


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, FEAR AND SOCIAL CONTROL:  
A SECOND LOOK AT THE HARTFORD PROGRAM

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
List of Tables	iii
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgements	vi
Introduction	1
Project Background	1
Significance of Re-evaluation	6
The Program, 1977 to 1979	7
Impact on Social Organization and Informal Social Control	8
Impact on Robbery and Burglary	16
The Impact on Resident Perceptions And Fear of Crime	18
Conclusions and Implications	21
Citations	28

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE 1 Use of the Neighborhood in North Asylum Hill, 1975-79	11
TABLE 2 Informal Social Control and Perceptions of Neighborhood, North Asylum Hill	12
TABLE 3 Neighbors as Resources Against Crime and Neighborhood Quality, 1975-79	14
TABLE 4 North Asylum Hill Crime Rates, Observed and Expected	17
TABLE 5 North Asylum Hill Fear Levels, Observed and Expected	20
TABLE 6 North Asylum Hill Ratings of Neighborhood Crime Problems	22

ABSTRACT

In 1976, a unique effort to curb burglary and robbery as well as fear of these crimes in an urban neighborhood was implemented in the Asylum Hill section of Hartford, Connecticut. The program had three components:

1) By building cul-de-sacs on some neighborhood streets and by making others one-way, use of residential streets by motorists passing through the areas was substantially reduced. In addition, the residential character of the neighborhood was reinforced by creating visual entrances into the neighborhood from the busy streets that surrounded it.

2) A neighborhood police team was created, together with a Police Advisory Committee consisting of resident representatives, to strengthen the relationship between police and residents and increase police attention to neighborhood problems and concerns.

3) Formal organizations in the neighborhood were created and/or strengthened to provide effective ways for residents to work on neighborhood problems.

The program was not intended to affect crime and fear directly. Rather, it was intended to be catalytic and to create an environment in which the residents of the neighborhood would exert more social control, thereby reducing stranger-to-stranger crime and the extent to which people were afraid or concerned about crime.

The program was initially evaluated in 1977, after it had been fully in place for about a year. At that time, the rate of burglary in the neighborhood had dropped well below expected levels, and the robbery rate probably had improved as well. Moreover, some of the measures of fear and concerns about crime, particularly those with respect to burglary, also improved.

In 1979, three years after initial implementation, the effectiveness of the police component of the program was reduced. There were significant manpower reductions. The number of arrests made by police for burglaries and robberies, which had risen sharply when the program started, dropped sharply. However, the community organizations were still active; the street changes were still in place; and the traffic through the area was sharply reduced.

The most significant program effect was the extent to which residents increased in their behaviors and feelings related to informal social control of their neighborhood. Residents reported using the neighborhood more, a better ability to recognize strangers, a much higher incidence of actually

intervening in suspicious situations and a markedly increased perception of neighbors as a resource against crime. People also felt that the neighborhood was improving and would continue to improve.

Second, some of the measures of fear and concern about crime were better than preprogram measures, while others remained stable. However, all measures of fear and concern about crime were better than expected given city-wide trends.

Third, after an initial improvement as of 1977, the levels of burglary and robbery appeared to rise between 1977 and 1979, returning approximately to the levels that one would have predicted from the city-wide trends.

The research results support five critical conclusions:

- 1) Environmental design changes can strengthen a neighborhood. Making a neighborhood more residential can have positive effects on the extent to which residents exercise control over a neighborhood area and on the way they feel about their neighborhood and neighbors.
- 2) Strengthening informal social control in a neighborhood can have a positive effect on fear of and concerns about crime.
- 3) Fear of crime in an area is more related to the character of a neighborhood than to the actual rates of crime.
- 4) Increased informal social control in an urban neighborhood does not, by itself, necessarily lead to crime reduction (at least given the period of time evaluated here).
- 5) There is evidence that aggressive, effective police activity, in the context of other elements of social control, may play a key role in deterring crime in a neighborhood area.

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T. W. M.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, FEAR AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A SECOND LOOK AT THE HARTFORD PROGRAM

#### INTRODUCTION

In 1976, an experimental effort to reduce residential burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch and the fear of those crimes was implemented in the Asylum Hill section of Hartford, Connecticut.

The most distinctive feature of that program was its integrated approach: police, community organizations and physical design changes were all used to create an environment in which residents would be more likely to control their neighborhood and to reduce opportunities for criminal behavior.

This is a summary of the evaluation of the program in 1979, some three years after it was fully implemented. In essence, data on the variety of measures used in an initial evaluation carried out in 1977 (Fowler, et al., 1979) were up-dated, so that the situation in 1979 could be compared both with the years before the program was implemented and 1977, when the program had been in place a year. This summary presents the highlights of the research which is described much more fully in a separate report.

#### PROJECT BACKGROUND

In 1973, the predecessor of this project was funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) through a grant to the Hartford Institute for Criminal and Social Justice.

Then, as now, the problem of what to do about community crime was a top priority question -- and one to which there was no certain answer. There were, however, some interesting ideas. Some correlational studies suggested that crime was not distributed randomly. In particular, the physical design of an area and the way people used an area appeared to affect crime rates and patterns (Jacobs, 1961; Angell, 1968; Newman, 1972; and Reppetto 1974). The Hartford Project was designed using an understanding of the dynamics of community crime that emerged from those researchers to produce an intervention that would reduce crime and fear of crime in an existing residential neighborhood.

There were several premises that underlay the initial project:

- 1) Robbery and burglary were the target crimes because of their prevalence and the fact that they were committed by strangers, which made them among the most fear-producing crimes.

- 2) Fear of crime was as much a target as crime itself.
- 3) A neighborhood area was a reasonable level at which to attempt to reduce robbery and burglary.
- 4) A considerable amount of robbery and burglary is casual and unplanned. A path to crime reduction is deterrence through opportunity reduction.
- 5) The physical design of a neighborhood area is one feature that affects criminal opportunities. Proposed efforts at crime reduction should consider physical design changes as one potential resource.
- 6) A variety of factors can affect criminal opportunities. The programs most likely to succeed would be multi-faceted.

The plan was to build a team of experts to analyze the features of a neighborhood with a relatively high rate of burglary and/or robbery. Its first task would be to identify the characteristics of the area that seemed to create criminal opportunities. Its second task was to design a feasible intervention that would reduce criminal opportunities and thereby crime and fear. The NILECJ grant was to fund the planning and evaluation of such a project.

