


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National Institute of Justice
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Washington, D. C. 20531

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**GUIDELINES FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF
AIR CARGO SECURITY**



NOVEMBER 1980

80880

**NEW YORK/NEWARK COMMITTEE
NATIONAL CARGO SECURITY PROGRAM
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

U.S. Department of Justice
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FOREWORD

GUIDELINES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF AIR CARGO SECURITY is the product of the cooperative efforts of the members of the New York/Newark committee of the 15-City Campaign, National Cargo Security Program, United States Department of Transportation.

Special acknowledgement for their contributions is made to the members of the Police Department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the staff of the Airport Security Council, and personnel of the Federal Aviation Administration.

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ACQUISITIONS

PREFACE

These Guidelines have but one goal: to assist in establishing effective cargo security in an air freight industry which flies billions of revenue ton miles per year. The Guidelines do not theorize or generalize--they are practical and specific. They present a system of well-integrated, down-to-earth suggestions to reduce air cargo losses to a minimum.

Obviously, every air cargo operation has unique situations or problems which will make necessary the adaptation of the Guidelines to fit particular local needs. Nevertheless, an orderly working through of the text will provide a sound base upon which to structure adequate defenses against air cargo theft.

Though somewhat aside from the normal content of a preface, one point requires emphasis here. If, instead of logical order, these Guidelines were to be organized in the order of importance, the section entitled "Recommended High-Value Cargo Procedures" would have been considered first. It is in this single area that cargo facilities stand to suffer their most severe theft losses. This early stress is to suggest that terminal operators give this section maximum attention.

As these Guidelines show, cutting back air cargo losses is not impossible, nor even particularly difficult. Cargo becomes vulnerable to theft when procedures break down and rules are not followed. Tighten operating procedures, monitor them carefully, and losses can be dramatically reduced.

Taken as a whole, the air cargo industry loses less than 1/2 of 1% of all cargo revenue as a result of claims paid for non-delivery of cargo. In aggregate, this could amount to five million dollars or more in lost profit each year, in an industry which must count every profit dollar carefully. Experience has shown that the application of the security measures suggested in these Guidelines has the potential of reducing these losses to just a fraction of the current total.

Certainly, such a potential reduction in losses should be motivation to all terminal operators to give these Guidelines their serious attention. Possibly more important than this is the fact that a facility which maintains a low loss ratio quickly gains a reputation for reliability. Such a service image invariably means expanded cargo business and increased revenues. In addition, shippers who enjoy the convenience of reliable cargo delivery are likely to use the other services the facility offers.

In total view then, the Guidelines suggest a plan which has the potential of so improving a carrier's relations with the public that the carrier stands to gain important benefits in every aspect of its operation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. THEFT AND PILFERAGE.	1
2. SECURITY COMMITTEES.	2
3. SECURITY PROCEDURE FOR PERSONNEL	2
A. Personnel Screening	2
B. Employee Identification System.	3
C. Employee Training	3
D. Security Guards	4
a. Areas of Vital Training.	5
b. Management or Agency Responsibility.	5
c. Communications	6
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY.	6
A. Buildings	6
B. Fencing	7
C. Gates	8
D. Gate Houses	9
E. Procedures for Gatemen.	9
F. Buffer Zones.	10
G. Lighting.	11
H. Parking	12
I. Guarded Parking Areas	12
J. Locks, Locking Devices and Key Control.	13
K. Loading Docks	14
L. Signs	14
5. TYPICAL SYSTEM FOR HANDLING AND PROCESSING AIR CARGO	15
A. Documentation	15
B. Cargo Security.	16
C. Outgoing Cargo.	17
D. Incoming Cargo.	18
E. Escorts - Police and Private.	19
F. Cargo Patrol - Police	19
G. Armored Car Service	19
H. Cargo Building Security	20
I. Open Storage of Cargo	21
J. Covered Storage	21
K. Seals	21
L. Suggested Gate Pass Procedure	22
M. Delivery Procedure.	23
N. Receiving Procedure	24

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

	<u>Page</u>
6. SUGGESTED HIGH-VALUE CARGO HANDLING PROCEDURES	24
A. General	24
B. Procedure - Origin Station	25
C. Procedure - Destination Station	28
D. Transfer and Stowage of High-Value Cargo	32
E. Flight Delays and Diversions	33
7. PASSENGER TERMINAL SECURITY	34
8. PROGRAM TO IMPROVE BAGGAGE SECURITY	36
A. Baggage Acceptance	36
B. Transport to Baggage Room	37
C. Baggage Sort and Transfer Room	37
D. Movement to and from Aircraft	38
E. Aircraft Loading and Unloading	38
F. Baggage Claim Area	38
G. Baggage Delivery Service	39
H. Baggage Claims	39
APPENDIX	40

1. THEFT AND PILFERAGE

Theft and pilferage are the main problems in air cargo security. The term "pilferage" covers theft of a portion of the contents of a box or package. "Theft" is the removal of an entire package.

In dealing with these problems, police, cargo managers, and security personnel must be able to distinguish between these two main types of crime: pilferage and systematic theft. The two must be distinguished so that controls appropriate to each may be initiated.

The casual pilferer is almost always an employee; he steals small items only when alone and when the chance of detection is minimal. Even though the theft is not committed on a regular basis, if the practice becomes widespread, the cumulative effect of casual pilferage can lead to significant losses.

A few relatively simple measures can effectively deal with casual pilferage. Unannounced inspection of lunch boxes, pocketbooks, and lockers will do much to deter the casual pilferer. Prominent signs warning employees that anyone discovered stealing will be prosecuted, are strong psychological inhibitors. These measures, in conjunction with the security procedures detailed later in these Guidelines, will control this hazard to cargo.

The systematic thief steals according to a preconceived plan. He may engage in this activity alone, but more often with employees or other groups. Many of these persons may be in positions which enable them to locate the desired items, remove them from storage, and assist in their successful removal. The systematic thief always has made arrangements with a "Fence" to profitably dispose of the stolen valuables. "Pay-offs" to his collaborators insure him of their cooperation in additional theft.

The systematic thief is not as easily discouraged as the casual pilferer. Only resolute physical security measures will eliminate major losses from this source. The several sections of these Guidelines all apply, in one way or another, to the prevention of systematic theft. Some of the more important security requirements are these:

- A. Establish an effective screening and evaluation procedure in the hiring of security personnel.
- B. Maintain sufficient security forces to patrol buildings, grounds, and perimeter defenses.
- C. Install mechanical and electronic intrusion detection devices where required.
- D. Maintain accurate methods of taking physical inventories and accounting for cargo received and delivered.
- E. Investigate all losses immediately and report them immediately to the police and intelligence agencies.

A final point of significance: because systematic thieves are always changing their mode of operations, security directors should be adept at altering their methods to meet new contingencies.

2. SECURITY COMMITTEES

The basic goal of any security program, prevention of theft, cannot be achieved without close cooperation between the airlines and law enforcement agencies. An example of a viable effort at such cooperation is the Tri-Level coordinating committee method used successfully at several airports. A brief analysis of this plan follows:

Level I - The Police Section

This group is comprised of the commanding officers responsible for enforcement of the security regulations at the airport. The principal functions of the committee are: to seek solutions to internal problems which filter up from the working force; to provide the logistics for smooth cargo operation; to organize police matters affecting security procedures.

The committee consists of commanders of the airport security police, the local police department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the local District Attorney's Office, U.S. Customs, Federal Aviation Administration, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Postal Service. This group meets on a needs basis to resolve any policy questions or to investigate any unusual security problems.

Level II - Working Section

This group comprises the working enforcement forces housed at and concerned with the operation of investigative work at the airport. The primary function of this group is to coordinate active police cases and plans for handling them.

Members of this group are representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the local police, the airport police, District Attorney's Office, U.S. Customs, U.S. Postal Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Level III - Facility Section

This committee provides the civilian personnel employed by the airlines an opportunity to make recommendations for improving security individually and collectively. The chairman of the committee--a police officer selected by Level I and Level II groups--communicates these recommendations to the groups I and II. This committee maintains a direct line of communication for the dissemination of information that groups I and II feel is necessary for overall smooth operation.

3. SECURITY PROCEDURE FOR PERSONNEL

This section deals with a most vital consideration in the success of a security program: the employment and training of cargo personnel. Whatever the potential of a security system to insure cargo security, it cannot be realized without the cooperation of the employees who man the various areas of cargo processing. They must first evidence that they have the interest, intelligence, experience, and physical fitness required by the demanding nature of the work involved. What follows is a detailed analysis of the hiring and training of qualified individuals to work in an air cargo operation.

A. Personnel Screening

It is incumbent upon managers of cargo-handling facilities to process prospective employees through a screening procedure. This should require all personnel who will

have access to cargo areas to submit a detailed employment application which contains a photograph of the applicant and lists his residences and prior employment for the preceding 10 years. If a lapse is evident, an affidavit should be obtained for the unaccounted time.

In addition, the following are recommended considerations:

- (1) Require all applicants to be fingerprinted. This is a means of positive identification. It will deter applicants filing under assumed names and concealing arrest records.
- (2) Where there is no legal prohibition against it, request that the applicant take a polygraph test.
- (3) Verify all listed addresses.
- (4) Verify any prior employment. Be aware of any employment gaps.
- (5) Check all references.
- (6) Investigate the applicant's credit record and, if applicable, criminal record.
- (7) Require those applying for "sensitive" positions to complete a bonding application.
- (8) Inform prospective, as well as current employees, of security regulations and the consequences attached to violations of those regulations.

B. Employee Identification System

- (1) Immediately upon being employed the individual should be provided with an identification card. It must be impressed upon him that he is required to wear this card conspicuously on his outermost garment any time he is on airport property.
- (2) The identification card should contain the following information:
 - a. Color photograph of the employee.
 - b. Name and address.
 - c. Social security number.
 - d. Date of birth.
 - e. Signature of authorized agent.
 - f. Reasonable expiration date.
 - g. Name of employing companies.
- (3) Each card should be assigned a control number and be laminated to prevent tampering.

