


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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

National Evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Programs Volume I

80811 1 of 2

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U. S. Department of Justice
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

National Evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Programs

Volume I

Solomon Kobrin
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June 1982

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

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SECTION I

ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAM

CHAPTER I

THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS:

THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE

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CHAPTER I

THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS:

THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE

Solomon Kobrin and Frank R. Hellum

Passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 marked the beginning of a major federal effort to prohibit the incarceration of juvenile status offenders in our jails, detention centers, correctional facilities and other institutional settings. Status offenders are youths who have been charged with violations that would not be criminal if committed by an adult. These violations encompass such categories as incorrigibility, beyond control, truancy, runaway and various acronymic designations based on the phrase "in need of supervision." In contrast to dependent or neglected children who may be regarded as victims of either circumstance or the actions of others, the status offender is viewed as having engaged in behavior that is subject to official sanctions. The behavior, however, is only an offense for those who occupy the age-based status of juvenile.

The federal objective with regard to status offenders has been termed "deinstitutionalization" and implies at least a partial acceptance of a non-interventionist philosophy toward juvenile justice. In conceptualizing this objective it may be helpful to distinguish between three other related strategies: divestment, diversion, and decarceration. The first of these, divestment, would require the removal of status offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system and clearly represents the most extreme form of non-intervention.

This strategy has also been labeled decriminalization, but, since status offenses are non-criminal to begin with, use of this term may be somewhat confusing. A number of prestigious groups have endorsed removal of status violations from juvenile court jurisdiction (President's Commission, 1967; National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1961); although not required by the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, a few States (Alaska, Maine, Washington) have recently revised their statutes to achieve either partial or total divestment of status violations.

Use of the term diversion is currently applied to the employment of non-justice centered resources in responding to juvenile offenders. Not only are these youths diverted "from" juvenile court processing, but they are also diverted "to" service and treatment alternatives available within the community. Without the availability of an alternative service capacity, diversion becomes the equivalent of a divestment strategy. In many respects diversion has been a traditional feature in the processing of juvenile violations. Juvenile courts have utilized both informal agreements and probationary provisions to require community based services for juveniles as an alternative to further court action (Nejelski, 1976). However, with regard to status offenders, recent emphasis has been given to "front end" diversion in which police, schools, parents and others have been encouraged to completely by-pass the juvenile justice system and refer incidents involving status violations directly to the appropriate community based service agency. Since diversion is likely to rely rather heavily on discretionary decision making, it usually amounts to a form of selective non-intervention. The full range of official options, including

the coercive powers of the juvenile court, are left intact and are available if diversion fails to produce a desired outcome or is viewed as inappropriate for the juvenile.

In contrast to diversion, the decarceration of status offenders does involve a reduction in the coercive powers of the juvenile justice system. This strategy is non-interventionist only in the sense that it limits or removes the authority of the juvenile court to detain a youth prior to, or following, adjudication of an alleged status offense violation. Within these limitations, decarceration maintains the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over status offenders and allows intervention measures that are not accompanied by secure detention or correctional placement. However, if removal of the authority to incarcerate youth forcibly results in official inaction toward status violations, then decarceration may lead to a form of de facto divestment of such cases from the juvenile justice system. As will be discussed later, most juvenile courts are currently operating under either statutory, administrative or judicially imposed requirements for some form of decarceration of status offenders. But it is not uncommon in these jurisdictions to find "come back" provisions governing status offenders who violate court ordered probation conditions. These provisions generally treat non-criminal acts in violation of a court order as a delinquent offense which then permits detention and/or commitment of the status offender.

In light of these distinctions, then, the federal effort to foster the deinstitutionalization of status offenders can be described as an attempt to implement the strategies of both decarceration and diversion. While divestment also logically includes the decarceration of status offenders, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient requirement for

achieving compliance with federal provisions. As amended in 1977, the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 requires that status offenders ". . . shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities" (223(a)(12)(A), and provides for the termination of a State's eligibility for funding under the Act if full compliance is not reached within a specified period of time (223(c)). While the Act recognizes the possibility of limited 24 hour detention, federal definitions suggest that "come back" statutes allowing detention or commitment of previously adjudicated status offenders for non-criminal behavior would be contrary to the decarceration objective (White, 1976). In lieu of detention and correctional placement, the Act also mandates the use of "least restrictive" alternatives in providing services for status offenders (223(a)(12)(B). The criteria used in defining these alternatives clearly reveal an intention to encourage the diversion of status offenders to community based services and facilities. Beyond these requirements, federal guidelines also prohibit alternative, non-secure placement of status offenders in facilities that are similar, either by virtue of their size or function, to institutional settings traditionally used in providing custodial care for juvenile offenders. This objective offers the defining characteristic of federal efforts. Deinstitutionalization not only attempts to decarcerate and divert, but it also seeks to block the re-creation of institutionalized treatment of status offenders at the community level.

The Act thus had the double objective of removing from correctional institutions status offenders currently incarcerated and preventing their re-entry; and of terminating the practice of placing

status offenders in secure detention. The intent of the Act was to foster the replacement of incarceration and detention by the use of community based youth services. As will be seen in the course of this report, the first set of demonstration programs funded under the Act was focused primarily on the task of ending the use of secure detention and of providing alternative youth serving facilities.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL LEADERSHIP

The history of federal involvement in the delinquency control field has been marked by two quite distinct phases. The first paralleled the rise and diffusion of the juvenile court movement, lasting from the early 1900's through the 1950's. It was governed by a traditional model of federalism in which all major decisions and substantive support for delinquency programs emanated from the state level. Federal leadership was limited to an advisory function in the formulation of policy toward youth. The second phase began with the efforts of the Kennedy administration to extend the New Deal philosophy of the 30's to the social problems of the 60's. It launched an era of active federalism in the field of delinquency. Leadership was assumed not only in the development of policy, but also in the commitment of resources for the implementation of policy.

Traditional Federalism

Over the course of this period every State succeeded in establishing a separate court system with jurisdiction over the behavior of youth, both criminal and non-criminal. The development of special statutes and special courts dealing with youthful misconduct rested

on a theory of human development respecting the cause of juvenile delinquency, a related legal principle, and a corresponding philosophy of treatment. The attainment of adulthood with its privileges and responsibilities was seen as requiring a protracted period of development during which the young needed guidance, instruction, nurturance, control and protection. When these needs were met, children were law abiding; when they were not, children became delinquent. The prolongation of immaturity in modern society implied the raising of the legal age of criminal responsibility variously to the middle and late stages of the adolescent period. The associated philosophy of treatment held that the court should function as the parent of last resort in cases of extreme youthful misbehavior, intervening to provide for the developmental needs of the wayward. To accomplish this goal, courts assumed ultimate parental responsibility for the control of the child and undertook to supervise and correct his or her misconduct. Attempts were made to furnish whatever additional services that in the court's judgment were needed, available, and affordable.

The ideal prescriptions were not easily met. To process the flow of youthful offenders, new administrative structures had to be created and staffed, judges of requisite sensitivity and wisdom had to be selected, and treatment services had to be developed and routinized. Standards were also required to govern the selection and recruitment of personnel and to determine the character and quality of services designed to rehabilitate young law violators. In addition, it was necessary to encourage and maintain public support for the juvenile court and the philosophy on which it rested. Federal leadership was

most in evidence with respect to this last set of issues during the rise and diffusion of the juvenile court movement.

These efforts took two forms. A White House Conference on Children and Youth was sponsored by the federal Executive Office and held every ten years beginning in 1909. The Conference actively promoted a sense of national responsibility for the welfare of children, of whom delinquent children were viewed as a subset. The constituency of the decennial conferences were the professional welfare workers in communities around the country and those lay publics concerned with child welfare issues. Presidential sponsorship of the conferences lent legitimacy, prestige and visibility to a growing national welfare movement.

The second form of federal involvement in delinquency prevention and control came with the establishment of the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1912. As a major feature of its mission, the Bureau undertook to provide guidance in the development of the juvenile court movement by promulgating standards for court operations. In addition, it initiated the development of national statistics on juvenile delinquency by enlisting the cooperation of court jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Thus, following the creation of the Children's Bureau there was to be no major federal legislation in the juvenile justice field for the next half century. In light of the basic structure of federal-state relations, and given that states were assumed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in matters of criminal and juvenile justice, the federal role of advisor and standard setter appeared to be altogether appropriate.

Until the end of the 1950's there was little expectation of a more active federal participation in the efforts of states to cope with their delinquency problems.

Active Federalism

The advent of the 1960's marked an historic watershed respecting the federal role in the delinquency control problem. The preceding decade had witnessed an uninterrupted increase in reported arrests of juveniles and in the number of juvenile court cases, with a corresponding rise in public concern and anxiety. However, the politically quiescent years of the Eisenhower administration produced little inclination on the part of the federal establishment to break away from its traditional role in the delinquency field. It was not until the inauguration to cope with domestic social problems, that the federal government was brought into an emphatically activist posture in relation to the issue of delinquency.

Early in his brief tenure, President Kennedy established the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, consisting of the Secretaries of Labor and HEW, and the U.S. Attorney General. They were charged with the task of coordinating the programs of their several agencies having some bearing on conditions productive of delinquency. The initiative was given legislative form by the enactment of the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Act of 1961. In addition to providing for the coordination of all delinquency related federal programs, the Act was designed to improve economic and social conditions among the disadvantaged segments of the population, and to bring together at the local level the political, economic, educational and social welfare institutions that impacted on the lives of youth.

Congress appropriated what now seems a modest sum of \$10 million annually for implementation of the legislation during its first three years (Empey, 1978: 326-527).

Apart from the vicissitudes of program outcome, the significant feature of this initial effort was the ground breaking it performed in redefining the place of the federal establishment in the nation's effort to deal with the problem of delinquency. Briefly, it introduced and legitimated the federal government as a source of both leadership and funds in the development of state and local community juvenile justice policy. Having thus been established, federal leadership in this field entered its current activist phase. It has been marked by a steady increase in the prominence of federal legislative and executive initiatives in moving both the thinking and the practice in juvenile justice toward new ground.

DECLINE OF THE THERAPEUTIC MODEL

As the juvenile court movement expanded and took hold during the period of traditional federalism it was accompanied by an extensive refinement of the original developmental theory of delinquency. Professional interest in the field of delinquency control gradually began to focus on the intervening psychological processes linking abnormal development to delinquent behavior. From this perspective the delinquent act came to be viewed as merely symptomatic of an underlying psychological disorder. The initial developmental disturbance, especially from a Freudian view, would have occurred in very early childhood at a point too distant from the delinquent act to permit remediation. The professional practitioner, therefore, was left to apply the theories

and techniques of an emerging therapeutic model to the proximal psychological causes of delinquent behavior.

By the 1950's the therapeutic model had come to dominate the field of delinquency prevention as well as efforts to deal with other forms of deviant behavior. However, as a vehicle for the implementation of social policy the utility of the therapeutic model came to be questioned for a number of reasons. First, it is exclusively concerned with individual pathology and as a consequence can offer very little insight into the broader social and economic causes of delinquency. Secondly, the orientation toward individualized treatment has limited practical value in attempting to prevent or ameliorate delinquency on a broad scale. Preventative use of the therapeutic model requires the early diagnosis and prediction of delinquency in the general population. Such attempts have not only failed to survive close scientific scrutiny but have also been subject to charges of class, race, and sex discrimination. Finally, the therapeutic model has traditionally been followed under the assumption that treatment is at worst a benign experience. While the clinical patient may not be cured through therapeutic intervention, those with psychological disorders will not have worsened as a result of treatment and those who might not have initially required attention will not be harmed by the experience. Beneath the political somnolence of the 1950's these limitations of the therapeutic model were not a major issue. However, alternative perspectives were emerging that would have considerable force in the ensuing decade for the theory and practice of delinquency prevention.

Challenges to the adequacy of the therapeutic model and its exclusive use in the delinquency field has been a penchant of sociologists

in particular. In their view, the model obscured two types of important causal factors. The first concerned the social environment, that is, the positive inducements to delinquent behavior stemming from the prevailing economic and social conditions of life among the acutely disadvantaged populations of the urban metropolis (Shaw and McKay, 1969). Delinquent acts in response to inequities in the distribution of material, as well as personal, rewards could well reflect a rational form of adjustment rather than the pathological response assumed by the therapeutic model (Merton, 1968). Building upon these earlier sociological theories, two major publications appeared during the transition from traditional federalism and attempted to trace the linkage between social factors and delinquent behavior. The first of these offered the hypothesis of "status frustration" in which working class youth are motivated to adopt a delinquent solution as a means of attaining their own definition of self-worth in a middle class world that denigrates their working class origins (Cohen, 1955). The second provided a statement of "opportunity theory" in which the blockage of access to conventional occupational goals led lower class males to generate variant strains of a delinquent subculture (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). It was on their theory that the prevention program of the President's Committee of the early 1960's was founded.

The other domain of causal factors neglected by the therapeutic model concerned the response of the child to efforts aimed at the correction or treatment of delinquent behavior. The impact on the child of categorizing and defining activity by the police, courts and case-workers came increasingly to be viewed as at least equally important

in the genesis of delinquent careers as were the problems of pathology and personal deficiency (Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963; Schur, 1971). Much of the delinquent behavior, particularly as it occurs early in delinquent careers, was seen as "natural" in the sense of childhood experimentation with the limits of the prohibited (Lemert, 1951). The deviant behavior of children initially acquires its meaning for the youth only as it is responded to and defined by adult authorities (Tannenbaum, 1938). In the case of delinquent behavior, the intervention of the police, incarceration in detention centers, and placement in correctional institutions were seen as carrying the potential for imposing on the young person a stigmatized conception of self. In contrast to the assumption of the therapeutic model, the malevolent impact of official processing was as likely to result from efforts to treat the delinquent offender as it was from those who sought to punish him. Further undesirable consequences, especially for youthful, non-serious offenders, included enforced association with more sophisticated delinquents in jails and detention centers, and rejection by conforming peers for reputed delinquent behavior. Consistently higher recidivism rates among those exposed to processing by the juvenile justice system and to institutional placements were adduced as evidence of the negative effects of labeling experiences.

These, then, were the major alternatives to the therapeutic model that were offered by sociology as the move toward active federalism gathered force. This revised federal stance required new theories if there was to be a movement toward a national delinquency policy. Hard empirical support for the sociological perspectives of that period

were no more adequate than the "evidence" supporting the therapeutic model, prominent in the practice of psychology and psychiatric social work in the delinquency field. The sociological theories, however, offered a logic that simultaneously engaged the major emerging issues in juvenile justice and resonated with prevailing political policy. Under the Kennedy administration, opportunity theory was to become an intellectual linchpin in the early efforts to prevent delinquency. It would also serve as a basic strategy in the declaration of a war on poverty. Labeling theory would enter at a later point, first as the basis for critically appraising the system of juvenile justice, and eventually as a rationale for deinstitutionalization. While the therapeutic model would continue to reign at the level of individual practice, its position of prominence was destined to decline in the realm of policy determination.

THE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION OBJECTIVE

As previously noted, the shift toward active federal leadership in the delinquency field was initially given legislative force in the Juvenile Justice and Youth Offenses Act of 1961. The legislation was designed to furnish planning and seed money to cities that would attempt to coordinate the activities of youth serving agencies and institutions in both the public and private sectors. The theory that explicitly guided the federal effort viewed delinquent behavior as a product principally of social conditions which blocked opportunity for the young in achieving occupational and other culturally valued goals. In focusing on the causal factors cited by opportunity theory, federal leadership moved beyond the practitioner's concern with treatment and

attempted to implement a program of primary prevention. The objective of the program was to develop and direct existing resources in a unified attack on the basic causes of the delinquency problem (Marris and Rein, 1973).

The first federally supported programs in the early 1960's employed a combination of two basic strategies in attempting to launch delinquency prevention efforts. The first involved the mobilization of youth service and welfare institutions in a coordinated approach to delinquency problems. The second encouraged the organization of residents in poverty areas to deal with the entire range of social problems influencing youth. Cities that participated in the federal effort tended to emphasize one or the other of these strategies. Mobilization for Youth in New York City, for example, devoted its efforts largely to community organization and local political action. In Los Angeles, Chicago, New Haven, Cleveland, and most other cities, program effort was directed principally to the coordination task.

These early delinquency prevention programs were relatively short lived, in very large part because soon after inception the core ideas of opportunity enhancement, community action, and coordination of effort were adopted by federal programs dealing with the more general problem of poverty. Indeed, the War on Poverty, initiated in the Kennedy administration and expanded by President Johnson, was modeled on the key elements of the Mobilization for Youth program in New York's lower east side. As Empey observes:

Mobilization for Youth and the President's Committee (on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime) had scarcely gotten under way when opportunity theory became the rationale for social intervention on an even grander scale. A nationwide War on Poverty was declared. In October 1963, the President's Council of Economic Advisors asked David Hackett to submit a proposal for a series of programs, something like MFY, which would cost \$500 million in the first year of operation. (After Kennedy's assassination one month later) . . . Lyndon Johnson decided to go ahead with it. (Most of the senior staff who had worked on the President's Committee now became leaders in the War on Poverty. They simply took many of the ideas originally outlined in the MFY proposal and transferred them to the new agency (Empey, 1978: 297-298).

Having been established as the major objective of federal efforts, delinquency prevention was thus absorbed by the War on Poverty. This development clearly reflected the idea that delinquency was in the main a result of the more fundamental problem of poverty, and as the latter was ameliorated the former would come under control. The fact was, however, that whatever the accomplishments of the War on Poverty, reported arrests for delinquency and juvenile court cases continued to escalate and became a major political problem in its own right.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The unabated rise in crime rates generally during the 1960's led finally to the establishment in 1965 of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Commission was charged with the task of conducting a searching re-examination of the problem of crime and delinquency and of the operations of the nation's juvenile and criminal justice system. Published in 1967, its report on juvenile delinquency recommended programs addressed to two sets of concerns. The first included conditions in urban poverty areas that

denied equality of opportunity to youth. The second involved the excessive intervention of the juvenile justice system in the lives of youthful offenders, particularly in regard to minor delinquencies and in non-criminal cases such as status violations. The report was critical as well of practices that denied due process to youths in juvenile court proceedings.

Accordingly, the President's Commission (1967: 66-77) offered two sets of recommendations. The prevention of delinquency, the report asserted, lay outside the powers of the juvenile justice system. To provide equality of opportunity to poverty area youth, the needed reforms were a responsibility of the political, economic, and educational institutions of society. Specific proposals were directed toward the reduction of unemployment and provision of minimum incomes to strengthen the family unit, establishment of pre-school educational enrichment, elimination of discrimination in job opportunities, linkage of schools to the world of work, and participation of young people in community decision making. These proposals and the underlying concern expressed by the Commission indicate an acceptance of both opportunity theory and the delinquency prevention initiative that had already been undertaken at the federal level.

The recommendations relating to the Commission's concern with juvenile justice are especially noteworthy in that they interject a labeling theory critique as a basis for advocating changes in the operation of the juvenile justice system. While a majority of the recommendations are directed toward establishing procedural regularity and due process within juvenile courts, major proposals are aimed at avoiding

the unnecessary stigmatization of youth and the potential criminogenic influence of official processing. These latter proposals include the development of youth service bureaus and community based services as alternatives to justice system involvement, screening of criminal and non-criminal cases with diversion to community services whenever feasible, elimination of secure correctional placement for status offenders, and prohibition of the co-mingling of juveniles with adult offenders. Citing the "uncertain gain" and the inevitable stigma of juvenile court processing for status offenses, the Report went on to suggest that careful consideration be given to the complete removal of these cases from the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.

The President's Commission Report was significant not only in reinforcing federal efforts toward delinquency prevention, but it also added the reform of juvenile justice to the agenda of active federalism. In so doing, the labeling perspective entered as an alternative rationale to opportunity theory in selecting the course of future federal action.

The effect of the Commission's recommendations on federal initiatives was not long in coming. In 1968 Congress enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, administered by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration (YDDPA) of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The principal thrust of the Act was to assist in the development of youth programs in local communities through the allocation of modest federal grants. Only as a minor motif, the program was expected to foster reform in the juvenile justice system by encouraging a fuller use of diversion through the establishment of youth service bureaus.

THE YDDPA PERIOD

The period between 1968 and 1972 were years of uncertainty regarding future steps. A more conservative administration had come into office with a less sanguine view of the leadership role of the federal government in dealing with social problems. However, the urgency of the crime issue generally had already resulted in the 1968 establishment of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Located within the Department of Justice, its mandate was to assist the states through the use of a block grant program in reducing their crime problems. While there was uncertainty as to how the states might accomplish this aim, LEAA had taken as its central program interest the improvement of the law enforcement function. The issue of whether this extended to the juvenile justice system as well was resolved through the enactment of the Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1972. This legislation ratified an agreement between HEW and LEAA in which the YDDPA would confine its efforts to fostering community youth programs and LEAA would attempt to improve the delinquency prevention capabilities of the juvenile justice system. This division of effort amounted to a major re-casting of the overall federal role as it had developed prior to the YDDPA period.

In confining LEAA programming efforts to the juvenile justice system there was a concentration of effort in precisely the area which the President's Commission had viewed as fallow ground for delinquency prevention activity. However, with the dismantling of the War on Poverty initiative of the previous administration, and the return to the more traditional form of federalism, the character of federal efforts

to prevent delinquency shifted from the orientation of opportunity theory to an emphasis on efficiency and deterrence consistent with a law enforcement perspective. Any effort to increase the preventive reach of the juvenile justice system became the responsibility of the states and local communities.

The responsibility of YDDPA was similarly constrained by the requirement that its programming should focus exclusively on community efforts, principally the development of youth service bureaus. This effort would logically fulfill the recommendations for diversion proposed as part of an attempt to reform juvenile justice. However, in being closed off from the juvenile justice system, the efforts of YDDPA lacked a necessary mechanism for insuring support for the development of community based services for diversion purposes.

The break in continuity between the YDDPA period and previous federal leadership in the delinquency field was moderated by a single exception. The 1968 legislation that created YDDPA also gave to the Department of HEW the task of developing a national approach to the problem of juvenile delinquency. This was implemented by organizing a series of conferences which attracted a continuing group of academic and program specialists in the delinquency field. They were asked to address anew the causal roots of delinquency and to suggest the policy innovations implied by their analysis. The document generated by these deliberations highlighted the practices of schools and justice agencies that operate to alienate large numbers of youth, creating major barriers to the formation of legitimate identities. It recommended the development of a national youth policy that would end the sharp segregation of

adolescents into youth ghettos, link the young to the world of adult interests by establishing continuity between school and work, and confine the reach of the juvenile justice agencies to only the most serious and persistent youthful offenders (Empey, 1978: 534-5). This effort followed the reasoning underlying the previous federal concerns with delinquency prevention and the reform of the justice system. It also expanded the focus of labeling and opportunity theory to include the role of non-justice institutions such as the schools in accounting for the delinquency of middle as well as lower class youth.

Briefly, then, the years following the President's Commission Report, the YDDPA period, were marked on the one hand by a political climate of skepticism regarding the appropriateness of federal leadership in dealing with domestic social issues, and on the other hand, through the continued support of LEAA, the most massive federal intervention in the crime problem in the history of the country. While it was generally acknowledged that youth are heavily involved in the crime picture, there was a basic ambivalence in mounting a coordinated federal approach. The division of labor between LEAA and YDDPA resulted in a curious set of "catch-22" regulations. The delinquency prevention efforts of LEAA could only reach those youths who were already delinquent, and the YDDPA was prohibited from focusing their reform efforts on the juvenile justice system. The modest level of federal activity in achieving the twin objectives developed prior to 1968 was to continue until the passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT

Established in 1970, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency provided legislative oversight specifically concerned with federal efforts in responding to delinquency related issues. Chaired by Senator Birch Bayh, its initial attention was focused on the activities of the two major federal agencies having responsibility in this area, YDDPA and LEAA, both of which evidenced basic deficiencies in mounting delinquency related programming. A fundamental problem in YDDPA was the absence of effective leadership. Although created in 1968 within HEW, the agency did not have an appointed director for more than a year and a half, and by 1971 had fallen seriously behind in achieving its original purposes. During this period the agency had been authorized by the congress to expend \$150 million for juvenile delinquency programs; of this amount \$30 million was actually appropriated for operation of the agency, and only half, or \$15 million, was eventually spent. On the other hand, the efforts of LEAA to deal with the delinquency problem were handicapped by the absence of a clearly defined legislative intent in the Omnibus Crime Control on Safe Streets Act of 1968, which created the agency. The original Act did not provide even a reference to juvenile delinquency. The Subcommittee, therefore, undertook during the period from 1971 through 1973 to design and promote legislation that would remedy this deficiency.

Over a four-year period the Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings on these matters and eventually concluded that the bifurcation of federal effort had been ineffective in contributing to the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency. In its final analysis

the Senate Subcommittee cited three major problems: (1) the absence of centralized, national leadership in addressing the problems of juvenile delinquency; (2) an inability to coordinate the efforts of the various federal agencies with responsibilities toward youth; and (3) the inadequate level of funding available for the accomplishment of an effective federal program. The results of Congressional hearings were succinctly summarized in the characterization of federal juvenile delinquency efforts as a "national disgrace and dilemma." On the basis of its extended hearings, the Senate Subcommittee drafted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, endorsed with minor modifications by the appropriate House Subcommittee.

The proposed Act undertook to remedy the specific problems of prior federal delinquency programs identified by the Bayh subcommittees. The leadership issue was resolved by creating the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and placing it within LEAA as the single agency with primary responsibility in the area of juvenile delinquency. The administrator of OJJDP was to be appointed by the President with Senate approval, providing a high degree of policy control in implementing the Act and in coordinating federal efforts. The willingness to invest adequate resources was particularly manifest in providing an authorization unprecedented in the federal annals of delinquency programming: rising from \$75 million for fiscal year 1975 to \$125 and \$150 million in 1976 and 1977. The bulk of these monies were to be used in a program of grants to participating states under a formula requiring conformity to a set of specific provisions. These provisions defined the appropriate areas of programming at the state

level and included requirements for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders as well as prohibitions on the co-mingling of juveniles with adult offenders. As the former principal member of the Bayh sub-committee staff and current administrator of OJJDP has described it:

Formula grants are authorized for states that submit comprehensive juvenile delinquency plans as provided in the Act. Of these monies 75 percent must be expended on prevention, diversion and alternatives to incarceration including foster care and group homes; community based programs and services to strengthen the family unit; youth service bureaus; programs providing meaningful work and recreational opportunities for youth; expanded use of paraprofessional personnel and volunteers; programs to encourage youth to remain in school; youth initiated programs designed to assist youth who otherwise would not be reached by assistance programs; and, subsidies or other incentives to reduce commitments to training schools and to generally discourage the excessive use of secure incarceration and detention (John Rector, 1975).

In addition to the formula grants program, the Office of Juvenile Justice engaged in four other major areas of activity. The first of these is the special emphasis programs, which involve direct grants to states and local communities for the implementation and testing of action programs that are consistent with the purposes of the Act. The second is the provision of technical assistance to participants in both the formula and special emphasis grant programs. The third area concerns concentration of federal effort and is directed toward the coordination of federal juvenile programs. The fourth activity can be described as a general research and information function carried out by the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The Institute was created by the Act as a specialized component of the Office of Juvenile Justice, mandated to perform four delinquency related tasks: collection and dissemination of information,

research and evaluation, development and review of standards, and training related to juvenile justice issues.

Clearly, then, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 emphatically reversed the historical uncertainty respecting the use of federal leadership in carrying through the policy objectives that emerged from the shift to active federalism during the 1960's. The assumption of national leadership, the coordination of federal effort, and the provision of fiscal muscle were firmly established in OJJDP. In addition, this agency was provided an internal structure and legislative guidelines for the general task of developing effective responses to the problem of delinquency. The 1977 amendments to the Act sharpened and clarified the language of the original legislation, but did not substantially alter its major provisions. Moreover, the revisions provided for further authorization of funds amounting to \$525 million through fiscal year 1980. A portion of all other LEAA block grant funds amounting to at least 19.15% are also required to be appropriated for juvenile delinquency programs. These features of the current Act have given the federal establishment a strategic position in the future development of delinquency prevention and control policy. Prediction of the direction in which the strengthened federal leadership will take that policy is hazardous. But an examination of the general outline of the current legislative mandate and the evidence of its partial implementation can provide some clues as to future trends.

THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

When posed in relation to previous policy objectives in the delinquency area, the substantive thrust of current federal legislation can be described as having two basic characteristics. First, the Juvenile Justice Act rejects very few, if any, of the objectives that have previously been undertaken in the area of juvenile delinquency. Secondly, however, the legislation does establish priorities in the pursuit of answers to the underlying problems of juvenile crime and youthful misconduct. Viewed in this manner, it becomes apparent that the federal legislative mandate resides in the priorities accorded a wide range of objectives, rather than in the endorsement of a single policy aim or a narrow set of objectives. It is also clear that relative to the two general policy directives emerging from the federal experience of the 60's, the current mandate emphasizes the goal of juvenile justice reform over that of delinquency prevention.

As noted earlier, reform of juvenile justice as an area of federal concern was highlighted in the President's Commission Report of 1967. The recommendations were directed to two levels of reform--diversion, or the removal of youth from juvenile court processing, and the establishment of procedural regularity for all remaining cases. With the exception of the emphasis on due process, diversion is consistent with the federal effort to encourage the development of national standards as pursued even during the period of traditional federalism. While providing opportunities for achieving both types of reform, the Juvenile Justice Act clearly emphasizes diversion as the first order of business in modifying the system of juvenile justice. The federal

initiative prescriptively endorses the development of community based alternatives as was attempted during the YDDPA period, but also provides for the utilization of these alternatives through prohibitions on the institutionalization of status offenders and for support for the diversion of minor criminal offenders as well.

In pursuing the objective of deinstitutionalization, the 1974 Act in effect has given substantial impetus to a nationwide movement to end the use of detention and incarceration in correctional institutions for dealing with status offenders. The scope of the movement during the past eight years to prohibit their pre-adjudication detention and their post-adjudication commitment is set forth in detail in Appendix II. Briefly summarized, Wisconsin and Alaska prohibited post-adjudication commitment in 1971, with New Mexico following this lead in 1972. By 1973 three states, South Dakota, Texas, and Nevada, followed suit, as did five additional states in 1974: New Jersey, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Illinois, with Maryland and New Jersey prohibiting pre-adjudication detention as well. In 1975, three more states prohibited detention, and three eliminated commitment. During the following three years, 17 additional states acted to restrict or eliminate the use of detention, and 25 to prohibit or reduce the use of post-adjudication commitment. This objective was achieved in some of the states by revising their administrative practices or regulations, or through executive or court order rather than by statutory change. Of the 40 states now in the process of deinstitutionalizing status offenders, two (Maine and Alaska) have removed status offenses from court jurisdiction; three (Arkansas, Oregon, and Virginia) limit their detention

Table I

Jurisdictions Having Prohibited Pre-Adjudication Detention and Post-Adjudication Commitment of Status Offenders, by Effective Year and Type of Authority (unless otherwise indicated, authority is statutory)

<u>Jurisdiction</u>	<u>Pre-Adjudication Detention</u>	<u>Post-Adjudication Commitment</u>
Alabama	1978	1978
Alaska	1977 ^a	1971 (ct order)
Arizona		1977
Arkansas	1977 ^b	1977
California	1977	1977
Connecticut		1977 (admin prac)
Delaware	1978	1976
D. of Columbia	1978 (admin prac)	1978 (admin prac)
Florida	1975	1975
Georgia	1977 ^c	1976 (admin prac)
Idaho		1977 (admin reg)
Illinois	1977	1974 ^e
Indiana	1976 ^d	
Iowa		1974
Kentucky		1976
Louisiana	1975	1976
Maine	1977 ^a	1973
Maryland	1974	1974
Massachusetts	1977 (ex order)	1974 (ct order)
Michigan		1976 (admin reg)
Minnesota	1978	1978
Mississippi		1975 (admin reg)
Missouri		1977 (admin reg)
Nevada		1973
New Hampshire	1977	1977
New Jersey	1974	1974
New Mexico	1976	1972
New York		1976
North Carolina		1977
Ohio		1977 (admin prac)

Table I (cont'd)

<u>Jurisdiction</u>	<u>Pre-Adjudication Detention</u>	<u>Post-Adjudication Commitment</u>
Oklahoma	1977	1977
Oregon	1975 ^b	1975
Pennsylvania	1977	1977
South Carolina		1976 (admin prac)
South Dakota		1973
Texas		1973 ^f
Virginia	1977 ^b	1977
Washington	1978	1977
West Virginia	1977	1977
Wisconsin	1978	1971

- a. Removed status offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction
- b. Maximum limit of 72 hours detention
- c. Limit of 72 hours with added court ordered 48-hour detention
- d. Applies only to juveniles charged as runaways
- e. Commitment allowed if parents found to be unfit
- f. Commitment allowed for violation of probation conditions

to a maximum of 72 hours; and one (Georgia) permits a court ordered 48 hour extension to the 72 hour limit. Indiana prohibits secure detention only for runaways. Illinois permits post-adjudication commitment only if parents are found to be unfit, and Texas may commit for the violation of probation.¹

Thus, 40 of the 50 states have now moved either totally or partially down the road to legislative deinstitutionalization. In making eligibility for federal delinquency prevention funds contingent on progress toward total deinstitutionalization, the 1974 Act offers the states a powerful incentive to continue their efforts in this direction. However, the very vitality of the movement tends to create problems of another order. Except for the still rare cases in which the juvenile court has been divested of jurisdiction over status offenses, courts face the task of dealing with these cases in a constructive and responsible manner. Recognizing this, the Act has also mandated the development of community based alternatives to secure detention and incarceration. Unless such facilities are available in a jurisdiction on a scale corresponding to the volume of status offense cases, progress in deinstitutionalization is likely to be impeded. But access to facilities of the required capacity and quality is only one of the problems confronting the status offender deinstitutionalization effort.

A second problem likely to be encountered is opposition to the movement on the part of a substantial segment of the public. As embodied in the Act, the conception of the status offender as a misbehaving, non-criminal offender is largely restricted to those whose professions and occupations have brought them into direct contact

¹ Further changes may have occurred subsequent to this survey which was taken in 1977.

with the delinquency problem. There remains a large pool of public sentiment, reflected in existing state statutes, that defines status as well as youthful criminal offenders as constituting the delinquent population. Resistance to a discriminating and less "stern" treatment of status offenders may be expected in many jurisdictions.

Two further interlocking problems may be anticipated. The development and use of alternative community based facilities implies a substantially reduced use of detention and incarceration facilities that are already in place, each with its complement of personnel with a vested interest in their jobs. Moreover, the continued need for secure facilities for young criminal offenders means that the diversion of status offenders to non-secure facilities will leave the fixed costs of detention centers and correctional facilities unaltered. Hence, it may well be the case that the development and use of alternative facilities will entail increased costs in many jurisdictions. Jurisdictions that may be ambivalent respecting the wisdom of deinstitutionalization may thus be persuaded that the tradeoff between delinquency prevention and increased costs is unfavorable. The related cost problem concerns the possible need for an expansion of services for a segment of the status offender population, whose numbers cannot yet be estimated. It includes the incorrigibles or ungovernables and the chronic runaways who come to official attention after repeated episodes of misbehavior. They are likely to have come from problem impacted families and in some proportion to have developed severe behavior disorders. These problems are not readily remediable through brief intervention. They often require prolonged and costly treatment by skilled

workers. An adequate response to this aspect of the deinstitutionalization problem requires a commitment by the local community to expand, often substantially, the resources allocated to the youth welfare function.

A fifth problem is likely to arise in jurisdictions operating under juvenile statutes that definitively prohibit the use of secure detention for status offenders. These statutes, most of which have been enacted in recent years, are often phased in long before there has been opportunity to develop alternative facilities. In these circumstances the police and the courts may be constrained to resolve the problem by refusing to deal with status offense cases. This may well result in a situation of massive neglect, with the unintended consequence in many cases of a possible escalation of minor misbehavior to serious delinquency. Alternatively, and equally problematic, if community sentiment insists on positive official intervention in all cases of delinquency, however minor, the resolution may take the form of upgrading the formal complaint from a status to a criminal charge, or downgrading a status offense to neglect/dependency in order to create eligibility for secure detention. Such "relabeling" is technically feasible, given the enormous discretion available in juvenile offense cases.

Finally, in according priority to the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the 1974 Act has given decisive support to the therapeutic model of delinquency prevention. It is likely that some status offenders differ from many types of delinquent offenders in exhibiting severe developmental and associated psychological problems.

In these cases remediation requires individual treatment of the several kinds embodied in the therapeutic model. While this approach may be unexceptionable where appropriate, it poses the danger of being legitimized as either the sole or the principal intervention strategy for the prevention of delinquency. This is particularly likely in view of the support it normally receives from prestigious professional groups engaged in the practice of individual therapy. As was noted earlier, the 1974 Act was intended to encourage a range of intervention strategies, including "youth advocacy" approaches. These emphasize the importance of improving conditions known to be associated in the aggregate with delinquency, in particular those related to education, employment, and neighborhood subcultures. Because youth advocacy seeks institutional reform, occasionally of a radical character, it is programmatically diffuse and, unlike the therapeutic model, without an established body of practice.

Given this feature of the youth advocacy approach, and the current salience of the deinstitutionalization drive with its implicit revitalization of the therapeutic model, there exists a potential problem of imbalance among program approaches. Doctrinaire conceptions of the nature of the delinquency problem are frequently entertained, and with them a tendency to apply the limited remedies with which they are associated. Although neither the therapeutic nor the youth advocacy model necessarily fits all cases, the use of either in the program of any jurisdiction tends to subordinate or totally exclude the use of the other. As the emphasis on deinstitutionalization operates to enhance the relevance of the therapeutic model, the program is likely

to encounter informed and vocal opposition from supporters of the advocacy model. The resolution of such controversy will determine the survival of those elements of the 1974 Act that go beyond the immediate interest in deinstitutionalization. Awareness of an imbalance in legislative support for the two approaches was already reflected in the JDDPA 1977 reauthorization bill (S.1218). Its language emphasized, among other things, youth advocacy, due process, and neighborhood courts.

In one form or another each of the problems described has become evident in the implementation of the first program "initiative" of the Office of Juvenile Justice. In 1975, OJJ issued guidelines soliciting program proposals designed to foster the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. In conjunction with the program, the Office established an evaluation study of the experience in order to examine program achievements and the problems encountered in the course of program implementation. The content of the solicitation, the criteria for site selection, the administrative structure of both the program and evaluation components, and the characteristics of the programs funded will be presented in the next chapter. Following this, the model represented by each of the eight programs that were included in the evaluation study will be described.

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CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER II

THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION PROGRAM INITIATIVE

Solomon Kobrin and Frank R. Hellum

President Ford signed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act into law late in the summer of 1974. Its central feature was the offer of federal funds to states that agreed to undertake programs of delinquency prevention in conformity with the objectives stipulated in the Act. Of these, a high priority was given to the removal of status offenders currently held in detention facilities and correctional institutions, and the prevention of their future entry into these facilities. This was to be accomplished by providing community based alternatives through the use of existing youth agencies and the development of new services.

The Act also made available funds to be used at the discretion of the Office of Juvenile Justice for a variety of purposes, including the development of special programs designed to explore effective ways of implementing the Act. These were designated as "program initiatives." In March of 1975 LEAA provided \$8.5 million of these funds for use by public and private agencies to develop model programs for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Program proposals were invited nationwide, and a detailed set of guidelines was published and distributed setting forth the requirements the program proposals would be expected to meet in order to obtain funding. Federal support was to be limited to two years with an expectation that the programs would then be continued with local resources.

To orient prospective grant applicants in developing their program proposals, four goals were specified:

- Establish procedures to utilize alternatives to secure detention at both the pre- and post-adjudication stages.
- Remove status offenders incarcerated in correctional institutions.
- Provide community based services as an alternative to detention and institutional placement and establish procedures that "hold service providers accountable on a per child basis."
- Evaluate the effectiveness of various program models in order to provide guidance for the future development of status offender deinstitutionalization programs (LEAA, 1975:207).

In order to accomplish these general objectives, it was assumed by OJJ that various program strategies would have to be adopted. Jurisdictions were expected to differ in the conditions affecting the feasibility of program implementation. OJJ hoped to attract a set of programs, each of which was hopefully representative of differences with respect to the following five factors assumed to be relevant to the effort to establish an ongoing deinstitutionalization effort:

- (1) Not all communities were assumed to be equally tolerant of status offenses and offenders, and it seemed to be useful to provide an opportunity to test program strategies fitted to situations of intolerance as well as tolerance.

- (2) Differences among communities are known to exist as well in the scope of available alternative program resources.
- (3) Differences among communities exist in the discretion state statutes accord their courts to divert status offenders from detention and from correctional institutions.

A fundamental assumption of the status offender deinstitutionalization program*held that its value lay in the avoidance of stigma associated with contact and processing by official agencies of juvenile justice. To test this assumption an effort was made to include:

- (4) programs varied in degree of sponsorship and management by official justice agencies so it could be determined if the amount of justice involvement might, in effect, subvert the stigma avoidance aim, and
- (5) programs that varied in the use of treatment alternatives which maintain the type of control over client behavior commonly found in official justice processing.

There were, thus, five dimensions of community and program variation that were considered important in selecting proposals for funding: community tolerance of offender behavior; access to youth services resources; statutory provisions respecting status offenders; juvenile justice control of programs; and program control of client behavior.

SPECIFICATION OF PROGRAM STRATEGIES

Program strategies were designated in general terms. These included at a minimum the removal of status offenders from detention facilities and correctional institutions, and the prevention of their

* Commonly referred to as the DSO (Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender) program.

future placement in such facilities. In addition, where needed, programs were to be designed to press for new legislation or the modification of existing codes in the interest of fostering the diversion of status offenders. In all instances programs eligible for funding would be expected to join the twin objectives of reducing the use of locked facilities and expanding community based facilities, whose capacity to provide services was to be strengthened.

PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS

The guidelines issued in conjunction with the solicitation of program proposals also attempted to serve an educational function by listing the assumptions on which the deinstitutionalization effort rested. As derived from the JJDP Act, three assertions were offered, stating a specific view of the character of the status offender problem:

- The detention of status offenders and their incarceration in correctional institutions "is inappropriate and often destructive." Non-criminal youth stigmatized as delinquents are more likely to become delinquents.
- The adjustment problems of status offenders are "centered in the family and community and can best be treated through community based services."
- Status offenders "can be treated more effectively and economically outside incarcerative settings" (LEAA, 1975: 208-209).

With respect to community resources, the stated assumption was that they "have the responsibility, interest, and capacity to respond

in creative and responsible ways to the development and delivery of services which support more constructive juvenile behavior patterns" (LEAA, 1975:209). Of substantial importance, however, was the fact that in discussing community resources, the OJJ guidelines accepted the possibility that variant assumptions or theories entertained by proposal proponents regarding the causes of status offense behavior might modify the character of the services provided. It was evident that while the program took as its point of departure the conception of the status offense problem embodied in the 1974 Act, the possibility of alternative conceptions was not excluded. As placed in the field, the OJJ deinstitutionalization initiative thus remained marginally open to alternative conceptions of the problem and the acquisition of new knowledge. As will be seen in Section II, a number of the funded programs did indeed modify the view of the status offense problem as presented in the guideline document.

Three features of the juvenile justice system were defined as favorable to the implementation of the program. Stated as assumptions, these were, first, its tendency to detain and incarcerate status offenders only as a last resort when less restrictive and more constructive community resources were not available or were unable to respond; second, it was assumed that juvenile justice agencies would use their discretion to support alternatives to institutionalization and detention; and third, it was expected that the interest of juvenile justice agencies in making more efficient use of their resources would be served by deinstitutionalizing status offenders, particularly in dealing with the more serious juvenile offenders.

STATUS OFFENDER RESEARCH AND PROGRAM RATIONALE

The assumptions guiding the development of the program were more fully elaborated in a presentation of the program rationale. However, the presentation followed a summary statement of research findings in existing studies of status offenders and the status offense problem.

Nine principal conclusions were drawn from the review:

- The statistics available for assessing the scope of the status offense problem are grossly inadequate.
- Despite this, the available data strongly suggest that a large proportion of all youth dealt with by agencies of juvenile justice are status offenders, although they are only loosely distinguished from delinquent offenders in most jurisdictions.
- The detention and institutionalization of all juvenile offenders, including status offenders of both sexes, has been decreasing in recent years.
- The incarceration of all types of juvenile offenders in training schools and similar institutions is ineffective in rehabilitating delinquent youth.
- Detention appears to be unnecessary to assure the appearance of status offenders for court hearings.
- There is little evidence to support the view that status offenders are clinically distinguishable from delinquent offenders, although this is likely to be the case.

- Delinquent offense complaints are frequently reduced to status offense complaints for first time delinquent offenders, with the reverse true for multiple offenders.
- There exists no firm research evidence for the proposition that there is a progression from status to delinquent offenses in the careers of juvenile delinquents.
- Females continue to constitute a disproportionately large segment of institutionalized status offenders because of taboos on youthful female sexuality and the unavailability of suitable alternatives (LEAA, 1975:6-13).

The guideline statement of the state of research knowledge about the status offense problem is noteworthy on several counts. First, it became necessary to justify the commitment of substantial federal funds to a set of program procedures for the solution of a problem, when many of its major features were not known with certainty. The justification took two forms, empirical and philosophical. On the assumption that there exists in fact a population of youth who commit only status offenses, funded programs would be required to establish procedures that would provide differential dispositions for delinquent and for status offenders. This provision was designed to counteract existing tendencies among juvenile justice agencies to designate the same individuals interchangeably as either status or delinquent offenders for substantially similar offense behavior. The expected effect would be to reduce detention and incarceration in the jurisdictions where programs would be funded.

Second, as stated in the guidelines:

The primary basis for Congress' concern about secure confinement of status offenders comes not from complete findings about the effects of institutionalization on youths or reduced or increased recidivism rates, but rather from moral repugnance of the incarceration of young persons who have not committed crimes. Therefore, although we will carefully assess the consequences of deinstitutionalization, we will not be 'testing' the basic principle--one which is primarily philosophical in nature (LEAA, 1975:10).

In effect, therefore, the program was presented as resting on principles of justice and humaneness, and on evidence suggesting the failure of institutional treatment. It was the basis of these considerations that the Office of Juvenile Justice provided its statement of the program rationale. The spirit of the statement was tentative and judicious, taking fully into account the need to shed further light on the dark corners of the status offense problem, but confident that the removal of non-criminal but troubled youth from detention and incarceration served important social values. These considerations notwithstanding, the program rationale may be paraphrased as followed:

- 1) As a group, status offenders differ in important ways from delinquent offenders. The difference is obscured because both groups are processed by the juvenile justice system, which frequently fails to label youths on the basis of the actual behavior that brings them to the court's attention. As a result, delinquent offenders may be frequently adjudicated as status offenders, and vice versa.

- 2) The incarceration of youths for non-criminal offenses is unjust. Moreover, research on training schools does not support the justification that secure residential placement has a rehabilitative effect. However, there may be a small number of status offenders who require secure residential placement for their developmental needs.
- 3) It is also unnecessary to use detention centers and jails for status offenders prior to court processing of their cases. This is true even for runaways, regarded in the Juvenile Justice Act as insufficiently serious conduct to justify secure custody.
- 4) The services that status offenders need can be provided most effectively and economically within their own communities. Suggested examples of needed services are family counselling, health and psychiatric care, remedial education, and job skills development and placement.
- 5) In providing federal funds, the program will encourage communities in their efforts to improve the services available for status offenders, and the mechanisms for delivering existing services.
- 6) Community services are expected to be more effective than institutional programs in reducing the subsequent criminal behavior of status offenders, and in the improvement of their general social adjustment. The extent to which this outcome is achieved will be assessed by an evaluation study.

- 7) Targeting services for status offenders for those who would otherwise be detained or incarcerated will reduce the institutionalization of status offenders in the United States.
- 8) Since the specific content of programs in various types of communities will differ in relation to community differences, various program models will be developed. Through evaluation study it will then be possible to assess the relative effectiveness of alternative program models (LEAA, 1975:10-13).

These assertions of fact and expectations of program outcome constitute the program rationale. However, in the face of the questions raised in the guidelines regarding the validity of the facts asserted and the probability level of expected outcomes, there was a clear and acknowledged need for careful program evaluation.

SELECTION OF PROGRAMS FOR FUNDING

Programs selected for funding represented the survivors of a multi-stage screening process. Of the several hundred initial concept papers received in response to the program announcement, a subset of their proponents was invited to submit preliminary grant applications. These were assessed in relation to a set of 12 criteria of varying valence, with each accorded a score value.

First to be eliminated from consideration were those which failed to attain a pre-set total score on two criteria: specificity of justice agency agreement to reduce the detention and incarceration of status offenders, and agreements from youth serving agencies to participate in the program.

The survivors of this cut were then examined with reference to seven additional criteria:

- Allocation of supplemental local funds to the program
- Prospects of program continuity at the termination of federal funds
- The number and quality of youth serving agencies prepared to provide services for status offenders
- The "quality" of the program, i.e., its administrative and organizational coherence and the professional sophistication of its leadership
- Provision for accountability in the expenditure of program funds
- The expected effectiveness of the program in winning public acceptance
- The evaluability of the program

Programs failing to score sufficiently high on these elements were also eliminated.

Finally, proposals surviving the earlier stages of selection were subjected to further screening on the basis of three additional criteria: the expected number of status offenders in the jurisdictions who would be benefited by the program; the prospect of inducing needed changes in the procedures and policies of juvenile justice agencies supportive of deinstitutionalization; and the capacity of the program to reach the jurisdiction's population of disadvantaged youth. Programs located in jurisdictions with large populations of status offenders were given the largest score values.

The task of selecting for funding a limited number of the proposals that survived the final cut posed serious problems. The scoring procedure provided no more than a general guide in identifying for exclusion the proposals for which reasonable grounds existed for their disqualification. There was no way that final judgments could be reduced to quantifiable form; they had to be made on the basis of subjective assessments of prospects each proposal offered for achieving program objectives. Many were of presumably equal merit in meeting the most stringent of the funding eligibility criteria, and there were multiple candidates representative of specific locations on the range of variation sought. The scoring procedure thus met only part of the program selection problem.

The more serious difficulty concerned the issue of whether, given two equally meritorious proposals, preference should go to the one that was more advanced or the one more retarded in the degree to which the juvenile justice system in the jurisdiction had already developed deinstitutionalization activity. On the one hand, those that had entered on this path could more predictably make effective use of federal funds in advancing the cause of deinstitutionalization. Little time and effort would be needed to mobilize public support for the program, and their juvenile justice systems already had in place the policies and procedures necessary for the expansion of an existing program. Funding program proposals from such jurisdictions would have predictable payoff in demonstrating OJJ effectiveness in the use of federal funds to deinstitutionalize status offenders. The certainty that increased numbers of non-criminal youth would be spared detention and incarceration was an attractive prospect.

On the other hand, the more pressing need was represented precisely by the jurisdictions in which there was little interest in, or active opposition to, the exclusion of status offenders from detention or to removing them from correctional institutions. Proposals from such jurisdictions came typically from public or private youth welfare agencies having only nominal commitment of support from some of their juvenile justice agencies. Yet it was evident that from a national standpoint these were the jurisdictions where the main problem lay. Status offenders were commonly detained, they were indiscriminately mixed with delinquent offenders in juvenile detention centers and often in local jails, and commitments to correctional institutions tended to occur more frequently and for longer periods than for delinquent offenders. In such jurisdictions efforts to move forward the deinstitutionalization movement would have to begin at its earliest stages. Community support would have to be mobilized and the cooperation of the juvenile justice system won. In view of the brief two-year span of federal funding support, the likelihood of reducing the detention and incarceration of status offenders, or the continuation of the program on local resources, appeared to be minimal.

The program proposals ultimately selected for funding represented an uneasy compromise between these conflicting interests and motives. In all, 12 programs were funded and were scheduled to begin operations during the first half of 1976. Of these, five were statewide (Illinois, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, and Arkansas) and six encompassed county or city jurisdictions (Spokane and Clark counties in Washington state, Alameda County and Eldorado County in California, Pima County in

Arizona, and Newark, Ohio). The twelfth program funded was the general effort of the National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations to increase the interest of their affiliates in the status offender problem and to induce affiliates to increase the resources devoted to the problem.

As will be seen in the program model descriptions to be presented in Section II, of the eight programs included in the national evaluation study two were located in jurisdictions well advanced in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, two were heavily retarded in this respect, and the remaining four fell on various points of the continuum between these extremes. It can be argued, of course, that the Congressional mandate would have been most fully implemented by selecting for funding only the programs located in the most backward jurisdictions, where it was routine practice to treat non-criminal youth as delinquent offenders. However, the inclusion of advanced jurisdictions turned out to be advantageous in providing an opportunity to discover the problems, and some of their possible solutions, that emerge in deinstitutionalization programs that are more fully developed.

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CHAPTER III

THE EVALUATION STUDY:
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

CHAPTER III

THE EVALUATION STUDY:

PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Solomon Kobrin and Malcolm W. Klein

For some years prior to the inception of the status offender program the demand for the evaluation of all social programs came with increasing insistence from federal administrative and Congressional sources. The demand was fueled by skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the New Frontier and Great Society social programs of the 1960s, directed in particular to the War on Poverty program of the Johnson years. The additional concern with the cost effectiveness of social programs suggested the use of evaluation study of all federally funded programs as providing the only adequate grounds for their improvement, reconstruction, or elimination. It was consequently taken for granted that an evaluation study would be included in the planning stages of the status offender program. The task of designing and organizing the study fell to the research arm of OJJ, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP).

During the 1975 planning year, NIJJDP provided a grant to the Social Science Research Institute of the University of Southern California to design an evaluation study of the status offender program. The design established by sociologists at SSRI, and endorsed by NIJJDP, took as its primary study objective the task of ascertaining the effectiveness of the national status offender program in achieving its delinquency prevention and control goals. In essence the question was posed:

To what extent, and under what conditions of community support and the availability of community based alternative youth services, were status offenders who were to be accorded program services less prone to persist in status and/or delinquent offense behavior than were members of comparable groups of status offenders subjected to the traditional procedures of secure detention and commitment to correctional institutions? Additional questions to be addressed included program effects on the social adjustment of program clients; on the procedures and personnel of the juvenile justice system; on leaders of other community institutions that impacted the lives of youth; and on the community's youth service network. The design called as well for an examination of problems of program implementation, with special attention to strategies employed in their solution.

To answer the major question of program effect on the offense behavior of status offenders, the study design incorporated two principal elements. The first was the use of the strongest, i.e., the most conclusive, experimental design permitted by the program proponents at each site. The recommended procedure for program client intake into the program was a random assignment model. In this, youths eligible for program services by virtue of referral for a status offense would be assigned randomly (e.g., by use of a table of random numbers) to the status offender program or to traditional treatment, without respect to judgments regarding the "needs" of the client. If this procedure were not acceptable, provision was made for use of a number of weaker but possibly more acceptable experimental designs. OJJ had made proponent agreement to accept one of these designs as an absolute requirement for funding eligibility.

The second principal element of the evaluation design was the development of a data base for analysis. This included information respecting socio-economic, demographic, attitudinal, educational, and family status characteristics of each program client; the source of referral to the program; the formal complaint (if referred by police or court) together with a description of the behavior that occasioned the complaint; the record of both status and delinquent offenses; the community based services to which the client was both initially and subsequently referred so far as the latter information was recoverable; and the record of client behavior and adjustment subsequent to his admission to the program. In addition, data were to be obtained permitting characterization of each program jurisdiction with reference to elements assumed to facilitate or impede program implementation. The information was deemed essential in order to specify the conditions under which the program operated, and the degree of success with which various program models and components in each model were able to utilize or deal with each of these conditions. Thus, the national evaluation study was designed as a comparative study with a view to specifying the contextual problems that must be taken into account if the deinstitutionalization of status offenders was to produce a demonstrable delinquency prevention outcome.

Information provided in the program guidelines was only moderately explicit in presenting the character and thrust of the evaluation study of the national program. The major emphasis of the design was on amplifying the sparse current knowledge about status offenders and the status offense problem in order to furnish an empirical basis for the

improvement of delinquency prevention programming. While not opposed to this objective, the presentation of evaluation aims in the instructional materials sent into the field offered a slight shift in emphasis. Two evaluation study goals were specified: measurement of the success of the deinstitutionalization program; and assessment of the comparative effectiveness of the various program models to be funded. As for the first, programs were to be evaluated with respect to their success in reaching specified numerical goals in removing status offenders from detention centers, jails, and correctional institutions and preventing their re-entry into such facilities. In addition, an effort was to be made to obtain data relevant to (a) changes in juvenile justice system processing of offenders, in particular their labeling, delabeling, and re-labeling; (b) the effect of the program on juvenile justice system allocation of resources and personnel; and (c) unintended consequences of the program. As to the second evaluation goal, the comparative effectiveness of various program models, this was to be assessed with respect to (a) the comparative reduction in offense behavior among status violators served by the program; (b) change in their general social adjustment in family, school, and work settings; and (c) whatever additional criteria were deemed appropriate by the program director and the site evaluator in each program jurisdiction.

The guideline description of the evaluation study was also alert to the difficulties it was likely to encounter. Listed under this rubric were:

- absence of provision in the OJJ program for a long-time follow-up of program clients to obtain conclusive evidence of program effect;

- the difficulty and cost of developing measurement instruments to serve evaluation research objectives;
- the likelihood that subsequent to their initiation, projects would alter their initial designs, reducing the validity of comparative effectiveness measurement;
- and the difficulty of establishing controlled experimental designs for the comparison of institutional and community based treatment procedures for comparable status offender groups.

As to the last, anticipating the reluctance of program proponents to accept the need for building rigorous experimental design into their program intake procedures, the guideline document held out an attractive quid pro quo: "Special consideration will therefore be given to applicants who propose to incorporate control groups into their action programs" (LEAA, 1975:16).

The experimental design issue was one facet of a wider problem, namely, the importance to be accorded program evaluability as a criterion for funding eligibility. Noted earlier was the fact that evaluability constituted one of the seven criteria for program fundability employed in the penultimate screening procedure. Evaluability in relation to the total possible score was accorded a weight of only 10 percent. Nevertheless, at the insistence of NIJJDP, the Special Emphasis program staff requested SSRI, as the evaluation design group, to assist it in judging the evaluability of the approximately 70 program proposals that survived the first cut, and whose proponents might be invited to submit fully specified grant applications. These were assessed in relation to

four criteria central to evaluation payoff potential: (1) placement with respect to the five dimensions along which programs were expected to vary; (2) availability of and access to juvenile justice data; (3) the number of clients the program was expected to serve and would thereby be available for evaluation purposes; and (4) receptivity to the requirements of the evaluation study, including in particular the use of some form of experimental design.

The level of concern with enhancing evaluation productivity in the proposal selection process is suggested by the outcome of the evaluability assessment exercise. Of the 11 programs ultimately funded by OJJ (The National Assembly of Voluntary Associations proposal was not included in the assessment), only one had been recommended for funding on the basis of evaluability, with a second proposed as a possible substitute for the first. Two had been given secondary ranking, (i.e., others were more acceptable), one was given the lowest acceptable ranking, two were not included in the set reviewed, and four were rejected as posing virtually insuperable problems for evaluation. The following chart presents the outcome in more convenient form:

<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Number of Proposals Ultimately Funded</u>
Recommended	2
Secondary Ranking	2
Lowest Acceptable Ranking	1
Rejected	4
Not reviewed	2
Total	11

To understand this outcome it is necessary again to refer to the presentation of evaluation goals in the guideline document. Two goals were defined: measurement of the success of the deinstitutionalization program in terms of the number of status offenders removed and diverted from secure detention and incarceration; and assessment of the comparative effectiveness of the various program models in reducing post-program delinquent behavior on the part of program clients. In view of the scant account taken of program evaluability in the selection process, it is likely that this ordering represented a primary and a secondary concern of program personnel at OJJ. In effect, in presenting to the field the character of the evaluation to be conducted, OJJ reversed the priorities defined in the original evaluation design. There, the primary focus was placed on the examination of the comparative effectiveness of various program models and justice system contexts in reducing status and delinquent offenses among youth accorded the alternative of community based services. Recognizing that "success" in deinstitutionalizing status offenders was heavily dependent on the way in which juvenile justice systems utilized their discretion in case definition and disposition, the evaluation was designed less to assess "success" than to bring to light the conditions related to variation in developing and utilizing community based services in dealing with status offenders.

Discrepancy in priorities in program evaluation as defined in the design of the evaluation study and as represented to program proponents is probably traceable to the two basic aims of the deinstitutionalization initiative of the OJJ. The first of these, increased utilization of alternative community based facilities, was defined as socially

valuable in itself and therefore not subject to test. The second was the improvement of knowledge about the characteristics of status offenders and the nature of the status offense problem in order to lay an empirical foundation for the use of deinstitutionalization as a delinquency prevention tool. While these aims are by no means mutually exclusive, each corresponds to a somewhat limited specialized interest, with program personnel inclined to emphasize the first, and research personnel the second. Indeed, the divergence of focus was given extreme expression at a meeting in which project proponents were briefed on evaluation aims. One participant stated that even if the evaluation study found that the deinstitutionalization of non-criminal young offenders did not reduce their delinquency, it remained a valid goal simply on the grounds of justice and humaneness. This is tantamount to the view that the concern with program effectiveness is irrelevant.

The same divergence of focus and interest existed in the OJJ staff itself. Through most of the planning year the NIJJDP and the Special Emphasis program groups in OJJ brought conflicting views to the issue of primacy in program objectives. Trained in the canons of scientific investigation, the former had surveyed the research literature on the status offense problem by way of laying the groundwork for designing the status offender program. Concerned with the gaps in knowledge disclosed by the survey, and in the interest of implementing the Congressional mandate in a systematic and rational manner, the NIJJDP staff were inclined to give priority to the need to close the knowledge gap. In their view this aim could best be accomplished by selecting for funding only those proposals that accepted the need for strong

experimental design and that indicated a willingness to assist in generating the substantial body of data required. Essentially, then, the NIJJDP group viewed OJJ's status offender program initiative as an opportunity to build the knowledge base needed to deploy the deinstitutionalization approach for delinquency prevention purposes.

The Special Emphasis program staff, on the other hand, drawn largely from the practice field of social work, were more attuned to the task of demonstrating the feasibility of replacing detention and incarceration with community based facilities as an appropriate means of dealing with the status offense problem. The 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act had mandated deinstitutionalization on the assumption that, among other things, it would in fact reduce delinquency, an assumption shared by the Special Emphasis program staff. The questions they were inclined to address in selecting programs for funding concerned the conditions of organization, administration, resources, and commitment most calculated to promote and demonstrate progress in deinstitutionalizing status offenders. While the NIJJDP staff accepted this question as valid and important, they remained insistent on extending the evaluation to cover the entire gamut of empirical issues with which the status offense problem was encumbered. Among other things, the available research evidence strongly suggested a need for more definitive information in distinguishing status from delinquent offenders, in determining the incidence of neglect and dependency cases within the population treated as status offenders, and in ascertaining the age, gender, ethnic identity, family background, and offense pattern characteristics of those identified as status offenders whose response to various types of community based treatment effectively reduced delinquent behavior.

Put bluntly, the issue between the two components of OJJ was whether to treat the national status offender program solely as an opportunity to promote the status offender deinstitutionalization movement, or as an opportunity to generate the kind of discriminating information that would "fine tune" the movement as an instrument of delinquency prevention and youth welfare.

The two evaluation aims remained a source of strain with OJJ during the program planning year and, in ways that will be noted, during program implementation as well. As has been indicated, the divergence in evaluation aims was eventually resolved largely by displacing the strain from the OJJ office to the field programs. Evaluability as a criterion of project selection for funding was accorded relatively low priority and, with the exception of one project, a weak "before-after" experimental design was substituted for the more rigorous random assignment design whose adoption was initially urged.

These problems were overlaid and rendered even more complex by the manner in which the national evaluation study was organized and structured. NIJJDP had already expressed its interest in addressing the unresolved empirical issues in the status offender problem through its close collaboration with the Social Science Research Institute in designing the national evaluation study. The study was designed as a comparative examination of the conditions under which the deinstitutionalization of status offenders fostered a reduction of their offense behavior. This required the acquisition of uniform data elements to be obtained through the uniform administration of instruments across the set of diverse program sites, each varying with respect to data availability and access.

It was thus evident that for reasons of economy and efficiency the design grantee should also be retained to employ, train, and supervise the data collection staff at all program sites, and provide the required comparative analysis of program effect. However, LEAA regulations restricting the permissible dollar amount of a grant for sole source funding foreclosed opportunity to assure the services of the Social Science Research Institute in conducting the research operation at all sites. Hence, separate evaluation study grantees were procured on a competitive bid basis in each of the eight program sites. Of the 12 projects funded, four were excluded from the evaluation study: two (Eldorado County, California and Newark, Ohio) because of low numbers of status offenders; one (Arkansas) was insufficiently advanced in its deinstitutionalization planning; and a separate outside evaluator was chosen to conduct the evaluation of one (National Assembly). Thus, eight separate evaluation grants were made: a sole source grant to SSRI, and grants to seven different organizations to conduct the data collection operation at the eight program locations and, resources permitting, to pursue special site specific evaluation studies and their own research interests in the status offender problem.

The organizational structure implicit in the arrangement, although necessary on fiscal and administrative grounds, was far from optimal. Its principal difficulty lay in the splitting of responsibility and


authority in relations with site evaluators between NIJJDP and SSRI, and in creating communication barriers. As the funding agency, NIJJDP had sole authority with respect to the work of the site evaluators. As the organization coordinating the evaluation study and conducting the comparative effectiveness analysis, SSRI was responsible for obtaining from site evaluators an extensive body of data in uniform format and for maintaining quality control of the data.

As a condition of its grant, each site evaluator agreed to provide to SSRI the full complement of data as prescribed in the national evaluation design. This was clearly defined as their primary task. They were encouraged in addition to use the site data that they furnished to SSRI and to obtain whatever further data they wished for use in evaluation or research studies of specific interest to them. In addition, they were expected to furnish information on program operations that would serve the needs of program managers at their sites. However, as a condition of their grants, site evaluators were obliged to accord highest priority to the data requirements of the national evaluation study. This meant, in effect, that the design of their local evaluation studies was not freely determined by them, but imposed. As competent researchers in their own right, they were inclined to resent such imposition, despite the fact that their grants were based on an acceptance of this condition. Notwithstanding such agreement, as the evaluation study proceeded, site evaluators in many cases came to feel that they were functioning not as self-respecting researchers, but as mere data collectors. The difficulties were exacerbated by the need to revise the national data formats several times in order to accommodate extensive cross-site variation in access to program data and to official offense records. The fallout

of largely unrepressed resentment was understandable, but altogether unavoidable.

To meet the objectives of the national evaluation study, SSRI had to monitor continually and closely the data development work of the site evaluators. The major axis of communication was, consequently, between the eight site evaluators and SSRI. The line of control and authority, on the other hand, ran from the site evaluators to NIJJDP. Lines of control from SSRI to site evaluators could move only via NIJJDP. The awkwardness of this arrangement was eventually moderated by unusually supportive cooperation.

A further problematic feature of organizational structure had its source in the Office of Juvenile Justice itself. The program and evaluation sides of the deinstitutionalization program were handled by its Special Emphasis program staff and NIJJDP, respectively. Well into the first year of program operation this arrangement continued to interpose barriers to contact between the national evaluation study staff at SSRI and the directors of program projects at the eight sites. Directors of site programs were responsible only to the Special Emphasis program staff. As a consequence, what may be termed a climate of "disconnectedness" was generated between site program staffs and both SSRI and the site evaluators. This occurred despite the fact that program directors were obliged by the terms of the program grants to provide assistance to site evaluators in the data collection operation. Communication difficulties stemming from the organizational structure of the OJJ deinstitutionalization initiative are best reflected in the following chart:



Direct communication between pairs of units is indicated by the double arrow lines. To obtain information about the structure and operations of site programs, SSRI was obliged to route messages through NIJJDP and thence to the Special Emphasis program staff at the OJJDP level. Indeed, until well into the second program year SSRI labored under an OJJ directive forbidding communication with the directors of site programs. An alternative route was through the site evaluators to program directors. But here there existed communication barriers of another kind. In addition to the chronic suspicion of evaluation researchers entertained by program personnel, site evaluators were burdened with the task of providing the voluminous data required for the national evaluation study. They were inclined for the most part to attend only to those features of program operations relevant to their data collection tasks. Their

relations were further troubled by the demands imposed on program staffs to "paper" their client intake and service activities, i.e., to complete the required data forms accurately and promptly.

As is frequently the case when formal organizational structure impedes task accomplishment, by the end of the second program year informal lines of communication had been developed between the national evaluation study staff and the directors of site programs. SSRI staff had found it necessary to make frequent site visits to program locations to assist site evaluators with data collection and formatting problems. In the course of these visits opportunities arose both to observe program operations and on occasion to confer with program personnel. To supplement this source of information, as the funding period was drawing to a close several members of the national study staff spent several days at each program site obtaining interview data respecting structural and operational features of programs from program directors, their staff members, contracted service providers, and police and court personnel.

Three additional problems in conducting the national evaluation study deserve mention. The complexity of the task in organizing deinstitutionalization programs at multiple sites was initially little appreciated. Insufficient start-up time was provided for in the planning. As a result, a number of the programs did not become fully operational until well into their first funding year, drastically limiting the duration of the program "test" period. Failure to provide time to resolve start-up problems affected the evaluation study as well. Specifically, there was no opportunity prior to program initiation to field test the data collection instruments for their capacity to accommodate the

enormous variation across sites in the character and quality of available data. The concern here was with both program service and client offense data. This became a serious problem in view of the need this imposed to modify data instruments simultaneously with the need to maintain data recording concurrently with program operations.

A second special problem was intrinsic to the scope and complexity of the data required to examine the comparative effectiveness issue across the range of program models and program components. In all, 16 data sets were called for. In order to assure the uniformity of the information and to maintain quality control, these data were to be centrally processed and reduced to machine readable form at the University of Southern California. Arrangements had been made with site evaluators to return to them their own site data, thus relieving them of the task of data processing. However, it shortly became evident that the time required for constructing an analytically useful data system capable of handling the massive volume of data was seriously underestimated. As a result, it proved difficult to provide site evaluators with the information they needed from time to time for purposes of monitoring their own progress in completing data collection and data correction tasks, in performing special analyses of interest to them, and in some instances of providing client flow information to their opposite numbers on the program side.

The third, and possibly the most serious, of these technical problems was the need to sacrifice data on program services. The evaluation design initially called for extensive detail on each youth served by the program with respect to the precise content, frequency, and

duration of each of the sequences of services provided, as well as the professional level and treatment approach or intervention strategy of the personnel furnishing the service in each service episode. It quickly became apparent that the time and resources needed to record service history at this level of detail would be massively resisted by both service providers and site evaluators. The information was then supplemented by survey data describing in some detail the characteristics of the services provided by each program facility, permitting the recovery of service detail referenced in the aggregate to all clients serviced by that facility.

Presented in Chapter II in narrative form were the significant features of the status offender deinstitutionalization program, including the manner in which the problem was conceptualized, the suggested strategies for the development of alternative community based services, and the vicissitudes of selecting programs for funding. Described in this chapter were the objectives of the national evaluation study and its main problems of organization and implementation. The most salient of these problems were (1) resistance on the part of program personnel to the use of a random assignment design in order to establish appropriate control groups; (2) sacrifice of the needed scope and detail of program service data; (3) the inclusion of sites with unexpectedly small numbers of status offenders; (4) lack of adequate start-up time for the development of data instrumentation prior to program operations; and (5) an organizational structure that interposed barriers to communication between program and evaluation personnel, and between national program and site evaluators.

Examined in the next chapter are the differences among the eight programs funded under the deinstitutionalization initiative with a view to defining each as a distinctive program model and appraising their problems, strengths and weaknesses.

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SECTION II

PROGRAM MODELS FOR THE
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

Solomon Kobrin and Elaine M. Corry

INTRODUCTION

Of the 12 programs funded by OJJ in its deinstitutionalization initiative, eight were included in the national evaluation study. Sharing a set of general objectives, the eight programs were designed to prevent the placement of status offenders in detention facilities and correctional institutions by providing alternative community based facilities, and to register progress in reducing the number of status offenders currently incarcerated in correctional institutions. Common to the programs as well was a generally defined body of treatment practices.

However, the programs shared little beyond these general features. Each was distinctive both in regard to the institutional and community setting in which it functioned and in the specific variant of treatment approach adopted. As such, each program may be seen as prototypical for all jurisdictions in which the same contextual conditions exist and the same treatment approaches are employed. Accordingly, they may be regarded for analytic purposes as individual models open to assessment with respect to their advantages and weaknesses. Further, so far as each program was engaged in an enterprise of institutional change, and in an effort to introduce and gain acceptance for novel procedures in the treatment of status offenders, each encountered obstacles in the course of program implementation that are likely to be typical of comparable community and institutional settings. Success

and failure in coping with such difficulties, the victories, defeats, and accommodations the program experienced can illuminate further the virtues and shortcomings of each program model.

Narrative descriptions of each of the eight programs included in the National Evaluation are presented in the following chapters, and are based on recorded interviews with key participants in the programs. These included program directors and their staffs, court personnel including judges and probation workers, the police, the leaders as well as the line staff of youth agencies that provided community based services, site evaluators, and in some instances officials of juvenile justice planning agencies. The aim of the narrative presentations is to provide a concrete and detailed account of the community and institutional forces that shaped the program, including the latent and open conflicts that arose, at times resolved at the cost of subverting, and at other times in ways entirely favorable to the implementation of program objectives. It was inevitable in this type of situation that a "Rashomon" problem would arise, in which the same events and problems are diversely perceived, described, and interpreted. In these circumstances, as in all historiography and ethnology, the "objective truth" becomes elusive. However, every effort was made to achieve factual accuracy and, so far as possible, to reflect faithfully the various perspectives of the informants in order to produce a balanced portrayal.

Illustrative materials are occasionally introduced in the form of directly quoted statements, without attribution, and sometimes paraphrased.

To clarify the program models, an overview of differences among programs with reference to their fundamental features will be presented. Here, only gross typifications will be employed. The program-by-program descriptions are intended to provide a close up view of each program design, enabling the reader to discern the contextual and programmatic elements that constitute each program as a model.

PROGRAM DESIGN FEATURES

Figures 1 and 2 respectively provide a general overview of two categories of program characteristics. Contextual factors differentiate programs in terms of the community and justice system conditions within which programs functioned. Although at several of the sites (Alameda County, California; Pima County, Arizona; Vancouver County, Washington) juvenile justice agencies were the grant recipients, there was considerable variation in the degree of control exercised by each of these agencies over program operations. Justice control as used in this context indicates the extent to which the justice system exercised its control over program. Operational factors differentiate programs in terms of their basic design and operations. The characterization of programs with reference to their

Figure 2. PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS: SELECTED OPERATIONAL FACTORS

Program Sites	ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN			ELIGIBILITY FOR PROGRAM SERVICES		PRIMARY PROGRAM STRATEGY			SYSTEM PENETRATION DURING REFERRAL				PROGRAM CONTROL OF CLIENT C		
	Formal-istic	Mixed	Personal-istic	Status Offenses Only-"Mixed" Cases Excluded	Instant Status Offense as Sole Qualification	Family Crisis Counseling	Youth Advocacy	Eclectic	Justice Agency Referral Required		System Penetration		HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
									YES	NO	HIGH	LOW			
Alameda County (Calif.)	X				X	X			X			X			X
Pima County (Arizona)	X				X		X			X		X			X
Connecticut	X			X				X	X		X				X
Delaware	X			X				X	X		X			X	
Illinois ^b	X			X			X		X		X		-	-	-
South Carolina	X			X				X		X		X			X
Spokane County (Washington)			X		X	X			X			X		X	
Clark County (Washington)			X	X		X			X		X			X	

a. In the formalistic design, referrals of clients for service are typically routed through a central coordinating agency. Direct and unmediated referrals from one to another agency in the service network is represented in the personalistic organizational design.

b. No attempt was made to obtain information on program control of client. Those placed in group home facilities were present for the very brief period between arrest and court appearance to permit implementation of sanctions for rule violation.

c. Data are based on program facility responses to a list of possible rule violations and the severity of sanctions imposed. Overall, the DSO programs exercised relatively low control over clients because of the short-term nature of services provided. Data were not collected from foster home facilities.

Figure 1. SITE CHARACTERISTICS: SELECTED CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Program Site	Statutory Restriction on Detention and Incarceration			Community Tolerance			Justice Control of Program			Availability of Residential Facilities		
	Absent	Partly Restricted	Fully Restricted	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Alameda County (Calif.)		X			X		X			X		
Pima County (Arizona)		X		X				X			X	
Connecticut	X					X	X			X		
Delaware	X					X	X				X	
Illinois		X				X		X			X	
South Carolina	X					X		X				X
Spokane Co. (Washington)		X			X				X		X	
Clark Co. (Washington)		X			X		X					X

features was based on a variety of information sources, including program directors, site evaluators, and service providers. Where appropriate and feasible, classifications were based on available data, as in the use of school district disciplinary records for the assessment of community tolerance, and the use of survey data provided by site evaluators to determine levels of residential bedspace, and by service providers with reference to the degree of client control exercised by program facilities.

At the most general level, each program may be characterized with reference to an ideal typical set of contextual and operational features envisioned as optimal by the deinstitutionalization initiative. Thus, with respect to the community and juvenile justice system setting of any program, progress in deinstitutionalization would be maximally feasible in jurisdictions (a) highly tolerant of status offending youth, (b) with detention and/or commitment to correctional institutions either prohibited by statute or discouraged by administrative practice; (c) having adequate bedspace in non-secure residential facilities as alternatives to detention, and (d) in which the program was conducted by a community based youth serving agency outside the control of the juvenile justice system.

Further, as suggested by guideline specifications, an ideal typical deinstitutionalization program would include as critical program elements:

- (a) reasonably non-restrictive eligibility

- criteria for admission to program services;
- (b) maximum mutual access to and communication among program personnel throughout the youth service network of the jurisdiction;
- (c) reduction of "system penetration" by diversion of status offense cases to the program at the police or court intake level;
- (d) provision of treatment facilities that avoids the stigmatization of program clients by reducing the level of behavioral control exercised; and
- (e) an eclectic treatment strategy based on both a crisis intervention and a youth advocacy model.

There was, of course, no expectation that any of the programs would or could provide all of the elements of this prescription. However, it does provide a standard against which differences in the character of the several programs may be assessed. Figures 1, 2 and 3 present a summary description of the programs in relation to the conditions initially assumed to favor the implementation of program aims.

Figure 1 presents a summary account of selected success in achieving deinstitutionalization aims. Relevant conditions are defined by the legal, community attitude, community resource availability, and the local justice

system involvement in the management of the deinstitutionalization effort. Sites varied respecting statutory provisions in their juvenile codes in the degree to which detention and other forms of secure confinement in status offender cases were prescribed or prohibited. Sites operating under codes that prohibited such confinement were less restricted in the development of their programs.

As measured by the single indicator of rates of school expulsion and suspension, communities varied in the climate of opinion in which justice and youth services agencies felt free to pursue program aims. They differed also in the extent to which there was already in place a network of facilities for the residential care of those status offenders for whom returns to their own home was precluded.

Finally, whether the program grant recipient was an agency of the juvenile justice system, typically a juvenile court, a public welfare agency, or a coalition of private youth serving agencies, could potentially have important consequences for client perceptions of the stigmatizing effect of program services.

Figure 2 similarly summarizes the major dimensions along which site programs differed in concrete content. Networks of community-based service agencies were of two main types, with a third possibility in which the two were combined. The formalistic organizational design was one in which all referrals to the program were to a central agency for evaluation with respect to eligibility for program

services and for judgment regarding the type of service needed by program eligibles. Referrals were then made to volunteer or contracted service agencies with the requirement for accountable recording and reporting to the central DSO agency. There was little or no interaction and communication among the personnel of the service agencies with respect to problems of individual clients. In contrast, the personalistic organizational design, regardless of the source of initial referral to the DSO program, encouraged active communication among the personnel of service agencies, such that clients were referred freely from one to another in the search for services deemed appropriate in each case.

Eligibility for program services differed in relation to the legal status of the status offender. Some site programs accepted only those youth whose set of charged instant offenses did not include either violations of the criminal codes and/or were not currently on probation for a prior offense of any kind. In other sites, programs accepted as eligible for program services any youth whose instant offense or set of instant offenses included status violations.

Three types of primary program strategy were identified. The major treatment approach at virtually all sites was the provision of crisis counseling, which most frequently included members of the client's family. In a second type of program strategy, several sites emphasized a

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
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youth advocacy approach. This consisted variously of efforts to mediate conflicts between the youth and the family, the court, or the school, and efforts to provide help in remedying educational deficits and to obtain employment. A third program strategy avoided a special emphasis on either of the first two, and attempted to combine both in an eclectic approach.

The extent to which status offenders penetrated the juvenile justice system in various site programs also varied. The main distinction was whether justice agency referral was a requirement for program services eligibility, and, as a summary dichotomous judgment, whether the penetration of the juvenile justice system by the clientele of the site program was high or low.

Finally, Figure 3 presents information that was obtained regarding the extent to which programs attempted to maintain control over the behavior of their clients in the course of providing program services. Implicit in the labeling theory assumptions of the status offender desinstitutionalization program was the aim of avoiding the stigma attached to formal justice processing. Commonly seen as the specifically stigmatizing impact of formal processing is the use of punitive threat as the means of controlling delinquent behavior. However, this effect is also highly likely when community-based non-justice agencies to which status offenders are referred exercise restrictive control over the behavior of their clients. This is particularly


Program Control of Client



the case if referral has been initiated by the police or court, with the clear implication that continued misbehavior can result in remand of the youth to the control of the court. An important feature of the program, therefore, varying among sites, was the scope of control over client behavior exerted by community-based agencies which accepted status offender referrals. This was systematically assessed through a survey questionnaire completed by all service providers with the exception of foster homes. They were requested to specify the type and frequency of sanctions imposed for various forms of client violations of agency rules. Estimated from these returns was the percentage distribution at all sites of high, medium, and low sanction severity and frequency imposed for rule violation.

Elements of the classification scheme here reviewed will be referred to selectively in the course of individual program descriptions that follow. Such repetition is designed to bring to the readers attention the rationale of evaluation concerns with contextual conditions created by legal and community factors and with program characteristics as these have affected the specific site programs under discussion.

Program Control of Client



SANCTIONS

HIGH _____
 MED _____
 LOW _____

CHAPTER IV
THE PIMA COUNTY PROGRAM
(ARIZONA)

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CHAPTER IV
THE PIMA COUNTY PROGRAM
(ARIZONA)

The metropolitan area of southern Arizona centering on the city of Tucson formed the backdrop of a drama out of which, almost as an afterthought, the Pima County program emerged. Late in 1974 the Arizona Supreme Court suspended the Pima County Juvenile Court judge, the Honorable John P. Collins, pending an investigation of charges that he was "soft" on the juvenile criminals. He had been elected as a Superior Court judge in 1972, and was appointed to the juvenile court after a short period on the criminal bench.

Prior to his appointment, the Pima County Juvenile Court had made full use of detention and correctional institutions in its treatment of juvenile offenders. Each year some 200 to 300 young offenders were being sent to the State's reform school; detention rates were high; and large numbers of status offenders were being accorded the same treatment as young criminal offenders.

Among his first acts in taking over the juvenile bench, Judge Collins visited the State's principal juvenile correctional facility, the Fort Grant Reformatory. What followed is best described by Professor Dean Rojek of the University of Arizona:

What Judge Collins found was a model prison existing in a desolate and barren location outside of Pima County where juvenile felons, misdemeanants and non-criminal offenders were dumped for "rehabilitation" and treatment. The shock of seeing this juvenile prison prompted Judge Collins to issue a decree that he would no longer commit any juvenile offender to Fort Grant Reformatory and (that) the local community should begin to assume more

(with participation of Frank R. Hellum)

responsibility for the care and custody of delinquent offenders. The publicity that resulted from this action led to the closure of Fort Grant and the exclusive use of two major juvenile institutions, Arizona Youth Center and Adobe Mountain School and one male conservation camp, Alpine Conservation Center. . . . Under Judge Collin's leadership a community based treatment program was initiated in 1973 providing an individualized treatment and rehabilitation program for juveniles in need of temporary placement out of the home. By the end of 1973 there were ten placement facilities in the Tucson metropolitan area that were able to provide care for 100 juveniles.

It soon became apparent that Tucson was hardly the type of community in which so sweeping and decisive a reform could occur unopposed. Professor Rojek continues the account:

Late in 1974 the Director of Court services was removed from office and this set off a wave of anti-Collins propaganda. Allegations and innuendos were bantered about in Pima County concerning the "radical" Juvenile (Court) Judge and his mollycoddling of juvenile thugs and hoodlums. . . (This) vendetta resulted in the Arizona Supreme Court suspending Judge Collins as the Juvenile Judge pending an investigation of his actions. There was an immediate protest from the local community (which) rose up in strong support of Judge Collins and gave wholehearted endorsement of his policies. Within a month the Supreme Court rescinded the order of suspension and Judge Collins was reinstated as the presiding juvenile court judge for Pima County. Realizing the strong support that emerged from this experience, the Judge pressed for an even stronger commitment for community based treatment and became an outspoken critic of the juvenile court system. For his efforts and enthusiasm, he was given the Man of the Year Award in Pima County.*

Having thus survived the furor occasioned by exposing conditions at the Fort Grant Reformatory and its subsequent closing, and with the expansion of community based facilities for the commitment of adjudicated offenders, the juvenile court under Judge Collin's leadership

*Dean Rojek, Historical Development of the Pima County DSO Program, unpublished mss., Tucson: University of Arizona, 1977.

turned its attention to the existing heavy use made of the court's detention center. Its excessive use is indicated by the fact that in 1974 and 1975 over 62 percent of all referrals to the court for incorrigibility resulted in detention. This rate was exceeded only by the detention rate for homicide, kidnapping, and sexual assault. During these years almost half of all detentions were for status offenses.* As a first approach to reversing the use of detention in these cases, a small shelter care facility for runaways was established, and use was made of a State supported Family Counselling program. The latter provided payment to psychologists, psychiatrists, and other professional counselors to whom status offenders involved in serious family conflicts were referred in lieu of detention. During 1975 the court established the Mobile Diversion Unit (MDU) to divert status offenders from the court by detaching and placing in the field six of its probation officers. The function of the unit was to deal with status offense cases referred to the court by police, and to respond to requests by parents for assistance in these cases. In addition to diverting status offenders from court processing, the Mobile Diversion Unit also attempted to resolve family disputes frequently associated with status offenses and made referrals to social agencies when the need for further help was indicated.

Thus, by 1975, when the Juvenile Court received the general solicitation for preliminary program proposals from OJJ, it already had in place a program to deinstitutionalize status offenders. The court staff first regarded a response to the OJJ solicitation as inappropriate

* Rojek, op. cit.

in their situation in view of the solid progress already achieved. However, on further consideration it was apparent that only the first important steps had been taken and there was still a long way to go before the Tucson community would be fully committed to the value of deinstitutionalizing status offenders. The court applied for and received a grant to carry forward its program.

PROGRAM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

Faced now with the opportunity to expand its deinstitutionalization program, the court staff brought to the task the enthusiasm generated by success in surmounting the initial opposition to their efforts. Clearly, it would be necessary to increase the number and capacity of local facilities in order to provide alternatives to the use of detention and correctional institutions. At the same time, however, the staff was deeply convinced that the program should also address the underlying problems of which status offense behavior was seen as the symptom, without sacrificing the need for alternatives to detention. The program was thus viewed as requiring an essentially preventive thrust, with components aimed at community education and training of school personnel in dealing constructively with status offense problems. A substantial proportion of OJJ grant funds was to be used for these purposes, although most of the program budget was to be devoted to an expansion of shelter care facilities and other direct services. The court, as grant recipient, evidenced its commitment to deinstitutionalization by absorbing all of the administrative costs of the program.

Thus, with a program already in place to provide community based facilities as an alternative to detention, the court turned its attention to the task of developing new approaches to reach youth groups that in its view were relatively untouched by the established youth serving agencies of the community. Program initiatives were sought that might intervene constructively in situations productive of status offense behavior. Supervisory personnel of the Community and Family Service unit of the court's probation staff, including the director of the Mobile Diversion Unit, were constituted as a Source Evaluation Board, and requests for program proposals were circulated. Proposals were solicited from community agencies to conduct programs of outreach services, shelter care facilities, educational alternatives (alternative school programs and special truancy reduction programs), and training of school and agency personnel. In addition, a number of community-neighborhood resource units were planned in which local residents were to be involved.

During the solicitation phase, two problems arose which were to have a decided effect on both the character and development of the Pima County program. The first and more crucial of these stemmed from the criteria employed for selection of facilities to be funded. The Source Evaluation Board, composed of court personnel, wanted agencies and organizations with a flair for innovative programming designed to breach the generational, social class, and ethnic barrier between the youth and the adult worlds, and oriented to the prevention of delinquency as a primary objective. The Source Evaluation Board regarded the old-line youth service agencies as incapable of reaching out effectively to meet the needs of large numbers of unserved youth. The use of

these standards meant that many of the agencies constituting Tucson's established network of youth services facilities, to their surprise and chagrin, failed in their efforts to obtain the court's grant awards. With few exceptions, contracts were awarded to some of the smaller, more recently organized, or little known agencies and organizations. They were particularly angered by their failure to obtain funding since a number of them, having provided letters of support for the court's grant application to OJJ, had some expectation of being selected as the service providers. From the outset, then, the court came under muted but sustained critical attack from the "establishment" agencies.

The second problem was occasioned by the court's status as an agency of county government. As is usual for government purchasing procedures, the letting of contracts to organizations selected as the service providers entailed a complex and time consuming process. Contracts required approval at three levels: the County Attorney, the County Manager, and the County Board of Supervisors, with the customary delays at each level. The result was a delay of several months in the anticipated program start-up date, with consequent shortening of the expected time for program operation. However, as in the case of other funded programs, OJJ compensated for the failure to provide lead time for program start-up by granting a no-cost extension during the second program year.

As the Pima County program was finally established, 19 agencies and organizations were funded by the court. With respect to the type of service provided, the single largest category, in accord with the

court's philosophy, consisted of outreach programs (7), with shelter care agencies following closely (5). The remaining seven consisted of the following types: a truancy program in a Tucson school district; a crisis intervention service representing an expansion of the court's Mobile Diversion Unit; a counseling service operating in school locations; a program for female high school students to improve their social and occupational skills; and an advocacy center for young women focusing on the entire range of their problems. Initially planned but subsequently either drastically curtailed or abandoned entirely were the training program for school and agency personnel, a drama program for teen-agers, and a self-help family counseling program.

The striking feature of the Pima County program design was its coupling of expanded detention alternative facilities with a bold move into the uncharted waters of prevention programming and youth advocacy. The former capitalized on existing shelter care agencies in the community, some of which were only marginally established, and utilized grant funds to increase their resources. The seven "outreach" programs included four that were located in high delinquency rate neighborhoods, in which youth services were in short supply and where the young are often described as "hard to reach." These four programs operated in Tucson's Black community, in the American Indian community, in an isolated Mexican-American neighborhood in the south end of the county, and throughout the county's rural hinterland. The organizations funded to conduct the programs in these instances were directed and staffed by workers who were members of the same community or by persons well

established in their helping roles and trusted by the residents. With few exceptions their programs operated as multi-service centers in order to respond to the many different kinds of needs of youth and their families. The other three confined their outreach efforts to specific devices to attract the young to their program services: enriched educational service to the very young in one case, training in the use and care of motor bikes in a second, and in the third, crisis intervention and referral to agency services in conjunction with the major crisis intervention service of the court's Mobile Diversion Unit.

These programs were monitored by the same Community and Family Services unit of the court probation staff that had selected the community agency program proposals for funding. Because of their involvement in the selection process, members of the staff had something of a stake in their successful operation. Nevertheless, it became difficult for monitors to exercise more than the most general supervision in the case of the programs that provided a range of services centered on a preventive objective. In effect, these programs were given a relatively small annual budget, usually in the \$15,000-\$25,000 range, and were encouraged to "do their thing." There were difficulties in monitoring several of such programs, in part because of cultural barriers between the monitors and the program leaders, which resulted in the successive replacement of monitors, and in part because, as one informant put it, while program leaders had done street work with the youngsters, they had had no experience in the administration of grants. This was apparently the price the court was prepared to pay to encourage "grass roots" participation in the status offender

program. It was, incidentally, precisely the selection of these kinds of "off the wall" services that the established agencies had found objectionable in the court's program. Further, programs of this type posed very real problems for the "per child accountability" monitoring required by OJJ with respect to both services provided and their attached costs. The court made every effort to obtain such accounting, but with only moderate success. This was particularly true where programs were established in minority communities. In these settings any effort to devote program services to status offenders as distinct from delinquent offenders, or for that matter, to differentiate them from the general youth population, was regarded by their program directors as unrealistic.

Similar problems of monitoring and service accounting did not, however, arise with respect to the major unit for receiving status offender cases and referring them to detention alternatives (Mobile Diversion), or with respect to the shelter care programs. Other "outreach" programs, such as the Free Clinic, the women's advocacy center, and the program to improve social and occupational skills among female high schoolers presented difficult but manageable service accounting problems, since they, too, were oriented primarily to a prevention objective.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

As a locale for the status offender program, the Pima County community was not without conflict with regard to the value of deinstitutionalization. As attested by the history of the court's effort to move in this direction before the program started, there was some active and articulate opposition to this development,

While the court enjoyed substantial community support in its drive to eliminate commitments to the State's "juvenile prison," it had to overcome the objections of small but influential groups.

These events had the effect, then, of casting the court in a leadership role in the movement to reform juvenile justice on the local scene.

This fact constitutes the most significant contextual element of the Pima County program. It led to the decision to design a status offender program that aspired to add to the simple avoidance of detention the more basic aim of addressing directly the conditions responsible for the infractious behavior of youth.

Community Tolerance

A community ambivalent over the issue of deinstitutionalizing young offenders might well be expected to be sharply divided in its tolerance for youthful misbehavior of any kind, including status offenses. That this was the case in Pima County is suggested by two observations. The first, described below, is indicated by the posture of its enforcement agencies, which tended to regard the use of detention in status offense cases as a salutary use of authority. The second is based on the sole systematic measure of community tolerance obtained from the eight program sites funded in the national initiative, namely, the rate of school expulsions and suspensions. On this measure, during the school year preceding the introduction of its status offender program, Pima County was by far the lowest in the array. It may be seen, therefore, as a community in which its major institution for the training and education of the young had a comparatively high tolerance for

problem behavior. Further evidence of the position taken by school officials in this matter is the fact that they requested and received court funding for three efforts to deal constructively with the problem: a truancy program in one high school, an alternative school for truants and dropouts in another, and a counseling program in a third.

Availability of Residential Facilities

The use of detention in status offense cases had already declined prior to the start of the program. There was thus some solid basis in experience for estimating the volume of alternative non-secure out-of-home placement facilities that might be needed. Program plans called for contracting with several existing shelter care agencies, to be supplemented by the use of foster homes. With respect to the latter, a particular effort was made to establish a small number of foster homes in areas of the county in which none existed, so that out-of-home placements when necessary would occur reasonably close to the youth's area of residence. The single substantial problem that arose was an inordinate delay in the licensing of the planned foster homes. The delay was attributed by program personnel to bureaucratic foot-dragging in the Economic Security Agency, the State body that licensed foster homes. In addition to its inaccessibility because it was located in the State capitol, there was a suspicion that the delay was exacerbated by an undercurrent of competition between the status offender program and the ESA in recruiting foster parents. The ESA was also responsible for administering the State's foster home program, which included recruiting and funding them. The court program was apparently somewhat more successful in recruiting foster parents simply because it paid them at

a higher rate. Despite these incidental difficulties, there was basically no problem in meeting the moderate need for shelter care facilities, principally because in the Pima County program it was found feasible to return to their homes almost all status offenders who were referred to the program.

Juvenile Justice Control of Program

As the grant recipient, the Pima County Juvenile Court was totally involved in the design and administration of its status offender program. As has been indicated, from the program evaluation standpoint the interest in this contextual element lies in the likelihood that the supervening presence of the court in all program operations may unavoidably impose a climate of coercive authority that clings to judicial power, and convey to status offenders the impression that although they have not been put under lock and key, they remain under threat. However, the experience of this program suggests the conditions under which this is not a necessary consequence. In a word, the conditions include a voluntary and informal divestiture of jurisdiction in status offense cases, and moral and financial support of community based programs ranging from those that provide services specific to the needs of status offenders to those that provide general preventive services. In the case of Pima County the latter was represented by the extraordinary diversity of the programs supported out of grant funds, and the former by the court's practice of deflecting from court intake all status offense cases. Referrals of status offense cases by the court's own Mobile Diversion Unit were typically not made to the court, but directly to the various community programs. These were not recorded as court cases, but only for

purposes of program monitoring and program evaluation. And, as will be seen in the section on eligibility for program services, where enforcement agencies insisted on delivering status offenders bodily to the court center, they were neither held in confinement nor admitted to intake. Given these features of the program, it seems fair to conclude that although the court had total control of the program, it used its power in conscious and deliberate ways to reduce to a minimum the effect of court authority.

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes

Neither prior to nor after program start-up was there any prohibition on the use of detention in status offense cases in Arizona, nor is there such restriction as of the date of this report. On the other hand, the juvenile code was amended during the second program year (1977) to prohibit the commitment of status offenders to correctional institutions, a change for which the Pima County court under Judge Collins may have been in part responsible. Arizona was thus among the minority of States (16) in 1977 laggard in joining the general movement in the U.S. for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This fact clearly places the Pima County program in the forefront of effort in that State to alter its approach to the problem.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES OF THE PIMA COUNTY PROGRAM

The Intervention Strategy

The program approach adopted by the Pima County Juvenile Court was largely shaped by its history of success in diverting status offenders from standard forms of court processing. Encouraged by its progress, the court viewed its OJJ grant as an opportunity to stabilize the reforms

it had accomplished and to introduce a variety of innovative programs that would press forward its attack on the delinquency problem. In concept, the latter were designed to deal with the more basic conditions of which status offense behavior was symptomatic. In content, the innovative programs were intended to provide a variety of direct services to youth in their own community settings and in the schools. Programs selected for funding focused on several categories of minority youth and on such underserved populations as young women and rural youth.

The court's intervention strategy thus combined crisis intervention with a unique pattern of youth advocacy. Its Mobile Diversion Unit provided a routine 24-hour service responsive to calls for assistance in dealing with status offense cases without recourse to court processing. Conceived initially as a limited demonstration of the feasibility and usefulness of this procedure, to be taken over by either the police or another non-court entity, the crisis intervention function became a fixed feature of the court's program. The Tucson police were ideologically uninterested in this mode of operation, and were reluctant, in addition, to sacrifice the use of arrests as a criterion of job performance. Nor was there any clear prospect that this function might be assumed by either the private or the public social agency sector. Crisis intervention remained by default an established element of the court's program.

Youth advocacy in the Pima County program was distinctive for the scope of its aspirations. As initially conceptualized, this element was to constitute the innovative thrust of the program. Advocacy

consisted of three kinds of undertakings: a "grass roots" community organization effort; a program to train court, social agency, and school personnel to restructure their perception of the status offender as a disturbed and troubled rather than a law violating youth; and the provision of basic helping services to a large pool of unreached and disadvantaged youngsters.

The early efforts at both community organization and personnel training were less than successful, owing in large part to a lack of experience in setting attainable goals and in dealing with problems of their implementation. Nonetheless, the push in this direction was important as an expression of the court's interest in going beyond the more immediate and obvious, if necessary, moves to reduce the exposure of status offenders to institutional treatment. Despite many problems of execution, the interest was most fully implemented in the support the court provided its "outreach" programs, many of which mobilized newly developed or previously undersupported agencies and organizations in support of a preventive and advocacy operation. While some fell short of their initial promise, their effort had the effect of enlarging the circle of awareness with respect to the problem of institutionalizing status offenders, and increasing the resources available for addressing the problem outside the juvenile justice system.

PROBLEMS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation problems differed both in kind and degree among programs in relation to their operational features and the community and institutional context in which they functioned. Already alluded to has

been the delay in program start-up because of the legal complexities in concluding contracts with service providers. Here, attention will be given to problems in relations with the police and with service providers, and problems related to eligibility for program services as well as the associated problem of limiting system penetration. These have been identified as particularly relevant implementation issues intrinsic to the Pima County program model.

Relations With Police

The court's pre-program campaign to reduce the use of both institutional commitments for delinquent offenders and of detention for status offenders was given only the most nominal and pro forma endorsement by enforcement agencies. In establishing the Mobile Diversion Unit with the use of probation personnel prior to program inception, the court knowingly undertook a function that in many jurisdictions is performed by officers attached to the juvenile bureau or unit of the police department. The court had quite appropriately defined crisis intervention in status offense cases as a police function. In its initial approach to the Tucson police department, the court proposed to enter into a contract with them to fund their development of this service. The proposal was rejected. In the words of a court officer:

The word that we got from the police department was that they didn't want to have anything to do with it. Police officers would have to go through officer training and that would have to cost so much money. (They) just did not want to get involved in it. You try it, they said, and if it works, we'll look at it again.

Given the lack of police enthusiasm for the idea, the court developed the MDU program as an operation of its own staff. It soon became clear that the police would continue to oppose the court's effort

to avoid detaining status offenders. Once the federally funded program was fully operative, the court decreed that no status offender could be placed in detention without the explicit approval of the judge or the director of the court center, and the police were so informed. They nevertheless persisted in arresting status offenders and transporting them to the court center for purposes of detention. To dissuade them from continuing the practice, the court, obliged legally to take custody, ultimately arranged to place these youngsters in an unlocked room, providing a clear unspoken message that they might leave if they wished, or accept the help the MDU was prepared to offer. There was some fear on the part of the MDU staff as well as the police that they would simply leave the unlocked room in large numbers. Police officials were particularly vocal in their objection to this change, but in the end grudgingly agreed to "try it for three months." They insisted, however, in retaining the arresting officers' right to deliver the youth to the detention facility of the court. The fear of "running" did not, however, materialize, as there occurred only a single incident in which the youth simply returned home.

In time the police recognized the futility of delivering arrested status offenders for detention and, at the discretion of individual police officers, either referred such offenders directly to the MDU, or declined to take them into custody. Having failed in its effort to induce the police to take over the task of crisis intervention, the court used its program funds to expand its MDU staff and to improve its operation.

Relations With Service Providers

As has been noted, the thrust for innovation that characterized the Pima County program resulted in the selection of a number of service providers with close ties to residential and/or minority communities funded to conduct open outreach programs. Many of these agencies were relatively inexperienced in dealing with problems of fiscal management and of record keeping and reporting. As a consequence, the program encountered its most stubborn problem in relations with service providers in monitoring the performance of these agencies.

By terms of its grant, the court was obliged to account on a per-child basis for services provided by the community based agencies it funded, and to assist the evaluator in obtaining an extensive body of data on the characteristics of program clients and the character and volume of service each received. Although such "papering" of clients is no small task, it occasioned little difficulty with respect to the shelter care facilities, since client identification and the specification of services provided are readily recorded. The case was quite otherwise, however, in the open outreach programs that provide varied services to a clientele that included non-offenders as well as offenders, and of the latter, status as well as delinquent offenders. Eligibility for these services cannot be restricted to status offenders. Moreover, service providers were frequently reluctant to focus recording attention on clients referred for a status offense because of the difficulty of ascertaining with precision the specific services they had received. Their participation in the agency's program may or may not have had, for example, components of "counseling," an activity

that is often merged informally with other program services. Similarly, providers sometimes found it difficult to determine the duration of specific types of services rendered. For example, in the case of one agency, clients entered and left their program at will, with the director asserting that since all youth in the community were regarded as program clients, there could be no realistic entry and exit dates attached to the various services they received. The director of another outreach program had great difficulty in accounting for the number of status offenders served in his program because, as he stated, "all kids in this neighborhood are status offenders." A third program offering services that youngsters found exceptionally attractive was faced with a large number of self referrals of youth who, dubiously, represented themselves as status offenders. While these are extreme examples, all of the outreach programs exhibited these problems to some degree. From the standpoint of court personnel with responsibility for program monitoring, these features of the outreach programs proved to be highly frustrating. Nonetheless, because the more successful of these innovative outreach programs brought their services to bear on the kinds of problem behavior known to bring youth to official attention as status offenders, the court continued their support throughout the two-year period.

ELIGIBILITY FOR PROGRAM SERVICES

Among the eight sites, the Pima County program was the least restrictive in its eligibility requirements for access to program services. This feature was consistent with the court's advocacy stance, so clearly reflected in its support of outreach programs. The sole criterion for formal

referral to program services was the commission of a status offense, without regard to the person's pattern of prior offenses or legal status, with the exception of those who were probation violators. A likely consequence was that a large proportion of the program population may have consisted of individuals who would have been ineligible for status offender services in programs in the other sites, either because they would have been classified as "neglect and dependency" cases, as being "essentially" delinquent offenders, or who may never have come to the attention of authorities at all. The specific issue this raises with respect to the implementation problem in the Pima County program model is whether a preventive and advocacy approach to the deinstitutionalization objective results in an excessive spreading of available program resources to the point of losing its focus on a clearly defined status offender population. This may create the double danger of reducing needed controls on delinquent offenders and of imposing unneeded controls on marginally misbehaving youth, i.e., net-widening. The more general issue raised by the Pima County experience is whether there exists in fact a sufficiently definable "pure" status offender population for which it is feasible to focus program resources. In any case, the national status offender program assumed, with qualifications, the existence of this population, and program implementation called for maximum concentration of resources on that group. The design of the Pima County program suggests that its leaders did not altogether share this assumption. The court seemed to assume, rather, that status offense behavior was an only incidental feature of a more general pattern of problem behavior, and that its amelioration could well preempt

the need for institutional treatment. Since the population it served was highly inclusive, analysis of the offense pattern data of the Pima County program group should reveal the extent to which a "pure" population of status offenders was in fact available to be served.

SYSTEM PENETRATION

Whatever the other problems of program implementation may have been, the Pima County program was emphatically successful in limiting system penetration. Indeed, an effective mechanism in the form of the Mobile Diversion Unit had already been established prior to program start-up to divert status offense cases from detention. Court data on trends in the detention of status offenders, presented in Section IV, Chapter VIII, indicate that while the number detained was not reduced to zero during the program period, those who were placed in detention were so few as to suggest the likelihood of unusual circumstances, for example, status offenders who violated probation for previous status offenses. The effort during the program period was to push toward the total elimination of the residual system penetration represented by police arrest and by terminating the use of locked facilities at the court center for receiving arrested status offenders. Despite its identity as a court function, the Mobile Diversion Unit operated much the same as might any social agency related crisis intervention service. Receiving initial referrals from a variety of sources including the police, it obviated much of the police processing of status offense cases. And, as has been noted, the court succeeded in eliminating the use of a "holding tank" room at the court center in those cases that the police did process.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

Although the Pima County program did much to expand the earlier deinstitutionalization reforms of the juvenile court, only the most guarded assessment may be made of the extent to which these reforms have been consolidated. The single solid gain on the legal front was the change in the Arizona juvenile code in 1977 prohibiting the commitment of status offenders to correctional institutions for delinquent offenders. As one of the two major metropolitan regions of the State, Pima County is likely to have had some influence in this decision. Local jurisdictions, however, still retain the option to place status offenders in secure detention. The Pima County Court's rejection of this option in favor of the use of private agency sector services prior to the advent of the federally funded status offender program failed to win the support of the principal enforcement agency of the jurisdiction. To carry out its policy the court found it necessary to create what is best seen as a decentralized, neighborhood based intake operation, functioning essentially as a crisis intervention and referral unit designed to obviate the court processing of status offenders. Under federal funding, this program was expanded to a seven-day, 24-hour service. Over time, the police became increasingly willing to turn apprehended status offenders over to the MDU, but only because they saw this unit as a representative of the court. Since the end of the federal funding period, the court has continued to operate this service on a substantially reduced scale with other sources of federal funding. As of the time of this report, evidence of change in the police posture is not discernable.

The development of community support for a deinstitutionalizing program in the future, with prospects of funding from local sources, appears to depend on the interest and power of two constituencies. The first is a public constituency supportive of youth welfare interests; the second the constituency composed of the professional youth service agencies. As for the first, there has been little evidence of its mobilization in Pima County. For example, a recent proposal to use county funds for the support of programs for youth and for the aged was obstructed by a county counsel ruling that state law prohibited such expenditures. The fact of the matter was that such expenditures were not mandated by state law rather than affirmatively prohibited. When the public hearing on the ruling was held with reference to a program for the elderly, the hearing room was crowded with opponents of the counsel's ruling and it was rescinded. When a similar hearing with respect to youth programs was held, no representatives of major civic organizations appeared, and the ruling held.

Prospects for the mobilization of the professional youth serving community in behalf of deinstitutionalization have been complicated by its experience with the court's status offender program. A number of such agencies, principally those in the mental health field, were and continue to be opposed to the court's informal practice of refusing to take custody of status offenders, including the use of detention. It is their view that judicial coercion is essential in getting such youth to accept therapeutic counseling. Although not necessarily sharing this view, many of the other established, community supported, voluntary youth serving agencies were alienated from the court's

status offender program because they had been rejected as service providers in favor of newly established or unknown agencies offering innovative outreach programs.

Despite such obstacles to local support of a status offender program, the federally supported effort of the past two years has generated a community awareness that the status offender group represents a distinctive problem for which institutional treatment may be inappropriate. The very fact that the court's reform program continued to be controversial during the period of federal funding has meant that the issue of deinstitutionalization remains very much alive in Pima County. The court's continued pursuit of its reform objectives coupled with a slow but steady transformation in the community's view of the status offender problem may well lead to a favorable resolution of the controversy within the next several years.

SUMMARY: THE PIMA COUNTY PROGRAM MODEL

The Pima County program model may be summarily described as providing community based services for status offenders in the more or less standard and familiar form of shelter care facilities as an alternative to detention, combined with vigorous support of preventive and youth advocacy agencies. A crucial component of its community based service was the use of a crisis intervention and referral unit funded and staffed by juvenile court personnel. The model evolved in response to two unique local conditions: the disinclination of enforcement agencies to assume the crisis intervention and referral function, and the enthusiasm of the juvenile court, as grantee, for pursuing more basic preventive objectives. The latter entailed a deliberate choice of newly developed neighborhood

and school based agencies engaged in outreach programs over the established youth serving agencies of the community.

The model may thus be considered as possibly appropriate in jurisdictions characterized by sharp disparity, if not conflict, between court and enforcement agencies respecting the value of deinstitutionalizing status offenders, where the private sector agencies have not assumed the initiative, and where in addition the court has taken the lead in such development. The model may well be appropriate only in those jurisdictions where conditions parallel those that have prevailed in Pima County, i.e., where courts are dedicated to deinstitutionalization objectives in the face of questionable support from either enforcement agencies or the private agency community. Such jurisdictions cannot be numerous, as the more typical axes of conflict regarding deinstitutionalization are likely to pit the private youth serving agencies with a strong interest in diversion against the juvenile justice agencies opposed to relinquishing their control over the status offender population.

The Pima County program model is notable as much for its effort to break new ground in general prevention and youth advocacy as for the dominant role of the court in preventing the use of its detention facilities. Apart from its use of established shelter care agencies, in turning away from the traditional agencies as inaccessible to large numbers of unreached youth, and providing support instead to new and untried "grass roots" types of organizations, the model appears to create a number of problems. Although the latter may have easy access to troubled youth, unless they have been staffed with experienced and competent personnel and are organizationally stable, their services may be less than effective. Moreover, they are likely to have few ties to persons of

power and influence in the community, and therefore few and undependable sources of funding. More effectively situated in this respect, the traditional youth service agencies in the community may then become unavailable for whatever support of a local deinstitutionalization program they can be induced to provide. While the model suggests that there is a case to be made for linking deinstitutionalization and explicitly preventive objectives as essentially continuous with one another, a question can be raised whether the pursuit of the latter may not be at the cost of some sacrifice of the former.

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CHAPTER V
THE ALAMEDA COUNTY PROGRAM
(California)

INTRODUCTION

California has occupied a prominent place in the national imagination as an improbable land in which many of the unthinkable possibilities of American culture become realities. The state has been a seedbed of cultural innovation, new social and political movements, and bold efforts to reform traditional practices in many institutional areas. Not least has been its front-runner role in efforts to improve its system of juvenile justice, beginning several decades back with the establishment of the California Youth Authority and more recently with a major incentive program to encourage counties to reduce commitment to the Authority's training schools for delinquents. The effect of such continuing legislative receptivity to innovation and experimentation in juvenile justice has been to induce in a number of metropolitan county jurisdictions an alertness to the possibilities of constructive reform. Alameda County, with its major industrial city of Oakland, was one of these.

Several years prior to its grant supported status offender program, juvenile court practices with respect to the status offense problem were reassessed by the Alameda County Probation Department. The judgment was then made that status offense behavior is typically a product of crisis in parent-child relations, reflecting a more general disorder in family relationships. To deal appropriately with the problem, the Probation Department created a special group within its staff, the

Family Crisis Intervention Unit (FCIU), to which all status offense cases were then assigned. Since status offense behavior was seen as having its source in a family crisis, the approach of choice required prompt intervention in the family conflict situation with all of its members participating. Requiring inclusion in particular was, of course, the youth whose offense behavior had revealed the existence of the conflict. Because prompt response with all family members present is of the essence in crisis intervention, the detention of the member in question could serve no treatment objective. Thus, with the development of the Probation Department's family crisis intervention program, the use of detention in status offense cases underwent a steady decline beginning in 1973. The trend was accelerated in 1976 in anticipation of legislation prohibiting the use of secure detention in status offense cases, a change that took effect on January 1, 1977.

In the light of these developments one might ask why Alameda County was interested in obtaining OJJ funding to develop a program for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Detention was already in declining use, as was commitment of adjudicated status offenders and minor delinquent offenders to correctional institutions. This movement had been facilitated through "probation subsidy" incentive funds, which encouraged the use of community based alternatives to incarceration.

The answer is to be found substantially in the fact that, from the beginning, the leadership in the development of the theory and practice of the FCIU approach to the status offender problem was concentrated in a small but influential cadre of intellectually sophisticated, articulate,

well trained, and politically knowledgeable members of the professional social work and criminal justice planning communities. Among them were members of the Probation Department staff. It was their view that keeping status offenders out of secure detention and correctional institutions, and therefore untouched by the juvenile justice system, was only half the task. The equally important balance of the task was to provide a technically competent, neighborhood based, family crisis intervention service to which enforcement agencies, schools, parents, and others could with confidence refer status offense cases. So long as this service continued to be furnished by Probation Department personnel, however skillfully, status offenders would know that the coercive hand of the juvenile justice system was heavily laid upon them. It was specifically to shift the FCIU function to neighborhood based youth service agencies that a grant application was submitted to OJJ.

THE ALAMEDA COUNTY PROGRAM PLAN

The problem confronting the leadership of the status offender deinstitutionalization movement in Alameda County closely paralleled that faced by the leaders of the movement in Pima County, Arizona. In both cases substantial progress had already been made in reducing the use of detention and correctional facilities by the time OJJ's status offender initiative made its appearance. Both regarded the prospect of federal funds as an opportunity to carry the movement to completion by creating and consolidating a system of community based services for status offenders outside the juvenile justice system. However, unlike the Pima County situation, where the leadership resided in the judge of the juvenile court and its top administrative

personnel, in Alameda County it came from several of the supervisors of the Probation Department's Family Crisis Intervention Unit (FCIU), some of whom had been active in earlier efforts for its establishment, and from staff members of the county's Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board. Probation Department administrators were on the whole satisfied with the existing level achieved in reducing the number of status offenders detained in Juvenile Hall and with the alternative of court services for this group as provided by its FCIU structure. They did not necessarily share an interest in removing services to status offenders from the court and establishing alternatives under the private sector in community based agencies.

In the face of this situation the initiative in formulating a program proposal for submission to OJJ was taken by the local criminal justice planning agency. Several members of the planning board staff had been Alameda County probation officers and were highly supportive of the FCIU conception of the status offender problem and its intervention strategy. Although it was developed by the planning board, the proposal designated the Probation Department as the grantee. It was apparently the Board's view that FCIU philosophy and procedures were to be a central feature of the program and that therefore the administration and leadership of the program would reside within the Probation Department.

Program goals stated in the proposal included: (a) an increase in the number of community based resources; (b) improvement in the level of competence in family crisis intervention techniques among staff of community based agencies as well as in the FCIU staff itself;

(c) improvement in police response in referring status offense cases to community agencies or the FCIU rather than to Juvenile Hall detention; (d) coordination of the work of police officers, the FCIU, community agencies, and the schools with respect to the treatment of status offense cases; and (e) total elimination of detention for status offenders.

The principal neighborhood based resource to be utilized was the set of Youth Service Centers (YSCs) located throughout the county. To be added with the use of project funds were an additional YSC in East Oakland, and crisis receiving homes for short term shelter care in both the northern and southern sections of the county. Additional foster home services were to be obtained by establishing a monthly "holding fee" stipend and substantially increasing per diem payment. An extensive training program was planned to raise the competence of FCIU and YSCs in the use of family crisis intervention methods, to orient the police to these methods, and to encourage them to reduce referrals of status offenders to the court and to increase referrals directly to the youth service centers. A further aim of the training program was to foster communication and coordination among the various agencies to be engaged in the program effort.

What was contemplated, in brief, was the creation under the leadership of the court's family crisis intervention unit of an effective service system emphasizing a specific kind of family counseling, and transferring the treatment of status offenders from the court to neighborhood based youth serving agencies. The administration of the system was placed in the hands of the county probation department,

with its FCIU responsible for its development and implementation. Project funds were budgeted for administration, the establishment of a YSC in East Oakland, the creation and support of two crisis receiving homes, and the recruitment of additional foster homes. Existing youth service centers were supported primarily by customary funding sources, although project funds were allocated to add counseling positions and to provide staff training in family crisis intervention techniques.

Prior to the inception of the program, police referred status offender custody cases directly to the FCIU, where family crisis intervention services were provided with referral to additional services when deemed necessary. Through the training of justice and community agency personnel, the project undertook to move these services out of the probation department's FCIU. Police would then refer status offense custody cases directly to the YSCs where services were to be provided that would follow the approach and technique developed by the FCIU.

These plans were developed with little participation by the YSCs and the police, both slated as crucial components of the proposed system, with consequences to be noted below. All told, the planning involved two representatives of the YSCs, one a high level administrator of the county's YSC network, the other involved in youth center program work, and a police administrator. In addition, there was little effective communication of the program's objective of diverting status offender services to community based agencies, even to court administrators, members of the probation department, and FCIU staff,

as well as to top administrators in county government, all of whom had long since accepted the validity of excluding status offenders from detention.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

As suggested by its pre-program progress in reducing the use of detention and correctional institutions in status offender cases, Alameda County appears to have represented a favorable site for achieving the further gains envisioned by its federally funded program.

Community Tolerance

As measured by the available school data on student suspensions and expulsions, community tolerance for status offense behavior in the county was on the average moderately high. This impression was reinforced by evidence of vigorous activity on the part of the School Attendance Review Boards (SARBs) in most of the county's school districts during both the pre-program and the program periods. Composed of school, community, and agency representatives, these boards had been established by state statute to examine impending disciplinary action with a view to limiting school "kick outs" and referrals to the juvenile court by marshalling community resources to deal constructively with problems of truancy and student misbehavior.

Availability of Residential Placement

Alameda County was also well supplied with needed residential facilities for status offenders requiring out-of-home placement on either a temporary or long term basis. An established network of foster homes had been in existence for status offenders as well as for other types of child welfare cases. In the view of those who planned the status offender program, these facilities needed only supplementation by adding two crisis receiving group homes and by increasing foster parent compensation.

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes

Prior to 1977, there was no statutory restriction on the use of either detention or institutional commitment in status offender cases. As has been noted, however, for several years before the inception of the program, both detention and institutionalization for status offenders were drastically curtailed by administrative regulation. The statutory prohibition on detention that took effect in early 1977 was not inconsistent with the prevailing court philosophy.

Juvenile Justice Control of the Program

Since it was organized, directed, and administered by the county's Probation Department, the program was totally under justice system control. Paradoxically, in relation to an important program goal, this control was designed to "self destruct." That is, program control was maintained in order to build a system of services to status offenders lying outside the purview of the court. As will be seen, this aspiration encountered serious bureaucratic and ideological obstacles, the former in court and police practices, the latter in the treatment philosophies of service providers. During the actual operation of the Alameda program, this meant that the court could not avoid maintaining a prominent presence in the referral of status offenders to community based services through its family crisis intervention unit.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Selected for attention in this section are those features of the Alameda program that exhibited special problems of implementation. Included are the intervention strategy or approach to the treatment of status offenders, relations with the police and the court, and relations with private sector service agencies. By way of general description it may be noted that in its organizational design the program was highly

formalistic. That is to say that the contacts among personnel in the enforcement, court, and service agencies constituting the program network, and the relationships these contacts generated, were mediated by formally prescribed procedures. A formalistic organizational design seems to have characterized only those funded programs located in heavily populated areas, suggesting that a substantial degree of bureaucratization unavoidably attaches to large scale programs. Organizational patterns of a personalistic character, permitting easy communication throughout the program network and rapid access to community resources in serving status offenders, were found only in the status offender programs serving smaller jurisdictions.

The Intervention Strategy

One of the distinctive features of the Alameda program was the commitment of its leadership to the use of a family crisis intervention approach in dealing with the status offense problem. Briefly, the approach appears to be founded on two theoretical assumptions. First, status offense behavior such as ungovernability, running away, or truancy reflects a seriously impaired family relationship that has been brought to crisis; and second, with professional help the crisis condition can be utilized to aid parents in assuming responsibility for dealing constructively with family problems. The leaders of the program, particularly within the FCIU, tended to approach family crisis intervention with an insistence on its conceptual soundness, and a rejection of alternate forms of youth counselling or general advocacy strategies directed to youth welfare concerns. Moreover, the Alameda program also differentiated decisively between counselling of a family

in which the problem youth is the focus of attention, and family crisis intervention in which the system of family relationships is the object of interest. One of the leaders of the program pointed out, for example, that those who are not trained appropriately in family counselling work tend to "join the family system rather than intervene in it."

Private Sector Collaboration

The Alameda program's insistence on the exclusive validity of family crisis work as the intervention strategy of choice created serious problems of program implementation in relations with the community based youth service network. The YSCs of Alameda County had developed over a period of years, conducting programs that reflected the earlier influence of the federal Office of Youth Development. In consequence, their programs were oriented toward reform of youth related community institutions with a view to providing youth as a group with opportunity to develop responsibility for their own conduct. This approach also emphasized advocacy on behalf of individual youths in trouble with the schools, with the law, and with their families. Within Alameda County the status offender problem had been firmly established as within the domain of the Probation Department's FCIU, and the YSCs had had little contact, concern, or interest in status offenders as a group. Concretely, much of the previous program work of the YSCs concentrated on youth in conflict with community institutions, the majority of whom are usually charged with delinquent violations. Since the status offender program plan defined these organizations as an integral component of the envisioned treatment system, they accepted the added function for a variety of reasons. Among these, an important motive was the promise

of increased funding offered for their participation, since all of the YSCs suffered chronically from uncertainty of continued funding and therefore of survival. The addition of status offenders to their case-loads did not, however, have the effect of displacing their delinquent clients. To meet the increase in clientele, the status offender program provided funds for added staff positions, enabling YSCs to serve a larger population.

The program orientation of the YSCs and their fiscal difficulties produced two problems of program implementation. First, the effort of the Probation Department to introduce YSC staffs to the family crisis intervention approach and to train them in the use of its techniques was widely resisted and in some instances openly opposed. Project development plans included an extensive training program designed to produce competence in YSC personnel in dealing with what was essentially for them a novel undertaking, namely, the treatment of status offenders. There was only the most limited success in inducing YSC staff members to attend training sessions in family crisis intervention methods. As a result, when the YSCs eventually confronted a difficult status offense case, their tendency was to call for help from the FCIU staff. In retrospect, leaders of the Alameda program accounted for the problems of the training program on grounds that the "training committee" was an in-house group entirely composed of FCIU personnel. The inadequacies of the training program rather than the possible validity of opposing YSC views regarding treatment approaches were seen as the principal obstacle in persuading most of the YSCs to embrace family crisis intervention as the treatment of choice in status offense cases. Program leaders rejected the possibility that the alternative doctrine of youth advocacy

followed by most of the YSCs might be equally effective, or perhaps more effective for some subset of status offenders. Unfortunately, the program was so structured as to exclude the opportunity to test the conflicting claims empirically.

The second implementation problem centered on the funding needs of the YSCs. Alameda's \$1.5 million grant was used principally to augment the FCIU staff, establish a program administrative unit, and to provide training programs. There was consequently a shortfall of funds for support of the YSCs, which were expected to add status offender cases to their customary caseloads. Project funds were made available for only modest augmentation of YSC programs and to create a new YSC in East Oakland. Specifically, only \$140,000 of project funds were allocated to augment the programs of five of the 11 YSCs scheduled to come into the program network, with the balance expected to participate "for free." With the participation of the YSCs thus brought into question, the Alameda County Criminal Justice Planning Board, which had developed the program proposal, sought and obtained substantial additional funding from the LEAA State planning agency for criminal justice, as well as revenue sharing funds from the county.

The training and funding problems of the program were obviously related to the type of relationship that was established with the private sector youth service agencies. The experience in Alameda County suggests that it may be feasible to expect private social agencies to draw on their own resources in support of a status offender treatment system if there is agreement respecting the design and philosophy of the program. If mutual agreement is absent, as was the case

in the Alameda program, implementation problems of both training and funding become paramount.

Relations with Police

The Alameda program enjoyed the considerable advantage of having earlier won the support of all major police agencies for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. The police had accepted and approved the practice of the Probation Department's FCIU in eliminating the use of detention in all but a minority of status offense custody cases. However, the advent of the status offender program confronted the police with the problem of moving beyond this stage in the deinstitutionalization process to the direct referral of custody cases to private sector youth service agencies. Efforts to obtain the full willingness of the police in releasing these cases to the YSCs encountered resistance throughout the program period. There were a number of exceptions in police jurisdictions which, prior to the program period, had developed active diversion programs and close working relationships between line officers and YSC personnel. Officers in most of the county's enforcement jurisdictions continued to view as both proper and desirable the routing of status offender custody cases to the FCIU established by the Probation Department. They had come to trust the judgment of the FCIU staff in eliminating the use of detention in these cases, and to respect the competence of FCIU workers. With the exceptions mentioned, there had been no opportunity to develop the same trust and respect with reference to YSC staffs.

The situation respecting police attitudes and cooperation was stated in the following way by a supervisory FCIU staff member:

(The police expressed) a high level of criticism and a prediction of failure. On the diversion aspect (the police wanted to know) how can you expect the YSCs to do the work that Probation has been doing? The police are really concerned, and they still are. Some of our biggest (police) supporters, overall, still want to have Probation in it. . . . Police can accept the lack of Juvenile Hall better than they can diversion to other agencies for providing the service. It's like their disagreement is with a small segment of 601 status offenders being out of custody, but they're really worried about not having Probation to rely on for services. . . . They want to know that Probation will always be there. The direction (of the status offender program) now is to see if we can't eliminate Probation as the service (provider).

Modest gains in the effort to "eliminate Probation as the service" have been difficult to achieve. By the end of the program period, line officers were reluctantly bringing status offense custody cases to the two crisis receiving centers and to YSCs. In Oakland, the largest police jurisdiction, this was done at the command of the head of the police Juvenile Division. However, it remained common in these instances for police to refuse responsibility for the decision. Their practice was to phone in either to the FCIU or to the police department to receive explicit approval for the decision.

SYSTEM PENETRATION DURING REFERRAL

The case identification and referral system in the Alameda County program produced what is best characterized as a "shallow penetration" situation. Most status offense cases expectedly originated from police arrests. The pre-program case routing procedure of direct referral to court intake was altered to materially reduce the delivery of status offense custody cases to Probation Department detention facilities and

to increase their direct referral to the two crisis receiving homes and to selected YSCs. However, to assure the appropriateness of such referrals, when line officers in the major police jurisdiction of the city of Oakland found themselves unable to make a "field adjustment" in the more complex cases, they were required to phone headquarters for approval to deliver the youth to the community agency. Other police jurisdictions either followed a similar procedure, or consulted the FCIU in the Probation Department. In addition, since 1973 the FCIU made itself increasingly accessible to the public as a social service agency to assist parents requesting help with problems of incorrigibility in their children, without the need for prior intervention by the police. Thus, although the police and the Probation Department continued to be prominently involved in processing status offenders, both made a very real effort to use the community based services within the program network.

The question remains whether the shallow system penetration characterizing the Alameda program model has general significance for the status offender deinstitutionalization movement. If it is assumed the police are likely to be the major initial source of referral to community based status offender services, their involvement in the deinstitutionalization process may be unavoidable. Similarly, the court at the intake level is also likely to be unavoidably involved, since the police may regard some proportion of cases as too serious to warrant direct referral to community agencies. The Alameda program model suggests that an emphatic policy of diverting status offenders at the police and court intake stages may represent the most feasible means

of reducing system penetration, short of total divestiture of justice system jurisdiction over status offenders. Progress in divestiture, whose ultimate success remains highly questionable, is likely to be exceedingly slow.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

Prospects for continuity in the development of the Alameda program may be evaluated from two quite separate standpoints. With respect to the deinstitutionalization issue, there is little likelihood of reversion to the use of detention in status offense cases because of pre-program developments in Alameda County, now powerfully reinforced by statutory provision at the state level that prohibits, with exceptions, the use of detention. This is to say that progress in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders accomplished independently of program effort will remain as a feature of enforcement and judicial policy.

However, the purpose of the program was to provide a constructive alternative to detention by creating a system of effective community based services for status offenders. As has been noted, there were some successes in this effort. These included the establishment of two crisis receiving homes, the founding of an additional youth service center in the problem impacted East Oakland neighborhood utilizing family crisis treatment procedures, progress in training some of the staff of other YSCs in these methods, and registering some advances in winning the support of police agencies that were initially opposed to the program, and in demonstrating the feasibility of by-passing court intake in status offense cases.

The program continuity question consequently concerns the likelihood that these initial gains will be seen as moving in a desirable direction by local government units and by the private sector youth service agencies and therefore as worthy of ongoing support. As of the close of the project, the prospect that this will occur appeared problematic for a number of reasons.

First, the program aim of shifting the family crisis intervention function to the YSCs was recognized as creating the danger of a reduction in workload, with a consequent staff and budget cutback for the probation department. Members of its FCI unit were far from unanimous in their support of this aim. Opposition was couched in terms of the fiscal instability, if not irresponsibility, of many of the county's YSCs, and their questionable competence in the use of family crisis intervention methods. Although these problems may have been real, it appears likely that an equally cogent source of resistance was the explicit threat of staff and budget loss.

A second impediment to program continuity is the uncertainty of sustained funding support of the YSCs. During the program period they were supported in large part by a one-time allocation of funds from the state's Office of Criminal Justice Planning. They received in addition some support from the county's revenue sharing funds and from local public and private sources, as well as minimal support from program funds. Beyond the fiscal uncertainty of the future for the YSCs, there remains the more basic issue of their readiness and capacity to provide family crisis intervention in status offense cases at the level of professional competence demanded by the probation department's FCI unit.

All of these obstacles to program continuity were fully recognized by the program leadership. They were inclined to view the program as a significant learning experience in which they identified a number of its specific weaknesses. First, while acknowledging the need to locate the program in the probation department "as the only game in town," they faulted the leadership of that agency as essentially uncommitted to the aim of transferring responsibility for the treatment of status offense custody cases to community based agencies. As they saw it, the remedy would have been to retain the program in the probation department, but to place its administrative leadership in the hands of a person who was not a member of its established staff. As one person put it, the probation department does not produce people "who can carry out the crucial implication of a deinstitutionalization program," namely, the transfer of responsibility for the treatment of status offenders to the family, the schools, and the community.

A second recognized weakness was the failure of the training effort to communicate effectively the conceptual core of the program and to win the support of the YSCs to the family crisis intervention approach as well as to induce them to build their system of services around it.

Finally, the most critical weakness of the program was attributed to the assumption that major system changes could be achieved in the two-year time span of the federally funded program. One comment was that "if the (federal government) committed themselves to a four-year project and learned what it takes to achieve a change to a permanent local operation and committed their own energies to see that this happened, they would get a lot more for their money."

On balance, then, it appears that the unique mission of the Alameda Program to establish a system based on professional competence of YSC personnel in the use of family crisis intervention in dealing with status offense cases at all levels of complexity can move forward only on several conditions. The first of these is the willingness of the probation department to divert serious as well as minor status offense cases to the YSCs; second, an enhancement of the professional level of YSC staff members; third, the provision of tax supported resources to assure the stability of locally based youth services; and finally, the time required to forge these elements into a coherent and ongoing system.

SUMMARY: THE ALAMEDA PROGRAM MODEL

The model represented by the Alameda County program may become increasingly relevant as there is continued growth in the number of jurisdictions prohibiting the use of detention and institutional treatment for status offenders. As in Alameda, a concern with alternative services to status offenders can be anticipated in the wake of this initial shift in policy. These services can be centered in the court, as was initially the case in Alameda County, or, as is now widely urged, they can be relocated among decentralized youth service agencies in the private sector.

The crucial feature of the Alameda program was in fact the effort to transfer a relatively sophisticated and carefully rationalized family crisis intervention method of treating status offenders to a set of youth service centers in various localities throughout the county. With few exceptions, the latter were staffed by workers who were not

persuaded that this was the treatment of choice, or whose level of professional competence was not equal to the requirements of the method. The Alameda program consequently appears to be exemplary for situations in which the juvenile or family court has accepted the deinstitutionalization of status offenders in principle, and has the staff facilities to provide a reasonably high level of relevant services as an alternative to court processing. The problem that such courts may confront is whether, and how, they may "drop the other shoe," i.e., achieve a complete removal of the service from the court, relocating it in community or neighborhood based agencies in the interest of stigma avoidance.

The problems encountered in the Alameda experience raise a number of cautions. While court personnel may in the interest of agency survival resist the transfer of a function they regard as competent and valuable, such objection is readily reinforced when the community based agencies to which the treatment of status offenders is to be transferred lack the professional competence assumed to be required for the task. The objective in undertaking such a transfer is commonly the desire to bring the youth service function into closer contact with the residents of local communities. However, it is frequently the case that youth service agencies have a limited local constituency, and by virtue of that fact are poorly and undependably financed. Because of this, they find it difficult to compete successfully for well trained personnel. Hence, the drive to accomplish a radical decentralization of an established court service for status offenders diverted from detention encounters a dilemma. This may be succinctly stated in the form: the more closely integrated the community based agency with the

residents of a local area, the less dependable its funding support, the poorer its prospects of attracting professionally competent staff, and the more justifiable may appear the resistance of court personnel to the transfer of function.

In their reflections on the Alameda experience, the leaders of the program regarded the contradictions of their model to be soluble in some combination of three strategies. First, public funds supportive of court services that are relocated to community based agencies should be transferred to support those agencies. Second, excessive decentralization should be avoided, with the number of neighborhood based youth service agencies reduced by establishing a smaller number in a regionalized structure. Finally, given an improvement in the fiscal and funding stability of regional agencies, a carefully designed program of training the professionally competent personnel now available to staff these agencies should be conducted over a period of three to five years with the full support of the court. Court cooperation was deemed critical in order to win its confidence in the capacity of private agency staff to deal responsibly with the "harder" cases assumed to require direct court supervision.

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CHAPTER VI
THE CONNECTICUT PROGRAM

The proposal for the statewide Connecticut program was developed by the state's Council on Human Services (CHS), with the participation, support, and sponsorship of Connecticut's criminal justice planning agency, the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). The Council on Human Services was a legislatively mandated agency charged with the task of coordinating a substantial proportion of the services of state agencies. The program grant was awarded to the CJC, which in turn subgranted the funds for administration to CHS. Action had hardly gotten under way to develop contracts with youth serving agencies to provide program services when a newly elected state administration decided to abolish the CHS presumably in an economy move. The Justice Commission then transferred the subgrant to the state's Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS).

Although the transfer of the subgrant to DCYS substantially delayed program start-up, the initial program design remained intact. Developed with the assistance of OJJ funded evaluation researchers at the University of Connecticut, that design had two distinctive features. The first was variation in the use of treatment approaches to status offenders in each of the state's three judicial districts with a view to testing the comparative efficacy of each. Included were a community based and a court based minimum intervention program, both derived from the "Sacramento 601" model, and a community based maximum intervention program. The second feature of the design was that rigid restrictions

were placed on eligibility for program services. Only those status offenders who may have reasonably been expected to be held in detention centers prior to inception of the program would be eligible.

The two entities crucial to the implementation of the program were the state's juvenile courts and the private sector youth serving agencies. The former were required to agree to refer status offense cases normally under their jurisdiction to treatment programs operating outside the supervision of the court in two of the three judicial districts. On their part, the youth serving agencies were required to accept into their programs those status offense cases deemed suitable for referral under the eligibility criterion, "at risk of detention." Eligibility for program services was further restricted by the court's decision not to refer cases with mixed status and criminal charges, those with prior criminal charges still pending, and those who were already on probation for a prior status offense. Furthermore, to insure that only those clients who were actually "at risk of detention" would be referred to program services, that phrase was operationally defined as actual placement in one of the state's four detention centers. Hence, those status offenders who survived the drastic eligibility limitations were to come to the service agencies only after an experience of having been placed in detention, however briefly.

Except for the initially planned inclusion of all detainable status offense cases, the program design was eventually endorsed by the court. However, the design did present problems to the private sector social agencies which were expected to provide program services. The state's "mainstream" youth serving agencies found distinctly unacceptable the

restrictions on eligibility for referral to their programs, most particularly among these the requirement for actual detention. Oriented principally to a preventive approach, they preferred to work with status offense problems at their earlier stages of development. In addition, they entertained some reservations regarding the restrictions imposed by the quasi-experimental design. Conformity with provisions restricting their treatment approach to that designed for their judicial district would require departure from their customary and valued modes of treatment intervention. Coupled with this was some discomfort with the evaluation requirement. While the evaluation was ostensibly to be directed to the question of which treatment intervention works best, this meant that those agencies required to employ intervention methods that might prove less successful would suffer inadvertent damage to their reputations. Restricted from providing the type of intervention that in their view was best calculated to produce a favorable outcome, they anticipated an "unfair" evaluation.

Essentially, then, problems of implementation in the Connecticut program revolved around the issues of detention as a precursor of program services and the use of a predefined mode of treatment intervention. Whether, in what ways, and to what extent these problems had a consequential impact on the Connecticut program is considered in greater detail in the following sections.

THE CONNECTICUT PROGRAM PLAN

This statewide program was unique among those funded by OJJ in that serious consideration was given to the desirability of incorporating a number of elements of experimental design. The experimental

spirit apparently reflected a genuine desire on the part of those who initiated the program to identify the particular form of treatment intervention that would prove to be most effective in reducing status offense behavior and in limiting the transformation of status into delinquent offenders. At the urging of the research oriented site evaluator, and as initially prescribed in the program proposal, a randomized design was to be adopted. This provided for random assignment of youth referred for status offenses to two groups. Those in the first group were to receive one of the three types of program services. Participation in the program was on a voluntary basis. If the client elected to choose the program, all charges were to be dropped. The alternative was placement in a detention center. The second group was to receive court processing as it existed prior to the program. Although the design as initially proposed was supported by the program proponents and endorsed by the OJJ evaluation monitor, it encountered objections from the OJJ program monitor on grounds that status offenders randomly sorted into the normal court processing would be denied program benefits.

The experimental design was subsequently modified to exclude randomized assignment of program eligible clients. All youth detained only for status offenses at the state's detention centers were to be eligible for program services on a voluntary basis; i.e., they were to be given the alternative option of normal court processing. In the latter case, the court at its discretion could then refer the youth to program services as a case disposition.

Status offenders who opted for program services were to be placed in one of the three program types, or models, each located in one of

the state's three judicial districts. This feature was retained from the initial experimental design proposed. In the first of these program types, the Court Based Minimum Intervention Model, probation workers were to be given training to provide crisis counseling to the client and his/her family. The intervention was to occur within several hours after detention with removal of the youth and the offer of crisis counseling. If the offer were accepted, no more than five sessions of counseling were to be provided. No provision was to be made for follow-up or for any auxiliary services such as advocacy in relation to school or employment problems. The second program type, the Community Based Minimum Intervention Model, was identical with the first, with community based agencies providing the counseling instead of probation workers. Finally, the third, the Community Based Maximum Intervention Model, was to provide an extended range of services furnished by community based social agencies. These included case evaluation and diagnosis, crisis counseling, placement of the client in a community facility if indicated, and procurement of whatever additional services were deemed necessary, including advocacy and case follow-up, and an evaluation of the services provided.

As ultimately adopted, the Connecticut program retained the single experimental feature of systematically varied treatment approaches as described, but excluded the use of randomized client assignment to program services and to normal court processing. The University of Connecticut evaluation team made a final valiant effort to retain the power of randomized client assignment to test program effectiveness. They suggested as an alternative to the rejected randomized design that youth charged with status offenses be uniformly assigned to the following

three different conditions on different days of the week: (a) normal court processing; (b) assignment to the program, with status offense charges dropped; and (c) return to the custody of parents with charges dropped and no further intervention. This form of randomization was also found unacceptable by the OJJ program monitor because it would entail a denial of program services for some clients.

In summary, the Connecticut program plan called for (a) restriction of program services to cases of "pure" status offense in which the charged youth was neither on probation for a prior status offense nor had criminal charges pending, and was "otherwise detainable" as evidenced by the fact of actual detention; (b) referral to program services only with the signed consent of client and parents; and (c) provision solely of the specific type of treatment intervention assigned to the judicial district in which the client resided, variously furnished by probation workers or by community based youth serving agencies.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

Among the sites in which the Office of Juvenile Justice funded programs for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the State of Connecticut must be accounted one of the more precisely targeted jurisdictions. On virtually every dimension open to measurement or observation, Connecticut appeared to be one of the more forbidding locations in which children and youth might engage in status offense behavior. Misbehaving youngsters in that state were confronted by a refusal in the juvenile code to acknowledge a distinction between criminal and non-criminal justice offenses, by the court's reluctance to share with non-judicial agencies their power to determine appropriate and useful

treatment procedures in status offense cases, and by the disposition of the schools to meet infractious behavior with drastic disciplinary action.

Community Tolerance

As the most general indicator of community tolerance for status offense behavior, rates of school suspension and expulsions in this jurisdiction during the year preceding program inception (1975-1976) were among the highest encountered in the eight evaluated programs. With an estimated mean statewide rate of 136 suspensions and expulsions per 1,000 enrolled students in grades 7 through 12, Connecticut was topped only by Delaware with its rate of 147.

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes

No statutory restriction exists in the Connecticut juvenile code with respect either to the detention of status offenders or to their incarceration in correctional institutions. Unlike the situation in many of the other jurisdictions with funded programs, where there was evidence of a pre-program decline in status offender detentions, there was no evidence of a similar pre-program trend in Connecticut. There was, however, some suggestion of a slight decline in institutional commitments prior to program start-up, possibly related to a growing judicial sensitivity to the deinstitutionalization movement.

Availability of Residential Facilities

Connecticut appeared to possess an adequate supply of alternative residential facilities to accomodate youthful offenders for whom return to their homes was excluded. Indeed, the state had in being a well developed complement of private sector social agencies for which the challenge of meeting a possibly increased need for residential placement facilities offered little problem. Again, as has been the case in other status offender

programs, availability of residential facilities seemed not to be an issue in this jurisdiction.

Juvenile Justice Control of the Program

Finally, perhaps the most crucial of contextual elements was the degree to which justice system control was exercised over the program. Despite the fact that at no time was there any question about the court's formal commitment to cooperate with the program, there remained on the court's part a submerged but persistent reluctance to concede the need for the program as essential in expanding the use of community based facilities in status offense cases. This posture stemmed from the adherence of the court leadership to the traditional parens patriae doctrine and the conviction that community based services were either unavailable or non-existent for those status offenders who were being detained or occasionally institutionalized by the court. The single change the court regarded as potentially relevant would have been the establishment of a "children in need of supervision" (CHINS, PINS, etc.) statute, as had already been enacted in a large number of other jurisdictions. As justification for this posture, the court could in fact point to some progress in reducing institutional commitments during the recent past as it increasingly sought to utilize community facilities where available and suitable.

Given the tension between a formal commitment to cooperate with the program and a view of the program as an intrusion on its management of the status offense problem, the court's control of the program took indirect and subtle forms. Since only those status offenders judged to be admissible to detention were eligible for program services, and only court intake personnel were empowered to make that judgment, the court in effect functioned as the program gatekeeper. As stated by members of

the program staff, there were instances, for example, in which the court's virtual competitive stance vis a vis the program had resulted in the referral of status offense cases to community facilities not included in the program's service network. But for the most part it was simply the central position of court personnel at the crucial juncture of client intake that projected for service providers a continuing sense of the court presence in program operations.

To summarize, the single contextual feature seemingly supportive of program progress was adequate availability of residential space for out-of-home placements. The remaining features of the community context must be regarded as less than supportive in shifting to non-judicial and noncoercive methods of dealing with the status offense problem. The juvenile code of the state failed to differentiate non-criminal from criminal acts of juveniles in terms of providing separate procedures for the two types of cases. As reflected in school disciplinary actions, the climate of community opinion with respect to status offenses was highly intolerant. Added to these was the influence of a juvenile court disinclined to extend the presumed benefits of non-judicial treatment to any status offender whose claim to such treatment could be questioned.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Three parties were essential in conducting all of the funded status offender programs. At the structural center was the program organization itself, i.e., the entity that conducted the operation, flanked by the juvenile court on the one side, and the service providing agencies on the other. With minor variations, the crux of the operation was to maintain the agreement of the court to reduce the use of pre-adjudication

detention and post-adjudication commitment to correctional institutions in status offense cases, and whenever appropriate to provide the treatment services by contracting from private sector social agencies. There were thus two sets of relationships that the status offender program organization was required to manage, those with the court and those with the youth service provider community. Each had its own problems affecting program implementation. In the Connecticut case, the issues requiring negotiation and resolution were somewhat less resistant to solution with respect to program-court relations than with respect to program-service provider relations.

Court-Program Relations

The problem encountered in this area arose, basically, from the strong reservations held by the court with respect to both the need for and the value of the program. Program staff was acutely aware of the effects of the court posture on the readiness of probation officers to extend genuine cooperation in implementing program goals. With placement in detention established as the sine qua non for program service eligibility, these court officers were in a position to facilitate or hinder the program intake process. As a leading staff member observed:

. . . You have from your top level (of the court) saying, "we don't like your research, we don't like your program, we don't think this is the way you handle status offenders." In all honesty, (you can't) expect probation officers to fight that system.

On its part, the court had its own rationale for its position. It had full confidence in the adequacy of its procedures to protect both the youth and the community, and felt that its own judgment regarding

appropriate case dispositions was soundly grounded in experience.

This view of its competence in deciding cases was described by a member of the DCYS staff:

The court believed that they were doing a fairly good job, and that all they needed was money to place the kid when they made a decision to place the kid. So if they felt that a particular status offender belonged in (the state's secure facility), they felt they had good reasons for that. There was a whole host of other things the kid might have done. (The court) might not have been able to prove it. The only thing that was provable might have been a status offense. But they really honestly believed that when they sent a status offender to (the secure facility) there were very good reasons for it. So they strongly believed in what they were doing.

Beyond this, as regards the need for reducing recourse to the court in status offense cases, the court was inclined to view the substantial expansion of the state's Youth Service Bureau network as the primary means to this end. The court was therefore cool to that aspect of the program rationale claiming to provide needed community based treatment resources. In this connection, the court regarded itself as being on solid ground. The fact was that with substantial LEAA funding over a period of years the YSB network had expanded since 1970 to cover a total of 54 local communities in the state, serving approximately 80 percent of the state's youth. Discussing the relatively small proportion of youth with status offense charges found to be eligible for program services, another member of the grantee staff explained that this was due in large part to the active YSB program:

What you had here was (that) simultaneously with the project being implemented you had the whole YSBs growing. . . . I think that during the year of caseload entry into the project, during that year reductions of referrals to the juvenile court was something like 2,500. And Judge _____ said, allegedly, (this was) because of the impact of the YSBs.

Given the court's reluctance to embrace the status offender program, it was perhaps inevitable that probation officers would question the competence of voluntary agencies to deal effectively with the chronic status offenders. As perceived by a member of the program staff:

The court very strongly believes that detention is a preferable place for kids in some situations where, for example, a sexually acting out girl who threatens to run away from home is safe in detention because the staff in detention know how to handle 13 year old promiscuous young girls. . . . There are a great many (voluntary) agencies in (the judicial district) that have worked with clients before they come into the court system. There is a philosophy (often expressed) by probation officers and court personnel . . . that the court can handle cases where voluntary agencies fail. The need for the court is because of the failure of voluntary agencies. (They say that) kids who have been involved in voluntary programs have bombed out, that voluntary agencies can't help kids, and they need to lock them up in a secure place in order to deal with them effectively.

The most direct expression of the court's reservations respecting the program was its interest in restricting eligibility for program services. As initially developed by the Council on Human Services, the program workplan designated as eligible for program services all status offenders referred to the court who were at risk of detention. This was the sole eligibility restriction contemplated. However, the court insisted on adding to the ineligibles those coming to the court with combined status and criminal charges, those with criminal charges pending, and those on probation for a prior status offense. While they were not altogether happy with the added restrictions, program planners accepted them as valid in the light of the federal guideline directive to focus program attention on youth whose offenses were distinctively non-criminal. The question of who was and who was not a status offender

remained ambiguous in Connecticut as elsewhere among funded programs. Subsequent to the initiation of the national status offender program, OJJ did attempt to provide some definitional guidance, with particular attention to the mixed cases and cases under court supervision. As a practical matter, however, all of the funded programs made their own decisions on this issue, following largely the dictates of their courts. In effect, there was little the program leaders in Connecticut could do to alter the court's requirements. Only at one point in negotiating the issue were the program leaders successful, with strong assistance from the OJJ program monitor, in limiting the drive to draw even narrower boundaries around program eligibility. This occurred when the court attempted to add to the excluded categories those status offenders against whom there had been criminal charges in the past, but who were currently free of further court supervision.

Despite its lack of enthusiasm for the objectives of the status offender program, it would be inaccurate to infer from this that the court opposed the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. On the contrary, it considered itself to be actively engaged in doing just that. It appeared to be the court's view that in the Connecticut situation, with its well developed network of community based youth serving agencies engaged in preventive programming, the status offenders who were referred to the court were principally those for whom prior intervention efforts had failed. Even with these, the court felt it made every reasonable effort to obtain suitable remediation services. In the light of its responsibility to the community as well as for the welfare of the youth, the court saw itself as using detention and institutionalization in status offense cases only as a last resort. Moreover,

in the traditional manner the court defined as an essential aspect of its responsibility the need to take into account the entire pattern of behavior on the part of juveniles coming before it on a current status offense charge. In brief, the Connecticut juvenile court regarded itself as already engaged in what may be termed a program of "maximum feasible deinstitutionalization."

Program-Service Provider Relations

Two problems were encountered in efforts to enlist the cooperation of those private sector agencies regarded by program planners as well qualified to furnish effective treatment services. The first and more consequential problem was the objection raised by these agencies to the provision that only those status offenders placed in detention would be eligible for referral to program services. The second problem, troublesome in other ways, was related to the experimental feature of the program, i.e., the requirement that contracted service agencies in each judicial district were to limit their treatment procedures to a prescribed type.

The state's major youth service agencies regarded the requirement of detention prior to referral for program services as an insuperable obstacle to their participation. Their reluctance to participate became evident early in the planning and organizing phase of program development. After an initially well attended planning meeting, in which agencies learned of the "in detention" provision, attendance at subsequent planning sessions typically included representatives from the court, the Connecticut Justice Commission, and the Department of Children and Youth Services. Notably absent were representatives from the many

Youth Bureaus in Connecticut, considered particularly desirable as potential service providers. The YSBs were also apparently reluctant to face the bureaucratic barriers anticipated in contractual arrangements with the state government connected agency scheduled to administer the program. One observer described the problem encountered in engaging the cooperation of service providers in the following statement:

(The program) was intended as a real research effort. . . . (The planners) had made a real effort to conform to the original intent. The thing that intervened was all of the reality problems of getting cooperation from the various actors, and also getting really top-flight bidders on the contracts. Our dream was that the United Way and the Youth Service Bureaus would just jump at this. And for various reasons they backed out, and we had to do the best we could. . . . One of the major reasons (for this) was that the large social agencies in (one of the state's three judicial districts) was opposed to the child being brought to detention. They wanted the child to come directly from the police. Those of us who planned the project in conjunction with the federal monitor agreed that if we let the children be referred from the police to the project, the police would flood the project, and we really wouldn't get the status offender that was earmarked for detention. We'd be getting all kinds of kids. So we really agreed, the initial group on this (project), plus the federal monitor, that this is the way it had to be designed. So, when we presented this (to private sector agencies) as a condition of receiving the money, that (they) would be receiving referrals from detention, the social agencies in (the district) . . . decided that that was inappropriate, to have a child brought to detention.

A key program staffer described the response of the social agencies to the detention requirement more explicitly:

I thought it would be just great if the private agencies could come together and plan a joint response, with each one providing the expertise that they had (in order to implement the maximum intervention model). They did a whole planning process. (But) they screamed bloody murder when the (program planners) said the kids had to go to detention. . . . They screamed bloody murder (about the need for 24 hour, 7 days a week availability to

effect quick removal of status offenders from the detention centers), although I think . . . they could have worked that out. And, they weren't hungry (for the funding). This is a United Way (group of agencies) that makes its own way plus.

Disappointed in their efforts to obtain the service providers initially sought, the program moved to contract with agencies willing to accept youth that the court saw fit to place in detention. It was with some sense of loss that the program entered into these contracts. As another member of the program planning staff put it with special reference to the implementation of the maximum intervention model:

Because we were not able to contract with experienced people, with private agencies that had the freedom to move, we had to contract with the people who really didn't have staff with expertise. I'm not . . . saying (they did not have) credentials. (Some even had) a creative idea (such as) using peer counseling. . . . But they didn't have the expertise. They couldn't carry out the whole idea (of the maximum intervention program model). . . . Remember, the expertise, Children and Family Services, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Neighborhood Centers, they wouldn't deal with us.

