


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RATIONALITY AND EQUITY IN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS:  
GENDER AND RACE AS FACTORS IN THE  
STRATIFICATION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS

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RATIONALITY AND EQUITY IN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS:  
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ABSTRACT

Rationality and equity are important principles in the theory and legitimating symbolism of bureaucracy. As we use the terms, rationality refers to a reward and resource allocation system based on technical qualifications and equity denotes a single rule for apportioning rewards to investments for all participants. Taken together, these two principles account for the leveling effect on social differences posited by Weber. A deduction from this point of view, namely, that organizational systems will neither reinforce nor create inequality based on gender or race, was examined with data provided by the members of six multiagency social service delivery systems. The dependent variable was access to the interorganizational networks of professional exchange that tied together the agencies in these systems. On the average, men and women, whites and non-whites had equal access to these networks. However, their investments and qualifications were related to this access in quite different ways, indicating that there was not a single resource allocation rule in operation. For white men, formal authority was the key to a strategic network position but education, unexpectedly, was a handicap. White women could also rely on authority, though less so than men, but for non-white women education was the major factor. The most surprising finding was that for non-white men, none of the indicators of professional qualifications was a good predictor of network access. It is not clear whether these complicated findings indicate sex and race-based discrimination, but at the least a complicated process of negotiation for advantages among the participants must have been in operation.

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RATIONALITY AND EQUITY IN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS:  
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INTRODUCTION

This is an examination of stratification in the interorganizational exchange networks that developed among the professional agencies in six service delivery systems that were initiated and funded by the federal government. Stated abstractly, the objective was to assess the influence of the bureaucratic principles of rationality and equity on the way individual practitioners gained access to central positions in these networks. To accomplish this empirically, we compared the impact of gender and race, two ascribed characteristics, with the effects of several indicators of professional achievement. The findings are directly relevant for theories of organizational and interorganizational structure, but there are also implications for the literature on status attainment and sexual and racial stratification. Recent studies of the latter topics are making increasing use of organizational variables in their attempts to isolate the determinants of salary and to account for differential access to decision making authority (Kluegel, 1978; Wolf and Fligstein, 1979ab; Halaby, 1979). Typically, however, these studies are based on survey research not actually conducted in organizations and for this reason they are unable to specify the intraorganizational practices that would account for their findings.

What we have done in contrast to these macro-level analyses is to take a microscopic, by which we mean more direct, look at the mechanisms by which

individual attributes and resources, or investments, are translated into occupational realities. The information we drew upon dealt with the daily work experiences of individual respondents and, although we did not examine the determinants of either pay or authority (authority for us was an independent variable), we believe that the findings will be useful for understanding organizational position- and reward-allocation mechanisms in general.

Each of the service delivery systems in the study was made up of a number of independent agencies brought together to provide a broad array of services to juvenile "status offenders." Policies for handling these youth were in the process of changing so that they could no longer be processed exclusively by agencies of the official juvenile justice system. Because these are non-delinquent juveniles whose offenses would not constitute legal violations for adults, community based (non-institutional) alternatives were sought, and the six programs in this survey represent a federally sponsored attempt to develop such alternatives. For our purposes the salient feature of these programs was the fact that they relied upon complex networks of interpersonal exchange to link together the professional practitioners who officially belonged to different, geographically dispersed agencies. Our concern was to isolate the variables that determined where an individual came to be located in these interorganizational networks, since this was a crucial factor influencing not just their ability to meet the immediate client-related demands that were made on them, but also their visibility and influence in the community of professionals. Both the pool of resources available for dealing with a client's problems and the number of points of access to the larger professional and community audiences were significantly expanded

for the practitioners who were well integrated into these networks, and, conversely, the isolates were seriously handicapped professionally.

These programs were complicated interorganizational structures. However, they relied heavily upon the expertise of their members and had explicit system goals, an explicit interagency division of labor and clear system boundaries (that is, a clear demarcation between those agencies in the network and those that remained outside it). Therefore, they represented bureaucratic responses (in the theoretical, that is, Weberian, sense) to a problem of large scale performance and administration. In all, several thousand clients were processed over a two year period. Ideally (again following Weber), the ascribed characteristics of practitioners should not have been dominant factors in the way the interagency networks of professional exchange were structured. Rationality and equity are important elements in the legitimating symbolism of such systems, especially given their strong public commitment to professionalism and social justice. And rationality is incompatible with any organizational practice that ignores objective qualifications, while equity is incompatible with any practice that gives different payoffs to individuals making equivalent contributions. However, the actual implementation of these ideal bureaucratic principles can rarely be taken for granted. We will cite evidence that the effects of ascription-based differentiation--racism and sexism--characteristic of the larger society can break through the boundaries of supposedly rationally and equitably organized systems in a variety of ways.

The first part of the analysis concentrated specifically on rationality. It asked how gender and race affected network position compared with formal training, professional experience, workplace location and formal authority. The logic here is straightforward. In a purely rational situation, the objec-

tive advantages of the work situation should not be found to be structured along the lines of gender and race, but rather according to objective investments and contributions to the system's activities.

The second part of the investigation explored the more complicated notion of equity. This required a determination of whether a given objective contribution produced the same payoff regardless of race and gender. Statistical interaction between ascribed and achieved characteristics in determining payoffs (education producing greater advantages in network positions for men than women, for example) would constitute evidence of inequity.

Finally, a third question concerns the statistical interaction between race and gender. Jeffries and Ransford (1980) have implied that the intersection of ethnicity and gender will create unique aggregates ("ethsexes"), the life chances and experiences of which assume patterns that cannot be anticipated simply by "adding" the effects of race to those of gender. With this in mind, we asked whether the patterns of effects associated with race differed for men and women, and whether the effects of gender differed for whites and non-whites. Theoretically, interaction in this form should also be absent. Unfortunately, because of racial imbalance in the programs we studied, our attempt to address this issue will be tentative.

Before describing our research strategy in detail some attention must be paid to previous work that bears on these substantive issues.

UNIVERSALISM AND ACHIEVEMENT  
IN BUREAUCRATIC SETTINGS

Rationality, which in modern societies refers to the shift from ascription to achievement in the allocation of resources and rewards, and from

particularism to universalism in the evaluation of performance (Parsons, 1951) is usually traced to the dependence on complex and bureaucratized forms of organization. For Weber (1947), bureaucratic rationality meant that formal position and access to resources would be keyed to expertise, and rewards would be tied to the achievement of role obligations. This familiar argument also posited that a leveling effect on the ascribed status differences that characterize the larger society would accompany the attempt to ensure that irrelevant considerations did not distort the search for or utilization of talent (Weber, 1947:340; Gerth and Mills, 1958:224ff.).

