


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Staff Analysis

of

Correctional Institutions

for

Division of Corrections, Multnomah County, Oregon

by

Thomas A. Henderson

Robert C. Grieser

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

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Prepared under contract with Division of Corrections, Multnomah County,
Oregon, on the 9th day of February, 1979.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to assess the security staff needed to operate the four correctional institutions of the Division of Corrections, Multnomah County, Oregon, taking into account standard operating procedures for facilities of this type. It was requested by the Division Director as a companion to the analysis by William G. Nagel and John J. Galvin of the population limits for these facilities given the pattern of court decisions over the past few years.¹

Staffing decisions are an integral part of the general managerial and policy choices of an agency and must be considered in that context. The analysis which follows includes suggestions regarding the number of personnel required to operate these facilities, but these are not presented in isolation. Much of this report concerns itself with the broader managerial and policy issues which must be taken into account when making staffing decisions. The appropriate staffing level will depend upon the policies and programs which the Division wishes to emphasize.

This report was commissioned to identify present and potential problems in the administration of the four facilities and the staff implications for their resolution. The focus is upon weaknesses in the procedures followed; the strengths are largely ignored. The report, therefore, should not be read as a general evaluation of the success or failure of the Division or of each institution. That would require a study with a much broader framework than was used here.

APPROACH TO THE REPORT

Staffing levels are dependent upon a variety of factors. The one which most people focus on is the size of the population which must be served. Although important, absolute population size is less important than what is done to or for those individuals. For example, the Courthouse Jail only holds approximately 135 prisoners a day. However, there is a constant flow through the facility as new prisoners are booked, individuals are escorted to and from the courts for hearings, attorney's visits are arranged, inmates are transferred to and from the other facilities, and meals are served. Where absolute population size is critical we have used current figures and the effects of a reduction in accordance with the schedule prepared by Nagel and Galvin.

The second factor which influences staffing is the physical layout of an institution. The four facilities have very different requirements. Rocky Butte Jail, for example, is a labyrinth which demands many more staff than would be required for a better designed institution.

The third factor is the management and program priorities of an agency. Some objectives are fundamental to operating a jail, for example, safety of the public, processing people into the jail and providing food and housing for those in detention. But within those basic objectives are a variety of

options. Must all of those charged be held in maximum security facilities? What is the appropriate balance between security and programs? Since we cannot anticipate the answer the Division will give to these questions we have used as our guide to the options available the experiences of other institutions and the recommendations of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections in their Manual of Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities.²

Some of these policy and management questions are increasingly being answered by the courts. The fourth factor which must be taken into account, therefore, is judicial decisions. We cannot determine what is constitutional and what is not. But, wherever possible, we have tried to identify circumstances which have raised legal issues in other jails.

These factors are used as the foundation for the analysis which follows. The staffing recommendations are useful only after the implications of each of these factors for the four institutions are made explicit.

DATA COLLECTION

The data for this study are drawn from several sources. Personnel records were summarized by the Division's Support Services and provided to us. Fortunately, the staff had already compiled valuable summaries of staff utilization, especially of overtime usage. Agency documents were used to identify formal post assignments, schedules, procedures, and policies.

Critical to the analysis were six and one-half days which we spent on-site on February 14 - 20 to observe first hand procedures in each of the facilities.

Our time in the institutions as such was distributed as follows: twenty hours at Rocky Butte Jail, twenty at Courthouse Jail, seven hours at Clare Argow Center, ten hours at Multnomah County Correctional Institution, two hours with the Transport Unit, and five hours at the hospital. The sixty-four hours were distributed over all three shifts, including the weekend. These hours represent time spent on-site interviewing and observing the staff and sergeants. Over the six day period (from the 15th to 20th) inside the jails, we spoke extensively with eight of the sergeants, thirty-one CO's and five program staff. Numerous other security staff officers were observed and contacted for shorter periods of time, especially at RBJ and the CJ. Additional time was spent interviewing the four lieutenants and administrative personnel while collecting staffing data, including Tuck Wilson, Carl Mason, Donna Dunbar, Connie Mattingly, Stan Kerner, and Greg Schire.

Finally, an attempt was made by Division staff to gather flow data using instruments provided by the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, Inc. Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to provide training on the use of these instruments so the data were not in a form which could be incorporated into this study.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The report is organized around each of the four facilities. In addition, there is a separate discussion of several issues which apply to the Division as a whole. Each section begins with an overview of the facility and its operations. In writing the overview, we assume the reader is familiar with the general operations of each facility. For those requiring more detail we suggest they review the report prepared by Jack Chapman.³ This is followed by a detailed discussion of management issues on which the staffing recommendations are based. In these sections we present the policy options we feel should be considered by the Division. A summary of the staffing implications is presented in Section VIII.

SECTION II

GENERAL SYSTEM

OVERVIEW:

The Multnomah County Division of Corrections is responsible for the operation of four institutions. In addition, there is a separate transport unit for moving inmates between facilities, and a hospital unit. Each institution is unique in size, major objectives, operational procedures, and staffing requirements. Because of these unique qualities, most of the analysis will focus on each facility. Before these are considered in detail, however, there are some issues which affect the general operation of the division.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Overtime

Every corrections manager must wrestle with the problem of what is legitimate use of overtime and what is excessive. Unfortunately, there are no national figures against which to compare Multnomah's usage. Fortunately, a summary of the use of overtime has been assembled by the Division which provided some basis for analysis.⁴ These data are presented in Table 1. These figures summarize the purposes for which overtime was used by each facility.

Three items account for over half of the overtime: sick leave, vacation, and personal holiday. The remainder are distributed among a variety of functions. Overtime should be used only when absences cannot be anticipated. Three of the items on this list do not fit this criterion and suggest insufficient staff or scheduling problems: vacation, personal holiday, and training. These are predictable absences and it should be possible to build these absences into the staffing levels. This assumes, of course, that management is able to distribute the use of vacation and personal holidays over the entire year rather than concentrating it all in a few months. The fact that so much overtime is used for these purposes (23% of the total) suggests that either scheduling is a major problem, or that insufficient staff is available. There is some indication that the latter at least contributes to this problem because turnover rates are not taken into account when calculating staffing requirements. This will be discussed more fully in the staffing summary section of this report.

The largest item accounting for overtime usage is sick leave: Although national figures for sicktime use in jails are not available, the rate in Multnomah County exceeds any reasonable level. The average number of days taken in fiscal year 1977-78 was eight per corrections officer. (These figures were supplied by the Support Services, Division of Corrections. See Table 2 for a complete analysis of sickleave, vacation and personal holidays.)

These figures, coupled with information received during interviews with staff, indicate a significant morale problem which needs to be addressed by management.⁵ The high use of sick leave is a syndrome which reinforces itself. Officers are clearly using sick leave as a means of escaping from the pressures of the job. This forces other officers to put in 16-hour shifts

TABLE 1

Corrections Division
Hours of Institutional Overtime Usage
July 1 - Dec. 29, 1978

