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# COUNTERING PALESTINIAN
# TERRORISM IN ISRAEL:
# TOWARD A POLICY ANALYSIS
# OF COUNTERMEASURES

Hanan Alon

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# COUNTERING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM IN ISRAEL: TOWARD A POLICY ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES

## Hanan Alon

**Rand**
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

### PREFACE

In late 1978, The Ford Foundation provided grants to The Rand Corporation and several university centers for research and training in international security and arms control. At Rand, the grant is supporting a diverse program. In the Rand Graduate Institute, which offers a doctorate in public policy analysis, the grant is contributing to student fellowships for dissertation preparation, curriculum development, workshops and tutorials, and a series of visiting lecturers. In Rand's National Security Research Division, the Ford-sponsored projects are designed to extend beyond the immediate needs of government sponsors of research by investigating long-term or emerging problems and by developing and assessing new research methodologies. The grant also is being used to fund the publication of relevant sponsored research that would otherwise not be disseminated to the general public.

All research products are being made available to as wide an audience as possible through publication as unclassified Rand reports or notes, or in journals. The Rand documents may be obtained directly or may be found in the more than 330 libraries in the United States and 35 other countries that maintain collections of Rand publications.

The original version of this study was prepared as a dissertation in fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in policy analysis at The Rand Graduate Institute. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Nathan Leites, Chairman, Jan P. Acton, and Paul Berman.

The study addresses the following policy question: *What* and *how much* should be done by the Government of Israel to counter the *objective* threat of Palestinian terrorism? The Note makes an historical analysis of Palestinian low-level violence and Israel countermeasures, and suggests an approach for the policy analysis of such countermeasures.

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To the memory of Col. Uzi Yairi (1936-1975),
who gave his life combating terrorism.

## SUMMARY

This Note suggests an approach for the policy analysis of counter-measures taken by Israel against Palestinian terrorism. "Palestinian terrorism" here stands for Palestinian acts of *low-level* violence, for a political purpose, with the intent to inflict casualties and damage upon Israeli society, as well as fear and rage, and by so doing inciting Israel to react.

Part One includes an historical analysis of Palestinian violence and Israeli countermeasures between 1919 and 1978; three periods of Palestinian terrorism are discussed:

o   <u>1919-1948</u>:  Terrorism inflicted by local Arab groups against the growing Jewish population (the "*Yishuv*") in British-mandated Palestine.  The violence was motivated mainly by the goal to deny the Zionists' political aspirations, rather than to promote Palestinian national goals.

o   <u>1949-1956</u>:  Acts of terrorism along the 1948 armistice lines, inflicted by *Fedayeen* groups infiltrating from Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip).  The infiltrations were backed and supported by Jordan and Egypt as part of the military conflict.  No particular Palestinian national aspirations and goals were involved at this stage.

o   <u>1965-Present</u>:  Palestinian terrorism, carried out by a number of Palestinian groups, as part of the armed struggle of the Palestinians aiming at "liberating Palestine" and establishing a Palestinian state, which would replace the State of Israel, and also include the West Bank and Gaza.

Part Two focuses on the wave of Palestinian terrorism following the Six Day War (1967-1978).  It finds that:

o Terrorism is perceived by Israeli society as a major threat.
Israeli threat assessment is based upon subjective probabili-
ties assigned to terrorism and consists of two components:

   a. Personal component, the probability individuals assign
to being hit by an act of terrorism--reflected mainly in
the individual's fear.

   b. National image component, the degree of damage to the
national image assigned by individuals and reflected
mainly in society's rage.

o The perception of terrorism by the Israelis seems to be out
of proportion to the share of terrorism in inflicting casual-
ties. The proportion of Israeli civilian casualties inflicted
by terrorism over 12 years (1967-1978) out of the total number
of casualties from external causes is low: 0.55 percent (1856
out of 337,172).

o Perceptions of terrorism are shaped by many factors, e.g.,
the large-scale coverage of terrorism strikes by the media;
the change in sensitivities and increase in the desire to
dissociate politics and violence; the distinction between a
"statistical" victim and a particular victim; the intolerance
for a large number of casualties per single incident; the "in-
sult to the state"; and, finally--to close the circle--the
boomerang effect of permanent, preventive countermeasures as
a constant reminder of terrorism independent of actual strikes.

o The countermeasures taken by Israel were designed mainly to
minimize the number of casualties inflicted by terrorism.
Yet there seems to be a gross inequality between the amount
of resources invested by Israel to counter terrorism and
those allocated to counter other sources of casualties. A
partial explanation of this discrepancy in resource allocation
is provided by the way terrorism is perceived in Israel.

o The countermeasures taken by Israel were introduced gradually,
in response to innovations taken by the Palestinian terrorists;
countermeasures were introduced as crash programs, without a
detailed analysis. Once introduced, these countermeasures

remained. Hence, at present, there prevails a huge system of
countermeasures--some effective and some not--involving about
40,000 people per day, as well as at least five organizations
(some of them specially created) to control, coordinate and
implement the countermeasures. While the system grew, both
the number of Palestinian operations and the number of casual-
ties inflicted by terrorism decreased.

o It was often difficult to abstain from a huge reaction, even
in the face of smaller-scale yet effective alternatives.

Countermeasures taken by Israel can be categorized according to
whether they are intended to reduce terrorists' resources, terrorists'
propensity to strike, or the damage inflicted by terrorism. Four types
of countermeasures were taken by Israel in correspondence with these
goals:

o Counterforce Measures: Countermeasures taken to reduce the ter-
rorists' resources and hence reduce their capability to strike.

o Impeding: Countermeasures designed to intercept a particular
strike before it is carried out, or during, or after.

o Passive Defense: Physical passive countermeasures (e.g.,
sheltering) to reduce the yield from completed operations.

o Punishment: Reprisal operations and "administrative punish-
ment" measures.

Israel has demonstrated a huge reaction in all categories, and by so
doing has responded to a major element in the terrorists' calculations.
*What* and *how much* should be done to counter the *objective* threat of
terrorism? To approach this policy question, the following assumptions
are made:

o Israel will face terrorism in the foreseeable future.

o Terrorism *cannot* be eradicated by countermeasures.

o Society and government are mainly concerned with the threat
to lives. Hence, reducing as much as possible the rate of
casualties should be the main policy goal.

o   A life is a life.  Under this preference, the loss to both in-
    dividuals and society of a casualty is independent of the
    cause which generated the casualty.

Given these assumptions, the policy question can be rephrased:
*"How do we live with terrorism?"*  The policy objectives in this context
are:

o   To reduce the discrepancy in resource allocation among all
    casualty-preventing programs.
o   To adjust society's subjective probabilities with regard to
    terrorism to the objective probabilities; and to seek a policy
    with less exaggerated perceptions and less distinctive re-
    actions.

In addressing these policy objectives, a psychological dimension is
added to the physical passive defense measure:  downgrading the impact
of terrorism, i.e., *not reacting as expected by the terrorists*.

The analysis considers marginal adjustments in the prevailing set
of countermeasures in all the domains under consideration (i.e., terror-
ism, car accidents, etc.).  Past and present methodologies used to
address life-saving or casualty-preventing programs are examined.  Since
the beginning of this century, the analytical framework that has been
used for evaluating life-saving or casualty-preventing programs is cost-
benefit analysis.  Within this framework, economists have attempted,
using different approaches, to estimate the monetary aspects of life
(or limb) as a measure of benefits.

In accordance with the policy objectives of this study, and under
the assumptions presented earlier, a different approach is suggested:
cost-effectiveness analysis.  The number of lives saved (or the number
of life years saved), not estimates of monetary gain, serve as the
policy maximands.  Assuming that budgetary constraints prevail, i.e.,
resources are given, the suggested approach examines the *marginal
product of the casualty-preventing shekel*.  It requires looking at a
whole set of threats and hazards society faces, and allocating resources

in a way that will seek to equate the marginal product of the casualty-
preventing shekel of Program A (say, preventing car accidents) with
that of Programs B, C, etc.  In this context, countering terrorism is
treated as one of several casualty-preventing programs.

The suggested approach is discussed on two levels:

o   <u>Extra-terror</u>:  Outside the domain of terrorism, treating
    terrorism as a subset of a national casualty-prevention
    policy, side by side with other casualty causes.
o   <u>Intra-terror</u>:  Inside the domain of terrorism, looking at
    individual countermeasures vis-a-vis the policy objectives,
    seeking to equate the marginal product of the casualty-
    preventing shekel among countermeasures.

The implementation of the policy of downgrading the impact of ter-
rorism then calls for a national casualty-preventing policy.  Introduc-
ing such a policy requires a centralized government system and a sole
source of budget.  Israel satisfies both requirements.  It is small
enough, has a central government, and has one national yearly budget
planned and allocated by the Ministry of Finance.  The *Knesset* rarely
interferes with government allocational decisions.

A national casualty-preventing policy for Israel is justified on
the following grounds:

o   Israel is facing severe economic problems.  The need to
    allocate budget effectively is therefore intensified.
o   The overall level of casualties from various other sources
    is high in both absolute and relative rates.
o   There are discrepancies in present resource allocation among
    various casualty-preventing programs.
o   Treating the countering of terrorism as an equal program
    among other casualty-preventing programs serves the purpose
    of downgrading the reaction to terrorism.

This Note provides a framework for analysis, rather than a detailed working out, of the many elements of this complex policy issue. A detailed empirical application of the suggested methodology is left for the future. In addition, the suggested methodology can be applied in other countries that face terrorism, and to other domains concerned with life saving, such as medical care or industrial safety.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ALF | Arab Liberation Front |
| BJO | Black June Organization |
| BSO | Black September Organization |
| CC | Central Committee, PLO |
| CCPR | Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance |
| CHIM | Cheil Mismar (Defense Corps) |
| CG | Citizens' Guard (Mishmar Ezrachi) |
| EC | Executive Committee, PLO |
| ETZEL | Irgun Zvai Leumi (the "Irgun") |
| FOSH | Plugot Hasadeh (Field Companies) |
| GSS | General Security Service (Sherut Bitahon Klali) |
| IDF | Israel Defense Forces |
| JSP | Jewish Settlement Police |
| LEHI | Lohamei Herut Israel (the "Stern group") |
| MAL | Money Aspects of Life |
| MPS | Marginal Product of a Life-Saving Shekel |
| OAP | Organization of Arab Palestine |
| PALMACH | Plugot Machatz (Field Companies) |
| PDFLP | Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PFLP | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PFLP-GC | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| PLF | Palestine Liberation Front |
| PNC | Palestine National Council |
| PPSF | Palestine Popular Struggle Front |
| USO | Unidentified Suspicious Object |

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## INTRODUCTION

"Terrorism" was rediscovered in the mid-1960s. The "wave" of
microviolence used by small groups, in many parts of the Western world,
has led to the creation of a new research discipline, within the domain
of social sciences, focusing on this "new" phenomenon. A partial bibli-
ography on contemporary terrorism, prepared by the CIA, includes 1277
entries representing "nonjournalistic literature dealing with one or
another aspect of terrorism . . ."[1]

Yet, terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon. Throughout his-
tory, opposition groups have utilized low levels of violence to inflict
damage and induce reactions for the purpose of attaining political goals.
Nevertheless, there is a belief according to which terrorism is taken
to be a distinguished innovation of our age, in the manner of nuclear
weapons. An important researcher of terrorism points out that:

> "We have entered a unique 'Age of Terrorism' with all its
> formidable problems and frightening ramifications."[2]

Alexander links the "unique" phenomenon to

> "The brutalization and globalization of modern violence . . ."

Alexander continues and discusses the "new" threats of contemporary
terrorism:

> "Extra-legal terrorism poses many threats to contemporary
> society and is likely to have a serious impact on the
> quality of life and on orderly civilized existence."

"Perhaps," continues Alexander,

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[1] Edward F. Mikolus, *Annotated Bibliography on Transnational and
International Terrorism*, Central Intelligence Agency, PR-76, 10073U,
Washington (1976).

[2] Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Police," *Journal
of International Affairs*, Vol. 32 (1978), No. 1, p. 101.

"The most *significant* dangers are those relating to the safety, welfare and rights of ordinary people, the stability of the state system, *the health and pace of economic development* and the *expansion*, or even the *survival* of democracy." (italics added)[1]

Without going into a detailed discussion of Alexander's assessment of the threats, I would like to point out one obvious false point: attributing to terrorism a "significant" impact on the rate of economic growth. There is no evidence of impact on economic growth of societies which face a high level of microviolence (such as West Germany, Italy, and Israel) that may be attributed to terrorism.

Other observers who analyze the "new threat" go even further and adopt a doomsday view of contemporary terrorism. A notable Israeli law professor describes terrorism as:

". . . bit by bit genocide . . . for its object is to assassinate *any* person belonging to the group marked out for extermination."[2]

Ginossar's apocalyptic argument benefits from the double meaning of "any": Bit by bit, *some* persons may be hit by terrorist strikes, until *all* are exterminated.

"Terrorism is one of the most important and dangerous problems facing mankind today," wrote Walter Laqueur in the prologue to his monograph on terrorism.[3]

These assessments of the threat of contemporary terrorism, like many other similar observations that may be found in the growing literature on terrorism, exemplify in fact a *change in the perception* of the threat of terrorism, rather than a change in the *threat* itself.

The perception of contemporary terrorism as a "very serious" threat is not confined to the domain of scholarly research. It is shared by societies in countries which face microviolence generated

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Shalev Ginossar, "Outlawing Terrorism," *Israel Law Review*, Vol. 13 (1978) No. 2, p. 153.

[3] Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, Boston (1977), p. 1.

by terrorists, as well as by those who are not directly involved, but watch the acts of violence carried out in remote places through the communication media.

It will be shown later that terrorism is perceived by Israeli society as a major threat. Israeli threat assessment is based upon *subjective* probabilities assigned to terrorism and consists of two components:

o  Personal component, namely the probability individuals assign to being hit by an act of terrorism--reflected in individuals' fear; and,

o  National image component, an intangible one, namely the degree of damage to the national image assigned by individuals and reflected in society's rage.

The perception of terrorism by the Israelis seems to be out of proportion to the role of terrorism in the shaping of the *objective* probability of an Israeli suffering casualties from external causes. The proportion of Israeli civilian casualties inflicted by terrorism over 12 years (1967-1978) out of the total number of casualties due to nonnatural causes is low: 0.55 percent (1856 out of 337,172).[1]

This paper will address the following policy question: *What* and *how much* should be done by the Government of Israel to counter the *objective* threat of Palestinian terrorism?

In the context of this paper, "Palestinian terrorism" stands for Palestinian acts of *low level* violence, for a political purpose, with the intent to inflict casualties and damage upon Israeli society, as well as fear and rage, and by so doing inciting Israel to react. Note that the definition excludes violence directed at high-level targets such as vital military installations. Such acts, if taken, would be counterforce strikes, inflicting a high level of damage, and would probably inspire massive reactions that might culminate in war.

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[1]

The dissertation includes two parts:

o   <u>Part One</u>:  Historical analysis of Palestinian violence and
     Israeli countermeasures:  1919-1978 (focusing mainly on
     the wave of terrorism in 1967-1978).

o   <u>Part Two</u>:  Toward a policy analysis of countermeasures.

The data used in this dissertation on Palestinian terrorism
strikes and on the damage inflicted by these strikes  are based solely
on Israeli sources for the following reasons:

o   Israeli data are available, and records are kept up to date;

o   The side on which damage is inflicted is able to make a
     more precise measurement of the damage.  The terrorists can
     give only estimates, and their claims are frequently
     exaggerated.[1]

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[1]One may advance the reciprocal argument, that the side upon which
the damage is inflicted will tend to underestimate the damage.  In my
view, the possibility of underestimation is low.  A major premise of
this dissertation is that Israeli society, in its perceptions, tends to
overestimate the impact of terrorism, even for the reported level of
damage.  The possibility of underestimating data on damage will there-
fore be ignored.

PART ONE

<u>PALESTINIAN TERRORISM AND ISRAELI COUNTERMEASURES:  1919-1978</u>

## I. INTRODUCTION

January 1, 1965 marks the first terrorist operation of *Al-Fatah* (hereafter referred to as *Fatah*) in Israel. The first strike was an attempt to sabotage the national water carrier in the Galilee. This strike is generally recognized as the opening of the era of contemporary Palestinian terrorism.[1] It is important to note that the January 1965 strike was far from the first encounter of the Jewish population in Israel with terrorists' strikes. Three periods of Palestinian terrorism may be identified:

o   1919-1948: Terrorism inflicted by local Arab groups against the growing Jewish population (the *Yishuv*) in British-mandated Palestine. The violence was motivated mainly by the goal to deny the Zionists' aspirations, rather than to promote Palestinian national goals.

o   1949-1956: Acts of terrorism along the 1948 armistice lines, inflicted by *Fedayeen* groups infiltrating from Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip). The infiltrations were backed and supported by Jordan and Egypt as part of the military conflict. No Palestinian national aspirations and goals were involved at this stage.

o   1965-Present: Palestinian terrorism, carried out by a number of Palestinian groups, as part of the armed struggle of the Palestinians aiming at "liberating Palestine" and establishing a Palestinian state, which would replace the State of Israel, and also include the West Bank and Gaza.

Although the main focus of this paper is contemporary terrorism in Israel, Part One will provide the background for an understanding of the present policy problem.

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[1] For example, see E. Weisband and D. Roguly, "Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy" in Y. Alexander (ed.), *International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives*, New York (1976), p. 261.

## II. TERRORISM AGAINST THE "*YISHUV*" IN BRITISH-MANDATED PALESTINE:
### 1919-1948

### PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE

Acts of violence against the Jewish population in Palestine (the *Yishuv*) started soon after the Balfour Declaration (November 17, 1917) which established the right of Jews to a national home and stimulated Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The Arab community had a geographic as well as demographic advantage over the Jewish community.[1] The bulk of the Arab population was rather evenly distributed throughout the highlands (Judea-Samaria-Galilee) and the adjacent hilly zones. The Jewish population was mainly concentrated within a few urban districts (generally in mixed cities--Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, etc.) or scattered in small towns and rural settlements (*kibbutzim* and *moshavim*) along the coast, in the Jezreel Valley, and the eastern Galilee lowlands. (Only a few settlements were in the highlands.) Both urban and rural Jewish communities served as targets for Arab violence.

Three waves of Arab violence in British-mandated Palestine may be identified:

a. Local Reaction (1920-1929): Attacks on Jewish communities by local neighboring groups inspired by local religious leaders.

b. "The Arab Revolt" (1936-1939): Organized violence, coordinated by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, directed both against the British government and the Jewish *Yishuv*.

c. "Civil War" (November 30, 1947 - May 14, 1948): Organized violence supported by neighboring Arab states. The attacks were a reaction to the U.N. Partition Resolution dividing Palestine between Jews and Arabs.

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[1] For an excellent discussion of geographic and demographic aspects of the conflict see: Charles M. Perry, *Geography, Demography, and Casualty Expectations: Determinants of Israel's Political Military Strategy*, Ph.D. Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston, April 1977, pp. 179-192.

In all three waves, the Arabs recognized the main Jewish vulnerability--namely casualties, given the demographic inferiority of the *Yishuv*, and therefore the high value placed on life. Perry[1] notes that the strategy of Arab irregulars was "based squarely upon simple 'war of attrition' pressure tactics, designed to exploit the quantitative strength of the Arab community." The local Arab leadership favored a low-level yet prolonged conflict in whith the Arab ability to absorb large casualties would prove decisive against the "casualty-conscious," less populous Jewish community. And indeed, the rate of casualties inflicted upon the *Yishuv* by Arab violence was high, given the small Jewish population, as exemplified in Table 1. Many of the casualties were inflicted during short time periods, in a few locations. For example, in April 1920 some 216 Jews were killed or wounded in *one day* in Jerusalem; in May 1921 the rate of Jewish casualties approached 40 per day; and in August 1929, 80 per day.[2] During the 1929 riots, Jewish casualties in Jerusalem represented one percent of the Jewish community there; in Safed, 2 percent; and in Hebron, 12 percent.[3]

### COUNTERMEASURES

The Jewish *Yishuv* did not count on the British mandatory government to counter Arab violence. In 1920 the *Hagana* ("Defense") organization was established. The measures taken by the *Hagana* in the 1920s were mainly defensive. By the 1936-38 period, as incidents of Arab violence increased, an offensive strategy was adopted by the *Hagana*. In mid-1936 a small mobile strike unit (*Hanodedet*) was set up[4] by Yitzhak Sadeh, the *Hagana* commander in the Hartuv area (west of Jerusalem). *Hanodedet* carried out a number of raids against Arab guerrilla bases in the Jerusalem mountains.[5] The success of *Hanodedet* led to the promotion of

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[1] Op cit, p. 181.
[2] Ibid, p. 182.
[3] Ibid, p. 184.
[4] Schiff and Haber, op cit, p. 151.
[5] Ibid, p. 499.

Table 1

JEWISH CASUALTIES IN BRITISH-MANDATED PALESTINE (1919-1948)

(Percentage of Total Jewish Population)

| Period | Jewish Casualties | | Total Jewish Population |
|--------|-------------------|----------|-------------------------|
| | Fatalities | Wounded | |
| April 1920 | 25 (.037) | 200+ (.29) | 67,000 |
| May 1921 | 47 (.056) | 146 (.17) | 83,000 |
| June-September 1929 | 234 (.150) | 439 (.28) | 156,000 |
| 1936-1939 (Arab Riot) | 620 (.140) | 1108 (.25) | 445,000 |
| 1947-1948 (Civil War) | 1256 (.200) | 2102 (.30) | 628,000 |
| Total | 2182 | 3995 | --- |

SOURCES: (1) Perry, op cit, pp. 183 and 194; (2) Z. Schiff and E. Haber, *Israeli Army and Defence: A Lexicon* (Hebrew), Zmora, Bitan, Modan (Tel Aviv, 1976), p. 232. The data are not exact and represent, at best, minimum levels.

Sadeh within the *Hagana* and the creation of field companies (*Plugot Hasadeh--FOSH*), regional strike units, initiating strikes against terrorist bases, in accordance with intelligence collected by agents of *Sherut Yediot*, the "Intelligence Service" of the *Hagana*. The experience accumulated in the operation of the field companies led to the creation of "special operation units" ("*Yehidot le'Peulot Meyuhadot*"--"PUM") in 1939, and finally to the creation of the well-known *PALMACH* (Hebrew acronym for strike companies), the offensive arm of the *Hagana*. Perry points out that, ironically, two British initiatives facilitated the development of the mobile Jewish counter-guerrilla force.[1] First, in May 1936 the Mandatory Government raised and trained groups of regionally-based guard units, known as the Supernumerary Police Force, or SPF. The SPF was originally intended as a supplement to the static Jewish Settlement Police (JSP), but was soon organized into a network of mobile units. Second, in the

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[1]Perry, op cit, p. 189.

summer of 1938 a Royal Army officer, Captain Orde Wingate (originally assigned as an adviser to the SPF), developed mixed British/Jewish Special Night Squads (SNS) designed to combat Arab sabotage against the Iraqi Oil Pipeline in the Jezreel-Galilee area. Wingate's impact on Jewish counter-terror tactics went far beyond a local episode. Wingate introduced the prominent members of POSH--Sadeh, Yadin, Allon and Dayan--to a range of offensive techniques emphasizing elements of deception and surprise. Dayan devotes a whole section in his memoirs to Wingate, ". . . an extraordinary soldier . . . He had unconventional ideas about how to deal with Arab terrorism and sabotage, and unlike many of his military colleagues, thought well of Jews. . . . The seeds of Wingate's novel ideas and tactics had already been implanted in us by Yitzhak Sadeh, the pioneer of the 'emerge-from-the-fence' school . . . [Wingate], a dominating personality, infected us all with his fanaticism and faith. . . . He was a military genius and a wonderful man."[1] Both British initiatives--the SPF and the SNS--played a major role in the development of active defense strategies by the *Yishuv*. By 1939 both SNS and SPF were demobilized by the Mandatory Government.[2] Yet, the experience gathered during the three years of collaboration with the British Mandatory Government (1936-1939) in countering the Arab Revolt, as well as the trained manpower, enabled the *Hagana* to establish its own mobile assault units. The *PALMACH* was established in May 1941 and was organized into nine "commando-assault" companies.

The defensive missions were carried out by *CHIM* (Hebrew acronym for Defense Corps), established by the *Hagana* on a territorial basis to substitute for the Jewish Settlement Police. *CHIM* provided a basic quantity of local static defense, and consisted of armed cells in each urban neighborhood and rural settlement.

Countermeasures during the 1920s and 1930s were mainly defensive, and toward the end of the period, offensive: attacks against Arab terrorist targets, based upon intelligence.

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[1]Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1976), pp. 45-47.
[2]Perry, op cit, p. 191.

The operations of two underground organizations--*Etzel* (acronym for Military National Organization) and *Lehi* (acronym for Israel Freedom Fighters), alias the Stern group--during the 1940s added a new dimension to the countermeasures taken by the *Yishuv* up until then. Retaliation and counterterror were exercised by both *Etzel* and *Lehi* against the civilian Arab population in Palestine.[1] Most of the counterterror operations were carried out during the "civil war" (November 1947 - May 1948). Soon enough, the *Hagana* followed the new pattern. For example, on December 12, 1947, four *Etzel* members threw an explosive barrel out of a taxi into a crowd in East Jerusalem. Twenty Arabs were killed and 50 wounded. The same operation was repeated three times, in different sites in Jerusalem. In retaliation for an explosive planted in the Jewish section of Haifa, a bomb was thrown by an *Etzel* group at the gate of the Haifa oil refineries. Six Arab workers were killed. The Arab workers witnessing the event took immediate revenge on Jewish workers. Forty-one Jewish workers were massacred in the ensuing riots.

These 41 fatalities had a strong impact on the *Yishuv*. Disassociating the killing of the 41 Jews from the provocative killing of the six Arabs by *Etzel*, the *Hagana* carried out a large-scale retaliatory operation against Balad-a-Sheikh, the residence village of many Arab refinery workers, in the vicinity of Haifa. Sixty Arabs were killed.[2] This terror-counterterror cycle soon escalated into a civil war, and later in May 1948, after Israel's Declaration of Independence, into the invasion of the "new" Israel by regular Arab forces and the War of Independence. The war absorbed terrorism, and it is difficult to distinguish between micro and macro violence during that period.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The creation of the State of Israel and the Arab defeat in the 1948 War put an end to the first era of Arab terrorism. In retrospect, one may observe that Arab violence against the Jewish *Yishuv* was limited by a relative lack of leadership, organization, resources,

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[1] Violence inflicted by *Etzel* and *Lehi* upon the British mandatory government is beyond the scope of this work. The interested reader is referred to: J. Bowyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, Lehi, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

[2] Schiff and Haber, op cit, pp. 58-59, 100, 290.

and above all, defined political goals. Arab violence in British-mandated Palestine was fueled mainly at first by Jewish immigration, and later by the U.N. Partition Plan and the prospect of an independent Jewish state. The *Yishuv*, on the other hand, was motivated by a clear political goal. The Jewish *Yishuv* as well as its leadership were willing to accept the U.N. Partition Plan, in the hope that it would be accepted by both local Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab states. However, the Arab reaction turned out to be violent. Terrorism was exercised, severe counterterror measures were taken, and the cycle of terror-counterterror soon turned into a full-scale war.

The Arabs were aware of the high Jewish sensitivity to casualties, as they carried out strikes during the mandate period. However, they underestimated the Jewish reaction: organized defense, offensive initiative and, finally, large-scale retaliation. The *Yishuv* perceived the Arab violence as a threat to its existence and a barrier to the creation of an independent Jewish state. The fresh memories of the Holocaust, and the notion of "never again," were demonstrated in the willingness to die for the cause. What may be considered as microviolence in retrospect, was perceived at the time, given the population's size, as macroviolence.

Despite the differences in the perception of Arab terrorism and its threat, countermeasures that evolved during the British mandate period--defense, offensive strikes, and reprisals--were adopted (although in more sophisticated form) during the second and third periods of Arab terrorism.

### III. FEDAYEEN: 1949-1956

#### ARAB VIOLENCE

The second era of terrorism followed the Arab defeat in The 1948 War. The massive exodus of Palestinian Arabs from Israel during the war led to the creation of a Palestinian Arab diaspora and the problem of Palestinian refugees. Palestinian national aspirations had begun to crystallize during the early 1950s, but the Palestinians still lacked both leadership and organization. Palestinians were exploited during that period by the Arab states as pawns in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's 593 miles of land border (the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Lines--ADL) offered convenient opportunities for infiltration.

The rate of infiltration increased constantly. First, private infiltration: clandestine crossing of the ADL by Palestinians for purposes of theft or livestock rustling. Later, as Israeli patrols became more effective, increasing numbers of Palestinians crossed the ADL armed. Clashes were inevitable. By 1953, individuals were encouraged by Jordan and Egypt to commit acts of violence such as throwing grenades at border settlements or shooting at automobile traffic.[1] Some of these operations were financed, at various times, by the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Saudi Arabian Government.[2]

By 1954, most violent strikes were carried out by the *Fedayeen* (Arabic for Sacrificers), a special Egyptian unit whose manpower was recruited among Gazan Palestinians. The officers of *Fedayeen* units were Egyptian, and operations were directed by Col. Mustafa Hafez, head of the Palestine Intelligence Bureau in Gaza. Some of the *Fedayeen's* operations were carried out from Jordan.[3] Most of the strikes were inflicted along the ADL. Few terrorist groups penetrated to population centers of the coastal area. During that period (1949-1956), 269

[1] Schiff and Haber, op cit, pp. 413-414.

[2] Lt. General J. B. Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, pp. 250, 305-306; quoted in Barry M. Belchman, *The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment*, Ph.D. Thesis (Georgetown University, 1971), p. 67.

[3] Schiff and Haber, op cit, p. 414.

operations originated from the West Bank (Jordan) and 460 from Egypt.[1] Two hundred sixty-four Israeli civilians were killed and 477 wounded in these operations.[2]

#### COUNTERMEASURES

Given the length of borders and the difficult terrain in many sections of the ADL, no effective defensive solution was feasible. Effective border security demanded a large number of armed patrol units as well as a large number of observation teams distributed along the ADL. Israel did not have the necessary resources, particularly regular manpower, to implement such a defense. Furthermore, Israel focused on military preparation against a large-scale assault by the Arab states, and thus required maintenance of large units (brigades) equipped with advanced weapons, ready to be deployed anywhere on short notice. Perry[3] points out, correctly, that as neither the manpower nor the inventory of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) could accommodate both actions simultaneously, Israeli defense planners concentrated their efforts on acquiring the latter capability, and left the problem of border security to Small Border Policy (*Mishmar Hagvul*) and Territorial Defense (*Hagana Merhavit*) units based upon the population of the border settlements. Each block of settlements had a district military command responsible for organization, maintenance, training, and "current security"--an Israeli term for the defense missions. New settlements were established in unpopulated border zones as part of the Territorial Defense system.

In parallel to the defensive measures, Israel made attempts to reach agreement with the Arab governments concerned, through the Mixed Armistice Commissions, as to cooperative measures which would help to reduce the level of infiltration.[4] These measures included exchange of information, physical demarcation of the border, joint patrolling,

[1] Blechman, op cit, pp. 71 and 85.

[2] IDF spokesman, quoted in Perry, op cit, p. 229.

[3] Perry, op cit, p. 223.

[4] See Blechman, op cit, p. 71.

direct telephone links between local area commanders, etc. Although a few agreements were reached, they were generally temporary, restricted, and, in fact, ineffective.

Since both the defensive measures and the attempts to control in-filtration through Israeli-Arab collaboration proved ineffective, Israel decided on reprisals.

In a lecture to IDF officers in November 1955, General Moshe Dayan, then Chief of the General Staff, pointed out that Israeli reprisals were aimed at inducing Arab governments to control infiltration:

> "We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion, and every tree from uprooting. We cannot *prevent* every murder of a worker in an orchard, or a family in their beds. But it is in our power *to set a high price on our blood, a price too high* for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab government to think it worth paying."[1] (italics added)

> "We can cause the Arab governments to renounce a 'policy of strength' towards Israel by turning it into a demonstration of weakness. The decision not to get into quarrels with Israel will come only if the Arabs have reason to suppose that otherwise they will have to *reckon with sharp reactions from our side and be dragged into a conflict in which they would be the losers*"[2] (italics added).

> "The motive that could bring the Arab governments and armies to follow such a course [to combat infiltration]--and make the people understand why--must be something hard and real and certain: *reprisal actions by the Israeli Army, and the fear of such actions.*"[3] (italics added)

In his memoirs, Dayan added another purpose:

> "I felt that our primary problem was not what to do to the Arab terrorists in reprisal, but *how to improve the fighting*

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[1]Moshe Dayan, "Why Israel Strikes Back," in Donald Robinson (ed.), *Under Fire: Israel's 20-Year Struggle for Survival* (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 122-123.

[2]Loc cit, p. 123.

[3]Loc cit, p. 122.

*capability of our army . . . raising combat standards.*"[1] (italics added)

A special commando unit, Force 101, was established under the command of Major (later General) Ariel Sharon.

Force 101 later merged with a paratroop battalion. This unit "undertook all the reprisal actions against Arab terrorists."[2] Reprisal actions were first (1949-1953) carried out against Arab villages which harbored infiltrators. Later (1954-1956), the operations were directed at military targets in Jordan (West Bank) and in Egypt (Gaza Strip). In many cases, to minimize negative consequences on its foreign relations, and in order to avoid U.N. condemnation, Israel did not take public responsibility for certain of the reprisals. For example, after a major reprisal operation in Qibia (October 1953), Israel claimed that the reprisal was "nothing but the act of private citizens provoked beyond the limits of tolerance."[3] Official admission came only twelve years later when Moshe Sharet's (then Foreign Minister) diaries were published. The attack on Qibia was a reprisal for the murder of an Israeli woman and her two children by infiltrators who threw a hand grenade into her home at Tirat Yehuda (a small town east of Tel Aviv). Qibia was believed to be the town from which the terrorists came.[4] Even when Israel took responsibility for a reprisal, she was aware of world public opinion. In defending the reprisal on military positions near Lake Tiberias, as a reaction to several attacks on Israeli fishing boats (December 12, 1955), Abba Eban, Israel's ambassador to the U.N., said:

> "To maintain any semblance of peaceful life, those responsible for Israel's national defense are called upon daily to face tragic choices and complex dilemmas. On the one hand, we must be faithful to a paramount duty for which Governments are instituted--to protect the lives of citizens from violent assaults

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[1]Dayan, *Story of My Life*, op cit, p. 173.

[2]Ibid.

[3]UNSC, *VR*, 630 (October 27, 1953), pp. 5-7.

[4]*NYT*, October 16, 1953, p. 2.

and to conserve the nation's integrity against lawless challenges. On the other hand, the impulse to merit the comprehension of world opinion is felt with a special force . . .."[1]

There exists neither an official Israeli nor a reliable Arab chronology of Israeli reprisals. Belchman, based upon a large number of sources, lists 63 reprisals: 18 directed against Egyptian targets and 45 against Jordanian targets. The yearly number of reprisals and Arab casualties are presented in Table 2.

All Israeli reprisals during the 1950s were night operations, in the spirit of Wingate's teachings.[2] Yet, by turning reprisals into a pattern, the element of surprise was substantially reduced, and consequently, Israeli casualties significantly increased.[3] For example,

Table 2

ISRAELI REPRISALS AND ARAB CASUALTIES

1950-1956

| | Reprisals Against Targets in Jordan | | | Reprisals Against Targets in Egypt | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Arab Casualties | | | Arab Casualties | |
| Year | # of Reprisals | K | W | # of Reprisals | K | W |
| 1950 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| 1951 | 9 | 18 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| 1952 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 1 | ? | ? |
| 1953 | 15 | 77 | 32 | 1 | 20 | 62 |
| 1954 | 9 | 22 | 34 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| 1955 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 87 | 21 |
| 1956 | 5 | 119 | 46 | 4 | 78 | 106 |
| Total | 45 | 258 | 133 | 18 | 193 | 203 |

SOURCE: Blechman, op cit, pp. 73-75, 88.

[1] UNSC, *VR*, 713 (January 17, 1956), pp. 17-19.

[2] See pp. 10-11 above.

[3] Perry, op cit, p. 236.

the two most important actions toward the end of the period, the Gaza raid of February 28, 1955, and the Kalkilia raid of October 10, 1956, produced 107 Israeli casualties (Gaza: 8 killed and 13 wounded; Kalkilia: 18 killed, 68 wounded).[1] Perry points out that low-level terrorist strikes were never dampened for more than 30 or 40 days; and, based upon the buildup in Israeli casualties, he concludes that the rate of casualties had reached the "basic security" threshold by October 1956, which led to the 1956 Sinai campaign.[2] The reprisals turned out not to reduce the rate of terrorism inflicted by the *Fedayeens*. Arab violence/Israeli response had developed into a costly war of attrition.

In Dayan's words:

"We cannot continue in this state of no peace and no war . . .."[3]

In his memoirs, Dayan explained why the pattern of night reprisals had to be abandoned:

"The military implications of Kalkilia led me to suggest that we stop costly night reprisal actions and carry out daylight operations instead, *using armor and aircraft.* This would be one way of compelling our Arab neighbors *to choose between halting the terrorism themselves or meeting us in a full-scale war.* A strong daylight action would reduce our casualties, and the affected Arab state would be unable to ignore the shock to its prestige. Another way would be to cross the border, capture commanding positions and make our evacuation conditional upon the stopping of terror."[4] (italics added)

The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was launched two weeks after the Kalkilia reprisal. The increasing number of casualties and the failure of small-scale reprisals to prevent terrorism were a major component in the Israeli casus belli.

[1] Schiff and Haber, pp. 395, 455-456.

[2] Perry, op cit, p. 237.

[3] M. Dayan, *Sinai Dairy*, p. 56.

[4] Dayan, *Story of My Life*, p. 210.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Arab terrorism during the 1950s was not organized violence by a frustrated group seeking to achieve a political goal. It was rather microviolence, generated by Egypt and Jordan, using Palestinians to carry out the strikes. The purpose was to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict on an active level short of war. Nadav Safran correctly noted that organized infiltration for intelligence, sabotage and killing assumed central importance in Arab strategy.[1] Israel perceived terrorism during the 1950s as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and dealt with it militarily, holding the harboring Arab states responsible. Yet the countermeasures, defensive and offensive, proved to be unsuccessful. The increase in *Fedayeen* strikes finally led to the 1956 War which, from the point of view of preventing terrorism, achieved its goal. In the eight years that followed the Sinai Campaign (1957-1965), no acts of terrorism were inflicted upon Israel.

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[1] Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967* (New York, Pegasus, 1969), p. 45.

## IV. THE EMERGENCE OF PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

During the 1950s and 1960s, Palestinian nationalism began to crystallize. However, there was still no consensus among the Palestinian elite over the means of fulfilling these aspirations. The Palestinian dispersion led various groups to identify with various ideological currents in the area (e.g., Nasserism, Baa'thism, Marxism).

In the years following the 1956 War, the official position of most Arab governments was that though war against Israel was inevitable, the Arabs should first prepare themselves thoroughly, and should not precipitate war prematurely. This policy was advocated by President Nasser and endorsed at Arab summit meetings in 1964-1965.[1] In a speech on June 26, 1962, Nasser pointed out why a limited war of attrition against Israel, as demanded by Syria, was inappropriate:

> "I do not agree with becoming involved in semi-military operations. If we were engaged in such operations, how could we guarantee that Ben-Gurion should [not] also be engaged in semi-military operations? . . . I mean to say that conducting semi-military operations and going to war without adequate preparation is a political swindle. Whoever says that we should go to war without getting ready for it is a traitor to his country and his people . . ."[2]

By the early 1960s, two major Palestinian organizations had emerged: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah. The PLO was established in 1964 as the "official" voice of the Palestinians, under the auspices of Egypt, echoing the denial of the semi-military option. Nevertheless, a military component was organized by the Egyptians within the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), with a conventional force structure, equipped and trained by Egypt.

Fatah (Arabic for "conquest" is a reverse acronym of *Harakat at-Tahrir al Watani al-Filistini* - Palestine National Liberation Movement)

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[1] See Y. Harkabi, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy," *Adelphi Papers* #53 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1968), p. 1.

[2] Quoted in Harkabi, op cit, p. 5.

was formed sometime during the mid-1950s, but made its existence known only in fall of 1959,[1] although not openly under its own name. In its early publications, Fatah's main argument was that the liberation of Palestine was primarily a Palestinian affair and could not be entrusted to the existing Arab states. Palestinians were to take the lead in the battle against Israel. The Arab regimes could, at most, provide aid and support. Fatah was a strong proponent of small-scale operations, rather than conventional warfare as a means to "liberate Palestine." With the exception of Syria, Arab governments were opposed to Fatah. Fatah recruits were tracked down in Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. However, contacts with the Syrian government intensified the development of the idea of popular armed struggle, both as a means for mobilizing the Palestinians and as a way of forcing the other Arab regimes to follow the lead of Palestinians in regaining Palestine.[2] The Syrians gave Fatah support, and its headquarters was set up in Damascus. The Syrians provided Fatah with training facilities, weapons, and financial assistance.

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[1] The exact date of the formation of Fatah is unknown. Schiff and Haber, op cit, p. 436, place its origin in 1958; Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1969, p. 299, places Fatah's origin in 1956. Other sources, e.g., Abdullah Schleiffer, "The Emergence of Fatah," *The Arab World*, May 1969, p. 16, trace Fatah to a 1957 summer meeting of a dozen Palestinians on a beach near Kuwait City. Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah* (New York: Sabra 1970), p. 19, believes that "the idea was probably born in 1954, but did not crystallize until March, 1955."

[2] For a detailed discussion of the emergence of Fatah and the idea of popular armed struggle see, for example: William B. Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions*, R-782-ISA (Rand, Santa Monica, November 1971), pp. 4-16; E. Yaari, op cit, pp. 1-79; Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 5-8; and Bard E. O'Neill, "Towards A Typology of Political Terrorism: The Palestinian Resistance Movement," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 32, 1978, #1, pp. 21-23.

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## THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

The history of Palestinian terrorist organizations[1] has been characterized by one observer as "fission and fusion,"[2] and by another as "an endless dance of unification and separation, always changing partners and breaking off again."[3] Between January 1965 and October 1966, Fatah was the only organization that carried out operations in Israel. Fatah's rival organization, the PLO, following Egypt's policy, criticized the use of terrorism in the beginning. Only after the rapprochement of Egypt and Syria, in fall, 1966, and Egypt's consequent change in its attitude toward sabotage activities in Israel, did the PLO establish a new terrorist organization, the Heroes of the Return (*Abtal al-Awda*).[4] The Heroes of the Return became Fatah's first serious rival. Its base was located in Lebanon, and its men were recruited from refugee camps. The change in the PLO's position with regard to the armed struggle was publicly expressed by Ahmed Shukeiri, PLO's head since its establishment in 1964:

> "The PLO no longer utters mere verbiage. It no longer consists of groundless dreams and hopes. The PLO is now a fighting revolutionary organization, [committed to] professional action and self-sacrifice, followed by the brave Fadeyeen warriers . . . . The Fedayeen will strike Israel from time to time. They will leap forth from every hill and every wadi, from Ajaba in the South to the Golan in North. They will

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[1] A detailed analysis of the various Palestinian organizations, their ideology, structure, struggles for power, relations with the Arab regimes, and their conflicts is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader can find a rich literature on the subject. For example: Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine*, op cit, pp. 125-161; Y. Harkabi, op cit; William B. Quandt, op cit, pp. 9-77; E. Yaari, op cit, pp. 198-262; John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (London: Cassel, 1973), pp. 1-113; E. Weisband and D. Roguly, "Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy," in Y. Alexander (ed.), *International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 259-319.

[2] Michael Hudson, op cit, p. 297.

[3] Ehud Yaari, op cit, p. 199.

[4] Ibid, pp. 99-100.

strike Israel day and night to prove that the Palestinian
people is the people of the brave. The Fedayeen will grow
in number and in equipment."[1]

On October 27, 1966, a third terrorist organization calling itself *Abd el-Kader Husseini Unit* made its appearance. This organization was also established by the PLO.[2] During the first five months of 1967, a number of units, carrying names of Palestinian leaders of the mandate period, appeared. These units, which belonged to the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) headed by Ahmed Jibril, were operated by the Syrians (who independently continued to support Fatah) and backed by the PLO. The entry of the PLO into terrorist activities and the rising rivalry between it and Fatah resulted in an increase of activities in Israel, and at the same time in numerous false announcements of fabricated raids.[3] The acceleration of terrorist activities during 1967 coincided with Syria's aggressive strategy preceding the 1967 War.

Following the Arab defeat of June 1967, there was a proliferation of terrorist organizations having a heterogeneity of political and ideological views, as well as various links to the Arab states. By January 1968, terrorist groups were active,[4] yet Fatah was the most popular and the largest organization. At the fifth session of the Palestine National Congress (PNC), in February 1963, Fatah managed to win control of the PLO and elect Yaser Arafat as chairman of the Executive Committee, an office he has held ever since. Despite the fact that Fatah's dominance was established, smaller terrorist organizations still emerged to challenge Fatah.