The applicability of this view of organizational reality has of course been subject to criticism, but the claim that organizations are in principle universalistic and achievement oriented ("intendedly rational" in the language of March and Simon, 1958:169ff.) is a point that is shared by most theories of organization. Significantly, this is true both for those who take a very critical view of the emphasis on rationality (Argyris, 1957), and those who continue to see this emphasis as a major source of organizational strength (Perrow, 1972; 1979).<sup>1</sup>

Despite this superficial consensus, surprisingly little of the organizational or interorganizational literature has directly scrutinized the impact of ascribed characteristics, particularly gender and race, on the allocation of system rewards and advantages. As Acker and Van Houten (1974) pointed out some time ago, most organizational studies have avoided any but the most cursory examination of gender differences. It is instructive that the discussion of this topic occupied but a single sentence in the theorizing

of March and Simon (1958:101), otherwise a major source of hypotheses about the allocation of rewards in organizations. References to race in sociological studies actually conducted in organizations are even less frequent, in fact, are virtually non-existent.<sup>2</sup>

This vacuum in the literature has an unfortunate effect. Most would agree that women and non-whites are at a disadvantage in finding their way into organizations because of inequalities in access to training and job-finding networks, and that for the same reasons they are disproportionately found in lower level occupations and low status positions which convey fewer rewards and less chance for individual progress (see, for example, Siegel, 1965; Rossi, 1965; Treiman and Terrell, 1975; Kluegel, 1978; Wolf and Fligstein, 1979a). However, the silence in the intraorganizational literature on this matter has left unexamined the proposition that within a given organizational position, or at a given level of skill (in other words, once the entry level barriers are passed), the experiences of women and non-whites will parallel those of their male and white counterparts, in that the advantages they gain and the rewards they receive will be proportional to their skill and their diligence in understanding and implementing the rules of the system.<sup>3</sup>

It is precisely this assumption that needs to be tested. If it turns out that the opposite assumption is the one that is really justified, that is, if distinctions based on ascribed differences do enter directly into the functioning of organizations, then it will have been shown that the experiences of women and non-whites depart in significant ways from those of men and whites, and the presumption of a leveling effect of bureaucratic reward allocation mechanisms will have to be revised. In this connection, a persuasive argument is

currently being made that organizational practices reliably reflect the surrounding cultural environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Crozier, 1964, 1971; Lincoln, Olson and Hanada, 1978, Hannan and Freeman, 1975; Benson, 1977; Goldman and Van Houten, 1977). If this is a realistic view, it follows that in a culture characterized by sexism and racism discriminatory practices may well in fact penetrate the boundaries of organizations, otherwise, there would be a marked disparity between the practices of organizations and the surrounding culture that supports them.

It is only recently that studies have appeared that make it possible to weigh these possibilities, and at this point the direction of the evidence is still unclear. Kanter's "numbers hypothesis" (Kanter, 1977ab) is that women who must function alone or in small disconnected numbers surrounded by men will have different (and less favorable) experiences from women who are able to form liaisons and alliances with other women or who can escape becoming highly visible tokens. But where men and women are represented in more nearly equal numbers they will be found to have more nearly equal access to the rewards and advantages of work. The relative power of men and women and related questions concerning competing interests and direct discrimination are given comparatively little attention.<sup>4</sup>

Miller, et. al. (1975) reached substantially different conclusions in their study of small, highly professionalized bureaucracies in which the numbers of men and women were fairly evenly balanced. For men, they reported, the greater the investment or contribution the greater the subjective and social-relational rewards (a rational pattern); but for women, the greater the investment the greater the discrepancy between their re-

wards and those of men. In other words, women confronted a reward allocation rule that was fundamentally different from (and less rational than) the one that applied to men. This finding provided a strong, but essentially inferential, argument for the operation of vested interests and discrimination in the internal workings of organizations. Some indirect evidence for such a differential reward allocation rule for women is also offered by Wolf and Fligstein (1979b) and more direct evidence of this phenomenon is to be found in Halaby (1979).

Very little research has dealt directly with the experiences of non-whites in organizations, but it could be argued that the patterns of race relations will be basically similar to those for gender. Kanter's argument could be extended to cover race as well as sex (see Epstein, 1973, for example). Alternatively, Blau and Duncan's (1967) study of differential achievement by race in the occupational structure (see also Parcel, 1979) would not be inconsistent with an argument that organizationally bound occupational experiences will be directly affected by factors indicating systematic racial differentiation. In the Blau and Duncan data the deficits faced by non-whites were greater the more they invested in education, a finding similar in form if not subject matter to the result reported in the Miller, et. al. (1975) investigation of gender differences. More recently, Butler's (1976) study of the Army has brought this question of racial inequity closer to the organizational sphere. Race, independent of ability and training (as measured by the Army) was shown to have a direct effect on the difficulty of promotion, and the delays experienced by non-whites were more pronounced in the higher than the lower levels of the enlisted structure.<sup>5</sup>

Except for Kanter, each of these otherwise diverse studies of gender and race indicates that the relative deficits in rewards experienced by disadvantaged groups can persist and in some cases be intensified, not reduced, by access to the resources that are thought to be the keys to success in the workplace. However, there are unsettled elements in this argument. For example, the research by Miller, et. al. (1975) was confined in large part to male-dominated occupational areas. Most of the organizations they surveyed were involved in scientific research, an area in which women have rarely been able to compete on equal terms with men, either in gaining access to an occupation or in earning career rewards (see for example, Rossi, 1965). Women were present in fairly large numbers, but highly qualified women, that is, those with professional credentials and/or administrative positions, were few compared to the number of similarly qualified males. Therefore, it could be that their relative disadvantages were a result of this "skewness" in their immediate work surroundings, to use Kanter's term, and not the result of discrimination, per se.

Where comparisons of whites and non-whites are involved, still another caution is in order. An examination of Butler's (1976) Army data will show that for both blacks and whites, those who had more to offer to the Army (in terms of intelligence and skill) experienced the greatest delays in promotions. The deficit was greater for non-whites than for whites, to be sure, and it increased for them as talent and investments increased. But the key point is that the system actually worked "rationally" for neither group. This is in contrast to the Blau and Duncan (1967) finding that investments paid off for both whites and non-whites, only moreso for whites.<sup>6</sup>

In short, while it is possible to piece together from previous studies an impression of differentiation in organizations based on ascription "imported" from the larger society, a great many theoretical details remain unclear. To address this problem here three research strategies were used, corresponding to the three hypothetical questions that were raised in the introduction.

