


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INTEGRATED CRIMINAL APPREHENSION PROGRAM

Final Evaluation

October 1980

NCJRS


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ACQUITTALS

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This report represents the final evaluation of the East Providence Police Department's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). With this report, two evaluations were performed by an evaluation team made up of management professors from the College of Business Administration at the University of Rhode Island. The judgments and observations are those of the evaluation team solely.

  
Dr. George deLodzia  
Chief Evaluator

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We again wish to express our appreciation to Chief George Rocha and his entire command staff for their total cooperation, candor and good senses of humor.

We came away from this evaluation as we did the first one with a great respect for the professionalism of the staff and the dedication of the patrol personnel. Rarely in our evaluation have we found the top executives as willing to open all doors as did Chief Rocha.

Captain Ferreira must again be singled out for courage and resourcefulness in moving this entire project through a maze of bureaucracy, recalcitrant state agencies, and still carry on with his heavy duty as Head of Planning and Training. It has only been through dedicated change agents like Captain Ferreira that changes are made and in time institutionalized.

We were especially impressed with the help and cooperation we received from Captain Ferreira's ICAP staff: Mr. Mark Donovan, Ms. Faith Garrich, Mrs. Janet Gausland, and Detective Archie Andrade. The intergroup cooperation and excellent cooperation within the staff has been truly outstanding. We were heirs to a wealth of data at moment's notice.

Union President Frank Hurley, again, with his people receive our thanks for their confidence and support. We would not have gotten to first base had it not been for their openness and desire to help in every way possible.

Captain Joseph Creiver, Patrol Commander and Captain C. Goodwin, Chief of Detectives, also receive our sincere appreciation for being there with the data and the extra mile effort. Their dedication to implementing ICAP was always evident in word and deed.

Last, again, but foremost, our thanks to the person who inevitably bore the burden of pulling the report together, Ms. Catherine McGovern of the College of Business Administration. The constant typing and retyping were as essential as the efforts of Chief Rocha and his entire department.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The East Providence Police Department has moved through two funding cycles. The initial grant for \$35,500 was awarded for a one year period starting in January, 1978. The anticipated outcomes of the first year were:

- To improve the delivery of police services to the residents of East Providence.
- To reduce the opportunity for individual crimes.
- To create a sense of group cohesiveness and interaction among the police by combining a strong command structure with input from patrol officers with regard to the overall effectiveness of their patrol.
- To improve community relations by making the police more visible and responsive to local residents and merchants.

The first phase was evaluated by a team from the Management Department of the University of Rhode Island headed by Dr. George deLodzia. Dr. William Allen and Mr. Edward Marth made up the team and their recommendations were forwarded to Chief Rocha for consideration and implementation.

In January, 1979, Phase II started. Essentially, the goal was to continue upgrading the crime analysis and intelligence analysis capabilities, and to effect directed patrolling. The evaluation of this Phase II began one year after funding was received to start the grant. As a consequence, the evaluators were not able to establish ongoing research controls and monitor the implementation of Phase I recommendations.

Dr. George deLodzia was again the principal evaluator. Four specialists from the University of Rhode Island College of Business were selected to assist in the evaluation. They were: Dr. Russell Koza (authority in Management Information Systems), Mr. E.L. Marth (labor relations expert), Ms. Gail Fisher



(management specialist), and Ms. Mary Lawrence (organizational behavior specialist). Each came with a different perspective, and, upon the granting of the evaluation contract, began reconstructing events and developing methodological approaches which would be appropriate for the limited time available to conduct the evaluation.

After several planning meetings the evaluation team saw the crucial contribution from the evaluation to be not only in impact analysis, but an analysis of the development of the ICAP model per se; how it holds up in application and how an interdisciplinary management approach might well serve to structure future ICAP evaluations.

Phase I objectives were designed to correct the following deficiencies as stated in the initial grant proposal:

- Absence of data to support manpower allocation studies.
- Inadequate reporting procedures to record all police services rendered.
- Inordinate amount of time devoted to administrative duties by patrol officers.
- Inconsistent quality of reports primarily due to narrative report formats.
- Consistent procedures employed by line personnel in the preliminary stage of investigation.

