

Policy, Evaluation and Structural Constraints on Policing*

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It is an American tendency to believe that social problems can be solved by adequate good will, money and technology. The hope is that these problems will fade as greater intelligence, effort, and money are concentrated upon them. Politiciams trade on this belief, and thus maintain its reality. A number of observers have noted that Americans value freedom, individualism and personal expression and desire to acquire huge quantities of material goods, but do not see that crime, especially property crime, is highly correlated with the accumulation and wide distribution of large amounts of relatively accessible property (such as automobiles). These contradictions are at the heart of many American social problems. Nevertheless, the view has been adopted that more technology will solve or overcome the structural contradictions. The contradiction presented by the fact of a correlation between greater freedom (a "positive") and crime (a "negative"), for example, has been seen as being mediated or corrected by the application of technology by the police. Much of the recent "war on crime" has been defined in semi-technological terms - more vehicles, weapons, electronic devices, information systems, etc. It is not surprising, then, that the apparent failure of the police to control crime has been seen as being rectified, in turn, by applying the same means to discover the cause of the failure: the technology of evaluation. That is, if crime control has "failed," in spite of enormous expenditures, that the solution to one technological failure can be discovered by engaging in additional technological exercises, evaluation studies and the like, to discover why the police have "failed."

It is the aim of this paper to suggest that prior to asking the question of what kinds and types of evaluation ought be used, one ought ask what the limits are upon the police in attaining the goal against which they are nowadays mostly judged: crime control. It would appear that the police have accepted the burden of crime control through a series of historical developments, and in so doing,

have perhaps reached a point where admission of their own limitations is difficult. To begin to introduce changes in policing, either through policy change, evaluative research (or the two combined), one must have a clear vision of what the constraints are upon any attempt to alter the organization and practice of policing.

I. Organizational Constraints

Selznick's classic The TVA and the Grassroots (1966), argues that bureaucratic organizations must engage in a series of interchanges with their environment, and in so doing, may develop commitments that have unanticipated effects. The American police have done so, and the commitments are at this point very binding. The history of the police may be read as an attempt to establish a mandate in the context of competition with other order-maintaining institutions and organizations (e.g., Reith, 1938). As urbanization produced increasing demands for comprehensive, full-time, publically-financed and legally mandated policing in the United States, struggles between political forces in large cities broke out. Ethnic groups had fought "WASP" politicians for control, and had found in policing a secure, respectable means of adjusting to urban life. The Irish and Italians, in turn, were confronted by a set of reformers. The late nineteenth century, as Ferdinand has convincingly shown for Salem, Massachusetts (1972), was a period where ethnic groups had first struggled for control from "city fathers" to seize urban city governments. They sought and did establish a hegemony of patronage. They were later challenged by the reform-minded middle classes. The police, as they were to be later in the first decades of the twentieth century, became the locus of contests for control, and were thus often considered to be "corrupt," "criminal" and the like. That is, the claims and counter-claims of reformers and "machine politicians"

focused on the police, and the vulnerability of the police to such struggles has been continuously demonstrated (Sherman, 1974). One lever used to wrest control from the machine by the reforming forces was the ideology that said that by professionalizing, educating the police and improving police training, one could not only "clean up" the police, but make them effective in the control of crime. Crime control, as Wilson quite effectively argues (1969), became a theme in American policing in the late 'twenties, during the later years of Prohibition. At this time also, the FBI was organized and the first systematically gathered crime statistics became a reality. More and more, active policing was advocated as an improvement upon the traditional public order maintenance style (Wilson, 1968) which had been associated with machine control. Crime control, public decency, as shown by the absence of drunks on the streets, and public order, became associated and linked in public opinion.

The police, through this very gradual process, only superficially traced here, became almost by drift committed to the notion of crime control. The public were increasingly taught to expect it of their police. The police, in turn, became in fact better able to meet these demands, at least with respect to the enforcement of public order laws by mobil patrol vehicles. The public to some degree saw arrest figures as an accurate index of an effective police.

This series of adjustments for survival, intended to meet charges in public expectations for service, when combined with the growth in police capacity to enforce selected laws, tended to narrow public expectations of policing to active, effective crime control. This commitment was embedded in the assumption that crime control work would produce public order (Wilson, 1969).

As later segments of this paper argue, crime is diverse, often it is private, and many crimes cannot be detected without public cooperation (something the police

feel is declining). Further, even crime that is public is often fleeting, stealthy, and accomplished without warning by strangers. Unfortunately, the type crime that most concerns the public (violent personal crime) can be neither easily prevented nor easily solved. The classic police weapon, mobile patrol, apparently has little impact on crime, nor on citizens' sense of security (Kelling, et. al., 1974). These aspects of the social organization of crime, as well as the organizational limitations of the current paramilitary police operation, make actual crime control a rather unlikely consequence of policing.

In a word, the police market out a goal that was outside their domain of control. By making the tacit bargain with police reformers and seeking to reduce crime, the police found themselves committed to a line of action. They continue to claim to be able to manipulate, reduce, and control what is essentially out of their control (Manning, 1971). Thus, evaluation of policing often uncovers great discrepancies between the public claims made by the police and their actual operations. The social and organizational constraints under which they operate have produced this anomaly. In order to identify what sorts of areas might be altered through the application of evaluative

methods to policing, one must first identify the dilemmas or constraints upon the police.

The dilemmas of policing, in part, grow from what might be called its sacred properties, and these dilemmas are to some extent endemic to policing in a democratic society.* Unlike medicine, where the growth of applied technology and science provides the potential means by which the problems of medicine, narrowly defined as those of disease, can be resolved to the satisfaction of the profession and its clientele, the police are unable to "solve" or resolve the problems with which they are expected to deal. Lawyers stand in the same relation to their problems as do physicians: they have reached a degree of authority to define and dispose of "law jobs" and enjoyed some continuing, although variable level, of public and professional satisfaction (Rueschemeyer, 1973).

These occupations (law, medicine, policing) grew from what Shils (1974) has called, following Weber, the inarticulated center of society; they represent, enact and embody the amorphous, sacred, enduring and mysterious features of collective life. They share the ineffable properties of the sacred, and are by that token, highly resistent to change. This resistence can be indicated by consideration of the often-noted "irrationality" of judges, physicians, and police administrators; their curmudgeon-like qualities; the archaic aspects of their dress and demeanor; their cynicism about change in general and their defense of the status quo. Characteristics ascribed to administrators also apply to practitioners to a significant degree - policemen, lawyers and judges, physicians (and one could add the clergy), etc. Workers, as Weber wrote, are reluctant to

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*Some of these themes are developed in Peter K. Manning, Police Work, forthcoming.

grant complete control of their work to others. When the sacred aspects of the work are not only so because they are defined as such by practitioners but because in addition they convey some of the sacred of the society, the work is to that extent qualitatively more resistant to change. The problems attendent in policy changes in police organizations are, for a number of reasons, rather more complex than those of other bureaucracies. In addition to the sacredness of policing and its close association with the moral order and the law, there are other historically derived constraints upon the implementation of policy. Thus, even were evaluation to be carried out, and a policy articulated, implementation would be dependent upon other constraints on police organizations.