The first strategy was to assess whether the gender and race of program participants, net of their objective accomplishments and professional investments, figured prominently in their access to the networks of professional exchange. Did men in fact have an advantage over women, and did whites have an advantage over non-whites? Second, we explored the possibility of statistical interaction between ascribed and achieved factors in determining access to the exchange networks as a way of finding out whether organizational rewards and advantages were distributed to men and women, whites and non-whites according to the same principle of allocation. Finally, the subjects were partialled into the natural categories white men, white women, non-white men, non-white women and separate regressions performed for each "ethsex" category. The purpose here was to determine in what way the two ascribed factors, gender and race, interacted with each other. The details of these strategies will be addressed after a description of the research setting.

#### METHODS AND MEASURES

##### The Organizational Context of the Research

During the period from 1976 to 1978 the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration allocated several million dollars to establish the multi-agency service delivery systems described earlier. There were nine programs in all, but one declined to participate in the sociometric part of the survey which provided the network data, and two others were excluded because of delays in staffing and implementation. In each of the remaining six programs a variety of public and private agencies, most of them small, were pulled into a cooperative division of labor for the purpose of creating a community based interagency resource and treatment pool. The programs ranged in size from 20 to 90 members and from 7 to 25 separate participating agencies. The general pattern was for one agency (technically the grantee) to serve as the coordinating center which would then contract for the services of the other agencies in the program. In this way a clearly defined and bounded network of agencies was built up that was able to offer a far wider range of services and treatment modalities than any single agency could do, and it was this network structure that was thought to be the strength of the program.

The study was conducted roughly six months after the programs had begun to process clients. By this time stable linkages had evolved that tied the agencies in a given program together into a coherent service delivery system. A practitioner with extensive ties to others in this system could draw upon the treatment resources of the entire network in developing a course of aid or treatment for a given client. Access to the interagency network was therefore vital for an effective practitioner to have and for this reason it is appropriate to characterize a favorable network position as a "scarce and valuable resource."

Racially the programs were staffed predominantly (77%) by whites. In fact, in two programs all the respondents were white and in the others the proportions white ranged upward from about 60%. Given this imbalance our analysis of racial differentiation is somewhat restricted. A similar problem did not occur for gender. Overall, 60% of the practitioners were female, with a range among the programs from 48% to 70%.

The most characteristic occupations were social worker and youth counselor, categories that are certainly not the privileged preserve of men. Nor was the frequent observation that most supervisors in these kinds of occupations are men (Montagna, 1977:280) borne out in this survey. Among the 256 respondents there were 85, or about one third, who reported having some supervisory responsibilities. This proportion did not vary greatly in the breakdowns for men and women, whites and non-whites.<sup>7</sup>

The phenomenon that Kanter described, namely, women who are disadvantaged primarily by their small numbers, is ruled out by the composition of these programs. However, a similar possibility for non-whites cannot a priori be ruled out given their relatively meager representation in the programs.

Sociometric Measures of Network Position.

A key feature of the survey was the measurement of the interpersonal connections that linked the practitioners and agencies in each program together into a coherent overall effort. Ties among the practitioners were plotted from reports of closest work contacts and four other sociometric dimensions, including influence (who determines how the work of the program is done), respect (whose professional opinion is most highly regarded), informal support (who is dependable in times of crisis) and professional assistance (who is a good source of professional advice). Respondents were

asked to base their reports on their relations with the overall interagency program, since it was the operative unit for our purposes, rather than to confine their choices just to the members of their own agency. The nominations that were in fact interagency as opposed to intraagency ranged from 36% to 60% on the work contacts criterion, with similar proportions on the other four sociometric items.

A "centrality" index for each practitioner on each of these five sociometric dimensions was calculated, based on the number of "paths," and their lengths, that connected that person to others in the interagency network. An individual with a high score, then, was one who was more strategically tied into a given interagency network by numerous and relatively close linkages, and therefore could establish contacts with others with relative ease. This is what is meant by being close to the functional center of network activity.<sup>8</sup> (Previous applications of centrality measures in organizational analysis are to be found in Rice and Mitchell, 1974; Lincoln and Miller, 1979; and Miller, 1978.) In the case of the reported work contacts this centrality measure is an indicator of access to the network of actual professional-to-professional interaction. For the other four sociometric dimensions the interpretation of actual interaction is missing and in these cases the "network" represents a collective representation of how influence, respect worthiness, colleague support and expertise were distributed.

Measures of Achieved Status.

The following variables dealing with achieved status were included. Education refers to the number of years of formal schooling; professional

experience records the number of years the individual had worked at his or her occupation by the time of the survey; and formal position (authority) was measured by a dummy variable based on whether the respondent was in a position with official supervisory responsibility.<sup>9</sup> A measure called workplace, also a dummy, was included as a control. It reflects whether the respondent's own employing agency was or was not the grantee agency, that is, the one with responsibility for the overall coordination of the program. Almost by definition, members of these administrative centers were more likely to have greater centrality in the networks of interaction than those who were members of the other agencies in the programs,<sup>10</sup> and consequently it was necessary to account for this in the analysis.

There were five major occupational categories in these programs, including social workers, counselors, court personnel (primarily probation officers), staff and technical consultants (testing experts, psychologists, statisticians, etc.) and those with administrative but not treatment responsibilities (called 'Admin' in the tables). These categories were entered into the regressions as dummy variables with a residual category. "other occupations," excluded.

Finally, a preliminary analysis indicated that professional experience might actually be serving as a proxy for recency of acquiring professional skills, given the emphasis in the programs on young practitioners to deal with youthful clients. This suggested that age should also be included in the regression analyses. Like the workplace measure, it functions primarily as a control.

#### Statistical Approach.

Regression was the method used to examine the influence of the independent variables for the total subject population of 256. (The matrix of correlations among all the variables appears in the appendix.) A series of partial subanalyses involving just the men (N=100), then the women (N=156); just the whites (N=199), then the non-whites (N=57) was also called for. Finally, the theoretical problem dictated a breakdown into the finer categories, white men (N=71), white women (N=128), non-white men (N=28) and non-white women (N=29). A regression analysis with all the predictor variables included was not feasible for the latter two groups. Instead a reduced regression model from which the five dummy variables for occupation were dropped was used, an unavoidable compromise which made it possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the interaction of the variables race and gender.

#### FINDINGS

Three conclusions are supported. First, the interagency networks cannot be characterized as either male or white dominated overall.<sup>11</sup> Second, (and paradoxically), the mechanisms accounting for access to interagency networks did differ in ways that reflect interaction between ascribed and achieved factors. Third, non-white men differed dramatically from the other categories in their means of access to the networks. On the whole the picture is one that suggests a complicated process of negotiation for system resources and advantages, but whether this is properly called discrimination is open to debate.

