-level agencies identify public fear of crime, in addition to the factors identified with local police, as negatively affecting resources. State police identify decreased work load and public image as important factors. Generally, the police agencies identify factors external to their control but nevertheless production oriented (i.e., work-load related) as greatly affecting resources. When police agency work load is reduced, resources are restricted. Correctional agencies follow a similar pattern with respect to reductions in work load. However, correctional agencies, in the aggregate, identified agency effectiveness and agency public image as greatly affecting reductions in resources. One interpretation of this finding is supported by our previous consideration of ideology as a factor affecting correctional resources.

Comparisons made between correctional agencies suggest that state and local probation perceived agency image as more important in affecting resource loss than did institutional corrections or juvenile authorities. Also, state probation and parole and juvenile authorities identified agency planning as having less of an effect on resource loss than did institutional corrections and local probation. By and large, however, correctional agencies were quite similar to police agencies in their ranking of factors associated with reductions in resources.

The data reported in both Tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that criminal justice agencies are greatly affected by their local environments and that these environments differ significantly both by level of government and type of function. In each instance, factors previously identified through the interview process as affecting resource acquisition and use were also identified by the sample of agencies surveyed. The consistency in these findings obviously lends confidence to the general findings previously recorded, while enhancing the reliability of measurement of environmental influence in criminal justice agency resource distribution.

III. Concluding Remarks and Observations

Implicit in the analysis of the decision-making process in the acquisition and use of criminal justice resources was a consideration of the effect that external factors in the environment have on these decisions and the role of planning in this process. Consistent evidence was uncovered to suggest that planning plays an important role in the decision-making process when prior political decisions have been made to use the results of this analysis. Where such prior political decisions have not been made, the utility of planning is diminished. Further, it was clear that planning has an effect on such political concerns as the reputation of the administrator and of the agency, which, in turn, was translated into political clout with external actors.

Resource acquisition was greatly affected by such other concerns as the power of constituency and ideology, as well as the crises in agency operations

that raise public attention. Clearly, these factors have greatly affected resource decisions in the public sector and will continue to do so in the future.

The policy model that results from these observations is obviously of the "mixed model" variety, including a concern for both agency-based analysis and public and private expectations. Such a model of policymaking suggests that organizational survival in criminal justice is as much a political issue as it is an analytical one, and that any description of criminal justice agency decision making must take into account the diverse factors that provide the context for such decisions. Simply increasing agency planning capabilities in and of itself will not address the larger issue of how collective goods decisions are made or how environmental factors shape these decisions.

Notes - Chapter 7

1. For a discussion of organizational certainty with respect to environmental conditions, see James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), particularly Chapters 1, 2, and 6.
2. For a description of the multiple goals that organizations pursue, see Charles Perrow "Goals in Complex Organizations," *American Sociological Review* 26, 1961.
3. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 14–24.
4. See, James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (February 1958), pp. 23–31; Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964): William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2 (March 1958), pp. 409–443; and Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12 (December 1967), pp. 396–419.
5. Thompson, op. cit., Chapters 5 and 6, for a discussion of environmental contingencies and constraints. Also see Warren, ibid. for a description of the structure of various types of environments.
6. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, 19 (Spring 1959), pp. 80-82.
7. This is essentially what Simon refers to as "the criterion of efficiency." See Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 2nd. ed., 1957) pp. 172-197.
8. For a review of the development of planning-programming-budgeting systems and their effects on organizational planning, see Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," *Public Administration Review*, 26, 4 (1966) pp. 243-258.
9. Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2nd ed., 1974), p. 136.
10. For a review of the anti-rational planning position, see Lindblom op. cit., pp.

79-88 and Charles Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965) pp. 12-27.

11. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 14.

12. Charles Linblom, *The Policymaking Process* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 18–20.

13. The study is funded by the Office of Criminal Justice Education and Training, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice.

14. This was calculated by comparing agency increases and decreases in personnel as reported in *U.S. Department of Justice Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System: 1971–1976* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

15. Cities experiencing either great growth or restrictions in budgets were intentionally indentified to increase the variance in environmental conditions between sites.

16. The dimensions included agency reputation for having done manpower planning, the agency's general reputation for administration and planning, and the agency's reputation for success in these areas.

17. There was one city each from the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, Southeast, Southwest and West.

18. There was one state each from the Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West; and two states from the Middle Atlantic.

19. James S. Coleman, "Relational Analysis: The Study of Social Organizations with Survey Methods," in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (eds.), *Complex Organizations and Their Environments* (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company, 1972), p. 74.

20. Before the site visits, respondents were contacted both by mail and telephone and provided with detailed information about the intent of the project. This was done to socialize the respondents to the study's method and purpose, and to avoid response interpretation problems once field notes were combined.

21. Wildavsky, op. cit., pp. 65–70.

22. The use of quotation marks throughout this report is meant to *highlight* the intent of respondent remarks and is not an attempt to reproduce a response verbatim.

23. Walter B. Miller, "Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* 64, 2 (1973), pp. 141–162.

24. This figure varies by source. For example, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), indicates some 42,000 police agencies. A more realistic figure of approximately 20,000 is reported in *The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Volume Two*

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

25. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 32–46.
26. For a review of collective goods decision making see, Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration* (University, Ala.: The University of Alabama Press, rev. ed., 1976).
27. The scale for the response ran from 0 to 5.