The objection of the service agencies to the "in detention" provision was that it would produce a client pool of status offenders who were either already negatively affected by exposure to court treatment, or for whom preventive intervention had come too late to offer reasonable prospect of success. That this expectation was not off the mark was verified in a description offered at the close of the program of the type of status offender who most frequently came into the program:

By the time we got the status offenders (the) Youth Service Bureaus had given up (on them). The police had determined that whatever was (available) in the community wasn't serving the kid.

In the light of the difficulties created by the detention requirement, the reasons for instituting it need to be examined. Program

planners interpreted the deinstitutionalization objective of the national status offender program to mean just that. Status offenders incarcerated in correctional institutions and held in detention centers were to be removed and their re-entry prevented. The task with respect to those already incarcerated was clear. Not clear, particularly in the case of detention, was the basis on which a selection might be made of those status offenders who, in the absence of the program, would have been held in detention, and who would therefore be eligible for the program. Connecticut chose a forthright, if radical, solution of the problem. Since direct referral from the police had been excluded, it was apparent that operationally and as a practical matter, referrals would come principally from the court intake level of the justice system.

However, another set of factors intervened to give to detainability a possibly unanticipated operational meaning. Court personnel could have been requested, of course, to determine whether, absent the program, they would in fact have detained the child. This could have produced an identification of status offenders as "at risk of detention" in order to determine eligibility for program services in an operationally satisfactory way. But the program design pushed the procedure one step beyond hypothetical detainability by requiring an actual if brief and pro forma detention. An additional reason for this was suggested in the following observation by a program staffer:

When you say "at risk of detention" you have a number of other variables that really determine whether (the risk exists). . . . The court would not let us have a neutral (i.e., hypothetical) territory. They said if the kid is brought to the door and he's delivered to us, we're responsible for that kid. We've got to take him in (if detention is warranted).

Uneasy with the requirement of actual detention imposed by the program design, administrators of the program then limited the period in detention so far as possible to 24 hours by having contracted service providers alerted around the clock on every day of the week to remove eligible status offenders to the program. With the approval of OJJ, it was agreed that for census purposes detentions less than 24 hours in duration would not be counted as such.

Program personnel were of course acutely aware of the difficulties the detention requirement created for program implementation. In addition to losing the support of the best qualified service providers in the jurisdiction, the requirement tended to limit program eligibles to the most chronic status offense cases and to reduce the numbers available for the comparative test of treatment procedures. Nonetheless, the policy of limiting program eligibles to those placed in detention was defended as representing an honest implementation of the purpose of the national status offender program. In their view, its purpose was to test and demonstrate the feasibility of deinstitutionalizing status offenders. Indeed, it was seen by program planners as perhaps the only genuine attempt to do so in comparison to the way in which funded status offender programs at other sites were conducted. This is indicated in statements by several of those involved in the planning and development of the Connecticut program:

It was probably the only one that was a true deinstitutionalization rather than a diversion project because they were in fact focused on kids institutionalized, that is, detained.

Again,

The greatest anxiety (in organizing the program) was our insistence that the only way a kid could qualify for this program was if you brought him to the detention center. That's the strongest point in the program competitively

across the country, and it's the weakest point in terms of program acceptability in Connecticut. . . . (All of the agencies) resented that requirement. . . . All of the (status offender) programs except ours were doing police diversion and pre-police diversion. Ours was the only funded program focused solely on deinstitutionalization. . . . How do you justify (the use of money) for the deinstitutionalization of kids who in fact would never go to an institution? . . . We took the tougher course, and we took a hell of a lot of heat for it. We incurred the resentment of most of the community programs in Connecticut, and Connecticut has a lot of community programs.

As to the second principal problem in program-service provider relations, the allocation of varied treatment approaches among the state's three judicial districts was only reluctantly accepted. Objections to this experimental feature of the Connecticut program took two forms. First, service providers in each of the judicial districts would have preferred to be assigned the maximum intervention model, as this corresponded to their normal mode of treatment. However, the design required two of the three districts to implement the minimum intervention model, one using its community based, the other its court based form. As one of the program planners stated the problem:

Each of the three districts wanted the maximum intervention model, and everybody felt they had been done a dirty turn when it didn't come down that way.

An effort was made initially to deal rationally with this problem by allocating the maximum intervention model to the district with the fullest complement of service agencies. But for reasons that remain unclear, the court reallocated the models before the program got under way, with the maximum intervention model assigned to a district with less than desirable capacity to carry it out.

A second source of unhappiness with experimental variation of treatment approaches was ideological rather than pragmatic. For some,

the program was seen as an opportunity for social agencies to explore and develop creative ideas in reaching and treating status offenders. This opportunity was frustrated, in their view, by the need to restrict treatment intervention in the two minimum intervention models in order to obtain the data needed for the comparative test of intervention approaches. Further, there was some uncertainty that the data to be obtained would lend themselves to a conclusive determination of the relative effectiveness issue. One of the program participants aired this view in an emphatic way:

(We don't know) whether the data we will have at the end of this (program) will be adequate in terms of some of the research questions. I don't know whether that's true in other states, but if it's indeed true, it's really a shame. If we hadn't considered the research, we would have designed this very differently. We could have looked at it as a development of some model programs. But we didn't, and we did sacrifice some rather interesting ideas because we were concerned with (getting) as clean a data (set) as we could have.

SYSTEM PENETRATION

In the Connecticut case it may be inappropriate to raise the question of the degree to which status offenders were exposed to official processing. The program was designed deliberately to deal only with detained status offenders, constituting the principal part of the population defined as the appropriate object of a deinstitutionalization effort. In every case, therefore, youth entering the program were first dealt with as police cases and were then handled in standard fashion by court intake personnel. In relation to procedures followed at other program sites, the Connecticut program represented maximum system penetration.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

As is true for all of the jurisdictions whose programs were evaluated, further progress in Connecticut in reducing the use of detention and correctional institutions in status offense cases is difficult to assess. So far as early intervention in these cases is concerned, the Connecticut situation remains entirely favorable. Although their distribution favors the more urbanized sectors of the state, youth service agencies of high professional quality exist in well over half of the local communities. A large proportion of these consist of Youth Service Bureaus, with joint public-private funding. So far as actual deinstitutionalization is concerned, that is, the use of community based alternatives to detention and correctional institutions, there has been a slow but noticeable trend in court practice to reduce commitments of status offenders to the major state institution for delinquent youth. Moreover, the leadership of the court has indicated support for revision of the state's juvenile code to differentiate status from delinquent offenders and to provide for separate proceedings.

It is likely that the indirect and long run effects of the program are more important than the gains in deinstitutionalization made over the brief period of its existence. The program served, for example, to bring to the attention of both the public and private segments of the youth-serving community the need to address in a focused way certain neglected and unresolved problems in dealing with the status offender issue. Commenting on the state's detention practices, one of the program leaders observed:

There wasn't a (uniform) statewide detention system. They were developing it. This (project) forced it into being. The relationship of aftercare and protective services had

not been addressed. The whole issue of public-private (relationships) has been stirring (without progress). . . . What we're going to do is identify in a descriptive fashion (the shortcomings of the system). . . . (These) issues have been raised again and again through this project.

In addition to throwing into sharp relief inadequacies in the state's organization of services for troubled youth, the program served further to define and bring to public awareness the problem represented by the status offender. Students of the delinquency problem and professional youth service workers may be quite aware of the distinction between delinquent and status offenders; the public by and large is not. As was probably true in most of the other jurisdictions with funded status offender programs, the Connecticut effort introduced the concept and the problem of status offense into the vocabulary of public discussion. As one of the program planners indicated, this was regarded as a substantial if unmeasurable accomplishment:

(The status offender program in Connecticut) was a significant piece of social change. And regardless of whether it was successful or not successful on paper, a lot of people have been observing the project, (such as) legislators. The buzz word is status offenders, and that's a concrete result, (although) you can't measure it.

SUMMARY: THE CONNECTICUT PROGRAM MODEL

Status offender programs, funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice, appear to have varied along two dimensions. The first is the degree to which clients considered to be at risk of detention are selected for program services at the shallow rather than the deep end of system penetration, representing diversion rather than deinstitutionalization. The second dimension is the extent to which the juvenile court is prepared to forego its prerogative of pre-adjudication detention and

post-adjudication use of correctional institutions in favor of providing alternative community based treatment. The sacrifice of control over status offense cases may occur either by statutory compulsion, or by administrative regulation. Connecticut opted for the deeper end, in the course of which judicial control was essentially retained.

As a model, the Connecticut program appears to be well adapted to jurisdictions having the following three features. First, they operate under statutes that fail to decriminalize status offense cases, i.e., do not differentiate them in their processing from juvenile criminal offense cases and do not divest the court of jurisdiction in such cases, or both. Second, the model rests on a program decision to focus effort solely on the deep system penetration end of the deinstitutionalization-diversion continuum, accepting as clients only the most chronic status offenders who are free of involvement in criminal acts. These features are mutually supportive: a program emphasis on deinstitutionalization rather than diversion is most clearly indicated in jurisdictions whose relatively high rates of detention and institutional commitments for status offenders are permitted by statute and encouraged by courts opposed to divestment of their control over such cases. The model may work reasonably well if there also exists in the jurisdiction its third important feature. This is a well developed network of youth serving agencies of good professional quality committed to a policy of early intervention in cases of status offense. Under this condition, substantial diversion from police and court processing of status offenders can occur, furnishing a community based, non-judicial, response at the shallow end of the deinstitutionalization-diversion

continuum. To some extent this had occurred in Connecticut, but without its integration into a statewide status offender deinstitutionalization system.

The model does, however, present one potentially serious problem. The population of status offenders eligible for program services is defined as those at risk of detention. Whether the risk realistically exists is a decision that only the court can make. In the Connecticut program, the court construed "risk of detention" to mean the need to use an initial brief period of detention in meeting its legal responsibilities. States whose juvenile statutes are similar to those in Connecticut, and whose courts are protective of the reach of their jurisdiction, present a high probability that status offenders deemed eligible for program services will first have been exposed to a detention experience. If it is valid to assume that an experience of detention reduces the prospect of the youth's rehabilitation, then the model represented by the Connecticut program remains problematic.

On the other hand, the use of actual detention may not be intrinsic to the model. It remains a virtue of the Connecticut program that it did indeed focus on those most vulnerable to institutional treatment, and therefore on literal deinstitutionalization. The use of detention there was in all likelihood a function not of the initial program design, but of the court's freedom to define its legal responsibility in the way it chose. Courts in other jurisdictions, with statutory constraints similar to those in Connecticut, used their discretion to avoid detaining those whom they would have detained in the absence of the program. Thus, Connecticut's insistence on detention as a criterion of

program eligibility may be seen as idiosyncratic, rather than as intrinsic to the model.

CHAPTER VII

DELAWARE

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CHAPTER VII
THE DELAWARE PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

The key proposition driving the national status offender deinstitutionalization program was that the use of secure confinement in dealing with status offenders is unwarranted at the least and at the most likely to prove harmful. All program proposals that were approved for funding accepted this proposition as valid, and vouchsafed their effort to provide community based services as an alternative to detention and institutionalization. They were required to and did produce documented evidence of agreement on the part of their juvenile justice and local youth service agencies to cooperate in this effort.

However, as is often the case when assent is given to an abstractly stated principle, its implications for prior ideological commitments and for established practices were only dimly appreciated. The matter of defining who among juvenile rule violators was truly a status offender was the least of the issues raised in this connection. A more crucial issue that came into contention was whether those defined as status offenders were eligible to be free of the control apparatus of juvenile justice. As a practical matter, the issue turned on the question of the extent to which freedom from justice control would be granted, since status offense cases are normally initially identified and responded to by the police and the courts. Beyond the first point of contact, there were among the jurisdictions involved in the national effort a number of routes status offenders travelled before arriving at the door of the status offender program.

They could be referred directly to the program by the police without creating a court record in the case. They could be referred by the police to court intake (generally preferred by the police), with court intake personnel functioning simply as a conduit and sending the youth directly on to the program. In a decisive escalation of justice control, status offenders could be held by court intake personnel, with or without detention, for an informal, non-adjudicative court hearing to determine the suitability of the case for referral to the program. And, as a final step in the retention of justice control, with all processing of status offense cases originating in the court, intake personnel could itself undertake to provide initial services, usually in the form of crisis intervention; over a period of time they then screened clients for possible referral to youth service agencies contracted by the status offender program.

How does one account for the variation evident among the eight sites in the scope of control exercised by justice agencies in relation to the status offender program? An easy answer is that justice control over the processing of status offense cases varied randomly as a function of reluctance to surrender control in these cases on the basis of the legal and social doctrine that happened to be entertained by judicial and enforcement agencies. Some were prepared to accept a narrowing of their control in these cases, and some were not.

Another explanation of these differences among program sites is suggested by an observable pattern of association, with minor exceptions, between the retention of justice agency control in status offense cases and a reluctance to accept the notion that these offenses should be decriminalized. The national status offender program did not directly

push for decriminalizing status offenses. Progress in this respect was in any case already in prospect. Legislatures in a number of states were beginning to consider proposals to remove the status offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and by 1978 one state (Washington) took this step. Prior to the national status offender program many other states had taken the first step in this direction by limiting the discretion of their courts either to detain or to institutionalize status offenders, or in some instances, both.

Juvenile justice agencies have tended on the whole to view the move to deinstitutionalize status offenders as the foot-in-the-door of their decriminalization. They have accepted or resisted the move not on grounds of the validity of deinstitutionalization itself. In most jurisdictions, the police and the courts have followed a long established practice whenever possible of releasing to their parents not only first time status offenders but minor delinquent offenders as well. From their point of view, there appears to be a distinction between deinstitutionalization as a practice and as a doctrine. As a practice, no challenge is posed to the full retention of discretion in the hands of justice agencies. As a doctrine, however, discretion is implicitly denied. If the use of the criminal sanction of involuntary confinement is prohibited, or even actively discouraged as the national status offender program attempted to do, it follows from the legal principle, "without punishment there is no law," that the status offenses are no longer the proper business of juvenile justice agencies.

Hence, whether justice agency personnel in the program sites tended to accept or resist the doctrine of deinstitutionalization depended largely on their convictions and sentiments respecting the decriminalization of status

offenses. These varied substantially among the jurisdictions in which the eight programs were placed. There were two reasonably clear cases of support for decriminalization: the Pima County court (but not the police agencies) before and during the operation of the program, and the Spokane County court (and the Spokane city police) during and subsequent to program operation. In the other six program jurisdictions, the views respecting decriminalization were ambivalent and troubled, as indicated by the various levels of restriction put upon the eligibility of status offenders for program services. Both the Connecticut and the Illinois cases are somewhat unique in that their programs were deliberately designed to reduce the challenge to judicial discretion.

The jurisdictions offering the most pronounced resistance to the decriminalization implications of deinstitutionalization were South Carolina and Delaware, two states that had been making liberal use of secure confinement in status offense cases.

Taken as representative of jurisdictions of this type, the Delaware case may be particularly instructive in understanding the sources of resistance to the decriminalization of status offenders implied in their deinstitutionalization. A small border state consisting of only three counties, Delaware shares a southern regional culture rooted in a rural and small town economy in spite of the presence in its northernmost county of the thriving industrial metropolis of Wilmington. It may well be that traditions of legal and social control generated in settings of this type are essentially continuous with one another. Given a less fully elaborated functional specialization and division of labor among informal and formal control agencies than is found in communities of advanced urban development,

there is a tendency to view any offense that is formally sanctioned as grist for the legal mill. The mutual substitutability of the two control systems throws into question the alleged differential effects of treatment in one or the other of these systems on the careers of young offenders. Thus, in status offense cases the invocation of the criminal sanction through the use of secure confinement seems to be viewed by justice personnel in such jurisdictions as no more than a warranted escalation of the sanctions available to the informal control system, rather than as a shift to a sanction repertoire of a different order with consequences for the youthful offender that are different in kind.

THE DELAWARE PROGRAM PLAN

An OJJ program grant of slightly under \$1 million to Delaware, supplemented by state funds, was initially administered by the state's Division of Services to Children and Youth, a unit of the Department of Health and Social Services, under the guidance of an Advisory Council appointed by the Governor. Reorganization of the state's health and social service functions at the end of the first year of program activity eliminated this Division, and program administration was shifted to the Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice.

In most respects, the Delaware program was a straightforward effort to provide a set of community based services as an alternative to the detention and institutionalization of status offenders. However, in view of the prevailing practice of juvenile justice agencies to process status offenders as ordinary delinquents, program leaders made the decision to leave untouched the discretion of the court in selecting status offense cases for program services. Consequently, the central feature of the Delaware program design

was the establishment of a special court intake unit to deal only with status offense cases. Although the personnel of this unit was supported by program funds, they were employees of the court. Status offender intake units were established in the Family Court branches of each of the state's three counties. With frequent personnel turnover during the early months of the program, they were ultimately staffed by four counselors (two in urban Newcastle County and one each in Kent and Sussex Counties), and one clerk and a supervisor for the three units. Their function was to identify in the court docket cases entered on status offense charges, obtain a dismissal of the charges, make a determination of the nature of the presenting problem, provide crisis counseling and return the youth home if possible, arranging in the meantime for referral to needed services including placement outside the home if indicated.

A second and unique component of the program was a legal advocacy service, contracted to the Community Legal Aid Society (CLASI). In addition to providing legal counsel at court hearings in status offense cases that went to adjudication, this agency had as its main task a continuing review of cases institutionalized at the state's two training schools. Their effort there was to identify those committed for status offenses, review their case histories, and initiate due process proceedings to return the individuals to their homes or to placement facilities. Because work with these cases often entailed a need for counseling and psychological services, the staff of the agency included, in addition to its legal staff, a social worker, and had access to the services of a psychotherapist on a contract basis. In Newcastle County, this work was supported on program funds; in the two lower counties of Kent and Sussex funding support was provided by the Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice.

A third element of program structure was a status offender unit located in the state's Division of Social Services. Its function was to develop placement facilities for status offenders who could not be returned to their homes, to assign youths to appropriate placements, and to maintain general supervision of these cases. The unit was staffed by six social workers, two in Newcastle County, one each in the two lower counties, and an additional worker to serve both. Their support came from program funds.

Diagnostic and case evaluation services were contracted to three counseling centers, one in each county. These centers provided individual psychological counseling and, if needed, medical diagnosis for cases referred to them by the status offender court intake unit and the Division of Social Services. Each of these centers also furnished family counseling when considered appropriate.

Finally, residential services were provided in the form of shelter care and long-term group foster care. An eight-bed shelter facility was operated in Wilmington, supplemented by foster homes. In the lower two counties shelter care was provided exclusively by foster homes. In the course of the program, an effort to establish an eight-bed shelter facility for the southern counties was successfully opposed by the community selected for its location.

Centered on the special court intake unit, the program design thus included the standard complement of counseling and diagnostic services, and residential placement services. The single unusual feature of the Delaware program was its inclusion of an agency to provide legal advocacy services. To be considered now is the procedures through which these services were integrated in the course of case processing.

Case Processing Procedures

To understand the procedures employed in providing community-based services for status offenders in the Delaware program, it is necessary to recognize that under the existing juvenile code status offenders were treated as ordinary delinquents. As is everywhere normally the case, most status offense cases were initiated by police pickup. Under Delaware law, police are permitted to detain juvenile offenders for no more than two hours. Those not released to their parents were referred to the Family Court if the youth was in police custody on a court day. If the police pickup occurred at night, on weekends, or on a holiday, the case went to the local magistrate's court. In the latter case, the youth was most frequently remanded to one of the state's two locked detention centers rather than to one of the shelter facilities established by the program. The alleged status offender was then required to be produced before the court on its next business day, although this provision was not uniformly observed. The grounds for the resistance of magistrates to the use of shelter facilities will be dealt with below.

All cases appearing on the court calendar were routinely examined by the special status offender court intake unit instituted with program funds. The unit had been given court authority to remove all status offense cases found still in detention. Except in cases of repeated runaway, chronic incorrigibility, mental disturbance, or occasionally of referral by parents, the unit terminated the adjudication process and initiated services. According to one estimate, approximately 90 percent of cases determined by the unit to involve primarily status offenses were returned to their homes. The balance were held for a court hearing if the status offender unit

determined that there was a need for out-of-home placement or institutionalization. A court order was then required to transfer custody to the special status offender unit established by the program in the Department of Social Services for that purpose. There were also instances in which the status offender intake unit recommended a court hearing for the purpose of placing the youth on probation. These were cases in which the use of court authority was deemed necessary for the control of the youth's behavior.

For most cases, however, the status offender intake unit initiated services by arranging for crisis counseling, and developing an assessment of the underlying individual or family problem. When warranted, use was made of contracted facilities to provide a diagnostic workup to help determine whether and what kinds of further services might be required in the case. The intake unit's service procedures took up to 30 days to complete, during which counseling might be intermittently provided or contact with the youth maintained by telephone. Whether and to what extent the activity of the intake unit constituted only case assessment without substantial ameliorative services remains uncertain.

In those cases that went to court hearing, the Community Legal Aid Society was notified and was accepted by the court as the provider of legal counsel for the youth. Their effort in these cases was to prevent, if possible, commitments to the state's training schools. In general, their effort was, as one staff member put it, to "free the child from a restraining institution or facility." However, their advocacy work extended beyond the provision of legal counsel, and in the cases they represented, included as well the provision of placement services through the Division of Social Services, placement in out-of-state facilities, counseling, and occasionally

individual psychotherapy. As noted, the legal aid agency also represented status offenders already committed to the training schools for the purpose of returning them to the community.

The unique feature of case processing in the Delaware program was the full involvement of the Family Court. This differed from procedures followed in many of the other programs where some provision was made to refer status offense cases directly from police and other non-justice referral sources to the program.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes and Justice Control of Program

Of the contextual elements considered in these program descriptions, justice system control of the program has already been characterized as pervasive. This was true in the specific sense that control in the processing of status offense cases was firmly located in the Family Court, where case selection for referral to adjudication took place. As to statutory restrictions, the Delaware juvenile code did not prohibit use of secure confinement of status offenders. Other elements will be dealt with more fully.

Established procedures in dealing with status offense cases made virtually no distinction between these and cases of criminal offense. These procedures were reflected in the eligibility criteria for program services. Cases of mixed status and delinquent offenses were ineligible as were those status offenders who had delinquent charges pending and those on probation in the custody of the Bureau of Corrections. Cases of runaway and incorrigibility were also eligible, but only if the school or parent brought the charge. On the other hand, a record of prior delinquent offenses was not considered a bar to program services.

During the program period, the magistrates' courts continued to treat status offenses as indistinguishable from other kinds of delinquent offenses, and to make full use of detention facilities. Indeed, it was the judgment of the program director that the program had done little to reduce the numbers placed in detention, claiming only that there had been substantial reduction in incarceration time. It should be said, however, that in the face of unabated resistance, program personnel made some effort to persuade the magistrates to use shelter homes in lieu of detention facilities.

Availability of Residential Facilities

As was true for most of the other sites, the Delaware program found that while there was a need for placement facilities for a small number of status offenders, it was possible in almost all cases to return the youth home. The court intake unit first attempted a home return. Failing this, an effort was made to locate a receptive relative's home. This failing also, custody of the case was transferred to the DSS for long term placement in a group or foster home. In addition, the need for short term shelter space as an alternative to secure detention was substantially reduced by the preference of magistrates to use the state's two detention facilities.

As might be expected, most of the group residential beds were located in metropolitan Newcastle County. The two southern counties suffered a chronic shortage of shelter space. Shelter space used in this area of the state was consequently of the foster home type. Even here, difficulty in recruiting foster homes made it necessary to place southern county cases in facilities in Newcastle County, requiring DSS workers located in the south to spend excessive travel time to supervise and monitor

placements. Again, as noted in other program sites, program personnel complained of difficulty in placing teenage status offenders in foster homes for short term shelter care. Foster parents generally expressed a preference for young children.

Community Tolerance

Tolerance for the infractions of status offenders in the Delaware site was probably at a lower ebb than in any of the other program sites. The level of community intolerance was reflected in expressions of attitude and in the actions of the public, the schools, the public welfare agencies, and the juvenile justice system. It is important to note, however, that the tolerance level for status offense behavior was not entirely uniform in the metropolitan and rural areas of the state, nor in the family and magistrate courts.

While the public depends on its educational and control agencies to express and implement its views regarding matters of justice, it is occasionally offered an opportunity to make its views known directly. This occurred in connection with the program effort to establish an eight-bed group shelter home in a town in one of the lower counties. The town fathers adamantly refused to approve its establishment, and placed the program manager in the unhappy position of having to appeal to the court to overturn their decision.

School policy may be assumed to reflect public attitudes with reasonable accuracy. As was done in other sites, an effort was made to measure the rate of student suspensions and expulsions during the year preceding program start-up. Delaware was found to lead all other sites on this

measure, joining South Carolina, Connecticut, and the Cook County site in the Illinois program as the four sites with substantially higher rates. It is interesting to note that these were precisely the sites which were most reluctant to reduce the role of the juvenile justice system in dealing with status offenders. Further evidence of school attitudes is offered by the unhappiness of school personnel with the program practice of prompt removal of status offenders from detention. When it became known that the special intake units of the Family Court were discouraging detention, schools abandoned their earlier practice of referring truants to the courts in order to impose on them the punishment of detention. Instead, they took to charging students with the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct and with other varieties of criminal conduct in order to make them eligible for detention. As matters turned out, this device failed to serve school purposes. Complainants in criminal charges were required to appear at court hearings, and teachers did not want to take the time required.

Intolerance of status offenders was exhibited as well by leaders of the state's major public welfare agency. The program was initially managed and supervised by the Department of Health and Social Services. Leaders of this agency were largely antagonistic to the program, most immediately because of the difficulties encountered in establishing the additional shelter homes planned by the program. But behind the irritation with this unwanted burden lay their view of the appropriate way to deal with status offenders. As one informant put it, the position was that "kids of this age really have to be handled with an iron fist." An equally telling indication of the receptivity of state officialdom to the program was revealed when the Department of Health and Social Services

was relieved of the unwanted task of program management as a result of an administrative reorganization. Approximately six months elapsed before it was possible to find another agency to take the responsibility. In the interest of salvaging the federal grant, the Governor's office took over the program, assigning its supervision to the Commission on Criminal Justice.

But it was most prominently at the police and court level that community intolerance for status offenders was evident. A leading police official offered the prediction that any reduction in police authority to arrest youth for status offenses would be countered by shifting the supporting charge to a variety of criminal offenses. As to court attitudes, a distinction must be made between the magistrates' courts and the Family Court and, with respect to the latter, the urbanized north county and the two more rural southern counties. The persistent use of detention instead of shelter facilities that occurred during the program period could be ascribed almost entirely to the refusal of magistrates to acknowledge a distinction between a youth charged with a status or a criminal offense. Nor were they backward in asserting their prerogative in this judgment. As one observer stated, "They feel they should have the (right) to do whatever they want because they are the judge."

Problems of court attitudes toward status offenders encountered by the status offender intake units in the Family Court differed markedly in the two lower counties from those in Newcastle County. The intake unit in the latter encountered little interference with its authority to divert status offenders from adjudication and to arrange for the use of community services. In the southern counties, resistance to the operation

of these intake units was common and took various forms. Court personnel were much less ready to resort to the use of counseling agencies since, in their view, the appropriate expedient was to return the youth home to be "counseled" by parents. These courts were particularly opposed to the program philosophy that a status offender was not a criminal, even in cases of multiple runaway. The prevailing sentiment was that in the chronic status offense cases the appropriate remedy was secure confinement. With respect to runaway cases, the preference was, as one observer put it, "to put the kid away for a week or so, then he won't run again." Another informant stated "They got Stevenson House down there which is a secure detention facility. . . . Sometimes kids are sent there just to be taught a lesson, and sometimes kids go there and are forgotten. Stevenson House is not looked on as a jail. They look on Stevenson House as a place where you handle bad kids. Bad kids are those who say no to their parents."

The head of the status offender intake unit in one of the lower counties was explicit in expressing opposition to the program stating, "We are not going to treat these kids any different in the court." Although a psychologist from a local mental health clinic was available there for diagnostic evaluation of status offense cases, this intake unit preferred to get evaluations from the personnel of shelter homes. The use of the legal aid service in the south county courts was restricted to the cases in which custody was transferred to the DSS for purposes of placement, and was not used in cases that went to adjudication. Said one observer, "their attitude was that kids have no rights." Finally, intolerance of status offenders was reflected as well in punitive attitudes exhibited by workers in the DSS. Troublesome and recalcitrant youth in

their custody were commonly threatened with detention if they failed to behave in their foster homes.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

The problems the program encountered in diverting status offense cases from adjudication and procuring community-based services for them developed mainly in the state's lower two counties. Such services were in any case less available in these counties, but the principal source of resistance to the program was the tradition in rural areas respecting the control of juvenile misbehavior. They preferred to handle their own problems without the intervention of professional help, relying on the informal control influences of the family, the school, and the community.

Although most of the Family Court judges regarded the aims of the program with a distinct lack of enthusiasm, they welcomed its promise of increased service resources to be provided through the federal grant. For the most part, then, support of the program at the Family Court level remained firm, despite the fact that judges' skepticism about program value was fed by delays in developing promised services. However, the program generated little support from the local magistrate's courts, which handled status offense cases during non-court hours. They remained adamant in their refusal to use the group and foster home shelter facilities as an alternative to detention. Problems respecting the development of services for status offenders centered on shelter bed space. In contrast, diagnostic and counseling services were readily identified and brought into the program on a contract basis.

Finally, relations between the program and the police offered few problems. With negligible exceptions, eligibility for program services required all

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status offense cases to be initiated at the police level. Unlike the situation in other sites, where program time and effort were devoted to eliciting the collaboration of the police, virtually no attempt was made in Delaware to persuade police agencies to alter their traditional processing procedures and to refer clients directly to the program.

Program-Service Provider Relations

As was true at other sites, the Delaware program found that a substantial portion of the two-year period of federal funding was consumed in completing contractual arrangements with service providers. According to one estimate, the first six months of the program period was spent in this activity. Nominal agreement to cooperate with the program prior to receipt of the grant had to be followed by the selection of specific agencies and firming up contract provisions. This often turned out to be a protracted process, since youth service agencies typically follow their own case intake policies and time was needed for mutual adjustment between these and the requirements of the program.

It is important to note, however, that the basic service in the Delaware program model was located in the Family Court in the form of the status offender intake unit. The court's acceptance of this service both in principle and in practice, as well as the services of the legal aid agency, was firmly in place prior to program initiation in Newcastle County, but delayed until after program start in the lower two counties. In addition to diverting status offenders from adjudication, as well as removing them promptly from detention, the status offender intake units also procured community services in cases where these were needed.

Program managers planned for two types of needed community-based services. The first was for case evaluation and long-term counseling; the

second for residential placement. Little difficulty was encountered in bringing the first into the program. This was not the case, however, with respect to shelter home services. Although the program enjoyed the advantage of having incorporated into the program a unit of the Department of Social Services to handle all residential placements, there was an acute shortage of such bedspace. The DSS unit was funded by the program, and its function was to take court ordered legal custody of status offense cases requiring residential placement. But only one eight-bed group shelter home was available in Newcastle County and none in the two lower counties.

Maintained by a religious order, this operation was, however, beset with difficulties. In addition to financial problems the staff of the institution had had no prior experience in dealing with status offenders, and they seemed to resent the lack of program effort to brief them properly on the problems that might be presented by status offenders. The administrator complained that "persons soliciting contracts didn't know how to explain to anyone what this type of kid was like...They (evidently) were afraid of scaring them off, so they let them know as much as they thought they need to know to be enthused and go ahead with it." Perhaps it should be added that it was likely that program personnel also had little idea of "what this type of kid was like." Unprepared for the service they were expected to provide, this shelter facility faced serious problems in their efforts to integrate temporarily placed status offenders into institution routines with use of a poorly trained staff subject to frequent turnover. This resulted in a not infrequent remand of status offenders to the court and to detention.

Thus the main effort was subsequently devoted to the establishment of foster homes for shelter placement. The principle difficulty in obtaining these facilities was that foster homes were in short supply on the base of

Delaware's small population and, second, that foster parents expressed a preference for young children rather than the angry and emotionally upset teenagers who were typical of status offenders. In any event, the use of the state's established agency, the Department of Social Services, to find and certify shelter homes, and to supervise and monitor foster home placements, was uniformly regarded as one of the most successful aspects of the Delaware program.

As for the crucial status offender intake units in the Family Court, the principal problem that emerged was the uncertainty over the scope of services they were designed to provide, and the elapsed time between intake and the establishment of further services in cases where this was indicated. In metropolitan Newcastle County, initial crisis counseling was followed by intermittent follow-up counseling pending a determination of the services that might be needed in the case, often with assistance from a contracted diagnostic evaluation agency. The period from intake to service decision could have taken as long as 30 days, during which the intake unit may have been heavily involved in efforts to deal with the problem of the youth and family. On the other hand, a client might be told by the intake unit to report to a counseling agency on a specified date. If the client did not appear, there were no follow-up procedures and the case was dropped. In the two lower counties there was substantially less investment on the part of the intake units in providing services. The tendency there was to restrict their service to crisis intervention. Even more pronounced than in Newcastle County was their tendency to return most status offenders to their homes. Only those who were repeatedly returned to the court by the police were referred out to the program's contracted counseling agencies.

Program-Court Relations

Problems of program-court relations in Delaware differed at each of the two levels of the state's judicial structure. All juvenile cases were heard in its Family Court, but the local magistrate's courts were empowered to deal with juvenile cases during non-court hours or days. Their function was restricted to a determination of probable cause to hold the youth for referral to the Family Court, and until the next court day either to return the youth home or place him in detention. While the posture of the Family Court judges toward the program was one of skepticism respecting both its value and its prospects of success, the magistrates maintained an attitude of unrelieved antagonism to the program demand that they avoid the detention of status offenders.

The position adopted by a majority of Family Court judges was substantially that taken by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. In a word, Family Court judges objected to the reduction of court control in status offense cases implicit in the Delaware program on grounds of their conviction that they were better equipped by experience and knowledge of the community and its needs than were social workers to deal with young offenders. As one observer put it, "they honestly thought that every child could benefit from their advice and counsel, that they had helped reduce juvenile crime and helped keep families together." However, the Chief Judge of the Family Court was sympathetic to the aims of the program and, whatever his reservations, saw it as an opportunity to obtain federal assistance in expanding the services available to deal with status offense problems. Other judges reluctantly agreed to cooperate, but only in the light of the promised increase in services, and accepted the establishment of the special status offender

intake units in their courts. In brief, they supported the program without enthusiasm. And, again, as was repeatedly evident throughout the Delaware experience, the courts in Kent County and, to a lesser degree in Sussex County, proved to be particularly resistive to the program.

As the program developed, judicial resistance was expressed in the form of specific complaints. Since they had been prevailed upon to cooperate with the program on the promise of increased service, a major criticism centered on program tardiness in getting services into operation, particularly the provision of shelter homes. Judges were quick to fault the program for failure to provide in a timely way the one value that had persuaded them to accept it. Other objections were also raised. They were critical of the use of unlocked facilities in cases of girl runaways whom they regarded as highly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Some of the judges resented the tendency of intake unit workers to ignore the criminal charges in mixed status-delinquent offense cases in order to keep them from going to adjudication. As one judge put it, "social workers cheat on status offenders." This judge was willing to agree that status offenders do not belong in court, but he insisted that many of them are not "just status offenders." In cases requiring placement services, there was some resentment of the requirement that legal custody be transferred to the Department of Social Services, which in effect terminated the court's control. Some judges were antagonistic to the intrusion of the legal advocacy service that the program provided, finding it difficult to accept in principle the notion that young offenders had legal rights. One judge, for example, regarded the status offender label as meaningless. He insisted on dealing with them as ordinary delinquents and saw no reason for not committing them to institutions. In dealing with this court,

the legal aid service found it necessary to appeal several of this judge's decisions. But despite these criticisms, objections, and difficulties raised by the judiciary, most prominently in the lower counties, the program leaders regarded the work of the status offender intake units as having achieved very real progress. They were convinced that as the program progressed, fewer status offense charges reached the adjudication stage, and that while the numbers detained did not decrease, there was substantial reduction in time spent in detention.

The problem of numbers placed in detention was largely owing to the way the magistrate courts viewed the program. They regarded the efforts of social workers to treat juvenile offenders as amounting to little more than referring them from agency to agency with "kids falling between the cracks." They did not in any case like to deal with juvenile cases, disposing of them promptly by either placing them in detention or sending them home. Program efforts to persuade them to use shelter services rather than detention facilities were largely futile. Early attempts were made to communicate the program message by scheduling meetings, but few of the magistrates attended, and the effort was abandoned. Although he was opposed to having status offense cases heard in these courts, the Chief Judge of the Family Court could do little to remedy the problem since he had no power over the appointment of magistrates.

Program-Police Relations

As has been noted, relations with police agencies were entirely without problems since the program made virtually no effort to obtain their cooperation. Police cooperation was not considered essential to the program design for the simple reason that eligibility for program services required a complaint originated by the police. Unlike program models in several of the

other sites, no effort was made in Delaware to persuade the police to refer their status offender pickups directly to program services. This was excluded on grounds that services were to originate at the point of court intake, a point in the processing of juvenile offenders that could be reached only through police arrest.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the police were acutely aware of the existence of the program, and resentful of many of its features. Some of their criticisms stemmed from a general conviction that any reduction of punitive action in juvenile cases hampered the deterrent effectiveness of police work. Other objections were aimed at the failure of program leaders to make a serious effort to obtain police cooperation in the planning of the program. One charge was that police agencies were not even informed that such a program was being planned. At one point after the program was funded, a presentation of its objectives was made to police chiefs, but no follow-up occurred to communicate the message to line officers. The program was also faulted for its lack of administrative continuity, the reference being to the long interval of time that it took to shift supervision and control from the Department of Health and Social Services to the Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice. But all such criticisms of the program were in any case gratuitous, reflecting little more than skepticism regarding the value of the program's deinstitutionalizing aims. One police official, for example, ended his disparagement of the program by asserting that, as a matter of customary procedure, the police continue to divert deserving juvenile cases from detention and adjudication and make what effort they can to obtain help for them. Thus, at bottom, police agencies in Delaware questioned the need for a status offender deinstitutionalization program.

SYSTEM PENETRATION DURING REFERRAL TO PROGRAM

Delaware shared with a number of other sites, notably Connecticut and Illinois, a program design that required a substantial degree of system penetration as a condition of eligibility to receive program services. Only those status offender cases that reached the intake level of the court were referred to the program. Hence, no status offender in the Delaware site escaped an experience of official processing by the police, in many instances by the magistrate's court with a high probability of detention, and finally by the Family Court intake unit.

In these circumstances, only those conditions that may have exacerbated or mitigated system penetration can be noted. Mitigation occurred typically at court intake, where the special status offender unit diverted the case from adjudication and, under a standard arrangement, had the charge dismissed, although the case was entered into the court records. On the other hand, system penetration was sometimes intensified when parents, and, on very rare occasions, the police appealed to the court intake unit to provide help for a status offending youth. Since only a formal charge could initiate the action of the intake unit in behalf of the youth's welfare, the instruction typically given was to institute a formal charge of delinquency.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

The likelihood that the status offender services developed in the course of the program would be continued after termination of federal funding was a matter of deep concern for program personnel at all sites. In virtually all of the program jurisdictions they either sponsored or supported proposals before their legislatures intended to restrict police and court use of secure

confinement in status offense cases or, in some instances to remove status offense cases from the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system and redefine them as welfare problems. In Delaware, similar legislation had been proposed and was defeated. However, it was known that there were plans to reintroduce such legislation although, if successful, its specific provisions could not be predicted.

In the face of this possibility, program personnel freely speculated first on the fate of the status offender services developed by the program if the legislation failed to pass, and second, on consequences anticipated if it did. As to the first, the expectation was that the treatment of status offenders would quickly revert to the practices followed prior to the program. However, to prevent this from coming to pass, both the Family Court and the Department of Social Services planned to request increases in their budgets for the specific purpose in the one case to maintain the status offender intake units, and in the second to continue their support of their special status offender unit and the additional shelter space acquired to serve program clients.

The possibility that some form of deinstitutionalization legislation would succeed elicited some concern for negative consequences. For example, the prospect that status offenders might be placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services alarmed some observers on the grounds it would require very much more shelter space than could possibly be generated and financed. Others questioned the ability of the Department to handle a large increase in a current caseload for which they provided adequate supervision only with great difficulty. But the major concern focused on the response of the enforcement agencies to deinstitutionalization legislation. If they

were prohibited from arresting and charging juveniles with status offenses, the prediction from the social worker side was that they would charge status offenders with offenses that opened them to treatment as minor criminal offenders. A staff member of the legal advocacy service pointed out that there would always be available a misdemeanor charge of "imperiling family relations," a charge usually leveled at adults in cases of domestic violence. As a misdemeanant, the youth could then be treated as a delinquent. This possibility was explicitly echoed by a police official. He stated flatly that since the community expected the police to act in many cases of juvenile misbehavior, the police would simply shift their charges to such minor criminal offenses as loitering or trespassing in order to bring status offenders to the Family Court.

Thus, at the point at which federal support for the program ended, the most hopeful signs pointing to its continuation was the move of both the Family Court and the Department of Social Services to seek increased funds from the legislature to maintain two of the major sources of the program: the status offender court intake units and the special unit of the Department of Social Services created to deal exclusively with status offenders.* As the program ended, it was unclear whether they would succeed in this effort.

* It is worth noting that this hope was not futile. The federally funded program ended in 1977. Impressed with the accomplishments of the program, the Delaware legislature in 1979 revised the state's juvenile code, eliminating the offenses of runaway, truancy, and incorrigibility ("uncontrollable") as delinquencies. Responsibility for these cases was transferred to the Division of Social Services, which was granted a budget increase. The special intake units that the program had established in the Family Court were retained, now supported on state funds. The functions they had previously performed in status offense cases they now devote to delinquency cases. Both the Division of Social Services and the Family Court were provided funds to contract for the services of community agencies. This development was largely unpredictable in the light of generally unfavorable community attitudes toward status offender deinstitutionalization. Why and how this occurred deserves separate study.

Its source of support was restricted to a limited number of the judiciary and to the social work community; there was little evidence of either public knowledge of or organized support for the program.

SUMMARY: THE DELAWARE PROGRAM MODEL

The Delaware program was set in a jurisdiction that offered minimal public support for reducing the use of secure confinement in status offense cases. In contrast to several of the other program sites, in Delaware there had been little effort in these cases to restrict by statute the use of detention and of commitment to locked institutions. However, the urbanized northern of its three counties was more receptive to the value of status offender deinstitutionalization than were its two lower counties. The administration, supervision, and monitoring of the program was reluctantly undertaken initially by the state's major public welfare agency. Responsibility for the program was subsequently transferred to the Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice, which pursued program objectives with greater enthusiasm.

In this context, the most feasible program design was one in which the selection of status offense cases for diversion from adjudication and for program services contracted to community-based agencies was firmly located within the court. This task was vested, however, in a special intake unit supported on program funds. The unit was authorized by the court to dismiss the delinquent charges, and to examine each case with a view to the two options of return to the home, or residential placement. The unit was also given control of the decision to refer cases to contracted community agencies for a variety of further services, including case evaluation and counseling. Under contract as well was the state agency with responsibility for the development and licensing of shelter and foster home facilities and for the supervision

of youth placed in these facilities. Here, again, a special unit was established on program funds whose sole responsibility was to deal with status offense cases which in the judgment of the court's status offender intake unit required residential placement. Finally, a component unique to the Delaware program was a legal advocacy service contracted to intervene with blanket court approval in status offense cases that came to adjudication. The work of this agency was designed to prevent detention and commitment to the state's training schools. In addition, it reviewed the cases of all status offenders already incarcerated in an effort to effect their return to the community.

The Delaware program model is thus representative of those that operated in a climate of judicial and public opinion highly resistive to the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. The central feature of these programs is the insistence of its courts on the full retention of court control over the selection of status offender cases for diversion from detention and from long-term locked facilities, and for referral to community based services. The distinctive feature of the Delaware program in this set was the establishment within the structure of the Family Court of a mechanism and a procedure deliberately designed to intervene in the normal court processing of delinquency cases for purposes of providing a special program of treatment for those with status offense charges. In the light of this feature, it would be accurate to characterize the deinstitutionalization effort in Delaware as a court operated status offender program.

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CHAPTER VIII THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM

In its attempt to foster a reduced use of incarcerative settings in the treatment of status offenders, the national program encountered a typical set of issues in the eight funded sites. The salience of these issues varied among sites. What may have been acutely problematic in one was absent in others or open to ready solution. The Illinois program was distinctive in that everyone of the issues engaged in promoting the deinstitutionalization of status offenders came prominently into view, each generating conflict still in the process of resolution by the end of the funding period.

The first of these, arising early in the planning and organizing phase, concerned the question as to whether the leadership of the program should be vested in the public or the private agency sector. The decision of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC), the state planning agency for criminal justice, was to place the program in the public agency sector. The second, and related, issue was whether the scope of the program should be statewide or limited to a restricted set of local jurisdictions. ILEC chose to go statewide. A third issue concerned the distribution of program emphasis between protecting status offenders from a detention experience and providing for them a system of appropriate services. Virtually all other program sites gave approximately equal emphasis to both. The Illinois program was focused primarily on detention avoidance, with aftercare limited to a brief

period prior to case disposition by a court intake unit. Essentially, the decision regarding aftercare services, if any, was made by the courts. Fourth, the question of utilizing established, "old line," youth service agencies as service providers or stimulating the development of new, untried, but presumably more flexible and imaginative agencies represented another prominent issue. In the major metropolitan jurisdiction of Cook County, the statewide child welfare agency operating the program made use of newly developed youth service agencies as well as of established agencies, with the latter providing most of the advocacy services. Finally, as the fifth issue engaged in the programs at all of the sites, the important question was faced as to whether an effort should be made to induce the court to delegate to the program a substantial share of its legal power of control in status offense cases. No program could operate without the agreement of the court to permit it to take responsibility in providing for the needs of status offenders. However, the degree to which the courts granted the power to assume such responsibility varied widely among funded programs. The Illinois program operated under a particularly narrow grant of power.

The program at this site was initiated and given its most essential design features by ILEC, the state's criminal justice planning agency. At the time OJJ fielded its status offender initiative, Illinois had already enacted a Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS) statute, giving its juvenile courts authority to place MINS violators under the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), the statewide child welfare agency. It was soon discovered that the services provided by DCFS were far from adequate. With funding by ILEC, a special demonstration program was set up in two of that agency's regions as part of the status

offender project to develop the needed services. These activities were preceded in Illinois by a general movement to deinstitutionalize juvenile offenders under the leadership of the architect of the massive deinstitutionalization of youthful offenders that had occurred in Massachusetts. The then governor of Illinois had invited Jerry Miller to assist him in reforming the state's correctional system. A prominent feature of that movement was the effort to substitute community based services for incarceration. The later demonstration project, conducted under the aegis of DCFS, was also designed around the central feature of contracting with community based youth service agencies in the private sector to furnish the required services for MINS youth. Survey information had become available indicating that status offenders were being detained in large numbers throughout the state. In responding to the OJJ request for program proposals it apparently seemed reasonable to ILEC planners to utilize the service delivery model of the MINS demonstration program, and to place its administration in DCFS. As to the location of the administration and leadership of the status offender program, the alternative considered and rejected was to locate it in an existing organization of Youth Service Bureaus and other combinations of private youth agencies.

There was nevertheless both uncertainty and dispute regarding the placement of the status offender program. ILEC planners faced disagreements within the private youth services community regarding an appropriate choice of organizational leadership for the status offender program. There had already occurred a vigorous expansion of Youth Service Bureaus with substantial funding by ILEC, with well developed diversion programs in many localities. The YSBs regarded themselves as an established and logical

mechanism for providing community based services to detainable status offenders. Others saw the YSBs as unequipped to provide the round-the-clock readiness to intercept status offenders on their way to detention centers. Finally, at the court level there remained palpable resistance to surrendering control over the disposition of status offense cases. Although by 1974 the law prohibiting the incarceration of youth adjudicated as MINS was already in effect, it was variously interpreted and implemented by the state's juvenile court judges. As will be seen, the major feature of the status offender program in Illinois was an adaptation to court reluctance to embrace with enthusiasm the sweeping deinstitutionalization aims of the program.

THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM PLAN

The Department of Children and Family Services, the grant recipient, found it expedient to implement and develop the program by creating a separate structure, the Illinois Status Offender Services (ISOS), and labeled it in a way to provide it a separate and distinct identity. A number of reasons were suggested for the DCFS reluctance to absorb the operation into its own administrative structure. From the agency point of view, the addition of the program was expected to overload an already overburdened and underfunded staff. Other observers suggested, however, that tensions in DCFS relations with court and police personnel, accumulated over a decade, would impede the establishment of the program. The agency had apparently come to be seen as less than responsive in providing the scope of services expected of it. Still others were hostile to DCFS simply because of alienation generally from large governmental bureaucracies, and

a conviction that the status offense problem and its solution lay in the hands of local community residents and institutions.

Operating in 11 of the 18 DCFS regions, the ISOS launched its Alternatives to Detention program with an OJJ grant of \$1.5 million. As the title suggests, the program undertook no more than to provide an alternative to the placement of youth in detention centers pending a court hearing. This meant that the population of concern included all status offenders referable to detention, whether by police, probation officers, social agencies, or by whatever other source. In other words, the population consisted of youth identified as status offenders for whom it was appropriate to initiate a petition for a court hearing. The aim of the Alternatives to Detention program, then, was to provide a means by which youth could be maintained in the community while technically in detention status pending a court hearing for the disposition of the case.

The reasons for thus restricting the program population lay primarily with the posture of the Illinois courts respecting the imperatives of their jurisdiction in these cases. They were not disposed to yield any of their control over status offense cases to ISOS. As one of the ISOS administrators explained their decision to restrict attention to only the imminently detainable status offenders, they realized that the program would have its best prospect of court acceptance if its disturbance to the existing system were minimized, "as a matter of just selling it, getting them to let us do it." But there were in addition positive reasons for restricting the program focus to youth literally on their way to detention centers.

Program managers accepted the court's insistence that their clients be regarded as "in detention" during the period they were in the hands of

the program. This was useful not alone because the court wished to reserve to itself the power to decide the final disposition of the case. The arrangement was seen as inadvertently serving program interests as well. Another administrator stated the matter, ISOS accepted the court's position that the program treat the youth "as if he were detained" while under program supervision in the community because

. . . we wanted to make sure that the court didn't use us as a long term referral source, which I think they would have done. It would have taken forever if we hadn't insisted the kid be treated as if he were detained. If the kid's at home (i.e., sent home pending a decision whether to file a petition), they can file (a petition) whenever they feel like it. That's why we said a petition should be filed on every kid (referred to the program).

The interception operation of the Alternatives program required as well that agreements be established with police agencies to refer detainable status offenders to the program. The agreement established in the Cook County region of DCFS was most fully realized, and may be described as prototypical of those the program tried to conclude, with variable success, in the downstate regions.

The Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department agreed to refer to ISOS all youth charged with a status offense. On taking the youth into custody, the officer called on a "hotline" to a central switchboard, from which the message was relayed to the ISOS worker covering the police district concerned. By the end of the first program year, an Alternatives worker attached to a contracted agency appeared at the station within less than an hour on the average to take charge of the youth. In the meantime, the youth officer had prepared a request for a petition, to be reviewed the following day by the intake unit of the court. In the absence of this procedure, the youth would have been placed

in the court's detention center by the youth officer pending the screening intake on the next court day. The Alternatives worker now had the task of assuring the appearance of the youth at a court hearing, if that had turned out to be the decision of the intake screening unit.

Functioning as a "youth advocate," the Alternatives worker typically returned the youth to his/her home under his supervision. If the home situation made this impossible, the worker had available temporary foster care facilities provided by the contracted agency. When the police-initiated petition was reviewed by the intake screening unit, the Alternatives worker furnished whatever information on the case he had acquired, and participated in the discussion of the case only at the invitation of the probation officer heading the screening unit. If the decision was to grant the police petition requesting a court hearing, the worker could maintain supervision of the case for a period not to exceed ten court days. In effect, then, the Alternatives to Detention program placed a detained status offender in the community under the supervision of a youth advocate employed by a community based youth service agency.

This was the pattern of operation in Cook County. There, the Chief Judge of the court had issued an order prohibiting the placement of status offenders in the court's detention center. The effect of the order was virtually to force youth officers to refer cases to the Alternatives program. The situation was quite different in the downstate region of DCFS. Many judges refused to issue a blanket order banning detention. However, in many jurisdictions they agreed to permit the program to serve those youth they felt might be benefited. Typically, status offenders were brought into detention centers on petition, their

cases were reviewed by probation officers, and a selection was made of those that appeared to be appropriate for the Alternatives program. Generally, the "hard core" cases remained in detention until their court hearing.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

For reasons of economy and feasibility, the programs operating in only three of the DCFS regions were included in the national evaluation study. These were Cook County, embracing principally the city of Chicago, a region centered on Macon County downstate that included six additional largely rural counties, and LaSalle County.

As in the descriptions of all programs, only the more general contextual elements concerned with the juvenile code of the state, the availability of residential facilities, the justice system control of the program, and the level of community tolerance will be considered in this section of the report. Other, more specific, elements of institutional context will be discussed in the following section on program implementation problems.

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes

As has been suggested, elements of institutional and community context impacting each of these regional programs varied. The variation was true as well for the element of statutory restriction with particular reference to the use of detention in MINS cases. The 1974 statute prohibiting commitment to correctional institutions of those adjudicated MINS was apparently observed in all regions. However, only in the Cook County region was the detention of status offenders prohibited by court order, except for those from outside the county or for whom a court order had been issued. In the other regions, detention continued in use at the court's discretion.

Availability of Residential Facilities

While no serious problems arose respecting the availability of residential facilities, the Cook County program found it difficult to obtain these facilities in appropriate locations. They appeared to be in short supply in the communities in which program clients resided, frustrating the aim of the program to use only those facilities that were community based in terms of location. In cases requiring temporary out-of-home placement, it was frequently found necessary to use foster, shelter, and group homes at some distance from the home community of the client. Moreover, there was evidence that ISOS administrators throughout the state preferred to use residential facilities located at some distance from the client's community.

Juvenile Justice Control of the Program

Juvenile justice agencies had no direct control of program, since it was organized, staffed, and administered by the state's public child welfare agency. However, only the most persistent status offenders were given access to program services in one region after being placed technically in detention status, and then only briefly pending the court's disposition of the case. In the other two evaluated regional programs, the courts provided no general order designating the category of status offenders eligible for program services, dealing with such cases on an individual and ad hoc basis. Similarly, agreements with law enforcement agencies left in their hands the discretion to determine which status offense cases would be referred to the program. In brief, justice agency control, while indirect, took the form of restricting the population of status offenders to be served by the program and, distinctively in the Cook County program, the time available to provide the service.

Acceptance of these restrictions does not alter the case: justice system controls with reference to the status offender problem remained a prominent feature of the program.

Community Tolerance

As measured by school disciplinary action, community tolerance ranged from medium to low in the three districts whose programs were included in the evaluation. During the pre-program year, 1975-76, both the Cook County and the Decatur regions had rates of suspensions and expulsions in the highest third of the range across the eight sites, with the Ottawa-LaSalle region falling in the medium range. Supplementary evidence of low tolerance for status offense behavior in the Decatur region is suggested by the fact that urbanized Macon County rejected an opportunity to obtain state funding to establish a set of youth service bureaus in that region shortly before the status offender program was initiated.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

As in other sites, the Illinois program required for its execution the cooperation of the court and the police on one side, and of a set of service providers on the other. With reference to the former, the character of initial agreements to collaborate in carrying out the status offender program varied substantially. Jurisdictions in the state differed in respect to population size and urbanization, as well as the view held by justice agencies regarding the status offender problem. But whatever the initial agreements called for, the novelty of the undertaking precluded anticipation of the difficulties that arose in day-to-day contacts between the program and justice personnel and in the execution of program policy. With reference to relations between ISOS and

service providers, the program similarly encountered a variety of troublesome issues. Several of the most salient of these problems will be reviewed.

Program-Service Provider Relations

With the program fully operative near the close of the funding period, ISOS had succeeded in establishing contracts with 125 service provider agencies throughout the state. To achieve this level of development, the program leadership had to overcome problems of underfunding for the statewide scope of the program, understaffing of the coordinating and monitoring functions of ISOS, and, in the Cook County region, the need to engage new and relatively inexperienced agencies willing to provide status offender advocacy services at low cost. The coordination function was initially understaffed because the number of status offenders that had been subject to detention prior to the start of the program was seriously underestimated. In Cook County the program faced an unexpectedly high initial inflow of police referrals and, as one program leader put it, the coordinators had to act "like killing snakes all the time." Further, the ISOS organization was structured on the model of its parent agency (DCFS), with four service areas, each autonomously managed by a coordinator without adequate supervision. Since all were dealing with a single court, this arrangement quickly led to inconsistencies in case management. The problem was eventually remedied by establishing a functional division of labor among four coordinators under the supervision of a single program executive. A major initial problem was that coordinators were inexperienced in dealing with budgeting procedures and in the task of setting up contracts with service providers. All

contracts required approval in the DCFS office in the state capitol, and early failures to format budgets appropriately resulted in delays in getting contracts concluded.

As to the character of contracted agencies, those engaged in the downstate regions turned out to be more sophisticated with respect to their fiscal responsibilities than those in Cook County. They more frequently consisted of older and more established agencies with close ties to the social work community, participating in organized fund raising through United Way and similar formations. Contracted agencies in Cook County included a higher proportion of those newly formed to respond to the opportunity provided by the Detention Alternatives program of the ISOS, with their leadership ideologically committed to the values of deinstitutionalization and community treatment procedures. Viewing some of these agencies from the standpoint of a highly professionalized and somewhat unsympathetic social worker, one observer commented:

They were newly organized, they had a genuine concern to try to help youth, but they just didn't have the know-how to account for not only when you place a child in a (foster) home, but what you charged (in budgeting).

However, by the second year of program operation, these difficulties in Cook County were largely overcome by dint of the reorganization of the ISOS program along functional lines. Coordinators were assigned responsibility for monitoring and assisting service providers with respect to specific functions, such as contracting and budgeting, policy in the recruitment and selection of foster homes, responsiveness to police referrals of status offenders, and the like. Advocacy services were provided by the established as well as the newly developed youth

agencies, with the latter more often furnishing foster care.

The use of a youth advocacy procedure was central to the ISOS program of providing an alternative to detention. As has been indicated, the task of advocates employed by contracted agencies was to appear promptly at the police station in response to a call to take charge of a status offender who would otherwise have been placed in detention to await intake screening by probation officers. At that point, the responsibility of the advocate was to take custody of the youth until the intake screening on the following day. In most cases the youth was returned home during this brief interim, or less frequently placed in a shelter or foster care facility. In the meantime, the youth officer on the case had prepared a request for a petition to the court alleging a status offense, and informed the court's intake unit of the charge by telephone. The advocate appeared at the screening session with the youth and provided the probation officer in charge with whatever useful information he might have about the child, the family situation, and the offense.

If the screening unit accepted the petition request, as occurred in most cases, a court hearing was set not to exceed ten court days, or approximately fifteen calendar days. During this period the youth remained in technical detention status. Again, the advocate's primary effort was to return the youth to his/her home and to provide general supervision until the date of the hearing. In contrast to every other, the Illinois program made heavy use of foster and shelter care. The advocate was responsible for producing the youth at the court hearing, and at the invitation of the judge, was permitted to participate in the discussion of the case.

Since the Alternatives program included no provision for after care,* the advocate's responsibility terminated with the court's disposition of the case.

Advocates were employed and supervised by the service provider agencies contracted by ISOS. They were recruited principally from two sources: college students enrolled in social science or correctional courses, and a pool of paraprofessional youth workers that had developed principally in Cook County in response to the deinstitutionalization initiative introduced earlier into Illinois by Jerry Miller. As an agency executive put it, "Lots of people surfaced (during that period) who had skills working with people, but didn't have academic credentials." In addition to an interest in youth work, qualifications sought in advocates included flexibility in personal schedule, since advocates had to be ready to respond to police requests at any time, and the use of an automobile. In Cook County the applicant was also checked for a record of arrests and convictions. For many, employment as an advocate represented an entry level job in a planned career in human services. Contract agencies as well as ISOS leaders recognized the need for a training program, but the monthly four-hour meeting of all ISOS advocates fell far short of the need.

Advocates faced a particularly difficult task in carrying out their job duties. In addition to being on call during their working hours to respond to police referrals, they were required to supervise youths in their custody during both the pre- and post-intake screening period, deal with their families in a crisis situation, place them in foster homes in the

* However, the Service Demonstration program in Cook County provided after-care during the first program year. During the second program year the Decatur region established a special after-care service as an integral part of the Alternatives program.

youth's own community if possible, monitor the adequacy of foster home placements, and appear with the offender at court both for the intake screening and the court hearing. Such heavy demands on the time, skill, and dedication of the advocate created a problem of employee turnover as a result of "burn-out." An executive of one of the contract agencies in Cook County accounted for the problem by pointing out that "the gratifications of the job are sparse"; that advocates are the lowest paid employees of the agency; that her part-time advocate employees are on call 24 hours a day, seven days of the week; that much of their time is spent "chauffeur-ing kids around"; that he "suffers abuse in his court appearances" at the hands of probation officers because he is the least educated in the technical sense; and that altogether "the job is hard on the ego." Another agency executive pointed out that many advocates enter the job with little appreciation of its demands. "People come in," he said, "thinking the program is one thing and find out it's another."

The job performance of advocates was noted by a member of the ISOS evaluation staff to fall into two quite different work styles. Some made an earnest effort to work with the families of status offenders in resolving conflict problems, providing a counseling service to parents and youth. Others saw their task as primarily that of diverting youth from court processing, that is, of simply protecting the youth from a detention experience during the period prior to the final case disposition.

Finally, as a note on the fiscal problem faced in maintaining an advocacy service of the ISOS type, the smaller community based service provider agencies found it uneconomical to employ advocates on a full time, salaried basis. Since case flow in the police districts served tended to be sporadic, they determined that the need could be met at lower cost by

employing advocates on an hourly basis. They eventually succeeded in shifting ISOS reimbursement for advocacy service from a daily rate of \$9.00 to an hourly rate of \$8.34.

The experience of the Illinois program with respect to the out-of-home placement issue paralleled that of many of the other evaluated programs. Generally, it was found that most youth taken into custody for status offenses could be returned to their homes. The two downstate regions included in the evaluation encountered few problems in obtaining foster homes for the small numbers for whom they were needed. The single problem ISOS workers in these regions met was reluctance on the part of candidate foster parents to accept teen-agers and youth "in trouble with the law." Resistance to accepting status offenders on a short term basis because of the difficulty of coping with incorrigibles and runaways did not appear to be the problem it was at other sites. In the Cook County region, on the other hand, there were serious problems of establishing foster homes in the numbers and locales needed. The volume of status offender cases generated on the base of the county's population size created a need for a large number of foster homes, despite the minority of the total ISOS case load requiring temporary shelter. Because of the funding shortage and the consequent inadequate staff size in relation to need, there was apparently never enough time to devote to the recruitment of foster homes. In any event, those foster parents in this region who served status offenders regarded the link with the youth advocate as advantageous, as the advocate was more readily available for help in dealing with problem cases than were the workers in the standard placement agencies. Moreover, the link provided for the kind of continuity with the helping agent that is often lost in the usual referral procedures.

While issues of organizational structure and choice of service providers have been described, this account of program-service provider problems has focused on the use of youth advocates because of their key role in the ISOS Detention Alternatives program. The main problems, summarized, were (a) inadequate funding in the face of the effort to cover approximately one-third of the state's 102 counties; (b) a consequent problem of understaffing, particularly in the metropolitan Cook County region; (c) the further consequence of resort in that region to a substantial number of newly organized and relatively inexperienced community based agencies to provide status offender services; (d) the employment by these agencies of largely para-professional youth advocates on a part time basis; (e) a loss of stability in the youth advocate staff and a high rate of "burn-out" and turnover resulting from low pay rates and minimal job gratification; and (f) difficulties in the Cook County region in recruiting and maintaining an adequate supply of suitable foster homes in communities in which status offenders resided.

Police-Program Relations

An important first step in implementing the Illinois program was to obtain the cooperation of police departments in referring status offenders to project workers instead of delivering them to detention centers prior to the court's intake screening. Such cooperation required in the first instance that a court order be obtained prohibiting police referral to detention in status offense cases. Consequently, efforts were made in the counties constituting the DCFS regions to obtain court orders prohibiting pre-screening use of detention centers. Only in the state's major metropolitan region of Cook County was ISOS successful initially in obtaining

such a court order; in all others ISOS attempted to conclude agreements with individual police agencies. The downstate regions presented a formidable task, accomplished with only partial success. The commentary offered here on program-police relations is based principally on the Cook County case, supplemented by information from one of the downstate regions included in the evaluation, where the police department of the City of Decatur agreed to cooperate with the Detention Alternatives program.

By virtue of the court order, the police in Cook County, principally the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department, were in effect constrained to refer status offenders in custody to Detention Alternatives workers. The understanding entered into between the program and the CPD Youth Division stipulated that only those status offenders apprehended on a status offense, excluding out-of-county or state youth and status offenders on a warrant for arrest, and for whom a petition request was to be entered, would be referred. On its side, ISOS undertook to respond promptly to such referrals by dispatching a youth advocate from a provider agency covering the given police district to take custody of the offender.

With some reservations, the police responded positively to this arrangement. During the early months of program operation they were acutely critical of excessive delay in worker response to referrals. The problem was remedied by the fifth month of program operation by creating a backup mechanism to provide an advocate after the second police call. Additional reservations, voiced principally by the leadership of the department, concerned the professional qualifications of some of the advocates, and of the provider agencies contracted by ISOS. Despite such demurrers, police support

accorded the program was firm and consistent, although police were not eager to state their support publicly. An ISOS leader described the police posture in these words:

Law enforcement people, when they get in public meetings don't say much good about us because they're cops and we're the social work side. But in fact we've had more support, and more consistent support, from law enforcement people than from anybody else after the first three or four months of operation. They darn near buried us in Chicago (during) the first three months. We just had to work hard to convince them we're a service organization. They finally believed that, and they're liking that.

Similarly supportive was the Decatur police department, appreciative in particular for the dependability of ISOS help. As one police officer put it, "we may go along for three or four weeks and never need (ISOS) assistance, but when we need them, we need them now, and they're there to help."

Nonetheless, police collaboration with the program was not without problems affecting the selection of clients for the program as well as the task of the advocates. Some program workers observed that at several stations the police learned that the Detention Alternatives workers could be used to help meet two of their problems. The first was the shortage of referral resources available to youth officers to provide help to youth who did not meet program eligibility criteria. Included were those charged with delinquent offenses, and cases of neglect and abuse. Without providing hard evidence for the claim, program staff asserted that police reduced and escalated charges in the interest of obtaining the help of the ISOS program in selected cases. They asserted as well that a second type of police exploitation of advocate services occurred when cases customarily handled as "station adjustments," usually involving first and second time status offenses, were referred for advocate services. In some police districts in

the Cook County region, located principally in the ethnic poverty areas, youth officers apparently tended to call ISOS in order to get the status offenders off their hands and out of the police station as quickly as possible, with a consequent "net-widening" effect. The supervisor of advocate services in one agency stated, "We make the station adjustment that the police should do." For the most part, however, such youth were processed through the screening and hearing stages of court processing, increasing substantially the number entering the court system. In addition, both types of inappropriate referral, those resulting from charge reduction and from evasion of normal policy duty, added significantly to the work load of the youth advocate staff.

A quite different problem surfaced in relation to the Decatur police, who on the whole observed the program eligibility criteria more punctiliously. Although ISOS program personnel state that there was no problem in establishing temporary shelter and foster care facilities, from the police standpoint they were in distinctly short supply. As a result, they found it necessary either to hold for exceptionally long periods status offenders who could not be returned to their homes pending the advocate's location of a suitable facility, or to use a large, long term group home intended only for serious delinquent offenders.

A final problem affecting principally the program in the Cook County region stemmed from discrepant expectations of advocates and police respecting the use to be made of out-of-home placement. Most advocates made a determined effort to return those status offenders (including runaway) placed in their temporary custody to their own homes. The police, on the other hand, tended to view ISOS principally as a placement agency, and to regard youths apprehended for a third status offense as having come from a failed home. From their

point of view, youth officers had already attempted twice "to straighten out the kid" with return home. In their judgment the third offense warranted out-of-home placement. Youth officers were bound to see the advocate's insistence on attempting a third home return as an implicit denigration of their ability to make authoritative judgments in these cases. Although disagreements between advocates and youth officers over this issue were often spirited, in the end the advocate, taking custody of the child, was free to follow his own judgment.

To summarize, while the police were entirely cooperative with the Detention Alternatives program, whether under a court directive or by individually negotiated agreement, several implementation problems, both major and minor, persisted. The major problem was a police tendency to make inappropriate referrals out of both admirable and questionable motives. The former resulted in some "downcharging" of delinquent to status offenses. The latter, more critical for the program, inserted into the machinery of the court cases that should have been dismissed at the station level, resulting in a "widening of the net." A minor problem was a submerged but chronic conflict between advocates and youth officers regarding the need to avoid subjecting status offenders to even the benign institutional experience of temporary shelter or foster care.

Program-Court Relations

The description that follows of the relationship between the Detention Alternatives program and the court will focus mainly on problems in the Cook County region. Separate and less detailed treatment will be given to problems in the downstate Decatur region.

The court in Cook County readily provided the order prohibiting pre-screening detention of status offenders. In the light of subsequent developments, it seems clear, however, that the court order was an expression of judicial interest in reducing the use of secure detention in status offense cases, rather than that of the court's probation department. For the latter, the issue posed by the program was the use of ISOS service providers and their youth advocates to furnish interim supervision of status offenders pending their court appearance, who were technically and legally in the custody of the court and its probation department. The reservations expressed by the probation staff were concerned less with the use of community based facilities during this interim than with the temporary suspension of their direct control over the supervision of status offense cases, the professional competence of ISOS youth advocates, and the quality of facilities for out-of-home placements. They were inclined to regard even a brief suspension of their control as an abdication of the court's responsibility.

In justifying their objections to the ISOS Detention Alternatives program, probation personnel cited a history of similar raids on the court's jurisdiction over other kinds of cases. In each of these episodes, they claimed, the expected improvement in services failed to materialize. The first of these occurred during the economic depression of the 1930s, when the court was inundated with a flood of dependency cases. The court's Temporary Care Division had been established by the probation department or provide interim foster care for dependency cases pending their acceptance and longer term placement by private social agencies. The Division was expanded to 130 temporary foster homes accommodating some 300 children. However, the private social agency community felt that even the temporary placement of dependency cases was not an appropriate court function, and

led a successful campaign to have it transferred to the county public aid commission. In the view of the probation department, the public aid agency was unable to duplicate the experience and competence in selecting and monitoring temporary foster homes that probation officers had acquired over a period of years.

A second, more recent, episode occurred when the provision of social services to dependency cases was transferred from the court to the then newly established statewide Division of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The theory behind the move was that dependent children should not be exposed to the trauma and the stigma of a court appearance simply to receive social services. Although the private social agency community opposed the move in this instance, the law establishing DCFS gave that agency the power to accept children without their coming through the court. According to probation department personnel, however, DCFS found it necessary repeatedly to file petition requests in order to obtain court authority to compel the compliance of uncooperative clients.

In brief, probation workers in Cook County denied the need to divest from court control any of the categories of nondelinquent youth, whether temporarily as in the status offender Detention Alternatives program, or permanently as in the transfer of dependency cases to DCFS. The denial was grounded on three contentions: first, that probation workers had the professional competence and the experience to provide skilled social service; second, that resort to the court's authority is in many cases necessary and unavoidable; and third, that both by law and tradition, the

court has the ultimate responsibility to protect the child. Commenting on a currently considered problem of selecting a public welfare agency to which to transfer from the court the supervision of MINS adjudicated cases, a probation department official stated:

. . . If a welfare agency is going to take the MINS cases and they run into a problem, where they don't get cooperation, where the parents of the child isn't cooperative, where are they going to go (to get compliance)? Or if the child and the parent don't get along, (but) the child has something in his favor, and the agency goes along with the parent, who's going to protect the child (if not the court)?

In the light of this view of the need for court authority, and of the competence of the probation department and its concern for the welfare of children, it is hardly surprising that the Cook County probation department, while constrained to cooperate with it, was less than enthusiastic about the Detention Alternatives program. As the program settled into routine operation, youth advocates became increasingly confident of their judgments respecting the appropriate disposition of status offender cases referred to them by the police, and increasingly free to argue their views as participants in the intake screening sessions. What had been developing, in effect, was an undercurrent of competition between advocates and probation officers for control over case dispositions. The matter came to a head after eight months of program operation, when the intake screening staff was rotated to the field and a fresh crew took over. At that point the department official in charge of intake screening decreed that henceforth all advocates would be barred from participation in intake staff conferences, except at the explicit invitation of the head of a screening intake unit. They were otherwise to be restricted to furnishing the information they had about the case to the head of the unit to which it was assigned for screening.

A probation officer explained that in excluding the advocates from screening discussion

. . . we had to remind them that those are our kids and our responsibility and we have to keep a hand on them. They are in custody (of the court) when they're with ISOS. They are in a custodial situation. They call it shelter as opposed to incarceration, but they're still (under court control).

The heated objection to sharing the control of status offense cases was fueled by a refusal as well to accept the largely paraprofessional advocate staff as competent to make informed judgments in recommending case dispositions, and the service provider agencies to select and monitor temporary foster care facilities. As to the competence of advocates to participate in discussions with trained probation officers on the dynamics involved in a child's behavior, one probation worker stated that this was

like putting a horse and a mule together. . . (Advocates) don't have that much to offer. Our people are all trained, college trained, and then additionally trained, and have from three to thirty years experience.

There was, however, grudging recognition that advocates had "street sense," and knowledge of the youth's community and its pressures, information occasionally seen as helpful. The same probation worker conceded: "You can get some information from these people. I'm not putting them down altogether." On their side, on the other hand, advocates frequently had an opportunity denied probation officer screeners to obtain crucial information about the youth and the family as they attempted to return the youth home after picking up a referral from the police.

The probation department was equally critical of the competence of service provider agencies to make appropriate and knowledgeable selections

of temporary foster homes. Probation officers claimed that they found many foster homes to be inadequate, particularly during the early stages of program operation, although it was conceded that as these were brought to ISOS attention, their contracts were cancelled. "But," said one officer, "it was unfortunate that we had to be the ones to call this to their attention." There was some awareness at the same time that much of this problem was a function of inadequate resources and start-up time to organize the program properly. Said one:

The way the program started was a problem. It started in a big hurry with a staff of four coordinators to implement a program in a county of seven million people, thousands of agencies, and 50 miles from one corner of the county to the other. And they were supposed to do not only the paper work, but find the (service provider) agencies, do the monitoring, and oversee that the kids were getting to the facilities . . . They were just improperly staffed.

There were other criticisms as well. They pointed out that although the program was designed to select "community based facilities," so far as foster homes were concerned, "the idea of community based alternatives to detention became pretty much of a fallacy. If they could not find a community based facility (in the child's area), they would take one 40 miles away." Probation workers also faulted ISOS for depriving the child of schooling in their effort to avoid detention. Thus, "When that kid is two weeks in ISOS, he's not in school. And their aim was, we can put the kid in (his) community and keep him in (his) school." In this connection, they pointed out that one benefit of retaining the child in the detention center was that his education would be continued there.

It was evident, finally, that the basis of the disenchantment of the court's probation department with the program was at bottom its explicit

commitment to the value of keeping the status offender out of the hands of the court during the pre-adjudication period. "Philosophically," according to one of the probation officers, "the worst thing that could happen to a status offender in the mind of an advocate is if the child comes into the court system. So total diversion (from the court) at all costs was (the program's) goal." This posture, with its implicit denial of the court's claim to a benign interest in the welfare of the child, was hardly calculated to evoke a warm response. Moreover, the spirit of child advocacy embraced by many of the advocates was seen as undermining the value probation workers placed on defending the integrity of the family unit. With some indignation, the objection was made:

(ISOS) workers became the advocates for the child. . . . and completely shut the parents out in terms of what the parent saw as the child's needs at this time in the screening process. Whereas the screener listens not only to the child's (side) but also to the parent's in making that decision. And the advocate (tends to) disregard the parent.

Despite probation officer objections, complaints, and criticism, by the end of the funding period tensions between the department and the program were substantially reduced. Committed to working within the court structure and accommodating to its procedures, program managers set up regularly scheduled meetings with department officials to try to resolve all complaints and conflicts. The department systematically logged complaints and met bimonthly with the deputy director of ISOS to deal with them. Those that persisted concerned failure to inform the department of the transfer of clients from one to another placement facility, frustrating department efforts to complete court ordered social investigations; and criticism of some of the foster home facilities selected by service provider agencies.

As a final comment on the posture of the probation department respecting the ISOS program it should be noted that their objections were mainly directed to the loss of court control over status offenders in custody during the pre-adjudication period. Their concern with program quality appeared to be an overlay on the more basic grievance, as is suggested by the commentary of one of the department leaders:

There is no question in our minds that the court could do a better job of providing alternatives to detention. . . . But we don't have the money in our staff to implement such a program. Philosophically, I don't think any of us in the court are opposed to the idea of nonsecure detention. We also feel there are certain status offenders, certain MINS kids, who need secure detention. We also think that the major thrust must be on the development of adequate quality resources for these kids at the community level. Again, given the resources and given the monies to do this, I believe personally that ISOS . . . could accomplish this end. . . . But I still think that the court does need that bottom line control, because it's never been proven to me that another agency outside the court is able to provide it adequately. . . . Even though there seems to be a feeling around the country that this type of case should not even come into court, we don't take that position. We feel that the child needs someone to protect him against (the bureaucracy) of a social agency. See the child at least has his say in court.

The discomfort of the department with the program was reinforced by its impact on court operations. Probation personnel estimated that although the program reduced the number of status offenders in pre-screening and pre-adjudication detention by about 85 percent, it increased substantially the number sent to court intake. Many fewer were detained, but many more were coming into court. Said one, "Because of the availability of the ISOS service, the police are not diverting the same number. . . . It's much easier to pick up the phone and have an advocate respond to your police station than to get in the car and bring him down (to the court)."

To summarize, problems in program-court relations in Cook County centered on the concern of its probation department with the issue of control over status offense cases, and with the quality of services provided by ISOS. Because the presiding judge of the court strongly supported the program, the probation department was constrained to cooperate, despite its reservations respecting the competence of many of the service provider agencies and the youth advocates. In the end, while conceding that ISOS could improve service quality if given adequate resources, the department persisted in its conviction that in the light of court responsibility for the welfare of MINS offenders, all efforts to deinstitutionalize status offenders should remain a court function.

In contrast to program-court relations in Cook County, those in downstate Macon County in the Decatur region stemmed from the fact that the judiciary declined to issue a court order prohibiting the pre-adjudication detention of status offenders. ISOS workers in that county had to contend with a somewhat punitive court, which viewed the use of detention as a useful correctional experience in the control of status offense behavior. It has remained the practice of that court, for example, to decree "week-end" incarceration in the county's detention center for probation violators. In addition, placed as it was within the structure of DCFS, the ISOS program was obliged to overcome a decade long history of court antagonism directed against DCFS. The hostility stemmed from the earlier transfer of service to court wards to DCFS,

poorly performed in the court's view. To overcome the antagonism, ISOS leadership found it necessary to present the program as radically dissociated from its parent organization, "separate from anything you know about DCFS."

Within this context it was not surprising that relations between probation officers and youth advocates took on an adversary cast from time to time. Disagreements, when they arose, most often concerned the issue of returning pre-adjudicated status offenders to their own homes, a course favored by advocates, rather than placing them in shelter facilities. In addition, as in Cook County, probation officers opposed the choice of other types of service facilities made by advocates. Despite such problems, ISOS leaders were satisfied that the program in this region was on the whole effectively implemented. While the court embraced the Detention Alternatives objectives with considerable reluctance, the aims of the program were strongly supported by the enforcement agencies of the region and by the local press.

SYSTEM PENETRATION DURING REFERRAL

By design, status offender clients in the Detention Alternatives program were placed in the custody of the court as a condition of eligibility for program services. Only those status offenders were accepted by the program who were not accorded a "street adjustment," i.e., dismissed at the police level, and on whom the arresting officer had entered a petition for a court hearing. Thus, to receive program services, status offenders were processed by the police, with the cases

subsequently reviewed and screened at court intake, and with most obliged to undergo a court hearing.

On the one hand, it is accurate to characterize the program as requiring relatively deep system penetration. This is to say that program clients were fully exposed to processing by the juvenile justice system, with the exception, of course, that they could not, by law, be incarcerated in correctional institutions. On the other hand, however, as a deinstitutionalization effort the program was designed not to divert status offenders from system processing, but to avoid the use of secure detention pending the disposition of their cases at the intake and hearing stages.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

By the end of the second program year, discussion of future effort in Illinois to deinstitutionalize status offenders centered not on the question of whether it would continue, but under which administrative auspices and with what sources of funding. By that time, the statute prohibiting their post-adjudication incarceration in correctional institutions had been extended to require that only "shelter facilities" be used in status offender cases during the pre-adjudication period. A number of counties had already begun to interpret this provision as prohibiting the use of the court's established detention center.

Program personnel as well as disinterested observers reported that over the period of its operation many judges had come to regard the program as a useful adjunct in dealing with status offense cases. One downstate ISOS worker noted, for example, that during the first program year judges would have opposed the change in the state's Juvenile Court

Act that mandated the use of shelter care in pre-adjudicated MINS cases. The introduction of the change in the second program year found judges much less inclined to object to this change, largely attributable to the ISOS demonstration that the use of alternative nonsecure community facilities was altogether feasible.

Discussion of the agency auspices most frequently mentioned under which the program might be continued included DCFS and the Department of Corrections (DOC). The latter had earlier established a community treatment program for serious youthful criminal offenders, the Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS). DOC thus seemed a reasonable choice to take on the task of fostering the status offender program. As to DCFS, the parent agency of ISOS, there was general consensus that it would be a desirable choice. However, its leadership was cool to the prospect of absorbing the program into its structure, in part because its staff was already heavily burdened with traditional child welfare tasks, and in part because it was inclined to accord low priority to the advocacy feature of the ISOS program. DOC seemed a more likely prospect as the future home of the program, although there were misgivings on two grounds. The first was the questionable appropriateness of an agency principally concerned with the incarceration of serious offenders to provide for the needs of noncriminal youth in community settings. The second was the feature of the Juvenile Court Act that prohibited the commitment of adjudicated MINS cases to DOC institutions, interpretable as prohibiting as well the transfer to the department of custody in pre-adjudicated cases.

With reference to continued program funding, it was also widely conceded that the state's general revenue funds were an unlikely source of support, given the retrenchment of state spending then under way. The preservation of the program design required that funds be available for the purchase of services from private sector social agencies. Discussion of this aspect of the continuity problem focused on the need to tap into federal Title XX funds, available in Illinois as elsewhere. The problem, clearly, was to select an agency and create a mechanism that would meet the requirements of eligibility for these funds in support of the program.

As matters finally turned out, neither DCFS nor DOC picked up the ISOS Detention Alternatives program after termination of its federal support period. It was transferred instead to the Illinois Commission on Delinquency Prevention (ICDP), a statewide community based delinquency prevention agency under the control of the governor's office. Despite the state's economizing drive, the ICDP obtained \$800,000 from general revenue funds, supplemented by a grant from ILEC, the Illinois criminal justice planning agency. Essentially, the ISOS Detention Alternatives program design was preserved, with minor changes in organizational structure, but with a major addition to the scope of its services to status offenders with a new source of funding to support enlarged services. With few exceptions, ICDP has renegotiated the approximately 150 contracts statewide with service providers that had been established under ISOS, replacing only a small number. The major change has been

access to Title XX money administered by the State Department of Public Aid. The Commission makes use of these funds to support two additional program components. The first is designed to remedy the lack of after-care services from which the Detention Alternatives program suffered, since it was restricted to the two week, post-arrest period. Service providers are not contracted to furnish follow-up coverage of referrals from the status offender program. The second of the added program components is designed to furnish services to status offenders referred to the ICDP from other than police sources, i.e., self, parents, schools, and the like. Title XX funds are also now available to cover the costs of short term placements.

Of particular interest in this development is the use made of the reorganized program to obtain court orders prohibiting the detention of pre-adjudicated status offenders. Counties are offered access to Commission funds only on condition that their juvenile court judges provide such court orders. This is calculated to be an attractive inducement, since counties are chronically faced with a shortage of funds with which to use community based facilities as an alternative to secure detention, however favorably juvenile court judges may regard such a course. As of the time of this report, some half dozen counties have issued the required court order, adding to the single Cook County order with which ISOS initiated the Detention Alternatives program.

SUMMARY: THE ILLINOIS PROGRAM MODEL

The Illinois Detention Alternatives program offers a model that may be well adapted to jurisdictions whose courts can be induced to take only the first tentative steps toward the deinstitutionalization

of status offenders. Detention Alternatives was designed to introduce only the most minimal change in usual court procedures. Status offenders taken into custody by the police for referral to court intake, of whom a large proportion would otherwise have been placed in detention, were instead placed in the custody of program workers. This alternative to detention was sharply time limited to the period prior to both intake screening and court hearing, the total time not to exceed two weeks. After the hearing the case came under the complete control of the court, which provided whatever aftercare services were deemed appropriate.

The second notable feature of the Illinois program was its use of service provider agencies selected for their strong ties to local communities. In emphasizing the value of "community basedness," the program may have suffered some sacrifice in the quality of services offered program clients. Small, neighborhood based youth service agencies with tenuous funding are often unable to attract qualified line staff. In most cases, Detention Alternatives workers who were given responsibility for the temporary supervision of status offenders were paraprofessionals with an interest in youth welfare, and a disposition to adopt a youth advocacy approach in their relations with police and court personnel. As implemented in the case of the Illinois program, youth advocacy tended to denigrate the values of community safety as perceived by juvenile justice functionaries, and occasionally to oppose parental demands in cases of parent-child conflict.

However, these problems may have little importance for the model represented by the Illinois program. In this model, the primary objective is to demonstrate the feasibility of eliminating the use of secure detention in status offender cases during the period prior to the court hearing. During the two week hiatus between police referral and court hearing, the services furnished included only the supervision of the offender provided by the youth advocate and the placement in temporary foster and shelter care facilities. The program model thus differs markedly from those at a number of the other program sites, where charges against program clients were either dismissed by the court, or by agreement were not initially placed by the arresting agency.

In sum, the virtue of the Illinois program model is its capacity to demonstrate in situations of justice agency skepticism the feasibility of community based alternatives to the pre-adjudication detention of status offenders. As seen in the Illinois experience, the model imposes minimal demands for a high cost line staff and is highly flexible. Because services are given status offenders for only a short period, use may be made of provider agencies closely tied to local communities, obviating the need for costly professionalized staffs.

The ISOS program in Illinois and the DCYS program in Connecticut were the only ones among the federally funded set which made no attempt to divert status offenders from the court. Both thus represent model programs for juvenile courts that remain opposed to the divestiture of jurisdiction in status offense cases. Such opposition frequently persists even in the face of statutory prohibition of secure detention, often subverted by the device of charge manipulation. The Illinois program model, in effect, provides a procedure for initiating the use

of community based non-secure "detention," restricted to pre-adjudicated status offense cases. Because it avoids confrontation over the issue of court jurisdiction, the model represents a promising approach to the problem of overcoming court uncertainty regarding the feasibility of status offender deinstitutionalization.

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CHAPTER IX
THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROGRAM

As one of three statewide deinstitutionalization efforts included in the evaluation study, South Carolina offers an opportunity to examine a program that confronted in acute form the dilemma posed by the opportunity equally to divert status offenders from a juvenile justice system which institutionalized them in large numbers, or to remove from secure confinement those already institutionalized.

Already noted with reference to the programs funded in several of the other regions of the U.S., the notion had gained some headway that for purposes of an appropriate response to juvenile offenses a distinction might be usefully made between criminal and non-criminal-but-prohibited behavior. For well over a decade prior to the appearance of the LEAA status offender program, there had begun a slow but steady diffusion of statutes establishing a newly defined category of children primarily in need of effective community supervision rather than secure confinement. For this class of young offenders, known as CHINS, PINS, JINS, and the like, the customary use of detention or of commitment to secure institutions was regarded as counterproductive. As one of the more politically and socially conservative states of the region, South Carolina remained unresponsive to the stirrings of this reform movement. By statute as well as by administrative procedure, all juvenile offenders, whether charged with non-criminal or criminal offenses, were uniformly defined and dealt with as a single undifferentiated category with heavy use of institutional treatment. Pressures for the "modernization" of the

juvenile justice system existed, but the state legislature saw little need to spend tax dollars for this purpose.

This was the condition of juvenile justice in the state until the late 1960's when a reputable newspaper with a national circulation published a series of articles exposing abuses in the institutional treatment of juvenile offenders.* Included among the several states whose practices were given national exposure was South Carolina. Stung into action, the state legislature established the Juvenile Placement Bureau as the agency to oversee the practices of juvenile institutions, and vested it with sole authority to release committed offenders. The agency was directed to review the cases of all juveniles in correctional institutions at three month intervals.

Encouraged by the break in custom, those who had been urging the reform of juvenile justice in the state then undertook to press forward. Within the next several years, the Department of Corrections, with jurisdiction over the state's juvenile institutions, was renamed the Department of Youth Services (DYS), and was given the added function of developing a statewide delinquency prevention program. The initial effort of the DYS in this direction was to encourage the establishment of a network of locally based and funded youth service centers. Recognizing within a short time that local resources, if not interest, would not be forthcoming, DYS then succeeded in obtaining state funds for the employment of personnel to staff and operate youth service centers located in the more populous counties.

* Howard James, "Children in Trouble: A National Scandal," Christian Science Monitor. Series of 15 articles published between March 31, 1969 and July 7, 1970.

During the period when this structure was under development, it became evident that federal funds might become available to develop programs for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. The Division of Youth Services promptly prepared a comprehensive program proposal for submission to the federal Office of Juvenile Justice. In its concept, the program contained two major elements: the removal of status offenders currently confined in secure institutions, and the diversion from detention and institutional placement of youth charged with status offenses. Having already initiated the state supported youth service bureau network, it was its Youth Bureau staff that was to serve both functions.

It is important to note that more than most of the other program jurisdictions, South Carolina traditionally made use of institutional commitment in status offense cases. In one sense, this jurisdiction was ripe for a major push to reduce decisively the number of status offenders who were currently incarcerated. It was in the context of this opportunity that the functions of "front end" diversion and "back end" deinstitutionalization became competing objectives in relation to the distribution of program funds. While the program in fact served both objectives, the availability of the DYS supported network of youth bureaus created a tendency to emphasize the diversion component of the program. The "tilt" in this direction was reinforced by the need for the supplemental funds offered by the program grant to shore up the fiscal health of already existing youth bureaus and to establish additional units covering the less populous counties.

This policy did not, however, go unchallenged by those who regarded the primary task of the program as the removal of status offenders already incarcerated in long term correctional institutions. Most particularly, their concern was the chronic status offender, whose removal from institutional placement to treatment in a non-institutional facility posed serious problems requiring focused effort. The defense of DYS leaders to this virtual charge of inappropriate use of program funds was to point to their activity in removing in a timely manner adjudicated status offenders from the state's Reception and Evaluation Center (R & E). Without the concerted efforts of DYS, these individuals might otherwise have remained in that closed institution for a maximum of 45 days pending case disposition.

In the light of public and judicial conservatism respecting change in the treatment of status offenders, and of the tenuous state of the movement for the reform of South Carolina's juvenile justice system, it would have been reasonable to expect the federally supported status offender program to have been introduced on a modest scale. Such was not, however, the case. The proposal submitted and funded undertook to mount a statewide program on the base of a Youth Bureau structure that the Division of Youth Services had only recently established. With status offender program funds supplementing its state support, the Youth Bureau Division underwent an expansion from a \$400,000 to a \$2 million program in a single year. Such sudden and striking growth did not go unheeded by other agencies in state government, by the judicial community, and by those with strong convictions about what the shape of judicial and correctional reform should be.

The South Carolina program was thus staged against a background of a traditionally high level of institutional commitment in status offense cases. This tradition was in contention with an effort of very recent origin to build a statewide program emphasizing the use of community treatment in delinquency cases. A second background element of importance was the basic policy decision of program managers to lay major emphasis on "front end" diversion of status offenders from detention and from confinement in the state's diagnostic facility. This policy was persistently opposed by those more concerned with returning status offenders to their communities who were on long term institutional commitments. A final feature of the environment into which the program was introduced was the concern and anxiety evoked in court personnel and administrators of juvenile institutions by the ambitious scope of the program and its effort to introduce radical change in the approach to the status offender problem.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROGRAM PLAN

Overlaid as it was on the existing Youth Bureau network, the status offender program was shaped on the warp of this network's structure and activities. The most significant effect on the status offender program was to broaden the eligibility criteria for program services. The Youth Bureaus quite appropriately provided services to troubled youth, whatever the character of the problem. Accordingly, intake policy encouraged referrals from non-justice as well as from justice sources. With respect to status offense cases referred by non-justice sources, this meant that the program accepted as eligible for services whoever may have been regarded by parents and schools as "in danger of becoming status

offenders." Of the total number of clients who entered the program during its two-year existence, over half were referred by non-justice sources (see Chapter XII).

While they recognized the "net widening" effect of their intake policy, program managers steadfastly insisted that its benefits could only be positive. As one program administrator put it, ". . . the bottom line is helping kids. . . . As long as we don't go out and bring them in, and they do need services, they are eligible (for program services)."

Program administrators found further justification for a non-restrictive intake policy in the difficulties faced by status offenders in obtaining remedial services. They asserted that unlike other problem categories, for example, the mentally retarded or the psychotic youth for whom agencies exist with well defined criteria for case intake, the status offender typically does not fit snugly into any of the established categories of problem youth, while often overlapping a number of them. As a result, many status offenders, particularly in the early stages of an offense career, are frequently rejected by specialized service agencies. They remain a neglected population which by virtue of their treatment as delinquent youth tend to be pushed into correctional institutions.

The justification of an "open enrollment" policy in providing status offender services was reinforced by the state's liberal use of its diagnostic facility in detaining status offenders. Prohibited by law from referring adjudicated juvenile offenders directly to non-justice community agencies, the courts were obliged to remand them to the

Division of Youth Services (the renamed Department of Corrections), which maintained the Reception and Evaluation Center for diagnostic workup and ultimate case disposition. Program administrators consequently saw early intervention in problem cases originating in non-justice referral sources as interrupting a highly predictable process that would first bring the offender into court, and in a high proportion of cases result in an experience of detention at the R & E Center. It was in this sense that program personnel equated diversion with deinstitutionalization. In one Youth Bureau region, for example, it was claimed that referrals to the R & E Center were cut in half by the program in one county, and by about 80 percent in another. The regional administrator asserted, further, that in the absence of the program, some three-quarters of all status offense cases would have gone to court adjudication, and of these approximately half would have been remanded to detention in the R & E Center.

Program administrators thus did not perceive their diversion activities as separable from deinstitutionalization, whether responding to referrals from non-justice community sources or intervening to remove status offenders from detention at the R & E Center. Youth Bureau staff claimed to have removed substantial numbers of status offenders who were detained/institutionalized in the Center, a procedure usually accomplished in a five to ten day period. The release procedure required notification of the Youth Bureau in the status offenders' region of residence that he had been received at the R & E Center. A worker was then assigned to visit the court from which committed in order to ascertain whether this was a valid status offense case. Once verified,

the worker developed a placement plan (own or group home). The plan was then presented for approval to the Juvenile Placement Agency, which had sole authority to release juvenile offenders. Those who were removed were regarded as no longer at risk of commitment to long term correctional institutions, at least as a result of the current episode. It should be noted, however, that program personnel were reluctant to estimate the net deinstitutionalization effect of their procedures in returning to the community status offenders remanded to the R & E Center. As one program administrator put it, "Kids were DSO'd, no question about that. . . . But it's impossible to tell whether a kid would have gone to a (long term) institution if he hadn't been DSO'd." The phrase, "to be DSO'd," commonly used in the South Carolina program, was an acronymic rendering of "deinstitutionalization of status offenders."

A second major source of referral to the program was, of course, the court system itself. As noted, the Division of Youth Services, other than having developed the Youth Bureau network as its delinquency prevention function, was retained as one of the state agencies to which courts at their option could refer delinquent youth. Prior to the establishment of the status offender program, the court in one of the larger urban centers had collaborated with the DYS in conducting a pre-trial intervention program for criminal youth. In that program, adjudication proceedings were suspended and an opportunity given to the local Youth Bureau to provide remedial services. With the status offender program in place, the DYS now urged the courts to refer all status offense cases to the Youth Bureaus, excluding only those with

criminal charges pending and those on probation for a prior criminal or status offense. There were thus two "filters" for case intake, one finely screened by the court, and one virtually unscreened by community sources of referral.

Services for Program Clients

As has been indicated, the effort to remove status offenders from locked facilities was focused principally on the state's single Reception and Evaluation Center. Because this institution was an agency under its jurisdiction, the DYS was aware of every commitment and, in the interest of the status offender program, in a position to take action for the return of the youth to his/her community. To accomplish this, it was necessary to obtain the approval of the Juvenile Placement Bureau, the state agency vested with sole authority to release institutionalized juveniles, a procedure that typically took several days. Where status offenders were remanded to the R & E Center on mixed status and criminal charges, and the latter were "unproven," the youth was considered eligible for release.

The DYS thus found the release of status offenders from secure confinement in the R & E Center to be altogether feasible. However, this was not the case with respect to another widespread use of confinement during the pre-adjudication stage. In mid-1978, while the status offender program was in progress, legislation was enacted creating a statewide uniform probation intake system. One provision of the statute required that in juvenile cases a hearing on detained youth be held within 24 hours "on judicial days." This was a clearly intended effort to increase hearing promptness and to reduce time in detention. The difficulty posed by the "judicial days" specification was that in the

less populous, rural counties the interval between judicial days often extended to two weeks. Detention facilities there were commonly the county jails, typically without facilities for the segregation of juveniles. In the urbanized counties, where judicial days occurred at more frequent intervals, time in detention might on the average be shorter. But this, again, would depend on the load of juvenile cases and the variable frequency with which judicial days were scheduled.

The Youth Bureau program included residential placement, counseling with use of a crisis intervention model, educational services, and referral to community based recreational and mental health services as needed. Some of the latter services, principally the use of psychologists to furnish counseling, were contracted. However, most of the referrals for services provided by contract were to recreational agencies. As between those provided directly by staff of the Youth Bureaus and those by community agencies to which clients were referred, the bulk of services were furnished by the Youth Bureau staffs. One Youth Bureau regional supervisor estimated that approximately four-fifths of all services received by program clients were direct services by Youth Bureau staffs.

Program funds were used to establish one shelter and three group homes, each with a capacity of 20 residents, to supplement existing residential facilities. The latter consisted of two categories: a statewide network of over 100 volunteer foster homes provided by the Alston Wilkes Society, and locally based residential care facilities. The Alston Wilkes Society, based on church organizations, recruits volunteer foster parents to receive placements two to three times per year for periods of under ten days each. This facility was used primarily to remove youths from

jail detention. Reportedly, over 200 such removals were effected during 1978.

The second category of locally based placement facilities consisted of residential care institutions, some of which were state supported. Most housed populations larger than prescribed by the LEAA-OJJ guidelines for institutions appropriate for status offenders. In some instances their primary use was to house permanently placed orphans. The Youth Bureaus used such institutions as shelter care facilities for status offenders when no alternative suitable facility was available, with its staff assuming responsibility for providing the supplemental services needed. While aware that use of these kinds of institutions did not conform to the national program requirements, the DYS justified the policy on grounds that the use of community based residential facilities, despite their character, preserved an opportunity for Youth Bureau staff to serve the needs of the client. In many cases, however, youth in these institutions were placements outside their counties of residence. Among some judges the practice was not uncommon to commit juvenile offenders to distant institutions in order to rid the community of its "bad apples."

Program leaders regarded Youth Bureau employees as well trained to provide quality services. Led by two MSWs, a program of training in family counseling techniques was instituted for line staff, utilizing a crisis intervention model. With respect to this model, however, one administrator noted that its implementation fell short of success. Most Youth Bureau workers exceeded the 20 day limit set as the norm for crisis intervention, extending case treatment on the average to 45 days.

As a final note on program content, its design came under sustained criticism by the state's planning agency for criminal justice on a number of grounds, despite the fact that it had approved the program proposal. First, the program was faulted for failing to place major emphasis on strengthening community resources for the treatment of status offenders, rather than on expanding and stabilizing the state supported network of Youth Bureaus as the primary source of youth services. Program administrators conceded that this would indeed have been desirable, had there been, in their view, a willingness on the part of local agencies to devote greater resources to the status offender problem.

Second, there was objection to the use of the Youth Bureaus as an arm of the state's juvenile correctional agency, the Division of Youth Services. The point was made that such auspices would carry with it the stigma of treatment by a delinquency control agency. Program personnel countered the criticism by asserting that in their contacts with Youth Bureau clients and their parents, the latter tended to see these units as part of the state's structure of social services rather than of the delinquency control and correctional apparatus.

Third, the use of a substantial portion of program funds for the purpose of diverting youth from the justice system who were seen as "in danger of becoming status offenders" brought the program under critical attack for diverting resources from the task of removing status offenders already committed to long term correctional institutions. It was argued, for example, that if a genuine policy of deinstitutionalization were pursued, a substantial portion of program funds should have been made available to find community placements for the hard-to-place status offenders. The contention

was that those clients committed for status offenses to long term confinement were principally those for whom placement facilities in their home communities were inadequate or non-existent. As indicated earlier, program administrators defended themselves from this charge by pointing to their activity in reducing the period of detention in the R & E Center, and in truncating status offense careers by prompt intervention during their earlier stages. Moreover, administrators pointed out that in specifying the target population for the status offender program, the Office of Juvenile Justice never clearly defined how imminently "in danger of detention and institutionalization" this target population was to be.

With reference to these criticisms, the program description would be incomplete if note were not taken of the smouldering political conflict with which it was surrounded. Program funds came to South Carolina at about the same time that the first Republican governor since Reconstruction was voted into office. As an arm of a new administration devoted to fiscal economy and reduction in the growth of state services that were, naturally, led by staff appointed in preceding administrations, the criminal justice planning agency was bound to oppose any expansion, even with federal funds, of the Youth Bureau network of the DYS. This is not to say that their criticisms were necessarily without merit, but simply that legitimate disagreements respecting a proper program design were exacerbated by extraneous political conflict.

In summary, the main features of the South Carolina program were (a) the use of a pre-existing state supported network of Youth Bureaus as the principal resource for providing services to status offenders; (b) a policy emphasis on minimizing status offender insertion into the

juvenile justice system by diverting them from court processing and by obtaining the early release of those adjudicated and committed to the state's Reception and Evaluation center; (c) provision of residential placement services in three small group homes supplemented by access to a statewide volunteer foster home system, and by the use for temporary shelter care of locally based "orphanage" type institutions; and (d) the limited use of contracted counseling services to supplement, when needed, services of the same or similar type provided by Youth Bureau staffs. Program funds were used primarily to expand and strengthen the state supported network of Youth Bureaus.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes and Juvenile Justice Control of Program

Four features of the jurisdictions in which status offender programs were conducted have been defined as furnishing their crucial context. Two of these, statutory restriction on the secure confinement of status offenders, and justice system control of the program, have already been touched upon in the preceding sections. Neither pre-adjudication detention nor post-adjudication commitment to correctional institutions for status offenders was prohibited by the Southern Carolina juvenile code. However, prior to the advent of the program, courts in a number of the larger urban communities had begun by administrative arrangement to divert from detention minor criminal offenders, including status offenders. To the extent that the giant recipient and the administrator was the DYS, the state's juvenile correctional agency, the program was completely under the control of the justice system. At the same time, however, by placing the provision of community based status offender services in its Youth Bureaus, the DYS diligently sought to dissociate these services from its correctional function. As one means of accomplishing the

separation, very few workers were transferred from its correctional services to staff its Youth Bureaus; most were newly hired directly into the staff. Moreover, while youths could be moved from correctional institutions to Youth Bureau supervision, the Bureaus were prohibited from referring their clients to any of the DYS correctional agencies.

Two additional contextual elements of the program remain to be considered: the availability of residential facilities, and the level of community tolerance for status offense behavior.

Availability of Residential Facilities

Among the eight sites in which status offender programs were evaluated, South Carolina was notable for a virtual absence of adequate residential services. All programs, including that in South Carolina, made principal use of some form of "home detention," in which it was found feasible to return the youth home prior to adjudication. However, in the limited number of cases where homes were distinctly unsuitable, other sites found themselves on the whole reasonably well supplied with alternative placement resources. This was not the case in South Carolina. Even more critical was the fact that many localities lacked even separate detention facilities for juveniles and made use of local jails for this purpose.

The response of program administrators to the problem of widespread use of jails for the detention of juvenile offenders took two forms. The most immediate and active response was to make use of the statewide system of volunteer temporary foster homes sponsored by the Alston Wilkes Society. With this resource in hand, Youth Bureau staff often found it possible to remove detained status offenders from jails after a case investigation

that customarily took 48 hours. As previously noted, in the rural areas of the state, a decision to terminate jail detention was often delayed for several weeks pending the occurrence of a "judicial day." Beyond this, with the help of an Alston Wilkes "jail watch" program, every effort was made to reduce jail detention time.

The second response to the problem of inadequate residential resources was an effort to develop temporary shelter care and group homes for post-adjudication placement and as an alternative to detention. For several years prior to the program, the DYS had endeavored with little success to obtain state funding to develop these facilities. Its requests for funds were denied by an unsympathetic legislature. One program administrator characterized the posture of legislators as " . . . their attitude is to take a hard line with children without (making) a distinction between criminal and non-criminal offenders." Program funds were allocated for the development of three group homes and one shelter home, each limited to 20 residents. These were recognized as entirely inadequate to meet the need, and DYS permitted its Youth Bureaus to use as placement facilities group homes of virtually any size and character, provided they were located in the community of residence of their cases.

Community Tolerance

There seems to have been less tolerance for status offense behavior in South Carolina than in any of the other program sites, including even minimally tolerant Connecticut. This impression is gained not only from the limited data available on rates of school suspensions/expulsions, which fell in the high range of the distribution across the eight sites, but from the observations of program personnel.

In contrast to every other jurisdiction in which programs were funded, prior to the introduction of the program there was virtually no conception among juvenile justice personnel of a distinction between juveniles who committed criminal and those charged with status offenses. All offending youth were dealt with as delinquents, although status offenders were classified as "minor criminal offenders." An earlier reform of the juvenile justice system had established a diagnostic center to furnish an informed view of appropriate treatment in individual cases, many of whom were returned to their communities, but judges commonly remanded youth to the R & E Center for "punishment."

It would appear that although South Carolina had established a juvenile court structure as a means of providing separate treatment for young offenders, it was far from having accepted the philosophy of the juvenile court movement. One program administrator noted, for example, that the Old South conservatism of the state was expressed in the juvenile justice area by an insistence that " . . . (children are regarded) as responsible for their own acts." Other program personnel cited instances of court orders on the disposition of status offense cases that read, "committed to DYS for placement outside (the youth's) community." And a number referred to a "worst case" episode in which one judge ordered commitment to the county jail "until she was 21" in the case of a girl whom the DYS had "DSO'd" out of the R & E Center for return to the community. These impressions of a "hard line" stance toward status offenders in South Carolina are relieved, on the other hand, by the development of such DYS sponsored programs as pre-trial intervention in the city of Columbia prior to the federally funded status offender program.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Implementation of the status offender program required, most crucially, cooperation from three sources: the juvenile court, the enforcement agencies, and the youth service provider community. For the South Carolina program, progress in serving police initiated status offense cases hinged primarily on court support. Virtually all status offender services were provided directly by the DYS as the grant recipient, and with minor exceptions, police referrals to the program were minimal.

Program-Court Relations

Distinctive in the South Carolina program design was its sponsorship and administration by the leaders of the correctional agency of the state's juvenile justice system. In the light of this feature, relations between the program and the courts essentially required cooperation between two arms of the justice system. This meant that, unlike other program sites where courts were requested to refer status offense cases to private sector youth agencies, in South Carolina the request was to refer cases to another public agency within the same system. Nonetheless, virtually all of the problems in program-court relations that were seen as typical in other sites existed here as well.

First, many of the courts expressed some uneasiness over the fact that the program was not centered in the court, an arrangement that would have obviated the need to share their control over status offense cases. Court concern with this matter surfaced with particular vigor in connection with program efforts to obtain the quick release of status offenders from institutions. This seemed to many judges an unwarranted substitution of the judgment of Youth Bureau personnel for the judgment of the court in committing the youth. Said one administrator, "It's a problem of

trying to convince the judges (that status offense cases should be returned to their communities). They put a kid in, and we get them out." Because some number of released offenders reappear in court, he continued, "the judges call us the revolving door." The program method of dealing with runaways was another source of friction with the courts. The police were apparently not inclined to exert themselves to retrieve runaways except on the basis of a court issued warrant; they otherwise simply filed a missing person report. In order to intervene more positively in these cases, DYS followed a practice of filing a delinquency petition, thus obliging the court to issue an arrest warrant, with a subsequent withdrawal of the petition when the youth was recovered. Many courts were resentful of this procedure, complaining to the DYS, "you are just using us." In one Youth Bureau region, judges actively resented what they perceived as an effort "to tell the court what they can or cannot do in status offender cases."

Counter-pressure from the courts was, of course, inevitable, and the program in many instances found it expedient to seek a compromise. In some counties, judges agreed not to institutionalize only if DYS would agree in turn to their adjudication as status offenders, whereupon they were placed on probation and referred to a Youth Bureau for service. The arrangement enabled the courts to feel that they still maintained control over the case, and, mused one program administrator, "at least it kept the kids out of institutions."

On their part, program personnel were not totally out of sympathy with the need, in some proportion of status offense cases, for the use of court coercion. Said one, "At times we do need the (authority of

the court); we need the leverage (in dealing with intractable behavior)." Indeed, in one court with which the program enjoyed particularly good relations, where the judge had agreed to refer status offenders to the program without the filing of a petition, program personnel often returned clients who continued "to give trouble" to the court for a conference with the intake worker. Its purpose was to make clear to the client that the threat of remand to the R & E Center remained, according to one worker, "as a hammer over their heads."

Finally, whatever fear existed among court personnel that the program posed a competitive threat respecting case supervision and control was confined principally to courts in the smaller counties. The effort to persuade courts in these counties to support the program was hampered by the court's concern for maintaining an adequate caseload. Said one Youth Bureau worker, "It got to be a turf problem. They feared that if they didn't have status offenders, what would they have in a small community?"

In summary, while courts represented a significant source of referral to the program, court personnel tended to view the program variously as an intrusion on their authority and competence, as a source of acceptable help in dealing with status offenders, as an unwarranted subversion of the deterrent effect of institutionalization, or as a threat to their jobs. Despite this range of response, the net impression remains that program administrators managed their relations with courts well enough to open a view to the possible values of deinstitutionalization in status offense cases.

Program-Service Provider Relations

Relations with service providers were virtually problem free because, with minor exceptions, services to status offenders referred to the program were provided directly by the Youth Bureaus. As has been noted, the design feature that distinguished the South Carolina program was that the program staff and the DYS-supported Youth Bureau staff were one and the same. Administrators regarded this policy as having been forced on them because there were no youth service agencies in the smaller, rural counties and because in the urbanized counties, where a variety of services for youth existed, they typically did not serve status offenders. These latter agencies included units of the state's Department of Social Services, and family service and vocational rehabilitation agencies. Whether a concerted effort was made to enlist their cooperation and to offer to enter into contractual arrangements with them remains unclear. Where services were contracted out, they were in the main to private practice psychologists, youth and family counselors, physicians, recreation agencies, and group homes. The latter were largely privately sponsored, large population institutions that Youth Bureau staff used for temporary shelter care. For the most part, their services were obtained on an ad hoc basis. Of all types of services obtained through contract, it was the view of one program administrator that by far the largest category was for recreational services.

Where services were contracted out, only in rare instances did the program encounter a problem of availability or of difficulty with the service providers. This may well have been a function of the minimal use made of private sector services; the situation could conceivably have

been quite different had the program been designed for a heavy dependence on the private sector.

As to problems with the direct services provided by the Youth Bureaus, the only major difficulty concerned case overload. Caseload size was based on prevailing norms for a variety of problem types. It was found, however, that where clients were principally status offenders, such norms constituted an overload. A note of despair is evident in the following comment by one Youth Bureau worker: "I wonder what keeps me going, and I really don't know. These (status offender) kids are difficult to deal with. We really don't have needed staff and resources. The Department of Youth Services looks at staff compared to the number of kids you have, not the number of man hours spent with certain kids, so it's overwhelming. But staff keeps doing it and working hard."

Program-Police Relations

Unlike those at most other sites, the South Carolina program did not find the police to be an important source of referral. Apparently, the principal reason for the minimal role of the police in the program was their disinclination to deal with status offense cases, and their practice of dealing independently with those cases on which they were obliged to take action. This situation was described by one of the Youth Bureau regional supervisors in the following words: "Police just don't want to deal with (ungovernables or truants). They honestly don't care about keeping them overnight. Unless someone else has brought a formal charge against the juvenile, they just won't keep them. . . . They feel that is something the court should take care of. The police have not been a major factor in (the) South Carolina (program)."

That police were inclined to keep their distance from the program is indicated more specifically in the unsuccessful effort made in the city of Columbia to obtain their cooperation. Arrangements were initially made for the police department to refer status offender cases to the program. These were to be picked up by a Youth Bureau worker at weekly intervals. After several months the worker ceased his visits to the department because the police had no cases to refer. Whatever cases the police regarded as serious were petitioned to the court which, in this region, routinely referred them in turn to the program.

In summary, implementation problems centered predominantly on program-court relations. Relations with private sector service providers and with police agencies were non-problematic. In the former case almost all status offender services were provided directly by program personnel. In the latter case, police remained largely uninvolved with the program as a source of referral. Where they existed, difficulties in relation with the court primarily concerned uneasiness or downright objection to the program practice of promptly returning to the community status offenders remanded by the court to the state's R & E Center. Less obtrusive was the problem of competitive threat to court personnel posed by the use of program services for status offenders.

SYSTEM PENETRATION

Examined in the evaluation of each of the programs was the depth to which status offenders were inserted into the juvenile justice system in the course of program effort to reduce their institutionalization. This question becomes relevant because, as matters turned out, all programs had adopted as a principal strategy what may be termed "deinstitutionalization by diversion." This is to say that there occurred early on an

unspoken recognition that the lower the level of the justice system at which the status offender was diverted to community agencies, the less the likelihood of detention and of commitment to an institution. This was true for all program jurisdictions in which institutional commitment was not prohibited, the prevailing condition at all sites at the starting date of the program.

The South Carolina program presents a sharply divided picture with respect to system penetration. Approximately half their client population were court referrals. Data are not available to determine the proportion of this group diverted to the program at the pre- or post-adjudication levels, but the group as a whole represents a substantial degree of system penetration. On the other hand, the balance of the client group were referrals from parents, schools, and self, representing a segment for which, presumably, there was no contact with the justice system. However, in earlier references to South Carolina's criteria for client intake, it was pointed out that the standard "in danger of becoming a status offender" was invoked. In some minds this may well raise the question whether this half of South Carolina's program constituted an appropriate target population for a program concerned with status offenders at risk of being subjected to secure confinement. Admittedly a thin line separates youth exhibiting incipient rebellion against adult authority from youth in clear and open defiance of parental and school controls. However, it is the latter rather than the former who are the likely candidates for the various forms of secure confinement available to the juvenile justice system.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

The status offender deinstitutionalization initiative launched by the Office of Juvenile Justice was intended to do more in the funded jurisdictions than effect an immediate reduction in the use of secure confinement in dealing with status offenders, and to draw into this effort the treatment facilities of the private sector youth service agencies. It was also expected that the activity this fostered would persuade local jurisdictions of the desirability of these efforts, encouraging them to consider adopting the program as a permanent feature of their justice systems.

There is evidence that substantial progress toward this goal was accomplished in the South Carolina program. The main obstacle the program faced was, according to program administrators, the simple lack of awareness on the part of justice agency personnel, legislators, and even social agency leaders that a distinction useful for treatment purposes existed between criminal and non-criminal juvenile offenses. In what may have been an overstatement, one Youth Bureau staff member claimed that in 1976, the year prior to the start of the program, there were no more than three juvenile court judges in the state "who knew what a status offender was." By the end of the funding period, he asserted, the status offender concept and the arguments favoring their treatment in the community were familiar to almost all of the judges. Whatever its effectiveness in reducing the recidivism of status offenders, an issue acrimoniously debated during its life, the program apparently had visible impact as an educational enterprise. Awareness of the status offender as representing a distinctive problem spread as well to the private sector social agencies. In one region these agencies began actively to con-

sider mobilizing and coordinating their resources in behalf of providing services to status offenders. And the most hopeful note sounded by program administrators was that "some legislators are beginning to understand the need of keeping status offenders out of institutions."

In sum, it was asserted that the most important effect of the South Carolina program was to create awareness of the status offender problem, and to initiate a change in attitudes toward status offenders. By the end of the period of federal funding, the most tangible effect of the program was the fact that juvenile court judges in the larger cities had ceased hearing status offense cases and were routinely referring them to the Youth Bureaus.

Prospects for continued development of the program in South Carolina would thus appear to be entirely favorable. The optimism expressed by program leaders respecting post-funding progress in deinstitutionalization was based principally on the continuing availability of the state supported Youth Bureau network. While initially developed to conduct a community based delinquency prevention program by providing a variety of youth services, the status offender program added to its activities the diversion of status offenders from court processing and their removal from detention and long term incarceration.

There was, on the other hand, some concern that with the termination of federal support, used in part to expand Youth Bureau operations, it would be necessary to reduce staff. The expected result was that those regions where additions to Youth Bureau staff had been made would witness a rise in court commitments of status offenders to the R & E Center and to correctional institutions.

Program administrators were apparently prepared to push for reform in the juvenile code to prohibit the secure confinement of status offenders. In their judgment, however, there would be little prospect of success unless provision were made for retaining judicial power to confine status offenders in cases where treatment in community based facilities met with repeated failure.

SUMMARY: THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROGRAM MODEL

The South Carolina program represents a unique model which was unlike that developed at any of the other sites. With several of the other program models it shared the need to adapt its procedures to the court's reluctance to give up some of its control over status offense cases. And it was similar to other programs in its sponsorship and administration by a public agency. However, among programs in the evaluated set developed under the auspices of public agencies, it was distinctive in that the services it furnished in the treatment of status offenders were provided almost exclusively by its own staff. In every other case of public agency sponsorship, the focus of effort was to enlist the services of private sector youth agencies to furnish status offender services.

The reason for this may well have been due in part to conditions indigenous to South Carolina, and in part to the ambiguity of the national program guidelines in designating the target population. The population served by the program was extended beyond cited and adjudicated status offenders to include community referrals of youth "in danger of becoming status offenders." Discouraged by an apparent unreadiness or inability of private sector agencies to provide status

offender services, under pressure to initiate program activity, and with its state supported Youth Bureau network already in place, the Division of Youth Services, simply undertook to provide services itself. This policy presumably offered the added advantage of using federal program funds to strengthen its Youth Bureau operation.

In this connection, however, it is important to note that the use of multiple sources of funding in support of the South Carolina status offender program has created difficulties for evaluation. The practice of merging national status offender program funds with state funds normally designated for DYS operations, together with some use of Title XX funds, has made it impossible to assess the unique impact of federal financial support for status offender deinstitutionalization in South Carolina. This is not to fault the use of diverse sources of funding in behalf of a desirable social objective. But there is no way of disentangling the impact that each of these sources of support may have had on the achievement of program objectives. A contrast is offered by the other programs, where federal status offender deinstitutionalization funds constituted, with minor exceptions, the sole source of program support.

Relations with the juvenile courts of the state remained central to program operations, since efforts to engage the collaboration of private sector agencies were largely foregone, and the police were uninvolved as a source of referral. Status offenders processed by the juvenile justice system came to the program almost entirely through the courts. Other than outright dismissal, court options in disposing of delinquency cases had, in South Carolina, the restriction that the youth

could be committed only to official state agencies for further processing and ultimate case disposition. Referral to a community agency was not permitted. This meant, in effect, that cases could be transferred only to either the Reception and Evaluation Center or to a Youth Bureau, as both were operations of the juvenile corrections agency, the DYS. In turn, options open to the R & E Center, after case study, included release to the community or commitment to a longer term juvenile correctional institution. In consequence, program effort was focused first on increasing court referrals of pre- and post-adjudicated status offender cases to Youth Bureaus and, second, where judges insisted on commitment to the R & E Center, on their quick return to the community under the auspices of a Youth Bureau office. The main features of the South Carolina program may thus be best understood in the light of the structural imperatives under which juvenile justice was conducted in that state.

As an instructive model for pursuing status offender deinstitutionalization aims, the South Carolina program is probably of limited value. However, its program may offer suggestions of possible use in jurisdictions that maintain a "hard line" approach to juvenile offense, whether criminal or non-criminal, that prohibit or discourage the use of community based agencies in treating status offenders, and that in any case lack the resources of money and interest in building community agencies to serve youth. It seems clear that the principal factor that opened a path to status offender deinstitutionalization in South Carolina was the development of its state supported Youth Bureau net-

work. Whether it is politically feasible to accomplish this first step in jurisdictions where conditions parallel those found in South Carolina remains, of course, problematic.

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CHAPTER X

THE CLARK COUNTY PROGRAM (WASHINGTON)

Lying across the Willamette River from Portland, Oregon, and within the Portland metropolitan orbit, Clark County contains the principal city of Vancouver. With an estimated population of approximately 130,000, Clark County is one of the principal industrial areas of its metropolitan region. During the 18-month period prior to the start of the status offender program, funded by OJJ in July of 1976, the Clark County juvenile court processed approximately 5,000 cases referred on delinquency charges, and approximately 2,000 cases referred on status offense charges. Estimates derived from court records indicate that about three-quarters of the latter were placed in detention during the two years preceding the start of the program. The number of status offenders actually institutionalized after adjudication was difficult to ascertain. Those status offenders the court recommended for institutional treatment were transferred to the state's Department of Social and Health Services, which in turn made the decision whether to place the youth in one of the state's locked facilities. However, 32 status offenders were received by this agency during the 30-month period January 1, 1975 through June of 1976. When the program began operations, there were ten status offenders from Clark County still remaining in the institutions of the agency.

The major feature of the program design was its integration with established court procedures. As detainable status offenders were brought to the court, specially assigned personnel of the probation department

intake staff were charged with the task of furnishing a family crisis intervention service as an alternative to their placement in detention. Community based services were also provided, such as contracting with group homes for out-of-home placements, as well as a special form of family crisis intervention, in addition to that furnished by the court, for dealing with the more intractable cases. But the main locus of treatment intervention as an alternative to detention occurred within the court structure itself. In effect, the Clark County juvenile court used the grant funds to establish as a normal procedure the use of intake personnel who could return the youth to the family and attempt to resolve the precipitating problem.

THE PROGRAM PLAN

With a \$105,000 grant to be used entirely for providing services to status offenders, the court undertook to accomplish two goals. The first was to modify in a crucial way the court's customary method of dealing with status offense cases. The usual procedure had been to hold the offender in detention until the youth could be interviewed by a probation officer, a period that often took several days. In cases requiring social services, the time in detention might be extended until the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) was available to take over the case. DSHS is the statewide welfare agency charged, among other things, with furnishing social services to the court. The court modified this procedure by using program funds to employ additional probation officers whose sole function was to eliminate the use of detention for most of these cases. Where youth were physically brought to the court by police

or parents, detention was avoided by conducting the interview immediately on intake in an attempt to effect a return to the home. If this was inappropriate, the effort was made to place them in a non-secure community facility. In cases of a paper referral, the probation officers assigned to the status offender unit were to make an effort to contact the youth and set up a meeting with the family to discuss the problem. In effect, the aim of the court was to provide a specialized mechanism for rapid response crisis intervention in status offense cases. No petitions were filed in these cases, and according to the plan which was effectively implemented, this unit in the probation department provided virtual around-the-clock coverage at court intake.

Recognizing that a residual number of status offense cases were likely to represent the more chronic problems of family conflict, the program plan called for the development of an extensive form of family crisis intervention. This was done by setting up a volunteer group consisting of social workers, psychologists, educators, and others in the human services occupations to conduct, under the leadership of a program employed coordinator, a variant of family crisis counseling known as Multiple Impact Therapy (MIT).

A final element of the program plan called for funding, by contract, of a small addition to the bedspace available for out-of-home placements of status offenders. This was to be undertaken in collaboration with DSHS, which was charged with responsibility for providing foster and group home placement services.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Justice System Control of Program

In contrast to the situation in some of the other program jurisdictions, there was no evidence of a public concern in Clark County with the treatment accorded status offenders by the juvenile justice system prior to the establishment of the program. There was apparently no built-in constituency of youth service agencies together with "progressive" public support groups pressing for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. In the absence of such pressures, which implicitly question the utility of court jurisdiction in these cases, there had been no occasion for the court to develop a defensive posture. On the contrary, it was left to the court itself to initiate and manage a deinstitutionalization program in the manner that has been described. Hence, there was total justice system control of the program in Clark County.

Community Tolerance

The level of community tolerance for status offense behavior as measured by school suspensions and expulsions fell in the medium range. That this was not a community of high tolerance was revealed in addition by the experience of a private statewide agency that provided group and shelter home facilities. It had undertaken to purchase a residential structure for use as a shelter home for girls and encountered strong resistance from neighborhood residents. Two offers on homes were made and withdrawn before a successful purchase was made. The comment of the executive of the agency was that in the view of residents, "status offender" was just another term for delinquent.

Availability of Residential Facilities

Clark County was relatively poorly equipped with residential facilities for out-of-home placements. Difficulties in increasing the residential

bedspace available for status offenders served to spur program efforts to return to their homes as many as possible of those brought to court intake. In the final resolution of the bedspace problem, the court was able to reserve only 12 of the 78 places in the county for short term care of all juveniles. As at other sites, there was in any event much less need for residential bedspace than was anticipated. In most cases, status offenders could be returned to their homes.

Restrictiveness of Juvenile Statutes

Until July 1, 1977, when the program had been in operation for a year, no statutory restriction existed with respect to the detention or incarceration of status offenders. After that date, status offenders found to be incorrigible could, in the judgment of the court, be committed to a diagnostic and treatment facility for no more than 30 days if other less restrictive alternatives had been found to have failed to correct the behavior. This change in the juvenile code left untouched the court's power to detain status offenders. It was not until July of 1978 that the code was further altered to remove status offenders completely from the court's jurisdiction, placing them under the control of the state's Department of Social and Health Services.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

The procedures required by the program design were, with little exception, altogether under the control of the court, and consequently offered few problems of implementation external to the program itself. Potentially detainable status offenders were provided immediate service by the specialized probation department unit. Supplementing the prompt response was a volunteer organization providing intensive family crisis intervention for appropriate cases. Both the court centered and the volunteer operations were similar in their intervention strategy: both were focused on status offender cases for which the alternative was detention. The flow of cases into court intake was effectively screened

by police operations organized to divert the less serious cases, an activity that developed virtually simultaneously with the court program. Although the court program utilized a family crisis intervention approach similar to those found in a number of other funded programs, it presented a number of unique features worth noting.

The Intervention Strategy

The two member unit of the probation staff assigned to intercept status offenders at court intake typically interviewed the youth on entry, attempted to determine the nature of the problem, and sought to affect a return to the youth's home. This usually entailed a conference with the parents, and, if family conflict triggered the status offense episode, an effort to bring about its resolution. Where more chronic problems of family conflict existed, the case was referred to the volunteer group of family crisis counselors. If the problem transcended family conflict, other needed services were mobilized. In situations prohibiting return to the home, a shelter or group home placement was attempted.

The volunteer group of family crisis counselors, trained by a consultant, utilized Multiple Impact Therapy as the method of intervention. The procedure called for an initial sustained session of five to six hours held on "neutral" ground, usually in a church structure, involving all members of the family and an MIT team. Each member of the team functioned as an advocate for each family member. Immediately after the family and the team met as a group, advocates and family members met individually, followed by a meeting of the total group in an attempt to resolve the crisis problem. A relatively small number of status offense cases coming to court intake were referred for MIT treatment. The program

to recruit, train, and retain volunteers was successfully implemented under the leadership of a full time worker employed with program funds.

The two crisis intervention counselors on the court staff thus worked closely with the MIT teams, functioning as the source of their case referrals. These counselors found their principal implementation problem to be serious understaffing for the work load they faced. Given the numbers brought to intake, the need to spend a minimum of an hour for the interview of each status offender intake drastically reduced the time needed for the delivery of follow-up services in each case. In addition, more delay than was desirable intervened between the initial crisis counseling and the scheduling of sessions for those families seen as needing multiple impact therapy. Initially, MIT sessions were to be made available within 24 hours.

An additional implementation problem encountered by the court concerned placement in group homes in those cases ineligible for return to their own homes. Although the need turned out to be minimal, some difficulties were encountered in establishing bedspace for status offender placements. A major problem was presented by group home personnel, who regarded status offenders as presenting problems that they preferred to avoid. Unlike youth in long term placements, who could be integrated into the routines of the establishment, status offenders placed for brief periods required special surveillance. They often were found to present serious acting out problems. Further, because they were temporarily out of school, they had to be supervised throughout the day. As a result, the "burn-out" rate of foster homes as well as group homes with reference to their receptivity of status offender cases was found to be very high.

Such homes have traditionally handled long term placements of youth who are at school or at work during the day, leaving some free time for house parents. In status offense cases, where the length of stay may be overnight or for an unknown period pending further disposition of the case, such uncertainty is found to be disruptive. In addition, problems of house parent liability for property damage occasionally created by disturbed status offenders were not satisfactorily resolved since the DSHS, under whose jurisdiction the placements fell, was equally uncertain of its liability. These difficulties set up barriers to status offender placements, resulting in detentions that would otherwise have been avoided.

Program-Police Relations

The Clark County program was designed to emphasize deinstitutionalization in that most status offenders referred to the court clearly faced the alternative of detention. This emphasis was made possible in large part by the existence of a police operation created to effect early intervention in cases of delinquency. A "progressive" police chief of the city of Vancouver, appointed some months before the start of the program, established within the department a People's Assistance Team (PAT) staffed by one uniformed officer and three social workers. They were assigned the task of handling family disputes, youth problems, and similar requests for police help, and were on call around the clock to provide crisis counseling. The PAT team began operations on the same date that saw the inception of the program. However, this innovation seems not to have had an immediate impact on the number of post-program status offender referrals to the court. Trend data examined by the site evaluator indicated no change in the level of police referrals during the six-month period following

program start-up.

SYSTEM PENETRATION

With the exception of those with four or more prior offenses of any kind, all status offenders referred to the court were eligible for program services. Those referred to the court for program services who were re-referred for a status offense for a fourth time were transferred to the court's dependency unit and held in detention pending arrangements for their long term placement through DSHS. The Clark County program thus dealt only with that part of the status offender population that had penetrated the juvenile justice system only to the extent of police and court intake processing. They thus represented a group that was only moderately at risk of detention and minimally at risk of commitment to correctional institutions.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

By virtue of a change in the state's juvenile code, which took effect at the end of the program funding period, responsibility for dealing with status offense cases was removed from court jurisdiction and transferred to DSHS. The future of the status offender deinstitutionalization effort in the state of Washington will therefore depend largely on the capacity of that statewide agency to provide the kinds of services that have shown promise in the Spokane and Clark County programs. Although these programs differed in organizational design, they shared as essential features prompt intervention at the point of arrest or intake, a crisis intervention service focused on problems of family conflict, and subsequent referral to community based youth services as needed. Because the agency was expected to absorb the added responsibility within its current budget, DSHS' leadership in Clark County expressed strong

concern about their ability to take on the status offender problem.

Program continuity prospects in Clark County may suffer as a result of the limited effort made during the program period to establish a network of community agencies as the locus of status offender services. These were furnished principally by the court, which created a special crisis intervention unit in its probation staff. Additional services in cases of exacerbated family conflict were utilized in only a small proportion of cases, and were provided by an organization staffed by volunteers. In Spokane County, where a separate status offender service network linked to community based youth agencies was created outside the court structure, the divestiture of court authority in status offense cases can conceivably leave the network available for use by DSHS. The Clark County program, on the other hand, by focusing services almost exclusively within the court, now faces a situation in which the court is preempted from expanding a promising program of services. Handicapped by restricted resources, severe constraints in furnishing prompt round-the-clock intervention in detainable status offense cases, and an absence of the kind of assistance available in Spokane County, the DSHS organization in Clark County may be hard put to sustain the progress initiated by the court.

The Clark County program experience points up an important consideration with respect to progress in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Whether jurisdiction in status offense cases remains vested in the court or is relocated in public child welfare agencies, as has occurred in the state of Washington, the effort to register steady progress will continue to require the creation of a mechanism to

mobilize a network of community based agencies prepared to provide prompt and effective alternatives to the use of detention. The experience of the national status offender program suggests that the initiative in developing such mechanisms can be taken by courts, by public child welfare agencies, or by combinations of youth service agencies in the private sector. As a practical matter, the source of such initiative is rarely an outcome of unconstrained choice. The institutional locus of interest in promoting status offender deinstitutionalization seems in part a matter of historical accident, and in part a reflection of the locally prevailing balance of power and influence among the potential actors in the undertaking. Nor, finally, is it possible in the light of current knowledge to argue convincingly that any one of the three sources of initiative possesses intrinsic superiority. Each is likely to offer both advantages and problems.

SUMMARY: THE CLARK COUNTY PROGRAM MODEL

This program offers a feasible model for jurisdictions of moderate population size without a well developed network of private sector youth service agencies. Juvenile courts in such jurisdictions are generally relied on by the communities they serve to provide within their structures both the control and rehabilitation service functions. Moreover, jurisdictions of this type are unlikely to generate strong professional and public pressures in behalf of deinstitutionalization objectives. Advances in this direction are probably most feasibly made when undertaken by the court.

The Clark County program experience suggests that with the assistance of federal funding, courts in the smaller jurisdictions that are poorly equipped with youth service agencies may be encouraged to add to their intake staffs small special crisis intervention units to deal specifically with status offenders at the greatest risk of detention. While it is likely that the direct service delivery of such a unit will fall short of the need, their activity can well provide a critical first step in the expansion of community based facilities for serving the needs of status offenders. Opportunity to move ahead in this respect will, of course, vary among such jurisdictions in relation to differences in concrete features. Clark County had the advantage of adjacency to the sophisticated and advanced metropolis of Portland, making possible the inclusion of a family crisis intervention component, as well as access to the services of a statewide welfare agency. But the initiative for utilizing these services in behalf of deinstitutionalization objectives necessarily lay with the court.

The Clark County program model is particularly worthy of attention in view of the likelihood that jurisdictions of its type account for a very large proportion of detained and institutionalized status offenders nationwide. This may occur as much by the absence of alternative facilities as by a disposition to emphasize the court's control function. Jurisdictions serving the large metropolitan communities have developed over the past decade a variety of diversion programs in one or another form and, whether by statute or administrative regulation, introduced separate proceedings for status offenders. Also more readily available to them is a more adequate potential supply of alternative facilities for their treatment. Lacking these, the public in smaller communities may tend to rely on their juvenile courts as the principal means of dealing with the infractious behavior of its youth. As a consequence, such courts represent the crucial institutional locus for initiating change in the treatment of status offenders.

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CHAPTER XI
THE SPOKANE PROGRAM
(WASHINGTON)

The Spokane program took shape in a community with a well developed concern for youth problems, a coherent organizational structure committed to giving effective expression to that concern, and possessing, in addition, a reasonably full complement of youth serving facilities. Several years prior to program inception the Spokane Area Youth Committee (SAYC) was established by resolution of the Spokane City Council and the governing commission of Spokane County. The primary goals of the SAYC were (a) to act as a policymaking body concerned with the needs of youth, and (b) to coordinate the activities of both public and private youth service agencies in responding to those needs.

Undertakings of this kind are hardly unique. Indeed, the landscape of organized social work is strewn with the remains of coordination efforts that have perished in the hot sun of agency autonomy. What was unique about SAYC, endowing it with vigor, was, first, that its membership embraced the leadership of all the local public agencies with legal responsibility for youth services. In addition to representatives of the major private social agencies, its charter mandated the inclusion of the superintendant of the major school district of the county, a representative of the County Commission, the Spokane County Sheriff, the Spokane City Chief of Police, the sitting judge of the Spokane County Juvenile Court, and the Spokane regional director of the State Department of Social and Health Services. The second, and perhaps more significant feature of SAYC was that its public members represented

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the executives and policymakers of their several agencies rather than line personnel to whom the duty of representing agency interests in coordination efforts is frequently delegated. With the heads of agencies in the private sector, the members of SAYC thus personally constituted the set of community influentials. Each had the power to determine policy for its agency.

ORIGINS OF THE SPOKANE YOUTH ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM

At the suggestion of the juvenile court one of the first issues to be tackled by SAYC was the problem of incorrigible youth. The court viewed status offenders generally as requiring an excessively large share of its resources. As one observer stated, "Status offenders had been a problem because (the court) spent so much more time with them than with the delinquent population." The SAYC's interest in this problem was shortly to coincide with the LEAA announcement of the deinstitutionalization initiative. SAYC had already mobilized a task force of agency representatives to examine models designed to meet a variety of youth service needs, including those of status offenders. The task force included some 50 participants who worked for 12 weeks to develop their recommendations. With a model to provide services for status offenders already developed, they were thus prepared to apply for program funds.

After receiving their program grant the principal problem SAYC faced was to determine the organizational structure of the status offender program. As a coordinating body, SAYC regarded itself as an inappropriate group to operate the program. Taking its cue from the program model thought to be most responsive to the needs of status

offenders, SAYC created Youth Alternatives as a new organization with a mandate to receive referrals of status offenders from the police and the court, provide a family crisis intervention service, evaluate client needs and refer the case on to an established social agency appropriate to the presenting problem. Not without some objection and misgivings in various quarters, a well placed and respected juvenile court functionary was selected as program director to recruit the Youth Alternatives (YA) staff, create a YA Board of Directors, and establish its operating procedures. The concern with the selection was that the shadow of the court, with its formal procedures and devotion to the protection of the community, would lie over the enterprise. This turned out not to be the case, as the Program Director brought with him an already established court commitment to avoid so far as possible the use of detention and correctional institutions in status offense cases.

An additional problem that threatened to become troublesome surfaced in the course of establishing YA. SAYC as the grantee continued to be uneasy about its legal responsibility for the administration of program funds. This concern stemmed from the fact that fiscal control was lodged with YA, a separate operating body having its own Board of Directors. Staff of SAYC were particularly critical of the decision of the YA Board to incorporate. This move tended to increase their "sense of ownership" of the YA operation, although no formal subcontracting relationship with SAYC was entered into. One observer regarded the informality of the tie as placing SAYC in legal jeopardy, although he conceded that despite some "rocky moments" no serious problems arose.

He accounted for this outcome on grounds that "Spokane is a hand-shaking community" and "everybody just expected it to work out because everyone had known each other for twenty years." Further, the composition of the YA Board itself created a fail-safe situation. While the SAYC membership was comprised of the heads of those major public and private agencies dealing with youth, the YA Board was made up of line staff from the same agencies.

The organizational structure of Spokane's YA program reflected the norms of the community. Just as the organizational moves that established YA were grounded in the network of personal ties among community influentials, so the YA structure was itself founded on similar ties among agency workers. As revealed by the organizational analysis that supplements the National Evaluation Study, three types of organizational structure were discerned among the seven programs: formalistic, personalistic, and a blend of the two. YA was seen in that analysis as a clear case of personalistic structure. However, despite the high degree of direct access of agency workers to one another, as noted below there were problems of competition over "turf," centering principally around the division of labor between YA and several social agencies in providing client counseling.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS

Four features of each program have been defined as providing the basic conditions that were faced in developing community based services for status offenders. These relatively fixed conditions confronting program efforts included the level of community tolerance for status offenses, the availability of non-secure residential facilities for the

alternative placement of status offenders, the scope of juvenile justice system control over program content and procedures exercised by the juvenile justice system, and statutory restrictiveness respecting the detention and incarceration of status offenders.

Community Tolerance

As measured by rates of school suspensions and expulsions, Spokane was assessed as exhibiting only moderate tolerance for youthful misbehavior. This suggests that in the mix of community sentiment with respect to troublesome but non-criminal youth, the attitude of indulgent forbearance is likely to be balanced by a view of this group of offenders as continuous with those who commit criminal offenses. Important here is the identity of those on each side of these conflicting views, and their access to the machinery of social control. In Spokane it would appear that those who managed the control system, the agencies of juvenile justice, supported a constructive rather than a repressive approach. In any event, rates of school disciplinary action, the single measure used as an indicator, suggest a lower level of tolerance relative to other program sites.

Availability of Residential Facilities

Based on past status offender statistics, it was anticipated that there would be a need to develop additional bed space for boys. However, the Spokane program was not put to the task of helping to develop such facilities. By virtue of its intervention strategy the program found it unnecessary to make extensive use of residential placement, as it was found possible in virtually all cases to return status offending youth to their own homes pending a determination of the further action to be undertaken.

Juvenile Justice Control of Program

The Spokane County Juvenile Court was among the prime movers in the development of plans for the program in the interest of improved services to status offenders, and remained fully supportive throughout the demonstration period. Despite its involvement, at no time was the program perceived as dominated by the court. Unlike several of the other programs, the court in Spokane was not the grant recipient. The court was at all times insistent that with the exception of out-of-county runaways YA be used as the initial agency to respond to all status offense cases. For example, the juvenile code of the State required arresting officers at their discretion to transport youth charged with delinquency or with status offenses either to their parents or to the court. Utilizing its discretion, the court had authorized enforcement agencies to refer arrested status offenders to YA. Despite these arrangements and understandings, some Spokane city police and virtually all members of the Sheriff's Department insisted on a punctillious observance of the State statute and brought their arrestees to the court. Court policy was then promptly to refer the case to YA. This problem was reduced over time, in large part because of the time and effort YA staff devoted to cementing relationships with enforcement agencies through cooperation, collaboration, and immediate response to referral calls. While the court continued to use detention in status offense cases, this was largely but not entirely restricted to cases of out-of-county runaways. Justice system domination of program is very much a matter of the restrictions the court is empowered to place on the eligibility of status offenders for program services, discussed below. The situation in the

Spokane program was succinctly put by a YA staff member: "One thing that was of extreme help (in program operations) was the court's very definite statement that they would no longer deal with status offenders."

Statutory Restrictions

Shortly after the program started in 1976, the juvenile code was altered to provide for a 30-day maximum commitment of incorrigibles to a diagnostic and treatment facility, and only when the use of less drastic alternatives had failed. However, prior to this change, there existed no prohibition on the post-adjudication institutionalization of status offenders. The 1976 change in the code, which came into effect on July 1, 1979, was, moreover, silent respecting the use of detention in status offense cases. In 1978 further legislative prohibitions were extended to the use of detention for status offenses. In fact, in that year jurisdiction in status offense cases was removed from the juvenile justice system entirely with responsibility placed in the hands of the Department of Social and Health Services. It is of interest to note (a) that, as in a number of other program sites, legislative action for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders was proceeding simultaneously with the establishment of the status offender program, and (b) that prior to the imposition of statutory restriction, the Spokane court had already taken the initiative in instituting the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Here as elsewhere, the signals from the State capitol and from the Federal establishment were being accurately read.

OPERATIONAL FEATURES OF THE YOUTH ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM

The Intervention Strategy

The OJJ guidelines suggesting acceptable program designs specified two major types of service to status offenders. Supported by a substantial degree of consensus among youth workers, the first type was crisis intervention supplemented by individual and family counseling. In many of the programs under review here, service entailed rapid response to case referral, and counseling of the youth and parents to initiate the task of resolving the underlying problem that is assumed to have precipitated the status offense incident. A second type of service, enjoying somewhat less support among youth workers, called for an effort to provide for the substantive needs of status offending youth. As commonly conceived, these include the need for help in problems of school adjustment, of developing employment skills and finding jobs, of identifying recreational opportunities in constructive settings, and more generally the provision of a "brokerage" function in obtaining the specialized services of youth agencies in the community. Youth advocacy in this mode assumes that delinquent behavior is generated by a failure principally of the educational system and the economy to respond to the needs of adolescent youth in winning their way to a respected adult status. Implied in the youth advocacy stance is the notion that it is the failure of these institutions that accounts for both the weakening of parental controls and the delinquent behavior. Although ideologically the crisis intervention/counseling and the youth advocacy service approaches are mutually exclusive, in practice youth workers find it necessary to employ both. Program service designs consequently are best

distinguished on the basis of the emphasis given in the intervention approach to one or the other, since resources are rarely adequate for the full utilization of both. The Youth Alternatives program in Spokane focused principally on crisis intervention and associated counseling, although more than in similar programs in the national effort, YA made a very real effort as a service broker to "follow through" beyond crisis intervention to obtain needed services for its clients. The Youth Alternatives program in Spokane had as its principal goals:

- (a) to develop and coordinate resources;
- (b) to provide crisis intervention which involved responding immediately to court and police referrals and providing family counseling;
- (c) to assess the need for further services;
- (d) to attempt to tailor available services to client need; and
- (e) to refer clients on, as soon as possible, to existing community agencies for needed additional services.

While all YA clients received a crisis intervention service, this was the sole service provided to almost half of the clients. An additional small group of the clients were referred on to other agencies for additional longer term counseling. In other words, almost three-fourths of the program clients were only accorded crisis intervention combined with some additional form of counseling, with the remaining receiving a variety of services other than solely longer term counseling in addition to crisis intervention.

This suggests the possibility that for the majority of youngsters who come to attention as status offenders, the network of services required beyond immediate and constructive intervention may not be as extensive and comprehensive as is often assumed. Spokane, for one, found that in their program planning they had overestimated the need for group and shelter home bedspace.

Despite its eclectic leanings, the YA program was oriented primarily to a family conflict view of the source of status offenses. Specifically, its staff regarded the chronic parent-child conflicts that were frequently seen as the proximate cause of a status offense incident as a reflection of failure of the family to take responsibility for its own problems. The Court was particularly supportive of the demand that parents be held accountable for the care and welfare of their children. In the view of one of its officers, certain families "feed on conflict," and should not be allowed to use the court to solve their problems. The thrust of the crisis intervention operation was then to "cool out" the immediate conflict and arrange for the re-entry of the client into the family. An incidental but significant consequence of this approach was to reduce drastically the need for short term residential placements. A staff member summarized the model of crisis intervention as consisting of three goals:

- (a) defuse the tension in the situation so "people can hear what's going on";
- (b) identify what has precipitated the flare-up of the conflict and the strengths and weaknesses of the family and share this with them; and
- (c) refer them to existing agencies to get continuing help.

Finally, a comment on the problem encountered in the YA's advocacy efforts is warranted. There was a pressing need for jobs for youth, particularly during the summer months. The only program available for this purpose was restricted to youth from only the lowest income families. The benefits of the program were inaccessible to YA clients, almost none of whom, according to a YA worker, could qualify on the basis of family income. This experience points up the excessive restrictiveness of federal youth programs for summer employment.

PROBLEMS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Whatever the initial advantages a program concept may have, and Spokane was well supplied with these, putting them into operational form is bound to encounter difficulties. The most significant of these are reviewed, with attention to the ways in which they were met.

Relations With Police

Involved in the planning of the YA program was not only the command level of the Spokane Police Department, but line officers as well. There was sharp awareness that, as put by a YA worker, "there have always been some strong feelings between cops and social workers." Three methods were used to counteract possible antagonism between these groups. First, during the early period of program operations YA workers were invited to attend police roll call sessions to explain the purposes and procedures of the program. As a counterpart to this communication campaign, the training of newly recruited YA workers included riding in squad cars on routine police patrols. In addition to promoting personal relationships among the two groups, this provided an opportunity for YA

staff to understand the status offender problem from the police perspective. YA workers came to view police officers in Spokane as "a pretty neat group of guys." The appreciative view was probably fostered in large part by the fact that many of the line officers were young and college educated, some with degrees in social work, sociology, and psychology. YA staff came to see many of the police as professionals "who were probably in more contact with more people more of the time than anyone else in town." There were, of course, other officers, principally older, "who feel you should just lock up kids."

Second, on their part police came to appreciate the 24-hour on call availability of YA workers to respond to their calls to take over in status offense arrest cases. In addition, a special follow-up report form was developed to feed back to police information on the outcome of each case, including the agency, if any, to which the client was referred, whether a family conflict situation was resolved, and the like. This procedure seemed to be decisive in cementing the communication link between YA staff and the police. Finally, with some success police officers were invited to volunteer their off-duty time to assist YA staff, joining them in crisis intervention and counseling sessions. The effectiveness of all these moves notwithstanding, the importance of sustained support for the program from the top echelon of the Spokane Police Department remained crucial. Their determination to support the program is suggested by the comment of one police officer, citing the posture of the Chief of Police: "They (the officers) will do it this way (cooperate with the YA program) or maybe a little time off will teach them a little better."

Juvenile Court-YA Relationship

Already noted was the court's early and sustained support of the YA program. Its initial organizer and director was an employee detached from court service. Two principal issues required resolution as the program got under way. The first was the eligibility of court wards for program services. The general problem of client eligibility is discussed below, but here it may be noted that it was necessary early on to determine the eligibility of status offenders on probation to the court for a prior delinquent offense. In the first resolution of the issue, the court decided that it would process all cases of a status offense by a youth on probation for a delinquent offense, but that status offenders on probation for a status offense would be referred to YA. In the latter cases the court could, by law, take jurisdiction since such probation violators were defined as dependent and neglected cases. The decision rule with respect to delinquent probationers was then altered to refer to YA all status offending delinquents on probation for minor offenses unless the remaining period of probation was at least six months. Toward the end of the program period the court became increasingly flexible, referring to YA delinquent probationers arrested for a status offense virtually without respect to the length of the remaining probation period. The technical procedure employed was to dismiss and close the case prior to referral.

Noted earlier was a second issue affecting the role of the court in program implementation. This concerned the insistence on the part of some police officers to continue bringing arrested status offenders

to court intake. In instances where the return of the offender to his home was unfeasible, the statute explicitly directed the arresting officer to deliver the person to the court. To counter fear of legal difficulties in the police use of YA, the court by letter informed all police agencies that it approved the use of the YA program as a viable option in case disposition, and that if there were still uncertainty the referral could be made to the court, but that the court would ask YA to handle the case.

Private Sector Agency Collaboration

Despite the fact that the YA program in concept and design was set up as a coordinating and referral agency, limiting its direct service to crisis intervention, there remained among private sector agency concern about YA as a competitive threat. As the program developed, some criticism surfaced with respect to YA "holding on" to clients beyond the initial crisis intervention. An agency executive asserted, for example, that YA expanded the crisis intervention procedure to include counseling. This was faulted on grounds that for therapeutic reasons the two types of service must be provided by different persons in different agency settings. YA staff claimed, however, that the average time devoted to each case was one and one-half days. They denied that they retained clients beyond the time needed to resolve the immediate conflict situation, assess the nature of the problem, decide on an appropriate referral, and follow up the case to ascertain whether the client and/or the family appeared at the agency to which they were referred. The last was regarded as having particular importance for

completing the follow-up form furnished to the police. For the officers, this information was an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their interest in the outcome of cases with which they were the first to deal. For YA workers, provision of the information served to keep alive the close collaborative relations this had formed with the police. From the YA perspective, the entire set of procedures represented a responsible way of providing a crisis intervention service.

ELIGIBILITY FOR PROGRAM SERVICES

Perhaps the most distinctive and critical feature of each program has been the set of criteria each employed in selecting status offenders into program services. Programs varied widely in defining the conditions under which the commission of a status offense warranted treatment of the youth as a status offender. An unavoidable uncertainty has always surrounded the distinction between the act and the actor in the legal response to juvenile offenses and offenders. Concretely, for the status offender programs, each program site had to determine whether any youth arrested for a status offense would be eligible to receive program services, irrespective of concurrent delinquent offenses, a record of prior serious delinquent offenses, or violation of probation for a prior delinquent offense or for a prior status offense. To be determined also was whether only those were eligible whose current or past offenses excluded serious delinquencies, and in the cases of "pure" status offenders, whether eligibility should be confined to those who, in the absence of program services, would have been placed in detention. Clearly, program eligibility criteria are calculated to have a determining effect on the composition of the program

population and consequently on prospects of affecting favorably the future conduct of clients.

The Spokane program represented one of three instances in the set of eight evaluated programs in which, with minor qualifications, the sole criterion for eligibility was the commission of a status offense. However, it was feared that when the availability of the program became known in the community, YA would be inundated with more cases than their small staff could serve and continue to maintain program quality. Of particular concern was the possibility that schools would see the program as a new resource to deal with truants, with whom the court had not dealt in the past. The request to school officials to refrain from making such referrals received their full cooperation. Minor exceptions were made in those cases in which all school-initiated efforts to deal with the problem had failed. It should be noted that the acceptance of the requested cooperation in this matter was facilitated by the presence on the YA Board of Directors of the school district representative responsible for the administration of the student adjustment program. Further, since student misbehavior cases were not normally placed in detention, the court was insistent on excluding them as eligibles for the YA program, since its resources were to be used primarily for cases most of which would have resulted in detention in the absence of the program. Also ineligible for program services were out-of-county runaways, for whom detention was used pending an appropriate disposition. Finally, as noted earlier, the court increasingly referred to YA status offenders on probation for a prior delinquent offense.

SYSTEM PENETRATION DURING REFERRAL

Once determined to be eligible for program services, status offenders may reach program intake by a number of routes, each distinguished by the degree to which agencies of the juvenile justice system are involved. The decision to deflect a status offender from official treatment and possible detention by referral to an alternative, community-based service can occur at a series of junctures, beginning with parents or school officials. The sequence involving increasing degrees of system penetration then moves to the police, court intake, and pre-adjudication hearing, with the decision to avoid commitment to a correctional institution possible only at the post-adjudication stage. If it is the purpose of a deinstitutionalization program to avoid the labeling effect associated with the experience of detention, that effect is also, if perhaps not equally, conveyed by whatever other formal processing occurs by agencies of juvenile justice. Given the fact that the labeling effect has been a matter of fundamental concern in the national status offender initiative, it becomes relevant to assess programs in terms of system penetration.

