


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
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
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AUGUST 1979

# CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INFORMATION CENTER

## A MANUAL FOR POLICE DEPARTMENTS



74152

# **CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INFORMATION CENTER**

## ***A MANUAL DESCRIBING THE ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION***

**AUGUST 1979**

**Prepared for the:  
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS**

**By: DON R. HARRIS, Ph.D.**



**NCJRS**

**DEC 19 1980**

**ACQUISITIONS**

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### **FORWARD**

Given the inability of many police departments to establish or maintain a full, complemented intelligence unit, this manual is initiated to assist those departments in directing an abridged capability to systematically review, collate and analyze criminal information to support strategic and tactical planning of investigations.

The components of this capability, as reflected in this manual, are suggested ones and, therefore, may be adopted in whole or in part depending upon the needs and limitations of the individual department. Moreover, the location of this capability within the department's organizational structure must be left to the discretion of the individual department so that criminal information review, collation and analysis functions can service all investigative activities.

As a final observation, the department which implements the proposed Criminal Investigation Information Center must be cognizant of and incorporate/practice standards applicable to the jurisdiction's security and privacy regulations.

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## PREFACE

The concept developed in this manual proposes a more effective method to make criminal information, which is available in a department, more available and useful to an investigator. The development of this concept is based on observations of the handling of information in many state and local police departments.

The key fact noted in all departments in their handling of information is the availability within the departments of large flows of information that are not systematically exploited. The investigator, once assigned to a case, normally must personally seek out relevant information in case files, in central records, and by asking questions of other investigators in his own and other departments. He cannot turn to a file that contains information already organized by criminal activities. He will have no way of knowing what items of information are known to individual police officers. He must depend on his own experience, and the knowledge of his brother officers who may have vital information, and he must depend on luck. The Criminal Investigation Information Center is suggested as a method by which investigative units can systematically organize, for their benefit, the department's flow of criminal information.

The CIIC is suggested as a method of approach for an investigative unit. It is not designed as an alternative method to the crime analysis unit that is suggested in the ICAP. It can become the collation and analysis element of an existing intelligence unit which focuses on investigation but has not developed collation and analysis.

This manual is the result of personal observation, discussion, and consultation over a number of years in many state and local police departments. The final formulation of the concept is a result in part of participation in the active training programs in the State of Ohio, under the leadership of Karl Koch, Director of Training, Division of Crime Prevention, Department of Economic and Community Development. Practical insights which flowed from this participation were provided by members of the Cleveland Police Department, especially Mark Romph; the Office of the Summit County Prosecutor, Akron; and the Tri-County Anti-Crime Unit, Newark, Ohio.

In part, the development of the concept was made possible by my access to, and discussions with, members of the Fairfax County Police Department, especially Bob Hooker, and members of the Montgomery County Police Department, namely Sgt. Michaleski and Cpl. Bill Mooney.

The ideas and methods included in this manual are the responsibility of the author. The effectiveness of delivery of these ideas is due largely to the efforts of Ann Seely, editor.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In most police jurisdictions, there are categories of crime whose solutions can be made more efficient and effective by improved use of available information on criminals and their activities. Law enforcement action against street crimes is improving through more effective use of patrol forces. Where this has occurred, investigators in criminal investigations units have had increased time to devote to fulfilling their responsibilities against more complex crimes—fencing, auto theft rings, major narcotic dealers, white collar crime, traditional organized crime, etc.

The potential for improvement, however, has not been fully exploited in many departments. The investigators continue to be hampered by filing systems that lock all their information on criminal activities in case files. The data therein can only be probed by knowing the name of a suspect. There is no efficient way to search for suspects by exploring relationships among criminals or their groupings, or among crimes of a similar nature. Success often depends on the memory of one of the “old hands.” Unfortunately, the old hands leave by transfer and retirement.

One approach to better exploit criminal information is through an intelligence unit. This unit, within a police department usually is not involved in enforcement investigation. It has its own investigators, files and analysts. Its reports are the result of analysis of criminal information.

However, by this definition, there are relatively few operating criminal intelligence units in this country. There are, on the other hand, many departments with a unit called “intelligence.” These are actually investigative units, generally with a responsibility for enforcement action. They put relatively little, if any, effort into analysis of the information that is available to them. In some departments, the intelligence unit is almost totally focused on people or groups in the society who threaten or are engaged in terrorist criminal activities.

An alternative approach to intelligence will be developed in this manual. It involves the creation of an element in the investigative unit designed specifically to assist criminal investigation. It will assist by assembling, collating, filing, and analyzing information on selected criminal activities in the jurisdiction. This suggested approach is known as the CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INFORMATION CENTER (CIIC). The specific location of the CIIC within the department is not critical, but, to be effective, the CIIC must be accepted by the investigators as a working part of their organization.

The following are some of the advantages that the CIIC offers:

- The CIIC can develop a series of files in which information is focused on selected major criminals, criminal groups, or criminal activities.
- This CIIC file would provide a place in which to systematically organize information on criminal activities which is not case associated. This is an alternative to the usual “match-book cover” personal file.
- The CIIC would provide a file in which information on criminal activities in adjacent jurisdictions could be organized. This information would assist the department in investigations within its own jurisdiction since criminals do not observe such boundaries except to reduce the probabilities of their arrest.

- As the CIIC establishes itself and in time develops an extensive data base, the value of the information could be further enhanced by the introduction of an analyst. The analyst would aid the investigator by discovering new data and determining its meaning when combined with existing information.

The concept for a CIIC is quite simple. In terms of minimal personnel, it could consist of no more than one file clerk. In terms of equipment, the clerk requires a typewriter and file cabinets. More effective results would be achieved if an analyst is added to the center. In the absence of an analyst, the growth potential of the CIIC would be greatly enhanced if the clerk had the potential to grow in the job. Such growth requires that the clerk learns to understand criminals and their illegal activities. The clerk must be able to put relevant pieces of information together to make maximum use of the first-level analytic capabilities of the collation system. Initially, the information used would be what is abstracted from the investigator case reports. Later, other units of the department could be tapped to contribute information.

This manual is designed to be a supplement to *Basic Elements of Intelligence*, published by LEAA in 1976. It is focused on demonstrating the value of transforming selected portions of the information available to a police department into intelligence. Intelligence, in this case, is defined as one of two interrelated products:

- data that has been organized in a file by name of known or suspected criminal, type of criminal activity, area or location of selected criminal activities, and group or gang.
- data from such a file which is analyzed to develop suggestions of actual or potential criminal activities beyond those now being investigated.

The intent is to suggest a tool or technique that is simple to create and inexpensive to operate. It will give the department that does not have an intelligence unit an opportunity to gain an advantage over the criminals in its jurisdiction. It will provide warning of the development of new criminal activities, or at least of the intensification of or pattern changes in existing criminal activity.

Developing a capability to perform collation and analysis can be a value to any police department regardless of size. Collation involves reviewing, abstracting, evaluating and filing of information. In the filing system, abstracts of information are organized by name, location or area, criminal grouping and criminal activity. The filing system is not organized by case. The suggested title for this unit is a "CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INFORMATION CENTER" (CIIC) which is diagrammed in Figure 1.

The CIIC can be implemented in an existing investigation or detective unit, in a patrol force which has investigative responsibilities, or in an "intelligence" unit that has not yet developed an analytic function. The CIIC is not directed primarily to casemaking, but its files and analysis are available to assist investigators with their current cases.

Basic to the CIIC approach is the concept that *intelligence* data is not evidential. Intelligence data is suggestive of direction for further investigation. It can be assembled from various units of the department to suggest new leads in a current case, or new targets in a known criminal activity. The CIIC can use all kinds of information. It can use information developed incidental to investigative case-making. It can use information concerning criminal activities in adjacent jurisdictions. The information often will be unconnected, and often unverified. It is just such data on activities in the criminal environment which, when organized and collated and tested against hypotheses, suggests the existence of

criminal activity. The verification and eventual case-making are the responsibilities of the enforcement investigative elements of the department.




FIGURE 1



## CHAPTER II

### CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INFORMATION CENTER CONCEPT, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATION

#### A. CONCEPT

Basically, a CIIC is a technique by which elements of information contained in the normal flow of police reporting can be organized and focused for more effective use in making cases and in probing the criminal environment for developing criminal activities. The technique is conceptually simple; namely, that information on criminals and their activities can be abstracted and entered into a series of file formats. These make possible a search for suspects by association, geographic area of activity, and reported involvement in specific criminal activities. They also make it relatively easy to probe for developing criminal activity, whether new in the jurisdiction or an old one in a changed form.

It is the collating of similar pieces of information on the same format that is the essential element of this approach. The unique aspect of this technique is that the act of filing actually performs first-level analysis. All information available to the CIIC on a particular criminal activity, location, or group/gang is collated so that on retrieval all related data is already assembled without further file search. Thus, even a clerk with little experience can respond to a request for assistance by quickly giving all activities related to a suspect, a group, gang, or a location or area. A clerk can also put together, for the jurisdiction as a whole and by selected time-periods, a list of suspects or a list of reported actions recorded for a particular criminal activity.

For the balance of this manual, the home organization for a CIIC will be referred to as a CID, taken to indicate an investigative unit regardless of an exact title or specific responsibility. This abbreviation is not meant to foreclose on the choice of location for the CIIC, but rather to save words.

Likewise, for the balance of the manual, the discussion of the operation of a CIIC is limited to three levels of personnel:

- a one-clerk operation,
- a clerk-plus an analyst operation, or
- a unit which has assigned a supervisor grade leader, and at least one clerk, one analyst, and one investigator.

This approach is designed to avoid overspecificity when generalizations are adequate. The focus will be on activities to be performed by the CIIC, not the precise number of personnel a particular department may believe essential to achieve effective performance.

1. *One-Clerk Operation.* A CIIC with minimum personnel assigned—one clerk—should be made part of the CID case file/investigator report preparation operation. This approach would be best for a small department, or for a larger department that wishes to test the approach suggested. The clerk should be located, if at all possible, in the same office with the personnel responsible for typing and filing investigator reports. There appear to be three advantages to this location:

- Investigative reports, the principal source of information, will be readily available. The CIIC

clerk will have more flexibility and will be less handicapped by typing overload since the material can be reviewed and abstracted either before or after it is typed.

- The CID commander can have ready access to the CIIC, even though one of his subordinates is assigned to supervise the activities of the clerk.
- The CIIC clerk will be available to assist the other CID clerks as problems and needs unexpectedly arise—heavy report flow from a major case, illness, covering the office, etc.

2. *Clerk Plus Analyst.* The addition of even one analyst presents a different organizational problem. The most important of the new factors to be considered is that an analyst works best if he or she has an office that is relatively quiet. It is often overlooked that the principal function of the analyst is to think, analyze, and extract meanings from the accumulation of pieces of information.

Thus, at a minimum, the CIIC should have a room to itself. It should be large enough for the analyst and the files. If necessary the clerk should also be included, but the best working arrangement calls for the latter to be close to but outside the analyst's office. These factors may act against the CIIC clerk being close to or part of the CID clerks.

For this approach to be successful, the importance of the clerk-analyst being a team must be understood. The analyst must be in a position to supervise the clerk, to decide on questions with regard to items of information or file format. For these reasons, the analyst should be in charge of the team. But this is not meant to underestimate the importance of the work of the clerk.

It should be noted that there is no suggestion that the CIIC have a staff of only an analyst. This would result in the analyst, being paid at an analyst's salary, performing the duties of a clerk. Unfortunately, many intelligence units are structured in this manner, an analyst without a clerk. The result is that the analyst spends all of his time acting in a clerk's role and no analysis is done. Both effectiveness and efficiency are negated.

3. *A CIIC Unit—Supervisor, Analyst, Investigator, and Clerk.* The most effective CIIC operation would undoubtedly be one in which there were:

- a supervisor who understands and appreciates the CIIC function, and coordinates and integrates the activities of the other assigned personnel,
- one or more analysts to perform the analytical function, as well as to respond to requests for assistance from investigators in other units of the department,
- one or more investigators to fill specific, important gaps in existing information that have been discovered by the analyst as the existing data is probed. The investigator would also act as liaison with other units of the department to enhance the inflow of information, and
- two or more clerks or clerk/analysts to perform the collation function and to answer telephone inquiries.

Within a large police department a unit having no more than five or six total personnel can still be a subordinate unit within the CID. Although it will perform all of the functions of an "intelligence" unit, it is too small an element to be effective. Smallness may be of assistance, however,

in enabling the unit to avoid orders to perform other duties. It will preserve unit integrity and allow the personnel to remain totally committed to the intelligence function.

A small sized intelligence unit, outside the principal investigative elements of the department, will not have sufficient personnel to develop an adequate flow of information on its own. In particular, it will probably not have enough personnel to seek information from other units of the department. It may also be labeled as a competitive investigative element which will hinder its ability to obtain cooperation from other investigators. The development of information flow in a police department is difficult enough without permitting additional obstacles to be erected.

If the CIIC unit remains as a subordinate element of the CID, the unit commander should report directly to the CID commander. This will ensure that the unit focuses on the important criminal problems, as seen by the senior person in the department. It also means, that the "weight" of the CID commander can be used by the CIIC to obtain a proper flow of information at least from the CID investigators.

## B. ORGANIZATION

The organization of a CIIC will reflect directly the number of personnel assigned to it and its location. The two functions basic to a CIIC are collation and analysis. It may be advisable to take into account the assignment of responsibilities in information gathering. The CIIC relationship with other units of the department will reflect directly its assigned functions.

Based on a review of the organization and operation of many departments, the most advantageous location for a CIIC would appear to be in one of the investigative units of the department. The latter could be the central or general investigative element. It could be a unit with the responsibility for traditional "vice" crimes, and/or organized crime. It could be an existing "intelligence" unit that has not yet been organized and staffed to do collation and analysis. A lesser, but still advantageous location for a CIIC could be the department chief's staff. The analytic capabilities of the CIIC would be available directly to the chief to help with whatever problem he considers his most important.

## C. OPERATION

The scope of a CIIC operation is determined largely by the number of personnel assigned and their skills. Regardless of size, the CIIC should always be considered as a staff function for it supports the unit to which it is assigned. Depending on the capabilities and assigned responsibilities of the CIIC, it can be supportive of other units in the department and other law enforcement agencies.