C. Employee Training

Security consciousness is generally an acquired, not an inherent, mental trait. Therefore, if security hazards are to be eliminated, any newly hired applicants must take part in an effective security education program. Through such a program, the employees will have explained to them the reasons security measures are necessary. If intelligently acquainted with these reasons, most

employees will be instilled with a willingness to assist in and comply with a security plan. In a word, if employees understand why the security system is, of necessity, restrictive, they will, as a group, accept and implement it. It would be a serious management error not to continue employee training after the initial orientation. Security officers should conduct frequent conferences where small groups of cargo and security personnel can exchange ideas and discuss individual problems and solutions to them. Continuing instruction should include supervisory and management personnel. Since the key to cargo security is ever-improving cargo control, managers should be required to attend seminars in which the latest trends and techniques in security maintenance and crime prevention are explained and discussed. Similarly, top staff members should meet regularly to discuss methods of improving the cargo security system.

D. Security Guards

The efficiency of any cargo security system will be improved by care taken in recruiting, training, and supervising security guards. Guards may be employed by the operator of a terminal or contracted from a guard service. Whichever method is used, it is most important that the number of guards employed can provide adequate security in relation to the size of the facility and the amount of cargo handled. If the terminal handles a substantial shipment of international cargo, a sufficient guard force should be available to protect that cargo.

Both in-house and contracted guards should satisfy all levels of the induction process that show they possess certain personality characteristics. The most important part of this evaluation falls to the supervisors during the guards' probation period. A list of these traits follows:

- (1) ALERTNESS - This determines the effectiveness of a security guard, and must be cultivated. He must watch for deviations from normal routine, such as strange trucks or cars, or a person approaching from an area not normally used.
- (2) JUDGMENT - Security instructions cannot cover each situation. The guard must learn to compare, discriminate, and formulate accurately and arrive at a sound decision.
- (3) CONFIDENCE - He must have confidence in himself, his fellow guards and his superiors.



- (4) PHYSICAL FITNESS - Guards work long hours when ships/planes are being unloaded and cargo removed. The guard should be of sound mind and body since the job, if done correctly, is demanding and the guard is exposed to the weather for long periods of time.
- (5) APPEARANCE - Guards should be properly uniformed at all times. At present the only uniform equipment some guards own is a police-type cap. When completely and properly uniformed, the guard is easily identified as a figure of authority. Experience indicates that this alone has a deterrent effect on pilferers.
- (6) EQUIPMENT - When given the responsibility of guarding valuable cargo, the guard should be armed. Men who are selected for this duty should exhibit fair proficiency with a weapon. A sneak thief will have second thoughts before attempting to challenge an armed guard in good physical condition.
- (7) TACTFULNESS AND SELF CONTROL - He should be able to give instructions clearly, firmly and concisely, but without arrogance. In addition, he must not lose control of his temper.
- (8) BACKGROUND - Each guard should undergo a record check by a responsible authority. This will insure that valuable cargo will be entrusted only to persons of known responsibility and trustworthiness and help to eliminate collusion between thieves and guards. Persons known to be in debt or to gamble heavily should be excluded from working as a guard since they can become involved with loan sharks and racketeers.

a. Security Guard - Areas of Vital Training

While the total training of the security guard is considered in the syllabus in the appendix of the Guidelines, at this point, summary mention should be made of the major emphases in guard training. Training in the following should be meticulous:

1. Methods of patrol regarding terminals and warehouses.
2. Identification of security problems and specific trouble areas.
3. Report writing and record keeping.
4. If required, the proper use of firearms or other equipment that may be furnished.

b. Security Guard - Management or Agency Responsibility

1. To equip guard forces with uniforms which are complete, distinctive and authoritative in appearance.
2. Provide any equipment (firearms, vehicles, communication systems, etc.) which will be necessary for effective security function.
3. Defray the expense of the required yearly physical examination.

4. Provide self-defense training similar to that of police.
5. Each guard should be provided by the agency or operator with Guidelines incorporating procedures, standards of conduct and a definitive statement of what management expects of him.

c. Communication - Particular Agency or Operator Responsibility

Adequate and reliable communications should be provided to enable contact between elements of the terminal security force and from the security force to local law enforcement. This can be provided in the following manner:

1. Security guards should be provided with a telephone at fixed posts, or two-way radio, intercom, or similar type of equipment which will provide voice communication within the terminal area.
2. Assured means (telephone, radio, special alarm lines, etc.) should be provided for summoning assistance from local police.

The details of the training program for security personnel are included in Section I of the Appendix.

4. PHYSICAL SECURITY

A. Buildings

Approximately 80% of thefts occur in the cargo storage warehouse. With this in mind, all cargo handling and storage facilities should provide a physical barrier against unauthorized access to their contents. All such buildings should be constructed to specifications which resist unlawful entry. The maintenance of the structure as a defense against theft can be assured only by periodic inspection, repair, and updating of the facility. In order to assure inaccessibility to the physical plant, the following are suggested:

- (1) The building walls should be of sufficient strength to make penetration all but impossible.
- (2) Openings in the walls should be held to the absolute minimum necessary for efficient operation and compliance with local fire regulations.
- (3) Since the typical parapetted, flat-roof construction of warehouses invites "through-the-roof" forced entry, consideration should be given to wiring all major roof supports into a vibration alarm system. This system can be set to such sensitivity that anyone walking on the roof will trigger the alarm. Even if the thief avoids foot-fall detection, through the use of sponge rubber pads, the tools he must use to penetrate the roof will most certainly trigger the alarm. The alarm should be of a distinctive horn type, mounted both inside and outside the building so as to alert in-house security guards regardless of their location. Immediately upon the triggering of the alarm, the airport and local police should be notified so that patrol cars may surround the building to assist in the apprehension of the intruder.
- (4) All exterior doors should be equipped with locks, properly installed. Since emergency exit doors must open upon the pressing of a panic-bar, they should be protected against non-emergency use by a mechanical sound alarm sufficiently loud to alert security guards.

- (5) Windows accessible from the ground should be safeguarded with bars or 11 guage wire mesh.
- (6) All glassed-in areas where shipping documents are processed should be treated in the same manner as accessible windows.
- (7) Shipping and receiving doors should be constructed of steel. These doors should eliminate any space between truck trailers and the dock. Cargo operations should be completed inside the building. Outside handling invites theft. Shipping and receiving areas should be separated as far apart as available space permits. When not in use, all doors should be closed and locked.
- (8) Possible entry from an adjacent building can be monitored by photoelectric detection alarms.
- (9) There should be specific door or doors for the entry and exiting of employees. A Security guard should be stationed at these doors to make certain that only authorized persons enter or exit the building.
- (10) Fire walls and fire doors should be installed as local fire department regulations require.

B. Fencing

Adequate fencing provides certain immediate improvements in the security situation. The most obvious are these:

- (1) Prevents accidental entry into the security area.
- (2) Deters unauthorized entry for criminal purpose.
- (3) Delays entry into areas by criminals determined to commit a crime, making apprehension likely.
- (4) Restricts pedestrian and vehicular traffic to designated entrances.
- (5) Curtails pilferage by employees by creating a psychological fear of apprehension.



In order to provide uniformity in the construction of fencing, the following are recommended specifications:

- (1) Installation of chain link fencing, with mesh openings not larger than two inches and made of 11 guage or heavier wire with twisted and barbed selvage top and bottom. The fence should be at least eight feet high. If the fence is constructed on uneven ground, the height must be adjusted to provide an effective eight-foot fence at all points.

- (2) The fence should be topped with a two-foot barbed wire extension consisting of three strands of barbed wire, properly spaced and at a 45 angle to the vertical.
- (3) Fence posts should be placed inside the fence and secured in a cement foundation to a minimum of two feet.
- (4) Ensure that persons or objects cannot pass beneath the fencing by providing one of the following:
 - a. Cement aprons not less than six inches thick.
 - b. Frame piping.
 - c. U-shaped stakes driven approximately two feet into the ground.



- (5) Prevent compromising the fence line. Prohibit the placing of any commodity (containers, dunnage, cargo, vehicles, etc.) in a position which would allow a breaching of the fence line.
- (6) When warranted, install concrete bumpers or fence guards to prevent damage to vehicles or to the fence. Create a corridor providing a clear view of the fence line to management and security personnel.
- (7) A clearance of at least 20 feet should be allowed between fences and exterior of buildings, parking areas, or other natural features which offer concealment to criminals. In addition, at least that much space is required for the maneuvering of pickup and delivery vehicles.
- (8) Regular inspection of fencing should be conducted to ensure its integrity and repairs to damage.

C. Gates

Gates should be treated in much the same manner as openings in the building wall. The number of gates should be limited to the minimum number required for entrance/exit. The construction of the gate should be of the same quality as the fencing. All gates should be equipped with a deadlocking bolt or equivalent device which does not require the use of a chain. Hardware connecting the lock to the gate should be of case-hardened type capable of withstanding constant use and any attempts to breach it. Swing-type gates should be so constructed that they can be secured to the ground when closed.

Separate gates should be constructed for the use of personnel and vehicular traffic. Personnel gates, since they are generally important employee control points, should only be wide enough to permit single line entry or exit. Vehicular openings which allow for the simultaneous ingress and egress of traffic if manned by only one security guard, should be equipped with an electrically operated drop-type bar barrier. Such a barrier makes it possible for the one guard to maintain the proper inspection of entering/exiting documents.

D. Gate Houses

Gate Houses at all vehicle entrances and exits should be manned during business hours by operators of facilities handling a substantial volume of high-value cargo.

Areas of concern are:

- (1) Gate houses should be situated in from the gate so that exiting vehicles may be halted and examined on terminal property.
- (2) All gate houses should be equipped with telephones or other communication devices.
- (3) The area surrounding gate houses must be cleared of any items which restrict the guard's line of vision.




- (4) Signs advising drivers and visitors to stop, and the conditions of entry onto company property, should be posted prominently on the exterior of all gate houses. Included in these conditions should be a notice that all vehicles and personnel entering are subject to search. (All signs to be international in design).

E. Procedures for Gatemen

- (1) Trucks must be checked for proper name displayed on the side in either stencil, paint or decal. Crayon, magic marker, masking tape and other non-permanent type placards are not acceptable as properly identifying trucks.
- (2) Temporary placards, as used by lease operators or owner operators, may be accepted if the operator of the truck can produce an acceptable "Trip Lease Agreement" showing affiliation with the truckman of record.
- (3) All lease equipment drivers must produce lease papers and driver's license prior to being passed through gate.

- (4) Straight trucks, where the body and cab are one unit, may be admitted when the name of the company appears on the body of the truck, providing it is the company of record. All others should at least have a lease agreement or letterhead authorization to be approved.
- (5) Truck registration should be presented at the gate and checked by gateman for matching vehicle plates.