The most important among the rival organizations was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), established in December 1967 as the result of a merger of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and three other organizations: PLF, Heroes of the Return, and the Vengeance Youth. PFLP was headed by Dr. George Habash. The rivalry between Fatah and PFLP was based on personal and ideological elements:

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[1] Quoted in Yaari, op cit, p. 100.
[2] Ibid, p. 101.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Bard E. O'Neill, op cit, p. 126.

o   Struggle for leadership of the PLO, encouraged by a personal
    rivalry between Arafat and Habash.
o   The PFLP tended to link the Palestinian cause to a broader
    objective of a social revolution in the Arab world. Fatah
    focused on a Palestinian war of liberation.

Soon after its establishment, PFLP began to split apart. Quarrels between "left" and "right" as well as disagreements on the links to the Arab states led to fragmentation of the PFLP:

o   PFLP General Command, headed by Ahmed Jibril, linked to Syria;
o   Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP), headed by Ahmed Za'rur,
    linked to Egypt;
o   Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
    (PDFLP), headed by Naif Hawatmah, linked to Syria;
o   PFLP, the remainder of the organization headed by George
    Habash, linked to Iraq.

In addition to Fatah and the PFLP and its offshoots, other terrorist groups were established during 1968-1970. The most important organization among them was the *Saika* ("lightning bolt") created by Syria, in 1968, as its own terrorist forces trained and commanded by regular Syrian Army officers. Syrian efforts to gain influence within the Palestinian terrorist organizations led Iraq to act similarly as part of the rivalry between Iraqi and Syrian Baa'th. In 1969 Iraq formed the Arab Liberation Front (ALF).

Fatah was and is in the position of *primus inter pares* among the terrorist organizations, and holds the key positions within the PLO. Yet its power was not decisive and was challenged by organizations which retained the capability to operate independently. Their power to do so was generated either through their own dexterity (e.g., PFLP) or through the power of their parent Arab state (e.g., *Saika*, ALF).

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[1] Bard E. O'Neill, op cit, p. 126.

A few attempts toward unification or coordination among the organizations were made, usually within the framework of the PLO. The Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance (CCPR) was established in June 1970.[1] CCPR did not last long and was replaced by the Central Committee of PLO (PLO-CC). Another attempt was the formation of a joint command (PASC). However, at no time did all the terrorist organizations subordinate themselves to a central authority. The history of Palestinian terror organizations is characterized by ongoing clashes in two dimensions: among the terrorist organizations on one hand, and among terrorist organizations and various Arab states. The latter were incited either by inter-Arab conflicts (e.g., Iraqi-sponsored AFL activities against Syria; PFLP terrorism in Jordan) or as a result of Israeli retaliations against harboring Arab states (e.g., Israeli retaliations against Jordan, 1968-1970, which led to the September, 1970, "civil war" and the expulsion of all Palestinian terrorists from Jordan; or the Civil War in Lebanon in 1976-1978). .

During the 1970s, new organizations appeared and disappeared. The most important among them was the "Black September Organization" (BSO), established by Fatah to carry out terrorist strikes abroad in competition with PFLP, which took the initiative in expanding Palestinian terrorism outside the Middle East. In this context, some observers note that there seems to be a division of labor among the organizations with regard to their modus operandi, with PFLP, BSO and PSF specializing in operations outside the Middle East, while the larger groups like *Saika* and Fatah emphasize guerrilla raids and semi-military operations.[2] In fact, at various times, all organizations have taken part in all types of operations. Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the PLO.

Despite the fact that in the years following the 1973 War, the PLO established its international position as the representative of Palestinians, internal rivalry has not ceased. A "rejection front" was formed around opposition to a perceived willingness on the part of the PLO to compromise. The PFLP joined forces with the PFLP-CC. Other

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[1] B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 138.

[2] E.g., B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 152.

Fig. 1 — PLO: organizational structure

participants in the "rejection front" are the Iraqi-sponsored ALF and other militant elements within the "moderate" organizations. The rejection front condemns any partial resolution of the conflict that will leave any portion of Palestine in Israeli hands, a so-called "surrender solution." However, since there is no willingness on the part of Israel to have any contacts with any element of the PLO, the rivalry among the Palestinians remains in the ideologic realm. Furthermore, despite attempts made by scholars to rank the various organizations according to their degree of "moderation,"[1] the fundamental document of the PLO (the Palestinian National Covenant of 1968) defines explicitly both the goals of the PLO and the means to achieve them in a way that leaves no room for any partial solution. For example:

o   Article 1:   "Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people . . ."

o   Article 4:   "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine . . ."

o   Article 10:   "Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian Popular liberation war . . .."

o   Article 19:   "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are *entirely illegal*, regardless of the passage of time . . .."

o   Article 20:   "The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon them, *are deemed null and void* . . ... Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong."[2]

The Palestinian covenant has not been amended with regard to the cited articles, and it still reflects the major tenets of PLO's ideology, its

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[1]See, for example, E. Weisband and D. Roguly, op cit, pp. 258-260.

[2]Y. Harkabi, *The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning* (Totowa, N.J., Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1979), Appendix B1, pp. 113-118. The complete text is presented in Appendix A, pp. 189-235, below.

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main arguments, its strategic objectives and an outline of its program to achieve these objectives.

## External Support

Some final remarks are in order on the external support of Palestinian organizations.[1] *External support* is an important factor for Palestinian organizations, since their efforts to achieve *internal support* from the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and the occupied territories have been unsuccessful, as will be shown later. External support, namely political and moral backing, provision of sanctuaries, and material support, were and are provided to the Palestinian organizations by:

o   Arab states bordering Israel;

o   Peripheral Arab states;

o   Non-Arab States.

## Arab States Bordering Israel

Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, although not uniformly, supported different organizations at different times. The degree of support (or nonsupport) was a function of inter-Arab relations, Israeli responses, and internal politics. Besides political and moral support, the bordering countries provided the Palestinian organizations with operational support. The bordering states are a rather convenient launching platform for strikes against Israel, either by enabling terrorist groups to penetrate into Israel from their territory, or by permitting terrorist fire (shelling, Katyusha rockets, etc.) on Israeli targets from their territory. Periodically, terrorist incursions were supported with covering artillery fire by regular armies (Syria, Jordan). Besides sanctuary, political, and operational support, the bordering states provided material support: arms, equipment, training, installations and financial aid. Among the bordering states, Syria can be noted

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[1]For a detailed discussion see Bard E. O'Neill, op cit, pp. 163-204; Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the PLO*, Research Paper No. 1a, The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Jerusalem, December 1976); "Special Documents: The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 187-212.

as the most consistent supporter of the Palestinian organizations, although she has varied her operational support periodically. Jordan and Egypt supported some organizations part of the time. Jordan ceased its support after the 1970 civil war, and reestablished it in recent years. Egypt, in the spirit of the Camp David Accord and the peace agreement that followed, ceased supporting the organizations and their armed struggle, adhered instead to a general political backing of Palestinian national aspirations, and sought a partial solution in the form of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Lebanon, which as a result of Israeli reprisals was trying to prevent terrorism from its territory, instead found itself a victim. The Palestinian organizations, backed by Syria, were a main cause of the Lebanese Civil War (1974-1978) and the Syrian control that followed.

## Peripheral Arab States

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen were the main supporters of the Palestinian organizations. Their main support was political and material. Despite the fact that the degree of support varied over time, it is important to remember that the main source of financial aid to the Palestinian organizations was and is provided by peripheral states, mainly Kuwait and Libya. Libya provides training facilities as well as operational aid, mainly for strikes abroad (under the umbrella of diplomatic immunity). Libya has also provided asylum for hijackers and other terrorists. Libya's financial contribution is estimated at $20 million annually.[1] Iraq, although appearing as a strong political supporter of the Palestinian causes, maintained cool relations with Fatah and rather emphasized its relations with PFLP and PDF, providing these organizations with arms and training facilities. The rift between Iraq and Fatah may be explained in the light of the Iraqi-Syrian conflict. In addition to its support of "rejectionist" organizations, Iraq established its own, the ALF.

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[1]B. O'Neill, loc cit, p. 193.

## Non-Arab States

The main non-Arab support to Palestinian organizations is provided by the Soviet Union and its satellites, and by the People's Republic of China. Soviet support started after the 1967 War, following three years of indifference. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union does not support the PLO's goals with regard to Israel's existence, and despite a few public condemnations of international terrorism strikes carried out by BSO or PFLP, the Soviet Union maintains a close relationship with the PLO, and since 1972 has provided weapons as well as training to Palestinian terrorists. Its support has taken a modest, discrete form, below Palestinian expectations--namely, sustaining the Palestinian insurgent movement with abundant military assistance à la Vietnam.

The PRC has supported the Palestinian organizations since their first emergence in 1964. The PRC's support was in the form of loud, public, sympathetic declarations, as well as material aid (arms and training). Most observers agree that Chinese material aid was less than their propaganda.[1] It is interesting to note that most of the public political support was given by PRC to the Fatah-PLO wing, while there are indications that, with regard to military assistance, there is a tendency to favor the PFLP and the PDFLP,[2] which have a Marxist orientation.

## INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

Since the 1973 War, PLO has gained increasing international recognition. The Palestinian cause was publicized through acts of transnational terrorism. Backed by the Communist bloc and their world countries, Arafat made a triumphant appearance before the U.N. General Assembly, on November 14, 1974. Furthermore, the PLO opened more than 50 offices abroad, some of them with full diplomatic status.[3]

The Palestinian organizations also maintain close relationships with other terror organizations, such as the Italian Red Brigade, the Japanese Red Army, the German *Bader-Meinhoff* group, the Turkish

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[1]B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 204.

[2]Ibid.

[3]See Appendix A, pp. 224-235, below.

Popular Liberation Front, the Nicaraguan Sandinist Movement, the Irish Republic Army, and others. Members of foreign terror organizations have been trained in PLO bases in Lebanon, South Yemen, and Libya. In a large number of strikes, foreign terrorists have collaborated with Palestinian terrorists. For example, on December 12, 1969 an explosive was planted near the El Al office in West Berlin by the *Bader Meinhoff* group in collaboration with the PFLP. On May 28, 1971, the Israeli Consul General in Turkey was murdered by the Turkish Liberation Army. On June 9, 1970 a Nicaraguan Sandinista participated in an attempt to hijack an El Al plane in London. On May 30, 1972 three Japanese Red Army terrorists in the service of PFLP killed 26 persons and injured 76 in an attack at Ben Gurion Airport, in Lod, Israel.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The history of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, from 1964 until present, is replete with rivalries: interorganizational, among competitive organizations, and with Arab states. The ongoing struggle for power, as well as ideological differences, has led to the rise and fall of many terrorist organizations. Fatah was and is the main terrorist organization, and is in the position of *primus inter pares* among the members of the PLO. Yet, its power is not decisive, and is challenged frequently by other organizations which retain the capability to operate independently, such as the PFLP and PDFLP, around which a "rejection front" was established. Despite attempts to detect a notion of moderation in the mainstream of the PLO, the Palestinian fundamental document, the Palestinian Covenant, has not been amended, and reflects the major tenets of the PLO's ideology, its main arguments, its strategic objectives and an outline of its program to achieve these objectives. There is no indication up to the present that the Palestinian National Council is ready to moderate the PLO position. Therefore, in the context of this paper, with regard to Israel and the policy problem of countering terrorism, the following conclusions may be drawn:

    o   A consensus prevails among all Palestinian organizations
          as to the goals and the means with regard to the "liberation

of Palestine," the elimination of Israel, and the substitution of a Palestinian state; and

    o   If some (small or large) elements among the Palestinians might be willing to pursue paths of compromise (such as partial solutions for Palestinian aspirations, say a Palestinian state in Gaza and West Bank, etc.), there would emerge a "rejection front" opposing the compromise solution, and continuing to use terrorism against both Israel and the compromising organizations. The rejectionists will most likely be supported by militant Arab states and will probably maintain connections wtih international terror organizations. Hence, Israel is likely to face terrorism in the foreseeable future, independent of any political course Israel may pursue regarding the Palestinian issue.

## V.  FIRST ATTEMPT:  1965-1967

### PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE

From the first operation, on January 1, 1965, until the outbreak of the "Six Day War" in June 1967, the Palestinians carried out 113 operations; 108 operations were carried out by Fatah, and the remaining five by the "Heroes of the Return."  All operations were carried out by infiltrators.  There was no response by Israeli Arabs to Fatah's appeals calling on them to participate in an insurgency.  Furthermore, Fatah was backed and supported only by Syria.  Egypt liquidated a Fatah cell in Gaza following three operations concerned with planting mines on Israeli border roads in the Gaza area during the first three months of 1965.  No further operations were carried out from Egypt.

King Hussein was less successful in abolishing operations from Jordanian territory.  Despite his explicit orders to that effect, lower echelons of the Jordanian Army were not eager to carry them out.  The Palestinian population of the West Bank provided sanctuary to terrorist groups before and after operations in Israel.  While 71 operations were carried out by infiltration from Jordan and 15 by infiltration from Lebanon, most of them originated in Syria, with Jordan and Lebanon serving only as a convenient passage.

Table 3 presents the terrorist infiltrations and their origins. The infiltrators made an effort to avoid encountering Israeli patrols or security guards.  Whenever a group assumed it was detected, it retreated. Hence, only 76 of the 113 infiltrations resulted in actual operations. All operations were carried out exclusively in border areas.  The deepest penetration was 18 kilometers (an explosive planted at a water pump in Arad), and the terrorists were discovered on their way back to the Jordanian border.  Sixty-eight percent of the operations involved planting explosives, usually at isolated water installations (pumps, pipes), railroads, and houses located at the edge of border settlements. Twenty-five percent of the operations involved mining border roads, while only seven percent involved small arms fire, in ambushes along border roads.  A breakdown of the 76 operations is presented in Table 4.

Table 3

PALESTINIAN TERRORISM: 1965-1967

| Year | Palestinian Infiltrations and Their Origin | | | | | Infiltrations Culminating in Operations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Syria | Lebanon* | Jordan** | Egypt | Total | |
| 1975 | 2 | 1 | 28 | 3 | 35 | 31 |
| 1976 | 8 | 3 | 30 | – | 41 | 16 |
| 1977 (Jan-June) | 13 | 11 | 13 | – | 37 | 29 |
| Total | 23 | 15 | 71 | 3 | 113 | 76 |

\* All operations from Lebanon originated in Syria, and were carried out in the upper Galilee, near the intersection of the Syria-Lebanon-Israel border.

\*\* Forty operations from Jordan originated in Syria.

SOURCE: Based on monthly chronologies published in: *SKIRA HODSHEET*, Monthly Survey, A Journal for IDF officers (Hebrew), (Vol. XlI-Vol. XIV: January 1965 – June 1967), passim.

Table 4

MODES OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS: 1965-1967

| Year \ Mode of Operation | Explosives | Mines | Small Arms Fire | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 24 | 4 | 3 | 31 |
| 1966 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 16 |
| 1967 (Jan-June) | 20 | 8 | 1 | 29 |
| Total | 52 | 19 | 5 | 76 |

SOURCE: drawn from *SKIRA HODSHEET*, op cit, passim.

Thirty percent of the explosives were detected before they went off. All the explosives had a simple time delay mechanism, with a sufficient delay to enable the group to retreat and cross the border before detonation. None of the explosives inflicted any casualties. Minor damage, though, was caused to pipes, pumps, and water reservoirs. During that period, 12 Israelis were killed and 31 were injured. *All fatalities were caused by mines;* 29 were injured by mines and 2 by small arms fire. The breakdown of casualties is presented in Table 5.

Although communiques issued by Fatah after operations usually emphasized the large number of Israeli casualties and/or heavy damage inflicted in the operations, the evidence shows that casualties were relatively few, primarily because of the positioning of explosives and the terrorists' caution in attempting to avoid encountering Israeli security forces. Yet, intent to destroy was there, as exemplified by one notable incident: On January 15, 1967, two mines were planted in a soccer field, in Dishon, a small moshav near the Lebanese border. One teenage boy was killed, and two others were severely injured.

## ISRAELI COUNTERMEASURES

The defensive measures that had been developed during the 1950s had been discontinued after the 1956 War, and had to be reintroduced.

Table 5

ISRAELI CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY TERRORISM: 1965-1967

| Casualties Year | Civilians | | Soldiers | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded |
| 1965 | – | 1 | – | 4 | – | 5 |
| 1966 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 20 | 11 | 23 |
| 1967 (Jan-Jun) | 1 | 3 | – | – | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 4 | 7 | 8 | 24 | 12 | 31 |

SOURCE: Data drawn from *SKIRA HODSHEET*, op cit, passim.

Fences were erected around border settlements and guards were put in place. In a lecture delivered in March 24, 1967, General Itzhak Rabin, then Chief of the General Staff, IDF, pointed out that

"We must not delude ourselves that it is within the power of defensive measures, electronic devices, etc., to seal borders as long and as convoluted as Israel's."[1]

Israel readopted the "active defense" approach, and carried out six reprisals: four against Jordan, one against Lebanon, and one against Syria. Each IDF operation followed an accumulation of terrorist strikes. The targets and methods were chosen to correspond to those employed by the terrorists. The first reprisal was carried out in the night of 27/28 May 1965, in the form of three raids against three targets in Jordan: one east of the Jordan Valley in the Beit Shean area, and two in the West Bank. In Jenin, a flour mill was blown up (corresponding to an attempt to blow up a grain silo in Kefar Hess on February 28). In Kalkilia, a gas station was blown up. The declared purpose was warning. The IDF spokesman emphasized that the reprisal raid followed a number of terrorist strikes "in which the *intent* to kill people was specially prominent."[2] Rabin pointed out that

"the purpose [of the raids] was to send Jordan a clear warning, and to express that we will not accept her inactivity and lack of control over her sovereign area, nor her not preventing its transformation into a base of sabotage operations against Israel."[3]

Following five Palestinian operations directed against water installations in Israel (three near the Jordanian border and two near the Lebanese border), Israel carried out on September 5, 1965, two reprisals. In Kalkilia (Jordan) 11 water pumps were blown up and in Hule (Lebanon) three water reservoir pools were blown up.

[1] Quoted in *SKIRA HODSHEET*, Vol. XIV (1967), p. 67.
[2] *SKIRA HODSHEET*, Vol. XII (1965), No. 5, p. 3.
[3] Ibid.

No terrorist activity was reported during seven months after these operations, namely September–March, 1966. Four terrorist strikes (three mines and one explosive that were planted) during April led to the fourth Israeli reprisal on April 30, 1966. Fourteen houses in two Jordanian villages were blown up after having been evacuated of their inhabitants. Despite Israeli care in attempting to avoid Jordanian casualties, the Jordanians reported that 11 persons were killed. Rabin, explaining the motive of the reprisal, pointed out that

"The operation was intended to make it clear to Jordan, and to the population which is collaborating with Fatah, and to Fatah members themselves, that as long as this side of the border will not be quiet, no quiet will prevail on the other side. Following our warning operations last September, the region was quiet from November of last year until April. The acts of terrorism that have been carried out from Jordan during April demonstrate a decrease in the effectiveness of Jordanian counter-measures. Israel continues to view any state, out of which terrorists act, as responsible for these acts. Our operations were aimed at demonstrating that he who will not do all he can to prevent terrorism, will not remain unpunished."[1]

Terrorist activities did not cease after Israel's fourth reprisal. During the last year of the first wave, Israel carried out two more reprisals, both massive and both triggered by terrorist strikes that inflicted deaths and casualties. On July 13, 1966 a car hit a mine near Almagor, a kibbutz on the Syrian border. Two persons were killed and one injured. It was the second mine that had exploded in the Almagor area; in the previous incident, on May 16, two youngsters were killed. Israel's sensitivity to casualties was demonstrated in a reprisal on July 14, 1966, which made use of the Air Force for the first time. Israeli aircraft attacked a concentration of heavy engineering equipment being used for the Jordan water diversion project. Prime Minister Eshkol stated, after the Air Force strike:

[1]*SKIRA HODSHEET*, Vol. XIII (1966), No. 4, p. 91.

"There is no force in the world that can prevent a human being or a people from reacting, as they wish, to acts of murder and bloodshed that cry out aloud. Syrian acts of terror have forced us to prove once again that those who plot to disturb our peace, and attack Israeli lives and property, will not remain unpunished."[1]

The main significance of this operation was the introduction of air power as a countermeasure to terrorist operations. In this context, Rabin declared:

"The Syrians were probably thinking that they can dictate the rules of the game, and that, by employing terrorist methods, they will force us to respond in a similar manner. But selecting the proper countermeasure is a function of the goal one seeks to achieve. It is not the other side's technique that will dictate our responses . . .. Israel has therefore chosen to employ its Air Force as a means of demonstrating clearly the gravity with which Israel views the provocation. Our enemies should realize that we shall decide upon the rules according to our perceptions and preferences. The IDF has long arms and many tricks up its sleeve, and Israel shall decide how, where, and when to use them according to its own will."[2]

The sixth and last reprisal, on November 13, 1966, was triggered by a terrorist mine, planted southwest of Hebron, which killed three soldiers and injured six. Israel carried out its first day-time reprisal—a large armored raid into Samoa', a Jordanian village in the Hebron area. Thirteen houses were blown up, and a local police station was destroyed. Israel suffered 11 casualties in this operation, one killed and ten injured. The Jordanians reported 18 killed and 54 injured. A number of sources indicate that Israel did not expect active Jordanian interference.[3] The operation was described by Eshkol as a "Deterrent Defense."[4] However, this massive operation did not prevent further acts of terrorism. Furthermore, it was directed at the wrong address,

[1]*SKIRA HODSHEET*, Vol. XIII (1966), No. 7, p. 175.
[2]Ibid, p. 176.
[3]B. M. Blechman, op cit, p. 111; cf Yaari, op cit, pp. 102–103.
[4]*SKIRA HODSHEET*, Vol. XIII (1966), No. 11, p. 295.

since Syria was responsible for Fatah's activities. Instead of increasing Hussein's willingness to curb Fatah's activities, Samoa' led him to collaborate with the terrorists. Furthermore, the Samoa' operation, as Yaari correctly points out, "threw Arab public opinion into a belligerent mood, which raged until the Six Day War."[1]

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Terrorist activities continued at an increasing rate following the Samoa' operation. The Egyptian-controlled PLO joined the terrorist effort (see p. 28 above). The first wave of terrorism ended with the outbreak of the Six Day War. The Palestinian strikes had no military or economic impact on Israel. Yet Israel responded vigorously whenever casualties were inflicted, and by so doing contributed to the weakening of Egypt's and Jordan's opposition to the use of small-scale operations; and, finally, to the escalation which led to the Six Day War.

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[1]Yaari, op cit, p. 103.

## VI.  PALESTINIAN TERRORISM:  1967-1978

Palestinian terrorism increased greatly after the Six Day War. In fact, it was the Arab defeat in the 1967 War that boosted terrorism. In retrospect, the following factors that contributed to the increase of terrorism may be pointed out:

1. The realization, within the Arab world, that the regular Arab forces were not capable of deciding a war led to adopting terrorism as a means of keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict active as long as necessary to prepare the regular forces. An editorial in a semi-official Egyptian weekly included the following statement with regard to Palestinian guerrillas:

> "The present goal in carrying out *fedayeen* activities is to keep the Israeli enemy occupied and weakened, and to create prolonged periods of worry and tension that will force Israel to invest effort beyond her capability in all spheres, until a sufficient Arab force will be created, a force that will be capable of imposing a military solution--with force."[1]

Both Egypt and Jordan, who were reluctant to support the Palestinian organizations before the war, joined Syria in supporting the Palestinian "military struggle for the liberation of Palestine" after the war. Even Lebanon's firm opposition softened, when faced with the general Arab trend. Hence, the terrorist organizations found, after the war, new sources of arms acquisition, bases, extended penetration areas, and direct operational support (intelligence as well as fire support) from regular Arab forces in border positions.

2. The million Palestinians now under Israeli occupation provided new content to the notion of a "War of Liberation." The terrorist organizations saw the occupation as an opportunity to mobilize the Palestinian masses for an insurgency, a "popular revolution." On June 20, 1967, ten days after the cease-fire, Fatah announced that

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[1]*Ruz al Yussuf*, April 22, 1968, quoted in Y. Raviv "Israel's Security in the Third Year After the Six Day War" (Hebrew), *MAARACHOT*, Vol. 55 (1970), No. 4, p. 10.

"The headquarters of the organization has moved into the territory occupied by Israel. From now on, the organization will carry on its operations far from Arab states, so that they [the Arab states] can avoid the danger of being hit by Israeli reprisals to *fedayeen* operations."[1]

Fatah believed that it could easily incite an insurgency. On September 1, 1967, Fatah presented its wishful plan in a manifesto distributed secretly in the West Bank and Gaza. The manifesto included a call for a revolutionary war of liberation, and outlined detailed instructions for carrying it out. It is worthwhile to quote the manifesto in full:

"To the heroes of the Arab people in the occupied land. We call upon you in the name of the Arab heroes Omar and Salah el-Din to rise against the foreign occupation and prohibit the Zionist occupiers from treading on our sacred Arab land.

"The legendary resistance of Algeria, which had suffered more than a million casualties, will guide us on our way. We must understand that the foreign occupation is the beginning of a revolutionary war of liberation. Let us take as our model the struggle of the Vietnamese people, who are performing miracles against the American invader. The Zionist occupation is nothing but the rise of a new crusade. We shall continue to rebel until the final victory.

"We must boycott all economic, cultural, and legal institutions of the Zionists. This boycott will be the first step in our struggle against the occupational powers.

"In every neighborhood, street, and village, we must elect local committees to solve our everyday problems, for we must not turn to the enemy for a solution to our problems and for the settlement of our affairs. The enemy's slogan is always: 'Divide and rule.'

"The enemy utilizes his broadcasts and papers as weapons of psychological warfare conducted against us, to weaken our power of resistance. We shall not let the enemy exploit this opportunity for we must not read his papers or listen to his broadcasts.

"The enemy's pleasant words and his desire to draw us near will not fool us. We must not fear the enemy's planes and armor, for he lives in constant fear, knowing that we are a two-edged sword waved against him.

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[1]Quoted in S. Gazit, "The Administered Territories: Policy and Deeds" (Hebrew), *MAARACHOT*, Vol. 55 (1970), No. 4, p. 36.

"We must set up secret resistance cells in every street, village, and neighborhood. For even one fighting cell, operating in any region, has the power to inflict great losses upon the enemy.

"Roll down great stones from the mountain slopes to block communications lines for the enemy's movements. If you happen to stand by an enemy's car, fill its gas tank with sand or sugar to put it out of action.

"Try to produce fires in the enemy's cars with oil and other means.

"You must observe the enemy's movements, count his soldiers, determine the kinds of weapons he uses, and locate his supply depots. Follow the enemy's movements and reconnoitering parties.

"Our slogan shall always be--The revolution is our road to liberation until we win.

"Fill half a bottle with tar, lime or turpentine oil. To the tar, add a quantity of benzine, about a quarter of the bottle's capacity. Now add an additional quantity of oil to the mixture, equal to half the quantity of benzine. Take a caulker and place around it several matches, side by side, turning the heads of the matches up, outside the bottle. Seal the bottle properly. To operate it, light one of the matches, and throw the bottle at the target."[1]

3. The proliferation of Palestinian terrorist organizations (see pp. 22-27 above) and their competitors, each organization trying to justify its existence by carrying out operations.[2]

Altogether, the Palestinian organizations carried out 6839 operations from June 1967 to December 1978. However, 72.2 percent (4991) of the operations were carried out during the first three years. Many observers take advantage of the dramatic drop in the number of Palestinian operations in 1971 to subdivide the period and to talk about waves of terrorism. Although this is partially true, I have chosen to deal with the whole period as one unit in order to be able to trace trends through both parts: terrorist operations, Israeli countermeasures, and the interaction between the two. Figure 2

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[1]Yaari, op cit, pp. 133-135.

[2]The incentive to maximize the number of strikes led also to advertising a large number of fictitious operations, as well as to exaggeration of the magnitude and outcomes of operations that were carried out.

Fig. 2 — Terrorist incidents: 1967 - 1978

SOURCE: IDF records.

presents the distribution of the total number of terrorist incidents per year. The reader should note that the numbers do not represent the magnitude of the different, individual strikes. Infiltrations are recorded side by side with firing across the border or bomb planting or throwing a Molotov cocktail or killing hostages, etc. We shall examine a breakdown of the incidents later on. At this stage the gross figures are presented to give the general order of magnitude of Palestinian strikes, as recorded by the IDF.

The number of incidents as well as the mode of operation used by the terrorists were affected by a number of factors: the Israeli countermeasures (preventive and responsive, passive and active), the degree of support of the Arab states bordering Israel, the degree of support of the population in the occupied territories, intra-organizational conflicts, extra-organizational conflicts and, to a lesser extent, world public opinion. Figure 3 presents a schematic diagram of the multi-directional interaction between the various factors.

The main effort of the terrorist organizations during 1967-1968 was to incite an insurgency in the occupied territories. Both Fatah and the PFLP tried to establish a network of cells in both rural and urban settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. In parallel to organizational efforts, and before the organizations were well established and prepared, they exposed themselves by carrying out strikes directed against Israeli military government personnel and installations, within the territories, and inside Israel (taking advantage of the ease of penetration into Israel in the post-1967 environment). Terrorism was also directed against the local population in the occupied territories, mainly against collaborators with the Israeli military government. From its very beginning, the military government made a large counter-insurgency effort (see pp. 70-75 below), which affected both the willingness of the local population to take part in an insurgency, and the capability of the terrorist organizations to establish themselves and carry out operations from the occupied territories. Hence, the terrorists were forced to act from behind the 1967 cease-fire lines. Jordan was their natural choice, given its proximity to the West Bank and the fact that it has the longest land border with Israel (561 km). During 1968-1970, 647 penetrations from Jordan were recorded by the IDF; they

Fig. 3 — Factors affecting terrorist strikes and mode of operation

represent about 65 percent of all border penetrations during that period.[1] The penetrations were carried out by small groups (3-10), carrying on their backs the necessary weapons and supplies to enable them to stay a few days. Most of the groups found shelter in one of the many caves on the eastern slopes of the Judean and Samarian mountains, using them as a base for operations: mining, planting explosives, or ambushing. They then retreated back to Jordan after completing their tasks. Israel's intensive border security system, which was implemented during 1968-1969 (see pp. 75-76 below), inflicted a large nubmer of casualties on the penetrating terrorists (nine in 1967, 550 in 1968, 293 in 1969, and 308 in 1970), and gradually put an end to the systematic penetration effort. As a result of the increasing effectiveness of Israel's border security system, the terrorists shifted their mode of operation to firing across the border with Katyusha rocket launchers, mortars, bazookas, and small arms. Their targets were both civilian settlements, mainly in the densely populated Beit Shean valley south of the Lake of Galilee, and military targets (installations and patrols) along the border. In many cases, the terrorists were given artillery support by the Jordanian Army, or by the Iraqi Expeditionary Forces stationed around Irbid. Figure 4 indicates the shift from operations inside the territories to fire assaults across the Jordanian border, 1967-1969.

The firing assaults escalated in most cases into an artillery fire exchange between Israel and Jordan. Israel's heavy reprisals against Jordan (see pp. 76-77 below) led King Hussein to demand the cessation of terrorist activities from Jordan. Following the refusal of the Palestinian organizations to yield to his demands, Hussein launched a war on the terrorist organizations which culminated in September, 1970. The conflict, known as the "Jordanian Civil War," alias "Black September," as the Palestinians call it, in fact put an end to terrorist operations from Jordan.

Although Jordan was the main front from which the terrorists acted, operations were carried out from Syria starting on December 2, 1967,

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[1] Raviv, op cit, p. 11.

Fig. 4 — Incidents along the Jordanian border: 1967-1969

and from Lebanon starting on May 7, 1968. After the expulsion of the terrorists from Jordan in September, 1970, and following the resolutions of the Arab summit conference[1] in Cairo (September, 1970), the terrorists shifted their effort to operations from Lebanon.

Despite their relatively large magnitude, terrorist activities from 1967 until September, 1970, were "swallowed up" in the ongoing "War of Attrition," along the Suez Canal between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan. Terrorist operations within the cease-fire lines, namely in Gaza, the West Bank, and inside Israel, represented only 10.8 percent of the total number of incidents, as demonstrated in Table 6.

The terrorists inflicted 1325 casualties during that period, which represent 53 percent of the total number of casualties (Table 7). It is worthwhile to note that 52.3 percent of the casualties that were caused by Palestinian terrorist strikes (62.4 percent of the killed and 50.6 percent of the wounded) were military casualties. This fact corresponds to the semi-military character of the Palestinian activity during that period. The failure of the "Vietnamization" of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the increasing effectiveness of the Israeli counter-measures, and the lack of sufficient effect of the strikes, led the militant Palestinian organizations (mainly PFLP and its splinter groups, which did not approve of the semi-military "guerrilla" type of operations carried out by Fatah) to open a new front: international terror-ism. The first operation was the hijacking of an El Al aircraft en route from Rome to Lod, Israel, on July 23, 1967. George Habash admitted that the main motive behind the strikes abroad was their effect.

"To kill a Jew far from the battlefield had more effect than killing a hundred Jews in battle. When we set fire to a store in London [referring to the incendiary bombs in Marks and Spencers on August 17, 1969] those few flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim, because we force people to ask what is going on."[2]

[1] B. O'Neill, op cit, pp. 81-82.
[2] To Oriana Fallaci--in an interview held on June 22, 1970, quoted in John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (London, Cassel, 1973), p. 45.

## Table 6

INCIDENTS ALONG ISRAEL'S BORDERS AND WITHIN THE BORDERS
DURING THE "WAR OF ATTRITION": 1967-1970

| Area/Front | Number of Incidents | % of Total |
|---|---|---|
| Lebanese Front | 181 | 1.9 |
| Syrian Front | 346 | 3.7 |
| Jordanian Front | 3425 | 36.6 |
| Egyptian Front | 4433 | 47.0 |
| Total Along Borders | 8385 | 89.2 |
| Total Inside the Borders | 996 | 10.8 |
| Total | 9381 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: Raviv, op cit, p. 10.

## Table 7

ISRAELI CASUALTIES DURING THE "WAR OF ATTRITION":
1967-1970

| Cause \ Casualties | Civilian Casualties | | Military Casualties | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded |
| Terrorist Strikes | 71 | 561 | 118 | 575 | 189 | 1136 |
| Regular Arab Forces | 14 | 28 | 288 | 833 | 302 | 861 |
| Total | 85 | 589 | 406 | 1408 | 491 | 1997 |

SOURCE: Data drawn from IDF spokesman and Raviv, op cit, p. 11.

From 1968 until the end of 1978, a total of 169 international terrorism strikes were carried out, 40 by PFLP and 47 by the "Black September Organization" (BSO), the international terror arm of Fatah. The huge effect of the early strikes and the PFLP monopoly led Fatah to join the effort in 1971. Only 24 of the 169 strikes abroad involved casualties: 169 killed and 193 wounded. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the data on the Palestinian terror strikes abroad.

Twenty-seven of the 169 strikes were not completed, either because of arrests or through discovery of planted explosives.

Palestinian terrorism abroad represents only 2.6 percent of the total number (6389) of Palestinian operations from 1967 to 1978. In spite of its low proportion, transnational Palestinian terrorism had the largest effect on both international public opinion and domestic

## Table 8

PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
1968-1978: INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES

| Year | Total # of Incidents | # of Incidents with Casualties | Casualties | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Total | | Israelis | |
| | | | Killed | Wounded | Killed | Wounded |
| 1968 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 1969 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 7 |
| 1970 | 15 | 3 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 6 |
| 1971 | 16 | 0 | - | - | - | - |
| 1972 | 35 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 12 | 1 |
| 1973 | 38 | 5 | 38 | 62 | 3 | - |
| 1974 | 15 | 1 | 88 | - | 12 | - |
| 1975 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 79 | - | 20 |
| 1976 | 14 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| 1977 | 4 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| 1978 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 5 |
| Total | 169 | 24 | 169 | 193 | 38 | 46 |

SOURCE: IDF spokesman and *SKIRA HODSHEET* (1968-1978), passim.

## Table 9

### PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1968-1978, ACCORDING TO TYPE OF STRIKE

| Type of Strike / Year | Related to Aviation | | | | Explosives | Small Arms | Booby-Trapped Letters | Arson | Hostage Taking | Poisoning | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hijacking | Blowing Up Aircraft | Airport Terminal Assaults | Total Aviation | | | | | | | |
| 1968 | 1 | – | 1 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 |
| 1969 | 3 | – | 2 | 5 | 5 | 4 | – | – | – | – | 14 |
| 1970 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 9 | – | 2 | 3 | 1 | – | – | 15 |
| 1971 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | – | – | 16 |
| 1972 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 12 | 2 | 2 | – | 35 |
| 1973 | 2 | – | 5 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 4 | – | 38 |
| 1974 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | – | – | 3 | – | 15 |
| 1975 | – | – | 2 | 2 | 1 | – | 2 | – | 4 | – | 9 |
| 1976 | 2 | – | 4 | 6 | 6 | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 14 |
| 1977 | 2 | – | – | 2 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | 4 |
| 1978 | – | – | 2 | 2 | 4 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 7 |
| Total | 24 | 6 | 24 | 54 | 36 | 30 | 27 | 7 | 14 | 1 | 169 |

SOURCE: IDF spokesman and *SKIRA HODSHEET* (1968-1978), passim.

public opinion in Israel. From the Palestinian point of view, international terrorism strikes were the most effective strikes in the sense that they brought the Palestinian issue to the international agenda. The effect was achieved by a few murderous strikes and prolonged hijackings that shocked and fascinated the world through broad and intensive media coverage. The following examples illustrate the buildup of the effect.

o   On July 23, 1968 three PFLP terrorists hijacked an El Al aircraft en route from Rome to Lod and forced its landing in Algeria. The hostages were released after sentenced terrorists were handed over by Israel two weeks later. This was the first Palestinian operation abroad.

o   On February 2, 1969 four PFLP terrorists, using small arms and hand grenades, attacked an El Al aircraft before takeoff in the Zurich airport. The copilot was killed and five passengers were injured.

o   On September 9, 1969, a TWA plane en route from Rome to Lod was hijacked by two PFLP terrorists and forced to land in Damascus. Two Israeli passengers were detained for three weeks and released in return for the release of two Syrian pilots held in Israel.

o   On November 27, 1969, two PSF terrorists threw a hand grenade into the El Al office in Athens, wounding 14 people (10 local citizens and 4 Israelis).

o   On February 2, 1970, three PFLP-GC terrorists threw grenades into a crowd of El Al passengers at the Munich airport, killing one and injuring eight.

o   On February 2, 1970, a Swissair plane en route from Zurich to Lod exploded in mid-air, killing 47. Jibril's PFLP-GC took responsibility for this strike.

o   On September 6, 1970, three planes with 400 passengers on board were hijacked by PFLP terrorists. One was blown up in Egypt. The other two were taken to Zorka, Jordan, joined by another hijacked BOAC plane and blown up there.

o   On February 6, 1972, an explosive went off in a Hamburg electronics plant and caused heavy damage. BSO took responsibility, claiming that the German firm did business with Israel.

o   On February 2, 1972, a Lufthansa plane was hijacked by five PFLP terrorists and released for a $5 million ransom.

o   On May 5, 1972, a Sabena plane en route from Brussels to Lod was hijacked by four BSO terrorists and was forced to land in Lod. An Israeli commando assault led to the release of the hostages. Two terrorists were killed and two others were taken prisoner.

o On September 5, 1972, a squad of eight BSO terrorists seized the dormitory which housed the Israeli team to the Olympic Games in Munich. During an attempt to release the hostages, eleven Israeli athletes were killed. Five terrorists were killed, and three arrested (and later released following a Lufthansa plane hijacking in October 1972).

o On December 28, 1972, four BSO terrorists attacked and occupied the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok. Six hostages were released 19 hours later.

o On July 1, 1973, the Israeli Air Attache in Washington was ambushed and killed.

o On July 20, 1973, a JAL plane en route from Paris to Tokyo was hijacked by "Red Army" and PFLP terrorists and forced to land in Libya. The plane was blown up four days later.

o On August 5, 1973, a squad of terrorists of the "Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine" attacked a crowd at Athens airport, killing four and wounding 54.

o On September 5, 1973, a BSO missile attack on an El Al plane at Rome was prevented. Five terrorists were arrested. In their possession were Soviet-made *SA-7* man-carried missiles.

o On December 17, 1973, a squad of ANYOLP terrorists attacked a Pan American plane on the ground at Rome, killing 31 and wounding 31. They later hijacked a Lufthansa plane and flew to Kuwait.

o On September 8, 1974, a TWA plane en route from Lod to New York exploded in midair. All 88 passengers and crew were killed. ANYOLP took responsibility.

o On January 13, 1975, two PFLP terrorists fired Katyusha rockets at an El Al plane at Orly Airport in Paris. They missed the target but hit a Yugoslav plane nearby. Three persons were wounded.

o On January 9, 1975, PFLP terrorists fired and threw grenades at a crowd at Orly Airport, injuring 20.

o On December 21, 1975, six terrorists occupied the OPEC building in Vienna, holding OPEC oil ministers and their aides hostage.

The terrorists and their hostages left for Algeria the following day. Four were killed and one injured.

o On June 28, 1976, four terrorists hijacked an Air France plane en route from Lod to Rome after having stopped at Athens. The plane landed at Libya and later at Entebbe, Uganda. Two hundred forty-six passengers and 12 crewmen were on board. On June 30, 46 passengers were freed. On July 1 an additional 100 were released. Seventy-eight Israelis, dual nationals, and the plane's crew remained. On the night of July 3-4, an IDF Commando Force (consisting of ground and air forces) liberated the passengers in a daring operation. One IDF officer was killed, three Israeli citizens were killed and five others wounded, and four Israeli soldiers were wounded. Several days after the operation Mrs. Bloch, a passenger on the plane, was murdered after being abducted from a Ugandan hospital by Idi Amin's agents.

o On August 12, 1976, three PFLP terrorists attacked an El Al plane in Istanbul. Four passengers were killed and 21 were wounded.

o On October 13, 1977, a group of PDFLP and *Bader Meinhoff* terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa plane en route from Majorca to Frankfurt. The plane was forced to land in Somalia. The hijackers, who demanded a ransom and the release of imprisoned comrades in Ankara and Germany, killed the plane's captain. On the night of October 17-18, the hostages were released by an operation staged by German commandos in Somalia.

o On August 8, 1978, a bus carrying 20 El Al crew members to London airport was attacked by terrorists. A stewardess was killed and three crew members were wounded. Six British citizens were also wounded. The terrorists claimed to belong to the "Sons of South Lebanon."

Although the frequency of Palestinian strikes abroad has decreased since 1975, and despite Fatah's declared abandonment of international terrorism, strikes continue to occur, mainly by groups belonging to the "rejectionist front."

So far, we have focused on three classes of Palestinian operations: an attempt to incite an insurgency in the occupied territories, which failed; semi-military operations, which characterized the Palestinian activity during the War of Attrition (1967-1970); and international terrorism, which started in July 1968, reached its peak during 1972-1973, and declined afterward.

A fourth class is terrorism directed against civilian targets inside Israel, probably posing the largest direct threat to Israel. Terrorism against civilian targets inside Israel has been carried out continuously during the whole period (1967-1978). During that period, 3158 incidents which involved civilian targets have occurred. They represent 46.2 percent of the total number of incidents (6839). One thousand nine hundred eight-eight incidents (about 63 percent) occurred during the War of Attrition (1967-1970), and most of those involved firing across the border at Israeli border settlements. Despite the overall decrease in terrorist activities since 1970, it is worthwhile to note that the proportion of incidents which involve civilian targets inside Israel has been increasing constantly since 1967, as displayed in Figure 5.

About 5 percent of the total number of incidents involving civilian targets inside Israel, namely 157 out of 3158, inflicted civilian casualties. Two hundred seventy-two Israeli citizens were killed from 1967 through 1978, and 1584 were injured. Table 10 summarizes the data.

Of the 157 strikes which involved civilian casualties, 54.2 percent were explosives (85 incidents), 20.4 percent were small arms assaults[2] (32 incidents), 10.8 percent were mines (17 incidents), 9.5 percent were artillery firing[2] (15 cases), and 5.1 percent were hostage-bargaining incidents (8 incidents). Table 11 and Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 summarize the data on the terrorists' *modus operandi* and the number of casualties which were caused, by year, by cause, and by their geographic distribution.

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[1]Including grenades.

[2]Including Katyusha rockets and mortars.