Overall Regression Analyses.

It is evident in Tables 1 and 2 that the networks of professional exchange were not organized primarily around differences in ascribed status. Mean centrality on the five network dimensions varied very little from one category to another (Table 1). The explained variance for the centrality Tables 1 and 2 about here measures (Table 2) ranged from 20% to 26% and, with the exception of the assistance dimension, neither race nor gender was a significant factor. Much of the variance was traceable to workplace (as expected) and individual status in the hierarchy of authority (for a similar result see Lincoln and Miller, 1979). In addition, a very clear pattern of isolation appeared for the occupational category "staff/consultant," which represents personnel who served the programs in largely advisory positions and who had little direct involvement in their day-to-day operations. (Males predominated in this category, but the finding of isolation is net of gender.) Counselors were also disproportionately isolated on three of the five dimensions. Finally, a pattern of isolation is evident for those with greater professional experience, a finding which initially seemed paradoxical but which upon consideration follows from the youth oriented service climate of such programs and the fact that they typically rely heavily upon newly trained practitioners to carry out their basic client-related activities. The fact that age was also inversely and significantly related to centrality in the interaction networks (that is the networks of work contacts) is compatible with their youth service objectives.

To summarize the results in Tables 1 and 2, there was little to suggest

that race and gender were dominant factors in the way these programs were structured. In fact, with no other data than these it would seem that ascribed differentiation had been largely neutralized. However, the analysis so far has asked only how race and gender figured into the overall distributions of centrality; attention will now be directed toward the more complicated question of whether the combinations of variables that influenced access to a strategic network location differed fundamentally for men and women, whites and non-whites.

Comparisons of Men and Women.

Table 3 deals with the network locations of men (panel A) and women (panel B) treated separately. For both sexes, experience (more correctly inexperience, since the relationships again were inverse) and workplace had an important influence on location in the networks of professional exchange; and for both categories, race for the most part was not a significant

Table 3 about here

contributing factor. For education, however, an interesting specification effect is apparent. For women, this variable contributed significantly and positively to centrality on all of the network dimensions but one (support). For men the result was reversed: the effect of education was negative and significant across the same four dimensions.

Less pronounced but nevertheless interesting contrasts appeared in the effects of status. To be specific, the "payoff" of status in access to the exchange networks was consistently positive for both men and women but on the dimensions of influence and support the increments to centrality associated with status were considerably greater for men. (This is based on a comparison

of slopes: .107 versus .037; and .171 versus .04. The slopes are interpretable as increments expressed as a percentage of centrality<sub>max.</sub>) Other contrasts are also apparent. For men, age was positively related to support; for women the relationship was negative (i.e., age was associated with relative isolation); for men being a counselor was related to isolation from the network of support only, but for women it was related to isolation on all the dimensions except support; for women, being a member of the court personnel category generally produced isolation but for men this was not the case; and finally, men who were part of the staff/consultant category were relatively excluded from the networks of work contacts, influence and support, while for women the strongest negative effects associated with this occupational category concerned isolation from the networks of professional respect and assistance. In short, different combinations of positive and negative factors went into the determination of network centrality for men and women, with the largest differences being associated with education, which consistently favored women, and status, which to some extent favored men.

Comparisons of Whites and Non-Whites.

Panels C and D of Table 3 compare the experiences of whites with those of non-whites. The differences are many and in some cases quite pronounced. As one case in point, the combined impact of the variables in the equation is consistently greater for non-whites than whites; the R<sup>2</sup>s are just about double in most cases. Specific differences were apparent for the variables gender (being male was an advantage on two network dimensions for whites but not for non-whites); experience (the advantage of being professionally "new"

was more consistent for non-whites); age (being young, net of experience, was an advantage for whites, not for non-whites); workplace (membership in the administrative center had a more consistent payoff for whites); and the dummies for counselor and staff/consultant (these two occupational categories, but especially the latter, conveyed greater handicaps for non-whites than whites). However, the most impressive differences between the races, as between the sexes, involved formal status and education. Comparing slopes, status conveyed distinct and comparatively quite strong advantages for whites, a result that was conspicuously absent for non-whites, with the single exception of position in the network of mutual support. The findings for education were just the reverse; this resource was an advantage for non-whites but not for whites. These two mechanisms for gaining network access were clearly race-linked, but in opposite ways.

The diverse array of findings from the first two stages of the study can be brought into sharper focus by asking this question: For each broad ascribed category (men, women, whites, non-whites) what combination of variables produced favorable outcomes and what variables apparently functioned as handicaps? Taking this approach, the key to understanding access to the exchange networks lies in the widely varying effects of authority and education. For men in general and whites in general, authority was the major determinant of network centrality. For women in general the effect of authority was attenuated and for non-whites it had very little effect. Education, by way of contrast, worked quite well for women and non-whites, but was either ineffective or actually a hindrance for whites and males. Keeping in mind that the four ascribed categories ultimately achieved the same

basic access to the five network dimensions (Table 1), the strong indication is that quite different but equally effective paths to success existed; one, accessible largely to men and whites, was opened by claims based on authority and the other, largely restricted to women and non-whites, was accessible by claims based on professional credentials. Sex- and race-linked activities are clearly indicated by these patterns but the data do not unequivocally support or unequivocally refute the notion of systematic inequity in the systems of reward and resource allocation. Each race and sex category had both advantages and disadvantages that were missing for its counterpart.

The Interaction of Gender and Race.

This analysis is less than complete, however, because it does not deal with the joint effects of gender and race. It is possible to ask tentatively whether the relationships between the measures of achievement and the network position variables change in important ways for the four natural combinations of gender and race: white men, white women, non-white men, non-white women. Because the numbers of non-white men and women were small (28 and 29, respectively), a regression model reduced by the deletion of the five occupational measures was employed (Table 4). This approach obscures the relevance of an important dimension of achievement but it was necessary to gain a look at a more realistic partialling of the data.<sup>12</sup>

Table 4 about here

In this table only, a regression coefficient that is at least one and one half times its standard error is considered sufficient to indicate that there is a

relationship of interest. Our objective in this part of the analysis was to discover relationships that might guide future studies and for this exploratory purpose a relaxed criterion of significance is justified.

Within the limitations of the data, the results for authority, education and experience (the measures of achievement) are very interesting because the patterns of relative advantage and disadvantage are now much more apparent. For white men, high status and recent entry into their occupation provided greater network access but they faced a disadvantage if their education was superior. White women could also apparently use authority as a basis for a claim to network centrality (though not as effectively as men), but education had no clear payoff, and experience was virtually irrelevant. Non-white women were similar to white women in that some advantage, generally not large, accrued to supervisory status but unlike the white women in that, for them, superior education and recency of entry to the occupation were much more effective factors upon which to base a claim to network centrality. Finally, for non-white men, status offered no clear advantage, superior education was a definite and persistent handicap and experience was unimportant. In summary, note that (1) education was a certain benefit only for non-white women; (2) education was a handicap for both white and, especially, non-white men; and (3) authority conveyed at least some advantage for everyone but non-white men.