Hartford, Connecticut was chosen as the site for this test for three reasons. First, there were neighborhoods in Hartford similar to those in many other cities where crime is a major problem. It seemed essential to test the approach in areas where extensive crime control efforts were most needed and most likely to be attempted. Second, the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice provided an ideal organization to carry out such experiments. As a non-profit institute outside city government, with strong working relationships with city officials, the police department and the business community, the Hartford Institute offered an uncommon potential for successfully coordinating and implementing a complex experiment. Third, the project required independent funding of the proposed crime control program, including any physical design changes proposed. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) could only fund the planning and evaluation components of the experiment. In Hartford, there was an expressed willingness on the part of private and public interests to make capital investments in an existing neighborhood, if a feasible and convincing plan could be developed.

#### Planning the Program

In 1973, an interdisciplinary team was assembled to work with the Hartford Institute. It included experts in urban design and land use planning, as well as criminological, police and research experts. Using existing police record data, data from a sample survey of residents, site analysis, and the results of interviews with offenders, police officials and other knowledgeable people, this team assembled a composite picture of crime and fear in the target areas. The principal focus of the analysis was the way the neighborhood environment contributed to the creation of criminal opportunities. The analysis also included an assessment of the roles, current and potential, of citizens and police in opportunity reduction.

The area chosen as a target was Asylum Hill, a residential area a few blocks from the central business district of Hartford. The 5,000 residents lived mainly in low-rise apartment houses and some two- or three-family houses. The area was racially mixed and consisted largely of single residents, young and old. It had a high rate of transiency and street crime.

Briefly, the analysis concluded that this neighborhood had become non-residential in character, because of the large amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic that passed through each day. Residents avoided their streets and yards, did not know their neighbors, could not exercise any control over who used their neighborhood, or for what purpose. Offenders could comfortably wander residential streets in such an environment. Although the composition of the neighborhood and the nature of the housing contributed to this situation, the extensive use of the neighborhood by outsiders was considered to be an important contributing factor -- and one that could be changed.

The physical design team proposed:

- a) To restrict vehicular traffic through the neighborhood and to channel most remaining through-traffic onto two major streets within the neighborhood.
- b) To define visually the boundaries of the neighborhood and sub-parts of the neighborhood.

These changes were to be realized by creating cul-de-sacs at a few critical intersections, narrowing the entrances to some streets, and making other streets one-way. The combination of these changes, which could be accomplished in a reasonably short period of time at a modest cost, was intended to make the neighborhood more residential -- to make it a place that belonged more to the residents -- of which they would feel a part and of which they would take care.

The Hartford police were very well regarded by Asylum Hill residents. Their pattern of rotating assignments within a centralized department, however, did not foster intimate knowledge of the neighborhood, its physical environment, the patterns of crime, or the residents and their concerns.

Therefore, the plan proposed that a decentralized team of police be assigned permanently to the area. It was felt that police could be more effective in opportunity reduction if they were familiar with the neighborhood. This also would provide an opportunity for increased communication between citizens and police so that each could support the efforts of the other more effectively. Decisions about policies and procedures would more likely reflect neighborhood priorities.

It was felt that an increased citizen role in opportunity reduction would result from the physical changes and, perhaps, from closer relationships with the police as well. However, an important part of the program entailed encouraging existing community organizations and stimulating the development of others. Community organizations were needed to enable citizens to participate in the planning and implementation of the physical changes. Their approval of the plans was required before the physical improvements could be funded. In addition, such groups provided a mechanism for establishing a

Police Advisory Committee through which citizens and police could discuss concerns, problems and priorities. Finally, it was thought that such groups might, on their own, initiate activities directly related to crime and fear or to improving the neighborhood in general.

The purpose of the community organization component of the program was not simply or primarily to mobilize citizens to fight crime. This component instead was seen as an essential ingredient to implementing all parts of the program. Moreover, the goal of increased citizen involvement in crime reduction was expected to be achieved through the combined effects of the physical changes, the reorganization of police and the work of the community groups.

#### The Program Implementation

Community organization work began in the fall of 1974. At that time, there was one existing resident organization serving the northern part of the neighborhood. Over a period of six months two more organizations serving other parts of Asylum Hill were formed.

The initial agenda for community meetings was the way the physical environment affected the neighborhood and how changes might improve the neighborhood as a place to live. Later, a Police Advisory Committee was formed, including representatives of the three major community groups. Over time, the groups initiated block watch programs, recreational programs for youth, improvements in a large neighborhood park and worked with others in Hartford to try to stabilize the housing situation in Asylum Hill.

The Hartford Police Department created a district which included Asylum Hill early in 1975. Within the district, two teams were created, one of which was designated to serve Asylum Hill. A set of men was permanently assigned to the area and provided most of the police service. There was a moderate amount of command autonomy for the team leader. A good relationship between the team leader and the Police Advisory Committee developed that led to police services that clearly reflected citizen priorities.

The physical design plan underwent a long period of review during which a number of details were modified. Approval was difficult to obtain for several reasons. It was the most radically innovative component in that it proposed closing off several streets to through traffic. The logical connection between closing streets and crime reduction is a subtle one, more so than that between police or citizen efforts and crime, and therefore more difficult to communicate. The proposed street closings necessarily affected directly more people than the other two program components, including residents and businesses on the streets to be closed, city departments providing services in the area, and political officials of the city. Therefore more people had to be consulted and convinced of the value of the changes.

Eventually a plan was approved which entailed eleven changes in the public streets, all in the northern half of the neighborhood.\* Two key east-west streets were closed to through traffic. A number of other streets were

\* The community organization and team policing components of the program were implemented for the entire Asylum Hill neighborhood.

narrowed at intersections; one was made one-way. One north-south street and one east-west street were left open to carry traffic not routed around the neighborhood. The goal was to make most of the streets in the neighborhood of use primarily to residents. Some of the street narrowings were also intended to give definition to neighborhood boundaries. The intersection treatments were designed to be attractive, including planters and areas for resident use. Work began in June, 1976. The majority of the streets were closed in the summer of 1976. All street closings were complete by November, 1976.

#### 1977 Evaluation

From the outset, evaluation of the program was a central part of the project. Hence, extensive data were gathered, starting at the planning stage in 1973. A detailed evaluation was prepared as of the spring of 1977, after all parts of the program had been in place for a year (Fowler, et al. 1979).

The 1977 evaluation indicated that during the 1976-1977 experimental year, residential burglary in North Asylum Hill decreased by nearly half while robbery/pursesnatch at least leveled off. Both rates increased for Hartford as a whole.

There were corresponding changes in patterns of fear of these crimes among residents of the area. These changes occurred only where the physical design changes were in place, together with the police team and the citizen organization efforts; they were not apparent in areas without the street changes (South Asylum Hill through 1977 and North Asylum Hill from 1975 to 1976). The short-term conclusion was clearly that the program had a direct effect on crime rates and on fear.