As indicated earlier, system penetration is generally defined by the presence or absence of a requirement that referral to community based services can be made exclusively by an agency of the juvenile justice system, namely, the police or the court. The important matter is whether there exists such a requirement regardless of the fact that in virtually every one of the status offender programs most referrals came from the police. Where court processing has preceded referral, penetration is increased to the degree that the client is filtered

through its successive stages prior to referral. The Spokane program required neither prior police nor court contact with the status offense case as a condition of referral, although as in all of the status offender programs, the largest single source of referrals were police agencies. In the relatively rare instances in which police had insisted on transporting an arrested status offender to the court, YA staff were immediately alerted by the court intake worker to take charge of the case. Police procedures called for immediate referral of status offenders to YA at the point of complaint, unless the alleged offense included drug or alcohol use, defined in Washington State as a delinquency. In these cases the officer in charge of the juvenile division of the Spokane police department was first consulted with regard to possible referral to an agency specifically concerned with such problems.

On the obverse side of easy and direct referral to a status offender program lies the danger of "net widening," i.e., including youngsters who would otherwise have been simply counselled and released by the police. There is some evidence that a net-widening effect may, in fact, have occurred. As the police became more aware and appreciative of the approach and services provided by the YA staff, it was much easier for officers to call YA to take a youth off their hands in a matter of minutes than to return the youth to his or her home and deal with the complexities of the situation themselves. The YA staff was quite aware that their success in engaging the enthusiastic cooperation of the police created such a net widening danger. They kept this under control to some extent by adhering carefully to program

eligibility restrictions confining program intake to incorrigibles and in-county runaways. They estimated inadvertent admissions of non-eligibles to comprise no more than five percent of their program population.

PROGRAM CONTINUITY PROSPECTS

Effective July 1, 1978, the juvenile code of the State of Washington was revised, divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction in status offense cases. Responsibility for dealing with the problem was transferred to the State's Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). For a number of reasons this development was widely regarded by YA staff and Board members as posing problems for the continued operation of the Spokane program. First, while DSHS was mandated to take over the status offender program, its budget was not correspondingly increased. Fund shortage was seen as a special handicap because a YA type of program required 24 hour availability of staff to provide continuous and rapid response to police calls. To accommodate after-hour referrals, the DSHS staff, by virtue of their union contract, had to be paid an after-hour wage bonus, including travel time to the work location, materially increasing program costs. Second, the cooperative relations between YA staff and the police, essential for program effectiveness, would have to be achieved anew by the DSHS staff. There was some skepticism whether this could be readily accomplished in view of the cool, not to say hostile, relations that had traditionally existed between the two. However, as the program period drew to a close, active and somewhat favorable consideration was being given by State and regional leadership of DSHS to the possibility of continuing the YA program and staff by contract.

SUMMARY: THE SPOKANE PROGRAM MODEL

The Spokane program provides a model well adapted to jurisdictions whose community features generally parallel those found in Spokane County. These are communities that embrace a region with populations not exceeding several hundred thousand containing a relatively small proportion of minority groups, centered on a major city constituting the region's metropolitan center, possessing a well established and stable political power structure with an open or "progressive" orientation with respect to human services, and equipped with a wide range of youth services facilities in the private sector. To mobilize community effort in behalf of deinstitutionalizing status offenders, the model requires the creation of an organization concerned generally with the youth welfare problems of the community, whose membership by its charter must include the top leadership of all public institutions charged with the education, training, and formal control of the youth population. Constituted as a corporate body to plan, initiate, and monitor programs responsive to identified problems in the delivery of youth services, the regional youth committee may then, by contract or otherwise, create, fund, and provide public, political, and fiscal support for a specialized organization to receive referrals of status offenders from the police and the court.

With respect to program content, certain elements are unique to the Spokane model. First, because there existed in the region a full complement of community based youth service agencies already committed to accept and serve clients referred by the status offender unit, program funds were little used for contracting services. Second, intake

into the program was restricted to the highest frequency categories of status offenders, typically incorrigibles and runaways, principally those selected by the police and the court as representing serious problems. Referral of curfew violators, truants, and drug and alcohol cases was discouraged as dissipating the resources of the unit, and as providing pressure on parents, schools, and the police to share the responsibility for dealing with the status offender problem. Third, particular effort was invested in developing the closest possible relationships with the police by furnishing timely feedback information on case disposition and in other ways treating the police as full partners in the program.

While congruent with the Spokane model, other program elements were not unique to it. These include crisis intervention as the principal treatment strategy, supplemented where possible by youth advocacy procedures; little or no control of the program by agencies of juvenile justice beyond their use as the primary source of referral; a highly personalistic organizational design, in which workers in the network of services to status offenders have personal and direct access to one another; little restriction on client eligibility for program services in relation to past offenses; referral source restricted to juvenile justice agencies; and very low penetration of status offenders into the juvenile justice system.

SECTION III

CORE ANALYSIS

CHAPTER XII

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROGRAM POPULATION
IN EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED SITES

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CHAPTER XII

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROGRAM POPULATION
IN EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED SITES

Solomon Kobrin and Frank R. Hellum

The Office of Juvenile Justice funded programs in ten* sites, each designed to provide community based services to status offenders as an alternative to their detention and institutionalization. In the course of their operation over the two-year period of federal funding, these programs served some 17,000 youth. Slightly less than one-fifth of the population was cycled through the program more than once, yielding a case count of approximately 20,000.

As noted previously, two of the ten programs, El Dorado County, California and Newark, Ohio, were excluded from the evaluation study. This decision was based on the expectation that the number of youth they planned to serve was too small to warrant their inclusion.

In presenting the characteristics of the program population, attention will be focused on their gender, age, ethnicity, community type, offense attributes, source of referral, and type of customary household. Beyond providing an accounting of the number and kinds of youth served by the national status offender program, these data offer an opportunity, first, to establish some of the parameters of a status offender population based on a large sample and, second, to assess some of the variation across jurisdictions in the types of juveniles regarded as eligible for treatment as status offenders. In addition, these descriptive materials provide an opportunity to examine some of the features of those who were referred for program services more than once, constituting a group whose status offenses were possibly more chronic.

* Two additional programs funded by OJJ, Arkansas and the National Assembly of the National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations, were evaluated separately from the National.

GENDER

The data presented in Tables 1 and 2 support the general impression that females are overrepresented in the status offender population, constituting 55.3 percent of the total. The imbalance is even more pronounced in the two smaller program sites excluded from the evaluation study, where females constituted 60.3 percent of those referred to the program. Among the eight evaluated sites, the proportion of females ranged from a low of 44.6 percent in Delaware to a high of 69.2 percent in Connecticut, with a mean percentage of 53.6. Only in Delaware and South Carolina did the female proportion fall below 50 percent.

Females similarly predominated as a proportion of all program clients of both genders who re-entered the program, constituting 19.4 percent of return cases versus 14.6 percent for males. In the evaluated sites this difference was 19.9 versus 14.9 percent, and in the two non-evaluated sites, 7.7 versus 7.2 percent. The imbalance is more striking when return referrals are compared for each gender group. For the entire program population, of re-referred cases, 62.1 percent were females compared to 37.9 percent for males. Approximately the same discrepancy was true for the evaluated sites (62.2 versus 37.8 percent), as well as for the non-evaluated sites (61.9 versus 38.1 percent). A similar predominance characterized every one of the evaluated sites. Of the two non-evaluated sites, only the Newark program showed a reversal of the trend, an effect, possibly, of instability associated with the very small numbers of total returns.

TABLE 1
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS
EVALUATED, NON-EVALUATED AND ALL SITES
BY GENDER

Site Groups	Male		Female		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Evaluated Sites</u>						
New Referrals	7,459	46.4	8,617	53.6	16,076	100.0
Returns	1,305	37.8	2,143	62.2	3,448	100.0
Total Cases	8,764	44.9	10,760	55.1	19,524	100.0
% Return Cases	14.9		19.9		17.7	
<u>Non-Evaluated Sites</u>						
New Referrals	309	39.7	469	60.3	778	100.0
Returns	24	38.1	39	61.9	63	100.0
Total Cases	333	39.6	508	60.4	841	100.0
% Return Cases	7.2		7.7		7.5	
<u>All Sites</u>						
New Referrals	7,768	46.1	9,086	53.9	16,854	100.0
Returns	1,329	37.9	2,182	62.1	3,511	100.0
Total Cases	9,097	44.7	11,268	55.3	20,365	100.0
% Return Cases	14.6		19.4		17.2	

Missing Observations:

New Referrals - 27
Returns - 25
Totals - 52

Table 2. New and Return Referrals, All Sites, By Gender

Evaluated Sites						
Program Site	Male		Female		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Pima County, AZ</u>						
New Referral	1793	49.9	1800	50.1	3593	100.0
Returns	579	42.3	791	57.3	1370	100.0
Total Cases	2372	47.8	2591	52.2	4963	100.0
% Return	24.4		30.5		27.6	
<u>Alameda County, CA</u>						
New Referral	1305	44.4	1632	55.6	2937	100.0
Returns	214	35.9	382	64.1	596	100.0
Total Cases	1519	43.0	2014	57.0	3533	100.0
% Return	14.1		19.0		16.9	
<u>Connecticut</u>						
New Referral	128	30.8	287	69.2	415	100.0
Returns	10	20.8	38	79.2	48	100.0
Total Cases	138	29.8	325	70.2	463	100.0
% Return	7.2		11.7		10.4	
<u>Delaware</u>						
New Referral	867	55.4	697	44.6	1564	100.0
Returns	76	48.1	82	51.9	158	100.0
Total Cases	943	54.8	779	45.2	1722	100.0
% Return	8.1		10.5		9.2	
<u>Illinois</u>						
New Referral	1003	38.3	1614	61.7	2617	100.0
Returns	240	32.3	504	67.7	744	100.0
Total Cases	1243	37.0	2118	63.0	3361	100.0
% Return	19.3		23.8		22.1	

Table 2. New and Return Referrals, All Sites, By Gender (contd.)

Evaluated Sites (contd.)						
Program Site	Male		Female		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>South Carolina</u>						
New Referral	1718	51.8	1596	48.2	3314	100.0
Returns	72	44.2	91	55.8	163	100.0
Total Cases	1790	51.5	1687	48.5	3477	100.0
% Return	4.0		5.4		4.7	
<u>Clark County</u>						
New Referral	283	40.8	411	59.2	694	100.0
Returns	46	35.1	85	64.9	131	100.0
Total Cases	329	39.9	496	60.1	825	100.0
% Return	14.0		17.1		15.9	
<u>Spokane</u>						
New Referral	362	38.4	580	61.6	942	100.0
Returns	68	28.6	170	71.4	238	100.0
Total Cases	430	36.4	750	63.6	1180	100.0
% Return	15.8		22.7		20.2	

Table 2. New and Return Referrals, All Sites, By Gender (contd.)

Non-Evaluated Sites						
Program Site	Male		Female		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado County, CA</u>						
New Referral	246	39.2	381	60.8	627	100.0
Returns	19	34.5	36	65.5	55	100.0
Total Cases	265	38.9	417	61.1	682	100.0
% Return	7.2		8.6		8.1	
<u>Newark, OH</u>						
New Referral	63	41.7	88	58.3	151	100.0
Returns	5	62.5	3	37.5	8	100.0
Total Cases	68	42.8	91	57.2	159	100.0
% Return	7.4		3.3		5.0	

AGE

Of interest in the age distribution of status offenders referred to the program is the fact that the most frequent category is found in the 15 and 16 year age groups. The largest percentage of new referrals (Table 3) fell into these two ages for the evaluated, non-evaluated, and for the entire set of program sites. Those under 12 years of age constituted strikingly smaller proportions for the three groupings of sites. Older youth represented approximately 10 percent of total new referrals, with this proportion slightly elevated for the non-evaluated sites (13.6 percent). The age distribution suggests that status offenders tend to be concentrated among youth during the middle and later stages of the adolescent career. It also suggests the need for caution regarding the assumption sometimes made asserting a general pattern of progression from status offenses among the younger group to later criminal offenses. However, the higher frequency of females among status offenders coupled with the possibility that they may come to official attention only as they become older can well affect the age distribution when the two genders are pooled.

Approximately 18 percent of all cases (new and return referrals) were re-referrals in the evaluated sites. This proportion in the non-evaluated sites was very much reduced (7.4 percent), and may well reflect a difference in policy in those two sites with reference to the acceptance of youth once served by the program. For the most part, however, return cases exhibit substantially the same age distribution as do initial referrals.

As seen in Table 4, the proportion of return referrals among evaluated sites ranged from a low of 4.7 percent of all cases in the

TABLE 3

NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, EVALUATED, NON-EVALUATED
ALL SITES, BY AGE

Site Groups	UNDER 12		12-14		15-16		17 & OVER		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Evaluated Sites										
New Referrals	1122	7.0	6201	38.7	7175	44.8	1534	9.6	16,032	100.1
Returns	122	3.5	1416	41.1	1639	47.5	272	7.9	3,449	100.0
Total Cases	1244	6.4	7617	39.1	8814	45.2	1806	9.3	19,481	100.0
% Return Cases	9.8		18.6		18.6		15.1		17.7	
Non-Evaluated Sites										
New Referrals	18	2.4	257	33.7	384	50.3	104	13.6	763	100.0
Returns	2	3.3	20	32.8	32	52.5	7	11.5	61	100.1
Total Cases	20	2.4	277	33.6	416	50.5	111	13.5	824	100.0
% Returns	1.0		7.2		7.7		6.3		7.4	
All Sites										
New Referrals	1140	6.8	6458	38.5	7559	45.0	1638	9.8	16,795	100.1
Returns	124	3.5	1436	40.9	1671	47.6	279	7.9	3,510	99.9
Total Cases	1264	6.2	7894	38.9	9230	45.5	1917	9.4	20,305	100.0
% Return Cases	9.8		18.2		18.1		14.6		17.3	

Missing Observations:

New Referrals - 86
Returns - 26
Total -112

TABLE 4

NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES BY AGE

EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Under 12		12-14		15-16		17 & over		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Pima Co., AZ										
New Referrals	322	9.0	1283	35.7	1433	39.9	552	15.4	3590	100.0
Returns	43	3.1	541	39.5	625	45.6	161	11.8	1370	100.0
Total Cases	365	7.4	1824	36.8	2058	41.5	713	14.4	4960	100.0
% Return Cases	11.8		29.7		30.4		22.6		27.6	
Alameda Co., CA										
New Referrals	179	6.1	1132	38.8	1247	42.7	361	12.4	2919	100.0
Returns	15	2.5	256	42.8	279	46.7	48	8.0	598	100.0
Total Cases	194	5.5	1388	39.5	1526	43.4	409	11.6	3517	100.0
% Return Cases	7.7		18.4		18.3		11.7		17.0	
Connecticut										
New Referrals	13	3.1	201	48.7	199	48.2	---	---	413	100.0
Returns	2	4.2	23	47.9	23	47.9	---	---	48	100.0
Total Cases	15	3.2	224	48.6	222	48.2	---	---	461	100.0
% Return Cases	13.3		10.3		10.4				10.4	
Delaware										
New Referrals	57	3.6	415	26.5	745	47.6	347	22.2	1564	99.9
Returns	8	5.1	45	28.5	82	51.9	23	14.6	158	100.0
Total Cases	65	3.8	460	26.7	827	48.0	370	21.5	1722	100.1
% Return Cases	12.3		9.8		9.9		6.2		9.2	

TABLE 4 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY AGE
EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Under 12		12-14		15-16		17 & over		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Illinois</u>										
New Referrals	102	3.9	1022	39.2	1421	54.4	65	2.5	2610	100.0
Returns	36	4.8	311	41.9	381	51.3	15	2.0	743	100.0
Total Cases	138	4.1	1333	39.8	1802	53.7	80	2.4	3353	100.0
% Return Cases	26.1		23.3		21.1		18.8		22.2	
<u>South Carolina</u>										
New Referrals	395	11.9	1495	45.2	1361	41.2	56	1.7	3307	100.0
Returns	13	8.0	90	55.2	59	36.2	1	.6	163	100.00
Total Cases	408	11.8	1585	45.7	1420	40.9	57	1.6	3470	100.0
% Return Cases	3.2		5.7		4.2		1.8		4.7	
<u>Clark County, WA</u>										
New Referrals	16	2.3	308	44.7	308	44.7	57	8.3	689	100.0
Returns	2	1.5	47	35.9	76	58.0	6	4.6	131	100.0
Total Cases	18	2.2	355	43.3	384	46.8	63	7.7	820	100.0
% Return Cases	11.1		13.2		19.8		9.5		16.0	
<u>Spokane, WA</u>										
New Referrals	38	4.0	345	36.7	461	49.0	96	10.2	940	99.9
Returns	3	1.3	103	43.3	114	47.9	18	7.6	238	100.1
Total Cases	41	3.5	448	38.0	575	48.8	114	9.7	1178	100.0
% Return Cases	7.3		23.0		19.8		15.8		20.2	

TABLE 4 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES BY AGE
NON-EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Under 12		12-14		15-16		17 & over		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado Co., CA</u>										
New Referrals	14	2.3	213	34.6	308	50.0	81	13.1	616	100.0
Returns	2	3.7	18	33.3	28	51.9	6	11.1	54	100.0
Total Cases	16	2.4	231	34.5	336	50.1	87	13.0	670	100.0
% Return Cases	12.5		7.8		8.3		6.9		8.1	
<u>Newark, OH</u>										
New Referrals	4	2.7	44	29.9	76	51.7	23	15.6	147	99.9
Returns	---	---	2	28.6	4	57.1	1	14.3	7	100.0
Total Cases	4	2.6	46	29.9	80	51.9	24	15.6	154	100.0
% Return Cases	0.0		4.3		5.0		4.2		4.5	

South Carolina program to a high of 27.6 percent in the Pima County program, with a mean percentage of 17.7. Such extreme dispersion is a likely reflection of wide differences in policy among programs with respect to their use of resources, and to differences in jurisdictional policy on returning repeat offenders to the program. Both of the non-evaluated sites showed relatively low proportions of return referral cases: 8.1 percent for El Dorado County and 4.5 percent for Newark.

To be noted in connection with the high proportion of return cases in Pima County, evident in all of the data presented in this chapter, is the fact that this may reflect the operations of its Mobile Diversion Unit (see Chapter IV). The MDU operated at the neighborhood level, responding continuously to calls for assistance from the police and residents. Repeat referrals to the program escalated as a function of the high level of MDU responsiveness, and a program intake procedure that recorded a repeat referral on multiple MDU contacts with the same youth.

ETHNICITY

Not unexpectedly, the population served by the national status offender program was predominantly white. As shown in Table 5, for all program sites white youth constituted 68.5 percent of all individuals (new referrals) who received program services, and 67.5 percent of all cases (new and return referrals). Blacks constituted the next largest group, with corresponding percentages of 20.4 and 20.7. The Hispanic category, consisting principally of Mexican-American and Puerto Rican youth, constituted slightly less than 10 percent of the total, followed

Table 5. New and Return Referrals, Evaluated, Non-Evaluated, and All Sites, By Ethnicity

Site Groups	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Evaluated Sites										
New Referrals	10,801	67.2	3,435	21.4	1,356	8.4	483	3.0	16,075	100.0
Returns	2,152	62.3	769	22.3	450	13.0	83	2.4	3,454	100.0
Total Cases	12,953	66.3	4,204	21.5	1,806	9.2	566	2.9	19,529	100.0
% Returns		16.6		18.3		24.9		14.7		17.7
Non-Evaluated Sites										
New Referrals	744	96.0	5	0.6	19	2.5	7	0.9	775	100.0
Returns	59	93.7	-	-	4	6.3	-	-	63	100.0
Total Cases	803	95.8	5	0.6	23	2.7	7	0.8	838	99.9
% Returns		7.3		0.0		17.4		0.0		7.5
All Sites										
New Referrals	11,545	68.5	3,440	20.4	1,375	8.2	490	2.9	16,850	100.0
Returns	2,211	62.9	769	21.9	454	12.9	83	2.4	3,517	100.1
Total Cases	13,756	67.5	4,209	20.7	1,829	9.0	573	2.8	20,367	100.0
% Returns		16.1		18.3		24.8		14.5		17.3

Missing Observations:

New Referrals	- 31
Returns	- 19
Total	- 50

by about 3 percent for a residual "Other" group, made up mainly of native American and Asian youth.

The data in Table 6 indicate the wide variation among evaluated sites in the proportion of the two major minority groups served, corresponding in all likelihood to their proportion in the total population of these sites. The proportion Black ranged from a high of 40.7 percent of the Illinois program population (accounted for principally by the Cook County site) to a low of 0.4 percent in the Clark County program. Black youth constituted approximately one-fifth of the program populations in Alameda County, Connecticut, Delaware and South Carolina. The Hispanic group, with a mean percentage of 17.4, varied from approximately one-quarter (23.9 percent) in Pima County to none in three of the evaluated sites. Hispanics were slightly less than 10 percent in Alameda County and Connecticut and only 5.8 percent in Illinois. Again, it was principally in the Pima and Alameda County programs that the smaller numbers of native American and Asian youth received status offender services.

The highest proportions of return referrals occurred in the minority ethnic groups (Table 5). With a mean return referral rate of 17.7 percent in the evaluated sites, for whites it was 16.6, for Blacks 18.3, for Hispanics 24.9, and for the Other category 14.7. As previously noted, the elevated return rate in Pima County, accounted for in part as an effect of its Mobile Diversion Unit operation and in part as a reflection of the high proportion of Hispanics, principally Mexican-American, in the county as well as in the program population, may be reflected in the high average return rate for all evaluated sites.

TABLE 6

NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY ETHNICITY

EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Pima Co., AZ</u>										
New Referrals	2167	60.3	325	9.0	859	23.9	243	6.8	3594	100.0
Returns	878	64.0	92	6.7	348	25.4	54	3.9	1372	100.0
Total Cases	3045	61.3	417	8.4	1207	24.3	297	6.0	4966	100.0
% Return Cases	28.8		22.1		28.8		18.2		27.6	
<u>Alameda Co., CA</u>										
New Referrals	1843	62.8	660	22.5	290	9.9	140	4.8	2933	100.0
Returns	362	60.4	165	27.5	58	9.7	14	2.3	599	99.9
Total Cases	2205	62.4	825	23.4	348	9.8	154	4.4	3532	100.0
% Return Cases	16.4		20.0		16.7		9.1		17.0	
<u>Connecticut</u>										
New Referrals	304	73.3	76	18.3	30	7.2	5	1.2	415	100.0
Returns	35	72.9	9	18.8	4	8.3	--	--	48	100.0
Total Cases	339	73.2	85	18.4	34	7.3	5	1.1	463	100.0
% Return Cases	10.3		10.6		11.8		0.0		10.4	
<u>Delaware</u>										
New Referrals	1202	76.6	337	21.5	22	1.4	8	.5	1569	100.0
Returns	96	61.1	60	38.2	1	.6	--	--	157	99.9
Total Cases	1298	75.2	397	23.0	23	1.3	8	.5	1726	100.0
% Return Cases	7.4		15.1		4.3		0.0		9.1	

TABLE 6 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY ETHNICITY
EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Illinois</u>										
New Referrals	1364	52.1	1066	40.7	153	5.8	37	1.4	2620	100.0
Returns	319	42.8	380	50.9	39	5.2	8	1.1	746	100.0
Total Cases	1683	50.0	1446	43.0	192	5.7	45	1.3	3366	100.0
% Return Cases	19.0		26.3		20.3		17.8		22.2	
<u>South Carolina</u>										
New Referrals	2361	71.2	948	28.6	--	--	5	.2	3314	100.0
Returns	108	66.3	55	33.7	--	--	--	--	163	100.0
Total Cases	2469	71.0	1003	28.8	--	--	5	.1	3477	99.9
% Return Cases	4.4		5.5		---		0.0		4.7	
<u>Clark Co., WA</u>										
New Referrals	679	98.4	3	.4	1	.1	7	1.0	690	99.9
Returns	129	98.5	--	--	--	--	2	1.5	131	100.0
Total Cases	808	98.4	3	.4	1	.1	9	1.1	821	100.0
% Return Cases	16.0		0.0		0.0		22.2		16.0	
<u>Spokane, WA</u>										
New Referrals	881	93.7	20	2.1	1	.1	38	4.0	940	99.9
Returns	225	94.5	8	3.4	0	--	5	2.1	238	100.0
Total Cases	1106	93.9	28	2.4	1	--	43	3.7	1178	100.0
% Return Cases	20.3		28.6		0.0		11.6		20.2	

TABLE 6 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY ETHNICITY
NON-EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado Co., CA</u>										
New Referrals	596	95.5	3	.5	19	3.0	6	1.0	624	100.0
Returns	51	92.7	--	--	4	7.3	--	--	55	100.0
Total Cases	647	95.3	3	.4	23	3.4	6	.9	679	100.0
% Return Cases	7.9		0.0		17.4		0.0		8.1	
<u>Newark, OHIO</u>										
New Referrals	148	98.0	2	1.3	--	--	1	.7	151	100.0
Returns	8	100.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	100.0
Total Cases	156	98.1	2	1.3	--	--	1	.6	159	100.0
% Return Cases	5.1		0.0		0.0		0.0		.2	

OFFENSE PATTERNS

The kinds of status offenses that occasioned referral to the program included runaway, incorrigibility/ungovernability, truancy, curfew violation, possession of alcohol, and a variety of other acts defined as offenses in some but not other jurisdictions. Because over four-fifths of all offenses recorded on initial referral to programs at all sites (84.2 percent) consisted of runaway, incorrigibility, and truancy, the remaining types of offenses are grouped for purposes of this presentation in an "Other" category (Table 7). In the many instances in which multiple status offenses were recorded, the most "serious" in the list was counted. On the assumption that the seriousness of a status offense could reasonably be determined by the level of parental concern and of justice agency time and effort it evoked, runaway led the list, followed by incorrigibility, truancy, curfew violation, possession of alcohol, and a residual set designated "other." No claim is here made that any of the program clients enumerated in one of the three major categories has restricted his or her status offenses to that type. The classification was created primarily to bring into view some of the underlying heterogeneity of the program population with respect to type of status offenses.

In the evaluated sites, well over two-thirds of program clients fell into the runaway and incorrigibility categories, approximately evenly divided (38.2 and 35.7 percent, respectively). In the case of the non-evaluated sites, on the other hand, over half the clients were recorded as runaways (56.3 percent), with only 13.0 percent in the incorrigibility category.

TABLE 7
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, EVALUATED,
NON-EVALUATED, AND ALL SITES, BY OFFENSE

Site Groups	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Evaluated Sites</u>										
New Referrals	6131	38.2	5736	35.7	1743	10.9	2450	15.3	16,060	100.1
Returns	1769	51.3	1123	32.6	160	4.6	397	11.5	3,449	100.0
Total Cases	7900	40.5	6859	35.2	1903	9.8	2847	14.6	19,509	100.1
% Return Cases	22.4		16.4		8.4		13.9		17.7	
<u>Non-Evaluated Sites</u>										
New Referrals	435	56.3	100	13.0	25	3.2	212	27.5	772	100.0
Returns	24	38.1	14	22.2	5	7.9	20	31.7	63	99.9
Total Cases	459	55.0	114	13.7	30	3.6	232	27.8	835	100.1
% Return Cases	5.2		12.3		16.7		8.6		7.5	
<u>All Sites</u>										
New Referrals	6566	39.0	5836	34.7	1768	10.5	2662	15.8	16,832	100.0
Returns	1793	51.1	1137	32.4	165	4.7	417	11.9	3512	100.1
Total Cases	8359	41.1	6973	34.3	1933	9.5	3077	15.1	20,344	100.0
% Return Cases	21.4		16.3		8.5		13.6		17.3	

Missing Observations:
New Referrals - 49
Returns - 24
Total - 112

Not surprisingly, the highest proportion of return referrals in the evaluated sites fell into the runaway category. With a mean return referral rate of 17.7 percent for all offense categories, runaways showed a rate of 22.4 percent. Again, this finding is reversed in the non-evaluated sites, where the return referral rate was only 5.2 percent. This may be accounted for on grounds that El Dorado County in California, adjacent to the gambling casinos and resort community of Nevada, attracts large numbers of runaway youth from other jurisdictions. Similarly, it is likely that runaways picked up in the largely rural community of Newark, Ohio, also were residents of other jurisdictions and would not be expected to be returned to its program.

Much of the variation in offense distribution across evaluated sites may be accounted for largely by the random patterning of combinations of offenses, with program clients classified only under the rubric of the one most serious in the set (Table 8). In addition, court and police policies varied with respect to the kinds of offenses regarded as most needing program services, as did the intake policies of the programs themselves. Thus, Connecticut, Illinois, and Clark County programs recorded extraordinarily high proportions of runaways (79.7, 70.9, and 60.5 percent, respectively), while in Delaware and South Carolina these were unusually low (21.4 and 14.6 percent). There were, of course, reciprocally low or high proportions of incorrigibles in each instance. High rates in the "Other" category occurred in the Pima County and Delaware programs. In the case of the 1,157 Pima County youth whose referral offenses fell in the "Other" category, 58.9 percent were made up of the jurisdiction specific "health and morals" offenses,

TABLE 8
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY OFFENSE
EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Pima County, AZ</u>										
New Referral	1090	30.5	935	26.2	392	11.0	1157	32.4	3574	100.1
Returns	613	44.8	399	29.2	84	6.1	272	19.9	1368	100.0
Total Cases	1703	34.5	1334	27.0	476	9.6	1429	28.9	4942	100.0
% Return Cases	36.0		29.9		17.6		19.0		27.7	
<u>Alameda Co. CA</u>										
New Referral	1136	38.6	1028	35.0	284	9.7	492	16.7	2940	100.0
Returns	307	51.3	227	37.9	13	2.2	52	8.7	599	100.1
Total Cases	1443	40.8	1255	35.5	297	8.4	544	15.4	3539	100.1
% Return Cases	21.3		18.1		4.4		9.6		16.9	
<u>Connecticut</u>										
New Referral	330	79.7	79	19.1	4	1.0	1	.2	414	100.0
Returns	40	83.3	8	16.7	---	---	---	---	48	100.0
Total Cases	370	80.1	87	18.8	4	.9	1	.2	462	100.0
% Return Cases	10.8		9.2		0.0		0.0		10.4	
<u>Delaware</u>										
New Referral	335	21.4	520	33.2	207	13.2	505*	32.2	1567	100.0
Returns	30	19.0	88	55.7	17	10.8	23	14.6	158	100.1
Total Cases	365	21.2	608	35.2	224	13.0	528	30.6	1725	100.0
% Return Cases	8.2		14.5		7.6		4.4		9.2	

* 491 (97.2% of Other; 31.3% of Total) = MIP

TABLE 8 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY OFFENSE

EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Illinois</u>										
New Referral	1856	70.9	692	26.5	23	.9	44	1.7	2615	100.0
Returns	530	71.2	188	25.3	4	.5	22	3.0	744	100.0
Total Cases	2386	71.0	880	26.2	27	.8	66	2.0	3359	100.0
% Return Cases	22.2		21.4		14.8		33.3		22.1	
<u>South Carolina</u>										
New Referral	485	14.6	2019	60.9	713	21.5	97	2.9	3314	99.9
Returns	23	14.1	107	65.6	25	15.3	8	4.9	163	99.9
Total Cases	508	14.6	2126	16.1	738	21.2	105	3.0	3477	99.9
% Return Cases	4.5		5.0		3.4		7.6		4.7	
<u>Clark Co., WA</u>										
New Referral	420	60.5	165	23.8	65	9.4	44	6.3	694	100.0
Returns	85	64.9	30	22.9	9	6.9	7	5.3	131	100.0
Total Cases	505	61.2	195	23.6	74	9.0	51	6.2	825	100.0
% Return Cases	16.8		15.4		12.2		13.7		15.9	
<u>Spokane Co. WA</u>										
New Referral	479	50.8	298	31.6	55	5.8	110	11.7	942	99.9
Returns	141	59.2	76	31.9	8	3.4	13	5.5	238	100.0
Total Cases	620	52.5	374	31.7	63	5.3	123	10.4	1180	99.9
% Return Cases	22.7		20.3		12.7		10.6		20.2	

TABLE 8 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY OFFENSE

NON-EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado Co., CA</u>										
New Referral	340	54.5	83	13.3	18	2.9	183	29.3	624	100.0
Returns	20	36.4	14	25.5	3	5.5	18	32.7	55	100.1
Total Cases	360	53.0	97	14.3	21	3.1	201	29.6	679	100.0
% Return Cases	5.6		14.4		14.3		9.0		8.1	
<u>Newark, OH</u>										
New Referral	95	64.2	17	11.5	7	4.7	29	19.6	148	100.0
Returns	4	50.0	---	---	2	25.0	2	25.0	8	100.0
Total Cases	99	63.5	17	10.9	9	5.8	31	19.9	156	100.1
% Return Cases	4.0		0.0		22.2		6.5		5.1	

with another 25.7 percent of alcohol possession violations. In the case of the 505 referrals in Delaware for "Other" offenses, 97.2 percent were for alcohol possession.

There was little variation in the distribution of return referrals across evaluated sites. The highest rates of return occurred in the runaway category, with two exceptions. In the Illinois program (heavily weighted by the Cook County site) the return percentage for runaways was approximately the same as for incorrigibles, and in the Delaware program the returns for incorrigibility was almost twice that for runaway (14.5 versus 8.2 percent).

Whatever the shortcomings of the record data from which the offense distribution of program clients has here been developed, it remains highly likely that runaway and incorrigibility constitute the principal offenses of non-criminal youth.

SOURCE OF REFERRAL

For all cases dealt with by the program, both initial and re-referral, by far the major portion (45.6 percent) came from police agencies (Table 9). In descending order, cases were referred by parents and guardians (15.0 percent), courts (12.3 percent), schools (10.7 percent), and "Other" (10.1 percent). An additional 6.3 percent were self-referrals. Approximately the same order of magnitude among referral sources held for the evaluated sites. On the other hand, in the two non-evaluated sites, referrals from "Other" sources constituted the largest source, coming primarily from probation and parole services. With respect to return cases, in the evaluated programs approximately equal proportions came from police, parents and guardians, self, and "other" (20.2, 18.9, 18.8, and 19.0 percent, respectively). Court returns were not far behind with

TABLE 9
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, EVALUATED, NON-EVALUATED AND ALL SITES BY SOURCE OF REFERRAL

Site Groups	Police		Parent Guardian		Court		Self		School		*Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Evaluated Sites														
New Referrals	7073	45.5	2325	15.0	2007	12.9	909	5.8	1884	12.1	1352	8.7	15,550	100.0
Returns	1786	52.5	543	16.0	359	10.6	211	6.2	182	5.4	318	9.4	3,399	100.0
Total Cases	8859	46.8	2868	15.1	2366	12.5	1120	5.9	2066	10.9	1670	8.8	18,949	100.0
% Return Cases	20.2		18.9		15.2		18.8		8.8		19.0		17.9	
Non-Evaluated Sites														
New Referrals	164	21.3	84	10.9	62	8.0	110	14.3	44	5.7	307	39.8	771	100.0
Returns	6	9.8	12	19.7	6	9.8	9	14.8	7	11.5	21	34.4	61	100.0
Total Cases	170	20.4	96	11.5	68	8.2	119	14.3	51	6.1	328	39.4	832	99.9
% Return Cases	3.5		12.5		8.8		7.6		13.7		6.4		7.3	
All Sites														
New Referrals	7237	44.3	2409	14.8	2069	12.7	1019	6.2	1928	11.8	1659	10.2	16,321	100.0
Returns	1792	51.8	555	16.0	365	10.5	220	6.4	189	5.5	339	9.8	3,460	100.0
Total Cases	9029	45.6	2964	15.0	2434	12.3	1239	6.3	2117	10.7	1998	10.1	19,781	100.0
% Return Cases	19.8		18.7		15.0		17.8		8.9		17.0		17.5	

Missing Observations:

New Referrals - 560

Returns - 76

Total - 636

*Includes Probation, Parole, Institution, and Other

15.2 percent, but schools, with 8.8 percent appeared to be least active in returning youth to the program. In the non-evaluated sites, on the contrary, schools were the most prominent source of return referrals, with 13.7 percent, closely followed by parents and guardians, with 12.5 percent.

Among evaluated sites, police as the source of referral for all cases ranged from a high of 84.3 percent in Connecticut to a low of 7.1 in South Carolina (Table 10). Excluding the two extreme cases, the mean percentage of police initiated referrals was 53.0. Alameda, Illinois, and Clark County, Washington, were above the mean, with Spokane County, Washington, Delaware, and Pima County, Arizona, below. With respect to the two extreme cases, the Connecticut program was so structured as to eliminate all but the police as the referral source. Only the "detainable" cases were, by design, eligible for program services. The South Carolina program, by contrast, defined as program eligibles a heterogeneous population of youth referred to the regional Youth Service Bureaus maintained by the State Department of Youth Services. It will be noted that over some 42 percent of the cases in that program were referred by courts. Since many of these cases are likely to have been police initiated, the low police referral rate is probably misleading.

CUSTOMARY HOUSEHOLD OF PROGRAM CLIENTS

Because problems of incorrigibility and runaway constitute the two principal offenses that bring status offenders into the juvenile justice system, it was deemed useful to obtain data on the family situation of program clients. Data that were both accessible to the national evaluation and reasonably uniform across sites were necessarily restricted to

TABLE 10
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY SOURCE OF REFERRAL
EVALUATED SITES

<u>Program Site</u>	<u>Police</u>		<u>Parent Guardian</u>		<u>Court</u>		<u>Self</u>		<u>School</u>		<u>*Other</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Pima County, AZ</u>														
New Referrals	1364	38.1	716	20.0	171	4.8	403	11.3	431	12.0	496	13.9	3581	100.1
Returns	644	47.0	311	22.7	75	5.5	110	8.0	93	6.8	137	10.0	1370	100.0
Total Cases	2008	40.6	1027	20.7	246	5.0	513	10.4	524	10.6	633	12.8	4951	100.1
% Return Cases		32.1		30.3		30.5		21.4		17.7		21.6		27.7
<u>Alameda County, CA</u>														
New Referrals	1650	56.3	233	7.9	4	.1	146	5.0	437	14.9	461	15.7	2931	99.9
Returns	378	63.7	34	5.7	-	-	37	6.2	37	6.2	107	18.0	593	99.8
Total Cases	2028	57.5	267	7.6	4	.1	183	5.2	474	13.5	568	16.1	3524	100.0
% Return Cases		18.6		12.7		-		20.2		7.8		18.8		16.8
<u>Connecticut</u>														
New Referrals	354	86.1	4	1.0	4	1.0	3	.7	2	.5	44	10.7	411	100.0
Returns	33	68.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	31.1	48	100.0
Total Cases	387	84.3	4	.9	4	.9	3	.7	2	.4	59	12.9	459	100.1
% Return Cases		8.5		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		25.4		10.5
<u>Delaware **</u>														
New Referrals	597	41.5	620	43.1	17	1.2	1	.1	160	11.1	43	3.0	1438	100.0
Returns	33	23.2	84	59.2	3	2.1	-	-	13	9.2	9	6.3	142	100.0
Total Cases	630	39.9	704	44.6	20	1.3	1	.1	173	10.9	52	3.3	1580	100.1
% Return Cases		5.2		11.9		15.0		0.0		7.5		17.3		9.0

*Includes Probation, Parole, Institution, Youth Agency, and Other

**The distribution refers to the source initiating the case. However, all referrals to the program were made by the court or the status offender intake unit of the court.

TABLE 10 (continued)

Program Site	Police		Parent Guardian		Court		Self		School		*Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illinois														
New Referrals	2012	77.7	70	2.7	233	9.0	15	.6	5	.2	255	9.8	2590	100.0
Returns	549	74.1	25	3.4	110	14.8	10	1.3	1	.1	46	6.2	741	99.9
Total Cases	2561	76.9	95	2.9	343	10.3	25	.8	6	.2	301	9.0	3331	100.1
% Return Cases	21.4		26.3		32.1		40.0		16.7		15.3		22.2	
South Carolina														
New Referrals	214	7.2	493	16.6	1260	42.5	241	8.1	741	25.0	15	.5	2964	99.9
Returns	6	4.4	38	27.9	55	40.4	16	11.8	20	14.7	1	.7	136	99.9
Total Cases	220	7.1	531	17.1	1315	42.4	257	8.3	761	24.5	16	.5	3100	99.9
% Return Cases	2.7		7.2		4.2		6.2		2.6		6.3		4.4	
Clark County, WA														
New Referrals	370	53.3	181	26.1	2	.3	81	11.7	44	6.3	16	2.3	694	100.0
Returns	69	52.7	36	27.5	-	-	15	11.5	9	6.9	2	1.5	131	100.1
Total Cases	439	53.2	217	26.3	2	.2	96	11.6	53	6.4	18	2.2	825	99.9
% Return Cases	15.7		16.6		0.0		15.6		17.0		11.1		15.9	
Spokane, WA														
New Referrals	512	54.4	8	.9	316	33.6	19	2.0	64	6.8	22	2.3	941	100.0
Returns	74	31.1	15	6.3	116	48.7	23	9.7	9	3.8	1	.4	238	100.0
Total Cases	586	49.7	23	2.0	432	36.6	42	3.6	73	6.2	23	2.0	1179	100.1
% Return Cases	12.6		65.2		26.9		54.8		12.3		4.3		20.2	

*Includes Probation, Parole, Institution, Youth Agency, and Other

TABLE 10 (continued)
NON-EVALUATED SITES

Program Site	Police		Parent Guardian		Court		Self		School		*Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado County, CA</u>														
New Referrals	147	23.7	83	13.4	-	-	76	12.3	34	5.5	280	45.2	620	100.0
Returns	6	11.3	12	22.6	-	-	8	15.1	6	11.3	21	39.6	53	99.9
Total Cases	153	22.7	95	14.1	-	-	84	12.5	40	5.9	301	44.7	673	99.9
% Return Cases		3.9		12.6		0.0		9.5		15.0		7.0		7.9
<u>Newark, Ohio</u>														
New Referrals	17	11.3	1	.7	62	41.1	34	22.5	10	6.6	27	17.9	151	100.1
Returns	-	-	-	-	6	75.0	1	12.5	1	12.5	-	-	8	100.0
Total Cases	17		1		68	42.8	35	22.0	11	6.9	27	17.0	159	
% Return Cases		0.0		0.0		8.8		2.9		9.1		0.0		5.0

variables of family composition. In order to avoid the distorting effect of such temporary living situations as foster or group homes, the information concerned the composition of the customary household rather than that of the household lived in immediately prior to program entry. Households were classified as nuclear (natural father and mother living together), reconstituted (households with two parents reconstituted by remarriage of one or both parents, or similarly constituted households whether or not based on marriage), single parent, relative and extended family, and a residual category or "other." The latter included foster homes and independent living in a variety of forms.

As seen in Table 11, clients in the evaluated sites came in approximately equal proportions from nuclear (35.3 percent) and single parent households (33.3 percent), with the next largest category consisting of reconstituted families (19.1 percent). While the proportion of cases from reconstituted families was only a little over half that of either nuclear or single parent households, the proportion of return cases was greater (18.2 percent versus 15.4 and 14.7 percent respectively). In the non-evaluated sites, the distribution differed in two respects: substantially fewer came from single parent households (33.3 versus 22.5 percent) and a slightly higher percentage of return cases across household types were minor in both the evaluated and the non-evaluated sites, although the proportion of re-referrals was uniformly larger in the former.

There was relatively little variation across evaluated sites in the proportion of their clients from nuclear households (Table 12). It was the highest in Pima County, with 40.6 percent, and lowest in Spokane, with 30.4 percent. There was also relatively little variation across sites that characterizes each

TABLE 11
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, EVALUATED, NON-EVALUATED, AND ALL SITES, BY CUSTOMARY HOUSEHOLD

Site Groups	Nuclear		Reconstituted		Single Parent		Relatives/ Extended Fam.		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Evaluated Sites</u>												
New Referrals	5084	35.1	2656	18.3	4840	33.4	739	5.1	1165	8.0	14,484	99.9
Returns	923	36.4	589	23.2	834	32.9	104	4.1	89	3.5	2,539	100.0
Total Cases	6007	35.3	3245	19.1	5674	33.3	843	5.0	1254	7.4	17,023	100.1
% Return Cases	15.4		18.2		14.7		12.3		7.1		14.9	
<u>Non-Evaluated Sites</u>												
New Referrals	274	35.9	171	22.4	169	22.1	19	2.5	130	17.0	763	99.9
Returns	24	39.3	15	24.6	16	26.2	1	1.6	5	8.2	61	99.9
Total Cases	298	36.1	186	22.6	185	22.5	20	2.4	135	16.4	824	100.0
% Return Cases	8.1		8.1		8.6		5.0		3.7		7.4	
<u>All Sites</u>												
New Referrals	5358	35.1	2827	18.5	5009	32.9	758	4.9	1295	8.6	15,247	100.0
Returns	947	36.4	604	23.2	850	32.7	105	4.0	94	3.6	2,600	99.9
Total Cases	6305	35.3	3431	19.2	5859	32.8	863	4.8	1389	7.8	17,864	99.9
% Return Cases	15.0		17.6		14.5		12.2		6.8		14.6	

TABLE 12
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY TYPE OF CUSTOMARY HOUSEHOLD
EVALUATED SITES

Program Sites	Nuclear		Reconstituted		Single Parent		Relatives/ Extended Fam.		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Pima Co., AZ</u>												
New Referral	1460	41.1	643	18.1	1090	30.7	161	4.5	202	5.6	3556	100.0
Returns	447	39.1	262	22.9	346	30.2	45	13.9	44	3.8	1144	99.9
Total Cases	1907	40.6	905	19.3	1436	30.6	206	4.4	246	5.2	4700	100.1
% Return Cases	23.4		29.0		24.1		21.8		17.9		24.3	
<u>Alameda Co. CA</u>												
New Referral	964	33.0	534	18.3	1111	38.0	125	4.3	187	6.4	2921	100.0
Returns	33	39.3	16	19.0	26	30.9	4	4.8	5	6.0	84	100.0
Total Cases	997	33.2	550	18.3	1137	37.8	129	4.3	192	6.4	3005	100.0
% Return Cases	3.3		2.9		2.3		3.1		2.6		2.8	
<u>Connecticut</u>												
New Referral	138	33.8	78	19.1	119	29.2	20	4.9	53	13.0	408	100.0
Returns	10	21.7	16	34.8	17	37.0	2	4.3	1	2.2	46	100.0
Total Cases	148	32.6	94	20.7	136	30.0	22	4.8	54	11.9	454	100.0
% Return Cases	6.8		17.0		12.5		9.1		1.9		10.1	
<u>Delaware</u>												
New Referral	359	35.0	108	10.5	243	23.7	39	3.8	277	27.0	1026	100.0
Returns	24	35.8	7	10.4	30	44.8	1	1.5	5	7.5	67	100.0
Total Cases	383	35.0	115	10.5	273	25.0	40	3.7	282	25.8	1093	100.0
% Return Cases	6.3		6.1		11.0		2.5		1.8		6.1	

TABLE 12 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY TYPE OF CUSTOMARY HOUSEHOLD
EVALUATED SITES

Program Sites	Nuclear		Reconstituted		Single Parent		Relatives/ Extended Fam.		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Illinois</u>												
New Referral	854	32.7	463	17.7	892	34.2	155	5.9	246	9.4	2610	99.9
Returns	252	34.3	160	21.8	269	36.6	35	4.8	19	2.5	735	100.0
Total Cases	1106	33.1	623	18.6	1161	34.7	190	5.7	265	7.9	3345	100.0
% Return Cases	22.8		25.7		23.2		18.4		7.2		22.0	
<u>South Carolina</u>												
New Referral	760	32.6	386	16.5	916	39.3	173	7.4	98	4.2	2333	100.0
Returns	30	31.6	13	13.7	42	44.2	9	9.5	1	1.0	95	100.0
Total Cases	790	32.5	399	16.4	958	39.5	182	7.5	99	4.1	2428	100.0
% Return Cases	3.8		3.3		4.4		4.9		1.0		3.9	
<u>Clark Co., WA</u>												
New Referral	267	38.8	191	27.8	189	27.5	21	3.1	20	2.9	688	100.1
Returns	50	38.2	38	29.0	38	29.0	0	0.0	5	3.8	131	100.0
Total Cases	317	38.7	229	28.0	227	27.7	21	2.6	25	3.0	819	100.0
% Return Cases	15.8		16.6		16.7		0.0		20.0		16.0	
<u>Spokane, WA</u>												
New Referral	282	29.9	253	26.9	280	29.7	45	4.8	82	8.7	942	100.0
Returns	77	32.5	77	32.5	66	27.8	8	3.4	9	3.8	237	100.0
Total Cases	359	30.4	330	28.0	346	29.3	53	4.5	91	7.7	1179	99.9
% Return Cases	21.4		23.3		19.1		15.1		9.9		20.1	

TABLE 12 (cont'd)
NEW AND RETURN REFERRALS, ALL SITES, BY TYPE OF CUSTOMARY HOUSEHOLD
NON-EVALUATED SITES

Program Sites	Nuclear		Reconstituted		Single Parent		Relatives/ Extended Fam.		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Eldorado Co., CA</u>												
New Referral	211	34.5	131	21.4	135	22.1	16	2.6	119	19.4	612	100.0
Returns	21	39.6	11	20.8	15	28.3	1	1.8	5	9.4	53	99.9
Total Cases	232	34.9	142	21.4	150	22.6	17	2.6	124	18.5	665	100.0
% Return Cases	9.1		7.7		10.0		5.9		4.0		8.0	
<u>Newark, OH</u>												
New Referral	63	41.7	40	26.5	34	22.5	3	2.0	11	7.3	151	100.0
Returns	3	37.5	4	50.0	1	12.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	100.0
Total Cases	66	41.5	44	27.7	35	22.0	3	1.9	11	6.9	159	100.0
% Return Cases	415		9.0		2.9		0.0		0.0		5.0	

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of the other household types. However, evaluated sites varied widely in the proportion of total cases represented by re-referral to their programs. In the Spokane, Illinois, and Pima County programs the percentage of return cases was 20.1, 22.0, and 24.3, respectively, while it was 2.8, 6.1, and 3.9, respectively, in the Alameda County, Delaware, and South Carolina programs. In the remaining two, Connecticut and Clark County, the return percentages were 10.1 and 16.0. Extreme differences in return cases are likely to reflect policy differences respecting client eligibility requirements and in the emphasis placed on extending services to the maximum number of individuals.

The proportion of return cases for clients from reconstituted households was significantly higher in the Pima County and the Illinois programs than in the other sites. These programs also showed the highest proportion of return cases from single parent households. Both these differences probably reflect the high proportion of minority group clients in their program populations, although in these sites the return percentages were approximately the same for youths from nuclear households.

In summary, the "typical" program client in the national status offender program may be profiled with respect to gender, age, offense, source of referral and household composition, despite variation across program sites. The program client was likely to be a white 15 or 16 year old youth, slightly more often female, from a nuclear or reconstituted family dealt with by the juvenile justice system as either an incorrigible or runaway who was referred to the program by the police. During the two-year program period the youth had approximately one chance in six of being returned for additional services.

However, the program client in the two non-evaluated sites was even more likely to be female, with significantly larger proportions of both genders falling into the white category, and somewhat larger proportions in the 15-16 year old age range. Much larger proportions were dealt with as runaways than in the evaluated sites, with a smaller percentage of self-referrals. Fewer came from single parent households, but significantly more from foster and group homes.

Among evaluated sites, the highest proportions of female clients were found in the Connecticut, Illinois, Clark County, and Spokane programs, with lowest proportions in Delaware and South Carolina. The age distribution was substantially similar across all sites. The Alameda County, Illinois, Delaware, and South Carolina programs served a very large number of black clients, while substantial numbers of Hispanics received services in the Pima County program. Runaways represented the presenting offense in relatively high proportions in the Connecticut, Illinois, and Clark County programs, while incorrigibility predominated in the South Carolina program. Police agencies were the major source of referral in the Connecticut and Illinois programs. Parents and guardians as the source of referral were prominent in the South Carolina, Delaware, and Clark County programs, courts in the South Carolina and Spokane programs. Schools as the referral source stood out only in South Carolina. Type of customary household showed little variation across evaluated sites with the exception of Illinois and South Carolina, where a relatively large proportion of clients came from single parent families.

CHAPTER XIII

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE EVALUATED SAMPLE

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CHAPTER XIII

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE EVALUATED SAMPLE

Solomon Kobrin and Elaine M. Corry

INTRODUCTION

The evaluation study was designed to obtain both client and program data at two levels of comprehensiveness. First, for all clients who entered the program a set of data was obtained that was restricted to the demographic items of age, gender, ethnicity, and size of community, and to school status, family structure, offense at referral, and initial service assignment.

The anticipated number of referrals at each site was based by program personnel on past police and court data to the extent that they were available and accessible. These were counts variously of individuals or cases of status offenses or offenders recorded by police, courts and detention centers. However derived, all estimates pointed to the likelihood that the number of project clients would be very large. It was thus apparent that in order to obtain and analyze the large body of additional data needed to assess the effect of the program on client conduct, a reduced subset of the total client population would have to be sampled.

For this sampled subset an expanded number of information items was required. These included, in addition to family socioeconomic status (Form 2), the type and number of treatment service or services provided (Form 1-B), the offense history of the client prior and subsequent to entry into the program (Forms 5-A, B, and C), and responses to a self-report offense and social adjustment interview instrument. In two of the eight sites, Connecticut and Clark County, the number of clients was sufficiently small to obviate the need for sampling.

SAMPLE SELECTION

The sampling design employed may be described as an approximation to systematic quota sampling from monthly intake of program clients. The main effort with respect to representativeness was to reproduce in the sample so far as possible a sufficient distribution of status offense types in the program population. Because it was desirable to identify and contact sampled subjects for the initial interview immediately after they were scheduled to become program clients, the possibility was precluded of using a probabilistic procedure as, for example, by sampling subjects from a frame composed of all clients constituting the monthly program intake at the end of any one month. The solution was to employ a "forecasting" technique, in which a probabilistic procedure was approximated by adjusting monthly sampling fractions of offense types in advance of each month. The adjustments were to be made on the basis of earlier (cumulatively "smoothed") flows in given offense categories. The obvious risk in this procedure was misestimation of the correct sampling fraction in the early months of the evaluation period. Since no knowledge-based assumptions could be made with respect to the distribution of offense types in a status offender population, the only reasonable procedure appeared to be the use of a design giving each type an opportunity to be selected into the sample.

The total sample size needed for the types of analyses planned required site evaluators to select into site samples the first 12 in each of five offense categories entering their programs in each month. The categories in descending order of judged seriousness in a status offender population were runaway, ungovernable/incorrigible, truancy, curfew violation, minor in possession of alcohol, and a residual category of "other." Constrained by

the need to identify sampled program clients for early interview, the "forecasting" method posed difficult problems requiring at many of the sites extensive, and as will be seen later, distorting adjustments.

The absence of probability based selection means that the population of inference must be restricted to those clients served by the national status offender program who were defined as "evaluation eligible" on evidence that they were referred to the program for having committed one or more of the designated status offenses. Generalization of findings to the wider population of all status offenders would not be warranted. The degree to which the clientele of the national program is representative of the total U.S. population of status offenders is not empirically ascertainable at this time.

The sampling procedure posed a number of additional subsidiary problems. First, where youths were referred to the program on the basis of multiple status offense charges, the problem arose of selecting one of these charges as the appropriate categorization. The approach adopted was to classify the client according to the most serious status offense on which the referral was based, utilizing the order of seriousness indicated above. It was assumed that this offense would be the one most likely to determine the kind of treatment prescribed for the client.

Second, and more critically, although the effort was made to select into the sample equal numbers in each of the five offense categories (12 per category in each month of program intake), for various reasons these quotas could not be met. Some categories consistently produced fewer than 12 cases per month, either because the site did not generate these numbers, or because the policy of the jurisdiction was to take no official action with respect to certain types of status offenses (e.g., curfew violation,

or minor in possession of alcohol). It thus became apparent early on that it would not be feasible to implement the intended sampling procedure. The fallback position was then adopted to assure a sample size at each site irrespective of its distribution respecting offense type at the very least to provide sufficient numbers in each of the many client-service-offense categories required by the analysis. There was in any case no possibility of estimating a priori the category proportions of the total program population together with their likely variances on measures of outcome variables. Were this possible, it would, of course, have been desirable to sample disproportionately among offense categories for analysis purposes. Hence, site evaluators were requested, to the extent feasible, to meet the total monthly quotas required by the national evaluation design.

"EVALUATION ELIGIBLE" PROGRAM POPULATION

Clients referred to the eight programs at the evaluated sites numbered 16,103. Of these, 8,563, or 53.2 percent, were, for a variety of reasons, defined as eligible for inclusion in the population from which the evaluated sample was drawn.¹ In two cases (Arizona and South Carolina), as programs came into operation and their availability became known in their communities, clients were referred to and admitted to the programs who were troubled youth in need of counseling or were cases of neglect and abuse with no specific status offenses of the five types indicated. In another program (Illinois), only five of its counties were included as evaluation sites. In still another (South Carolina) a similarly limited number of sites became the focus of

¹ This is the maximum number of individual clients in the evaluation eligible population. It is based on gender data, for which there were virtually no missing values. Variation in the number of missing values for other client characteristics accounts for differences in the totals for each.

evaluation interest, to the exclusion of the rest of the state. Excluded as well in all sites were clients who entered the program prior to the initiation of the evaluation study and subsequent to a termination date set by the end of funding.² At the request of OJJ, a basic record consisting only of demographic information, source and reason for referral and service assignment was compiled on all clients entering the program, without regard to their evaluation eligibility status. These clients were included in the total program population count of 16,103 recorded at the eight evaluated sites. As stated, approximately half of this number (8,563) formed the frame from which an evaluated sample of 4,010 clients was drawn.

SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS

Given the non-probabilistic procedure used in drawing the sample, its representativeness of the evaluation eligible population is open to question. The question is addressed by examining the comparative distribution of characteristics in the non-evaluated eligible population and in the evaluated sample. As noted, offense type was the only characteristic for which an effort was made initially to reproduce in the sample approximately the same proportionate distribution as existed in the population eligible for evaluation.

Three questions arise. First, how closely does the distribution of the offense types in the sample aggregated over the eight sites resemble that in the non-evaluated eligible population? Second, if the comparative distributions with respect to offense type in the two groups are similar, is the comparative distribution for the two groups similar for gender, age, ethnicity, and source of referral? And third, to what extent did specific program sites

² The final date for intake into the evaluated sample was set to allow for at least a six-month follow-up and to include a sufficient number in the sample from each site. Extensions were allowed in some sites to accomplish this and to provide data to the national evaluators in time for processing.

vary in sample bias respecting each of the client characteristics?

In assessing the extent of bias in the evaluated sample, use was made of the one-sample Chi Square test of no difference. The significance level was set at the conventional .05. Clearly, this is not necessarily the "best" choice of significance level, and the reader is free to make another judgment in this matter. In the context of the procedure followed, any χ^2 product whose p value is larger than .05 indicates that the degree of similarity in the distributions for the non-evaluated and the evaluated samples was sufficient for the acceptance of the latter as representative of the former.

Offense type. Aggregated over the eight sites, the distribution of instant status offenses for the evaluated sample is not representative of the distribution of instant offenses in the non-evaluated eligible sample (Table 1). Similarity of the two samples in their pattern of distribution across offense types is evident only in Illinois. In all other sites, the instant offense distribution is dissimilar.

Age. Here, again, when aggregated over all sites, the age distribution of the evaluated sample appears to be unrepresentative (Table 2). Age distribution by site discloses representativeness of the sample only in Delaware, South Carolina, and marginally in Spokane County.

Gender. Aggregated for the eight sites, the evaluated sample reproduces reasonably closely the male - female distribution in the non-evaluated group (Table 3). The same was true for Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina, but not in the other sites (always excluding the special cases of Connecticut and Clark County).

Ethnicity. Again, for the eight sites together, the distributions of ethnicity in the two samples are not comparable (Table 4). However, the evaluated samples were representative in Pima County, Delaware, South Carolina, and marginally in Spokane County. Substantially dissimilar

distributions on ethnicity were found for Alameda County and for Illinois.

Referral source. The pattern of distribution with respect to referral source for the evaluated sample was substantially unrelated to that for the non-evaluated eligibles when aggregated across the eight sites, as well as in the Pima, Alameda, and Spokane County program sites (Table 5). These distributions were similar, however, in Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina.

Referral source: justice and non-justice. In order to gain a clearer view of the relative prominence of juvenile justice agencies as the source of referrals to the program, referral sources were collapsed to two categories. As seen in Table 6, when the data are aggregated across the eight sites, the distribution for justice and non-justice sources of referral are unrelated, as was the case for Pima, Alameda, and Spokane Counties. Evaluated samples were found to be representative in Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina.

SUMMARY

The estimates of evaluated sample representativeness suggest that, overall, the evaluated sample differed substantially from the non-evaluated eligibles in their distributions of client and offense characteristics (again excepting Connecticut and Clark County, where virtually all evaluation eligible clients were included in the evaluated sample). However, these differences varied substantially at specific sites. As seen in the summary provided in Table 7, with respect to instant offense, only the Illinois sample was representative. This was true of the age distribution in Delaware and South Carolina; of gender in Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina, of ethnicity in Pima County, Delaware, and South Carolina; of referral source in Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina; and of the

balance between justice and non-justice referrals in Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina.

Of the six client variables utilized to assess representativeness, Delaware and South Carolina each was most adequate with five, Illinois was next with four, followed by Spokane County with marginal representativeness in two, and Pima County with one. The variation across sites was a consequence principally of a sample selection design that attempted to obtain adequate numbers of cases referred for each of five types of status offense.

As noted earlier, the evaluation eligible population was restricted to those referred for the status offenses of runaway, incorrigibility, truancy, curfew violation, minor in possession of alcohol, and a low frequency variety of other statutorily defined offenses. It was anticipated that substantial numbers of cases of such essentially non-offense types as neglect and dependency as well as non-offending troubled youth might also be referred to and accepted by the programs. Moreover, sites differed substantially in the kinds of juvenile misconduct that were legally defined as status offenses, and in the practices of police and courts respecting the types of status offenses deemed worthy of official action. In some sites, this was true, for example, of the offense of minor in possession of alcohol and of curfew violation. In addition, the eligibility of status offenders for referral to the program, a matter negotiated between court and program personnel, varied from site to site. For example, some sites considered cases of mixed status-delinquent offenses as eligible, other did not.

With particular offense types missing in the evaluation eligible population, the need for sufficient numbers for analysis increased the selection of those who were actually referred to the program and who met

the criteria for selection into the evaluation eligible population. To the extent that those referred to the program clustered in the more numerous offense categories, to that extent these categories of offense produced a selection into the evaluated sample of variously biased proportions in particular age, gender, ethnicity, and referral source categories.

In sum, therefore, the evaluated population was on the whole a biased sample of the evaluation eligible population. However, site differences in this respect were pronounced. As noted, the evaluation sample in three sites, Delaware, South Carolina, and Illinois, were largely unbiased. The remaining three sites for which the representativeness assessment was applicable (Pima, Spokane and Alameda Counties) drew highly biased samples into the evaluated group.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF INSTANT OFFENSE DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ALL SITES

Sample	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other*		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	1704	38.4	1490	33.6	423	9.5	822	18.5	4439	100.0
Evaluated	1600	39.9	1301	32.5	432	10.8	673	16.8	4006	100.0
TOTAL	3304	39.1	2791	33.0	855	10.1	1495	17.7	8445	99.9

$$\chi^2=8.839 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0315$$

PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA

Non-Evaluated	422	32.1	377	28.1	111	8.4	405	30.8	1315	100.0
Evaluated	204	25.3	180	22.3	162	20.1	261	32.3	807	100.0
TOTAL	626	29.5	557	26.3	273	12.9	666	31.4	2122	100.0

$$\chi^2=68.571 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0001$$

ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Non-Evaluated	833	40.0	761	36.6	199	9.6	288	13.8	2081	100.0
Evaluated	81	23.8	77	22.7	72	21.2	110	32.4	340	100.0
TOTAL	914	37.8	838	34.6	271	11.2	398	16.4	2421	100.0

$$\chi^2=132.840 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0001$$

CONNECTICUT**

Non-Evaluated	2	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	100.0
Evaluated	121	83.5	22	15.2	1	.7	1	.7	145	100.0
TOTAL	123	83.7	22	15.0	1	.7	1	.7	147	100.0

DELAWARE

Non-Evaluated	25	15.1	52	31.3	21	12.7	68	41.0	166	100.1
Evaluated	216	27.7	239	30.7	80	10.3	244	31.3	779	100.0
TOTAL	241	25.5	291	30.8	101	10.7	312	33.0	945	100.0

$$\chi^2=13.208 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0042$$

* Includes Curfew, MIP and Other

** Virtually all of the evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF INSTANT OFFENSE DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ILLINOIS

Sample	Runaway		Incorrigible		Truant		Other*		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	354	75.5	107	22.8	2	.4	6	1.3	469	100.0
Evaluated	540	70.8	211	27.7	6	.8	6	.8	763	100.1
TOTAL	894	72.6	318	25.8	8	.7	12	1.0	1232	100.1

$$\chi^2=4.826 \quad df=3 \quad p=.1850$$

SOUTH CAROLINA

Non-Evaluated	52	17.3	169	56.3	60	20.0	19	6.3	300	99.9
Evaluated	93	18.4	337	66.6	72	14.2	4	.8	506	100.0
TOTAL	145	18.0	506	62.8	132	16.4	23	2.9	806	100.0

$$\chi^2=27.384 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0001$$

CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON**

Non-Evaluated	5	71.4	1	14.3	1	14.3	-	-	7	100.0
Evaluated	83	44.4	59	31.6	35	18.7	10	5.3	187	100.0
TOTAL	88	45.4	60	30.9	36	18.6	10	5.2	194	100.1

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON

Non-Evaluated	11	11.1	23	23.2	29	29.3	36	36.4	99	100.0
Evaluated	262	54.7	176	36.7	4	.8	37	7.7	479	100.0
TOTAL	273	47.2	199	34.4	33	5.7	73	12.6	578	99.9

$$\chi^2=207.005 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0001$$

* Includes Curfew, MIP and Other.

** Virtually all of the evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

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TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF AGE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ALL SITES										
Sample	Under 12		12-14		15-16		17-18		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	337	7.6	1731	39.1	1876	42.4	479	10.8	4423	99.9
Evaluated	175	4.4	1497	37.4	1880	47.0	449	11.2	4001	100.0
TOTAL	512	6.1	3228	38.3	3756	44.6	928	11.0	8424	100.0
$\chi^2=48.176$ df=3 p=.0001										
PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA										
Non-Evaluated	130	9.8	495	37.4	517	39.1	182	13.8	1324	100.1
Evaluated	44	5.5	283	35.1	335	41.6	144	17.9	806	100.1
TOTAL	174	8.2	778	36.5	852	40.0	326	15.3	2130	100.0
$\chi^2=18.715$ df=3 p=.0004										
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA										
Non-Evaluated	127	6.2	844	40.9	864	41.9	227	11.0	2062	100.0
Evaluated	14	4.1	114	33.6	155	45.7	56	16.5	339	99.9
TOTAL	141	5.9	958	39.9	1019	42.4	283	11.8	2401	100.0
$\chi^2=14.305$ df=3 p=.0025										
CONNECTICUT*										
Non-Evaluated	-	-	2	100.0	-	-	-	-	2	100.0
Evaluated	5	3.5	72	49.7	68	46.9	-	-	145	100.1
TOTAL	5	3.4	74	50.3	68	46.3	-	-	147	100.0
DELAWARE										
Non-Evaluated	3	1.8	36	21.8	80	48.5	46	27.9	165	100.0
Evaluated	29	3.7	220	28.2	358	45.8	174	22.3	781	100.0
TOTAL	32	3.4	256	27.1	438	46.3	220	23.3	946	100.1
$\chi^2=5.519$ df=3 p=.1375										

* Virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluation sample.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF AGE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ILLINOIS										
Sample	Under 12		12-14		15-16		17-18		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	35	7.5	171	36.5	251	53.6	11	2.4	468	100.0
Evaluated	25	3.3	308	40.5	415	54.6	12	1.6	760	100.0
TOTAL	60	4.9	479	39.0	666	54.2	23	1.9	1228	100.0
$\chi^2=12.555$ df=3 p=.0057										
SOUTH CAROLINA										
Non-Evaluated	35	11.8	141	47.3	120	40.3	2	.7	298	100.1
Evaluated	38	7.5	251	49.6	213	42.1	4	.8	506	100.0
TOTAL	73	9.1	392	48.8	333	41.4	6	.8	804	100.1
$\chi^2=4.093$ df=3 p=.2516										
CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON										
Non-Evaluated	-	-	1	16.7	5	83.3	-	-	6	100.0
Evaluated	7	3.8	79	42.5	87	46.8	13	7.0	186	100.1
TOTAL	7	3.6	80	41.7	92	47.9	13	6.8	192	100.0
SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON										
Non-Evaluated	7	7.1	41	41.8	39	39.8	11	11.2	98	99.9
Evaluated	13	2.7	170	35.6	249	52.1	46	9.6	478	100.0
TOTAL	20	3.5	211	36.6	288	50.0	57	9.9	576	100.0
$\chi^2=8.126$ df=3 p=.0435										

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF GENDER DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES
ALL SITES

Sample	Female		Male		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	2474	55.6	1974	44.4	4448	100.0
Evaluated	2142	53.4	1867	46.6	4009	100.0
TOTAL	4616	54.6	3841	45.4	8457	100.0
$\chi^2=4.082$ df=1 p=.0433						
PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA						
Non-Evaluated	729	55.0	597	45.0	1326	100.0
Evaluated	351	43.5	456	56.5	807	100.0
TOTAL	1080	50.6	1053	49.4	2133	100.0
$\chi^2=26.464$ df=1 p=.0000						
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA						
Non-Evaluated	1193	57.4	887	42.6	2080	100.0
Evaluated	150	44.1	190	55.9	340	100.0
TOTAL	1343	55.5	1077	44.5	2420	100.0
$\chi^2=20.736$ df=1 p=.0001						
CONNECTICUT*						
Non-Evaluated	2	100.0	-	-	2	100.0
Evaluated	104	71.7	41	28.3	145	100.0
TOTAL	106	72.1	41	27.9	147	100.0

* Virtually all of the evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF GENDER DISTRIBUTIONS
FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

DELAWARE						
Sample	Female		Male		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	67	40.4	99	59.6	166	100.0
Evaluated	369	47.3	412	52.8	781	100.0
TOTAL	436	46.0	511	54.0	947	100.0
$\chi^2=2.613$ df=1 p=.1060						
ILLINOIS						
Non-Evaluated	290	62.0	178	38.0	468	100.0
Evaluated	487	63.7	277	36.3	764	100.0
TOTAL	777	63.1	455	36.9	1232	100.0
$\chi^2=.394$ df=1 p=.5302						
SOUTH CAROLINA						
Non-Evaluated	135	45.0	165	55.0	300	100.0
Evaluated	257	50.8	249	49.2	506	100.0
TOTAL	392	48.6	414	51.4	806	100.0
$\chi^2=2.528$ df=1 p=.1118						
CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON						
Non-Evaluated	5	71.4	2	28.6	7	100.0
Evaluated	108	57.8	79	42.2	187	100.0
TOTAL	113	58.2	81	41.8	194	100.0
SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON						
Non-Evaluated	53	53.5	46	46.5	99	100.0
Evaluated	316	66.0	163	34.0	479	100.0
TOTAL	369	63.8	209	36.2	578	100.0
$\chi^2=5.496$ df=1 p=.0191						

*Virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in evaluated sample.

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF ETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ALL SITES

Sample	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	2693	60.6	946	21.3	587	13.2	221	5.0	4447	100.1
Evaluated	2676	66.8	897	22.4	320	8.0	111	2.8	4004	100.0
TOTAL	5369	63.5	1843	21.8	907	10.7	332	3.9	8451	99.9

$$\chi^2=93.436 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0001$$

PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA

Non-Evaluated	783	59.1	106	8.0	338	25.5	99	7.5	1326	100.1
Evaluated	480	59.6	43	5.3	213	26.4	70	8.7	806	100.0
TOTAL	1263	59.2	149	7.0	551	25.8	169	7.9	2132	99.9

$$\chi^2=6.202 \quad df=3 \quad p=.1022$$

ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Non-Evaluated	1268	60.9	496	23.8	205	9.9	112	5.4	2081	100.0
Evaluated	227	67.4	66	19.6	39	11.6	5	1.5	337	100.1
TOTAL	1495	61.8	562	23.2	244	10.1	117	4.8	2418	99.9

$$\chi^2=14.153 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0027$$

CONNECTICUT*

Non-Evaluated	1	50.0	-	-	1	50.0	-	-	2	100.0
Evaluated	101	69.7	31	21.4	10	6.9	3	2.1	145	100.1
TOTAL	102	69.4	31	21.1	11	7.5	3	2.0	147	100.0

DELAWARE

Non-Evaluated	133	81.1	29	17.7	1	.6	1	.6	164	100.0
Evaluated	595	76.1	170	21.7	15	1.9	2	.3	782	100.0
TOTAL	728	77.0	199	21.0	16	1.7	3	.3	946	100.0

$$\chi^2=3.410 \quad df=3 \quad p=.3326$$

* Virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF ETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

ILLINOIS

Sample	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	190	40.5	231	49.3	41	8.7	7	1.5	469	100.0
Evaluated	263	34.4	447	58.5	43	5.7	11	1.4	764	99.9
TOTAL	453	36.7	678	55.0	84	6.8	18	1.5	1233	100.0

$$\chi^2=11.599 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0089$$

SOUTH CAROLINA

Non-Evaluated	216	72.0	84	28.0	-	-	-	-	300	100.0
Evaluated	380	75.1	126	24.9	-	-	-	-	506	100.0
TOTAL	596	74.0	210	26.1	-	-	-	-	806	100.1

$$\chi^2=.939 \quad df=1 \quad p=.3325$$

CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON

Non-Evaluated	6	100.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	100.0
Evaluated	179	96.8	1	.5	-	-	5	2.7	185	100.0
TOTAL	185	96.9	1	.5	-	-	5	2.6	191	100.0

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON

Non-Evaluated	96	97.0	-	-	1	1.0	2	2.0	99	100.0
Evaluated	451	94.2	13	2.7	-	-	15	3.1	479	100.0
TOTAL	547	94.6	13	2.3	1	.2	17	2.9	578	100.0

$$\chi^2=7.938 \quad df=3 \quad p=.0478$$

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE OF REFERRAL FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES

All Sites														
Sample	Police		Parent/ Guardian		Court		Self		School		Other*		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	2139	48.2	606	13.7	207	4.7	294	6.6	596	13.4	595	13.4	4437	100.0
Evaluated	2111	53.0	706	17.7	430	10.8	101	2.5	371	9.3	263	6.6	3982	99.9
TOTAL	4250	50.5	1312	15.6	637	7.6	395	4.7	967	11.5	858	10.2	8419	100.1
$\chi^2 = 337.389$ df = 5 p = .0001														
PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA														
Non-Evaluated	433	32.7	279	21.1	62	4.7	180	13.6	168	12.7	202	15.3	1324	100.1
Evaluated	378	47.0	160	19.9	36	4.5	57	7.1	91	11.3	82	10.2	804	100.0
TOTAL	811	38.1	439	20.6	98	4.6	237	11.1	259	12.2	284	13.4	2128	100.0
$\chi^2 = 56.631$ df = 5 p = .0000														
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA														
Non-Evaluated	1130	54.4	181	8.7	3	.1	105	5.1	320	15.4	338	16.3	2077	100.0
Evaluated	203	60.6	14	4.2	-	-	9	2.7	66	19.7	43	12.8	335	100.0
TOTAL	1333	55.3	195	8.1	3	.1	114	4.7	386	16.0	381	15.8	2412	100.0
$\chi^2 = 18.732$ df = 5 p = .0022														
CONNECTICUT**														
Non-Evaluated	1	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	100.0
Evaluated	128	89.5	-	-	1	.7	1	.7	-	-	13	9.1	143	100.0
TOTAL	129	89.6	-	-	1	.7	1	.7	-	-	13	9.0	144	100.0

*includes probation, parole, institution and other.

**virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE OF REFERRAL FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES
DELAWARE

Sample	<u>Police</u>		<u>Parent/ Guardian</u>		<u>Court</u>		<u>Self</u>		<u>School</u>		<u>Other*</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	81	50.6	55	34.4	2	1.3	-	-	15	9.4	7	4.4	160	100.1
Evaluated	336	43.8	338	44.0	11	1.4	-	-	60	7.8	23	3.0	768	100.0
TOTAL	417	44.9	393	42.4	13	1.4	-	-	75	8.1	30	3.2	928	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 5.507 \text{ df} = 4 \text{ p} = .2391$$

ILLINOIS

Non-Evaluated	420	89.6	3	.6	24	5.1	-	-	1	.2	21	4.5	469	100.0
Evaluated	667	87.8	5	.7	53	7.0	-	-	-	-	35	4.6	760	100.1
TOTAL	1087	88.4	8	.7	77	6.3	-	-	1	.1	56	4.6	1229	100.1

$$\chi^2 = 3.333 \text{ df} = 4 \text{ p} = .5037$$

SOUTH CAROLINA

Non-Evaluated	27	9.0	84	28.0	96	32.0	5	1.7	64	21.3	24	8.0	300	100.0
Evaluated	43	8.5	133	26.3	157	31.0	3	.6	124	24.5	46	9.1	506	100.0
TOTAL	70	8.7	217	26.9	253	31.4	8	1.0	188	23.3	70	8.7	806	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 3.576 \text{ df} = 5 \text{ p} = .6119$$

CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON**

Non-Evaluated	43	42.9	2	28.6	-	-	2	28.6	-	-	-	-	7	100.1
Evaluated	79	42.2	54	28.9	1	.5	24	12.8	21	11.2	8	4.3	187	99.9
TOTAL	82	42.3	56	28.9	1	.5	26	13.4	21	10.8	8	4.1	194	100.0

*includes probation, parole, institution and other.

**virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE OF REFERRAL FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON

Sample	<u>Police</u>		<u>Parent/ Guardian</u>		<u>Court</u>		<u>Self</u>		<u>School</u>		<u>Other*</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	44	44.4	2	2.0	20	20.2	2	2.0	28	28.3	3	3.0	99	99.9
Evaluated	277	57.8	2	.4	171	35.7	7	1.5	9	1.9	13	2.7	479	100.0
TOTAL	321	55.5	4	.7	191	33.0	9	1.6	37	6.4	16	2.8	578	100.0

$\chi^2 = 101.201$ $df = 5$ $p = .0001$

Non-Evaluated
Evaluated
TOTAL

Non-Evaluated
Evaluated
TOTAL

Non-Evaluated
Evaluated
TOTAL

*includes probation, parole, institution and other

TABLE 6

COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE OF REFERRAL FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES USING
JUSTICE/NON-JUSTICE DICHOTOMY

ALL SITES						
Sample	Justice		Non-Justice		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	2435	54.9	2002	45.1	4437	100.0
Evaluated	2583	64.9	1399	35.1	3982	100.0
TOTAL	5018	59.6	3401	40.4	8419	100.0
$\chi^2=86.941$ df=1 p=.0001						
PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA						
Non-Evaluated	521	39.4	803	60.7	1324	100.1
Evaluated	425	52.9	379	47.1	804	100.0
TOTAL	946	44.5	1182	55.6	2128	100.1
$\chi^2=36.977$ df=1 p=.0001						
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA						
Non-Evaluated	1186	57.1	891	42.9	2077	100.0
Evaluated	212	63.3	123	36.7	335	100.0
TOTAL	1398	58.0	1014	42.0	2412	100.0
$\chi^2=4.524$ df=1 p=.0334						
CONNECTICUT*						
Non-Evaluated	1	100.0	-	-	1	100.0
Evaluated	131	91.6	12	8.4	143	100.0
TOTAL	132	91.7	12	8.3	144	100.0
DELAWARE						
Non-Evaluated	83	51.9	77	48.1	160	100.0
Evaluated	348	45.3	420	54.7	768	100.0
TOTAL	431	46.4	497	53.6	928	100.0
$\chi^2=2.293$ df=1 p=.1300						

* Virtually all evaluation eligibles were included in the evaluated sample.

TABLE 6

COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE OF REFERRAL FOR
EVALUATED AND NON-EVALUATED ELIGIBLE SAMPLES USING
JUSTICE/NON-JUSTICE DICHOTOMY

ILLINOIS						
Sample	Justice		Non-Justice		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Non-Evaluated	454	96.8	15	3.2	469	100.0
Evaluated	735	96.7	25	3.3	760	100.0
TOTAL	1189	96.8	40	3.3	1229	100.1
$\chi^2=.008$ df=1 p=.9287						
SOUTH CAROLINA						
Non-Evaluated	123	41.0	177	59.0	300	100.0
Evaluated	201	39.7	305	60.3	506	100.0
TOTAL	324	40.2	482	59.8	806	100.0
$\chi^2=.128$ df=1 p=.7205						
CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON						
Non-Evaluated	3	42.9	4	57.1	7	100.0
Evaluated	80	42.8	107	57.2	187	100.0
TOTAL	83	42.8	111	57.2	194	100.0
SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON						
Non-Evaluated	64	64.7	35	35.4	99	100.1
Evaluated	451	94.2	28	5.9	479	100.1
TOTAL	515	89.1	63	10.9	578	100.0
$\chi^2=73.558$ df=1 p=.0001						

TABLE 7

Chi Square Based Probability Values of Relationship Between
Distribution of Non-Evaluated and Evaluated Eligibles,
by Client Characteristics*

Program Site	Instant Offense	Age	Gender	Ethnicity	Referral Source	Justice Non-Justice Referrals
Pima County	.0001	.0004	.0001	.1022	.0001	.0001
Alameda County	.0001	.0025	.0001	.0027	.0022	.0334
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	.0042	.1375	.1060	.3326	.2391	.1300
Illinois	.1850	.0057	.5302	.0089	.5037	.9287
So. Carolina	.0001	.2516	.1118	.3325	.6119	.7205
Clark County	--	--	--	--	--	--
Spokane County	.0001	.0425	.0191	.0473	.0001	.0001
All Sites	.0315	.0001	.0433	.0001	.0001	.0001

* Cell frequencies are shown in Tables 1-6.

CHAPTER XIV

CLIENT RECIDIVISM AND PROGRAM COMPONENTS:

A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER XIV

CLIENT RECIDIVISM AND PROGRAM COMPONENTS:

A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Carl L. Heck and Solomon Kobrin

INTRODUCTION

Our interest in this chapter is in disentangling the contribution of program variables to client recidivism. By classifying these variables according to distinguishable program components, we may be able to identify those more amenable to change in future program efforts.

Despite differences in the detail of their implementation, the programs at the eight evaluated sites exhibited a common basic content and set of procedures. Each operated within a political, administrative, and organizational context provided by the court and police jurisdictions in which it was set. Each program found or developed facilities to provide a set of services to a population of clients referred for status offenses. Accordingly, four major determinants potentially affecting client recidivism may be identified: site, client characteristics, type of service furnished, and the character of the facility furnishing the service.

Site, as well as each of the other recidivism outcome determinants, was treated as a composite indicator created by multiple variables. For convenience, these sets of variables, or variable domains, are here referred to as "levels," although no suggestion of hierarchical order is intended. However, the variable domain levels did appear to be differentially open to manipulation by program personnel. With existing statutory provisions respecting the use of secure confinement in status offense cases, and established administrative procedures in their implementation, site appears to be

a "given" and least open to manipulation. Also largely fixed are client characteristics, although program intake policy varied on client eligibility across sites. Some programs were more restrictive in limiting intake to "detainable" status offenders; others were less restrictive. Both the type of service provided and the service facilities selected, or available to provide the service, seemed to offer maximum opportunity for choice and discretion in intervening to reduce the likelihood of subsequent offense behavior.

The effects of site, client characteristics, services provided, and facility characteristics, treated as levels of program input on the dependent variable of subsequent offense behavior, were then examined. The dependent variable was constituted by all delinquent and status offenses entered into court and police records during the six-month period following the date of the client's entry into the program. The impact of these program dimensions on client offense behavior was assessed through the use of regression analysis. This statistic offered an efficient means of examining the extent to which each of the program levels accounted for offense behavior outcome, net of the influence of all of the other levels.

Two of the eight sites were excluded from the analysis. Data respecting facility characteristics in the Connecticut program were not obtained in time to be included. While facility data were available from the Illinois program, it was also excluded since most of its program clients were served directly by part time personnel hired by contracted agencies to act as youth advocates during a short-term home detention period. Clients were not directly exposed to the usual services provided by those agencies. The remaining six sites were Pima County (Arizona), Alameda County (California), South Carolina, Delaware, and Clark and Spokane County (Washington).

PROGRAM LEVELS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIVE VARIABLES

An effort was made to obtain so far as possible a data set sufficiently comprehensive to serve a variety of purposes. These included not only the evaluation oriented empirical search for relationships between a wide range of program input variables and client responses, but the purpose as well of providing a data base of potential use in the future development of testable hypotheses. Despite the volume of data acquired, neither purpose was altogether satisfactorily accomplished. The opportunity to obtain some of the data at a requisite level of detail was foreclosed largely by the refusal of program personnel to invest the time and effort needed to record the requested data systematically. In lesser part the failure was due to a lack of direct control over the field data recording operation. As a consequence, while a large volume of data was generated, some of the variables specifically needed for a number of analytic purposes are not available. However, the range of information at hand is sufficiently broad to provide a choice of variables that may function reasonably well as surrogates for information foregone.

Variables selected to represent various levels were those that might reasonably function as determinants of variation in client subsequent offenses. Their selection was based on etiological assumptions implicit in the national status offender program and on the research findings in the juvenile delinquency literature. Variable selection was a problem principally in connection with the client and facility levels of the program. Site information was contained in five effect coded nominal variables, with the sixth treated as the omitted category. The service level variables

were established as a set of eight categories of treatment modalities. All variables were either nominal, ordinal or interval scale. In an auxiliary analysis, clients whose variables had missing data at client and facility levels were included by assigning to them the means on those variables, and then creating dummy variables to indicate the presence or absence of a value on the variable. This was done in order to include an expanded number of clients in the regression equation.¹

1. Site. Treated as a set of effect coded nominal dummy variables, site consists of a number of unmeasured dimensions. Included principally are (a) the extent to which statutory provisions prohibit or permit secure confinement in status offense cases; (b) the operational policies and practices followed by police and courts in the implementation of statutory prescription; and (c) the level of community tolerance for status offense behavior.

2. Client level variables. Client characteristics selected for construction of the client program level were drawn from data recorded in Forms 1-A, 1-B, 2, 3, and 5-A, B, and C. The selection was based on the commitment in the national status offender program to the assumptions of labeling theory (LEAA, 1975). The central proposition of labeling theory holds that juvenile offense behavior varies as a function of the frequency with which the youthful offender is processed by juvenile justice agencies (Becker, 1963; Schur, 1973). It follows that any feature of client experience or background that increases the likelihood of such processing is interpretable as contributing to the labeling effect. Thus,

¹ In this procedure, the mean value of a variable is first assigned to those cases that have missing data on the variable; and then one creates a new dummy variable coded 1 if the client lacked data, and coded 0 if the client data were present (Cohen and Cohen, 1975).

in addition to the specific most serious status offense for which the client was referred to the program, variables were selected that may be reasonably related to variation in exposure to juvenile justice processing, and for which there is research evidence of their relationship to variation in subsequent offense behavior. Included were:

- a) Prior offenses: the number of prior delinquent and status offenses, multiple status offenses, and multiple non-status offenses (Wolfgang et al., 1972; Glueck and Glueck, 1940; and Mannheim and Wilkins, 1955).
- b) Family socioeconomic status: father's and mother's occupational status (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Empey, 1978).

2. Occupational status was based on the NORC (1975) occupational prestige scale.
3. The widely assumed inverse relationship of family socioeconomic status to delinquency has been called into question by self-report delinquency studies (Gold, 1970; Short and Nye, 1958; Williams and Gold, 1972). However, the offense data in this analysis is based on police and court records. The class status-delinquency relationship with respect to officially recorded offenses as distinguished from self-reported offense behavior has been repeatedly confirmed in ecological studies and supported in the Wolfgang et al. (1972) study (see also Shannon, 1963). As Empey (1978:155-157) has observed, the social conditions surrounding disadvantaged youth increases the likelihood of intervention by police and courts, and consequently of acquiring an official record. This may be even more the case with respect to the status offenses.

- c) Family intactness: dummy variable, nuclear family versus all other family constellations (Monahan, 1957; Nye, 1958; Barker, 1940).
- d) Attachment to school and family: school adjustment scale; school attendance status; client's perception of time spent with family (Elliott, 1966; Polk and Halferty, 1966; Polk and Schafer, 1972; Empey and Lubeck, 1971; Hirschi, 1969).
- e) Age: interval variable, age of client (8-18) at instant offense (Sellin, 1958; Mannheim and Wilkins, 1955).
- f) Gender: dummy variable, male and female.

4. Other constellations included one-parent family, reconstituted family (previously divorced mother or father), institutional home, and a category of "other" made up of miscellaneous low frequency living arrangements.
5. But see Toby (1957) and Hodgkiss (1933) for evidence that the broken home has more serious impact on preadolescents and on females than on male delinquents. The fact that approximately half the program population was female serves as further warrant for the inclusion of family intactness variables.
6. The studies cited found age of first offense and recidivism to be inversely related: the younger the age at first offense the greater the likelihood of a second offense and the shorter the time span between first and second offense. Moreover, implied in labeling theory is the notion that the younger and presumably more impressionable the person when exposed to formal processing by the juvenile justice system, the greater the probability of the labeling effect.
7. Studies of the gender distribution of populations in juvenile institutions and detention centers have found those committed for status offenses to be disproportionately female (Pappenfort, 1970; California Youth Authority, 1974). Further, females have been found more susceptible to incarceration for status than for criminal offenses. Lerman (1974) found that of total admissions to the New Jersey Training School for Girls in 1972, 57 percent were for status offenses. Of 169 girls 10-16 years of age in juvenile institutions in June of 1974 in South Carolina, 62 percent were confined for status offenses. The corresponding proportion for the 437 institutionalized boys in that state during the same month was 8.4 percent (South Carolina Department of Youth Services, 1975).

g) Ethnicity: dummy variable, minority and non-minority. The minority group category consisted of Black, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, other Hispanic, Native American Indian, and Asian or Asiatic Pacific.⁸

3. Service level variables. Eight types of service, each treated as a dummy variable, represented this program component. They were 1) diversion/evaluation, consisting of case evaluation followed by brief client oriented crisis intervention; 2) temporary shelter home placement; 3) longer-term group home placement; 4) long term client counseling; 5) referral to a multiple service center, such as a YMCA or similar broad spectrum youth service agency; 6) "outreach intervention" consisting of neighborhood centered problem resolution services; 7) "multiple impact therapy" and 8) a residual category of miscellaneous, low frequency "other" services.⁹ It was unfortunately necessary to omit from the regression equation foster home placement as a service type in one analysis because problems of confidentiality made it difficult to obtain full data on their facility characteristics, including experience and training of foster parents, number of own and foster children, household regimen, and the like. However, this variable was included in the auxiliary analysis referred to above, in which missing data values were allocated.

8. Minority group status as a determinant of delinquency is known primarily with respect to Blacks. However, to the extent that minority group status is associated with depressed socioeconomic status, the observations respecting the relationship of the latter to delinquency will apply to the former (see Empey, 1978:155-159). But it is likely that the association of class status and delinquency is more prominent during the earlier stages of juvenile justice processing. Thornberry (1973) found that lower class youth are not convicted of charged offenses at higher rates than are higher status youth.

9. See Chapter XVI for site variations in the implementation of these program types.

4. Facility level variables. Nineteen variables were employed to measure facility characteristics, drawn from the Survey of Program Facilities and the Organizational Survey instruments (Appendix III). They were selected on the basis of current ideology and practice in the delinquency prevention field, labeling theory, and program assumptions respecting the utility of community based treatment in the reduction of status offense behavior. These considerations suggested four dimensions of facility characteristics as likely determinants of variation in client recidivism. Included were professional level of the facility staff; eclecticism in the use of treatment modalities; focus of intervention strategy employed; and the extent to which program staff engaged local community resources in serving program clients.

a) Professional level of facility staff: percentage of staff professionally trained, pre-professional, paraprofessional, and volunteer.¹⁰

b) Diversity of services: number of types of services offered by facility.¹¹

¹⁰ The importance of trained social workers in delinquency control remains controversial (Rutherford and Bengur, 1976). The argument has been made that a professionally trained staff is important for success in community-based corrections programs, as well as in the more standard forms of agency practice (Fox, 1977:226; Levine, 1977:146; Nejelski, 1976:403). However, the importance of such training in the treatment of deviant youth, particularly in urban areas of high delinquency rates, has been questioned, and has given rise to a movement extolling the replacement of trained social workers with "indigenous" workers (Kobrin, 1959). The use of paraprofessionals and volunteers in corrections work has since been generally accepted as supplementing if not replacing professionals despite the competitive tension between the two (Maris and Rein, 1973; Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training, 1970).

¹¹ Facilities varied with respect to the range of services offered. Some emphasized the value of a particular form of treatment in dealing with status offender problems, e.g., group therapy, family or individual counseling, or youth advocacy. Others were less wedded to a particular theory of effective treatment and attempted to provide the type of treatment thought useful in the individual case. It was of interest to examine empirically the bearing of the two types of emphasis on the subsequent offense behavior of program clients.

c) Approach to client treatment: ¹² use of coerciveness (frequency of imposition of sanction for violating conditions of acceptance into program, i.e., average frequency of sanction imposition); strategy of intervention (judicious use of sanction, focus on psychological adjustment, focus on improving client relations with family and peer group, focus on changing societal institutions, concerned with the training and control of youth, e.g., school, police, court); ideology respecting cause of delinquency (responsibility for behavior resides in person, psychological maladjustment, pathology lies in immediate social milieu, behavioral deviance traceable to malfunctioning societal institutions); extent to which local community resources are engaged in serving program clients (level of staff activity to generate support for the program, frequency of staff contact with community organizations and agencies in behalf of improving services to clients, staff perception of cooperation elicited from community organizations).

¹²Programs at each site had the identical objective of reducing the use of secure confinement in status offense cases, but they differed in the ways they attempted to implement it. Variables were selected to measure, first, the differential impact of a deterrent strategy on subsequent offense behavior, consonant with labeling theory, as contrasted with varieties of treatment that sought to avoid the labeling effect. Among the latter, treatment approaches appeared to fall into the three rather standard categories that characterize current treatment ideology, and that correspond to three types of theory in the explanation of deviant behavior (Cohen, 1966:41-47). These place the locus of the problem in the psychological makeup of the individual, in the person's relationships with the "significant others" of his primary groups, or in the features of the wider institutional order that provide or deny opportunities to develop as a conforming person. A final set of variables tested for the relevance to recidivism of program assumptions respecting the importance of engaging the services of community based agencies and organizations as an alternative to processing by juvenile justice agencies. In this as well as in other deinstitutionalization programs, the intensive use of community based agencies is prescribed as the primary means of reducing the labeling effect and therefore subsequent offense behavior (Coates, et al., 1978).

5. The dependent variable: subsequent offenses. This variable consisted of the number of offenses, both status and non-status, for a six-month period subsequent to program entry. Because of excessive skewness, this measure of recidivism was transformed to the base 2 logarithm of subsequent offenses(+ 1) to improve the shape of the distribution.

ANALYTIC PROCEDURES

The initial order of entry of the program levels into the regression equation was based on the distinction made between those variables assumed to be more and those assumed to be less subject to manipulation by program personnel. Least manipulable were site and client characteristics: they were entered in that order. On the assumption that program personnel took account of client characteristics in making referrals for services, both the service type and the facility to provide the services offered some choice. These differences among levels suggested an order of priority in their entry into the regression equation, moving from those less open to program manipulation to those relatively more open. Thus, the effect of client characteristics could be examined controlling for site, treatment services controlling for client characteristics, and so forth.

This reasoning suggested the following additive model for the initial regression equation, according priority to site and client characteristics in explaining variation in the dependent variable of client offenses subsequent to program entry:

$$\text{Subsequent Offenses} = \text{Site} + \text{Client Characteristics} + \text{Service Type} \\ + \text{Facility} + E$$

This initial model provided a means of assessing whether or not each of the levels did indeed have an effect on subsequent offenses.

However, assumptions regarding the "manipulability" of program components may well be qualified by the limited scope of choice that may have been available at program sites with respect to the selection of clients, of services, and of facilities. Each program was constrained by financial resources and by the number and kinds of youth service agencies available in the jurisdiction to provide a range of services to status offenders. In the light of these constraints, a second model was used which assumed no differences in the discretionary control respecting any of the program levels and which thus addressed only the issue of the differential impact of the levels. In this model, the order in which each of the program levels was entered into the regression equation was systematically varied to enter each level last. The purpose of this strategy was to determine the size of the additional increment to explained variance in client recidivism accounted for by each program level, net of the contribution of the remaining three. The rationale of the procedure was that the level providing the largest additional increment to explained variation when entered last into the equation is the level that contributes most to the R^2 measure. The rank of each level with respect to its effect on client recidivism could thus be ascertained.

DATA LIMITATIONS

The difficulties and complexities of obtaining an extensive body of data on a large program population dispersed across eight sites created a substantial problem of missing data. The largest data gap occurred in the facility level variables (Figure 1), although there was data loss at the client levels as well. As mentioned, two sites had to be dropped from

the multi-level analysis, due in one case to late receipt of facility data and in the other to minimal use of community agency services. The analysis thus covers six of the eight program sites, with findings descriptively applicable only to the programs in those sites. Within these sites as well, clients were deleted from the analysis if there were no return of the Survey of Program Facilities or the Organizational Survey instruments. There was substantially less data loss at the client level.¹³ Neither the site nor service level was affected by failure to record data items, because a radically simplified categorical scheme was provided.

A second problem of reduced numbers for this analysis resulted from the fact that clients could receive services in more than one facility. Of the 3,481 program clients entering the program at the six sites who received services in one or more facilities, 1,555, or approximately 45 percent, were referred for service in a second facility, and 532, or about 15 percent, were served in three or more facilities. Each entry or re-entry of a client into the program marked the beginning of what was defined as a new service pattern. Each referral within a service pattern by program personnel to a facility was defined as a "series." Thus, the Series 1 clients were those referred to at least one facility, the Series 2 clients to at least two facilities, and the Series 3 clients to three facilities.

¹³ In some sites, clients were referred for services to non-DSO facilities where local evaluators found it impossible to obtain family data. In one site, where only DSO facilities were used, restrictions were placed on the recording of family data when, in the judgment of program personnel, this would interfere with treatment.

However, an increase in the number of facility referrals increased the volume of missing data from the client and service levels as well as from the facility level, resulting in a particularly sharp reduction in Series 2 and Series 3 client numbers available for the analysis. The N for Series 2 was 462 and for Series 3, 105.

The scope and distribution of missing data presented a dilemma. The analysis could focus on the Series 1 clients, representing the largest number and thus providing the most stable estimates of the effect of program levels on client recidivism. However, this would sacrifice information on the importance of the additional services and the additional exposure to treatment represented by the reduced numbers in the Series 2 and the Series 3 categories. On the other hand, the sharply reduced numbers in the latter groups would yield highly unstable estimates. The choice made was to omit the analysis of the Series 2 and Series 3 data in this presentation, focusing the multi-level analysis on the Series 1 data. Supporting this decision was the fact that of the total number of referrals to the program, almost two-thirds (62.5 percent) represented client referrals to a single facility each.

As noted earlier, an effort was made to remedy in part the missing data problem in the Series 1 group. In an auxiliary analysis, clients with missing data on variables at the client and facility levels were included by assigning to them the means on those variables. With the use of this allocation method, the number of clients in the auxiliary analysis was increased by 583, or about 30 percent.

FINDINGS

The question addressed in the multi-level analysis was the relative importance of various program elements as determinants of client recidivism. In addition to other values sought, the national status offender program hoped to demonstrate as one of its effects a reduction in the offense behavior of status offenders. With respect to this effect, the findings are presented in the following chapter. The issue of concern here is the extent to which variation in the recidivism measure is related to distinguishable program components as defined in the present analysis.

The issue has direct policy relevance. Program effort may be variously distributed among the several potential avenues to achieving recidivism reduction. Is it more important to invest effort in changing the juvenile code and administrative procedures to reduce the use of secure confinement than to provide the types of treatment procedures specific to the problems of status offenders? What is the relative effect on status offender recidivism of a judicious selection of youth for referral to community based treatment agencies as compared to the experience, ideology, and treatment orientation of the youth serving facilities that provide the services?

The issue was examined in a regression analysis utilizing both the Series 1 data and the Series 1 with missing values allocated. The first step was to test the significance of the overall regression equation each time a new level was added, until all levels were in the equation. The F values for the equation after each new level was added are displayed in Table 1. With each new level added, the equation remained significant beyond chance at .05, establishing the utility of the model.

TABLE 1

Significance Test Results for Equation with Addition of Each
New Program Level, Subsequent Offenses Regressed on Program Levels

Step	Series 1			Series 1, Missing Data Allocated		
	Program Level in Equation	DF ¹	CV ²	F	DF ¹	CV ²
1	Site Only	$\frac{5}{1,904}$	2.21	9.68*	$\frac{5}{2,407}$	2.21
2	Site and Client	$\frac{38}{1,871}$	1.00	6.95*	$\frac{38}{2,454}$	1.00
3	Site, Client and Service	$\frac{45}{1,864}$	1.00	6.22*	$\frac{46}{2,446}$	1.00
4	Site, Client Service and Facility	$\frac{63}{1,846}$	1.00	4.99*	$\frac{69}{2,423}$	1.00

1. Degrees of freedom: upper number associated with numerator;
lower number with demoninator in F ratio

2. Critical value: minimum F value at .05 level

* p < .05

Next to be assessed was the significance of the increment of each program level to explained variance in client recidivism (R^2) at each successive step of entry into the regression equation (Table 2). The contribution at each level was found to be significant with use of Series 1 data. With the data base expanded by the allocation procedure, site, client, and facility had significant F values, but the value for service drops below the test level of significance.

Although the test displayed in Table 2 shows the significance of the increment to explained variance in client recidivism at each level, this does not address a further important question. Not disclosed is the program level that provides the largest additional increment to the R^2 measure with all of the other levels controlled for in the regression equation. The procedure required for this test is to enter each program level last in a series of regression equations. The last entered level which produces the largest additional increment to the R^2 measure is interpreted as the one that contributes most to explained variance.

Displayed in Table 3 is the rank order of importance of program levels as determinants of client recidivism, with use of both the Series 1 data and the Series 1 with missing data allocated. Top rank is held by the client level, followed by site and facility. Service fails to add significantly to explained variance in client recidivism when controls are instituted for the other three program levels.

This test of the relative importance of program levels as determinants of client recidivism controlled for the number of variables in each level. The number varied substantially among levels (See Attachment). Estimates of R^2 increments were adjusted or standardized in these tests by dividing the

Table 2

Incremental Increases to Explained Variance
in Client Recidivism by Program Level Steps

Step	Program Level	Series 1				Series 1, Missing Data Allocated			
		DF ¹	CV ²	R ²	F	DF ¹	CV ²	R ²	F
1	Site	$\frac{5}{1,904}$	2.21	.025	9.68*	$\frac{5}{2,487}$	2.21	.029	14.78*
2	Client	$\frac{33}{1,871}$	1.00	.124	6.40*	$\frac{33}{2,454}$	1.00	.127	8.34*
3	Service	$\frac{7}{1,864}$	2.01	.131	2.10*	$\frac{8}{2,446}$	1.94	.131	1.63
4	Facility	$\frac{18}{1,846}$	1.63	.146	1.80*	$\frac{23}{2,423}$	1.54	.145	1.72*

1. Degrees of freedom: upper number associated with numerator,
lower number with denominator

2. Minimum F value for $p < .05$

* $p < .05$

Table 3

Rank Order of Added R²
Increment, Each Level Entered Last

Rank by R ² Difference	Series 1		Series 1, Missing Data Allocated	
	Level	R ² Increment	Level	R ² Increment
1	Client	.00279*	Client	.00275*
2	Site	.00151*	Site	.00081*
3	Facility	.00083*	Facility	.00061*
4	Service	.00040	Service	.00021

* $p < .05$

Figure 1
Distribution of Missing Data Items

Source	Number
a) Evaluation eligible cases at 8 sites	3,481*
b) Loss due to omission of Illinois (inapplicable) and Connecticut (late) and non-return of Facilities and Organizational Survey instruments, all sites	1,355
c) Loss due to omission of data items impartially completed survey instruments, remaining 6 sites	146
d) Additional loss due to missing client data	70
e) Total missing cases (b+c+d)	1,571
f) Cases included in analysis (a-e)	1,910

* The difference between the total N for the program-pre-program six-month client recidivism analysis (3,714) and the N for the multi-level recidivism analysis (3,481) is accounted for by the exclusion in the latter analysis of those clients who had no Series 1 service assignment (233). This group consisted of clients who were referred to the program whose problems were presumably dealt with by DSO program personnel without formal referral to a treatment facility, or by referral to a facility outside the network of DSO facilities.

raw R^2 increments by the degrees of freedom based on the number of variables constituting each program level.

The number of variables in each program level was constrained by the character of the program component that each level represented. For example, site level could be constituted by no more than six variables, since only six program sites were appropriate for use in the analysis. Similarly, the number of variables constituting the service level was restricted to the eight categories of treatment services. On the other hand, both the client and the facility levels were constructed from a large number of variables. As noted earlier, these were selected from a wider set of obtained data items whose relevance for delinquent behavior was suggested by research-based knowledge.

In the light of such extreme variation in the number of variables in each program level, adjustment of the R^2 increment measure by the degrees of freedom may well have introduced a distorting statistical artifact. The use of standardization by adjusting for the number of variables in each level carries the potentially misleading implication that each of the variables in each level has, on the average, equivalent impact on recidivism. Although the variables that were entered into the regression equation were, a priori, "reasonable," particularly in the client and facility levels, their selection could not be based on rigorous theoretical grounds with reference specifically to status offense behavior. Knowledge of the determinants of status offense behavior was simply too sparse to permit other than a "grounded theory" approach to the analytic problem (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It was in any case reasonable to examine the degree to which the rank order of the

contribution of each program level may have been affected by the constraints imposed by differences in the number of variables in each level.

This was tested by examining the rank order of levels, with the R^2 measures unadjusted for degrees of freedom. As seen in Table 4, client level retains a leading position in its contribution to explained variance, but site now ranks third. Second in rank order is taken by facility, which was third in the standardized version of the same test.

Evident in both the adjusted and the unadjusted versions of the test is that the characteristics of program clients provides the largest contribution to the R^2 measure when all other features of the program are statistically controlled. The facility and site levels of the program follow in rank order of their contribution, depending on which of the two tests is used. Most striking in the unadjusted test is the emergence of facility, i.e., the orientation, ideology, and experience of service providers, as an important determinant of client recidivism, second only to client level.

This multi-level analysis has been concerned only with the relationship of program levels to the subsequent offenses of clients. As noted earlier, each level was composed of sets of variables. A final point of interest is the identification of the specific variables in each set that exhibited a significant F value at each step of level entry into the regression equation. As displayed in Figure 2, based on the Series 1 data with missing values allocated, each column is labeled with the new level that was entered into the equation for that step. Thus, step 1 included only the site level variables; step 2, site with the added client level variables; step 3, site plus client, with service level now added; and step 4, the first three with the facility level variables added. Program levels are arranged by rows as

Table 4
Rank Order of Added R^2 Increment,
Unadjusted, Each Level Entered Last

Rank by R^2 Difference	Series 1			Series 1, Missing Data Allocated		
	Level	R^2 Increment	F Values (Adjusted)	Level	R^2 Increment	F Values (Adjusted)
1	Client	.09206*	6.40*	Client	.09086*	8.34*
2	Facility	.01499*	1.80*	Facility	.01397*	1.72*
3	Site	.00407*	9.68*	Site	.00757*	14.78*
4	Service	.00280	2.10*	Service	.00168	1.63

* $p < .05$

Figure 2
Significant Variables at Each Step
of Entry into Regression Equation

	1 Site	2 + Client	3 + Service	4 + Facility
Site	Alameda***(+) Delaware****(+) South Carolina****(-) Clark County**(-)	Delaware **(+) South Carolina****(-)	Delaware***(+) South Carolina**(-)	Spokane County**(+)
Client		All Prior Offenses****(+) Prior Status Offenses Only**(+) Gender**(+) Age**(-) Minor in Possession of Alcohol***(-) Other Status Offenses**(-)	All Prior Offenses****(+) Prior Status Offenses Only**(+) Gender**(+) Age**(-) Minor in Possession of Alcohol***(-)	All Prior Offenses****(+) Gender**(+) Age***(-) Minor in Possession of Alcohol***(-) Father's Occupation**(-)
Service			Diversion- Evaluation***(+) Outreach Intervention**(+)	
Facility				Institutions Cause Delinquency**(-) Cooperative Community Agencies***(-)

p < .05, *p < .01, ****p < .001

well, so that it is possible to follow a row level across the figure to note the significance status of variables as new levels were added. Both the significance of its F value and whether the variable was found to be positively or inversely related to subsequent offenses are indicated.

When site variables at step 1 were entered into the equation, four of the six sites showed significant relationships to subsequent offenses, two positive (+) and two inverse (-). With the entry of client variables at step 2, only Delaware (+) and South Carolina (-) remain significantly related to subsequents. At this point the significant client variables emerge: all prior offenses (+), gender (+), age (-), the instant offense of minor in possession of alcohol as the most serious of the instant status offenses (-), and other instant offenses as the most serious among the instants (-). With service variables entered at step 3, the same two sites remain significant, as do the client variables referred to, with the single exception of other instant status offenses as the most serious instants. With the addition, finally, of facility variables at the fourth step, the site variables that emerged at previous steps disappear, to be replaced by Spokane County alone (+). Again, the significant client variables identified at steps 2 and 3 remain significant, with prestige level of father's occupation now emerging as a significant client variable (-). In addition, two facility variables were found to be significant: staff belief that institutional malfunction is the cause of delinquent behavior (-), and staff perceived success in obtaining cooperation from community agencies

and organizations in serving clients (-).¹⁴

DISCUSSION

In assessing the findings of this chapter, the reader is again reminded that the effort here was to determine the importance of each of four major program elements for client recidivism. The question of concern was the comparative effect on recidivism of each of these components. How important was the site in which deinstitutionalization programs were launched, varied with respect to their statutory and administrative provisions for dealing with status offenders and differing in their tolerance for minor forms of juvenile misbehavior? What was the effect of the kinds of youth services facilities that served the needs of program clients? What was the importance of the kinds of services these facilities provided, and the kinds of clients who were referred to the program? More explicitly, the somewhat limited technical question to which an answer was sought was which, if any, of these program factors "explained" the variation in client recidivism, that is, "made a difference" one way or the other with respect to recidivism and, of those that did, whether its influence was favorable or unfavorable.

¹⁴The findings respecting the two facility variables require qualifying comment. They would seem to indicate that reduced recidivism is a function of staff linkage to community based services and of staff attention to malfunction in youth serving institutions as the source of youth problems. However, community linkage was operationalized in part by scaled staff perception of cooperation elicited from community agencies. Unknown is whether these perceptions reflected a generally positive and enthusiastic approach to program clients as well as to community agencies, in which case the reduced client recidivism may be accounted for independently of cooperation elicited from community agencies. As to the causal attribution variable, its inverse relationship to subsequent client offenses showed up principally in the Organizational Survey returns in which precisely these questionnaire items were typically not completed. These returns were assigned the mean scale values of those who did complete the item. The fact of consistent nonresponse to this causal attribution item in the face of willingness to respond to other causal attribution items may be accounted for speculatively in a variety of ways, none of which can be ascertained.

Further, the fact that only two of 19 relationships were statistically significant raises the obvious problem of random variable appearance. Crisis validation is required before making much of these relationships.

Of the four program components, client characteristics emerged as the major factor affecting variation in recidivism. The client variables that were significantly related to reduced recidivism were age (older clients recidivated less); minor in possession of alcohol as the instant, or referral, offense (inversely related to recidivism); and father's occupation (the higher the father's occupational status, the less likely the client's recidivism). The client variables that were significantly related to increased recidivism were number of prior offenses (the larger the number the more likely the recidivism); and gender (females were more recidivistic than males). With reference to the last, account should be taken of the likelihood that females are more often placed on supervised probation and are therefore at greater risk of re-referral.

Least important as a factor affecting variation in recidivism for better or worse over the client population as a whole was type of service furnished. Speculatively, there may have been a number of reasons for this. First, the major type of service provided was short term crisis counseling. Given the often involved and complex character of the problem represented by status offense behavior, intervention of this kind may be incapable of effecting significant change. Second, those eligible for program services included a very large proportion of first time offenders, many of whom in the absence of program intervention were unlikely to become repeaters. Third, the predominance of counseling among the types of services provided requires for its effective implementation a level of skill and experience that may have been absent in the treatment staffs employed at some of the program sites.

When considered by itself, site appeared to have substantial explanatory reach respecting variation in recidivism. This is to say that the program

in some sites seemed to be successful and in others unsuccessful in reducing recidivism. However, when account is taken of differences among them in the kinds of services provided (i.e., when these program components were statistically controlled), the effect of site on recidivism was insignificant. This finding suggests that the statutes under which programs at the several sites operated, their administrative provisions for dealing with status offense cases, and the prevailing climate of community opinion with respect to the use of restrictive sanctions in these cases are not necessarily, and contrary to expectation, important factors in recidivism. It may well be the case that otherwise dissimilar jurisdictions share a limited set of norms governing their disposition decisions in status offense cases. Thus, it is possible that it is common in both "progressive" and "conservative" jurisdictions to give major weight to features of these cases informally regarded as predictive of recidivism, such as offense history, family capacity to provide supervision, age, and gender. In that event, differences in disposition decisions among contrasting types of jurisdictions are likely to be confined to status offenders marginal with respect to the features listed, and resulting high uniformity in the treatment of the majority of status offense cases. While this explanation is admittedly speculative, it would account for the failure of program site differences in policy and practice to show an effect on variation in recidivism.

Youth services facilities as a program component showed only a marginal and tenuous relationship to recidivism. Of the 19 variables constituting this component, only two exhibited an inverse relationship to recidivism, with all variables in the other three program components statistically controlled. Among the unrelated variables were several that intuitively

might be thought to have substantial influence. However, only two of the facility variables were found to be inversely related to recidivism at a statistically significant level. These were cooperation among the staffs of the local community network of community based services, and staff attribution of the cause of delinquency to deficiencies in the major control and educational institutions for youth. The latter suggests the possible importance, other things equal, of an emphasis on an advocacy approach in any of its various forms.

However, these findings should be viewed with caution. Indicated earlier was the fact that there were substantial problems in operationalizing these variables. The findings are nonetheless of sufficient potential importance for effective intervention to warrant further research.

The policy relevant purpose in undertaking the analysis presented in this chapter was to identify the relative contribution of each of four program components to recidivism reduction, and in those that did so contribute, the specific features of each component that appeared to be more effective. The underlying assumption was that each program component was potentially important in achieving that aim of the deinstitutionalization effort. Its failure to do so raises the question: what was its specific shortcoming and, in the interest of guiding future program effort of this kind, how may the deficiency be remedied?

The detailed review that follows is based on this chapter's findings as presented in Figure 2. There, the variables in each program component accounting for variation in client recidivism either favorably or unfavorably are indicated, net of the variables in all other components. Observations concerning those features of program operation that were manifestly

important for recidivism either for good or ill, as well as those that appeared to be irrelevant (i.e., were unrelated to variation in recidivism) are drawn from findings in other chapters of this report.

Site

Sites differed widely in respect to prevailing statutory provisions and other conditions likely to affect the implementation of program objectives. Prior to the introduction of the program, in some sites an effort was already under way to divert status offenders from detention and to reduce the use of long-term institutionalization. At other sites, it had long been customary in these cases to make full use of detention facilities and to commit status offenders to locked institutions. However, neither of these features of site context appeared to have a clearly independent effect on recidivism. In both types of sites, an initial appearance of impact vanished when account was taken of the effects of other program components. The neutrality of site characteristics for recidivism reduction suggests that both in sites receptive and resistive to deinstitutionalization, there may have been failure to achieve full program implementation for entirely different reasons. In the receptive sites, there is some evidence in the program descriptive chapters that while diversion activity was given additional support resources, police and court practices established during the pre-program period continued largely unchanged. Any gain in reducing status offender recidivism in these sites would have had to come from two related sources: targeting program effort more sharply on the subset of status offenders more likely to recidivate, and in sites where this was the case, relaxing client eligibility requirements to accept for program services such categories of ineligibles as those currently on probation for prior

status or delinquent offenses. On the other hand, in many of the resistive sites, program implementation weakness tended to center on failure to focus the effort to divert status offense cases from formal processing at the "front end" of the juvenile justice system, i.e., at the police or court intake level. In a number of sites of this type, diversion from the system was either temporary or placed at the "deep end," in the form of procuring releases of status offenders already institutionalized or preventing their commitment.

Program Services

The failure of program services to affect favorably status offender recidivism can be ascribed principally to extraordinary narrowness in the range of services actually furnished. The main service given the overwhelming majority of program clients was brief crisis counseling. Program guidelines requiring implementation explicitly prescribed the use of varied types of services in relation to the character of the client problem, in which crisis counseling figured as only a first step. The restriction to counseling of this type was likely to be most effective with clients least likely to recidivate.

Service Facilities

This program component also exhibited no perceptible independent effect on recidivism. Variation in recidivism was apparently unaffected by such facility characteristics as level of staff professionalism, the use of volunteers or paraprofessionals, the diversity of services offered (where this was in fact the case), or the use of coercive authority in treating status offenders. However, there was suggestive but inconclusive evidence that two features of youth service facilities may have been related to reduced recidivism, net of all other program variables: staff attribution

of the cause of delinquency to institutional malfunction, and staff perception of high levels of cooperation from community based youth service agencies. This finding requires validation through further research, and if validated, would suggest as important for delinquency control a youth advocacy posture on the part of treatment personnel, and a need to engage more fully the interest and resources of youth serving institutions and agencies in the delinquency control effort.

Client Characteristics

This program component was by far the most important determinant of variation in recidivism. Whatever success in delinquency reduction programs might anticipate thus hangs largely on the selection of their clientele. The data presented in this chapter suggest that programs serving a clientele constituted predominantly of older male status offenders with few or no prior offenses can expect a favorable outcome as concerns recidivism. The outcome can be expected to be unfavorable if the served population has a high proportion of females, younger males, and in any of these categories, those with multiple prior offenses. To be meaningful, program success in reducing recidivism among status offenders cannot be claimed unless its clientele is of the latter type. It would appear, then, that the most critical aspect of program policy in efforts to reduce recidivism involves client selection. Status offense behavior is probably the most widespread form of juvenile misconduct, most of it of an occasional or transitory nature. Programs seeking an appropriate clientele are consequently under strong temptation to cast a wide net, and to provide services to youth whose need for them may be questionable. Evidence from other sections of this report suggests that this is precisely what happened at several of the program

sites. The policy implication would seem to be clear: the service eligibility criteria of deinstitutionalization programs should be designed to focus on those who are most likely in the future to require institutionalization either as persistent status offenders or as serious delinquent offenders.

ATTACHMENT I
GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES

GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>
Dependent Variable:	
L2SUBS	Interval variable: number of subsequent offenses (during 6 months) transformed to the base 2 logarithm (subsequent offenses + 1).
Site Variables:	
SPOKANE (omitted category)	Site membership information was contained in 5 effect coded nominal variables with membership in Spokane County, Washington treated as the omitted category. All Spokane clients were coded -1 on each of the 5 site variables.
ARIZONA	Effect coded nominal variable: clients from Pima County, Arizona were coded 1 on ARIZONA and 0 on ALAMEDA, DELAWARE, SOUTH CAROLINA, and VANCOUVER.
ALAMEDA	Effect coded nominal variable: clients from Alameda County, California were coded 1 on ALAMEDA and 0 on ARIZONA, DELAWARE, SOUTH CAROLINA, and VANCOUVER.
DELAWARE	Effect coded nominal variable: clients from Delaware were coded 1 on DELAWARE and 0 on ARIZONA, ALAMEDA, SOUTH CAROLINA, and VANCOUVER.
SOUTH CAROLINA	Effect coded nominal variable: clients from South Carolina were coded 1 on SOUTH CAROLINA and 0 on ARIZONA, ALAMEDA, DELAWARE, and VANCOUVER.
VANCOUVER	Effect coded nominal variable: clients from Vancouver County, Washington were coded 1 on VANCOUVER and 0 on ARIZONA, ALAMEDA, DELAWARE, and SOUTH CAROLINA.
Client Variables:	
L2PRIORS	Interval variable: number of prior offenses transformed to the base 2 logarithm (prior offenses + 1).
PURE STATUS	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's priors were status offenses, 0 if otherwise.
GENDER	Dummy variable: coded 1 if female, 0 if male.
ETHNICITY	Dummy variable: coded 1 if majority group, 0 if other than majority.
AGE	Interval variable: age of client at instant offense, range 8 - 18.
MULTIPLE STATUS	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client had multiple instant status offenses, 0 if only one instant status offense.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>
MIXED OFFENSES	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client had one or more instant nonstatus offense, 0 if otherwise.
RUNAWAY	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was runaway, 0 if otherwise.
UNGOVERNABLE	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was ungovernable, 0 if otherwise.
TRUANCY	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was truancy, 0 if otherwise.
MINOR IN POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was minor in possession of alcohol, 0 if otherwise.
OTHER STATUS	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was other than runaway, ungovernable, truancy, curfew, or minor in possession of alcohol, 0 if otherwise.
CURFEW (omitted category)	Dummy variable: coded 1 if client's most serious instant status offense was curfew violation, 0 if otherwise.
NUCLEAR	Dummy variable: coded 1 if current residence was with client's nuclear family, 0 if otherwise.
The variables, FATHER-OCCUPATION, MOTHER-OCCUPATION, FATHER-EDUCATION, MOTHER-EDUCATION, had substantial amounts of missing data. FOCC99, FOCC0, FOCC999, HOUSEWIFE, MOC99, MOCC999, FED999, MED999 are all dummy variables created using the Cohen and Cohen method, to save cases. These dummy variables represent various kinds of missing data associated with parents' occupation and education. For the occupation variables:	
99 indicated that the occupational status could not be coded because the parent had no occupation or the occupation was uncodeable.	
0 indicated that the occupational status could not be coded because the entire Form 2 was missing.	
999 indicated that the occupational status could not be coded because the question was not applicable, e.g., no parent present.	
For the educational variables:	
999 indicated that the parent's education was missing.	
For the variables that had the mean of valid cases assigned to cases with missing data, the assigned mean is provided in parentheses.	
FATHER-OCCUPATION	Ordinal variable: father's occupational status on the Prestige Scale in Appendix F of the 1975 NORC General Survey of Social Issues (Chicago, Illinois: NORC). (assigned mean = 37.718)

Variable	Description
MOTHER-OCCUPATION	Ordinal variable: mother's occupational status on the Prestige Scale in Appendix F of the 1975 NORC General Survey of Social Issues (Chicago, Illinois: NORC). (assigned mean = 34.852)
FATHER-EDUCATION	Interval variable: years of education of father. (assigned mean = 11.492)
MOTHER-EDUCATION	Interval variable: years of education of mother. (assigned mean = 11.005)
FOCC99	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FATHER-EDUCATION was coded 99, 0 if otherwise.
FOCC0	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FATHER-OCCUPATION was coded 0, 0 if otherwise.
FOCC999	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FATHER-OCCUPATION was coded 999, 0 if otherwise.
HOUSEWIFE	Dummy variable: coded 1 if mother's occupational status could not be coded because the mother was a housewife, 0 if otherwise.
MOCC99	Dummy variable: coded 1 if MOTHER-OCCUPATION was coded 999, 0 if otherwise.
MOCC999	Dummy variable: coded 1 if MOTHER-OCCUPATION was coded 999, 0 if otherwise.
FED999	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FATHER-EDUCATION was coded 999, 0 if otherwise.
MED999	Dummy variable: coded 1 if MOTHER-EDUCATION was coded 999, 0 if otherwise.

The remaining client variables SCHOOL SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT SCALE, FAMILY TIME, ATTEND SCHOOL, and FAMILY INTACT had substantial amounts of missing data. SCHOOL SCALE MISSING DATA, FAMILY TIME MISSING, ATTEND SCHOOL MISSING, and FAMILY INTACT MISSING are dummy variables created, using the Cohen and Cohen method, to save cases. For the variables that had the mean of valid cases assigned to cases with missing data, the assigned mean is provided in parentheses.

SCHOOL SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT SCALE	Ordinal variable: the SCHOOL SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT SCALE was created by adding the response to the following six items (taken from Part 2 of the Wave 1 Form 3):
	Item 1. It is important to me that I get good grades in school.
	Item 2. I care what my teachers think of me.
	Item 3. It is important to me that I finish high school.
	Item 5. It is important to me that I go to college.

Variable	Description
	Item 16. How much of your assigned homework do you usually do?
	Item 20. How would you describe your grades at school compared to other kids in your same school year? (assigned mean = 15.498)
SCHOOL SCALE MISSING DATA	Dummy variable: coded 1 if SCHOOL SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT SCALE could not be created due to missing data on any of the 6 items, 0 if otherwise.
FAMILY TIME	Ordinal variable, client's perception of time spent with family from Item 18, Part 2 of the Wave 1 Form 3. (assigned mean = 2.031)
FAMILY TIME MISSING	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FAMILY TIME was missing, 0 if otherwise.
ATTEND SCHOOL	Dummy variable: coded 1 if full time student, 0 if otherwise. From Item 3.01 of Form 1-A. (assigned mean = .811)
ATTEND SCHOOL MISSING	Dummy variable: coded 1 if ATTEND SCHOOL was missing, 0 if otherwise.
FAMILY INTACT	Dummy variable: coded 1 if FAMILY INTACT, (both natural or adoptive parents present), 0 if otherwise.
FAMILY INTACT MISSING	Dummy variable: coded 1 if data on FAMILY INTACT was missing, 0 if otherwise.
Service Variables:	
DIVERSION/EVALUATION	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred for DIVERSION/EVALUATION, 0 if otherwise.
SHELTER HOME	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred to SHELTER HOME, 0 if otherwise.
GROUP HOME	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred to GROUP HOME, 0 if otherwise.
MULTIPLE SERVICE	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred to MULTIPLE SERVICE center, 0 if otherwise.
OUTREACH	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred for OUTREACH intervention, 0 if otherwise.
OTHER SERVICE	Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred to service other than DIVERSION/EVALUATION, SHELTER HOME, GROUP HOME, MULTIPLE SERVICE, OUTREACH, MULTIPLE IMPACT THERAPY, and COUNSELING, 0 if otherwise.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>
MULTIPLE IMPACT THERAPY	Dummy Variable: coded 1 if referred for MULTIPLE IMPACT THERAPY (Clark County program only); 0 if otherwise.
Facility Variables:	
PROFESSIONAL	Interval variable: percent of facility staff professionally trained, i.e., possess degree in disciplinary field.
PRE-PROFESSIONAL	Interval variable: percent of facility staff who are pre-professional.
PARAPROFESSIONAL	Interval variable: percent of facility staff who are paraprofessional
VOLUNTEER	Interval variable: percent of facility staff who are volunteer.
OTHER STAFF (omitted category)	Interval variable: percent of facility staff who are in the other category.
DIVERSITY SERVICES	Interval variable: number of services offered by a facility. Services counted were any kind of counseling, drug abuse program, educational program, recreational program, employment program, legal services, general supervision, advocacy, advanced diagnostic screening, and other services.
COERCIVENESS	Ordinal variable: average coerciveness of facility. The average sanction from a list of 13 sanctions ranked by increasing degree of severity, used for 30 occasional and frequent client infractions. Numerous facilities did not respond to this portion of the Survey of Program Facilities. The Cohen and Cohen method was used to save cases. (mean assigned = 6.081)
COERCIVENESS MISSING	Dummy variable: coded 1 if facility did not answer sanction items, 0 if otherwise.
BLAME CLIENT	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, client is (is not) responsible for own behavior.
PUNISH CLIENT	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, punishment is (is not) effective in correcting delinquent behavior.
CAUSE-PSYCHOLOGICAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, psychological maladjustment is (is not) cause of delinquent behavior.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>
CHANGE-PSYCHOLOGICAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, treatment strategy of choice is (is not) effort to change client's psychological adjustment.
CAUSE-SOCIAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, family and peer group relations do (do not) cause client problems.
CHANGE-SOCIAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, treatment strategy of choice is (is not) effort to change impaired family and peer group relation.
CAUSE-INSTITUTIONAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, social institutions do (do not) cause client problems.
CHANGE-INSTITUTIONAL	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item, treatment strategy of choice is (is not) effort to change social institutions.
CONTACT SCALE	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire respecting community ties. Scale items include mean frequency of contact with law enforcement agencies, schools, courts, religious organizations, private community organizations, and public social service agencies. Reliability: Alpha = .680, 79 facilities.
COOPERATION SCALE	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire respecting perceived cooperation resulting from community contacts. Scale items are the same as in the CONTACT SCALE, except religious organization was omitted. Reliability: Alpha = .797, 61 facilities.
ACTIVISM SCALE	Ordinal variable: mean response of facility staff to questionnaire item respecting frequency (per week) of community contacts to obtain service for clients. Scale items include frequency of contact to obtain economic support for client service programs, to elicit support from community organizations, to influence local police in the treatment of status offender clients, and to promote development of improved treatment resources. Reliability: Alpha = .892, 79 facilities.

The following five facility variables were added to the auxiliary analysis based on the allocation of missing data values using the Cohen and Cohen technique. The description of each missing data variable includes a list of related variables that had to have means assigned to cases with missing data. The assigned means are included in parentheses.

Variable	Description
SURVEY OF PROGRAM FACILITIES MISSING	Dummy variable: missing survey of program facilities. Coded 1 if a facility did not return Survey of Program Facilities, 0 if survey was present. PROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 59.6667) PRE-PROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 31.7105) PARAPROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 39.8615) VOLUNTEER (mean assigned = 34.7800) OTHER STAFF (mean assigned = 17.8900) DIVERSITY SERVICE (mean assigned = 2.4584) COERCIVENESS (mean assigned = 6.0810)
STAFF MISSING	Dummy variable: staff items missing. Coded 1 if a facility failed to respond to the staff items on the Survey of Program Facilities, 0 if otherwise. PROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 59.6669) PRE-PROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 31.7105) PARAPROFESSIONAL (mean assigned = 39.8615) VOLUNTEER (mean assigned = 34.7800) OTHER STAFF (mean assigned = 17.8400)
ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY MISSING	Dummy variable: missing organizational survey. Coded 1 if facility did not return the Organizational Survey, 0 if survey was present. BLAME CLIENT (mean assigned = 5.4551) PUNISH CLIENT (mean assigned = 6.3721) CAUSE PSYCHOLOGICAL (mean assigned = 7.0351) CHANGE-PSYCHOLOGICAL (mean assigned = 7.5618) CAUSE-SOCIAL (mean assigned = 7.6198) CHANGE-SOCIAL (mean assigned = 7.1028) CAUSE-INSTITUTIONAL (mean assigned = 5.7392) CHANGE-INSTITUTIONAL (mean assigned = 7.1217) CONTACT SCALE (mean assigned = 2.9878) COOPERATION SCALE (mean assigned = 6.9976) ACTIVISM SCALE (mean assigned = 2.4316)
TREATMENT MISSING	Dummy variable: missing data on CAUSE-INSTITUTIONAL and CHANGE-INSTITUTIONAL items. Coded 1 if facility failed to response to CAUSE-INSTITUTIONAL and CHANGE-INSTITUTIONAL items on Organizational Survey, 0 if otherwise. CAUSE-INSTITUTIONAL (mean assigned = 5.7392) CHANGE-INSTITUTIONAL (mean assigned = 7.1217)
COOPERATION SCALE MISSING	Dummy variable: missing data on the COOPERATION SCALE. Coded 1 if a facility failed to respond to all the items that made up the COOPERATION SCALE, 0 if otherwise. COOPERATION SCALE (mean assigned = 6.9976)

Variable	Description
FOSTER HOME	One new service variable (FOSTER HOME) was added to the auxiliary analysis. FOSTER HOME had no cases in the first analysis; however, in the auxiliary analysis, with all cases assigned values on the facility variables, FOSTER HOME was added. Dummy variable: coded 1 if referred to a FOSTER HOME, 0 if otherwise.

Figure 3: Series 1 Model, 63 variables, 1910 Cases

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error	F
Spokane	.171	.171	.130	1.727
Arizona	.217	.218	.166	1.716
Alameda	.314	.262	.174	3.272
Delaware	.413	.309	.145	8.055***
South Carolina	-.321	-.266	.176	3.331
Vancouver	-.794	-.574	.314	6.392**
L2 Priors	.205	.243	.020	100.346***
Pure Status	.766 D-01	.029	.061	1.597
Gender	.683 D-01	.046	.036	3.647
Ethnicity	-.781 D-02	-.005	.044	0.032
Age	-.302 D-01	-.071	.010	8.473***
Multiple Status	-.531 D-03	-.000	.062	0.000
Mixed Offenses	-.159 D-01	-.004	.087	0.033
Runaway	-.910 D-01	-0.59	.080	1.297
Ungovernable	-.936 D-01	-.062	.080	1.436
Truancy	-.822 D-01	-.035	.089	0.846
Minor in Possession of Alcohol	-.218	-.096	.083	6.862***
Other Status	-.260	-.055	.127	4.206**
Nuclear	-.117	-.077	.060	3.836
Father-Occupation	-.498 D-03	-.005	.003	0.038
Mother-Occupation	-.174 D-02	-.016	.003	0.453
Father-Education	-.528 D-02	-.014	.010	0.286
Mother-Education	-.646 D-03	-.002	.011	0.004
FOCC99	-.140	-.034	.096	2.102
FOCC0	-.912 D-01	-.062	.061	2.202
FOCC999	.627 D-01	.030	.093	0.457
Housewife	-.303 D-01	-.013	.060	0.254
MOC99	-.438 D-01	-.020	.059	0.551
MOCC999	.131	.022	.153	0.735
FED999	-.878 D-01	-.044	.090	0.942
MED999	-.350 D-01	-.010	.096	0.133
School Social Adjustment Scale	.670 D-02	.035	.004	2.417
School Scale Missing Data	.571 D-02	.004	.097	0.003
Family Time	.276 D-01	.022	.028	0.990
Family Time Missing	-.545 D-01	-.037	.103	0.282
Attend School	-.988 D-01	-.049	.048	4.220**
Attend School Missing	.632 D-01	.030	.126	0.251
Family Intact	.834 D-01	.052	.063	1.727
Family Intact Missing	-.889 D-01	-.041	.175	0.259
Diversion/Evaluation	.105	.071	.115	0.835
Shelter Home	.239	.067	.252	0.893
Group Home	-.413	-.013	.907	0.208
Multiple Service	.177	.056	.256	0.476
Outreach	.586	.085	.325	3.241
Other Service	-.128 D-01	-.003	.297	0.002
Multiple Impact Therapy	.700	.022	.853	0.674
Activism Scale	-.208	-.205	.107	3.757
Professional	-.495 D-02	-.136	.009	0.276
Pre-Professional	-.588 D-02	-.130	.011	0.312
Paraprofessional	-.589 D-02	-.96	.008	0.491
Volunteer	-.619 D-02	-.172	.008	0.533
Diversity Services	-.600 D-01	-.132	.043	1.973
Coerciveness	-.537 D-01	-.222	.024	5.189**

Figure 3 (continued)

Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error	F
Coerciveness Missing	-.127	-.086	.094	1.818
Blame Client	-.115 D-01	-.010	.072	0.025
Punish Client	-.108	-.112	.064	2.892
Cause-Psychological	.141	.103	.089	2.486
Change-Psychological	.162 D-01	.024	.067	0.058
Cause-Social	-.120	-.076	.093	1.647
Change-Social	-.339 D-01	-.025	.127	0.071
Cause-Institutional	.117	.139	.046	6.477**
Change-Institutional	.116	.111	.061	3.612
Contact Scale	.248	.224	.142	3.024
Cooperation Scale	.112	.107	.115	0.953
(Constant)	.244			
Multiple R	.382			
R Square	.146			
Adjusted R Square	.116			
Standard Error	.691			
Analysis of Variance	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F
Regression	63.	150.319	2.386	4.99
Residual	1846.	882.374	0.478	

**p < .05,

***p < .01,

****p < .001

Figure 4: Series 1, Missing Data Allocated, 69 Variables, 2493 Cases

Variables in the Equation				
Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error	F
Spokane	.204	.190	0.096	4.491**
Arizona	-.762 D-01	-.071	0.067	1.278
Alameda	.986 D-01	.074	0.115	0.740
Delaware	.177 D-01	.014	0.067	0.071
South Carolina	-.943 D-01	-.072	0.078	1.447
Vancouver	-.150	-.097	0.107	1.973
L2 Priors	.207	.245	0.018	135.808****
Pure Status	.102	.038	0.053	3.683
Gender	.731 D-01	.049	0.032	5.311**
Ethnicity	-.227 D-01	-.013	0.038	0.360
Age	-.273 D-01	-.062	0.009	8.482***
Multiple Status	-.990 D-02	-.004	0.054	0.034
Mixed Offenses	-.193 D-01	-.005	0.082	0.055
Runaway	-.449 D-01	-.028	0.076	0.348
Ungovernable	-.721 D-01	-.046	0.076	0.898
Truancy	-.711 D-01	-.032	0.083	0.742
Minor in Possession of Alcohol	-.215	-.091	0.080	7.218***
Other Status	-.239	-.045	0.125	3.657
Nuclear	-.649 D-01	-.041	0.053	1.524
Father-Occupation	-.796 D-03	-.008	0.002	0.128
Mother-Occupation	-.863 D-03	-.008	0.002	0.147
Father-Education	-.745 D-02	-.020	0.009	0.758
Mother-Education	.156 D-02	.004	0.009	0.028
FOCC99	-.164	-.040	0.083	3.936**
FOCC0	-.739 D-01	-.049	0.055	1.826
FOCC999	.458 D-01	.022	0.081	0.322
Housewife	.553 D-03	.000	0.052	0.000
MOC99	-.267 D-01	-.012	0.051	0.277
MOCC999	.187	.033	0.127	2.183
FED999	-.908 D-01	-.047	0.078	1.341
MED999	-.569 D-01	-.017	0.081	0.495
School Social Adjustment Scale	.567 D-02	.030	0.004	2.363
School Scale Missing	-.156 D-01	-.010	0.090	0.031
Family Time	.271 D-01	.023	0.024	1.317
Family Time Missing	-.515 D-01	-.034	0.096	0.288
Attend School	-.725 D-01	-.034	0.044	2.754
Attend School Missing	.673 D-01	.030	0.112	0.364
Family Intact	.338 D-01	.002	0.055	0.004
Family Intact Missing	-.883 D-01	-.038	0.162	0.296
Diversion/Evaluation	.454 D-01	.030	0.075	0.363
Shelter Home	.595 D-02	.002	0.099	0.004
Group Home	-.312	-.032	0.205	2.309
Foster Home	.247	.021	0.223	1.229
Multiple Service	-.388 D-01	-.013	0.102	0.145
Outreach	.504 D-01	.010	0.162	0.097
Other Service	-.188 D-01	-.006	0.097	0.037
Multiple Impact Therapy	-.294	-.008	0.751	0.153
Cooperation Scale Missing	.322 D-02	.002	0.107	0.001
Professional	-.421 D-02	-.127	0.004	1.184
Pre-Professional	-.641 D-02	-.145	0.004	2.468
Paraprofessional	-.248 D-02	-.057	0.004	0.465
Volunteer	-.622 D-02	-.165	0.004	2.715
Survey of Program Facilities Missing	.472	.177	0.279	2.862

Table 4 (continued)

Variable	B	Beta	Standard Error	F
Staff Missing	.793 D-01	.002	0.765	0.011
Diversity Services	-.108 D-01	-.022	0.016	0.457
Coerciveness	-.590 D-02	-.022	0.014	0.182
Coerciveness Missing	-.726 D-01	-.046	0.062	1.369
Punish Client	-.193 D-01	-.022	0.030	0.427
Change-Psychological	.450 D-01	.061	0.047	0.917
Change-Social	-.506 D-02	-.004	0.054	0.009
Change-Institutional	.451 D-03	.000	0.034	0.000
Blame Client	-.636 D-01	-.059	0.035	3.329
Cause-Psychological	.527 D-01	.039	0.061	0.755
Cause-Social	-.290 D-02	-.002	0.057	0.003
Cause-Institutional	.456 D-01	.048	0.031	2.128
Organizational Survey Missing	-.120	-.060	0.137	0.762
Treatment Missing	-.600	-.060	0.284	4.471**
Contact Scale	-.303 D-01	-.026	0.070	0.187
Activism Scale	.813 D-02	.007	0.053	0.023
Cooperation Scale	-.152	-.125	0.047	10.283***
(Constant)	2.152			
Multiple R	0.38133			
R Square	0.14541			
Adjusted R Square	0.12107			
Standard Error	0.70576			
Analysis of Variance	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F
Regression	69.	205.35279	2.97613	5.97503
Residual	2423.	1206.88310	0.49809	
p < .05, *p < .01, ****p < .001				

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CHAPTER XV

COMPARISON OF PROGRAM AND PRE-PROGRAM YOUTH

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CHAPTER XV

COMPARISON OF PROGRAM AND PRE-PROGRAM YOUTH

Malcolm W. Klein and John Peterson

INTRODUCTION

In this and the following chapters, we come to what many will consider the heart of the DSO final report, namely the attempt to answer the question, "did it work?" Of course, we must face the usual problems of defining what is meant by "it" and what is meant by "work." The "it" refers to those programs, described in the preceding chapters, that were designed to bring about deinstitutionalization and provide alternatives for temporary and long-term incarceration.

But even if the eight program descriptions provide the answers to what "it" was, we are hardly on solid ground yet to describe how "it" worked, for two reasons. First, the entire DSO effort was not designed in such a way as to provide definitive answers to whether or not it worked. Second, there are numerous ways to define "work," only some of which were incorporated in the national evaluation. Thus, depending on one's choices among the appropriate effectiveness measures, it is possible to conclude that (a) effectiveness was not appropriately measured, (b) the program succeeded in providing useful service, (c) the program did substantially achieve its deinstitutionalization aims, or (d) the program failed and may even have been more harmful than helpful to its thousands of youthful clients.

Before considering these possible outcome statements further, we must first be clear about the comment above that the entire DSO effort was not designed so as to provide definitive evaluation results. The comment is based upon a number of realities: (a) The eight sites selected for the

program, for the most part, had already initiated deinstitutionalization, thus making it difficult to attribute to the DSO program whatever subsequent declines in institutionalized populations may have occurred. (b) The staff of OJJDP gave very low priority to field experimentation, with the result that random assignment of youths to various experimental and control conditions was not undertaken. (c) The eight sites varied widely in their system data capacities and data banks, erring generally on the side of inadequacy. Thus, attempts to demonstrate DSO-related changes in client flows was very difficult. (d) Program operations in a number of sites made it impossible to obtain client interviews close in time to client intake, thus preventing the use of social adjustment measures to assess changes from pre-intervention to post-intervention periods (some "first wave" interviews took place weeks, even months after intake, in some instances after intervention had been completed). (e) Finally, client eligibility criteria varied so widely, and generally were so ill-defined, that the DSO program intervened in the lives of many youngsters who, in the absence of the program, may not normally have been detained or institutionalized. To assess the effects of a deinstitutionalization program on clients for whom it may not have been appropriate would seem to test the outer limits of evaluation fantasies. We do not assess the effectiveness of parole on non-adjudicated adults, nor of detoxification programs on non-addicts or teetotalers. Then why assess the effects of deinstitutionalization for minor offenders for whom institutionalization was in any event highly unlikely?

Now we can return for a brief comment on the several possible outcome statements posited earlier. For instance, the limitations of the research just listed certainly support the first possible conclusion, that

effectiveness was not appropriately measured. Under the circumstances described, that conclusion might be inevitable. Further, the national evaluation chose not to measure some things that others might consider important. Choices were made in the light of limited resources and intractable logistical problems. Among matters excluded were cost-effectiveness,¹ social adjustment of clients and their families, changes in community delinquency patterns, and changes in the behavior and opinions of various segments of the community such as political leaders, education and welfare workers, and criminal justice officials.² If one values these particular criteria highly; one could also conclude that the program's effectiveness has not been appropriately assessed.

By way of contrast, the eight program descriptions can just as easily be used to claim program success. While some qualifications are noted from site to site, it seems eminently clear that many services were implemented for many thousands of youths deemed in need of such services. Given the federal carrot, eight highly diverse county and state mechanisms were successfully engaged, and successfully developed service delivery systems of substantially greater scope than those which had existed previously. If such matters are taken as legitimate outcome goals, then DSO has every right to proclaim itself a successful venture.

The third possibility, that the program achieved substantial success in achieving a reduction in institutionalized populations, can be reasonably entertained so long as one does not require proof of causal connections.

As materials reported by Frank Hellum indicate, the period of the DSO

1. A cost study was conducted, but it was restricted to a comparison of costs of community versus institutional treatment in a limited number of sites with contrasting program strategies (see Chapter XXI).
2. However, see the report by Peter Gardiner on value positions of these community members (Chapter XX).

program over all eight sites saw a reduction in numbers of youth detained of about 25 percent, and a reduction in numbers of youth institutionalized of about 50 percent. Neither figure reaches the original requirement of the federal legislation, but both figures are substantial and in the desired direction. However, the details of the Hellum report suggest that, rather than a failure of program effort, this reduction possibly represented further progress in deinstitutionalization that was already under way in several of the sites before the program was initiated. (See Chapter XXII).

Finally, then, we come to the fourth possible outcome statement, that the program failed and may even have been more harmful than helpful. The available data which might be pertinent to testing such a conclusion are of four kinds.

First, there is the issue of reducing the numbers of youth incarcerated. It is assumed by most critics, and made explicit in the federal legislation, that deinstitutionalization is humane. Thus we achieve humanness in proportion to the number of status offenders who are released from or diverted from incarceration. The Hellum figures suggest that the program achieved some increment of advance in the humaneness with which status offenders were treated.

Second, we can determine the degree to which status offender flows in the juvenile justice system have changed, in what fashion, and whether the system has adjusted to these flows in a consonant fashion. The report by Robert M. Carter (Chapter XVIII), summarizing the system rates changes during the DSO program, provides inconclusive evidence at best. Carter was severely handicapped by the inadequacies of the available data bases, but at the very

least this much can be said: the impact of the DSO program on the eight juvenile justice systems was not of sufficient magnitude to be revealed by the data available from those systems.

Third, we can ask whether the appropriate youngsters were served by the program. As revealed by the separate local evaluations as well as the over-all national analysis, it is clear that among the clients engaged by the DSO program there were very substantial numbers who were not properly the clientele of the program. These were youngsters whose offenses and careers would not have justified their detention normally, nor the level of service to which they were exposed. An analysis of offense patterns of program clients indicated that the largest single group of program clients had no officially recorded offenses either prior or subsequent to the "instant" offense that occasioned their referral to the program. Their inclusion in the program may well be a classic example of "net-widening" wherein the justice system, inadvertently or otherwise, has actually increased the level of their penetration into its mechanisms. The potential for harm through stigmatization and improper associations is obvious, and precisely what the DSO program was designed to prevent, not to promote.

Finally, we come to the question of recidivism, the rate at which program clients acquired police records for status or other offenses following program intervention. We will look at this outcome measure in three different ways. First, in the present chapter, we will compare recidivism rates of program clients with the rates of "pre-program" youths selected from court records during a pre-program period. In the following chapter, we will then attempt to assess the degree to which recidivism rates can be attributed

to (a) different sites, (b) different kinds of clients, (c) different kinds of programs and program facilities, and (d) different specific services offered within each site (which programs "work" best for which category of status offender). As can be seen, the first approach, the program/pre-program comparison, comes closest to asking the question "did it work?" as a positive means of delinquency reduction, while the latter approach is more concerned with understanding policy related connections between what went into the DSO program and what resulted.

THE PROGRAM/PRE-PROGRAM COMPARISON

Ideally, assessment of recidivism as an impact measure would employ comparisons between experimental and control groups to which clients had been randomly assigned. However, random or matched assignment was not actively encouraged in the OJJDP program solicitation and was actively discouraged by OJJDP staff during site visits to potential program grantees. Thus a genuine experimental design was not achieved in any of the eight sites.

3. An exception occurred in one site in which the local evaluator convinced program personnel to implement a randomized assignment design. With this accomplished and because resources were limited, the evaluator was able to eliminate "wave one" interviews on the assumption that experimental and control groups would have yielded similar scores. However, the local evaluator left the monitoring of randomization in the hands of local program personnel who, as is often the case, failed properly to maintain the assignment system. As a result, the experimental and control groups differed greatly on significant personal background variables (especially gender) and a proper comparison was negated. And of course there was no way to retrieve the omitted "wave one" interviews.

Of various possible substitute comparisons considered, the national and local evaluators settled on the use of a pre-program group in each site as the most feasible approach. There were several reasons for this choice. First, the availability of court records made possible the selection of known, detainable status offenders. Second, these same records could provide at least minimal data on the prior records and demographic characteristics of the comparison group. Third, gathering data from record sources alone meant that this part of the research process would not interfere with, and therefore not encounter resistance from the program staffs in the eight sites and in OJJDP.

Each local evaluator, in consultation with the national evaluators, selected a pre-program period consisting of the full year prior to program start-up.⁴ The criteria for selection of pre-program cohorts were three in number: cases were drawn in which the instant offense was one of

4. In addition to a pre-program sample drawn from the first year, the Pima County, Arizona, program also drew a "pre-preprogram" sample from the second year prior to program start-up. The analysis of program-preprogram differences in recidivism scores focused principally on the pre-preprogram cohort. There were several reasons for this. During the first preprogram year, the court had begun to implement an extensive program of diverting status offenders from detention, and providing many services similar to those in the subsequent DSO program. This was Pima County's "Mobile Diversion Program." In an effort to avoid stigmatization, status offense cases were handled informally by neighborhood based units, and it was difficult to recover adequate records of client characteristics. Since these difficulties did not exist with respect to the pre-preprogram cohort, which in any case represented a more appropriate comparison, the six and 12 month follow-up data presented here are for this group.

the five selected for the program population; they were drawn from a pre-program month corresponding to the program month, and only if they had not been selected into the sample for a prior pre-program month; and they excluded cases not eligible for some form of detention.⁵

The recidivism criterion selected for the comparisons to be reported here are total counts of charges in all officially reported police incidents. To have employed a deeper-penetration criterion such as court appearance would not have yielded a sufficient amount of variation for the analysis.⁶

5. The procedure is illustrated by the following excerpt from the evaluation Guidelines: For each month of the pre-program period (i.e., the 1975-76 month corresponding to the evaluation month), it will be necessary to identify the total population of status offenders from juvenile court intake records. (Depending upon local procedures, some sites may also require a search of police records for initial identification.) The monthly cohort should then be randomly sub-sampled to gain equal representation of five status offense categories: runaway, ungovernable, curfew, truancy, and minor in possession of alcohol. Each of these randomly selected sub-samples should contain 12 members and the total sample of the monthly cohort should contain 60. If there are 12 or less in the monthly flow of any category, then all cases are to be selected into the sub-sample. If there are more than 12 in the monthly flow of any category, then the random selection procedure will select out the necessary 12 cases. This same procedure should be repeated each month, except that all subjects selected in a previous month are to be excluded from a later monthly sample. (Also, transient runaways and other status offenders who are returned to a jurisdiction outside of the DSO program area should be excluded from the sample.)

The instant offense for the comparison group is defined as the first status offense recorded for a subject during the pre-program month under consideration. Two additional rules apply to the determination of the instant offense. First, if the subject's instant offense consists of multiple charges, all of which are status offenses, then assign the subject to the most serious category. The order of most to least serious is as follows: runaway, ungovernable, truancy, curfew, and minor in possession of alcohol. For example, a subject charged with runaway and curfew would be eligible for selection in the runaway sub-sample. A second rule regarding the instant status offense is that if a subject's instant offense consists of multiple charges, one of which is a delinquent offense, then the subject should be excluded from selection into a sample; that is, the subject's instant offense should be a "pure-status offense."

6. However, court data only were used in the case of the Connecticut program, since police report data were not made available to the site evaluator.

While the re-arrest criterion certainly has its drawbacks because it reflects an unknown combination of youth behavior and adult reaction, no more feasible criterion seemed possible. Self-report data, for instance, was a logical impossibility for the pre-program cohort.

Recidivism data were collected by the local evaluator in each site from police and court records and delivered to the national evaluation staff. (Only police records were actually used in this analysis). After checks for missing information, data cleaning and file construction were undertaken by the national staff and variables were constructed for number of subsequent offenses at six months and at twelve months following the program entry of each client for the program group,⁷ and following the instant offense for the pre-program group. Relationships among the six and twelve month scores, and among scores based on court records alone and police and court records combined, yield intercorrelations ranging from +.80 to +.98. The analysis to be reported here will include the six month period for all sites, and a twelve month period for six sites. Connecticut and Clark County were excluded from the twelve month scores because, for various reasons, a follow-up period of this length was not available.

PROGRAM AND PRE-PROGRAM COMPARISON VARIABLES

The variables on which the two cohorts could be compared were limited to those rather routinely available in police files. Among these, consultations among local and national evaluators led to the selection of the following:

7. Throughout these analysis chapters, "program group" and "program cohort" refer to the evaluation sample. The sample consisted of only those clients whose offenses on referral to the program were one or more of the five status offenses listed above. (See Chapter XIII).

Dependent Variables

Number of subsequent offenses at six months (8 sites) and 12 months (6 sites).

