

SECURITY PROCEDURES AT ^X
U.S. EMBASSIES _{MFI}

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AND ON
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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¹ Resigned June 3, 1980.

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SECURITY PROCEDURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES

Protection of Americans in Iran and U.S. Diplomatic Personnel in Iran and Afghanistan

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m. in room 2200, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. We meet today to discuss the unfortunate events that recently have taken place in Iran and Afghanistan. Our specific interest is the protection of American citizens and diplomatic personnel in ordinary circumstances, in extraordinary circumstances and in other cases.

Our witness today is the Hon. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We will vote to hold the hearing in executive session. That is the understanding that we have with the State Department, and we also have agreed that as rapidly as practicable we will sanitize the record and make it public. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, then. Why do you not advise us what happened in Iran to the best of your knowledge, or what is happening, or what is about to happen, or all three?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID NEWSOM, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, Mr. Chairman, do you want to concentrate on the events of the 14th, or do you want a general roundup of where we are in Iran at the moment?

Mr. FASCELL. Let us talk about the protection of our personnel in the Embassy first, because that is our specific obligation. Of course, that has to be done in the context of what is happening.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me begin by saying that we are providing you with a full chronology based on our operations center log and reports from Embassy Tehran of the attack on February 14.

Mr. FASCELL. That is what we have in front of us now?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is what you have in front of you.

Mr. FASCELL. Could I ask you a question about this generally?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. You say that you are submitting a chronology of the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979. This is an official State Department chronology?

Mr. NEWSOM. This is an official State Department chronology based on our Operations Center log, supplemented by reports that came in from the Embassy.

Mr. FASCELL. Is this the official U.S. chronology?

Mr. NEWSOM. To the extent that there is an official chronology, this is it.

Mr. FASCELL. Who is responsible for the U.S. official chronology?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think that the only place there is a log chronology in existence is in the Operations Center at the State Department. There may also be one—

Mr. FASCELL. You know DOD keeps one.

Mr. NEWSOM. DOD keeps one relating to defense aspects.

Mr. FASCELL. Were there defense personnel?

Mr. NEWSOM. Defense personnel are in the Operations Center in the State Department. It was the center of the U.S. Government's control of the crisis.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. Would you explain that to us, please, because it seems to me rather important. There is more than one crisis management center in the U.S. Government. There is one at DOD, as I understand it.

Mr. NEWSOM. There is the National Military Command Center, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. National Military Command Center. There is one at the White House.

Mr. NEWSOM. The situation room at the White House.

Mr. FASCELL. The situation room at the White House. You have one at the State Department, of course.

Mr. NEWSOM. We have the Operations Center at the State Department.

Mr. FASCELL. Operations Center at the State Department.

Now, the intelligence community has one somewhere.

Mr. NEWSOM. At Langley.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you know whether that is a combined situation center?

Mr. NEWSOM. The one at Langley, no.

Mr. FASCELL. You do not know whether that is combined with all the rest of the community or not?

Mr. NEWSOM. The intelligence community—what its representation is, I do not know.

Mr. FASCELL. Right.

John, would you like to ask a question?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I move that the committee go into executive session.

Mr. FASCELL. All of those in favor of going into executive session, please respond by saying "aye"; those opposed "no." The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Ireland.

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Mica.

[No response.]

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Bowen.

Mr. BOWEN. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Aye.

Mr. FINLEY. Six in favor, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the entire proceedings be classified.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, so ordered.

I have never been able to track down all of the mechanics and I think it is important for us to get the mechanics straight in our head.

Does NSA operate a crisis center?

Mr. NEWSOM. They may. I do not know.

Mr. FASCELL. Somebody has to clear them in for operational purposes, obviously.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me explain how it looks from the State Department—

Mr. FASCELL. That would be good.

Mr. NEWSOM. When the crisis erupts, either short term or long term, we organize a task force in our operations center which is manned by personnel from the State Department and from the military. On a permanent basis in the State Department Operations Center, there is an officer from the National Military Command Center on a 24-hour basis. That task force will have numbers of people in other agencies involved, including the NSC, the CIA, DIA, as necessary NSA, to call on aspects which relate to those agencies.

Mr. FASCELL. Call on their own resources?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right. So, for example—

Mr. FASCELL. Who convenes the U.S. task force, like Iran? Who convened that task force?

Mr. NEWSOM. It is done by the State Department, either I or Warren Christopher or the Assistant Secretary will decide that a task force is necessary and we will assemble one.

Mr. FASCELL. Who is chairing that?

Mr. NEWSOM. I have to draw a distinction between two things. The task force is a group in the Operations Center that is staffed on a 24-hour basis and has an officer in charge for each 8-hour period. In the case of Iran, Henry Precht here, Director for Iran, was the overall supervisor of the task force and was in charge of one of the shifts, and then other officers of the Bureau manned the additional shifts.

There is also what is called a working group on Iran, which is not a crisis management group, that is, not managing an immediate crisis but overseeing the longer range operational aspects of the problems in Iran created by the changes in that country.

I chair a working group on Iran which meets daily, has been meeting daily since December, reviewing the evacuation; the situation in the oilfields; the problems of financial and economic problems in

Iran; the questions of press information; problems of access to the Government, and so forth, on a continuing basis.

When a crisis erupts such as the occupation of the Embassy, then usually the Secretary and I will come to the Department and whoever is the senior officer in the Operations Center at that time really takes charge of the management. The Secretary, as he was on the morning of the 14th, will be in telephonic communication with the President, as necessary, and with the Secretary of Defense and Admiral Turner at the CIA.

But that is on the very basic decisions that need to be made about what the U.S. response will be. That is basically how it works.

The task force in the Operations Center continues on a 24-hour basis and is in direct telephonic link with the Embassy in Tehran. It is very helpful, because Embassy Tehran's working hours are our sleeping hours and this gives us continual contact.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, does the task force have decision-making authority?

Mr. NEWSOM. No, it does not, other than for very minor matters. If anything requiring a decision comes up, they call me or they call Mr. Christopher or the Secretary.

Mr. FASCELL. So basically, then, is it Mr. Precht—is that correct—who was in charge, operationally, of the task force as a whole and also stood watch on one of the watches, one of the 8-hour tours? Is that correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right. Actually, he was on duty about 14 hours a day.

Mr. FASCELL. I am sure that he worked longer than that, but technically that is the way it worked?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. They are basically an information management and alert organization?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. They feed the material to whomever needs to have it for decisionmaking and that decisionmaking might be at any level. It could be you. It could be the Assistant Secretary of the region; it could be the working group; it could go to the Secretary.

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. The information is fed out constantly, as I understand it?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. How does that actually transpire? How do you get the information personally? If the task force does not have the authority to make the decision, they have to be able to identify those facts which would require a decision which is the same thing.

Mr. NEWSOM. They get all the telegrams that come in from the post and from adjoining posts. They have, as I say, a direct telephone link when it is working. They have a secure telephone link. They get the telegrams that come in through other agency channels, through Defense and CIA channels.

Mr. FASCELL. On a day-to-day, hour-to-hour, nittygritty basis, does Mr. Precht simply pick up the phone and call you and say hey, we got to do something about this?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. That is generally the way it works? You really do not have time to convene a working group or get anybody else involved?

Mr. NEWSOM. No.

On the morning of the 14th, I was called first I guess about 2 in the morning first on the Afghan problem and then headed for the operations center and the Secretary came in about 3—it is all in the chronology—so that the decisionmaking authority was there very soon after the crisis erupted.

Mr. FASCELL. You might as well now take us through it, if you do not mind.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me use Washington times here. Let me explain that this chronology that I am about to review was preceded by a series of events in Iran which made our Embassy particularly vulnerable.

On February 10, a group of air force cadets at a military base in Tehran were shown a film on television of the arrival in Tehran of Ayatollah Khomeini. This set off a demonstration on their part. They would not respond to their officers. Army forces were called in to get them back into their barracks. Some firing erupted. Eventually it quieted down.

The next morning the battle between these two groups began again and got worse. It was accompanied by attacks by mobs on police stations.

Mr. FASCELL. Excuse me. What two groups got into a battle?

Mr. NEWSOM. The air force cadets and air force enlisted personnel in a battle with army units that had been called in by their commanding officer in order to get them back into their barracks.

This was accompanied by mob action in the town as word spread of this conflict. This mob action included raids on police stations and other military bases, the object was to get arms and in this period of several hours what had, up to that time, been a problem of demonstrating, but unarmed, groups became a problem of armed crowds.

On that day, the military leadership met and decided that they could not contain the situation and maintain the cohesion of the military so they ordered the military to leave the streets and go to the barracks. Our Embassy was being protected at that time by approximately 200 soldiers. They were called away from the Embassy and back into their barracks, so that on the 13th of February, we were without any protection other than 19 marine guards.

We had already begun to receive some sniper fire from tall buildings around the Embassy. On Tuesday afternoon of the 13th, the Embassy was told late in the day that it had to remove its flag or be attacked. Threats had been commonplace. The Embassy did not respond.

The next morning at about 10:30, some 100 armed men began to fire at the Embassy from outside of the compound and then came over the wall, invading the compound, continuing to fire at the chancery, the Ambassador's residence, and other buildings. Embassy officers immediately began to attempt to reach key government officials by telephone.

Now, there are two things, Mr. Chairman, that are critical in a crisis like this. One is access to somebody in the country who can be of help and the second is communications.

In the Iranian situation, we benefited greatly by the fact that, for several months before this happened, even though it was our position not to make things more difficult for the Government in power; we felt that it was desirable to open quiet contacts with the Khomeini forces. We began this in Paris and we picked up these contacts when Khomeini returned.

These contacts became invaluable when the Embassy was invaded and within a relatively short time, our Embassy was able to establish telephone communication with people in the Khomeini camp and after—it was less than 2 hours—the Government sent irregular troops that were a part of the Khomeini entourage to eject the guerrillas that were occupying the compound, and within about 4 hours of the time of the original invasion, the Embassy was cleared of those who had occupied it and was being protected by irregulars from the Khomeini group.

During this period we lost communication with our Embassy because a standard procedure in a situation like this is to destroy all classified equipment and communications. We were out of communication by any classified means, either voice or Telex, and the telephone lines went out. Here, we benefited from being able to call on other embassies, the British and the Swedish Embassy which was very nearby.

The two of them in particular gave us status reports from their people during this time—at least, what their people could observe.

After the Embassy was cleared of the original invaders, we discovered that 18 persons had been taken away during the occupation and again, with the help of the Khomeini group, we were able to recover all of them except Sergeant Krause who had been taken by another committee. As you know, that also was resolved a few days ago when he was released.

I think that is a brief rundown, Mr. Chairman, of the events in Iran. I would be glad to expand on it, and Ambassador Quainton, who is with me here, is in charge of our terrorism office in the State Department. He may want to elaborate on some aspects of it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Are we going to be advised what intended role, if any, in this scenario would have been played by the marines that were shown on our television being loaded onto planes ready for action? While you were getting whatever reports you were getting, the American public was being shown marines boarding aircraft ready for action.

Mr. NEWSOM. The marines and the helicopters were moved before the Embassy occupation. That is right. On the 11th, I believe, when the military was withdrawn from the streets, we still had several thousand Americans in Iran. We had no clear idea—I do not think anyone had any clear idea what the course of events would be. One possible option was that we would have a government that would still be able, still be willing to work with us, but not have the means to be of help. And in that event, it might have been helpful to have helicopters which would pick people up at prearranged sites, move them to the airfield where we could pick them up with evacuation planes and have additional marine guards in the Embassy and elsewhere for that operation.

So we began moving them forward right after the collapse or the withdrawal of the armed forces. One difficulty in a crisis like this, Mr.

Chairman, it is not possible for the United States to move anything very quietly. Even the movement of 6 helicopters and 69 marines becomes far more dramatic than it was intended to be.

It was a precautionary move to place these limited assets closer in the event that we needed to use them as a part of an evacuation plan, but the publicity that was given to it meant that the clearances for the transit of these men become more difficult, and it certainly removed any possibility that an Iranian Government in the present circumstances would have agreed to their employment.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, do you want to add anything at this point before we go to questions?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Not on this particular point.

Mr. FASCELL. On the whole thing.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY QUAINTON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMBATING TERRORISM

Ambassador QUAINTON. My personal involvement during this night that we are looking at—the 14th—was with regard to the Afghan situation where I headed up a task force and working group which was operating side by side, in an adjacent room, if you will, to the Tehran one.

My energies were very much concentrated on the range of things that had to be done to deal with the kidnaping of Ambassador Dubbs and their liaison with other agencies that derived from that.

Mr. FASCELL. Do I understand from that that you had decisionmaking authority?

Ambassador QUAINTON. It was a similar situation to the one Mr. Newsom described. I was in direct touch with him and with the Secretary on many issues and, of course, as you know—we will come to that later—we did make some decisions.

Mr. FASCELL. You were in charge of the task force but had no authority to make any decisions?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Not the major decisions.

Mr. NEWSOM. There were certain standard guidelines for dealing with a situation such as the kidnaping and Ambassador Quainton was operating on those, the most important of which that we sought to delay by every means possible any precipitous action and that is the basic guideline under which he starts out and operates.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Indeed, we established initial contact directly. It was only at the point that it was important to have the direct input of very senior levels of the U.S. Government that we went beyond the standard guidelines.

Mr. FASCELL. Let us finish with Iran first before we get to Afghanistan. Mr. Bowen.

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am wondering in the Iranian situation, in the seizure, first, the withdrawal of the Iranian troops. I do not want to debate the question of whether or not the 19 marines were capable themselves of defending the compound. I suspect that the answer is no, they probably could not have if they attempted to do so and much greater bloodshed would have occurred if they had attempted to do it.

That being the case, and presuming that the traditional responsibility for protection is that of the host government, what could have been

done to maintain some Iranian protective cover for the Embassy? The withdrawal of those troops? What kind of negotiations took place?

You spoke of contacts with Khomeini and, of course, contacts with other sources inside Iran. What could have been done to maintain the traditional protection which a government owes to an embassy located in its capital.

Mr. NEWSOM. Once the Iranian regular forces were withdrawn, the Embassy made efforts to get new security. Unfortunately they were not able to accomplish that until faced with the actual invasion. This was the time when the streets were filled with armed men, when the situation—when there was very little real government of any kind that one could deal with.

It was a time, if we had attempted to bring in additional security personnel of our own, we would have run a very secure risk of triggering even an earlier and perhaps more ruthless attack on the Embassy than we did sustain.

Mr. BOWEN. Did we seek that protection, Mr. Secretary? As soon as that withdrawal took place, did it surprise you that it took place, and did we immediately take action to try to get them to restore some kind of protective shield around the Embassy compound?

Mr. NEWSOM. We certainly did, but we had difficulty in finding anyone who was in authority.

Is that right, Henry?

STATEMENT OF HENRY PRECHT, DIRECTOR, IRAN WORKING GROUP

Mr. PRECHT. When the troops were withdrawn, we immediately communicated with the military authorities with whom we had been dealing to ask them to leave people in the Embassy compound. They refused to do so. This was at the time when the military was collapsing. When the new government came in, they essentially had no troops at their disposal.

The military and the police had been shattered. There was no resource except these irregulars who were just being formed that the new government had at its disposal.

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Secretary, one other question. You mentioned that the issue was one of access to personnel back here, leadership here in Washington and communications with those.

Mr. NEWSOM. Excuse me, Congressman, access to personnel in Tehran.

Mr. BOWEN. Access to personnel in Tehran and communication lines back here.

It seems to me that in the middle of a revolutionary situation, complete chaos, that we might expect that one of the hazards of that situation might be storming the Embassy by revolutionary forces. Why would it not be possible for us to do some planning in advance instead of trying to get on the phone in the middle of the night and get ahold of you and say, what do you do? The Secretary, or the President, or somebody, why would we not make some contingency plans on precisely what we should do in those circumstances and did we make any such plans?

Mr. NEWSOM. Once the military collapsed, as I mentioned to Congressman Derwinski, we began moving forward possible assets that

we might use, even though recognizing that circumstances might not make that possible. As Henry Precht just said, the Embassy immediately began to look for someone who could restore security presence. But we also began to destroy all files, destroy all classified equipment, so that if there was an invasion there would be nothing of a sensitive nature that would be compromised. The Marine guards were instructed to use nonlethal protective equipment—tear gas, primarily, in the event of an invasion, and to surrender if it looked as if the only alternative was an armed fight.

Beyond that, in that situation, there is not a great deal that one could do.

Mr. BOWEN. One quick question, Mr. Secretary. Reports yesterday that I read indicated that there were some major policy and communications channel distinctions between what kind of recommendations were coming from General Hauser and our Ambassador, one going through military linkage to Washington, the other through diplomatic linkage or the State Department.

Although the main concern we had with that was policymaking, of course there are also ramifications in regard to the safety and security of American personnel and American citizens throughout the community. What could you say about the problems that might have been generated by this dual, two-headed communications and policymaking apparatus and the lack apparently of any ability here in Washington to reconcile those.

We talk about crisis centers. Somehow or other, we did not bring together these two channels very effectively.

Mr. FASCELL. SOP for the United States; anytime we get into a crunch they send a military brain out there to settle our political problems.

Mr. BOWEN. He talks to the Defense Department.

Mr. NEWSOM. I think that Mr. Kraft's article exaggerated the situation. During the period General Hauser was out there, he stayed with the Ambassador. His communications to Secretary Brown were immediately recorded and shared with the State Department, as were our communications with Ambassador Sullivan.

Both were shared with the NSC.

It stands to reason in a situation like that, that there may be differences in perception, because people are in touch with different people and have a different point of view. If there were differences in perception, they were not an element in the management of this crisis. We were in constant touch with the Defense Department and with the NSC and there were no basic differences on how it should be handled.

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. You do not want to leave it on the record like that, do you, Mr. Newsom? You know that was a major policy decision that was made as a result of that dispute.

Mr. NEWSOM. Mr. Chairman, talking about the crisis—

Mr. FASCELL. Let us forget the crisis and just talk about the policy, because that is important in the whole process of who was calling the shots.

Mr. NEWSOM. In a situation like this, Mr. Chairman, the President of the United States is calling the shots.

Mr. FASCELL. He called them on this one?
 Mr. NEWSOM. He has been calling them on the Iranian crisis.
 Mr. FASCELL. Did you back up Bill Sullivan?
 Mr. NEWSOM. Bill Sullivan is our Ambassador. He is the President's representative.
 Mr. FASCELL. That is not what I asked you.
 Mr. NEWSOM. We have given him full support.
 Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Newsom, it is a plain, simple question: Did you support Bill Sullivan in that dispute?
 Mr. NEWSOM. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to characterize this as a dispute.

Mr. FASCELL. Difference of opinion? Differences of perception?
 Mr. NEWSOM. Differences of perception.
 Our job as members, essentially, of the President's staff is to provide him with the most accurate and honest perception that we can. He has other perceptions which are sent to him, and he makes the decisions.
 Mr. FASCELL. I agree with all of that, but do you not agree that this was a major difference in perception as to whether or not the military would hang on and keep the Bakhtiar government in power? That is a major decision.

Mr. NEWSOM. The question of how the military would stand up was certainly a key question in the decisionmaking, but I do not think it is appropriate to put it in terms of personalities.

Mr. FASCELL. Probably not, since politics does not operate in a vacuum. I have a very sensitive nature about deciding who made what decision.

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Chairman, could you yield?
 Mr. FASCELL. Sure.

Mr. BOWEN. Was the determination to accept what appeared to be the military recommendation emanating from General Hauser and all at Defense that there was a greater likelihood that the Bakhtiar government would survive? Was that a major factor in waiting as long as we waited to evacuate American citizens then in Iran? That policy decision had a great deal to do with the actual survival of the Americans there. We were rather fortunate. It could have been a horrible tragedy.

Mr. FASCELL. I would bet the order said, "Hunker down, because we don't have too long to wait."

Mr. NEWSOM. We began evacuating and encouraging Americans to leave as long ago as early December. We had 45,000 Americans in Iran. By the time this crisis took place, that number was down to about 7,000. We then went into what we called phase III and brought in chartered aircraft to take the people out. The speed of the evacuation was determined by the events and the perceptions of the risk to the community. It was not governed by any policy considerations.

Mr. BOWEN. Are you saying, Mr. Secretary, that we have not gotten anybody out any quicker, even if we had made the policy determination here in Washington, if the President had decided the government was going to fall and a threat may be posed to the American citizens living there in the revolutionary chaos that ensued?

Mr. NEWSOM. We could have ordered them out sooner, perhaps. In the first place, the only people that we can order out in a situation like

that are our own official personnel. We can only advise other Americans to leave.

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Secretary, if I may interrupt, everybody that I saw, at least on television, getting off airplanes was complaining bitterly about the slowness of our Government in getting them out.

So I think they would have been quite anxious to get out earlier, if they had that transportation provided. At least that is the perception that we got in this country, from looking at it.

Mr. NEWSOM. A number of the people were contract personnel and their departure was, in part, contingent on the decision of their contractor as to when they would move. The largest part were employees of Bell Helicopter Co. in Isfahan and the speed with which those people were evacuated was the decision of the company, rather than the U.S. Government.

We had indicated to them some time before the final crisis that we were not going to ask them to remain for reasons of national interest, but the speed with which they could get out was due both to conditions in Isfahan—the fact that the airport was intermittently opened and closed—and the fact that the airbase from which they originally expected to leave was taken over by Iranian Air Force personnel who would not permit any Americans on the base.

Ultimately, we had to bus them up to Tehran for departure. The elements which determine how rapidly people leave in a situation like this are complex.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to ask some questions, but before that, it is my understanding that there was some difficulty and danger involved in the actual transport of Americans to the airport during this time frame that may have been a delaying factor?

Mr. NEWSOM. There were 72 hours there where we would not have advised any Americans to get on the streets. When we finally organized the evacuation, the Iranian Government provided buses with armed escorts to take the people to the airport.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do you contact the Americans directly or do you look to the corporate entities which may be involved in the case of employees of a given corporation to do the notifying when you give the advice that Americans should leave?

Mr. NEWSOM. The normal channel is through the corporations to their employees and our Ambassador and Embassy people keep in touch with representatives of the companies on a daily basis to apprise them of our assessment of the situation and any change in the advice that we are giving.

We also post it in hotels and get out as many ways as we can.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am a little confused about the degree of communication there was between your crisis center and the site of the crisis during the time it was a crisis. According to your chronology, at 2 a.m. Washington time, you were informed by the White House Situation Room of a request from Embassy Tehran that all telegraphic traffic would be held. That is the first thing that puzzles me a little.

How did this information come from the White House Situation Room? Were you not already in contact? Why did this occur.

Mr. PRECHT. The White House communication probably came simultaneously with State communications.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Up to that time, you were in regular contact. Were you in communication?

Mr. NEWSOM. It may be that the phone, that they asked for the White House Situation Room. When they found it, the communications come in almost simultaneously to both places.

Mr. PRECHT. We had, at the time that the attack occurred, an open, unclassified telephone line to the Embassy at the Marine Guard's desk. We also had a secure line.

We got continuing reports from those two points during the attack. Finally, the Marine had to withdraw from his desk. That killed that line, and when the Embassy smashed the secure telephone equipment, we lost both of those connections.

Mr. BUCHANAN. But you say later, "At 0330 Washington time, all communication with Tehran cut." And you informed the British that you needed communication.

Then you got a report that the Embassy of Tehran personnel had locked themselves in the communications vault, and thereafter, you maintained an international open telephone line with your Embassy in Kuwait and they were in radio communication with Tehran.

Mr. NEWSOM. We had a shortwave radio in the vault which could reach Kuwait, but could not reach Washington.

Mr. BUCHANAN. What I am getting at, why did the system not provide some means of continuing communication as a contingent plan against this kind of crisis? If you have a vault, if it is a secure area, why is there not already set up some such means of communication as you did an hour and a half later, that you managed to establish?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think in this case it was partly a matter of available power, but I would have to get more information for you on that. They were not able to operate our main circuit which is by a satellite link. Do you know?

Mr. PRECHT. I do not know. We had this secure line. I was speaking to the political consul. You could hear the bullets coming, the sound of fighting over the line.

The Embassy's primary job was to get in touch with someone who could bring them help, so they were using all of their people on the telephones trying to call to Iranian Government officials, or people who were in direct contact with Government officials.

They had to go down on the secure lines because they had to destroy the equipment, and it was a short time later after they could get out of the way of the bullets and leave the job of trying to reach people locally, that they made a radio link with Kuwait.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is more important to destroy the secure line than to maintain the communications in times of crisis?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It seems to me, with our technology, without its being prohibitive economically, that there should be a way to establish a communication link that you could continue to use.

Mr. NEWSOM. In my experience with these crises, Congressman, communications are the most difficult aspects. If it is not a tech-

nical problem it is a weather problem, or a security problem. We did have in Iran a full, single-size band radio network between Tehran and the consular post in Iran and nearby embassies and this is our final fallback and that was what was in operation to Kuwait.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

One other matter, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned that you had guidelines for crises. Are those guidelines in writing—is that something we could see?

Mr. NEWSOM. The ones on kidnaping are, yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Are there similar guidelines for this kind of thing?

Mr. NEWSOM. This is a little more unusual.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Could we see or obtain for our perusal the guidelines for a kidnaping type crisis?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes, I think they have been submitted.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Department of State has long standing procedures for dealing with crisis situations overseas. The Department maintains an Operations Center which is staffed around the clock. The Center receives from the Department's Communications Center advance copies of all high precedence messages so that it can alert the appropriate Departmental personnel and those of other U.S. Government agencies as well. In addition it has wire service tickers and direct access to appropriate intelligence traffic. The Operations Center is linked to around the clock operations at the CIA, NSA, National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, and the White House Situation Room and can communicate with all the foregoing instantaneously via secure telephone. It is also linked to the Treasury Department and the Secret Service, the Department of Justice and the FBI, the Transportation Department's Federal Aviation Administration and Coast Guard, and the International Communications Agency. Lists are maintained that enable the Operations Center to contact other U.S. Government agencies should that be appropriate.

In a crisis situation Operation Center personnel notify the appropriate action offices in the Department. The Operations Center staff can be immediately augmented if required. And should the situation warrant it, the Executive Secretary can establish a Task Force or Working Group, which brings into special facilities in the Operation Center, personnel from various Department offices and from other agencies as well, to work on the crisis.

The past ten months have witnessed a succession of Working Groups, including Shaba, Nicaragua, Iran and Guyana. During one week last month Working Groups were operating simultaneously on Iran, Afghanistan, and Chad, while the Operations Center was also closely monitoring reports on the Sino-Vietnam and several other political crisis situations. We feel that this system is more than adequate to provide decision makers with the information that they need to react to any situation.

Should you or any member of your staff desire any additional information, or like to tour the Department's facilities, we would be pleased to arrange it.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Department of State communicates with our posts overseas via a number of means depending upon the volume of traffic as well as other factors.

This system provides for secure communications, including backup systems that can be utilized if needed.

We would be pleased to provide a full briefing to the Committee at your convenience.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think that you said that there was the removal of the 300 troops that were providing protection for the Embassy grounds. I think that, if I understood you correctly, that there was about 2 days between that removal and the actual attack on the Embassy. Is that correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. GRAY. The question that I have, in light of what was happening in Iran and in light of the fact that these troops were removed, was there any consideration ever given at that point, since in answer to Congressman Bowen's question, that obviously the few marines could not provide adequate protection, that consideration would be given to, at that point, removing Embassy personnel or drastic evacuation methodology in that 48-hour period, perhaps leaving a skeleton-type crew, if any, crew.

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, sir, the airport was closed. It was closed throughout this period.

The options that were available to us were first, to try to get someone to restore the protection of the Iranian Armed Forces. That turned out not to be possible.

The second option was to find forces from the Khomeini group. They were only in the process of organization.

A third would have been to try to bring in troops ourselves. Our conclusion was that for us to have done so would have posed a very severe risk to the lives of the Americans who were in the country.

Another option was to evacuate the Embassy compound and to disperse the people throughout the community. Our judgment was that for our people to leave the compound in this period with indiscriminate armed gangs roaming the street would have posed an even greater threat to their security.

There were very few options open to us at that time.

Mr. GRAY. Were these options being pursued one at a time, or the first three being pursued and looked at rapidly together?

Mr. NEWSOM. I am sure that all possible options were being pursued by those on the spot and we certainly were considering everything we could do here.

We were very conscious here of the peril which our people faced at that time, but the possibilities of response were very limited.

Mr. GRAY. Who would be in control of that decision? Would that be the Ambassadors there who would say, request immediate evacuation of all personnel? Who has the major responsibility in terms of making that kind of determination?

Mr. NEWSOM. On the spot, the Ambassador has the basic responsibility. We had a contingency plan of moving people from the Embassy compound to an Iranian military base next door for better protection, but that was overrun before our Embassy compound was overrun.

Mr. GRAY. Could you also give me further information about the marine sergeant, Sergeant Kraus? What were the specifics, if you can tell me, about his situation? Why was he singled out and taken out?

Mr. NEWSOM. He had a slight head wound which occurred during the attack and he was evacuated to a hospital. On the evening of that day—I think I am correct on this—on the evening of the day that he was taken to the hospital a group of men came in from one of the revolutionary committees and picked him up, claiming that he was re-

sponsible for four deaths of guerrillas that took place in the vicinity of the American Embassy.

He was held by these people and we were unable, initially, to find out where he was. We finally found out in whose hands he was and then, through the contacts that we had, were able to get him released.

Mr. GRAY. Was there any such evidence that he was, perhaps, involved?

Mr. NEWSOM. No. Our marines—if they did any firing, it was very little firing, and they were ordered not to fire anything except tear gas and to surrender rather than put up a firefight.

Mr. GRAY. The impression that was given with regard to Sergeant Kraus, particularly in eastern Pennsylvania, where I am from, was that he was actually tried by some kind of court. Do you have any knowledge of his being tried by some type of revolutionary court and a sentence being pronounced?

Mr. NEWSOM. We heard originally that this was their intention, but we never—unless he has said something since his return—I have no knowledge that he was actually tried.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is always difficult, is it not, in a situation like this—at this point, we have not lost any American lives. I think the record should be clear that, at this point, we have not lost anybody.

How many people do we still have in the country?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have about 3,200 in the country, of whom probably 2,200 are either dual nationals or married to Iranians.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Of the 3,200, 2,200 are dual nationals?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. PRITCHARD. They will probably stay in unless ordered out?

Mr. NEWSOM. Of the less than 1,000 people in the country, most of them are either officials or skeleton crews for contract operations.

We have 45 military now, and how many in the Embassy?

Mr. PRECHT. The total official population is less than 100.

Mr. NEWSOM. A hundred official personnel.

Mr. PRITCHARD. In other words, are you, at this point, trying—

Mr. NEWSOM. To get down to the hardcore.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You are going to leave those in unless the situation gets worse?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

I am glad you mentioned something which I think needs to be appreciated, and I welcome the opportunity that this committee has given to put it on the record.

In conditions which, at times, have been totally chaotic and without any local authority to which we could turn, our Ambassador and his staff have gotten out of the country almost 45,000 Americans without any loss of life, or a serious problem other than those which we are discussing here today.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think we have a hard time in this country because all of these things get filtered through the media and perceptions get a little strange. I do not think we want to open it up into the future here, so I will pass.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with Mr. Pritchard in saying that I think it should be on the record that no lives were lost. I think that is something that even I have overlooked.

What did we lose by way of classified information and so on? Do we have any idea of what has been lost by way of materials and so on?

Mr. NEWSOM. In the Embassy itself, we had destroyed everything sensitive.

Mr. MICA. When you say everything—

Mr. NEWSOM. We burned all of our sensitive files.

Mr. MICA. I understand that this was going on from December with 45,000 through February and 7,000. I would assume that between December and February, most of our important files were removed?

Mr. NEWSOM. Most of them were burned.

Mr. MICA. Burned?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes. This is our standard procedure; shredded and burned.

Mr. MICA. You did not have time in those 3 months to remove them and bring them to this country? Was that not done?

Mr. NEWSOME. We did remove some, yes. I was thinking of the final period when it would have been risky to remove anything out to the airport.

Mr. MICA. My point is, at the final period, I would assume that there was hardly anything left to be burned?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had cut it down to the absolute minimum.

Mr. MICA. Percentagewise, what are we talking about, from 100 percent?

Mr. NEWSOM. How much of our files were left on the 10th of February, say?

Mr. MICA. From 2 months previous.

Mr. PRECHT. A very small amount; manageable.

Mr. MICA. Was the information that was destroyed, is this the type of information that we need for security purposes? Can it be reconstructed?

Mr. NEWSOM. The files were duplicates of documents that have been transmitted to Washington.

Mr. MICA. Great.

Let me ask you this. Who were—you termed the attack by "the original invaders." Who were they?

Mr. NEWSOM. We are not quite sure yet. There were elements of a group called the Chariks or Fedayeen who are a leftist revolutionary terrorist group.

Mr. MICA. Communist or leftist?

Mr. NEWSOM. They may even be left of Communist.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. MICA. You mentioned that 18 people were taken away, if I understood it correctly, and we would be able to get them back. Was it the same group that took them away?

Mr. NEWSOM. They were taken away. Some went home, and we were not able to reestablish contact with them. Some were taken away by the Khomeini group when they came in and then were released.

You see, at that time, the Government was just beginning to get organized. They had appointed a Prime Minister and several other

Ministers and the Prime Minister had only moved into his office. [Security deletion.]

Why the 18 were picked, I do not know.

Mr. MICA. Let me pursue one other area briefly. Is it my understanding that contract personnel are at the behest of their employer and there is no input or decision made by the Government when they should leave? In other words, if the employer says, "The heck with them," they are just going to stay?

Mr. NEWSOM. They stay at their risk. That is clearly understood. But in one case, for example, some employers were not prepared to continue anybody on the rolls once they left Iran, so a number of people were reluctant to leave Iran until they really had to, because they would be unemployed.

Mr. MICA. Do you think this is an area for possible involvement by the Congress or this committee to see that proper protection—there seems to me there is a gap there, if we have our Ambassador and our Government employees and the communique or communications system to get them out and alert them and relieve the rest of the Americans—in this case, 45,000 or a percentage of that number, just at the will of their employer, and their employer does not seem to have anyone near to contact, or the legitimate concern that we might have as Government officials for Americans.

Mr. NEWSOM. I think that it would be very difficult to legislate a responsibility in a foreign environment like that. What happens—and I have evacuated people out of Libya during the 1967 war—the Ambassador has daily meetings. First, we have an evacuation plan in every Embassy. That evacuation plan embraces not just the official personnel, but all Americans in the country. It has a system in which there are wardens in companies and in neighborhoods who can pass the word about the advice to be given.

In addition to that, the Ambassador meets with the heads of all of the principal companies in a crisis period on almost a daily basis and advises them of how he sees the situation and what he suggests that they do. In Iran, almost every company was responsive to this. The biggest problem was really the problem with Bell Helicopter but that was as much due to the size of their contingent—they had over 1,000 people in the country at one point.

You can tell an American that he has to leave, but he can exercise his independent rights—and I have seen it done.

Mr. MICA. Do we notify them that we are no longer capable?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is the final statement. That is the one we made in phase III.

Mr. MICA. One last point.

Have we lost our security stations there? Have they been ransacked?

Mr. NEWSOM. The two intelligence posts, one was placed on a standby basis and the personnel taken out about 2 months ago. The second one, we are in the process of removing our people at the present time. [Security deletion.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, on what day were the orders issued to the marines?

Mr. NEWSOM. The marines to go from Camp Lejeune?

Mr. FASCELL. No, sir. We will get to them later.

The marines in the Embassy, they were ordered not to fire anything but nonlethal weapons.

Mr. NEWSOM. That was the day of the invasion. Although the Ambassador had come in 2 days before, when the army forces had been withdrawn, and said, it is possible that the Embassy could be attacked in this situation and my instructions to the marines will be, in such an event, to release tear gas, but to withhold fire.

Mr. FASCELL. Was that on the 13th?

Mr. NEWSOM. That would have been probably on the 11th. I will have to check that date, but it was before the actual attack.

Mr. FASCELL. That was simply precautionary on his part?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Given the situation?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. The attack actually took place on the 14th, Washington time?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. How many people were in the Embassy at that time?

Mr. NEWSOM. About 70.

Mr. FASCELL. Were they all Americans?

Mr. NEWSOM. No. Seventy Americans and how many Iranians?

Mr. PRECHT. Several hundred Iranian employees.

Mr. NEWSOM. One of them was killed defending one of the marines.

Mr. FASCELL. When was the order issued to destroy all equipment?

Mr. NEWSOM. That was issued on the 10th, after the guards were pulled out.

Mr. FASCELL. As soon as the Iranian military protective force was withdrawn, the orders went out to the Embassy. Was that standard operating procedure?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is the Ambassador's discretion.

Mr. FASCELL. He immediately started destroying all—

Mr. NEWSOM. All files.

Mr. FASCELL. All files and equipment?

Mr. NEWSOM. That was done at the last minute. Our communications suffered also because there was another area in which our military mission was located which was also an Iranian military base and there was one part of our secure telephone system that was located on that base and that was overrun and destroyed on the 10th.

Mr. FASCELL. Where was that base?

Mr. NEWSOM. That was about 6 miles up the hill, in the northern part of the city.

Mr. FASCELL. Was that the entire military communications link that was destroyed on the 10th?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. PRECHT. They still had radios.

Mr. NEWSOM. They still had unclassified radios.

Mr. FASCELL. All of the secure lines, military secure lines, which ordinarily would have been available to the Embassy were not available?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Starting on the 14th?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Did we have any other secure military communications anywhere in the country?

Mr. NEWSOM. No. We only had single side-band radios over which one could send coded messages when technically possible to do so.

Mr. FASCELL. At the air bases where we have military advisers, what was the situation at those bases with respect to our military?

Mr. NEWSOM. By the time that this happened, there were no longer any Americans left on these bases.

Mr. PRECHT. At a couple of places there were still Americans in touch by radio.

Mr. NEWSOM. Where were they?

Mr. PRECHT. In Shiraz.

Mr. FASCELL. The F-15 base?

Mr. PRECHT. F-14.

Mr. FASCELL. F-14 base?

Mr. PRECHT. There are some there.

Mr. FASCELL. What was the other base?

Mr. PRECHT. Some at the naval base at Bandar Abbas, I believe.

Mr. FASCELL. The major air base in the interior of the country?

Mr. NEWSOM. At Isfahan, they had already been excluded from that base.

Mr. FASCELL. At a couple, you said?

Mr. NEWSOM. The Iranian air base, the two principal Iranian air bases outside of Iran were at Isfahan and Shiraz. Most of the equipment was at Isfahan.

Mr. FASCELL. Most of what kind of equipment?

Mr. NEWSOM. Most of the equipment, the same sort of equipment we had sold the Iranians—the F-14's. There was some also at Shiraz. Then there was the naval base at Bandar Abbas.

At Isfahan, let me explain that there is a group in the Iranian Air Force called the Homafars. These are warrant officers, largely trained technically to handle and maintain this equipment.

They were one of the first parts of the Iranian Armed Forces to join the revolution. They did so apparently in part because they were afraid that we were going to come in and take out that equipment to which they attached a great deal of importance.

Mr. FASCELL. That equipment would be the training equipment plus the manuals, the aircraft, the sensitive radar?

Mr. NEWSOM. Right.

The question has come up whether the security of this equipment is in danger of being taken by Soviet agents or others from outside. We cannot exclude this, but the fact is that these men who feel very strongly about the fact that this is Iranian equipment and for that reason excluded the Americans from the base after there were press stories about contingency plans for the removal of the equipment. I do not think you are going to let anybody else on that base, either. So our Americans were excluded from Isfahan. Some were still out at Shiraz and there was the so-called Taft group, a training group with the Navy.

They had unclassified radio communication with Tehran and also with other stations in our embassies in the Persian Gulf. They have now all been evacuated. The radios were taken even before they were evacuated.

Mr. FASCELL. Do I understand the situation now that at the two air bases and the naval base there are no Americans?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. At one intelligence site there still are Americans?

Mr. NEWSOM. Right.

Mr. FASCELL. The other intelligence site has been closed down and is on a standby basis and no Americans are there?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. We are in communication with the present government with respect to the second intelligence site?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Where the Americans were located?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, what specific equipment in the Embassy is destroyed?

Mr. NEWSOM. I should say that about 2 weeks ago—no, a week ago, we were able to get a courier back in with communications gear, that we have reestablished our classified Telex link to Tehran, and we are sending normal messages back and forth.

Mr. FASCELL. Obviously, that was done with the knowledge and consent of our Government?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. You could not get a courier in with equipment without it?

Mr. NEWSOM. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. So the State Department relies on two major internal communication links. One is the Telex and the other is a secure telephone?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Then you have open telephones and you have short-wave radios?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Open radios?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Which it is possible to send coded messages on, but you do not consider that very secure, and it is very slow?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Was any other embassy of any other country attacked or invaded or occupied?

Mr. NEWSOM. The Moroccan Embassy was briefly attacked when the Shah went to Morocco. The Israeli Embassy was occupied. There was a brief attack on the Egyptian Embassy.

Mr. FASCELL. Was there any attack on the Egyptian Embassy after Sadat invited the Shah to come to Egypt?

Mr. NEWSOM. The attack on the Egyptian Embassy was related to the invitation to the Shah, but I do not remember the exact timing.

Mr. FASCELL. How did Sergeant Kraus get to the hospital?

Mr. PRECHT. I think he was taken by the guerrillas.

Mr. FASCELL. When the group came in and took over the Embassy and Kraus was wounded, they took him and he wound up in a hospital.

Mr. PRECHT. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. How long was he there?

Mr. PRECHT. He was in the hospital just a few hours.

Mr. FASCELL. Then the group came back and got him again?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. PRECHT. He was released by the hospital at 7 at night, I believe.

Mr. NEWSOM. And then picked up?

Mr. PRECHT. Then picked up, presumably by the same group.

Mr. NEWSOM. It was the same group.

Mr. FASCELL. Nongovernmental, non-Iranian?

Mr. NEWSOM. It was Iranian. Some of the people around the Ayatollah Khomeini who was at that time, and still is, to some extent, the center of authority.

Mr. FASCELL. If it is the same group and they were around him and he is the center of authority, you cannot say that this was a ragtag leftist element that invaded the Embassy.

Mr. NEWSOM. I am not talking about the invaders, Mr. Chairman. The invaders were leftist guerrillas. The sort of Khomeini militia and unorganized guard force who came in and relieved us at the Embassy were the ones who took Kraus to the hospital and they are the ones who came and picked him up.

Mr. FASCELL. He had been wounded earlier?

Mr. NEWSOM. He was wounded, if I recall, fairly near the end of the occupation.

Mr. FASCELL. How long was he kept by the government group after he was taken out of the hospital?

Mr. NEWSOM. He was taken out on the night of the 14th and we got him released—today is Monday, we got him released on Wednesday.

Mr. FASCELL. And immediately shipped out?

Mr. NEWSOM. Immediately shipped out.

Mr. FASCELL. Has Sergeant Kraus been debriefed?

Mr. NEWSOM. He has been debriefed by the Marine Corps.

Mr. PRECHT. He has not been to the Department yet.

Mr. FASCELL. Does the Department expect to debrief him?

Mr. NEWSOM. He was debriefed quite thoroughly by the Embassy.

Mr. FASCELL. He has been already debriefed by the Department for your purposes?

Mr. NEWSOM. For our purposes.

Mr. PRECHT. If he is still in town, we would like to talk to him.

Mr. FASCELL. The evacuation plans of the Americans started in December?

Mr. NEWSOM. We went into phase II in December. You will remember there was a very tense period in December, or the Muslim month of Muharram, where there were major demonstrations on behalf of Khomeini while he was still in Paris. Our first phase, advising Americans to stay off the streets and to send dependents home was a little before the 10th of December.

The second phase, which was after the Bakhtiar government came in was to change basically the advice to dependents to leave, to urging them to leave, and sending all of our official dependents home.

Then the third phase was on the 10th of February when we said we no longer can protect the lives of the Americans in the country.

Mr. FASCELL. What phase are we in now?

Mr. NEWSOM. We are in the third phase now.

Mr. FASCELL. Are we still evacuating Americans?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have completed the U.S. Government-organized evacuation because everybody who we either want to leave or is ready to leave is gone. We were not able to fill up the last charter flight.

Mr. FASCELL. How many American citizens are left in Iran now?

Mr. NEWSOM. About 3,200.

As I was explaining earlier, somewhere around 2,200 of those are dual nationals or married to Iranians and are likely to stay.

Mr. FASCELL. How many American official personnel are in Iran now, and where are they?

Mr. NEWSOM. About 100 and they are all in Tehran.

Mr. FASCELL. The consulates have been closed?

Mr. NEWSOM. The consulates have been closed.

Mr. FASCELL. How many consulates do we have?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had three. The most dangerous situation was in the city of Tabriz where our consulate building was invaded on three different occasions. We finally got our consul out and down to Tehran about 10 days ago.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Mica has a question.

Mr. MICA. Just briefly.

This morning, the latest reports are that we are not quite sure who is really in control or if any control is being established there. Can you comment on that?

Also, do we have any estimate now? You know, before December it looked like all of Iran supported the Shah. Then it became very evident that there was a split. Now, it looks like all of Iran supports Khomeini. Do you have any idea of how unanimous or how strong the factions are? Is it nearly 50-50, 75-25? Have any assessments been made since the takeover?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think our estimate is the main force of the revolution was symbolized in Khomeini; once the Shah had left and Khomeini had returned and was clearly in power, some of the divisions within this amorphous group began to surface and you have now leftist influence, not necessarily allied to the old party, but their voice is becoming more often heard, now trying to influence the course of the revolution and becoming a matter of more and more concern to Khomeini himself.

If people vote with their feet, if Khomeini calls for a meeting and a demonstration he can get a million people in the streets of Tehran with very little trouble. The largest number that has been mobilized at any one of the leftist rallies that have been held is about 50,000. But they should not be underestimated because they are organized, and they are armed.

Mr. MICA. How many major factions are there now? There is the Khomeini faction, the leftist faction. Are there three or four major ones?

Mr. NEWSOM. There are probably different tendencies within the Khomeini group. There are those who will tend to emphasize the religious, the Islamic aspects and those who may emphasize more the organization of a modern government. But, so far, those groups seem to be working in relative harmony.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You do not mean to imply that the whole political situation is either Khomeini or groups to the left of Khomeini and that is all there is? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. NEWSOM. It is pretty hard to find anything else at the moment.

Mr. FASCELL. At what point in time, Mr. Secretary, did the United States decide on a plan to provide for additional evacuation vehicles?

Mr. NEWSOM. You mean aircraft?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. NEWSOM. After we went into phase III on the 10th of February, as soon as we alerted Pan American and other charter companies that as soon as the airport was open—this has been a big factor—we wanted to start—

Mr. FASCELL. A general evacuation?

Mr. NEWSOM. A general evacuation, and the airport opened on the 15th.

Mr. PRECITT. Friday the 16th.

Mr. NEWSOM. The airport opened on the 16th.

Mr. FASCELL. Was that the first time the airport was opened?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. From what previous day?

Mr. NEWSOM. Certainly from the 9th of February, the 9th or 10th of February, but it had been intermittently open and closed because the civilian air controllers had been on strike from some time in January.

Mr. FASCELL. Does your chronology indicate the times that the airport was closed and the times that the airport was open?

Mr. NEWSOM. This chronology covers only the 14th of February. If you want a chronology on the evacuation, we could provide that.

Mr. FASCELL. I think we need to have that.

Mr. BOWEN. I was going to raise that issue. This is an interesting reading for a 1-day rundown, but you have all kinds of important events: withdrawal of protective police; orders to destroy equipment; instructions to the marines not to resist. All this is taking place, particularly from the 10th to the 14th, and some of it prior to that. If we could have more of that information, that would be most helpful.

Mr. NEWSOM. Right.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know at what point it would be useful to go back to it, but we certainly need to go back to phase II of the evacuation. Otherwise, we will not have a clear picture of the factors.

Mr. NEWSOM. Why do we not give you the whole chronology?

Mr. FASCELL. That would be useful. That would be extremely useful.

Mr. NEWSOM. From December 1 on.

Mr. FASCELL. That would give us a better idea of what you were confronted with and just what were our plans with respect to additional airplanes and supplementary evacuation procedures.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE EXODUS OF AMERICANS FROM IRAN

During the year of turbulence in Iran that started in January 1978 there has been a veritable exodus of Americans from that strife-torn country. The American community in Iran has dwindled from an initial 45,000 to 3,300. Most of the departures have taken place since September 1978, at an ever accelerating rate. The great majority departed via regularly scheduled commercial airlines, thousands left on aircraft chartered by their companies, over four thousand were provided seats on U.S. military aircraft when commercial space was not available, and nearly four thousand were airlifted out in the last surge via aircraft chartered by the Department of State.