Regardless of number of personnel, the operation of the CIIC should include the performance of the following basic functions:

- review and collation of incoming information;
- respond to requests from investigators for information relating to their current cases;
- prepare analyses, requested by appropriate commanders or initiated by the CIIC itself, to:
  - assist in closing of current cases
  - give leads to other potential cases
  - suggest new developments in the criminal environment, either of new activity or a new approach in an existing one:

- maintain a priority listing of information gaps or needs. This will be the source for requests of assistance to other units of the department and other law enforcement agencies.

In addition, depending on the number of assigned personnel and their responsibilities, the CIIC can have other functions to perform. These could include:

- going out to other units in the department, in a liaison capacity, to discuss information needs and the potential of that unit to assist;
- conducting selected investigations to fill specific information gaps;
- working with and assisting the clerk or clerks of the parent investigative unit;
- developing leads to information to assist investigators.

Should the CIIC have one or more investigators assigned to probe for information needed to fill gaps, it must do everything possible to perform in a non-competitive manner. It must take account of traditional and human feelings of rivalry among investigators and between investigative units. This is often at the heart of an extreme reluctance, if not flat refusal, to share information. It often causes investigators to conceal information that might help others on their cases. For the CIIC to gain full cooperation from investigators in its parent unit, it must convince the investigators that it can help; but more importantly that it will not steal, harm, or "blow" the case of another investigator. The goal is to develop a relationship of mutual trust.

The CIIC should not be secretive about its operations. It must avoid any resemblance to the manner in which many intelligence units operated in the past; they tended to be "cloak and dagger" in reputation and hoarded to themselves whatever information they had accumulated. This only causes resentment and tends to cut them off from any information flow from the rest of the department. The CIIC must make a continuous effort, assisted by the commander of its parent unit, to convince investigators that it exists to help them. It must also be ready to realize its limitations, caused not only by lack of staff but more basically by the deficiency in its inflow of information.

The CIIC should be an information center with files of data on criminal activities. This gives the center an ever-improving capability to analyze selected items which will assist in the department's fight against crime. It must not be a "means of concealment" for items on political figures or groups not engaged in criminal activity. It must not get involved in its own activities to the detriment of the needs of others.

1. *Focusing CIIC Activities.* The CIIC, to be most effective, must focus its efforts on a priority basis. It can never follow all criminal activity in the jurisdiction. If it tried to do so, its personnel would be too busy abstracting and filing items of information to do any analysis, and its data base would be spotty because the flow of information would not be adequate.

Thus, a procedure must be established to determine the CIIC priorities. Initially, when the department begins discussions leading to the establishment of a CIIC, a few criminal activities should be selected as targets. Therefore, the information flow sought from outside its parent CID should be guided by these categories. The acceptance of reports for abstracting and filing should be guided in a like manner. The reports requested should pertain to these areas. The number of areas should be no more than three or four while the CIIC is testing its mode of operations.

The basis for selecting the initial priority categories of criminal activities should include two interrelated factors. The first factor is the importance of the activity related to other types of criminal activity. This importance should be perceived as a reflection of the number of such crimes in the



jurisdiction, or the fact that it is a growing criminal activity, or that the case closure rate for the activity is running behind. The second factor is the source and adequacy of information available on this activity. If the primary source of the information is from a unit other than the parent CID, major problems might surface for a new unit. A similar problem might be created if the activity is one that the department is not yet equipped to handle. For example, this difficulty has been the case in the area of "white collar" crime.

Additional criminal activities can be added to the operating priorities as the CIIC personnel gains experience and begins to understand its capacity for performing collation *and* analysis. The procedure for adding additional targets should ordinarily originate with the CIIC. It should make recommendations to the CID commander for approval. The proposal should take into account such factors as those discussed above for the originating priority list. It would also be useful if the chief's approval were sought and a memo stating his approval went out to all senior commanders. This would aid the CIIC as it seeks to gain the necessary information flow. The CID commander or the chief can add new activities to the CIIC list.

2. *Handover of CIIC Developed Potential Case.* The CIIC must deal with the problem of transferring a case to enforcement investigators. This will occur when the CIIC has put together enough leads to indicate a potential case. This is a problem that intelligence units have faced often in the past and they are facing the same problem today. What is involved is a decision to minimize strain on the limited CIIC capabilities and to bring enforcement investigators to accept the case. The enforcement investigators have their own priorities and they too are under heavy pressure. They may not trust the basis of the CIIC judgment. They may not want to accept the type of case presented because they believe it would take too much time. This is particularly true where investigators are evaluated on the number of cases closed in a given period of time.

One approach to this reoccurring problem is for the CIIC supervisor to keep the CID commander informed on a weekly basis of any potential cases that may develop. It should be the CID commander's choice as to when he wants the material released to one of his investigators or to another investigative unit. He must use his judgement to balance conflicting needs and capability levels. He is in a much better position than the supervisor of the CIIC to make such a decision.

3. *Avoiding Duplication of Effort.* In its operation, the CIIC should avoid duplication of the efforts of others. It must not replicate case files in its own files. As discussed later in Chapter IV, the CIIC must avoid accumulating evidential material in its files. It must also seek to avoid giving back to an investigator only that which was received from him. Success will depend on the effectiveness of the CIIC's efforts to gain information from multiple sources.

4. *Security.* The CIIC must maintain security in its operations. Security refers to protection of sources and the privacy of persons about whom they have information. It does not refer to secrecy about the existence of the unit or its operations. Security can be maintained by following a few basic rules:

- information is given out only to law enforcement officers who have a need-to-know;
- no one but members of the CIIC has access to its files (this will also insure that information does not get misfiled or taken away inadvertently);
- sensitive information is so marked and is not disseminated to any one without permission of the supervisor of the CIIC.

### CHAPTER III SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Any discussion of information sources for a CIIC unit must take into account value—the worth of an item of information relative to the effort it will take to gain it. In other words, a rough priority of information by source should be established. The priority should be considered flexible, since some sources are more important than others depending on type and location of the subject of the criminal activity. The order of priority should be considered liable to change through time. There may be a shift in type of important criminal activity. Or the effort required to "milk" a particular source may be reduced, perhaps through better understanding or as a result of practical working arrangements.

The following is an example of the order of priorities for a CIIC as part of a special investigation unit:

- first priority as a source of information would be the parent unit itself
- second priority might be given to other specialized investigative units in the department—vice, organized crime, white collar crime, narcotics, etc.—since the areas of the criminal environment that the investigators of these units were probing would probably relate to those of the parent unit
- third priority could be given to the normal investigative elements, whether detective or patrol, centralized or decentralized, and
- final priority would be given to other elements of the department.

Priorities would not be established for other law enforcement agencies. These would be approached on a specific request basis.

While the above examples might provide a general outline for priorities of effort, a more finely tuned priority list should be developed to take into account the assigned or selected targets. Such a priority approach, taking into consideration some of the points made above with reference to flexibility, might refer to:

- the type or class of criminal activities to be targeted,
- the degree of cooperation already established with other investigative units,
- the area of the criminal activity if it appears to be localized within the jurisdiction, and
- any problems in the relationship of the parent unit and other investigative units.

These and other local problems must be considered by the CIIC in its efforts to develop priorities to guide its information seeking activities among the other units of the department. The balance of this chapter will discuss ideas and approaches that may be of assistance to prospective and actual CIIC units. Sources are discussed and problems to be overcome are explored; but how an individual CIIC should proceed will be based on its perception of the problems in its own department.

1. *Information From Parent Investigation Unit.* For most CIIC units, this initially would be the only source that would be relatively easy to work. Even here it would depend on the commander of the parent unit giving his assistance, both in terms of an initial order and continuing supervision, to see that the order is carried out. The CIIC should be able to gain access to all investigator reports as they

are transmitted for typing and filing. These reports would fall into three general categories:

- Reports on investigative action on a particular case. These will cover questioning of suspects, witnesses, and other potential sources of information. There will be informant debriefs concerning the case. There will be answers to queries sent to other units of the department and other law enforcement agencies. Where wire taps are legal, there will be transcripts. Finally, there will be the record of arrest, in some cases, including the answers to a questioning at that time.
- Reports covering non-case related information. While the investigator is always gaining such information, it is normally only reported if some special procedure has been established (this is discussed in further detail later).
- Reports of information developed in the course of an investigation, directed by the parent unit commander, to fill a gap developed by the CIIC.

The above discussion of types of investigator reports points to a major problem facing the CIIC. The investigators in their normal activities learn much about the criminal environment. Much of the information has little to do with the current cases on which they happen to be working. Since they tend to try to minimize paperwork by keeping their reports as brief as possible, the investigators ordinarily do not record this non-case associated information. Furthermore, since their case reports will be available for a subsequent trial, they should not put this extraneous material in their case reporting. This leaves the CIIC with two options, neither of which is mutually exclusive. The CIIC, with the concurrence of the unit commander, can develop a form on which the investigators can write this additional information and hand it in to the CIIC. The other option leaves the CIIC to attempt to interview the investigators on a catch-as-catch-can basis, doing the recording of information for the investigator. A tape recorder theoretically can be used to minimize the work in the latter approach. However, in many cases, investigators do not like to use tape recorders. In some cases, they are opposed to others recording their words in this manner because it reminds them of the internal affairs unit at work.

Some sort of working solution to this problem is essential to the CIIC achieving a minimum inflow of information on the criminal environment. Often, it is a problem that tends to resolve itself as the CIIC becomes more effective. It begins to give more assistance to the investigators, and they perceive the value of their information when collated with that from other sources and analyzed by the CIIC.

2. *Information From Other Investigative Units.* The CIIC should work continuously to obtain inputs from the other investigative units. At a minimum, these inputs will consist of answers to specific requests for information about a particular person. At a higher level of return, one or more of the other units may be willing to respond to a request for investigative action. This could be in the course of an assigned case, or it could be an extra action. The degree of cooperation will be a product of the ability of the CIIC to sell itself as an aid to investigators throughout the department. It will also be aided by word from the chief that he expects such assistance to be given to the CIIC. It should be noted that in most cases a chief's order, in the absence of an acceptance of the CIIC, would have relatively little effect on most investigators.

The goal of the CIIC should be to acquire a copy of all investigator reports. This would appear to be more than a small unit can handle. But a CIIC does not operate in all areas of criminal activity; its efforts are focused by direction and/or by the importance of a particular activity in a criminal development sense. Therefore, the review function needs a large flow from which to select items of interest to the CIIC. Only the unit, knowing its needs and priorities, can determine items of information that are useful. Thus, the CIIC, rather than the unit in which the report originates, should make this latter decision.

An essential element in developing information flow from other units will be the knowledge of

the major cases on which the other investigative units are working. For example, by knowing that the narcotics unit is working a major case in a particular area of the jurisdiction, the CIIC could seek to gain data from the narcotics unit on other criminal activities in that area. The CIIC could formally request assistance, depending on established relationships. Or it could proceed informally, seeking items of information by meeting and talking with the investigators involved.

3. *Informants.* Informants are probably the single most important information source to a police department. This importance is enhanced in those states where the use of wire taps is not accepted. To be sure of common understanding, in this manual *informants* include a diversity of contacts: other police officers, public spirited citizens, sources developed by police officers on a personal basis, persons who are paid on a spot or "salary" basis for their information, those sources covered by the word "snitch". The sources can be employees of legitimate organizations, or persons on the outskirts of or involved in criminal activities.

The importance of the informant rests largely on his or her ability to learn of or observe a criminal activity. The ability to mix with criminals in their environment provides one basis for this. Another basis exists when a normal citizen, because of his employment, can observe potential criminal transactions in what is otherwise a lawfully operated business or profession. The value of the police officer lies in the fact that the officer not only operates in both environments, but is also a trained observer.

The only alternative to the informant is the police officer operating undercover. This is often extremely dangerous to the personnel involved. It is also expensive in terms of manpower. There are limitations to which the police officer can be used, since he must be unknown to the group he is now seeking to infiltrate. Moreover, he or she may not be able to penetrate some criminal groups because it requires the commission of a felony before the person can be accepted.

a. *CIIC's Own Informants.* The CIIC itself can develop some of its own informants. Ordinarily, this would be done by investigators. It is even possible for the analyst to develop informants. A unit with only a clerk, however, must depend on others for informant-generated information.

Ordinarily, the CIIC would seek to develop a continuing relationship with its informants. Since its primary objective is to develop information and not to produce evidence, the informant usually does not have to be surfaced. In these circumstances, the CIIC should consider developing a small network of paid or unpaid informants. They could be in areas of known criminal activity, such as restaurants, all-night food stores, service stations, bars, barber shops, beauty parlors, etc. If paid, informant compensation should be over and above their salary earned at their daily work. This type informant, given some help in what to look for and identification of important criminals, can observe activities and associations. As an example, fragments of knowledge of subjects being discussed by criminals might be overheard, if the informant was the serving waiter.

The CIIC should also consider persons employed in service organizations, such as banks, law offices, telephone companies, etc., as potential informants. In many cases, the persons approached would be law-abiding and would respond, if at all, on the basis of a citizen's duty. Support personnel in other government offices, local and state, might also be approached. For example, a report by a clerk in a zoning office calling attention to what appeared to be a strange development might be a lead to a developing land fraud. Even where a CIIC had only an analyst, the latter could seek to develop sources of the type discussed above.

Whatever the type and location of the informant, the CIIC should hold, as a minimum, monthly debriefs. The CIIC debriefer should be prepared with a list of questions relating to areas of major concern and about which he believes the informant might have some information. Guidance should be given through predesigned questions to indicate to the informant priority items about which infor-

mation is desired. The preparation of the questions is to give time for review of the sensitivity of the subject. Since the informants are never under direct control, care must be taken to ensure that debriefing sessions do not inadvertently give away sensitive developments. The estimate of informant reliability must be taken into account to determine who will be asked what type of questions.

*b. Other Unit's Informants.* The CIIC objective, with respect to informants working for police officers in other units of the department, would be to gain access to the informant's knowledge of the various kinds of activity within the criminal environment. Unlike the law enforcement side, the criminals do not strictly observe functional lines. For example, the bookie and pimp may invest some of their earnings in a major shipment of narcotics. Fences may also engage in fraud, skimming off the profits of a legitimate retail operation which has been used as a front. Cigarette smugglers, seeking a return cargo, may arrange to act at some level as a narcotics wholesaler back in his home territory. Narcotic users are generally engaged in breaking and entering and/or armed robbery. In turn they deal with fences to get enough funds to buy their fix. The fence may also be backing the narcotics pusher and his wholesaler with funds to buy from the major wholesaler up the ladder.

