


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## Research Utilization Program

### Special National Workshop Criminal Justice Program Evaluation

March 17-19, 1980

*Selected Workshop Papers*

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United States Department of Justice  
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Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination

**SPECIAL NATIONAL WORKSHOP**  
March 17-19, 1980

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM EVALUATION**

**SELECTED WORKSHOP PAPERS**

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH UTILIZATION PROGRAM**

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For

National Institute of Justice

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# FOREWORD

Criminal justice program evaluation has advanced significantly during the last decade--in part as a result of extensive evaluation of criminal justice programs which has increased both our knowledge and understanding of "what works" and "what does not work"; and the implementation of practical techniques and strategies which have been learned from the evaluation of these programs.

To provide an opportunity for program administrators and evaluators to discuss the policy implications of current evaluation findings and program experience with the nation's leading researchers and evaluators, the National Institute of Justice held a Special National Workshop on Criminal Justice Program Evaluation, March 17-19, 1980. The workshop brought together decisionmakers, researchers, planners, evaluators, and program administrators interested in a diversity of topics.

The workshop agenda was not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, it presented a limited number of in-depth seminars and topics which focused on major criminal justice program evaluation efforts. The papers which were selected for this publication represent some of those efforts. The National Institute hopes this report will be of assistance to policy officials, researchers, and evaluators who are actively engaged with those types of programs represented in the selected papers, or who foresee involvement with similar programs at the state and local levels in the immediate future.

Harry M. Bratt  
Acting Director  
National Institute of Justice

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**Evaluating Victim Assistance Programs:  
A Historical Understanding of the  
Information We Wish We Had**

Rev. Robert Denton, Ph.D.  
Director, Victim Assistance Program  
Akron, Ohio

Roberta Cronin has presented what might be considered a macro account of what is currently available by way of research information on victim and witness assistance programs at the national level. This emanates from her Phase I research project at the American Institutes for Research. One of the values of that work has been the identification of information not readily available within such programs:

- How well were such services appreciated?
- How thoroughly were they performed?
- Which services were most important for what populations?
- Were theoretical foundations adequately operationalized?
- Where programs succeeded, were the specific types of interventions related to such theoretical considerations?
- Where they failed, was it because of program failure or theory failure?

With that in mind, it would seem appropriate to focus attention briefly, first, upon the problems of doing research in a changing environment, and second, upon the roles of program evaluation in victim/witness assistance programs as they evolved during the past decade. Finally, based upon that historical approach, it will be easier for us to perceive the nature of the gaps in our current information base.

I would like to direct your focus upon what might be called a micro consideration of the role of program evaluation in victim/witness assistance programs, and I do so from that awkward position of both academician and program director.

SOME PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION RESEARCH

Most of us recall the general classroom instruction in the academics of research: methodology, design, validity, role of theory, appropriate statistics, and so on. Unfortunately, that preparation did not always take into account the larger context in which research was performed. Hence, as evaluation research grew in stature, some questioned its legitimacy because its ability to empirically control the environment was something less than that of the laboratory. Enter the concepts of formative and summative evaluation research and the location of the administration of such an endeavor in-house or outside the program's superstructure, and the acquisition of positive knowledge seemed further threatened.



Many of us moved out of the classroom and into the world where we encountered the effects of dollars, policy, program strategies, accountability, political turf, use and misuse of information, and depending where you ended up (i.e., who pays your salary), we discovered that our data tended not to follow rhyme or reason, but rather, the latest directive, contract, change in policy or administrator, or cost cut. It seemed there was no end to the victimization of the poor empiricist by all that reality out there in the subjective world. It is the stuff of such considerations that make the disciplines of philosophy of science and social science so bothersome.

Indeed, the academic social science approaches to problem analysis and interventions seem to dictate a methodology of defeat, wherein we attempt to empirically identify our problem, locate it in some appropriate theory base, devise policies and derivative programs, build in our research components, and then try to enact the entire affair through rather irrational political processes at some appropriate intervention level.

If it flies, our rigorous endeavor often returns to us in some unrecognizable form, void of original rationale. Our problem has been redefined, theory bases may no longer fit, policies built upon the former become severed from any logical connection, and programs are altered by all types of realities, leaving us to research something very different from our original mission. The serious researcher may well look to some victim aid project for supportive emotional services simply to de-sensitize his or her stresses and hostility.

#### ROLE OF EVALUATION RESEARCH IN THE EVOLUTION OF VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

It would be difficult to find an area of planning and organizing for social change where this process has been more vividly projected than that of the victim assistance movement--both in the private and public sectors. Here, it is possible to trace the presence and nature of research along each stage of the movement's institutionalization.

Our consideration of the evolutionary stages of victim services and the types of research they produced may be enhanced by James Thompson's four-cell matrix relating the nature of empirical knowledge and agreement concerning the importance of a social problem to the nature of policy decisions.

	High Agreement	Low Agreement
High Knowledge	Computational/ decision oriented	Political bargain/compromise/negotiation
Low Knowledge	Judgments	Inspirational

#### Grassroots Stage

During the early 1970s, the status of crime victims occupied a position wherein there was little agreement within the system as to the importance of such a group and about whom little was known. It is not surprising, then, that the nature of policy and programs was basically inspirational, emanating from the tireless work of some concerned individuals.

It consisted largely of advocacy and crisis intervention services within the private sector. For instance, our program, one of the older ones in the United States, began its advocacy activities in early 1972 and developed its service delivery unit in February 1974. Generally, service units did not appear until late 1973 and early 1974, and these took the form of rape crisis projects and a few comprehensive victim service programs like that of Aid to Victims of Crime in St. Louis and Victim Assistance Program in Akron, Ohio.

Most of the programs were staffed by dedicated persons with little or no professional training in the helping services--a phenomenon carefully noted with more than a little alarm by professionals in the area who saw nonspecialists rise to professional wages through ensuing grant and funding agents.

Many of the programs tended to use little or no planning procedures and operated outside the context of a social science approach to problems and policies. Hardly any used the experiences of service delivery accrued during the 1960s, with its still too vivid lessons of what did not work and what was deemed necessary to make lasting improvements in the state of affairs. The grassroots stage might be characterized as a time of high motivation and low technology.

The primary objective was humanitarian; a simple desire to help. With some exceptions, then, a frequent comment was "why play with statistics." Furthermore, there was little idea of what kind of data to collect or what to do with it. What was collected was basically output material--"look how many and how much."

#### Federal Dollar Stage

When Donald Santarelli resigned from LEAA because of his belief that Watergate precluded any justice project in that administration, he had allocated several million dollars for Citizen Initiative projects and for victim-oriented programs, in particular. About this same time, the National District Attorney's Association acquired funding for its victim/witness assistance programs. Many LEAA dollars also went to victim services outside the court processes. For the victim movement, this meant a change in stature and structure.

With federal dollars came the issue of accountability and the familiar research modules aimed at bringing some semblance of order to both the goals and objectives of such units. Behavioral indicators were stressed, and measurement of activity became possible. A tacit thrust of this funding was pro-system, while the operating values for many program boards remained humanitarian. For some, this led to invariable strains; for others, it directed their location more deeply into the criminal justice system.

In this second stage, the policy and program decisions moved from the inspirational stage to the judgmental sector on the matrix, where there was still a dearth of knowledge, but an increase in the agreement that such services were important for a host of reasons. The data collected began to formalize, but seemed to focus basically on outputs and their impact on various functions within the system. If the numbers looked good, they served a variety of interests from the selling and promotion of private service models to the political interests of the public models ranging from prosecutors to police departments.

### Impact Stage

With the formalization of services based on temporary monies came an increase in our knowledge base. Decisions moved toward a macro level within the federal and state government, where there seemed to be less agreement as to the importance of such expenditures. With a new layer of issues at the broad political level and a competition for dollars, the nature and use of data began to change. Accountability continued to be a factor. But the struggle for the movement to succeed meant entering the negotiation and bargain-oriented environment typical of the political section of our matrix.

Many programs whose primary reason for being was that of service delivery were visited by state planning units and informed that they had no goals and objectives, which after political translation really meant service delivery goals were no longer acceptable. Such programs would have to reorganize their data modules to reflect impact upon the system, if not their formal program mission.

Data collection was no longer concerned with the number of cases served, nature of services provided, number of services brokered, and so on. Goals and objectives were revised to show how victim/witness programs impacted upon the criminal justice system: increase in cooperation with police and prosecutor, decrease in crime, increase in reporting, increase in convictions, increased affinity between the population and the system. In Ohio, this trend began about mid-1978.

### Service Institutionalization Stage

By the end of the decade, the most serious issue facing most programs at both the private and public levels was that of raising the local cash base to offset diminishing federal funds. For some early projects--those that were re-funded throughout the allowable time period--the issue was: become self-supporting, or die. In short, institutionalize.

Programs within the system stood a better chance of survival, while private projects had to return to traditional methods of support. Most began to live with highly budgeted programs and cutbacks. It is interesting to note that a significant number of projects initially identified by the Phase I study were not in operation when Cronin and staff attempted to contact them.

With fiscal cutbacks and minimal budgets, the nature of data collected and the types of research geared to evaluating projects cannot be expected to significantly expand or change. Federal interest in information collection and evaluation has, to date, helped stem the inevitable tide. I, however, do not see a major expansion in the types of data collected or evaluation research on program variables heretofore not addressed. It would be comforting to be proven incorrect, and perhaps the work of students, doctoral candidates, and victimologists will be able to fill the void.

### OUTCOMES: SOME MISSING VARIABLES IN VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

If the preceding consideration demonstrates the effect of program evolution upon the nature of evaluation research, it also indicates, by silence, what remains to be addressed. Although not entirely accurate, there is a sense in which the bulk of evaluation research to date has shown, at worst, a confusion of

outputs with outcomes and, at best, a certain negligence toward outcomes, per se. We have, for the most part, acquired some data on how much we have done and made certain questionable arguments as to how these have impacted upon the system. Little has been noted as to how well the activities were actually performed.

Without attempting an exhaustive review of what is yet needed within the research endeavors, information about the following variables would prove most useful within the confines of victim service programs.

1. More detailed identification of victim responses to violence. Much has been written about the general emotional responses of victims of rape, robbery, burglary, and so on. Little is available beyond this general description that would provide useful research variables at the social-psychological level. What are the perceptions of victims at a cognitive level? Are there any differences between victim types, victim backgrounds, demographically?

2. Measurement of the effect of services on various victim types. Which services are most important to victims of violence? Are some more important to different victim types than others? I, for instance, have studied 106 victims of rape, robbery, assault, and purse-snatching and found that basic crisis intervention services have no differential utilization or impact on those victim types. Currently, these base data remain to be substantiated. Research, however, has not shown a proclivity to proceed along these lines.

3. Assessment of the quality of brokered services. If a formal goal of the program is to broker services to existing agencies, instead of creating duplicated services for this special sub-population, how well are those services provided? Are they well done, or did they never get beyond the referral stage? Did the victims pursue such services? Were the services promised never obtained because the so-called network of social service agencies lost the case or passed the buck until the client simply gave up?

4. Assessment of crisis intervention services. Most programs propose to deliver crisis intervention services to their clientele, but little or nothing is available in the current information base as to what crisis intervention services are really offered. What does that mean? How is the theory operationalized in the service delivery unit?

Where the theory has been actuated in some form of intervention, there is no information available evaluating how well such interventions were performed. While it is possible for agencies to report "x number of victims received crisis intervention," there is a vacuum as to whether those services were correctly performed according to crisis intervention theory, how well performed, their impact upon the victim, or whether that victim would have done as well without the services.

Some programs have offered crisis intervention services and attempted to operationalize the crisis constructs, as possible. In the best of circumstances, it is argued that the services were well performed, and by theory, there is reason to believe that the victim will improve beyond a level of performance had he not received such assistance. There is, however, nothing to date that tests for theory failure. Thus, when we fail, we don't know whether it was because someone performed the program intervention poorly or whether the theoretical constructs are wrong. Further, when we succeed, we are not positive that it was because of

a good program intervention, an extraneous influence, or because crisis intervention theory is correct and was correctly provided. We are left with our assumptions.

It remains a problem that such a major program goal can be overlooked by evaluation research personnel. It would seem that this is a fundamental question to pursue. Although it is certainly much safer to say we performed something we call crisis intervention to an impressive number of clients, someone must ask what does that mean and how well was it done?

5. Assessment of administration activities. Formative evaluations have yet to provide administrative data indicating which staff do better interventions. Do volunteers do as well? Do they do it better? Which individuals among these categories of intervenors are doing it poorly? Do trained professional staff do better under these circumstances than volunteers or nonprofessional staff? If so, is the difference great enough to justify the cost? What impact would these data have upon licensing laws currently in legislature defining such interventions totally within the parameters of professional ranks?

Instruments are available to measure such phenomena. Likert-type scales may be utilized to measure such criteria on the parts of both staff and victims, allowing correlations that produce data upon which to address the above questions. Yet, why is such data generally unavailable?

#### CONCLUSION

In view of the information not available from victim assistance programs, it cannot be said that evaluation research has made inroads to important service and policy information within the field of service delivery. Much information is yet to be obtained.

It can be seen, however, in light of the victim movement's evolution from a grassroots stage through the early phases of institutionalization, why important outcome data have been neglected. The issues of survival and nature of the movement's purpose have had a determinant effect upon what has been open for research. The implications of public, and particularly LEAA, monies has further directed the nature of the questions that have been asked.

The victim service movement faces some serious difficulties in the next several years that will determine whether and in what form it will survive. Money problems will be its greatest problem. This may determine what little will be done to answer many serious questions about what it has accomplished. Ironically, if it is to survive, it is precisely such information that is necessary to provide its reason for continuing.

#### Evaluation of Victim Witness Assistance Projects: Where Do We Go From Here?\*

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#### INTRODUCTION

Concerted efforts to assist victims and witnesses of crime first emerged in the early 1970s in response to a growing recognition that victim needs and desires had been largely ignored by the criminal justice system. The existence of such needs and their interdependence with system demands for more efficient, effective performance are now widely perceived as "givens" in the criminal justice world.

In the last 10 years, work in the clinical setting, especially with rape victims, has illuminated some dimensions of victim trauma (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974, 1976; Miller et al., 1978; Sutherland & Scherl, 1970). Supplementary evidence from a number of victim surveys establishes that emotional upset and suffering are common reactions to victimization (Knudten et al., 1976; Black & Regenstreif, 1977; Syvrud, 1977; Waller & Okihiro, 1978; Bourque et al., 1978). It has also been shown that certain classes of victims tend to change their lifestyles as a result of crime, withdrawing from activities they enjoy (Burkhardt & Norton, 1977; Garofalo, 1977), quitting their jobs (Midwest Research Institute, 1974), or simply taking preventive measures against further victimization (Rifai, 1977).

Victim reactions are frequently interpreted in terms of crisis theory (Bard & Ellison, 1974; Bard & Sangrey, 1979; Brodyaga et al., 1975; Symonds, 1975; Stratton, 1976), which postulates that victimization may disrupt an individual's normal coping or problemsolving abilities and produce considerable emotional upset. Without receiving an appropriate response to the crisis, some victims can incur long-term psychological damage.

The notion that the criminal justice system mistreats the victim or witness is also well accepted. Although the painful questioning undergone by rape victims may represent the worst of the criminal justice system for many critics, attitudinal surveys indicate that more typical sources of dissatisfaction among victims and witnesses are inconvenience and lack of information. Victims tend to be relatively dissatisfied with the lack of feedback about their cases (Rifai, 1977; Sacramento Police Department, 1974; Bourque et al., 1978), the handling of victim property (Rifai, 1977; National District Attorney's Association, 1976), and the lack of protection afforded them (Black & Regenstreif, 1977). Witnesses

\*This research was supported by Contract #J-LEAA-020-78 awarded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended.

complain of unnecessary trips to court and associated loss of income; inconveniences in parking, locating the court, and waiting; and fear of retaliation by the suspect (National District Attorney's Association, 1976).

The impact on system performance is a serious concern. After all, law enforcement success is partially dependent on citizen reporting of crime and on obtaining a clear description of offenses and suspects. Police officer communication with and sympathy to the victim or witness is an important factor in eliciting cooperation (Cannavale & Falcon, 1976; Institute for Community Studies, 1978).

Witness testimony is also critical to prosecution. Yet, nonappearance rates for postarrest court dates in one metropolitan court were 57.5 percent (Vera Institute of Justice, 1976(b)), and data from several jurisdictions suggest that nonappearance and other witness problems are very serious throughout the system (National District Attorney's Association, 1976; Brosi, 1979). Several explanations have been suggested: negative citizen attitudes toward the criminal justice system, witness discouragement, inadequate communication between prosecutors and witnesses, and simple lack of notification (Cannavale & Falcon, 1976; National District Attorney's Association, 1976).

With the increasing recognition of these problems and the toll they exact on our ability to mete out justice, a variety of responses have emerged. These include victim compensation legislation, use of restitution orders, development of special police or prosecution units trained to handle sex assault cases, improved police training, and rape crisis programs.

Our study looks at another of these responses--the victim/witness assistance project.

#### APPROACH

This study was conducted under the National Evaluation Program (NEP) of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the National Institute of Justice) to help provide practical information on the activities, costs, benefits, and limitations of selected groups of projects to criminal justice planners and administrators.

The NEP employs a two-phased approach, with the Phase I assessment concentrating primarily on assembling and organizing what is currently known about the topic area. In other words, it relies heavily on existing data. The decision to fund a more intensive Phase II effort is based on the results of the Phase I study, as well as considerations of cost, feasibility, and probable value to decisionmakers.

Our study was a Phase I effort. Therefore, within the limits of readily available data, our goals were:

- To describe current victim/witness assistance efforts across the country;
- To examine how well they are meeting the expectations set for them;

- To identify significant gaps in our knowledge about these projects; and
- To suggest approaches for filling these gaps.

For purposes of the study, the victim/witness assistance project was defined as any local effort to deliver direct services to victims or witnesses of crime.<sup>1/</sup> In the course of our work, several additional criteria evolved to help distinguish the universe under examination:

1. Project Purpose. All projects aim to ameliorate the effects of criminal victimization on victims or their families; to encourage the participation of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system; and/or to facilitate more effective and efficient victim or witness utilization in the criminal justice process.
2. Target Population. Each project defines service to crime victims or witnesses as one of its primary functions. Projects serving only child abuse victims, sexual assault victims, and/or battered women were excluded, as were victim restitution and/or compensation projects.<sup>2/</sup> Projects including these components in combination with others eligible for study have been retained.
3. Intervention Strategies. All projects provide one or more direct services to victims or witnesses at the local level. Excluded under this criterion were: projects performing only technical assistance, planning, coordination, public information, or research functions; crime prevention projects lacking any special component designed to assist victims or witnesses; and projects that provide only referral to other direct service providers. In addition, police family crisis intervention projects, consumer fraud projects, and crime reporting hotlines were excluded from the study.