Although the data on the impact of the program were relatively clear, the data on why the program worked were less so. There was evidence that the program had positive effects on resident behaviors that were crucial links in the model. Frequency of walking in the neighborhood increased significantly; this was found to be related to a significant increase in ease of stranger recognition. Residents were also much more likely to have made regular arrangements to watch one another's homes. However, general attitudes and perceptions of neighbors and the neighborhood had not changed significantly. Informal social control was supposed to be the key to the way the program would work. Yet, the evidence for increased social control - while present - did not seem commensurate with the burglary and fear reductions observed.

There was some evidence of change in offender behavior. During the 1976-1977 evaluation year, there was a substantial shift in street robbery/purse snatch from side streets where they had predominated to main streets. Since this shift occurred (though in a smaller way) in South Asylum Hill as well as North Asylum Hill, we assumed it was the result not only of street changes, but also of citizen and/or police efforts.

The number of arrests of burglars and street robbers increased substantially in 1976 and climbed even higher during the evaluation year. The police seemed to become more effective. Police were generally more positive in their perceptions of the neighborhood, police-citizen relations, and their own work.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF RE-EVALUATION

The results of the 1977 evaluation were inconclusive in two critical respects. First, it is easy to think that the impact observed on burglary and other crime-related measures may have been short-term. It is not uncommon to see some initial effects of an experimental program that quickly disappear.

More important, however, was the failure of the program after one year to show a marked effect on a variety of measures related to commitment to the neighborhood and informal social control. Although there was some increased use of the neighborhood and an increase in informal arrangements to watch homes, the variety of measures reflecting the ability and willingness to control events in the neighborhood did not indicate the substantial improvements which had been predicted and which would seem to be required in order to affect crime and fear levels over a long period. By extending the evaluation, the opportunity was created to better understand neighborhood dynamics and to determine which factors play critical roles in reducing crime and fear.

One issue was the potential significance of the physical design of a neighborhood. The Hartford Project certainly had its roots in the work of Jacobs (1961), Angel (1968), Newman (1972) and Reppetto (1974). Each of those studies suggested that the way a neighborhood was built and used made an important contribution to the likelihood of crimes occurring in the neighborhood. The critical mechanism through which the environment affected criminal opportunities was informal social control. In essence, each of these researchers concluded that the way the physical environment was built affected the ability and willingness of people to control an area. In environments where would-be offenders were more likely to be observed, where they were more likely to be questioned, where they felt that intervention was more likely, offenders would be less likely to operate. These ideas are more fully developed in Tien et al. (1975) and Fowler et al. (1979).

The theory about the relationship between the physical design of a neighborhood and informal social control was based on correlational studies. Researchers observed that neighborhoods with more favorable environmental designs seemed also to have more effective social control. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Hartford experiment was that it was the first time that physical design changes were implemented explicitly to increase the ability of residents to exercise informal social control over their neighborhood area.

If the level of informal social control exercised by residents of North Asylum Hill actually increased as a result of the experiment, there were two other important hypotheses that could be addressed. First, the research cited above posited that increased informal social control would reduce criminal opportunities, and thereby, reduce crime rates. This is an hypothesis that is difficult to examine on a cross-sectional basis. Multi-neighborhood studies are needed. Because neighborhoods often differ in a variety of ways, it is difficult to sort out the independent effects of informal social control or cohesion from other important determinants of crime, such as proximity of

offenders. Although the Hartford project has its own problems with sorting out causality because of the potential for more than one change to occur over time, its longitudinal design provides a unique potential to see whether changes in informal social control coincide with reductions in crime rates.

Second, the work of Lewis *et al.* (1980) and Skogan and Maxfield (1980) provides correlational evidence that would lead one to expect that increased informal social control might have a salutary effect on fear of crime independent of any direct effect on crime rates. The Hartford experiment provides a different and useful look at that relationship.

#### THE PROGRAM, 1977 to 1979

For the most part the physical design change did remain unchanged from 1977 through 1979. The traffic reductions observed in 1977 were even more evident in 1979. The same was not true for the community component nor the police component.

There was a significant erosion of the police team component of the program between 1977 and 1979. Police officers cited the reduction in manpower as the principal problem. For whatever reason, men often were assigned to work districts other than their "home" district. The team leader in Asylum Hill seldom attended Police Advisory Committee meetings. There were virtually no special police activities, beyond patrol and calls for service, as there had been in 1975 through 1977. The district leaders generally spent less time in the district field offices than before and more time at the central headquarters.

The police officers, in their questionnaire responses, reported a decline in their effectiveness in responding to calls for service and in clearing cases. A concrete indication of this was a sharp drop in the number of arrests of offenders committing crimes in Asylum Hill. When the team was first instituted, arrests increased markedly. Arrests in 1979, however, were only about 60 percent of those in 1977.

The community organization component of the program also changed between 1977 and 1979. In 1977, the efforts of the three organizations in North Asylum Hill relied entirely on voluntarism. A good deal of effort was devoted to planning and helping to implement the street changes and to working with the police. There also was an active block watch program at some periods of the year, as well as park clean up.

By 1979, there had been a notable shift in the nature of community organization in Asylum Hill. One group, was nearly inactive. The block watch program, while still extant, was having increased difficulties recruiting volunteers. On the other hand, there had been two major positive events in the area. First, the Police Committee, in conjunction with that of another district, applied for and was granted significant funding for five different anti-crime programs. These programs together comprised the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP). There was staff of CCPP that was paid from the grant. Second, there was an infusion of new money for housing rehabilitation.

Neighborhood residents worked with leaders from banks and insurance companies to get public and private monies to help improve the housing stock in Asylum Hill. They also called city inspectors regarding houses that were not maintained and exerted influence on the way buildings were used.

In addition, it is important to note that the Police Advisory Committee was as strong or stronger in 1979 as it was in 1977. However, its strength was no longer primarily through the neighborhood team police leader. Rather, it was able to exert political influence directly on central police headquarters and on other appropriate agencies in city government.

Thus, the changes in resident organization were significant. There was a change from an emphasis on voluntarism, such as pot luck suppers and block watches, to more professional kinds of activities. The focus of efforts was broadened. Most important, it appeared that, if anything, there was more sophistication, more problem solving ability and more ability to mobilize resources for the neighborhood than was the case two years before.

