


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City of New Orleans
The Mayor's Criminal
Justice Coordinating Council

September 1981

**THE ARSON REDUCTION
PROGRAM:
A FINAL EVALUATION**

Gilbert D. Litton, Jr., Director of Evaluation,
Linda Maryo, Evaluator

MAYOR ERNEST N. MORIAL, Chairman
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80859

THE ARSON REDUCTION PROGRAM: A FINAL EVALUATION

Prepared by
THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COORDINATING COUNCIL

September, 1981

Gilbert D. Litton, Jr., Director of Evaluation
Linda Marye, Evaluator

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was funded by the

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THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COORDINATING COUNCIL
Mayor Ernest N. Morial, Chairman
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Director

MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

FINAL EVALUATION

PROJECT: Arson Reduction Program

PROJECT NUMBER: 80-C9-7.1-0001

FUNDING SOURCE: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Criminal Justice
Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council

SUBGRANTEE: City of New Orleans

OPERATING AGENCY: New Orleans Fire Department

PERIOD OF GRANT REPORT: January 1, 1980-June 30, 1981

DATE OF REPORT: September, 1981

PREPARED BY: Linda Marye

EVALUATION ASSISTANCE: Gladys Anderson, Clerical and Graphic
Assistance

CUMULATIVE GRANT AWARD:	SLEPA	\$19,030
	Subgrantee	2,114
	Total	\$21,144

PROJECT PERSONNEL: William J. McCrossen, Superintendent of
New Orleans Fire Department

AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL: Ernest N. Morial, Mayor, City of New Orleans

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September, 1979, the Mayor of New Orleans appointed an Arson Task Force to direct arson reduction efforts. Made up of representatives from public agencies, businesses, and community leaders, the Task Force had been suggested by a report from the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council released in May, 1979, that described a lack of cooperation and preparedness in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of arson. Block grant funds were obtained to train police and fire investigators and purchase needed equipment. This evaluation of that grant covers 18 months of operation from January 1, 1980, to June 30, 1981.

In New Orleans, arson reduction involved changes within public agencies and the way the agencies related to each other. In addition to training investigators and purchasing equipment, it required establishing routine channels of cooperation between the Fire Department, the Police Department, and the court system; forming an Arson Squad with investigators from both the Fire and Police Departments; developing a record-keeping system; and presenting the arson problem to the public.

In the almost two years of Task Force operation, most of these procedures have been well-established. For example, Goal 2 of the grant required improved cooperation between the Fire Department, the Police Department, and the District Attorney's office. An Arson Squad

was formed in January 1980, of investigators from the Police Arson and Bomb Squad and the Fire Prevention Division. These investigators work together in teams of two and meet weekly to review cases. An Assistant District Attorney has also been appointed to work with the squad to improve the quality of cases.

As required by Objective 1, all squad members have either been trained at the National Fire Academy or are scheduled to receive this training. In addition to supplementary courses in fire chemistry and arson devices, one member of the Police Arson and Bomb Squad has been trained as a certified arson instructor and a Fire Prevention Investigator is scheduled to attend the same course. Three investigators have also been trained in the use of the Psychological Stress Evaluator. In short, more training than anticipated has been provided and at a lower cost. Finally, the equipment mentioned in Objective 2 has been purchased, including cabinets and generator for the arson van, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and tools and kits to obtain evidence.

Because of limited arson information in earlier years, Goals 1, 3, and 4 are more difficult to assess. Goal 1, reducing the incidence of and dollar loss due to arson, is impossible to measure directly. Decreases in multiple exhibiting alarms and suspicious fires suggest a decrease in arson, but the data are not sufficient to determine to what extent this decrease may be part of a previously existing trend.

Likewise, Goal 3 states that the number of arson investigations will be increased. Investigations in the first half of 1981 have increased over the same period in 1980, but because data are questionable from earlier years, it is difficult to state whether this represents an increase over the pre-grant period.

Goal 4 calls for increased arrests and convictions of arsonists. Since the program began, arrests are only slightly more frequent, but the number convicted shows a definite increase. In addition, more arsonists are being incarcerated.

In general, over the 18 months of program operation, the Squad has improved in cooperation; has been well trained and obtained needed equipment; and, finally, has increased the likelihood that New Orleans arsonists will be arrested and convicted. As Squad members become more experienced and routine records are maintained, further increases in convictions and decreases in arson may occur.

While these accomplishments represent a sound beginning, the following recommendations are offered to further improve operations:

1. More efficient operations would probably result from locating the Police and Fire Department branches of the Arson Squad in one location under a single supervisor. Current political realities, however, make implementation of this recommendation difficult.

- As an alternative, centralized record keeping might be improved to assure that both branches have available identical information on each case.
2. A clerk typist should be hired as clerical support for the Arson Squad to leave investigators free for field work. Currently, Squad members transcribe all their own tapes, prepare all reports, etc.
 3. To speed investigations and improve management, an on-line computer system should be developed. Such a system could enhance arson control and prediction.
 4. After 18 months of operation, the Squad should begin to develop a written manual of policies and procedures.
 5. Improved cooperation with insurance companies should be accomplished through seminars or informational packets that detail limits of liability and the beneficial aspects of cooperation.
 6. As a matter of routine, District police must refer all arson cases to the Arson Squad for handling. Reliable information about arson and consistent handling of cases are impossible without such a centralized procedure for investigation.
 7. Since the city now has a municipal ordinance against simple arson, liaison needs to be made with the City Attorney at Municipal Court to insure that arson case information is shared.

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ARSON REDUCTION PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

In September 1979, the Mayor of New Orleans appointed an Arson Task Force to reduce incidents of arson through a cooperative effort of governmental agencies, interested businesses, and individuals. The original impetus for the Task Force came from a report prepared by the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) outlining the arson problem in New Orleans.* At the same time, recent arson incidents in a hospital and condominium had peaked public interest; the Fire Department was concerned about an apparent growth in crimes of arson; the FBI had recently included arson as a Part I crime in the Uniform Crime Reports; and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had announced the availability of three-year discretionary grants to initiate several arson reduction programs. Although New Orleans did not receive one of these grants, it did make use of block grant funds to train police and fire investigators in arson detection and investigation and to purchase much needed equipment. This final evaluation of that grant covers 18 months of grant operation from January 1, 1980 through June 30, 1981.**

*City of New Orleans, Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, An Assessment of Arson in New Orleans, May 1979.

**The grant was originally written to fund only 12 months, but the availability of training at a lower cost than anticipated provided an excess of funds allowing the program to be extended for 6 additional months.

Grant Goals and Objectives

The stated goals and objectives of the grant were as follows:

GOALS:

1. To reduce the number of arson incidents and dollar loss due to arson;
2. To further improve cooperative efforts between the Fire Department, the Police Department, and the District Attorney's office;
3. To increase the number of arson investigations; and
4. To increase the number of arrests and convictions of arsonists.

OBJECTIVES:

1. The provision of advanced training to the arson control team in the areas of detection, investigation, case preparation and prosecution at the National Fire Academy, the Fire Training School, and the Police Academy; and
2. The provision of equipment essential to the arson team in effectively fulfilling its duties.

METHODOLOGY

Because the program was operational for only 18 months, the evaluation concentrated on process measures of cooperativeness between governmental agencies, the provision of equipment, the training of the arson squad, and increased arson investigations. The impact measures of reduced incidence and increased arrests and convictions were addressed, but the full impact of reduction efforts is not expected to become evident for some time.

Much of the description of arson incidents, investigations, arrests, and convictions came from information recorded by the fire investigators on the Arson Tracking Form. (A copy appears in Appendix A.) Training and equipment purchase data was provided by the Fire Department grant administrator. Evidence of cooperation was obtained through minutes of Task Force meetings, interviews with participants, and observations of Task Force and Arson Squad meetings. Information on earlier fire and arson incidence was found in Fire Department reports and in the planning document, An Assessment of Arson in New Orleans prepared by the CJCC and published in May 1979.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

Development of the Arson Squad

Before the Task Force was developed, all the responsibility for arson investigation was with the Fire Prevention Division of the Fire Department which employed two untrained arson investigators. These investigators were issued no special equipment or vehicles. They were even forced to purchase their own handtools and to rely on donations from businesses of cans and packages for the preservation of evidence. Investigators could only travel in their private automobiles. The Crime Laboratory which analyzed physical evidence, sometimes delaying investigations for a month, provided the only Police Department support for arson.