All Phase I assessments employ a fairly structured common methodology. Overall, there is an attempt to identify common models of intervention practiced in the field and to use these models as a framework for assessing the current state of knowledge and for designing better evaluations.

We used several methods to accomplish our study goals:

- A systematic attempt to locate all local victim/witness assistance efforts in existence nationwide;
- A descriptive mail survey of the 280 projects identified through our search procedures, which attained an 81-percent response;
- Two- to three-day site visits to 20 projects, selected to be roughly representative of the full project universe; and

<sup>1/</sup>The use of the term "project" should be viewed as a shorthand reference, because many agencies do not define their victim/witness activities in that way.

<sup>2/</sup>These exclusions were established in the contract supporting this work.



- A systematic review of all available project evaluations, published and unpublished<sup>1</sup>, as well as any other documentation bearing on intermediate and longer term effects./3/

## FINDINGS

### Victim/Witness Assistance Projects in Operation

Our Phase I assessment of victim/witness assistance projects nationwide identified a universe of 280 projects that met the definition described earlier. Within this universe, we observed and identified at least three different intervention models or styles, termed the "victim," "witness," and "victim-witness" models. These models can be distinguished by target population, point of intervention with clients, and service emphasis. These characteristics are, in turn, associated with somewhat different outcome expectations.

The three models were defined and elaborated as a result of literature review and field observation of 20 projects, but we later found that most projects responding to the mail survey could be reliably classified into the same three types. In all, 89 (39 percent) of our survey respondents were identified as victim projects, 107 (47 percent) as witness projects, and 24 (11 percent) as victim-witness; 3 percent were unclassifiable.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize some key characteristics of projects falling into each of the three model types. While the three models provide a convenient device for organizing a good deal of descriptive information, there is obviously a great deal of variability among "same type" projects and many commonalities across types.

A few summary observations are warranted about victim/witness assistance projects in operation. First and foremost, in the immediate sense, projects of all three types seem to be doing exactly what they promise to do. They have developed a range of services and referral arrangements tailored to the perceived needs of their target populations. They are delivering many concrete services to victims and witnesses that can be considered "goods" in themselves, regardless of whether they contribute to the long-range well-being of client or system. Clients apparently like the services and so do criminal justice personnel, such as police and prosecutors, who are most immediately affected by project activities. Resource constraints and the local political climate set some limits, of course, but we encountered many projects whose staff proved quite adept at manipulating both.

The specific services offered obviously have a great deal to do with the choice of target population. Victim projects concentrate on immediate face-to-face work, such as crisis intervention, counseling, and other "restorative" efforts. Added support is offered for those few victims who are later involved

<sup>3</sup> Readers interested in study methodology are referred to Chapter II of the full study report: Cronin, Roberta C. & Bourque, Blair B., The National Evaluation Program Phase I Assessment of Victim/Witness Assistance Projects: Final Report, May 1980. The report is available through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS BY MODEL TYPE

PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS	Victim		Witness		Victim-Witness	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<b>Host Agency</b>	(n=89)		(n=107)		(n=24)	
Police/Sheriff	25	28	1	1	0	0
Prosecutor	2	2	99	92	20	83
Community-Based Organization	34	38	4	4	2	8
Probation	4	5	1	1	2	8
Other <sup>1</sup>	24	27	2	2	0	0
<b>Jurisdiction Served</b>	(n=89)		(n=107)		(n=24)	
City/Neighborhoods	44	50	6	6	2	8
County/City & County	33	37	84	79	21	88
Multi-County	3	3	12	11	1	4
Other <sup>2</sup>	9	10	5	5	0	0
<b>Starting Year</b>	(n=89)		(n=105)		(n=23)	
1975 or before	19	21	18	17	6	26
1976-77	39	44	41	39	9	39
1978 or later	31	35	46	44	8	35
<b>Primary Funding Source</b>	(n=89)		(n=106)		(n=24)	
LEAA <sup>3</sup>	52	58	57	54	12	50
CETA <sup>3</sup>	6	7	10	9	2	8
Other Federal	5	6	1	3	0	0
State	3	3	5	5	0	0
County	4	5	24	23	7	29
City	10	11	2	2	0	0
Foundations, Charitable organizations, Contributions	6	7	2	2	1	4
Other	3	3	3	3	2	8
<b>Current Budget</b>	(n=80)		(n=81)		(n=22)	
Less than \$50,000	34	43	50	62	6	27
\$50,000-99,999	16	20	19	23	1	14
\$100,000-199,999	12	15	7	9	8	36
\$200,000 and over	18	23	5	6	5	23
<b>Original Funding Source<sup>4</sup></b>	(n=64)		(n=78)		(n=19)	
LEAA <sup>3</sup>	38	59	44	56	14	74
CETA <sup>3</sup>	6	9	13	17	1	5
Other Federal	3	5	1	1	0	0
State	1	2	2	3	0	0
County	1	2	13	17	3	16
City	3	5	0	0	1	5
Foundations, Charitable organizations, contributions	9	14	3	4	0	0
Other	3	5	2	3	0	0
<b>Expectations for V/WA Services in Jurisdiction Five Years From Now</b>	(n=84)		(n=101)		(n=24)	
Disappeared	4	5	6	6	1	4
Reduced	7	8	4	4	0	0
About the same	12	14	20	20	9	38
Expanded	46	55	60	59	13	54
Integrated into existing/another agency	8	10	4	4	0	0
Other	7	8	7	7	1	4

<sup>1</sup> Includes projects operated by other units of local government and by hospitals, mental health centers, or universities.

<sup>2</sup> Includes state and other.

<sup>3</sup> Includes projects reporting multiple "primary sources" of funding, including LEAA or CETA. Any project reporting both LEAA and CETA support was included in the LEAA group.

<sup>4</sup> Reported only for projects over one year old.

TABLE 2. INTERVENTION STRATEGY: THREE V/WA MODEL TYPES

	Victim I	Witness II	Victim-Witness III
Target population	Victims	Witnesses	Victims and Witnessess
Primary methods of locating clients	<p>Screening police reports.</p> <p>Reponse to police calls from crime scene.</p> <p>Referrals from other agencies or self-referral.</p>	<p>Review of witness lists or subpoena lists.</p> <p>Referral from prosecutors.</p> <p>Referrals from other agencies or self-referral.</p>	Combinations of methods under I and II.
Availability	Round-the-clock through on-call arrangements.	Regular office hours, Monday through Friday.	Varies.
Primary service emphases	<p>Counseling: crisis intervention, follow-up, and/or supportive.</p> <p>Service referral/advocacy with referral agencies.</p>	<p>Schedule and disposition notification, reception, orientation, alert.</p> <p>Arrangement of appearance support, e.g., transportation, child care, protection, escort.</p>	Combinations of I and III.
Location	Often in law enforcement agency, but varies.	In courthouse or prosecutor's office.	Varies. Some with multiple locations.

in case investigation and prosecution. Witness projects, on the other hand, focus on witness notification and appearance management--services that can often be handled by phone or mail or in relatively brief face-to-face contact. Victim-witness projects have components that do both.

In many projects, there is a tendency to proclaim a very broad range of assistance to victims and witnesses, but typically only a few core services are routinely delivered to the bulk of clients. This is not a matter of false advertising, but rather a result of staff judgments that most people simply do not require or want the full range of services. For example, witness projects typically offer or can arrange appearance support services, such as transportation to court or child care, but activity records and reports show that these services are used fairly infrequently. The routine services are witness notification, reception, and orientation. As a corollary, it seems to be the case for all project types that a minority of clients command a disproportionate share of staff attention and assistance. In the victim project, this might be an elderly purse-snatch victim who has lost her Social Security check or other valuables and identification papers and has been injured in the bargain. In a witness project, it is often the rape victim.

The data available do not permit even moderately sophisticated analyses of project costs. However, some crude estimates confirm that there are definite differences in overall costs across project types (see Table 3). In general, victim projects show relatively low volume and relatively high costs per client contact--a median of \$46 for victim project mail respondents versus \$6 and \$8 for witness and victim-witness respondents, respectively. The latter types also handle larger volumes. Per capita budgets, based on population of jurisdictions served, do not differ very much, however--the medians run \$.18, \$.13, and \$.15.

The difference in median client volume and costs are not surprising, given the differences in intervention strategy across types. Unfortunately, the within-type variation is less easy to explain with the data available; it is considerable, especially for types I and III. Based on our site visit experience, we would expect that higher costs are associated with:

- 24-hour, seven-day-a-week availability;
- Crisis intervention at the crime scene as the preferred contact strategy;
- Heavy investment in multiple contacts with a client and follow-up, rather than one-time-only intervention;
- Emphasis on direct service, rather than referral; and
- Allocation of significant resources to nonclient services, such as research, training, public relations, and lobbying for statutory changes.

#### Victim/Witness Assistance Project Impacts

This report now turns to the broader question of project success or failure and the current state of knowledge concerning that question. How well are these

TABLE 3. RESOURCE LEVELS FOR MAIL SURVEY PROJECTS BY MODEL TYPE

	Victim Projects N=68 <sup>1</sup>	Witness Projects N=80 <sup>1</sup>	Victim-Witness Projects N=20 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Annual Budget</b>			
Budget Range	\$2,000 to \$438,000	\$8,000 to \$469,000	\$11,000 to \$242,000
Median Budget	\$70,000	\$33,500	\$100,000
Per Capita Budget Range <sup>2</sup>	\$.003 to \$7.13 <sup>3</sup>	\$.004 to \$.81	\$.05 to \$.55
Median Per Capita Capita Budget	\$.18	\$.13	\$.15
<b>Staff</b>			
	(N=89)	(N=107)	(N=24)
Range in Staff Size	Full-time 0-30 Part-time 0-31 Volunteer 0-120	Full-time 0-33 Part-time 0-9 Volunteer 0-81	Full-time 0-83 Part-time 0-30 Volunteer 0-41
Median Number of Full-time Staff	3	1.8	5
Median Number of Part-time Staff	.5	.2	.4
Median Number of Volunteers	.4	.2	3.5
Percent of Projects Using Volunteers	44%	31%	75%
<b>Estimated Monthly Volume Face-to-Face Contacts</b>			
	(N=68) <sup>1</sup>	(N=80) <sup>1</sup>	(N=20) <sup>1</sup>
Range	0 to 300	0 to 5,000	8 to 1,800
Median	30	71	81
<b>Cost per Face-to-Face Contact</b>			
Range	\$7 to \$2,159	\$0 to \$400	\$5 to \$1,104
Median	\$165	\$51	\$51
<b>Estimated Monthly Volume of Total Contacts -- Mail, Telephone, Face-to-Face</b>			
	(N=68) <sup>1</sup>	(N=80) <sup>1</sup>	(N=20) <sup>1</sup>
Range	22 to 690	10 to 5,950	75 to 3,800
Median	117	547	477
<b>Cost Per Contract<sup>4</sup></b>			
Range	\$4 to \$720	\$1 to \$21	\$2 to \$141
Median	\$46	\$6	\$8

<sup>1</sup>Based on projects that had been in operation at least one year at the time of the survey.

<sup>2</sup>Based on total population of jurisdiction served.

<sup>3</sup>The maximum value reported for per capita budgets is probably erroneously inflated by projects that reported entire budgets of an effort with a relatively small victim component.

<sup>4</sup>Based on budgeted cost only, divided by estimated client volume. No adjustments have been made for varying overhead estimation procedures or any reporting anomalies.

projects meeting the goals and expectations set for them? What, in fact, are the intermediate outcomes and long-term impacts?

Although data relevant to these questions were uncovered for about 50 projects, on the whole the evidence is very sparse and the methods employed to get that evidence not very rigorous. Some problems include:

- Failure to report sampling procedures and/or response rates for surveys, as well as wide variations in reported response rates;
- Reliance on client or observer attitude and opinion responses as measures, rather than behaviorally referenced indicators;
- Lack of appropriate baseline or comparison groups against which changes or improvements can be evaluated;
- Narrowness of focus; that is, concentration on only one or two outcomes, often without any measurement of intermediate steps to their achievement;
- A dearth of cross-site evaluations using comparable measures; and
- Absence of designs powerful enough to capture effects remote in time from the original intervention (e.g., changes in conviction rates or increases in crime reporting).

For purposes of summary, project effects are divided into two broad groupings: benefits to the victim or witness--the primary client--and benefits to the system--police, courts, and prosecution. The bottom line is fairly disappointing, however. Aside from a few elements of the witness model, most of the working assumptions about the intermediate and longer range effects of victim/witness assistance projects remain just that--plausible assumptions, buttressed by anecdotes, but with weak or nonexistent support from systematic research and evaluation.

**Victim/witness benefits.** In the realm of victim or witness benefits, there is simply a lack of evidence. Time savings for witnesses, although not precisely quantified, appear to be the only clearly established benefit of witness projects or components. In other respects, the merit of local victim or witness assistance efforts has neither been disproved nor systematically confirmed for any of the project types. Most strikingly, we know of no study that examines the extent to which immediate victim or witness trauma, as well as longer run damage, can be averted by project assistance. Yet, this is a core motivation for all victim projects and many witness and victim-witness efforts.

**System benefits.** For victim projects and components, such benefits as time savings for police or reductions in police stress have not been established; again, lack of evidence is the major problem. For witness projects or components, the information gaps are less absolute.

There is substantial confirmation that improved witness notification and management services are: a) saving time for system personnel, especially prosecutors and police; and b) producing very modest improvements in witness appearance rates. Time savings have generally not been quantified except through



relatively crude estimation procedures, but we would expect considerable variation across jurisdictions according to baseline conditions and current project procedures. On the other hand, the magnitude of changes in appearance rates has been established, but for so few jurisdictions that generalization is risky. It is interesting, however, that all reported changes in appearance rates were of similar magnitude (about 10-15 percent over comparison groups), despite marked differences in project and jurisdiction size.

Because those system benefits of witness projects--especially time savings--that we are reasonably confident about have not been widely quantified, no conclusions can be drawn about the range of cost savings produced for the criminal justice system. Other things being equal, including the police witness in the notification system appears to provide a considerable boost to the "system costs saved" column of the ledger, however. This is true because: a) police time is expensive; and b) police witnesses are involved in almost every case.

It is important to distinguish between direct cost savings (i.e., reduced agency budgets) and indirect savings (i.e., resources freed up for alternative uses). Police overtime expenditures may decline, but most system savings, if any, are likely to fall in the indirect category.<sup>4/</sup> Thus, operation of a witness project or witness component ordinarily means a net budget increase to the locality.

For a number of other system benefits, the available evidence, although limited, raises doubts about the expectations for victim/witness assistance projects. Efforts to document changes in dismissal rates, processing speed, and conviction rates, as well as more subjective measures of victim/witness attitudes and predispositions to report crime or cooperate in prosecution have been largely unsuccessful.

Why might this be the case? There are at least three possibilities:<sup>5/</sup>

- First, the chain of assumptions leading up to these outcomes and impacts may be faulty. The theory itself may be bad.
- Second, the theory may be correct, but the measurements and design used to test the theory may be unsatisfactory.
- Third, the expected effects may occur, but be too weak to detect through typical evaluation designs.

At this point, we favor a combination of the second and third explanations. Greater scrutiny of the theoretical argument may prove more profitable when more and better evidence is available. On its face, it exhibits no glaring flaws.

<sup>4</sup> Making the police department happy has other potential benefits for program operations; for example, eliciting more police referrals of clients and opening up channels to improve property return.

<sup>5</sup> We are assuming that the projects are, by and large, expending the resources and performing the activities expected of them.

## IMPLICATIONS

Our assessment of the state of knowledge about victim/witness assistance brings us to a final conclusion. Policymakers and practitioners at all levels in the public and private sectors simply cannot expect much guidance from the research and evaluation literature in making resource allocation decisions about victim/witness assistance efforts.

We cannot, with much confidence, answer the following questions about victim or witness benefits, for example:

1. Are victims and witnesses better off emotionally, or healthier in the long run, for having received assistance?
2. Are victims and witnesses now receiving better treatment at the hands of local criminal justice and social services agencies (other than the host agency), as a consequence of project efforts?
3. Are victims and witnesses suffering significantly less financial loss as a result of victim/witness assistance?

Given the dearth of information on these basic points, questions about the conditions under which favorable outcomes for victims and witnesses are achieved cannot be addressed either. We cannot examine which project types or sponsors or service components produce the greatest client benefits--despite our conviction that this information would be exceedingly useful to decisionmakers.

Even in the area of system benefits, where expectations for witness projects find some confirmation, the current evidence does not shed much light on several significant questions.

1. What service components are producing the most time and cost savings or the greatest improvements in witness appearance rates? Should a project invest considerable resources in support services like transportation and employer intervention, or are good notification services enough?
2. Are prosecutor-based projects best suited to producing the above outcomes, or can other agencies perform equally well?
3. What environmental or contextual conditions significantly influence the magnitude of outcomes? Obviously, having an "enlightened" supportive prosecutor is important, but what characteristics of the court system are important, for example?
4. What range of system savings, direct or indirect, can be expected under varying conditions?

There are not enough data, especially quantitative data, to confidently formulate any replies. This kind of information is sorely needed. Hardly anyone these days would question the proposition that victims and witnesses deserve decent treatment. And no one would demand that victim/witness assistance efforts solve all the assorted ills of the law enforcement and criminal justice system. But we live in a world of scarce public resources, and decisionmakers and their

constituents need to know the value of public investments in victim/witness assistance. In particular, they need to know more about the various options and their advantages and liabilities. The current research and evaluation literature cannot rise to this challenge.

Several directions for future research make sense in the light of current evidence.

1. For all project types, good cross-site comparisons of process and impact, using uniform measures, are needed. Thus, one could examine project successes and failures under differing demographic, organizational, and political conditions.
2. Good, single-site evaluations are still needed in the victim assistance area. In particular, systematic investigation of the extent to which any victim project can alleviate victim psychological trauma would make a real contribution to the state of knowledge.
3. At least two variations of victim project intervention deserve a comparative test: victim services with an on-scene crisis intervention component and victim services without on-scene intervention. Comparison with conditions where police have received some training in handling victims in crisis or orientation to referral sources, or where no special police or civilian victim assistance exists, would also be useful.
4. Similarly, there are some major variations in witness services to be examined: those projects or components providing notification services only; those projects supplementing notification with appearance support, restitution, counseling, and the like; and those jurisdictions in which no special witness services exist.
5. A longitudinal study of the institutionalization experience of local victim/witness assistance efforts could provide many insights. If the projects do not survive, do they leave a residue in the form of procedural changes, new training programs, or the like? If they do survive, what happens to their budgets and organizations, and why? Two relatively low-cost efforts would be useful and interesting in this context: a retrospective review of the literature on defunct projects and development and implementation of a simple monitoring system for checking annually on the fate and funding levels of projects now in existence.