First, most policy is set neither scientifically nor as a result of a rational consideration of alternative plans in police departments (Wilson, 1968: ch. 3). Patrol continues in a traditional fashion because it has previously been done in that way. An excellent example of the control of tradition in police practice is the use of the hazard formula to allocate police patrol - the numbers of cars deployed is based on a weighing of last year's crimes in a given area rather than on an underlying model of allocation to achieve crime minimization or optimization.

Second, change in police organizations is often assumed to flow from the administrative sector down the line to the patrolmen who, in the same fashion that they deal with other orders, are to implement them. Consistently, it has been observed that the most powerful segment of the police department is the patrol division (Wilson, 1968; Chatterton, 1973; Manning, 1974a Davis, 1969). This is so not only because the patrol officer has enormous discretionary power, in part because his decisions key subsequent action in the criminal justice system (Reiss, 1974; J. Goldstein, 1960), but also because this discretion gives him great latitude within the organization. Granted that the power of

patrol officers is negative, a veto power, what Max Weber described as "putting on the brakes," it is nevertheless the most important obstruction to the implementation of any extant policy.

Third, most police administrators are committed publically to a policy of full enforcement. The administrator takes this position for a number of moral reasons, but also because it is very difficult to publically defend discretionary action by his officers (since it apparently violates commonsense notions of fairness and justice); because legally he is often required to maintain full enforcement; because it apparently constitutes a modification of legislative intention; because it is believed to foster corruption through authorizing differential treatment of citizens (cf. H. Goldstein, 1964).

Fourth, the segmentalization of police departments in American society is based not only on organizationally relevant status and functions, but also upon class, ethnic, age and style of life differences between administrators, immediate supervisors, and patrolmen. Unless these substantial differences in life interest are altered or linked to the organization in new ways, there is little chance of creating change in police organizations.

Finally, change of policy in any organization can only take place when systematic cooperation exists between sponsors of the reform within the organization (all levels, not simply at the top of the organization), and innovators, which may include evaluation researchers, from outside the organization.

Ironically, features of an organization which contribute to its cohesiveness, morale and integration, especially organizations like the police which have a normative basis for integration and compliance (cf. Etzioni, 1962) and patrimonial modes of loyalty (Weber, 1947), are also those which make the organization most resistent to innovation. To fully appreciate the problems of creating, applying and evaluating a policy in police departments, the forces which perpetuate

fragmentation and those that facilitate integration must be reviewed. The integrative forces are not necessarily facilitative of change, nor are they disintegrative forces; they represent the bases for complex trade-offs, some of which aid change, some of which will retard it. The particular changes will also have a bearing on the ways police organizations respond.

Various modes and kinds of social integration obtain in police departments. The commonsense basis of policing, the occupational culture, the binding aspects flowing from the sentiments of police work (suspicion, honor, tradition, secrecy), the mythology of police work, as well as associative ties (friendship, cliques and colleagality), all contribute to social integration within departments.* These bases of integration are "two-edged." The sentiments of police work, for example, are binding upon participants, but also create distance between officers. Secrecy in the context of competition for arrests, and the suspiciousness required for good patrol, lead to distance from colleagues. The social organization of policing, with its asymmetrical knowledge-sharing, clinically defined competence, segmentalized standards of excellence (the denial of necessary police-relevant knowledge to administrative police officers) and the distinctive experience of administrators, diffuses and makes competition between standards of judgment within the force. The rules by which "good police work" are judged on one level provide a sense of integration between officers and patrolmen, but divide them on another level.

On the other hand, aspects of policing create potential divisions or disintegration within departments. The dependent position of the police in the

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*For useful treatments of social integration, see Wilson, 1963; Wilson, 1968; Banton, 1964; Cain, 1973; Manning, forthcoming a; Rock, 1973, Ch. 4; and Reiss and Bordua, 1967.

criminal justice system means that on-the-street arrest decisions, when no arrest occurs, are subject to very limited judicial and administrative review. Public pressures, especially those on administrators, tend to create situations where administrators dissemble, take contrary public and private positions, or selectively present facts known to the department in the interest of self-protection. The ambiguity of the administrator's stance creates anxiety and uncertainty for the patrolman who expects and requires public support from his leader, and who prefers clear, well-structured and ordered decision rules (cf. Trojanowicz, 1969; H. Goldstein, 1964). Other sources of schism in police departments, for rather obvious reasons, are external review boards, internal disciplinary committees or internal affairs divisions. Ethnic and/or rank-based groups e.g., the Afro-American League or the Patrolman's Association, as well as the growing number of civilian employees and unionization divide the force into opposing legally defined groups or factions. Internal competition, especially between the detective and the uniform divisions continues, and leads to concealing of evidence, avoidance of communication, and failure to fully cooperate in investigations.

This truncated description of the principal organizational sources of integration and segregation within police departments will serve to highlight interrelated further points.

II. Policy and the Police

Two general modes of policy can be identified. "Policy" refers to both internal and external policy and is defined as a general plan for the identification of goals, the means for their achievement, and aspects of evaluation of the plan. In a sense, one can only be identified in the sense that the absence

of an explicit policy, or an ambiguous unstated policy, is by contrast a "policy". Informal, tacit, inarticulated responses to the dilemmas of policing are the order of the day in traditional police departments. Traditional modes of policing, what Wilson (1968) terms the "system," were viable only insofar as the rootedness of policing in the local neighborhood, ethnic and class traditions was a given, and served as a shared frame around events for both citizens and police. Formal policy was neither required nor of concern. Formal policies, especially written policies dealing with external issues - when an arrest should be made for a vice violation, sanctions for violation of procedural guarantees, when a gun should be used, etc., are a relatively recent development. Internal regulations governing the conduct of an officer on and off the job and the standard procedures contained in general orders or police manuals, on the other hand, have been prominent features of policing since Rowan and Mayne assumed the joint commissionship of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. As many writers have noted, the internal rules and regulations of the police and standards of procedure are far more detailed, elaborate and conceptually refined, than are policies, if any, governing the when, what and how of policing (see Bittner, 1971; McNamara, 1967; Wilson, 1968).