- (6) Examination of all vehicles will be necessary upon exiting. This is especially true when trucks have entered with shipping cargo and exit with a partial load.
- (7) Any truckers who do not comply with any of the procedures should be turned away. If, after a truckman gets a gate pass, a discrepancy is observed, the pass should be voided.

F. Buffer Zones

Just as the consideration of gates logically followed that of fencing, there is now need to turn attention to the maintenance of buffer zones. This is appropriate because, in a very important way, buffer zones contribute to the effectiveness of fencing. The prime elements in establishing buffer zones follows.

- (1) Buffer zones (cleared areas) on both sides of a fenced area provide an unobstructed view of the fence and the ground adjacent to it. Police vehicles should patrol as close as the terrain allows.
- (2) A buffer zone of 20 feet or greater is recommended between any fence and exterior buildings, and parking areas. This is essential in areas where large numbers of cars or other vehicles are stored.

- (3) In areas adjacent to warehouses and sheds, a buffer zone of 10 feet should be created around the entire building. This should be enforced at all times.
- (4) Under no circumstances should any vehicle be permitted to park against a building at any time, unless loading or unloading cargo at a platform.
- (5) No vehicle, loaded or empty, should be left parked against a loading platform overnight.
- (6) When it is impossible to have adequate buffer zones because of property lines or other features, additional fencing may be necessary, as well as additional lighting and more frequent police patrols.
- (7) If properly installed and maintained, buffer zones will afford the police patrols a clear view along the fenced areas. They will also permit the officer to observe all doors, windows and other entrances to a building, day or night.

G. Lighting

No matter how well planned and maintained, fencing and buffer zones are useless, for long periods of time, without protective lighting. The principal function of lighting is to reduce or eliminate the advantages of concealment and surprise so valuable to a determined intruder. While the lighting of each facility presents particular problems based on layout, terrain, and protective requirements, to be effective every lighting system must have, at least, these attributes:

- (1) It should light both boundaries and approaches to the secured area.
- (2) It must light the area and structure within the general limits of the property.
- (3) It must be sufficiently bright to insure that the security guard can distinguish any intruder at a considerable distance. The lighting, however, should allow the guard to make such observations without disclosing his presence.
- (4) The element of contrast is necessary for lighting to be truly protective. This is most easily accomplished by painting the lower part of the building a light color. This will prevent the absorption of light and increase the visibility of suspicious objects or persons.
- (5) The elimination of shadows is of great importance. Shadows serve as hiding places for intruders. Overlapping lamp beams and an orderly organization of outside storage will, for the most part, eliminate hazardous shadows.
- (6) The entire lighting system should be provided with a gas driven generator of sufficient capacity to provide normal illumination during local blackouts.

H. Parking

Private passenger vehicles should be prohibited from entering or parking in cargo areas or immediately adjacent to cargo storage buildings. Control of access to employee parking areas should be supervised.

Further areas of consideration are:


- (1) Parking areas should be situated outside of fenced operational areas, or, if impractical, a substantial distance from cargo handling and storage areas or buildings. (All parking spaces should be identified by signs and by lines).
- (2) Employees exiting to the parking area from a cargo facility should be required to pass through a controlled area under the supervision of management or security personnel.
- (3) Discourage employees from visting their autos at odd times. If the trip is necessary, require notifications to be made to management or security personnel.
- (4) Parking in employee parking areas should be restricted and by permit only. The permit may consist of a numbered decal, tag, sign, etc., placed in a uniform location on the vehicle. A record must be maintained of all permits issued consisting of: permit number, vehicle registration number, model, make and year of vehicle, and person to whom it is issued.
- (5) Temporary permits, to allow parking in designated controlled areas, may be issued to vendors and visitors.

I. Guarded Parking Areas

- (1) Other physical protection recommendations:
 - a. Improved lighting.
 - b. Anti-theft fencing.
 - c. Buffer zones.
 - d. General clean-up.
- (2) In addition, armed guards and alarm systems may be used.
- (3) Once a security parking area is constructed, these basic steps can be followed to deter theft from this area:
 - a. Trucks parked in lot back to back.
 - b. Use of "Fifth Wheel Locks" for maximum security.
 - c. Frequent check of "seals" to insure they remain intact.
 - d. Alarm system between guard force and police.
 - e. Cursory checks by police/management to insure presence and safety of guards.
 - f. Inspection of truck drivers' credentials and pickup order before releasing a loaded trailer. This would include a routine check of drivers' licenses to insure identity of driver.

- g. Investigate the possibility of taking photographs of drivers, papers, etc. If union problems are encountered it should be stressed that this is done for the protection of all the legitimate truck drivers who suffer when a theft or a hijack occurs.

J. Locks, Locking Devices and Key Control



Locks are an integral part of security. Their constant use provides a psychological deterrent. Their physical strength and resistance provide meaningful protection. Locks or locking devices used on buildings, gates and equipment should be constructed so as to provide positive protection against unauthorized entry. Management or security personnel should control the issuance of all keys. To further guarantee security, specifications recommended are:

- (1) Locks selected for use should have:
 - a. Multiple pin tumblers.
 - b. Deadlocking bolts.
 - c. Interchangeable cores.
 - d. Serial numbers.
 - e. Not be subject to key duplication.
- (2) To facilitate detection of unauthorized locks, use only locks of standard manufacture displaying the facility's company name, logo or mark.


(3) All keys should be numbered. Control files for all keys should be maintained and the recipient of each key required to sign for it. Distribution of master keys must be restricted to persons whose responsibilities require them to possess one.

(4) All unissued or duplicate keys should be logged and secured.

(5) When cargo handling equipment is not in actual use, keys must be removed and secured.

(6) Regular inspections should be made of all locks to determine that they are in good working order, and any malfunctioning lock must be repaired or replaced.

(7) If a key is lost, the lock must be replaced.



K. Loading Docks

Many acts of theft and pilferage occur between the dock and the terminal warehouse. To lessen or eliminate these occurrences, the recommendations are:

(1) Separate receiving and shipping records.

(2) Maintain rest rooms, telephones, etc. nearby but separate from the dock and/or cargo offices.

(3) Have supervisory personnel present during lunch and coffee breaks if these are taken in work area.

(4) A security cage should be maintained for "high-value" cargo.

(5) Supervisory offices should be constructed at a height to allow an overview of the dock.

L. Signs

(1) Regulations detailing all cargo handling should be conspicuously posted throughout the facility.

(2) Signs, warning against mingling with the employees, should be placed in the drivers' room or area.

(3) Reward Posters serve both as an incentive to report and a deterrent to commit theft if the posters are prominently displayed throughout the cargo storage area. The posters should offer rewards for in-

formation leading to the arrest and conviction of any person or persons involved in theft or pilferage of air cargo. It is suggested that the Reward Posters be printed on heavy white cardboard, size 14 by 22 in. with text in black, with heading and border in red.

5. TYPICAL SYSTEM FOR HANDLING AND PROCESSING AIR CARGO

A. Documentation

Much of the loss of cargo can be traced to poor documentation practice attributable to the volume of paperwork necessary to control both large and small shipments. Nevertheless, documentation is one of management's most important methods for controlling cargo handling and combating thieves of all kinds.

Documentation, while essential to the movement of cargo, tends by its very nature to expose the cargo it covers to risk of theft. To control this risk the following precautions should be taken as a first step in cargo handling.

(1) Maintain a continuing review of the company's documentation procedures and change them where necessary to improve cargo security.

(2) Analyze records of incidents of losses to determine causes and take necessary corrective action.

(3) Limit access to documentation. Maintain strict control over the storage and distribution of invoices, manifests, and other vital papers.

(4) Avoid wide dissemination of documents.



(5) Transcribe information from source documents to subsidiary documents and check the transcription closely.

- (6) Forward shipping documents promptly, especially those needed at foreign destinations.
- (7) Limit the number of persons having knowledge of cargo shipments.
- (8) Maintain strict control of information on the shipments.
- (9) Give cargo manager at destination advance notice of cargo requiring surveillance and protection. Shipper should inform the carrier when the special protective services are required.
- (10) Ensure that dissemination procedures provide a clear audit of all cargo shipped and received.
- (11) Inspect cargo immediately upon receipt. Notify supervisor of all irregularities and document them on an Over/Short and Damage Report. If theft is suspected, immediately notify proper law enforcement authority.
- (12) Select documentation employees carefully, ensure thorough training, including instruction in the security hazards of documentation.
- (13) Supervise documentation personnel closely.

B. Cargo Security

Cargo, when not in storage, is constantly in transit within an airport; from warehouse to loading area, to aircraft and vice-versa. Often this cargo in transit is lost within the confines of the airport. To prevent this type of loss, the following are recommended:

- (1) Any cargo of allowable size should be placed in a container, closed truck or any vehicle which is capable of being secured for transport to areas within the airport complex. When it is deemed necessary, such transportation will have a seal affixed to it at the point of initiation of the movement.
- (2) Accountability for all items in a shipment is necessary.
 - a. All shipments should be physically counted to ensure that all items recorded on the manifest or waybill are present.



- b. Any document required for interline shipment must be processed by supervisory personnel or other authorized personnel.

- (3) Any shipments, with the exception of high-value cargo, should be stored in a given location, whether the fixed or random type of storage is used. Maintaining an accurate record of cargo location is vital in preventing unauthorized removal or hiding in preparation for theft.
- (4) Because of the possibility mentioned in (3), it is extremely important to report and log any legitimate change in the location of a shipment.

C. Outgoing Cargo

The handling and processing of outgoing cargo is fundamentally a material-handling function.

Shippers may use the services of a freight forwarder or book shipments directly with the airline. Because of lift capacity and schedules, shipments are usually booked on the first available flight.

The shipper or his agent will usually prepare the shipping documents. When there is no airbill, the airline will prepare and issue one. Most domestic airlines attach a copy of the airbill to one of the packages of the shipment for identification and instruction purposes and all packages of the load are labeled. Because all packages are required to have the shipper/consignee's name and address on their outside, the zip number is used by some carriers as a means of package identification.

The international trade requires many documents. Therefore, instead of attempting to attach the papers to a package, all documents are consolidated and shipped with the cargo in a separate container designed for that purpose. With exported cargo, the cargo manifest is the control document for entry of a shipment at a foreign destination.



Upon acceptance of cargo at the receiving dock, it should be loaded directly into carts or containers in order to minimize the number of handlings. This reduces cargo exposure to theft and other hazards. Where this is not practical, shipments must be taken to an assembly area where the cargo is sorted and unitized into containers or carts for a specific flight.