The American Embassy in Tehran assisted the American community in a number of ways during these trying times. The Embassy established a pyramid communications network with the American companies in Iran through which advice and information was provided. It also issued general security advisories to the community at large. It set up an information center to deal with rumors and to provide up to date facts about the evolving security in various parts of Tehran. The Embassy interceded with the Iranian Government to obtain exit permits and protection for movement to the Airport. It worked with the authorities to gain access to military airfields and to assure needed traffic control during strikes. In the final phase, the Embassy served as an assembly point during the evacuation and smoothed the departures.

1978

August 1 AMERICANS IN IRAN: 45,000

August 12 -- Martial law imposed in Isfahan after frequent violent demonstrations. American Consul advises Americans to stay home.

August 19 -- Fire in Abadan movie theater claims hundreds of lives. Demonstrations follow.

August 20 -- Embassy issues advisory to American community urging low profile during deep mourning days in late August.

 -- Amuzegar Government replaced by Sharif-Emami Government; press freedom, but demonstrations continue, strikes start, and shops are closed in protest to regime.

September 7 -- Huge peaceful march despite ban on demonstrations.

September 8 -- Martial law proclaimed in Tehran and twelve other cities. Security troops attack large gathering in Jaleh Square in Tehran resulting in numerous deaths and injuries.

September 11 -- AMERICANS IN IRAN: 41,000 (est.)

September 14 -- Embassy issues lengthy advisory to American community on martial law regulations and general situation. Embassy also issues travelers advisory saying travelers may face inconvenience but no great risk in Iran.

October 3 -- Strikes spread to oil industry and civil service. Shop closings frequent and widespread.

October 6 -- Ayatollah Khomeini moves to France from Iraq.

October 12 -- Bell Helicopter bus carrying Americans attacked in Isfahan; no serious injuries.

October 24 -- Embassy issues advisory to American community urging precautionary measures during upcoming weekend. Embassy reports many American companies are paying bonuses for hazardous duty.

October 30 -- Embassy reports growing anti-foreign attitude has heightened possibility for incidents involving Americans.

November 1 -- Strikes disrupt commercial air service; Pan Am goes to turn-around operation from Istanbul.

November 5 -- Worst riots in ten years in Tehran. Mobs burn cars, buses, banks, movie theaters, stores. Embassy recommends non-essential travel to Iran be avoided until further notice.

- November 6 -- Sharif-Emami Government replaced by military-led Azhari Government. Embassy issues two advisories, telling Americans to stay home that day; informing them they can plan on resuming important work next day.
- November 7 -- Reports that Americans becoming increasingly nervous and significant outflow has started.
- November 13 -- Embassy asks that safehaven posts be designated for possible evacuation of Americans.
- November 16 -- Embassy issues travel advisory recommending tourists should not plan travel within Iran and should only transit Tehran.
- November 20 -- Embassy sets up information and rumor control center.
- November 27 -- Report indicates violence against Americans has increased; foreign communities becoming edgy, particularly about huge demonstrations expected during December 10-11 holy days.
- December 6 -- Voluntary temporary departure authorized for official military and civilian dependents.
- December 9 -- 1,300 official dependents have departed (1,100 military, 200 civilian). American companies say 40% of their dependents have left.
- December 10 -- Tehran airport closed again for three days. Violence is avoided at last moment when demonstrations permitted and troops pulled back.
- December 23 -- First American fatality: oil company executive Paul Grimm assassinated by terrorists in southern Iran.
- December 24 -- Exodus of foreign oil workers starts. By January 4, 1979, over 1,300 had left area. Embassy attacked by youthful mob of 200-500 who throw stones and burning rubbish and set fire to an Embassy car.

- December 27 -- Air traffic controllers go on strike; no Pan Am flights for several days. Demonstrations around country take on more anti-American tone. Embassy issues advisory saying Americans should limit their movement and stay north of specified street in Tehran.
 - December 28 -- Oil production ceases.
 - December 31 -- Embassy moves to Phase One of Emergency Evacuation Plan recommending that dependents of the official and private American communities temporarily depart Iran.
- 1979
- January 3 -- AMERICANS IN IRAN: 20,107 (est.)
 - January 4 -- Some Americans leave north Iran on Canadian airlift.
 - January 5 -- Azhari resigns; Bakhtiar appointed Prime Minister.
 - January 9 -- Large number of Americans have departed Iran since January 2 on Pan Am flights. Airport closed by snow January 10-11, but subsequently exodus continues until January 23.
 - January 15 -- Second American fatality: mining company employee Berkowitz assassinated by unknown assailants in Kerman.
 - January 16 -- Shah departs Iran.

Embassy advises Americans to stay home January 19 (religious day; airport closed).
 - January 19 -- AMERICANS IN IRAN: 12,824
 - January 24 -- Airport closed to prevent return of Khomeini. Up to January 30, when airport again opened, U.S. military flights take out several hundred Americans from Tehran; company arranged charters take out many from Isfahan.

- January 30 -- Embassy moves to Phase Two of Emergency Evacuation Plan, orders all official dependents and non-essential personnel out, urges private Americans and companies to follow suit.
- February 3 -- AMERICANS IN IRAN: 8,847
- February 3 -- Pan Am halts flights until further notice owing to unsafe traffic control situation; by February 10, more than 3,000 Americans were provided seats on U.S. military MAC flights from Tehran to Europe. Airport was completely closed between February 11 and 16.
- February 9 -- Fighting breaks out at Doshen Tappeh Air Base in Tehran between pro-Khomeini Air Force personnel and other military units.
- February 10 -- Fighting continues and spreads; attacks on police stations and other military installations. Embassy advises all Americans to stay home. Snipers fire at Embassy.
- February 10 -- Third American fatality: newsman Joe Alex Morris, Jr., is caught in crossfire while covering battle.
- February 11 -- Military high command orders troops back to barracks, withdrawing support from Bakhtiar. Security forces protecting Embassy leave. Khomeini appoints Bazargan as new Prime Minister. Military units disintegrate, large numbers of arms passed out indiscriminately to civilians. Law and order ceases to exist.
- February 13 -- Embassy is told that it must remove flag or be attacked. Threat one of a continuing series.
- February 14 -- Embassy is attacked and captured by over 100 armed leftist guerrillas. Khomeini guerrillas come to rescue. All Americans, except Sgt. Kraus, released next day. No Americans killed. (See more detailed attached account of attack.)

- February 15 -- Embassy announces Phase Three of Emergency Evacuation Plan, advising Americans to depart Iran because Embassy can no longer guarantee their safety. Evacuation procedures are explained.
- February 16 -- Between 400-500 Americans come to Embassy in preparation for evacuation flights.
- February 17 -- State Department-chartered evacuation flights commence. By February 22 about 3,600 Americans have been flown out. A few hundred leave Iran by ship from southern ports, assisted by U.S. naval vessels.
- February 22 -- Sgt. Kraus released to Embassy after massive USG effort to secure his release; departs for U.S.
- February 28 -- AMERICANS IN IRAN: 3,300
(of the 3,300 remaining American citizens, about 2,200 are American spouses of Iranians and/or children of Iranians born in the U.S.)
- March -- Official U.S. presence is further reduced to about 60.

CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACK ON AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN, February 14, 1979

(All times Tehran Standard Time, EST in parentheses)

- 1000 (apprx)
(0130) Firing from snipers on compound commences. Marine Security Guards go to their posts and security officers, including Military Attache, stand by walkie-talkie radios to monitor events.
- 1030 (apprx)
(0200) First unidentified armed men perceived on the compound near southeast (Roosevelt) gate and proceeding north toward Ambassador's residence rather than Chancery.
- 1045
(0215) Attack mounts. They take Ambassador's residence where only a few servants are present; other guerrillas enter compound from several other directions and seize outlying buildings with some American personnel within. Iranian employee in Embassy restaurant shot and killed, another wounded. Marine Security Guards are instructed by the Ambassador to release tear gas as needed but withhold aimed fire. Some fire from shotguns containing buckshot is directed at the attackers to slow them down, but the Marines surrender at the Ambassador's direction over walkie-talkie radio network as the attackers approach their positions.
- (0200) The State Department Operations Center was informed by the White House Situation Room of a request from Embassy Tehran that all telegraphic

- traffic be halted because armed people had entered the Embassy Compound. Secretary Vance, Deputy Secretary Christopher, Undersecretaries Read and Newsom, Assistant Secretary Saunders and Iran Working Group Director Precht were alerted. They leave for the Operations Center.
- 1053 (apprx)
(0223) Embassy personnel in Chancery begin to receive reports that Chancery is under attack directly and some attackers may have entered the building. For approximately next half hour reports continue of entry by attackers into building and progress through basement and first floor despite heavy tear gas released there. The Iran Working Group was informed of this through its telephone line with the Embassy. Before the phones were cut, the Political Counselor had indicated that the Iranian Prime Minister's office had promised help to the Embassy.
- 1100 (apprx)
(0230) First reports of other groups of men on outside of Embassy compound apparently shooting at the attackers and seeking entry. Word is flashed to Embassy employees who are all in communications area that help has arrived. This is dampened by realization that the attackers are between the employees and the relief.

- 1115 (apprx) Attackers breach defenses of Chancery second
(0245) floor and heed shouts in Persian language by Iranian employee, who is with the Americans in the communications vault area, that the Americans will surrender. Armed attacker appears at the open vault door and orders everyone out with hands up. Destruction of cryptographic equipment has already taken place.
- (0249) CIA reported to the Department that it believed the attackers had reached the Embassy Communications Section.
- 1120 (apprx) Some 50 Americans and one Iranian employee are
(0250) brought into Ambassador's outer office and made to stand with hands up in ranks facing one of the walls. About 10 armed men guard them, some acting nervous and making threatening noises. However, one of the attacking group tells the Americans in English that they do not intend to harm them or steal from them; their quarrel is with the American Government. While Americans are searched for possible hidden weapons, others in the attacking force ransack through all Chancery offices. Only a few valuables disappear, and the safes containing classified materials are not tampered with.

- 1130 (apprx) Captors are shouting to others outside in Persian.
(0300) A bullet from outside comes through the window of the room in which Americans are being held, and all drop to the floor. One of the captors shouts excitedly, "Who has the gun? Who has the gun?" His finger is on the trigger of the automatic weapon but he is calmed down by shouts of the Americans that the bullet came from outside and confirming information from his fellow attackers.
- 1140 (apprx) Captors are quietly replaced by other armed men.
(0310) One of them announces in English that the Iranian Government deeply regrets this incident and assures the Americans they are safe. He asks them to march with their hands up down through the basement to the main entrance courtyard of the compound. They are searched for weapons many times, but otherwise the new arrivals are friendly.
- 1150 (apprx) Americans are asked to stand in one corner of
(0320) entrance compound (no need for hands up) while Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs Yazdi addresses the various armed men standing around over a megaphone. After about 20 minutes of this, and two false starts, during which the Americans are asked to proceed elsewhere in the compound but called back, many of the armed men begin to leave the compound. Yazdi forces (from Khomeini Hdq.) form two protecting ranks in front of the Americans as the others leave. Yazdi has already asked the Ambassador where he should take the Americans, and the Ambassador's residence is

chosen as the destination. American and other media representatives have arrived, but Yazdi tries to permit no pictures.

(0330) With all communications with Embassy Tehran cut, the State Department awakened British, French, German, Swedish, and Iranian diplomats in Washington, requesting that they urgently contact their missions in Tehran for news about the fate of our Embassy. Non-official persons known to have channels of communication with the new Iranian authorities were also called for their help. Ham radio operators were enlisted in trying to communicate with Tehran. An attempt was made to set up a telex link with Tehran through one of the American wire services and Pan Am -- without success.

As all of this was going on, our Embassy in Kuwait called to say that they were in radio contact with Embassy Tehran on the Emergency and Evacuation radio network. Kuwait reported that Embassy Tehran personnel had locked themselves into the communications vault. The Department thereafter maintained an open international telephone line with our Embassy in Kuwait, and this, with Kuwait's limited but vital radio contact with Embassy Tehran and our Consulates in Iran, became one of the Department's principal communication links to the confused scene in Iran. The Consulates at times were only able to maintain contact with each other via Embassy Kuwait.

(0500) The Pentagon passed word to the Department that the US Military Advisory Group Team in Kermanshah had informed them that pro-Khomeini forces had retaken the Embassy. They had no word on the fate of the Americans at the Embassy, however.

(0505) The President telephoned the Operations Center for the latest news on Iran. He was briefed and then spoke with Secretary Vance.

(0630) It was announced that a National Security Council meeting would be held at 0900.

(0700) Three reports were received from and through the British and Swedish missions in Tehran and the American Deputy Political Counselor in Tehran -- who had been out of the Embassy when it was attacked. The reports indicated that all Americans at the Embassy had been released, after having been taken prisoner, that calm had been restored on the Embassy compound, and that one Marine Security Guard had been wounded, one Iranian Embassy employee killed, and another wounded, before the pro-Khomeini forces came to the rescue of the Embassy. It was not until 24 hours later that Embassy Tehran itself was able to confirm this through a cable of its own. Until that time, communications were maintained telegraphically and by telephone with the British and Swedish Ambassadors in Tehran.

Mr. NEWSOM. Our basic plans counted on charter aircraft as our first line. On MAC aircraft, where charter aircraft could not operate, there were days, as our chronology will show, when Pan Am or no civil airlines would go in because of the chaotic conditions at the airport, when we took MAC in. The preference was for the chartered, civilian aircraft.

Mr. FASCELL. Did you actually have some military aircraft? You say some actually landed at the airport.

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes. We were using MAC as well as the chartered aircraft.

Mr. FASCELL. How about other aircraft? You had helicopters standing by somewhere.

Mr. NEWSOM. We had helicopters standing by in Turkey.

Mr. FASCELL. Where in Turkey?

Mr. NEWSOM. In Ancirlik.

Mr. FASCELL. How many?

Mr. NEWSOM. Six.

Mr. FASCELL. What kind were they?

Mr. NEWSOM. These were the HH-53's. They carry 50 to 60 people.

Mr. FASCELL. Those are military helicopters?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. How far away is that air base in Turkey from where they would have to be used in Iran?

Mr. NEWSOM. It was about 10 hours flying, 10 flying hours, I think.

Mr. FASCELL. If the helicopter left the base in Turkey and went to Tehran, where would he go after he left Tehran?

Mr. NEWSOM. We were going to use those only if they could be used in a cooperative environment. You see, up to the point of the fall of the Bakhtiar government and the collapse of the military, we were using Iranian helicopters for evacuation purposes.

For example, on the night that there was a fight between the air force people and the army at the air base in Tehran, there were 70 Americans there that night. The Iranian military group provided helicopters to lift them out.

Our helicopters were pre-positioned in the event that circumstances with the Iranian helicopters were not available and circumstances permit our using these in a nonhostile environment, admittedly not terribly likely—

Mr. FASCELL. I understand, but would that particular helicopter fly from Turkey to Tehran?

Mr. NEWSOM. It was accompanied by a C-130 which would refuel in midair.

Mr. FASCELL. They would have to refuel it in air?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. When it took off from Tehran, where would it go?

Mr. NEWSOM. It would have been used only for shuttling from points in Iran or in Isfahan to an airport where people would be picked up by a transport aircraft.

Mr. FASCELL. I see.

Was the pre-positioning of those aircraft made known in a public statement?

Mr. NEWSOM. It was not intended that way, but it came out in public.

Mr. FASCELL. How about additional U.S. military personnel? Were they pre-positioned somewhere?

Mr. NEWSOM. We did not alert any major military units because once you move into that phase, you are moving into quite a different situation here. If we would have to go in and take Americans out by major armed action in a country on the borders of the Soviet Union, you are talking about a different ballgame.

Mr. FASCELL. What you are saying is that we never considered that?

Mr. NEWSOM. We never considered it. We never placed anybody on an alert for that contingency.

Mr. FASCELL. Did we pre-position some U.S. military forces somewhere?

Mr. NEWSOM. No, only the 69 marines.

Mr. FASCELL. Only the 69 marines. Where were they?

Mr. NEWSOM. They were moved from Camp Lejeune to Lajes in the Azores. The intention had been to move them on to Turkey but the situation changed; once you had the chaotic conditions on the 13th and 14th—and once there had been publicity about their movement—the chances of their getting in there became very remote.

Mr. FASCELL. Getting in where? Turkey?

Mr. NEWSOM. Tehran.

Mr. FASCELL. The United States did not publish the fact that they were moving 69 marines from Camp Lejeune to the Azores.

Mr. NEWSOM. It came out in the press.

Mr. FASCELL. It came out in the press? Was that while they were on their way, before they left, or after they got to the Azores?

Mr. NEWSOM. Within 2 hours, or almost, of the order to send them, the press had it here in Washington.

Mr. BOWEN. I was going to ask this: Was this a White House press decision or a military press decision? Who made the decision to have TV cameras come in and film these guys going across the Atlantic?

Mr. NEWSOM. I did not know that happened. We wanted to move them very carefully.

Mr. BOWEN. Who is we?

Mr. NEWSOM. The State Department.

Mr. BOWEN. Somebody else decided obviously they did not want to move them very quietly.

Mr. NEWSOM. They did not actually take off until the fact that they were going to move had already leaked, so probably the public relations people of the Marine Corps.

Mr. FASCELL. Was a request ever made of the Turkish Government to allow the Marines to be repositioned on Turkish soil?

Mr. NEWSOM. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Did they agree to it?

Mr. NEWSOM. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. When the request was made to the Turkish Government, was that before the Marines took off or while they were in the air?

Mr. NEWSOM. Before the Marines took off. They were not to take off until they had clearance to land somewhere.

Mr. FASCELL. Obviously.

Did we make any request of any other governments in the area?

Mr. NEWSOM. Portugal.

Mr. FASCELL. And?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is where they are, in Lajes.

Mr. FASCELL. No other countries around Iran?

Mr. NEWSOM. No. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. How about naval vessels?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had in the area two ships permanently assigned to the Middle East force command and three other ships that were in the Indian Ocean on the normal rotation of ships from the 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean, and they were all in the vicinity of the mouth of the Persian Gulf and one of them, the U.S.S. *LaSalle* was used in the evacuation of people out of Bandar Abbas.

Mr. FASCELL. The naval?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. What kind of vessel is the *LaSalle*?

Mr. NEWSOM. It is a large amphibious command ship.

Mr. FASCELL. Large amphibious command ship?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. What were the other four vessels and where were they?

Mr. NEWSOM. Two destroyers and I think the other two were cruisers.

Mr. FASCELL. They were not to be used for evacuation purposes?

Mr. NEWSOM. They could be, if necessary.

Mr. FASCELL. Was that a part of the plan?

Mr. NEWSOM. They were there as a part of our normal naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. FASCELL. Those ships were transferred by order, moved by order, is that correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. They were not. The *LaSalle* was brought into the evacuation planning.

Mr. FASCELL. The other ships were moved by order, were they not? By command?

Mr. NEWSOM. You mean moved particularly because of the situation in Iran?

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know why they were moved. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. NEWSOM. No. We rotate ships into the Indian Ocean.

Mr. FASCELL. Those ships stay in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the significance of that?

Mr. NEWSOM. In order to maintain a U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. FASCELL. That, I understand. What does that have to do with Iran?

Mr. NEWSOM. The only relationship to Iran is the fact that one of these ships was used to evacuate the people out of Bandar Abbas.

Mr. FASCELL. That is four of the ships. What is the other one?

Mr. PRECHT. There was an oil support ship.

Mr. FASCELL. Where was she?

Mr. NEWSOM. She was near the Persian Gulf.

Mr. FASCELL. What was she doing?

Mr. NEWSOM. She was standing by to fuel the ships.

Mr. FASCELL. That might come in? I do not understand.

Mr. NEWSOM. Sir, we had three ships of the 7th Fleet—

Mr. FASCELL. In the Indian Ocean.

Mr. NEWSOM. In the Indian Ocean.

Mr. FASCELL. Were they under orders to come to the Persian Gulf for any reason at any time?

Mr. NEWSOM. They stayed off the mouth of the Persian Gulf somewhere between the Persian Gulf and Diego Garcia.

Mr. FASCELL. What was their purpose? To fly the flag?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right. We have naval units in the Indian Ocean almost continuously.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that.

Now, they were positioned at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It took an order to put them there, did it not?

Mr. NEWSOM. They were somewhere between the mouth of the Persian Gulf and Diego Garcia.

Mr. FASCELL. What orders that you know about were given the commanders of those vessels? To do what and for what reason? I do not understand it yet.

Mr. NEWSOM. To the best of my knowledge, those ships were told to stay in the general vicinity of the area between the Persian Gulf and Diego Garcia.

Mr. FASCELL. The State Department knew about that, did they not?

Mr. NEWSOM. We knew the ships were there; yes.

Mr. FASCELL. You had to agree with the positioning of the vessel, did you not? At least you were aware of it?

Mr. NEWSOM. We were aware of it; yes.

Mr. FASCELL. The reason for that?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had no objections to it.

Mr. FASCELL. That order was a published order, made public?

Mr. NEWSOM. I do not think the order was made public.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know how I found out about it, so it must have been public. Certainly nobody briefed me.

Mr. NEWSOM. It certainly was no secret that these ships were in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. FASCELL. There was no secret that the oil was there and the oil was to provide fuel for the vessels that might be called in for whatever reason: right?

Mr. NEWSOM. I am not quite sure.

Mr. FASCELL. I am trying to find out what part the State Department has in the whole question of policy, if any.

Mr. NEWSOM. Our part in determining naval—

Mr. FASCELL. That is not naval, Mr. Secretary, for goodness sake.

Mr. NEWSOM. Let me put it this way, Mr. Chairman. Any unusual movements of the naval vessels are discussed with the State Department before their order.

Mr. FASCELL. I would sure hope so.

Mr. NEWSOM. That has been the case throughout this crisis.

Mr. FASCELL. You have no objection to the movement of these particular vessels?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had no objection.

Mr. FASCELL. The order was being made public for a political purpose, international politics. This was not another *Mayaguez*?

Mr. NEWSOM. No. It is not secret that we continually rotate ships in and out of the Indian Ocean and we will be taking these three out and bringing others in.

Mr. FASCELL. The policy decision was to take the best of both worlds, which was to downplay it, saying the ships are there, so do not attach any particular importance to it; on the other hand, we are moving them to the mouth of the Persian Gulf, so don't get too nasty.

Mr. NEWSOM. That is one way.

Mr. FASCELL. We were trying to deliver a message and only indirectly related to the evacuation problem, although one vessel did actually evacuate American military from the naval base.

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. It is all a part of the political process.

Mr. NEWSOM. It evacuated Americans as well as other nationalities from that area.

Mr. FASCELL. During the time that we were closed down in Tehran, we had communications capability with some of our friends. Who were they?

Mr. NEWSOM. The British, the Swedish, mainly because their Embassies were near to ours. We could also have used, I am sure, the French and the German, but their Embassies were more distant from ours.

Mr. FASCELL. We had plenty of help from our friends?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. How does that actually work in the chaotic conditions, the way our Embassy was there for a few days? Did we actually send a man through the streets?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had to send a man through the streets, or they sent a man through the streets with messages. We kept the messages, as you can understand, down both in number and size.

Mr. FASCELL. It had to be a real emergency?

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. How extensively did we use the British capability?

Mr. NEWSOM. I would say perhaps in the 4 or 5 days that we were totally shut down, we may have sent 10 messages to the British.

Mr. FASCELL. Has the Department assessed whether or not there has been any long-term damage, as a result, to the access of classified material or equipment?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have not finished that assessment. There was some classified correspondence of confidential and below in the ICA building when it was taken over and I do not have a reading of what may have happened on the military side.

Mr. FASCELL. Was the leak of information on the movements of marines and the movement of vessels an accident or a deliberate decision?

Mr. NEWSOM. It was not a deliberate decision on our part or the part of the Pentagon as far as I know, because we had an understanding that we would not release the information. We would only answer questions if someone else posed them.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you suppose it was a political decision at the White House?

Mr. NEWSOM. I do not think so, sir, no.

I think what happened in these cases was that John Doe calls up his mother and says I have just been ordered to go someplace in the Middle East. She tells—

Mr. FASCELL. The military must have changed since I was in it. Anybody on a move would not be anywhere near a telephone.

Mr. NEWSOM. That has been one of the discouraging aspects of managing this crisis is that we cannot seem to do anything other than in a fishbowl.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe that is the way we ought to do it.

Mr. NEWSOM. That is the way we are doing it.

Mr. FASCELL. Your enemy cannot afford to believe it. It may drive him to distraction.

What did it take to get Sergeant Kraus released?

Mr. NEWSOM. It did not take anything in the way of money. It just took persistence and persuasion and here we used not only the connections that we had with the Khomeini group, we also enlisted the help of people in this country who had friends in the Khomeini group who telephoned friends in Tehran to press how important it was that if there were to be good relations with the United States that Sergeant Kraus get out.

Mr. FASCELL. As I understand it, Ambassador Sullivan is talking with the Foreign Minister?

Mr. NEWSOM. And the Prime Minister.

Mr. FASCELL. The Prime Minister of the Khomeini government. Did he initiate those conversations?

Mr. NEWSOM. He initiated the conversations under our instructions with both Bazargan and the Foreign Minister after they came into office and we decided to do business with that government.

Mr. FASCELL. What is your assessment with respect to signals that have come out of that government so far? I certainly take it as an affirmative position on their part that they will be willing to talk to the U.S. Ambassador, and that they cooperate with the evacuation.

Mr. NEWSOM. That is right. All of our contacts with the people at the top have been very friendly and somewhat encouraging. The difficulty is, I think, that they still have a way to go in dealing with their many problems.

Mr. FASCELL. Are they in power now? Is the Khomeini government still in power now? They still have real problems of opposition from these armed gangs and from some of the groups. How about the Shah's forces in Tabriz? Is that fight over?

Mr. NEWSOM. That fight is over and Tabriz seems to be in the hands of either Khomeini or the leftists, but not the Shah.

Mr. FASCELL. Nobody knows for sure?

Mr. NEWSOM. I do not think we know for sure.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any evidence of Soviet direction or involvement in the attack on the U.S. Embassy?

Mr. NEWSOM. No.

Mr. FASCELL. What is our assessment with respect to the Soviet influence and direction in the present conditions in Iran?

Mr. NEWSOM. We do not have any real, hard evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the political struggle going on in Tehran. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We have a lot more questions but we have to get over and answer a series of rollcalls and you have to get back to the State Department.

I would like to conclude with Afghanistan. I would like to come back and do that, at least get into that. We have so many more questions on Iran.

Mr. BUCHANAN. We are going to have a long series of votes.

Mr. NEWSOM. I will offer up Ambassador Quainton.

Mr. FASCELL. Why do we not plan—maybe we should give it up as a bad job now.

Mr. NEWSOM. Would you like to submit your remaining questions?

Mr. FASCELL. Whatever questions we have, we can do that. I guess we had better plan on trying to get back another time.

Mr. QUAINTON. I am available whenever it is convenient for you.

Mr. FASCELL. All right.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]

SECURITY PROCEDURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES

The Circumstances Surrounding the Killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Hon. Adolph Dubs

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1979

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AND ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The Subcommittee on International Operations and the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs meet jointly today to examine the circumstances surrounding the killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, the Honorable Adolph (Spike) Dubs on February 14 of this year.

I understand that Mrs. Dubs was in the United States at the time of the death of her husband. I would like to take this opportunity to express our condolences to Mrs. Dubs on behalf of the committee. Her husband was one of this country's most accomplished diplomats. His counsel and skills are a tremendous loss to this country.

Our witness is Hon. Anthony Quainton, Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism, Department of State. Ambassador Quainton is accompanied by Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer, and James W. Lannon, Office of Security.

With us today is the chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Hon. Lester L. Wolf. Both our subcommittees, of course, are interested in this entire matter.

Mr. Ambassador, I understand you have a prepared statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY QUAINTON, DIRECTOR FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador QUAINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Wolf, members of the committee.

Mr. FASCELL. Will you pull the mike closer to you?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you to review the tragic events in Afghanistan in which Ambassador Dubs lost his life. My Foreign Serv-

ice colleagues and I are extremely grateful for the strong support and continuing concern of the Congress for the well-being and safety of official American personnel abroad, as well as, indeed, of all Americans.

Unfortunately, in 1978 there was no reduction in the international terrorist threat. Americans, both official and private, were its victims. Our facilities and installations continue to be attacked. Events in Tehran and Kabul, and the recent murder of an American serviceman in Izmir and the wounding of another, have reminded us of the tragic fact that America and its representatives abroad are symbolically the most visible targets for those who use violence and terror to achieve their aims.

"Spike" Dubs is the latest casualty of the Foreign Service in a series of terrorist incidents going back for more than a decade, which have already taken the lives of five U.S. Ambassadors.

Over the last year we have worked to enhance our preventive and protective measures. We have taken important steps to upgrade our contingency plans and our crisis management capability, and to build an international consensus against terrorism.

During the past 7 months, our crisis management structures have been utilized in a number of instances: In the seizures of the Chilean consulate in San Juan and the West German consulate general in Chicago; in the TWA hijacking to Geneva and the LOT hijacking to West Berlin; and most recently in the kidnaping of Ambassador Dubs. While we have improved our capabilities to deal with such situations, no crisis management structure can guarantee the successful resolution of a terrorist incident, particularly overseas where our influence may be limited and where communications are less than perfect. These limitations were all too evident in the Kabul incident.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department of State is the lead agency in dealing with foreign terrorist incidents involving Americans or American interests. Less than 1 hour after being alerted by our Operations Center of Ambassador Dubs' kidnaping, the Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, under my direction, had organized its working group which functioned as the central coordination point and crisis center throughout the course of the incident. We were in direct contact by telephone and telegraph with our Embassy and with the various Government agencies whose resources were or might have been needed.

In the immediate aftermath of "Spike" Dubs death, the Department began a thorough investigation into the circumstances of the incident. That investigation is still going on. We have been examining our actions and procedures for lessons learned. We contacted all governments to establish, in advance, guidelines and understandings for handling hostage situations involving our officials. The responses have been positive, indicating widespread readiness to cooperate with us in the future. Further, we asked all our diplomatic and consular posts worldwide to conduct an immediate reassessment of protective security measures being provided to Chiefs of Mission and principal officers. Based on those responses, we are implementing increased security measures at certain posts.

In the specific case of Afghanistan, we have made clear to that Government our strong displeasure over their actions, which resulted in the death of Ambassador Dubs. Protests have been registered with

the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and Deputy Foreign Minister. On the day of Ambassador Dubs death, the Acting Secretary of State also protested to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin the role played by Soviet advisers at the Kabul Hotel, where Ambassador Dubs was being held. Subsequently, Ambassador Toon discussed the incident with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow.

Finally, as a result of our ongoing review of our relations with Afghanistan, and taking into account the circumstances surrounding Ambassador Dubs death, the President has decided to reduce severely our economic assistance program and to terminate our military training program in that country. We have also carefully reviewed our other activities in Afghanistan to insure they are consistent with the current state of our relationship and our security concerns.

I will be pleased to answer any questions which you, Mr. Chairman, or members of the committee may have about any of these matters. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Before we turn to questions, would you briefly describe the circumstances of the Ambassador's killing?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes, sir. On the morning of February 14, as the Ambassador was going to the Embassy from his residence, at about 8:45 in the morning—

Mr. FASCELL. At what time?

Ambassador QUAINTON. At 8:45 in the morning, the Ambassador's car was stopped to acknowledge the command of what appeared to be an ordinary Afghan policeman. Four armed men entered the Ambassador's car and ordered the chauffeur at gunpoint to drive them to the Kabul Hotel in downtown Kabul.

The terrorists proceeded with the Ambassador to a room in the hotel. Embassy officials and Afghan police went quickly to the scene.

Over the next 4 hours, before the assault on the room where Ambassador Dubs was being held, we had intense consultations, meetings with the Afghan Government in which we stressed to the police officials with which we were in touch, and other officials of the Foreign Ministry our strong view that no action should be taken which could jeopardize the Ambassador's life. As you know, Mr. Chairman, that advice was not heeded and the Afghan police moved to force entry to the room where Ambassador Dubs was being held captive at about 12:50, just 4 hours after Ambassador Dubs was taken hostage.

In that assault an exchange of gunfire occurred, resulting in the fatal wounds to the Ambassador. We do not know with any certainty at this point who fired the shot that actually killed the Ambassador; that is part of the ongoing study which my colleagues in the Office of Security are carrying out. As I indicated in my testimony, we followed up on his death with a series of protests to the appropriate authorities.

Mr. FASCELL. Just as part of that description, do we know why the Ambassador was taken to the hotel?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have no information on that point of which I am aware.

Mr. FASCELL. It does strike you as curious, does it?

Ambassador QUAINTON. It is indeed curious that they should have chosen a central place in downtown Kabul. I should say that, although

we have no confirmed understanding of why that was, we have assumed that the purpose of taking him to a central place was so that negotiations could be carried out to meet certain demands which the terrorists may have had.

Mr. FASCELL. But we do not know if they even had any demands, do we?

Ambassador QUAINTON. All we know is what the Afghan Government had told us, which is that they demanded the release of an Afghan called Bahruddin Bahes. We have been told that they did demand his release in the course of that morning. We know very little about Bahes, and whether that was in fact their demand is not certain.

Mr. FASCELL. In your description of the circumstances did you say that other people were killed?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Who were the other people who were killed?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The other people that were killed were the terrorists who were holding Ambassador Dubs.

Mr. FASCELL. How many of them?

Ambassador QUAINTON. There were three who we believe were killed at the hotel. Four bodies were subsequently shown to us by the Afghan Government as having been the terrorists involved. Our people who were at the hotel at no time were aware of more than three people who were there. There is some discrepancy here which our investigation is pursuing.

Mr. FASCELL. Where were the U.S. people at the hotel at the time of the shooting?

Ambassador QUAINTON. They were at various places at the hotel. They were in the lobby in consultation with the Afghan officials and, at the time of the actual shooting they were, I believe, in the hall some distance away from the actual entrance to the room where Ambassador Dubs was.

Mr. FASCELL. Chairman Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

There are a number of circumstances that surround this situation that deeply trouble us, Mr. Ambassador. This incident took place at approximately the same time as another incident was taking place in Iran. I am troubled whether sufficient attention was paid to this event compared to that which was paid to the event in Iran.

I have copies of the cables, transmission; they are inconsistent with some of the points that you have just made. For example, one of the terrorists was still alive when he was taken. He was on his feet.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct, sir, yes.

Mr. WOLFF. So, when the terrorists were originally taken there were two that possibly were alive; one was said to be dead, another was pretty badly bloodied and it was thought that he might be alive. The fourth one was still alive, that was the hooded terrorist, the one that they brought upstairs.

Now, if they were subsequently killed, have any representations been made to the Afghan Government relative to the opportunity of questioning the one who was alive at that time?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have not raised that specific issue as far as I am aware, Mr. Chairman. We have demanded on a number of occasions from the Afghan Government a full report of the circum-

stances, including the autopsy reports on those who were killed, and ballistics information, and so forth. We have not received adequate information from the Afghan Government on these points.

Mr. WOLFF. Is there any reason why you did not ask to interrogate the fourth man, or the people there did not ask to interrogate the fourth man while he was still alive?

Ambassador QUAINTON. My recollection is that very little time elapsed. He was taken away immediately and we were shown the bodies only a few hours later. Is that correct, Mr. Lorton?

**STATEMENT OF RONALD D. LORTON, COUNTRY OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. LORTON. I do not believe that the fourth man was ever seen at the hotel.

Mr. WOLFF. All right, suppose it was the third man.

Ambassador QUAINTON. There was a third man, Mr. Chairman, that was alive. Our people saw one dead, one very probably dead, and a third man who was taken away alive.

Mr. LORTON. That is right. By the time we were notified by the Afghan Government that we would be able to see the bodies of the terrorists, that was the first word we had of which terrorists were in their custody and what had happened to them. When we were advised of this, all four had been killed.

Mr. WOLFF. You are sure there was a positive identification made by our Embassy of the man that was supposedly killed as being the same man that was brought upstairs with the hood?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes, sir; that is our understanding.

Mr. WOLFF. During the period of time, I notice that you indicated the Embassy had been in touch with you right away, at 9:55 you were contacted; is that correct?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. WOLFF. Are there any communications that you have, records of conversations you had with the Embassy?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I did not have a conversation with the Embassy until some time later.

Mr. WOLFF. It says that the operations center alerted Ambassador Quainton, who took action to establish the working group, which was operational at 10:40.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Since we are dealing with the chronology at this point, without objection, we will include in the record the chronology of major events in the death of Ambassador Dubs.

Mr. WOLFF. I thank the Chairman.

[The document referred to follows:]

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR DUBS—KABUL,
AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 14, 1979

(All times Kabul standard; EST in parentheses.)

- 0845 (1115) Ambassador Dubs kidnapped; Embassy immediately contacted DRA Foreign and Interior Ministries.
- 0900- (1130-
0930 0000) Embassy officers arrive at hotel, followed shortly by police and first Soviet police advisor. Embassy officers immediately voiced their concern for Ambassador's safety. Afghans and Soviet advisor assured Embassy officers they shared that concern.
- 0950 (0020) On DCM's instruction, EmbOff reiterated to Afghan police at hotel strong concern for Ambassador's safety and requested that no precipitate action be taken and that Afghans wait for Embassy to receive Department guidance. Soviet and Afghan officials acknowledged but made no commitment.
- 0955 (0025) OpCenter alerted Amb. Quainton, who took action to establish Working Group which was operational at 1040 (0110).
- 1015 (0045)
(approximate) Soviet Embassy security officer arrived at hotel; assured EmbOff of strong Soviet interest in Ambassador's safety. Senior Afghan police official assured EmbOff that all precautions being taken to protect Dubs.
- 1040 (0110) Amb. Quainton arrived at OpCenter and took charge of Working Group operations.
- 1050 (0120) Quainton called DOD re movement of DAO aircraft from Islamabad, possible dispatch of anti-terrorist expert and other matters.
- 1055 (0125) Working Group undertook to inform Mrs. Dubs in Washington.

- 1115 (0145) Working Group sent cable endorsing Embassy's efforts to urge DRA avoid precipitate action and offer USG assistance.
- 1115 (0145)
(approximate) EmbOff and local national employee arrived at Ministry of Interior to see Police Commissioner Taroon; were kept waiting in outer office.
- 1120 (0150) Embassy officers observed Afghan police moving ladders against outside of hotel and arrival of Afghans with commando badges at hotel.
- 1125 (0155) EmbOff notified Embassy that police action against terrorists could be imminent. At Embassy's request, EmbOffs again urged police to be patient.
1137. (0207) Embassy reported Ambassador was seen at hotel window apparently unharmed.
- 1140 (0210) Afghan security official asked EmbOff to talk to Ambassador through door in German to ask about terrorist armament and tell him to go to bathroom in ten minutes and drop to floor. EmbOff demurred on latter point out of concern it might encourage police assault.
- 1140 (0210) DCM talked twice with Deputy Foreign Minister Dost and tried to phone Acting Prime Minister/ Foreign Minister Amin. EmbOff dispatched to palace to give DCM's message to Amin.
- 1156 (0226) Embassy reported Dost had assured EmbOff that DRA would do everything possible to secure Ambassador's safe release. Dost said Amin personally supervising developments; that DRA had received no demands yet, that Dubs was unharmed.

- 1200 (0230) Soviet Embassy officer revealed to EmbOff that kidnapers had set time deadlines; first one of which, "noontime", had already passed. He thought deadline had been extended to 1300. Firemen with picks and axes arrived at hotel. Photo of Ambassador was shown to all members of assault force.
- 1200 (0230) Direct phone line established with Kabul (poor connection). DCM's secretary reported that EmbOffs were at hotel communicating with Embassy by phone and radio.
- 1203 (0233) Embassy reported Police Commissioner's assurances DRA has no intentions of using force and that they would consult DCM before taking any action.
- 1207 (0237) It became clear to EmbOffs at hotel that assault being prepared. When informed, DCM urgently requested EmbOffs seek delay. EmbOffs reported to Embassy that they could not influence action on scene because assault force under orders from higher officials. EmbOff urged Soviet advisor to seek delay, but was told it was Afghan police matter.
- 1210 (0240) Embassy reported by direct line that DCM on phone to Deputy Foreign Minister Dost urging restraint. Working Group officer on direct line expressed Department's concurrence.
- 1215 (0245) Quanton advised on direct line Department's full concurrence with Embassy's efforts; suggested influential Ambassadors or religious leaders might appeal to GOA, and advised that message enroute from Secretary Vance.
- 1215 (0245) EmbOff phoned Embassy from Interior Ministry to say he was unable to see Police Commissioner
- 1217 (0247) At hotel, additional Afghan security officers took up positions near Room 117.

- 1230 (0300) DRA military officer in charge gave instructions to Police Commissioner's assistant who went upstairs. EmbOff passed message to Police Commissioner through secretary to do nothing to endanger Ambassador.
- 1230 (0300) EmbOff on direct line reported DRA planning assault. Bad phone connection resulted in delay before complete report understood that action was to be forced within 8 minutes. Working Group reiterated instructions that DRA be urged not to take any action which might harm Dubs.
- 1235 (0305) Embassy/direct line reported that an EmbOff had been sent to find Amin to urge he stop assault.
- 1242 (0312) Embassy/direct line reported DRA had rejected terrorists' demands.
- 1245 (0315) EmbOff called Embassy from Interior Ministry and again was instructed to stress cautionary message since Embassy had information that DRA planned to assault in 2 minutes. EmbOff passed message to Police Commissioner through secretary. Clear to EmbOffs at hotel in corridor outside Room 117 that police had received orders to assault. Police took up assault positions. Non-participants were required to take positions of safety.
- 12~~4~~²5 (0315) Embassy/direct line reported EmbOff was told Amin was unavailable to see him.
- 1247 (0317) Working Group officer read to EmbOff on direct line the Secretary's instruction that DCM convey to highest levels of DRA the Secretary's

- 1247 (0317) personal request that nothing be done to
(cont'd) jeopardize Dubs' safety.
- 1250 (0320) Working Group phoned DIA that an assault on
the hotel room was anticipated in 2 minutes.
- 1250 (0320) Embassy officers at hotel heard heavy gunfire
in corridor, in the room and from across the
street; single shot and automatic weapons
fire were heard with initial burst lasting
40 seconds. Soviet advisors used hand
signals to cut off sniper fire. Three
more bursts were heard inside room,
then silence.
- 1254 (0324) Embassy/direct line reported that police had
attacked room and that Dubs was wounded.
Consecutive reports indicated the Ambassador
was badly wounded and being tended by
Regional Medical Officer. Finally, at
1256 (0325) Embassy/direct line relayed
radio report from EmbOff that Ambassador
was dead.
- 1255 (0325) EmbOff reported to Embassy from Interior
Ministry that Soviet civilian had emerged
from Police Commissioner's office and left
building with him.
- 1255 (0325) Within minutes after the shootout at the
Kabul Hotel, DCM protested by telephone to
Deputy Foreign Minister Dost noting that
the police action had been taken in total
disregard of our repeated requests not to
use force and recalling Secretary's personal
appeal that no force be used.

- 1304 (0334) Working Group instructed Embassy to take
all necessary precautions for safety of
American personnel and Amcits.
- 1320 (0350) Working Group phoned JCS to ask for review
of positions of available aircraft and
possibilities for evacuation of Ambassa-
dor Dubs' remains.
- 1600 (0630) Working Group officer briefed Ambassador Barnes
on incident.
- 1700 (0730) Kabul Radio announced kidnapping and death
of Ambassador Dubs and reported President Tarak
and Foreign Minister Amin had expressed "deep
regrets" and had sent condolence telegrams
to President Carter and Secretary Vance.
- 1725 (0775) Working Group officer briefed Under
Secretary Newsom's office on events.
- 1731 (0801) All posts ordered to lower flags to half
mast until interment.
- 2000 (1030) Embassy officers are taken to Military
Hospital to view four bodies of men which
DRA claims were involved in the kidnapping.
- MORNING Secretary issues statement on incident.
- MORNING President issues statement on incident.
- 2104 (1134) Embassy reminded that DRA should be aware
of our expectation that they have taken all
necessary steps to protect American lives and
asked to advise on a continuing basis of any
threats to officials or private Americans.
- 2330 (1400) Department instructed all diplomatic and
consular posts to review security posture
in light of events in Tehran and Kabul.

February 15

- 0520 (1950)
(2/14) Department Spokesman announced Soviet Ambassador called in by Acting Secretary to receive protest regarding role of Soviet advisors in action by Afghan police. Acting Secretary requested full report.
- 2000 (1030) Special Mission Aircraft departed Andrews AFB for Kabul. Aboard were Ambassador Dubs' widow and brother, two family friends, and an official delegation headed by Ambassador Barnes, Director General of the Foreign Service.
- 2000 (1030) US Ambassador to Moscow Toon reported conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko regarding Soviet role.

February 16

- 1200 (0230) Regional Security Officer arrived from Karachi and subsequently met with Charge and senior staff members for briefing on incident and submitted report on security situation to Department.
- 1200 (0230) Deputy Foreign Minister Dost called on Charge to express condolences and deliver wreath from Foreign Ministry.
- 1800 (0830) Memorial service held at Residence. A middle-level Foreign Ministry official attended. Soviet Ambassador was also present.

February 17

- 0300 (1830)
(2/16) Soviet Ambassador delivered reply to Acting Secretary's protest. Reply denied any Soviet officials responsible for decisions about handling of the terrorists. Acting Secretary replied that US information came from eye-witness accounts.

February 17

- A.M. Charge and Country Director called on Deputy Foreign Minister Dost to deliver protest note from Acting Secretary to Foreign Minister Amin. Amin was unable to give Charge an appointment until February 19. Charge informed Dost we would be following up with formal written request for a full DRA report of the incident. Dost denied Soviet participation in incident and offered to do his best to provide a detailed and full report.
- 0820 (0320) Special plane carrying Ambassador Dubs' body departed. Minister of Culture and Information Bareq Shafiee, and two Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Dost and Mokamel) attended. Soviet Ambassador attended.

February 18

- 1110 (0140) Embassy confirmed dispatch of note to Foreign Ministry asking for full DRA report on incident
- 2145 (1215) Special Mission plane carrying Ambassador Dubs body arrived at Andrews.

February 19

- 1100 (0130) Charge and Country Director called on Foreign Minister Amin and reaffirmed USG concern over DRA's handling of the incident. Charge informed Amin US is reviewing its relations with Afghanistan. Amin claimed DRA action was taken to "rescue" the Ambassador, denied consultations had taken place with Soviet advisors, and hoped incident would not affect US-Afghan relations.
- 1430 (0500) Embassy officers met with Police Commissioner Taroon.

February 19

P.M.

Foreign Minister Amin held press conference. He said US protest is groundless and Afghan intention had been to secure release of Ambassador Dubs. Amin claimed identities of terrorists involved were not known but said the person whose release was demanded was an "extreme leftist adventurer". Amin also said Soviets present at the Kabul Hotel during the incident were not there to give advice.

February 20

1930 (1000)

Funeral service for Ambassador Dubs held at Fort Myer Memorial Chapel, Fort Myer, Virginia. Private interment at Arlington National Cemetery followed.

February 21

Charge called on Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, who denied that any Soviet specialist took part in the Afghan operation.

February 22

2127 (1157)

Afghan Charge informed by NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary of President's decision to reduce economic assistance and terminate military training program as part of USG ongoing review of relations with Afghanistan.

Clearances:
NEA/PAB:R Lorton
EUR/SOV:S Byrnes

M/CT -- 3/5/79

Mr. WOLFF. The information that is given to us here is unclassified and states that the operations center alerted you at 9:55.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is right.

Mr. WOLFF. And you established a working group at 10:40. What I am getting at is, were there any MemComs at all that are a record of the conversations that took place between your working group and the Embassy?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, if I may, what transpired in the operations center where we were, and how we handled the communications in this particular crisis.

I was alerted, as the chronology says, at 25 minutes after midnight. I was at home, asleep. I immediately came in and assembled a team of people. I was not at the operations center at that time. We assembled about half an hour to 45 minutes later, the group of people who worked with me—including Mr. Lorton, members of my own staff and others. We had at that time at our disposal some three or four rather short messages from our mission, including the fact that the Ambassador had been taken hostage; that our people were at the hotel; that the Embassy wanted our assistance in getting in the military attaché's aircraft from Islamabad with the regional psychiatrist. We felt and they felt, that he could potentially have been of assistance in any negotiating situation; he could have given advice about hostage negotiation.

We were not, for almost an hour after my arrival and the establishment of the team, in telephonic conversation with Kabul.

Mr. WOLFF. Excuse me for one moment. Was this at the concurrent period that the situation was taking place in Iran?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. WOLFF. Were you in any telephonic communication with Iran at that time?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I was preoccupied, to be quite honest, with the Afghanistan situation. We were operating in crisis centers very close one to the other—the Iranian task force being on one side of the operations center, the Afghan task force being on the other. I was vaguely aware of efforts to contact Tehran by telephone. I cannot honestly tell you—I can certainly find out—at what point telephonic communication was established.