Some Police Problems in Need of Evaluation

A review of the literature devoted to identifying police problems would yield an unmanageable list. The latest report, by the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, The Police (1973), is some 650 pages long, contains 108 standards toward which police departments are asked to strive, and 16 specific recommendations. Obviously, such a document, by its sheer size and scope, cannot be meant as an operational agenda. Too much is said, too broadly, and in far too platitudinous a fashion e.g., "Cooperation is essential in any organization" (Standards and Goals, 1973:196). "Every police agency

should implement an allocation system for the geographical and chronological proportionate need distribution of patrol personnel." (ibid, p. 199). The sweeping generalizations and recommendations contained therein proceed on a largely managerial model because the report was written with the advice of, in addition to lawyers and judges, administrative policemen. This essay urges evaluation to create a few selective changes. It can deal only with a few questions of policy and evaluation. Seven problem areas are discussed (in no special order): morale; discretion; accountability; crime-fighting focus; rational allocation of resources; public trust and corruption. They are first briefly described and then aspects of policy addressed.

Morale. Morale can be viewed as an administrative problem associated with high rates of turnover, work slow-downs, resistence to compliance with command and the like. Since the level of morale bears on the willingness of officers to value and invest themselves in their work, and to derive self-esteem from it, morale is one of the most generic problems of policing. James Q. Wilson locates the "morale problem" specifically among lower participants (the patrolmen):

> The police problem has many aspects...In attempting to account for the police problem and the relative failure of reforms, we will begin, not at the top, with an account of the political system and the administrative apparatus, but at the bottom, with a discussion of the nature of the big city police role as it is seen and experienced by the policemen themselves...to the individual officer, the police problem is largely a morale problem [my emphasis - PKM] (1963).

The concern of the patrolman, as this quote implies, is in maintaining self-esteem in the context of social isolation, frequent adversary relations, with citizen's socially structured ambivalence toward the role expressed in social interaction, and a negative social imagery of police work. He sees himself

as the front line recipient of administrative folly, public opinion, personal eccentricities of the public, and the erstwhile violence of citizens. Insofar as this sense of lowered self-esteem is collective, entire police forces become dissent-ridden, uncohesive and in a very real sense, ungovernable.

Discretion. Police observers continue to remark upon the striking contrast between the degree of specificity characterizing internal standard procedures of police departments and those governing discretionary practices in exercising their authority:

> The absence of carefully developed policies to guide police officers in handling the wide variety of situations which they confront is in sharp contrast to the efforts taken to provide detailed guidance for other aspects of police operations.
>
> Like all military and semi-military organizations, a police agency is governed in its internal management by a large number of standard operating procedures. Elaborate regulations exist dealing with such varied phases of an agency's internal operations as the receipt of complaints from citizens, the keeping of records, the transportation of non-police personnel in police vehicles. Established procedures govern such matters as the replacement of vehicles, uniforms and ammunition. Police agencies have also established policies with respect to certain public service functions, but these usually do not involve important criminal law issues. There are policies, for example, which provide guidance in determining whether to transport a person requiring emergency medical assistance, in deciding whether to take a stray dog into custody, and relating to the inspection of the premises of a vacationing resident....
>
> In contrast, there have been only occasional efforts to make use of a deliberative planning process to develop policies to guide and control police officers in dealing with the wide variety of situations that require the exercise of some form of police authority (Task Force - Police, 1967:16-17).

The exercise of discretion, that is, the use of decision-making authority which is not subject to review or appeal, is characteristic of police patrol work. Kenneth Davis, one of the most articulate writers concerned with this issue, wrote:

> The police are among the most important policy makers of our entire society...they make far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close second....the amount of governmental activity through the police, measured in man hours is more than forty times as much as the amount of governmental activity through all seven of the independent federal regulatory agencies; those agencies in the aggregate have about 40,000 employees but the nation has about 420,000 policemen...Enforcement policies resting upon social values usually should be determined not primarily by individual patrolman but by top officers of the departments, as well as other officers of the local government (Davis, 1969:222-223).

The problem is the absence of clear guidelines to which police can refer when they exercise their authority to ask people to move on, break up a gathering, try to calm a domestic disturbance, or use force to constrain citizens. Among the many solutions advanced are judicial rule-making (especially with regard to procedural questions), judicial case-decisions (such as the enforcement of the exclusionary rule), legislative regulation, and various internal codes and regulations (cf. McGowan, 1972). Most observers advocate the development of police policy-making, or rules about rules, to reduce the low visibility of decisions taken by police officers, and to increase the likelihood of review of these decisions by accountable persons other than patrolmen (cf., Alprin and Wilson, 1974; PCC, 1967; Davis, 1969; McGowan, 1972).

Accountability. The police in a democratic society are expected to uphold and enforce the criminal law, a substantive body of rules, and to respect procedural rules. A question is whose standards are the police to uphold in a very pluralistic society, and who sanctions them for excesses? In a very general sense, it is difficult to identify the channels and sources of police directives, policies and conduct. Wilson sees a limited impact upon policing flowing from deliberate community choices:

> ...deliberate community choices rarely have more than a limited effect on police behavior, though they may often have a great effect on police personnel, budgets, pay levels, and organization. How the police, especially the patrolman, handle routine situations that bring them most frequently into contact with the public can be determined by explicit political decisions only to the extent that such behavior can be determined by the explicit decisions of the police administrator, and the administrator's ability to control the discretion of his subordinates is in many cases quite limited by the nature of the situation and the legal constraints that govern police behavior (Wilson, 1968:227).

Wilson notes, as was argued above, that the police administrator has very little explicit control in controlling order-maintenance situations (unless they are large scale disturbances where military planning and execution are employed) and citizen-initiated crime episodes (where the wishes of the citizen seem to be rather closely adhered to). Even in the case of police-initiated activities (e.g., vice and traffic), Wilson writes:

> ...where the administrator does have the ability to make policy, that policy is often his and not the community's. He can determine how many traffic tickets will be issued and he can strongly influence if he chooses, how many drunk arrests will be made, but in no city studied for this book were those decisions made by the chief made at the direction of the governing bodies of the community...such matters are not of general interest to the citizenry or to public officials (Wilson, 1968:228).

The issue of police accountability is joined around specific events of interest to citizens, and often involves issues of responsiveness (police willingness to alter police policies or actions as a result of a special interest group's pleas or demands) rather than accountability. Further, accountability does not rest simply in the issues raised by Wilson - accountability to whom? Proponents of police professionalism often advocate professionalism as a set of norms guaranteeing the minimal impact of social values and identities other than those relevant to the police role. Yet, such committment alone, in the absence of subscription to "higher" democratic values of justice, fairness and equal enforcement of the laws, is unacceptable morally in a democratic society. Contrarily, a police which refuses to enforce laws which are anti-democratic albeit passed

by a city or state legislative body, could be said to be non-accountable, but morally acceptable. Accountability is a complex matter involving whose standards shall be upheld, how the determination of adequate conduct shall be made, and to whom should the police be politically obligated.

