This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS database. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20531

March 17-19, 1980

Selected Workshop Papers
SPECIAL NATIONAL WORKSHOP
March 17-19, 1980
MINIMAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS EVALUATION WORKSHOP PAPERS

EDITED BY: Elizabeth Scullin
Prepared by: Gary D. Reiner, Special National Workshop Manager

For National Institute of Justice
Frank Vaccarella
Program Manager

Sheldon S. Steinberg, Program Director, pursuant to Contract No. 4-J-AQ-0001-78-
which was awarded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
as amended.

The points of view or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent official
policy or positions of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice reserves the right to reproduce, publish,
translate, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to publish and use, any part of the
copyrighted material contained in this publication.

Copyright, 1981
University Research Corporation
Washington, D.C.
Criminal justice program evaluation has advanced significantly during the last decade—in part as a result of extensive evaluation of criminal justice programs which has increased both our knowledge and understanding of "what works" and "what does not work"; and the implementation of practical techniques and strategies which have been learned from the evaluation of these programs.

To provide an opportunity for program administrators and evaluators to discuss the policy implications of current evaluation findings and program experience with the nation's leading researchers and evaluators, the National Institute of Justice held a Special National Workshop on Criminal Justice Program Evaluation, March 17-19, 1980. The workshop brought together decisionmakers, researchers, planners, evaluators, and program administrators interested in a diversity of topics.

The workshop agenda was not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, it presented a limited number of in-depth seminars and topics which focused on major criminal justice program evaluation efforts. The papers which were selected for this publication represent some of those efforts. The National Institute hopes this report will be of assistance to policy officials, researchers, and evaluators who are actively engaged with those types of programs represented in the selected papers, or who foresee involvement with similar programs at the state and local levels in the immediate future.

Harry M. Bratt
Acting Director
National Institute of Justice
Evaluating Victim Assistance Programs:  
A Historical Understanding of the  
Information We Wish We Had  

Rev. Robert Denton, Ph.D.  
Director, Victim Assistance Program  
Akron, Ohio  

Roberta Cronin has presented what might be considered a macro account of what is currently available by way of research information on victim and witness assistance programs at the national level. This emanates from her Phase I research project at the American Institutes for Research. One of the values of that work has been the identification of information not readily available within such programs:  
- How well were such services appreciated?  
- How thoroughly were they performed?  
- Which services were most important for what populations?  
- Were theoretical foundations adequately operationalized?  
- Where programs succeeded, were the specific types of interventions related to such theoretical considerations?  
- Where they failed, was it because of program failure or theory failure?  

With that in mind, it would seem appropriate to focus attention briefly, first, upon the problems of doing research in a changing environment, and second, upon the roles of program evaluation in victim/witness assistance programs as they evolved during the past decade. Finally, based upon that historical approach, it will be easier for us to perceive the nature of the gaps in our current information base.  

I would like to direct your focus upon what might be called a micro consideration of the role of program evaluation in victim/witness assistance programs, and I do so from that awkward position of both academician and program director.  

SOME PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION RESEARCH  

Most of us recall the general classroom instruction in the academics of research: methodology, design, validity, role of theory, appropriate statistics, and so on. Unfortunately, that preparation did not always take into account the larger context in which research was performed. Hence, as evaluation research grew in stature, some questioned its legitimacy because its ability to empirically control the environment was something less than that of the laboratory. Enter the concepts of formative and summative evaluation research and the location of the administration of such an endeavor in-house or outside the program's superstructure, and the acquisition of positive knowledge seemed further threatened.
Many of us moved out of the classroom and into the world where we encountered actual dollars, policy, program strategies, accountability, political turf, use and misuse of information, and depending where you ended up (i.e., who pays your salary), we discovered that our data tended not to follow rhyme or reason, but rather, the latest directive, contract, change in policy or administrator, or cost cut. It seemed there was no end to the victimization of the poor empiricist by all that reality out there in the subjective world. It is the stuff of such considerations that make the disciplines of philosophy of science and social science so bothersome.

Indeed, the academic social science approaches to problem analysis and interventions seem to dictate a methodology of defeat, wherein we attempt to empirically identify our problem, locate it in some appropriate theory base, devise policies and derivative programs, build in our research components, and then try to enact the entire affair through rather irrational political processes at some appropriate intervention level.

If it flies, our rigorous endeavor often returns to us in some unrecognizable form, from original rationales. Our problem has been redefined, theory bases may no longer fit, policies built upon the former become severed from any logical connection, and programs are altered by all types of realities, leaving us to research something very different from our original mission. The serious researcher may well look to some victim aid project for supportive emotional services simply to de-sensitize his or her stresses and hostility.

**ROLE OF EVALUATION RESEARCH IN THE EVOLUTION OF VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

It would be difficult to find an area of planning and organizing for social change where this process has been more vividly projected than that of the victim assistance movement—both in the private and public sectors. Here, it is possible to track the presence and nature of research along each stage of the movement's institutionalization.

Our consideration of the evolutionary stages of victim services and the types of research produced may be enhanced by James Thompson's four-cell matrix relating the nature of empirical knowledge and agreement concerning the importance of a social problem to the nature of policy decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Agreement</th>
<th>Low Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Knowledge</td>
<td>Political/decision oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Knowledge</td>
<td>Judgments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grassroots Stage**

During the early 1970s, the status of crime victims occupied a position wherein there was little agreement within the system as to the importance of such a group and about whom little was known. It is not surprising, then, that the manner of policy and programs was basically inspirational, emanating from the tireless work of some concerned individuals.

It consisted largely of advocacy and crisis intervention services within the private sector. For instance, one of the older ones in the United States, began its advocacy activities in early 1972 and developed its service delivery unit in February 1974. Generally, service units did not appear until late 1973 and early 1974, and these took the form of repressurian projects and a few comprehensive victim service programs like that of Aid to Victims of Crime in St. Louis and Victim Assistance Program in Akron, Ohio.

Most of the programs were staffed by dedicated persons with little or no professional training in the helping services—a phenomenon carefully noted with more than a little alarm by professionals in the area who saw nonprofessionals rise to professional wages through ensuing grant and funding agents.

Many of the programs tended to use little or no planning procedures and operated outside the context of a social science approach to problems and policies. Hardly any use was made of the experiences of service delivery units in the 1960s, with its still too vivid lessons of what did not work and what was needed. Consequently, making improvements in the state of affairs, the grassroots stage might be characterized as a time of high motivation and low technology.

The primary objective was humanitarian; a simple desire to help. With some exceptions, then, a frequent comment was "Why play with statistics." Furthermore, there was little idea of what kind of data to collect or what to do with it. What was collected was basically output material—"look how many and how much."

**Federal Dollar Stage**

When Donald Santarelli resigned from LEAA because of his belief that Water-gate precluded any justice project in that administration, he had allocated several million dollars for Citizen Initiative projects and for victim-oriented programs, in particular. About this same time, the National District Attorney's Association acquired funding for its victim/witness assistance programs. Many LEAA dollars also went to victim services outside the court processes. For the victim movement, this meant a change in nature and structure.

With federal dollars came the issue of accountability and the familiar research modules aimed at bringing some semblance of order to both the goals and objectives of such units. Behavioral indicators were stressed, and measurement of outputs and outcomes was possible. A tacit thrust of this funding was program control, while the operating values for many program boards remained humanitarian. For some, this led to invariable strains; for others, it directed their location more deeply into the criminal justice system.

In this second stage, the policy and program decisions moved from the inspirational stage to the judgmental sector on the matrix, where there was still a dearth of knowledge, but an increase in the agreement that such services were important for a host of reasons. The data collected began to formalize, but seemed to focus basically on outputs and their impact on various functions within the system. If the numbers looked good, they served a variety of interests from the selling and promotion of private service models to the political interests of the public models ranging from prosecutors to police departments.
Impact Stage

With the formalization of services based on temporary monies came an increase in our knowledge base. Decisions moved toward a macro level within the federal and state government, where there seemed to be less agreement as to the importance of such expenditures. With a new layer of issues at the broad political level and a competition for dollars, the nature and use of data began to change. Accountability continued to be a factor. But the struggle for the movement to succeed meant entering the negotiation and bargain-oriented environment typical of the political section of our matrix.

Many programs whose primary reason for being was that of service delivery were visited by state planning units and informed that they had no goals and objectives, which after political translation really meant that delivery goals were no longer acceptable. Such programs would have to reorganize their data modules to reflect impact upon the system, if not their formal program mission.

Data collection was no longer concerned with the number of cases served, nature of services provided, number of services brokered, and so on. Goals and objectives were required to show how victim/witness programs impacted upon the criminal justice system: increase in cooperation with police and prosecutor, decrease in crime, increase in reporting, increase in convictions, increased affluence between the population and the system. In Ohio, this trend began about mid-1978.

Service Institutionalization Stage

By the end of the decade, the most serious issue facing most programs at both the private and public levels was that of raising the local cash base to offset diminishing federal funds. For some early projects—those that were re-funded throughout the affordable time period—the issue was: become self-supporting, or die. In short, institutionalize.

Programs within the system stood a better chance of survival, while private projects had to return to traditional methods of support. Most began to live with highly budgeted programs and cutbacks. It is interesting to note that a significant number of projects identified by the Phase I study were not in operation when Cronin and staff attempted to contact them.

With fiscal cutbacks and minimal budgets, the nature of data collected and the types of research geared to evaluating projects cannot be expected to significantly expand or change. Federal interest in information collection and evaluation has, to date, helped stem the inevitable tide. I, however, do not see a major expansion in the types of data collected or evaluation research on program variables heretofore not addressed. It would be comforting to be proven incorrect, and perhaps the work of students, doctoral candidates, and victimologists will be able to fill the void.

OUTCOMES: SOME MISSING VARIABLES IN VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

If the preceding consideration demonstrates the effect of program evolution upon the nature of evaluation research, it also indicates, by silence, what remains to be addressed. Although not entirely accurate, there is a sense in which the bulk of evaluation research to date has shown, at worst, a confusion of outputs with outcomes and, at best, a certain negligence toward outcomes, per se. We have, for the most part, acquired some data on how much we have done and made certain questionable arguments as to how those that have been imputed upon the system are the perceptions of victims at a cognitive level? Are there any differences between victim types, victim backgrounds, demographically?

1. More detailed identification of victim responses to violence. Much has been written about the general emotional responses of victims of rape, robbery, burglary, and so on. Little is available beyond the general shock and upon the system, are the perceptions of victims at a cognitive level? Are there any differences between victim types, victim backgrounds, demographically?

2. Measurement of the effect of services on various victim types. Which services are most important to victims of violence? Are some more important to rape, robbery, assault, and purse-snatching and found that basic crisis intervention services have no differential utilization or impact on those victim types. Currently, these base data remain to be substantiated. Research, however, has not shown a proclivity to proceed along these lines.

3. Assessment of the quality of brokered services. If a formal goal of the program is to broker services to existing agencies, instead of creating duplicated services for this special sub-population, how well are those services provided? Are they well done, or did they never get beyond the referral stage? Because the so-called network of social service agencies lost the case or passed the buck until the client simply gave up?

4. Assessment of crisis intervention services. Most programs propose to deliver crisis intervention services to their clientele, but little or nothing is really assessed. What does that mean? How is the theory operationalized in practice?

Where the theory has been acted upon in some form of intervention, there is no information available evaluating how well such interventions were performed. While it is possible for agencies to report "x number of referrals were performed," there is no way of assessing how the crisis was performed according to crisis intervention theory, how well performed, their impact upon the victim, or whether that victim would have done as well without the services.

Some programs have offered crisis intervention services and attempted to operationalize the crisis intervention constructs, as possible. In the best of circumstances, some to believe that the victim will improve beyond a level of performance that failed. Thus, when we fail, we do not know whether it was because someone theory failure. Further, when we succeed, we are not positive that it was because
a good program intervention, an extraneous influence, or because crisis intervention theory is correct and was correctly provided. We are left with our assumptions.

It remains a problem that such a major program goal can be overlooked by evaluation research personnel. It would seem that this is a fundamental question to pursue. Although it is certainly much safer to say we performed something we call crisis intervention to an impressive number of clients, someone must ask what does that mean and how well was it done?

5. Assessment of administration activities. Formative evaluations have yet to provide administrative data indicating which staff do better interventions. Do volunteers do as well? Do they do it better? Which individuals among these categories of intervenors are doing it poorly? Do trained professional staff do better under these circumstances than volunteers or nonprofessional staff? If so, is the difference great enough to justify the cost? What impact would these data have upon licensing laws currently in force? Are interventions totally within the parameters of professional ranks?

Instruments are available to measure such phenomena. Likert-type scales may be utilized to measure such criteria on the parts of both staff and victims, allowing correlations that produce data upon which to address the above questions. Yet, why is such data generally unavailable?

CONCLUSION

In view of the information not available from victim assistance programs, it cannot be said that evaluation research has made inroads to important service and policy information within the field of service delivery. Much information is yet to be obtained.

It can be seen, however, in light of the victim movement's evolution from a grassroots stage through the early phases of institutionalization, why important outcome data have been neglected. The issues of survival and nature of the movement's purpose have had a determinant effect upon what has been open for research. The implications of public, and particularly LEAA, monies has further directed the nature of the questions that have been asked.

The victim service movement faces some serious difficulties in the next several years that will determine whether and in what form it will survive. Money problems will be its greatest problem. This may determine what little will be done to answer many serious questions about what it has accomplished. Ironically, if it is to survive, it is precisely such information that is necessary to provide its reason for continuing.

*This research was supported by Contract RI-LEAA-020-76 awarded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended.
complain of unnecessary trips to court and associated loss of income; inconvenience in parking; locating the court; and waiting; and fear of retaliation by the suspect (National District Attorney's Association, 1976).

The impact on system performance is a serious concern. After all, law enforcement success is partially dependent on citizen reporting of crime and on obtaining a clear description of offenses and suspects. Police officer communication with and sympathy to the victim or witness is an important factor in eliciting cooperation (Cannavale & Falcon, 1976; Institute for Community Studies, 1978).

Witness testimony is also critical to prosecution. Yet, nonappearance rates for postarraignment court dates in one metropolitan court were 57.5 percent (Vera Institute of Justice, 1976(b)), and data from several jurisdictions suggest that nonappearance and other witness problems are very serious throughout the system (National District Attorney's Association, 1976; Brosi, 1979). Several explanations have been suggested: negative citizen attitudes toward the criminal justice system; witness discouragement, inadequate communication between prosecutors and witnesses; and simple lack of notification (Cannavale & Falcon, 1976; National District Attorney's Association, 1976).

With the increasing recognition of these problems and the toll they exact on our ability to mete out justice, a variety of responses have emerged. These include compensation legislation, use of restitution orders, development of special police or prosecution units trained to handle sex assault cases, improved police training, and rape crisis programs.

Our study looks at another of these responses--the victim/witness assistance project.

**APPROACH**

This study was conducted under the National Evaluation Program (NEP) of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the National Institute of Justice) to help provide practical information on the activities, costs, benefits, and limitations of selected groups of projects to criminal justice planners and administrators.

The NEP employs a two-phased approach, with the Phase I assessment concentrating primarily on assembling and organizing what is currently known about the topic area. In other words, it relies heavily on existing data. The decision to fund a more intensive Phase II effort is based on the results of the Phase I study, as well as considerations of cost, feasibility, and probable value to decisionmakers.

Our study was a Phase I effort. Therefore, within the limits of readily available data, our goals were:

- To describe current victim/witness assistance efforts across the country;
- To examine how well they are meeting the expectations set for them;
- To identify significant gaps in our knowledge about these projects; and
- To suggest approaches for filling these gaps.