In addition, preparation of cases for prosecution was the responsibility of the arson investigators. In 1978, only four arson cases were accepted for prosecution by the District Attorney and, although three of these defendants were found or pled guilty, no jail time resulted. No special record keeping for arson cases existed. Information was maintained with other Fire Prevention records. Consequently, any data on arson before 1980 is sketchy at best.

When the Fire Department was notified of a fire, it was the duty of the district chief in command to determine if the fire was started accidentally or intentionally. If arson was suspected, a Fire Prevention

Investigator was called to the scene for further investigation. Upon finding evidence of arson, that investigator prepared a report and submitted it to one of the arson investigators. From that point the case was the sole responsibility of the arson investigator who proceeded under the difficult circumstances described above.

As a result of this grant, the Arson Squad now has a much more specialized function. While the Fire Department arm of the Arson Squad is still located within the Fire Prevention Division, four investigators have been assigned to work specifically with arson under the supervision of the head of the Fire Prevention Division. The arm of the Arson Squad within the Police Department is placed within the Special Operations Division and consists of four investigators and a sergeant with the combined functions of the Arson and Bomb Squad. To coordinate arson investigations, the duty roster of the fire investigators has been changed to coincide with that of the police investigators. Each police and fire investigator work rotating on-call shifts of one week each and, when possible, the same two fire and police investigators work together as a team.

The first notice that a fire is suspected of being arson is still relayed by the district fire chief in charge of suppressing the fire. He calls the Fire Department's communication system (Fire Alarm) which maintains a duty roster of all fire arson investigators. If after an on-site

investigation the fire arson investigator determines arson, the police arson investigator is notified through Fire Alarm. In any suspected case of arson, however, the district police are also called. They and the fire investigator remain on the scene to protect the evidence and prepare the first Police Department report. When the police arson investigator arrives, the arson team is complete, and the police and fire arson investigators jointly work the case until it is either completed or set aside. Much the same thing happens in the case of an extinguished fire discovered by the district police. They call Fire Alarm which sends out a fire engine and from that point on the two procedures coincide.

Record maintenance in arson cases has also become more standardized. The Fire Department designed an Arson Tracking Form and an Incident Report Form to manually compile data. They also developed a manual cross index file of everyone involved in arson fires—property owners, tenants, persons discovering fires, persons calling in the alarm, and others. At present, however, there is no computerized system within the Fire Department to store and analyze this arson information. The police arson investigators also prepare reports using standard police format. Arson arrests are entered in the police computer system as normal procedure.

Development of the Task Force

As a result of a CJCC report, An Assessment of Arson in New Orleans released in May, 1979, the city administration and Fire Department began planning the establishment of a Task Force. In August 1979, before the formation of the Task Force, the Arson Assistance Program of the United States Fire Administration was invited to carry out a study of New Orleans' capabilities for arson prevention and control. In effect, they determined that no anti-arson programs were in place. At the request of the Fire Chief, the USFA program provided technical assistance in a week-long series of meetings. Through these meetings the Arson Task Force was formed.

When the Task Force first met in September 1979, it was faced with the uncoordinated approach to the arson problem already described. To provide for the necessary coordination, the Mayor chose Task Force members to represent the Fire Department, the Police Department, the District Attorney, the Mayor's Office, the insurance industry, the State Fire Marshal, the City Council, the Metropolitan Area Committee, and community leaders. The Task Force was headed by the Superintendent of the Fire Department and has met on a monthly basis its formation.

The Task Force formed four subcommittees: Public Awareness, Coordination of System Efforts, Operational Preparedness, and Arson

Information. Non-grant related accomplishments of the Task Force include: the establishment of a Speakers Bureau; an Arson Hotline; a Reward Fund; a Name the Arson Rat contest for school children; numerous television and radio appearances; and, newspaper coverage to alert the public to the arson problem. The New Orleans Task Force was reassessed by USFA in June, 1981. The written report of that assessment appears in Appendix C and states, "The City of New Orleans has established one of the most effective local arson task forces in the country today."

Because a major procedural goal of the grant was to increase communication between the Police Department, the Fire Department, and the District Attorney's Office, the activities of the Coordination of System Efforts Subcommittee were especially relevant. Most of those activities were noted in the Task Force minutes.

FINDINGS

The findings were divided into three sections—a qualitative analysis of Goal 2 and the Objectives, a statistical description of arson in New Orleans; and a quantitative analysis of Goals 1, 3, and 4.

A. Qualitative Assessment

1. Goal 2-Cooperation

The minutes begin by describing good cooperation between the Fire Department, the Police Department, and the D.A.'s Office. Until April, 1980, however, several problems were evident. In some meetings the Fire Department complained that police investigators were not available at the fire scenes and the Police Department complained that they were not being notified of fires. Also, the district fire chiefs did not always stay at a fire scene until an arson investigator arrived. Part of the problem was solved by using pocket pagers and Fire Alarm communications to send notices of fires between the two agencies rather than relying on the district police to do so.

Members also commented on the absence of a District Attorney's representative and the need to track case information throughout judicial processing. In March, 1980, however, an Assistant District Attorney was assigned to work with the Arson Squad and has continued to do so until the present. By May 1980, police and fire members of the Arson Squad were meeting weekly to prioritize cases and discuss progress.

Although the Assistant District Attorney has not been consistently present at the squad meetings, that individual seems to have maintained a close relationship with the squad.

In the meetings of the Arson Squad, further problems were discovered. Apparently, the police investigators were often not available for arson cases because of a conflicting workload, the police investigators needed more automobiles and pagers, and records for the entire squad needed to be centralized. The Police and Fire Chiefs met and assigned a management team of the supervisory personnel of the fire and police squads and the chairman of the subcommittee on Coordination of System Efforts to develop solutions. Within a month police investigators were placed into an Arson and Bomb Squad under a sergeant who provided some of the necessary direct supervision. Pagers were ordered and the Police Department made additional cars available as needed. The fire and police investigators also formed teams of two riding in the same car. The management level meetings further refined notification of fires and designed a standardized incident report form for the Fire Department that complemented the Police Department's report forms. Although records and operations have not been centralized, squad meetings have been held alternately at either Fire Headquarters or the Police Arson and Bomb Squad Offices.

Another identified problem was the lack of funds with which to pay informants. The Task Force agreed that the Arson Reward Fund could be used in such instances. In May 1981, the first informant was paid.

After the Arson Squad began to make arrests, and have cases referred to the D.A. for action, a new source of frustration arose. Because New Orleans had no municipal ordinance against arson, the only place for the fire with little property damage, with little danger to life, and generally with revenge as a motive to be heard was state Criminal District Court. In response, the Coordination of Systems Efforts subcommittee met with municipal and criminal court judges. The Task Force felt that if a municipal ordinance against arson were enacted more smalltime arsonists could be prosecuted. Such an ordinance against simple arson was enacted by the City Council in November 1980, and revised in April 1981, with a more specific definition of simple arson. (Both forms of the ordinance appear in Appendix D.)

To deter and punish more serious aggravated arson offenders, the Task Force supported a state bill introduced in the State Legislature providing for a mandatory incarceration period of two years, without suspension, probation, or parole to anyone convicted of aggravated arson. That bill reached the Louisiana Legislature in June,

1981, with the support of the State Fire Marshal and the insurance industry and was enacted into law the following month.

An additional problem area was identified involving cooperation between the Arson Squad and the insurance industry. Both entities would seemingly be interested in the same problem -detection of arson -but mechanisms for cooperative action were lacking. Thus, the Task Force prepared form letters addressed to insurance companies explaining the need for cooperation and the nature of the information needed for successful arson prosecution. Because state law limited the time an insurance investigation could be conducted and made the immunity of the insurance company questionable in criminal processing, some insurance companies had been reluctant to share information. That situation is improving, however, with the arson investigators spending more time in civil court as expert witnesses usually to support insurance companies in not paying a claim.

In the role of expert witnesses, the fire arson investigators are learning from the more experienced police investigators. Currently the Arson Squad members note what needed trial information was not on the standard report form in order to revise the form to be more inclusive.

The Squad has also developed as a team by sharing other areas of expertise. The police investigators have learned from the fire investigators about the detection of arson and investigation of the fire scene, while the fire investigators have learned from the police investigators about such things as interrogating witnesses, stake outs, and report completion.