This flexibility of criminals is well known to police officers. Yet, when it comes time to talk to their informant, they forget to ask about (or are not interested in) the general knowledge of criminal activity known to the informant. They press for items of information that will suggest a case they can open, or that will help them build evidence in a current case.

What is being suggested here is that the senior commanders in a department must explicitly recognize the existence of this wealth of knowledge that is readily available through the informant population. They must recognize its worth to the department as a whole. They must take steps to ensure that some arrangements are developed whereby the knowledge of the informant is shared. The sharing should involve other investigative units, and an intelligence or CIIC unit if either has been established. These suggestions go directly against the tradition of investigators keeping to themselves the existence, name and scope of knowledge of their informants.

From the CIIC point of view, there are several practical steps it can take short of revolutionizing the system. After establishing some basis of worth through its efforts to help investigators, the CIIC should propose a few questions to be put to the informants. These would refer to priority items on the list of information gaps the CIIC had developed. Questions should be limited to avoid irritating the investigator or the informant. In this case, the approach would fall apart and nothing would be gained. The CIIC should try to ask the same questions of all informants, developing a relatively wide view of what is known in the criminal environment about the subject of the questions. Since the answers need not be evidential, but only suggestive (in terms of street talk), there is less pressure put on the informants. This creates less risk that the informant will be surfaced by having to appear in court.

Another approach would be for the CIIC to develop a list of subjects (people, places, activities,) about which informants have knowledge. Under each subject, there will be the name of the investigator or patrol officer who has informants knowledgeable on the subject. This approach would enable the CIIC (and other investigative units) to ask for assistance on a specific subject from the officer or officers who have knowledgeable informants.

It should also be mentioned that if the CIIC unit has the required capability and the consent of the command echelon, the CIIC could be given funds to develop informants. This could be used for its own informants, or to help other investigators. In the latter case, the agreement would include some

assurance that the CIIC would have access to the informant for whom it is paying.

4. *The Patrol Unit.* Traditionally, investigators have perceived the patrol as knowing little about the business of crime solving or about criminal activity. In some cases, this is true since the patrol was forbidden to get involved in investigations. In others, the patrol may have spent all its time riding around and learning little or nothing about the environment and the people in its area. But in general, as recent studies have shown, the patrol can have a marked impact on the success of crime solution. Moreover, where the patrol has been encouraged to learn about its beat and/or to assist in crime solving, the extent of its ability to develop knowledge of the criminal environment has been proven.

This manual is not directed to solving the argument about the role of the patrol in investigations. The above was cited only to indicate that the patrol can be a good source. It is one that the CIIC should consider as a target for exploitation and to do so requires some delicacy in approach. The patrol has its own functions to perform. It has several reports to fill out, including those relating to each specific patrol action taken. Thus, to suggest another daily report for the patrol to produce would be less than well received. What has been found acceptable is a request for assistance on a specific subject for a limited period of time. For example, a request may state that all three shifts in a patrol area observe and report all activity at a specific address. The request should give what information is known on the subject and the reason for the request (taking into account whatever sensitivity must be observed about the fact that the subject is under observation).

The fact that the patrol had stopped persons on the priority list could be of interest to the CIIC. Such action could be noteworthy because of where the subject was stopped, the persons he may have had with him (or her), and the action causing the patrol reaction. At a minimum, this could be material for the subject's biography. It could suggest the subject was associating with criminals in another area of criminal activity. It could suggest another location (if such was included in the report) about which further information might be requested.

However, the CIIC will have difficulty in obtaining patrol reports. In some departments such reports are kept in precinct or district headquarters; in others, they are centralized either in the patrol command or in central records. Any of these sources would be difficult for the CIIC to acquire if it tried to take in the total daily flow.

Listed below are two approaches that could help in the problem of acquiring priority subject information:

The first approach would be for the CIIC to prepare a list of its priority subjects. This list would be circulated to all patrol districts or precincts. They would be requested to notify the CIIC, by phone or written report, if there had been contact with any of the priority subjects.

The CIIC should not allow the list of priority subjects to remain outstanding for more than two weeks or a month at most. It should be formally cancelled and, if appropriate, replaced with another list of priority subjects. The list should always be short, perhaps no more than five subjects.

If at all possible, someone from the CIIC should go personally to each precinct when such an activity is initiated. This provides an opportunity for the CIIC person to explain what is being sought and why. It personalizes a unit that the patrol would not otherwise come in contact with. It should emphasize participation. In any case, as reports are received from the patrol specific recognition

should be given to the patrol officer and to his superior.

A second approach would be to provide central records unit with a list of priority subjects to be given to those persons assembling the files. They could immediately note or report references to the subject and could notify the CIIC. The CIIC could then perform any further research necessary, including a request for a copy of the report that triggered the system. If the system is computerized, a program could be introduced that triggers a notice on the appearance of one of the names on the priority list. This approach should obviously be approved by the chief and the supervisors of the computer program.

5. *Debriefing of Arrestees.* An excellent potential source of criminal information is the criminal at booking. He has failed to avoid arrest and psychologically could be highly vulnerable. He might be willing to talk to a friendly person about his environment, or he might be willing to answer specific questions from the officer who brings him in for booking. The questions would have nothing to do with the matter of his arrest, and should not interfere in the normal formalities of the event.

The CIIC approach to this source of information could also be both formal and informal. A request could be forwarded through the CID commander to the chief requesting a department policy on the subject of debriefing at time of booking. Such a statement could include recognition of CIIC involvement and request cooperation. The CIIC could prepare a list of specific questions for the arresting officer to put to the criminal. Or, if the CIIC kept itself aware of the progress of important cases, one of its members could be present to ask the questions directly (probably after the arresting officer had completed his formal activities).

6. *Liaison With Internal Affairs.* One often overlooked source of criminal information is that which is produced during the course of internal affairs operations. The probing of complaints about corrupt actions of police officers can produce information concerning the activities of criminals. This is almost always the case where the officers under investigation have been on "the take". They receive their illegal funds from someone who wishes to hide his activities or to keep the police from taking action against him.

Depending on how the case is handled, most, if not all, of the information on criminal activities will be lost unless the CIIC makes an effort to obtain it. Normally the internal affairs unit operates with strict security and maximum secrecy. When an indictable case is developed, the internal affairs unit will present only that material necessary to gain a conviction. There is, of course, much more information on criminal activities in their files than is presented in the case. It is this material that the CIIC should try to obtain.

This suggested liaison should be considered sensitive. The CIIC must obviously stand apart from the internal affairs unit. If they are connected, the members of the department will believe that the CIIC is in fact engaged in spying and will refuse to direct any information their way. Therefore, any liaison should be considered a sensitive matter known to as few persons in the department as possible. The source of the material received by the CIIC should be concealed.

## CHAPTER IV

### COLLATION: REVIEWING, EVALUATING ABSTRACTING, AND FILE STRUCTURING

#### A. INTRODUCTION

The collation function is the keystone to the effective and efficient operation of a CIIC. The effectiveness of output and the efficiency of the process are a direct result of:

- the value of the information received,
- the act of filing which automatically associates items of information in appropriate categories, and
- the ability to seek and retrieve items of information by multiple paths.

Efficient analysis cannot be accomplished if the basic data is contained in case files, even where those files are indexed by name cards.

Case files are designed to accumulate the evidential material that the investigation produces. It is filed by the name given the case; for example, the name of a person, organization, or location. From such files there is no efficient way to gather data on which to base an analysis of a specific criminal activity in the jurisdiction. Reliance would be given to the memory of a clerk or investigator to recall certain cases involving a specific type of crime.

The other method of retrieving information would be to review name cards, providing the type of crime in which the person involved is indexed. The review of name cards can be a major chore since over a period of years they can number in the hundreds.

In either case, a review involves going through bound case files to abstract whatever information is required to answer a simple query or to produce an analytic report.

This manual suggests an *information abstracting* approach to file structuring. The items of information in a report that are considered important — names, criminal activities associations, locations, etc. — are recorded in brief on a format that ensures related items are associated (see Figure 2 for a list of suggested files and their contents). For example, all items of information received by the CIIC with respect to hijacking would be abstracted and recorded in a Criminal Activity File entitled "hijacking". There would be no need to look elsewhere in the CIIC files. The file would contain the names of known and suspected hijackers about whom there are reports. Depending on what information has been discovered, the date and location of the hijackings would be recorded. Also the locations where the stolen vehicles are recovered (if they had in fact been moved to another location) would be noted.

By using these files of abstracted material, a clerk could produce reports on criminal activities. The clerk could cover the jurisdiction as a whole or a selected area of the jurisdiction. One could compare similar crimes for selected time periods. Lists could be made of suspected and/or known criminals operating in a given area. By going to Name Files and Biographic Files, the clerk could also report on other criminal activities in which the suspects being reviewed are involved.

An analyst could produce considerably more results from such files. One could estimate future trends and determine information gaps. Closing the gaps could give further indications that the



FIGURE 2

SUGGESTED CIIC FILES AND THEIR CONTENTS	
NAME FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Name of known or suspected criminal</li><li>– Criminal activity or activities in which involved.</li></ul>
BIOGRAPHIC FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Biographic data form: All known information about a major and/or career criminal.</li><li>– Biographic update form: Sources of all information on biographic data form. Retain description of old items replaced by new information on biographic data form. Abstracted items of information on activities of criminal.</li></ul>
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– An abstract of all information available on a specified criminal activity.</li><li>– Names of known or suspected participants in the activity.</li><li>– Location and/or area of activity.</li><li>– Mode of operation individual or group.</li></ul>
GROUP/GANG FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Names of known or suspected members and associates of a definable group, gang or criminal organization.</li><li>– Known and suspected criminal activities.</li><li>– Location where they gather.</li><li>– Normal area of activity.</li></ul>
LOCATION FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Names of known or suspected criminals who have been reported at a specific location (house, bar, restaurant, social club, business establishment, etc.)</li><li>– Known or suspected criminal activities.</li></ul>

In addition to these files there could be others that a CIIC may decide are essential to its operation.

estimated direction of thinking is probably accurate. One could develop link diagrams giving an estimate of the strength of relationships among members of a group or gang, or among associates of a major criminal. The analyst, for example, could probe several files through the multiple access routes seeking indicators that a group may be operating in a police district far from its home, thus making it difficult for the district where crimes are being committed to discover the suspects.

Another aspect of the efficiency of the abstracting approach is based on the fact that items of information used by the CIIC are not necessarily evidential in nature. The items of information and short statements of activity abstracted from a report are probably all that the analyst (or anyone else) will need for responding to requests concerning named individuals or for preparing an analytic report. Time is saved because the clerk in these situations does not have to search through jacket files for base documents.

Time is not required to place the Base Reports in folders to file by name or subject. The CIIC would file all reports from which it accessed information in a common (or seriatum) file. The reports would be filed as they came, and not by subject or organization from which they came. The CIIC ability to retrieve Base Reports would rest on the accession (or identification) number which would be associated with each item of information in the several files of abstracted material.

The only exception to this filing of Base Reports would be those relating to cases in the CIIC's parent CID unit. To eliminate double filing, a CIIC unit established in an investigative unit can use the case file as the CIIC file for all such reports abstracted. The CIIC clerk must use an accession number list (see Figure 3). The case file number assigned to a specific named or numbered CID file must be recorded on the accession number list, related to an assigned CIIC accession number. While this approach means that the clerk must check the list before going to the CIIC Base Report file, it will take much less effort than making copies of all reports going into the case files and then filing them in their own base file.

FIGURE 3

EXAMPLE OF ACCESSION NUMBER LIST	
Accession number	Case File Number or Title
456	345-120377
30	10-010478
200	150-021578 Omega Corp.
580	290-072278 George Russell
etc.	etc.

The operation of the collation process requires the establishment of a series of procedures, guidelines, and file formats. These include:

- guidelines to assist the clerk in the review of reports to determine those that will be accepted and abstracted for filing,
- an accession numbering system,
- a procedure for evaluating the reliability of the reporter and substance of the report,
- a procedure for indicating the sensitivity of the report to control the dissemination of abstracted items of information,
- development of formats for the initial set of files,
- development of abbreviations and codes to use in recording material abstracted, to save on typing time, and
- procedures for purging useless material.

## B. REPORT REVIEW GUIDELINES

Report review guidelines are designed to ensure that the analyst or clerk, when reviewing the inflow of reports, abstracts information that is relevant to the CIIC assigned tasks. All information received is not necessarily useful to an understanding of the criminal environment or a specific element in the environment. There must be some selectivity or the report volume could swamp the CIIC personnel.

It is difficult to generalize about such guidelines. They must be developed with respect to the situation of an individual CIIC; in particular the source units, types of reports, and the volume of inflow. The CIIC should be hopeful in its planning and estimate that, as it gains experience and begins to produce useful responses to investigators and useful analytic reports to the commanders, the flow of information will increase.

It does appear, however, that there are some general rules that can be applied in most situations. These are presented below.

1. *Reports Related To CID Case-Building in CIIC Priority Criminal Activities.* For reports on priority criminal activities, the emphasis should be on abstracting information on persons and activities beyond the evidential stage information that will lead to an arrest. Hopefully, the principal suspects will be taken out of circulation for a period of time. But from the CIIC's function of looking for other potential cases, the information of interest will be leads to other criminals, associations, activities, locations, etc.

Examples of items of information that would be useful to abstract and put into the CIIC files are as follows:

- In the case of a known (or designated) major and/or career criminal, any new information would be added to this Biographic File. This would apply to suspects in the case as well as those incidentally linked in reported meetings.

- Names of criminals or suspected criminals with indication of criminal activity in which they engage would be placed in the Name File and the Criminal Activity File.
- Locations used as meeting places would be added to the Location File.
- Items about the criminal activity that is the focus of the case would all be filed. Items which described the mode of operation used, locations that appear to have criminal connections, apparent groupings or associations among the criminals or suspects turned up during the investigations, apparent relationships discovered between this criminal activity and other criminal activities would all be filed under the appropriate file.

