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
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### MEASURING WHITE COLLAR CRIME:

THE USE OF THE "RANDOM INVESTIGATION" METHOD FOR ESTIMATING TAX OFFENSES

Ъу

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Paper to be presented before the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, November 5-8, 1980. Support for this research was received under grants from the U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (Grant Nos. 79-NI-AX-0007 and 78-NI-AX-0132) and the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SOC-7825039). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the supporting agencies. Traditional measures of the frequency and character of index offenses and other street crimes are based largely upon victim reports-either from offenses reported to the police, or from victim surveys. Despite many limitations in reporting, recording, and compilation, victim reports do provide at least a starting point for estimating crime rates. Large areas of the criminal law, however, are not covered by victim reports -- whether because there aren't victims in the usual sense (the so-called victimless crimes), or because of the nature of the offense victims are unaware they have been victimized. In this latter category fall large segments of white collar crime. This paper examines the use of an alternative approach for measuring offense rates, the "random investigation" method, as applied to federal income tax violations. Estimates are derived for the level of tax noncompliance by individuals, and the rates for serious civil and criminal offenses.

ABSTRACT

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Traditional measures of the frequency and character of index offenses and other street crimes are based largely upon victim reportseither from offenses reported to the police, or from victim surveys. Despite many limitations in reporting, recording, and compilation, victim reports do provide at least a starting point for estimating crime rates. Large areas of the criminal law, however, are not covered by victim reports -- whether because there aren't victims in the usual sense (the so-called victimless crimes), or because of the nature of the offense victims are unaware they have been victimized.<sup>1</sup> In this latter category fall large segments of white collar crime. For these, alternative data sources must be developed to estimate the extent of law violations.

Data on enforcement actions, while valuable in studying government response to law infractions, generally do not provide an alternative basis for estimating the extent of such crimes since they are as much a product of agency resources and priorities, as of offense prevalence. Limited resources, for example, prevent many offenses from being adequately investigated; many remain unknown to enforcement authorities. Changes in enforcement trends are as likely to reflect shifts in agency or public priorities, as any "real" change in crime rates. The drawbacks of using enforcement records as a source for estimating offense rates would be reduced if some means were found to draw a "representative sample" of potential violations for intensive

<sup>1</sup>Some victims are hesitant to report because they would be implicated in the offense.

investigation. Results from these sample investigations could then be used to estimate actual offense prevalence. This paper examines results based upon the use of the "random investigation" approach in measuring federal income tax violations.

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ESTIMATING TAX NONCOMPLIANCE: THE RANDOM INVESTIGATION

Detailed tax investigations of a random sample of persons, locations, or events provide one basis for estimating the extent of tax violations. First employed by IRS in its 1948 Audit Control Program,<sup>2</sup> the use of this technique was expanded with the establishment of IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in 1962. Since then some 20 separate TCMP studies have been conducted covering different tax areas ("Phases") and tax years ("Cycles"). These have been used to estimate the nature and extent of failure to timely pay required taxes (Phase I), file required returns (Phase II), or correctly report tax liability on filed returns (Phases III-VII).

TCMP Sampling and Data Collection Procedures.

Sampling techniques have varied by TGMP phases. Estimates for nonfilers have been based largely upon canvassing sampled geographic areas; the extent and reasons for delinquent payments were based upon samples of notices and bills issued to taxpayers of unpaid tax balances.

<sup>2</sup>Early uses of the random investigation method to assess tax compliance were the Audit Control Program after World War II, and the Audit Research Program in the early sixties. These included studies of 1948 individual income tax returns, 1949 individual and small corporation income tax returns (including payroll and certain excise taxes), and 1960 low income individual income tax (less \$10,000 nonfarm business) returns. (See Farioletti, 1952, 1958; Commissioner's Annual Report 1949, 1950; IRS, The Audit Control Program; IRS Manual Supplement 48G-31 (May 5, 1961) and 48G-35 (February 23, 1962); IRS Document 6457 (9-77).) Collection Division personnel have carried out the surveys of delinquent accounts and delinquent returns (nonfilers), though the last survey in these areas was conducted in 1971.

Errors in the reporting of tax liabilities have been estimated using stratified cluster samples of filed returns. Experienced revenue agents and tax auditors from IRS Examination Division conduct in-depth audits of each of the sampled returns. Detailed checksheets are made out by the IRS examining officer of the amounts reported line by line on the return and "corrected" amounts after audit. Supplemental information concerning the taxpayer's financial affairs, who prepared the tax return, and what procedures were used in carrying out the TCMP examination are also included. In the recent (TCMP-Phase III, Cycle 6) survey of 1976 individual tax returns filed in 1977, for example, 190 separate numbered items of information are covered on the checksheet (reproduced at Table 1), with additional fuformation required where there is partnership income.