Fig. 5 — Proportion of terrorist operations directed against civilian targets inside Israel, 1967-1978

Table 10

ISRAELI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, 1967-1978

| Year | Total # of Incidents Against Civilian Targets | # of Incidents Involving Civilian Casualties (% of Total) | Civilian Casualties Killed | Wounded |
|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1967 | 296 | 4 (1.35%) | 4 | 9 |
| 1968 | 600 | 20 (3.3%) | 27 | 258 |
| 1969 | 592 | 19 (3.2%) | 25 | 171 |
| 1970 | 500 | 11 (2.2%) | 21 | 118 |
| 1971 | 232 | 5 (2.1%) | 5 | 45 |
| 1972 | 85 | 12 (12.9%) | 28 | 112 |
| 1973 | 125 | 6 (4.8%) | 1 | 15 |
| 1974 | 174 | 19 (7.3%) | 62 | 211 |
| 1975 | 203 | 23 (11.3%) | 38 | 178 |
| 1976 | 147 | 11 (23.4%) | 3 | 74 |
| 1977 | 150 | 12 (8.0%) | 3 | 128 |
| 1978 | 54 | 15 (27.7%) | 55 | 265 |
| Total | 3158 | 157 (27.7%) | 272 | 1584 |

SOURCE: IDF spokesman

It is important to note that explosives planted in public places caused most of the casualties—about 56 percent (1037 out of 1856). Most of the strikes which involved casualties were carried out in Jerusalem (25.4 percent) and Tel Aviv (21.6 percent). Also, the largest numbers of civilian casualties were inflicted in these two cities: Jerusalem (29.7 percent) and Tel Aviv (25.6 percent).

While strikes against civilian targets inside Israel were "swallowed up" in the War of Attrition (1967-1970), these strikes had a growing effect after the cease-fire and the expulsion of terrorists from Jordan. Despite the relatively low proportion of strikes which inflicted casualties (5 percent), they created a large impression,

Table 11

MODE OF OPERATION IN TERRORIST STRIKES INVOLVING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, 1967-1978, BY NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES[*]

| Year | Mining | Explosives | Small Arms | Artillery Fire | Hostage Bargaining | Total |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1967 | 1 (3K,4W) | 2 (1K,4W) | – | 1 (1W) | – | 4 (4K,9W) |
| 1968 | 5 (13K,33W) | 8 (14K,150W) | 4 (62W) | 3 (13W) | – | 20 (27K,258W) |
| 1969 | 1 (1K,21W) | 11 (8K,112W) | 3 (13K,16W) | 4 (3K,22W) | – | 19 (25K,171W) |
| 1970 | 2 (5K,2W) | 1 (2K,33W) | 5 (13K,61W) | 3 (1K,22W) | – | 11 (21K,118W) |
| 1971 | 2 (2W) | – | 1 (1K,11W) | 1 (4K,32W) | – | 5 (5K,45W) |
| 1972 | 3 (1K,15W) | 5 (19W) | 3 (27K,76W) | 1 (2W) | – | 12 (28K,112W) |
| 1973 | 1 (2W) | 4 (12W) | 1 (1K,1W) | – | – | 6 (1K,15W) |
| 1974 | – | 8 (4K,95W) | 7 (8K,18W) | 1 (1K) | 3 (48K,98W) | 19 (62K,211W) |
| 1975 | 1 (1K,2W) | 15 (25K,160W) | 3 (2K,2W) | 2 (5W) | 2 (10K,9W) | 23 (38K,178W) |
| 1976 | – | 9 (3K,71W) | 2 (3W) | – | – | 11 (3K,74W) |
| 1977 | – | 11 (3K,127W) | 1 (1W) | – | – | 12 (3K,128W) |
| 1978 | 1 (1W) | 11 (20K,174W) | 1 (6W) | 1 (2K,2W) | 1 (33K,82W) | 15 (55K,265W) |
| Total incidents | 17 | 85 | 32 | 17 | 6 | 157 |
| (Killed,wounded) | (24K,82W) | (80K,957W) | (66K,257W) | (11K,99W) | (91K,189W) | (272K,1584W) |
| Total casualties | 106 | 1037 | 323 | 110 | 280 | 1856 |

SOURCE: Drawn from IDF spokesman chronologies.

[*]Figures in parentheses indicate killed (K) and wounded (W).

Fig. 6 — Distribution of civilian casualties inflicted by terrorism, 1967–1978



Fig. 7 — Proportion of civilian casualties according to type of strike: total for 1967–1978

**Legend:**

☐ Hostage/bargaining
▨ Artillery fire
▨ Mining
▨ Explosives
▨ Small arms assaults

Fig. 8 — Distribution of civilian casualties according to type of strike, 1967–1978

Fig. 9 — Geographic distribution of terrorist strikes involving civilian casualties, 1967–1978

Fig. 10 — Geographic distribution of civilian casualties, 1967-1978

similar to international terrorism. Once again, the effect was achieved by a number of murderous or "dramatic" incidents. As will be shown later, the impact of a few bloody events, which involved a large number of casualties per incident, was greater than the aggregate number of casualties caused, say, by explosives. The following examples illustrate the buildup of the effect.

o  On March 18, 1968, a school doctor and a youth movement leader were killed and 28 high school students were wounded when a bus hit a mine in the Arava Valley.

o  On March 28, 1968, a tractor-drawn platform hit a mine near Kibbutz Massada. Four were killed, and one severely injured.

o  On August 8, 1968, five boobytrapped grenades were planted in garbage cans in Jerusalem. Three went off; two were discovered and dismantled. Fourteen passersby were wounded. (This incident is still remembered as "the night of the grenades.")

o  On November 11, 1968, a boobytrapped car in Jerusalem's Mahaneh Yehuda market caused the death of 12 persons and wounded 53. Adjacent cars, shops, and flats were damaged.

o  On January 1, 1969, five Katyusha rockets hit the town of Kiryat Shmona. Three were killed, and one wounded.

o  On March 6, 1969, an explosive device went off in the Hebrew University cafeteria in Jerusalem, wounding 29.

o  On May 5, 1970, a school bus was attacked by bazooka fire near Kibbutz Baram, killing nine elementary school pupils and three teachers, and wounding an additional 19 children.

o  On June 1, 1970, Katyusha rockets fired at the town of Beit Shean, killing one girl and wounding eight.

o  On November 6, 1970, two explosive devices, planted at the central bus station in Tel Aviv, killed two persons and wounded 33.

o  On July 7, 1971, four Katyusha rockets were fired on Petah Tikva (a small town six miles north of Tel Aviv), killing four and wounding 16.

o  On May 30, 1972, 26 persons were killed and 76 were wounded in a murderous attack at Ben-Gurion Airport, carried out by three Japanese terrorists working for the Popular Front for

the Liberation of Palestine. The terrorists, two of whom
were killed and a third captured, reached Lod on an Air France
flight from Paris via Rome.

o On July 11, 1972, an explosive device wounded 11 persons at
the Tel Aviv central bus station.

o On July 19, 1973, an explosive device wounded five in the
Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem.

o On April 11, 1974, three PFLP-GC terrorists infiltrated
Kiryat Shemona from Lebanon, murdered 16 persons (including
eight children) and wounded 16 persons. All three terrorists
were killed.

o On May 15, 1974, three PDFLP terrorists took school pupils
hostage in Ma'alot. During a rescue operation, 24 were killed
and 62 wounded.

o On November 19, 1974, three PDFLP terrorists seized an apart-
ment building in Beit Shean. Four persons were killed and
18 wounded.

o On December 12, 1974, an explosive device wounded 20 passersby
in Zion Square, downtown Jerusalem.

o On March 5, 1975, eight Fatah terrorists seized Tel Aviv's
Savoy Hotel. The IDF stormed the hotel. Eight persons were
killed and 6 wounded.[1]

o On July 4, 1975, a boobytrapped refrigerator exploded in Zion
Square, Jerusalem. Fifteen persons were killed and 62
wounded.

o On November 13, 1975, a boobytrapped van exploded at the same
site in Jerusalem. Seven persons were killed and 41 injured.

o On July 28, 1977, an explosive device in the Beersheba market
wounded 28 persons.

o On March 11, 1978, 13 Fatah terrorists, penetrating Israel
from the sea, took over two buses en route from Haifa to Tel
Aviv. During the rescue operation, the terrorists killed 33
and wounded 82.

o On November 19, 1978, an explosion in a bus en route from
Sodom to Jerusalem killed four and wounded 37.

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[1]Col. Uzi Yairi, to whom this dissertation is dedicated, gave his
life in the rescue operation.

In these 23 strikes (occurring over a period of 12 years), which
represent 14.6 percent of the total number of incidents which inflicted
casualties, and 0.7 percent of the total number of incidents involving
civilian targets inside Israel, 768 casualties were inflicted (165
killed and 603 wounded), representing 48.4 percent of the total number
of civilian casualties. Despite the relatively large time interval
between these strikes, their impact contributed to the buildup of fear.

## VII.  ISRAELI COUNTERMEASURES:  1967-1978

### INTRODUCTION

Until the Six Day War, Israel focused on reprisal operations as its major countermeasure:  A lesser effort was put on defensive measures, mainly because of the long and crooked borders.

The "boom" of terrorism which followed the 1967 War induced Israel to diversify its countermeasures.  In a sense, Israel found herself always one step behind the terrorists.  After each introduction of a new terrorism strategy or tactic, Israel employed a new countermeasure, which in its turn led the terrorists to pursue another path, which was then countered, and so on.  It is interesting to observe that, in parallel to the decrease in number of terrorist operations (among other reasons, a result of the Israeli countermeasures), the overall number of countermeasures increased, as will be shown later on.  Once a countermeasure was employed, usually as an immediate response to a new threat, it was kept.  Hence, by the end of the period a whole set of countermeasures prevailed.  The set of countermeasures consisted (and consists) of a large number of passive (that is, defensive) and active (or offensive) measures.

Countermeasures taken by Israel during that period can be categorized according to their purpose, as follows:

A.  Reduce terrorists' resources;

B.  Reduce terrorists' propensity to strike;

C.  Reduce the damage inflicted by terrorism.

Four types of countermeasures were taken by Israel, during that period, in correspondence with these three goals:

α.  Counterforce Measures--countermeasures taken to reduce the terrorists' resources and hence their capability to strike. Examples are military operations directed at terrorists' bases; covert operations; counterinsurgency measures in the administered territories; etc.  Counterforce measures serve goals A and B above.

β.  Impeding--countermeasures designed to impede a particular attempt to strike:

*before* the strike is carried out, for example, preemptive military operations based upon an intelligence early warning and directed against a terrorist base from which an attempted strike is to be carried out; or

*during* an attempted strike, that is, *intercepting* the terrorist squad on its way; for example, the border security system, road blocks; or

*after* a strike has been carried out, for example, the bomb disposal system.  Impeding serves all three goals:  A, B, and C above.

γ.  Passive Defense--physical passive countermeasures taken to reduce the yield from completed terrorist strikes.  For example: sheltering civilian settlements along the borders; paving dirt roads with asphalt; and the border security system.  Passive defense serves purposes B and C.

δ.  Punishment--reprisals in reaction to completed strikes.  For example:  military operations; blowing up houses of arrested terrorists; deportation; etc.  Punishment serves purposes A and B.

Figure 11 illustrates the relationship among the purposes of countermeasures, their categories, the countermeasures, and the terrorists' *modus operandi*.

Besides the terrorist strikes, which were the major generator of the countermeasures, other important factors were involved:  organizational considerations of the organizations involved in implementing the countermeasures (IDF, the police, the General Security Service, and the Mossad); domestic public opinion as reflected in the perception of terrorism; the decisionmaking process in Israel, etc.  The countermeasures will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

The countermeasures discussed are:

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

**Purposes of countermeasures**    **Categories of countermeasures**    **Countermeasures**



Fig. 11 — Israeli countermeasures: purposes, categories, and their interrelationship

The figure labels include:

Purposes of countermeasures:
- A. Reduce terrorists' resources
- B. Reduce terrorists' propensity to strike
- C. Reduce damage inflicted by terrorism

Categories of countermeasures:
- α Counterforce
- β Impeding
- γ Passive defense
- δ Punishment (reprisals)

Countermeasures:
1. Air strikes (c, d, e, f, g)
2. Land operations (c, d, e, f, g)
3. Airborne operations (c, d, e, f, g)
4. Naval operations (c, d, e, f, g)
5. Artillery fire (c, d, e, f, g)
6. Covert operations (c, d, e, f, g)
7. Paving roads (d)
8. Border security system (b, d, e, f, g)
9. Sheltering (c)
10. Bomb disposal system (e)
11. Patrolling/guarding (b, d, e, f, g)
12. Administrative punishment (a)

Terrorists' modus operandi
a. Inciting insurgency
b. Infiltrating
c. Artillery fire
d. Mining
e. Planting explosives
f. Hostage taking
g. Small arms assaults

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- o   Counterinsurgency efforts in the occupied territories
- o   The system of border security
- o   Military reprisals
- o   Counter-terror covert operations
- o   Intelligence gathering
- o   Dealing with strikes in process
- o   Security measures to protect the civilian rear
- o   Security measures in the context of terrorism abroad
- o   The judicial system for trying captured terrorists

Figure 12 illustrates the major factors that were involved in the buildup of the countermeasures. The buildup of the countermeasures will be presented, in the following sections, chronologically, to emphasize the cause-effect relationship between the terrorist operations and the countermeasures.

COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS

Immediately after the Six Day War, Israel established a military government in the occupied territories to govern over a population of about one million: circa 670,000 in the West Bank, circa 300,000 in the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, about 7500 in the Golan Heights and the remaining in southern Sinai.[1] Given their size, the West Bank and Gaza had the major insurgency potential. The Military Governors reported directly to the Minister of Defense. Dayan's counterinsurgency policy was described by him as "a mailed fist in a silken glove,"[2] focusing on the latter. General Shlomo Gazit, then the "Policy Coordinator for the Administered Territories" in the Ministry of Defense, described the main components of Israel's policy: minimal military presence; minimal intervention in local, daily life; and "open bridges" to enable the population of the occupied territories to maintain their family as well as commercial connections with the neighboring Arab states.[3] The Israeli labor market, opened to Arab labor, reduced the

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[1] Gazit, op cit, p. 25, based on 1969 census.

[2] Dayan, *Story of My Life*, op cit, p. 47.

[3] Gazit, op cit, p. 34.

**Fig. 12 — Factors affecting Israeli countermeasures**

unemployment rate to almost a zero level. Israeli advisers assisted in raising the local standards of health, agriculture, etc. The major motive which led to this policy was to decrease, as much as possible, the incentives of the local population to take part in an insurgency. So much for the "silken glove." The population was faced with a dilemma: whether to accept the new situation and derive the maximum out of the liberal, noninterfering government, trying to suppress the notion of being under occupation and in so doing being exposed to violent pressures from the Palestinian terror organizations; or to collaborate with the Palestinian organizations, and by so doing exposing themselves to the "mailed fist." There is no doubt as to where their sympathies lay. During the first months after the 1967 War, the local population tried to pursue the latter course. Many "civil disobedience" incidents occurred (strikes, demonstrations, stonings, etc.) in addition to terrorist strikes. The dilemma was solved by the quick implementation of active Israeli counterinsurgency measures:

## Intelligence

The Israel General Security Service (GSS) established in the occupied territories "a sophisticated and efficient intelligence network, tightly connected to the operational arms (IDF, Police) which are capable of using effectively the information [gathered by GSS] and acting upon it successfully."[1] A measure of success of the intelligence operations is the large number of terrorist cells exposed during 1967-1970, and the arrests that followed. A Ministry of Police report indicates that by March 1971 the number of terrorist prisoners in Israeli jails was 3,400.[2]

Laffin illustrates the effectiveness of the intelligence operation:

"A fedayeen cell is quickly detected, often through informers. Once a single arrest is made the whole cell usually blows. Early in 1970 the entire 37 members of a group operating in Hebron were taken within a few days. It had been responsible for several ambush murders, including the deaths of two American tourists."[3]

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[1] Gazit, op cit, p. 37.

[2] Quoted in B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 66.

[3] J. Laffin, op cit, p. 126.

It is interesting to observe how the system was perceived by the Palestinians.

"Hazim al-Khalidi, an expert and dispassionate Arab observer of the scene from the vantage point of his home in East Jerusalem, considers that 95 percent of the fedayeen who are captured are given away by their own people.[1]

Whether this proportion is true or not is unimportant. The fact that the local population perceived it to be true had a probable deterrent effect by itself.

## Sanctions

Israel employed a system of "administrative punishment," based upon administrative regulations issued by the military government and bypassing the lengthy legal procedures. The sanctions employed were:

Blowing up homes. The sanction of blowing up homes of captured terrorists and collaborators was known in Israel as "neighborhood punishment." To quote Dayan:

"From time to time, local residents of the administered territories joined the terror organizations and took part in their operations. We had to take stern measures. We would blow up houses--after evacuating the occupants--that had served to shelter saboteurs or where stores of weapons and explosives had been found. Naturally this caused a furor, particularly when the householder was well known. But it proved effective and deterred many."[2]

Blowing up houses was criticized by many in Israel. Following a political crisis in 1970 which was generated by Jerusalem's mayor, Teddy Kollek, this measure was used less frequently, was implemented with circumspection,[3] and each case had to be approved by the Minister of Defense in person.

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[1]Ibid.

[2]Dayan, op cit, p. 402.

[3]B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 68.

## Deportations

"Another measure was exile. We used this punishment against leaders who had taken an active part in incitement to terror or in helping saboteurs. In most cases we gave them a warning, and many indeed took heed and desisted. But there were some who ignored it, continuing their hostile activity in the belief that it would not be discovered . . . . Exile, like blowing up houses, was an effective method and helped to keep down terrorism, but it also roused popular anger."[1]

Deportation was used against leaders who either instigated civil disobedience or consorted with the terrorists. By late 1970, the total number of those deported was about 90.[2]

In explaining the administrative punishment policy, General Gazit wrote:

"The great advantage of administrative punishment is the rapidity of its implementation. In combating terrorism, a government cannot allow itself to wait three, six, or even nine months until the completion of the legal process-- investigation, preparing the legal case, and prolonged procedures in the different levels of jurisdiction. In order to deter, a sanction must be visible immediately. Blowing up terrorist homes is intended to achieve this purpose. If we wish to deter youngsters from following Az-a-Din Ris (who threw a grenade in Hebron)--we cannot achieve this deterrence by publicizing his life sentence, imposed about nine months after the strike. However, blowing up his home the day after he was caught and we obtained his confession--this is "the pillar of fire" which everybody sees, listens to, and understands.[3]

Restrictions on Movements. As another measure designed to deal with civilian unrest and terrorism, roadblocks were set up at random and passengers were searched. Denying freedom of movement, either across "open bridges" to Jordan or to Israel, was occasionally used as a threat, and was implemented a number of times. In an effort to curb smuggling of arms through the "open bridge," Israel imposed

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[1]Dayan, loc cit.

[2]B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 67.

[3]Gazit, op cit, p. 37.

restrictions on trucks entering from Jordan. Trucks were not allowed
to carry hollow objects such as water or gas containers. Furthermore,
trucks selected at random were practically taken apart by special teams
of mechanics assigned to the checkpoints at the bridges of the Jordan
River.

Cordon and Search Operations. Following major terrorist strikes,
a curfew was imposed, and search was conducted. This tactic often led
to the detention of the perpetrators of strikes. O'Neill points out
that even the terrorists admitted the effiency of the "speedy arrests."
For example, the arrest of the arsonist responsible for a fire at al-
Aqsa Mosque was referred to, by a Palestinian publication, as "still
another proof of the efficiency of that state's security forces."[1]

The counterinsurgency effort proved to be successful, first in the
West Bank (by 1969) and later (by 1971) in the Gaza Strip as well.
Harbaki pointed out, correctly, that the population's refusal to collab-
orate with the terrorists and take part in an insurgency--the result of
Israel's counterinsurgency efforts--does not mean that the population
wishes Israel to stay, or that it does not sympathize with Fatah and
rejoice in listening to its announcements. "If these people admire
Fatah for national reasons, they are more skeptical about its capabil-
ities."[2] As mentioned earlier, the failure of the Palestinian terror
organizations to establish themselves in the occupied territory and to
incite an insurgency led them to pursue an alternative path--carrying
out operations by infiltration across the Jordanian border.

## BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM

Deploying a border security system was one of the major counter-
measures during this period. The system was first established along
the Jordanian and Syrian borders during 1968-1969, and later along the
Lebanese border (1970-1971). By 1972, the system existed along all
330 miles of Israel's land borders: The border security system

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[1] Quoted in B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 75.

[2] Harakabi, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy," op cit, p. 26.

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consisted of a combination of physical obstacles and mobile military
units. It included parallel barbed-wire fences about three meters high,
enclosing minefields and dotted with electronic warning devices and
boobytraps. Four-meter-wide dirt roads were bulldozed parallel to the
fence. The dirt roads were regularly patrolled, and swept with barbed
wire or cloth to facilitate detection of tracks. At strategic points
behind the fences and the road, military strongholds and observation
posts were sited. Mobile units were stationed behind in full alert to
carry out pursuit, once a penetration had been detected. These hot
pursuits were carried out on the ground and by helicopters.[1] At first,
terrorist groups tried to cross the Jordan River in spite of the system.
In most cases, hot pursuits culminated in combat, and terrorists were
arrested or killed. "But we paid a high price," wrote Dayan in his
memoirs with regard to the pursuit operations. "Heading the units
on these pursuit operations were many of our finest officers, some
quite senior, and they were the first to be exposed to enemy fire when
the terrorists found themselves trapped."[2] Two hundred ninety-three
terrorists were killed in pursuits along the Jordanian front (1967-1970),
and 138 Israeli soldiers lost their lives during these operations.[3]

Realization of the effectiveness of the Israeli border security
system led the terrorists to focus next on fire assaults across the
border. Laffin points out that the effect of the sophisticated fence
was so great that "the fedayeen themselves believe that at many points
machine guns operate automatically by infra-red rays."[4]

## MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES

The traditional use of reprisals was extended after the Six Day
War. In addition to military reprisals, carried out as an immediate
response to terrorist strikes which inflicted a large number of casual-
ties, Israel engaged in intensive counterforce activity across its
borders, ambushing and patrolling. This latter tactic was used frequently
along the Lebanese front (1970-1975) when Israel carried out "knock on
door" operations, searching for terrorists in southern Lebanese villages.

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[1] J. Laffin, op cit, p. 127.

[2] Dayan, op cit, p. 424.

[3] Raviv, op cit, p. 11.

[4] Laffin, op cit, p. 127.

Israel employed all arms of its military in carrying out its counterstrikes: artillery fire, land forces, raids, airborne operations, Air Force strikes, and naval operations. The first large offensive effort was directed against Jordan (1968-1970), starting with an armored raid directed at a Fatah base in Karamah on March 21, 1968, in response to a mining incident which inflicted two deaths and 28 injuries on March 18. With the increase of fire assaults along the whole Jordanian border, Israel employed its artillery and Air Force, striking Pales-tinian hiding places along the eastern bank of the Jordan. Occasionally, in response to the shelling of Israeli settlements, Israel would fire at the town of Irbid. This policy was called "active self defense."[1] The large-scale operation resulted in the evacuation of Jordanian citizens from the valley, and to increasing pressure on King Hussein to curb the activity of the Palestinian organizations. In fact, the expulsion of terrorists from Jordan was achieved mainly by the use of Israeli re-prisals and offensive efforts. Terrorism generated from Jordan prac-tically ceased as of September 1970. This observation contradicts Blechman's conclusion of his rigorous study of Israeli reprisals. Blechman concluded that:

> "The reprisals have not fulfilled their stated purpose of com-pelling Arab states to reduce Arab initiated violence directed at Israel, except from a relatively short time perspective, and with some other exceptions, particularly notable before 1956."[2]

Ten years without terrorism are indeed not a "short time."

The terrorist shift to operations from Lebanon redirected Israel in its operations, a large number taking place almost continuously from 1970 to the present. These operations culminated in "Operation Litani," the occupation of South Lebanon from March 1978 through July 1978, following the casualty-heavy bus incident on March 18, 1978. Israel in fact created a buffer zone from its border up to the Litani River. After retreating from the area and handing it over to the U.N., Israel

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[1] B. O'Neill, op cit, p. 80.

[2] Barry Blechman, op cit, p. 288.

maintained its control by supporting Christian militia, which takes an active part in current measures against Palestinian terrorists. The Israeli Navy carried out a number of operations against Palestinian bases along the Lebanese Mediterranean coast, from which terrorist groups launched rubber boats in order to land on Israeli shores.

Israel's military operations were both retaliatory and counterforce strikes. In most cases the operations were directed at terrorist tar-gets, yet in some cases the operations were directed against the host Arab country. On December 12, 1968, in response to a PLFP attack on an El Al aircraft in Athens two days earlier, Israel carried out a dramatic helicopter raid against the Beirut airport, blowing up 13 Arab airliners without inflicting any casualties. Another important operation which struck directly at Fatah and the PFLP was a raid on Beirut, on April 10, 1973, carried out by Israeli commandos in a combined naval and helicopter-borne operation that killed three PLO leaders.

Some counterforce and dissuasion operations were based upon intelli-gence. However, these were not always successful. On August 10, 1973, Israeli jets intercepted a Middle East Airlines jet and forced it to land in Israel, in an attempt to capture George Habash, who was supposed to be on board, but wasn't. In his memoirs, Abba Eban, then Israel's foreign minister, sheds some light on the Israeli decisionmaking process with regard to offensive counterterror operations. Eban, who claims no part in the decision, wrote:

> "The operation was approved by three ministers after a short consultation. Following the operation, Israel was severely criticized by world public opinion, mainly in the U.S. It seems to me that our decisionmakers probably made erroneous calculations with regard to the methods of combatting terror-ism. What could we have done with our "success," even had Habash been present on the plane? He would have most probably used an Israeli court as a stage to preach "the Palestinian Revolution" in the spirit of a martyr, in front of the inter-national viewers. Furthermore, his presence for many years in an Israeli prison would have led to a new sequence of kid-nappings aimed at achieving his release."[1]

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[1] Abba Eban, *Life Chapters* (Hebrew), SIFRIAT MAARIV (Tel Aviv, 1978), p. 486.

Another tragic failure was an impeding military operation: the interception and shooting down of a Libyan airliner on February 21, 1979, over the Sinai Desert. A few days earlier, Israeli intelligence had reported that the Palestinians were planning to blow up an airliner loaded with explosives in the air above Tel Aviv.[1] In retrospect the Israeli action may seem an over-reaction; however, it must be viewed in the context of the general perception of threat prevailing in Israel at that time, taking into account the short period that was available to make this decision.

To analyze the effect of Israel's military operations from 1967-1978 on terrorism requires a complete data base on Israeli operations, a data base which is not available. Only general observations can therefore be made in this regard.

o   Israel's intensive strikes against Jordan contributed in a major way to the expulsion of terrorists from that country and to an almost complete cessation of terrorist activity from that country.

o   The continuous strikes against terrorist targets, whether in retaliation for terrorist strikes or as counterforce or impeding, inflicted damage on the terrorist organizations and hence helped to prevent many strikes that would otherwise have been carried out. However, because of the fact that many of the terrorists' installations were (and are) located in densely populated areas, these strikes inflicted a sizable rate of casualties among civilians residing in the vicinity of the targets. This fact contributed to a tilt in world public opinion in favor of the Palestinians.

o   The military operations involved a relatively high rate of casualties among the Israeli military units carrying out these operations.

o   There is no proof that the strikes reduced the willingness of Palestinians to join the organizations and die for their cause.

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[1]Hanoh Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days* (Hebrew), SIFRIAT MAARIV (Tel Aviv, 1979), p. 226.

One may assume that, on the contrary, the strikes led to rage which may have encouraged joining terror organizations and taking part in their operations. It may have led the terrorists to carry out suicidal missions, such as those in the domain of international terrorism, and the increasing number of hostage-bargaining assaults inside Israel from 1974-1978.

## COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The retaliatory dimension of countering strikes abroad has been discussed in the previous section. In addition to military operations, it has been reported by non-Israeli sources that the Israeli Mossad carried out a number of covert operations abroad, mainly in Europe and in Lebanon, which ended when Palestinian terrorists' bodies were discovered by local police.

The main effort in the arena of international terrorism was placed on preventive security measures.

o   Security agents were assigned to all El Al aircraft and to all official Israeli offices abroad.

o   Electronic detection devices were installed in Lod Airport and in Israeli buildings abroad.

o   Any Israeli official delegation going abroad for an international event (conferences, sports games) was accompanied by bodyguards.

These security measures were introduced gradually, following the innovations of the terrorists. The hijacking of an El Al aircraft in July 1968 led to a crash program, which still prevails, to secure El Al planes. El Al security personnel proved to be effective in a few incidents. They were the first to fire back at assaulting terrorists in a European airport, and in some cases were the only security force present.

The assault on the Israeli embassy in Bangkok led to the deployment of security measures in all Israeli offices abroad. Similarly, the death of 11 Israeli atheletes in the Olympic Games in Munich

(September 1972) led to securing official Israeli delegations. In addition to these measures, Israel collaborated with security services abroad by exchanging information on Palestinian activities, movements, etc.

The Israeli countermeasures to international terrorism were mainly preventive. An exception was the famous long-range airborne raid on Entebbe (July 4, 1976) to rescue the hostages of the hijacked Air France plane. This successful operation set an example which was then repeated by West German commandos who carried out a rescue operation in Mogadishu on October 10, 1977.

## RESPONSE TO STRIKES-IN-PROCESS

With two exceptions, Israel adhered to a policy of not yielding to terrorist demands in hostage-bargaining incidents. To respond to strikes-in-process within Israel, Israel employed special military commando units. The first operation was the successful rescue of the hostages in a hijacked Sabena airplane which was forced to land in Lod, on May 9, 1972. The commandos, disguised as airport technicians, stormed the aircraft in a blitz-type operation, killed two terrorists, and captured the other two. However, most such operations ended with casualties among the hostages, inflicted by the terrorists facing the storming Israeli rescue forces—for example, the operation to rescue the school children taken hostage at Ma'alot on May 15, 1974. In his memoirs, Dayan writes:

> "The attempt to rescue the children was not the most succesful military action ever undertaken. One reason can be attributed to delaying the attack until the last moment . . . . The second error involved the actual execution of the operation. Our men used an inappropriate weapon, the phosphorous grenade . . . they had to wait until its smoke cleared. By that time the terrorists carried out their massacre of the children."[1]

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[1]Dayan, op cit, pp. 586-587.

The tragic dilemma set before Israel was whether to submit to terrorists' blackmail or to fight and try to rescue the hostages. Israel resolved its dilemma by pursuing the latter alternative. It did its best to improve its tactics of fighting terrorists while they were holding hostages. Israel's response turned, in essence, any hostage-bargaining strike into a suicidal operation for the Palestinian terrorists. This type of response seems to have been effective. The number of hostage-bargaining strikes decreased dramatically after 1974 (see Table 11, p. 59 and Figure 8, p. 62 above).

## COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE CIVILIAN REAR

Strikes against civilian targets in Israel became the major mode of operation of the terrorists after 1972 (see Figure 5, p. 55 above). For the first time in the history of microviolence in the Arab-Israeli context, Israel deployed a large number of preventive measures.

### Paving Roads

To counter mining, Israel carried out a large project, paving all dirt roads in the border areas with asphalt—including small roads leading to fields, orchards, etc. Road paving was effective, and explains the reduction in mining incidents since 1972 (see Table 11, p. 59 and Figure 8, p. 62).

### Sheltering

In response to artillery, mortar and Katyusha firing across the borders, all settlements within 15 km of a border were hardened. The goal of 100 percent sheltering was achieved in 1975. A shelter or a hardened security room was added to each building. In addition, public shelters were built in each residential neighborhood. Sheltering played a part in the decrease in the number of casualties caused by firing incidents since 1972 (see Table 11, p. 59 above).

### Fences and Guarding

Fences were erected around all border settlements and essential installations (power plants, water installations, oil terminals, major

factories, etc.). Military reservists were assigned to guard duty along these fences. As of 1970, civil defense reserve personnel were assigned to guard all public gathering sites: entertainment facilities, beaches, sports arenas, etc. *Every* site is guarded by at least two civil defense reservists, on active duty, assigned to the police on a daily basis by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Each ticketholder is searched before being permitted to enter the facility.

Following the Ma'alot incident,[1] a mandatory School Guarding Act was passed by the Knesset,[2] enforcing the guarding of each school (nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary, junior high, and high schools) by parents. Physical security measures were taken as well—mainly, fences that were erected around all schools in Israel. The parents (in most cases two adults at every school on every school day) are *unarmed*. The presence of parents at the school gate is a doubtful deterrent to any assault by armed terrorists, yet this measure was accepted willingly by all and no voice whatsoever was raised against it. It provided society with an illusive sense of security, ignoring its likely real effectiveness as well as its costs. And the costs are high. In 1975, there were 6526[3] school buildings in Israel. Probably 10,000 parents were guarding schools every school day, representing about one percent of the adult Israeli labor force (995,200)[4] in 1975.

Following the Yom Kippur War, a voluntary "Citizens Guard" (Hamishmar Ha'ezrachi") was established under the auspices of the (national) police. The Citizens Guard (CG) is organized on a territorial level. The circa 100,000 volunteers take patrolling shifts in their neighborhoods each night. Their commanders are full-time officers; they and the administrative support staff numbered about 1100 in 1975. Command posts were situated in each town, and the CG was armed and equipped with communication sets and vehicles. There is no recorded case, to the best of my knowledge, of the CGs having ever prevented

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[1] The children taken hostage in Ma'alot were high school students from Zefat, who were camping overnight in the Ma'alot school building.

[2] See Appendix B, pp. 237-262 below.

[3] *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, 1976.

[3] Ibid.

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a terrorist strike. There *are* reports of their contribution to crime prevention, mainly thefts, in various neighborhoods.

### Bomb Disposal System

A bomb disposal system was established by the police to deal with explosives planted by terrorists. The public was encouraged to report immediately to the police *any* unidentified suspicious object (USO) observed. A large advertising campaign was launched to increase the awareness of the public in this regard. In each police district, special bomb squads were established. The squads respond to each alarm in the following process:

o   Arrive at the scene,
o   Isolate the scene area,
o   Check the USO and find out whether the alarm was false or true,
o   Deactivate the bomb, if possible, or transfer it to a nearby disaster area.

A large number of planted explosives have been dismantled by police bomb squads.

### THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO TRY CAPTURED TERRORISTS

Arrested terrorists or suspected members of terrorist organizations are under the jurisdiction of the military court system. The sentences of convicted terrorists vary between three years' imprisonment and life sentence. The death penalty is not imposed. Gazit explained the sentencing policy as follows:

"It is doubtful whether a death penalty will deter many from joining terror organizations. Our experience shows that knowledge of the high probability of getting killed during an attempt to penetrate the lines did not deter other terrorists from trying it again and again. An expected death penalty may, therefore, drive the terrorist—once he encounters security forces—to fight for his life. If he won't survive, he may at least be able to inflict casualties upon his enemy. Even if he is captured alive, the notion of an expected death penalty might well create a sense of self-martyrdom which will

lead to noncooperation with his investigators, an unwilling-
ness to provide information which can lead to the arrest of
his comrades. However, nowadays every terrorist knows that
once he sticks up his hands and gives himself up, nothing
will happen to him. This realization explains the increas-
ing number of terrorists who give themselves up willingly,
and later collaborate with their investigators and lead to
the collapse of entire networks."[1]

## ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

Until 1967 the IDF was the sole organization involved in counter-
ing terrorism. With the diversification of both terrorist tactics and
countermeasures, the number of organizations involved increased and
included, in addition to the IDF, the police, the GSS, the Mossad, and
major corporations, not to mention the public (parents, CG volunteers,
etc.). Although the IDF was responsible for all countermeasures, in-
cluding security in the civilian rear, the need for coordination spurred
Prime Minister Meir to appoint an adviser responsible for the "coordin-
ation of combating terrorism," reporting directly to her.

After the Yom Kippur War, the IDF General Staff realized that it
could not maintain responsibility for security in the civilian rear,
because this mission did not correspond to its principal mission--to
maintain constant readiness against regular Arab forces (one of the
many lessons derived after the surprise of Yom Kippur). Prime Minister
Rabin shifted responsibility for "internal security" from the IDF to
the police.[2] Yet, the IDF was supposed to maintain its capability to
intervene in cases where the police would be unable to handle the situ-
ation. The police reorganized itself in a semi-military manner after
that decision. Staff functions were added in all echelons, and the
Citizens Guard was nurtured and developed until a system parallel to
that of the IDF Civil Defense prevailed. By 1979, the GSS was respon-
sible for intelligence gathered in the occupied territories, the IDF
for border security and military operations, and the police for the
security of the civilian rear. In accord with its new mission, in ad-
dition to the CG, the police established a special assault unit

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[1]Gazit, op cit, p. 37.

[2]Yitzhak Rabin, *A Service Diary* (Hebrew), SIFRIAT MAARIV (Tel
Aviv, 1979) p. 520.

consisting of IDF commando veterans. The police continued to be rein-
forced, on a daily basis, by IDF/Civil Defense reservists for guard
missions that were assigned by local police commands. Figure 13 illus-
trates organizations countering terrorism.

Fig. 13 — Organizations involved in countering terrorism

# VIII.  ON SOCIETY'S PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM

The perception of contemporary terrorism as a "very serious" threat is not confined to the domain of scholarly research.[1]  It is shared by societies in countries which face microviolence generated by terrorists, as well as by those who are not directly involved, but watch the acts of violence carried out in remote places through the communication media.

This change in perception is demonstrated in recent public opinion polls, cited below.  A number of surveys indicate that terrorism is perceived to be a "very serious" problem.

In a recent study carried out in Israel, in April, 1979, 500 people representing the adult urban population were surveyed.[2]  The study focuses on society's perceptions of Palestinian terrorism; society's position with regard to countermeasures; and the impact of terrorism on society's position on the Palestinian problem.  Thirty questions covering these issues were asked.

The main findings of the study are:

o   93 percent are "worried" or "very worried" about terrorism directed against civilian targets inside Israel.

o   88 percent are "worried" or "very worried" about terrorism directed against Israelites abroad.

o   73 percent are "worried" or "very worried" about the possibility that they or their immediate family members will be victims of terrorist strikes.

The majority support the use of severe countermeasures:

o   80 percent support blowing up homes which harbored terrorists.

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[1]See pp. 1-3 above.

[2]A. Marari and N. Friedland, *Public Attitude to Terrorism* (Hebrew, unpublished manuscript).  Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, January, 1980.

o 82 percent support the use of force in response to violent Palestinian demonstrations in the administered territories.

o 88 percent support the use of curfews in response to terrorist strikes originating in the administered territories.

o 90 percent support deportation of persons who had any contact with members of Palestinian terror organizations.

o 95 percent support reprisals against terrorist bases.

o 75 percent support reprisals even if innocent civilians are hit during the operation.

o 93 percent support assassination of terrorist leaders.

o 96 percent believe that Palestinian terrorism is a sufficient reason for opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

o 95 percent believe that Palestinian terrorism is a sufficient reason not to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

The researchers point out that:

"The high degree of worry is above and beyond the actual risk of being hit by a terrorist strike. However, in order to assess the impact of terrorism on the public, the *subjective perception* of terrorism is a more important measure than its *objective probability*. If Palestinian terrorism is aimed at spreading fear in disproportion to the actual magnitude of the threat, it seems that this aim has been achieved. Furthermore, about half of the respondents believe that terrorism strikes affect, partially, the willingness of Israelis to live in Israel. This feeling is more frequent among women than among men (54 percent vs. 40 percent, respectively)."[1]

Similar studies have been carried out in other Western countries. Late in 1977, 90 percent of the population of the United States considered terrorism to be a "very serious" problem,[2] and according to

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[1]Ibid, p. 3.

[2]Harris Poll, December 1977, quoted in Connie deBoer, "The Polls: Terrorism and Hijacking," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 43 (1979), No. 3, p. 412.

an opinion survey conducted half a year later in Great Britain, 85 percent of the British population holds the same view.[1] Furthermore, several opinion surveys conducted in West Germany and Holland indicate the willingness of people "to sacrifice their personal rights and liberties if this can serve the purpose of combatting terrorism."[2]

Governments' reactions to terrorism reflect these perceptions. Governments assign a high weight to the threat of terrorism, and as a result react massively--in many cases, by so doing, serving a goal of the terrorists.

Perceiving terrorism as a "most serious" threat has provoked the Government of Israel to carry out a large number of countermeasures, passive and active, preventive and/or retaliatory, imposing by the implementation of the variety of countermeasures a heavy burden on Israel's society and economy.

The money costs and other resources involved in countering terrorism are not limited to government budgets. They are, in fact, spread over the whole economy. Private corporations and firms such as banks, airlines, major businesses, etc., have growing direct costs devoted to security measures (bodyguards, electronic surveillance systems, etc.). Furthermore, not all the costs involved in countering terrorism are quantifiable or measurable in money units, such as violation of civil rights, legal rights and property rights, or the increasingly free hand given to police forces. These may all be generalized as a threat to democracy.[3]

Furthermore, beyond the high costs imposed on society as a result of the countermeasures, overreaction sometimes has a "boomerang" effect on government. A government frequently becomes paralyzed *during* a terrorist incident, and is unable to deal with its other tasks. Thus, a government may at times be unable to handle a real national crisis which happens to develop coincident with the *perceived* crisis created by the terrorist strike, as exemplified by the following case.

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[1]Social Surveys, Ltd., June 1978, in deBoer, op cit.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Much has been written on the threat. For a comprehensive analysis, see: Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., "Can Democracy Defend Itself Against Terrorism," in *Commentary*, May 1977, pp. 55-63.

On September 28, 1973, three Jewish emigrants en route from the Soviet Union to Israel, and an Austrian customs official, were taken hostage by two armed Arab terrorists who claimed to be members of the "Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution," an offshoot of *Saika*. The terrorists demanded that the Austrian government close Schoenau Castle—a transit camp for Jewish emigrants on their way to Israel.

Bruno Kreisky, Austria's chancellor, yielded to the terrorists' demand. Schoenau was closed, and the hostages were released. This "minor" incident, usually treated as a sample point or a statistical entry in chronologies on terrorism, paralyzed two governments (Jerusalem and Vienna) and dominated public interest in the two countries. The prime minister of Israel, Golda Meir, flew to Vienna to attempt to convince Kreisky to change his decision. The Israeli cabinet was busy evaluating the situation; large parts of the Israeli Defense Forces' general staff were occupied in studying operational contingency plans against terrorist targets. Net assessments were done. Military reprisal was considered. Both the decisionmakers and the public were busy discussing the "Vienna blackmail."

Nothing extraordinary? Indeed, it was; in fact, the Vienna crisis took place only eight days before the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War! What a successful, although probably unplanned, contribution to the Arab strategic deception effort. In retrospect, because of the time coincidence, "Vienna" turned out to be an extreme case of assigning disproportionate weight to a terrorist act.

It is interesting and important to observe that the perceptions of the threat of terrorism seem to be independent of the physical outcomes of the terrorists' strikes, as measured by aggregate statistics. Society perceives terrorism as a "most serious threat" to the lives of its members despite the fact that the "blood toll collected" by acts of terrorism is significantly lower than the rate of casualties caused by other sources such as criminal violence, car accidents, and labor-related accidents.

Table 12 and Figure 14 exhibit the number of civilian casualties in Israel (deaths and injuries) for the period 1967-1978 by cause of death or injury.

Table 12

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN ISRAEL, 1967-1978
(% of total)

| Source of Casualty | Type of Casualty | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Deaths | Injuries | Total |
| Terrorism* | 272 (2.9%) | 1,584 (.5%) | 1,856 (.55%) |
| Criminal violence | | | |
| o Murder | 449 | – | 449 |
| o Manslaughter | 549 | – | 549 |
| o Assault | – | 76,664 | 76,664 |
| Total | 998 (10.6%) | 76,664 (23.4%) | 77,662 (23.0%) |
| Car accidents** | 6,312 (66.9%) | 212,511 (64.8%) | 218,823 (64.9%) |
| Labor accidents | 1,842 (19.6%) | 37,013*** (11.3%) | 38,855 (11.55%) |
| Total | 9,424 | 327,772 | 337,172 |

*SOURCE: Israel Defense Forces spokesman, December 1978.

**SOURCE: *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, Vol. 19 through 29 (1968-1978), Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel.

***Total disability only.

Surprisingly, the proportion of civilian casualties caused by terrorism is very low. Only 0.54 percent of the total number of casualties were caused by terrorism, yet Israeli society perceives terrorism as a major threat and justifies the allocation of resources for countermeasures accordingly.

Israeli society seems to tolerate casualties inflicted by terrorist strikes less than those caused by other sources. This is not a uniquely Israeli phenomenon and is in fact demonstrated as well in other countries which face terrorism.

Why do societies perceive terrorism as a "new threat," more "serious" than other hazards they face? Why do people seem to tolerate casualties inflicted by terrorism much less than those generated by other causes? Why do governments share this attitude toward terrorism,

Fig. 14 — Casualties from different causes: 1967-1978

as reflected in their responses?  Are the countermeasures an over-reaction?

The following sections will suggest a few tentative answers to these questions.

## TERRORISM AS THEATER

Much has been written about terrorism and the media.[1]  An argument is frequently raised that the success of a terrorist movement is depen-dent upon the amount of publicity it receives.  Terrorists fear being ignored.  Media coverage has become an important end for terrorists. In many cases, the victims or targets selected by terrorists serve only as means to achieve media coverage, to achieve "propaganda by deed." Therefore, the media, according to this frequently raised argument, contribute to the generation of further acts of terrorism.

I would like to stress in this context the role of the media in shaping the public's perception of the threat of terrorism.