	%	Total	RBJ	CHJ	CAC	MCCI	Trans- port	Hos- pital
Sick	34.57	5084.5	2329.5	2124.5	232.	96.	84.	218.5
Vacation	10.32	1518.5	641.	690.5	95.5	16.	33.	42.5
P. H.	10.05	1478.5	502	602.5	140.	13.	58.5	162.5
Holiday	6.36	936.	384.	304.	104.	128.		16.
Transport	4.48	659.5		1.	1.5	2.	652.	3.
Hospital	4.46	656.						656.
Self	3.65	538.	158.	380.				
Court	2.69	396.	130.	108.	46.5	86.5	20.5	4.5
Unfilled	2.92	430.5	124.5	290.		16.		
Training	2.34	345.	120.	160.5	15.		49.5	
Admn. Segregation	4.09	602.	602.					
Military Leave	1.65	244.	101.	94.				49.
Ward	1.89	278.	212.				66.	
Court Security	2.17	319.5		319.5				
Bereavement	1.03	151.5	56.	65.5	15.		15.	
Leave of Absence	.95	140.		140.				
Tower	.71	105.	105.					
Scheduling	.66	97.5	17.	56.5	8.	16.		
Overload	.65	97.	3.5	90.5		3.		
Admin. Leave	.48	71.	56.	8.	7.			
Shakedown	.27	40.5	40.5					
Special Assign.	.38	56.	6.	50.				
Meeting	.38	57.	17.	22.5		1.		16.5
Large or Late Chain	.29	44.	15.5	28.5				
Extra Security	.16	24.	16.	8.				
Med Tests	.02	4.		4.				
Daylight to Standard	.12	19.	9.	6.	2.	1.		1.
Escape	.13	19.5	19.5					
Conference	.10	16.			16.			
Relief Late	.10	16.	3.	9.	1.	1.		2.
Unknown	.05	7.5	1.	6.5				
Wedding	.01	1.5	1.5					
Visiting	.06	9.5	9.5					
Briefing	.00							
Trace Money	.01	1.		1.				
Report Writing	.05	6.8	2.5	2.8		1.5		
Paddywagon/Bus	.04	5.5	5.5					
Feeding	.07	10.	10.					
Line-Up	.04	4.	4.					
Emergency	.04	6.		6.				
Delivery	.05	7.		7.				
Supr. Xmas Tree Decorating	.01	2.	2.					
Recreation	1.16	170.5	170.5					
Release Center	.03	5.	5.					
Custody	.05	7.5		7.5				
Weather	.05	8.		8.				
Range	.05	8.		8.				
Total	99.80	14703.8	5879.5	5609.8	683.5	381.	978.5	1171.5

*Data compiled by Administrative Office, Multnomah County, Oregon, Division of Corrections

which increases the probability of fatigue and their using sick leave to recover. Limiting the amount of time any individual can devote to overtime is one means for reducing the worst effects of overtime use, but it does not get to the basic problem, which is one of morale.

Some use of sick leave to relieve the tensions of the job can be expected in a corrections institution. Scheduled holidays and vacations do not always occur when the pressures are the greatest. But an average of eight days a year for each corrections officer is excessive.

As with most morale issues, it was difficult to identify the sources of the problem. We understand that a systematic review of the problem is now underway within the Division. This is likely to be more effective than our brief exposure of a few days in determining the source of low morale. To supplement that effort, however, we offer some brief observations and impressions we received during the course of our interviews with staff which that committee may want to take into account and suggest steps which may contribute to its relief. They include inservice training, systematic review of operating procedures, and a performance review process to reward job achievement. We also think that efforts to reduce tension among inmates through increased program activities and eliminating overcrowding will relieve many of the job pressures now felt by staff. Most of these suggestions are treated in more detail in other sections of the report.

Training

The training provided to new employees appears sufficient. We were not in a position to assess the content of the program, but the number of hours is consistent with accepted standards.

Inservice training, on the other hand, is very inadequate. Standards developed by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC) call for at least 40 hours of inservice training after the first year of employment for an officer in a detention facility.⁶ Serious consideration should be given to implementing such a program. If facilities are not available for a residential program, half day sessions on site covering various policies and procedures needed in each institution could be implemented. This could be supplemented with course work through local colleges where appropriate. The staffing requirements for such a program are estimated to be an additional three officers for relief purposes. The formula for making this calculation is summarized in Section VIII.

Inservice training is frequently treated as a luxury. But this is far from the case, especially for corrections officers. Training can serve to increase the professional commitment of staff, enhance skills needed on the job, and provide time to review their own performance away from the daily pressures. Such a program is especially important in this agency because of the evidence of low morale.

Clerical Skills

A jail, by definition, is responsible for an enormous amount of paper work. The high rate of turnover means that records must be created quickly

on a daily basis. During the first two weeks of February, the Courthouse Jail handled 905 bookings with all of the accompanying forms to fill out to record charges, bail, personal history, etc. Although the volume is less at the other institutions, it is still very high as new inmates are processed in and releases and transfers processed out.

This paper work is, at present, handled principally by sworn officers whose primary skills are custody and security not clerical. In some cases we observed officers using the "hunt and peck" method for typing out forms. Increased effectiveness would be achieved by either 1) requiring all officers who have primary responsibility for record keeping to take a commercial typing course; or 2) supplementing, and in some cases, replacing corrections officers with clerical staff at intake and release points in the process. Some record keeping by corrections officers will always be necessary, but where volume is so high that a majority of an officer's time is spent at the typewriter clerical skills are much more appropriate. Moreover, an officer bent over a typewriter is not an effective security staff. We have tried to specify in this report where clerical staff could be used effectively. But this will require a significant policy decision affecting all institutions.

Programs, Visiting and Classification

Program activities and visiting privileges are woefully inadequate for most inmates in the system. Programs occupy a very minor place in the procedures for Rocky Butte Jail and visiting is severely limited at all of the institutions. There is always a tension between the requirement for operating a secure institution and providing as humane a treatment of inmates as possible. Nagel and Galvin raise this issue in their report and suggest that at present the balance is in favor of custody and security. Our observations confirm their conclusion.

Increasing the importance of programs at Rocky Butte Jail will not be a simple matter of adding more space to the institution. It will also entail a significant change in many of the practices within the facility to permit easier movement of inmates, and more careful scheduling of activities and staff. More liberal visiting policies will also involve significant changes at all institutions. These are discussed in more detail in the section on each facility.

It is our observation that substantial changes in the administration of program services will be required if they are to be strengthened. Institutional program staff did not appear to have very firm supervision from management. Several of them expressed feelings of isolation and there was no sense of overall direction. We do not advocate placing program staff under the direction of the various institutional managers, especially with the present emphasis upon custody and security and the overcrowded situation which exists in Rocky Butte Jail. A tension between the two staffs is to be expected and, to a certain extent, is healthy. Rather, we suggest that a detailed plan be developed by program management which specifies what programs are available in each institution, what areas need to be strengthened and expanded, and how these activities can be integrated into the security requirements. Participation of security staff in the development of such a plan is essential if it is to be practical.

A final concern is the need to re-examine the classification system. We concur with Nagel and Galvin's recommendation that inmates be more carefully diagnosed and separated according to potential risk. There is also a larger question which needs to be addressed and that is the changing character of the inmate population. The issue as expressed by staff (especially at RBJ, and to a lesser extent at MCCI) concerns the increasing numbers of inmates entering the system with severe psychological disorders. It was questioned as to whether it is the function of the county jail system to care for such inmates who are diagnosed as being mentally ill. We hold serious reservations about these inmates being placed in local jail facilities. It seems that the responsibility for this issue lies with the administration/program staff to explore more thorough and alternative means of assessment/ placement for inmates. As a first step in dealing with this crucial problem we would strongly recommend that interagency relationships with local/state mental health be fostered and strengthened.

Administrative Procedures

There are several management procedures which the Division should give serious consideration. First, a means for systematic review of employee performance needs to be instituted within each institution and for the Division as a whole. At present, there are very few ways that an employee can gain recognition except through the infrequent promotion process. Performance review procedures are often implemented in negative terms (weeding out incompetents), but if structured properly they can be a positive incentive instead.

Second, a regular, formal review of operational procedures by management needs to be implemented. This suggestion is discussed more fully in the section on Rocky Butte Jail. One positive effect of such a process is to alert staff to the fact that their job is important to others.

Third, the top management of the division, especially the director, and the manager of each facility need to regularly observe the operations of each institution on a regular basis and under all conditions. This is especially true for those managers who are removed physically from the day to day operations of the facility such as Rocky Butte Jail, and those in the central office. Such observations accomplish two purposes. There is no substitute for first hand observation for understanding what is actually happening in a facility. Furthermore, it makes the staff aware of the interests and concerns of management. These observations should be information gathering only. Operational decisions are best left to other circumstances.

Finally, the Division would benefit from a systematic review of the objectives for each operation and the relationship of existing procedures to those objectives. This review should include participation by line staff as well as management. A variation on an MBO process may be appropriate. With the proposed reorganization of the Division, and the addition of new personnel in key management positions this would be an opportune time to institute such a process.

SECTION III
ROCKY BUTTE JAIL

OVERVIEW:

The inadequacies of this building are so overwhelming that it is tempting to condemn it as inoperable. It is so badly designed in terms of both security and the care and safety of inmates. The equipment is antiquated and poorly maintained. There are numerous blind spots in the connecting hallways, especially the stairs, which makes movement within the institution extremely difficult. The housing units offer few comforts to the inmates and even those few are overwhelmed by the overcrowding in all of the units. Finally, there are very few facilities for recreation and programs beyond an outside yard and a weight room which will hold a maximum of 16 people.