Mr. WOLFF. Could you furnish for the record how many people were in the working group on Afghanistan?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Surely, sir.

I think the working group on Afghanistan was something on the order of eight people throughout most of those hours that we were there.

Mr. WOLFF. And Iran?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Ten individuals were directly participating in the Afghanistan Working Group. Three staff members of the Iran working group were present throughout the night. Senior officials of the Department, including the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management and the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, were closely involved during each incident. Both working groups were supported by the staff of the Department of State operations center.

Certainly, in the case of a terrorist incident of this kind, our immediate effort is to establish direct contact, continuous contact with the Embassy so that there is a continuous exchange of views. Even the very best telegraphic communications take time, as you will see from just looking at the chronology. When you have two crises at once, feeding messages into a system, a direct line is of vital importance in being able to deal with the situation.

We did not have a direct phone line, however, until about 2:30 that morning, although we were in the operations center shortly after 1. So, there was a period when we were relying on telegraphic communications.

Mr. WOLFF. During that time period, has your investigation indicated that any contact other than the local contact that was made with the Soviets, was made at any high level?

Ambassador QUAINTON. To the best of our knowledge, there were no other contacts during that period with the Soviets. We were only aware of the presence of a Soviet police adviser at the hotel.

Mr. WOLFF. As I understand it, the Soviet agents were not only advisers, but there was a Soviet agent in with Taroon, the police chief; am I correct in that?

Ambassador QUAINTON. A representative of the Soviet Embassy was seen coming out of Taroon's office. He was certainly there at some point. Whether he was there throughout the crisis we do not know. What we now know from a review of all the information is that there were four or five Soviet advisers at the Kabul Hotel, one of whom was the security officer at the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Bakhturin.

Mr. WOLFF. Am I not correct that the operation itself was fairly well directed by a Soviet adviser who, with his hand signals, indicated the methods that were to be used, and was actually in command of that operation?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct in substantial part, Mr. Chairman. My recollection—and my experts will correct me if I am wrong—is that these hand signals were to direct the placement of snipers outside the hotel, shooting toward it from across the street. The Soviets were also involved inside the hotel. I do not have evidence to suggest that they formally directed the assault into the room from within.

Mr. WOLFF. The investigation you are conducting at the present time, have our people, other than the notification of our protest to the Soviet Government—has the Soviet Government been cooperative with us, or have we requested cooperation in this investigation from the Soviet Government?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We, of course, have been in touch with the Soviet Government, both in the context of our protest and subsequently with the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul. I am not sure of the extent to which the Soviets have made contributions to the inquiry which the Office of Security has been carrying out.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES W. LANNON, OFFICE OF SECURITY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. LANNON. As of today the Soviets have made no contributions nor have they been specifically asked.

Mr. WOLFF. Is there a reason that they have not been asked, since they were part of the operation? I take it, at the high levels of government, that they would be cooperative. Is there any reason to believe that they would not be cooperative with us?

Mr. LORTON. Mr. Chairman, we did ask the Soviets to explain the role their advisers played in the operation. We were told that they did not play a role in the operation, that they were there to protect Soviet citizens in the hotel. We have been concentrating our efforts on trying to get additional information for the investigation from the Afghan Government, which has conducted their own investigation into the matter.

Mr. WOLFF. It seems to me that if we cannot monitor the operations of a few Soviet agents who are in Kabul, how are we going to be able to monitor something as vast as SALT?

Mr. Chairman, I would yield at that point and some time later I would like to ask some questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Goodling?

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Ambassador, you touched on it, but what, in your estimation, was the Soviet role in this whole incident?

Ambassador QUAINTON. As best I have been able to reconstruct what happened—and this is subject to refinement in the report on which we are currently working and on which we will be happy to brief the committee when it is completed—that the Soviets came very promptly to the Kabul Hotel. They included advisers to the Afghanistan police, who had a regular working relationship with the Afghan police, and the security officer at the Soviet Embassy who presumably had broader responsibilities for the security of Soviet citizens.

Throughout the period in which Ambassador Dubs was being held, these various Soviet officials, particularly the Soviet security officer, were in very close collaboration with the Afghan officials. There were repeated discussions to which we were not privy, in which we were in fact not allowed to participate, and which certainly would imply very close consultation between these two sets of police officials as to the steps which ought to be taken.

In the actual assault phase, as I mentioned, there was an element of Soviet direction. We do not have any evidence to suggest that the decision to assault the room was a decision of the Soviet Government. We assume that it was a decision of the Afghan Government in which, presumably, the Soviet advisers concurred. They gave technical advice on how to carry it out.

Mr. GOODLING. You also spoke of a fourth individual. Do we have any indication at all of how he may have died, or why he may have died; how he met his death?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not believe so.

Mr. LANNON. That is correct, we do not have any information.

Mr. GOODLING. But we do know he was alive after the assault?

Ambassador QUAINTON. As the chairman mentioned, in going into the room, one was found dead, one was probably dead and the third was taken away alive. As to the fourth figure, we are not sure of his identity. When we had an opportunity to view the bodies, shortly after the Afghan Government asked us to come in to show us the terrorists who were dead, our people recognized three of the four. The fourth we were not able to identify at all.

Mr. GOODLING. But the third figure, then, you did see being taken away alive?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. GOODLING. And how much later was he seen dead?

Mr. LORTON. It was approximately 5 or 5:30 that afternoon when the Embassy officers were allowed to view the bodies of the four terrorists. The Afghan Government has told us that all four were killed in the assault on the room.

Mr. GOODLING. But that is obviously not true.

Mr. LORTON. We have not been able to show that that is true.

Mr. GOODLING. Is our policy one, in dealing with terrorists, of not meeting any demand; or, if that is not our policy, do we have some kind of set policy?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have had a policy, and have one now in which we make quite clear that in the event of terrorist attacks we do not pay ransom and we do not make substantive concessions, such as the release of prisoners in American jails. This grows out of a conviction that for the U.S. Government to meet such demands would only be to invite further attacks on our employees abroad, wherever they might be stationed.

We look to a foreign government to carry out its responsibilities. We do, however, expect the very closest consultation with the U.S. Government before any decisions would be made which would risk the lives of our employees and of our citizens. We have now made that point to every government, formally, in the aftermath of the death of Ambassador Dubs. That remains our policy.

Mr. LORTON. If I could go back to the Congressman's question again about the four terrorists. I have located here what we were in fact told by the Afghan Government. They stated that when their forces entered the room they found, along with the Ambassador's body, three bodies and one person firing. They claimed that the one who was wounded was taken to a hospital, where he died. Our people did not ever see this fourth individual.

Mr. GOODLING. Then, one last question. You did talk about who may or may not have given the orders in relationship to assaulting the room. You have in your unclassified information here the police had received orders to assault. Are you saying we do not have any idea who gave them those orders?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not think we know the individual who may have given the orders, although I assume it was the commander of the Afghan Police. Whether the order came from a higher level in the Afghan Government is a point on which we do not have any information. We do not know at what level that decision was taken inside the Afghan Government, whether by the Prime Minister or by others.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In reviewing the beginning of the incident when the car was stopped, you said that three terrorists got into the car; is that correct?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I forget how many did get into it.

Mr. LANNON. Four terrorists.

Mr. IRELAND. And what became of the driver at that point, he was told to drive to the hotel; right?

Ambassador QUAINTON. And then was released.

Mr. IRELAND. The driver was released.

Ambassador QUAINTON. He was immediately released. He reported immediately back to the Embassy, which was the source of our information.

Mr. LANNON. That is correct. He was released with instructions to report to the Embassy.

Mr. IRELAND. So, that left the four so-called terrorists, one of which you never got any idea. Did the driver participate in the identification of the terrorists later on, and what kind of light did he cast on this nebulous fourth terrorist?

Mr. LANNON. He participated in the identification and was only able to positively identify three of the terrorists that had been in the vehicle. The third was identified by Embassy officers and the fourth remained unidentified.

Mr. IRELAND. But there had in effect been four in his vehicle.

Mr. LANNON. That is correct.

Mr. IRELAND. There was considerable talk in the press and, I guess just talk, about warnings that had been received. Would you elaborate some on that and if there were warnings, why nothing was done; or, if something was done?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The warning which we received and which you correctly note has been widely reported on in the press, was received the year before, in March of 1978. It indicated that there was a general threat to the American community, to American facilities in Kabul.

We immediately, in the light of that threat—which was not specific in terms of any individual who was being targeted—sent in a special training team from the Office of Security. We reviewed a whole range of procedures and requested from the Afghan Government a car to accompany the Ambassador on his movements. We substantially upgraded the security of the Kabul mission in response to that threat.

No subsequent threat was received between that time and the attack on Ambassador Dubs. My understanding is that subsequently, about 6 weeks later, the present government came to power; the previous government was overthrown, and the bodyguards provided to the Ambassador were withdrawn. Apparently it was the judgment of the Ambassador at that time—Mr. Dubs' predecessor—that there was not a sufficient threat to him or to his mission, to necessitate special protection, although the general level of protection which was being provided by our security personnel remained in effect. That decision was continued by Ambassador Dubs. He did not have, as the record shows, an escort car at the time at which he was killed.

I might comment that we have requested special protection for our Chargé d'Affaires in Kabul—that is a fellow-car and bodyguard protection. Although it was initially granted, it has been withdrawn by the Afghan Government, against our wishes. We continue to seek this protection from the Afghan Government, but they have not seen fit to provide it to us.

Mr. IRELAND. Do I understand from what you said that you sent a special team after that warning, gave this special training to the people there, and required that additional protection. Then, when the new government came in, who made the decision that the protection was no longer necessary?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The Ambassador.

Mr. IRELAND. Who did?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The Ambassador.

Mr. IRELAND. And do you have knowledge on what grounds this new, untested government was suddenly going to be so protective that this was not needed? How did we get that decision, on what grounds was it made after your expert team indicated there was ground for concern?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The expert team was not there as a threat assessment team. It was there to enhance the security of the mission by reviewing physical security.

Mr. IRELAND. But it was their recommendation that to enhance security they needed that kind of protection.

Ambassador QUAINTON. I am not certain whether that is so, Congressman, I would have to find out. I think probably it was a decision of the Ambassador to request directly from the Afghan Government additional protection; I am sure it was concurred in by our security team. Whether it was their recommendation, which was followed, or the other way around, I do not honestly know. I can find out.

Mr. IRELAND. Does this indicate an inadequacy in the training that they were sent to do, or an inadequacy in the assessment of what the problem was?

Mr. LANNON. Congressman, if I may, maybe I can clarify this. Upon receipt of the March 1978 threat, during the process of assessment, we deemed it prudent to enhance the security posture of the post and provide additional protection to the Ambassador. Over the period of time that elapsed from the receipt of the initial threat, and based upon continual assessment, it was ascertained that that threat was decreasing.

Mr. IRELAND. Who was making that assessment?

Mr. LANNON. The assessment was made by various components of the Department.

Mr. IRELAND. But they had to take constructive memo notice of some kind to say, "Our assessment is that we no longer need this protection," is that right?

Mr. LANNON. Well, it was done in conjunction with the post as well as the Ambassador, as he perceived the situation at post. At the time the threat was received the security posture was greatly increased, special training was provided, special briefings were provided.

Mr. IRELAND. Well, could we know from you, or how would we know that a relatively unknown government in this changing place would suddenly decrease the need and change the assessment to such laxity? I mean, what were the compelling reasons for lowering the guard all of a sudden?

Mr. LANNON. No; the posture was lowered before the new government came to power.

Mr. IRELAND. I did not understand that from the Ambassador.

Mr. LANNON. Well, I may be mistaken on that.

Ambassador QUAINTON. My understanding is that the Department consulted Ambassador Eliot after the Dubs incident about the circumstances at the time. He apparently determined that in light of the security posture which the Afghan Government was maintaining in Kabul and throughout the country that the bodyguards were no longer required. It was a conscious decision of our Ambassador.

Mr. IRELAND. The Ambassador previous to Ambassador Dubs?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. IRELAND. There is no record of that assessment that would be available to us, and why such a decision was made?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Let me answer that question for the record, Congressman, I do not have the answer as to whether there was a specific request put to the Department.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to ask that we get that information?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We will be happy to get that information for you.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

On the morning of March 25, 1978 an ICA local employee discovered a threat letter on the floor next to his desk in the ICA library. The letter, purportedly written by an organization calling itself "Charika-ye-Feda'i-ye-Khalq" (People's Sacrifice Guerrillas—PSG), threatened an attack against American citizens in Kabul beginning that date unless the ICA Cultural Center was closed. The letter contained a number of incantations lauding Mao Tse-Tung, Lenin and Arafat. No further threats were received and U.S. agencies were unable to establish the credibility of the threat.

Following receipt of the threat, then Ambassador Eliot met with appropriate Afghan officials and Embassy officers to evaluate the threat. The Embassy was brought to an alert status, additional security measures were undertaken and all American and local employees were briefed on the threat and advised to take appropriate precautions. The Afghan Government provided additional police sentries for the principal American installations in Kabul, for three senior officers' residences and an armed detail of Afghan police in a follow car was assigned to the Ambassador. Ambassador Eliot discontinued the use of a follow car just prior to the coup as he felt it was no longer required. He did not consult the Department about that decision, which was based on his assessment of the situation then prevailing in Kabul.

At no time was there a diminution of the level of security at Kabul. The security posture was raised to an alert status. As the threat dissipated over time, increased security measures taken in response were reduced commensurately.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In regard to our ambassadors worldwide, do most of them heed the warnings on terrorist groups, do they follow certain precautions?

Ambassador QUAINTON. The situation varies enormously from one country to another. We share with every ambassador whatever intelligence is available which might indicate a threat to him personally, or to his mission. We seek his advice and the advice of the Security Watch Committee which exists in every embassy. It is composed of representatives of all key agencies. They assess the information and intelligence. We provide our own assessments from the Department and, in the light of those assessments, we will provide special protection to our missions. This may include the dispatch of special security teams, fully armored vehicles—a range of measures.

These measures are not provided to all ambassadors at all times because there is not sufficient threat in many countries where we work, to do so. But this process is one which is continually reviewed. Security Watch Committees are expected to meet regularly to review their security situation. In the aftermath of the killing of Ambassador Dubs, we have looked at the situation systematically across the board; we went out to every one of our embassies and consulates and asked them, "What are you doing? Are you aware of any local threats? Is there anything you need, whether it is in terms of protecting the Embassy building, protecting your residences, protecting yourselves in your vehicular movements?"

Ambassadors came back to us, describing exactly what they have and their assessment of whether it was adequate or not adequate. On the basis of a number of recommendations that have come to us from those that felt there were deficiencies, the Office of Security, out of its budget, will be meeting any deficiencies that exist.

Mr. HALL. In regard to Ambassador Dubs, apparently he was a very, very courageous man, very fearless, always had been, all his life. I would imagine many of our ambassadors are like this, across the world. I guess the question is, it has to be almost impossible to protect them.

I assume it has to be, if not fairly easy, not necessarily complex to kidnap or assassinate an ambassador or an American VIP abroad, if you want to. I do not envy you your position, knowing full well some of our ambassadors overseas.

With respect to the assassination of the Ambassador and the Soviets' alleged role and the way it was done, it looks to have been a mistake, an act of incompetence. And yet, could it possibly be a very, very carefully prepared plan to assassinate him and to try to present a smoke-screen to the world where, in fact, Ambassador Dubs was really assassinated through a very carefully planned execution? I do not know; I ask the question because it is just amazing to me that a major country, a world power like Russia, would be so involved with a hideous act on an American diplomat. I guess one way to put a smokescreen around it is crying incompetence, major mess-ups, and try to blame it on everybody else when, in fact, it could have been planned. Is that possible? Do you have any reason to believe it?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have no reason to believe that is the case. Our assessment of the Soviet counterterrorist tactics is that they tend to use force as a regular procedure, whereas we attach enormous importance to playing for time to negotiate. We try to wear down the terrorists by nonviolent means. Tragically, tactics which were totally inappropriate in the situation were used, which resulted in the death of our Ambassador. But as to your suggestion, we have no reason to suppose that is the case.

Mr. HALL. I think you have an impossible job. I do not know how you can protect ambassadors overseas if they do not listen. When you have ambassadors who are courageous and fearless, like Ambassador Dubs, who was tremendously respected in the world, it has to be an impossible job.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We try to provide the very best protection possible but protection is not our only consideration. Many of our ambassadors—and I see them as they go out in the field, and I see them

when they come back and we talk about whether there is a terrorist problem in their country—are very concerned that they may not be able to do their job of representing America as an open society, if they have to go about—as a few of them do—with enormous security measures, cars in front, cars behind, special armoring. I talked to one ambassador yesterday, our Ambassador to Lebanon, who said he had yet to set foot on the sidewalk in Beirut. He only goes out under very special security. We have to do that when there are particular circumstances. We do whatever is necessary to protect our ambassadors.

But obviously these courageous men in the service of their country want to represent America in the best possible way. We are trying to make sure that they are aware of whatever threats there are and that they get the protection which they need. But it will never be foolproof.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have been touching on some of the things I want to ask. When the level of terrorism goes up, there is no foolproof protection system, unless that is going to be your primary concern. Is that not right?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It is not our primary concern, or the No. 1 item for a person serving overseas. It cannot be. I would imagine you have to look at how all the other ambassadors operate in a particular country. It is very difficult for our person to be running around in a tank and everybody else is driving around in a car.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We got that very comment from a number of our Embassies after Ambassador Dubs was killed.

Mr. PRITCHARD. The final decision as to how an ambassador operates has to rest with the ambassador himself; does it not?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. PRITCHARD. He makes that assessment.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We give him as much advice as we can, on the information we have.

Mr. PRITCHARD. And some people are just going to be more careful than others; perceive the dangers differently.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct. We try to make sure there are certain minimum levels, I would say. We do insist that embassies have certain minimum standards of security, and we are constantly upgrading them; we try to make sure that residences have certain minimum standards. There are some things we can legitimately and prudently ask every Chief of Mission to do as basic security for himself and for his personnel. When you get into special kinds of security, then the considerations which you mentioned have an important role to play.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Do you see any way in which this rise in terrorism, these actions, are going to be stopped?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We are trying to stop them in a couple of ways. The only long-term way in which terrorism will be stopped is when the political grievances which give rise to it are finally resolved. The very intense efforts which this administration has been making to find peace in the Middle East; majority rule in southern Africa; negotiated settlements in Central America, are all directed at finding solutions to those situations which generate violence in general, and

terrorist violence in particular. That is certainly the long-term goal.

The other major thrust of what we have been trying to do is to build a consensus internationally that there are certain acts that are inadmissible under the law of war and under the law of peace. That may be hijacking; that may be the seizure of diplomats. There is an international convention against the seizure of diplomats, there are 40 countries that are party to it. We have just gone out, in fact, in the aftermath of Ambassador Dubs' death to any country that has not become a party to that convention saying, "Why are you not concerned about the protection of diplomats?"

In February of this year in Geneva a convention dealing with the taking of hostages was drafted. We hope it will be finalized soon. There are only two small clauses which are not fully agreed. Our Government is going to give the very strongest support to the building of an international consensus that some things are just inadmissible. The taking of hostages, whether they be ambassadors, or whether they be Peace Corps volunteers, is just something which the international community should not tolerate.

Mr. PRITCHARD. There are two items here. One, it seems that these actions cannot end up as a plus for the host country.

The other point is that I would certainly agree with the policy that there cannot be any reward; there cannot be a giving in; there cannot be any gain by terrorism, it has to be a losing operation. I think that is very hard for people to understand, but, if you take any other position, you open the door. The first time one of these ambassadors is held up for ransom and you pay the ransom, you really open up the possibility for all our ambassadors being attacked. I would agree, the problem is difficult and it is going to get more difficult as terrorism seems to spread all over the world. I would agree that it is a no-end situation.

Let me ask you one question. There is a report that a Russian was with the chief of police during the time this whole altercation was going on. At the same time, there was an American attempting to see the chief of police and he was not given an audience. After it was over, the chief of police and the Russian came out of the office. Is that correct?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct. The most frustrating aspect of the management of that incident was our inability to get access at a suitably high level, to get across our basic position that nothing should be done to risk the life of Ambassador Dubs. If people keep their doors closed, you cannot force your way in.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to go to square one for a minute. Three so-called terrorists were in the room at that time, one of whom was alive and subsequently, a few hours later, wound up dead. Would you put the names of those three people in the record, please?

Mr. LORTON. We do not have the names and cannot put them in the record. We have asked for identities and have not received them.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have asked for a full report on the deaths of those persons.

Mr. FASCELL. You have asked for a full report from the Afghan Government and have not received it.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. LORTON. We have not received an identification of the terrorists.

Mr. FASCELL. Have you received any communication?

Mr. LORTON. Yes, we have received information from the Afghan Government on their views of what has happened. But it does not respond to the questions we have put to them.

Mr. FASCELL. You have received a communication from the Afghan Government on their views as to what happened. You mean a chronology of events?

Mr. LORTON. In effect.

Ambassador QUAINTON. A report of their handling of the incident.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that report classified?

Mr. LORTON. The report is not classified.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know why it should be.

Mr. LORTON. There is a problem, though, which perhaps Mr. Lannon would like to speak to, that is, while the investigation is still in progress, we have not tried to release individual aspects of the investigation, or individual statements about it. I think that the report will be available, though, when the investigation is completed. Will it not?

Mr. LANNON. It will be, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we would of course like to see all the communications from the Afghan Government and of course the report, when it is completed.

Ambassador QUAINTON. I have that information and would be happy to give it to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. You do not know the name of the fourth individual either.

Ambassador QUAINTON. No, we do not.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, after the shooting, at some time—the same day, was it—the Afghan Government displayed four bodies to whom?

Ambassador QUAINTON. To officers of the Embassy and to the driver.

Mr. FASCELL. Officers of the Embassy and whom?

Ambassador QUAINTON. To the driver and to American personnel. I do not know how many. I believe three officers and the driver were taken there.

Mr. FASCELL. Can we have the names in the record, please, of the three Americans who viewed the bodies of the four people who were dead?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you know who they are now?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not know. This will all form part of the formal report that we will be briefing the committee on. I do not have the names in my head of the various officers who did specific acts in the course of the incident.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, the actions and the statements of every individual American who participated is part of the investigation, is it not?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, for starters, we would like to have the names in the record now of those three who viewed the bodies, and at what time they viewed the bodies, and what they were told at that time. That is something that should not in any way prejudice the ongoing investigation.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We will get that information for you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Political Counselor Bruce Flatin, Regional Security Officer Charles Boles and Consular Officer Michael Malinowski viewed the bodies of the four terrorists on February 14, 1979 at 8:00 p.m.

They were told by an unidentified police official that the four bodies were those of the terrorists killed in the shootout at the Kabul Hotel. The Embassy officers requested that they be allowed to view the terrorists' clothing and weapons. They were informed that such a request would have to be submitted to the Prime Ministry.

Mr. FASCELL. Also, who was the Afghan official who made the presentation?

Ambassador QUAINTON. An unnamed police official presented the bodies after the invitation was conveyed through the Afghan Foreign Ministry's Protocol Department.

Mr. FASCELL. Was it the chief of police of Kabul who was at the site of the killing?

Mr. LORTON. The police commandant for the country.

Mr. FASCELL. The police commandant of the country. So, he was a national officer, not a municipal officer.

Mr. LORTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, what is a police commandant in Afghanistan?

Mr. LORTON. He is the senior police official in the country, in the Ministry of Interior.

Mr. FASCELL. A national police force, as distinguished from the military?

Mr. LORTON. Yes; it is a police force separate from the military, although there are, we understand, military officers who have deputed to it from time to time.

Mr. FASCELL. Military officers are detailed to the national police, are they?

Mr. LORTON. That is our understanding.

Mr. FASCELL. So, Mr. Taroon is the national police commandant of Afghanistan.

Mr. LORTON. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. And he was in charge of the operation at the hotel.

Mr. LORTON. He was at his office, but we believe he was in charge of directing the operation, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. Well, do we know who the Afghan official at the hotel was who appeared to be in charge, or was in charge?

Mr. LORTON. I do not have the name of that individual, but it may be in the material we have; we can look.

Mr. FASCELL. When was the first demand made for the release of the prisoner by the so-called terrorists? You gave his name earlier, I just did not get it.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Bahruddin Bahes is the prisoner the Afghan subsequently identified to us as the man.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me see if I understand that correctly. A man named Bahes was in jail in Afghanistan, being held by the Afghan Government. Was he an Afghan national?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I believe they said he was not being held.

Mr. FASCELL. They said what?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I believe they said he was not being held and hence they could not release him. That is my recollection.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, what demand exactly did the terrorists make, when did they make it, and to whom did they make it?

Mr. LORTON. According to what we have been advised by the Afghan Government, the individual who was in charge of the operation at the hotel was the chief of the Kabul police department.

The Afghan official believed to have been in charge at the scene (Kabul Hotel) on February 14, 1979 was identified as a Major Saifuddin, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (described as one of Taroon's closest aides).

Mr. FASCELL. We do not have his name. Could we get it, do you suppose?

Mr. LORTON. I think we could get it, yes. It indicates that when he went to talk to the terrorists through the door of the room in which they were holding the Ambassador captive, they informed them that a condition was to release this individual, Bahruddin Bahes from prison.

Mr. FASCELL. Give me that again, I am sorry; I missed that.

Mr. LORTON. When he went to the room—

Mr. FASCELL. When who went to the room?

Mr. LORTON. The chief of police of the Kabul police department.

Mr. FASCELL. When he went to the room. Go ahead.

Mr. LORTON. He was informed by the terrorists, when talking to them through the door of the room, that their first condition was the release of this individual. Now, it does not stipulate a time here, as to when that was. But it was very shortly after the terrorists themselves went to the hotel.

Mr. WOLFF. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. WOLFF. Was not that first demand made of the other kidnaper who was down in the lobby, not this man Bahes? Was not one of the terrorists taken by the police downstairs in the lobby when they came in, and was not the request by the terrorists in the room for that man to be brought up? Was not that the request that they made?

Mr. LORTON. Well, this, Congressman, is getting into the issue of the varying accounts we have of what happened, and the reason we are still in the course of conducting the investigation. What I have just told you is what we were told by the Afghan Government, happened.

Now, we also have other accounts of what happened. These questions are going to be addressed in this report.

Mr. WOLFF. Then the information you just handed up to us here is not all the information that you have from the Afghan Government.

Mr. LORTON. No. We have their views on their handling of the incident, which we have not released, for the same reason we have not released other individual accounts.

Mr. FASCELL. Getting back to the question of the demand of the release of an individual who was allegedly in jail, that demand was made, according to the Afghans, by the terrorists who were holding Ambassador Dubs in the hotel room, to the chief of police of Kabul?

Mr. LORTON. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. He talked through the door and, I gather, nobody else was with him, as far as we know.

Ambassador QUAINTON. No.

Mr. FASCELL. No other person was with the chief of police.

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not know that.

Mr. FASCELL. What?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not know the answer to that, whether he went to the door and there were other police officers besides him, or not.

Mr. LANNON. We would have to assume that there were other officers, Afghan officers, present.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, let me get back a different way, then, on this chronology of events. When was the first time, according to our own chronology of events, that an American official appeared at the hotel?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Very shortly after 9 o'clock the first American officials arrived.

Mr. FASCELL. And who was that, and how many of them?

Mr. LORTON. At 9:15 officers of our Embassy were able to establish contact with the police officer at the hotel. So, by 9:15 they were there.

Mr. FASCELL. Who were "they"?

Mr. LORTON. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I defer to the representative of the Office of Security.

Mr. LANNON. There were three Embassy officers and a Foreign Service national who arrived at the hotel at that point.

Mr. FASCELL. Could we get those names?

Mr. LANNON. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

Political Counselor Bruce Flatin, Regional Security Officer Charles Boles, Consular Officer Michael Malinowski and Foreign Service National Employee Khalig Ghafari arrived at the Kabul Hotel at approximately 0900 hours.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, I assume the foreign national was for language purposes?

Mr. LANNON. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. We would like to have his name, too.

I assume that the three Americans who were there could not speak Afghan, or whatever language they speak? What is the language, by the way?

Mr. LORTON. Dari is the language.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that the principal language, or are there many languages?

Mr. LORTON. There are two principal languages, Dari is one and Pushtu is the other. We did have a Dari speaker among the Embassy officers.

Mr. FASCELL. A Dari speaker was among the Embassy officers. The foreign national could speak Pushtu?

Mr. LANNON. I do not know which dialect he spoke.

Mr. FASCELL. Could you find out?

Mr. LANNON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we know whether any of them spoke Russian?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes; we do. There was at least one officer who spoke Russian. Mr. Bakhturin, who was the senior Soviet officer there, spoke excellent English.

Mr. LORTON. Mr. Chairman, the Embassy national employee, the Afghan employee, could interpret both Dari and Pushtu.

Mr. FASCELL. The foreign national was a U.S. Embassy employee?

Mr. LORTON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. He accompanied the first American officials to the hotel.

Mr. LORTON. Correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And Bakhturin was the senior Russian official at the hotel, and he speaks fluent English.

Mr. LORTON. That is correct.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Right.

Mr. LORTON. And we had a Russian speaker among our own officers there as well.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Mr. Bakhturin was the senior security official from the Embassy. We are not certain he was the senior Russian official there.

Mr. FASCELL. He was the senior security official of the Soviet Embassy at the hotel, but you are not sure he was the senior Soviet official at the hotel; is that what you are saying?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. The demand that was made of the Chief of Police of Kabul for the release of Bahes was communicated to the Americans by whom and when?

Mr. LORTON. We first learned of the demand for the release of Bahes as a result of the Afghan Government's official press account of the assassination carried in the February 14, 1979 issue of the Kabul Times, "The terrorists demanded that a man named Bahruddin Bahes, who is not in Afghanistan and his residence is not known, be placed at their disposal."

In its 5 p.m. news broadcast on February 14 Radio Afghanistan announced the news of Ambassador Dubs' kidnaping and death. According to the broadcast, the perpetrators were "several anti-Khalqi terrorists" who subsequently demanded the release of a political prisoner named "Bahruddin."

The Afghan official report of the kidnaping and killing of Ambassador Dubs was submitted to the Embassy on February 27, 1979, by Dr. Mohammad Rafik Shamreiz, Director of the Third Political Division (Europe and Americas), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report indicated that the terrorists had demanded the release of Bahruddin Bahes from jail.

Mr. FASCELL. Not until after the killing?

Mr. LORTON. Correct. We can check the record and establish that for certain.

Ambassador QUAINTON. My recollection, from having been in the Operations Center and in contact with the Embassy throughout that period is that we had no clear idea what demands were being levied on the Afghan Government, no precise information at any point. We had no reason to suppose that any demands were being levied on the U.S. Government.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, you had no reason to know that any demands had been levied on the Afghan Government.

Ambassador QUAINTON. But we assumed that that was the case. If demands would have been levied on the U.S. Government, we obviously would have heard that.

Mr. FASCELL. You did not know about any demands on the Afghan Government until after the incident, that is quite clear, is it not?

Mr. LANNON. I would like to go back to Mr. Wolff's question before, about the release of the terrorist who was believed to be downstairs. Bakhturin at one point advised the American officers present that the terrorists in the room had requested the release of the captured terrorist. Bakhturin came to our officers, and it was approximately 11:30 a.m., to advise that the terrorists in the room had demanded of the Afghan Government that the terrorist that had been captured be returned.

Those were the only demands we were aware of until after the incident.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, what happened to this guy who was in the lobby, allegedly, that Bakhturin was talking about?

Mr. LANNON. We had the observation that he was brought up to the room and was removed after the shooting, with the hood remaining over his head, attempting to fight off the Afghans that were holding him. The next time he was observed was when he appeared with the bodies which our Embassy officers observed.

Mr. FASCELL. So, he was definitely seen in the lobby alive?

Mr. LANNON. He was seen on the stairway alive.

Mr. FASCELL. He was taken to the room, we believe; is that correct?

Mr. LANNON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And then he was later observed dead.

Mr. LANNON. He was later observed coming down from the room alive.

Mr. FASCELL. Alive.

Mr. LANNON. Alive. And, later that afternoon was observed with the other three bodies that were shown to our Embassy officers.

Mr. FASCELL. So, by 5:30 in the afternoon that man was dead.

Mr. LANNON. That is correct.

Mr. WOLFF. If the chairman will yield.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. WOLFF. Three bodies you saw, or four bodies?

Mr. LANNON. No, I said he was one of the four bodies. He was seen with the other three bodies. In other words, four bodies were observed that afternoon, including that individual.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, what information do we have on that individual Bahes, if any?

Mr. LORTON. We have no confirmed information about him, Mr. Chairman. We are looking into the various possibilities and speculations that people have provided to us. This will be part of the report, I assume.

Mr. FASCELL. Have we asked to talk to this individual?

Mr. LORTON. No one has been able to identify whether this individual is even alive, or where he is.

Mr. FASCELL. And the only information we have that there is such an individual, by that name, is the fact that the Chief of Police of Kabul said the terrorists asked for his release.

Mr. LORTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And the Afghan Government says, "We do not know of such a man and he is not being held".

Mr. LORTON. No, they do know of an individual that they have described as being this person. However, we are not certain that this is the full description, or that this is in fact the individual.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I thought I understood somebody to say before that the Afghan Government said that they were not holding such an individual.

Mr. LORTON. I believe they did say that.

Ambassador QUAINTON. They characterized the terrorists as a group of extreme leftist adventurers, without being much clearer. That was in the press conference.

Mr. FASCELL. I am just trying to find out who Bahes is, if he exists.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We do not have any information on him.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that part of your investigation?

Mr. LORTON. Yes, it is. The Afghan Government stated that Bahes is believed to be living in hiding.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the Afghan's official statement.

We are going to take a short recess to answer this quorum call, and we will continue as soon as we get back.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. FASCELL. The committee will come to order.

When we left, we were asking you to provide information on the reports, or allegations, with respect to the demands of the kidnapers. Now, there was one report—I guess it was a press report, I am not sure—that there were three people, kidnapers, who requested the release of Bahes.

Ambassador QUAINTON. If I might, Mr. Chairman, amplify or correct an answer which I gave to Chairman Wolff on this point because my personal recollection of the events of that night, was that we did have additional information on the point of what the demands were. What we were told from our Embassy was that they overheard a conversation in which it was said that the terrorists were demanding the release of three religious leaders. I believe we have those names, and we set in motion the normal checks to see if we could identify them, and we indeed could identify several of those names, as I recollect.

It seemed to us to be plausible, given the events in Iran and elsewhere, that perhaps the release of religious leaders might have been the terrorists' demand.

As we testified earlier, the Afghan Government said, no, as far as they were concerned, the only demand was for the release of the leftist, Mr. Bahes. This points out the enormous numbers of inconsistencies which we have turned up as we have investigated this case. All of the inconsistencies are going to be reviewed in detail in their report. We now have no reason to suppose, beyond that one overheard conversation, that there was a demand for the three Mullahs; but that may also have been the real demand and the Government of Afghanistan may have chosen to change their report to us after the event.

I cannot tell you what the real demands were. We have had these two differing reports, one during the incident, and one after.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it seems to me it is important. Certainly, the kidnaping is not an unrelated, inconsequential, no-motive act; they had to have a reason. If they wanted to kill the Ambassador, they could have shot him in the car, do you not think so?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct. We were very concerned that the Embassy give us whatever might be available about possible motives, so they could give them the best possible advice about how to deal with the incident. If they had been Mullahs, we thought we

should consider seriously the question of whether or not there were perhaps Islamic governments that could be helpful. It is very important to know what the real demands are. Our inability to get that information hindered, in fact, our ability to aid our mission in what was obviously a very, very difficult situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, the point is, you could not negotiate because you did not know what you were negotiating about.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. It is obvious that the kidnapers had something in mind or they would not have gone to a hotel, highly visible, and locked themselves in a room, obviously easily reached either outside or inside—a totally indefensible position from simply a security or a military point of view. Obviously, they had something in mind, but they are all dead and we do not know what they had in mind.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, the United States was frustrated in getting any information early on in this matter from anybody, I gather. One, you could not talk to the national commandant at all; is that correct, during the incident?

Ambassador QUAINTON. There was one telephone conversation with Taroon early on, in which we conveyed our Government's position that no precipitate action be taken. And there was a conversation with the Deputy Foreign Minister.

Mr. FASCELL. And you made the same request of him?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct. And those requests were made on the site both to the Russians and to the Afghans.

Mr. FASCELL. And those were the only two people of whom you had an opportunity to make that request?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct only those officials of the Afghan Government. That is my recollection. We tried and were not able to contact the Deputy Prime Minister, the effective leader of the country.

Mr. LORTON. If the chairman will refer to the chronology which was made part of the record, we do note there that the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Dost, had called back to our DCM to say that—well, it does not state it specifically here, but it implied he had been in touch with the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Amin because he said Amin was personally supervising the developments.

Mr. FASCELL. He was personally supervising the developments. Who is "he"?

Mr. LORTON. This is the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

Mr. FASCELL. One of them was personally supervising the events. Who is he?

Mr. LORTON. The same person, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador QUAINTON. The No. 2 man in the Afghan Government.

Mr. FASCELL. And you were never able to contact him again?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We were never able to contact him directly.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, the ranking security officer of the Russian Embassy, what was his name, Bakhturin?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Bakhturin, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Did we talk to him and give him the same information?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. And when was the first request made to him to take no precipitous action until you had an opportunity to talk to the kidnapers?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Quite early on that morning, 10-something. He expressed some understanding of that view, if I remember correctly.

Mr. LANNON. At 10:15, and he assured the Embassy officer present that there was a strong Soviet interest in the safety and well-being of the Ambassador at that time.

Mr. FASCELL. I am sure that is true. You had no other conversations with him subsequent to that time?

Mr. LANNON. There were frequent conversations. He was the principal contact point for some period of time between the Embassy officers present and the Afghan officials on the scene.

Mr. FASCELL. So, he had full knowledge of what the U.S. position was on this matter.

Mr. LANNON. Yes, he did.

Mr. FASCELL. And you have no way of knowing whether he communicated that to the chief of police.

Mr. LANNON. Yes; as a result of subsequent conversations we are sure that it was communicated. Whether it was to the chief of police himself or one of his aides, we are not sure.

Mr. FASCELL. But you are reasonably sure that the ranking Soviet person did communicate the U.S. request.

Mr. LANNON. That Bakhturin did, yes. We do not know whether he was the ranking Soviet at the scene, though.

Mr. FASCELL. I mean, he was the security man at the scene.

Mr. LANNON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you know whether or not autopsies were performed on the four terrorists?

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have asked for the autopsy reports, we have not received them.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe no autopsy was performed.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is very possible.

Mr. FASCELL. But you do not know that. All you have done is request an autopsy report, and you had no response.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have repeatedly requested that information and requested the ballistics information which would be critical, in determining who it was that actually fired the fatal bullets.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we have all the ballistics information obtainable from Ambassador Dubs' body.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. What kinds of weapons were the kidnapers carrying?

Mr. LANNON. I think we are getting into an area here which may cause problems with the furtherance of our investigation at this point. We would be more than happy to supply the information that was provided to us, as well as the ballistics information that results from the autopsy. However, we would prefer to do that in a closed session or by document to the chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you mean by that—and I agree with that—do you mean by that that there is some dispute?

Mr. LANNON. There is information which we are attempting to gain

at this time where, if we reveal the information we have in our possession, it might hinder our investigation.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Wolff?

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Do we have any information on Bahes? Did he have any contact or prior history with any Soviet activity?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not know the answer to that.

Mr. LORTON. We have not been able to specifically identify Mr. Bahes at all because we have a number of various possibilities. These are what the investigation is attempting to reconcile and come up with an answer.

Mr. WOLFF. There was a rumor circulating that this was a case of mistaken identity, and that the individual which was supposed to be kidnaped was not "Spike" Dubs but the Russian Ambassador. Did you hear anything about that?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I have heard the rumor. We cannot confirm that.

Mr. LANNON. In fact, the Russian Ambassador is very heavily guarded in Kabul and would be much more difficult to kidnap.

Mr. WOLFF. On the demands we know of and any other information, do we have any idea whether this was a religious group that was involved, or a political group?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Well, as I suggested a minute ago, the fragmentary information which we had in the course of the incident suggested that it was a religious group, seeking the release of religious prisoners. We were able to confirm during the night that a number of religious leaders were in jail in Afghanistan. It seemed to us possible, without any further confirmation, that that was the demand the terrorists were making. Obviously, that was never pursued because the Government of Afghanistan said, no, that was not the case and has taken a different tack.

Mr. WOLFF. We have only a few minutes because we have to go over to vote. The driver of the vehicle that Mr. Dubs was riding in, what about his history, how long has he been with the Embassy; what is his background?

Mr. LANNON. He has been with the Embassy for 18 years.

Mr. WOLFF. Has he been questioned thoroughly? It seems to me that for the kidnapers to release him to call the Embassy is a little bit peculiar.

Mr. LANNON. Yes; he has been questioned thoroughly and in fact has been polygraphed.

Mr. WOLFF. With positive results?

Mr. LANNON. No deception was indicated in the polygraph examination.

Mr. WOLFF. Now, I take it that we have "Entebbe" groups, rescue teams. Were any rescue teams alerted to this situation at all?

Ambassador QUAINTON. This is a fairly sensitive area, Mr. Chairman, which I would be happy to discuss in some greater detail with the committee—

Mr. WOLFF. I just want to know if there were any steps taken.

Ambassador QUAINTON. I was going to deal with the general question. When a crisis of this kind takes place, and the Operations Center of the State Department is informed, one of the very first things we

do is to call the National Military Command Center and the Central Intelligence Agency's Command Center. They have also been alerted by those first flash messages which come in. We make sure that we are aware of all contingencies. Any requirements are coordinated from the State Department. That was done in this case. The National Military Command Center in such situations establishes a terrorist action team, as they call it—TAT—which operates out of the NMCC, and which maintains contact with a variety of resources, including our various potential rescue resources. The military issue, which was immediately before us in this crisis was, could we get our military attache's plane in from Pakistan with a doctor and a psychiatrist, and that, of course, required a series of military clearances through the appropriate commands.

We were in very direct touch with NMCC throughout.

Mr. WOLFF. Was any attempt made to reach the Prime Minister, since we tried to reach the Deputy Prime Minister? Did we try to reach the Prime Minister of Afghanistan at all?

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not know whether we did try to reach Mr. Taraki.

Our instructions to the DCM from the Secretary, which we prepared in the task force were to go to the highest possible level in the Afghan Government.

Mr. WOLFF. No direct approaches were made by the Secretary or anyone else to higher levels of the Government. All the moves were made from Afghanistan directly.

Ambassador QUAINTON. From the Secretary to the Foreign Minister, which was Mr. Amin.

Mr. WOLFF. From the Secretary to Mr. Amin. He called Mr. Amin?

Ambassador QUAINTON. This was handled in two ways, in fact, simultaneously, in order to cover all possibilities. It was sent out by flash message. The Secretary, as you know, was in the Department a good part of that time. So, we were able to coordinate with him very rapidly. We passed the message both telephonically to our Embassy because that was working by that point, and telegraphically.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Ambassador, I want you to know that Spike Dubs was a very close friend of mine, and perhaps that is one of the reasons why I am as intense as I am on this point.

Do you think that everything was done that could possibly be done to preserve the life of Spike Dubs? Are you satisfied with what was done?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Without sounding complacent, I think we functioned as well as could reasonably be expected—which is not to say that with hindsight, and going over minute by minute what was done in various ways, there might not have been some other things which might have been done by us and might have been done in the field.

You recognize, I am sure, as we all do, the very considerable pressures which operate in this kind of crisis. It seems to be that all prudent measures were taken.

Mr. WOLFF. Would you do the same thing again, or do you now have some second thoughts about what was done?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Second thoughts? I think we did learn a great deal from this incident about the handling of crisis of this kind,

and about some of the potential bottlenecks. The fact that it took an hour for a flash message to get through; that telephonic communications, although not satisfactory, provide the possibility of a genuine interchange of views. The sooner you can get this established, the better. Afghanistan is the most difficult country in the world to do this with.

Mr. WOLFF. Are you telling us that there is not a line of communications available through satellite that you could not get to immediately from there?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Not to Afghanistan. Our Embassy has good communications, but the mechanical process of sending messages, typing them out, putting them into the machine, takes time even though you might have virtually instantaneous linkages through satellites. The process of moving the paper is something with which I am not satisfied.

Mr. WOLFF. It seems to me that we are more interested in the security of the message than we are in the individual, and that is something that troubles me greatly.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is exactly the point that I would make in saying that telephone is the best way. It is not secure, but it is immediate. Our concern was with the life of Spike Dubs. We found telephonic links more effective. Mr. Lorton here was on the line to the Embassy virtually the whole time; I was on when there was a specific need to talk to somebody.

Mr. WOLFF. You said there was an hour's lapse.

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is right, it took time to get it set up. Certainly, better communications is something for which there is a real need.

Mr. WOLFF. With the sophistication of electronic gear which we have today, it would seem to me that is quite an inefficiency and should be remedied.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much. We will probably call on you again as we proceed in this matter and you have had an opportunity to further your investigation. We will develop a new line of questioning for you when you have completed your own investigation. We will be anxious to pursue the matter further.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We will, Mr. Chairman, be sharing with you our report in due course. I was consulting with my colleague from the Office of Security and he says they will not have it completed because of the extraordinary complexity of the issues, for a number of weeks yet. But I assure you that we desire to work very closely with you to make sure that the appropriate lines of investigation have been pursued and that you have all the necessary information about those tragic events.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me ask you for the record to furnish the names of the American personnel now stationed in Afghanistan.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Surely.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN KABUL, FEBRUARY 14, 1979

Amstutz, J. Bruce, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Graham, Esther R., Secretary.

Finkelstein, Phyllis Ann, Secretary.
Flatin, Bruce A., Political Officer.
Turco, Frederick A., Political Officer.
Taylor, James Edward, Political Officer.
McNaull, Michael E., Narcotics Control Officer.
Marik, Warren J., Political Officer.
Albison, Adele M., Secretary.
Sigman, Rose Ann, Secretary.
Freres, Jay P., Economic/Commercial Officer.
Litt, David C., Economic/Commercial Officer.
Long, Arnold C., Economic/Commercial Officer.
Simpson, Susanne, Secretary.
Malinowski, Michael E., Consular Officer.
Adams, Martin Phillip, Consular Officer.
Woerz, Bernard J., Administrative Officer.
Kosheleff, Mary J., Personnel Specialist.
Carr, Carolyn I., Administrative Specialist.
Billick, Michael, General Services Officer.
Miles, Joseph C., GSO Building Management.
Heritage, George Franklin, GSO Procurement and Supply.
Aronhime, Joseph F., Budget and Management Officer.
Alexander, Joseph N., Communications & Records Officer.
Turner, Janice M., Communications & Records Officer.
Juntunen, Dorian J., Support Communications Officer.
Leaper, Ronald C., Telecommunications Officer.
Wilson, Edward, Telecommunications Support.
Boles, Charles K., Security Officer.
Flynn, Kay M., Secretary.
Rotz, Lloyd S., Medical Officer.
Rigamer, Elmore F., Medical Officer.
Cramer, Jeannene J., Nurse.
Yamamoto, Marjorie T., Nurse.
Cross, Kumiko I., Nurse.
Vik, Se Dell G., Medical Technician.
Strong, Louise M., Secretary.
Loskot, William F., Rotational Officer.

HEADS OF OTHER AGENCIES

Grader, Charles R., Director, AID.
Rockwood, Stacy F., Director, Peace Corps.
Edgar, James S. V., Col., Defense and Army Attaché.
Wankel, Harold, Special Agent in Charge, DEA.
Lydon, Roger M., Public Affairs Officer.

Mr. FASCELL. And also a complete list of all kidnapings, and killings of diplomatic personnel, by country, in the last 5 years—United States and foreign.

Ambassador QUAINTON. We have that information.

[The information referred to follows:]

The following is a listing of all significant international terrorist incidents from 1970 through March 31, 1979. All initially successful kidnappings or killings of diplomatic personnel, both U.S. and foreign, during this period have been indicated by asterisk. An addendum of such incidents from March 31 to the present is also attached. The 9-year totals, by country, of such incidents are as follows:

Country:		
United States	-----	20
West Germany	-----	5
Turkey	-----	5
Israel	-----	3
Yugoslavia	-----	3
Sweden	-----	2
Great Britain	-----	2
Switzerland	-----	2
France	-----	2

Nicaragua	2
Uruguay	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Jordan	1
Egypt	1
Italy	1
Belgium	1
Japan	1
Venezuela	1
Costa Rica	1
Brazil	1
Paraguay	1
Bolivia	1
Chile	1
Mexico	1

It should be noted that these figures do not include the large number of bombings and armed assaults against diplomatic installations or the many instances of unsuccessful kidnapping attempts or the wounding of diplomatic personnel.