After a TCMP audit is completed, internal procedures call for administrative review of the checksheets for quality control. In addition, for some surveys a subsample of checksheets and related audit workpapers have been examined by IRS's Internal Audit Division to determine the extent required TCMP policies and procedures have been properly carried out. After being reviewed, transcribed and appropriately weighted, these TCMP sample results provide extremely detailed data on the frequency, amount and character of tax noncompliance and its distribution across taxpayers.

TABLE I

# DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOR TCMP SURVEY OF 1976 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

TCMP Individual Aud	it Evaluation Docume	ent – 1976	•	2. Occupenion Code	ı.	D	ita Center	Ute
				3. Method Used to Examine Return			Office	a Audit
					÷	Field Audit	Office	Out o Offic
•			•	Assigned		(1)	(3)	(5)
				Closed		(2)	(4)	(6)
<b>*4</b>	PART I - TCMP I	RELATED DA	TA					
Return (1) INO Unpaid Prepared By Assistance Assistan	(2) IRS Assistance O nce (3) IRS Preparation		RS Review /ITA Assist			(wh	Check C	
Peid Assistance (7) 🗆 CPA (8) 🔲 Public Acct,	(9) 🗋 Attorney (10) 🗖 CPA & Atty.		.ocal Tax S lat'l. Tax S		her	(1) Yes	(2)	(3) N/A
5. Did preparer sign or stamp return?	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•		·····	5	+	+	┼
6. Was signature or stamp of preparer legit	pie?				6	-	+	1-
7. Did preparer enter his/her EIN or SSN?					7	+-	<u>†</u>	+
<ol> <li>Did taxpayer use IRS plain 'anguage put</li> </ol>				•		1	+	
9. Did taxpayer receive classroom instruct		ion?			9			
0. If Item 9 is yes, enter year of most rece		·····			10			
1. Indicate how foreign accounts question		"Not Answered"	1)		11	1	T	1
2. Did taxpayer(s) actually have a foreign a			•		12			
3. Did activity in foreign accounts lead to a					13		1	1
I. If yes, enter portion of total tax change					14			
5. Was TCMP return the subject of a fraud				· · ·	15			
5. Did TCMP examination result in any oth				· · ·	16			
. Was income verified or corrected by use	the second s			•	17	<u> </u>		
If a deduction was claimed on Schedule filed?	C or F for Employee Benefit	Plan, was a For	m 5500, 55	00-C or 5500-K	18			). 
a. Did taxpayer receive a tump-sum distri	bution from an employee be	nefit plan(s)?		-	192			
b If yes, was a Form 1099R received?		•			195			
<ul> <li>If taxpayer received a lump-sum taxable Individual Retirement Savings Program</li> </ul>	e distribution, was all or part	t of it a rollover	into a qual	fied plan or an	190	2		
•	PART II -	CONTROL D	ATA		•		•	
Examining Officer's Name	21. Grade		22. Time o	n TCMP Return				/
Group Manager's Initials	24. Date	1		25, Form 3628 Rev 1. 🗋 Yes	2. [] (		Manager	<u>10</u>
TCMP Reviewer's Initials	27. Date	28, Time	17.	29. Disposal Code			ing Distr	int
Conferee's Initials	32. Date	33. Time	10	34, Principal Issue N	umber			
marks (I'se Reverse of Page & for Addition	el Space)		10	L				

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	Vis,	es, Tips, etc.	35.	l
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	Inte	rest	37.	I
	Sch	eduic C (Item 144)	38.	
	Sch	edure D (Item 179)	39,	I
Į	Fur	in 4797	40.	
i i ž	Pen	sions and Annuities	41.	l
	Ren	its (liem 150)	42.	
Z	Roy	alties	43.	
, Š	For	m 1065	44.	
S.	For	m 1041	45.	
	For	m 11205	46.	l
: -	Sch	edule F (Item 172)	47.	
·.	Sat	e Income Tax Refund	48.	ļ
	Alin	nony	49.	ļ
	Oth	er	50.	
	Tou	1 (Items 35-50)	51.	
•	<b> </b>	lot Applicable	52.	ŀ
ĨĘ		ing Expense bloyee Business	53.	
MEN	f	10982 Dasiness	54.	
UST	Payr	ments to IRA	55.	
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ficm :		nie <u>51-581</u>	_	
Sanca			<del>6</del> 0,	
• •		Deductible ½ Medical Insurance Premium	61.	
	•	Other Deductible Medical	62.	1
DNS.		State & Local Income Taxes	63.	
Ē		Real Estate Taxes	64.	
Da	0	Other Taxes	65,	
õ	; EMIZED	Home Mortgage Interest	66,	
U	: 181	Other Interest	67.	
SECTION C - DEDUCTION		-tu Cash	68.	
SEC			69.	
		Casualty/Theit Losses	70.	
.		Alimony Other	71.	
			72.	
1		Tatal (Items 61-72)	<u> </u>	

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Form 3628 (Rev. 2-77) Discose of all prior issues.