The proposal goes on to narrate the steps taken to start an ICAP unit and address these deficiencies.<sup>1</sup> The evaluation addressed these program goals and their attainment.<sup>2</sup> In general, there was substantial progress in operationalizing the crime analysis function, in the establishment of an elementary

<sup>1</sup>Evaluation of the East Providence Police Department Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program, April 15, 1979, p. 29.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 32.

management information system, and more effective reporting systems and patrol activities. However, except for a few well documented instances, little tangible evidence that a causative link or even a correlation existed between these ICAP unit activities and the reduction of crime. While these steps were being taken to implement ICAP, anticipation was high among patrol personnel that new vehicles, equipment, facilities, training, and management efforts were coming from the ICAP "blessing." It wasn't long into the second phase that all of these benefits were seen as attached to certain obligations, obligations which had serious labor relations outcomes.

Phase II was designed to continue progress towards Phase I goals. As stated in the grant proposal they were:

- Instruction of a field reporting system and a refinement of crime analysis and other analysis capabilities to implement the necessary operational changes for the improved effectiveness of all department field operations.
- Data analysis was greatly improved by the restructuring of the crime analysis unit into three specific areas of responsibility with adequate personnel, i.e., crime, intelligence, and operations.
- Directed deterrent patrol activity, tactical patrol deployment and an intense study of a viable patrol allocation model.
- Intensive ICAP training both at roll call and in a formal classroom setting was instituted and is ongoing at the present time.

It is important to notice that events came to a head in Phase II. As patrol personnel were asked to implement technical changes, management control problems increased; interdepartmental relations were strained and management was placed in the lime light to integrate activities. If nothing else, ICAP brought a problem to the cultural status quo. The test of its real effectiveness would rest in how well a change was or was not managed.



The evaluation of Phase II lasted from February, 1980 until August 1980. The methodology will be explained in greater detail. Management and personnel reactions to acceptance of innovations of the ICAP program are the primary areas of study. Nothing is more threatening to people than change. One can well appreciate the dilemma of patrol personnel who are not trained to accept the ambiguity posed by line-staff disagreements, changes coming from Washington, recommendations from university professors and civilian ICAP planners and dispatchers; new forms, new regulations on time and manning procedures. Concurrently, one can recognize the frustration of line and staff officers as they try to bring order out of the implementation of change. These have not been easy times for anyone in the police department, especially in a facility which was the town garage. During this past summer temperatures ranged from 95°-119° in the building with no air conditioning to improve morale. With an inadequate heating plant, winter is no better in this building. It seems that great changes are often times conditioned by situations like these which rarely find their way into the formalities of a report.

This, then, is the environment and the excitement which faced the evaluators as they worked through the frustrations of the staff and pressures of the patrol officers.

## II. THE PROBLEM

Initially observations were organized by defining "problems" into three categories. First, the initial interviews and observations yielded "organizational problem" areas which served as a basis for interview schedules and questionnaires. Second, the evaluation team remained sensitive to all the "organizational problems" as seen by the ICAP personnel. (There were other problems of a patrol and information processing nature cited in the grant proposals). Third, the evaluators faced a serious methodological problem: synthesizing observations of organizational, and ICAP related "problems," processing and interpreting them through the scientific method. Where the first two represented problems arising directly from ICAP implementation and the command decision made by ICAP personnel, the methodological represents problems of approach to the first two types of problems.

The first category of problems reflect the reaction of implementing an innovation and the consequences of lack of continuity in evaluation. The former were more specifically in the area of conflicts between command and staff personnel; between union and management on minimum manning; between manual recordkeeping and record utilization. The latter refers to excessive bureaucratization of procedures for contracting by the Governor's Justice Commission and the maximizing of form over substance.

The second category of problems refer to problems cited as deficiencies in Phases I and II.

Those related to Phase I were:

- Absence of data to support manpower allocation studies.
- Inadequate reporting procedures to record all police services rendered.



- Inordinate amount of time devoted to administrative duties by patrol officers.
- Inconsistent quantity of reports primarily due to narrative report formats.
- Inconsistent procedures employed by line personnel in the preliminary stage of investigations.