For purposes of the study, the victim/witness assistance project was defined as any local effort to deliver direct services to victims or witnesses of crime. /1/ To push the universe under examination:

1. **Project Purpose**. All projects aim to ameliorate the effects of criminal victimization on victims or their families; to encourage the participation of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system; and/or to facilitate more effective and efficient victim or witness assistance in the criminal justice process.

2. **Target Population**. Each project defines service to crime victims or witnesses as one of its primary functions. Projects serving only child abuse victims, sexual assault victims, and/or battered women were excluded, as were victim restitution and/or compensation projects. Projects including these components in combination with others eligible for study have been retained.

3. **Intervention Strategies**. All projects provide one or more direct services to victims or witnesses at the local level. Excluded under this criterion were: projects performing only technical assistance, planning, coordination, public information, or research functions; crime prevention projects lacking any special component designed to assist victims or witnesses; and projects that provide only referral to other direct service providers. Additional exclusions were made for projects serving only battered women, consumer fraud projects, and crime reporting hotlines.

All Phase I assessments employ a fairly structured common methodology. Overall, there is an attempt to identify common models of intervention practiced in the field and to use these models as a framework for assessing the current state of knowledge and for designing better evaluations.

We used several methods to accomplish our study goals:

- A systematic attempt to locate all local victim/witness assistance efforts in existence nationwide;
- A descriptive mail survey of the 280 projects identified through our search procedures, which obtained an 81-percent response; and
- Two- to three-day site visits to 20 projects, selected to be roughly representative of the full project universe; and

1. The use of the term "project" should be viewed as a shorthand reference, because many agencies do not define their victim/ witness activities in that way.

2. These exclusions were established in the contract supporting this work.
A systematic review of all available project evaluations, published and unpublished, as well as any other documentation bearing on intermediate and longer term effects.1

**FINDINGS**

**Victim/Witness Assistance Projects in Operation**

Our Phase I assessment of victim/witness assistance projects nationwide identified a universe of 280 projects that met the definition described earlier. Within this universe, we observed and identified at least three different intervention models or styles, termed the "victim," "witness," and "victim-witness" models. These models can be distinguished by target population, point of intervention with clients, and service emphasis. These characteristics are, in turn, associated with somewhat different outcome expectations.

The three models were defined and elaborated as a result of literature review and field observation of 20 projects, but we later found that most projects responding to the mail survey could be reliably classified into the same three types. In all, 89 (39 percent) of our survey respondents were identified as victim projects, 107 (47 percent) as witness projects, and 24 (11 percent) as victim-witness; 3 percent were unclassifiable.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize some key characteristics of projects falling into each of the three model types. While the three models provide a convenient device for organizing a great deal of descriptive information, there is obviously a great deal of variability among "same type" projects and many commonalities across types.

A few summary observations are warranted about victim/witness assistance projects in operation. First and foremost, in the immediate sense, projects of all three types seem to be doing exactly what they promise to do. They have developed a range of services and referral arrangements tailored to the perceived needs of their target populations. They are delivering many concrete services to victims and witnesses that can be considered "goods" in themselves, regardless of whether they contribute to the long-range well-being of client or system. Clients apparently like the services and so do criminal justice personnel, such as police and prosecutors, who are most immediately affected by project activities. Resource constraints and the local political climate set some limits, of course, but we encountered many projects whose staff proved quite adept at manipulating both.

The specific services offered obviously have a great deal to do with the choice of target population. Victim projects concentrate on immediate face-to-face work, such as crisis intervention, counseling, and other "restorative" efforts. Added support is offered for those few victims who are later involved

---


---

### TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF MODEL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Victim/Witness</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jurisdiction</strong></td>
<td>City/County</td>
<td>City/County</td>
<td>City/County</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding Sources</strong></td>
<td>LEAA</td>
<td>CETA</td>
<td>LEAA</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Size</strong></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Duration</strong></td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2Includes projects operated by states within of local government and by hospitals, mental health centers, or universities.

3Includes projects operated by non-profits and by government, including LEAA or CETA. Any project reporting such LEAA or CETA support was included in the LEAA group.

4Reported only for projects over one year old.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Victim I</th>
<th>Witness II</th>
<th>Victim-Witness III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target population</strong></td>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Witnesses</td>
<td>Victims and Witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary methods of locating clients</strong></td>
<td>Screening police reports.</td>
<td>Review of witness lists or subpoena lists.</td>
<td>Combinations of methods under I and II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reponse to police calls from crime scenes.</td>
<td>Referral from prosecutors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referrals from other agencies or self-referral.</td>
<td>Referrals from other agencies or self-referral.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Availability</strong></td>
<td>Round-the-clock through on-call arrangements.</td>
<td>Regular office hours, Monday through Friday.</td>
<td>Varies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary service emphases</strong></td>
<td>Counseling: crisis intervention, follow-up, and/or supportive.</td>
<td>Schedule and disposition notification, reception, orientation, alert.</td>
<td>Combinations of I and III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service referral/advocacy with referral agencies.</td>
<td>Arrangement of appearance support, e.g., transportation, child care, protection, escort.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Often in law enforcement agency, but varies.</td>
<td>In courthouse or prosecutor's office.</td>
<td>Varies. Some with multiple locations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in case investigation and prosecution. Witness projects, on the other hand, focus on witness notification and appearance management—services that can often be handled by phone or mail or in relatively brief face-to-face contact. Victim-witness projects have components that do both.

In many projects, there is a tendency to proclaim a very broad range of assistance to victims and witnesses, but typically only a few core services are routinely delivered to the bulk of clients. This is not a matter of false advertising, but rather a result of staff judgments that most people simply do not require or want the full range of services. For example, witness projects typically offer or can arrange appearance support services, such as transportation to court or child care, but activity records and reports show that these services are used fairly infrequently. The routine services are witness notification, reception, and orientation. As a corollary, it seems to be the case for all project types that a minority of clients command a disproportionate share of staff attention and assistance. In the victim project, this might be an elderly purse-snatch victim who has lost her Social Security check or other valuables and identification papers and has been injured in the bargain. In a witness project, it is often the rape victim.

The data available do not permit even moderately sophisticated analyses of project costs. However, some crude estimates confirm that there are definite differences in overall costs across project types (see Table 3). In general, victim projects show relatively low volume and relatively high costs per client contact—a median of $46 for victim project mail respondents versus $6 and $8 for witness and victim-witness respondents, respectively. The latter types also handle larger volumes. Per capita budgets, based on population of jurisdictions served, do not differ very much, however—the medians run $.18, $.13, and $.15.

The difference in median client volume and costs are not surprising, given the differences in intervention strategy across types. Unfortunately, the within-type variation is less easy to explain with the data available; it is considerable, especially for types I and III. Based on our site visit experience, we would expect that higher costs are associated with:

- 24-hour, seven-day-a-week availability;
- Crisis intervention at the crime scene as the preferred contact strategy;
- Heavy investment in multiple contacts with a client and follow-up, rather than one-time-only intervention;
- Emphasis on direct service, rather than referral; and
- Allocation of significant resources to nonclient services, such as research, training, public relations, and lobbying for statutory changes.

Victim/Witness Assistance Project Impacts

This report now turns to the broader question of project success or failure and the current state of knowledge concerning that question. How well are these
projects meeting the goals and expectations set for them? What, in fact, are the intermediate outcomes and long-term impacts?

Although data relevant to these questions were uncovered for about 50 projects, on the whole the evidence is very sparse and the methods employed to get that evidence not very rigorous. Some problems include:

- Failure to report sampling procedures and/or response rates for surveys, as well as wide variations in reported response rates;
- Reliance on client or observer attitude and opinion responses as measures, rather than behaviorally referenced indicators;
- Lack of appropriate baseline or comparison groups against which changes or improvements can be evaluated;
- Narrowness of focus; that is, concentration on only one or two outcomes, often without any measurement of intermediate steps to their achievement;
- A dearth of cross-site evaluations using comparable measures; and
- Absence of designs powerful enough to capture effects remote in time from the original intervention (e.g., changes in conviction rates or increases in crime reporting).

For purposes of summary, project effects are divided into two broad groupings: benefits to the victim or witness—the primary client—and benefits to the system—police, courts, and prosecution. The bottom line is fairly disappointing, however. Aside from a few elements of the witness model, most of the working assumptions about the intermediate and longer range effects of victim/witness assistance projects remain just that—plausible assumptions, buttressed by anecdotes, but with weak or nonexistent support from systematic research and evaluation.

Victim/witness benefits. In the realm of victim or witness benefits, there is simply a lack of evidence. Time savings for witnesses, although not precisely quantified, appear to be the only clearly established benefit of witness projects or components. In other respects, the merit of local victim or witness assistance efforts has neither been disproved nor systematically confirmed for any of the project types. Most strikingly, we know of no study that examines the extent to which immediate victim or witness trauma, as well as longer run damage, can be averted by project assistance. Yet, this is a core motivation for all victim projects and many witness and victim-witness efforts.

System benefits. For victim projects and components, such benefits as time savings for police or reductions in police stress have not been established; again, lack of evidence is the major problem. For witness projects or components, the information gaps are less absolute.

There is substantial confirmation that improved witness notification and management services are: a) saving time for system personnel, especially prosecutors and police; and b) producing very modest improvements in witness appearance rates. Time savings have generally not been quantified except through

---

### TABLE 3. RESOURCE LEVELS FOR MAIL SURVEY PROJECTS BY MODEL TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Type</th>
<th>Victim Projects</th>
<th>Witness Projects</th>
<th>Victim-Witness Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Range</td>
<td>$20,000 to $400,000</td>
<td>$8,000 to $400,000</td>
<td>$10,000 to $400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Budget</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Budget</td>
<td>$0.03 to $1,125</td>
<td>$0.04 to $1,41</td>
<td>$0.15 to $1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Per Capita</td>
<td>$1.18</td>
<td>$1.12</td>
<td>$1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Monthly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client/Save-Face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$0 to $300</td>
<td>$0 to $4,000</td>
<td>$8 to $1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$71</td>
<td>$11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$7 to $2,159</td>
<td>$9 to $600</td>
<td>$15 to $1,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>$551</td>
<td>$351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Monthly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of Work/Client</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>22 to $400</td>
<td>10 to $5,600</td>
<td>74 to $1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>$24 to $720</td>
<td>$11 to $521</td>
<td>$27 to $1,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>$465</td>
<td>$56</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Based on projects that had been in operation at least one year at the time of the survey.
2Based on total population of jurisdiction served.
3Median value reported for per capita budgets is probably erroneously inflated by projects that reported entire budgets of an effort with a single staff position.
4Based on budgeted costs only, divided by estimated client volume. No adjustments have been made for varying overhead assistance procedures or any reporting anomalies.

14
relatively crude estimation procedures, but we would expect considerable variation across jurisdictions according to baseline conditions and current project procedures. On the other hand, the magnitude of changes in appearance rates has been established, but for so few jurisdictions that generalisation is risky. It is interesting, however, that all reported changes in appearance rates were of similar magnitude (about 10-15 percent over comparison groups), despite marked differences in project and jurisdiction size.

Because those system benefits of witness projects—especially time savings—that we are reasonably confident about have not been widely quantified, no conclusions can be drawn about the range of cost savings produced for the criminal justice system. Other things being equal, including the police witness in the notification system appears to provide a considerable boost to the “system costs saved” column of the ledger, however. This is true because: a) police time is expensive; and b) police witnesses are involved in almost every case.

It is important to distinguish between direct cost savings (i.e., reduced agency budgets) and indirect savings (i.e., resources freed up for alternative uses). Police overtime expenditures may decline, but most system savings, if any, are likely to fall in the indirect category. Thus, operation of a witness project or witness component ordinarily means a net budget increase to the locality.

For a number of other system benefits, the available evidence, although limited, raises doubts about the expectations for victim/witness assistance projects. Efforts to document changes in dismissal rates, processing speed, and conviction rates, as well as more subjective measures of victim/witness attitudes and predispositions to report crime or cooperate in prosecution have been largely unsuccessful.

Why might this be the case? There are at least three possibilities:

1. First, the chain of assumptions leading up to these outcomes and impacts may be faulty. The theory itself may be bad.
2. Second, the theory may be correct, but the measurements and design used to test the theory may be unsatisfactory.
3. Third, the expected effects may occur, but be too weak to detect through typical evaluation designs.

At this point, we favor a combination of the second and third explanations. Greater scrutiny of the theoretical argument may prove more profitable when more and better evidence is available. On its face, it exhibits no glaring flaws.

Making the police department happy has other potential benefits for program operations; for example, eliciting more police referrals of clients and opening up channels to improve property return.

We are assured that the projects are, by and large, expanding the resources and performing the activities expected of them.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Our assessment of the state of knowledge about victim/witness assistance brings us to a final conclusion. Policymakers and practitioners at all levels in the research and evaluation literature in making resource allocation decisions about victim/witness assistance efforts.

We cannot, with much confidence, answer the following questions about victim or witness benefits, for example:

1. Are victims and witnesses better off emotionally, or healthier in the long run, for having received assistance?
2. Are victims and witnesses now receiving better treatment at the hands of local criminal justice and social services agencies (other than the host agency), as a consequence of project efforts?
3. Are victims and witnesses suffering significantly less financial loss as a result of victim/witness assistance?

Given the dearth of information on these basic points, questions about the conditions under which favorable outcomes for victims and witnesses are achieved cannot be addressed either. We cannot examine which project types or sponsors or that this information would be exceedingly useful to decisionmakers.

Even in the area of system benefits, where expectations for witness projects find some confirmation, the current evidence does not shed much light on several significant questions.

1. What service components are producing the most time and cost savings or the greatest improvements in victim appearance rates? Should a program invest considerable resources in support services like transportation and employer intervention, or are good notification services enough?
2. Are prosecutor-based projects best suited to producing the above outcomes, or can other agencies perform equally well?
3. What environmental or contextual conditions significantly influence the magnitude of outcomes? Obviously, having an “enlightened” supportive prosecutor is important, but what characteristics of the court system are important, for example?
4. What range of system savings, direct or indirect, can be expected under varying conditions?

There are not enough data, especially quantitative data, to confidently formulate any replies. This kind of information is sorely needed. Hardly anyone would question the proposition that victims and witnesses deserve decent treatment. And no one would demand that victim/witness assistance efforts solve all the assorted ills of the law enforcement and criminal justice system. But we live in a world of scarce public resources, and decisionmakers and their
constituents need to know the value of public investments in victim/witness assistance. In particular, they need to know more about the various options and their advantages and liabilities. The current research and evaluation literature cannot rise to this challenge.

Several directions for future research make sense in the light of current evidence.

1. For all project types, good cross-site comparisons of process and impact, using uniform measures, are needed. Thus, one could examine project successes and failures under differing demographic, organizational, and political conditions.

2. Good, single-site evaluations are still needed in the victim assistance area. In particular, systematic investigation of the extent to which any victim project can alleviate victim psychological trauma would make a real contribution to the state of knowledge.

3. At least two variations of victim project intervention deserve a comparative test: victim services with an on-scene crisis intervention component and victim services without on-scene intervention. Comparison with conditions where police have received on-scene training in handling victims in crisis or orientation to referral sources, or where no special police or civilian victim assistance exists, would also be useful.

4. Similarly, there are some major variations in witness services to be examined: those projects or components providing notification services only; those projects supplementing notification with appearance support, restitution, counseling, and the like; and those jurisdictions in which no special witness services exist.

5. A longitudinal study of the institutionalization experience of local victim/witness assistance efforts could provide many insights. If the projects do not survive, do they leave a residue in the form of procedural changes, new training programs, or the like? If they do survive, what happens to their budgets and organizations, and why? Two relatively low-cost efforts would be useful and interesting in this context: a retrospective review of the literature on defunct projects and development and implementation of a simple monitoring system for checking annually on the fate and funding levels of projects now in existence.