The crime-fighting focus. There is a wide-spread popular conception of police work as the exciting, nerve-jangling, chasing and apprehending of dangerous criminals. This conception can be termed the "cops and robbers" game, although it also might be called the "hunt mentality," the "thief-taker image," the popular conception, or the "crime-fighting" symbolic focus of modern police work. This view, selective as it is, serves an important function for the officer, and it has great staying power - it is mythical. The officer views his rather sparse, intermittent, often rare contacts with active crime events as "real police work." Among the many functions of the officer is, to be sure, that of apprehending criminals, and when confronted with violence, or with on-going crime or events which require coercive intervention, the police are unquestionably expected to respond.

(Manning, 1974).

This image of police work is as powerful as it is seductive/ It easily shades into or partakes of the "war on crime" imagery as well. That is, the danger, the confrontation with threatening or hostile adversaries, the struggle for control in the context of protection of socially valued property and persons, and the legitimate social sanctions available, make the police officer "soldier-like" in at least some of his activities. Because the public is prepared to accept this description of policing, it is convenient and powerful persuasive rhetoric for public occasions:

> In every war America has always equipped its armies with the best and most modern weapons. We in law enforcement are engaged in a continuous war in peacetime. We ask only that we be properly equipped to meet the criminal enemy and to make certain that law enforcement and the public are not left defenseless in the war against crime. (Former NYPD Commissioner Michael Murphy, in Cipes, 1968:51).

As Jerry V. Wilson, former Chief of Police in Washington D.C. noted in a recent column in the Washington Post, the crime reports, as a police chattel, are tightly bound to the full enforcement doctrine.

> Police departments, as custodians of the basic crime reports, are heralds of crime news in most cities, informing the mass media, the public, and the governing bodies of crime levels and crime trends. But police departments seldom have much incentive to express crime reports in tones of moderation. If the police down grade any part of the crime problem, however undangerous to life and limb, they soon will be under pressure from one community group or another to change their view. More important, to obtain legislative and budgetary resources, the police must persuade both legislators and the general public that crime is bad and is likely to worsen (Nov. 15, 1974:A27).

The consequence of this symbolic relationship between the police, the media, the public, and the legislators, is two-fold. All are locked into the police version and rendition of crime, its consequences and levels, and all are supportive, each for quite different reasons, of the fictive policy of "full enforcement." It is quite apparent that the forces that perpetuate dependence on police crime statistics are pragmatic - there are few options, and a great need for information on crime. However, the police also use them to project the mirage of an absolutistic moral order, which is protected by police action, and readily accepted by their several audiences for reasons quite distinctive.

The problem inherent in the crime-fighting image is a multiple one, but stated simply it is this: police work involves little actual contact with criminals and certainly few arrests, yet the organization judges itself and its members against its ill-defined goal of crime-effectiveness. It is a false and misleading

set of criteria, and depresses morale, leads to public humiliation, lowered self-esteem, public criticism and the violation of many procedural guarantees.

The consequences of the imagery are produced as follows. The activities of policing are geared to constant attention to crime primarily through the patrol function. Yet, the patrol function yields little crime, few arrests, and is, in fact, both tiring and depressing (e.g., Cruse and Rubin, 1973; Kelling, et. al., 1974). This reduces morale insofar as policemen judge themselves against arrest rates or even citizen contacts leading to arrest, and as over against the activities of the more glamorous, crime-oriented members of the department - the tactical squads, detectives, and vice division. The police officer tends to avoid non-crime events, to reduce their significance to himself and the public and to be more sensitive to negative aspects of public reactions. Avoidance of "shit work" means that integrative, socially rewarding, nonadversary relationships are proportionately valued less than other sorts of encounters in crime-oriented departments. The use of mobile patrol heightens this distance from the public and from nonadversary interactions.

There are administrative consequences as well. The Task Force Report noted how constraining the police crime-fighting role is when it is (as it almost always is) linked with the full enforcement doctrine (1967:17ff). Secondly, the imagery produces public fear and concern about crime: it serves both to heighten public concern about their own safety and well being as well as, in some cases, to reduce it. Thirdly, the focus on crime not only leads to reduced morale, public fear, and to a false concern with the pursuit of criminals, but to the manipulation of the arrest statistics under the production demands that result. What constantly must be born in mind are the following facts about crime itself, some of which have been touched on before. Crime is

not a single, reified, constant, wholistic matter in any sense. It is diverse as to targets, settings, motives, consequences, costs, legal definitions, clearance rates, and perpetrators. McGowan writes:

> ...there is insufficient grasp of the fact that crime is various in its manifestations....The member of the Mafia bears little resemblance to the nineteen-year-old public school drop-out, or to the Black who cannot get a job because of his color. The political crimes, which have grown greatly in the wake of the dissatisfactions of the privileged as well as the underprivileged members of society with various aspects of modern life, have little or nothing in common with the ordinary housebreaking or street mugging. The antitrust or securities fraud defendent, the colorless clerk of years of respectability who is suspected of murdering his wife, present problems quite unlike other defendents. The victimless offenses of alcoholism, gambling, prostitution and sexual aberration are a world unto themselves. (McGowan, 1972:661).

In summary, the thief-taker, crime-fighter role has a number of important consequences seen in police morale and administrative structure as well as in the domain of maintaining a consistent public imagery. If the thief-taker role is emphasized in a department and if, in addition, the public policy of the department is "full enforcement," then the gap between the reality of police work and the public presentation of police work is likely to be great. It is this gap between expectations and performance which is reflected most dramatically in the levels of self-esteem within a department.

Rational allocation of police resources. The police pursue contradictory objectives, and the attainment of one, crime control, is very difficult to measure and operationalize, while attaining the other, order maintenance, is fraught with potential political and social conflicts (Wilson, 1968). The police have not, as a result, developed a set of rationally articulated means to these ends. Rather, they have proceeded by displacement of means into ends, by the use of dramaturgical management of appearances, and by subscribing to the police myth of crime control. The police myth suffuses the operations of police departments with a sense of certainty which it would appear is almost a necessity in a

complex and fractionated social system. Certainly, little effort, until very recently, has been directed to the assessment of what is considered the heart or backbone of policing, traditional preventive patrol (Kelling, et. al., 1974; Wilson, 1974a). The variation in the per capita distribution of policemen in large urban areas is surprisingly high, and is unrelated to the arrests or crime rate in those cities. For example, ratios of policemen per thousand residents in cities of over 500,000 population ranged (in 1967) from 1.07 to 4.04, while the incidence of crime does not show similar gross differences (PCC, 1967:96). "Preventive patrol - the continued scrutiny of the community by visible and mobile policemen - is universally thought of as the best method of controlling crime that is available to the police. However, the most effective way of deploying a department's patrol force is a subject about which deplorably little is known." (PCC, 1967:116). If the police, like other institutions in the society are to become more and more oriented to the "business" of public service, or in "producing" a marketable product for a clientele, then, whatever their goals, they must engage in the process of self-examination.