Unfortunately, these characteristics are not unique to Multnomah County. They are shared by a great number of jails in this country. It is encouraging that this facility is scheduled to be replaced, and a gym/programs building added in the next few months, but in the meantime it must be maintained and operated as effectively as possible.

As presently operated Rocky Butte Jail (RBJ) is almost a total lockdown situation. There is very little movement outside of the dormitories and cells. Inmate activities are limited to going to and from the court house facility for attorney's visits and court appearances; meals three times a day (however, cell blocks A,B, and K are fed in their cells); medical calls; visiting on the week-ends only; attorneys' visits on site; and, on occasion, recreation. At all other times, inmates are locked into their cells and dormitories.

In general, the jail is operated to facilitate institutional management at the expense of inmate needs. There are very few services available to inmates beyond the basic necessities.

The exception to this pattern is the medical service which appears to be extremely good. But most other services such as education, recreation, counseling, and vocational training, which have been accepted by professionals in the field as an integral part of operating a jail, are missing or very inadequate. Providing such services significantly complicates the operation of a jail, especially one as poorly designed as RBJ. But their benefit in reduced tensions has been well documented, not to mention the reduced liability to court suit, and the policy question of humane treatment of inmates.

There was no printed schedule of activities available. The following schedule was obtained during interviews with staff on all three shifts. The times are rough approximations.

11:00 P.M. - 5:00 A.M.

Prisoners are locked in and lights out. The principal activities of staff are man stationary posts, relief for meals, preparing court list for the next day and deliver it to Court House Jail, and preparation of breakfast.

5:00 A.M. - 7:00 A.M.

Feed the prisoners--dormitories are escorted one by one to the dining hall, the three cell blocks are fed in their cells.

7:00 A.M. - 8:00 A.M.

Inmates scheduled for court appearance are dressed out and chain formed for movement to the Court House Jail.

8:00 A.M. - 8:30 A.M.

Federal prisoners are dressed out and taken by Federal Marshals to court.

8:30 A.M. - 9:00 A.M.

Regular releases are dressed out for those who have completed their sentence, and transfers to MCCI. Any additions to court chain made at this time.

9:00 A.M. - 10:15 A.M.

Recreation, medical, and dental lists identified and escorted to respective sites. Dental list and recreation are usually mutually exclusive.

10:15 A.M. - 11:00 A.M.

Medical ward escorted to showers and phone.

11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.

Prisoners are fed following the same routine as for breakfast.

1:15 P.M. - 2:15 P.M.

First chain returned from Court House Jail. If there are several new prisoners the time may be extended because of processing.

2:15 P.M. - 3:45 P.M.

General movement; medical calls; attorney visits.

3:45 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.

Prisoners are fed following the same routine as for breakfast.

5:30 P.M. - 6:30 P.M.

Relief of jail side officers.

6:30 P.M. - 7:30 P.M.

Second chain returned from Court House Jail. All prisoners are shaken down and new inmates are recorded in. If chain is especially large, and/or there are several new inmates this time may be extended.

8:00 P.M. - 10:30 P.M.

Continue relief of jail side officers. Program activities take place in residential areas.

10:30 P.M. - 11:00 P.M.

Dormitory clean up.

11:00 P.M.

Lights out.

On weekends the schedule is much different as there are no court calls. On Saturday visiting is permitted by appointment between 8:30 A.M. and 10:30 P.M. for residents of A & B cell blocks. The general population has visiting between 1:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. Sunday. In addition, during the week day there are several miscellaneous activities which are not included in this schedule such as visits by the nurse to all housing units, attorneys' visits, transportation to the hospital for emergency service and scheduled treatment, visits by counseling staff volunteers to the housing units, and commissary.

In the discussion which follows the focus is upon the problems and weaknesses which we identified in our site visit. This is consistent with our role as critics. However, it should be pointed out that there are many positive things to say about the Rocky Butte operation. We were impressed with the overall quality of the staff. In most instances we found a genuine commitment to doing the best job possible under the circumstances. And, given the primary focus on security, the procedures are well designed.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Safety and Security of Inmates

When facilities are as crowded as RBJ, everyone's safety is endangered, staff and inmates alike. For staff there is the risk of tension building among prisoners undetected until it erupts in overt violence requiring physical intervention. For inmates, there is the risk of rape, assault, and intimidation by fellow inmates because of inadequate supervision by staff.

Although all of the residential areas are overcrowded, four of the dormitories are especially susceptible because of their physical layout-- D & G on the second floor of the south building, and E & F on the third floor of the south building. On both floors a single officer is stationed at one end of the room. All are double bunked which prevents a clear view of the

dormitories from that post. On the second floor dormitory G occupies one corner of the floor with a masonry wall which prevents the officer from even viewing the entire front half of D. Dormitory G houses the youthful offenders who are often the most prone to aggressive behavior. On this floor, however, he has the ability to walk down both sides of the dorm to monitor activities in the rear. On the third floor the single officer is responsible for both E and F. Because of the double bunking he cannot monitor the rear of the dorm from the front and can only walk down one side of the room. Although these dormitories are reserved for those with lesser charges, the potential for violence is still high. We suggest the addition of either one officer who would move between the two floors on a random basis to supplement the stationary post; or an additional stationary post in each dorm. If the population reduction recommended by Nagel & Galvin is achieved, this addition would not be necessary. Until then, the threat to inmate safety warrants more staff.

Another area receiving limited coverage is K dorm which is reserved for special custody inmates. At present this is covered by one of the runners or the operations officer when the runners are otherwise engaged. Given the numerous demands made on all three officers K receives minimal attention, at least during the several times we were there. Although the demands of monitoring K do not warrant an additional officer, it may be possible to relieve one of the other officers of some of their duties, especially if more assistance is provided in the watch room as discussed below.

A third area of concern is monitoring movement through the institution. At present all movement is done under escort. In part this is necessary because of the numerous blind spots in the stairwells. Consideration should be given to the installation of passive monitoring devices. The simple addition of parabolic mirrors in the stairwells would facilitate the current escort procedures as now it is impossible for an officer to maintain contact as men move around the corner of the ramp. A more elaborate system of television cameras would permit remote monitoring of movement through the institution. These devices cannot provide as much control as the physical presence of corrections officers. But they can supplement their activity and reduce some of the need for direct supervision of all movement.

Administrative Segregation

The administrative segregation unit is presently located near the watch room. When occupied it is covered by an officer on overtime. It is close enough to K for a single officer to cover both units. But there are some serious problems raised by any permanent coverage of the administrative segregation unit. A major problem for all corrections institutions is the utilization of such units. Both judicial decisions and current corrections practices mandate that administrative segregation only be used in extreme instances.

In practice it is difficult to restrict such utilization, however. When faced with a situation which they feel is potentially violent it is only natural that officers will resort to segregation if it is readily available. This temptation can be reduced if there are substantial disincentives involved such as an elaborate justification which must be filled out (very few people enjoy doing paper work); or a regular review every time it is used. The necessity to bring someone in on overtime is an additional hurdle which

may serve to inhibit the use of segregation and we are reluctant to recommend that this practice be discontinued.

Programs

It is difficult to assess the staffing needs of a non-existent activity. At present, recreation appears to occur on a "hit or miss" basis depending upon the concurrence of available staff and good weather. The present facilities permit only sixteen participants at any time and even this is frequently sacrificed in favor of medical and dental services if the demand for the latter is intense. In part this is due to the policy of escorting all movement through the institution; in part it is due to the need for more staff. Other programs must operate on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Education and counseling "through the bars" as it is presently practiced is only slightly better than no programs at all.

The addition of the gym/activity center will relieve the pressures on available space. The present plans for its siting, however, materially increase the staff needed to ensure it will be used to its fullest. As we understand the plan, it will be located some distance from the present building which means that perimeter security must be penetrated every time it is used. This will require an escort of at least two officers for most movement to and from the building in addition to the security inside the building. This will effectively eliminate any casual use of the facility. We strongly recommend that this be avoided by locating the building close enough to the present facility to permit an enclosed walkway between the two.