Most of the research suggestions advanced are fairly demanding and expensive. Ultimately, of course, the decision to invest in such work must be balanced against its probable utility in guiding decisions.

If the investment is made in further evaluation, however, the following three points are suggested:

1. Appropriate comparison groups or baselines are essential. Given the infeasibility of classic experimental designs under most circumstances, potential for quasi-experimental designs should be thoroughly investigated.

2. Behavioral indicators of outcomes should be given preference over measures of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. While attitude change may contribute to desirable outcomes, it is extremely difficult to measure and, in itself, not convincing evidence of success.

3. Evaluation designs should emphasize the more intermediate system effects of victim/witness assistance efforts. For long-term impacts, such as increased crime reporting or citizen cooperation in prosecution, weak effects are likely, attributing results to projects interventions is difficult, and measurement is costly. Study of intermediate benefits probably is sufficient to show whether victim/witness assistance efforts indeed contribute to a solution of the larger problems of unnecessary victim suffering and erosion of public support for the criminal justice system.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

General


Project-Specific


Coates, C. York Street Center: Final evaluation report (Draft). Denver, Col.: n.d. (in progress).


Kraft, Marion County Victim-Witness Assistance Program to the legislature. The implementation of Minnesota laws 1977, Chapter 314, regarding the establishment of victim/witness assistance provided by the Marion County Criminal Justice Commission. Indianapolis, Ind.: Marion County Criminal Justice Commission, 1976.


Marion County Victim-Witness Assistance Program. Project assessment. Indianapolis, Ind.: Marion County Criminal Justice Planning Agency.


Prince George’s County Criminal Justice Evaluation Unit. An examination of witness assistance provided by the State’s Attorney’s Office of Prince George’s County. Prince George’s Co., Md.: Author, 1979.


— The effects of witness information provided by the Victim/Witness Assistance Project to aid case decision-making in Brooklyn Criminal Court. New York, N.Y.: Author, March 1, 1979.

Introduction

The National Assessment of Adult Restitution Programs is funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice (now the National Institute of Justice), Office of Program Evaluation. The project aims at producing evaluable models of both community service and monetary restitution projects for adult offenders. An evaluable model will conceptualize project activities, and project outputs as well as specify linkages among inputs, project activities, and project outputs. In short, an evaluable model will conceptualize project activities and project outputs as well as specify linkages among inputs, project activities, and project outputs. The error specification will allow considerable latitude for interpretation. Clearly, however, we wanted to exclude programs in which community service and monetary restitution were incidental program requirements. We therefore obtained the judgment, first, from people who identified potential programs for us, and, second, from various project directors as to what monetary restitution or community service sanctioning should be considered implicit and central.

Admittedly, the notions of "implicit" and "central" allow considerable latitude for interpretation. However, we wanted to exclude programs in which community service and monetary restitution were incidental program requirements. We therefore obtained the judgment, first, from people who identified potential programs for us, and, second, from various project directors as to what monetary restitution or community service sanctioning should be considered implicit and central.

Armed with a working definition, we surveyed all state criminal justice planning agencies, all criminal justice local planning units, and all state departments of corrections in the 50 states and the various territories. We request that they identify projects in their jurisdictions consistent with our working definition of monetary restitution or community service sanctioning projects. The list compiled from these surveys was supplemented with projects identified in previous surveys. This process produced a list of 289 identified community service sanctioning or monetary restitution projects.

Telephone interviews were conducted with the director of each identified project. The interview involved two stages. The first stage covered some very open-ended questions to determine if the project met our working definition of community service sanctioning or monetary restitution projects. Many projects did not meet the working definition, and we were able in very short telephone conversations to reduce the population to 106 projects.

For those projects that met our operational definition, we proceeded to the second phase of the interview. This involved a fairly structured interview schedule designed to secure background information regarding the type of restitution used, administrative auspices of the project, budget and number of staff employed, number of clients served, phase in the criminal justice system, whether the project was residential or nonresidential, extent of victim involvement with the project, relative emphasis placed on restitution and community service activities provided to offenders, and very preliminary discussion of the possible interest of the project in further involvement in our research.

Two things clearly emerged from the interviews. First, we noted four distinct patterns in the use of monetary restitution and community service. Some projects were predominantly involved in monetary restitution; others were predominantly involved in community service sanctioning; others required offenders to complete both monetary restitution and community service requirements; and some projects encouraged direct involvement between victims and offenders, and those that did only involved a minority of cases. Based on this information collected from the screening interviews, we selected a purposive sample of 20 projects that reflected diversity along the dimensions of type of restitution (predominantly monetary, predominantly community service, or either monetary or community service), administrative auspices, phase in the criminal justice system, geographic location, and residential or nonresidential programming.

After selecting the 20 projects, we then negotiated with each project a written memorandum of understanding that specified the purpose of our research, what the project could expect from the researchers, and what demands we would likely place upon the project. We were able to complete memos of understanding with 19 of the 20 originally selected projects; one project chose not to participate in the research and was replaced by another project similar in characteristics.

In addition to collecting data from which to assemble an evaluable model of the current operations of each project, we also collected data of a historical nature in order to understand the origin of the project and the process by which the monetary restitution or community service sanctioning idea was implemented. We collected data from a review of all available project documents, as well as site visits which provided opportunities for interviews with project staff and
other key respondents, including persons involved in the history and development of the project as well as other key actors in the criminal justice system. We are preparing reports based on available documents and information collected through interviews which trace the pre-project history of the restitution or community service sanctioning idea, analyze the process by which the idea was implemented, and present the current operations of the project. The current operations section identifies project inputs with measures, project activities with measures, and project outputs with measures, and to the extent that it has been articulated, describes the rationale linking inputs to activities and activities to outputs.

Generally, however, we are finding that the rationale is not very clearly articulated. These project reports, once prepared in draft form, are reviewed with the various projects and updated, clarified, and corrected to insure that we have an accurate understanding of the current operations.

The various individual project models will form the basis for the development of composite evaluable models. At this point, we expect to develop two--an evaluable model of a community service sanctioning project and an evaluable model of a monetary restitution project. Although there may be some differences based upon location in the criminal justice system or administrative auspices, we do find considerable similarities in the inputs, activities, and outputs. We think that one model can be developed for each type of programming, which might be implemented at various settings with some modifications. Programs utilizing both monetary restitution and community service sanctioning will probably reflect some merged version of the two models we are developing. Figure I presents a draft composite model of a community service project involving the major activity components, outputs, and outcomes.

Preliminary Impressions

Based on our work up to this point, a number of tentative conclusions can be offered:

1. The community service projects in this group predominantly serve misdemeanants. There doesn't appear to be any inherent reason why they could not also serve felons, but the projects in our group tend to have been established for misdemeanant offenders.

2. These projects appear to have the ability to serve a very large number of offenders at very nominal costs. They tend not to get involved in counseling or supervision types of activities, and therefore, a small staff is able to provide services to a substantial number of offenders.

3. By and large, the projects have not experienced any major difficulty finding opportunities in the community for offenders to engage in unpaid community service.

4. The community service projects included in our sample have, at best, collected evaluative data on inputs--especially the number and characteristics of offenders referred--and outputs--especially the number and characteristics of project completions (in-project successes) and the
number of hours of service performed. Very little data has been collected on the major activity components, and in this respect the project has been treated by the evaluator as a kind of "black box."

5. The projects have highly successful completion rates. Typically, 90 percent or more of the offenders admitted to a project successfully complete program requirements.

The Study of Governmental Responses to Crime Project Report No. 1*
Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University

The Governmental Responses to Crime Project began in October 1978. It has involved a substantial effort to collect and retrieve large amounts of information about cities and crime. We are within three months of completing the data collection effort and about to embark on its analysis. This paper, therefore, does not report the analyses of these data but, rather, describes the data base we are collecting and some of the uses to which it will be put.

We needed to make decisions about three sets of variables: the time frame for the study, its geographic and jurisdictional scope, and the operational meaning of crime and of governmental responses. Each of these deserves scrutiny.

We decided to concentrate our study on the 31-year period from 1948 to 1978. We chose 1948 as the beginning point of our study because it represents the first national elections of the post-World War II era. We chose not to go back to earlier years both because we wanted to avoid the special circumstances of the Great Depression and of the war years and because we feared that it would be too difficult to retrieve information for an earlier period. We chose 1978 as the end point of our study period because it provided a decade of experience with LEAA programs and grants. Although we are not specifically attempting to evaluate LEAA's effect on cities, we wanted to be able to take it into account.

Our original proposal promised to study 10 city triads consisting of a central city and two of its suburbs. In some minor ways we have contracted that enterprise; in some major ways we have expanded the scope of our study.

In looking for cities on which to concentrate, we determined at the outset to choose urban areas which would reflect some of our major hypotheses about the manner in which cities respond to crime. Thus, we wanted sites which were rapidly growing as well as those which were stable or declining. We wanted locations with large minority populations and some with smaller ones; we looked for some with predominantly black minority composition and some with a large proportion of Latinos. We wanted cities with reformed city governments in which a city manager played a predominant role and unreformed cities in which mayors and traditional partisan elections were more important. We wanted cities which had black mayors as well as some which did not. We wanted cities with very high crime rates as well as some with lower ones. Finally, we wanted study sites in all sections of the country.

*This is a preliminary report of the Governmental Responses to Crime Project funded under Grant 78 WX-AK-0096 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. While the principal investigator, Professor Herbert Jacob, is the author of this report, the project has been carried forward jointly with Professor Robert L. Lineberry who is co-principal investigator and Dr. Anne Heinz who is project manager.
This led us to examine the characteristics of the 65 largest cities and from that examination we chose 10: Philadelphia, Newark, Boston, Atlanta, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Houston, Phoenix, Oakland, and San Jose. These sites provide us all the contrasts mentioned above and many more. The eastern cities and Oakland have been seen to be declining, Atlanta, Phoenix, Houston, and San Jose have experienced rapid growth. Oakland, San Jose, and Phoenix have city managers. Newark, Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta and Oakland have large black populations; San Jose, Phoenix, and Houston have substantial Latino populations. Newark, Atlanta, and Oakland have had black mayors.

The crime rates of the cities also differ substantially. In addition, our study sites reflect a wide range of socioeconomic circumstances. For instance, using the index of need developed by Bunce and Glickman, 1980, we find three of our cities (Newark, Atlanta, and Boston) among the 10 most needy cities and three (Phoenix, Indianapolis, and San Jose) among the 10 least needy (see table 1). Likewise, these cities also represent different degrees of income inequality. Thus, we are confident that we have chosen 10 sites which will provide us with widely varying settings for our analysis.

The selection of these sites, however, had one disadvantage—not all of them had enough suburbs for us to find two to complete the proposed triad. The towns around Newark, Oakland, and San Jose are not clearly linked to those central cities, rather than to others in the metropolitan area, to be called their suburbs. In addition, Indianapolis vastly expanded its boundaries in 1972 and swallowed up many of its suburbs in a metropolitan-wide form of government called unigov. Thus, we can examine suburbs for only 6 of our 10 cities.

However, we have vastly expanded the geographic scope of our study from the original proposal by also collecting some information on all 395 cities in the United States that had a population of 50,000 or more in 1950, 1960 or 1970. These 395 cities constitute our baseline data set. We call it our baseline data set because we will use these cities as a basis of comparison for our 10 cities. Examination of the baseline cities will permit us to see to what degree our study sites reflect mean or modal trends among all larger cities and to what extent we are dealing with deviant cases. Although we have collected only limited information about the 395 cities, this data set constitutes a very large file with almost 200,000 bits of information.

We also needed to operationalize our concept of crime. We are concerned with the perceptions of crime that city officials might respond to rather than a "true" crime rate for our cities. For that reason, one of our measures of crime is the data collected as "Offenses Known to the Police" from the Uniform Crime Reports. We collected these data from the published reports on an annual basis for most of our time period, but for a 10-year span we took them from a data set located at the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. The consortium also provided us data on a monthly basis for a 10-year period. We use these UCR data in full knowledge of the many critiques that have been leveled against them. Those criticisms, however, are directed against their use as indicators of the real incidence of crime rather than as indicators of perceived crime. These data are the reports which appear in the local press and they are the ones to which local officials must respond. For those reasons, they appear quite adequate for our use.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Need Score*</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Need Score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>1.448</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>1.166</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Baton Rouge</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>-0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Jacksonville</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Natchitoches</td>
<td>-0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>-0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Onaha</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>-0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>-0.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>-0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Tulsa</td>
<td>-0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Nashville-Davidson</td>
<td>-0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>-0.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>-0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>-0.892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The average need score for the population of the 483 metropolitan cities included in the needs analysis is zero. Large cities as a group are somewhat needier than average.

Source: Buncic and Glickman (1980)
We have collected an independent measure of perceived crime. For 9 of our 10 cities (Newark was excluded because of its unique location in the New York megalopolis), we analyzed the content of local newspapers. It was, unfortunately, not possible to read all issues of all newspapers completely. Therefore, we took a random sample of dates which provided us a randomly reconstructed week for each four-month period of a year. We then chose the particular newspaper to read according to each paper's share of the citywide circulation. This provided us with 21 newspapers for each year for the 31-year period.

For each newspaper thus selected, we read the front page (or in the case of tabloids, the first three pages) and the editorials and letters to the editor. One of the items we counted was the number of crime incidents reported on the front page and whether they had taken place locally or somewhere else. This crime incident count will then provide us with a second and independent measure of the amount of crime to which local officials might respond.

The third element requiring measurement in our research is governmental response. We have operationalized this in a number of quite different and independent ways. First, we have measures which come from police departments and police activities. These include arrest data (available to us in several instances on a monthly basis for much of the period), the number of sworn officers, police staffing policies, the number of squad cars, the number of officers in the patrol division and in other divisions, and the total amount of police protection expenditures. We also viewed large changes in offense rates as potential response to crime, since it is well known that these crime rates can be manipulated by police departments.

We have not limited ourselves, however, to these conventional measures of police response to crime. We are also researching each change of police chief (or the equivalent position in the city), the number of policy changes and policy statements recorded in our content analysis of local newspapers, changes in intergovernmental revenues devoted to policing (largely LEAA grants), changes in conviction rates in local courts, changes in the staffing of the local prosecutor, and changes in local ordinances which involve crime.

Thus, we have a wide array of measures of governmental responses to crime. We suspect that there is considerable variation in their significance from one city to another and over the 31-year time period. By using these many measures, we avoid gross oversimplification of what surely is a complex process.

These data have been collected from a variety of sources. Some, such as the offense data and police protection expenditures, were obtained from published sources--the Uniform Crime Reports and Census Bureau publications. Most of our information from our 10 cities, however, has been collected on-site from city offices and archives by our field staff. In addition, we have relied on newspaper accounts of specific events, such as the hiring of a new police chief, and on interview responses from persons who were well informed about events in a particular period.

We are, of course, aware of the potential bias in the oral histories; we have tried to account for that bias by relying on several knowledgeable respondents for each time period. We are also investigating in depth--through newspaper and documentary research and by interviews with participants--key decisions in each city.

Finally, we are obtaining from our professional field staff a profile of each city for the 31-year period. This historical essay will provide us with a great deal of qualitative background material for our comparative analysis of the 10 sites. Most of these data sets are presently being organized into computer accessible files. The numerical time series are being compiled into SPSS files; much of the interview material and data about police chief selections is being organized into RQUS files.

An important part of our work has been an effort to pay special attention to the quality of the data we have been collecting. On superficial examination, the time series look like numbers that are easy to analyze. However, in many cases our field staff has warned us that the series are not consistent because of changes in definitions or changes in departmental jurisdiction. Each of these and other problems with the data are being fully documented in our code books so that we and future users will know what precautions are required before proceeding to the analysis of these data.