#### Other Changes

There were several other aspects of the neighborhood area that deserve note. In 1979 the population of North Asylum Hill, though highly transient, had a composition virtually identical to previous years. However, the urban design team when viewing the neighborhood noted several conflicting trends. Evidence of housing which had been rehabilitated was clear. Property values had increased significantly. The increased investment in the area was a very positive sign. The appearance of Sigourney Park, in the middle of the area, had also been improved. On the other hand, there were buildings which had been allowed to further deteriorate. Thus, the housing situation was somewhat mixed, though clearly improving.

In addition, the urban design team observed that the rate at which teenagers and other outsiders were walking through and "hanging around" the area had, if anything, increased and intensified since 1977. Our standardized pedestrian counts tended to confirm that conclusion, as did some ratings by residents and police. The urban designers noted the neighborhood bordering on the north of Asylum Hill was a place where housing deterioration was particularly apparent.

Ideally, for evaluation purposes, the program and other relevant aspects of the community should remain stable. It is not surprising that there were salient changes, however. These changes obviously must be considered when attempting to assess the effects of the program.

#### IMPACT ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

##### Introduction

The main way in which the experimental crime control program in Hartford was supposed to reduce crime and alleviate fear of crime was through increasing informal social control in North Asylum Hill. Informal social



control requires that residents be both able and willing to monitor and affect what goes on in the neighborhood. The theory is that when there is informal social control, potential offenders - particularly those who live outside the neighborhood - can less comfortably wander the streets looking for targets. When an opportunity arises, the theory is that an offender is less likely to commit the crime if he/she feels that neighbors may be watching and may intervene in some way. The same theory suggests that people will be less fearful to the extent that they feel part of a neighborhood in which residents work together to produce order and to control what occurs.

Each of the program components was designed to strengthen informal social control in North Asylum Hill. The key program component in this respect, of course, was the physical design changes: the reduction of traffic through street changes and the increased definition of the neighborhood. By reducing traffic and increasing the residential character of the neighborhood, it was hoped that people would be encouraged to walk the neighborhood streets. Upgrading the park was aimed at increasing its use as well. People who are on the streets and in their yards and in the park are able to exercise surveillance in a way that people who are in their homes cannot. In addition, people who use the neighborhood are more likely to know their neighbors, know what goes on in the neighborhood, and are thus better able to identify suspicious or inappropriate people or behaviors. Furthermore, the quieter, less congested environment produced by reduced traffic would make a would-be offender stand out more, be more conspicuous. Thus, the street changes were designed to make it easier for people to exercise informal social control.

In addition, it was hoped that residents of this environment would be more willing to intervene if they thought it necessary. It was hoped that if residents used the neighborhood more and knew their neighbors better, they would feel more responsibility for affecting what went on in the neighborhood and what happened to neighbors. The entrances were designed to reinforce the residential nature of the area and, more important, to enhance residents' sense of belonging to a place. Finally, in a context of less congestion it may seem more appropriate to intervene or to look out for other people.

Although the physical design changes were seen as critical, the community organization and police components of the program also had a role to play in strengthening informal social control. In fact, the roles of the two components were rather similar. In both cases, it was hoped that neighborhood problems which could not be addressed effectively in an informal way could be dealt with either by the resident organizations or by the police, depending on the problem. Thus, the police were called into the fray against prostitutes, loitering drunks and traffic violators while the community organizations addressed cleaning up the parks and working on housing-related problems that affected the neighborhood. Such activities and efforts may have the potential for a direct effect on either the rate of crime or resident fear of crime. In addition, though, they have the potential for providing a sense of hope and power to neighborhood residents. It may well be essential for residents to feel they have access to effective, formal problem-solving mechanisms in order for them to work day in and day out informally to affect what goes on in the neighborhood.

#### Use of the Neighborhood

There were four questions asked in the resident survey that dealt with use of the neighborhood: frequency of walking in the neighborhood during the day and at night, frequency of being outside in the yard or on the porch, and feelings about use the neighborhood parks.

There was a significant increase between 1976 and 1977 in the rate at which residents said they walked in the neighborhood during the day. Although the period 1977 to 1979 showed some drop in the reported frequency of walking in the neighborhood during the day, the rate in 1979 was still significantly higher than before the physical design changes were implemented. There was also a significant increase in reported walking at night between the 1977 and 1979 surveys (Table 1).

There was a significant increase between preprogram ratings and 1977 in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents said they liked to walk in the park. This increase was maintained at the same level through 1979. The number of days that respondents said they spent outside of their homes in the preceding week also increased significantly between 1977 and 1979, though the change between the preprogram rate and 1979 did not quite reach the level needed for statistical significance.

#### Stranger Recognition

One important precursor to exercising informal social control is knowing who belongs in a neighborhood and who does not. The program planners hoped to improve stranger recognition in two ways. First, if people use the streets more, they are more likely to become familiar with their neighbors. Second, to the extent that congestion is reduced, it is easier to become familiar with people who belong in the neighborhood.

By 1977 there was somewhat of an increase in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents said it was "pretty easy" to recognize strangers. This ability rose slightly higher between 1977 and 1979 and became significantly higher than the preprogram level, (Table 2).

#### Territoriality

Territoriality is a concept introduced by Newman (1972). His idea was that there are some spaces, pieces of turf, for which individuals take responsibility, which they will supervise and control. In some areas, people feel responsible for only small spaces - for instance, their own housing units and spaces quite adjacent to them. In order to have informal social control operating effectively at a neighborhood level, residents must feel responsibility for larger spaces. To the extent that residents will take control of the sidewalk in front of their homes, of their neighbors' yards, of the parking lot near their building, in short, for areas which do not strictly belong to them but rather belong to the neighborhood, the potential for effectively controlling the area is markedly increased.

TABLE 1  
Use of the Neighborhood in North Asylum Hill, 1975-79

Measure	Year		
	Preprogram N=167	1977 N=232	1979 N=218
Walk in the neighborhood during the day at least several times per week	53%	70%*	64%*
Walk in neighborhood at night at least several times per week	22	18	27**
Like to use nearby park	26	37*	36*
Average number of days per week outside of residents' home	1.7	1.6	2.2**

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels.

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels.

TABLE 2  
Informal Social Control and Perceptions of Neighborhood, North Asylum Hill

Measure	Year		
	Preprogram N=167	1977 N=232	1979 N=218
Easy to recognize a stranger	25%	32%	35%*
Have regular arrangements with neighbors to watch each other's houses	16	26*	29*
Have intervened in a suspicious situation in neighborhood	21	20	30**

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels.

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels.