To round out the analysis, age (net of experience) also entered the equation in different ways. For white men and non-white women, being older was generally an advantage; for white women being younger was more likely to provide benefits; and for non-white men age was not an important factor.

Finally, workplace is the only variable that provided consistently favorable payoffs for all four race-sex combinations.

#### SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The first part of this analysis revealed that gender and race were comparatively insignificant as determinants of the network positions of the participants. The effects of occupation were more substantial, and a consistent advantage was also apparent for those with official authority or membership in the administrative centers of the programs. There was very little evidence at this level that the rationality principle had been compromised specifically by the intrusion of ascribed differentiation.

The second part of the analysis dealt more directly with the questions of racial and sexual equity. Here there were a number of important differences between men and women, whites and non-whites that make the interpretation of the findings more difficult but at the same time more interesting. Two conflicting scenarios that, on the surface, are equally plausible can be constructed. The first notes that women and non-whites could command centrality in the networks of exchange on the basis of their educational credentials, a rational process that calls to mind Weber's discussion of certification (Weber, 1947:333). They could place less reliance on access to formal decision making authority. In contrast, whites as a category were unable to profit from their education in the same way as non-whites, and men in comparison to women actually had to pay a price for the educational investment they had made. Any gains made by men came from the possession

of official decision making authority. The fact that authority had such a payoff for them could be seen as rational, but the anomalous finding for education certainly could not. This interpretation focuses on inequities directed against whites and men, and supports the idea that the social service delivery area is one that has in part reversed the general societal pattern of white and male domination.

However, a second scenario suggests a very different conclusion. Leaving aside the question of education, the data show that men and whites who had formal authority consistently found themselves close to the center of the exchange networks, a fact that indicates their ability to exploit this key organizational resource (the formal structure) to their advantage. The fact that superior formal training gave them no advantage in this regard, but in fact was a hindrance which could be overcome, makes this finding even more impressive. Authority did women less good in the professional exchanges that took place and, of particular importance, it carried with it less claim to actual day-to-day influence over co-workers. For non-whites status carried hardly any advantage at all. A claim to access to the exchange networks was likely to be successful for them only if backed up by superior technical credentials; they had to be "better" to gain the same access. This scenario is not consistent with the usual interpretation of the leveling effect posited by Weber. To be sure, credentials opened up a path to important work-related resources for women and non-whites, but another channel, that provided by authority, remained at least partially closed to them. Stated differently, the power of office was less effective for them.

These two arguments succeed in undermining each other in effect, illustrating the futility of searching for a pattern that unequivocally supports or unequivocally refutes the notion of white male domination. The data simply do not offer this certainty, but are much more suited to an argument that recognizes several alternative but equally effective pathways to network centrality. At least one of these alternatives was open to each of the race and gender categories. Such an argument points to a process of negotiation in which different categories of participants have different strong suits with which to advance their own positions and different liabilities for which they must compensate. The summary data that were presented at the outset (see the comparisons in Table 1) show that this process produced an overall outcome that was remarkably balanced. No gender or race category was able to dominate the networks of professional exchange, and no group was systematically excluded from these networks.

The final stage of the analysis provided the most provocative hints about the terms on which such a process of negotiation might have proceeded. For white men, claims to network centrality based on authority were honored, those based on education were not. White women could rely primarily on authority and youth, non-white women on authority, education and age. Non-white men diverged sharply from the other categories and emerged as the one group unable to turn the symbols of achievement into work-related payoffs. The latter is the closest the data came to revealing a pattern of clear racial or sexual inequity, but it must again be stressed that these non-white men were not on the average disproportionately isolated, but only that their formal positions, experience and credentials were of little use

to them in avoiding isolation.

Our strong suspicion is that the characteristic that non-white men were able to exploit in avoiding professional isolation was the very fact that they were who they were. The service delivery agencies in the survey had to deal with large numbers of male, non-white status offenders (of all male clients processed, 33% were minority--predominantly black--but non-white males were only about 10% of all practitioners), and with communities often also disproportionately minority. In such a context being a minority male, particularly one directly involved in client contact on a daily basis, would be a resource of considerable usefulness, and they could not in good sense be excluded by other practitioners from the professional networks, even though the claims they made based on authority were apparently ineffective, and those based on educational credentials apparently rejected. Their small numbers no doubt amplified their functional importance.

This interpretation, with the emphasis on negotiated outcomes, is largely inferential and not without unresolved anomalies. There are elements in the argument of rationality (authority was positively related to centrality for three of four race-sex categories; education was positively correlated for two) and non-rationality (for one group authority was ineffective and for another education was a handicap); elements of sexual and racial equity (white and non-white women had similar means of access to work-related advantages) and possible inequity (white men could expect payoffs for investments that were not forthcoming for non-white men). Finally, if our interpretation of the situation of non-white men is correct this is a clear case in which claims to work advantages based on ascribed attributes may in fact not have violated the principle of bureaucratic rationality. As Perrow (1972; 1979)

has argued, what constitutes rationality and universalism is not constant but varies with the objectives the collectivity is attempting to achieve. Dealing with disproportionately male and minority youngsters in disproportionately minority communities calls for some resources that must be considered lacking by definition for whites and for women.

#### CONCLUSION

The programs that provided the data for this survey are not representative of all such interorganizational systems, particularly given their demographic makeup, their level of professionalism and their visibility as a result of their federal sponsorship. However, the pressure to define a relationship with other agencies, to establish and maintain a structure of exchange among professionals with different backgrounds and philosophies, and to balance out the claims of different racial and gender groups are strategic problems faced by virtually all service delivery systems and by a large proportion of organizations in general. Therefore the findings are useful for revealing how such pressures may be resolved and they also provide some insight into the broader sociological problem of how societal biases concerning ascription can be filtered through the boundaries of organizational systems and be modified by the internal practices that take place there.

The specific findings illustrate quite clearly what the consequences for organizational theory might be of continuing to ignore race and gender as factors influencing the internal operation of bureaucratic systems. Table

2 taken alone might suggest that these two ascribed factors have little impact compared to more traditional occupational and organizational variables. Tables 3 and 4, however, show that organizational experiences vary quite substantially for different categories of participants, even in circumstances in which the ultimate allocation of advantages was remarkably equal. The deceptively uncomplicated hypothesis that investments and contributions are rationally and equitably, even mechanically, translated into objective rewards and resources was revealed as in fact seriously oversimplified. The effects of investments in educational and occupational training and such contributions as serving a supervisory function varied in important and sometimes surprising ways depending on whether the participant was male or female, white or non-white.