Although great progress has been made in cooperation between the public agencies, problem areas mentioned by participants during the grant period that have not been solved include:

- The absence of a centralized location for the Arson Squad activities and records;
- The need for a computerized system with operators and analysts to fully use arson data for management, prediction, and investigation;
- Improved cooperation with the insurance industry;
- A clerk-typist for the Arson Squad to eliminate the need for the investigators to transcribe their own tapes and perform other clerical functions;
- A coordinator for the Fire Department branch of the Arson Squad devoted only to those activities;
- A written record of operating procedures and policies developed by the Arson Squad.

2. Objective 1-Training

Grant funds have provided members of the Arson Squad with some of the best training available. The following chart details what training has been received by members of the Squad.

Chart 1 Arson Training		
<u>Course Title</u>	<u>Length of Course</u>	<u>Squad Members Involved</u>
National Fire Academy	3 weeks	5 fire investigators 2 police investigators 1 fire supervisor
"	scheduled for training	1 fire investigator 2 police investigators 1 police supervisor
Arson Investigation Course (supplements the NFA course)	1 week	1 police supervisor 1 police investigator
Arson Instructors Course "	4 weeks scheduled for training	1 police investigator 1 fire investigator
Arson Investigator Course (stressing arson devices)	2 weeks	4 fire investigators 1 fire supervisor 4 police investigators 1 police supervisor
Chemistry of Fire	2 weeks	4 fire investigators 1 fire supervisor 4 police investigators 1 police supervisor
Psychological Stress Evaluator	2 weeks	2 fire investigators 1 police investigator

In addition to Squad members, 2 Fire Department Instructors in the Fire Training School attended a one week course in Arson Detection to teach all Fire Department personnel how to identify intentionally set fires. Presently, all new firemen and policemen are also

taught a short course in arson detection and investigation as part of the basic training.

3. Objective 2-Equipment

The City Council appropriated enough funds to purchase an Arson Squad van. The grant outfitted the van with cabinets and a generator. In September 1980, the van was delivered and in January 1981, the outfitting was completed. A Psychological Stress Evaluator, two 35mm. cameras, 2 polaroid cameras, and miscellaneous hand tools were also purchased with grant funds. Pocket pagers, darkroom equipment and film, a finger print kit, a plaster mold kit, liquid and dry sample kits, 2 gas sniffers, and an ultraviolet detector kit were later ordered with grant funds.

B. Statistical Description of Arson

1. Time of Fires

Table 1 demonstrates that arson fires are more likely to be set in the early hours of the morning. In 1980, 25% of the fires occurred between midnight and 4:18 am; during the first 6 months of 1981, 25% occurred between midnight and 2:46 am. In 1980, the midpoint in fire-setting coincided with midday. In 1981, the midpoint was approximately an hour earlier.

Table 2 specifies the days of the week on which arsons occurred. In 1980, 37% of the fires occurred on Wednesday or Sunday. Although fires were more evenly spread over all days of the week in 1981, over

Table 1

TIME OF DAY

<u>Measure</u>	Jan-Dec 1980	Jan-June 1981
	<u>Time</u>	<u>Time</u>
Median	12:07 PM	10:26 AM
Mean	11:57 AM	10:54 AM
25% between midnight and ...	4:18	2:46

Table 2

DAY OF WEEK

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Monday	31	15%	12	10%	43	13%
Tuesday	21	10%	17	15%	38	12%
Wednesday	39	19%	14	12%	53	17%
Thursday	31	15%	19	16%	50	16%
Friday	21	10%	16	14%	37	12%
Saturday	25	12%	18	15%	43	13%
Sunday	37	18%	21	18%	58	18%
Total	205	99%	117	100%	322	101%

the 18 month period, arsons tend to cluster at mid-week and again on Sunday.

The months in which arsons occurred also differed in 1980 and the first six months as of 1981, as show in Table 3. The major months for fires in 1980 was January and December. For the first six months of 1981, the highest percentage occurred in February. Nevertheless, during the 18 month period arson seems to peak during winter months.

2. Fire District

Table 4 reports the fire districts in which arsons occurred. In both periods, January-December 1980 and January-June 1981, more arsons occurred in the second fire district. That fire district is bounded by Tulane, Broad, Washington, and the Mississippi River. Over the 18 month period, the second district was followed in number of arsons by the third and fourth districts.

3. Property Loss

Table 5 illustrates the types of property most often destroyed in arson fires. By far, the majority of arson occurs in residences, followed by businesses and vehicles. The normal property loss in an arson fire, however, is relatively small. Table 6 reveals that the median loss was less than \$1,000 in 1980 and was less than \$1,200 in 1981. Part of the reason for this median increase might have been the investigators' attempt to more accurately estimate loss. An earlier analysis by the

Table 3
MONTH OF ARSON INVESTIGATION

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981	
	Investigations	% of Midyear	Investigations	% of Midyear
January	26			
February	18	23%	18	15%
March	18	16%	26	23%
April	18	16%	18	15%
May	15	16%	18	15%
June	17	14%	19	17%
Mid Year Total	<u>112</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>100%</u>
July	15	16%	---	
August	10	11%	---	
September	18	20%	---	
October	12	13%	---	
November	15	16%	---	
December	<u>22</u>	<u>24%</u>	---	
Mid Year Total	<u>92*</u>	<u>100%</u>	---	

*One date is missing

Table 4
FIRE DISTRICT

Districts	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
First	21	10%	12	10%	33	10%
Second	38	19%	30	26%	68	21%
Third	35	17%	13	11%	48	15%
Fourth	31	15%	15	13%	46	15%
Fifth	15	8%	11	9%	26	8%
Sixth	24	12%	8	7%	32	10%
Seventh	14	7%	13	11%	27	9%
Eighth	15	8%	10	9%	25	8%
Ninth	8	4%	5	4%	13	4%
Total	201*	100%	117	100%	318	100%

*4 Missing districts

Table 5

TYPE OF PROPERTY

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Residence	113	56%	59	52%	172	55%
Business	35	17%	23	20%	58	18%
Residence & Business	12	6%	5	4%	17	5%
Vehicle	25	12%	9	8%	34	11%
Institution	12	6%	14	12%	26	8%
Residential Vehicle	1	1%	1	1%	2	1%
Garage & Storage	3	2%	2	2%	5	2%
Land	0	0%	1	1%	1	0%
Total	201*	100%	114**	100%	315	100%

*4 missing
**3 missing

Table 6

ESTIMATED LOSS

	Jan-Dec 1980	Jan-June 1981
Median	\$ 940.00	\$ 1,200.00
Mean	\$9,869.24	\$13,457.78
% Less than \$500	46%	39%

Task Force showed that the investigator's estimates were as much as two to three times below what it actually cost to rebuild some of the property.

4. Injuries

In 1980, the 205 arson fires resulted in eight injuries and four deaths. In the first half of 1981, only one death and no injuries has occurred.

5. Method of Setting

Most detected arsonists were relatively unsophisticated fire-setters. According to the Arson Tracking Sheets, an arson may be set with a bomb or device such as Molotov cocktail; with an accelerant such as gasoline or kerosene poured on the surroundings; by lighting some object found on the site such as furniture, drapes, paper, or trash; or by a match or lighter without specifying what was lit. Table 7 shows that almost two-thirds of the detected arsons fell into the last two categories. Further, as indicated in Table 8, almost three-fourths of the arsonists set fire to only one point within a structure.

6. Motive

The motive of most New Orleans arsonists who were detected appears to be either revenge or the excitement in seeing something destroyed. Very few arsons for profit were detected, but a number of fires were set hoping to destroy the evidence of another crime. Table 9 shows the investigator's definitions of motive in arson fires.