In any case, if recreation and programs are to become an integral part of jail operations both security and program staff need to be designated. At present all movement within the institution stops as the chains are formed in the morning and return in the afternoon. With an additional staff person on 2nd and 3rd shifts the present facilities could be used more often than they are at present.

Nagel and Galvin raise the issue of contact visiting in their report. There are really two questions that need to be addressed. One is whether contact should be permitted or not; and the second is the frequency of visiting hours. Both judicial decisions and practice in other jails favors much more liberal visiting privileges than are now practiced at RBJ. Daily visiting hours are much more in keeping with accepted practice. If such a policy is adopted both jail procedures and staff needs will be materially affected. Scheduling visits in the evening will overlap with the return of the chain from the Courthouse Jail. At present all movement ceases during this time which may last as long as three hours if there are many new inmates to be processed. It was impossible for us to assess whether the lockdown practice was a function of the physical layout of the institution or of the need to move all mobile staff to the intake room. If the latter, additional staff should permit incorporating daily visiting into the schedule. Assuming visiting is limited to much smaller groups than is done at present one additional staff member should be sufficient. If, however, contact is permitted a much more substantial staffing will be required as it will mean

shakedowns after each visit as well as security in the visiting room. We would estimate that two additional staff will be required during the week, and one additional staff on week-ends to accommodate contact visiting.

It should be pointed out that increased programs and/or visiting will have a substantial impact on current jail procedures far beyond the staff directly involved even if contact visiting is avoided. At present the emphasis is upon security. Given the present overcrowded situation this is a legitimate concern. Programs and visiting will require greater movement within the institution and more non-security personnel and outsiders in the buildings. Security staff in other institutions have traditionally resisted such changes as it increases the conditions in which they feel most vulnerable. On the other hand, the current lockdown situation contains its own dangers. The close quarters increase the likelihood of tensions building among inmates, and inactivity increases the likelihood of these exploding into violent, dangerous situations. In addition, there is the very real possibility of court action.

Administrative Procedures

Although in general we found the procedures followed in the jail well suited to the objective of security, several things were observed which deserve additional attention, one of which has a direct impact on staffing levels.

The critical point for all corrections institutions is the control center. In RBJ the Watch Office operates both the vehicle and pedestrian sally ports; processes both incoming and outgoing prisoners; monitors the movement of staff and inmates through the institution; maintains the counts; and receives incoming calls among other things. He is a security officer, clerk, director and props man for the institution. During our observations of second and third shifts one person did not seem adequate for the task. In fact, during most of our time there the officer on overtime who was responsible for the segregation unit between his rounds assisted the operations officer. A second corrections officer, however, does not seem warranted. Many of his responsibilities could be filled more effectively by someone with clerical skills. This is especially true during the second and third shifts when most of the inmate processing takes place. Therefore, we recommend the addition of one clerical staff during the 2nd & 3rd shifts, five days a week.

On a more general level, although the formal procedures appeared sound, we observed some practices which were disturbing. The control of the keys is very inadequate. Part of this is due to the different kinds of keys which are necessary to move through the institution which prevents the use of a shadow board to monitor which keys are in use. But no one appeared responsible for routinely inventoring keys, even when the shift change took place. More adequate staffing of the Watch Office would help, but only if the importance of this responsibility is reinforced by management.

There was very little evidence of a routine review of jail operations. The post descriptions were four years out of date; emergency procedures are not reviewed by all staff on a regular basis; employee evaluations are virtually non-existent; and programs for refreshing officers on standard operating procedures or upgrading skills (except arms training) unavailable. None of these things in and of themselves is essential to an effective jail. But when all are absent there is the strong probability that there is a marked

discrepancy between formal procedures and practice. It is not necessary for all of these things to be introduced on an elaborate scale. Post descriptions, for example, can be briefly described by those manning them to ensure that their understanding coincides with the expectations of management. If there is a discrepancy management expectations may be out of date and need to be revised, or the problem lies with the officer. Without such a regular review informal practices emerge to deal with new situations which may be useful in the short run but have the potential for problems in the future. This need for a regular assessment of operations is especially important in a facility like RBJ because of the physical isolation of most of the posts. At the other facilities most staff on a shift are in regular contact with each other and can observe and adjust to the activities of each other. Such is not the case at RBJ. The officers manning the stationary posts rarely are in contact with each other while on the job. A rotation among posts reduces some of the problems of isolation and in the absence of any other management techniques should be standard practice.

If program activity is to increase substantially, the present practice of escorting all movement within the institution will need to be changed. Other institutions have successfully used pass systems with check points at critical junctures in the traffic flow. By calling ahead the traffic can be anticipated even if there is unscheduled movement. This may require the installation of new security doors and walkways. It is also recommended that officers within the institution be provided with portable radios to permit communications with each other at all times. A telephone system, while necessary, does not ensure contact at all points in the facility. This should be adopted regardless of the decision on escorted movements.

Staff Morale

Of all four institutions we visited, morale is lowest at RBJ. In part this is common to any high security institution, especially when it is as overcrowded as this one. The majority of the security posts are stationary and have extended periods of inactivity. Verbal abuse is common and the threat of violence constant. The same threats are present at the Courthouse Jail but there is so much going on that there is less time to dwell on the danger. Moreover, they have the reassurance of other staff in the immediate vicinity. The physical isolation and inactivity of the stationary posts at RBJ offer few distractions from the problems of security. Although morale is always a problem in a high security institution, we felt it was lower at RBJ than normal.

We have no immediate answers to the problem of low morale. In other sections of this report we have suggested several procedures which may alleviate some of the problem such as training, reduced overtime, and changes in management practices. Without a systematic assessment of the problem any full scale set of recommendations on our part would be presumptuous.

SECTION IV

COURTHOUSE JAIL

OVERVIEW

As a short-term booking and holding facility, the primary function of the Courthouse Jail (CJ) is to insure the security and accountability of all those persons charged to its custody. The majority of those held consists of pre-trial detainees awaiting hearing, arraignment, or sentencing. The average population also includes approximately 25 or 30 inmates transported from Rocky Butte and Clare Argow (the Women's Center) on a daily basis for interviews with their attorneys. The physical facility itself encompasses an L-shaped area or two adjacent sides of the seventh floor in the county courthouse. One wing is comprised of a long cell block (A and B tanks), four single cells used for administrative segregation, and the drunk tank.⁷ The second wing contains the main sally port, two holding tanks, the women's tank, central booking unit, control center, nurses' and sergeants' quarters, kitchen, and visiting rooms. The second wing of the jail is the central focal point of activity, and the area where most movement occurs. There is a gate which separates the cell block, separation cells, and the drunk tank from these other activity areas.

The staffing for the jail is currently composed of six CO's on all three shifts, seven days a week plus the sergeant or supervisor. The six posts may be outlined as follows: 1) Control or Operations desk officer, 2) Custody or Tank officer, 3) Central Booking officer - prints, 4) Booking II officer - processing and female supervision, 5) Security officer - shake-down and 6) Runner - bail; both 5) and 6) assist in booking or tank as needed. During the day shift on Monday through Friday or when the court is in session, there is an additional staff of nine CO's or court guards who are responsible for the overall security of the courthouse. During the weekday shift, the Runner and/or Security Officer are sometimes pulled from the 'floor' or jail to fill in as additional court guards when deemed necessary. Thus, the functions of both the Security Officer and Runner are broadened during the weekday shift and may vary due to the nature of jail activities at these times. Conversely, the assigned court guards may assist with duties in the jail if the need and the time arises.

The schedule of activities for each shift at the CJ are not quite as constant as in the other institutions. This is due to the nature of its operations which results in rapid turnover of its daily population. Basically, the activity of the first shift encompasses booking new arrests, breakfast at 5:30 a.m., and a subsequent change in the bedding/mattresses before the second shift staff arrive at 6:45 a.m. For the weekday shift, which is the most hectic, most of the activity begins at approximately 8:30 a.m. when the first 'chain' or bus comes in from Rocky Butte. This does not end until about 6:30 in the evening (during the third shift) when the last chain of inmates leaves the facility.