When the cargo is ready to move from the cargo terminal, it is taken to the aircraft loading area. Depending upon the type of aircraft, cargo is loaded loose or containerized.

D. Incoming Cargo

Upon arrival of all cargo it is transported from the aircraft to the cargo facility. Once in the terminal, cargo is disassembled and checked in. During this function, the different shipments are assigned a storage location in the warehouse. The location is recorded upon the "check-in" document to avoid "hunting" at time of delivery.


With domestic cargo, the consignee has prior knowledge of the arrival of his shipment; thus, frequently will be on hand to pick up his goods once they have been sorted for delivery. If no prior knowledge exists, the airline issues an arrival notice by phone and/or mail.

The domestic cargo delivery is relatively simple because no Customs activity is involved. The trucker presents his authorization and identification to the cargo agent. If the airline is satisfied, delivery is made. Most domestic cargo is delivered within 24 hours following its arrival at destination.

When requested, airlines, through their own trucking operator, Air Cargo Inc., perform a pickup/delivery service of domestic cargo. Outbound acceptance of export cargo may be similarly arranged with participating airlines.

Customs' requirements necessitate certain modifications in the handling procedures for imported cargo which are not needed for the processing of inbound domestic shipments. Imported cargo accountability is predicated upon the cargo manifest, while domestic goods are accounted for according to the waybill. This is not to say domestic airlines never use the manifest as a control document, but that Customs demands the manifest for overseas shipment quantity control purposes.

Most imported cargo is processed through Customs by a customs broker. The documents which have arrived with the flight are sorted by the airline and made available to the consignee's broker. If no broker is assigned, the airline notifies the consignee by phone and/or mail with instructions that the consignee make his own arrangements to clear the shipment through Customs. Cargo in storage for five or more business days and not cleared may be ordered to General Order Warehouse. The purpose of this action is to relieve the cargo terminal of congestion and needed storage space.



Although the consignee or his agent enters the shipment, Customs releases the cargo to the airline who makes the actual delivery.

Obviously the delay necessitated by the clearance procedure results in an added risk to the airline which it should guard against. One of the more critical periods exists during the interface between trucker and airline personnel at time of delivery. The trucker must present authorization and positive identity to the cargo agent before the cargo is released to him.

E. Escorts - Police and Private

In order to provide maximum security at airports, an escort should be provided by both police and private guards for valuable and sensitive material.

F. Cargo Patrol - Police

Cargo area patrol and escorts at the terminal should consist of at least two one-man patrol cars around the clock, 365 days per year. This complement may be increased as needed. Additional manpower is always required during the Christmas season. The cargo officers serve two important functions; one is patrol and observation of the cargo area, and the second is to provide police escort for valuable and sensitive materials.

When an airline transports valuable cargo from one location on the airport to another, it may request a police cargo escort for the shipment. The procedure, very simply, entails notification from the requesting airline, usually a few hours before time. The Police Desk Officer receiving the request prepares the top portion of a form. This form indicates time and location of departure, destination and nature of the shipment, and the name and telephone number of the person requesting the escort. The information is then logged in the cargo escort book, and the form is given to the cargo officer. The lower portion of the escort form is prepared by the escorting officer and the completed record is kept on file.

Specific orders should be given to cargo patrol officers to be on the alert for any indications of potential hijackings and suspicious vehicles or persons. Escort routes are analyzed and alternate routes for movements designated, using both streetside and rampside roadways.

The Police at Kennedy Airport alone provide over 4,000 escorts annually. The success of this program can be measured by the record: few hijackings at the busiest cargo airport in the world.

G. Armored Car Services

At major airports, private armored car services make frequent deliveries and pickups of high value and sensitive materials. Police escorts are provided to these companies in the same manner as is available to the tenant airlines.


The armored car services are provided with special license plates which enable them to make pickups and deliveries rampside, or at a particular aircraft. In addition, payroll deliveries are made rampside (if accessible) rather than at terminal entrances to eliminate the potential of an armed holdup. Police escorts are also provided for payroll deliveries upon request.

H. Cargo Building Security

Truck drivers should be restricted to a special room or to a marked platform area. They should never be allowed to mingle with airline personnel, as this invites collusion and theft.

The administration and operational office is the center of operation and should be off limits to everyone except the Terminal Manager, Assistant Terminal Manager, dispatcher, foreman and clerk in performance of company business.

Authorized personnel only should be permitted in the warehouse. It is the workers, foreman and company supervisor's duty to challenge all others by determining the nature of business and reason for their presence. The warehouse should be well lighted for the purpose of performing functions of employees and spotting unauthorized persons in the area. Warehouse bay doors and their locking devices should be examined regularly for defects and immediately repaired. Overhead doors should be lowered and locked when unattended (including during coffee and meal breaks).



Key control must be maintained and responsibility identified. All locks on the terminal should be opened only by three master sets of keys. Master sets should be in the custody of the Terminal Manager, the Security Director and the roundsman. There should not be any individual keys in the possession of terminal personnel. The set for the use of the roundsman must be kept locked in the security office when not in actual use. All terminal offices should be secured at the end of the workday. Security personnel will admit cleaning personnel and secure doors on completion. They also open all doors in the morning.

I. Open Storage of Cargo

- (1) When property is stored in outside areas, it should be properly stacked and placed within, away from and parallel to fences in order to permit an unobstructed view of the fences by police and guards. Stacks and lines of cargo should be a minimum of 5 feet from the fence. Aisles between stacks or lines should be wide and straight.
- (2) Fixed position lights in a storage area should be of a diffused type to eliminate deep shadows.

J. Covered Storage

- (1) The same principles of even stacking and aisle space recommended for use in open storage are applicable to covered storage. Lighting should be used to reduce deeply shadowed areas to a minimum.
- (2) In warehouses where stored items are moved frequently, more emphasis should be placed on security guards than structural protection, to prevent pilferage by workers.
- (3) "Target Items" should be kept separate from other cargo. Items such as calculators, precious metals, radios, TVs, etc., fall into this category. The best solution would be to store such cargo in a separate location, including a cage or crib within a warehouse. The floors and roof of such an enclosure must be comparable in strength to its walls. (In one cargo crib for valuables it was discovered that solder wire had been substituted for the heavy gauge wire normally used to secure a cyclone fence enclosure. It was found that the solder wire could be removed with the fingers, access gained, cargo removed and the solder wire replaced in minutes).

K. Seals

Seals are manufactured in varying designs, sizes and costs. Seals are of two basic types. One type is the seal which offers little or no physical resistance to theft. It serves only one purpose: to prevent surreptitious entry. It does, however, provide prevention. A basic requirement must be that a seal cannot be manipulated open and closed without detection. The second type is a security seal much like a locking device.

Basic considerations as regard seals are:

- (1) Seals should be distributed in a system by number. The first and last numbers in a series should be recorded so the origin of any seal may later be determined.
- (2) A seal record should be maintained. Seals are of little value without this supporting record.
- (3) All containers, trailers, etc. entering or leaving a facility should be sealed.

- (4) Seals should be inspected whenever sealed cargo units enter or leave a facility. If the seals are not intact or there is evidence of tampering or the seal numbers are incorrect, notification should be made to security and/or management personnel, and the cargo tallied.
- (5) All unsealed shipments entering a facility should be sealed at the point of entry and the seal number noted on the shipping documents. Shipments exiting a facility should be handled in a similar manner.
- (6) Seals should be released to as few persons as possible. All persons handling seals should be held responsible for their strict control and storage in a secure place.
- (7) Seals should be removed from inbound shipments by authorized personnel only. Upon removal, the seal should be placed in a receptacle utilized strictly for this purpose.
- (8) Truck drivers should never be allowed to affix seals. (At times, they have been found to carry, on their persons, substitute seals which they apply in place of the valid seal. After leaving the terminal, the driver strips the substitute seal, pilfers the cargo, and then applies the valid seal. For this reason, only supervisory personnel should be allowed to attach seals).

L. Suggested Gate Pass Procedure

- (1) The driver approaches the gate house where he presents his papers (delivery order), along with the vehicle registration. He is then issued one of two gate passes, green for delivery or yellow for receiving.

- (2) The gateman inserts the following information on the pass:

- a. Trucking Company & Plate (Registration) Number.
- b. Driver's name.

He then stamps the time of arrival at the holding area and refers the driver to the proper delivery or receiving office. All information is then logged in the gate logbook.

- (3) The driver walks to the office where he is routed. The driver remains in a waiting area until such time as there is space for him at the loading platform.



- (4) When there is room at the platform, the trucker is instructed to drive to the assigned bay for loading or unloading.
- (5) After loading or unloading, the pass is again time stamped, and finally stamped when the driver signs for shipment.
- (6) The driver then departs the terminal upon surrender of the pass to the gateman, who stamps the time out.
- (7) All trucks should be opened and inspected by the gateman upon leaving the terminal. If a truck leaves with a partial load, it will be recorded on the gate pass.
- (8) The number of pieces either delivered or received, as well as the number of dock receipts or tallies, are entered on the gate pass by the platform clerks. This is checked by the gateman on his inspection of the truck as it leaves the terminal.

M. Delivery Procedure (Pickup by Trucker)

- (1) The driver is issued a green gate pass and referred to the delivery office to be routed.
- (2) He presents his delivery order to the clerk. If cargo is cleared, the driver then goes to the loading clerk who checks the carrier's credit and loading charges. If all documents are in order, the trucker is directed to the waiting area.
- (3) When available, the dock manager will assign the trucker to a space at the platform where the cargo is loaded. When loaded, the gate pass is time stamped.

- (4) At this time, the driver and documents should be photographed by a dual-lens camera.
- (5) The documents are returned to the delivery office. The driver then signs out with the clerk who signs the gate pass and copy of the delivery order.



- (6) The driver is given a tally and surrenders the gate pass on departing the terminal. The number of pieces delivered is noted on the pass by the loading checker together with the number of tallies.

N. Receiving Procedure (Delivered by Trucker)

- (1) After receiving a yellow gate pass the driver is directed to the receiving office to be routed.
- (2) When space is available, the driver is instructed to back in and the cargo is unloaded. When unloading is complete, the checker signs the gate pass and enters the number of pieces received and number of dock receipts, if more than one.
- (3) The two copies of the dock receipt are sent back to the receiving office and the clerk pulls the fourth copy. Size, number of pieces and weight of the freight are checked.
- (4) The driver returns to the sign-out clerk and receives a signed copy of the dock receipt and gate pass. The gate pass is also time stamped by the clerk.
- (5) The driver then departs the terminal and surrenders the gate pass which is again time stamped.