Because the distribution was heavily skewed, it was transformed to the base 2 logarithm of number of charges (plus 1). This improved the shape of the distribution but could not overcome skewness due specifically to the large number of clients with no recidivism charges.

Independent Variables

a. Site

The sites were effect coded, using Spokane as the omitted category and seven effect coded nominal variables.

b. Offense History

There were three characterizations of each client's prior record:

1. the log transformed number of recorded prior offenses;
2. the number of prior status offenses, similarly transformed;
3. status offense purity, dummy coded by scoring 0 if there was no prior record or if the prior record included non-status offenses, and scored 1 if the prior record consisted of status offenses only.

c. Instant Offense

Instant status offenses were specifically defined and were classified in several ways:⁸

1. Pre-program and program youth were coded for six possible types of instant offense. For program clients, the instant offense is defined as a status offense that resulted in a referral to the program. For pre-program youth, the instant offense is a status offense that occurred within the monthly time frame specified for the pre-program year that resulted in a police or court record.

8. Of 6,962 cases in the two cohorts, only 17 had missing data on instant offenses. These have been omitted from the analyses.

As already noted, the six offense types were runaway, ungovernable, truant, curfew violation, minor in possession of alcohol, and other. In a large number of cases multiple instant status offenses were recorded, indicating the likelihood that the defiant and rebellious behavior represented by this type of infraction could frequently be expressed simultaneously in a number of ways. A youth could run away from home because of his ungovernability, in turn leading to such other status offenses as curfew violation and others. Where multiple charges or "allegations" exist, which or how many of these the police or court might single out for recording as a basis for action was deemed likely to be in large part arbitrary. The decision was therefore made to collapse multiple instant status offenses on some reasonable basis to only one of those recorded. This was done by imposing the assumption that the six status offenses can be differentiated in terms of the degree to which each suggests a loss of parent/guardian control over the youth's behavior. On this basis a hierarchy of "seriousness" was constructed in the order of runaway, ungovernable, truant, curfew, possession of alcohol, and other. In all cases of multiple instant status offenses, the single most "serious" was coded.

2. Six dummy variables were used for the status offense categories, except in sites where some categories remained unfilled. In the multiple regression analysis for the aggregate eight site six-month subsequent offense follow-up, only three or fewer were used, since runaway, ungovernable, and truant were individually significant. In this analysis, clients who were curfew violators, minors

in possession of alcohol, or "other" fell into the residual category for the regression. The dummies are thus exclusive: a client was coded 1 on only one instant status offense.

3. Separately from the specific instant status offense to which multiple instants were collapsed, information was retained to distinguish those with a single instant offense from those with multiple instant status offenses. The former were dummy coded 0, the latter 1.

d. Demographic Characteristics

Five dummy coded variables were employed to describe the personal status of clients.

- a. gender, scored 1 if female, 0 male;
- b. ethnicity, scored 1 for Anglo, 0 for any other;
- c. age, scored as an interval variable in years at the time of the referral or instant offense. The range is from seven to eighteen.
- d. customary residence, describing whether it was with the nuclear family, scored 1; non-nuclear scored 0.

e. Time Variables

In order to control for any interaction effects associated with date of program referral and date of instant offense of pre-program cases, or associated with date of the initiation of data collection (researchers, too, show activity trends over time), variables were included to equate the cohorts and

9. Missing data caused deletion of some cases, as follows: gender, 7; ethnicity, 17; age, 22; customary household and current residence (combined), 410.

10. The validity of T-tests of customary residence as a determinant of subsequent offenses with use of the eight site aggregate data is undermined by missing data from the Alameda County site, where there were substantial differences in Ns for these and for other variables.

investigate possible time confounding. Also, seasonal effects were effect coded for entry into the equations since a preliminary regression had indicated lower recidivism rates for summer referrals.

Comparability

The variables above were to be used in regression equations in the program/pre-program comparisons of recidivism. Obviously, it is useful to compare the two cohorts on the relevant variables first to ascertain their overall comparability. The number of cases available for these analyses is quite substantial, although reduced somewhat by data problems. Of a total of 7,109 cases combined, 147 were "crossovers," appearing in both cohorts. Eliminating these from the program cohort yielded 3,017 pre-program and 3,945 program cases. In preparation for the regression analysis, missing data cases were also deleted, yielding final cohorts of 2,959 (pre-program) and 3,714 (program) for a total of 6,673. This refers to the numbers available for the six month recidivism analysis. The twelve month analysis, primarily due to the loss of Connecticut and Clark County, was based on a somewhat smaller number of cases.

Table 1 presents, for each site separately and for all sites combined, the means or proportions (as appropriate) for each of the comparison variables in the pre-program and program cohorts. Also indicated are two-tailed probability levels based upon t-tests using pooled or separate variance as necessary.

Looking first at the last column of Table 1, it can be seen that the two cohorts differed significantly on the majority of the comparison variables.

TABLE 1
COMPARISONS ON INPUT VARIABLES BETWEEN PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM COHORTS: SIX MONTH COHORTS

Variable		Pima	Alameda	Conn.	Delaware	ILL.	S. Carolina	Clark	Spokane	National
Mean prior offense score*, ***	Pre-Prog:	1.09	.88	.76	.95	2.12	.31	.09	.90	.96
	Prog:	.68	.87	.54	.78	1.42	.14	.34	.44	.75
	t:	6.64	.24	1.97	2.68	10.03	4.32	-5.29	5.28	7.65
	p:	<.01	ns	<.05	<.01	<.01	<.01	<.01	<.01	<.01
Mean prior status offense score*	Pre-Prog:	.47	.31	.48	.30	1.36	.08	.04	.53	.46
	Prog:	.24	.33	.32	.27	.94	.04	.15	.18	.36
	t:	5.43	-.31	1.91	.88	7.05	1.64	-3.38	5.22	5.05
	p:	<.01	ns	<.10	ns	<.01	.10	<.01	<.01	<.01
Proportion pure prior status offenders	Pre-Prog:	.10	.09	.22	.07	.25	.03	.04	.17	.11
	Prog:	.07	.07	.12	.09	.29	.03	.12	.07	.12
	t:	1.99	.87	2.36	-1.35	-1.44	.22	-2.92	3.15	-.84
	p:	<.05	ns	<.05	ns	ns	ns	<.01	<.01	ns
Proportion mixed instant offenses	Pre-Prog:	.16	.04	.01	.05	.07	.01	.00	.06	.06
	Prog:	.03	.05	.03	.02	.02	.01	.00	.05	.03
	t:	7.26	-1.06	-1.45	2.90	3.66	-.56		.18	5.75
	p:	<.01	ns	ns	<.01	<.01	ns	ns	ns	<.01
Proportion females	Pre-Prog:	.34	.52	.69	.43	.54	.51	.59	.59	.49
	Prog:	.43	.43	.71	.47	.63	.51	.57	.66	.53
	t:	-3.31	2.51	.42	-1.45	-3.17	-.14	.43	-1.79	-3.33
	p:	<.01	<.05	ns	ns	<.01	ns	ns	<.10	<.01
Proportion White	Pre-Prog:	.66	.64	.72	.68	.35	.62	1.00	.92	.65
	Prog:	.60	.67	.70	.76	.35	.76	.97	.94	.67
	t:	2.12	-1.00	.29	-3.04	-.13	-4.55	2.60	-.74	-1.49
	p:	<.05	ns	ns	<.01	ns	<.01	<.01	ns	ns

Table 1 (cont'd)
COMPARISONS ON INPUT VARIABLES BETWEEN PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM COHORTS: SIX MONTH COHORTS

Variable		Pima	Alameda	Conn.	Delaware	ILL.	S. Carolina	Clark	Spokane	National
Mean Age	Pre-Prog:	14.33	15.16	14.08	15.17	14.51	13.85	14.60	14.65	14.59
	Prog:	14.70	14.74	14.06	15.07	14.50	13.98	14.50	14.72	14.62
	t:	-4.13	3.46	.12	1.13	.08	-1.05	.62	-.50	-.96
	p:	<.01	<.01	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Proportion nuclear customary household	Pre-Prog:	.38	.31	.25	.43	.30	.37	.52	.35	.37
	Prog:	.48	.34	.37	.47	.31	.32	.40	.32	.39
	t:	-3.50	-.42	-2.19	-1.39	.37	1.63	2.34	.69	-1.89
	p:	<.01	ns	<.05	ns	ns	ns	<.05	ns	<.10
Proportion reconstituted customary household	Pre-Prog:	.12	.16	.22	.18	.12	.10	.14	.37	.16
	Prog:	.16	.18	.23	.15	.17	.18	.22	.29	.19
	t:	-1.80	-.38	-.27	1.33	-2.90	-3.59	-2.15	2.72	-3.59
	p:	<.10	ns	ns	ns	<.01	<.01	<.05	<.01	<.01
Proportion intact customary household**	Pre-Prog:	.50	.47	.46	.61	.42	.47	.66	.72	.52
	Prog:	.63	.52	.60	.62	.49	.50	.62	.61	.58
	t:	-4.80	-.68	-2.25	-.41	-2.35	-.93	.69	2.54	-4.47
	p:	<.01	ns	<.05	ns	<.05	ns	ns	<.05	<.01
N:	Pre-Prog:	506	440	167	557	437	452	228	172	2,959
	Prog:	766	302	145	723	734	393	173	478	3,714

* Logarithmic functions

** Intact household is a summary measure meaning either nuclear or reconstituted.

*** Mean prior offense scores (untransformed) were, for pre-program cohort: Pima, 2.07; Alameda, 1.46; Conn., 1.30; Del., 1.92; Ill., 4.72; S. Carolina, .52; Spokane, 1.52; Vancouver, .09. National, 1.88. For the program cohort the scores were: Pima, 1.09; Alameda, 1.53; Conn., .99; Delaware, 1.41; Illinois, 2.79; S. Carolina, .16; Vancouver, .39; Spokane, .62; National, 1.33.

The size of these differences is not very substantial, however, except in the case of prior offenses. Since prior record has uniformly appeared as a major predictor of recidivism--often as the major predictor--this difference is of major importance. Thus the absence of control groups is costly, and the current analysis must attempt to control on prior record (as well as the other differentiating variables) while undertaking comparisons of recidivism rates. But after-the-fact statistical controls do not equate with random assignment controls.

For those less accustomed to interpreting data such as those displayed in Table 1, we can offer the following with respect to the differences at the national level. The program groups had significantly fewer prior offenses, including fewer status offenses, and they did not have delinquent charges included in the instant offense. Thus, in terms of offense history, they constituted a less serious group of offenders confirming earlier comments about "net-widening" in the DSO program.

Program clients did not differ significantly on age or ethnicity, but were more likely to be female. With respect to household composition, they were significantly more likely to come from intact parental situations, homes with two parents whether natural or step. This, again, suggests a client selection process favoring less serious cases than those in the pre-program cohort, although the difference is not a large one.

The expectation from these indications of a less serious program clientele are clear; less serious cases, other things being equal, should yield lower recidivism rates. Thus, in our comparative analysis, if the program/pre-program comparison yields lower recidivism rates for the program group, we will be hard put to credit this to the program, even with the inclusion

of the control variables in the regression equation. If the analysis yields differences in rates which are either equivocal or unfavorable toward the program group, then the implication will be that the program may have contributed to a higher level of recidivism than probably would have occurred without the program.¹¹

Since the analysis will look at the results in each site, it is appropriate to look down each column in Table 1 to observe the intersite differences both in the levels of the scores and in the program/pre-program differences. For instance, the Alameda comparison reveals almost no difference between the two cohorts; Alameda might thus stand as a critical case for the recidivism analysis.¹² By way of contrast, Pima County differs on virtually all the comparisons; recidivism comparisons in that site must be viewed with the greatest degree of skepticism.

Clark County is somewhat different from the others in that it shows major reversals in direction; it has more prior offenses and more non-intact family situations among its program clients. On the other hand, the pre-program group was such a non-serious group to begin with that no other result might have been possible.

In terms of the general seriousness of the cases selected in each site, other contrasts also emerge. For instance, Illinois clearly involved the

¹¹. This judgment is, of course, qualified by the fact that the control group (offense matched pre-program sample) was not generated by a random assignment design.

¹². An unfortunate mix-up in research procedures in Alameda County forced the local evaluator there to reconstitute the evaluation sample. The reconstituted sample was derived by an ex post facto matching procedure which presumably is the basis for the absence of differences between the two Alameda cohorts.

most serious prior offense patterns. One must wonder, especially in the case of South Carolina with .16 mean score for prior offenses,¹³ whether the "D" in DSO had any real meaning at all.

RECIDIVISM

Six month recidivism: The procedure for establishing the nature of recidivism rate differences between the two cohorts was to enter in a regression equation each of the variables listed earlier in this chapter. These variables fell under the categories of site, offense history, instant offense, demographic characteristics, time variables, and recidivism measures. With all these variables included, and with the inclusion of the site by program interactions, a highly significant multiple r of .39 is achieved, explaining 16 percent of the total variance in recidivism. The largest single contribution, as might be expected, is the number of prior offenses.

If one reviews the overall regression equation without seeking inter-site variation, it appears that program participation had no significant effect.¹⁴ That is, six month recidivism rates did not differ between pre-program and program cohorts once the comparison variables were controlled statistically. At this most gross level of analysis, DSO failed to reduce rates of recidivism in comparison with expectations derived from the pre-program group. However, this statement fails to be sensitive to the inter-site variations in program which are of course very substantial. Thus the regression was re-run with site by program interactions included. These interaction terms, which boost the overall multiple r only slightly, to

¹³. This is the actual, untransformed score.

¹⁴. Tables are available on request.

.40, are included to capture information on differences between sites in the effects of program participation.

The result of this new analysis is to produce a significant and negative F value for the site by program interaction, significant beyond the .001 level of probability. Overall, the analysis shows a moderately deleterious impact--higher recidivism rates at six months--attributable to program participation. The exception to this conclusion is Pima County which shows a significant positive effect (Beta coefficient -.09, F=39.03). The other sites show no significant departure from the overall negative main effect.

¹⁵ Whatever qualifications may be put on these findings, they raise serious questions regarding program impact on the recidivism of its clients. Even though the differences we have found are not large, they move in a direction opposite to an expected program effect of reduced recidivism, except in the single case of Pima County. Pima County, it will be recalled, stood out in our analysis of comparison variables as the most "suspect" of all because its pre-program cohort differed so markedly from its program cohort. Further, these findings of deleterious impact stand in face of the expectation, in view of the non-serious nature of the overall program cohort, that recidivism should be less in this cohort even without the introduction of the DSO program.

However, before allowing this conclusion to stand as final, we will test complications that might have arisen from two sources, the very low

¹⁵. An important caution to be observed in interpreting this finding is that to the extent the program succeeded in reducing the use of detention, its clients were likely to have enjoyed more "street time" than was available to the pre-program group, with increased opportunity to commit delinquent acts. The program may thus have reduced the incapacitation effect of detention on program clients.

prior offense mean and variance in Clark County and the aforementioned pre-program problem in Pima County.

The problem with the Clark County data, and less so with South Carolina as well, is that the necessarily low variance in the offense data might have attenuated the overall national effect. Therefore the entire regression analysis was repeated using seven rather than eight sites with Clark County excluded. The results were almost identical to the earlier findings except for the emergence of instant offense truancy as a predictor of recidivism and a very slight reduction of variance explained from .16 to .15.

The Pima County problem needs some elaboration. It was noted earlier that the program group in Pima County was more divergent from the pre-program group than was the case in any other site. The selection of the period of the pre-program cohort might have been the reason for this. As noted earlier, there were in fact two such periods and two cohorts selected in Pima County. The year immediately prior to the program was selected, as it was in all other sites, in order to reduce extraneous intervening factors related to time. However, the main ingredient of the Pima County program was the Mobile Diversion Unit (see Chapter IV). As in most other sites selected for the DSO program, Pima County was already moving in the direction of status offender deinstitutionalization. Specifically, the Mobile Diversion Unit was in place and functioning during the year immediately preceding the program.

Because of this program continuity, it was felt advisable to select a second pre-program cohort, representing a period two years prior to the program when Mobile Diversion was not yet functioning. It was in fact this "pre-preprogram" cohort which was reflected in Table 1 and in the regression analyses reported above.

The use of this cohort was not incorrect; it was merely a choice between two non-satisfactory alternatives, between a group more distant in time but "program-pure" and a group more close in time but "contaminated" by possible anticipatory program effects. Perhaps the major problem with having employed the more distant time period is that Pima County was the only one of the eight sites with such a pre-program period. Thus it could be that this site's production of a beneficial program, as contrasted with the other seven, is an artifact of period selection. The case can be made that the immediately preceding year--with Mobile Diversion--is the appropriate year because it was in existence without the federal DSO carrot; i.e., the DSO program was merely a veneer over an already functioning structure.

With these thoughts in mind, we undertook a regression analysis of the Pima County program and immediate pre-program group. The result, employing the same control variables as before, was that there was no significant difference in recidivism between the two cohorts. The use of the same time period in Pima County as was used in other sites had the effect of washing away the one case of beneficial impact. DSO seems not to have added any impact of value on recidivism over and above what was apparently already taking place in the absence of DSO.

16. However, this one case of beneficial effect based on the use of an earlier pre-program group suggests that the use of a pre-program group drawn from the year prior to program start may have obscured a similar effect at other sites. If so, the effect would be attributable to the general movement to deinstitutionalize status offenders rather than to the program itself. In varying degrees most sites had also been reducing the use of detention in delinquent as well as status offender cases. It is possible that the positive effect seen in Pima County would have been reproduced at other sites if the pre-program comparison groups there had also been drawn from an earlier period.

Twelve month recidivism: The advantages of assessing recidivism over a longer time period are several. Any delayed program effects, either positive or negative, have a greater opportunity to appear. Program effects which take place toward the end of the treatment period or which are cumulative in effect have a greater opportunity to appear. Independent reactions, positive and negative, to initial recidivism offenses can be demonstrated more clearly. Delayed effects, dependent upon interactions with maturation or community changes likewise have more opportunity to become evident. Finally, from a statistical viewpoint, more time means more offenses committed and greater variance within which to discern differential impact.

However, the character of the DSO program has damaged the 12-month analysis to an unfortunate extent. Two sites, Connecticut and Clark County had foreshortened data collection periods. In the case of Connecticut, this was due to a very considerable delay in program start-up. (See Chapter X). In Clark County the shorter follow-up period resulted from the failure of an initial effort to obtain a comparison group by the random assignment of clients to the program and to normal court processing. An attempt was then made to substitute a pre-program comparison group for the now unusable control group. However, the effort was undertaken too close to the end of funded activity to permit more than a six-month follow-up. Thus the 12-month recidivism analysis has been carried out on the data from the remaining six sites.

In this analysis, we are dealing with far smaller numbers in each of the six sites because the period between program completion and the last date on which data could be collected was variably less than twelve months.

TABLE 2
COMPARISONS ON INPUT VARIABLES BETWEEN PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM COHORTS;
TWELVE-MONTH COHORTS

Variable		Pima	Alameda	Delaware	Illinois	S. Carolina	Spokane	National
Mean prior offense score*, ***	Pre-Prog:	1.10	.87	.88	2.09	.34	.90	1.00
	Prog:	.61	.93	.79	1.54	.13	.46	.76
	t:	5.53	-.57	.96	5.34	4.03	4.78	6.04
	p:	<.01	ns	ns	<.01	<.01	<.01	<.01
Mean prior status offense score*	Pre-Prog:	.54	.35	.33	1.41	.07	.53	.51
	Prog:	.20	.36	.35	1.00	.04	.18	.37
	t:	5.52	-.19	-.37	4.65	1.20	5.01	5.06
	p:	<.01	ns	ns	<.01	ns	<.01	<.01
Proportion pure prior status offenders	Pre-Prog:	.15	.11	.07	.27	.04	.17	.13
	Prog:	.06	.09	.12	.32	.02	.06	.12
	t:	3.14	.90	-1.78	-1.18	.95	3.43	.88
	p:	<.01	ns	<.10	ns	ns	<.01	ns
Proportion mixed instant offenses	Pre-Prog:	.16	.04	.04	.07	.00	.06	.06
	Prog:	.03	.05	.02	.02	.02	.05	.03
	t:	4.74	-.36	1.16	2.77	-1.26	.35	3.48
	p:	<.01	ns	ns	<.01	ns	ns	<.01
Proportion females	Pre-Prog:	.39	.54	.43	.59	.51	.59	.51
	Prog:	.42	.37	.50	.59	.48	.66	.51
	t:	-.64	3.40	-1.61	.07	.72	-1.41	.22
	p:	ns	<.01	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

COMPARISONS ON INPUT VARIABLES BETWEEN PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM COHORTS;
TWELVE-MONTH COHORTS

Variable		Pima	Alameda	Delaware	Illinois	S. Carolina	Spokane	National
Proportion White	Pre-Prog:	.57	.65	.67	.34	.64	.92	.62
	Prog:	.55	.63	.74	.33	.78	.93	.64
	t:	.49	.31	-1.59	.34	-3.32	-.24	-1.01
	p:	ns	ns	ns	ns	<.01	ns	ns
Mean Age	Pre-Prog:	14.10	15.11	15.33	14.49	13.99	14.65	14.62
	Prog:	14.67	14.74	15.07	14.44	13.95	14.70	14.61
	t:	-4.32	2.16	1.83	.34	.22	-.34	.14
	p:	< .01	< .05	<.10	ns	ns	ns	ns
Proportion nuclear customary household	Pre-Prog:	.32	.31	.44	.29	.37	.35	.35
	Prog:	.44	.41**	.46	.30	.31	.33	.38
	t:	-1.30	-.99	-.44	-.08	1.42	.44	-1.52
	p:	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Proportion reconstituted customary household	Pre-Prog:	.12	.16**	.18	.08	.09	.37	.16
	Prog:	.16	.14	.12	.18	.18	.30	.19
	t:	-1.18	.32	1.69	-3.45	-2.64	1.61	-2.15
	p:	ns	ns	<.10	<.01	<.01	ns	<.05
Proportion intact customary household	Pre-Prog:	.44	.47**	.61	.37	.47	.72	.50
	Prog:	.60	.55	.58	.47	.49	.63	.56
	t:	-3.90	-.68	.78	-2.32	-.47	2.04	-3.09
	p:	<.01	ns	ns	<.05	ns	<.05	<.01
N:	Pre-Prog:	214	283	261	228	286	172	1,444
	Prog:	449	152	252	320	193	316	1,682

* Logarithmic functions

** Alameda pre-program group had 130 cases with missing family data.

*** Mean prior offense scores (untransformed) were for pre-program cohort: Pima, 2.08; Alameda, 1.40; Delaware, 1.60; Illinois, 4.70; S. Carolina, .51; Spokane, 1.52; National, 1.89. For the program cohort, the scores were: Pima, .93; Alameda, 1.63; Delaware, 1.37; Ill., 3.22; S. Carolina, .15; Spokane, .69; National, 1.36.

Thus many clients simply didn't have sufficient time "at risk" to be included here. The new numbers are shown at the bottom of Table 2, which is the 12-month counterpart to Table 1 comparing the two cohorts on input variables.

Not much need be said about the data displayed in Table 2. The general pattern is similar, as would be expected, to that of Table 1 which was based on the larger full six-month cohorts. Row differences remain substantially the same except that the finding of significantly more females in the program cohort does not hold true for the 12-month comparison.

Reading down the columns, it appears that Pima County remains the site with the greatest number of differences, but the effect is smaller now. Alameda remains a case of few differences, but it is now Delaware which has the fewest. Overall, there has been a reduction of 29 percent, from Table 1 to Table 2, in the number of differences reaching the .05 level of significance. This general trend toward reduction of differences, while not very pronounced, should reduce slightly the difficulty in uncovering "true" recidivism differences between the two cohorts.

Since the reader is familiar with the pattern of the six-month regression analysis, we can report the results of the 12-month regression more briefly. The variables employed in the equation account for a slightly greater amount of the total variance. With a multiple r of .46, an r square of .21 is obtained. This is an additional .05 over the variance explained in the six-month analysis. Once again, the equation without the site by program interactions reveals no significant program impact. However, the site by program interactions are highly significant ($F=10.18$, $P<.01$), suggesting that the program, in the light of an apparently heavy

inflow of relatively minor offenders, may have increased client recidivism. As was the case earlier, Pima County emerges with a statistically significant counter trend (beneficial) based upon the pre-preprogram cohort. If the pre-program cohort exposed to Mobile Diversion were employed, this program effect would presumably be substantially reduced. Unfortunately, these 12-month data were not collected in Pima County and this cannot be clearly demonstrated.

Overall, then, the 12-month recidivism analysis confirms the six-month analysis. On the criterion of re-arrest, the DSO program does not emerge as a success. It has apparently contributed to a somewhat higher rate of recidivism among a cohort of youngsters, many but certainly not all of whom were probably not appropriate clients for a deinstitutionalization program. Whether such a result would have occurred in sites which had not yet instituted significant movement toward deinstitutionalization is an unanswerable question: we are reluctant to generalize from the one pattern to the other.

SITE BY SITE COMMENT

All of the preceding material constitutes one part of the "national" analysis. But in truth, there has been debate since the very first day of research planning for the DSO program over whether or not a "national" analysis was appropriate or even possible. This debate, involving the national evaluation staff, the local evaluators, the NIJJDP staff, and the advisory committee to the national staff, has consisted of a friendly yet intense discussion concerning the process of aggregating data over eight rather disparate sites.

The basic question in these discussions has been the feasibility of disentangling the contextual effects of site, as a categorical variable, from the effects of client characteristics and the effects of program and service variables. Further, even if one could disentangle these effects might there not be additional unmeasured characteristics associated with site, as a variable, which would confound any aggregated analysis?

No final resolution to the question achieved consensus; indeed the debate mirrored what are currently unresolved positions in evaluation research generally. Our approach in this report has been to "surround" the question with several analytic approaches, accepting the premise that what we have are not eight replications of a DSO program, but eight variations. Further, we explicitly accept the probability of contextual and selective biases associated with the site variable. That is, we acknowledge that different sites will reflect differences in client selection and processing, differences in program development and style, and differences in specific services offered.

This premise, and the acknowledgement of such differences, is implicit in the preceding chapters and in the earlier pages of this chapter. We have attempted, both descriptively and analytically, to provide both a national overview and a sensitization to differences associated with the eight sites. The additional reports by Robert Carter, Frank Hellum and Jon Miller also mirror the concern for site differences and give less attention to the need for cross-site aggregation. Finally, the two modes of analysis following this chapter help to triangulate on this issue of the level of analysis.

By way of prelude to these forthcoming analyses and as a complement to the preceding aggregate-level analysis, we present below some thumb-

"nail sketches of the six- and twelve-month analyses within each of the eight sites.

The aim of the intra-site analyses was to replicate as closely as possible the structure of the regression reported above on the aggregated data. However, certain site idiosyncrasies made this impracticable. There were, in different combinations, empty or near-empty categories of instant status offense, yearly quarter of referral, and ethnicity. This meant that in different sites, the possible combinations of dummy or effect coded dichotomous variables would vary and that, for the instant status offense variables, the "omitted category" implied by the intrasite regressions would vary as well. There are six tables of data summarizing the missing and collapsed data categories by site: these are not included here in the belief that most readers will not be concerned with this level of detail. They are, however, available on request from the national evaluation staff.

Pima County

Using the pre-preprogram cohort, we find that overall program impact is positive and statistically significant at six months, as noted earlier. Instant offenses of runaway and ungovernability are significantly related to increased recidivism while nuclear customary household is significantly related to reduced recidivism. As we are accustomed to finding, number of prior offenses is the single best predictor of recidivism.

At twelve months, the proportion of variance explained almost doubles, from .14 at six months to .24. This and other increased coefficients are probably due, at least in part, to the greater variation available in twelve month recidivism scores. For instance, at twelve months, both

mixed instant offense and gender now have significant F values. The program effect remains significantly positive at twelve months.

However, when the pre-program cohort is used, the one more analogous to the seven other pre-program cohorts but with an ongoing mobile diversion unit, the picture is quite different. At six months, there is no program effect whatsoever, and only prior record and instant offense of runaway are significantly related to recidivism. As noted earlier (p. 7), no twelve month data were collected on this pre-program cohort.

Alameda County

The proportion of total variance explained is .14 at six months and .16 at twelve months. In both analyses, program effect appears deleterious, but it is not statistically significant. Prior record predicts to increased recidivism in both analyses. Ungovernability does so in the six month analysis, but fails to reach significance at twelve months. The same is true of a pure status offense prior record. Mixed instant offense emerges as a significant predictor at twelve months but not at six. Remembering our earlier suggestion that the Alameda program/pre-program comparisons perhaps best typified the aggregated national picture, the small number of significant effects and their inconsistency over time in this site may serve as a bellwether of disappointing relationships between program inputs and results.

Connecticut

The state of Connecticut proved a difficult site in many ways, and necessary compromises may have worked against a satisfactory evaluation. Resistance to the DSO program on the part of the court, police, and service provider agencies was far greater here than elsewhere. The most properly

restrictive client definition emerged here (i.e., the closest to the concept of a "detainable" client). Access to police records was generally not obtainable by the local evaluator, and access to court records was only partially achieved after much negotiation and bad feeling on all sides.

Total variance explained was .12 at six months. There was no twelve month analysis. The program effect at six months was deleterious although not at a statistically significant level. Mixed instant offense, gender, and age predict to recidivism, as does runaway instant offense but, surprisingly, prior record does not. This latter may be a function of the record access problem noted above.

Delaware

Variance explained in this site was .13 at six months and .16 at twelve. The program effect was deleterious but non-significant at both points of time. At six months, several instant offenses and gender, along with prior record, are the significant predictors. At twelve months, instant offenses generally fail to retain significance, while age and nuclear family are added to gender and prior record as significant predictors. Thus personal or demographic characteristics emerge as primary while offense type and program involvement predict less effectively. This type of finding will emerge more generally in analyses to be reported in a subsequent chapter. At twelve months, it may be recalled from the earlier aggregated analysis, Delaware emerged with Alameda as typical of the overall national picture.

Illinois

While Illinois was spoken of as a state program, the evaluation took place only in Cook County (Chicago) and several downstate counties. Due to the inequality of population densities, the findings most generally

reflect the situation in Cook County. For instance, Illinois had the most serious offenders in its program, to judge from their prior records, and the largest proportion of offenders from non-intact homes. In this sense, DSO might have had its most critical test in this site. On the other hand, the Illinois program was the narrowest in conception and consequently cannot provide a very comprehensive test.

Total variance explained is .11 for six months, increasing to .18 for twelve. The program effect is in the deleterious direction but not significant. Prior record, gender, age, and ethnicity are the significant predictors in both the six and twelve month cohorts. Instant offense type, limited essentially to runaway and ungovernability, was not related to recidivism. As in Delaware, demographic characteristics are the predominant predictors.

South Carolina

South Carolina had the most non-serious program clientele of any of the sites. Most had no prior records and no juvenile justice contact in connection with the instant "offense" (the quotation marks are necessary; the "offense" is a service worker's description, not an official charge). One would worry in such a situation about the creation of a criminal record via unjustified client selection and stigmatization. And indeed at six months, although not at twelve, the deleterious program effect almost reaches statistical significance at the .05 level.

With the least serious offenders and the youngest offenders of all sites, one might also expect recidivism to show more randomness and less responsiveness to patterned variable relationships. Again, the expectation is fulfilled; proportion variance explained with our variables is only .08 at six months (rivalled only by Clark County) and .11 at twelve. In both the

six and twelve month cohorts, only prior record (as usual) and mixed instant offense emerge as significant predictors of recidivism. Question may be raised whether the South Carolina clientele was altogether appropriate for a deinstitutionalization program. They were "swallowed up" in the service track of a far larger Youth Service Bureau program, in which a variety of youth problems, many not necessarily related to delinquency, were served in the DSO program. Thus it may be small wonder that South Carolina provides so little of value to our analysis. Yet its near-significant deleterious program effect should stand as a warning against "treating" those not yet targetable as appropriate clients.

Clark County *

As with Connecticut, we have only a six month analysis for this site. As with South Carolina, we can explain only eight percent of the variance, and following the South Carolina pattern we have a deleterious program effect, but in this case one which well exceeds statistical significance. This may be due to the low variation in recidivism in the pre-program as compared to the program cohort, such that recidivism effects could only be manifested in the program group. This was the reason, earlier, for running a seven-site regression which, as it turned out, yielded the same results as the full regression.

Still, the Clark County results show the same pattern as those for South Carolina, with exaggeration. Not only are there no significant predictors other than program involvement; even prior record fails to relate to recidivism. The lesson of these two sites would seem to be two-fold: (1) with inappropriate clientele (net-widening) the usual delinquency-related variables are inoperative, and (2) the danger of creating recidivism may be significantly increased. There may be no greater criticism

*See footnote in conclusion of this chapter.

than this for programs that aim to treat "pre-delinquents." Early intervention receives no support from the DSO evaluation.

Spokane

Here, total variance explained was again low, being .11 in both time periods. The program effect, while in the beneficial direction, was very insignificant. At six months, the significant predictors were prior record, age, and time period variables. At twelve months, the same pattern emerges except that gender replaces age. Again, the intra-site analysis shows more randomness than hints for successful programming.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Among the several ways in which the effect of the DSO program may be assessed, this chapter examines its impact on the offense behavior of program clients. Their offenses recorded in police and court records for 6 and 12 months subsequent to program entry were compared to the recidivism of a cohort of officially recorded status offenders during the year preceding the start of the program at each of the eight sites included in the evaluation study. For reasons beyond the control of the study, the comparability of the two groups was reduced by larger proportions in the pre-program cohort of individuals with prior criminal and status offenses. Other differences between program and pre-program cohorts existed but they were insubstantial on the average over the eight sites. The range of comparability was defined by the Alameda County program at one extreme, in which there were virtually no differences between the two cohorts, and the Pima County program in which the cohorts differed substantially in offense history as well as in the demographic and family variables.

To obtain post-hoc statistical control in view of the approximate comparability of the two groups, a multiple regression procedure was

employed in data analysis. The following findings emerged:

1) With the comparison variables controlled statistically, recidivism rates aggregated over the eight sites did not differ between the program and the pre-program cohorts at six-month follow-up.

2) However, when site as a variable was taken into account, with the site-program interaction term included in the regression equation, the program cohort overall exhibited statistically significant higher recidivism rates at six-month follow-up than did the pre-program cohort. Clients in the Pima County program were the single exception: their recidivism rates were lower, with the difference statistically significant.

3) The exception to this finding, the Pima County program, may be accounted for by the fact that, in contrast to other sites, the pre-program cohort was drawn from a period predating the general movement to deinstitutionalize status offenders. To a greater or lesser extent, in all other sites status offender deinstitutionalization was under way during the year prior to program start-up.

4) With minor exceptions, the twelve-month recidivism analysis yielded findings identical with those of the six-month analysis.

5) Recidivism analysis of the data disaggregated by site revealed that in only two sites were the offense scores for the program clients lower than for the pre-program cohorts: Pima County and Spokane. In the former the difference, as already noted, was statistically significant; in Spokane it was not. In the other six sites, offense scores for the program clients were higher than for the pre-program comparison groups, although in no case did the difference reach statistical significance.

It should be at once apparent that the findings from the aggregated and the disaggregated data differ with respect to the level of statistical

significance attached to the higher recidivism scores of program clients. In the latter case the difference falls short of an acceptable level of probability. However, the major trend is in a direction that suggests the probable validity of the finding based on the aggregated data, namely, that program clients tended to be slightly more recidivistic than their comparison cohorts. This is the more unexpected in view of the more substantial offense histories of the comparison cohorts.

The findings of the comparative recidivism analysis may be interpreted in diverse ways. First, they provide some support for the view that furnishing a program of non-court services for minor juvenile offenders, many of whom might not have come to official attention, may have the effect of increasing their visibility and entangling them unnecessarily in the sanctioning machinery of juvenile justice. Offense rates may reflect official action as much as they do actual offense behavior. Paradoxically, this is precisely the effect that a deinstitutionalization strategy seeks to avoid.

Second, the strikingly deviant case of the Pima County program, where the comparison group constituted more appropriately a sample drawn from a pre-deinstitutionalization era,¹⁷ suggests on the other hand that the avoidance of secure confinement of status offense cases does in fact reduce recidivism. However, this interpretation should be entertained with caution. The eligibility criteria for entry into the Pima County program were among

17. The reader may raise the question why the comparison groups were not drawn at all sites from a period more remote from the initiation of the program. The reason for this was the naive assumption of the evaluation research design that all deinstitutionalization programs would be funded in jurisdictions in which the detention and institutionalization of status offenders was still in full flower.

the most liberal of all, possibly exceeding those of the South Carolina program (see Chapter IV).

Finally, in view of the difficulties encountered in obtaining entirely adequate data, and of the small and frequently non-significant differences in recidivism scores between the program and comparison groups in five of the eight programs, the findings may also be interpreted reasonably as indicating "no difference." In that case, the question of a beneficial effect of the program may be reversed to challenge the preventive utility of secure confinement in status offender cases. Briefly, if status offenders who are not detained and institutionalized exhibit approximately the same rate of recidivism as those who are subjected to confinement, why lock them up? The pre-program comparison group was not provided an expanded set of services, but their recidivism rates did not differ materially from those of the program clients who received such services.

However, skepticism regarding the utility of non-court community based services as a means of recidivism reduction may be unwarranted in the light of a related issue. In many chronic status offense cases, the offense behavior is likely to be symptomatic of a seriously impaired life situation, frequently beyond the reach of standard court services. It remains possible that failure to provide additional non-court services would compound the massive neglect to which chronic status offenders may have already been subject.

The diversity of possible interpretations of the recidivism analysis seems to foreclose the kind of definitive recommendation that evaluation studies are expected to provide. However, a balanced view suggests the following: Pending the development of intervention programs in status

offense cases that are demonstrably more effective than those of the prevailing type, there is no gain in recidivism reduction associated either with their secure confinement or with their referral to programs of remediation.

FOOTNOTE from page 32

*An analysis conducted by the Clark County program site evaluator showed a substantially more favorable recidivism outcome. However, in that analysis, the test population included in addition to evaluation eligibles, as we have defined them, those program clients in a concurrent control group as well as subjects in an historical comparison group who became program clients. Their recidivism was defined as re-referral to the court within specified time periods. The analysis reported here was based solely on evaluation eligibles, excluding subjects from the concurrent and the historical comparison groups who were given program services. Recidivism was measured by reappearance in the police records. For the site evaluator's report, see Final Report on the Clark County Project to Deinstitutionalize Status Offenders. Eugene, Ore.: Institute for Policy Analysis, 1978.

CHAPTER XVI

WHAT WORKS FOR WHOM: THE USES OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

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CHAPTER XVI

WHAT WORKS FOR WHOM: THE USES OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

Katherine Teilmann and John Peterson

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the relative effectiveness of the various types of services offered to clients in the eight sites, and to determine whether certain types of services are more effective for certain types of clients. The first section of this chapter will describe the services offered and their variation across sites. The second section will describe the methods of sampling and data collection; the third section analyzes the "biases" involved in assigning clients to services, thereby indicating potential confounding variables in the relation between service type and recidivism. The remainder of the chapter presents results of the analyses.

SERVICES

In this chapter, the focus is on the services delivered to DSO clients. It is important, therefore, to describe them and how they differ in the various DSO program sites. For example, crisis intervention in one site may not be crisis intervention in another site, and this fact must be taken into account when interpreting analyses which inspect the effectiveness of crisis intervention for reducing recidivism.

If one is to compare the relative effectiveness of many services, some means must be devised to categorize the services along meaningful dimensions. Dimensions along which services could be categorized must surely be infinite (e.g. the degree to which they control behavior, what assumptions are implicit about client problems, therapeutic style, etc.). Most possible classifications were precluded for lack of information on what happened to specific clients. It was not possible to obtain data on service delivery beyond the most general classification of the type of

services usually offered by the agency to whom the client was referred. Given this constraint, an effort was made to devise categories which would have meaning to practitioners, although we recognize that most abstractions beyond the individual client will be unsatisfactory to many practitioners. Eight categories (including "other") were ultimately used to classify services received. In the actual analysis, however, there are usually only six categories since the three residential services were often collapsed to one category (i.e. "residential"). Below are descriptions of these categories and how they varied across sites.

(1) Diversion, diagnostic and evaluation screening

This category refers to a unit that (a) makes decisions about clients determining which, if any, of various treatment intervention strategies and programs the client will receive and (b) is considered a specific DSO program service that provides a referral for additional service: e.g. mobile diversion unit, diagnostic and evaluation unit or "emergency" crisis intervention. The latter refers to an intervention strategy that attempts to resolve crises during single meetings, with a capacity to refer clients to additional service(s). This can be contrasted with "extended" crisis intervention where the strategy includes a capacity for continued contacts and possible referral to additional service(s). Extended crisis intervention would be coded as outreach (6) or counseling (7) depending upon the nature of the service and the client's situation. Following are descriptions of the programs in each site that fit this general description.

Pima County. "Mobil Diversion Unit" consisting of five to six radio equipped cars in the field, operating 24 hours a day, staffed by probation officers. Units picked up clients from police, courts, schools, etc., attempted to return clients to parents' homes and resolve crises. Clients were referred to additional services if required.

Alameda County. A 24-hour a day specialized family crisis intervention unit. Attempts were made to deal with the family while in a crisis situation, and then return the client home as soon as possible. Some agencies were staffed by probation officers and others by private practitioners.

Connecticut. Status offenders were removed from detention and given one-time-only crisis counselling. The program was run and staffed by the Department of Child and Family Services (a public welfare agency).

Delaware. This was a unit run by the family court which took clients from detention facilities and provided advanced diagnostic screening for referral to service agencies.

Illinois. This was a program staffed by youth advocates hired for the specific purpose of intervening at police or court intake, and returning clients to their homes or to temporary shelter care while awaiting court hearings.

South Carolina. This was a program staffed by the Department of Youth Services (the state's juvenile correctional agency) to do crisis counseling, testing and youth advocacy. Referrals came from courts, schools, parents and self-referrals.

Clark County. Crisis family counseling was provided on a 24-hour basis by court staff hired for this function. Clients came from court intake:

Spokane County. This was a specialized family crisis intervention unit operating 24 hours per day. It was run by Youth Alternatives, a private agency with trained counselors. Counseling was short-term and oriented to the immediate crisis. Concerted efforts were made to return clients to their homes as soon as possible, resolve the family conflict and then, when necessary, to refer on to agencies for services designed to meet their special needs.

Residential Treatment:

(2) Shelter Care

This service refers to temporary residential facilities where placement is 30 days or less. Examples include emergency housing and care for runaways, homes for children awaiting some official action that will lead to another placement, and a temporary community-based residential program for acting out clients. There may be crisis or short term intervention services, such as counseling, provided on a routine basis within this facility. In such cases, these were not coded as separate or additional services.

(3) Group Home

This category refers to residential facilities where placement is for 31 days or more. There may be services routinely provided at the facility, such as counseling, recreation, job placement or training, and youth advocacy. In such cases, these services were not coded as separate or additional services.

(4) Foster Home

This would be a residential placement in a single family home with the adult male and/or female serving as parent surrogate. In some instances, where foster parents have been trained, there were special services provided which were not coded as separate or additional services. Following are descriptions of the programs in each site that were coded into the categories described above (2,3, and 4).

Pima County. Temporary shelter care only was used; no group homes. These facilities were privately run.

Alameda County. Two crisis receiving homes were funded under the DSO program. Police were able to refer to them directly if parents were unavailable. Length of stay averaged less than two to three days. Short term foster homes were used as well if crisis homes were overloaded.

Connecticut. Privately run emergency shelter care was used in Connecticut.

Delaware. Privately run emergency shelter care only was used here.

Illinois. Temporary shelter in private foster homes, shelter or group homes was provided where needed until the child's court date (within ten court days).

South Carolina. Foster home placement consisted of volunteer families provided by the Alston Wilkes Society. The families agreed to take, without pay, one or two clients per year for a period of from one day to one week. Other residential placements consisted of large group homes and orphanage type institutions.

Clark County. The DSO program contracted with the public welfare agency (DSHS) for foster, shelter and group homes, usually for short-term care.

Spokane County. Privately run emergency shelter care and group homes were used in this site.

(5) Multiple Service Centers

This service type refers to non-residential agencies and organizations such as the YMCA, youth service bureaus, and neighborhood drop-in centers where the focus of services is on recreation, handicrafts, character building, employment referrals, advocacy, tutoring, etc., rather than solely on psychological counseling or crisis intervention. Also, such services are designed for the general youth population, rather than for a special problem group. If these services are provided in a shelter or group home setting as part of their routine programming, then MSC (5)

was not coded separately. Following are site-specific descriptions of the uses of this code.

Pima County. Several programs in this site fell into this category: The YMCA mini-bike program, arts, grooming, theater, recreation and advocacy programs as well as a unique Young Women's Center which provided a variety of services including counseling for pregnancy, health care, abortion, GED (general education diploma) and advocacy.

Alameda County. Programs in this site conformed quite well to the general description above. The programs did have an advocacy "flavor" to them, however.

Delaware and Illinois. These programs provided no services that would fall into this category.

South Carolina, Clark County and Spokane. Programs in these three sites did not vary in any unique way from the general description above.

(6) Outreach Intervention

Programs of this category varied a great deal across sites. They would probably be best thought of as another "other" category as they really are quite disparate. The category was meant to include short-term, intensive, non-residential intervention which responds to situational requirements and is designed to effect change in a variety of the clients' physical, social, and emotional circumstances. It is an outreach strategy in that the service is provided outside the agency office, such as in the home, on the street, or in other similar locations. Below are site-specific descriptions of programs coded into this category.

Pima County. Programs coded into the outreach category in Arizona were varied and might appropriately be called multiple service center programs except that they

were not formally organized in the way a YMCA, boys club or girls club, etc., are. The programs were usually in rural or suburban areas, catered to a general population, but responded to referrals resulting from trouble as well. They provided such services as counseling, advocacy, recreation, employment, and suicide counseling.

No outreach was offered in the Alameda County, Connecticut, or Delaware sites.

Illinois. In this site, outreach involved general supervision by youth advocates for the period during which the client was in home detention or in temporary shelter. The advocate would ensure the youth's appearance in court.

South Carolina. In this site, programs were coded as outreach (6) that focussed on youth advocacy, opportunity enhancement and some counseling. The programs were run by the Youth Bureaus (part of the Department of Youth Services).

Clark County. Here, outreach was coded where specialized services were contracted for. Such services included alcoholism programs, economic opportunity programs, legal aid, campfire girls, etc.

Spokane County. No outreach was offered in this site.

(7) Counseling only

In general, such programs were non-residential ones where the sole or primary service is individual or group psychological counseling or therapy, including work with the DSO client's family. While the length of the service duration was variable, it was offered at a specific location and on a scheduled basis. The actual service provided may be on a purchase of service arrangement or a DSO-funded program. Typically, this took place in a community center. However, if counseling was included in services provided by or at any of the other program

service types on a routine basis, those service types were coded.

Pima County. Few DSO clients were referred to programs which were oriented exclusively to counseling. The one major program of this type took its clientele from a general youth population through active recruitment, so most were not recorded in police files as status offenders. The program was DSO-funded and run by private agencies.

Alameda County. Clients categorized in this manner were referred to probation-run family crisis intervention units and private youth service centers focussing on extended family counseling.

Connecticut. The DSO program in this state was divided into three districts. The intention was for the districts to vary in the intensity of intervention. However, they ended up looking very much alike. Individual and family counseling were part of each program. Referrals almost always came from court for youths who were detained for status offenses. The counseling services were provided by private agencies.

Delaware. Individual and family counseling was provided by contracted private agencies.

Illinois. Few cases were referred to counseling agencies. Where they were used, it was for minimal counseling while awaiting court hearings.

South Carolina. Individual, family and group counseling was provided by Youth Bureaus (part of Corrections) and contract service agencies.

Clark County. The majority of the counseling referrals were to a court-based extended family counseling program.

Spokane County. Referrals coded into this category were cases judged to need more than

was offered in the crisis intervention (1) program provided by Youth Alternatives. Youth Alternatives made a concerted effort to obtain specialized services to meet the needs of the individual. In this site, it appeared that status offenses frequently resulted from drug related problems. Therefore, clients with these kinds of problems were referred to agencies specializing in drug problems to provide this service.

(8) Other

Programs that could not be classified under the first seven categories were coded (8). Programs coded in this category are described by site below.

Pima County. The following services were coded under "other": Youth Service Bureaus, Reading Clinic, employment agency, legal services.

Alameda County. No programs were classified as "other."

Connecticut. Non-DSO-funded long term residential support services were coded into this category.

Delaware. The following services were coded under "other": (a) legal services provided to clients upon request by Community Legal Aid Society (CLASI) and contracted by DSO, (b) detention and (c) non-DSO services.

Illinois. This category was not used for DSO clients.

South Carolina. The following services were coded under "other": (a) psychological testing services contracted for by Youth Service Bureau, (b) R & E Center - testing and observation. (Clients could be held for up to 45 days), and (c) detention - holding for disposition prior to court appearance.

Clark County. Protective custody (detention) was coded under "other."

Spokane County. Big Brothers, Boy/Girl Scouts, employment, and education programs were coded under "other."

As would be expected, services were distributed differently across sites and within sites. The majority of clients (51%) received only one service, while 97% received no more than three services. Based on this distribution, only three services were coded per client. Further, the analysis reported in this chapter only deals with original referrals. It was possible for a youth to terminate (successfully or unsuccessfully) one referral and later be re-referred to the DSO program. Services offered under such second referrals were not considered in this analysis. About 19% of all first referrals were followed by a second referral.

Table 1 shows the distribution of types of services by site. Unfortunately, not all sites offered all services, so most comparisons can be made only on a limited number of sites. It should be noted that Table 1 indicates the number of clients who received each type of service regardless of what other services may or may not have been given to the youth.* In other words, youths who received two services will appear in the table twice. Those who received three services will appear three times. Combinations of services will be addressed later.

Some combinations of services were quite common and should be dealt with as units rather than just separately. Table 2 shows the common combination of two services and forms the basis for selection of certain combinations to be tested in the analysis.

There were even some combinations of three services which were common enough to note. Table 3 shows these distributions across sites.

Of course, not all variables will be used on all sites since no site offered all program types. In fact, not all combinations shown in Tables 2 and 3 actually

*The total number of clients included in this analysis is drastically reduced from the total number recorded as entering the program. In Delaware, clients received at court intake by the Family Court Intake unit were not recorded as receiving services unless they appeared at one of the community agencies to which they were referred for additional services. In South Carolina, the missing cases are attributable to missing data.

Table 1

Services received by Site

Service*	Pima County (N=800)	Alameda County (N=326)	Connecticut (N=145)	Delaware (N=380)	Illinois (N=750)	S. Carolina (N=361)	Clark County (N=156)	Spokane County (N=470)
Div/Eval	549 68.6	136 41.7	41 28.7	104 27.4	740 98.7	25 6.9	140 89.7	468 99.6
Shelter	87 10.0	104 31.9	39 27.3	62 16.3	13 1.7	12 3.3	22 14.1	29 6.2
Group Home	0 0.0	1 0.3	4 2.8	10 2.6	29 3.9	45 12.5	2 1.3	26 5.5
Foster	2 0.8	17 5.2	2 1.4	26 6.8	314 41.9	3 0.8	1 0.6	0 0.0
Multi-Center	225 28.1	31 9.5	3 2.1	4 1.1	0 0.0	26 7.2	0 0.0	74 15.7
Outreach	79 9.9	0 0.0	2 1.4	0 0.0	184 24.5	15 4.2	5 3.2	0 0.0
Counseling only	98 12.2	155 47.5	107 74.8	259 68.2	6 0.8	350 96.9	69 44.2	115 24.5
Other	76 9.5	5 1.5	23 16.1	113 29.7	2 0.3	68 18.8	12 7.7	44 9.4
462 TOTAL Services Received	1116	449	221	578	1288	544	251	756

*If more than one service received, client appears in the table under each service received.
 Note: Percentages based on number of clients rather than number of services.

Table 2

Common Combinations of Two Services by Site

Combination	Pima County (N=800)	Alameda County (N=326)	Connecticut (N=143)	Delaware (N=380)	Illinois (N=750)	S. Carolina (N=361)	Clark County (N=156)	Spokane County (N=470)
Div/Shelter	56 7.0	78 23.9	13 9.1	22 5.8	12 1.6	-	18 11.5	28 6.0
Div/Multi-serv	99 12.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	73 15.5
Div/Outreach	19 2.4	-	-	-	177 23.6	-	-	-
Div/Counsel	53 6.6	11 3.4	-	53 13.9	-	21 5.8	57 36.5	113 24.0
Div/Foster	-	10 3.1	-	14 3.7	310 41.3	-	-	-
Div/Group	-	-	-	-	26 3.5	-	-	26 5.5
Div/Other	16 2.0	-	17 11.9	38 10.0	-	-	-	44 9.4
Shelt/Multi-serv	13 1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shelt/Foster	-	15 4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shelt/Counsel	-	11 3.4	25 17.5	29 7.6	-	10 2.8	12 7.7	-
Shelt/Other	-	-	-	16 4.2	-	-	-	-
Group/Counsel	-	-	-	-	-	40 11.1	-	-
Group/Other	-	-	-	-	-	18 5.0	-	-
Foster/Outreach	-	-	-	-	99 13.2	-	-	-
Multi-serv/outreach	22 2.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2 (Cont'd)

Common Combinations of Two Services by Site

Combination	Pima County (N=800)	Alameda County (N=326)	Connecticut (N=143)	Delaware (N=380)	Illinois (N=750)	S. Carolina (N=361)	Clark County (N=156)	Spokane County (N=470)
Multi/Serv/Counsel	15 1.9	-	-	-	-	25 6.9	-	-
Outreach/Counsel	26 3.3	-	-	-	-	14 3.9	-	-
Outreach/Other	12 1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Counsel/Other	-	-	-	39 10.3	-	64 17.7	-	-
Other Combina- tions of 2	36 4.5	20 6.1	38 26.6	39 10.3	28 3.7	38 10.5	32 20.5	43 9.1

Note: Percentages of the total number of cases are shown; therefore percentages do not add to 100.0.

Table 3

Common Combinations of Three Services by Site

Combination	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut	Delaware	Illinois	S. Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
Div/Shelt/Couns	-	-	-	10 2.6	-	-	11 7.1	-
Div/Couns/Other	-	-	-	11 2.9	-	-	-	-
Div/Fost/Outreach	-	-	-	-	96 12.8	-	-	-
Group/Couns/Other	-	-	-	-	-	16 4.4	-	-
Other Combina- tions of 3	51 6.4	22 6.7	15 10.5	31 8.2	48 6.4	31 8.6	13 8.3	41 8.7

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Note: Percentages of the total number of cases are shown; therefore percentages do not add to 100.0.

appear in the analysis of even one site since they had to meet certain criteria, not shown here, to be included in actual analysis. Specific criteria used are described later in this chapter.

METHODS

Sampling

While sampling was discussed more thoroughly in Chapter XIII, a very brief review will be presented here to refresh the reader's memory on salient issues. The initial sampling plan looked toward a sample stratified by offense type. Stratification was employed as a means to assure variation in client types, knowing that status offenders are not evenly distributed among status offenses; that is, arrests of runaways are more common than arrests for minors in possession of alcohol, etc. Quotas were set up for each of five offense types: 1) Runaway, 2) Ungovernable, 3) Curfew, 4) Truancy, 5) Minor in possession. It soon became clear, however, that quotas for the last three categories could not be filled. Several sites began taking all youths who entered the program and who had committed a definable status offense. Some even enlarged the original geographic areas comprising the evaluation sites. Tables 1 through 6 in Chapter XIII of this report indicate the results of this sampling process. First, these show the differences in types of clients across sites, and second they show that the evaluated clients are a (not always representative) subset of the clients eligible for evaluation. Since the difference between the evaluated and non-evaluated sample has been discussed in Chapter XIII, the focus of this section will be on the differences in evaluated clients across sites.

Table 3 (Chapter XIII) indicates a much higher proportion of girls in Connecticut, Illinois, Clark County and Spokane County than in the other sites. Table 4 (Chapter XIII) shows a predominantly Anglo sample in all sites but Illinois. In Clark and Spokane Counties, the samples are almost exclusively Anglo. Alameda County, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois and South Carolina have substantial proportions of Blacks in their samples, especially Illinois where Blacks comprise the majority of the sample. Hispanics appear in negligible numbers in all sites but Pima County, Arizona and Alameda County. "Other" is noticable only in Arizona

where it usually indicates Native American Indians.

Age distributions are shown in Table 2 (Chapter XIII). Pima County, Alameda Delaware, and Spokane have noticeably older populations than the other sites, but the difference is not extreme. Connecticut and South Carolina show the youngest samples in the group.

Table 1 (Chapter XIII) indicates distributions by offense type. Several features of the table stand out. First, only the runaway and incorrigible (sometimes referred to as ungovernable) categories are consistently large enough to allow comparisons across all sites. Second, Pima County, Alameda County and Delaware produced remarkably even distributions across offense types. Connecticut and Illinois are very heavily weighted with runaways while South Carolina is quite disproportionate in the number of incorrigibles.

The differences among sites in the number of prior offenses exhibited by its evaluated clients are quite large, as shown in Table 4. In this case the data are not in categories but means. Shown in Table 4 are means of log 2 transformations (it should be remembered that, as in Chapter XVI, the measure of "number of prior offenses" is the total number of charges that appear on all arrests prior to the referral date. The analog to this measure applies for "number of subsequent offenses.") of the number of prior offenses (plus 1) as well as the untransformed means. It is clear that the samples in Illinois, Alameda and Delaware included juveniles who had more prior involvement with the justice system than did clients in other sites. Particularly "soft" cases appear in South Carolina and Clark County. The middle range figure (raw score of 1.04 and transformed score of .57) seen in Connecticut may be misleading since the figure reflects court referrals, not arrests at the law enforcement level. Typically there are fewer referrals to court than arrests since police dispose of cases in ways other than court referral. We should assume, then, that the Connecticut figure is an underestimate of justice system contact compared to the other site.

Most of the variables under discussion here have been shown many times by

Table 4

Mean Prior Offenses Transformed and Raw by Site
Six Month Cohort

	Pima County N=800	Alameda County N=326	Connecuticut N=143	Delaware N=380	Illinois N=750	South Carolina N=361	Clark County N=156	Spokane County N=470
Mean Prior Offenses Trans- formed to Log 2	.71	.85	.57	.81	1.43	.15	.36	.44
Mean Prior Offenses Raw	1.15	1.48	1.04	1.35	2.81	.18	.41	.62

delinquency research to be associated with recidivism, or, more generally, frequency of arrest. Four of the five will be shown (later in this chapter) to relate to recidivism in the manner expected according to prior studies: Prior record, ethnicity, gender and runaway. One, however, deviates in this data set from common expectations: here, younger clients appear to be more rearrest-prone compared to older ones. We will be able to proceed toward a better and more cautious interpretation of the data emerging from the analysis, if we can characterize each site in terms of these high-risk variables since they are commonly related to subsequent offenses and therefore to recidivism.

The sites with the most clients in high-risk categories are Illinois, Connecticut and Alameda County. Illinois shows disproportionate numbers of boys, Blacks, runaways and youths with longer prior records. Connecticut selected a sample with larger proportions of boys, Blacks, runaways and young offenders compared to other sites. Alameda's sample includes many Blacks, Hispanics and clients with many priors.

The sites with the most low-risk groups are Arizona, Clark County and Spokane. Pima County evaluated a sample heavy only in one high-risk category: Hispanics. Similarly Clark County and Spokane have high proportions of boys, but in all other respects show "easy" groups.

Delaware and South Carolina fall in the middle of the continuum with two factors working against program success. The South Carolina evaluated group included somewhat higher proportions of Blacks and younger clients.

In summary, there is considerable variation in sample composition across sites, with some taking on an apparently more difficult clientele than others. One group that is traditionally considered more arrest-prone, older youths, show the opposite tendency in this sample.

6 Month - 12 Month sample differences

Naturally, a cut-off date for the end of data collection was necessary. As always, this results in a potentially longer follow-up period on the earlier referrals compared to the later referrals. A decision was made that the shortest follow-up period would be 6 months. The longest was 12 months. All referrals who came into the sample too late for a 12-month follow up to be possible were truncated to six months to provide comparability. Consequently, the entire sample can be analyzed, using a six-month follow-up period and a sub group (of early referrals) can be analyzed on the basis of a 12-month follow-up. This implies two sets of analyses corresponding to the two follow-up periods. It is important, therefore, that any differences between the groups be pointed out and taken into account when interpreting results. Following is a description of the differences between the groups and a summary of them in Table 5.

Pima County is the site where the strongest differences appear. Here early referrals were a less serious group. There were fewer clients with priors, fewer runaways and more "other status" offenses, but more minorities and fewer youths from nuclear families.

Three sites admitted more males early in the program period: Alameda, Illinois and South Carolina. The other differences are few and quite scattered.

Data

The data collected on program clientele, evaluated clients and interviewed youths among evaluated clients have been described in an earlier chapter, but a very brief review will be undertaken here.

Table 5

Differences in 12-month follow-up group compared to entire sample

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut*	Delaware	Illinois	S. Carolina	Clark County*	Spokane County
Sex	No diff	More males	NA	No diff	More males	More males	NA	No diff
Ethnicity	More minority	More minority	NA	No diff	No diff	No diff	NA	No diff
Age	No diff	No diff	NA	No diff	No diff	No diff	NA	No diff
Family	Fewer nuclear	No diff	NA	No diff	No diff	No diff	NA	No diff
Priors	Fewer Priors	No diff	NA	More pure status	More prior More pure status	No diff	NA	No diff
Instant offense	Fewer runaway More "other" More multiple status charges	No diff	NA	No diff	No diff	No diff	NA	More runaways Fewer "other"

*Sites that had no 12-month group

Information gathered at program intake, and therefore on all clients, were gathered on Form 1a.* The areas of information relevant to this analysis are:

1. Demographic information
2. New or return status
3. School information
4. Residence information
5. Instant offense (status offense that brought the youth to the program)
6. Referral date

Program service information was gathered on all evaluated clients using Form 1b. It included a very limited number of items:

1. Program assignments (all)
2. Dates of entry
3. Closing dates (i.e., dates cases were closed, not the end of services)

Information on the prior and subsequent involvement of evaluated clients with the juvenile justice system was recorded on Forms 5a, 5b, and 5c and included information in the following areas:

1. Charges for each arrest and referral to probation and court
2. Disposition of each arrest and referral to probation and court
3. Detention information
4. Dates of each event

Occupation and education information of mother and father was gathered at the interview (and therefore not on all evaluated clients). The rest of the interview concerned 1) self reported delinquency and 2) social adjustment information in the areas of school, family, church and work.

Efforts were made to interview evaluated clients soon after program referral, six months after referral and 12 months after referral. Many clients could not be interviewed the first time for three reasons: 1) refusals, 2) difficulties in locating clients to interview and 3) priority of program requirements. The sample was, of course, further reduced for similar reasons at the time of the second interview, and again at the third. In addition, some clients were referred late enough in the program period that there was no time to interview them a third time or to collect

12-month arrest data before evaluation funding ceased. This, of course, further

*See National Evaluation of Status Offender Programs, Computer File Documentation Section I, Part E.

reduced the sample of clients. Consequently, the major focus of the analysis will be on the six-month follow-up group.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

The analyses in this chapter will be concerned with two major issues:

1) the relative effectiveness of the service types (described earlier in the chapter) for reducing recidivism after accounting for potentially confounding variables and 2) the relative effectiveness of the service types for particular types of youths. By and large, the "types of youth" of interest will be represented by the same variables that are treated as confounding variables in the first analysis question. Before variables are put into any model, however, we will test a) for their relations with the dependent variables and b) for their relations with service types (i.e. assignment biases).

The following variables were considered for inclusion in this analysis: (some will be abbreviated for convenience, but will be described fully here)

Prior Offense Characteristics

L2PRIORS Number of prior arrest charges(or probation referrals if no arrest was involved or measured), transformed to the log to the base 2.
PRISTAT Number of prior status offenses transformed to the log to the base 2.
PURESTAT Coded 1 if the client had prior offenses and they were all status offenses; coded 0 otherwise.

Instant Offense Characteristics

MULTSTAT Coded 1 if there was more than one status offense involved in the instant offense; coded 0 otherwise.
MIXED Coded 1 if there were both status and delinquent offenses involved in the instant offense; coded 0 otherwise.
RUNAWAY Coded 1 if there was a runaway charge in the instant offense; coded 0 otherwise.

UNGOVERNABLE Coded 1 if there was a charge of ungovernable on the instant offense and no runaway was charged; coded 0 otherwise.
TRUANCY Coded 1 if there was a charge of truancy on the instant offense and there was no runaway or ungovernable charged; coded 0 otherwise.
The coding of these three offenses implies a comparison with clients charged with curfew.

Client Descriptions

GENDER Coded 1 if the client was male; coded 0 otherwise.
ETHNICITY Coded 1 if the client was Anglo; coded 0 otherwise.
AGE Measured in years of age

Family Characteristics

NUCLEAR Coded 1 if the client resided with natural or adoptive parents; coded 0 otherwise.
RECONSTRUCT Coded 1 if the client resided in a reconstructed family (i.e. with one step parent); coded 0 otherwise.
NUCRECON Coded 1 if the client resided in either a nuclear or reconstructed family; coded 0 otherwise.
ONEPAR Coded 1 if the client resided with one parent only; coded 0 otherwise.
DENTENTION Coded 1 if the client resided in a detention center or correctional facility; coded 0 otherwise.
FATHEROCC Fathers occupation was coded using the NORC Occupational Prestige Scale.
MOTHEROCC Mother's occupation was coded using the NORC Occupational Prestige Scale.
FATHERED Father's education was measured in years of education
MOTHERED Mother's education was measured in years of education.

Social Adjustment Variables

SCHLSTAT Coded 1 if client was a full-time student at time of referral; coded 0 otherwise.
SCHLADJ This is an index of school adjustment consisting of the following items:
a. Good grades are important to me
b. I care what the teacher thinks
c. Finishing high school is important to me

- d. College is important to me
- e. How much homework do you do?
- f. How high are your grades compared to other kids in your same school year?

FAMTIME This is a question, coded ordinally, about how much time the client spends with family.

Finally, a set of variables was included to adjust for any spurious effects of the particular time a client was referred to the program. First, seasons were coded to take account of the types of clients that might be referred in the summertime compared to winter, etc. Second, another adjustment was made for the amount of time the program had been in operation (in months) at the time of each client's referral (the variable is called TIME). The season variable would not suffice for this since programs started at different times of the year.

All variables were tested for their relationships with the dependent variables. Variables which contributed to the variance explained in the dependent variable (statistically significant at the .05 level using F tests) across all sites or only in one site were retained. Those that did not pass this test were dropped from the analysis. The following variables, by this criterion, will be used throughout the analysis using official recidivism as a dependent variable:

L2PRIORS	GENDER	SUMMER
PURESTAT	ETHNICITY	WINTER
MULTSTAT	AGE	SPRING
RUNAWAY	NUCLEAR	TIME
UNGOVERABLE		

With the exception of the season and time variables, these will be the client characteristics used as controls while determining the relative effectiveness of service types. In the second phase of the analysis the same variables will be used as the "client types" when comparing the effectiveness of service types for particular client types.

Assignment Biases

Table 6 summarizes the assignment biases observed in the various sites. The variable of gender made a difference in service assignment in four of the eight sites. In Pima County and Alameda, girls, received more services than did boys. Boys were more likely to receive counseling only in Alameda and a multi-service center referral in Pima County. Girls were more likely than boys to be referred to diversion in Arizona, shelter in Alameda and Delaware, multiservice centers in Alameda and group homes in Spokane.

In two sites (South Carolina and Spokane) Anglos get more services than non-Anglos. In Alameda the opposite is true. Few other regularities are seen although the effects of ethnicity on service assignments are observable in a variety of ways in six of the eight sites.

Age is an apparent factor in assignment in five sites, but with very little consistency in type.

One of the clearer patterns in the table is seen in the non-nuclear family category. In four of the eight sites, Pima County, Alameda, Connecticut and Delaware) clients from non-nuclear families are assigned to more services than are clients from nuclear families. In two of the sites (Alameda and Delaware), the non-nuclear family clients were more likely to receive shelter care than their nuclear counterparts. The only service more prevalent among nuclear family residents is counseling only (in Connecticut and Delaware).

Clients with few priors, as with clients from nuclear families, seem prone solely to counseling only as a service assignment, this occurring in two sites (Alameda and Delaware). Clients with longer prior arrest records are, in two sites (Alameda and Connecticut) likely to receive more services and in two (Alameda and Spokane) are disproportionately assigned to Shelter care.

Table 6

Service Types where Client Type is Overrepresented
Compared to other Service Types.

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecuticut	Delaware	Illinois	South Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
<u>Sex</u> male	Multi-serv	Counseling only	None	None	None	None	None	Other
<u>Female</u>	More Services Diver-sion	More Services Shelter Multi-service Center (small)	None	Shelter	None	None	None	Group Home
<u>Ethnicity</u> Anglo	Diver-sion	Counseling	None	None	Group home (small)	More Service Other	None	More services
Non Anglo	Multi-serv	More services	Shelter	None	Foster	None	None	None
<u>Age</u> Older	More services Diver-sion	Diver-sion	None	None	None	None	None	None

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Table 6

Service Types where Client Type is Overrepresented
Compared to other Service Types. (Continued)

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut	Delaware	Illinois	South Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
Younger	Multi-serv	Counseling only	None	Diver-sion	None	None	Counseling only	Multi-serv
<u>Family</u> Nuclear	None	None	Counseling only	Counseling only	None	None	None	None
Non nuclear	More Services	More Services Shelter	More Services Diver-sion	More Services Diver-sion Shelter Other	None	None	None	None
<u>Priors</u> Less	None	Counseling only	None	Counseling only	None	None	None	None
More	None	More Services Shelton	More Services Diver-sion	None	None	None	None	Shelter

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Table 6

Service Types where Client Type is Overrepresented

Compared to other Service Types. (Continued)

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut	Delaware	Illinois	South Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
All Status	None	More Ser- vices Diver- sion Shelter Foster	More Ser- vices Diver- sion	Group Home	None	None	None	None
<u>Instant Offense</u> Runaway	More Ser- vices Shelter Diver- sion	More Ser- vices Shelter	Diver- sion	More Ser- vices Diver- sion	None	None	Shelter	More Ser- vices
Ungovernable	Multi- serv	None	Counsel- ing only	Diver- sion Counsel- ing only	None	None	Shelter	None

Table 6

Service Types where Client Type is Overrepresented
Compared to other Service Types. (Continued)

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut	Delaware	Illinois	South Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
Other	None	Counsel- ing only	Counsel- ing only	None	None	None	More services Counsel- ing only	None
Multiple Status Offenses.	Multi- serv	More Ser- vices	None	None	None	None	Insuffi- cient cases	Group Home
One Status Offense	Diver- sion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None

Clients whose prior record consists only of status offenses are, in Alameda and Connecticut, likely to receive more services than those who have no prior record or mixed arrests. In the same sites they are more likely to receive diversion/evaluation assignments. In Alameda and Delaware they are more likely to be assigned residential services of various kinds. In interpreting these biases the reader should be reminded that the dichotomy coded here is between a) those who have prior records that consist only of status offenses and b) those who either have no priors or whose priors contain criminal offenses--an unusual dichotomy.

Being arrested for runaway seems to have led clients to be assigned more services than other types of offenders. This was the case in four sites (Pima County, Alameda, Delaware and Spokane). In three sites (Pima County, Alameda and Clark County) they were assigned to shelter care services disproportionately, and in another three (Pima County, Connecticut and Delaware) they were likely to be assigned to diversion/evaluation services. It is more difficult to see patterns in the assignment of ungovernables. Status offenders of other kinds (especially curfew) were often sent disproportionately to counseling only.

Few patterns are observable among those clients who had multiple status offense as their instant offense or who had only one instant charge. However, it should be noted that very few clients fell into the multiple status offense category, so statistically significant differences would be difficult to produce.

Overall, it is clear that assignments did not approximate randomness and the sources of bias must be controlled. Even after such controls, however, we shall have to refer back to this Table in interpreting future results since statistical controls are not perfect.

Table 7

Client characteristics disproportionately represented in one or two
instant offense categories (characteristics appear in
categories where they are overrepresented.)

	Pima County	Alameda County	Connecticut	Delaware	Illinois	South Carolina	Clark County	Spokane County
Runaway	More pure status offenses more Anglo	More male	More priors More pure status offenses Older	More female More Anglo	More pure status offenses	More priors More males More Nuclear	-	More priors
Ungovern- ables	More males More Anglo		More males	-	More males	More Black	-	More Priors More males
Other status offenses	More priors More males Older	More males	More males	More prior More male More Anglo Older More nuclear	More males	-	More males	More males

Offense Categories

One final preliminary analysis is indicated before proceeding to the impact analysis. The instant status offense is a central variable to the analysis. It would be prudent, then, to determine the ways in which this variable relates to other variables in the equations so that interpretations of effects apparently due to offense type will be carefully considered. Table 7 is a summary of the relations between each offense type and all other variables to be used in predicting subsequent offenses (with the exception of service variables which have already been analyzed).

Probably the most consistent pattern observable in Table 7 concerns the distribution of gender across offense categories. Ungovernables and "other" status offenses are much more likely to be male while runaways are more likely than other types of offenders to be female. In four sites ungovernables are disproportionately male while the same is true of other status offenses in seven sites. South Carolina is the major exception with more runaways being male than other categories.

There is also some tendency for runaways to have more priors (3 sites) and for the priors to be purely status offenses (3 sites).

Differences of client characteristics with respect to the offense categories of ungovernable and other status offenses are on the whole unpatterned, although some differences in these characteristics are more pronounced than others. These were more diverse in Pima County and in Delaware than in other sites, and should be noted carefully in the analysis based on the two sites.

In summary, the data reveal some patterns that are consistent and others that are virtually random. This suggests that the decisions of program personnel at specific sites respecting the referral of status offenders to services may be based on widely varied judgments about client characteristics across sites.

vary widely from site to site. Such inconsistency in approaches to treatment suggests at the very least the need for guidelines based on tested theory to maximize program effect in dealing with status offenders.

ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL ARREST DATA

The central data analysis will be concerned with the six-month follow-up with official arrest data (or court referrals in the case of Connecticut) since this group affords the largest sample size of any for possible analysis of the data. Following the six-month analysis, the final models applied to this analysis will be applied to the 12-month group. Finally, the six-month self-report data will be subjected to a separate analysis that takes advantage of the higher frequencies of self-report by taking offense dimensions into account.

The first set of analyses, those concerned with the six-month group, will be of two types. The first seeks to find the most parsimonious model to describe what is important (predictively) in each site, and to describe the relationships observed. The second analysis of the six-month data will compare service types across sites regardless of their strengths or statistical significance in an effort to find any discernible patterns of effects across sites.

Toward Parsimony

It should be stated at the outset that there are several limiting problems in the data set that make confident statements of impact difficult. First, as described earlier, the clients are quite diverse across sites. Second, services differed considerably across sites, even when they were given the same name. Third, there was no effort toward randomization to services, nor any possibility of matching. All controls must, therefore, be statistical -- a method fraught with pitfalls. The first two difficulties make cross-site comparisons for national implications dangerous,

and therefore must be approached very cautiously. However, a fourth difficulty militates against discerning any effects of services and will require a liberal use of informed judgment. That is, distributions across services within sites are highly skewed, with most clients receiving some services and virtually none receiving others. This, together with biased service assignment, makes true effects difficult to identify and untangle. So a combination of caution and judgment must be employed in order not to ignore effects that may be there but also not to be misled by artifacts of the data.

An expanded and more accurate description of the central six-month analysis is that it is an effort to find: (1) what types of services work best on status offenders, and (2) what types of services are most effective with particular types of status offenders. A test of such effects requires the use of a great many combinations of client types and services, and it would be impossible to accomplish this task in one predictive equation. Consequently, a serial approach was taken. Also, since each site is different by clientele and by services offered, the process was different for each site. It would require far too much space to describe the process of determining the most parsimonious model for each site; therefore we will merely set out the general rules that were applied across sites.

Ignoring combinations of services for the moment, following is a review of the variables used in the initial regression equations for all sites, (with a few exceptions where there were too few cases):

L2PRIORS	AGE	MULTSTAT	MULTISERVICE	COUNSELING
PURESTAT	NUCLEAR	SERVNUM	FOSTER	"OTHER"
FEMALE	RUNAWAY	DIVERSION	GROUP	RESIDENTIAL
ANGLO	UNGOVERN	SHELTER	OUTREACH	L2SUBS (Dependent)
AGE16UP	AGE13DN	TIME	SUMMER	WINTER
				SPRING

Combinations of services were considered as terms for the equation only if the crosstabulation of the two variables involved in the combination yielded at least 10 cases in each cell. Less than this number would open us to the danger of estimating effects that would be unstable.

The steps enumerated here were applied to each site toward the end of settling on a parsimonious model predicting program success in terms of arrests subsequent to program intervention.

Creating a Base Model Against Which Interactions Were Tested:

1. Age and number of services (SERVNUM) were tested for linearity. Where the relation was linear, the continuous variable of AGE was put into the base model. Where the relation was not linear, appropriate dummy variables were added to the model. These variables were: AGE16UP to account for differences in older offenders, and AGE13DN to account for particularly young offenders and their differences. SERVNUM related linearly.
2. TIME, WINTER, SUMMER, and SPRING were tested for effects on subsequents. Where they were statistically significant they were added to the base model.
3. All other "client" variables were added: L2PRIORS, PURESTAT, MALE, ANGLO, NUCLEAR, RUNAWAY, UNGOVERN.

Testing Combinations and Interactions Against the Base Model

4. All single services offered in the site were entered as a group into an equation with the base model. They were tested for significance* both as a group and individually. They were, however, kept in the equation as part of the base model while interactions concerning them were being tested, regardless of their statistical significance.
5. All combinations in the site that met criteria for numbers described earlier were entered into an equation including the base model. The combinations were tested for significance as a group. Where the

*Throughout the report, where the term "significant" is used, "statistical significance" (at the .05 level) is meant. The next eight sections will be analyses of the results of this process in each site.

group was not significant, all were dropped from further consideration. Where the group was significant, individually significant variables from the group were entered into a final (or semifinal) model late in the process.

6. When combinations proved significant, the additive or single services involved in the combinations were kept in the equation regardless of significance.
7. Sets of client/service interactions were tested serially against the base model. The sets were defined by client variables. For instance, a set of terms would represent the assignment of runaways to all services. The purpose of this set of terms would be to test the relative effectiveness of the services for runaways. Another set making this test for ungovernables would be tested next, etc. through all client variables. When a set of such interactions proved significant, its individual terms became eligible for the final model, together with its additive component parts.
8. All terms which proved significant in preceding steps were included in a semifinal model. Where terms which were significant decreased to non-significance in this final equation, they were removed in a final equation. Some terms, however, remain in the final equation even though they are not significant. This occurs when another term that is significant is in the equation and is correlated with the insignificant term to such an extent that their unique effects cannot be separated from one another. In such cases, both terms are left in. This occurs often with SERVNUM (number of services) which is often correlated highly with residential services or, in Clark County, Washington, with counseling services.

Pima County, Arizona

No single service stood out from the others in effectiveness or deleteriousness. (See Table 8 throughout this entire analysis. In addition, correlation matrices are included with each site discussion.) The only combination of services that explained a significant amount of variance in subsequent offenses was that of Diversion/Evaluation (sometimes called crisis intervention) in combination with "other" services. Unfortunately there were only 16 cases receiving this combination of services leaving us little confidence in the finding. In its favor, however, is the fact that analyses of assignment biases do not lead us to be suspicious of the clientele for this combination. In other words the clients in Diversion and "other" services were not significantly less serious than clients assigned to other services. If the effect is stable, it would be in an ameliorative direction; thus the content of "other" should be described. The distribution of services among those clients who were coded "other" as well as "Diversion/Evaluation" was divided among the majority who were referred to the Child Protection Services (presumably a residential placement) and a lesser number who were referred to health clinics but were "no shows."

There appeared to be no client types whose subsequents were increased or decreased by one service more than another, i.e., no client-service interactions were statistically significant.

Although there were no services or client-service combinations that were better than any others in terms of reduction in subsequents (with the possible exception of Diversion/other) it is worth noting the variables that were important in Pima County in predicting success or failure. First, the model explains 14% of the variance -- a moderate amount in the context of this program. Prior record takes its traditional position as the most

TABLE 8
EQUATIONS FOR EACH SITE - 6 MONTH FOLLOW-UP

ARIZONA $R^2 = .14$ N = 800				
VARIABLE	REGRESSION COEFFICIENT	STD ERROR	F	p ≤
L2PRIORS	.26	.03	88.20	.001
PURESTAT	.25	.10	6.26	.05
RUNAWAY	.13	.06	4.46	.05
MULTSTAT	-.12	.09	2.05	N.S.
SERVNUM	.09	.04	4.46	.05
DIVERSION	.09	.06	1.85	N.S.
OTHER	.13	.11	1.33	N.S.
DIVER/OTHER	-.54	.22	5.95	.05
CONSTANT	.01			
ALAMEDA $R^2 = .19$ N = 326				
L2PRIORS	.25	.04	41.01	.001
MULTSTAT	.52	.19	7.21	.01
SERVNUM	.20	.07	8.18	.01
COUNSELING	-.06	.09	.42	N.S.
MULTOFF/COUNSEL	-.60	.28	4.53	.05
CONSTANT	.03			
CONNECTICUT $R^2 = .08$ N = 143				
L2PRIORS	.03	.09	.13	N.S.
AGE	-.19	.07	7.25	.01
RUNAWAY	.42	.21	4.00	.05
MULTSTAT	-.08	.23	.13	N.S.
SERVNUM	.15	.10	2.12	N.S.
CONSTANT	2.74			
DELAWARE $R^2 = .19$ N = 380				
L2PRIORS	.20	.04	24.47	.001
AGE	.16	.06	6.19	.05
AGE16UP	-.60	.15	16.57	.001
AGE13ON	.46	.18	6.44	.05
SPRING	-.21	.11	3.91	.05
SUMMER	-.24	.09	6.56	.05
SERVNUM	.19	.06	12.42	.001
LONGTERM	-.49	.16	9.62	.01
COUNSELING	-.17	.09	3.50	N.S.
CONSTANT	-1.78			

TABLE 8 (CONT.)

ILLINOIS $R^2 = .13$ N = 750				
VARIABLE	REGRESSION COEFFICIENT	STD ERROR	F	p \leq
L2PRIORS	.27	.03	92.59	.001
ANGLO	-.21	.07	9.45	.01
AGE	-.07	.02	10.05	N.S.
CONSTANT	1.62			
SOUTH CAROLINA $R^2 = .15$ N = 361				
L2PRIORS	.22	.07	10.74	.01
MALE	-.12	.05	6.92	.01
RUNAWAY	-.11	.08	2.28	N.S.
SERVNUM	.12	.04	7.46	.01
COUNSELING	-.39	.14	7.60	.01
OTHER	-.14	.09	2.73	N.S.
RESIDEN	.14	.09	2.18	N.S.
PRIORS/RES	-.30	.12	5.74	.05
RUNAWAY/OTHER	.45	.15	9.37	.01
RUNAWAY/RES	-.50	.16	9.63	.01
CONSTANT	.41			
CLARK COUNTY $R^2 = .11$ N = 156				
AGE	.14	.06	5.74	.05
AGE16UP	-.34	.15	5.37	.05
AGE13ON	.40	.18	5.12	.05
NUCLEAR	-.19	.10	3.81	N.S.
SERVNUM	-.07	.08	.77	N.S.
COUNSELING	.27	.13	3.96	.05
CONSTANT	-1.63			
SPOKANE $R^2 = .12$ N = 470				
L2PRIORS	.17	.04	14.72	.001
MALE	.21	.07	8.78	.01
AGE	-.06	.02	8.27	.01
RUNAWAY	-.10	.08	1.34	N.S.
MULTSTAT	-.05	.11	.23	N.S.
TIME	-.03	.01	11.70	.001
SUMMER	-.19	.07	7.56	.01
SERVNUM	.06	.07	.69	N.S.
MULTISERVICE	-.30	.16	3.68	N.S.
COUNSELING	-.18	.13	2.12	N.S.
RUNAWAY/MULTISERV	.36	.18	3.91	.05
RUNAWAY/COUNSEL	.31	.15	4.23	.05
CONSTANT	1.44			

powerful predictor of subsequent offenses regardless of intervention. Beyond this expected fact, PURESTAT (prior status offenses only) and RUNAWAY proved to predict subsequents quite well. Thus, in Arizona the feelings of many practitioners are confirmed that offenders who have only status offenses on their records are more difficult to change than many other offenders. Similarly, runaways are more predisposed to subsequent offending than other types of status offenders. Of course, reference to the correlation matrix (Table 9) will show that "runaway" as an instant offense is correlated with pure status offense records ($r=.15$).

The remaining significant term in the equation is SERVNUM, indicating that SERVNUM (more services rendered) is associated with more subsequent offenses. An analysis of the assignment biases for this variable indicates a preponderance of runaways and clients from non-nuclear families in the condition of more services, leading us to expect more subsequents from clients in this group anyway. However, the other biases associated with number of services assigned are not associated with higher probabilities of arrest in Pima Co. (males and older clients). We are unable to be sure, then, whether the assignment of more services leads to more trouble with the law or whether the types of offenders who are assigned more services are the types who would get into trouble regardless of services rendered.

Alameda County, California

Again in Alameda, single services did not predict one way or the other to subsequents, at least as a group. It should be noted that residential services predicted subsequents early in the equation process but was completely usurped by SERVNUM which is highly correlated (.81) with residential services. Likewise, combinations of services as a group did not predict level of subsequents. The groups of client-service

TABLE 9

ARIZONA CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=800																		
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Muls	Ser	Div	Shl	Mult	Out	Cns	Oth	Res	
	.43	.71	.08	.57	.59	14.73	.46	.25	.22	.10	1.45	.69	.11	.28	.10	1.2	.10	.11	
L2PRIORS	.32																		
PURESTAT	.15	.16																	
MALE	.05	.22	-.06																
ANGLO	.01	.01	.02	.01															
AGE	-.00	.08	-.08	.05	.05														
NUCLEAR	-.03	-.03	-.04	.08	-.02	.07													
RUNAWAY	.09	-.02	.15	-.25	.15	.09	-.01												
UNGOVERN	-.00	-.07	-.07	.06	.03	-.18	-.01	-.31											
MULTSTAT	-.06	-.01	-.01	.01	-.01	.04	.05	-.06	.06										
SERVNUM	.06	-.07	.07	-.16	-.00	-.09	-.10	.19	.16	-.04									
DIVERSION	.07	.04	.04	.09	.14	.19	.01	.14	-.05	-.18	.07								
SHELTER	.02	.01	.03	-.11	.11	.02	-.03	.33	-.00	-.05	.32	-.03							
MULTISERVICE	-.04	-.04	.04	-.18	-.14	-.13	-.03	-.01	.08	.02	.32	-.33	-.10						
OUTREACH	.05	-.02	-.03	.03	-.05	-.15	-.02	-.08	.21	.07	.34	-.32	-.08	-.00					
COUNSELING	.03	-.08	.02	-.08	.13	-.05	.02	.01	.16	.16	.41	-.12	-.02	-.11	.21				
OTHER	-.00	-.01	.05	.02	-.13	-.08	-.13	-.05	-.06	.00	.18	-.33	-.00	-.12	.06	-.06			
RESIDEN	.03	.03	.03	-.10	.10	.02	-.03	.33	.00	-.06	.33	-.03	.99	-.11	-.08	-.02	.01		

TABLE 10
ALAMEDA CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=326																
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Mu1	Ser	Div	Sh1	Fos	Mult	Cns	Res
L2PRIORS	.52	.85	.09	.56	.68	14.8	.36	.24	.23	.09	1.4	.42	.32	.05	.10	.48	.33
PURESTAT	.36																
MALE	.07	.16															
ANGLO	.09	.21	-.16														
AGE	-.03	-.02	-.06	.06													
NUCLEAR	-.02	.07	.02	.12	.19												
RUNAWAY	-.11	.00	.01	.17	.22	.13											
UNGOVERN	.02	-.03	.10	-.20	-.13	-.20	-.07										
MULTSTAT	.06	-.03	-.01	-.10	-.01	-.16	-.05	-.30									
SERVNUM	.11	.02	.01	.02	-.12	-.03	-.11	.14	.00								
DIVERSION	.25	.16	.20	-.18	-.19	-.03	-.11	.29	.17	.11							
SHELTER	.19	.13	.13	-.02	-.05	.21	.00	.14	-.03	.01	.56						
FOSTER	.28	.17	.20	-.22	-.25	-.00	-.18	.31	.18	.08	.81	.46					
MULTISERVICE	.09	.08	.12	-.10	.01	-.04	-.06	.16	.10	.02	.43	.08	.28				
COUNSELING	.04	-.02	-.10	-.18	-.07	-.14	-.02	.06	.05	.08	-.01	-.19	-.06	-.08			
RESIDEN	-.18	-.16	-.10	.19	.12	-.14	.08	-.17	-.05	-.01	-.38	-.67	-.51	-.22	-.29		
	.27	.18	.20	-.24	-.24	-.01	-.18	.32	.19	.07	.82	.48	.99	.34	-.07	-.52	

interactions were not significant with one exception: multiple status offenders. Among multiple status offenders, counseling produced fewer subsequents than other services. However, there were few cases of multiple status offenders who received counseling only, and we are wary of emphasizing this finding.

The final equation for Alameda County predicted about 19% of the variance in subsequents -- one of the larger proportions in this analysis. As usual, much of this proportion is accounted for by the length of clients' records regardless of what services they received. In addition to clients with prior records, clients with multiple offenses on their instants proved to be more difficult to deal with than other clients (significantly so). Again, number of services given is solidly associated with subsequents but this is to be expected since clients assigned to more services tended to be disproportionately high-risk categories -- at least in Alameda County: minorities, clients from non-nuclear families, clients with more priors, pure status offenders and clients with more than one status offense as part of their instants. Counseling only -- a term included only because it is implied by the significant interaction term of MULTSTAT/COUNSEL -- shows a negative relationship with subsequents but this is to be expected since clients referred to this service are disproportionately non-minority, young, low in priors, and had instant offenses other than runaway or ungovernable. All of these factors are negatively associated with subsequents in Alameda County.

Connecticut

The only variables that predict outcome in the Connecticut site are priors, age and an instant offense of runaway. As usual, priors and runaway are positively correlated with subsequents. Age, on the other hand, is negatively related; i.e., the older the client is, the less likely he is to have subsequents. The fact that after age 16 juvenile records

TABLE 11

CONNECTICUT CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=143															
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Mul	Ser	Div	Shl	Cns	Oth	Res	
L2PRIORS	.66	.57	.13	.29	.70	14.1	.31	.83	.13	1.6	.29	.27	.75	.16	.31	
PURESTAT	.06															
MALE	.02	.37														
ANGLO	.08	.09	-.15													
AGE	-.11	.07	.06	.05												
NUCLEAR	-.17	.07	.06	-.20	.20											
RUNAWAY	-.09	-.15	-.12	-.06	.24	.02										
MULTSTAT	.14	.08	.06	-.16	-.01	.18	-.07									
SERVNUM	-.01	.12	.04	.02	.17	-.02	.19	.07								
DIVERSION	.12	.27	.28	-.06	-.14	.16	-.30	.11	-.01							
SHELTER	.02	.36	.37	-.04	-.06	.15	-.26	.20	-.02	.73						
COUNSELING	.04	-.13	.05	-.12	-.18	-.03	-.10	.02	-.05	.46	.06					
OTHER	.02	-.19	-.07	.02	.08	-.16	.21	-.22	.04	-.56	-.81	-.15				
RESIDEN	.02	.33	.12	.09	.12	.16	-.13	.04	-.06	.52	.44	-.14	-.40			
	.12	-.06	.07	-.06	-.19	-.04	-.15	.06	.01	.58	.18	-.92	-.24	-.09		

are not generally kept in this state may account for this relationship. SERVNUM, although not significant, shows the same effect as usual: a positive one (increased subsequents). But, as usual, clients with more services are higher risk clients anyway. In Connecticut they were disproportionately pure status offenders, had priors, and were from non-nuclear families. After taking into account all of these background variables, no services or combinations of services were able to affect outcome. The total R^2 for this equation is only .08, the lowest in the analysis. This may be related to the fact that only court referrals could be measured; police records were not available to the researchers on this site.

Delaware

While combinations and interactions were inconsequential in the prediction of subsequents here, there did appear to be some impact attributable to single services. As a group, the single services applicable in Delaware were significant. The strongest effect is seen in residential services, but they differ by the type of residential placement. The pattern seems to be that the longer term residential placements (group homes and foster homes) predict fewer subsequents while the short term placement (shelter care) predict more subsequents. For this reason, a new term, "LONGTERM", was constructed for test in the final equation. LONGTERM consists of clients assigned to group or foster homes. The effect described here has stood up to several tests of its stability and strength. Clients assigned to this type of service were not materially different from those assigned to other types of services as has been the case in other sites where apparent "effects" were found. About 40 clients were assigned to long-term residential care and more were assigned to shelter care, thereby providing a reasonably stable estimate of their effects.

TABLE 12

DELAWARE CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=380																	
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Muls	Ser	Div	Shl	Grp	Fos	Cns	Oth	Res
L2PRIORS	.60	.81	.15	.42	.72	14.8	.25	.38	.40	.08	1.6	.27	.16	.03	.07	.68	.30	.22
PURESTAT	.26																	
MALE	.07	.16																
ANGLO	.15	.28	-.13															
AGE	-.01	.14	.01	.09														
NUCLEAR	-.11	.11	.02	.01	.21													
RUNAWAY	-.07	.05	-.07	.04	.22	.13												
UNGOVERN	-.04	-.05	.14	-.32	.08	.01	-.06											
MULTSTAT	.02	-.05	-.12	.11	-.20	-.11	-.07	-.65										
SERVNUM	.11	.10	.01	-.00	.10	-.01	-.01	.12	-.03									
DIVERSION	.14	-.00	.09	-.06	-.04	-.04	-.21	.16	-.01	.01								
SHELTER	.14	.03	.02	.04	-.10	-.14	-.13	.05	.04	-.03	.52							
GROUP	.12	.02	.09	-.12	.02	-.02	-.17	.19	-.07	-.00	.55	.08						
FOSTER	-.06	.09	.16	.03	.02	-.01	-.09	.07	-.07	-.05	.14	-.06	.15					
COUNSELING	-.04	-.04	.09	-.10	.05	-.02	-.11	.06	-.01	-.00	.36	.16	.13	.09				
OTHER	-.10	-.09	-.09	.01	-.01	.08	.14	-.12	.13	-.00	-.04	-.23	-.20	-.17	-.20			
RESIDEN	.11	.03	.00	.00	-.01	-.02	-.12	.14	-.08	.08	.31	.09	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.47		
	.08	.02	.11	-.11	.03	-.03	-.22	.19	-.05	.00	.63	.17	.83	.31	.51	-.25	-.03	

Another service impact seen in this site is from counseling only assignments. The apparent effect is in the direction of fewer subsequents, but we cannot be as sure of this as we were about the LONGTERM effect. Clients assigned to counseling were "easier" clients than those sent to some other services. They were disproportionately low in priors and were from nuclear families. To be fair, though, ungovernables were also overrepresented and this is a high-risk group in Delaware. Overall, however, we would have to be suspicious of this modest effect in view of the clients represented by it.

One other service effect ought to be mentioned. We are used to seeing SERVNUM positively related to subsequents and then discounting the effect by the fact that the more difficult clients are usually assigned to more services. Here, the effect of number of services is quite strong but the assignment biases are not severe. The biases in assignment are among non-nuclear family clients (a relatively high risk group) and runaways (a low risk group in this site). We are inclined, therefore, to consider more seriously the possibility that increasing numbers of services may actually lead to more subsequents.

The remaining variables in the final equation for Delaware are only control variables, but they show similar effects in this site as elsewhere. Priors has a very substantial impact on subsequents as does age, although the age relationship seems to be more complicated here than elsewhere. In addition, there seem to be stronger seasonal effects in this site than have been shown by the sites described so far.

Illinois

This is a site where some of our more severe problems of skewness occur. Almost all (99%) clients received Diversion/Evaluation. Almost half received residential care (47%) and 25% received outreach services.

TABLE 13

ILLINOIS CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=750																
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Muls	Ser	Div	Sh1	Grp	Fos	Oth	Res
	.86	1.4	.30	.36	.35	14.5	.29	.71	.28	.14	1.8	.99	.02	.04	.42	.25	.47
L2PRIORS	.33																
PURESTAT	.08	.09															
MALE	.08	.16	-.26														
ANGLO	-.14	-.06	-.01	-.02													
AGE	-.11	.04	-.03	-.08	.10												
NUCLEAR	-.04	-.05	.04	.03	.09	.08											
RUNAWAY	.04	.01	.15	-.19	.05	.03	.01										
UNGOVERN	-.03	.01	-.14	.18	-.06	-.01	-.02	-.96									
MULTSTAT	.07	.03	-.02	-.04	.00	-.06	.00	.17	-.16								
SERVNUM	-.03	-.02	.00	-.04	.00	-.00	-.05	.04	-.05	.01							
DIVERSION	-.04	-.02	-.05	.04	.06	-.04	-.03	.00	-.01	-.02	-.05						
SHELTER	-.03	.01	.00	.03	.03	.00	.00	-.07	.08	.01	.13	-.07					
GROUP	.02	-.05	.06	-.08	.14	.05	.04	.05	-.05	-.04	.14	-.16	-.03				
FOSTER	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.03	-.09	-.01	-.02	.06	-.07	.05	.71	.00	-.03	-.13			
OUTREACH	-.06	-.03	.01	-.02	.02	.01	-.07	-.01	.02	-.01	.62	-.12	-.00	-.03	.14		
RESIDEN	-.01	-.02	-.00	-.05	-.03	.01	.00	.06	-.07	.03	.76	-.08	.14	.21	.91	.13	

Few clients received the rest of the services. As noted earlier, this program was designed to provide alternatives to detention only. Interestingly, few assignment biases were evidenced in this site, and there were no significant service effects either singly or in combination. Similarly, no types of services were particularly beneficial or harmful to particular client types. Even number of services does not predict subsequent offenses. Only priors, ethnicity, and age predict subsequents here, and they are all in the expected direction. Together they explain 13% of the variance in subsequent arrests.

South Carolina

This is another site where skewness was a problem, with 97% of the group receiving counseling services. As a group, individual services proved significant. This was largely due to counseling (received by 97% of the clients), followed by outreach (received by only 4% of the clients) which did not reach significance individually. Consequently, the strongest effects are seen in services containing 97% and 4% of the clients respectively. Since counseling reached significance individually, it will be included in the final equation in spite of the heavily skewed distribution. To the extent that we can trust the effect, it is negative; i.e., clients at this site who were assigned to counseling were less likely to have subsequent offenses than clients who did not receive counseling.

Types of services as applied to clients with priors proved significant as a group. That is, some services seemed more effective for clients with prior offenses than other services, or some services were more effective than others with clients who had no priors. In particular, the most effective combination is residential service for clients with priors. This can be

TABLE 14

SOUTH CAROLINA CORRELATION MATRIX

N=361

\bar{X}	Sub	Pr	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Muls	Ser	Div	Shl	Grp	Mult	Out	Cns	Oth	Res
	.17	.15	.03	.49	.76	14.0	.31	.17	.71	.00	1.6	.07	.03	.12	.07	.04	.97	.19	.15
L2PRIORS	.15																		
PURESTAT	.15	.44																	
MALE	-.10	.07	-.14																
ANGLO	.06	-.02	.10	-.04															
AGE	.03	.03	.03	-.04	.12														
NUCLEAR	-.02	-.01	.02	-.02	.15	.07													
RUNAWAY	-.01	.09	.13	-.20	.14	-.02	.22												
UNGOVERN	-.02	-.02	-.07	.15	-.23	-.01	-.15	-.72											
MULTSTAT	.09	-.02	-.01	-.05	.03	-.07	-.04	.11	-.09										
SERVNUM	.19	.08	.08	.03	.22	-.02	-.09	.03	-.08	.09									
DIVERSION	.09	-.01	-.04	.08	.05	.04	.03	-.04	.08	-.01	.28								
SHELTER	.08	.06	-.03	.03	.07	.02	-.06	.08	-.12	-.01	.24	.01							
GROUP	.08	.08	.03	-.00	.10	-.09	-.09	.03	-.06	-.02	.49	.03	.02						
MULTISERVICE	-.02	.07	.14	.07	.03	.02	.00	.01	-.01	-.01	.30	.05	-.05	-.01					
OUTREACH	.17	.04	.04	-.04	.09	.02	-.02	-.06	-.02	-.01	.22	-.06	.04	.05	-.06				
COUNSELING	-.14	.03	-.06	.01	-.06	.03	-.02	-.09	.14	.01	-.04	-.21	-.15	-.18	-.01	-.04			
OTHER	.11	.06	.08	.01	.14	-.07	-.03	.10	-.10	.11	.64	-.08	.07	.20	.06	-.03	-.08		
RESIDEN	.12	.11	.01	.02	.13	-.07	-.12	.05	-.10	-.02	.54	.04	.44	.89	-.03	.07	-.24	.23	

interpreted in two ways: 1) among clients with priors, residential services are most effective, or 2) residential services are most effective on clients with priors. While this is an interesting finding, we must still be cautious since very few clients are represented by this combination (N = 11).

Another set of interactions proved significant. They concerned the assignment of services to runaways. Within this group of terms, the combination of RUNAWAY /RESIDENTIAL and RUNAWAY/OTHER showed themselves to be significant individually. The interpretations are similar to those applied to the L2PRIORS interactions, except that in the case of "RUNAWAY/OTHER" the relationship is positive. That is, runaways assigned to "other" services had higher subsequents than runaways assigned to other types of services. (In this site, "other" refers to contract referrals to private psychologists or psychiatrists.) On the other hand, runaways assigned to residential services were better in terms of subsequents than were runaways assigned to other types of services. We have the problem of small numbers with this finding as well, but it does, at least, correspond to the finding concerning clients with priors and residential treatments. We are also aided by the fact that assignment biases are minimal in this site.

If we trust the coefficients based on such skewed distributions, we would conclude that, overall, counseling is a better approach for status offenders in South Carolina but that residential placement is more effective for runaways and clients with priors -- a believable finding.

Among the control, or base model variables, there are some familiar patterns as well as some differences compared to other sites. Priors, as usual, is positively (increased subsequents) and significantly related to subsequents, indicating difficulty in dealing with clients with prior

records. Also, SERVNUM is related to subsequents in the usual positive (increased subsequents) manner; and, as in Delaware, it is not so plagued by assignment biases as to render it uninterpretable. Anglo clients are somewhat overrepresented in larger numbers of services, and this is, in South Carolina, a higher risk group than minorities, but this is the only bias problem we face here. We could take this as one more small piece of evidence that a plethora of services may do more harm than good.

Unusual in this site are the negative (reduced subsequents) relationships of maleness and runaway with subsequent offenses. In most sites these are high-probability groups where subsequents are concerned, but the opposite is true in South Carolina.

Clark County, Washington

The only service effects seen in this site, as individual services or combinations, with or without specification of client type, was COUNSELING and SERVNUM. Unfortunately, COUNSELING and SERVNUM are highly correlated (.71) making it impossible to separate the effects of one from the other. Almost everyone in this site received Diversion/Evaluation, with little left to decide but whether or not to send the client to counseling. Thus, the high correlation between number of services and counseling. The impact, whether due to counseling, number of services, or something else (counseled clients are more likely to be young and therefore subsequent offense-prone), the relation is positive; that is, more subsequent arrests follow. The only control variables necessary in this equation were age (several versions) and whether or not the client was from a nuclear family. As always, clients from nuclear families are less likely to get into subsequent trouble than are other clients.

TABLE 15

CLARK COUNTY CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=156													
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Mul	Ser	Div	Shl	Cns	Res
	.28	.36	.14	.44	14.5	.40	.44	.33	.10	1.8	.90	.14	.44	.15
L2PRIORS	-.02													
PURESTAT	.07	.49												
MALE	.02	.18	-.06											
AGE	-.03	.03	.08	-.08										
NUCLEAR	-.15	-.10	.04	-.02	.07									
RUNAWAY	.10	-.11	.05	-.05	.02	.09								
UNGOVERN	-.11	.14	-.01	-.08	.09	-.08	-.62							
MULTSTAT	-.03	.04	.12	.06	-.00	.04	.15	.00						
SERVNUM	.09	-.00	-.08	-.02	.02	-.07	.07	.17	.14					
DIVERSION	.02	-.08	-.11	-.04	.06	-.11	-.00	-.12	.11	.13				
SHELTER	-.10	.05	-.06	.01	.05	-.03	-.06	.18	-.07	.35	-.11			
COUNSELING	.17	-.07	.05	-.04	-.06	.06	.08	.16	.10	.71	-.21	.08		
RESIDEN	-.04	.05	-.02	.08	.06	-.06	-.05	.19	-.02	.39	-.09	.95	.12	

Spokane County, Washington

The individual service terms did not show significance, nor did they as combinations. However, one set of client-service interactions was demonstrated to contribute to explained variance; these had to do with runaways. According to the final equation, runaways who were assigned to multiservice centers or to counseling only were arrested more frequently than others. We were told that many in this site referred to these services had drug related problems. This finding could be seen complementing the finding from South Carolina that runaways (and clients with priors) do better in residential treatment than other types of treatment. In addition, long term residential treatment seemed more beneficial in general in Delaware.

The effect of SERVNUM is, as usual, in the direction of more subsequents, but is not significant in this site. However, two high-risk categories (runaways and anglo clients) are overrepresented in higher numbers of services, leading us to expect more subsequents from clients receiving more services anyway. (In Spokane, anglos slightly arrest-prone.)

All other variables in the equation are there for control purposes. Those with priors and those brought to the program for running away are, overall, more likely to recidivate. AGE, RUNAWAY and MULTSTAT, on the other hand are negatively (reduced subsequents) related to subsequents. Seasonal and program duration effects are stronger in this site than in most other sites as well. The model finally explains about 12% of the variance in subsequents.

Summary of the First Half of the Six-Month Analysis

Few strong service effects were observed, and those that were often were based on small numbers or were riddled with assignment bias problems. There are a few hints, however. Primarily, residential services, especially longer term care (as shown in Delaware), may be more effective than other

TABLE 16
SPOKANE CORRELATION MATRIX

	N=470																
\bar{X}	Sub	Pri	Pur	Fem	Ang	Age	Nuc	Run	Ung	Muls	Ser	Shl	Grp	Mult	Cns	Oth	Res
L2PRIORS	.43	.44	.07	.34	.94	14.7	.30	.55	.37	.10	1.6	.06	.06	.16	.24	.09	.11
PURESTAT	.17																
MALE	.07	.16															
ANGLO	.14	.04	-.10														
AGE	.03	-.05	-.10	.07													
NUCLEAR	-.12	.08	.05	-.05	-.04												
RUNAWAY	-.06	-.02	-.04	-.06	.04	.07											
UNGOVERN	.01	.05	.04	-.16	.03	.00	.02										
MULTSTAT	.01	-.01	-.02	.12	-.01	.00	-.01	-.84									
SERVNUM	-.03	-.06	-.01	.03	.02	-.03	.01	.12	-.07								
SHELTER	.05	-.01	-.02	-.02	.09	-.06	.02	.06	-.03	-.04							
GROUP	.06	.05	.06	-.03	.03	.13	.01	.02	.03	-.05	.34						
MULTISERVICE	.03	-.01	.08	-.13	-.02	-.00	-.01	.09	-.07	.17	.24	.05					
COUNSELING	.02	.05	-.03	-.03	.06	-.19	-.02	.04	-.05	-.00	.44	.06	-.05				
OTHER	.03	-.04	-.01	.03	.04	.04	.04	-.01	.02	-.08	.51	-.08	-.09	-.12			
RESIDEN	-.04	-.02	-.06	.11	.05	-.02	-.00	-.00	.01	-.08	.36	-.02	-.05	-.04	-.03		
	.06	.04	.11	-.11	.00	.09	-.02	.06	-.01	.09	.40	.73	.69	.02	-.12	-.04	

types of programs, especially for the more difficult clients: runaways and clients with priors. In one site, runaways did particularly badly with counseling and multiservice center referrals. There is some equivocal evidence that more services may be somewhat harmful. In most sites this comparison was impossible because it was confounded with a more difficult clientele. However, the relationship held up in two sites where this was not an obvious problem.

The more solid findings of this analysis did not concern the effectiveness of services. Rather, they identified rather consistently across sites the more difficult types of clients faced by practitioners. They include runaways, pure status offenders (i.e., offenders with no delinquent offenses on their records), males, and most certainly, clients with prior records.

A Search for Patterns

In the preceding analysis we were careful to ignore all effects that were not statistically significant individually and as groups of variables. Only strong effects were discussed, and then with considerable caution due to assignment biases and skewed distributions. It could also be argued that the number of variables found significant means little since they were few among a very large number of significance tests. A more reasonable approach is to rely on patterns observable across sites and situations. The following analysis searches for patterns that hold across sites regardless of statistical significance. For simplicity and because few service combinations have more than a few cases representing them, only single services will be considered. Finally, only the direction of the effects will be included in the analysis.

Table 17 displays the data relevant to this analysis. There are two rows for each service type, excluding the outreach and "other" categories which are too diverse across sites to be meaningful. The first row of each section of the table indicates the direction and degree of assignment bias for the service in each site. Where there is a bias that would predispose the clientele to recidivism, one or more "+" signs appear. Where the bias indicates a tendency away from recidivism (a negative relationship to subsequents) one or more "-" signs appear. The number of signs for each site is determined by 1) the number of categories overrepresented in the services that are associated with recidivism (and their strength of association), and 2) an adjustment for biases that predict the opposite direction. The signs are not meant to be precise, but to reflect in a general way the degree to which programs are working with or against probabilities. For instance, residential programs in Alameda County (see the first row, second column of Table 17) received clients who were disproportionately minority, from non-nuclear families, had longer prior records, were pure status offenders and were runaways. Each of these biasing factors would predict further involvement in the system in Alameda County as indicated by the correlation matrix, Table 10. Together, however, they present a formidable obstacle to overcome for any program practitioner.

The second row of each section of Table 17 indicates the sign of the regression coefficient representing the service type in each site. The coefficients represent the effects of the services after controlling statistically for assignment biases to the extent possible. All service variables were included simultaneously in the equation. It is, of course,

TABLE 17

DIRECTION OF SINGLE-SERVICE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR ASSIGNMENT BIAS AND SHOWING ASSIGNMENT BIASES - 6 MONTH FOLLOW-UP

	AZ	AL	CN	DL	IL	SC	CK	SP
	<u>Residential</u>							
Assignment Biases (Sign of Relation with Subsequents)	+	+++ +++	++	++	++	0	+	+++
Sign of Service Relation With Sub- sequents)	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+
	<u>Counseling</u>							
Assignment Biases (Sign of Relation with Subsequents)	0	--	--	-	NA	0	+0	0
Sign of Service Relation With Sub- sequents)	+	+	+	-	NA	-	+	-
	<u>Diversion/Evaluation</u>							
Assignment Biases (Sign of Relation with Subsequents)	++	+++ +++	++ ++	+++	0	0	0	NA
Sign of Service Relation With Sub- sequents)	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	NA
	<u>Multi-Service</u>							
Assignment Biases (Sign of Relation with Subsequents)	-	-	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	0
Sign of Service Relation With Sub- sequents)	-	+	NA	NA	NA	-	NA	-
	<u>Outreach</u> (too variable)							

not possible to control perfectly for assignment biases using statistical methods; they must be born in mind while interpreting results of any analysis involving effects possibly confounded by such biases.

The first section of the table pertains to residential services. The hints of the relative success of residential services that were seen in the earlier analysis receive support here. All eight sites offered residential services for some of their clients. Out of the eight sites, six produced lower subsequents for clients receiving these services. More impressive, in most of the six sites showing reduced subsequents, the effects were achieved in spite of difficult clientele compared to clientele assigned to other services. The two sites showing increased subsequents had even more difficult clients than was usual for residential services. This is the strongest pattern that we will see in either analysis.

Counseling programs fare less well in this analysis. Out of seven sites offering counseling programs to their clients, four resulted in increased subsequents. In two sites, Alameda and Connecticut, the increased subsequents effect was in the face of particularly arrest-resistant clients. In another two sites, the effect was shown on an unbiased or nearly unbiased clientele. Three sites showed reduced subsequents effects. In two cases, the reduction effect was seen on unbiased clientele while in the third, the clients of the programs were biased against subsequents, thereby making the achievement less noteworthy. The pattern would have to be seen as mixed, but the weight of the evidence is against counseling. It is difficult to find explanations for the variation in the kinds of counseling programs found in the various sites. Some were privately run,

others run by probation departments or by departments of correction, but these factors seem unrelated to the direction of the effects.

Diversion/Evaluation programs, more appropriately called crisis intervention programs, were offered in seven sites. Of the seven, four resulted in more subsequents.

Most programs, though, were working against probabilities. Three of the increased subsequents effects are seen in sites where the clientele were very difficult, while two are seen in programs with apparently unbiased types of clientele. There were, however, two sites where the coefficients predicted fewer subsequents. One such effect was accomplished on unbiased clientele while the other was attained in the face of a high-risk group. It is interesting to note the the two apparently successful crisis intervention programs were run by non-justice organizations. One program was in Illinois where interventions were by lay youth advocates; the other, in Connecticut, was staffed and run by a welfare department. All of the programs producing increased subsequents effects were based in the juvenile justice system. This is hardly conclusive evidence against programs based in the system, but it is a pattern worth noting.

The final service type subjected to this analysis is multi-service center programs. Four sites assigned clients to these types of programs. Most of these programs were of the standard type such as YMCAs, Boys Clubs, etc. The Pima County program offered a number of services falling into this category; some were of the usual type and others were quite unusual, such as the Young Women's Center and the mini-bike program. The Alameda County program was unusual in that the services in many of their multi-service centers (Youth Bureaus) were oriented toward youth advocacy.

In three of the four sites the services coded as multiservice centers yielded "negative" coefficients. However, their clientele were not a difficult sort; most were biased against subsequent offenses. Only one site offered unbiased clients to their multiservice centers. Here (in South Carolina) the effect still predicted reduced subsequents. Only in Alameda County was there an increase in subsequents and this was produced on a very arrest-resistant group of clients. The real pattern, though, is for multiservice centers to receive low-arrest-probability clients and to produce low levels of recidivism among its clients.

Summary of the Search for Patterns

The most impressive performance, based on this simple analysis, seems to come from residential services. The clientele referred to these services are more consistently difficult and arrest-prone. In spite of this, the record of these programs is to produce low-recidivating clients. The most discouraging picture comes from the counseling programs where clients are typically not difficult and yet four out of seven programs showed increased subsequents. The picture is mixed, however; counseling programs in two sites resulted in negative coefficients (reduced subsequents) based on non-biased clientele. Diversion/Evaluation (crisis intervention) and multiservice programs present a very mixed result. By and large, their coefficients match the direction of the client bias, with crisis intervention programs receiving difficult clients and multiservice centers receiving "easy" clients.

Overall 6-Month Arrest Data Summary

Strong and consistent service effects are hard to identify in a data set of this type, and none were found. The strongest effect we have seen in this analysis comes from residential services, and this is far from unequivocal. However, it may well be that residential programs result

in lower recidivism in more difficult and arrest-prone clients. This proved to be the case in Delaware and in at least one site it was particularly true for runaways and clients with arrest histories. The same types of clients were particularly recidivistic when assigned to multiservice and counseling programs in another site. Finally, in the analysis of the directions of effects, residential programs show the most consistent pattern of low recidivism, even though the clients of these programs would be expected to recidivate more than average. Although the residential service findings are not unequivocal, they are bolstered by findings in other studies. For instance, both Empey and Lubeck (1971) and Murray (1978) find residential treatment more effective than other kinds of treatment. In these cases the clients were far more serious offenders than we find in this sample, but the similarities in findings are worth noting. Other effects are variable and difficult to interpret. Finally, the issue of number of services assigned is an interesting but difficult one. Number of services is consistently related to higher subsequents but often the clients who receive multiple services are the more difficult clients. From this we would assume that the causal direction is from difficult clients to multiple services rather than the other way. However, in two sites where clients referred to multiple services were not noticeably different from clients referred to one service, the positive effect of number of services remained. It is, at least, a relationship worth pursuing in other studies.

Analysis of 12-Month Sample

The 12-month group is considerably smaller than the six-month group, and, of course, it is an earlier sample. The function of the 12-month analysis is to test the stability of the findings from the six-month analysis. Toward this end, the final equations from the six-month analysis were tested on the

12-month group. However, two sites did not operate programs or evaluations long enough to make a 12-month follow-up possible: Connecticut and Clark County. In addition, since the sample sizes were considerably smaller in the remaining sites, some terms had to be dropped from the equations as there were not enough cases represented by them. With these reservations, we proceed to the comparison.

Table 18 lists the terms of each equation used in the six-month analysis for each site available for the 12-month analysis. Opposite each term in the table are regression coefficients for the 12-month equation and, in parentheses, the corresponding coefficients for the six-month analysis. This is followed by the standard errors, F ratios and probabilities for each term for each of the two analyses. In addition, the R^2 for each equation is shown opposite the names of the sites.

Overall, the 12-month equations are very similar to the six-month equations. A number of terms that were statistically significant with the six-month group are not statistically significant for the 12-month. However, the regression coefficients are of similar magnitude and always (with two exceptions) of the same sign (direction). The two instances of sign reversal were for terms that were not significant in the first analysis. The first is seen in Arizona for the term MULTSTAT, included only as a companion to RUNAWAY since the two were highly related. The second instance is found in Spokane where the coefficient for the term SERVNUM was reduced from .06 to -.00.

There were four effects that seemed worthy of note in the six-month analysis. The first was in Delaware where long term residential care produced a strong negative (subsequent reducing) coefficient. The twelve-month follow-up shows an even stronger coefficient which remains statistically significant.

TABLE 18

REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR 12-MONTH FOLLOW-UP

Variable	Regression Coefficient 12 mo(6 mo)	Standard Error 12 mo(6 mo)	F 12 mo(6 mo)
Pima County, Arizona ($R^2 = .19$)			
L2PRIORS	.41 (.26)	.04 (.03)	88.60(88.20)
PURESTAT	.22 (.25)	.16 (.10)	1.88 (6.26)
RUNAWAY	.09 (.13)	.10 (.06)	.80 (4.46)
MULTSTAT	.04(-.12)	.14 (.09)	.07 (2.05)
SERVNUM	.10 (.09)	.06 (.04)	3.01 (4.46)
DIVERSION	.09 (.09)	.10 (.06)	.79 (1.85)
OTHER	.09 (.13)	.15 (.11)	.38 (1.33)
DIVER/OTHER	-.46(-.54)	.29 (.22)	2.55 (5.95)
CONSTANT	.03 (.01)		

Alameda County, California ($R^2 = .22$)

L2PRIORS	.39 (.25)	.06 (.04)	35.76(41.01)
MULTSTAT	.37 (.52)	.25 (.19)	2.12 (7.21)
SERVNUM	.08 (.20)	.12 (.07)	.43 (8.18)
COUNSELING	-.11(-.06)	.15 (.09)	.55 (.43)
MULTOFF/COUNSEL	NA(-.60)	NA (.28)	NA (4.53)
CONSTANT	.31 (.03)		

Delaware ($R^2 = .22$)

L2PRIORS	.22 (.20)	.08 (.04)	7.65(24.47)
AGE	.24 (.16)	.12 (.06)	3.81 (6.19)
AGE13ON	.87 (.46)	.34 (.18)	6.72 (6.44)
AGE16UP	-.83(-.60)	.29 (.15)	8.04(16.57)
SERVNUM	.31 (.19)	.11 (.06)	7.44(12.42)
LONGTERM	-.79(-.49)	.27 (.16)	8.54 (9.62)
COUNSELING	-.44(-.17)	.17 (.09)	6.73 (3.50)
SPRING	NA(-.21)	NA (.11)	NA (3.91)
SUMMER	NA(-.24)	NA (.09)	NA (6.56)
CONSTANT	-2.77(-1.78)		

Illinois ($R^2 = .21$)

L2PRIORS	.37 (.27)	.05 (.03)	64.84(92.59)
ANGLO	-.19(-.21)	.12 (.07)	2.59 (9.45)
AGE	-.15(-.07)	.04 (.02)	15.49(10.05)
CONSTANT	2.91(1.62)		

TABLE 18 (continued)

Variable	Regression Coefficient 12 mo(6 mo)	Standard Error 12 mo(6 mo)	F 12 mo(6 mo)
South Carolina ($R^2 = .14$)			
L2PRIORS	.17 (.22)	.10 (.07)	2.94(10.74)
MALE	-.21(-.12)	.08 (.05)	6.60 (6.92)
RUNAWAY	-.13(-.11)	.12 (.08)	1.18 (2.28)
SERVNUM	.13 (.12)	.06 (.06)	4.72 (7.46)
COUNSELING	-.51(-.39)	.20 (.14)	4.58 (7.60)
OTHER	-.05(-.14)	.13 (.09)	.18 (2.73)
RESIDEN	NA (.14)	NA (.09)	NA (2.18)
RUNAWAY/OTHER	.36 (.45)	.23 (.15)	2.38 (9.37)
RUNAWAY/RES	NA(-.50)	NA (.16)	NA (9.63)
PRIORS/RES	NA(-.30)	NA (.12)	NA (5.74)
CONSTANT	.61 (.41)		

Spokane County, Washington ($R^2 = .16$)

L2PRIORS	.25 (.17)	.06 (.04)	16.84(14.72)
MALE	.33 (.21)	.10 (.07)	10.32 (8.78)
AGE	-.11(-.06)	.03 (.02)	11.83 (8.27)
RUNAWAY	-.14(-.10)	.13 (.08)	1.14 (1.34)
MULTSTAT	-.12(-.05)	.17 (.11)	.53 (.23)
TIME	-.09(-.03)	.03 (.01)	6.75(11.70)
SUMMER	-.31(-.19)	.17 (.07)	3.28 (7.56)
SERVNUM	-.00 (.06)	.11 (.07)	0.00 (.69)
MULTISERVICE	-.17(-.30)	.23 (.16)	.55 (3.68)
COUNSELING	-.03(-.18)	.19 (.13)	.03 (2.12)
RUNAWAY/MULTISERV	.30 (.36)	.26 (.18)	1.30 (3.91)
RUNAWAY/COUNSEL	.55 (.31)	.22 (.15)	6.01 (4.23)
CONSTANT	2.46(1.44)		

The second effect occurred in South Carolina where the combinations of RUNAWAY and RESIDEN, as well as PRIORS and RESIDEN, showed strong negative, statistically significant coefficients. Unfortunately neither of these terms represented enough cases to appear in the twelve-month equation and therefore cannot be tested for stability.

The third set of effects noted in the earlier analysis came from Spokane. They were interaction effects from the combinations of RUNAWAY with MULTISERV and with COUNSELING. Both terms were positively (detri-mentally) related to subsequent offense. This seemed complementary to the South Carolina finding that runaways are best treated with residential care. In the twelve-month group the same effects appear, and both are significant. The interaction term including MULTISERV decreased slightly in strength (.36 to .30) but remained significant while the other term including COUNSELING increased in strength (.31 to .55) and also remained significant.

The final trend noted in the earlier analysis was the consistency with which SERVNUM or number of services assigned predicted more subsequent offenses. It remains unclear what the causal direction of this effect is since the more difficult cases are usually assigned to more services, but whatever the direction, the effect remains stable in all sites but Spokane as noted earlier. The two sites (South Carolina and Delaware) where the SERVNUM effect seemed relatively uncontaminated by assignment biases and multicollinearity again produce positive coefficients that are statistically significant. In South Carolina the effect is almost exactly the same magnitude and in Delaware the coefficient is considerably stronger (from .19 to .31).

Summary of Arrest Data Analysis

In each case where previous findings were testable on the 12-month sample the findings were upheld. In one critical case the findings were not testable. These concerned the apparently beneficial (subsequent reducing) effect of residential care for runaways and for clients with priors in

South Carolina. All other effects concerning the subsequent reducing impact of residential services were supported, as was the subsequent increasing effect of counseling and multi-service centers for runaways in Spokane. Finally, to the extent that there seemed to be a deleterious impact of number of services on subsequents, or an impact of difficult clients on number of services, it remains true in the 12-month analysis. It is, however, still impossible to be sure of the causal direction of the effect.

CONTINUED

6 OF 14

Analysis of Self-Reported Delinquency

The use of self-reported delinquency data in this report has some advantages and some disadvantages. The disadvantages have to do with the fact that self-report requires interviews with clients, and thereby inevitably reduces sample size through attrition. The advantages all relate to the fact that offenders engage in more potentially chargeable activity than they are arrested for, so frequencies and distributions are more favorable for analytic purposes. Specifically, in this analysis, the dimensions of delinquent behavior can be acknowledged and attended to with use of self-report data, while this was not possible with arrest data.

The disadvantage of smaller sample size (N=951) will be vitiated somewhat by doing an aggregate analysis, bringing sites into the analysis as a series of dummy variables in an attempt to "partial out" jurisdiction "effects" rather than treating each site separately.

The availability of more offenses per person will permit several types of analyses beyond those for the simple effect of services upon subsequent offenses. The first analysis will examine the dimensions of self-reported delinquency and the potential specialization of offenders. In a much simpler manner, this will be done with arrest data as well in preparation for the comparison of official and self-reported offending.

The second set of analyses will explore the relationship between arrests and behavior, using the dimensions established in the first analysis.

The third set of analyses will be the most rigorous possible with this data set and pertains to the effect of service types on subsequent offenses.

Finally, an analysis will be made of the relationships among prior offenses (official and self report), service types (taken individually) and subsequent offenses. This analysis will take into account the strength and sign of these relationships relative to each other. Statistical significance will not be a

prominent feature of this particular analysis.

The Variables

The client background variables used in this analysis will be familiar from preceding chapters. They are: AGE, MALE, ANGLO, and NUCLEAR. Similarly, the services in question have all appeared in previous analyses: DIVERSION/EVALUATION, SHELTER, GROUP, FOSTER, LONGTERM, RESIDEN, MULTISERV, COUNSELING, and SERVNUM

The variables unique to this analysis are those measuring offense behavior of the clients both before and after service intervention and as reflected by arrests (probation referrals for Connecticut) and self-report. (It should be noted here that Clark County does not appear in this analysis because clients were not interviewed until six months after intervention, therefore there are no self-report measures of prior behavior.) Hindelang, et al. (1979) have pointed out that offense behavior is not unidimensional and that treating it so is likely to mask important effects, especially in comparing self-reports to official records. A series of factor analyses was therefore undertaken on the self-report data to identify dimensions of behavior. In the light of space limitations, only the final result will be reported here.

Before proceeding to the factors, the reader should be reminded that the self-report information was gathered twice on each client. The first (Wave 1) interview was administered soon after service assignment and covered the six-month period prior to program intervention. The second administration (Wave 2) took place approximately six months after service assignment, and represents post-service behavior. Each wave is treated separately and then compared to the other.

A preliminary step in the factor analyses was inspection of the distributions of the variables. Not surprisingly there were problems. The more serious offenses showed the familiar highly skewed distribution with the majority

of cases at "0". The less serious offenses were more evenly distributed but heavier (in terms of frequency) at both ends of the distribution. In addition, the means and variances were quite diverse. There was little that could be done for the skewness (since it differed by offense) using transformations. However, the means and variances problems were resolved by standardizing the responses. Consequently, all that follows reflects standardized rather than raw scores.

Arrest data were treated as before, i.e., the number of charges plus 1 transformed to the Log base 2. The only difference is that for this analysis they are also divided into status offenses and non-status offenses yielding the following variables:

L2SUB6STAT
L2SUB6NONSTAT
L2PRIORSTAT
L2PRIORNONSTAT

Dimensions of Self-Report

The factor analyses consistently produced three strong factors and one independent item, RUNAWAY. On the basis of these factors, four self-report indices were constructed as simple summations of subsets of the self-report items, with each item treated as a standard score (mean of "0", unit variance). Shown below are the indices, their estimated reliability, and their component items.

<u>Dimensions</u>	<u>Reliability (Alpha)</u>	<u>Items</u>
DRUGSR1* (Wave 1)	.83	Use and sale of pills
DRUGSR2 (Wave 2)	.82	Driving under influence
		Use and Sale of hard drugs
		Use and sale of marijuana
		Drinking
		Getting Drunk
		Sniffing Glue
PREDSR1	.82	Burglary
PREDSR2	.83	Shoplifting
		Misdemeanor Theft
		Felony Theft
		Breaking and Entering
		Joyriding
		Vandalism

<u>Dimensions</u>	<u>Reliability (Alpha)</u>	<u>Items</u>
		Receiving Stolen Goods
		Robbery
		Concealed Weapon
		Assault
ADOLSR1	.77	Truancy
ADOLSR2	.81	Disobeying Parents
		Disobeying School Rules
		Curfew
RUNSR1	NA	Runaway (Single item)
RUNSR2	NA	Runaway (single item)

*An example of these acronyms: DRUGSR1 stands for the report of a drug (or alcohol) offense (DRUG) self-reported (SR) on the Wave 1 interview (1).

The factors divided quite well into (1) drug and alcohol behavior, (2) predatory behavior, (3) fairly typical adolescent misconduct, or rebellion against authority, and (4) running away. Interestingly, runaway did not relate well to any dimension or item. It always remains independent. This may address the popular notion that running away necessitates other law violations and therefore leads to a more serious involvement in crime. This may be true in some cases but does not seem to be the rule. In addition, this finding may give some credence to the notion held by many practitioners that the act of running away is, in some cases, therapeutic.

A comparison of Wave 1 behavior with Wave 2 behavior for the same individuals was the next analysis undertaken. The purpose was to determine the stability of behavior over time regardless of services. Figure 1 displays the statistically significant path co-efficients among the four subindices of self-report. It is clear that in each case, the Wave 1 measure of a sub-index is considerably more related to its Wave 2 counterpart than it is to any other Wave 2 subindex. We interpret this to indicate some stability in the dimensions of behavior. Note that runaway is related to no other offense types.

FIGURE I
A SIMPLE PATH ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN
WAVE I AND WAVE 2 SELF-REPORT INDICES




Table 19 addresses a similar question for official offenses. This table is a simple correlation matrix, possible because of the relative simplicity of the dimensions used with official offenses. The evidence for stable dimensions using arrest data is not as compelling as that using self-report data but the same pattern is visible. The two highest correlations in the table are (1) between nonstatus priors and nonstatus subsequents and (2) prior status and subsequent status offenses.

This analysis raises the question of the relationship between self-reported delinquency and official delinquency. Table 20 addresses this question. In general it can be said that status offenses are considerably more at risk of official notice than are predatory or drug offenses. This is particularly true for run-away which, not surprisingly, results in more arrests for status offenses than for nonstatus offenses. Youngsters who engage in rebellious behavior other than running away are arrest prone for both status offenses and nonstatus offenses. The same pattern holds for both six-month periods shown in the table. Both drug and predatory behavior are low-risk offenses, especially drugs. These data would seem to buttress the point made by Hindelang et al. (1979), i.e., it makes little sense to compare total arrests with total self-report behaviors. In this data set there are dimensions to delinquent behavior and they relate differently to arrest data. Of course we cannot be sure that the differential risks of arrest for the various offense categories is not a reflection of the particular sample we are working with. These are all youths who have committed status offenses for which they have come to the attention of authorities.

The final preliminary analysis concerns the relationship between client characteristics and offense behavior. The question is, who commits what type of offense? Table 21 indicates that predatory offenses are committed more by males and younger juveniles than by females and older juveniles.

TABLE 19
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OFFICIAL OFFENSES
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES

	<u>L2PRIOR NONSTAT</u>	<u>L2PRIOR STAT</u>	<u>L2SUB6 NONSTAT</u>	<u>L2SUB6 STAT</u>
L2PRIOR NONSTAT	1.0			
L2PRIOR STAT	.26* .0001	1.0		
L2SUB6 NONSTAT	.31* .0001	.09* .004	1.0	
L2SUB6 STAT	.04 .24	.31* .0001	.23* .0001	1.0

*Indicates statistical significance at $\leq .05$

TABLE 20
CORRELATIONS FOR OFFICIAL VERSUS SELF-REPORT OFFENSES

Self-Reported Offenses	Official Offenses			
	<u>L2PRIOR STAT</u>	<u>L2PRIOR NONSTAT</u>	<u>L2SUB6 STAT</u>	<u>L2SUB6 NONSTAT</u>
PREDSR1	.03 .29	.10* .001		
DRUGSR1	.05 .11	.003 .94		
ADOLSR1	.10* .002	.10* .002		
RUNSR1	.32* .000	-.03 .40		
PREDSR2			.05 .10	.09* .004
DRUGSR2			.07* .04	.05 .12
ADOLSR2			.07* .07	.05 .16
RUNSR2			.30* .000	-.000 .99

*Indicates statistical significance at $\leq .05$

TABLE 21
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR
CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND SELF-REPORT

	Female	Anglo	Age
PREDSR1	.19* .0001	.06 .09	-.09* .004
ADOLSR1	.02 .57	.17* .0001	.14* .0001
DRUGSR1	-.04 .20	.24* .0001	.19* .0001
RUNSR1	-.20* .0001	-.06 .06	-.01 .73
PREDSR2	.12* .0002	.06 .06	-.09* .006
ADOLSR2	.01 .66	.13* .0001	.05 .14
DRUGSR2	.0001 .97	.25* .0001	.17* .0001
RUNSR2	-.11* .0006	-.06* .05	-.13* .0001

*Indicates statistical significance at $\leq .05$

Both adolescent rebellious and drug behavior is committed more by Anglo and older youth. Finally, runaways are disproportionately minority and young. We suspect that these patterns reflect arrest and status offender program referral criteria.

Summary of Preliminary Analyses

The preceding analyses can be reasonably summarized by three points. First, the most critical component of self-reported behavior, insofar as it relates to official offending, is a single item, runaway, which has little in common with the rest of the self-report variation. This may be unique to a status offender program sample, but it speaks to the methodological issue of the use of overall summations versus subindices in self-report, especially when comparing self-report to official delinquency.

Second, there seem to be dimensions of offense behavior that are not highly related to one another. This point is best made by self-report data but also receives some support from arrest data.

Third, the status offender program sample is a unique one, so that traditional relationships cannot be assumed. Specifically Anglos and younger youths report more substance abuse, while boys and younger youths report more predatory offenses than others.

Service Effect Analysis - Multiple Regression

This will be the first of two analyses of service effects on self-reported behaviors and arrests. It will represent the more severe test of services because service effects on subsequent arrests is tested only after controlling for:

(1) all site terms, (2) all Wave 1 self-report dimensions (if significant) and (3) both dimensions (status and nonstatus) of official arrests (if significant). Service effects on arrests are not calculated directly in this analysis (this was done in an earlier section of this chapter). Rather, Wave 2 self-reported behavior is controlled before assessing effects on arrests. Any effects of service on arrests, then, would be interpreted as system response effects over and above behavior. That is, if a service type predicts arrests, or explains variation in arrests beyond what is explained by behavior, we can only assume that something about the service itself makes the client disproportionately vulnerable to arrest (beyond what is expected on the basis of behavior). Tables are not shown for this analysis since there are so few service effects identified. The services tested in this manner are: Diversion, Shelter, Group, Foster, Long-term Residence (combination of Group and Foster), Residential Care (combination of Group, Foster, and Shelter), Multiservice Center, Outreach, Counseling, and Number of Services. The services were tested against the rest of the equation serially. A total of three statistically significant service effects were seen among all of these tests. The first is a subsequent arrest producing effect of shelter on self-reported runaway. The second is a subsequent arrest reducing effect of foster care on adolescent rebellion self-reported behavior. The third effect is a negative (subsequent reducing) effect of counseling on official nonstatus offenses.

In summary, effects seen in the arrest analysis are not seen in the first analysis. In addition, the effects seem to be unpatterned and therefore difficult to interpret. It may be that including as many control variables (especially site variables) as we did may have been too rigorous a test. For instance, if site variables are correlated with residential services (they are) and if residential care is correlated with subsequent behavior, the service-behavior correlation is likely to be "absorbed" by the site variables entered earlier in the

equation. This danger implies the need for another, more liberal analysis.

Service Effect Analysis-Correlations

This correlational analysis looks at the differences between the correlation of Wave 1 self-report dimensions with service types (reflecting the behavior of the clients before entering or early in service) and the correlation of the Wave 2 behaviors with services. For instance, the first section of Figure 2 shows that predatory offending before the program was correlated at +.01 with diversion/evaluation or crisis intervention. However, Wave 2 predatory behaviors are correlated at -.03 with this service. This would be interpreted as a slight recidivism decreasing effect of crisis intervention on predatory offenses. Three situations would qualify as a beneficial effect in this analysis: (1) a positive correlation with the service for offenses occurring prior to the program intervention and a negative correlation with the service for offenses occurring after the intervention; (2) a positive correlation for prior offenses and a smaller positive correlation for offenses after intervention; and (3) a negative correlation for offenses occurring before the program and a larger negative correlation for offenses occurring after the intervention. A deleterious effect, of course, would be defined by the opposite conditions.

The comparisons shown in Figure 2 can be analyzed in at least two ways. The first focuses on the service and the second focuses on the offender type.

Close observation of Figure 2 reveals that some services are generally more effective than others. The services that show at least some beneficial effect (very small in some cases) on all categories of offenders are: outreach and large numbers of services (the latter is a direct contradiction to the results of the arrest data analysis). Those services that have a beneficial effect on three offender types and do not have a deleterious effect on the fourth are: foster care and long-term residential care (combination of group and foster). Clearly, the "LONGTERM" effect is largely due to foster care.

FIGURE 2

WAVE 1 AND WAVE 2 CORRELATIONS WITH SERVICES
FOR SELF-REPORT DIMENSIONS





FIGURE 2 (Cont'd)



Overall, the least beneficial (in terms of offense reduction) are: multi-service centers, counseling and shelter care. These three services show deleterious effects for almost all offender types.

Among those services that were generally beneficial, group homes appear to be especially effective with adolescent rebellion behaviors (largely status offenses) and runaways. The combination of group homes and foster homes (long-term residential) are more effective for drug users and runaways than for others. Foster homes are most effective for runaways, and the same effect on runaways is seen by residential services in general. A large number of services seem to be best for runaways.

On the other side of the coin, multiservice centers appear least effective with runaways as do counseling services. Shelter care is least effective with status offender clients of all types, including runaways.

The second way of looking at the data in this figure is based on offender types. For instance, predatory offenders seem to be best served by outreach programs, group homes, crisis intervention, and a larger number of services. However, they seem to do worst with multiservice centers, counseling and shelter care. All effects for predatory offenders, whether they increase or reduce recidivism, are small.

Drug offenders are affected in only small degrees by the services also. On the beneficial side are outreach, counseling, group homes, foster homes, residential services generally, and especially long-term residential services. Finally, number of services (larger) shows a beneficial effect on this type of offender. On the harmful side for drug users are multiservice centers, crisis intervention, and shelter care. Again, all effects mentioned for drug users are small.

Status offenders (referred to here as adolescent rebellious behavior), excluding runaways, show positive but small effects from multiservice centers, outreach programs, crisis intervention, residential care, larger numbers of services, and especially foster care. Counseling, shelter and group homes do not appear to do well for these offenders.

The largest effects in the entire data set are seen for runaways. Here the beneficial services are listed in order of the strength of their beneficial effects: long-term residential care, foster care, residential care in general, crisis intervention, group homes, larger number of services, and outreach. Deleterious effects are also stronger for runaways than for other types of offenders. They include, in order of the strength of their effects: counseling, multiservice centers and shelter care.

Summary of Self-Report Analysis

The self-report analysis has yielded several findings of interest. Offending behavior has been shown to have several distinct dimensions including predatory, drug, adolescent rebellion, and runaway behaviors. Runaway behavior is quite independent of other types of offender behavior. Further, the major link of self-report to arrest data is in status offenses, particularly runaways, i.e., runaway is the highest arrest-risk behavior. It has also been shown that this sample of offenders is an unusual one, showing predatory offenses committed more by Anglos and younger juveniles, a reversal of expected relations.

After controlling for client characteristics and site effects, as well as prior self-reported behavior and arrests, very few services showed statistically significant effects on any behavior type or arrest frequencies. The few that did occur were not patterned and were therefore not taken seriously.

A comparison of behavior before and after service interventions yielded a few effect patterns that seem worth summarizing. On the basis of this analysis,

there is some evidence that some services are generally more effective than others. Those showing consistent beneficial effects (if small) are outreach programs, larger numbers of services, and longer term residential treatment. Residential treatments showed the strongest effects, thereby supporting a similar finding based on arrest data.

Showing effects of increased recidivism generally are multiservice centers, counseling, and shelter care.

Offenders most amenable to service seemed to be runaways. They were best served by long-term residential placements and crisis intervention. The offenders least well served overall seemed to be offenders with a predatory offense background. This is not surprising in a program designed for status offenders. Drug offenders showed their strongest beneficial effect in long-term residential placements.

All effects must be treated with caution unless seen consistently over many situations since biases cannot be adequately controlled to be sure effects are real and not artifacts of program assignment.

Chapter Summary

There were three major findings based on the arrest data analysis that can be compared to the self-report analysis findings:

- (1) Residential treatment showed the most consistently beneficial effects in the arrest data analysis. More specifically, long-term residential placement received support from one site, Delaware. The self-report analysis supports both aspects of this finding. Foster care and group homes show consistent offense reduction relationships. Shelter care, on the other hand, did not show the same effect, but an opposite one. The policy implications of this finding are unclear. The most obvious interpretation is that since long-term residential care is beneficial, its

use should be expanded. On the other side of the issue is the fact that the finding is based on a very small proportion of the total sample. Indeed, some practitioners felt that residential care was needed in a surprisingly small number of cases. If their inclinations were accurate, the beneficial effect of residential placement may apply only to the few most difficult cases. It is also true, however, that our juvenile justice system and related practitioners (system and private) usually start from the premise or assumption that children are better off in their own families if there is any way this can be worked out. If this assumption is inappropriately strong, it may be that residential care is underutilized in view of its apparent benefits. Only a systematic test of residential care treating a variety of client types would yield an answer to this ambiguity.

- (2) In the arrest analysis, runaways seemed to benefit most from residential placements. This is also the case in the self-report analysis, so that we gain confidence in this finding as well.
- (3) There was some evidence in the earlier analysis that providing a larger number of services was harmful to clients. However, this finding was consistently contradicted by the self-report analysis. Two interpretations of these contradictory findings seem possible. First, they may well simply be unstable results that should be dismissed. Second, there may be a beneficial effect in terms of behavior but a harmful effect in terms of the official response to the youths' behavior. It is impossible to know which is correct, if either.

Finally, there is considerable evidence that there are different types

of offenders, with some specializing, to some degree, in predatory offenses, others in drug and liquor offenses, others in rebellious status offense behavior, and still others in runaway behaviors. The latter was the most distinct group. They are also the most treatable according to the self-report data analysis, especially by long-term residential care.

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Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
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National Evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Programs

Volume II

-END-
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Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

National Evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Programs

Volume II

Solomon Kobrin
Malcolm W. Klein
Co-Principal Investigators

June 1982

HOW THE PAGES ARE NUMBERED

The two volumes of this final report are numbered consecutively in large, black numbers at the lower right of each page. Thus, the first page of Volume II is numbered 541.

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-35-

Suppose you want to find Chapter X, "The Clark County Program." From the table of contents at the beginning of Volume I, you learn that this chapter begins on page 265.

Turning to that page, you learn that the chapter summary, which you are seeking, begins on page 12. To find it you turn to the page which is numbered, at top,

-12-

and, at bottom,

277.

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CHAPTER XVII
OFFENSE PATTERNS OF STATUS OFFENDERS

Until very recently, the laws respecting juvenile offenders in the United States treated as delinquents not only youth who violated the criminal law, but also all those who ran away from home, were incorrigibly disobedient, refused to attend school, violated local curfew regulations, and committed similar acts prohibited only for the young. These infractions have been designated "status offenses" since they apply only to the incumbents of youthful age status. Juvenile courts have commonly accorded status offenders much the same treatment given those who committed criminal offenses. They were frequently placed in locked detention facilities awaiting a formal court hearing, with the period of detention sometimes prolonged until the hearing date. When formally adjudicated as status offenders, many were committed to juvenile correctional institutions, where they were indiscriminately mixed with youth committed for criminal offenses.¹

During the past decade, a deinstitutionalization movement of substantial strength has developed to provide a separate type of treatment for status offenders. Two kinds of arguments have been advanced in support of the status offender deinstitutionalization movement. The first has been based on legal and ethical doctrines. It asserts that there can be no justification for subjecting those who commit non-criminal acts to the same deprivation of liberty as is imposed on youth guilty of criminal violations. Quite apart from the effect that incarceration in detention facilities or correctional institutions

may have on non-criminal youth, that is, whether such treatment deters or stimulates future misbehavior, the secure confinement of status offenders is judged to be both unwarranted and morally repugnant.

A second set of arguments marshalled in support of the movement rests on the perspective of labeling theory (Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963; Schur, 1971). Proponents of this view have asserted that deviant identity becomes a fixed element of the person's self concept primarily as a consequence of being dealt with as a deviant by the agents of the official control institutions. The meaning of an act and therefore its significance for the person's self concept is defined by the response to the act on the part of those who wield societal authority. Status offenders who are arrested and haled before the court, just as are youthful criminal offenders, are on this reckoning subtly pressed to see themselves as delinquents, however minor, transitory, or fortuitious their status offenses might have been. In many cases, such pressures may induce an adaptive response in which the young person seeks the companionship and social support of those similarly stigmatized. This outcome is seen as more likely if status offenders are held in detention facilities and committed to correctional institutions, where they are thrown into close association with youth held for criminal offenses. However unintended, the result, the argument runs, is to encourage the development of delinquent careers. Youth whose initial deviance may have been confined to the status offenses now expand their misbehavior to include the more serious offenses by virtue of the exposure to institutional treatment.

In the past there has been little opportunity to investigate the claims of the latter perspective with respect to the effect of institutional treatment on status offenders. Specifically, two propositions are asserted. The first is that there exists an identifiable population of young offenders who confine their misbehavior to the status offenses, who endanger themselves rather than the community, and who require a quite different treatment approach than that accorded the young criminal offender. The second proposition implicit in the labeling perspective is that there occurs a progression from status to criminal offenses, resulting in part from the labeling process to which status offenders are exposed, and in part from their exposure to young criminal offenders in detention and correctional facilities.

Both of these assertions have been questioned, in particular the view that there exists a group of juveniles who commit only status offenses. Among the few studies that have examined this issue, the majority conclude that status offenders cannot be distinguished from those who commit criminal violations (Thomas, 1976; Erickson, 1979; Klein, 1971). These findings have been interpreted as supporting a versatile or cafeteria-style view of juvenile offense patterns in which "today's status offender is tomorrow's burglar and vice versa" (Klein, 1979). There is, however, at least one study that found status offenders to be a clearly discernable sub-group.

Clarke (1975) reported major differences among types of juvenile offenders in the Philadelphia birth cohort data (Wolfgang, Figlio & Sellin, 1972). Among the 3,475 males who acquired a police juvenile record, 23.4 percent (n=812) first appeared for behavior that would not be

criminal if engaged in by an adult and were classified as juvenile status offenders. Comparisons with those who were first arrested for a criminal offense reveal the following: (1) criminal offenders recidivated at over twice the rate of status offenders (61 percent vs. 30 percent having at least two offenses); and (2) 21 percent of the initial criminal violators became "chronic" offenders (at least five offenses) in contrast to only 10 percent of the status offenders. The less serious nature of delinquency involvement among status offenders was apparent in additional measures reported by Clarke, and identical patterns were found among white and non-white males analyzed separately.

The contradiction between the findings reported by Clarke and the conclusions of the other studies may be explained by a number of factors. Beyond the common focus on offense patterning, these studies varied considerably in terms of the selection of research issues, the choice of research design, and even in the definition of major terms. For instance, possession of alcohol by a minor may have been counted as either as status or criminal offense; two studies examined birth cohorts as compared to cross-sectional data; and an interest in repeated violation of a specific statute (such as burglary) is a separate issue from that of concentration within broader categories of offense behavior or of movement toward non-recidivism. Since these variations might have led to varying conclusions, it would seem appropriate to briefly review each of these studies for evidence bearing upon the issue raised in this research: are there youths who confine their offense behavior to status violations?

The earliest cited findings (Klein, 1971) were gathered in evaluations of programs directed at gang delinquency in five major cities.

In at least one site, Los Angeles, an attempt was made to determine the correlations between specific, officially recorded violations among individuals in five male gangs. The finding of "no systematic ordering of offenses" (Klein: 125) supported the conclusion of versatility in offense behavior. While gang members in Klein's study had on occasion been charged with status offenses, the population was not representative of juvenile offenders, nor was an analysis reported of patterns or progressions involving the broader categories of status and criminal violations. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that a juvenile who committed only status offenses would be viewed as a bonafide gang member. The absence of offense patterning in this study might provide a benchmark for further research in establishing analogies between diverse juvenile populations, but it does not directly apply to the issue under consideration.

The previously discussed findings offered by Clarke (1975) are of limited value in ascertaining patterned offense behavior. A major limitation is the absence of females, who represent a substantial portion of the status offender population. For the male birth cohort, the data do show that initial status offenders are the least seriously delinquent group and that 70 percent appeared only for a single status violation. However, there is no indication of the extent to which criminal offenders subsequently appeared for status violations, nor is it possible to determine the types of violations for which status offenders recidivate. The latter issue is of importance because it bears upon our second proposition, namely, that status offenders become involved in a progression toward more serious violations. In recomputing some of the reported information it is possible to suggest at least the direction in which status offenders progress.

An additional measure of seriousness examined in the study was the average number of "index" offenses attributable to the initial offender groups. These offenses consist of the more serious violations involving injury, theft or property damage. This classification was also used to divide the initial criminal violators into two groups-- index and non-index offenders. In the total population the index offense average for the three initial groups consisted of the following: status (.354); non-index (.727); index (2.053). If a progression toward more serious violations was evident in the data, then one would expect that the disparity between average number of index offenses would be substantially reduced for those in the initial groups who committed further law violations. In other words, the recidivists would appear to be much more similar in this respect than the initial offender groups. Recomputation of the average number of index offenses beyond the first offense for the recidivists in the initial groups yielded the following: status (1.191); non-index (1.219); index (1.686). When examining only recidivism there are a number of reasons for reduced disparity between the groups (i.e., the first index offense of the initial index offenders is automatically excluded, and the fewer number of repeat offenders in the initial status offenders group affects the average figure considerably). However, it does appear that when initial status offenders are involved in further violations the seriousness of the behavior is comparable to that of the initial criminal offenders. In sum, the Philadelphia cohort data is at least suggestive of both a specialized status offender population and of some progression toward more serious violations.

Thomas (1976) examined offense patterns among 2,092 youths appearing in the juvenile court records of two cities during the years 1970 through 1974. From the analysis he concluded that the data provided "little or no support for those who have contended that status offenders are a distinctly different group of juveniles" (p. 454). Notwithstanding the nuances of the term distinctly different, the conclusion appears to be unwarranted, since the data contained in the published report of the study support an alternative interpretation. For the purposes of this review, the data suggest that in the earlier stages of their offense careers status offenders are readily distinguishable from criminal violators, but with further involvement their offense behavior seems to progress toward more serious violations.

In examining differences among types of offenders, Thomas divided the population according to their most serious charge at initial appearance in court records and obtained the following three groups: felony (n=467), misdemeanor (n=1,053), and status (n=572). Comparisons were then made of the offenses charged for as many as three reappearances. For the first reappearance Thomas noted that initial status offenders did not differ in the expected direction toward fewer repeated violations (pp. 445-46). Status offenders were reported as having the highest rates of recidivism (i.e., status 38 percent; misdemeanor 22 percent; felony 31 percent). However, inspection of the data reveals that this finding was entirely a function of the initial status offenders being more likely than any other group to have reappeared for a status offense. If first reappearance rates had been reported for criminal offenses only, the ordering of initial offender groups would have changed considerably (i.e., status 20 percent; misdemeanor 17

percent; felony 28 percent). A major difference between the groups was that the initial status offenders, constituting approximately 27 percent of the total population, accounted for 63 percent of all status violations recorded at first reappearance. Similar figures can be obtained for the distribution of offenses at the second and third reappearances as well. In other words, contrary to Thomas's conclusion, the data indicate that status offenders differ from criminal offenders in that their subsequent offenses more often involve repeated status violations.

With regard to progression in offense careers, Thomas states that "evidence in support of the hypothesis that court appearances encourage movement toward more serious delinquency is difficult to find in any of the tables present in this analysis" (p. 449). It should be noted, however, that there are alternative methods of analysis which might have uncovered supporting evidence. One possibility would be simply to examine the relationship between types of initial and subsequent offenses to determine if there was a shift toward more serious violations at each level of increasing court involvement.