# TABLE 1. (con't - 1)

			SE DÁTA				1
Reported	(2) Corrected		1	1		(1) Reported	(2) Corrected
	•	j.	Taxpayer	Regular	74.		-
		2		65 or Over, Blind	75.		
		ĪĒ		Regular	76.	· · ·	
		- EXEMPTIONS	Spouse	65 or Over, Blind	.77.		1
				Same Address	<sup>.</sup> 78.		1
			Children	Different Address	79.		
		SECTION D					
		1 2	Parents	Same Address	80.		
		U U	ļ	Different Address	81.		
			Othe: De	pendents	82.		[ 
	•		Total (/	tems 74-82)	83.		
			BLE INCO		84.		
		<u></u>	<i>9 minus 6</i> 3 STATUS	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	84.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u>
		1	T	Applicable	86.1		
			Tax Tab	a de la companya de l	87.		
		1		Schedule	88.	······································	1
		1	Schedul		89. 90.		
	-			26 (Maximum)	91.	<u> </u>	ļ
			Other		92.		
			Eide	ніу	93.		
			Inve	stment .	94.	~	
			en Ear	lign Tax	95.		
		· ·		d Care	96.		<u> </u>
		₹		eral Tox	97.		·····
		COMPUTATION					
		5	Oth	or <u>state</u>	98.		 
		Ň		OME TAX 92 Minus 93-98j	99.		
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	- -	1	Other Ta:	xês 1	02.		
	•	E N	Total ///e	ms 49-102) 1	03.	: '	
		SECTION			04.		ļ
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		•	Estimated Excess FI	and the second se	07.		
			Other		08.		-
				dits and Pre- (liemis 104-108)	09.		
	1.1 <u>21</u> /		BALANC	E DUE	10.		
·					11.		
			Balance D Payment	lue After 1 In Item 111	12.		
		-	OVERPA (Item 109	YMENT Minus (03)	13.		
		•	Penalties		14.	·	

Page 2

Form 3628 (ITev. 2-77)

(con't - 2)TABLE I

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				(1) Reported	(2) Correcte	8					(1) Reported	(2) (	Corre
	Gro	s Receipts	1 18.		•		Gro	ss Rec	eipts	154.			
	Less	Returns and Allowances	119.			7	Plut		riculture gram Payments	155.			
	Net	Receipts	120.			-	Cas	Le	ss Cost of Livesto Other Items Solo	ock 156.		Ι	
		Beginning	121.						Beginning	157.			
	LESS	Merchandise Purchases	122.				CCRUAL	Less.	Livestock and Other Purchase	158.			
		Other	123.	•		ECTION H	V	Plus	Closing Inventory	159.			
	Plus	: Closing Inventory	124.				Gro	ss Prof	it it	160.			
•	Gros	a Profit	125.	د <del>استایب بیمارین باز بار بر</del>		<b>−</b> °			or Hired	161.			·
	Och	ir Income	126.			7		Repa Main	itenance	162.	······································		
2	Tou	l income	127.	•		<b>-</b>	ø	Inter		163.			: 
SECTION		Depreciation	128.			-	EDUCTIONS	Rent	line, Fuel	164.			
Ц		Taxes	129			-1	15	Oil		165.		<u>  .</u>	
<b>\$</b>		Rent	130.				DEDI	Taxe	s ion & Profit	166,	<del></del>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	ŀ	Repairs	131.				ARME		ng Plans	167.		L	
		Salaries	132.				FAR	Emp	loyee Benefit Pla	ns 168.			
		Insurance	133.			_		Depr	eciation	169.			
	NO	Legal & Prof. Fees	134.			•		Othe		170.			
	EDUCTI	Commissions	135.			-		Total	FIT (LOSS)	171.			
	000	Amortization	136.			-			nual Item 47)	172.		ļ	
	ESS.	Pensions & Profit	137.				the second se	EDUL		173,	Not As	plicat	ie .
	BUSIN	Sharing Plans			<u>`</u>	-	ILO	5)	Term Gain	174.		<u> </u>	
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·		Interest Bad Debts	139.			CTION		above	tems 174 &	176.	•		
		Depletion .	141.						02 Deduction Line 15a	177.	•		
.		Other	142.				Sect	ion 12	11 Limitation	178.			
Ï		TOTAL (Items 128-142)	143.			]•			D Line 16a Gain (Loss) Jual Irem 391	179.			
		PROFIT (LOSS)	144.		•	·			PREPARER P	ENALTI	ES	(1). YES	(2) :10
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	<u>0</u>	Depreciation	147.			ECTION	Will	טיו עוש	erstatement	. IRC-6	694 (b) 182	·	
Ĕ		Repairs	148.		-				lurnish copy		695 (J) 183	· +	
SECTION		Other Expense	149				promotion -		ugn return		695 (b) 184	- •	
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TCMP Estimates of Tax Noncompliance. 1963, 1965, 1969, and 1973 tax years.<sup>3</sup> systematic data base we have.