ADDENDUM

Date and Country	Event
March 22, 1979*, The Hague, Netherlands.	British Ambassador to the Netherlands Assassinated: On March 22, the British Ambassador was shot and killed outside his home in The Hague by unknown gunmen. The Ambassador was leaving his home for the Embassy when the attack occurred. A butler, a Dutch citizen, was also shot and died later of his wounds. Local police have no clues to the identity of the attackers but speculation is that the IRA is involved.
May 4, 11, 1979*, San Salvador, El Salvador.	French, Venezuelan and Costa Rican Embassies Seized by the BPR: Members of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), a peasant-student-urban slum dweller coalition, occupied the French, Venezuelan and Costa Rican Embassies and held a number of hostages, including the Ambassadors of all three countries. Ultimately, all hostages either escaped or were freed in exchange for the release of several BPR members being held by the government and asylum in Costa Rica and Panama for the BPR occupiers.
May 30, 1979* San Salvador, El Salvador.	Swiss Chargé d'Affaires to El Salvador Assassinated: The Swiss Chargé d'Affaires, Hugo Wey, was assassinated while driving to work. The assailants rammed his car from behind with their vehicles and forced him off the street where they then shot him. No group has yet taken credit for the attack.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to take a look at the pattern, who gets "lobbered" and why.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittees stand adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m. the subcommittees adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

SECURITY PROCEDURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

This afternoon the Subcommittee on International Operations initiates a series of hearings on protection of U.S. diplomatic and other governmental personnel serving overseas. Our hearings will also explore the security of our embassies and other installations and the safeguarding of vital national security information.

Today marks the 117th day of captivity for the American hostages in Iran and the beginning of the second day in the hands of terrorists for the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia.

In recent months our Embassy in Pakistan was burned, our Embassy in Libya was invaded, and other posts throughout the world subjected to various kinds of attacks. These outrageous attacks are not just threats to our diplomats. They are attacks on the world community and on a civilized tradition which has taken centuries to build.

The sanctity of diplomatic status is not a quaint custom. It is the vital cornerstone of world peace. Any politically motivated attack on a diplomat is a crime against all nations and against mankind itself.

The protection of American diplomats and our posts abroad has been a matter of great interest to the Foreign Affairs Committee and this subcommittee in particular. We have fully supported every administration request to enhance security and have urged that the security function receive the level of resources required.

At future hearings, we will explore in detail what happened in Iran, Pakistan, Colombia, and elsewhere. Today, we have asked representatives of the Department of State to discuss in broad terms the nature of the threats to our personnel and diplomatic posts and what we can do to improve security. It is my hope that today's discussion can be held entirely in open session and that any issues involving sensitive national security matters will be deferred to a future executive session.

Our witnesses are: the Honorable Ben Read, Under Secretary for Management, Department of State, and the Honorable Thomas Tracy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration, Department of State. They are accompanied by Karl D. Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

tary for Security, and Stuart Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications.

Mr. Read, perhaps you can start out by bringing us up to date on Colombia first and then go into your regular testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN H. READ, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT

Mr. READ. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Gray.

We very much appreciate your holding these hearings today. Obviously, it is a subject of absolutely fundamental importance to us, and the timeliness is sadly underscored by the events of the last 24 hours.

We are not able to give you much more than the news that you have all heard. In brief recap, yesterday shortly after noon, 15 to 25 heavily armed terrorists in jogging clothes came from across the street where the university is located and stormed the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogota, Colombia, during a Dominican Republic national day diplomatic reception.

Our Ambassador, Diego Asencio, was among the diplomats at the reception. He was just about to leave when the attack occurred and was among those taken hostage. Terrorists attacked the chauffeurs and bodyguards who were assembled in front of the embassy, wounding several and forced their way in at gunpoint. They had both automatic and other weapons.

Shortly thereafter the Colombian security forces, including both military and police, appeared on the scene. There was an exchange of gunfire in those early minutes between the authorities and the terrorists inside the Embassy.

On their own decision or on the appeals of the U.S. embassy and other diplomatic missions which coincided, there was a cessation of violence after that initial exchange.

The terrorists, as nearly as we can tell, are holding approximately 80 persons hostage. That includes some 20 diplomats, 50 other guests, and some staff of the Embassy. They call themselves members of a group of urban terrorists called the M-19, which we have known about. It is probably the most violent single group operating in Colombia today. The apparent purpose of this seizure, as nearly as we can tell in these early hours, and you are never certain of the fullness of your information base at such times, is to obtain the release of, as they call them, the political prisoners of the regime who are in Colombian prisons.

The press reporting appears to be accurate that they are demanding a large ransom sum in the neighborhood of \$50 million in U.S. currency and the release of some 300 plus prisoners. These are people the Colombian Government has arrested in relatively recent months for various crimes against persons and installations.

There is negotiation in process. A foreign minister of a former regime is conducting those negotiations on behalf of the Colombian Government. They have been in contact with the hostages themselves who have formed a small negotiating committee of which our Ambassador, Diego Asencio, is one member.

There has been an initial exchange between the authorities and the group. The situation is still very much on dead center, and we can't see the resolution in sight at this point in time.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, how are we getting our information?

Mr. READ. We have an open line, Mr. Chairman, which we put up right after the event. It has been open for 24 hours now. We do have, of course, the classified link through our regular communications center; and we have formed an around-the-clock task force in the Operations Center of the Department of State, so communications are full and complete.

It is still a matter of piecing together information, as it always is in these fast-breaking events. We are meeting this afternoon, for instance, with representatives of the embassies of other countries who have diplomatic hostages in this incident to share information, and we will be doing that on a regular basis throughout this incident.

Mr. FASCELL. What function does our Embassy in Bogota have at this point with regard to this particular matter?

Mr. READ. They are playing an integral role. Our DCM, Mr. Crigler, almost immediately after the incident opened communications with the Government of Colombia at several levels. He spoke at one point early yesterday afternoon to President Turbay. He has spoken to the foreign minister. The Government of Colombia has designated the No. 2 man in the foreign ministry as their official point of contact, and Mr. Crigler has had repeated communications with him during this period. He is also in touch with people on the scene by simple open radio communications, and there have been phone communications directly with the people inside the Dominican Embassy.

Mr. FASCELL. Are there any other American personnel being held hostage?

Mr. READ. No. To the best of our knowledge there are not, although the composition of the 50 guests we do not know at this time.

Mr. FASCELL. Were any Americans wounded?

Mr. READ. There were not, but one of the two guards, contract employees who had been accompanying Ambassador Asencio, was wounded at the time of the initial occurrence. Happily, his driver, a Foreign Service national employee, was not wounded; and we have, of course, talked to him at some length about it.

Mr. FASCELL. I gather there must have been some information which required bodyguards in Colombia.

Mr. READ. There had been. It was fragmentary. It was not pinpointed in any way toward what actually happened; but there had been some evidence.

Mr. FASCELL. Were all ambassadors to Colombia accompanied by bodyguards?

Mr. READ. I can't say, Mr. Chairman. I am told that there were other guards at the scene, but we don't know who they were.

Mr. FASCELL. You don't know then at this point whether or not the Colombian Government had made any information available which required any extraordinary security precautions?

Mr. READ. I cannot say at this time.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Gray, have you any questions you want to ask at this point?

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. READ, can you tell me anything about the background of the M-19 group that you feel at this time is responsible for the taking of the embassy and the holding of the hostages?

Mr. READ. We have some information about the group, Mr. Gray, but one is never certain of the accuracy of this type of data. Apparently there are several hundred members of this group which was formed perhaps 6 or 7 years ago. It does include, of course, mostly Colombian terrorists, but also some foreign members as well.

It has conducted a variety of terrorist incidents in the intervening years. I guess the thing that brought it to everyone's attention initially was back in 1974 when members of the group stole the sword of Simon Bolivar and got world attention for a short time. But it has conducted a series of straight crimes, terrorist incidents, and other lawbreaking activities which have brought it repeatedly to the attention of the Colombian public and Government.

Perhaps the most serious incident for which they claimed credit afterwards was the assassination of the former Colombian Interior Minister in September 1978. It is an urban terrorist organization which we take very seriously indeed. It has targeted many different people.

Mr. GRAY. So there is evidence that they have killed people in the past, or is there just a claim that they did?

Mr. READ. There is solid evidence of that fact.

Mr. GRAY. Can you describe them politically or philosophically? Have they any philosophical links to any outside groups, outside of the country?

Mr. READ. I cannot do so with any feeling of confidence. Their goals appear to be intra-Colombian first and foremost. They have taken a number of steps to embarrass the Government on different occasions. Their orientation beyond that is hard to accurately summarize.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. [Nods negatively.]

Mr. FASCELL. OK, Mr. Read. Let's go on to your testimony.

Mr. READ. I have a very brief statement, and with your consent I would like to read it. It is just two pages or so, Mr. Chairman.

The year 1979 introduced new security concerns for diplomatic and consular personnel assigned overseas. The events at our embassies in Tehran, Islamabad, Tripoli, and San Salvador demonstrated the vulnerability of our posts to mob violence. Although attacks on our posts abroad are not an entirely new phenomenon, the mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979, and again on November 4, 1979, as well as the total destruction of our Embassy in Islamabad on November 22 and the sacking of our Embassy in Tripoli on December 2 were events quite without precedent.

In the history of diplomatic discourse in the postwar period you cannot find a parallel to what has occurred in these places. As a result, we have reviewed our overseas security programs to determine what additional measures should be taken to improve the protection of our personnel, property, and national security information.

The review has highlighted the need for protection against a new threat not envisaged by the antiterrorism program which the Congress has so generously supported since the mid-1970's. That program has been directed, as you well know, to the threat of individual or group terrorist actions such as we are now witnessing in Bogota.

The violence we have experienced recently, however, and what makes it new, is that of organized mobs allowed to wreak havoc without any or adequate response by the host government.

To cope with this new brand of mob terrorism it is essential to expand and accelerate certain ongoing projects and initiate new ones. The programs identified in our presentation are designed to improve chances of surviving hostile mob action and destroying classified material.

To upgrade the protection and safety of our personnel and property, the initiatives planned would revise or build communication vault areas or alternate locations as mission safe havens in time of attack with appropriate escape features; expand the public access controls program; reinforce perimeter barriers; employ a variety of nonlethal activated access denial systems; significantly increase the life support capabilities of our Embassies under attack; increase our inventory of protective equipment; and augment our radio and telephone programs.

The other major problem encountered by our diplomatic installations in times of crisis has been the protection of national security information. To destroy all sensitive materials and papers in a brief time under harrowing circumstances is obviously almost impossible under current filing and data handling procedures.

We, therefore, recommend a new approach—the installation of centralized electronic storage systems overseas to replace decentralized paper files. These systems would minimize the amount of classified hard copy information filed at posts and allow for quick destruction during crises. Additionally, such systems would permit the rapid reconstruction of the post's key files after the danger has passed.

Our plans also call for the purchase of additional document destruction equipment for use at a great number of locations within an Embassy than at present in order to speed destruction of documents.

The Congress, and your committee in particular, have always been supportive of our security and communication programs in the past. We hope your support will continue in funding these necessary projects after you receive a comprehensive explanation of the effort from Mr. Tracy, Mr. Ackerman, and Mr. Branch. We would be pleased to try to respond to questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, all of us who have visited posts abroad can appreciate the problem of security, and I just want to ask some questions about that.

There are some issues which seem obvious and I am interested in how they fit into the enhancement program which you have been working on. In some posts we are not able to house all of our personnel in one place. I remember in one country we visited we had 11 different installations. Some people felt that was a very bad situation, and yet, in other places we visited everyone, for business purposes, was housed in one building and some people thought that was an extremely bad situation.

In any event, physical security, I suppose, is being incorporated into structures as quickly as is possible, either through incorporation in the plans for new structures or by redesigning and modifying existing ones to incorporate new concepts.

Am I correct so far?

Mr. READ. You certainly are.

Mr. FASCELL. That leaves the question, and I don't know how far along with that we are—

Mr. READ. Quite far.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, is it above the 50-percent mark in terms of worldwide installations?

Mr. READ. In many instances it is. In some it is ahead, in some it is behind. There are a number of facets of that program that we could get into.

Mr. FASCELL. Obviously we cannot make every chancery a fortress. We can build in the facility itself maximum security as such.

The question of Marine guards always comes up.

What is the general rule as far as host governments are concerned on the size of a Marine contingent? Does that vary from country to country?

Mr. READ. It varies enormously. Some countries put a very strict low limit. Others are fairly liberal and permit us to do what we feel needs to be done.

You have pointed out the fundamental question very clearly. As you say, we cannot make our embassies fortresses which will withstand indefinitely sustained attacks.

What we are talking about here, however, in terms of a new program designed to help us in the type of mob action that we have seen in the last calendar year is essentially twofold. It is to look first and foremost at the physical layout of the Embassies. There we find that we have had to use as safe havens, the communication centers within the embassies, which of course were designed for totally different purposes—cable machines and two or three people. But they have had to serve as safe havens in times of sustained mob action.

We must look at them now to see how many people they can hold under emergency circumstances, and whether they have adequate escape facilities. Thank God the one in Islamabad had such an escape hatch.

But we also need to look, as I indicated, at the posts' electronic retrieval of files capability because you cannot burn paper in a closed, small vault and expect safe conditions to prevail.

We cannot and we should not attempt to make embassies impregnable fortresses, but the ability to hold out in safe havens for those first few hours are invaluable when a mob is expending its fury in a situation in which a host government is not doing its duty, as we have seen in these major incidents of 1979. Every hour counts in that sort of a circumstance.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I don't know. It looks very difficult to have a haven big enough in an embassy chancery to hold all of the people, all of the equipment, all of the food and supplies for a sustained attack. You might get by for several hours, but you sure as heck couldn't get by for several days without extensive building modifications. The escape routes would probably have to be underground.

Mr. READ. We have to make sure that a rule of reason prevails here. We are looking at the most dangerous posts.

Mr. FASCELL. With the volatility in the world such as it is today, is there a safe post? You still have the problem in Washington. You have a lot of embassies here. We as a host government have a tremendous responsibility. Assuming the willingness of the host government to cooperate by lending some support, the question is what relationships generally are established for the kind of quick response by the host government, which may be needed? For that period of time, whatever that takes—hopefully, it would not be hours; it should be minutes—it is conceivable to have safe havens to protect the personnel.

Mr. READ. It is, and I think where we have got to try to start in this effort. We are proposing to start at the most dangerous posts where host government capabilities are not a sure thing and where adequate response is not a sure thing, although we have been in contact with all other governments, and not once but repeatedly, since Tehran and Islamabad, to make certain that their obligations would be fulfilled.

It is a continuing dialog that is needed, and we must try to devise, and we think we have, a program which will—

Mr. FASCELL. Let us assume that you built in the maximum security possible in a situation of that kind, and then the terrorists' dynamics change, and now you have to worry about the housing of your personnel. If the personnel are attacked where they live, and that includes families and children, now what?

Mr. READ. In the first instance I hope we have the foresight, and we have been able to demonstrate that in some of the incidents, to drawdown dependents well in advance of such periods of crisis.

Mr. FASCELL. We will take a recess to answer the rollcall. We will get back to these hearings at the first opportunity. We have some questions which we will submit to you for inclusion in the hearing record.

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO HON. BEN H. READ, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR MANAGEMENT, AND RESPONSES THERETO

Q: You mention that recent events represent a new category of threat, one where for whatever reason the host government does not provide prompt and adequate help to us. What are the major categories of threat to our personnel overseas? Are all employees threatened? Ambassadors more than others? Are the problems at residences, against cars, etc.?

A: There are essentially three major categories of threat to our personnel and installations overseas:

-- that of mob violence by the host country populace, or third country nationals, in which the host country does not deter the action or respond in sufficient time to prevent violent acts against our personnel or property (examples of that type of action would be Tehran, Islamabad and Tripoli).

-- that of international terrorist acts by small, well-organized quick strike groups which rely on the elements of surprise and pin-point violence to accomplish their intermediate mission. This type of activity differs from the "mob violence" threat in that the host government generally is not a willing or tacit accomplice, the violence is far more goal directed and the ultimate goals meet international or transnational objectives.

-- crime has increased as a day to day threat faced by our personnel overseas. As financial conditions deteriorate in countries, the incidence of robbery, theft and other crimes of violence increases. In many of our posts abroad the fear of robbery and associated violence is the major fear because it is a daily occurrence and it strikes all personnel at post.

United States diplomatic establishments have been shot at, bombed, attacked with grenades and rockets, stormed by terrorists, pelted with rocks and molotov cocktails, burned and seized by mobs. U.S. diplomats have been shot at, beaten, assassinated, kidnapped and threatened. Their cars have been burned and firebombed, their residences shot at, robbed and burned.

All employees are generally threatened by terrorism. However, the preferred terrorist target is the high ranking diplomat, because of his/her status and the publicity such a target attracts. Of the ten U.S. diplomats killed since 1968, nine have been Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission or Consuls. Nine of these murders occurred from 1968-1976. During the

period 1976 - 1979, only one high ranking U.S. diplomat has been killed, Ambassador Dubs in Afghanistan. All U.S. diplomats and staff, however, are potential targets for terrorists and mob violence. Our experiences in Tehran and Islamabad bear proof to that. The international terrorist organizations have seen ample demonstration in Tehran that the taking of hostages other than an Ambassador also generates enormous world publicity.

The United States takes a variety of security measures for Ambassadors and other senior officials. Armored cars, bodyguards, defensive driving training and other protective measures have all combined to make such attacks more risky for terrorists than they were five or six years ago. Despite the publicity given to occasional sophisticated operations, most terrorist attacks are generally simple in conception and implementation, posing little risk to the perpetrators. Terrorist preference for low-risk operations and the increased security for high level officials leaves the vast majority of foreign service officers vulnerable to an attack.

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Q: How dangerous is it being a U.S. diplomat overseas? Do you have statistics? What are the trends?

A: From 1968 to 1979 there were approximately 273 terrorist incidents directed against U.S. diplomatic interests overseas. The majority of these incidents have taken place in Latin America and Western Europe. Roughly 65% of all anti-American attacks occur in these areas. Bombings, kidnappings and assassinations have been the primary form of attack. From a ten year low of twelve attacks in 1976, there were 21 incidents in 1977, 22 incidents in 1978 and 21 incidents in 1979 directed against U.S. diplomatic interests. The ten year high occurred in 1970 and 1971 when there were 52 and 51 terrorist attacks, respectively, against U.S. diplomatic interests (See Attachments "A" and "B" for statistics)

In general, 1979 was a dangerous year for official Americans overseas. For the first time in three years, a U.S. Ambassador was killed as a result of terrorism. For the first time ever, a large group of American diplomats were seized and held as hostages. U.S. embassies in Iran, Pakistan, Libya and El Salvador were attacked, and in some cases burned. Two Americans lost their lives during these attacks. For the first time ever, Americans were killed by terrorist groups in Turkey. Though these victims were members of the U.S. armed forces, U.S. diplomats face an increased threat in that country because of the high level of terrorist activity. In Belgium, General Alexander Haig, the Supreme Commander of NATO, narrowly escaped being assassinated in a terrorist attack. Thus, the threat to our personnel abroad is assessed by the actual incidents perpetrated against us, incidents directed at other U.S. citizens, threats to U.S. interests, and the state-of-the-art of the terrorists. We are greatly concerned about the increased threat to our embassies from mob violence or hostage-taking. A further concern is the general trend worldwide for increased attacks against persons, especially diplomats.

ATTACHMENT A

Table 1

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-79

Location	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
North America	35	7	23	24	18	18	38	51	37	23	19	25	318 (11.4)
Latin America	41	71	113	70	49	80	124	48	105	46	61	53	861 (25.8)
Western Europe	16	31	5*	38	112	141	151	109	179	129	166	137	1,267 (38.0)
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	3	15 (0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	7	8	4	4	4	9	18	16	20	24	10	124 (3.7)
Middle East and North Africa	18	32	60	52	35	21	47	56	62	48	61	39	531 (15.9)
Asia	1	12	19	24	43	10	11	13	14	8	16	26	197 (5.9)
Oceania	0	5	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	19 (0.5)
Transregional	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.1)
Total	111	166	282	216	269	275	382	297	413	279	353	293	3,336

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 2

International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Target

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	273 (20.3)
Military officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	204 (15.1)
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	217 (16.1)
Business facilities or executives	6	35	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	487 (36.2)
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	166 (12.3)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	122	77	1,347

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

This table is Unclassified.

ATTACHMENT B

CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS INVOLVING
NON-OFFICIAL AMERICAN CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS

1969 - April 30, 1979

June 20, 1969	Uruguay	2 Tupamaro terrorists dressed in police uniforms attacked a facility of the General Motors Company in Montevideo causing damage estimated at \$1 million.
June 26, 1969	Argentina	A series of bombings of stores in Argentina of a US-owned Minimax supermarket chains occurred on the occasion of an official visit of Governor David Rockefeller.
August 9, 1969	Greece	2 American tourists were injured when a bomb exploded at an Olympic Airlines facility in Athens.
October 6, 1969	Argentina	Offices of the First National City Bank, Pepsi-Cola, Squibb and Dunlop Tires in Cordoba were damaged by bombs.
October 6, 1969	Argentina	Bombs damaged offices of IBM and General Electric Company in Tucuman.
October 8, 1969	Argentina	A branch of the Bank of Boston in Buenos Aires was bombed.
October 8, 1969	Argentina	An office of Remington Rand was bombed in Sante Fe.
November 20, 1969	Argentina	Offices of 15 foreign firms, including 9 US firms, were bombed. The Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) claimed responsibility.

March, 1970	Ethiopia	5 members of a National Geographic film crew, including an American producer, were taken hostage by members of the ELF. There were no ransom demands but the 5 were held for 17 days and then released unharmed.
July 21, 1970	Bolivia	Terrorists burned the offices of the US-owned gold mining firm South American Placers, Inc., stole \$5,000 and fled into the jungle with their captives whom they threatened to execute unless the Bolivian Government released 10 prisoners within 48 hours. The Government yielded and the 2 technicians were released unharmed on July 23.
August 19, 1970	Uruguay	Stephen Spann, son of a local Southern Baptist missionary, was held captive by a group of Tupamaros while his car was being used in a bank robbery. He was released unharmed a few hours later.
September 11, 1970	Uruguay	Tupamaros robbed the offices of ESSO Standard Oil Company of \$1,800.
December 1, 1970	Uruguay	Tupamaros bombed the offices of ITT.
March 15, 1971	Netherlands	Terrorists sabotaged the Gulf Oil Company refinery in Rotterdam. The terrorists were reported to be Europeans operating on a contract for an underground organization controlled by Fatah.
April 2, 1971	Jordan	Fedayeen damaged the pipeline carrying crude oil to the Zarka refinery in Jordan. The pipeline is an extension of the Tapline and is owned by the Arabian-American Oil Company.

May 23, 1971	Argentina	Stanley Sylvester, an executive of the Swift Meat Packing Company in Rosario and Honorary British Consul, was kidnapped by members of the ERP. The kidnapers demanded the company donate \$62,500 worth of food, clothing and school supplies to the poor. The company complied and Sylvester was released unharmed on May 30.
September 9, 1971	Jordan	Fedayeen terrorists damaged the Tapline near the Syrian border.
September 15, 1971	Jordan	Fedayeen terrorists blew up a section of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, which is owned by Tapline, a US company.
September 16, 1971	Israel	Fedayeen terrorists threw a hand grenade into a crowd of American tourists. One child was killed, 6 others injured and 5 American tourists were hit by shrapnel.
November 3, 1971	Brazil	Molotov cocktails damaged a car of the US Consul General and homes of officials of Swift & Company and Chicago Bridge Company in Sao Paulo.
November 10, 1971	Jordan	4 explosions occurred in the Intercontinental Hotel which is managed by US personnel and at one time had a small amount of US backing.
January, 1972	Kuwait	2 incidents, one confirmed as sabotage, damaged facilities of the Kuwait Oil Company, which is partially US owned.
January 16, 1972	Gaza Strip	A US nurse was killed in a terrorist attack.

March 27, 1972	Turkey	3 NATO radar technicians were kidnapped and murdered by terrorists of the Turkish People's Liberation Army at Unye.
May 12, 1972	Argentina	4 US firms were bombed by members of the Comit�e Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialista.
May 25, 1972	France	Bombs exploded at the US Consulate and at offices of the American Legion, Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airways in Paris.
June 9, 1972	Argentina	Bombs placed by Argentine terrorists damaged 4 US firms.
July 28, 1972	Uruguay	Hector Menoni, manager of UPI in Uruguay, was kidnapped by terrorists. He was released unharmed on July 29.
September 5, 1972	Argentina	Argentine terrorists kidnapped Jan Van de Panne, a Dutch executive of the Phillips Company in Buenos Aires. The kidnapers demanded \$500,000 ransom which the company paid. Van de Panne was released unharmed on September 7.
October 16, 1972	Argentina	A bomb, placed by supporters of Juan Peron, exploded in the Sheraton Hotel in Buenos Aires. A Canadian vacationer was killed.
November 5, 1972	El Salvador	A bomb was detonated in the Pan American World Airways main ticket office causing considerable damage but no casualties.

November 9, 1972	Argentina	A powerful bomb explosion damaged the San Miguel de Tucumen branch of the US owned IBM Corporation.
December 8, 1972	Australia	An American businessman vacationing in Australia was killed in a bomb blast in an auto outside a Serbian Orthodox church in Brisbane.
December 27, 1972	Argentina	An executive of Standard Electric of Argentina was kidnapped by a group identified as Demiscados Peronistas Montoneros. He was released on December 30 after payment of ransom.
December 27, 1972	Argentina	Vicenta Russo, an executive for the Argentine subsidiary of ITT, was kidnapped. He was released on December 29. The company refused to say if it had paid a ransom.
January 17, 1973	Lebanon	A small charge of dynamite wrecked a basement restroom in the American University of Beirut.
January 24, 1973	Iran	A small bomb exploded at the office of Pan American Airlines in Tehran.
February 3, 1973	Argentina	Norman Lee, an Argentine Coca-Cola Bottling Company executive, was kidnapped. He was released about 2 weeks later apparently after payment of a ransom. (See July 4, 1973 incident.)
March 28, 1973	Argentina	Gerardo Scalmazzi, manager of the Rosario branch of the First National Bank of Boston, was kidnapped by Argentine guerrillas. He was released on April 4 when the bank paid an estimated \$1 million ransom.

March 28, 1973	Argentina	Gerardo Scalmazzi, manager of the Rosario branch of the First National Bank of Boston, was kidnapped by Argentine guerrillas. He was released on April 4 when the bank paid an estimated \$1 million ransom.
April 2, 1973	Argentina	Anthony de Cruz, an American executive with a Kodak subsidiary in Buenos Aires, was kidnapped by the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). He was released 5 days later when Kodak paid \$1.5 million in ransom.
April 8, 1973	Argentina	Francisco Brimicombe, President of Nobleza Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of the British and American Tobacco Company, was kidnapped outside his home in Buenos Aires by members of the ERP. A ransom of approximately \$1 million was paid for his release.
April 14, 1973	Lebanon	Masked raiders destroyed a US owned Tapline storage tank in Sidon, badly damaged 2 others and slightly damaged a fourth.
April 16, 1973	Lebanon	Unknown saboteurs tried to blow up the Tapline in Zahrani, but only dented the pipeline. The flow of oil was not affected by the minor damage.
April 21, 1973	Italy	A car owned by an American employee of the European Exchange Service was slightly damaged by a small bomb. Leaflets attributed the action to the National Youth Resistance Organization.

April 29, 1973	El Salvador	An explosion caused extensive damage to local IBM offices in San Salvador.
April 30, 1973	Argentina	A bomb exploded in a building owned by the Goodyear Rubber Company in Cordoba, seriously damaging the building but causing no casualties. The ERP later claimed responsibility for the attack.
May 1, 1973	Argentina	A bomb placed by the ERP exploded in front of the Goodyear Office in Cordoba.
May 2, 1973	Spain	2 firebombs were thrown at Pan American Airlines offices in Barcelona breaking all the windows and causing considerable smoke damage.
May 7-13, 1973	Greece	2 pipe bomb explosions: One heavily damaged a car carrying official non-diplomatic tags that belonged to a US-European Exchange System vendor in Athens; another damaged the auto of a US civilian employed at Athenai Airport. On May 13, pipe bombs caused extensive damage to autos of 2 US military personnel and to the auto of a Greek-American movie producer.
May 21, 1973	Argentina	Oscar Castell, manager of the Coca-Cola Bottling plant in Cordoba, was kidnapped by several armed men. He was released on June 2 after a ransom of \$100,000 was paid.
May 21, 1973	Argentina	2 executives of the Ford Motor Company in Buenos Aires were wounded in an unsuccessful kidnap attempt made by the ERP. One of the executives died on June 25 from the wounds.

May 23, 1973	Argentina	A bomb was defused at the Ford Motor Company offices in Buenos Aires. Ford agreed to give \$1 million worth of ambulances and donations to hospitals in response to extortion demands by the ERP.
June 6, 1973	Argentina	Charles Agnew Lockwood, a British Director of the Roberts Finance Company, which represents some American and British interests, was kidnaped by several gunmen who were identified as members of the ERP. Lockwood was released on July 29 after his firm agreed to pay the \$2 million demanded by the kidnapers.
June 18, 1973	Argentina	John R. Thompson, President and General Manager for the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. in Buenos Aires, was kidnapped by several armed men, allegedly elements of the ERP. He was released unharmed on July 6 after a reported record payment of \$3 million in ransom.
June 18, 1973	Guatemala	Roberto Galvez, General Manager of Corn Products, an American company in Guatemala City, was kidnapped by persons claiming to be members of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). He was released after the payment of \$50,000 ransom.
July 2, 1973	Argentina	Raul Bornancini, Assistant Manager and head of banking operations for the Cordoba City Bank of the First National City Bank of New York, was kidnapped while en route from his home to his office. Several hours later a ransom demand of \$1 million was made by a person who said the kidnapers were not connected with a political group. Bornancini was released on July 5 after a ransom payment was made.

July 4, 1973	Argentina	Norman Lee, an executive of the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in Buenos Aires, was kidnapped for a second time by a group of armed men. After convincing the kidnapers they would not receive any more ransom, Lee was released; the kidnapers took his car and approximately \$100 from his wallet. (See February 3, 1973 incident.)
July 26, 1973	Honduras	A tear gas bomb was fired into the offices of the Organization of American States in Tegucigalpa by several unidentified persons.
August, 1973	Argentina	An unidentified Pepsi-Cola executive was kidnapped and held for \$1 million ransom, according to the Argentine press. Both the police and company officials denied knowledge of the kidnapping; in some previous cases, however, there was no official acknowledgement until the victim was released.
August 2, 1973	France	Juan Felipe de la Cruz Serafin, a US citizen and member of the militant anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Directorate, was killed in a bomb explosion in his hotel room in Avrainville.
September 10, 1973	Italy	A small bomb exploded in the mailbox at the home of a US citizen in Bologna. There were no injuries. Italian police investigation has eliminated the possibility of a letter bomb and they surmise it was the work of pranksters.
September 21, 1973	Argentina	David George Heywood, an accountant with the Nobleza Tobacco Co., a subsidiary of the British-American Tobacco Company, was kidnapped by 6 gunmen. On October 20 Argentine police announced they had freed Heywood and arrested 2 of his captors.

September 24, 1973	Lebanon	Unknown persons tried to blow up the oil pipeline of the Tapline Co. in the An-Nabitayah district of Lebanon. The explosion made a hole in the ground without causing any damage to the pipeline.
September 28, 1973	Italy	A fire occurred outside the office of ITT Standard S.A. in Rome. Police said unknown persons poured gasoline on the main doors of the office and ignited it, but the fire was quickly put out and damage was slight.
October 4, 1973	Colombia	Rene Francis Kast and Willis Leon Dotsun (also reported in the press as Leon Norton), US employees of the Frontino Gold Mines, were kidnapped by the ELN who demanded \$168,990 in ransom. The company attempted to pay ransom but Colombian authorities seized the money as it was being delivered. The Colombian Army rescued the 2 men on March 7, 1974.
October 8, 1973	Argentina	12 rockets were fired at the Sheraton Hotel in Buenos Aires. Only 2 hit the building, causing little damage and no injuries. On the same day, the Bank of America was firebombed by a group of young demonstrators who threw molotov cocktails that did considerable damage to the building.
October 9, 1973	Argentina	Bombs exploded in front of the offices of Coca-Cola and Firestone Rubber Co. There were no injuries.

- October 18-19, 1973 Lebanon 4 armed men, claiming to be members of the Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization, shot their way into the Bank of America in Beirut taking about 50 employees and customers as hostages. An American hostage, John C. Maxwell of Douglas Aircraft Co., a Lebanese national and 2 of the gunmen were killed when Lebanese police stormed the building. On March 9, 1974, the 2 remaining terrorists were sentenced by a Lebanese military tribunal, one receiving the death sentence and the other life imprisonment. As of late 1974, both men were in prison with appeals pending.
- October 19, 1973 Malaysia 8 persons were injured when a time bomb exploded at the Lincoln Center in Kuala Lumpur. Left-wing students who had denounced US support for Israel were behind the bombing, according to press reports; however, the students denied this when confronted by Malaysian officials.
- October 23, 1973 Argentina David B. Wilkie, Jr., President of the Argentine subsidiary of Amoco International Oil Co. of Chicago, was kidnapped and held for \$1 million ransom. Wilkie was released on November 11 after a part of the ransom was paid. Amoco officials believe the kidnapers were common criminals.
- November 17, 1973 Germany 2 subsidiaries of ITT, one in Nuernberg and one in West Berlin, were hit by bomb explosions. There were no injuries but both bombs did considerable damage to the buildings, as well as to parked cars in the vicinity. The perpetrators are unknown, but German authorities do not rule out involvement of the Baader-Meinhof group.

- November 22, 1973 Argentina John A. Swint, US citizen and General Manager of the Ford subsidiary Transax and 2 of his bodyguards were shot to death in an ambush by a group of about 15 men. A third bodyguard was critically injured. The ERP is suspected as being responsible for the killings.
- December 3, 1973 Greece A bomb exploded outside the building housing a branch office of the Bank of America. There were no injuries but there was material damage to the bank building and adjacent area.
- December 6, 1973 Argentina Victor E. Samuelson, General Manager of the ESSO Oil Refinery at Campana, was kidnapped by members of the ERP. Samuelson was released on April 29, 1974, 7 weeks after his company had paid a record ransom of \$14.2 million.
- December 18, 1973 Portugal The main office of Mobil Portuguesa was stoned by 15-20 youths. There were no injuries but damage was estimated at \$810,000. Leaflets identified the perpetrators as members of the reorganized Movement of the Portuguese Proletariat. On the same day, offices of Reader's Digest and Ford were also stoned, possibly by the same group.
- December 20, 1973 Greece A watchman discovered a bomb in an elevator of the building where the local branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank is located. It was turned over to police who disarmed it.

December 21, 1973	Argentina	Charles R. Hayes, construction superintendent of the US engineering firm A.G. McKee and Company, was kidnapped at gunpoint while driving to work. Hayes was released by his abductors, possibly common criminals, on January 31, 1974. The original ransom demand was for \$1 million, but the amount paid for his release was not revealed.
December 21&26, 1973	London	2 bombs exploded outside the London Hilton Hotel bar. There were no injuries in the double blast. Both devices were described as small and said damage was minimal. On December 26, 2 more bombs exploded, one shattering a bar adjacent to a crowded theater. There were no injuries, although 2 persons were treated for shock.
December 30, 1973	London	Joseph E. Sieff, President of the Marks and Spencer store chain, was shot by a gunman who burst into his home and later escaped. The PFLP claimed responsibility for the shooting.
December 31, 1973	Italy	Explosions heavily damaged 3 building housing offices of companies owned by ITT.
January 3, 1974	Argentina	Douglas G. Roberts, an Argentine citizen and director of the Pepsi-Cola Co., was kidnapped by gunmen. Roberts was freed by Argentine police early in February. His abductors appeared to be common criminals.

January 11, 1974	Italy	4 bomb exploded in Rome causing extensive damage to buildings but no injuries. Messages found near the sites of the bombings accused ITT of being behind a "reactionary and fascist plot" in Italy. The persons responsible are unknown.
January 31, 1974	Singapore	4 terrorists, believed to be members of the PFLP and JRA, set fire to the Shell Oil Company tank on Pulau Bukum Island off Singapore. The terrorists, with hostages from the refinery, then hijacked a small ferry boat in an attempt to escape but were intercepted by Singapore police.
February 11, 1974	Israel	3 Christian establishments -- the office of Baptist House (run by the US Southern Baptist Convention), the US owned Zion House Bible Shop and the chapel of the Swedish Theological Institute -- were firebombed. The group responsible for the bombings is not known.
February 23, 1974	Greece	Terrorists placed 5 bombs in the Dow chemical plant at Lavreion, about 40 miles from Athens. 4 exploded causing material damage. The fifth bomb exploded while 2 Greek demolition experts were attempting to defuse it; both were killed. The People's Resistance Organization Army claimed responsibility for the bombings.
February 24, 1974	Mexico	7 bombs exploded at US and other companies. There were no injuries. Pepsi-Cola and Union Carbide plants were bombed in Guadalajara, and Coca-Cola, a bakery and federal offices were targets in Oaxaca. The perpetrators are not known.

March 1, 1974	France	The Sonolar factory, owned by a French subsidiary of ITT, was destroyed by fire. A group calling itself "We Must Do Something" claimed responsibility for the fire.
March 14, 1974	Venezuela	Incendiary bombs went off at the Sears main store in Caracas causing minor fires that were extinguished with little damage.
March 26, 1974	Ethiopia	4 Tenneco Oil Company employees (3 US and 1 Canadian) and their Canadian pilot were captured by Eritrean Liberation Front/General Command (ELF/GC) insurgents after their helicopter made a forced landing because of bad weather near Massawa in Eritrea. After long and complicated negotiations by Tenneco officials, the hostages were released on September 11. (Another Canadian pilot and an American missionary nurse captured by the ELF/GC in subsequent terrorist acts were released in June.)
May 1, 1974	Lebanon	A dynamite blast damaged the Tapline telemetering station located west of the Hasbani River in the vicinity of the Israeli border. The Lebanese Army extinguished the resulting fire, which had no effect on pipeline operations. The Organization of Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (OANY) claimed responsibility.

May 19, 1974	London	A bomb estimated as weighing 100 pounds was detonated in a public parking garage at Heathrow Airport, damaging about 40 vehicles and injuring 3 persons, including one American tourist.
May 22, 1974	Belgium	A stolen auto loaded with cans of gasoline exploded outside the office of Iberia Airlines. The blast injured one person and caused heavy damage to the building, which also houses the First National Bank and the American owned Westbury Hotel. The Spanish exile International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) was held responsible.
May 27, 1974	Ethiopia	4 armed members of the ELF forced their way into the American Evangelical Mission Hospital at Ghinda, near Asmara, and kidnapped 2 nurses -- one a US national, the other a Dutch national who was later killed. The American nurse was released on June 22, 1974.
June 18, 1974	Switzerland	Detonation of a powerful explosive at the Zurich branch of the US owned Manufacturers Hanover Trust caused extensive damage to the installation but no personal injuries. Members of the Krause Group were arrested in connection with this explosion.
June 19-24, 1974	Argentina	A series of bombs damaged the offices or premises of the following business establishments: First National City Bank (2 branches), Bank of Boston (2 branches), Bank of America, Coca-Cola (warehouse), Eveready, Ford (showroom), Parke-Davis and Xerox.

July 17, 1974	Argentina	Machine gun fire from a passing car was directed at the home of Juan Courard, an Argentine national and head of the Ford Motor Company of Argentina. One guard was injured in the attack. The ERP is suspected.
August 6, 1974	Argentina	Maurice Kember, an Argentine national and President of Inti, Inc., a subsidiary of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company, was kidnapped in front of his house as he was leaving for work. Kember was freed on October 8 after a gun battle in which one of his abductors was killed, 2 wounded and 3 others captured. A \$1.5 million ransom had been demanded for his release.
August 14, 1974	Syria	A homemade bomb exploded near the entrance of the US pavilion at the Damascus International Fair. There was moderate damage to the "Skylab" exhibit. One pavilion guard and one civilian policeman sustained minor injuries. The Arab Communist Organization claimed responsibility.
September, 1974	Argentina	A series of bombs exploded at US companies in Buenos Aires. Targets included: 3 Ford showrooms; Goodyear and Firestone tire distributors; Union Carbide Battery Company; Bank of Boston and Chase Manhattan Bank branches; Xerox Corporation; and, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Companies.
October 6, 1974	Italy	4 terrorists invaded Face-Standard, a local ITT communications subsidiary and set fire to a warehouse resulting in about \$9 million damage. The same evening Avis Milan offices were also bombed with damage reported to be about \$15,000.

October 10&11, 1974	Syria	A Syrian office boy was killed and a cleaning woman injured in an explosion at the offices of the National Cash Register Company (NCR) in Damascus. The 2 story building was severely damaged and most of its contents destroyed. NCR offices in Aleppo also were bombed on October 11. A group calling itself the Arab Communist Organization claimed responsibility.
October 11, 1974	Lebanon	An explosion damaged the First National Bank of Chicago in downtown Beirut. No injuries were reported. The Arab Communist Organization claimed responsibility. A statement found near the bank entrance demanded the release of a Lebanese under death sentence for the seizure of the Beirut branch of the Bank of America on October 18, 1973.
October 21, 1974	Argentina	The USIS Binational Center was bombed. On the same evening, a Ford showroom and a Pepsi-Cola Bottling plant in Rio Cuarto were bombed, with moderate damage and no injuries. An Argentine official of the Transax Company (a Ford affiliate) was seriously injured by a powerful bomb as he left his home in San Carlos.
October 29, 1974	Iran	Bombs were exploded causing considerable property damage; ITT offices were completely gutted. Iranian revolutionaries were responsible for the incident.
November 1, 1974	Peru	A bomb exploded in a Sears Roebuck store, causing extensive damage and injuring 11 persons, none seriously.

November 3&5, 1974	Italy	Gasoline bombs were thrown into the offices of the IBM Corporation and the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, causing light damage. 3 branches of the Italian affiliate of the Bank of America were damaged, one extensively, when gasoline bombs were thrown by unidentified youths. There were no injuries. On November 5, firebombs were tossed into the offices of Honeywell by a group of youths.
November 7, 1974	Ecuador	2 bombs exploded near the conference site of the Organization of American States, causing extensive damage.
November 14, 1974	Mexico	Mrs. Sara M. Davis, wife of an American real estate dealer, was kidnapped. The abductors demanded a ransom of nearly \$1 million in food and land for the poor. 2 communique found in a Mexico City subway station were signed by the "United Popular Liberation Army of America."
November 18, 1974	Mexico	A wave of bombings hit commercial establishments including explosions at Sears and a US owned restaurant and drug store, causing extensive damage. The 23rd of September Communist League was believed responsible.
November 21, 1974	Peru	A bomb exploded in a Sears Roebuck store causing extensive damage and injuring 11 persons, none seriously. The Revolutionary Vanguard was believed responsible.

November 25, 1974	Argentina	A branch of the First National City Bank and 2 General Motors showrooms were damaged by bomb explosions. There were no injuries and the perpetrators are unknown.
December 7, 1974	Peru	A group of unidentified persons opened fire with submachine guns on the Sheraton Hotel, wounding at least 2 guards.
December 15-16, 1974	France	Bombs exploded outside TWA and Coca-Cola offices, causing slight damage. On December 16, another bomb exploded at the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, shattering windows. There were no injuries in either explosion. Members of the extreme right-wing Youth Action Group claimed responsibility.
December 22, 1974	Jerusalem	A 16-year old American girl was seriously injured when a grenade struck a bus carrying an American tourist group. The PLO later issued a statement warning visitors "not to go to occupied Palestine during the escalation of commando activity against the Israeli enemy." The bus belonged to a local company and the attacker may not have been aware that it was carrying an American group.
December 24, 1974	Australia	2 firebombs were thrown into a downtown office of Pan American Airways, causing moderate damage but no injuries. A socialist youth group may have been responsible.

February 11, 1975	Lebanon	A bomb exploded at a branch office of the American Life Insurance Co. in Tyre, causing extensive damage but no casualties. The Arab Communist Organization claimed credit for the explosion.
February 17, 1975	Lebanon	The 11-year old son of Robert Walker, chaplain and professor of culture at the American University of Beirut, was slightly injured when a hand grenade attached to his father's car exploded. The perpetrators are unknown.
February 21, 1975	Argentina	The First National Bank of New York, the Bank of Boston and several other foreign banks were damaged by bomb blasts. Several auto showrooms were also damaged, causing injuries to 2 persons. The perpetrators are unknown.
March 9, 1975	Argentina	Leftist guerrillas bombed new cars on production lot at the Chrysler-Fevre plant in San Justo, causing extensive damage. No casualties were reported. The Montoneros were held responsible.
April 11, 1975	Kuwait	A bomb exploded at the American Life Insurance Co., causing considerable damage; there were no injuries. The Kuwaiti press reported that the Communist Labor Organization (Lebanon) was responsible. This probably is the Arab Communist Organization which had previously claimed responsibility for similar acts against US owned companies. 3 of the terrorists were arrested in July and sentenced in late December, 1975 to prison terms of from 3-15 years to be followed by deportation. Several other ACO terrorists were arrested in July, 1975 in Syria and Lebanon. Those in Syria were sentenced shortly after their arrest and some were executed. The fate of those in Lebanon is not known.

May 7, 1975	France	A bomb exploded in the Paris office of IBM. No one was injured. A Spanish anarchist group, GARI, claimed responsibility for the attack.
May 16, 1975	Spain	The Pan American office in Barcelona was attacked by a group of youths who were protesting the American use of force to free the "Mayaguez." Windows were broken and a molotov cocktail was exploded which caused smoke and fire damage. Leaflets referring to the "Mayaguez" incident were found scattered in the area and were attributed to a Catalan separatist group.
May 19, 1975	Tanzania	4 Stanford University students - 3 Americans (Barbara Smuts, Carrie Hunter and Kenneth Steven Smith) and a Dutch girl (Emilie Bergmann), were kidnapped from an animal research center. A group of armed men from the insurgent People's Revolutionary Party stormed the camp in Western Tanzania and took the hostages by boat to Zaire. On May 25, one American girl was released to carry the kidnappers' demands to officials, which included \$500,000 in cash, a large quantity of arms and ammunition and the release of 2 PRP colleagues imprisoned in Tanzania. On June 28, 2 of the remaining 3 hostages were freed. The terms of their release were not disclosed but the press speculated that \$40,000 was paid. The fourth student was freed on July 26.

May 31, 1975	Lebanon	A dynamite explosion blew out windows and damaged offices of ITT in downtown Beirut. Most of the offices and shops in the building had closed and no injuries were reported. The Arab Communist Organization claimed responsibility.
June 3, 1975	Italy	Firebombs were thrown at offices of 3 American companies only hours after President Ford left Rome. Windows were broken at a branch of the Bank of America; a fire in a storage area caused minor damage at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and bombs exploded but did not break windows at an ITT subsidiary. The perpetrators are unknown.
July 14, 1975	Ethiopia	2 US employees of Collins International Service Company, James Harrell and Steven Campbell, were kidnapped from the US Navy Kagnev Station transmitter site in Asmara by members of the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), an Eritrean separatist group. They were released on May 3, 1976.
July 19, 1975	Mexico	An American Express executive was kidnapped outside his house by 5 armed terrorists. He was released on July 21 after a ransom of \$80,000 in Mexican pesos was paid. The executive identified his captors as members of the 23rd of September League, an urban guerrilla gang that has been responsible for a number of bloody bank robberies and abductions over the past 2 years. However, Mexican authorities believe the abductors probably are common criminals using a political cover.

August 2, 1975	Lebanon	Constance Stransky, a US citizen, was held hostage by an unidentified Palestinian group. She was released unharmed 11 days later.
August 4, 1975	Malaysia	3 American citizens were taken hostage, along with US Consul Robert Stebbins and 50 others of various nationalities, by 5 Japanese Red Army (JRA) terrorists in the US and Swedish Consulates in Kuala Lumpur. The release of 5 terrorists from Japanese prisons was arranged; 2 other terrorists refused to be released. The 10 terrorists, accompanied by 2 senior Malaysian and 2 senior Japanese guarantors in place of the original hostages, flew to Libya on August 7. The guarantors were released and the terrorists gave themselves up to Libyan officials.
August 5, 1975	Colombia	A Sears Roebuck executive, Donald Cooper, was abducted from his home in Bogota by 8 unidentified gunmen. His maid and chauffeur were wounded in the attack. After almost 3 months of captivity and negotiations between Sears and the kidnapers, Cooper was released unharmed on November 2.
August 30, 1975	Philippines	2 US employees of Boise-Cascade were abducted from a timber concession near Zamboanga, by presumed Moslem dissidents. They were released unharmed less than 24 hours later.