2. *Other Reports Relating to CIIC Priority Criminal Activities.* Reports from other units of the department or from other law enforcement agencies are important. These reports should present items of information that complement rather than duplicate what is being developed by the parent CID unit as it builds cases looking forward to arrest and conviction. Again, the actual value of the information can be determined only by CIIC review. It can be anticipated that there will be names, locations, types of action within the criminal activity category, and perhaps groups or gangs that are new or different compared to reports accumulating in case files. These new items can come from the CID or another unit in the department.

Examples of items of information that should be abstracted from reports received from other units of agencies are listed below.

- Potential criminals operating in the criminal activity, new names, or old pros.
- New or different areas of activity of a particular group or gang.
- New or different modes of operation in the criminal acts.
- New locations where criminals gather or to which they can be associated.

3. *Reports Relating to Criminal Activities Not On The CIIC Priority List.* Information to be abstracted about activities not on the priority list should be limited to names of known or suspected criminals and the type criminal activity in which they engage. This is a result of the concept discussed above of focusing CIIC efforts. Its priority list should not necessarily be determined by the volume of information. Most important in establishing activities on the priority list would be the extent to which the CIIC techniques of organizing and analyzing information could make an effective contribution to department efforts. The objective of the CIIC is *not* to create another file of criminals. *The CIIC is a tool to be used selectively.*

There is also the practical problem of work load. The collation effort — reviewing, abstracting, and filing — of a one-clerk operation is limited to that which can be done in a normal work day. It is a time period in which the clerk must also answer queries from investigators and assemble relatively simple reports on developments in the selected criminal activities. A CIIC with more personnel would be able to do more, but practical limits of work load must be taken into account.

The approach suggested in this manual is a compromise between the concept developed above and the traditional police approach of filing everything ("string saving"), because some day it might be useful. The items of information from reports of activity not on the priority list that should be abstracted and filed are as suggested below.



- The CIIC should abstract and enter into its files, names of known or suspected criminals that are involved in what the department defines as major criminal activities. By this approach, the CIIC will have a record of name, date of event, and type of criminal activity. By using the accession number, it can get back to the original report if this activity is put on the priority list. The report may have items of interest to be put in the background as a new criminal activity file is activated.
- The CIIC should not abstract criminal activities from these reports. If the CIIC believes that one or more of the criminal activities are becoming important, it should request a change in the priority list that governs its focus of effort.

4. *CIIC Development of Understanding of The Criminal Environment.* As a rule, the CIIC personnel should review as large a volume of reports as possible, including current case reporting, in order to develop a working knowledge of the jurisdiction's criminal environment. This will assist them in understanding current trends and in detecting new activities or new criminals in old activities. It will help in future changes or additions to their priority list of assigned criminal activities.

### C. ACCESSION NUMBERING SYSTEM

Essentially, the accession number is the identifier that permits the Base Report (from which the information was abstracted) to be retrieved, either from the CIIC common file or the CID case files. The number of digits assigned to the accession number is based on the CIIC's estimate of the number of reports it will accept into its system in a year. The number of digits can be held down by starting with new numbers each year.

The accession number can be expanded to encompass indicators of other factors. In addition to the date, it can include the source of the information, the type of criminal activity, the evaluation of the reliability of the report and its reporter, and the sensitivity of the information. The individual CIIC unit will have to decide a balance between including a great deal of information in the accession number and the amount of typing required each time the number is used.

### D. EVALUATION OF VALIDITY OF REPORTS

An assessment of the validity of a report can be important, especially in the abstract file approach, since the items are separated from their Base Report. There is no indication necessarily as to the source of the material abstracted. The item may come into use some months after it was filed and the clerk or analyst may have forgotten just which organization or person was responsible for the information that was abstracted. If it is a police officer reporting something that he observed, there is little problem, except it is not indicated in the file form that he observed it. It becomes a serious problem if the source of the report is an informant about whom either the officer making the reports or the analyst in the CIIC have their doubts.

While an evaluation of the validity of the report is important, the CIIC may have trouble getting units other than its parent CID to accept a system of evaluation. Within the CID, provided the commander gives his support, the investigators will probably be willing to cooperate by evaluating their reports according to the system given below. The main focus will be on sources other than police officers since it would be a practical impossibility to ask investigators to assess each other. The members of the CIIC, by talking to other unit investigators, may be able to develop an appreciation of the value of certain informants and, thus, be able to evaluate the validity of the information collected.

What is proposed in this manual is that the CIIC develop a system for indicating the value or worth of the data in a report. The indicator system should evaluate the reporter as well as the substance of the report. The CIIC should begin by applying the indication system code to any report that is generated by its own personnel. The CIIC should then convince the CID commander that his investigators should attach such indicators to their reports. What happens beyond this will depend on the time available to the CIIC and the support given by the commander of the CIIC. To get other units to follow this type of evaluation requires educating the other units and their commanders and convincing the chief. As stated above, the CIIC may attach its own evaluation to reports from outside the CID, based on information derived by personal contact. But, however widespread the system becomes, its success depends greatly on its being simple and practical.

One approach is suggested in Figure 4. It is based on a three level value assessment of the source of the information and its substance.

FIGURE 4

VALIDITY EVALUATION CODE	
Source	Substance
1 - Police officer or person known to be reliable	1-Activity directly observed
2- Person whose reliability is <i>probably good</i> , but some doubt exists	2- Items in report are <i>probably largely true</i>
3- Reliability questionable or <i>unknown</i>	3- Accuracy of report is doubtful or <i>unknown</i>

What is suggested is that a report be given a double digit evaluation number. As indicated in the example following, reliability of source can be associated with more than one validity of substance indicators.

- 11 would indicate that a police officer or a person equally reliable had observed the activity. 12 would indicate a reliable person had been given a report that appeared to him to be largely true. 13 would indicate a reliable person had been given a report whose substance was doubtful or at least unknown to him.
- 21 would indicate that a person, whose reliability is probably good, observed the activity. 22 would indicate a person, whose reliability is probably good, received a report that he believes is largely true. 23 would indicate a person, whose reliability is probably good, received a report the truthfulness of which is doubtful or unknown.

- 33 is about the only indicator that can be given to a report from a source that is questionable or his reliability is unknown. Even though he might observe an activity, because of his unreliability, there would be reason to doubt the fact. Thus, it would probably be best to always associate the indicators of unreliability of source with doubtful or unknown validity of substance.

#### E. SENSITIVITY OF REPORTS

Protection of sensitive reports is a critical issue, especially if the CIIC hopes to get reports on major current cases. Investigators are understandably concerned when persons not working with them have access to their case reporting. A leak, inadvertent though it may be, could jeopardize months of work spent in collecting the evidence necessary for the arrest of a major criminal.

This manual must assume that the CIIC personnel are trustworthy and can convince other police officers of their reliability. Beyond this assumption, the CIIC must have a system which clearly will indicate that any abstracted item from a sensitive report will be marked classified on every file form on which it may appear. This will contribute to the CIIC being able to convince investigators that their information, once entered into the CIIC system, is secure. However, the system must allow for changes in the sensitivity of the items of information, especially those involved in cases which result in an arrest and trial.

Again, to be useful, the system must be simple and effective. The simplicity can be achieved by minimizing the number of categories of relative sensitivity. The effectiveness is also enhanced by having a few categories with which to deal, and a coding system that is easy to remember and requires a minimum of effort to record. The sensitivity code given in Figure 5 is designed to meet these requirements.

FIGURE 5

SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION CODE
1 - circulate the element of information in the department and only outside to law enforcement officers with need-to-know
2 - circulate only in the department
3 - circulate only to those persons given specific approval by the CID commander.

#### F. USE OF A TEMPORARY NAME FILE

There will be instances when the CIIC will review reports containing names of persons, the extent

of whose participation in criminal acts is not clear. There may be a record of past activities known to the investigator, but he may not include such knowledge in his report. For example, the names may result from raids in which a number of persons are arrested for apparent participation in a criminal activity, or the names may come from an informant whose reliability is questionable. Where there is doubt, the CIIC, if it decides to access the item, should file the name in a clearly defined compartment separated from its general Name File.

The separate file should be considered a temporary holding file. Names of persons would remain here until their association with the crime was more clearly defined. The information in the Temporary File should not be disseminated outside the department. There should be an established time limit beyond which the names would not be held if the necessary clarifying information has not been developed. A six month holding period is suggested.

The name of the person and other available information called for on the Name File would be the only items of information uniquely related to the person to be abstracted and entered into the CIIC Temporary File. No references would be made in the Biographic, Criminal Activity, Location, or Group/Gang Files. Thus, if at the six month deadline the name was deleted from the file, there should be no other references to delete.

Whether or not the Base Report was removed would depend on whether it contained other items of information — names, activities, etc. Even though the Base Report was retained because of other abstracted items, the privacy of the individual in question would be protected. The CIIC working materials are those in the files of abstracted items of information, not the Base Reports.

On the other hand, if the suspicion of criminal involvement or association becomes more solidly supported or confirmed, the CIIC should enter the name and other pertinent material into the regular files.

#### G. ABSTRACTING AND FILING

The central collation activity of the CIIC is the actual abstracting of information from incoming reports and entering the information onto preprinted forms for the various files. The format for the preprinted forms will be suggested later in this chapter. Specific instructions cannot be stated in a manual addressed to many different sized departments. The items of information to be abstracted, the shorthand or symbols used in recording the information, and the formats of the files themselves will be decided by the individual CIIC units.

1. *Suggested Clerk/Analyst Approach to Abstracting and Filing.* The CIIC should establish a routine for the reviewing, abstracting, and filing of items of information in the daily inflow of reports. This should be done routinely in a single clerk operation. It would probably be even more necessary where there are more the personnel in the CIIC. In the larger unit, the analysts should review the incoming reports and indicate (by underlining or using a hi-lighting pen) the items of information that the clerk will abstract and type on the appropriate file form. The routine will ensure that all reports are reviewed as soon as possible, and that all items of information deemed important are put in the files promptly. This will ensure that answers to requests for information will include current material. By performing this routine initially in the morning, the prospect of a back-log of reports building up can be minimized.

The clerk, alone or with an analyst, should eventually develop short-hand methods for writing

the abstracted items of information on the file forms. The abbreviations should be written up and recorded in the front of the file. This will reduce the typing load and will also insure continued understanding of what is in the file when there are changes in the CIIC personnel.

Examples of such short-hand or abbreviations are as follows:

- The *jurisdiction* can be *subdivided* into sub-areas and these represented by letters or numbers. In some cases, the police districts or precincts may suffice. But in most, the creation of smaller sub-areas will be of greater use in indicating where particular types of criminal activities are occurring.
- The elements of a *mode of operation* can be coded. For example, in a fencing operation, a double digit could be used to describe each of the following functions:
  - the type of business used by the fence i.e., 10
  - the type of merchandize in which he specialized i.e., 20
  - whether or not he had thieves that operated to order i.e., 30
  - how the stolen material was delivered i.e., 40
  - etc.

As will be demonstrated later in the discussion of the use of the file forms, a search, for example, for a specific approach to fencing can be greatly assisted by such coding. The criminal activity form can be reviewed seeking a specific combination of numbers.

The coding of the mode of operation can be done as selected criminal activities are accepted into the CIIC priority list. This will prevent the coding from becoming a monumental administrative task.

The process of abstracting items of information and transferring them to preprinted forms is demonstrated in the following pages. The abstracted material is drawn from a fictitious surveillance report, the text of which is given in Figure 6.

2. *The Name File.* The clerk has two options in recording information on persons to be abstracted from a report. The first is to check the existing files to see if there is already a card on the person to be entered. The other approach would be for the clerk to type information on the card without checking the files. The approach suggested here is the latter. It is easier for the clerk to stay at the desk, type up a name card, and later, when all the work for the morning is caught up, to file them in the Name File.

The suggested approach means that, each time there is a report on the person, information will be recorded on a new card (provided the decision is made to abstract his name). One problem with this approach is that the total information on the person may be spread over several cards. On the other hand, because of the date on the card, the most current information can be readily determined. What is further suggested is that when a criminal has accumulated several cards in the Name File, he may be the subject for a Biographic File.

FIGURE 6

FICTITIOUS SURVEILLANCE REPORT	
Accession Number:	580
Evaluation:	11
Sensitivity	2
Reporting Officers: Smith and Jones, CID	
Surveillance of George Russell, Suspected Bank Robber	
1. On July 22, 1978 at 2030 hours reporting officers took up position outside subejct's house - 2834 E 28th St.	
2. At 2200 hours subject left house driving away in a 1976 Black Mercury, license number 345-268. He drove to the corner of 8th St. and Penrose Ave. where he stopped at 2215 to pick up two persons. One was a caucasian male identified as Mike Conners, known bookmaker and loan shark, the other person was an unidentified caucasian female, about 30 years old. Female seemed to be associated with Conners.	
3. Three persons in car drove to Tony's, a bar and grill at the corner of 10th St. and Euclid Ave. (3824 Euclid Ave.), parked in the adjacent lot, and went into the bar at 2245.	
4. Reporting officer Jones went into bar and observed that the three persons entering joined three other persons at a table, apparently having been expected. The three new persons were: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- A young blonde female, age about 25</li><li>- Jose Perez, a known major gambler</li><li>- Judith Pearson, wife of Ronald Pearson, a major fence now serving a 2-10 year sentence.</li></ul>	
5. The group of six appeared to be engaged in serious discussion with Russell and Conners doing much of the talking. Several pieces of paper were handed around. This part of the meeting ended at 2330 and another round of drinks was ordered.	
6. At 2400, Conners and the female that came with him, and Perez and Pearson left together and drove away in Perez's car, (a 1977 green two-door Oldsmobile, license number 384-123). At 2430 hours, Russell and the unidentified blonde left in his car. They drove to and parked in front of the Bellair Apartments, 3840 Melrose Avenue, at 2450. Both went in, apparently to apartment 301 because of the lights coming on. On mail box Joan Peters listed for Apt. 301.	
7. Reporting officers ended surveillance at 0230 hours, July 23, when lack of activity indicated that Russell would probably stay in the apartment for the night.	

Once a Biographic File is opened on a criminal, the formats can be kept in loose-leaf binders on or adjacent to the clerk's desk. A name can be easily checked, and the clerk will probably come to remember the major criminals accepted into the Biographic File. As a reminder, however, a card should be left in the Name File stating that a biography has been opened.