There were two measures directly related to the extent to which residents were taking responsibility for or were concerned about what went on in their neighborhood and what happened to their neighbors. One question in the survey asked whether or not people had made arrangements with neighbors to look out for one another's houses. They also were asked whether these were routine regular arrangements or only occurred on special occasions. In 1977 there was a significant increase over preprogram figures in the rate at which there were routine arrangements between North Asylum Hill residents to look out for one another's homes. This significant increase was maintained in 1979 (Table 2).

A second measure asked whether respondents had observed any suspicious event in their neighborhood in the year preceding the interview. If so, they were asked whether they had done anything about it. Responses were coded into three main categories: those who essentially did nothing or ignored it, those who intervened directly either by asking the person what he/she was doing or calling a neighbor, and those who called the police. There is probably no measure which more directly captures the concept of "territoriality" than the rate of intervention.

There was no apparent change in the rate at which "territorial" behavior was reported between 1976 and 1977. However, the 1979 interviews revealed a significant increase in the rate at which respondents reported having intervened in a suspicious event in their neighborhood (Table 2). In this case, though, there was also a parallel change in the rest of the city for which we have no explanation.

#### Neighbors as a Resource

Obviously informal social control of a neighborhood is a two-way street. Not only were we concerned about the extent to which residents reported doing constructive things, we were also interested in the way they viewed their neighbors as resources with respect to neighborhood crime control. A number of questions were asked which all seemed to relate to the general topic of the way North Asylum Hill residents felt about their neighbors. To simplify the analysis, as well as to produce a more reliable indicator of respondent feeling, seven items were combined into a single index. Included in the index were the following: whether respondents thought their neighbors would intervene in a suspicious situation, whether the neighborhood was the kind where neighbors help each other, whether respondents felt part of a neighborhood, whether respondents thought neighbors would report a crime to the police, answer questions to help the police and help with the crime control groups; and the extent to which respondents thought neighbors were concerned about keeping crime from happening to others.

When the program was evaluated in 1977, resident perceptions of "neighbors as a resource" had not changed from pre-program levels (Table 3). However, between 1977 and 1979, there was a statistically significant increase in the way North Asylum Hill residents saw their neighbors in a helping role. This change provides very clear evidence that North Asylum Hill residents in 1979 had a much more positive view of the part that their neighbors could and would play in controlling crime in the neighborhood. In this case, the pattern in the rest of Hartford was stable, as one would expect.

TABLE 3  
Neighbors as Resources Against Crime and Neighborhood Quality, 1975-79

Measure	Year		
	Preprogram N=167	1977 N=232	1979 N=218
Average score on neighbors as resources index <sup>a</sup>	2.85	2.88	3.18* **
Neighborhood has gotten better in past year <sup>b</sup>	16	18	39* **
Neighborhood will be better place in 5 years	26	34	57* **

<sup>a</sup> The neighbors as resources index includes ratings of whether neighbors help each other, whether respondent feels part of neighborhood, the neighborhood's concern about crime, and ratings of whether neighbors would: intervene in a suspicious situation, report a crime, answer questions for police, and help with a crime control group. On a scale from 1 to 5, a high score indicates the most favorable opinions of neighbors as resources for control of crime.

<sup>b</sup> Wording was "past two years" in 1979 survey.

\* Significantly different from preprogram level.

\*\*Significantly different from 1977 levels.

### Incivilities

Lewis and his associates (1980) have coined the term "incivilities" to characterize activities that indicate disorders occurring in some neighborhoods. Their observation is that groups of teenagers hanging around, drunken men, drug dealing and prostitution may generate other crimes themselves. However, whether or not they actually generate crimes with victims, they communicate to residents a state of disorder, and a breakdown of the mechanisms of social control. The argument is that such signs of disorder undermine confidence in the neighborhood and make a major contribution to fear.

Incivilities have been a significant part of the Asylum Hill scene since 1973 when the evaluation began. According to residents' own ratings, drunken men, loitering teenagers, prostitution and drug use were all more likely to be rated "serious problems" by Asylum Hill residents than by residents in the rest of the city. In 1977 and 1979 these problems remained or may even have been worse. Police rated drunks as more of a problem than previously.

In evaluating the impact of the crime control problem it is critical to note that perceptions about these "incivilities" were not improved since the program was implemented. To the extent that they play a role in engendering crime and fear, these forces will work to undermine and mitigate whatever positive impact on crime and fear the program may have accomplished.

### Overall Confidence in the Neighborhood

Another component in developing informal social control in a neighborhood is the degree of resident confidence in the area. Unless people feel that some good can come from their efforts and that problems can be solved, they are unlikely to persist indefinitely. The evidence presented thus far suggests a number of improvements in resident feelings about their neighbors, at the same time their perceptions about some neighborhood "problems" remained unchanged at best.

Since 1973, sample survey respondents were asked whether they thought the neighborhood had been getting better, getting worse or had stayed about the same in the preceding year or two. They were also asked whether they thought it would get better, get worse, or stay about the same in the upcoming five years (Table 3).

It is important to note that there was some evidence of a generalized increase in optimism throughout Hartford, though this may in part be a methodological artifact. However, even adjusting for the city-wide experience, the proportion of North Asylum Hill residents who perceived that the neighborhood had gotten better in the year or two preceding 1979 had increased somewhat.

### Conclusion

The findings in this chapter regarding the change of atmosphere in North Asylum Hill are potentially quite important. Virtually every measure of people taking care of their neighborhood and exercising informal social

control was significantly higher in 1979 than it had been in any previous year studied. The central role of informal social control in the general model of community crime prevention makes these data of critical importance to this evaluation.

### IMPACT ON ROBBERY AND BURGLARY

#### The Burglary Rate

Burglary is the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, most often grand larceny or theft. For some accounting purposes, "attempted burglaries" are grouped with burglaries. Attempted burglaries are instances where there is evidence of effort to illegally enter a home, but entry is not successful, and of course, nothing is taken. Because of the difficulty of knowing when such events actually occur, and hence the unreliability of reporting, attempted burglaries are not included in our analysis\*.

One of the most fundamental questions to be answered in this project is whether the rate of burglary victimization was different in North Asylum Hill than it would have been if the program had not been implemented. In 1977, the burglary rate was much better than expected. The expected burglary rate in North Asylum Hill in 1977, adjusting for the experience in the rest of Hartford, was over 22 burglaries per 100 households (Table 4). The observed burglary rate in North Asylum Hill in 1977 was less than 11 per 100 households, a statistically significant reduction.

However, in 1979 burglary no longer seemed to be affected by the program. Between 1977 and 1979 burglary victimization rates for the rest of Hartford declined. In 1979, an adjustment for the city experience yields an expected burglary rate in North Asylum Hill of 19 burglaries per 100 households for 1979. The observed rate in North Asylum Hill was exactly the expected rate of 19 burglaries per 100 households.