6. SUGGESTED HIGH-VALUE CARGO HANDLING PROCEDURES

A. General

In order to transport high-value cargo by air without loss, there should be fixed handling procedures. These procedures should provide maximum security and accountability for the location of shipments at all times.

The handling procedures described in these guidelines provide the level of security necessary to prevent high-value cargo losses. But the fact remains that, even with these procedures in effect, high-value cargo losses do occur. An analysis of these losses has proven that they are not due to any flaws in the procedures but rather to the failure to follow them. In the light of this, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that every level of supervision, from top management to dock "boss" be ever alert to see to it that the recommended procedures are followed. If they are fully operational, the recommendations will provide the best defense against high-

value losses: this defense consists of keeping the goods moving so as to reduce to a minimum the time the cargo is in airline custody.

High-value cargo, within the meaning of these handling suggestions, is defined as a shipment containing one or more of the following commodities:

Art Works	Jewelry (other than costume jewelry)
Bills of Exchange	Money
Bonds	Pearls (including cultured pearls)
Bullion or Precious Metals	Platinum
Currency	Promissory Notes
Deeds	Securities, Negotiable
Dore Bullion	Silver Bullion, Coined, Uncoined, Concentrates, Cyanides, Precipitates or Sulfides
Evidences of Debt	Stamps, Postage or Revenue
Firearms, all types	Stock Certificates
Furs	Gold Bullion, Coined, Uncoined, Cyanides, Dust or Sulfides
Fur Clothing and Fur-Trimmed Clothing	Watches and Watch Parts
Gems, cut or uncut (including diamonds for industrial use)	

General cargo which, because of ease of portability and marketability, is highly vulnerable to crime, also needs special protection. This includes such items as wearing apparel, wigs, radios, photographic equipment, calculators and costume jewelry.

B. Procedure - Origin Station

- (1) High-value cargo should be accepted only subject to reservation.
- (2) Reservations may be accepted up to "cut off" time.
- (3) The origin station should determine, before shipping high-value cargo, if the destination station is capable of providing adequate security protection. It should be further determined if the consignee can pick up the shipment within 3 hours after flight arrival. No reservation should be made, nor shipment dispatched, before confirmation is received from the destination station.



- (4) When high-value cargo is tendered, first determine if it is reserved. If no reservation is available, refuse shipment with instructions to the shipper as to the procedure to be followed relative to reservation. If reservation is available, check shipping documents for completeness and accuracy. Examine each package to insure that documents and package information agree.
- (5) Shipping packages should not be accepted, if, in the judgment of the carrier, the packaging is inadequate, requires cooping or has other deficiencies.
- (6) If shipment is "ready to go" in all respects, sign for shipment to signify acceptance.
- (7) The carrier, having accepted the high-value shipment, should place it in a safe repository such as a locker, vault or similar enclosure for holding prior to actual aircraft loading. Such enclosure should be locked at all times, except as required for the safe performance of cargo operations. The crib in the warehouse to be used for high-value cargo will vary in size depending on the dimensions, volume, and quantity of stored cargo. In all cases it should be constructed of heavy gauge cyclone fencing fixed to steel posts. This fencing must also cover the top of the crib. Sections of concrete curbing should be secured to the warehouse floor along the inside perimeter of the crib fencing. A sliding type gate should be secured by a chain and heavy padlock. The crib should be protected by a criss-crossed system of photoelectric alarms, wired to sound in both the warehouse and the supervisor's office.




In all cases a vault or large safe should be available for very high-value cargo. In this area alarm systems and closed-circuit television applications are recommended.

- (8) A log recording all movements and storage information should be maintained in the repository of high-value packages. The following should be recorded: package identification, time placed in repository, time out, and other pertinent data as the circumstances may require. In addition, an authorized designated individual should sign the log adjacent to the specific log entry. An inventory should be made at every shift, and noted in log.
- (9) The shipping documents should be promptly transferred from the receiving dock to the dispatcher, to record the shipment into the system and to institute security procedures. Most high-value cargo

handling procedures require the duty supervisor to be notified upon receipt of high values, in order that the goods be acknowledged as on hand and that they will be dispatched promptly under maximum security.

- (10) Small quantity shipments of high-value cargo may, at the discretion of the airline, be held for a sufficient period of time to consolidate such shipments in a suitable container, providing such period for consolidation does not represent unreasonable delay. In the application of this recommendation, the reservation procedure for high-value cargo should be coordinated with this consolidation feature.



- (11) Where size and weight permit, individual pieces are usually consolidated into a single carrying container. This may be a pouch, locker, or box which is secure and simple for a runner to handle. Container should be sealed, and record made of seal number on documents remaining at origin station and also on documents accompanying shipment.
- (12) Some airlines elect to load in a ULD container. The container for high-value cargo should be of sufficient size and shape so that it normally can be handled by conventional material-handling equipment. This container must be of such design that it is enclosed on all sides, has but one means of entry and egress, and such entrance should be capable of being securely locked and sealed. Seal number should be recorded on records accompanying ULD and those retained by origin station. Screens, nets and similar devices for controlling openings are not acceptable. The container should be in sound condition prior to its utilization for any movement of high-value cargo.

- (13) When the collective value of the cargo exceeds \$25,000, shipments should move under police or armed guard escort between cargo terminal and planeside.
- (14) Advance notice should be sent to the destination station immediately upon departure of flight carrying the valuable cargo. The location of the "value" aboard aircraft is given in the advance notification, to avoid "hunting" for shipment upon arrival. The Advance Notice also gives the destination station sufficient time to put into effect the standard high-value handling procedures. In order to enforce the 3-hour pickup requirement, the Advance Notice also serves the function of alerting the destination station to inform the consignee that the "value" is on its way; that the flight will arrive at a given time; and that the consignee should make all necessary arrangements for pickup within the required time.
- (15) Airlines, particularly international carriers, may wish to adopt a signature service, wherein a form such as a "Special Handling Notice" is used to indicate a high-value shipment. The form is a backup to the Advance Notice. This form is carried in the pouch containing the shipping documents that accompany the flight. The form may also include information regarding special handling of perishables and other cargo requiring prompt or particular service. The "Special Handling Notice" is to be signed by an authorized person at each point of interface from origin to destination. When the compartment of the aircraft is opened during a stop-off, the notice is to be signed as indicating that the "value" has not been tampered with at the stop-off point.
- (16) High-value shipments should be stowed aboard the aircraft so that they are under the observation of a supervisor, guard or runner at all times prior to the securing of the compartment.

C. Procedure - Destination Station

- (1) Destination should promptly acknowledge origin's request regarding reserve status when high-value handling procedure includes reservation clearance. Upon receipt of inquiry, contact consignee regarding his ability to pick up shipment within the 3-hour free time and/or not later than 24 hours before responding to clearance request.
- (2) Upon receipt of an Advance Notice, the destination station should institute standard high-value handling procedures, commencing with meeting the shipment at planeside before the opening of the cargo compartment.
- (3) Whether or not shipper has notified the consignee of the anticipated arrival time of the "value", in order that it be picked up within the 3-hour free time and/or not later than 24 hours, the destination station, upon receipt of the shipment, should notify the consignee of arrival and repeat the pickup requirement. Even when the shipper has informed the consignee of the arrival time in advance, the above suggestion is a good backup procedure.

- (4) Destination should notify the origin station within one hour after receipt that the valuable shipment has been received.
- (5) Notify, immediately, the origin station in the event a valuable is short-landed from the aircraft. Also notify security personnel, U.S. Customs, and law enforcement agencies.
- (6) The Advance Notice should require the attendance by an assigned person at the aircraft at the time of blocking. It should be the responsibility of the cargo duty supervisor to determine this arrival time and insure that the assigned employee is notified. When airline procedures require each arriving flight to be met by a cargo runner, whether an Advance Notice is received or not, he must be present when compartment of aircraft is opened.
- (7) Those airlines using a "Special Handling Notice" accompanying the flight should require the runner to obtain this notice at once, to determine if a valuable is aboard the aircraft. The notice, having been signed as the final act upon departure of a flight, may prove more valuable as a control device than the Advance Notice.
- (8) If the valuable is shipped loose, in a pouch, locker or other easily portable container, the runner or person assigned to retrieve same from aircraft must do so as soon as the compartment is opened.
- (9) If the valuable is shipped in a ULD, under seal, the seal condition and number must be checked, to determine that it is the same as applied at origin. Upon off-load of container and staging it on ramp, prior to transfer to cargo terminal, the container must be under constant surveillance by an authorized person. Valuables shipped in other than ULDs should be placed in a vehicle under attendance and immediately transferred to the cargo terminal.
- (10) If valuable is worth \$25,000, request a police escort. To assure the presence of escort on time, notify the police desk as far in advance as practical.
- (11) Whether under police escort or not, proceed to cargo terminal by prescribed route. Determine a standard time for run. When the load is late by 15 minutes, notify the police (unless under known escort) of the last known location of transporter. The time standard should be checked frequently. Road construction work, etc. may alter the standard. Where feasible, the route taken should avoid public roads. No deviation or stop-offs should be permitted.
- (12) When the runner with the valuable arrives at the cargo terminal, the shipment shall immediately be placed in the value room or cage, or delivered to the consignee. Make a log entry as per standard procedure. A valuable in ULD should be brought into the terminal without delay. Do not allow a container to stand on cargo ramp. Check the seal and number

for tampering. Once in terminal, the valuable should be removed from the container promptly. The container should not be left unattended until value is actually removed, accounted for, inspected and placed in the security room or vault. Make a log entry as per standard procedure.

- (13) An entry must be made in the log each time the value room is entered, stating the purpose. The log entry, key controls, and inventory check and signature service are the most practical measures for accounting for high-value cargo entrusted to airlines.
- (14) No matter what system of safeguarding the value room is used, there must be positive control of keys. Only designated persons should be allowed into the room. Such persons shall be held responsible for others entering the room for the purpose of handling cargo.
- (15) The value room should be equipped with shelves for the placement of small packages. Shelves keep pieces of different size separated while in the vault, reducing the risk of removing cargo by mistake.
- (16) An inventory should be taken of the high-value security room at frequent intervals; preferably, once each shift. During the inventory the log must be reviewed to determine how long pieces have been in the room. If an item is in the area for more than 24 hours, instruct consignee or his agent to pick cargo up immediately. Keep following up until delivery is made.
- (17) U.S. Customs may order certain valuable shipments into Public Stores. The result is a possible delay in delivery, beyond the control of carrier and consignee. Adequate security must be provided the goods prior to their transfer to the Public Store and following release from the Public Store.