Acts of terrorism receive more coverage by the media than any other act of violence, even criminal violence, or any other incidents which involve causalties, such as car accidents or on-the-job accidents. The public, both fascinated and repelled, witnesses strikes of terror-ism on the evening news.  The media have turned terrorism into a "spec-tator event" providing "armchair participation" in terrorist acts.

Brian Jenkins, in dealing with "terrorism for effect," points out:

> "Perhaps we count the wrong things.  More likely, the things we can count do not reflect our perceptions of the phenomenon.  Terrorism is not simply what terrorists do, but the effect—the publicity, the alarm—they create by their actions.

[1] See, for example:  David Gutmann, "Killers and Consumer:  The Terrorist and His Audience," *Social Research*, Vol. 46 (1979), No. 3, pp. 517-536; Jordan J. Paust, "International Law and Control of the Media:  Terror, Repression and the Alternatives," *Indiana Law Journal*, Vol. 53 (1978), No. 4, pp. 621-677; Edward J. Doyle, "Propaganda by Deed:  The Media Response to Terrorism," *The Police Chief*, Vol. 46 (1979), No. 6, pp. 40-42; H. H. A. Cooper, "Terrorism and the Media," in *Terrorism:  Interdisciplinary Perspective* (John Jay Press, 1977)..

"Public perceptions of the level of terrorism appear to be determined *not by the level of violence* but rather by the quality of the incidents, the location, *and the degree of media coverage.* Hostage incidents seem to have greater impact than murder; barricade situations more than kidnapping. Hostage situations may last for days, possibly weeks. Human life hangs in the balance. The whole world watches, and waits. By contrast, a death, even many deaths, are news for only a few days. They lack suspense--and are soon forgotten."[1]

There is a positive relationship between the amount of media coverage and society's perceptions of terrorism, which are shaped by building up the emotional charge. Assume for a moment that each car accident or on-the-job accident had received the same amount of media coverage as incidents of terrorism receive at present. Such hypothetical, non-discriminatory coverage would have probably led society to reassign weights altering its perception of the various threats.

## WHAT COUNTS IS THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND NOT AGGREGATE CASUALTY STATISTICS

People are fascinated by large incidents. Their attention is captured when many casualties are involved in a single incident. Society will tend to ignore annual summary statistics, and will "forget" many "small" incidents. Every Israeli will remember the 24 school children killed and the 62 wounded by three terrorists in Ma'alot on May 15, 1974; or the takeover of two busses on the coastal highway on March 11, 1978, when 33 passengers were killed and 82 wounded.

They assess the risk of future terrorism according to the few, particularly bloody strikes rather than by estimating the probability of being hit by a terrorist, based upon annual statistics. The Ma'alot massacre represents 42 percent of the number of civilians killed by terrorism in 1974 (58) and 29 percent of the total number of injuries (217) caused in 1974. Similarly, 60 percent out of the total 1975 annual terrorism fatalities (55) were killed in the bus incident, and 31 percent of the annual number of injuries were wounded.

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[1]Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 32 (1978), No. 1, p. 119.

The countermeasures taken by the government reflect the impact of these tragic yet single events on society, and are justified accordingly. In spite of the fact that schools had been targets of terrorist strikes only twice (Kiryat Shmona, April 11, 1974, and Ma'alot), the Knesset passed a Mandatory School Guarding Act,[1] enforcing the guarding of each school (nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary, junior high, and high schools) by parents. Physical security measures were taken as well--mainly, fences that were erected around all schools in Israel. The parents (in most cases two adults at every school on every school day) are *unarmed.* The presence of parents at the school gate is a doubtful deterrent to any assault by armed terrorists, yet this measure was accepted willingly by all and no voice whatsoever was raised against it. It provided society with a sense of security, ignoring its likely real effectiveness as well as its costs. And the costs are high. In 1975, there were 6526[2] school buildings in Israel. Probably 10,000 parents were guarding schools every school day, representing about one percent of the adult Israeli labor force (995,200)[3] in 1975. Analogies may be found in other risky domains. For example, society justifies a higher and more expensive standard of safety for airplanes as compared with highways by the argument that threat of a crash produces greater anxiety in air passengers than in auto passengers, even though the objective probabilities of death per mile are lower for the former group. The disproportionate demand for air safety is partially generated by the impact of a few crashes with a high rate of casualties.

A number of recent studies attempt to analyze the impact of catastrophic events on societies. Many researchers observe that:

"A single accident killing one hundred individuals is generally regarded to be less acceptable to society than ten accidents killing ten individuals each";[4]

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[1]See pp. 84-85 above.

[2]*Statistical Abstracts of Israel,* 1976.

[3]Ibid.

[4]J. Ferreira, Jr. and L. Slesin, *Observations on the Social Impact of Large Accidents,* Technical Report #122, Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 1976, p. 1.

or

"large accidents are psychologically much more important
and less acceptable than the simple theory (that is a
model in which all causes of death are equally acceptable
to the public) would allow."[1]

Some tried to assess the relationship between the number of casualties
per incident and society's reaction.

One study suggests, "as a guess," that

"A risk involving N people simultaneously is $N^2$ (not N)
times as important as an accident involving one person."[2]

Another study[3] proposes three possible relationships between social
costs (i.e., costs which are determined outside the market system and
cannot be measured in money terms, e.g., sorrow, suffering, pain, etc.)
and the number of lives lost at one time in one incident:

The first proposition assumes that every individual death is
equally costly to society. Therefore, the total social cost (SC) of
an event that takes N lives can be estimated by adding the costs of
the individual lives lost. Thus, the social cost of an event that
causes three deaths is three times as great as the cost of a single
death. Graphically, the relationship would be shown in a straight
line.

[1] R. Wilson and W. J. Jones, *Energy, Ecology, and the Environment,*
New York, Academic Press, 1974, p. 179.

[2] R. Wilson, "The Costs of Safety," *New Scientist,* Vol. 68, 30
October, 1975, p. 274.

[3] P. Slovic, B. Fischoff and S. Lichtenstein, "Perceived Risk," a
paper presented to a General Motors Symposium, October 9, 1979.

The second proposition assumes that the social cost per life of
*more* than one life lost at a single incident becomes less as the mag-
nitude of the catastrophe increases. Therefore, although a terrorist
strike that takes 20 lives is much worse than one that takes 10 lives,
it is less than twice as bad. Similarly, the difference between two
strikes or accidents taking, say, 80 and 90 lives is less than the
difference between two strikes or accidents taking 10 and 20 lives.
A geographical representation of the relationship according to the
second proposal will show diminishing marginal and average costs as N
gets larger.



The third proposition assumes that events that take multiple
lives are disproportionately costly to society. Hence, a strike that
takes 10 lives is considered *more* than ten times worse than the strike
that takes a single life. Similarly, loss of 100 lives at a single
strike or accident is more than 10 times worse than the loss of 10
lives.

The three propositions present different preferences of society. The authors of the quoted study argue that "people agree with all three of these proposals,"[1] and the relevant relationship depends on the source of casualties.

It seems to me that the third proposition reflects the way society perceives catastrophes in general and terrorism in particular. The subjective risk assessment of society is dominated by the impact of a few major terrorism strikes that cause many casualties, and tends to underweigh incidents in each of which there is a small number of casualties.

## STATISTICAL VICTIMS VERSUS PARTICULAR VICTIMS

The perception of terrorism as a major threat, greater than other hazards that in fact inflict more casualties, may also be explained by the implicit distinction that society makes between the value of a *particular* identified life at stake and the value of unknown lives. Richard Thaler provides the following example that may illustrate this point.[2] If a small girl falls into a well, the local community will go to great expense to save her. They will do this even if the same expenditure of funds used elsewhere (say in highway safety) would save *many* "statistical" lives. Society does not tolerate a situation where particular lives are at stake, such as in incidents which involve the taking of hostages. Hostage taking seems to be the most repugnant

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[1]Ibid, p. 17.

[2]Richard H. Thaler, *The Value of Saving a Life: A Market Estimate,* Ph.D. thesis, the University of Rochester, 1974, p. 2.

mode of terrorism for society, probably because of the encounter with specific victims of terrorism by the spectator public, through the media. Society will therefore justify an emphasis on measures designed to "prevent" future hostage situations or air hijackings. Similarly, society seems to condone acts of massive retaliation as a response to hostage killing, such as the heavy Air Force strikes directed at Palestinian targets following the death of 11 Israeli athletes in the Munich Olympic Games (September 1972), and Operation *Litani* following the coastal bus incident in March 1978. Similar emotions can be found in American public reactions to the Iranian hostage taking, despite the fact that "only" 50 hostages were "merely" held in the American Embassy in Teheran. Many voices supporting a military operation against Iran were heard during the first weeks of the crisis. "Send in the Marines" was a popular reaction that reflected, implicitly, the willingness of some parts of society to risk "statistical" lives of military servicemen to rescue particular and identified hostages. The military option, setting aside any question of the feasibility of military operations, was mentioned by people not only for the purpose of rescuing the hostages, but also for punishment. Perceiving hostage/bargaining strikes as the worst among the terrorists' modes of operation is shared also by the Government of Israel. In his memoirs, Rabin pointed out that "Of all types of terrorist operations, I considered the bargaining strike as the worst . . ."[1]

## CHANGES IN SOCIETY'S SENSITIVITIES TOWARD THE USE OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

Perceiving terrorism as a "new," "most serious" threat corresponds to the emergence of a desire to dissociate completely politics and violence. The decreasing tolerance of political microviolence is a counterpart of the refusal-of-war attitude by the Western world in the last decades. The higher the desire to become a Denmark where politics and death are dissociated, the more sensitive society becomes to any deviation from its "peaceful" life. Acts of terrorism are perceived, in

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[1]I. Rabin, op cit, p. 520.

this context, as "murder in the cathedral." It may seem surprising
that the same sensitivies prevail in Israel despite the frequent, "reg-
ular" wars. A consensus prevails in Israel around the issue of sur-
vival and the need for a strong military apparatus to defend the
existence of the state; wars are perceived in this context as unavoid-
able. Yet, between wars, Israeli society focuses on its welfare, and
seems to repress the idea that war may occur; it is this repression,
among other factors, that led Israel's intelligence community to mis-
interpret existing information at the outbreak of war in fall 1973,
with the consequent strategic surprise. Furthermore, the War of Inde-
pendence of 1948 was the last war that directly affected the civilian
rear. The subsequent wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973 were fought along
the borders and later on enemy soil. Terrorism directed against civil-
ian targets during inter-war periods is therefore perceived as a dis-
tortion of the quiet, peaceful life Israelis seek. In this sense,
Israeli society is not different from the rest of contemporary Western
society.

Despite the increase in criminal violence in the Western world,
societies do not tolerate terrorism. In this context, it is the de-
structive *intent* that people do not tolerate rather than the destruc-
tive *effect*. People believe that the typical terrorist wishes to see
great damage inflicted upon the target society, disregarding, say,
political or operational constraints imposed by the decisionmakers in
the terrorist organization. Such an intent is not associated with the
typical criminal.

These changes in sensitivities explain why the same rate of politi-
cal violence that was exercised in Europe between 1880-1910, or even
a lower level, is not tolerated in the 1960s and 1970s; and similarly,
why a lower proportional rate of civilian casualties inflicted by Pal-
estinian terrorism in 1967-1978 is less tolerated than the larger rate
of casualties inflicted upon Israel in previous periods. Figure 14
illustrates this point.

## INSULT AGAINST THE STATE

The organized use of microviolence by terrorists challenges the
monopoly of governments to use violence. Contemporary terrorism evokes

Fig. 15 — Average rate of casualties per 100,000, 1929-1978

emotional reactions creating a feeling of insult against the state
("*Stattsbeleidigung*") among ruling establishments as well as among
citizens. The feeling of insult becomes prominent when accompanied
by feelings of helplessness while facing a terrorist act that demon-
strates the limits of government response in dealing with the situation,
for example, when a government is blackmailed in hostage situations,
such as the kidnapping (and later killing) of Aldo Moro in Italy, or
during the Iranian crisis. To avoid future blackmail situations that
may involve and further expose helplessness, governments tend to re-
spond by introducing heavy security measures.

The following three Israeli examples may illustrate the point.
After the first hijacking of an El Al airplane enroute from Rome to Lod
on July 23, 1968 (forcing it to land in Algeria), and the release of
Palestinian terrorists by the Government of Israel in exchange for the
hostages, accompanied by an unprecedented rage in Israel, the govern-
ment introduced equally unprecedented as well as costly security mea-
sures on all El Al planes and installations. Similarly, after four
"Black September" terrorists occupied the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok
on December 12, 1972, all Israeli government offices abroad were for-
tified, security devices were installed, and Israeli security personnel
were assigned for guarding purposes.

After the killing of the 11 Israeli athletes in Munich (September,
1972), the government devised new regulations prohibiting any appear-
ance of an Israeli delegation in international events unless accompanied
by security officers.

The preventive countermeasures taken after these three cases are
in a sense a response to the insult inflicted by the terrorist strikes,
and were well accepted by society, despite the high cost involved.
The national rejoicing in Israel after the successful rescue operation
in Entebbe on July 4, 1976 was in sharp contrast to seven days of de-
pression, helplessness, and humiliation that preceded the military
operation. The insult was answered.

## THE PERSONAL THREAT LEADERS FACE

Perception of terrorism as a "serious threat" by governments is
affected by the wounded sense of safety of establishments. The killing

of Aldo Moro in Italy by the Red Brigade, the assassination of Lord
Mountbatten by the IRA, and the assaults on key diplomats and business
corporation executives contributed to the fear. Even in Israel, de-
spite the fact that no attempt has ever been made by Palestinian ter-
rorists to assault any political leader, heavy security measures have
been taken, and many political leaders are surrounded by bodyguards.
Some cynics observed that security turned out to be a new criterion
for status: "Tell me how many bodyguards you have, and I'll tell you
how important you are..." A partial explanation for the measures taken
to protect Israeli leaders may be the large proportion of strikes
inflicted in Jerusalem (see Fig. 9, p. 62, above).

## THE BOOMERANG EFFECT OF COUNTERMEASURES

It is commonly accepted that, inter alia, an important goal of
contemporary terrorists, whether explicit or implicit, is to incite
overreaction by the target state. Large-scale countermeasures often
serve the purpose of terrorists and are welcomed by them. The counter-
measures help to maintain terrorism as an important item on society's
agenda, as a permanent presence *independent of whether terrorists strike
or don't*, and hence contribute to intimidation. Strikes, then, are
needed principally to avoid a fading of society's fearful attitude
toward terrorism. Some preventive countermeasures that have been turned
into Standard Operating Procedures may have this effect. Some of the
preventive measures taken by the Government of Israel have been men-
tioned in previous sections: mandatory school guarding by parents,
heavy security measures at airports and on El Al planes, security
officers' accompanying every Israeli delegation to international events
(sports, cultural events, scientific conventions), guarding of public
entertainment facilities by civil defense reservists, etc.

The implementation of these preventive countermeasures imposes
high costs on society. Besides the money costs involved, and despite
the fact that some of the measures are effective to a certain degree,
spillovers--negative externalities--are generated. Independent of the
level of terrorism, the permanent preventive measures and citizens'
actual participation in their implementation keep terrorism on the

agenda and hence contribute to the high weight society assigns to the threat of terrorism.

## SUMMARY

"Terrorism is one of the most important and dangerous problems facing mankind today" wrote Walter Laqueur in the prologue to his monograph on terrorism. This statement is echoed by Laqueur's peers and reflects the way societies and governments perceive the threat of terrorism. The high weight societies and governments assign to the threat are then reflected in the spectrum of countermeasures taken. Perceptions of terrorism are shaped by many factors: the large-scale coverage of terrorism strikes by the media, the desire to dissociate politics and violence, the fear of being a victim, the distinction between a "statistical" victim and a particular one, the intolerance of a large number of casualties per single incident, the insult to the state, the personal threat that members of establishments face, and, finally-- to close the circle--the "boomerang" effect of permanent preventive countermeasures as a constant reminder of terrorism independent of actual strikes. The perception of the threat in Israel seems to be independent of the physical outcomes of terrorist strikes: the rate of casualties inflicted by terrorism is significantly lower than that caused by other hazards which do not weigh upon souls at large, such as car accidents, labor accidents, and criminal violence. Yet, the spectrum of measures taken by the government and accepted willingly by society to counter terrorism, as well as the costs involved in their implementation, are significantly higher than the measures taken to prevent other hazards facing society. In other words, society seems to overreact to the threat of terrorism and may, by so doing, serve an important goal of terrorists.

## IX. SUMMARY

The analysis of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli countermeasures carried out in Part One yields some important observations:

1. Terrorism is perceived by Israeli society as a major threat. Israeli threat assessment is based upon subjective probabilities assigned to terrorism and consists of two components:
   a. Personal component, namely the probability individuals assign to being hit by an act of terrorism--reflected in individuals' fear; and,
   b. National image component, an intangible one, namely the degree of damage to the national image assigned by individuals and reflected in society's rage.

2. The perception of terrorism by the Israelis seems to be out of proportion to the role of terrorism in the shaping of the objective probability of an Israeli suffering casualties from external causes. The proportion of Israeli civilian casualties inflicted by terrorism over 12 years (1967-1978) out of the total number of casualties from external causes is low: 0.55 percent (1856 out of 337,172).

3. Perceptions of terrorism are shaped by many factors, e.g., the large-scale coverage of terrorism strikes by the media; the change in sensitivities and increase in the desire to dissociate politics and violence; the fear of being a victim; the distinction between a "statistical" victim and a particular victim; the intolerance for large number of casualties per single incident; the insult to the state; and, finally-- to close the circle--the boomerang effect of permanent, preventive countermeasures as a constant reminder of terrorism independent of actual strikes.

4. The countermeasures taken by Israel were designed mainly to minimize the number of casualties inflicted by terrorism. Yet there seems to be a gross inequality between the amount

of resources invested by Israel to counter terrorism and those allocated to counter other sources of casualties. A partial explanation of this discrepancy in resource allocation is provided by the way terrorism is perceived in Israel.

5. Countermeasures taken by Israel were introduced gradually, in response to innovations taken by the Palestinian terrorists. Countermeasures were introduced as crash programs, without a detailed analysis. Once introduced, these countermeasures remained. Hence, at present, there prevails a huge system of countermeasures--some effective and some not--involving about 40,000 people per day, as well as at least five organizations (some of them specially created) to control, coordinate, and implement the countermeasures. While the system grew, both the number of Palestinian operations and the number of casualties inflicted by terrorism decreased. Figure 16 illustrates the gradual introduction of Israeli countermeasures in response to terrorists' initiatives.

6. It was often difficult to abstain from a huge reaction, even in the face of smaller-scale yet effective alternatives. The following examples illustrate this point.

   a. Paving roads with asphalt (see p. 82 above). All dirt roads in the border areas were paved with asphalt in response to mining incidents. Since mining involves penetration, one alternative to paving was the costly and effective border security system that was erected simultaneously. Yet the huge measure was implemented (one has to mention in this context the pressure put on the government to pave the roads with asphalt by the population in the border *kibbutzim*). This is an example of a huge yet effective reaction.

   b. School guarding (see pp. 82-83 above). The mandatory School Guarding Act is an example of a huge yet ineffective reaction. Unarmed parents cannot prevent or deter an armed strike. Scanning of schoolgrounds for suspicious objects could have been done by teachers or older students, a less costly alternative.

Fig. 16 — Terrorists' initiatives and Israeli countermeasures

7.  Countermeasures taken by Israel can be categorized according
    to their purpose, as follows:
    a.  Reduce terrorists' resources;
    b.  Reduce terrorists' propensity to strike;
    c.  Reduce the damage inflicted by terrorism.

8.  Four types of countermeasures were taken by Israel in corres-
    pondence with these goals:
    a.  <u>Counterforce Measures</u>:  Countermeasures taken to reduce
        the terrorists' resources and hence reduce their capabil-
        ity to strike (for example, military operations directed
        at Palestinian terrorists' targets; counterinsurgency
        measures in the occupied territories).
    b.  <u>Impeding</u>:  Countermeasures designed to intercept a par-
        ticular strike before it is carried out (border security
        system, preemptive military strikes based on concrete
        early warnings) or after (bomb disposal system).  Impeding
        serves all three purposes (a, b, c).
    c.  <u>Passive Defense</u>:  Physical passive countermeasures (e.g.,
        sheltering) to reduce the yield from completed operations.
        Serves both purposes b and c.
    d.  <u>Punishment</u>:  Reprisal operations and "administrative pun-
        ishment" measures.  Serves purposes a and b.

Israel has demonstrated a huge reaction in all categories, and
by so doing has responded to a major element of the terrorists' calcu-
lations.

The analysis carried out so far implies neither that there is no
threat of terrorism nor that countermeasures should not be taken to
counter it.  The relevant policy questions in this context are:  *What*
and *how much* should be done to counter the *objective* threat of terrorism?

Part Two will focus on these policy questions, and will suggest an
approach to address them.

PART TWO

<u>TOWARD A POLICY ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES</u>

## X.   INTRODUCTION

Part Two will focus on the policy questions presented above, namely, *what* and *how much* should be done to counter the *objective* threat of terrorism.

In order to approach these questions the following assumptions and preferences are made:

a.  There is no willingness on the part of Israel, in the foreseeable future, to deal with the political aspirations of the Palestinians.  Furthermore, even if the political aspirations were satisfied by some compromise, say in the spirit of the Camp David agreement, violence generated by extreme wings of the PLO, the so-called rejectionists, backed by militant Arab countries, will continue.  Hence, Israel will face terrorism in the foreseeable future.

b.  Terrorism *cannot be eradicated* by countermeasures.

c.  Society and government are mainly concerned with the threat to lives.  Hence, reducing as much as possible the rate of casualties should be the main policy goal in the context of countering terrorism.  Doing so will not be merely "lip service" but rather "conscience service."

d.  *A life is a life.*  Under this preference the loss to both individuals and society of a casualty is independent of the cause which generated the casualty, i.e., the same weights are assigned under this preference to a casualty caused, say, by a car accident as to a casualty inflicted by terrorism.  (To the extent to which this preference is adopted, the yield to the terrorists of even physically successful actions is sharply reduced.)

Given these assumptions, and the observations made previously[1] (i.e., the discrepancy in resource allocation among casualty-preventing

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[1] See Part One, pp. 107-110 above.

programs and the huge reaction to terrorism) the policy question can be rephrased: *"How do we live with terrorism?"* The policy objectives in this context are:

a. To reduce the discrepancy in resource allocation among all casualty-preventing programs, i.e., to minimize (under the prevailing budget constraints) the overall number of casualties from external causes.

b. To adjust society's subjective probabilities with regard to terrorism (subjective risk assessment resulting in *fear*) to the objective probabilities; and to cause society to estimate to a lesser degree the intangible component in its threat assessment (damage to national image resulting in rage); that is, to have a policy which will end with less exaggerated perceptions and less distinctive reactions.

In order to address these policy objectives, a psychological dimension is added to the physical passive defense measure (see pp. 108-109 above): downgrading the impact of terrorism, namely, *not reacting as expected by the terrorists*. I eliminate a priori three other policy alternatives:

(1) have no countermeasures;

(2) do not change the present system;

(3) upgrade the response.

I believe that eliminating these three alternatives is justified by the analysis carried out so far, and does not require further discussion.

The second policy objective raises an interesting and important question: whether subjective probabilities are a policy variable, namely, can perceptions be changed by a policy? I believe that by means of education, as well as by neutralizing the boomerang effect of some countermeasures (see pp. 105-106 above), perceptions can be changed. Proving this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper and calls for a controlled experiment involving two groups each responding to a carefully designed questionnaire. The experimental group would be

"educated," and presented with all the comparative statistical data on the variety of external casualties and the estimated objective probabilities based upon these data. The control group would respond without being given any information. A detailed data analysis is required in order to accept or reject the hypothesis that perceptions can be changed. Unfortunately, such an experiment must be left for the future. For the purposes of this paper, I assume, quite comfortably, that society's risk assessment can be changed. I have some doubts, however, that the rage component in society's perception, which is sensitive to my fourth preference, namely that *a life equals a life*, is subject to change. It will be shown later how this assumption may be relaxed.

The forthcoming analysis will consider marginal adjustments in the prevailing system of countermeasures in all the domains under consideration (i.e., terrorism, car accidents, etc.). No "tabula rasa" assumption is made: We are not asking the question, "If we had to start from scratch, which policies should have been implemented?" This pure, theoretical approach is frequently taken in analyses having the pretentious goal of a "Pareto-optimal" resource allocation. The relevant question in this paper is: Assuming we have extra money, say, 10 million shekels to be allocated during the coming year, what will be the most effective allocation in correspondence with our policy objectives? Similarly, if we have to cut our present budget by 10 million shekels, what would be the cut that would have the least effect on the overall number of casualties prevented?

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism will be discussed in Part Two on two levels:

a. Extra-terror: Outside the domain of terrorism, treating terrorism as an equal subset of a national casualty-prevention policy, side by side with other external casualty causes (Chapter XIV); and

b. Intra-terror: Inside the domain of terrorism, looking at individual countermeasures vis-a-vis the policy objectives (Chapter XV).

The following chapters will discuss present approaches to life-saving or casualty-preventing programs and will suggest a different approach to be applied to both levels described above.

## XI.  ON PAST AND PRESENT APPROACHES TO
## LIFE-SAVING OR CASUALTY-PREVENTING PROGRAMS

### INTRODUCTION

Life saving or casualty prevention has been an important public policy concern in numerous public programs aimed at increasing safety or longevity.  In the last 200 years, economists have been trying to find a procedure for "measuring the benefits of such programs in units which can be readily compared with the costs."[1]  Since the beginning of this century, the analytical framework that has been used for evaluating life-saving or casualty-preventing programs is cost-benefit analysis.[2]  Within this framework economists attempted, using different approaches, to estimate the monetary value of life (or limb). Richard Zeckhauser[3] describes what can happen to the analyst approaching the problem of valuing life:

> "Too often when analysts approach the problem of valuing life, they concentrate on philosophical issues which are inherently unresolvable.  Sometimes they begin by identifying the difficulties.  Then, if they have been scrupulously honest with themselves, they will tend to give up when they discover the most basic problems.

> "At the other extreme from defeatism the analyst grinds out some numbers, however questionable.  Such calculations are unlikely to have a positive effect.  They will be effectively challenged by politically oriented individuals who oppose the actions they recommend, and by methodologically oriented decisionmakers who recognize the inadequacies in their methods of generation."

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[1] J. Acton, op cit, p. 1.

[2] For a literature review covering the period until 1930 see L. I. Dublin and A. J. Lotka, *The Money Value of a Man* (New York: Ronald Press, 1930).  A survey of the value of life literature, post-1930, is included in M. W. Jones-Lee, *The Value of Life: An Economic Analysis* (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 20-56; and in J. Acton, op cit.

[3] R. Zeckhauser, "Procedures for Valuing Lives," *Public Policy*, Vol. 23 (1975) No. 4, p. 423.

Zeckhauser concludes that analysts can provide some basic "building blocks" so that decisionmakers can have some analytic inputs for their decisions. The value of life is one of them.

Over the years, numerous attempts have been made to estimate the monetary value of human life in a blossoming literature which is still growing.

Four basic approaches for estimating the monetary value of human life may be identified:[1]

o   Explicit statements of politically designated persons;
o   Revealed preference implicit in past decisions;
o   The human capital approach;
o   The willingness-to-pay approach.

APPROACH ONE:   EXPLICIT STATEMENTS OF DECISIONMAKERS

This approach looks at statements made by politicians from which the value of life may be induced. Acton lists this approach without pursuing it further, in order that no theoretical approach be excluded. Acton's short discussion and the reasons for not pursuing it further are quoted in full:

"It is possible that some elected or appointed person or body would explicitly state the amounts that society *is* (or *might* be, or *should* be, or *could be induced* to be) willing to pay for saving lives. This responsible person or group might be the decisionmaker in an appropriate agency, an executive officer (perhaps the President or a mayor), or an elected body (Congress or a state assembly). . . . The statement need not be a direct manner such as, 'We will pay $X per man-year saved from disease A.' The analyst can present packages of social services and let the decisionmaker choose among them. If enough choices are presented, the analyst can determine the rates at which outcomes from various programs are exchanged.

"The major problem with this approach is that it is hard to find politically designated persons who will state the buying price of reduced mortality. Understandably, these

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[1]See J. P. Acton, op cit, pp. 1-20 and J. P. Acton, *Evaluating Public Programs to Save Lives: The Case of Heart Attacks*, R-450-RC, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, January 1973, pp. 62-82.

persons do not want to commit themselves in advance to a firm amount. For this reason, and because it is often difficult to identify the politically responsible body for a given evaluation problem, this approach is not pursued."[1]

APPROACH TWO:   REVEALED PREFERENCE IMPLICIT IN PAST DECISIONS

The implicit value of life is estimated, according to this approach, by analyzing past allocation decisions in various casualty-preventing and/or life-saving programs, and observing a gross implicit value of life, as derived by the political process. The first to suggest this approach were two French economists, Abraham and Thedié (1960).[2] They address the question:  "How much should a society spend to save a human life," and suggest that the answer is to some extent dependent "upon the subjective views of those who govern." For practical purposes they suggest basing injury and mortality evaluations on compensation determined in courts.

This approach has been followed by a number of researchers.[3] Acton points out some difficulties involved in the revealed preference approach:[4]

a.   The preferences are considered to be stable, i.e., a basic assumption is made that past decisions were based upon sufficient information so that later developments do not change the evaluation in any significant manner.
b.   Similarly, tastes, preferences, and tradeoffs among objectives are also assumed to be constant in order to enable extrapolations.

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[1]J. P. Acton (1973), loc cit, p. 62.

[2]C. Abraham and J. Thedié, "Le Prix d'une Vie Humaine dans les Decisions Economiques," *Revue Francaise de Recherche Opérationelle* (1960), quoted in M. W. Jones-Lee, *The Value of Life: An Economic Analysis*, Chicago (The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 23-24.

[3]See for example J. Carlson, *Valuation of Life Saving*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1963, quoted in Acton (1973), p. 63; or R. Dorfman, *Measuring the Benefits of Government Investments*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1965; or Fromm, "Civil Aviation Expenditures" in R. Dorfman (ed.), supra.

[4]J. P. Acton (1973), op cit, p. 63.

c. Past policies demonstrate a bewildering variation in implicit evaluations.

A potential application of the implicit value of life as derived by the political process, in the context of countering terrorism, may be the use of compensations paid by the government, such as the compensations paid by the Institute for National Insurance (the Israeli equivalent of U.S. Social Security) to the victims of terrorism.[1] However, based on the above-listed shortcomings of this approach, and my principal objection to the use of a monetary measure for the value of life (see p. 132 below), this approach will not be applied.

## APPROACH THREE:  THE HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH

The human capital approach is the oldest and most commonly used approach for assessing the monetary value of life.  The conventional measure traditionally used by adherents of this approach has been based on estimating *the present discounted value of expected future earnings*.  The first to use the simplest version of this approach was Sir William Petty (1623-1687), who attempted to determine the wealth of Great Britain.  It is interesting to note how Petty derived his estimate of the value of man:

> "Suppose the People of England be Six Millions in number, that their Expence at £7 per Head be Forty Two Millions: suppose also that the Rent of the Lands be Eight Millions, and the yearly profit of all the Personal Estate be Eight Millions more; it must needs follow, that the Labour of the People must have supplyed the remaining Twenty Six Millions, the which multiplied by Twenty (the Mass of Mankind being worth Twenty Years purchase as well as Land) makes Five Hundred and Twenty Millions, as the value of the whole People:  which number divided by Six Millions, makes above £80 to be the value of each Head of Man, Woman, and Child, and of adult Persons twice as much; from whence we may learn to compute the loss we have sustained by the

[1]*Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730-1970* was passed by the Knesset on July 22, 1970.  See Appendix B, p. 249 below.

Plague, by the Slaughter of Men in War, and by the sending them abroad into the service of Foreign Princes."[1]

The human capital approach was further pursued by Adam Smith, William Farr and others.[2]  William Farr (1853)[3] computed the economic value of a human life by discounting the value of future earnings and was the first to take account of average life durations at different ages. Farr deducted from these earnings the discounted value of maintenance costs, including the cost during the period of childhood dependence and "helpless old age."  Farr applied his estimates over the time, the estimation process was refined, and a livelihood measure was introduced.  The livelihood measure is derived by calculating the present discounted value of the expected changes in a person's earning stream.  According to this approach, if the earnings in year i are $E_i$, the probability of surviving the ith year is $P_i$, and the discount rate is r, then the "livelihood measure" V of a person n years old is:[4]

$$V = \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \frac{P_i E_i}{(1 + r)^{i-n}}$$

[1]Sir William Petty, *Political Arithmetick, or a Discourse Concerning the Extent and Value of Lands, People, Buildings, etc.*, 3rd edition (London:  Robert Clavel, 1699), p. 192.  Quoted in L. I. Dublin and A. J. Lotka, *The Money Value of Man*, 2nd edition (New York:  Ronald Press, 1946), p. 9.

[2]For an intensive literature review up to 1930, see Dublin and Lotka, op cit.

[3]W. Farr, "Vital Statistics," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1853, quoted by Selma Mushkin, "Health as an Investment," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 70 (1962), p. 151.

[4]Acton (1976), op cit, p. 7 and Note #13, p. 40.  Some take into account the consumption $C_i$ in the ith year and modify the formula:

$$V = \sum_{i=n}^{\infty} \frac{P_i (E_i - C_i)}{(1 + r)^{i-n}}$$

See E. S. Quade, *Analysis for Public Decisions* (New York:  American Elsevier, 1976), p. 113.

The decision rule used by adherents of this approach was simple: Reject a life-saving program if its costs exceed the expected livelihood-savings associated with the program. Acton points out that a possible explanation for the popularity of this approach is the relative ease of application and the resulting impression of providing an "unambiguous" answer to a complex problem. Analysts had only to consult a table to determine the livelihood at different ages, identified by sex, race and education.[1] An example relevant to our context is the use of this method by a proponent of the human capital approach, Gary Becker, who suggested an economic framework for the evaluation of crime and punishment. "For example," wrote Becker, "the cost of murder is measured by the loss in earnings of victims. . . ."[2] Becker used this cost measure despite the fact that it "excludes, among other things, the value placed by society on life itself."[3] "Optimal" decisions, according to Becker, are hence "decisions that minimize the social loss in income from offenses."[4]

The human capital approach has been widely used in numerous other public policy problems. The following are examples.

o National Security

During World War I, two British economists, Crammond and Boag, attempting to evaluate the cost of the war, suggested measuring the losses in lives by the loss of earnings.[5]

o Road Accidents

A British economist, D. J. Reynolds (1956), used the human capital approach to assess the cost of losses of life due to

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[1] Ibid, pp. 7-8.

[2] Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 76 (1978) No. 2, p. 174.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Becker, op cit, p. 208.

[5] E. Crammond, "The Cost of the War," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, Vol. 78 (1915), pp. 361-399; and H. Boag, "Human Capital and the Cost of War," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, Vol. 79 (1916), pp. 7-17.

car accidents.[1] Reynolds assessed the economic loss of a human life as the "net reduction in output. In the case of fatal accidents this is taken to be the difference between the present value of the output that the victim would have produced and the present value of his consumption if he had lived."[2]

o Public Health

Acton[3] lists a number of examples of the use of the human capital approach and livelihood measures in a number of public health studies: D. Rice (1967),[4] U. S. Department of Health (1966),[5] B. F. Kiker (1966),[6] L. Thurow (1970),[7] and D. Rice and B. Cooper (1970).[8]

Criticism of the Human Capital Approach

a. The major objection to the human capital approach is based on ethical grounds. As Hirshleifer et al (1974)[9] point out:

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[1] D. J. Reynolds, "The Cost of Road Accidents," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, Vol. 119 (1956), pp. 393-408.

[2] D. J. Reynolds, op cit, p. 396.

[3] J. P. Acton, op cit, p. 39.

[4] D. Rice, "Estimating the Cost of Illness," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 57 (1967) No. 3, pp. 424-440.

[5] U.S. Department of HEW, *Disease Control Programs: Selected Disease Control Programs*, Washington, D.C. (1966); and U.S. Department of HEW, Human Investment Programs: *Selected Human Investment Programs*, Washington, D.C. (1966).

[6] B. F. Kiker, "The Historical Roots of Human Capital," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 74 (1966) No. 5, pp. 481-499.

[7] L. Thurow, *Investment in Human Capital*, Belmont, Calif. (1970).

[8] D. Rice and B. Cooper, "The Economic Value of Human Life," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 57 (1967) No. 11, pp. 1954-1956.

[9] J. Hirshleifer, T. Bergstrom and E. Rappaport, "Applying Cost-Benefit Concepts to Projects Which Alter Human Mortality," UCLA-ENG-7478, UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science, Los Angeles, November 1974, p. 19.

"Indeed, in an ethical sense it might be claimed that
life value must be regarded as infinite. But even if
we define life-value in purely economic terms we must
recognize that lifetime earnings generally represent an
understatement."

In other words, human beings cannot be treated as machines,
where the value of the "human machines'" services are equal
to their rental rate, i.e., their wage rate. This approach
does not capture the real loss to individuals and society
from a death or injury.

   b. The human capital approach places no value on humans in non-
income earning status. The livelihood saving measure does
not capture implicit earnings, say, from home production,
and leaves out a large population of housewives, the elderly,
etc. As a result, a higher value is attached to men than
to women.

   c. The human capital approach ignores interpersonal relations.
People suffer a real loss from the death of another, beyond
the pecuniary loss. Love and friendship are totally ig-
nored.[1]

## APPROACH FOUR: WILLINGNESS TO PAY

The willingness-to-pay approach is based on the fundamental assump-
tion that individuals' preferences should play a role in the process of
policymaking for policies which affect them directly. From the point of
view of basic methodology, proponents of this approach argue that poten-
tial changes in fatality and casualty rates are most fruitfully viewed
as changes in the *probability* of death or injury. Therefore, in order
to assess the value of lives to be saved and injuries to be prevented,
policymakers should seek to find out what value *individuals* place upon
changes in these probabilities.

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[1] For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the "human
capital" approach, see J. P. Acton (1976), op cit, pp. 8-17, and
J. Hirshleifer et al, op cit, pp. 18-20.

Among the first to introduce this approach was the French econ-
omist J. Drèze[1] (1962), who suggested applying the economic concepts
of cardinal utility and subjective probability to analyze the amount
the individual would be willing to spend to effect various improvements
in his safety. In order to address the question of how much society
as a whole should spend upon life saving, Drèze suggested looking at
the collective utility function, derived as a weighted sum of individ-
ual utilities. Drèze, however, does not suggest how the required in-
formation may be inferred. Later works by T. C. Schelling (1968)[2] and
E. J. Mishan (1971)[3] dwelt upon these foundations. Schelling, discuss-
ing what he called "consumer interest in reduced death," and dealing
only with preventing a "statistical death," argues:

"It is not the worth of human life that I shall discuss,
but of 'life-saving,' of preventing death. And it is not
a particular death but a statistical death. What is it
worth to reduce the probability of death—the statistical
frequency of death—within some identifiable group of
people none of whom expects to die except eventually?"[4]

Schelling was the first to suggest finding out the willingness to pay
by using a survey.

"Suppose a program to save lives has been identified and
we want to know its worth. The dimensions of the risks to
be reduced are fairly well known, as is the reduction to
be achieved. Suppose also that this risk is small to begin
with, not a source of anxiety or guilt.

"Surely it is sensible to ask the question: what is it
worth to the people who stand to benefit from it?"[5]

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[1] J. Drèze, "L'Utilité Sociale d'une Vie Humaine," *Revue Francaise
de Recherche Opérationelle*, Vol. 23 (1962), pp. 43 ff. Summarized in
Jones-Lee, op cit, pp. 24-26.

[2] T. C. Schelling, "The Life You Save May Be Your Own," in S. Chase
(ed.), *Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis*, The Brookings Institu-
tion, Washington, D.C. (1968), pp. 127-176.

[3] E. J. Mishan, "Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach,"
*Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 79 (1971), pp. 687-705.

[4] Ibid, p. 127.

[5] Ibid.

Schelling acknowledges the difficulty of eliciting a true response to hypothetical questions. However, he justifies the asking of such questions by arguing that there is no reason to suppose that the actual response will reflect true preferences any less accurately than market decisions concerning expenditures on safety improvements.

Mishan[1] follows the same lines, based upon the probabilistic formalization of risk. Mishan distinguishes four categories of risk:

o  <u>direct voluntary risks</u>, risks that people voluntarily assume whenever they choose an action which involves risks (e.g., risks to health involved in smoking).

o  <u>direct involuntary risks</u>, risks that cannot be avoided by individuals, or those that can be avoided at some cost.

o  <u>indirect involuntary financial risks</u>, risks associated with the death or injury of others, i.e., the effects of the ith person's death upon the income (or wealth) of the jth person.

o  <u>indirect involuntary psychic risks</u>, risks associated with the death or injury of others, as in the previous category, the intangible effects of the ith person's death on the jth person.

Mishan recommends the use of surveys to find out the willingness of individuals to pay for the reduction of risk in each of the categories, to satisfy the Pareto-improvement criterion, defined as:

"If no individual's welfare is lower under allocation X than under allocation Y and some individuals' welfare is higher under X than under Y, then allocation X is better than allocation Y. (In all but exceptional circumstances, the necessary and sufficient condition for an *individual's* welfare to be greater under allocation X than under allocation Y is that the individual *himself* should prefer X to Y.)"[2]

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[1] Mishan, op cit, pp. 695-701.

[2] Jones-Lee, op cit, p. 3.

The willingness-to-pay approach has gained many adherents in the last 15 years. Most of the empirical studies following this approach provided measures of *implicit* willingness to pay for life saving.

R. H. Thaler (1974),[1] R. H. Thaler and S. Rosen,[2] and R. S. Smith[3] examined the higher wages paid in occupations which involve an above-average risk of death, to derive an implicit value of life saving. As Acton[4] correctly points out, their implicit value calculation, which rests on market wages, fails to determine an appropriate value for housewives, children, retired persons, etc., a drawback similar to that of the "human capital" livelihood measure.[5] D. Usher[6] made an interesting attempt to derive the implicit value of life saving by the use of Canadian national income accounts to infer a tradeoff between consumption over the life cycle and resources devoted to death reduction. His primary objective was not to place a value on life saving as such, but rather ". . . to find a natural way of combining two social indicators, the GNP and mortality rates, into a single comprehensive index." Usher assumes that individuals are "expected utility maximizers," and this utility is assumed by Usher to be solely a function of consumption in each time period, as well as a function of the probability of surviving.[7]

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[1] R. H. Thaler, *The Value of Saving a Life: A Market Estimate*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Rochester, New York (1974).

[2] R. H. Thaler and S. Rosen, "The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market," paper presented at the NBER Conference on Income and Wealth, Washington, D.C. (November 1973).

[3] R. S. Smith, "Compensating Wage Differentials and Hazardous Work," U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. (August 1973).

[4] J. P. Acton, op cit, pp. 20-21.

[5] For a further discussion of the main drawbacks of the implicit value of life saving, see Acton, ibid.

[6] D. Usher, "An Imputation to the Measure of Economic Growth for Changes in Life Expectancy," in M. Moss (ed.), *The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance*, NBER, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, New York (1973), pp. 193-225.

[7] For a detailed discussion and criticism of Usher's study, see J. P. Acton (1976), op cit, pp. 22-23 and M. W. Jones-Lee, op cit, pp. 36-38.

A second method which is used by adherents of the willingness-to-pay approach is the use of surveys to derive explicit statements of individuals. As noted above, the use of surveys was suggested by Schelling, Mishan, and Jones-Lee.[1] An empirical study of willingness to pay for health programs was carried out by Acton.[2] Approximately 125 persons were questioned about their willingness to pay for reducing heart attack mortality. Acton's questionnaire included 36 questions in four major types:

"(1) Age choice questions--Which of two seriously injured would you like to see saved in an emergency? (total of 26 questions of this type)

(2) Live in the community--How much would you be willing to pay to have a heart attack ambulance that is expected to save X lives per year of the 10,000 people living around you? (two questions)

(3) Advice willingness to pay--Suppose your neighbor has just been told his risk of heart attack is Y per year, and his chances of dying if he has a heart attack are Z. How much do you think he should be willing to pay per year for a heart attack program that would reduce his chances of dying to Z*? (four questions)

(4) Own willingness to pay--Suppose your doctor tells you your chances of a heart attack are Y per year, and your chances of death, given the heart attack, are Z. How much are you willing to pay per year for a heart attack program that can reduce your chances of dying to Z*? (four questions)"

Acton concluded that the survey is a feasible instrument in deriving the willingness of individuals to pay for a reduction in the probability of death or injury.

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[1] M. W. Jones-Lee, "Valuation of Reduction in Probability of Death by Road Accident," *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy*, January 1969, pp.

[2] J. P. Acton, *Evaluating Public Programs to Save Lives: The Case of Heart Attacks*, R-950-RC, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, January 1973.