<sup>3</sup>In addition a 1971 TCMP survey of certain low income taxpayers was conducted. A sixth survey of 1976 returns has been completed, but tabulations are not yet available.

This paper looks at some results from the longest time series of TCMP surveys, those on income tax returns filed by individuals. For this series, TCMP measures of noncompliance are currently available for

Because these figures are derived from income tax audits, they are subject both to the strengths and weakness of this measurement method. What they estimate are auditors' findings were all returns subject to a tax audit -- albeit, one of above average thoroughness and quality. Some tax violations will not be detected by an audit, and how detected violations are treated -- whether civilly or criminally -- reflect agency practices and standards, as well as what the law in a narrow sense may provide. Further, auditor findings are themselves fallible. Auditors may make mistakes because of inadvertence or lack of knowledge; we should also expect because of the organizational context that an "enforcement bias" may result in asserting many civil claims which would not withstand challenge in a court forum (see Long, 1979). Despite these important limitations, TCMP data present a very useful source of information -- and for many purposes, provides us with the only

Estimates derived from 1963-1973 are summarized in Table 2 for three measures of noncompliance: the proportion of returns with tax underreporting errors, the average net tax underreported, and the proportion of total tax liability this underreporting represented. Because large shifts occurred over this ten-year period in the

distribution existed in prior years. inflation into account rose 50 percent.

<sup>4</sup>A change in category definition further implicates the data. For the 1963 and 1965 surveys, the "standard deduction" return category includes only those filing on the short 1040A form. In later years, it includes all, those with 1040A type characteristics, even if a regular 1040 form was used. (In 1969, there was no Form 1040A.)

5 Because some taxpayers overreport rather than underreport, net underreporting represents the difference between aggregate under- and over-reporting. The proportion of net tax underreporting or noncompliance level (NCL) is thus defined: NCL = (Tax should have been reported - Tax reported)/Tax should have been reported. Or, NCL = (Tax underreported - Tax overreported) / (Tax Reported + Tax underreported -Tax overreported)

distribution of taxpayers by income levels and return categories, the right-hard panel of Table 2 presents what, other things equal, TCMP estimates of noncompliance would have been had the 1973 income or return

Unadjusted, all three TCMP indices show some increase in measured tax noncompliance over the ten year period. The proportion of returns underreporting tax increased from one in three in 1963 to four in ten in 1973. The proportion of net tax underreported (NCL)<sup>5</sup> increased from 6.0 to 6.7 percent, and the average tax change even after taking

However, all of the increase in the size of the tax error is accounted for by the movement of taxpayers into higher income brackets. Once this adjustment and inflation is taken into account, the average amount of tax underreported remains roughly unchanged--\$152 in 1963, \$146 in 1973. But, both the percent of returns with underreporting errors, and the proportion of tax underreported show even larger - increases after adjustment. Because general reduction in tax rates between 1963 and 1973 lowered average tax-liabilities (in constant dollars), as a proportion of total tax liabilities, this unchanging amount of tax error translated into an increasing underreporting rate

•			Under	reporting of Ta	x on Filed Return	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		•
•		TCMP			·	TCMP (Adjusted)		
Tex Year	Percent of	Percent of	Average	Per Return			Average	Per Retur
•	Returns Underreported (1)	Net Tax Underreported (2)	\$ (3)	Constant 1978 \$ <sup>5</sup> (4)	Percent of Returns (5)	Percent of Net Tax (6)	\$ (7)	Constant 1978 \$ <sup>b</sup> (8)
1963	33.1	6.0	\$50	\$107	31.9	4.8	\$71	\$152
1965 .	33.5	5.2	42	87	32.3	4.1	49	101
1969	40.9	6.4	80	143	39.2	5.5	87	155
1973	39.7	6.7	99	• 146	39.7	6.7	99	146
Ratio 1973/1963	1.2	1.1	2.0	· 1.4	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.0

TABLE 2

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Bistribution of returns and tax dollars adjusted so that distribution returns (col.5) or taxes (cols.6-8) across ten IRS audit categories (classified by level and source(s) of income) for earlier years engel to that occurring in 1973. This adjustment was made to control for charging distribution of taxpayer income levels between 1963-1973.

• ?