Most of the research suggestions advanced are fairly demanding and expensive. Ultimately, of course, the decision to invest in such work must be balanced against its probable utility in guiding decisions.

If the investment is made in further evaluation, however, the following three points are suggested:

1. Appropriate comparison groups or baselines are essential. Given the infeasibility of classic experimental designs under most circumstances, potential for quasi-experimental designs should be thoroughly investigated.

2. Behavioral indicators of outcomes should be given preference over measures of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. While attitude change may contribute to desirable outcomes, it is extremely difficult to measure and, in itself, not convincing evidence of success.
3. Evaluation designs should emphasize the more intermediate system effects of victim/witness assistance efforts. For long-term impacts, such as increased crime reporting or citizen cooperation in prosecution, weak effects are likely, attributing results to projects interventions is difficult, and measurement is costly. Study of intermediate benefits probably is sufficient to show whether victim/witness assistance efforts indeed contribute to a solution of the larger problems of unnecessary victim suffering and erosion of public support for the criminal justice system.

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## Toward An Evaluable Community Service Sanctioning Project Model

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### Introduction

The National Assessment of Adult Restitution Programs is funded by a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the National Institute of Justice), Office of Program Evaluation. The project aims at producing evaluable models of both community service and monetary restitution projects for adult offenders. An evaluable model will conceptualize project inputs, project activities, and project outputs as well as specify linkages among these variables. Finally, measurement points and measures will be provided in relation to the inputs, activities, and outputs. In short, an evaluable model describes independent variables (in this case, community service and financial restitution programs) in measurable terms and is a necessary prerequisite for the assessment of program effects or outcomes, the dependent variables.

This paper will focus on community service sanctioning projects, describe the procedures we have been following to arrive at a composite evaluable model, offer some initial impressions regarding community service sanctioning projects, and present a preliminary draft of a composite community service sanctioning project.

### Methodology

Since the evaluable models were to derive from and reflect the experiences of actual operating projects, the first task was to identify the population of both monetary restitution and community service sanctioning projects in the country. To do that, we needed to develop a working definition of what was meant by a community service or monetary restitution project. The best we could do was an imperfect, yet usable, definition that specified that at least 75 percent of the clients of a project must have a monetary restitution and/or community service requirement and that monetary restitution or community service sanctioning must be an explicit and central programming focus of the project.

Admittedly, the notions of "explicit" and "central" allow considerable latitude for interpretation. Clearly, however, we wanted to exclude programs in which community service and monetary restitution were incidental program requirements. We therefore obtained the judgment, first, from people who identified potential programs for us and, second, from the various project directors as to whether monetary restitution or community service sanctioning should be considered explicit and central.

Armed with a working definition, we surveyed all state criminal justice planning agencies, all criminal justice local planning units, and all state departments of corrections in the 50 states and the various territories to request that they identify projects in their jurisdictions consistent with our

working definition of monetary restitution or community service sanctioning projects. The list compiled from these surveys was supplemented with projects identified in previous surveys. This process produced a list of 289 identified community service sanctioning or monetary restitution projects.

Telephone interviews were conducted with the director of each identified project. The interview involved two stages. The first stage covered some very open-ended questions to determine if the project met our working definition of community service sanctioning or monetary restitution projects. Many projects did not meet the working definition, and we were able in very short telephone conversations to reduce the population to 108 projects.

For those projects that met our operational definition, we proceeded to the second phase of the interview. This involved a fairly structured interview schedule designed to secure background information regarding the type of restitution used, administrative auspices of the project, budget and number of staff employed, number of clients served, phase in the criminal justice system, whether the project was residential or nonresidential, extent of victim involvement with the project, relative emphasis placed on restitution and community service activities compared to other services provided to offenders, and a very preliminary discussion of the possible interest of the project in further involvement in our research.

Two things clearly emerged from the interviews. First, we noted four distinct patterns in the use of monetary restitution and community service. Some projects were predominantly involved in monetary restitution; others were predominantly involved in community service sanctioning; others required offenders to complete both monetary restitution and community service requirements; and some required some offenders to complete monetary restitution and community service requirements and other offenders to complete community service requirements.

Second, very few of the projects encouraged direct involvement between victims and offenders, and those that did only involved a minority of cases. Based on information secured from the screening interviews, we selected a purposive sample of 20 projects that reflected diversity along the dimensions of type of restitution (predominantly monetary, predominantly community service, both monetary and community service, or either monetary or community service), administrative auspices, phase in the criminal justice system, geographic location, and residential or nonresidential programming.

After selecting the 20 projects, we then negotiated with each project a written memorandum of understanding that specified the purpose of our research, what the project could expect from the researchers, and what demands we would likely be placing upon the project. We were able to complete memoranda of understanding with 19 of the 20 originally selected projects; one project chose not to participate in the research and was replaced by another project similar in characteristics.

In addition to collecting data from which to assemble an evaluable model of the current operations of each project, we also collected data of a historical nature in order to understand the origin of the project and the process by which the monetary restitution or community service sanctioning idea was implemented. We collected data from a review of all available project documents, as well as site visits which provided opportunities for interviews with project staff and

other key respondents, including persons involved in the history and development of the project as well as other key actors in the criminal justice system. We are preparing reports based on available documents and information collected through interviews which trace the pre-project history of the restitution or community service sanctioning idea, analyze the process by which the idea was implemented, and present the current operations of the project. The current operations section identifies project inputs with measures, project activities with measures, and project outputs with measures, and to the extent that it has been articulated, describes the rationale linking inputs to activities and activities to outputs.

Generally, however, we are finding that the rationale is not very clearly articulated. These project reports, once prepared in draft form, are reviewed with the various projects and updated, clarified, and corrected to insure that we have an accurate understanding of the current operations.


The various individual project models will form the basis for the development of composite evaluable models. At this point, we expect to develop two--an evaluable model of a community service sanctioning project and an evaluable model of a monetary restitution project. Although there may be some differences based upon location in the criminal justice system or administrative auspices, we do find considerable similarities in the inputs, activities, and outputs. We think that one model can be developed for each type of programming, which might be implemented at various settings with some modifications. Programs utilizing both monetary restitution and community service sanctioning will probably reflect some merged version of the two models we are developing. Figure I presents a draft composite model of a community service project involving the major activity components, outputs, and outcomes.

#### Preliminary Impressions

Based on our work up to this point, a number of tentative conclusions can be offered:

1. The community service projects in this group predominantly serve misdemeanants. There doesn't appear to be any inherent reason why they could not also serve felons, but the projects in our group tend to have been established for misdemeanor offenders.
2. These projects appear to have the ability to serve a very large number of offenders at very nominal costs. They tend not to get involved in counseling or supervision types of activities, and therefore, a small staff is able to provide services to a substantial number of offenders.
3. By and large, the projects have not experienced any major difficulty finding opportunities in the community for offenders to engage in unpaid community service.
4. The community service projects included in our sample have, at best, collected evaluative data on inputs--especially the number and characteristics of offenders referred--and outputs--especially the number and characteristics of project completions (in-project successes) and the

FIGURE 1: COMMUNITY SERVICE PROJECT MODEL



number of hours of service performed. Very little data has been collected on the major activity components, and in this respect the project has been treated by the evaluator as a kind of "black box."

5. The projects have highly successful completion rates. Typically, 90 percent or more of the offenders admitted to a project successfully complete program requirements.

The Study of Governmental Responses to Crime  
Project Report No. 1\*

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The Governmental Responses to Crime Project began in October 1978. It has involved a substantial effort to collect and retrieve large amounts of information about cities and crime. We are within three months of completing the data collection effort and about to embark on its analysis. This paper, therefore, does not report the analyses of these data but, rather, describes the data base we are collecting and some of the uses to which it will be put.

We needed to make decisions about three sets of variables: the time frame for the study, its geographic and jurisdictional scope, and the operational meaning of crime and of governmental responses. Each of these deserves scrutiny.

We decided to concentrate our study on the 31-year period from 1948 to 1978. We chose 1948 as the beginning point of our study because it represents the first national elections of the post-World War II era. We chose not to go back to earlier years both because we wanted to avoid the special circumstances of the Great Depression and of the war years and because we feared that it would be too difficult to retrieve information for an earlier period. We chose 1978 as the end point of our study period because it provided a decade of experience with LEAA programs and grants. Although we are not specifically attempting to evaluate LEAA's effect on cities, we wanted to be able to take it into account.

Our original proposal promised to study 10 city triads consisting of a central city and two of its suburbs. In some minor ways we have contracted that enterprise; in some major ways we have expanded the scope of our study.

In looking for cities on which to concentrate, we determined at the outset to choose urban areas which would reelect some of our major hypotheses about the manner in which cities respond to crime. Thus, we wanted sites which were rapidly growing as well as those which were stable or declining. We wanted locations with large minority populations and some with smaller ones; we looked for some with predominantly black minority composition and some with a large proportion of Latinos. We wanted cities with reformed city governments in which a city manager played a predominant role and unreformed cities in which mayors and traditional partisan elections were more important. We wanted cities which had black mayors as well as some which did not. We wanted cities with very high crime rates as well as some with lower ones. Finally, we wanted study sites in all sections of the country.

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\*This is a preliminary report of the Governmental Responses to Crime Project funded under Grant 78 NI-AX-0096 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. While the principal investigator, Professor Herbert Jacob, is the author of this report, the project has been carried forward jointly with Professor Robert L. Lineberry who is co-principal investigator and Dr. Anne Heinz who is project manager.



This led us to examine the characteristics of the 65 largest cities and from that examination we chose 10: Philadelphia, Newark, Boston, Atlanta, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Houston, Phoenix, Oakland, and San Jose. These sites provide us all the contrasts mentioned above and many more. The eastern cities and Oakland have been stable or declining; Atlanta, Phoenix, Houston, and San Jose have experienced rapid growth. Oakland, San Jose, and Phoenix have city managers. Newark, Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta and Oakland have large black populations; San Jose, Phoenix, and Houston have substantial Latino populations. Newark, Atlanta, and Oakland have had black mayors.

The crime rates of the cities also differ substantially. In addition, our study sites reflect a wide range of socioeconomic circumstances. For instance, using the index of need developed by Bunce and Glickman, 1980, we find three of our cities (Newark, Atlanta, and Boston) among the 10 most needy cities and three (Phoenix, Indianapolis, and San Jose) among the 10 least needy (see table 1). Likewise, these cities also represent different degrees of income inequality. Thus, we are confident that we have chosen 10 sites which will provide us widely varying settings for our analysis.

The selection of these sites, however, had one disadvantage--not all of them had enough suburbs for us to find two to complete the proposed triad. The towns around Newark, Oakland, and San Jose are not clearly enough linked to those central cities, rather than to others in the metropolitan area, to be called their suburbs. In addition, Indianapolis vastly expanded its boundaries in 1972 and swallowed up most of its suburbs in a metropolitan-wide form of government called unigov. Thus, we can examine suburbs for only 6 of our 10 cities.

However, we have vastly expanded the geographic scope of our study from our original proposal by also collecting some information on all 395 cities in the United States that had a population of 50,000 or more in 1950, 1960 or 1970. These 395 cities constitute our baseline data set. We call it our baseline data set because we will use these cities as a basis of comparison for our 10 cities. Examination of the baseline cities will permit us to see to what degree our study sites reflect mean or modal trends among all larger cities and to what extent we are dealing with deviant cases. Although we have collected only limited information about the 395 cities, this data set constitutes a very large file with almost 200,000 bits of information.

We also needed to operationalize our concept of crime. We are concerned with the perceptions of crime that city officials might respond to rather than a "true" crime rate for our cities. For that reason, one of our measures of crime is the data collected as "Offenses Known to the Police" from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). We collected these data from the published reports on an annual basis for most of our time period, but for a 10-year span we took them from a data set located at the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. The consortium also provided us data on a monthly basis for a 10-year period. We use these UCR data in full knowledge of the many critiques that have been leveled against them. Those criticisms, however, are directed against their use as measures of the real incidence of crime rather than as indicators of perceived crime. These data are the reports which appear in the local press and they are the ones to which local officials must respond. For those reasons, they appear quite adequate for our use.

Table 1  
Need Scores and Need Rankings, Cities with Populations over 250,000

Rank	City	Need Score*	Rank	City	Need Score*
1	Newark	1.448	30	Kansas City	0.042
2	New Orleans	1.166	31	Los Angeles	0.017
3	St. Louis	1.022	32	Denver	-0.030
4	Cleveland	0.782	33	Fort Worth	-0.117
5	Birmingham	0.777	34	St. Paul	-0.134
6	Baltimore	0.764	35	Sacramento	-0.142
7	Washington	0.663	36	Portland	-0.160
8	Detroit	0.626	37	Columbus	-0.165
9	Atlanta	0.590	38	Toledo	-0.168
10	Boston	0.556	39	Baton Rouge	-0.178
11	Cincinnati	0.543	40	Long Beach	-0.202
12	Oakland	0.524	41	Seattle	-0.221
13	Chicago	0.521	42	Oklahoma City	-0.242
14	Buffalo	0.513	43	Dallas	-0.249
15	New York	0.517	44	Charlotte	-0.260
16	Philadelphia	0.495	45	Jacksonville	-0.331
17	Louisville	0.485	46	Houston	-0.356
18	Pittsburgh	0.484	47	Wichita	-0.363
19	San Antonio	0.467	48	Albuquerque	-0.365
20	Miami	0.459	49	Omaha	-0.389
21	Norfolk	0.341	50	Austin	-0.399
22	El Paso	0.322	51	Tucson	-0.435
23	Memphis	0.316	52	Honolulu	-0.476
24	Rochester	0.299	53	San Diego	-0.510
25	San Francisco	0.219	54	Tulsa	-0.517
26	Tampa	0.155	55	Nashville-Davidson	-0.556
27	Milwaukee	0.060	56	Phoenix	-0.564
28	Minneapolis	0.059	57	Indianapolis	-0.567
29	Akron	0.058	San Jose	-0.892	

\*The average need score for the population of the 483 metropolitan cities included in the needs analysis is zero. Large cities as a group are somewhat needier than average.

Source: Bunce and Glickman (1980).

In addition, however, we have collected an independent measure of perceived crime. For 9 of our 10 cities (Newark was excluded because of its unique location in the New York megalopolis), we analyzed the content of local newspapers. It was, unfortunately, not possible to read all issues of all newspapers completely. Therefore, we took a random sample of dates which provided us a randomly reconstructed week for each four-month period of a year. We then chose the particular newspaper to read according to each paper's share of the citywide circulation. This provided us with 21 newspapers for each city for each year of the 31-year period.

For each newspaper thus selected, we read the front page (or in the case of tabloids, the first three pages) and the editorials and letters to the editor. One of the items we counted was the number of crime incidents reported on the first page and whether they had taken place locally or somewhere else. This crime incident count will then provide us with a second and independent measure of the amount of crime to which local officials might respond.

The third element requiring measurement in our research is governmental response. We have operationalized this in a number of quite different and independent ways. First, we have measures which come from police departments and police activities. These include arrest data (available to us in several instances on a monthly basis for much of the period), the number of sworn officers, police manning policies, the number of squad cars, the number of officers in the patrol division and in other divisions, and the total amount of police protection expenditures. We also viewed large changes in offense rates as potential response to crime, since it is well known that these crime rates can be manipulated by police departments.

We have not limited ourselves, however, to these conventional measures of police response to crime. We are also researching each change of police chief (or the equivalent position in the city), the number of policy changes and policy statements recorded in our content analysis of local newspapers, changes in intergovernmental revenues devoted to policing (largely LEAA grants), changes in conviction rates in local courts, changes in the staffing of the local prosecutor, and changes in local ordinances which involve crime.

Thus, we have a wide array of measures of governmental responses to crime. We expect to find considerable variation in their significance from one city to another and over the 31-year time period. By using these many measures, we avoid gross oversimplification of what surely is a complex process.

These data have been collected from a variety of sources. Some, such as the offense data and police protection expenditures, were obtained from published sources--the Uniform Crime Reports and Census Bureau publications. Most of our information from our 10 cities, however, has been collected on-site from city offices and archives by our field staff. In addition, we have relied on newspaper accounts for specific events, such as the hiring of a new police chief, and on interview responses from persons who were well informed about events in a particular period.

We are, of course, aware of the potential bias in the oral histories; we have attempted to account for that bias by relying on several knowledgeable respondents for each time period. We are also investigating in depth--through

newspaper and documentary research and by interviews with participants--key decisions in each city.

Finally, we are obtaining from our professional field staff a profile of each city for the 31-year period. This historical essay will provide us with a great deal of qualitative background material for our comparative analysis of the 10 sites. Most of these data sets are presently being organized into computer accessible files. The numerical time series are being compiled into SPSS files; much of the interview material and data about police chief selections is being organized into RIQS files.

An important part of our work has been an effort to pay special attention to the quality of the data we have been collecting. On superficial examination, the time series look like numbers that are easy to analyze. However, in many cases our field staff has warned us that the series are not consistent because of changes in definitions or changes in departmental jurisdiction. Each of these and other problems with the data are being fully documented in our code books so that we and future users will know what precautions are required before proceeding to the analysis of these data.

Our analysis will follow several paths. Our working hypothesis is that issues go through cycles. When there is no perceived problem, the issue is latent. When a problem comes to be seen as serious, it enters an acute stage; when the general public and government officials tire of the problem, it enters a chronic stage--still present, unsolved, but not considered top priority.

Thus, the manner in which cities respond to crime depends, in the first instance, on the way in which crime is perceived as a problem. That, however, is not simply a function of the seriousness of crime nor the manner of its presentation; it also depends on the presence of other problems that are pressing for public and official attention. The agenda for action is always limited; whether crime is placed on it depends not only on how seriously the crime problem is perceived, but also on what other problems are clamoring for attention.

Secondly, the manner in which cities respond to crime will, we think, depend on the structure of decisionmaking in a city, the decisionmaking styles which are utilized, the information that is available to decisionmakers, and the amount of resource slack that decisionmakers enjoy. These variables which intervene between crime as a problem and the responses that city officials devise carry us far from the specifics of crime and the criminal justice system. But by not taking this larger context into account, we believe it would be impossible to understand the process that produces governmental responses to crime.

We do not yet have all of our data in analyzable form; therefore, our first analyses are more modest than our grand scheme will require. At the moment we are working on four small-scale analyses:

- 1) We want to reexamine with our time series data the research of Wilson and Boland (1978) which asserted that styles of policing made a difference in crime rates. Their analysis rested on a cross-sectional analysis of 35 cities for 1972. We are replicating and elaborating their analysis for seven of the same cities for the 31-year period of our study.