The necessary data can be abstracted from the published report (pp.445-46), and are shown in Table 1. The analysis shows that at first reappearance there is a moderate relationship between initial offense type and the type of offense at reappearance ($\text{Gamma} = .45$; $p < .01$). This is consistent with the previous observation of differences between groups. At the point of first reappearance those who committed a second offense showed the highest percentage of involvement for the same type

TABLE 1
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES OF STATUS AND
DELINQUENT OFFENDERS (FROM THOMAS' STUDY)

Type of Offense at 1st Reappearance	Type of Offense at Initial Appearance		
	Status	Misdemeanor	Felony
<u>Felony</u>	18% (n= 38)	26% (n= 59)	46% (n= 67)
<u>Misdemeanor</u>	36% (n= 79)	55% (n=125)	43% (n= 63)
<u>Status</u>	46% (n=100)	19% (n= 43)	12% (n= 17)
Totals:	100% (n=217)	100% (n=227)	100% (n=147)
$\text{Gamma} = .45 \quad p < .01$			
Type of Offense at 2nd Reappearance			
	Status	Misdemeanor	Felony
<u>Felony</u>	20% (n= 22)	40% (n= 42)	37% (n= 26)
<u>Misdemeanor</u>	46% (n= 50)	42% (n= 44)	49% (n= 34)
<u>Status</u>	33% (n= 36)	17% (n= 18)	14% (n= 10)
Totals:	99% (n=108)	99% (n=104)	100% (n= 70)
$\text{Gamma} = .29 \quad p < .02$			

(Table 1 cont'd)
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES OF STATUS AND
DELINQUENT OFFENDERS (FROM THOMAS' STUDY)

Type of Offense at 3rd Appearance	Type of Offense at Initial Appearance		
	Status	Misdemeanor	Felony
Felony	27% (n= 14)	46% (n= 22)	41% (n= 17)
Misdemeanor	38% (n= 20)	44% (n= 21)	49% (n= 20)
Status	35% (n= 18)	10% (n= 5)	10% (n= 4)
Totals:	100% (n= 52)	100% (n= 48)	100% (n= 41)
Gamma = .30 p < .10			

of violation as was initially charged: for returning felony offenders (n=147), 46 percent reappeared as felony violators; among the misdemeanor recidivists (n=227), 55 percent committed a misdemeanor; and for the reappearing initial status offenders (n=217), 46 percent returned for a status violation. If progression is suggested by the data, then it would be expected that the relationship between initial and subsequent offenses would decline with increasing reappearances in court records (i.e., knowledge of the initial offense would not predict the type of later offense because the groups had become more similar in their law violating behavior). The test of this relationship at later reappearances shows evidence of progression toward more serious violations. At second reappearance the relationship is reduced considerably as the initial status offenders show a greater proclivity for criminal violations, but the differences between the groups are still statistically significant (Gamma = .29; p < .02). By the third reappearance the measure of association remains stable, but the group differences are not statistically significant (Gamma = .30; p < .10). In other words, the differences that were observed in their early offense careers appear to diminish with further juvenile court involvement as the recidivists among the initial offender groups become more heavily involved in criminal violations.

As a final comment on the Thomas study, an explanation should be attempted as to why a re-analysis of reported data could lead to conclusions that contradict those of the original author. An important clue can be found in the title of the Thomas study--"Are Status Offenders Really So Different" (italics added). This question seems to imply a standard of absolute difference in comparing juvenile offenders. According to this standard, Thomas's conclusions are absolutely correct. Even in

their early offense careers some status offenders reappear for felony violations, and some criminal violators return for status offenses. It is also possible to maintain that there is an absence of pronounced homogeneity in offense careers (p. 447), that juvenile offenders are not bound to a single type of delinquency involvement (p. 448), and that the type of initial charge is an imperfect predictor of subsequent offense (p. 453). However, the present review of the Thomas data has focused on relative differences and according to this standard status offenders do appear to be different from criminal violators, but the difference becomes relatively less pronounced with increased involvement in the juvenile justice system.

The most recently reported data on offense patterns appears in Erickson (1979) and offers an analysis of both self reported and officially recorded delinquency in several populations of juvenile offenders. The data that are comparable to the studies reviewed here are drawn from the official records of a birth cohort including both males and females, and represents all violations for 2,843 juveniles in the years prior to their eighteenth birthday. The analysis of official offenses is quite dissimilar to the tracking of initial offender groups as undertaken by both Clarke and Thomas, and there are very few parallel findings that can be abstracted from the published data. Also, Erickson's data are largely reported as percentages of the total population and therefore the following must be viewed as approximated figures.

Erickson reported that 50 percent of the cohort first appeared in court records as status offenders (p. 21). This represents an obvious disparity with the 23.4 percent figure in Clarke's data and the

27.4 percent from the Thomas study. Since none of these studies state the specific violations included in the classification of status offense it is difficult to determine if the difference is a matter of definition or represents some other source of variation.

Erickson also indicated that criminal violators were less likely than status offenders to reappear for a second offense. In the total population, 38 percent were reported as one time offenders for either a felony or misdemeanor violation. Since the total population was evenly divided between status and criminal offenders, this means that 76 percent of the initial criminal offenders were non-recidivists. For initial status offenders only 40 percent were reported as having never returned for a second offense. In other words, the data showed almost a complete reversal of the Clarke findings that 39 percent of the criminal offenders were non-recidivists as compared to 70 percent of the status violators. Comparable figures from the Thomas study showed that 75 percent of the combined criminal offender groups never returned for a second offense, and that non-recidivist status offenders accounted for 62 percent of the initial group (with the difference being attributed to repeated status offenses in the status offender group).

Erickson's analysis was primarily aimed at demonstrating the rarity with which juveniles are concentrated in the category of "pure status offenders" and that with increasing involvement in court processing the offense careers of juveniles assume an "erratic-random" pattern. Until the data are subjected to further analysis, it is impossible to determine if a progression toward more serious violations by status offenders is present in Erickson's data. The only difference noted by Erickson that would seem to favor specialized treatment of

status offenders is found in his category of static careers. Here it was found that 15 percent of the total population having multiple offense careers persisted in the commission of a single type of offense. Within this category 11 percent of the total population committed only status violation with the number of offenses varying from as few as two and as many as 27 in a single offense career. Relative to the 50 percent of the total population who first appeared for as status offense, this means that approximately two-thirds (62 percent) either did not return for a second time or reappeared only for status violation.

Thus, recent research offers reasonably strong evidence of the existence of a fairly large group of juvenile offenders who tend to restrict their violations to the status offenses, of whom a small subset recidivate as "pure" status offenders. While some progression from status to delinquent offenses is apparent in the Thomas data, those who appeared initially as delinquents (i.e., misdemeanor or felony offenders) were significantly more prominent in the same subsequent offense categories than were those who appeared initially for status offenses. Similarly, status offenders on initial appearance showed much higher proportions of status than of delinquent offenses in their subsequent appearances. Status offenders may not be distinctly different from delinquent offenders, as Thomas asserts, but they are distinguished by a tendency to reappear in police and court records as status offenders in significantly higher proportions than are youth who commit misdemeanor and felony offenses. Finally, Erickson's data provide clear evidence of the very small proportion of all juvenile offenders who fall into the "pure" status offender group, and underscore the prominence of versatility in juvenile offense patterns.

However, these findings may not be entirely relevant to the need for special programs to deal with the status offense problem. The opportunity and incentive to commit status offenses is generally available to all youth, including those with records of serious and persistent delinquency, minor and intermittent delinquency, and of no delinquency. Of all youth who at any juncture in their careers are arrested or cited for a status offense, it should be possible in principle to differentiate this population in terms of somewhat typical juvenile career patterns, each of which encompasses some degree of offense versatility. These may include, at a minimum, the "heavies" who are predominantly serious delinquent offenders, a category of "lightweights" made up of misdemeanants, and a group of predominantly conforming youth, whose misbehavior may occasionally come to the attention of the juvenile authorities. Each of these groups is in one sense made up of "status offenders," but the meaning of the status offense differs for the members of each group, for the community, and for the juvenile justice system. For the "heavies" a status offense is likely to be a largely incidental event. For those given to minor and intermittent delinquent acts, for the possibly very small group which restricts itself to multiple status offenses, and for those who gain admission to a population recorded as having committed a status offense by an occasional outburst of rebellion against adult authority, the act may well be symptomatic of a set of problems unique to this group. Clearly, then the question of the potential usefulness of special programs of any kind, including a program for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, will rest largely on the relative size of the second and third of the three groups identified.

These considerations suggest that in examining the evidence in support of the status-to-delinquency offense progression assumption, it is essential to focus on the latter two groups should it turn out that they are in fact discriminable. The hazard of escalation from status to delinquent offenses involves these groups principally. Youth whose records may include status offenses, but whose delinquency is of the more serious variety raise other concerns.

An opportunity to examine these issues empirically has arisen during the past several years. In 1976, the Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funded a large scale program to encourage the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, as mandated by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975). Funding support was provided for 11 projects in various regions of the United States. Of these, eight projects were intensively examined in an evaluation study (Kobrin and Klein, 1979). The programs were designed to encourage police agencies and courts to divert status offenders from detention facilities and correctional institutions by referring them for rehabilitative services to community based youth serving agencies. The data reported here are based on the evaluation study of the national program.

THE DATA

During the two-year period of federal funding of the national program, over 16,000 juveniles charged with status offenses were served by the eight programs. Demographic, socioeconomic, and family data were obtained on all juveniles referred to the program. In addition,

treatment and both self-report and official offense data were collected on some 4,000 program clients constituting the evaluated sample. With the exception of self-report offense and treatment data, similar information was obtained on a comparable control group of status offenders dealt with in each program jurisdiction during the year prior to the establishment of the program. The pre-program comparison group consisted of approximately 3,000 individuals. Evidence for the existence of a discriminable population of status offenders, and of progression from status to criminal offenses was examined with reference only to the pre-program group, for which the special deinstitutionalization program was not yet available, and who therefore were more likely to be exposed to the threat and/or the experience of secure detention and commitment to correctional institutions.

The pre-program population in each site consisted of a sample of juveniles from the pre-program year who became eligible for selection into the sample upon their first status offense for that year.² This first status offense, for the period and not for the individual career, was defined as the "instant" status offense. The sample was selected so far as possible to match the program clientele at each site with respect to sociodemographic and offense characteristics. Court files were searched for the record of all offenses prior and subsequent to the "instant" offense, as well as the record of "charges" in police files which were available and accessible in all but one site. The record of subsequent offenses was compiled for two periods, yielding a six-month follow-up for approximately 75 percent of the evaluated sample, and a smaller 12-month follow-up cohort, consisting of approximately 37 percent of the sample.³ The research cohort was classified by four offense categories with respect

to both prior and subsequent offenses: no offenses, status offenses only, mixed status and criminal (both misdemeanor and felony) offenses, and criminal offenses only. Those with prior records of mixed or criminal offenses will be referred to here as "delinquents" by way of distinguishing them from the "pure" status offenders.

THE STATUS OFFENDER POPULATION

Two questions are addressed in examining the evidence for the existence of a population constituted predominantly by status offenders. First, is there a segment of the juvenile offender group that confines its infractions wholly to the status offenses, and if so, what is its relative size? Second, do their age, gender, and ethnic characteristics differ from those of a population whose records contain some proportions of delinquent offenses as well?

As seen in Table 2, those with no offenses of either kind recorded prior to their initial appearance in police and court files for a status offense constituted half (51.9 percent) of a population dealt with as status offenders at a given point in time. When the additional 11.2 percent of those whose prior offenses were only of the status variety is added, almost two-thirds (63.1 percent) of the population dealt with as status offenders had no official record of a prior delinquent, i.e., criminal act.⁴

TABLE 2
PRIOR OFFENSE PATTERN OF
PRE-PROGRAM POPULATION BY AGE

Offense Type	Under 13		13 - 14		15 - 16		Over 16		Total		Offense Type %
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
No Offenses	173	11.1	510	32.7	738	47.3	139	8.9	1,560	100.0	51.9
Status Only	19	5.7	122	36.3	178	53.0	17	5.1	336	100.0	11.2
Delinquent Only	42	7.3	185	32.0	283	49.0	68	11.8	578	100.0	19.2
Mixed	30	5.6	171	32.1	295	55.5	36	6.8	532	100.0	17.7
Total	264	8.8	988	32.9	1,494	49.7	260	8.6	3,006	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 42.06 \quad df = 9 \quad p < .001$$

Two cautions must be observed in the interpretation of this finding. First, it is based solely on official records. Self-report delinquency studies have provided ample evidence of the large number of delinquent acts which result neither in apprehension nor court action (Erickson & Empey, 1963; Gold, 1966). On the other hand, it has also been noted that as concerns the more serious offenses against property and persons, the discrepancy between self-report and officially recorded offenses is substantially reduced (Empey, 1978: 164). Hence the use solely of officially recorded offense data in assessing the distribution of offense patterns among those dealt with as status offenders is warranted when, as in the present study, interest centers on the shift from status to the more serious forms of delinquency. It is entirely likely that the offense record is incomplete with respect principally to the minor and occasional offenses commonly viewed by control agents as undeserving of their time, attention, and effort.

The second caution regarding the offense pattern of the pre-program sample concerns the effort to match it to the program clientele. The latter group was selected into the program on the basis of their referral by police, courts, schools, and others for a status offense. Criteria employed in determining eligibility for program services varied widely from site to site. In some instances eligibility criteria excluded the more persistent offenders, such as those with more than two prior status offenses, or those already on probation for a previous status offense. To the extent, then, that the match between pre-program and program subjects was successful, the pre-program group may well have been biased toward the selection of individuals less likely to include the "mixed" and criminal offense only category.

These cautions notwithstanding, the substantial proportion represented by those whose only prior offenses were of the status variety can suffer a material corrective reduction and still constitute a very large proportion of all those dealt with by police and courts as status offenders. In brief, there does appear to be a substantial and identifiable group in the juvenile offender population whose infractions are largely restricted to the status offenses.⁵

Table 3 about here

Age and Gender Characteristics

Juveniles cited for status offenses among the pre-program group fell principally in the 13 through 16 year old age group (Table 2), with half (49.7 percent) consisting of 15 and 16 year olds. About one-third (32.9 percent) were 13 and 14 years old, and a residual 17.4 percent were equally distributed between those under 13 and over 16. With respect to age distribution, the question of interest is whether age level is related to differences in the proportion with prior delinquent offenses, a relationship that may have a bearing on an assumed progression from status to delinquent offenses. The percentage of those with no prior offenses, or with status offenses only, declines steadily from 72.7 percent in the group under 13 years of age to 60.0 percent in the group over 16 (Table 3). However, when the "no prior offense" category is excluded from the sample, it becomes evident that there is virtually no relationship between age and prior delinquent offenses (Table 4).⁶ Even for those

Table 4 about here

TABLE 3

MAJOR TYPE OF PRIOR
OFFENSE PATTERN BY AGE

Offense Type	Under 13		13 - 14		15 - 16		Over 16		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offense and Status Only	192	72.7	632	63.9	916	61.3	156	60.0	1,896	63.1
Delinquent and Mixed	72	27.3	356	36.1	578	38.7	104	40.0	1,110	36.9
Total	264	100.0	988	100.0	1,494	100.0	260	100.0	3,006	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 13.95 \quad df = 3 \quad p < .01$$

TABLE 4

PRIOR OFFENSE PATTERN OF PRE-PROGRAM
POPULATION BY AGE, WITH "NO OFFENSE PRIORS" EXCLUDED

Offense Type	Under 13		13 - 14		15 - 16		Over 16		Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Status Only	19	20.9	122	25.5	178	23.5	17	14.0	336
Delinquent Only and Mixed	72	79.1	356	74.5	578	76.5	104	86.0	1,110
Total	91	100.0	478	100.0	756	100.0	121	100.0	1,446

$$\chi^2 = 7.46 \quad df = 3 \quad p < .05$$

under 13 years of age, over three-quarters had records of prior delinquent offenses. The proportion with such prior records remains remarkably stable through age 16.

The data on gender distribution confirms the prevailing impression that among status offenders females constitute a far larger proportion than among delinquent offenders (Table 5). Approximately half of the total pre-program population (49.2 percent) are females, representing a 1:1 ratio. This is in striking contrast to the 4:1 ratio of males to females in the general delinquent population (Gottfredson et al., 1977: 487). Further, the data of Table 5 disclose a perceptible difference between male and female status offenders in the age distribution across the four patterns of prior offense. Although there is a relationship between age and pattern of prior offense for both genders, it has a higher level of probability for males than for females ($p < .001$ vs. $p < .02$). This is seen even more clearly when the four prior offense patterns are collapsed to two: no offenses-status offenses only, and delinquent-mixed (Table 6). Here, percentages are calculated for each age group. For females, the probability level of the relationship becomes non-significant, while for males it retains its definitive character ($p < .001$). These findings may be interpreted to mean that at every age level females in high proportions are found in the no offense-status offense only prior offense category. Among males, on the other hand, the proportion in this category declines with increasing age. Put another way, three-quarters to four-fifths of the females across the

TABLE 5
PRIOR OFFENSE PATTERN OF PRE-PROGRAM
POPULATION BY AGE AND GENDER

Offense Type	MALE										Offense Type %
	Under 13		13 - 14		15 - 16		Over 16		Total		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
No Offenses	93	13.7	198	29.2	308	45.5	78	11.5	677	100.0	44.4
Status Only	10	12.0	27	32.5	39	47.0	7	8.4	83	100.0	5.4
Delinquent Only	30	6.8	130	29.6	218	49.7	61	13.9	439	100.0	28.8
Mixed	21	6.4	97	29.8	180	55.2	28	8.6	326	100.0	21.4
Total	154	10.1	452	29.6	745	48.9	174	11.4	1,525	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 28.09 \quad df = 9 \quad p < .001$$

FEMALE											
Offense Type	Under 13		13 - 14		15 - 16		Over 16		Total		Offense Type
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	%
No Offenses	80	9.1	310	35.3	429	48.8	60	6.8	879	100.0	59.6
Status Only	9	3.6	95	37.5	139	54.9	10	4.0	253	100.0	17.1
Delinquent Only	12	8.6	55	39.6	65	46.8	7	5.0	139	100.0	9.4
Mixed	9	4.4	73	35.6	115	56.1	8	3.9	205	100.0	13.9
Total	110	7.5	533	36.1	748	50.7	85	5.8	1,476	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 19.64 \quad df = 9 \quad p < .02$$

entire span of juvenile age may be found in the no offense-status of-fense only prior offense category, while the proportion of males in this category declines from about two-thirds in the youngest group to somewhat less than one-half in the older groups.

Ethnic Characteristics

The ethnic breakdown of the pre-program population indicates that in all patterns of prior offense white youth had the highest ratios, followed by Blacks, Hispanics, and a residual "other" group, respectively (Table 7). Since no data were obtained on the distribution of white and minority populations in the program jurisdictions, it cannot be determined which of these groups were disproportionately represented in the pre-program status offender sample. The Hispanic group in the sample included principally Mexican-American youth in program jurisdictions located in the west and southwest regions of the United States, and Puerto Rican youth in the midwest and eastern regions. The residual "other" category was drawn from Native American and Asian groups at all sites.

With the exception of the last group, whose numbers were too small to yield a stable measure, the two major minority groups show relatively smaller proportions than white youth in the no offense and status offense only categories, and larger proportions in the delinquent only and mixed categories.

TABLE 6
MAJOR TYPE OF PRIOR OFFENSE
PATTERN BY AGE AND GENDER

MALE										
	Under 13		13-14		15-16		Over 16		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offense and Status Only	103	66.9	225	49.8	347	46.6	85	48.9	760	49.8
Delinquent and Mixed	51	33.1	227	50.2	398	53.4	89	51.1	765	50.1
Total	154	100.0	452	100.0	745	100.0	174	100.0	1,525	99.9

$$\chi^2 = 21.17 \quad df = 3 \quad p < .001$$

FEMALE										
	Under 13		13-14		15-16		Over 16		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offense and Status Only	89	80.9	405	76.0	568	75.9	70	82.4	1,132	76.7
Delinquent and Mixed	21	19.1	128	24.0	180	24.1	15	17.6	344	23.3
Total	110	100.0	533	100.0	748	100.0	85	100.0	1,476	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 3.00 \quad df = 3 \quad n.s.$$

TABLE 7
PRIOR OFFENSE PATTERN OF
PRE-PROGRAM POPULATION BY ETHNICITY

Offense Type	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total		Offense Type %
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
No Offenses	1,115	71.4	326	20.9	79	5.1	41	2.6	1,561	100.0	51.9
Status Only	213	63.4	95	28.3	21	6.3	7	2.1	336	100.0	11.2
Delinquent Only	333	57.6	169	29.2	61	10.6	15	2.6	578	100.0	19.2
Mixed	300	56.4	164	30.8	61	11.5	7	1.3	532	100.0	17.7
Total	1,961	65.2	754	25.1	222	7.4	70	2.3	3,007	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 79.28 \quad df = 9 \quad p < .001$$

The relationship of ethnicity to prior offense pattern is more clearly seen in Table 8, particularly with respect to the comparative distribution of the prior offense pattern for the Black and Hispanic groups. The former showed a higher proportion in the no offenses-status offenses only category, the latter in the delinquent only-mixed category.

Main and Interaction Effects of Age, Gender, and Ethnicity

The differential effects of age, gender, and ethnicity on the probability of a prior pattern of delinquent offenses in a population of status offenders requires further assessment. A regression model was developed to measure the main and interaction effects on the likelihood of a pattern of criminal offenses (delinquent only plus criminal/status) prior to the "instant" status offense.

The three variables were operationalized in the following manner:

- 1) Site was treated as a set of seven effect coded dichotomous variables, and entered into the equation prior to age, gender, and ethnicity.
- 2) Age from 7 through 18 was used as a straightforward interval level variable.
- 3) Gender was treated as a dummy variable, coded 1 for males for females.
- 4) Ethnicity was operationalized as a set of three dummy variables, reflecting a four-category classification, as follows: Hispanic = 1 if client was Hispanic, 0 otherwise; Black = 1 if

TABLE 8
MAJOR TYPE OF PRIOR OFFENSE
PATTERN BY ETHNICITY

Offense Type	White		Black		Hispanic		Other		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offense and Status Only	1,328	67.7	421	55.8	100	45.0	48	68.6	1,897	63.1
Delinquent and Mixed	633	32.3	333	44.2	122	55.0	22	31.4	1,110	36.9
Total	1,961	100.0	754	100.0	222	100.0	70	100.0	3,007	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 67.13 \quad df = 3 \quad p < .001$$

client was Black, 0 otherwise; Other Ethnic = 1 if client was neither Black, White, or Hispanic, 0 otherwise; and White clients constituted the omitted category implied by the set of three dummy variables.⁷

Variables were entered into the regression in four stages as follows:

1. Seven site effect codes.
2. Additive versions of the client variables, namely, age, gender, and ethnicity.
3. Interaction terms, successively added to the base model established at stage 2. These included (a) multiplicative terms reflecting interaction between age and ethnic categories; (b) interaction of age and gender; and (c) interaction of gender and ethnic categories.
4. Based on the results of stage 3, a final regression equation was developed which included stage 2 variables plus the age-gender interaction term and the gender-ethnicity interaction terms.

Site location proved to be a substantial determinant of delinquent priors. The additive effects of site on the likelihood of a delinquent offense pattern prior to the "instant" status offense was found to explain approximately half of the variation in delinquent priors accounted for jointly by client characteristics and site.⁸ This suggests that independently of age, gender, and ethnicity, the probability that the status offender will fall into the delinquent prior offense category is substantially affected by the jurisdictions in which he/she resides.⁹ When the effects of age, gender, and ethnicity on the likelihood of a pattern of prior delinquent offenses were included, explained variance was increased to 19.5 percent (Table 9).

TABLE 9

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PRIOR DELINQUENT PATTERNS^a
ON AGE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND TWO WAY INTERACTIONS

(N = 2993)

Variables	Additive Model		Interaction Model	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
Male	.252	.261*	-.145	-.150
Age	.001	.037†	-.004	-.013
Black	.061	.054†	.035	.032
Hispanic	.097	.052†	.012	.006
Other Ethnic	.083	-.026	.010	.003
Age x Gender	----	----	.026	.398†
Other Ethnic x Gender	----	----	-.171	-.039
Hispanic x Gender	----	----	.145	.061†
Black x Gender	----	----	.052	.035
(Constant)	.309		.262	

$R^2 = .195$

$R^2 = .199$

p < .001*
p < .01 †
p < .05 †

^aSite effect codes entered as controls, but not presented.

More detailed information regarding the determinants of prior offense pattern is provided by an examination of interaction effects.

The interaction of age and gender by itself has a significant effect on the probability of a pattern of prior delinquency. The age-ethnicity interaction was not found to be significant when added to the basic equation for additive effects alone. However, when the gender-ethnicity interaction is included in the basic equation, the explained variation for prior delinquent offense is significantly increased. These statistical tests indicated that while the age-ethnicity interaction has no significant effect in relation to prior delinquent offense pattern, both the age-gender and the gender-ethnicity interactions do.

While the effects of age, gender, and ethnicity on the likelihood of a prior delinquent pattern are significant in an additive model, their effects were found to fall below an acceptable level of significance ($p < .05$) when the interactions among these variables were included in the equation. On the other hand, interaction between age and gender is a significant determinant, as is the set of terms capturing gender-ethnicity interaction. Of the latter set, only the variable reflecting whether or not the youth is an Hispanic male is individually significant, indicating that they are more likely to show a pattern of prior delinquency than would be predicted by gender or ethnicity as separate variables. The age-gender interaction coefficient suggests that the likelihood of a pattern of prior delinquent offenses increases at a higher rate for male than for females with an increase in age. Further, among the set of gender-ethnicity interaction coefficients, the only one that is individually significant is that for Hispanic males, indicating that they are more likely

to show a pattern of prior delinquency than would be predicted by either gender or ethnicity alone.

Thus, as seen in the additive model displayed in Table 9, the variables of age, gender, and ethnicity were positively and significantly related to the probability that a status offender in the pre-program sample would have a record of prior delinquent offenses. The main effects of the variables, along with information as to jurisdiction, accounted for 19.5 percent of the variation in the incidence of a prior delinquent offense pattern. While quite modest, the .4 percent increment in explained variation due to the addition of age-gender and ethnicity-gender interaction terms is statistically significant, owing to the large sample size. Individually significant interaction terms suggest that being an older male or an Hispanic male raises the probability of a delinquent prior career beyond what might be predicted on the basis of age, gender, and ethnicity considered separately.

Progression from Status to Delinquent Offenses

While the data revealed an identifiable population of juvenile offenders whose only recorded offenses prior to their identification were of the status variety, the question remains whether they tend over time to commit with increasing frequency the "delinquent" offenses, i.e., misdemeanors and felonies.

To assess this question, the officially recorded offenses of the pre-program group in the national status offender program were examined subsequent as well as prior to the "instant" status offense. As stated earlier, the "instant" offense was defined as the first occurrence of a recorded status offense during the pre-program year. The pre-program sample was classified by four types of prior offense: no offenses, status offenses

only, delinquent (misdemeanor and felony) offenses only, and mixed status and delinquent offenses. The sample was then cross-classified by the same offense categories subsequent to the "instant" offense, utilizing a six-month and a 12-month follow-up period. Since the "instant" offense could occur at any point during the pre-program year, it was necessary to eliminate from the follow-up cohorts those members of the sample who, by virtue of the date of their "instant," were not at risk for six months in one case, and for 12 months in the other. Consequently, each of the follow-up cohorts represents a reduced subset of the pre-program sample, larger for the six-month cohort, smaller for those having a 12-month risk period.

As seen in Table 10, six months after their first recorded status offense, most of the group in this follow-up cohort (68.7 percent) had no record of a subsequent offense. Of those with no prior offenses, a substantial 83.1 percent remained free of subsequent offenses of any kind. Very small proportions of those with no prior offenses turned up as having committed status offenses (8.3 percent), and even fewer in the delinquency only (6.1 percent), and the mixed (2.6 percent) categories. The "no prior offense" subset in the 12-month follow-up cohort exhibited substantially the same absence of subsequent offenses, with 75.9 percent remaining free of recorded offenses of any kind (Table 11). It may thus be noted at the

TABLE 10
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE PATTERN OF
PRE-PROGRAM SAMPLE AT SIX-MONTH FOLLOW-UP

Subsequent Offenses	Prior Offenses									
	No Offenses		Status Only		Delinquent Only		Mixed		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offenses	1,302	83.1	191	56.7	335	57.8	245	46.0	2,073	68.7
Status Only	130	8.3	80	23.7	66	11.4	89	16.7	365	12.1
Delinquent Only	95	6.1	29	8.6	126	21.7	117	22.0	367	12.2
Mixed	40	2.6	37	11.0	53	9.1	82	15.4	212	7.0
TOTAL	1,567	100.1	337	100.0	580	100.0	533	100.1	3,017	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 416.4 \quad df = 9 \quad p = < .001$$

TABLE 11
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE PATTERN OF
PRE-PROGRAM SAMPLE AT 12-MONTH FOLLOW-UP

Subsequent Offenses	Prior Offenses									
	No Offenses		Status Only		Delinquent Only		Mixed		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Offenses	555	75.9	85	45.2	130	46.1	99	35.6	869	58.8
Status Only	76	10.4	53	28.2	30	10.6	57	20.5	216	14.6
Delinquent Only	63	8.6	18	9.6	75	26.6	63	22.7	219	14.8
Mixed	37	5.1	32	17.0	47	16.7	59	21.2	175	11.8
TOTAL	731	100.0	188	100.0	282	100.0	278	100.0	1,479	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 237.2 \quad df = 9 \quad p = < .001$$

outset that there exists a very large group of youth of which, on a first citation for a status offense, from three-quarters to four-fifths are unlikely to commit further offenses of any kind during the following year. This finding raises the question whether the official intervention in a status offense case is warranted for the protection of either the person or the community, and supports the contention of those urging a "do nothing" approach in dealing with status offenders. At the same time, however, it cannot be determined from these data whether non-appearance for a recorded subsequent offense may be attributed to the deterrent effect of official intervention, to increased knowledge of how to avoid arrest, or to intensified informal pressures from family members for conforming behavior, among other possibilities.

The issue of progression from status to delinquent offenses is best examined by excluding the large group for which no offenses were recorded either prior or subsequent to the "instant" offense. This procedure yields a 2 x 2 table in which the prior status only and delinquent/mixed categories are cross-classified by the same categories at six- and 12-month follow-up. The sample may now be regarded as "purified" by the exclusion not only of those who had no prior offenses, but of those as well who had no subsequent offenses. The "status offense only" priors are now constituted by individuals for whom two or more status offenses were recorded (at least one of which occurred prior to the "instant"), and they may be viewed more appropriately as a "pure" status offender group. Further, since those in the mixed category are known to have committed both delinquent and status offenses, their merging with those recorded as "delinquent only" creates a category of youth known to have committed delinquent offenses.

TABLE 12
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE PATTERN OF PRE-PROGRAM SAMPLE AT SIX MONTH FOLLOW-UP, WITH "NO OFFENSE PRIORS AND SUBSEQUENTS" EXCLUDED

Subsequent Offenses	Prior Offenses					
	Status Only		Delinquent Only and Mixed		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Status Only	80	54.8	155	29.1	235	34.7
Delinquent Only and Mixed	66	45.2	377	70.9	443	65.3
Total	146	100.0	532	100.0	678	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 33.3 \quad df = 1 \quad p < .001$$

Almost half of those with "status only" prior offenses at both the six- and 12-month follow-up had records of delinquent offenses (45.2 and 48.5 percent), respectively, (Tables 12 and 13). But notable in the same data is the distinction that persistently emerges between two groups in the pre-program sample: those whose offenses tend to remain predominantly in the status offense category, and those given principally to delinquent offenses. Approximately 70 percent of those with delinquent priors had only delinquent subsequent offenses, and approximately 50 percent of those with only status offense priors had only status offense subsequents. These seem to represent two discernably different groups with respect to offense pattern. A third group emerges, clearly apparent only when the "no offense" individuals in either their prior or subsequent offenses are excluded from the follow-up cohorts, constituted by a subset of status offenders of whom a substantial proportion show subsequent records of delinquency. In the six-month cohort, of the 146 juveniles with prior status offenses only, 45.2 percent had subsequent records of delinquent acts. The corresponding percentage among the 103 juveniles with prior status offenses only in the 12-month follow-up cohort was 48.5 percent.

These findings offer some support for the progression thesis, if only with respect to a limited segment of a status offender population. However, the evidence is subject to an important qualification. In the light of the probable differential treatment of female status offenders,

TABLE 13

SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE PATTERN OF PRE-PROGRAM SAMPLE AT 12-MONTH FOLLOW-UP, WITH "NO OFFENSE PRIORS AND SUBSEQUENTS" EXCLUDED

Subsequent Offenses	Prior Offenses					
	Status Only		Delinquent Only and Mixed		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Status Only	53	51.5	87	26.3	140	32.3
Delinquent Only and Mixed	50	48.5	244	73.7	294	67.7
Total	103	100.0	331	100.0	434	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 34.3 \text{ df} = 1 \text{ p} < .001$$

namely, their higher vulnerability to recording as delinquent offenders on the basis of probation violation, it is entirely possible that a very high proportion of the recorded subsequent delinquent offenses of prior status offenders may be ascribed to female probation violators.¹⁰ Hence, the impression of progression from status to delinquent offenses suggested by the data of this study may be misleading. In addition, there is evidence for regression from delinquent to status offenses as well as for "progression" from status to delinquent offenses. The data of Tables 10 and 11 indicate that at six-month follow-up 19.6 percent of those with "status only" priors were recorded as having subsequent records of delinquency ("delinquency only" plus "mixed"). The corresponding percentage at 12-month follow-up was 26.6. However, of those with "delinquent only" priors, 11.4 and 10.6 percent had "status only" subsequents at six- and 12-month follow-up, respectively. This suggests, of course, the substantial degree of offense versatility exhibited by most juvenile offenders, repeatedly noted in prior research (Thomas, 1976; Klein, 1971; Wolfgang et al., 1973; Erickson, 1979; Institute for Juvenile Research, 1972).¹¹

Discussion

Two major assumptions inform the current movement to deinstitutionalize status offenders by reducing and ultimately eliminating the power of police and courts to deal with them as they do with youth who commit criminal offenses. Supporters of the movement contend, first, that status offenders constitute a distinctive and identifiable category of juvenile offenders, largely free of involvement in criminal acts. It follows from this that the use of secure detention and commit-

ment to correctional institutions has neither legal nor ethical justification. A second assumption holds that, by virtue of being accorded standard police and court treatment, status offenders tend increasingly to commit the more serious criminal offenses. Hence, the removal of status offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system is expected over time to prevent delinquency.

Data obtained in conjunction with an evaluation study of a federally funded status offender deinstitutionalization program presented an opportunity to test the support for the empirically more accessible of these assumptions. Singled out for scrutiny was, first, the question whether there may be found a subset of infractious youth who confine their misbehavior to the status offenses and, if identified, its proportion among a status offending population, together with its age, gender, ethnic/racial characteristics and patterns of offense over time. The second question assessed was the extent to which progression from status to criminal offenses occurred in an identified population of status offenders.

Data analysis yielded, first, the unanticipated finding that, in any population identified by a citation for a status offense, by far the largest proportion is likely to be youngsters for whom there exists no official record of a prior offense of any kind. They fall principally between the ages of 13 and 16, with approximately equal proportions of males and females. With reference to ethnicity, the Black and Hispanic minority groups were found to have higher proportions of their prior offenses in the delinquent category than were whites. The group free of official records of offense prior to an arrest or citation for

a status offense tend not to reappear either as status or delinquent offenders subsequently. It is likely that on the whole this group undergoes minimal penetration into the juvenile justice system and represents those customarily diverted by the police.

A second finding, less unexpected, was that of those with offense records prior to a status offense arrest, about one in 10 consist of youth who have committed only status offenses. Of this group, about one-quarter continue to confine their infractions to the status offenses, another quarter show a subsequent record of delinquent offenses, and approximately half remain free of recorded offenses.

In general, it appears that a population identified by an arrest or appearance before the juvenile court for a status offense contains two quite distinguishable groups. About two-thirds consist of a majority of youth virtually free of recorded prior offenses, and a minority showing records of prior status offenses only. The prior records of the remaining one-third of this population designate either solely delinquent offenses or mixed delinquent and status offenses. That the distinction between the no offense/status offense only group and the delinquent only/mixed group remains relatively stable is attested to by the subsequent offenses of the two groups. The latter group remains disproportionately in the delinquency/mixed categories; the former in those of no offense/status offenses only.

Findings on gender differences indicate that males at every age level are very much more likely than females to acquire records of non-status offenses. Fully half of the male members of the sample had delinquent (i.e., non-status) recorded offenses, compared to less than one-fourth of the females.

Examination of the relative predictive utility of jurisdiction, age, gender, and ethnicity revealed jurisdiction to be an important determinant of the probability that a youth cited for a status offense would have a record of a prior delinquent offense. Certain combinations of age, gender, and ethnicity were found to increase this probability. Thus, the likelihood of a prior record of delinquent offenses increased with increasing age at a higher rate for males than for females. When this interaction is combined further with ethnicity, it was found that older Hispanic males had the highest probability of recorded prior delinquency.

On the basis of the data available for this analysis, the evidence for progression from status to delinquent offenses remains debatable. If the population under consideration are all youth cited for a status offense within a given time period, irrespective of the number of prior status offenses, the overwhelming majority within a 12-month follow-up are found either to have no subsequent offenses or to confine their subsequents to the status offenses. On the other hand, if the population of concern are youth with two or more prior status offenses, there is virtual equal probability that their subsequent offenses will be either of the delinquent or of the status variety. In other words, youth marginally involved in status offense behavior are in little danger of moving into the more serious forms of delinquency. However, those for whom status offense behavior has become chronic appear to be as likely subsequently to commit misdemeanor and criminal offenses as they are to confine themselves to the status offenses.

But there remains strong and consistent evidence for the existence of three relatively separable groups, each of substantial size, and each

distinguishable on the basis of the predominant character of their offenses. The first consists of status offenders with little tendency to commit the more serious delinquent offenses; the second includes juveniles whose records show a predominance of delinquent offenses. Finally, as a finding of some importance, the data revealed the third and largest group to consist of juveniles without records of either a status or a delinquent offense both prior and subsequent to the single incident that defined their membership in a status offender population.

Thus, only one of the basic assumptions of fact on which the status offender deinstitutionalization movement rests is provisionally supported by the evidence of the present study. While its boundaries cannot be sharply drawn, there does appear to be a distinguishable population of misbehaving youth whose infractions are confined principally to the status offenses. Nor does it appear that they tend to commit the more serious delinquent offenses in increasing numbers and with increasing frequency. They thus constitute an identifiable group whose problem behavior may be sufficiently differentiated from that represented by acts in violation of the criminal law to warrant distinctive forms of response and treatment. There is little support for the notion that they tend in substantial proportions to become serious delinquents. What evidence there is in support of that assumption has reference only to that relatively small segment of a status offending population consisting of chronic status offenders. They are as likely in time to engage in serious delinquent offenses as they are to remain status offenders.

Finally, nothing in the data of this study can throw light on the third basic assumption of the status offender deinstitutionalization movement asserting that traditional juvenile court processing increases the

likelihood of progression from status to delinquent offenses. However, the evidence does indicate that contained within any population of juvenile offenders defined by a citation for a status offense are substantial numbers of delinquent offenders. Whether the use of secure confinement in the treatment of this group reduces their recidivism or increases community protection is a separate issue. But with respect to the group of status offenders which shows little inclination to engage in the more serious forms of delinquency, no form of secure confinement would appear to be warranted on either preventive or ethical grounds.

FOOTNOTES

1. Surveys conducted during the decade, 1965-1974, in a variety of jurisdictions have found that half of all juveniles arrested for a status offense were placed in secure detention for periods ranging from several days to several months (LEAA, 1975: 1-3). One-third of all juveniles in correctional institutions (training schools, group homes, half-way houses) were committed as adjudicated status offenders (LEAA, 1974).
2. The status offenses were runaway, ungovernability, truancy, curfew violation, and minor-in-possession of alcohol. A residual "other" category was used to include types of behavior defined as status offenses in some but not other jurisdictions.
3. The two-year life of both the program and the evaluation study meant that the later during this period that juveniles were referred to the program, the less their availability for a 12-month follow-up.
4. The data on prior offense and gender are presented by age as a summary indication that age distribution does not differ materially as between those whose prior offenses do and do not include a substantial proportion of delinquent offenses.
5. Attention is directed to the fact that the records were entered in a search for instant status offenses. The number of those who were primarily status offenders in terms of their prior records constitutes 63 percent of the total as defined by our entry criteria. The same number of status offenders would constitute a far smaller proportion of the total arrested and adjudicated juvenile population. A project on delinquent or mixed offenders, using an analogous record entry procedure, would have yielded large numbers of predominantly delinquent or predominantly mixed offenders. A not

- unreasonable alternative in estimating the proportion of status offenders in the pre-program population is to exclude the 1,560 individuals with no recorded offenses prior to the "instant" on grounds that they are essentially non-offenders. With their exclusion, the N=1,446, of which 336, or 23.2 percent, have substantial prior records of status offenses only (see Table 2). As will be seen, however, this proportion is further reduced when offenses subsequent to the "instant" at six and 12 month follow-up are taken into account.
6. The exclusion of the "no prior offense" category is warranted for present purposes since a large proportion in the category is likely to be one-time offenders. Thus, 43.2 and 37.5 percent, respectively, had no record of a subsequent offense of any kind at six- and 12-month follow-up.
 7. The dependent variable of "delinquent priors" was operationalized as a dummy variable, with 1=record of a delinquency prior to the "instant" offense, 0=no such record. Anticipating the objection that the use of dummy variables in regression equations violates the necessary assumption of homoscedasticity, it should be stated that in this instance the dichotomy is not badly skewed. In the 2,993 cases in the regression, the proportion in 1 was 37 percent, in 0, 63 percent.
 8. This was ascertained in a special analysis of the independent effects of site location. Site terms were entered after the client variables, permitting assessment of their contribution to explained variance due solely to their addition.

9. With the data available to this study, it was not possible to determine the relative importance of various features of jurisdictions in the relationship. These include community tolerance for juvenile misbehavior, police and court policies with respect to the use of diversion practices, the statutory definition of "status offenses," the adequacy of record keeping, accessibility of the records, and the diligence with which a search of the records may have been conducted.
10. Most jurisdictions treat violation of probation as a delinquent offense. Females were found to constitute approximately half of the pre-program sample. Since female status offenders are more likely than males on a first offense to receive probation because of concern over alleged sexual misconduct, they may be more likely to acquire a higher risk of probation violation, and therefore to being recorded for a delinquent offense.
11. Similar findings were reported by one large scale study of youth behavior based on self-report data. However, their data did not identify a population similar to that found in the present study (Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, 1972).

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CHAPTER XVIII

EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF STATUS OFFENDERS PROJECT THROUGH THE
SYSTEM RATES METHODOLOGY

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EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS PROJECT THROUGH THE SYSTEM RATES METHODOLOGY

Introduction: Some Comments on the Justice System

Some years ago, researchers at the University of Southern California observed that a perspective of the criminal justice system as a system is a view which contains elements of reality and fantasy. They observed:

The reality is that the community, the police, the courts and the correctional agencies do combine to attack the problem of crime and process the criminal offender. The fantasy lies in the speculation that the various agencies approach these processes in a coordinated and rational fashion (Klein, et al., 1971).

Although there is considerable discussion and writing by academicians, administrators, practitioners and researchers about the "system" of criminal and/or juvenile justice, the United States does not have a single system of justice. Each level of government, indeed each jurisdiction, has its own unique way of doing things. These many "systems" -- all established to enforce the standards of conduct believed necessary for the protection of individuals and preservation of the community -- are a collectivity of thousands of law enforcement agencies and a multiplicity of courts, prosecution and defense agencies, probation and parole departments, correctional institutions and related community-based organizations. It is clear that the "system" of criminal and juvenile justice sacrifices much in the way of efficiency and effectiveness in order to protect the individual and to preserve local autonomy.

The many systems of justice now in existence in the United States are not the same as those which emerged following the American Revolution. Although American legal arrangements have traditionally tried to insure justice for all citizens, the systems have not developed or evolved uniformly or consistently or, for that matter, always in the same direction. Parts of our system, such as

trial by jury and the principle of bail, are relatively old and date back to our European heritage in general and the English Common Law in particular. Probation and parole began in the nineteenth century and the juvenile court is a twentieth century innovation. Some of the innovations and changes in our systems have been generated by judicial decisions and legislative enactments. Many have evolved more by chance than by design.

Coupled with the numerous criminal and juvenile justice systems in the United States and their uneven development is the separation of functions within the systems. There are similar components in all systems starting with police at input, through prosecution and courts, and finally, to corrections. Although these major components and subcomponents are interwoven and interdependent one with the other, they typically function independently and autonomously. This separateness of function, which on one hand prevents the possibility of a "police state," on the other hand leads to some extra-ordinarily complex problems. Not the least of these is that the systems of justice are not really systems -- integrated, coordinated, and effective entities -- but rather are collections of agencies tied together by the processing of an increasing number of adult and juvenile offenders. They are marked by an unequal quality of justice, inadequate funding, and lack of relevant research and evaluation to provide some measure of effectiveness. And, until recently, they were regarded with a general indifference and apathy on the part of the public which they were designed to serve.

That set of institutional arrangements, activities and processes known as the criminal justice system is also referred to as the "non-system" of criminal justice. But the "non" aspect must be related to such notions as efficiency, agreement as to goals and objectives, and the like. The justice "system" does exist, even if all of its activities are not systematic, orderly and smooth-flowing. The dictionary definition of a system -- a set or arrangement of things so related or connected as to form a unity or organic whole -- is an

appropriate target, but that definition is not strictly applicable to the current criminal and juvenile justice systems.

Introduction: The System Rates Methodology (Klein et al., 1971)


Perhaps the best known model of the criminal justice system is that which was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). That model or flow chart portrayed generally the movement of cases -- felony, misdemeanor, petty and juvenile -- through the justice system. The flow chart generically is a basic tool of the system rate methodology and is involved in its first three steps. These steps include:

- 1) Construction of an explicit justice system flow chart portraying the decision points in the system
- 2) Insertion of justice system data -- the "numbers of _____" -- into the flow chart
- 3) Calculation of input and decision-point system rates or percentages

The following pages provide a brief commentary on each of these three steps -- construction of flow charts, insertion of data and computation of system rates.

Construction of Flow Charts. The Criminal Justice Training Center at the University of Southern California explains the system rates methodology in a training module on criminal justice planning. For illustrative and explanatory purposes, the following materials are extracted from that planning module (Criminal Justice Training Center, 1977). Figure 1 is a flow chart representing the criminal justice system in a greatly abbreviated and simplified form.

FIGURE 1: A MODEL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM



Note that the model presents "crime" in an irregular shape -- an amoeba of sorts -- to signify the absence of precise data on the amount of crime, as well as to suggest that its nature and definition change over time and by political jurisdiction. The amoeba also serves to remind us of the imprecision generated by the exercise of discretion by law enforcement agencies and their personnel. Also amoeba-shaped are crimes "not observed-not reported" and "observed-not reported;" again, the amoeba suggests the uncertainty of the level of crime which falls into either of these two categories. At this point in the system flow chart, the amoeba is replaced by a rectangle, suggesting some certainty as to both flow of cases and offenders through the system as well as their numbers. But even here, there is less certainty than might be suggested. For example, the rectangle marked "arrest" suggests that definitions of arrest are commonly shared; such is not the case operationally, particularly in the juvenile justice system. Then too, there are significant gaps in data about some of these rectangles. For example, we may know the total number of arrests for various crimes, but not the number of different individuals arrested for these crimes

over a given time frame, even though the use of a rectangle rather than an amoeba suggests some certainty about the data. Ten arrests may represent ten separate individuals or one individual arrested five times and five individuals each arrested once.

We must also mention the fact that flow charts may be misleading in that they suggest that offenders move through the justice system in an orderly fashion. It is to be emphasized that disruptions frequently occur, that blockages are not uncommon, and that cases and offenders are occasionally processed as though part of a tide -- with a significant ebb and flow. Some offenders leave the justice system for reasons such as insanity or certification as to addict status, others enter the system at a midpoint such as the juvenile offender certified to adult court, while others, after winning an appeal, may leave the system totally or "backtrack" in the system to a new trial or resentencing.

A final observation about flow charts as used in the system rates methodology: the charts, unless clearly identified otherwise, represent system processes, and only indirectly reflect the activities of specific agencies. In Figure 1, for example, "arrest" represents the process of arrest, not the agency or agencies which do the arresting. As will be shown later, it is possible and generally advantageous to portray both process and agency concurrently.


Vertical lines in a flow chart represent decision points in the justice system at which some individual, group of individuals or agency makes a decision, e.g., chooses from among the alternatives available. Thus, the vertical line following conviction indicates a decision point; here, the court must select a sentencing alternative from those available -- probation, jail or prison in the illustration. The vertical line following arrest suggests that the prosecuting attorney must choose from the alternatives available to him -- to prosecute or

not. The observation that vertical lines represent decisions does not suggest that the decisions are simple -- they frequently are not -- but rather that decision-makers and the choices available to them may be portrayed with some precision. A caution must issue: there are many informal processes in the justice system which are not reflected or revealed by vertical lines on system flow charts.

Insertion of Data. We have noted earlier that the step which follows construction of a system flow chart is the insertion of justice system data onto the charts and that these data represent the "numbers of ____" being processed by or moving through the system. As relates to "numbers of ____," it is important to observe that the agencies which comprise the justice system keep data on both "cases" and "offenders," but that cases and offenders are indeed different. Thus, one case may involve two or more crime-partner offenders, or one offender may be the subject of two or more cases. But even apart from that issue, the numerical data used by the system rates methodology are of two types. One type of numbers is of the "cohort" variety; the second is of an "inventory" nature. A cohort follows the same offenders or cases through the system; the inventory records the number of offenders or cases appearing at points in the justice system over a given time frame.

Figure 2 is a cohort portrait showing the flow of offenders over time through the criminal justice system. It indicates that of the 20,000 arrests reported, there were 15,000 prosecutions and 5,000 non-prosecutions. Of the 15,000 prosecutions, 10,000 resulted in conviction, 5,000 in non-conviction. And of the 10,000 convictions, there were 6,000 probation dispositions, 3,000 commitments to jail and 1,000 to prison. In short, cohorts follow individuals through the system over time.

FIGURE 2: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT DATA




Note that in the cohort flow chart, there is balance -- the parts all equal the whole suggesting that every case/offender is accounted for. Thus, in Figure 2, the 15,000 prosecutions and 5,000 non-prosecutions equal the 20,000 arrests reported; the 6,000 cases to probation, 3,000 to jail and 1,000 to prison equal the 10,000 convictions. A simple rule may be constructed for the cohort data: the numbers to the right of any vertical, decision-point line should equal the number to the left of that line. Where there is not a balance between the two sides of the vertical line, the number to the left of the line will almost inevitably be larger suggesting that there is an option available to the decision-maker -- perhaps an informal, partially hidden option -- which is not portrayed to the right of the vertical line and which accounts for the missing cases/offenders. A search to discover the missing decision alternative(s) is important.

Figure 3 is a reproduction of the same basic flow chart with inventory data appended thereto. The inventory data are gathered over some precise point in time as, for example, a specific day (July 14), or for a certain month (June 1975), or perhaps for an entire year (1977). There is no tracking of

individuals as in the cohort approach, but rather a counting of cases/offenders in the various parts of the system. Indeed, numbers to the right of a vertical decision-point line may be greater or lesser than the number to the left; balance is not required. The inventory approach provides a portrait which may be compared with other portraits, e.g., June with July, 1976 with 1977, and so on.

FIGURE 3: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH INVENTORY DATA



Computing System Rates. System rates mathematically are percentages -- nothing more, nothing less. But in the complex world of criminal justice, these simple mathematical expressions take on special meaning. Klein, Kobrin, McEachern and Sigurdson described system rates in the following way:

System rates are statements, in simple mathematical form, expressing the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the criminal justice system at its various levels of functioning. They differ from traditional crime statistics, which, at best, measure limited outcomes of unknown or unmeasured processes. System rates tell us not only what has happened but how well we have done. The clearance rate used by police agencies is one kind of system rate, stating a ratio of crimes solved to crimes known to the police -- a function of the level of criminal activity, the reporting system, and the efficiency of police investigative practices.

Similarly, a plea-bargaining rate, if available, would represent a useful statement on interagency accommodation to the exigencies of both legal statutes and administrative pressures. To a lesser extent, this would be true of juvenile detention rates and delinquency reporting rates from such community agencies as the schools and halfway houses for juveniles and narcotic addicts.

In brief, the examination of the criminal justice system in terms of such rates offers an opportunity to raise detailed and searching questions respecting the system's accomplishments and failures. Most immediately, these rates can provide answers to the more mundane questions of the degree to which formal and official organizations in the system perform their routine functions. But perhaps more important, rate assessment may also be used to measure the extent to which the system as a whole fulfills its fundamental tasks (Klein, et al., 1971).


Klein and colleagues see system rates as providing data about criminal justice system accomplishments and failures and argue for a series of such indices or system rates portraying the major decision points in the justice system.

But even apart from the broad criminal justice perspective which speaks for the use of system rates, there are some practical reasons for conversion of data to percentages, i.e., system rates. Percentages permit comparison between similar types of organizations and activities such as the clearance rates of various police departments. Then too, criminal justice agency personnel are familiar with the rate statistic; they have utilized a variety of rates -- clearance rates, success rates, conviction rates, and so on. The use of percentages, of course, also minimizes some of the difficulties in interpreting the magnitude of a number. Thus, while it is difficult to determine whether 83,199 is a small or large number (it obviously depends on the magnitude relative to a base), there can be more rapid consensus that 96 percent is large, 11 percent small.

There are two types of system rates: input rates and decision-point rates. Input rates/percentages are calculated using as a denominator some number representing input into the justice system. Figure 4, for example, provides input system rates (for cohort data) based upon an input number of

100,000 crimes reported. The 20,000 arrests measured against the 100,000 crimes reported yields a system rate of 20 percent. The 15,000 prosecutions against the 100,000 crimes reported is a 15 percent prosecution system rate; the 10,000 convictions against the 100,000 crimes reported is a 10 percent conviction system rate. In this example, the number of crimes reported served as the input number, but the 20,000 arrests could have been used in the same way. Had that been done, the system rate for prosecution would have been 75 percent (15,000 prosecutions for the 20,000 arrests), the conviction rate would have been 50 percent (10,000 convictions for the 20,000 arrests), and so on.


FIGURE 4: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT INPUT SYSTEM RATES



Decision-point system rates/percentages are calculated using as a denominator the total number of cases/offenders available at any decision point in the system. Figure 5 is an illustration of decision-point system rates for cohort data. The data at the judicial decision-point of sentencing reveals 10,000 convictions disposed of with 6,000 cases to probation (60 percent), 3,000 to jail (30 percent) and 1,000 to prison (10 percent). Similarly, using


the 6,000 cases/offenders to probation as the denominator, note that probation has a success system rate of 83 percent, 5,000 of the 6,000 cases, a failure system rate of 17 percent, 1,000 of the 6,000 cases.

FIGURE 5: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT DECISION-POINT SYSTEM RATES




Additional Data for Flow Charts. An examination of justice system flow charts will quickly reveal that some of the "boxes" represent specific events such as arrest or conviction, while others represent status or location of cases/offenders such as in jail or on probation. Accordingly, other data may be appended to these charts to better portray justice system behavior: these other data may include the average (or other statistic) length of stay in a "box" or between "boxes," the numbers of cases/offenders moving into, through and out of different boxes for given periods of time, and the like. Figure 6 illustrates the portrayal of additional data for a given time frame, e.g., for the year ending December 31, 1977 (this latter date being important because of "current population" data on the chart).

FIGURE 6: USING THE FLOW CHART TO HIGHLIGHT OTHER INFORMATION



It has been noted above that justice system flow charts normally represent process, rather than agency data. It is true that if only one agency does the process (the parole board, for example), the process and agency data are the same. Thus, when it is observed in Figure 2 representing cohort data that of 1,000 offenders in prison, 900 were paroled and 100 were not, we have both parole process and the paroling authority data; they are one and the same. However, where multiple agencies are involved, as for example in the process of arrest, there may be a requirement to separate the behavior of one agency from that of another. Using the 20,000 arrests from Figure 2, as an example, it is clear that a particular process box may be exploded to portray individual agency performance as in Figure 7.

FIGURE 7: PORTRAYAL OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCY PERFORMANCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHARTS



The posting of individual agency performance on justice system flow charts permits the portrait to be both specific as to agency and general as to process.

Summary on System Rates

As a methodology, system rates provides mathematical statements about justice system behavior; indeed, the methodology calls for a series of indices constructed at decision points in the justice system. Basically, system rates are portraits and although the simplified illustrations provided in text have been for the system as a whole, the process has application for detailed examination of specific parts of the overall system such as corrections or law enforcement or even an individual agency. The method may be crime specific, e.g., tracking the robber or rapist through the system. Or the approach may track specific types of offenders through the system: the old, the young, the black, the white. And by using identical system formats, it is possible to contrast this year with last, or March with July for specific kinds of offenders such as auto thieves or forgers. Then too, as programs are added or modified or deleted to, within

and from the system, the basic portrait will change. Thus, the introduction of one or more diversion programs to a system chart should permit comparison of the "new" system with the old one.

The National Evaluation Design: DSO and System Rates


The instructions provided site evaluators of Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) Programs as relates to the system rates assessment were at once both simple and complex: we requested that a flow chart portraying the juvenile justice system be prepared and that inventory data be obtained on both delinquent youth and status offenders for two distinct time frames, before and at least six months after programmatic DSO activities were initiated. These four charts -- a before and after on delinquents and a before and after on status offenders -- would serve as the basis for our analysis.

A series of general communications and site-specific follow-up correspondence and telephone calls also requested that the evaluators be as comprehensive as possible and exhaustive of all processes and agencies which comprise the juvenile justice system. Finally, recognizing that changes in system rates might be impacted as much by system capacity changes (such as the opening or closing of institutions or the addition or deletion of probation officers and juvenile court judges) as by philosophical or process changes, we asked that there be monitoring and recording of events which would effect justice system capacity.

To facilitate this total process, a sample juvenile justice system flow chart was developed and given each site. That chart appears as Figure 8. Note particularly the level of detail desired at the front end of the system -- that dealing with system entry by police, parents, school, self, and "other."

There emerged, almost immediately, a common set of problems at the evaluation sites. The first difficulty focused upon the system portrait itself;

FIGURE 8:
SYSTEM RATES FLOW CHART



the second, closely but not totally interwoven with the first, centered upon data collection. As relates to the charts, the most common question was the degree of resolution or detail desired or required. Indeed, the range of processes/agencies identified by the site evaluators was from 15 to about 150. The second problem, data collection, had two subsets. First, detailed data were not available for the many processes/agencies which were identified in the more detailed system charts. Aggregate data for major processes were almost always available, but as the level of detail of the charts increased, there was a parallel decrease in specific data availability. Also surfacing with the initial data collection effort was the absence or poor quality of data maintained by the juvenile justice agencies. Some agencies had historical and current data available; others had no historical (before) data whatsoever. In some jurisdictions it was possible to track a juvenile through the system from one process or agency to another; in other jurisdictions, there was no such capability. Even the most fundamental types of data such as age, gender, race, or offense often were unrecorded and unavailable. The range of data availability and retrieval varied from computer tape to search-of-individual-files and "stubby pencils." And in no jurisdiction was there justice system entry data at the level of detail desired.

These two basic challenges to flow chart construction and data collection drove a series of compromises and trade-offs, including sampling of cases at one or more sites. Clearly, less detailed flow charts than could have been constructed were drawn and aggregated data were appended to them. But, also contributing significantly to the system chart and data dilemma was the fact that the portrayal, in most instances, is of cases, not individuals. Thus, site evaluators reporting four juveniles detained usually did not (indeed, could not) distinguish between one individual detained four times, four individuals each detained on one occasion, or the other possible combinations

of cases and individuals that four detentions could represent. In fact, the numbers describe system workload and, without some type of offender behavior transaction system or file (OBTS/OBTF as they have become known), individual juvenile tracking at these evaluation sites is at best difficult, and at worst, impossible.

One other significant data problem must be addressed, although it is common in this type of temporal analysis. The data represent an "inventory" of cases in the juvenile system rather than the tracking of a cohort through the system. Thus, the number of cases at various points in the justice system during a given time frame (say April, May and June) includes cases which started prior to the time frame (perhaps in March), or exit the system after the time frame (July, for example), as well as those which enter and exit the system during the time frame (such as enter in April, exit in June). The system charts, accordingly, do not always "balance." Thus, on occasion, the number of cases which emerge from a decision point in the system may exceed (as illustrated in Figure 9) or be less than (as in Figure 10) the number of cases at the decision point.

FIGURE 9





FIGURE 10



When these patterns were found within site data, the decision-point system rate charts were calculated with the "80 plus 30" (110) or "60 plus 30" (90) as the denominator rather than the input number of 100.

A final problem -- gaps in the data. On some occasions, there were data gaps of the variety which appear in Figures 11 and 12.

FIGURE 11





FIGURE 12



Although sensitive to the potential error of filling in these "?"s by simple arithmetic, we did so. Thus, the "?" in Figure 11 was assumed to be 30, in Figure 12 to be 100.

System Impact at DSO Sites: An Overview

These difficulties notwithstanding, we turn now to the DSO system rates data. Inasmuch as the reader is provided with full system charts as part of this text, as well as the decision-point system rate calculations, the commentary here is based upon changes in the juvenile systems "before" and "after" introduction of DSO activities at the evaluation sites. We are interested collectively in the overall number of cases at intake, as well as law enforcement referrals to the juvenile justice system, detention following court appearance, and cases placed on probation and institutionalized. Five basic tables for the 14 sites and sub-sites summarize the overall portraits. Note that there are data on 14 sites as well as cumulative data for the states of Connecticut and Delaware. The before and after are always the months of April-May-June, but there are different years involved at the various sites -- this is a product of varying program start-up dates at the sites. The years are:

Arizona	1975 and 1977
California	1976 and 1977
Connecticut (all sites)	1976 and 1977
Delaware (all sites)	1975 and 1977
Illinois (both sites)	1976 and 1977
South Carolina (both sites)	1976 and 1977
Washington (both sites)	1975 and 1977

Except for the portrayal of intake data, the "cumulative" charts reflect the number and percent of delinquent and status offenders before and at least six months after the initiation of DSO activities. The data reflect the number of offenders who entered the juvenile justice system by law enforcement action, were detained after court hearing, and were placed on probation or institutionalized by the juvenile court. We would caution the reader against assuming that the before and after data represent trends; these data are only statements as to direction and intensity of change and may or may not be indicative of long range trends at either a specific site or nationwide. The reader should note that the small numbers at some sites may produce distorted percentage changes in the before and after portraits.

A more fundamental caution should be raised at this point. At best these data are only suggestive of the possible short-run impact made by the introduction of a DSO program on case flow in its jurisdiction. However, such short-run changes are indistinguishable from longer and more durable trends. Consequently, the system rates data presented here are useful only as a description of the flow of cases during the period bracketing the introduction of the DSO programs. The extent to which changes in system rates may be attributed to the advent of efforts to deinstitutionalize status offenders, or any other policy change, must await the development of comprehensive, uniform, and economically retrievable juvenile justice data. The system rate changes

presented here are best seen primarily as exemplifying a model approach to the task of tracking the consequences of one kind of change in juvenile justice policy.

Court Intake.

Table 1 provides data on the numbers of cases at intake, the juvenile court, before and after the initiation of DSO activities.

Even with the caution about changes in small numbers possibly generating large percentage changes, the percentage data collectively reveal the following balanced pattern:

Sites with a percentage increase in delinquent and status offenders	3
Sites with a percentage increase in delinquent, and decrease in status offenders	3
Sites with a percentage decrease in delinquent, and increase in status offenders	3
Sites with a decrease in delinquent and status offenders	3
Data not available	<u>2</u> 14

With the four possible outcomes evenly divided among the 12 sites providing data, we are hard pressed to interpret the findings although we note some consistency within states. Thus, Connecticut's three sites experienced decreases in delinquent and increases in status offenders, the two sites in Washington had the pattern of increases in the numbers of delinquents and reductions in status offenders, and Delaware had two of its three sites report increases in both delinquent and status offenders with the third site reporting an increase in delinquent and decline in status offenders. At best, the data suggest some consistency within states with two or more sites and diversity between states as to patterns of intake of

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF DELINQUENT
AND STATUS OFFENDERS AT COURT INTAKE
BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

SITE	NUMBER OF OFFENDERS		DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
	BEFORE	AFTER	
ARIZONA - Pima Co. Delinquent Status	1650 775	1453 471	- 11.9 - 39.2
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	3061 736	2968 582	- 3.0 - 20.9
CONNECTICUT - Statewide Delinquent Status	3452 585	3127 629	- 9.4 + 7.5
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	1078 135	1000 142	- 7.2 + 5.2
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	1268 240	1117 269	- 11.9 + 12.1
CONNECTICUT - District III Delinquent Status	1106 210	1010 218	- 8.7 + 3.8
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	782 140	934 255	+ 19.4 + 82.1
DELAWARE - Kent Co. Delinquent Status	163 36	172 55	+ 5.5 + 52.8
DELAWARE - New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	443 33	545 143	+ 23.0 +333.0
DELAWARE - Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	176 71	217 57	+ 23.3 - 19.7
ILLINOIS - Cook Co. Delinquent Status	5170 1054	5651 1225	+ 9.3 + 16.2
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	393 118	377 79	- 4.1 - 33.1
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	N/A*	N/A	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	-----
WASHINGTON - Clark Co. Delinquent Status	589 259	750 240	+ 27.3 - 7.3
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquent Status	851 183	1025 118	+ 20.4 - 35.5
* DATA NOT AVAILABLE			

delinquent and status offenders. There may be a more important observation - the system data analysis should examine individual DSO sites and their justice systems.

Referral to the Juvenile Justice System.

The reader will recall from Figure 8 that the data collection plan included the collection of data not only at entry into the juvenile justice system by major categories including law enforcement, schools, parents and others, but also requested detailed information on the sources of referral to law enforcement by parents, schools, and others, as well as by law enforcement action itself. The general data on sources of referrals were available; the specific source of referral to law enforcement generally was not.

As would be expected and as portrayed in Table 2, law enforcement, including both local police agencies and sheriff's departments, is the source of entry into the juvenile justice system for the majority of delinquents. The range for this phenomenon was from a high of 98.2 percent in Pima County, Arizona to a low of 52.8 percent in New Castle, Delaware before DSO to a range of 98.5 in Pima County to 60.5 in Kent County, Delaware after DSO.

The agencies of law enforcement were responsible for a lesser number and proportion of status offender referrals to the justice system than was the case with delinquent offenders. The range for the eight sites where such data were available was from a high of 83.0 percent in Pima County to a low of 27.8 percent in Kent County, Delaware before DSO and from 91.2 percent in Pima County to 33.5 percent in District III, Connecticut after DSO.

As was the case in the summary of intake data nationwide by direction and percentage of change, clear patterns in the percentage of law enforcement referrals to the juvenile justice system before and after DSO are

TABLE 2

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS REFERRED TO JUVENILE SYSTEM BY LAW ENFORCEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

SITE	BEFORE		AFTER		DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	
ARIZONA - Pima Co. Delinquent Status	1621 643	98.2 83.0	1430 429	98.5 91.2	- 11.8 - 33.3
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	2553 546	83.4 74.2	2516 423	84.8 72.7	- 1.4 - 22.5
CONNECTICUT - Statewide Delinquent Status	3326 295	96.3 50.4	2958 333	94.6 52.9	- 11.1 + 12.9
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	1028 70	95.4 51.9	955 93	95.5 65.5	- 7.1 + 32.9
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	1231 147	97.1 61.3	1053 167	94.3 62.1	- 14.5 + 13.6
CONNECTICUT - District III Delinquent Status	1067 78	96.5 37.1	950 73	94.1 33.5	- 11.0 - 6.4
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	477 12	61.0 50.0	588 125	63.0 49.0	+ 23.3 -----
DELAWARE - Kent Co. Delinquent Status	135 10	82.8 27.8	104 23	60.5 41.8	- 23.0 -----
DELAWARE - New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	234 12	52.8 36.4	345 66	63.3 46.1	+ 47.4 -----
DELAWARE - Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	108 48	61.4 67.6	139 36	64.1 63.2	+ 28.7 - 25.0
ILLINOIS - Cook Co. Delinquent Status	N/A**	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
WASHINGTON - Clark Co. Delinquent Status	503 125	85.4 48.3	609 N/A	81.2 N/A	+ 21.1 -----
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----

* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

** NA = Data not available at the time this report was developed. These data were subsequently available and were incorporated in a number of instances in the publications of site evaluators.

absent. At one of the eight sites on which data are available, there was an increase in the percentages of law enforcement referrals of both status and delinquent offenders, at three sites there were decreases in the percentages of law enforcement referrals, while at the remaining four sites, three reported a decrease in the proportion of delinquent and an increase in status offender referrals, and one site reported the reverse. Contrary to the intake findings, there were not even consistencies within states on these referral data.

Detention.

Table 3 presents detention data following entry into the juvenile justice system for 12 of the 14 DSO sites. Using percentage of change in detention of delinquent and status offenders before and after DSO programming, the overall patterns are again diverse. At three sites, the percentages of delinquent and status offenders detained increased; at five sites, the percentages for delinquent and status offenders decreased; and, at the remaining four sites, there were two with increases in the percentages of delinquents and decreases for status offenders and two with the opposite pattern.

The ranges of percent of delinquent and status offenders detained before and after DSO programming may be summarized. The high percentage for delinquent detention before DSO was 64.9 in Alameda County, California followed by the two Washington State sites and the low percentage of delinquent detention was 1.4 percent in District III, Connecticut. After the DSO projects were initiated, the high percentage of delinquent detention was still Alameda County at 55.1 percent, the low was 2.5 percent in Macon County, Illinois.

TABLE 3

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS DETAINED FOLLOWING COURT APPEARANCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

SITE	BEFORE		AFTER		DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	
ARIZONA - Pima Co.					
Delinquent	266	16.1	265	18.2	- 0.4
Status	197	25.4	60	12.7	- 69.5
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co.					
Delinquent	1988	64.9	1635	55.1	- 17.8
Status	486	66.0	0	0.0	-100.0
CONNECTICUT - Statewide					
Delinquent	221	6.4	320	10.2	+ 44.8
Status	147	25.1	177	28.1	+ 20.4
CONNECTICUT - District I					
Delinquent	106	9.8	123	12.3	+ 16.0
Status	48	35.6	39	27.5	- 18.8
CONNECTICUT - District II					
Delinquent	100	7.9	140	12.5	+ 40.0
Status	81	33.8	113	42.0	+ 39.5
CONNECTICUT - District III					
Delinquent	15	1.4	57	5.6	+280.0
Status	18	8.6	25	11.5	+ 38.9
DELAWARE - Statewide					
Delinquent	61	7.8	46	4.9	- 24.6
Status	20	14.3	29	11.4	+ 45.0
DELAWARE - Kent Co.					
Delinquent	11	6.7	17	9.9	-----
Status	8	22.2	9	16.4	-----
DELAWARE - New Castle Co.					
Delinquent	28	6.3	17	3.1	- 39.3
Status	2	6.1	9	6.3	-----
DELAWARE - Sussex Co.					
Delinquent	22	12.5	12	5.5	- 45.5
Status	10	14.1	11	19.3	-----
ILLINOIS - Cook Co.					
Delinquent	266	25.7	211	21.2	- 20.7
Status	63	44.4	45	22.3	- 28.6
ILLINOIS - Macon Co.					
Delinquent	6	13.3	1	2.5	-----
Status	7	14.9	1	3.2	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co.					
Delinquent	N/A**	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
Status					
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co.					
Delinquent	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-----
Status					
WASHINGTON - Clark Co.					
Delinquent	248	47.3	309	49.9	+ 24.6
Status	180	82.9	105	53.3	- 41.7
WASHINGTON - Spokane					
Delinquent	324	38.1	320	31.2	- 1.2
Status	113	61.7	42	35.6	- 62.8

* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

** NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE

*** Does not include detention prior to court appearance

As relates to status offender detention prior to DSO, the high percentage of status offenders detained was in Clark County, Washington at 82.9 percent, followed by Alameda County and Spokane, Washington; the low detention percentage was 6.1 in New Castle County, Delaware. Following the DSO interventions, the high percentage of status offenders detained was 53.3 at the Clark County, Washington site; the low detention percentage was zero in Alameda County, which did not detain any status offenders.

Probation as a Disposition.

Table 4 presents data on the number and percent of delinquent and status offenders placed on probation before and after DSO programming at the 14 sites. These collective probation data, as has been the case with other data examined thus far, do not provide a clear pattern. For example, at 8 of the 14 sites, there was a percentage increase in the use of probation for delinquent offenders after DSO and a parallel decrease in probation usage at 6 sites. For the status offenders, there was an increase in the percentage of probation usage after DSO at two sites, a decrease at four locations, no change at one location and seven sites had changes too small to be significant.

Institutionalization as a Disposition.

The data in Table 5 on institutionalization of delinquent and status offenders before and after DSO at the 14 sites also do not lend themselves to convenient collective analysis. For example, the percentage use of institutionalization for delinquent offenders increased at eight sites during the before-to-after time frames and decreased at six sites. For the status offenders, institutionalization increased at four sites, decreased at six, and was unchanged at two sites in this same before-to-after time frame.

TABLE 4

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED ON PROBATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

SITE	BEFORE		AFTER		DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	
ARIZONA - Pima Co.					
Delinquent	53	25.4	9	3.1	- 83.0
Status	35	58.3	3	13.0	- 91.4
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co.					
Delinquent	370	68.3	475	69.1	+ 28.4
Status	51	87.9	15	68.2	- 70.6
CONNECTICUT - Statewide					
Delinquent	720	85.7	716	84.5	- 0.5
Status	137	84.6	116	78.9	- 15.3
CONNECTICUT - District I					
Delinquent	151	85.3	147	77.8	- 2.6
Status	19	73.1	19	73.1	0.0
CONNECTICUT - District II					
Delinquent	350	86.6	290	85.3	- 17.1
Status	73	94.8	51	76.1	- 30.1
CONNECTICUT - District III					
Delinquent	219	84.6	279	87.7	+ 27.4
Status	45	76.3	46	85.2	+ 2.2
DELAWARE - Statewide					
Delinquent	204	33.6	211	38.9	+ 3.4
Status	17	16.7	16	17.6	- 5.9
DELAWARE - Kent Co.					
Delinquent	70	52.2	67	54.9	- 4.3
Status	7	36.8	7	53.8	-----
DELAWARE - New Castle Co.					
Delinquent	81	26.6	66	26.4	- 18.5
Status	2	13.3	6	10.3	-----
DELAWARE - Sussex Co.					
Delinquent	53	31.5	78	45.9	+ 47.2
Status	8	11.8	3	7.5	-----
ILLINOIS - Cook Co.					
Delinquent	144	80.4	206	76.9	+ 43.1
Status	7	14.6	26	74.3	-----
ILLINOIS - Macon Co.					
Delinquent	15	33.3	14	35.0	- 6.7
Status	1	2.1	4	12.9	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co.					
Delinquent	36	11.0	49	24.3	+ 36.1
Status	0	0.0	0	0.0	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co.					
Delinquent	26	8.4	27	8.6	+ 3.9
Status	17	17.0	10	11.8	- 41.2
WASHINGTON - Clark Co.					
Delinquent	49	32.2	73	39.2	+ 49.0
Status	32	46.4	46	58.2	+ 43.8
WASHINGTON - Spokane					
Delinquent	45	48.4	93	45.1	+106.7
Status	5	20.0	3	50.0	-----

* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

TABLE 5

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT
AND STATUS OFFENDERS INSTITUTIONALIZED AS
DISPOSITION BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

SITE	BEFORE		AFTER		DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	
ARIZONA - Pima Co.					
Delinquent	3	1.4	4	1.4	-----
Status	0	0.0	0	0.0	-----
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co.					
Delinquent	172	31.7	212	30.9	+ 23.3
Status	7	12.1	7	31.8	-----
CONNECTICUT - Statewide					
Delinquent	120	14.3	131	15.5	+ 9.2
Status	25	15.4	31	21.1	+ 24.0
CONNECTICUT - District I					
Delinquent	26	14.7	42	22.2	+ 61.5
Status	7	26.9	7	26.9	-----
CONNECTICUT - District II					
Delinquent	54	13.4	50	14.7	- 8.0
Status	4	5.2	16	23.9	-----
CONNECTICUT - District III					
Delinquent	40	15.4	39	12.3	- 2.5
Status	14	23.7	8	14.8	- 42.9
DELAWARE - Statewide					
Delinquent	47	7.7	38	7.0	- 19.1
Status	4	3.9	0	0.0	-----
DELAWARE - Kent Co.					
Delinquent	9	6.7	13	10.7	-----
Status	1	5.3	0	0.0	-----
DELAWARE - New Castle Co.					
Delinquent	24	7.9	20	8.0	- 16.7
Status	2	13.3	0	0.0	-----
DELAWARE - Sussex Co.					
Delinquent	14	8.3	5	2.9	-----
Status	1	1.5	0	0.0	-----
ILLINOIS - Cook Co.					
Delinquent	35	19.6	62	23.1	+ 77.1
Status	0	0.0	0	0.0	-----
ILLINOIS - Macon Co.					
Delinquent	4	8.9	2	5.0	-----
Status	1	2.1	0	0.0	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co.					
Delinquent	12	3.7	18	8.9	-----
Status	0	0.0	0	0.0	-----
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co.					
Delinquent	9	2.9	31	9.9	-----
Status	2	2.0	3	3.5	-----
WASHINGTON - Clark Co.					
Delinquent	14	9.2	20	10.8	-----
Status	2	2.9	5	6.3	-----
WASHINGTON - Spokane					
Delinquent	9	9.7	7	3.4	-----
Status	1	4.0	0	0.0	-----

* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

Table 5 data also reveal that the institutionalization of 31.7 percent of delinquent offenders in Alameda County represents the high end of that range, and Pima County, Arizona at less than two percent institutionalization, is the low end of the delinquent institutionalization range. After DSO, Alameda County (30.9 percent), the Connecticut sites (overall, 15.5 percent), and Cook County, Illinois (23.1 percent) are high; Pima County remains at the low end for institutionalization of delinquent offenders (1.4 percent).

As relates to status offenders before DSO, Connecticut statewide (15.4 percent) institutionalized the highest percentage of its status offenders, while ten sites institutionalized two or less status offenders during the time frame. After DSO, Connecticut overall institutionalized 21.1 percent of its status offenders; eight sites did not institutionalize any status offenders as a juvenile court disposition.

System Impact at the DSO Sites: A State-Site Review

Introduction

The above commentary on system impact collectively at the 14 DSO sites produced neither a common thread nor clear nationwide patterns. Indeed, there were variations in intensity and direction of change at the five focal areas -- court intake, referral to the system by law enforcement, detention, and the use of probation and institutionalization. These many variations suggest a state or site-by-site portrait which examines the same five focal points within the juvenile justice system for delinquent and status offenders both before and after the introduction of programmatic DSO activities. These specific DSO programs are not described here; they are detailed in the basic descriptive report. The data provided below are not different from those presented above; they are, however, arranged by sites and accompanied by a brief narrative. The reader is provided with a system rate chart, decision point calculations, and a summary table for each site and most likely will find data interpretation facilitated by review of these documents together.

Arizona: Pima County

Data for Pima County are available for three years, 1975 through 1977. The before-and-after years, however, are 1975 and 1977: those years surround the introduction of the Mobile Diversion program. The summary data for Pima County are provided in Table 6; the system rate data on system charts 1 and 2.

The Pima County data reflect a general decrease at intake over the before-and-after time frame of the deinstitutionalization project. Further, there is a substantial decrease in the detention of status offender cases at the time of their first court hearings, a significant increase in the number of cases entering the Mobile Diversion system, and reductions in the numbers of both delinquent and status cases granted probation after processing by the juvenile court. The decline in probation usage as portrayed in the system charts appears to be a reflection of a decrease in the number of status offender cases entering the formal adjudication phase and, despite an increase in the number of delinquent cases, a reduction in probation usage as a large number were pending in a "continued" status.


A caution is warranted regarding these data, particularly as relates to detention. Over time, there has been a continuing trend of less detention for status offenders -- this, in large measure a product of a juvenile court decision to reduce such detention. As a result, the decline in status offender detention may reflect that judicial decision as much as or more than the impact of DSO activities. Note also that decreases in percentages relating to law enforcement referral, court intake, detention and grants of probation are consistently greater for status rather than delinquent offenders.

TABLE 6
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
ARIZONA: PIMA COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1621	1430	- 11.8
Status Offenders	643	429	- 33.3
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1650	1453	- 11.9
Status Offenders	775	471	- 39.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	266	265	- 0.4
Status Offenders	197	60	- 69.5
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	53	9	- 83.0
Status Offenders	35	3	- 91.4
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	3	4	-----
Status Offenders	0	0	-----


* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

ARIZONA - PIMA COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

ARIZONA - PIMA COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



California: Alameda County

Summary data for Alameda County for 1976 and 1977 are presented in Table 7; system rate data are on system charts 3 and 4.

The Alameda data and system charts reflect a decline in both the number of delinquent and status offender cases entering the juvenile justice system. Concurrently, there is a decrease in the number of delinquent cases closed at intake and an increase in delinquent cases becoming wards of the court, a marked decline in the detention patterns of both delinquent and status cases and an increase in the use of probation and institutionalization for delinquent offenders.

The significant drop in detention seems worthy of note. As relates to delinquent cases, the decline of some 350 detentions represents an almost 18 percent reduction over the before-and-after time frame; as for the status cases, the detention numbers drop from 486 to 0. This reduction to zero is a reflection of California legislation known as AB 3121, enacted in January, 1977, which prohibits the detention of status offenders. This significant legislation may invalidate any system rate analysis of DSO data since it became law at the same time. Indeed, the reductions in status offender referrals by law enforcement, court intake, detention and grants of probation may be a "spin-off" of AB 3121 instead of the influence of the DSO activities. The increase in probation usage and institutional commitment for delinquent cases, despite a slight decrease in the number of cases, appears to be a function of system penetration. That is, while fewer delinquent cases are entering the juvenile system, a lesser number of these are being closed at intake and more are entering a more formal adjudication process which generates decisions about "wards of the court." The increased number and percentage of juveniles declared wards, for whom the disposition is basically


either probation or institutionalization, generates increases in those dispositional categories. The system data similarly reflect that the lesser number of delinquent cases closed at intake and thus penetrating the system more deeply also generates increases in formal decisions of "not declared wards of the courts" and informal probation.

TABLE 7
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
CALIFORNIA: ALAMEDA COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	2553	2516	- 1.4
Status Offenders	546	423	- 22.5
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	3061	2968	- 3.0
Status Offenders	736	582	- 20.9
DETAINED			
Delinquents	1988	1635	- 17.8
Status Offenders	486	0	-100.0
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	370	475	+ 28.4
Status Offenders	51	15	- 70.6
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	172	212	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	7	7	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


CALIFORNIA - ALAMEDA COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT	3061	2968
STATUS OFFENSE	736	582

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

CALIFORNIA - ALAMEDA COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

Connecticut: Statewide and Districts I, II, and III

Data for the State of Connecticut and the three Districts which comprise the State are provided in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. These data are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 5 through 12.

The overall data for Connecticut -- an aggregate of its three individual Districts -- reflect peculiar patterns. It is important to understand that there were separate programs in each district and that data must be reviewed on a District-by-District basis. For example, there is an approximate ten percent reduction in the number of delinquent cases at intake and an increase of seven-plus percent in status offender cases. The percentages of delinquent cases entered into the system with law enforcement agencies as the source diminished, while the percentage of status cases referred by law enforcement increased. The detention of both status and delinquent cases increased in absolute numbers and percentages (delinquents about 100 cases and 45 percent; status offenders 30 cases and 20 percent). The number and percent of delinquent cases which were disposed of by grants of probation remained constant; the number and percent decreased for status offenders. When the institutional data are examined, the number and percentage of status and delinquent offender cases increased.

There are variations within the three Districts, but the statewide pattern is generally consistent for the status offender: the juvenile justice system absorbed a greater number of status offender cases after DSO than before. This pattern was most likely a response to the judicial philosophy of the presiding state judge who desired to retain jurisdiction over status offenders. Law enforcement contributed significantly to that pattern, and

an increasing percentage and number of status offenders were detained, a somewhat lesser number and percentage of status cases were placed on probation and a slightly greater number and percentage were institutionalized after the introduction of DSO programmatic activities.*

*A caution is issued concerning the completeness and reliability of data. Data collected by the University of Connecticut and these data are from different sources and seemingly utilize different definitions of status offenders.

TABLE 8

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
CONNECTICUT: STATEWIDE

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	3326	2958	- 11.1
Status Offenders	295	333	+ 12.9
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	3452	3127	- 9.4
Status Offenders	585	629	+ 7.5
DETAINED			
Delinquents	221	320	+ 44.8
Status Offenders	147	177	+ 20.4
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	720	716	- 0.5
Status Offenders	137	116	- 15.3
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	120	131	+ 9.2
Status Offenders	25	31	+ 24.0

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

TABLE 9

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT I

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1028	955	- 7.1
Status Offenders	70	93	+ 32.9
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1078	1000	- 7.2
Status Offenders	135	142	+ 5.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	106	123	+ 16.0
Status Offenders	48	39	- 18.8
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	151	147	- 2.6
Status Offenders	19	19	0.0
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	26	42	+ 61.5
Status Offenders	7	7	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

TABLE 10
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT II

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1231	1053	- 14.5
Status Offenders	147	167	+ 13.6
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1268	1117	- 11.9
Status Offenders	240	269	+ 12.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	100	140	+ 40.0
Status Offenders	81	113	+ 39.5
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	350	290	- 17.1
Status Offenders	73	51	- 30.1
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	54	50	- 8.0
Status Offenders	4	16	-----


* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


TABLE 11
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT III

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1067	950	- 11.0
Status Offenders	78	73	- 6.4
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1106	1010	- 8.7
Status Offenders	210	218	+ 3.8
DETAINED			
Delinquents	15	57	+280.0
Status Offenders	18	25	+ 38.9
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	219	279	+ 27.4
Status Offenders	45	46	+ 2.2
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	40	39	- 2.5
Status Offenders	14	8	- 42.9


* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


CONNECTICUT -- STATEWIDE: NUMBER OF CASES/ INDIVIDUALS





CONNECTICUT - DISTRICT 1: NUMBER OF CASES/ INDIVIDUALS






	1976	1977
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		


Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

CONNECTICUT - DISTRICT II: NUMBER OF CASE/INDIVIDUALS



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT	1268	1117
STATUS OFFENSE	240	269


CONNECTICUT - DISTRICT III: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT	1106	1010
STATUS OFFENSE	210	218

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

CONNECTICUT - DISTRICT III: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

Delaware: Statewide and Kent, New Castle, and Sussex Counties

Data for Delaware and Kent, New Castle, and Sussex Counties are contained in Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15. The before-and-after years are 1975 and 1977. System rate data appear on charts 13 through 20.

The system data for Delaware statewide reveal an overall increase in both the number and percent of delinquent and status offender cases. An increase of 150 delinquent cases over the before-and-after time frame represented a 20 percent jump; an increase of 115 status offender cases signified an 80 percent rise. The pattern was not consistent within the separate counties: for example, as relates to status offenders, New Castle reported an increase from 33 to 143, Sussex a decline from 71 cases to 57, Kent County an increase from 36 to 55. Overall, law enforcement agencies entered an increased number and percent of both delinquent and status offenders into the system after DSO than before. The number of delinquent cases resulting in detention dropped statewide from 61 to 46, but status offender cases detained increased from 20 to 29. This increase in status offender detention may be part of a long-range, slowly-rising trend for such detention. Indeed, it appears from other data that the courts maintained or increased the use of detention, but reduced the amount of time in detention. Again, there are variations in this pattern by county. Statewide, the utilization of probation as a court disposition for both status and delinquent offenders remained constant: the number of delinquents institutionalized declined from 47 to 38, status offenders from 4 to 0. These system fluctuations notwithstanding, the system rate charts for Delaware overall portrays clearly the role of DSO. Note that the number of status offender cases at intake increased from 140 to 255, but that 195 of the 255 were handled by DSO and that there was a concurrent reduction from 102 to 38 cases which went to a formal hearing.

The reader will also note from the system charts that the increase in the number of delinquent cases at intake from 782 to 934 was in some ways offset by the process of "arbitration" which handled 180 delinquent and 9 status cases.

TABLE 12

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
DELAWARE: STATEWIDE

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	477	588	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	70	125	+ 78.6
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	782	934	+ 19.4
Status Offenders	140	255	+ 82.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	61	46	- 24.6
Status Offenders	20	29	+ 45.0
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	204	211	+ 3.4
Status Offenders	17	16	- 5.9
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	47	38	- 19.1
Status Offenders	4	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

TABLE 13

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
DELAWARE: KENT COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	135	104	- 23.0
Status Offenders	10	23	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	163	172	+ 5.5
Status Offenders	36	55	+ 52.8
DETAINED			
Delinquents	11	17	+ 54.5
Status Offenders	8	9	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	70	67	- 4.3
Status Offenders	7	7	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	13	-----
Status Offenders	1	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

TABLE 14

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
DELAWARE: NEW CASTLE COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	234	345	+ 47.4
Status Offenders	12	66	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	443	545	+ 23.0
Status Offenders	33	143	+333.0
DETAINED			
Delinquents	28	17	- 39.3
Status Offenders	2	9	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	81	66	- 18.5
Status Offenders	2	6	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	24	20	- 16.7
Status Offenders	2	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


TABLE 15

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
DELAWARE: SUSSEX COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	108	139	+ 28.7
Status Offenders	48	36	- 25.0
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	176	217	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	71	57	- 19.7
DETAINED			
Delinquents	22	12	- 45.5
Status Offenders	10	11	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	53	78	+ 47.2
Status Offenders	8	3	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	14	5	-----
Status Offenders	1	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


DELAWARE - STATEWIDE: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1975	1977
DELINQUENT	782	934
STATUS OFFENSE	140	255

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS


DELAWARE - STATEWIDE: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES




	1975	1977
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

DELAWARE - KENT COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS




DELAWARE - KENT COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES




Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

DELAWARE - NEW CASTLE COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS




NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

DELAWARE - NEW CASTLE COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding


DELAWARE - SUSSEX COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1975	1977
DELINQUENT	176	217
STATUS OFFENSE	71	57

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

DELAWARE - SUSSEX COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



	1975	1977
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

Illinois: Cook County

The data for Cook County, Illinois appear in Table 16 and are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 21 and 22.

Data developed by sampling court records reflect that Cook County experienced an increase in the number and percent of both delinquent and status offender cases over the before-and-after time frame of the DSO project. The increase in delinquent offenders was almost ten percent, for status offenders, 16 percent. Detentions for both status and delinquent cases were reduced, 21 percent for delinquents and 29 percent for status offenders.

The system data for Cook County appear to be unstable because of the large numbers of cases which entered the system prior to the April-May-June time frame but were disposed of during those months, as well as cases which entered the system during April-May-June, but were not disposed of during that period. Thus, there is considerable "imbalance" in the data. Additionally, different data sources may have been used for the DSO analyses and there may have been some definitional variations. We note in the system charts that the ISOS project absorbed some 171 status offenders who otherwise would have entered the juvenile justice system during that three month time frame. Overall, there may have been a "net-widening" phenomenon, although Illinois law does not allow for the institutionalization of status offenders.

TABLE 16

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS


ILLINOIS: COOK COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	5170	5651	+ 9.3
Status Offenders	1054	1225	+ 16.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	266	211	- 20.7
Status Offenders	63	45	- 28.6
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	144	206	+ 43.1
Status Offenders	7	26	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	35	62	+ 77.1
Status Offenders	0	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

** NA = Data not available at the time this report was developed. They were subsequently included in reports issued by the Illinois site evaluator.


ILLINOIS - COOK COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT	5170	5651
STATUS OFFENSE	1054	1225

* May include cases continued from prior months and/or to subsequent months

ILLINOIS - COOK COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

* Includes cases continued from prior months and/or to subsequent months
Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

Illinois: Macon County

The data for Macon County, Illinois appear in Table 17 and are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 23 and 24.

Macon County data reveal a decrease at intake of both delinquent and status offender cases. As relates to status offenders, the decline from 118 cases to 79 is a reduction of one-third. The number of detentions for delinquent and status offenders combined prior to DSO was 13; after DSO, one of each was detained. The number of delinquent cases on whom petitions were filed declined from 45 to 40 from before-to-after; the status offender filings diminished from 47 to 31. The dispositions of probation and institutionalization had numbers too small for interpretation.

Note, however, from the system rate chart that the ISOS project absorbed 19 status offender cases which otherwise would have entered the juvenile justice system. That reduction translates to a decline of cases entering the juvenile court from 60 to 41, about one-third.

TABLE 17

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
ILLINOIS: MACON COUNTY


	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	393	377	- 4.1
Status Offenders	118	79	- 33.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	6	1	-----
Status Offenders	7	1	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	15	14	- 6.7
Status Offenders	1	4	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	4	2	-----
Status Offenders	1	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

** NA = Data not available at the time this report was developed. They were subsequently included in reports issued by the Illinois site evaluator.

*** Does not include detention prior to court appearance.

ILLINOIS - MACON COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



South Carolina: Greenville and Spartanburg Counties

Limited data for the two of the five South Carolina DSO sites are contained in Tables 18 and 19 and represent before-and-after years 1976 and 1977.

These data and the system rate charts begin at the "petition filed" stage of juvenile justice proceedings, inasmuch as the local evaluator did not retrieve data necessary for the system rates analysis up to that point shown on the system charts.

TABLE 18

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
SOUTH CAROLINA: GREENVILLE COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
DETAINED			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	36	49	+ 36.1
Status Offenders	0	0	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	12	18	-----
Status Offenders	0	6	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

**N/A = Data not available

TABLE 19


JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
SOUTH CAROLINA: SPARTANBURG COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
DETAINED			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	26	27	-----
Status Offenders	17	10	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	31	-----
Status Offenders	2	3	-----


* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

**N/A = Data not available


SOUTH CAROLINA - GREENVILLE COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS




SOUTH CAROLINA - GREENVILLE COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding


SOUTH CAROLINA - SPARTANBURG COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1976	1977
DELINQUENT	311	314
STATUS OFFENSE	100	85

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

SOUTH CAROLINA - SPARTANBURG COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

CONTINUED

18 OF 14

Washington State: Clark County

Clark County data are found in Table 20 and represent before-and-after years 1975 and 1976; system rates data appear on system charts 25 and 26.

The Clark County intake data reflect a 27 percent increase in delinquent and a 7 percent decrease in status offender cases during the before-and-after time frame of the DSO project. The detention of delinquent cases also increased by 25 percent concurrently with a 42 percent reduction in detention of status cases; the system chart reflects that the numbers of detentions overall did not change markedly from before (428) to after (414). Probation usage overall increased in the forty-plus percentage range for both delinquent and status offenders, but the system rate charts indicate that the total numbers receiving "intensive" probation did not change significantly during this before to after time frame.

TABLE 20


JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS
WASHINGTON: CLARK COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	503	609	+ 21.1
Status Offenders	125	N/A**	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	589	750	+ 27.3
Status Offenders	259	240	- 7.3
DETAINED			
Delinquents	248	309	+ 24.6
Status Offenders	180	105	- 41.7
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	49	73	+ 49.0
Status Offenders	32	46	+ 43.8
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	14	20	-----
Status Offenders	2	5	-----


* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

**N/A = Data not available

WASHINGTON - CLARK COUNTY: NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS/CASES



WASHINGTON - CLARK COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



	1975	1976
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

* Data not available

Washington State: Spokane

Spokane data are found in Table 21 and represent before-and-after years 1975 and 1977; system rates data appear on charts 27 and 28.

The Spokane data reflect an increase (20 percent) in delinquent and decrease (36 percent) in status offender cases. The decrease in status cases from 183 to 118 is partially explained on the system rate charts by the DSO Youth Alternatives activity which absorbed 45 status cases. Detentions for delinquent cases diminished minimally during this period but status offender detention dropped almost two-thirds (63 percent) from 113 to 42 cases. Overall, the numbers of cases detained was reduced from 437 to 362. This seemingly is part of a long term trend and may or may not be directly attributable to DSO activities.

Probation usage for delinquent offenders doubled during this time frame with the "minimum probation" and "probation" categories increasing about equally. A marked increase in delinquent offenders becoming wards of the court is portrayed on the system charts -- from 14 to 49 cases.

TABLE 21

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO
BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS


WASHINGTON: SPOKANE

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-----
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	-----
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	851	1025	+ 20.4
Status Offenders	183	118	- 35.5
DETAINED			
Delinquents	324	320	- 1.2
Status Offenders	113	42	- 62.8
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	45	93	+106.7
Status Offenders	5	3	-----
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	7	-----
Status Offenders	1	0	-----

* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

** N/A = Data not available


WASHINGTON - SPOKANE COUNTY: NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS



	1975	1977
DELINQUENT	851	1025
STATUS OFFENSE	183	118

NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

WASHINGTON - SPOKANE COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>
DELINQUENT		
STATUS OFFENSE		

Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

Summary:

A brief interlocking commentary on both the system rate methodology and the specific findings from the utilization of that methodology in the current DSO assessment is appropriate. The value of system rates for examination of the justice system and/or its component parts is limited almost uniquely by the availability of data. The methodology is data-dependent: it should have cohort or inventory (and preferably both) data. Even without data, system rates provide useful and informative portraits which may serve to illuminate the findings obtained from other methodologies. With data, system rates are a panorama with corroborative capability, able to assist in the validation of other findings, as well as having a potential for identifying additional areas worthy of special inquiry. The utility of system rates also is influenced significantly by the interface of the degree of resolution of the system charts and data availability. It should be clear to the reader that significant gaps exist in juvenile justice system data at the DSO sites. Some limited data are computerized and readily available; the bulk, however, are retrievable only by manual efforts. Often, there are no historical data -- only current cases.

The system rates DSO data were examined both collectively and by individual sites without across-site consistencies being uncovered. It is clear that system rates are responsive to and portray system changes: an obvious example is the portrayal of the dramatic reduction of status offender detentions in Alameda County, California from 486 to 0. But the methodology cannot determine whether system changes are the product of DSO activities or simply occurred during the DSO time frame. As relates to Alameda County and the 0 status offender detention phenomenon, it is certain that the 0 is a product of California legislation (AB 3121) and not DSO. Similarly, changes (or lack of

changes) which occur during the DSO time frame may result from the impact of a general policy decision as in Pima County, Arizona where a non-detention of status offender policy already was generating a reduction in status offender detentions prior to the introduction of DSO activities designed to produce such a reduction. Or, the influence of a key decision maker in the justice system, as in Connecticut where an important juvenile court judge influenced the system by her personal preference to retain jurisdiction over status offenders, may have as much or more impact as legislation or official policy. Again, although changes may be obvious in system portraits, explanations of these changes often are not obvious and may be due to influences external to specific DSO programmatic activities. Clearly, changes in the justice system may be coincidental with DSO programming, not the result of it.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES OF SEVEN PROGRAMS FOR THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

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1. INTRODUCTION

This report covers the organizational evaluation of the LEAA-funded programs for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders (DSO) in seven localities: Clark County, Washington; Spokane, Washington; Alameda County, California; Pima County, Arizona; Illinois; Delaware; and South Carolina. The complete questionnaire upon which the survey was based appears in Appendix A.

Although the seven programs were charged with similar responsibilities, they differed in the ways they defined their tasks and problems and in terms of their structural outlines. For purposes of preparing this report, however, the analysis was guided by two key assumptions concerning the mandate under which the national DSO effort proceeded: first, that all the programs were expected to pull a variety of agencies and treatment resources into a coordinated network or system of youth service delivery; and second, that the organizational success of the programs was to be defined in large part in terms of their community-basedness. Consistent with the first assumption, close attention has been given to the location of practitioners in the system of inter-agency ties in each locality that bound the separate components of the program together. In keeping with the second assumption, scales were developed to measure the volume of interaction between the participants in each program and a variety of institutions and agencies in the surrounding community, as well as the frequency of active attempts by program participants to influence the community in ways likely to benefit status offenders.

These three variables, then, the positions of practitioners in the networks of professional exchange and the measures of community contact and

community activism, form the outstanding core of this report, although a great deal of other descriptive information on the programs and the attitudes of their participants is also provided. Take note that no mention has been made of performance measures based on DSO client outcomes. This report deals only with the characteristics of practitioners, the organizational settings in which they performed their duties, and their relationships to the surrounding community.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Section I of the report, by far the longest, will be largely descriptive, concentrating on comparisons of the programs with respect to each of the following sets of characteristics:

1. Demographic and occupational composition, including break-downs by race, gender, education and experience, and occupation;
2. Treatment philosophies and strategies, based on opinions about the roles of psychogenic and sociogenic factors in the problems of juveniles and the utility of punishment in solving these problems;
3. Decision making arrangements, specifically, styles of supervision and quality of the contacts between supervisors and their subordinates;
4. Internal networks of interaction and communication, based on a sociometric analysis of work contacts and patterns of consultation and mutual support among co-workers.
5. Elements of work strain, including expressions of concern over professional autonomy, the work load, the availability of information and other aspects of the overall work setting.

After these background comparisons among the programs have been made, Section II will concentrate on the documentation and explanation of three sets of performance variables:

1. Interorganizational contacts by DSO participants with other agencies and institutions in the community, including the police, schools, religious organizations, courts and both public and private social service agencies not directly involved in the DSO program;
2. Community activism, based on participants' reports of the amount of effort they have given to increasing the level of community support and improving the community resource base for programs that deal with the problems of youth; and
3. Subjective estimates by participants of the effectiveness of their own efforts and of the program as a whole.

The descriptive material in Section I is essentially preliminary to the analysis of these outcomes, which will concentrate on questions such as these: What variable or combination of organizational variables shows the most direct relationship to members' community involvement or interorganizational contact? Are patterns of decision making more or less important than the patterns of interaction, consultation and mutual support that have developed among the program members? Are the variables that account for subjective estimates of effectiveness the same ones that are related to objective measures of community basedness? The greatest payoff in useful information for future youth service delivery efforts is likely to come from the attempts to answer these questions.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This evaluation was intended to be a quasi-longitudinal (two-phase) survey of all the participants in all of the programs involved in the national DSO effort. The first wave of questionnaires was to have been sent to program participants in June, 1976, followed after a one-year interval by a second wave during the Summer of 1977. This two-step design was expected to register changes over the life of each program and thus enable the evaluators to comment on the organizational strategies best suited for both initial and relatively long-term success. The final research design that was actually employed was considerably less ambitious than this and in some areas was only a pale reflection of the original. This final working plan was the result of decisions, redefinitions and compromises at several levels. The major steps in the evolution (devolution) of the final design will be briefly recounted because many of them reflect chronic problems in the evaluation of large scale, federally funded programs that should be documented. The intention in recounting these problems is to signal important points of caution both for future researchers and for future program organizers.

Changes in the Scope of the Evaluation.

A series of decisions reduced the comprehensiveness of the evaluation. First, the DSO program in Arkansas was dropped entirely on the grounds that it was sufficiently different from the other programs that it could not meaningfully be evaluated in the same terms. It does not appear in this report.

Second, the national evaluation staff agreed that only parts of the programs in South Carolina and Illinois would be included in the evaluation and,

as a consequence, the organizational evaluation of each of these programs was drastically truncated. The interpretation of the findings for these two programs was much more difficult as a result. In South Carolina federal funds were added to state and local financing to support the processing of DSO clients through the existing youth service delivery machinery. It was not possible to specify with any confidence which agencies, treatment modalities or practitioners were DSO-funded and which were not and the opinion expressed by the South Carolina director and supported by the evaluation team was that an analysis encompassing the entire state-wide service delivery system was inappropriate. Accordingly, personnel rosters were provided for the organizational analysis that included only certain personnel from selected, and no doubt unrepresentative, parts of the system. In short, since large parts of the program were exempted from the evaluation, and since it was not possible to separate DSO effort from non-DSO effort, the data presented here should be taken as a tentative examination of the organizational effectiveness of a part of South Carolina's youth service delivery system (through which DSO clients were processed) and not as an evaluation of a program put together for the national DSO program, per se.

A similar but more complicated problem was encountered in Illinois. Here again the program drew upon funding from a variety of sources, and activities relevant to the DSO program were diffused throughout a large number of agencies spread over a wide area. More critically, multiple evaluations were being conducted simultaneously by different funding agencies and the saturation point in the respondents' tolerance was quickly reached. Again, the decision was made to confine the organizational survey to a reduced and unrepresentative number of sites and there is no way to determine to what extent the results from this truncated survey would be typical of the Illinois DSO effort overall. In the final accounting the research design in Illinois

became quite distorted and the response rate was very low (43%), in part because a large number of foster parents were listed on the organizational roster and most of them, even after several follow-up requests, declined to participate in the evaluation.

Finally, the start-up of the DSO program in Connecticut was delayed until well after this organizational evaluation began and a personnel list was not available until September, 1977. The survey could not be initiated until that time, several months after the coding and processing of the data from the other programs had been started. The data from Connecticut will be analyzed separately and presented in a supplemental report to be completed at a later time.

Personnel Rosters.

Next to the shrinking of the population of organizations to be studied, securing accurate and comprehensive personnel rosters for the DSO programs was the most serious problem encountered. Though the research was scheduled to begin in June of 1976, the first reasonably complete roster was not available until July and the last one not until December of that year. As a consequence, the entire evaluation had to be delayed by six months in order to attempt to handle all the programs within the same time frame.

Part of the delay was a simple function of postponements in the staffing and starting of the different programs and could not be avoided. Much more troublesome difficulties were caused by a lack of clarity in the way the organizational features of the programs were defined, a lack of understanding by program personnel of what the LEAA and national evaluation requirements were, and a lack of willingness in some instances to see the organizational evaluation take place at all. Problems such as these recur with some regularity

in evaluation research but they should be recounted in some detail here because they have a direct bearing on the evaluability of ambitious, large-scale demonstration projects such as DSO.

Defining the organizational boundaries of the DSO program was a difficult task in most cases. There was disagreement over whether the term "DSO program" referred only to the staff of individuals directly responsible for the administration of the DSO grant or whether the boundaries should not also include all the practitioners involved with status offenders, including subcontracting agencies contributing to the program in various ways, foster parents, consultants, and so on. The latter, more comprehensive definition was insisted upon by the national evaluation team, on the assumption that anyone whose involvement with status offenders was subject to scrutiny by the coordinating DSO staff should be considered a part of the program. Accordingly, all program directors were asked to furnish personnel rosters that included everyone within these boundaries. As it turned out, it was difficult for some projects to fulfill this request and the final rosters that were used in the evaluation contained some known and undoubtedly some unknown sources of error. For example, except for Illinois, hardly any foster parents were included on the personnel lists, and consultants were generally considered to be outside the organizational boundaries.

From these and other problems we encountered, it became clear that the DSO projects for the most part had vaguely defined and shifting memberships and obscure boundaries. Very often the participants, i.e., the actual practitioners, had little understanding of their organizational position in the DSO effort and still less understanding of why they were being called upon to participate in the evaluation of it. Some examples should make this point clear. In several cases all the members of a cooperating agency were listed

as participants in the program when only one or two individuals were actually expected to be involved in DSO-related activities. Just as often, individuals appeared on a roster who had delegated their DSO duties to people not on the roster, or who had been reassigned to non-DSO activities between the time the roster was prepared and the questionnaires mailed out. In a small number of cases individuals were contacted who had never heard of the DSO program and in other cases important individuals were overlooked altogether even though they had important DSO functions to perform.

Staff turnover on some projects also presented a problem for the analysis. In one case about 20% of an agency's members were replaced in the weeks that passed between the preparation of the roster and the administration of the survey, and in one other instance the members declined to reply to the questionnaire because they had heard that the funds for their share of the DSO effort were being withdrawn. A unique problem arose in one locality when two community agencies which were fully involved in the program were excluded entirely from the organizational roster that was provided by the project director. When they learned of the evaluation they asked to be added to the mailing list so that their reactions to the program would not be overlooked. The converse also occurred, that is, agencies appeared in the rosters that were never in fact involved in the DSO effort. Finally, in one program several agencies never responded to the request for rosters or did so only with great reluctance because they had been assured that if they agreed to participate in the DSO program, they would not be asked to submit to any LEAA evaluation.

Problems such as these made it difficult to determine the organizational outlines of the DSO programs with accuracy and the evaluation was made more difficult as a result. Usually the difficulties arose, we believe, because no

allowances were made for an extensive organizational evaluation such as this one and consequently there had been little concern given to defining the precise organizational features of the programs as they were being assembled. In most cases the rosters had to be extended and amended several times and in their final forms most of them provided at least a workable framework upon which to base the investigation. However, the delays caused by the attempts to complete the rosters stretched from weeks into months, consumed an inordinate amount of the staff time and research funds of the national evaluation team, and were a substantial factor in the decision to shelve the longitudinal dimension of the evaluation for all but those two programs, Spokane and Delaware, which had provided comprehensive rosters and high response rates much earlier than the other programs.

At this point we are primarily concerned with the problems which this delay caused for the evaluation of the DSO programs and not with the difficulties it might have caused for the actual implementation of the programs. It is clear that if the organizational features of such programs are to be properly evaluated in the future a clear statement must be made at the outset (preferably at the RFP stage) describing the nature of the evaluation and the extent of the detail about their projects that program directors are to be asked to provide. The resulting savings in time, effort and money and the improvement in the quality of the evaluation from having these expectations up front will more than offset the added effort required of the program directors at the time when they are involved in establishing the organizational structures of their programs.

Response Rates.

Questionnaires were mailed to program participants during December, 1976 and January, 1977. The initial returns were for the most part very slow and two mailed follow-ups and a series of telephone contacts with project directors and agency heads were used over a five month period to improve the response rates. As the list shows, the final returns were quite variable:

Alameda County, California	66%	(96/145)
Clark County, Washington	80%	(20/25)
Delaware	79%	(37/47)
Illinois	43%	(60/139)
Pima County, Arizona	56%	(78/139)
South Carolina	65%	(37/57)
Spokane, Washington	91%	(39/43)

In general the returns were best for the personnel directly employed by the DSO grants and those directly charged with program administration, and worst for the participants who were involved at the periphery of the programs, such as foster parents and consultants. The overall response rate of 62% (367/595) would appear quite good compared to most mailed surveys but is lower than expected given that there was a strong mandate for the study and most of the subjects were aware, at least in general terms, of the necessity for the evaluation.

As we pointed out above, personnel turnover was a problem in some sites and could account for some of the failures to respond. Whenever we were aware that respondents had left the program the response rates for their programs were adjusted upward because the non-responses were not actually refusals to respond. However, in all likelihood there was more turnover than we were

not aware of but we were unable to document this in any detail at the time of the survey.

A different problem affected the response rate for the program in Alameda County, California. Project participants reacted negatively to Section V of the questionnaire, which contained sociometric items designed to provide an index of the program's structure, specifically, its patterns of inter-agency communication, influence and mutual support. It was not possible to convince the respondents that LEAA would respect the confidentiality of these items and the result was an extremely low response rate from the community based agencies in the program. A compromise was reached by replacing the offending items with an alternative series of questions (see Appendix B) and the response rate improved considerably. However, because the sociometric items were dropped, the measurement of the internal connectedness of this program will not be directly comparable with that of the other programs in the study.

The length of the evaluation instrument (8 pages) and the fact that it came on the heels of many other DSO-related paperwork obligations also caused some reluctance to respond. We will report later that paperwork was the most frequent source of work strain in many of the programs. In one program, in fact, several respondents complained that DSO paperwork had expanded to the point where it required more time than was spent actually dealing with the problems of clients.

Finally, a small but vocal handful of program participants in almost every program objected in principle to having their professional activities evaluated by a distant research team that had no first-hand experience with the circumstances that they, the practitioners, had to face.

Changes in the Longitudinal Design.

In order to conduct a Time 1-Time 2 comparison we needed to have a high response rate for each program so that the two waves of the analysis would be based on the replies of essentially the same personnel. Because of the short life of the programs, it was also necessary to have a quick response to the first wave so that an appropriate interval could elapse between the two waves. As we have already pointed out there was approximately a six-months delay in the administration of the first wave of questionnaires, and only the programs in Spokane, Washington and Delaware responded quickly enough and with a high enough response rate that the second wave of the analysis remained feasible. In the other programs the process of collecting the questionnaires took almost six months before it was decided that the response rate was acceptable (or as high as it would ever be), and because of this it was not possible to allow an appropriate interval to elapse before the second wave would have had to be administered. The second wave was sent to the Spokane and Delaware programs in September, 1977 and the analysis comparing the two waves for these sites will be presented in a separate report.

3. SUMMARY

The overall research design for this evaluation was altered in some major and minor ways and as a consequence is less comprehensive than originally intended. With a few exceptions the representatives of the different programs cooperated as much as could be expected given the uncertainty of the situations they faced. Many of the problems that were encountered can be traced to the fact that most of the programs were funded and implemented with only indistinctly drawn organizational features. New projects were combined with or superimposed upon ongoing ones and formerly independent agencies were tied into networks of service delivery with other agencies, both public and private. Methods of coordination, spheres of responsibility and the division of labor among the parts of these complicated systems were not always apparent. An argument could certainly be made that a flexibly structured approach to the delivery of human services is preferable to one that requires precisely defined organizational features, on the grounds that such flexibility will have a payoff in performance that a more bureaucratic approach would sacrifice. However, indistinctly defined boundaries and responsibilities are not synonymous with the flexibility this argument has in mind. The lack of clarity encountered in the DSO programs meant that their activity often took place in an atmosphere of turbulence and uncertainty, a fact that should definitely influence the way the findings are read. The idea of conducting an organizational evaluation was sometimes conceptually out of phase with the somewhat unorganized state of the programs.

SECTION I DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON THE PROGRAMS

1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES

The background characteristics of the seven programs are given in Tables 1A to 1E. They show considerable variation, both within and between programs, in terms of occupational composition, gender ratios, age, race, education and experience.

Occupationally, not all respondents provided easily recognizable or clearly defined labels for themselves (Table 1A). Counselors and social workers were the most numerous, followed by the category "supervisor/coordinator/administrator," and then probation officers. Together these groups accounted for over two thirds of all participants. The remainder were spread over a wide range of skills, including psychologist, recreation specialist, consultant and support staff, such as secretary, accountant, and so forth.

Looking at the individual programs, Arizona, Alameda County and Clark County had relatively high proportions of counselors and of probation officers, whereas in the remaining four programs far greater reliance was placed on social workers and, interestingly, on administrators.

Most of the participants had academic credentials, about evenly divided between bachelor's and master's degrees (Table 1B). By this criterion, the Illinois program relied least on degree holders (35% had no degree) and Spokane represented the other end of the range (55% had master's degrees or better). Arizona ranked lowest in average number of years of professional experience (4.2 years) and Clark County ranked highest (7.2 years). When the three sets of information in Table 1B are taken together, the seven programs fall into two fairly distinct categories. Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina practitioners were somewhat less educated (in terms of years of schooling and degrees held)

and less experienced than the members of the programs in Alameda, Clark County, Delaware, and Spokane. Though the variations were not great, Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina also employed proportionally fewer whites (Table 1C) and substantially larger numbers of practitioners 30 years of age or less (Table 1D).

Different strategies concerning professionalism seem to be indicated by this, with Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina representing a less traditional (younger, less educated, more likely to be non-white) alternative than the other programs. It is outside the range of this organizational evaluation, but other parts of the investigation should examine whether these distinctions bear any relationship to client characteristics and client outcomes.

Finally, gender breakdowns are given in Table 1E. Women outnumbered men in all the programs except Alameda County, with the greatest disproportion (70%) appearing in Delaware. Overall, the ratio of women to men was roughly 6:4.

TABLE 1A.
OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION (%) OF SEVEN DSO PROGRAMS

TREATMENT	ALAMEDA	ARIZONA	CLARK COUNTY	DELAWARE	ILLINOIS	SOUTH CAROLINA	SPOKANE	ALL PROGRAMS
Counselor	30.3	26.3	20.0	13.5	7.0	8.6	13.9	19.5
Houseparent	-	3.9	-	-	-	-	2.8	1.1
Social Worker	11.2	19.7	15.0	51.4	33.3	34.3	42.2	27.2
Volunteer	2.2	3.9	-	-	-	-	-	1.4
Psychologist	11.2	-	5.0	2.7	5.3	2.9	2.8	4.9
Therapist	12.4	1.3	-	2.7	-	-	8.3	4.3
Recreation	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	.3
<u>COURT-RELATED</u>								
Unspecified	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.8	.3
Probation Officer	12.4	11.8	15.0	-	3.5	-	-	7.2
Court Liaison Officer	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	.3
<u>ADMINISTRATION</u>								
Administrator*	6.7	7.9	15.0	18.9	21.1	31.5	16.7	14.5
Community Worker/ Program Development	-	1.3	-	-	5.3	8.6	2.8	1.4
<u>TECHNICAL STAFF</u>								
Consultant	-	-	5.0	-	-	-	-	.3
Researcher	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	.3
Planner	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	.3
Attorney	1.0	-	-	5.4	-	-	-	.9
<u>SUPPORT STAFF</u>								
Accountant	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	.3
Business Manager	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	.3
Statistician	-	-	-	-	-	2.9	-	.3
Secretary	1.1	3.9	-	-	1.8	14.3	2.8	3.2
Other Clerical	3.4	-	5.0	2.7	-	-	2.8	1.7
Public Relations	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	.3
OTHER**	4.5	9.2	10.0	-	5.3	-	-	4.6

* Includes "Supervisors," "Coordinators" and "Administrators."

** Teacher, Nurse, Student, "Change Agent"

TABLE 1B.
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF PARTICIPANTS IN SEVEN DSO PROGRAMS

PROGRAM	MEAN YEARS EDUCATION	MEAN YEARS EXPERIENCE
ALAMEDA	17.3	6.0
ARIZONA	16.1	4.2
CLARK COUNTY	17.3	7.2
DELAWARE	16.9	6.8
ILLINOIS	16.1	5.5
SOUTH CAROLINA	16.3	5.4
SPOKANE	17.3	6.5

ALL PROGRAMS 16.7 5.7

ACADEMIC DEGREE HELD

PROGRAM	PERCENT NO DEGREE	PERCENT 2-YEAR DEGREES	PERCENT BACHELOR'S	PERCENT MASTER'S AND ABOVE
ALAMEDA	10.1%	2.2%	41.6%	46.1%
ARIZONA	27.6	3.9	43.4	24.9
CLARK COUNTY	15.0	0.0	45.0	40.0
DELAWARE	8.1	5.4	40.5	45.9
ILLINOIS	35.1	1.8	35.1	28.1
SOUTH CAROLINA	17.1	2.9	45.7	34.3
SPOKANE	8.3	2.8	33.3	55.5
ALL PROGRAMS	18.6	2.9	40.7	37.9

TABLE 1C.
RACIAL BREAKDOWNS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SEVEN DSO PROGRAMS

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>PERCENT BLACK</u>	<u>PERCENT WHITE</u>	<u>PERCENT MEXICAN-AMERICAN</u>	<u>PERCENT OTHER</u>	<u>PERCENT NO ANSWER</u>
ALAMEDA	13.5%	82.0%	1.1%	3.3%	0.0%
ARIZONA	6.6	72.4	18.4	2.6	0.0
CLARK COUNTY	0.0	90.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
DELAWARE	10.8	81.1	0.0	5.4	2.7
ILLINOIS	35.1	61.4	0.0	1.8	1.8
SOUTH CAROLINA	20.0	77.1	0.0	0.0	2.9
SPOKANE	2.8	94.4	0.0	2.8	0.0
ALL PROGRAMS	14.0	77.7	4.3	2.5	1.4

TABLE 1D.

AGE BREAKDOWNS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SEVEN DSO PROGRAMS

	<u>PERCENT IN AGE CATEGORIES:</u>							<u>51 OR OLDER</u>	<u>NO ANSWER</u>
	<u>UNDER 20</u>	<u>21-25</u>	<u>26-30</u>	<u>31-35</u>	<u>36-40</u>	<u>41-45</u>	<u>46-50</u>		
ALAMEDA	0.0	18.0	35.9	23.7	5.5	6.7	2.2	5.5	2.2
ARIZONA	5.2	31.6	33.0	14.3	9.1	1.3	1.3	3.9	0.0
CLARK COUNTY	0.0	15.0	15.0	35.0	10.0	5.0	10.0	10.0	0.0
DELAWARE	0.0	8.1	29.7	29.7	2.7	13.5	8.1	5.4	2.7
ILLINOIS	0.0	31.6	39.9	10.6	12.3	7.1	1.8	5.4	1.8
SOUTH CAROLINA	2.9	22.9	48.6	17.2	2.9	0.0	0.0	5.8	0.0
SPOKANE	0.0	11.2	33.5	30.6	2.8	5.6	5.6	11.2	0.0
ALL PROGRAMS	1.5	31.7	33.4	20.6	6.9	5.4	3.1	6.0	1.1

TABLE 1E.

GENDER BREAKDOWNS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS OF SEVEN DSO PROGRAMS

	PERCENT MALE	PERCENT FEMALE	NO ANSWER
ALAMEDA	51.7	48.3	0.0
ARIZONA	39.5	60.5	0.0
CLARK COUNTY	40.0	60.0	0.0
DELAWARE	27.0	70.3	2.7
ILLINOIS	42.1	56.1	1.8
SOUTH CAROLINA	31.4	68.6	0.0
SPOKANE	47.2	52.8	0.0
ALL PROGRAMS	41.8	57.6	0.6

2. TREATMENT PHILOSOPHIES AND STRATEGIES

Eight questions (items 3-10 in Section II of the questionnaire) were used to assess the DSO participants' opinions about the problems of juvenile offenders. Four of these items dealt with the etiology of juvenile problems and the other four dealt with their judgments as to the generally proper strategy to use in dealing with those problems. These two sets of opinions will be discussed in turn and then the results of a factor analysis based on all eight items will be reported. It was hoped that these items would reveal any important philosophical and strategic differences among the programs. As the discussion proceeds, it should be clear that profound differences of this sort were not in evidence.*

Etiology.

Respondents were asked to express, on a scale of 1-9, their degree of endorsement of the following four items dealing with etiology:

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY:

Use the following scale to indicate the extent to which you think juveniles in trouble are responsible for their own problems:

The juvenile is usually to blame for his/her problems	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	The juvenile is usually not to blame for his/her problems
---	-------------------	---

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

On the following scale indicate the effect of social institutions as a contributing factor causing juveniles to get into trouble:

Not usually a major factor	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Usually a major factor
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* A different set of items might have produced different results. The development of reliable scales for these orientations should have high priority in evaluation research.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT:

How important are problems of psychological adjustment as a contributing factor causing juveniles to get into trouble?

Not usually a major factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually a major factor

SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS:

How important are the juvenile's immediate social surroundings as a contributing factor causing him/her to get into trouble?

Not usually a major factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually a major factor

In each case, the higher the number circled, the more supportive or "liberal" the response, in the sense of locating the source of problems outside the volition of the individual offender. It is important to note that, given the way the first item was worded, to endorse it was to indicate that juveniles are not responsible for their own troubles and not to endorse it implied that part of the blame does rest with the offender.

The consensus from one program to another on these items was quite strong, as Table 2A on the following page shows. When the average levels of endorsement of the four items are ranked from high to low for all seven programs combined, the following order obtains:

SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS	(mean = 7.6)
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT	(7.0)
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY	(5.9)
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY	(5.5)

The same order among these items appeared with minor deviations in each of the separate programs, suggesting that the participants, on the whole, were in basic agreement that a child's immediate social surroundings were most likely to be a source of problems, followed by problems of a psychological nature and problems involving the failure of community institutions. The responses to

TABLE 2A.
MEAN SCORES ON FOUR ITEMS DEALING WITH THE
ETIOLOGY OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS

PROGRAM	INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY ^b	ETIOLOGY ITEMS ^a		
		INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS	PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS	SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS
ALAMEDA	5.6	6.0	6.9	7.7
ARIZONA	5.3	5.8	6.8	7.5
CLARK COUNTY	5.6	5.0	7.1	7.4
DELAWARE	5.8	6.1	7.3	7.7
ILLINOIS	5.6	5.6	7.3	7.6
SOUTH CAROLINA	5.7	6.0	6.6	7.5
SPOKANE	5.4	6.1	6.8	7.9
ALL PROGRAMS	5.5	5.9	7.0	7.6

^a Items 3, 5, 6 and 7 in Section II of the questionnaire

^b Higher scores reflect endorsement of the idea that the individual is not responsible for his/her own problems

the item assessing personal responsibility were something of an anomaly. Given the relatively "liberal" endorsement of the idea that social conditions and adjustment problems figure strongly in juvenile troubles, it is a little surprising to encounter the noticeably less supportive pattern of replies to the question dealing with personal responsibility. The responses to this item serve as a caution against stereotyping DSO practitioners in terms of clear-cut, predefined philosophical dichotomies. To believe that impersonal forces and psychological problems are important causal factors is no guarantee that the respondent will also absolve the offender of a measure of personal responsibility.

The detailed response frequency breakdown on this item assessing individual responsibility is instructive. Just about 40% of the respondents were neutral (scores of 5) and another 17% leaned decisively toward the idea of individual responsibility (adding together those with scores less than 5):

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY				
		Frequency	Relative Proportion	Cumulative Proportion
Juvenile is to blame	1	2	.6%	.6%
	2	10	2.9%	3.5%
	3	18	5.2%	8.7%
	4	28	8.1%	16.9%
	5	139	40.4%	57.3%
	6	60	17.4%	74.7%
	7	47	13.7%	88.4%
	8	33	9.6%	98.0%
Juvenile not to blame	9	7	2.0%	100.0%
		344	100.0%	

It is true that the largest single segment (a total of 43%) favored the supportive or lenient pole of this scale (scores above 5); nevertheless, a sizeable proportion of the participants were apparently unwilling to rule out personal responsibility as one of the factors leading to problems for juveniles.

Treatment Strategies.

In addition to the questions on etiology, the following four items were used to record participants' conceptions of the appropriate strategy for dealing with the problems of juveniles:

PUNISHMENT:

In dealing with juveniles who are in trouble, what is the best strategy?

Ordinarily, juveniles in trouble should receive punishment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Ordinarily, juveniles in trouble should not receive punishment
--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:

How much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to change the social institutions of the surrounding community?

Should be given very little effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Should be given a great deal of effort
------------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE:

How much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to improve a child's psychological adjustment?

Should be given very little effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Should be given a great deal of effort
------------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

CHANGE SURROUNDINGS:

In your opinion, how much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to change the immediate social surroundings the juveniles have to live with?

Should be given very little effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Should be given a great deal of effort
------------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

Of these four strategies, attempting to improve the client's psychological adjustment was the most favorably rated one (see Table 2B, next page), followed by attempts to change institutions and social surroundings. Withholding punishment was the least favored strategy. As the following breakdown shows, the replies on this punishment item were concentrated toward the "should not be punished" option; nevertheless, it is significant that fully one third of all respondents were either neutral or tended to favor punishment to some degree, a pattern noticeably less "liberal" than that exhibited by the other three items:

PUNISHMENT AS A STRATEGY

		<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Relative Proportion</u>	<u>Cumulative Proportion</u>
Juvenile should be	1	5	1.5%	1.5%
	2	7	2.0%	3.5%
	3	7	2.0%	5.5%
	4	16	4.7%	10.2%
	5	77	22.4%	32.6%
	6	44	12.8%	45.3%
	7	75	21.8%	67.2%
	8	73	20.9%	88.4%
Juvenile should not be punished	9	<u>40</u> 344	<u>11.6%</u> 100.0%	100.0%

As with the etiology items, the consensus among the seven programs on these four strategy items was fairly strong. No one program stood out as dramatically more likely to endorse or reject any single approach. It is important to keep in mind that the strategy items were not presented to the respondents as mutually exclusive alternatives. They were asked to give their assessment of each approach separately and it is probable that most would have favored a technique that combined several reactions to clients' problems.

TABLE 2B.
MEAN SCORES ON FOUR ITEMS DEALING WITH
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH JUVENILE PROBLEMS

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>PUNISHMENT^b</u>	<u>STRATEGY ITEMS^a</u>		
		<u>INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</u>	<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE</u>	<u>CHANGE SOCIAL SURROUNDINGS</u>
ALAMEDA	6.9	6.9	7.7	7.0
ARIZONA	6.5	7.2	7.6	7.3
CLARK COUNTY	6.7	6.6	7.4	6.3
DELAWARE	6.6	7.1	7.8	7.2
ILLINOIS	6.1	7.1	7.7	7.3
SOUTH CAROLINA	5.9	7.1	7.6	7.3
SPOKANE	6.1	7.3	6.7	7.0
ALL PROGRAMS	6.5	7.1	7.6	7.1

^a Items 4, 8, 9 and 10 in Section II of the questionnaire

^b Higher scores reflect endorsement of the idea that punishment is not appropriate as a strategy for dealing with the problems of juveniles

It was pointed out in the previous section that the seven DSO programs could be tentatively separated into two groups on the issue of professionalism (or, more precisely, differences in training and experience, age and race). From this, it might have been expected that Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina, which we characterized as the three less "traditional" programs, would exhibit noticeably more liberal aggregate profiles on these eight etiology and strategy items, on the presumption that a conscious attempt had been made to select and recruit practitioners of a more or less common philosophical and professional persuasion. This was not the case. As we have seen the variations from program to program were small in general and bore no obvious relationship to the demographic compositions of the programs. Nor was there a clear indication that the demographic and professional characteristics of individuals bore any direct relationship to their orientations toward etiology and strategy. The correlations with education, experience, gender, and race were generally unremarkable (Table 2C).

A Factor Analysis.

In a final attempt to discover distinct patterns in these data, a routine factor analysis was performed. Originally, it was speculated that the replies to the set of etiology and strategy items would suggest scales that would divide the practitioners into clear-cut categories based on distinctive philosophical/practical positions. Several factors were thought possible. One would involve the emphasis on psychological and individual causes and solutions as opposed to structural, social or institutional causes and solutions and another would distinguish between punitive versus non-punitive approaches. The first of these distinctions would correspond to a division of opinion concerning psychogenic versus sociogenic causes and the second would roughly

TABLE 2C.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DSO
PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD ETIOLOGY AND TREATMENT STRATEGY

	ETIOLOGY ITEMS				STRATEGY ITEMS			
	INDIV- IDUAL	INSTITU- TIONAL	PSYCHO- LOGICAL	SOCIAL	PUNISH- MENT	INSTITU- TIONAL CHANGE	PSYCHO- LOGICAL CHANGE	CHANGE SURROUNDINGS
<u>ALAMEDA</u>								
RACE	.04	-.13	-.09	-.04	.17*	-.12	-.17*	-.05
GENDER	-.04	-.04	-.07	-.05	-.06	-.20**	-.14*	-.21**
EDUCATION	.22**	.11	-.15*	-.07	.18**	.10	-.16*	.03
EXPERIENCE	.00	-.05	-.09	-.15*	.03	-.01	-.07	-.20**
<u>ARIZONA</u>								
RACE	-.14	.09	.08	.08	.07	-.02	-.08	-.10
GENDER	.01	.14	.01	-.20**	.09	.09	.01	-.01
EDUCATION	.03	.12	-.18*	.17*	.00	.14	-.15*	.01
EXPERIENCE	-.12	.16*	-.01	.04	.04	.23**	-.04	.12
<u>CLARK COUNTY</u>								
RACE	-- ^a	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GENDER	.08	.00	-.24	-.02	.27	-.23	-.38**	-.12
EDUCATION	-.24	.28	.01	-.01	-.14	-.33	.01	-.17
EXPERIENCE	-.16	.09	.16	.01	.45**	-.11	.28	.15
<u>DELAWARE</u>								
RACE	-.15	.03	.04	.23*	.21	.17	.22*	.19
GENDER	.24*	.06	.17	-.08	.05	.15	-.06	-.00
EDUCATION	.01	.10	-.08	.04	.10	-.06	-.10	.07
EXPERIENCE	-.01	-.11	.15	.19	-.01	-.15	.39***	.11
<u>ILLINOIS</u>								
RACE	-.16	.05	-.24**	-.20*	.05	-.12	-.37***	-.27**
GENDER	-.00	.20*	-.10	-.15	.06	.06	-.17	-.01
EDUCATION	-.10	.03	-.10	-.20*	.24**	-.04	-.20*	-.15
EXPERIENCE	.06	.06	-.06	-.05	-.07	-.05	.13	.12
<u>SOUTH CAROLINA</u>								
RACE	-.30**	-.09	-.49***	-.07	.03	-.08	-.17	-.20
GENDER	.27*	.23*	.02	.04	.44***	.43***	-.25*	.17
EDUCATION	.06	.20	.18	-.14	.44***	.10	-.16	-.06
EXPERIENCE	-.20	.03	-.12	-.00	.04	.05	-.22	-.23*
<u>SPOKANE</u>								
RACE	.15	-.25*	-.17	-.18	.42***	-.22*	-.25*	-.16
GENDER	-.01	-.24*	-.07	-.15	-.03	-.13	-.22*	.01
EDUCATION	-.10	-.25*	-.17	.24*	.45***	.03	-.10	-.03
EXPERIENCE	.06	.11	.02	-.23*	-.11	.02	-.07	-.28**
<u>ALL PROGRAMS</u>								
RACE	-.09*	.00	-.10**	-.02	.12***	-.08*	-.17***	-.10**
GENDER	.04	.06	-.04	-.10**	.08*	-.02	-.14***	-.06
EDUCATION	.03	.09*	-.10**	-.01	.19***	.00	-.15***	-.05
EXPERIENCE	-.03	.04	-.01	-.02	.02	.01	.02	-.04

^a All respondents were white
One asterisk represents $p < .10$, two represent $p < .05$, and three represent $p < .01$.

parallel the conservative-liberal split over whether juvenile misdeeds are acts of will or reactions to circumstances largely beyond the control of the individual.

When the responses were factor analyzed, a solution was produced which indicated that individual practitioners can be arrayed on three dimensions, one comprised largely of attitudes toward blame and punishment, a second based on opinions about the role of structural factors, such as social and institutional variables, and the third composed of assessments of psychological factors.* Given that the rotation was orthogonal, an individual's score on one of the three bore little or no relationship to their score on either of the other two. Thus, a person could score consistently high, or low, or medium on all three dimensions. As an example of what this means, it would be possible to separate those practitioners who took a punitive view from those who did not, and the resulting dichotomy would not permit a prediction of the extent to which the two groups stress, or fail to stress, structural factors or psychological factors.

Factor scores representing individuals' positions on each of these three composite dimensions were calculated and the means computed for each of the programs in the hope that this would bring the small differences that were reported in Tables 2A and 2B into a little sharper focus. Factor scores are constructed in such a way that the grand mean for all the respondents combined is zero. Departures from zero within a given DSO program provides an idea of how different that program is, in the aggregate, from the others. Scores above the grand mean are more "liberal" and those below the mean are less "liberal" than the average. Table 2D below displays the results on this analysis.

* Principal components analysis, varimax rotation. Three factors had eigenvalues above 1.0. Analyses performed separately for the seven programs produced basically similar results.

TABLE 2D.
COMPARISONS (MEAN FACTOR SCORES) AMONG
PROGRAMS ON THREE COMPOSITE DIMENSIONS REPRESENTING
THE STRESS ON PSYCHOLOGICAL, STRUCTURAL AND
PUNITIVE CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS

PROGRAM AND DOMINANT DIVERSION STRATEGY	Psychological Dimension	Structural Dimension	Punitive Dimension ^a
Alameda (Family Counseling)	.00	-.04	.18
Arizona (Advocacy)	-.08	.10	-.11
Clark County (Family Counseling)	.01	-.58	.12
Delaware (Eclectic)	.17	.03	.16
Illinois (Advocacy)	.18	-.03	-.05
South Carolina (Eclectic)	-.12	.09	-.13
Spokane (Eclectic)	-.22	.18	-.24

^a Positive scores represent non-punitive responses

QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS	FACTOR LOADINGS		
	Psychological Dimension	Structural Dimension	Punitive Dimension
1. Individual Responsibility	.16	.01	.78
2. Punishment as a Strategy	-.09	.18	.76
3. Institutional Factors	-.23	.60	.30
4. Psychological Factors	.79	-.03	.06
5. Social Surroundings	.55	.36	-.01
6. Change Social Surroundings	.34	.72	-.11
7. Psychological Change	.81	.02	.02
8. Institutional Change	.08	.79	.15

Individuals in the Delaware and Illinois programs placed more than the average and the participants in South Carolina and Spokane less than the average emphasis on psychological factors. The latter two programs were also, on the average, a little more punitive in their orientations (that is, less likely to endorse the position that juveniles are not to blame and/or not to be punished), while Alameda, Clark County, and Delaware were relatively less punitive than the average. The sharpest departure from the norm, however, is apparent on the structural dimension. Clark County participants were clearly less likely than those in other programs to think in terms of these structural and institutional causes and solutions.

It is interesting to compare these results with what is known about the actual approaches to treatment that the different programs adopted. Program organizers in Clark County and Alameda described their programs as emphasizing family crisis counseling, Arizona and Illinois stressed a youth advocacy approach and Spokane, Delaware and South Carolina reported using an eclectic approach. These distinctions bear only a very tenuous relationship to the three dimensions in Table 2D. The clearest difference is that the participants in the two family counseling-oriented programs, Clark County and Alameda, tended to be a little less punitive than the average, a distinction they shared with one "eclectic" program, Delaware. The participants in one of the family counseling programs, Clark County, were also noticeably less likely to emphasize structural causes and solutions, though they were no more likely than the average to stress psychological problems and solutions. Two of the three eclectic programs, South Carolina and Spokane, were distinctive, in two ways. The participants of each on the average placed less emphasis on psychological factors and were more likely to adopt a punitive stance toward juveniles. The advocacy

programs resembled the eclectic programs on the punitive dimension but fell into no clear pattern on the other two dimensions.

These untidy comparisons are inconclusive at best and should be regarded with caution. Remember that these relative differences exist in a context that, overall, was generally liberal (Tables 2A and 2B). Note also that while those in charge of organizing the different DSO efforts generally leaned in favor of one service delivery mode or another, the reality in most cases was no doubt more mixed than the simple classification into "advocacy," "family counseling" and "eclectic" types implies. Additionally, in at least one instance, Alameda County, a family counseling diversion strategy was imposed on some participating agencies that were themselves committed to an advocacy approach, and there were other examples of philosophical differences between program organizers and participating agencies. This would no doubt produce a more mixed program and one internally more diverse philosophically than would be expected given just the statement of preferred diversion strategy from the policy makers in the different programs.

Summary.

In short, from this analysis no very profound philosophical differences among the programs should be assumed. Rather, what appears to be the case is noticeable but for the most part moderate differences in emphasis from one program to another that seem to bear very little relationship either to the programs' demographic and professional profiles or, perhaps more crucially, to the stated treatment preferences offered by program organizers. In one sense these findings are quite remarkable. The seven programs surveyed were geographically dispersed, were assembled in widely varying circumstances, expressed different objectives and relied differentially on public and private agencies

to achieve their goals. Not to discover greater philosophical polarities is something of a surprise, for it implies that such concerns were subsidiary to (and perhaps subordinated to) other considerations in the assembling of the programs.*

* A multiple regression analysis (not shown) also revealed that these philosophy and strategy items bore no significant relationship to community basedness after the effects of individuals' demographic and organizational characteristics were controlled.

3. DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS

Relationships between the DSO decision makers and their subordinates were assessed by a series of questions in Section IV of the questionnaire. Note that parallel questions were asked of rank and file participants and supervisors so that the view of decision making as seen from above could be compared with the view from below.

The major distinction to be drawn involves the comparison of three different styles of supervision, participative (decisions are mutual), directive (supervisor makes most decisions) and laissez faire (subordinates make most of the decisions). It is generally assumed that professional and semi-professional practitioners working in organizations (rather than privately) both expect and demand to share in the decisions concerning the actual performance of their jobs and to have a fair amount of influence over the determination of general policy in the organization that employs them. The prediction, then, was that the DSO programs would be structured along participative lines and, as Table 3A shows, from the point of view of the rank and file, a decision making style that allowed their participation was by far the most commonly reported arrangement. In every program except the one in Delaware more than three-fourths of the responses fell into the two categories specifying participation. Delaware was an exception because about a third of the participants there reported a laissez faire pattern. In no instance was the directive style reported by more than a very small minority. In fact, if the "participative" and "laissez faire" responses are combined, the proportion of practitioners making either some or nearly all of the decisions about their work jumps to 90% overall and ranges

TABLE 3A.
STYLES OF DECISION-MAKING AS
REPORTED BY SUBORDINATES

PROGRAM	<u>DECISION-MAKING PATTERNS</u>					
		<u>MUCH DISCUSSION</u>			<u>LITTLE DISCUSSION</u>	
	<u>PERCENT MUTUAL DECISIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT SUPERVISOR'S DECISIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT RESPONDENT'S DECISIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT MUTUAL DECISIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT SUPERVISOR'S DECISIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT RESPONDENT'S DECISIONS</u>
ALAMEDA	52.1%	4.2%	7.0%	23.9%	9.9%	2.8%
ARIZONA	73.1	1.5	6.0	14.9	1.5	3.0
CLARK COUNTY	64.7	0.0	5.9	11.8	5.9	11.8
DELAWARE	51.7	3.4	13.8	6.9	3.4	20.7
ILLINOIS	50.0	5.3	5.3	28.9	7.9	2.6
SOUTH CAROLINA	63.3	6.7	3.3	16.7	6.7	3.3
SPOKANE	60.0	4.0	0.0	20.0	4.0	12.0
ALL PROGRAMS	59.6	3.6	6.1	18.8	5.8	6.1

from 86.6% in South Carolina to 97% in Arizona. Viewed in this way, professional autonomy was a reality for almost all of the DSO participants.

Looking at the data in Table 3A another way, a great deal of discussion about decisions was also frequently reported, ranging from a high of about 81% in Arizona to lows of 69% in Delaware and 61% in Illinois. Not surprisingly, most people also approved of the style of decision making in their program, judging from the results in Table 3B. More than 70% in all programs indicated that they would not change the arrangement in which they were then involved and, of the remainder, far more expressed a preference for more participation than for less.

For supervisors, the result was essentially the same (see Table 3C). Mutuality was reported by from 70% to 100% of the supervisors responding and a great deal of discussion was indicated by more than 80% in all seven programs. Delaware again stands out as the only program in which a laissez faire style was at all common. Equally important was the fact that a directive style of supervision was in evidence with any frequency in only one program, South Carolina (18.2%).

Like the rank and file, supervisors also seemed comfortable with their decision-making styles (Table 3D). Overall, more than three-fourths of them indicated a preference for the status quo in their relationships with subordinates. There was, however, one significant exception. In South Carolina, a substantial majority (73%) of the supervisors expressed a preference for greater participation by subordinates. Since the supervisors in this program also reported the greatest frequency of directive leadership, it is possible that supervisor-subordinate relations were somewhat strained, though the numbers are far from conclusive. Another suggestive piece of evidence from the survey points in the same direction. In Table 3E data are presented on the average frequency

TABLE 3B.
PREFERENCES EXPRESSED BY SUBORDINATES IN
DECISION-MAKING WITH THEIR SUPERVISORS

PROGRAM	PERCENT WHO PREFER:		
	LESS PARTICIPATION	SAME PARTICIPATION	MORE PARTICIPATION
ALAMEDA	4.1%	81.1%	14.9%
ARIZONA	1.5	83.8	14.7
CLARK COUNTY	0.0	82.4	17.6
DELAWARE	10.3	79.3	10.3
ILLINOIS	0.0	71.4	28.6
SOUTH CAROLINA	0.0	83.9	16.1
SPOKANE	4.0	76.0	20.0
ALL PROGRAMS	2.8	80.1	17.1

TABLE 3C.

STYLES OF DECISION-MAKING AS REPORTED BY SUPERVISORS

PROGRAM	DECISION-MAKING PATTERNS					
		MUCH DISCUSSION			LITTLE DISCUSSION	
	PERCENT MUTUAL DECISIONS	PERCENT SUPERVISOR'S DECISIONS	PERCENT RESPONDENT'S DECISIONS	PERCENT MUTUAL DECISIONS	PERCENT SUPERVISOR'S DECISIONS	PERCENT RESPONDENT'S DECISIONS
ALAMEDA	75.9%	6.9%	0.0%	17.2%	0.0%	0.0%
ARIZONA	75.9	0.0	10.3	10.3	3.4	0.0
CLARK COUNTY	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DELAWARE	53.8	7.7	23.1	15.4	0.0	0.0
ILLINOIS	83.3	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
SOUTH CAROLINA	63.6	18.2	0.0	9.1	0.0	9.1
SPOKANE	90.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0
ALL PROGRAMS	75.0	4.5	5.4	13.4	0.9	0.9

TABLE 3D.

SUPERVISORS' PREFERENCES FOR PARTICIPATION BY THEIR SUBORDINATES IN DECISION-MAKING

PROGRAM	PERCENT WHO PREFER:		
	LESS PARTICIPATION BY SUBORDINATES	SAME PARTICIPATION BY SUBORDINATES	MORE PARTICIPATION BY SUBORDINATES
ALAMEDA	0.0%	80.0%	20.0%
ARIZONA	3.3	80.0	16.7
CLARK COUNTY	0.0	100.0	0.0
DELAWARE	7.1	78.6	14.3
ILLINOIS	5.0	85.0	10.0
SOUTH CAROLINA	0.0	27.3	72.7
SPOKANE	0.0	90.0	10.0
ALL PROGRAMS	2.6	76.9	20.5

TABLE 3E.

FREQUENCY AND QUALITY OF SUPERVISOR-SUBORDINATE CONTACTS

	REPORTED BY SUBORDINATES		REPORTED BY SUPERVISORS	
	MEAN FREQUENCY ^a	MEAN QUALITY ^b	MEAN FREQUENCY ^a	MEAN QUALITY ^b
ALAMEDA	3.5	6.9	3.4	7.6
ARIZONA	4.3	7.4	4.3	7.4
CLARK COUNTY	2.4	7.2	3.0	8.5
DELAWARE	4.0	6.6	4.1	6.6
ILLINOIS	2.7	6.5	3.3	7.4
SOUTH CAROLINA	4.1	7.4	4.7	6.7
SPOKANE	3.7	6.8	4.1	6.9
ALL PROGRAMS	3.6	7.0	3.9	7.3

^aResponse Categories:

1 Less Than Once A Week	2 About Once A Week	3 Several Times A Week	4 Once Or Twice A Day	5 Several Times A Day	6 Almost Constantly
----------------------------------	------------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------

^bResponse Categories:

The time is almost never helpful to me — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 — The time is almost always helpful to me

of contact between supervisors and subordinates and the perceived helpfulness of this contact. Based on the responses of supervisors, South Carolina ranked below average on the quality of the contacts compared to the other six programs. The relationship is not simple, however, because paradoxically, based on the replies of subordinates reported in the same table, the quality of the contacts was rated quite favorably. In short, the strain over matters of leadership suggested in this program was largely confined to the perceptions of supervisors, who apparently had some reservations about the behavior of their subordinates. Keep in mind also that the overall impression from the South Carolina data was favorable.

In general, it is clear that the service delivery systems established for the DSO effort relied heavily on a democratic style of decision making. This is not surprising given the nature of the work in which most of the practitioners were engaged, a kind of work that would respond poorly to routinization, close supervision, or directive decision making. What is a little surprising is the overall degree of consensus between supervisors and their subordinates on this topic. In some work settings what is seen as democratic participation by the rank and file can mean an erosion of influence for the supervisor and for this reason a disparity in the way participation is evaluated by the two groups is not uncommon. Such a disparity had not evolved in the DSO programs at the time of the survey, and in fact, in the one instance in which disagreement was apparent, South Carolina, the preference among supervisors was for more rather than less participation by subordinates.

4. NETWORK STRUCTURES OF THE PROGRAMS

In response to their mandates, the DSO programs represented attempts to create inter-agency networks of service delivery. Despite their expressed philosophical differences and differences in their strategies of implementation, all the programs were established with a relatively small administrative core at the center of an expected network of participants. The primary work sites of these participants were typically in different agencies or offices dispersed over geographical areas ranging considerably in extensiveness, from a single city to entire counties and multi-county areas. The programs in Delaware, South Carolina, and Illinois were state-wide but in the latter two only selected components were included in this evaluation. Although in the preceding analyses we have treated the entire DSO program as a single unit of analysis for purposes of reporting, it is necessary to emphasize here that, in reality, each program was intended to be an inter-organizational system. The manner in which the activities of the members of the discrete agencies in the programs were in fact coordinated is the issue that will now be addressed.

In every program the expectation was that the separate agencies in the system would be coordinated by the center and, therefore, they would cohere functionally, that is, they would cooperate and exchange resources among themselves in ways that would create the conditions for a lasting network of service delivery for problem juveniles. This was an ambitious goal, because community helping agencies, particularly private ones, almost always run short-staffed and under-funded and, more often than not, stand in an at least partially competitive relationship to each other. It is true that there are compelling

reasons for inter-agency contact, and the language of inter-agency coordination and shared objectives is often quite refined.* But this rhetoric may sometimes be disjunctive with reality because of counterpressures that work against inter-agency cooperation. To justify its existence and to compete successfully for limited resources, an agency must lay claim to a distinctive approach to a problem area. It clearly undermines its own self-interest to some extent if it concedes that its objectives and its techniques are just like those of other agencies or even just compatible with them, and it also compromises its interests if it changes its methods of operation to accommodate a funding source. For this reason inter-agency ties and agency-funding source ties are always likely to be somewhat tentative and perhaps fragile, and there were several examples in the DSO programs that could be used to illustrate this. Philosophical disputes and disagreements over contractual obligations and treatment strategies were often mentioned in conversations with program participants.

Sarason, et. al.,** take this argument even further by insisting that stable inter-agency networks are likely to survive only when money is not the keystone of the relationship, in fact when it is explicitly excluded from the relationship. Unless the network is based on the free exchange of resources and services other than money, they argue, the centrifugal forces will overcome the centripetal ones and a fragmentation of the network back into its individual constituent parts will result. This is an unduly pessimistic view, but it does highlight the problems that connections based on money can cause.

* For a persuasive discussion of the necessity of inter-agency contact in "people processing" (i.e., service delivery) agencies, see Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, "People processing organizations: an exchange approach," American Sociological Review 37 (June, 1972): 256-263.

** Sarason, Seymour, Charles Carol, Kenneth Maton, Saul Cohen and Elizabeth Lorentz.

1977 Human Services and Resource Networks. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

A dilemma, then, is always potentially present: on one hand, an arrangement characterized by unique agencies with distinctive approaches and vigorously defended principles competing destructively and separately for the same limited resources and the same pool of potential clients is likely to be self-defeating. It is just this experience that has made the network alternative look more attractive. On the other hand, it could be argued that tightly linked agencies offering services that differ only superficially because they have compromised their objectives in the interest of a stable exchange with other agencies and with the funding source is not apt to be much of an improvement. For purposes of evaluation, the possibility of such a dilemma creates serious problems of interpretation. If we have not overstated the case, it is possible that a tight-knit and closely coordinated system can also be counterproductive and, if so, the DSO mandate may have lead to the creation of "systems" that by their nature would be ineffective and unable to survive, qua systems, once the DSO funding being channeled through the administrative core was removed.

But what of a third possibility, namely, collections of agencies only loosely connected, if at all, and not clearly coordinated by the administrative center? When are such "non-systems" to be considered successful, and when do they in fact only indicate that the administrative core is not doing its job and that no coordinated service-delivery program exists? What is involved in this discussion is the question of the definition of program success. The fact is that very disparate outcomes can be seen from different perspectives as both favorable and unfavorable.

To address this complicated issue for the DSO programs, we have examined the intra- and inter-agency ties and exchanges that were reported by the participants in response to the five sociometric questions in Section V of the

questionnaire (see Appendix A). The first item is the central one. It asked participants to record their three closest work contacts among the other personnel throughout the overall DSO program. This item permitted a direct assessment of the volume of contact among the members of different components of the programs. The four other questions asked members to indicate the individuals with the greatest influence over the program, those most deserving of professional respect, those most likely to offer support in difficult situations, and those most likely to be a reliable source of advice and counsel. (In Alameda County the sociometric analysis was replaced by an alternative method of assessing the agency-center and agency-agency linkages. Participants were asked to think of specific individuals who were their closest work contacts and whom they considered worthy of professional respect, and capable of providing advice and support, but then, in the interest of anonymity, to enter on the questionnaire only the names of the agencies in which these individuals worked. These replies were not comparable to the sociometric data reported for the other six programs, but they do permit an assessment of the amount of centralization and the volume of inter-agency contact.)

The data provided by these items will be used here in two ways. First, the replies will be used to record the sheer volume of contact that took place among the agencies and between the agencies and the administrative center in each program. Second, the results of a smallest space analysis of the sociometric work contacts will be presented to convey a graphic or visual impression of the relationships that existed among the various parts of each program. (Because a sociometric analysis was not conducted in Alameda County, it will not appear in this second part of the analysis.)

Agency-Administration and Agency-Agency Linkages.

Tables 4A and 4B present the statistical breakdowns for the ties among the different subparts of the DSO programs.* To preview those findings, the data suggested two rather distinct interorganizational strategies. First, Spokane and Clark County displayed tightly interconnected systems with comparatively frequent work contacts between the members of the program components and the administrative center (Table 4A) and frequent agency-agency contacts as well (Table 4B). Second, Delaware and Arizona represented just the opposite: relatively infrequent agency-center and agency-agency contacts. South Carolina and Alameda County were mixed; they displayed fairly frequent agency-center ties but were more like Arizona and Delaware in the sparseness of direct agency-agency linkages. However, because of the way the program in South Carolina was structured and the way the data were collected in Alameda County, it is unfortunately not clear whether they can be considered to represent a third distinct network type. Finally, Illinois was intermediate in terms of both agency-center and agency-agency ties, and thus did not fit neatly into any of the patterns, though it was closer in type to Spokane and Clark County than to Arizona and Delaware. The detailed data that suggested these distinctions will now be discussed.

Centralization. In terms of reliance on the administrative center, the Clark County program stands out as a special case. In this small program only 10 of the 20 responding practitioners occupied positions outside the administrative center. Among these respondents the reliance on the center was quite clear. Twenty-five of the 30 work contacts that they reported involved

* The comparisons in these Tables are sometimes based on small numbers, particularly for Clark County. In Spokane the response rate on the sociometric items was under 50% (compared to over 90% for the rest of the questionnaire). As a result the data should be considered suggestive, not conclusive, and read accordingly.

TABLE 4A.