Our analysis will follow several paths. Our working hypothesis is that issues go through cycles. When there is no perceived problem, the issue is latent. When a problem comes to be seen as serious, it enters an acute stage; when the general public and government officials tire of the problem, it enters a chronic stage--still present, unsolved, but not considered top priority.

Thus, the manner in which cities respond to crime depends, in the first instance, on the way in which crime is perceived as a problem. That, however, is not simply a function of the seriousness of crime nor the manner of its presentation; it also depends on the presence of other problems that are pressing for public and official attention. The agenda for action is always limited; whether crime is placed on it depends not only on how seriously the crime problem is perceived but also on what other problems are clarifying for the public.

Secondly, the manner in which cities respond to crime will, we think, depend on the structure of decisionmaking in a city, the decisionmaking styles which are utilized, the information that is available to decisionmakers, and the amount of resource slack that decisionmakers enjoy. These variables influence the way in which decisionmakers decide how to respond to crime.

Finally, we are obtaining from our professional field staff a profile of each city for the 31-year period. This historical essay will provide us with a great deal of qualitative background material for our comparative analysis of the 10 sites. Most of these data sets are presently being organized into computer accessible files. The numerical time series are being compiled into SPSS files; much of the interview material and data about police chief selections is being organized into RQUS files.

An important part of our work has been an effort to pay special attention to the quality of the data we have been collecting. On superficial examination, the time series look like numbers that are easy to analyze. However, in many cases our field staff has warned us that the series are not consistent because of changes in definitions or changes in departmental jurisdiction. Each of these and other problems with the data are being fully documented in our code books so that we and future users will know what precautions are required before proceeding to the analysis of these data.

Our analysis will follow several paths. Our working hypothesis is that issues go through cycles. When there is no perceived problem, the issue is latent. When a problem comes to be seen as serious, it enters an acute stage; when the general public and government officials tire of the problem, it enters a chronic stage--still present, unsolved, but not considered top priority.

Thus, the manner in which cities respond to crime depends, in the first instance, on the way in which crime is perceived as a problem. That, however, is not simply a function of the seriousness of crime nor the manner of its presentation; it also depends on the presence of other problems that are pressing for public and official attention. The agenda for action is always limited; whether crime is placed on it depends not only on how seriously the crime problem is perceived but also on what other problems are clarifying for the public.

Secondly, the manner in which cities respond to crime will, we think, depend on the structure of decisionmaking in a city, the decisionmaking styles which are utilized, the information that is available to decisionmakers, and the amount of resource slack that decisionmakers enjoy. These variables influence the way in which decisionmakers decide how to respond to crime.

Finally, we are obtaining from our professional field staff a profile of each city for the 31-year period. This historical essay will provide us with a great deal of qualitative background material for our comparative analysis of the 10 sites. Most of these data sets are presently being organized into computer accessible files. The numerical time series are being compiled into SPSS files; much of the interview material and data about police chief selections is being organized into RQUS files.

An important part of our work has been an effort to pay special attention to the quality of the data we have been collecting. On superficial examination, the time series look like numbers that are easy to analyze. However, in many cases our field staff has warned us that the series are not consistent because of changes in definitions or changes in departmental jurisdiction. Each of these and other problems with the data are being fully documented in our code books so that we and future users will know what precautions are required before proceeding to the analysis of these data.

Our analysis will follow several paths. Our working hypothesis is that issues go through cycles. When there is no perceived problem, the issue is latent. When a problem comes to be seen as serious, it enters an acute stage; when the general public and government officials tire of the problem, it enters a chronic stage--still present, unsolved, but not considered top priority.
2) Boland (1976) has suggested that different types of crime are predominant in several sections of the country. She has suggested that violent crime predominates in the stable and declining cities of the Northeast, while property crime is more important in the booming cities of the Southwest and West. The implication of her findings is that the stresses associated with decay lead to personal violence, while the conditions underlying growth are more likely to lead to property crimes. This analysis also rested on an examination of a cross-section of data at one point of time. We will reexamine this finding with the time series of our baseline data set.

3) Analysis by Tufte (1978) suggests that Presidents manipulate economic conditions during election years to enhance their chances for reelection or for the election of their favorite as successor. We are examining a parallel hypothesis for cities and crime to see whether crime statistics show cyclical changes that correspond to mayoral elections.

4) Finally, we are initiating our use of the concept analysis of the city press by examining the degree to which press attention to crime reflects changes in officially published crime statistics. From there, we will look for other correlates of press attention to crime, looking both at larger societal factors and to changes in the organization of the newspapers themselves.

I am unable, at this time, to provide results for these several research efforts. We are, as I stated, at the threshold of the analysis stage of our work. This paper, however, has outlined our data holdings and may allow others to plan their own research. Our data will be made available to others at the conclusion of our grant, which we now anticipate to occur in October 1981.

References


would result in a reduction of the resources necessary to respond to calls for service, without adversely affecting levels of patrol officer utilization or citizen satisfaction. This would, in tum, free up patrol units that could be put to use in more critical areas.

Prior to implementing the alternative response methods, there were two determinations that had to be made: one, what work alternative responses were available; and two, what the community would accept. The alternatives that were arrived at included:

- **Formal delayed response.** This is the 30-minute delayed response that was originally used in the Split Force. It would be continued.

- **Specialist unit response.** This procedure was developed to accommodate a response, by appointment at the convenience of the caller, that could be delayed for some period of time. Essentially, this is a formal delayed response carried out on a much higher level.

- **Walk-in response.** This alternative of asking complainants to come in to the police station to file a report, instead of having a unit respond to them, had been used informally for some time in the department. It would be continued on a more formal level under Managing the Police Demand.

- **Telephone report.** A number of police agencies have developed mechanisms for telephone report-taking. This method is particularly useful for handling minor complaints, especially property crimes that are being reported primarily for insurance purposes.

- **Outside referral.** Because the police are perhaps the only social service agency open 24 hours a day, they frequently are the recipients of requests for which they can offer no effective service. In such instances, it would be more appropriate to refer the caller to other existing services that are equipped to handle the particular problem.

- **Telephone adjustment.** Certain complaints received by the police are actually requests for information or advice. Many of these can be satisfactorily handled by the person originally receiving the call in the police communications center.

In order to determine which of these alternatives would be acceptable to the population served by the Wilmington Police, an attitudinal survey was developed and conducted by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachusetts. This firm served as the evaluation consultant for both the Split Force and Managing the Police Demand Projects. Questions regarding the quality of police service, response times, and the alternative responses mentioned above were asked of the first few months of 1978. It was found that slightly more than 34 percent of those surveyed would be willing to accept one of the alternative responses (see Figure 1).
question: For the type of problem you reported, what do you think would be the best police department response to meet your needs? Would you say it was:

1. Having a patrol car respond immediately 65.8%
2. Having a patrol car come to you when available, but within 24 hours 13.5%
3. Having the police department call you back on the telephone (this would result in a police visit whenever appropriate) 18.4%
4. Going to the police department in person (this would result in a police visit whenever appropriate) 2.3%

With the above in mind, the Wilmington Police set itself a goal of decreasing the volume of complaints dispatched to Basic Patrol units by at least 20 percent. This decrease would be attained through the use of the various response alternatives. These response alternatives would be used only for low-priority complaints where immediate assistance was not required.

Whereas during the Split Force Project we had used three categories for prioritizing complaints, under Managing the Police Demand only two were used. We found that under Split Force only 1.6 percent of the complaints received were classified in the middle category by our communications personnel. In actual practice, complaints were treated as either critical or noncritical, with few "in-betweens." We adapted this two-fold distinction under Managing the Police Demand using the following breakdown:

- Critical complaint—a call for service that requires the immediate intervention of a police officer. Complaints involving a serious offense that is in progress or has just occurred, complaints where a suspect is still on the scene or is fleeing, or complaints where any life-threatening condition exists would all be classified as critical complaints.

- Noncritical complaint—a call for service that does not require an immediate response by a police officer. Such calls may be delayed, adjusted, or handled through alternative means.

The first responsibility of a communications clerk upon receipt of a request for police service is to determine if the complaint is of a critical or noncritical nature. If critical, the dispatcher is notified and sufficient patrol units dispatched immediately to the scene. If noncritical, the communications clerk will take a few moments to see if the caller will accept one of the response alternatives. Many noncritical complaints will still continue to require a response by a patrol unit, depending on the circumstances attendant to the complaint. In some cases the caller will demand to have a police officer respond, even though by our criteria none should do so. (Our policy in Wilmington has been to dispatch a patrol unit if a citizen demands it, regardless of the nature of the complaint.) If the caller does accept one of the alternatives offered, and the complaint cannot be quickly adjusted at the time of the initial call, the caller is then referred to our Complaint Service Unit. An officer from this unit will then call the complainant back at a time that is convenient to both of them. In this way, emergency phone lines are not tied up and complainants are not put on hold indefinitely. In addition, the Complaint Service officer can schedule his callbacks over an entire shift, spreading out the demand peaks, which enables him to handle more complaints.

By diverting 20 percent of the complaints away from dispatch to our Basic Patrol Units, we anticipated being able to decrease the number of four-hour active response units by at least 20 percent, while maintaining individual unit workload and response time to primary critical calls at levels comparable to those achieved under the Split Force. This reduction was again planned through use of the Patrol Car Allocation Model and the Hypercube Queuing Model, as was done for the Split Force Project.

We show the reduction in Basic Patrol Unit deployment in Figure 2. Note that the units are defined in terms of four-hour tours. The number of eight-hour units can be determined by dividing each total by two.

Figure 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tour</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Split Force</th>
<th>Managing the Police Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2400-0400</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>0400-0800</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>0800-1200</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1200-1600</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1600-2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>2000-2400</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Managing the Police Demand has been in full operation since July of 1978. Although the federally funded project ended on November 1, 1979, the Wilmington Department of Police continues to operate the program. As of the date of this writing, the final evaluation report on the program is being prepared by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.

Although we do not have the final figures on the project, we are convinced that it has been successful. The alternative responses are in operation. They are accepted by the public. The reduction in Basic Patrol Unit deployment has been achieved. There is no indication that individual unit workload has
increased beyond expectations. The overall effectiveness of the department seems unaffected.

This is, of course, only a brief description of the operation of Managing the Police Demand. Anyone wishing more detailed information on this program, or on the Split Force, should consult with either of the sources below:

Planning & Research Division
Wilmington Department of Police
1000 King Street
Wilmington, Del. 19801

Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.
929 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program:
A Summary
W. Victor Rouse, Vice President
American Institutes for Research
in the Behavioral Sciences
Washington, D.C.

COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice urged that:

Every American can translate his concern about, or fear of crime into positive action. Every American should. Specialists alone cannot control crime. Controlling crime is the business of every American. Direct citizen action to improve law enforcement has become an absolute necessity.1/

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 mentioned the concept of "community anti-crime activities," though no federal funds were allocated for them at that time. In 1973, the National Advisory Board on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals wrote a report on community crime prevention that strongly advocated citizen participation in anti-crime activity:

Action by citizens is at the heart of community crime prevention. The Commission recommends that every citizen contribute to local community crime prevention efforts. Government agencies should encourage and support citizen action programs. Existing community organizations should explore ways they can relate their activities to crime prevention.2/

Congressional hearings were held before the Crime Control Act of 1976 was passed. Testimony was given by private citizens and members of community-based organizations that indicated their concern about crime in their neighborhoods. These groups sought federal recognition of their independently initiated anti-crime activities. In an effort to promote and support these locally organized crime prevention activities, Congress amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to include a provision for direct federal funding of such activities. This amendment (Public Law 94-503: Crime Control Act of 1976) mandated the establishment of the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs (OCACP)


within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The stated purpose of OCACP is:

1. to provide appropriate technical assistance to community and citizen groups to enable such groups to apply for grants to encourage community and citizen participation in crime prevention and other law enforcement and criminal justice activities;
2. to coordinate its activities with other federal agencies and programs (including the Community Relations Division of the Department of Justice) designed to encourage and assist citizen participation in law enforcement and criminal justice activities; and
3. to provide information on successful citizen and community participation programs to citizens and community groups.3/

To implement this mandate, Congress allocated $15 million to OCACP for grants to community groups for each of the fiscal years (FY) 1977 and 1978. The Community Anti-Crime Program is designed to assist the efforts of community groups by providing resources for organizing and implementing their activities. As stated in the CAC Program Guidelines:

Emphasis is placed on community-based organizations that have substantial grassroots input or a membership base of neighborhood groups, or that relate to a network of neighborhood groups. In addition, already established or new neighborhood groups may come together in a coalition to apply under the name of one applicant community organization. The central applicant would serve as the grantee and would normally assume fiscal administration and other program coordination responsibilities for the project. Under such arrangements, unincorporated neighborhood groups would be eligible participants because the applicant organization has nonprofit, incorporated status. Eligible grantees, therefore, might include: (1) locally based chapters of national organizations involved in community improvement efforts; (2) community-based organizations (having no national affiliation) currently conducting community improvement efforts; (3) community development corporations, community-based economic development corporations, and other established community-neighborhood organizations; and (4) existing community anti-crime organizations.4/

To provide essential seed money for grassroots organizations, OCACP developed operational guidelines and program criteria for awarding the grants, which were in amounts up to $250,000.

The guidelines suggested, for illustrative purposes, two categories of activities that would be eligible—those that stressed reduction of opportunities for crime and those that addressed the causes of crime. Examples of projects in the first category were blockwatch programs, escort services for the elderly, and residential security education. The second category of projects included youth crisis centers, victim assistance programs, volunteer-based recreation programs, and juvenile counseling services. The design of the program was to be the responsibility of the community organization, and applicants were encouraged to develop innovative approaches.

LEAA funded 150 CAC projects during FY 1978. Of these, 146 were action grants to community organizations and four were technical assistance grants. Two additional technical assistance grants had already been funded in FY 1977. The 146 action grants were selected from over 1,000 organizations. Twenty-six million dollars were spent on the action grants, with the average award being $183,721.

THE EVALUATION

The CAC evaluation, like many others, had its real beginning long after the program formulation at the national level was completed and considerably after most of the local projects had begun operation. When American Institutes for Research undertook the evaluation in October 1978, it was evident that information on the program would have to be produced quickly. OCACP was expecting congressional review to begin in January 1979 and had to start making re-funding decisions in that same month. It was obvious that the evaluation design could not afford the luxury of extensive first-round site visits or other time-consuming data collection efforts.

On the other hand, we did not want to base our evaluation on archival sources simply because it was more expedient. The task of the design was to meet the information needs of policymakers, while at the same time generate the scientific data necessary for a valid evaluation effort.

The model that we employed to guide our evaluation analysis corresponds directly with our view of the program process as a multi-stage sequence of interrelated conditions and events. This model, as applied to the Community Anti-Crime evaluation, is presented in Figure 1.

The CAC evaluation was designed to answer the following questions:

1. What are the specific functions that residents and resident groups can most appropriately and usefully perform in the process of crime prevention?
2. What are the structural and organizational characteristics of resident groups that increase or limit their effectiveness in the performance of these functions?
3. What has been the impact, positive and negative, of the LEAA grants on the development of resident groups with these kinds of characteristics and on their capacity for performing the various functions?
4. What other types of support, local or federal, seem necessary, in addition to the inputs that LEAA provides, to enable resident groups to overcome the specific problems and difficulties that they encounter?
Figure 2
BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE CAC PROGRAM EVALUATION

OTHER EVENTS

Disposing Conditions
Baseline State of Affairs
Organizational Inputs
Program Inputs
Immediate Outcomes
Intermediate Outcomes
Ultimate Outcomes
TA and Project Monitors

PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED IN TERMS OF (1) CRIME LEVELS, (2) FEAR OF CRIME, AND (3) LEVEL OF COOPERATION AMONG RESIDENTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OFFICIALS. MOST OF THE DATA FOR THIS WOULD COME FROM THE GRANT APPLICATIONS OR, FOR A LEVEL III, FROM OFFICIAL RECORDS AND INTERVIEWS.

THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE COMPONENTS OF A VIABLE ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUP. THE FFORMER WOULD INCLUDE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, CHAINS OF AUTHORITY, HIRING STAFF, ETC.; THE LATTER SUCH THINGS AS THE DEGREE OF HIERARCHY, PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP, ETC.

ALL STEPS IN PROGRAM PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LEADING UP TO ACTUALLY ENGAGING IN CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES. EXAMPLES WOULD BE PLANNING ACTIVITIES, NEEDS ASSESSMENTS, SURVEYS OF CITIZENS, TALKING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS, GETTING GROUPS ORGANIZED, BUYING EQUIPMENT FOR MARKING PROPERTY, ETC.

LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC CAPABILITIES OVER WHICH THE PROJECT HAS LITTLE OR NO DIRECT CONTROL. THESE INCLUDE BOTH DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION, SES LEVELS OF THE COMMUNITY, ETC., AS WELL AS THEEXISTENCE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL REALITIES, WILLINGNESS OF GROUPS TO CooperATE, EXPERIENCE OF RESIDENTS WITH PREVIOUS INTERVENTIONS IN COMMUNITY, ETC.
5. What are the generalizable implications of the CAC experience for the role and functions of resident groups and for the related local and federal policy issues?

To answer these questions, we undertook a process-oriented evaluation involving three levels of analysis.

The first level, Level I, involves data collection on and from all CAC projects. First, we collected demographic data on the cities and on the target areas chosen by the projects. We also coded information presented by the projects in their initial grant applications.

The bulk of the data at this level will come, however, from two surveys of all projects. The first of these took place in the spring of 1979. The second will be mailed to projects as close as possible to the end of their funding periods. Since these are surveys of all projects, they have been labeled "Global Surveys" and are referred to as such in the rest of this report.

Of the 141 surveys mailed in the first wave, 128 were returned (a 90.8-percent rate). The data from the surveys were combined with the demographic data and the grant proposal data in the Management Information System that exists. The information is then cross-referenced with data from the different sources. It is the complete data from these 128 CAC projects that form the descriptive data base for this report, providing us with two snapshots of the program. The proposals give us a picture of the conditions that the projects were trying to address and what they intended to do, and the Global Survey data give us a picture of where the projects are after approximately one year of operation.

Level I data are the most descriptive of the CAC Program as a whole, but they do not provide a great deal of insight into how specific projects are implementing specific crime prevention activities and with what effects. In short, descriptive data do not enable one to make evaluative statements. For that, on-site collection efforts—and thus, the other two levels of evaluation effort—are necessary.

Just as Level I sites constitute the basis of our Global evaluation, Level II sites are the units of analysis for the Focused evaluation, and Level III sites for the Intensive. There are 24 Level II sites, and each is being visited twice. Each of the 12 Level III sites is being visited several times. At each site, we are specifying the results of the Global evaluation by gathering additional, detailed data on the contents within which the projects are operating, their organizational characteristics and problems, their activities, and their impacts. As of this writing, we have visited all Level II and Level III sites once.

Site visit data provide us with our third snapshot of the program. First-round site visits generally included interviews with staff, tours of the target area, meetings with board members and project directors, and discussions of key activities. Data were collected from both structured interviews and observation of the project and its environmental context.

After each site visit, an extensive report was written to supplement the material in our files from the proposals and the Global Survey. Clearly, it is the 30 projects that we have visited that we know best, and in the analyses that follow, we will first ask questions about these projects and then, where appropriate, supplement the analysis with data from the proposals and the Global Survey.

ISSUE OF CREAMING

In this section, we examine the process of site and grantee selection as implemented by OCACP. One of the most frequently heard criticisms of federal programs is that bureaucrats often try to influence the success of their programs by "creaming off" for funding those most likely to succeed. It can be argued with no proven track record, never get a chance, even though they may have a lot of innovative ideas and motivation.

In the case of the CAC Program, there were really three kinds of creaming that could have occurred. The program could have chosen cities with low crime and/or a history of crime prevention and community organizing activities; all low levels of crime or reference groups working in neighborhood target areas with experience in groups with extensive experience and proven track record in management. We have looked for evidence of each of these.

Did OCACP Choose "Easy" Cities?

Our site visits provided data relevant to an effort to answer this question. We determined whether there was an active crime prevention unit in the police department and whether, in comparison with other cities visited, there was a history of active community organizing efforts. Of the 36 sites visited, 19 were sites with histories of community organizing. What is interesting, however, is that only 8 projects were in cities that had both, which critics would have said in most instances along only one of these dimensions, rather than along both.

Crime data can also be used to address the criticism that OCACP would choose projects in cities with lower than average crime problems. The data that we collected were from the FBI (the base year for most project applications), and we have data on the FBI's Crime in the United States, projects from jurisdictions with over 25,000 population reporting to the FBI, with national rates. Then, we compared the rates for index crimes in the CAC cities with rates for populations living in cities with over 25,000 population—lower rates typically found in rural areas where there are also few CAC projects.

Property Crime

- The burglary rate for the nation was 1,411 incidents per 100,000 residents. The burglary rates for cities over 25,000 population was 1,824. Seventy-six percent had burglary rates higher than the national rate of 83 percent.

We also examined a variety of other issues.
The overall property crime rate for the nation was 4,588 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban property crime rate was 6,031. The median rate for the CAC cities was 5,526. One hundred and four CAC cities (90 percent) had property crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-two (90 percent) had property crime rates higher than the urban rate.

**Violent Crime**

- The murder rate for the nation was 8.8 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban murder rate was 17.5. One hundred CAC cities (87 percent) had murder rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-nine (69 percent) had murder rates higher than the urban rate.
- The overall violent crime rate for the nation was 467 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban violent crime rate was 709. The median rate for the CAC cities was 997. One hundred CAC cities (87 percent) had violent crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-three (72 percent) had violent crime rates higher than the urban rate.

**Total Crime**

- The National Crime Index for 1977 was 5,055 incidents per 100,000 residents. The urban index was 6,740. In the CAC cities, it was 8,197. One hundred and five CAC cities (91 percent) had total crime rates higher than the national rate. Eighty-five (74 percent) had total crime rates higher than the urban rate.

In addition to looking at individual crimes, one can ask how many CAC sites were worse off than the national or urban rates across crimes. A city could have murder rates worse than the national or urban rates on from 0 to 7 of crimes listed in the National Crime Index. Table 1 shows the projects by the number of crimes for which the CAC cities have higher rates than the national or urban rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>CRIME PROBLEM INDEX FOR CAC CITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 114</td>
<td>NO. OF PROJECTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of crimes where cities have above-average rates</td>
<td>National Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>5 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3 (2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>21 (18.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>35 (30.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this comparison of crime rate figures, there appears to be very little evidence that OCACP chose projects in cities with abnormally low crime problems. Only eight projects are in cities above the national rates on three or fewer crimes. The vast majority of projects are in cities above the national rates on all or almost all index crimes.

**Did OCACP Choose "Easy" Organizations?**

OCACP's decision to support locally administered crime prevention projects entailed a certain amount of risk. To some extent, community organizations are an unknown quantity. They are highly disparate in terms of age, experience, structure, and management capability.

There is no generally accepted definition of a community organization, but there are some defining characteristics: for example, accountability to residents; control by voluntary leadership; political, but nonpartisan, orientation; and a high degree of political autonomy. From the federal government's perspective, none of these organizational traits signifies an "easy" grantee. It is no wonder critics charged that OCACP would impose implicit selection criteria to control the risk associated with investing in such unconventional grantees; control the risk associated with investing in such unconventional grantees.

**Was the selection biased in favor of experienced groups?** In this section, we examine the relevant site visit and survey data to determine the extent to which experienced grantees predominated in the CAC Program.

The explicit funding criteria allowed considerable latitude in defining eligible grantees. Local chapters of national organizations involved in community improvement, community organizations with no national affiliation, community development corporations, and existing community anti-crime groups were among those specified as eligible. Even unincorporated groups were eligible, if they formed a coalition and applied under a central, incorporated grantee.

From these criteria, one could infer at least a paper commitment by OCACP to grassroots participation in the program. If the commitment were genuine, we would expect a substantial portion of the grantees to be young, inexperienced, unsophisticated groups in which power to set policy is vested in a volunteer membership. The Global Survey and our first round of site visits focused heavily on problems associated with program start-up and organizational development. Each of these two issues casts light on the question of organizational maturing.

**Age of grantees.** As a rule, most of the designated grantee organizations are young. For the 105 organizations reporting, 1971 was the median year of incorporation. Seven groups were incorporated before 1950. Five were incorporated in the 1950s, 31 in the 1960s, and 49 were incorporated between 1970 and 1976. A sizable number of grantees (13) were incorporated in 1977 and 1978, usually to meet LEAA eligibility requirements.

**Experience.** In the Global Survey, we used two indirect measures to evaluate the grantees' experience at the local level. We asked projects about their previous experience with federal grants and about the size of their operating budgets (excluding the CAC grant). For both measures, the findings reflect only the experience of the grantee organizations. Consequently, for some of the coalition projects, the findings present an inflated estimate of overall project experience.
When asked if they had ever received a federal grant other than CAC, 45 (37 percent) of the grantees responded that they had not, and 78 (63 percent) said they had. Only 14 grantees had received LEAA funds before. The median federal grant size was $200,000. A sizable number of grants were awarded to groups with no track record in grant management.

Our second indirect measure of fiscal management experience produced parallel evidence about the projects. We found that nearly 8 percent of the grantees had no funds other than the CAC grant. Seventy-five percent of the groups had additional budgets other than the CAC grant. About half the annual budgets of $50,000 or less, excluding the CAC grant, were in the average CAC grants had additional budgets less than $183,721, the size of the average CAC grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million. In grant. Eighteen percent of the grantees had budgets larger than $1 million.

Problems encountered. If the argument that OCACP would choose "easy" organizations cannot be justified, the critics might argue that there are not, after all, many "easy" organizations, and the rest of the community-based groups could be characterized as having so many organizational and management problems that they would never get around to implementing crime prevention activities. Our site visits suggest that although there are significant problems at some of the sites, they are generally of a size only to cause delays and not to cripple the projects.

To provide a balanced picture, we indicate below the number of projects that have specific problems and the number that definitely do not have each problem. The data reflect judgments by our field staff about each project in comparison to the others that they visited.

- For 12 projects, staff turnover has been a problem. For 13 projects, it has not been a problem at all.
- Seventeen projects had difficulty initiating a working relationship with the police; however, 21 had no such problem.
- Eight groups have had conflicts with other community organizations in their cities, but for 12 this has definitely not been a problem.
- Seven projects had financial management problems, but 23 definitely did not.
- Seven projects had difficulty in developing a work plan acceptable to OCACP; however, this was definitely not a problem for 7 projects.
- Eight projects had to rely heavily on technical assistance during their start-up phases, but 27 did not.
- Ten project directors had little program management experience; 10 had a great deal of experience.
- In only seven projects were staff experienced in crime prevention.
- At 17 sites, the person(s) who wrote the grant proposal is not working on the funded project.

Of the 36 projects visited, 11 had none or only one of the problems listed above. Twenty-one had between two and four problems, and four had five or six of the problems. None had more than six.

Where multiple problems exist, they are clearly serious. In some instances, they have caused substantial delays in program implementation and may impair the ability of the projects to meet their objectives by the end of their funding cycles. In only one or two instances, however, did the evaluation field staff feel that organizational problems might actually cripple the projects. In other projects, the problems have been met and dealt with effectively, with only minimal impact on program implementation.

Did OCACP "cream off" the most experienced groups? Alternately, were the projects selected so beset by organizational difficulties that program implementation was impaired?

The data show that only a few projects provide evidence to support either of these contentions. Most of the grantees are fairly new and have only a modicum of grant management experience, though there are exceptions. Although most of the grantees have experienced multiple organizational problems, most have dealt with these problems in ways that resulted in nothing more serious than delays in program implementation. There are only one or two exceptions.

**CITIZEN PARTICIPATION**

**Citizen Participation in Proposal Development**

The LEAA Community Anti-Crime Program Guidelines called for "evidence of substantial input from neighborhood residents in the identification of crime problems and assessment of needs." 5/1

The importance of citizen participation in planning can be viewed from two perspectives. Community organizations are voluntary associations that define their purpose in terms of the interests of a specific constituency. Therefore, citizen input is usually considered a requirement for program planning and development efforts. From a crime prevention perspective, citizen participation in planning is assumed to be vital because of its motivating efforts. It can be hypothesized that, particularly at the community level, commitment is partly a function of participation in developing the program. When commitment is high, projects should be able to mobilize their constituencies effectively.

During the first round of site visits, we found that most projects had made some attempt to involve residents of the target areas in the planning of the projects and the development of the proposals that were submitted to LEAA. This involvement ranged from holding community meetings in which residents could voice their concerns, to having citizen volunteers planning the entire project and actually writing the proposal. From our discussions with project staff, we identified six major channels of citizen participation during the planning phase. These are shown in Table 2.

2/ibid.
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING AND PROPOSAL PREPARATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens attended meetings to discuss community problems and needs</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens suggested ideas for the CAC proposal</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens reacted to plans formulated by professional staff of the grantee</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization or plans written by outside consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens surveyed opinions and attitudes of target area residents</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens provided supporting documentation or data to be included in proposal</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens drafted major portions of the proposal</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Thirty-one projects reported that they had organized or participated in some type of community meeting during the initial planning stages. This was the most common channel of participation. Within this category, the organization of meetings varied greatly. Some projects organized only one mass meeting, where the availability of CAC funds and community concerns were discussed. Other projects organized meetings to obtain resident participation. A few projects held regular, small action meetings at which the final proposal was developed.

The two categories of participation next mentioned most often were that citizens suggested ideas for a proposal or that they reacted to plans formulated by professionals. The three most common channels of citizen involvement represented a less intense degree of participation than do the remaining three categories. Attending meetings, suggesting ideas, or reacting to the ideas of others, writing a proposal, and collecting data were the activities involved. Various small-scale surveys were conducted by citizens for 15 of the projects. These surveys were usually informal and consisted of residents interviewing their neighbors or interviewing people at local stores, shopping centers, or community events. Several other projects mentioned that they had considered community events. Several other projects mentioned that they had considered community events, but given the conditions in their target areas, they had not thought that residents would answer the door to people they did not know.

Residents provided supporting documentation or data to be included in 14 of the projects. In several cities where crime statistics were not available on a neighborhood basis, volunteers pulled and coded crime reports. In other cities, volunteers were responsible for collecting housing and demographic data from municipal departments; and for some projects, volunteers collected letters of support from local politicians, community leaders, and police officials. For three projects, citizens were involved in all six channels of participation.

Conclusions as to the extent of citizen involvement in the development of the CAC projects that we studied are limited. For half the projects, citizens seem to have played only a peripheral role in the planning phase, while in the remaining projects they were an integral part of the process.

Role of the Advisory Board

One of the most familiar channels of citizen participation in community action programs is a community or advisory board. We found this to be the case in CAC, with all the projects that we visited having some kind of advisory board. Furthermore, of the 128 respondents to the Global Survey, 85 percent reported that they have a board with community representation. The critics of the CAC Program predicted that these boards would not have a significant role in monitoring project operations and would serve as figureheads, rather than exerting actual control over the projects.