Table 7
METHOD OF FIRE-SETTING

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Device/Bomb	16	8%	7	6%	23	7%
Accelerant	53	26%	31	27%	84	26%
Common Object	69	34%	49	42%	118	37%
Match/Lighter	56	27%	27	23%	83	26%
Unknown	11	5%	3	3%	14	4%
Total	205	100%	117	101%	322	100%

Table 8
NUMBER OF POINTS OF ORIGIN

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980 - June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
One Point	150	73%	86	74%	236	73%
More than One Point	55	27%	31	26%	86	27%
Total	205	100%	117	100%	322	100%

Table 9

MOTIVE

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980- June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Revenge	79	38%	50	43%	129	40%
Vandalism	63	31%	38	33%	101	31%
Profit	5	2%	2	2%	7	2%
Cover Other Crime	22	11%	3	3%	25	8%
Emotional Disturbance	6	3%	4	3%	10	3%
Pyromania	2	1%	1	1%	3	1%
Other	2	1%	1	1%	3	1%
Unknown	<u>26</u>	<u>13%</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>14%</u>
Total	205	100%	117	101%	322	100%

7. Arson Teams

The final descriptive table (Table 10) shows the mix of Fire and Police Department personnel who investigated arson as listed on the Arson Tracking Form. Whereas over 92% of the forms in 1980 had a single fire investigator listed, only 60% also listed a single police investigator. In 5% of the cases, two fire investigators worked together often as a form of on-the-job training for the inexperienced investigator. Nevertheless, 3% of the forms listed no fire investigator and 40%, no police investigator. In 98% of the cases in 1981, however, a single fire investigator is shown, while a single police investigator is shown in 73% of the cases. The ideal of one fire and one police investigator on each case showed some improvement, but is still not evident in over one-fourth of the cases.

C. Quantitative Goal Attainment

1. Goal 1-Reduction of Arson Incidents and Dollar Loss

Because little arson data were maintained before 1980, it is impossible to accurately assess this goal. However, a series of suppositions leads to a possible indicator of the incidence of arson. It has been suggested that arson fires are more difficult to control than ordinary fires because the arsonist wants as much destruction as possible to occur before the fire becomes visible. Thus, it is hypothesized that more than one engine is often needed to control an arson fire. The Fire Department refers to the number of engines needed as the number of exhibiting alarms. This hypothesis would

Table 10
ARSON TEAM INVESTIGATORS

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980- June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Single Fire Investigator	188	92%	115	98%	303	94%
Two Fire Investigators	11	5%	2	2%	13	4%
No Fire Investigators	6	3%	0	0%	6	2%
Single Police Investigator	122	60%	86	74%	208	65%
Two Police Investigators	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
No Police Investigator	83	40%	31	27%	114	35%

suggest that a decrease in arson incidents would be reflected in a decrease in multiple exhibiting alarms. As Table 11 shows, the number of multiple exhibiting alarms decreased from 1979 to 1980, but since so few years of data are available, any conclusions to be drawn can only be tentative.

Another possible indicator of the incidence of arson is the total number of suspicious fires. As Table 12 shows, this number has been decreasing steadily since 1977; and, thus, any decrease cannot be attributed to the recent arson program. Nevertheless, the decrease from 1979 to 1980 shows the largest percentage decrease over that period.

2. Goal 3-Increase in the Number of Arson Investigations

The number of arson investigations before the formation of the Task Force varied from year to year. It cannot be determined, therefore, to what extent investigations increased in 1980. The reporting procedure should have stabilized when the arson reduction program was initiated. The number of arson investigations in the first six months of 1981 do show a 4½% increase over the same period in 1980. (see Table 3.)

3. Goal 4-Increase in the Arrests and Convictions of Arsonists

Because systematic records were not kept on arson cases before the grant period, the extent to which this goal was met cannot be assessed. In 1978, the last full year before Task Force involvement, 44 arson arrests were made. Of these 44 arrests, only 4 cases were accepted by the District Attorney. Three of these cases resulted in convictions, but in

Table 11
EXHIBITING ALARMS
1979 & 1980

	One Alarm	Two Alarms	Three & More Alarms	All Multiple Alarms	Total
1979	867	31	20	51	918
1980	873	22	18	40	913
% change	+1%	-29%	-10%	-22%	-1%

Table 12
SUSPICIOUS FIRES INVESTIGATED FOR POSSIBLE ARSON

Year	N	% Change
1977	742	-6.6%
1978	693	-15.0%
1979	589	-35.0%
1980	383	

Table 13
ARSON INVESTIGATIONS BY YEAR

<u>Year</u>	<u>N</u>
1976	135
1977	206
1978	101
1979	--*
1980	205
1981 (6 Mos.)	117

*Information not available for 1979

no case was the defendant incarcerated. As Table 14 shows, the number arrested has remained consistent since that time; however, the number of accepted cases, the number of convictions, and the number of incarcerations has increased.

A charge may be changed at many points in the arrest and prosecution process. Of course, all cases submitted by the Squad include, at a minimum, a simple or aggravated arson charge. The District Attorney, however, may decide not to accept the arson charge and to prosecute for another offense. For example, a charge of simple arson might be changed to criminal damage or one of aggravated arson may be prosecuted as an assault or homicide. Even after the case goes to trial, the charges may again be altered when the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge or only one of a series of charges. Table 15 displays the charges first accepted by the District Attorney.* While it is apparent that the Arson Squad has been making more use of the simple arson charge in the first half of 1981, none of these were municipal charges using the new city ordinance.

All of these charges were not accepted by the District Attorney (Table 16). They may have been refused for several reasons. In 1980, most refusals were because the victim either failed to press charges or to give testi-

*This may differ either from that first presented by arresting officers or from the charge on which the defendant is finally prosecuted.

Table 14
NEW ORLEANS ARSON STATISTICS 1980 & 1981

Category	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	% of Total	N	% of Total	N	% of Total
<u>Total Confirmed Cases</u>	205	100.0%	117	100.0%	322	100.0%
<u>Arrests</u>	46*	22.4%	24	20.5%	70	21.7%
Not Accepted	18		6		24	
Pending Acceptance	2		0		2	
Accepted	26		18		44	
<u>Accepted Cases</u>	26	12.7%	18	15.4%	44	13.7%
Pending Trial	12		8		20	
Institutionalized**	1		2		3	
Found not guilty	1		0		1	
Pled or found guilty	12		8		20	
<u>Completed Trials</u>	14	6.8%	10	8.5%	24	7.5%
Not guilty	1		0		1	
Insane, institutionalized	1		2		3**	
Pled or found guilty	12		8		20	
<u>Total Guilties</u>	12	5.9%	8	6.8%	20	6.2%
Incarcerations	4	2.0%	4***	3.4%	8	2.5%
<u>Guilty of Arson</u>	7	3.4%	6	5.1%	13	4.0%
Incarcerations	1	0.5%	4	3.4%	5	1.6%
<u>Guilty of Related Offense</u>	5	2.4%	2	1.7%	7	2.2%
Incarceration	3	1.5%	0	0%	3	0.9%

*2 additional suspects were picked up: one was taken to Charity Hospital; one case was handled by the FBI.

**These three defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity and institutionalized.

***One of these defendants was sentenced to Helis House.

Table 15
 CHARGES IN ARSON CASES

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>State Charges</u>						
Simple Arson	3	6%	7	29%	10	14%
Simple Arson & Others	5	11%	1	4%	6	8%
Aggravated Arson	29	61%	10	42%	39	54%
Aggravated Arson & Others	3	6%	2	8%	5	7%
Arson dropped, other charges	4	8%	4	17%	8	11%
<u>Other Charges</u>						
Other Municipal Charges	1	2%	0	--	1	1%
Federal Charges	1	2%	0	--	1	1%
Unknown*	2	4%	0	--	2	3%
Total	48	100%	24	100%	72	99%

*One of these cases was taken over by the FBI, one defendant was taken to Charity Hospital.

Table 16
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S REASONS FOR REFUSAL

	Jan-Dec 1980		Jan-June 1981		Jan 1980-June 1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Victim Problems	7	39%	0	--	7	29%
Insufficient Evidence	4	22%	5	83%	9	38%
Committed	2	11%	1	17%	3	13%
Unknown	5	28%	0	--	5	21%
Total	18	100%	6	100%	24	100%

mony against the defendant. This situation often occurred when the victim and defendant were related or were living together.

In 1981 the most frequent reason for refusal was a lack of evidence.

In three cases, the charges were refused because the defendant was committed to a mental institution. In such cases, although not actually a conviction, an arsonist was treated and possibly prevented from repeating his or her crime.

Table 14 further indicates that although a smaller proportion of cases resulted in arrest in 1981 than in 1980, a slightly greater proportion of cases were accepted for prosecution. Not only were more cases accepted, but more were also completed, found or pled guilty, and incarcerated. The investigators are apparently becoming more sophisticated as the judicial system becomes more aware of the seriousness of arson.