Implicit in these deficiencies and in the overall goals for this phase mentioned earlier are the assumptions that police services might not adequately be delivered by random patrolling, that the opportunity for certain crimes was high, that community relations vis-a-vis visibility and responsiveness might be in trouble, and finally, that there might be problems with patrol personnel not inputting to upper echelons on the upgrading of police activities in their posts. It is interesting to note that the stated deficiencies and the implicit ones underlying the Phase I goals<sup>3</sup> were not tested in a needs analysis prior to the implementation of the grant. Granted, there were some serious problems as police personnel saw it, the entire picture did not come into focus until the question was asked: What are the basic vital issues which make those deficiencies only the symptoms? A formalized needs analysis would have turned up the answers.

The problem cited for the second phase were:

- Management and union resistance to change.
- General apprehension that some ICAP components would not work.
- Changing of personnel due to other employment and lag time encountered in city hiring procedures.

Implicit in these deficiencies and the overall goals for this phase mentioned earlier<sup>4</sup> are the assumptions that (a) crime analysis and other analyses are not up to a desired level to operationalize aspects of the program, (b) there

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

is a problem with implementing D-runs and (c) training was seen as the vehicle to change attitude as well as increase learning of ICAP. Again, it is interesting to note the discrepancy between the problems cited and the connection of problems to underlying basic issues. For example, if a goal is set to change attitudes about ICAP and training is seen as a means to accomplish this change, then at the end of the training some statement could be made that the means were necessary and sufficient to the ends. The question raised by the symptoms raise other questions about methodology and approach. Problems as cited in the proposals were not construed by the evaluation team to be exclusively valid. Instead, a methodology was developed for getting to the vital basic problem that ICAP was asked to address. It will be explained under the methodology section.



### III. BACKGROUND OF THE DEPARTMENT

No significant changes have occurred in the make-up of the city since the first evaluation.

#### A. The City of East Providence

East Providence, the fifth largest city in Rhode Island, has a population (1975 estimate) of 50,900. It is located at the head of Narragansett Bay, just across from Providence, the state's capital and largest city. It is bordered by the City of Pawtucket on the north, by the Town of Barrington on the south, and by the Town of Seekonk, Massachusetts on the east. In terms of size, East Providence occupies a land area of 13.3 square miles and has a population density of 3,820 persons per square mile.

The majority of the city's resident civilian labor force (about 45%) is employed by manufacturing concerns. The city has a large amount of wholesale and retail outlets which account for some 31% of the employed. According to the last U.S. Census, the median family income in East Providence was \$10,179.

#### B. Crime Problem and the Consumption of Patrol Time

The basic pattern of offenses has not changed since the first evaluation. Over 90% of the offenses can still be categorized as property related crimes. Statistics with regard to the consumption of patrol time are as shown in Appendix K. The overall rising crime problem within categories indicates either a continuous pattern of crimes, a pattern forced by the reporting categories or both. This is one of the serious problems in interpretation of statistics. Be this as it may, the reality of crime occurrence shows a steady increase in crime that ICAP has not been able to reduce. The designers of the ICAP model could not anticipate all of the intervening variables which effect the crime rate.

#### C. The East Providence Police Department

Since the first evaluation there has been no reorganization or change in management conditions and make-up of the Divisions have basically remained intact. This is significant. If the department had undergone massive internal changes we might well have had intervening variables which would not allow for speculation on ICAP variables alone. A general review of conditions prior to Phase I is described in the Phase I evaluation.<sup>5</sup> However, changes have occurred in the ICAP unit since Phase I. There have been noticeable additions and changes in the information processing and change has taken place in organizational behavior as a reaction to manning requirements and tactical unit jurisdiction. Other noticeable changes have been in the addition of two crime analysts, an intelligence analyst, and an ICAP secretary. Certain duties of these personnel have been expanded since Phase I.

<sup>5</sup>Op.Cit. p. 8.



#### IV. METHODOLOGY

##### A. Historical Perspective and the Evaluation

In Phase I the evaluators found that most of the effort was centered on the identification of key variables in order to establish a baseline for the further comparisons and contrasts in Phase II. From this baseline, barriers to change could be found and then the progress in the acceptance of ICAP monitored. An overview of the interrelationship between phases would be appropriate to help the reader see the historical arrow moving forward.