September 5, 1975	London	A bomb exploded in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel, killing 2 and injuring more than 40. Army bomb experts discovered and set off a second bomb at the Hotel. Associate News papers in London received a warning from an anonymous caller with an Irish accent that the bomb would go off. The call came too late to evacuate the hotel before the bomb exploded. Police think the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is responsible.
September 11, 1975	Portugal	The Sheraton Hotel was bombed. There was slight property damage. An anonymous caller claimed that the "Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity" was responsible.
October 11, 1975	Turkey	2 improvised explosive devices were detonated near US-occupied buildings in Ankara, causing property damage but no injuries. One device was thrown from a passing car into the parking lot of a building occupied by the US Base Civil Engineer Detachment. The second explosion occurred at the Ankara Officers Club. The perpetrators are unknown.
October 29, 1975	Lebanon	Herman Huddleston, an American pilot for Trans-Mediterranean Airlines, was kidnapped from his apartment by armed Palestinians who were suspicious of his amateur radio equipment. He was released unharmed 3 days later.
November 21, 1975	Ethiopia	US citizen Ronald Michalke, an employee of Collins International Service Company, was kidnapped from his home in Asmara by 5 armed Ethiopians who were members of one of the Eritrean insurgent groups. He was released unharmed on June 2, 1976 by the Eritrean Liberation Front.

January 9, 1976	France	Firebombs were thrown at the 2 UNESCO headquarters buildings in Paris, causing property damage but no injuries. A group called the Jewish Self-Defense Front claimed responsibility.
January 14, 1976	Colombia	A Colombian employee of Intercol (ESSO) Fred Archibald, was kidnapped by guerrillas. He was released on January 17, after Intercol paid a ransom. The guerrillas claimed they were Communists without specifying membership in a particular organization. The press speculated that the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) was responsible.
January 29, 1976	Argentina	2 Bendix officials, Argentine citizens were killed in their offices by terrorists. A small bomb destroyed the interior of the General Manager's office. A policeman was also killed when he tried to interfere with the terrorists. A Montonero slogan was painted on the outside wall of the offices.
February 27, 1976	Venezuela	William Niehous, Vice President and manager of the Owens-Illinois Glass Company in Venezuela, was kidnapped from his home in Caracas by 7 gunmen. A group calling itself "Revolutionary Command", not further identified, claimed credit for the kidnapping. The Venezuelan Government announced it would expropriate Owens-Illinois after the company gave a \$116 bonus to each of its employees and paid for the placement of the kidnappers' "political manifesto" in several newspapers abroad. The Venezuelan Government has refused to deal with the kidnappers, who had issued new demands for the release of Niehous. There has been no communication from Niehous or his kidnappers since July, 1976, and as early 1977 nothing was known of his fate. As of April 30, 1978, nothing is still known of his fate.

February 27, 1976	Greece	Homemade bombs exploded at the American Express and Chase Manhattan Banks in downtown Athens. The perpetrators are unknown.
March 31, 1976	Turkey	A bomb exploded outside the entrance to the Pan American Airlines office in Ankara, causing extensive property damage but no serious injuries. No group claimed credit for the bombing.
April 2, 1976	Greece	A smoke bomb detonated at the American Express office in Athens, causing limited damage. Afterwards, American Express received several telephone calls regarding 2 additional bombs allegedly planted at the office; however, no devices were found.
April 3, 1976	Colombia	A bomb exploded at the First National City Bank in Bogota. This was one of a series of bombings that weekend. The perpetrators are unknown.
April 14, 1976	Argentina	The Argentine marketing manager of the Chrysler Corporation was shot to death in his Buenos Aires home by unknown terrorists. He was the sixth employee of an American Company killed in a recent wave of violence in Argentina.
April 14&21, 1976	Italy	The Armed Communist Formations, a new name among Italian extremist organizations, claimed credit for the April 14 firebombing of the Texaco Oil Company offices in Florence. The same group claimed credit for severely wounding the Italian President of Chevron Oil Italiana in Rome on April 21. Chevron is a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California.

April 22, 1976	Greece	A bomb exploded at the Athens branch of the First National City Bank.
April 23, 1976	Turkey	A bomb exploded at the entrance to the American Language and Trade Institute, a private girls' school founded by the American Board Mission and the YWCA. Damage was negligible. The school is the first non-military American target to be attacked in Istanbul. No group has claimed responsibility.
June 26, 1976	Argentina	2 US missionaries were kidnapped in Argentina by the Political Military Organization of Paraguay and taken to Paraguay. The missionaries were released on June 30 after the police raided the kidnappers' hideout.
July 27, 1976	Colombia	A bomb explosion occurred at the US pavilion causing some property damage but no injuries. The fair had ended on July 25. The perpetrators are unknown.
August 4, 1976	Colombia	A bomb exploded at the Summer Linguistics Institute in Bogota, injuring 5 US citizens who had just arrived from Peru. Several other bombs were detonated in Bogota, one at the Bank of America.
August 11, 1976	Turkey	4 persons, including one US citizen, were killed and 17 injured when 2 terrorists attacked passengers preparing to board an El Al flight to Israel. The captured terrorists claimed to belong to the PFLP. After trial in Istanbul, the 2 were sentenced to life imprisonment on November 16, 1976.

August 23, 1976	Egypt	3 terrorists hijacked an Egypt Air Boeing 737 in Cairo and flew it to Luxor, demanding the release of several Libyans imprisoned for assassination plots. Egyptian authorities stormed the plane and the passengers, including a few Americans were unharmed. The 3 were sentenced by an Egyptian Tribunal and were sentenced to life at hard labor.
August 27, 1976	Argentina	3 people were injured in separate incidents when bombs hidden in flowers and other gift packages exploded. One of the victims was associated with the Renault auto company, another with IBM and a third with a Ford subsidiary. The Montoneros later claimed responsibility for sending the bombs.
August 28, 1976	Iran	3 American officials of Rockwell International were assassinated by terrorists. The terrorists belonged to the People's Strugglers, the "Islamic Marxist" anti-government group which was also responsible for assassinating 2 US military officers last year. One of the assassins was killed by Iranian authorities on September 3 when he attempted to avoid arrest.
September 1, 1976	Argentina	David Kraiselburd, the 2 year old US citizen son of Argentinian newspaper publisher, Raul Kraiselburd, was kidnapped near Buenos Aires. 5 arrested suspects confessed on September 5, 1977 that although they had planned to demand ransom, they had killed the child because they had no place to hide him. On September 27, 1977, 4 of these suspects were killed by Argentinian police when they tried to escape from the prison in La Plata where they were being held.

September 9, 1976	Argentina	An Argentine executive of the Chrysler factory in Buenos Aires was assassinated in front of his home. The Montoneros claimed responsibility. Workers have been on strike at the auto factories in Argentina. This assassination followed the firing of 121 workers accused by Chrysler and Ford of promoting work stoppages and slowdowns.
September 11, 1976	Italy	Bombs exploded outside the offices of USIS. The "Che Guevara Internationalist Brigade" claimed credit for placing the bombs. In addition, molotov cocktails were thrown at the office of Honeywell International and the auto of a US Navy enlisted man. Police speculated that the bombings were to mark the third anniversary of the military coup in Chile which resulted in the death of Salvador Allende.
September 15, 1976	Argentina	Guerrillas fired submachine guns and 3 hand grenades against the house of an Argentine executive of the Ford Motor Company in Buenos Aires. The Montoneros claimed responsibility. This is the second attack against an auto executive within a week. The auto industry has been experiencing strikes and slowdowns and 121 workers were recently fired.
September 20, 1976	Argentina	Several persons in a truck fired on the Chrysler Febre-Argentina administrative offices outside Buenos Aires. The Montoneros claimed credit for the attack on Chrysler and an earlier attack at the home of a Ford executive.

September 25, 1976 Italy Numerous bombings and firebombings occurred simultaneously with the rally against American, Israeli and Lebanese installations in Rome: 3 branches of the Bank of America and an office of Avis car rentals. The Avis office suffered extensive damage.

September 28, 1976 Colombia Gustavo Curtis, the American manager of the US owned Beatrice Foods Company subsidiary in Colombia, was kidnapped in Bogota by unknown persons. Curtis and his chauffeur were both abducted after their car was rammed on a Bogota road. The driver was released shortly afterwards. Curtis was held for almost 8 months and was freed on May 18, 1977. Press reports indicated that a ransom payment of over \$140,000 was made to secure Curtis' release.

October 7-8, 1976 Argentina Argentine terrorists bombed several foreign businesses in commemoration of the capture and death of Argentine-born Cuban guerrilla leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Primary targets were the showrooms of foreign-controlled auto companies including the Ford Motor Company. A branch of the Bank of Boston was also hit. There were no injuries and property damage was moderate.

November 3, 1976 Argentina An Argentine executive of the Chrysler Corporation was shot to death by 2 unknown assailants as he was leaving his home. Another Argentine Chrysler executive was killed by the Montoneros in early September.

December 13, 1976 Mexico A Mexican employee at a Chrysler plant in Mexico City was shot by 23rd of September Communist League members when he attempted to stop them from distributing the League's pamphlets to plant workers. This is the second incident within a week in which a Mexican employee of a US-owned company was shot by members of the 23rd of September terrorist group.

January 20, 1977 Mexico Duraflex Corporation President Mitchell Andreski and a Mexican associate were shot and killed in a Mexico City suburb while inspecting a construction site. The attackers are said to be members of the 23rd of September Communist League.

January 25, 1977 Argentina The suburban Buenos Aires home of a Goodyear executive was attacked by the Montoneros with machine gun fire and a pipe bomb. The house was vacant at the time of the attack. The Montoneros left leaflets at the home, the Goodyear plant and the surrounding area supporting the workers in their struggles against the Government. Goodyear has been experiencing labor problems recently.

March 28, 1977 Argentina 6 bombs exploded in scattered parts of the Argentine capital, including one in the Sheraton Hotel that injured 9 persons.

March 31, 1977 Colombia 3 bombs exploded in the Sears store in Bogota causing minor damage. The ELN claimed responsibility for the attack which it said was to commemorate the death of a university student killed during a confrontation with police in 1976.

April 11, 1977	Argentina	An Argentine executive of the Surrey Company, which operates under a license from General Motors Corporation, was shot and killed in Buenos Aires. Anonymous callers to Buenos Aires newspapers claimed the Montoneros were responsible for the killing.
May 29, 1977	Turkey	A bomb exploded in Istanbul's Yesilkoy Airport killing 5 persons and injuring 42. The injured included one US citizen. A group calling itself the "28 May Armenian Organization" claimed responsibility for this incident as well as for one the same day at the Sirkeci train station.
July 14, 1977	Greece	A bomb explosion at the American Express Company offices in Athens shattered windows and damaged the main door. A car belonging to an American professor at a US sponsored school was set ablaze. A second bomb, which had failed to explode, was found in a storeroom at the US Armed Forces Post Exchange. No injuries were reported in any of the incidents which were blamed on protestors against alleged US support for the former military government and alleged US tolerance of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
August 6, 1977	Turkey	The Intercontinental Hotel in Istanbul, owned by Pan American Airlines, was strafed with automatic weapon fire. Several windows were broken, but no one was injured in the attack. 23 members of the Acilciler faction of the Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front (TPLP/F) were arrested in late August for involvement in this incident as well as numerous bombings and several bank robberies.

August 9, 1977	Mexico	William Andrew Weinkamer, an American businessman in Mexico, was kidnapped in Mexico City. The kidnapers dragged Weinkamer from his vehicle while he was on the way home from his office. The following day Weinkamer's abductors called his company and demanded a US \$100,000 ransom for his release. Weinkamer was freed on August 12 after the ransom was paid.
August 28, 1977	West Germany	Molotov cocktails were thrown into an IBM office building in Hamburg, West Germany. Fire damage was slight and no one was injured. The perpetrators are unknown.
September 6, 1977	Colombia	A bomb exploded in the Sears store in Cali, injuring 3 persons. 2 other bombings, both at local police stations, occurred the same day. The perpetrators are unknown.
September 10, 1977	Turkey	A bomb exploded in front of the Turkish American Association in Adana, shattering all the glass on the building's ground floor. No injuries were reported. The perpetrators are unknown.
September 13-14, 1977	Mexico	A wave of bomb explosions hit Mexico City, Guadalajara and Oaxaca. Although most of the targets were Mexican, some US businesses were also bombed. 5 persons were injured and the total property damage was estimated at US \$20 million, according to a press report. A small, independent terrorist group, the Union del Pueblo, is responsible for the attacks.

September 27, 1977 India

JRA guerrillas hijacked a Japan Airlines plane shortly after takeoff from Bombay and forced it to land in Dacca, Bangladesh. The Japanese Government agreed to the terrorists' demands for the release of 9 - imprisoned Japanese and US \$6 million in exchange for the more than 150 hostages on the aircraft. 10 of the passengers were US citizens. 8 passengers were released in Dacca during the next 2 days. After the arrival on 10/1 of the ransom money and the 6 released Japanese prisoners who had agreed to join the hijackers, over 100 more passengers were freed. The aircraft carrying the remaining hostages, the hijackers, the released Japanese prisoners and the ransom money, departed Dacca on 10/2 for Algeria. During refueling stops en route in Kuwait and Syria, a total of 17 additional hostages were released. Upon arrival in Algiers on 10/3, the JRA hijackers and released prisoners surrendered to Algerian authorities and the remaining 19 passengers and crew were freed. The hijackers were expelled from Algeria shortly after they arrived and their whereabouts are unknown.

October 13, 1977 Argentina

A bomb concealed in a car exploded in front of the residence of Eduardo Beach, an Argentine executive of the Chrysler Corporation. The explosion killed Beach's bodyguard and a passerby. 2 others were injured.

October 13, 1977 Spain

A Lufthansa plane en route from Majorca, Spain to Frankfurt was hijacked on 10/15 by 4 terrorists, two Arabic-speaking men and two women. The hijackers directed the plane, carrying 86 passengers and five crew members, to refueling stops in Rome, Nicosia and several Middle East countries. Saying they were acting in support of the Schleyer kidnapers in West Germany, the hijackers demanded the release of the 11 German terrorists connected with the Schleyer case, two Palestinians jailed in Turkey and a US \$15 million ransom. The hijackers killed the Lufthansa pilot before the plane's arrival at Mogadiscio, Somalia on 10/17. In the early morning hours of 10/18, an FRG commando team stormed the plane, freeing all of the hostages, including two Americans, killing three of the terrorists and wounding the fourth. The wounded terrorist was convicted of air piracy and terrorism and received a 20 year prison sentence.

December 2, 1977 Argentina

The bodyguards of a Chrysler Corporation executive were the victims of an armed attack in a suburb of Buenos Aires. The car used by the guards was sprayed with machine gun fire from 2 other cars. 2 of the bodyguards were killed and a third seriously wounded.

December 28, 1977 Iran

An explosion at the Iran-American Society Center in Tehran resulted in heavy damage to the building and injured one person. The Center is used to teach the English language. A statement left at the UPI office indicated that the incident was to protest President Carter's visit to Iran. The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas claimed responsibility for the bombing.

January 21, 1977	Greece	Time bombs caused heavy damage at 2 American offices in Thessaloniki shortly before the scheduled arrival in Athens, of US Secretary of State Vance: USIS and the American Express Bank and Travel Agency. Though damage was extensive at both locations, there were no injuries reported.
January 22, 1978	Turkey	A bomb detonated in front of the Turkish-American Association building in Ankara. The blast went off between two walls which separate the building from the street. Damage consisted of broken windows; no injuries resulted.
February 13, 1978	Australia	Just after midnight a bomb exploded outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel. Leaders of 12 countries attending the Commonwealth Conference of Asian and Pacific Nations were staying in the hotel. Though none of the foreign leaders was hurt, two garbage men were killed and 9 policemen were injured. The garbage truck was damaged and numerous windows were broken along the street. A second bomb was found and safely detonated without incident.

February 18, 1978	Cyprus	2 gunmen shot and killed the Secretary General of the African-Asian Solidarity Organization. That organization was meeting in the Hilton Hotel in Nicosia. The pair took 30 hostages; 12 were released in exchange for safe conduct to Larnaca Airport. At the airport they negotiated for a plane to depart Cyprus. The plane, with a volunteer crew of 4 and 11 hostages, took off for what turned out to be a refueling stop in Djibouti (the only place that would permit the plane to land) and then returned to Larnaca. While negotiations were going on with the gunmen, Egyptian commandos attempted to storm the plane. A gun battle between Egyptian and Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen erupted. Following the melee, the terrorists gave up and released the remaining hostages. The gunmen were charged with murder and an Egyptian request for their extradition has been rejected. The 2 Palestinians have been found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging. On 11/14 the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
February 28, 1978	Spain	Around midnight the Spanish office of the Bechtel Corporation of San Francisco was bombed. The company is involved in the construction of a nuclear plant near Bilbao. There was property damage but no injuries were reported.
March 12, 1978	Turkey	A bomb exploded under the car belonging to the principal of the Tarsus American School in Adana. The fender of the car was blown off and windows of a nearby building were shattered. There were no injuries. A typewritten letter, signed "TIP" was received the same day, saying other explosives had been placed about the campus of the school. A police search for other bombs was negative.

March 15, 1978	Colombia	An American was kidnapped and held hostage on a farm. The kidnapers demanded a ransom of US \$250,000 for his release. The Colombian armed forces rescued him on April 29.
May 5, 1978	Turkey	An explosion was detonated between 2 buildings in Ankara. One of the buildings houses the US International Communications Agency. No injuries resulted and property damage was limited to broken windows. No person or group has claimed responsibility.
May 11, 1978	Italy	The Italian manager of the Milan branch of the New York Chemical Bank was shot in the legs. 2 groups jointly claimed responsibility -- the Communist Fighters Organization Front Line and the Communist Fighting Formations. Local police have expected the terrorists to turn to non-Italian targets for some time and had tightened security at Embassies. The Red Brigades have labeled US multinational corporations as among their prime enemies.
May 12, 1978	Italy	A group of armed men burst into a warehouse of the US owned Honeywell Company in Milan. After overpowering the guards and cleaning crew, they emptied 2 cans of gasoline and ignited it before fleeing. The resultant fire caused a loss of two million dollars including electronic instruments stored in the building. The perpetrators claimed to be from the Front Line.
May 29, 1978	Colombia	The Colombian General Manager of Petroleum Company in Bogota was kidnapped. There has been no contact by the perpetrators regarding demands for the victim's release. It is not known if the kidnapers are common criminals or members of a terrorist group.

June 2, 1978	Israel	A bomb exploded in the back of a bus in Jerusalem. The explosion tore off the back part of the bus and resulted in the death of 6 persons, including one US citizen. The PLO stated that the 13-pound bomb had been set by Al Fatah.
June 22, 1978	El Salvador	2 Salvadorean employees of McCann-Erickson, a US owned company, were kidnapped by armed men as they departed their office. The man was forced into his own car and his secretary was forced into a microbus both vehicles were then driven away. The secretary was released in the northern part of San Salvador a few hours later. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.
July 14&21, 1978	Turkey	The Mobil refinery in Atas, Turkey was the site of an explosion of a small bomb. A larger bomb was discovered by a worker before it detonated. The second bomb, set to go off approximately one-half hour after closing time, was dangerously close to storage tanks. Police safely defused the second bomb. No injuries or damage were reported in either incident.
July 19, 1978	Nicaragua	A bomb was thrown at the Industrias Nabisco Cristal S.A. in Managua. The management of the cookie and cracker factory (60% owned by the US Nabisco Inc. Company) reported no injuries and minimal damage. The incident was apparently connected to the fact that the firm's employees largely ignored a work stoppage which had been called. A similar bombing occurred in January/February during a work stoppage called at that time.

July 24, 1978	Italy	A bomb exploded near the Turin offices of IBM. Damage to the front of the building resulted and windows in nearby apartments were broken. No injuries were reported. A group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed Squads (SAR) claimed responsibility.
August 8, 1978	Argentina	A bomb exploded in front of the home of the President of General Motors in Buenos Aires. There were no injuries and property damage was limited to destruction of the front gate. No group has claimed responsibility.
August 13, 1978	Iran	A bomb exploded in a restaurant in Tehran. One Iranian was killed and 45 people were injured, including 10 Americans. Local police believe the dead man was carrying the bomb into the basement of the Khansalar Restaurant. Authorities believe that the bomber was a religious fanatic protesting the playing of loud music at the restaurant during the Moslem holy month of Ramadan.
August 25, 1978	Geneva	TWA flight #830 was hijacked over the Irish coastline on a flight from New York to Geneva. A mysterious person wearing a disguise presented a hijack note to a stewardess and directed her to take it immediately to the pilot. When the stewardess returned from the cockpit the person was nowhere to be found. Later, the disguise was found in a lavatory. The hijack demands included the release of a varied assortment of prisoners. After waiting on the ground in Geneva for some 10 hours with no hijacker evidence all passengers and crew deplaned safely. No weapons or explosive devices were found on the plane. On 10/20 an unemployed chauffeur was arrested and charged with intimidating the TWA crew and interfering with the flight.

September 1, 1978	Argentina	A bomb exploded in the residence of the Legal Adviser to the General Motors Board of Directors in Buenos Aires. Although damage was extensive there were no injuries. No group or person has claimed responsibility.
September 14, 1978	Iran	The Northrop Motor Pool in Isfahan was the target of 9 molotov cocktails and 2 bombs. The fire department was notified and damage was limited to destruction of one car. No injuries were reported; no group has claimed responsibility.
September 17, 1978	Iran	2 fire bombs exploded at the home of the maintenance manager of Bell Helicopter in Isfahan. The explosion damaged the house and a car; no injuries were reported. A sign with the words "American Go Home" was seen in the crowd which gathered.
October 11, 1978	Iran	A pipe bomb exploded after being thrown through the window of a bus belonging to Bell Helicopter International in Isfahan. The bus, on its regular route, was carrying men and women to the residential area from Bell offices when a motorcycle pulled alongside and one of 2 men tossed the bomb through an open window. 3 Americans received minor injuries and were treated and released from the local hospital. Damage to the bus was minor. No group has claimed responsibility.
October 20, 1978	Turkey	An explosion at the offices of Pan American Airlines in Istanbul caused property damage. Windows were broken in the Pan Am offices and in neighboring offices. No injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility; however, an anti-American demonstration was going on at the time of the incident.

October 23, 1978	Iran	Buses carrying Lockheed Aircraft Corporation employees to their homes in Tehran were attacked by a group of Persian men throwing bricks and rocks. 2 buses were extensively damaged and lesser damage to 9 others. 4 passengers were injured, one of whom required stitches for head wounds at the US Army Hospital. It is thought the attackers were students.
October 24, 1978	Iran	A Chevy Blazer was the target of a molotov cocktail in Ilam. The Americans who own the car saw the flash and were able to prevent extensive damage. They also discovered a bomb in a stairwell of their quarters which had failed to detonate. No injuries were reported.
October 25, 1978	Iran	Molotov cocktails were thrown at a youth hostel in Isfahan. The attackers scaled the fence, unlocked the gate for the main group to enter the compound and began throwing bottles of flammable liquid against the building. Extensive damage to the building resulted and 2 vehicles parked in the area were destroyed. 16 foreigners, including Americans, were residing in the hostel. No injuries were reported.
October 28, 1978	Iran	3 buses returning US Air Force personnel and some civilians to their residences were confronted by Iranian youths who threw rocks and bricks at the buses in Tehran. The first bus had all the windows broken but the other 2 buses were less damaged. 2 persons cut by flying glass on the first bus were the only injuries reported. This seems to be the latest in a series of such attacks on buses transporting personnel from Doshen Tappeh Airbase to residential areas of Tehran.

November 13, 1978	Iran	3 Iranians threw at least one molotov cocktail at the car of the Deputy Director of Oil Services Company in Ahvaz. The American chased the attackers on foot without success. The car caught fire and exploded; however, no injuries resulted.
November 14, 1978	Iran	A minibus of a US contractor, used for the last 6 months to transport US citizens the 40 miles to and from their residences to the work site was rendered inoperable by detonation of 2 explosive devices. No injuries resulted as the bus had been parked after returning the employees from work. The company is considering moving its employees onto the militia installation at Semnan or back to Tehran.
November 17, 1978	El Salvador	A bomb made from 4 sticks of dynamite exploded at a McDonald's restaurant in San Salvador. No injuries were reported and damage to the building was minimal. The Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) claimed responsibility for the incident.
November 18, 1978	Greece	2 bombs went off at the Coca-Cola plant near Thessaloniki. A third bomb failed to detonate. Damage to 2 trucks and the building is estimated at approximately US \$6,000. No injuries were reported. The Revolutionary People's Strugglers claimed responsibility for the incident in a manifesto dated November 19.
November 30, 1978	Italy	A bomb detonated outside a warehouse of the IBM Company in Bologna. Damage to the building was confined to one wall and broken windows. No injuries were reported. A group calling itself the Proleterian Squad claimed responsibility for the bombing.

December 17, 1978	Israel	A bomb exploded on a bus as it traveled a route through Jerusalem. More than 20 people were injured including 5 US citizens. All the injured were treated at the local hospital and released. In addition to damage to the bus several houses in the vicinity where the explosion occurred were slightly damaged. The PLO claimed responsibility for the incident.
December 23, 1978	Iran	A Texaco executive working in Iran for an Iranian oil company was killed by 3 unidentified men. The well organized attack on the executive was carried out as he was driving to work in Ahwaz. Iranian officials believe the People's Strugglers were responsible for the killing.
January 3, 1979	Colombia	An executive of the Texas Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Texaco, was killed when a guerrilla hideout was stormed by local authorities, in Bogota. He had been kidnapped May 2 (see May 29 incident) and held prisoner since that time.
January 14, 1979	Iran	A former US Air Force Colonel working for an American construction company was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home in Kerman. The incident is the second killing of an American during the anti-Shah disturbances of the last year.
January 22, 1979	Italy	An American reporter for the Washington Post answered her door for a registered package to be delivered and was confronted by a man who pointed a revolver at her. The woman screamed "terrorist" hysterically, scaring the man into running from the scene. The "delivery man" dropped a briefcase in which investigators found handcuffs and a revolver.

February 13, 1979	Egypt	A bomb exploded in the Cairo Sheraton Hotel injuring 7 people (no Americans were among the injured). The bomb exploded in a first floor lavatory. Authorities arrested several "Palestinians and Jordanians" who were in the hotel when the bomb went off. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident.
February 19, 1979	Turkey	A bomb, thrown from a passing car, exploded outside the Pan Am office in Izmir. The explosion broke windows in the Pan Am office, in shops located on the same floor and on all 3 floors of the hotel located above the Pan Am offices. No injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility for the incident.
February 27, 1979	Chile	A bomb exploded at the Bi-National Center (BNC), a cultural center jointly sponsored by the US and Chile in Santiago. The explosion broke windows and caused minor damage to the building. The building was occupied by a guard at the time of the incident; he was not injured. This was the second explosion at the BNC (a third bomb was found and removed by a bomb squad). A flyer left in the mailbox claimed the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was responsible for this latest incident.
March 7, 1979	Israel	A bomb detonated in the luggage compartment of a tourist bus near Jerusalem at Allenby Bridge over the Jordan River. 12 persons were injured including 2 US citizens who were treated at the scene and released.

March 9, 1979	Philippines	An American missionary teacher, Lloyd Van Vector, was kidnapped by an armed group believed to be Muslim rebels. He was abducted from his office. During his captivity, his wife died of complications after surgery; he did not know of his wife's death until his son told him upon his release unharmed on March 28. The kidnappers had demanded a US \$67,000 ransom. It is not immediately known if a ransom was paid or if the demand was dropped during negotiations directed by the Libyan Ambassador.
March 12, 1979	Turkey	Shots were fired at the windows of the Director's residence of the Tarsus American College in Tarsus. 3 British teachers and the Turkish business manager of the school were in the building at the time of the shooting, but no one was injured.
March 26, 1979	Israel	A grenade exploded in the old city of Jerusalem. 4 tourists were injured including 2 Americans; one was treated and released but the other was hospitalized with an injured leg.
April 5, 1979	Guatemala	The General Secretary of the Coca Cola Union was attacked and killed while on a distribution route in Guatemala City. His killers are unknown.
April 14, 1979	Turkey	A bomb detonated damaging a privately owned vehicle of a General Electric employee, a US citizen. The car had no overt identifying marks to indicate it was the property of an American. The blast caused a 4 inch hole in the street, extensive damage to the car and broken windows in the vicinity. No injuries were reported and no group claimed responsibility.

April 16, 1979	Lebanon	An explosive charge was detonated at the International Communication Agency Center. The American Center suffered structural damage as a result of the blast. A second charge failed to detonate. No injuries were reported. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident.
April 19, 1979	Spain	Explosives were detonated at a showroom of the Ford Motor Company in Valencia. Windows in the showroom were blown out and 13 cars were damaged; no injuries were reported. The incident is believed to be connected with a labor dispute at Ford's Spanish plant. However, the First of October Group of Anti-Fascist Resistance, a far left urban guerrilla group, claimed responsibility for the explosion.

Q: Mr. Read, you referred to prompt and adequate responses by host governments to attacks on the U.S. Obviously each situation differs, but do we have a policy to deal with a case where we're convinced a host government either deliberately or through gross negligence failed to carry out its responsibility? Do we acquiesce, break relations? What is our policy?

A: It is difficult to speculate on what our response would be to an attack on one of our posts, without specifying the exact circumstances in each case.

But it would range from a request for reimbursement for damages and no further action, to closure of our facility, withdrawal of all personnel, and breaking of relations.

In between, depending on the exact circumstances, would be a variety of options including the withdrawal of some personnel and the withdrawal of all personnel without a break in relations.

Each case will be dealt with individually with the utmost concern for the safety of our personnel.

Q: The Department of State has responsibility for the security of its employees and installations overseas.

a) What responsibility do you have for employees and installations of other agencies?

b) Who has overall governmental responsibility for anti-terrorism? Is that in the NSC? Who is in charge of incidents overseas, State?

A: a) The Ambassador has responsibility for all U.S. government employees within country. The Department of State has direct responsibility for the security of all personnel making up the country team. That is, employees and dependents of all U.S. agencies who are part of the diplomatic mission, even though their actual office space might be at a location removed from the Chancery (e.g. USAID, ICA). U.S. military installations, apart from the Defense Attache Office, generally assume responsibility for their own security.

b) By direction of the President, the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council (NSC/SCC) has overall responsibility for the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism program. The State Department chairs the Interagency Working Group on Terrorism, which reports directly to the NSC/SCC. Under the "lead agency" concept, the Department of State is also responsible for directing and coordinating the counter-terrorism program overseas and for managing the response to terrorist attacks abroad. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has similar responsibility for actions occurring in the United States and its possessions, and the Federal Aviation Agency is responsible for the program to counter terrorist actions against civil aviation.

Q: An Ambassador has full authority over all U.S. personnel in a foreign country even if he or she does not have the security responsibility? An Ambassador can order an evacuation? Does the Secretary of State have that authority? Can the Secretary, for example, tell the Peace Corps to evacuate?

A: Under Sec. 12 of P.L. 93-475, 88 Stat. 1439 (1974) and a Presidential letter to Chiefs of Mission of October 25, 1977, the Chief of Mission has full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. Government officers and employees in his or her country of accreditation except for those who are under the control of a U.S. area military commander (e.g. CINCEUR, CINCPAC). These persons are also required to "comply fully with all applicable directives of the Chief of Mission." Thus the Chief of Mission has clear authority to order the departure of the personnel of any agency, except for personnel under the command of an area military commander.

The Department's regulations provide that a Chief of Mission should, if possible, consult with the Department before ordering an evacuation thus permitting coordination in Washington. However, in case of an emergency where for reasons of time or a breakdown in communications, a Chief of Mission may order an evacuation without consulting with Washington.

Obviously, this is not a power that is exercised lightly. And more often than not, it will be done in consultation with the Department and the affected agencies. However, since the Chief of Mission is ultimately responsible for all U.S. personnel he or she must make the ultimate decision whether safety and security require departure of any personnel, no matter to what agency they belong.

Q: Deterrence is an important part of any security system and part of deterrence is the level of expectation that an act will bring certain retribution. Are any of the terrorists who kill, kidnap and maim our people ever caught? Do we attempt to identify who committed these outrages? Do we as a nation attempt to bring them to justice?

A: The United States response to terrorist incidents is based on an on-going process of multilateral diplomatic initiatives designed to deter terrorist actions and on case-by-case bilateral diplomatic responses as incidents occur. When a terrorist attack occurs involving U.S. diplomats, we seek to:

- 1) effect a non-violent end to the incident, and
- 2) try to identify the perpetrators and ensure that they are brought to justice.

These efforts are often tempered by conditions within the host country, such as the level of political stability, the state of our bi-lateral relations, and the effectiveness of the host government's security services.

In a review of the incidents of the last ten years where our personnel have been harmed, the host government's response has been mixed, with:

- several incidents still unresolved
- some incidents where the terrorists were captured and then released
- one instance in which the terrorists were given light sentences
- some cases where terrorists have been brought to trial and given strong punishment.

See attachments for a brief description of incidents involving U.S. Government personnel

DATE OF INCIDENT: August 28, 1968

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Guatemala

TARGET: John Gordon Mein U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, became the first American Ambassador assassinated by terrorists. As his limousine was driving to the Embassy, a car forced his vehicle to the side of a downtown Guatemala city street. A small truck then blocked it from behind. Several youths, armed with automatic weapons, approached and ordered Mein out of the car. He opened the door on the other side and attempted to run, but was struck from behind by a burst of submachinegun fire, which killed him instantly. The chauffeur was unharmed. The rebel armed forces issued a statement that next day claiming that they had planned to kidnap Mein and demand a release of Camilo Sanchez. The U.S. State Department requested "a full investigation of all the circumstances". President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro later claimed that the assassins had been identified, and offered a \$10,000 reward for information leading to their arrest. Guatemalan police traced the automobile which had been rented for the FAR on August 22, and went to the apartment of Michele Firk, a young member of the French Communist party and a graduate of the Institute of Higher Cinematographic Studies, who had arrived in Guatemala in July. When the police entered her home, she turned a gun on herself to avoid interrogation. Four FAR members who later confessed to complicity in the assassination were among those whose release was demanded in the March 31, 1970 Von Spreti case.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 31 July 1970

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Uruguay

TARGET: In the first of a series of raids in Montevideo, hooded Tupamaros attempted to kidnap members of the U.S. Embassy in an underground garage of their apartments in the early morning. Michael Gordon Jones, 27, the Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy and Nathan Rosenfeld, 48, the Cultural Attache Officer, both received head wounds by being beaten with revolvers. Rosenfeld broke loose and ran, while Jones was tied and blindfolded, wrapped in a blanket, and thrown into the back of a pickup truck. Upon regaining consciousness while being driven through the streets of the City, he rolled out of the truck onto the street during a stop for a Red Light.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 31 July 1970

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Uruguay

TARGET: Tupamaros kidnapped 49-year-old Daniel A. Mitrione, a U.S. Aid Public Safety Advisor to the Uruguayan Police, on his way to work. A wild shot hit as he was being dragged to the same car which was used in another kidnapping incident. The group announced that they had performed surgery on him, and demanded the release of all Political Prisoners, who were to be flown to Mexico, Peru, or Algeria. The government again refused the demands of the Tupamaros. The State Department asked the kidnappers to release him and to allow him to receive hospital care. On August 8, several radio stations received a Communique setting a deadline of noon the next day. The U.S. Ambassador, Charles W. Adair, Jr., broadcast an appeal for mercy 20 minutes before the deadline. The radio station Carve received a phone call soon after noon claiming that Mitrione had been shot, stating "In the face of the President of the Republics failure to fulfill the demands of the movement, Mr. Dan Mitrione was executed." Mitrione's body was found in the trunk of a car on a Montevideo Residential Street the next day. He had been shot in the head twice, apparently early that morning.

Over 100 individuals were arrested during a street search by 5000 Montevideo Police before the killing. Their numbers swelled to over 10,000 after Mitrione's death, in a house-to-house search for the two remaining hostages.

On March 20, 1973, Security Officials announced the capture of 4 men who participated in the killing. According to facts on file, "Antonio Mas Mas, identified as a Spanish Student who joined the Tupamaros while attending Montevideo University, was said to have killed Mitrione. His accomplices were identified as Henry Engler, Esteban Pereira, and Rodolfo Wolf, arrested with him, and Armando Blanco, killed by police. Englar was said to have directed the abduction and order the killing." On February 16, 1977, the Buenos Aires TELAM reported that Mas Mas, 28, was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment and 12 years of additional unspecified security measures, the maximum punishment provided by the Penal Code.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 1 March 1973

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Sudan

TARGET: 8 Black Septemberists, driving in a Land Rover with PLO Diplomatic Plates, seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum. After unsuccessful bargaining for the release of imprisoned Terrorists, they murdered 2 Americans, U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., George C. Moore, the departing U.S. Charge and Guy Eid, the Egyptian-born Charge at the Belgian Embassy.

The attack began at 7 p.m., when the Land Rover, with "The 8 Invaders, led by Abu Salem, second-ranking official at the Fatah Office in Khartoum, crashed the gate and entered the building...the group then fired machineguns and revolvers.

The group set a 24-hour deadline for their demands for the release of prisoners to be met. They demanded that the U.S. release the killer of Senator Robert Kennedy, Sirhan Sirhan (see incident 0054); that Israel release all women detained in Israeli Jails, including the 2 surviving hijackers of the Sabena Plane (see incident 1024); that West Germany release imprisoned members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang (see incident 1027); and that Jordan release Abu Daoud and the 16 Black Septemberists accompanying him (see incident 1459) as well as Major Rafeh Hindawi, a Jordanian Officer who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting against the Amman Government. Their demands were not met.

At around 9:30 p.m. on March 2, the group took the two Americans and the Belgian to the basement and emptied 40 rounds, beginning by firing at their legs after Ambassador and Charges had been allowed to make out their Wills and had thanked the Saudi Ambassador for the Party. The terrorists phoned the U.S. Embassy, announcing "we have executed the 2 Americans and the Belgian."

The Terrorists were informed that they would not be allowed a flight out of the country, and a few hours later they ended the 40-hour seige by releasing their remaining hostages and surrendering to Sudanese authorities. The Sudanese conducted raids on the Khartoum office of the PLO and discovered many documents which linked FATAH and the PLO to the Black September Operation. The Black Septemberists had hoped to fly their American hostages to the U.S., where they would assassinate them.

A Sudanese Court of Inquiry indicted the 8 on 5 counts Murder, but released 2 of them. A Khartoum Court convicted them of Murder in 1974 and sentenced them to Life, but Sudanese President Gaafar El-Nimeiry commuted the sentence to 7 years. He also announced that the group would be handed over to the PLO. They were flown to Cairo the next day. Egypt placed the group at the disposal of the PLO in November, 1974.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 4 May 1973

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Mexico

TARGET: The U.S. Consul General in Guadalajara, Terrence G. Leonhardy, was kidnapped by members of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, who demanded (1) the release of 30 prisoners in Mexican Jails who were to be flown to Cuba; (2) Publication of an anti-government communique; (3) Suspension of the search for Leonhardy and his kidnappers; and (4) a television appearance by the Cuban Ambassador to confirm that the prisoners had arrived safely in Havana. The Mexican Government's President, Luis Echeverria Alvarez quickly agreed to the demands, and the 26 men and 4 women arrived in Havana on a Mexican Airliner on May 6. Leonhardy's wife borrowed \$80,000 from a local bank, and paid the money to the FRAP as ransom for her husband, who was released unharmed on May 6.

On December 24, 1973, Pedro Orozco Guzman was wounded by police in a shootout. Before he died of his wounds, he confessed to participation in the kidnappings of Williams, Aranguren, and Leonhardy. On August 28, 1974, 3 of those who were released to Cuba participated in the kidnapping in Guadalajara of General Jose Zuno Hernandez, who was required to restate his belief in Revolution. The release of a man imprisoned for the Leonhardy incident was unsuccessfully sought by 2 FRAP bus hijackers in Mexico City in August 1977.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 22 March 1974

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Mexico

TARGET: U.S. Vice-Consul John S. Patterson reported kidnapped after leaving the Consulate in Hermosillo (Sonora State) with an unidentified man. A ransom note demanding \$500,000 for his release was received at the Consulate, signed by The People's Liberation Army of Mexico (P.L.A.). Although Patterson's wife, Ann, attempted to deliver the ransom, she was unable to make contact with the abductors. Patterson's mutilated body was found in a creek bed near the town on July 7, 107 days after his abduction.

On May 28, Bobbie Joe Keesee, 40, a U.S. citizen, was arrested in San Diego on U.S. Federal charges of planning and participating in the kidnapping (he had also participated in a hijacking). Greg Curtis Fielden was named as unindicted co-conspirator. On April 29, 1975 Keesee was sentenced to 20 years for Conspiracy to kidnap a Diplomat. The plan turned out to be a hoax.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 12 April 1974

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Argentina

TARGET: Alfred A. Laun III, Chief of the USIS in Cordoba, was kidnapped in the morning from his home by the ERP, who shot and beat him when he resisted abduction, wounding him in the head, abdomen, and shoulder. Shortly afterwards, the ERP sent a message to a Cordoba Radio Station, saying that he would be "interrogated on counterrevolutionary activities in Vietnam, Santo Domingo, Brazil and Bolivia, and for his active participation as a Liaison in the Fascist Military Coup Against our Brother People in Chile. He will also be interrogated on his ties with the Central Intelligence Agency." Laun was released in the evening, 15 hours after his abduction, when his kidnappers realized the seriousness of his wounds and worried that he would die in their hands. Laun was treated in Cordoba and Panama, and survived.

On April 28, police shot Claudio Alberto Luduena, one of Laun's abductors, as he was attempting to kidnap a business executive in Cordoba, Antonio Minetti.

DATE OF INCIDENT: 19 August 1974

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Cyprus

TARGET: The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger P. Davis, and a Greek Cypriot Embassy Secretary were shot to death by Eoka-B members during a riot in Nicosia by a group protesting what they claimed to be a Pro-Turkish policy of the U.S. in the Greek-Turkish clash over Cyprus. In the attack against the U.S. Embassy and Official Residence, firebombs were thrown at official vehicles, destroying several cars, including that of the Defense Attache. Nearly 100 bullets ripped into Davies' L-shaped office from 2 angles, leading police to conclude that a conspiracy was evident. His secretary died as she came to his assistance.

After years of American pressure, the 6 suspects were arrested on February 4, 1977. Three of them, Ioannis Ktimatis, a former policeman serving a prison term for illegal possession of firearms, Loizos Savva, a former policeman, and Neoptolemos Leftis, were charged with Homicide. 3 others, including a Lieutenant in the Greek Cypriot National Guard, were accused of crimes which included the illegal use of firearms, threats of violence, and rioting. All 6 were identified as belonging to the Eoka-B Organization. The former trio were arraigned on charges of manslaughter on February 11, 1974. On June 3, a Cypriot Court threw out the Homicide against the Greek Cypriots Ktimatis, 39, and Leftist, 50, citing lack of evidence. The decision insured that the duo would not be asked to testify in court about any links between the gunmen and Eoka-B leaders who might have planned and ordered the assault, as well as held government posts. Two of the other defendants were acquitted, one on a Technicality, while the other 2 were sentenced to a few months in jail after pleading Guilty. On June 20, 1977, Ktimatis was convicted of illegal use and possession of firearms, riot, and property damage, while Leftis was convicted of illegal possession of firearms and riot. Ktimatis was liable to a sentence of 15 years, while Leftis faced a possible 8-year sentence. On June 21, 1977, the court sentenced them to 7 and 5 years, respectively. The press reported that these were considered unexpectedly stiff sentences.

DATE OF INCIDENT: September 27, 1974

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Dominican Republic

TARGET: A group of seven armed men from the 12th of January Liberation Movement kidnapped Barbara Hutchison, USIS Director in Santo Domingo, as she left her office, and then seized the Venezuelan Consulate, holding seven more hostages, including the Venezuelan Consul and Vice-Consul, a Spanish priest, and four Dominican Consulate employees. According to Lester Sobel, "Radhames Mendez Vargas, the Guerrillas' leader, told reporters over the telephone that his group would kill the hostages one by one unless the U.S. paid them \$1,000,000 in ransom and the Dominican Government released 38 political prisoners. He said his men had mined the Consulate and would blow it up if police tried to storm it. Security forces cordoned off the area and began the long siege, allowing two daily deliveries of food to the terrorists and their hostages. The deliveries were cut to one a day October 1 on orders of President Joaquin Balaguer, who, with the support of the U.S., Venezuelan, and Spanish governments, refused to meet the guerrillas' demands. The terrorists dropped the \$1,000,000 ransom demand October 3 and asked for release of the political prisoners and safe conduct for all to either Mexico or Peru. This was rejected by Balaguer and reportedly by the Mexican and Peruvian governments. Balaguer made an "absolutely final" offer of safe conduct out of the country October 7, and the guerrillas accepted this the next day. Panama agreed to grant the terrorists asylum to help the Dominican government "end this unfortunate case", according to Panamanian Ambassador Alejandro Cuellar Arosemena October 9. The guerrillas were flown to Panama City immediately after they freed the seven hostages.

DATE OF INCIDENT: February 26, 1975

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Argentina

TARGET: John Patrick Egan, the U.S. Consular agent in Cordoba, was kidnapped from his home by the Montoneros, who demanded that the Argentine government prove that four missing guerrillas were alive and well. The government refused to negotiate and 48 hours later Egan was shot and killed by the guerrillas. His body was found soon after.

DATE OF INCIDENT: December 23, 1975

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Greece

TARGET: Richard S. Welch, 46, the Athens Station Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, was killed in Palaion Psyhiko by three gunmen as he and his wife returned home after a Christmas party at the home of the U.S. Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch. His wife was not injured. The union of officers struggling for the National Idea claimed credit for the shooting as he got out of his car. Welch's name, along with that of other U.S. Embassy employees, had been published on November 25, 1975 in the Athens Daily News, which claimed that his position of Special Assistant to the Ambassador and First Secretary at the Embassy was a cover for his CIA position.

DATE OF INCIDENT: June 16, 1976

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Lebanon

TARGET: U.S. Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, 59, Economic Counselor Robert O. Waring and the Ambassador's chauffeur, Zohair Moughrabi, were taken from their armor-plated Chevrolet on Beirut's Corniche Mazraa. After a period in which it was assumed that they had been kidnapped, their bodies were found in a garbage dump near Beirut's beach, each with bullets having been fired in their heads. Responsibility for this crime was never fixed.

DATE OF INCIDENT: February 14, 1979

COUNTRY OF INCIDENT: Afghanistan

TARGET: U.S. Ambassador Adolph "Spike" Dubs, 58 was taken hostage in Kabul by armed terrorists and died in a police attempt to free him.

The Ambassador, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, was abducted when his chauffeur-driven Oldsmobile, flying the U.S. flag, stopped for a traffic light at 8:45 a.m. A man in a police uniform pulled a gun on his driver. Reports differ as to whether he was then driven off in his car by three terrorists who joined the first, or whether he was taken in another car. Dubs had no guard riding with him. He was taken to the Kabul Hotel, where the terrorists demanded the release of three individuals (whom the government claimed were unavailable).

American Embassy pleads to avoid precipitate actions and prolong the negotiations were ignored by the government. The U.S. Embassy was unable to get through to Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amid or police commander Syed Daoud Tarun during the negotiations, although Soviet advisors were seen openly conferring with Afghan authorities at the hotel. The Soviet advisors refused to confer with U.S. officials at the scene. Several American sources claimed that three Soviet advisors and a Soviet Embassy security officer, Sergei Bakhtourin, conferred closely with the police, and probably influenced the police decision to attack the terrorists' position.

According to the Afghan government, its hand was forced when the terrorists set a ten-minute deadline at 12:30 for accession to their demands. At 12:50, the police began a 40-second onslaught on the hotel room, using single-shot and automatic weapons. The Afghans claimed that upon opening the door, Ambassador Dubs was found alive, then quickly brought to a local hospital where he died. The U.S. Embassy claimed that Dubs was already dead, having sustained a single small-caliber wound above the right eye, a large-caliber bullet wound in the heart area, and a wound in the left wrist. The Afghans claimed that the terrorists shot the Ambassador during the assault, although it was impossible to determine at the scene what bullets had struck the Ambassador. The U.S. Embassy protested "in the strongest possible terms" to the Afghan government for the precipitate action.

The fate of the terrorists is cloudy. It was reported that three individuals were removed from the room--one dead, one unconscious and probably dead, and one injured but alive. When and where the third terrorist died is unknown. His body was in the morgue with the other three terrorists (apparently including the individual captured during the negotiations) when the U.S. political counsellor was called in by the government to view the bodies.

Q: The programs mentioned stress protection of our embassies. What is being done to enhance the safety of our personnel when they are at their homes?

A: Protection of personnel in their residences is a far more difficult task than the protection of our embassies. We provide guidance and assistance in the selection of residences and in measures to increase the security of the buildings. As funds have permitted we have provided locking devices and intrusion alarms for private residences. Further funds have been spent in high threat posts for locally hired private guard services. We are presently assessing overseas housing policy to determine if there are any changes which would enhance the security of our personnel, e.g. placing employees in housing clusters with built-in security features.