Tables 17 and 18 display the final disposition of arson charges in 1980 and 1981. Based on this limited data, a comparison of the tables reveals the decreased number of suspended sentences for arson and the increased similarity in sentences given for arson and other offenses. In spite of efforts to coordinate investigations, also evident, however, was the continued failure of the district police to notify the Arson Squad whenever an arrest for arson was made.

Table 17
FINAL DISPOSITION OF ARSON CASES - JAN-DEC 1980**

Initial charges include
arson; arson dropped;
prosecuted on other
offense

Record Source	Other	Refusal	Pending Trial	Not Guilty	Agg. Arson-GAC	Simple Arson-GAC	
Arson Squad and District Attorney		12 4 victim 1 in evid. 2 committed by Coroner 5 Unknown	8	1	6 Institutionalized Susp-prob. Susp-prob. \$200 rest. Susp-prob. \$300 rest Susp.-prob. \$500 rest. Susp-prob. but 3 yrs. PP*	1 Susp. - inactive prob.	5 Att. Murder: Susp-prob. Interfering w/fire and police: 1 mo. PP, fine Assault, damage, etc: prob. \$400 rest, fine Burglary: 5 yrs. LSP Manslaughter: PSI
Only* D.A. (probably district arrests)		3	4	0	1 Susp-prob. rest.		1 Criminal Damage: Susp-prob. -fine
Only Arson records	3 2 pending acceptance 1 not arrested- taken to CHNO	6 3 victim 3 in. evid.	3 (1 probably combined with earlier offense)				1 Federal interstate travel to commit arson: 2 1/2 yrs. FP.

1 cont'd with
FBI

*Because of record source, it is unclear whether these are arrested suspects or incidents cleared.

**Key with Table 18.

Table 18
FINAL DISPOSITION OF ARSON CASES JAN-JUNE 1981

Initial charges include
arson; arson dropped;
prosecuted on other
offense

Record Source	Other	Refusal	Pending Trial	Not Guilty	Agg. Arson-GAC	Sim. Arson-GAC	
Arson Squad & District Attorney		6 5 in. evid. 1 Committed	8	2 2 NG Insane, institutiona- lized	3 3 Yrs. PP Sentence deferred 2 Yrs. Hells House	3 2 yrs. DOC 1 yr. PP PSI	2 Criminal damage: Susp. inactive prolation Theft: pending sentence
Only D.A.* (probably dist- rict arrest)		2	6				Key Reasons for refusal victim: victim fails to cooperate in evid.: insufficient evidence
							General Disposition GAC-guilty as charged NG: not guilty SUSP: Suspended Sentence PROB: probation REST: restitution P.P. parish prison LSP: Louisiana St. Prison FP: federal prison PSI: presentence investi- gation DOC: Dept. of Corrections CHNO: Charity Hospital

*Because of record source, it is unclear whether these are arrested suspects or incidents cleared.
**In 1981, the arson squad had no records of cases that the DA did not also have.

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To determine what types of fires were most often successfully prosecuted, additional analyses were required. Table 19 crosstables the method of fire setting by the final status of the case. Of any method type, the indistinct class of "by match or lighter" had a slightly larger percentage of cases not arrested. The largest percentage by class of cases not accepted, however, was the "device" fires. Of any class, a somewhat larger percentage of "accelerant" cases were accepted by the District Attorney for prosecution.

As Table 20 shows, vandalism fires resulted in a smaller percentage of arrests per class than any other motive category; however, revenge fires showed the greatest percentage of refusals. On the other hand, the majority of fires motivated by either pyromania or other emotional disturbance were more often accepted for prosecution than other motive categories.

The property loss in dollars by final status of the case is provided in Table 21. In part trends are less evident in this table because of the investigators' imprecise estimates of loss. Nevertheless, it is clear that arrests were not made often in large destructive fires of over \$100,000 or in fires of \$10,000 or less. By percentage of class, the most often refused class was that of \$50,000 to \$100,000. In absolute numbers, however, arrests made in the very small fires of \$50 or less were the most often refused. The most often prosecuted fires both by percentage of class and in absolute numbers, were

Table 19
METHOD BY STATUS OF CASE

Status of Case	Device	Accelerant	Common Object	Match/Lighter	Total
Not Arrested	17 (74%)	64 (76%)	90 (76%)	67 (81%)	238 (77%)
Not Accepted	3 (13%)	6 (7%)	11 (9%)	5 (6%)	25 (8%)
Pending	0	0	0	1	2
Refused	3	6	10	4	23
Accepted	3 (13%)	14 (17%)	17 (14%)	11 (13%)	45 (15%)
Pending Trial	1	7	10	1	19
Pending Sentence	0	3	0	1	4
Completed Trial	1	4	5	7	17
Other jurisdiction	1	0	0	0	1
Institutionalized	0	0	2	2	4
Total	23 (100%)	84 (100%)	118 (99%)	83 (100%)	308*(100%)

*14 missing on method

Table 20

MOTIVE BY STATUS OF CASE

Status of Case	Revenge	Vandalism	Profit	Cover Other Crime	Emotional Disturbance	Pyromania	Other	Total
Not Arrested	86 (67%)	95 (95%)	4 (57%)	22 (88%)	3 (30%)	1 (33%)	2 (50%)	214 (77%)
Not Accepted	20 (16%)	1 (1%)	1 (14%)	1 (4%)	1 (10%)	0 (--)	0 (--)	24 (9%)
Pending	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Refused	20	0	1	1	1	0	0	23
Accepted	23 (18%)	4 (4%)	2 (29%)	2 (8%)	6 (60%)	2 (67%)	2 (50%)	41 (15%)
Pending Trial	13	1	0	1	3	0	1	19
Pending Sentence	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	4
Completed Trial	7	3	1	1	0	1	1	14
Other jurisdiction	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Institutionalized	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
Total	129 (100%)	100 (100%)	7 (100%)	25 (100%)	10 (100%)	3 (100%)	4 (100%)	279* (101%)

*43 missing on motive.

TABLE 21

ESTIMATED VALUE OF PROPERTY LOSS BY STATUS OF CASE

Status of Case	Less than \$50	\$ 50 to \$100	\$100 to \$500	\$ 500 to \$1000	\$1000 to \$5000	\$5000 to \$10000	\$10000 to \$50000	\$50000 to \$100000	More than \$100000	Total
Not Arrested	43 (73%)	19 (83%)	47 (84%)	19 (83%)	56 (78%)	24 (83%)	30 (70%)	4 (50%)	6 (86%)	248 (78%)
Not Accepted										
Pending	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Refused	6	2	3	2	4	3	1	2	0	23
Subtotal	7 (12%)	2 (9%)	3 (5%)	2 (9%)	5 (7%)	3 (10%)	1 (2%)	2 (25%)	0 (-)	25 (8%)
Accepted										
Pending Trial	0	1	5	2	6	2	3	1	0	20
Pending Sentence	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	5
Completed Trial	7	0	1	0	4	0	5	0	0	17
Other Jurisdiction	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Institutionalized	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
Subtotal	9 (15%)	2 (9%)	6 (11%)	2 (9%)	11 (15%)	2 (7%)	12 (28%)	2 (25%)	1 (14%)	47 (15%)
Total	59 (100%)	23 (101%)	56 (100%)	23 (101%)	72 (100%)	29 (100%)	43 (100%)	8 (100%)	7 (100%)	320 (101%)

those in the \$10,000 to \$50,000 range.

Final analyses were done by charge on the status of the case and the District Attorney's reasons for refusal. As Table 22 demonstrates, in terms of number of cases, aggravated arson charges were the least often accepted.

Table 23 offers an explanation for these findings. Apparently, aggravated arson was often refused for lack of victim cooperation, while only one simple arson case was refused on those grounds. This was interesting in view of the fact that in aggravated arson the victim's life was at stake in addition to property. Insufficient evidence made up the bulk of other reasons for refusal of aggravated and simple arson cases.

Table 22
CHARGE BY STATUS OF CASE

Status of Case	Simple Arson	Simple Arson +	Aggravated Arson	Aggravated Arson +	Municipal Charge	Federal Charge	Other State Charge	Total
Not Accepted								
Pending	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Refused	4	1	15	2	1	0	0	23
Subtotal	4 (40%)	2 (33%)	16 (41%)	2 (40%)	1 (100%)	0 (-)	0 (-)	25 (36%)
Accepted								
Pending Trial	3	2	12	1	0	0	2	20
Pending Sentence	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	5
Completed Trial	1	2	7	2	0	1	4	17
Institutionalized	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	3
Subtotal	6 (60%)	4 (67%)	23 (59%)	3 (60%)	0 (-)	1 (100%)	8 (100%)	45 (64%)
Total	10 (100%)	6 (100%)	39 (100%)	5 (100%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	8 (100%)	70 (100%)

2 missing estimates of loss.