The recommended format for the Name File is given in Figure 7. It is suggested to use a 3 x 5 card to minimize the size of the file. This will be the file with the most entries, since names will be added when no other information is taken from a report. It also gives adequate space for the information believed to be essential to this file.

It is also suggested that a *different color* of card be used for each year. Many departments are now doing this and they find that it is easy to review the cards at purge time, to determine what names, if any, are no longer relevant or of value.

a. *Information Items On The Name File.* Reasons for having the following items of information on the Name File card are explained below.

- The *date of birth* (DOB), *identification numbers* or *Social Security* number, and *aliases* will assist in determining which person is being referred to when there are several with the same name (or approximately the same name because of the confusion that may exist in spelling).
- The *address* and *telephone numbers*, while important as means of identification, are useful to assist investigators when developing a surveillance plan of the subject.
- The type *criminal activity*, indicated by a numerical code (discussed below in the section on Criminal Activity File), establishes a link between the subject and the one or more Criminal Activity Files.
- Membership in a *group or gang* is important because it gives another potential source of information about a criminal not believed important enough for the establishment of a Biographic File. The name of the group or gang will be a referral to the Group/Gang File.
- *The date of an event* recorded on the Base Report is helpful in responding to an inquiry. It can aid the investigator who is asking for assistance to determine whether an event on the particular date is relevant to his search.
- The *accession number* establishes a link between the Name File and the Basic Report File, and permits the retrieval of the required report.

b. *Example Name File.* (Figure 7) Of the persons reported in the surveillance report, only Joan Peters had to be entered in the Name File. Mike Conners, Jose Perez, and Judith Pearson had Biographic Files already opened. The CID commander had indicated that George Russell, though a new-comer to town, was to have a Biographic File opened. A sensitive, reliable source had indicated that Russell was coming into town and that he was a suspected bank robber.

The points of importance being exemplified in the example (Figure 7) are as follows:

FIGURE 7

EXAMPLE: NAME FILE

Name Peters Joan Aliases \_\_\_\_\_  
(last) (first) (middle)

DOB \_\_\_\_\_ Identification \_\_\_\_\_  
Numbers SS \_\_\_\_\_  
Others \_\_\_\_\_

Criminal Activity (s) 0346/1313/1915

Group/Gang A - Football Group

Date of event 072278

Accession Number 58

(front)

Address Apt. 301, 3840 Melrose Ave.

Telephone number \_\_\_\_\_

(back)

- *Three criminal activities are indicated.* This is due to the known criminal activities of the major criminals at the meeting — bank robbery, fencing, and gambling. The code used to indicate type of crime can be whatever the CIIC (or the department) desires. The numbers shown in the example are taken from the UCR code, but have had other figures added to give greater definitiveness.

- 0346 This comes directly from the UCR. The definition of 03 is Robbery and Attempts; 034 Robbery and Attempts, Strong Arm; and 0346 Robbery and Attempts, Strong Arm, Bank/Saving Loan/Credit Union.

- 1313 The UCR code to Stolen Property is 13. A double digit has been added to mean fencing.

- 1915 This combines 19, the UCR code for gambling, with a double digit to indicate football bookmaking.

The CIIC can work out its own coding for the criminal activities on which it focuses its efforts. These obviously should be recorded so that the information can be passed on to replacement personnel.

- The clerk, after working on updating the Perez Biographic File, discovered that he was carried as a *member* of a group, named by the police as the Football Group. Since Peters appeared to be a close member of the dinner group, it was decided to label Peters, as well as all other participants at the dinner, as associate members of the Football Group. This is indicated by the "A - Football Group". If Peters had been considered a member, it would have been recorded as "M - Football Group".
- The *Accession Number* is shown as having only two-digits. It is suggested that to save typing, the zeros often used to round out a number to a given number of digits not be included. An example of this use of zeros to round out to six digits would be: 000058.

3. *The Biographic File.* The Biographic File is maintained only on those criminals considered to be major and/or career. They are the ones who may go to prison for a short stay but on release they return to their old haunts and criminal activities. Therefore, the file containing past activities, associations, etc. are of continuing value. Depending on work load, the CIIC may decide to open Biographic Files only on criminals involved in the criminal activities which are on the priority list. However, once a Biographic File is opened, it probably should be maintained even though the criminal activity is dropped from the priority list.

a. *The Make-up of The Biographic File.* The Biographic File is made up of two forms, a Biographic Data form and a Biographic Data Update form. The items of information to be recorded on the Biographic Data form should be decided by the CIIC. But once the form has been structured, it should be printed (or at least reproduced in quantity). This reduces the typing requirements and insures that the same data is to be sought on all criminals accorded the honor of being considered "major or career". It is also recommended that once the Biographic File is initiated, the Biographic Data form be kept current. When new items of information are reported that will cause a change on the form, it should be accomplished by whiting-out the old information and overtyping with the new information. In this manner the data on the Biographic Data form is always current and requests for a copy can be met without any research effort.

The Biographic Data Update form is used to record and give three types of information:

- The sources of the initial material entered into the Biographic Data
- The source of changes in the initial data that was recorded on the Biographic Data form. A record is made, on this update form, of which item is changed and what the old item was. The latter can often be important, for example the name of an old associate, an address, a car, etc.
- Information of the current activities in which the person is reported to be engaged are added as they occur.

The two forms making up the Biographic File should be kept together. The Biographic Files should be kept in a loose-leaf folder with the Files arranged alphabetically. This arrangement allows for loose-leaf folders to be kept on the clerk and/or analyst's desks for ready reference. They can respond to telephone requests without a file search. When an arrest record ("rap sheet") is available it should also be kept with the other two forms.

b. *Example Biographic File.* Of the persons in the Fictitious Surveillance Report, three had pre-existing Biographic Files and a Biographic File was to be opened on the fourth major criminal. For purposes of exemplifying the forms, only one, that of Jose Perez is presented. (See Figures 8 and 9).

The points of importance being exemplified in the example of the Biographic Data form are listed below.

- The old and new associates are listed in space (11) *Associates* without any indication of closeness of the relationship. These can be calculated, based on observed activities engaged in by pairs or groups of the associates. The techniques are discussed in Chapter V, Output.
- If there was a decision to increase the information concerning Perez, more data would be gathered about his girl friend since she might be involved in his criminal activities. This and other material could be added in the space marked (15) *Other Information*.

The points of importance being exemplified in the example of the Biographic Data Update form are listed below.

- Item from Accession number report 450 demonstrates how a change in item (9) Employment on the Biographic Data Form was made, with the old item being retained on the Update form.
- Accession Number 45 demonstrates how information on activities of the subject can (and should) be recorded. Thus, in this case for some period after 030677 the supposition could be that Perez was in a Federal Penitentiary.
- Item from Accession Number 580 report gives an example of the type of information that can be abstracted. There is enough information on the Update form to show the events and names of people involved; and also show where changes were made on Biographic Data (10) Activity and (11) Associates.

7 7 7 7 7

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FIGURE 9

BIOGRAPHIC FILE - BIOGRAPHIC DATA UPDATE FORM					Perez, Jose (name)
Accession Number/ Base Reports	Date/ Event	Data Item	Original/ Change O or C	Eval./ Sensi- tivity	Abstracted Item of Information
367	093076	1 thru 12	O		Initial material from report made at time subject questioned regarding Morris Henderson's homicide.
450	112576	9	C		Informant told of change in subject's occupation. Former occupation: Manager M & M Bar.
45	030677				Arrested and convicted by FBI on gambling charge. Sentenced one to five years.
275	040178			22/1	Word from Las Vegas that Watson and Perez opn growing.
410	060378				FBI opened major investigation "Football Group"
580	072278	10 11	C C	11/2	Subject observed in meeting with Judith Pearson, suspected fence; Mike Conners, known bookmaker and loanshark; George Russell, suspected bank robber; and Joan Peters, criminal activity unknown. Appeared to be a business meeting.  Loan sharking, bank robbery and fencing added to ciminal activities. Four persons added as associates.

4. *The Criminal Activities File.* From the point of view of the analytic function, the Criminal Activities File is very important. It provides a uniquely effective and efficient method by which a specific criminal activity can be studied as it occurs throughout the jurisdiction. Related items of information are organized so that their association is readily apparent.

The Criminal Activities File contains the names of known and suspected criminals in the jurisdiction that are involved in a specific criminal activity. It has data that can be aggregated by a single location (house, bar, store, etc.), or a sub-area of the jurisdiction. Its data can be aggregated by time period, by time period in a sub-area, by criminals in a sub-area, etc. The CIIC can also readily respond to a telephone inquiry about the participation of one person or a group in the criminal activity.

The only real limitation on the effectiveness of this approach is in the information flow. In the end, no matter how efficient and effective the technique of collation and analysis are, they cannot make-up for a short-fall in information.

a. *Information Categories in the Criminal Activities File.* The CIIC should use great initiative in developing Criminal Activities File formats. It will aid in displaying effectively associated items of information. The individual formats should be adapted to reflect important elements of specific criminal activities (See Figure 10). For example, if a CIIC were following "breaking and entering" as one of its priority activities, it would be useful to have separate information categories: modes of operation (MO), types of goods stolen, narrowly defined area of occurrences, etc. On the other hand, if the activity were "fencing" the categories might include: broadly defined sub-areas, location of the fencing operation, and methods of operation (but, as discussed below, with a different coding from that used in "breaking and entering").

The concept behind this suggested approach is that the result will be an easily reviewed column of associated items of information. For example, in the case of the MO category, the analyst could quickly look down the column seeking events with the same or similar code numbers. The same would hold true for the "area" category.

Regardless of the type of criminal activity, it is suggested that the following information categories always be included:

- Accession number,
- Date of event,
- Code giving evaluation and sensitivity of the information,
- Names of known or suspected criminals given in Base Report, and
- Abstracted items of information, other than those included in other categories.

b. *Discussion of the Information Categories on the Criminal Activities File Format.* The following discussion will use the examples of categories given in the several sample formats given in Figure 10.

1. *Accession number.* This will be the number assigned to the Base Report at the time of its review. It provides the means to recover the Base Report if additional information is sought.

FIGURE 10

SAMPLE INFORMATION CATEGORIES FOR SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES FILE FORMATS							
CRIMINAL CATEGORY: <u>Fencing</u> CODE NUMBER: <u>1313</u>							
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sen.	Area	Location	MO	Names Known/Suspected Criminals	Abstracted Information
CRIMINAL CATEGORY: <u>Breaking &amp; Entering</u> CODE NUMBER: <u>05</u>							
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sen.	Area	Type Property	MO	Names Known/Suspected Criminals	Abstracted Information
CRIMINAL CATEGORY: <u>Public Corruption</u> CODE NUMBER: <u>2750</u>							
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sen.	Organization/Agency		MO	Names Known/Suspected Criminals	Abstracted Information
CRIMINAL CATEGORY: <u>Fraud – Land</u> CODE NUMBER: <u>1120</u>							
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sen.	Names Known/Suspected Criminals		Abstracted Information		

2. *Date.* This will record the date of the event being reported in the Base Report. If no event date is given, then the analyst/clerk should assign an approximate date.

3. *Evaluation/Sensitivity.* This will be a coded entry reflecting the evaluation of the reliability of the source and of the validity of the information. (See Figure 4).

Another coded entry will tell future users of the file the degree of sensitivity attached to the report. (See Figure 5).

4. *Area.* For many purposes, the department's division of responsibility into districts or precincts would be sufficient. But for a criminal activity such as "breaking and entering" a more precise location of the individual crimes would be useful. It is suggested that the jurisdiction be divided into sub-areas, and that these be represented by a code.

The CIIC should develop area codes as the need develops. Their specific nature will, as discussed above, depend on what categories of information are most useful.

5. *Mode of Operation.* As suggested here, some criminal activities require the development of a code whereby the major components of modes of operation can readily be displayed. The department may already have such codes developed for specified crimes. What is important is that for crimes where MO is an important indicator of who might be committing the crimes, there should be a relatively quick way to aggregate crimes or persons with similar MO's.

6. *Organization/Agency.* What is suggested here is the format to be used when the CIIC is collecting items of information from various sources, hinting at possible public corruption.

The category of Organization/Agency would permit a quick review to determine if there were sufficient data developing about a specific agency to turn the matter over to enforcement investigators. Or it might be useful at this point to open a separate Criminal Activity File on the Organization to allow a closer association of the flow of information about public corruption in that specific agency.

7. *Names Known/Suspected Criminals.* It is very useful to have such names listed in a separate information category. After quickly scanning the category it reveals names associated with the specific criminal activity. This would be most efficient if the query had to do with a series of names. Otherwise, name cards on the whole series of names would have to be reviewed.

This Name Known/Suspected Criminal information category in the Criminal Activity File would be helpful also when the investigator is looking for suspects operating in the activity but whose names he does not have.

8. *Abstracted Information.* This information category should be used to record important items of information that were not put into any of the separate categories. These could include: source of the information, activity being reported, a specific address, etc. It should also be the place where the clerk/analyst briefly records any ideas suggested to him by the report. For example, that it was similar to another event, that the group involved had also been reported in another criminal activity, that the event seemed to indicate a change, etc.