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<sup>b</sup>Dollars expressed in 1978 constant dollar terms to adjust for changes resulting from inflation.

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(NCL)--up 40 percent over the ten year period. 6 Also despite rising income levels, more people took the standard deduction in 1973 because of a significant statutory increase in the deductible amount. Such simple returns have lower rates of error. As a result the unadjusted totals showed smaller gains in the proportion of returns with error, than after adjustment.

When we to remove "standard deduction" tax returns (with adjusted gross income less than \$10,000), returns with underreporting increase to over half for wage-earners, and to two out of three returns for individuals with business or professional income, and involve even higher amounts (and rates) of tax underreporting.

## TCMP DATA ON SERIOUS INCOME TAX OFFENSES

At first glance, these rates of tax "violations" may appear umbelievably high. But they cover a diverse array of behaviors, most of which have little to do with tax evasion per se. Given the complexity of the law, inadvertent errors are common. Further many tax requirements are subject to interpretation, where opinions vary even among experts. It is therefore important to clearly distinguish between the bulk of these errors which are relatively minor and civil in nature and serious tax offenses: criminal offenses and civil violations where at least negligence or fraud is involved.

<sup>6</sup>This reduction in tax liability for taxpayers as a whole does not show up in the unadjusted TCMP estimates of total tax liability because rising income levels moved people into higher tax brackets. The TCMP estimates of the "true" tax liability (in constant dollars) averaged \$1663 in 1963, and \$2024 in 1973.

### Estimates of Criminal Income Tax Offenses on Filed Returns

Again based upon TCMP data from Phase III, rates of criminal income tax violations were estimated by the author for returns filed by individuals. Results are shown for criminal income time violations in Table 3. Rates of referral for potential criminal tax evasion averaged 18

per 10,000 returns across the three surveys. 7 Though based on only 668 cases out of a combined sample of over 140,000, rates for each of the three surveys (despite even smaller n's) were surprisingly close: 22 (1965); 16 (1969); 17 (1973) per 10,000.<sup>8</sup> After adjusting for certain cases excluded from these tabulations, an estimated rate of 20 per 10,000 was obtained.<sup>9</sup> (Referral rates under the regular audit program, where returns are selected for their audit potential, average around 42 per 10,000 returns (unpublished internal IRS tabulations).)

in the above analysis.

8 The sampling ratio differed by strata, making the design several times more efficient than a simple random sample of the same size. Because criminal violations are relatively rare, however, even a sample of 50,000 (the typical TCMP sample size) even when efficiently designed included only a very small number of cases referred for potential criminal violations. Thus, expected sampling variability of any estimate remains sizable, and the close correspondence of our estimates across TCMP surveys is a happy, but unexpected, event.

<sup>9</sup>Cases selected for the TCMP sample which were already under criminal investigation were excluded from the tabulations. While data for earlier TCMP surveys were not retained, figures for the latest cycle (III-69 record 22 exclusions for this reason (out of a total sample of approximately 50,000). This figure of 22 per survey was used to adjust (22X3 = 734 - 668) the number of returns referred. In the absence of information on the distribution of these exclusions across sampling strata, a straight 10% upward adjustment ( 66/668) was made in the estimated rate of criminal referrals from 18 to 20 per 10,000.

<sup>7</sup>Delays have been encountered in receiving photocopies of relevant 1963 TCMP tabulations from the Service; hence they could not be included

### TABLE 3

### Estimated Criminal Income Tax Violation Rates Returns Filed by Individuals

Taxpayer			Referral for Potential Criminal Tax Violation					
Compliance Measurement Program Survey	Tax Year	Sample Size (returns)	Number of Returns	Rate per 10,000 Returns				
III-2	1965	41,440	125	22				
<b>III-3</b>	1969	47, 534	268	16				
III-5	1973	51,402	275	17				
Total				•				
Combined Sample Adjusted		140,376	668	18				
for exclusions <sup>2</sup>		•	734	20				
Estimated Rate				•				
of Criminal Offenses		•		1-2 <sup>3</sup>				

Source: Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, Returns Filed Phase III, Cycles 2, 3, 5, weighted and unweighted diagnostic tables: 5/990, 9/990, 3/990; A, C tables (RAT).

<sup>1</sup>The sampling ratio varied by strata; the rate shown is based upon the weighted frequencies, taking into consideration the varying sampling ratios.

<sup>2</sup>Cases selected for the TCMP sample which were already under criminal investigation were excluded from the tabulations. While data for earlier TCMP surveys were not retained, figures for the latest cycle (III-6) record 22 exclusions for this reason (out of a total sample of approximately 50,000). This figure of 22 per survey was used to adjust (22X3 = 734-668) the number of returns referred. In absence of information on the distribution of these exclusions across sampling strata, a straight 10% upward adjustment ( 66/668) was made in the estimated rate of criminal referrals from 18 to 20 per 10,000.