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Table 23
CHARGE BY REASON FOR REFUSAL

	Simple Arson	Simple Arson +	Aggravated Arson	Aggravated Arson +	Municipal Charge	Federal Charge	Other State Charge	Total
Victim Problems	0 (-)	1 (100%)	5 (45%)	0 (-)	1 (100%)	0 (-)	0 (-)	7 (37%)
Insufficient Evidence	3 (75%)	0 (-)	4 (36%)	2 (100%)	0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)	9 (47%)
Committed by Coroner	1 (25%)	0 (-)	2 (18%)	0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)	3 (16%)
Total	4 (100%)	1 (100%)	11 (99%)	2 (100%)	1 (100%)	0 (-)	0 (-)	19 (100%)

COST

Table 24 reports total funds available* to the Arson Reduction Program through June 30, 1981. Because all purchases have not been finalized, this represents a close approximation of total costs. Dividing the cost of \$21,144.00 by the 322 investigations costs out at \$65.66 per investigation.

*Includes allocated funds for training and equipment that have not yet been expended.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL
 1000 HOWARD AVENUE, SUITE 1200
 NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70113

Table 24

Grant Title: Arson Reduction Program
 Grant Number: 80-C9-7.1-0001
 Period Covered: 1/1/80 - 6/30/81

Date Report
 Prepared: 8/26/81

Item	TOTAL GRANT FUNDS			LEAA CASH ONLY		
	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance
Personnel						
Fringe						
Travel	6,186.00	6,186.00	0	4,072.00	4,072.00	0
Equipment	13,036.00	13,036.00	0	13,036.00	13,036.00	0
Supplies						
Contractual						
Construction						
Other Direct	961.00	961.00	0	961.00	961.00	0
Indirect	961.00	961.00	0	961.00	961.00	0
TOTAL	21,144.00	21,144.00	0	19,030.00	19,030.00	0

Note: Total grant funds includes both LEAA cash and City in-kind match
 Expenditures include encumbrances.

Report based on unaudited amount. Project has until 9/30/81 to liquidate encumbrances.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The arson reduction effort in New Orleans required major changes both within public agencies and in the way those agencies related to each other. Besides purchasing grant-funded training and equipment, it involved appointing a Task Force to oversee the effort; establishing routine channels of cooperation between the Fire Department, Police Department, and the court systems; forming an Arson Squad with investigators from two different public agencies, the Fire Department and the Police Department; developing a record-keeping system; and, communicating the arson problem to the public.

At this time the Task Force has operated for almost two years and directed successful realignments and cooperative efforts in a number of areas. In particular, Goal 2 of the grant called for improved cooperation between the Fire Department, Police Department, and District Attorney's Office. An Arson Squad was formed in January 1980, composed of investigators from the Police Arson and Bomb Squad and the Fire Prevention Division. As a result, Police and Fire Investigators now work together in teams and meet weekly to review cases. Together, they have overcome communication problems, developed a record-keeping system, and shared areas of expertise. Further, an Assistant District Attorney has been appointed to work directly with the Squad to improve the quality of prosecutable cases.

In accordance with Objective 1, all members of the Arson Squad have either already been trained or are scheduled for training at the National Fire Academy. Most of them have also received supplementary training in fire chemistry and arson devices. One member of the Police Arson Squad has been trained as a certified arson instructor and a member of the Fire Arson Squad is scheduled for the same training. Both Police and Fire Investigators have been trained in the use of the Psychological Stress Evaluator. In fact, more training than was anticipated has been achieved and at a lower cost. The equipment items identified in Objective 2 were also purchased, including cabinets and a generator for the van, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and tools and kits to obtain evidence.

Because of inadequate arson data from earlier years, Goals 1, 3, and 4 were harder to assess. Goal 3 stated that arson investigations would be increased. Investigations during the first six months of 1981 have increased over that same period in 1980, but because accurate investigation data was not available from earlier years it is difficult to state with certainty whether this represents an increase over the pre-grant period.

Likewise, Goal 4 called for increased arrests and convictions of arsonists. Although only a small increase in arrests has occurred since the program became operational, more frequent convictions did result. In addition, more arsonists were incarcerated. These changes were especially evident when the first six months of 1981 were compared

to 1980.

Reducing the incidence and dollar loss due to arson as specified in Goal 1 was impossible to measure directly. Decreases in multiple exhibiting alarm fires and in suspicious fires suggested a decrease in arson, but because so little data were available, it was difficult to determine to what extent this decrease was part of an already established trend.

In general, however, over the 18 months of program operations the Squad showed tremendous advancements in cooperation, was solidly trained, obtained much needed equipment, and increased the likelihood that New Orleans arsonists will be arrested and convicted. As Squad members become more experienced and routine records are kept, further increases in convictions and decreases in arson incidents may result.

While many goals and objectives have been accomplished, other areas for improvement can be identified. Therefore, the following recommendations are offered:

1. More efficient operations would probably result from locating the Police and Fire Department branches of the Arson Squad in one location under a single supervisor. Current political realities, however, make implementation of this recommendation difficult.


As an alternative, centralized record keeping might be improved to assure that both branches have available identical information on each case.

2. A clerk typist should be hired as clerical support for the Arson Squad to leave investigators free for field work. Currently, Squad members transcribe all their own tapes, prepare all reports, etc.
3. To speed investigations and improve management, an on-line computer system should be developed. Such a system could enhance arson control and prediction.
4. After 18 months of operation, the Squad should begin to develop a written manual of policies and procedures.
5. Improved cooperation with insurance companies should be accomplished through seminars or informational packets that detail limits of liability and the beneficial aspects of cooperation.
6. As a matter of routine, District police must refer all arson cases to the Arson Squad for handling. Reliable information about arson and consistent handling of cases are impossible without such a centralized procedure for investigation.
7. Since the city now has a municipal ordinance against simple arson, liaison needs to be made with the City Attorney at Municipal Court to insure that arson case information is shared.

APPENDIX A

Arson Tracking Sheet

ARSON INVESTIGATION REPORTING AND TRACKING



I. CASE OF SUSPECTED ARSON:

- Incident Number:
- Police Item Number:
- Priority Category:
- Address:
- Date:
- Time of day/day of week:
- Weather Conditions:
- Fire District:
- Police District:
- FDZ:
- Census Tract:
- Type of Property:
- Point (s) of Origin:
- Method of Starting Fire:
- Estimated Value: Structure/ Contents:
- Insured Value: Structure/ Contents:
- Estimated Loss: Structure/ Contents:
- Insurance Company:
- Insurance Adjuster:
- Injuries/ Fatalities
- Arson Investigator(s) (Fire/Police):
- Witness(es):
- Suspect (s):
- Probable Motive:

Owner:
Date Closed or inactive:

II. ARSON CASES LEADING TO ARREST:

Charge(s):
Date of Arrest:
Arresting Officer(s):
Motive:
Assistant District Attorney:
Date ADA Consulted:
If Case Refused: Reason Why _____
If Accepted, Date of Arraignment:
Plea:

III. ARSON CASES LEADING TO PROSECUTIONS:

Defendant(s):
Witness(es):
Testifying Investigator(s):
Prosecuting Attorney:
Defense Attorney:
Section of Court/ Judge:
Date of Trial:
Plea:
Verdict:
Sentence:
Date of Sentence:

APPENDIX B
Incident Report Form

DATE	FIRE PREVENTION DIVISION NEW ORLEANS FIRE DEPARTMENT CONTINUATION		INCIDENT NO.
PAGE _____ OF _____			LOCATION OF OCCURANCE
TYPE BUILDING		NO. OF STORIES	BUILDING CONDITION
TYPE OCCUPANCY		NAME OF BUSINESS	
DESCRIPTION OF BUILDING:			
FIRST FIRE CO. ON SCENE		OFFICER IN CHARGE	
OBSERVATIONS OF FIRE FIGHTERS:			
FORCIBLE ENTRY PRIOR TO FIRE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO ALARM SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
TYPE OF ALARM SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> FIRE <input type="checkbox"/> BURGULAR ALARM SYSTEM WORKING <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
EVIDENCE FOUND:			
EVIDENCE FOUND BY		TIME	DATE
WITNESSED BY			
DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE			
CRIME LAB TECH.		UNIT NUMBER	
NUMBER OF PHOTOS		PHOTOGRAPHER	
ELECTRIC SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> ON <input type="checkbox"/> OFF		GAS SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> ON <input type="checkbox"/> OFF	
ACTIVITIES OF LAST PERSON ON PREMISES			
POINT OF ORIGIN			
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR			
PROBABLE SOURCE OF IGNITION			
PROBABLE CAUSE			
INVESTIGATOR		INVESTIGATOR	ITEM NO.