FIGURE 11

EXAMPLE – CRIMINAL CATEGORY: Gambling – Football					CODE NUMBER: 1915
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sens.	Location	Name Known/Suspected Criminal	Abstracted Information
130	031278	22/1	Las Vegas	Palacio, Ken Marks, William	Informant stated subject new bookie believed associated with Marks opn.
275	040178	22/1		Watson, Harold Perez, Jose	Informant saw Watson in big game in Vegas. Word was that Watson and Perez opn now growing larger.
305	051078	11/3	Carriage House 3710 Euclid Ave.	O'Rourke, Pat Brown, Alexander	Investigator saw two gamblers and county supervisor John Williams having dinner together. Appeared very friendly. <i>Note:</i> Williams went to school with O'Rourke according to Inv. Jones.
410	060378	11/2	Tony's 3824 Euclid Ave.	FBI opened major investigation of Football Group	
580	072278			Conners, Mike Pearson, Judith Perez, Jose Peters, Joan Russell, George	Subjects observed at what appeared to be a business dinner meeting. One unidentified blonde female also present. Appeared to be a friend of Conners. No indication of subject of the meeting.


c. *Sub-Categories of Criminal Activity.* The use of the Criminal Activities File should be flexible. It should be designed in a way that is most helpful to the CIIC in its performance of its tasks. In particular, it should reflect the flow of information. The criminal category under which items of information are gathered should be general if the incoming information is not specific. If, for example, there were an increased inflow of information regarding the fencing of hi-fi equipment, there would be a second Criminal Activity File on Fencing opened. This one would be titled: Criminal Category: Fencing – Hi-Fi Equipment. The general file should be continued but with a notation made after the appropriate entry that information on fencing hi-fi equipment would be found in the more specific file. When the information begins to indicate the potential of a case, copies of the File and Base Reports would be turned over to the CID for enforcement action. Additional information received could still be filed in the sub-category of Fencing – Hi-Fi, and the additional information turned over to the CID personnel working the case.

d. *Example Criminal Activities File.* It is assumed that Gambling-Football is one of the CIIC priority targets. Figure 11 exemplifies one of what would be many pages in a Criminal Activity File on this activity. Betting on pro-football games is perhaps the largest single gambling activity nation-wide. There are relatively few jurisdictions that do not have bookmakers handling bets placed by criminals and the normally "law-abiding" citizen alike.

While not displayed, it was assumed that "fencing", the activity of Judith Pearson, was also a priority target. A Criminal Activities File on Fencing was in existence. The information abstracted from the report Accession Number 580 for the Gambling-Football File (see Figure 11) would be reported almost identically in the Fencing File. In keeping with the format for "fencing" suggested in Figure 10, there would be two additional information categories, "area" and "MO". However, the report Accession Number 580 did not contain any items for these two categories.

The Criminal Activity of Gambling-Football is selected as an example because of the many interrelations that usually exist between the bookmaker and other criminal activities. Though many jurisdictions do not place a high priority on enforcement action against gambling, most have great interest in the other activities of the bookie and his associates. Figure 12 illustrates such related activities as they exist today in many jurisdictions.

FIGURE 12



The series of fictitious entries on the Criminal Activities File, Gambling-Football, as presented in Figure 11, are designed to show that the information items are filed one after another regardless of source. In actuality, there would probably have been many more items that are depicted here. It is usually a subject about which there are many reports. There are enough entries to exemplify the major points about the Criminal Activities File which are important to note.

- *A running account.* Files, that combine abstracted items of information and groups them by relevant criminal activities, establish what in fact is a continuing record of these activities. The items are associated by the activity regardless of the information source.
- *Information categories.* It is suggested that, for the football gambling criminal activity, the only special information category might be "location". This would apply to the establishment in which bookmaking is carried out, where the subject and their associates meet, and as noted in the example (Figure 11) an area of significance to the activity.
- *Evaluation/Sensitivity.* Each item in the Eval/Sen. column in Figure 11 is coded. In the two cases where informants were the source, they and their material are recorded as "22" (persons believed to be reliable/information probably valid). The reports by police officers who observed the event are recorded as "11" (police officer or person of known reliability/event observed). The important point demonstrated by the sensitivity coding is the value of protecting information that is sensitive by limiting its distribution. In Accession Number 305, the "3" sensitivity (no dissemination outside CIIC without supervisor approval) was given to protect the county supervisor (see Figure 5). Further checking would be required to determine what implications, if any, are to be associated with the apparent relationship.
- *CIIC Notes in Abstracted Information Category.* Accession Number 305 also demonstrates how a clerk or analyst can use the Abstracted Information category to record immediate reactions, thoughts, etc. It provides an easy way to retain these ideas, which may become important in subsequent reviews and analyses of the material.
- *Indicator of Case Opening.* Accession Number 410 demonstrates how the CIIC might indicate, right in the activity file, that a case has been opened on a specific person or group. This will guide the future accession of items referring to the subjects that are the target of the case. Information in Accession Number 580 was abstracted even though Perez is the subject of a major investigation. The fact that he was at the dinner with such an assortment of other criminals could be very significant.

5. *Group/Gang File.* The Group/Gang File is an excellent approach to keeping organized and current information on criminal groupings. Groups of criminals other than those of Italian heritage and related to La Cosa Nostra (LCN) also should be considered as major antagonists of society. Even though not highly structured, the members of a gang enhance their individual capability by exchanging information on targets for criminal action and providing such assistance as cars, hideouts, supporting services and partners in the action.

The Group/Gang File consists of two forms as does the Biographic File already discussed. One form is the Group/Gang Data Form, the other is the Group/Gang Data Update Form.

The Group/Gang Data Form (See Figure 13) provides an easy means for keeping current the membership and associate members of the group or gang, the types of criminal activities in which



FIGURE 13

EXAMPLE OF GROUP/GANG DATA FORM		
GROUP/GANG: _____		
1. Names of known or suspected members:		
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
2. Names of known or suspected associate members:		
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
3. Known/suspected criminal activities of gang/group:		
_____		
4. Location(s) where gang gather: _____		
_____		
5. Normal area of activity: _____		

they are engaged, their hang-out or gathering places, and their normal areas of activity (if they have some). The suggestion is that these items of information be kept current in the same manner as described for the Biographic File. The clerk would white-out the old information and overtype it with the new information.

The Group/Gang Data Update Form (see Figure 14) is a format on which to record items of information reported about the collective activities of the group. Information on the individual members activities would be recorded in their Name File, Biographic File or the Criminal Activity File.

The Update Form is also designed to record old items that were changed on the Group/Gang Data Forms. The information categories on the Update Form are, for the most part, the same as discussed for the other files. But, as in the case of the Abstract of Information category on the Biographic Data Update Form, the following types of items of information should be recorded:

- the old information on the Group/Gang Data Form that is replaced by the new,
- the circumstances surrounding the change if given in the Base Report, and
- activities of the gang even though they cause no change in the items on the Group/Gang Data Form.

A third form could be developed and kept with these two that make up the Group/Gang File. This would be a Link Diagram displaying the degree of closeness among the members of the group or gang. The method for developing the Link Diagram is given in Chapter V.

6. *Location File.* Another file that appears useful is one that focuses all available information on a particular location. A location can be a home of a criminal or suspect, a bar or restaurant that has a significant clientel that is associated with the criminal activities in the jurisdiction, or any other specific location where criminals or the associates appear to congregate.

The value of this focus of items of information is in the fact that it can indicate relationships beyond a single criminal activity. After all, the criminals do not organize their lives according to the categories suggested in the UCR or by the political jurisdictions of police departments.

As a practical matter, it also gives the department a target for surveillances and, if permitted, wire taps and "bugs". It is in these establishments (locations) that the criminals discuss and plan their criminal actions. As indicated below in Figure 15, this approach simply suggests that items of information concerning the observation of known or suspected criminals in a selected location be recorded in this file. It makes the task of probing for potential relationships easier. The CIIC can look down the column for relevant names, the abstracts can be reviewed seeking information that suggests criminal associations.

## H. PURGING

As a result of events of the past several years, there is a general view that out of date information in police files should be purged. This applies to data that is not in enforcement case files. It is suggested that this information should be reviewed regularly. Names and data that are determined to be out of date, or irrelevant for whatever reason, should be purged from the files.

FIGURE 14

EXAMPLE OF GROUP/GANG DATA UPDATE FORM					
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sens.	Original/Change Information	Item Number	Abstract of Information

FIGURE 15

EXAMPLE OF THE LOCATION FILE				
LOCATION: _____ Address: _____		OWNER OF LOCATION: _____ Apparent activity at location: _____		
Accession Number	Date/Event	Eval./Sens.	Names of Known/Suspected Criminals and Associates Observed/Reported at the Location	Abstracted Information

Each CIIC must develop its own guidelines to put this concept into practice. The approach to file structure proposed in this manual eases the review problem. The Name File cards have a different color for each year. The data items in all other Files have both a reference to the Base Report and to the date of event. Any material on the file formats to be purged can literally be cut out, the format put back together with scotch tape, reproduced, and used without any other problem.

The Base Report to be purged can easily be withdrawn from its file since the reports are not affixed in the folders and are filed largely by date. Removal can be done easily because Base Reports are filed in a common file without regard to source or subject. Base Reports that are in the CID files can be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to case files.

## I. COMPUTERIZATION

Many departments are advancing toward computerization. In most cases, central records have been the first to be put on the computer. Patrol reports, especially traffic violations, have been another area in which computerization has been adopted. The pace has not been as swift with respect to case files of the investigative units and intelligence data. The CIIC, as proposed in this manual, fits somewhere in between the latter two functions.

By computerization, the information in police files can be made more readily available to more officers in the department. The programming and planning staffs of the department can have their data better organized and readily available. By proper programming, the chief's office, for instance, can keep daily account of established measures of evaluation of the activities of the department. But there is a relatively high cost for the equipment and for effective programming to ensure that the system is efficient. It is the programming that determines the ability of the computer to give back the files' information in formats that will aid the users. To be worthwhile, the computer must be more than an electronic case file.

The information files of the CIIC, like all others, could be much more effective and efficient if they are computerized. If computerized, the CIIC, as presented in this manual, should be a part of the computer program of the CID. It will take a relatively long period of time before the flow of information to the CIIC is beyond the capability of its staff to handle. The CIIC's principal short term problem is not computerization, but the development of an adequate flow of information.

Thus, from the point of view of this manual, computerization is the problem of the department and the parent unit of the CIIC. Probably of greater importance to its parent CID commander would be a computer for more efficient handling of case files. The file system presented in this manual has been tested as being computer compatible. The CIIC could be put on the computer more readily than almost any other unit in the department. Probably the best solution, if it were financially possible, would be for the CIIC to be equipped with a micro-computer, one that would be totally under the control of the CIIC. But, as stated above, the need for such a development is of relatively low priority compared to the development of an adequate flow of information.

If the CIIC is to be computerized it must take special steps to protect the security of its files. There must be assurances that no one but the CIIC will have access to their data files. Given the state of computer security, this is difficult in a shared computer.

## CHAPTER V

### CIIC OUTPUT

#### A. INTRODUCTION

The output of the CIIC is the payoff for the investment. The accumulation of information and its analysis must be of assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the department in its enforcement actions. There must be a return for the commitment of one or more persons to this task. It must have a return equal to or greater than what could be obtained by committing the same personnel to another activity in the department.

The output of a CIIC will fall into four categories. Not all CIIC units will be able to produce in all categories. It will depend on the number and capabilities of its personnel.

The first category is the CIIC response to specific questions concerning persons, places and activities. Most often these inquiries will come in and be answered by telephone. The most common request will be from an investigator working a case. He will be seeking any information available on a potential suspect. If he realizes the capabilities of the CIIC, he may ask if it has data on similar crimes, perhaps in the area of his current case. These requests may be answered with specific items of information abstracted and recorded on one of the CIIC file forms.

This first category will be the focus for the initial efforts of most CIIC units as they begin their operation. Much will depend on the effectiveness of the CIIC's response. If it does well and shows how it can help the investigator, he in turn will be more inclined to provide information inputs.

The second type of output will ordinarily not be case associated. It will consist of written reports, based on aggregations of data in the Files. They might concern the activities of a gang, a trend in one of the criminal activities being followed, or the developing importance of a location as a gathering place for known criminals. However, a report can be case oriented. The CIIC, knowing that a certain type case is being worked, can review its Files and put together those items of apparent usefulness. Reports in this category can be requested or they can be self-initiated by the CIIC.

The first two types of output can be accomplished by a CIIC even with a minimum staff of one. The third type, an analytic report, will ordinarily require that the CIIC have at least one analyst. The objective of the analytic report category is to attempt to answer questions posed by a situation or relationship displayed in one of the CIIC Files. This could also be an estimate of what can be expected in a particular criminal activity, the implications of a realignment of associates of a major criminal figure, or the possibilities that a developing situation, which contributed to a new criminal activity in an adjacent jurisdiction, will have the same result in this CIIC area.

The fourth type of output from the CIIC completes the circle, since it is a statement of information requirements that appear necessary if the CIIC is to fulfill its responsibilities (see Figure 1). Such information requirements can result from investigator inquiries in priority criminal activities, and gaps in the files which appear as the CIIC seeks to produce Tactical and Analytic Reports (see below for a discussion of these reports). They can also be derived from missing data in the Biographic File of a major criminal, or that regarding membership of an important criminal group.

The dissemination of the CIIC outputs is a matter for department policy. The recipients should be law enforcement officials, unless there are specific guidelines stating the types of data and the conditions under which other than law enforcement officials can have access to the output of the CIIC.

B. CIIC RESPONSE TO INVESTIGATOR'S REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INFORMATION

The ability of the CIIC to respond successfully to investigators' inquiries rests basically on the scope and nature of the information inflow. If it has the item of information, the structure of its Files insures that the search can be efficient. Moreover, associated material that can be useful is available in the same search.

For example, if an investigator calls to see if the CIIC has any information about a named person (suspect or just exploring the possibilities), the search procedure might be as follows:

- Check *Name File*. If the person's name was recorded, this would be the beginning. If not, this would be the basis for a negative report.
- Check *Biographic File*. This would be done if there had been a card in the Name File stating that the subject was in the Biographic File.
- If the subject was recorded in either file, the next step would be to check the *Criminal Activities File* appropriate to the criminal activities in which the subject was involved as indicated on the Name File or the Biographic File. This would apply only if the appropriate criminal activities were on the the CIIC priority list and were being maintained.
- If the subject was recorded in either Name or Biographic File and there was a reference to his membership in a group or gang, then the *Group/Gang File* should be checked.
- Any other special file being maintained by the CIIC could also be checked. For the system to be efficient there should be a space on the Name or Biographic File on which a reference to the special file could be placed.

The search and the initial response would take only a few minutes since all Files except the Name File would be in loose-leaf binders adjacent to the clerk and/or analyst's desks. The location of the Name File should be within easy access of the clerk and/or analyst. (NOTE: If binders are used, care should be taken to ensure that they are locked in cabinets when the office is closed.)

The CIIC recipient of the call should keep a record of which investigator called and what information he requested (i.e., concerning a specific person, subject, or place.) The CIIC guidelines should require its personnel to automatically refer any subsequent information to the inquiring investigator. To systematize this matter, it is suggested that there be a CIIC form, *Request For Information*, available on each staff member's desk (see Figure 16). This captures the subject matter requested by the CIIC members. It also provides a record of the number of calls being made to the CIIC and the rate of its positive assistance. Such a record is very useful at budget time, especially if it shows heavy usage of the Files and a high rate of response by the CIIC.