- 2) Boland (1976) has suggested that different types of crime are predominant in several sections of the country. She has suggested that violent crime predominates in the stable and declining cities of the Northeast, while property crime is more important in the booming cities of the Southwest and West. The implication of her findings is that the stresses associated with decay lead to personal violence, while the conditions underlying growth are more likely to lead to property crimes. This analysis also rested on an examination of a cross-section of data at one point of time. We will reexamine this finding with the time series of our baseline data set.
- 3) Analysis by Tufte (1978) suggests that Presidents manipulate economic conditions during election years to enhance their chances for reelection or for the election of their favorite as successor. We are examining a parallel hypothesis for cities and crime to see whether crime statistics show cyclical changes that correspond to mayoral elections.
- 4) Finally, we are initiating our use of our content analysis of the city press by examining the degree to which press attention to crime reflects changes in officially published crime statistics. From there, we will look for other correlates of press attention to crime, looking both at larger societal factors and to changes in the organization of the newspapers themselves.

I am unable, at this time, to provide results for these several research efforts. We are, as I stated, at the threshold of the analysis stage of our work. This paper, however, has outlined our data holdings and may allow others to plan their own research. Our data will be made available to others at the conclusion of our grant, which we now anticipate to occur in October 1981.

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#### Managing the Police Demand

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Since July of 1978, the Wilmington Department of Police has been operating a program entitled "Managing the Police Demand." The aim of this program has been to test the effectiveness of alternative methods of handling requests for police service; that is, methods other than the immediate response of a police unit. This program was funded for a one-year experimental period by the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the National Institute of Justice), under Grant #77-NI-99-0074. This paper will briefly discuss our experience with the program.

The concept of Managing the Police Demand was an outgrowth of an earlier project of the Wilmington Police Department, the Split Force Patrol Project. Split Force was an effort to develop a system of patrol deployment that would maximize the efficient utilization of patrol resources. Also funded by NILECJ for a one-year experimental period from 1975 to 1976, Split Force remained the standard for patrol operations in Wilmington after the experiment ended.

Basically, the Split Force concept provides for concentrated police patrol coverage to areas experiencing high crime rates, while at the same time maintaining sufficient patrol resources to more efficiently handle requests for police service. Under this concept, the entire patrol force is split into two different and distinct units:

1. The Basic Patrol Force, whose units respond on a prioritized basis to complaints and calls for service as they are called in by citizens.
2. The Structured Patrol Force, whose units are committed full-time to conducting various crime prevention and apprehension activities, which are selected through analysis of crime data and various other feedback mechanisms from police personnel.

The Basic Patrol units were allocated both geographically and temporally according to the demand for service that was experienced. This was done through the use of two computer models, the Patrol Car Allocation Model and the Hypercube Queuing Model. Geographic sectors did not remain stable throughout each 24-hour period, but shifted to match variations in the demand for police service.

The number of basic units deployed also varied to meet demand for service. This resulted in a closer match of resources to demand, allowing each patrol unit to work at an optimum level.

Prior to the Split Force, the Wilmington Department of Police had deployed 43 units each 24-hour period. Under Split Force, the department found it could handle requests for police service with 27 Basic Patrol units. This allowed the department to dedicate the remaining 16 units to full-time crime suppression duties. These units became the Structured Patrol Force.

The above is only a brief summary of the Split Force concept and should not be seen as a complete explanation of the project. This program did lead directly to the current effort of Managing the Police Demand, as we shall see below.

One of the elements of Split Force was the prioritization of complaints into three categories, based on the severity of the incident. In order to modulate some of the peaks in the demand levels experienced, we instituted as part of the Split Force a 30-minute delay procedure for the lowest priority calls, those in category 3. Under this procedure, a call in this category could be delayed for up to 30 minutes; the caller would be advised of the delay and its length so as to keep his or her expectations at a minimum. We found that callers were just as satisfied with a response time of less than 10 minutes as they were with one of twice that length, provided that they were advised of the delay.

This formalized delay procedure allowed us to "spread out" demand peaks to a certain extent. This, in turn, allowed us a certain freedom in staffing patrol units. Rather than deploying enough units to meet peak demand and then having them underutilized at other times, we could make our deployments closer to the average demand level.

At the conclusion of the Split Force experiment, this is how matters stood: Patrol resource deployment was much more closely matched to demand than had been the case previously. The greater efficiency of this approach meant that the same complaint service workload could be handled by fewer units, freeing up units for crime suppression activities.

Under Split Force, police productivity was increased by reacting better to the demand for police services by adapting resources deployed to the demand experienced. The only effort made to better manage the actual demand on patrol units, the use of the 30-minute delay procedure described above, was minimal at best. The Wilmington Department of Police, like any other police agency, had accepted the demand for police services as a given, about which nothing could be done.

Managing the Police Demand, however, represents an attempt to somehow manage this demand for police service, at least to the extent of diverting demand away from the traditional (and costly) service of providing a timely response by a patrol unit to every request for police assistance. The value of such an approach becomes evident when one considers the percentage of police service calls that are not emergencies, that are noncritical, and that could conceivably be amenable to some alternative mode of service. In the one-year period from December 1976 through November 1977, for example, 94.9 percent of the calls for service received by the Wilmington Police were noncritical.

We felt that the judicious use of alternative methods of handling complaints would result in a reduction of the resources necessary to respond to calls for service, without adversely affecting levels of patrol officer utilization or citizen satisfaction. This would, in turn, free up patrol units that could be put to use in more critical areas.

Prior to implementing the alternative response methods, there were two determinations that had to be made: one, what work alternative responses were available; and two, what the community would accept. The alternatives that were arrived at included:

- Formal delayed response. This is the 30-minute delayed response that was originally used in the Split Force. It would be continued.
- Specialist Unit response. This procedure was developed to accommodate a response, by appointment at the convenience of the caller, that could be delayed for some period of time. Essentially, this is a formal delayed response carried out on a much higher level.
- Walk-in response. This alternative of asking complainants to come in to the police station to file a report, instead of having a unit respond to them, had been used informally for some time in the department. It would be continued on a more formal level under Managing the Police Demand.
- Telephone report. A number of police agencies have developed mechanisms for telephone report-taking. This method is particularly useful for handling minor complaints, especially property crimes that are being reported primarily for insurance purposes.
- Outside referral. Because the police are perhaps the only social service agency open 24 hours a day, they frequently are the recipients of requests for which they can offer no effective service. In such instances, it would be more appropriate to refer the caller to other, existing services that are equipped to handle the particular problem.
- Telephone adjustment. Certain complaints received by the police are actually requests for information or advice. Many of these can be satisfactorily handled by the person originally receiving the call in the police communications center.

In order to determine which of these alternatives would be acceptable to the population served by the Wilmington Police, an attitudinal survey was developed and conducted by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachusetts. This firm served as the evaluation consultant for both the Split Force and Managing the Police Demand Projects. Questions regarding the quality of police service, response times, and the alternative responses mentioned above were asked of 344 city residents who had requested police service of noncritical complaints during the first few months of 1978. It was found that slightly more than 34 percent of those surveyed would be willing to accept one of the alternative responses (see Figure 1).



Figure 1

# ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES FOR NONCRITICAL COMPLAINTS

Question: For the type of problem you reported, what do you think would be the best police department response to meet your needs? Would you say it was:

1. Having a patrol car respond immediately 65.8%
2. Having a patrol car come to you when available, but within 24 hours 13.5%
3. Having the police department call you back on the telephone (this would result in a police visit whenever appropriate) 18.4%
4. Going to the police department in person (this would result in a police visit whenever appropriate) 2.3%

(N=342)

With the above in mind, the Wilmington Police set itself a goal of decreasing the volume of complaints dispatched to Basic Patrol units by at least 20 percent. This decrease would be attained through the use of the various response alternatives. These response alternatives would be used only for low-priority complaints where immediate assistance was not required.

Whereas during the Split Force Project we had used three categories for prioritizing complaints, under Managing the Police Demand only two were used. We found that under Split Force only 1.6 percent of the complaints received were classified in the middle category by our communications personnel. In actual practice, complaints were treated as either critical or noncritical, with few "in-betweens." We adopted this two-fold distinction under Managing the Police Demand using the following breakdown:

- Critical complaint--a call for service that requires the immediate intervention of a police officer. Complaints involving a serious offense that is in progress or has just occurred, complaints where a suspect is still on the scene or is fleeing, or complaints where any life-threatening condition exists would all be classified as critical complaints.
- Noncritical complaint--a call for service that does not require an immediate response by a police officer. Such calls may be delayed, adjusted, or handled through alternative means.

The first responsibility of a communications clerk upon receipt of a request for police service is to determine if the complaint is of a critical or noncritical nature. If critical, the dispatcher is notified and sufficient patrol units dispatched immediately to the scene. If noncritical, the communications clerk will take a few moments to see if the caller will accept one of the response alternatives. Many noncritical complaints will still continue to require a

response by a patrol unit, depending on the circumstances attendant to the complaint. In some cases the caller will demand to have a police officer respond, even though by our criteria none should do so. (Our policy in Wilmington has been to dispatch a patrol unit if a citizen demands it, regardless of the nature of the complaint.)

If the caller does accept one of the alternatives offered, and the complaint cannot be quickly adjusted at the time of the initial call, the caller is then referred to our Complaint Service Unit. An officer from this unit will then call the complainant back at a time that is convenient to both of them. In this way, emergency phone lines are not tied up and complainants are not put on hold indefinitely. In addition, the Complaint Service officer can schedule his callbacks over an entire shift, spreading out the demand peaks, which enables him to handle more complaints.

By diverting 20 percent of the complaints away from dispatch to our Basic Patrol Units, we anticipated being able to decrease the number of four-hour active response units by at least 20 percent, while maintaining individual unit workload and response time to primary critical calls at levels comparable to those achieved under the Split Force. This reduction was again planned through use of the Patrol Car Allocation Model and the Hypercube Queuing Model, as was done for the Split Force Project.

We show the reduction in Basic Patrol Unit deployment in Figure 2. Note that the units are defined in terms of four-hour tours. The number of eight-hour units can be determined by dividing each total by two.

Figure 2

## COMPARISON OF BASIC PATROL DEPLOYMENT 4-HOUR ACTIVE RESPONSE UNITS

Tour	Hours	Split Force	Managing the Police Demand
I	2400-0400	8	7
II	0400-0800	5	4
III	0800-1200	7	7
IV	1200-1600	10	8
V	1600-2000	12	8
VI	2000-2400	12	8
	Total	54	42

Managing the Police Demand has been in full operation since July of 1978. Although the federally funded project ended on November 1, 1979, the Wilmington Department of Police continues to operate the program. As of the date of this writing, the final evaluation report on the program is being prepared by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.

Although we do not have the final figures on the project, we are convinced that it has been successful. The alternative responses are in operation. They are accepted by the public. The reduction in Basic Patrol Unit deployment has been achieved. There is no indication that individual unit workload has

increased beyond expectations. The overall effectiveness of the department seems unaffected.

This is, of course, only a brief description of the operation of Managing the Police Demand. Anyone wishing more detailed information on this program, or on the Split Force, should consult with either of the sources below:

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75717

Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program:  
A Summary

W. Victor Rouse, Vice President  
American Institutes for Research  
in the Behavioral Sciences  
Washington, D.C.

COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice urged that:

Every American can translate his concern about, or fear of crime into positive action. Every American should. Specialists alone cannot control crime. Controlling crime is the business of every American. Direct citizen action to improve law enforcement has become an absolute necessity./1/

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 mentioned the concept of "community anti-crime activities," though no federal funds were allocated for them at that time. In 1973, the National Advisory Board on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals wrote a report on community crime prevention that strongly advocated citizen participation in anti-crime activity:

Action by citizens is at the heart of community crime prevention. The Commission recommends that every citizen contribute to local community crime prevention efforts. Government agencies should encourage and support citizen action programs. Existing community organizations should explore ways they can relate their activities to crime prevention./2/

Congressional hearings were held before the Crime Control Act of 1976 was passed. Testimony was given by private citizens and members of community-based organizations that indicated their concern about crime in their neighborhoods. These groups sought federal recognition of their independently initiated anti-crime activities. In an effort to promote and support these locally organized crime prevention activities, Congress amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to include a provision for direct federal funding of such activities. This amendment (Public Law 94-503: Crime Control Act of 1976) mandated the establishment of the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs (OCACP)

<sup>1</sup>The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup>National Advisory Board on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Report on Community Crime Prevention. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The stated purpose of OCACP is:

- to provide appropriate technical assistance to community and citizen groups to enable such groups to apply for grants to encourage community and citizen participation in crime prevention and other law enforcement and criminal justice activities;
- to coordinate its activities with other federal agencies and programs (including the Community Relations Division of the Department of Justice) designed to encourage and assist citizen participation in law enforcement and criminal justice activities; and
- to provide information on successful citizen and community participation programs to citizens and community groups./3/

To implement this mandate, Congress allocated \$15 million to OCACP for grants to community groups for each of the fiscal years (FY) 1977 and 1978. The Community Anti-Crime Program is designed to assist the efforts of community groups by providing resources for organizing and implementing their activities. As stated in the CAC Program Guidelines:

Emphasis is placed on community-based organizations that have substantial grassroots input or a membership base of neighborhood groups, or that relate to a network of neighborhood groups. In addition, already established or new neighborhood groups may come together in a coalition to apply under the name of one applicant community organization. The central applicant would serve as the grantee and would normally assume fiscal administration and other program coordination responsibilities for the project. Under such arrangements, unincorporated neighborhood groups would be eligible participants because the applicant organization has nonprofit, incorporated status. Eligible grantees, therefore, might include: (1) locally based chapters of national organizations involved in community improvement efforts; (2) community-based organizations (having no national affiliation) currently conducting community improvement efforts; (3) community development corporations, community-based economic development corporations, and other established community-neighborhood organizations; and (4) existing community anti-crime organizations./4/

To provide essential seed money for grassroots organizations, OCACP developed operational guidelines and program criteria for awarding the grants, which were in amounts up to \$250,000.

The guidelines suggested, for illustrative purposes, two categories of activities that would be eligible--those that stressed reduction of opportunities for crime and those that addressed the causes of crime. Examples of projects in

<sup>3</sup>Community Anti-Crime Program Guidelines, LEAA Manual M4500. IF, 21 December 1977, Chapter 2, Section 2, Part a.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

the first category were blockwatch programs, escort services for the elderly, and residential security education. The second category of projects included youth crisis centers, victim assistance programs, volunteer-based recreation programs, and juvenile counseling services. The design of the program was to be the responsibility of the community organization, and applicants were encouraged to develop innovative approaches.

LEAA funded 150 CAC projects during FY 1978. Of these, 146 were action grants to community organizations and four were technical assistance grants. Two additional technical assistance grants had already been funded in FY 1977. The 146 action grants were selected from over 1,000 organizations. Twenty-six million dollars were spent on the action grants, with the average award being \$183,721.

#### THE EVALUATION

The CAC evaluation, like many others, had its real beginning long after the program formulation at the national level was completed and considerably after most of the local projects had begun operation. When American Institutes for Research undertook the evaluation in October 1978, it was evident that information on the program would have to be produced quickly. OCACP was expecting congressional review to begin in January 1979 and had to start making re-funding decisions in that same month. It was obvious that the evaluation design could not afford the luxury of extensive first-round site visits or other time-consuming data collection efforts.

On the other hand, we did not want to base our evaluation on archival sources simply because it was more expedient. The task of the design was to meet the information needs of policymakers, while at the same time generate the scientific data necessary for a valid evaluation effort.


The model that we employed to guide our evaluation analysis corresponds directly with our view of the program process as a multi-stage sequence of inter-related conditions and events. This model, as applied to the Community Anti-Crime evaluation, is presented in Figure 1.

The CAC evaluation was designed to answer the following questions: ✓

1. What are the specific functions that residents and resident groups can most appropriately and usefully perform in the process of crime prevention?
2. What are the structural and organizational characteristics of resident groups that increase or limit their effectiveness in the performance of these functions?
3. What has been the impact, positive and negative, of the LEAA grants on the development of resident groups with these kinds of characteristics and on their capacity for performing the various functions?
4. What other types of support, local or federal, seem necessary, in addition to the inputs that LEAA provides, to enable resident groups to overcome the specific problems and difficulties that they encounter?

Figure 2

BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE CAC PROGRAM EVALUATION



**BASLINE STATE OF AFFAIRS:**

Problems to be addressed in terms of (1) crime levels, (2) fear of crime, and (3) level of cooperation among residents and criminal justice officials. Most of the data for this would come from the grant applications or, for a Level III, from official records and interviews.

**ORGANIZATIONAL INPUTS:**

The process of developing the components of a viable organization as well as structural characteristics of the group. The former would include financial systems, chains of authority, hiring staff, etc.; the latter such things as the degree of hierarchy, patterns of leadership, etc.

**PROGRAM INPUTS:**

All steps in program planning and development leading up to actually engaging in crime prevention activities. Examples would be planning activities, needs assessments, surveys of citizens, talking with neighborhood groups, getting groups organized, buying equipment for marking property, etc.

**DISPOSING CONDITIONS:**

Local circumstances affecting the development of organizational and programmatic capabilities over which the project has little or no direct control. These include both demographic characteristics such as racial and ethnic composition. SES levels of the community, etc., as well as the existence and relative strength of other organizations, political realities, willingness of groups to cooperate, experience of residents with previous interventions in community, etc.

**IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES:**

Actual levels of crime prevention activity engaged in, (e.g., hours of surveillance, amount of property engraved, numbers of youths counseled).

**INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES:**

Intended and unintended consequences of crime prevention activities having taken place (except for those direct impacts on crime, fear of crime, and level of CJ system cooperation). Examples would be increases in sense of community, increasing use of streets, increases in security feelings, lower transiency levels, political clout of group, new tensions in community at large, changes in the political agenda, etc.

**ULTIMATE OUTCOMES:**

Changes in the baseline state of affairs in terms of crime levels, fear of crime, and cooperation among residents and the CJ community.

**OTHER EVENTS:**

Events taking place outside the immediate project environment that affect its ability to develop and implement its crime prevention program. For example, a change in city administration (Other Event) might affect the Disposing Condition of groups' willingness to cooperate. In addition, a particular violent wave of crime (as an Other Event) might have an effect on the number of security precautions taken by residents (Immediate Outcome) which is independent of project efforts. Similar events can also affect intermediate and ultimate outcomes.

**TA AND OTHER INPUTS:**

The CAC Program is one that has built in intervention in the project development and implementation process. The role of TA groups and project monitors is expected to be crucial, and we will be concerned with their roles at all stages.



5. What are the generalizable implications of the CAC experience for the role and functions of resident groups and for the related local and federal policy issues?