The structure of boards for the projects that we visited varied considerably. For some projects, the boards are the existing board of directors of the grantee organization; for other projects, new boards were created specifically for the CAC project. Some projects that are being implemented by coalitions have an overall board for the project, while in other coalitions, each organization has its own advisory board.

The backgrounds and positions of the board members also vary widely. Some boards are composed primarily of community residents, block captains, and representatives of neighborhood associations. The boards for other projects include representatives from social service agencies and police departments, ministers, school principals, and local political leaders. We were told that board members for these projects were usually chosen with the hope that the CAC project could benefit from their experience and draw on some of the resources--such as equipment, space, and money--that they represent.

From our initial site visit observations, it seemed that the boards composed of community residents generally try to maintain greater control over the project activities and paid staff than do boards made up of organization and agency representatives. In the latter case, the boards mainly give advice and serve as trouble-shooters.

According to the information collected during the site visits, we found that there are eight general categories that describe the ways that advisory boards are involved in the project. These are given in Table 3.
Citizens or citizen boards decided how the CAC funds were allocated
Paid staff must have major decisions about activities sanctioned by citizen board
Citizen board evaluates performance of CAC staff
Citizens or citizen board reviewed applicants and hired project staff
The citizen board or a member of the board must sign off on project expenditures
Citizen board members participate in day-to-day operations of the project
Citizens or the citizen board developed work plans to be implemented by paid staff

Staffing Patterns

Another item examined under citizen participation is the extent to which CAC projects have selected staff who reflect their constituencies. Our impression from the first round of site visits is that most of the projects seem to be fairly representative of the target area populations.

Five of the 36 sample projects reported that residents who helped to develop the proposal were hired as paid staff, and 22 projects recruited staff members from their target area. Nine of the projects are staffed at the management level exclusively by target area residents. One project said, however, that they had made a conscious decision not to recruit staff from the target area. They believed that outside persons would be better able to assess the area's problems and would not be involved in local conflicts.

CHOICE OF ACTIVITIES: THE SAME OLD STUFF?

Every crime prevention strategy is based on a particular conception of the best means of reducing the incidence of criminal behavior. Some strategies emphasize the deterrent effect of stiff penalties and punishments. Other strategies address the complex of socio-economic and psychological factors that may make an individual predisposed to commit crime. Still other strategies are aimed at making the commission of crime more difficult and the apprehension of a criminal more likely.

Like other groups of professionals and experts, the law enforcement/criminal justice community has changed its conceptions and philosophical orientations in the light of new evidence. Although each crime prevention strategy has always had its proponents, the focus has shifted over time.

The 1960s and the War on Poverty brought what might be characterized as a "structuralist" approach to crime prevention. People commit crimes because a whole host of environmental factors make legitimate behavior unproductive or because psychological determinants predispose some persons to criminal behavior. This strategy addresses the causes of crime—the influence of society, family, and peers on individual behavior.

In recent years, this strategy has come under attack. Some critics contend that a cause reduction approach simply does not work. They argue that criminal behavior involves rational decisions, that a potential criminal evaluates the costs and benefits of his actions just as any other decisionmaker does. The task of a good crime prevention strategy is to influence that decision in the right way. If the likelihood of committing a crime "successfully" is reduced, if the difficulty of committing a crime is increased, or if the chances of apprehension are raised, the potential criminal will be less likely to commit a particular crime in a particular neighborhood. The opportunity for crime is thus reduced.

CAC reflects the current interest in opportunity reduction strategies, but program implementation depends on actors—community-based organizations—who have traditionally drawn support from and voiced allegiance to structural cause reduction strategies.

Community-based organizations have tended, historically, to provide services designed to help a person cope with the environment. Their approach has centered on helping people adjust to a society that is often perceived as hostile or unsupportive. Programs that emphasize the structural, cause reduction approach to social problems have been the bread and butter of many community-based organizations. In this context, concern for the possible unwillingness of community-based organizations to adopt the opportunity reduction strategies of CAC is certainly relevant and was often voiced by the program's critics.

The data in Table 3 indicate that the CAC projects are, at least collectively, making substantial investments in opportunity reduction strategies. But what is the typical mix of opportunity and cause reduction activities for individual projects? All of the 123 projects for which we have complete activity data are doing some opportunity reduction activities. The median number engaged in this is 5, but 14 projects are implementing more than 10. Twenty-five projects report that they are doing no activities oriented toward the cause of crime. Of those that are implementing cause reduction activities, 46 are doing only one or two, and 17 are doing more than five.

In terms of the mix of strategies, opportunity reduction activities comprise the majority of efforts for 76 percent of the projects. Percentages of project activities in opportunity reduction range from 22 to 100, with the median being
### Table 4
CAC ACTIVITIES BROKEN DOWN INTO OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION AND CAUSE REDUCTION STRATEGIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity Reduction</th>
<th>Cause Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number of Citations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information/Education</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletters</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Publicity</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Forums</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime, Drug, and Alcohol programs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film Library</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention curricula</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information activities</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockwatch Activities</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building watch</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizing</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business watch</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whistle Alert</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe houses</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Hardening</th>
<th>Number of Citations</th>
<th>Cause Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation ID</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Other manpower development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home security survey</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Job development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Placement and referral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of hardware</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other manpower development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct deposit of social security checks</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Victim/Witness Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Victim model, court reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painting numbers on curbs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Victim-witness model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self defense/rape prevention</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Physical Improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson prevention</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>House repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other target hardening</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Street clean-ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Services</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Building renovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice/Community Relations</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Other physical improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police-community relations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring/negotiating services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Intergenerational Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtwatch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Community Revitalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CJ-community relations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrols</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotlines</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis intervention/ counseling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency security repairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emergency services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Opportunity Reducing Activities** | **680** |
**Total Cause Reducing Activities** | **300**
67. It must be emphasized that numbers of activities are serving here as a very imperfect indicator for level of effort. Some activities require a greater investment of project resources than others. Some activities are ongoing efforts, while others are one-shot affairs. A detailed examination of effort levels for individual activities and for projects as a whole will be a major emphasis on future rounds of site visits.

Are projects doing "the same old stuff?" To some extent, yes. But the fair and accurate answer is that projects are continuing some of their previous cause reduction activities plus a wide variety of new opportunity reduction activities. The charge that projects would use CAC funds primarily to continue their previous activities under new labels is not substantiated by the evidence.

GETTING THE DOLLARS ON THE STREETS

Federal programs are notoriously difficult to initiate, particularly those that seek to involve community groups. The process leading to final implementation is complicated and time-consuming. By the time the funds actually reach the community, local circumstances may have changed drastically, and the most appropriate intervention strategy may bear little resemblance to the one that was planned.

To the outside observer, community organizations are often an unknown quantity. Their resources and staff capabilities change over time, and it is nearly impossible for a program administrator to evaluate fully a local organization's ability to conduct a given program. Critics of government social policy contend that the gulf between theory and practice is enormous, that the well-intentioned federal dollars that flow into communities all too often fail to reach the people for whom they are intended.

More than many other programs, CAC was designed to get funds out on the street. By placing those funds in the hands of people who know and understand their community, it was hoped that effective crime prevention would be quickly instituted. In addition to the evidence evaluating the selection of appropriate sites, the involvement of citizens, and the choice of activities, we took a preliminary look at what projects promised and what they have delivered so far.

CONCLUSION

It is too early to report on the Community Anti-Crime Program's efficacy in reducing crime and changing communities, but we can make some judgments about the overall validity of OJIP's approach. In this report, we have presented what is essentially a worst-case analysis. We have inquired whether the charges of the program's harshest critics would stand up. We have sought evidence that the CAC Program selected cities, target areas, or organizations with problem-minimizing characteristics. We have looked at the roles of citizens in the planning and implementation of the program, at what advisory boards do, and at the extent to which project staff reflect their constituencies. We have looked at project activities to see if projects are "doing the same old stuff" for a new federal agency.

The notions of "creaming," "milking," "stealing," "charade," "rubberstamp," and "paper-pushers" have been the reference points for our analysis of three major conceptual criticisms leveled at the CAC Program. There is substantial evidence that community organizations are generally adequate to the tasks of designing, organizing, and implementing crime prevention activities.

The final questions remain, however. With what levels of citizen participation? For how long? With what levels of community support? With what effects on the communities and their crime problems?

These are the evaluation questions that will be addressed in future rounds of site visits and in our final evaluation report.
National Evaluation of the Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test/1
David I. Sheppard
Vice President
Institute for Social Analysis

Seeking viable alternatives to the courts for persons having disputes with their friends, neighbors, relatives, or with a merchant or landlord, the Department of Justice and the National Institute of Justice established three experimental projects in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles. The Neighborhood Justice Centers (NJC’s) were to provide third-party mediation to resolve disputes as an alternative to traditional litigation. Concurrent with the 18-month test period, a national evaluation of the program was conducted. This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of that research.

GOALS OF THE NJC FIELD TEST

There were two major goals of the program, and a majority of the evaluation effort was centered around them. The first goal was to establish an effective community mechanism (Neighborhood Justice Centers) for a relatively inexpensive, expedient, and fair resolution of citizen disputes through the processes of conciliation, mediation, and/or arbitration. At the same time, the Centers were expected to enhance the quality of justice delivered to the community without diminishing the effectiveness of the existing criminal justice system. The Centers were to help the disputing parties arrive at resolutions which were fair, long-lasting, and satisfactory to all those involved and compared favorably to the courts in terms of cost and the amount of time needed to process cases. The second goal stated that the NJC’s should attract a variety of civil and criminal dispute cases drawn from different sources in the community and criminal justice agencies.

In addition to these two major goals, there were four less important goals to be achieved during the course of the field test. Two of these focused on the community; first, it was noted that key elements of the community should have a positive view of the Centers, and second, the NJC’s should contribute to the reduction of tension and conflict in the communities in which they were to operate. Another goal was to institutionalize the Neighborhood Justice Center concept and procedures in the field test communities and provide information to guide the establishment of NJC’s in other areas. Lastly, the evaluation project was to provide information to the National Institute of Justice and the Department of Justice on the progress and effectiveness of the Centers as related to future planning for the expansion of NJC’s and their concept.

1Cook, R., Boehl, J., and Sheppard, D. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test: Final Evaluation Report. (Currently being printed by the National Institute of Justice.)

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NJC’s

The Neighborhood Justice Center of Atlanta served the entire city of Atlanta and surrounding areas; it was sponsored by a nonprofit organization created for that sole purpose. The Center was closely monitored and guided by a Board of Directors composed of court officials, attorneys, and representatives from the police department and community agencies. The Center established and maintained close working relationships with the local court system, its major referral source. Court clerks referred cases to the NJC in lieu of filing charges in court, while judges made referrals for cases at a preliminary (binderover) hearing. Volunteer intake workers were stationed in court to accept cases from these sources.

The Center’s caseload consisted of 60 percent civil cases and 40 percent interpersonal disputes.

The Kansas City NJC was sponsored by the city government under the auspices of the Community Services Department, which monitored the Center’s activities and served as its policymaking body. An Advisory Board composed of community, agency, and city government representatives advised the NJC on local needs and problems and provided support and assistance. The NJC received the majority of its cases from the criminal justice system and served all of Kansas City and nearby communities. The Center’s major referral sources were the police department, the city prosecutor’s office, and judges in municipal court. The resulting caseload was primarily interpersonal-criminal disputes.

The Venice/Mar Vista Neighborhood Justice Center was sponsored by the Los Angeles County Bar Association. A Board of Directors, composed of Bar Association, community, and public agency representatives, served as the Center’s sole policymaking and guiding body. The Center adopted a community approach to dispute resolution, concentrating outreach activities and media coverage in the Venice and Mar Vista target areas. Over half of the NJC’s cases were initiated by the disputants themselves at the Center. The NJC did establish noncoercive referral arrangements with several small claims courts and received cases from court clerks and judges. Nearly all of the NJC cases involved small claims disputes or other civil matters.

PROJECT DESIGN

In order to accommodate the developing nature of the three centers—hiring and training staffs and mediators, establishing linkages to referral agencies, creating public outreach programs -- a multifaceted evaluation methodology was employed. There were three primary data collection activities during the NJC evaluation:

• An Implementation Study, designed to document the initial phase of program development and operation.
• A Process Study, intended to describe NJC caseloads, handling procedures, and resolution outcomes.
• An Impact Study, designed to assess the impact of the NJC’s on the disputants, the courts, and the community.
A routinized data collection system was developed, which gathered data on the source of client referrals to the NJCs, the nature of the dispute, the relationship between the parties, the characteristics of the disputants, the disposition of cases referred to the Centers, and the hearing sessions themselves. The data system was used to generate periodic feedback on NJC operations to program planners and policymakers, as well as to National Institute project monitors.

Two special evaluation procedures were employed in the study. First, nearly all of the on-site data collection was conducted by three evaluation analysts hired and supervised by the central evaluation project. They worked throughout the field test period and were crucial in providing the needed link between the central evaluation staff and the NJCs. The second procedure was a series of monthly feedback reports to the NJCs and to the LEAA program monitors. These reports provided timely information on caseloads, referral sources, and case dispositions. The feedback process alerted program management to potential problem areas as well as charted project accomplishments.

MAJOR FINDINGS

The evaluation of the Neighborhood Justice Centers concentrated on the process and impact of the program. Figure 1 depicts the flow of the cases through the NJCs; 3,947 cases were handled between the Centers' opening in March 1978 and the end of the data collection period in May 1979. A case involved two or more disputing parties; the initiator of the dispute was referred to as the complainant while the second party was labeled the respondent. As indicated in Figure 1, there were two immediate outcomes of cases--they were either resolved or not resolved after contact with the NJC. The primary means of dispute resolution practiced by the NJCs was mediation; formal mediation hearings, where a neutral third party attempted to facilitate an agreement between the disputants, were held for 35 percent of the NJC cases. A great majority of the mediated cases were resolved at the hearing by the disputing parties reaching an agreement. For 18 percent of the mediated cases, no agreement was reached by the parties, and the case remained unresolved.

A sizable number of cases were resolved before a hearing took place, often during the process of contacting the responding party to solicit his or her participation in mediation. In total, nearly half of all cases were resolved by the NJCs via mediation or conciliation prior to a hearing. The term "resolved" indicates that an agreement was reached in a hearing or the complainant and/or respondent reported the dispute was settled prior to a hearing; the actual extent and permanence of the resolutions are discussed below.

The remainder of the cases were closed by the NJCs without any apparent resolution of the problem. The most common reasons for cases not being resolved or mediated were the respondent's refusal to participate in mediation and the inability of the NJC to contact the respondent due to inadequate information regarding the person's telephone number or address.