At 9 a.m. all the courtroom activity begins as well as the attorney visiting. The shift for the court guards starts at 8:45 a.m. to coincide

with these activities. The next significant period of inmate movement occurs at the lunch meal (11:30). Feeding times are the only set inmate activity which affects everyone. The Custody and Security Officers are both present to supervise this movement. Soon after the lunch meal is over, the noon chain leaves for Rocky Butte. While these two major activities take precedence (feeding and the noon chain), the others do not necessarily cease. Although the judges make fewer requests for detainees during this time, there are still demands for some inmates to be escorted for hearings. The period from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. appeared to be the most difficult for the officers assigned to the custody or tank area. At 1 p.m. courtroom activity resumes along with attorney visits until 4:30, or after the third shift arrives to replace the daytime staff. The court guards remain until 5 p.m. when the need for escorting has finally diminished.

Briefly, the third shift staff are responsible for the evening meal and preparing the chain for return to the other institutions. This usually takes place from 5:30 to 7 p.m. and sometimes later on Friday afternoons. In addition to the daytime activities mentioned, there are also new bookings coming in during every shift. Although these are slightly lower in the daytime, they average 25 to 30 per shift. The coordinating point where all this activity takes place is at the control center, which is undoubtedly the heart of CJ operations. Although there is only one staff person actually assigned to this post, there are usually anywhere from two (at a minimum) to three or more staff at work inside the center at any given time during the weekday shift. There are numerous functions which are being carried out from within this control center, and this entire issue will be elaborated upon more fully in a section to follow.

Generally speaking, the morale of the CJ staff appeared to be reasonably good, probably due to the high level of activity. Yet the common practice of pulling 16 hours, or double shifts, seemed to be taking its toll on staff as it contributes to staff fatigue.

The short sessions during roll call on Standards of Conduct-Personal Liability held in the CJ during January and February are a valuable training device which we recommend be replicated in the other facilities. It should be expanded to cover other topics such as emergency procedures and crisis intervention. Suggestions for additional subject areas can be elicited from staff to increase their relevance to daily activities in each facility.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Safety and Security of Inmates

While on site, one of the issues that impressed the observers was the lack of any means to protect and insure inmate safety in A and B cell block. Due to the physical limitations of the facility, the Custody Officer is positioned between these two tanks, with no direct line of sight supervision of detainees. In addition, the four single cells used for administrative segregation are located directly behind A and B cell block at the opposite end of two long corridors. There are monitors at the far corners of A and B tanks and two that enable the four single cells to be viewed from inside the control

center. Yet, with the control center being the hub of activity on the day shift, there is insufficient time available for the Operations Officer to check the monitors on even a periodic basis. The observers did not once witness any staff in the control center examine these monitors while on-site. This was not due to irresponsibility, but rather to the level of demand from all of the other functions they were required to perform.

Therefore, the only means of providing supervision coverage for A and B tanks and administrative segregation would be to regularly tour the hallways. This may be in the job description, but it did not appear to be taking place while the observers were on site. It would appear from our observations that the Custody Officer has the time to make such a tour at least every hour, preferably twice. It simply is not being done, which results in the greater likelihood that serious incidents will occur.

Control Center

This area contains the most activity of any of the posts at CJ. It is considered by many staff to be a "pressure cooker." Numerous officers who were interviewed described this particular assignment to be the least desirable post in the jail. After a few minutes observing the activities in the control center it becomes readily apparent why this is true. The numerous functions conducted there include:

- a) unlocking all doors, thereby controlling general movement in and out of the jail;
- b) taking care of all inmate property;
- c) maintaining records for all those detained;
- d) serving as a clearinghouse for courtroom activity (judges' requests) and escorting by court guards;
- e) identifying attorney identification and calling out inmates for visits;
- f) answering all telephone calls to CJ (from the general public);
- g) checking all the monitors;
- h) typing administrative forms;
- i) responding to the alarm board which signals an emergency somewhere in the courthouse.

We were impressed by the ability of the staff we observed to maintain effective control over all of these demands for their attention. But we also feel that it required an extraordinary effort on their part to perform at such an intense level for eight hours.

Nowhere was the need as evident for distinguishing between the security functions of CO's and the clerical/secretarial duties they are required to perform as they are in the control center. It is obvious that the workload and responsibilities placed upon the Operations Officer are entirely too great. Furthermore, the major portion of the responsibilities require clerical/secretarial skills. The largest percentage of staff time appeared to be spent answering the phones and filling out forms.

Based on the current level of activity within the control center, and the type of skills required to undertake such tasks, it is our recommendation that a communications/clerical expert be added during the weekday shift (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) to assist in administrative processing and secretarial responsibilities.

Booking

The situation at the Central Booking Unit (CBU) resembles that of central operations in one major respect: there is a high volume of work requiring clerical skills. Most of the activities observed behind the counter at booking demanded typing skills and administrative processing of information. The general level of activity, however, is not as high as in the control center. It is recommended that the Booking II Officer be replaced by a clerical/secretarial staff person on the third and first shifts during the week and for all shifts on the weekends. During the weekday shift, due to the potential need for additional escorting coverage by court guards, the Booking II Officer can be utilized in that capacity, while the clerical person would be an addition to the total number of staff. This recommendation will necessitate some internal changes to occur (due to the need for the female supervision function, which is now the task of the Booking II Officer), and these adjustments among officers should be made to correspond accordingly.

Courtroom Security

A Court Services staff of nine CO's, or court guards, are charged with the responsibility for escorting detainees to court appearances in addition to the overall security of the courthouse when court is in session. This responsibility was a particularly sensitive issue at the time the observers were on-site. The observers encountered a strongly perceived need on the part of many CJ staff for additional court guards. It is difficult to assess whether this need is high because of a series of extraordinary events, or because of an on-going demand for services.

Before the courtroom security function became a part of the Corrections Division, it was the responsibility of the sheriff's office. Staff were sworn Deputy Sheriffs. At that time, the staff available to carry out this function numbered thirteen. As the activity was phased out of local law enforcement and into Corrections, the number of staff was reduced to nine (mainly through an attrition process). The feelings are strong that Court Services has been operating shorthanded ever since.

Recent events (especially the homicide-suicide which occurred the week before we arrived) have intensified demands by judges for courtroom security. Incidents such as these can possibly be prevented by court security. More than likely, however, they are the exception to the rule and the risk will always exist. While additional court guard staff may be an immediate response to this type of problem, it is not, in our estimation, a long range solution to the problem. This particular incident actually involved a civil suit, and there are no court guards required in this type of case. Perhaps a metal screening device upon entering the courthouse (for non-employees and persons without proper ID) may help alleviate tragedies such as these.

On two occasions, while the observers were on-site, the sergeant and lieutenant were both present in the courtroom for security reasons. It was evident that judges, in requesting double escorting coverage, were extremely sensitive to security needs at this time.

Our data are not sufficient to provide an estimate of how many court security staff are needed. An average of 38 inmates are being escorted on a daily basis to and from the CJ.⁸ Approximately 50% of these escorts are for trials; the remainder are for preliminary hearings. The Court Services Team Leader spends most of his time in the control center, leaving eight court guards to provide coverage in the courtroom. Missing from our data is an accurate count of the range and of the average length of time it takes for preliminary hearings and for full trials. Without these data it is impossible to estimate staffing requirements.

Our sense is that the coverage is not adequate at present. However, it was impossible to distinguish between the effects of extraordinary events and the on-going demand for court security. There will always be a need for supplementary staffing by pulling people off of the floor or using the sergeant and the lieutenant on an irregular basis because of a dramatic trial, or a temporary increase in the fears of judges. It would be unwise to increase permanent staff to take account of peak demand periods. But the normal flow should be covered and that can only be determined by a systematic monitoring of the time spent in the courtroom for the various kinds of appearances over an extended period of time. If possible the monitoring should cover at least a month of activity and preferably three months.

If more staff are needed for court security, it may be possible to accommodate the demand by adding the clerical staff to booking instead of replacing a correctional officer as recommended earlier. This extra officer could be activated within the court guard unit as needed so that the Runner could spend greater time dealing with movement and security activities in the jail.