##### The Relationships of ICAP Grants

<u>Pre ICAP</u>	<u>Phase I (1st grant)</u>	<u>Phase II (2nd grant)</u>
Priorities determined by events.	Priorities designated to put a planning foundation under patrol activities.	Projected priorities aimed at operationalizing planned changes.
<u>Reactive Problems:</u>		
1. Absence of Beat data support manpower allocations.	1. Development of crime analysis unit.	1. Training.
2. Inadequate reporting procedures and recording management.	2. Application of rational decision model (ICAP model).	2. Establish a career criminal unit.
3. Lack of a management information system.	3. Test reports in service.	3. Upgrade reports.
4. Inconsistent procedures in investigations.	4. Train personnel to ICAP.	4. Full field reporting.
	5. Development of new reporting systems.	5. Better MIS system.
		6. Better procedures for investigations.
		7. Implementation of directed patrols based on beat data.

- Random patrol.
- Responsive to demand.

Base line identification for Change in service.

In general, many of the objectives of Phase II have been accomplished.

The following illustrate notable achievements.

1. Training of personnel has become an ongoing activity (see Appendix A).
2. Crime operations analysts and an intelligence analyst have been added to the ICAP unit.
3. A new reporting system has been implemented.
4. New reports and revised report format have been developed (see Appendix B).
5. A full field reporting system has been implemented.

In addition, procedures for investigations have been improved, but, the implementation of a tactical unit and D-run management are still being worked out.

In general, a great number of reports, manual tabulations and analyses have been generated by ICAP personnel, but measures of effectiveness have not been devised to monitor the application of ICAP in the field or the statistics to show how effective ICAP has been in reducing the opportunity for crimes. It should be pointed out that the cultural problems that make informed police reluctant to accept direction, advice, and "orders" from civilian ICAP personnel make the above accomplishments remarkable!

##### B. Evaluation Subjects and Special Emphasis

During Phase I the following items were the subject of the evaluation effort.

- Organizational structure.
- Staffing procedures and patterns.
- Crime analysis unit.
- Patrol personnel.
- Community of East Providence.

During Phase II the evaluation was aimed at:

- The organizational climate, particularly as it applies to the acceptance of ICAP. The climate was seen as important because implementation is done by patrol personnel.
- The interrelationship between Detectives, Vice and Patrol; each department was examined to see if ICAP reporting procedures were being followed.
- The crime and intelligence analysis function and results.
- Patrol personnel.
- Detectives and Vice personnel.
- The East Providence community.

Again, special emphasis was placed upon the labor relations area for reasons cited earlier. Special questionnaires for Vice, Detectives, ICAP personnel, and Patrol (see Appendix C) were designed. The Patrol questionnaire was updated and redesigned to capture answers to implementation problems and acceptance of ICAP reporting requirements. Interviews were also conducted with city officials, state drug control officials and with other police department personnel in the state.

#### C. Conduct of the Evaluation

Due to the lack of continuity between the two phases of the ICAP evaluation effort pre- and post- experiments could not be performed. In addition, ICAP personnel could not be guided in the design of evaluation procedures for their activities. To overcome these problems, the evaluation team monitored performance through quarterly reports and direct observations of procedures, records, reports and events. Intensive interviews were conducted with key personnel in all departments; special attention was devoted to Detective and Vice in this phase of the evaluation, particularly in the area of recordkeeping procedures contrasted with Patrol.

The evaluators went out on patrol repeatedly in East Providence and in a small city of Rhode Island that was not receiving federal funds. Officers were interviewed while on patrol as well as responding to an opinionnaire. The Chief of Police, heads of departments, ICAP staff personnel and selected command officers were interviewed as were the community relations head and a random sample of people in the community.

The Management Information specialist on our staff spent time following the reporting and recordkeeping process. In addition, the computer systems that ICAP personnel intend to implement in Phase III were explored to see if the present system is compatible with the POSSE system.

#### D. Data Collection

Questionnaires were designed and circulated to all Detectives, Vice, Patrol, and ICAP personnel; the same patrol questionnaire was used on the third shift for City X in Rhode Island. Two police departments in other Rhode Island communities would not allow interviews for purposes of establishing a control group. There was a great deal of paranoia in even discussing ICAP for fear of having strangers come in and investigate the operations. This paranoia was well founded when certain disclosures were made of illegal activities in another police department in the State. The openness of the police personnel in East Providence and City X were in sharp contrast. This can be attributed to the attitude of the Chief of Police.