In the event a security depository or armored trucker is utilized in conjunction with this type of transaction, the airline should establish a procedure that protects its revenue as well as the cargo. This is usually best accomplished by the airline retrieving the cargo, once it is released from the Public Store.

- (18) Airlines holding substantial sums of valuable cargo on their property for any length of time require contingency procedures to reduce this risk. The following are some of the more common reliefs available to carriers:
 - a. Enforce the requirement that high-value cargo will not be accepted more than 3 hours prior to departure and that inbound valuables shall be picked up within 3 hours and/or not later than 24 hours following arrival in the cargo terminal.
 - b. Require system not to ship valuables that will arrive on weekends or holidays, without special arrangements that goods, if shipped, will be picked up within 3 hours and/or not later than 24 hours of arrival at destination terminal.

- c. Where there is failure to comply with Nos. 1 and 2, return shipment to origin. This is a policy decision which must be established before the rule is implemented.
- d. Publish notice that, if cargo is not picked up within the 3-hour free time and/or not later than 24 hours, the airline may elect to transfer the cargo to a contract high-value security firm. All expenses for such shall be borne by the customer. Carrier shall inform the customer of the actions taken.
- e. According to the U.S. Customs' Tariff Act, Section 490(b):

"At Request of Consignee: At the request of the consignee of any merchandise, or of the owner or master of the vessel or the person in charge of the vehicle in which the same is imported, any merchandise may be taken possession of by the appropriate customs officer after the expiration of one day after the entry of the vessel or report of the vehicle and may be unladen and held at the risk and expense of the consignee until entry thereof is made."

All of these options are designed for the security benefit of customer and carrier.

It is in the interest of all that valuables remain in the custody of the airline for the shortest possible time. When this is not possible, the customer is asked to assume the extra expense for added protection. Therefore, the customer must be informed of the above options, in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

The vehicle for such notice is the tariff. Knowing the facts, the customer will make the most economical choice.

- (19) No valuable shall be released without positive authorization and identification. Particular attention must be given these requirements when the pickup is to be made during non-business hours. If positive verification cannot be made by using reasonable means, do not release the valuable until such verification is possible.
- (20) Having established positive authorization and identification of consignee and/or his agent, retrieve shipment from high-value room. Packages should be examined for condition and count. It is usually the best practice that the security area not be entered alone. In that way one person helps to insure the integrity of the other and guards against mistaken removals.

- (21) Upon removal of the shipment, log entries shall be made and the log signed, in order to fix responsibility.
- (22) Release shipment only after acquiring proper signature. Do not release a valuable shipment against any form of exception. Call the supervisor immediately if pickup driver seeks an exception or other question arises.
- (23) If aircraft is diverted for any reason, a procedure must be established with operations personnel so that the destination station is informed of the diversion. It should be the duty of the destination station to notify the station to which the flight is diverted regarding the handling required of high-value shipments. If the station is not a system station, or where required of an airline's own station, issue specific instructions as to the security required. Instructions should always include guidance regarding subsequent forwarding of the valuable by the station to which flight was diverted; that is Advance Notice to destination, etc. (A detailed consideration of this problem is covered in E., below).

D. Transfer and Stowage of High-Value Cargo

The following recommendations are designed to support and complement preceding suggestions for the handling and transport of high-value cargo:

- (1) Small packages containing valuables should be contained in standard/minimum size containers or high-value pouches affixed to the aircraft.
- (2) Sensitive or high-value articles should not be accepted prior to three hours before a flight. Incoming merchandise of high value should be picked up within three hours of arrival or placed in a central repository for safekeeping.
- (3) Valuables should be immediately off-loaded from incoming flights by supervisory personnel and taken to a value room or central repository.
- (4) Advance notice relative to information on valuables should be restricted, and access limited to authorized personnel only.
- (5) Special precautions should be taken when flights are aborted in order to protect high-value cargo.
- (6) Valuables should be escorted via cart, in minimum/standard size containers.
- (7) Responsibility for the consignment of valuables to a high-value room or central repository should be specifically assigned.
- (8) Immediate notification should be made by the airline to the consignee upon receipt of a high-value shipment. Prompt pickup rules must be adhered to.
- (9) Release of high-value/risk shipments should only be made with proper authorization and positive identification. The consignee

should be contacted when in doubt and the cargo in question withheld.

- (10) Release of C.O.D. and high-value shipments should be limited to delivery during banking hours only, in order to verify the validity of a check, draft, order, etc.

E. Flight Delays and Diversions

The safeguarding of high-value cargo in instances of a delay or diversion of a flight should be incorporated into all airline security plans.

Flight Delays

- (1) The airline operational manager should notify the cargo manager immediately whenever a delay occurs. He in turn alerts the security officer and other interested parties.
- (2) Immediate precautions to protect vulnerable cargo should be instituted by the duty manager as the plane is returned to a specific location, according to the nature of the delay. (A guard should be assigned throughout the delay).
- (3) Persons assigned to protect cargo should maintain continuous observation and document any movement of the valuable cargo.
- (4) High-value cargo should be removed from the aircraft and stored in a burglar-proof high-value room if security cannot be provided and/or conditions warrant.

Flight Diversions

- (1) The operational manager should alert the duty cargo manager as to the location or diversion point of his aircraft.
- (2) Prompt notification should be made by the cargo manager to airline security who should take immediate and positive action to safeguard the sensitive cargo.
- (3) If the company does not maintain a cargo facility at the airport of diversion, company officials should grant authorization to the agency representing the airline to employ necessary safety precautions.
- (4) Document all movement of high-value cargo.
- (5) Arrange storage in a theft-proof facility or vault as applicable.

Aborted Flights

If, after the completion of loading, circumstances develop that require the flight containing high-value cargo to be aborted, the following procedures are recommended:

- (1) Notifications will be made to:
 - a. The duty cargo supervisor

- b. The airline's security officer
- c. Airport police

- (2) Airline security and supervisory personnel will respond to the aircraft prior to unloading. NO items will be removed from the aircraft until these parties are at the scene.
- (3) As high-value items are removed from the aircraft, they should be checked against the manifest or airbills for the flight.
- (4) If it is not to be placed on an alternate aircraft within a short time, the high-value cargo should be returned to the central repository.
- (5) Upon completion of unloading, the supervisor/senior agent present should physically examine the aircraft to ensure that all cargo has been removed.
- (6) Once cleared by the supervisor/senior agent present, the aircraft may be removed for repairs.
- (7) Subsequent management of the cargo should follow the procedures indicated in the section on High-Value Cargo Handling.

7. PASSENGER TERMINAL SECURITY

Since Passenger Terminal Security involves problems and procedures distinct from those of other air cargo, it is here considered in a separate section. This fact does not in any sense imply that diminished importance should be given to these procedures. It is to be emphasized that it is in this area of cargo handling that airlines have their most obvious contact with the general public. The efficiency with which passenger baggage is handled will in serious measure determine the opinion passengers have of an airline's competence. Inefficient, inconvenient baggage delivery invariably results in loss of future patronage. It is most important, therefore, that the terminal operations follow these guidelines:

- (1) All passenger terminals should be designed to provide clear demarcation between the public areas and the ramp areas.
- (2) Doors from the public areas to the ramp should restrict access to the ramp but at the same time provide escape routes for the public in the event of emergencies. The door should be equipped with panic hardware with alarms to signal when the doors are open.
- (3) Jetway doors and other doors used for aircraft loading should be fitted with a lock to permit closing and locking the doors to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
- (4) Ticket counters should be so constructed as to prevent the public from reaching money, accountable documents, validators, etc. from the front of the counter.

- (5) Ticket counters should be so constructed as to prevent the public from having access to the work area.
- (6) Locked ticket storage or ticket vending equipment should be provided.
- (7) Agents' change drawers should be fitted with a removable core lock.
- (8) Change drawer storage cabinets should be located in a locked room behind the ticket counters which can be kept under observation by a supervisor. This room should have a single access and no window.
- (9) A safe with a night deposit attachment should be provided into which flight crews can deposit funds collected in flight. This safe preferably will be located in an accounting office with the night deposit device outside the office.
- (10) Where ticket lift desks are located at gate positions, each should be equipped with a locked slotted box built into the desk for ticket deposit to assure that tickets cannot be removed by unauthorized persons when the agent is required to leave his position.
- (11) Baggage conveyors should be enclosed from the point where bags are placed on it to the ultimate point of discharge to prevent access to the bags from the public to the makeup area.
- (12) Barriers should be installed to enclose the passenger baggage pickup area. Barriers should be constructed so as to prevent bags being passed over, through, or under the barrier.
- (13) Entrances and exits in the barriers should be reduced to the minimum required to handle the passenger flow and should be controllable when in use and capable of being closed and locked when not in use.



- (14) Receptacles should be provided at each opening in the barrier into which baggage claim and strap checks can be deposited.



- (15) Signs should be installed instructing passengers to claim bag by strap check number, not by appearance.
- (16) A secure storage area capable of being locked should be installed to store bags not claimed after a flight.
- (17) Escalators, elevators and stairways should be locked so that they do not open inside the baggage claim area barriers.
- (18) Rooms where large quantities of money are handled or kept overnight should be fitted with a burglar-proof vault equipped with an alarm to the local police station and sounding in the supervisor's office.
- (19) Electrical outlets and space for security screening and processing of passengers should be provided.
- (20) A facility to insure privacy should be maintained in the event that personal search or interrogation becomes necessary.

8. PROGRAM TO IMPROVE BAGGAGE SECURITY

A. Baggage Acceptance

The first step in a secure baggage acceptance program is to insure that the process is systematized to provide for the orderly receipt of baggage. At curbside or at a terminal counter the stock of baggage tags should be protected at all times to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining baggage tags. Lockable receptacles should be used.

The next step is to make sure that the baggage presented is acceptable for transport, that it is properly packaged and not damaged. The recent dramatic increase in the number of passengers, including many infrequent flyers, makes it imperative that only properly packaged baggage be accepted. Some airlines use a Limited Release Tag for items that are fragile, unsuitably packed, damaged when checked in, or perishable. The traffic increase also highlights the need to assure that an identification tag is affixed to each piece of luggage.