<sup>3</sup>No compilations were available on the outcome of criminal fraud referrals. The estimate of 1-2 taxpayer convictions per 10,000 returns based upon experience from the regular/crim program. There are approximately 1.5 taxpayers per return on average; The estimated rate of potential criminal convictions per 10,000 taxpayers is 0.8-1.1.

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A referral for potential criminal tax violation is not the same as a finding of criminal tax evasion. Though data were collected on the results of these referrals, they were apparently never compiled. The only guide in transforming this figure on referrals, into potential criminal tax convictions, comes from the regular tax investigation program. Referrals go through several steps before an indictment is filed. First, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division screens referrals for those warranting further investigation. Only 30 to 40 percent of referrals from the regular audit program are accepted for criminal investigation. Of those which are fully investigated, only roughly 40 percent are recommended for criminal prosecution; and of those recommended, less than half are indicted or convicted.<sup>10</sup> Thus, based upon the regular referral program, only about 5-10<sup>11</sup> out of 100 audit referrals end up as criminal convictions. Such a winnowing process implies that the TCMP referrals of 20 per 10,000 might translate into 1-2 criminal convictions per every 10,000 returns.<sup>12</sup> For the more than 87 million individual income tax returns filed last year, these data suggest potential criminal violators numbering somewhere around 10,000. This figure may strike one as awfully low. Of course, these figures do not include criminal nonfilers, nor do they

10 According to IRS directives, lack of investigative resources is not a grounds for rejecting a referral for criminal investigation. Even after acceptance of the referral, only a small number (5-10%) are recorded as closed for lack of resources.

Il Figures vary by source. Data though limited from the Examination (Audit) Division on their referrals differ from Criminal Investigation Division statistics on receipts of audit referrals.

12 Criminal convictions are based upon counts of taxpayers; the rate, however, is relative to return filings which average -- exclusive of dependents -- roughly 1.5 taxpayers per return.

include corporate tax offenses. Among current criminal tax prosecutions, roughly 25 percent involve nonfilers (though this proportion as likely reflects policy priorities as incidence). Perhaps more important, these figures reflect incidents which not only would be detected under present IRS investigation procedures, but prosecuted under current prosecution standards -- something that may tell us more about IRS choice of civil over criminal enforcement strategies, than about offense prevalence. Estimates of Serious Civil Tax Violations

on Filed Returns

Table 4 presents rates for serious civil--as compared with criminal offenses--based upon the same TCMP data. Rates estimated for civil fraud averaged 9 per 10,000 across the three surveys.<sup>13</sup> In contrast, estimated rates for negligence violations are much higher--123 per 10,000. Despite some suggestions of an increasing rate over time for civil pénalty violations,<sup>14</sup> estimates appear remarkably stable across surveys despite the small n's on which they were based (shown in Table 4).

The low rate for civil fraud raises questions. On its face , it is unclear why civil fraud penalties were asserted in less than half the cases referred for criminal investigation. Though TCMP survey instructions called for the completed survey forms (checksheets) even on

at Table 3.)

<sup>14</sup>Rates for negligence rose from 86 (1965) to 106 (1969) to 170 (1973). For example, other indications, however, suggest that the increase may reflect a change in enforcement policy, rather than any real increase in negligence violations.

13 This rate has been adjusted to take into consideration a small number of cases excluded from the sample because they were already under criminal investigation at the time of the TCMP survey. (See footnote 4

### ESTIMATED RATES OF SERIOUS INCOME TAX OFFENSES: NEGLIGENCE. CIVIL FRAUD AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS

(Income	Tax	Returns	Filed	by	Ind	[11]	lual	8)	)
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, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Rate	es per l	D,000 Re	turns	Total Violations on Filed Returns <sup>2</sup>				
	Returns With Violations	TCM	P Tax Ye	ars		1990 - Handre Handre, 1 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1990 - Handre Handre, 1	Estimated			
	Within Combined TCMP Samples	1965	1969	1 973	Average Across Samples (adj)	Estimated Occurrence on Returns Filed	Penalties Currently Detected By Audits	Percent Detected		
Criminal Penalties Referrals Offense(s)	668	22	16	17	20	175,000 10,000	7,000 400 <sup>6</sup>	47 47 <sup>6</sup>		
Civil Penalties Civil fraud Negligence	238 <sup>7</sup> 3,068	6 <sup>7</sup> 86	7 <sup>7</sup> 106	8 <sup>7</sup> 170	9 <sup>7</sup> 121	80,000 <sup>7</sup> 2,100,000	6,400 64,000	82 <sup>7</sup> 62		
Other Total civil <sup>8</sup>	4,991 8,297	117	103 216	109 287	237 365	2,100,000 3,200,000	na	na na		

<sup>1</sup>Total combined sample size in the three TCMP surveys (Phase III, Cycles 2, 3, 5) was 140,376 returns. The sample was a stratified cluster design. Figures indicated within this sample are the number of geturns on which these specific violations were found.