Public trust. Public attitude polls show that public confidence in the police is declining at a steady rate (see Hindelang, 1974; Erskine, 1975). They do not feel the police can control crime, they do not think of them as especially honest, they express doubt that they can catch criminals ("do something") about crime, and tend not to report large numbers of crimes. There is reason to believe this is a trend in Britain as well (Banton, 1964). Public satisfaction with police service as measured by local surveys before and after policy modifications does not seem to be affected by improved service as judged by police-relevant criteria of their own performance (cf. E. Ostrum, et. al., 1973 /). Changes in the administration of policing, such as improved opportunities for

promotion and the like, although they improve the morale of the force, do not change public attitudes toward policing (Wilson, 1966). The sources of changes in public trust are not well understood. Some of the resistence to rapid fluctuations shown in these studies may be accounted for by the traditional nature of the police and their mythological position. But, on the other hand, public opinion of the police, or more accurately, the police perception of public opinion, does seem to affect police morale, and probably is associated with higher rates of corruption, disciplinary and legal violations by officers.

Corruption. One of the persistent and perhaps chronic problems in big city police departments is corruption. In whatever form, it reduces police morale, undercuts administrative control, makes policemen and the public share a mutual perception of each other as hypocrites, increases public cynicism (especially if scandal is involved). More importantly, it denigrates the social order represented by the police. As a representative body, corruption among policemen is a doubly powerful sign of immorality. The trust placed in the policeman, his opportunity, his contact with vulnerable persons makes his potential for damaging corruption high (see Sherman, ed., 1974; Manning and Redlinger, 1975, forthcoming).

III. Some Structural Limits Upon Change

The problems identified in the first sections of this essay outline complex matters involving political, organizational and to some degree, legal constraints. Additional specification of the limits of policy change is required. Three observations can be made concerning policy.

The first is that, given the present body of knowledge of organization, management, accounting and the like, there is no lack of knowledge in the field of

police management. The available money and expertise may be lacking for other reasons such as the unwillingness of departments to experiment, to hire outside experts, or the simple lack of skill and ability which doubtless does limit the governance of many departments in this country. The problem is more likely to be one of application, or the introduction of management expertise into police organizations. In large part, this is a matter of time, and the monies made available through LEAA have made possible important advances in this area over the last seven to eight years (cf. LEAA, NILECJ Annual Report, 1974).

Secondly, many of the needed alterations in the performance of police departments cannot be considered until fundamental changes in the legal structure itself are accomplished. Such fundamental changes are: alterations in the penalty structures for victimless crimes such as possession of personal amounts of marijuana and cocaine and other non-addictive drugs; loosening of the penalties for prostitution; decriminalizing many minor offenses (vagrancy, drunkenness); increased use of a magistrate system and citizen's panels to set penalties and fines at the local level; legalization of gambling; the institution of no-fault insurance and removal of traffic law enforcement and adjudication from the courts and creating a separate agency for traffic law enforcement, separate traffic courts, and a set of penalties administered by a non-police governed agency. These, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of police departments to create independently. They remain as one of the most consistent sources of police problems in large cities.

Thirdly, a great many of the present crime problems are the result of two very major but relatively understandable social processes which have taken place since World War Two in America (Wilson, 1975). The first is the migration of Blacks from rural to urban areas and their subsequent concentration in the center

of urban areas, and quasi-incorporation into the urban social order. The second is the enormous growth of the percentage of youth in the population. These simple facts portend enormous implications, many of which are politically volatile, as Banfield (1974) discovered. The shrinking percentage of youth in our population (and assumes in addition that aging and socialization-acculturation do proceed apace, something many might argue), suggests that the crime rate in this country, like that in England, will soon begin to decrease as a result of demographic transition (Wilson, 1975). On demographic grounds, guarded optimism is warranted for the future of crime i.e., one can expect a decrease in the sort of crime that has been inflating the statistics in the past 10-15 years. No changes in police policy will substantially modify the aging process, the commitment of the young to families and jobs (assuming that international depression does not befall us in the interim), the socialization and education of Blacks and other minorities. These social processes, it is clear, will do more to reduce crime than any presently imaginable social policy.

Nonetheless, the question should be asked, what, given limited resources, time, and energy, should be the nature of the effort to impact on police departments? One must "work by omission" i.e., to exclude areas in which required social action is either massive or where scientific and technological solutions are presently available (even if they have not been introduced into departments). It can be assumed that over time at least some of these badly needed managerial innovations will be adopted by departments, especially the larger urban and suburban county departments. This omission process leaves three areas in which a definition of the problem is needed, and where strategies for innovation are much needed. By addressing them, we can make some attempt to impact in areas where change is both needed and possible.

The three areas that are neither matters of legal or administrative alteration nor are strictly managerial/technological are the morale question, the problem of citizen confidence and the crime-orientation of urban departments. In choosing these three problems, a conscious attempt is made to omit purely technological problems e.g., the development of more effective and cheaper hand-held radios, digital communications systems, more efficient automobiles, more protective outerwear for officers, more efficient computerized dispatch and data storage systems, etc. All of these approaches to the problems of the police, it can be assumed, are within the reach of scientists. We can, for example, expend enough money to have jet-powered helicopters flying daily over every city above 250,000 people in the country; we can design a more comfortable shoe for policemen, and devise dispatch-queuing models to reduce response time. Not only are these things within reach, they probably will be available within five years in sufficient quantity and quality to improve the everyday occupational life of the police officer. The major problems of the police in this period in our history are social and human, and they defy technological solutions. Principal among the central problems of the police are matters of morale, corruption, and public trust that cannot be solved or alleviated, for example, by tinkering with a system's capacity for information storage.

One can learn lessons about the value of a technological strategy for the solution to social problems by examining some aspects of the consequences of problem-solving by science produced for the Viet Nam war. In many respects, the war represented a socially defined problem where scientific methods, rational analysis, and the most advanced technology in the data gathering and processing field were available, and where evidence suggests the absolute utter and complete failure not only of the application of science to the problem, but of the severe limits a procedure for defining problems which assumes their solution to be found

in rational-technological means. The remaining pages concern those varieties of problems associated with modern police work which can be addressed, defined, and managed by the introduction of new ideas and patterns of organizational conduct, i.e., they are neither managerial nor technocratic problems or solutions.