Passenger tickets should be examined to insure that baggage tags showing the proper destination and flight number are affixed to the proper pieces. The agent should repeat the flight number and destination to the passenger. Examination of the ticket and repetition of destination and flight number prevents misroutings. It also prevents input of items into the baggage flow by non-ticketed persons attempting fraudulent shipment of the items or other criminal purposes.

B. Transport to Baggage Room

The first step in secure transport of baggage to the baggage room is to control access to the conveyor and limit access on the route the bag takes. In this regard there should be coordination with facility design personnel. Baggage must be placed on a secure conveyor or in a protected cart. Irregular baggage must be placed in a proper receptacle to prevent its being damaged or causing damage to other baggage or equipment. Unidentified baggage should be released to the custody of the baggage supervisor; it should not be placed in the normal flow of baggage. Damaged bags should be removed and immediately recovered and, if possible, the cause of damage should be identified and rectified. The requirement that conveyors and bag-handling equipment be inspected periodically must be enforced to make sure there are no obstructions or projections which could tear a bag or cause it to open and expose its contents.

C. Baggage Sort and Transfer Room

The security of this room begins with good coordination with facility design personnel to insure that it is well lighted and provides for clear observation of all tasks by a supervisor. Unnecessary partitions should be eliminated. Baggage makeup procedures should be designed to prevent positioning of carts and stacking of baggage in such a way as to provide unsupervised areas. During non-operational hours the room should be locked. If this is not possible, on-hand baggage should be placed in a locked crib or other suitable receptacle. Unauthorized personnel should not be permitted in the room, nor should there be an unlocked entrance to the room from another room or hallway. Personnel should be aware of the security dangers of advance forwarding of bags.



D. Movement to and from Aircraft

Security of this phase of movement of baggage begins with defining a precise route to be followed. This should avoid public roads, parking area, routes taken by trash trucks, and areas where buildings or other vehicles obstruct vision. The entire route should be well lighted. Proper equipment must be used to preclude baggage falling off carts. Supervisors and carrier security officers should make unscheduled inspections of the routes. Where practicable, police patrols should cover this area at unscheduled times. Supervisors should establish schedules, where appropriate, and be alerted to overdue vehicles.

E. Aircraft Loading and Unloading

The two most important security features of the aircraft loading and unloading part of baggage processing are lighting and supervisory presence. Lighting is essential for safety, accuracy, and prevention of damage as well as a deterrent to criminal or careless activities. Lighting must be adequate on the ramp area as well as in the belly of the aircraft. The handling of baggage on the ramp, particularly the aircraft stowage or unloading procedures, should be under the close scrutiny of the ramp supervisor or his designee. Since baggage that is not in the normal flow presents security dangers greater than baggage being processed in normal fashion, it should be sorted and loaded according to destination to prevent overflight of bags on multi-stop itineraries. In addition, wherever possible during the unloading procedure, interline baggage should be separated from terminating or on-line transfer baggage to provide for expeditious movement to a contract transfer agent or directly to the receiving airline.

F. Baggage Claim Area

Positive claim is the most secure method of release of baggage to passengers. In addition to the security benefit, there is a certain feeling of moral comfort by a passenger when he or she sees his or her baggage processed under controlled conditions. Many stations do not use positive claim because of structural or space problems, economic considerations or esthetic rejection. Such stations should make a reevaluation of their decision. The increase in carrier liability for lost bags, the huge traffic increase, particularly the increase in the number of new travelers, the increase in congestion in public transportation areas adjacent to baggage claim stations dictate a reassessment of the need for positive claim. Where positive claim is not in use, a bag on a carousel represents a target of opportunity, and it is essential to remove one or both to prevent the criminal act.



Claim areas, whether positive or not, must be kept under constant or reasonably frequent surveillance by airline personnel. Police patrols should include frequent passing through the area. Where positive claim is not in use, random spot checks of claim checks should be made by station personnel. Baggage should be removed from carousel and secured within 20 minutes from the time that it was available to the passengers.

Surveys have shown instances of inadequate supervision of claim areas, particularly when a contract firm is working at a claim station used by more than one carrier. Claim areas have been left unmanned, bag claim checks are not compared, tags are not pulled and destroyed, and skycaps are not picking up and destroying claim stubs. Local baggage and security committees should become involved in the supervision of baggage claim areas and plans should be formulated to insure adequate supervision.

G. Baggage Delivery Service

Selection of a reputable contractor is the first step in insuring that baggage turned over for delivery will be delivered in a timely manner to the correct place. Airports handling a substantial number of group travelers might consider a multi-part baggage tag that would establish a good chain of custody.

H. Baggage Claims

The increase in traffic, increase in dollar amounts that can be claimed for undelivered baggage, and severe taxing of facilities accent the necessity to have extremely close coordination between baggage and security personnel. It is essential that personnel taking the initial report of lost baggage be as thorough as possible. All claims by passengers for loss of baggage should be reviewed to ascertain if they are wholly legitimate.

Claims representatives should refer suspicious claims to the security departments of the carriers. Some carriers have maintained cost comparisons of cases referred to security for investigation and the savings have been substantial. Some carrier investigators use checklists in conducting interviews of claimants.

Before paying a claim the baggage manager should consult the computerized list of "professional" claimants.

APPENDIX

	Page
I. Syllabi for the Training of Security Personnel	41
II. Air Cargo Security Questionnaire	47
III. 24 Point Program of the Port Authority of NY/NJ	54
IV. J. F. Kennedy Airport Security Council Mandates	58

I. TRAINING OF SECURITY PERSONNEL

The Watchman

Training

It has been suggested by law enforcement officers that, since a watchman's duties are somewhat limited, training objectives can be achieved with two days of academic training and three days "on the job training" with an experienced watchman.

A suggested schedule for the two days of academic training follows:

DAY ONE

0800 - 0900	Introduction to the Airport and Employing Company
0900 - 1000	The Duties and Responsibilities of the Watchman
1000 - 1100	Employee Rules and Regulations
1200 - 1300	L U N C H
1300 - 1500	Fundamentals of Security and Fire Alarm Systems
1500 - 1600	Ethics and Courtesy

DAY TWO

0800 - 0900	Reporting Incidents
0900 - 1000	"Watchman-Police" Relations
1000 - 1100	Written Reports - Security Incidents - Hazardous Conditions - Security Deficiencies
1100 - 1200	Fundamentals of Patrol
1200 - 1300	L U N C H
1300 - 1400	Fire Incidents - Reporting - Use of Fire Extinguishers
1400 - 1500	Summary
1500 - 1600	Graduation and Concluding Remarks

Before concluding this segment, stress is to be placed on the importance of assigning the new employee to a "model" watchman for his three days of "on the job training". The reason for the importance of selecting this person is because he can either reinforce the ideals taught during the academic phase or indoctrinate the new watchman with negative values and behavior.

The Security Guard

Training

Since his duties are important, we believe that the training objectives can be achieved with eight days academic training and two days "on-the-job" training with an experienced Security Officer.

Two-Week Security Guard Curriculum - Week One

First Day - (Week One)

0800 - 0900	Introduction to the Airport and Employing Company
0900 - 1000	The Duties and Responsibilities of the Security Guard
1000 - 1200	Employee Rules and Regulations
1200 - 1300	L U N C H
1300 - 1500	Fundamentals of Security and Fire Alarm Systems
1500 - 1600	Ethics and Courtesy

Second Day - (Week One)

0800 - Physical Security Systems I	Fences, lighting and locks
0900 - Other Law Enforcement Agencies - FBI	Guest FBI speaker
1000 - Law III	Legal aspects of robbery, burglary and trespass

1100 - First Aid II

Sounds

1200

L U N C H

1300 - Other Law Enforcement Agencies - Port or Local Police

Guest speaker

1400 - Hazards

Alarm systems, guard response, prevention and reports

1500 - Routine Patrol I

Foot patrol

1600 - Dismissal

Third Day - (Week One)

0800 - Report Writing #1

Basic forms and techniques

0900 - Other Law Enforcement Agencies - Customs

Guest speaker

1000 - First Aid III

Fractures, sprains, strains and dislocations

1100 - Law IV

Use of physical force and deadly physical force

1200

L U N C H

1300 - Report Writing #2

The complete narrative

1400 - Ethics

1500 - Cargo Documents I

1600 - Dismissal

Fourth Day - (Week One)

0800 - First Aid IV

Strokes and heart attacks

0900 - Law V and VI (2 hours)

Other crimes

1100 - Law VII

Rape, rape evidence and handling the victim

1200

L U N C H

1300 - Other Law Enforcement Agencies Postal security and immigration

Guest speaker

1400 - Hazards

Chemistry of fire and principles of extinguishment and rescue

1500 - Cargo Documents II

1600 - Dismissal

Fifth Day - (Week One)

0800 - Routine Patrol	Car and selective patrol
0900 - Radio codes and use	
1000 - Intelligence and organized crime	
1100 - Courtesy	
1200	L U N C H
1300 - First Aid V	Artificial respiration
1400 - Cargo Documents III	
1500 - Labor Problems	
1600 - Dismissal	

Two-Week Security Guard Curriculum - Week Two

First Day - (Week Two)

0800 - Safeguard Crime Scenes and Evidence	
0900 - Self-Defense	
1000 - First Aid Examination	
1100 - Traffic Direction	
1200	L U N C H
1300 - Lost Property	
1400 - How to Accept Supervision	
1500 - Sociology I	Perception and empathy
1600 - Dismissal	

Second Day - (Week Two)

0800 - Sociology II	Crisis intervention
0900 - Sociology III	Handling mentally disturbed persons
1000 - Hazardous cargo	Safety precautions and emergency response
1100 - Sociology IV	Minority groups and inter-personal relations
1200	L U N C H
1300 - Law VIII (2 hours)	Arrest, search, seizure and review

Second Day - (Week Two) Continued

1500 - Law Test	
1600 - Dismissal	

Third Day - (Week Two)

0800 - 0900	Final Test
0900 - 1200	Tour of Port and its security systems
1200	L U N C H
1300 - 1500	General Review
1500 - 1600	Graduation
1600	Dismissal

Fourth and Fifth Days (Week Two)