AGENCY-CENTER CONTACTS:
PROPORTION OF ALL SOCIOMETRIC CHOICES DIRECTED BY PARTICIPANTS TOWARD MEMBERS OF
THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF IN THEIR DSO PROGRAM

PROGRAM	WORK CONTACTS			INFLUENCE NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL RESPECT NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL ADVICE NOMINATIONS			ALL FIVE SOCIOMETRIC QUESTIONS		
	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank	Total Exercised	To Center No. (%)	Rank
ALAMEDA*	163		3	140	56 (40)	3	143	42 (29)	5	135	55 (41)	3.5	132	37 (28)	5	713	246(35)	5
ARIZONA	158	25 (16)	6	144	21 (15)	7	151	32 (21)	6.5	145	40 (28)	7	143	20 (14)	6	741	139(19)	6
CLARK CO.	30	25 (83)	1	27	22 (81)	1	24	21 (87)	1	25	24 (96)	1	27	22 (81)	1	133	114(86)	1
DELAWARE	90	9 (10)	7	78	16 (21)	6	77	16 (21)	6.5	66	23 (35)	5	71	5 (7)	7	382	69(18)	7
ILLINOIS	101	32 (32)	4	85	33 (39)	4	89	34 (38)	3	74	35 (47)	2	84	27 (32)	3	433	161(37)	2.5
SO. CAROLINA	68	15 (22)	5	44	20 (45)	2	62	25 (40)	2	58	24 (41)	3.5	56	20 (36)	2	288	104(36)	4
SPOKANE	44	24 (55)	2	37	12 (32)	5	33	11 (33)	4	38	11 (29)	6	32	10 (31)	4	184	68(37)	2.5
MEAN %		(36%)			(39%)			(38.4%)			(45.3%)			(32.7%)			(38%)	

* Based on a non-sociometric question that asked for agency membership, not names, of closest associates.

TABLE 4B.

AGENCY-AGENCY CONTACTS:
PROPORTION OF SOCIOMETRIC CHOICES (EXCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED TOWARD THE CENTER) THAT WERE
DIRECTED TO MEMBERS OF AGENCIES OUTSIDE THAT OF THE RESPONDENT

PROGRAM	WORK CONTACTS			INFLUENCE NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL RESPECT NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT NOMINATIONS			PROFESSIONAL ADVICE NOMINATIONS			ALL FIVE SOCIOMETRIC QUESTIONS		
	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank	Total	Inter-Agency No. (%)	Rank
ALAMEDA*	107	34 (32)	6	83	18 (22)	7	101	21 (21)	7	80	22 (27)	7	95	24 (25)	6	466	119 (25)	7
ARIZONA	133	35 (26)	7	123	35 (28)	6	119	43 (36)	5	105	40 (38)	5.5	123	48 (39)	5	603	201 (33)	5
CLARK CO.	5	3 (60)	2	5	3 (60)	2	3	3 (100)	1	1	1 (100)	1	5	3 (60)	3	19	13 (68)	2
DELAWARE	81	37 (46)	4	62	31 (50)	4	61	29 (48)	4	43	20 (47)	4	66	35 (53)	4	313	152 (49)	4
ILLINOIS	69	38 (55)	3	52	29 (56)	3	55	34 (62)	3	39	27 (69)	3	57	37 (65)	2	272	165 (61)	3
SO. CAROLINA	53	20 (38)	5	24	8 (33)	5	37	11 (30)	6	34	13 (38)	5.5	36	4 (11)	7	184	56 (30)	6
SPOKANE	20	14 (70)	1	25	21 (89)	1	22	18 (82)	2	27	23 (85)	2	22	17 (77)	1	116	93 (80)	1
MEAN %		(46.8%)			(47.6%)			(54.1%)			(57.7%)			(47.1%)			(44.4%)	

* Based on a non-sociometric question that asked for agency membership, not names, of closest associates.

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members of the administrative center, a proportion that was far higher than for any of the other programs. This pronounced pattern in the work contacts was repeated on all four of the other sociometric dimensions. Members of the central core received better than 80% of the nominations as influential members of the program, and they were just as frequently seen as worthy of professional respect and as sources of useful work-related assistance and advice. Clearly this was a tightly knit program, a feature that was no doubt accentuated by its small size and the fact that no autonomous private subcontracting agencies were involved. All of the respondents to the survey were public employees and the distinction between "Central" and "non-Central" members was difficult to draw and somewhat artificial as a result. It is probable that problems of coordination and conflict were minimal in this program and for this reason it is in many ways not directly comparable to the other programs in the organizational survey.

Spokane also appeared to be a fairly centralized program. More than half of the reported work contacts were with members of Spokane Youth Alternatives, the agency in charge of the overall DSO effort in that county. On the other four sociometric dimensions centralization was less pronounced; still, roughly a third of all the ties were with the members of this central coordinating agency. A similar result was apparent in Illinois. In this program, where the respondents were much more widely dispersed geographically than in Clark County or Spokane, still a third of all work contacts reported were with the coordinating staff and from a third to nearly half of all the ties on the other dimensions followed the same trend.* The degree of centralization of work contacts and choices in the Alameda County program was also moderately

* In Illinois, an agency coordinator was assigned to each geographic area in which the program operated.

pronounced. Its profile in Table 4A is generally similar to that of Illinois: much less centralized than Clark County but clearly more centralized than Arizona or Delaware.

In contrast to these relatively more centralized programs, Delaware and Arizona displayed a pattern that suggests comparatively low reliance on the center. In both of these programs, fewer than 20% of all reported work contacts were with those in the administrative unit, a pattern that was also apparent on the other four sociometric dimensions.

Finally, in terms of the pattern it displayed on several of the sociometric dimensions, South Carolina was among the more centralized group of programs; however, because of its unique features it must be treated separately. In this program most of the practitioners who responded to the evaluation were public employees of Youth Service Bureaus in the counties of Greenville, Spartanburg and Lexington, agencies whose activities were part of the ongoing state system of youth service delivery. Not all of the private agencies involved in DSO were included on the personnel roster for this program and the members of those that were included comprised only a small part of the total responding personnel. While the frequency of work contacts between members of this program and the central administrative unit (i.e., the state office in Columbia) was not high (22%), their responses on the other four sociometric items suggested that they were nevertheless dependent on the administrative center in other respects. Generally, around 40% of their nominations on the criteria of influence, professional respect, support and advice were directed toward the center. Unfortunately, this fact may have limited significance for this evaluation because, as was pointed out earlier, the system of service delivery that existed in South Carolina had not been established specifically

for the DSO program. The processing of DSO clients was simply added to the other duties of this state-run system and the presence or absence of DSO funds probably had very little to do with whether the system as we found it was likely to alter its pattern or persist beyond the period of the DSO contract.

Agency-to-Agency Ties. The data in Table 4B provide an index of the amount of agency-agency interaction that took place among the components of each DSO program. In this table, the ties directed toward the administrative center have been excluded altogether. Thus, it was based only on a comparison between the ties that were confined to the respondent's own agency and those that were directed toward practitioners in other agencies in the DSO network.

It is significant that Clark County and Spokane, the two programs whose participants showed the greatest frequency of working contact with the center, also showed the greatest frequency of interchange among the non-administrative subparts of the DSO program.* Thus, it would be inappropriate to refer to these two programs as "dependent" upon the center because their greater frequency of contact with the administration (Table 4A) was paralleled by greater contact among the practitioners dispersed throughout the program (Table 4B). What is indicated in these two programs is a greater density of ties in general pulling together the different parts of the system, including the administrative core, into an integrated network of activity.**

The other programs did not convey the same impression. Arizona, for example, was seen in Table 4A to be a program in which the components were relatively independent of the center, and in Table 4B it appears as one in which

* To be precise, in Clark County, the vast majority of all choices were directed toward the center. Of the small number that were not, most were inter-agency rather than intra-agency. Combining all five sociometric items, 13 of 19 nominations were inter-agency, that is, exchanged between members of different sub-parts of the program.

**In Spokane, this interpretation assumes that the low response rate did not produce a fundamentally distorted view of the program's internal linkages.

there was also comparatively little direct contact among the agencies and units that comprised it. Taken together, this suggests that, of all the programs surveyed, it may be the one most aptly characterized as made up of comparatively isolated components. The density of ties based on work contacts, influence, mutual respect and mutual assistance was very thin compared to what was observed in the Clark County and Spokane programs. Delaware was basically similar to Arizona, though less extreme. Like Arizona, its reliance on the center was also generally low and in Table 4B it can be seen that better than half of the remaining ties were directed by respondents to the members of their own specific workplaces. It ranked well below Clark County and Spokane in this regard.

Alameda County presented a mixed picture. As we saw earlier, the focusing of ties on the center was not distinctive; in fact, it was just about average in this respect. However, in terms of inter-agency ties it did display an extreme pattern: on three of the five dimensions it ranks at the very bottom among all programs.

Illinois represented a midway category in terms of inter-agency contact. It ranked third of seven on four of the five sociometric dimensions, a fact that was consistent with its middling ranking on the extent of contact with and reliance upon the center, reported above.

Finally, South Carolina must again be regarded in a category separate from the other programs. We pointed out above that, in terms of reliance upon (though not contact with) the administrative component, it was comparable to Spokane and Clark County. However, in Table 4B it is seen to share with Arizona and Alameda County the characteristic of insularity of its components from each other. What this represents is a program for juvenile offenders that was apparently highly centralized in terms of influence and expertise, but with comparatively little direct working interaction among its separate divisions. At

least this description fits the fragment of the overall program that we were enabled to survey.

The relative sparseness of inter-agency work ties (compared to Clark County and Spokane) in Delaware, South Carolina and, to a lesser extent, Illinois can perhaps be partially explained by their spatial dispersion. In each case, components of the program were spread across different cities and counties. The Arizona and Alameda County programs were both confined to a single county, however, and therefore spatial dispersion is clearly not the only factor influencing the density of inter-agency ties.

Disregarding for the moment the variations in the completeness of our information, the foregoing data do suggest some tentative conclusions. Clark County and Spokane stand out in each of the comparisons as programs with frequent linkages among all their parts. Illinois would fall into the same category but with a somewhat lower frequency of contacts making the connections. The remaining four programs are more variable in the patterns they display but, compared to the first three, are generally less tightly bound together in terms of the linkages among their parts.

If we put aside the findings for Alameda County (because the data took a different form) and Illinois and South Carolina (because only fragments of the programs were surveyed), the remaining programs indicate somewhat more clearly that two distinct coordinating strategies were used, the one in Spokane and Clark County based on a great deal of interaction and the other in Arizona and Delaware based on relatively infrequent interaction among the participating agencies in the program. It is tempting to give a direct interpretation to these differences, because common sense suggests that programs in which the parts of the system are closely linked with the administrative core and at the same time tightly bound to each other are clearly more "coordinated" or

"integrated" or "cooperative" (in the sense in which these terms are applied to service delivery systems) than programs in which the agency-center and agency-agency linkages are less dense. However, the data which are presented next and in the concluding section of this report indicate that such a conclusion would be premature; that, in fact, alternative but perhaps equally effective modes of coordination are suggested by the differences among these four programs.

A Graphic Display of Inter-Agency Work Contacts.

By use of a technique called smallest space analysis (a form of multi-dimensional scaling), sociometric data based on work contacts can be made to yield a geometric, visual representation of the communication linkages tying the members of a network to each other. This can be a useful supplement to the statistical analyses of choice patterns offered above.

This technique requires first that a measure called "path distance" be computed which specifies the number of choice links in the chains that connect each individual in the network to all of the others. In this process the pair, or dyadic relationship, is the unit of analysis. If A directly names D as a work contact, for example, the path distance ($A \rightarrow D$) separating them is 1. If A has no direct work tie to D but does have contact with B who has a link to C who in turn interacts with D, then the path distance between A and D is 3 ($A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$). Once the path distances separating all the possible pairs in a given program were computed, these measures were subjected to the Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Solution to produce the two-dimensional displays that appear in Figures 4A to 4F.* It will be helpful to think of these figures in

*The measure of path distance comes from graph theory, which is developed in detail in Harary, Frank, et al., Structural Models: An Introduction to Directed Graphs. New York: Wiley, 1965. Smallest Space Analysis is ably explained and demonstrated in Laumann, Edward O. and Franz U. Pappi, Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence. New York: Academic Press, 1976.

the following way. Suppose that all the responding program participants were brought together in a very large room and each was asked to locate him/herself with respect to each other member in a way that reflects the direct and indirect accessibility of that other member at work. Individuals who work directly together would stand quite near each other and individuals who can reach each other only through a complicated series of indirect ties would be spatially distant from each other. Such a sorting process would produce a great deal of milling about as individuals tried to locate themselves properly, simultaneously, with respect to everyone else in the program, but eventually, given enough time and enough knowledge on the part of the participants (that is, assuming that everyone had good knowledge of the total pattern of individual-individual linkages), the process would come to rest. If at this point a photograph could be taken from a birds-eye view, the result would be a spatial distribution that reflects the actual working relationships among all the program participants. With smallest space analysis the computer is able to produce and process the total pattern of direct and indirect linkages that this spatial representation requires and then plot the results in figures such as those that are reproduced below.

These visual plots are useful but must be interpreted with some caution. An SSA plot gives a good idea of where different individuals and functional subunits stand relative to all others but does not convey an accurate impression of the overall density of ties. Moreover, the result of a smallest space analysis is quite sensitive to the rate of response and this fact created a problem in three of the programs. In Spokane the response rate overall was quite high (over 90%) but for reasons that are not clear, the response rates for just the sociometric items were unusually low (under 50%). There is no way to be sure that the non-responses represented accurately an actual absence

of ties or a reluctance to respond. Interviews with knowledgeable participants suggested the former interpretation and we proceeded as if that were the case. However, the results should be read cautiously, keeping in mind that the visual representation of the network of work ties for that program is derived from the data provided by a minority of respondents. In Illinois and South Carolina a similar problem arose for a different reason. In each of these two cases, only part of the overall DSO program was selected for examination by the national evaluation and, therefore, the visual representations reflect the inter-connections among the evaluated parts. Moreover, in Illinois, unlike the other programs, a large number of foster parents were included on the DSO personnel roster provided by the administration. The response rate for these individuals was extremely low, and consequently, for the most part their impressions had no effect on the characterization of this program. Finally, in South Carolina it will also be recalled that DSO clients were being processed through the existing youth service delivery apparatus. No DSO network, per se, had been created. As a result, our sociometric analysis can give an accurate impression of the type of organizational structure to which DSO clients were exposed but it says nothing about this program's success in creating and maintaining a new service delivery system.

With these cautions in mind, Figures 4A to 4F collected at the end of this section deserve a close look. In each case membership in a common agency or administrative unit has been indicated by circling, and the area occupied by the administrative core has been shaded.* This immediately reveals one

* In every program individuals were named who did not appear on the "official" rosters provided by program directors. It was not possible to determine in many cases whether they represented actual DSO participants who were overlooked in the enumeration process or individuals who had contact with the program without actually being part of it. They were retained in the SSA plots because they provided a reminder that the programs were constructed with indistinctly defined boundaries of considerable permeability.

similarity among all the programs, that is, that the official administrative unit in each program occupies a region near the center of network activity. This is true in different degrees for all the programs, including those in which, as shown earlier, direct contact between practitioners and the administrative staff was relatively infrequent.

The smallest space "map" for Arizona is in many ways the most interesting of the six (Figure 4A). The central coordinating staff, in this case primarily court personnel, occupied an amoeba-shaped area near the center of network activity, with extensions out into the surrounding space. Arrayed in radial fashion around this center were the different agencies which comprised the service delivery system. More often than not the different agencies were relatively separate from each other,* but many of them had one or two individuals who were drawn toward the central core and, therefore, represented liaison individuals, or "boundary spanners." By probing, we were able to learn that the members of the central staff who occupied the positions most proximate to the surrounding agencies (that is, those located in the "fingers" of the amoeba) were actually supervisors to whom responsibility was delegated for overseeing the broad areas of program activity expected of different agencies. Consistent with what we reported earlier, then, what is suggested is an interorganizational strategy of coordination that involved relatively little direct agency-to-agency interaction. Most of the practitioner-practitioner contacts were within-agency contacts and the coherence of the system of discrete agencies seems to have been maintained by administrative "brokers" through whom indirect agency-agency linkages were funnelled. Incidentally, one of the unique features of this program was the use of a "Mobile Diversion Unit" which was free to move

* Individuals in agency 'k,' for example, would have virtually no direct contact with those in 'p' or 'b'.

about physically to respond to juvenile problems as they occurred. This unit, labelled 'B' on the map, was among the more isolated components of the program and appeared to have no very close tie-in to the administrative center. Mobility in this case seemed to convey a certain autonomy and separation that did not characterize the other agencies in the program. The agency labelled 'G' on the map is also of interest. Philosophically, there were suggestions that it was in conflict with much of the rest of the program and its relationship to the system was sometimes abrasive.* The map suggests that most of its members functioned with little contact with the rest of the DSO network, but its director occupied a position very near the center of program activity, a fact which probably reflects that person's efforts to advance the interests of the agency vis-a-vis the administrative center. Finally, it is interesting to note that individuals '82' and '84' in site 'U' were program evaluators and individual '6' was a liaison person assigned to facilitate their work with the program.

In varying degrees the maps for Delaware (Figure 4C), Illinois (Figure 4D), and South Carolina (Figure 4E) showed a radial pattern of network relations similar to that of Arizona. Delaware is distinctive in that employees of the Division of Social Services (sites 'C,' 'D,' 'E,' and 'F') occupied the upper half of the network space and other affiliated components of the program occupied the lower half. The staff office of the statewide Division of Social Services ('F') was most centrally located, and there was at least one individual in each of the program's components who was drawn more toward the center than others in the same unit, suggesting a pattern of liaison coordination similar to that observed in Arizona.

* Based on impressions of program monitors who were in frequent contact with the agencies in this network.

Spokane (Figure 4F) is unique among these six programs in that members of the grantee agency (Spokane Youth Alternatives, site 'A') by no means dominated the center of the network space. Its members were fairly dispersed, especially when they are compared to the dense cluster of participants in the area of the network to the right in the figure. These latter individuals were members of six separate agencies who were linked together by a very dense mini-network of direct and indirect ties that were clearly not mediated by the central administrative unit. Thus, the earlier finding for this program of relatively dense agency-center and agency-agency ties is directly reflected here in a system in which administrators appear to have rather high accessibility to most of the people in the program, but do not apparently function as "brokers" for the agency-agency ties that had developed. In fact, the map strongly suggests the presence of two nuclei, one centered on the grantee agency and the other separate from and somewhat independent of it. This may represent a situation in which activities of a purely administrative nature were focused on the official administrative center, while affairs directly involving client-related problems were mediated by direct professional-to-professional, between-agency ties. In the absence of confirming evidence, and given the low sociometric response rate for this program, this is only speculation, however.

Finally, the network map for the Clark County program (Figure 4B) has two major points of interest. The first is the pattern of delegation of authority suggested by the fact that the nominal head of the program, number '4' in site 'D,' occupied a position clearly removed from the other personnel who functioned as program administrators. Individuals '1,' '2,' and '3,' who occupied the intervening space closer to the centroid, were members of agencies ('A,' 'B,' and 'C') which, though they were not the grantee, had a hand in the running of the program.

The second point of interest is the fact that the different sub-parts of the program did not cohere as distinct "groups" on the map. This is quite apparent in the case of the members of sites 'E' and 'F.' These are "multiple impact therapy" teams, and it is clear from their dispersed patterns that between-team and team-administration ties were just as frequent as ties confined within a team itself, again corroborating the data in Tables 4A and 4B.

It is risky, but nevertheless interesting, to speculate again about what is meant by the different inter-organizational strategies suggested by these network data. To concentrate again on just the two relatively clear-cut types, those represented by Arizona and Delaware, on one hand and, on the other, Spokane and Clark County, it would appear that the first two represent inter-agency exchanges that followed a rather formal pattern: relatively isolated units linked indirectly to each other by their common ties, through clearly visible (and probably formally designated) boundary spanners, to the administrative center. The Delaware program was comprised primarily of public agencies and, therefore, a highly rationalized system of contacts is not surprising. The Arizona program, in contrast, relied on a large number of private agencies, and a highly rationalized (even "bureaucratized") system of relationships is somewhat surprising.

In Spokane and Clark County the patterns of ties that emerged do not suggest such clear "channels" of interchange. To the contrary, a more personalistic system is indicated, that is, the binding together of the different agencies in the program by way of a much larger number of direct (i.e., unmediated) person-person ties. Here again, it is significant that one program, Clark County, relied almost entirely on public employees and agencies and the other, Spokane, pulled together a diverse aggregation of private agencies. The fact

that the public-private distinction does not entirely predict the type of system that appeared indicates that the pattern that we observed was at least to some extent a matter of strategic choice on the part of the program developers.

Summary.

An important expectation for the SO programs was that they function as networks. It was not considered sufficient that they be multi-agency systems; they were expected to encourage the development of enduring, cooperative inter-agency interaction. As a reflection of this, a major question for this evaluation was the extent to which networks were in evidence and the forms that they took. What comes through clearly in this chapter is the fact that no program failed to create a network of interchange, though the forms and densities of the frameworks varied both quantitatively and qualitatively. The placements and functions of the administrative centers also varied but none appeared to be disinvolved. And finally, only a very few of the individuals in the different programs were true isolates.* With the exception of Spokane, where the data were unaccountably sparse, almost all the practitioners could have had access, at least potentially, to all the others in their program through a (longer or shorter) chain of linkages.**

The tabulating and mapping of the structure of these programs is useful descriptively, but the crucial test of such material is whether it enhances our understanding of program success. Are some types of network structure more successful than others in creating a favorable work environment? How does an individual's location in an inter-agency system of exchange relate to his or

* No more than one or two in any program. An isolate is a practitioner completely outside the network, i.e., one who has no direct or indirect ties at all with other practitioners.

**In Spokane there were groups isolated from other groups, but almost no truly isolated individuals.

her effectiveness as a practitioner? How do the network measures that we have developed compare with other variables covered by this survey as predictors of effectiveness? Attempts to answer these questions form the basis for the last section of this report. Before we turn to that analysis, however, the descriptive part of the survey will be concluded with a brief account of how the work environments of the programs were judged by the participants.

FIGURE 4A

VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NETWORK FEATURES OF THE ARIZONA DSO PROGRAM




FIGURE 4A, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR ARIZONA

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Pima County Juvenile Court	A
Mobile Diversion Unit	B
Associations for Youth Development, Inc.	C
Free Clinic of Tuscon	D
Autumn House	E
Catholic Social Services	F
New Directions for Young Women	G
Project PPEP	H
Profiles of Me	I
Suicide Prevention Crisis Center	J
Teen Challenge of Arizona, Inc.--Springboard	K
Traditional Indian Alliance	L
Center for Family and Individual Counseling	M
Mosenthal Alternative School	N
Congress Street School	O
Open-Inn, Inc.	P
Invisible Theater	Q
Sunnyside Junior High School	R
Tuscon YMCA--NYPUM Project	S
Shining Star Learning Center	T
Local Evaluation Staff	U

FIGURE 4B

VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NETWORK FEATURES OF THE CLARK COUNTY DSO PROGRAM





FIGURE 4B, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR CLARK COUNTY

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Health and Welfare Planning Council	A
Department of Social and Health Services	B
Albertino Kerr Center for Children	C
Clark County Juvenile Court	D
Multiple Impact Therapy Team #1	E
Multiple Impact Therapy Team #2	F
Youth Outreach	G

CONTINUED

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FIGURE 4C
VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NETWORK FEATURES OF THE DELAWARE DSO PROGRAM



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FIGURE 4C, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR DELAWARE

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Community Legal Aid Society, Inc: New Castle County	A
Kent and Sussex Counties	B
Division of Social Services: New Castle County	C
Kent County	D
Sussex County	E
Statewide	F
Family Court: New Castle County	G
Kent County	H
Sussex County	I
Family Services of Northern Delaware	J
Peoples' Place II	K
Delaware Curative Workshop	L
Turn About Counseling Center	M
Division of Services to Children and Youth	N

FIGURE 4D

VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NETWORK FEATURES OF THE ILLINOIS DSO PROGRAM




FIGURE 4D, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR ILLINOIS

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Illinois Status Offender Services Staff	A
LaSalle Youth Service Bureau	B
Macon County: Youth Advocate Program	C
Foster Homes	D
Piatt, Shelby, Moultrie Counties: Youth Advocate Program	E
Piatt County Probation and Court Services	F
DeWitt Court Probation Department	G
McLean County: Project OZ	H
Mental Health Center, Inc.	I
Foster Homes	J
Livingston County: Institute for Human Resources	K
Foster Homes	L
The Woodlawn Organization	M
Thornton Township Youth Committee Program, Inc.	N
Southwest YWCA	O
Chicago Youth Centers	P
Better Boys Foundation	Q
Firman House	R
BUILD	S
MEB, Inc.	T
Little People	U
Community Advancement Program	V
Methodist Youth Services	W
Youth Enrichment Services, Inc.	X
New Life House	Y

FIGURE 4E
VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NETWORK FEATURES OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA DSO PROGRAM




FIGURE 4E, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR SOUTH CAROLINA

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Department of Youth Services	A
Alston Wilkes	B
Columbia Youth Bureau	C
Shannondora (Caroselle)	D
St. Luke's Center	E
Lexington Youth Bureau	F
Greenville Youth Bureau	G
Spartanburg Youth Bureau	H

FIGURE 4F, Continued,
AGENCY CODES FOR SPOKANE

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Spokane Youth Alternatives, Inc.	A
Salvation Army Spokane Booth Care Center	B
Phase II Group Home	C
Catholic Family Services	D
Children's Home Society of Washington	E
Lutheran Family and Child Services	F
Department of Social and Health Services	G
Spokane Community Mental Health Center	H
YWCA Youth Resource Center	I
Youth Help Association	J
Spokane Center for Youth Services	K
YMCA	L
Consultant	M

5. ELEMENTS OF JOB STRAIN

Surveys of work settings routinely include measures of job satisfaction, alienation and work strain, but the reasons for including them are not always clear. For a long time it was assumed that there must be a direct connection between these subjective states and productivity, and thus their linkage to considerations of efficiency and effectiveness. This is no longer an assumption that is likely to be taken uncritically (and we make no such assumption here) because the research findings on this connection have ranged from inconclusive to negative. But there are other reasons to continue to be interested in these subjective variables. The success of any social enterprise can be judged in two ways, first, by the extent to which it accomplishes its stated program goals and second, by its success in creating a meaningful and rewarding work atmosphere for its members. In this brief analysis, it is primarily in this second meaning of success that we are interested in measures of work strain, although we are also sensitive to the likelihood that individuals or agencies characterized by subjectively unrewarding work circumstances would probably be less willing to continue their ties to the overall service delivery system after the grant-supported DSO program, per se, is phased out. In other words, the measures of work strain used here are meant to be reasonable indicators of each program's ability to create a satisfying work atmosphere and as a useful suggestion about the level of continuing motivation to continue with the service delivery methods developed during the life of the program, but it is not expected that they will be particularly useful in explaining differences in objective program outcomes.

Section III of the questionnaire contained thirty Likert-type items asking the respondents to record the frequency with which they were troubled about different aspects of the work-environment, where 1 = "never troubled" and 5 = "constantly troubled." These items are reproduced here in Figure 5A. The average responses for each item in each of the seven programs are given in Table 5A. The results are generally favorable. Only six of the thirty items (4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12) have overall averages above 2.5, the point above which replies are predominantly unfavorable. The single item with the least favorable pattern of replies was item 9, which deals with the amount of paper work generated by DSO. Of the remaining predominantly unfavorable items, two deal with the availability of work-related information (5, 6), two with the individual's judgment of his/her own skills and the ability to use them (7, 12) and one with the pressures of the work load (4).

When the programs are compared to each other, Clark County stands out as the one least characterized by strain. It had the lowest average score on no fewer than twenty-five of the thirty items. No single program represents the opposite, unfavorable, pole, though Illinois and Spokane each recorded the greatest strain on thirteen of the thirty items.

These results are presented in a different, abbreviated form in Table 5B. In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, the thirty job strain items were factor analyzed and the six factors which emerged, with approximate labels, are as follows (numbers in parentheses refer to the items which had their strongest loadings on that factor):*

1. AUTHORITY: Concern over patterns of decision-making and responsibility in the program (1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 30);

* Principal components, varimax rotation. Six factors had eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Factor loadings not shown.

FIGURE 5A.
ITEMS MEASURING JOB STRAIN

BELOW IS A LIST OF ITEMS THAT SOMETIMES TROUBLE PEOPLE IN THEIR WORK. USING THE CODE LETTERS PROVIDED, INDICATE HOW FREQUENTLY YOU FEEL TROUBLED BY EACH ITEM IN YOUR WORK FOR THE DSO PROGRAM.

- | | A
NEVER | B
RARELY | C
SOMETIMES | D
OFTEN | E
CONSTANTLY |
|---------|------------|-------------|----------------|------------|-----------------|
| 1. ___ | | | | | |
| 2. ___ | | | | | |
| 3. ___ | | | | | |
| 4. ___ | | | | | |
| 5. ___ | | | | | |
| 6. ___ | | | | | |
| 7. ___ | | | | | |
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| 25. ___ | | | | | |
| 26. ___ | | | | | |
| 27. ___ | | | | | |
| 28. ___ | | | | | |
| 29. ___ | | | | | |
| 30. ___ | | | | | |

TABLE 5A.

MEAN SCORES ON THIRTY ITEMS MEASURING
CONCERN OVER VARIOUS SOURCES OF JOB STRAIN

ITEM	ARIZONA	ALAMEDA	CLARK CO.	DELAWARE	ILLINOIS	SOUTH CAROLINA	SPOKANE	TOTAL
1	2.2	2.1	(1.8)	2.4	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	2.2	2.3
2	2.2	2.1	(1.8)	2.2	<u>2.3</u>	2.2	<u>2.3</u>	2.2
3	2.0	2.0	(1.8)	(1.8)	<u>2.2</u>	2.1	2.0	2.0
4	(2.4)	2.6	2.8	2.8	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.9</u>	2.8	2.7
5	2.7	2.5	(1.9)	2.6	<u>2.9</u>	2.4	2.7	2.6
6	2.6	2.6	(1.9)	2.5	<u>2.8</u>	2.4	2.5	2.6
7	2.7	2.7	(2.2)	2.3	<u>2.6</u>	2.3	<u>2.8</u>	2.6
8	1.9	2.1	(1.6)	2.1	<u>2.2</u>	2.0	<u>2.2</u>	2.1
9	2.9	<u>3.1</u>	(2.5)	(2.5)	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.8
10	2.0	<u>2.2</u>	(1.7)	1.9	2.1	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.2</u>	2.1
11	2.0	2.6	(2.2)	<u>2.8</u>	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6
12	2.2	2.2	(2.0)	2.3	<u>2.7</u>	2.2	2.4	2.3
13	2.2	2.2	(2.0)	2.3	<u>2.7</u>	2.2	2.4	2.3
14	1.8	1.8	(1.6)	2.0	<u>2.1</u>	2.0	<u>2.1</u>	1.9
15	2.3	(2.0)	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.3	<u>2.6</u>	2.3
16	2.1	1.9	(1.7)	2.1	2.1	2.0	<u>2.2</u>	2.0
17	2.1	<u>2.5</u>	(1.9)	(1.9)	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
18	2.2	2.4	2.3	(2.0)	<u>2.6</u>	2.1	2.4	2.3
19	2.2	<u>2.4</u>	(2.1)	2.3	2.2	2.3	<u>2.4</u>	2.3
20	2.0	<u>2.5</u>	(1.4)	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
21	2.2	2.3	2.3	(1.9)	<u>2.5</u>	(1.9)	2.3	2.2
22	2.2	2.3	(1.5)	1.8	<u>2.8</u>	2.1	2.2	2.2
23	1.8	2.0	(1.5)	1.8	2.1	1.9	<u>2.2</u>	1.9
24	2.1	1.9	(1.6)	2.2	<u>2.3</u>	1.8	2.1	2.0
25	1.6	1.6	(1.3)	1.7	1.8	1.7	<u>1.9</u>	1.7
26	1.7	1.6	(1.2)	1.4	1.8	1.8	<u>1.9</u>	1.6
27	1.4	<u>1.7</u>	(1.2)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5
28	2.0	<u>2.3</u>	(1.9)	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1
29	1.9	2.0	(1.7)	1.7	<u>2.2</u>	2.0	1.9	2.0
30	1.7	1.8	(1.5)	1.8	1.7	1.8	<u>1.9</u>	1.8

() represents the lowest average item scores among sites

== represents the highest average item scores among sites

TABLE 5B.

COMPARISONS AMONG PROGRAMS (MEAN FACTOR SCORES)
ON SIX COMPOSITE DIMENSIONS REPRESENTING CONCERN OVER
DIFFERENT SOURCES OF WORK STRAIN

	ARIZONA	ALAMEDA	CLARK CO.	DELAWARE	ILLINOIS	SOUTH CAROLINA	SPOKANE
AUTHORITY	-.02	-.18	-.32	.27	.10	.14	.09
WORK LOAD	.09	.01	-.09	.12	-.11	.11	.15
INFORMATION	.05	-.03	-.56	-.22	.48	-.18	-.10
PROGRESS	-.03	-.01	-.33	-.14	.14	-.01	.20
BUREAUCRACY	-.17	.34	-.23	-.27	-.05	.01	.00
PROFESSIONAL UNCERTAINTY	.05	.00	-.09	-.09	.12	-.44	.23

2. WORK LOAD: Concern over the amount of work required and the ability to do it properly (4, 19, 25);
3. INFORMATION: Concern over the availability and timing of work-related information (5, 6, 13, 22);
4. PROGRESS: Concern over the opportunities for career advancement (3, 23, 24, 26);
5. BUREAUCRACY: Concern over personal restrictions, rules and regulations (9, 14, 18, 20, 27, 28, 29); and
6. PROFESSIONAL UNCERTAINTY: Concern over the inadequacy of own skills (7, 11, 21).

Standardized scores (factor scores) were constructed for each respondent on each of these scales and a comparison of the seven programs appears in Table 5B. The means for the separate programs have negative values if the responses are more favorable than the overall average and positive values if work strain is more pronounced than the average.

Again, Clark County is distinctive on the positive side because its responses were consistently more favorable than the average on all six dimensions. It is very possible that the small size of this program, together with the cohesive patterns revealed in its network structure, goes far toward explaining the unusually low levels of job strain it exhibited. Among the remaining six programs, however, neither size nor network properties appeared to bear any systematic relationship to overall levels of strain. As a case in point, the Spokane program was also relatively small and cohesive but showed comparatively high levels of job strain, while the Arizona program was comparatively large but with generally only average or below average levels of strain. However, while the data failed to reveal obvious patterns, they are not without interest.

On the negative side, Spokane's participants clearly had a wide range of concerns but were most likely to express discomfort over professional considerations, particularly those involving career development and the application of professional skills. Earlier, the demographic analysis indicated that this

program's participants were well above the average in professional training (Table 1B) and somewhat more experienced than the norm. This takes on significance in the context of a complaint expressed by several participants to members of the evaluation staff to the effect that a typical career pattern in the Spokane area was to shift from one agency to another without any perceptible upward career progress. Their discontent, then, may have been as much a reflection of the labor market for practitioners as it was a response to the DSO program, per se. Nevertheless, an inter-agency service delivery program that did succeed in creating new avenues of professional expression and career development would probably command more of the loyalty of the participants from different agencies than a program that left such considerations completely in the hands of individual agencies. The formal designation by program organizers of liaison positions charged with facilitating inter-agency relations is one example of the kind of avenue to personal progress that could be created in multi-agency programs.

As in Spokane, the participants in Illinois also expressed some concern over career progress and professional uncertainty but clearly their primary concern was related to the availability of important work-related information. This is apparent in Table 5B and can be seen in more detail in Table 5A. All four of the items dealing with this problem (5, 6, 13, and 22) showed unusual levels of concern. Note that these are items that have directly to do with the way the DSO program functioned and cannot easily be attributed to extraneous factors in the surrounding community environment. The same is true of the items that comprise the factor dealing with problems involving authority in the program, which also was a source of above average concern in Illinois.

Concern about authority relations was also apparent in the Delaware program,* as was somewhat above average concern over the volume of work required. Otherwise, this program recorded below average levels of strain on most dimensions. The Alameda County program was characterized by problems that we have labeled "bureaucratization" and which involved concern over rules and regulations, paper work and limitations on the use of personal judgment in matters concerning the work.

In summary, the findings on job strain revealed no single source of overriding concern that cut across all seven programs. To the contrary, different sources of work strain were characteristic of different programs. It is important to keep in mind that the comments offered here have referred to relative differences among the programs. The fact that some were comparatively more stressful than others on selected items or dimensions should not be allowed to obscure the conclusion that was stated at the outset, namely, that the overall pattern of replies to this part of the questionnaire was a favorable one, on balance, in all seven programs. To state this another way, the DSO setting was at least tolerable and at best positively rewarding for most of the participants on most of the important dimensions of their work.

* The elevated concern over authority in Illinois and Delaware echoes some findings that were apparent in the earlier discussion of decision making patterns. See in particular Tables 3A, 3B, and 3E. The respondents in these two programs generally expressed less satisfaction with decision-making arrangements than those in other programs.

SECTION II

ASSESSMENTS OF PERFORMANCE: COMMUNITY CONTACT AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

The performance of the practitioners in the DSO programs was measured in two ways: first, by the amount of contact they reported with persons in law enforcement, in the schools, in the courts, in local religious organizations and in public and private social service delivery agencies--all outside the DSO network; and second, by the amount of activity they spent in efforts to change the community climate for dealing with status offenders. Both of these are used as measures of "community-basedness" and were suggested by the discussion of this concept by Coates.* From the beginning, it was clear that the DSO programs selected for funding were expected to establish methods of dealing with status offenders that would be firmly grounded in the communities in which they were to operate. As Coates summarizes this strategy, it is usually based on the assumptions that community-based programs are more cost-effective, more humane, and less stigmatizing than other approaches and that, properly employed, community-basedness can contribute significantly to both rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender. As he defines it, community-basedness has two dimensions, one dealing with a program's facility in gaining access to and cooperation from a wide range of institutions and organizations in the community, and the other having to do with direct efforts by a program's participants to improve the local resource base and community climate in which it must perform.

In this evaluation we have treated these dimensions of community-basedness as program objectives and have asked two questions concerning them. The first

* Coates, Robert.B. "Community-based Corrections: Concept, Historical Development, Impact, and Potential Dangers." Paper presented at the Massachusetts Standards and Goals Conference, November, 1974. (mimeo.)

addresses the frequency with which community-based activities took place, calling for data that are essentially descriptive. Programs whose members showed greater involvement with the community can be considered more successful in achieving this element of the DSO mandate.

The second question is more analytic. It concerns the relationship between the network properties of the programs which were described in detail earlier and the two measures of community-basedness. The DSO programs were expected to utilize a network of services and to be community-based, with the clear implication that the former strategy would facilitate the accomplishment of the latter objective. What we have asked here is whether an individual who was well-placed, i.e., centrally located, in the overall network of professional exchanges in his/her program was also one with extensive contacts with important agencies outside the immediate DSO network and one who was more likely to be involved in active efforts to improve the local resource base and community climate as far as status offenders were concerned. With this approach to the problem of DSO performance, it is possible to characterize the network strategies developed by the programs as more or less effective depending on the extent to which these correlations were in evidence.

The measures of community-basedness, which we have labeled community contact and community activism, were taken from Section VI in the organizational questionnaire. For purposes of comparison the analysis was expanded to include also a measure of the practitioners' subjective assessments of program success. The items comprising this measure appear as numbers 1 and 2 in Section II of the questionnaire.

SECTION II

ASSESSMENTS OF PERFORMANCE: COMMUNITY CONTACT AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

1. PERFORMANCE MEASURES: STATISTICAL SUMMARIES

Contact with Community Organizations.

From the contact measures in Table 1A on the following page, some differences among the programs are apparent. In Arizona, Clark County, Delaware, Illinois, and South Carolina, the most frequent contact was with court personnel. In each case respondents reported that such interaction took place, on the average, between once a week and several times a week.* In Alameda County, by way of contrast, contact with courts was relatively infrequent; here, the most frequent contacts were with law enforcement and schools, then public and private non-DSO agencies. Contact with courts was fifth in order of magnitude. The participants in Spokane were the only ones to report most frequent contact with non-DSO private service delivery agencies, followed very closely by contact with non-DSO public service delivery agencies, then contact with courts. In all seven programs the least frequent outside contact was with local religious groups.

These data on contact patterns can be interpreted in more than one way. On the one hand, the average amount of contact with any single category of outside agency was not high. With scattered exceptions the means were near or slightly below the once a week level. On the other hand, keep in mind that each respondent reported his or her contacts with six different types of groups in the community. Extrapolating from this, it is reasonable to assume that the average participant was in fact maintaining fairly extensive contacts with community agencies outside the DSO network, an effort that in all likelihood would consume

* In Delaware an equal frequency was reported with non-DSO public social service agencies.

TABLE 1A.
MEAN SCORES ON SIX ITEMS MEASURING CONTACT WITH
AGENCIES OUTSIDE THE DSO NETWORK

	CONTACT WITH:					
	LAW ENFORCEMENT	SCHOOLS	RELIGIOUS GROUPS	PRIVATE AGENCIES	COURTS	PUBLIC AGENCIES
ALAMEDA	2.8	2.8	1.3	2.5	2.0	2.6
ARIZONA	2.2	2.8	1.9	2.4	3.7	2.8
CLARK COUNTY	2.0	2.2	1.5	2.1	3.4	3.1
DELAWARE	2.6	2.7	1.7	1.9	4.0	4.0
ILLINOIS	3.0	2.4	1.6	2.7	3.1	2.7
SOUTH CAROLINA	2.5	2.6	1.9	2.5	3.1	2.9
SPOKANE	2.6	2.9	1.7	3.5	3.1	3.3
ALL PROGRAMS	2.6	2.7	1.6	2.5	3.1	2.9

Based on questions 1-6 in Section VI of the questionnaire

SCALE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Never	Less Than Once A Week	About Once A Week	Several Times A Week	Once Or Twice A Day	Several Times A Day	Almost Constantly

a part of each working day. To the extent that this accurately gauges "community-basedness," it would appear that the latter was a well established part of each program. Incidentally, it is important to note that no single program stands out as being the most involved in these outside contacts.

Law enforcement contact was most frequent in Illinois; contact with schools and private agencies in Spokane; with religious groups in Arizona and South Carolina; and with courts and other public agencies in Delaware.

In judging the quality of these contacts outside the DSO networks, there was remarkable similarity from one program to another. In fact, the data were so uniform they need not be presented in tabular form here. Nine-point scales were used to register the organizational level at which the contacts usually took place, the amount of cooperation the contacts involved, and the benefit they produced for DSO clients. The replies generally ranged between six and eight on these scales, which is clearly toward the positive, or favorable, end. Contacts were generally with persons in authoritative positions, were seen as cooperative, and were thought to produce significant benefits for DSO clients. Only the evaluation by Arizona participants of their law enforcement contacts suggested a partial exception to this pattern (replies there averaged below 6 for each of these evaluations).

Table 1B presents the reasons given for different kinds of contacts, aggregated across all seven programs.* The indication is that contact with schools and agencies of the justice system took place primarily for providing information about the needs of clients, whereas contact with religious groups and public and private service delivery agencies was aimed toward gaining

* With only minor exceptions, breakdowns for each separate program follow the basic pattern in Table 1B.

TABLE 1B.
REASONS GIVEN FOR CONTACTS WITH AGENCIES OUTSIDE THE
DSO NETWORK, AGGREGATED ACROSS ALL SEVEN PROGRAMS

<u>CONTACTS WITH</u>	<u>Clarify Needs of DSO Clients</u>	<u>PRIMARY REASONS FOR CONTACTS</u>		
		<u>Encourage Change in Treatment of Juveniles</u>	<u>To Get Resources For Clients</u>	<u>Encourage Respect For Clients</u>
LAW ENFORCEMENT	50.5%	31.4%	17.7%	.5%
SCHOOLS	47.7%	18.8%	32.2%	1.3%
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS	33.3%	6.7%	56.3%	3.7%
PRIVATE NON-DSO AGENCIES	19.1%	12.6%	67.1%	1.2%
COURTS	52.9%	20.5%	25.4%	1.2%
PUBLIC NON-DSO AGENCIES	33.5%	7.4%	57.6%	1.6%

resources to aid in dealing with clients. Actively trying to change the operation of any of these outside organizations was generally infrequent, but law enforcement was an exception. Almost a third of these contacts represented what Coates would call an "advocacy" approach (encouraging a change in procedures). Finally, attempting to influence the way people in these outside agencies think about offenders was almost negligible.

Community Activism.

Activism in this survey refers to attempts by program participants to influence the community by increasing the economic assistance and community support for programs for status offenders, by attempting to change local policies toward offenders, and by attempting to improve the treatment resources available for dealing with the problems of youth. Participants were asked to indicate the frequency of their efforts along these lines, using a scale that ranged from 1 (never) to 9 (almost constantly). The results appear in Table 1C.

Overall, attempting to improve treatment resources was the most frequently reported activity, followed closely by encouraging community support and attempting to influence local policy. All of these took place close to once a week on the average. The least frequent activity was attempting to find sources of economic support (averaging around the "less than once a week" level). None of the separate programs departed radically from this profile, although Arizona and Illinois did show noticeably higher levels of action than the other programs on all four types of activity.

It is fairly apparent from these data that community activism was not an effort that consumed a large amount of time in any of the DSO programs. But the same interpretation applies here as in the case of community contact:

TABLE 1C.
MEAN SCORES ON FOUR MEASURES OF
COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

PROGRAM	TYPE OF ACTIVITY			
	GETTING RESOURCES FOR JUVENILE PROGRAMS	GETTING SUPPORT OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS	INFLUENCING LOCAL POLICIES FOR JUVENILES	IMPROVING TREATMENT RESOURCES
ALAMEDA	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.7
ARIZONA	2.5	3.3	2.8	3.3
CLARK COUNTY	1.9	2.6	2.4	2.7
DELAWARE	1.8	2.5	2.6	3.2
ILLINOIS	2.5	3.3	3.4	3.8
SOUTH CAROLINA	1.9	2.7	2.6	2.8
SPOKANE	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.7
ALL PROGRAMS	2.2	2.8	2.8	3.1

Based on question 7 in Section VI of the questionnaire

SCALE:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Never	Less Than Once A Week	About Once A Week	Several Times A Week	Once Or Twice A Day	Several Times A Day	Almost Constantly

most participants reported some effort in all four areas of community activism. Placing this effort alongside all the other activities that their DSO positions required (including client contact, contact with other community agencies, and ordinary bureaucratic activities such as meetings and record-maintenance), it seems fair to say that community activism was a significant part of each program.

Subjective Measures of Effectiveness.

In addition to the measures of community contact and activism, respondents in the programs were given a nine-point scale to record their impression of the effectiveness of the program of which they were a part and to judge the productivity of their own efforts. On both counts the replies were quite favorable and the variation between programs was small. On the average, the participants confined their judgments to a very small, approximately one point range (from about 6 to about 7 on the scale of nine). These results appear in Table 1D.

TABLE 1D.
SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF OWN PERFORMANCE AND
OVERALL DSO PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

	EFFECTIVENESS OF OWN EFFORTS	EFFECTIVENESS OF OVERALL DSO PROGRAM
ALAMEDA	7.0	6.6
ARIZONA	6.9	6.9
CLARK COUNTY	6.7	6.8
DELAWARE	6.7	5.7
ILLINOIS	6.6	6.1
SOUTH CAROLINA	7.1	6.8
SPOKANE	5.8	6.1
ALL PROGRAMS	6.8	6.5

Based on questions 1 and 2 in Section II of the questionnaire

1 = "not at all effective"
9 = "extremely effective"

2. ASSESSING THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY

Dimensions of the Analysis.

The final question to which this report is addressed is in many ways the most important one. It has to do with the variables or sets of variables that account for differences in the ways the DSO goals were accomplished by the participants. For our purposes the most critical assumption that guided the establishment of the programs was that coherent inter-agency networks would be better able to sustain community based programs than separate agencies or individual practitioners working in isolation from each other. As we showed earlier, each of the programs* had in fact created an inter-agency network of professional exchange, though the forms of these networks varied considerably from one program to another. If these networks were functioning as intended, then the individuals who were strategically placed within them should have been in a better position to carry out program objectives than those who were relatively isolated. Stated more concretely, the hypothesis to be tested is that the frequency of participants' community-based activities, specifically, community contact and activism, will be a direct correlate of how well-placed they were in the inter-agency systems of professional exchange that characterized their program. To disconfirm this hypothesis for any of the programs would mean that the inter-agency network, whatever other advantages it may have offered, did not produce a professional environment for individuals that was an advantage to them in making their contribution to the program's community-based objectives.

*That is, each of the six for which network data were available.

To test this hypothesis a multiple regression analysis was performed in which community contact and activism were the dependent variables. Rather than treating each of the several measures of these variables separately, the investigation was simplified by combining the six contact measures into a single index called CONTACT, and the four community activism measures into a summed index called ACTIVISM. The two items dealing with subjective evaluations of performance were again included, this time combined into a single index called PERFORMANCE. The reliabilities of these three indices (alpha) were respectively, .74, .88, and .63.

In addition to measures of network placement, two other sets of independent variables were entered, including measures of individuals' personal resources and their organizational positions. Each of these will be discussed briefly.

Personal resources refers to those attributes and qualifications that individuals carry with them and that might be expected to have an effect on the way they perform their DSO activities. They include education and number of years of professional experience, gender, and ethnicity. As we reported earlier in Section I of this report, there was considerable variation from one program to another on each of these variables. In most organizational settings an easy prediction could be made that advanced education, long professional experience, male gender, and white race will convey access to important organizational resources and advantages, both formal and informal, and, for this reason they are likely to be linked to higher levels of performance. However, the DSO programs cannot be considered typical work settings. They represented specially created organizational mechanisms for dealing with special juvenile problems and it was by no means self-evident how these personal resources would affect program outcomes. It was important to gauge their impact, even without clear-cut hypotheses about the direction of their effects.

Organizational position refers to two indicators of the participant's location in the hierarchy of authority and decision-making within his/her specific place of employment (not in the DSO program overall). STATUS is a dichotomy indicating whether the respondent had supervisory responsibilities or not.* PARTICIPATION (also a dichotomy) refers to whether or not the respondent was allowed to participate in the decisions that affected his/her work (based on Section III, question 3 in the questionnaire). Some arguments in the inter-organizational literature stress that boundary spanning ties to other organizations and interaction with the community-at-large are tasks usually carried out by higher ranking personnel acting as "representatives" for their own organization. However, in the DSO programs virtually all practitioners were encouraged or required to be involved with people in agencies outside the immediate DSO network and for this reason high organizational rank is less likely to be a determining factor. In fact, if supervisors were caught up in administrative duties they may have had less time and opportunity to be involved outside the program and the impact of status on contact and activism could be negative as a result. As for rank and file participation in decision-making, it was shown earlier that this was the accepted strategy in all the DSO programs. It is important to know whether being allowed to participate in this process was linked in any systematic way to performance. Unfortunately, because the variation on this variable was limited no conclusive assessment of its effect is likely to be forthcoming.

Network location is the key variable of interest here. It refers to how strategically placed the individual was with respect to the patterns of professional exchange among the different subparts of the DSO programs. For each of

*Social service agencies are typically "flat," that is, they function without an elaborate bureaucratic hierarchy. Therefore, finer distinctions than this simple dichotomy are difficult to determine.

the five sociometric dimensions of contact, influence, professional respect, support, and assistance, a score called "centrality" was computed for each participant based on the number of direct ($A \rightarrow C$) and indirect ($A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$) links, and their lengths, that they were involved in. An individual with a high centrality score on the work contact dimension, for example, is one who had high access to others and was at the same time potentially highly accessible to them. The other four dimensions provided similar measures of where an individual stood in the inter-agency networks of influence, respect, support, and professional assistance. In the six programs for which these network measures were available,* these five centrality scores were highly intercorrelated (see Appendix C). To deal with this problem of multicollinearity the five measures of centrality were "blocked" in the regression analysis and a single beta, called a "sheaf coefficient," was computed to record their combined impact on the three dependent variables.**

For purposes of program evaluation, the usefulness of this network construct is of crucial importance. The properties of the systems of inter-agency exchange that had been established in the different programs were described in Section I and it was suggested that two major interorganizational strategies were in evidence. In Arizona and Delaware the volume of inter-agency and agency-center ties and the visual displays in the smallest space maps suggested formalized patterns of coordination in which the central administrative core functioned to mediate the linkages among the parts of the program. Spokane and Clark County, by contrast, displayed less formalized patterns that suggested linkages formed through very numerous person-to-person exchanges. The administrative centers of these two programs were by no means excluded from these exchanges but neither

*Recall that the sociometric analysis was dropped in Alameda County.

**This technique is described in detail in David R. Heise, "Employing nominal variables, induced variables, and block variables in path analysis," Sociological Methods and Research 1 (November, 1972): 147-173.

did they appear to mediate or "broker" the agency-to-agency linkages. Illinois and South Carolina did not fall clearly into either of these two patterns, and in South Carolina in particular it was pointed out that the network that was apparent was part of the pre-established state system of youth service delivery and not a network assembled expressly to deal with the problems of status offenders.

With this brief summary in mind, what can we expect the measures of NETWORK CENTRALITY to show with respect to individual performance as we have measured it in each of these programs? If, after all the other variables describing the individual's place in a program (that is, the measures of personal resources and organizational position listed above) are taken into account, CENTRALITY still shows a clear positive relationship to the individual performance measures, we will take this to be evidence for the viability of the inter-agency strategy adopted by that program. That is, we will take it as evidence that the network represents to individuals a resource that is of benefit to them in their relations with the community. To observe no relationship between CENTRALITY and performance would provide evidence for a contrary argument, that is, that individuals functioning with only their own and their agency's resources perform as well as those who have access to the complicated system of inter-agency exchanges. And finally, a negative relationship would indicate that strategic placement in the inter-agency network is actually counterproductive as far as individual practitioners are concerned.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the findings a methodological comment is in order. The analytic strategy described above

concentrates on the explanation of the contributions by individuals to the community-basedness of their programs. It employed separate replications for each of the seven programs and it permits only essentially qualitative comparisons to be made among the programs, based on a discussion of differences in the overall configuration of findings from one program to another. A more complete analysis would supplement this by addressing more directly the effects of the "global" properties of the programs on their aggregate levels of community-basedness while adjusting for individual-level effects. For purposes of this report this macro-level analysis was excluded for two reasons.* The first was the limited range of variability in aggregate levels of community-basedness (the dependent variable). In terms of average contact with outside organizations and community activism the seven programs were performing at very similar levels. The second was a reservation about the use of aggregate measures based on the sociometric data (the primary independent variable of interest) to capture the overall structural properties of the programs. In Alameda County these data were missing altogether, in Illinois and South Carolina they were based on program fragments and in Spokane the sociometric response rate was low. Thus, while the sociometric data could reasonably be used to compare the connectedness (centrality) of one individual on a roster to another, there was a serious question in four of the seven programs concerning the aggregation of these data to reflect overall program characteristics.

*It will be pursued separately in an exploratory manner and reported at a later time. For the latest in a long series of discussions of the problems of multi-level analysis and cross-level inference, see Glenn Firebaugh, "A Rule for Inferring Individual-Level Relationships from Aggregate Data," American Sociological Review 43 (August 1978): 557-572.

In short, the reader should be aware that any speculation offered below concerning differences among the programs is based on qualitative inferences from the intra-program analyses and not on a direct statistical assessment of program effects, per se.

Results.

Separate multiple regression analyses were performed for each of the three measures of performance. In Table 2 the findings are displayed for all seven DSO programs. Note that RACE was dropped from the analysis for Clark County because all those responding were white and that CENTRALITY was missing for Alameda County.

The most important finding concerns the location of the individual practitioner in the systems of inter-agency exchange. In Arizona and Delaware CENTRALITY was the best single predictor of both CONTACT and ACTIVISM. Clearly, the types of networks that were apparent in those two programs functioned well for facilitating the work of individual practitioners vis-a-vis the community. In Arizona, EDUCATION also had a positive (but non-significant) impact on CONTACT and STATUS was inversely (but again not significantly) related to ACTIVISM (non-supervisory personnel were more active than supervisors). In Delaware RACE (being non-white), GENDER (being male), and PARTICIPATION rivaled CENTRALITY as explanations for ACTIVISM. Overall, however, none of the measures of personal resources or organizational position had an effect that was as pronounced or as consistent as CENTRALITY.

A basically similar pattern of findings was apparent in Spokane and Clark County. The personalistic networks that were observed in these two programs also functioned to facilitate CONTACT and, in Spokane, ACTIVISM as well. In Clark County there was little relationship between CENTRALITY

TABLE 2. REGRESSION OF COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE ON INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION AND NETWORK LOCATION, FOR SEVEN INTER-AGENCY PROGRAMS INVOLVED IN THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS (DSO).

	Arizona (N=76)			Delaware (N=37)			Spokane (N=36)			Clark County (N=20)			Illinois (N=57)			South Carolina (N=35)			Alameda County (N=89)		
	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.	Con- tact	Act- ivism	Subj. Perf.
INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES:																					
Gender	.03	.08	.04	-.10	-.36*	.07	-.09	-.02	-.08	.06	-.06	-.27	.02	.07	.01	-.04	.29	.26	.03	.10	.21*
Race	-.10	-.05	-.14	-.22	-.39*	-.14	-.36	-.30	-.12	---	---	---	-.06	-.21	.14	-.003	.30	-.19	.11	-.12	.01
Experience	.03	.09	.20	-.26	-.19	-.03	.63*	.94	.003	-.10	-.51	-.13	-.08	.05	-.13	-.55	-.42	-.18	.12	.01	.08
Education	.20	-.01	.06	-.17	.05	-.01	.20	.22	-.12	.13	.07	.39	.17	.18	-.004	.36	.50*	-.52	-.02	.19*	.08
ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE:																					
Status	-.10	-.20	-.36*	-.10	-.07	-.06	.24	.07	.07	-.42	.09	-.07	-.19	-.40*	-.02	-.08	-.08	.38	-.15	-.27*	-.05
Participation	.02	.02	-.10	.21	.35*	-.11	.34	.50*	.12	-.13	.19	.13	.20	.11	.31	-.06	.28	-.25	.13	.03	.08
NETWORK CENTRALITY (Sheaf Coefficient)	.36*	.37*	.21	.49	.68***	.29	.87***	.63**	.69	.83*	.28	.67	-.45	.42	.34	-.47	-.54	.55	---	---	---
R ² WITHOUT NETWORK SHEAF COEFFICIENT	.17	.17	.13	.16	.31	.04	.08	.27	.11	.17	.24	.22	.13	.32	.13	.23	.38	.13	.08	.17	.08
R ² WITH NETWORK BLOCK INCLUDED:	.27	.28	.17	.37	.64	.11	.54	.56	.53	.76	.28	.49	.18	.34	.23	.38	.56	.33	---	---	---

Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
One asterisk represents p<.10, two represent p<.05, and three represent p<.01.

^aAll respondents were white.
^bNetwork measures not available.

and ACTIVISM. In fact, both of these programs differed from Arizona and Delaware in that EXPERIENCE appeared to be a more important factor in explaining levels of ACTIVISM. Curiously, however, this variable had a positive effect in Spokane (more experienced personnel were more active) but an inverse effect in Clark County (less experienced participants were more active).

One other interesting difference between these two sets of programs is apparent. In Arizona and Delaware network location showed little relationship to the practitioners' subjective estimates of their own effectiveness and that of the overall program, but in Spokane and Clark County the effect was clearly positive.

To summarize, in these four programs the evidence for the viability of what we have characterized as two quite different inter-agency network strategies was clear. Whether the network was structured along formalistic or personalistic lines, being favorably located within it was a consistently effective predictor of the level of involvement with community agencies outside the network, and was useful in three of the four programs for accounting for the level of effort devoted to influencing the community climate for dealing with the problems of status offenders. An indirect idea of just how important these network variables were can be gained by comparing the total variance in CONTACT and ACTIVISM explained in these four programs (from 27% to as much as 76%) with that in Alameda County, where the information required for constructing the measure of network location was not available (8% for CONTACT and 17% for ACTIVISM).

When Illinois is considered, a strikingly different picture emerges. In this case, the information on the network locations of program practitioners was of very limited utility in accounting for the variance in CONTACT and

ACTIVISM. The betas (one negative, one positive) were comparatively large, though non-significant, but the contribution to explained variation was quite small (5% for CONTACT; 2% for ACTIVISM). As we pointed out earlier, only selected parts of this state-wide DSO effort were subjected to evaluation; nevertheless, the discussion of agency-center and inter-agency ties and the smallest space analysis suggested that there were network linkages among these parts. Whatever the functions of this network were, however, for practitioners, facilitating interaction with non-DSO agencies and with the community at large were not among them. What is doubly curious for the measure of CONTACT is that none of the other variables in the regression analysis contributed significantly to the explanation either. With seven variables in the equation only 18% of the variance was accounted for. In the case of ACTIVISM substantially more of the variance, about 34%, was explained. Of this, almost half (14%) was attributable to EDUCATION, another 10% to STATUS (non-supervisory personnel were more active), and about 5% to GENDER (males were more active than females). In weighing these results, it is important to keep in mind that Illinois did not register unusually low on any of the three effectiveness measures (see Tables 1A, 1C, and 1D in this section). It is, therefore, not the intention here to characterize it as an unproductive program, but rather simply to point out that centrality in the network of professional exchanges in the program was not a significant contributor to the effectiveness of its individual participants.

For the South Carolina program it can be said that the network of exchanges among the evaluated parts of the system was actually counterproductive with respect to the participants' ties to the community outside the program. CENTRALITY was negatively related to both CONTACT and ACTIVISM, though the relationships fall just short of statistical significance. It is important to note that EXPERIENCE was also strongly and inversely related to CONTACT, but

that EDUCATION had a positive effect. The same pattern was true for ACTIVISM, but in this case GENDER, RACE, and PARTICIPATION made additional (positive) contributions. Interesting profiles emerge from this analysis. Contact with agencies outside this program were maintained largely by those participants who were better educated, but who were relatively inexperienced and relatively isolated from the channels of professional exchange within the program. Activities aimed at influencing the community climate for the treatment of status offenders also involved educated but relatively inexperienced and isolated personnel, but with the added distinction that they were somewhat disproportionately likely to be male and white and be able to participate in the decision-making process within the DSO program. On the third effectiveness measure, subjective PERFORMANCE, a significant reversal occurred: network location had a strong positive effect on this variable. Clearly, perceptions of effectiveness followed a different logic of causation from that which seemed to apply to the objective effectiveness measures.*

A Note on Gender, Race, and Decision-Making.

Most of the discussion of the regression analysis has concentrated on the importance of the network variables as determinants of individual effectiveness. The effects of GENDER, RACE, and PARTICIPATION in the analysis also call for a brief additional comment. The effects of RACE were generally not at all large but were remarkably persistent. Non-whites were consistently a little more productive than whites, as measured by

*This point is borne out by the absence of any relationships between subjective PERFORMANCE and CONTACT ($r=.01$) and ACTIVISM ($r=-.02$). In the other six programs, PERFORMANCE was related to CONTACT and ACTIVISM, respectively, as follows: Arizona (-.06, -.15); Delaware (.35, .21); Illinois (.12, .09); Spokane (.55, .35); Clark County (.13, .15); and Alameda County (-.13, .15).

CONTACT and ACTIVISM, and they generally rated their own and their program's efforts a little more favorably. There were only two real exceptions to this. In South Carolina it was whites who were more active in attempts to influence the community, and in Alameda County whites had slightly more contact with agencies outside the DSO program.

GENDER usually had very little impact on effectiveness and the effects were generally no more likely to favor men than women. Again, however, there were two exceptions. In South Carolina it was men who showed higher levels of ACTIVISM in the community, and in Alameda County it was men who were more likely to score high on the measure of subjective PERFORMANCE.

Finally, it should not escape attention that PARTICIPATION had scattered and inconsistent effects on effectiveness. It had a significant effect on ACTIVISM in Delaware and Spokane and had an effect on subjective PERFORMANCE in Illinois. On the whole, however, it was not a major factor in explaining effectiveness. It was argued earlier that professional practitioners expect and rely upon the ability to participate in the decision-making process and for this reason it seems odd that the measure was not more systematically related to their productivity. The conclusion that this suggests is that different internal administrative strategies, like different network arrangements, can be equally effective, even though a democratic style of decision-making is by far the preferred one among professional practitioners.

3. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The participants in the seven DSO programs brought with them a repertoire of skills and attributes many of which would seem to have been relevant for their professional productivity. They were also assigned positions in the organizational structure of their employing agency and more often than not were allowed to participate with their supervisors in making work-related decisions. These organizational factors might also have been relevant to their effectiveness as practitioners. Yet, for the most part these personal and organizational factors had inconsistent, often trivial and sometimes negative effects on two objective and one subjective measures of effectiveness.

In direct contract to this, the four programs that had settled on distinctive strategies for pulling the scattered parts of the overall program together seem to have profited greatly from it. Two different inter-organizational coordinating strategies were apparent, one formalistic and one personalistic, but both appeared to function as important resource networks for the practitioners, judging from the fact that strategic placement in these networks contributed substantially to objective professional effectiveness. The two personalistic networks had an added advantage in that a favorable network location also contributed to a more favorable subjective assessment of program effectiveness.

In two other programs (in both of which the DSO effort was state-wide but for which we have only fragmentary information), the network relations that existed among the programs' sub-parts were not for individuals conducive to effectiveness. In one case neither the network variables nor any of the others seemed to have much impact, and in the other involvement in the network of professional ex-

changes had a distinctly negative impact on effectiveness.

It is significant that the four programs with what we have characterized as productive networks varied drastically in other ways, specifically in size and scope (from city-wide to state-wide), and in their emphasis on public and private agencies and resources (from predominantly public, to mixed, to predominantly private). It is also significant that they were assembled under conditions of uncertainty with, at best, ill-defined mandates to guide them. The fact that despite this diversity and uncertainty there was a clear pay-off from the strategies of coordination they developed offers strong testimony to the viability of the inter-organizational approach to service delivery.

The message from the two programs in which the networks did not seem to facilitate the practitioners' work is less clear. In one sense these programs serve as a useful caution against the uncritical acceptance of the inter-organizational strategy for social service delivery. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the present data are unable to suggest conclusively just why involvement in the network was unproductive in one of these programs and actually counter-productive in the other. In Illinois the results for all the variables in the analysis were so thin that almost no clues for better understanding this program are suggested, except for the possibility that the quality of the data gathered for this program was insufficient to the task of evaluation. In the case of South Carolina, it may be that the network of internal linkages tying together the existing state youth service delivery system was simply not flexible enough to accommodate the goals of community contact and activism envisioned for DSO when they were superimposed upon the activities already going on there. This would not argue against the network approach per se, but would argue against expecting long-

established systems to be completely adaptable to a new mandate imposed from the outside.

But this speculation about South Carolina, even if correct, is incomplete because it says nothing about the fact that the aggregate levels of community involvement were not lower than in the other programs. In fact, the same can be said of Illinois. A division of labor must have existed in these programs that delegated the maintenance of community ties to people who were not caught up in interaction with members of other DSO agencies but the precise nature of this division of labor and the reasons for it are beyond the capacity of the present data to illuminate. The fact that only parts of these programs were available for evaluation further obscures the problem. The problem posed by these two troublesome cases suggests one other interesting line of inquiry, but one that requires a different interpretation of the importance of community ties. By simplifying the discussion even more than we have already done it is possible to see four of the DSO programs (Arizona, Delaware, Spokane, and Clark County) as representative of a strategy whereby extensive inter-agency ties are for the most part maintained by the same individuals who are involved in extensive program community ties and the other two (South Carolina and Illinois) as representative of a strategy that separates these two functions in that practitioners deeply involved in one activity are likely to be freed from the other. The rationale for the first strategy is basically the one that guided this entire investigation: having extensive inter-agency alliances facilitates and is compatible with the development of extensive ties to the community, and the conjunction of the two represents a favorable program outcome. Is it possible that another very different rationale guided the development of the DSO programs

in Illinois and South Carolina? By glossing over all the many ambiguities in the data it is possible to surmise that these two programs were structured on the assumption that the maintenance of agency-agency ties and the maintenance of program-community ties are best separated and that their conjunction would not represent a favorable outcome. What is missing from this speculation and cannot be supplied here is a specification of which type of tie (to other agencies in the program or to the larger community) is taken to be the one most vital to favorable client outcomes, for the fact that they are functionally separated implies that they are differentially evaluated.

This line of thinking takes us far beyond the available data and it raises issues that cannot be dealt with here. Furthermore, it may simply be wrong. An equally possible explanation for the Illinois and South Carolina findings is that, rather than being expressions of different strategic assumptions, the networks that evolved there were in fact simply ineffective in the sense that we have used the term, and their levels of community-basedness were accomplished in spite of their network deficiencies. There is no more direct evidence to support this interpretation than the other one but it does have the virtue of greater parsimony.

To conclude this report on a note of caution it needs to be pointed out that the overall evaluation will be incomplete until the findings related here can be tied in with data bearing directly on client outcomes. On the whole, this organizational assessment has been favorable and certainly no information has appeared here to indicate that the DSO mandates were not taken seriously. In the final accounting, however, all we have shown is that inter-agency strategies are compatible with greater community

involvement and whether this eventuates in the delivery of higher quality services to clients is a question that will have to be answered elsewhere.

APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE

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SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
FOR THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

Dear DSO Participant:

This questionnaire has been sent to all those who are participating in any way in the demonstration programs for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. We rely on your responses to give us an accurate picture of the strong points of the program you participate in as well as its potential problem areas, if any exist. For purposes of answering the questions, please think of yourself just as a member of the DSO program.

In this survey we are not interested in analyzing or reporting the responses of any particular individual. Instead, we are interested in the average responses of all the members of each DSO program. For purposes of tabulating and reporting your answers will be coded and combined with the answers of the other respondents for computer processing. No one will be shown your individual responses and the confidentiality of your questionnaire is completely assured.

The accuracy and usefulness of this survey is dependent upon your cooperation. Please answer all the questions fully and return the form right away in the prepaid envelope we have provided.

Thank you very much for your time and your assistance.

Solomon Kobrin
Principal Investigator
National Evaluation Staff

Jon Miller
Consultant on
Organizational Evaluation

SECTION I

1. Name _____

_____ Male _____ Age: _____ years _____ Black
_____ Female _____ White
_____ Mexican American
_____ American Indian
_____ Puerto Rican
_____ Oriental
_____ Other
2. What is your relationship to the DSO program? Are you:
_____ a full-time paid employee of the DSO project
_____ a part-time paid employee of the DSO project
_____ paid by another agency or organization but assigned to the DSO program
_____ an unpaid volunteer
_____ other (Specify _____)
3. Place of employment. Where do you report for work on the DSO program?

_____ Street Address _____ City _____ State _____
4. What is the official title of your present job in the DSO program?

Please give a brief description of your major tasks and responsibilities in the DSO program:

5. What do you consider to be your occupation? Please give as precise a title as you can (for example, social worker, clinical psychologist, vocational counselor and not "rehabilitation work," "youth work" or "administration").

How many years of experience do you have in this occupation? _____ years
6. When did you assume your present duties on the DSO program? _____ Month _____ Day _____ Year
7. Please circle the highest level of education you have completed:

<u>Elementary School</u>	<u>High School</u>	<u>Undergraduate College</u>	<u>Graduate School</u>
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4 5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7+

What formal academic degree(s), if any, do you hold?

1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____

SECTION II

THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION ASK FOR YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE DSO PROGRAM AND THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILES. FOR EACH QUESTION CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST EXPRESSES YOUR OPINION.

- When you think about your own work in the DSO program, how effective do you think your efforts have been?
Not at all effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely effective
- Based on the part of it you are familiar with, how effective would you say the DSO program has been in its treatment of juvenile clients?
Not at all effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely effective
- Use the following scale to indicate the extent to which you think juveniles in trouble are responsible for their own problems.
The juvenile is usually to blame for his/her problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The juvenile is usually not to blame for his/her problems
- In dealing with juveniles who are in trouble, what is the best strategy?
Ordinarily, juveniles in trouble should receive punishment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ordinarily, juveniles in trouble should not receive punishment
- On the following scale indicate the effect of social institutions as a contributing factor causing juveniles to get into trouble:
Not usually a major factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually a major factor
- How important are problems of psychological adjustment as a contributing factor causing juveniles to get into trouble?
Not usually a major factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually a major factor
- How important are the juvenile's immediate social surroundings as a contributing factor causing him/her to get into trouble?
Not usually a major factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Usually a major factor
- In your opinion, how much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to change the immediate social surroundings the juveniles have to live with?
Should be given very little effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Should be given a great deal of effort
- How much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to improve a child's psychological adjustment?
Should be given very little effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Should be given a great deal of effort
- How much effort should those who deal with the problems of juveniles make to change the social institutions of the surrounding community?
Should be given very little effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Should be given a great deal of effort

SECTION III

BELOW IS A LIST OF ITEMS THAT SOMETIMES TROUBLE PEOPLE IN THEIR WORK. USING THE CODE LETTERS PROVIDED, INDICATE HOW FREQUENTLY YOU FEEL TROUBLED BY EACH ITEM IN YOUR WORK FOR THE DSO PROGRAM.

A B C D E
Never Rarely Sometimes Rather Often Constantly

- Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you in the program.
- Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your job in the program are.
- Not knowing what opportunities for promotion or advancement exist for you in the program.
- Feeling that you have too heavy a workload, one that you can't finish in a normal day.
- Feeling that the information you need in your DSO work comes too late to be of much use.
- Feeling that DSO organization is unable to keep you informed about changing conditions and problems that may affect your work.
- Feeling that you need more training to do your job properly.
- Being convinced that the DSO organization is unable to create a meaningful and rewarding work atmosphere for its personnel.
- Thinking the meetings and paper work required by the DSO program takes up too much of your time.
- Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands of various people who rank above you in the DSO program.
- Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job because you need more experience in working with juveniles.
- Not having enough opportunity to do the things you feel you are best at doing.
- Thinking you cannot get the information about the problems and needs of juveniles that is necessary to do your job properly.
- Not being able to try out your own ideas on the job.
- Feeling that your progress on the job so far has not been what it should be.
- Having to make decisions that affect other people working for the DSO program before you fully understand their problems.
- Thinking that you are unable to influence the decisions and actions of those who evaluate your work in the DSO program.
- Not knowing what those who judge your work in the DSO program think of your work or how they evaluate your performance.
- Thinking that the amount of work you have to do for the DSO program interferes with how well it gets done.
- Feeling that you have to do things for the DSO program that are against your better judgment.
- Not knowing what resources are available to meet the needs of juveniles in the program.
- Feeling that the DSO organization does not show enough concern for the welfare and satisfaction of those who work in the program.
- Not knowing what the people you normally work with in the DSO program think of you.
- Thinking that your future progress on your job in the DSO program is not likely to be what it should be.
- Thinking that you have too much responsibility delegated to you by your superiors in the DSO program.
- Believing that others in the DSO organization get ahead by making less of a contribution to the program than you do.
- Thinking that your DSO work does not give you enough freedom to choose your co-workers.
- Believing that there are too many rules and regulations to restrict you in your DSO work.
- Feeling that those above you in the DSO program don't pay enough attention to your own opinions about your work in the program.
- Feeling that your skills and qualifications don't count enough in determining your progress in the DSO program.

SECTION IV

A. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS DESCRIBE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PERSON WHO SUPERVISES THE WORK YOU DO FOR THE DSO PROGRAM. (IF YOU ARE A DSO PROGRAM DIRECTOR AND HAVE NO IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR IN THE PROGRAM, CHECK HERE _____ AND GO ON TO PART B OF THIS SECTION ON THE NEXT PAGE.)

1. How often in the course of your work on the DSO program do you have contact with the person who supervises the work you do for the program? Circle the appropriate letter:

A	B	C	D	E	F
Almost	Several	Once or	Several	About once	Less than
Constantly	times a day	twice a day	times a week	a week	once a week

2. How would you describe the time you spend with the person who supervises your work on the DSO program? Circle the number that best represents your opinion:

The time is almost never helpful to me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The time is almost always helpful to me

3. Which of the following statements best describes your relationship with the person who supervises the work you do for the DSO program?

____ We discuss things a great deal and come to a mutual decision about the task at hand.
 ____ We discuss things a great deal and the supervisor's decisions are usually adopted.
 ____ We discuss things a great deal and my decisions are usually adopted.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much but usually come to a mutual decision.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much and the supervisor's decisions are usually adopted.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much and my decisions are usually adopted.

4. If you could decide, how much would you prefer to participate with your DSO supervisor in making the decisions that determine how you do your work in the program?

____ Less than at present
 ____ About the same as at present
 ____ More than at present

B. IF YOUR JOB INVOLVES SUPERVISING THE WORK OF OTHERS IN THE DSO PROGRAM, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. (IF YOU DO NOT SUPERVISE THE WORK OF ANYONE ELSE IN THE PROGRAM CHECK HERE _____ AND GO ON TO THE NEXT SECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.)

1. How many people working in the DSO program do you supervise, that is, how many must report directly to you in their work?

2. How often are you actually involved in directly supervising the work of others in the program? Circle the appropriate letter:

A	B	C	D	E	F
Almost	Several	Once or	Several	About once	Less than
Constantly	times a day	twice a day	times a week	a week	once a week

3. How would you describe the time you spend with those whose work on the DSO program you supervise? Circle the number on the scale that best describes your opinion:

The time is almost never helpful to me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The time is almost always helpful to me

4. Which of these statements best describes the relationship you have with those whose work in the DSO program you supervise?

____ We discuss things a great deal and come to a mutual decision about the task at hand.
 ____ We discuss things a great deal and my decision is usually adopted.
 ____ We discuss things a great deal and their decisions are usually adopted.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much but usually come to a mutual decision.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much and my decisions are usually adopted.
 ____ We don't discuss things very much and their decisions are usually adopted.

5. If you could decide, how much would you prefer to have those whose work you supervise participate with you in making the decisions that determine how they do their jobs?

____ Less than at present
 ____ About the same as at present
 ____ More than at present

SECTION V

THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION ARE INTENDED TO GIVE US AN IDEA OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE PEOPLE WHO WORK ON THE DSO PROGRAMS. ALL THE INFORMATION YOU GIVE US HERE WILL BE CODED AND ANALYZED WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY. IN ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS PLEASE INCLUDE ONLY THE NAMES OF PEOPLE WHO YOU KNOW ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE WORK OF THE DSO PROGRAM.

1. In the spaces provided below, list the names of the three people in the DSO program with whom you have the most contact. Indicate by checking the primary reason for your contact with each person.

Primary reason for the contact
(Please check only the answer that best applies)

Names:	Sharing information and ideas about clients' problems	To find out about general DSO rules and procedures	Basically for reasons of friendship	Unavoidable; contact is required by the nature of the job

2. Please give the names of the three people on the DSO project who you feel actually have the greatest influence over how you do your work on the project.

3. If you wanted to have your own work on the DSO program evaluated, who are the three individuals in the program whose opinion of your work you would respect the most?

4. If you had an opinion about the handling of juveniles that did not agree with official policy, who are the three individuals in the DSO program you could count on to help you get a hearing for your point of view?

5. If you were working with a client who was an especially difficult case, who are the three people on the DSO project who could offer the most assistance in dealing with the problem?

SECTION VI

THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION ASK ABOUT YOUR CONTACTS WITH SOME OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE COMMUNITY THAT THE DSO PROGRAM MAY WORK WITH. IF YOU HAVE NO CONTACT AT ALL WITH ANY ONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS LISTED, BE SURE TO INDICATE THIS.

1. In the course of your work for the DSO program, how often do you come into contact with members of local police and/or sheriff's departments?

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 2) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
- ☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
- ☐ To get the resources that clients need.
- ☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with members of these local police and sheriff's departments:

Contacts never with people in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with people in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with law enforcement	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with law enforcement

2. How often in the course of your work in the DSO program do you come into contact with representatives of local schools?

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 3) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
- ☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
- ☐ To get the resources that clients need.
- ☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with representatives of local schools:

Contacts never with people in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with people in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with schools	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with schools

3. How often in the course of your work in the DSO program do you come into contact with representatives of local religious organizations?

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 4) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
☐ To get the resources that clients need.
☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with representatives of these local religious organizations:

Contacts never with people in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with people in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with religious groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with religious groups

4. How often in the course of your work in the DSO program do you come into contact with representatives of private non-profit community organizations that deal with juveniles but are not actually part of the DSO program? (Examples might include organizations such as the YMCA and YWCA, Boys' Clubs, Big Brothers and other organizations of this type.)

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 5) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
☐ To get the resources that clients need.
☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with representatives of these local private groups:

Contacts never with persons in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with persons in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with these local private groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with these local private groups

5. How often in the course of your work in the DSO program do you come into contact with representatives of the courts?

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 6) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
☐ To get the resources that clients need.
☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with representatives of the courts:

Contacts never with persons in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with persons in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with the courts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with the courts

6. How often in the course of your work in the DSO program do you come into contact with representatives of local public social service agencies, such as welfare agencies, employment services, mental health agencies, public health agencies and the like?

NEVER (GO ON TO QUESTION 7) Less than once a week About once a week Several times a week Once or twice a day Several times a day Almost constantly

Which of the following best states the primary reason for these contacts? (Check only one)

- ☐ To clarify the needs of individual DSO clients.
☐ To encourage a change in the way juveniles are handled.
☐ To get the resources that clients need.
☐ To encourage respect for the client as a person.

On each of these scales circle the number that best describes the contacts you have with representatives of local public service agencies:

Contacts never with persons in positions of authority	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always with persons in positions of authority
Contacts never produce benefits for DSO clients	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always produce benefits for DSO clients
Contacts never lead to closer cooperation with these local public service agencies	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Contacts always lead to closer cooperation with these local public service agencies

7. Finally, how often in the course of your work in the DSO program are you involved in each of the following kinds of community activity?

	Never	Less than once a week	About once a week	Several times a week	Once or twice a day	Several times a day	Almost constantly
How often are you involved in efforts to get more local economic support for programs for juveniles?	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
How often are you involved in efforts to get more community organizations involved in the problems of juveniles?	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
How often are you involved in attempting to influence local policies on the ways the problems of juveniles are handled?	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
How often are you involved in attempts to get better local treatment resources for the problems of juveniles?	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PATIENCE IN FILLING OUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. PLEASE CHECK TO SEE THAT ALL QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED FULLY BEFORE RETURNING THE FORM TO US.

APPENDIX B
ALAMEDA COUNTY
QUESTIONNAIRE MODIFICATION

SECTION V

THE LEAA FUNDED DSO PROGRAM IN ALAMEDA COUNTY INVOLVES A FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WORK IN THE FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION UNITS OF THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS PEOPLE WHO WORK IN SEVERAL YOUTH SERVICE CENTERS AROUND THE COUNTY. THE QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION ARE DESIGNED TO GIVE US AN IDEA OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE PEOPLE WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PROGRAM. AS YOU ANSWER THE QUESTIONS THINK OF THE DSO PROGRAM AS THE OVERALL COUNTY-WIDE EFFORT, NOT JUST IN TERMS OF YOUR OWN SPECIFIC OFFICE OR AGENCY.

1. Please think of the three people in the overall Alameda County DSO program with whom you have the most contact in the course of the work you do for the program. In the spaces provided list the agency or specific office that each of these people works for. Indicate by checking the primary reason for your contact with each person.

Primary reason for the contact
(Please check only the answer that best applies)

Agency name (List a specific FCI unit or Youth Service Center)	Sharing information and ideas about clients' problems	To find out about general DSO rules and procedures	Basically for reasons of friendship	Unavoidable: contact is required by the nature of the task
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

2. List the agency or specific office of each of the three people who work for the DSO program in Alameda County who you feel actually have the greatest influence over how you do your work on the project.

3. If you wanted to have your own work on the DSO program evaluated, who are the three individuals in the program whose opinion of your work you would respect the most? In the space provided list the agency or specific office in which each of these three people works.

4. If you had an opinion about the handling of juveniles that did not agree with official policy, who are the three individuals in the overall DSO program you could count on to help you get a hearing for your point of view? In the spaces provided, list just the agency or office that each works for.

5. If you were working with a client who was an especially difficult case, who are the three people in the overall County DSO program who could offer the most assistance in dealing with the problem? In the spaces provided, list the agency or office that each works for.

APPENDIX C
CORRELATION MATRICES

TABLE C1.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	ARIZONA													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race	-.22	---												
3 Experience	-.02	-.08	---											
4 Education	.02	.21	.05	---										
5 Status	-.04	.03	-.17	-.42	---									
6 Participation	.03	-.12	.11	-.10	.22	---								
7 Work Contact	.18	.04	.16	.23	-.35	-.01	---							
8 Influence	.26	.03	.12	.16	-.26	.01	.78	---						
9 Respect	.27	-.09	.18	.31	-.32	.02	.65	.66	---					
10 Support	.27	-.01	.16	.27	-.34	-.06	.69	.82	.84	---				
11 Assistance	.15	-.06	.08	.24	-.22	-.05	.48	.56	.68	.67	---			
12 Contact	.13	-.10	.11	.33	-.29	-.04	.22	.21	.40	.39	.37	---		
13 Activism	.18	-.11	.19	.19	-.34	-.01	.34	.29	.46	.41	.35	.56	---	
14 Performance	.04	-.12	.15	-.10	.26	.01	-.05	-.09	-.08	-.08	-.18	-.06	-.15	---

TABLE C2.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	<u>DELAWARE</u>													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race	-.06	---												
3 Experience	-.16		---											
4 Education	.28	.02	.11	---										
5 Status	.24	-.20	-.27	-.06	---									
6 Participation	.00	-.10	-.01	-.10	.18	---								
7 Work Contact	-.02	-.21	-.06	.12	.00	-.53	---							
8 Influence	-.16	.03	-.03	.19	-.31	-.31	.51	---						
9 Respect	-.16	.12	.04	.24	-.50	-.32	.40	.69	---					
10 Support	-.22	.04	-.04	.21	-.35	-.41	.54	.90	.78	---				
11 Assistance	.16	.08	-.03	.31	-.33	-.31	.32	.66	.78	.62	---			
12 Contact	-.03	-.18	-.21	-.16	-.03	.16	.11	.29	.12	.11	.24	---		
13 Activism	.18	-.40	-.16	.15	.03	.18	.29	.45	.19	.38	.15	.42	---	
14 Performance	.17	-.08	-.03	.06	.05	-.05	-.05	.07	.02	.02	.19	.35	.21	---

TABLE C3.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	ILLINOIS													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race	-.15	---												
3 Experience	.21	.02	---											
4 Education	.15	-.04	-.06	---										
5 Status	-.29	-.09	-.13	-.50	---									
6 Participation	-.17	-.18	-.07	-.07	.17	---								
7 Work Contact	-.04	.25	-.25	.06	-.02	-.03	---							
8 Influence	-.02	.27	-.25	.07	-.02	-.06	.99	---						
9 Respect	-.02	.27	-.25	.08	-.03	-.05	.97	.99	---					
10 Support	-.03	.27	-.26	.06	.01	-.07	.97	.99	.97	---				
11 Assistance	-.04	.28	-.26	.10	-.03	-.07	.97	.97	.98	.96	---			
12 Contact	.06	-.11	-.07	.27	-.22	.15	-.07	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.03	---		
13 Activism	.23	-.15	.07	.41	-.49	.03	.04	.05	.05	.02	.06	.57	---	
14 Performance	-.11	.03	-.10	-.02	.02	.34	-.12	-.15	-.14	-.18	-.12	.12	.09	---

TABLE C4.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	SOUTH CAROLINA													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race	-.11	---												
3 Experience	.11	.26	---											
4 Education	.27	.06	.07	---										
5 Status	-.07	-.20	.11	-.55	---									
6 Participation	-.40	-.01	-.27	-.02	-.18	---								
7 Work Contact	-.05	.21	.02	.42	-.48	.29	---							
8 Influence	.00	.20	.04	.36	-.49	.23	.86	---						
9 Respect	-.04	.22	.00	.39	-.44	.22	.86	.81	---					
10 Support	-.19	.02	-.69	.00	-.36	.41	.48	.53	.52	---				
11 Assistance	-.27	.04	-.64	.05	-.29	.41	.59	.54	.57	.94	---			
12 Contact	.13	-.18	-.35	.23	-.15	-.05	-.22	-.24	-.25	.01	-.04	---		
13 Activism	.35	.12	-.16	.46	-.33	.08	-.08	-.06	-.12	-.03	-.11	.76	---	
14 Performance	.20	-.11	-.02	-.03	-.13	-.19	.26	.19	.19	.07	.13	.01	-.02	---

TABLE C5.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	SPOKANE													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race	.23	---												
3 Experience	.16	.13	---											
4 Education	.40	.39	-.15	---										
5 Status	-.22	-.14	-.45	-.06	---									
6 Participation	-.24	-.15	-.44	.10	.13	---								
7 Work Contact	-.09	.12	-.15	.05	-.15	.26	---							
8 Influence	-.09	.12	-.11	.04	-.17	.27	.99	---						
9 Respect	.00	.14	-.25	.10	-.06	.16	.84	.82	---					
10 Support	-.02	.12	-.17	.15	-.12	.28	.72	.71	.87	---				
11 Assistance	-.01	.13	-.13	.20	-.09	.25	.73	.70	.86	.98	---			
12 Contact	-.13	-.22	-.07	-.08	.11	.16	.38	.37	.46	.30	.29	---		
13 Activism	.07	-.13	.39	-.01	-.18	.07	.10	.12	.22	.16	.18	.60	---	
14 Performance	-.17	-.10	-.22	-.12	-.02	.20	.61	.60	.66	.49	.49	.55	.35	---

TABLE C6.

CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

CLARK COUNTY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Gender	---													
2 Race *	---	---												
3 Experience	.25	---	---											
4 Education	.44	---	.11	---										
5 Status	.27	---	-.32	.22	---									
6 Participation	.12	---	-.18	.16	.23	---								
7 Work Contact	-.16	---	.05	-.02	-.29	.08	---							
8 Influence	-.14	---	.05	.09	-.22	.11	.93	---						
9 Respect	-.06	---	.16	-.17	-.56	-.12	.79	.76	---					
10 Support	-.19	---	-.17	-.19	-.08	-.18	.65	.66	.67	---				
11 Assistance	.04	---	-.04	-.03	-.31	.28	.70	.61	.68	.24	---			
12 Contact	-.23	---	-.12	-.12	-.24	-.27	.51	.33	.36	.61	.10	---		
13 Activism	-.13	---	-.45	-.01	.12	.24	.05	.00	.07	.00	.09	.60	---	
14 Performance	-.05	---	.00	.28	-.23	.13	.29	.43	.40	.16	.32	.13	.15	---

* All respondents were white.

TABLE C7. CORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION,
NETWORK LOCATION, COMMUNITY CONTACT, COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE.

	ALAMEDA COUNTY*								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 Gender	---								
2 Race	.07	---							
3 Experience	.09	-.05	---						
4 Education	.30	.11	.25	---					
5 Status	-.14	-.09	.35	.25	---				
6 Participation	-.16	-.03	.07	.11	.08	---			
7 Contact	.00	.08	.18	.08	.19	.14	---		
8 Activism	.10	.12	.17	.28	.32	.06	.32	---	
9 Performance	.22	.02	.14	.18	-.08	.06	-.13	.15	---

* Network measures not available.

CHAPTER XX

EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS PROGRAMS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASUREMENT*

by

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CHAPTER XX

EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDER PROGRAMS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASUREMENT

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CHAPTER XX

EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDER PROGRAMS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASUREMENT

Peter C. Gardiner

INTRODUCTION

Reported here are program evaluation findings based on the assignment of values to the diverse effects or impacts of the program as derived from often differing viewpoints about which impacts are "good" or "bad." To accomplish this task, an evaluation technology based on the ideas of contemporary decision theory is employed. This chapter discusses how that technology was applied in the national evaluation of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO) program.* In the present context, the term impacts refers to program effects on the offense behavior of status offenders who were provided treatment services by the DSO program and to certain characteristics of the DSO programs themselves once implemented (e.g., costs).

While evaluating DSO programs in terms of their impacts requires data describing actual program impacts, the national evaluation had not yet completed the necessary analyses at the time of this writing. Nevertheless, a discussion and partial illustration of this approach to program evaluation can still proceed. The reason involves the approach to evaluation

* The national evaluation program was funded by the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

taken. As the term has been used here, evaluation encompasses three distinct, but interrelated activities: (1) identifying program impacts for which data should be collected, (2) factual data collection and statistical analyses for each impact identified, and (3) the attaching of values to impacts. In this sense the common approach of number two, by itself, is simply not evaluation. Why?

Decision makers need to know if an on-going program is a good idea. Should it, and others like it, be carried out? If so, how many? And Where? Should it be taken as a model for other locations? If so, can key decision makers and stakeholders in these other locations be persuaded to accept the program? Plain facts cannot tell a decision maker the answers to any of these questions--though they certainly offer hundreds or thousands of numbers that bear on them in one way or another. And that is the problem and the distinction among the three activities named. Plain numbers are not values. Values reside inside the heads of people and reflect their personal preferences. These values are used to interpret the "facts" and decide what is "good" or "bad."

The essence of the term evaluation as used here lies in identifying relevant program impacts and attaching values to them. Or stated another way, the approach is one of linking factual impacts to values and overall values to decisions. And the rationale for this approach is simple. Arguments and debates over the merits of alternative programs typically hinge on disagreements about the values of the various impacts that accompany implementation of those programs, not necessarily on the correctness of their measurement. Often those in conflict may agree about what the relevant and important impacts to be evaluated are, and they may even (although

not always) agree on how to measure those impacts and on the accuracy of the measurements once taken. The conflicts arise over how to attach values to them and then link the values to decisions about the programs.

Normally such disagreements are fought out over and over again, at enormous social cost, each time another program decision must be made. This is especially true as the number of different viewpoints to be accounted for increases. This chapter discusses a method called multi-attribute utility measurement (MAUM) that can spell out explicitly--and numerically--what each individual's or pressure group's values are, showing how and to what degree they differ, and in the process can frequently reduce the extent of such differences. Use of MAUM permits a decision making body to shift its attention from the specific programs being evaluated to the values the programs are designed to serve. In so doing, the set of impact measurements to be taken, the evaluation rules, and the decision making mechanisms that implement them are made explicit. This in turn informs those who wish to present alternative programs, thus removing the uncertainty inherent in planning and obviating the need for costly, time-consuming case-by-case proceedings (except in borderline cases). Moreover, while the evaluation rules and decision making mechanisms remain relatively constant, the values embedded in them can be easily changed in response to new circumstances or changing value systems. It is in this sense, then, that evaluation can be discussed in the absence of data to be evaluated and it is in this sense that evaluation data (data about values) can be reported without program impact data.

In this chapter the focus of the discussion is on evaluation data. Specifically, the focus is on (1) the process of identifying those DSO program

impacts that are of importance to individuals or groups with an interest in the treatment of status offenders, (2) establishing the relative importance of these, (3) identifying any shared viewpoints or "natural" constituencies that seem to form along the program impact dimensions either overall, by individual DSO program location, or by job categories regardless of location (e.g., social services, police, clergy, etc.), (4) identifying any clustering of program impact dimensions where "different" dimensions are perceived by individuals as being somewhat similar, and (5) determining if changes in relative preferences for program impacts occur over a four month period on the part of individuals participating in this evaluation.

The answers to these five questions, while not providing a complete evaluation in and of themselves, can provide help for policy makers who desire to understand what program impacts are considered important by various community leaders and how these leaders seem to form themselves into constituencies in terms of the importance they assign to the various program impacts.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE MEASUREMENT
AS A MEANS FOR STATUS OFFENDER PROGRAM EVALUATION

As a result of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-415), LEAA made funds available to various state and local jurisdictions to help remove status offenders from detention and correctional institutions, and to prevent future detention and institutionalization. To achieve the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the Act called for the development of "advanced techniques" of community-based programs and services for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency through the development of foster care and shelter care homes, group homes, halfway houses, homemaker and home health services, and any other designated community based diagnostic, treatment, or rehabilitative service.

In January 1976, two year grants totalling \$13 million were awarded by LEAA to 11 jurisdictions across the country to develop community based alternatives for status offenders. The jurisdictions selected were:

1. Pima County, Arizona
2. Alameda County, California
3. Arkansas
4. Connecticut
5. South Carolina
6. Clark County, Washington
7. Spokane County, Washington
8. Delaware
9. Illinois (Cook, Decatur, and LaSalle County)
10. Newark, Ohio
11. South Lake Tahoe, California

The National Evaluation Plan

The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP), the research arm of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, LEAA, is required under Section 102 (a) (1) of the JJDP Act to provide for the evaluation of all federally assisted juvenile delinquency programs. To meet this mandate, evaluation funds totalling about \$2 million for a two-year period were awarded to provide for the evaluation of eight of the 11 status offender projects funded by the OJJDP. Newark, Ohio and Southern Lake Tahoe, California were excluded from the National Evaluation. Later, Arkansas was also dropped from the National Evaluation.

The NIJJDP evaluation plan for the DSO initiative consisted of awarding separate evaluation grants to evaluators located near each site selected for funding and awarding an overall coordination and national evaluation grant to the Social Science Research Institute, University of Southern California. The local evaluators were responsible for implementing the national evaluation design developed by the University of Southern California during the evaluation planning phase, as well as evaluating other aspects of the individual projects which fell outside the national design. The University of Southern California was responsible for conducting an analysis of the effectiveness of the DSO projects across all sites, assisting the local evaluators in implementing the national design and compiling the results of the evaluation activities at each significant point in the process. The present report describes the portion of the National Evaluation effort involving the application of Multi-Attribute Utility Measurement evaluation procedures in the national evaluation.

Multi-Attribute Utility Measurement and the National Evaluation Plan

The national evaluation team utilized the MAUM procedure as one tool to help in the evaluation of the various programs established to deinstitutionalize status offenders. The goal of this portion of the national evaluation was to define societal values so that those values could be linked to program impacts and subsequently help policy makers make sound decisions about the types of programs that should receive funding support, which ones to cut back, and so on. The key is the use of MAUM to assign values to program impacts.

Impacts (outcomes) of any on-going criminal justice program can be evaluated in many direct ways. Perhaps the most commonly used direct way is to equate outcome with price. The phrase, "that's so cheap it can't be any good" is true enough, often enough, to illustrate the phenomenon, and its frequent falsity illustrates how unsatisfactory the procedure is. Price depends more on the relation between supply and demand than on value. Moreover, the difficulty of assigning economic proxies to non-economic impacts, such as the amount of time a juvenile spends with his family, is well known.

A more reasonable procedure, often used, is simply to consider the outcome, and make a direct intuitive value judgment. We all do this everyday. While such judgments are most often phrased in language that is vague, categorical, or both, they can be expressed directly in numbers. Miller, Kaplan and Edwards (1969) showed that a resource allocation system designed around such numbers far outperformed a system based on intuitive judgments. Yet this, too, is an extremely primitive way of making value judgments.

Most outcomes have value for a number of different reasons, that is, on a number of different dimensions. In status offender programs there are many

such dimensions such as costs, recidivism, public safety, and so on.

All of these considerations, and many others, may enter into a decision about some program to be implemented. Clearly, this multiplicity of value dimensions presents a multiplicity of problems. Who determines what dimensions are relevant, and how relevant is each? How is that set of judgments made and used? How is the location of each possible outcome of each program being considered on each relevant dimension of value measured, judged, or otherwise discovered? Finally, what combination of judgmental transformation and arithmetical aggregation is used to translate all this input information into outcome evaluations?

An explicit technology, or, more precisely, several competing versions of an explicit technology, exists to answer some of these questions. Its name is multi-attribute utility measurement, and expositions of various versions of it have been presented by Raiffa (1969), Kenney (1972a), Edwards (1971), and others. The version presented here, previously published by Edwards (1971) and Gardiner and Edwards (1975), is oriented not toward mathematical sophistication or intimacy of relation between underlying formal structures and the practical procedures that implement them but rather toward easy communication and use in environments in which time is short and decision makers are multiple and busy. Still, unpublished studies strongly argue that the simple rating-scale procedures described below produce results essentially the same as much more complicated procedures involving imaginary lotteries.

Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique (SMART)

One evaluation approach used in the National DSO Evaluation, SMART consists of ten steps:

Step 1. Identify the person or organization whose values are to be maximized. If, as is often the case, particularly where criminal justice programs are involved, several organizations and many individuals have stakes and voices in the decision, they must all be identified. People who can speak for them must be identified and induced to cooperate in completing questionnaires, etc.

To identify the individuals to whom a questionnaire would be mailed in the DSO MAUM operation, the local DSO program directors for each site were asked to provide a mailing list consisting of 20 to 40 individuals whose views were important or influential with respect to DSO programs. Although the lists were reviewed by the national evaluation team, the emphasis was on identifying viewpoints and spokesmen for those viewpoints that were considered important to DSO programs by the local DSO program directors. The names submitted from each site contained a few unique categories of respondents, but most categories were similar across all sites (e.g., police, courts, social agencies for youths, NAACP, YMCA, state legislators, mayors, educators, etc.).

Program directors at each site suggested over 300 names and a SMART questionnaire was mailed to each. It should be pointed out that none of the recipients was contacted beforehand to see if they would be willing to participate, although a short post card was sent to them prior to the mailing to alert them that they would shortly be receiving an evaluation questionnaire. Other than the post card, each individual was receiving the SMART questionnaire "cold."

In spite of the lack of prior agreement to participate, there were 109 usable questionnaires returned. A telephone follow-up probably added some

inducement among those reluctant to respond. A second, Time 2, questionnaire was sent to the 109 respondents to assess changes in their value judgments as a possible effect of familiarity with the DSO program at their sites, and 52 usable questionnaires were returned. To our knowledge, this is the largest effort ever undertaken to systematically involve public value systems in an evaluation task using multi-attribute utility measurement. Also, this is the first time that such an effort has been done exclusively by a mailed instrument to "cold" participants.

Table 1 presents the number of participants for each program site for the Time 1 and Time 2 mailings, and Table 2 presents the occupational categories for all sites combined. Table 3 presents occupations by sites for all respondents for the Time 1 mailing only, to illustrate the variety of respondents who participated in the evaluation.

Step 2. Identify the issue or issues (i.e., decisions) for which the values being solicited are relevant. In this evaluation the issues involve juvenile justice systems in general and deinstitutionalization of status offenders in particular.

Step 3. Identify the entities to be evaluated. Here the focus is on alternative treatment programs.

Step 4. Identify the relevant dimensions of value. The first three steps were more or less philosophical. The first answered the question: Whose values? The second answered the question: Value for what purpose? The third answered the question: Values assigned to what entities? With step 4 we come to the first technical task: discover what outcomes are important to the evaluation of any proposed plan (one outcome = one impact = one value dimension).

TABLE 1

MAUM Participants for Each DSO Program Location for the Initial (Time 1) and Follow-up (Time 2) MAUM Questionnaire

TIME 1

Site	Number of Participants	
	Frequency	Percent
Pima County, Arizona	14	12.844
Alameda County, CA	19	17.431
Connecticut	14	12.844
Delaware	24	22.018
Illinois	14	12.844
South Carolina	5	4.587
Spokane County, WA	12	11.009
Clark County, WA	7	6.422
	109	100%

Time 2

Site	Number of Participants	
	Frequency	Percent
Pima County, Arizona	14	26.923
Alameda County, CA	5	9.615
Connecticut	6	11.538
Delaware	10	19.231
Illinois	4	7.692
South Carolina	3	5.769
Spokane County, WA	5	9.615
Clark County, WA	5	9.615
	52	100%

TABLE 2

MAUM Participants for Each Occupational Category for the Initial (Time 1) and Follow-up (Time 2) MAUM Questionnaire

TIME 1

Occupational Category	Number of Participants	
	Frequency	Percent
Other Public Employee	5	4.587
Judicial	13	11.927
Corrections	6	5.505
Police	12	11.009
State Elected Official	3	2.752
Local Elected Official	3	2.752
Law	4	3.670
Clergy	2	1.835
Education	7	6.422
Human Services	47	43.119
Citizen	7	6.422
	52	100%

TIME 2

Occupational Category	Number of Participants	
	Frequency	Percent
Other Public Employee	2	3.846
Judicial	5	9.615
Corrections	5	9.615
Police	4	7.692
State Elected Official	2	3.846
Local Elected Official	2	3.846
Law	2	3.846
Clergy	3	5.769
Education	1	1.923
Human Services	21	40.385
Citizen	5	9.615
	52	100%

CONTINUED

10 OF 14

TABLE 3

A BREAKDOWN OF MAUM QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY
AND DSO PROGRAM LOCATION FOR THE INITIAL (TIME 1) MAUM QUESTIONNAIRE

	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Arizona County Attorney	1	0.917
Arizona Elected Official	2	1.835
Arizona School Administrator	2	1.835
Arizona Social Services	9	8.257
Alameda Social Services	3	2.752
Alameda Police	1	0.917
Alameda CJS Plan	1	0.917
Alameda Social Services	5	4.587
Alameda Police	3	2.752
Alameda Juvenile Justice	1	0.917
Alameda Delinquency Prevention	1	0.917
Alameda Social Services	1	0.917
Alameda School Administrator	3	2.752
Connecticut Corrections	1	0.917
Connecticut Elected Official	2	1.835
Connecticut Social Services	3	2.752
Connecticut Citizen	1	0.917
Connecticut Clergy	1	0.917
Connecticut Citizen	1	0.917
Connecticut Social Services	1	0.917
Connecticut Citizen	1	0.917
Connecticut Judicial	2	1.835
Connecticut Social Services	1	0.917
Delaware Social Services	9	8.257
Delaware Judicial	6	5.505
Delaware Legal Services	1	0.917
Delaware Social Services	7	6.422
Delaware Police	1	0.917
Illinois Social Services	1	0.917
Illinois Delinquency Prevention	1	0.917
Illinois Social Services	1	0.917

TABLE 3 (cont'd)

	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Illinois Elected Official	1	0.917
Illinois Social Services	2	1.835
Illinois Police	2	1.835
Illinois Social Services	3	2.752
Illinois Corrections	2	1.835
Illinois Social Services	1	0.917
Spokane Judicial	2	1.835
Spokane Police	4	3.670
Spokane Corrections	1	0.917
Spokane Social Services	3	2.752
Spokane School Administrator	1	0.917
Spokane Citizen	1	0.917
South Carolina OCJP	1	0.917
South Carolina School Adm.	1	0.917
South Carolina Citizen	2	1.835
South Carolina Lawyer	1	0.917
Clark County Judicial	2	1.835
Clark County Elected Official	1	0.917
Clark County Citizen	2	1.835
Clark County Clergy	1	0.917
Clark County Police	1	0.917
	<u>109</u>	<u>100%</u>

As Raiffa (1969) has noted, goals ordinarily come in hierarchies. But it is often practical and useful to ignore their hierarchical structure, and instead to specify a simple list of goals that seem important for the purposes at hand. In this study the initial MAUM instrument was mailed to all individuals with the following pre-selected set of value dimensions:

- A. The average number of arrests per status offender per year.
- B. The proportion of status offense arrests that result in court appearance.
- C. The average number of serious delinquent offenses (such as robbery) that might occur in a six month period, regardless of whether these offenses come to the attention of justice authorities.
- D. The amount of time status offenders spend with family.
- E. Status offenders' perceptions about the seriousness of an offense such as robbery.
- F. Status offenders' perceptions of justice system effectiveness.
- G. Parental knowledge of whereabouts of status offender.
- H. Status offenders' attitudes toward observing the law.
- I. The average number of minor delinquent offenses (such as truancy) that might occur in a six month period, regardless of whether these offenses come to the attention of justice authorities.
- J. The annual cost in dollars per individual status offender served.
- K. Status offenders' perceptions about the seriousness of an offense such as truancy.
- L. Frequency of contact between programs set up to provide services to status offenders and other social service agencies or institutions.

- M. The percentage of arrested status offenders placed in locked facilities while waiting for a court appearance.
- N. Level of the status offenders' school performance relative to his school mates.

As indicated, the relevant value dimensions (SMART Step 4) were pre-selected in this application. The national evaluation data collection design had to be completed and implemented before individuals at the DSO sites could be identified as potential SMART questionnaire recipients. Moreover, since the SMART component of the national evaluation planned to elicit values by mailed questionnaires it was concluded that even if these 300 or more individuals could be identified, and if each agreed to participate, the delay in identifying relevant value dimensions would have introduced an unacceptable delay in the overall national evaluation implementation schedule. Therefore, the national evaluation team internally reviewed the data sets projected to be available, and the goals of the DSO programs and their treatment strategies, and produced the initial list of 14 value dimensions.

However, the effects of pre-selecting the value dimensions was tested during the study by encouraging participants to suggest any additional impacts that they personally considered important enough to be added to the initial list of the 14 mailed to them. These additional impacts were then to be included in the follow up (Time 2) questionnaire. The results of this part of the MAUM study, and information about how the 14 pre-selected attributes compared to those suggested by participants, are presented later in this report.

Step 5. Rank the dimensions in order of importance. This ranking job, like Step 4, can be performed by an individual, or by representatives of

different value systems acting separately, or by those representatives acting as a group. Individual judgments may well differ here and in the following steps.

Step 6. Rate the dimensions in importance, preserving ratios. To do this, start by assigning the least important dimensions an importance of 10. (Use 10 rather than 1 to permit subsequent judgments to be finely graded and nevertheless made in integers.) Now consider the next-least-important dimension. How much more important (if at all) is it than the least important? Assign it a number that reflects that ratio. Continue on up the list, checking each set of implied ratios as each new judgment is made. Thus, if a dimension is assigned a weight of 20, while another is assigned a weight of 80, it means that the 20 dimension is 1/4 as important as the 80 dimension, and so on. By the time you get to the most important dimensions, there will be many checks to perform; typically, respondents will want to revise previous judgments to make them consistent with present ones. That's fine; they can do so.

Step 7. Sum the importance weights from step 6, divide each by the sum, and multiply by 100 (i.e., normalize the weights). This is a purely computational step which converts importance weights into numbers that, mathematically, are like percentages.

Step 8.* Measure the value of each alternative being considered for each dimension. As used here there are two activities involved in value measurement. The first involves measuring the impacts of an alternative for each value dimension in its "natural" measurement units. For example, in measuring "the average number of arrests per status offender per year," the natural unit of measurement is fairly clear and might lead to an impact such

*The results of Steps 8, 9, and 10 will not be repeated in this document.

as "12 arrests/status offender/year" for some program. In this study the analyses undertaken by the national evaluation team are designed, in part, to discover the impacts of each treatment type in their natural measurement units. The second activity of value measurement and, the essence of the MAUM study, involves attaching values to impacts. In this sense, measuring the value of treatment alternatives involves translating their impacts dimensions-by-dimension from natural measurement units to corresponding dimension-by-dimension value units. The task is somewhat complicated by the fact that there are three classes of impact dimensions: purely subjective, partly subjective, and purely objective. The purely subjective dimensions are perhaps the easiest; you simply get an appropriate expert to estimate a program's impact on some subjective scale such as a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 is defined as the minimum plausible impact and 100 is defined as the maximum plausible impact. Note "minimum and maximum plausible" rather than "minimum and maximum possible." The minimum plausible impact often is not total absence of the dimension.

A partly subjective dimension is one in which the natural units of measurement are objective, but "measuring" how a program impacts on it involves subjective estimation.

A wholly objective dimension is one that can be measured in objective units. The example given above is one for a wholly objective impact dimension objectively measured.

At this point dimension-by-dimension value curves can be constructed.* Of various ways of obtaining such curves, the easiest way is simply to ask

*Value curves are the technical means by which impacts in various natural units of measurement are translated to a common value based unit of measurement.

the respondent to draw graphs. The X axis of each such graph represents the plausible range of performance for the effect under consideration measured on its natural scale. The Y axis represents the ranges of values, or desirabilities, or utilities associated with the corresponding X measurement. To find the dimension-by-dimension value contributions of each impact of an on-going program, simply use the value curves to translate each impact measured on its own natural scale into a common value-scale unit measurement. At this point, the impacts of programs being evaluated have all been translated from incommensurable "apples and oranges" scales to common value scales. For example, suppose the two alternative treatments being evaluated are "group homes" and "one hour of counseling" and their two impact dimensions are "average number of arrests per status offender per year" and "school performance." The following data matrix would be typical of one discovered by an analysis of these dimensions:

DATA MATRIX

Treatment Alternatives	Impact Dimensions	
	Average Number of Arrests/Status Offender/Year	School Performance
Group Homes	12	Excellent
One Hour of Counseling	9	Poor

Deciding which treatment is "best" is not easy since group homes score better on school performance and counseling scores better on arrests. Moreover, since the natural units of measurement for each dimension are different, the impact scores cannot readily be "added up." Therefore, it is not immediately clear how to arrive at an overall value for each treatment.

The diagram (pg. 21) shows an example of a MAUM value curve for the dimension "average number of arrests/status offender/year." Note that the X-axis goes from zero arrests to 35 (the presumed plausible maximum). The Y-axis goes from zero worth to a maximum worth of 100. The value curve shown indicates that zero arrests as an impact have the maximum worth (100 points) and 35 arrests have the least worth as an impact. Other possible arrest impacts can be assigned worths by use of the value curve. Simply find the arrests on the X-axis and then use the curve to find the corresponding worth for that number of arrests. For example, five arrests corresponds to 90 worth points. By using two such value curves (one for arrests and one for school performance), the data matrix can be converted to a value matrix form shown below:

VALUE MATRIX

Treatment Alternatives	Impact Dimension	
	Worth of Impact: "Average Number of Arrests/Status Offender/Year"	Worth of Impact: "School Performance"
Group Homes	50	60
One Hour of Counseling	70	30

With all matrix entries now in common value units of measurement it is fairly easy to compute a treatment's overall value once the relative importance of the two impact dimensions have been specified and the aggregation rule decided upon.




Diagram Illustrating a Value Curve.

In what sense, if any, are value scales comparable? The question cannot be considered separately from the question of what "importance," as it was judged at Step 6, means. Formally, judgments at Step 6 should be designed so that when the output of Step 7 (or of Step 6, which differs only by a linear transformation) is multiplied by the output of Step 8, equal numerical distances between these products on different dimensions correspond to equal changes in desirability. For example, suppose program A (a group home) has a value scale location of 50 and program B (one hour of counseling) a value scale location of 10 for an impact on dimension X (cost in dollars), while A has a value scale location of 70 and B a value scale location of 90 for an impact on dimension Y (amount of time spent with family) (only X and Y are relevant). Suppose further that dimension Y is twice as important as dimension X. Then A and B should be equivalent in value. (The arithmetic is: for A, $50 + 2(70) = 190$; for B, $10 + 2(90) = 190$). Another way of writing the same arithmetic, which makes clearer what is meant by saying that equal numerical differences between these products on different dimensions correspond to equal changes in desirability,

is $(50-10) + 2(70-90) = 0$. It is important that judges understand this concept as they perform both Steps 6 and 8.

Step 9. Calculate overall values for entities. The equation is

$$V_i = \sum_j w_j v_{ij}$$

remembering that $\sum_j w_j = 100$. V_i is the aggregate value for the i^{th} entity. w_j is the normalized importance weight of the j^{th} dimension of value, and v_{ij} is the rescaled position of the i^{th} entity on the j^{th} dimension. Thus w_j is the output of Step 7 and v_{ij} is the output of Step 8. The equation, of course, is nothing more than the formula for a weighted average.

Step 10. Decide. If a single program approach or intervention strategy is to be chosen, the rule is simple: maximize V_i . If a subset of i is to be chosen, then the subset for which $\sum_i V_i$ is maximum is best.

A special case arises when one of the dimensions, such as cost (c), is subject to an upper bound--that is, there is a budget constraint. In that case, Steps 4 through 10 should be done ignoring the constrained dimension. The ratios V_i/C_i should be chosen in decreasing order of that ratio until the budget constraint is used up. (More complicated arithmetic is needed if programs are interdependent or if this rule does not come very close to exactly exhausting the budget constraint.) In the absence of budget constraints, cost is just another dimension of value, to be treated on the same footing as all other dimensions of value, entering into V_i .

SMART can easily be adapted to cases in which there are minimum or maximum acceptable values on a given dimension of value, by simply excluding alternatives that lead to outcomes that transgress these limits.

Flexibilities of the method. Practically every technical step in the preceding list has alternatives. For example Keeney (1972b) has proposed

use of a multiplicative rather than an additive aggregation rule. Certain applications have combined multiplication and addition. The methods suggested above for obtaining location measures and importance weights have alternatives; the most common is the direct assignment of importance weights on a 0-to-100 scale.

Independence properties. Either the additive or the multiplicative version of the aggregation rule assumes value independence. Roughly, that means that the extent of your preference for location a_2 over location a_1 of dimension A is unaffected by the position of the entity being evaluated on dimensions B, C, D, Value independence is a strong assumption, not easily satisfied. Fortunately, in the presence of even modest amounts of measurement error, quite substantial amounts of deviation from value independence will make little difference to the ultimate number V_i , and even less to the rank ordering of the V_i values.

A trickier issue than value independence is what might be called environmental independence. For example, the cost per youth of a program is extremely likely to be negatively correlated with the number of youths in the program. Yet these two dimensions may be value-independent; the correlation simply means that programs with both low cost/youth and low numbers of youths handled are unlikely to present themselves for evaluation.

Interpersonal and intergroup disagreements. Nothing in the preceding discussion ensures that different respondents will come up with similar numbers. Such agreements are indeed rare.

One might expect that the magnitude of interpersonal disagreement would make this technology of questionable value. Not so. Gardiner (1974; 1977) found that application of SMART actually helped reduce disagreement when compared with direct, intuitive evaluations.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The results reported here focus on (1) the MAUM instrument itself and establishing its reliability and (2) an analysis of the importance weight data (SMART steps 5, 6, and 7) aimed at answering the preliminary questions identified in the introduction.

The MAUM Instrument

The initial MAUM questionnaire was developed and pilot tested in Ventura County, California, and then mailed to the 300 named participants for the Time 1 mailing. A copy of the Time 1 instrument is shown in attachment 1. The Time 2, follow-up questionnaire was similar to that of Time 1 with two exceptions: (1) the instrument contained 25 impact dimensions, rather than the original 14, for MAUM step 5--the rank ordering step--only, and (2) the method of indicating the rank ordering on an answer sheet was modified by providing "paste-on" labels for ease of initial sorting, ranking, and transferring ranked impacts to the answer sheet. Attachment 2 shows the Time 2 instrument (modified portions only).

The Additional MAUM Impacts. The Time 2 instrument contained 11 additional impact dimensions for rank ordering purposes only. These were developed by reviewing the Time 1 responses. These responses contained 294 suggestions under part 3, "suggestions for additional factors." These 294 suggestions were screened by three DSO project staff members and 99 were eliminated. The decisions to eliminate any suggested factor was made if there were three votes (i.e., unanimous agreement) placing it in one, or more, elimination category. The elimination categories were:

- (1) independent variable in some other experiment/evaluation
- (2) dependent variable in some other experiment/evaluation
- (3) not applicable, irrelevant
- (4) useful but redundant with existing DSO factors
- (5) useful but merely a different way of operationalizing existing DSO factors
- (6) just airing a gripe, complaint or preaching
- (7) useful but merely the time series form of an existing DSO factor, and
- (8) an intervening variable with unknown utility to this evaluation.

The remaining 195 suggested MAUM factors were reviewed by five DSO staff members. Each member individually sorted (clustered) the 195 factors into major, generic categories. The five members then met jointly to compare individual sorts and to agree on a final sorting into major, generic categories. When the final sort had been completed, a frequency count was made of the number of suggested factors that clustered into each major, generic category. The results are shown in Table 4. The first 11 were selected for inclusion in the MAUM round two questionnaire. The remaining major categories were deleted outright or retained but not included in the MAUM round two for the reasons shown.

The 11 additional MAUM factors selected were included in the follow-up, Time 2 questionnaire in an attempt to "calibrate" the adequacy of the initial 14 impacts selected a priori by the DSO evaluation team.

TABLE 4

A. MAJOR, GENERIC CATEGORIES SELECTED AS ADDITIONAL MAUM FACTORS

	Frequency Count (Number of Suggested Factors in Cluster)
1. Amount of community support generated for status offender programs.	12
2. The number of status offenders employed.	11
3. Status offender's perceptions of self worth.	10
4. Attitudes of educators towards status offenders.	10
5. Status offender's positive involvement with peers.	9
6. Status offender's perceptions of status offender program.	8
7. Availability of status offender program services to status offender's family.	8
8. Nature and extent of status offender program client follow-up.	7
9. Level of qualifications and professional training of status offender program personnel.	6
10. Status offender involvement in recreational pursuits, cultural and other constructive activities.	6
11. Attitudes of status offender's parents towards status offender programs.	6

TABLE 4 (cont'd)

B. DISPOSITION OF REMAINING MAJOR GENERIC CATEGORIES

<u>Category</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
Number of alternative services available	12	Delete	Wrong level of abstraction
Family environment	11	Delete	Redundant
Client progress in school	10	Delete	Redundant
Family Attitudes	9	Delete	Redundant
Coordination & involvement of other services to status offenders	7	Delete	Redundant
Sense of legal consequences for actions	7	Delete	Redundant
Status offender becoming delinquent after treatment	7	Delete	Redundant
DSO program effective use of information re: status offenders	6	Delete	Unable to operationalize
Student-Teacher/Administration relationships	5	Retain	Combined for item 4
School as institution response to status offenders	5	Retain	Combined for item 4
Status offender recidivism	4	Delete	Redundant
Global attitudes	4	Delete	Ill-defined
Program evaluation	3	Delete	Redundant
Maintaining family unit	3	Retain, but omit from list	Weight too small
Judiciary attitudes	3	Retain, but omit from list	Weight too small

TABLE 4 (cont'd)

B. DISPOSITION OF REMAINING MAJOR GENERIC CATEGORIES (cont'd)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
Community attitudes toward status offenders	3	Retain, but omit from list	Weight too small
Supervision & frequency of contact	3	Retain	Merge with item 8
Status offender identify with significant adult	2	Retain, but omit from list	Weight too small
Family involvement in program	2	Retain	Merge with item 11
Police attitudes	2	Retain, but omit from list	Weight too small

Establishing the Reliability of the MAUM Instruments.* To establish the reliability of the two MAUM instruments, the analysis of variance approach to reliability was chosen (see C. Hoyt, Test Reliability estimated by analysis of variance, Psychometrika, 1941, 6, 153-160). Briefly, Hoyt's method involves setting up data as shown in Table 5 where each " w_{ij} " is the un-normalized importance weight assigned by MAUM respondent i to impact j (MAUM step 6). Hoyt regards the matrix of scores as a two-way factorial design for analysis of variance without replications. The basic formula used by Hoyt to find reliability is

$$r_{tt} = 1 - \frac{V_r}{V_e} = \frac{V_e - V_r}{V_e}$$

where V_r = the remainder variance (the interaction term between MAUM respondents and MAUM dimensions in this application) and V_e = variance for the MAUM respondents.

In this application of Hoyt's approach, the Time 1 instrument had 109 respondents ($n=109$) and the Time 2 instrument had 52 respondents ($n=52$). In each application, the number of attributes assigned importance weights in MAUM step 6 was exactly the same--14. Table 6a and 6b display the results of the analysis of variance for the importance weight data in the MAUM questionnaires.

Applying Hoyt's equation to the data contained in Table 6a and b, the following reliability is computed for each MAUM instrument:

$$r_{tt} \text{ (Time 1 instrument)} = .70$$

$$r_{tt} \text{ (Time 2 instrument)} = .81$$

*We are grateful to J. Robert Newman of the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Southern California for suggesting this approach and for the assistance in establishing the tests of instrument reliability.

TABLE 5
IMPORTANCE WEIGHT SCORES
OF MAUM RESPONDENTS FOR MAUM ATTRIBUTES

		ATTRIBUTE NUMBER												
		1	2	3	4	. . .							14	
MAUM RESPONDENT	1	w_{11}	w_{12}	w_{13}	w_{14}	. . .							$w_{1,14}$	
	2													
	.													
	.													
	.													
M	w_{m1}												$w_{m,14}$	

TABLE 6

A. SOLUTION FOR THE VARIANCES IN THE INSTRUMENT
PREPARATORY TO ESTIMATION OF RELIABILITY (TIME ONE INSTRUMENT)

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean SS
MAUM Attributes	316430.9	13	24340.8
MAUM Respondents	4589877.1	108	42498.8
Atts x Resp	17890612.1	1404	12742.6

B. SOLUTION FOR THE VARIANCES IN THE INSTRUMENT
PREPARATORY TO ESTIMATION OF RELIABILITY (TIME TWO INSTRUMENT)

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean SS
MAUM Attributes	199103.4	13	15315.64
MAUM Respondents	2553046.4	41	62269.42
Atts x Resp	6185198.29	533	11604.49

We may conclude from these results that the reliability of the Time 1 instrument is probably not lower than .70 and the reliability of the Time 2 instrument is probably not lower than .81.

Preliminary Analyses

Perhaps the most efficient way to present the results of the preliminary analyses is first to discuss the major procedure used to develop the results--cluster analysis--and then to state the five major questions addressed in this preliminary analysis followed by their answers.

Cluster Analysis. The cluster procedure used in the analyses that follow is programmed in the SAS system (A.J. Barr, J.H. Goodnight, J.F. Sall, and J.T. Helwig, the SAS Institute, Raleigh, North Carolina) and based on an algorithm outlined by Stephen C. Johnson in his article in Psychometrika (September, 1967). The procedure performs a hierarchical cluster analysis. It begins by identifying each single respondent in the analysis as a cluster. Then the two closest clusters (respondents) are combined into one cluster. Then the two closest clusters in the new set of clusters are combined into one cluster, and so on. The clustering is done in terms of the data observed for each respondent. For example, suppose there are six respondents and we want to cluster them by the following age data: 14, 21, 22, 24, 57, and 52. The first set of clusters would be:

(14) (21) (22) (24) (57) (52)

or six separate clusters, one for each respondent. The cluster procedure then looks for the two closest respondents in terms of age and clusters them together. The second set of clusters would then be:

(14) (21,22) (24) (57) and (52)

since 21 and 22 are the closest age observations. The two respondents corresponding to those ages are now combined into one cluster. The third clustering would be:

(14) (21,22,24) (57) and (52)

and the fourth:

(14) (21,22,24) and (57,52)

and the fifth:

(14,21,22,24) (57,52)

and the sixth:

(14,21,22,24,57,52)

producing one cluster of all six respondents. In essence the procedure starts with "N" individuals and forms "N" clusters of one respondent each and progressively "clumps" together the nearest respondents, reducing the total number of clusters by one iteratively until there is only one cluster containing all "N" respondents.

In instances where there are more than one datum for each respondent, as in this application where there are 14 for each respondent (the 14 importance weights), the i^{th} respondent is defined by

$$X_i = (w_{i1}, w_{i2}, \dots, w_{i,14})$$

where X_i can be called the respondent vector. The distance between any two respondents (in 14 dimensional space) can be written

$$d(X_i, X_j) = (X_i - X_j)' (X_i - X_j).$$

We can then standardize the distance matrix by dividing each element by the average distance from the vector of variable means, d ,

$$d = \frac{i \cdot d(X_i, \bar{X})}{N}$$

where N is the number of respondents. Using this procedure, the cluster analyses that follow--in answering the questions posed--progressively cluster the respondents in terms of "how close they are" in 14 dimensional space. That is, the two closest are clustered first and so on. Displays were developed to show the progressive clustering from one respondent to a cluster to all respondents combined in one cluster for each particular application.

Answers to Major Preliminary Questions. The portion of the report that follows poses in slightly different form the major preliminary study questions proposed in the introduction and reports their answers.

Question 1. How do the respondents cluster? Are there regional or occupation related clusters formed among respondents? The fundamental answer to this question is that the data suggest neither occupational category nor geographic patterns in the clustering among the 109 respondents to the Time 1 instrument. A similar finding is suggested by the 52 respondents to the Time 2 instrument, both for the 14 original attributes and the complete list of 25 attributes.

Since a complete presentation of the cluster analysis printouts would make rather tedious reading and shed little additional light, only two of the printouts have been selected for inclusion here to illustrate the points (and findings) made. To illustrate the finding that there is no noticeable geographic clustering, the occupational category of judges was selected showing the cluster analysis performed on the responses of judges for the Time 1 MAUM instrument (see figure 1). Notice that the clustering shows how all judges who responded from all sites cluster among themselves. The strongest cluster is between a judge in Spokane and one in Clark County.

Figure 1. Cluster of all MAUM Time 1 Subjects by Occupational Categories: Judicial
Cluster Map





Figure 2. Cluster Analysis By Location for 14 Original Attributes of MAUM
Time I Subjects: Delaware



The next strongest clustering is between two Delaware judges. Yet, there were six Delaware judges included in the analysis. The third strongest cluster was between a Connecticut judge and a Delaware judge. The two Connecticut judges were not even closely related in terms of their responses. These findings could lead one to speculate about the "real" reasons for the clustering (e.g., law schools, age, year appointed to bench, political inclination, number of children, and so on), but, whatever the reasons might be, geography is evidently not one of them.

To illustrate the finding that there is no noticeable occupational clustering, the geographic location of Delaware was selected and the cluster analysis performed on the responses of all occupations answering the MAUM time 1 instrument. These results are shown in figure 2. Notice that there were sixteen social workers responding, yet, the largest number of them clustering together were three. Also, notice that one cluster consisted of a social worker and policeman. Also, one social worker did not cluster with any other individual or group at all. Other geographic locations (Arizona, Alameda, and so on) produced similar results. It simply is not possible to claim that individuals within any given occupation view the world similarly. Both the judges and the social workers in Delaware (and other sites) seem to show that any such claim of occupational group viewpoints is not warranted on the basis of these findings. (In reading figures 1 and 2, the number of clusters are printed on the left hand side of each display and represent a step-wise reduction to a single cluster in the number of clusters from a number equal to the number of respondents involved in the cluster analysis. For example, in Figure 1, the display shows on the top line of the display 13 clusters of one respondent each for the 13 respondents involved in this particular analysis. The next line shows which of the 13 clusters are the closest in 14 dimensional space and connects

them leaving 12 clusters, where 11 of them are one respondent each and the 12th cluster contains two respondents. The next line shows which respondents are closest if the number of clusters is reduced to 10, and so on. When, on the bottom line, there is only one cluster present, it shows all 13 respondent members of that cluster.)

As indicated, these results suggest that a decision maker cannot rely on constituent groups forming among these respondents either in terms of job categories, in terms of geographic location within job categories, or in terms of geographic location. This finding remains constant from both the initial and follow-up MAUM questionnaire data and for 14 attributes or 25 attributes.

Question 2. How did the attributes chosen a priori by the DSO evaluation team compare with those suggested by the respondents in the initial MAUM instrument? There are a number of ways to respond to this question as a review of Table 7 reveals. For example, if the number of respondents assigning a rank of #1 to a given attribute is the comparison criterion, the original 14 attributes did not compare well with the 11 suggested by the field. If, on the other hand, the number of respondents suggesting that an attribute belongs in the "top 14" is the criterion, the original 14 compared reasonably well with the 11 from the field--perhaps because ties were allowed and in a number of instances all 25 attributes were listed in the top 14. Another way of examining the data is to compute the average rank order assigned to each attribute by taking the number of votes for each rank and multiplying this number by the rank, summing these totals and dividing by 52 (subjects). The resulting number represents the average rank assigned by the 52 respondents in the follow-up round. Table 8 displays this information along with the mean rank order of the initial 14 attributes and the mean rank order of the 11 suggested by the field. A simple t test shows that $t = 3.705$, indicating a significant difference between the mean rankings of the

initial 14 attributes and the 11 suggested by the field. Simply stated, and confirming what seems to be the visual impression, the respondents generally liked "their" attributes better than "ours."

Perhaps the major message in the data is that the respondents thought there should be more than 14 attributes to consider in evaluating DSO programs. It does seem clear that the most important attribute (38.5 percent of the respondents ranked it number one) is the status offender's perceptions of self worth, an attribute omitted from the original 14 selected by the national evaluation team. Moreover, if the average rankings are a valid indicator of respondent preferences, only A8--status offenders attitudes toward observing the law--would represent the initial list of attributes whereas eight of the field suggested attributes would be included in the top nine attributes to evaluate DSO programs.

Additional interesting findings showed up in a comparison of occupational categories and the rankings assigned to attributes. For example, although A8--status offenders' attitudes towards observing the law--showed up as the most important of original 14 attributes, no respondent within the occupational categories of police, judicial or elected official ranked this attribute first. The first rankings came from corrections and human service job categories. In the case of A14--level of the status offenders' school performance relative to his school mates--the lone Time 2 education respondent ranked it number 14 of 25 attributes to consider. In general, as the data indicated in response to question one, a person's job category did not necessarily lead to any hard and fast rules about which attributes were the most important in evaluating DSO programs.

Question 3. How do the additional 11 field-suggested attributes affect the clustering of respondents? As indicated in the response to question one, the data suggest again that neither job category nor geographic pattern emerged in the clustering of the 52 follow-up respondents.

TABLE 7

A COMPARISON OF THE 14 ORIGINAL MAUM ATTRIBUTES WITH THE 11 ADDITIONAL
ATTRIBUTES SUGGESTED BY THE 109 RESPONDENTS TO THE INITIAL MAUM QUESTIONNAIRE

Number of Follow-up Questionnaire Respondents* Assigning this Attribute a Rank of							
Attribute	#1	Top 5	Top 14	Bottom 11	Bottom 5	#25	Most Frequent Rank Assigned
A. No. Of Arrests Per Year	2	12	35	17	9	1	Rank 10 by 6 Resp.
B. Court Appearances	0	9	36	16	7	0	Rank 9 by 6 Resp.
C. Serious Delinquent Offenses	1	8	34	18	12	0	Rank 7, 11, 14 by 5 Resp. Each
D. Time with Family	3	17	35	17	6	0	Rank 5, 11 by 5 Resp. Each
E. Perceptions of the Serious- ness of an Offense	1	13	41	11	3	1	Rank 11 by 6 Resp.
F. Perception of CJS Effectiveness	3	15	36	16	5	0	Rank 2 by 7 Resp.
G. Parental Knowledge of SO's Whereabouts	4	18	37	15	3	0	Rank 5 by 5 Resp.
H. Attitudes on Observing the Law	6	19	43	9	3	1	Rank 1, 3 by 6 Resp. Each
I. Minor Delinquent Offenses	0	3	32	20	10	1	Rank 7, 12 by 6 Resp. Each
J. Annual Cost Per SO	0	9	30	22	12	2	Rank 13, 19 by 5 Resp. Each
K. Perceptions of Offense like Truancy	0	9	39	13	9	2	Rank 14 by 6 Resp.
L. Frequency of Contact Among SO Programs	1	10	32	20	9	0	Rank 9 by 5 Resp.

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TABLE 7 (cont'd)

Attribute	#1	Top 5	Top 14	Bottom 11	Bottom 5	#25	Most Frequent Rank Assigned
M. Percent of SOs placed in Locked Facilities	3	14	35	17	8	1	Rank 4, 5 by 5 Resp. Each
N. School Performance	1	12	35	17	8	1	Rank 11 by 5 Resp.
O. Community Support	5	17	41	11	3	1	Rank 4 by 6 Resp.
P. Family Service Programs	8	31	47	5	3	0	Rank 1, 5, 6 by 8 Resp. Each
Q. Educator's Attitudes to SO	0	10	33	19	5	1	Rank 5 by 5 Resp.
R. Parents Attitudes Toward SO Programs	0	15	42	10	5	0	Rank 6 by 6 Resp.
S. Program Staff Qualifications	3	18	41	11	2	0	Rank 2, 3 by 5 Resp.
T. Program Follow-up	6	16	43	9	3	1	Rank 1, 6 by 6 Resp.
U. Number of SOs Employed	1	11	39	13	7	0	Rank 5, 7 by 5 Resp.
V. Involvement in Other Activities by SOs	1	14	36	16	3	0	Rank 15 by 6 Resp.
W. Positive Involvement with Peers	0	22	43	9	2	0	Rank 2 by 9 Resp.
X. SOs Perception of SO Programs	2	13	37	15	7	0	Rank 2, 9, 16 by 5 Resp. Each
Y. Perceptions of Self Worth	20	33	46	6	0	0	Rank 1 by 20 Resp.

* There were 52 respondents involved in comparing the 14 original attributes with the 11 suggested by the field. Also, since respondents could tie-rank any number of attributes, the number of "votes" for any rank could range from none to 52 so for example, in theory, at least, each attribute could have 52 votes for rank #1, for rank #2, and so on.

TABLE 8
MEAN RANKINGS OF THE 14 ORIGINAL ATTRIBUTES
AND THE 11 FIELD SUGGESTED ATTRIBUTES

Attribute	Average Rank Order
A1. The average number of arrests per status offender per year.	11.46
A2. The proportion of status offense arrests that result in court appearance.	11.23
A3. The average number of serious delinquent offenses (such as robbery) that might occur in a six-month period, regardless of whether these offenses come to the attention of justice authorities.	12.76
A4. The amount of time status offenders spend with family.	10.80
A5. Status offenders' perceptions about the seriousness of an offense such as robbery.	10.13
A6. Status offenders' perceptions of justice system effectiveness.	10.42
A7. Parental knowledge of whereabouts of status offender.	10.50
A8. Status offenders' attitudes toward observing the law.	8.90
A9. The average number of minor delinquent offenses (such as truancy) that might occur in a six-month period, regardless of whether these offenses come to the attention of justice authorities.	13.42
A10. The annual cost in dollars per individual status offender.	13.36
A11. Status offenders' perceptions about the seriousness of an offense such as truancy.	11.67
A12. Frequency of contact between programs set up to provide services to status offenders and other social service agencies or institutions.	11.75
A13. The percentage of arrested status offenders placed in locked facilities while waiting for a court appearance.	11.30
A14. Level of the status offenders' school performance relative to his school mates.	11.48
Average Rank for all 14 = 11.37 Standard Deviation = 1.195 Highest Average Rank = 8.90 Lowest Average Rank = 13.42	

TABLE 8 (cont'd)

Attribute	Average Rank Order
A15. Amount of community support generated for status offender program.	9.36
A16. Availability of program services to status offender's family.	6.23
A17. Attitudes of educators toward status offenders.	11.94
A18. Attitudes of status offender's parents towards program.	9.25
A19. Qualification and training of program personnel.	8.96
A20. Nature and extent of program client follow-up.	9.23
A21. Number of status offenders employed.	11.11
A22. Status offenders involvement in recreational pursuits, cultural, and other acts.	8.96
A23. Status offenders positive involvement with peers.	8.17
A24. Status offenders perceptions of program.	10.50
A25. Status offenders perceptions of self worth.	5.42
Average Rank for all 11 = 9.01 Standard Deviation = 1.828 Highest Average Rank = 5.42 Lowest Average Rank = 11.94	

It was noticed, however, that the addition of attributes did cause some shifting and change who clustered where. This suggests that as clusters form, a change in the number of evaluation attributes considered may produce significant shifts in how constituents find themselves clustered.

It should be pointed out clearly at this point that a conclusive answer to question 3 may not be possible within the context of this DSO program evaluation. In an evaluation using SMART, the attribute rankings and importance weights are only part of the evaluation process. Any final evaluation figures of worth developed by a respondent for some alternative DSO program under consideration is compared by taking a linear combination of both his importance weights and program impacts as "translated" to worth by his value curves. Drawing inferences about changes in respondent clustering on overall (SMART-computed) figures of worth based on assigned importance weights or rank orders alone, may be very misleading. Frequently, individuals disagree rather strongly about ranking and importance weights assigned to individual attributes, yet, they agree overall on alternative figures of merit and rankings in spite of these differences. In fact, this is one of the major advantages of using such a technique (Gardiner, 1974). The clusters of individuals that may form to support a given DSO program based on a complete SMART evaluation may be very different from those that form based on ranking and rating of attribute dimensions alone. Moverover, they may be affected very differently by the addition or deletion of attributes. To develop a clear and definitive answer to question 3 within the context of this evaluation, overall evaluation scores should be computed with complete program impact data using the entire SMART process, and with sensitivity analyses performed on the number of attributes involved. In this way, the clustering of individuals could be looked at in terms of their overall evaluations, not

just one component of their value models. Since such scores cannot be computed in this study due to the lack of program impact data for all 25 attributes, one can only guess at the true effect of 11 additional attributes on the evaluation process and on cluster formation. Yet, it is the shifting of individuals among clusters in response to changes in the number of evaluation attributes that underlies the true intent of question 3. If, however, the evaluation were to be conducted based on ranks and ratings alone, it would appear that changes in the number of attributes do have the effect of shifting the individuals among the clusters formed.

Question 4. Did respondents change their minds between the initial and follow-up questionnaire on the rank ordering of the attributes? Before responding directly to this question, a short discussion is in order. This question is asking for causal inferences about any changes observed in the data between the initial and follow-up rounds of the MAUM questionnaire. Changes in how respondents rank order a list of 14 to 25 attributes may be produced by many factors and their interactions. Yet, two fundamental factors can be identified: (1) there is a true change in how the respondents feel about the rankings between Time 1 and Time 2, or (2) the respondents feel pretty much the same about the attributes but are unable to reproduce their original rankings (random error). It is well known that individuals have difficulty in reproducing a rank ordering of any list of attributes even without a change in values just because of the information overload involved. And this difficulty increases as the number of things to be ranked increases. Even for those individuals who have very strong feelings about the items to be ranked, only the top few and the bottom few seem to remain relatively constant

from ranking attempt to ranking attempt. The items in the "middle" seem to fluctuate due to random error. In this instance, there are 14 attributes to be ranked during the initial round and 25 attributes to be ranked in the follow-up. Hence, we may draw the following ground rules: If a respondent produces relatively the same ranking from Time 1 to Time 2, his (or her) values have probably not changed and the rankings probably reflect a true value system. If, on the other hand, the rankings change from Time 1 to Time 2 it may represent a true change in the respondents value system, or it may just be a product of random error in the ranking process. In the latter case, it would be very difficult to infer which factor was the true cause of the ranking changes.

Table 10 shows the correlations between the initial and follow-up rankings for the 14 original attributes for the 41 subjects that completed both questionnaires.* It should be emphasized that the second ranking of the 14 original attributes was completed in the context of ranking all 25 attributes in the follow-up questionnaire and the influence of this confounding factor is unknown. As can be seen from Table 10, 16 correlations were statistically significant (.10 or less). Of these 16, only one consisted of a reversal (negative correlation) that may represent a true reversal or confusion on how to complete the rankings, producing a reversal between the ranking efforts. The mean correlation for those with statistically significant, positive correlations was .656 with a range from .862 to .473. It probably can be said that these respondents held pretty much the same value system in terms of attribute rankings for both the initial and follow-up round in spite of the approximate four month interval between

*Only 41 individuals responded to both the Time 1 and Time 2 MAUM questionnaires.

questionnaire administrations. Of the 26 respondents with rankings that produced no significant correlations from Time 1 to Time 2, there is little to aid in inferring to which cause the low correlation could be attributed. One might suspect that the primary cause was random error, especially since there were only eight negative correlations produced compared to 33 positive correlations. The error was probably not random in its truest sense since such an error would lead to about as many positive correlations as negative ones. Yet, one might reasonably argue that while the basic rankings were about the same there was a lot of random error in assigning ranks within that basic ranking structure (for example, number 4 and 5 were reversed and so on). While this argument is plausible, it should be taken as just that, plausible but not statistically supported "fact."

The conclusion to be drawn from the data in Table 10 is that the respondents seemed to retain the basic ranking structure over the four months tested, but that specific attributes were juggled around within that basic structure. Hence, one might well conclude that subjects probably did not undergo a major shift in values between questionnaire administrations since there is no evidence to support a conclusion to the contrary and some evidence to support this conclusion.

Question 5. How do the evaluation attributes cluster among themselves?

A reasonable question that one might ask involves the issue of overlapping or redundant attributes on the attribute list. Such an overlap might account for the difficulty in reproducing rankings between questionnaire applications. Also, for technical reasons, it is not desirable to have highly positively correlated attributes on the evaluation list in SMART. This

TABLE 10

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE INITIAL AND FOLLOW-UP MAUM RATINGS FOR THE 14 ORIGINAL MAUM attributes for 41 SUBJECTS

Subject	Correlation	Significance
1. Arizona Elected Official	-.197	.49
2. Arizona School Administrator	.022	.93
3. Arizona Social Services	.407	.14
4. Arizona Social Services	-.167	.56
5. Arizona Social Services	.637	.01
6. Arizona Social Services	.397	.15
7. Arizona Social Services	.128	.66
8. Arizona Social Services	.426	.12
9. Alameda Social Services	.516	.05
10. Alameda Social Services	.563	.03
11. Alameda Social Services	.862	.0001
12. Alameda Juvenile Justice Comm	-.304	.29
13. Alameda Delinquency Prevention Comm	.371	.19
14. Connecticut Social Services	.587	.02
15. Connecticut Social Services	.314	.27
16. Connecticut Citizen	.584	.02
17. Connecticut Clergy	.059	.83
18. Connecticut Elected Official	.797	.0006
19. Connecticut Judicial	.659	.01
20. Delaware Social Services	-.719	.003
21. Delaware Social Services	.509	.06
22. Delaware Judicial	.202	.48
23. Delaware Legal Services	.167	.56
24. Delaware Social Services	-.179	.53
25. Delaware Social Services	.139	.63
26. Delaware Social Services	.045	.87
27. Delaware Police	.315	.27
28. Delaware Judicial	.224	.44

TABLE 10 (cont'd)

Subject	Correlation	Significance
29. Illinois Delinquency Prevention	-.254	.37
30. Illinois Police	-.079	.78
31. Illinois Corrections	.188	.51
32. Illinois Corrections	.473	.08
33. South Carolina Citizen	.008	.97
34. Spokane Judicial	.808	.0005
35. Spokane Police	.379	.18
36. Spokane Police	.338	.23
37. Clark County Elected Official	.533	.04
38. Clark County City Manager	-.109	.70
39. Clark County Clergy	.559	.03
40. Clark County Police	.624	.01
41. Clark County Citizen	.716	.004

leads to possible double counting in the evaluation. For example, if there were only five attributes and four were highly positively correlated, then instead of establishing worth of alternatives based on two independent worth dimensions, one of those dimensions would in fact be contributing 80 percent of overall worth.

Figures 3, 4, & 5 show how the attributes cluster for the initial administration with 109 respondents, how those same 14 attributes cluster for the 52 Time 2 follow-up respondents, and how the 25 attributes in the follow-up round clustered in the views of the 52 respondents. The cluster analysis procedure is the same used earlier except that the cluster procedure begins with 14 (or 25) groups of one attribute each and gradually forms clusters until there is just one group with 14 (or 25) attributes in it.

In Figure 3, there appears to be some reasonable (i.e., intuitively appealing) clustering of attributes. For example, A1--the average number of arrests per status offender per year--and A2--the proportion of status offense arrests that result in court appearance--are the two attributes most closely related. In fact, these two may represent a situation of double counting of two highly positive correlation attributes. Similarly, the clustering of the three attributes involving perceptions of the status offenders would seem to form a reasonable group. On the other hand, it is not clear why A3--the average number of serious delinquent offenses (such as robbery) that might occur in a six month period, regardless of whether these offenses come to the attention of justice authorities--and A14--level of the status offenders' school performance relative to his school mates--should form a cluster although it is only after forcing the number of clusters to 7 (half the original 14) that these two form a cluster so they may

Figure 3. Cluster Analysis of 14 MAUM DSO Program Evaluation Dimensions Time 1

CLUSTER MAP

NUMBER OF
CLUSTERS

14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1




Figure 4. Cluster Analysis of ~~COMMUNITY~~ DSO Program Evaluation Dimensions ~~Time 2~~

CLUSTER MAP





Figure 5. Cluster Analysis of 25 MAUM Time 2 DSO Program Evaluation Dimensions

CLUSTER MAP



be relatively distant in the cluster space. In the views of the 52 Time 2 respondents (Figure 4) the attributes cluster somewhat differently although the comments made earlier in response to question 3 apply here also. The strongest cluster remains arrests and court appearances, but in the view of the Time 2 respondents these two attributes are no longer the closest. Instead, both A3 and A9, each dealing with counting delinquent offenses (the former serious ones, the latter minor ones) are the closest in meaning. One might conclude, as in question 3, that clustering is a function of those responding (or viewing the attributes involved). When the Time 2 respondents' data were used to cluster the 25 attributes (see Figure 5), the strongest cluster was once again arrests and court appearances. The next two closest attributes were "attitudes on observing the law" and "perceptions of the criminal justice system effectiveness," a quite reasonable clustering if one took the view that the more effective the juvenile justice system is seen, the more likely one is to obey the law. Similarly, the clustering of the attributes "parental knowledge of status offenders whereabouts" and "amount of time spent with family" seems to be reasonable as does the clustering of "community support for the program" and "parental attitudes toward the program." The implications of these clusters in Figures 3, 4, & 5 are two: (1) the clustering is affected by the number of respondents asked to view the attributes, and (2) more importantly, there may be some instances of double counting among the 25 attributes being used to evaluate the DSO programs. Since future use of these data will concern only the 14 attributes, only those instances where both sets of respondents see strong clustering between any of these 14 attributes will be reviewed for possible elimination of attributes to prevent double counting.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the analyses presented here have been preliminary, a limited number of speculative conclusions can be made with respect to the larger population of people interested in DSO programs and their evaluation.

1. The values of relevant publics can be brought into DSO program evaluation. Although only a post card prior notification was sent to respondents, and without any agreement to participate, 109 usable evaluation instruments were returned of about 300 questionnaires sent (actually 150 were returned but only 109 were usable). The respondents represented a wide range of job categories including, among others, police, judges, probation officers, and social workers over many program sites. Each respondent was one named as important to a local DSO program manager. The results are even more indicative that public values can be brought into an evaluation process because the questionnaire forms were very different from those normally used in "tapping" public values (as a number of respondents indicated). Specifically, it would appear that the SMART version of multi-attribute utility measurement can be used via the mails to involve the public in evaluation efforts. This is the first time such a finding has emerged on the scale used in this evaluation.

2. People probably won't cluster by region or job category the way one might expect them to. Although this finding must remain tentative since it is based on importance weights and attribute rankings alone (rather than on the full SMART computations of value), it does seem that people cannot be expected to form clusters for or against some program based solely on geography or job category. Any attempt by local managers to develop and exploit

any regional or job category "advantages" in the development of status offender deinstitutionalization programs may not produce the results expected. This finding would appear to be counter-intuitive, since similar occupational groupings may be expected to share common values. However, the DSO program represents a currently developed instance of the relatively new movement to deinstitutionalize formerly incarcerated categories of deviants. During the early phases of new social movements uncertainty and confusion are common respecting their meaning and implications for occupational interests.

3. Let "real" people help pick the evaluation dimensions to evaluate programs. A very important finding about evaluation emerged from the data in this evaluation: there is more than one way to develop the dimensions to be used in evaluating programs. For example, in this evaluation there were at least four potential sources of value dimensions: (1) the "list" that is implicit in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 itself, (2) the list that could have been developed by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention staff who are responsible for implementing the Act, (3) the list that may have been thought conceptually or scientifically important by those involved in formally evaluating deinstitutionalization programs that are established as a result of funding from the Act, and (4) the list that the relevant public would have considered important in evaluating deinstitutionalization programs. A major problem with such a multiplicity of attribute generating sources is that they may--and probably will--all generate different lists!

In this evaluation the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention dictated certain attributes that in turn were contracted for in the national evaluation. Also, measurability and data access reasons influenced

attribute selection by the national evaluation team. Moreover, the national evaluation team did not emphasize what relevant publics might consider important. Rather, the attributes were selected in part for conceptual and scientific purposes. This composite list was then submitted to a relevant public for their input. The results of this attribute "generating" process comparison are clear in the data and should be no surprise. If one takes the view that the relevant public knows what it wants to consider in evaluating a program better than "experts" do, the initial, composite list of attributes developed in this national evaluation left much to be desired. If, on the other hand, one takes the view that national policy makers and other experts know what dimensions should be considered in evaluating programs better than the relevant public, the initial attributes could be viewed more favorably.

A most interesting situation occurs when national policy makers consider views of the relevant public important in generating attributes for evaluation purposes. Although extraordinarily cumbersome and time consuming, this study has demonstrated that the public could be involved in setting up evaluation dimensions in SMART evaluations. The importance of identifying whose values (step 1 of MAUM) are to be served in a program evaluation cannot be overemphasized. Step 4 (identifying the value dimensions) cannot be successfully carried out until the question of "whose values" has clearly been answered. Failure to resolve that critical question properly raises the risk of a program evaluation developing very thorough value models for relatively unimportant value dimensions in MAUM steps 2 through 10. This evaluation has shown that given a list of, for example, 14 attributes a group of public respondents will complete the instruments necessary to produce a value

model, yet there is little guarantee that the 14-attribute-based-evaluation-model will be able to establish real figures of worth for alternative programs under consideration since the 14 attributes may just as easily be the least important 14 as well as the most important 14 in the eyes of the public. Such a "wrong" set of attributes for the "right" public may lead to severe implementation problems following program selection based on the alternative evaluation models, especially if the right "public" has the value system that really counts during program implementation.

4. Develop the evaluation before developing the programs to be evaluated. While it is very difficult for most funding agencies to develop a complete evaluation design before funding the programs to be evaluated, it is reasonable to expect that SMART steps 1 through 4, for example, be completed prior to funding programs. With SMART step 4 completed, the data necessary for accomplishing the evaluation will be identified and can be made part of the requirements in the program funding to preclude problems of after-the-fact data gathering or, worse, missing evaluation data. The reason for this is clear:

Either new individuals with new value systems or submerged, unacknowledged, or new attributes may affect an ultimate evaluation. While this is a very complicated issue involving completed SMART procedures and sensitivity analyses as well as issues about how to combine different individuals' value models, there is some indication in these preliminary analyses that either new individuals or additional attributes may affect the computations leading to overall figures of worth for any given set of alternatives being evaluated. Going from 109 to 52 respondents and from 14 to 25 attributes seemed to affect either the clustering of respondents (in the former case)

or the clustering of attributes (in the latter). However, in the absence of a sound statistical measure of this effect and completed SMART evaluations, this finding must remain tentative.

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ATTACHMENT 1

THE MAUM TIME 1 INSTRUMENT

INSTRUCTIONS

NAME _____ Title _____
(Please Print)

PLEASE CHECK HERE IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF THIS SURVEY.

There are three parts to this questionnaire. Part I asks for your views about the relative importance of 14 factors to be considered in evaluating status offender programs. Part II asks for your preferences about different amounts of each evaluation factor considering just that factor by itself. Part III asks for your comments about the "completeness" of the current list of 14 factors. Please complete the questionnaire in order. We are interested in your personal preferences, so there are no "right" or "wrong" answers. We estimate that the length of time to complete this questionnaire will be about one hour.