Finally, one other point needs to be raised and that is the dual use of the jail elevator for security purposes and as a public elevator. We recognize this is the only elevator on the Fifth Street side of the building and it would be difficult to rectify without major renovation. But this is a major weakness in the overall security of the courthouse. Without the exclusive use of one elevator for jail operations, there are numerous problems that can arise concerning public safety. We strongly recommend that a plan be developed and implemented to remedy this situation. This is far more important than the current demand for increased security in every courtroom.

Attorney Interviews

The final issue that needs to be examined is the use of the chain for the purpose of inmate visits with their attorneys. There are usually from 25 to 30 inmates who request to be brought down to the CJ for an interview with their attorney and have no scheduled court appearance. Usually, this necessitates a second bus be used for transportation from RBJ. This ties up two additional transport officers for the round trip. In addition, these extra inmates add to the already hectic activity level at the CJ, increasing the security risks unnecessarily. We believe that space should be made available for attorney's visits at RBJ, and transportation of inmates to CJ limited to court appearances. This will be a less convenient arrangement for attorneys but the increase in courthouse security warrants such action. If this change is adopted, it should be possible to reassign one CO from the Transport Unit to RBJ for escorting inmates.

SECTION V

CLARE ARGOW CENTER

OVERVIEW

The Clare Argow Center (CAC) is a wing of the Donald E. Long Home for Juveniles. There is a connecting hall between the two facilities and they share several facilities--a gym, the kitchen, and medical services. There are two units in the CAC: Unit 1 is the maximum security unit with an average population of 35 women; Unit 2 is a work release center with individual rooms for 14 women. It is the only institution among the four with adequate facilities. Unit 1 contains a small kitchen, dining room, day room, laundry, an office for the counselor and a music room. Unit 2 also has a kitchen, dining room, dayroom, an office for the counselor and a classroom.

This is one of the few facilities which has regularly scheduled programs. The gym is used twice a day; there are two resident counselors available; volunteers come in daily for education programs, drug counseling, chaplaincy, etc; and during good weather there is an exercise yard which is used regularly. The facility is small enough to be manageable. Overcrowding does not appear to be a major problem which enhances the operation. The chains are small compared to RBJ so are not as disruptive of the rest of the operation.

Morale among staff appeared to be very high. There were fewer complaints voiced here than at any of the other facilities we visited. There is little we can add to the operation of this facility. We offer two comments for consideration, but in neither case do we consider the problem major.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Counselor/Security Staff Relations

Of the four facilities we observed CAC appeared to have the least tension between counseling staff and security staff. Some reservations were expressed by security staff, mainly with regard to administrative accountability. In general, however, it is very healthy for there to be some tension between the two staffs as their orientation should be different. Therefore, we do not see the need to offer recommendations on this issue in this case.

Visiting

The same issue arises at CAC as at RBJ; visiting is severely limited in frequency and no contact visits are permitted. We understand contact visits were permitted at one time but problems of contraband led to reversion back to the present system. We sympathize with the problem of contraband here as well as at RBJ. However, since the direction of the judiciary on this issue is toward daily visiting with contact we feel we should address the staffing implications of such a policy.

Because of the size of the facility integrating daily visiting hours into the regular schedule is less of a problem here than at RBJ. At present, the sergeant operating the control room on each shift also serves as intake officer, shift supervisor, escort officer, and chief clerk. On week-ends that person also provides security for visiting. It appears to us that daily visiting could be covered by the sergeant if he/she was relieved of some of the voluminous clerical duties by adding a clerk to the staff during the relevant shift. Contact visiting, on the other hand, will entail more staff as a shakedown will be necessary as well as a stationary security post. This would require the addition of one security officer as well as the clerical staff.

SECTION VI

MULTNOMAH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

OVERVIEW

Multnomah County Correctional Institution (MCCI) is a minimum security institution with its primary purpose as a work or educational release unit. During the calendar year 1978, MCCI had an average daily population of approximately 150 males sentenced for up to one year (over one-half are felons).⁹ The facility is located on a large acreage with a fence around it that remains unlocked. The layout of the unit is fan-shaped with the control center located in the middle. There are nine wings in all, with four used as dorms for inmate housing, and the others used for dining, administration, recreation, showers, and programming.

Presently, the staffing is composed of nine CO's and the facility commander (Lt.). The third or evening shift usually has three staff assigned, as this is the busiest time of day with inmates returning from work release. The second shift has two or three, and the first shift has one, with one CO serving staggered duty from 5 a.m. to 1 p.m. three days a week. The schedule of staff activities basically encompasses supervising inmates at meals and other times, taking counts, dispensing medication, (see section on Medical Services below) and administrative processing such as intake, releases, and check-ins from work and social passes in the evening.

It was both reported by staff and observed that duty at MCCI is an easy security post. Overall, the staff morale at MCCI appeared to be a unique mixture. On the one hand, there was a sense of relief by the CO's that they were not working under heavy pressures as described in the CJ or RBJ; on the other hand, there seemed to be some discontentment over the lack of greater direction/supervision being provided by their superiors. In part, this may be due to the fact that they do not have a shift supervisor or sergeant, but rather must report directly to the facility commander. Another contributing issue is that of the interaction between counselors and security staff. To a certain degree, some tension in this area is normal and will always exist. Actually, the staff expressed the opinion that counselor/security relations have improved somewhat over the past two years. This particular issue is significant enough to merit a separate discussion below.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Overcrowding

The current population at MCCI is composed of more than fifty per cent sentenced felons. This figure includes both multiple offenders and first offenders as well as transfers from RBJ. As mentioned earlier, the majority of these inmates are on work release. There are also a few trustees who work in the food service area. It was reported by the program staff that a change is taking place in the composition of the inmate population. Increasingly referrals are being made by judges and RBJ staff on the basis of an inmate's

tendency toward violence rather than his qualifications for work release. This is producing a component of the population who are unable to work because of psychological traits or mental deficiencies. This mix of inmates who are free to move in the community and those who cannot produces tensions among the population.

It was also reported by staff that the possibility of double bunking other dorms was being considered. At present, double bunking is only used in the wing housing new inmates. This structure now provides inmates with some behavior incentives in order to move into the single-bedded dormitories. Double bunking would not only remove this incentive, but, more important, increase tensions because of overcrowding. We strongly recommend that the double-bunking of other wings should not be used at any time in the future.¹⁰

In a related issue, it is our impression that MCCI is increasingly being used as a release valve to handle the overcrowded situation at RBJ. If this institution is permitted to become overcrowded, or the composition of the population becomes heavier, they run the risk of destroying the social basis on which the institution operates. At present it appears to be a relatively easy institution to maintain, largely because of the non-violent character of the population. What happens when overcrowding occurs, or placements are made for increasing numbers of inmates who are only marginally qualified for work-release status is highly problematical.

Counselor/Security Staff Interaction

The link between counselors and security staff at MCCI is tenuous. There are very few mechanisms at present for resolving the conflicts which are inevitable. We observed little evidence of any systematic exchanges between the two staffs. They are physically separated with the security staff located in the control center and the counseling staff at the far end of one wing. Their shifts are not coterminous; officers work the traditional 8 hour, 3 shift per day, 7 days per week schedule; counselors 10 hours, four days per week, during the five week days only. Administratively they are further isolated as officers report to the institution lieutenant and counselors to the program officer at RBJ. When all of this is added to the normal distance between the staffs due to their different roles and training it is not surprising if relationships are frequently strained to the point of open hostility; communications are garbled or non-existent; and misunderstandings are the order of the day.

From conversations with various staff at MCCI, both current and past, we understand that relationships between counselors and security have frequently been openly hostile. Our impressions of the current situation, however, are that relations are relatively good. The contact is still very tenuous, but members of each staff seemed to recognize the different roles the other plays and understand that conflicts between the two are to be expected. The conditions appear to be present for the development of a good working relationship between the two if appropriate steps are taken.

It is strongly recommended that general staff meetings be held on a regular basis, with all security and program staff required to attend (with the possible exception of first shift officers). Although such a suggestion may seem token or symbolic, it is the feeling of the observers that regular staff meetings held to review general operating procedures can go a long way in resolving differences existing between the two staffs. The two day training session presently scheduled for both staffs is a positive step in the right direction but it needs to be reinforced by continued contact after it is over. These meetings can be used to discuss general operating procedures, problems with inmates, and any other issues of common concern. They should include both the lieutenant and the program supervisor at RBJ.