If the data fail to fit the classical "inducements-contributions" formulation (March and Simon, 1958), however, they also fail to fit a neat formulation positing clearly polarized competing interest groups (cf. Dahrendorf, 1961; Miller, et. al., 1975; Benson, 1977; Goldman and Van Houten, 1977). Males (and females) had quite different experiences depending on whether they were white or not, and whites (and non-whites) had different experiences depending on whether they were male or not. The situation of non-white males in particular presented two rival complexities. First, it was suggested that for this category position in the exchange networks was most decisively influenced by the nature of the client pool, indicating that, like elements of organizational structure, interpersonal relations among organizational participants are also affected by external environmental contingencies. Second,

the experiences of this group indicate that, contrary to Kanter, their small numbers may also work to the advantage of a minority group in some important areas of organizational activity.

Our hypothesis is that research in other organizational settings will support the basic finding that considerations of race and gender set into action complicated processes of competition and negotiation, but whether or not the specific configurations that we discovered are confined to the variables we examined and/or to systems very similar to the ones we studied can only be determined after many replications.

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The dominance of the rational, or Weberian, view of organizational reality is also being challenged by several variations of the loose coupling view of Weick (1976) and by the view that such organizing principles as rationality and formality function primarily as legitimating myths for organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Incidentally, in his presentation at the 1979 ASA meeting Perrow reduced the Weberian tradition to a footnote in a sweeping rejection of the largest share of organizational research in sociology. From this it is apparent that much of the point of view he developed in Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (1972) would no longer be supported by him, although a revised version only slightly changed from the original has recently appeared (Perrow, 1979).

<sup>2</sup>This assessment applies to the empirical organizational literature. There is of course no lack of concern for the effects of ascribed differences in other areas of sociology that deal with work and rewards. See Jeffries and Ransford (1980) for a detailed treatment of this literature. See also Alves and Rossi (1979) and Nock and Rossi (1979).

<sup>3</sup>One competing interpretation is that women bring fundamentally different expectations to the work setting and therefore respond in fundamentally different ways from men to issues of influence and equity (Etzioni, 1964:89). This view is directly challenged by evidence recently presented by Grandjean and Bernal (1979).

<sup>4</sup>It is interesting that Kanter's paper appears in reprint with the subtitle "Tokenism, Not Sex Discrimination." See Kanter (1979). Limited empirical support for Kanter's viewpoint appears in Spangler, et. al. (1978),

and some theoretical corroboration for her concentration on numbers as the key to inter-gender relations is found in Blau (1977). See also Lorber (1979).

<sup>5</sup>See also Miller and Ransford (1978); Hauser (1978); and Butler (1978).

<sup>6</sup>Note also that the argument of Miller, et. al., involves differential access to the rewards of status (i.e., the rewards of high education, occupation and authority), while the work cited for race deals with access to high status itself. We have assumed that these two processes will follow similar logics but the possibility that quite different mechanisms are involved should also be considered.

<sup>7</sup>The Wolf and Fligstein (1979a) and Kluegel (1978) findings that women and blacks are excluded from authority receives little support in this study.

<sup>8</sup>The centrality scores were generated by DIGRAPH, a program furnished by Peter Marsden. Centrality is determined by the number of "links" or "ties" that exist to connect the individual to all the other participants. Mathematically, the scoring is done in such a way that a more central person is connected to all the others by a dense web of short distance chains. A relative isolate is connected by longer and more indirect channels which for them are also fewer in number.

For the purpose of pooling the data for the six programs, the network measures were standardized by calculating each person's score as a proportion of the highest score achieved in the program in which they were a participant (Individual Centrality/Centrality<sub>max</sub>). Thus, the slopes in the tables have a direct interpretation. To illustrate, on the dimension of support in Table 3, possessing higher status added an increment of 17 percentage points for men, only 4 for women; on influence the contrast is between about 11 and roughly 4 percentage points.

<sup>9</sup>This dichotomy is justified by the relatively undifferentiated authority hierarchies that existed in the agencies in the programs.

<sup>10</sup>The proportion of all work contacts exchanged that were directed toward the members of the administrative center averaged 36% for the six programs, with a range of 16% to 83% (the latter figure representing the smallest program, one with only 20 responding members). Similar proportions of sociometric ties based on the remaining four sociometric questions were also directed toward the administrative centers.

<sup>11</sup>When separate regression analyses were performed for the populations of the six separate programs the results were essentially the same, though the explained variance was sometimes higher, sometimes lower. The relative importance of gender and race varied little from program to program and the conclusion that neither was a primary determinant of the dependent variables was substantiated. These more detailed findings, including the assessment of the effects of a series of dummies for program membership upon the dependent variables, are not shown for reasons of space but are available upon request.

<sup>12</sup>A rough idea of the consequences of dropping the occupational measures was obtained by regressing the network measures on just these five dummy variables separately for the four ethsex categories. This strategy is imperfect because it does not assess the net effect of these variables when the other independent variables are in the equation. These regressions suggest that the prediction for white men would have been improved by the positive effect of the dummy for "court personnel" and the negative effect of "staff/consultant." For non-white men the addition of "counselor" would have added a strong negative effect. For the white women no one of the occupational variables had a strong impact on network position, but for non-white women "staff/consultant" appeared to represent a persistent disadvantage, just as it did for white men.

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TABLE 1. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE  
 VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

	ALL (N=256)		MEN (N=100)		WOMEN (N=156)		WHITES (N=199)		NON- WHITES (N=57)	
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	$\bar{X}$	S.D.
GENDER *	.42	.49	--	--	--	--	.36	.48	.49	.50
COLOR *	.77	.41	.72	.45	.82	.39	--	--	--	--
EXPERIENCE	6.69	6.08	6.08	5.96	5.27	4.79	5.72	5.51	5.18	4.42
EDUCATION	16.69	2.26	16.99	2.46	16.16	2.14	16.67	2.09	16.89	2.90
STATUS *	.34	.46	.37	.49	.31	.46	.34	.48	.30	.46
AGE	31.66	8.59	31.81	7.42	31.42	9.59	31.66	8.90	31.11	8.49
WORKPLACE *	.26	.44	.25	.44	.27	.45	.28	.45	.18	.38
SOCIAL WKR. *	.34	.47	.31	.46	.36	.48	.31	.46	.48	.50
COUNSELOR *	.18	.39	.22	.42	.16	.37	.20	.40	.15	.36
COURT WKR *	.06	.25	.08	.28	.05	.22	.07	.25	.06	.23
STAFF/CONSUL. *	.06	.23	.07	.26	.04	.21	.06	.24	.04	.19
ADMIN. *	.19	.40	.20	.40	.20	.39	.22	.41	.11	.32
OTHER OCC. *	.15	.36	.12	.32	.18	.38	.15	.36	.17	.38
WORK CON.	.73	.15	.73	.15	.73	.15	.73	.14	.74	.16
INFLUENCE	.75	.14	.75	.14	.74	.13	.75	.13	.74	.16
RESPECT	.75	.14	.76	.14	.75	.13	.76	.13	.74	.16
SUPPORT	.75	.14	.76	.16	.75	.13	.75	.15	.76	.12
ASSISTANCE	.79	.13	.79	.14	.79	.12	.79	.12	.77	.15