PART I


On page 3, you will find 14 Evaluation Factors (i.e., impacts) that we consider important for the purpose of evaluating the merits of any proposed program to treat status offenders. We would like you to review this list and then indicate your views as to the relative importance of each factor on the list as follows:

1. Please consider the 14 factors (and only these 14) and then RANK ORDER them in decreasing order of importance to you, with number 1 being most important and the least important last. (ties are acceptable)
2. Once you have rank-ordered them, please reflect on their relative importance to you. How much weight does each factor carry relative to the other factors as you would use them to evaluate a Status Offender program if there were one in your community? Please write the weights you would assign to each factor to reflect its relative importance to you.
 - a. Do this by assigning a weight of 10 to the least important factor (lowest rank) as a common starting point.
 - b. Next, for the factor with the next highest rank, assign it a weight to reflect its importance compared to the lowest factor. For example, it may be half again as important to you as the lowest factor. If so, it would receive a weight of 15. If it is twice as important, it would receive a weight of 20.
 - c. Then go to the next most important factor and compare it to the one just completed and repeat the process.

A factor with a weight of 40 is twice as important as one with 20 and half as important as one with 80, and so on. A factor with 50 is as important as one with 20 and one with 30 taken together.

There are no limits to the weights you assign. When finished, you will have weighted all the factors to reflect their relative importance to you. Page 2 shows a simplified example of how this is done.

EXAMPLE: EVALUATING AUTOMOBILES



EVALUATION FACTORS

- A. PURCHASE PRICE
- B. COMFORT
- C. STYLE
- D. HANDLING
- E. GAS MILEAGE
- F. SAFETY

RANK ORDER

LINE 1	<u>a</u>	(MOST IMPORTANT)
LINE 2	<u>c</u>	
LINE 3	<u>E</u>	
LINE 4	<u>B, F</u>	(A TIE)
LINE 5	<u>D</u>	(LEAST IMPORTANT)
LINE 6		(EMPTY IN THIS EXAMPLE)

ASSIGN WEIGHTS

	<u>60</u>	
	<u>50</u>	
	<u>30</u>	← GAS MILEAGE IS TWICE AS IMPORTANT AS SAFETY
	<u>15</u>	← 10 POINTS ASSIGNED AS REFERENCE TO LEAST IMPORTANT FACTOR
	<u>10</u>	

PURCHASE PRICE (60) POINTS IS TWICE AS IMPORTANT AS GAS MILEAGE (30 POINTS) FOUR TIMES AS IMPORTANT AS SAFETY (OR COMFORT) (BOTH TIED AT 15 POINTS) AND SIX TIMES AS IMPORTANT AS HANDLING (10 POINTS)

STEP 1 -- REVIEW THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IN TERMS OF THEIR IMPORTANCE IN EVALUATING STATUS OFFENDER PROGRAMS:

EVALUATION FACTORS

- A. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER STATUS OFFENDER PER YEAR. TYPICALLY, ARRESTS OF INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDERS MIGHT RANGE FROM 0 TO 10 OR MORE PER YEAR.
- B. THE PROPORTION OF STATUS OFFENSE ARRESTS THAT RESULT IN COURT APPEARANCE.
- C. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS DELINQUENT OFFENSES (SUCH AS ROBBERY) THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE OFFENSES COME TO THE ATTENTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITIES.
- D. THE AMOUNT OF TIME STATUS OFFENDERS SPEND WITH FAMILY.
- E. STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF AN OFFENSE SUCH AS ROBBERY.
- F. STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS.
- G. PARENTAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHEREABOUTS OF STATUS OFFENDER.
- H. STATUS OFFENDERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD OBSERVING THE LAW.
- I. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINOR DELINQUENT OFFENSES (SUCH AS TRUANCY) THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE OFFENSES COME TO THE ATTENTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITIES.
- J. THE ANNUAL COST IN DOLLARS PER INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDER SERVED (\$200 WOULD BE THE APPROXIMATE COST OF SHORT-TERM COUNSELING ONLY AND \$4,000 THE APPROXIMATE COST OF RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT INCLUDING A WIDE VARIETY OF SERVICES).
- K. STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF AN OFFENSE SUCH AS TRUANCY.
- L. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT BETWEEN PROGRAMS SET UP TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO STATUS OFFENDERS AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES OR INSTITUTIONS.
- M. THE PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTED STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED IN LOCKED FACILITIES WHILE WAITING FOR A COURT APPEARANCE.
- N. LEVEL OF THE STATUS OFFENDER'S SCHOOL PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO HIS SCHOOL MATES.

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EVALUATING STATUS OFFENDER PROGRAMS

STEP 2. RANK ORDER EVALUATION FACTORS

TO REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO YOU AS YOU EVALUATE AUTOMOBILES, TIES ARE ACCEPTABLE. ENTER THE LETTER CORRESPONDING TO THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR LISTED IN STEP 1 ON LINE 1. ENTER THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT ON LINE 2, AND SO ON. IF ANY TWO FACTORS ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT, PLACE BOTH LETTERS ON THE SAME LINE. FOR THREE-WAY TIES, PLACE THREE LETTERS ON THE SAME LINE, AND SO ON.

	RANK ORDER	ASSIGN WEIGHTS
	(MOST IMPORTANT)	
LINE 1	_____	_____
LINE 2	_____	_____
LINE 3	_____	_____
LINE 4	_____	_____
LINE 5	_____	_____
LINE 6	_____	_____
LINE 7	_____	_____
LINE 8	_____	_____
LINE 9	_____	_____
LINE 10	_____	_____
LINE 11	_____	_____
LINE 12	_____	_____
LINE 13	_____	_____
LINE 14	_____	_____

STEP 3. WEIGHT THE EVALUATION FACTORS

ASSIGN 10 POINTS TO THE LEAST IMPORTANT FACTOR AND THEN INDICATE YOUR OWN OPINION ABOUT THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH FACTOR BY ASSIGNING WEIGHTS ACCORDINGLY. (NO UPPER LIMIT ON WEIGHTS)


PART 2

In Part I of this questionnaire we were interested in how you felt about the relative importance of each evaluation factor--one compared with the other. In this part of the questionnaire, we are interested in how you feel about varying amounts of each particular factor considered one at a time, independently of the other factors. For example, "How do you feel about more and more (or less and less) cost per status offender to run the treatment program, regardless of what is happening on the other factors?" (To answer this, assume everything else is equal. The only thing that is changing is the amount, or level of performance--dollar cost--on this single factor).

On Page 5 you will find one of the evaluation factors for an automobile used as an example of how to follow the four steps necessary to complete Part 2. In some cases it may appear obvious as to what the "Best" and "Worst" sample points are (Steps 2-4) that are to be placed at 100 and zero. However, it is the relative worth to you of the remaining sample points that is of importance in evaluating program impact.

After reviewing the example on page 5, please turn to page 6 and complete the questionnaire.

EXAMPLE: EVALUATING AUTOMOBILES



EVALUATION FACTOR A

- STEP 1. CONSIDER THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER STATUS OFFENDER, PER YEAR. TYPICALLY, ARRESTS OF INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDERS MIGHT RANGE FROM 0 - 10 OR MORE PER YEAR.
- STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE OF POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER YEAR

0 2 4 6 8 10 or more

- STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.
- STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.
- STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR B

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE PROPORTION OF STATUS OFFENSE ARRESTS THAT RESULT IN COURT APPEARANCE. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 0% TO 100%.

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE OF POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

0.....no arrests go to court
25%..... $\frac{1}{4}$ of arrests go to court
50%..... $\frac{1}{2}$ of arrests go to court
75%..... $\frac{3}{4}$ of arrests go to court
100%.....all arrests go to court

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100
WORTH POINT SCALE

006

EVALUATION FACTOR C

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS DELINQUENT OFFENSES (SUCH AS ROBBERY) THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE OFFENSES COME TO THE ATTENTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITIES.
STATUS OFFENDERS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN ASKED THE QUESTION, "How many times in the last six months have you used force or threat of force to take something from another person?" THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 0 TIMES TO 15 TIMES OR MORE.

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

NUMBER OF TIMES OFFENSE COMMITTED

0 3 6 9 12 15 or more

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100
WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR D

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE AMOUNT OF TIME STATUS OFFENDERS SPEND WITH FAMILY. STATUS OFFENDERS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN ASKED THE QUESTION, "How much time, if any, do you spend with your family?" THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (ALL OF THEIR TIME) TO 4 (NONE OF THEIR TIME).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....all of their time
- 2.....some of their time
- 3.....very little time
- 4.....none of their time

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR E

STEP 1. CONSIDER STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF AN OFFENSE SUCH AS ROBBERY.
THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (EXTREMELY SERIOUS) TO 7 (NOT AT ALL SERIOUS).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

1.....extremely serious
2
3
4.....somewhat serious
5
6
7.....not at all serious

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.
(POINTS 2, 3, 5, 6 ARE NOT LABELLED BUT SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE WORTH SCALE.)

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT
DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

903

EVALUATION FACTOR F

STEP 1. CONSIDER STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS. STATUS OFFENDERS WERE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THEY AGREED WITH THE STATEMENT, "If kids get caught breaking the law they are almost always punished." THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (AGREE STRONGLY) TO 6 (DISAGREE STRONGLY).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....agree strongly
- 2.....agree pretty much
- 3.....agree a little
- 4.....disagree a little
- 5.....disagree pretty much
- 6.....disagree strongly

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

406

EVALUATION FACTOR G

STEP 1. CONSIDER PARENTAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHEREABOUTS OF STATUS OFFENDER. STATUS OFFENDERS WERE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THEY AGREED WITH THE STATEMENT, "My parents usually know where I am." THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (AGREE STRONGLY) TO 6 (DISAGREE STRONGLY).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....agree strongly
- 2.....agree pretty much
- 3.....agree a little
- 4.....disagree a little
- 5.....disagree pretty much
- 6.....disagree strongly

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0...5...10...15...20...25...30...35...40...45...50...55...60...65...70...75...80...85...90...95...100
WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR H

STEP 1. CONSIDER STATUS OFFENDERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD OBSERVING THE LAW. STATUS OFFENDERS WERE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THEY AGREED WITH THE STATEMENT, "It is alright to get around the law if you can get away with it." THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (AGREE STRONGLY) TO 6 (DISAGREE STRONGLY).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....agree strongly
- 2.....agree pretty much
- 3.....agree a little
- 4.....disagree a little
- 5.....disagree pretty much
- 6.....disagree strongly

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR I

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINOR DELINQUENT OFFENSES (SUCH AS TRUANCY) THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE OFFENSES COME TO THE ATTENTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITIES. STATUS OFFENDERS HAVE BEEN ASKED THE QUESTION, "How many times in the last six months have you skipped classes while at school or left school early without permission?" THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 0 TIMES TO 15 TIMES OR MORE.

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

NUMBER OF TIMES

0 3 6 9 12 15 or more

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR J

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE ANNUAL COST IN DOLLARS PER INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDER SERVED. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF \$200 (\$200 would be the approximate cost of short-term crisis counseling only) TO \$14,000 (\$14,000 would be the approximate cost of residential placement including a wide variety of services).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE OF POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

<u>COST PER INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDER SERVED</u>				
\$200	\$1,000	\$4,000	\$9,000	\$14,000

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

908

EVALUATION FACTOR J

STEP 1. CONSIDER THE ANNUAL COST IN DOLLARS PER INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDER SERVED. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF \$200 (\$200 would be the approximate cost of short-term crisis counseling only) TO \$14,000 (\$14,000 would be the approximate cost of residential placement including a wide variety of services).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE OF POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

<u>COST PER INDIVIDUAL STATUS OFFENDER SERVED</u>				
\$200	\$1,000	\$4,000	\$9,000	\$14,000

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95...100

806

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR K

STEP 1. CONSIDER STATUS OFFENDERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF AN OFFENSE SUCH AS TRUANCY. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (EXTREMELY SERIOUS) TO 7 (NOT AT ALL SERIOUS).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....extremely serious
- 2
- 3
- 4.....somewhat serious
- 5
- 6
- 7.....not at all serious

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE. (Points 2, 3, 5, 6 are not labeled but should be placed on the worth scale.)

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

606 0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100
WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR L

STEP 1. CONSIDER FREQUENCY OF CONTACT BETWEEN PROGRAMS SET UP TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO STATUS OFFENDERS AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES OR INSTITUTIONS. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (NO CONTACTS) TO 4 (CONTACTS SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....no contact between service providers and other agencies
- 2.....contact less than once a week
- 3.....contact about once a week
- 4.....contact several times a week

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0.....5.....10.....15.....20.....25.....30.....35.....40.....45.....50.....55.....60.....65.....70.....75.....80.....85.....90.....95.....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR M

STEP 1. IN SOME JURISDICTIONS, LOCKED FACILITIES ARE PROVIDED FOR DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS PRIOR TO COURT APPEARANCE, CONSIDER THE PERCENTAGE OF ARRESTED STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED IN LOCKED FACILITIES WHILE WAITING FOR A COURT APPEARANCE. THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 0% (NO STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED IN SUCH FACILITIES) TO 100% (ALL ARRESTED STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED IN SUCH FACILITIES).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING SAMPLE OF POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

0%.....no arrested status offenders placed in locked detention facilities while waiting for a court appearance.
25%..... $\frac{1}{4}$ of arrested status offenders placed in locked detention facilities while waiting for a court appearance.
50%..... $\frac{1}{2}$ of arrested status offenders placed in locked detention facilities while waiting for a court appearance.
75%..... $\frac{3}{4}$ of arrested status offenders placed in locked detention facilities while waiting for a court appearance.
100%.....all arrested status offenders placed in locked detention facilities while waiting for a court appearance.

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "BEST" AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER "WORST" AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

EVALUATION FACTOR N

STEP 1. CONSIDER LEVEL OF THE STATUS OFFENDER'S SCHOOL PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO HIS SCHOOL MATES. STATUS OFFENDERS WERE ASKED THE QUESTION, "How would you describe your grades at school compared to other kids in your same school year?" THIS FACTOR HAS A RANGE OF 1 (MUCH BETTER) TO 5 (MUCH WORSE).

STEP 2. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE RANGE GIVEN IN STEP 1:

- 1.....much better than school mates'
- 2.....better than school mates'
- 3.....about the same as school mates'
- 4.....worse than school mates'
- 5.....much worse than school mates'

STEP 3. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "BEST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT 100 ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 4. SELECT THE POINT IN STEP TWO THAT YOU CONSIDER THE "WORST" RESPONSE A JUVENILE MIGHT GIVE AND PLACE IT AT ZERO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE.

STEP 5. PLACE THE REMAINING POINTS IN STEP TWO ON THE WORTH POINT SCALE (RELATIVE TO THE BEST AND WORST) SO THAT DISTANCES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATIONS REFLECT THEIR RELATIVE WORTH TO YOU.

0....5....10....15....20....25....30....35....40....45....50....55....60....65....70....75....80....85....90....95....100

WORTH POINT SCALE

PART 3

1. Obviously, there are other important factors to be considered in planning or evaluating status offender programs. We would like to ask your help in identifying additional factors you personally consider important. We do not maintain that these 14 factors are exhaustive. Please indicate your suggestions in the space provided below, being as specific as possible in describing them.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL FACTORS

A.

B.

C.

D.

2. If, prior to receiving this questionnaire, you were exposed to meetings, literature, other questionnaires, etc., surrounding the treatment of status offenders, please answer the following:

In the last six months, have you (check all that apply)

- ☐ served as a member of a Board of Directors for a youth service agency?
- ☐ responded to any other questionnaire specifically about status offenders?
- ☐ attended, as a participant, any meeting about the treatment of status offenders?
- ☐ been the recipient of mailings, such as newsletters, brochures, etc., primarily about the treatment of status offenders?

Thank you again for your participation in this national evaluation study.

CONTINUED

11 OF 14

ATTACHMENT 2
THE MAUM TIME 2 INSTRUMENT
(Selected Portions Only)*

* Only those portions of the instrument that differed from the Time 1 MAUM instrument are included in this attachment.

INSTRUCTIONS

NAME _____ TITLE _____
(Please print)

There are two parts to this questionnaire. Part I asks for your views about the relative importance of 25 factors to be considered in evaluating status offender programs. Part II asks for your preferences about different amounts of each evaluation factor considering just that factor by itself. Please complete the questionnaire in order. We are interested in your personal preferences, so there are no "right" or "wrong" answers.

PART I

On page 5 you will find the first of four pages of answer sheets for Part I. Each answer sheet has space for evaluation factors that have been rank-ordered and space for locating ties, if there are any, for any particular factor ranking. You will also find enclosed in this questionnaire an envelope that contains 25 pieces of paper. Each piece of paper has typed on it an evaluation factor (i.e., impact) that is considered important for the purpose of evaluating the merits of any proposed program to treat status offenders. The 14 factors that are on green paper are the same 14 that were in the original questionnaire you received and completed for us. The 11 factors that are typed on the white paper are the 11 that you, those of you who returned the first questionnaire, suggested to us as additional factors you consider important. We would like you to review this combined set of "green" and "white" evaluation factors and then indicate your views as to the relative importance of each as follows:

1. Please consider these 25 factors and only these 25, and then RANK ORDER them on a desk top or table top ignoring the color differences in decreasing order of importance to you, with number 1 being the most important and the least important last. Ties are acceptable. (One way to help in rank ordering them is to make three "piles" at first where one pile has those that are most important to you, another pile has those least important to you, and the third pile has those that fall in between. Then by ranking those factors within piles you can more easily find an overall ranking of the 25. Remember for this step, please ignore the different colors in establishing your rank ordering.)
2. Once you have rank-ordered the factors and are satisfied with the rank order, please transfer the factors to the answer sheets preserving the rank order. This can be done by peeling off the backs and just pressing the papers onto the answer sheets in the spaces provided. Ties will be placed across the answer sheets and the rank order will be placed "up and down" the sheets as shown in the example.
3. Once the factors are placed on the answer sheets, please review those factors on green paper only (ignore those on white) where ever they may be on the rank ordering on the answer sheets. Please reflect on their relative importance to you. How much weight does each green factor

carry relative to the other green factors as you would use them to evaluate a Status Offender program if there were one in your community? Please write the weights you would assign to each green factor to reflect its relative importance to you.

- a. Do this by assigning a weight of 10 points to the least important green factors (lowest rank ordered green factor) as a common starting point.
- b. Next, for the green factor with the next highest rank, assign it a weight to reflect its importance compared to the lowest green factor. For example, it may be half again as important to you as the lowest green factor. If so, it would receive a weight of 15 points. If it is twice as important, it would receive a weight of 20 points.
- c. Then go to the next most important green factor and compare it to the one just completed and repeat the process.

A green factor with a weight of 40 is twice as important to you as one with 20 and half as important to you as one with 80 and so on. A green factor with 50 points is as important as one with 20 and one with 30 taken together.

There are no limits to the weights you assign. When finished, you will have weighted all 14 green evaluation factors to reflect their relative importance to you and rank-ordered all 25 evaluation factors (both green and white) on the answer sheets. Page 3 shows a simplified example of how this is done with automobiles.

BEGIN PART I

STEP 1. OPEN ENVELOPE AND REVIEW LIST OF EVALUATION FACTORS

STEP 2. RANK ORDER THE EVALUATION FACTORS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR AND TRANSFER RANKING TO ANSWER SHEETS THAT FOLLOW

To reflect their relative importance to you as you evaluate DSO programs. Ties are acceptable.

Rank order the factors on a table or desk top first and then transfer to answer sheet by peeling off backs and sticking them in proper place.

The most important factor regardless of color is placed on RANK 1. The second most important factor is placed on RANK 2. If two (or more) factors tie, place them on the same RANK line. (Use reverse side if necessary.)

STEP 3. WEIGHT THE GREEN EVALUATION FACTORS ONLY

In the space provided, assign 10 points to the least important Green factor and then indicate your own opinion about the relative importance of each other Green factor by assigning weights accordingly. No upper limit on weights. Ignore the white factors during weighting.

STEP 1. OPEN ENVELOPE AND REVIEW LIST OF EVALUATION FACTORS (A Factor = a "thing to consider")

(6 original factors on green paper)

EXAMPLE: EVALUATING AUTOMOBILES

EVALUATION FACTORS

Purchase price (green)
Gas mileage (green)
Safety (green)
Handling (green)
Comfort (green)
Reliability (green)

Trade in value (white)
Braking ability (white)

(two new factors shown on white paper)

STEP 2. RANK ORDER THE EVALUATION FACTORS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR AND TRANSFER RANKING TO ANSWER SHEETS

To reflect their relative importance to you as you evaluate automobiles. Ties are acceptable. Rank order on table or desk top first and then transfer to answer sheet by peeling off backs and sticking them in proper place. The most important factor regardless of color is placed on rank 1. The second most important factor is placed on rank 2. If two factors tie for any rank, place them side by side on that rank.

ANSWER SHEET

60	RANK 1 (Most Important)	PURCHASE PRICE
50	RANK 2	SAFETY
White not weighted	RANK 3	TRADE IN VALUE
30	RANK 4	GAS MILEAGE
15	RANK 5	COMFORT
10	RANK 6	HANDLING
White not weighted	RANK 7 (Least important)	BRAKING ABILITY
	RANK 8	

Empty in this example

Least important green factor has 10 points assigned

Purchase price (60 points) is twice as important as gas mileage (30 points) and four times as important as safety or comfort (both tied at 15 points) and six times as important as handling (10 points).

STEP 3. WEIGHT THE GREEN EVALUATION FACTORS ONLY

Assign 10 points to the least important green factor and then indicate your own opinion about the relative importance of each other green factor by assigning weights accordingly. No upper limit on weights.

CHAPTER XXI
COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS
OF
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION PROGRAMS

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & Co.

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

555 SOUTH FLOWER STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90071

June 30, 1978

Dr. Solomon Kobrin
Social Science Research Institute
950 West Jefferson Boulevard
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90007

Dear Dr. Kobrin:

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM&Co.) has completed its engagement for the Social Science Research Institute (SSRI) to develop a comparative cost analysis of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) action grant program. The cover letter portion of this report includes background and DSO Program information and describes the engagement's objectives and scope, the approach undertaken by PMM&Co. to accomplish the engagement objectives, key assumptions and a summary of the results of our work. Detailed descriptions and unit costs of the program elements are included in the Jurisdiction sections of the main body of the report as well as a discussion of the primary tasks required to complete the study to be used as a guide for future studies.

BACKGROUND

In January 1976, DSO Program grants were awarded to 11 jurisdictions across the country through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U.S. Department of Justice. The purpose of these grants was to develop community-based alternatives for juvenile status offenders as opposed to institutional placement. The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP) of the OJJDP concurrently awarded a grant to the University of Southern California's Social Science Research Institute to conduct a national evaluation of the OJJDP's DSO Program.

Of the 11 jurisdictions receiving program grant funds, eight have been included in the national evaluation by SSRI. From the eight, three jurisdictions were subsequently chosen by

SSRI and PMM&Co. for cost analysis based upon differences in program approach, the condition and availability of financial and statistical data for both the program and comparative preprogram periods, as well as the expected level of support from jurisdictional agencies.

DSO PROGRAM

To assist readers unfamiliar with the DSO Program, the following brief summary of the program objectives is provided to facilitate understanding of the report.

The major goals of the DSO Program as set forth in the "National Evaluation Design for the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Program" focus on the removal of juvenile status offenders from secure detention and correctional institutions and the development of community-based treatment and rehabilitative services to be used as an alternative to secure detention and institutional commitment. For purposes of the cost analysis contained in this report, detention and correctional services are referred to as juvenile justice services. Alternative services are referred to as social services.

To estimate the costs associated with the DSO Program, the status offender must be defined to identify the target population of the program, and accordingly the study. Status offenders are those minors who have committed juvenile status offenses (as contrasted with delinquent offenses) and, as a result of these acts, have been eligible for services provided by the juvenile justice program authorities in the selected jurisdictions. Juvenile status offenses are acts which, if committed by an adult, would not constitute a law violation. Examples of status offenses include running away from home, incorrigibility, truancy, or possession of alcohol or tobacco. Delinquent offenses, on the other hand, are acts (such as burglary or robbery) which would constitute a violation of Federal, state, or local laws if committed by an adult.

In addition to the proper definition of the target population, the service elements of a program must be defined, the components of the elements identified, and the units of service of the elements determined for cost analysis purposes. A program is an assortment of service elements made available by a jurisdiction's agencies to a target population with specific needs. Service elements represent specific types of direct services. Service element components exist when an element is provided by more than one agency. For example, counseling in a jurisdiction is a service element and when counseling is provided through various contract

agencies, each contract agency becomes a component of the overall counseling service element. Units of service include detention days, referrals served or youths served.

ENGAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

The "National Evaluation Design for the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Program" suggested the need for program cost data to allow jurisdictions and the LEAA to make cost comparisons (1) before and after deinstitutionalization, (2) among community-based programs and possibly (3) by and among youth careers (tracks).

The overall objective of the engagement has been to provide program cost data to SSRI to facilitate cost comparisons by the Institute. Specific cost data requested by SSRI were full unit costs of service for program service elements or components and the full total costs for the corresponding program element or component. The specific project objectives set forth in PMM&Co.'s proposal were to:

- . Identify specifically the types of cost information desired by the Institute
- . Determine the condition and availability of financial and statistical data in the selected jurisdictions
- . Collect and compile the required financial and statistical data with the assistance of SSRI and its local evaluators
- . Perform the various cost analyses to develop fully costed preprogram and program costs and unit of service costs for service structures relating to status offenders
- . Prepare an outline of the major tasks undertaken to conduct the comparative cost analysis of the DSO Program.

SCOPE

The scope of the engagement covered estimating the full costs associated with serving the status offender population in three selected jurisdictions for the DSO Program period and a prior preprogram period. (Note: The term "full costs" is defined under the caption APPROACH appearing later in this section of the report.) These costs are to be estimated for the service elements and displayed on a unit cost basis as well as total service element costs.

Jurisdictions and Study Periods

Time periods corresponding to SSRI's preprogram and program evaluation time periods were selected by SSRI and PMM&Co. for cost analysis in the three jurisdictions. The jurisdictions and study periods are:

	<u>Preprogram</u>	<u>Program</u>
New Castle County, Delaware		
PMM&Co. cost period	July 1, 1975 – June 30, 1976	July 1, 1976 – June 30, 1977
SSRI evaluation period	May 1, 1975 – April 30, 1976	July 15, 1976 – August 31, 1977
Pima County, Arizona		
PMM&Co. cost period	July 1, 1974 – June 30, 1975	July 1, 1976 – June 30, 1977
SSRI evaluation period	July 1, 1974 – June 30, 1975	August 1, 1976 – June 30, 1977
Spokane County, Washington		
PMM&Co. cost period	January 1, 1975 – December 31, 1975	July 1, 1976 – June 30, 1977
SSRI evaluation period	January 1, 1975 – December 31, 1975	July 15, 1976 – August 31, 1977

Service Elements

The primary service elements associated with status offenders for the preprogram and program periods are listed below. Descriptions of each element are contained in the body of the report.

<u>Preprogram period elements</u>	<u>Program period elements</u>
Police	Police
Court intake	DSO screening unit
Detention	Shelter care home
Hearings	Group home
Probation	Foster home
Incarceration	Multiple service center
Social service programs	Outreach intervention
	Counseling

In some cases, status offenders received preprogram-type services during the program period. The cost impact of these preprogram elements is included in the program period costs.

To the extent possible, cost pools (an accumulation of the costs associated with providing a service) were developed to capture the full cost for each service element listed above. These cost pools (or elements) and their unit and total costs are displayed in the tables at the end of the individual Jurisdiction sections of this report. The main body of the Jurisdiction sections provides descriptions of the cost pools/elements to add clarity to jurisdiction terminology or unique approaches undertaken by jurisdictions in providing service elements. In some cases, cost pools do not directly correspond to service elements for reasons discussed under the caption **Limitations**. Diagrams are also included in the Jurisdiction sections in the body of the report to display typical youth careers (tracks) of the preprogram and program periods. (Note: Typical youth careers or tracks are a series of service elements which correspond to the typical preprogram or program.)

Status Offender Population

For the program period, the status offender population includes youths who received services from the DSO grant program elements after being processed by the DSO screening unit. The screening unit generally was responsible for several activities including diversion of the youth from the juvenile justice system, evaluation of the eligibility of the youth for inclusion in the target population, and referral of the youth to an appropriate DSO grant program element. In some cases, the population was expanded to include those status offenders who were referred to program elements which were not funded by the DSO grant. Also covered in the expanded population were "walk-in" referrals, i.e., those status offenders who entered the program system of elements without having been processed by the screening unit.

To enable comparison between program and preprogram costs, status offenders deemed to be "ineligible" by the DSO screening unit for the DSO Program were added to the program population described above. These youths were not diverted from the juvenile justice system and were subsequently processed by service elements identical to the preprogram juvenile justice elements. This category of status offender could not be eliminated from the preprogram population because of limitations in preprogram classification records. Accordingly, they were included in the program population for cost comparability.

The preprogram period status offender population is comprised of all youths who had committed status offenses previously described under the caption DSO PROGRAM.

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For cost analysis purposes, PMM&Co. relied on the jurisdictions' *agencies'* definition of status offenses, and therefore those youths deemed to be status offenders.

Limitations

PMM&Co. performed this analysis in accordance with the objectives, scope and approach set forth in conjunction with SSRI and within the limitations inherent in the financial and statistical data relating to program efforts which require support from multiple agency/functional organizations.

Financial and statistical data used in this cost analysis were not audited by PMM&Co. and accordingly we express no opinion on them. PMM&Co. has relied upon financial and statistical data provided to us by the following sources:

Financial data:

- Financial records of relevant agencies providing services to status offenders

Statistical data:

- SSRI
- Local program evaluators
- Program statisticians
- Relevant agencies.

Where information was not available because of record limitations, to complete the cost analysis of a service element, it has been so designated on the appropriate table. The normal limitations of public agencies' financial and statistical records which resulted in reduced analysis were the following:

- Nonexistent data could not be recreated.
- Data from nonsummarized records prepared at the transactional level and not maintained in good form for accurate and timely summarization were not considered accessible and were therefore not recreated for use.
- More precise and directly relevant material could not be readily furnished by the agency at the time of the study.

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It should be emphasized that PMM&Co. was engaged by SSRI to determine program and preprogram costs of juvenile justice and social service program elements associated with status offenders. In this capacity, this report does not present specific conclusions or recommendations regarding program efficiency and/or effectiveness.

APPROACH

The basic approach to the conduct of the engagement was to perform comparative cost analyses of the program period and preprogram period service elements which provided services to the jurisdictions' status offender population. The cost analyses include all costs, direct and indirect, associated with providing these services. However, separate presentation of direct and indirect costs was not required by SSRI. Direct and indirect costs of the jurisdictions' agencies are the following:

Direct costs of the jurisdictions' agencies':

- Salaries and all fringe benefits, including pensions for personnel providing services directly related to status offenders
- Materials and supplies and other expenses utilized by personnel providing services directly related to status offenders
- Costs of contracting with private outside organizations to perform services directly related to status offenders. While these costs are a direct cost to the jurisdiction, the reimbursement made by the agency includes the contract organization's indirect costs.

Indirect costs of the jurisdictions' agencies':

- Salaries and other expenses associated with supervising and administrating personnel providing services to status offenders. For example, a pro rata share of the Governor's Office expense would be allocated to state agencies
- Facilities costs for working spaces of direct and indirect personnel. These indirect costs are included in public-calculated facilities charges (in lieu of depreciation charges) or in direct rent user charges included in agency budgets
- Centralized public agency indirect services, such as treasury, accounting, purchasing or building maintenance.

The general approach used to complete the comparative cost analysis was the following:

- . Identified the typical status offender youth career (tracks) and basic service elements associated with the program or preprogram
- . Reviewed the organizational structures of agencies providing the service elements and, by using staff classifications and salary ordinances, determined the direct salary costs of the element
- . Ascertained the types of centralized indirect services provided to the direct service agency and determined the agency's organizational relationship to the central government
- . Allocated the indirect costs of centralized services and administration and facilities to the service elements using an appropriate allocation basis. The accuracy of this allocation is usually limited by the availability of data; however, the number of staff or salary costs are generally accepted as reasonable bases.
- . Selected the most suitable work load measure for service elements and identified and organized work load data relating to the elements
- . Determined the proportion and/or unit cost of service element costs associated with status offenders. The accuracy or completion of this step was highly dependent on the quality and quantity of work load statistics.

Certain costs were adjusted to facilitate preprogram-to-program cost comparisons. The preprogram costs have been adjusted for inflation of salaries and other costs. In addition, identifiable program start-up costs were amortized over five years so that program operation costs were not overstated.

At the outset of the study, the following specific work plan was developed to implement the general approach described earlier:

- . Determine preliminary data requirements of the Institute for the cost analyses
- . Assess jurisdictional accounting and operating systems for data availability and integrity
- . Update data preliminary requirements based upon availability

- . Present results to the Institute for review and concurrence
- . Establish costing assumptions and guidelines for the study based upon the Institute's requirements and data limitations
- . Collect and compile data from jurisdictions
- . Prepare cost analyses
- . Outline cost analyses tasks for use by other agencies desiring to conduct similar cost analyses in the future
- . Prepare final report.

The full cost analysis approach utilized by PMM&Co. is one of several approaches which could have been used. For example, direct or differential costs could have been used instead of full costs. However, because the full costs of services provided by agencies with large administrative structures are generally not realized utilizing other approaches, the full cost approach was selected. Also, a cost-benefit analysis could be used in addition to the cost comparison analysis. This report has provided cost data to the Institute for its subsequent evaluation of the change in cost structure in relation to the benefits of the DSO Program. It should be emphasized that a cost-benefit analysis was beyond the scope of PMM&Co.'s engagement.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The key assumptions that were made to complete this study are discussed below. These assumptions relate to the general structure of the study, the methodology for service element costing, the costing of the status offender youth and the adjustment of costs for analysis. The assumptions relating to the general structure of the study were as follows:

- . That a fully costed service element approach constitutes a reasonable basis for comparative cost analyses
- . That the comparative fiscal periods chosen constitute a reasonable basis for comparative cost analysis of the preprogram (institutional) and program (deinstitutional) approaches to child service.

The cost methodology used to identify cost pools corresponding to service elements and subsequently used to determine the total direct and indirect costs associated with that element required several assumptions which were as follows:

- That records, documents and verbal information obtained from site agency personnel reasonably reflect costs and activities related to youth services
- That organizational charts provided to PMM&Co. or developed by PMM&Co. from interviews with agency personnel and personnel listings reasonably reflect location and job responsibilities of agency personnel
- That distribution of personnel and/or personnel costs constitutes a reasonable basis for allocating other expenses
- That the various consolidated statewide and countywide cost allocation plans for the jurisdiction constitute a reasonable basis for the allocation of total statewide and countywide central and administrative services for the appropriate fiscal years
- That the units of service selected for the service element components' unit costs represent the work load of the service element components
- That the work load of the youth careers (tracks) entrance element represents the total number of status offenders referred to the jurisdiction, and therefore constitutes a reasonable basis to calculate the average unit cost to the jurisdiction for serving a status offender.

Determining the proportion of service element costs that were applicable to only status offenders required several assumptions. Data was not readily available which would facilitate discrimination of cost differences between youths being served by a service element. The assumptions used were as follows:

- That status offenders are juveniles deemed to be status offenders by the relevant service agencies
- That for any given service element, juvenile delinquents and status offenders receive similar units of service and therefore have similar unit costs. (Note: It is recognized that juvenile delinquents and status offenders generally receive dissimilar units of service and quantities of units of service from any given service element; however, service records' limitations necessitated this assumption for costing purposes.)
- That for any given agency service element, males and females receive similar treatment and therefore have similar unit costs.

COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL SERVICE ESTIMATED COSTS (1) (2)
FOR STATUS OFFENDERS

Jurisdiction	Fiscal service periods						Change* in estimated cost		
	Preprogram			Program			Total cost		Unit
	Total cost	Service mix	Unit cost	Total cost	Service mix	Unit cost	\$	%	cost %
New Castle County, Delaware:									
Juvenile Justice Services	\$ 1,213	50%		\$ 388	14%		\$(825)	(68)%	
Social Services	1,228	50%		2,428	86%		1,200	98 %	
Total jurisdiction estimated cost	\$ 2,441	100%	\$ 4,173	\$ 2,816	100%	\$ 3,313	\$ 375	15 %	(21)%
Pima County, Arizona:									
Juvenile Justice Services	\$ 1,130	59%		\$ 100	8%		\$(1,030)	(91)%	
Social Services	791	41%		1,123	92%		332	42 %	
Total jurisdiction estimated cost	\$ 1,921	100%	\$ 630	\$ 1,223	100%	\$ 520	\$(698)	(36)%	(17)%
Spokane County, Washington:									
Juvenile Justice Services	\$ 436	77%		\$ 111	20%		\$(325)	(75)%	
Social Services	129	23%		437	80%		308	239 %	
Total jurisdiction estimated cost	\$ 565	100%	\$ 759	\$ 548	100%	\$ 544	\$(17)	(3)%	(28)%

*Increase (decrease)

(1) Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

(2) Total costs are in thousands (\$000s omitted).

Several assumptions are used to make adjustments to preprogram cost data in order to facilitate preprogram-to-program cost comparisons. These assumptions were as follows:

- That application of an inflation index to preprogram costs materially eliminates distortions caused by inflation for the preprogram and program comparative cost analysis
- That the identification and amortization of program start-up costs results in service element costs similar to the costs of an ongoing program operation.

Imprecise Statistical Data

When work load data was not originally captured by agency personnel and summarized in a fashion suitable for element analysis, informed estimates by operating personnel were obtained. Reasonable estimates such as average lengths of service or status offender component of total census work load were used with other corroborating data to complete the analysis. When data was virtually nonexistent for a service element, estimates could not be used; such instances are designated "N/A" in the report.

STUDY RESULTS

The overall results of the jurisdiction cost studies are included as a comparative summary of juvenile justice and social service estimated costs on Table I on the facing page. The total costs on Table I are supported by the jurisdiction summaries of juvenile justice and social service element estimated costs at the beginning of each Jurisdiction section on Tables II, V and VIII for New Castle County, Pima County and Spokane County, respectively. The jurisdiction summaries are supported by the detailed element tracking costs on Tables III and IV for New Castle County; Tables VI and VII for Pima County; and Tables IX and X for Spokane County at the end of the respective sections. The element tracking cost tables include unit costs as well as total costs for the agencies providing service elements.

Summary of Jurisdiction Analyses

Table I highlights the shift in status offender cost between juvenile justice services and social services from the preprogram period to the program period as demonstrated by the change in the service mix proportions of total costs. The cost impact of the DSO Program was

similar in the three jurisdictions to the extent that juvenile justice service estimated costs declined absolutely as well as proportionally in relation to total estimated cost, while social service estimated costs increased absolutely as well as proportionally in relation to total estimated cost. It should be pointed out that the decline in the cost of juvenile justice services is only in relation to the cost of serving status offenders. In addition, the average unit cost of a status offender referral to the jurisdiction for services declined from the preprogram to the program period in all cases.

The financial impact of the DSO Program on the cost of serving status offenders appears to be favorable based upon the decline in the average unit cost of serving a status offender and the shift of cost from juvenile justice to social service programs.

It should be pointed out that the following observations should be considered when reviewing this analysis:

- The decline in cost may not be an actual cost savings to the jurisdiction unless the juvenile justice elements are reduced to the extent that they served status offenders in the preprogram period. If juvenile justice services are not reduced when status offenders are no longer served and, if these services are facing increasing work loads, then the apparent decline in costs for status offenders could represent future cost savings to the jurisdiction because growth of the juvenile justice service system could be postponed until the work load reaches the system capacity.
- The costs of services in the three jurisdictions are understated to the extent that information was not available to estimate the costs of certain service elements. Social services appeared to be more understated than juvenile justice services. The impact of these cost understatements is to reduce the magnitude of the estimated cost shift from juvenile justice to social services. For example, if the omitted costs were determined and included in the summary, social service costs would have increased in both periods but to a greater extent in the program period. This observation is based upon interviews and available work load statistics which indicate that the greatest understatement of costs is in the program period social services area.
- The impact of the program period social services cost understatement on the average unit cost to the jurisdiction is to increase the average unit cost primarily in the program period. While this impact appears to partially negate the favorable decline in the average unit cost, further analyses indicated that this impact would be minimal.

P. M. M. & CO.

Police costs could not be adequately estimated for inclusion in our report because financial and statistical data regarding status offenders was not readily available. However, our review determined that police procedures in relation to status offenders which would affect costs did not substantially change. While a change in the number of police contacts may have occurred, a significant change in the unit costs could not be identified.

Comparability and Analysis

Preprogram-to-program cost comparability has been facilitated by the adjustment of preprogram costs for inflation. In addition, identifiable program start-up costs were amortized over five years. However, short-term distortions in unit costs may exist because of changes in facility or service utilizations due to changes in work load. Allocation of indirect costs may also obscure comparability; however, every effort was made to make preprogram and program costs comparable by using similar allocation techniques where possible.

Jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction comparability of cost data to determine relative efficiencies is generally not valid. The reasons for this noncomparability of jurisdictions include:

- Deinstitutionalization had started prior to the DSO action grant program in the jurisdictions; however, progress toward total deinstitutionalization was varied when the action grant program started. Because the jurisdictions' deinstitutionalization efforts varied at the start of the action grant, the relative successes of the jurisdictions' DSO action grant programs cannot be judged solely from this data.
- Service element components differ due to varying jurisdictional approaches to service delivery as well as differences in cost accumulations required by jurisdiction financial and statistical systems. In addition, varying degrees of intensity of service delivery for service elements are not indicated. Therefore, the relative jurisdiction efficiencies for service elements cannot be judged solely from this data.
- The fully costed approach utilized in this analysis obscured jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction comparability because of varying indirect cost allocation techniques as well as the differences in administrative structures.
- Variations in general regional cost-of-living indices between the jurisdictions obscured direct jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction comparability.

P. M. M. & CO.

Recommendations for Future Studies

The results of the cost analysis presented in this report could have been more precise if cost data requirements had been defined prior to program start-up and cost data collection efforts had been more closely monitored and coordinated. Based upon this experience, PMM&Co. recommends that systems for accumulating and reporting financial and statistical data be generally improved in the juvenile justice and social service agencies noted in this report. These systems improvements will improve grant reporting of interim progress and final results to funding agencies.

* * * * *

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance we received from the numerous agencies and their personnel, and especially the staff of the Institute. Without their valuable cooperation, preparation of this report would not have been possible.

Very truly yours,

Pent, Hannah, Mitchell & Co.

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I – INTRODUCTION

The following comparative cost analyses of three DSO Program jurisdictions are a part of the Social Science Research Institute's evaluation of the DSO grant program for serving status offenders. Each jurisdiction's status offender cost data was accumulated, analyzed and reported for comparability between the preprogram and program period costs. Comparison of jurisdictions for relative efficiency is not appropriate because of the reasons set forth in the "Comparability and Analysis" subsection of the cover letter of this report.

Each jurisdiction section presents background information and cost data for all major service elements starting with the jurisdiction's initial contact with the status offender through the jurisdiction's final disposition of the youth. The background information provided in each section includes a diagram of the preprogram and program process of serving status offenders and a narrative description of the process. In addition, the element descriptions include an identification of significant component direct and indirect costs, the cost methodology behind the cost analysis, and unit costs. Further background information regarding the jurisdiction analysis includes a description of the jurisdiction's indirect cost allocation, inflationary adjustment, and any significant cost omissions which may have occurred because of unavailable data.

Jurisdiction cost data is presented in summary and detail form in each section. Costs are presented in summary form by juvenile justice and social services elements for both periods in the "Jurisdiction Findings" subsection of each Jurisdiction section. These summary costs are the basis of the mix calculations presented in Table I in the report cover letter. Detail costs behind the jurisdiction summaries are presented at the end of each jurisdiction section in table format.

The last section of this report is an outline of the general tasks and records which were used to complete this report. This section has been included to provide guidance to others who may desire to conduct a similar study in the future.

II - NEW CASTLE COUNTY COST ANALYSIS

Data was accumulated for two study periods in order to determine the cost of providing services to status offender juveniles in New Castle County, Delaware. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1976 was selected as the preprogram cost period and fiscal year ended June 30, 1977 was selected as the program cost period. Cost data relating to both fiscal periods was accumulated for all major service elements starting with the jurisdiction's initial contact with the status offender through the jurisdiction's final disposition of the youth.

The State of Delaware Family Court in New Castle County was the primary evaluation and referral agency for juvenile status offenders during both periods; however, during the program period the court's DSO intake unit was established exclusively as the status offender screening unit to improve evaluation and referral services' delivery to status offenders. Cost data was also accumulated for other juvenile justice and social service agencies which provided direct services to status offenders during both fiscal periods.

Full costs of services as described in the Approach section of this report were determined by allocating the costs of indirect administrative and support services to the costs of all services provided directly to status offenders. The majority of the services to status offenders were provided by state agencies during both study periods. Accordingly, the State of Delaware's consolidated Statewide Cost Allocation Plan was used to apply the costs of central support service agencies to the agencies directly servicing status offenders. The costs of all other general statewide administrative agencies were also allocated to the direct service agency costs. Charges for the use of state-owned buildings or rent were reflected in agency expenditure data used to determine the cost of service elements. Where pension and other employee costs were not reflected in agency cost data, salary costs were adjusted to reflect the costs of the statewide pension plans.

Appropriate preprogram period cost elements were adjusted for inflation to program period price levels using the rate of the cost-of-living salary increases paid to state employees during the study time period in order to facilitate comparability of costs between the two periods. Cost-of-living increases were based upon the Philadelphia consumer price index. Purchase of service contract rates which did not change were not adjusted for inflation.

Table II

NEW CASTLE COUNTY, DELAWARE
SUMMARY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL SERVICE ELEMENTS
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR STATUS OFFENDERS

<u>Services</u>	<u>Preprogram</u>	<u>Program</u>
Juvenile Justice Services:		
Local Courts	N/A	N/A
Family Court	\$ 307,567	135,450
Corrections	905,367	252,216
Subtotal	1,212,934	387,666
Social Services:		
Family Court (DSO intake)	—	129,744
Family Court (SP)	28,481	25,180
Special Services	22,888	106,602
Shelter Care	N/A	41,990
Group Homes	13,409	97,392
Counseling	17,983	70,611
Foster Care	64,210	114,979
Child Protective Services	64,055	37,518
Medical Evaluation and Treatment	1,017,042	1,804,373
Subtotal	1,228,068	2,428,389
Total jurisdiction estimated costs	\$ 2,441,002	2,816,055
Status offender contact at system entrance:		
Family Court: Complaints and Intake	585	—
Family Court: DSO Intake	—	850
Total contacts	585	850
Average unit cost to the jurisdiction for status offender contacts	\$ 4,173	3,313

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

The estimated cost of serving status offenders in New Castle County for both periods can be only partially determined because of incomplete work load statistics and/or cost data regarding status offenders. These omissions primarily existed in delivery of social services. Generally, the social service agencies maintained total work load statistics for the agency; however, in most cases a social service agency was not concerned with the specific offense category of the youth, and accordingly did not make such a determination in their records. Without an indication of the component of status offenders in total work load, an estimate of total status offender costs could not be made. In this case, only unit costs could be estimated using total work load. Nevertheless, cost observations can be made regarding the status offender population in the preprogram and program periods.

This Jurisdiction section will describe the service elements' function and cost components as well as contrast the preprogram and program element differences. In addition, our estimated youth tracking unit costs and total costs for the preprogram and program elements used by status offender youth are presented in Tables III and IV, respectively, at the end of the Jurisdiction section.


JURISDICTION FINDINGS

Estimated costs for New Castle County are summarized in Table II on the facing page by juvenile justice and social service elements. The mix of the cost of services provided to status offenders in New Castle County, Delaware shifted from the preprogram to the program period, resulting in proportionately less costs being incurred by status offenders for juvenile justice services. As computed in Table I in the cover letter of this report, juvenile justice services accounted for approximately 50% of the total costs incurred for the status offender population in the preprogram period. During the program period, juvenile justice services accounted for only 14% of the total cost after the estimated juvenile justice cost for status offenders declined 68% and the social services cost for status offenders increased 98%. In addition, the average unit cost to the jurisdiction for serving a status offender declined 21% to \$3,313 from \$4,173. The average unit costs are calculated on Table II.

In certain cases, an estimated cost for status offenders could not be determined because of data not being available (N/A). The impact of these omissions appears to understate the shift of costs from juvenile justice to social services and overstate the decline in unit costs. These observations are based upon agency interviews and other available data and indicate that

Diagram I

NEW CASTLE COUNTY, DELAWARE
PREPROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1976



status offenders received more social services in the program period than the preprogram period because of the increased orientation toward evaluation, diagnosis and referral as a result of the DSO program. Further analysis indicates that unit costs would still decrease if all costs could have been determined. For example, total jurisdiction costs would have had to increase approximately 45% for the unit cost to have remained constant. The omissions were not that significant.

The average unit cost calculation uses the referral work load of the court's complaints and intake unit and the DSO intake unit because the intake units generally received all youth entering the jurisdiction's youth career tracks. It should be noted that while the intake unit work load can be used to calculate an overall average unit cost of the jurisdiction's contact with a status offender, the intake work load is not indicative of the magnitude of the total system work load because of varying youth career tracks, varying levels of intensity at which services are provided, and the varying lengths of stay in any given element.

DESCRIPTION OF PREPROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENTS

The typical youth career track elements for the preprogram and program periods are described in this subsection and displayed in Diagrams I and II, on the facing and following pages, respectively.

During the preprogram period, juvenile status offenders were generally referred to the Family Court by police, local community courts, citizen complaint or parents. Youth contacted by police during Family Court hours were referred to the Family Court. Youth contacted by police at night or on weekends were referred to local community courts which, in turn, referred them to the Family Court generally via detention at Bridge House. The local community courts had the option of referring status offenders to shelter care prior to Family Court processing; however, this option was seldom used in the preprogram period. During the program period, Mary House Association was established to receive local court referrals in lieu of detention; however, the general youth career track options did not significantly change.

The Family Court received arrest and detention cases into arrest processing during both periods and complaint cases into the intake units during both periods. Subsequent to intake, the youth career track in both periods then generally included hearings with referrals to

NEW CASTLE COUNTY, DELAWARE PROGRAM PERIOD YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977




Diagram II

social services, probation or incarceration. Contrasting the Family Court procedures for both periods will facilitate a general understanding of the procedures for both periods.

Family Court arrest processing and intake of status offenders changed from the preprogram to the program period with the establishment of the DSO intake unit. During the preprogram period, the Family Court received arrest and detention cases at the bail detention unit for arrest processing, which included a preliminary hearing before a judge. Those youth not dismissed at the preliminary hearing were returned to detention pending receiving by the complaints and intake unit. During the program period, status offender arrest and detention cases still received arrest processing; however, status offenders bypassed the bail detention unit and the complaints and intake unit which were specifically structured for juvenile delinquents and received the arrest processing and intake services only from DSO intake counselors. The status offender arrest processing policies were also changed to provide that all status offenders be removed from detention each working day at the beginning of Family Court working hours.

Detained and arrested status offenders are then received at arrest processing and, where possible, are returned home pending subsequent intake processing by the DSO intake unit. Where status offenders could not be returned home pending intake, shelter care was provided. When cases could not be disposed of at the receiving level, the court provided judicial hearing services and probation services which did not significantly change from the preprogram to the program period.

Referral of status offenders by the court to social service agencies could occur at any point in the Family Court youth career track during both periods. For example, psychologist and substance abuse counseling services were used by the court in both periods to better evaluate the youth cases. In addition, Community Legal Aid Services were provided to some youth in both periods and, in the program period, special intensive mental diagnostic services were provided by the Delaware Curative Workshop to enhance the court's youth evaluation. Also, youth could be referred directly to any social service agency by the intake unit and thereby bypass any further court processing.

The major agencies providing direct services to juvenile status offenders during the preprogram and program periods include the State of Delaware Family Court, Department of Corrections and the Department of Health and Social Services. The Department of Health and Social Services provided services to status offenders primarily through the separate Divisions of

Social Services (DSS) and Mental Health (DMH). In addition, police agencies, local courts and private contract agencies provided services to the status offender population during the preprogram and program periods.

Police Agencies

The police agencies providing referrals to courts during both periods included the Delaware State Police, New Castle County Police, Wilmington Police Department and several other municipal police departments. Police agencies refer status offenders to the New Castle County Family Court as either paper or physical referrals. A youth referred by paper is released after contact and ordered by citation to appear at the Family Court. A physical referral occurs when the youth is taken into custody and transported to a local court or Family Court. Use of a paper or a physical referral was circumstantial and could apply to delinquents or status offenders. As a result of our review, we could determine no substantial change in police procedures and, accordingly, costs for referring the average status offender to a local court or the Family Court.

Local Courts

Local courts include Justice of the Peace (Magistrate) Courts, the Wilmington Municipal Court or Alderman's Courts. Local courts generally received police contacts which occurred in the evenings or weekends. The local court would conduct a hearing and the youth was generally referred to detention or shelter care, or was released to parents.

The local court element costs include the total expenditures of all individual courts in New Castle County as direct costs, and allocated indirect costs which include the statewide Administrative Office of the Courts. Unit costs were calculated using total costs and total number of cases handled by the courts. Available statistics did not differentiate status offenses; therefore, the status offender component of local court work load could not be determined.

Family Court

Family Court preprogram and program element costs were determined by identifying staff associated with service elements and then assigning to the elements all costs directly identifiable with the element staff. Indirect administrative costs of the Family Court and the

appropriate proportion of the Administrative Office of the Courts' costs were subsequently allocated to the service element costs. Court statistics relating to the specific elements' work load were then used to arrive at unit costs as well as the proportion of the elements' costs which applied to status offenders.

The New Castle County Family Court provided juvenile justice services and several special social services to status offenders. The primary juvenile justice services included arrest processing prior to intake, court intake unit (complaints and intake during the preprogram and DSO intake during the program), hearings, and probation services. The primary special programs (SP) included a court psychologist and substance abuse counseling. The Family Court preprogram and program elements are further described in the following subsections for added clarity:

- **Arrest Processing Prior to Intake** — Preprogram processing of arrest referrals prior to intake costs an average of \$250 to receive arrest referrals from police or detention facilities, to prepare for a preliminary hearing and to conduct a preliminary hearing, as opposed to \$142 for the program period. This element includes the direct costs of the bail detention unit for the preprogram period and a portion of the DSO intake costs for the program period. The special bail detention unit was bypassed by status offenders in the program period, and DSO intake counselors performed arrest processing in addition to intake processing. The element also included direct costs of the judicial preliminary hearing and allocated indirect costs.
- **Intake** — The preprogram complaints and intake unit processing of referrals cost an average of approximately \$149 to receive referrals, to file the appropriate legal paperwork, and to attempt a voluntary settlement of the case. This element includes the direct costs of the complaints and intake unit and allocated indirect costs. The program DSO intake unit performed a similar function for approximately \$152, essentially no change in cost. The program element includes the direct costs of the DSO intake unit and the allocated indirect costs.
- **Hearings** — The average cost of a judicial hearing was \$91 for the preprogram and \$63 for the program to conduct a predispositional, adjudicatory or dispositional hearing. Although there were several different types of hearings, the costs for all hearings were accumulated into a single element even though costs of individual hearings may vary by type. This element includes the direct costs of judicial services and the investigation counselors who generally provide youth background information to judges in support of hearings. County Attorney and Public Defender costs were not included in the cost

element because they generally did not attend status offense hearings. This element also includes allocated indirect costs. The reduction in hearing cost reflects the reduced number of investigations required in the program period to support the hearing process for status offenders.

- **Probation** — Probation services cost an average of \$1.69 per probation day in the preprogram and \$1.52 in the program period for each day a case remains open. Individual cases can require greater or lesser costs depending on the level of intensity of attention to a youth by a probation counselor. This element includes the direct costs associated with probation counselors and the allocated indirect costs.
- **SP/Psychologist** — In the preprogram period, the court incurred a total cost of approximately \$12,000 to provide psychological evaluation services to status offenders and approximately \$9,000 in the program period. The total status offender costs are based upon the proportion of status offenders to the total court intake work load which may have used this service. This element includes the direct costs of a court-retained psychologist and indirect allocated costs.
- **SP/Substance Abuse Counseling** — The court incurred a cost of approximately \$16,000 to provide alcoholism counseling services to status offenders in both periods. The total status offender costs are based upon the proportion of status offenders to total court intake. This element includes the direct costs of court alcoholism counselors and indirect allocated costs.

Corrections

Preprogram and program element costs of the State Department of Corrections were determined by identifying costs associated with the Bureau of Juvenile Correction facilities and subsequently using departmental statistics to determine the proportion of the total work load applicable to status offenders. The primary juvenile correctional elements serving New Castle County status offenders include Bridge House for detention and Ferris School and Woods Haven-Kruse School for incarceration. Unit costs of juvenile correctional facilities generally increased, reflecting lower facilities utilization because of an overall reduction in total work load. These elements are described in the following subsections for added clarity:

- **Bridge House** — Short-term detention services cost an average of \$39 per day in the preprogram period and \$55 in the program period to detain a youth pending court processing. This element includes total Bridge House expenditures as direct costs and allocated indirect costs.

Ferris School for Boys -- Incarceration services cost an average of \$11,000 per male youth in the preprogram period and \$16,500 in the program period for long-term custody imposed by a court's adjudication. Because this institution serves youth from all over the state, the total status offender work load was adjusted to reflect the New Castle County component based upon the county referral source statistics for all youth in custody. This element includes total Ferris School expenditures as direct costs and allocated indirect costs.

Woods Haven-Kruse School for Girls -- Incarceration services cost an average of \$18,000 per female youth in the preprogram period and \$41,000 in the program period for long-term custody imposed by a court's adjudication. This significant increase in unit cost is a dramatic example of the impact of an overall reduction of work load on the unit cost. Because this institution serves youth from all over the state, the total status offender work load was adjusted to reflect the New Castle County component based upon the county referral source statistics for all youth in custody. This element includes total Woods Haven-Kruse expenditures as direct costs and allocated indirect costs.

Parole -- Parole (Aftercare Services) costs an average of \$1,500 per youth released from long-term custody in the preprogram period and \$1,800 in the program period. This element includes the direct costs of all Aftercare Services personnel of the Bureau of Juvenile Corrections and allocated indirect costs.

Social Service Agencies

The primary social services provided to status offenders during both periods were special services, short-term shelter care, group home residence, counseling services, long-term foster care, child protective services, and medical evaluation and treatment. Special shelter care, group home and counseling services were provided by private agencies operating on a contract basis with the state while protective services and medical evaluation and treatment were provided by the state Divisions of Social Services (DSS) and Mental Health (DMH). Foster care service uses the DSS placement services to place a youth in a state contract relationship with a private family or, in some cases, professional foster parents.

The private contract agency elements include the direct costs of expenditures by state agencies to contract agencies for services provided to status offenders. The indirect costs of the private contract agencies are included in the state payment; however, contract, grant and general administration costs of the state are not included in the private contract agency costs.

These costs are estimated to be approximately 20% of the amounts disbursed to contract agencies. For example, to reflect state administration in the private contract agency costs, these specific costs in Tables III and IV should be adjusted upward by 20%.

Contract agencies were either paid in lump sum by grant to serve varying numbers of youth referrals up to a maximum or they received a fixed rate for each youth served. The unit cost on a fixed rate will not vary; however, average unit costs on lump sum payments can vary with work load. The wide divergence in contract agency average unit costs within service elements and from preprogram to program period appears to be the result of varying work loads unless otherwise stated.

Descriptions of private contract and state social service agency preprogram and program elements are provided in the following subsections within their appropriate service element subsection:

- **Special Services** -- Special contract services include Community Legal Aid (CLASI) services for an average cost of \$121 per youth served in the preprogram period and \$343 per youth served in the program period. The Alpha Project of the court was a special medical evaluation program element which cost a fixed rate of \$360 for each youth served.
- **Short-term Shelter Care** -- Shelter care services were provided by Bellefonte Shelter for an average cost of approximately \$904 per youth served in the preprogram period and \$664 in the program period. The Mary House Association was established late in the program period and served status offenders at an average cost of \$873 per youth served.
- **Group Homes** -- Preprogram group residence services were provided by Camelot, Pine Street, Seton Villa and Duncan Road Academy for a fixed rate of approximately \$11 per day in residence. In addition, Turning Point provided residence and counseling services for an average cost of approximately \$3,600 per youth served. Program group residence services were expanded to include the Mary Herring and Sienna Hall group homes at the same fixed rate of \$11 per day. Turning Point provided residence and counseling services in the program period for an average cost of approximately \$4,600 per youth served.
- **Counseling** -- Preprogram and program counseling services were provided by Family Services of Northern Delaware, Catholic Social Services and Union Baptist Center for an average cost of approximately \$112, \$338 and \$511,

respectively, for each youth served during the preprogram period and \$284, \$351 and \$510, respectively, for the program period. Family Services of Northern Delaware was the New Castle County counseling agency receiving DSO funds in the program period to provide counseling services to status offenders on short notice versus counseling by appointment at some future date when the urgency of the situation had passed. The increase in unit cost for Family Services of Northern Delaware reflects the increased cost of providing immediate unscheduled counseling services to status offenders. Cost data for Delaware Guidance Service was not available.

Long-term Foster Care — Foster care services were provided to status offenders by the state DSS placement services section at an average cost of approximately \$550 per youth placed in foster care during both periods and approximately \$5.42 per day of residence in ordinary foster care. The placement element includes the direct costs of the DSS placement section, other related DSS costs and allocated indirect costs. During the program period, a professional foster parent element was created for placement of problem children in a foster setting under the direct “parental” care of a trained psychologist. This element was provided for an average cost of approximately \$24 per day in residence.

Child Protective Services — Protective services were provided to status offenders by the state DSS protective services section at an average cost of approximately \$1,100 per youth served in the preprogram period and \$987 in the program period. This element includes the direct costs of the DSS protective services section, other related DSS costs and allocated indirect costs.

Medical Evaluation and Treatment — Medical evaluation and treatment services were provided by the state’s Division of Mental Health (DMH). Governor Bacon Health Center of the DMH provided resident psychological evaluation and treatment services at an average cost of approximately \$60 per day in residence as a patient during both periods. The Delaware State Hospital (DMH) adolescent program provided services similar to the Governor Bacon Health Center for an average cost of approximately \$46 per day in residence as a patient in the preprogram period and \$57 in the program period. The increased unit cost of the adolescent program in the program period reflects a declining use of the adolescent program. The adolescent program was terminated during the period and youth were transferred to the Governor Bacon Health Center. The Bureau of Substance Abuse Alcoholism Program provided services to youth with alcoholic problems through services of differing intensity and unit cost. While a significant number of status offenders were referred to these programs, their component of total work load could not be specifically identified. These elements include the direct costs of the program, other related DMH costs and allocated indirect costs.

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NEW CASTLE COUNTY, DELAWARE
PREPROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1976

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE AGENCY: Referral	Referral	N/A	354	N/A
LOCAL COURTS:				
Justice of the Peace Courts	Referral	\$ 20.69	N/A	N/A
Wilmington Municipal Court	Referral	23.35	N/A	N/A
Alderman's Courts	Referral	N/A	N/A	N/A
FAMILY COURT:				
Arrest Processing prior to Intake	Referral	250.27	473	\$ 118,378
Complaints and Intake	Referral	149.52	585	87,469
Hearings	Hearing	91.46	721	65,943
Probation	Probation Day	1.69	21,170	35,777
Subtotal				307,567
Special Programs:				
Psychologist	Referral	N/A	N/A	11,970
Substance Abuse Counseling	Referral	N/A	N/A	16,511
Subtotal				28,481

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

Table III

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
CORRECTIONS:				
Detention (Bridge House)	Detention Day	\$ 39.20	4,149	\$ 162,641
Incarceration:				
Ferris School for Boys	Youth	11,201.00	26	291,226
Woods Haven-Kruse School for Girls	Youth	18,060.00	25	451,500
Parole	Youth	1,523.00	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>905,367</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Special Services:				
Community Legal Aid (CLASI)	Youth	121.10	189	<u>22,888</u>
Short-term Shelter Care:				
Bellefonte Shelter	Youth	904.00	N/A	N/A
Group Homes:				
Camelot (Diamond State)	Resident Day	11.10	N/A	N/A
Pine Street	Resident Day	11.10	910	10,101
Seton Villa	Resident Day	11.10	298	3,308
Turning Point	Youth	3,648.33	N/A	N/A
Duncan Road Academy	Resident Day	11.10	N/A	<u>N/A</u>
Subtotal				<u>13,409</u>
Counseling:				
Family Services of Northern Delaware	Youth	112.95	22	2,485
Catholic Social Services	Youth	338.13	5	1,691
Union Baptist Center	Youth	511.37	27	13,807
Delaware Guidance Service	Youth	N/A	27	<u>N/A</u>
Subtotal				<u>17,983</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Long-term Foster Care:				
DSS – Placement Caseworker Cost	Youth	\$ 554.03	95	\$ 52,633
DSS – Maintenance Payment	Resident Day	5.42	2,136	<u>11,577</u>
Subtotal				<u>64,210</u>
Child Protective Services:				
DSS – Protective Services	Youth	1,104.40	58	<u>64,055</u>
Medical Evaluation and Treatment:				
DMH – Governor Bacon Health Center	Patient Day	59.96	16,962	1,017,042
DMH – Delaware State Hospital:				
Adolescent Program	Patient Day	46.61	N/A	N/A
DMH – Bureau of Substance Abuse Alcoholism Program:				
Fortnight	Youth	178.28	N/A	N/A
New Castle County Alcohol Detox	Youth	1,153.84	N/A	<u>N/A</u>
Subtotal				<u>1,017,042</u>
Total preprogram estimated cost				<u>\$ 2,441,002</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

Table III-3

**NEW CASTLE COUNTY, DELAWARE
PROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS**

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE AGENCY:				
Referral	Referral	N/A	587	N/A
LOCAL COURTS:				
Justice of the Peace Courts	Referral	\$ 19.51	N/A	N/A
Wilmington Municipal Court	Referral	26.28	N/A	N/A
Aldermen's Courts	Referral	N/A	N/A	N/A
FAMILY COURT:				
DSO Intake	Referral	152.64	850	\$ 129,744
Arrest Processing prior to Intake	Referral	142.64	536	76,455
Hearings	Hearing	63.49	702	44,570
Probation	Probation Day	1.52	9,490	14,425
Subtotal				<u>135,450</u>
Special Programs:				
Psychologist	Referral	N/A	N/A	9,107
Substance Abuse Counseling	Referral	N/A	N/A	<u>16,073</u>
Subtotal				<u>25,180</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
CORRECTIONS:				
Detention (Bridge House)	Detention Day	\$ 54.85	2,337	\$ 128,184
Incarceration:				
Ferris School for Boys	Youth	16,508.00	5	82,540
Woods Haven-Kruse School for Girls	Youth	41,492.00*	1	41,492
Parole	Youth	1,829.00	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>252,216</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Special Services:				
Community Legal Aid (CLASI)	Youth	343.50	172	59,082
Alpha Project (Delaware Curative Workshop)	Youth	360.00	132	<u>47,520</u>
Subtotal				<u>106,602</u>
Short-term Shelter Care:				
Bellefonte Shelter	Youth	664.00	N/A	N/A
Mary House Association	Youth	873.06	33	28,811
Individual Foster Care	Resident Day	9.42	1,399	<u>13,179</u>
Subtotal				<u>41,990</u>

* The increase in unit cost from the preprogram period is indicative of a dramatic impact of lower facilities usage on operating unit costs.

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Group Homes:				
Camelot (Diamond State)	Resident Day	\$ 11.10	N/A	N/A
Mary Herring	Resident Day	11.10	2,376	\$ 26,374
Pine Street	Resident Day	11.10	1,251	13,886
Seton Villa	Resident Day	11.10	3,235	35,909
Sienna Hall	Resident Day	11.10	1,912	21,223
Turning Point	Youth	4,639.73	N/A	N/A
Duncan Road Academy	Resident Day	11.10	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>97,392</u>
Counseling:				
Family Services of Northern Delaware	Youth	285.81	158	45,158
Catholic Social Services	Youth	351.43	7	2,460
Union Baptist Center	Youth	510.96	45	22,993
Delaware Guidance Service	Youth	N/A	27	N/A
Subtotal				<u>70,611</u>
Long-term Foster Care:				
DSS – Placement Caseworker Cost	Youth	554.03	105	58,173
DSS – Maintenance Payment, Professional	Resident Day	24.06	2,361	56,806
DSS – Maintenance Payment, Ordinary	Resident Day	5.42	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>114,979</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Child Protective Services:				
DSS – Protective Services	Youth	\$ 987.32	38	\$ <u>37,518</u>
Medical Evaluation and Treatment:				
DMH – Governor Bacon Health Center	Patient Day	59.96	29,298	1,756,708
DMH – Delaware State Hospital:				
Adolescent Program	Patient Day	57.00	N/A	N/A
DMH – Terry Children's Psychiatric Center	Youth	10,816.95	3	32,451
DMH – Wilmington Mental Hygiene Clinic	Youth	134.71	25	3,368
DMH – Community Mental Health Center	Youth	438.73	27	11,846
DMH – Bureau of Substance Abuse Alcoholism Program:				
Community Alcoholism Clinic	Youth	195.01	N/A	N/A
CARP	Youth	207.35	N/A	N/A
Fortnight	Youth	96.22	N/A	N/A
New Castle County Alcohol Detox	Youth	581.74	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>1,804,373</u>
Total program estimated cost				<u>\$ 2,816,055</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

III – PIMA COUNTY COST ANALYSIS

Data was accumulated for two study periods on the cost of providing services to status offenders in Pima County, Arizona. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1975 was selected as the preprogram period, and fiscal year ended June 30, 1977 was selected as the program period. Cost data relating to both fiscal periods was accumulated for all major service elements starting with the jurisdiction's initial contact with the status offender through the jurisdiction's final disposition of the youth.

The Pima County Juvenile Court was the primary evaluation and referral agency for status offenders during both periods; however, during the program period, the court's Mobile Diversion Unit (MDU) was established exclusively as the status offender screening unit to improve evaluation and referral services delivery to status offenders. Cost data was also accumulated for other social service agencies which provided direct services to status offenders in Pima County during both fiscal periods.

In order to arrive at fully costed services as described in the Approach section of this report, the Pima County Central Service Cost Allocation Plan for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976 was used as the basis of allocating indirect support costs to County agencies for the preprogram and program periods. The plan includes the support costs of all central service agencies, including depreciation expense for physical plant. Pension and other employee costs were included in the salary components of the direct and indirect service agencies.

Preprogram period cost elements were adjusted for inflation to program period price levels using the consumer price index in order to facilitate comparability of costs between the two periods. County employee salaries were not subject to a freeze during the study time frame and received salary increases based upon the increased cost of living during the study time frame.

This jurisdiction section will present the jurisdiction findings and describe the service elements' functions and cost components as well as contrast the preprogram and program element differences. In addition, our estimated youth tracking unit costs and total costs for the preprogram and program elements used by status offender youth are presented in Tables VI and VII, respectively, at the end of this jurisdiction section.

Table V

PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA
SUMMARY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL SERVICE ELEMENTS
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR STATUS OFFENDERS

<u>Services</u>	<u>Preprogram</u>	<u>Program</u>
Juvenile Justice Services:		
Juvenile Court	\$ <u>1,130,492</u>	<u>100,012</u>
Social Services:		
Juvenile Court (MDU)	—	416,668
Juvenile Court (SP)	361,097	107,742
Shelter Care	32,092	161,147
Foster Care	10,372	N/A
Group Homes	387,268	N/A
Outreach Counseling	—	191,971
Other DSO agencies	—	<u>245,680</u>
Subtotal	<u>790,829</u>	<u>1,123,208</u>
Total jurisdiction estimated costs	\$ <u>1,921,321</u>	<u>1,223,220</u>
Status offender contact at system entrance:		
Juvenile Court: Receiving and Evaluation	3,052	417
Juvenile Court: Mobile Diversion Unit	—	<u>1,937</u>
Total contacts	<u>3,052</u>	<u>2,354</u>
Average unit cost to the jurisdiction for status offender contacts	\$ <u>630</u>	<u>520</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

JURISDICTION FINDINGS

Estimated costs for Pima County are summarized in Table V on the facing page by juvenile justice and social service elements. The mix of the cost of services provided to status offenders in Pima County, Arizona shifted from the preprogram to the program period, resulting in proportionately less costs being incurred by status offenders for juvenile justice services. As calculated in Table I in the cover letter of this report, juvenile justice services accounted for approximately 59% of the total costs incurred for the status offender population in the preprogram period. During the program period, juvenile justice services accounted for only 14% of the total cost after the estimated juvenile justice cost for status offenders declined 91% and the social services cost for status offenders increased 42%. In addition, the average unit cost to the jurisdiction for serving a status offender declined 17% to \$520 from \$630. The average unit costs are calculated on Table V.

The average unit cost calculation uses the referral work load of the court's receiving and evaluation unit and the Mobile Diversion Unit (MDU) because the intake units generally received all youths entering the jurisdiction's youth career tracks. During the program period, approximately 20 youths or less were identified as having entered the youth career track without passing through the MDU. These youth were not included in the program unit cost calculation. It should be noted that while the intake unit work load can be used to calculate an overall average unit cost of the jurisdiction's contact with a status offender, the intake work load is not indicative of the magnitude of the total system work load because of varying youth career tracks, varying levels of intensity at which services are provided, and the varying lengths of stay in any given element.


DESCRIPTION OF PREPROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENTS

The typical youth career track elements for the preprogram period are described in this subsection and displayed on the following page in Diagram III.

During the preprogram period, juvenile status offenders were referred to the Juvenile Court intake unit by parents, citizen complaints or the police. Those status offenders not returned home or referred to a shelter care were generally held in detention pending a judicial hearing. Judicial hearings generally resulted in status offenders leaving the system, being put on

PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA PREPROGRAM PERIOD YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1975



probation or being referred to other social service agencies or special court programs. The youth track elements for the preprogram period as reflected in Diagram III are not intended to represent all tracks which may have occurred by exception. Costs of institutionalization in incarceration facilities were not determined because, by the preprogram period, essentially all status offenders were being placed with other social service agencies after court processing.

The major agencies providing direct services to juvenile status offenders during the preprogram period include the Tucson Police Department, Pima County Sheriff, Pima County Juvenile Court and other social service agencies operating on a contract basis with the Juvenile Court.

Police and Sheriff

The Tucson Police and the Pima County Sheriff's departments refer status offenders to the Pima County Juvenile Court as either paper or physical referrals. A youth referred by paper is released after contact and ordered by citation to appear at Juvenile Court. A physical referral is when the youth is taken into custody and transported to the Juvenile Court. Use of a paper or a physical referral was circumstantial and could apply to delinquents or status offenders. As a result of our review, we could determine no substantial change in procedures, and accordingly costs, for referring the average status offender to Juvenile Court. This determination is based upon data provided by the police and sheriff's departments and personnel interviews.

Juvenile Court

Juvenile Court program costs were determined by identifying staff associated with services and programs and then assigning all costs directly identifiable with the services or programs. Special program fund expenditures from the records of the Juvenile Court were used as the basis for estimating the costs of social services provided to status offenders because the court administrated and funded these programs. After indirect costs were included in the cost elements, court statistics relating to the specific services' work load were used to arrive at unit costs as well as the proportion of the cost element which applied to status offenders. In all cases, the unit cost for providing a service to a status offender was assumed to be similar to a delinquent's unit cost because differences in service intensity could not be determined for a given element.

The Pima County Juvenile Court provided juvenile justice services and several special social services programs. The primary juvenile justice services included receiving and evaluation (intake), detention, hearings, and probation. The special programs (SP) included Voluntary Intensive Probation, Oasis, Project Carrera and supplemental nonlicensed foster care. Other special programs of the court were not included because of limited status offender participation. The Juvenile Court preprogram elements are further described in the following subsections for added clarity:

- **Receiving and Evaluation** — Each referral to the Juvenile Court cost an average of \$67 for processing, evaluation and crisis intervention. This element includes the direct costs of receiving officers, probation officers, Court Clerk and County Attorney personnel and adjustment counselors and allocated indirect costs.
- **Detention** — The average cost per detention day was \$72 for providing a supervised and secure detention for juveniles. This element includes the direct costs of staff assigned to the Juvenile Court detention facility, other related costs, and allocated indirect costs.
- **Hearings** — The average cost of a judicial hearing was \$82 for all hearings including preliminary, adjudicatory and disposition hearings. Although there were several different types of hearings, the costs for all hearings were accumulated into a single element even though costs of hearings may vary by type. This element includes the direct costs of judges, referees, County Attorneys and Court Clerk personnel and probation officers and allocated indirect costs.
- **Probation** — Probation services cost an average of \$3 per probation day for each day a case remains open. Individual cases can incur greater or lesser costs depending on the level of intensity of service to a youth by a probation worker. This element includes the direct costs associated with probation officers and allocated indirect costs.
- **SP/Voluntary Intensive Probation** — The average cost of serving a youth was \$482 to provide counseling services for parents and youth at a predelinquent stage and/or attempt to dispose of a law violation without the court process. This element includes the direct costs of probation officers and allocated indirect costs.
- **SP/Oasis** — The average cost per day in residence at Oasis was \$97 for short-term residence as an alternative to detention. The element includes the direct costs of operating the separate facility and assigned probation officer costs and allocated indirect costs.

- **SP/Project Carrera** — The average cost for serving a youth was \$2,280 to provide job counseling services. The element includes the direct costs of probation officers and stipends for youth in search of a job and allocated indirect costs.
- **SP/Supplemental Nonlicensed Foster Care** — The average cost for a resident day was \$1 to provide short-term care as an alternative to detention when a child could not be returned home pending a court hearing. Generally, these children were placed with a relative. The element includes the direct cost of the maintenance payment only, with no allocated costs. This program accounts for a small portion of court activities.


Social Service Agencies

The primary social services provided to status offender juveniles other than the court's special programs during the preprogram period included short-term shelter care, individual foster care and group homes. The agencies providing these services to juvenile status offenders operated in a contract relationship with the Juvenile Court to provide these services. The agencies and their costs are described in the following subsections under their appropriate service category:

- **Short-term Shelter Care** — Short-term shelter care was provided to juvenile status offenders by Open Inn, Inc., for an average cost of \$25 per resident day. The element includes the direct cost of disbursements to Open Inn, Inc. and allocated indirect costs for administration of the contract.
- **Individual Foster Care** — Long-term foster placement of a youth with a private family costs an average of just under \$6 per resident day. The element includes the direct cost of a \$150 per month maintenance payment and other minimal expense reimbursements. Youth are placed in foster care by a court dispositional hearing and subsequently supervised by probation officers.
- **Group Homes** — The average cost for a resident day in a state-licensed group home is \$24. The element includes the direct cost of the fixed rate maintenance payment to the group home under contract with the court. The \$24 average of all the various group home rates was presented because the number of status offender referrals to specific homes could not be determined. Total costs and work load for status offenders is based upon an estimate of total proportion of status offenders in relation to total group home placements. Youth are placed in a group home by a dispositional hearing of the court and subsequently supervised by probation officers.

PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA PROGRAM PERIOD YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977



DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENTS

The typical youth career track elements for the program period are described in this subsection and displayed on the facing page in Diagram IV.

Program period juvenile status offenders were referred to the court by parents, citizen complaints or the police. The Mobile Diversion Unit generally replaced the intake unit for providing evaluation and referral services; however, some status offenders did pass directly through to the juvenile justice elements of the court without being diverted by the MDU. In addition to evaluation and referral services, the MDU provided crisis and outreach intervention services. Subsequent to evaluation, MDU referrals were primarily to DSO agencies or special court programs. The typical youth track elements for the program period reflected in Diagram IV are not intended to represent all tracks which may have occurred by exception. For example, several DSO agencies received referrals directly as awareness of their services increased.

Juvenile Court justice services of intake, detention, hearings and probation services were used in the program period. Jurisdiction statistics indicated that approximately 417 status offenders bypassed MDU and were processed by the juvenile justice elements of the Juvenile Court. These status offenders were primarily out-of-county or out-of-state youth who were not eligible for the MDU services. Estimated costs for these youth were determined using preprogram juvenile justice element unit costs since the elements did not change significantly. In addition, potentially 12 status offenders were referred back to Juvenile Court for processing because of not being suitable for DSO agencies after being processed through the DSO elements of the program youth career track. Since this represents less than 1% of the MDU referrals, the cost data were not separately accumulated and displayed for the program period.

The major agencies providing direct services to juvenile status offenders during the program period include the Tucson Police Department, Pima County Sheriff, Pima County Juvenile Court and DSO agencies operating on a contract basis with the Juvenile Court.

Police and Sheriff

There was no significant change in police delivery of services to status offenders in the program period from the preprogram period.

Juvenile Court

During the program period, the Pima County Juvenile Court reassigned the receiving and evaluation function of the intake unit to the newly created Mobile Diversion Unit and significantly reduced the practice of using the juvenile justice services of detention, hearings and probation, unless a youth was not eligible for MDU processing or ultimately was not suited to the DSO agencies in use during the period. Several special programs (SP) of the court continued to provide services to status offenders including Community and Family Services, Family Counseling and supplemental nonlicensed foster care. No significant change occurred in the juvenile justice court elements. Therefore, the preprogram unit costs were used to determine the estimated costs of the status offenders who were not eligible for the MDU. Also, the elements are not described a second time in the program section. The court's program elements are further described in the following subsections:

- **Mobile Diversion Unit** — Each referral to the court's Mobile Diversion Unit costs an average of \$215 for receiving, evaluation, crisis intervention, limited outreach intervention, and diversion to other DSO social services. This element includes the direct costs of personnel assigned to MDU and allocated indirect costs.
- **SP/Community and Family Services** — The Community and Family Services unit at Juvenile Court provided counseling services to status offenders at an average cost of \$516 per youth handled. In addition to counseling, the caseworkers were responsible for the development of the contract relationship with the DSO agencies. Those contracting costs were excluded from the costs of counseling and treated as start-up costs of the program.
- **Family Counseling Agencies** — The Juvenile Court contracted with various counseling agencies in addition to DSO agencies to provide counseling services to status offenders and their families. These services were described as traditional counseling provided in a clinic to status offenders and/or their families. The element includes the direct costs of the disbursements made to the counseling agencies for services provided.
- **Supplemental Nonlicensed Foster Care** — There was no significant change in nonlicensed foster care services provided to status offenders from the preprogram period.

DSO Program Agencies

Other than the social services provided by the court's special programs, social services were provided to status offenders primarily by DSO program contract agencies during the program period. These services included short-term shelter care, outreach counseling services and other special DSO programs. The agencies and their costs are further described in the following subsection under their appropriate service category.

- **Short-term Shelter Care** — As an alternative to detention, the number of shelter care facilities was expanded in the program period to include Autumn House, Springboard and Time Out placement homes in addition to Open Inn of the preprogram period. Their respective average costs for serving a youth were \$485 for Autumn House, \$230 for Open Inn and \$464 for Springboard. Time Out costs were not available. Referral unit costs were determined by the number of referrals in relation to total payments by Juvenile Court.
- **Outreach Counseling** — Counseling services were provided to status offenders and their families in a manner described as "nontraditional" by ten counseling agencies during the program period. Unit costs were determined on an average cost-per-referral basis in relation to total payments from the Juvenile Court. Payments were made on a lump sum basis, and accordingly the unit cost would be affected by the number of referrals to the agency.
- **Other Special DSO Agencies** — Special agencies' unit costs were also calculated by the number of referrals in relation to total lump sum payments by Juvenile Court. The Old Congress Street School was a truant program. PPEP was a job program. New Direction for Young Women was a counseling program. Creative Learning was an alternative approach to education. Again, the unit costs are affected by the number of referrals to the program.

Social Service Agencies

Jurisdiction statistics indicated that several youth were referred to Arizona State Department of Economic Security, Child Protective Services, Palos Verde Hospital and state-licensed group homes. Cost data for these referrals were not identified and accumulated because of the limited amount of referrals.

PREPROGRAM VERSUS PROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENT COMPARISONS

DSO Program changes during the program period in Juvenile Court service elements for status offenders were an expansion of an existing deinstitutionalization approach rather than the introduction of a deinstitutionalization program. While short-term detention of status offenders was used during court processing in the preprogram period, Judicial hearings generally did not result in referrals of status offenders to incarceration. Hearings were generally used to place the status offenders in state-licensed group homes. In the program period, status offenders entering the MDU bypassed the court's juvenile justice elements. The MDU was able to place status offenders with DSO service elements without a Judicial hearing. Placement of a status offender in a state-licensed group home seldom occurred, resulting in fewer Judicial hearings that would be required to do so.

Wide divergences of average unit costs for social services appeared to occur because of varying agency referral work load. Contract agencies were either paid in lump sum by grant to serve varying numbers of youth referrals up to a set maximum, or they received a fixed rate for each youth served. The unit cost on a fixed rate maintenance payment will not vary; however, average unit costs of service paid for by lump sum payment can vary with work load. For example, DSO agencies were lump sum contracts while group homes were fixed daily rates.

Social Service and DSO Program Agencies

The change in referrals from official court actions to MDU actions resulted in a shift of referrals to DSO program agencies from official residential group and foster homes. The actual change in the official placement status offender costs could not be determined because payment records for official placement social service agencies did not specify offense categories for placements; however, statistical data and court personnel interviews indicated that status offenders were primarily referred to DSO program agencies rather than being placed in official placement agencies.

**PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA
PREPROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS**

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1975

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE OR SHERIFF:				
Referral	Referral	N/A	2,577	N/A
JUVENILE COURT:				
Receiving and Evaluation	Referral	\$ 67.04	3,052	\$ 204,606
Detention	Detention Day	72.56	9,815	712,176
Hearings	Hearing	82.95	403	33,429
Probation	Probation Day	3.36	53,655	180,281
Subtotal				<u>1,130,492</u>
Special Programs:				
Voluntary Intensive Probation (VIP)	Referral	482.38	519	250,355
Oasis (Short-term Residence)	Resident Day	97.66	807	78,812
Supplemental Nonlicensed Foster Care	Resident Day	1.00	N/A	N/A
Project Carrera	Referral	2,280.68	14	31,930
Subtotal				<u>361,097</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Short-term Shelter Care:				
Open Inn, Inc.	Resident Day	25.47	1,260	32,092
Individual Foster Care	Resident Day	5.92	1,752	10,372
Group Homes (Unspecified)	Resident Day	24.23	15,983	387,268
Total preprogram estimated costs				<u>\$ 1,921,321</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

**PIMA COUNTY, ARIZONA
PROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS**

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE OR SHERIFF:				
Referral	Referral	N/A	2,010	N/A
JUVENILE COURT:				
Mobile Diversion Unit	Referral	\$ 215.11	1,937	\$ 416,668
Receiving and Evaluation	Referral	67.04	417	27,956
Detention	Detention Day	72.56	809	58,701
Hearings	Hearing	82.95	161	13,355
Probation	Probation Day	3.36	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				100,012
Special Programs:				
Community and Family Services	Referral	516.00	125	64,500
Supplemental Nonlicensed Foster Care	Resident Day	1.00	N/A	N/A
Family Counseling Agencies:				
Tucson East	Referral	115.80	45	5,211
Reading Clinic	Referral	294.23	13	3,825
New Life	Referral	115.80	14	1,621
Family Counseling Agency	Referral	115.80	25	2,895
PET (Parent Effectiveness)	Referral	115.80	11	1,274

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

Table VII

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
CFIC	Referral	\$ 115.80	64	\$ 7,411
La Frontera	Referral	115.80	47	5,443
Family Counseling (Unspecified)	Referral	115.80	28	3,242
Job Programs:				
Project Work	Referral	250.30	8	2,002
Young Women's Company	Referral	245.67	42	10,318
Subtotal				<u>107,742</u>
DSO PROGRAM AGENCIES:				
Short-term Shelter Care:				
Autumn House	Referral	485.60	105	50,988
Open, Inc.	Referral	230.65	222	51,204
Springboard	Referral	464.21	127	58,955
Time Out	Referral	N/A	1	N/A
Subtotal				<u>161,147</u>
Outreach Counseling:				
Family Development Project	Referral	950.01	5	4,750
Free Clinic of Tucson	Referral	342.98	60	20,579
NYPUM	Referral	219.90	94	20,671
Profiles of Me	Referral	315.60	80	25,248
Rural Outreach Projects - PPEP	Referral	406.70	56	22,775
Santa Cruz Project	Referral	380.38	60	22,823
Invisible Theatre	Referral	189.79	31	5,883

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

Table VII-2

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Shining Star	Referral	\$ 617.01	58	\$ 35,787
Youth Advisory Services	Referral	219.03	95	20,808
Youth Involvement Outreach Services – SPCC	Referral	93.68	135	12,647
Subtotal				<u>191,971</u>
Other Special DSO Agencies:				
Old Congress Street School	Referral	2,666.95	47	125,347
New Directions for Young Women	Referral	752.84	135	101,633
Creative Learning	Referral	211.94	80	16,955
Jobs for Youth – PPEP	Referral	349.00	5	1,745
Subtotal				<u>245,680</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Individual Foster Care	Resident Day	5.92	N/A	N/A
Group Homes (Unspecified)	Referral	N/A	20	N/A
Total program estimated costs				<u>\$ 1,223,220</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

IV - SPOKANE COUNTY COST ANALYSIS

Data was accumulated for two study periods in order to determine the cost of providing services to status offender juveniles in Spokane County, Washington. The calendar year ended December 31, 1975 was selected as the preprogram cost period and the fiscal year ended June 30, 1977 was selected as the program cost period. Cost data relating to both fiscal periods was accumulated for all major service elements, starting with the jurisdiction's initial contact with the status offender through the jurisdiction's final disposition of the youth.

During the preprogram period, the Spokane County Juvenile Court was the receiving, evaluation, and referral agency for status offenders. During the program period, Youth Alternatives, Inc. operated the DSO program and was the screening unit for status offenders entering the program. Cost data was collected for these elements and other juvenile justice and social service agencies which provided direct services to status offenders during both fiscal periods.

In order to arrive at fully costed services as described in the Approach section of this report, an estimate of countywide overhead was used because Spokane County did not have an indirect cost allocation plan. The estimated rate includes costs for all central service agencies and countywide or statewide general administration.

All preprogram period cost elements were adjusted for inflation to program period price levels using the consumer price index in order to facilitate comparability of costs between the two periods. During the time frame of the study, Spokane County employees received periodic wage increases as cost-of-living adjustments.

The following Jurisdiction section will present findings for both periods, describe the service elements, function and cost components, and contrast the preprogram and program element differences. In addition, our estimated youth tracking unit costs and total costs for the preprogram and program elements used by status offender youth are presented in Tables IX and X, respectively, at the end of the Jurisdiction section.

JURISDICTION FINDINGS

Juvenile justice and social services were provided to the status offender population in both periods. Social services include Youth Alternatives, Inc., shelter and foster care, group

Table VIII

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON
SUMMARY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL SERVICE ELEMENTS
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR STATUS OFFENDERS

<u>Services</u>	<u>Preprogram</u>	<u>Program</u>
Juvenile Justice Services:		
Juvenile Court	\$ 236,507	111,154
Institutions	186,957	-
Juvenile Rehabilitation	12,530	-
Subtotal	435,994	111,154
Social Services:		
Youth Alternatives	-	158,956
Shelter Care	10,305	3,178
Foster Care	8,389	17,346
Group Homes	110,572	215,269
Child Protective Services	N/A	5,370
Multiple Service Centers	-	4,314
Counseling	-	33,037
Subtotal	129,266	437,470
Total jurisdiction estimated costs	\$ 565,260	548,624
Status offender contacts at system entrance:		
Juvenile Court: Intake Unit	745	343
Youth Alternatives: Initial Contact and Intervention	-	665
Total contacts	745	1,008
Average unit cost to the jurisdiction for status offender contacts	\$ 759	544

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

homes, multiple service centers and counseling, while juvenile justice services include the Juvenile Court's intake, detention, hearings and probation services as well as Institution's and Juvenile Rehabilitation's services. Police unit costs could not be determined, and accordingly could not be included in the cost comparison; however, it was determined by interview that police handling procedures did not change significantly. Therefore, it is assumed that unit costs did not change significantly, and total costs varied with work load.

Estimated costs for Spokane County are summarized in Table VIII on the facing page by juvenile justice and social service elements. The mix of the cost of services provided to status offenders in Spokane County, Washington, shifted from the preprogram to the program period, resulting in proportionately less costs being incurred by status offenders for juvenile justice services. As computed in Table I in the cover letter of this report, juvenile justice services accounted for approximately 77% of the total costs incurred for the status offender population in the preprogram period. During the program-period, juvenile justice services accounted for only 20% of the total cost after the estimated juvenile justice costs for status offenders declined 75% and the social services estimated cost for status offenders increased 239%. In addition, the average unit cost to the jurisdiction for serving a status offender declined 28% to \$544 from \$759. The average unit costs are calculated on Table VIII.

The average unit cost calculation used the referral work load of the court's intake unit and Youth Alternatives because these units received all youth entering the jurisdiction's youth career tracks. It should be noted that while the intake work load can be used to calculate an average unit cost of the jurisdiction's contact with a status offender, the intake work load is not indicative of the magnitude of the total system work load because of varying youth career tracks, varying levels of intensity at which services are provided, and the varying lengths of stay in any given element.


DESCRIPTION OF PREPROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENTS

The typical youth career track elements for the preprogram period are displayed on the following page in Diagram V, and described in this subsection.

Status offenders were generally referred to the Juvenile Court intake unit by police, citizen complaint or parents. Those youth not returned home or sent to a short-term receiving

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON PREPROGRAM PERIOD YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS

Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1975



home pending a hearing were placed in detention until a hearing was conducted. Youth were then generally placed on probation, referred to a social service agency or sent to correctional institutions.

The major agencies providing direct services to status offender juveniles during the preprogram period include police, Juvenile Court, other social service agencies, correctional institutions and rehabilitation agencies.

Police and Sheriff

Police unit costs for referrals to the Juvenile Court intake unit could not be determined; however, it was determined by interview with police personnel that handling procedures did not change significantly.

Juvenile Court

The primary Juvenile Court activities for cost purposes include the intake process, detention of juveniles while in court process, judicial hearings and juvenile probation.

- **Intake** — Juvenile Court incurred an average of \$55 for intake evaluation and processing the youth. Salaries for probation officers assigned to the intake unit was the major cost in this element. Other costs included allocated clerical support, space cost, maintenance and repair, allocated depreciation, administrative costs for the Juvenile Court, and countywide overhead. Probation officers assigned to the intake unit generally handled the less serious cases such as status offenders and reviewed the information presented to determine what action should be taken.
- **Detention Cost** — The cost of detaining a youth for court processing averaged approximately \$93 per day in detention during calendar year 1975. There were two major cost elements in the detention unit. These were salaries of the staff assigned to operate the detention unit and the facilities cost of the unit itself. In addition, food, other support costs such as clerical support, Juvenile Court and countywide overhead costs were also allocated to the detention unit.
- **Hearings** — The average cost per court hearing was \$524 in 1975. The estimated costs for all court hearings were accumulated in one hearing cost pool, although there were several different types of hearings. The number of hearings was computed using official petitions and motions. The major costs

included salaries for the Superior Court judge assigned to Juvenile Court, salaries of bailiffs, salaries of court reporters, costs of public defenders, salaries of the Juvenile Court hearings' investigation unit, space cost, administration related to each of the above items, and general countywide overhead.

Probation — The cost of probation services was approximately \$776 per youth on probation. This is the average cost for all youth placed on probation. The actual cost per case could vary substantially. Some cases require intensive probation officer attention, while others may require very little probation officer supervision over a long span of time. Salaries of probation officers was the primary cost, including an allocated portion of probation officer salaries from the court investigation unit. Countywide and Juvenile Court administrative support costs were also included.

Social Service Agencies

The primary social services provided to status offender juveniles during the preprogram period were receiving home shelter care, DSHS foster care and child protective services and other group homes services.

- **Receiving Home Care** — Receiving home average costs of \$12.66 per resident day were incurred to provide short-term living quarters to youth whose family situations required temporary removal from the home. Resident day costs include the average maintenance payment to the agency.
- **DSHS Foster Care** — DSHS (State of Washington Department of Social and Health Services) foster care included the two major cost elements of caseworker and maintenance payment costs. DSHS foster care caseworker costs were approximately \$419 per placement case. This is the average cost of servicing a youth assigned to a DSHS foster care caseworker. Caseworker costs were primarily salaries, with departmentwide and statewide indirect costs applied. The second major element of cost for DSHS foster care was the maintenance payment amount. This is the average amount paid by the DSHS to a foster parent for each youth day in foster care.
- **DSHS Child Protective Services** — The average cost of each case supervised by a child protective services' caseworker was an estimated \$190. The major costs were the salary of the child protective services' caseworker, plus departmentwide and statewide indirect costs.
- **Group Homes and Other Social Agencies** — This category includes the maintenance payment for group homes, institutions and other foster care.

Included here were the average amounts paid by the Department of Social and Health Services to Catholic Family Services, Lutheran Family Services, other social agencies, Circle Bar J Boys' Ranch, Kettle Falls Boys' Ranch, Morning Star Boys' Ranch, Good Shepherd Home, Shamrock Acres, Awareness House, and other private group homes. The costs for a foster care caseworker were not applied to these cases and adjustment for reimbursement to the state made by the parents of the youth was not made.

DSHS Department of Institutions

The Department of Institutions performs diagnostic and custody services with Cascadia providing the diagnostic services for detention and incarceration facilities. Cascadia evaluations of all youth committed to institutions generally take one month. After the one-month evaluation, the youth was either returned to Juvenile Court or sent to other state institutions for long-term commitment. Each youth day in residence at the Cascadia diagnostic facility costs an estimated \$71. The major cost elements were staff salaries and facilities maintenance, utilities and depreciation, as well as departmentwide and statewide indirect costs. The average cost for the final placement in long-term commitment was approximately \$56. This was a composite for all the institutions used by the state and included all disbursements for operating expenses adjusted for depreciation and indirect costs.

DSHS Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation (Juvenile Parole)

The estimated cost for juvenile parole is \$1,253 per youth. The salaries for state parole officers were the major cost element. Office support, departmentwide and statewide indirect costs were allocated to salaries.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENTS


The typical youth career track elements for the program period are displayed on the facing page on Diagram VI and are described in this subsection.

Status offenders were referred to the DSO program by police or other sources. In most cases the referrals were made directly to Youth Alternatives, the program screening unit. In other instances, status offenders were referred to the Juvenile Court and were subsequently

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON PROGRAM PERIOD YOUTH CAREER TRACK ELEMENTS

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977

Diagram VI



referred to Youth Alternatives if eligible for the DSO Program. Some status offenders referred to the Juvenile Court were not subsequently referred to Youth Alternatives. These youth then remained in the custody of the court and were subject to the preprogram youth career track elements as displayed on Diagram V and described in the previous preprogram subsection.

The major agencies providing direct services to status offenders for the program period included police, Juvenile Court, Youth Alternatives, Inc. and other social service agencies.

Juvenile Court

Status offender referrals to Juvenile Court were either referred to Youth Alternatives or were processed under the juvenile justice elements of the preprogram period. No significant change occurred in the court's juvenile justice elements. Therefore, the preprogram unit costs were used to determine the estimated costs of the status offenders who were not eligible for referral to the Youth Alternatives' DSO Program. Also, the elements are not described a second time in the program section.

The Juvenile Court incurred a cost of nearly \$18 for each youth referred through the court to Youth Alternatives, Inc. Salaries of admitting officers in the Juvenile Court intake unit was the major cost element. Their time for preparing the appropriate paperwork, determining the facts of the case and calling Youth Alternatives, Inc. was estimated by Juvenile Court. In addition, the costs for support activities and overhead were also included in the estimate.

Youth Alternatives, Inc.

Youth Alternatives, Inc., a private agency, was the DSO program administrator and diversion agency (screening unit) providing the primary services of initial contact and intervention and follow-up intervention.

- Initial Contact and Intervention -- Youth Alternatives incurred an average cost of approximately \$192 per youth served for initial contact and referral. This element included evaluation of the case, crisis intervention and diversion to a social service agency if necessary. The major cost elements included youth worker salaries for time involved in ascertaining the situation, crisis intervention and selection of the proper referral. Also included was the administrative costs of Youth Alternatives, such as utilities, rent, overhead and support services.

- Follow-up Intervention -- Youth Alternatives incurred an average cost of approximately \$137 for each case that needed an additional follow-up contact (outreach intervention) with the youth or family. These costs were similar to the cost of the initial contact; however, less youth worker time was involved to complete the follow-up contact, resulting in a lower cost per youth. The shorter time generally resulted from the fact that initial case workup had already been prepared.

Social Service Agencies

The primary social services provided to status offenders were expanded in the program period to include emergency bed services, group homes services, DSHS foster care services and child protective services, multiple service center services and counseling services.

- Emergency Bed Services -- The cost for emergency bed services of \$12.66 per day was computed from the maintenance payments amount paid by the State of Washington. Two primary organizations were used as emergency bed services (shelter home care). These were Leadership House and Booth Care Center Emergency Bed Program.
- Group Homes -- The cost of services in group homes generally included the full cost of the home in accordance with objectives of this study. The cost per day was determined by dividing the total costs by the total number of resident days of care provided during the period. The cost per day varied by type of group home because the program varied. Cost data was obtained for Good Shepherd Home, Shamrock Acres, St. Joseph's Children's Home, Booth Care Center (regular program), Regina Hall and Galland Hall.
- DSHS Foster Care -- Two cost elements were included in this item, including the foster care maintenance payment of DSHS and the cost of DSHS foster care caseworkers. Direct caseworker average costs of \$619 per youth included salaries, as well as DSHS departmentwide and statewide indirect cost allocations. The resultant figure is the average cost per case handled by a DSHS caseworker. The foster care maintenance payment of \$4.33 was the average maintenance payment paid by the State of Washington for foster family care services, computed as a cost per day of service.
- DSHS Child Protective Services -- The estimated average cost for youth referred to DSHS Child Protective Services was \$179 per youth. This was determined by dividing the total child protective services caseworker cost, department overhead and state overhead by the number of youth served.

- **Multiple Service Centers** — Counseling costs per visit hour account for the major costs in this category. These costs were determined primarily from records at Youth Alternatives, Inc. or from the agencies themselves. Program costs were determined by dividing the total disbursements from Youth Alternatives by the total number of youth referred from Youth Alternatives.
- **Counseling Services** — Counseling services were computed on the basis of cost per youth or cost per visit hour depending on available information. Family Counseling Service's cost of \$14.12 per visit hour and Youth Help Association's cost of \$25.72 per visit hour include salaries and indirect costs. Youth Resource Center's \$24.97 cost per youth includes all agency costs divided by the number of youth served. DSHS Delinquency Prevention Center's \$546 cost per youth includes total program costs and departmentwide and statewide indirect costs divided by the number of youth served.

PREPROGRAM VERSUS PROGRAM PERIOD ELEMENT COMPARISONS

The activities of the Juvenile Court during the preprogram period can be contrasted with the activities of Youth Alternatives during the program period. The major difference was an intensified diversion program rather than a deinstitutionalization program because, prior to Youth Alternatives, Juvenile Court did not generally institutionalize a large number of youth (approximately ten during the preprogram year). For example, the preprogram Juvenile Court philosophy was one of diverting the youth from institutions to foster care and other group home agencies where possible.

Youth Alternatives did not have an intake function. Once Youth Alternatives' personnel were called to handle a case, they would arrive on the scene and handle the case from an intervention standpoint, whereas Juvenile Court investigations were concerned with obtaining the facts for hearings. Youth Alternatives did not perform the hearings investigation function.

Services provided by other agencies increased from the preprogram period to the program period. The major category of increase was multiple service centers and counseling. The type of services provided in group care did not change dramatically. By reviewing the number of service agencies providing multiple services and counseling in the program period, it is evident a major change occurred in the services provided. In the preprogram period, some counseling services were provided by probation officers, but these costs could not be

separately identified. There was an apparent thrust toward community services during the program period. PMM&Co. estimated community social and counseling agencies incurred cost of more than \$40,000 during the program period that was not evident during the preprogram period.

SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON
PREPROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS

Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1975

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE OR SHERIFF:				
Referral	Referral	N/A	N/A	N/A
JUVENILE COURT:				
Intake Unit	Referral	\$ 55.17	745	\$ 41,102
Detention	Detention Day	93.23	1,350	125,861
Hearings	Hearing	523.67	115	60,222
Probation	Referral	776.84	12	9,322
Subtotal				<u>236,507</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Receiving Home Shelter Care:				
Booth Care Center	Resident Day	12.66	814	<u>10,305</u>
Individual Foster Care:	Referral	419.44	20	8,389
DSHS — Placement Cost	Resident Day	4.49	N/A	<u>N/A</u>
DSHS — Maintenance Payment				<u>8,389</u>
Subtotal				

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

Table IX

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Group Homes:				
Catholic Family Services	Resident Day	\$ 5.44	182	\$ 990
Lutheran Family Services	Resident Day	5.44	183	996
Other Social Agencies	Resident Day	N/A	N/A	N/A
Circle Bar J Boys Ranch	Resident Day	16.60	365	6,059
Kettle Falls Boys Ranch	Resident Day	16.60	730	12,118
Morning Star Boys Ranch	Resident Day	10.67	2,190	23,367
Good Shepherd Home	Resident Day	15.01	1,580	23,716
Shamrock Acres Boys Ranch	Resident Day	14.58	548	7,990
Awareness House	Resident Day	9.51	N/A	N/A
Other Private Group Houses	Resident Day	13.83	2,555	35,336
Subtotal				<u>110,572</u>
Child Protective Services:				
DSHS – Protective Services	Referral	189.93	N/A	N/A
INSTITUTIONS:				
Cascadia:				
Detention Diagnostic	Resident Day	70.60	122	8,613
Incarceration Diagnostic	Resident Day	70.60	304	21,462
Incarceration	Resident Day	57.34	2,736	156,882
Subtotal				<u>186,957</u>
JUVENILE REHABILITATION:				
Parole	Youth	1,253.00	10	12,530
Total preprogram estimated costs				<u>\$ 565,260</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:				
Emergency Bed Service				
Shelter Care:				
Leadership House	Resident Day	\$ 12.66	65	\$ 823
Booth Care Center	Resident Day	12.66	186	<u>2,355</u>
Subtotal				<u>3,178</u>
Group Home:				
Good Shepherd	Resident Day	31.93	1,580	50,449
Shamrock Acres	Resident Day	14.77	23	340
St. Joseph Children's Home	Resident Day	14.41	365	5,260
Booth Care Center	Resident Day	46.16	331	15,279
Regina Hall	Resident Day	28.94	2,189	63,350
Galland Hall	Resident Day	63.06	1,278	<u>80,591</u>
Subtotal				<u>215,269</u>
Individual Foster Care:				
DSHS - Placement Cost	Referral	619.50	28	17,346
DSHS - Maintenance Payment	Resident Day	4.33	N/A	<u>N/A</u>
Subtotal				<u>17,346</u>
Multiple Service Centers:				
Catholic Family Service	Visit Hour	16.13	64	1,032
Children's Home Society	Visit Hour	39.71	21	834
Community Mental Health Center	Visit Hour	42.27	N/A	N/A

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
Lutheran Family and Child Services	Visit Hour	\$ 22.65	12	\$ 272
YMCA Youth Development	Referral	310.87	7	<u>2,176</u>
Subtotal				<u>4,314</u>
Child Protective Services:				
DSHS – Protective Services	Referral	179.00	30	<u>5,370</u>
Counseling:				
Family Counseling Service	Visit Hour	14.13	N/A	N/A
Youth Resource Center	Referral	24.97	72	1,798
Youth Help Association	Visit Hour	25.72	790	20,319
DSHS – Delinquency Prevention	Referral	546.00	20	<u>10,920</u>
Subtotal				<u>33,037</u>
Total program estimated costs				<u>\$ 548,624</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

**SPOKANE COUNTY, WASHINGTON
PROGRAM PERIOD
YOUTH TRACKING COSTS**

Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1977

<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit of service</u>	<u>Estimated cost per unit</u>	<u>Estimated number of units</u>	<u>Estimated cost for status offenders</u>
POLICE OR SHERIFF:				
Referral	Referral	N/A	N/A	N/A
JUVENILE COURT:				
Referral to Youth Alternatives	Referral	\$ 17.59	243	\$ 4,274
Intake Unit	Referral	55.17	343	18,923
Detention	Detention Day	93.23	730	68,058
Hearings	Hearing	523.67	38	19,899
Probation	Referral	776.84	N/A	N/A
Subtotal				<u>111,154</u>
YOUTH ALTERNATIVES, INC.:				
Initial Contact and Intervention	Referral	192.80	665	128,212
Follow-up Intervention	Referral	137.25	224	<u>30,744</u>
Subtotal				<u>158,956</u>

Based upon unaudited data available at the time of the study.

V – COST ANALYSIS TASKS

The determination of the current financial impact on a governmental jurisdiction from policy changes can be assessed by comparative cost analyses such as these. In the event that others may desire to perform a similar study, we have generally outlined the tasks and records used to complete this study. In addition, observations are included in the outline which address potential pitfalls that should be avoided.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND APPROACH

Prior to commencing the project definition phase, the purpose of the study should be clear. For example, the purpose of the study could be to accumulate and present data, arrive at specific conclusions, make specific recommendations, and the like. Then, prior to conducting any analysis, the project objectives should be carefully defined, project scope should be established, and the appropriate approach should be selected from feasible alternatives. The definition of these project elements generally will require some preliminary research. The importance of these preliminary steps should not be underestimated.

- Objectives – The general purpose of the study will determine what specific objectives will be accomplished to complete the study.
- Scope – The scope of the study defines that which will be included in the study and in some cases that which will not.
- Approach – The approach of the project will be translated into a detailed work plan delineating specific tasks and subtasks to be completed in order to reach the objectives of the study.

COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS TASKS

The understanding of this task outline will be enhanced by referring to the cover letter of this report for general background and perspective. The generalized tasks accomplished to complete this study are as follows:

- Define the program target population which was affected by the policy change. In this case, status offenders were affected by the DSO Program, a change in juvenile justice policy.

CONTINUED

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- Identify the primary service elements involved in the change of policy. In this case, specific juvenile justice and social service elements were involved in the change of policy.
- Determine the agencies which operated the identified service elements that provided services to the target population. For example, the State of Delaware Department of Corrections provided the service element of detention to status offenders.
- Acquire and review general background literature regarding the direct service element agencies for general understanding.
- Examine the organizational structure of the agencies to determine the organizational group which most closely corresponds to the service element and determine the position classifications which correspond to the organizational group. These groups may be departments, divisions, sections, or supervisor units. For example, the State of Delaware Department of Corrections, Division of Juvenile Corrections, Bridge House facility provided detention services. In other cases, facilities provided several service elements and individual supervisors and their staff were service elements.
- Determine the indirect service and administrative agencies which support the direct service element agencies and identify those costs if the cost study addresses full costs. In some cases indirect cost allocation plans are prepared by the jurisdiction's administration.
- Examine organizational financial reports and organizational work load reports for their relation to the identified service elements. Departmental-level reports should be examined as well as detailed reports to ensure that the perspective of the service element is maintained.
- Accumulate and organize specific financial and statistical records pertinent to the agencies and service elements. Specific types of records which were particularly useful include:
 - Departmental expenditure summaries (program expenditure summaries are particularly useful when available; however, most agencies have only line-item summaries).
 - Departmental annual reports (in addition to financial data, annual reports can provide narrative descriptions to assist in analysis, work load statistics and organizational information, and the like).
 - Salary ordinances and position classification schedules as the basis of personnel costs.

- Department summary statistical reports indicating work load by service type. A service type may correspond to a service element. In some cases, supervisor-level reports are available for expanded detail. The use of statistical data should be subject to scrutiny, analysis and caution to ensure that the meaning of the data is fully understood as well as the reliability. Statistical data confidence levels are generally lower than financial data because different levels of internal control are applied to the systems which accumulate and report these data.
- Department's budgets.
- Define cost pools corresponding to service elements and apply the appropriate costs to the pools. Where possible, define cost pools which correspond to work load reports for unit costing or cost proportioning.
 - Cost pools constructed from position classifications are readily costed using the salaries for classification types from the salary ordinance and position classification records.
 - Other materials and supplies costs can then be allocated to the cost pools using the number of persons in the pool.
 - General and administrative cost pools similarly constructed, or available by indirect cost plan or rate, are allocated to the element cost pools using an appropriate base such as personnel head count.
- Apply statistical data to cost pools for unit costing or cost proportioning.
- Analyze and interpret cost data changes and relationships.

The effective use of this outline assumes some general knowledge of cost accounting on the part of the reader, and we hope that these points will prove to be a useful guide in the completion of similar studies.

CHAPTER XXII
PROGRESS TOWARD DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION:
the impact of alternative programs on
the incarceration of status offenders
Frank R. Helling

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PREFACE

This research originated as part of the national evaluation of Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) Programs conducted by the Social Science Research Institute, University of Southern California. The need for a special study on the detention and institutional commitment of status offenders was not apparent until the final months of the evaluation data collection period. The information required for this task was gathered during the first half of 1978, the final year of funding for preparation of the national evaluation report. Research priorities in the last months of the project delayed the actual writing and preparation of this report until after the termination of the national evaluation. Material support in completing this study has been provided by Research Center West, National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

Special acknowledgements are extended to Ms. Bonnie Lewin, former Project Monitor, and Dr. James C. Howell, Director, National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, at whose urging this special study was conducted; to the national DSO evaluation staff headed by Dr. Malcolm Klein and Dr. Solomon Kobrin; to the participating local evaluations directed by Drs. Charles Logan, Dean Rojeck, Ann Schneider, and Irving Spergel; to Marcia Empey, Dr. James Galvin and Dr. Barry Krisberg of Research Center West; and to individuals in a number of organizations who contributed data for this study.

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

This report examines the progress of eight major federally funded Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) Programs in achieving the goal of deinstitutionalization as defined in Section 223(a)(12) of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974. At the inception of these programs in 1976, this JJDP section required that eligibility for formula grants to participating States must be conditioned on the acceptance of a plan that would commit a State to ". . . provide within two years after submission of the plan that juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult, shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities . . ." During June of 1976, the Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), in concurrence with Senator Birch Bayh, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, established a substantial compliance standard allowing acceptance of a 75% reduction in detention and correctional placements for States which were unable to achieve full compliance within the initial two year period. Although the terms of Section 223(a)(12) have been recently expanded by the 1977 amendments to the JJDP Act, this report is limited to a concern with deinstitutionalization as defined in the original legislation.

Among the possible methods of assessing social programs, an obvious pragmatic appeal can be found in the straightforward inquiry that examines the impact of public funds in achieving a defined objective. The necessary information for this type of assessment is presented in the following tables. Table I-1 provides an initial view of the extent to which the

TABLE I-1: SUMMARY OF DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS COMPARING PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS OF EQUAL DURATION FOR ALL EVALUATED DSO PROGRAMS

Program Site	* Months Compared	Percent of Program Period	Institutions			Detention			Total Change	
			Pre-Program	Program	Change	Pre-Program	Program	Change	(N)	(%)
	(N)		(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)		
PIMA COUNTY	15	83%	0	8	+ 8	690	317	- 373	- 365	- 53%
ALAMEDA COUNTY	6	33%	missing information			1100 **	834	- 266	- 266	- 24%
CONNECTICUT	12	92%	126	73	- 53	442	540	+ 98	+ 45	+ 8%
DELAWARE	12	67%	51	9	- 42	647	702	+ 55	+ 13	+ 2%
ILLINOIS	12	67%	statutory prohibition			1783	824	- 959	- 959	- 54%
SOUTH CAROLINA	4.8 ***	20%	missing information			182	214	+ 32	+ 32	+ 18%
CLARK COUNTY	12	67%	8	2	- 6	666	440	- 226	- 232	- 34%
SPOKANE COUNTY	18	86%	21	7	- 14	621	330	- 291	- 305	- 48%
Totals:	91.8	62%	206	99	-107	6131	4201	-1930	-2037	- 32%

* The number of months used for comparison was determined by the availability of information during the program period. For example, Pima County data were for 15 months of the program (July, 1976 through September, 1977) and were used in a comparison with a 15 months per-program period (April, 1975 through June, 1976).

** Figures for Alameda County are estimates representing 50% of the 1975 pre-program detentions and 50% of the 1976 program period detentions. After six months of program operation in the latter half of 1976, the detention of status offenders was prohibited by state statute in Alameda County.

*** Comparable detention figures were available for only two of the five evaluated counties in South Carolina, and were limited to the first year of program operation. While 12 month comparisons were made in these two counties, the available data represents only two-fifths of the counties for one-half of the two years program period (i.e., 40% of 12 months).

DSO programs achieved deinstitutionalization by means of blocking or preventing the secure placement of status offenders. Essentially, this table offers a comparison between the numbers of detained and institutionalized status offenders in the program period with the figures available during a pre-program period of equal duration. Examination of the column totals reveals the aggregate level of achievement for all DSO programs. The first column indicates that comparative data were available covering 62% of the period in which DSO programs were fully operational prior to the termination of evaluation efforts on January 1, 1978. This figure is weighted toward the earliest months of operation and translates into an average for the DSO programs of 11.5 months activity out of a total of 18.5 operational months. The combined accomplishment of all programs in reducing the number of detained and institutionalized status offenders is shown in the final columns of Table I-1. In the pre-program period 6,337 status offenders were placed in secure facilities - 6,131 in detention and 206 committed to institutions. During a period of equal length in which the DSO programs were operational there were a total of 4,300 secure placements - 4,201 detained and 99 institutionalized. The net decrease of 2,037 secure placements during the program period amounts to a 32% reduction from the number of such placements occurring in the pre-program period. In summary, the overall DSO effort can be seen as having achieved a 32% level of deinstitutionalization of status offenders during an average of 11.5 months of program activity. If this rate of reduction was maintained for a two year period, the programs would have attained about a 67% reduction, or slightly less than the 75% substantial compliance standard set by LEAA.

The results from an alternative method of assessing the impact of

TABLE I-2: PREDICTED AND ACTUAL DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS DURING THE PROGRAM PERIODS IN ALL EVALUATED DSO PROGRAM SITES

Program Site	Program Months (N)	Predicted * Detention (N)	Actual Detention (N)	Difference Between Predicted and Actual (N) (%)	
PIMA COUNTY	15	445	317	- 128	- 29%
ALAMEDA COUNTY	6	1014	834	- 180	- 18%
CONNECTICUT	12	385	529	+ 144	+ 37%
District 1	12	117	114	- 3	- 3%
District 2	12	240	331	+ 91	+ 38%
District 3	10	28	84	+ 56	+200%
DELAWARE	12	758	702	- 56	- 7%
ILLINOIS	18	2922	1234	-1679	- 57%
Cook County	18	2509	923	-1586	- 63%
Macon County	18	237	124	- 113	- 48%
LaSalle/McLean Co.	17	176	196	+ 20	+ 11%
SOUTH CAROLINA	12	182	214	+ 32	+ 18%
Anderson Co.	12	79	78	- 1	- 1%
Spartanburg Co.	12	103	136	+ 33	+ 32%
CLARK COUNTY	12	751	440	- 311	- 41%
SPOKANE COUNTY	18	445	330	- 115	- 26%
Totals:	105	6902	4609	-2293	- 33%

* With two exceptions the predicted program figures were obtained by continuing the pre-program detention trend throughout the program period. For Alameda County the predicted figure represents the annual change between 1974-75 applied to one-half the 1975 figure (as an estimate for the six months of program operation in 1976 prior to an effective change in legislation preventing detention of status offenders). The predicted figure for South Carolina represents actual detentions in 1975. Both exceptions were due to the unavailability of monthly detention figures during the pre-program period.

the programs on the detention of status offenders can be seen in Table I-2. In contrast to the previous table which showed the absolute change in detentions, these results take into account the trend in detention at each site before the program and allow a measure of change relative to the pre-program experience. If the assumption is made that past performance provides an accurate estimate of future attainment, then the predicted figures in Table I-2 represent estimates of what would have occurred in the absence of the DSO programs. The difference between predicted and actual detentions is a measure that attempts to separate the effect of the programs from other factors influencing the detention of status offenders. This analysis offers a somewhat altered view of the impact of specific programs. In Pima County, for instance, there was an existing trend toward reduced detention before the DSO program that would have yielded an expected figure of 445 detained status offenders during the first 15 months of the program period. When the 317 actual detentions are compared to expected detentions (instead of the pre-program total of 690 - see Table I-1) the percentage change drops from a 53% to a 29% reduction. In other words, almost half of the change in detention for Pima County could be the result of policies that were already in effect before the start of the DSO program. In Connecticut there was also a declining trend before the program that would have yielded an expected figure representing a 19% reduction from the pre-program level. In two of the three districts in Connecticut there was a reversal of the previously established trend which amounted to a 37% increase in statewide detention during the program period. In comparison to Table I-1 the analysis of relative change effects the magnitude but not the direction of program impact at specific sites. The overall reduction in detention shown in Table I-1 amounts

TABLE I-3: SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES FOR DSO PROGRAMS AND EVALUATIONS

National Evaluation Sites	Program Funds		Evaluation Funds		Category Total
	date	amount	date	amount	
PIMA COUNTY	12/31/75	\$1,403,532	4/ 9/76	\$ 265,000	
	12/31/75	76,558	3/ 3/78	49,558	
	FY 1978	247,500	9/ 1/79	28,208	
		1,727,590		342,696	\$2,070,286
ALAMEDA COUNTY	12/18/75	1,500,000	2/17/76	225,000	
	FY 1978	471,796			
		1,971,796		225,000	2,196,796
CONNECTICUT	11/12/75	1,405,641	12/31/75	209,521	
		1,405,641	12/31/75	2,117	
				211,638	1,617,279
DELAWARE	12/ 3/75	987,083	12/31/75	103,427	
			12/31/75	68,783	
			1/17/78	52,759	
			4/ 9/79	31,167	
		987,083		256,136	1,243,219
ILLINOIS	11/12/75	1,493,300	12/31/75	174,380	
			12/31/75	51,617	
			12/31/77	120,549	
			8/16/78	68,845	
		1,494,300		415,391	1,908,691
SOUTH CAROLINA	11/ 4/75	1,500,000	12/31/75	222,745	
			12/31/75	2,225	
		1,500,000		224,970	1,724,970
WASHINGTON	12/29/75 *	104,799	3/ 1/76	80,000	
	11/30/75 **	55,055	6/ 1/77	60,636	
	12/29/75 **	303,169	5/28/78	28,383	
		463,023		169,019	632,042
NATL. EVALUATION			FY 1975	57,455	
			12/31/75	440,825	
			12/31/75	4,460	
			8/15/77	460,000	
			7/ 5/78	100,304	
				1,063,044	1,063,044
Evaluated Sites Total:		\$9,548,433		\$2,907,891	\$12,456,327

* Clark County program
** Spokane County program

TABLE I-3 (CONT.): SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES FOR DSO PROGRAMS AND EVALUATIONS

Other Program Sites	Program Funds		Evaluation Funds		Category Total
	date	amount	date	amount	
ARKANSAS	FY 1976	\$ 552,985	FY 1976	\$ 169,221	
	FY 1978	351,396	unspent	- 89,778	
			FY 1978	110,373	
		904,381		189,816	\$1,094,197
ELDORADO COUNTY	FY 1976	49,166	FY 1977	29,125	
	FY 1978	46,166			
		95,332		29,125	124,457
NEWARK, OHIO	FY 1976	114,000			
		114,000			114,000
NATL. ASSEMBLY	FY 1976	1,431,481			
	FY 1978	948,581			
		2,380,062			2,380,062
Other Program Total:		\$ 3,493,775		\$ 218,941	3,712,716
DSO Total:		\$13,042,208		\$3,126,835	\$16,169,043

Combined Program/Evaluation Costs of DSO Programming Prior to January 1, 1978:

Program Awards:	\$ 9,548,433
(less FY 1978)	- 719,296
	8,829,137
Evaluation Awards:	2,907,891
Total:	\$ 11,737,028

Per Capita Deinstitutionalization Costs:

(based estimated expenditures for 62% of the program period and a net reduction of 2037 detained and institutionalized status offenders - see Table I-1)

Program Costs: \$ 8,829,137(.62) / 2037 = \$ 2,687 per capita

Evaluation Costs: \$ 2,907,891(.62) / 2037 = \$ 885 per capita

to a 31% decrease, from 6,131 to 4,201, and is comparable to the relative reduction of 33% shown in Table I-2 where a slightly longer period of program operation is represented in the data.

The remaining information required in assessing the impact of DSO funding on deinstitutionalization is contained in Table I-3 which shows the full federal expenditure for programs and evaluation. Of the \$16,169,043 in total DSO costs, various amounts must be deducted in arriving at a figure apportioned to the deinstitutionalization progress documented in Table I-1.* First, program and evaluation funds in the amount of \$3,712,716 were for activities beyond the scope of the national evaluation. This includes programming conducted by the private, non-profit affiliates of the National Assembly, and DSO sites excluded from the national evaluation - Arkansas, Elderado County, California, and Newark, Ohio. In FY 1978 there were awards of \$719,296 to Pima County, Arizona and Alameda County, California for programming conducted after the evaluation period. The remaining \$11,737,028 represents program and evaluation efforts directly related to the national and local evaluation of activities occurring before January 1, 1978. In allocating these costs, one last refinement is required. The data in Table I-1 were obtained for only 62% of the operational program period and the level of expenditure must be reduced by the same percentage to insure an equivalence between the two data sets. The final figures in Table I-3 have been adjusted to reflect this proportionate reduction in funding.

If the level of federal expenditure for DSO was assessed solely in terms

* The comparison is being made to the summary information in Table I-1 for two reasons. First, unlike Table I-2 the earlier table includes both detention and insitutional data. Second, the measure of absolute change without regard to previous trends is more consistent with the objectives of Section 223 (a)(12) of the 1974 JJDP Act.

of having reduced the secure placement of status offenders, the findings in Tables I-1 and I-3 could be summarized in the following manner: the per capita cost in deinstitutionalizing status offenders amounted to an estimated \$3,542 - of this figure \$2,647 was expended in program funds with an added \$885 per child for the research that documented this outcome. In weighing these results, the pragmatic analyst might also wish to emphasize that in a separately conducted cost study of three DSO sites the average per unit cost of secure placement was approximately \$98. In other words, the cost of deinstitutionalizing a single status offender was 36 times greater than the alternative of allowing secure placement. However, having explored a 'bang-for-the-bucks' view of deinstitutionalization, an important question remains concerning the appropriateness of this method for assessing the DSO effort. There are at least three major reasons for rejecting this type of analysis when applied to federal initiatives similar to the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Programs.

First, most of the resources available to DSO programs were used in creating alternatives to secure placement for status offenders and cannot be directly apportioned to activities aimed at reducing or preventing detention or correctional placement. At each site the decision to incarcerate remained a prerogative of law enforcement and the juvenile court. With few exceptions the programs relied upon informal agreements and a general willingness to divert status offenders. Efforts to secure the cooperation of officials in the actual deinstitutionalization process were largely an administrative function and consumed relatively little of the overall DSO programming costs.

Secondly, a per capita cost assessment of the aggregate program impact

obscures the differences both within and between program sites in reducing the rates of detention and correctional placement. These differences are especially apparent in Table I-2 which shows a 57% reduction in detention for Illinois and a 37% increase for Connecticut. Within each of these states there are even more extreme differences among the separate program jurisdictions.

Thirdly, the DSO programs did not represent a uniform approach to the achievement of a single objective. They were initially funded as locally proposed models representing a range of alternative, non-traditional responses to status offenders. The extensive research and evaluation efforts directed at these programs were intended to document the success or failure of varying strategies and to suggest which program elements might serve as models for future efforts in responding to status violations. The purpose of the DSO effort, both programming and evaluation, was to produce a knowledge base to be used in implementing the deinstitutionalization mandate of the JJDP Act. Viewed from this perspective it would be totally inappropriate to judge the value of the DSO effort in terms of cost effectiveness in reducing the number of detained and institutionalized status offenders.

The remaining sections of this report are concerned with the knowledge that can be gained from the DSO experience. The primary focus is not on the amount of progress achieved in deinstitutionalization, but on how these programs progressed in attempting to influence a reduction in detention and correctional placement for status violations. Section 2 contains a general discussion of data collection issues. Section 3 is the main body of the report and contains sections on each of the program sites. These sections begin with a brief description of the program structure and, depending on the availability of data, go on to explore the following issues pertaining to deinstitutionaliz-

ation:

1. Number of detained status offenders.
2. Institutional commitments.
3. Detention of non-resident status offenders.
4. Length of detention.
5. Gender differences
6. Ethnic/Racial differences
7. Net-widening.
8. Relabeling.

While most of the above are familiar measures of impact, the latter two may require some explanation.

Net-widening and relabeling are two possible unintended consequences of programs such as the DSO effort (Klein, 1979:181-186). The net-widening effect refers to the possibility that creation of a program may have focused attention on status offense behavior and caused a greater number of cases to be brought within the system than might have occurred otherwise. In other words, a wider net may have been cast over the youth population and involved within the system those who previously were not at risk of juvenile court processing. The relabeling effect can usually be seen as an attempt to retain control of a youth by charging as delinquents those who would previously have been handled as status offenders. Other forms of relabeling are also possible. While there are alternative methods of testing for these effects, the data in this report were limited to aggregate figures on the number and type of offenses processed through the juvenile justice system. With this level of information the same data can serve as indicators for the presence of either consequence.

As illustrated in Figure I-1, there are four major possibilities for

FIGURE I-1: CHANGES IN THE RECORDED NUMBER OF DELINQUENCY AND STATUS VIOLATIONS AS INDICATORS OF NET-WIDENING OR RELABELING.

DELINQUENCY VIOLATIONS	STATUS VIOLATIONS	
	Decreased or no Change	Increased
Decreased or no Change	neither	net-widening
Increased	relabeling	both

a program to have influenced the number of recorded delinquency and status violations. When the only change associated with the establishment of a program was an increase in status violations, a tentative conclusion would be that net-widening had occurred. A decrease in reported status violations combined with an increase in delinquency would suggest the presence of relabeling. A decrease or no change in both types of violations points to the presence of neither effect. And an increase in delinquency and status violations raises the possibility that both net-widening and relabeling occurred as consequences of the program. These aggregate changes in reported violations could also result from actual change in the incidence of juvenile law violation and should not be taken as conclusive evidence of a program impact. However, the available information was included in this report because both net-widening and relabeling are related to deinstitutionalization. Increased involvement in the juvenile justice system, or net-widening, is clearly in opposition to the intended purpose of deinstitutionalization. Relabeling represents an alternative explanation for apparent reductions in

the institutional treatment of status offenders. When decreases are a result of merely relabeling from status to delinquency categories, deinstitutionalization has not occurred.

The final part of Section 3 will offer a summary of findings on program impact in reducing the levels of detention and correctional placement for status violations.

SECTION II: DATA COLLECTION

The attempt to document program accomplishments in deinstitutionalizing status offenders involved two separate data collection efforts. As originally designed, the evaluation of DSO programs did not include a study of deinstitutionalization. Rather, it was agreed that this information would be forthcoming from monitoring reports required of the participating jurisdictions. Although the submission of these reports was a seemingly automatic feature of the terms under which program funds were allocated, it became apparent during the second year of evaluation that the anticipated level of information would be unavailable. This development necessitated a revision in plans for the national evaluation involving an independent effort to obtain data at the local level.

This section will review the progress of both data collection efforts and will specifically focus on the following: (1) the difficulties and shortcomings of the original federally mandated data collection procedures; and (2) the level of success in obtaining information under the revised procedures. These efforts offer valuable insights into the major problems of data access that should be considered in any future effort of a similar nature. The purpose of this discussion is to point out the various lessons that have been learned in attempting to assess deinstitutionalization, and to familiarize the reader with the quality of the data contained in the subsequent sections of this report. The reader whose immediate interest does not involve data collection issues is encouraged to omit this section and proceed to the substantive discussion.

The Original Design

In planning the national evaluation of DSO programs, decisions were made

to gather various types of information related to the secure custody of status offenders. This was especially apparent in the requirements for client-centered offense histories, as well as for the system rates and cost studies included in the national design (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1977). Clearly, however, these data were not intended to provide measures of program impact in reducing the rates of detention and correctional commitment for status violations. This omission resulted from neither an oversight in designing the research nor from a judgement to devalue detention and correctional experiences as evaluation measures. Instead, the reason for neglecting a study of deinstitutionalization was an early assumption, shared by the evaluators and the funding agency, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), that the necessary information would be obtainable from monitoring reports generated at the state level. Unfortunately, this assumption proved to be unwarranted.

The requirement for state monitoring of compliance in deinstitutionalizing status offenders is found in Section 223(a)(14) of the JJDP Act of 1974 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1974). Under this provision participating states were to submit annual reports of the number of status offenders placed in secure detention and correctional facilities. In June, 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) provided further specification of the need for base-line comparison data and the methods to be utilized in measuring compliance. During the summer of 1977, in the final months of a two year evaluation period, the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP), the research and evaluation unit of OJJDP and the direct source of funding for evaluation, informed the national evaluators of problems encountered in obtaining monitoring data. After requesting from NIJJDP all currently available data for the eight evaluated DSO sites, the following major problems were discovered:

1) Reporting periods. Consistently reported data for both program and pre-program periods would not be available for states in which DSO programs had been funded. This presented two types of difficulties. First, comparison between program sites required measures of performance over similar periods of time, but the base-line monitoring information varied among sites from 1973 to 1975 and precluded this type of analysis. Second, even within site comparisons would have been of questionable value where the base-line data left a gap of as much as two years prior to the program period.

2) Reporting methods. Another barrier to uniform comparison involved the use of alternative reporting methods in compiling the monitoring reports. The three major alternatives (aggregate annual totals, average monthly figures, and daily census results) would have prevented any meaningful contrast between sites using different reporting methods.

3) Aggregation of data. While program activities were generally confined to specific counties or districts, monitoring reports offered information aggregated at the state-wide level. Without disaggregated reporting for jurisdictions where DSO programs were operating, it would not have been possible to assess deinstitutionalization in relation to program efforts.

4) Definitional Variation. Although attempts were made to foster the use of common definitions for federal monitoring, it was not clear that state data had been generated on the basis of similar definitions of key terms. The national evaluation had frequently encountered definitional variation among programs in differing states over terms closely related to the monitoring effort such as in distinguishing between secure and non-secure facilities, and in designating a juvenile violation as a status offense. If these variations also existed in the monitoring data then it could lead to substantial under-

reporting of detained and institutionalized status offenders by some jurisdictions and would further undermine the potential for comparative analysis.

5) Descriptive Characteristics. Monitoring reports only provided an enumeration of status offenders placed in secure facilities and did not include information necessary for an analysis of possible changes in the demographic characteristics of institutionalized populations or of shifts in the duration of confinement. Added descriptive data would allow at least a preliminary examination of the manner in which deinstitutionalization was implemented.

6) Accuracy of Reported Data. The difficulties of obtaining accurate data from state and local records had previously been established in other areas of the national evaluation. Here it had been found that even in jurisdictions with computerized systems the identification and tracking of status offenders could be frustrated by a variety of factors. Some systems might not have been operational long enough to include information from past years necessary in providing base-line statistics. Also, the coding categories in these systems were designed for retrieval of information relevant to the jurisdiction and might not include status offense codes. Finally, local requirements for purging juvenile records at age of majority may involve the deletion of computerized records as well as destruction of case files. In jurisdictions relying on manually assembled records the data collection task can be extremely burdensome and the resulting statistics may reflect a multitude of errors and omissions. Against this background it could be anticipated that at least a portion of the monitoring information would be highly suspect as an accurate accounting of detention and institutional commitments.

7) Interpretive Background. Reliance on secondary data such as offered in monitoring reports involves a high degree of isolation from events that may

have had a significant influence in determining a statistical outcome. For example, in attempting to attribute a decline in institutional commitments to the activities of a DSO program it would be useful to know if a statutory revision had been enacted which effectively prohibited such commitments. Adequate interpretation of data on deinstitutionalization as measures of program impact would require an additional level of information beyond that planned as part of the original monitoring effort.


Some of these concerns can be illustrated by an examination of Figure II-1 which presents the trend lines for the number of status offenders detained in Connecticut for the years 1975 through 1977. During the evaluation the State of Connecticut was eventually found to have four separate data sources recording the monthly detention figures for status violations. The earliest system, represented by the solid line, is a computerized record maintained by the juvenile court which provided detention figures for the full three year period. A second computerized system, marked by the broken line, was developed from intake records at the four state detention centers beginning with calendar year 1976. The third system was established by the Chief Clerk of Juvenile Court as a screening procedure for the DSO program and is represented by the dashed line. The dotted line represents a final version of statewide detention compiled for the State Justice Commission in their effort to fulfill monitoring requirements. There is an obvious disparity between these systems in their reported numbers of detained status offenders. In the order presented above, the average monthly figure for each data source is 41, 77, 64 and 78. While these variations suggest the use of different definitions for status offenses, there is also the possibility of serious error in the data. For instance, the version developed for State Justice Commission monitoring is extremely erratic

in reporting 110 detentions for April, 1977, a decline to 18 in May, and an increase during June to 166. While the organizational processes involved in arrest, court action, and incarceration normally produce some variation in the flow of cases over time, fluctuations of the magnitude reported in the monitoring effort raise immediate questions concerning the accuracy of the data.

In addition to the disparities that can be seen in Fig. II-1 there is also an interesting type of convergence in the figures for the four data reporting systems. In each system there is a peak level of detention reported for the summer of 1977 with a uniform decline continuing through the month of August. Although the trends over previous years indicate a seasonal decline in detention during the summer months, the 1977 experience is more pronounced and points to the possibility that the fully operational DSO effort may have successfully impacted state-wide detention of status offenders. This interpretation loses some of its credibility however, when it is noted that the detention center with the highest volume of admissions was closed during this period due to problems concerning fire regulations.

Having considered the types of problems that could be expected in the data obtained from the monitoring reports, the evaluation staff assessed a number of alternatives in approaching the issue of documenting progress toward deinstitutionalization. First, would it be worth the effort to pursue the original design and utilize whatever information the monitoring reports might provide? Had this been attempted, a comparative analysis of the DSO sites would not have been possible, and furthermore, the effort would have been based on sources such as those depicted in Fig. II-1 but without any opportunity to assess the quality of the data. Second, since the Office of Juvenile Justice was in the process of revising procedures for monitoring deinstitutionalization,

FIGURE II-1: CONNECTICUT DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH ACCORDING TO ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES



would it be possible to await the results of later monitoring reports? Unfortunately, the time constraints of the national evaluation precluded this option. Third, would it be acceptable to simply abandon the attempt to assess program effects on detention and correctional placements? This option would have created the unenviable prospect of having to produce a national evaluation report on deinstitutionalization without the capacity to examine one of the major objectives of the DSO programs. In rejecting each of these alternatives, the only remaining choice lay in the direction of developing a revised strategy for obtaining deinstitutionalization data.

The Revised Strategy

As an initial step in developing an alternative data set, an agreement was reached with the granting agency, NIJJDP, that contacts would be made with each of the local evaluation grantees to determine the feasibility of gaining detention and correctional data directly from the program sites during the remaining months of the evaluation data collection period. If feasible, the national evaluation would undertake a special study of the DSO program impact in reducing the number of status offenders confined in secure facilities. The completion of this task was eventually accomplished in three stages. First, specifications were drawn for the data elements believed to be most suitable for the evaluation of progress toward deinstitutionalization. Second, input was obtained from each program site in selecting the most appropriate source of data for their respective jurisdictions. Finally, arrangements were made for the forwarding of the information available from these sources to the national evaluation for analysis and reporting purposes. The following describes the data elements and sources of information eventually relied upon

in assessing deinstitutionalization, and discusses the extent to which the revised strategy yielded the desired level of information on detention and correctional placements.

Data Elements. The general objective in pursuing a revised strategy was to document, as fully as possible, any alteration in patterns of detention and correctional commitments that might reasonably be attributed to the establishment of the DSO programs. Toward this end an attempt was made to obtain serial data over a sufficient number of points in time to allow an assessment of changes at the various stages of program development. Furthermore, the request for data also called for detailed information that would permit an examination of differential shifts among sub-groups within the institutionalized populations. The reporting form and instructions distributed to local program sites can be seen in Appendix A. Essentially, the request for information was focused on the following types of data.

1) Number of status offenders entering secure facilities. These data were requested on a monthly basis for each separate facility serving the program site. The time frame was set for at least one year of the pre-program period and the entire program period. Separate reporting was requested on admissions to detention within the program site, and on commitments to correctional institutions originating from the program jurisdiction.

2) Duration of secure placement. In the case of detention this called for the average number of days for admissions in a given month, with any portion of a 24 hour period being counted as a full day. Since institutional commitments can be rather lengthy, and in some instances might extend beyond the data collection period, an alternative measure was specified that called for a count of the number of commitments from the program jurisdiction remaining in the

institution during each month following their original placement.

3) Gender and ethnic characteristics of secure placements. This was requested on a quarterly basis for both detention and correctional placements.

4) Total versus program eligible status offenders. While all DSO programs generally excluded transient youths such as out-of-jurisdiction runaways, some of the programs (most notably Connecticut and Clark County, Washington) imposed more restrictive eligibility requirements which could have left large numbers of ineligible youth subject to detention or correctional commitment. Interest in the effects of varying eligibility requirements led to a request for separate data on the total status offender population as well as the lesser group of program eligibles.

Data Sources. The early assumption underlying the revised data collection strategy was that the local evaluators at each program site would be involved in compiling the available information on detention and institutional placements. Various problems such as the timing of the data request, previous commitment of resources, and competing interests of the local evaluators resulted in the participation of only four of the seven local evaluation grantees. While alternative sources were eventually located, the inability to secure the co-operation of all the local evaluators affected the quantity of information gathered from the different program jurisdictions. The final sources of detention and institutional data from each site consisted of the following:

1) Pima County, Arizona. The data on detained status offenders were compiled by the local evaluators at the University of Arizona from a computer tape provided by the juvenile court staff. Information on institutional commitments was obtained from the research and evaluation unit of the court.

Since the Pima County court routinely destroys juvenile records at age of majority, a retrospective tabulation is likely to yield an under-estimate of actual cases. For example, a file no longer exists for 35% of the correctional commitments during the period of 1974 through 1977, and it is possible that some of these missing cases may have been adjudicated for status violations.

2) Alameda County, California. The limited information from this site was provided by the Office of Criminal Justice Planning for Alameda County. Detention figures were obtained from a computerized master file maintained by the juvenile probation department and reflect the number of status offender "book-ins" to the Juvenile Hall detention facility. Alcohol possession offenses were not included in the count of status violations. The only available institutional data were obtained from a previous study that only provided partial information for the calendar year of 1974.

3) Connecticut. Of the four data sets on detention of status offenders, a decision was made to rely on the computerized system maintained by the juvenile court. While it is thought that this system may under estimate the number of detained youth, there is no evidence that the downward bias changed though time. The Connecticut data, therefore, can be taken as an accurate indicator of through-time changes or trends, but cannot be viewed as an exact record of actual detentions. The figures in this report were supplied by the local evaluator who accessed the computerized court records (Logan et al., 1978:104&147).

4) Delaware. The detention and institutional data were compiled from records available to the Delaware State Planning Agency, the Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice. The figures represent in-state residents who had been charged only with a status violation at the time of incarceration.

5) Illinois. The detention figures for three of the program sites were obtained directly from facility records by the local evaluators at the University of Chicago. The data from Cook County represent a 16% random sample and not a total population. For the purposes of this report the Cook County sample is treated as the population of detained youth. Estimation of the actual population can be obtained by increasing the reported figures by a factor of 6.25. There are no figures on correctional placements due to the statutory prohibition that has existed in Illinois since 1974.

6) South Carolina. The data on institutional commitments in the five evaluated counties were obtained from the South Carolina Department of Youth Services. This information covered the two years of program operation, 1976 and 1977, but was not available for the period prior to program funding. Partial detention information for the five counties was obtained from a report prepared for the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (Stephen Carter & Associates, 1977). These data were available for only the year immediately preceding the program, 1975, and the first year of program operation, 1976. A study by the local evaluators, Technology Institute, reports on the statewide experience regarding detention and institutional placement. This latter report included areas in which the program was not in operation and did not provide a provide separate reporting for the evaluated counties. With regard to institutionalization, the evaluated counties where the program was known to have been operational did not replicate the statewide experience; no appreciable change was noted in the number of detained status offenders (Banks and Deutsch, 1979).

7) Clark and Spokane Counties, Washington. The local evaluator responsible for both of these sites provided detention and institutional data

obtained from computerized court records in each county. In Washington the possession of alcohol by a minor was considered a delinquent offense and does not appear in the status offense data. The information supplied to the national evaluation is also reported in the local evaluation reports (Schneider et al, 1978a and 1978b)

Data Availability

The request for detention and institutional data was aimed at securing measures on a number of items over a sufficient period of time to allow an adequate assessment of change. The time periods for which information was available can be seen in Table II-1. In the eight programs there are two States, Connecticut and Illinois, with separately analyzed data on jurisdictions within the program site. South Carolina is also represented by five evaluated counties, but the lack of detailed information led to the consideration of all counties as a single site. Overall the data can be seen as covering 12 specific DSO program sites. The total number of months, both before and after the program starting dates, are shown in separate columns for the available detention and institutional data. For detention information there was an average of 37.6 months of coverage, and for institutions there was an average of 35 months available data over all the sites (excluding Illinois which did not institutionalize status offenders).

As seen in Figure II-2, it was not possible to obtain data for uniform time measures across all the sites. Here the '-' represents availability of data in a pre-program months, and the 'o' indicates data for the program period. Delaware, for instance, provided pre-program detention data for only 12 months in 1974-1975 and program information for calendar year 1977. The last column indicates availability of information on a monthly or annual basis.

TABLE II-1: PROGRAM STARTING DATES AND PERIODS COVERED BY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT DATA

	Program Starting Date	Availability of Detention Data		Availability of Institutional Data	
		Period Covered	# of Months	Period Covered	# of Months
Arizona - Pima Co.	6/76	1/74 - 9/77	45	1/74 - 9/77	45
California - Alameda Co.	7/76	1/74 - 12/77	48	1/74 - 12/74	12
Connecticut - District 1	12/76	1/75 - 11/77	35	1/75 - 11/77	35 ^a
Connecticut - District 2	12/76	1/75 - 11/77	35	1/75 - 11/77	35 ^a
Connecticut - District 3	2/77	1/75 - 11/77	35	1/75 - 11/77	35 ^a
Delaware	6/76	8/74 - 7/75 & 1/77 - 12/77	24	1/74 - 12/75 & 8/76 - 12/77	41
Illinois - Cook Co.	7/76	7/75 - 7/78	37		-- ^b
Illinois - LaSalle/McClean Co.	9/76	1/75 - 7/78	43		-- ^b
Illinois - Macon Co.	7/76	7/75 - 7/78	37		-- ^b
South Carolina	1/76	1/75 - 12/76	24	1/76 - 12/77	24
Washington - Clark Co.	7/76	1/74 - 6/77	42	1/74 - 6/77	42
Washington - Spokane Co.	4/76	1/74 - 10/77	46	1/74 - 10/77	46

^a Connecticut institutional data were available as state totals only, not reported by district.

^b Illinois statute prohibits institutional commitment of status offenders.

FIGURE II-2: COMPARISON OF PERIODS COVERED AND TYPE OF REPORTING FOR DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT DATA IN ALL PROGRAM SITES

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	Type of Reporting
<u>DETENTION DATA</u>	JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJ					
Arizona - Pima Co.	-----		0000000000000000			monthly
California - Alameda Co.	-----		0000000000000000			annual
Connecticut - District 1		-----	000000000000			monthly
Connecticut - District 2		-----	000000000000			monthly
Connecticut - District 3		-----	000000000000			monthly
Delaware	-----		000000000000			monthly
Illinois - Cook Co.		-----	0000000000000000000000			monthly
Illinois - LaSalle/MacClean Co.		-----	0000000000000000000000			monthly
Illinois - Macon Co.		-----	0000000000000000000000			monthly
South Carolina		-----	000000000000			annual
Washington - Clark Co.	-----		00000000000000000000			monthly
Washington - Spokane Co.	-----		00000000000000000000			monthly
<u>INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT DATA</u>	JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJ					
Arizona - Pima Co.	-----		0000000000000000			annual
California - Alameda Co.	-----					annual
Connecticut		-----	000000000000			monthly
Delaware	-----		0000000000000000			annual
South Carolina			0000000000000000000000			annual
Washington - Clark Co.	-----		000000			monthly
Washington - Spokane Co.	-----		0000000000000000000000			monthly

(note: Illinois statute prohibits institutional commitment of status offenders)

key: '-' indicates pre-program month; 'o' indicates program month

Since institutional commitments occurred at a relatively low frequency, the issue of monthly or annual data was not of major significance. With detentions, however, the lack of monthly figures reduced considerably the potential for analyzing changes that may have resulted from the establishment of the DSO programs.

Table II-2 summarizes the availability of information by specifically requested items for the eight major site groupings. The compliance figures represent simple percentages of the number of sites supplying the minimal level of information requested by the national evaluation (see Appendix A). There was considerable variation between the program sites in providing data. Only in Illinois was it possible to obtain information for all the relevant items which, because of statutory prohibitions, were limited to detention of status offenders. Clark and Spokane Counties provided virtually all of the requested detention data, but none of the descriptive information on the numbers of institutionalized status offenders. The least successful data collection efforts were in Alameda County, California and South Carolina.

The final column of Table II-2 indicates the level of success in securing information on specific data items. The institutionalized population proved to be the most difficult in obtaining detailed information. This can be explained by the fact that in most sites the institutional commitments are recorded at a state facility which does not provide detailed information on commitments from a local jurisdiction. Even among the detained population it was relatively more difficult to obtain descriptive information that would permit sub-group comparisons. In some of the sites it was maintained that status offenders entering detention in the program period were largely ineligible for alternative treatment because of current probation status on

TABLE II-2: AVAILABILITY OF DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT DATA FOR DSO PROGRAMS

Type of Data Requested	Type of Data Received								Percent Compliance
	Pima	Alameda	Conn	Del	Ill	SC	Clark	Spokane	
Detention Data:									
-monthly detention	mo	yr	mo	mo	mo	yr	mo	mo	75%
-one year pre-program period	2.5	2	2	1	1	1	2.5	2	100%
-full program period	83%	100%	92%	67%	100%	50%	67%	86%	79%
-total status offenders	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	88%
-eligible status offenders	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	yes *	yes *	50%
-facility or region specified	na **	na **	yes	yes	yes	yes	na **	na **	100%
-average detention days	no	yes ***	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	50%
-gender specified	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	50%
-ethnicity specified	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	38%
Institutional Data:									
-monthly commitments	yr ***	yr ***	mo	yr	na	yr	mo	mo	43%
-one year pre-program period	2	1	2	1	"	-0-	2.5	2	86%
-full program period	83%	-0-	92%	67%	"	100%	67%	86%	67%
-total status offenders	yes	yes	yes	yes	"	yes	yes	yes	100%
-eligible status offenders	no	no	no	no	"	no	no	no	-0-
-facility or region specified	no	no	no	yes	"	yes	no	no	29%
-number remaining	no	no	no	no	"	no	no	no	-0-
-gender specified	no	no	no	yes	"	no	no	no	14%
-ethnicity specified	no	no	no	no	"	no	no	no	-0-
Percent Full Compliance:	35%	24%	39%	50%	100%	33%	47%	53%	

* available for program period only

** item is non-applicable for this program site

*** reporting of partial or incomplete data

a prior offense or because they were non-residents of the jurisdiction. The inability to provide a separate count for eligible youth made it impossible to verify the claims regarding the detained population. There was also a lack of information on the gender and ethnic or racial composition of incarcerated status offenders. Of the eight sites, four could not provide data on gender and five were unable to specify the racial characteristics of the detained population. For institutional commitments only one site had separate counts for males and females, and none of the sites could provide detailed racial information.

Since the request for this information was delayed until very late in the evaluation data collection period, it was encouraging to find that at least some statistics could be gathered for all the DSO program sites. The local evaluators and others who participated in this task can be credited with accomplishing a monumental eleventh hour effort. Their success, however, should not be taken as evidence of the adequacy of local information systems in providing juvenile justice data. Even where evaluators could access computerized data it was not possible to obtain uniformly recorded information across program sites. The experience in gathering the information for this report points to the need for development of information systems that can be used as a basis for deciding policy on a range of issues in juvenile justice, including, but not limited to, the treatment of status violations.

SECTION III: PROGRESS BY THE DSO PROGRAMS

The following is organized into sections discussing the detention and institutional commitment experience in each of the DSO programs - Pima County, Arizona; Alameda County, California; Connecticut; Delaware; Illinois; South Carolina; Clark County, Washington; and Spokane County, Washington. Since Connecticut contained three separately reported judicial districts and Illinois is represented by three evaluated counties, there are actually twelve distinct program jurisdictions. South Carolina was also represented by five evaluated counties, but the level of available information did not justify a separate examination of each county. Depending on the availability of data, as many as eight measures of deinstitutionalization are presented - number of detentions, institutional commitments, detention of non-residents, length of detention, gender differences, racial or ethnic characteristics, net-widening, and relabeling. A final section offers the summary of these measures for all program jurisdictions.

The raw data tables and accompanying figures are distributed throughout each section. The graphic presentations of detention over time have been plotted according to the average three month figure around the reported month or quarter.

PIMA COUNTY

The DSO program was based in the Pima County Juvenile Court, a division of the Arizona Superior Court system. Although the county encompasses a large geographical area, most of the population is in the vicinity of Tucson which was the focal point of virtually all program activities. The Juvenile Court Center in Tucson, the facility containing the county's only juvenile detention unit, was a major element in the DSO effort. Court staff maintained a separate intake section for status offenders and offered immediate diversion from detention, counseling and referral for additional services. The center was also the operating base for 24 hour mobile diversion units which were dispatched into the community and offered crisis intervention services to status offenders and their families. The administrative staff at the center was responsible for monitoring non-court agencies under contract for the delivery of alternative services to status offenders. These services had been negotiated and funded by the court administrators of the program and involved a variety of counseling, educational, residential and advocacy services performed at the community level.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. Table III-1 contains data available from Pima County which suggest the program was highly successful in deinstitutionalizing status offenders, especially at the detention level. During the two years prior to the program, 1974 and 1975, there was an average of nearly 63 status offender detentions per month. In the first program year this figure was reduced to slightly over 34 such instances, and in the second program year the average detention figure for status offenders dropped to approximately 15 cases per month.