As political conditions deteriorate in a country, the embassy's security watch committee meets regularly and recommends or initiates actions designed to protect personnel. For example, employment of more guards, the forming of transportation convoys, a policy prohibiting evening social functions, training of personnel in the use of weapons, etc., are all measures which have been taken at posts as the level of threat has heightened. Evacuation of dependents is another action which is dictated by the security climate at post.

Q: With respect to overseas operations, please describe the internal organization of the Department with respect to security, first of persons and second of buildings and information. How about your security responsibilities within the U.S.?

A: Our security programs overseas are administered by 102 professional security officers known as Regional Security Officers (RSOs), 35 Security Engineering Officers (technical security engineers), and 6 Regional Security Supervisors. Although we have a professional security officer at each large post, and at a number of smaller posts where a need for a resident professional is considered essential, our RSOs have regional responsibilities and travel regularly to the posts for which they have security purview. The same is true of our Security Engineering Officers. Our six Regional Security Supervisors are senior security officers responsible for oversight of the security programs in their geographic areas of responsibility. In addition, each post not having a resident professional security officer appoints an officer to serve as Post Security Officer. He receives assistance, guidance and program direction from the Regional Security Officer having responsibility for his post.

The Regional Security Officer is responsible for physical, personnel, procedural, and protective security programs at his post(s). He shares responsibility with the Security Engineering Officers for the technical security program at post. "Protection of people" includes such actions/items as:

- physical security of the embassy compound and Chancery building (i.e. strengthening of building envelope, locking devices, bullet resistant materials, grills, forced entry proof doors, etc.

- design of safehavens for final retreat

- Procurement and utilization of defensive systems, riot control equipment and devices, armored cars, intrusion alarms, locking devices, CCTV systems

- Marine Security Guards,

- local national contract guards

- host country police providing static coverage on the embassy compound and Ambassador's residence

- contingency planning and testing for bombs, riots,

- terrorist incidents, fire, etc.

"Security of information" is provided by the aforementioned physical security of the buildings as well as:

- security containers to hold classified material

- destruction and emergency destruction devices such as disintegrators, incinerators, shredders, incendiary devices

- cryptographic equipment to protect classified information during electronic transmission.

Domestically, the Office of Security maintains field offices in nine major cities and resident offices at 19 other locations within the United States. The field offices are staffed by special agents of the Department who conduct routine pre-employment background investigations, criminal investigations of violations of U.S. passport and visa statutes and special investigations in cases of alleged employee misconduct. Agents from the nine security field offices and 19 resident offices also are required to staff protective security details for select foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. In addition to the investigative and protective functions, the field offices also serve as the focal point for Department of State liaison with law enforcement officials on the local level.

Q: Are you satisfied with the performance of Marine Guards? What is their command structure? Why haven't they used their weapons in recent confrontations? Should we increase the numbers of Marine Guards?

A: We are indeed satisfied with the performance of Marine Security Guards (MSGs). Let me briefly explain the role and mission of our Marine Security Guards. Their mission is two-fold:

- 1) to protect classified material
- 2) to protect our personnel and property

They have a long and proud tradition of providing security guard coverage at our embassies and consulates abroad. Their duties are defensive in nature and entail the protection of classified information and the provision of an "in-house" deterrent to counter small scale acts of violence directed against our personnel and facilities.

In the event of large scale riots and demonstrations directed against U.S. diplomatic installations, the role of the MSGs is to delay entry of the hostile group into the installation long enough to allow for the destruction of classified material, and to aid in safeguarding the lives of American and locally hired personnel.

Marine Security Guards are under the operational supervision of the Department of State, with the Marine Corps retaining traditional military "good order and discipline" command responsibility. Overseas, the Chief of Mission "commands" the Marine Security Guards at a post; however, day to day operational supervision is exercised by the post's security officer. Regional Marine Officers attend to the good order and discipline of the MSG detachments to ensure that the Marine Security Guards meet high military standards and that the provisions of the State/USMC Memorandum of Understanding are honored by all parties.

Regarding use of weapons by MSGs - MSGs have always had the authority to use their weapons in the performance of their duty, when their lives or the lives of other Embassy employees were in direct and immediate danger. In the event of riots or mob action, the senior officer present is responsible for all decisions regarding the display and use of weapons.

There are times and situations when the use of lethal force by Marine Security Guards and others on an Embassy's internal defense force would be appropriate. For example, in the judgement of the senior officers in Tehran and Islamabad, deadly force by the Marines would have only increased the risk to all Americans at post.

In the two recent cases in Tehran, the Marines' performance of what must have been a most frustrating duty, i.e. providing a delaying action without use of deadly force, bought sufficient time for the destruction of much classified material, including all cryptographic equipment, and undoubtedly spared the lives of Embassy personnel at the time of the Chancery takeovers.

In Islamabad, the courageous actions of the Marines and other personnel making up the internal defense force permitted the orderly withdrawal of Embassy personnel to the communications vault, where they held out for some four hours until the demonstrators departed the area.

Q: Senator Jim Sasser has introduced a Concurrent Resolution which seeks to establish a U.N. diplomatic security corps which could help with security issues when asked. Has the Department evaluated such a proposal?

A: The Department is examining Senator Sasser's Concurrent Resolution in the context of an overall study on the protection of diplomatic missions and personnel.

Q: Our personnel in Moscow were bombarded with microwaves. Is this kind of danger likely to become more widespread and will your proposals safeguard our employees' health and protect our information?

A: We do not expect microwave bombardment to become widespread. There have been no instances other than at Moscow. The periods of operation of the microwave signal were reduced steadily throughout 1979, and have been in total remission since September 1979. We do not propose protective measures at other Embassies in anticipation of spread of such signals.

Q: To what extent is the breakdown of the protection of diplomatic status a distinctly U.S. problem? Are attacks on the diplomats of other countries on the increase? (e.g. 12 Turkish diplomats or family members have been killed since 1973.)

A: A terrorist threat or attack is by no means a distinctly U.S. problem as the current incident in Bogota makes abundantly clear. A comparison of attacks on U.S. diplomatic victims and non-U.S. diplomatic victims of international terrorist incidents from 1968 to February 1980 shows that only between the years 1969 - 1971 were the number of U.S. diplomatic victims greater than non-U.S. targets. (See attached table)

Attacks on diplomats of other countries have generally increased since 1968, reaching the highest level in 1976, and declining somewhat since that year. Although the total number of incidents, both U.S. and foreign, were fewer in 1979 than in 1978, there has been no concomitant decrease in the casualties from terrorist attacks. These attacks caused more casualties in 1979 than during any previous year since 1968 (according to statistics provided in "International Terrorism in 1979", published by the National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA)

In 1979 there were 57 incidents involving foreign diplomats and 28 involving U.S. envoys. The United States lost one high-ranking diplomat (Ambassador Dubs) compared to six foreign diplomats assassinated, three foreign ambassadors wounded, and one ambassador kidnapped. There were four incidents involving barricade and hostage situations for the United States versus nine seizures of foreign establishments. In 1980, there has already been six assassinations of foreign diplomats. The overwhelming majority of personal attacks against high-ranking diplomats, both foreign and U.S., in 1979 and in January and February of 1980 were against individuals with minimum security or those who had neglected to follow all the basic security precautions against terrorist attacks.

Type of Event	1979		1980	
	U. S.	Foreign	U.S.	Foreign
Assassination	1	6	0	6
Bombing	12	24	4	8
Arson	0	0	0	0
Barricade & Hostage	4	9	1	9
Kidnap	1	4	0	0
Sniping	1	4	0	0
Armed Attack	7	6	0	2
Threats	4	3	0	1
Theft	0	1	0	0
Other	0	0	0	1
Total	29	57	5	31

Statistics provided by Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center.

TYPE OF NON-US VICTIM TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
1968-1978

TYPE/VICTIM TEXT	YEAR	NUMBER
CORP OFFICIALS	68	16
	69	19
	70	15
	71	18
	72	02
	73	35
	74	64
	75	51
	76	80
	77	72
	78	24
FORM DIPLOMATS	68	24
	69	14
	70	41
	71	26
	72	71
	73	57
	74	72
	75	77
	76	109
	77	79
	78	82
FORM MILITARY	71	1
	72	3
	73	2
	74	4
	75	2
	76	1
	77	8
	78	16
HOST SOVT MILITARY	69	2
	72	1
	73	3
	74	13
	75	2
	77	1
	78	4
HOST SOVT OFFICIALS	69	1
	70	7
	71	1
	72	22
	73	10
	74	10
	75	19
	76	9
	77	13
	78	10
INDETERMINATE	70	2
	72	1
	73	2

UNCLASSIFIED

TYPE OF NON-US VICTIM TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 1969-1978		
TYPEVICTEXT	YEAR	NUMBER
INDETERMINATE	77	2
	78	9
PRIVATE PARTIES	68	21
	69	33
	70	33
	71	20
	72	102
	73	95
	74	68
	75	55
	76	90
	77	72
PROM_OPINION_LEADERS	78	54
	69	1
	70	2
	71	2
	72	2
	73	3
	74	12
	75	5
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS	76	9
	77	6
	78	15
	68	1
	69	6
	70	3
	71	3
	72	20
	73	9
	74	7
75	9	
76	9	
77	5	
78	7	

UNCLASSIFIED

TYPE OF US VICTIM TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 1968-1978			
USVICTEXT	YEAR	NUMBER	
BUSINESS		747	
	68	6	
	69	35	
	70	25	
	71	56	
	72	45	
	73	57	
	74	94	
	75	58	
	76	62	
	77	45	
	78	48	
	DIPLOMATIC	68	17
		69	21
		70	90
71		91	
72		54	
73		33	
74		16	
75		16	
76		19	
77		28	
INAPPLICABLE	78	15	
	68	62	
	69	76	
	70	103	
	71	71	
	72	304	
	73	216	
	74	250	
	75	211	
	76	307	
MILITARY	77	258	
	78	221	
	68	4	
	69	2	
	70	41	
	71	41	
	72	13	
	73	12	
	74	12	
	75	9	
OTHER NONOFFICIAL	76	33	
	77	11	
	78	3	
	68	3	
	69	9	
	70	19	
71	9		
72	28		

UNCLASSIFIED

2

TYPE OF US VICTIM TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
1969-1978

USVICTEXT	YEAR	NUMBER
OTHER NONOFFICIAL	73	11
	74	17
	75	31
	76	29
	77	21
	78	23
	68	29
OTHER US GOVT	69	36
	70	62
	71	33
	72	36
	73	10
	74	17
	75	17
	76	6
	77	7
	78	8
	UNKNOWN	68
70		4
73		1
74		19
77		2
78		7

UNCLASSIFIED

Q: During the 1970's what were the major threats perceived by the Department and what steps were taken to counter them? How successful were those efforts?

A: In the 1970's the major threats to diplomats abroad were perceived to be from carefully plotted commando actions by international terrorist groups or smaller-scale but equally dangerous attacks from indigenous terrorist groups.

In response to the various terrorist tactics employed in the 1970's, a number of diplomatic initiatives were undertaken. As kidnapping became a prime concern, the United States adopted a policy of non-payment of ransom to terrorists. In 1973, the United States signed the "New York Convention on Internationally Protected Persons" which makes it a crime to undertake a terrorist act against diplomats and obliges states to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators of such acts. Only 43 countries are parties to this convention and it has not been particularly effective to date.

Hijacking reached an all-time high in the early 1970's and a number of physical security measures were adopted by airports throughout the world. There are three international conventions dealing with aircraft hijacking: the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971. These conventions have over 100 parties each and have been widely observed. In addition, the Bonn Declaration was signed in the summer of 1978 by the United States and six allies which provides for cutting off air service to any country refusing to extradite or prosecute aerial hijackers.

At the end of the decade, the United States faced an increased threat from two new trends:

-- The most publicized trend is the threat from mob violence and large-scale hostage taking. There were eight incidents of this type between 1970-74, three in 1975, one in 1976, three in 1978, and twelve in 1979. (See Attachment E.) In an effort to counter this tactic diplomatically, the United States signed a UN Convention early this year which provides for the prosecution or extradition of hostage takers.

-- The second alarming change which occurred in 1979 was the increase in the proportion of incidents apparently aimed at causing casualties, most notably assassination attempts, while incendiary bombings -- which generally

involve only property damage -- declined. This trend has continued into 1980.

At the same time that the Department was initiating diplomatic initiatives to counter the terrorist threats, it also spent a significant amount of money to upgrade the physical security of our embassies and consulates overseas. Specifically the Department has:

Augmented its staff of professional security officers overseas by some 75 positions; (total: 137); Marine Security Guards by 150 (total: 1,100); and its cadre of U.S. Navy Construction Specialists (Seabees) by 30 positions (total: 100).

Strengthened the public access controls and overall physical posture of its official installations and private residences (the latter predominately in high threat areas) through added security barriers, ballistic shields, closed circuit TV and electronic alarm coverage, metal detector equipment, improved lock hardware and an increase in coverage provided by U.S. Marine and locally hired guards;

Improved and augmented voice communications networks linking employees and installations with security control centers at each post from which a threatened employee or facility can expect a security response;

Purchased additional defensive weapons, chemical (anti-riot) agents, bomb detection equipment, body armor and other devices to enhance the protection provided to overseas personnel and installations;

Acquired additional fully armored vehicles for the protection of American officials in threatened areas and follow vehicles to transport the security forces protecting American principals;

Implemented a partial vehicle armoring program aimed at insuring that each overseas post is equipped with at least a minimum capability of protecting American lives against the threat of street attack during troubled periods;

Improved upon its security (anti-terrorism) training and indoctrination programs for the enlightenment of all official Americans serving abroad, with emphasis on those known to constitute the highest risk from terrorist attack and those American guard forces on whom the ultimate defense of our installations depends. Mobile Training Teams of security officers visited all posts abroad. Domestically, in addition to expanding its security officer and Marine Guard courses, the Department has established a mandatory one-day anti-terrorism training course for all employees scheduled for overseas assignment. This course is administered by the Foreign Service Institute.

SECURITY PROCEDURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1980

PREFACE BY HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

The United States was shocked and saddened by the tragic events of November 21, 1979, in which a mob burned its Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, causing two Americans and at least two Pakistanis to lose their lives. Even more significant, the incident seemed to be another example in a pattern of increasing violence against American officials and property abroad. After another mob of "students" overran the Embassy in Tehran almost a year ago, and captured hostages against a backdrop of violent revolution under Ayatolla Khomeini, it appeared that the entire Southwest Asian area was becoming dangerously volatile.

Acting to protect Americans, the Department of State evacuated hundreds of American officials and their dependents from Iran and Pakistan. Given this concern the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs undertook to examine the circumstances of the November 21 episode in Islamabad.

The intent of the hearing was not to embarrass the Government of Pakistan, which accepted responsibility for reconstructing the Embassy. Rather the purpose was to place the event in a perspective from which recommendations could be made for the future—to determine what lessons could be learned from the tragedy. In this connection I invite attention to the report of a congressional delegation which I conducted to South Asia in late May, 1980. The report contains recommendations to improve Embassy security arrangements and proceedings.¹

Because this issue involves the larger question of security of American diplomatic posts, it was appropriate to hold the hearing jointly with the Subcommittee on International Operations, under Chairman Dante B. Fascell. In addition, certain questions also arose about the conduct of evacuations and the treatment of and support for Americans who had been evacuated. It was necessary to learn how these matters had been handled as well.

As our mission was informed, the Islamabad tragedy was also marked by individual heroism by at least two Pakistani citizens on behalf of Americans whose lives and persons were in danger. Mr. Siraj Patel, an employee of the American club, managed to protect and guide a group of American officials and dependents for several hours while they were set upon and abused by a part of the mob which had stormed the American club. By his actions and personal courage Mr. Siraj prevented any of the Americans from suffering serious injury and is regarded as having saved the life of more than one American.

¹ "The Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia: Circle of Fear."

Col. Ismail Mohammed Khan, a former Pakistani diplomat whose son attends the American school in Islamabad, intervened when a group of rioters started to storm the school where several American and other students were in attendance. Col. Ismail Khan and his 16-year-old son, by sheer courage, succeeded in deflecting the rioters so that no one suffered injury, when the situation might well have resulted in tragedy.

I have therefore, in a separate action, introduced private bills on behalf of Siraj Patel and Ismail Mohammed Khan which would provide them and their dependent families with admission to the United States as permanent immigrants.

The hearing reported herein included testimony from Ms. Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Mr. Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security; and Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Chairman of the Executive Committee and Working Group on Terrorism, Department of State.

LESTER L. WOLFF,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

SECURITY PROCEDURES AT U.S. EMBASSIES

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1980

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
AND ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 10 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester Wolff (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs) presiding.

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come to order.

Unfortunately Chairman Fascell is detained by pressure of business today on the floor. We are going to have a hard time going through all of the various aspects of this, but in the interest of time we will begin.

Today the Subcommittees on International Operations and Asian and Pacific Affairs join to examine current policies and procedures regarding the security of American embassies and their personnel overseas.

As we are all aware, attacks on embassies and on diplomatic personnel have become increasingly common, though no less tragic, in recent years. The United States has had no monopoly in being the victim of this violent upswing nor has any particular area of the world been exempt.

The British have recently been credited with a success in crisis management even though terrorists murdered two hostages before they were overwhelmed by attack troops. By contrast extended negotiations and avoidance of armed force characterized the successful rescue of the hostages in Bogota, including the American Ambassador, who by all reports played a hero's role.

I specify these two among many possible examples because they would seem to represent the two basic alternatives in hostage situations, each of which we have tried in Iran, in their most simple terms. Also they dramatize, as Iran has dramatized, the complex and often contradictory problems facing both host governments and the nation whose embassy or personnel may find itself the target of attack.

EMBASSY SECURITY

Members of my subcommittee and I did not become personally involved in the issue of embassy security until the tragic kidnaping and subsequent murder more than a year ago of our dear friend, the Ambassador to Afghanistan, "Spike" Dubs.

Last fall our Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, was briefly overwhelmed by a mob, burned and sacked, with two of our people killed.

On previous study missions overseas, members of our delegation and I have been frequently made aware of the need for security and of the hard work and dedication of the men and women of our foreign service, our intelligence community, our Armed Forces, and our law enforcement agencies on our behalf.

Similarly, we have been impressed by and grateful for the equally dedicated work of our many host governments and their personnel and I would stress that nothing we say or do today should be construed by anyone to represent criticism by us of any government or its people.

Quite the opposite. The rise of international terrorism is a threat to all governments and all peoples everywhere. It is one which we can and must approach in a spirit of cooperation borne from mutual need.

ATTACK ON EMBASSY

It is with this strong caveat in mind that I note one of our principal areas of discussion today will be the attack on our Embassy in Pakistan. It is my feeling that the events of November 21, 1979, in Islamabad can serve as a case history to determine what lessons are to be learned and what improvements should be made to help insure the future safety of our people and our embassies, as well as the embassies and personnel of other nations.

Just last month I led a congressional delegation which visited Islamabad, among other locations. We viewed the burned-out structures of our Embassy and the surrounding compound. We spoke with a number of people who lived through this harrowing experience.

I have taken pictures of some of these scenes in Islamabad, scenes which to my mind show the incredulous fact that a brick building remains just a shell and everything in it burned, including some people, and the fact that the way the people got out of that building was through an escape hatch. And, if certain steps had been taken by the rioters, that escape hatch would not have done them very much good. They would have been fried in the locked vault.

I would like to say that I think we can view the collective performance of all our people in Pakistan with pride and appreciation. There were many, many instances of individual heroism, most of which have been recorded. They reflect the training, dedication, and initiative of brave professionals.

We also heard of numerous additional instances of quiet courage and supportive actions throughout those desperate hours. I came away with the conviction that if ever a group earned what the military call a "unit citation," this was it.

HEROISM OF SIRAJ PATEL

In this regard I would like to mention by name one specific individual, a Pakistani national, Mr. Siraj Patel, an embassy employee. By all accounts his initiative and actions helped bring to safety 16 men and women besieged in the American Club. At an appropriate

point, I would like to enter into the record a verified statement describing Mr. Siraj's heroism and what I propose be done to recognize his actions.

I also would like to commend, from the investigation we made in the hearing, the Marine Guards, essentially the top sergeant of the Marines who was outstanding as well as the DEA agents there who participated in the defense of the people under very, very difficult circumstances.

However, obviously not all went well that terrible day in Islamabad nor have things gone well in the many instances of terror and terrorism which have prompted our hearing today.

We will be specifically interested in how the Department of State has been approaching the problems raised by terrorist events and how systematically the Department is carrying out the policies and lessons learned. Perhaps more important, we will seek to learn what areas still await coherent policies or actions in anticipation of future crises.

It is appropriate that our subcommittees examine specific allegations of shortcomings and omissions in the continuing effort to improve procedures to safeguard the lives, well-being and property of embassy personnel and their dependents. In the subcommittee letter to the Department we have requested that testimony be responsive to a number of specific concerns that have been voiced by individuals and in the press.

Some of the testimony or queries by members may involve matters of a classified nature. Quite bluntly we are not interested in supplying individuals or groups with a "handbook of operations" for future use. Accordingly, the subcommittees will be polled to go into executive session if the need arises. However, I would urge that the maximum portion of testimony which can be a matter of public record be so given.

I am happy to say that the chairman of the International Operations Subcommittee has joined our hearing this morning and perhaps he would like to make a statement before we call the witnesses.

Mr. FASCELL. I think we had better hear the witnesses because we are not going to have very long.

Mr. WOLFF. I understand that.

Our State Department witnesses are: Mrs. Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Mr. Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Security; and they will be accompanied by Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Chairman of the Executive Committee and Working Group on Terrorism.

Following prepared testimony we would ask that our witnesses serve as a panel for members' queries.

We also have received a copy of a summary from the Office of Security of the State Department which had been classified and, as I understand it, is declassified at this point?

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is correct.

Mr. WOLFF. Regarding the action report on the American Embassy in Islamabad. Mrs. Coon, would you like to proceed? Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF JANE A. COON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mrs. Coon. I do, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to take the opportunity to introduce Mr. Sheldon Kryss who can assist in answering questions on some of the administrative matters and follow up and management of evacuation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Department of State and I personally welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the crucial issue of the safety of American personnel serving abroad and the security of our diplomatic installations.

We share your objectives of insuring that every possible measure is taken to enhance the security of individuals and property and that individuals affected by forced or precautionary evacuations are helped promptly and in every way possible and with sensitivity and sympathy. The Department of State's most important resource is people and we intend to protect them and look to their welfare.

Regrettably, events of the past 18 months have underscored what many have realized for a long time, namely, that our diplomatic personnel serving abroad are indeed vulnerable to a wide variety of terrorist and mob attacks.

Of necessity, we must rely primarily on the host government concerned to protect our personnel but we are also redoubling our own efforts to strengthen security and to heighten individual awareness of safety considerations and procedures.

The tragic assault on our Embassy compound in Islamabad last November 21 should be seen against a background. Less than 3 weeks earlier a mob had overrun Embassy Tehran. That attack and the temporary invasion of the Tehran compound in February 1979 were the first incidents involving a mob overrunning an American embassy in recent years.

Shortly after the attacks in Islamabad and on our Consulate General in Lahore, a Libyan mob attacked Embassy Tripoli. Reports of demonstrations and threats elsewhere in the region led us to conduct the largest evacuation of official personnel since we departed Saigon. Nearly 1,000 employees and dependents were evacuated from 13 countries throughout the Near East and South Asia. We have learned a great deal from these events and welcome the subcommittee's scrutiny of our actions.

I particularly appreciate the fact that Chairman Wolff was able to go to Islamabad and that he and his staff were able to talk to so many members of the staff there.

DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION

The Department's Office of Security has completed a thorough investigation into the Islamabad incident and we have provided copies to the subcommittees. The chronology which accompanies the report outlines the sequence of events on November 21.¹

¹ The information referred to appears in appendix 1.

The attacks on our facilities in Pakistan and the demonstrations elsewhere in the region were generated by the deep outrage felt by Moslems everywhere at the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20. Initial international radio accounts apparently led some to believe that the United States might have been involved.

This totally incorrect conclusion was particularly widespread in Pakistan, though after an exhaustive investigation we have been unable to pinpoint exactly why this was so. Given the ephemeral nature of the radio medium we probably never will be able to identify the broadcast or broadcasts which allegedly triggered the extreme emotional response in Pakistan.

The Embassy was first alerted to the prospect of trouble with the appearance of two busloads of students seen moving toward the compound about 12:30 p.m. They dispersed and it appeared that the demonstration had ended peacefully.

However, additional busloads arrived almost immediately and during the course of the afternoon, somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 violent demonstrators rampaged through the Embassy compound, setting fire to and destroying every building on it save one still under construction.

AMERICANS DIE

When the ordeal ended that evening, 137 people had barely escaped with their lives from the burning chancery and at least 5 people were dead. U.S. Marine Security Guard Cpl. Steven Crowley, killed by hostile fire; U.S. Army CWO Bryan Ellis, whose burned body was found a day later in one of the staff apartments; two Pakistani Foreign Service National employees, Nazir Hussain and Sharafat Ali, who burned to death on the ground floor of the chancery; and at least one demonstrator.

I might add that there are unconfirmed reports of another death among the demonstrators. Pakistani military authorities had re-established control of the compound by approximately 6 p.m. and assisted employees who had escaped from the chancery roof via the emergency escape hatch of the communications vault in descending to the ground; 18 other Americans and 1 Canadian endured a 4-hour ordeal of abuse and rough handling by the mob but most were ultimately evacuated from the compound by the Pakistani military who took them to a nearby army camp for the night.

One USAID employee was taken away and held for several hours by Pakistani students who threatened and abused him. His was a harrowing experience and we are thankful he was ultimately released.

INDIVIDUAL HEROISM

During that afternoon there were numerous acts of individual heroism, especially on the part of the Marine security guards, DEA agents, and the Pakistani Manager of the American Club, Mr. Siraj Patel. Ambassador Hummel and his deputy, as well as the British,

Canadian, and West German Ambassadors worked ceaselessly with Pakistani officials to obtain relief. Assurances that help was on the way, however, did not materialize in the form of effective actions at the compound until late in the day.

While the compound in Islamabad was in flames, a smaller mob attacked our Consulate General in Lahore, inflicting significant damage but with no serious injuries. The American Center in Rawalpindi was set on fire and destroyed. Anti-American demonstrations also occurred in Peshawar and Karachi, but Pakistani security forces were able to prevent them from approaching our offices in those cities.

We believe these events were essentially spontaneous in nature. There is no convincing evidence of a countrywide conspiracy, although there may have been some element of advance planning on the part of student groups on several campuses for demonstrations in that rough timeframe.

The fact that the group which was trapped in the Embassy vault survived is testimony to the effectiveness of the chancery's physical security preparedness training. The Marine security guards did a magnificent job in accord with their instructions to delay the advance of the mob long enough to allow most of the American and Pakistani personnel to retreat to the communications vault area. Those in the vault as well as those trapped elsewhere on the compound endured a traumatic experience, and that I think is an understatement.

We are extremely proud of the exemplary manner in which our employees, Pakistani and American, as well as others caught up in this desperate situation, conducted themselves. We appreciate your remarks, Mr. Chairman, in this regard. At the same time, we mourn the tragic deaths of Corporal Crowley, Warrant Officer Ellis, and our two Pakistani employees, Mr. Hussain and Mr. Ali.

SLOW RESPONSE

Both we and the Pakistan Government remain deeply concerned by the slowness of the response of Pakistani security forces. There appear to have been a number of factors which contributed to this, but do not excuse it. These include:

One, the lack of warning, as well as the inadequacy of preparation for an incident of such unprecedented magnitude in a normally tranquil capital thought to be immune to such mob violence. There was no precedent of mob action in Islamabad and adequate security forces were not in place or readily available;

Two, the deployment of Pakistani security forces guarding President Zia, who happened to be touring Rawalpindi, about 15 miles from the capital, on November 21; and

Three, the apparent breakdown in command and communications with the security forces and among the security forces.

There was never any question as to the Pakistan Government's acceptance of its full responsibility to provide protection or subsequently of its deep regret that it failed to fulfill these responsibilities. The Pakistan Government immediately offered full compensation. Measures have been taken to prevent a recurrence.

Our expressions of appreciation to the Pakistan Government immediately after the incident reflected our great relief that those in the vault had survived. We were also very aware of the clear distinction in the attitude and actions of the Pakistani authorities and those of the Government of Iran in response to the takeover of our Embassy in Tehran.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION

Following the lifting of the siege of the chancery and the escape of our people from the fire and the mob, Embassy Islamabad worked around the clock to implement orders for the emergency evacuation of all dependents and less essential personnel. In accomplishing this withdrawal within 2 days, the mission enjoyed the full cooperation and assistance of the Pakistani military, including transport of the evacuees to the airport.

The approximately 450 evacuees from Pakistan arrived in Washington on November 23 and 24, exhausted by their ordeal. Those with nearby relatives went to their homes; others were accommodated in a nearby hotel where we could provide medical and other services.

On the following day, a Saturday, the Department opened all necessary facilities to assist the evacuees with housing, medical needs, and emergency funds; a health room was set up for counseling adult evacuees and psychiatrists conducted special sessions with youngsters and teenagers.

Psychiatrists were also available for subsequent consultations. A shuttle bus from the hotel ran throughout the day permitting people to shop for essential items. As you can imagine, some of the people who lived in the compound arrived in Washington with nothing but the clothes that they wore to work the day of the riot.

The Department's Family Liaison Office (FLO) did a superb job working out individual problems and keeping evacuees informed through a special weekly newsletter during the months they were in Washington or in the United States. Evacuations from other countries in the area soon followed and multiplied the tasks faced by the Department and other agencies many times over.

FIELD SUPPORT

In the field, we also sought to give special attention to the needs of employees remaining at post. Our regional psychiatrist proceeded immediately to Islamabad. He was in Delhi. The post differential was promptly increased to the maximum allowable.

Family visitation privileges and special allowances were arranged. We sought to respond positively, personally, and equitably to all individual problems and concerns. Some claims took longer to process than others but we expedited these to the extent possible.

We are, of course, cognizant that if there are future evacuations to the United States, there are areas where we can improve our support. We have encouraged the evacuees to voice their concerns and have held many sessions with them to brief them on policies and discuss problems they faced. We welcome, too, the suggestions of mem-

bers of these subcommittees who have had a chance to review our procedures and policies.

FULL INFORMATION

I would like to respond now to one criticism which needs to be laid to rest; namely, that there was some sort of coverup regarding events in Islamabad or the conduct of the evacuation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

We have kept the public fully informed throughout this ordeal, though the subcommittees will appreciate that there are some aspects of physical security arrangements which must of necessity remain classified in the interests of the safety of our people overseas.

Ambassador Hummel's judgment in this regard was, in our view, absolutely correct. He quite properly asked departing evacuees to keep in mind those they left behind and our colleagues held hostage in Iran when commenting publicly on their ordeal. We discouraged the press from interviewing the exhausted evacuees immediately upon their arrival in the middle of the night but they were available to speak with the press subsequently.

In fact, we advised those reporters who inquired that some individuals had expressed a desire to talk about their experiences and I personally assisted in this, I might add. The newspapers from the 3 or 4 days following the incident contained extensive and detailed coverage of the events in Islamabad and the evacuation.

PROTECTION CAPABILITIES

With the help of the Congress and the support of the American public, we will continue to improve our ability to protect our personnel and facilities overseas. This takes resources and training. The Foreign Service and our missions abroad are vital to our national interest. We are doing everything possible to insure their effective functioning and to prevent future Islamabads, Tehrans, or Tripolis.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ackerman will explain in more detail what we are doing worldwide to provide security to our missions and personnel. Each and every American serving the United States abroad is risking his or her life for us and we must support that commitment with a determination of our own to make their welfare and safety, and that of their families, a priority concern in all that we do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to turn this over to Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mrs. Coon.

We will now hear from Mr. Ackerman.

STATEMENT OF KARL D. ACKERMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a brief opening statement for the record.

The year 1979 introduced new security concerns for U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel assigned overseas. The events in Tehran, Islamabad, Tripoli, and San Salvador demonstrated the vulnerability of our posts to mob violence.

Although attacks on our posts abroad are not an entirely new phenomenon, the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979, and again on November 4, 1979, as well as the total destruction of our Embassy in Islamabad on November 22 and the sacking of our Embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979, were events almost without precedent.

As a result we have reviewed our overseas security programs to determine what additional measures should be taken to improve the protection of our personnel, property, and national security information.

NEW THREATS

The review has highlighted the need for protection against a new threat not envisaged by the antiterrorism program which Congress has funded since the midseventies. That program was directed at the threat of individual or small groups of terrorists. The violence we have experienced recently has been new, that of organized mobs allowed to wreak their havoc without a prompt, adequate response by the host government.

To cope with this new brand of terrorism we believe it is essential to expand and accelerate certain ongoing projects and to initiate new ones. The programs identified in our presentation are designed to improve the chances of surviving hostile actions and destroying classified material.

To upgrade the protection and safety of our personnel and property the initiatives planned would:

Revise or build communications vault areas or alternate locations as mission safe havens in time of attack with appropriate escape features;

Expand the public access controls program;

Reinforce perimeter barriers;

Employ a variety of nonlethal activated access denial systems;

Significantly increase the life support capability of our embassies;

Increase our inventory of protective equipment;

Augment our radio and telephone programs.

The other major problem encountered by our diplomatic installations in times of crisis has been the protection of national security information. To destroy all sensitive materials and papers in a brief time under harrowing circumstances is almost impossible if present filing and data handling procedures continue.

We, therefore, recommend a new approach: the installation of centralized electronic storage systems overseas to replace decentralized paper files. These systems would minimize the amount of classified hard copy information filed at posts and allow for quick destruction during crises. Additionally, such systems would permit the rapid reconstruction of the post's files after the danger has passed.

Our plans also call for the purchase of additional document destruction equipment for use at a greater number of locations within an embassy to speed the destruction of documents.

I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
 Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
 Mr. Quainton, do you have any prepared statement?

**STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY C. E. QUAINTON, CHAIRMAN,
 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND WORKING GROUP ON TERROR-
 ISM, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
 STATE**

Ambassador QUAINTON. I do not have any prepared statement but I would like to make a few remarks if I may, Mr. Chairman.

To supplement the comments which have been made both by Mrs. Coon and by Deputy Assistant Secretary Ackerman, I would like to note several other areas in which the Department and the U.S. Government as a whole have been trying to learn from the experiences which we have seen beginning with the tragic kidnaping of our Ambassador in Afghanistan and running through the events which have been touched on this morning.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

In the last year we have been requiring a greatly expanded and much more detailed set of contingency plans from all our posts throughout the world, in every country, to make certain they are prepared in their own internal organization, in their contacts with the host government, and in a variety of technical ways to meet the threats which we have now to face overseas.

These threats run from the possibility of individual terrorist attacks through the problems of mob violence which have become more prevalent in the last year.

TRAINING UPGRADED

We have also significantly changed and modified the training which we are providing to our employees. In the next few months we will be expanding the training course on terrorism which is jointly sponsored by the Office of Security and the Office of Anti-Terrorism in a number of significant ways to make certain that all of our employees serving abroad, not just those in the traditional foreign affairs agencies, are briefed and fully informed about the measures of personal security and embassy security which are in place.

We will also make certain that the dependents of our employees who have been able to attend on an optional basis will now attend as a routine matter so that they too are fully cognizant of our policies and better able to cope with the problems of violence, not just terrorist violence but criminal violence and mob violence in the world in which they will have to operate abroad.

U.N. ASSISTANCE

In the last few weeks, and I will not speak in detail about the international consultations we have been engaged in with our allies, the Nordic countries have asked the Secretary General of the United Na-

tions to inscribe on the agenda for the next General Assembly session an item to consider effective measures to enhance the protection, security, and safety of diplomatic and consular missions. We will be supporting that initiative and will be seeking ways to bring the international community work more effectively together in order to enhance the security of our missions abroad.

These I think are a number of significant steps which have been taken and which are being taken to build upon the work which has gone on in previous years to enhance the security of our personnel abroad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Quainton. I would like to yield to Chairman FASCELL.

Mr. FASCELL. I see we have a vote going on. Do you want to wait until the second bell?

Mr. WOLFF. I think we might.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that these hearings are a continuation of a series of hearings in which both subcommittees have been involved over a period of years in dealing with the whole problem of security, starting back before even the working group on terrorism was set up in the Department of State.

We note that the Department has responded to the request of the Congress with respect to the review on security and that funding has been provided. Hopefully all of it will be made available by the Congress; at least if we have anything to say about it, it will be.

I believe the request is \$50 million for the fiscal year. We will certainly do our best. The problem is severe.

TERRORISM WORKING GROUP

Before we get into details on that, I would like to ask Ambassador Quainton, who as chairman of the working group was on location in the most recent weeks, to give us in a very quick summary what the relevance of the working group is toward dealing with this kind of problem.

Ambassador QUAINTON. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the case of the abduction of our Ambassador in Bogotá and other Ambassadors in the Dominican Republic Embassy we did set up a crisis task force in the Department. That task force brought together all the resources of the State Department, both from the bureau of the geographic area concerned, Office of Security, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and other concerned bureaus. It was also the focal point for the interface with other governments and with other agencies of the executive branch that were concerned with this problem.

What we have done in the last 2 to 3 years is build a network of effective working relationships among the 30 Federal Government agencies that are concerned with terrorism. In any of the terrorist incidents of the kind that we are familiar with, 6, 8, or 10 may be directly involved, in the intelligence community and elsewhere.

If we have a network of relationships they can be called upon to deploy their resources rapidly and effectively. In the case of the incident in Bogotá we sent a number of people to Bogotá very rapidly to provide assistance to the Embassy, including my own deputy, a staff psychiatrist and others.

The contingency plans which we have for dealing with terrorism have been refined in the crucible of events as much as in the committee structure which has been established.

Mr. FASCELL. So, the important thing then is that it no longer is an ad hoc proposition. You have continuity, you are developing experts, coordination, techniques, methodology and you have personnel who are assigned to the problem?

Ambassador QUAINTON. That is correct. Those who have responsibilities whether in the Department of State or in other agencies move immediately into the breach when a particular incident arises.

Mr. WOLFF. We are going to have to call a short recess to take a vote. We hope when we come back we will be able to discuss certain specifics of the Pakistani situation and what steps you are taking to avoid the possible threats in the future.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. WOLFF. Because of the situation on the floor our members have to stay for awhile. In order to get in the record all the information we would like to receive, I should like to comment for just a moment and pose some questions to you relative to the Pakistani incident and then go to a broader inquiry.

PERSONNEL TREATMENT

First of all, in commenting overall I have some serious questions on the compassionate nature in treating some of the people who have been subjected to the trauma of these events. Specifically, I am referring to the fact that recently in one particular case, the Ambassador's wife and family got in touch with me in order to get some information about the situation that existed with a relative.

Other than some complaints that were made by some people involved in the events that transpired and although perhaps the official response to their problems has been met, the fact is that there is some degree of lack of compassionate attitude upon the part of the Department.

If you want to respond to it you may. You do not have to respond to it. I do think that when we deal with people we have to deal with them on a personal basis as well as on an official basis.

If we do not, then we are not going to have the type of personnel abroad serving our country that our Nation needs. The Foreign Service personnel to my mind are a dedicated lot of people even though many people heap criticism upon them and think they are living a life of luxury and ease.

I would hardly consider a post in Pakistan as a luxury spot or some of the other places that I have traveled to. Therefore, I would make strong representations that we ought to give some greater consideration to compassionate thoughts and help to those who suffer these events.

FIXING RESPONSIBILITY

I should like also to ask about one particular element and that is during the events that have transpired in Pakistan particularly, there were several deaths that were involved there. Has anybody been brought to account in Pakistan on this?

Mrs. COON. Let me respond to your second question first and then I would like to just touch on your first question.

The Pakistan Government has informed us of some of the actions that have been taken subsequent to the event. The President of Pakistan approved the recommendations made to improve the general security in the Islamabad area and strengthen protection afforded to the diplomatic missions in order to assure no repetition of such an incident takes place in the future.

Action has been taken in Pakistan against officials found wanting in the efficient discharge of their duties. I cannot give you specificity on that. I think it is reassignment.

Legal proceedings have been initiated against a number of individuals who were arrested by the police during or immediately after the incident of November 21. The legal proceedings against the persons referred to are handicapped by lack of evidence.

After initial hearings these persons were able to secure their release on bail granted by the courts in accordance with provisions of law but these cases are still pending in the courts.

That is the extent of my information.

Mr. WOLFF. According to the information we have, there are very few people that are going to be brought to account here based upon the lack of evidence. Yet we do have any number of people who were witnesses to the incidents and it seems strange to me that we are not getting any more than, to my mind, lip service for the deaths and accountability of our people particularly, as well as the Pakistani people who were killed and injured.

STUDENT ACTIONS

From the information that we gathered broadly through one of the main sources, the original attack on the Embassy was by a group of Iranian students and Palestinians.

Mrs. COON. Our impression, Mr. Chairman, is there weren't many Iranians and Palestinian students involved. The number of attackers that ultimately descended on the Embassy far exceeded the small number of Iranian students and Palestinians.

I think one can say it was the emotional impact and the number involved stems from the erroneous accounts of the attack on the mosque at Mecca.

Mr. WOLFF. We understood there were languages that could not be understood by Pakistanis, spoken by people who were in essence directing the attack.

Mrs. COON. Perhaps I had better turn to Mr. Ackerman with respect to this.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I do not think we really know, Mr. Chairman. The eye witnesses of course, who consisted of some 18 people who were in one part of the compound and who were, as you know, subjected to a great deal of mistreatment, their perspective at any given point would be what they saw, what they heard.

When you try to extrapolate from that to try to conclude a hard core leadership directing the attack and so forth, I do not think there is information available on our side. I doubt that there is much available from the Pakistan side.

Mr. WOLFF. According to the information contained in this heretofore classified document, it does relate to the heavy participation of the Iranian students and Palestinians.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But that represents a mosaic, if you will, that we have been able to put together from the testimony, that we have been able to take from all the various people who were interviewed. There has to be some measure of speculation there.

Mr. WOLFF. Now it was we, I believe, who thanked the Pakistanis for the work of their people in protecting the Embassy—yet it took 5 to 6 hours for a real response. I am going to give you about 10 minutes or so to respond to that because I have to vote again.

The committee will recess until I return from the vote.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. PRITCHARD. We have an unusual situation in that we are back and forth voting all the time. I think rather than have your valuable time wasted while we take the long walk we will try to overlap. Mr. Buchanan and I will carry on. Unfortunately the series of questions may not flow and you will just have to suffer.

EVENTS IN CHAD

I would like to ask some questions. Maybe one of you can tell me what happened in Chad and what was our response?

Mrs. COON. I think I will defer to Mr. Ackerman on Chad.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I do not believe we are quite prepared to discuss that in any detail, Mr. Chairman, largely for lack of information. I can say from my perspective, which is the security program, that we had a situation in which the sudden outbreak of actual fighting caused the total evacuation of our personnel from there. Right up, as far as I am aware, to this very moment the situation has not permitted anyone to get back into Chad to take possession of our mission.

We have had personnel stationed close by since virtually the moment that they left, including some special teams from the United States, prepared to go in as soon as it appears they can do so with some reasonable degree of safety, and I underscore "reasonable."

We are prepared to take some risks. But reports that we have been able to get from other sources indicated it is a totally out-of-control situation and in the vicinity of the Embassy there has been heavy firing and there continues to be.

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Mr. PRITCHARD. Were we able to pull out of there with our papers destroyed?

Mr. ACKERMAN. I cannot give you an answer on that, Mr. Chairman. We do not have complete information. We are aware that the evacuation had to be very hasty.

We have to assume there was a good deal of material which was secured but which was not destroyed. The question is whether our premises will have been violated, and to what degree. We are confident that everything in the place is in proper safes and vaults.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I am sure the committee will be interested, when you do get that information, to receive that information.

You have two responsibilities here, and it seems almost harsh to say it but the first responsibility is to make sure that the papers are destroyed or properly handled, and then there is the safety of the officers themselves.

Perhaps Ambassador Quanton or either one of you may know this. In what kind of time do we expect to be able to destroy all our sensitive material in an embassy? Do we have a timeframe, something we aim for?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Every defense plan of every embassy must take this problem into account. I should like to point out a rather interesting bit of background that prior to Tehran we had only a handful of actual penetrations, attacks that resulted in penetration and some partial or whole takeover of our premises.

The last one before Tehran was in Taipei in 1957. That Embassy was out of our control under total destruction conditions for a matter of 10 or 12 hours at the outside. The significance of this is that our destruction plans heretofore have been based upon priority; most critical materials, starting with the cryptographic system obviously and in descending order, given how much time you may have in a certain circumstance.

NEW SYSTEMS

What we now have to confront, and this is why in my statement I mentioned the fact that we are going to go to a whole new system of information storage, is the possibility, as happened in Tehran, that our Embassies may be out of our hands for significantly long periods. Obviously, whatever we have is going to be penetrated one way or the other if we give somebody a matter of days, weeks, or months in this case.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Do you have a target here of 30 minutes or 20 minutes or what?

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have actually instructed specific posts in the highest threat areas to reduce their holdings in some cases to a half hour and in other cases not more than an hour. You have to confront, of course, the size of some of the posts we are talking about. Obviously, some of our small posts would not have much material in any case.

But that has been specifically addressed since the attacks of last year and translated into specific directives to the posts that they will maintain no more than for a certain fixed period of destruction time and it is usually less than an hour's time.

Mr. PRITCHARD. In those sensitive posts, do we have the type of equipment which shreds or burns, or whatever it does, quickly?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes; we do, but again, as I mentioned in the statement, that is tied to the question of how much you are going to maintain and how fast you are going to get rid of it. We also contemplate deploying more destruction equipment than we do at the present time.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Are you coordinating pretty closely with other agencies that might have classified material, DOD and others?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, Mr. Buchanan. We have an intergovernmental organization known as the SECOM, Security Committee, which is under the immediate direction of the Director of Central Intelligence. All national security agencies are members of that committee. One of the principal purposes is the very coordination you speak of.

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is my understanding there might be some differences in procedures among the various agencies. I assume when you move into this kind of emergency situation—

Mr. ACKERMAN. In fact the Department of State is the landlord, if you will, of our Embassies abroad. Now, we have many tenants in the form of other agencies, and internally there has been certainly a degree of latitude about how they run their operation in terms of their own needs.

But in the circumstances that Mr. Pritchard has just mentioned with respect to a directive on how many files will be maintained for what period of destruction time, we assume that will be translated by the Ambassador at his post and applied to all agencies.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

MARINE GUARDS

Mrs. COON. Perhaps I could add here, if I might, Mr. Pritchard, that we are extremely proud of the fact that the discipline and training of both our personnel and, of course, our Marine security guards in Islamabad were such that under the circumstances we do not believe that we lost a single piece of classified material during the events in Islamabad. Everything was secured or destroyed.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me that the only way this is going to be kept from spreading is that it is going to be very harmful to a host country if they allow this to happen, and there has to be response by more than just the nation that was attacked to have it painful and costly to a country.

What do we do if the Chilean or Belgian, what have you, or French Embassy is attacked? What is our response?

Ambassador QUAINTON. If an embassy is attacked here in this country?

Mr. PRITCHARD. No. I am talking about, say, in Australia that the French Embassy is overrun by a mob. What is our position on that?

Ambassador QUAINTON. Of course the immediate response would be to offer whatever assistance we could to the remaining members of the staff of that embassy. There have been a number of cases in recent months where we have done that. In the case in Islamabad our friends immediately provided that same kind of support in terms of communications and other assistance which was absolutely essential.

We have gone out to our Embassies in the last 3 or 4 months urging them to establish relationships with other friendly missions to provide mutual support and assistance particularly in the area of communications so that indeed we will have that kind of backup from people who have a common interest in dealing with the problem.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me that when a host country allows one of these embassies to be overrun there has to be a response by all the countries to that action if you are not going to have this going on intermittently. In other words, we wouldn't pull most of our people out of any country where proper steps were taken by the host country.

Even though they did not touch us, they touched some other embassy, we automatically pull our people out. There has to be some kind of response so that there is real suffering by the host country and they do not allow these things to be picked off one by one.

What do we do if somebody else gets taken? How do we make it painful?

OTHER COUNTRY RESPONSE

Mrs. COON. Let me speak to Islamabad, turning your question around, what people did for us and I would hope we would do the same for them. In Islamabad the British, Canadian, and German Ambassadors particularly, who were close by, were making constant efforts throughout that afternoon to get the Pakistani Government moving effectively to raise the siege.

The British Embassy and British Ambassador received all the people who came out of the vault, at considerable risk to themselves, I might add. The German Ambassador who was dean of the corps came by the Embassy midafternoon when the mob was there in an attempt to do something and as dean of the corps he filed on behalf of the corps a very strong, and I will say very strong, protest with the Government of Pakistan.