<sup>2</sup>1978 Estimates. Adjusted for sample exclusions of cases which were already under criminal investigation (see footnote 2 of Table 3). Adjustments in case of criminal and civil fraud were based on the ratio of estimated exclusions to total returns with violations of type shown.


<sup>4</sup>Estimated rates in the column labeled "Average Across Samples" are applied to the number of individual income tax returns filed in 1978 of 87,386,093. Numbers are rounded to emphasize the lack of precision inherent in the estimation process; because of rounding components of civil penalties do not add precisely to total, which has been rounded to 3.2 million.

Since criminal referrals from the Examination Division and prosecutions resulting from this source on income tax returns for individuals were not separated from total examination referrals, figures shown are estimated from those totals reported. The rate of criminal convictions resulting from audit referrals in the regular audit program was used

as the basis for estimating criminal tax offenses from TCMP referrals. As a result, the rate of "detection" for potential referral versus potential criminal offenses is mathematically identical. The estimate for rate of civil fraud appears much too low, thus inflating the estimate of the proportion of violations detected; since the number of TCMP returns for which civil fraud penalty was assessed is only a third of those referred for criminal prosecution, it appears that this item was unreliably filled out by TCMP examiners.

The counts reflect not the number of civil violations, but the number of returns on which civil penalties were asserted. Only the principal civil penalty asserted was checked. While these counts should reflect any penalties asserted during the TCMP audit, instructions received by the TCMP examining officer are not entirely clear whether penalties asserted at the service center such as for late filing or payment were counted or not. Since the rate of assertion of such penalties in 1978 greatly exceed that based upon TCMP results (total assessments on individual income tax returns was almost 7,000,000) it is clear that they were usually not included. It is unclear, however, whether these penalties were consistently excluded in the adjustment counts on all TCMP returns.

Source: Unpublished internal computer tabulations (diagnostic and RAT tables, TCMP Phase-Cycles III-2, III-3, III-5, unpublished internal statistics of Examination Division, Criminal Investigation Division, and Service Centers.



cases referred for criminal investigation, this procedure differs from normal audit practice and may not have been done consistently. Incomplete survey forms on TCMP criminal referrals--while not affecting total survey estimates on most items -- would materially affect our civil fraud counts.

Because of the low priority assigned by IRS to TCMP data on criminal referrals (and the few number of TCMP cases on which a criminal referral occurred), this aspect of the survey design may not have been closely monitored. Further, though an internal audit of each TCMP survey was conducted by IRS Internal Audit Division, to verify that required procedures were properly carried out, these covered such small subsamples of each TCMP survey that it is possible few or no criminal investigation cases were included.<sup>15</sup>

• The estimates for total civil penalties asserted--around 3.2 million-- is also widely at variance with penalties assessed, which in 1978 on individual income tax returns alone amounted to nearly 7 million (Annual Report of the Commissioner, 1978;95). Some of this difference may be explained by the TCMP sample design which covered only returns filed during the 12 months following the close of the tax year. This would have excluded some delinquent filings. (See "Sample Design Methodology," and "Computer Selection of IMF TCMP Sample," unpublished IRS reports on various TCMP cycles.) Nonetheless, the size of the difference suggests that assessments made by Service Centers for late

15 The rate computed on TCMP audits, however, may also reflect inconsistencies in IRS policies in asserting the civil fraud penalty. A 1974 internal agency report on the civil fraud penalty concluded that it was often not asserted in cases returned from criminal investigation, though practices differed widely by office (Task Force Report on Civil Fraud Penalty, 1974).

TCMP checksheets.

Figures in Table 4 also provide some estimates of potential enforcement workloads if all serious violations were subject to detection and punishment. Were this to occur, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) would experience an estimated twenty-fold increase in cases.<sup>16</sup> Current CID special agents number 2,800, not counting supporting and clerical CID staff. Twenty times 2,800 would be 56,000, or approximately twice the total number of enforcement officers in audit, collection and criminal investigation combined. With a comparable increase in support staff, CID would require more than the current IRS workforce just to process criminal referrals. This, of course, does not take into consideration the vast expansion in civil auditors and revenue agents required to generate these referrals, or the increase in attorneys at IRS, Justice, and in U.S. Attorney's offices needed to handle the increase in court prosecutions. Currently, for example, only 1 in 50 returns receive a civil audit. Even if more efficient means were developed to select cases with criminal potential,<sup>17</sup> it would require a vast increase in audit staffing to generate these referrals. An across the board,

16 This assumes that the rates of audit referrals to total violations detected by audits is the same as the ratio of referrals from other sources relative to the remaining violation.