#### Robberies/Pursesnatch

Robbery is the crime of taking something from someone by force or threat of force. Pursesnatching is akin to robbery in that the victim is present and some force is used. The line between robbery and pursesnatching, depends on the amount of force used to grab the purse and on the amount of confrontation between the victim and the offender. Because of the basic similarity of the two, we have chosen to combine these two street crimes in our analysis.

In 1977, the observed rate was lower than that which would have been expected, and this difference approaches the standard level of statistical significance. In 1979, the observed rate for robbery/pursesnatch in North Asylum Hill was not different from the level one would have predicted for North Asylum Hill without the program.

\* For our analysis of crime rates, we rely only on the victimization experiences reported by survey respondents. Because of various internal changes in the Hartford Police Department, we did not feel that the incidence of burglaries from police records constituted a reliable indicator of the rate at which these crimes occurred. This issue is discussed in more detail in the full report.

TABLE 4  
North Asylum Hill Crime Rates, Observed and Expected

Type by Year	Crime Rates Per 100 Households	
	Burglary	Robbery/Pursesnatch
Preprogram rate	17.5	4.0
Observed rate, 1976-77	10.6	4.2
Expected <sup>a</sup> rate, 1976-77	22.4	5.9
Significance of difference <sup>b</sup> observed-expected, 1976-77	.01	.13
Observed rate, 1978-79	19.3	6.6
Expected <sup>a</sup> rate, 1978-79	19.1	5.1
Significance of difference <sup>b</sup> observed-expected, 1978-79	NS <sup>c</sup>	NS <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Expected calculated by applying city-wide trend to observed value in preceding time period.

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>c</sup> Significance levels that exceed .20 are reported as NS.

#### Other Crimes in the Neighborhood

If the residents of North Asylum Hill were effectively controlling destructive and criminal events in the area, there are other events besides burglary and robbery that one might expect to improve. In particular, one would expect to see some decrease in the rate of vandalism or property damage. In addition, it is possible that thefts from mail boxes might be affected by people exercising more control over the neighborhood area.

We looked at the reported rate at which a household experienced vandalism or arson. The pattern observed is not too dissimilar to that for robbery. The rate observed in 1977 was below that which was expected approaching statistical significance. However, there was an increase between 1977 and 1979. The 1979 figure was actually higher than would have been expected to a statistically significant degree.

When we looked at the rates at which people said their housing units experienced mail box theft one or more times during the year, there was no evidence of any positive effects.

#### THE IMPACT ON RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS AND FEAR OF CRIME

##### Introduction

In some ways, reducing residents' fears and concerns about crime was a more important objective of the program than reducing the rate of burglary and robbery. Crime itself, of course, takes its toll on the population -- particularly its direct victims. However, fear and concern ultimately can affect the quality of life and the attractiveness of an area for all residents.

As we turn to those measures in North Asylum Hill, the predictions are not absolutely clear. Based on the crime rates themselves, one would predict somewhat improved perceptions with respect to burglary in 1977, with deterioration between 1977 and 1979. For street crimes, predicted trends would be more modest but in a similar direction.

When one looks at the ratings of "incivilities", we have seen that there was no improvement in these aspects of the neighborhood. In fact, prostitution and possibly drinking men were rated as more problematic in 1979 than they were before the program began.

However, there was a clear improvement between 1977 and 1979 in people's perceptions of their neighbors as a resource in the control of crime. Indeed, there appeared to be more "territoriality". Following the suggestive evidence of Lewis (1980) and recent work by Newman and Franck (1980), one would expect such changes in perceptions to be associated with decreased concerns and fears. Moreover, the improved perceptions of the effectiveness of the formal neighborhood organizations also could be expected to have some salutary effect on resident concerns.

In this section, we will discuss the measures of fear in two general groups. One group deals with personal concerns about crime. People were asked how worried they were about various crimes occurring to them in different situations, how safe they felt in different situations and how likely they felt they were to be victims of various crimes. These measures turned out to be highly intercorrelated. They were combined into two indices, one of which combined all the items with concerns about burglary, which we labeled "fear of burglary", and another which combined items related to street crime, which we labeled "fear of robbery".

A second set of items uses resident ratings of the extent to which various crimes are a "problem", using the neighborhood, rather than the person's own concerns, as a referent. Again, an index was constructed combining the ratings of a number of different crime problems into a single measure, labeled "crime problem rating". In addition, the items rating burglary and robbery as problems were analyzed separately, as were the answers to a question about whether crime was going up, going down or staying about the same in the neighborhood.

We have used the same approach to modeling expected values as we did in the case of crime rates. It is reasonable to think that some factors might affect people's fears and concerns about crime at city-wide level. The most obvious example of such a possible effect is the coverage of crime given by the television and print media. Thus, we have calculated the preprogram value of a measure from data gathered before the program was implemented, that is before the summer of 1976. Then we examined what happened to these measures in the rest of Hartford during the postprogram period. If there was any change in the rest of Hartford, we adjusted our expected values for North Asylum Hill accordingly. We then calculated the likelihood that the observed value of the measure in North Asylum Hill was lower than the expected value.

#### Fear of Burglary

Table 5 presents the values of our index of fear of burglary for North Asylum Hill. If one looks at the data for North Asylum Hill alone, the value of the index has been extremely constant during the experimental period. However, in the rest of Hartford, there was a steady increase in this index since the preprogram period. As a result, based on the experience in the rest of Hartford, we would have expected a rise in fear of burglary in North Asylum Hill. In fact, we observed no increase. Thus, although there was not a decline in the fear of burglary in North Asylum Hill, in the context of what was happening in the rest of Hartford, one must conclude that the responses to this index were significantly lower in 1979 than would have been expected from the city-wide trend, and almost significantly lower in 1977.

#### Fear of Robbery

Table 5 also presents our index of fear of robbery. The findings were almost identical to those above. The value of the index was almost constant across the years in North Asylum Hill. However, in the rest of Hartford, there was a steady increase in fear of robbery since the preprogram period.

TABLE 5  
North Asylum Hill Fear Levels, Observed and Expected

Level by Year	Mean Fear of Crime	
	Burglary	Robbery/Pursesnatch
Preprogram	2.29	2.48
Observed, 1977	2.30	2.48
Expected <sup>a</sup> , 1977	2.37	2.56
Significance of Difference <sup>b</sup> observed-expected, 1977	.15	.10
Observed <sup>a</sup> , 1979	2.32	2.50
Expected, 1979	2.44	2.64
Significance of difference <sup>b</sup> observed-expected, 1979	.02	.01

<sup>a</sup> Expected levels calculated by applying city-wide trend to observed value for preceding time period.