Case Characteristics

Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the referral sources and types of cases processed by the NJCs, broken down by their disposition (mediated, resolved prior to a hearing, or unresolved). These data indicate that the NJCs are capable of attracting and processing a wide variety of case types from both criminal
Figure 1
CASE DISPOSITION FLOW

3,947 cases received

11.4 days
Resolved prior to a hearing (36.5%)

9.9 days
Hearing held (34.9%)

13.8 days
Not resolved, no hearing (48.7%)

Mediated with agreement (80.0%)

Arbitrated (1.8%)

Mediated with no agreement (18.2%)

Respondent refused (49.0%)
NJC could not contact respondent (17.6%)
No-shows at hearing
Complainant (2.3%)
Respondent (5.1%)
Both (4.1%)
Complainant withdrew case (13.0%)
Other reasons (8.2%)

Total number of cases resolved 1,777 (45.0%)

Total number of cases unresolved 2,170 (55.0%)
### TABLE 1: ALL NJCS
**CASE DISPOSITION BY REFERRAL SOURCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Cases with hearings, resolved</th>
<th>Cases with hearings, unresolved</th>
<th>Cases resolved without a hearing</th>
<th>Cases unresolved, no hearings (no-shows, withdrawals)</th>
<th>Cases unresolved, no hearings (respondent refusals and no contacts)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges (Court referrals)</td>
<td>515 (69)</td>
<td>68 (13)</td>
<td>260 (19)</td>
<td>226 (12)</td>
<td>559 (40)</td>
<td>745 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Office of Child</td>
<td>279 (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>94 (18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Agencies</td>
<td>33 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Aid Organizations</td>
<td>99 (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Agencies</td>
<td>29 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>745 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>99 (15)</strong></td>
<td><strong>260 (19)</strong></td>
<td><strong>226 (12)</strong></td>
<td><strong>559 (40)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1224 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing data on 36 cases.*

### TABLE 2: ALL NJCS
**CASE DISPOSITION BY TYPE OF CASE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Domestic Assault and Harassment</th>
<th>Domestic Settlement and Dispute</th>
<th>Family Dispute</th>
<th>Neighborhood Harassment</th>
<th>Neighborhood Harassments and Other</th>
<th>Harassment, Assault</th>
<th>Harassment, Other</th>
<th>Larceny/Fraud Disputes</th>
<th>Consumer/Trade Disputes</th>
<th>Employee/Other Disputes</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases with hearings, resolved</td>
<td>101 (56)</td>
<td>11 (45)</td>
<td>88 (48)</td>
<td>147 (31)</td>
<td>169 (43)</td>
<td>77 (12)</td>
<td>152 (18)</td>
<td>31 (9)</td>
<td>80 (31)</td>
<td>1122 (28.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases with hearings, unresolved</td>
<td>20 (6)</td>
<td>26 (9)</td>
<td>12 (6)</td>
<td>8 (5)</td>
<td>18 (4)</td>
<td>20 (5)</td>
<td>25 (9)</td>
<td>77 (5)</td>
<td>19 (9)</td>
<td>247 (6.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases resolved without a hearing</td>
<td>23 (7)</td>
<td>18 (7)</td>
<td>16 (6)</td>
<td>32 (10)</td>
<td>176 (26)</td>
<td>185 (23)</td>
<td>87 (21)</td>
<td>647 (9)</td>
<td>247 (9)</td>
<td>647 (16.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases unresolved, no hearing</td>
<td>57 (18)</td>
<td>57 (21)</td>
<td>36 (12)</td>
<td>38 (14)</td>
<td>80 (20)</td>
<td>115 (17)</td>
<td>103 (15)</td>
<td>56 (13)</td>
<td>80 (16.5)</td>
<td>615 (17.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(no-shows, withdrawals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases unresolved, no hearing</td>
<td>44 (14)</td>
<td>66 (24)</td>
<td>45 (23)</td>
<td>82 (33)</td>
<td>89 (22)</td>
<td>323 (42)</td>
<td>172 (25)</td>
<td>101 (16.5)</td>
<td>1293 (17.4)</td>
<td>33.0 (5.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(respondent refusals and no contacts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>325 (6.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>278 (7.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>197 (5.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>307 (7.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>398 (10.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>672 (17.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>840 (21.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>356 (9.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>661 (17.7)</strong></td>
<td><strong>924 (100%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing data on 23 cases.*
justice and community sources of referral. A majority of the NJC cases were referred from the criminal/civil justice system--judges, court clerks, public attorneys, other court officials, and police officers. The remainder were self-initiated by individuals or referred from a variety of community, private, and government organizations.

Measures of the NJC effectiveness include the number of cases that reached a hearing and the number that were resolved. Two major factors, referral source and type of case, affect whether a case is mediated or not resolved or resolved. Interpersonal disputes were more likely to reach a hearing than civil cases and were more apt to be resolved via mediation or conciliation; half of the interpersonal cases were mediated. In contrast, only 23 percent of the civil cases reached a hearing, but many others were resolved prior to a hearing. The source or referral had an effect on whether a hearing was held for a case or not. Hearings were held for 82 percent of the judge-referred cases; however, the majority of the cases did not reach a hearing. For all other referral sources only 14-36 percent were mediated, yet almost as many follow-up data were not provided to the NJC as through a hearing. Referral source and resolution rate are also related; 71 percent of judge referrals were ultimately resolved, as were 35-45 percent of the cases from other sources.

The characteristics of the disputants varied among the three NJCs, reflecting the different demographic compositions of the three cities, but the Centers appeared to attract a disproportionate number of lower income people.

Center Differences

The caseloads of the three NJCs reflected their primary referral sources and orientation to the criminal justice system. The Atlanta NJC processed 2,351 cases during the field test period, 60 percent of the total NJC caseload. Almost half of these cases were resolved either at a mediation hearing or prior to a hearing. The majority of Atlanta's cases (68.6 percent) originated in the criminal/civil justice system. The Atlanta NJC's primary referral sources were the courts in the small claims court, followed by the judges in criminal court.

The Kansas City NJC processed 845 cases between March 1978 and May 1979; hearings were held for 40 percent of the disputes, and 19 percent were resolved prior to a hearing. The criminal justice system was the primary source of the Kansas City cases, with 68 percent of the cases originating there. The prosecutor's office referred the most cases, followed by the police and judges. In contrast to the other NJCs, the Kansas City Center handled primarily interpersonal cases involving criminal and, to a lesser extent, civil disputes.

Of the 751 cases processed by the Venice/Mar Vista NJC, hearings were held for 31 percent of the cases, 14 percent were resolved prior to a hearing, and the rest remained unresolved following NJC contact. Over half of the cases opened in the NJC were initiated by the disputants themselves. Community organizations were not a major referral source; however, small claims courts (judges and clerks) and police officers followed self-referrals in number of cases referred. The Venice/Mar Vista NJC caseload was dominated by civil cases, with only 21 percent of the cases relating to criminal or police matters; about half of these were between landlords and tenants, consumers and merchants, and employees and employers. These civil cases made up 73 percent of the total caseload.
**TABLE 3**
DISPUTANT SATISFACTION
FOR MEDIATED CASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index/Response</th>
<th>Complainant</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with overall</td>
<td>428 (88%)</td>
<td>347 (88%)</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience at NJC?</td>
<td>43 (9)</td>
<td>30 (8)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with mediation</td>
<td>414 (84%)</td>
<td>335 (89%)</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process?</td>
<td>61 (12)</td>
<td>41 (10)</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with mediator?</td>
<td>432 (88%)</td>
<td>348 (88%)</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with terms</td>
<td>335 (80%)</td>
<td>296 (83%)</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of agreement?</td>
<td>65 (15)</td>
<td>45 (13)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with terms of</td>
<td>20 (5)</td>
<td>17 (5)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4**
STABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT
FOR MEDIATED CASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index/Response</th>
<th>Complainant</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you kept all terms of the</td>
<td>316 (79%)</td>
<td>303 (67%)</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement? No</td>
<td>22 (5)</td>
<td>24 (4)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially No Terms</td>
<td>20 (5)</td>
<td>18 (3)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has other party kept all terms</td>
<td>287 (69%)</td>
<td>236 (67%)</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the agreement? No</td>
<td>47 (12)</td>
<td>35 (10)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially No Terms</td>
<td>24 (6)</td>
<td>17 (5)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any more problems</td>
<td>135 (28%)</td>
<td>87 (22)</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other party?</td>
<td>341 (72%)</td>
<td>307 (78%)</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where would you go in future</td>
<td>346 (72%)</td>
<td>285 (73%)</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with a similar problem?</td>
<td>79 (16)</td>
<td>45 (12)</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJC</td>
<td>20 (4)</td>
<td>17 (4)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>15 (3)</td>
<td>22 (6)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney</td>
<td>20 (4)</td>
<td>19 (5)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A comparison of processing times for the courts in Kansas City and Atlanta with the NJCs in those two cities indicates that case processing in the courts can take five to ten times longer than in the Justice Centers. The length of time required to process court cases in Atlanta from filing to trial was 98 days; if the case was dismissed at the bindover hearing, it was in the court system for only six days. Mediated cases at the Atlanta Neighborhood Justice Center, on the other hand, required an average of only nine days between intake and hearing, and those that were resolved without a mediation hearing were processed in an average of eight days. In the Kansas City Municipal Court, cases took an average of 63 days from filing to final disposition at a court hearing. In contrast, the NJC in Kansas City mediated cases within an average of 13 days from the time of referral.

In Kansas City, trials were ultimately held for 53 percent of the cases followed up: 25 percent were withdrawn by the complainant; 11 percent were dropped prior to the trials; and in 11 percent, warrants were never served. Of the cases tried, only 27 percent involved guilty verdicts. In the Atlanta court, only 14 percent of the cases were tried. Two-thirds (67 percent) were dropped prior to the trial, 11 percent before the bindover hearing, 27 percent at the bindover hearing, and 9 percent before the trial date. In another 19 percent of the cases, a warrant for the defendant's arrest was never served. Of the small number of cases that reached trial, 6 percent were dismissed and 14 percent received not guilty verdicts: the rest resulted in guilty or nolo contendere verdicts or were bound over to Superior Court.

Reactions of the complainants who took their cases to court were contrasted with the results from the long-term follow-up interviews with complainants who had cases mediated in the NJCs. There were no substantial differences between NJC and court complainants in terms of whether or not the dispute had been resolved, but on satisfaction indices, there were numerous differences—all in favor of the NJC. The NJC process appears to be a faster and more satisfying experience than the courts for the resolution of these types of disputes.

In interviews, court judges stated they were highly supportive and positive about the Neighborhood Justice Centers. While nearly all said the NJC had not reduced their caseload to any noticeable extent, the judges also reported that the NJCs facilitated the processing of all cases by diverting cases which were inappropriate and time-consuming for the court.

Impact on the community. A random telephone survey of 200 households was conducted in the Venice/Mar Vista NJC target area to assess the community awareness of the Center. Venice/Mar Vista was chosen because of the Center's community orientation and emphasis on local outreach and media coverage. Thirty percent of the people reached were aware of the NJC, and the majority understood roughly what services were offered. The community residents learned of the NJC primarily through media coverage and public outreach activities conducted by the NJC.

CONCLUSIONS

There were eight major conclusions developed from the NJC evaluation, and they are summarized as follows:

- Neighborhood Justice Centers provide a needed and effective alternative mechanism for the resolution of minor disputes. The three Centers attracted and handled a respectable number of cases during their first year of operation.
- NJCs need to develop more effective ways for improving public awareness about their program and for bringing cases to mediation or conciliation. Although the Centers did resolve disputes after the cases had been referred to them, they had some difficulty in soliciting cases from the community.
- NJCs appear to handle most minor interpersonal dispute cases more efficiently than the courts. The Centers resolve disputes more quickly than the courts, and citizens are more satisfied with the mediation process than the court process.
- NJCs with connections to the local justice system will attract and resolve more disputes than Centers without such referral sources. A modest caseload can be developed from self-referrals and referrals from community agencies; however, it is the police, prosecutors, and the courts who refer large numbers of cases.
- NJCs are capable of handling a wide variety of minor disputes, including interpersonal/criminal cases as well as civil/consumer cases. Both criminal and civil cases were handled at the Centers, although a higher percentage of interpersonal/criminal cases reached a hearing than did civil cases.
- Reliable analytical data are not yet available on the costs of processing cases through NJCs as compared to court processing costs; however, available data indicate that Center costs, for at least some cases, may become competitive with the courts.
- The three NJCs differ in caseload size, type of disputes handled, and to a lesser extent, in resolution effectiveness. The most probable source of these differences include the Centers' philosophy/approach, their socio-cultural context, and their organization and management.
- NJC disputants tend to reflect the ethnic characteristics of their surrounding community, but represent a disproportionate number of low-income people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were generated from an analysis of the findings and conclusions of the evaluation study:

- It is suggested that federal, state, and local governments support the continued development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly those that are similar to the NJCs. Since this research has shown that NJCs are an effective alternative mechanism for resolving disputes, more Centers should be established in those areas that do not have other available alternatives.
• A program of research, evaluation, and demonstration should be conducted on strategies and techniques (including media) to improve the effectiveness of NJC outreach methods. Additionally, a modular set of media materials and strategies that educate citizens about alternative dispute resolution techniques should be developed that can be used in any city where dispute centers are established. Public outreach and attracting cases from the community were difficult problems for the Centers. Research and technical assistance designed to increase the effectiveness of these activities would be very useful for these community-based programs.

• A series of regional or local training workshops should be offered on NJCs and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for judges, police, prosecutors, and other relevant criminal justice officials. If these local policymakers were more knowledgeable about these programs, it would be more likely that they would consider supporting or developing a center.

• A broad, comprehensive research and evaluation program should be launched to document and assess the approaches and performance of NJC-like dispute resolution centers across the nation. Research should be designed to: (1) create uniform data systems among the centers; (2) screen complex interpersonal cases based on the NJC's ability to handle them; (3) assess different potential NJC referral points in the criminal justice processing sequence; and (4) increase referrals from the police.

The MITRE Corporation's National Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program: A Discussion of the Findings

Eleanor Chelimsky
Judith Dahmann
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, Virginia

The Career Criminal Program is a federal initiative sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to improve the administration of criminal justice by focusing prosecutorial resources on the serious repeat offender. The program was first announced in 1974. By mid-1975, 10 programs had been funded and were in operation, and in April 1976, the MITRE Corporation received a grant to conduct a national evaluation of the program./1 The purpose of this evaluation was to define and examine the effects of targeted prosecution of "career criminals" through an intensive analysis of program processes and program effects in four jurisdictions (New Orleans, Franklin County, Kalamazoo, and San Diego).

A number of factors contributed to the shape of our evaluation plan. The first was the state of knowledge concerning anticipated program effects at the time the program was developed and the evaluation designed. Career Criminal Program planning had been influenced both by local initiatives in career criminal prosecution and by research findings that suggested a large potential payoff for such initiatives. The bulk of the available empirical research spoke to the existence of a pool of recidivist offenders with repeated exposure to the criminal justice system who were consequently assumed to be responsible for a disproportionately large share of crime. At the time, little was known concerning the actual impact of program activities.

LEAA's selection of the Bronx Major Offense Bureau (MOB) as an exemplary project was based on analysis of available data concerning the performance of the Bronx District Attorney's Office with selected MOB cases. This analysis demonstrated that cases accorded special prosecutorial attention were treated more

1Among the documents produced for this evaluation are the following:
severely than were cases handled in a routine manner. However, career criminal cases and routine cases differ in a number of respects besides the way in which they are prosecuted. What was lacking in this analysis, and therefore, what we consequently attempted to provide in the national evaluation, was an adequate basis for comparison from which one could determine whether, and to what extent, prosecutor performance with career criminal cases represents an improvement over what would have happened with such cases in the absence of any special program. The key evaluation or knowledge needed was that of a baseline for evaluation.

Certain program characteristics were the second factor central to the approach taken in the evaluation plan. Given the single, unified concept of the program—the focusing of prosecutor resources on the serious career offender—the logic of program activities and expectations was considered quite natural at both the federal and local levels and by both practitioners and researchers, thereby making it not only possible, but apparently reasonable, to posit goals for the program generally.

However, the substantial differences that exist among localities in the routine processing of criminal cases, and the high degree of local involvement in defining critical features of individual programs, posed—and continue to pose—real difficulties for any attempt to aggregate the data across sites. Individual jurisdictions have different target population definitions, different program activities (or "treatments"), and different baseline performance levels. Given this jurisdictional variability, it was both necessary and important to examine and account for differences in conducting the national evaluation as a whole.