To answer these questions, we undertook a process-oriented evaluation involving three levels of analysis.

The first level, Level I, involves data collection on and from all CAC projects. First, we collected demographic data on the cities and on the target areas chosen by the projects. We also coded information presented by the projects in their initial grant applications.

The bulk of the data at this level will come, however, from two surveys of all projects. The first of these took place in the spring of 1979. The second will be mailed to projects as close as possible to the end of their funding periods. Since these are surveys of all projects, they have been labeled "Global Surveys" and are referred to as such in the rest of this report.

Of the 141 surveys mailed in the first wave, 128 were returned (a 90.8-percent rate). The data from the surveys were combined with the demographic data and the grant proposal data in the Management Information System that enables us to cross-reference data elements from the different sources. It is the complete data from these 128 CAC projects that form the descriptive data base for this report, providing us with two snapshots of the program. The proposal data give us a picture of the conditions that the projects were trying to address and what they intended to do, and the Global Survey data give us a picture of where the projects are after approximately one year of operation.

Level I data are the most descriptive of the CAC Program as a whole, but they do not provide a great deal of insight into how specific projects are implementing specific crime prevention activities and with what effects. In short, descriptive data do not enable one to make evaluative statements. For that, on-site collection efforts--and thus, the other two levels of evaluation effort--are necessary.

Just as Level I sites constitute the basis of our Global evaluation, Level II sites are the units of analysis for the Focused evaluation, and Level III sites for the Intensive. There are 24 Level II sites, and each is being visited twice. Each of the 12 Level III sites is being visited several times. At each site, we are specifying the results of the Global evaluation by gathering additional detail on the contexts within which the projects are operating, their organizational characteristics and problems, their activities, and their impacts. As of this writing, we have visited all Level II and Level III sites once.

Site visit data provide us with our third snapshot of the program. First-round site visits generally included interviews with staff, tours of the target area, meetings with board members and project directors, and discussions of key activities. Data were collected from both structured interviews and observation of the project and its environmental context.

After each site visit, an extensive report was written to supplement the material in our files from the proposals and the Global Survey. Clearly, it is the 36 projects that we have visited that we know best, and in the analyses that

follow, we will first ask questions about these projects and then, where appropriate, supplement the analysis with data from the proposals and the Global Surveys from other projects.

#### ISSUE OF CREAMING

In this section, we examine the process of site and grantee selection as implemented by OCACP. One of the more frequently heard criticisms of federal programs is that bureaucrats often try to influence the success of their programs by "creaming off" for funding those most likely to succeed. It can be argued that one result of this is that many worthwhile organizations, especially those with no proven track record, never get a chance, even though they may have a lot of innovative ideas and motivation.

In the case of the CAC Program, there were really three kinds of creaming that could have occurred. The program could have chosen cities with low crime rates and/or a history of crime prevention and community organizing activities; it could have chosen groups working in neighborhood target areas with exceptionally low levels of crime and social problems; or it could have selected only groups with extensive experience and proven track record in management. We have looked for evidence of each of these.

#### Did OCACP Choose "Easy" Cities?

Our site visits provided data relevant to an effort to answer this question. We determined whether there was an active crime prevention unit in the police department and whether, in comparison with other cities visited, there was a history of active community organizing efforts. Of the 36 sites visited, 17 were judged to have active crime prevention units. Twenty-four projects were in cities with histories of community organizing. What is interesting, however, is that only 8 projects were in cities that had both, which critics would have said made them ripe for a CAC project. If any creaming took place, therefore, it was in most instances along only one of these dimensions, rather than along both.

Crime data can also be used to address the criticism that OCACP would choose projects in cities with lower than average crime problems. The data that we report are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Crime in the United States, 1977 (the base year for most project applications), and we have data on the 115 projects from jurisdictions with over 25,000 population reporting to the FBI. Our methodology was first to compare the rates for Index crimes in the CAC cities with national rates. Then, we compared the rates for Index crimes in the CAC cities with rates for populations living in cities with over 25,000 population--what we call urban rates. Our intention was to set a basis for comparison with the lower rates typically found in rural areas where there are also few CAC projects. Among the findings are:

#### Property Crime

- The burglary rate for the nation was 1,411 incidents per 100,000 residents. The burglary rates for cities over 25,000 population was 1,824. The median rate for CAC cities was 2,344. Ninety-six CAC cities (83 percent) had burglary rates higher than the national rate. Seventy-six (67 percent) of the CAC cities had burglary rates higher than the urban rate.



- The overall property crime rate for the nation was 4,588 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban property crime rate was 6,031. The median rate for the CAC cities was 6,526. One hundred and four CAC cities (90 percent) had property crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-two (71 percent) had property crime rates higher than the urban rate.

#### Violent Crime

- The murder rate for the nation was 8.8 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban murder rate was 17.5. One hundred CAC cities (87 percent) had murder rates higher than the national rate. Eighty (69 percent) had murder rates higher than the urban rate.
- The overall violent crime rate for the nation was 467 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban violent crime rate was 709. The median rate for the CAC cities was 997. One hundred CAC cities (87 percent) had violent crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-three (72 percent) had violent crime rates higher than the urban rate.

#### Total Crime

- The National Crime Index for 1977 was 5,055 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban Index was 6,740. In the CAC cities, it was 8,197. One hundred and five CAC cities (91 percent) had total crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-five (74 percent) had total crime rates higher than the urban rate.

In addition to looking at individual crimes, one can ask how many CAC sites were worse off than the national or urban rates across crimes. A city could have rates worse than the national or urban rates on from 0 to 7 of crimes listed in the National Crime Index. Table 1 shows the projects by the number of crimes for which the CAC cities have higher rates than the national or urban rates.

Table 1

#### CRIME PROBLEM INDEX FOR CAC CITIES

n = 114	NO. OF PROJECTS			
	National Rate		Urban Rate	
No. of crimes where cities have above-average rates				
0-1	5	( 4.4%)	13	(11.4%)
2-3	3	( 2.6%)	15	(13.1%)
4-5	21	(18.5%)	28	(24.5%)
6-7	35	(74.6%)	58	(50.9%)

From this comparison of crime rate figures, there appears to be very little evidence that OCACP chose projects in cities with abnormally low crime problems. Only eight projects are in cities above the national rates on three or fewer crimes. The vast majority of projects are in cities above the national rates on all or almost all Index crimes.

#### Did OCACP Choose "Easy" Organizations?

OCACP's decision to support locally administered crime prevention projects entailed a certain amount of risk. To some extent, community organizations are an unknown quantity. They are highly disparate in terms of age, experience, structure, and management capability.

There is no generally accepted definition of a community organization, but there are some defining characteristics; for example, accountability to residents; control by voluntary leadership; political, but nonpartisan, orientation; and a high degree of political autonomy. From the federal government's perspective, none of these organizational traits signifies an "easy" grantee. It is no wonder critics charged that OCACP would impose implicit selection criteria to control the risk associated with investing in such unconventional grantees.

Was the selection biased in favor of experienced groups? In this section, we examine the relevant site visit and survey data to determine the extent to which experienced grantees predominate in the CAC Program.

The explicit funding criteria allowed considerable latitude in defining eligible grantees. Local chapters of national organizations involved in community improvement, community organizations with no national affiliation, community development corporations, and existing community anti-crime groups were among those specified as eligible. Even unincorporated groups were eligible, if they formed a coalition and applied under a central, incorporated grantee.

From these criteria, one could infer at least a paper commitment by OCACP to grassroots participation in the program. If the commitment were genuine, we would expect a substantial portion of the grantees to be young, inexperienced, unsophisticated groups in which power to set policy is vested in a volunteer membership. The Global Survey and our first round of site visits focused heavily on problems associated with program start-up and organizational development. Each of these two issues casts light on the question of organizational creaming.

Age of grantees. As a rule, most of the designated grantee organizations are young. For the 105 organizations reporting, 1971 was the median year of incorporation. Seven groups were incorporated before 1950. Five were incorporated in the 1950s, 31 in the 1960s, and 49 were incorporated between 1970 and 1976. A sizable number of grantees (13) were incorporated in 1977 and 1978, usually to meet LEAA eligibility requirements.

Experience. In the Global Survey, we used two indirect measures to evaluate the grantees' experience at the local level. We asked projects about their previous experience with federal grants and about the size of their operating budgets (excluding the CAC grant). For both measures, the findings reflect only the experience of the grantee organizations. Consequently, for some of the coalition projects, the findings present an inflated estimate of overall project experience.

When asked if they had ever received a federal grant other than CAC, 45 (37 percent) of the grantees responded that they had not, and 78 (63 percent) said they had. Only 14 grantees had received LEAA funds before. The median federal grant size was \$200,000. A sizable number of grants were awarded to groups with no track record in grant management.

Our second indirect measure of fiscal management experience produced parallel evidence about the projects. We found that nearly 8 percent of the grantees had no funds other than the CAC grant. Seventy-five percent of the groups have annual budgets of \$50,000 or less, excluding the CAC grant. About half the grantees had additional budgets less than \$183,721, the size of the average CAC grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than \$1 million. In sum, our data show that in over half the cases, the CAC award exceeded the grantees' total operating budget from other sources.

Problems encountered. If the argument that OCACP would choose "easy" organizations cannot be justified, the critics might argue that there are not, after all, many "easy" organizations, and the rest of the community-based groups could be characterized as having so many organizational and management problems that they would never get around to implementing crime prevention activities. Our site visits suggest that although there are significant problems at some of the sites, they are generally of a size only to cause delays and not to cripple the projects.

To provide a balanced picture, we indicate below the number of projects that have specific problems and the number that definitely do not have each problem. The data reflect judgments by our field staff about each project in comparison to the others that they visited.

- For 12 projects, staff turnover has been a problem. For 13 projects, it has not been a problem at all.
- Fourteen projects had difficulty initiating a working relationship with the police; however, 21 had no such problem.
- Eight groups have had conflicts with other community organizations in their cities, but for 12 this has definitely not been a problem.
- Seven projects had financial management problems, but 23 definitely did not.
- Seven projects had difficulty in developing a work plan acceptable to OCACP; however, this was definitely not a problem for 17 projects.
- Eight projects had to rely heavily on technical assistance during their start-up phases, but 27 did not.
- Ten project directors had little program management experience; 10 had a great deal of experience.
- In only seven projects were staff experienced in crime prevention.
- At 17 sites, the person(s) who wrote the grant proposal is not working on the funded project.

Of the 36 projects visited, 11 had none or only one of the problems listed above. Twenty-one had between two and four problems, and four had five or six of the problems. None had more than six.

Where multiple problems exist, they are clearly serious. In some instances, they have caused substantial delays in program implementation and may impair the ability of the projects to meet their objectives by the end of their funding cycles. In only one or two instances, however, did the evaluation field staff feel that organizational problems might actually cripple the projects. In other projects, the problems have been met and dealt with effectively, with only minimal impact on program implementation.

Did OCACP "cream off" the most experienced groups? Alternately, were the projects selected so beset by organizational difficulties that program implementation was impaired?

The data show that only a few projects provide evidence to support either of these contentions. Most of the grantees are fairly new and have only a modicum of grant management experience, though there are exceptions. Although most of the grantees have experienced multiple organizational problems, most have dealt with these problems in ways that resulted in nothing more serious than delays in program implementation. There are only one or two exceptions.

#### CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

##### Citizen Participation in Proposal Development

The LEAA Community Anti-Crime Program Guidelines called for "evidence of substantial input from neighborhood residents in the identification of crime problems and assessment of needs."/5/

The importance of citizen participation in planning can be viewed from two perspectives. Community organizations are voluntary associations that define their purpose in terms of the interests of a specific constituency. Therefore, citizen input is usually considered a requirement for program planning and development efforts. From a crime prevention perspective, citizen participation in planning is assumed to be vital because of its motivating efforts. It can be hypothesized that, particularly at the community level, commitment is partly a function of participation in developing the program. When commitment is high, projects should be able to mobilize their constituencies effectively.

During the first round of site visits, we found that most projects had made some attempt to involve residents of the target areas in the planning of the projects and the development of the proposals that were submitted to LEAA. This involvement ranged from holding community meetings in which residents could voice their concerns, to having citizen volunteers planning the entire project and actually writing the proposal. From our discussions with project staff, we identified six major channels of citizen participation during the planning phase. These are shown in Table 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

Table 2  
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING AND PROPOSAL PREPARATION

	FREQUENCY
(n = 36)	
Citizens attended meetings to discuss community problems and needs	31
Citizens suggested ideas for the CAC proposal	27
Citizens reacted to plans formulated by professional staff of the grantee organization or plans written by outside consultants	22
Citizens surveyed opinions and attitudes of target area residents	15
Citizens provided supporting documentation or data to be included in proposal	14
Citizens drafted major portions of the proposal	11

Thirty-one projects reported that they had organized or participated in some type of community meeting during the initial planning stages. This was the most common channel of participation. Within this category, the organization of meetings, the number of meetings, and attendance varied greatly. Some projects organized only one mass meeting, where the availability of CAC funds and community concerns were discussed. Other projects organized meetings to obtain resident reactions after the proposal was drafted. A few projects held regular, small meetings at which the final proposal was developed.

The two categories of participation next mentioned most often were that citizens suggested ideas for the proposal or that they reacted to plans formulated by professionals. The three most common channels of citizen involvement represent a less intense degree of participation than do the remaining three categories. Attending meetings, suggesting ideas, or reacting to the ideas of others takes less time and effort than surveying neighbors, collecting information, or writing a proposal.

Various small-scale surveys were conducted by citizens for 15 of the projects. These surveys were usually informal and consisted of residents interviewing their neighbors or interviewing people at local stores, shopping centers, or community events. Several other projects mentioned that they had considered doing some kind of survey, but given the conditions in their target areas, they did not think that residents would answer the door to people they did not know.

Residents provided supporting documentation or data to be included in 14 of the projects' proposals. In several cities where crime statistics were not available on a neighborhood basis, volunteers pulled and coded crime reports. In other cities, volunteers were responsible for collecting housing and demographic

data from municipal departments; and for some projects, volunteers collected letters of support from local politicians, community leaders, and police officials. For three projects, citizens were involved in all six channels of participation.

Conclusions as to the extent of citizen involvement in the development of the CAC projects that we studied are mixed. For half the projects, citizens seem to have played only a peripheral role in the planning phase, while in the remaining projects they were an integral part of the process.

#### Role of the Advisory Board

One of the most familiar channels of citizen participation in community action programs is a community or advisory board. We found this to be the case in CAC, with all the projects that we visited having some kind of advisory board. Furthermore, of the 128 respondents to the Global Survey, 85 percent reported that they have a board with community representation. The critics of the CAC Program predicted that these boards would not have a significant role in monitoring project operations and would serve as figureheads, rather than exert real control over the projects.

The structure of boards for the projects that we visited varied considerably. For some projects, the boards are the existing board of directors of the grantee. For other projects, new boards were created specifically for the CAC project. Some projects that are being implemented by coalitions have an overall board for the project, while in other coalitions, each organization has its own advisory board.

The backgrounds and positions of the board members also vary widely. Some boards are composed primarily of community residents, block captains, and representatives of neighborhood associations. The boards for other projects include representatives from social service agencies and police departments, ministers, school principals, and local political leaders. We were told that board members for these projects were usually chosen with the hope that the CAC project could benefit from their experience and draw on some of the resources--such as equipment, space, and money--that they represent.

From our initial site visit observations, it seemed that the boards composed of community residents generally try to maintain greater control over the project activities and paid staff than do boards made up of organization and agency representatives. In the latter case, the boards mainly give advice and serve as trouble-shooters.

According to the information collected during the site visits, we found that there are eight general categories that describe the ways that advisory boards are involved in the project. These are given in Table 3.

Table 3  
ADVISORY BOARD INVOLVEMENT

n = 36	FREQUENCY
Citizens or citizen boards formulated goals for CAC project	25
Citizens or citizen board decided how the CAC funds were allocated	20
Paid staff must have major decisions about activities sanctioned by citizen board	19
Citizen board evaluates performance of CAC staff	18
Citizens or citizen board reviewed applicants and hired project staff	17
The citizen board or a member of the board must sign off on project expenditures	14
Citizen board members participate in day-to-day operations of the project	11
Citizens or the citizen board developed work plans to be implemented by paid staff	8

#### Staffing Patterns

Another item examined under citizen participation is the extent to which CAC projects have selected staff who reflect their constituencies. Our impression from the first round of site visits is that most of the projects seem to be fairly representative of the target area populations.

Five of the 36 sample projects reported that residents who helped to develop the proposal were hired as paid staff, and 22 projects recruited staff members from their target areas. Nine of the projects are staffed at the management level exclusively by target area residents. One project said, however, that they had made a conscious decision not to recruit staff from the target area. They believed that outside persons would be better able to assess the area's problems and would not be involved in local conflicts.

#### CHOICE OF ACTIVITIES: THE SAME OLD STUFF?

Every crime prevention strategy is based on a particular conception of the best means of reducing the incidence of criminal behavior. Some strategies emphasize the deterrent effect of stiff penalties and punishments. Other strategies address the complex of socio-economic and psychological factors that may

make an individual predisposed to commit crime. Still other strategies are aimed at making the commission of crime more difficult and the apprehension of a criminal more likely.

Like other groups of professionals and experts, the law enforcement/criminal justice community has changed its conceptions and philosophical orientations in the light of new evidence. Although each crime prevention strategy has always had its proponents, the focus has shifted over time.

The 1960s and the War on Poverty brought what might be characterized as a "structuralist" approach to crime prevention. People commit crimes because a whole host of environmental factors make legitimate behavior unproductive or because psychological determinants predispose some persons to criminal behavior. This strategy addresses the causes of crime--the influence of society, family, and peers on individual behavior.

In recent years, this strategy has come under attack. Some critics contend that a cause reduction approach simply does not work. They argue that criminal behavior involves rational decisions, that a potential criminal evaluates the costs and benefits of his actions just as any other decisionmaker does. The task of a good crime prevention strategy is to influence that decision in the right way. If the likelihood of committing a crime "successfully" is reduced, if the difficulty of committing a crime is increased, or if the chances of apprehension are raised, the potential criminal will be more likely to refrain from committing a particular crime in a particular neighborhood. The opportunity for crime is thus reduced.

CAC reflects the current interest in opportunity reduction strategies, but program implementation depends on actors--community-based organizations--who have traditionally drawn support from and voiced allegiance to structural cause reduction strategies.

Community-based organizations have tended, historically, to provide services designed to help a person cope with the environment. Their approach has centered on helping people adjust to a society that is often perceived as hostile or unsupportive. Programs that emphasize the structural, cause reduction approach to social problems have been the bread and butter of many community-based organizations. In this context, concern for the possible unwillingness of community-based organizations to adopt the opportunity reduction strategies of CAC is certainly relevant and was often voiced by the program's critics.