A separate but related issue is the schedules of the two staffs. There are no weekend counseling services provided, even during the visiting hours on Sunday. Although the primary function of the program staff is vocational counseling, their presence would provide valuable assistance in dealing with the problems of week-end activity. It would appear that the week-ends are the times when the most need exists with inmates who cannot get out on passes, families coming to visit, and all the other ingredients of unhappiness because of apparent deprivations. This would also serve to help security/counselor staff relations as at present counselors are not aware of the changes which occur in the facility during the week-end. We highly recommend that counselors alternate their schedule on a rotating basis to spend at least one week-end per month at MCCI.

Staff Coverage for 1st and 3rd Shifts

At present 1st shift is covered at MCCI by one corrections officer. This is very poor practice. A second person should be added to that shift immediately. Every shift should have at least two people present to provide minimum coverage in case of emergency. The physical isolation of MCCI makes this an especially important issue which needs to be resolved.

Consideration needs to be given to changes on the 3rd shift. Since the evening is the time at MCCI when the majority of the activity occurs, it is the best staffed with 3 CO's on duty, and well should be. Due to the heavy propensity of administrative processing of inmates and the clerical function, our recommendation here is to replace one of the CO's with a secretarial staff. This person could then be responsible for the necessary clerical function while the other two officers can concern themselves with security.

Our other suggestion for the 3rd shift is not as pressing, but also merits re-examination. That is, one of the officers should probably be upgraded to the sergeant's position in order to provide needed supervision as well as a critical management link with administration/facility commander.

Medical Services

The medical services at MCCI are virtually non-existent. There is a part-time nurse who comes in twice a week to check medication; otherwise dispensing the medication is presently the responsibility of the officers (four times a day). This is not a sound medical practice. Correctional officers are not equipped to make judgments regarding the quantity of medication dispensed to inmates, and should not be put in the position of doing so,

especially due to the fact that inmates bring in their own prescriptions from private doctors. The risk of lawsuits occurring is quite high. It is our recommendation that appropriate medical personnel be hired to undertake this task, and the current practice be discontinued.

SECTION VII

TRANSPORT UNIT AND HOSPITAL

The Transport Unit has one sergeant and nine CO's who are involved in the movement of both male and female inmates for all four county jail facilities. Their primary function is to transport the daily chain or buses of inmates to and from the CJ, RBJ, and CAC. The staff also escorts inmates to and from the hospital for any medical treatment necessary. In addition, they may be required to transport inmates to and from the State Prison (Penitentiary) in Salem, or conceivably any other county in the State (although this is usually an exception to the rule outside of neighboring counties). The population of inmates transported varies, but is approximately 125 daily.

Currently most of the transport staff work on the weekday shift only, with at least two and sometimes three officers scheduled for third shift during the week. The day shift schedule is staggered so that officers may arrive for duty at 6, 7, 8 and 9 A.M. The final hour for duty on the third shift is at 10 P.M. in the evening. Although the need has been proposed for additional weekend coverage, there is presently no one scheduled for that purpose. It is our feeling that weekend duty arises mostly on an emergency basis, and that this need should continue to be covered with overtime. The only possible changes that we suggest in staffing the Transport Unit would occur if the present chain practice for attorney visits were eliminated. In this case, the Transport Unit staff may be reduced by one at a minimum, (and possibly two officers), who could then be reassigned for escort coverage at RBJ during attorney visiting hours.

The Hospital is currently staffed by four CO's who are permanently assigned there (three plus one relief officer). They must cover all three shifts seven days a week, (and are supervised by the Sergeant of the T.U.). There would be a maximum of four inmates that they are supervising at any given time. Whenever one of the inmates is required for surgery, an additional officer is called in on an overtime basis. This same rule applies to coverage on the crisis intervention unit (on the first floor in the hospital). Similar to administrative segregation at RBJ, the psychiatric unit is staffed on an as needed basis exclusively by overtime. There is no way of avoiding this policy decision, and we believe the hospital unit should continue at the present staffing level.

SECTION VIII

SUMMARY OF STAFFING IMPLICATIONS

In the final section of this report, we shall summarize our recommendations for present and projected staffing levels based on data collected and observations made regarding historical and current practices.¹¹ In order to provide some background, we refer the reader to Table 2. This table delineates the amount of sick leave, personal holidays, and vacation used, as well as the total number of officers and staff turnover for Fiscal Year 1977 and FY 1978. Briefly, the amount of sick leave used is eight shifts per officer in FY 1977 and nine shifts for FY 1978. These data substantiate the statement made herein regarding the excessive use of sick leave. The personal holidays used comes out to nine shifts per officer, whereas the vacation time (projected for FY 1978) is thirteen shifts per officer. The actual time taken for this latter purpose (annual leave) is less than the average amount of time (15 shifts) which the Division is liable for, based on seniority and accrual. Finally, the number of total officers for FY 1977 is 138 (134 in FY 1978) with a staff turnover of eleven officers.

The next chart (Table 3) illustrates the total shifts available per person year. This takes into account 261 work days minus the known absences recorded

TABLE 3

Available Shifts per Person Year

Under Current Practices

Shifts Available per Person Year	261
Less Known Absences per person year	- 32
Average Liability for Vacation	15
Personal Holiday Liability	10
Sick Conversion	1
Military Leave	1
¹ Training	2
² Turnover Delay	3
Net Shifts Available per Person Year	229

¹Based on an average turnover rate of 11, all of whom must go through four weeks of training.

²In conversations with Connie Mattingly it was estimated that an average of three months is required to recruit, test, hire, and orient to the department each new corrections officer. This is in addition to the training period required.

TABLE 2

Division of Corrections Personnel

History for Corrections Officers¹

	Fiscal Year 1977 - 1978			July 1, 1978- Dec. 31, 1978		Projected Fiscal Year 1978 - 1979	
	Total Hours	Avg. Hours	No. of Shifts ²	Total Hours	Avg. Hours	Avg. Hours	No. of Shifts
Sick Leave Used	8,795.1	63.73	8	4,914.46	36.67	73.34	9
Personal Holidays Used	9,974.2	72.27	9	5,201.5	38.81	77.62	10
Vacation Used	10,731.	77.76	10	6,884.5	51.37	102.74	13

Note: The total number of officers³ for fiscal year 1977-78 was 138 with 11 resignations. From July 1, 1978 through December 31, 1978, the total number of officers was 134 with six resignations.

¹Taken from personnel records by the Administration Office, February, 1979.

²Rounded off to the nearest whole number.

³Includes three officers assigned to central office administrative positions.

for the following reasons: liability for vacation (described above) and personal holidays, maximum sick conversion permitted, military leave, training and turnover. The training time is calculated only for the basic four week course required for new officers within the first year of employment. It does not include any in-service training. The turnover data is explained in the footnote. Thus, 32 shifts must be subtracted from the total number of annual shifts per corrections officer for the predictable time off, producing the net total of 229 shifts per person year.

Table 4 deals with the current assigned shifts by institution. The information gathered for this table was extracted from the work schedules received at each institution. (See Table 4). In developing this table, the number of positions were multiplied by the number of shifts by the number of days per week to arrive at a total number of shifts for each institution. This rationale was used so that all shifts could be accounted for. Obviously, every position is not staffed for all three shifts seven days a week. Oftentimes, there are positions filled during the weekdays only, evenings, or specific weekend posts. In addition, there are numerous staggered shifts such as mid-week at MCCI (from 5 a.m. - 1 p.m. on Tues., Wed., and Thurs.). For example, the CJ has seven CO positions that are staffed for all three shifts seven days a week. On the other hand, the nine Court Services officers are scheduled for the weekday shift only. By multiplying and then adding these figures, the results show 192 total shifts necessary to operate the CJ in one week. The same procedure was followed for all the other facilities.

Taking our calculations one step further, we can determine the number of corrections officers needed to fill current institutional positions.

TABLE 5

Corrections Officers Needed to Fill Current Institution Positions

Institution	Total Shifts per Year ¹	Shifts Available Per Person Year	Total Corrections Officers Required
RBJ	11,908	229	52
CJ	9,984	229	44
CAC	3,796	229	17
MCCI	2,392	229	10
Hospital	1,092	229	5
Transport	2,600	229	<u>11</u>
		Total	139

¹These figures were obtained by multiplying the total number of shifts per week (in Table 4) by 52 weeks for the year.