SEQ.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION
INVESTIGATOR		INVESTIGATOR
		ITEM NO.

APPENDIX C

Assessment of Arson Task Force
by Federal Emergency Management Agency



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington D.C. 20472

July 8, 1981

William J. McCrossen
Superintendent of Fire
New Orleans Fire Department
317 Decatur Street
New Orleans, LA 70130

Dear Superintendent McCrossen:

On July 23rd and 24th, 1981, Charles Radford, Coordinator, San Francisco Arson Task Force and I conducted an assessment of the New Orleans Arson Task Force at the request of the City. The assessment was conducted as part of the continuing assistance being provided to the City of New Orleans by the Arson Assistance Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The objectives of the assessment were to identify the increased capacities of the City for effective arson prevention and control realized from the efforts of the Arson Task Force.

Before presenting the results of the assessment, it is important to restate the major constraints to which an assessment of municipal arson prevention and control capacities must adhere to be of value. Quantitative comparative analyses of cities have little or no value due to the following factors:

- o Municipalities do not have commonalities of characteristics or profiles; local economies, sociological structures, infra-structures and demographics differ dramactically.
- o Data collection capabilities have considerable variances among municipalities (a well trained fire department has an increased capability for data collection as compared to the untrained department).
- o Data definitions frequently are incompatible with no common meaning existing (arrest, clearance and referral rates are utilized interchangeably without discretion).

Therefore an assessment to have value to the locality must assess the present capacities for arson prevention and control as compared to its previous capacities. From the findings of that assessment an expert in anti-arson programming may provide a qualitative comparlson to other city's programs. Again the comparative analysis among cities will be of less value then the identification of local capacities.

Enclosed you will find the results of the assessment of the arson prevention and control capacities of the City of New Orleans. In brief, the assessment has found those capacities to have been greatly increased as a result of the efforts of the New Orleans Arson Task Force. On behalf of the Arson Assistance Program of the FEMA, I am extending a well done to all persons involved.

Sincerely yours,

John W. Lynch

John W. Lynch
Director
Arson Assistance Programs
Office of Planning and Education
U.S. Fire Administration

ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE NEW ORLEANS ARSON TASK FORCE
June 24, 1981

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The City of New Orleans has established one of the most effective local arson task forces in the country today. The Task Force is divided into four sub-committees (Public Education - Coordination of Systems - Operational Preparedness - Arson Information) each of which has the responsibilities for program development and control for programs of their specific area. Excellent documentation exists of the program activities of the Task Force as a whole and the individual committees in the minutes of the Task Force's meetings.

The Task Force has developed its greatest anti-arson capacities in the area of Public Education, Coordination of Systems and Operational Preparedness. Its greatest weaknesses are in the area of Arson Information Programs.

DISCUSSION

On August 20, 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), United States Fire Administration (USFA), Arson Assistance Program conducted an assessment of the capabilities of the City of New Orleans for arson prevention and control. At that time it was determined that while arson/incendiary fires were a major problem New Orleans had no effective anti-arson programs. While this problem accounted for 63.7% of the major fire losses in 1978 for a total of \$3,772,225 no structured programs to address the problem existed.

Arson/fire investigation was conducted on an ad hoc basis with no specifically earmarked resources committed. Interaction among the fire, police and prosecutorial agencies were none existent. Training for fire investigation consisted of attending one day seminars and other nonstructured programs. Any individual in Fire Prevention may have conducted the investigation of a fire based upon their availability.

There existed at that time no Public Education or Arson Awareness Program in that City. There was no private sector involvement and the only public agency with any response was the fire department.

At the request of Superintendent of Fire, William J. McCrossen, through a series of meetings conducted that week, technical assistance was provided in developing the New Orleans Arson Task Force. Attending those meetings with USFA staff were representatives of the New Orleans Fire Department, Criminal Justice Planning Commission, Chamber of Commerce, New Orleans Merchants Association, Insurance Association of New Orleans and the Prosecutor's Office. The formal New Orleans Arson Task Force was implemented by Mayor Morial and Superintendent McCrossen in September 1979.

The remaining discussion presents the findings of assessing the Task Force's work 21 months after its implementation.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The following programs have been successfully implemented by the Task Force:

- o Arson Hot Line - an award program for citizens providing information leading to arrest and conviction. Program has provided information which aided in convictions. It is funded by the Property Insurance Association of Louisiana at \$7,000 (\$5,000 in award fund and \$70 per month equipment).
- o Name the Arson Rat - 1,400 entries received in contest for school children to name the New Orleans Arson Rat. Commercial Union Insurance provided \$1,000 operational funds and Krausser Company donated two bicycles as prizes.
- o Arson Speakers Bureau - developed program to provide business and community group meetings with knowledgeable speakers on arson. Also developed speakers package with prepared presentation.
- o Task Force Stationary - Independent Insuror's Association of New Orleans developed Arson Task Force Stationary
- o Public Service Announcements (PSAs) - Local television station has developed a series of TV PSAs; task force frequently appear on local media shows
- o Anti-arson Posters - 500 anti-arson posters obtained from the Hartford Insurance Company distributed throughout the City.
- o Arson Box Score - regular feature in local newspaper providing public awareness to the local arson problem.

It is inconceivable that one could live in New Orleans and have not been exposed to the Arson Public Education and Awareness Program. A conservative estimate of the value of resources leveraged to date (including local media time) would be in the area of \$75,000.

OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

The level of training received by local investigators in the City of New Orleans is among the most advanced and complete in the country. All investigators (police and fire) have received 40 hours training in the Chemistry of fire, will shortly complete 120 hours training in basic fire investigation, 80 hours training in investigation of explosive devices and 40 hours advanced training in Arson for Profit Investigation. Three investigators from the New Orleans Fire Department

have received police training and the remaining two are being scheduled for that training. Each investigator of the City of New Orleans has received over 300 hours training in arson/fire investigation. Estimated value of training per individual is \$3,600 which was received at a maximum cost of \$256 per individual.

New Orleans has established an Arson Strike Force through which the New Orleans Fire and Police Departments cooperate with the Prosecutor's Office in conducting arson investigations. The Fire and Police Departments each have one supervisor and four investigators assigned to the Strike Force. Cooperation appears to be very high and improving.

Arson detection and awareness training has been incorporated in rookie training programs of the police and fire departments. In addition the fire department is providing 40 hours training in arson detection to all its supervisors. This will greatly enhance the City's capacities for identification of the arson fire. It should be anticipated that this increased capability will result in an increase in the reported number of arson/incendiary fires.

SYSTEMS COORDINATION

The New Orleans Arson Task Force has established an enviable track record in the development of coordinated programs. Considering that in 1979 not a single coordinated arson program could be identified, justifiable pride can be taken of the progress realized in this area. Coordinated programs have been developed and implemented in each of the major initiative areas.

The Public Education Program demonstrates close coordination and support between the private and public sectors. All program initiatives in this area are joint ventures undertaken with the involvement of many organizations and agencies. The Name the Arson Rat contest perhaps best exemplifies this coordination. For this program to be successful it required the support and commitments from the police and fire departments, insurance industry, Board of Education, private sector, media and citizens of New Orleans.

The Arson Strike Force type of operation of police, fire and prosecutorial agencies conducting cooperative investigations represents a tremendous advancement in coordination of Operational Preparedness. Further coordination in this area is fostered by the pooling of resources and sharing of information among the Strike Force Agencies. There also appears to be limited progress being realized in coordinating criminal investigations with the civil investigations of the insurance industry.