IV. An Assessment of Approaches to Two Problem Areas: Public Trust and the Crime Focus

Citizen Involvement in Law Enforcement

The investment of the citizen in formalized systems of social control, namely, the police, seems to be declining. Any means designed to encourage citizen involvement, and increase the citizen's sense of efficacy, is to be encouraged.

The police are dependent on information for success in dealing with crime (Willmer, 1971). In adversarial situations such as those that produce and result from crime, there are abundant reasons why persons neither cooperate nor inform the police of crime-related events. Police solution of crime problems, insofar as the police depend on information, depends on citizen cooperation. The community service aspects of the job are almost by definition reactive matters to which the police respond. They are not in the same sense, then, dependent on the citizen's decision to call the police. Put in another way: the citizen who calls for police help in a non-crime matter is more likely to be in no personal danger as a result, need not be concerned about being called as a witness, endangered from prosecution him/herself or other people. When a crime report is made all of these considerations may be involved as well as the belief that the police can do little or nothing about the problem (the most frequently given response in victim surveys to the question "why didn't you inform the police of a crime?" cf. Ennis, 1967).

In 1973-1974 Donald Santarelli, then Administrator of LEAA, undertook a public campaign to demonstrate the importance of citizen participation and involvement in the criminal justice system. It is clear that many people do not report crimes because they feel the police can do nothing about the particular crime, that they feel the police can do little about crime in general, and that they increasingly distrust the police (Ennis, 1967). At least in part as a response to this growing distrust and suspicion of the police, and what he defined as a growing unwillingness of the public to provide the police with needed information, Santarelli began a program of publicizing the LEAA funded Victimization studies. These studies provide, among other things, data upon the extent of victimization measured <u>independently</u> of the figures assembled by police departments (LEAA, 1975). However, other functions were served by such information: the gap between the reported and the actual victimization rates is measurable, but more importantly, there are data on the discrepancies between what is reported by citizens as having occurred to them and reported to the police and what police departments show for the same period of time. This later gap is a product solely of police decisions and discretion (i.e., whether to define an event as a crime and to stipulate its precise name), and therefore, shows the independent impact of police operations on the nature, amount and distribution of what is known as "crime" in this society.

It would seem that given the organizational character of the police, citizen involvement at every point is not possible, assuming that it is worthwhile, unless there are ways to monitor and evaluate police performance by means other than by police descriptions of their own activities.

Given the fact that policemen are in fact rarely supervised, that supervisory (sergeant to patrolman) ratios are very high, and training in most cases is minimal, "internal" control over police conduct is weak. Reiss has proposed

both an internal audit of performance and an <u>external</u> set of organizations to monitor and sanction police performance and to increase accountability (Reiss, 1971:190-207). Reiss suggests that two units be established, one external unit to receive, transmit to the appropriate agency, and be given in return full report of the decisions made concerning complaints, and one unit to investigate, sanction and adjudicate complaints <u>within</u> the agency. In connection with these quite useful proposals, Reiss advances a means to avoid the negative aspects of police complaint systems i.e., the fact that only complaints are systematically registered (a fact that is symmetrical with the unwillingness of the police to collect data on their own misconduct, and to collect data only on the misconduct of the citizenry). All police-citizen contacts in a law enforcement episode should be recorded and a copy of the data provided to citizens.

> Police officers should be required to make an official record of <u>any</u> work contact with a citizen when the encounter is terminated, whether or not an arrest is made. Immediately on completion, a copy of the form should be given to the citizen as an official notice acknowledging the contact, and another copy should be filed with the department. The form must be numbered uniquely, as it is for traffic warrants, to insure greater accountability in its use. (Reiss, 1971:205).

Such information provides the citizen with an <u>independent</u> record of the event, and Reiss urges that such receipts for Action or discretionary decisions be registered at each point in the process: booking, charging, setting conditions of release, etc. All of these proposals are valuable and point in the direction of citizen's interests being made more specific and more clearly stated, rather than noted in the breach. However, the only way in which such proposals will become a reality is through what might be called <u>incremental</u> policy change. Little by little, such alternatives to the now thoroughly arbitrary exercise of police power should be introduced. But each of the "external" means of control through organizations that watch over the conduct of the police must be linked to an "internal" means of executing the actual punishment or sanctioning, else the

exercise will become defined as yet another intra-bureaucratic struggle for control.

The key problem is, and remains, that the police maintain almost exclusive control over the definition and meanings of crime and the nature of their public service. Insofar as the public remains completely uninformed about decisions made, and police discretion apparently exceeds that found in any other public bureaucracy (cf. Davis, 1969), the public is incapable of making the police accountable for their actions. The first step toward creating the organizational mechanisms proposed by Reiss should be an attempt to monitor the police disposition of calls (cf., Furstenberg and Wellford, 1973; Shearing, 1973). Such research should investigate not only whether the police received the calls and how the police defined them (see Reiss, 1971:84-102), but how they were dealt with, how quickly, what investigation, if any, followed the initial call, and what the disposition of the case was (whether it lead to an arrest or not). Most critical of all, measures of citizen satisfaction for the specific call must be gathered rather than general attitudes toward police service (Ostrom et. al., 1973). These data would allow a means to check the flow of information through the department, and to check otherwise invisible discretionary decisions. Such data will also provide an opportunity for citizens to become involved in law enforcement and to have an increased sense of efficacy in controlling services provided for them.*

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*Additional possible ways of encouraging citizen involvement are being explored by LEAA. Some recent research deals with the problems prosecuting attorneys have in assembling witnesses. Some 45 percent of the cases are dropped for lack of witnesses who are willing or able to appear in court. Many witnesses fail to appear due to fear of revenge, loss of job time, etc., but a substantial percentage of witnesses do not appear because they were not informed of the time and place of the trial. It is hoped that by a few innovations in procedures in the courts and by prosecuting attorneys that some of the failures to show can be reduced, and that increased satisfaction of witnesses and victims will result from making an appearance against a charged person. Consistent with these efforts are those in California and other states to pay compensation to victims of violent crimes.

These data on the police disposition of calls and discretionary decisions within departments will be instrumental, if used by police policy makers, in making legitimate the creation and use of alternative measures of police performance.* Research is needed to develop ways of measuring police performance which avoid a total reliance on the police figures (which are principally crime-oriented), and which will encourage citizen participation in the evaluation of policing. The crime focus of urban departments has prevented recognition of the great need to alter the present pattern of police self-evaluation. Current modes of evaluation, in addition to being oriented to punishing errors rather than to providing prospective guidance and education, rely almost entirely upon easily manipulated paper records of discretionary decisions. Because the records are almost impossible to verify against other versions of the events, and because of the needed legal presumption of the credibility of the police, these records are virtually unassailable at present. They add to the frustration of those citizens who desire changes in police policy, or wish to develop some sense of public accountability by the police to citizens. If these mechanisms exist, evaluation research can be more effectively employed.