TABLE 4

Current Assigned Shifts by Institution¹

Institution	# of Positions	# of Shifts	# of Days/Wk.	Total # of Shifts
RBJ	9	3	7	189
	1	2	7	14
	3	1	7	21
	1	1	5	<u>5</u>
			Total	229
CJ	7	3	7	147
	9	1	5	<u>45</u>
			Total	192
CAC	2	3	7	42
	1	2	7	14
	1	2	6	12
	1	1	4	4
	1	1	1	<u>1</u>
			Total	73
MCCI	1	3	7	21
	1	2	7	14
	1	1	7	7
	1	1	3	<u>3</u>
			Total	45
Hospital	1	3	7	21
Transport	10	1	5	<u>50</u>
			Total	<u>71</u>
			Grand Total	610

¹The positions for each institution were derived from Chapman, op. cit.; Officer's Assignment Schedule sheets for the month of February, and interviews with staff.

As stated in the footnote, the numbers in the left-hand column indicate total shifts per year. These figures were reached by multiplying the number of weekly shifts (shown in Table 4) by 52 weeks for the entire year; we divided by the number of shifts available per person (229) to arrive at the CO requirements for each institution. As the table indicates, the total CO requirements for all county facilities is 139 staff. This particular figure merits close attention, since it points out a discrepancy in the present number of officers (134 - refer to Table 2 data) needed solely to meet the current staffing requirements. If the three officers in administrative positions are subtracted from the 134 presently available, there are only 131 staff remaining to cover all the institutions, or eight staff short of the present requirements. To reiterate, these data do not include any of the changes we have projected, but rather concerns the staffing pattern as it currently exists. This shortfall of officers clarifies why so much overtime usage is required for vacation and personal holiday coverage discussed in Section II.

Finally, we conclude with our recommended projections for staff at each facility. Table 6 provides a summary of these suggested changes in staffing levels (see Table 6). It is important to note here that these figures were derived in the same manner as those in Table 4 (multiplying the position by number of shifts by days per week) and Table 5 (dividing shifts per year by the 229 available shifts per person). Thus, for example, if we recommended one security post be added for two shifts seven days a week, it would require three additional officers.

On a systemwide basis, we recommend three more staff officers to cover the time necessary for in-service training discussed earlier (using the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections standard of forty hours per officer). At RBJ, our recommendations vary as they are subject to decisions which shall be made based on certain policy choices. It is for these reasons that we have a minimum and maximum range for staff recommended at each institution. The two clerical staff recommended for the watch room refer to coverage during the second and third shifts on weekdays only. An additional Corrections Officer position has been recommended (second and third shifts daily) in order to staff recreational programs. This will require three additional CO's. For inmate safety, it was recommended either one (at a minimum) or two (maximum) positions be created to provide double coverage in D, G, E and F dorms. One post would necessitate five extra officers, whereas two positions will require ten. Daily visiting during the weekdays can be covered with one extra CO, while contact visiting would require three officers. Thus, at RBJ, the net change if all of our suggestions are adopted involves the addition of nine CO's (at a minimum), sixteen CO's (maximum), and two clerical staff.

It is recommended for the control center at the CJ that one clerical staff be added during the weekday shift only. For the Central Booking Unit, we have similarly suggested that clerical staff be added, but for all three shifts seven days a week. This change will necessitate a total of five clerical staff be added. The decrease in number of CO positions (-4) refers to the net result that occurs in replacing the Booking II position with the clerical staff person (on third and first shift weekdays and on all weekend shifts). It was also stated that this clerical person be hired during the

TABLE 6
Summary of Suggested Changes
in Staffing Levels¹

	Minimum		Maximum	
	CO	Clerical	CO	Clerical
General:				
Inservice Training at 40 hours x 128 ²	3		3	
RBJ:				
Watch Room		2		2
Programs	3		3	
Inmate Safety	5		10	
(D, G, E, & F Dorms)				
Visiting, Daily ³	1		3	
CJ:				
Control Center		1		1
Booking	-4	5	-4	5
CAC:				
Visiting, Daily ³		1	1	1
MCCI:				
First Shift	1		1	
Third Shift	-1	1	-1	1
Total	8	10	16	10

¹The figures reflect the number of additional officers and clerical staff required to fill the shifts per year. The formula used was: total shifts/229 = number of personnel.

²128 refers to the total number of officers necessary to staff all facilities (139 as shown in Table 5) less eleven officers that resigned in FY 1977. The staff turnover figure represents new officers who would not qualify to receive in-service training.

³The minimum figure represents daily visiting without contact; the maximum represents daily visiting with contact.

weekday shift as an addition to the Booking II Officer's position. This alternative was discussed as a means for supplementing the present court guard staff. Thus, our recommendations for the CJ request a net gain of six clerical staff with a decrease of four in the number of CO's.

At CAC, the recommended changes involve the visiting procedure. Daily visiting during the week could be implemented with the simple addition of one clerical staff on the second shift. If contact visiting were established, this would necessitate the addition of one more CO during whichever shift is designated for visiting. At MCCI, the only recommended changes involve the addition of one CO on the first shift and replacing one security officer with a clerical staff person for the third shift during the week.

There are no recommended changes in the present staffing at the hospital. The Transport Unit may be reduced by at least one CO, only if the current practice of using the chain for attorney visits is eliminated. However, as we mentioned earlier, this position could be transferred to RBJ and utilized as necessary.

In sum, the net change for clerical staff will remain constant at ten additional persons. The recommendations for CO's vary, depending upon which policy decisions are followed. Typically, a question is whether to replace CO's with clerical or simply add the clerical as a complement to the existing staff. Thus, the minimum number of CO's that we have recommended involves an increase of eight staff, while the maximum requires an increase by sixteen.

FOOTNOTES

- 1¹"A Technical Assistance Report on Population Limits (and Related Matters) for Multnomah County (Oregon) Detention/Correction Facilities," unpublished.
- 2²(Rockville, Maryland: Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, 1978; formerly affiliated with the American Correctional Association. This was supplemented by the series of handbooks on various aspects of jail administration issued by the National Sheriffs' Association and to Nick Pappas, ed., The Jail: Its Operation and Management (Washington, D. C.: United States Bureau of Prisons, undated).
- 3³"Location of Custody Staff Posts," memo to Carl Mason, January 25, 1979.
- 4⁴Some questions were raised by line staff about the accuracy of these figures because of delay in reporting. However, the relative importance of each category is not in dispute which is the basis for the discussion here.
- 5⁵Normally low morale is reflected in a high turnover rate among staff as well as excessive use of sick leave. But turnover is very low. Eleven officers left the Division in Fiscal 1977-78. This turnover rate of approximately eight per cent compares very favorably with the national average for state corrections facilities of comparable size of 17.3 per cent. The National Planning Association, The National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System: Corrections, Vol. 3 (Washington, D. C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978) p. 45.
- 6⁶Manual of Standards for Local Detention Facilities, Standard # 5072, p. 14
- 7⁷Under Oregon State law, alcoholics are no longer supposed to come under the auspices of the criminal justice system. Yet due to the many cases where alcoholics are being arrested for civil complaints, the local Detoxification center will not accept these people; hence, alcoholics are still being housed in the CJ until they "sleep it off."
- 8⁸These figures are drawn from the summary of activities for the week of February 5 - 9 and estimates provided by Sergeant Joe Golden.
- 9⁹These figures are taken from statistical data provided by counselors at MCCI.
- 10¹⁰We are not taking issue with the conclusion of Nagel and Galvin that the current population of 155 is tolerable. We are only concerned that this figure remain constant or decline. As attempts are made to reduce the population at RBJ it will be difficult to resist the temptation to move increasing numbers to MCCI which, by comparison, appears spacious.
- 11¹¹The formula we have used for calculating personnel requirements conforms to common practice among corrections administrators as well as the Support Services of the Division. See, for example, Nick Pappas, ed., The Jail: Its Operation and Management (Washington, D. C.: United States Bureau of Prisons, undated), pp. 118-122.

END