The data in Table 4 indicate that the CAC projects are, at least collectively, making substantial investments in opportunity reduction strategies. But what is the typical mix of opportunity and cause reduction activities for individual projects? All of the 123 projects for which we have complete activity data are doing some opportunity reduction activities. The median number engaged in this is 5, but 14 projects are implementing more than 10. Twenty-five projects report that they are doing no activities oriented toward the cause of crime. Of those that are implementing cause reduction activities, 48 are doing only one or two, and 17 are doing more than five.

In terms of the mix of strategies, opportunity reduction activities comprise the majority of efforts for 76 percent of the projects. Percentages of project activities in opportunity reduction range from 22 to 100, with the median being

Table 4

CAC ACTIVITIES BROKEN DOWN INTO OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION  
AND CAUSE REDUCTION STRATEGIES

Opportunity Reduction		Cause Reduction	
Activities	Number of Citations	Activities	Number of Citations
Public Information/Education	203	Delinquency Prevention	125
Newsletters	26	Youth recreation	27
General Publicity	41	Counseling, leadership training	27
Community Forums	13	Academic assistance	3
Crime, Drug, and Alcohol programs	11	Other delinquency prevention	63
Crime Prevention Film Library	6	Social Services	46
Crime Prevention curriculum	5	Outreach/advocacy	18
Seminars	24	Child care	5
Workshops	34	Child abuse prevention	4
Other information activities	25	Other social services	19
Blockwatch Activities	176	Community Resource Development	33
Blockwatch organizing	90	Community organizing (non-crime)	17
Building watch organizing	20	Technical assistance providers	2
Business watch organizing	8	Needs assessment	10
Whistle Alert	8	Other resource development	4
Safe houses	10		
Other blockwatch organizing	40		

Table 4 (con't)

Opportunity Reduction		Cause Reduction	
Activities	Number of Citations	Activities	Number of Citations
Target Hardening	160	Manpower Development	29
Operation ID	46	Job development	3
Home security survey	37	Placement and referral	17
Business Security survey	7	Vocational training	6
Installation of hardware	11	Other manpower development	3
Direct deposit of social security checks		Victim/Witness Assistance	23
Security training	10	Victim model	16
Painting numbers on curbs	6	Witness model, court reporting	2
Self defense/rape prevention	14	Victim-witness model	5
Arson prevention	3	Physical Improvements	16
Other target hardening	23	House repair	2
Escort Services	50	Street clean-ups	5
Criminal Justice/Community Relations	33	Building renovation	1
Police-community relations	13	Other physical improvements	8
Monitoring/negotiating services	4	Recreation	11
Courtwatch	3	Intergenerational Programs	10
Other CJ-community relations	13	Community Revitalization	7
Patrols	29		
Emergency Services	29		
Hotlines	12		
Shelters	6		
Crisis intervention/counseling	7		
Emergency security repairs	1		
Other emergency services	3		
Total Opportunity Reducing Activities	680	Total Cause Reducing Activities	300



67. It must be emphasized that numbers of activities are serving here as a very imperfect indicator for level of effort. Some activities require a greater investment of project resources than others. Some activities are ongoing efforts, while others are one-shot affairs. A detailed examination of effort levels for individual activities and for projects as a whole will be a major emphasis on future rounds of site visits.

Are projects doing "the same old stuff"? To some extent, yes. But the fair and accurate answer is that projects are continuing some of their previous cause reduction activities plus a wide variety of new opportunity reduction activities. The charge that projects would use CAC funds primarily to continue their previous activities under new labels is not substantiated by the evidence.

#### GETTING THE DOLLARS ON THE STREETS

Federal programs are notoriously difficult to initiate, particularly those that seek to involve community groups. The process leading to final implementation is complicated and time-consuming. By the time the funds actually reach the community, local circumstances may have changed drastically, and the most appropriate intervention strategy may bear little resemblance to the one that was planned.

To the outside observer, community organizations are often an unknown quantity. Their resources and staff capabilities change over time, and it is nearly impossible for a program administrator to evaluate fully a local organization's ability to conduct a given program. Critics of government social policy contend that the gulf between theory and practice is enormous, that the well-intentioned federal dollars that flow into communities all too often fail to reach the people for whom they are intended.

More than many other programs, CAC was designed to get funds out on the street. By placing those funds in the hands of people who know and understand their community, it was hoped that effective crime prevention would be quickly instituted. In addition to the evidence evaluating the selection of appropriate sites, the involvement of citizens, and the choice of activities, we took a preliminary look at what projects promised and what they have delivered so far.

#### CONCLUSION

It is too early to report on the Community Anti-Crime Program's efficacy in reducing crime and changing communities, but we can make some judgments about the overall validity of OCACP's approach. In this report, we have presented what is essentially a worst-case analysis. We have inquired whether the charges of the program's harshest critics would stand up. We have sought evidence that the CAC Program selected cities, target areas, or organizations with problem-minimizing characteristics. We have looked at the roles of citizens in the planning and implementation of the program, at what advisory boards do, and at the extent to which project staff reflect their constituencies. We have looked at project activities to see if projects are "doing the same old stuff" for a new federal agency.

The notions of "creaming," "milking," "stealing," "charade," "rubberstamp," and "paper-pushers" have been the reference points for our analysis of three major conceptual criticisms leveled at the CAC Program. There is substantial

evidence that community organizations are generally adequate to the tasks of designing, organizing, and implementing crime prevention activities.

The final questions remain, however: With what levels of citizen participation? For how long? With what levels of community support? With what effects on the groups themselves? With what effects on the communities and their crime problems?

These are the evaluation questions that will be addressed in future rounds of site visits and in our final evaluation report.

National Evaluation of the Neighborhood Justice  
Centers Field Test/1/

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Seeking viable alternatives to the courts for persons having disputes with their friends, neighbors, relatives, or with a merchant or landlord, the Department of Justice and the National Institute of Justice established three experimental projects in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles. The Neighborhood Justice Centers (NJCs) were to provide third-party mediation to resolve disputes as an alternative to traditional litigation. Concurrent with the 18-month test period, a national evaluation of the program was conducted. This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of that research.

GOALS OF THE NJC FIELD TEST

There were two major goals of the program, and a majority of the evaluation effort was centered around them. The first goal was to establish an effective community mechanism (Neighborhood Justice Centers) for a relatively inexpensive, expeditious, and fair resolution of citizen disputes through the processes of conciliation, mediation, and/or arbitration. At the same time, the Centers were expected to enhance the quality of justice delivered to the community without diminishing the effectiveness of the existing criminal justice system. The Centers were to help the disputing parties arrive at resolutions which were fair, long-lasting, and satisfactory to all those involved and compared favorably to the courts in terms of cost and the amount of time needed to process cases. The second goal stated that the NJCs should attract a variety of civil and criminal dispute cases drawn from different sources in the community and criminal justice agencies.

In addition to these two major goals, there were four less important goals to be achieved during the course of the field test. Two of these focused on the community: first, it was noted that key elements of the community should have a positive view of the Centers, and second, the NJCs should contribute to the reduction of tension and conflict in the communities in which they were to operate. Another goal was to institutionalize the Neighborhood Justice Center concept and procedures in the field test communities and provide information to guide the establishment of NJCs in other areas. Lastly, the evaluation project was to provide information to the National Institute of Justice and the Department of Justice on the progress and effectiveness of the Centers as related to future planning for the expansion of NJCs and their concept.

<sup>1</sup>Cook, R., Roehl, J., and Sheppard, D. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test: Final Evaluation Report. (Currently being printed by the National Institute of Justice.)

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NJCS

The Neighborhood Justice Center of Atlanta served the entire city of Atlanta and surrounding areas; it was sponsored by a nonprofit organization created for that sole purpose. The Center was closely monitored and guided by a Board of Directors composed of court officials, attorneys, and representatives from the police department and community agencies. The Center established and maintained close working relationships with the local court system, its major referral source. Court clerks referred cases to the NJC in lieu of filing charges in court, while judges made referrals for cases at a preliminary (bindover) hearing. Volunteer intake workers were stationed in court to accept cases from these sources. The Center's caseload consisted of 60 percent civil cases and 40 percent interpersonal disputes.

The Kansas City NJC was sponsored by the city government under the auspices of the Community Services Department, which monitored the Center's activities and served as its policymaking body. An Advisory Board composed of community, agency, and city government representatives advised the NJC on local needs and problems and provided support and assistance. The NJC received the majority of its cases from the criminal justice system and served all of Kansas City and nearby communities. The Center's major referral sources were the police department, the city prosecutor's office, and judges in municipal court. The resulting caseload was primarily interpersonal-criminal disputes.

The Venice/Mar Vista Neighborhood Justice Center was sponsored by the Los Angeles County Bar Association. A Board of Directors, composed of Bar Association, community, and public agency representatives, served as the Center's sole policymaking and guiding body. The Center adopted a community approach to dispute resolution, concentrating outreach activities and media coverage in the Venice and Mar Vista target areas. Over half of the NJC's cases were initiated by the disputants themselves at the Center. The NJC did establish noncoercive referral arrangements with several small claims courts and received cases from court clerks and judges. Nearly all of the NJC cases involved small claims disputes or other civil matters.

PROJECT DESIGN

In order to accommodate the developing nature of the three centers--hiring and training staffs and mediators, establishing linkages to referral agencies, creating public outreach programs -- a multifaceted evaluation methodology was employed. There were three primary data collection activities during the NJC evaluation:

- An Implementation Study, designed to document the initial phase of program development and operation.
- A Process Study, intended to describe NJC caseloads, handling procedures, and resolution outcomes.
- An Impact Study, designed to assess the impact of the NJCs on the disputants, the courts, and the community.

A routinized data collection system was developed, which gathered data on the source of client referrals to the NJCs, the nature of the dispute, the relationship between the parties, the characteristics of the disputants, the disposition of cases referred to the Centers, and the hearing sessions themselves. The data system was used to generate periodic feedback on NJC operations to program planners and policymakers, as well as to National Institute project monitors.

Two special evaluation procedures were employed in the study. First, nearly all of the on-site data collection was conducted by three evaluation analysts hired and supervised by the central evaluation project. They worked throughout the field test period and were crucial in providing the needed link between the central evaluation staff and the NJCs. The second procedure was a series of monthly feedback reports to the NJCs and to the LEAA program monitors. These reports provided timely information on caseloads, referral sources, and case dispositions. The feedback process alerted program management to potential problem areas as well as charted project accomplishments.

#### MAJOR FINDINGS

The evaluation of the Neighborhood Justice Centers concentrated on the process and impact of the program. Figure 1 depicts the flow of the cases through the NJCs; 3,947 cases were handled between the Centers' opening in March 1978 and the end of the data collection period in May 1979. A case involved two or more disputing parties; the initiator of the dispute was referred to as the complainant while the second party was labeled the respondent. As indicated in Figure 1, there were two immediate outcomes of cases--they were either resolved or not resolved after contact with the NJC. The primary means of dispute resolution practiced by the NJCs was mediation; formal mediation hearings, where a neutral third party attempted to facilitate an agreement between the disputants, were held for 35 percent of the NJC cases. A great majority of the mediated cases were resolved at the hearing by the disputing parties reaching an agreement. For 18 percent of the mediated cases, no agreement was reached by the parties, and the case remained unresolved.

A sizable number of cases were resolved before a hearing took place, often during the process of contacting the responding party to solicit his or her participation in mediation. In total, nearly half of all cases were resolved by the NJCs via mediation or conciliation prior to a hearing. The term "resolved" indicates that an agreement was reached in a hearing or the complainant and/or respondent reported the dispute was settled prior to a hearing; the actual extent and permanence of the resolutions are discussed below.

The remainder of the cases were closed by the NJCs without any apparent resolution of the problem. The most common reasons for cases not being resolved or mediated were the respondent's refusal to participate in mediation and the inability of the NJC to contact the respondent due to inadequate information regarding the person's telephone number or address.

#### Case Characteristics

Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the referral sources and types of cases processed by the NJCs, broken down by their disposition (mediated, resolved prior to a hearing, or unresolved). These data indicate that the NJCs are capable of attracting and processing a wide variety of case types from both criminal

Figure 1  
CASE DISPOSITION FLOW




TABLE 1: ALL NJCs  
CASE DISPOSITION BY REFERRAL SOURCE

	Judges (Bench Referrals)	Pros. Office or Civil/ Criminal Warrants Desks	Police	Community Agencies	Self	Legal Aid Organizations	Government Agencies	Others	Tot.
Cases with hearings, resolved	515 (69)	279 (20)	94 (33)	33 (18)	99 (15)	29 (15)	29 (12)	46 (24)	1124 (28.7)
Cases with hearings, unresolved	95 (13)	68 (5)	8 (3)	7 (4)	32 (5)	18 (9)	4 (2)	17 (9)	249 (6.4)
Cases resolved without a hearing	15 (2)	260 (19)	33 (12)	34 (19)	147 (22)	39 (20)	76 (32)	36 (18)	640 (16.4)
Cases unresolved, no hear- ing (no-shows, with- drawals)	89 (12)	226 (16)	48 (17)	37 (20)	106 (16)	35 (18)	42 (17)	29 (15)	612 (15.6)
Cases unresolved, no hear- ing (respondent refusals and no contacts)	31 (4)	559 (40)	99 (35)	71 (39)	295 (43)	73 (38)	90 (37)	68 (35)	1286 (32.9)
Total	745 (19.0)	1392 (35.6)	282 (7.2)	182 (4.7)	679 (17.4)	194 (5.0)	241 (6.2)	196 (5.0)	3911 (100%)*

\*Missing data on 36 cases.

TABLE 2: ALL NJCs  
CASE DISPOSITION BY TYPE OF CASE

	Domestic Assault and Harassment	Domestic Settlement and Other	Family Dispute	Neighbors: Assault and Harassment	Neighborhood Nuisances and Other	Friends: Assault, Harassment and Other	Landlord/Tenant Disputes	Consumer/Merchant Disputes	Employee/Employer Disputes	Other	Tot.
Cases with hearings, resolved	181 (56)	111 (40)	88 (45)	147 (48)	86 (31)	169 (43)	77 (12)	152 (18)	31 (9)	80 (31)	1122 (28.6)
Cases with hearings, unresolved	20 (6)	26 (9)	12 (6)	8 (3)	18 (6)	20 (5)	25 (4)	77 (9)	19 (5)	22 (8)	247 (6.3)
Cases resolved without a hearing	23 (7)	18 (7)	16 (8)	32 (10)	47 (17)	40 (10)	176 (26)	185 (22)	87 (24)	23 (9)	647 (16.5)
Cases unresolved, no hear- ing (no-shows, with- drawals)	57 (18)	57 (21)	36 (18)	38 (12)	38 (14)	80 (20)	115 (17)	103 (12)	56 (15)	35 (13)	615 (15.7)
Cases unresolved, no hear- ing (respondent refusals and no contacts)	44 (14)	66 (24)	45 (23)	82 (27)	92 (33)	89 (22)	279 (42)	323 (39)	172 (47)	101 (39)	1293 (33.0)
Total	325 (8.3)	278 (7.1)	197 (5.0)	307 (7.8)	281 (7.2)	398 (10.1)	672 (17.1)	840 (21.4)	365 (9.3)	261 (6.7)	3924 (100%)*

\*Missing data on 23 cases.



justice and community sources of referral. A majority of the NJC cases were referred from the criminal/civil justice system--judges, court clerks, public attorneys, other court officials, and police officers. The remainder were self-initiated by individuals or referred from a variety of community, private, and government organizations.

Measures of the NJC effectiveness include the number of cases that reached a hearing and the number that were resolved. Two major factors, referral source and type of case, affect whether a case is mediated or not and resolved or not. Interpersonal disputes were more likely to reach a hearing than civil cases and were more apt to be resolved via mediation or conciliation; half of the interpersonal cases were mediated. In contrast, only 23 percent of the civil cases reached a hearing, but many others were resolved prior to a hearing. The source or referral had an effect on whether a hearing was held for a case or not. Hearings were held for 82 percent of the judge-referred cases; however, the majority of the cases did not reach a hearing. For all other referral sources only 14-36 percent were mediated, yet almost as many cases were resolved prior to a hearing as through a hearing. Referral source and resolution rate are also related; 71 percent of judge referrals were ultimately resolved, as were 35-45 percent of the cases from other sources.

The characteristics of the disputants varied among the three NJCs, reflecting the different demographic compositions of the three cities, but the Centers appeared to attract a disproportionate number of lower income people.

#### Center Differences

The caseloads of the three NJCs reflected their primary referral sources and orientation to the criminal justice system. The Atlanta NJC processed 2,351 cases during the field test period, 60 percent of the total NJC caseload. Almost half of these cases were resolved either at a mediation hearing or prior to a hearing. The majority of Atlanta's cases (68.6 percent) originated in the criminal/civil justice system. The Atlanta NJC's primary referral sources were the clerks in the small claims court, followed by the judges in criminal court.

The Kansas City NJC processed 845 cases between March 1978 and May 1979; hearings were held for 40 percent of the disputes, and 19 percent were resolved prior to a hearing. The criminal justice system was the primary source of the Kansas City cases, with 68 percent of the cases originating there. The prosecutor's office referred the most cases, followed by the police and judges. In contrast to the other NJCs, the Kansas City Center handled primarily interpersonal cases involving criminal and, to a lesser extent, civil disputes.

Of the 751 cases processed by the Venice/Mar Vista NJC, hearings were held for 31 percent of the cases, 14 percent were resolved prior to a hearing, and the rest remained unresolved following NJC contact. Over half of the cases opened in the NJC were initiated by the disputants themselves. Community organizations were not a major referral source, however. Small claims courts (judges and clerks) and police officers followed self-referrals in number of cases referred. The Venice/Mar Vista NJC caseload was dominated by disputes of a civil nature between landlords and tenants, consumers and merchants, and employees and employers. These civil cases made up 73 percent of the total caseload.

#### Impact of the NJCs

The primary goal of the evaluation impact analysis was to assess the impact of the NJCs on disputants after their experience at the Centers. The major focus was on information that indicated whether the elements of the resolution process were satisfying to disputants and resulted in lasting resolutions; additional analyses explored the sources of observed variation in disputant satisfaction and resolution stability. The impact study also compared court and NJC cases in terms of disputant satisfaction, resolution rates, and processing speed, and provided information on how the Centers were perceived and utilized by elements of the local justice system. Finally, the impact of the Centers on community residents and organizations was explored.