<sup>17</sup>Unlike the civil area, little systematic work has been done by IRS to develop a DIF-like formula to predict potential criminal tax violations. While IRS staffing formula currently allocates criminal investigators in part as a form function of civil DIF score distributions, there is no hard information that civil DIF scores are predictive of criminal violation rates.

filing or late payment may not have been consistently included on the

Variations in Serious Violations by Taxpayer Class these estimates.

Alternative ways to measure offense prevalence -- particularly where victim reports are either not applicable or available as for many white collar crimes -- are needed. Without measures of the extent or

individuals.

twenty-fold in increase in IRS enforcement persons (who now total over 27,000) would mean a staff of over a half million agents.

Not unexpectedly, the rate of serious violations varies sharply with income source. (Presumably, it also varies by level of income, but IRS did not prepare tabulations relating violations to the level of actual -- rather than reported -- income.)

As shown in Table 5, individuals receiving income from business, farm or a profession have violation rates 5 to 9 times higher than wageearners or salaried individuals.<sup>18</sup> One might guess that this reflects greater opportunities for evasion by business and professionals; it may also reflect the relative ease with which criminal intent can be shown for violations typical to the two groups -- understatement of (business) income versus overstatement of deductions (wage-earners). The rates again, even with the further breakdown, showed stability across surveys. Because business returns make up only 12 percent of the total N, expected sampling variability as we observe is somewhat larger for

### CONCLUSIONS

<sup>18</sup>Serious violations by corporations are not covered, of course, in these tabulations--only serious violations on returns filed by

### TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED SERIOUS VIOLATION RATES BY OFFENDER CLASS (Income Tax Returns Filed by Individuals: Rate per 10,000 returns)

All Returns 				Wage-earners and Salarics <sup>1</sup> (nonbusiness) TCMP Tax Year				Business and Professional <sup> </sup>   -  TCMP Tax Year <sup>2</sup> 				   Ratio of	
	    1965 	    1969   	11973 1	  Average  Across  Samples  (adj)	Ì		   	Average   Across  Sampleg   (adj)	1 1965	1	    1 978 	  Average  Across	Business to  Nonbusiness
Criminal Referrals	22	1 16	   17	l   20	1	8	6	10	   70	   71	97	1 87	9
Negligence Other	209	1106 1216	B  170  287  465	237	125			81 159	1 758	413   668	506 944	404	   8   5   5   5

<sup>1</sup>Taxpayers filing a Schedule C (Business Income) or F (Form Income) with their individual Form 1040 income tax returns are classed a "business and professional"; "wage-earners and salaried" are those (referred to by IRS as nonbusiness returns) not filing a Schedule C or F. <sup>2</sup>Because professionals' returns comprise only twelve percent of total returns expected sampling


Because professionals' returns comprise only twelve percent of total returns expected sampling yariability of these estimates is greater. Adjusted for sample exclusions of cases which were already under criminal investigation (see footnote

Adjusted for sample exclusions of cases which were already under criminal investigation (see footnote 2 of Table 3 and footnote 3 of Table 4). The same adjustment factor was used for wage earners and for business and professional return classes.

<sup>4</sup>The counts reflect not the number of civil violations, but the number of returns on which civil penalties were asserted. Only the principal civil penalty asserted was checked. While these counts should reflect any penalties asserted during the TCMP audit, instructions received by the TCMP examining officer are not entirely clear whether penalties asserted at the service center such as for late filing or payment were counted or not. Since the rate of assertion of such penalties in 1978 greatly exceed that based upon TCMP results, (total ascessments on individual income tax returns was almost 7,000,000) it is clear that they were usually not included. It is unclear, however, whether these penalties were consistently excluded in the adjustment counts on all TCMP returns.

Source: Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, Returns Filed Phase III, Cycle 2, 3, 5, weighted and

unweighted diagnostic tables: 5/990, 9/990, 3/990; A, C tables (RAT).



seriousness of offenses, both research and policy decisions are constrained by lack of knowledge.

4.4

The approach examined here, the random investigation method, offers us one alternative. While not unknown to other agencies, it has been most extensively applied over the longest period of time by the Internal Revenue Service in measuring tax violations. Estimates derived from this I.R.S. data base indicate some of the potential uses and versatility of this measurement method. Despite limitations both in the types of offenses for which it is suited and the degree of accuracy and reliability of the data derived, nonetheless it does offer important advantages over our current state of ignorance. More research would help in determining what other types of offenses it is suited to measure (and what related cost factors would be), as well as in assessing the validity of the estimates derived.

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