The final factor, as is often the case, was that the program was already in place and operational in a number of jurisdictions at the time the evaluation was planned. Consequently, it was understood that the evaluation approach would have to be adapted to meet program constraints, rather than vice versa.

These three factors—the lack of an adequate baseline for comparison, the inability to aggregate data meaningfully across sites, and the timing of the evaluation—led us to base the research design for the national evaluation on an intensive analysis of the form and the effects of career criminal prosecution in four local jurisdictions. A single methodology was developed and, with some adaptation, applied to the analysis of four programs. This repeated case-by-case approach was selected because it allowed for a close and sensitive analysis of the realities of targeted prosecution as implemented in different criminal justice contexts, whereas at the very outset, it provided some comparative analysis of the locally based analyses through the similarity maintained in the structure of these analyses. This is to say that the evaluation attempted to ask similar evaluation questions, formulated in the same way, of the four programs in an effort to identify the range of likely program inputs and effects across the four.

Our evaluation of the Career Criminal Program was completed in November 1975, and our findings can be best summarized by presenting them in terms of four basic sets of assumptions underlying the program:

First, the existence, the identifiability, and the criminal justice contact with a subpopulation of serious, repeat offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of crime;

Second, the ability of the prosecutor to provide specialized, intensified attention to a select subgroup of criminal defendants;

Third, the impact that specialized prosecutorial attention might have on the performance of the criminal justice system; and

Fourth, the impact on crime of the incapacitation effect achieved through increasing the conviction and the incarceration of this active subpopulation of criminal defendants.

Career Criminal Target Population

The first set of assumptions concerns the career criminal target population itself: that such a subgroup exists, comes into contact with the criminal justice system, and can be isolated for special handling. Although this evaluation did not directly address the issue of who career criminals are and how they may be identified, the results of the evaluation nonetheless shed some light on what happens when these assumptions are accepted and local agencies are given the opportunity to define and identify for local their career criminal populations.

First, the prosecutors in the four jurisdictions studied enthusiastically endorsed the concept of isolating the most serious subpopulation of their criminal defendant population. None of the four was specifically concerned with any quantitative prediction of the likely future criminality of the population they had identified, a key element in translating targeted prosecution into crime effects. Rather, the offices either directed their attention solely toward past repeaters (New Orleans or Franklin County) or toward the most "serious" portion of their criminal defendant population (Kalamazoo, San Diego) as defined by a complex of factors identified by the prosecutorial staff, based on their experience with cases and the realities of targeted prosecution as implemented in different jurisdictions.

None of the offices utilized information derived from research in other jurisdictions, indeed, at the time these programs were beginning, little research in this area was available. Even had it been available, however, it is not clear that it would have been used: most jurisdictions appeared to appreciate the opportunity to define for themselves, on a local basis, the characteristics of those defendants to receive special attention. It has, in fact, been suggested by local personnel that it was this flexibility in target population definition, as well as in program activity development, that made the Career Criminal Program of interest to them in the first place.

Allowing for local autonomy in defining the target population appears to have aided in program acceptance, implementation, diffusion, and institutionalization. At the same time, however, it fostered diversity among the career criminal populations selected for special handling, none of which were defined based upon predictions of recidivism. Thus, there was some tension between the program's crime reduction objective and the desire for the program to be successfully institutionalized. While local autonomy insured the program's popularity, it also contributed to a somewhat lower likelihood of crime level effects.

174

175
Targeted Prosecution

A second major assumption underlying the program involved the ability of the prosecutor to provide specialized prosecutorial attention to a selected target population of defendants. Unlike some other programs in law enforcement and criminal justice, the four Career Criminal Programs studied in the national evaluation were admirably implemented. In all four jurisdictions, special career criminal units were created and career criminal cases were issued and prosecuted by these units well within the timetables anticipated within their grant applications.

To some extent these four may represent a select subgroup of the programs, since they were, in fact, selected for inclusion in the national evaluation based on the fact that they were fully operational. Nonetheless, general observation of the program as a whole suggests that in this regard they are more typical than not of the implementation quality in the program has been very good.

There are a number of factors that have contributed to this implementation success. First, the majority of the program activities are within the jurisdiction of a single agency—the prosecution—and can be administered through changes in internal office operations. The importance of this factor appears in its true perspective only when one considers the minimal progress made in improving coordination between the police and the prosecutor (except in those situations in which police investigators were administratively attached to the prosecutor’s office).

Another important consideration here is the autonomy given to the local prosecutors in designing the program’s activities. To a large degree, individual prosecutors were given a free hand to develop a program of activities that would promote the identification and special handling of their targeted caseload. Each office was encouraged to examine its routine operations and identify those areas where it was felt that special attention could benefit case prosecution.

In effect, prosecutors were given additional support to prosecute a high-priority subgroup of cases in a manner that they felt appropriate, in a manner that led them to be more effective in their handling of high-caseloads, limited resources, and other system constraints (e.g., court organization)—they might choose for their total caseload. Hence, the program, in effect, provided prosecutors with the opportunity to improve their operations in a way they defined for themselves, an understandably appealing prospect.

In this context, each prosecutor’s office implemented a set of activities that more or less differentiated the prosecutorial handling of target, career criminal cases, as a group, from the office’s routine caseload. The activities implemented in the four programs—typically, continuous case handling by a single attorney or team of attorneys, reduced caseloads, increased investigative support, more stringent plea bargaining policies, efforts to increase incarceration and to reduce processing time—all focus on improving case prosecution once an arrest has been obtained and pursuit of the case has been reached.

This set of activities reflects the range of alternative strategies readily available to prosecutors in the four jurisdictions. To a large extent, all represent an intensification of effort or organization, rather than any radical departure from the kinds of activities normally undertaken for routine prosecutions. This factor may help to explain the limited changes observed in selected measures of criminal justice system performance as a result of the program.

Criminal Justice System Performance

Inherent in the program design, and crucial to its logic, is the assumption that making changes in the method and management of the prosecution of a subgroup of criminal cases will result in changes in the performance of the criminal justice system with respect to these cases. In this evaluation, four areas of potential program effects on criminal justice system performance—mode and type of disposition, strength of conviction, sentencing, and processing time—were examined for the four evaluation sites.

The analysis results showed that few changes in disposition mode and type (conviction rates, plea rates, trial rates, dismissal rates) of career criminal defendants were associated with the Career Criminal Programs analyzed. Improvement in the strength of career criminal convictions was observed in two jurisdictions, an improvement that was accompanied by the imposition of longer sentences for career criminals in one site. No increases in incapacitation rates were observed in any of the four sites; three of the four places were incapacitating career criminals at a high (90 percent) rate before the program. Processing time showed an improvement in one jurisdiction with notable time delay problems.

These specific findings suggest that, based on the experience in these four sites, increasing prosecutorial attention on a high-priority subset of the criminal caseload will not necessarily increase the conviction and incapacitation rates for those high-priority cases. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the program can increase the strength of the convictions obtained and that it can result in longer sentences being imposed where particular judicial constraints (e.g., tying sentence to conviction charge) apply.

Expectations for system performance effects in the Career Criminal Program were based on a number of assumptions concerning the current status and potential of prosecutorial efforts. First of all, the program concept presumes that because of resource constraints, the prosecutor is not doing all that can be done to pursue career criminal cases and that there is room for improvement in the way the criminal justice system responds to these career criminal prosecutions. The analysis results suggest, however, that in terms of system outcomes, this is not the case in several specific instances in the four evaluation sites.

Most notable is the case of incarceration rates. A review of baseline incarceration rates for career criminals indicates that, with 90 percent or higher rates of incarceration for convicted career criminals in three of the four sites, these criminal justice systems may already be acting as vigorous a manner as possible to respond to the seriousness of the defendants convicted in career criminal cases. In places such as these, little program impact is likely, and any program analysis may be called for to suggest another more callous target populations (i.e., offenders with a low probability of conviction and/or incarceration without the program treatment) or reduced expectations for effects in this area.

Several other instances of high baseline performance (e.g., high conviction rates for career criminals in San Diego) were also observed. For other jurisdic-
be intuitively expected. But in the other sites, where an independent judicial

determination of minimum sentences is made, program effects were not clearly

obtained. In other cases, slightly longer sentence lengths for career criminals

appeared to be largely due to factors other than the program. The absence of a

clear program effect on sentence lengths may be the result of a number of fac-
sors, including the possibility, suggested by other research,2/ that judges

impose sentences based less upon the conviction charge than upon information per-
taining to defendant characteristics and to the criminal act itself; information

which is largely unaffected by prosecutorial efforts.

It is unclear to what extent these specific programs and the limited system

performance results associated with them represent a realistic approximation of

the kind of impact other prosecutorial efforts might have on alternative target

populations in these sites, such as larger sites, different priority cases, different

project activities, or a different target population would lead to different

different results cannot be determined from this research. It is clear, however, that sim-

ply providing the prosecution with added resources in the expectation of direct

effects on criminal justice system performance measures does not fully consider

the complexities of that system and the limited role that the prosecution plays

in its operations.

Crime Level Effects

Finally, the last assumption underlying the Career Criminal Program links

anticipated changes in criminal justice system performance to crime level effects

through the increased incapacitation of serious repeat offenders. As the above

discussion has shown, no increases in the incapacitation of career criminals were

observed in the four sites analyzed. In the absence of the critical linking ele-

ment of criminal justice system performance changes, crime level effects from

incapacitation cannot be demonstrated in these four jurisdictions. The signifi-
cantly longer imposed sentence lengths observed in one jurisdiction may, if sent-
tenced offenders are removed from circulation. These problems

such effects would not be observed until the release time of these

offenders, however.--a time beyond the period covered by this evaluation.

The expectation of measurable crime level effects of a program such as the

Career Criminal Program, which is internal to the criminal justice system, may

not be reasonable, given the scope and context of program activities. Even if

improvements in system performance (i.e., increased incapacitation) had been

observed, linking such changes to crime level effects would have been difficult given

the marginality of program treatment (program attention was provided to a rela-
tively small group of criminal defendants who would have been subject to routine

criminal prosecution without the program), the potential counterbalancing actions

of the corrections subsystem, and the possible recruitment of new career crim-

nals as the older serious offenders are removed from circulation. These problems

of assessing the crime impact of a program limited in scope and context are

further compounded by analytical problems in measurement of crimes "saved."

2 Wilkins, Leslie T., Jack M. Kress, Don M. Gottfredson, Joseph C. Calpin,


Criminal Justice Program Evaluation

Agenda

Baltimore Hilton Hotel
SUNDAY, MARCH 16

REGISTRATION: 6:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m.
Francis Scott Key North

PLENARY/SOCIAL: 7:30 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.
Francis Scott Key North

Baltimore Hilton Hotel
MONDAY, A.M., MARCH 17

WORKSHOP SESSIONS 9:30 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.

Session 1: Evaluation of Financial Assistance to Parolees
Francis Scott Key North

The value of providing substance allowances to parolees following release from prison has been questioned extensively. Recent evaluations of large-scale programs provide a new understanding of this intervention strategy and the complexity of the issue.

MODERATOR: Lawrence Bennett, Director
Office of Program Evaluation
National Institute of Justice
Richard A. Berk, Professor
University of California at Santa Barbara
Peter Boss, Director, Social and Demographic Research Institute
University of Massachusetts

Session 2: Evaluation of Career Criminal Programs
Francis Scott Key Center

This panel will focus on the results of the National Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program. Specific - far - wide evaluations will also be discussed.

MODERATOR: Frank Varcoe, Program Monitor
Office of Program Evaluation
National Institute of Justice
Judith S. Bledstein, Department Staff
The MTHC Corporation
Joe Phillips, Vice-President
Metanomics, Inc.
Joseph Scully, Group Leader
The MTHC Corporation

Session 3: Evaluative Perspectives on Testing Alternative Responses and Police Demand
Carroll Room

The demand for police services is increasingly being scrutinized as public officials reassess the workloads of the police and alternatives for handling incidents more effectively. Panel members will discuss efforts to implement and evaluate a system intended to more effectively manage the demand for police service.

MODERATOR: David Farnese, Director
Police Division
National Institute of Justice
Michael Cahn, Vice-President
Public Systems Evaluation Inc.
Dennis P. Begam, Commanding Officer
Tidewater Department of Police

WORKSHOP SESSIONS 10:40 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Session 4: Influence of Perspectives on Evaluations
Francis Scott Key North

How does philosophical orientation, programmatic orientation, and agency orientation (planning or action) affect one's approach to evaluation? The panel will highlight the importance of acknowledging these biases when an evaluator negotiates an evaluation. (Session sponsored by State Planning Agencies and Regional Planning Units)

MODERATOR: Scott Green, Senior Criminal Justice Evaluator
Comprehensive Planning Organization
Thomas Lang, Evaluator
Bureau of Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance
Charles A. Murray, Chief Scientist
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences
W. Vernon House, Senior Research Fellow
American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences
Since the start of the Columbus, Ohio, Prosecutor’s Dispute Resolution Program in the late 1960s, various programs of this type have been developed for processing disputes outside the court and prosecutor jurisdiction. Mediation and arbitration are the usual tools used, and the issues are between individuals or small businesses. The National Institute funded two evaluations of these types of programs. It assessed the Boston (Dorchester) Court Program, which focused on court referrals primarily as part of its Field Test Program. It also assessed three Neighborhood Justice Centers, which were modeled on all existing centers and received referrals from police, prosecutors, and courts. The panel will discuss the results from these evaluations.

MODERATOR: Cheryl Martenoff, Director Adjudication Division National Institute of Justice David Sheppard, Vice President Institute for Social Analysis Lynne A. Williams, Research Associate Social Science Research Institute University of Southern California

Baltimore Hilton Hotel
TUESDAY, P.M., MARCH 18

WORKSHOP SESSIONS
1:15 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.
Repeat Session 7: Audit and Evaluation Francis Scott Key North
Repeat Session 18: Evaluation of Governmental Responses to Crime Francis Scott Key Center
Repeat Session 9: Evaluative Perspectives on the PROMIS Information System Carroll Room

2:50 p.m. - 3:10 p.m.
COFFEE BREAK

WORKSHOP SESSIONS
3:10 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.
Repeat Session 4: Influence of Perspectives on Evaluations Francis Scott Key North
Repeat Session 8: Evaluation of Financial Assistance to Prosecution Francis Scott Key Center

Baltimore Hilton Hotel
WEDNESDAY, A.M., MARCH 19

WORKSHOP SESSIONS
9:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.
Repeat Session 14: Evaluation of Neighborhood Justice Centers and Dispute Resolution Programs Francis Scott Key North
Repeat Session 11: Evaluation Strategies of the Improved Correctional Field Services and Intensive Probation Programs Francis Scott Key Center

10:20 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.
COFFEE BREAK

WORKSHOP SESSIONS
10:40 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

Session 15: General Evaluation Concerns at State and Local Levels and Available Resources Carroll Room

This panel will discuss the Justice System Improvement Act and its impact on evaluation. The panel will also discuss resources that LEAA has made available to facilitate the conduct of evaluations and to act as a feedback mechanism regarding how well the workshop served evaluation needs. It is also intended to facilitate discussion among participants regarding issues confronting evaluation efforts in fiscal year ‘80 and fiscal year ‘81.

MODERATOR: Mark Carroll, Director National Association of Criminal Justice Planners Ben Coates, Director Technical Assistance Resource Center Washburn University Elizabeth Powell, Research Assistant National Academy of Public Administration

Repeat Session 13: Evaluation of Victim/Witness Programs Francis Scott Key North
Repeat Session 10: Evaluation Perspectives on Testing Alternative Responses to Police Demand Francis Scott Key Center