The Canadians were equally helpful. I would hope under the same circumstances we would do the same thing for anyone else who was under these circumstances and for days afterward I might add we were using the British Embassy as a means of communication.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I understand the cooperation. What I am talking about is, if you are going to make it painful for these countries so that they do not pick off one by one, there has to be some greater response by the entire community, at least by Free World countries, that says if you do not set up proper protection, then we are in some kind of compact where we do something—I do not know what it is—but we collectively do something here so that there is a real price that has to be paid by a host country.

I guess I am just reaching around something because if we just say, as countries are being picked off one by one, "We are sorry, we want to be helpful," how much does that damage these countries? In the past you could hardly get away with it.

Mrs. COON. I think if I might, sir, distinguish between those countries which in effect collaborate in the overrunning of an embassy and those who do not. Pakistan is certainly in the latter category.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We are not talking about collaborating. We are talking about not having in place enough security or feeling that this is something that we have to do if we are going to have an international community in our country.

SUPPORT BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Ambassador QUAINTON. There have been a number of recent cases in which the dean of the diplomatic corps, speaking on behalf of all colleagues, including American colleagues, has gone to a host government and said "The security situation is serious, the support which the government is providing is inadequate. We, the diplomats, expect the government to provide better and more intense protection," and that has had some effect.

The problem which you allude to is a very real one which we have been struggling with now for 7 or 8 years. Is it possible to get an agreement among countries to impose some kind of sanctions against those who violate the basic norms of diplomatic procedure and practice?

We have had a little bit of success as you know in dealing with the problem of aviation hijacking where a small group of countries with

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2 OF 3

close common interests have joined together. But when it comes to closing down of diplomatic missions or suspending specific programs of economic or other assistance, there has been great reluctance in the international community, and we certainly regret it, to join together in mutual defense when there has been an attack against one or more diplomatic missions.

I would hope when we get the issue on the agenda of the General Assembly in September that it will provide an opportunity to see if there are ways of standing together within the international community to do something effective.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Certainly it is in everybody's best interest.
Ambassador QUAINTON. Surely.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think there has to be some sort of automatic response which means that a large number of the international community leaves that country in protest. This will only get worse; it is not going to get better unless there is pain and suffering.

We would like to work off high principles but it does not seem to work very well.

Mr. Chairman, you were in the middle of a question. We did not pursue your question.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you. Maybe now we can get the answer. The question is not as important as the answer. I will repeat the question.

Why is it that it took some 5 to 6 hours for a meaningful response to be made by Pakistan to help alleviate the problem, the major part of the problem in the hands of our own security people? Now we do know that a goodly portion of the security people were out of Islamabad at the time, I believe, with the President; and therefore they were unable to make the type of response that was necessary.

However, it seems to me that in the capital of a nation there should be an adequate number of people to protect the international community as well as protect the head of state.

Mrs. COON. Mr. Chairman, I alluded to some of the reasons in my statement. I think you have been in Islamabad and you know what sort of quiet town it is. It is a capital city which was an artificially created capital built some distance from the more major city of Rawalpindi in the last 15 years.

MOB ACTION

I think one of the problems is that there had never been a precedent in Islamabad for mob action. Even during the rather considerable unrest in the spring of 1977, for example, there had never been in Islamabad riots and the kind of civil disorders which occurred in many other cities in Pakistan.

So that you have a situation where the government just plain was not expecting it. Everyone thought Islamabad was immune so there were no security forces in our view in place and readily available.

You alluded to other reasons, that the security forces in Rawalpindi were focused on President Zia who was on tour in the city.

Mr. WOLFF. Excuse me for interrupting, but since he was on tour in the city—

Mrs. COON. Of Rawalpindi.

Mr. WOLFF [continuing]. Was there no line of communication to him that this event was taking place?

CONFUSED COMMUNICATIONS

Mrs. COON. I cannot answer specifically what indeed were the communications involved among the Pakistanis themselves. It is our impression very frankly that there was breakdown and confusion in both the communication and in the command and control system and it did not respond adequately and rapidly and people were not assuming the responsibilities which they should have assumed.

Mr. WOLFF. With due respect, you say adequately and rapidly. Five hours is a long time.

Mrs. COON. We were acutely conscious of how long 5 hours was. There was additional breakdown in command and control. So, a combination of factors led to a very, very unhappy situation where the response was not adequate.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Ackerman?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer a personal opinion on this point. I have very little evidence to substantiate it except that we have seen the phenomenon before and that is where a country must fall back upon military force, martial law, if you will, whether formally or informally declared, where that has not been fully laid on in advance you are going to have enormous confusion and breakdown of communication because it comes down to a question of who is going to order whom to do what and with what.

Mr. WOLFF. But the country is under martial law.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The police were, and in considerable force, I might add, relatively speaking, in charge of the plan of defense of the Embassy. At the time they were overrun there was no backup of police that could be brought into the picture.

We have gone into this in the aftermath in a number of other places in terms of having our security officers talk more frankly with their contacts in terms of their contingency plans. How will they react when what is supposed to happen does not happen or does not happen effectively.

I think you can appreciate it is also a rather delicate area when you are getting around to the point of telling people how they should deploy their forces. Nevertheless, we feel it is very important and we have tried to include that aspect into our planning.

IMPROVED PAKISTANI SECURITY

Mr. WOLFF. Have they taken steps now to provide for the security of these people?

Mr. ACKERMAN. In Islamabad?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You mean specifically whether the Pakistanis have made a contingency plan?

Mr. WOLFF. I would like to know whether our people there now have had adequate protection.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I believe they do. I think there is nothing so instructive as an episode of this kind for any country that was not in collaboration with the episode and we certainly do not believe that.

Mrs. COON. The Pakistanis have deployed forces and identified forces in Islamabad. They have set up roadblocks that will cut off an influx from Rawalpindi on another occasion and they have improved direct communication between embassies and security forces in Islamabad.

Mr. WOLFF. Since the events took place prior to the attack on the Embassy in various other areas, was that part of the contingency planning? Did we not alert the Pakistanis or did we not alert people to the events that were taking place and put them on ready alert, so to speak?

Mr. ACKERMAN. We did, indeed.

Mr. WOLFF. But obviously it was not heeded.

Mr. ACKERMAN. There were additional forces assigned. In fact, as late as, I believe, 24 hours or so prior to the attack there were reports from our Embassy of their coordination with the Pakistanis. But I think it underscores—what I emphasize is a personal opinion—that their plan which they perceived to be adequate to deal with any contingency they expected had a flaw in that the police were not capable to deal with the situation and they had to fall back on military force.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Ackerman, do you think that we, on an overall basis, can depend on local forces in the future to defend our personnel?

Mr. ACKERMAN. First of all, Mr. Chairman, we have to, in the last analysis, consider that we must depend on that as we assess the situation. We feel we can do a great deal more and we intend to do a great deal more to provide for our own defense but that great deal more in effect will buy time, as indeed it did in Islamabad, time for the host government to get its act together, if indeed it is capable or is willing to get its act together.

Mr. WOLFF. I have one final question at this point in the proceedings and then I will yield to my cochairman.

DELAY IN REBUILDING EMBASSY

Why has it taken us so long to rebuild or even start rebuilding that Embassy? Why are these people continuing to have to be in a kind of makeshift situation when the terrorist situation throughout the world is so apparent?

Mrs. COON. I would like to ask Mr. Krys to address that question on the time involved in rebuilding the Embassy.

STATEMENT OF SHELDON J. KRYS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. KRYS. Mr. Chairman, we frankly are equally distressed with the length of time that it has taken but it has been a pulling together of not just something that we control; it is architects and individual studies. It is also a discussion of payment for the Embassy and cost studies that must go into that. At the present time there are two survey teams. These are independent consultants.

Mr. WOLFF. It has been 6 months now.

Mr. KRYS. I know.

Mr. WOLFF. According to the information I have, we have an awful lot of excess currency that still sets there with which we can prepay

some of the things without waiting for the Pakistani Government to pay. If it is a question of money, I defer to my cochairman here; but if it is a question of money that money should be made immediately available in order to provide for the rebuilding of the Embassy.

Mr. KRYS. I would propose, if I may, to ask the foreign building operations to submit a response to that question if that is acceptable to you, Mr. Chairman, because they are far more familiar with it.

Mr. WOLFF. It has been 6 months, Mr. Fascell, since they sent the first survey team out there, as I understand it, while we were there. Maybe if we had nothing out there the team might not have gone out there yet.

Mr. KRYS. It is my understanding in effect they are rebuilding that which was not so totally destroyed as the chancery. Part of it should have been done much more rapidly I think.

We pushed for it but I do think FBO would be your best witness on it. They simply have not gotten to it yet. They know the reasons. If I may I will ask them to supply the information.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C. August 15, 1980.

Ms. SUSAN MCCARTAN,
Staff Assistant, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR Ms. MCCARTAN: As promised in his testimony before your committee on June 19 and in response to your memorandum of July 19, Mr. Sheldon Krys has requested the Office of Foreign Buildings (FBO) to furnish information on what actions have been taken to rebuild the American Embassy Compound in Islamabad.

The 31-acre American Embassy Compound in Islamabad was attacked and burned by hundreds of Pakistani citizens on November 21, 1979. Damage to compound (constructed at a cost of approximately \$5,500,000 in 1972-5) was extremely severe. The Chancery building (70,000 sq. ft.), the 30 unit staff apartment building (71,306 sq. ft.), the Marine Security Guard Quarters (4,913 sq. ft.), the Community Center (14,619 sq. ft.), and the Domestic staff quarters (24,000 sq. ft.) were totally gutted by the fires set by the attackers who used gasoline, paint and other highly flammable materials. The fires eventually burned themselves out days afterward. The intense and prolonged heat weakened all of the structures necessitating design modifications in the restoration plans to permit use of the existing buildings rather than completely razing them and building anew. The compound walls and grounds were also extensively damaged by the rampaging crowds. The Government of Pakistan promised to compensate the U.S. Government for the damages incurred.

Enclosed is a chronology of the events from the date of the attack to the present. We recognize that the rebuilding process has taken longer than anyone had wished. The magnitude of the damage and its assessment, the requirement to provide a specific scope of services for the construction bids, and the development of contractual arrangements acceptable to the interested American contractors and the United States Government have been time consuming but essential.

Dillingham Corporation and Turner International will submit their bids on the restoration of the embassy compound on August 21. Their bids and other related costs resulting from the attack, e.g., the rental costs incurred in housing those personnel displaced from the apartment building, will be presented to the Government of Pakistan for payment of compensation. Upon acceptance by the Government of Pakistan and the transfer of funds to the United States Government, the Department of State will award a contract for the reconstruction. The entire construction project is expected to take 25 months.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM L. SLAYTON,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Foreign Buildings.

Enclosure: As stated.

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN CHRONOLOGY

November 21, 1979.—Rioters destroy compound.

November 26-29, 1979.—FBO Area Officer H. Scott Witmer II visits compound to survey damage. Amb. Hummel asks for technical team to make survey but agrees to delay team until January 1980 after the holiday season.

November 29, 1979.—Amb. reports GOP President and Foreign Affairs Advisor both promise orally "full compensation" and requests Dept. advise language for diplomatic note to GOP.

December 5, 1979.—DAS Jane Coon calls for meeting to discuss note language. FBO Area Officer Witmer and FBO legal advisor Linda Shenwick attend.

December 12, 1979.—DAS William Slayton request FBO contact Architect George Qualls to begin thinking about design changes.

December 12, 1979.—Post request that Project Manager Vallejo, who was evacuated with family on 11/28/79 return to post o/a 1/6/80, and that FBO structural engineer arrive at same time.

December 18, 1979.—Diplomatic Note language drafted by L/M and NEA/PAB and cleared by A sent.

December 19, 1979.—FBO Area Officer Witmer shows compound damage slides to NEA bureau.

January 6, 1980.—FBO Project Manager arrives in Islamabad. EMR and COMM construction projects, halted on 11/26/79, are resumed.

January 25-February 1, 1980.—FBO survey team of Peter Gurvin, Robert Gardner, and Carl Hansen in Islamabad.

February 11, 1980.—DAS Slayton clears on Ben Read memo to the Secretary stating redesign work will begin in February 1980 with construction to start in the summer. It is stated that reimbursable (from the GOP) costs are available minor reprogramming of FBO's dollar and SFC appropriations.

February 13, 1980.—DAS Slayton recaps 2/4/80 FBO meeting noting three major actions to be taken—a) redesign SDA-30, b) in coordination with post redesign OBC, MSG and REC, and c) resolve funding question.

February 22, 1980.—FBO technical survey team publishes report.

February 26, 1980.—Amb. Hummel requests A&E team visit compound to prepare drawings, plans, and specifications.

March 6, 1980.—FBO responds to Amb Hummel's 2/26/80 telegram. Suggest MSG, DSQ, and REC be done first because fewest changes required. OBC and SDA-30 most heavily damaged and require design changes.

March 16, 1980.—Embassy receives full set of drawings and specifications.

March 26, 1980.—Amb. Hummel Approves comprehensive design for SDA-30. Wants U.S. contractor to do OBC and perhaps SDA-30. Asks whether Department intends to ask GOP for funding up front. Requests Dept. prepare diplomatic note.

April 17, 1980.—Meeting with Counselor for Administration David Fields. Tom Coffey to call Dillingham to arrange for their bidding on 5 projects and sending representatives to FBO as soon as copies of the original specifications and drawings are ready, but letting them know payment will be in Pakistani rupees except for imported materials.

April 22, 1980.—FBO-Lackey announces that Dillingham will meet with FBO on 5/7/80 to discuss scope of services. After gaining experience on what will be expected of FBO then 2 other firms will be invited to join and bid. A decision should be reached by end of May. It was decided that the bids should note each building separately.

April 23, 1980.—Islamabad Admin. Counselor Fields telephoned to say Dillingham will tour compound 4/24. Witmer advised Fields of 5/7/80 meeting scheduled with other Dillingham representative.

April 24, 1980.—Deputy Director Gingles and Area Officer Witmer meet with Amb. Hummel. It is agreed that only U.S. contractors will be invited to bid. Three—Bechtel, Dillingham, and Turner—have been selected and will be asked to meet with FBO. USG should have the GOP put the funds up front. The Amb. wants to lay complete bid proposals before the GOP in order to get the funds. Mr. Gingles said the results of the meeting with contractors will ultimately lead to this. Amb. requests FBO expedite.

April 25, 1980.—FBO in-house meeting. 4 contractors will be invited to bid—above three plus Morrison-Knudsen who were original contractor. Decided that contract will be fixed price (lump sum) because Federal Procurement Regulations prohibit cost plus contracts. Bids will be used by FBO as a preliminary cost estimate and be presented by Amb. Hummel to the GOP.

May 14, 1980.—Meeting with Bechtel, Dillingham, and Turner. Morrison-Knudsen declined invitation. Project discussed and contractors requested advise FBO by May 21 if still interested and will attend meeting in FBO on May 23 to discuss scope of services.

May 21, 1980.—Only Bechtel responds by letter and they say they are not interested in bidding on lump sum basis. Holmes checks with other 2 and they will attend. Bechtel told we have open mind and they agree to attend.

May 23, 1980.—FBO meets with contractors. All agree that FBO will sign contract with all three who will join as troika and jointly survey compound to draft cost estimate. Contractors are asked to submit scope of services by May 28, 1980 for approval by FBO.

May 28, 1980.—FBO advises Amb. that composite team and FBO team will meet in Islamabad June 1, 1980 for approximately 1 week to fully assess damages and agree upon scope of services.

June 2, 1980.—All three firms would be invited to bid in construction work. FBO willing to sign contracts with each for \$40,000 to partially offset firms' expenses. FBO sent telegram to Islamabad advising of short delay.

June 9, 1980.—IFB letters sent to Bechtel, Dillingham, and Turner.

June 11-16, 1980.—First of Dillingham representatives arrive in Islamabad.

June 12, 1980.—Bechtel declines invitation to bid, by letter dated June 12, 1980, because contract will be a fixed price contract with escalation clause.

June 17, 1980.—Second of Dillingham representatives arrives in Islamabad.

June 18, 1980.—FBO team and Turner representatives arrive in Islamabad.

August 21, 1980.—Due date for fee proposals. Valid for 120 days. "U.S. dollars payable under the contract shall be the U.S. dollars required to be paid by the contractor for United States materials and overhead and profit". Contract work to be completed within 25 calendar months from date of execution of the contract. "In consideration of the limited period being allowed for preparation of bids, the presence of many unusual factors relative to construction work, and the lack of complete assurance that all required funding will be made available for this project, the Government agrees to provide up to \$40,000 to each bidder who submits a bid based on a serious bidding effort and who is not awarded a construction contract. Bidders will submit justification of costs incurred, which will include direct and indirect costs allocable to preparing the bid, to qualify for compensation for such costs, but not exceeding \$40,000."

Mr. FASCELL. One of the reasons is that neither the supplemental nor the appropriation has passed yet. They do not want to be on the hook for money unless they have some other funds that they can reprogram.

Mr. KRYS. Yes; and also I do feel that there is a responsibility for payment, and we made that clear to the Pakistani Government.

Mr. WOLFF. I do believe the Pakistani Government has already indicated they will pay for the rebuilding.

Mr. KRYS. That is correct.

COMPENSATION TO INDIVIDUALS

Mr. WOLFF. What about compensation to the people who have been killed or injured in this event?

Mr. KRYS. Within the regulations of the Department of State and other agencies, compensation has been made in accordance with that.

Mr. WOLFF. I believe there is a limitation, is there not, on the amount of compensation that can be paid? I think it is \$10,000 if I am not mistaken.

Mr. KRYS. I really do not know how the military handles it.

Mr. WOLFF. \$15,000?

Mr. KRYS. I think it is about \$15,000.

Mr. WOLFF. With today's inflation that will hardly take care of the complete burnout of the possessions of a number of the foreign service people who were involved.

Mr. KRYS. You are talking about the possessions. I am sorry, I misunderstood you. There is a bill in Congress now to raise the amount from \$15,000 to \$40,000. I believe that is before Mr. Daniel's committee. We of course are most anxious to see it come through because we do have certainly a situation where one vehicle today could cost most of that \$15,000.

Claims have been paid on the basis of setting aside that amount in excess of \$15,000 where adequate documentation has been available. The \$15,000 has been paid and the remaining portion of that claim awaits the passage in anticipation of this bill which would raise it to \$40,000.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you. Mr. Fascell.

ALLEGED RADIO REPORT ON MOSQUE INCIDENT

Mr. FASCELL. Two statements in Mrs. Coon's testimony intrigue me and, as the paraphrase goes, get "curiouser" and "curiouser." One is the ephemeral nature of the alleged radio report that kicked this whole thing off. Yet in the investigative summary it is pointed out that the effect was immediate and nationwide in terms of the acceptance of the report that the United States was the enemy.

How could a report like that be ephemeral? How could a report like that in an alleged radio broadcast not be a radio broadcast? Nobody can identify it. Nobody knows anything about it. Nobody can recall such a broadcast. Yet the effect was nationwide with demonstrations in several cities at the same time. That is one "curious" matter.

The second "curious" situation is that there was some slight evidence of organization with respect to mobilizing 10,000 students and buses; some slight evidence of organization. Now organizing 10,000 people and getting the buses, getting them all to the same place at or about the same time to do the same thing, print up their placards, carry the rocks with them, does not sound like some small evidence of organization.

So I am curious about those statements and I am curious about the way they were treated in the investigative report. The investigative report also says there were speakers out there haranguing the crowd, whipping them up and organizing both right and left.

Yet we do not seem to know who they were and who was responsible and why.

Mrs. COON. Let me attempt to address those two questions and then defer to Mr. Ackerman for more detail perhaps.

We worked very hard to try to find out what radio broadcast this could have been.

Mr. FASCELL. How do we know it was a broadcast?

Mrs. COON. We do not know for a certainty. This has been alleged and I think I made that point in my statement. Our Foreign Broadcast Information Service does monitor a large number of broadcasts but not every broadcast that occurs.

They went over their material in great detail for that morning and just could not identify a specific broadcast. There were some broadcasts that were sourced to Washington on the Mecca incident which could have been misinterpreted but we cannot say with any certainty those were the broadcasts involved.

The fact that it was nationwide and as spontaneous and emotional as it appears to have been suggests there was some kind of broadcast or mass dissemination of this allegation.

The question of organization is one that intrigued us, sir, and we have attempted to look into this to the best of our ability. We do have evidence that there were demonstrations that were being organized roughly in this timeframe by student groups. There had been a number of demonstrations several days earlier, generally small, well controlled, well contained.

In this part of the world demonstrations are a fairly common phenomenon. Of course one just ballooned into something that was enormous, again due with quite certainty to the belief, incorrect, that we had something to do with the incident in Mecca.

BUSES READILY AVAILABLE

The question of how did they get the buses and that sort of thing is a question that I was rather intrigued with myself. I asked one of my colleagues who had lived in Pakistan for some time. He said it is very normal for students to just commandeer buses at times of demonstration. They just commandeer every bus they come across and take them along and fill them up with students.

So that in and of itself apparently is not sufficient evidence of a conspiracy.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know about a conspiracy but it seems to me that not a lot of buses run around a university at one particular time. It means you had to send somebody out to get the buses unless they have a lot of buses on that one route.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I cannot really add much to that.

Mr. FASCELL. We must not have many friends over there who want to talk to us and tell us what happened.

Mr. ACKERMAN. As a matter of fact, the friends are the ones in this circumstance in several of these incidents I personally know about who are least anxious to talk about what they considered to be a blot on their national pride. We do know that the core of the demonstrators was from the university, came from that direction.

As for the phenomenon of cheerleaders, there has never been a group of students who ever demonstrated at our place or any place that did not have some cheerleaders. That could be as spontaneous as anything else.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; but making up placards is not spontaneous.

Mrs. COON. I do not think, sir, that we have evidence that there was much in the way of placards.

Mr. FASCELL. That is what the investigative report said, they had placards and leaflets. You cannot spontaneously print up a leaflet.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Will you yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I will be glad to yield.

RAWALPINDI NEWSPAPER EXTRA

Mr. PRITCHARD. There were reports that an extra edition of a Rawalpindi newspaper carried a false report. Do you know anything about an extra that was put out? Has anybody obtained a copy of this so-called extra?

Mr. ACKERMAN. I will have to take the question, Mr. Pritchard. I have no information on that. It is news to me.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Mrs. Coon?

Mrs. COON. I do not have any information on that.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We were told in Islamabad that false reports of American involvement were carried by international radio. I viewed the Embassy, I guess it was February when I was there, at the same time that Secretary Christopher went up there with Mr. Brzezinski.

But the staff here was told about this extra by some people in Pakistan. I guess we would like to know a little bit about that.

Mrs. COON. We will take the question and get back to you.

Mr. PRITCHARD. If there was one it is hard to believe why somebody did not get a copy of it.

Mr. PALMER. The staff tried to get a copy of that one page newspaper extra and was unable. No one had one. We did not physically see one.

Mr. FASCELL. One other curious matter. At one time from Iran we were confronted with broadcasts which were traced to Soviet broadcasts. I seem to recall that when the attack was made in Mecca that there was some broadcast made then. I do not know whether those were ever traced.

So, the question I have is whether or not any study was made on the relationship of international broadcasts, and where they came from, if any.

Mrs. COON. There was a broadcast from Iran that afternoon in which the notion of American involvement in the incidents in Mecca was encouraged. I cannot quote you the broadcast. We traced that back in terms of its timing and it appears to have been first broadcast some time in the midafternoon well after the attack on the Embassy had been launched.

So that we cannot tie that to the attack on the Embassy in its initial phases. We did look into that rather carefully.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. That is all I have.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LIBERIAN INCIDENT

Mr. Chairman, this does not touch on the subject of the hearing but it is related. Mr. Ackerman, I wonder has the United States or anyone made representation to Liberia on the recent arrest at the French Embassy of Tolbert's son? I share Mr. Pritchard's concern about adequacy of response. This is not a mob action.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have no information on that, Mr. Buchanan. I will be glad to take the question and ask the African Bureau if they can give you an answer. It is not within my scope of responsibility.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., July 3, 1980.

Memorandum

To: A/SY/DASS—Mr. Ackerman.

From: AF/W—Parker W. Borb.

Subject: Representation to Liberian Government on Violation of French Embassy During Arrest of A. B. Tolbert.

The American Ambassador in Monrovia has expressed deep concern to the government of Liberia over the violation of the French Ambassador's residence.

We have stressed that the sanctity of diplomatic property must be recognized. The Liberians have asserted that the French did not observe diplomatic custom because they failed to inform the GOL within 48 hours that they had given asylum to A. B. Tolbert. We have no knowledge of this custom and have passed this word to the Liberians.

We have been informed by the Liberians that no force was used during the arrest of Tolbert. Other nations have expressed their concern over the incident, but we do not have a list of these.

Drafted: AF/W:RLoftis/1h.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Pritchard?

Mr. PRITCHARD. I do not think it does an awful lot of good to go back over the past. It seems we should be concerned about the future. Are you satisfied with the money you have asked for and are going to receive in the area of security?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Pritchard, I will say first of all that we do indeed go back over the past on any incident of any kind for whatever we can learn to detect something we are not doing that we should be doing and so forth.

I must say regarding Islamabad, despite the unhappiness of losing lives and having a mission burned out, that nevertheless there are one or two aspects of it from which we feel we can at least take some satisfaction. One, that our defenses which were designed for a terrorist kind of attack, one or two people trying to take over a place with an automatic weapon, did indeed hold up rather well.

One hundred thirty-seven people did get out alive, although narrowly. This and our total survey have led us to the conclusion that what we are doing is essentially correct. We feel only that we now must do more of it and hopefully faster than we might otherwise do.

With respect to your question on finances we feel that we can get into it rather quickly, dealing of course with the number of priority posts that we feel are the most threatened. Of course, that list may change. In fact, I might say Bogotá at a certain point was not on that list. Bogotá may well stay on the list at this point.

Mr. FASCELL. Now the administration had originally requested \$140 million over a 3-year period and then came in with a supplemental of \$25 million. The subcommittee added \$35 million. Is the original plan still more or less valid?

Mr. ACKERMAN. The original is still valid, Mr. Chairman. It is a question of timing. In other words, if the amount is reduced we feel the timing to carry out what we project, and I emphasize it is projected here—it is important to remember that in most cases we will be dealing with the reality of our installations as they are.

HOUSING SECURITY

New construction is something else again. But existing facilities we will have to survey individually to determine what things we can reasonably do short of tearing them all down and rebuilding them.

Mr. FASCELL. I had raised this issue in an earlier hearing and that is that at one time we were concerned about U.S. compounds all over the world. We felt it was not in the best interest of our representation abroad that we had people scattered all over for housing, including marines, I might add.

Now it seems that maybe that has to be reconsidered because it is one thing to do all of the steps necessary with respect to the security

of the Embassy and quite something else to deal with the security of housing.

Mr. ACKERMAN. There is something of a dilemma, Mr. Chairman. In fact, in the early 1970's when we had the Tupamaro situation in Uruguay, a very serious terrorist threat against our people individually, as one measure in addition to cutting down the size of the staff we colocated people in apartment complexes because we could provide a greater measure of personal security by that means.

Now, colocation, if you are threatened by mob action and another action may not be a wise idea. I think where we are coming out, and I believe some of the staff members had that same impression, that maybe part of the answer lies in not colocating housing on the same compound with the chancery if the chancery is going to end up being a magnet for these kinds of attacks.

Mr. FASCELL. I guess you are going to assess it on a case-by-case basis as you go along and decide what you are going to do. I suppose one of the first things to do is to decide where to put the marines from now on.

Mr. ACKERMAN. In all cases we are attempting to keep them as close to the compound as we can.

SCHOOL SECURITY

Mr. FASCELL. The other question I raise is about the security of schools for American children. Has that been cranked into this whole situation?

Mr. ACKERMAN. That, of course, is a very important aspect of the general question of security of people. We have been doing in individual places a great deal with respect to individual homes, schools, their personal safety. We intend to look at that and do more where it seems indicated.

I certainly would not wish to leave the impression with the committee that when we have done everything we can possibly do that we will have in any way eliminated a personal risk. You have seen on the C Street entrance the two memorial plaques. It is interesting to note not too many years ago the dangers and the risk that brought about loss of life in the Foreign Service were from natural disaster and disease—Vietnam was a special situation, I think; a great many deaths occurred there but under war conditions—but to now confront injury and loss of life is a relatively new phenomenon and we are going to have to deal with it as best we can.

Mr. FASCELL. Is some consideration being given to some possibility of an international tripwire in terms of embassies?

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not sure I understand your question, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, to review the possibility of some kind of international staff that is symbolic which would be an international tripwire in terms of any attack on any embassy.

For example, let us say you had a U.N. staff or a staff by agreement which would assign an individual or several individuals to the Embassies of all countries. An attack on that embassy would be an attack against whatever international community participated in this effort.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Let me answer that, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Surely.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

Ambassador QUAINTON. As you know, there are two proposals which the Congress is considering, one which Congressman Fithian has put forward which relates to the security of the Secretariat and one which Mr. Sasser has put forward which relates to some kind of international force in the country which would pool resources with the purpose of indeed providing the kind of protection which you mentioned.

Mr. FASCELL. Not total protection now.

Ambassador QUAINTON. Total protection, no. Both of these proposals have considerable difficulties with them, not the least of which would be getting broad international support for them, given the very different perspectives in the international community about the problem of security.

The second proposal of stationing security forces under the U.N. aegis poses issues of sovereignty for the receiving countries. Since most receiving countries, including the United States, assert very strongly their responsibility to assure the protection of diplomatic premises, the reception of an international force would be extremely difficult.

We have been exploring with the people in New York the question of whether there is some useful role for the Secretariat. We have to be very concerned and careful in any organization which is set up that this not be merely a vehicle for attacking the performance of the United States.

I regret to say there have been a number of cases, as you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in which despite our best efforts and the best efforts of local law enforcement there have been bombings and attacks on premises here. We have to look at it in the context of how proposals affect us and how that would affect the countries which are not sympathetic to the United States which could use such as a stick to beat us.

We are in the process of looking at both of these proposals. There are letters that are coming up to Chairman Zablocki and to Senator Church which will comment on them in specific terms.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to speak to one particular point. We have concentrated on the whole question of the Pakistani situation. I should like to say that from the information we received, there were a number of Pakistanis who were very courageous in the actions they took to protect the Americans. I think that should be noted because there are several cases that were outstanding examples of very courageous action even taken by some of the police.

HOTEL HEROISM

Some of the police were not so courageous and participated, as I understand it, with some of the demonstrators. Some of them took courageous actions. I mention the situation with Mr. Siraj. I should like to read from the report for a moment that was made by the Ambassador.

When the rioters broke into the Embassy grounds on November 21, Mr. Siraj was in the Club with 16 Americans, most of them women who were planning a charity fashion show. One of the women had brought her 6-year-old daughter.

At the outset, Mr. Siraj ordered Club Pakistani employees to secure the building to whatever degree possible. As the horrifying afternoon wore on, Mr. Siraj remained calm and unruffled in the midst of an indescribable holocaust.

While thousands of rampaging rioters screamed "kill the Americans," and the Chancery, Embassy Apartments, Marine House and even the American Club building they occupied were all going up in flames, Mr. Siraj remained imperterbable and assumed a "take charge" role in a situation that demanded leadership and risked his life more than once to save the trapped Americans.

During the several hours of violence, the women were cursed, spat upon, stoned, and humiliated. One of them nearly collapsed under the onslaught and Mr. Siraj personally saved her. Throughout the afternoon and early evening, Mr. Siraj devoted himself to the safety and well-being of the Americans and by his timely and heroic action saved them from further injury and possible death.

One point on this is the fact that while we have thousands upon thousands of illegal immigrants coming into this country, Mr. Siraj who has applied to come into this country, has been denied through official redtape or whatever you want to call it.

If necessary, I, for one, am going to put in a private bill to see to it that he is enabled to come to this country in response to the act of heroism that he exhibited in attempting to protect the lives of Americans.

I understand as well there was a Pakistani nurse who protected a young child for several hours at the risk of her life.

EXAMPLES OF COURAGE

We have innumerable examples of people who displayed great courage during this event and I do not think they have been adequately recognized. I think that the DEA agents who were there and who participated were given commendations.

If that is all they get for this type of heroic action above and beyond, I think something is severely lacking. We have to do something about recognizing their efforts. We know of a native boy who displayed heroic action and was taken hostage. I think there are many other people who have to be recognized in this.

I do say that there is, in addition to that, however, a great need for us on an overall basis to provide more adequate protection for our personnel abroad. I would hope, Mr. Ackerman, that you are doing what you can in order to bring into this very serious concern all the weight of your office and if you do have any problems, although I am not speaking for the chairman of the International Operations Subcommittee, I know I can speak for our committee who are very concerned over this action.

I would just like to proceed in one further area and that is the fact that although Congressmen generally are considered to be abroad on junkets—there are many Congressmen who are traveling today—unfortunately, many times our security falls within the cracks; we are not protected by the FBI.

CONGRESSIONAL SECURITY

We do appreciate, and I must say this to you, Mr. Ackerman, not only the great concern but the efforts of your bureau in providing

security abroad for Congressmen who are there on official missions. I am wondering whether or not any additional steps are being taken, since we are employees of the U.S. Government, to protect us while we are overseas as well?

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have, in cooperation with the Bureau of Congressional Relations, Mr. Chairman, instituted a procedure that goes back a number of months now wherein we are informed of a trip of a congressional delegation, be it one or a group of people.

The security assessment is part of the initial evaluation of their trip which goes out to the mission concerned and which is taken up by the security watch committee to determine whether there is any perception of a particular threat.

Obviously, if there is, this information would be communicated back to the group.

Mr. WOLFF. I know that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Quite frankly, the reaction frequently of a host government, if they felt there was a serious threat, would be one of calling that specifically to our attention and possibly even to the point of discouraging the trip if they felt that in the context of the threat they did not have adequate resources or whatever to provide a personalized protection.

This is a very big problem. It is a problem in two directions. Resourcewise, when you talk about a protective detail of security agents for close-in protection of individuals, it gets into enormous numbers of people and enormous amounts of money.

Second, again, you are traveling—not you but any Member of Congress—American officials are traveling in another country and the issue is not just sovereignty but the issue is whether or not a bodyguard can function as a bodyguard would be expected to do in the circumstance, with weapons.

Mr. WOLFF. Strangely enough, we do not have that with the executive department employees because you provide very adequate protection for them, but Congressmen are a little bit different. I have had one circumstance where I traveled with one of your executive branch officials and one member of our committee brought this to my attention, the fact that there was a great group of Secret Service people who accompanied the mission abroad. This was in a very sensitive area.

Wherever the executive personnel went, that security detail went with them. Wherever the Congressman went, he went by himself and no security was provided for him at all. I am not talking about myself. I am kind of a lone wolf under any circumstance. [Laughter.]

The fact is that there is great concern; I do not know whether or not it is concern that you are not afraid to lose a Member of Congress but you are afraid to lose a member of the executive branch.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I might say even in the executive branch it is not very extensive. The only official that we provide full-time protection to on a continuous basis is the Secretary of State. When Mr. Christopher, for example, his deputy, goes abroad we assess the locations on his itinerary in terms of the threat situation and in certain circumstances we have provided him protection and in others we have not.

Beyond that it is very, very minimal and again it is a matter of a legislative mandate to do so. We have no mandate to provide protection to a Member of Congress.

Mr. WOLFF. Nobody has a mandate to provide protection to Members of Congress except the Capitol Police and they are right here in the Capitol.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am not disagreeing with your premises, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUCHANAN. On a related point, Mr. Chairman, perhaps it is not the will of the people that Members of Congress should be protected. They might feel they would be better off without us.

You mentioned the problem of the personnel requirement or source requirement. I am curious because of your unfortunately growing function and I wonder if you do have adequate personnel and resources to do the things you must do even if you do not protect my junketing friends.

PROTECTION MANDATE

Mr. ACKERMAN. There are several aspects of this, Mr. Buchanan. Our mandate extends, as far as American officials are concerned, to the Secretary, the Deputy, and selected officials who would be traveling on a specific international affairs mission. Except for the Secretary, who is provided protection on a continuous basis because of his continuous role of being identified with many of our policies, and many of them unpopular ones, the coverage given to the others is selective; it is geared to threat.

Our biggest problem is that we are also responsible, and not too many people know this, so I welcome the opportunity to put it on record, the Department of State is responsible for providing protective security to all foreign dignitaries who are perceived to require protection in this country, save only chiefs of state.

Chiefs of state, heads of government, those people are protected by the Secret Service. Unfortunately, as you point out, sir, this has been a growth industry unhappily in the last 4 or 5 years. But at the moment we are coping with it, and I might say, in a manner that I think the Congress would approve of, in fact we have testified about it. We have entered into cooperative agreements with the Government agencies who have this capability and under the Government Economy Act we borrow agents from time to time when our resources are stretched, which is principally during the period of the United Nations General Assembly when we have so many people in the country who do require protection.

OVERTIME EXPENSE

Mr. BUCHANAN. If you will yield for one step further, I believe you did testify earlier that your people were working a good deal of overtime in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Happily, and we hope it will continue, we have been able to get control of that problem. They will always work a certain amount of overtime because the protectees like yourself are frequently 18-hour people. So the problem is how much overtime. You are correct, a little over a year ago we were in very very bad shape because of the excessive overtime.

One of the means that we have used to cut that down has been to follow a fairly rigid policy on threat assessment. We do not provide personal protection to foreign dignitaries simply on the basis that

anything could happen. We provide it on the basis of perceived threat and that has been a help to us.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. I just want to take this opportunity to invite my colleague on the next junket.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am not leaving because I am mad. I will be right back.

Mr. WOLFF. I am wondering how you would feel if the Capitol Police were permitted to accompany official visits of Members of Congress abroad.

Mr. ACKERMAN. It could be organized in any number of ways, Mr. Chairman. The two problems I cited however would be the same regardless of how it was organized. It is not so much who has, first of all, the quality of training that entered into it, who was selected.

CAPITOL POLICE TRAINING

Mr. WOLFF. Could you provide training for Capitol Police? I know that they have made a request to join several missions abroad where there were very sensitive areas. I chair a committee which unfortunately is a high target for violent activities. From time to time they have indicated a desire to assist us but actually do not have the training that will be necessary.

I am wondering whether or not your office might be able to provide training for them.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have training capability except at the present time obviously it exists to the extent of our own requirements. If we were to take on on any significant basis a larger training function—I say significant meaning sizable numbers of people—a few people it would be no problem—then we would have to expand our capability if we were given the mandate to do so.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me that if we got into that it would be much cheaper to expand your force than to try to use the Capitol Police and have them go overseas.

Mr. WOLFF. The only problem is that they do not have the mandate to protect us.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think that is good. I think they ought to stay here.

Mr. WOLFF. The State Department does not have a mandate. Neither does the FBI, neither does the Secret Service. Nobody has.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think they take marvelous care of us while we are overseas.

Mr. WOLFF. You were with us one time that no one could have taken very much care of us at all.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You know there has to be some risk in the business. You remember I was in a refugee camp.

Mr. WOLFF. We thank you very much.

I should like to make the recommendation that the Subcommittee on State Department Operations pursue this matter on overall security. Pakistan can be used as an example of a recent situation. There are many others, assassinations of our Ambassador, Sudan, many others.

With the increased level of violence that occurs throughout the world I think we should pay increasing attention to it.

SECURITY BALANCE

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems to me we are in a very difficult area. You cannot go out and make them fortresses all over the country. I for one think that our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur has too much security and so do the people there, but it was built at a time when there was risk, and getting through there is worse than getting into the vault of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

How you strike a balance on these things is very difficult. We cannot take the risk out of Foreign Service. When you get down to it it seems to me that the security has to rest with the host nation. We have to do those things that make it in the host nation's best interest, whoever it might be, friend or foe, to maintain the embassies and give us protection. If they do not give us protection, then it seems to me we, not only ourselves, but other countries, have to devise some system where it is costly for them not to provide that protection.

For us to try to set up security on our own in foreign countries can be some help, but there is a limit to what you can do.

In the long run we would be much better off if we kept pressure on the host country to provide protection.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much.

Mrs. COON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the joint subcommittees were adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

CHRONOLOGY OF SEIZURES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS—1970—FEB. 28, 1980

12 June 1970	Uruguay, Montevideo	<u>Tupamaros Raid Swiss Embassy</u> Tupamaros raided the Swiss Embassy and seized typewriters, a photocopying machine and documents.
10 February 1971	Sweden, Goteborg	<u>Emigres Seize Yugoslav Consulate</u> Two Croatian emigres seized control of the Yugoslav Consulate in Goteborg in an unsuccessful attempt to ransom its occupants for convicted terrorists held in Yugoslav jails.
6 October 1972	Algeria, Algiers	<u>Seizure of West German Consulate</u> Palestinian students entered the West German Consulate in Algiers and held hostages for about an hour. They demanded the release of three Arab terrorists held in Munich.
28 December 1972	Thailand, Bangkok	<u>Seizure of Israeli Embassy</u> Four BSO members entered and seized control of the Israeli Embassy. They took as hostage six Israelis, five members of the Embassy staff and the visiting Israeli Ambassador to Cambodia. In return for the release of the hostages, the captors demanded the release of 36 terrorists imprisoned in Israel. After 18 hours of negotiation with Thai authorities, the terrorists agreed to release the hostages in exchange for their own safe passage to Cairo.

1 March 1973

Sudan, Khartoum

BSO Seizes Saudi Arabian Embassy
Eight BSO terrorists seized the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum as guests were departing from a reception. They held the new U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan and the departing Deputy Chief of Mission, the Belgian Charge, a Jordanian Charge, and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador as hostages. The U.S. Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Belgian Charge were assassinated the following day. After prolonged legal delays, the eight BSO terrorists were sentenced to life imprisonment. President Nimeiri reduced the sentence to seven years, and the terrorists were flown to Cairo on 25 June 1974 to serve the remainder of their terms.

5-8 September 1973

France, Paris

Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris Seized
Five fedayeen terrorists claiming to be members of the "Punishment Organization" shot their way into the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris and seized 13 of its staff as hostages. After negotiations, the terrorists released most of the prisoners and departed Paris with four hostages for an unknown destination. After a stop in Cairo, Egypt, the terrorists landed in Kuwait. They demanded another plane and flew to Saudi Arabia, decided not to land, and returned to Kuwait. On 8 September the terrorists surrendered to Kuwaiti authorities and handed over their hostages unharmed.

In October the five had departed, possibly for Syria, to fight against Israel, according to press reports. The operation had been mounted by Iraqi-based Fatah dissident leader Sabri al Banna, who wanted to force the release of a Fatah official imprisoned in Jordan.

3 September 1974

Netherlands,
The Hague

Seizure of French Embassy

Three members of the Japanese Red Army seized the French Ambassador and 10 other hostages in the French Embassy and threatened to kill them unless the French authorities released a Red Army member who had been arrested on 21 July at Orly Airport, Paris, for possessing counterfeit currency and false passports. On 14 September French authorities flew the JRA member to The Hague. A French aircraft and a Dutch volunteer crew were made available to the terrorists. On 17 September the hostages were released and the terrorists were flown to Syria, which had agreed to receive them. The terrorists surrendered their weapons and the ransom money to the aircraft crew and turned themselves over to Syrian authorities.

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5 December 1974

Mexico,
Mexico City

Mexican Terrorist Holds French Embassy Officials Hostage

A member of the 23rd of September Communist League, an urban guerrilla group, held two French diplomats hostage in their Embassy for four hours until his demands for political

asylum and safe passage to France were granted. The terrorist was disarmed and arrested at the airport, however.

24 April 1975

Sweden, Stockholm

West German Embassy in Stockholm Attacked
West German terrorists, identifying themselves as members of the Holger Meins Commando, seized the German Embassy in Stockholm on 24 April and demanded that 26 imprisoned comrades be released and flown from Germany with \$520,000. The German government rejected these demands. The third floor of the Embassy was dynamited, and after a gun battle with police, five terrorists were captured. The military and economic attaches were killed, one terrorist was found dead, and 13 people were injured. The terrorists were extradited to West Germany where they are in jail.

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4 August 1975

Malaysia,
Kuala Lumpur

JPA Seizes U.S. and Swedish Consulates in Malaysia
Five Japanese Red Army members seized the U.S. and Swedish Consulates in Kuala Lumpur on 4 August. About 50 people were held hostage, including the U.S. Consul and the Swedish Charge. The release of five terrorists from Japanese prisons was arranged; two other terrorists refused to be released. The ten terrorists, accompanied by two senior Malaysian and two senior Japanese

guarantors in place of the original hostages, flew to Libya on 7 August. The guarantors were released and the terrorists gave themselves up to Libyan officials.

September 1975

Spain, Madrid

Egyptian Embassy in Madrid Seized
Four armed Arab terrorists seized the Egyptian Embassy in Madrid on 15 September and held the Ambassador and his assistants hostage. They identified themselves as belonging to the "Group of the Fallen Abd al Kadir Husayni," hitherto unknown. Several Arab Ambassadors negotiated with the terrorists, who had demanded that the Egyptians repudiate their recent agreement with Israel. The terrorists, with the Egyptian, Iraqi and Algerian Ambassadors and two Egyptian staff members as hostage, flew to Algeria on 16 September. They surrendered to Algerian authorities and the hostages were released.

11 October 1976

Italy, Rome
Pakistan, Islamabad

Syrian Embassies in Rome and Islamabad Attacked by Palestinians
Three Palestinians seized the Syrian Embassy in Rome, taking five hostages, but surrendered after two hours. One hostage was seriously wounded. The attackers, claiming to be members of the Black June organization, said they were protesting Syria's intervention in Lebanon. A similar attack was attempted

against the Syrian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, but the three Palestinian terrorists were intercepted by police. One terrorist was killed and the other two wounded. The attackers also threw a grenade into the Syrian Ambassador's house, but no one was injured. The PLO has denied responsibility for the attacks. The three terrorists arrested in Rome were each sentenced on 6 November to a 15-year prison term to be followed by three years of supervised freedom. They also face possible extradition to Syria. The two surviving terrorists in Islamabad were quietly released by the Pakistani government in December and allowed to continue their studies in Lahore where they had been students.

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14 June 1977

United States,
New York

Croatian Nationalists Seize Yugoslav
Mission to the UN

Three Croatian nationalists, armed with small-calibre handguns, seized the offices of the Yugoslav Mission to the UN on 14 June, but surrendered after two hours. The Mission chauffeur was wounded in the takeover. The motivation for the attack appears to have been publicity for the cause of independence for Croatia. The three Croatians were indicted on 23 June on charges of attempted murder, attempted kidnapping, assault, burglary and criminal possession of a weapon. The trio was convicted by a Federal jury and pleaded guilty to State charges.

3 July 1978

Puerto Rico,
San Juan

Chilean Consul Held Hostage in Puerto Rico

On 3 July a man and a woman invaded the Chilean Consulate in San Juan. The Chilean Consul, a Chilean citizen, and another man, a Puerto Rican, who had been there on business were taken hostage. The hostages were released unharmed and the perpetrators surrendered 17 hours after the incident began. The pair had demanded freedom for four Puerto Ricans in prison in the U.S. for carrying out an armed attack on the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. and the attempted assassination of President Truman. They have been charged with abduction.

31 July 1978

France, Paris

Iraqi Embassy in France Attacked

On 31 July two armed men shot their way into the Iraqi Embassy in Paris. They told guards they had an appointment, pulled submachine guns and opened fire. One of the pair suddenly fled while the other seized nine hostages and demanded the release of a woman being held in London in connection with an attempt on the Iraqi Ambassador there and use of an airplane. During negotiations the terrorist released a wounded guard. He later surrendered to French police; as he was being taken from the building Iraqi Embassy personnel shot and wounded him and killed one policeman. One of the Iraqis was also killed in the exchange of fire and three other persons were wounded.

17 August 1978

United States,
Chicago

Croatians Hold Hostages in West German
Consulate in the U.S.

On 17 August two armed Croatians entered the West German Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, pulled guns and took eight people hostage. The pair demanded release of Croatian leader Stjepan Bilandzic from detention in Cologne and assurances that the FRG would not permit his extradition to Yugoslavia. Two hostages were released unharmed after a couple of hours. After 10 hours of negotiating and a telephone conversation between the terrorists at the Chicago Consulate and Bilandzic in Germany, the duo surrendered to authorities after releasing the remaining hostages unharmed. The pair was tried and convicted on imprisoning the Vice Consul by using a deadly weapon (they were acquitted on a kidnapping charge).

16 January 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Mexican Embassy Occupied in El Salvador

On 16 January leftist youths occupied the Mexican Embassy, the Organization of American States building and the Red Cross offices in San Salvador. The group, the United Popular Action Front, held six Mexicans and about 150 Salvadorans hostage in the Embassy. They demanded the release of political prisoners. They released all their hostages after being assured of political asylum in Mexico.