As may be expected, Acton found the statistical significance of the result increased with an increase in probability of death and with an increase in the magnitude of reducing this probability (although not in a linear fashion).[1] Furthermore, the willingness-to-pay responses are greater the more concretely and immediately the hypothetical program is related to the individual.[2] Acton points out a number of issues "still left open in the feasibility of a survey-based method for eliciting value." These include the validity, stability and replicability of responses, problems involved with understanding and processing the information based upon *hypothetical* situations, and "strategic" behavior of respondents facing hypothetical questions.[3]

Another method of estimating the willingness to pay based on the implicit value derived from consumption activity was used recently by G. Blomquist (1979).[4] Blomquist analyzed the use of automobile seat belts. He found the use of seat belts to be greater the higher the value a driver places on his life. A similar method was used by Jones-Lee (1978),[5] who estimated the value of life from tire replacement data. A variant of this method is assessing the value of life based on "the insurance principle" which attempts, according to Mishan, "to attribute a value for loss of life . . . on the implied assumption of a straight-line relationship between the probability of a person being killed and the insurance premium he would pay to cover the risk."[6]

So far we have discussed four approaches to assessing the monetary value of human life. The monetary value estimated by any of these

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[1] Acton (1976), op cit, p. 25.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Acton (1976), pp. 28-30.

[4] Glenn Blomquist, "Value of Life Saving: Implications of Consumption Activity," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 87 (1979) No. 3, pp. 540-558.

[5] M. W. Jones-Lee, "Empirical Procedure for Estimating the Value of Life from Tire Replacement Data" (unpublished manuscript, 1978).

[6] For a discussion see Mishan, op cit, pp. 690-691 and Jones-Lee, op cit, pp. 72-91.

methods is then used in a cost-benefit analysis, with the following
(simple) decision rule: *If the cost of life-saving or a casualty-
preventing program exceeds the expected monetary benefits (a function
of the number of lives saved or casualties prevented), then the pro-
gram should not be implemented.*

## XII.  CRITICISM OF PRESENT METHODOLOGIES

A detailed criticism of each of the four approaches described
above may be found in each of the studies quoted,[1] and will not be
recapitulated.  The following chapter will focus on the drawbacks of
trying to assess the value of human lives in monetary terms in
general, and of using cost-benefit analysis as a policy analysis
tool in evaluating life-saving and/or casualty-preventing programs
in particular—disregarding which of the methods was used to assess
the monetary value of lives.

In a recent article, John Broome presented a scathing criticism
of the various attempts to value a life:

> "Many of the enterprises governments engage in cause
> people's deaths in one way or another.  Therefore, those
> governments which like to give some of their actions the
> appearance of economic rationality have to fix on a mone-
> tary value for a human life.  A blossoming literature ex-
> plains to them the correct way to make this valuation.
> But, though it blossoms still, I think that the roots of
> the literature are insecure.  Indeed, one of my objects in
> this paper is to show that the attempt to value life in
> terms of money is more or less doomed to failure."[2]

Broome's main criticism is that "no finite amount of money could com-
pensate a person for the loss of his life, simply because money is
no good to him when he is dead," and hence "cost benefit analysis
will be inapplicable for judging any proposal involving death."[3]

The association of the three words *life, value,* and *money* by all
authors, disregarding which approach they take, is misleading.  Readers
are misled to believe that externalities, namely, nonpecuniary aspects

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[1] In particular, see J. Acton, op cit, passim; Mishan, op cit,
pp. 689-695; Jones Lee, op cit, pp. 20-51; S. Mushkin, "Health as an
Investment," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 70 (1962) No. 5, pp.
129-157; and R. Zeckhauser, op cit, passim.

[2] John Broome, "Trying to Value a Life," *Journal of Public Econ-
omy*, Vol. 9 (1978) No. 1, p. 91.

[3] Ibid, p. 100.

of life and death, are included.  There is a designated sense in
which the word *value* is interpreted.  The following typical sentences
may illustrate this point:

(1) "The value of life is the amount of earnings foregone"; or

(2) "The value of life is equal to the amount of insurance an
individual is willing to buy"; or

(3) "The value of life is the amount of money individuals are
willing to pay to reduce the probability of death from X
to Y."

These sentences are probably hidden tautologies; if asked what evidence
is required to refute these sentences, the authors probably will have
no answer. . .  The reader is misled by the fact that the sequence of
the words in these sentences seems to be clear (assume for a moment
that instead of "value" the authors would have used the nonexistent
word "*lavue*"--the same questions that should have been asked by the
readers with regard to the usage of "value" suddenly become obvious).
Replacing *value* with the word *price* has the same drawback.  Price
may be used only in the context of a slave economy.  Instead the
authors could have simply used *money aspects of life*.  One money
aspect, denoted by $MAL_1$, is the amount of earnings foregone; another
money aspect, say $MAL_2$, is the amount of insurance individuals will
buy, etc.  There are probably many MALs.

Leaving aside these rather pedantic remarks, focusing on money
aspects of life and death is an improper approach which may lead to
bad and inconsistent decisions.  Hence the application of cost-benefit
analysis (where the benefits are measured in money) to life-saving and
casualty-preventing programs is not adequate.  Bauer and Yamey (1957)
correctly noted that:

"Once one leaves the *terra firma* of material capital and
branches into the uper aether of human capital, there is
endless difficulty in finding a resting place."[1]

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[1]P. T. Bauer and B. C. Yamey, *The Economics of Underdeveloped
Countries,* Cambridge University Press (1957), p. 27, quoted in
Mushkin, op cit, p. 129.

It is interesting to note that many of the authors who contributed to
the growing literature in this field felt it necessary to present some
apologetic remark (sometimes in a footnote) stating that he (the author)
is aware of the limits of the "monetary value," but it is justified as
the least of many evils.  The following citations may illustrate this
point:

"We are concerned here with man as a wage-earner, the sup-
porter of himself, and, in the normal case, of a family,
through a large fraction of life.  If such a man is removed
by death, his family suffers, emotionally, a loss which
escapes our powers of evaluation in figures; and with
which we are, therefore, not here concerned.  But the
family suffers, in addition, an economic loss, for which
a fairly definite estimate in dollars and cents can be
given. . . .

"If it is clearly understood that it is solely from this
point of view that we shall here speak of the value of a
man, there should be no danger of our being drawn aside
into metaphysical discussions as to what constitutes
value, or as to absolute or other standards of value."[1]

Richard Zeckhauser wrote:

"The valuation of lives involves and reflects many of the
most basic beliefs and institutions of our society.  It
might seem, then, that economists would have little to
contribute to the life-valuation discussion.  This essay
argues quite to the contrary.  The complexity of the
problem enhances the potential contribution of the or-
ganizing concepts of the economics discipline.  Insights
culled from the examination of a number of other sticky
issues can be applied with profit."

However, warns Zeckhauser:

"It is critical that policymakers realize that there is
no unambiguous procedure for valuing a human life.  Not
only do we lack a general approach that will apply in
all circumstances, there is rarely any circumstance for
which a specific approach could receive universal
approval."[2]

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[1]L. Dublin and A. Lotka, op cit, pp. 4-5.
[2]R. Zeckhauser, op cit, p. 421.

Burton Weisbrod wrote in 1961:

> "A person's value as a companion to, and the leader of,
> his family is neglected--not because it is deemed in-
> significant or irrelevant, but because it seemed too
> difficult to measure, at least for the present."[1]

Hirshleifer et al (1974) are bothered by these questions and try
to provide some tentative answers:

> "Question: Isn't human life infinitely valuable? Isn't
> it incommensurable with ordinary commodities?
> Answer: People *behave* as if their lives have finite value.
> For example, we all ride in automobiles, often in situa-
> tions where it is not "necessary." Therefore we voluntar-
> ily, consciously, and rationally undergo mortal danger in
> order to gain 'ordinary' goods and services, e.g., seeing
> a movie . . ."

> "Question: Doesn't one have value to the rest of society?
> Answer: Certainly man is a social animal, 'every man's
> death diminishes me, for I am involved in mankind,' etc.
> Unfortunately, these interpersonal effects are difficult
> to incorporate into the analysis . . ."[2]

The Eleventh International Road Congress, after reviewing the problem
of human costs of highway accidents as part of cost-benefit analysis
of highway construction, concluded:

> "However repellent it may be to assess human life, it does
> not seem that such a valuation can be dispensed with . . .
> Decisions attribute unconsciously in each case a value to
> human life and suffering. It seems preferable to make this
> more conscious and systematic."[3]

The second drawback of cost-benefit analysis is its application
to *single programs*, holding all other life-saving or casualty-preventing

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[1] Burton Weisbrod, "The Valuation of Human Capital," *Journal
of Political Economy* Vol. 69 (1961) No. 5, pp. 425-436.

[2] J. Hirshleifer et al, op cit, pp. 30-31.

[3] Quoted in S. J. Mushkin, "Health as an Investment," *Journal of
Political Economy*, Vol. 70 (1962) No. 5, p. 155.

programs constant, even if the other programs are in the same domain,
say health. When dealing with a cancer-preventing program, heart
attacks, renal disease, etc., are held constant. Cost-benefit
analysis estimates the costs and benefits for a specific program.
In the best case, it is used to compare costs and benefits of differ-
ent alternatives *within* the specific program, but ignores other pro-
grams, which, say, might have yielded higher benefits at lower costs.
Governments are frequently criticized for inconsistent decisions with
regard to life-saving or casualty-preventing programs. This has led
some to dismiss, correctly, a priori use of a precedent decision as a
standard by which to measure benefits of potential programs (see
pp. 116-117 above). As Acton points out:

> "In the absence of a consistent set of values generated
> by the political decision process, there remains a press-
> ing need for benefit values calculated on the basis of
> more fundamental normative considerations."[1]

The intensive research effort, attempting to derive a monetary measure
of life "on the basis of more fundamental normative considerations,"
did not yield a "consistent set of values" either. It is interesting
to compare the results of some empirical studies carried out over the
last 50 years that try to assess monetary aspects of life, using the differ-
ent approaches. Table 13 summarizes the findings.

The lowest estimate, in 1979 dollars, was $15,503 (Reynolds, 1956),
the highest estimate derived was $10,920,750 (Jones-Lee, 1976). The
median ranges between $157,700 and $159,300. The 25th percentile is
$79,860, the 75th percentile is $430,200. That is to say that 50
percent of the studies derived a "value of life" ranging between
$79,860 and $430,200. It will not be surprising if some future study
suggests using the median or the average of all past estimates as a
new monetary measure . . . .

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[1] Acton (1976), op cit, p. 7.

Table 13

ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS THE MONETARY ASPECTS OF LIFE: 1930-1980

| Author, Country, Year Published (Year of Data) | Approach (Application-Area) | Assessment Method | Discount Rate | Estimated Monetary Value of Life | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Current Units | $1979[*] |
| 1. Dublin & Lotka, USA, 1930 (1929) | Human capital (general) | Estimating present discounted value (at birth) of a person whose maximum annual salary is $5,000 (earned at age 50) then deducting present value of consumption | 3-1/2% | $9,802 | $47,713 |
| 2. Reynolds, England, 1956 (1952) | Human capital (road accidents) | Estimating the total present discounted value of the loss of net output, divided by the number of casualties | 4% | Death £2,000 Serious Injury £520 Light Injury £40 | $15,503 $4,030 $309 |
| 3. Abraham & Thedié, France, 1960 (1957) | Revealed preference implicit in past decisions, combined with "human-capital" (road accidents) | 1) Estimating losses of gross output (≡net output + consumption) divided by the number of casualties; and 2) Deriving "subjective costs" from past court compensation decisions: o Suffering of relatives: (-) for bachelors (-) for married men (-) for heads of families o Costs to society o Suffering of non-fatal victims o Compensation for "anxiety" | 8% | 1) 110,000 N.F. 2) 5,000 N.F. 10,000 N.F. 20,000 N.F. 5,000 N.F. 5,000 N.F. 15,000 N.F. | $722,668 $32,847 $65,696 $131,393 $32,847 $32,847 $98,546 |
| 4. Fromm, USA, 1965 (1960) | Implicit value derived from past allocative decisions (civil aviation) | Estimating the total loss per carrier fatality, compounded of: 1) value of individual life to himself 2) loss to his family 3) economic loss to the community | | $373,000 $210,000 $123,000 $4,000 | $869,084 $489,296 $286,588 $9,320 |

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Table 13 (cont'd)

| Author, Country, Year Published (Year of Data) | Approach (Application-Area) | Assessment Method | Discount Rate | Estimated Monetary Value of Life | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Current Units | $1979[*] |
| 5. Dawson, England, 1967 (1963) | Human capital (road accidents) | Estimating *net* losses of output per fatality and injury + "subjective costs" derived by court decisions | 6% | Death<br>£8920<br><br>Serious Injury<br>£710<br><br>Light Injury<br>£150 | $55,820<br><br><br>$4,430<br><br><br>$938 |
| 6. Dawson, England, 1971 (1970) | Same as above | An amendment of the above method, estimating the *gross* loss of output as a basis for calculating the loss due to casualties | 7% | Death<br>£19,000<br><br>Serious Injury<br>£1,400<br><br>Light Injury<br>£250 | $79,860<br><br><br>$5,884<br><br><br>$1,050 |
| 7. Thaler & Rosen, USA, 1973 (1967) | "Willingness to pay" (hazardous jobs) | Estimating the "risk premium" demanded by 907 individuals, for a "dangerous activity" | | $200,000 | $404,960 |
| 8. Usher, Canada, 1973 (1972) | "Willingness to pay" (general) | 1) Deriving the implicit willingness-to-pay measure from two indicators: GNP and mortality rates, i.e., "the amount one would pay per unit for a decrease in one's mortality rate in the current year" | | $150,000 | $238,992 |
| | | 2) Observing individual choices (implicit or explicit value of life of a man about 30 years old) | | Thousands Canadian Dollars | Thousands U.S. Dollars |
| | | 1. Hazard pay:<br>    Premium miners accept for working<br>        underground<br>    Test pilot | | <br>34-159<br><br>161 | <br>54-253.3<br><br>256.5 |
| | | 2. Medical expenditure:<br>    Kidney transplant<br>    Dialysis in hospital<br>    Dialysis at home | | <br>72<br>270<br>99 | <br>114.7<br>430.2<br>157.7 |

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Table 13 (cont'd)

| Author, Country, Year Published (Year of Data) | Approach (Application-Area) | Assessment Method | Discount Rate | Estimated Monetary Value of Life | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Current Units | $1979* |
| 8. (cont'd) | | 3. Valuation of the cost of disease | | 75 | 119.5 |
| | | 4. Valuation of the cost of airplane accidents | | 472 | 752 |
| | | 5. Traffic safety: | | | |
| | | Recommended for cost-benefit analysis by the National Safety Council | | 37.5 | 59.7 |
| | | Value of life in a cost-benefit study of highways | | 100 | 159.3 |
| | | 6. Military decisionmaking: | | | |
| | | Instructions to pilots on when to crash-land airplanes | | 270 | 430.2 |
| | | Decision to produce a special ejector seat in a jet plane | | 4500 | 7169.6 |
| 9. Acton, USA, 1973 (1971) | "Willingness to pay" (heart attacks) | Estimating the willingness to pay for reducing the probability of death from heart attacks from 2/5 to 1/5 for a given probability of heart attack of 1/100 | | $28,000 | $46,656 |
| 10. Jones-Lee, England, 1976 (1975) | "Willingness to pay" (air accidents) | Estimating the willingness to pay for reduction of air accidental death from from 2/500,000 to 1/500,000 based on a small experiment (n=30). Applying the estimate to a group of 500,000 yielded an estimated value of human life | | £3,100,000 | $10,920,750 |
| 11. Blomquist, USA, 1978 (1978) | Implicit "willingness to pay" derived from consumption activity (road accidents) | Estimating the value of life by analyzing the use of seatbelts | | $370,000 | $394,666 |

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Table 13 (cont'd)

Notes to Table 13

*The value in 1979 dollars was calculated in two steps:
1) Calculating the current dollar value, using the official exchange rate, for the relevant currencies in a given year
2) Adjusting the current dollar figure derived above into 1979 dollars using the Implicit Price Deflator (IPD) index (1979=160 for the base year 1972=100)

The following exchange rates and IPD indices were used:

| Year | Currency | Exchange Rate 1 $US = X | IPD | Multiplier =160/IPD |
|------|----------|---------------------------|--------|---------------------|
| 1929 | $US | 1.0 | 32.87 | 4.8676 |
| 1952 | £(pounds) | 0.3558 | 58.00 | 2.7586 |
| 1957 | Francs | 419.9 | 65.02 | 2.4607 |
| 1960 | $US | 1.0 | 68.67 | 2.3299 |
| 1963 | £(pounds) | 0.3571 | 71.59 | 2.2349 |
| 1967 | $US | 1.0 | 79.02 | 2.0248 |
| 1970 | £(pounds) | 0.3571 | 91.36 | 1.7513 |
| 1971 | $US | 1.0 | 96.02 | 1.6663 |
| 1972 | $Canada | 0.9958 | 100.00 | 1.6000 |
| 1975 | £(pounds) | 0.3454 | 127.18 | 1.2580 |
| 1978 | $US | 1.0 | 150.00 | 1.0666 |

It seems that the intensive research effort did not yield a consistent estimate of the monetary aspects of life. Furthermore, there is no consensus among economists with regard to the best method to be used to derive an estimate. The tendency of economists to focus on monetary costs of lives may lead to vulgar calculation. The following example was given by Fred Hapgood,[1] and illustrates this point:

> "In a recent essay Clark Abt, president of a Cambridge, Massachusetts think tank, contemplated the problem of coming up with a "net psycho-social quality of life cost of mastectomy," a single figure that will represent all the costs to the patient of a radical mastectomy. In this passage he considered the possible cost to her sex life:
>
> "If we assume the shadow price of sexual experience is roughly $40, and if we assume an average frequency of 50 per year, the annual shadow price is $2,000, or a total of $4,000 for the two years of life during which the sex life the "no mastectomy" alternative affords is unaffected by mastectomy. This 'cost' must be discounted by the probability of a satisfactory sexual adjustment. Assuming this probability is 50% . . ."

So where do we go from here? As mentioned earlier (see p. 129 above), the recently published criticism of trying to attach a monetary measure of life was John Broome's. Broome's article generated a number of responses.[2] Broome was taken to task by the adherents of "monetary value of life," mainly for not suggesting an alternative approach.

> "Since he [Broome] does not tell us what the criteria are for judging 'correctness,' nor even whether this is a logical or an empirical matter, we are left waiting expectantly for a revelation which is not vouchsafed us. . . . This is a pity, because he is dealing with

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[1] Fred Hapgood, "Risk-Benefit Analysis: Putting a Price on Life," *The Atlantic*, January 1979, p. 35.

[2] A. Williams, "Trying to Value a Life--Note," *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 12 (1979), pp. 257-258; James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith, "Trying Again to Value a Life," ibid, pp. 245-248; and M. W. Jones-Lee, "Trying to Value a Life: Why Broome Does Not Sweep Clean," ibid, pp. 249-256.

a matter of considerable theoretical and practical importance, and if he has something new to contribute to the literature he should not withhold it."[1]

or:

> ". . . [Broome] made no serious attempt to offer a workable alternative to CBR [cost benefit analysis of risk-change]. . . .
>
> "I would suggest that while Broome has, as it were, aimed a vigorous blow at the foundations of the CBR methodology, he has in fact completely missed his intended target, the full force of his assault being taken squarely on the chin by his own straw-man."[2]

I believe that any attempt to measure the benefits of life-saving or casualty-preventing programs in monetary terms will fail to capture all the value dimensions of a life to an individual and society. Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis based upon a monetary measure of lives is inadequate. An alternative approach for policy analysis of life-saving or casualty-preventing programs will be suggested in the next chapter.

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[1] A. Williams, op cit, p. 258.

[2] M. W. Jones-Lee, op cit, p. 456.

## XIII. EXTRA TERROR: TOWARD A COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF LIFE-SAVING OR CASUALTY-PREVENTING PROGRAMS

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter will suggest a different approach to the policy analysis of life-saving or casualty-preventing programs, based upon the four assumptions discussed earlier (see p. 111, above) and on the major policy goal: to minimize as much as possible the overall number of casualties, during a given time period, within prevailing budget constraints. The basic tool will be a cost-effectiveness analysis. The measure of effectiveness will be simply the number of lives to be saved, in each of the relevant programs (or for each countermeasure to be analyzed).

Instead of looking at single programs, each dealing with a specific cause of fatalities or injuries, holding all other causes and programs constant, this approach, in correspondence with the policy goal, requires looking at a set of threats and hazards society faces for a given time period. Using the number of casualties to be prevented as a measure of effectiveness captures most of the externalities left out by the monetary value approach. It can easily be stated that saving two lives is better than saving one and saving a thousand is better than saving 900, for all aspects: economic, social and individual. Hence, for a given budget, a simple decision criterion for selecting among several alternative programs will be to select the program with the lowest shekel costs per life saved. However, production functions of life-saving programs are not monotonically linear, and diminishing returns prevail. Therefore the most effective resource allocation, in a theoretical economic framework, will be achieved when all the marginal products of the casualty-preventing shekel are equated over all the programs under consideration. That is, for n casualty-preventing programs, the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel for program i ($MPS_i$) has to be equal to the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel for program j ($MPS_j$), in order to achieve an effective allocation:

$$MPS_i = MPS_j \quad \text{where } i, j = 1, 2, \ldots, n$$
$$\text{and } i \neq j$$

The n programs will include preventing car accidents, occupational safety measures, countering terrorism, etc. The following will illustrate a process for an effective allocation of resources between *two* programs, say preventing car accidents and countering terrorism, within this theoretical framework.

### 1. Deriving Production Functions

For the sake of simplicity, all the production factors will be presented in (i.e., converted into) money terms, in shekels. The units produced will be the number of casualties prevented in a year. Assuming diminishing marginal returns (that is, as the amount of shekels is increased, a point will be reached beyond which the marginal product declines), the two hypothetical production functions may look like those illustrated in Figure 17.

### 2. Deriving the Production Possibility Frontier

Using the two production functions enables us to derive the production possibility curves for different levels of total cost.

The production possibility frontiers in Figure 18 are in fact isocost curves for different budget levels. The line $L_1L_2$ may be viewed as an "isocasualty" line. Note that the slope of the $L_1L_2$ line is equal to -1, based upon our fourth preference (see p. 113 above) that a life equals a life. The optimal allocation will be achieved at the northeastern point of tangency between the isocost curve and the isocasualty line, subject to our budget constraint (the relevant isocost curve will represent this budget constraint). Note that this hypothetical model will lead, for any budget constraint, to allocation of zero shekels to countering terrorism and all to car accidents. However, this preference may be relaxed, if so desired, by any decisionmakers who may persist in the belief that, in the light of negative externalities associated with terrorism, each terrorism casualty should be weighted more heavily than the casualty inflicted by other causes.

Fig. 17 — Hypothetical production functions
for two casualty-preventing programs

Fig. 18 — Production possibility frontiers for two
casualty-preventing programs

All that is required is to change the slope of the line $L_1L_2$ according to the weights. A slope of -2 (shown by the line $L_1'L_2'$), then, will represent a policy assumption that the social cost of each casualty inflicted by terrorism equals the social cost of two car accident casualties, etc.

## 3. Allocating Resources Among Programs

Once the point of tangency between the isocost and the isocasualties lines has been determined, the allocation of the given budget, say 10 million shekels, between the two programs will be determined by equating the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekels. The process can be generalized to n programs.

So far we have presented a simple theoretical framework for the allocation of a given budget among programs. Remember that our point of departure was the prevailing system of countermeasures in all relevant domains, and we asked, how would we allocate most effectively an extra amount of budget among programs? Similarly, if we have to cut our budget by a given amount, how much to cut from each program in a way which will have the least effect on the number of casualties to be prevented?

Applying the theoretical model to our relevant policy problems involves difficulties:

a. Identifying the production function for each of the casualty-preventing programs

b. Predicting the number of casualties to be prevented

The following discussion will address these two problems for the case of countering terrorism.

## IDENTIFYING THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION OF PREVENTING CASUALTIES: THE CASE OF TERRORISM

The number of casualties inflicted by terrorism in a year is a function of the number of successful strikes carried out by the terrorists during that year.

Each terrorist attempt to strike may be viewed as a Bernoulli random variable with probability P of success and probability (1 - P) of failure, where "success" is defined as a strike which has been carried out, and "failure" is defined as an attempt that was prevented. Similarly, the probability of x successes in n attempts may be viewed as a binomial random variable with parameters n and P, and may be calculated by

$$P(x) = \binom{n}{x} P^x \cdot (1 - P)^{n-x}.$$

However the number of terrorist attempts is a function of a large number of variables, among them:

o Palestinian manpower potential
o Budget
o Logistics
o Arab support
o Organizational conflicts
o Leadership
o World public opinion
o Israeli countermeasures

However, it is very hard to identify the endogenous and exogenous variables. For example, Israeli countermeasures are a function of terrorist attempts; the Palestinian manpower potential, logistics, world public opinion are each a function of the Israeli countermeasures; etc. Furthermore, it is difficult to measure all the variables, not to mention the problem of lack of data.

Even if we look at the number of attempts in the light of the simple probabilistic model presented earlier, as a function of Israeli countermeasures, we shall end with a problem of estimating the number of attempts dissuaded. Figure 18 represents a probability tree for a terrorist attempt.

The problem of identifying the production function may be described as "the elephant syndrome," illustrated by the following dialog:

When the doctor asked his nervous patient, "Why are you snapping your fingers," the 'snapper' answered: "To keep the elephants away." "Relax," said the understanding doctor in a fatherly tone, "There are no elephants around." "You see, doctor," said the patient victoriously, "IT WORKS!"

The problem, then, is how to bypass the "elephant syndrome." It is important to note that the identification problem, discussed above, does not arise because of the use of a cost-effectiveness analysis

Fig. 19 — Factors affecting the initiation and outcome of a terrorist attempt to strike

instead of the traditional use of cost-benefit analysis for casualty-preventing programs. Cost-benefit models face the same problem of identifying the production function.

In order to approach the problem, we shall assume that the number of attempts is a function of Israeli countermeasures, holding all other variables constant. This strong assumption may be justified by two arguments:

a. The process of action-interaction between terrorist attempts and Israeli countermeasures over the years was incremental.

As discussed previously, each modus operandi of the terrorists resulted in the introduction of a new countermeasure, which led to a shift of the terrorist effort, and so on (see p. 108 above). It is reasonable to assume that, after ten years, all the other factors affecting terrorist attempts reached, in a sense, a stable point; therefore, it is sensible to observe only the marginal changes in the number of casualties as a function of the marginal changes in countermeasures (measured in shekels), and use this information as a basis for analysis, within the suggested framework.

b. Our basic approach is incrementalist, and we do not pretend to make a *tabula rasa* assumption. This approach enables us to look at the margins of the "production function" as observed.

In order to estimate the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel based upon this assumption requires looking at the reduction of the rate of casualties per, say, 100,000 people between year $t$ and $t + 1$ ($\Delta C$) as a function of the increment in countermeasure shekels ($\Delta S$).

Table 14

MARGINAL COUNTERMEASURE BUDGET INCREMENTS
AND MARGINAL CHANGES IN THE RATE OF CASUALTIES

| Year | Countermeasure Shekels Per Year $t_i$ | $\Delta S$ | # of Casualties Per Year $t_i$ | $\Delta C$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $t_0$ | $x_0$ | — | $y_0$ | — |
| $t_1$ | $x_1$ | $x_1 - x_0$ | $y_1$ | $y_1 - y_0$ |
| $t_2$ | $x_2$ | $x_2 - x_1$ | $y_2$ | $y_2 - y_1$ |
| $t_3$ | $x_3$ | $x_3 - x_2$ | $y_3$ | $y_3 - y_2$ |
| $t_4$ | $x_4$ | $x_4 - x_3$ | $y_4$ | $y_4 - y_3$ |
| . | . | . | . | . |
| . | . | . | . | . |
| $t_n$ | $x_n$ | $x_n - x_{n-1}$ | $y_n$ | $y_n - y_{n-1}$ |

The marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel can then be calculated by the ratio:

$$MPSt_i = \frac{\Delta St_i}{\Delta Ct_i}$$

It is important to note that applying the approach suggested in this chapter requires first a suboptimization in each of the relevant domains. Suboptimization within the domain of terrorism will be discussed in Chapter XIV.

Unfortunately, this approach will not be further pursued empirically for the case of countering terrorism because of lack of data on the monetary costs of countermeasures. Data on costs can be derived, but are unfortunately classified, and therefore must be left for future analysis.

The following is an example for a gross estimation of the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel for the case of traffic safety measures, taken in Israel between 1967-1978. We shall assume, for ease of presentation, that the countermeasures included are effective, that is, assume that suboptimization within the domain of traffic safety has been carried out previously.[1]

The calculations of the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel for the case of preventing road accidents in Israel are presented in Table 15. This example does not imply that the rate of casualties per 100,000 people, used in Table 15, is the only measure. Other measures which can be used are the rate of casualties per kilometer driven, or per car, etc. Note that for empirical purposes, factors affecting the rate of casualties must be carefully identified, and only relevant expenditures should be included.

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[1]For an intensive discussion and a suggested methodology see: *Cost-Effectiveness and Highway Safety*, a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation by the Department of Industrial and System Engineering (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1969).

Table 15

PREVENTING ROAD ACCIDENT CASUALTIES IN ISRAEL, 1967-1977:
YEARLY ROAD SAFETY EXPENDITURE INCREMENTS AND MARGINAL CHANGES
IN THE RATE OF CASUALTIES PER 100,000 PEOPLE

| Year $(t_i)$ | Population | Car Accident Casualties | | | Countermeasure Expenditures[1] | | | Marginal Product of the Casualty-Preventing Shekel $(MPSt_i)$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total Number | Rate per 100,000 $(C_i)$ | Yearly Change in the Rate of Casualties $(\Delta C_i)$ | In Current Million I.L.[2] | In 1980 Shekels $(S_i)$[3] | Yearly Increments $(\Delta S_i)$ | |
| 1967 | 2,776,300 | 15,039 | 542 | – | 26.730 | 67.497 | – | |
| 1968 | 2,841,100 | 15,784 | 555 | (+) 13 | 24.631 | 65.325 | (–) 2.172 | .1670 |
| 1969 | 2,929,500 | 17,459 | 595 | (+) 40 | 31.459 | 56.639 | (–) 8.686 | .2171 |
| 1970 | 3,022,100 | 19,526 | 646 | (+) 51 | 27.000 | 53.504 | (–) 3.135 | .0164 |
| 1971 | 3,120,700 | 21,006 | 673 | (+) 27 | 30.634 | 50.626 | (–) 2.878 | .1065 |
| 1972 | 3,225,000 | 22,011 | 682 | (+) 9 | 31.957 | 48.218 | (–) 2.408 | .2675 |
| 1973 | 3,338,200 | 21,730 | 650 | (–) 32 | 55.400 | 64.633 | (+)16.415 | .5129 |
| 1974 | 3,421,600 | 21,555 | 630 | (–) 20 | 81.000 | 67.346 | (+) 2.713 | .1356 |
| 1975 | 3,493,200 | 21,106 | 604 | (–) 26 | 88.000 | 71.600 | (+) 4.254 | .1636 |
| 1976 | 3,575,400 | 20,920 | 585 | (–) 19 | 104.000 | 80.200 | (+) 8.600 | .4526 |
| 1977 | 3,653,200 | 22,721 | 621 | (+) 36 | 125.500 | 69.700 | (–)10.500 | .2916 |

SOURCE: Statistical Abstracts of Israel (1968-1978)
NOTES: (1) Includes: fences, bicycle path, lights, major repairs, intersections.
(2) Until February 1980 the IL (*Israeli Pound*) was the official Israeli currency; the IL was replaced by the shekel in February 1980.
(3) The adjustments to 1980 shekels were calculated by the IPD multiplier. However, this index is based on the overall consumer price index, and does not reflect precisely items included in road safety measures.

## PREDICTING THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Predicting the expected number of casualties for some future time period is an essential requirement for the policy analysis of casualty-preventing programs. While empirically simple to derive for most sources of casualties, predicting the number of casualties inflicted by terrorist strikes is rather complex. A detailed discussion of the prediction problem, and a suggested methodology to solve it, will be presented in Chapter XIV as part of the analysis of countermeasures within the domain of terrorism.

## SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This chapter presented an alternative approach to the analysis of casualty-preventing programs: cost-effectiveness analysis instead of cost-benefit analysis, which is applied at present. Reducing the overall number of casualties is the policy objective. Terrorism is treated within this framework as one source of casualties side by side with other sources. The suggested approach requires equating the marginal product of the life-saving shekel among all casualty-preventing programs. Applying this approach requires first a suboptimization in each of the relevant domains (countering terrorism, traffic safety measures, labor safety measures, etc.); that is, first to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis in each of these domains, equating the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekels among the various countermeasures. "Extra Terror" was presented first for methodological reasons.

As discussed earlier, cost-effectiveness analysis enables us to compare casualty-preventing programs and allocate a given budget to those that are effective. Adopting this approach calls for a national casualty-preventing policy. Having such a policy, and allocating available budget among programs according to the suggested approach, will lead to a reduction in the present discrepancy in resource allocation among existing programs.

Many organizations are involved in the implementation of such a policy. By the very nature of organizational behavior, each organization will seek to maximize its budget. Organizational conflicts,

competition, and sometimes rivalry may pose an obstacle to the implementation of such a national policy. Therefore, introducing a national casualty-preventing policy requires a centralized government system and a sole source of budget. Israel satisfies both requirements. It is small enough, has a central government, and one national yearly budget planned and allocated by the Ministry of Finance. The *Knesset* rarely interferes with government allocational decisions. Hence no major implementation difficulties are to be expected from the introduction of such a policy.

A national casualty-preventing policy for Israel is justified on the following grounds:

a. Israel is facing severe economic problems. The need to allocate budget effectively is therefore pressing.

b. The overall level of casualties from various sources is high in both absolute and relative rates.

c. There prevails a discrepancy in present resource allocation among various casualty-preventing programs.

d. Treating countering terrorism as an equal program among other casualty-preventing programs serves the new dimension added to the passive countermeasures, namely, downgrading the reaction to terrorism.

As discussed earlier, downgrading the reaction to terrorism is a countermeasure per se, namely, not reacting as expected by the terrorists. Downgrading the reaction to terrorism can be implemented by adopting a national casualty-prevention policy, described above, and by abolishing countermeasures which are huge yet not effective, as will be shown in Chapter XIV. Some arguments may be raised against downgrading the reaction:

o Perceiving terrorism as a major threat is good.

o Downgrading the reaction is an open invitation to terrorists.

o Downgrading the reaction to terrorism will have no effect on society's perceptions.

o A life does not equal a life, and a death does not equal a
death.

## Perceiving Terrorism as a Major Threat is Good

This Machiavellian argument states that it is in the interest of
Israel to maintain the perception of Palestinian terrorism as a "very
serious threat." Such an argument probably would never be stated ex-
plicitly, but might affect the calculations of certain political figures.
This argument may be based on the fact that Israelis do not support an
independent Palestinian state. One conscious reason for this position
is the way Israelis perceive Palestinian terrorism, as demonstrated in
a recent survey (see pp. 88-89 above), or it might be hoped by proponents
of this argument that the international community will sympathize with
Israel as long as it is perceived as facing "genocidal" threats. Or
some may argue in the same vein that perceiving terrorism as a major
threat encourages feelings of national unity, comradeship, etc. Such
arguments, if raised, can be incorporated in the analysis as externali-
ties; whether negative or positive externalities is a question of pref-
erence.

## Downgrading the Reaction to Terrorism is a Challenge to Terrorists

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism may induce Palestinian ter-
rorists to upgrade their activity. There is no evidence to support this
argument. The following point can be made to counter it.

o It is plausible to assume that the Palestinian terrorists
have reached their potential, or at least are close to
reaching that point; and

o Even if the above assumption is false, supposing that the
number of casualties inflicted by terrorism were greater
by a factor of (say) 5, there still would remain a significant
gap between the larger amount of casualties inflicted by ter-
rorism and the number of casualties caused by other sources.

## Perceptions Are Not a Policy Variable

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism will have no effect on
society's perceptions. As pointed out before (see p. 112 above), the
question of whether subjective probabilities are a policy variable
is left open, and requires further research.

Few attempts have been made in the past to address this question.[1]
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investigated insurance behavior of people facing natural hazards. Slovic
et al looked at perceptions of nuclear disasters. The two studies
yielded contradictory conclusions. Kunreuther recommends providing
people with historical information in order to affect their perceptions,
adjust their subjective probabilities to the objective probabilities, and
hence affect their insurance behavior:

"Unless individuals have been made graphically aware of the
consequences of disasters, typically through past experience,
they are unlikely to even consider purchasing insurance pro-
tection."[2]

Slovic et al warn that educational efforts may backfire. That is, the
provision of information may heighten the salience, and consequently the
perceived probability, of a rare event, even when the information is
designed to give reassurance that the event is highly unlikely to occur.
According to this argument, identifying the various safety measures that
have been taken to protect against a hazard may serve to increase concern
about the hazard by indicating previously unknown ways in which things
could go wrong. It is assumed that those being educated will not assess

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Problems in Inferring a Level of Acceptable Risk*, The Rand Corporation,
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[2] Quoted in S. Salem, et al, p. 73.

the information correctly, i.e., take into account the low probability
of each malfunction, and will instead consider the event more likely
as a result of their increased knowledge of the number of ways in which
it could occur.  This argument against informing the public is put
forth intuitively; there is no reported research to support it.[1]

### A Life Does Not Equal a Life and a Death Does Not Equal a Death

This argument is a matter of preference.  Some may argue that,
despite the fact that they agree in principle with the preference that
"a life equals a life" on ethical grounds, they still think that the
way one dies makes a difference; namely, death by terrorism should not
be weighted the same as a death caused by another source.  How one
dies is an externality which may have an effect on making tradeoffs
among casualty-preventing programs.  It is unnecessary to dispute this
important and widely shared belief; instead, I have shown that differ-
ent preferences can easily be incorporated in the model.  All that is
required is to weight differently the casualties inflicted by terrorism,
and change the slope of the isolife lines accordingly (see pp. 142-143
above).

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[1]Ibid.

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## XIV.  INTRA-TERROR:  TOWARD A COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF COUNTERING TERRORISM

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on effective resource allocation among
various countermeasures within the domain of terrorism.

As discussed previously, *intra-terror* analysis should precede
*extra-terror* analysis, where marginal allocations among casualty-
preventing programs require a previous suboptimization in each of
the relevant domains.

In the previous chapter, the number of casualties prevented
served as the sole measure of effectiveness.  It is important to note
that analysis of individual countermeasures within the domain of ter-
rorism may require, in some cases, different measures of effectiveness,
since the effect of a single countermeasure on the number of casualties
cannot always be isolated.  For example, in assessing the effectiveness
of the border security fence, an appropriate measure of effectiveness
is the number of infiltrations impeded by the fence.

The major criterion for analysis in this chapter is the way each
countermeasure contributes to the achieving of a downgrading of the
impact of terrorism without having a negative effect on the number of
casualties prevented.

### PREDICTING THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Predicting the expected number of casualties at some future time
period is an essential requirement for casualty-preventing programs.
As has been illustrated in Fig. 19 (p. 146 above), the expected number
of casualties per year is a function of the number of "successful" at-
tempts during that year.  Hence the prediction problem based upon past
data consists of two parts:

o   Predicting the number of strikes which inflict casualties; and

o   Predicting the number of casualties in these strikes.

### Predicting the Number of Strikes Inflicting Casualties

Terrorist strikes may be viewed as events occurring over time. It has been shown in many cases for events which occur randomly over time that the number of occurrences X in a unit time interval has a Poisson distribution with parameter $\lambda$, where $\lambda$ is the mean number of occurrences in a time interval of length one, say a month, if the following main assumptions are satisfied:

a.  the events occur singly;

b.  the number of occurrences in nonoverlapping (i.e., disjoint) time intervals is statistically independent.

Hence the probability that exactly x strikes will be inflicted per day is given by:

$$P(X = x) = \frac{e^{-\lambda}\lambda^x}{x!} \quad \text{for } x = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$$

However, it may be argued that the second assumption is a very strong one in the context of terrorism; that is, to assume that the number of strikes at time t is independent of the number of strikes at time t - 1, t - 2, . . . and at time t + 1, t + 2, . . . . A similar problem was encountered in the past by Lewis Richardson.[1] Richardson looked at the distribution of wars in time, using data on outbreaks of wars in 432 years from 1500 to 1931. Richardson showed that the number of outbreaks of wars per year is generated by a Poisson process:

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[1]Lewis F. Richardson, "The Distribution of Wars in Time," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, Vol. 107 (1944), pp. 242-250.

"Each calendar year can be characterized by the number 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 of wars which began in it, as shown in Appendix I. The number of years of each character has been counted (by three observers, M. W., E. D. R. and L. F. R.) with the following results

Years from 1500 to 1931 A.D.

| Number of outbreaks in the year | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | >4 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of such years ... ... | 223 | 142 | 48 | 15 | 4 | 0 | 432 |
| Poisson law ... ... ... ... | 216·2 | 149·7 | 51·8 | 12·0 | 2·1 | 0·3 | 432·1 |

By the Poisson law is here meant the statement that there were

$$Ne^{-\lambda}\lambda^x/x! \quad \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$$

years each containing exactly x outbreaks of war. The law was fitted to the observations by first equating N to the observed total number 432 years; and then determining $\gamma$ by R.A. Fisher's Principle of Maximum Likelihood, according to which $\gamma$ equals the mean number of outbreaks per year; that is

$$\lambda = 299/432 \quad \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$$

It is seen at a glance that there is a considerable resemblance between the historical facts and the Poisson law. This resemblance suggests that we may perhaps find out something about the causes of wars by thinking of their outbreaks in connection with other phenomena known to be described at least approximately by the Poisson law. Such include: factory accidents, deaths by kick from a horse, and the emission of alpha particles from radioactive substances."[1]

In order to see whether the number of terrorist strikes which inflict casualties, per month, are generated by a Poisson distribution, I looked at the number of strikes inflicting civilian casualties for each of the 139 months (June 1967 - December 1968), and then tried to fit the Poisson distribution to the observations. Each month was characterized by the number 0, 1, 2, . . ., 8 of such strikes which were inflicted during it. Table 16 and Fig. 20 summarize the results.

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[1]Ibid, p. 242.

Table 16

NUMBER OF STRIKES PER MONTH (JUNE 1967–DECEMBER 1978)

| | Number of Strikes Per Month (x) | | | | | | | | | |
| Item | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | >7 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of such months | 52 | 45 | 26 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 139 |
| $N \cdot P(X = x) = \dfrac{N e^{-\lambda} \lambda^x}{x!}$ | 44.9 | 50.7 | 28.6 | 10.8 | 3.0 | 0.7 | .13 | .002 | .0003 | 138.7 |

SOURCES: Table 12 (p. 93) and IDF Spokesman Chronologies.

$\lambda$ is estimated by $\hat{\lambda}$: The maximum likelihood estimator of $\lambda$, namely of the observed mean number of strikes per month

$$\hat{\lambda} = \frac{\text{total number of strikes}}{N} = \frac{157}{139} = 1.1294$$

N was equated to the observed total number of 139 months. To test the null hypothesis

$H_o$: The Poisson distribution fits the observed frequency of strikes

against the alternative hypothesis,

$H_A$: The Poisson distribution does not fit the observed frequency of strikes

I carried out a $\chi^2$ goodness of fit test. The test statistic $\hat{\chi}^2$ is calculated by

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$$

where $f_i$ denotes the observed frequency of strikes and $F_i$ denotes the theoretical frequency of strikes (Poisson).

Fig. 20 — The distribution of terrorist strikes that inflict casualties, over time

## PREDICTING THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Predicting the expected number of casualties for some future time period is an essential requirement for the policy analysis of casualty-preventing programs. While empirically simple to derive for most sources of casualties, predicting the number of casualties inflicted by terrorist strikes is rather complex. A detailed discussion of the prediction problem, and a suggested methodology to solve it, will be presented in Chapter XIV as part of the analysis of countermeasures within the domain of terrorism.

## SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This chapter presented an alternative approach to the analysis of casualty-preventing programs: cost-effectiveness analysis instead of cost-benefit analysis, which is applied at present. Reducing the overall number of casualties is the policy objective. Terrorism is treated within this framework as one source of casualties side by side with other sources. The suggested approach requires equating the marginal product of the life-saving shekel among all casualty-preventing programs. Applying this approach requires first a suboptimization in each of the relevant domains (countering terrorism, traffic safety measures, labor safety measures, etc.); that is, first to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis in each of these domains, equating the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekels among the various countermeasures. "Extra Terror" was presented first for methodological reasons.

As discussed earlier, cost-effectiveness analysis enables us to compare casualty-preventing programs and allocate a given budget to those that are effective. Adopting this approach calls for a national casualty-preventing policy. Having such a policy, and allocating available budget among programs according to the suggested approach, will lead to a reduction in the present discrepancy in resource allocation among existing programs.

Many organizations are involved in the implementation of such a policy. By the very nature of organizational behavior, each organization will seek to maximize its budget. Organizational conflicts,

competition, and sometimes rivalry may pose an obstacle to the implementation of such a national policy. Therefore, introducing a national casualty-preventing policy requires a centralized government system and a sole source of budget. Israel satisfies both requirements. It is small enough, has a central government, and one national yearly budget planned and allocated by the Ministry of Finance. The *Knesset* rarely interferes with government allocational decisions. Hence no major implementation difficulties are to be expected from the introduction of such a policy.