Institutional Commitments. Arizona has three secure juvenile facilities maintained at the state level by the Department of Corrections. The Pima County figures show that such commitments rarely occurred for status violations even in the two years prior to the DSO program. Court records indicate there were 6 commitments in 1974 and none in 1975 and 1976. There were, however, 8 status offenders committed to an institution during the first nine months of the second program year. Examination of court files showed that all of these commitments had a prior record of non-status delinquency at the time of commitment.

Length of Detention. This issue is of interest because of the possibility that as an increasing number of youth were diverted from detention the remaining cases may have represented a more difficult group that was subject to lengthy periods of confinement. As noted in Table III-1 the Pima County data are limited in that length of detention covers all types of offenses, both delinquent and status. Also, the figures on monthly detention of status offenders were available for only one year of the program from July, 1976 through June, 1977. However, a partial test is possible. If a core group was subjected to longer periods of detention, it could be expected that, as the number of detained status offenders decreased, the contribution of the core group would increase the average length of detention for all offenses. Confirmation for this line of reasoning would be provided by finding an inverse relationship between the number of detained status offenders and the average length of detention for all offenders (i.e., the fewer the number of detained status offenders, the greater the length of average days in detention). The data do not appear to support this possibility. The relationship between the number of detained status offenders and average days in detention is in the wrong direction and it is not statistically significant ($R = .09, p < .78$).

TABLE III-1: PIMA COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths		number sent to secure institutions
			female		
			male		
1974			(%)	(%)	
1st qtr.	207		57%	43%	
2nd qtr.	195		50%	50%	
July	54				
August	67				
September	57				
3rd qtr.	178		51%	49%	
October	74				
November	56				
December	63				
4th qtr.	193		54%	46%	
Total Year	773		53%	47%	6
1975					
January	80				
February	90				
March	100				
1st qtr.	270		49%	51%	
April	72				
May	54				
June	52				
2nd qtr.	178		48%	52%	
July	52				
August	(na)				
September	(na)				
3rd qtr.	135		42%	58%	
4th qtr.	147		48%	52%	
Total Year	730		47%	53%	0
1976					
January	(na)	8.05			
February	(na)	5.72			
March	(na)	6.37			
1st qtr.	137	(na)	46%	54%	
April	(na)	4.67			
May	(na)	5.96			
June	(na)	6.91			
2nd qtr.	93	(na)	44%	56%	
July	37	6.04			
August	22	8.29			
September	41	5.94			
3rd qtr.	100	6.49	41%	59%	

TABLE III-1 (CONT.): PIMA COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

demographic characteristics of detained youth						number sent to secure institutions
1976 (cont.)	number detained	average days in detention	female			
			male			
			(%)	(%)		
October	28	4.64				
November	25	6.51				
December	28	7.65				
4th qtr.	81	6.26	35%	65%		
Total Year	411	(na)	42%	58%	0	
1977						
January	33	7.99				
February	19	6.13				
March	14	5.69				
1st qtr.	66	6.97	35%	65%		
April	8	5.91				
May	16	6.92				
June	16	6.13				
2nd qtr.	40	6.40	53%	48%		
July	(na)	6.63				
August	(na)	8.07				
September	(na)	7.62				
3rd qtr.	30	(na)	57%	43%		
9 mo Total	136	(na)	45%	55%	8	

¹ Average detention days are estimates based on experience of all detained juvenile offenders.

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona (detention data) & Pima County Juvenile Court, Tucson, Arizona (institutionalization data).

Gender Differences. The figures seen in Table III-1 on the gender of detained status offenders provide some insight into the differential effect of the Pima County program in deinstitutionalizing both male and female status offenders. As shown in Table III-1 there was a slight disparity during the earliest pre-program year with 53% of all detained status offenders being female. As the detention figures began to decline during the year immediately preceding the program, 1975, the disparity was reversed with 47% of the detentions being female. With further reductions during the program year, the gender differences increased substantially to the point where only 35% of the detained status offenders were female and the remaining 65% were male. And, finally, as detention reaches its lowest point, the percentage of females is again slightly higher than the figure for males. Since these latter percentages involve fairly small numerical differences they are of questionable significance. But the earlier differences, especially during the operational period of the program, do involve substantial numbers and point to a definite change in the characteristics of the detained population. The reason for this shift may be related to a number of factors, such as a greater emphasis in responding to females, a greater difficulty in finding alternative non-secure placements for males, or a greater willingness by parents to accept females back into the home.

Net-widening/Relabeling. These terms refer to two types of changes that could be expected as a consequence of programs such as the DSO effort. The prediction of a net-widening effect recognizes that the capacity of a system to respond to any particular problem of service need is limited by the availability of resources. When additional resources become available, such as those provided by the DSO program, the previously established standards used

in identifying a target population may be altered in such a way that a much larger number of cases are brought within the control of the system. In effect, the control network may have been widened or extended to include a larger target population. Differences of opinion exist concerning the location of a system boundary in relation to new-widening. For the purposes of this report, the system under consideration is the juvenile court and the boundary is marked at the point of entry into the records of the juvenile court.

Relabeling focuses on the possibility that officials may respond to a program such as DSO by charging youths with delinquency offenses where in the past they might have chosen the less serious charge of status violation. This type of relabeling seems to assume a desire on the part of police or other officials to insure that controls are exercised over youths, and, possibly, that the method of control will include a punitive response such as placement in a detention facility. While other forms of relabeling could also occur, the substitution of delinquency for status offense charges seemed likely in Pima County. Early in the program a major change occurred in the processing of law enforcement referrals to the juvenile court. At the start of the program all referrals to the Juvenile Court Center were received through a secure entrance that served as intake to the detention facility. This arrangement was altered with the opening of a reception area in another wing of the building. The police were then required to bring all status offenders to an entirely separate entrance from that of the detention unit. Comments at the time suggested that some officers did not agree with the more lenient procedures governing status offender intake.

Table III-2 contains the figures on delinquency and status offenders referrals to juvenile court for both a pre-program and program period. These

TABLE III-2: PIMA COUNTY REFERRALS FOR DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENSES DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS


	Delinquent Offenses	Status Offenses
<u>Pre-Program 1974-75</u>		
August	501	211
September	436	223
October	585	282
November	537	240
December	624	229
January	557	275
February	526	275
March	604	296
April	594	247
May	569	234
June	526	179
July	528	176
Total	6,587	2,867
Monthly Avg.	549	239
<u>Program 1976-77</u>		
July	503	207
August	548	213
September	530	230
October	621	226
November	561	208
December	589	202
January	436	191
February	470	140
March	610	149
April	556	133
May	488	126
June	486	126
Total	6,398	2,151
Monthly Avg.	533	179
Percent Change	- 2.9%	-25.0%

data suggest that neither relabeling nor net-widening occurred as a consequence of the DSO program. During the pre-program period (August, 1974 through July, 1975) there was a fairly stable relationship between types of referrals with about 30% (N=2,867) of all referrals being for status violations. In the program period there was not an increase in status offense referrals as would have been seen if net-widening were present. Instead the number of referrals for status offenses dropped to 2,151 - a 25% decline from the pre-program figure. Delinquency referrals remained about the same in both periods with 6,587 in the pre-program year and 6,398 during the first 12 months of the program - a 2.9% decline during the program year. The increase in delinquency referrals that would have been predicted by a relabeling hypothesis was not present in the data.

While these results are supportive of the Pima County program as an effective model for the achievement of deinstitutionalization, it should be emphasized that the DSO effort operated in a context that was conducive to the success of the model and that the same level of deinstitutionalization might have been achieved in the absence of funding for the program. A major contextual factor could be seen in the philosophy of the juvenile court which had been turned toward a less punitive treatment of youth before the establishment of the DSO effort. The prime mover in this movement was the presiding judge of the juvenile court. Prior to his tenure which began in 1972, Pima County committed as many as 200 to 300 youth annually to the State Department of Corrections. By 1975 only 3% (N=18) of all commitments came for Pima County, a jurisdiction containing 20% of the state's population. Further evidence of this person's impact can be detected in the changes that occurred in detention of status offenders.

Figure III-1 provides a plot of quarterly detention figures for status offenders from 1974 through the third quarter of 1977. According to Dr. Dean G. Rojek, a University of Arizona evaluator of the Pima County program, by 1974 it was recognized that the progress being made in reducing correctional commitments was not being matched by similar reductions in detention. This was especially apparent among status offenders whose rate of detention in 1974 was surpassed only by juveniles charged with homicide or kidnapping. In late 1974 the Presiding Judge removed the Director of Court Services, and in April, 1975 a new Director was named with instructions to implement a policy of reduced reliance on detention. In six months the quarterly detention figure for status offenders had been cut exactly in half, from 270 at the close of the first quarter, to 135 at the end of the third quarter, 1975. There is no way to prove that reductions in detention would have continued without the alternative provided by the DSO program. On the other hand, progress had been made prior to the program initiative and the juvenile court might have continued in the absence of the DSO program to approximate a level of reduction similar to the trend line established during the pre-program period, as shown in Figure III-1. Clearly, however, within the supportive context provided by the court, the Pima County model did achieve a significant reduction in the detention rate for status violations.

FIGURE III-1: PIMA COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY QUARTER DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



ALAMEDA COUNTY

The DSO program was administered by the Probation Department of Alameda County, California, which contains a separate division that serves the juvenile court. The program consisted of two principal components - services offered by community-based Youth Service Centers, and activities under the direct control of the Probation Department. In addition to administration, the Probation Department maintained two Family Crisis Intervention Units offering 24 hour, 7 day per week intake and counseling services. The northern location served Oakland, Berkeley and four other cities; the southern location served the remainder of the county. The administrative unit also arranged foster and group home placements and other purchased services. Many of the Youth Service Centers were established prior to the program either by private non-profit organizations or as publicly funded social service agencies. During the program period thirteen Youth Service Centers operated throughout the county on either program funds or as cooperating agencies in a unified network. The Centers offered counseling and advocacy services as well as some short-term shelter care.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. New legislation in California limited the possibility of testing the capacity of the Alameda DSO program for reducing the rates of detention and institutional commitment of status offenders. The data in Table III-3 show that in excess of 2,000 status offenders were detained in each of the two years prior to the program, and that in 1974 (the only year for which the data are available) the average stay in detention was over 6 days, and for the 129 institutional commitments the average stay exceeded 5 months. Although the detention figures indicate a substantial decline during the first program year, 1976, it is difficult to determine if the change resulted

TABLE III-3: ALAMEDA COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY YEAR

YEAR	number detained	average days in detention	number sent to secure institutions	average days in institution
1974	2,384	6.02	129 ^a	153.1
1975	2,199	N/A	N/A	N/A
1976	1,667	"	"	"
1977	215	"	"	"

^a data not available from two of four facilities and the California Youth Authority.

SOURCE: Office of Criminal Justice Planning, Alameda Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board, Oakland, California

from the efforts of the DSO program. First, the program began operation in July of 1976, and with only annual figures it is impossible to say that the decline occurred after the establishment of the program. Second, in September of 1976 the California legislature approved Assembly Bill 3121 which prohibited the placement of status offenders in secure detention or correctional facilities. While the law was not effective until January 1, 1977, there is the possibility of an anticipatory effect in which law enforcement agencies may have reduced their rates of referral for status violations, and, as a consequence, may have caused the reduction in detention figures. There are additional data to suggest the latter was not the case.

Law Enforcement Anticipation of AB 3121. Preliminary findings from a study conducted by the California Youth Authority (CYA) on the impact of Assembly Bill 3121 show that law enforcement referrals of status offenders to the Alameda County Probation Department were undergoing a moderate but steady decline during the period from 1974 to 1976. As shown in Table III-4, part B, the 1975 reduction was 8.0% (from 2,761 to 2,541) and the 1976 decline amounted to 8.9% (down to 2,316 referrals in 1976). If the 1976 passage of the law had produced an anticipatory effect at the law enforcement level, then it should have contributed to a higher rate of decline for 1976 as compared to 1975, and the 1976 reduction of 8.9% for referrals should have been much closer to the 24.2% reduction in detention that can be seen in Table III-3 (from 2,199 detentions in 1975 to 1,667 in 1976). Tentatively, then, it could be concluded that the law enforcement response to an imminent change in juvenile law did not reduce the number of detained status offenders in 1976.

Probation Department Detention Before AB 3121. If detention figures are computed as percentages of law enforcement referrals, there is a suggestion of

a major change in probation department practices during 1976. In 1974 and 1975 the number of detained status offenders amounts to 86.3% and 86.5%, respectively, of probation department referrals from law enforcement. Since most instances of detention are likely to involve a law enforcement referral, these figures indicate that probation department intake at juvenile hall usually responded to such referrals by deciding to place the status offender in detention. However, in 1976 this figure dropped to 72.0% and suggests the use of alternative procedures for handling status offenders. Additional data from the probation department also show that the number of non-custody referrals for status offenders increased by 32.1% from 1975 to 1976 (i.e., from 662 to 975). This latter category includes referrals to the Family Crisis Intervention Units which provided intake for the DSO program. There is some evidence then, that the 1976 decline in detention may have been due to the establishment of the program. However, in the absence of detailed information showing the decline in detention as occurring after the program became operational, the evidence of a program impact must be viewed with caution.

Post AB 3121. Since the change in California law was effective on January 1, 1977, it is obvious that the further reduction in detention during the second program year was not a result of the DSO effort. There are two issues, however, that should be examined. First, why were there any status offenders appearing in the detention records for 1977? Second, how did the revised law affect the processing of status violations in Alameda County?

The reasons that status offenders appear as having been detained after the effective date of Assembly Bill 3121 reveal some of the difficulties in classification of juvenile offenders and the fine detail of the legislation. According to a review of detention records conducted by the DSO program, as

many as 80 of these cases were misclassified. These instances involved cases such as a youth having been detained on a delinquent offense and a status violation. The delinquency charge was then dropped and the case appeared in the record as a status offender. The remaining cases involved status offenders who at the time of arrest also had an active delinquency charge from a prior arrest. Under one interpretation of the law, the status violation could be treated as a violation of a court order which then provides the justification for detention.

While the revised statute only limited the use of secure detention for status offenders and did not remove these violations from juvenile jurisdiction, the major impact of the law was to sharply reduce the number of such cases being processed by the juvenile justice system. The data from the CYA study show that police arrests for status violations declined 22.7% during 1977 (from 3,593 in 1976 to 2,777 in 1977), and that law enforcement referrals to the juvenile probation department dropped even further to 39.6% (from 2,316 in 1976 to 1,400 in 1977). For the probation department the reduction of status offender referrals from all sources amounted to 27.9% (from 2,985 in 1976 to 2,152 in 1977). The distribution of this change in probation referrals was as follows: detention intake declined 87.1% (from 1,667 in 1976 to 215 in 1977); police citations or paper referrals dropped 37.9% (from 343 in 1976 to 213 in 1977); and non-custody referrals increased 76.8% (from 975 in 1976 to 1,724 in 1977). The non-custody referrals included 1,600 status offenders who were received at the Family Crisis Intervention Units as clients for the DSO program.

Net-widening/Relabeling. The proximity of the program start to changes in the California law make it difficult to determine if the program might

have altered the rates of referral for delinquency or status offenses in a direction predicted by net-widening and relabeling. The previously mentioned CYA data, shown in Table III-4, provides partial evidence for the absence of these effects in Alameda County. The annual percentage changes in the arrests and court referrals for status offenses in the pre-program year, 1975, and the first program year, 1976, fail to show an increase consistent with net-widening (i.e., bringing more cases within the system as a consequence of having established the program). Although arrests did not decline as much in the program year as compared to 1975, the declines in status offense referrals are comparable for both periods (-8.0% and -8.9% respectively). The suggestion of relabeling from status to delinquency categories as evidenced by an increase in delinquent offense is also unsupported by the data. The declines in delinquency arrests and referrals occurring before the program continued at a similar pace in the first program year.

While the program may not have had the unintended consequence of relabeling or net-widening, there is a possible slight effect that could have resulted from the change in statute. As seen in Table III-4 there was a shift in law enforcement referrals and arrests during 1977, the first year of AB 3121. For status violations there was a sharp decline in arrests and court referrals, dropping by about 23 and 40 percent, respectively. Delinquency arrests show the least amount of reduction in 1977, and the trend toward reduced delinquency referrals is virtually absent - a negligible decline of 0.6%. While the major effect of the new legislation seems to have been divestment of status offense cases from the juvenile system (the opposite of net-widening), there is a suggestion of some relabeling in the first year of AB 3121. The 1978 figures

TABLE III-4: ALAMEDA COUNTY ARRESTS AND REFERRALS FOR DELINQUENCY AND STATUS OFFENSES, 1974-1978

PART A: Arrests		Delinquent Offenses		Status Offenses	
	Number	Annual Change	Number	Annual Change	
1974	18,062		4,441		
1975	16,821	- 6.9%	3,796	-14.5%	
1976	15,495	- 7.9%	3,593	- 5.4%	
1977	14,565	- 6.4%	2,777	-22.7%	
1978	13,216	- 9.3%	2,336	-15.9%	

PART B: Referrals		Delinquent Offenses		Status Offenses	
	Number	Annual Change	Number	Annual Change	
1974	12,286		2,761		
1975	11,133	- 9.4%	2,541	- 8.0%	
1976	10,174	- 8.6%	2,316	- 8.9%	
1977	10,109	- 0.6%	1,400	-39.6%	
1978	9,288	- 8.1%	1,262	- 9.9%	

indicate that, with the exception of status offense arrests, the previously established pattern emerged once again in the continuing declines for arrests and referrals of delinquents and in the reduced levels of status offender referrals to juvenile court.

CONNECTICUT

The organizational structure and design of the Connecticut effort was the most complex of any DSO site, and, in fact, provided three separate models for delivery of services to status offenders. Administrative responsibility for the program was located in an executive agency, the Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS), which also operated the state's secure correctional facility for juveniles, Long Lane School. Operationally, however, the program was subject to a high degree of court control. Eligibility requirements were established which limited participation to youths who were actually detained solely on the basis of a status violation and were not under current court supervision or subject to pending criminal charges. All DSO intake screening was conducted by staff at the four juvenile court detention centers located throughout the state. Depending on the judicial district in which the detention center was located, the DSO client was offered services within one of the following models:

District 1 - Community-based, minimum intervention model. This approach was based on the Sacramento 601 model with short-term counseling and crisis intervention being offered by teams from community agencies under contract to the DSO program. District 1 covers the western third of Connecticut with the detention facility located in Bridgeport.

District 2 - Court-based, minimum intervention model. This was also a 601 approach with the teams consisting of juvenile court staff members. The jurisdiction of District 2 consists of the central and eastern sections of the southern portion of Connecticut. Unlike the other judicial districts, there are two detention facilities in District 2 - New Haven and Montville.


District 3 - Community-based, maximum intervention model. This approach emphasized client evaluation and provision of services suited to individual

needs. Both contracted and purchased community services were offered. This district encompasses the northeastern and north central areas of the state and contains a detention facility in Hartford.

While the overall program represented an attempt to test three contrasting models of service delivery, it should be emphasized that the approaches were not as dissimilar in reality as they appeared in conception. First, all the models shared some basic features such as court-based intake and provisions for emergency shelter care. Second, the local evaluation (Logan et al., 1978) suggests the models were not implemented as originally planned. The maximum intervention model in District 3 was undermined at a number of points by contractual problems with community based service delivery agencies which delayed the start of the program until February, 1977, and caused further interruptions while the program was operational. The minimum intervention programs were underway by December, 1976, but there were reports that the intervention teams were inclined to extend the contact period beyond the planned minimum for status offenders who appeared to be in need of further services. The similarity resulting from the possible convergence of the minimum and maximum treatment approaches was probably not as significant in affecting detention rates as the uniform reliance on court determined eligibility requirements and intake procedures.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. The detention figures for all three judicial districts are shown in Table III-5 and are graphically displayed in Figure III-2. While there are differences between the districts, it is apparent that the Connecticut DSO program produced an overall increase in numbers of detained status offenders. Most of this increase can be attributed to District 2, the court-based minimum intervention program, which is the most populated judicial district and which contains two rather than a single detention center.

FIGURE III-2: CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL DISTRICT DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



During the pre-program period, from January, 1975 through November, 1976, there was a total of 454 status offenders detained in District 2. This amounted to an average monthly detention figure of 19.7 cases. As can be seen in Figure III-2 there was a slightly increasing trend established during the pre-program years with an average monthly detention figure of 19.3 in 1975 and 20.6 in 1976. In the first year of the program, December, 1976, through November, 1977, the average monthly detention figure for status offenders rose to 27.6, an increase of 40% over the pre-program experience. It should also be noted that the decline occurring in the second half of 1977 was occasioned by the temporary closing of the largest detention center in District 2. If the comparison is limited to the first seven months of the program, during which both of the detention facilities were functioning, the average monthly detention for the program period would have been 30.9 status offenders and the increase over the pre-program average would have amounted to more than 60%.

The detention experience in the remaining two districts was mixed. In both districts the incidence of detention for status violations had been declining during the pre-program period. For District 1, the community-based, minimum intervention model, the decline continued during the program period, but in District 3, the community-based, maximum intervention model, there was a reversal in the detention trend with a gradual increase occurring throughout the program period. In District 1 there were 133 detentions during the 1976 pre-program period, January through November. This amounted to an average monthly figure of 12.1 as compared to 13.3 detentions in 1975. During the program year, from December, 1976, through November, 1977, there were 114 detained status offenders which amounted to a 25% decrease in the average monthly detention figure as contrasted to the entire 23 month pre-program period, from

12.7 to 9.5 average monthly status offender detentions. For District 3, which was delayed in starting until February, 1977, there were 62 detentions in the 13 month period immediately preceding the program, from January, 1976 through January, 1977. The average monthly detention figure for this period was 4.8 as compared to 8.3 in 1975. In the 10 months of the program for which data were available, there were 84 detained status offenders. In terms of average monthly detention this amounted to an increase of 29% over the entire pre-program period, from an average of 6.5 for the 25 months prior to the program as compared to 8.4 monthly detentions during the program. This increase in District 3 yielded a return to 1975 levels of detention and represented a marked shift from the relatively low levels that were achieved in the year immediately prior to establishment of the DSO program.

Institutional Commitments. The figures in Table III-5 indicate the number of secure placements by DCYS following commitment to that agency by the Juvenile Court. There is an indication that secure placements for status violations were declining during the pre-program period. In the first and second halves of 1975 the average monthly placement figures were 16.7 and 16.8 respectively. In the first six-months of 1976 this figure dropped to 11.5 and was reduced further in the second half of 1976 to 7.8 average monthly institutional placements. During the period of program operation in 1977 there was an actual increase for the first half year with an average monthly placement figure of 8.5 status offenders. Beginning in June, however, there was a noticeable reduction in the monthly figures that continued to the end of the reported program period. When the comparison is made between the June through November figures in 1977 with the same period in 1976, the 1977 placements represent a 60% reduction in secure institutional placements. In sum, the collaborative effort of DCYS and the Juvenile Courts did produce a reduced

TABLE III-5: CONNECTICUT DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained				number sent to secure institutions
	district 1	district 2	district 3	statewide	
<u>1975</u>					
January	15	26	8	49	23
February	10	28	14	52	21
March	16	20	7	43	21
1st qtr.	41	74	29	144	65
April	24	12	4	40	11
May	11	15	8	34	20
June	15	27	9	51	14
2nd qtr.	50	54	21	125	35
July	12	13	13	38	12
August	12	11	6	29	4
September	6	17	7	30	15
3rd qtr.	30	41	26	97	31
October	13	21	9	43	32
November	12	23	8	43	19
December	13	19	7	39	19
4th qtr.	38	63	24	125	70
Total Year	159	232	100	491	201
<u>1976</u>					
January	8	23	3	34	12
February	13	12	5	30	15
March	13	14	5	32	15
1st qtr.	34	49	13	96	42
April	18	25	4	47	8
May	13	25	6	44	9
June	15	28	8	51	10
2nd qtr.	46	78	18	142	27
July	18	22	1	41	6
August	8	13	3	24	8
September	10	21	4	35	9
3rd qtr.	36	56	8	100	23
October	6	10	5	21	10
November	11	29	7	47	5
December	5	25	3	33	9
4th qtr.	22	64	15	101	24
Total Year	138	247	54	439	116

TABLE III-5 (CONT.): CONNECTICUT DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained				number sent to secure institutions
	district 1	district 2	district 3	statewide	
1977					
January	14	18	8	40	11
February	7	27	7	41	4
March	14	36	8	58	5
1st qtr.	35	81	23	139	20
April	9	36	5	50	10
May	16	37	10	63	15
June	13	37	9	59	6
2nd qtr.	38	110	24	172	31
July	3	19	9	31	2
August	3	20	9	32	5
September	17	23	9	49	2
3rd qtr.	23	62	27	112	9
October	7	28	12	47	3
November	6	25	6	37	1
2 mo total	13	53	18	84	4
11 mo total	109	306	92	507	64

SOURCE: Site evaluation, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut.

level of placement but did not eliminate the use of institutional commitment for status violations.

Net-widening. The previously examined evidence of increased detention for status offenders points to a net-widening effect as a consequence of the Connecticut program. The result is ironic in that the strict eligibility requirements were imposed for the purpose of insuring that intake would be limited to status offenders who would have been detained in the absence of the program. By restricting eligibility to status offenders appearing at the detention centers it was believed that the program would avoid the possibility of casting a wider net over the youth population and bringing into the program those who were not at risk of juvenile court processing. The failure of these requirements to eliminate a widening of the net points to the complexity of the issues involved in attempts to narrowly target a program population. One of the major issues that was inadequately dealt with by the Connecticut program concerns the use of discretionary decision-making.

First, the indestructibility of discretion has been documented in other areas of the justice system, and the attempt to limit the use of discretion in determining program eligibility did not prevent its application at other decision points in the system. The program did not attempt to limit the exercise of police discretion and, in effect, created the option of having to detain a status offender in order to provide access to DSO services.

Secondly, the program plan did not include provisions for expanded screening of detention decisions at the point of entry to the detention facilities. In Districts 2 and 3 the probation officers reviewed eligibility for the DSO program only during court hours and status offender referrals during non-court hours would have been held until the next judicial day. For District 1,

however, the Bridgeport detention center required that probation officers be on call 24 hours a day and provided prompt review and screening of status offender detentions. This difference in intake procedures existed independently of the DSO program plan and was probably a major factor in preventing an increased detention rate in District 1.

Finally, the design of the program models included features which may have motivated detention center staff to exercise their discretion in detaining a greater number of status offenders. The court-based minimum intervention teams in District 2 had a vested interest in insuring a sufficient number of cases to justify their presence in the DSO program. In District 3 the contracted services for the community-based, maximum intervention model created a demand for clients that would not have been met by the continued decline existing in the pre-program period. Coincidentally, the detention rates in each of these districts increased during the program period. A decrease in detention occurred only in District 1 which provided minimum services delivery by non-court personnel.

In summary of the Connecticut detention experience, the program offered one example of the consequences of imposing strict eligibility requirements on program entry. In targeting detained status offenders the program attempted to avoid widening of the net by limiting the use of discretion at the program entry stage. The program plan did not, however, address the problem of displacement of discretionary decision-making to the earlier stages of justice system processing, it did not provide for prompt review of detention decisions at intake to the facilities, and it did not attempt to counter the possibility of having created a motivated bias among detention intake staff toward increasing the number of detained status offenders. The trade-off in preventing

non-detained status offenders access to program services appears to have involved a substantial increase in detention. It is difficult to determine the exact size of this increase because other factors may have been operating such as an actual increase in status violations during the program period. However, if the 10.6% reduction that occurred in statewide detention of status offenders for 1976 had continued at the same rate through 1977, then the eleven-month predicted total for 1977 would have been 360 detentions. The actual figure was 507 detained status offenders, a 41% increase over the predicted figure.


DELAWARE

Although the Delaware DSO effort was officially located within a state agency, the Division of Services to Children and Youth, the design of the program was clearly court-based. A specially created Family Court intake unit served as the entry point for all status offenders entering the program. Individual cases reached this intake unit by two routes, either through physical arrest or direct referral. Physical arrest in Delaware is characterized by a high degree of legal formality with an emphasis on the use of warrant procedures and a requirement of transfer to Family Court within two hours of taking the juvenile into custody. Status offenders arrested during court hours could be taken directly to the Family Court, otherwise they would be placed in one of two detention facilities operated by the State Bureau of Juvenile Corrections. The Family Court generally reviewed the cases of all arrested status offenders before referral to the DSO intake unit. The second route for program entry involved non-custody complaints from law enforcement or referrals from community sources, both of which usually reached the DSO intake unit without prior screening. The decision to refer status offenders for further services was largely controlled by the Family Court DSO intake unit.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. The detention figures shown in Table III-6 were available only for a pre-program year covering August, 1974 through July, 1975, and a program period covering calendar year 1977. The figures for the interim months (August, 1975 through December, 1976) are estimates taken from a separate report of both resident and non-resident status offender detentions during this period. The comparative detention figures are for resident status offenders only. It is apparent that the program did not

FIGURE III-3: DELAWARE DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH DURING PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS

solid line - actual detention figures
dotted line - estimated detention figures



reduce the absolute number of youths detained for status violations. In fact, the figure for the program period (N=702) represents an 8.5% increase over the number detained during the pre-program year (N=647). Without the actual interim figures it is impossible to determine if this increase resulted from a trend established in the pre-program period (see Figure III-3), or if the availability of DSO services may have influenced law enforcement to increase the number of arrests for status violations.

Institutional Commitments. Table III-6 also contains the figures showing the Delaware experience in reducing the number of status offender committed to secure institutions. In the two years prior to the program there was some evidence of a movement to decrease the number of institutionalized status offenders, with 75 commitments in 1974 and only 51 in 1975. In the first six months of 1976 the frequency of such commitments continued at about the 1975 level, but with the start of the DSO program in June of 1976 there was an obvious decline with only 2 commitments in the second half of 1976, followed by 9 cases during 1977. There are some additional data focusing on the period between October, 1975 and September, 1976 that can shed some light on the significance of these reductions. During this year, status offenders represented 18% (N=53) of all juvenile commitments to secure institutions. Also, among the 241 institutionalized males only 10% were status offenders, and among the 53 females the number of status offenders amounted to 55%. In other words, the reductions achieved during the DSO program removed a significant proportion of all youths from correctional facilities and halved the number of female commitments.

Length of Detention. The data concerning average length of detention for status offenders indicate that the program did make some progress.

TABLE III-6: DELAWARE DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	number sent to secure institutions	gender distribution of institutionalized youths	
				female (%)	male (%)
1974-75					
August	53	8.68			
September	43	5.32			
October	68	9.27			
1st qtr.	164	8.05			
November	44	8.93			
December	50	7.06			
January	64	8.17			
2nd qtr.	158	8.03			
February	46	9.54			
March	66	7.43			
April	42	8.29			
3rd qtr.	154	8.30			
May	64	8.44			
June	54	6.87			
July	53	4.46			
4th qtr.	171	6.71			
Total Year	647	7.75			
1975 (cont.)					
August	(56) ^a		4		
September	(54)		4		
October	(77)		9		
November	(51)		7		
December	(47)		4		
5 mo Total	(285)		Total Year 51	51%	49%
1976					
January	(55)		6		
February	(69)		6		
March	(52)		5		
April	(44)		7		
May	(63)		4		
June	(59)		3		
July	(43)		-		
August	(74)		2		
September	(51)		-		
October	(59)		-		
November	(46)		-		
December	(49)		-		
Total Year	(664)		33	55%	45%

TABLE III-6 (CONT.): DELAWARE DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	number sent to secure institutions	gender distribution of institutionalized youths	
				female (%)	male (%)
1977					
January	54	4.90	-		
February	67	2.46	2		
March	60	2.66	-		
1st qtr.	181	3.25			
April	42	3.10	1		
May	73	4.02	1		
June	60	4.21	-		
2nd qtr.	175	3.87			
July	54	2.32	2		
August	50	4.96	1		
September	57	3.40	1		
3rd qtr.	161	3.52			
October	57	3.00	1		
November	87	4.74	-		
December	41	3.83	-		
4th qtr.	185	4.00			
Total Year	702	3.67	9	33%	67%
1978					
January	63	3.67	2		
February	55	5.10	-		

(^a Figures within parentheses are estimates based on another series reporting the detention of out-of-state as well as resident status offender detention. The figure reported here represents 88% of all detentions reported in the other series.)

SOURCE: Governor's Commission on Criminal Justice, Wilmington, Delaware

The average number of days in detention was fairly uniform within each of the two periods. However, in the program period this figure had been reduced by more than 50%, from 7.75 days in 1974-75 to 3.67 days in 1977.

In retrospect these results provide a summary of the major strengths and weaknesses of the Delaware program structure. The close relationship with the court seems to have been effective in reducing the number of institutional commitments and in shortening the length of detention for status offenders awaiting court action. On the other hand, the exclusive reliance on an intake procedure that was limited to court hours was totally ineffective in shielding status offenders from the experience of secure detention and may have resulted in an actual increase in the frequency of arrest and detention for status violations.

ILLINOIS

Legislation effective statewide in 1974 had already prohibited institutional commitment of status offenders, designated in Illinois as Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS), and thus the DSO effort was concerned solely with the issue of diverting status offenders from secure detention prior to court adjudication. The program was formally administered by a state social welfare agency, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which in turn created and staffed a separately identified unit, Illinois Status Offender Services (ISOS), with responsibility for implementing two programs for status offenders.

The DSO program, known as Alternatives to Detention, focused on service delivery between the point of arrest and first court appearance. Program entry ordinarily began with notification by the police to the ISOS office or contract agency representative that an arrest had occurred for a status violation. The youth advocates were usually available 24 hours a day and could assume responsibility for the child at the point of police custody. The advocates could return the child to their home or find alternative shelter, and with permission of the court would provide home supervision and other services until the scheduled court appearance occurring in approximately two weeks of the time of arrest. While the advocates could be involved in court deliberations on the disposition of the case, their involvement with the child was officially ended at the hearing stage. The alternatives model was operated in 11 of the 18 DCFS regions in Illinois, or approximately 35 of 102 counties.

The second ISOS program was funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC), the state criminal justice planning agency, and was designed to provide services to adjudicated status offenders who had been referred by

the court to DCFS. Known as the Service Demonstration Program, this effort was limited to the south Chicago area of Cook County, and the Decatur region containing seven central Illinois counties. While the same child may have been served by both programs, the Service Demonstration Program received some clients that had not been previously seen in the Alternatives to Detention Program.


Detention data were available from three sites in which the DSO program, Alternatives to Detention, was operational. The Cook County Detention Center information is shown in Table III-7 and includes a pre-program year from July, 1975 through June, 1976 with a program period beginning in July, 1976 and ending in July, 1978. Table III-8 contains the data from the Macon County Detention Center located in Decatur, Illinois. The program and pre-program periods are identical to those of Cook County. The final Illinois data set is shown in Table III-9 which combines the information from the LaSalle County Detention Center in Ottawa with the figures from a small facility serving McLean County. This merger was suggested because McLean County was reported as having frequently used the LaSalle facility as an alternative to the privately operated, non-profit facility also used by McLean County. There was a delayed program start in LaSalle County with the result that the program period begins in September, 1976 and continues through July, 1978. Pre-program data were available from January, 1975 through August, 1976. The local Illinois evaluators were able to obtain one of the most complete data sets on deinstitutionalization and have facilitated the examination of a number of issues related to program impact, the first being the effectiveness of the program in reducing the number of detained status offenders.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. The monthly detention figures for each site have been plotted in Figure III-4* which shows an impact in all three sites on detention rates but with apparent variation in the magnitude and the pattern of the reduction. The most precipitous decline in any DSO site was observed in Cook County. During the peak pre-program month, February of 1976, there were 174 detained status offenders, and by the third month of the program, in September, 1976, this figure had dropped to 25 - a decline of almost 86%. Overall comparison of the pre-program and first program year indicates a reduction of 61.1%, from 127.2 average monthly detentions between July, 1975 and June, 1976, to a 49.5 average between July, 1976 and June, 1977. Beyond the first year the program effect was somewhat lessened, with an average monthly figure of 57 detained status offenders from July, 1977 through July, 1978, a 55.2% reduction compared to the pre-program year.

In viewing only the detention figures it is possible to conclude that law enforcement in Cook County, principally the Chicago Police Department, may have substantially reduced their efforts to intervene in situations involving status violations. Additional data on the rates of referral to the DSO/Alternatives program (see Table III-10) suggest that this was not the case and, in fact, that law enforcement was highly receptive to utilizing the ISOS youth advocates

* The Cook County figures are limited to in-county residents only, with the transient detainees, who were ineligible for the program, being reported separately in Table III-7. The Macon and LaSalle/McLean figures represent total status offender detentions. The differential reporting was justified on the grounds that the Macon County and LaSalle/McLean Detention Centers were located in multi-county areas served by the program and that non-residents of the detention counties could have been eligible for the program in their county of residence. Cook County was not reported as a detention site for surrounding counties and non-resident detentions generally involved actual transient youths.

FIGURE III-4: ILLINOIS COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



as an option to detention. In the early months of the program, which actually began in mid-July, the number of referrals to the program from police custody approximately doubled each month, beginning with 25 cases in July and reaching 151 by October. In terms of total identification of detainable youth (actual detentions plus program referrals) it is apparent that law enforcement began to increase their levels of arrest for status violations and soon exceeded the peak month for the pre-program period (i.e., 174 detentions in March, 1976 versus the total detainable figure for October of 193 - 42 actual detentions plus 151 referrals). The only period of reduced intervention seems to have occurred immediately preceding the start of the program and may have resulted from an anticipation of utilizing an option other than detention in responding to status offenders. This increase in total detainable status offenders raised the possibility of a 'widening of the net' effect and will be discussed below in greater detail.


The detention experience in the remaining areas did not exhibit the dramatic decline seen in Cook County and suggests the possibility of a slower rate of impact in less urbanized areas where the initial incidence of detention is likely to be much lower. In the long run, however, both of these areas did achieve reductions that either exceeded or matched that of Cook County. In Macon County where there was a slight increasing trend during the pre-program period, the first year of the program saw a reduction of 35.8% from the preceding twelve months, a decline from 11.2 to 7.2 average monthly detentions. After the first year Macon County appears to have totally eliminated the use of detention for status violations for the last seven months, and recorded an average monthly figure for July, 1977 through July, 1978 of 2.9 detentions, a 73.8% decline from the pre-program period.

For LaSalle/McLean Counties a comparison of average monthly detention figures in the twenty month pre-program period and the first program year shows a slight increase of 8.0%, from approximately 11 to 11.8 status offenders monthly. The peak detention figures were recorded at the end of the first year and declined steadily thereafter with the average monthly figure for the last eleven months being 6.8 detained status offenders, a drop of 37.7% from the pre-program figure.

If progress in reducing the use of detention at all three Illinois sites is compared on the basis of achievement in the last six months of the two year program effort (i.e., January through June of 1978 versus the same pre-program months in 1976), the results are as follows: -56% for Cook County (from 806 to 355 detained status offenders); -100% for Macon County (from 77 to zero detentions); and -51.1% for LaSalle/McLean Counties (from 66 to 32 status offenders). The eventual impact of the Alternatives to Detention model yielded comparable reductions in detention for both the highly urbanized and more rural areas of Illinois.

Detention of Non-resident Status Offenders. A second issue on which only Illinois information was available involves the possible impact of the DSO effort on the detention of transient, non-resident status offenders. Because the detention centers in Macon and LaSalle Counties served as a detention site for surrounding counties in which the program was operating, the non-residents of these detention counties were not recorded separately. In Cook County, however, these cases did represent a transient youth population of the type that is likely to be drawn to a large urban area. The monthly figures on detention of non-resident status offenders in Cook County are shown in the second column of Table III-7. The data are also plotted in Figure III-5 along with

FIGURE III-5: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS DETENTION OF RESIDENT AND NON-RESIDENT STATUS OFFENDERS DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



the detention of resident status offenders in order to provide an indication of the trend and relative size of the two groups. Three observations seem warranted.

First, there is no evidence of a program effect. In the eleven months prior to the program, from August, 1975 through June, 1976, there were 40.3 average monthly detentions for non-resident status offenders. In the first 13 months of the program the average monthly figure was 37.5 detentions. Since non-residents were ineligible for the program, this result could be expected. But, it also suggests that law enforcement continued to screen for non-resident youth and provides further evidence that the program did not create a non-interventionist response at the police level.

Secondly, not only did the program fail to affect this group, but there appears to be very little else that affects the level of non-resident status offender detentions. The monthly number of transients remained fairly constant both before and during the program and appears to be unrelated to even extreme fluctuations in resident detentions. The only decline of any significance occurred in December, 1976 when Chicago was experiencing severe weather conditions (program referrals also dropped sharply in this period).

The final observations concern the decision to exclude non-resident status offenders from the DSO program. During the months in which data were obtained on both groups it is apparent that non-resident status offenders contributed significantly to the total detained population. In the pre-program period transients accounted for 24% of all status offender detentions, and as a number of resident detentions declined in the program period the relative size of the non-residents increased to 48% of all detained status offenders. While services other than home supervision would have been required for this group,

it seems reasonable to ask why an alternative other than secure detention was not offered for this relatively large number of non-criminal youth.

Length of Detention. A third issue concerns the effect of the program on length of detention among the program eligible status violators. In each of the three Illinois tables the number of average days in detention is shown for the status offenders detained for a given month (exclusive of the non-resident detainees in Cook County). Analyses of these figures were undertaken to determine the extent of pre-program/program differences in length of detention, and to test for an inverse relationship between the numbers of detained youth and length of detention during the program period. Presence of the latter relationship would suggest that the program was less successful in diverting the more hard to place youth from lengthy periods of detention. If such a core group were subject to a greater likelihood of detention under the alternatives program, then, as the less difficult cases were diverted, their increasing relative contribution would have raised the average detention day figure for the reduced number of detained status offenders.

The possible effects of the program on length of detention should be assessed in relation to the impact on the number of detained status offenders. The first year reduction in the use of detention in Cook County was also accompanied by an increase in the period of confinement for status offenders. The average length of detention on Cook County during the first 13 months of the program was raised by about 32% over that of the 11 month pre-program period, from 6.8 to 9.0 days. Within the program period there was also a slight inverse relationship between status offender detentions and the average length of detention for each month ($r = -.26$), suggesting that the program may have had less of an impact in removing the more difficult placement cases from detention.

In Macon County, the first year reduction in the number of detained status offenders was not accompanied by an increased period of detention. The 12 month pre-program average of 6.4 detention days was virtually identical to the 6.3 figure for the first 13 months of the program. There was also no confirmation of a relationship between monthly detentions and the average detention day figure ($r = .09$).

While the number in detention was not reduced in LaSalle/McLean Counties until after the first year of the program, there was evidence of a decline in detention days during the first 11 months of the program. Compared to a 20 month pre-program period this decline amounted to over 24%, from 8.2 to 6.2 days. During the program months there was no relationship between the number of detainees and length of detention ($r = -.04$).

In sum, then, the average day figures indicate that the Cook County program was less successful than it appeared to be when assessed only in terms of numerical reductions (i.e., fewer status offenders were detained for longer periods of time), Macon County achieved a reduction in numbers without increasing the length of confinement, and in the LaSalle/McClean area there was somewhat of a reduction in the length of detention prior to an actual drop in the number of detained status offenders.

An additional area that can be examined in Illinois involves the possible effect of deinstitutionalization on the demographic characteristics of the detained status offender population. Ideally it could be expected that a program such as the alternatives effort would be equally successful in diverting youth with differing demographic features such as gender or ethnic group membership, and that the proportionate representation of a specific demographic grouping would remain the same in both the pre-program and program periods.

The Illinois data tables show the quarterly composition of the detained population on gender and ethnic characteristics, and allow an examination of demographic differences before and during program operation. In all three sites the information was obtained for the same months as those in which average length of detention was measured, and, with the exception of the LaSalle/McLean data, the comparison periods are identical to those of the preceding analysis. Since the program in LaSalle County started during the third quarter of 1976, this quarter was dropped from the analysis and the demographic comparisons involve pre-program/program periods of 18 and 10 months respectively.

Gender Differences. With regard to gender characteristics of detained status offenders, the only consistent finding was the predominance of females in both the pre-program and program periods. The shifts that can be observed in comparisons of the program and pre-program data indicate that the Alternatives to Detention effort was not equally successful in diverting both males and females, and that the pattern of differential impact was somewhat unique in each of the three areas. In Cook County there was an 11% increase in the proportionate representation of detained female status offenders during the program, from 50.9% in the pre-program period to 61.9% in the first 13 program months. While Cook County recorded a general decline in detention during this period, the relative increase for females occurred as a result of the greater impact in diverting males from secure detention. For males the average number of monthly detentions declined by nearly 70% - from 62.5 to 19.3 per month. Among female status offenders the monthly detention figure was reduced by slightly over 51% - from 64.8 to 31.4 cases monthly.

In Macon County the opposite pattern occurred. During the program the proportion of female detainees declined 11.3% - from 65.7% before the program

to 54.4% during the first 13 months of the program. This decrease in the percentage of detained females in Macon County reflects a movement toward less gender-based disparity in status offender detentions. Before the alternatives program, the average monthly figure for detained females was almost twice that of males, 7.3 females versus 3.8 males per month. After the first year of the alternatives program, the monthly average of females was 3.8 as compared to 3.2 for male status offenders.

The LaSalle/McLean data reveal that the previously noted modest increase in overall detention was entirely the result of an increased detention rate for females. The proportion of detained females rose from 59.9% in the pre-program period to 67.0% during the program months in which data were available, a 7.5% increase. This shift represents an increase of 22.6% in the average number of females detained monthly, from 6.3 before the program to 7.7 per month during the program. For male status offenders there was actually a slight decline in average monthly detentions of 11.2%, from 4.3 per month before the program to 3.8 during the program.

In summarizing these gender-based differences, it appears that the Alternatives to Detention program was more successful in diverting male status offenders. At all three detention centers the average monthly figure invariably reached a lower level for males than for females. The disparity between the percentage of male and female detentions increased in both Cook County and the LaSalle/McLean areas. The reduction in gender differences for Macon County approached but never reached parity for females. In relative terms the provision of short-term home supervision as an alternative to detention seems to have been less acceptable for female than for male status offenders.

Ethnic/Racial Differences. The data regarding the ethnic or racial characteristics of the detained populations indicate that the program generally

did not affect the proportion of minority youth held in secure detention. The detention center in LaSalle County held almost no minority status offenders either before or during the program period, a finding related to the predominance of white, anglo families in that area of Illinois. In Cook County, minority youth, mostly black, constituted 53.5% of the detained population before the program, and continued at a comparable level of 54.2% during the first program year. The only evidence of a differential impact appears in Macon County where the proportion of minority youth increased from 20.9% before the alternatives effort to 28.9% during the first program year. This shift occurred because the diversion from secure detention largely involved non-minority youth and left the absolute number of minority cases at the same level both before and during the program period. For non-minority youth the number of average monthly detentions declined by over 44% during the first program year, from 8.8 to 4.9 status offenders per month. For minority youth there were 2.3 average detentions for the pre-program months as compared to 2.0 monthly detentions averaged in the first year of the program. Since Macon County eventually removed all status offenders from detention, it would be misleading to attach undue significance to the differential impact on minorities in the first program year.

There is one remaining observation concerning the ethnic composition of the detained populations that deserves special emphasis. Over the full period covered in these data the level of detention shown for minority youth suggests substantial over-representation relative to their numbers in the total population. While more refined comparisons could be obtained, the 1970 census recorded the black population of Cook and Macon counties as 21.4% and 7.9% respectively; the corresponding figures on the detention of black youth for

TABLE III-7: COOK COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS ¹

		demographic characteristics of detained youths						
		average days in detention	female		white		latino	
number detained			male		black	other		
1975			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
July	(126)							
August	121 (32) ²	8.73						
September	127 (46)	8.41						
3rd qtr.	374	8.57	58%	42%	38%	62%		
October	112 (55)	9.96						
November	131 (36)	9.36						
December	103 (32)	2.56						
4th qtr.	346	7.53	51%	49%	53%	45%	2%	
6 mo Total	720	7.96	54%	46%	47%	52%	1%	
1976								
January	116 (43)	5.81						
February	148 (39)	6.69						
March	174 (33)	5.37						
1st qtr.	438	5.93	53%	47%	42%	54%	4%	
April	162 (49)	7.75						
May	132 (48)	5.25						
June	74 (30)	3.29						
2nd qtr.	368	5.96	43%	57%	51%	47%	2%	
July	79 (42)	4.28						
August	57 (33)	6.13						
September	25 (44)	3.47						
3rd qtr.	161	4.18	65%	35%	52%	35%	13%	
October	42 (44)	12.95						
November	34 (44)	7.72						
December	30 (17)	12.53						
4th qtr.	106	11.15	80%	20%	40%	60%		
Total Year	1073	6.29	54%	46%	46%	49%	4%	
1977								
January	49 (32)	9.69						
February	51 (28)	14.00						
March	49 (49)	7.78						
1st qtr.	149	10.54	50%	50%	36%	58%	5%	
April	58 (34)	9.05						
May	66 (56)	5.29						
June	54 (21)	10.40						
2nd qtr.	178	8.65	52%	48%	59%	41%		

TABLE III-7 (CONT.): COOK COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths					
			female		white		latino	
			male	female	black	white	other	other
			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1977 (cont.)								
July	65	(43) ²	14.64	82%	18%	28%	63%	9%
August	61							
September	49							
3rd qtr.	175							
October	55							
November	52							
December	47							
4th qtr.	154							
Total Year	656	na	-----	na	-----	na	-----	-----
1978								
January	47							
February	57							
March	61							
1st qtr.	165							
April	60							
May	71							
June	59							
2nd qtr.	190							
July	57							
7 mo Total	412							

- ¹ All statistical computations based on detained youths residing in Cook County.
² Indicates the number of additional detained youths whose residence is outside of Cook County.

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

TABLE III-8: MACON COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths					
			female		white		latino	
			male	female	black	white	other	other
			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1975								
July	13	2.58						
August	11	10.27						
September	4	2.50						
3rd qtr.	28	5.59	61%	39%	86%	11%	4%	
October	11	4.92						
November	7	4.69						
December	11	7.36						
4th qtr.	29	5.79	72%	28%	93%	7%		
6 mo Total	57	5.69	67%	33%	89%	9%	2%	
1976								
January	21	5.32						
February	10	12.15						
March	14	4.70						
1st qtr.	45	7.91	62%	38%	73%	16%	4%	7%
April	13	5.48						
May	13	4.98						
June	6	7.73						
2nd qtr.	32	5.70	69%	31%	69%	28%	3%	
July	7	6.77						
August	11	11.14						
September	17	5.18						
3rd qtr.	35	7.37	43%	57%	74%	23%		3%
October	8	7.53						
November	7	5.47						
December	6	6.64						
4th qtr.	21	6.59	71%	29%	67%	24%		10%
Total Year	133	7.03	60%	40%	71%	22%	2%	5%
1977								
January	1	6.00						
February	2	5.40						
March	9	4.49						
1st qtr.	12	4.85	67%	33%	67%	33%		
April	5	2.20						
May	8	5.78						
June	5	10.80						
2nd qtr.	18	6.18	50%	50%	83%	17%		

TABLE III-8 (CONT.): MACON COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths				
			female	male	white	black	latino other
1977 (cont.)							
July	4	1.50	50%	50%	25%	50%	25%
August	6						
September	14						
3rd qtr.	24						
October	9						
November	5						
December	0						
4th qtr.	14						
Total Year	68	na	-----	na	-----	-----	-----
1978							
1st qtr.	0						
2nd qtr.	0						
July	0						
7 mo total	0						

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois

TABLE III-9: LASALLE/McLEAN DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths				
			female	male	white	black	latino other
			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1975							
January	11	16.22					
February	14	26.52					
March	13 (2) 1	5.94					
1st qtr.	38	13.06	45%	55%	97%	3%	
April	8 (1)	7.15					
May	9	4.53					
June	10 (1)	5.02					
2nd qtr.	27	5.49	48%	52%	100%		
July	13 (1)	3.90					
August	9	1.44					
September	12 (1)	14.97					
3rd qtr.	34	7.16	44%	56%	100%		
October	8	5.18					
November	12 (3)	3.59					
December	5 (1)	11.36					
4th qtr.	25	5.65	84%	16%	100%		
Total Year	124 (10)	9.35	53%	47%	99%	1%	
1976							
January	8 (6)	43.05					
February	11 (4)	2.40					
March	9	1.67					
1st qtr.	28	13.78	68%	32%	100%		
April	13 (2)	6.03					
May	16 (3)	1.91					
June	9	4.53					
2nd qtr.	38	3.94	74%	26%	100%		
July	11 (2)	2.44					
August	18 (1)	3.70					
September	11	5.35					
3rd qtr.	40	3.81	63%	37%	100%		
October	11	7.85					
November	6	6.83					
December	8 (2)	2.33					
4th qtr.	25	5.84	64%	36%	100%		
Total Year	131 (15)	6.37	67%	33%	100%		

TABLE III-9 (CONT.): LASALLE/McLEAN DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	1977	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths			
				female	white	latino	
				male	black	other	
January	12	(1)	5.77				
February	9	(2)	6.20				
March	14		5.03				
1st qtr.	35		5.58	54% 46%	94% 6%		
April	11	(1)	4.80				
May	17		10.00				
June	10		9.26				
2nd qtr.	38		8.30	79% 21%	97% 3%		
July	17		3.93	71% 29%	100%		
August	16						
September	11						
3rd qtr.	44						
October	13						
November	10						
December	2						
4th qtr.	25						
Total Year	142	(4)	na	-----	na	-----	
1978							
January	3						
February	11						
March	4						
1st qtr.	18						
April	5						
May	4						
June	5						
2nd qtr.	14						
July	7						
7 mo Total	39						

- ¹ Indicates the number of MacLean County detainees included in total number.
² Data for current and all remaining months for LaSalle County only.

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

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
status violations in 1975-77 were 50.5% for Cook County and 19.2% for Macon County. These comparisons do not establish the presence of bias in the treatment of minority youth, but they do raise questions concerning the social and economic correlates of detention for status violations and certainly dispel contentions that minority youth are infrequently detained for status offense behavior.

Net-widening. The final issue to be examined involves the possibility of a 'net-widening' effect (i.e., did the establishment of the program draw more youths into the net of the juvenile justice system than might have occurred otherwise?). The data from Cook County contained in Table III-10 and graphically displayed in Figure III-6 suggest that a net-widening effect can be attributed to the Alternatives program. As previously discussed, there was a substantial decline in the use of detention in Cook County during the program period. At the same time, however, this reduction was more than compensated by the number of referrals to the ISOS youth advocate services, largely home supervision while awaiting court appearance. Data available for the first 15 months of the program indicate a total of 2,779 detainable status offenders, or approximately 185 per month. Of this total there was an average of 51 cases entering detention (N=769) and 134 youths going to the program (N=2,009). In the year before the program the total population of detainable status offenders can be identified only on the basis of having actually been placed in detention. The pre-program figure amounts to an average of 127 cases monthly (N=1,526). The difference in the monthly averages of total detainable status offenders represents a 46% increase for the program period. This increase should be interpreted as a maximum net-widening effect because: 1) program referrals may have been double counted by virtue of being placed in detention

TABLE III-10: COOK COUNTY TOTAL DETAINABLE STATUS OFFENDERS DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS

	actually detained	program referrals	total detainable youth
1975: July	126		126
August	121		121
September	127		127
October	112		112
November	131		131
December	103		103
1976: January	116		116
February	148		148
March	174		174
April	162		162
May	132		132
June	74		74
Pre-program Total:	1526		1526
(monthly avg.)	(127)		(127)
July	79	25	104
August	57	56	113
September	25	111	136
October	42	151	193
November	34	107	141
December	30	100	130
1977: January	49	143	193
February	51	162	213
March	49	196	245
April	58	171	229
May	66	178	244
June	54	163	217
July	65	140	205
August	61	143	204
September	49	163	212
Program Total:	769	2009	2779
(monthly avg.)	(51)	(134)	(185)

FIGURE III-6: COOK COUNTY DETAINABLE STATUS OFFENDERS DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



following their court appearance; and 2) cases formerly entering the system under delinquent charges may have been relabeled in the program period in order to allow referrals to the youth advocates. As in Connecticut, it seems likely that the Illinois program model influenced the use of police discretion in officially citing a greater number of status offenders than would have occurred in the absence of the program.

SOUTH CAROLINA

The DSO program was operated by the South Carolina Department of Youth Services through its Youth Bureau Division. Although services were offered to status offenders statewide, the evaluation was limited geographically to five of the state's forty-six counties. Anderson, Spartanburg and Greenville counties are in the northeastern section of the state; Richland and Lexington counties surround the capital, Columbia, which is centrally located. These five counties contain an estimated 30% of the state's juvenile population aged 10 to 16 years (the maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction). Separate Youth Bureau centers were established in each of the evaluated counties.

The decision to incarcerate juveniles in South Carolina is made at the local level. The facilities used by sheriffs or police officers for detention of juveniles are located in county jails or city lockups. Juveniles are held in these facilities for processing through county level courts. These local courts, either Family or General Sessions Courts, may commit juveniles to one of four state institutions which are also operated under the Department of Youth Services through its Juvenile Institutional Division. The Reception and Evaluation (R&E) Center in Columbia receives short-term commitments (less than 45 days) for diagnostic assessment prior to the final disposition hearing in the county court. Long-term and intermediate length commitments are sent to the three secure residential schools. The average length of stay for all juveniles, including both status and non-status, has been reported as 35 days for the R&E Center, and 285 days for the three correctional institutions (South Carolina Department of Youth Services, 1978:37).

Number of Detained Status Offenders. While the Department of Youth Services could not exercise any direct controls over decisions to detain or commit

status offenders, the program did have an opportunity to persuade local court and law enforcement personnel to utilize the Youth Bureaus and to eliminate the use of incarceration in responding to status violations. The data shown in Table III-11 indicate that this effort not only failed to reduce incarceration, but that the use of detention increased during the first program year and that institutional commitments exhibited a similar growth over the life of the program.

In the three counties where detention figures were available for both pre-program and program years, only Anderson County failed to increase the use of detention and achieved a reduction of only one case in the 1975-76 comparisons. During this period the figure for Spartanburg County increased 32% (from 103 to 136), and for Lexington County the increase in detention went from 52 to 128. This latter increase of 146% should be viewed with caution because the number for the program year includes cases from the city police lockup while the pre-program count was confined to county jail records.

Institutional Commitments. Figures on the commitment of status offenders to state institutions were not recorded in South Carolina prior to the establishment of the DSO program and comparisons to the pre-program experience cannot be made. However, data recorded for the two years of program operation show a general lack of progress in reducing commitments and, in at least one county, a definite increase in the institutional treatment of status offenders. Commitment to the state's correctional facilities appears to have been an infrequently used alternative for status offenders and remained so during both years of the program with 14 commitments occurring in 1976 and 12 in 1977. Referrals to the R&E Center for short-term diagnostic commitment show an overall increase from 77 cases in 1976 to 86 in 1977. Most of this increase can be

TABLE III-11: SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	number sent to institutional facilities reception and evaluation center	correctional institution
<u>1975</u>			
Anderson Co.	79	N/A	N/A
Spartanburg Co.	103	"	"
Greenville Co.	N/A	"	"
Lexington Co.	52	"	"
Richland Co.	N/A	"	"
Total Year	234	N/A	N/A
<u>1976</u>			
Anderson Co.	78	16	2
Spartanburg Co.	136	26	2
Greenville Co.	42 (a)	2	4
Lexington Co.	128 (b)	22	2
Richland Co.	237	11	4
Total Year	621	77	14
<u>1977</u>			
Anderson Co.	N/A	35	3
Spartanburg Co.	"	26	2
Greenville Co.	"	5	0
Lexington Co.	"	11	4
Richland Co.	"	9	3
Total Year	N/A	86	12
<u>1978 (6 month post-program, January through June)</u>			
Anderson Co.	N/A	14	0
Spartanburg Co.	"	2	0
Greenville Co.	"	2	0
Lexington Co.	"	4	0
Richland Co.	"	8	5
6 mo Total	N/A	30	5

^a reported for 9 month period
^b includes cases from police lockup which was not counted in 1975 figures

attributed to Anderson County which more than doubled the number of R&E referrals during the second program year and contributed a net increase over the reduction of referrals from Lexington County. The three remaining counties exhibited little change in the number of R&E referrals over the two program years.

The available data for South Carolina fail to show any appreciable impact of the program in deinstitutionalizing status offenders. Admittedly, more detailed information could alter this conclusion, but there are a number of factors relating to the South Carolina situation that would support an expectation of limited program impact.

First, the commitment of status offenders to one of the state's correctional schools was a relatively rare event even during the first year of program operation. A recently available report for FY 1977-78 suggests that this pattern continued in the period following termination of federal funding. During the year from July, 1977 through June, 1978 there were only 47 commitments of status offenders to the three juvenile correctional institutions for all forty-six counties; 12 of these commitments were from the five evaluated counties; and the total number of status offenders represented less than 6% of all correctional commitments. (South Carolina Department of Youth Services, 1978: 61-62) Barring the possibility of a dramatic change having occurred during the first program year, it would be reasonable to assume that even prior to the program there were relatively few status offenders being placed in correctional institutions. In a situation where the frequency of commitments is already at a fairly low level it is a relatively more difficult task to gain a further reduction in cases that the courts are likely to view as involving exceptional circumstances. This would have been especially true in South

Carolina where the program was not associated with the courts and lacked any formal mechanism for influencing the exercise of judicial discretion.

Secondly, the DSO program was also limited in its ability to affect court referrals to the R&E Center because of statutory requirements that existed prior to, and during, the program period. Under these provisions the Department of Youth Services was mandated to accept referrals from the courts and would have had to develop other alternatives in attempting to implement deinstitutionalization such as attempting to reduce the length of such commitments or providing non-secure settings for diagnostic assessments. Unfortunately, no alternative plans were included in the program design and there is no available evidence that they were undertaken.* The success of efforts to persuade counties to reduce institutional commitments has already been discussed, but in relation to R&E referrals it should be further noted that individual county courts exhibited patterned usage of diagnostic services that was characteristic of the court throughout the program period. For instance, Greenville, the largest of the five evaluated counties, very seldom referred status offenders to the R&E Center, while Anderson County, with less than half as many juveniles, showed one of the highest frequencies of referral and continued this practice in the post-program period.

Finally, although the detention data are extremely limited, it is not surprising to find lack of evidence concerning program impact on law enforcement detention figures. The Youth Bureau program was not based on a uniform service strategy that included early intervention and diversion at the arrest

* The DSO program managers have claimed that the length of stay in the R&E Center was reduced on the average through their efforts. However, data are not available to confirm this claim.

stage of juvenile justice processing. Rather, the centers operated at fixed locations with limited intake hours and a formal screening procedure for deciding to advance a referral to active service status. In contrast to Connecticut, the program structure in South Carolina did not require the detention of status offenders, but it also offered very little that would divert these youths from placement in county jails and city lockups.


The South Carolina experience suggests that deinstitutionalization cannot be achieved by merely establishing alternative services for status offenders. The Youth Bureau program was not linked to the decision-making at the law enforcement and court level that results in the incarceration of juveniles. In the absence of specific program strategies that could have blocked the institutional treatment of status offenders, the DSO effort could only rely on a well-intentioned, but essentially weak, attempt at persuasion. This approach did not appear to have been especially promising.

CLARK COUNTY

Located within a jurisdiction immediately adjacent to Portland, Oregon, the program in Clark County, Washington represented a court-based effort primarily concerned with providing crisis intervention and diversion at the point of initial referral to the juvenile court. Comparatively, this effort was designed on a much smaller scale than the remaining DSO programs. The operational staff consisted of two designated probation officers responsible for all status offenders receiving specialized DSO treatment. While maintaining a schedule of extended hours for referral of cases from the court intake unit, these probation workers provided immediate crisis counseling, arranged alternative residential placement in non-DSO supported facilities, and trained volunteers in the delivery of supervised short-term family counseling for selected cases. Specialized DSO treatment was not accorded to all status offenders referred to the juvenile court. In the first program year slightly less than half of the referrals did not meet the eligibility requirements set by the court. These generally involved cases with four or more prior offenses, or residents of a jurisdiction outside of Clark County. An additional 14% were selected for a comparison group and were not seen by the DSO probation officers. The remainder, approximately 39% (N=355), represented the DSO service population for the initial year of the Clark County program.

The available information on detained and institutionalized status offenders allows only a limited comparison concerning the effect of the DSO program. With the exception of the number of detentions, the data from the program period are confined to the first six months of operation and are not sufficient for an adequate comparison to the pre-program experience. However, as shown in Table III-12, it can be noted that institutional commitments for

FIGURE III-7: CLARK COUNTY DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



status violations were an infrequent event prior to the program and occurred at an average of 1 per month between January, 1974 and June, 1976. Both of the commitments in the first two quarters of the program involved ineligible status offenders who may have been under continuing court jurisdiction for a prior delinquency. Also, gender differences among detained status offenders were fairly stable over time with about 60% at any one period being female. Finally, the absence of minority youth in the detained population is consistent with the demographic makeup of Clark County, and it is unlikely that any racial or ethnic shifts would be noted in more extended time series data.

The remaining information for Clark County allows an examination of two possible areas of program impact: effectiveness in reducing the number of detained status offenders, and existence of a net-widening and/or relabeling phenomena.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. The detention figures shown in Table III-12 indicate the Clark County began the DSO effort with by far the highest rate of status offender detention than any other DSO site. The 1975 detention figure of 741 status offenders represents an annual rate of 479 detentions per 100,000 estimated population. In contrast to the next three highest jurisdictions, this figure is 2.4 times that of Alameda County, 2.9 times that of Pima County, and 3.6 times that of Spokane County, each of which had 1975 detention rates of 202, 164, and 134, respectively.

The progress of Clark County in reducing its reliance on detention during the program period is depicted in Figure III-7. The experience during the full pre-program period, from January, 1974 through June, 1976, reflects an increasing trend in status offender detentions which peaked in 1975 and appears to have begun a decline preceding the start of the program in

TABLE III-12: CLARK COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

		demographic characteristics of detained youth						number sent to secure institutions	
	number detained	average days in detention	female		white	n-amer			
			male		black	other			
1974			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)		
January	50	N/A						2	
February	36							0	
March	48							3	
1st qtr.	134		52%	48%	99%	-0-	1%	-0-	5
April	55								1
May	35								1
June	47								1
2nd qtr.	137		62%	38%	97%	-0-	2%	2%	3
July	50								1
August	51								1
September	63								1
3rd qtr.	164		61%	39%	96%	1%	2%	-0-	3
October	66								0
November	49								2
December	45								1
4th qtr.	160		64%	36%	98%	-0-	-0-	2%	3
Year Total	595		60%	40%	98%	0.4%	1%	0.7%	14
1975									
January	76								1
February	61								3
March	66								2
1st qtr.	203		62%	38%	99%	0.5%	0.5%	-0-	6
April	59								0
May	75								2
June	67								0
2nd qtr.	201		66%	34%	100%	-0-	-0-	-0-	2
July	55								0
August	40								1
September	56								1
3rd qtr.	151		56%	44%	100%	-0-	-0-	-0-	2
October	79								2
November	55								0
December	52								0
4th qtr.	186		59%	41%	100%	-0-	-0-	-0-	2
Year Total	741		61%	39%	99.8%	0.1%	0.1%	-0-	12

TABLE III-12 (CONT.): CLARK COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	average days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths						number sent to secure institutions
			female	male	white	black	n-amer		
			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
1976									
January	55	N/A							0
February	55								0
March	53								4
1st qtr.	163		57%	43%	100%	-	-	-	4
April	61								0
May	63								0
June	42								0
2nd qtr.	166		63%	37%	100%	-	-	-	-0-
July	50								0
August	43								0
September	61								1
3rd qtr.	154		65%	35%	97%	1%	2%	-	1
October	48								1
November	36								0
December	26								0
4th qtr.	110		51%	49%	100%	-	-	-	1
Year Total	593		60%	40%	99.3%	0.2%	0.5%	-	6
1977									
January	35								0
February	41								0
March	31								0
1st qtr.	107								0
April	31								0
May	15								0
June	23								0
2nd qtr.	69								0
6 mo Total	176		----- NA -----						0

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, Institute of Policy Analysis, Eugene, Oregon

July, 1976. The detention figures in Table III-12 indicate that the average monthly detentions during the pre-program period amounted to 55.5 status offenders, and that the overall average during the first year of the program was reduced to 36.7 status offenders monthly, a decrease of 33.9%. Obviously, the use of detention continued to decline throughout the program and the monthly average for the entire year does not capture the full extent of the reduction. For instance, in the quarter immediately prior to the start of the program there were 166 detentions, or an average of 55.3 monthly; during the last quarter of the program period detentions had fallen to 69, a monthly average of 23 detentions - a 58.5% decrease by the end of the first program year.

While the proportionate reduction in the use of detention in Clark County suggests the presence of a viable DSO model, there are a number of caveats that must be attached to an interpretation of the data. First, the program began with a comparatively high rate of detention and, in a sense, had more to work with in achieving a reduction than in sites where the initial detention rate was already at a much lower level. Secondly, the eligibility requirements adopted by the program resulted in the exclusion of over 50% of all status offenders from specialized DSO treatment and assumably resulted in the delivery of a limited set of services to the least difficult cases. Finally, the number of status offenders who were detained in the final months of the program year still represents a high rate of detention for a jurisdiction the size of Clark County - an average of 23 detentions per month is equivalent to an annual rate of 180 per 100,000 population.

Net-widening/Relabeling. There is additional information available from a separate report by the local evaluator of the Clark County program (Schneider,

TABLE III-13: CLARK COUNTY REFERRALS, DETENTIONS, AND PETITIONS FILED FOR DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENSES DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS.

	Delinquent Offenses		Status Offenses	
	Total Number	Monthly Average	Total Number	Monthly Average
<u>Referrals</u>				
Pre-program *	5,242	174.7	2,317	77.2
Program	2,594	216.2	914	76.2
Percent Change		+ 23.8%		- 1.3%
<u>Detentions</u>				
Pre-program	2,202	73.4	1,668	55.6
Program	1,271	105.9	439	35.6
Percent Change		+ 44.3%		- 36.0%
<u>Petitions Filed</u>				
Pre-program	1,420	47.3	698	23.3
Program	754	62.8	210	17.5
Percent Change		+ 32.8%		- 25.0%

* The duration of the pre-program period was 30 months, from January, 1974 through June, 1976; the program period represents 12 months, from July, 1976 through June, 1977.

et al., 1978) which addresses the possibility that the program may have had a net-widening (i.e., increased the number of status offenders brought within the system) or a relabeling effect (i.e., relabeled as delinquent those who may have been classified previously as status offenders, or vice versa). A summary of the data presented in the local evaluation report appears in Table III-13. Comparison of the program and pre-program figures for status offenses suggests that net-widening did not occur as a result of the Clark County program. Referrals for status violations remained fairly constant in both periods with a monthly average of 77.2 in the pre-program period and 76.2 during the program year. Reductions in the number of detentions and petition filings are also documented for the program period.


With regard to relabeling, the increase in delinquency referrals - from 174.7 per month before the program to 216.2 per month during the DSO effort - has been analyzed by the local evaluator and has been interpreted as resulting from a gradual increase beginning in the pre-program period. In other words, the 23.8% increase in delinquency referrals is an artifact of having compared an average from an earlier portion of an increasing trend to the average of a later (and therefore higher) period. Additional comparisons of the characteristics of program and pre-program delinquency referrals provided further results that support a conclusion that "there is no evidence of any kind that shifts in classification (relabeling) either from delinquent to status offenses or vice versa occurred as a result of the project" (Schneider, et al., 1978a:25).

SPOKANE COUNTY

This eastern Washington state site represented the only private, non-profit DSO effort to be included in the national evaluation. Operated by Youth Alternatives (YA), the program maintained a 24 hour, 7 days a week crisis intervention service intended to limit the entry of status offenders into the juvenile justice system. Further activities included needs assessment, short-term counseling and referral to other community-based programs providing shelter care and other necessary services. While the program attempted to limit its clientele to children who would have been referred to juvenile court, there was no requirement regarding actual appearance at the court prior to acceptance into the program. Approximately 35% of all YA cases were initially seen by the juvenile court staff and then referred to the program. These cases were subject to eligibility criteria that permitted referral of only those status offenders who were in-county residents, non-delinquent during the preceding year, and, prior to the preceding year, had appeared for misdemeanor offenses only. The remaining YA clients were referred directly by law enforcement, schools, families, or other community sources, and, in some instances, appeared as self-referrals. These non-court referrals, about 65% of all YA cases, were handled without any requirement that the program notify the court of their alleged status violation.

Number of Detained Status Offenders. The Spokane data are contained in Table III-14 which shows the detention figures for all status offenders between February, 1974 and October, 1977. This information is also present in Figure III-8 which indicates a declining trend in status offender detentions throughout the entire period. Before the program began in May, 1976, detentions had dropped from a 1974 average of 44.7 per month to 34.3 monthly status offenders

FIGURE III-8: SPOKANE COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS BY MONTH DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS



detentions in 1975, a 23% decline. During the program period this decline continued at a steady, or even an accelerated pace. When the 18 months of program data are divided into two equal periods the average monthly figure for each period, successively, amounts to 22.7 and 14.0 detentions. Compared to the 9 months immediately before the program when the detention average was 33.3 per month, the program figures represent declines of 44% and 58% for each succeeding period.

The existence of a previously established declining trend in detention presents a number of difficulties in assessing the impact of the YA program. If it is assumed that this trend would have continued of its own momentum, then it is possible to conclude that YA had little, if any impact on the continued decline in status offender detentions. Alternatively, it could be argued that the rate of reduction in Spokane County could not have continued without the DSO program and that the creation of Youth Alternatives was essential in reaching the level observed in the last months of the program. Since the actual trend in detention falls below that predicted by the pre-program experience, it seems reasonable to assume that YA did contribute to the observed reduction. It is difficult, however, to separate the effect of the YA program from other factors influencing the total reduction in detention.

Institutional Commitments. As in other DSO jurisdictions, there were very few status offenders being committed to correctional facilities before the start of the program. In Spokane County these figures represent the number of cases referred for correctional placement, and not the number actually committed by the receiving state agency. Before the program there was an average of 1.2 referrals each month for correctional placement of Spokane County status offenders. During the 18 months of the program there were 5 referrals

with only 1 of them occurring in the last half of the program period. Had the pre-program average been maintained there would have been over four times as many referrals during the program than actually occurred.

Length of Detention. In Spokane County the average number of days in detention for status offenders was available for each month in the full program/pre-program period. As shown in Table III-14 these figures remained fairly constant throughout the entire 45 months. Analysis of these figures for the program period showed no significant relationships between the length of detention and number detained ($r = -.02, p < .96$), or between the length of detention the successive months of the program ($r = -.36, p < .26$). Both of these results would support a conclusion that the length of detention did not significantly increase during a period when the number of detainees was declining.

Gender Differences. The percentages of male and female status offenders detained each quarter can be seen in Table III-14. During the program months, from May, 1976 through October, 1977, there was a slightly higher percentage of female detentions, 53.6%. This figure represents a decline from the pre-program months, February, 1974 through April, 1976, when 61.1% of all status offender detentions involved females. Furthermore, in the earliest months of the pre-program period the gender difference was even more pronounced with about 70% of the detainees being female. This clearly points to the possibility that the pre-program reduction in the number of detained status offenders was primarily concerned with the female population.

Separate examination of the detention data reveals that in 1974 the average monthly figure for detained females was 29.8 as compared to 14.8 for males. In 1975 these figures had been reduced to monthly averages of 19.6 for females and 14.7 for males. In other words, the decline in detention figures within

TABLE III-14: SPOKANE COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

	number detained	ave. age days in detention	demographic characteristics of detained youths						number sent to secure institutions
			female		white	n-amer			
			male		black	other			
1974			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
February	27	3.93							2
March	63	2.25							3
April	61	3.44							1
1st qtr.	151	3.03	71%	29%	93%	3%	3%	1%	6
May	44	2.64							1
June	28	3.36							0
July	40	2.85							2
2nd qtr.	112	2.89	70%	30%	92%	3%	4%	2%	3
August	48	2.23							0
September	51	2.67							1
October	65	1.94							1
3rd qtr.	164	2.65	63%	37%	92%	2%	5%	1%	2
November	40	3.75							0
December	28	3.61							0
January(75)	41	2.83							1
4th qtr.	109	3.37	64%	36%	94%	3%	2%	1%	1
Total Year	536	2.83	67%	33%	93%	3%	4%	1%	12
1975									
February	28	4.71							1
March	30	3.43							4
April	37	4.30							0
1st qtr.	95	4.15	62%	38%	91%	1%	6%	2%	6
May	47	3.60							1
June	29	3.24							2
July	41	2.85							0
2nd qtr	117	3.25	65%	35%	93%	2%	4%	2%	3
August	31	2.13							0
September	38	2.39							1
October	38	3.32							0
3rd qtr.	107	2.64	55%	45%	92%	3%	5%	1%	1
November	24	3.33							0
December	26	2.88							0
January(76)	42	5.00							4
4th qtr.	92	3.97	45%	55%	93%	2%	4%	-0-	4
Total Year	411	3.46	58%	42%	92%	2%	5%	1%	14

TABLE III-14 (CONT.): SPOKANE COUNTY DETENTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

demographic characteristics of detained youths									
	number detained	average days in detention	female		white	n-amer			number sent to secure institutions
			male		black	other			
1976			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
February	36	2.89							1
March	33	2.58							3
April	32	5.09							2
1st qtr.	101	3.49	47%	53%	94%	2%	1%	4%	6
May	19	5.79							0
June	21	3.05							1
July	30	2.13							0
2nd qtr.	70	3.40	46%	54%	93%	1%	4%	1%	1
August	19	6.74							0
September	35	2.80							1
October	24	1.38							1
3rd qtr.	78	3.32	56%	44%	97%	-0-	3%	-0-	2
November	32	2.56							1
December	9	2.67							0
January(77)	15	2.33							0
4th qtr.	56	2.52	63%	38%	89%	-0-	7%	2%	1
Year Total	305	3.25	52%	48%	93%	1%	3%	2%	10
1977									
February	8	3.00							0
March	14	2.79							0
April	18	2.61							0
1st qtr.	40	2.75	50%	50%	95%	-0-	5%	-0-	-0-
May	10	1.30							0
June	14	1.93							0
July	15	1.47							0
2nd qtr.	39	1.59	56%	44%	90%	9%	2%	-0-	-0-
August	20	2.55							0
September	15	4.27							0
October	12	8.58							1
3rd qtr.	47	4.64	51%	49%	94%	3%	3%	-0-	1
9 mo Total	126	3.10	53%	47%	93%	4%	4%	-0-	1

SOURCE: Site Evaluation, Institute of Policy Analysis, Eugene, Oregon

Spokane County before the program involved only female status offenders, and it was not until the introduction of the Youth Alternatives program that a decline began in the detention of males as well. This point is demonstrated by the separate detention figures for the program period in which the monthly average for males dropped to 8.5 detentions and the figure for females was reduced to 9.8 detentions per month.

Ethnic/Racial Differences. Since Spokane County has relatively few minority youth it would be surprising to find any major change in their representation among the population of detained status offenders. Table III-14 is unsurprising in this regard. During both the program and pre-program periods there was a fairly constant rate of about 7% minority youth among the detained population, with slightly more than half being Native Americans. As the number of detained youth declined there was no percentage change in the distribution of minority detentions, indicating that the program did not differentially impact any particular ethnic or racial group.

Net-widening. Spokane County data were available on the number of status offender referrals between January, 1974 and November, 1977 for both the juvenile court and the Youth Alternatives (YA) program. The referral figures provide an indication of the extent to which the program may have increased the number of status offenders brought within the system (i.e., the extent to which net-widening occurred). As seen in Table III-15 the first column of figures contains the number of status offense referrals to juvenile court; the second column shows the number of court referrals (beginning in May, 1976) sent to the YA program; and the third column indicates the number of non-court referrals to YA. The sum of the first and third columns, referrals to juvenile court and non-court referrals to YA, represents total status offender referrals.

TABLE III-15: SPOKANE COUNTY REFERRALS FOR STATUS OFFENSES DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS

	Juvenile Court Referrals	Court Referrals To YA	Non-Court Referrals To YA	Total Status Offense Referrals
1974				
1st qtr.	181			181
2nd qtr.	168			168
3rd qtr.	192			192
4th qtr.	193			193
Total	734			734
Monthly Avg.	61.2			61.2
1975				
1st qtr.	177			177
2nd qtr.	183			183
3rd qtr.	182			182
4th qtr.	171			171
Total	713			713
Monthly Avg.	59.4			59.4
1976				
1st qtr.	174			174
2nd qtr.	141 (78)*	30	78	219 (156)*
3rd qtr.	140	51	97	237
4th qtr.	183	85	112	295
Total	638	166	287	925
Monthly Avg.	53.0	20.8	35.9	77.1
1977				
1st qtr.	145	62	118	263
2nd qtr.	118	44	95	213
3rd qtr.	101	47	90	191
4th qtr.**	84	36	73	157
Total	448	189	376	824
Monthly Avg.	40.7	17.2	34.2	74.9
Pre-program Avg.	60.1			60.1
Program Avg.	44.7	18.7	34.9	79.6

* Indicates the number of referrals in May and June, exclusive of April, the month before the program began.

** This quarter contains information for only two months, October and November

In examining this information, the local evaluator had concluded that a net-widening effect was present in Spokane County (Schneider, et al., 1978b). This was based on the observation that in the pre-program period there was an average of 60.1 status offense referrals to the juvenile court, as compared to 79.6 total referrals per month to the court and YA in the program period. In this view the YA program is treated as part of the system, but it would seem that this definition of "system" can be seriously questioned.

In the majority of DSO sites the programs were structured in such a way that any increase in the identification of status offenders during the program period would have required some form of contact with the juvenile justice system. In the most extreme case, Connecticut, contact with the system meant actual placement in a detention facility. In Delaware, Illinois and Clark County, Washington all program clients were officially within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This was also partially true for referrals in Alameda County, California and Pima County, Arizona. Only Spokane County and South Carolina had an established central intake point that was entirely separate from the juvenile court. In view of these differences, it seems entirely reasonable to exclude non-court referrals to the YA program from an analysis of net-widening and restrict the definition of "system" to actual involvement with the juvenile court.

Examining only juvenile court referrals, it appears that the system net in Spokane County was substantially narrowed. During the program period, court identification of status offenders fell from the pre-program average of 60.1 referrals to 44.7 per month. Within the program period there was a continuing decline in court referrals throughout. The average for the eight months of program operation in 1976 was 50.1 as compared to 40.7 in the eleventh month data for 1977.

In summary, since there was no apparent trend toward a reduction in court referrals before the program, it would be possible to credit the YA effort with having diverted about 26% of the expected court referrals from any involvement with the juvenile justice system (i.e., the difference between average monthly referrals in the pre-program and program periods as a percentage of the pre-program average: $((60.1-44.7) \div 60.1)$, and with having removed approximately 31% of the expected court referrals from further processing by the juvenile court (i.e., the average number of court referrals to YA as a percentage of the pre-program monthly referral: $(18.7 \div 60.1)$).

SUMMARY

While the nationally evaluated DSO effort represented eight county or statewide program sites, there were divisions within two of the states, Connecticut and Illinois, which resulted in the reporting of detention and institutional commitment data for twelve separate program locations. Previous sections examined the influence of these programs relative to eight measures of deinstitutionalization - number of detentions, institutional commitments, detention of non-residents, length of detention, gender differences, racial or ethnic characteristics, net-widening, and relabeling. This summary section presents the findings on each of these measures from the programs for which information was available.

1) Number of Detained Status Offenders. Among the DSO programs there was no single pattern with respect to change in the number of detained status offenders. The summary data are shown in Table III-16 which compare the average monthly detention figure for the total program and six month interim periods to the monthly average of the entire pre-program period. In the ten programs reporting interim figures the most common pattern involved initial declines followed by a higher percentage reduction in the later interim periods. Compared to the pre-program average, the final interim period reductions for these programs were -83% (Pima County, Arizona), -35% (District 1 in Connecticut), -44% (Macon County, Illinois), -47% (Clark County, Washington), and -63% (Spokane County, Washington). Cook County, Illinois was unique in that the highest decline occurred in the first six months, -65%, and leveled off at -57% in the remaining months of the program. The remaining sites showed an increase in detention for at least one if not all of the interim periods. These increases contributed to the following total program

TABLE III-16: CHANGE IN TOTAL AND INTERIM PROGRAM DETENTION AS COMPARED TO AVERAGE MONTHLY DETENTION DURING THE PRE-PROGRAM PERIOD FOR ALL DSO PROGRAM SITES

	Pre-Program Detention		First 6 Months		Second 6 Months		Third 6 Months		Total Program Detention	
	Number	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Percent Change	Monthly Average	Percent Change	Monthly Average	Percent Change	Number	Monthly Average
Pima Co.	1733	57.8	30.2	- 48%	17.7	- 69%	10.0	- 83%	317	21.1
Alameda Co.	4583	191.0							834	139.0
Cn: Dist. 1	292	12.7	10.8	- 15%	8.2	- 35%			114	9.5
Cn: Dist. 2	454	19.7	29.8	+ 51%	25.3	+ 29%			331	27.6
Cn: Dist. 3	162	6.5	8.0	+ 23%	9.0	+ 38%			84	8.4
Delaware	647	53.9			59.3	+ 10%	57.6	+ 7%	702	58.5
Ill: Cook Co.	1526	127.2	44.5	- 65%	54.5	- 57%	54.8	- 57%	923	51.3
Ill: Macon Co.	134	11.2	9.3	- 17%	5.0	- 55%	6.3	- 44%	124	6.9
Ill: LaSalle/McL.	219	11.0	9.5	- 14%	14.2	+ 29%	9.0	- 18%	178	12.7
South Carolina	182	15.2							214	17.8
Clark Co.	1665	55.5	44.0	- 21%	29.3	- 47%			440	36.7
Spokane Co.	1048	38.8	24.7	- 36%	16.0	- 59%	14.3	- 63%	330	18.3
Totals:	12,645	50.6	23.4	- 54%	24.4	- 52%	27.9	- 45%	4,591	28.9

* Interim period may be less than 6 months depending on availability of data.

** Estimated number of program detentions.

*** Based on two of the five evaluated counties.

period changes: +40% (District 2, Connecticut), +29% (District 3, Connecticut), +9% (Delaware), and +16% (LaSalle/McLean Counties, Illinois). The two sites for which interim data could not be obtained recorded estimated changes in the program period of -27% (Alameda County, California) and +18 (South Carolina). For the twelve jurisdictions, seven showed a reduction during the period of the DSO program, and five recorded increased levels of status offender detentions. The aggregate level of change for all sites as compared to the pre-program monthly average amounted to a 43% decline in detention.*

2) Institutional Commitments. The comparative figures on institutional commitments for status violations were available in five of the eight basic program sites. As shown in Table III-17 there were substantial reductions in four program sites with ranges from -50% to -86% change in commitments. The increase for Pima County is misleading in that it is based on a very small number of commitments during the program as compared to an even smaller number in the pre-program period. Comparison of commitment rates based on population provide more of a perspective on the issue of correctional placement for status violations. In the pre-program period these rates varied from less than 1 to as high as 11 commitments per 100,000 total population in the specific program sites. For the sites in which data were available for both periods the program rates shifted to between 1 and 4 commitments per 100,000 population. The program rate for South Carolina is obviously much higher than the other sites and in the absence of pre-program data cannot be assessed as an indication of change. Statutory prohibition in Illinois (and to a partial extent

* The differences between the figures shown in this section and those presented in Chapter 1 are due to the use of the full pre-program data and adjustments related to variations in program starting dates that have been included for this summary section.

TABLE III-17: CHANGE IN AVERAGE MONTHLY INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS AND RATES PER 100,000 TOTAL POPULATION BETWEEN THE PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIODS FOR ALL DSO PROGRAMS

	Total Number	Monthly Average	Annual Rate Per 100,000 *	Total Number	Monthly Average	Annual Rate Per 100,000 *	Percent Change
Pima County	6	0.20	0.54	8	0.53	1.43	+165%
Alameda County	129	10.75	10.08		not available		na
Connecticut	308	13.39	5.18	73	6.08	2.35	- 55%
Delaware	154	5.31	11.00	14	0.74	1.53	- 86%
Illinois		statutory prohibition			statutory prohibition		na
South Carolina		not available		189	7.88	10.08 **	na
Clark County	30	1.00	7.76	6	0.50	3.88	- 50%
Spokane County	32	1.19	4.66	5	0.28	1.10	- 76%
Totals:	656	4.36		295	3.28		

* Based on total estimated 1975 population.
** Computed for 5 evaluated counties only.

in Alameda County, California) eliminated the consideration of institutional commitments.

3) Detention of Non-Residents. In all the DSO sites non-resident status offenders were generally ineligible for program services and it could be assumed that the detention of these youths would be unaffected by DSO activities. The Cook County, Illinois site provided the information needed to test this assumption. As expected the rate of non-resident detentions remained constant throughout a period of substantial change in the numbers of detained resident status violators. In fact, this lack of variation combined with the volume of such cases points to the existence of a relatively large number of non-criminal youth who did not benefit from the DSO effort. The average monthly detention of non-residents was maintained at approximately 40 cases in the program and pre-program periods. Since the Cook County data represented a 16% sample of all detention, the actual number of non-residents can be estimated at 250 per month, or 3,000 annually. In the pre-program period non-residents represented about 24% of all detentions, but with the decline in resident detentions in the program period the stable non-resident population achieved a 48% representation among total detentions. These findings suggest that in urban areas similar to Cook County consideration should be given to deinstitutionalization efforts aimed at the issue of non-resident status offenders.

4) Length of Detention. The analysis of length of detention for status offenders focused on two issues: a) the extent to which programs may have achieved a reduction in the number of detained youth by diverting only the less difficult cases and detaining a core group for extended periods of time; and b) whether programs that failed to reduce the number of detentions may

have succeeded in limiting the length of status offense placements. On the first issue there were 4 sites that had reduced the number of detained youth and also provided information on the length of detention. An attempt was made to test the relationship between average length of detention and number detained in each month of the program. The finding of a negative relationship would indicate that few status offenders (a core group) were being detained for extended periods of time. In three of the sites - Pima County, Macon County, and Spokane, County - there was no significant relationship. For Cook County, however, the average length of detention was inversely related to the number of detentions and represented an overall increase of 32% as compared to the pre-program length of detention figures. This suggests the possibility that the marked rate of initial program period reduction in Cook County involved an element of creaming in which only the less difficult cases were diverted from detention. The leveling off of detention in the later program months could represent an unwillingness to divert the more difficult types of status offense cases from detention.

On the second issue there were two sites that failed to reduce the number of detentions in which it was possible to obtain length of detention information. In both programs there was an effect on the average number of days status offenders remained in detention. The Delaware program reduced the length of detention during the program period by about 50 percent. In the LaSalle/McLean area the average period of detention decline by 24 percent during the program.

5) Gender Differences. Among the 6 jurisdictions reporting the gender characteristics of detained status offenders there was no uniform influence on the percentages of female and male detentions. Before the DSO effort the

proportion of females in the detained population ranged from between 50 and 70 percent. In two sites there was no change associated with the program period. In Clark County, Washington, females were a 60% majority before the program and remained at the same level in the six months of the program for which data were available. In Spokane County, Washington, the disparity had been reduced from a high of 70% female in the earliest pre-program months to approximately 50% female just before the start of the program. The percentage stayed at this lower level throughout the program period.

In two of the Illinois programs there was an increase in the percentage of female detentions. Cook County recorded a shift from 50% before DSO to 60% female detention in the program months. This was accomplished by diverting more males than females from detention in the program period. In the LaSalle/McLean area there was an increase in detention during the program that primarily involved female status offenders. This resulted in a shift from 60 to 70 percent female detentions after the start of the DSO effort.

The jurisdictions showing a decrease in the percentage of female detainees exhibited a pattern of diverting more females than males in the program period. In Macon County, Illinois, female detention dropped from 65 to 55 percent in the program period. In Pima County, Arizona, there was a decline in female detention from 50 to 35 percent during the program. This was the only instance where the program percentage of females constituted a minority of the detained population.

With the exception of Pima County none of the programs attempted to deal specifically with the needs of females status offenders. The changing percentages of female detainees at the other sites were probably the result of contextual factors external to the program models.

6) Ethnic/Racial Differences. In the five programs providing this information there was little or no evidence of a racial or ethnic bias in diverting status offenders from detention. During the first year of the Macon County program the reduction in detention largely involved anglo youth. However, the number of detained minority youth remained at low level, about 2 per month, and the program is reported as having eventually removed all status offenders from detention. In Cook County, LaSalle/McLean, Clark and Spokane Counties the percentage of detained minority youth was approximately the same in both the pre-program and program periods. With the exception of Cook County, however, these jurisdictions contained a small minority population to begin with and would be expected to show little variation in this regard. The Cook County data did reveal that minority youth, mostly black, were a majority of all detained status offenders and seem to be over represented in comparison to their number in the general population.

7) Net-Widening. Information was available from eight jurisdictions regarding the possibility that the programs may have inadvertently increased the number of status offenders brought within the control of the juvenile court (i.e., widened the net of the juvenile justice system). The evidence from five jurisdictions - Alameda County, Pima County, District 1 in Connecticut, Clark County and Spokane County - indicates the number of status offender contacts with the juvenile justice system either declined or remained unchanged during the program period. The three remaining sites showed an overall increase in status offense cases within the jurisdiction of the court - Districts 2 and 3 in Connecticut, and Cook County. These results seem to be related to general features of the DSO programs. Alameda, Pima, and Spokane Counties had alternative entry mechanisms

that did not require official court contact and, in effect, could siphon cases that would otherwise have appeared at the juvenile court. The Cook County program offered only an interim alternative to detention prior to court appearance; program referrals generally were joined to the actual status offender detentions in defining the reach of the juvenile justice system. Among the remaining court-based intake programs only District 1 and Clark County provided extended hours of intake screening and the possibility of immediate diversion from detention. There is a suggestion, then, of two alternatives for avoiding a net-widening effect. Either provide direct referral to alternatives that completely avoid court contact, or offer virtual 24 hour diversion at the point of initial intake appearance.

8) Relabeling. Three programs provided information on delinquency referrals and allowed a test of the possibility that officials may have responded to the program by relabeling as delinquents those who would have previously been handled as status offenders. In Pima and Clark Counties there was no evidence of an increase among delinquency referrals associated with the establishment of the DSO programs. For Alameda County there was some evidence of relabeling, but as a response to an effective statutory prohibition on detention and not to the establishment of the DSO effort.

ATTACHMENT A

ATTACHMENT A

DIRECTIONS FOR THE SURVEY OF DETAINED AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED STATUS OFFENDERS

Population: All status offenders as defined by NIJJ guidelines who were detained or institutionalized by the juvenile justice system.

Periods Covered:

- a) Baseline period of at least 1 year (preferably 2 years) prior to program implementation.
- b) Program period through calendar year 1977 and available months of 1978.

Data Requirements:

- a) Number of detained status offenders by month and detention facility (see footnote below).
- b) Average number of detention days by month and detention facility.
- c) Number of status offenders sent to correctional institutions by month and facility.
- d) Number of status offenders remaining in correctional institutions by month and facility.
- e) Gender and ethnic breakdown for (a) and (c) above.
- f) Replication of the above according to the status offense definition governing program eligibility (if this definition differs from NIJJ guidelines).

NIJJ GUIDELINES: DEFINITIONS

Offender Definitions:

1. Criminal Offender - is a juvenile or adult who has been charged with or convicted of a criminal offense in a court exercising adult criminal jurisdiction.
2. Delinquent Offender - is a juvenile who is alleged to have committed, is charged with, or has been adjudicated for a criminal offense and who has not been waived to a court exercising adult criminal jurisdiction.

3. Status Offender - is a juvenile who is alleged to have committed, is charged with, or has been adjudicated for a status offense (i.e., a violation of law which would not be criminal if committed by an adult, and which is specifically applicable to youth because of their minority).
4. Status Offender (Detention Classification) - is a juvenile who is placed in either a juvenile or adult detention facility, charged with a status offense, or, having been adjudicated a status offender, awaiting transfer to another agency or for violation of probation or parole.
5. Status Offender (Institutional Classification) - is a juvenile who:

(a) is committed to a juvenile or adult correctional facility, after having been adjudicated a status offender by a court of competent jurisdiction, for diagnosis, treatment, or for violation of probation or parole; or

(b) is placed in a juvenile correctional facility, upon order of a correctional official, for violation of probation or parole, for an institutional escape, or for an offense committed during an institutional furlough, when the originating order of probation or commitment adjudicated the juvenile for a status offense.
6. Juvenile Offender - is either a status or a delinquent offender as defined in (2) and (3) above.

Facility Definitions:

7. Facility - is a place, an institution, a building or part thereof, set of buildings or an area whether or not enclosing a building or set of buildings which is used for the lawful custody and treatment of juveniles and may be owned and/or operated by public or private agencies.
8. Facility, Secure - is one which is designed and operated so as to ensure that all entrances and exits from such facility are under the exclusive control of the staff of such facility, whether or not the person being detained has freedom of movement within the perimeters of the facility or which relies on locked rooms and buildings, fences, or physical restraint in order to control behavior of its residents.
9. Facility, Nonsecure - is a facility not characterized by the use of physically restricting construction, hardware and procedures and which provides its residents access to the surrounding community with minimal supervision.
10. Community-based - facility, program, or service means (a) a small, open group home or other suitable place located near the juvenile's home or family and (b) programs of community supervision and service which maintain community and consumer participation in the planning, operation, and evaluation of their programs which may include, but are not limited

to, medical, educational, vocational, social, and psychological guidance, training, counseling, alcoholism treatment, drug treatment, and other rehabilitative services.

11. Juvenile Detention or Correctional Facility - is any:

- (a) Secure public or private facility used for the lawful custody of accused or adjudicated juvenile offenders; or
- (b) Public or private facility used primarily (i.e., more than 50% of the facility's population during any consecutive 30-day period) for the lawful custody of delinquent offenders even if the facility is nonsecure; or
- (c) Public or private facility having a bed capacity to house 20 or more accused or adjudicated juvenile offenders or non-offenders, even if the facility is nonsecure, unless used exclusively for the lawful custody of status offenders or non-offenders, or is community-based; or
- (d) Public or private facility, secure or nonsecure, which is used for the lawful custody of accused or convicted criminal offenders.

Miscellaneous Terms:

- 12. Lawful Custody - the exercise of care, supervision and control over a juvenile or non-offender pursuant to the provisions of the law or of a judicial order or degree.
- 13. Non-offenders - a juvenile who is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, usually under abuse, dependency or neglect statutes, for reasons other than legally prohibited conduct of the juvenile.
- 14. Exclusively - as used to describe the population of a facility, the term "exclusively" means that the facility is used only for a specifically described category of juvenile to the exclusion of all other types of juveniles.
- 15. Detention Days - Count any portion of a 24 hour day as a full day.

Quarterly Report of Detained and Institutionalized Status Offenders for Evaluation Site: _____
for the quarter beginning _____, 19__ and ending _____, 19__

Table 1: Number of Detained Status Offenders within Jurisdiction.

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3
	(n)	(n)	(n)
Named Facility			
1st facility			
2nd facility			

nth facility			
Total N			

Demographic breakdown for all cases in table 1:

Male: (N=) Female: (N=) White: (N=) Black: (N=) Latino: (N=) N-Amer: (N=) Other: (N=)

Table 2: Average number of detention days for the corresponding cells of table 1.

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3
	(n)	(n)	(n)
Named Facility			
1st facility			
2nd facility			

nth facility			
Grand X			

Table 3: Number of Status Offenders Sent to Correctional Institutions from the Site.

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3
	(n)	(n)	(n)
Named Facility			
1st facility			
2nd facility			

nth facility			
Total N			

Demographic breakdown for all cases in table 3:

Male: (N=) Female: (N=) White: (N=) Black: (N=) Latino: (N=) N-Amer: (N=) Other: (N=)

Table 4: Number of Status Offenders Sent from the Site Who Remain in Correctional Institutions.

	Month 1	Month 2	Month 3
	(n)	(n)	(n)
Named Facility			
1st Facility			
2nd facility			

nth facility			
Total N			

Demographic breakdown for all cases in table 4:

Male: (N=) Female: (N=) White: (N=) Black: (N=) Latino: (N=) N-Amer: (N=) Other: (N=)

NOTE: If the eligibility requirements of the program would exclude any of the status offenders entered above, please replicate these tables for the population eligible for program intake.

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APPENDIX I

STATUTE ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE
CODES FOR THE STATES OF:

ARIZONA
CALIFORNIA
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
ILLINOIS
SOUTH CAROLINA
WASHINGTON

PREPARED BY:

SUSAN M. SPELLETICH

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PREFACE

This study presents an analysis of the juvenile codes applicable to the evaluation sites in the seven states included in the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Projects. The methodology primarily involved statutory review of the most current juvenile legislation available during August and September of 1977. When available, relevant case law, court rules and other factual information was integrated into the analysis.

Discrepancies between the text and previous statutory studies are apparent. Some may be due to the more recent changes in the laws that were included in this study. Others are the result of more than one possible interpretation of a statute or of alterations that have occurred through administrative interpretation and practice. The judgements utilized in this analysis were governed by available knowledge of juvenile procedures in the evaluation sites. Investigation into actual practices as they may vary from statutory provisions was limited by the time and resources available for this study.

S.M.S.
February, 1978

SUMMARY TABLES

	ARIZ	CAL	CONN	DEL	ILL	SC	WASH
I. JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE	1	1	2	2	1	3	1
1 = Session of State Trial Court System			1 (7/78)			2 (7/77)	
2 = Separate State Court System							
3 = Separate County Courts							
II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT							
<u>Maximum Age, Original Jurisdiction:</u>							
Delinquent Violations	17	17	15	17	16	16	17
Status Violations	same	same	same	same	17	same	same
Dependency & Neglected	same	same	17	same	17	20	same
<u>Age of Termination for Continuing Jurisdiction:</u>	21	21 *	18 *	18	21	21	21
<u>Behavior or Conditions Conferring Jurisdiction:</u> (see separate table)							
<u>Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction:</u>							
Is transfer allowed by statute?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Transfer restricted by type of criminal offense?	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	no
Minimum age criteria for transfer (statutory)	8	16	14	16 *	13	16 *	none
III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES							
<u>Standards Governing Arrest</u>	1,3	1,2,3	1,3	1	2,3	2,3	2,3
1 = Adult Standards for Juveniles							
2 = Reduced Adult Standards for Juveniles							
3 = Separate Standards for Juveniles							
<u>Authority to File a Petition</u>	1,2	1	1	3	3	3	3
1 = Probation/Juvenile Court Officer						2 (1/77 for delinquent offenses)	
2 = County Attorney						1 (1/77 for status violations)	
3 = Knowledgeable Person or Agency							
<u>Alternatives to Adjudication</u>	1	1,2 *	2,3	1,3	3	3	3
1 = Diversion Agreement/Referral to Service							
2 = Informal Probation/Supervision							
3 = Informal Adjustment (unspecified)							

* see text for exceptions or effective dates

	ARIZ	CAL	CONN	DEL	ILL	SC	WASH
IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION							
Is a detention hearing provided?	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes *
Detention limit prior to filing petition (days)	1	2	na	na	na	na	3
Detention limit prior to hearing or requirement of court order (days)	1	1	none	1	1.5	2	3
Total detention limit prior to hearing or requirement of court order (days)	2	3	none	1	1.5	2	6
Detention limit on post-hearing or court ordered detention (days)	none	15	none	10 *	10 *	none	30 *
Is bail allowed?	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes
Can youths be detained for status violations?	yes	no *	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Can juvenile detention occur in a facility for adults?	no	no	no	no *	yes	yes	no *
Can detained juvenile be co-mingled with adult detainees?	no	no *	no	no *	no	no	yes *
V. ADJUDICATION							
Are hearings open to the public?	no	no *	no *	no	no *	no	no
Are jury trials permitted?	no	no *	no	no	no	no	no
Is a prosecutor required at hearing?	yes	yes *	no	yes	yes	no	yes *
Is retained or appointed counsel available?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes *	yes *
Is a disposition hearing required?	yes *	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes
Can the disposition hearing be held immediately following the adjudication hearing?	yes	yes	na	yes	yes	na	yes
VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES							
Suspended judgement	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
Fine	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no
Restitution/public service	no	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no

* see text for exceptions or effective dates

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES (CONT.)

	ARIZ	CAL	CONN	DEL	ILL	SC	WASH
Counseling	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no
Alternative residential placement	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Probation services	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
General care and supervision	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes
Correctional commitment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Can status offenders be sent to correctional institutions?	no *	no *	yes	yes *	yes *	yes *	yes *

* see text for exceptions or effective dates

BEHAVIOR OR CONDITIONS CONFERRING JURISDICTION

STATE	STATE DESIGNATIONS		STATUTORY MENTION OF BEHAVIOR OR CONDITIONS CONFERRING JURISDICTION ⁴			
	Delinquent Offenses	Status Violations	Criminal Violations	Violation of Court Order	Possession of Alcohol	Use of Alcohol or Drugs
ARIZONA ¹	Delinquent	Incorrigible	yes - del	yes - del	no *	no
CALIFORNIA	Sec. 602	Sec. 601	yes - del	yes - del (until 1/1/77)	no *	no
CONNECTICUT	Delinquent	(none)	yes - del	yes - del	no *	no
DELAWARE	Delinquent	no general designation	yes - del	no	no *	no
ILLINOIS	Delinquent	minor otherwise in need of spervision	yes - del	yes - status	no *	yes - status
S. CAROLINA ²	no general designation	no general designation	yes	no	no *	no
WASHINGTON ³	Delinquent	Dependent	yes - del	no	no *	yes - status

¹ Delinquent or status violations by children under 8 years of age are treated as dependency cases.

² The statutory reference for jurisdiction in the five evaluated counties (Lexington, Spartanburg, Anderson, Greenville, and Richland) is taken from the Family Court Act of 1968. The language of this act was incorporated in the revised statute which became effective statewide in July, 1977. Prior to the adoption of a uniform state statute, county jurisdiction could have been based on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts Act

³ Major revisions will become effective in July, 1978 and will substantially alter the classifications presented herein.

⁴ Jurisdiction over dependent and neglected children is provided in all seven states. Connecticut, Delaware and Illinois provide separate definitions for each; Arizona, California, South Carolina and Washington provide statutory language permitting the distinction within a general definition.

* In the absence of a statutory mention it can be assumed that this behavior would be treated as a delinquent act.

STATUTORY MENTION OF BEHAVIOR OR CONDITIONS CONFERRING JURISDICTION (CONT.)

Curfew	Truancy	Runaway	Ungovernable	Endangerment of Welfare/Immorality	<u>STATE</u>
no *	yes - status	yes - status	yes - status	yes - status	ARIZONA
yes - status (begin 1/1/77)	yes - status	no	yes - status	yes - status (until 1/1/76)	CALIFORNIA
no *	yes - del	yes - del	yes - del	yes - del	CONNECTICUT
no *	yes - truant	no	yes - del	yes - del	DELAWARE
no *	yes - status	no	yes - status	yes - neglected	ILLINOIS
no *	no	no	yes	yes	S. CAROLINA
no *	yes - status	no	yes - status	yes - status	WASHINGTON

TEXT

ARIZONA

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

Juvenile Court is a division of Superior Court, the highest trial level court. Appeals go to the Court of Appeals. This is a statewide system.

In counties with more than one Superior Court judge, the judges designate one or more judges to hear all juvenile cases. The juvenile judge may appoint referees to hold hearings. The referees' findings are final unless a rehearing is requested by a party. The juvenile judge may also appoint traffic hearing officers.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction over dependent children under 18, and delinquent and incorrigible children from 8 to 18.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

When the court has acquired jurisdiction over a juvenile, it terminates when the juvenile reaches age 21.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction is unclear in the statute

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior, and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court

1. Delinquent

A child who commits an act, which if committed by an adult, would be a public offense, or any act that would constitute a public offense which can only be committed by a minor, including violation of Arizona law, or of another state's law if the act occurred in that state, violation of U.S. law, violation of any Arizona city

or county ordinance defining a crime, or failure to obey a juvenile court order.

2. Incorrigible

Incorrigible children are those who:

- a. Refuse to obey parents and are beyond parental control; or
- b. Habitually truant; or
- c. Runaways; or
- d. Habitually deport themselves so as to injure or endanger the morals or health of themselves or others.

3. Dependent

Dependent children are:

- a. In need of proper and effective parental care and control and have no parent exercising such control; or
- b. Destitute, without the necessities of life, or a home, or whose home is unfit because of parental neglect, abuse or cruelty; or
- c. Children under age 8 who are found to have committed acts that would result in adjudication as delinquent or incorrigible if committed by older children.

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The probation officer or county attorney can request transfer of a juvenile to adult court. The juvenile has a right to a hearing by the juvenile judge. Evidence considered by the judge in an investigation report by the probation officer and evidence of the alleged offense.

Grounds for transfer: the court finds the alleged offense was committed, and probable cause exists to believe the juvenile committed it; and the juvenile is not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation, and the public safety or public interest requires transfer.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Mandatory Arrest

A peace officer shall take a child into custody pursuant to the laws of arrest, with or without a warrant, when there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile committed a delinquent act which, if committed by an adult, could be a felony or breach of the peace and the juvenile has been apprehended in the act or in fresh pursuit.

B. Discretionary Arrest

A peace officer may take a child into custody

1. Pursuant to the laws of arrest without a warrant when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child committed a delinquent act or is incorrigible,
2. Pursuant to a juvenile court order,
3. If there are reasonable grounds to believe the child is ill or injured or in immediate danger from his/her surroundings,
4. If there are reasonable grounds to believe the child is a runaway.

C. Filing a Petition

When a complaint alleging delinquency or incorrigibility is filed with the juvenile court, the probation officer investigates the facts to determine whether court action is warranted. If the probation officer decides action is warranted then the probation officer or county attorney files a petition.

D. Alternatives to Adjudication

1. If a delinquency complaint alleges a misdemeanor other than assault and battery and it is the juvenile's first offense, the court may refer the juvenile to a youth service bureau or counseling program in lieu of court appearance.

2. If a juvenile admits a delinquent act after a complaint is filed with the probation officer, and the probation officer finds court action to be unnecessary, the juvenile may be referred to agencies or his/her parent for corrective action.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements for Detention

1. Probation officer must notify parent and child of reason for detention
2. Length of Detention
 - a. 24 hour limit (except Saturdays, Sundays & holidays) unless a petition is filed
 - b. After a petition is filed, 24 hour limit unless the court orders continued detention after a hearing

3. Grounds for Detention

The juvenile won't otherwise appear at a hearing, the juvenile is likely to commit an offense injurious to himself/herself or others, the juvenile is being held for another jurisdiction, or the child's or the public's interest requires that the child receive custodial protection.

B. Detention Facilities

1. The county maintains detention centers for children alleged to be delinquent or incorrigible
2. Restrictions
 - a. Detention facilities must be separate from jails or lock-ups for adults
 - b. Juveniles can't be confined with adults

- c. Any detained child who endangers the safety of other detained children shall not be allowed to intermingle with other detained children

- C. Alternative to Detention: Release to parent or other suitable person

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Characteristics of Hearings

1. Hearings are closed to the public
2. There is no jury
3. Hearings are as informal as due process and fairness allow
4. The county attorney represents the state

B. Rights of the Child

1. The child can be excluded from the hearing in matters not involving the commission of an act that is a violation of criminal law; and at the request of the child's attorney.
2. The child has the right to a retained attorney or an appointed attorney if indigent.
3. The child has the right to remain silent, and the right to call witnesses.

C. Standard of Proof

1. Delinquency cases involving a criminal offense and incorrigibility cases -- proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Dependency and probation revocation cases -- proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

D. Findings by the Court

The court must make written findings that a juvenile is delinquent or incorrigible, or the petition is dismissed.

E. Disposition Hearing

Prior to disposition, the probation officer may investigate the juvenile and make recommendations to the court, and the court may order physical or psychological examinations of the juvenile.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES FOR JUVENILES ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OR INCORRIGIBLE

1. Parental custody, with supervision by the probation department
2. Custody by the probation department
3. Place the juvenile with a reputable citizen with supervision by the probation department
4. Place the juvenile with a private agency or institution with supervision by the probation department
5. Commit to the Department of Corrections. Effective 8/27/77, incorrigible juveniles cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections.
6. Place with relatives with supervision by the probation department (effective 8/27/77).
7. Counseling

CALIFORNIA

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

Juvenile Court is a division of Superior Court, the highest trial level court. Appeals go to the District Court of Appeals. This is a uniform statewide system.

Juvenile Court judges may appoint referees who hear cases assigned by the judge. The judge has discretion to grant rehearing applications after an original hearing by a referee. The judge is required to grant the application if no official recording of the referee hearing was made. The juvenile judge may also appoint traffic hearing officers to hear certain kinds of cases.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction over all persons under 18.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

When the court has acquired original jurisdiction over a child, it must terminate when the child reaches age 21. Exception, effective 1/1/77: The court may retain jurisdiction until age 23 of delinquents who committed certain more serious criminal offenses, if the delinquent was committed to the Youth Authority.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction

The person's age on the date the offense was allegedly committed determines whether the person is classified as a juvenile or an adult.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court

1. Dependent (referred to as Section 600s or Section 300s)

Dependent children are children who are:

- a. In need of parental care or control; or
- b. Destitute, without the necessities of life, without a home; or
- c. Physically dangerous to the public because of a physical or mental deficiency, disorder or abnormality; or
- d. Living in an unfit home because of parental neglect, cruelty or abuse.

2. Status Offenders (referred to as Section 601s)

- a. Child who persistently refuses to obey his/her parent or who is beyond parental control;
- b. Child who violates any city or county curfew ordinance that is based on age (effective 1/1/77);
- c. Child in danger of leading an idle, dissolute or immoral life (effective until 1/1/76).
- d. School attendance review boards have original jurisdiction over habitual truants and persons who habitually refuse to obey school authorities. The board can refer these persons to juvenile court if the board is ineffective in correcting such a person's behavior. A juvenile found to be a ward of the court solely on this basis can be removed from parental custody only during school hours.

3. Delinquents (referred to as Section 602s)

- a. A child who violates any law of California or the U.S., or any city or county ordinance defining a crime.

- b. A status offender who fails to obey a juvenile court order (effective until 1/1/77).

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over persons coming within the above age and offense/behavior categories. However, persons under 18 who violate California criminal law and flee from the state may be proceeded against as adult criminals, until they are returned to the state, where the juvenile court jurisdiction applies. Also, persons under 18 who violate the criminal law of another state and flee into California may be proceeded against as adult criminals.

Certification to adult criminal court by the juvenile court is possible if the juvenile court finds the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law. Certification is allowed only if the minor is an alleged delinquent by reason of violation of a criminal statute when age 16 or older.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Grounds for Taking Custody of a Juvenile by a Peace Officer without a Warrant

1. Dependent children

A child can be taken into custody if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the child is within the statutory meaning of dependency; if the child is found in a public place sick or injured; if a child has been adjudicated dependent and the officer has reasonable cause to believe the child violated a juvenile court order or escaped from a commitment by juvenile court.

County welfare department social workers can take a child adjudicated dependent into custody if the child is in need of care.

2. Status offenders and delinquents

A child can be taken into custody if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the child is within the statutory meaning of status offender or delinquent; if the child has been adjudicated a ward of the court and the officer has reasonable cause to believe the ward has violated a juvenile court order or escaped from a commitment by the juvenile court; if the child is found sick or injured in a public place.

3. Delinquents

A juvenile can be taken into custody if the officer has reasonable cause to believe he/she committed a public offense in the officer's presence; if the juvenile committed a felony or if the officer has reasonable cause to believe he/she committed a felony; if the officer has reasonable cause to believe a juvenile who is involved in a traffic accident was driving under the influence of liquor or drugs.

B. Grounds for Warrant of Arrest of a Juvenile

A juvenile judge can issue a warrant ordering a juvenile be taken into custody if a petition is filed in juvenile court alleging the juvenile to be a status offender or delinquent; or if it appears to the court that the conduct or behavior of the juvenile may endanger the person or property of himself/herself or another, or the circumstances of the juvenile's home environment endangers him/her.

C. Post Arrest Procedures for Alleged Status Offenders and Delinquents

The minor can be released; released after the minor or parent is given

a written notice to appear before the county probation officer, with or without a written Promise to Appear; or custody of the minor can be delivered to the probation officer.

D. Filing a Petition and the Intake Investigation

If the juvenile is delivered to the probation officer and the probation officer detains him/her on the grounds he/she is a person described by Section 602, the probation officer presents the case to the district attorney who decides whether to file a petition with juvenile court. If the juvenile within the terms of Section 602 is released pending investigation by the probation officer, and the probation officer decides court action is warranted, the case is referred to the district attorney for decision whether to file a petition.

According to statute, the probation officer files petitions alleging a juvenile is a person within Section 601.

Any person can apply to the probation officer in the form of an affidavit to commence juvenile proceedings with respect to a juvenile. The probation officer makes such investigation as he/she deems necessary. If the probation officer decides the juvenile is within Section 602, the affidavit is referred to the district attorney.

Prior to 1/1/77, the probation officer had authority to file petitions on juveniles within both Sections 601 and 602 without referral to the district attorney for a decision.

E. Alternatives to Adjudication: Disposition Without Adjudication

The probation officer can delineate a supervision program for the juvenile for up to six months, with the consent of the juvenile and his/her parent. If necessary, the probation officer can file a petition during this period.

Effective 1/1/77: The probation officer can contract with a public or

private agency for shelter care and counseling for the juvenile for a maximum of 90 days; for residence at a crisis resolution home and counseling for 20 days; or refer the minor to a counseling or educational center.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements for Detention of the Juvenile While in Custody of Probation Officer

1. Grounds

The minor can be detained if in need of parental care or control; if destitute; if his/her home is unfit because of parental neglect, cruelty or abuse; if detention is necessary to protect the minor or another person; if he/she is likely to flee; if in violation of a juvenile court order; or if physically dangerous to the public because of a physical or mental abnormality.

2. Time limit

The minor must be released within 48 hours (excluding non-judicial days) after being taken into custody, unless a petition has been filed within that time.

B. Detention Hearing

1. Requirement

A detention hearing must be held before a juvenile court judge or referee before the expiration of the next judicial day after a petition is filed. If the juvenile is ordered detained, he/she may request a special detention hearing known as a Dennis H. hearing, which is held one week after the first detention hearing.

2. Hearing procedure

The juvenile is entitled to appointed counsel, can exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, and has the right to confront and cross-examine any person examined by the court. The juvenile and his/her

parent and attorney can present evidence. Continuances and rehearings are possible.

3. Grounds for continued detention

The reasons for which the court can order continued detention are: the juvenile violated a juvenile court order; the juvenile escaped from a juvenile court commitment; detention is necessary to protect the juvenile or another person; or the juvenile is likely to flee.

4. Length of detention

The court can order detention for up to 15 judicial days.

C. Detention Facilities

1. Juvenile Halls

Juvenile Halls are provided and maintained by the Board of Supervisors in every county for detention of juveniles within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Juvenile Halls are controlled and managed by the probation officer, and must be separate from jails and prisons. Escape is a misdemeanor.

2. Restrictions

No juvenile can be detained in a jail, lock-up, juvenile hall or other secure facility who is taken into custody on the grounds he/she is a status offender or made a ward of the court solely on the ground he/she is a status offender. Such a person can be detained in a shelter-care facility, crisis resolution home or other non-secure facility (effective 1/1/77). Persons under 18 cannot be detained in jails or lock-ups unless a juvenile court judge determines there are no other adequate facilities.

D. Alternatives to Detention

The peace officer or probation officer can release the juvenile upon receiving a written promise to appear before the probation officer. The

probation officer can release the minor to his/her parent on home supervision, and require the minor to observe certain conditions, unless the minor lacks parental care, is destitute, or the minor's home is unfit (effective 1/1/77).

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Jurisdiction Hearing

If the juvenile is detained in custody at the time the petition is filed, the hearing must be held within 15 judicial days from the date of the court order directing detention. If the juvenile is not detained, the hearing must be held within 30 calendar days from the date the petition is filed. Notice of the hearing date must be given to the juvenile and his/her parent.

The juvenile may admit the allegations of the petition and waive the hearing with the consent of counsel.

B. Characteristics of Jurisdiction Hearings

1. Cases of children are heard at court sessions separate from other matters.
2. Hearings are closed to the public. Only persons with a direct interest are admitted. The juvenile or his/her parent may request an open hearing.
3. Proceedings are informal and nonadversary except where there is a contested issue of law or fact.
4. In delinquency cases the district attorney appears for the state. In status offender cases the district attorney may appear to assist in ascertaining and presenting evidence if the juvenile represented by counsel and the court either consents to or requests the district attorney's appearance.

5. Case law indicates the juvenile judge has the discretion to impanel an advisory jury.

C. Rights of the Child

1. The juvenile is entitled to be present at the hearing with a parent or adult relative and counsel.
2. The juvenile has a right to a retained attorney or an appointed attorney if indigent.
3. The juvenile has the right to remain silent, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to compel attendance of witnesses in the juvenile's behalf.

D. Conduct of the Jurisdiction Hearing

1. Evidence

Admission of evidence is in accord with the Evidence Code and judicial decision.

2. Standard of proof

Delinquency: allegations of petition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Status offenders: allegations of petition must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Continuances

The court may continue the hearing.

E. Findings by the Court

The court must make written findings stating whether the minor is a person described within the statute.

F. Disposition Hearing

1. Time

The disposition hearing can be held immediately following the jurisdiction hearing, or it can be continued until a later date.

2. Admissible evidence

The court can receive in evidence the probation officer's social study and other relevant and material evidence on the proper disposition of the juvenile.

3. Continuances

The court may continue disposition hearings for 90 days and order temporary placement of the juvenile at a Youth Authority diagnostic and treatment center for diagnosis.

4. Judgments possible by the court

- a. Dismiss the petition
- b. Place the juvenile on probation for up to 6 months without adjudicating the juvenile a ward of the court.
- c. Adjudicate the juvenile a ward of the court.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE COURT FOR JUVENILES ADJUDICATED WARDS OF THE COURT

A. Status Offenders

1. The court can make all reasonable orders for the care and supervision of the juvenile.
2. Commit the juvenile to the supervision and custody of a probation officer, reputable person, an association with the purpose of caring for such juveniles, a family home, a private institution, or a public agency.
3. The court can limit parental control over the juvenile. The juvenile can be taken from the physical custody of the parent if the parent failed to provide for the juvenile's maintenance, training or education; if the juvenile failed to reform while on probation; or if the juvenile's welfare so requires.

4. Prior to 1/1/77: Commit the juvenile to a juvenile home, ranch or camp.

B. Delinquents

1. All of the above alternatives are available.
2. Commit the juvenile to a juvenile home, ranch or camp established and maintained by the county; or if there is none within the county, to the juvenile hall.
3. Commit the juvenile to the probation officer's supervision. The court can order the juvenile to earn money to support dependents or to make reparation.
4. Order the juvenile to make restitution.
5. Order the juvenile to participate in an uncompensated work program.
6. Place the juvenile in shelter care.
7. Order the juvenile to participate in a counseling program.
8. Order the juvenile to perform public services if the minor committed petty theft of retail merchandise.
9. Commit the juvenile to the Youth Authority if at least 8 years of age and disease-free. The Youth Authority has jurisdiction over all educational training and treatment institutions maintained as correctional schools for juvenile court wards.

CONNECTICUT

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

The Juvenile Court is a separate court with exclusive original jurisdiction over juveniles. Juvenile court has 3 districts in the state. Each juvenile court judge can hold court sessions within the district to which he or she is appointed, at any town within the district, as court business requires. The judges jointly appoint to statewide offices a chief clerk and director of juvenile probation services. Within their respective districts the judges appoint probation officers and detention personnel. Appeals go to Superior Court (trial court).

Effective July 1, 1978: Jurisdiction over juveniles will be transferred from Juvenile Court to Superior Court, which will be the sole court of original jurisdiction. Juvenile matters will be kept separate from other Superior Court business.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

A child is defined as a person under age 16. A youth is a person age 16 to 18 (effective 1/1/76). Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over all proceedings concerning delinquent children; and over all proceedings concerning uncared for, neglected and dependent children and youth.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over children adjudicated delinquent terminates at age 18. Exception: Commitment of delinquents to the Department of

of Children and Youth Services is for an indeterminate period up to a maximum of 2 years, and an extension of up to 2 years is allowed. Therefore, jurisdiction can apparently be retained in cases where an extension is granted up to age 20.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction is not set forth in the statute.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court

1. Delinquent

- a. Child who violated a state or federal law or municipal or local ordinance.
- b. Child who ran away from home without just cause.
- c. Child who is beyond parental control.
- d. Child engaged in indecent or immoral conduct.
- e. Child who is habitually truant or is continuously and overtly defiant of school rules.
- f. Child who violated a lawful juvenile court order.

2. Other categories

Juvenile court also has jurisdiction over neglected, uncared-for and dependent children and youth.

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The juvenile court can transfer to superior court any child referred to juvenile court for the commission of murder, if the murder was committed after the child reached age 14. Prior to transfer the juvenile court must conduct a complete investigation and hold a hearing.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Arrest

1. A child may be taken into custody by a police or probation officer with or without a warrant pursuant to adult arrest laws. A child may be taken into custody if apprehended in a delinquent act, on information, or if it is imperative that the child be taken into custody.

2. Post-arrest procedures

The officer must turn the juvenile over to a probation officer or other juvenile court officer, or to a youth service program or bring the child before a juvenile court judge.

There is no statutory requirement that the parent be notified.

B. Filing a Complaint and Petition

1. Complainant

Any person or agency can file a written complaint maintaining that a child's conduct constitutes delinquency.

2. Preliminary inquiry by the court

When a complaint is filed, the juvenile court makes a preliminary investigation to determine whether the facts, if true, would be sufficient to bring the child within the court's jurisdiction; and whether the interests of the child or the public require action.

3. Petition and summons

The court can authorize a petition of alleged delinquency or can make a non-judicial disposition of the complaint. The court issues a summons to court to the child and parent when a petition is authorized.

C. Alternatives to Adjudication

If the child and parent admit the facts establishing juvenile court jurisdiction, the court may make any practicable nonjudicial disposition, if the child and parent accept the disposition.

There is a 3 month limit on informal supervision of the juvenile, which can be extended by the judge if the child and parent accept the extension.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements for Detention

1. Court order

A juvenile can be detained pending a hearing and disposition under order of commitment by the court.

2. No grounds for detention are specified in the statute.

3. No time limit is specified on the length of detention.

B. Detention Facilities

1. Detention homes operated by the state, by towns, or by agencies and persons designated by juvenile court judges.

2. Any other suitable accommodations arranged by the judge.

3. Restrictions

Juveniles cannot be confined in community correctional centers or lock-ups, or in any place where adults are or may be confined.

Juveniles cannot be kept in solitary confinement.

C. Alternatives to Detention

The judge can release the juvenile on bail, release him/her to a youth service program, or release the juvenile in the custody of the probation officer, parent or suitable person.

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Characteristics of Hearings

1. Hearings cannot be held in rooms regularly used for criminal business.
2. The judge can exclude anyone from the hearing whose presence is unnecessary.
3. Hearings are non-prosecutorial.
4. There is no jury.

B. Rights of the Child

1. The child has the right to a retained attorney or an appointed attorney if indigent. The judge will appoint counsel for the child in the absence of a request by the child if the judge decides that the interests of justice require it.
2. The child has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
3. Any admission by the child is inadmissible at the hearing unless made in the presence of the parent, and the parent and child have been advised of the child's right to counsel, of the right to refuse to make statements, and that any statement can be introduced as evidence against the child.

C. Disposition

No disposition can be made of any juvenile found delinquent until the probation officer conducts a social investigation and presents the results to the judge.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES FOR DELINQUENTS

1. Place the juvenile in the care of an institution or agency which cares for delinquents.
2. Release the juvenile in the custody of parent, other relative or any fit person, subject to the supervision of the probation officer.

3. Withhold or suspend execution of judgement.
4. Place the juvenile on vocational probation if age 14 or older.
5. Order the juvenile to do work on public property, if there is competent acceptance of this disposition by parent and child.
6. Commit to Department of Children and Youth Services. Commitment is for an indeterminate time up to a maximum of two years, and the court can grant an extension for up to an additional two years. The Department can transfer juveniles to state mental health facilities after a juvenile court hearing. The Department can transfer juveniles age 14 or older who are dangerous to themselves or others to state correctional institutions after a juvenile court hearing.

DELAWARE

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

The Family Court has original civil and criminal jurisdiction over family and child matters and offenses set forth in the statute. This is a uniform statewide system.

The statute provides for 11 Family Court judges. The chief judge may appoint masters to hear cases. The master's findings and recommendations become the judgement of the court, unless a party petitions for review by a judge. Appeals from Family Court decisions go to the Superior Court (trial court) of the county in which the Family Court is located.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OVER JUVENILES

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning juveniles under 18.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

Family court jurisdiction terminates at age 18.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction is not set forth in the statute.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction over Children on the Family Court

1. Delinquent

- a. A child who commits an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime;
- b. A child who is uncontrolled by his/her custodian or school authorities;

- c. A child who habitually departs himself/herself so as to endanger or injure the morals or health of himself/herself or others.

2. Dependent

A child whose custodian is unable to provide child with adequate care.

3. Neglected

A child whose custodian refuses to provide the child with adequate care.

4. Truant

A child absent from school without a valid excuse for more than 3 days.

5. Children charged with violating certain motor vehicle code provisions (effective 8/5/76).

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

In certain cases juveniles within the jurisdiction of Family court may be transferred to adult court. In these cases, the Family court must hold an amenability hearing to decide whether the juvenile is amenable to the rehabilitative processes available to the Family Court. If the court decides the juvenile is not amenable, then the juvenile is proceeded against as an adult.

Cases where amenability hearings are required:

1. The juvenile is at least 16 and is alleged to have committed first degree murder, rape or kidnapping;
2. The juvenile is alleged to have committed, after reaching age 16, second degree murder, manslaughter, robbery, attempted murder, burglary or arson;

3. The juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and committed to the custody of the department of corrections and is charged with acts constituting a felony, committed after reaching age 14, and committed during escape from custody or unauthorized absence from custody.

Amenability hearings may be held by the court on its own motion or on motion of the Attorney General if the juvenile is charged with being delinquent after reaching age 16.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Arrest

1. Arrest of a juvenile by a peace officer without a warrant is allowed pursuant to the general laws of arrest.
2. Post-Arrest procedures
The officer must release the juvenile, or take the juvenile before Family Court within 2 hours of taking the juvenile into custody. The officer must notify the child's parent.

3. Warrant

Any judge of any court or official designated for such purpose may issue a warrant directing a peace officer to take into custody any child alleged to be delinquent. If a child is brought before a court other than Family Court, the judge must file a petition with Family Court.

B. Filing a Petition

1. Petitioner

Any person with knowledge of a neglected, dependent or delinquent child can file a petition with Family Court. Petitions alleging

delinquency can also be filed by the Intake Department of Family Court and by the Attorney General.

2. All petitions alleging delinquency are referred to the Intake Department.

C. Intake Investigation

The Intake Department decides whether the allegations of delinquency petitions are legally sufficient to warrant filing of the petition. If the Intake Department fails to authorize the petition, the petitioner has the right to a review of the decision by the Attorney General.

If the facts appear to be legally sufficient, the Intake Department can hold voluntary interviews with the juvenile. The juvenile has the right to counsel, the right to remain silent and the right to produce evidence, at such interviews.

D. Alternatives to Adjudication: Informal Adjustment by the Intake Dept.

Adjustment efforts can extend for 60 days, with a 30 day extension possible by the judge. The judge must approve the outcome of informal adjustment of petitions by the Intake Department.

Options available to the Intake Dept.: dismiss the petition; refer the juvenile to a public or private agency; the Department can refuse to authorize further proceedings; or the Department can conduct a conference to effect an agreement that obviates formal court action.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Detention Hearing

1. Requirement

If a child is brought before Family Court by a peace officer a detention hearing is held. The parent must be notified.

If a child is brought before a court other than Family Court, the judge may order detention in a facility designated by the Dept. of Health and Social Services if the child fails to make bail and detention is necessary to protect the child or the public. Detention continues until the next session of Family Court, when a detention hearing is held.

2. Criteria used by the judge to determine whether detention is necessary

These factors are: prior delinquent record; home situation; available adult supervision pending trial; the alleged misconduct; protection of the public interest; the child's general welfare.

3. Length of detention

No time limits on detention are specified, except in the case where a child is detained because he/she fails to make bail. In this case the juvenile must have an adjudicatory hearing on the merits of case or some other disposition within 10 days, unless the judge orders otherwise.

4. Procedure

After the detention hearing the judge can defer further proceedings pending investigation, or proceed directly to an adjudicatory hearing.

B. Detention Facilities

1. Juveniles can be detained in facilities designated by the Department of Health and Social Services.

2. Prohibited facilities

Juveniles cannot be detained in a jail, police station cell, prison, workhouse, or correctional institution, except on order of a Family Court judge.

C. Alternatives to Detention

The child can be released to his/her custodian, on the child's recognizance, or released on bail, to appear when notified.

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Characteristics of Hearings

1. Hearings are closed to the public.
2. There is no jury.
3. Hearings are recorded.
4. The Attorney General presents evidence against the juvenile.

B. Rights of the Child

1. The child has the right to be present at the hearing.
2. The child has the right to a retained attorney, or an appointed attorney if indigent. A juvenile of age 16 or above can waive counsel. If under 16, waiver must be made in the presence of a parent, attorney or judge.
3. The child has the right to remain silent, the right to present evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

C. Conduct of the Adjudicatory Hearing

1. Evidence

The court can admit all competent, material and relevant evidence.

2. Standard of Proof

The facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to find a child delinquent.

3. Continuances

The judge can continue the hearing.

D. Findings by the Court

The court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

A juvenile can be found guilty of a lesser included offense.

E. Disposition Hearing

1. Time

A disposition can be entered immediately after the court makes its findings, or it can be deferred while a pre-disposition report or medical exam of the juvenile is made. No unreasonable delay is allowed.

2. Admissable evidence

After a delinquency adjudication is made, the judge may accept any study relevant to the juvenile previously made by a recognized welfare agency, or order that a study be made.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES FOR DELINQUENTS

1. Leave child in his/her home, with or without court supervision.
2. Probation
3. Fine
4. Order the juvenile to make restitution.
5. Grant custody to any person, institution or agency where satisfactory arrangements can be made.
6. The court can order any treatment, punishment or care that best serves the needs of the child and society.
7. Revoke or suspend driver's license or postpone eligibility for license for 3 months to 2 years (effective 7/30/76).

8. Grant custody to the Department of Health and Social Services for placement of the juvenile - such as foster care or training school.
9. Commit to Department of Corrections if the acts would constitute 2 felonies and the act occurred when the juvenile was age 14 or older; or if the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent previously and is again adjudicated delinquent because of escape from a commitment (effective 7/30/76).

ILLINOIS

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

Juvenile Court is a session or division of Circuit Court, the court of highest trial level. Appeals go to Appellate Courts. This is a uniform statewide system.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction over all juveniles under age 17 who are delinquent, and over all juveniles under 18 who are minors otherwise in need of supervision, neglected, or dependent.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

When the court has acquired original jurisdiction over a child, it must terminate when the child reaches age 21.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction

The person's age on the date the offense was allegedly committed determines whether the person is classified as a juvenile or an adult.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions That Confer Jurisdiction on the Court

1. Delinquent

A juvenile who violates or attempts to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or state law or municipal ordinance.

2. Minor Otherwise in Need of Supervision

A juvenile who is beyond parental control; who is subject to compulsory school attendance and is habitually truant; who is a drug addict; who violates a lawful court order.

3. Neglected

A juvenile who lacks support, education, medical care or is abandoned, whose environment is injurious to his/her welfare, or whose behavior is injurious to self or others.

4. Dependent

A juvenile without a parent or legal custodian, or who is without care because of parents' physical or mental disability, or whose parent wishes to be relieved of parental rights.

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The Juvenile Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over persons coming within the above age and offense/behavior categories. Under certain conditions, persons otherwise within juvenile court jurisdiction can be transferred to Adult Court.

If the juvenile petition alleges a juvenile age 13 or older committed a crime, the juvenile judge can hold a hearing to determine whether it's in the best interest of the juvenile and the public to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act or allow a criminal prosecution. This hearing is held on the motion of either the state's attorney or the juvenile with consent of the juvenile's counsel.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Arrest

1. Grounds under which a police officer can take a juvenile into temporary custody without a warrant

Any child whom the officer, with reasonable cause, believes is delinquent, a minor otherwise in need of supervision, dependent or neglected; who is a ward of the court and escaped from commitment; who is found in public sick or injured, can be taken into custody.

2. Warrant

A juvenile judge can issue a warrant ordering a child be taken into custody when a petition is filed regarding the child and the child's conduct may endanger self or others, or the child's home environment endangers the child.

3. Post Arrest Procedures

The officer who takes the child into custody must notify the child's parent and take the child to a juvenile police officer.

The child can be released, or delivered to the court or to a place designated by the court.

B. Filing a Petition

Petitioner

Persons who may institute proceedings: Any adult, agency or association, or the state's attorney if so directed by the court.

C. Intake Investigation

The juvenile probation officer investigates facts and circumstances relevant to the juvenile being taken into custody, and investigates and evaluates complaints against juveniles. When a petition is filed, the probation officer makes a pre-hearing investigation and formulates recommendations for the court.

D. Alternative to Adjudication: Informal Adjustment

The juvenile court can authorize the probation officer to confer with any petitioner, respondent and interested person with a view toward adjusting the case informally. There is a 3-month time limit on adjustment efforts.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Detention Authorized by Probation Officer During Intake Investigation

1. Grounds

The juvenile can be detained if detention is an immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the juvenile or the person or property of another; if the juvenile is likely to flee from the court's jurisdiction; if the juvenile was taken into custody under a warrant.

2. If the juvenile is detained, the probation officer must file a petition.

3. Time limit

The probation officer can authorize detention up to 36 hours (except Sundays and holidays).

B. Detention Hearing

A hearing must be held before a judicial officer within 36 hours of the time the juvenile is taken into custody. The petition is dismissed unless the judicial officer finds probable cause to believe the child is delinquent, a minor otherwise in need of supervision, dependent or neglected. If probable cause exists, detention can be continued. The juvenile and his/her parents can give relevant testimony at the detention hearing. The court makes findings of fact and an order.

Detention continues until the adjudicatory hearing. If the petition alleges the minor is delinquent or otherwise in need of supervision, an adjudicatory hearing must be held within 10 judicial days from the date of the detention order. If the petition alleges a crime of violence, the state's attorney can move to postpone the adjudicatory hearing and the court can postpone the hearing up to 10 additional judicial days.

C. Detention Facilities

1. The Board of County Commissioners can establish a detention home for the temporary care and custody of children.

2. The Department of Corrections Juvenile Facility can be used for temporary detention of juveniles under age 16 if no other facilities are available and the juvenile is kept separate from adjudicated delinquents.
3. A juvenile detention center can be maintained in a multipurpose municipal or county building that includes a police station or jail if juveniles are isolated from adults.
4. Juveniles can be confined in police stations in places not ordinarily used for confinement of prisoners.
5. Any minor who requires care away from home, but not physical restriction is given temporary care in a foster home or shelter facility designated by the court.
6. Restrictions:
Juveniles under 16 cannot be confined in jails or places ordinarily used for confinement of prisoners in police stations. Juveniles under 17 must be kept separate from confined adults and cannot be kept in the same cell, room, or yard with adults confined pursuant to criminal law.

D. Alternative to Detention

The child can be released to the custody of his/her parent.

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Characteristics of Adjudicatory Hearings

1. Hearings are closed to the public. Only persons with a direct interest and the news media are admitted.
2. There is no jury.
3. The county state's attorney represents the state.

B. Rights of the Child

1. The child may be excluded from parts of the hearing by the court with the consent of the child's parent or attorney.
2. The child has a right to a retained attorney, or an appointed attorney if indigent.
3. Child has the right to examine court files.
4. Child has the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination applies.

C. Conduct of the Adjudicatory Hearing

1. Evidence

In delinquency proceedings, the rules of evidence of criminal proceedings apply. In proceedings involving a minor otherwise in need of supervision, the rules of evidence of civil proceedings apply.

2. Standard of Proof

Delinquency: Allegations of petition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. MINS: Allegations must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Continuances

The court can continue the hearing after evidence is given and before the court makes findings, unless the child or his/her parent objects.

D. Findings by the Court

Court determines whether allegations proved, and if so, whether the child should be adjudged a ward of the court.

E. Disposition Hearing

Court can consider all evidence and reports and adjourn the hearing in

order to receive reports. The parties have an opportunity to controvert the reports.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE COURT FOR JUVENILES ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OR MINOR IN NEED OF SUPERVISION

A. Delinquents

1. Place on probation or conditional discharge and release to parent
2. Remove minor from parental custody and place in custody of relative or guardianship of probation officer, or commit to an agency, training or industrial school, or institution for delinquents. These are placements outside the Department of Corrections and Department of Children and Family Services.
3. Treat for drug addiction
4. Commit to Department of Children and Family Services
5. Commit to Juvenile Division of the Department of Corrections. The child must be at least 13 and incarceration must be allowed for adults found guilty of the same offense.

B. Minors in Need of Supervision

1. Commit to Department of Children and Family Services
2. Place child under supervision and release to parent
3. Remove child from parental custody and place in custody of a relative or guardianship of probation officer; commit to an agency, training or industrial school or an institution for delinquents. These are placements outside the Department of Corrections and Department of Children and Family Services
4. Treat for drug addiction

SOUTH CAROLINA

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

Effective July, 1977: A statewide family court system was to be implemented by legislation passed in June, 1976. There is one family court for each of the 16 judicial circuits in the state. Each court has at least one full time judge. Judges are elected by the General Assembly for 4-year terms. Appeals go to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Court sessions are held in the various counties within each circuit. The family courts have the same authority and jurisdiction as that provided by the Family Court Act of 1968 over juveniles, with some amendments. The family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in these matters. Each county provides juvenile intake and probation services until July 1, 1978, when the Dept. of Youth Services begins to provide these services.

Prior to July, 1977: There was no statewide system. There existed in the various counties family courts, juvenile courts, domestic relations courts, and combination juvenile and domestic relations courts, with jurisdiction over juveniles. Also, probate courts, recorder's courts, municipal courts, and county courts had some statutory jurisdiction over juveniles, but it is unclear whether these courts exercised such jurisdiction.

In the 5 counties where programs were evaluated, the provisions of the Family Court Act of 1968 seemed to generally control juvenile law and procedure, but there were statutory variations. It appears that in each of these counties one court had exclusive, original jurisdiction over juveniles: Anderson County - County and Family Court; Greenville, Lexington and

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Spartanburg Counties - Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts; Richland County - court was called either Family Court or Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction over all persons under 17 who are delinquent (prior to 7/1/77, the statute is unclear whether the age is under 17 or under 16 in Greenville and Spartanburg counties). The court also has jurisdiction over all persons under 21 who are dependent or neglected.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

When the court has acquired original jurisdiction over a child, it terminates when the child reaches age 21.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction

The person's age on the date the offense was allegedly committed determines whether the person is classified as a juvenile or an adult.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction on the Court

1. Child is neglected as to support, education or medical care, or is abandoned.
2. Child's occupation, behavior, condition, environment or associations are such as to injure or endanger the child's welfare or that of others.

3. Child is beyond parental control.
4. Child is alleged to have violated or attempted to violate any state or local law or municipal ordinance, regardless of where the violation occurred.
5. Any child age 17 or over, alleged to have violated any law prior to becoming 17.

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction over persons coming within the above age and offense/behavior categories. But under certain conditions persons otherwise within family court jurisdiction can be transferred to adult court.

If the child is alleged to have committed certain offenses, the person executing the petition may request that the case be transferred to adult court and the child be proceeded against as a criminal. Effective 7/1/77 these offenses are murder and rape. Prior to this date, these offenses were murder, manslaughter, rape, attempted rape, arson, burglary, bribery, and perjury.

A separate statutory provision states that the family court may bind over a child age 16 or older to criminal court if the child is charged with a felony or misdemeanor if the court, after investigation, deems it contrary to the best interests of the child or the public to retain jurisdiction.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Arrest

1. Grounds under which a police officer can take a juvenile into custody

Any child violating a law or ordinance or whose surroundings endanger his/her welfare can be taken into custody.

2. Post-Arrest procedures

Officer must notify child's parent. The child can be released, taken before the court, or taken to a place of detention designated by the court.

3. Warrant

After a petition is filed a warrant can be issued ordering the child be taken into custody if the child's welfare requires that the child be in custody, or if summons of the child to court has not been obeyed or the judge thinks a summons will be ineffectual.

B. Filing a Petition

1. Petitioner

Persons who may institute proceedings: parent or custodian of child, child welfare official, public official who cares for the poor, agent of any association, any person with knowledge or information that a child is subject to the court's jurisdiction, any person who suffered injury through a child's delinquency, an officer who arrested a child.

2. Preliminary inquiry by the court

When a person informs the court that a child is within the court's jurisdiction, the court makes a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interest of the child or the public requires further

action. The court may authorize a petition to be filed by any person.

C. Intake Investigation

Prior to the adjudicatory hearing the judge orders an investigation to be made of all facts pertaining to the case: parents, surroundings, age, habits, history, school reports, physical or mental exams.

D. Alternative to Adjudication

Court can make informal adjustments as practicable.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements for Detention

1. If the child is placed in detention by a police officer after being taken into custody, the officer must so report to the court, with the reasons the child was not released to the parent.
2. The court can detain the child subject to further order up to 2 days (excluding Sunday and holidays).
3. The judge must sign an order for any further detention. No time limit is specified on the length of any further detention.
4. No grounds for detention are specified.

B. Detention Facilities

1. Detention homes are conducted by the court or an appropriate public agency. The court can arrange for the use of private homes, or any institution or agency.
2. Prohibited facilities: Jails and adult detention facilities can't be used for juveniles, unless the juveniles are in a room or ward entirely separate from adults.

C. Alternative to Detention

The child can be released to a parent or other responsible adult upon written promise to bring the child to court.

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Characteristics of Hearings

1. Cases of children are heard separate from other court business.
2. Hearings are closed to the public. Only persons with a direct interest are admitted.
3. Hearings are informal.
4. There is no jury.
5. Transcripts are discretionary.

B. Rights of the Child

1. The presence of the child at the hearing can be waived by the court or at any stage of the proceeding.
2. The child has a right to a retained attorney, or appointed attorney if indigent, if the child may be committed to an institution or removed from his/her home.
3. The privilege against self-incrimination and the right of cross-examination apply in delinquency hearings that may result in an institutional commitment where the child's freedom would be curtailed.

C. Admissible Evidence

1. Result of an investigation by a probation counselor.
2. Evidence relative to the child's family situation, if otherwise competent.

3. Documents: school attendance records, school report card, physician's statement of treatment, agency investigation of child's home.

D. Court Order

A court order is required to be made after the hearing which sets forth the facts on which it is based.

VI. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE COURT AFTER THE COURT MAKES FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. Dismiss the petition
2. Place child on probation or supervision at home or in the custody of a suitable person, with any conditions the court makes.
3. Commit the child to the custody or guardianship of a public or private institution, or to an agency authorized to care for children.
4. Place child in a family home.
5. Place child in the guardianship of a suitable person.
6. Place child in a hospital for examination or treatment.
7. Order any necessary care or treatment.
8. Commit the child to the Department of Youth Services for placement in a correctional school or vocational training center. The child can be transferred to the state Department of Corrections if the child is committed for an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult and such crime carries a maximum sentence of 30 years imprisonment.
9. Commit child under 10 to the Board of Juvenile Placement for placement in a corrective environment.
10. Commit child to a penal institution for up to 30 days.

WASHINGTON

I. THE JUVENILE COURT IN THE JUDICIAL STRUCTURE

Juvenile Court is a session of Superior Court, the highest trial level court. This is a statewide system. There is no provision for appeals in the statute.

In counties with a population of 30,000 or more, the Superior Court judges designate one or more judges to hear all juvenile cases. In smaller counties without a resident Superior Court judge, the court commissioner has concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court judge to hear juvenile cases, enter judgements and make orders, subject to Superior Court review.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

A. Age Classification as Juvenile

1. Age limits for original jurisdiction

The court has jurisdiction over all persons under 18.

2. Continuing jurisdiction

When the court has acquired original jurisdiction over a juvenile, it must terminate when the juvenile reaches age 21.

3. Age determination date for jurisdiction is unclear in the statute.

B. Types of Offenses, Behavior and Conditions that Confer Jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court

1. Delinquent

A child who violates a penal law of Washington, any city or county ordinance defining a crime, a federal law, or another state's penal law.

2. Dependent child

- a. Incurable; beyond parental control
- b. Frequents the company of criminals, vagrants or prostitutes
- c. Habitual truant
- d. Uses liquor or drugs
- e. Habitually visits places where liquor is sold or given away
- f. Wanders about at night
- g. Lives in house of prostitution
- h. In danger of being brought up to lead an idle, dissolute or immoral life
- i. Has no home, guardian or means of subsistence
- j. Has no guardian willing or capable of exercising parental control
- k. Home is unfit by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity of parent
- l. Grossly and willfully neglected as to medical care

C. Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court Jurisdiction

The juvenile court has discretion to order a child turned over for trial under the criminal code, if upon investigation, it appears the child was arrested for committing a crime. A hearing is required, at which the court considers the probation department's investigation of the child.

III. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROCESSES

A. Arrest

1. Grounds for taking custody of a juvenile by a police or probation officer without a warrant: any child who is violating any law; who is reasonably believed to be a fugitive from his/her parents, or justice; or whose surroundings endanger his/her health, morals or welfare.

2. Post-arrest procedures

The parent must be immediately notified when a child is taken into custody.

The child can be released to the parent if the parent signs a statement agreeing to produce the child at juvenile court; or taken directly before juvenile court; placed in a detention home; or put in the custody of a probation officer.

B. Filing a Petition

1. Petitioner

Any person can file a petition maintaining that a dependent or delinquent child resides in the county.

2. Administrative screening

If there is a court probation officer, the officer must decide whether the petition is reasonably justifiable.

C. Intake Investigation

The probation officer can conduct a voluntary interview with the parent and child.

D. Alternative to Adjudication

Informal adjustment by the juvenile court judge or probation officer (subject to review by the judge) is permitted with the parent's consent.

IV. DETENTION PRIOR TO ADJUDICATION

A. Requirements for Detention

1. Juvenile Court judge or probation officer can admit a child to detention.

2. Grounds for detention

The juvenile can be detained if he/she engaged in assaultive conduct, if he/she is a parole violator, or if the juvenile is unlikely to appear at the court hearing.

3. Detention hearing

The juvenile has a right to a hearing before a juvenile judge, if requested by the parent or child. The hearing is waived if no request is made. The parent and child must be given notice of this right. At the hearing the parent and child can present evidence, and be heard on the issue of temporary detention.

4. Length of detention

- a. 72 hour limit (excluding Sunday and holidays) after a child is taken into custody, unless a petition is filed.
- b. After a petition is filed, there is a 72 hour limit unless the court orders continued detention.
- c. 30 day limit on court ordered detention, unless the court orders continued detention and enters a record of findings on which the order is based.

B. Detention Facilities

1. A juvenile can be committed to the care of the sheriff, police or probation officer to be detained in a suitable place provided by the city, county, or an association that cares for dependent and delinquent children and is willing to receive the child.
2. Counties with a population of 50,000 or more must establish a detention room or house separate from the jail or police station.

3. Restrictions

Juveniles under 16 can't be confined in a jail, lock-up, or police station.

C. Alternatives to Detention

The juvenile can be released on bail, released to parental custody if the parent signs a statement agreeing to produce the child at the juvenile court hearing, or released to the custody of the probation officer.

V. ADJUDICATION

A. Adjudicatory Hearings

If a child or parent dispute the allegations of a petition, a hearing is scheduled, with preference to cases where the child is in detention. If the allegations of the petition are not contested, the court can schedule a hearing on the agreed facts to be combined with a disposition hearing.

B. Characteristics of Adjudicatory (fact-finding) Hearings

1. Hearings are closed to the public. Only persons with a direct interest are admitted.
2. There is no jury.
3. The prosecutor presents evidence supporting the petition if the court so requests.

C. Rights of the Child

Juveniles have the right to retained counsel in all proceedings. If indigent, juveniles have the right to appointed counsel if subject to a decline of juvenile court jurisdiction which allows a felony prosecution, if the court may consider removing the child from the parent's custody, if the court may consider committing the child to the Department of Social and Health Services, or if the court determines the child's welfare requires that he/she have counsel.

D. Conduct of the Adjudicatory Hearing

1. Evidence

The rules of evidence apply.

2. Standard of proof

The facts must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to find a child dependent; and beyond a reasonable doubt to find a child delinquent.

E. Findings by the Court

The judge must make written findings of fact unless the case is dismissed.

F. Disposition Hearing

1. Time

The disposition hearing can be held immediately after the court announces its findings of fact, or it can be continued until a later date.

2. Admissible evidence

The court may consider the probation officer's social study of the juvenile, the juvenile's social file, and evidence from the adjudicatory hearing.

3. The court can defer entry of fact findings on the record if the child and parent agree, subject to conditions imposed by the court. If the conditions are met, the court can dismiss the petition.

VII. DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES

When any child is found delinquent or dependent the court can make such order for the care, custody or commitment of the child as the child's welfare in the interest of the state require. The court may commit the child:

1. To care of child's parents, subject to supervision of probation officer,
2. To custody of a probation officer,
3. To a reputable citizen or association or a private agency,
4. To the Department of Social and Health Services, and institutions under its jurisdiction.

Prior to 7/1/77, dependents and delinquents may be committed to minimum security institutions, training schools and juvenile correctional institutions. Dependents may not be committed to these facilities after 7/1/77 except for juveniles adjudicated dependent-incorrigible, who may be committed to diagnostic and treatment facilities for not more than 30 days.

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