Finally, the record of calls provides the CIIC with information on types of crimes that are of importance to the investigators. This could become a basis for opening a new Criminal Activities File, or a specialized file that would better aggregate the types of information some of the investigators were requesting.

1. *Example of Response From Name File*. The following are samples of items of information with which the CIIC might respond, using only the Name File (the actual response would depend on the extent of information available):

FIGURE 16

REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FORM					
Subject of Request – name of person (last name first) – place – activity – etc.	Name/Unit of Requestor	Date of Request	Response		
			Available Information Given	No Data	Follow- up

- A *date of birth* and/or *ID number* that would give assurance the name (and its spelling) was correct.
- An *alias* that is new, at least to the investigator asking for assistance.
- An *address* that could become the target of a surveillance.
- The name of a *group or gang* in which the subject reportedly is a member or an associate member. This is also the reference pointing to the Group/Gang File.
- The reported *criminal activities* in which the subject engages. Where there is more than one



listed, it can be a lead to the investigator to pursue his enquiries of the unit handling such cases. This is also the reference pointing to the Criminal Activities File, provided it is one of the CIIC's priority targets where there would be additional information available.

- The *Accession Number* is the reference to the Base Report File. Ordinarily the Base Report would not be referred to since all important elements of information would be abstracted. However, if the subject is involved in a criminal activity not in the CIIC Criminal Activity File, the Base Report probably should be reviewed.
- Should the investigator not be sure of the spelling of the name or be in doubt about the given name, the Name File can be used to produce a list of similar sounding names, or if correctly spelled, of all the same family names but with different given names.
- Where a Biographic File exists, there will be a *reference* card in the Name File.

2. *Example of Response Using the Biographic File.* The CIIC's response will be substantially greater if the subject is considered of sufficient importance to be worthy of a Biographic File. Examples of potential responses from a Biographic File are as follows:

- The identity of the suspect can clearly be established not only by *birth date, address, and ID numbers*, but also by a *physical description* and a *picture*. The picture, especially if it is not a "mug" shot but taken under natural conditions, can be of great value to the investigator. Duplicates of the picture can be circulated to help gain further information.
- Information on the subject's auto, including the *tag numbers* and *make*, can also be of great assistance. They give a target for search and surveillance.
- Probably of most importance will be information on the subject's *criminal activities*, associates, and membership or association with one or more *criminal groups*. Often this can be the data an investigator is lacking as he starts on a case with a little known suspect. These become pointers to other CIIC Files and to other sources for the investigator to tap.
- The place and address of *nominal employment* suggests a potential source of information, or at least a location to be placed under observation. It may also suggest a connection between the company and/or some of its employees, and the criminal activities of the suspect.
- The names of the members of the *family* can be important as targets for questioning and surveillance.
- The *Biographic Data Update Form* can be a major source of information for the investigator. It would tell him of past changes in information about the person, and it would be a record of all data reported to the CIIC on the suspect's activities.

It is suggested that when the subject of a query has a Biographic File, the most efficient way to pass on the information would be to make a copy of the Biographic Data Form and the Biographic Data Update Form. In so doing, the CIIC must be sure to "white-out" any material classified as sensitive. (NOTE: State laws and court decisions regarding discovery actions should be reviewed to ensure that this approach would not have a harmful impact on the integrity of CIIC files.)

3. *Example of Response Based on Criminal Activities File.* This should be the most important source file of the CIIC. It probably will be unique both in focus and data content. If the CIIC system is working well, the CIIC file on a priority criminal activity should be the best source in the department. It should have items of information regarding the criminal activity where ever it is occurring in the jurisdiction.

Several important items of information can be taken from the Criminal Activities File. Examples of these are as follows:

- From the point of view of an investigator working a case, the single most important information item that the CIIC can give him or her from its Criminal Activities File is the *name of known or suspected* criminals or *criminal groupings* reported to be active in the subject area of criminal activity. This could give leads to a suspect, or to a series of persons to be investigated because of their apparent involvement. These names are also references to other Files: Name, Biographic, Group/Gang, and other Criminal Activity Files.
- Perhaps of equal importance is information on areas of action, either by specific *location* or *geographic area*. If the case involves a group with widespread action, such as a motorcycle gang, the information on location and area of operation in the Criminal Activity File is important. If this information is lacking, the investigator is now given targets for surveilling in which to seek leads on the suspects. The location area category is also a pointer to the Location File in which there may be additional data on the subject under consideration.
- The abstracts of information on all *reported actions* of interest, as included in the Criminal Activity File, are very useful. The investigator may get leads based on data on other crimes that he is investigating. This is specifically true if the *mode of operation* (MO) is an important indicator of a similarity between crimes. The investigator can be given a list of other crimes in which the same MO is used.
- The *date of event* can be a reference point for the investigator. He may find useful all reported activity on or about a specific date.

4. *Example of Response Based on the Group/Gang File.* This File is focused on a relatively narrow subject. It covers the names of persons associated together in a manner that is distinct enough to cause investigators to label them as a criminal group or gang. If the group has no name of its own, the CIIC will need to give them one for ease of reference.

The CIIC personnel would come to this File if the subject's Name or Biographic File indicates that he is associated with a named criminal grouping. They would also come to the File if the investigator has the name of a group. Or they can search for a criminal group reportedly involved in a type of criminal activity and/or operating in a particular area.

Examples of data to be given an investigator from the Group/Gang File are:

- The *names* of current members and associates (known or suspected) of a criminal grouping. This can lead back to a review of each person's Name and/or Biographic File.
- The known *hang-outs* of members of a group. This could provide a pointer to the Location File where members of a group might reportedly be associated with other criminals. This

can give the investigator a lead to a new group or to another criminal activity, with which his suspect may be involved.

- The known or suspected *area of operations* of the subject group. This can help the investigator in his effort to decide whether the group might be involved in the crime being investigated.
- The categories of *criminal activities* in which reports indicate the members of the group, collectively and/or individually, are involved. These are references to the Criminal Activities File, from which the CIIC can extract information of the nature discussed above.

The above examples point out very clearly the capabilities that a CIIC can develop. From the name of a criminal group or gang given by an investigator to be checked, the CIIC can produce a list of suspected members and their hang-outs, areas of operations, and criminal activities in which they reportedly engage. After reviewing these items, the investigator can go on to the Name, Biographic, Criminal Activities, and Location Files to see if there is information of use. All of this, as reemphasized in this manual, is dependent on a flow of information to the CIIC.

5. *Example of Response Based on the Location File.* This File is an example of whatever specialized file a CIIC wishes to have. Such a file is opened whenever the CIIC determines that there appears to be a need for it. There may not be adequate information to support it in the beginning, but CIIC will assume that it can develop an adequate flow of information from the appropriate units of the department.

In the case of the Location File, the CIIC can use it to furnish the following type of information:

- A list of known or suspected criminals who have been observed or reported in this location. This can be very important since it can suggest new associations and changes in old associations. It can also suggest new members to be added to the lists because of their close familiarity with known or suspected criminals.
- A category of several types of *criminal activities* in which the known and suspected criminals are engaged and reportedly seen at this location.
- A statement of the *ownership* of the location may be suggestive to the investigator as he relates this item of information to others of which he is aware.

### C. CIIC TACTICAL REPORTS

A CIIC, even with a minimum personnel of one, will have the capability to provide more detailed and comprehensive reporting than what was included in the immediate response to the investigator's inquiries. It can aggregate data from its Files to show trends in selected criminal activities, shifts in areas of such activities, relationships among major criminals and changes therein, interconnections between criminal activities, etc.

To give this type of response a name, it is suggested that it be called *CIIC Tactical Reports*. The subject matter of these reports would come directly from the Files. They would present data that was added, focused, or listed. The reports would not be analytical and they would not have CIIC judgments. But they would present items of data as the File system caused them to be associated. The Tactical Report is a critical activity for the CIIC. It is the first step toward a product that is more than what would result from the traditional name check of files.

The Tactical Report is designed as a written document. It is produced in response to a request from the CID commander (or from the Chief) or an investigator in charge of a major case. It can also be initiated by the personnel of the CIIC. The CIIC might note a development of interest and seek to share it with the department through a Tactical Report. The fact that it is given a name should not cause CIIC personnel to believe it has to be lengthy. Most material that is supportive of the substance of a Tactical Report can be aggregated in the form of a list, i.e., of names or locations. It may be aggregated numerically, i.e., so many incidents of a selected criminal activity in a sub-area of the jurisdiction between two dates. Or the material may be summarized in a sentence or two, i.e., the fact that a shift in activities of a career criminal had caused him to develop a new group of associates.

Examples of the substance of Tactical Reports are:

- A list of criminal acts of a selected criminal activity that have the same mode of operation.
- A list of persons reported to be involved in a selected criminal activity.
- A list by sub-areas of a selected criminal activity.
- A change in the composition of a group or gang.
- Names of important/career criminals who are involved in more than one criminal activity.
- New geographic area of focus in a criminal activity.
- A list of new faces, criminals or suspected criminals, reported at or seen in a specific known gathering place of criminals.
- New criminal activities of important/career criminals.
- A change in the associates of a career criminal.
- A change in the activities reported for a group or gang.

The above examples demonstrate that a CIIC can aggregate information from its Files and produce a Tactical Report. For many departments a report such as those suggested above would be unique. It would give investigative units a "look across" a specific criminal activity or a criminal activity in a particular sub-area. At present the unit "knows" of a criminal activity because of complaints and subsequent cases. The individual investigators may carry in their minds a concept of criminal activity in their jurisdiction, but it is not available to any other person unless a specific question is asked. The Tactical Report would put some of this mind-stored material on paper where it could help all members of the unit (or department). It would contribute to their understanding of the environment of crime in the jurisdiction, in terms of specific criminal activities and names of criminals or suspects reportedly involved.

A single person CIIC can produce Tactical Reports because of the structure of the Files. The information received is abstracted according to the unit's guidelines with like items being associated in the Files. The act of producing a Tactical Report is a simple review of the subject File and an aggregation of items of information in the File.

#### D. CIIC ANALYTIC REPORTS

This type of report would be unique in most departments. It would attempt to explain a new development where information is sparse. It would try to estimate the future trend in a specific type of criminal activity. It would point out the type of information required if an estimated view is to be confirmed or disproved. It would be providing the department with a method to "get ahead" of the criminals in its jurisdiction.

1. *Examples of the Subjects of Analytic Reports.* Suggested subjects of Analytic Reports are as follows:

- An estimate of the meaning of a shift in a criminal group's sub-area of operation. Does it indicate a different type of criminal activity? Does the group have new members? Are there especially lucrative targets of the group's criminal activity in the new sub-area?
- What will be the activities of a gang leader soon to be released from prison? Will he be able to resume his role as leader of the gang? Is an intra-gang conflict possible? Will the relationship with other gangs, developed during the absence of the leader, lead to inter-gang conflict? Will the gang change its focus of criminal activities?
- What is the possibility of a new criminal activity developing, one that has appeared in a neighboring jurisdiction? What conditions are most conducive to such a development? Do some or all of the conditions now exist? What existing criminal grouping might be involved?
- What is the meaning of a meeting of two important criminals, each engaged primarily in a different criminal activity? Who are their associates? Do the areas of the operations of the principals suggest conflict or a basis for their joining together?
- What future developments are expected in a selected criminal activity?
- What are the implications of an apparent change in the mode of operations being seen in a criminal activity?
- What are the implications of a company going out of business, one in which a major criminal is nominally employed? Is he about to shift to another company? Is an illegal act involved?
- What are the implications of crimes being committed that are similar in operation to those of a current case where the prime suspect has been jailed?

This type of report could not be done by a one person CIIC. The only exception might be where that person is an analyst and does the clerical work as well. However, this would probably leave little time for thinking about the importance of the items of information being abstracted and recorded in the Files.

The production of Analytic Reports calls for the CIIC analyst to employ certain methodologies and techniques as he (or she) summarizes, compares, and explains the data which is the focus of analysis. These could include:

- hypothesizing

- researching
- summarizing/displaying data using:
  - associational analysis and link diagrams
  - event/activity charting
  - frequency/time series analysis

Figure 17 depicts a CIIC analytic operation that will produce an Analytic Report.

2. *What is Analysis?* It is necessary to define analysis to clarify the objective of this type of CIIC activity. Analysis is the normal function of any investigator as he sorts evidence, develops an idea (hypothesis) of who the suspect might be, and tests his concept as he reviews existing evidence and gathers additional data. The difference in the activities of the analyst and the investigator is primarily in the formality of approach. The analyst is systematic in his logical probe of a set of data seeking for its meaning. Unlike the investigator, the analyst uses formats and techniques to summarize and compare his data as he seeks an answer.

One definition of analysis is that activity whereby meaning, actual or suggested, is derived through organizing and systematically examining diverse information.


3. *What is a Hypothesis?* A hypothesis is a logical construction of the activity or event which appears to give the best explanation from the known information. A hypothesis might be a statement of the analyst's belief about the answer to a problem, the meaning of a set of activities, the apparent reason for certain actions, the future trend as a result of certain developments, etc. An initial hypothesis is often developed when facts and items of information are few, and may even be doubtful. A hypothesis should be considered as being dynamic and subject to change as new items of information become available. In the early stages, it is often best for the analyst to have alternative hypotheses which explain the meaning of the items of information.

In the beginning, a statement of the hypothesis can be a simple statement of belief (or what amounts to an educated guess). For example: The Jose Group will expand its activities into bank robbery. The analyst believes this is the best guess of what several items of information mean. Subsequently, the analyst may change this to indicate that the Jose Gang is trying to take over the fencing activity in a section of the jurisdiction. He may have enough information by this time to develop an outline of the information he has and items of information as they occur or become known. What the analyst is doing is testing his views against the existing stock of information and against that which is coming in. The hypothesis also assists the analyst in developing a list of information requirements which, if accumulated, would go far to tie down his views as being valid.