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

When we calculate the values expected in North Asylum Hill by applying the city-wide trend, we find that fear of robbery in 1977 was lower than expected, approaching statistical significance. The 1979 figure was significantly lower than we would have expected.

Ratings of Neighborhood Crime Problems

Respondents were asked whether they considered burglary to be a "big problem, some problem or almost no problem" in their neighborhood. It can be seen in Table 6 that there was a marked shift in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents considered burglary to be a problem after the experimental program was implemented. In this case, the reduction compared to to preprogram values which was observed in 1977 was almost statistically significant; and it was even larger in 1979 and significantly different.

Also, in Table 6 the extent to which robbery was considered to be a problem in the neighborhood is shown. The findings were similar to what we observed with respect to fear of burglary. No absolute change in the rate at which respondents considered robbery to be a problem in North Asylum Hill can be associated with the implementation of the program. Once again, though, the data need to be interpreted in the context of what was going on throughout the city. In the rest of Hartford, there was an increase in the rate at which robbery was considered a problem between 1977 and 1979. When one adjusts for that fact, the observed rating in North Asylum Hill in 1979 was significantly lower than we would have expected.

Finally, Table 6 presents the answers to the question of whether residents thought crime was going up, staying about the same or going down in their neighborhood. There was an absolute improvement in resident perceptions in North Asylum Hill. The striking change occurred between 1977 and 1979. Although people throughout the city of Hartford also improved slightly in the extent to which they saw crime going down, adjusting for the city-wide experience does not diminish the statistical significance of the change observed in North Asylum Hill. Very clearly, North Asylum Hill residents were more likely to see crime as declining than one would have expected from preprogram responses and from the experience in the rest of Hartford.

Conclusion

The data presented in this section provide evidence that resident perceptions of crime in general, and particularly their concerns and fears about burglary and robbery, were better than one would have expected considering city trends. Some of these changes were apparent in 1977. However, in every measure observed in this chapter, the responses in North Asylum Hill were significantly better than would have been expected in 1979.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The experimental program evaluated in this project has the potential to contribute to understanding of community crime prevention issues in a variety of ways. In this closing section, the main conclusions and implications are summarized and discussed.

TABLE 6  
North Asylum Hill Ratings of Neighborhood Crime Problems

Measure	Year		
	Preprogram N=167	1977 N=232	1979 N=218
Percent who rated burglary as a big problem	40%	31%	26% <sup>a</sup> *
Percent who rated robbery as a big problem	25	26	24 <sup>a</sup>
Percent who say crime went down in past two years	12	17	32 <sup>a</sup> * **

<sup>a</sup> A comparison with expected levels that took into account city-wide trends showed this value to be significantly different with  $p < .05$ .

\* Significantly different preprogram levels.

\*\*Significantly different from 1977 levels.

One worthwhile product of the evaluation is the documentation of the evolution of the program as implemented. Both the community organization and the neighborhood police components of the program changed significantly over the four-year period for which they were observed. Programs as implemented will almost certainly evolve and change. The kinds of changes observed in Hartford are likely to recur. Even if exactly the same principles do not apply, a program planner must give attention to how program components are likely to evolve.

This evolution is not significant only for program planners. It also has significance for program evaluators. Most often, an experimental program is implemented and rather quickly evaluated. Understandably, people are anxious to find out whether or not a program "works". However, the Hartford experiment provides concrete evidence of two rather important principles. First, the program as implemented will not be the same as the one that endures. Second, the effects of a program shortly after it is implemented are not necessarily those that one will observe after the program is in place for some time.

Certainly one of the most significant results of this evaluation is the documentation of change in the measures thought to be related to informal social control and territoriality. The combination of people using the streets more, recognizing strangers more easily, taking more initiative and feeling more confident that their neighbors were a resource against crime, adds up to "territoriality" or "informal social control. These measures showed significant improvement between 1977 and 1979 in North Asylum Hill.

A critical question is the extent to which one can attribute these changes to the "program." Let us be clear and state that we can not prove in a statistical sense that the program caused the changes. There was only a single experiment. The experiment took place, not in a vacuum, but in an ongoing neighborhood within a city over several years, with a variety of events going on around it. However, there are several important points that can be made.

This program was an effort to solve some problems that were thought to exist in North Asylum Hill. Essentially, all that was done was to establish catalytic mechanisms. These mechanisms included several community organizations, a neighborhood police team, and an environment (a neighborhood that was less thoroughly inundated with outside traffic) which would enhance the likelihood that problem solving would occur. The program was not intended as the solution to problems but as the means to solve problems. The solutions to problems, if they occurred, would emerge from the actions of police and residents within the neighborhood environment over a period of time.

The exact role of the program in strengthening territoriality and informal social control is hard to document. Two concrete links can be established. First, introduction of the street changes was associated with increased use of the neighborhood. It also corresponded with increases in stranger recognition and an increased likelihood of informal arrangements to watch houses. Second, the neighborhood organizations involved more people in neighborhood problems in 1979 than in any previous year; and those organizations were judged to be more effective than in the past.

In addition, the importance of the program is reinforced by observers. Two active leaders we spoke with were unequivocal in their belief that the program had been critical in three ways. First, the formal organizations in the neighborhood were much stronger once they became organized around the crime issue. Second, they were convinced that the street changes actually worked to make the neighborhood quieter, more residential and more easily controlled. Third, they were convinced that the problem solving capabilities in the neighborhood were fundamental to the improvements to be observed and to people's confidence that the neighborhood could be turned around.

Certainly events outside the program occurred that helped produce progress. Some middle class suburban people moved into the neighborhood and provided leadership. The rising prices of housing in the neighborhood made it possible to fix up and rehabilitate housing that at former levels could not have been restored. There was particularly good fortune, it seems to us, in the leadership that was available to the neighborhood police team in its first two or three years. The relationship with the police provided a focus for thinking about crime problems in the neighborhood and provided neighborhood leaders with a real problem-solving capability early in the program when, perhaps, the capabilities of the community groups themselves to solve problems were not as great.

On the other side, the political difficulties in getting the physical changes implemented, which delayed implementation and detracted from program momentum, undoubtedly reduced the likelihood of success. There was continual vocal opposition to the program from businessmen in particular and others in the neighborhood. The police department had problems throughout, both with internal political problems and with resources. The transient nature of the neighborhood certainly made it a difficult one for a program such as this.