Impact on the disputants. Six-month follow-up interviews were conducted with both disputants in a large number of the NJC cases. The indices of disputant satisfaction and the stability of the agreement for mediated cases are displayed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. These follow-up data on mediated cases show that a substantially high proportion of both complainants and respondents were satisfied with their overall experience, the mediation process and the mediator, and the agreement terms. A slightly lower, yet not unimpressive, proportion of disputants indicated that the agreement had held and that they would return to the NJC with a similar problem.

Over one-third of all resolved cases were resolved prior to a hearing, and follow-up data on these cases show that such resolutions were effective. Only a few of the complainants and respondents reported that the dispute was unresolved. The majority of the disputants reported no more problems with the other party and a high degree of satisfaction with the NJC experience. The majority of the complainants and half the respondents would return to the NJC for a similar dispute.

Disputants whose cases did not reach a hearing and were not resolved were also followed up to determine how their dispute had fared and how they viewed their limited experience with the NJC. The majority of complainants said that their dispute remained unresolved, while less than half of respondents claimed that it was unresolved.

The findings on NJC resolution effectiveness parallel results from studies of other similar dispute resolution programs around the nation. A follow-up study of disputants in Boston's Dorchester Urban Court Program revealed results that are highly similar to the NJC cases--the majority of the disputants were satisfied with the mediation process and their dispute was resolved on a long-term basis. The rates of satisfaction and the stability of resolutions in the studies of the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center and Florida's Citizen Dispute Settlement Programs are also similar to the rates in the NJC cases. To a high degree, the mechanism of third-party dispute resolution operates successfully across different locations and types of dispute resolution organizations.

Impact on the courts. The Kansas City Municipal and Fulton County State Courts were selected for a comparison study of court cases since they were primary sources of case referral for the Kansas City and Atlanta NJCs, respectively. In addition to interviews conducted with justice system officials in all three sites, court cases similar to those in the NJCs were analyzed to see how far they penetrate the court system before being dropped or resolved, and a sample of court complainants were interviewed regarding their experiences in the system.

TABLE 3  
DISPUTANT SATISFACTION  
FOR MEDIATED CASES

Index/Response		Disputant		Total
		Complainant	Respondent	
Satisfied with overall experience at NJC?	Yes	428 (88%)	347 (88%)	775
	No	43 (9)	30 (8)	73
	Somewhat	18 (4)	17 (4)	35
Satisfied with mediation process?	Yes	414 (84)	335 (89)	749
	No	61 (12)	41 (10)	102
	Somewhat	15 (3)	21 (5)	36
Satisfied with mediator?	Yes	432 (88)	348 (88)	780
	No	39 (8)	26 (7)	65
	Somewhat	19 (4)	21 (5)	40
Satisfied with terms of agreement?	Yes	335 (80)	296 (83)	631
	No	65 (15)	45 (13)	110
	Somewhat	20 (5)	17 (5)	37

TABLE 4  
STABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT  
FOR MEDIATED CASES

Index/Response		Disputant		Total
		Complainant	Respondent	
Have you kept all terms of the agreement?	Yes	316 (79%)	303 (87%)	619
	No	9 (2)	20 (6)	29
	Partially	14 (3)	21 (6)	35
	No Terms	63 (16)	7 (2)	70
Has other party kept all terms of the agreement?	Yes	287 (69)	236 (67)	523
	No	77 (18)	47 (13)	124
	Partially	49 (12)	24 (7)	73
	No Terms	8 (2)	47 (13)	55
Any more problems with other party?	Yes	135 (28)	87 (22)	222
	No	341 (72)	307 (78)	648
Where would you go in future with a similar problem?	NJC	346 (72)	285 (73)	631
	Court	79 (16)	45 (12)	124
	Attorney	20 (4)	17 (4)	37
	Nowhere	15 (3)	22 (6)	37
	Other	20 (4)	19 (5)	39

A comparison of processing times for the courts in Kansas City and Atlanta with the NJCs in those two cities indicates that case processing in the courts can take five to ten times longer than in the Justice Centers. The length of time required to process court cases in Atlanta from filing to trial was 98 days; if the case was dismissed at the bindover hearing, it was in the court system for only six days. Mediated cases at the Atlanta Neighborhood Justice Center, on the other hand, required an average of only nine days between intake and hearing, and those that were resolved without a mediation hearing were processed in an average of eight days. In the Kansas City Municipal Court, cases took an average of 63 days from filing to final disposition at a court hearing. In contrast, the NJC in Kansas City mediated cases within an average of 13 days from the time of referral.

In Kansas City, trials were ultimately held for 53 percent of the cases followed up; 25 percent were withdrawn by the complainant; 11 percent were dropped by the prosecutor; and in 11 percent, warrants were never served. Of the cases tried, only 27 percent involved guilty verdicts. In the Atlanta court, only 14 percent of the cases were tried. Two-thirds (67 percent) were dropped prior to the trial, 31 percent before the bindover hearing, 27 percent at the bindover hearing, and 9 percent before the trial date. In another 19 percent of the cases, a warrant for the defendant's arrest was never served. Of the small number of cases that reached trial, 6 percent were dismissed and 14 percent received not guilty verdicts; the rest resulted in guilty or nolo contendere verdicts or were bound over to Superior Court.

Reactions of the complainants who took their cases to court were contrasted with the results from the long-term follow-up interviews with complainants who had cases mediated in the NJCs. There were not substantial differences between NJC and court complainants in terms of whether or not the dispute had been resolved, but on satisfaction indices, there were numerous differences--all in favor of the NJC. The NJC process appears to be a faster and more satisfying experience than the courts for the resolution of these types of disputes.

In interviews, court judges stated they were highly supportive and positive about the Neighborhood Justice Centers. While nearly all said the NJC had not reduced their caseload to any noticeable extent, the judges also reported that the NJCs facilitated the processing of all cases by diverting cases which were inappropriate and time-consuming for the court.

Impact on the community. A random telephone survey of 200 households was conducted in the Venice/Mar Vista NJC target area to assess the community awareness of the Center. Venice/Mar Vista was chosen because of the Center's community orientation and emphasis on local outreach and media coverage. Thirty percent of the people reached were aware of the NJC, and the majority understood roughly what services were offered. The community residents learned of the NJC primarily through media coverage and public outreach activities conducted by the NJC.

#### CONCLUSIONS

There were eight major conclusions developed from the NJC evaluation, and they are summarized as follows:

- Neighborhood Justice Centers provide a needed and effective alternative mechanism for the resolution of minor disputes. The three Centers attracted and handled a respectable number of cases during their first year of operation.
- NJCs need to develop more effective ways for improving public awareness about their program and for bringing cases to mediation or conciliation. Although the Centers did resolve disputes after the cases had been referred to them, they had some difficulty in soliciting cases from the community.
- NJCs appear to handle most minor interpersonal dispute cases more efficiently than the courts. The Centers resolve disputes more quickly than the courts, and citizens are more satisfied with the mediation process than the court process.
- NJCs with connections to the local justice system will attract and resolve more disputes than Centers without such referral sources. A modest caseload can be developed from self-referrals and referrals from community agencies; however, it is the police, prosecutors, and the courts who refer large numbers of cases.
- NJCs are capable of handling a wide variety of minor disputes, including interpersonal/criminal cases as well as civil/consumer cases. Both criminal and civil cases were handled at the Centers, although a higher percentage of interpersonal/criminal cases reached a hearing than did the civil cases.
- Reliable analytical data are not yet available on the costs of processing cases through NJCs as compared to court processing costs; however, available data indicate that Center costs, for at least some cases, may become competitive with the courts.
- The three NJCs differ in caseload size, type of disputes handled, and to a lesser extent, in resolution effectiveness. The most probable sources of these differences include the Centers' philosophy/approach, their socio-cultural context, and their organization and management.
- NJC disputants tend to reflect the ethnic characteristics of their surrounding community, but represent a disproportionate number of low-income people.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were generated from an analysis of the findings and conclusions of the evaluation study:

- It is suggested that federal, state, and local governments support the continued development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly those that are similar to the NJCs. Since this research has shown that NJCs are an effective alternative mechanism for resolving disputes, more Centers should be established in those areas that do not have other available alternatives.

- A program of research, evaluation, and demonstration should be conducted on strategies and techniques (including media) to improve the effectiveness of NJC outreach methods. Additionally, a modular set of media materials and strategies that educate citizens about alternative dispute resolution techniques should be developed that can be used in any city where dispute centers are established. Public outreach and attracting cases from the community were difficult problems for the Centers. Research and technical assistance designed to increase the effectiveness of these activities would be very useful for these community-based programs.
- A series of regional or local training workshops should be offered on NJCs and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for judges, police, prosecutors, and other relevant criminal justice officials. If these local policymakers were more knowledgeable about these programs, it would be more likely that they would consider supporting or developing a center.
- A broad, comprehensive research and evaluation program should be launched to document and assess the approaches and performance of NJC-like dispute resolution centers across the nation. Research should be designed to: (1) create uniform data systems among the centers; (2) screen complex interpersonal cases based on the NJC's ability to handle them; (3) assess different potential NJC referral points in the criminal justice processing sequence; and (4) increase referrals from the police.

The MITRE Corporation's National Evaluation of the  
Career Criminal Program: A Discussion of the Findings

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The Career Criminal Program is a federal initiative sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to improve the administration of criminal justice by focusing prosecutorial resources on the serious repeat offender. The program was first announced in 1974. By mid-1975, 10 programs had been funded and were in operation, and in April 1976, the MITRE Corporation received a grant to conduct a national evaluation of the program.<sup>1/</sup> The purpose of this evaluation was to define and examine the effects of targeted prosecution of "career criminals" through an intensive analysis of program processes and program effects in four jurisdictions (New Orleans, Franklin County, Kalamazoo, and San Diego).

A number of factors contributed to the shape of our evaluation plan. The first was the state of knowledge concerning anticipated program effects at the time the program was developed and the evaluation designed. Career Criminal Program planning had been influenced both by local initiatives in career criminal prosecution and by research findings that suggested a large potential payoff for such initiatives. The bulk of the available empirical research spoke to the existence of a pool of recidivist offenders with repeated exposure to the criminal justice system who were consequently assumed to be responsible for a disproportionately large share of crime. At the time, little was known concerning the actual impact of program activities.

LEAA's selection of the Bronx Major Offense Bureau (MOB) as an exemplary project was based on analysis of available data concerning the performance of the Bronx District Attorney's Office with selected MOB cases. This analysis demonstrated that cases accorded special prosecutorial attention were treated more

<sup>1</sup> Among the documents produced for this evaluation are the following:

- E. Chelimsky, J. Dahmann, and J. Sasfy, The National-Level Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program: Concept and Plan, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7355, May 1976.
- J. Dahmann, E. Albright, L. Hardacre, and L. Russell, Site Selection for the National-Level Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7346, September 1976.
- J. Dahmann and J. Lacy, Criminal Prosecution in Four Jurisdictions: Departures from Routine Processing in the Career Criminal Program, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7550, June 1977.
- E. Chelimsky and J. Dahmann, Final Report: National Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program, The MITRE Corporation, November 1979.



severely than were cases handled in a routine manner. However, career criminal cases and routine cases differ in a number of respects besides the way in which they are prosecuted. What was lacking in this analysis, and therefore, what we consequently attempted to provide in the national evaluation, was an adequate basis for comparison from which one could determine whether, and to what extent, prosecutor performance with career criminal cases represents an improvement over what would have happened with such cases in the absence of any special program. The key evaluation or knowledge needed was that of a baseline for evaluation.

Certain program characteristics were the second factor central to the approach taken in the evaluation plan. Given the single, unifying concept of the program--the focusing of prosecutor resources on the serious repeat offender--the logic of program activities and expectations was considered quite natural at both the federal and local levels and by both practitioners and researchers, thereby making it not only possible, but apparently reasonable, to posit goals for the program generally.

However, the substantial differences that exist among localities in the routine processing of criminal cases, and the high degree of local involvement in defining critical features of individual programs, posed--and continue to pose--real difficulties for any attempt to aggregate the data across sites. Individual jurisdictions have different target population definitions, different program activities (or "treatments"), and different baseline performance levels. Given this jurisdictional variability, it was both necessary and important to examine and account for individual differences in conducting the national evaluation.

The final factor, as is often the case, was that the program was already in place and operational in a number of jurisdictions at the time the evaluation was planned. Consequently, it was understood that the evaluation approach would have to be adapted to meet program constraints, rather than vice versa.

These three factors--the lack of an adequate baseline for comparison, the inability to aggregate data meaningfully across sites, and the timing of the evaluation--led us to base the research design for the national evaluation on an intensive analysis of the form and the effects of career criminal prosecution in four local jurisdictions. A single methodology was developed and, with some adaptation, applied to the analysis of four programs. This repeated case study approach was selected because it allowed for a close and sensitive analysis of the realities of targeted prosecution as implemented in different criminal justice contexts, while at the same time, it provided some comparability among the locally based analyses through the similarity maintained in the structure of these analyses. This is to say that the evaluation attempted to ask similar evaluation questions, formulated in the same way, of the four programs in an effort to identify the range of likely program inputs and effects across the four.

Our evaluation of the Career Criminal Program was completed in November 1979, and our findings can perhaps be best summarized here by presenting them in terms of four basic sets of assumptions underlying the program:

First, the existence, the identifiability, and the criminal justice contact with a subpopulation of serious, repeat offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of crime;

- Second, the ability of the prosecutor to provide specialized, intensified attention to a select subgroup of criminal defendants;
- Third, the impact that specialized prosecutorial attention might have on the performance of the criminal justice system; and
- Fourth, the impact on crime of the incapacitation effect achieved through increasing the conviction and the incarceration of this active subpopulation of criminal defendants.

#### Career Criminal Target Population

The first set of assumptions concerns the career criminal target population itself: that such a subgroup exists, comes into contact with the criminal justice system, and can be isolated for special handling. Although this evaluation did not directly address the major questions relevant to the issue of who career criminals are and how they may be identified, the results of the evaluation nonetheless shed some light on what happens when these assumptions are accepted and local agencies are given the opportunity to define and identify for themselves their local career criminal populations.

First, the prosecutors in the four jurisdictions studied enthusiastically endorsed the concept of isolating the most serious subpopulation of their criminal defendants for specialized attention.

Second, however, beyond general support for targeting career criminals, there was considerable diversity among the four offices in how they defined their career criminal population. None of the four was specifically concerned with any quantitative prediction of the likely future criminality of the population they had identified, a key element in translating targeted prosecution into crime effects. Rather, the offices either directed their attention solely toward past repeaters (New Orleans, Franklin County) or toward the most "serious" portion of their criminal defendant population (Kalamazoo, San Diego) as defined by a complex of factors identified by the prosecutorial staff, based on their experience with case prosecutions.

None of the offices utilized information derived from research in other jurisdictions; indeed, at the time these programs were beginning, little research in this area was available. Even had it been available, however, it is not clear that it would have been used: most jurisdictions appeared to appreciate the opportunity to define for themselves, on a local basis, the characteristics of those defendants to receive special attention. It has, in fact, been suggested by local personnel that it was this flexibility in target population definition, as well as in program activity development, that made the Career Criminal Program of interest to them in the first place.

Allowing for local autonomy in defining the target population appears to have aided in program acceptance, implementation, diffusion, and institutionalization. At the same time, however, it fostered diversity among the career criminal populations selected for special handling, none of which were defined based upon predictions of recidivism. Thus, there was some tension between the program's crime reduction objective and the desire for the program to be successfully institutionalized. While local autonomy insured the program's popularity, it also contributed to a somewhat lower likelihood of crime level effects.

### Targeted Prosecution

A second major assumption underlying the program involved the ability of the prosecutor to provide specialized prosecutorial attention to a selected target population of defendants. Unlike some other programs in law enforcement and criminal justice, the four Career Criminal Programs studied in the national evaluation were admirably implemented. In all four jurisdictions, special career criminal units were created and career criminal cases were issued and prosecuted by these units well within the timetables anticipated within their grant applications.

To some extent these four may represent a select subgroup of the programs, since they were, in fact, selected for inclusion in the national evaluation based on the fact that they were fully operational. Nonetheless, general observation of the program as a whole suggests that in this regard they are more typical than not and that implementation quality in the program has been very good.

There are a number of factors that have contributed to this implementation success. First, the majority of the program activities are within the jurisdiction of a single agency--the prosecution--and can be administered through changes in internal office operations. The importance of this factor appears in its true perspective only when one considers the minimal progress made in improving coordination between the police and the prosecutor (except in those situations in which police investigators were administratively attached to the prosecutor's office).

Another important consideration here is the autonomy given to the local prosecutors in designing the program's activities. To a large degree, individual prosecutors were given a free hand to develop a program of activities that would promote the identification and special handling of their targeted caseload. Each office was encouraged to examine its routine operations and identify those areas where it was felt that special attention could benefit case prosecution.

In effect, prosecutors were given additional support to prosecute a high-priority subgroup of cases in a manner that they felt appropriate, in a manner that--were it not for high caseloads, limited resources, and other system constraints (e.g., court organization)--they might choose for their total caseload. Hence, the program, in effect, provided prosecutors with the opportunity to improve their operations in a way they defined for themselves, an understandably appealing prospect.

In this context, each prosecutor's office implemented a set of activities that more or less differentiated the prosecutorial handling of target, career criminal cases, as a group, from the office's routine caseload. The activities implemented in the four programs--typically, continuous case handling by a single attorney or team of attorneys, reduced caseloads, increased investigative support, more stringent plea bargaining policies, efforts to increase incarceration and to reduce processing time--all focus on improving case prosecution once an arrest has been obtained and a decision to pursue the case has been reached.

This set of activities reflects the range of alternative strategies readily available to prosecutors in the four jurisdictions. To a large extent, all represent an intensification of effort or organization, rather than any radical

departure from the kinds of activities normally undertaken for routine prosecutions. This factor may help to explain the limited changes observed in selected measures of criminal justice system performance as a result of the program.

### Criminal Justice System Performance

Inherent in the program design, and crucial to its logic, is the assumption that making changes in the method and management of the prosecution of a subgroup of criminal cases will result in changes in the performance of the criminal justice system with respect to these cases. In this evaluation, four areas of potential program effects on criminal justice system performance--mode and type of disposition, strength of conviction, sentencing, and processing time--were examined for the four evaluation sites.

The analysis results showed that few changes in disposition mode and type (conviction rates, plea rates, trial rates, dismissal rates) of career criminal defendants were associated with the Career Criminal Programs analyzed. Improvement in the strength of career criminal convictions was observed in two jurisdictions, an improvement that was accompanied by the imposition of longer sentences for career criminals in one site. No increases in incapacitation rates were observed in any of the four sites; three of the four places were incapacitating career criminals at a high (90 percent) rate before the program. Processing time showed an improvement in one jurisdiction with notable time delay problems.