In the area of Arson Information, the cooperation of the New Orleans Criminal Justice Council in developing a centralized arson data base represents a strong increase in capabilities in this area. The utilization of the Case Management System of the New Orleans Police and Fire Investigators will serve well to increase coordination in this area.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Arson Information

There exists in the City of New Orleans an excellent potential for the development of an effective arson information management system. This potential has been created as the result of earlier efforts of the Task Force in this area. At this point in time it is most appropriate that the City utilize this potential in the most effective manner. The problem most frequently cited of lack of insurance industry cooperation in information sharing does not appear to be insurmountable. The correct approach to this problem is one of education and motivation.

RECOMMENDATION

The following are recommendations for future actions and activities for the New Orleans Arson Task Force which have been formulated as a result of the assessment.

Public Education

Given the present level and sophistication of the programs in this area it is recommended that future programs be targeted to specific problems identified, specific areas and populations. Present programming, which reaches the broad population of the City, should also be continued. The Speaker's Bureau should be provided an increased structure and materials developed which are targeted for the specific audiences addressed identifying their stake and role in combatting arson. Development of an Arson Rat poster contest will provide that program with a second life year. Community based and supported programs in arson public education and awareness should be developed to involve the grassroots in the arson programs.

Operational Preparedness and Coordination of Systems

Both of these areas will be improved by development of a program design/standard operations procedure manual for fire/arson investigation. There exists a real need for institutionalization of the Strike Force Operations by clearly defining roles, responsibilities and jurisdictional boundaries of the agencies involved. It is also recommended that the coordination of the Arson Strike Force be improved by placing the police and fire components in a single workplace. The present physical separation of those units hinders effective communication and control. It is strongly recommended that New Orleans Fire Department investigators receive police firearms training and certification to avoid possible future problems.

In the area of insurance sharing of information, it is recommended that the realization of this objective be accelerated through joint Task Force and industry educational programs. A one day conference for industry personnel sponsored jointly by the Task Force and insurance industry would do much to increase cooperation in this area.

As to the efforts of the Task Force to increase judiciary awareness to the nature and character of the crime of arson, a presentation by a Task Force member to this group should prove effective. It is also recommended that present communication links established be utilized to involve the judiciary in the anti-arson programs. In the area of public education this forementioned approach may be most effective (e.g. providing the judiciary with materials for presentations on arson and utilizing them in the Speaker's Bureau Program.

Arson Information

The City of New Orleans has developed an increased potential in this area; unfortunately to date, it has been unable to fully capitalize this potential. The FEMA/USFA Arson Assistance Program will provide technical assistance in the near future. An effective Arson Information Management System (AIMS) will provide the City with an increased capability to effectively utilize the existing fire incident reporting system, Criminal Justice Information System and the PROMIS program of the Prosecutor's office.

CONCLUSION

The City of New Orleans has been served well by its Arson Task Force. The Arson Task Force has increased the City's capacities for arson prevention and control and has documented well its activities. In comparison to where the City's anti-arson programs were in 1979 to the progress made to date there exists no question of the Arson Task Forces effectiveness. The ability of the Arson Task Force to stimulate support and leverage resources for its programs is a tribute to the level of commitment of those involved. The New Orleans Arson Task Force is a model of a local commitment to effectively combat arson that other communities could profit by following.

APPENDIX D
Municipal Ordinance
Against Simple Arson

ORDINANCE
(AS AMENDED)
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

CITY HALL: October 30, 1980
CALENDAR NO. 9524

NO. 7857 MAYOR COUNCIL SERIES

BY: COUNCILMAN GIARRUSSO (BY REQUEST)

AN ORDINANCE to amend Chapter 42 of Ordinance No. 828 M.C.S., as amended, known as the Code of the City of New Orleans, by adding thereto a new section, to be known as Section 42-30.1, relative to the crime of simple arson, to provide a definition of simple arson and the penalty for violation of simple arson, and to provide otherwise with respect thereto.

1. SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS HEREBY
2. ORDAINS That Section 42-30.1 of Chapter 42 of Ordinance No. 828
3. M.C.S., as amended, known as the Code of the City of New Orleans,
4. be and the same is hereby ordained to read as follows:
5. "Section 42-30.1. Simple arson; penalty
6. It shall be unlawful for any person to commit the crime
7. of simple arson as hereinafter defined.
8. 'Simple Arson' is the willful and malicious setting
9. fire to or burning or causing to be burned or aiding, counsel-
10. ing, or procuring the burning of any property, building,
11. structure or vehicle of whatever class or character, whether
12. the property of himself or others, where the damage is less
13. than five hundred dollars.
14. ~~xxxxxx the crime of simple arson shall be defined~~
15. ~~xxxxxx at the discretion of the courts in~~
16. ~~xxxxxx with the S.C.R.S. 13-2500(c)~~

1. SECTION 2. If any provision or item of this Ordinance or
2. the application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not
3. affect other provisions, items, or applications of this Ordinance
4. which can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items, or
5. applications, and to this end the provisions of this Ordinance
6. are hereby declared severable.

1. SECTION 3. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
2. herewith are hereby repealed.

ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS NOV 6 1980

SIDNEY J. BARTHELEMY
PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL

Delivered to the Mayor on NOV 7 1980

ERNEST N. MORIAL,
MAYOR


Returned by the Mayor on
NOV 10 1980 at -- 4-25 PM

JOSEPH C. PETERSON,
CLERK OF COUNCIL

THE FOREGOING IS CERTIFIED
TO BE A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY.

Joseph C. Peterson

JOSEPH C. PETERSON, COUNCIL CLERK
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS



ORDINANCE
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

CITY HALL: _____

CALENDAR NO. _____

NO. 5105 MAYOR COUNCIL SERIES

BY: COUNCILMAN GIARRUSSO (BY REQUEST)

AN ORDINANCE to amend Ordinance No. 828 M.C.S., as amended, known as the Code of the City of New Orleans, by amending Section 42-30.1 of Chapter 42 thereof, relative to the crime of simple arson, to provide a definition of simple arson, and to provide otherwise with respect thereto.

1. SECTION 1. THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS HEREBY
2. ORDAINS That Section 42-30.1 of Chapter 42 of Ordinance No. 828
3. M.C.S., as amended, known as the Code of the City of New Orleans,
4. be and the same is hereby amended and reordained to read as follows:
5. "Section 42-30.1. Simple arson.
6. It shall be unlawful for any person to commit the crime of
7. simple arson as hereinafter defined.
8. 'Simple Arson' is the intentional setting fire to or burning
9. or causing to be burned either (1) the property of another
10. without the consent of the owner or (2) any property regard-
11. less of ownership or consent where it is reasonably foresee-
12. able that damage to the property of any other person could
13. occur."

1. SECTION 2. If any provision or item of this Ordinance or the
2. application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect
3. other provisions, items, or applications of this Ordinance which can
4. be given effect without the invalid provisions, items, or applications,
5. and to this end the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby declared
6. severable.

1. SECTION 3. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
2. herewith are hereby repealed.

ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS APR 30 1981

JOSEPH I. GIARRUSSO
PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL

Delivered to the Mayor on APR 30 1981

ERNEST N. MORIAL
MAYOR

Returned by the Mayor on
MAY 4 - 1981 at 2:00 PM

JOSEPH C. PETERSON
CLERK OF COUNCIL

THE FOREGOING IS CERTIFIED
TO BE A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY.

Joseph C. Peterson

JOSEPH C. PETERSON, COUNCIL CLERK*
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

APPENDIX E

Project Response



CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

September 10, 1981



ERNEST N. MORIAL
MAYOR

Mr. Frank Serpas, Director
Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
1215 Prytania Street, Suite 418
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Dear Mr. Serpas:

This letter is written to acknowledge receipt of a draft of the report entitled "The Arson Reduction Program: A Final Evaluation." It is my feeling, as Chairman of the New Orleans Arson Task Force, that this report provides an excellent analysis of the efforts of the Task Force to impact arson in New Orleans. Further, I am in concurrence with the recommendations for future effort. The report provides an objective, quantitative study of where local anti-arson efforts have been, of how we have advanced and of the directions for further effort.

You and your staff should be highly commended for playing a key role in the coordination of system efforts to meet the arson problem and for establishing an arson information system where none previously existed. It is my sincere hope that the end of this grant project will not signal the end of the vital participation of you and your staff in the work of the New Orleans Arson Task Force.

Thank you again.

Very truly yours,

William J. McCrossen
Superintendent of Fire
Chairman, New Orleans
Arson Task Force.

WJM/WAD/bf

Department of Fire / William J. McCrossen, Superintendent / 317 Decatur Street / New Orleans, La. 70130

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