14 February 1979

Iran, Tehran

U.S. Embassy in Iran Seized by Militants
A mob of militants seized the U.S. Embassy and took the staff, including the Ambassador, captive. Negotiations by the Iranian government resulted in the freeing of the captives.

4 May 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

BPR Seizure of French and Costa Rican Embassies

Approximately 16 BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc) activists seized the French Embassy, while 4 other BPR militants took over the Costa Rican Embassy 15 blocks away. In both cases the Ambassador and staff members were held hostage. After "escape" of Costa Rican hostages, BPR militants were granted sanctuary in Costa Rica. Following lengthy negotiations and some GOES concessions, French Embassy occupiers accepted safe passage to Cuba.

11 May 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

BPR Seizure of Venezuelan Embassy
Following the "escape" of its Costa Rican hostages and the "Cathedral Massacre" of BPR sympathizers and activists, nine BPR militants seized the Venezuelan Embassy. On May 20 the Ambassador and four staff members escaped, leaving two Venezuelans to maintain a presence. Occupiers joined their cohorts from the French Embassy in their safe passage to Cuba on June 1.

15 May 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Attempted FPL Seizure of South African Embassy

While the BPR takeovers were in progress, 8 FPL (Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces) militants attempted to seize the South African Embassy. In a gun battle with police, two of whom were killed, the FPL was repulsed without penetrating the Embassy, but all terrorists escaped.

13 July 1979

Turkey, Ankara

Terrorists Takeover Egyptian Embassy in Turkey

Four terrorists attacked the Egyptian Embassy and took 20 hostages, including the Egyptian Ambassador, in Ankara. Two Turkish security agents were killed when the Palestinians initially attacked the Embassy and one of the Egyptian hostages died after jumping from a window while trying to escape. One additional person was injured trying to escape. A PLO negotiating team arrived from Damascus and was able to secure the release of all remaining hostages and the surrender of the terrorists, who claimed to be members of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution. The four were turned over to a Turkish military court for trial and are being held in a military prison.

30 October 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Leftist Attack on the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador

Approximately 300 leftists attacked the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador firing guns and climbing the fence. Salvadoran

31 October 1979

El Salvador,
San Salvador

troops and U.S. Marine guards repelled the attackers before they entered the building. Two Marines were slightly wounded but no other injuries were reported.

Guatemalan Embassy Attacked in El Salvador
An unidentified group of hooded people attempted to take over the Guatemalan Embassy in San Salvador. The group attempted to scale a wall but was engaged in a 10-minute shootout with security forces. There were no arrests; however, it is believed some in the group were wounded. The facade of the building was damaged by gunfire.

3 November 1979

Iran, Tehran

Takeover of American Embassy in Tehran
A group of "student" militants attacked and occupied the American Embassy, taking about 60 U.S. employees and dozens of FSN's captive. The occupiers demanded the return of the Shah, who had been admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment. On November 20, 13 American hostages (blacks and women) were released. Occupation of Embassy continues.

5 November 1979

Iran, Tehran

Occupation of British Embassy
A group of "students", initially opposed but ultimately joined by "komiteh" Embassy guards, forced their way into the British Embassy to search for "documents." It soon became a general occupation. Subsequently, discussions resulted in the occupiers abandoning the Embassy.

21 November 1979

Pakistan, Islamabad

Destruction of American Embassy in Islamabad

A mob of students and demonstrators sacked and burned the American Embassy. Marine guard Cpl. Crawly was shot and killed by rioters and bodies of Warrant Officer Ellis and two PSN's were found in the ruins. Other Embassy employees barely escaped, following tardy arrival of Pakistani security forces.

2 December 1979

Libya, Tripoli

U.S. Embassy in Libya Attacked

A large group of Libyan demonstrators marched on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. They broke down the door and set fire to furniture, destroying the first floor of the four-story building and damaging the second floor. The 14 Americans and others inside the Embassy were able to escape unharmed through a side door. The attackers were forced to retreat by tear gas which was dispensed by an automatic tear gas security system.

11 January 1980

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Panamanian Embassy Seized in El Salvador

Leftist militants seized the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador and held several hostages including the Ambassadors of Panama and Costa Rica and the Costa Rican Charge d'Affaires. The group said they were members of the 28 February Popular League and demanded the release of several of their members arrested about a month

31 January 1980

Guatemala,
Guatemala

ago. On 14 January the Salvadoran government released the League members from prison and the hostages, including the diplomats, were released from the Embassy.

Occupation of Spanish Embassy

A group apparently led by EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor) members and including campesino sympathizers occupied the Spanish Embassy. Police penetrated Embassy, despite Ambassador's request for them to leave, and in the resulting melee, an EGP molotov cocktail was ignited. Conflagration resulted in 39 deaths, including 5 Embassy staff members, although Ambassador escaped. Spain broke relations with Guatemala as a result of incident.

4 February 1980

Libya, Tripoli

Sacking of French Embassy in Tripoli
French Embassy was sacked and burned by a mob of organized demonstrators, in an attack very similar to that on U.S. Embassy. Precautions were taken by GOL and attackers to ensure safety of French Embassy personnel, all of whom escaped.

5 February 1980

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Occupation of Spanish Embassy by LP-28 Group

Militants of the LP-28 (Popular Leagues of February 28) occupied the Spanish Embassy and is holding Ambassador and others hostage. LP-28 has presented demand to GOES, which is negotiating with occupiers.

13 February 1980

El Salvador,
San Salvador

Seizure of Panamanian Embassy
Leftist seized the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador and held three hostages including the Ambassador. They left peacefully saying the Panamanian Ambassador had agreed to present their demands to the Salvadoran Government. No injuries were reported.

18 February 1980

Mexico,
Mexico City

Occupation of Danish and Belgian Embassies
The National Democratic Popular Front, a leftist group, occupied the Embassies of Denmark and Belgian. They demanded freedom for political prisoners and better living conditions for the poor. The leftist were apparently unarmed and no injuries were reported at either Embassy.

27 February 1980

Bogota,
Colombia

Takeover of Dominican Republic Embassy
Approximately 25 M-19 terrorists seized the Dominican Republic Embassy during a reception celebrating National Day. About 80 hostages were originally seized including the US Ambassador and Ambassador's from 18 other countries. The terrorist demands included the release of political prisoners; safe conduct out of the country; \$50 million ransom and publication of a manifesto in the newspaper of countries whose representatives are being held.

28 February 1980

Panama

Takeover of Salvadoran Embassy
A group of 17 unarmed masked University students occupied the Salvadoran Embassy for more than three and a half hours. The students were members of FER-29, "a militant student group." They were demanding the release of imprisoned comrades. The students ended their occupation after talks with University officials.

APPENDIX 2

QUESTION SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT
AND RESPONSE THERETO

Q: Since one of the objectives of your enhanced program is to increase the time available for relief forces to mobilize and effectively end an attack, what steps are you taking to assure that adequate force will be within reach? Is the military or the U.N. or someone going to keep contingency forces available to reach our people within the time available?

A: We are deeply concerned about the availability of relief forces in times of threat to our personnel and posts. As you know, the Vienna Convention on the Conduct of Diplomatic Relations specifically charges host governments with the responsibility for the protection of diplomatic personnel and property. Because of the incidents in Tehran, Islamabad and Tripoli, the Secretary of State directed our Ambassadors abroad to approach host governments directly on this subject, and to evaluate the capabilities and attitude of foreign governments to protect our facilities in crisis situations. The results of these inquiries have been encouraging.

The U.S. Government does have a military counter-terrorism response capability which is available to the President. The use of such a force, however, is not always practical or desirable. There are serious tactical, logistical and diplomatic difficulties associated with any "Entebbe" type of paramilitary action.

APPENDIX 3

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, ISLAMABAD, NOVEMBER 21, 1979

1225 Two busloads of students observed moving in direction of Embassy. Embassy alerted.

1225 Security Office notifies police of impending demonstration.

1226 MSGs sound recall.

1230 Embassy notifies police Assistant Sub-Inspector on compound of impending demonstration.

1235 Students arrive in two buses at front entrance to Embassy chanting and throwing rocks.

1240 Ambassador contacts host government and asks for assistance. Ambassador speaks with foreign secretary Shahhaz and then General Arif, Military Aide to President Zia. Ambassador continues making contact with host government authorities, including President Zia and requesting assistance.

1240 Embassy notifies police Deputy Sub-Inspector of situation on the compound. Embassy is advised that help is on the way.

1240 Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified of situation.

1245 Police detachment on compound talks demonstrators into leaving area.

1250 Embassy notified by Sub-Inspector that police superintendent in charge is not in Islamabad but in Rawalpindi.

1250 Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted again by Ambassador and by the Political Counselor.

1300 Marines are deployed inside chancery.

1300 Demonstrators return in 8 to 12 buses; disembark and begin shouting and throwing rocks at police near Embassy front entrance.

1300 Embassy contacts senior police supervisor in Rawalpindi. Embassy is advised that police are on the way from Rawalpindi.

1300 Two police trucks and a fire truck arrive at the southeast corner of the Embassy compound.

1310 Embassy calls police again and advised that two vans of police are on the way.

1310 Two armed Pakistani police officers take up positions near the American Club on the compound. Fifteen American and one Canadian are inside having lunch. They move to temporary safehaven inside office of Club Manager, Mr. Saraj.

1315 Police retreat towards front of chancery building. A crowd of over 200 breach exterior perimeter wall and immediately move toward chancery building. Police fire over heads of demonstrators but are overcome and demonstrators take weapons.

1315 Demonstrators return fire.

1315 Embassy once again calls police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1315-1320 MSG Sergeant Crowley shot while manning post six on roof of chancery.

1315 Embassy personnel moving to safehaven area.

1320 Gunshots break windows in Political Section of chancery.

1320 Internal defense team holding second floor area while Embassy staff move to third floor.

1330 Demonstrators attack American Club.

1330 Small contingent of police arrive and temporarily relieve group at the Club.

1340 Demonstrators occupy entire compound, concentrate attack on chancery building, set fires to vehicles in the private parking area, the motorpool area and attack the American Club and staff apartments.

1340 Demonstrators break into ground floor of chancery through the cafeteria by pulling grill work off the windows.

1340-1800 American Embassy officer at UK Embassy informing government contacts of the situation and requesting assistance.

1345 MSG Sgt. Purry confronts demonstrators in hallway near cafeteria. Purry moves to second floor lobby area after throwing tear gas grenades down stairwell to first floor.

1400 Embassy again calls police.

1400 Telephone contact established from vault area to Ambassador at residence.

1400 All American and Foreign Service national employees with the exception of internal defense team inside vault.

1400 Mob attacks Club while police and firemen are busy elsewhere on the compound. Within 10-15 minutes entire Club in flames. Mr. Saraj leads group outside. With assistance of small element of police they proceed to nearby wall where they huddle for about 2 hours. Police force mob back but group is attacked with rocks, stones, and other objects. A family of 3 joins the group.

1410 Smoke on third floor increasing. Ambassador is requested to have host government send fire brigade. This communication repeated throughout the afternoon.

1410 RSS establishes radio contact with vault and phone contact with ConGen Karachi.

1415 Two dozen police arrive outside Embassy and enter compound.

1430 Demonstrators control chancery roof.

1430-1700 Pakistani military helicopters hovering over compound.

1445 Internal defense team retreats from second floor to third floor vault dispensing tear gas behind them.

1500 Demonstrators break through barriers into second floor area.

1500 Armored Pakistan Army jeep arrives at front of compound but does not attempt to enter compound.

1520 Embassy nurse reports that MSG Corporal Crowley must be moved to a hospital immediately or he will die.

1525 Embassy nurse advised Corporal Crowley is dead. FLASH SITREP sent to the Department.

1530 Ambassador moves from residence to the Foreign Ministry.

1530 Four-five soldiers come to aid the group outside the American Club. Individual members of the mob manhandle those in the group. An AID employee is struck by thrown object and cut.

1530 Demonstrators gain access to third floor area.

1530-1800 Demonstrators on roof attempt to break through the escape hatch and gain access to vault.

1545 Telephone lines cut but radio communication maintained with Ambassador and other persons off chancery grounds.

1600 Two trucks of Pakistan military troops with commo equipment arrive at compound.

1630 Military and police slowly escort the group outside the Club (now ly evacuees) to perimeter of compound. Group is constantly attacked while en route. An AID employee is taken away and held hostage for several hours at a local university. Three women became separated and were later rescued or released.

1700 Smoke and heat increasing. Employees in vault urged to stay low and move as little as possible.

1730 Internal defense force reconnoiter third floor and determine that while it is clear of rioters it is an impossible escape route for the employees in the vault due to the intense heat and smoke.

1730 Remainder of Club group escape through rear gate to Pakistani military trucks parked just off the compound. Military helps truck depart for nearby military base.

1730-1800 Pakistan troops take control of compound; demonstrators leave compound.

1745 Heat in vault increasing to the point where employees have to stand.

1750 Heavy blast felt within vault. Sounds of mob activity from roof continue. Shots being fired through roof air vent down into vault.

1800 Internal defense team secures roof.

1815 Ambassador advised by radio of Pakistan Army assurance that roof area is clear.

1820 Internal defense force opens escape hatch.

1825 Evacuation of vault begins with women, Pakistani employees, and Americans following.

1830 Pakistan military assists evacuees from roof.

1845 RSO and communications personnel leave the vault after checking to insure that classified has all been secured.

1850 All personnel have left the chancery roof and are moving to the ground level.

1900 Pakistan Army units transport evacuees to British Embassy.

APPENDIX 4

AFTER ACTION REPORT—ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN EMBASSY,
ISLAMABAD, NOVEMBER 21, 1979Synopsis

On November 21, 1979 between 1200 and 1300 hours, the United States Embassy in Islamabad was attacked by a group of Pakistani students. This attack was quickly followed by a larger attack involving over 500 Pakistanis. During the afternoon, mob violence grew until a total of 5,000 to 10,000 persons were involved in a violent demonstration against the U.S. Embassy. At the onset of the demonstration the Pakistan National Police (PNP) and local Foreign Service National Contract Guards were quickly overpowered and the Embassy compound was overrun. However, the combination of public access controls, the use of tear gas and a dedicated internal defense force delayed the advance of the attackers sufficiently for mission employees within the Chancery to be evacuated to the safehaven area. Other facilities on the compound, e.g., the American Club, staff apartments, motorpool, and Marine quarters were overrun, vandalized, and set on fire. A small group of Americans and foreign service nationals (FSNS) unable to gain access to the chancery, and initially accosted by the mob were protected by a small contingent of PNP Officers. Later in the day, the PNP assisted the group in escaping from the compound to sanctuary at the British Embassy.

The chancery was initially penetrated through the ground floor level when decorative grill windows were removed from the cafeteria and other areas. Although the attackers were delayed by the use of tear gas, they eventually overran the remainder of the ground, second and third floors of the building. The entire building was set on fire. Despite the fact there was no direct contact between the Embassy's internal defense team and the attackers, one member of the Marine Security Detachment was shot and killed while manning his post on the roof of the chancery.

The safehaven located in the Post Combined Communication (PCC) vault area was never penetrated despite the determined efforts of the mob to force open the escape hatch leading from the vault to the roof. One hundred and thirty six Americans, Pakistani FSNS and one Time Magazine correspondent remained in the vault area for approximately four and one half hours while the Embassy burned and the attackers maintained control of the compound. At approximately 1800 hours an armed team of Marine Security Guards (MSGs) supported by two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents were deployed to gain access to the roof, clear it of attackers, and force open the jammed escape hatch to the Embassy roof. This was accomplished without hostile resistance as the attackers had vacated the roof.

At approximately 1830 hours the FSNS and American employees escaped to the roof from the vault via the emergency escape hatch. Pakistani military authorities, who had established control of the compound by approximately 1800 hours, assisted the employees in descending to the ground. They escorted the Americans to the British Embassy located a short distance from the chancery.

In addition to those employees taking refuge in the Embassy vault, a small group of Americans were caught by the incident at the Embassy Club/restaurant. This group, consisting of approximately sixteen people, represented a mix of government employees, private business personnel, and other Western nationalities. The group was protected by a small force of PNP and later military who formed a ring around the personnel. This group was subjected to considerable verbal abuse and rough handling by the mob which numbered in the hundreds. Although no severe physical harm was done to any of the people in this second contingent, they suffered a harrowing four hour ordeal until the police were able to negotiate them through the crowd and into an army truck which took them to a Pakistani army camp for the night.

The total fatalities included one U.S. Marine, who was killed by hostile weapons fire; one U.S. Army Warrant Officer, whose burned body was discovered a day later in the staff apartments; two FSNS, who had been burned to death on the ground floor of the chancery; and one demonstrator who was shot and killed by the Pakistani police during the attack. There have also been unconfirmed reports of another death among the demonstrators. The chancery compound was completely destroyed with the exception of the partially constructed Ambassador's residence.

During the entire period of the attack, from approximately 1235 to 1800 hours, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the British, Canadian and West German Ambassadors had been in constant contact with Pakistani Government officials at the highest level in an effort to obtain a relief force. Their efforts were consistently met with assurances from the Government of Pakistan (GOP) that adequate protection would be forthcoming. However, it was not until 1800 hours, some six hours after the first call for help, that the Pakistani military obtained meaningful control of the chancery compound. Prior to this, the mob had, of its own accord, begun to break off the attack and leave the Embassy grounds.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NOVEMBER 21 ATTACK ON THE
U.S. EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD

Although there had been demonstration activity against U.S. installations in Pakistan during the summer of 1979, there had been no violent incidents, and the activity was

apparently unrelated to the situation in Iran. On August 15, 50-75 students demonstrated in front of the American Consulate General (Congen), Lahore. On August 17, there was a demonstration in front of the American Congen, Karachi and on August 21, a demonstration in front of the International Communications Agency (ICA) American Center, Hyderabad. All of these demonstrations were pro-Arab, staged to protest alleged American imperialism, zionism, the U.S. role in the Israeli/Egyptian peace process, as well as an alleged U.S. military threat in the Middle East.

After November 4, the day of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the tempo of the demonstrations changed. Subsequent demonstrations had, for the most part, pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. overtones. In mid-November intelligence indicated that groups of Iranian students, as well as Arab and left-wing Pakistanis were planning anti-American demonstrations during Moharran, the eleven-day Muslim period of mourning scheduled to start on or about November 20 and end on or about December 1.

On November 16 some 50 Iranian students gathered in front of the Iranian Cultural Center, which is located several blocks from the Congen, Karachi. Part of this group proceeded to the area adjacent to the Consul General's residence. The police prevented them from gaining access to that area and they returned to the Iranian Cultural Center. After some delay, the same group set out in the direction of the Congen office building displaying large photos of Ayatollah Khomeini and placards stating "Down with Carter," "Down with the Shah," "Down with Sadat." Before traveling the short distance to the Congen, they were stopped by the police and given two minutes to disperse. When they refused, the police subdued them by use of force and took them to the local police station where they were detained pending investigation. On November 16 the American Embassy, Islamabad received a report that a demonstration was planned for that date at the Embassy's front gate. The assumption was that the demonstration would involve Iranians and be related to the situation in Tehran. No demonstration materialized.

On November 19, 100 to 200 students held a demonstration a short distance from the ICA American Center in Lahore. The majority of the demonstrators were apparently Arab students and exhibited strong pro-Khomeini, anti-U.S. feelings. The GOP appeared aware of the planned demonstration and had taken appropriate security measures in the area. During the week prior to the events of November 21, students at Quaid-E-Azam University in Islamabad had been participating in a student week organized by the student union.

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PAKISTAN - COMPOUND LAYOUT

The American Embassy in Pakistan is located on a 31-acre site in the diplomatic enclave of Islamabad. This new

capital city is built on a selected site near the older Cantonment Town of Rawalpindi. Islamabad consists principally of government offices, foreign diplomatic missions, and residential area for senior government officials and employees of foreign missions. Islamabad is a well-planned city with broad avenues and wide streets. The Canadian residential compound is directly across the street from the American Embassy, and the British Embassy is approximately a quarter of a mile away. The Foreign Ministry of Pakistan is approximately a five-minute drive from the U.S. Embassy.

The Embassy compound included a chancery building, two staff apartment complexes, Marine quarters, servants quarters, an American Club and a recreation area consisting of a swimming pool, tennis courts and a small golf driving range. It also housed a large GSO complex, warehouses and a motor pool. To the north side of the compound was the yet uncompleted Ambassador's residence. The rear of the compound was enclosed by a tenfoot cyclone fence and the front and sides were enclosed by brick/masonry walls ranging in height from nine to eighteen feet. There were four entrances to the compound: the main vehicular and pedestrian gate, located 75 yards to the front of the chancery entrance; a pedestrian gate leading to the American Club; a pedestrian gate leading to the servant's quarters, and a vehicle gate at the southeast end of the compound. The latter was permanently secured. All entrances to the compound were controlled by members of the Embassy Contract Guard force. In addition, the main gate, the American Club entrance, and the servant's quarters entrance were manned by Pakistan National Police Officers. Normally a contingent of nine police officers were assigned to the Embassy compound. However, as a result of reports received by the GOP indicating the possibility of hostile action against the Embassy, the police complement had been increased to thirty-one officers.

The extremely large area of the compound ruled out the establishment of strong exterior defensive perimeters; therefore, the chancery building was the focal point for the Embassy's internal defense efforts. The chancery was a large three-story brick and masonry building with five entrances that had been hardened to prevent forced entry:

(1) The front or main entrance was secured by wood and glass double doors and protected on the exterior by a twelve foot iron bar gate and on the interior by an iron bar gate remotely controlled from within.

(2) The secondary entrance was located on the ground floor adjacent to the motorpool area and secured by solid core wood double doors.

(3) An emergency exit was located on the ground floor at the northwest end of the chancery and secured by a hollow core wood door:

(4) The ground floor front courtyard entrance was secured by hollow core wood doors augmented with a heavy iron gate on the interior side.

(5) There was also an entrance from the roof that was protected by a hollow core wood door.

The main and secondary entrances were controlled by MSG posts. Post one controlled the chancery lobby on the second floor. Post two controlled the entrance to the ground floor from the southeast side of the chancery. MSG post one was located in a ballistically hardened booth while post two was located in a partially armored booth. Plans for completing the armoring of post two had been approved by the Department but the implementation of those modifications was pending receipt of materials. Access doors leading from the lobby to the Consular Section and to the main corridors of the building were reinforced with one-eighth inch boiler plate steel and secured with Brute Master Locks electronically controlled by MSG post one. The chancery ground floor front windows were protected with decorative iron grills. A main central stairwell and stairwells at both ends of the building led to the upper floors. Hollow core wood doors prevented access from the second floor to the third floor. An elevator was located in the center of the building which could be remotely shut off by MSG post one. The PCO vault area was secured by a Mosler Class 6 vault door and was located on the third floor, southeast corner of the chancery building.

From the perspective of public access controls at other embassies, the security arrangement at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad was well above average. Lobby public access controls were properly designed to perform the intended function of preventing penetration of the building by a small armed group of terrorists. However, in other areas of access control, e.g., ground floor window grills and secondary entrances, the controls and physical barriers were not sufficient in scope or design to prevent forced penetration by a large and determined mob, particularly in view of the lack of a prompt or meaningful response by the host government.

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES

In light of the heightened security sensitivity due to the situation in Iran, as well as the previous demonstrations in Lahore and Karachi, the Embassy had sought explicit assurances from the GOP that it was willing and able to defend the Embassy from attacks or violent demonstrations. During the week of November 12 - 16, Andy Koritko, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and his FSN security assistant met with Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sherafzal, who was responsible for the protection of all foreign missions in Islamabad, and subsequently with Sherafzal's superior, Mohammed Ali. The RSO was informed that the police would and could handle any threat directed to the U.S. Embassy.

Furthermore, he was informed that the additional 22-man police detail assigned to the Embassy was in response to the situation in Iran, and if a demonstration or attack were to occur the police were prepared to use tear gas, lathi (riot control batons) and weapons, as necessary. Their instructions were to put down any demonstration. The police on the compound were to serve as an initial response force that could be quickly reinforced as necessary. Emergency phone numbers for contacting the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other officials were provided to the RSO with the assurance that an English speaking Pakistani officer would always be available to monitor any request for assistance. The Embassy also undertook measures to further increase its security. During the week before the attack, the Marine Security Detachment conducted internal defense drills to improve its state of readiness. The Security Watch Committee met and reviewed the situation including internal defense arrangements and emergency and evacuation plans. The Embassy compound access procedures were reviewed and tightened to provide more positive control of persons entering and leaving the compound.

PRELUDE TO THE ATTACK

On Wednesday morning, November 21, rumors began spreading in Pakistan that an armed group had seized the Haran Mosque in Mecca at the direction of U.S. and Zionist forces. Reportedly a radio newscast started the rumor but despite an intense effort we have not been able to identify such a broadcast. In any event, no newscast clarifying or denying the early report was broadcast until that evening when President Zia went on television to calm the population and explain that no foreigners were involved in the mosque attack. Pakistanis throughout the country apparently accepted that allegation of foreign involvement at face value and in many areas they closed shops, stopped work and took to the streets in both peaceful and violent demonstrations. The most violent demonstrations took place in Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Islamabad.

During the morning leaflets were passed out on the campus of Quaid-E-Azam University identifying the U.S. as an enemy of Islam. Between 1200 and 1230 rightist and leftist student leaders began addressing groups on the university grounds, urging them to gather weapons and attack the U.S. Embassy. The Majaat-Islami, a rightist group, assembled some 35 male students on buses and drove toward the American Embassy. On the same morning, a number of Palestinian students on the university campus were also encouraging attacks against the Embassy.

Shortly before 1225 hours, two busloads of students from Quaid-E-Azam University drove to the USAID/UN complex, which is several miles from the Embassy, where they stopped and requested directions to the United States Embassy. The AID Administrative Officer immediately called the Embassy

and advised that a group of students in buses were on their way to the Embassy compound and that their arrival was imminent. At about the same time Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., United States Ambassador to Pakistan, enroute to his residence from the chancery, observed the buses of university students heading toward the Embassy. As soon as he arrived at his residence he telephoned the Embassy to alert the security and administrative staff. Upon receipt of the warnings, the initial phase of the internal defense plan was implemented and at approximately 1226 recall was sounded for the Marine Security Guard Detachment.

At approximately the same time the FSN security assistant telephoned police Assistant Sub-Inspector Nawaz, who was in charge of the police detachment on the Embassy compound, alerting him to the imminent arrival of the students. Nawaz was temporarily housed at the servant's quarters located approximately 200 feet from the chancery building. As soon as the alert was received the contract guards were instructed to deny access to the compound to all persons. At approximately 1235 two buses of students stopped at the front perimeter gate entrance. The students disembarked chanting anti-U.S. slogans, carrying placards, and throwing rocks at the front gate and guard booth. The small force of three to five policemen outside the entrance were eventually successful in talking the group into returning to the buses and departing the area, heading back toward Quaid-E-Azam University. This demonstration lasted little more than five minutes and the only damage was to the windows of the guard booth at the entrance.

Marine Posts one and two at the front/lobby and side entrances were manned and the remaining off-duty Marines, who had immediately responded to recall, were placed on standby in the chancery lobby. A few minutes later a new group of buses appeared heading toward the Embassy from the direction of the University. The Marines, who had already donned their emergency gear, were deployed to their internal defense posts. Posts four and six took up their assigned observation posts on the roof of the chancery. Post three assisted Post two in reinforcing the ground floor entrance.

THE ATTACK

The second group of buses, numbering eight to twelve and crammed with some 500 students, arrived at the front gate at approximately 1300 hours. They were immediately confronted by a small contingent (half dozen) armed police stationed directly outside the main entrance gate and a similar number of police inside the gate. The mood of the demonstrators was substantially different from that of the first group. This was no longer a controlled demonstration with chanting, rock-throwing and general harassment; it was an hysterical, frenzied, irrational group clearly intending violence. Immediately upon disembarking from the buses,

they swarmed to the perimeter walls, overpowering the police and taking their weapons. An FSN in an ICA vehicle who had driven up to the main gate to enter the compound was ordered from his vehicle by the mob and the vehicle was set on fire. Members of the mob climbed on the roofs of the buses and the shoulders of other demonstrators and scaled the exterior perimeter wall. They were chanting, screaming and throwing rocks at the policemen inside the compound. At approximately 1315 the attackers began jumping off the wall and entering the compound, commencing a full scale attack against the compound. Some of the attackers were armed with sticks, pipes, rocks and other weapons including rifles and handguns; however, the majority of the mob had no firearms.

Immediately upon entering the compound the attackers moved east of the Chancery toward the motor pool and the American Club. Private and official vehicles parked in those areas were quickly set afire. The small contingent of police inside the perimeter wall had positioned themselves between the main entrance gate and the entrance to the chancery. As the mob approached, the police retreated to the area near the chancery flag pole which is directly in front of the lobby. They attempted to stall the advance of the mob by firing warning shots in the air. Almost immediately there was return fire from the area near the front gate. None of the policemen were wounded but they were quickly overrun and their weapons taken by the mob.

At that time the Administrative Counselor, Dave Fields, directed floor wardens to inform all mission employees to move to the safehaven area located on the third floor. Initially those on the ground and second floors collected in the corridors of the second floor behind the public access control barriers. Shortly thereafter they were directed to the third floor vault area. At approximately 1315 the NCOIC, Master Gunnery Sergeant Miller, conducted an inspection of the MSG defensive positions. He checked Post two, which was outside the cafeteria at the ground floor entrance, and then went to Posts four and six on the roof. Post six was at the southwest corner of the roof overlooking the auditorium. Post four was at the southeast corner of the roof overlooking the motor pool area. Both MSGs assigned to these posts had their emergency equipment including flack jackets, steel helmets, gas masks, mace, service revolvers, 12-gauge shotguns and emergency kits with gas grenades and launchers, and extra ammunition. The MSG internal defense force was not equipped with hand held VHF radio communications as had been specified in the internal defense plan. Radios were on order but had not been received.

As the NCOIC arrived on the roof he noted that Post six, Corporal Crowley, was propped up against a sixteen inch vertical wall that surrounded the entire outside of the chancery roof area. Sporadic weapons fire continued, apparently coming from the front entrance of the compound.

After checking Post four, the NCOIC advised the Marine to secure the Post and augment the internal defense force on the lower floors of the chancery. Turning to Post six, approximately 40 yards away, the NCOIC immediately recognized that Corporal Crowley had been injured. A quick examination indicated he had been shot through the head. The bullet had entered the temple near his left eye below the helmet line and exited the rear of the head behind his left ear above the helmet line, passing through the helmet. The NCOIC first attempted to render first aid by stopping the massive bleeding, and then had Corporal Crowley removed from the roof to the third floor and later to the vault area. Mrs. Fields, the Embassy Nurse, attended to his wound and kept him alive for more than three hours through the use of oxygen units maintained in the vault. At approximately 1525, when the last of the oxygen was exhausted, Corporal Crowley died.

The 'mob,' after overpowering the police in the very early stages of the attack, had free run of the compound. They began throwing rocks and flower pots through the ground floor windows and then attempted to remove the decorative iron grill work. The first penetration of the chancery occurred at approximately 1340 through the ground floor cafeteria windows after the grill work was pulled away. Shortly thereafter they removed the grill work from the remaining windows in both the southeast and northwest ground floor courtyards. Just prior to the initial penetration of the chancery the NCOIC had ordered MSG Post two to secure and report to the second floor lobby area. As Corporal Purry, the MSG at post two secured the area and moved toward the cafeteria staircase, he was confronted by the first group of attackers, who had broken into the cafeteria and were moving into the hallway between the cafeteria and Post two.

Corporal Purry, armed with a shotgun and other emergency protective equipment, confronted the demonstrators, who retreated from the hallway area back into the cafeteria allowing Purry to proceed down the hallway and up the stairs. On reaching the second floor, Purry threw several tear gas grenades down the stairwell and secured the fire door between the ground floor and second floor lobby area. The time was approximately 1345.

At the chancery entrance the mob threw rocks and sticks and debris through the outer grill gate breaking and smashing the glass on the front door. Flammable materials were stacked between the grill gate and front door and ignited. Despite their concerted effort, they were unable to break through the protective iron grill gate. The RSO, NCOIC, several Marines, and two DEA agents remained behind the Marine control booth and public access barriers observing the mob and throwing tear gas grenades into the lobby and down the stairwells to the ground floor area. The use of

tear gas effectively delayed the attackers from penetrating the second floor lobby area from either the ground floor level or from the main lobby entrance.

By approximately 1400 all employees except the internal defense force located in the lobby had retreated to the third floor vault area. The NCOIC then directed the two DEA agents to deploy to the third floor central staircase entrance door and secure that area. He also requested the MSGs to check and ensure that the staircases on both ends of the building were secured, which they did.

While the internal defense team held the second floor, the attackers began vandalizing and setting fire to the ground floor. As the fires spread throughout the lower floor of the building, the heat increased in intensity and the second floor area became uninhabitable. Smoke and tear gas filled the hallways and it became extremely difficult for the internal force to see, communicate and remain operational. There still had not been any direct physical contact between the internal defense force and the demonstrators although the demonstrators had attempted to come up the ground floor staircase. The internal defense force responded by throwing tear gas canisters under the fire door and down into the ground floor area below.

At about 1445, the internal defense force was forced to give up the second floor due to smoke and heat and withdrew to the third floor vault. By this time almost all Embassy staff who had been in the building at the time of the attack were secure in the vault area. Notable exceptions were several FSNs and an FBO third country national contract employee who were caught in the attack on the ground floor. The FBO man and two FSNs escaped by jumping to safety through open windows. The burned bodies of two other FSNs were discovered the day after the attack during an inspection of the chancery.

SITUATION IN THE VAULT

The vault was located at the extreme southeast end of the third floor and was composed of several separate communications rooms plus an area that housed the incinerator and a small bathroom. Entrance to the vault was through a Mosler Class 6 vault door into what was referred to as the outer vault.

Of the 137 occupants of the vault, all were Embassy employees or dependents with the exception of a female Time Magazine correspondent. Most of these people, including all the FSN employees, were located in the file room of the vault.

Once the vault door was secured, the defense force assumed posts in the outer vault near the door. Their

assignment was to prevent any attempted forced entry from the third floor hallway into the vault. The attackers, by this time, had obtained access and control of the chancery roof, including the area directly above the vault. Initially, they had climbed the flag pole next to the chancery building and by the use of the flag pole rope were able to swing to the auditorium roof and from there, ascend to the chancery roof. Once on the roof they smashed the communication antennas, threw the emergency destruction barrels off the roof and attempted to force open the emergency escape hatch leading from the roof to the vault.

In order to prevent this, the employees augmented the existing hatch security with wire, reinforcing the locking device to prevent the hatch from being forced open. Additionally, the NCOIC periodically threw tear gas canisters into the Model two incinerator which discharged the tear gas through the incinerator stack to the roof. This was effective initially in driving the demonstrators away from the escape hatch.

Both the American and FSN employees in the vault remained calm throughout their confinement. The FSNs were situated quietly seated on the file room floor while the Administrative Counsellor and other senior American officers and staff continually reassured them that all would be well. Other American employees manned radio and telephone equipment. Communication was maintained with Ambassador Hummel, who was at his residence, as well as with observers at the Canadian Embassy and the American School. At one point the Embassy generator failed and all power was lost for approximately four minutes until the remotely activated emergency generator came on. All areas in the vault except the file room, where the majority of the employees were located, had emergency lighting; nevertheless, for those crammed in the file room, the temporary darkness created a very tense situation. Moreover, the vault area was becoming intensely hot and unbearable due to the seepage in of smoke and tear gas.

DISPOSITION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Immediately prior to vacating their offices and taking refuge in the vault, American employees had been instructed to secure all classified material in their safes. Without exception this was done. The communications supervisor positioned himself at the vault door during the initial stages of the attack to ensure that mission employees would be able to gain access and that the vault could be secured immediately if the third floor were penetrated by the attacking mob. At approximately 1320, after the demonstrators had initially overrun the police and contract guards on the compound, communications personnel began destroying classified material. This material was fed into a Model 1012 disintegrator

and all of the highly sensitive material in the communications area was totally destroyed within one and a half hours from the time of the initial attack. Other classified records from the file room area of the vault were destroyed by 1430. This delay was caused by the post's inability to use additional destruction devices located in a room off the outer vault due to smoke, intense heat, and tear gas seepage. No classified material was compromised during the attack since, in addition to those highly sensitive materials which were destroyed, all other materials remained secured in safe file cabinets.

ESCAPE FROM THE VAULT

As the afternoon progressed the situation in the vault became significantly worse. The intense heat, smoke, and tear gas, as well as the rapid oxygen depletion, were having a serious effect on the people in the vault. At approximately 1745 the carpet began smouldering from the intense heat and the floor tiles began to peel. A fire extinguisher was used to douse the carpet.

During the attack and throughout most of the afternoon, communication with Ambassador Hummel and others outside the compound continued via VHF radio. Details of the situation in the vault had been transmitted to the Ambassador who was extending all efforts to obtain a relief force from the Pakistan Government and at the same time keeping the Department informed of the situation. The efforts of the Ambassador and others to obtain assistance were augmented by members of the Canadian and British Embassies. Additional information concerning the activities of the mob and the lack of response by the Pakistani military was transmitted from the Canadian compound. From approximately 1410 RSS Kelly, Consular Officer Bowen and Mrs. Tripett, wife of State Department employee Frank Tripett, had been monitoring the communications from the vault area at a nearby residence. They established phone contact with U.S. Consul General in Karachi and requested he initiate telegraphic contact with the Department. The ConGen sent a number of FLASH messages to the Department indicating the critical situation at the Embassy and the desperate situation of the persons in the vault.

Ambassador Hummel had frequent contacts with senior members of the Pakistani Government in an attempt to obtain a military relief force for the compound. He spoke with President Zia on several occasions and on each occasion was assured that military help was either on the way or had already arrived.

From approximately 1430 until 1700 two Pakistani military helicopters circled the compound and made passes at the demonstrators on the roof. The helicopters did not attempt to land a rescue force on the roof and were not a very effective means of crowd control. For example, on several

occasions the Pakistan Government assured the Ambassador that the chancery roof area had been cleared of hostile elements. In each instance this turned out to be false.

At approximately 1530 on the advice of the RSS, the Ambassador moved from his residence, which was the next likely target of attack, to the Foreign Ministry. During the next three hours at the Foreign Ministry, time and time again he implored Pakistani authorities at the highest level to initiate an appropriate rescue action. Repeatedly he was assured that rescue was on the way but no concrete response materialized at the Embassy site. In these efforts the Ambassador was supported by Deputy Chief of Mission Barry King who had been at the Foreign Ministry for most of the afternoon attempting to obtain GOP assistance.

At approximately 1730 hours the NCOIC was directed by Admin Counselor Fields to take a small force and attempt to clear an escape route from the third floor vault area to the ground floor. He was told to use force, as necessary, to clear the area. The NCOIC, two MSGs, and two DEA agents left the vault and attempted to traverse the third floor from the southeast corner to northwest stairwell, where egress from the building would be possible using the emergency exit on the ground floor. The fire and smoke, however, were so intense that they were forced to return to the vault.

Up until approximately 1800 hours the demonstrators had been highly visible on the roof and their presence was being reported by observers at the Canadian compound. During the afternoon they had attempted to force open the emergency escape hatch leading to the vault. They had also fired weapons from the roof through the air vent down into the vault area below. At approximately 1750 hours these activities stopped and the Admin Counselor and other responsible officials in the vault surmised that the attackers may have vacated the roof due to the intense heat and flame. Because of the desperate situation in the vault, i.e., the rapid depletion of oxygen and the strong possibility of burning to death, Admin Counselor Fields requested that the emergency hatch be opened. An attempt was made to open the hatch from inside the vault but it had been jammed by the demonstrators and could not be forced open.

At approximately 1800 hours the NCOIC and two MSGs acting under the orders of Fields left the vault to gain access to the roof via the southeast stairwell. Once again they had orders to use lethal force, as necessary, in order to clear the roof area. Upon reaching the roof of the chancery they found it free of attackers. The best estimate of when the attackers left the roof is around 1800 hours, shortly before the internal defense team gained access to the roof. At approximately 1820, after intensive efforts, the emergency escape hatch was forced open. The MSGs and DEA agents provided cover while the remaining members of the internal defense team left the vault and took up defensive positions on the roof.

The evacuation from the vault was orderly and controlled with the women, then FSN employees and finally American staff leaving, in that order. NCOIC Miller carried the body of MSG Crowley from the vault to the roof and subsequently to the ground below. The last persons to leave the vault were the communications supervisors. They insured that the vault door was secure and that all safes and repositories had been locked. The emergency escape hatch was then closed and secured from the outside. During the evacuation from the vault, members of the internal defense force assumed positions on the auditorium roof which joined the chancery. Ladders provided by Pakistani military/police authorities were then placed against the side of the walls and the employees descended to the ground. As the MSGs vacated the roof, Pakistani military personnel attempted to disarm them. The MSGs refused to surrender their weapons. There was some disorganization among GOP elements at that point with respect to arranging the transportation from the chancery to the British Embassy, a short distance away. Most of the vehicles used were provided by the Pakistani military and it took over an hour before all the American personnel were secure within the British Embassy. The FSNs made their own way to their homes.

Upon arriving at the British Embassy, the Americans were met by Ambassador Hummel who had moved from the Foreign Ministry to the British Embassy as soon as the vault evacuation was completed. Efforts commenced immediately to insure that all U.S. personnel had been accounted for including those persons who had been removed from the compound earlier in the day by the Pakistani military and police forces or were otherwise separated from the main group. Ambassador Hummel reestablished telephone contact with Washington to assure the Department that the situation was under control.

The British Ambassador offered the evacuees the full hospitality of the British Embassy and provided food, drink, and a general feeling of warmth and safety. This was done at considerable risk to his mission as the security situation in Islamabad at that time was unclear. The State Department Operations Center was provided with the names of all personnel who had been accounted for up to that time. The Office of Security was given a report on the amount of classified material that remained in the chancery and arrangements were made for the protection of the chancery grounds until all classified material could be destroyed. Corporal Crowley's body was placed in a casket provided by the British Embassy and then transported to the AID Commissary for storage. All the evacuees remained in the British Embassy until the Pakistani military authorities had provided assurances that they could be safely escorted to their homes. This was done in the early hours of the morning of November 22.

SITUATION OUTSIDE THE CHANCERY BUILDING

By approximately 1340 hours the mob was in complete control of the Embassy compound. During the afternoon the mob increased from the original 500 to somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 demonstrators and spectators. Although the initial attack focused on the motorpool area and the main chancery building, other elements of the mob quickly spread throughout the compound attacking, burning and looting as they went. The American Club was the target of one such attack. At approximately 1310 two armed Pakistani police officers took up positions near the Club, one at the entrance and the other near the rear vehicle gate. In the Club 15 Americans and one Canadian were having lunch. Shortly after the demonstration began, Mr. Saraj, the American Club Manager, instructed his employees to draw the window drapes, turn off the lights, and lock the Club doors. The people in the Club moved into Mr. Saraj's private office behind the Club bar. This office was chosen as a temporary safehaven because it could be secured from the inside. Shortly thereafter the mob attacked the Club breaking windows and attempting to smash the entrance door. Initially, the mob gained access to the Club through the kitchen area. Once inside they began smashing furniture and equipment, completely ransacking the Club. However, there was no attempt at this time to enter Mr. Saraj's office. Apparently the mob did not know that the office was occupied. The mob remained in the Club for 15 to 20 minutes. The kitchen area of the Club had been set on fire but as soon as the mob departed the FSNs extinguished the flames.

At approximately 1330 hours a small contingent of police arrived at the club, temporarily relieving the besieged staff. The police were led by a Pakistani in civilian clothes who time and time again during the afternoon demonstrated his concern over the welfare of the persons in his charge. Directly outside the American Club a small fire truck and a few firemen were desperately trying to put out a number of fires in the area. Firemen had removed fire hoses from their truck but did not have the necessary wrenches to open the water valves. Their efforts were laudable, but unsuccessful. All of the vehicles in the private parking lot, as well as vehicles parked behind the Club were burning. Occasionally shots could be heard over the noise of the mob. The B block apartment complex was in flames as was the dispensary. There was extensive damage to the A block apartment complex but it was not burning at that time.

At approximately 1400 hours elements of the mob returned and with a vengeance re-attacked the Club area. The police and fire contingents were busy elsewhere and once again the group took refuge in Mr. Saraj's office. After approximately 10 to 15 minutes it was clear that the entire Club was in flames. After moving from one office to another they were forced to vacate the Club building, grouping together outside the main Club entrance while Mr. Saraj planned a safe escape route from the compound area. By this time all

the apartment buildings, as well as the fire truck near the Club, were in flames. A small element of Pakistan police came to their defense as a large number of demonstrators pressed in from all sides. The police fired several warning shots in the air and forced the demonstrators back. Nevertheless, the mob began throwing rocks, stones and other objects at the group. For the next two hours they remained huddled against a small 3 foot wall not far from the Club area. They were eventually joined by the Dornan family carrying their young son, bringing the total in the group to 19. They had just escaped from one of the apartment complexes by climbing out the rear bedroom window and had been escorted to the main group by some of the demonstrators. This was not the only time that elements of the mob provided assistance to Americans trapped on the compound.

During the period that the group was huddled against the wall for protection they were continually engulfed by the mob. The police, desperately trying to keep the mob away, were assisted by some of the less violent demonstrators who sought to protect the evacuees from other more radical elements who were shouting "kill them, kill them, lynch them, lynch them." At approximately 1530 the police were joined by four or five Pakistani soldiers carrying automatic weapons over their shoulders. They assisted in holding back the mob which had been throwing rocks and debris at the group. The evacuees were spit upon, jostled, insulted and generally abused. No one was seriously injured, however. An AID TDY employee, Tom Putsher, was struck by a thrown object and cut. Although there were no instances of rape or specific sexual abuse of the female personnel, they all were manhandled and two employees saw a man in the crowd urinate on part of the huddled group from the crowd standing on the wall behind the group.

At approximately 1630 hours the military/police, encircling the 19 evacuees, began moving slowly across the compound in the direction of the Marine House and the servants' quarters gate. The pace was painfully slow, and frequently interrupted by the mob. The demonstrators continually jostled the group, stripping the evacuees of wallets, watches and anything they could get their hands on. The American women were manhandled and the men were struck again and again with stones and other sharp weapons whenever the mob could break through the small ring of police and military.

The procession constantly changed direction due to the activities of the mob. During one such change the main group was divided into several smaller groups but were subsequently reunited. Four of the group, however, were separated during this movement and made their way to safety through other means. One of these, Thomas Putsher, had the

unique experience of being held hostage at a local university for some hours and it appears from Putsher's experience that the students may have intended to take a number of American hostages from the Embassy but were thwarted in this by the Pakistan Army. Three women were also separated at this time; one was rescued by Pakistan police and taken to her home after having been confronted by a female demonstrator who tried to rip her clothes. Another was rescued by the restaurant manager who took her out of the compound on a motorcycle. The third woman was a Canadian citizen and the wife of a Canadian External Affairs Officer. Based on this, she was released by the crowd. None of the four persons separated during the move to the trucks were seriously harmed although they were subjected to considerable abuse including being spat on, hit with objects, and having their clothing ripped.

The remainder of the group eventually reached a site near the perimeter fence of the servants' quarters' gate. There they sat and waited while the mob stood over them chanting anti-U.S. slogans and offering verbal abuse. At approximately 1730 hours the police detachment herded them out the rear gate into a large two and one-half ton Bedford truck parked just off the compound. There were 10 to 15 Pakistani police officers in the truck. As the demonstrators noted the escape of the group from the compound they attempted to pull the American women into buses parked nearby.

With the help of the police this was prevented and all reached the safety of the truck. The truck moved out in the direction of Quaid-E-Azam University. After driving approximately one and a half miles a bus loaded with Pakistani students blocked the road while a second student bus pulled up behind the truck blocking any retreat. Within moments a Pakistani military force arrived on the scene and "negotiated" the release of the trapped truck. It was apparently agreed that the men would be delivered to the University in exchange for the safe passage of the women and children. The seven men were transferred to a covered Army vehicle and driven from the scene in the direction of Quaid-E-Azam University. Once out of sight of the demonstrators the military vehicle turned around and went back toward the Embassy. It passed the site where the truck had originally been stopped and proceeded on to Islamabad. As they drove toward Islamabad they could see the rear of the Embassy. The compound was a scene of total destruction. Approximately 30 minutes later after negotiating streets still filled with mobs of Pakistanis they reached the military headquarters of the Punjab Regiment at West Ridge, Rawalpindi. Shortly thereafter they were joined by the six women and two children who had been left behind in the truck used to escape from the compound area. Neither the women nor the children had been harmed. All the evacuees were provided warm food, bedding, and medical care as required. A heavy military security guard was placed around their building and they were offered all the hospitality of the military camp. The next day at noon they left the military base to return to Islamabad. Once again they were provided a strong military escort. Without exception they were extremely well treated while in the hands of the Pakistani military.

END