It should be remembered that in advocating "citizen involvement " in maintaining public order that the involvement recommended is not all of a piece. For some social groups, participation in citizen patrols, auxiliary police units, and neighborhood block watch clubs may be the most likely to increase commitment. For other groups, namely the middle classes, involvement may mean exerting

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*Studies are presently being considered at the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and have been funded by them (e.g., a study by Jerome Needle of the American Justice Institute), and similar studies have been carried out at the Urban Institute, and by a group at MIT headed by Gary Marx.

pressure through meetings, political action in the form of petitions, demonstrations, and support of candidates. All of these should be encouraged by the police. Other groups may feel that the thing most urgently needed is not a sense of involvement at all, but simply more quality police service of the kind required by citizens in their own neighborhoods.

One of the most promising developments designed to increase citizen involvement is the use of citizen patrols, block watches and other quasi-legitimate modes of law enforcement to assist the police by carrying out routine tasks. In addition to the encouragement of these semi-formal groups by providing training, communications systems, pay and supervision, the police would be advantaged to increase their use of auxiliary or reserve police officers and to increase their interfacing with private security forces.

The police have historically opposed the use of private security forces, and have objected to informal groups who attempt to patrol an area and/or enforce the law. The history of vigilante groups is a sordid one, and many recent groups have been seen as threatening by the police (cf., Violence Commission Report; Skolnick Report, 1969; Marx and Archer, 1971). The police opposition is, in part, well founded, given the past performance of vigilante groups. The vigilante group in part represents a symbolic threat because it reduces the power that a quasi-monopoly on symbols of authority and violence provides the police (cf., Goffman, 1957). Vigilante groups, as will be discussed below, are of special value in carrying out routine patrol and in performing order-maintaining functions in neighborhoods, at schools and large gatherings.

Private guards, either those hired by contract or employed by a particular industry or organization, are a growing and significant aspect of the formal law enforcement apparatus.

> About one in every 100 persons in the civilian labor force of the United States is employed in public or private law enforcement or security work. In 1969 there were an estimated 804,900 persons employed in law enforcement or security work (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971:11). Of these, 64 percent were employees of public organizations ...The remaining 36 percent were in the private sector. In 1969, between one-fourth and one-third of all privately employed guards and investigators worked for contract security firms and the remainder were in-house employees (Reiss, 1974).

Far from viewing this rather large body of law enforcement personnel as "enemies," every effort should be made to create linkages between private and public agencies. It is fair to say that the arbitrary discretion of relatively better supervised and legally constrained public employees must be far less than that exercised by private security personnel. Standardization in reporting procedures, incident reports, conditions under which public agencies must be called, sharing of patrol responsibilities, and the like would vastly expand the capacity of the police to regulate private areas while still respecting the sense of territoriality, private property, and private definitions of space and conduct norms. The development and proliferation of private security forces is viewed by some as evidence of fragmentation of the authority of the police, but conversely, it can be seen as a response to quite different definitions of order prevalent in a pluralistic society.

It would seem that private groups of citizens represent an untapped resource for the police insofar as the police maintain the groups in a symbiotic and dependent relationship. That is, as long as the groups serve to monitor socially bounded semi-public settings such as neighborhoods, schools, riots or areas such as parks, and they restrict their activities to "back-up" or assistance to the police, they are of value to the police. As Marx and Archer (1971) note, when these groups become involved in law enforcement, or compete with law enforcement agencies to make calls (using citizen's band radios or by monitoring police calls),

the conflict potential is high. Although Marx and Archer note that there are differences in public attitudes toward urban vigilante groups (lower class, less educated, younger people are more favorable to them; Blacks are more favorable to these groups than are Whites), nearly half of a sample of persons in Boston were supportive of the general idea. It is a resource that can be manageable and supportive of the police. Newark, New Jersey, for example, has used state and LEAA monies to employ auxilliary police to aid in service types of calls thereby presumeably relieving police to deal with other calls (Newark, N.J. Star-Ledger, Feb. 10, 1975).* The Newark system is an example of how organizations can be coopted to police use, while at the same time serving the community. A similar experiment using citizen involvement is the Los Angeles plan of employing block-watch units to observe schools, voluntary parent patrols, and student assistants who will patrol with regular security officers (Baltimore, Sun, Feb., 20, 1975).

The Crime Focus

The second problem is the crime-orientation of urban departments. It must be modified both by creating a new division of labor within departments and an altered imagery. It is not claimed that the police are failing in any sense except by virtue of their own arrogation to themselves of the role of exclusive crime controllers. They cannot control crime anymore than they can alter the economic structure, the political system, the educational system, or fundamentally impact upon the birth rate or patterns of migration. They have oversold themselves as crime-fighters. In so doing, they have tended to avoid the admittedly

*The unit is under the command of the Community Relations Division, involves minimal training, and adds 114 persons to the force every night of the week. Six new patrol cars will supplement an additional ten foot patrols, all equipped with personal radios, and under the command of captains in the city's four police districts.

very difficult task of attempting to educate the public to the diversity of crime (varying from arson, the extortion of money from a child on a play ground, the swindling of millions of dollars through corporate fraud, etc.). Nor have they educated the public to the very different capacities that the police possess for preventing or controlling various sorts of crime. They have very rarely illuminated the public concerning the process of the construction of official statistics: how crimes are founded, the difference between a reported crime, a founded crime, an arrest, a charge, a hearing, an arraignment, etc. Nor have they made any effort to publicize their own low clearance rates, ineffectual investigation practices, the number of arrests cleared by confession, and the like, and the number of arrests which do not result in a criminal charge. The relative ineffectiveness of police patrol, in terms either of arrests or of obtaining crime-relevant information, has been examined by research only recently, and little effort has been made by the police to make the public aware of the possible futility of traditional preventive patrol as a crime-deterring and public assurance mechanism (Kelling, et. al., 1974; Bahn, 1974).

The public remains uneducated about these issues, in part because the mass media enters into complicity by its special pleading for the police case. The phenomenology of crime itself deeply rooted in people's sense of order. Police agencies constantly battle the image of thief-taker that they have created for themselves. They employ the crime problem as both a scare tactic and a rationale for their existence. This data alone does not argue for an alteration of police practice with regard to the investigation of serious crimes. This may be needed, and an argument has made for changes in detective work. It may well be futile as a crime-solving technique. What is needed is a refocusing of police efforts to avoid an exclusive projection of the imagery of thief-taking and crime-fighting. They neither require nor deserve such image-making work.