A national casualty-preventing policy for Israel is justified on the following grounds:

a. Israel is facing severe economic problems. The need to allocate budget effectively is therefore pressing.

b. The overall level of casualties from various sources is high in both absolute and relative rates.

c. There prevails a discrepancy in present resource allocation among various casualty-preventing programs.

d. Treating countering terrorism as an equal program among other casualty-preventing programs serves the new dimension added to the passive countermeasures, namely, downgrading the reaction to terrorism.

As discussed earlier, downgrading the reaction to terrorism is a countermeasure per se, namely, not reacting as expected by the terrorists. Downgrading the reaction to terrorism can be implemented by adopting a national casualty-prevention policy, described above, and by abolishing countermeasures which are huge yet not effective, as will be shown in Chapter XIV. Some arguments may be raised against downgrading the reaction:

o  Perceiving terrorism as a major threat is good.

o  Downgrading the reaction is an open invitation to terrorists.

o  Downgrading the reaction to terrorism will have no effect on society's perceptions.

o   A life does not equal a life, and a death does not equal a
death.

### Perceiving Terrorism as a Major Threat is Good

This Machiavellian argument states that it is in the interest of
Israel to maintain the perception of Palestinian terrorism as a "very
serious threat." Such an argument probably would never be stated ex-
plicitly, but might affect the calculations of certain political figures.
This argument may be based on the fact that Israelis do not support an
independent Palestinian state. One conscious reason for this position
is the way Israelis perceive Palestinian terrorism, as demonstrated in
a recent survey (see pp. 88-89 above), or it might be hoped by proponents
of this argument that the international community will sympathize with
Israel as long as it is perceived as facing "genocidal" threats. Or
some may argue in the same vein that perceiving terrorism as a major
threat encourages feelings of national unity, comradeship, etc. Such
arguments, if raised, can be incorporated in the analysis as externali-
ties; whether negative or positive externalities is a question of pref-
erence.

### Downgrading the Reaction to Terrorism is a Challenge to Terrorists

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism may induce Palestinian ter-
rorists to upgrade their activity. There is no evidence to support this
argument. The following point can be made to counter it.

o   It is plausible to assume that the Palestinian terrorists
have reached their potential, or at least are close to
reaching that point; and

o   Even if the above assumption is false, supposing that the
number of casualties inflicted by terrorism were greater
by a factor of (say) 5, there still would remain a significant
gap between the larger amount of casualties inflicted by ter-
rorism and the number of casualties caused by other sources.

### Perceptions Are Not a Policy Variable

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism will have no effect on
society's perceptions. As pointed out before (see p. 112 above), the
question of whether subjective probabilities are a policy variable
is left open, and requires further research.

Few attempts have been made in the past to address this question.[1]
Two quoted studies both look at *very* low-probability events. Kunreuther
investigated insurance behavior of people facing natural hazards. Slovic
et al looked at perceptions of nuclear disasters. The two studies
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[1]Ibid, p. 242.

Table 16

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| | Number of Strikes Per Month (x) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Item | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | >7 | Total |
| Number of such months | 52 | 45 | 26 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 139 |
| $N \cdot P(X = x) = \dfrac{N e^{-\lambda} \lambda^{x}}{x!}$ | 44.9 | 50.7 | 28.6 | 10.8 | 3.0 | 0.7 | .13 | .002 | .0003 | 138.7 |

SOURCES:  Table 12 (p. 93) and IDF Spokesman Chronologies.

$\lambda$ is estimated by $\hat{\lambda}$:  The maximum likelihood estimator of $\lambda$, namely of the observed mean number of strikes per month

$$\hat{\lambda} = \frac{\text{total number of strikes}}{N} = \frac{157}{139} = 1.1294$$

N was equated to the observed total number of 139 months.  To test the null hypothesis

$H_o$:  The Poisson distribution fits the observed frequency of strikes

against the alternative hypothesis,

$H_A$:  The Poisson distribution does not fit the observed frequency of strikes

I carried out a $\chi^2$ goodness of fit test.  The test statistic $\chi^2$ is calculated by

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$$

where $f_i$ denotes the observed frequency of strikes and $F_i$ denotes the theoretical frequency of strikes (Poisson).

Fig. 20 — The distribution of terrorist strikes that inflict casualties, over time

Table 17

DERIVING THE $\chi^2$ GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTIC

| Category (# of strikes per month) | Frequency Observed | Poisson | $f_i - F_i$ | $\dfrac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 52 | 44.9 | 7.1 | 1.123 |
| 1 | 45 | 50.7 | -5.7 | 0.641 |
| 2 | 26 | 28.6 | -2.6 | 0.236 |
| 3 | 11 | 10.8 | 0.2 | 0.000 |
| >3 | 5 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 0.250 |
| Total | 139 | 139.0 | - | 2.250 |

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{5} \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i} = 2.250 \text{ with 4 degrees of freedom.}$$ Since the 5%

critical value is 9.49, there seems to be no sufficient reason to reject the null hypothesis.

To derive a confidence interval for the expected number of strikes which involve casualties per month $\lambda$, the following process was applied: Assuming that $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{157}$ are a random sample from a Poisson distribution $(\lambda)$, and assuming that the distribution of

$$z = \frac{(\bar{x} - \lambda)}{\sqrt{\lambda/n}}$$

can be well approximated by a standard normal distribution, then approximate 95 percent confidence limits can be calculated by

$$\bar{x} + 1.92/n \pm \sqrt{\frac{3.84\,\bar{x}}{n} + \frac{3.69}{n^2}}$$

which yields: $0.975 < x < 1.310$

and for year $t_{13}$ a 95 percent confidence interval for the expected number of strikes which involve casualties $(\lambda)$ will be

$$(11.7, 15.7).$$

One must be very careful in interpreting the finding that the null hypothesis (the Poisson distribution fits the observed frequency of strikes) is not rejected on statistical grounds. On statistical grounds, this finding may indicate that strikes which inflict casualties *are randomly distributed over time*, and therefore strikes inflicted during month j can be assumed to be statistically independent of strikes inflicted during month i, where i ≠ j. Furthermore, on the same grounds, the average number of strikes per month can be assumed to be constant. Does this imply that the terrorists are making an effort to keep the number of strikes which involve civilian casualties on a more or less constant level? Without going into the decision process and calculations made by Palestinian terrorists (concerning which there are no data or evidence), this hypothesis seems to be plausible based upon:

a. the observed frequency of strikes which involve civilian casualties;

b. the increase over the years in the proportion of strikes directed against civilian targets inside Israel, out of the total number of operations (see Fig. 5, p. 57, above). It may be argued that accepting this hypothesis can lead us to conclude that whatever countermeasures are taken, their effect on reducing the number of strikes which involve casualties will be small. This argument cannot be dismissed on the basis of the historical observation. However, the reciprocal of this argument, namely that decreasing the level of some or all effective countermeasures will not affect the number of strikes which involve casualties, is not valid. Doing so will probably lead to an increase in both the number of strikes and the number of casualties.

The policy implications of these arguments require a careful look at the various threats, i.e., the various types of strikes, and a focus on those which inflict the highest rate of casualties.

### Predicting the Number of Casualties per Strike[1]

Let $X_i$ be the number of casualties during the ith terrorist strike in a given year, and let N be the number of strikes during the year.

Since we assume that the number of strikes during a single month follows a Poisson distribution with parameter $\lambda$, and that the number of strikes during different months are independent of each other, it follows that the number of strikes during the year N follows a Poisson distribution with parameter $12\lambda$. The mean and the variance of the number of strikes during the year are both $12\lambda$.

It is plausible to assume that $X_i$ (the number of casualties per strike) has a Poisson distribution. However, $\lambda$ in this case is a random variable itself, that is, some strikes have the potential to inflict more casualties than others. We may assume then that $\lambda$ has a Gamma distribution, and the number of casualties per strike $X_1, \ldots, X_N$ are independent (of each other and of N) identically distributed random variables following a Negative Binomial distribution with parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, so each has mean $\alpha\beta$ and variance $\alpha\beta(1 + \beta)$.

Hence, the probability that the number of casualties per strike X is exactly x is given by

$$\Pr\left\{ X = x \right\} = \binom{x + \alpha - 1}{\alpha - 1} \left(\frac{\beta}{\beta + 1}\right)^x \left(\frac{1}{\beta + 1}\right)^\alpha$$

where

$$\binom{x + \alpha - 1}{\alpha - 1} = \frac{\Gamma(x + \alpha)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(x + 1)}$$

to allow for $\alpha$ to be non-integral.

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[1] The procedure discussed in this section was developed by my friend, William Lisowski, to whom I am grateful.

The Negative Binomial distribution was chosen since it is a family of discrete distributions, whose variance is greater than the mean. Table 18 and Figure 21 show the observed frequency of casualties per strike and the Negative Binomial fit.

Table 18

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CASUALTIES PER STRIKE,
1967-1978

| Frequency of Strikes | Number of Casualties per Strike | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Observed Frequency | 3001 | 32 | 28 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Negative Binomial Fit | 3000.94 | 39.50 | 19.54 | 12.80 | 9.41 | 7.38 | 6.02 | 5.05 | 4.32 | 3.75 | 3.30 |

| Frequency of Strikes | Number of Casualties per Strike | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | $\geq 20$ |
| Observed Frequency | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 28 |
| Negative Binomial Fit | 2.93 | 2.63 | 2.37 | 2.15 | 1.96 | 1.80 | 1.65 | 1.52 | 1.41 | 25.56 |

The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ were derived using numerical methods (there are no explicit expressions for $\alpha$ and $\beta$).

Fig. 21 — The distribution of casualties per strike, 1967-1978

To test the null hypothesis

$H_o$: The Negative Binomial distribution fits the observed frequency of casualties per strike

against the alternative hypothesis,

$H_A$: The Negative Binomial distribution does not fit the observed frequency of casualties per strike

I carried out a $\chi^2$ goodness of fit test. The test statistic $\chi^2$ is calculated by

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$$

where $f_i$ denotes the observed frequency of casualties per strike and $F_i$ denotes the theoretical frequency of casualties (Negative Binomial).

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \frac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i} = 15.996$$

Since the 5 percent critical value of a $\chi^2$ with 19 degrees of freedom is 30.1, there seems to be no sufficient reason to reject the null hypothesis.

## Table 19

### DERIVING THE $\chi^2$ STATISTIC

| Category (No. of Casualties per strike) | Frequency Observed $(f_i)$ | Negative Binomial Fit $(F_i)$ | $f_i - F_i$ | $\dfrac{(f_i - F_i)^2}{F_i}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 3001.00 | 3000.94 | .06 | .000 |
| 1 | 32.00 | 39.50 | -7.50 | 1.424 |
| 2 | 28.00 | 19.54 | 8.46 | 3.662 |
| 3 | 12.00 | 12.80 | -.80 | .050 |
| 4 | 10.00 | 9.41 | .59 | .037 |
| 5 | 10.00 | 7.38 | 2.62 | .930 |
| 6 | 4.00 | 6.02 | -2.02 | .677 |
| 7 | 6.00 | 5.05 | .95 | .178 |
| 8 | 5.00 | 4.32 | .68 | .107 |
| 9 | 2.00 | 3.75 | -1.75 | .816 |
| 10 | 2.00 | 3.30 | -1.30 | .512 |
| 11 | 5.00 | 2.93 | 2.07 | 1.462 |
| 12 | 2.00 | 2.63 | -.63 | .151 |
| 13 | 3.00 | 2.37 | .63 | .167 |
| 14 | 3.00 | 2.15 | .85 | .336 |
| 15 | 1.00 | 1.96 | -.96 | .470 |
| 16 | 0.00 | 1.80 | -1.80 | 1.800 |
| 17 | 2.00 | 1.65 | .35 | .074 |
| 18 | 0.00 | 1.52 | -1.52 | 1.520 |
| 19 | 0.00 | 1.41 | -1.41 | 1.410 |
| $\geq 20$ | 28.00 | 25.56 | 2.44 | .233 |
| Total | 3156 | 3155.99 | 0.01 | 15.966 |

For purposes of policy planning, we have to provide bounds for the expected number of casualties during a year.

If we define Y as the number of casualties during the year, so that

$$Y = X_1 + \ldots + X_N,$$

it is a simple matter to show that, in general, Y has mean $E(N)E(X)$ and variance $E(N)\mathrm{Var}(X)+\mathrm{Var}(N)E^2(X)$.

If the values of our parameters were precisely equal to their maximum likelihood estimates from the data at hand, we would have

$$\alpha = 0.013486$$
$$\beta = 40.928$$
$$E(X) = 0.55196$$
$$\mathrm{Var}(X) = 23.142$$

$$\lambda = 19.862$$
$$E(N) = 238.34$$
$$\mathrm{Var}(N) = 238.34$$

$$E(Y) = 131.55$$
$$\mathrm{Var}(Y) = 5588.3$$
$$\sigma_Y = 74.755$$

From Chebyshev's inequality, we have

$$\Pr(|Y-E(Y)| \geq k\sigma_Y) \leq 1/k^2 .$$

For $1/k^2 = .05$, this yields

$$\Pr(|Y-131.55| \geq 334.31) \leq .05$$

or, removing the absolute value signs and using the fact that Y must be a nonnegative integer, we have

$$Pr(Y \geq 466) \leq .05 .$$

A similar line of reasoning for $1/k^2 = .01$ yields

$$Pr(Y \geq 880) \leq .01 .$$

One can argue that the uncertainty in the estimates of the parameters makes these bounds less conservative. However, the additional variance introduced by the error in the estimates is dwarfed by the variances of the random variables themselves.

For policy planning, these results can be interpreted as follows: The probability that the overall number of casualties inflicted by terrorism during a year will exceed 466 is less than or equal to .05 and the probability that this number will exceed 880 is less than or equal to .01.

## RESPONSES TO HOSTAGE/BARGAINING STRIKES

Countermeasures which are designed to deal with hostage/bargaining strikes-in-process are excluded from the analysis in this chapter. This paper focuses on preventing unknown casualties during a given future time period, and does not treat rescue operation programs which concern identified victims, for the following reasons:

- o It is plausible to assume that once a terrorist squad has penetrated a target area (i.e., impeding has failed) with the intention of taking hostages, it will be able to do so (there is no way to seal off the population hermetically).
- o Each hostage incident has unique circumstances, and therefore requires a specific response. Only the most general strategy guidelines can be formulated in advance. Most, if not all, decisions have to be made during the incident.

- o Hostage/bargaining situations have been dealt with intensively and extensively in the literature on terrorism.[1]

## COUNTERMEASURES INVOLVING CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION

Countermeasures that appear to be huge and noneffective (see p. 107 above) can be singled out intuitively since they do not require rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis. The countermeasures to be singled out in this category are:

- o Mandatory school guarding
- o Guarding public entertainment facilities
- o Citizens' Guard patrols

These three countermeasures are based on citizens' participation. The first two require mandatory participation and the last one, voluntary participation. As discussed earlier, there is no evidence on the effectiveness of these measures. In the first two, the citizens involved are unarmed. Schools are guarded by parents, in most cases mothers. Public entertainment facilities are guarded by unarmed civil defense reservists. In this case, as well, it is plausible to assume that once a terrorist squad, equipped and armed, has penetrated into Israel, impeding it is very difficult. Similarly, the deterrent effect of unarmed citizens seems to be doubtful. The money costs are high; I estimate that about 40,000 citizens are involved each day in implementing these countermeasures. The economic burden in gross terms is about 3.4 million shekels per day, and around 1.2 billion shekels per year (based on an average daily income of 85 shekels per day in 1980).

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[1] See, for example, B. Jenkins et al, *Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes*, The Rand Corporation, P-5905, July 1977; J. G. Stratton, "The Terrorist Act of Hostage-Taking: Considerations for Law Enforcement," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, Vol. 6 (1978) No. 2, pp. 123-134.

In February 1980 dollars the yearly costs are around 31 million dollars
(about .3 percent of the Israeli GNP). The yearly shekel costs of the
Citizens' Guard are around 53 million shekels a year[1] (about 13 million
dollars).

Abolishing these countermeasures will save around 1.25 billion
shekels a year. However it is important to consider, in this context,
the externalities, positive and negative, which are involved in abolish-
ing these participational countermeasures.

We shall first discuss the positive externalities. Abolishing the
participational countermeasures will serve to downgrade the reaction to
terrorism. It will neutralize the boomerang effect of countermeasures:
that is, independent of the level of terrorism, these permanent coun-
termeasures, and citizens' participation in their implementation, keep
terrorism on the agenda and hence contribute to the high weight society
assigns to the threat of terrorism. On the negative side, some may
argue that society derives benefits from participational countermeasures,
despite their ineffectiveness. People believe that they are doing some-
thing about terrorism, which provides them with a certain sense of
security. Citizens' participation, this argument may continue, con-
tributes to preventing the danger of citizens' vigilante groups which,
in response to strikes, might be directed against innocent Arab citi-
zens. This important externality should be carefully weighted. The
following points can be made:

o It seems to me (based on my own experience) that the sense
of security and the benefit of participation yielded by
these countermeasures prevailed during the first two years
after their implementation (1974-1975). Enthusiasm
diminished gradually. For example, in a number of cases,
parents hired guards to replace themselves in guarding
schools. The superficial search carried out by civil defense

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[1]The Citizens' Guard yearly budget is included in the police
budget.

reservists in public entertainment facilities became a
butt of jokes.[1]

o Neutralizing the boomerang effect of these countermeasures
will probably decrease, after a while, the perceptions, and
hence society's need "to do something about terrorism."

o Abolishing these countermeasures within the policy of down-
grading the impact of terrorism will be accompanied by
education.

o The police will probably oppose the abolition of the Citizens'
Guard, on an organizational behavioral basis. Abolishing the
CG affects more than a thousand policemen, including a few
hundred officers in administrative positions, in all police
echelons. However, some of these personnel can be reallocated
to other police units within the framework of the national
policy discussed in Chapter XIII. Furthermore, abolishing
the CG corresponds with the declared policy of the Government
of Israel to decrease the manpower employed by the public
sector, as one of the recent measures to curb inflation.

Other arguments which may be raised as negative externalities to
the policy of downgrading the impact of terrorism have been discussed
previously (see pp. 151-154 above). After weighing the costs and bene-
fits, including the externalities, my preference leads me to recommend
abolishing these three participational countermeasures.

PHYSICAL PASSIVE DEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES

The major physical passive defense measures were implemented in
the past, and require at most yearly maintenance budgets. Based on
our incremental approach, that is, not making a *tabula rasa* assumption
(see p.113 above), the countermeasures in this category do not require
a detailed analysis. The countermeasures in this category are:

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[1]For example, a recent Israeli movie comedy, "Funny Israelis"
(1978), devoted an entire sketch to the search carried out by civil
defense reservists.

o  Sheltering

o  Paving roads with asphalt

o  Border fence system

All three were implemented between 1967 and 1974 and proved to be effective.

The first two countermeasures contributed to reducing the damage inflicted over the years by artillery fire and mining, respectively (see Fig. 8, p. 62 above). The border security system is an effective impeding countermeasure which reduced the rate of terrorist infiltration. All three do serve other national security goals as well, and are part of the regular border security mission of the IDF, in the context of military threats.

It is noteworthy that these measures do not affect society's perceptions of terrorism, and maintaining them will have no effect on downgrading the impact of terrorism. With regard to the border security system, an effort should be made to replace as much as possible the military manpower involved with electronic devices. This calls for a separate cost-effectiveness analysis.

## SUBOPTIMIZING SINGLE COUNTERMEASURES

Each of the countermeasures has to be suboptimized before an analysis of resource allocation among countermeasures can be made. For some of the countermeasures, a proper tool of analysis is a Monte Carlo simulation. The following is a detailed example:

### The Operation of Police Bomb Squads: A Monte Carlo Simulation

Planting explosives is the most frequent mode of strike used by Palestinian terrorists. Between 1967 and 1978, 54 percent of terrorists' operations involving civilian casualties were explosives planted in public places. About 56 percent of the total number of civilian casualties during that period were inflicted by explosives (see pp. 59-65 above). Planting explosives is a popular mode of operation for the following reasons:

o  Planting explosives requires minimum exposure and involves a relative low risk of encounter with law enforcement while planting the explosive. It may be conceived of as a "hit and run" strike.

o  Planting explosives is simple, and does not require advanced technologies. Homemade primitive bombs with simple time delay mechanisms can be prepared using available materials.

o  Some of the "successful" strikes inflict a large number of casualties, and hence contribute to the intimidation of society.

Based on these observations, it seems clear that the main focus inside the domain of terrorism should be directed at the bomb disposal system.

Bomb disposal is the responsibility of the police and is carried out by bomb squads allocated by the National Police Headquarters to each of the police districts. Bomb squads respond to two types of alarms:

o  Early warning based on intelligence

o  Alarms from the public giving notification of Unidentified Suspicious Objects (henceforth, USO).

Once an alarm is received at a police station, a bomb squad (if available) is dispatched. The missions of the squad are:

(1)  to get to the scene;

(2)  to isolate the scene area;

(3)  to check the USO, and find out whether the alarm was true or false;

(4)  if true, to deactivate the bomb if possible or to transfer it to a close disposal site.

A failure to impede this type of strike can be caused by either one of the following:

o  There was no alarm.

o  Late arrival of a bomb squad, either because there was no
   available squad (in some cases a squad was assigned to a
   previous alarm that had proven to be false), or because of
   the wrong handling of the explosive by the squad.

The police encourage the public to report any USO immediately. About
99 percent of the alarms prove to be false.

The main problem the police face, in this context, is how to
*increase* the number of explosives discovered and disposed of.

This goal can be achieved by a combination of the following
options:

o  Minimize the response time to a USO alarm, i.e., reduce
   the time interval between an alarm and the arrival of the
   bomb squad at the scene; and

o  Increase the number of bomb squads in some or all police
   districts.

o  Improve communication networks; or

o  Have mobile bomb squads patrolling in "popular" target
   areas; or

o  Use helicopters to increase the mobility of squads; or

o  Coordinate and use if necessary military bomb squads, etc.

A Monte Carlo simulation is a useful tool to address these policy
options. Figure 22 presents a flowchart of the simulation model.
The simulation can be carried out for each of the police districts
or simultaneously for all. The model simulates the operation of
bomb squads through the following phases:

(1)  generating an alarm
(2)  selecting the closest available squad
(3)  route to the scene
(4)  bomb disposal
(5)  returning to base

Fig. 22 — Flow chart for Monte-Carlo simulation of the response system
to "USO" alarms in one police district

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Different policy options and combinations of options can be simulated using this model.

This example illustrates how suboptimization can be carried out for each of the countermeasures. The allocation of yearly budgets among countermeasures should then be carried out using the analytical framework discussed in Chapter XIII, that is, equating the marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel among countermeasures. The prediction model suggested above can be applied. An empirical analysis requires data on the number of strikes impeded. These data are classified since they are based on intelligence reports and interrogations of captured terrorists. Also classified are the detailed data on the costs of countermeasures.

The fact that countermeasures have been introduced as crash programs over the years and have accumulated, together with the need for a policy of downgrading the impact of terrorism—calls for carrying out a detailed policy analysis within the framework suggested in this dissertation.

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## XV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest an approach for the policy analysis of countermeasures taken by Israel against Palestinian terrorism.

In the context of this paper, "Palestinian terrorism" stands for Palestinian acts of *low-level* violence, for a political purpose, with the intent to inflict casualties and damage upon Israeli society, as well as fear and rage, and by so doing inciting Israel to react. Note that the definition excludes violence directed at high-level targets such as vital military installations. Such acts, if taken, would be "counterforce" strikes, inflicting high level of damage, and would probably inspire massive reactions that might culminate in war.

Part One includes an historical analysis of Palestinian violence and Israeli countermeasures between 1919-1978; three periods of Palestinian terrorism were discussed:

o  1919-1948: Terrorism inflicted by local Arab groups against the growing Jewish population (the "*Yishuv*") in British-mandated Palestine. The violence was motivated mainly by the goal to deny the Zionists' political aspirations, rather than to promote Palestinian national goals.

o  1949-1956: Acts of terrorism along the 1948 armistice lines, inflicted by *Fedayeen* groups infiltrating from Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip). The infiltrations were backed and supported by Jordan and Egypt as part of the military conflict. No particular Palestinian national aspirations and goals were involved at this stage.

o  1965-Present: Palestinian terrorism, carried out by a number of Palestinian groups, as part of the armed struggle of the Palestinians aiming at "liberating Palestine" and establishing a Palestinian state, which would replace the State of Israel, and also include the West Bank and Gaza.

The analysis in Part Two focuses on the wave of Palestinian terrorism following the Six Day War (1967-1978).

The analysis yielded the following observations:

o   Terrorism is perceived by Israeli society as a major threat.
    Israeli threat assessment is based upon subjective probabilities assigned to terrorism and consists of two components:

    a.  Personal component, namely, the probability individuals
        assign to being hit by an act of terrorism--reflected
        mainly in the individual's fear; and

    b.  National image component, an intangible one, namely, the
        degree of damage to the national image assigned by indi-
        viduals and reflected mainly in society's rage.

o   The perception of terrorism by the Israelis seems to be out
    of proportion to the role of terrorism in the shaping of the
    objective probability of an Israeli suffering casualties
    from external causes.  The proportion of Israeli civilian
    casualties inflicted by terrorism over 12 years (1967-1978)
    out of the total number of casualties from external causes
    is low:  0.55 percent (1856 out of 337,172).

o   Perceptions of terrorism are shaped by many factors, e.g.,
    the large-scale coverage of terrorism strikes by the media;
    the change in sensitivities and increase in the desire to
    dissociate politics and violence; the distinction between
    a "statistical" victim and a particular victim; the intol-
    erance for a large number of casualties per single incident;
    the "insult to the state"; and, finally--to close the circle--
    the boomerang  effect of permanent, preventive countermeasures
    as a constant reminder of terrorism independent of actual
    strikes.

o   The countermeasures taken by Israel were designed mainly to
    minimize the number of casualties inflicted by terrorism.
    Yet there seems to be a gross inequality between the amount
    of resources invested by Israel to counter terrorism and
    those allocated to counter other sources of casualties.

A partial explanation of this discrepancy in resource
allocation is provided by the way terrorism is perceived
in Israel.

o   The countermeasures taken by Israel were introduced gradually,
    in response to innovations taken by the Palestinian terrorists:
    Countermeasures were introduced as crash programs, without a
    detailed analysis.  Once introduced, these countermeasures re-
    mained.  Hence, at present, there prevails a huge system of
    countermeasures--some effective and some not--involving about
    40,000 people per day, as well as at least five organizations
    (some of them specially created) to control, coordinate and
    implement the countermeasures.  While the system grew, both
    the number of Palestinian operations and the number of casual-
    ties inflicted by terrorism decreased.

o   It was often difficult to abstain from a huge reaction, even
    in the face of smaller-scale yet effective alternatives.

Countermeasures taken by Israel can be categorized according to
their purpose, as follows:

    a.  Reduce terrorists' resources;
    b.  Reduce terrorists' propensity to strike;
    c.  Reduce the damage inflicted by terrorism.

Four types of countermeasures were taken by Israel in correspon-
dence with these goals:

α.  Counterforce Measures:  Countermeasures taken to reduce
    the terrorists' resources and hence reduce their capability
    to strike (for example, military operations directed at
    Palestinian terrorists' targets; counterinsurgency measures
    in the occupied territories).

β.  Impeding:  Countermeasures designed to intercept a particular
    strike before it is carried out (border security system, pre-
    emptive military strikes based on concrete early warning) or

after (bomb disposal system). Impeding serves all three
purposes (a, b, c).

γ. Passive Defense: Physical passive countermeasures (e.g.,
sheltering) to reduce the yield from completed operations.
Serves purposes b and c.

δ. Punishment: Reprisal operations and "administrative punish-
ment" measures. Serves purposes a and b.

Israel has demonstrated a huge reaction, in all categories, and
by so doing has responded to a major element in the terrorists' calcu-
lations.

The analysis implies neither that there is no threat of terrorism
nor that countermeasures should not be taken to counter it. The
relevant policy questions in this context are: *What* and *how much*
should be done to counter the *objective* threat of terrorism?

To approach the policy question, the following assumptions are made:

o There is no willingness on the part of Israel, in the foresee-
able future, to deal with the political aspirations of the
Palestinians. Furthermore, even if the political aspirations
were satisfied by some compromise, say in the spirit of
the Camp David agreement, violence generated by extreme wings
of the PLO, the so-called rejectionists, backed by militant
Arab countries, will continue. Hence, Israel will face ter-
rorism in the foreseeable future.

o Terrorism *cannot* be eradicated by countermeasures.

o Society and government are mainly concerned with the threat
to lives. Hence, reducing as much as possible the rate of
casualties should be the main policy goal in the context of
countering terrorism. Doing so will not be merely "lip
service," but rather "conscience service."

o A life is a life. Under this preference, the loss to both
individuals and society of a casualty is independent of the
cause which generated the casualty, i.e., the same weights

are assigned under this preference to a casualty caused,
say, by a car accident as to a casualty inflicted by ter-
rorism. (To the extent to which this preference is adopted,
the yield to the terrorists of even physically successful
actions is sharply reduced.)

Given these assumptions and the observations made previously, the
policy question can be rephrased: *"How do we live with terrorism?"*
The policy objectives in this context are:

o To reduce the discrepancy in resource allocation among all
casualty-preventing programs, i.e., seeking to reduce
(under the prevailing budget constraints) the overall number
of casualties from external causes.

o To adjust society's subjective probabilities with regard to
terrorism (subjective risk assessment resulting in *fear*) to
the objective probabilities; and to cause society to estimate
to a lesser degree the intangible components in its threat
assessment (e.g., damage to national image resulting in rage);
that is, to have a policy which will end with less exaggerated
perceptions and less distinctive reactions.

In order to address these policy objectives, a psychological dimen-
sion is added to the physical passive defense measure: downgrading the
impact of terrorism, namely, *not reacting as expected by the terrorists.*

The analysis considers marginal adjustments in the prevailing set
of countermeasures in all the domains under consideration (i.e., terror-
ism, car accidents, etc.). No *tabula rasa* assumption is made: We are
not asking the question, "If we had to start from scratch, which policies
should be implemented?" Such a pure, theoretical approach is frequently
taken in analyses having the pretentious goal of a "Pareto-optimal"
resource allocation. The relevant question in this paper is: Assuming
we have extra money, say, 10 million shekels to be allocated during
next year, what will be the most effective allocation in correspondence

with our policy objectives? Similarly, if we have to cut our present
budgets by 10 million shekels, what will be the cut that would have
the least effect on the overall number of casualties prevented?

Past and present methodologies used to address life-saving or
casualty-preventing programs are discussed in Chapter XI. Life saving
or casualty prevention has been an important public policy concern in
numerous public programs aimed at increasing safety or longevity. In
the past 200 years, economists have been trying to find a procedure
for "measuring the benefits of such programs in units which can be
readily compared with the costs." Since the beginning of this cen-
tury, the analytical framework that has been used for evaluating life-
saving or casualty-preventing programs is cost-benefit analysis.
Within this framework, economists attempted, using different approaches,
to estimate the monetary aspects of life (or limb) as a measure of
benefits.

Four approaches for estimating the "monetary value of human life"
may be identified:

a. Explicit statements of politically designated persons;
b. Revealed preference implicit in past decisions;
c. The human capital approach; and
d. The willingness-to-pay approach.

The monetary value was then used for carrying out cost-benefit analyses
of life-saving or casualty-preventing programs. The decision rule that
follows suggests that a program should be implemented if and only if
the expected monetary value of the potential lives that are to be
saved exceeds the costs of implementing the program. Needless
to say, all four approaches do not capture the real value of life, and
furthermore, using the ceteris paribus assumption, they all provide a
tool for dealing with a single, particular, casualty-preventing program,
ignoring others.

In accord with the policy objectives, and under the assumptions
presented earlier, a different approach is suggested, namely, cost-
effectiveness analysis. The number of lives saved (or the number of

life years saved) will serve as the policy maximands, not attempting
to estimate the monetary gain. Assuming that budgetary constraints
prevail, i.e., resources are given, the suggested approach looks at
the *marginal product of the casualty-preventing shekel*. It requires
looking at a whole set of threats and hazards society faces, and
allocating resources in a way that will seek to equate the marginal
product of the casualty-preventing shekel of Program A (say prevent-
ing car accidents) with that of Programs B, C, etc. In this context,
countering terrorism will be treated as one of several casualty-
preventing programs.

The theoretical framework for this approach requires:

o  Deriving the casualty-preventing production functions of
   all programs;
o  Deriving the production possibility frontiers, expressed
   in isocost curves;
o  Selecting the point of tangency, for a given budget con-
   straint, between the relevant isocost and an "isolife"
   line, which under our preference has slope of -1. It is
   important to note that the slope can be easily changed,
   according to other preferences (that is, the preference
   that "a life equals a life" may be relaxed).

Downgrading the reaction to terrorism is discussed on two levels:

o  Extra-terror: Outside the domain of terrorism, treating
   terrorism as a subset of a national casualty-
   prevention policy, side by side with other casualty causes;
   and
o  Intra-terror: Inside the domain of terrorism, looking at
   individual countermeasures vis-a-vis the policy objectives.

The implementation of downgrading the impact of terrorism calls
for a national casualty-preventing policy.

Introducing a national casualty-preventing policy requires a centralized government system and a sole source of budget. Israel satisfies both requirements. It is small enough, has a central government, and one national yearly budget planned and allocated by the Ministry of Finance. The *Knesset* rarely interferes with government allocational decisions.

A national casualty-preventing policy for Israel is justified on the following grounds:

a. Israel is facing severe economic problems. The need to allocate budget effectively is therefore intensified.

b. The overall level of casualties from various other sources is high in both absolute and relative rates.

c. There prevails a discrepancy in present resource allocation among various casualty-preventing programs.

d. Treating countering terrorism as an equal program among other casualty-preventing programs serves the new dimension added to the passive countermeasures, namely, downgrading the reaction to terrorism.

Arguments that may be raised against a policy of downgrading the impact of terrorism are discussed in detail in Chapters XIII and XIV. These arguments include the following:

o Perceiving terrorism as a major threat serves the interests of Israel.

o Downgrading the reaction to terrorism is a challenge to terrorists.

o Perceptions are not a policy variable.

o A death caused by terrorism means more than a death from other external causes.

o Society will not tolerate the abolition of participational countermeasures.

This dissertation provides a framework for analysis, rather than a detailed working out, of the many elements of this complex policy issue. A detailed empirical application of the suggested methodology is left for the future. However, I do hope that this work will contribute to a better understanding of Palestinian terrorism in its *actual* magnitude, the countermeasures taken by Israel to curb it, the way Israelis perceive terrorism, and the interrelationship among the three. I also hope that the discussion presented here will lead to a more sober approach to countering terrorism by Israeli decisionmakers. In addition, it is worthwhile noting that the suggested methodology can be applied in other countries which face terrorism, and to other domains concerned with life saving, such as medical care or industrial safety.

## Appendix A

### THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

I.   The Palestine National Charter (1968)[*]

II.  Constitution of the PLO (1968)[*]

III. PLO Organization and Leadership[**]

IV.  Terrorist Groups within PLO[**]

V.   PLO Representation Abroad[**]

VI.  PLO Index of Personalities[**]

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[*] Y. Harkabi, *The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning*, Valentine, Mitchell & Co., Totowa, New Jersey, 1979, pp. 119-131.

[**] Based on Schiff & Haber, op cit, passim; and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Background Brief, November 1979, passim.

## I. THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER ADOPTED BY THE FOURTH PALESTINE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Cairo, July 17, 1968

1. This Charter shall be known as "the Palestine National Charter."

Articles of the Charter:

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation.

Article 2. Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article 7. Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. It is a national obligation to provide every Palestinian with a revolutionary Arab upbringing, and to instil in him a profound spiritual and

material familiarity with his homeland and a readiness for armed struggle and for the sacrifice of his material possessions and his life, for the recovery of his homeland. All available educational means and means of guidance must be enlisted to that end, until liberation is achieved.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organizations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on towards popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinian masses and all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilised and organised to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 11. Palestinians shall have three slogans: national unity, national mobilisation and liberation.

Article 12. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. To fulfil their role in the achievement of that objective, they must, at the present stage in their national struggle, retain their

Palestinian identity and all that it involves, work for increased awareness of it and oppose all measures liable to weaken or dissolve it.

Article 13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives; each leads to the achievement of the other. Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity. To work for one is to work for both.

Article 14. The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the continued existence of the Arabs, depends on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This interrelationship is the point of departure of the Arab endeavour to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the movement to achieve this sacred national objective.

Article 15. The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for the Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist and imperialist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the peoples and governments of the Arab nation and to the Palestinian people first and foremost.

For this reason, the task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nation, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible aid, material and manpower support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 16. On the spiritual plane, the liberation of Palestine will establish in the Holy Land an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in which all religious institutions will be safeguarded and freedom of worship and the right of visit guaranteed to all without discrimination or distinction of race, colour, language or creed. For this reason, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17. On the human plane, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinians their dignity, integrity and freedom. For this reason, the Palestinian Arab people look to all those who believe in the dignity and freedom of man for support.

Article 18. On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defence. This is why the Palestinian people, who seek to win the friendship of all peoples, look for the support of all freedom, justice and peace-loving countries in restoring the legitimate state of affairs in Palestine, establishing security and peace in it and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19. The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Instrument, and their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalisation of the Palestine problem.

Article 22. Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movements or movements for progress in the world. The Zionist movement is essentially fanatical and racialist; its objectives involve aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the Nazis. Israel acts as cat's paw for the Zionist movement, a geographic and manpower

base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the
Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nation to
liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace
in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of
Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that
country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people
look for support to all liberals and to all forces of good, peace and
progress in the world, and call on them, whatever their political con-
victions, for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate
struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23. The demands of peace and security and the exigencies
of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as
an illegal movement and outlaw it and its activities, out of considera-
tion for the ties of friendship between peoples and for the loyalty of
citizens to their homelands.

Article 24. The Palestinian Arab people believe in justice,
freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right
of peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25. In pursuance of the objectives set out in this charter,
the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall perform its proper role in
the liberation of Palestine to the full.

Article 26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the repre-
sentative of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible
for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to regain, liberate
and return to their homeland and to exercise the right of self-
determination in that homeland, in the military, political and finan-
cial fields, and for all else that the Palestinian cause may demand,
both at Arab and international levels.

Article 27. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall cooperate
with all Arab countries, each according to its means, maintaining a
neutral attitude vis-a-vis these countries in accordance with the re-
quirements of the battle of liberation, and on the basis of that
factor. The Organisation shall not interfere in the internal affairs
of any Arab country.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authen-
ticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all
forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.

Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and
prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define
their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the
attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the
Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that
people in their revolution to achieve their objectives.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of
liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the
achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31. The Organisation shall have a flag, an oath of alle-
giance and an anthem, to be decided in accordance with appropriate
regulations.

Article 32. Regulations, to be known as Basic Regulations for
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, shall be appended to this
Charter. These regulations shall define the structure of the Organi-
sation, its bodies and institutions, and the powers, duties and obli-
gations of each of them, in accordance with this Charter.

Article 33. This Charter may only be amended with a majority of
two thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly of
the Palestine Liberation Organisation at a special meeting called for
that purpose.

## II. CONSTITUTION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION

Cairo, July 17, 1968

### CHAPTER I

#### General Principles

Article 1. The Palestinians, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, form themselves into an organisation to be known as the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Article 2. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall exercise its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter, the provisions of this Constitution, and such rules, provisions, and resolutions as may be issued in conformity with these principles and provisions.

Article 3. Relationships within the Organisation shall be based on commitment to struggle and to national action, the different levels of the Organisation, from its base up to its collective leadership, being closely linked together on a basis of the following principles: the minority shall defer to the will of the majority, confidence of the people shall be won through persuasion, the movement of Palestinian struggle shall be continued, the armed Palestinian revolution shall be supported, and every possible effort shall be made to ensure that it continues and escalates, so that the impetus of the masses towards liberation may take its course until victory is achieved.

In implementation of this principle, the Executive Committee shall draft constitutions for the Organisation's subsidiary bodies, due regard being paid to the circumstances of Palestinians in all places where they are concentrated, to the circumstances of the Palestinian revolution, and to the realisation of the objectives of the Charter and the Constitution.

Article 4. All Palestinians are natural members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, performing their duty to liberate their country

in accordance with their abilities and qualifications. The Palestinian people is the base of this Organisation.

### CHAPTER II

#### The National Assembly

Article 5. The members of the National Assembly shall be elected by the Palestinian people by direct ballot, in accordance with a system to be devised for this purpose by the Executive Committee.

Article 6. (a) Should it be impossible to hold an election to the Assembly, the National Assembly shall continue to sit until circumstances permit of the holding of elections.

(b) If, for some reason, one or more seats in the National Assembly fall vacant, the Assembly shall appoint a member or members to fill the vacant seats.

Article 7. (a) The National Assembly is the supreme authority of the Liberation Organisation. It drafts the policy, planning and programmes of the Organisation.

(b) Jerusalem is the seat of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Article 8. The National Assembly is elected for three years, and it shall be convened in regular session once every six months by its President or, should extraordinary sessions be necessary, by the President at the request of the Executive Committee, or of a quarter of its members. It shall meet in Jerusalem, Gaza, or any other place, depending on circumstances. Should the President not call such a session, the session shall convene automatically in such place and at such time as are designated in the request submitted by its members or by the Executive Committee.

Article 9. The National Assembly shall have a President's Office, consisting of the President, two Vice-Presidents, and a Secretary, elected by the National Assembly when it first meets.

Article 10. The National Assembly in ordinary session shall consider:

(a) The annual report submitted by the Executive Committee on the achievements of the Organisation and its subsidiary bodies.

(b) The annual report of the National Fund and budget allocations.

(c) Proposals submitted by the Executive Committee and recommendations of Assembly committees.

(d) Any other questions submitted to it.

Article 11. The National Assembly shall form such committees as it deems necessary to assist it in the performance of its duties.

These committees shall submit their reports and recommendations to the National Assembly, which shall debate them and issue its decisions as regards them.

Article 12. Attendance by two-thirds of the members of the Assembly shall constitute a quorum. Decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of those present.

## CHAPTER III

### The Executive Committee

Article 13. (a) All members of the Executive Committee shall be elected by the National Assembly.

(b) The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be elected by the Committee itself.

(c) The Executive Committee shall be elected from the National Assembly.

Article 14. The Executive Committee shall consist of eleven members, including the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Palestine National Fund.

Should vacancies occur on the Executive Committee, for any reason, when the National Assembly is not sitting, they shall be filled as follows:

(a) If the vacancies are less than a third of the total membership, they shall not be filled until the first session of the National Assembly.

(b) If the vacancies amount to a third or more of the total membership of the Executive Committee, the National Assembly shall fill them at a session convened for the purpose in not more than thirty days.

(c) Should it be impossible, for valid reasons, to convene the National Assembly in extraordinary session, vacancies arising in either of the above cases shall be filled by the Executive Committee, the Assembly's Bureau and such members of the Assembly as are able to attend, at a joint assembly formed for this purpose. The new members shall be chosen by majority vote of those present.

Article 15. The Executive Committee is the highest executive authority of the Organisation. It shall remain in permanent session, its members devoting themselves exclusively to their work. It shall be responsible for executing the policy, programmes and planning approved by the National Assembly, to which it shall be responsible, collectively and individually.

Article 16. The Executive Committee shall assume responsibility for:

(a) Representing the Palestinian people.

(b) Supervising the Organisation's subsidiary bodies.

(c) Issuing regulations and instructions, and taking decisions on the Organisation's activities, provided these are not incompatible with the Charter or the Constitution.

(d) Implementing the Organisation's financial policy and drafting its budget.

In general, the Executive Committee shall assume all the responsibilities of the Liberation Organisation, in accordance with the general policies and resolutions adopted by the National Assembly.

Article 17. The permanent headquarters of the Executive Committee shall be in Jerusalem. It shall also be entitled to hold its meetings in any other place it sees fit.

Article 18. The Executive Committee shall establish the following departments:

(a) A Military Department.

(b) A Department for Political and Information Affairs.

(c) A Palestine National Fund Department.

(d) A Department for Research and Specialised Institutes.

(e) A Department for Administrative Affairs.

(f) Any other department the Committee considers necessary.

Each department shall have a Director-General and the requisite staff. The authority of each department shall be defined by special regulations drawn up by the Executive Committee.

Article 19. The Executive Committee shall establish close relations and coordinate activities between the Organisation and all Arab and international organisations, federations and institutions which agree with its aims, or which help it in the realisation of the Organisation's objectives.

Article 20. The Executive Committee shall continue to exercise its prerogatives as long as it enjoys the confidence of the National Assembly. The Executive Committee shall submit its resignation to the new National Assembly at its first session. It is subject to re-election.

Article 21. Attendances of two thirds of its members shall constitute a quorum, and its resolutions shall be adopted by majority vote of those present.

