


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The Integral Unit

By Clarence M. Kelley
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People from other lands find it difficult to comprehend how our system of government functions. Many do not understand the principle of voluntary cooperation responsible for much of the success achieved under our separate divisions of government. This is particularly true of the field of law enforcement.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the primary investigation arm of the Department of Justice; and as such, it is charged with investigating violations of certain specific laws. But the FBI does not discharge this duty in a vacuum. It receives help and it gives help as does all of law enforcement.

This giving and receiving—this voluntary cooperation—among all the separate branches of law enforcement has developed to the extent that the entire law enforcement community is coming to be perceived almost as an integral unit. While each agency has totally separate responsibilities, an ever-present cooperative unity enables all law enforcement to render to the American people infinitely better service in each sphere of responsibility than otherwise would be possible.

While the duties of most Federal enforcement agencies are limited to a comparative handful of violations, the FBI's sphere of responsibility covers an extremely broad spectrum. Alphabetically, it ranges from Admiralty Matters and Anti-racketeering to violations of the Welfare and Pension Plans, Disclosure Act, and the White Slave Traffic Act.

Some of the offenses within our jurisdiction command national headlines and have tremendous emotional impact: bombing matters; kidnappings; major bank robberies; sky-jackings; and other violent crimes—

including assaults upon, or killings of, Federal officers—involving direct threats to human life. Others are less dramatic and perhaps less familiar to the public: piracy of films or musical recordings in violation of Federal copyright laws; embezzlement of Federal funds or funds of specified banking-type institutions; "scams"—that is, planned bankruptcies; and even such unusual offenses as violations of the Migratory Bird Act and unauthorized use of the "Smokey Bear," "Woodsy Owl," and "Johnny Horizon" symbol.

This broad range of investigative responsibility could not be discharged effectively without the close, reciprocal cooperation afforded the FBI by other law enforcement agencies. We are particularly grateful to the men and women of the United States Customs Service, who have been, and continue to be, most helpful to our agents. We, in turn, strive to reciprocate.

There are several ways we are able to do so. One is through the training services that the FBI is privileged to make available, not only in the Washington, D.C., area but elsewhere throughout the Nation. Best known of them are the special programs conducted at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. However, qualified instructors are assigned also to each of our field divisions; and they are available to assist in meeting training needs of other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

Most recently, the increasing number of hostile acts by smugglers and terrorist groups against Customs Patrol Officers assigned to various posts in the United States prompted Customs to request specialized training for these officers. One training school

already has been held; and FBI Training Division and Customs Service personnel currently are collaborating on three additional—with the possibility that other schools will be scheduled in the future.

The same spirit of close cooperation exists in the area of identification.

Our Identification Division processes arrest fingerprint cards forwarded to it from the Headquarters of the United States Customs Service and its 45 district offices throughout the United States. It also conducts name searches with regard to suspected smugglers when the Customs Service telephones in such requests; and wanted notices are posted in the files of the Identification Division for fugitives being sought by Customs. These wanted notices assure that your Service will be notified immediately of any in-

formation bearing on the fugitive's whereabouts that is later received. In addition, if needed for use in a subsequent court action, our Identification Division will furnish a Certification of Record relative to the arrest record of subjects of Customs Service cases.

The services of our FBI Laboratory are fully available in Customs matters. They include, among others, scientific examinations of evidence and expert testimony by the FBI scientists involved at trials in court.

We can also be of direct investigative assistance in the event a suspected smuggler, apprehended by the United States Customs Service, defaults his bond. A violation of this type brings the fugitive within our jurisdiction and enables our agents to actively seek his arrest.

We, in our turn, depend greatly on

the United States Customs Service. Day after day, for example, we rely on your alertness in identifying fugitives on whom stops have been placed by our agents.

The daily work at each port of entry may encompass elements which are both dangerous and dramatic. Among the many instances in which Customs Inspectors frustrate attempts to bring contraband into the United States, there are always some cases which have far-flung ramifications; and scores of officers at the local, county, state, and Federal levels may combine in the united effort to achieve a solution.

The success of such far-flung investigations hinges upon the quick availability and exchange of key data. Very often the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the United States Customs Service's

Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) play an immensely important role.

Nothing reveals more clearly the reciprocal compact of cooperation existing between the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service than the relationship which enables the NCIC—a computerized index of information on missing persons, fugitives, and stolen property—and TECS to function so effectively.

The NCIC computer is located in Washington, D.C. Terminals enable law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and certain foreign areas to access and retrieve criminal information from the NCIC.

The TECS computer, located in San Diego, California, has a direct line into the NCIC. Primary and secondary terminals at ports of entry throughout the

United States lead into TECS, with direct access to NCIC being made through the secondary terminal.

In the early days of TECS and NCIC, the effort on the part of the Customs officers was to check persons entering the United States through what is now known as the secondary terminal. This meant each request went first to TECS and then to NCIC. In the process, a delay in the order of four seconds might result; and with thousands of persons arriving at ports of entry daily, some means had to be found to overcome this delay. Accordingly, NCIC personnel working closely with TECS personnel, compiled a special program—actually creating an index of wanted persons taken from the full records in NCIC—which could be stored in the TECS computer in San Diego.

Today, a Customs Inspector makes his check of individuals entering the United States on a TECS primary terminal and receives a one-word answer—a "yes" or a "no"—in considerably less than a second. If the answer is "no," the entrant is permitted to proceed. If it is "yes," the individual is detained while an NCIC check, which will produce a full record from the NCIC computer in Washington, is made on the secondary line.

On October 17, 1977, a new program became operational in which abbreviated stolen and felony vehicle records and stolen license plate records from NCIC are stored in the TECS computer. Now, a quick primary check can be made of vehicles as well as persons coming into the United States.

In fiscal year 1979, through the on-line access to NCIC, Customs officers intercepted and turned over 1,622 felony fugitives to state, local, and other Federal law enforcement agencies and recovered 743 stolen vehicles.

Today, computer technology contributes its immense capacity to the uses of law enforcement. It is one more of the vital cooperative services which help to form the United States Custom Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and all of the many other branches of law enforcement into an integral unit serving the American people.



At the FBI laboratory in Washington, a firearms expert compares firing pin markings on cartridge cases to determine if both were fired by the same gun.



A confiscated weapon is examined for possible addition to the reference collection.



A serial number which had been ground off the weapon is restored and then photographed.



A document is examined to determine if it was altered with an ink different from the original ink.



Making a photomicrograph of line crossings on a document to determine if handwriting was made before type-writing.

END