\* Dummy variables: Male, white, supervisor and member of the administrative center were coded 1; for the occupational dummies, membership in the category was coded 1.

TABLE 2. REGRESSION OF NETWORK LOCATION MEASURES ON  
TWELVE INDICATORS OF ASCRIPTION  
AND ACHIEVEMENT

Independent Variables:	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
COLOR	-021	-06	007	02	018	05	-014	-04	026	08*
GENDER	008	03	021	07	020	07	020	07	009	04
EXPERIENCE	-004	-13***	-005	-18***	-004	-17***	-008	-29***	-008	-35***
EDUCATION	004	07	004	06	002	03	000	00	005	09
AGE	-003	-20***	-002	-10	-001	-09	-002	-10	001	05
STATUS	074	24***	067	23***	085	29***	092	31***	059	22***
WORKPLACE	116	34***	086	28***	095	30***	087	27***	082	28***
SOC. WKR.	-022	-07	-024	-08	015	05	-027	-09	017	06
COUNSELOR	-046	-14**	-063	-20***	-041	-13**	-033	-10	-021	-07
COURT WKR.	-043	-08	-056	-11*	-037	-07	-034	-07	-027	-06
STAFF/CONSUL.	-126	-22***	-120	-23***	-120	-23***	-110	-20***	-092	-19***
ADMIN.	-013	-03	-030	-08	-025	-07	-059	-16**	-026	-08
$R^2$ :	.26		.20		.24		.25		.22	
Intercept:	.778		.742		.737		.832		.675	

In this and subsequent tables one, two and three asterisks refer to significance levels of .05, .01 and .001, respectively. Decimals eliminated where possible to conserve space.

TABLE 3. REGRESSION OF NETWORK LOCATION MEASURES ON INDICATORS OF ASCRIPTION AND ACHIEVEMENT PERFORMED SEPARATELY FOR MEN AND WOMEN, WHITES AND NON-WHITES

A. MEN ONLY

	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
COLOR	-.015	-.04	.039	.12	.043	.13	-.018	-.05	.054	.17**
EXPERIENCE	-.007	-.28***	-.008	-.36***	-.008	-.35***	-.021	-.81***	-.013	-.58***
EDUCATION	-.010	-.15*	-.013	-.21***	-.013	-.22***	-.005	-.08	-.010	-.17**
AGE	.000	-.001	.003	.14	.002	.13	.007	.32***	.004	.22*
STATUS	.086	.27***	.107	.36***	.098	.33***	.171	.51***	.087	.30***
WORKPLACE	.109	.32***	.082	.25***	.081	.25***	.062	.17**	.034	.11
SOC. WKR.	-.030	-.08	-.002	-.005	.065	.19	-.028	-.07	.062	.19
COUNSELOR	-.007	-.02	-.039	-.12	.031	.10	-.086	-.25**	.038	.12
COURT WKR.	-.021	-.05	-.031	-.07	.049	.11	.002	.003	.074	.18
STAFF/CONSUL.	-.206	-.42***	-.15	-.33***	-.073	-.16	-.162	-.32***	-.055	-.12
ADMIN.	.001	.003	-.008	-.02	.038	.10	-.097	-.22**	-.006	-.02
R <sup>2</sup> :	.40		.34		.31		.55		.31	
Intercept:	.929		.882		.847		.735		.808	

B. WOMEN ONLY

	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
COLOR	-.038	-.10*	-.021	-.06	-.002	-.007	-.023	-.07	.007	.02
EXPERIENCE	-.003	-.11	-.005	-.17***	-.004	-.13**	-.002	-.07	-.005	-.21***
EDUCATION	.018	.26***	.018	.28***	.015	.24***	.003	.05	.018	.32***
AGE	-.003	-.22***	-.002	-.13*	-.002	-.12	-.004	-.26***	.000	.03
STATUS	.069	.22***	.037	.13**	.076	.27***	.040	.15*	.040	.16***
WORKPLACE	.012	.36***	.087	.28***	.102	.33***	.090	.30***	.101	.37***
SOC. WKR.	-.040	-.13	-.051	-.18**	-.015	-.05	-.013	-.05	-.008	-.03
COUNSELOR	-.097	-.28***	-.095	-.30***	-.089	-.28***	.011	.04	-.061	-.21***
COURT WKR.	-.074	-.11*	-.074	-.12*	-.089	-.14**	-.044	-.08	-.078	-.14**
STAFF/CONSUL.	-.046	-.07	-.074	-.12*	-.141	-.23***	-.075	-.13	-.110	-.20***
ADMIN.	-.049	-.13	-.054	-.15*	-.063	-.18**	-.014	-.04	-.037	-.12
R <sup>2</sup> :	.33		.24		.29		.20		.29	
Intercept:	.591		.575		.574		.808		.493	

C. WHITES ONLY

	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
GENDER	.007	.02	.026	.10*	.028	.10**	.024	.08	.011	.05
EXPERIENCE	-.002	-.08	-.002	-.10	-.001	-.06	-.007	-.28***	-.007	-.34***
EDUCATION	.001	.01	.001	.02	-.001	-.02	.003	.04	.002	.04
AGE	-.005	-.28**	-.002	-.17***	-.003	-.18***	-.002	-.14*	.001	.04
STATUS	.100	.33***	.084	.31***	.102	.37***	.094	.30***	.073	.30***
WORKPLACE	.129	.40***	.096	.34***	.098	.34***	.088	.27***	.086	.33***
SOC. WKR.	.000	.00	-.005	-.02	.043	.14*	-.013	-.04	.027	.10
COUNSELOR	-.019	-.06	-.040	-.14	-.013	-.04	-.038	-.11	.003	.01
COURT WKR.	-.023	-.04	-.049	-.11	-.027	-.06	-.032	-.06	-.019	-.05
STAFF/CONSUL.	-.066	-.13**	-.062	-.13**	-.063	-.13**	-.115	-.21***	-.031	-.07
ADMIN.	.004	.01	-.016	-.05	-.013	-.04	-.058	-.15*	-.019	-.06
R <sup>2</sup> :	.32		.23		.26		.24		.23	
Intercept:	.811		.786		.808		.789		.730	