These specific findings suggest that, based on the experience in these four sites, increasing prosecutorial attention on a high-priority subset of the criminal caseload will not necessarily increase the conviction and incapacitation rates for those high-priority cases. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the program can increase the strength of the convictions obtained and that it can result in longer sentences being imposed where particular judicial constraints (e.g., tying sentence to conviction charge) apply.

Expectations for system performance effects in the Career Criminal Program were based on a number of assumptions concerning the current status and potential of prosecutorial efforts. First of all, the program concept presumes that because of resource constraints, the prosecutor is not doing all that can be done to pursue career criminal cases and that there is room for improvement in the way the criminal justice system responds to these career criminal prosecutions. The analysis results suggest, however, that in terms of system outcomes, this is not the case in several specific instances in the four evaluation sites.

Most notable is the case of incarceration rates. A review of baseline incarceration rates for career criminals indicates that, with 90 percent or higher rates of incarceration for convicted career criminals in three of the four sites, these criminal justice systems may already be acting in as vigorous a manner as possible to respond to the seriousness of the defendants convicted in career criminal cases. In places such as these, little program impact is likely, and some pre-program analysis may be called for to suggest either more appropriate target populations (i.e., offenders with a low probability of conviction and/or incarceration without the program treatment) or reduced expectations for effects in this area.

Several other instances of high baseline performance (e.g., high conviction rates for career criminals in San Diego) were also observed. For other jurisdic-

tions, although the baseline levels of performance may not be notably high on an absolute scale, it is possible that these levels represent close to the maximum level of performance that can reasonably be expected from the criminal justice system in that place and that prosecutor initiative may be having little effect on these levels because of the context and constraints which bound his actions.

This raises questions regarding the second major assumption underlying the expected program impact on criminal justice system performance: that the prosecutor is in a position to effect the kinds of changes envisioned for the program. As the process analysis component of the evaluation demonstrated in all four sites, and as is the case generally, the prosecutor is embedded in a system bound by legislative and administrative regulation, a system to which he or she must react to the extent of his or her ability. In this sense, the Career Criminal Program has provided prosecutors with resources to improve their ability to react to the demands of the system in terms of selected priority cases. What is in question is whether improving his or her ability to manage a target caseload can necessarily be expected to influence certain criminal justice system outcomes.

The prosecutor operates in a highly structured environment. Thus, it is understandable that the majority of the Career Criminal Program activities have involved changes in the internal operations of the prosecutor's office, operations over which the prosecutor can exercise control, rather than involving the prosecutor's relationship with other agencies of the criminal justice system.

The jurisdiction of the prosecutor, along with his current policies and management practices, defined the areas for program initiatives. In the four evaluation sites, the program treatment was applied only to cases that would have been prosecuted by the local office whether or not the program had been undertaken.

Further, in most circumstances in these four sites, program attention began at the point at which the prosecutor would have routinely taken cognizance of the criminal matter. Within this framework, the programs attempted, by providing more time and support to the prosecutorial staff and by allowing for more continuity in staff involvement with individual cases, to improve the quality of career criminal case preparation and in some cases to exercise control over dispositional practices through policies limiting plea bargaining. In this context, the evaluation examined the impact of these changes on criminal justice system performance.

It appears that the greatest prosecutor leverage across the four sites, may be in affecting the strength of convictions. By providing the prosecutorial staff with time, resources, and the ability to follow a case from intake to disposition, it becomes possible for the prosecution to realistically uphold a policy of "no plea bargaining." Other impact measures, such as conviction rates, may be determined by factors outside the control of the prosecutor (availability of witnesses, strength of evidence); therefore, to enhance the prosecutor's ability to prepare and prosecute cases coming to his attention through routine channels may not be appropriate for effecting changes in this measure.

Program effects on sentencing, among the four site results, appeared most clearly in that jurisdiction in which the strength of convictions was increased and in which sentence lengths were tied by law to the charges of conviction. At this site (San Diego, under the indeterminant sentencing system), increases in the strength of conviction were accompanied by longer sentence lengths, as would

be intuitively expected. But in the other sites, where an independent judicial determination of minimum sentences is made, program effects were not clearly obtained. In some cases, slightly longer sentence lengths for career criminals appeared to be largely due to factors other than the program. The absence of a clear program effect on sentence lengths may be the result of a number of factors, including the possibility, suggested by other research,<sup>2/</sup> that judges impose sentences based less upon the conviction charge than upon information pertaining to defendant characteristics and to the criminal act itself; information which is largely unaffected by prosecutorial efforts.

It is unclear to what extent these specific programs and the limited system performance results associated with them represent a realistic approximation of the kind of impact other prosecutorial efforts might have on alternative target populations in these sites. Whether more effort, a different configuration of project activities, or a different target population would lead to different results cannot be determined from this research. It is clear, however, that simply providing the prosecution with added resources in the expectation of direct effects on criminal justice system performance measures does not fully consider the complexities of that system and the limited role that the prosecution plays in its operations.

#### Crime Level Effects

Finally, the last assumption underlying the Career Criminal Program links anticipated changes in criminal justice system performance to crime level effects through the increased incapacitation of serious repeat offenders. As the above discussion has shown, no increases in the incapacitation of career criminals were observed in the four sites analyzed. In the absence of the critical linking element of criminal justice system performance changes, crime level effects from incapacitation cannot be demonstrated in these four jurisdictions. The significantly longer imposed sentence lengths observed in one jurisdiction may, if sentenced offenders do in fact serve longer sentences, translate into crime level effects. Such effects would not be observed until the release time of these offenders, however--a time beyond the period covered by this evaluation.

The expectation of measurable crime level effects of a program such as the Career Criminal Program, which is internal to the criminal justice system, may not be reasonable, given the scope and context of program activities. Even if improvements in system performance (i.e., increased incapacitation) had been observed, linking such changes to crime levels would have been difficult given the marginality of program treatment (program attention was provided to a relatively small group of criminal defendants who would have been subject to routine criminal prosecution without the program), the potential countervailing actions of the corrections subsystem, and the possible recruitment of new career criminals as the older serious offenders are removed from circulation. These problems of assessing the crime impact of a program with a limited thrust implemented in a complex environment are further compounded by analytical problems in measurement of crimes "saved."

<sup>2</sup>Wilkins, Leslie T., Jack M. Kress, Don M. Gottfredson, Joseph C. Calpin, and Arthur M. Gelman. Sentencing Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion. Washington, D.C.: February 1978.

# Criminal Justice Program Evaluation

## Agenda

### Baltimore Hilton Hotel SUNDAY, MARCH 16

REGISTRATION:  
6:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m.  
*Francis Scott Key North*

PLENARY/SOCIAL:  
7:30 p.m. - 8:30 p.m.  
*Francis Scott Key North*

### Baltimore Hilton Hotel MONDAY, A.M., MARCH 17

WORKSHOP SESSIONS  
9:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.

Session 1: Evaluation of Financial Assistance to Parolees  
*Francis Scott Key North*

The value of providing subsistence allowances to parolees following release from prison has been researched extensively. Recent evaluations of large-scale programs provide a new understanding of this intervention strategy, and the complexity of the issues.

MODERATOR: Lawrence Bennett, *Director*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
  
Richard A. Berk, *Professor*  
University of California at Santa Barbara  
  
Peter Rossi, *Director*, Social and  
Demographic Research Institute  
University of Massachusetts

Session 2: Evaluation of Career Criminal Programs  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

This panel will focus on the results of the National Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program. Specialized statewide evaluations will also be discussed.

MODERATOR: Frank Vaccarella, *Program Monitor*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
  
Judith S. Dahmann, *Department Staff*  
The MITRE Corporation  
  
Joel Phillips, *Vice-President*  
Metametrics, Inc.  
  
Joseph Sasfy, *Group Leader*  
The MITRE Corporation

Session 3: Evaluative Perspectives on Testing Alternative Responses and Police Demand  
*Carroll Room*

The demand for police services is increasingly being scrutinized as public officials re-assess the workload of the police and alternatives for handling incidents more effectively. Panel members will discuss efforts to implement and evaluate a system intended to more effectively manage the demand for police services.

MODERATOR: David Farmer, *Director*  
Police Division  
National Institute of Justice  
  
Michael Cahn, *Vice-President*  
Public Systems Evaluation Inc.  
  
Dennis P. Regan, *Commanding Officer*  
Wilmington Department of Police

10:20 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.  
COFFEE BREAK

WORKSHOP SESSIONS  
10:40 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Session 4: Influence of Perspectives on Evaluations  
*Francis Scott Key North*

How does philosophical orientation, governmental orientation, and agency orientation (planning or action) affect one's approach to evaluation? The panel will highlight the importance of acknowledging these biases when an evaluator negotiates an evaluation. (Session sponsored by State Planning Agencies and Regional Planning Units)

MODERATOR: Scott Green, *Senior Criminal Justice Evaluator*  
Comprehensive Planning Organization  
  
Thomas Long, *Evaluator*  
Bureau of Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance  
  
Charles A. Murray, *Chief Scientist*  
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences  
  
W. Victor Rouse, *Senior Research Fellow*  
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences



**Session 5: Evaluation of Integrated Criminal Apprehension Systems: Analysis Techniques for Police Decisionmaking**  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

This panel will be concerned with the evaluation of a multi-site resource allocation program and will review the experience of three police departments employing a set of analytic techniques to aid in decisionmaking. Crime analysis for decisionmaking, as emphasized in the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program will be presented based on National Evaluation findings.

**MODERATOR:** Phil Travers, *Program Monitor*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
Thomas Beall, *Senior Research Associate*  
Washington Program Office  
University City Science Center  
William G. Gay, *Director*  
Washington Program Office  
University City Science Center  
Ernest A. Unwin, *President*  
Theorem Institute

**Session 6: Evaluation of Restitution Centers**  
*Carroll Room*

Presentations will be made on methodology and preliminary findings from two LEAA-sponsored research efforts in the area of restitution — one on monetary restitution and the other on programs that involve community service.

**MODERATOR:** John Spevacek, *Director*  
Corrections Division  
National Institute of Justice  
Burt Galaway, *Professor*  
University of Minnesota at Duluth  
Alan T. Harland, *Co-Director of Criminal Justice Research Center*  
State University of New York (Albany)  
Joe Hudson, *Associate Professor*  
University of Minnesota at Duluth

**LUNCHEON (The Baltimore Hilton Hotel)**  
**12:00 p.m. - 1:15 p.m.**  
*Francis Scott Key South*

**GUEST SPEAKERS:** Dr. Eleanor Chelmsky, *President Elect*  
Evaluation Research Society  
Dr. Joseph Wholey, *Deputy Assistant Secretary for Evaluation*  
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

**Lord Baltimore Hotel**  
**MONDAY, P.M., MARCH 17**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**  
**1:15 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.**

**Session 7: Audit and Evaluation**  
*Center Ballroom*

The Office of Management and Budget's directives of audits indicate that it is within the auditor's range of responsibilities to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of programs under audit. What is the appropriate role of auditors in reviewing and evaluating programs? (Session sponsored by State Planning Agencies and Regional Planning Units)

**MODERATOR:** Olie M. Lyon, Jr., *Director*  
Division of Financial Management  
Kentucky Executive Office of Staff Services  
Daniel Paul, *City Auditor*  
Baltimore, Maryland  
E. William Rine, *Deputy Assistant Administrator*  
Office of Audit and Investigation  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

**Session 8: Evaluation of Community Crime Prevention Programs**  
*Cavalier*

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched a development and testing program in 1973 called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, which drew on the defensible space theory of Oscar Newman. In four sites, this program implemented changes in the physical and social environments of schools, commercial strips, and residential neighborhoods. These changes were designed to develop a feeling of security within the sites and promote crime prevention activities. Each project was assessed by the NIJ grantee and is now being reassessed. The panel will discuss the findings from two of these reassessments.

**MODERATOR:** Fred Heinzelmann, *Director*  
Community Crime Prevention Division  
National Institute of Justice  
Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., *Director*, University of Massachusetts/Center for Survey Research  
Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University  
James Kushmuk, *Justice Program Coordinator*  
Portland, Oregon  
Sherrill Whittemore, *Justice Program Coordinator*  
Portland, Oregon

**Session 9: Evaluative Perspectives on the PROMIS Information System**  
*A, B & C*

Jerry Hogg will speak about current management information systems used by prosecutors, and will discuss both PROMIS and PROMIS-like systems, addressing organizational context, development, operation, and impact of these computer information systems. Bill Hamilton will discuss the use of PROMIS data bases for research and administration purposes and will discuss INS-LAW findings.

**MODERATOR:** Richard Layman, *Program Monitor*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
Jerry W. Hogg, *Project Director*  
Westat, Inc.  
William A. Hamilton, *President*  
Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW)

**2:50 p.m. - 3:10 p.m.**  
**COFFEE BREAK**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**  
**3:10 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.**

**Session 10: Evaluation of Governmental and Community Responses to Crime**  
*Center Ballroom*

Governments and citizen responses to the rise in crime over the past 30 years have taken various forms — neighborhood group crime prevention reactions; or city, state, or Federal actions to improve the police, make new laws; or change the focus of city planning. To study these actions, the NIJ awarded two grants to Northwestern University: the first to study in three cities the reactions of citizens to crime, and the second to study governmental responses to crime in 10 cities over the past 30 years. The panel will discuss the results of these works and implications for future action and research.

**MODERATOR:** Richard Barnes, *Director*  
Center for the Study of Crime Correlates and Criminal Behavior  
Herbert Jacob, *Professor*  
Northwestern University  
Wesley Skogan, *Associate Professor*  
Northwestern University

**Session 11: Evaluation Strategies of the Correctional Field Services and Intensive Probation Programs**  
*Cavalier*

This panel will discuss methodologies being used in two large-scale research efforts dealing with probation. One project focuses on levels of supervision, while the other is probing the effects of other rehabilitation-oriented treatment modalities.

**MODERATOR:** Harold Holtzman, *Program Monitor*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
James Finckenauer, *Professor*  
Rutgers University  
Joseph Romm, *Vice-President*  
System Sciences Incorporated

**Session 12: Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program**  
*A, B & C*

In 1976, Congress authorized the creation within LEAA of a Community Anti-Crime Program for the purpose of providing

direct Federal funding to local community groups and organizations for crime prevention activities. LEAA created the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs and funded over 150 projects across the country in the first year (1977-78) at a total cost of \$30 million. The NIJ sponsored a dual evaluation of this large program to assess its effectiveness and efficiency. The panel will discuss the approaches and findings of the two evaluations.

**MODERATOR:** Richard M. Rau, *Operations Research Analyst*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
W. Victor Rouse, *Senior Research Fellow*  
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences  
Rex V. Brown, *Chairman of the Board*  
Decision Science Consortium, Inc.

**Lord Baltimore Hotel**  
**TUESDAY, A.M., MARCH 18**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**  
**9:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.**

**Repeat Session 6: Evaluation of Restitution Centers**  
*Center Ballroom*

**Repeat Session 5: Evaluation of Integrated Criminal Apprehension Systems**  
*Cavalier*

**Repeat Session 12: Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program**  
*A, B & C*

**10:20 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.**  
**COFFEE BREAK**

**10:40 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.**

**Session 13: Evaluation of Victim/Witness Programs**  
*Center Ballroom*

This panel will present the major findings of the Phase I Assessment of Victim/Witness Assistance Projects and findings from the single project evaluation level. National assessment activities have identified and surveyed 280 projects, 40 percent of which focus on victims, 49 percent on witnesses, and 11 percent on both.

**MODERATOR:** Jan Hulla, *Program Monitor*  
Office of Program Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
Roberta C. Cronin, *Research Scientist*  
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences  
A. Robert Denton, *Director*  
Victim Assistance Program  
Akron, Ohio



**Repeat Session 2: Evaluation of Career Criminal Programs**  
*Cavalier*

**Session 14: Evaluation of Neighborhood Justice Centers and Dispute Resolution Programs**

*A. B & C*

Since the start of the Columbus, Ohio, Prosecutor's Dispute Resolution Program in the late 1960s, various programs of this type have been developed for processing disputes outside the court and prosecutor jurisdiction. Mediation and arbitration are the usual tools used, and the issues are between individuals or small businesses. The National Institute funded two evaluations of these types of programs. It assessed the Boston (Dorchester) Court Program, which focused on court referrals primarily as part of its Field Test Program. It also assessed three Neighborhood Justice Centers, which were modeled on all existing centers and received referrals from police, prosecutors, and courts. The panel will discuss the results from these evaluations.

MODERATOR: Cheryl Martorana, *Director*  
Adjudication Division  
National Institute of Justice  
David Sheppard, *Vice-President*  
Institute for Social Analysis  
Lynne A. Williams, *Research Associate*  
Social Science Research Institute  
University of Southern California

**Baltimore Hilton Hotel**  
**TUESDAY, P.M., MARCH 18**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**

**1:15 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.**

**Repeat Session 7: Audit and Evaluation**  
*Francis Scott Key North*

**Repeat Session 10: Evaluation of Governmental Responses to Crime**  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

**Repeat Session 9: Evaluative Perspectives on the PROMIS Information System**  
*Carroll Room*

**2:50 p.m. - 3:10 p.m.**  
**COFFEE BREAK**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**

**3:10 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.**

**Repeat Session 4: Influence of Perspectives on Evaluations**  
*Francis Scott Key North*

**Repeat Session 1: Evaluation of Financial Assistance to Parolees**  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

**Repeat Session 8: Evaluation of Community Crime Prevention Programs**  
*Carroll Room*

**Baltimore Hilton Hotel**  
**WEDNESDAY, A.M., MARCH 19**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**

**9:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.**

**Repeat Session 14: Evaluation of Neighborhood Justice Centers and Dispute Resolution Programs**  
*Francis Scott Key North*

**Repeat Session 11: Evaluation Strategies of the Improved Correctional Field Services and Intensive Probation Programs**  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

**10:20 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.**  
**COFFEE BREAK**

**WORKSHOP SESSIONS**

**10:40 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.**

**Session 15: General Evaluation Concerns at State and Local Levels and Available Resources**  
*Carroll Room*

This panel will discuss the Justice System Improvement Act and its impact on evaluation. The panel will also discuss resources that LEAA has made available to facilitate the conduct of evaluations and to act as a feedback mechanism regarding how well the workshop served evaluation needs. It is also intended to facilitate discussion among participants regarding issues confronting evaluation efforts in fiscal year '80 and fiscal year '81.

MODERATOR: Mark Cuniff, *Director*  
National Association of Criminal Justice Planners  
Ben Coates, *Director*  
Technical Assistance Resource Center  
Washburn University  
Elizabeth Powell, *Research Assistant*  
National Academy of Public Administration

**Repeat Session 13: Evaluation of Victim/Witness Programs**  
*Francis Scott Key North*

**Repeat Session 3: Evaluation Perspectives on Testing Alternative Responses and Police Demand**  
*Francis Scott Key Center*

**END**