Altogether, this experiment seems to have been neither distinctively blessed nor distinctively disadvantaged. The idea that the neighborhood might have become stronger in the ways observed without the program is plausible. Each reader will have to make up his or her mind on that score. However, it seems likely that the program as a whole, and particularly the street changes, had a critical role to play.

As to fear of crime, the people in North Asylum Hill were significantly less fearful and concerned about crime after the program was implemented than one would have expected given the trends in the rest of the city. This finding was absolutely clear in the 1979 data for all relevant measures.

The patterns of fear observed in North Asylum Hill point fairly clearly in the direction predicted by Lewis and his associates. The data available to us do not permit elaborate model building. However, our data are consistent with the notion that the degree of social control and organization in a neighborhood and the degree of fear and concern about crime are connected. When people see incivilities, when they feel that there is not help available, the crime that exists in the neighborhood is problematic for them and they are frightened. When they see their neighborhood as a resource against crime, when they see police, when the incivilities such as drunken men and teenagers hanging out are at a minimum or under control, the problems of crime seem less severe and people are less afraid.



In North Asylum Hill, of course, the incivilities did not really improve; they may have gotten worse. The visibility of police remained unchanged. However, there was a clear and significant increase in the extent to which North Asylum Hill residents saw themselves and their neighbors banding together to control the neighborhood and to control crime in the neighborhood. It seems unlikely that these changes did not play an important role in the amelioration of the fears and concerns about robbery and burglary that were observed. Moreover, the fact that the positive results regarding fear occurred in the face of a rising crime rate, and possibly some increase in apparent incivilities, makes the importance of the neighborhood strength for determining fear levels take on added significance.

And what about crime? The victimization data clearly show that burglary dropped significantly below its expected levels immediately after the program was implemented, but then rose significantly during the following two years. The data are slightly less clear with respect to robbery/pursesnatch; but probably the same general pattern applies to that crime as well.

If that indeed is what happened to those crimes, there are several conclusions that follow. First, it means that a program such as the one implemented in Hartford can affect the rate of crime in a neighborhood. That is a very important conclusion. It has not been demonstrated before.

Second, the fact that the victimization patterns do not correspond very well with our measures of fear and concerns about these crimes is one more piece of evidence that fear of crime and the actual prevalence of crime are not necessarily closely related.

Third, the most critical part of the data is that burglary and robbery apparently went up between 1977 and 1979 at the same time that our various measures of informal social control and territoriality were indicating a significant improvement. We have cited at least two factors which may be responsible for the increase in crime. First, there is reason to be concerned that the pressure from offenders on the area increased between 1977 and 1979. Second, there seems to be little doubt that the effectiveness of police service in the area peaked in 1977, then declined in the subsequent two years.

Police success in arresting people for burglary and robbery declined since 1977. Recent research by Wilson and Boland (1979) suggests that aggressive arrest policies may deter crime. In addition to making arrests, the police team also attended to the drunks and loitering men. Although they did not feel they "solved" these problems, they certainly attempted to control them. Such efforts were among the casualties of reduced police service in Asylum Hill. It is quite plausible that the reduction in police service is the key explanation for reduced arrests, for perceptions of a greater problem with loitering, drinking men and for the increased crime rates in 1979.

Perhaps the best way to fit the pieces together is the following: What was needed and established in North Asylum Hill was some problem-solving capabilities that were not there before. Day-to-day supervision of neighborhood activities is necessarily an on-going, informal process. However, for some problems -- such as obtaining housing financing, cleaning up

the park or mobilizing police efforts, some kind of resident organization is needed. Moreover, there are some problems with which only the police can deal effectively. Arresting criminals, dispersing groups of men and controlling public drinking are among these.

In 1977, the police component of the program was working well, and the citizen efforts -- formal and informal -- were gaining strength. In 1979, the police were no longer effective neighborhood problem solvers in their sphere, but the residents were doing a better job than ever before. One could surmise that what the residents were doing was helpful to fear levels; but that the police component was essential to affecting crime rates. We also would expect that had the police component remained strong in 1979, there would have been a continued reduction in crimes rates and more dramatic positive effects on fear.

Unfortunately, we are not in a position to unequivocally sort out the answers. In the end, this evaluation can only provide hypotheses. However, one very important conclusion does emerge from these data: informal social control by itself is not enough to reduce robbery and burglary/pursesnatch in a neighborhood like Asylum Hill. Despite the striking improvements in these respects observed in North Asylum Hill, some set of additional factors worked to create an increase in burglary and robbery. Although our results are not definitive, they lead one to take a hard look at the offender population and at police activity, as well as informal social control and territoriality, in trying to predict rates of crime.

Finally, we need to address the question of whether this is a good kind of program for other communities to attempt to implement. In our view, that is the wrong question to ask. In essence, this experiment should not be looked at with the expectation that it be exported in toto to some other community. Rather, it was a project in which neighborhood problems were analyzed and solutions to those problems that were feasible in the particular context were designed and implemented. A crime control program such as this must be custom made to fit a particular set of circumstances. What one would want to derive from the Hartford project is not a program design but rather what we have learned about the nature of problems.

In conclusion then, we feel the following are the principal legacies of the Hartford Project:

- 1) The process of planning and implementing the program should provide a number of realistic lessons for those who would consider programs with components that are similar to any of those in Hartford.
- 2) The particular lessons about the way that program components evolve over time are very important to understand and are well documented in this study.
- 3) The fact that measures of informal social control and territoriality could change significantly over time in response to a program like this is a critical finding which heretofore has not been demonstrated.

4) The apparent intimate relationship between people's fears and concerns about crime and the degree of social organization and informal social control in a neighborhood is a critical finding.

5) The fact that burglary rates and robbery rates increased significantly, in the face of significantly increased social control is a very important observation with which theorists must deal. In essence, the project emphasizes the need to focus on offenders and on police activities, as well as informal social control, in order to predict crime rates. In particular, police efforts to arrest offenders and control incivilities appeared to play a role in deterring crime.

6) The project provides further evidence that victimization rates or objective risks of crime have little relationship to resident concerns and fears. The latter, as we have said, are much more closely tied to people's perceptions of the conditions of the neighborhood.

7) Finally, the project provides evidence that changes in the physical environment can be important levers for producing significant changes in the character of a neighborhood. Although the street changes were not a sufficient condition, there can be little doubt that they played a necessary and crucial role in catalyzing the improvements in the neighborhood that were observed.

The Hartford Project has been a long one. However, the longitudinal nature of the project has provided an opportunity to make observations and test ideas that have not been tested as well before. Certainly, no one project is going to be definitive on the variety of topics which this research has addressed. However, the above litany of findings seem to us to constitute a significant contribution to the theory and practice of community crime control.

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