An example of the development of a hypothesis is presented below:

- the Jose Gang is reportedly involved in major breaking and entering activity,
- the Jose Gang appears to have gained some new members who have been involved in fencing,
- based on the report of an informant, important members of the Jose Gang are talking about the fact that their present fence, perhaps Pearson, is "ripping them off" and not giving them a fair return for their merchandise,

FIGURE 17



- there has been an increase in the stealing of valuable items from households in their known area of activity, therefore
- Hypothesis: the Jose Gang has either become its own local fence or is using another person or group to perform this activity.

Subsequent information that gives support to the hypothesis:

- the recent arrest of a "fence" believed to be associated with Pearson turned up none of the stolen items reported in the new breaking and entering activity,
- one report from an informant states that the Jose Gang was the source of the information that led to the recent police raid on the Pearson outlet, and
- a report from an officer in an adjacent jurisdiction states that none of the items being stolen in the new thefts are appearing in the adjacent area.

Subsequent information that tends to discount the hypothesis:

- the lack of any word from any informant that there is a new fence operating, or that the Jose Gang has gone into business for itself,
- there have been no reports of any of the recently stolen articles showing up in town, and
- there are no reports that any "legitimate" retail outlet for the type of merchandise being stolen has changed hands or is offering the heavy mark-downs that often accompany the disposing of stolen goods.

From this structure, the CIIC analyst can develop a series of questions for which he needs answers. With the permission of the CIIC supervisor and/or the CID commander, these questions can be passed on to the investigators in the CID and other units in the department. A review of the hypothesis would have to wait until some answers to the questions begin to come in or new pertinent information is received by the CIIC.

4. *Production of an Analytic Report.* The following describes the several actions the CIIC analyst performs in producing an Analytic Report.

a. *Developing the Hypothesis.* This is the first step. It is assumed that the analyst is aware of the flow of information into the CIIC and is knowledgeable about the criminal activities on the priority target list and about the important/career criminals about whom the CIIC maintains Biographic Files. Thus, he would state a belief (or hunch) about the answer to the problem stated in the request for an analytic report.

b. *Organizing the Items of Information.* Many of the questions to be answered will take in more than one criminal activity, major criminal or gang. Thus, the analyst must pull pertinent information from the Files and organize it to focus on the question at hand. Thus, he would initially seek information from the following sources:

- as indicated, the CIIC Files,

- other department files that should have pertinent data about the activity or the question posed, and
- friends and associates in the department who could have information based on their experience.

As part of his effort to organize the available information, the analyst might make use of any number of methodologies or techniques. These will assist in aggregating data and/or placing it in a logical sequence. They also give a visual presentation that will assist the analyst in understanding the meaning of the information he has. Finally, it will assist in detecting gaps that must be filled if the hypothesis is to be proven. The analyst may also detect other directions that should be followed, indicating that the initial hypothesis should be modified or changed. Figures 18 and 19 give some examples of these methodologies.

c. *Testing the Hypothesis.* The analyst, once the information is organized, reviews it to see if the information supports the hypothesis (or any of the alternatives). It is imperative that the analyst not try to "force the fit". Nor should material arbitrarily be thrown-out that does not seem relevant to the initial concept of how the question should be answered. If it is an area about which little has been collected (or at least directed to the CIIC), the principal outcome of the testing will be a list of questions. These questions will be given to the CID to gather more information. It will be the answers to this set of questions, developed as part of the process of analysis, that will decide the answers to the initial question posed for the Analytic Report.

The outcome of testing the hypothesis can lead to one of two conclusions.

- Proof that the hypothesis is valid which will provide the go-ahead for finishing the Report.
- Failure to prove the validity of the hypothesis creating a need:
  - to seek more information along the line that was being pursued, or
  - the development of a modification of the current hypothesis or some new approaches to the question.

d. *Development of Conclusions and Drafting the Report.* The substance of the report will be a defense of the hypothesis that appears to be valid. Since the CIIC does not deal in evidence, the report will be suggestive rather than factual. It may well be the conclusions reached by the analyst based on partial information but not be acceptable to the senior echelon of the department. They may feel that the information is too skimpy to support the conclusions reached, or they may feel other conclusions are more appropriate. The possibility of such reactions can never be avoided. The CIIC is dealing with matters of judgment and probability, both of which must compete with the judgments and estimates of the seniors in the department, many of whom will have more experience than the analyst. Or because some of the information known to the senior officers never was put on the record and, therefore, was not available to the analyst.

The report should present the conclusions first. This is the most important message of the Report. Secondly, there should be a concise summary of the data which went into formulating the conclusions. If appropriate, some of the information summarized and displayed on analytical methodologies and diagrams should be included. But, the report should be short and concise. The objective of the Analytic Report, directly or indirectly, is to suggest that certain actions by the enforcement elements of the

FIGURE 18

### EXAMPLE OF ASSOCIATIONAL ANALYSIS AND LINK DIAGRAMMING

*Step 1 – Organize items of information* from the Files that are indicative of an association between and among persons of interest. It may or may not be important to select a time period from which to select the items, depending on the amount of information and its importance. From the point of view of Associational Analysis, it is important to note, for instance, what type of meeting was reported. This becomes the basis for giving a value other than gross number of meetings.

Reliability of Information	Reported Activities of Sid Shark and Associates Over a Two-Week Period
1	Each weekday, Sid lunches at Gus' Grill. Over the past two weeks he has been joined by Al three times, Phil two times, and Janet two times.
2	Phil meets with Herb for a couple of hours each afternoon at Herb's Lounge.
3	Sid meets with Herb and Henry once a week at Herb's Lounge.
3	Sid has met Henry on two other occasions in Henry's office at the Friendly Finance Corporation.
1	Herb and Henry went fishing together for an entire day.
1	Al and Phil both work at the Packing House.
3	Janet has visited Henry's office once.

(Reliability legend: 1 – Highly reliable; 2 – Probably factual; 3 – Possibly factual.)

*Step 2 – Display* the number of observed interactions on a Transaction Matrix.

	Sid	Al	Phil	Janet	Herb	Henry
Sid						
Al	3					
Phil	2	10				
Janet	2					
Herb	2		14			
Henry	4			1	3	

FIGURE 18 (continued)

EXAMPLE OF ASSOCIATIONAL ANALYSIS AND LINK DIAGRAMMING

Step 3 — Assign a worth factor to the relationships, based on the type or apparent purpose of meeting observed. Display the results in a Strength of Association Matrix.

	Sid	Al	Phil	Janet	Herb	Henry
Sid						
Al	1					
Phil	1	2				
Janet	1					
Herb	2		3			
Henry	2			1	2	

Legend

- 1 — Weak Association
- 2 — Moderate Association
- 3 — Strong Association

In this example, value was assigned on the following judgments:

Weak association was assigned to Al, Phil and Janet's lunches with Sid since there were no other meetings reported. Also to Janet's one meeting with Henry.

Moderate association was assigned to Sid's meeting with Herb and Henry because it occurred once a week. Also to Phil and Al since they work together. Also to Herb and Henry's association since reported once, although it was a fishing expedition. With more information this probably would change to a stronger indication.

Strong association was assigned to Herb and Phil's relationship since they met every day.

FIGURE 18 (continued)

Step 4 — Final estimate of the strength of association of pairs in the group, taking into account the reliability of the information from Step 1.


	Sid	Al	Phil	Janet	Herb	Henry
Sid						
Al	1					
Phil	1	2				
Janet	1					
Herb	1		3			
Henry	1			1	2	

The fact of low reliability of information caused the strength of two associations, Sid-Henry and Sid-Herb, to be given a lower value. In both cases if the reports were true, there would be good grounds for a higher value. This could become a target for the CHIC to request further checking.



FIGURE 18 (continued)

Step 5 - Constructing a Link Diagram to display the initial conclusions of the Associational Analysis.



EXAMPLE OF ASSOCIATIONAL ANALYSIS AND LINK DIAGRAMMING

Step 6 — Review/analysis of the outcome of the Associational Analysis.

Based on the number of reported meetings, regardless of the validity of the reports, there would appear to be a greater degree of association among these persons than was developed in the initial analysis.


The CIIC, if it believes this group is of sufficient interest because of the criminal activities of several of the members, would then develop a request for assistance from the CID. Or it might wait, believing that in the normal course of reporting, additional information would be received without special effort.

FIGURE 19

EXAMPLE OF EVENT/ACTIVITY CHARTING


This is an example of an aid to organizing information. The CIIC can display a series of events or activities that appear time related. There may be many events and there may be gaps in the progression of events. A list of the events can be made but it will not display the particular flow of events nor graphically suggest potential missing pieces of information.

One technique the CIIC can use is to chart a series of connected events. It can indicate approximately when an event may have occurred about which it has no information. Each event should be dated to help illustrate the timing of the series and to help pinpoint missing events. An example of the display follows:



There may be instances of events happening which may or may not be connected. The CIIC may be interested because the type of criminal activity is similar, the events may have a similar MO, or may involve persons whom the CIIC believes are associates.

These events can be displayed as individual items on a time chart, as follows:





department are called for. The Report often will present targets for further investigation, or suggest a shift in strategy. Whatever the scope of the report, if it is accepted, further questions will be forthcoming. The first questions will be from the senior officer who receives the report. Subsequently, questions will come from investigators detailed to do something about the reported criminal activities.

5. *Dissemination of the Analytic Report.* The dissemination of CIIC reports should be governed by previously approved guidelines. The guidelines should be approved by the CID commander, or by the chief. As a rule, the substance of an Analytic Report is not directed at investigators. It is attempting to tell senior officers of new developments or changes in criminal activities in the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is recommended that the initial dissemination of the Analytic Report be restricted to the CID commander and those he has approved in the guidelines. The latter would probably be CID subordinate supervisors, the chief or his deputy, and perhaps the department's planning staff (if there is one).

Depending on the acceptance of the report and its implications, it could be given a wider distribution in the department, or it could initiate further information-gathering and subsequent analytic action by the CIIC analyst. If proven useful, the CID commander and/or the chief could call for additional resource to assist the CIIC in preparing a more detailed analysis of the subject.

#### E. CIIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The fourth output of the CIIC is a request for additional information. This could result from the CIIC's inability to answer investigator requests or an inability to produce a Tactical or Analytic Report. The data in the Files could be found to be incomplete or the request for additional information could suggest a new aspect of criminal activity about which the CIIC should seek to gain information. The need for new information could result from the CIIC working its own material and finding it inadequate in light of new developments in the criminal environment. A request for additional information could relate to criminal activities for which the CIIC is already responsible or to an activity that is gaining in importance.

If the information needed is to meet an investigators request, or for data that the CIIC knows to exist in another unit of the department, the CIIC should be given permission to go directly to the potential source. This should apply only to CIIC requests that do not require the commitment of resources on the part of another unit of the department. If an investigative effort is required or a special payment to an informant is needed, then the request should be formal and go through the CID commander for approval. This formal channel should also be used when the CIIC request for existing information is turned down by the holding unit.

If the information sought requires an investigative effort or an agreement for a continuing flow of information from another unit of the department, the CIIC request should be addressed to the CID commander or to the commander of the unit to which it is subordinate. The CIIC ordinarily will have no investigative capability of its own. Furthermore, since in most cases it would be within a major unit of the department, it would not have the right to formally request the commitment of resources of another unit to meet the information requirements of the CIIC.

With respect to a request for an item of existing information, the CIIC should employ the simplest and most direct means to fulfill the request. Ordinarily, this would be done by telephone, but for the formal request to develop new information, the CIIC should not only specify what information it wants but why it is needed. The latter will help the CID commander understand the reason for the request. This is essential so that, when he approves it and sends it to the appropriate other unit of the department, he can give it positive support. Provided the CIIC knows who or what unit is in the best position to respond to its need, the CIIC request should suggest who should be asked and possibly how the information might be obtained.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This manual develops methods to improve the use of criminal information available in police departments. The stated goal is to employ the functions of collation and analysis to enable investigative units to understand more fully developments in selected major criminal activities. In the process of achieving this goal, accumulated information will also be more readily available to assist investigators with current cases.

This manual suggests that the following are the principal problems to be overcome if a department is to make better use of available information.

- The reluctance of investigators to record items of information beyond those essential to current case building.
- The reluctance of investigators to share their accumulated knowledge and sources of that information.
- The great difficulties in the use of the traditional case file as a source to determine the scope and trends in criminal activities.
- The absence of a method with which to seek out and integrate information, from both investigative and patrol units, concerning selected developments in the criminal environment.

To deal with these problems, this manual suggests the creation of a collation/analysis staff within a CID or other investigative unit of a police department. The principal responsibilities of the staff would be:

- To develop a system of collation—reviewing, abstracting or indexing, and filing—in which related items of information are associated by major criminal activities, groupings, locations, etc.
- To develop analytic reports that show trends in selected criminal activities, show anticipated activities of new groupings of criminals, show implications of new relationships among old major criminals, etc.
- To develop methods to increase the flow of information on selected criminals and criminal activities from all units in the department to the new staff in the CID.

This manual suggests specific techniques and methods to be used in implementing the concept of a *Criminal Investigation Information Center* (CIIC) in police departments. The core of the proposed approach is a series of files in which abstracted items of information are assembled. The suggested files include:

- A *Name File* to be used both as a record of information and as a pointer to other files.
- A *Biographic File* in which all information on known major or career criminals is recorded.
- A *Criminal Activities File* in which all information obtained on selected priority criminal activities is placed.

- A *Group/Gang File* in which to record information about known or suspected members of a criminal group and their activities.
- A *Location File* in which to record information on the suspected or known criminals who frequent a specific location (building, restaurant, bar, area, etc.)

The potential gain to the department adopting the suggested approach depends primarily on the personnel assigned to the CIIC. Assuming the unit has at least a clerk and an analyst, its output can be three fold.

- *Immediate response* from its Files to investigator inquiries concerning criminals or suspects, criminal activities, groups or gangs, etc.
- *Tactical Reports* in which information from the Files is organized to show, for example, new members in a criminal group, known or suspected criminals in a selected criminal activity, criminal acts where a particular MO was used, or new associates of a known major criminal.
- *Analytic Reports* in which attempts are made to explain new developments, and to estimate future trends in selected criminal activities.

In conclusion, the manual proposes a unique and practical approach to enable investigative units to make more effective use of criminal information available to the department. The cost in number of personnel is small. For most departments, the assignment of a clerk and an analyst will insure the performance of the basic functions of collation and analysis.

**END**