One of the most urgent needs with respect to changing police self-assessment is a socially derived system of measuring matters of public concern for which the police will be held accountable. For example, it is abundantly clear that although we expect the police to perform as a rational bureaucratic agency allocating resources in accord with predetermined plans and managerial priorities, we also expect them to deliver high performance bursts of energy in response to community problems or events that are both police business and "out of the ordinary". Think, for example, of public demands made upon the police with regard to manhunts for lost or abducted children, or children where foul play is suspected; public outcry against a rapist (or a series of unexplained rapes which attract public attention); manhunts for "radicals" such as Patricia Hearst and associates during 1974-1975; police action in disasters such as floods or other "acts of God," etc. None of these kinds of events is predictable, nor can they be set as high priority items. (Rare events are only planned for with great difficulty in rational allocation systems. The allocated money has a way of being drained off into everyday operational costs in any case.) Such "unique" high-energy "emergency" events are precisely the sorts of things for which the paramilitary model is supposed to equip and prepare the police, but are also those things which typically cause organizational chaos - excessive but unfocused efforts, frantic chases in response to unfounded or unconfirmed tips, public assurances and denials, concentrations of specially mobilized personnel in boring and unrewarding work (such as waiting in train and bus stations and airports in hope of intercepting the fleeing target of a search). Further, they are the <u>kinds of events with enormous dramatic "pay-off."</u> The FBI was "embarrassed" by its inability to arrest Ms. Hearst, but the successful arrest in the spring of 1974 of two other "radicals" was greeted with public acclaim for careful and diligent police work, and her capture yielded much-needed public praise to the FBI.

The point is that the police crime statistics, on the one hand, report the mandane events which the police are most easily organized to provide, and which they can most systematically control, but on the other, a number of socially significant events highly valued though rare are not captured in the crime statistics. (This is not to overlook that some of the crime recorded in the UCR is of little social significance to many persons e.g., larcenies of little more than $50 - the price of a sweater, a light jacket, or a cheap portable radio.) Such highly valued yet unique service demands make evaluation extremely difficult. Ironically, the police receive little credit for those things which we have argued are most critical to the maintenance of their symbolic role: service of all kinds in non-adversarial relationships (taking complaints, investigating reports of stolen property, intervening in situations disruptive to public order, etc.). They eschew and sometimes even disdain these functions. On the other hand, they are given great public acclaim when they successfully foil a bank robbery, capture a hijacker, intervene in a plot, return a child safely after a search, the very events that are so rare as to be outside the personal experience of all but a few police officers. Thus, the rarest events are most highly valued by the public in general terms (i.e., when the service is not provided for them directly), the most common are least appreciated, and the officers themselves must face the constant anomaly of doing the things for people that "people don't appreciate," and being unable to perform those dramatic and highly meaningful kinds of services which they deem to be most central to themselves and to the adequate performance of the role. It is reasonable to desist altogether trying to obtain evermore accurate crime statistics on the widest possible number of offenses (as are presently collected by local departments), and to focus attention on a few categories and carefully monitor and standardize their collection. These should include perhaps: rape, aggravated assault between strangers,

household burgulary, robbery and homicide. Chief Wilson writes:

> Most of the remaining criminal offenses should be relegated, as white collar crime is now, to the status of non-index crimes. As a start, we should recast all forms of simple larceny into the perspective we now reserve for larceny among friends. Reports could be taken for these crimes, at least on cases where prosecution is likely, but excluding them from the index will alleviate the confusion and frightening of the public with astronomical crime data having little relationship to realistic problems and goals (Washington Post, November 15, 1974).

The problem is less one of confusing and frightening the public (who seem to judge "crime" by two standards or frames of reference - their neighborhood ("safe") and "elsewhere" ("dangerous"). (Furstenberg, 197) The operational latitude of the police with respect to "crime" should be reduced, and attempts should be made to move them away from a dependence upon a monolithic view of society and social mores, and utilizing reified indices of that reality. The dramatization potential in such indices is high, but the reality of policing is such that a more modest means of symbolizing their operations, and more realistic means of assessing their performance, would be infinitely more desirable.

If fundamental alternations in the symbolization and dramatization of policing were to be considered, and an examination of new performance measures and an evaluation of traditional patterns of patrol allocations would seem to be first priority, they should be accompanied by at least some of the following organizational modifications. First, departments should be radically divided, with traffic and processing functions carried out under a separate control structure, staff and line, although remaining under the same command. Secondly, auxiliary police units, like the Newark experiment, should be used to handle routine patrols, domestic calls, and other service activities which are not crime oriented. Thirdly, police departments, ambulance services and fire should be publically owned and regulated, dispatched from the same number such as 911, and a sharp division of

labor maintained. The police should delegate community relations to an independent social service agency which coordinates service activities, with control over the police - an agency of public safety. The police should develop and maintain tactical forces for intervention in crime, for saturation patrol and the like.

Finally, the implications of this essay are several: the police might seek to evolve into a more specialized crime-fighting organization, while delegating as many other social service functions as possible. The performance of a crime prevention and deterrence unit within a Department of Public Safety should be evaluated primarily by measures tapping their output in clearances, not arrests. The performance could be assessed against an on-going citizen victimization panel in combination with the monitoring mechanisms outlined above, to measure the extent of police success in detecting and obtaining information on the level of crime in a community.

V. Comment

We are only now beginning to make visible the implicit assumptions that the police make about their own work: why, how, where and when they do it. The Kansas City patrol project carried out by George Kelling for the Police Foundation is a prime example of the attempt to outline the aims of a police function, to measure it, and to adduce from these data some possible organizational changes which are warranted. We are only now able to see that many commonsense assumptions about policing such as the assumption that they can prevent crime, control narcotics, deter offenders through patrol, or produce public sense of well-being, are quite functional for the maintenance of police morale and a sense of personal efficacy, but not representative of actual police goals. That is, if they are police goals, the police are failing in a catastrophic fashion; if they are not the police goals, then the public is being seriously mislead.

We have two logical options to pursue in further evaluation research, recognizing the limits suggested in this essay. We can attempt to develop more accurate descriptions of what the police actually do, and then try to devise measures of their effectiveness (do they achieve the goal at whatever cost [Wolfe and Heaphy, 1975]). Or, alternatively, we can attempt to change the behavior of the police to meet the goals they have set for themselves. Given the constraints identified in this paper, and detailed elsewhere (Manning, forthcoming), it is unlikely that we will succeed should we follow the latter course, even though it has been the traditional approach to the problem. Past efforts, for precisely the reasons articulated here, have not produced results.

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