On the job training with an experienced Armed Security Guard

ADDITIONAL TRAINING FOR ARMED SECURITY GUARD

Three-Day Curriculum

DAY ONE

0800 - 0900 Welcome and overview of the role of the Armed Security Guard
0900 - 1100 The law and deadly physical force
1100 - 1200 Issue of weapons and the mechanical operation of the revolver
1200 - 1300 L U N C H
1300 - 1400 Pistol range safety and rules
1400 - 1600 Holding and aiming the weapon
1600 Dismissal

DAY TWO

0800 - 0900 Range orientation and review of safety rules
0900 - 1200 Single action firing at bullseye targets
1200 - 1300 L U N C H
1300 - 1500 Double action firing at bullseye targets
1500 - 1600 Cleaning of weapons

DAY THREE

0800 - 0900 Review of safety rules and firing techniques
0900 - 0930 Double action firing at bullseye targets
0930 - 1200 Combat shooting (5 yds; 10 yds; 20 yds)
1200 - 1300 L U N C H
1300 - 1400 Combat shooting
1400 - 1500 Qualifying test
1530 - 1600 Cleaning of weapons

II. Air Cargo Security
Questionnaire

(This form is utilized by representatives of the Police Department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to provide data and guidance relative to organizational structure and areas of security within the air cargo industry at their airports)

AIR CARGO SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

Date: _____
 Time: _____
 Firm: _____ Phone: _____
 Location: _____
 Person Interviewed: _____ Title: _____
 Address: _____ Phone: _____
 Description of Complex: _____
 Fenced in? _____ Yes _____ No
 Hours of Operation: _____
 Type of Commodity Handled: _____

1. PERSONNEL

Security/Criminal Check? _____ Yes _____ No
 Explain: _____
 Credit Check? _____ Yes _____ No
 Bonded? _____ Yes _____ No
 By whom? _____
 Total number of employees: _____
 Union Affiliation: _____

Union Representatives: _____

Labor Problems: _____ Yes _____ No
 Explain: _____

2. SECURITY

How many guards? _____ Tour Breakdown: _____ 8 - 4
 Armed?: _____ Yes _____ No _____ 4 - 12
 Explain: _____ 12 - 8

Peace Officers? _____ Yes _____ No Pay Scale _____

Mobil Patrol? _____ Yes _____ No Uniformed? _____

Explain: _____

Name of Guard Service: _____

Head of Security: _____ Phone: _____

Address: _____

Who to Contact After Hours: _____

Name of Roundsman: _____

Powers of Arrest: _____

Apprehension/Arrests Past Experience: _____

ALARM SYSTEM:

_____ Central Alarm	_____ Yes	_____ No
_____ Electric Eye	N.D.T.	_____ Yes _____ No
_____ Push Button	A.D.T.	_____ Yes _____ No
_____ Closed Circuit TV	ELECTRO	_____ Yes _____ No
_____ Other	TELEPHONE Co.	_____ Yes _____ No
	Other	_____

Remarks: _____

Type of Communication: _____

Monitored by: _____

Who responds: _____

Agencies notified: _____

KEY CONTROL

Administered by: _____

Who has possession of keys? _____

Who logs in and out? _____

Mastered blanks? _____ Where kept? _____

Grand Masters: How many _____ In whose possession? _____

TRUCKING (Pickups and Deliveries)

Carriers: _____

Bill of Lading/Manifest accompany shipment? _____

Explain: _____

How does pick-up work? _____

How does drop-off work? _____

Any hold lines? _____

How are trucks controlled? _____

Who supervises loading/unloading? _____

Peak periods of activity: _____

How many truck docks? _____ Where located? _____

Log trucks in and out? _____ Yes _____ No

Procedure: _____

JANITORIAL SERVICE

Contractor: _____

Address: _____

Frequency service performed: _____

Areas serviced: _____

Number of employees: _____

Related crimes: _____

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY POLICE

24-POINT PROGRAM

Law enforcement recognizes that the best tool in cargo security is an effective, workable loss prevention program. As mentioned previously, cooperation in this area must be maintained between law enforcement and airline management. In January, 1968, an innovative loss prevention program was inaugurated at the New York airports by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. After analyzing the reasons which made the thefts possible, it was determined that apprehension of criminals, the traditional method employed by police, was outdated for several reasons.

A program based on information converted into the reasons for the thefts resulted in a simplified three-dimension prevention program.

1. Employee matters
2. Non-employee matters
3. Equipment matters

Detectives are assigned to investigate all areas of criminal activity for specific airlines, including cargo. This enables the investigative teams to become familiar with specific operations and personnel of each airline.

Cargo losses are investigated by the assigned teams and lapses of security are brought to the attention of airline security personnel immediately for corrective action.

Once a year, assigned detectives conduct a 24-point survey of recommendations to increase air cargo security. Breakdowns relevant to the 24-point program are forwarded to the Commanding Officer of the Detective Division.

A 24-point meeting is usually arranged between the Facility Commanding Officer, Detective Lieutenant, Airline Cargo Manager and Airline Security Officer. Violations of the program are discussed and airline personnel are encouraged to comply with the findings. Followup inspections are conducted by the Detective Unit on the airlines' progress in reducing the opportunity for thefts, and rarely are further meetings necessary to gain cooperation. Breakdowns in the 24-point program are also discussed at Level III of the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee, each month, for the benefit of all airline security personnel.

III. 24 Point Program of the
Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey Police

JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE AIR CARGO AREA SECURITY

(Presented to Airlines January 1968)

EMPLOYEE MATTERS

1. Each airline should assign a qualified security officer to its cargo activities.
2. Employers should secure background check to determine accuracy of job application form.
3. Identification cards should be issued bearing pictures that must be worn on outermost garment.
4. Supervisors should be trained to question presence of unknown persons in the cargo area.
5. Cargo area should be restricted. Only specified (by name list) employees should be permitted in the area.
6. Supervisors should be accountable for whereabouts of cargo handlers during tour. Work schedule should never permit the area to be abandoned at any time.
7. Burden of responsibility for signing freight in and out must be clearly assigned to a specific employee. Name, number and license plate of trucking outfit should be listed on all delivery receipts, and if a hired truck, driver's license number.
8. No employee should be permitted to park a private vehicle at any cargo building.
9. Airline gate guards should record all movements into and out of the cargo area rampside. A failure to exit within a reasonable time should be reported to the Port Authority Police. All rampside vehicles not driven by uniformed personnel should be questioned and identification obtained.

NON-EMPLOYEE MATTERS

1. Persons other than authorized airline employees should not be permitted to:
 - a. Enter warehouse streetside.
 - b. Remain rampside without surveillance.
 - c. Handle freight from one truck to another except under responsible supervision.
 - d. Locate and handle freight to be picked up.
2. Parallel parking of trucks in front of bays should be prohibited. Back parking should be enforced.

3. Trucking firms should not be permitted to use airlines' leased parking lots as their base of operations. However, if this is necessary for the benefit of the airline, the airline parking lots should be realigned to segregate truck parking areas from private vehicles. Loaded trucks should not be left in the parking lot unless a guard is on duty.
4. Brokers' runners should be supervised at all cargo areas and their access limited to the specific shipment involved.
5. No private vehicles should be parked near cargo building loading and unloading area.
6. No pickups should be permitted without valid orders, especially when hired equipment is involved. Any doubts should be cleared with consignee or broker.

EQUIPMENT MATTERS

1. Each company should have a burglar proof high value storage area with very limited access. Airlines and Port Authority should consider construction of a central "depository" for off-hour storage of high value cargo.
2. A direct silent alarm with provision for alert to the Port Authority Police desk should be considered; safes, value vaults, doors, and/or cashiers' areas should be specially equipped.
3. Loaded mobile equipment should never be stored outside without surveillance. When possible, they should be secured inside when the operation closes for the night.
4. All mobile equipment should have positive locking devices that are key operated (including pallets and carts).
5. No keys should be left in ignition locks of unattended vehicles.
6. Cargo containers, whether empty or loaded, should always be locked.
7. Contents of cargo trains should not be open to view.
 - a. Clear plastic covers should never be used.
 - b. Open trailers and trucks should be phased out to be replaced by enclosed vehicles.
8. Forklift vehicles should receive special attention to prevent their use in forcing doors.
9. Trucks containing cargo should have locked gates and doors across the rear and should be kept locked when unattended.

IV. AIRPORT SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATES

The following procedures have been mandated by the Airport Security Council:

1. Employees of Council members working in air freight facilities required to wear employee identification badges. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 1/1, October 10, 1968: "Air Cargo Employee Identification System")
2. Uniform system for recording thefts, pilferage and losses in air cargo operations established. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 5/0, January 23, 1969: "Uniform/Central Reporting Procedures")
3. Loading/unloading platform doors to be kept closed except while in use. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 3/03, December 19, 1969: "Required Gate Security Controls")
4. Paint yellow line beyond which no one shall be permitted except by authorization. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 3/03, December 19, 1969: "Required Gate Security Controls")
5. Carrier shall not stow or leave cargo in front of yellow line except while under attendance. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 3/03, December 19, 1969: "Required Gate Security Controls")
6. Council member must designate prescribed parking areas in and around cargo terminal. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 3/0J, December 23, 1969: "Limited Parking Areas at Cargo Terminals")
7. Neither cargo nor documents shall be released to anyone without proper identification. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 1/1H, December 19, 1969: "Release of Cargo and/or Shipping Documents")
8. All carriers are required to use Kennedy Form. It shall consist of a minimum of three copies. (Airport Security Council Circular Memorandum 3/6A, December 23, 1969: "Required Use of Kennedy Form") (Also required by United States Customs as of May 15, 1970)
9. Resolution relating to the protection of high value cargo which defined high value cargo and outlined procedures for security. (Memorandum to all Council members, July 28, 1970, file 0/24, effective August 15, 1970)
10. Compliance resolution, provides for corrective and/or punitive action by reprimand, fine or other penalties for failure to comply with mandates or action contrary to objectives of Council. (Council memorandum, July 29, 1970 file 0/24, effective August 15, 1970)
11. The mail mandate prescribes regulations concerning locking and sealing of mail vehicles moving between ramps and the air mail facility. Establishes routes and employee mail handling procedures intended to assure swift secure delivery between planeside and Post Office facilities. (Effective December 15, 1971.)
12. Periodic inventories shall be made of air cargo in storage in airline cargo facilities at John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark Airports.

This pertains to all stored cargo and is in addition to the periodic inventory already required of the contents of high value storage areas.

Additional copies of this book may be obtained from:

Public Affairs Officer
Eastern Region, FAA
Federal Building, JFK Airport
Jamaica, New York 11430

END