D. NON-WHITES ONLY

	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
COLOR	.040	.12	.020	.06	.022	.07	-.001	-.01	.022	.07
EXPERIENCE	-.011	-.31**	-.020	-.55***	-.019	-.55***	-.013	-.49***	-.015	-.43**
EDUCATION	.018	.29**	.015	.24**	.015	.24**	-.010	-.23	.018	.30***
AGE	.001	.06	.003	.17	.003	.14	.002	.14	.002	.09
STATUS	.003	.01	.023	.07	.029	.09	.078	.31**	.004	.01
WORKPLACE	.101	.23*	.073	.17	.092	.22*	.151	.48***	.069	.17
SOC. WKR.	-.132	-.40**	-.103	-.31*	-.082	-.26	-.053	-.22	-.068	-.22
COUNSELOR	-.156	-.40***	-.151	-.38***	-.137	-.36***	-.017	-.06	-.135	-.36***
COURT WKR.	-.176	-.28**	-.104	-.17	-.089	-.14	-.081	-.18	-.087	-.15
STAFF/CONSUL.	-.502	-.72***	-.476	-.68***	-.469	-.69***	-.007	-.01	-.479	-.72***
ADMIN.	.010	-.11	-.069	-.13	-.060	-.11	-.038	-.09	-.078	-.15
R <sup>2</sup> :	.43		.51		.55		.51		.50	
Intercept:	.577		.603		.600		.918		.584	

(Decimals Eliminated)

TABLE 4

REDUCED MODEL: REGRESSION OF FIVE NETWORK CENTRALITY MEASURES ON EXPERIENCE, EDUCATION, STATUS, AGE AND WORKPLACE

WHITE MEN (N=71)

	Work Contacts		Influence		Respect		Support		Assistance	
	b*	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Experience	-008*	-.37	-.010*	-.51	-.009*	-.47	-.022*	-.87	-.016*	-.82
Education	-.017*	-.25	-.012*	-.19	-.009	-.14	-.011	-.14	-.004	-.06
Status	.125*	.41	.131*	.48	.115*	.42	.156*	.44	.106*	.39
Age	.001	.05	.005*	.32	.004	.26	.010*	.47	.006*	.36
Workplace	.133*	.41	.089*	.30	.085*	.29	.083*	.22	.047	.16
R <sup>2</sup> (R <sup>2</sup> )	.35	(.30)	.35	(.30)	.28	(.22)	.44	(.39)	.39	(.34)

WHITE WOMEN (N=128)

Experience	.001	.02	.000	.00	.002	.08	-.001	-.05	-.002	-.07
Education	.007	.10	.005	.08	.002	.03	.004	.07	.007	.12
Status	.087*	.29	.052*	.19	.081*	.30	.042*	.15	.039*	.17
Age	-.006*	-.37	-.004*	-.29	-.004*	-.29	-.005*	-.33	-.001	-.05
Workplace	.123*	.39	.092*	.33	.088*	.30	.088*	.30	.095*	.38
R <sup>2</sup> (R <sup>2</sup> )	.35	(.32)	.22	(.19)	.23	(.20)	.22	(.18)	.20	(.17)

NON-WHITE MEN (N=28)

Experience	.008	.17	-.003	-.06	-.002	-.04	-.**	--	.006	.13
Education	-.020*	-.37	-.023*	-.40	-.022*	-.39	--	--	-.020*	-.37
Status	-.029	-.09	.015	.05	.010	.03	--	--	-.038	-.12
Age	-.003	-.12	-.003	-.11	-.003	-.12	--	--	-.003	-.10
Workplace	.130*	.34	.131	.33	.169*	.44	--	--	.152*	.40
R <sup>2</sup> (R <sup>2</sup> )	.25	(.07)	.28	(.11)	.34	(.18)			.28	(.12)

NON-WHITE WOMEN (N=29)

Experience	-.018*	-.62	-.025*	-.85	-.023*	-.82	-.**	--	-.020*	-.72
Education	.033*	.47	.033*	.48	.032*	.49	--	--	.035*	.54
Status	.098	.27	.100*	.28	.099	.29	--	--	.085	.26
Age	.007*	.42	.009*	.56	.008*	.50	--	--	.007*	.43
Workplace	.241*	.46	.205*	.39	.186*	.37	--	--	.158*	.32
R <sup>2</sup> (R <sup>2</sup> )	.51	(.37)	.65	(.55)	.64	(.54)			.61	(.51)

\*Regression coefficient is at least one and one half times its standard error

\*\* Small Ns due to missing data precluded meaningful analysis for non-white men and women

APPENDIX: CORRELATION MATRIX  
(Decimals Eliminated)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1 GENDER	--																
2 COLOR	-.06	--															
3 EXPERIENCE	.08	.02	--														
4 EDUCATION	.22	.14	.10	--													
5 STATUS	.01	.01	.20	.29	--												
6 AGE	.03	.00	.62	.08	.23	--											
7 WORKPLACE	.01	.10	.11	-.01	.06	.01	--										
8 SOCIAL WKR.	-.10	-.16	.04	.04	-.07	.01	-.16	--									
9 COUNSELOR	.06	.04	-.14	.10	-.07	-.09	-.12	-.36	--								
10 COURT WKR.	.13	.02	.12	-.03	.04	.08	.40	-.19	-.17	--							
11 STAFF/CONSUL.	.11	.03	-.04	.27	.08	-.02	-.06	-.18	-.16	-.08	--						
12 ADMIN.	-.02	.09	.07	.07	.29	.15	.06	-.28	-.25	-.13	-.13	--					
13 WORK CON.	.00	-.02	-.15	.02	.19	-.21	.34	-.02	-.07	.09	-.15	.11	--				
14 INFLUENCE	.03	.04	-.14	.03	.18	-.15	.27	.00	-.10	.07	-.13	.10	.83	--			
15 RESPECT	.02	.06	-.11	.04	.23	-.12	.30	.08	-.09	.08	-.17	.07	.78	.89	--		
16 SUPPORT	.03	-.03	-.26	.02	.19	-.22	.26	-.04	.01	.09	-.11	-.01	.62	.82	.73	--	
17 ASSISTANCE	-.01	.09	-.22	.08	.17	-.11	.25	.06	-.02	.06	-.13	.03	.68	.74	.80	.61	--