### CHAPTER IV

#### General Rules

Article 22. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall form an army of Palestinians, to be known as the Palestine Liberation Army, with an independent command which shall operate under the supervision of the Executive Committee, and carry out its instructions and decisions, both general and particular. Its national duty is to become the vanguard in the battle for the liberation of Palestine.

Article 23. The Executive Committee shall make every effort to enroll Palestinians in Arab military colleges and institutes for military training, to mobilise the potentials and resources of the Palestinians, and to prepare them for the battle of liberation.

Article 24. A fund, to be known as the Palestine National Fund, shall be established to finance the activities of the Organisation, which Fund shall be administered by a board of directors to be formed in accordance with special regulations for the Fund issued by the National Assembly.

Article 25. The Fund's sources of revenue shall be:

(a) An impost on Palestinians imposed and collected in accordance with a special system.

(b) Financial assistance provided by Arab governments and the Arab nation.

(c) The sale of "liberation stamps" which the Arab states will issue for use in postal and other transactions.

(d) Contributions and donations.

(e) Arab loans and aid from Arab countries and friendly peoples.

(f) Any other sources of revenue approved by the Assembly.

Article 26. Committees to be known as 'Committees for the Support of Palestine' shall be formed in Arab and friendly countries to collect contributions and support the organisation in its national endeavours.

Article 27. The level at which the Palestinian people is represented in Arab organisations and conferences shall be determined by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee shall appoint a representative for Palestine to the League of Arab States.

Article 28. The Executive Committee shall be entitled to make such regulations as are necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this constitution.

Article 29. The Organisation's National Assembly shall be empowered to amend, alter, or add to this Constitution by a two thirds majority of its members.

### CHAPTER V

#### Transitional Provisions

Article 30. On July 10, 1968, the National Assembly convened in Cairo shall replace the former Provisional National Assembly of the

Palestine Liberation Organisation, and exercise all the prerogatives allotted to it by this Constitution.

Article 31. The National Assembly shall sit for two years as from July 10, 1968. Should it prove impossible to hold elections for its successor, it shall meet and decide either to extend its term for another period or to form a new Assembly in such a manner as it may approve.

Article 32. The National Assembly alone is entitled to co-opt new members from time to time, as it sees fit, should this be desirable in view of the requirements of the battle for liberation and the need to strengthen national unity, in conformity with the provisions of the National Charter, in accordance with regulations to be drafted by the Executive Committee in the coming session.

## III. PLO ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

### 1. Central Agencies

#### a. Palestinian National Council (PNC)

The PLO "Parliament," selected from Palestinian terrorist organisations, national groups and unions throughout the region and abroad. Met annually in Jerusalem until 1967, thereafter in Cairo. Last met in Damascus (rather than Cairo, in view of Arab reaction to the Camp David Agreements) in January 1979, when it decided to expand its membership by nine to 301. It decided then to admit the PSF and PLF for the first time, giving them four seats between them. The PNC has however not yet agreed to the appointment to the Executive Committee of a PFLP representative, although this has been under discussion. At its January meeting the PNC approved the principle of working for an improvement in relations with Jordan by initiating a dialogue.

Khaled al-Fahoum                                Chairman (since July 1971).

#### b. Executive Committee

The Executive Committee takes decisions on the implementation of policy, as decided by the PNC. It meets whenever necessary; there are no hard and fast rules about frequency of meetings. 15 members, chaired by Yasser Arafat.

#### c. Central Council

Created in 1973 to link the PNC and the PLO Executive Committee. Meets every few months, usually in Damascus, and whenever an important issue arises. 55 members, including the Executive Committee.

Khaled al-Fahoum                                Chairman.

#### d. Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)

The PLO has had a regular army since 1964. In principle the PLA falls under the political authority of the PLO, and the PLO Executive Committee Chairman is the PLA Commander-in-Chief, but in practice PLA

contingents are dependent on host States. The PLA has about 4,000 regulars, the largest contingent being stationed in Syria and entirely under Syrian control. This led to difficulties in Lebanon in 1976 when PLA units were sent in to quell fighting and in some cases found themselves confronting Palestinian militias.

Yasser Arafat                         Commander-in-Chief, acting Chief-of-State.

### e. Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC)

The PASC was set up in 1969 within the PLO framework to act as a joint military co-ordinating body for Palestinian terrorist operations and activities. It replaced the ineffective Palestine Co-ordinating Council. Its role and functions have, however, decreased and it now acts as a military police force, keeping law and order within the refugee camps and the joint commando bases. Units sometimes appear in conflicts between Palestinians and the security authorities of host nations, for example in Lebanon in 1975-76, when the PASC helped to patrol the camps and participated in peace-keeping operations with the Lebanese authorities. It also tries to keep the peace between rival Palestinian factions.

Mustafa Dib Khalil                    Commander.
(Abu Ta'an)

### f. Support Bodies

A PLO Research Centre and Information Service was set up in Beirut in February 1965, and a Planning Centre in 1969. After a decision to unify the information media of all organisations, a Central Information Council was established. This operates the *Palestine News Agency* (WAFA) and publishes a weekly magazine, *Falastin ath-Thawra* (the Palestine Revolution), while the PLO Research Centre publishes books and issues a monthly journal, *Shu'un Filastiniya* (Palestinian Affairs). Radio stations called *Voice of Palestine* broadcast from several Arab countries, including Lebanon, Iraq and Algeria, frequently reflecting the views of host governments. *Voice of Palestine,* Baghdad, broadcasts the views of

the Rejection Front. Another PLO Agency is the Palestine Red Crescent Society.

| | |
|---|---|
| Majid Abu Sharar | Director, Information Council. |
| Dr Sabri Jiryis | Director, Research Centre. |
| Dr Fathi Arafat | Director, Palestine Red Crescent Society. |
| Munir Shafik | Director, PLO Planning Centre. |

### g. Palestine National Fund

Established 1964. Based in Damascus. Finance derives from official aid payments made by Arab governments under terms agreed at Arab summit meetings.

Dr Walid Muhammad Qamhawi           Chairman.

### 2. Leadership

#### Executive Committee (elected March 1977)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) | *Al-Fatah* | Chairman. |
| Faruq al-Qaddumi | *Al-Fatah* | Head of PLO Political Department. |
| Major General Muhammad Azzam | *As-Sa'iqa* | Deputy Secretary-General of *As-Sa'iqa*. Head of PLO Military Affairs Department. |
| Yasser Abd Rabbu | DFLP | Head of PLO Information Department. |
| Muhammad Abd al-Mohsen Abu Maizer | PNF | PLO's official spokesman and Head of Department for National, Pan-national and Returnees' Affairs. |
| Hamed Abu Sitta | Independent | Head of PLO Occupied Homeland Department. |
| Abd al-Jawad Saleh | PNF | Deputy Head of PLO Occupied Homeland Department. |
| Abdul Rahim Ahmed | ALF | Secretary-General of ALF and Head of PLO Popular Organisations Department. |
| Dr Walid Muhammad Qamhawi | PNF | Chairman of Palestine National Fund. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi | Independent | Secretary of Committee and Head of PLO Administration Department. |
| Majdi Abu Ramadan | Independent | Head of PLO Social Affairs Department. |
| Habib Qahwaji | Independent | Member of PLO Occupied Home-land Committee. |
| Talal Naji (Abu Jihad Talal) | PFLP-GC | Head of PLO Higher Education Department. |
| Alfred Tubasi | Independent | Member of PLO Occupied Home-land Committee. |
| Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajjani | Independent | Head of PLO Education and Culture Department. |

## IV.  TERRORIST GROUPS WITHIN PLO

### 1.  *Al-Fatah*

The Palestine National Liberation Movement (*Harakat Tahrir Falastin*— its Arabic initials reversed from "*Fatah*", meaning "Victory"). *Al-Fatah* has consistently been the dominant group within the PLO, with by far the largest membership. It remains the most influential faction.

#### a.  Origins

*Al-Fatah's* origins can probably be traced back to 1959 when groups of young Palestinians took part in terror operations in Gaza. The movement was formally established in 1962 as a sabotage group, but it did not come to prominence until after the Six-Day War in 1967 and Yasser Arafat's assumption of the leadership in 1968.  It joined the PLO in 1968 and gained control in 1969.  Its Intelligence Organisation, *Jihaz ar-Rasd,* is believed to have operated a clandestine terrorist wing called *Black September* (BSO) between 1971-74.

#### b.  Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) | Chairman of the Central Committee. |
| Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) | Deputy leader. |
| Faruq al-Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) | Head of PLO Political Department. |
| Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) | Secretary of the Central Committee. |
| Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) | Central Committee member. Commander of *Al-Fatah* forces with HQ in Damascus. |
| Hail Abdul Hamid (Abu Hawl) | Central Committee member. |

#### c.  Structure

10-man Central Committee; 40-man Revolutionary Council; Intelligence Organisation, and a General Command for military activities.

#### d.  Aims and Ideology

*Al-Fatah* demands complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories; recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights,

including the right to self-determination and Statehood in accordance
with the UN Charter; and implementation of UN Resolutions on Palestine,
including the Palestinians' right to repatriation and the formation of
an independent State.

It is concerned with preventing the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or
any other evacuated territory from again falling into non-Palestinian
hands, and calls for the setting up of a "national authority" (or
Palestinian State) on whatever part of Palestine Israel may evacuate.
This State would pursue the struggle for the liberation of the rest of
Palestine, though Al-Fatah's leaders have been ambiguous on this point.

### e. Outside Support

Financed largely by Arab States and contributions from the Pales-
tinian diaspora.

The Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries including
Cuba have given political, material and military support and training.

### f. Activities

Al-Fatah increased operations against Israel after the 1967 Arab
defeat, crossing the cease-fire lines in Jordan and Syria and carrying
out terror raids inside Israel and the occupied territories. Minor
incursions were also mounted from Lebanon. The build-up of militia
forces--mainly Al-Fatah--in Lebanon and Jordan, and the Israeli
reprisals which followed their activities, began to threaten the
internal stability of these countries. War broke out between Al-Fatah
and the Jordanian Government in September 1970. Many Al-Fatah members
were killed and the considerable presence in Jordan was ended. Since
King Hussein's acceptance of the PLO as the sole legitimate represen-
tative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat Summit in October 1974,
leaders of Al-Fatah have been involved in steps to improve relations
with Jordan: talks following the Baghdad Summit of October 1978 re-
sulted in agreement on future cooperation, the upgrading and expansion
of the PLO office in Amman and the disbursement of all assistance to
the occupied territories through Jordanian Government channels.

In Lebanon, the uneasy Palestinian presence was intended to be
regulated by the Cairo Agreement of November 1969 and the Melkart
protocols of May 1973. Matters came to a head in the Civil War of
1975-76, during which Al-Fatah members played a leading role in nego-
tiations aimed at ending the fighting. Since then Al Fatah's main
concern has been to ensure a continuing Palestinian presence relatively
independent of Syrian control in Lebanon. The policy of conciliation
has led to internal rifts within the organisation, especially in the
wake of the Israeli invasion of March 1978 and the establishment of
UNIFIL.

Black September operations from 1971 to 1974 took place mainly
outside the Arab world. According to a statement issued in Beirut
in December 1974, the organisation was suspended by Al-Fatah. Its
operations included the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister,
Wasfi Tal, in Cairo (November 1971); the hijacking of a Belgian air-
liner to Tel Aviv (three terrorists were killed by Israeli security
forces at Lydda (Lod) Airport (May 1972)); the killing of Israeli
athletes in the Olympic village at Munich (September 1972); sabotage
of oil installations in West Germany and the Netherlands (February
1972) and in Trieste (August 1972); seizure of the Israeli Embassy
in Bangkok and the holding of Israeli hostages (December 1972); an
attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, where three foreign
diplomats were killed (March 1973); a grenade and gun attack at Athens
Airport, where five people were killed and 55 injured (August 1973).

Black September was also suspected of involvement in a plot--
foiled by the Moroccan authorities--to assassinate a number of Arab
Heads of State, including King Hussein, during the Arab Summit in
Rabat in October 1974.

Although the Al-Fatah leadership has concentrated for the last
few years on the political aspect of the Palestinian struggle, the
organisation has not renounced terrorist activity. Al-Fatah units
frequently claim responsibility for bombings in Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories. In March 1978 Al-Fatah claimed responsibility for
the raid on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road which precipitated the Israeli

invasion of South Lebanon. Following the Camp David Summit and again later, after the signature of the Egyptian/Israeli Peace Treaty, Yasser Arafat said he would step up terrorist activity in Israel and the occupied territory. He also threatened to attack American targets. There have been several bomb attacks in Israel since the signature of the Peace Treaty for which the PLO as a whole has claimed responsibility. Israel has continued to implement its policy of striking at Palestinian terrorists wherever and whenever it might be necessary by carrying out bombing raids against camps and villages in Lebanon. A cease-fire was however initiated by the United Nations in Southern Lebanon in September 1979, which PLO representatives confirmed on 4 October they would observe.

*Al-Fatah* personnel are used mainly by the PLO in staffing Palestinian offices abroad (over 50), but the group retains some independent representatives. *Al-Fatah* has links with left-wing groups abroad and has trained some of their members.

### g. Strength

*Al-Fatah*, the largest Palestinian organisation, is believed to have 8-9,000 regular fighters.

## 2. *As-Sa'iqa* (Thunderbolt)

### a. Origins

Began in October 1968 as the military wing of the *Vanguards of the Popular War for the Liberation of Palestine*, formed before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war with members from the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Palestine battalion of the Syrian Army.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Issam al-Qadi | Secretary-General |
| Sami al-Attari | |
| Major General Muhammad Azzam | |
| Colonel Saleh al Maani | |
| Majed Mohsen | |

### c. Aims and Ideology

Nationalist, pro-Syrian Ba'athist, it opposes the Rejection Front groups and regards itself as a rival to *Al-Fatah*. Its identification with Syrian policy has meant support for the Palestine National Charter, the PLO's 1974 Phased Political Programme, and the concept of a State created on any part of Palestinian territory relinquished by Israel. It opposes the establishment of a government-in-exile, which would threaten Syrian influence in the Palestinian movement.

### d. Outside Support

Syria supports and finances the organisation. *As-Sa'iqa* forces are said to be augmented by Syrian troops. Although it was created partly as an alternative to *Al-Fatah*, the two organisations have usually cooperated.

### e. Activities

Relatively active in its early days, *As-Sa'iqa* was considerably weakened by a purge after Salah Jedid was ousted by Hafiz al-Assad in November 1970 (*As-Sa'iqa* was regarded as an arm of Jedid's faction of the Syrian Ba'ath Party) and has since carried out relatively few terror operations. After President Assad assumed power, the terrorists in Syria were prevented from engaging in activity from Syria against the Jordanian regime, but *As-Sa'iqa* was able to expand.

Although the organisation's leadership is opposed to international terrorism, members of *As-Sa'iqa* calling themselves *Eagles of the Palestine Revolution* attacked a train in Austria carrying Soviet jews *en route* to Israel in September 1971. In July 1979 the same group attacked and occupied the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara. After the arrival of a mediatory PLO team headed by Abu Firas from Damascus, the group surrendered.

*As-Sa'iqa* forces clashed with Lebanese security forces in 1969 and their activities were curtailed. Further trouble occurred in 1970 and in 1975-77, when *As-Sa'iqa*'s role as a Syrian instrument in the Lebanese civil war led to fighting with other Palestinian groups and calls for its expulsion from the PLO. The defection of Hanna Bathish, *Al-Sa'iqa*'s spokesman, failed to break up the organisation, while the dependence of

the PLO on Syria has assured *As-Sa'iqa* of continued influence in the
PLO.

Weekly journal: *At-Talia* (Vanguard).

### f. Strength

Believed about 2,000.

## 3. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

### a. Origins

The PFLP was formed in December 1967 when several small terrorist
groups associated with the Arab Nationalist Movement merged with the
ANM's Palestinian Special Group for Armed Struggle in the Occupied
Territories. This was set up before the June 1967 war and was led by
the ANM's founder, Dr Habbash. (Founded in the early 1950s, the ANM
had by 1967 adopted a Marxist-Leninist policy.)

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Dr George Habbash | Secretary-General. |
| Bassam Abu Sherif | The Front's official spokesman and editor of its journal *Al Hadaf* (Aim). Regarded as deputy leader. |
| Ahmed Yamani (Abu Maher) | Formerly PFLP representative on the PLO Executive Committee. |
| Taysir Qubbah | |

### c. Aims and Ideology

A Marxist organisation, it seeks to present the Palestinian problem
in the context of Western "imperialism." Before the DFLP emerged as an
independent organisation, the PFLP considered itself representative of
the Palestinian left wing. It upholds the 1968 Palestine National
Charter but has strong reservations about the Phased Political Programme
of 1974. The PFLP and the other members of the Rejection Front reject
any political settlement with Israel. There have been differences with
*Al-Fatah* over the question of hijackings and operations against foreign
"imperialist" interests. Dr Habbash has accused the PLO leadership of

cooperating with "capitulationist Arab regimes" which support a political
settlement. He has also condemned the Soviet Union for seeking a national
Palestinian authority only in part of Palestine. The PFLP opposes the
proposals for a Palestinian State in a "liberated" West Bank and Gaza
Strip, insisting on the "complete liberation of Palestine." Although it
remains a member of the PLO, which it joined in July 1971, the PFLP
withdrew from the Executive Committee in 1974 as the result of policy
differences. However, in late 1979, it agreed to re-join the Committee.
It heads the Rejection Front.

In 1973, Dr Habbash called for the establishment of a Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary party to lead the Palestine revolution. In
January 1976 he called for a wider Rejection Front to include the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and other "liberation"
movements. Neither call has met with any response.

### d. Outside Support

The PFLP is supported by Iraq, Libya, Algeria and the PDRY. It
is also attempting to mend fences with Syria. It claims links with
international "progressive" organisations and national liberation move-
ments. After the PFLP's adoption of a Marxist policy, Dr Habbash paid
visits to China, North Korea and the Soviet Union and seems to have
been persuaded to halt foreign operations, some of them carried out
with the help of organisations such as the Japanese Red Army. Latterly,
its opposition to a peaceful settlement has strained its relations with
the Soviet Union. (The Soviet *Literary Gazette* attacked Dr Habbash in
August 1974 as a "pseudo-revolutionary" who had been misled by "Maoist
demagogy" into thinking "peace and Socialism are incompatible.") How-
ever, a PFLP delegation led by Dr Habbash visited Moscow in November
1978.

### e. Activities

Although the Front aims to carry out terrorist strikes in Israel
and the occupied territories, its operations have mainly involved inter-
national hijackings. The PFLP was responsible in 1970 for hijacking
five aircraft, three being destroyed at Dawson's Field in Jordan; for
organising the Japanese Rengo Sekigun (United Red Army) radical group

which was responsible for killing 27 people at Lydda (Lod) Airport in May 1972, and for an attempt to blow up an oil installation in Singapore on 31 January 1974. Such operations were condemned by both supporters and opponents of the group, including China and the Soviet Union.

The PFLP now claims to have renounced foreign operations and hijackings some years ago--a decision which led to the defection of Dr Wadi' Haddad. Until his death in March 1978, he directed hijackings and foreign operations from Baghdad, without PFLP consent. His group, PFLP-Special Operations, claimed responsibility for the attack on an El-Al bus in London in August 1978 and have not renounced future terrorist action.

### f. Strength
Between 500-1,000.

## 4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC)

### a. Origins
A small terrorist group called the Palestine Liberation Front was created by Ahmed Jibril in 1959 to wage a terrorist war against Israel. After 1967 it joined with other groups, some associated with the Arab Nationalist Movement, to form "Section B" of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Jibril faction broke away in October 1968 to form the PFLP-General Command, claiming that there was too much emphasis on politics and too little on fighting.

The group seems to have joined the PLO just before the Palestine National Congress in June 1974. It then became a member of the Rejection Front, but was expelled in May 1977 because of its pro-Syrian leanings.

### b. Leadership
| | |
|---|---|
| Ahmed Jibril (Abu Jihad) | Secretary-General. |
| Talal Naji (Abu Jihad Talal) | Believed to be deputy leader. |
| Fadl Shrour | Member of the Front's Bureau; editor of its weekly magazine. |

### c. Aims and Ideology
A pseudo military organisation, the PFLP-GC continues to oppose a Middle East peace settlement except on Arab terms, but recognises that the establishment of a national authority is the guerrilla movement's tactical objective. In May 1974, Jibril said that the attack on Qiryat Shemona the previous month was aimed at bringing into existence a "new school of struggle based on the highest degree of revolutionary violence."

### d. Outside Support
Supported by Libya and Syria.

### e. Activities
The PFLP-GC claims to specialise in suicide operations and has made occasional raids into Israel. In May 1970, the group killed several schoolchildren in a rocket attack on an Israeli bus near the Lebanese border, an action deplored by Arafat and Habbash. In April 1974, the organisation attacked the Israeli village of Qiryat Shemona, killing 18 people; three people died in a follow-up attack on Shamir Kibbutz.

It publishes a weekly magazine in Lebanon entitled *Ilal-'Amam* (Forward), in Arabic and English.

### f. Strength
About 250 active members.

## 5. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Formerly known as the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

### a. Origins
The PDFLP was formed in 1969 when extreme left-wingers from the PLFP and the ANM broke away from their respective organisations. The rupture resulted in street fighting in Amman, with *Al-Fatah* intervening to restore peace. Dr Habbash was opposed to the PDFLP. He considered

that his PFLP represented the Palestinian left-wing, while Hawatmeh, the DFLP leader, accused him of betraying the Arab revolution.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Naif Hawatmeh | Secretary-General. |
| Yasser Abd Rabbu | Head of Information Department (believed to be deputy leader). |
| Samarra'i Qais (Abu Leila) | One of the Front's leading ideologists and member of its Executive Committee. |
| Abd al-Karim Hammad (Abu Adnan) | Member of Front's Political Bureau. |

### c. Aims and Ideology

Marxist-Leninist; it generally supports the policy of the PLO of which it is a member.

It is the only Palestinian terrorist group which subordinates armed struggle to political struggle; and it seeks to present (as does the PFLP) the Palestinian problem in the context of Western imperialism, maintaining that the Palestinian liberation struggle is inseparable from the liberation struggle in the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It accepts the 1968 Palestine National Charter and the 1974 Phased Political Programme. Like *Al-Fatah*, it is concerned with preventing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or any other Palestinian territory evacuated by Israel, from again falling into non-Palestinian hands. It was also the first organisation to advocate a "national authority" in such territory. With *Al-Fatah* and *As-Sa'iqa* it produced a working paper in 1974 on the establishment of an "independent national presence" in liberated territories and on participation in the Geneva talks.

The DFLP has sometimes allied itself with the "Rejection Front"; for example in May 1978 it joined Rejectionist groups in a statement condemning PLO policy in Lebanon and criticising the way in which decisions are made within the PLO. The DFLP has submitted its own plan for Palestinian unity to the Central Council. It was among the first to support the principle of Jewish national rights inside a liberated Palestine and has called on all "progressive Israelis and Jews" to merge in one popular Palestinian front.

Hawatmeh took the initiative, in the DFLP's view, of sending a "peace message" to Israel when he granted an interview to an American journalist, published in the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Aharanot* in March 1974.

### d. Outside Support

DFLP is the only Palestinian terrorist organisation to have links with anti-Zionist Marxist Israelis within Israel, and to have held meetings with them. It has links with several revolutionary and liberation movements such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), is supported in Lebanon by the Organisation of Communist Action (OCAL), led by Mohsen Ibrahim, and has links with student groups in Europe, America and the Soviet Union.

It maintains close links with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) leadership and has an office in Aden. Hawatmeh is an occasional visitor to Libya.

It is supported by the Soviet Union, from which it has received aid. Hawatmeh has visited Moscow, both as head of DFLP delegations invited by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and as a member of Yasser Arafat-led PLO delegations. Good relations are also maintained with China, which has trained DFLP members and received frequent delegations.

### e. Activities

The Front opposed the PFLP policy of international terrorism and has not been involved in any major operation outside Israel and the occupied territories. In May 1974, however, to coincide with the 26th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, the group claimed responsibility for the attack on a school in the Israeli village of Ma'alot--"to torpedo Dr Kissinger's plans" for settlement of the Middle East crisis, according to Hawatmeh. The Front also claimed responsibility for the attack on an apartment block in Beit She'an in November 1974, when it demanded the release of 14 "freedom fighters," including Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem (at the time imprisoned in Israel for allegedly aiding *Al-Fatah*). These and other attacks have

resulted in Israeli reprisals against refugee camps and villages in
Lebanon which were thought to harbour terrorists.

### f. Strength

Probably numbers about 1,000.

## 6. Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)

### a. Origins

An offshoot of the Popular Liberation Forces (commando force of
the Palestine Liberation Army) formed in Jordan in about 1968. Its
members briefly joined *Al-Fatah* in 1971 when it was temporarily sus-
pended after a clash with elements of the PASC, but since the October
1973 war it has reasserted its independence.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Bahjat Abu Garbiyya | Leader. |
| Dr Samir Ghusha | Deputy leader (is effective leader as Garbiyya has relin-quished most active duties due to age and ill health). |

### c. Aims and Ideology

A nationalist organisation (it has been described as "Nasserist"),
its policy is one of rejection of any negotiated settlement. Garbiyya
was a signatory of a memorandum published on the eve of the June 1974
PNC meeting in Cairo rejecting efforts for a peaceful Middle East
settlement, the Geneva Conference and UN Security Council Resolution
242. He said that the call to establish a Palestinian State on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be rejected. A member of the
Rejection Front.

### d. Outside Support

Has close links with Iraq.

### e. Activities

Mainly propaganda; no information on specific strikes which have
been carried out by PPSF.

### f. Strength

About 200.

## 7. Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

### a. Origins

A small group created by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party early in 1969
to rival *As-Sa'iqa*, which is closely linked with the Syrian Ba'ath
Party. Iraqi Ba'ath Party members take part in the ALF's political
and military structure.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Abd al-Rahim Ahmed | Secretary-General. |

### c. Aims and Ideology

Iraqi Ba'athist. According to the Front's first statement its
purpose is to give the terrorist movement a Pan-Arab framework. It
has insisted that any inter-terrorist relationship must be based on
rejecting plans for an Arab-Israeli settlement. A member of the
"Rejection Front."

### d. Activities

Co-ordinated operations are rare, though individuals have partici-
pated in raids. In June 1975 the ALF claimed responsibility for the
attack on the Israeli village of Kfar Yuval. The ALF has been active
in Lebanon as an instrument of Iraqi policy.

Publishes a magazine: *al-Tha'ir al Arabi*.

### e. Strength

About 500.

## 8. Palestine National Front in Occupied Territories (PNF)

### a. Origins

The establishment of a Palestine National Front in the Occupied territories was called for by the PNC at its 11th session in January 1973, and it was founded on 15 August 1973 under the aegis of the banned Jordanian Communist Party (JCP). As the only active Palestinian organisation operating clandestinely in the West Bank, it attracted widely-based popular support which tended to minimise the influence of the JCP.

### b. Leadership

Some leading members were expelled from the West Bank in December 1973 and joined the PLO Executive Committee. Leaders remaining in the West Bank are never named.

| | |
|---|---|
| Muhammad Abd al-Mohsen (Abu Maizer) | Member of the PLO Executive Committee and PLO official spokesman. |
| Dr Walid Qamhawi | Member of the PLO Executive Committee. |
| Abd al-Jawad Saleh | Member of the PLO Executive Committee. |

### c. Aims and Ideology

Considers itself an integral part of the PLO. The three members (expelled from the West Bank in 1973) who were elected to the PLO Executive Committee are regarded as moderates and support Arafat.

### d. Activities

The Front played an important role before and after the October 1973 war in the Arab boycott of Israeli elections. After the October war it campaigned for recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

The PNF sent a message to the PLO Executive Committee in September 1974 supporting the Phased Political Programme. PNF leaders expelled from the West Bank have spoken in favour of an independent State in

the West Bank and Gaza and of participation in the Geneva Conference. The Front has been largely dormant since 1975-76 following activity by the Israeli security forces which drove its supporters underground. In May 1979 however an agreement was reported between *Fatah*, the PFLP, PFLP-GC and the Palestine Communist Party to reactivate the PNF in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

## 9. Black June Organisation

### a. Origins

Formed in 1976 in protest at the incursion of Syrian forces into Lebanon to stop the fighting.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) | Former member of *Al-Fatah* and its representative in Baghdad, who has since been condemned to death in his absence by an *Al-Fatah* military tribunal. Formed an *Al-Fatah* rejectionist command in Baghdad called *Fatah-- the Revolutionary Council*. |

### c. Structure

Based in Baghdad, it consists mainly of former members of *Al-Fatah* who oppose political moves to end the Arab-Israeli dispute and the leadership's conciliatory posture in Lebanon.

### d. Aims and Ideology

A dissident terrorist group which aims to destroy the current policy of the PLO and, probably, its leadership. Also acts against Syrian targets in the Middle East and abroad.

### e. Activities

Although Black June at first concentrated on Syrian targets, it later widened its attacks to PLO officials. Attacks on the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus and the Inter-continental Hotel in Amman, 1976; assassination attempts on Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, during one of

which (in 1977) the United Arab Emirates Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs was killed; assassination of PLO London representative Said
Hammami in January 1978; assassination of PLO Kuwait representative
Ali Yassin in June 1978; assassination of PLO Paris representative
Izz ad-Din Qalaq and his assistant Adnan Hammad in August 1978; attack
on PLO office in Islamabad in which four people died in August 1978.

In late 1978 agreement was reached between *Black June* and *Al-Fatah*
to halt assassination attacks against each other's organisations. Since
then Abu Nidal and his organisation have been kept in the background
by the Iraqi regime.

### f. Strength

Believed to be about 500, including students in Europe and else-
where.

## 10. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

### a. Origins

Split from the PFLP-GC in 1977 in protest at the latter's alleged
collusion with Syria in the Lebanon.

### b. Leadership

| | |
|---|---|
| Tala'at Yaqub | Secretary-General. |
| Abu'l Abbas | Assistant Secretary-General and is effective leader. |

### c. Aims and Ideology

Opposes *Al-Fatah*'s policy of conciliation and cooperation with
UNIFIL forces in the Lebanon. Member of the Rejection Front.

### d. Outside Support

Supported by Iraq.

### e. Activities

The PLF is active in Lebanon. In July 1978, members of the PLF
kidnapped 51 members of UNIFIL; in the ensuing battles with *Al-Fatah*

a number of PLF members were killed. Armed clashes occur regularly.
The military command of the PLF narrowly escaped death in August 1978
when the nine-story apartment bloc in which it had been meeting was
demolished in an explosion which killed more than 180 people. *Al-Fatah*
appears determined to close down as many PLF offices as possible. The
PLF claimed responsibility for a raid on the Northern Israeli coastal
town of Nahariya on 22 April 1979 when four Israelis died.

### f. Strength

About 250.

## V. PLO REPRESENTATION ABROAD

The PLO seeks to maintain a Palestinian presence in as many countries as possible. The number of PLO offices increased noticeably after the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat in October 1974, when the PLO was recognised as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, and after the PLO had been granted permanent observer status at the United Nations in November 1974.

PLO offices enjoy diplomatic status in most of the Arab League States and in some Muslim countries. Elsewhere the level of representation is generally an information office or a representative working from the local Arab League office.

Most East European countries deal formally with the PLO through party rather than government channels. In the Soviet Union, the PLO office is accredited to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee; the PLO representative, however, enjoys the same rights and privileges as an ambassador of a foreign country.

### 1. ARAB LEAGUE STATES

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
|---|---|---|
| Algeria | Faruq Yunis | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Bahrain | | Office; branch of Doha office, no diplomatic status. |
| Egypt | Jamal Sourani (expelled following PLO criticism of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem). Said Kamal | Office; diplomatic status. This office has been closed since April 1979. |
| Iraq | Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) In April 1979 it was reported that he would be replaced by Abu Akran. | Nominally official PLO office but in practice supports Rejection Front; no diplomatic status but officially recognised by Ba'ath Party. Has however been kept in the background since Arab summit. |
| Jibuti | | Office. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Jordan | Brig Abd al-Razzak Yahya Abdul Jawad Saleh | Office. |
| Kuwait | Awni Battash Salim Za-nun (PLO Regional Representative for the Gulf). | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Lebanon | Shafiq al-Hut | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Libya | Suliman al-Shurafa (Abu Tariq) | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Mauritania | Midhat Saidam | Office. |
| Morocco | Abu Marwan | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Qatar | Yassin al-Sharif | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Saudi Arabia | Dr Husam Abu Sha'ban | *Al-Fatah* office; no diplomatic status. |
| Somalia | Muhammad Abdul Aziz | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Sudan | Kheir al-Din Abdul Rahman | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Syria | Muhammad al-Khalidi | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Tunisia | Hakam Balawi | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| United Arab Emirates (UAE) | Ribhi Awad | Office at Abu Dhabi; diplomatic status. |
| Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) | Muhammad Nasr | Office. |
| Yemen, People's Democratic Republic (PDRY) | Abbas Zaki (Mashal) | PLO (diplomatic) and *Al-Fatah*, PFLP and DFLP (*de facto* diplomatic) offices. |

(There is no representative in Oman).

### 2. AFRICAN STATES

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
|---|---|---|
| Angola | Abu Fahd | Office. |
| Burundi | | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Chad | | Office. |
| Congo | Abu Hadi | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Ethiopia | Khair al-Din Abdul Rahman | Office. |
| Gambia | | Office; partial diplomatic status. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Guinea | | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Guinea Bissau | Mahmud Khalaf | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Ivory Coast | | Representative. |
| Kenya | Salah Zawawi | Representative. |
| Madagascar | | Office. |
| Mali | | Office. |
| Mozambique | Hani ash-Shawa | Office. |
| Senegal | Ibrahim Tari | Office; quasi-diplomatic status. |
| Tanzania | Fuad Bitar | Office in Dar es Salaam; diplomatic status. Permission given for office in Zanzibar. |
| Uganda | Khalid al-Sheikh | Office; diplomatic status. |

(Agreement obtained in 1977 for offices in Zambia and Cameroon).

## 3. THE AMERICAS

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
|---|---|---|
| Brazil | Farid Sawan | Representative. Works from Arab League office. |
| Canada | Abdullah Abdullah | Representative. Works from Arab League office. |
| Cuba | Dr Isam Salem (may have been replaced: see GDR) | Office; *de facto* diplomatic status. |
| Mexico | Marwan Daud Fikri Tahbub | Information Office. |
| Peru | Issam Buseiso | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| United States | Saadat Hassan (New York) | Information Office. |
| | Hatem Husseini (Washington) | Information Office. |
| Venezuela | | Agreement to open an office obtained in September 1979. |

## 4. ASIAN AND PACIFIC STATES

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh | Jasim Sadiq Buseiso | Office. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| China | Tayib Abdul Rahim Mahmud (also accredited to Kampuchea) Dr Sami Mussallam | Office; quasi-diplomatic status. |
| India | Faisal Uweida | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Iran | Hani al-Hassan | Office. |
| Japan | Fathi Abdul Hamid | Office. |
| Kampuchea | (see China) | |
| Laos | Musfafa Farini | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Malaysia | Abdul Moneim Ismail (Abu Riad) | Office; no diplomatic status. |
| North Korea | Marwan Hassan Abdullah | Office. |
| Pakistan | Yusuf Abdul Karim Abu Hantash (Abu Yacub) Islamabad | Office; diplomatic status. There is also an office in Karachi. |
| Sri Lanka | Muhammad Abu al-Adel | Office. |
| Vietnam | Ali Fayyad | Office. |

(Agreement to establish an office in Indonesia obtained May 1977; and for a representative with full diplomatic status in Afghanistan, June 1978).

## 5. SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
|---|---|---|
| Bulgaria | Awni Nazer | Office. |
| Czechoslovakia | Muhammad Aleri | Office; quasi-diplomatic status. |
| German Democratic Republic | May have been replaced by Dr Isam Salem | Office; accredited to the GDR Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. |
| Hungary | Abdul Rahim Abu Jallab | Office; accredited to Hungarian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. |
| Poland | Atef Abu Bakr | Office; quasi-diplomatic status; accredited to All-Poland Committee of the Front of National Unity. |
| Romania | Imad Abdin | Office; quasi-diplomatic status; believed to be accredited to the Central Committee. |

| Soviet Union | Muhammad Sha'ir | Office; accredited to the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. |
| Yugoslavia | Ibrahim al-Khatib | Office; no diplomatic status. |

## 6. WESTERN EUROPE

| Country | Representative | Type of Representation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | | See UNIDO. |
| Belgium | Naim Khader | Liaison and Information Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Cyprus | Zakaria Abdul Rahim (Abu Yahya) | Office; diplomatic status. |
| France | Ibrahim Sousse (see also UNESCO) | Information Office; no diplomatic status. |
| German Federal Republic | Abdullah Franji | Representative, working from Palestine Information Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Italy | Nimr Hammad | Representative; no diplomatic status. |
| Luxembourg | | Liaison Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Malta | Mourad Issa Bahlul (Abu Rika) | Office; diplomatic status. |
| Netherlands | Mahmud Salem Rabbani (concurrently Kuwaiti Honorary Consul) | Representative; no diplomatic status |
| Portugal | | Information Office. |
| Spain | Monzer al-Dajjani | Office; granted "official" status March 1977. |
| Sweden | Daud Qaloti | Information Office; no diplomatic status. |
| Turkey | Ribhi Hallum (Abu Firas) | Office; diplomatic status. |
| United Kingdom | Nabil Ramlawi | Representative; works from Arab League office; no diplomatic status. |

(Agreement to open office reached with Finland in February 1977).

## 7. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

| Organisation | Representative | Type of Representation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| United Nations | Zehdi Labib Terzi (New York) | Observer. |
| | Daud Barakat (Geneva) | Observer. |
| UNESCO | Ibrahim Sousse (Paris) | Observer. |
| UNIDO | Ghazi Hussein (Vienna) | Observer. (Also represents the PLO in Austria). |

## VI. PLO INDEX OF PERSONALITIES

| Name | Organisation | Position |
|------|-------------|----------|
| ABBAS, Abu'l | PLF | Assistant Secretary-General of PLF and effective leader. Former Head of Information and official spokesman of PFLP-GC. |
| ABBAS, Mahmud (Abu Mazen) | Al-Fatah | Member of Al Fatah Central Committee. |
| al-ABD, Ibrahim | | Director, Palestine Research Centre. |
| ABD al-MOHSEN ABU MAIZER, Muhammad (see al-MOHSEN ABU MAIZER, Muhammad Abd) | | |
| ABD RABBU, Yasser | DFLP | Believed to be DFLP's Deputy Leader. Head of PLO Information Department and member of Executive Committee. |
| ABU ADNAN (see HAMMAD, Abdul Karim) | | |
| ABU AMMAR (see ARAFAT, Yasser) | | |
| ABU DAUD (see ODEH, Muhammad Daud) | | |
| ABU GARBIYYA, Bahjat | PPSF | Nominal leader of PPSF. Veteran West Bank politician and a former leader of the Ba'ath Party in Jordan. Elderly and in poor health. |
| ABU FANI (see HADDAD, Dr. Wadi') | | |
| ABU IYAD (see KHALAF, Salah) | | |
| ABU JIHAD (see JIBRIL, Ahmed) | | |
| ABU JIHAD (see al-WAZIR, Khalil) | | |
| ABU JIHAD TALAL (see NAJI, Talal) | | |
| ABU LEILA (see QAIS, Samarra'i) | | |
| ABU LUTF (see al-QADDUMI, Faruq) | | |

| Name | Organisation | Position |
|------|-------------|----------|
| ABU MAZEN (see ABBAS, Mahmud) | | |
| ABU NIDAL (see al-BANNA, Sabri) | | |
| ABU RAMADAN, Majdi (see RAMADAN, Majdi Abu) | | |
| ABU SHERIF, Bassam | PSLP | Regarded as deputy leader of PLFP, its official spokesman and editor of its journal, Al Hadaf. |
| ABU SA'ID (see al-HASSAN, Hani) | | |
| ABU SITTA, Hamed | Independent | PLO Executive Committee member and Head of its Occupied Homeland Dept. |
| ABU TA'AN (see KHALIL, Mustafa Dib) | | |
| ABU ZAIM (see FA'IZ, Atallah Atallah) | | |
| AHMAD, Abd al-Rahim | ALF | Secretary-General of ALF. PLO Executive Committee member and Head of Popular Organisations Department. |
| ARAFAT, Yasser (Abu AMMAR) (real name Abdul Rahman Abdul-Raouf Arafat Al-Qudwa Al-Husseini) | Al-Fatah | Chairman of Al-Fatah Central Committee and PLO Executive Committee. C-in-C of PLA. Born in Jerusalem in 1929 of a well-known family. Studied in Cairo and received some military training there. After the battle of Karameh, Jordan, on 21 March 1968, when Al-Fatah forces helped repulse the Israelis, he emerged as its spokesman. |
| al-ATTARI, Sami | As-Sa'iqa | Deputy Secretary-General of As-Sa'iqa, Deputy Chairman and Secretary of PLO Central Council and member of Syrian Ba'ath Party International Command. |
| AZHERI, Ahmad | | One of Arafat's closest advisers. |
| al-BANNA, Sabri (Abu Nidal) | Black June | Based in Baghdad. Sentenced to death by Al-Fatah in 1974. Heads a small group mostly composed of Rejection Front sympathisers drawn from Al-Fatah. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| al-BUDEIRI, Misbah | PLA | Self-styled Chief-of-Staff of the PLA. |
| al-DAJJANI, Dr Ahmad Sidqi | Independent | Member of PLO Executive Committee and Head of Education and Culture Department. |
| al-FAHOUM, Khaled | | Chairman of PNC and Central Council. |
| FA'IZ, Atallah Atallah (Abu Zaim) | *Al-Fatah* | One of Yasser Arafat's military advisers. |
| GARBIYYA, Bahjat Abu (see ABU GARBIYYA, Bahjat) | | |
| GHUSHA, Dr Samir | PPSF | Nominal Deputy Leader of PPSF; effective leader owing to Abu Garbiyya's age and ill health. |
| HABBASH, Dr George | PFLP | Secretary-General of PFLP; *de facto* leader of the Rejection Front. Born in Lydda in 1936 of a Greek Orthodox family. Educated in Jerusalem and the American University of Beirut, where he studied medicine. |
| HADDAD, DR Wadi' (Abu Hani) | PFLP | Head of PFLP Foreign Operations Group until reported expulsion in late 1975. Operated independently from Baghdad before his death in March 1978. |
| HAIL, Abdul Hamid (Abu Hawl) | *Al-Fatah* | A leading member of the *Fatah* Central Committee. |
| HAMMAD, Abd al-Karim (Abu Adnan) | DFLP | Member of DFLP's Political Bureau. |
| al-HASSAN, Hani (Abu Sa'id) | *Al-Fatah* | Political Adviser to Yasser Arafat. Brother of Khaled al-Hassan. PLO representative in Tehran. |
| al-HASSAN, Khaled | *Al-Fatah* | Member of *Al-Fatah* Central Committee. Brother of Hani al-Hassan. |
| HAWATMEH, Naif | DFLP | Secretary-General of DFLP. A Greek Catholic born in 1935 on the East Bank of the Jordan. Joined ANM in 1954. Graduated from the |

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| | | Arab University of Beirut with a degree in Philosophy and Social Sciences. Has written a book, *The Crisis of the South Yemen Revolution*. |
| al-HUT, Shafiq | *Al-Fatah* | Director of PLO Political Office, Beirut. |
| IBRAHIM, Mohsen | DFLP | Editor of DFLP's weekly journal *Hurriyeh* (Liberty) published in Lebanon. Leader of Organisation of Communist Action, Lebanon. |
| JIBRIL, Ahmed (Abu Jihad) | PFLP-GC | Secretary-General of PFLP-GC. Began his career in the Syrian Army. Born near Jaffa in 1936. Left for Syria with his family in 1948. |
| KAMAL, Muhammad Sa'id Wasfi | *Al-Fatah* | Deputy Director of PLO Political Department. |
| Al-KAYYALI, Dr Abd al-Wahab | ALF | Leader of ALF. |
| KHALAF, Salah (Abu, Iyad) | *Al-Fatah* | Leading Rejectionist and Deputy Leader of *Al-Fatah*. Believed to head its intelligence organisation. Head of PLO Security Section. |
| KHALIL, Mustafa Dib (Abu Ta'an) | PASC | Commander of the PASC. |
| MOHSEN, Zuhair | *As-Sa'iqa* | One-time Secretary-General of *As-Sa'iqa*. PLO Executive Committee member and Head of Military Affairs Department. Member of Syrian Ba'ath Party International Command and a former Syrian Army officer. Assassinated August 1979 in Cannes. |
| ABU MAIZER, Muhammad Abd al-Mohsen | PNF | PLO official spokesman and Executive Committee member. Head of Department for National, Pan-national and Returnees' Affairs. One of the leading PNF figures expelled from Jordan in 1973. |
| NAJI, Talal (Abu Jihad Talal) | PFLP-GC | Member of PLO Executive Committee. Head of PFLP-GC Higher Education Department and believed to be second in command overall. |

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| al-NASHASHIBI, Muhammad Zuhdi | Independent | Secretary of PLO Executive Committee and responsible for Administration Department. |
| ODEH, Muhammad Daud (Abu Daud) | Al-Fatah | Led opposition to Arafat in April 1978. Member of Revolutionary Council. |
| al-QADDUMI, Faruq (Abu Lutf) | Al-Fatah | PLO Executive Committee member and Head of Political Department. (PLO "Foreign Minister"). |
| al-QADI, Dr Issam | As-Sa'iqa | Secretary-General of As-Sa'iqa. Full member of the Syrian Ba'ath Pan-Arab Command, and Secretary of the Unified Palestinian Organisation office. |
| QAHWAJI, Habib | Independent | Member of PLO Executive Committee and Occupied Homeland Committee. |
| QAIS, Samarra'i (Abu Leila) | DFLP | Member of DFLP Executive Committee and a leading ideologist. |
| al-QALAQ, Izz ad-Din | | PLO representative in Paris until his assassination in August 1978. |
| QAMHAWI, Dr Walid Muhammad | PNF | Chairman of the Palestine National Fund and PLO Executive Committee member. |
| QUBBAH, Taysir | PFLP | Foreign Sphere Department, PFLP. |
| RABBU, Yasser Abd (see ABD RABBU, Yasser) | | |
| RAMADAN, Majdi Abu | Independent | Member of PLO Executive Committee and Head of Social Affairs Department. |
| SALAMEH, Ali Hassan | Al-Fatah | Leading member of Al-Fatah with responsibilities in the security field. Assassinated in Beirut, January 1979. |
| SALEH, Abd al-Jawad | PNF | PLO Executive Committee member and Deputy Head of Occupied Homeland Department. |
| SARTAWI, Dr Issam | | A leading diplomat. |
| SAYEGH, Dr Anis | | Former Director of Palestine Research Centre. |

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| SHAATH, Dr Nabil | Al-Fatah | Former Director of PLO Planning Centre. |
| SHARAR, Majid Abu | Al-Fatah | Director of PLO Central Information Council. Member of PLO Central Council and Secretary of Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council. |
| SHROUR, Fadl | PFLP-GC | Member of the Front's Political Bureau and editor of its weekly magazine Ilal-'Amam. |
| SHUQAIRY, Ahmed | | Former Chairman of PLO Executive Committee (1964-67). |
| SIDQI al-DAJJANI, Dr Ahmed | | See al-DAJJANI, Dr Ahmed Sidqi. |
| SITTA, Hamed Abu | | See ABU SITTA, Hamed. |
| SOURANI, Jamil | | Former PLO representative in Cairo and its accredited representative to the Arab League. |
| TUBASHI, Alfred | Independent | Member of PLO Executive Committee and Occupied Homeland Committee. |
| WARRAD, Faiq | | One-time leader of Al-Ansar (Partisan Forces), a Communist terror group. |
| al-WAZIR, Khalil | Al-Fatah | Member of Al-Fatah's Central Committee. Commander of Al-Fatah forces with HQ in Damascus. |
| YAMANI, Ahmed (Abu Maher) | PFLP | Was PFLP representative on PLO Executive Committee (Front not now represented). |
| YAQUB, Tala'at | PLF | Secretary-General of PLF. |
| YASSIN, Ali Nasser | | PLO representative in Kuwait until his assassination in June 1978. |

Appendix B

ISRAELI LEGISLATION ON COUNTERMEASURES

# LOCAL AUTHORITIES (REGULATION OF GUARD-SERVICE) LAW, 5721—1961*

**Definitions.**

1. In this Law —

"the officer-in-charge of the guard-service" means a person whom the Brigadier-in-Command or a person empowered by him has appointed to be the officer-in-charge of the guard-service: Provided that in a Command in which the guard-service is in the hands of the Police, the Brigadier-in-Command shall empower the person responsible on behalf of the Police for the guard-service in that Command to appoint an officer-in-charge of the guard-service;

"guard-service" includes exercises and any activity which in the opinion of the officer-in-charge of the guard-service is required for protecting the security of the inhabitants of a settlement or their property;

"local authority" means a municipality or a local council.

**Imposition of duty of guard-service.**

2. The Minister of the Interior may, after consultation with the Minister of Defence, impose, by order, the duty of guard-service on the inhabitants of any settlement or settlements (the order being hereinafter referred to as a "guard order"), and an order as aforesaid shall not require publication in *Reshumot*.

**Regulation of guard-service by bye-law.**

3. Where a guard order has been made, the local authority in the area of which the settlement or settlements to which the guard order relates is or are situated shall regulate, by bye-law, the fulfilment of the duty by the inhabitants, including prescribing the ages and categories of those liable to guard-service, the times of guard-service and the procedure for exemption from the duty of guard-service. Subject to the provisions of section 16, there shall apply to a bye-law under this section, in the case of a municipal corporation, the provisions of section 99 of the Municipal Corporations Ordinance, 1934[1]), and, in the case of a local council, the provisions of section 9 of the Local Councils Ordinance, 1941[2]).

**Regulation by order of the Minister of the Interior.**

4. Where a guard order has been made for a settlement not situated in the area of a local authority, or where the local authority has not made a bye-law as referred to in section 3, the Minister of the Interior

shall regulate the guard-service by order (such an order being hereinafter referred to as a "regulating order").

**Guard authority.**

5. (a) In a bye-law regulating the guard-service, the local authority shall designate a guard authority or guard authorities for the region to which the bye-law applies and shall define its or their powers and area or areas of operation.

(b) Pending the establishment of a guard authority in a particular region or, where the authority has ceased to operate, pending the establishment of a new authority, the functions of a guard authority shall be carried out by the officer-in-charge of the guard-service or by a person acting on his behalf in that region.

**Implementation of regulation.**

6. Guard-service under a bye-law or regulating order shall be in accordance with the directions of the officer-in-charge of the guard-service.

**Limitation of duty as to age and sex.**

7. The duty of guard-service shall only be imposed on a male person of the 18—55 age-group.

**Limitation of duty from health point of view.**

8. (a) The duty of guard-service shall only be imposed on a person who is fit for it from the point of view of health.

(b) A person who has not completed his fiftieth year shall be presumed to be fit for guard-service so long as the contrary has not been proved in such manner as the Minister of the Interior shall in consultation with the Minister of Health prescribe. The fitness for guard-service of a person who has completed his fiftieth year shall be determined by a medical examination carried out in such manner as the Minister of the Interior shall in consultation as aforesaid prescribe

(c) The guard authority shall excuse a person from guard-service on a particular night if it is satisfied that he is not capable of doing guard-service that night or if a medical certificate to that effect has been submitted to it.

**Limitation of duty in regard to time.**

9. (a) A person shall not be required to do guard-service for more than two nights in any one month, nor for an aggregate of more than twelve hours in any one month during the period between the 1st Tishri and the 30th Nisan or eight hours in any one month during the period between the 1st Iyar and the 29th Elul, unless the Brigadier-in-Command sees fit to direct, for security reasons, generally or in respect of a particular settlement or several settlements, that the number of hours or nights be increased (such a direction being in this section referred to as an "extension direction").

(b) An extension direction shall be valid for thirty days unless the Minister of Defence, after consultation with the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, approves an additional period of validity.

(c) An extension direction shall not require publication in *Reshumot*.

**Voluntary guard-service.**

10. A person not liable to guard-service under this Law may volunteer for guard-service, in writing, and a person liable for guard-service may volunteer as aforesaid for guard-service additional to that to which he is liable, and the guard-service or additional guard-service shall thereupon, to all intents, be deemed to be by virtue of the bye-law or regulating order, and the person in question shall have all the rights and duties laid down by this Law.

**Guard-service duty subject to defence service duty.**

11. The duty of guard-service under this Law shall be subject to the duty of defence service under the Defence Service Law, 5719—1959 (Consolidated Version)[1].

**Objection committees.**

12. (a) The Minister of the Interior shall appoint objection committees for the purposes of this Law; the appointment of an objection committee may be general or for a particular region.

(b) Every objection committee shall consist of three persons. A judge, or a person inscribed on the Roll of Advocates, shall be appointed, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, to be the chairman of the committee; at least one of the members of the committee shall be a physician, and at least one shall be an inhabitant of a settlement on which a guard order has been imposed. State employees or members of the local authority concerned shall not form a majority on the committee.

**Objection.**

13. (a) A person who contends that the duty of guard-service has been unlawfully imposed on him may lodge objection with an objection committee.

(b) The lodging of objection shall not stay the fulfilment of the duty of guard-service unless the chairman of the committee otherwise directs.

**Objection committee — procedure and powers.**

14. (a) The Minister of Justice shall prescribe by regulations the procedure before an objection committee. An objection committee shall itself prescribe its procedure in so far as it has not been prescribed by regulations as aforesaid.

(b) An objection committee shall have the powers which may be conferred under sections 5 and 5A of the Commissions of Enquiry Ordinance[2].

(c) An objection committee may confirm the imposition of the duty, subject to conditions or unconditionally, or void it.

1) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 296 of 5719, p. 286; *LSI* vol. XIII, p. 328.
2) *Laws of Palestine* vol. I, cap. 21, p. 157 (English Edition).

**Benefits to persons injured.**

15. A person who fulfils a duty of guard-service under this Law and is injured in the course of fulfilling it shall be deemed to be a border victim, within the meaning of the Border Victims (Benefits) Law, 5717—1956[1]).

**Penalties.**

16. The local authority may prescribe in the bye-law, and the Minister of the Interior may prescribe by regulating order, that a person who contravenes any of the provisions of the bye-law or the order, as the case may be, shall be liable to a fine of 300 pounds or, if he has already been convicted of such an offence in the past, to imprisonment for a term of three months or to a fine of 300 pounds.

**Repeal.**

17. The Emergency Regulations (Regulation of Guard-Service in Settlements), 5716—1956[2]) (hereinafter referred to as "the expiring Regulations") and the Emergency Regulations (Regulation of Guard-Service in Settlements) (Extension of Validity) (No. 2) Law, 5721—1961[3]), are hereby repealed.

**Transitional provisions.**

18. (a) Where immediately before the coming into force of this Law a guard-service was maintained in any settlement by virtue of the expiring Regulations, a guard order under this Law shall be deemed to have been made in respect of such settlement.

(b) A bye-law which immediately before the coming into force of this Law was in force by virtue of the expiring Regulations shall be deemed to embody the changes arising from this Law.

**Implementation.**

19. The Minister of the Interior is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations for such implementation, including regulations prescribing rules as to the modes of appointment, composition and powers of guard authorities.

DAVID BEN-GURION
*Prime Minister*

HAIM MOSHE SHAPIRA
*Minister of the Interior*

YITZCHAK BEN-ZVI
*President of the State*

1) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 213 of 5717, p. 22; *LSI* vol. XI, p. 19.
2) *Kovetz Ha-Takkanot* No. 603 of 5716, p. 766.
3) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 339 of 5721, p. 12; *supra*, p. 128.

## LOCAL AUTHORITIES (REGULATION OF GUARD-SERVICE) (AMENDMENT No. 2) LAW, 5736—1976*

**Amendment of section 1.**

1. In section 1 of the Local Authorities (Regulation of Guard-Service) Law, 5721—1961[1]) (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Law") —

(1) the definition of "the officer-in-charge of the guard-service" shall be replaced by the following definition:

""officer-in-charge of the guard-service" means a person appointed under section 2 (b) to be an officer-in-charge of the guard-service";

(2) the following definition shall be added at the end:

"inhabitant" includes a person who lives in a settlement without being registered in the Population Register as an inhabitant thereof but who does not fulfil a duty of guard-service in another settlement.".

**Replacement of section 2.**

2. Section 2 of the principal Law be replaced by the following section:

"Responsibility for guard-service.

2. (a) The Government may decide that the guard-service in a particular area shall be in the hands of the Police (such an area hereinafter referred to as a "Police responsibility area").

(b) The Major-General-in-Command or a person empowered by him or, in a Police responsibility area, a District Police Commander or a person empowered by him may appoint an officer-in-charge of the guard-service.

(c) The Minister of the Interior may, after consultation with the Minister of Defence or, in respect of a Police responsibility area, after consultation with the Minister of Police, by order, impose a duty of guard-service on the inhabitants of any settlement or settlements (such an order hereinafter referred to as a "guard order").

* Passed by the Knesset on the 17th Shevat, 5736 (19th January, 1976) and published in *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 794 of the 27th Shevat, 5736 (29th January, 1976), p. 88; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in *Hatza'ot Chok* No. 1184 of 5735, p. 294.

1) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5721, p. 169 — *LSI* vol. XV, p. 184; *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5730, p. 130 — *LSI* vol. XXIV, p. 136.

(d) A decision of the Government under subsection (a) and a guard order shall not require publication in *Reshumot*.".

**Amendment of section 3.**

3. In section 3 of the principal Law, the words "section 99 of the Municipal Corporations Ordinance, 1934" shall be replaced by the words "Chapter Thirteen of the Municipalities Ordinance[1])" and the words "section 9 of the Local Councils Ordinance, 1941" shall be replaced by the words "Article Three of Chapter Two of the Local Councils Ordinance[2])".

**Amendment of section 7.**

4. In section 7 of the principal Law, the figure "55" shall be replaced by the figure "60".

**Amendment of section 8.**

5. In section 8 of the principal Law, subsection (c) shall be re-marked as subsection (d) and subsection (b) shall be replaced by the following subsections:

"(b) A person on whom a duty of guard-service has been imposed shall be presumed to be fit for guard-service so long as the contrary has not been proved in such manner as the Minister of the Interior shall in consultation with the Minister of Health prescribe.

(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (b), where a person has been found unfit for service or temporarily unfit for service under the Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5719—1959[3]), his fitness for guard-service under this Law shall be determined in the manner prescribed by the Minister of the Interior in consultation with the Minister of Health.".

**Replacement of section 9.**

6. Section 9 of the principal Law shall be replaced by the following section:

"Limitation of duty with regard to time.

9. A person shall not be required to do guard-duty more than twice a month, nor for an aggregate of more than ten hours in any one month in the period between the 1st Tishri and the 30th Nisan or eight hours a month in the period between the 1st Iyar and the 29th Elul, unless the Major-General-in-Command or a District Police Commander, as the case may be, deems it necessary for security reasons to direct generally or in respect of a particular settlement or several settlements that the number of hours or times be increased (such a direction being in this section referred to as an "increase direction").

1) *Dinei Medinat Yisrael* (Nusach Chadash) No. 8, p. 197; *NV* vol. I, p. 247.
2) *Dinei Medinat Yisrael* (Nusach Chadash) No. 9, p. 256; *NV* vol. I, p. 315.
3) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5719, p. 286; *LSI* vol. XII, p. 328.

(b)   An increase direction shall not be issued more than once a year and shall be valid for thirty days: Provided that the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Police, as the case may be, may, after consultation with the Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset approve additional periods of validity.

(c)   An increase direction shall not require publication in *Reshumot*.

(d)   The hours and days when a person fulfils a duty of protection service under the Emergency Regulations (Protection of Educational Institutions), 5734—1974[1]), shall be included in the computation of guard-duty under this section.".

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| Replacement of section 11. | 7.   Section 11 of the principal Law shall be replaced by the following section: |
| "Overriding duties. | 11.   A duty of service imposed on a person under the Civil Defence Law, 5711—1951[2]), or a duty imposed on a person under the Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5719—1959, supersedes a duty imposed on him under this Law.". |
| Amendment of section 16. | 8.   In section 16 of the principal Law, the opening passage, beginning with the words "shall be liable to a fine of 300 pounds" shall be replaced by the words "shall be liable to a fine of 1,500 pounds or, if he has already been convicted of such an offence in the past, to imprisonment for a term of three months or to a fine of 3,000 pounds". |
| Amendment of section 19. | 9.   Section 19 of the principal Law shall be re-marked as section 19 (a) and the following subsections shall be added thereafter: |

"(b)   The State shall bear the expenses of implementing this Law.

(c)   The amount of the expenses shall be in accordance with a budget approved by the Minister of the Interior after consultation with the Minister of Finance.".

YITZCHAK RABIN
*Prime Minister*

YOSEF BURG
*Minister of the Interior*

EFRAYIM KATZIR
*President of the State*

1)   *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5735, p. 18; *LSI* vol. XXIX, p. 25.
2)   *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5711, p. 78; *LSI* vol. V, p. 72.

## EMERGENCY REGULATIONS (PROTECTION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS) (EXTENSION OF VALIDITY) LAW, 5735—1974 *

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| 1.   The validity of the Emergency Regulations (Protection of Educational Institutions). 5734—1974[1]), in the form set out in the Schedule, is hereby extended until the 21st Tammuz, 5735 (30th June, 1975). | Extension of validity. |
| 2.   The Minister of Education and Culture is charged with the implementation of the provisions of this Law. | Implementation. |
| 3.   This Law shall come into force on the 14th Kislev, 5735 (28th November, 1974). | Commencement. |

### SCHEDULE

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| 1.   In these Regulations — "the Minister" means the Minister of Education and Culture; "protection" includes exercises, comb-outs, guarding and any other activity which in the opinion of the officer-in-charge is required for the protection of educational institutions; "officer-in-charge" means a person appointed by the Minister to be responsible for the protection of educational institutions for the purposes of all or part of these Regulations; "institution" means a kindergarten, an elementary school, a *talmud tora*, a junior high school, a post-elementary school, a supplementary educational institution, a children's summer camp, a youth culture and sports centre, a boarding school and every other institution at which education is provided. | Definitions. |
| 2.   The officer in charge may impose the duty of protection service on students of an institution who have completed their sixteenth year, parents of students and the principal, teachers and other staff of an institution. | Imposition of duty of protection service. |

*   Passed by the Knesset on the 12th Kislev, 5735 (26th November, 1974) and published in *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 750 of the 21st Kislev, 5735 (5th December, 1974), p. 18; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in *Hatza'ot Chok* No. 1147 of 5734, p. 34.
1)   *Kovetz Ha-Takkanot* of 5734, p. 1902.

**Notice of imposition of duty.**

3. Notice of the imposition of the duty of protection service shall be given to the principal of an institution in writing, specifying the categories of persons liable thereto and the modes thereof. The principal shall give every person liable under the notice of the officer-in-charge reasonable advance notice, as the Minister may prescribe by rules after consultation with the Knesset Committee on Education and Culture, of the duty imposed on him, the times for its performance and the particulars of the activities to be carried out by him, and a person who has received notice as aforesaid shall comply therewith.

**Restrictions.**

4. (a) A parent shall not be required to perform protection service for more than ten hours in any one month.

(b) Where protection service involves the use of arms or activity at night, only a person liable to defence service under the Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5719—1959 [1], shall be liable therefor.

(c) A person who has been required to perform protection service at a particular time shall be exempt from performing it if at that time —

(1) he is a soldier, within the meaning of the Military Justice Law, 5715—1955 [2], under the Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5719—1959, or

(2) he is carrying out any task under the Civil Defence Law, 5711—1951 [3], or

(3) he is doing labour service under the Emergency Labour Service Law, 5727—1967 [4];

a person to whom paragraph (1), (2) or (3) applies shall inform the principal of the institution to such effect immediately upon receipt of the demand to perform protection service.

**Release from duty of protection service.**

5. The officer-in-charge or a person empowered by him in that behalf may release a person from the whole or part of the duty of protection service or defer its fulfilment if it appears to him that the person liable is not capable of performing it for reasons of health and a medical certificate to such effect has been submitted to him, or for other reasonable cause.

[1] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5719, p. 286; LSI vol. XIII, p. 328.
[2] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5715, p. 171, LSI vol. IX p. 184.
[3] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5711, p. 78; LSI vol. V, p. 72.
[4] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5727, p. 86; LSI vol. XXI, p. 82.

6. (a) The officer-in-charge may, in special cases and in accordance with rules prescribed by the Minister with the approval of the Knesset Committee on Education and Culture, direct that an institution shall be protected by paid guards within the limits of a budget approved for this purpose. Where the officer-in-charge does so, the Treasury shall defray the wages and other compulsory payments falling on the employer. **Voluntary and paid protection service.**

(b) A person not liable to protection service by virtue of these Regulations may volunteer for protection service in writing, and a person liable to protection service may volunteer as aforesaid for protection service additional to that to which he is liable; if he does so, he shall be treated as a person who fulfils a duty of protection service by virtue of these Regulations.

7. Where the officer-in-charge is of the opinion that installations should be provided at an institution for the purpose of protecting it, he may with the consent of the police and, if necessary, with budgetary approval from the Ministry of Education and Culture direct the local education authority, within the meaning of the Compulsory Education Law, 5709—1949 [1], in whose area of jurisdiction the institution is situated or the owners of the institution to provide the same, and the recipient of a direction as aforesaid shall be bound to carry it out. **Provision of installations.**

8. The Minister may direct the officer-in-charge to act within the framework of his powers if it appears to him that he has not done so. **Officer-in-charge to act within the framework of his powers.**

9. (a) A person who alleges that a duty of protection service has been improperly imposed on him may lodge objection with an objection committee. **Objection.**

(b) The lodging of objection shall not stay the fulfilment of the duty of protection service unless the chairman of the objection committee otherwise orders.

10. (a) A local authority shall, within the time prescribed by the Minister, appoint an objection committee for the purposes of these Regulations. Where the local authority does not appoint an objection committee within the said time, the Minister may appoint it. An objection committee may be appointed for the whole of the area of **Objection committees.**

[1] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5709, p. 287; LSI vol. III, p. 125.

jurisdiction of the local authority or for a particular educational institution.

(b) Every objection committee shall consist of three members.

(c) Sections 8 to 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729—196C [2], shall apply to an objection committee.

(d) The committee may confirm the imposition of the duty, subject to conditions or unconditionally, or rescind it.

**Pension for injured persons.**

11. (a) Where a person fulfils a duty of protection service by virtue of these Regulations and in the course of fulfilling it sustains an enemy-inflicted injury, within the meaning of the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970 [2], the injury shall be dealt with as an enemy-inflicted injury under the said Law.

(b) Where a person fulfils a duty of protection service by virtue of these Regulations and in the course of fulfilling it he sustains an injury other than an enemy-inflicted injury, the injury shall be deemed to be an employment injury under the National Insurance Law (Consolidated Version), 5728—1968 [3]. If it appears to the Minister and the Minister of Labour that it is necessary to adapt this regulation to the said Law, they may, by order, enact the provisions required therefor.

**Penalties.**

12. (a) A person who fails to fulfil a duty imposed on him by virtue of these Regulations or a request to provide installations under regulation 7 or obstructs the fulfilment of any such duty or request shall be liable to a fine of two thousand pounds.

(b) A person shall not be prosecuted under this regulation unless at the time of committing the offence he had completed his eighteenth year.

**Saving of laws.**

13. These Regulations shall not derogate from the provisions of any other law.

**Citation.**

14. These Regulations shall be cited as the Emergency Regulations (Protection of Educational Institutions), 5735—1974.

YITZCHAK RABIN    AHARON YADLIN
*Prime Minister*    *Minister of Education*
        *and Culture*

EFRAYIM KATZIR
*President of the State*

[1]  *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5729, p. 28; *LSI* vol. XXIII, p. 32.
[2]  *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5730, p. 126; *LSI* vol. XXIV, p. 131.
[3]  *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5728, p. 108; *LSI* vol. XXII, p. 114.

## VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION (PENSIONS) LAW, 5730—1970 *

1.    In this Law —                     **Interpretation.**

"enemy-inflicted injury" means —

(1) an injury caused through hostile action by military or semi-military or irregular forces of a state hostile to Israel, through hostile action by an organisation hostile to Israel or through hostile action carried out in aid of one of these or upon its instructions, on its behalf or to further its aims (all hereinafter referred to as "enemy forces");

(2) an injury inflicted by a person unintentionally in consequence of hostile action by enemy forces or an injury inflicted unintentionally under circumstances in which there were reasonable grounds for apprehending that hostile action as aforesaid would be carried out;

(3) an injury caused through arms which were intended for hostile action by enemy forces, or an injury caused through arms which were intended to counter such action even if they were not operated, other than an injury sustained by a person of the age of 18 years or over while committing a felony or some other offence involving wilfulness or culpable negligence;

"victim" means a person who has sustained an enemy-inflicted injury and who is one of the following:

(1) an Israel national or resident, whether the injury was sustained in Israel or outside it;

(2) a person who entered Israel under a visa or permit issued under the Entry into Israel Law, 5712—1952 [1], including a person who entered Israel while exempt from the requirement of a visa or permit under section 17 (a) of the said Law, or a person who entered Israel under one of the orders made by the Minister of the Interior by virtue of section 17 of the said Law and specified in regulations under that Law, all if the injury occurred in Israel or in some other area designated for this purpose by the Minister of Defence, by order, in respect of all or any classes of persons entering Israel.

* Passed by the Knesset on the 18th Tammuz, 5730 (22nd July, 1970) and published in *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 600 of the 26th Tammuz, 5730 (30th July, 1970), p. 126; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in *Hatza'ot Chok* No. 860 of 5730, p. 7.

[1]  *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5712, p. 354; *LSI* vol. VI, p. 159.

"arms" has the same meaning as in the Military Justice Law, 5715—1955 [1];

"the Insurance Law" means the National Insurance Law (Consolidated Version), 5728—1968 [2];

"the Institute" has the same meaning as in the Insurance Law;

"family member" of a victim —

(1) during the victim's lifetime — has the same meaning, *mutatis mutandis*, as in section 1 of the Invalids (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law (Consolidated Version), 5719—1949 [3] (hereinafter referred to as "the Invalids Law"): in paragraph 4 of the definition of "family member" in the Invalids Law, the words "and who was a dependant of the invalid immediately before the latter's enlistment for service" shall be deemed replaced by the words "and who was a dependant of the victim immediately before the injury"; and the terms "person incapable of earning his living", "brother", "income sufficient for a person's maintenance", "the determining wage", "destitute" and "self-supporting" shall, for the present purpose, have the same meaning, *mutatis mutandis*, as in section 1 of the Invalids Law and in the regulations made thereunder;

(2) upon the victim's death in consequence of the injury — has the same meaning, *mutatis mutandis*, as in the Fallen Soldier's Families (Pensions and Rehabilitations) Law, 5710—1950 [4] (hereinafter referred to as "the Soldiers' Families Law"); and the terms "person incapable of earning his living", "the determining day", "income sufficient for a person's maintenance", "the determining wage", "gratuity", "indigent" and "self-supporting", shall, for the present purpose, have the same meaning, *mutatis mutandis*, as in section 1 of the Soldiers' Families Law and in the regulations made thereunder;

"pension" includes any advantage to which a person is entitled under the Invalids Law or the Soldiers' Families Law, as the case may be.

**Presumption of enemy-inflicted injury.** 2. Where a person has been injured under circumstances affording reasonable grounds for believing that he has sustained an enemy-inflicted injury, the injury shall be regarded as enemy-inflicted unless the contrary is proved.

[1] *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5715, p. 171 ; *LSI* vol. XI, p. 184.
[2] *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5728, p. 108 ; *LSI* vol. XXII, p. 114.
[3] *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5719, p. 275 ; *LSI* vol. XIII, p. 315.
[4] *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5710, p. 162 ; *LSI* vol. IV, p. 115.

3. The provisions of Article Three of Chapter Three of the Insurance Law and the regulations made under such provisions shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to a victim. **Medical attendance, convalescence and rehabilitation.**

4. Where a degree of invalidity has been determined for a victim, as provided in section 5, the Institute shall pay him a pension as provided in section 6. **Pensions to invalids.**

5. The rules for the determination of the degree of invalidity in sections 61 (a), 62, 63, 64, 64A and 65 of the Insurance Law and in the regulations thereunder shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the determination of the degree of invalidity under this Law. **Determination of degree of invalidity.**

6. Sections 5, 6, 7, 7A, 8, 18(b) and (c), 22 and 44 of the Invalids Law shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the determination and calculation of a pension under this Law. **Pension and calculation thereof.**

7. Where an enemy-inflicted injury has caused the death of the victim, the family members shall be entitled to pensions, *mutatis mutandis*, as provided in sections 7, 8, 9, 9A, 10, 10A, 11, 12A, 13, 13A, 13B, 13C, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24, 29, 29A, 29B, 29C, 30 and 32 of the Soldiers' Families Law. **Pensions to family members.**

8. The status of a victim or a family member shall be the same as that of an invalid, within the meaning of the Invalids Law, or of a family member, within the meaning of the Soldiers' Families Law, for the purposes of every other enactment granting any advantage, exemption or reduction. **Status of victim or family member for purposes of other enactment.**

9. The Minister of Labour may — **Power of Minister to make and apply regulations.**

(1) with the approval of the Labour Affairs Committee of the Knesset make regulations as to all matters arising out of the provisions of sections 3 to 7, including regulations concerning the giving of loans and guarantees to a victim or the members of his family for creating or consolidating sources of livelihood or for purposes of housing — by way of tenancy or ownership — and the mode of repayment of such loans;

(2) by order, after consultation with the Labour Affairs Committee of the Knesset, apply *mutatis mutandis* all or part of the regulations made under the Invalids Law, including the provisions of Chapter Five of the Invalids (Medical Treatment) Regulations, 5714—1954 [1], or under the Soldiers' Families Law to victims and the members of their families.

10. (a) The Minister of Defence may, in consultation with the Minister of Labour, appoint a certifying authority (hereinafter referred **Appointment of certifying authority.**

[1] *Kovetz Ha-Takkanot* of 5714, p. 50.

to as "the authority") competent to certify that an injury which has occurred is enemy-inflicted. Notice of the address of the authority shall be published in *Reshumot*.

(b) The authority shall give its decision within three months from the day on which the claim reaches it, unless it decides to extend the period for special reasons which shall be recorded.

**Objection.**

11. (a) A person who considers himself aggrieved by a decision of the authority may appeal to the objections committee referred to in subsection (b).

(b) The objections committee shall consist of five members. Its chairman shall be a Judge appointed by the Minister of Justice, and the other members shall be appointed by the Minister of Defence in consultation with the Minister of Labour.

(c) Three members of the Committee, including the chairman, shall be a quorum.

(d) The objection shall be submitted in writing within 60 days from the day on which the committee's decision came to the knowledge of the objector.

(e) The decision of the objections committee shall be final.

(f) Notice of the address of the committee shall be published in *Reshumot*.

**Certification of enemy-inflicted injury.**

12. A certificate from the authority or the objections committee, as the case may be, that an injury which has occurred is enemy-inflicted shall be a pre-condition to every claim upon the Institute under this Law.

**Power of Labour Court.**

13. Subject to the provision of section 12, a Regional Court, within the meaning of the Labour Courts Law, 5729—1969 [1]) shall have exclusive power to hear any claim for a pension under this Law and any claim for the return of a pension erroneously or improperly paid.

**Representation before Court.**

14. In every claim under this Law against or by the State, the State shall be represented by the Institute through a person authorised for that purpose on behalf of the Institute.

**Applicability of Insurance Law.**

15. Chapter Three "A", Articles One and Two of Chapter Seven, and sections 196, 197 and 198, of the Insurance Law and the regulations made under such chapter, articles and sections, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* for the purposes of this Law.

**Pensions under this Law and benefits under Insurance Law.**

16. (a) A person entitled in consequence of one event to a pension under this Law and to a benefit under the Insurance Law may opt for

[1]) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5729, p. 70 ; *LSI* vol. XXIII, p. 76.

one of them ; but if he opts for a benefit under the Insurance Law, the part of the benefit which is in excess of the pension under this Law shall be on the account of the Institute, and the remainder of the benefit shall be on the account of the Treasury.

(b) A person entitled to a pension and a benefit as specified in subsection (a) shall opt for one of them within six months from the day on which the ground for the claim arose, and so long as he has not opted as aforesaid, he shall be paid a monthly pension under this Law. If within the said period he opts for a benefit under the Insurance Law, he shall be paid the benefit as from the day on which the ground for the claim arose, less the amounts paid to him as a monthly pension as aforesaid.

**Pensions under this Law and pensions or compensation under other Laws.**

17. (a) A person entitled to a pension under this Law on several grounds, or under this Law and under another Law under which the pension is payable out of the Treasury may opt for one of the pensions.

(b) The provisions of section 6 of the Invalids Law or section 21 of the Soldiers' Families Law, as the case may be, shall *mutatis mutandis* apply to a person entitled in consequence of one event to a pension under this Law and to compensation under the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version) [1]).

**Pensions out of the Treasury.**

18. (a) Pensions under this Law shall be paid out of the Treasury through the Institute.

(b) The Treasury shall indemnify the Institute, on its demand, for every expense incurred by it in paying a pension and for the proportionate part of the administrative expenses of the Institute arising out of the implementation of this Law.

**Scope of application.**

19. (a) This Law shall apply to a person who was injured by hostile action after the 25th Iyar, 5727 (4th June, 1967). A person entitled under this Law shall not be entitled to a pension under the Border Victims (Benefits) Law, 5717—1958 [2]) (hereinafter referred to as "the Border Victims Law").

(b) This Law shall not apply to an injury sustained by a person who belongs to or aids the forces of the enemy or acts upon their instructions or on their behalf or to further their aims.

**Transitional provisions.**

20. Where a person has received a benefit under the Border Victims Law in respect of a border injury sustained by him after the 25th Iyar, 5727 (4th June, 1967), such benefit shall be set off against the pension under this Law. However, where a person has lawfully received a pension under the Border Victims Law exceeding the pension due under this Law, the balance shall not be set off.

[1]) *Dinei Medinat Yisrael (Nusach Chadash)* No. 10, p. 266.
[2]) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5717, p. 22 ; *LSI* vol. XI, p. 19.

Implementation. 21. The Minister of Labour is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

Adaptations. 22. (a) The Laws referred to in the Schedule shall be amended as specified therein.

(b) The pensions officer referred to in the Invalids Law and the Soldiers' Families Law shall for the purposes of this Law be replaced by a claims officer, within the meaning of section 130 of the Insurance Law.

## SCHEDULE

### (Section 22)

1. In the Local Authorities (Regulation of Guard-Service) Law, 5721—1961 [1]), the following section shall be inserted after section 15 :

"Benefits to injured persons.

15A. A person who fulfilled a duty of guard-service under this Law and was injured in the course of guarding on or after the 26th Iyar, 5727 (5th June, 1967) shall be deemed to be a victim, within the meaning of the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970, and the provisions of that Law shall apply to him and his dependants.".

2. In the Civil Defence Law, 5711—1951 [2]), the following shall be added at the end of section 14B (a) :

"If a person called up as aforesaid was injured on or after the 26th Iyar, 5727 (5th June, 1967) in the course and in consequence of fulfilling his obligation, he shall be deemed to be a victim, within the meaning of the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970, and the provisions of that Law shall apply to him and his dependants.".

3. In section 168 (a) (3) of the Insurance Law, the following subparagraph shall be inserted after subparagraph (f) :

"(g) the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970.".

4. In the Income Tax Ordinance [3]), the words "or enemy-inflicted injury" shall be inserted after the words "or a border injury", in sec-

[1]) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5721, p. 169 ; *LSI* vol XV, p 184.
[2]) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5711, p 78 , *LSI* vol. V, p. 72.
[3]) *Dinei Medinat Yisrael (Nusach Chadash)* No. 6, p. 120 ; *NV* vol. 1, p. 145.

tion 36 (a) and the following definition shall be added at the end of section 36 (b) :

"enemy-inflicted injury" has the same meaning as in the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970.".

5. In the Border Victims Law, section 2 shall be re-marked as section 2 (a) and the following subsection shall be added thereafter :

"(b) A widow and orphan of a border victim shall be entitled to benefits under Chapter Three 1 of the National Insurance Law and the regulations made thereunder.".

GOLDA MEIR
*Prime Minister*

YOSEF ALMOGI
*Minister of Labour*

SHNEUR ZALMAN SHAZAR
*President of the State*

## VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION (PENSIONS) (AMENDMENT) LAW, 5733—1973 *

**Amendment of section 1.**

1. In the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970 [1] (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Law"), the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph (2) of the definition of "family member" :

"(3) a widower, within the meaning of section 74(b)(2) of the Insurance Law, even if the victim was not insured under Chapter Three of the said Law ;".

**Replacement of section 5.**

2. Section 5 of the principal Law shall be replaced by the following section :

**"Determination of degree of invalidity.**

5. (a) A physician or medical board appointed for the purposes of section 61 of the Insurance Law shall determine the degree of invalidity according to tests and rules laid down under section 10(b) of the Invalids Law.

(b) A person who considers himself aggrieved by a decision of a physician or medical board may lodge objection to it with the Medical Board of Objections appointed for the purposes of section 64 of the Insurance Law.

(c) The arrangements for determining the degree of invalidity under sections 62, 63 and 65 of the Insurance Law, the conditions for lodging objection under section 64 thereof, the conditions for filing appeal under section 64A thereof and the regulations under the said sections shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the determination of a degree of invalidity under this Law.".

**Amendment of section 6.**

3. In section 6 of the principal Law, the expression "20A" shall be inserted after the expression "18(b) and (c)".

* Passed by the Knesset on the 19th Adar Alef, 5733 (21st February, 1973) and published in *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 686 of the 27th Adar Alef, 5733 (1st March, 1973), p. 79 ; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in *Hatza'ot Chok* No. 1023 of 5733, p. 48.

[1] *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5730, p. 126 ; *LSI* vol. XXIV, p. 131.

**Addition of section 6A.**

4. The following section shall be inserted after section 6 of the principal Law :

**"Life insurance.**

6A. A victim who insures his life is entitled to Treasury participation in the insurance contributions at the rate and on the conditions prescribed by regulations with the approval of the Labour Affairs Committee of the Knesset.".

**Amendment of section 7.**

5. In section 7 of the principal Law, the figure "8A" shall be inserted after the figure "8" and the words "For the purposes of this section, the provision of section 13 of the Soldiers' Families Law shall apply to the orphans of the victim who are maintained by the widower even if he has remarried" shall be added at the end.

**Addition of sections 7A to 7C.**

6. The following sections shall be inserted after section 7 of the principal Law :

**"Victim who dies while under fourteen years of age.**

7A. Notwithstanding the provision of section 7, where the victim is under fourteen years of age at his death, the family members shall not be entitled to a pension before the time when he would have attained the age of fourteen years if he had survived and not unless the conditions of entitlement under section 7 are fulfilled at that time.

**Gratuity for funeral expenses.**

7B. Where a victim dies, the family members shall be paid funeral expenses at the rate and on the conditions prescribed by the Minister of Labour by regulations with the approval of the Labour Affairs Committee of the Knesset.

**Rest-and-recreation allowance.**

7C. A bereaved parent, or a widow, in receipt of a pension shall once a year be entitled to a seven-day rest-and-recreation allowance of an amount equal to the amount payable in that year to a State employee, provided that such parent or widow is not entitled to a rest-and-recreation allowance at his or her place of employment ; if he or she is entitled at his or her place of employment to an allowance for less than seven days' rest and recreation, he or she shall receive payment, at the rate obtaining in respect of a State employee, for the difference between seven days and the number of days in respect of which he or she is entitled at his or her place of employment.".

Amendment of
section 8.

7. In section 8 of the principal Law —

(1) the words "within the meaning of" shall in both places in which they occur be replaced by the word "under";

(2) the words "and the regulations thereunder" shall be inserted after the words "the Invalids Law" and after the words "the Soldiers' Families Law".

Amendment of
section 17.

8. In section 17 of the principal Law, the following shall be added at the end of subsection (a): "This provision shall not derogate from the provisions of section 34(a) of the State Service (Benefits) Law (Consolidated Version), 5730—1970 [1]), and section 30(c) of the Defence Army of Israel (Permanent Service) (Benefits) Law, 5714—1954 [2]).".

Addition of
section 17A.

9. The following section shall be inserted after section 17 of the principal Law:

"Pensions under this Law and under the Border Victims (Benefits) Law.

17A. a) Where on the 6th Nisan, 5731 (1st April, 1971) a benefit was due to a border victim, within the meaning of the Border Victims (Benefits) Law, 5717—1956 [3]), (hereinafter referred to as "the Border Victims Law"), he shall in place thereof be entitled to choose, in respect of the period beginning with that date, a pension under this Law.

(b) Where a person has chosen a pension under this Law, he shall not be able to go back on his choice; where he has not chosen as aforesaid, he shall retain the right to do so at any time.

(c) Where a person has chosen a pension under this Law, any amount received by him under the Border Victims Law for the period in respect of which the choice was made shall be set off against it.".

Amendment of
section 19.

10. In section 19 of the principal Law, the following subsection shall be added after subsection (b):

"(c) The Minister of Labour may, on conditions prescribed by him with the approval of the Labour Affairs Committee of the Knesset, apply all or part of the provisions of this Law to a non-resident sustaining an enemy-inflicted injury abroad in the

[1] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5730, p 65. LSI vol. XXIV, p. 57.
[2] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5714, p. 179; LSI vol. VIII, p. 149.
[3] Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5717, p. 22; LSI vol. XI, p. 19.

course of and in consequence of his employment by an Israel resident. With regard to a victim employed at an Israeli representation abroad, this power shall be exercised in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.".

11. In section 34(a) of the State Service (Benefits) Law (Consolidated Version), 5730—1970, the words "the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970" shall be inserted after the words "the Invalids (War against the Nazis) Law".

Amendment of State Service (Benefits) Law.

12. In section 30(a) of the Defence Army of Israel (Permanent Service) (Benefits) Law, 5714—1954, the words "the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730—1970" shall be inserted after the words "the Invalids (War against the Nazis) Law, 5714—1954".

Amendment of Defence Army of Israel (Permanent Service) (Benefits) Law.

13. (a) Section 7B of the principal Law shall come into force at the expiration of three months from the date of publication of this Law in Reshumot.

Commencement.

(b) Sections 8, 11 and 12 of this Law shall have effect from the 25th Iyar, 5727 (4th June, 1967).

GOLDA MEIR
Prime Minister

YOSEF ALMOGI
Minister of Labour

SHNEUR ZALMAN SHAZAR
President of the State

## VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION (PENSIONS)
## (AMENDMENT No. 3) LAW, 5733 — 1977 *

Addition of
sections 19A
to 19D.

1. In the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730 — 1970 ¹), the following sections shall be inserted after section 19:

"Persons injured
in the years
5708 and 5709.

19A. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 19 (a), this Law, except section 2, shall apply to a person who was injured by hostile action of enemy forces in the period from the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) to the 25th Shevat, 5709 (24th February, 1949), if he meets the following two requirements:

(1) he was injured in a place which at the time was Israeli territory, or under the control of the Defence Army of Israel or of a unit in respect of which the Minister of Defence, under paragraph (2) of the definition of "military service" in section 1 of the Invalids (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law (Consolidated Version), 5719 — 1959 ²), has declared that service therein shall be military service for the purposes of that Law, or in transit from one such place to another;

(2) he resided and was present in Israel continuously from the date of the injury until the date of the coming into force of the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) (Amendment No. 3) Law, 5737 — 1977; for this purpose, continuity shall be deemed not 'to have been broken by the injured person's staying outside Israel, consecutively

* Passed by the Knesset on the 26th Adar, 5737 (16th March, 1977) and published in *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 856 of the 6th Nisan, 5737 (25th March, 1977), p. 153; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in *Hatza'ot Chok* No. 1295 of 5737, p. 203.

¹) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5730, p. 128 — *LSI* vol. XXIV, p. 131; *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5733, pp. 79 and 253 — *LSI* vol. XXVII, pp. 74 and 291.

²) *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* of 5719, p. 276 — *LSI* vol. XIII, p. 315.

or intermittently, for a period not exceeding four years, or even for a longer period for purposes of study or on a mission on behalf of the State or a public body in Israel.

(b) For the purpose of this Law, an injury by hostile action of enemy forces shall be treated as an enemy-inflicted injury and a person who sustained an injury by hostile action as aforesaid shall be treated as a victim provided that he meets the requirements of the provisions of subsection (a).

Family members.

19B. Notwithstanding anything provided in this Law, the provisions thereof, except section 2, shall apply to a family member of a person to whom section 19A applies if the family member meets, *mutatis mutandis*, the requirements of the provisions of paragraph (2) of section 19A (a).

Restriction.

19C. (a) A person shall not be entitled to a pension under this Law if he has received any payment or other compensation, except medical treatment or medical rehabilitation, in respect of an injury referred to in section 19A from one of the following bodies:

(1) the State;
(2) the Jewish Agency for Israel;
(3) the World Zionist Organisation;
(4) the National Council (Vaad Leumi) of the Jewish Community in Eretz Israel;
(5) a local authority.

(b) A person who receives a weekly compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, 1947 ¹), in respect of an injury referred to in section 19A may choose between continued receipt of the said compensation and rights under this Law.

Claim for
pension.

19D. (a) A claim by virtue of section 19A or 19B shall be filed not later than the expiration of

¹) *P.G.* of 1947, Suppl. I, p. 186 (English Edition).

twelve months from the date of the coming into force of the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) (Amendment No. 3) Law, 5737 — 1977.

(b) A person who alleges that any injury was caused by hostile action of enemy forces and that invalidity or death resulted from such injury shall bear the onus of proof.".

Scope of application.

2. A pension under this Law shall be granted in respect of a period after the date of its coming into force. Any other right or advantage provided for by this Law shall be granted where the ground therefor arose after such date.

YITZCHAK RABIN
*Prime Minister*

MOSHE BARAM
*Minister of Labour*

EFRAYIM KATZIR
*President of the State*

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