#### E. Approach

The basic structure of problem identification in Phases I and II mentioned in the grant proposals run this way:

The Approach Category	Constrain The Area of Application	Performance Goals	Effect Impact Goals Effect Program Goals
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To be more specific, it is assumed that the performance goals associated with the training of patrol, upgrading reports, computerized data, expanding crime analysis capabilities effect impact goals, such as improving the quality of preliminary investigations, reports, etc. These, in turn, reduce the opportunity for crime. The approach categories, on the other hand, reflect categories in which performance and impact goals will be evaluated for their effect on overall program goals. They are: training, information support systems, upgrading of new data for analysis and the improvement of patrol deployment. These approach categories parallel those mentioned in a statement of ICAP goals sent out from LEAA.<sup>6</sup> A careful review of this letter and the ICAP manuals<sup>7</sup> shows a contradiction in focus, ambiguity of priorities and confusion on the proper method to accomplish program goals. With this confusion it is doubtful that causation statements can be made.

The responsibilities of the evaluation team was not to conduct the basic ICAP needs analysis. However, this is a necessary step and we highly recommend this step for future evaluations. The role of the evaluation team in this second phase was primarily after the fact since we did not input into the application of recommendations. The one year delay caused by the recontracting problem allowed events to move on (as they should).

The quarterly reports indicate technical progress or changes. In a sense this is a continuous evaluation of changes which contribute to the program goals stated in the proposals. We will spare the reader a repetition of these and refer him to the quarterly reports in the Appendix.

<sup>6</sup>Letter from Robert Hacht, Law Enforcement Assistance Administrator to ICAP Chiefs and Project Directors, March 1980, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup>Richard G. Grassie, et al., The Role of Communications in Managing Patrol Operations, U.S. Department of Justice, August 1978, p. 9-12.

The basic purpose of the evaluation effort was to follow the train of thought back to the basic ICAP needs analysis to see if conclusions follow logically. For example, is training the appropriate way to gain acceptance for an innovation? The logic followed here was that unless the tracks are laid correctly beforehand the best of trains would not get through.

After tracing the logic flows, consistency or nonconsistency between the ICAP model and the way it was applied in East Providence was evaluated. This evaluation, then, must assess whether the ICAP model and its interpretation by ICAP personnel has the potential to allow for causation statements (e.g., "a more systematic approach to data gathering ... will result in increased effectiveness") and an analysis of performance of goals to see which ones are necessary and sufficient to lead to impact and program goals (e.g., there can be a great quantity of training but if it is not reinforced by organizational rewards for better police work, the training is not the correct route to better program goal attainment).

Testing causation assumptions and models is only a part of any evaluation. In order to develop information for testing it is necessary to develop specific approach categories. Given the unique culture, it was decided to conduct the evaluation through the following perspectives:

- . Innovation diffusion.
- . Management information systems.
- . Labor relations.
- . Organizational management.
- . Organizational behavior.

Innovation diffusion refers to situations where changes are brought to a social system from outside that system (e.g., introduction of new procedures in a corporate merger, new liturgy changes in church ritual, hybrid corn acceptance

in a rural community). These changes, if not planned to accept the human relations can disrupt power, friendship relations, motivations, expectations, personalities, and eventually cause the innovation to be absolved in a totally different way than originally intended or can even reject it. ICAP is a change phenomenon introduced into a traditional police department where union relations, political relations with the city council and strong personalities in line and staff all present powerful manipulators of the "things" necessary to accept or reject change.

Management Information Systems refers to the entire recordkeeping, processing and reporting procedures used by management to control the allocation and development of resources. This field of inquiry is well developed. ICAP relies heavily for its success on the correlation between information processing and crime deterrence. How well raw data from the scene of a crime is processed to the completion of a case is a function of the managerial decisions along the way, and, related to the relationships between each step in the process.

Labor Relations is a particularly important area since the political relationships become strained when fear of the unknown increases. Police personnel feel uneasy about many of the efficiencies brought by ICAP, especially the notions of sequencing and allocation of personnel by ICAP requirements. The minimum manning issue will be the real test case for ICAP implementation with the real possibility of a confrontation. This area of inquiry represents a formalization of the combative process introduced by the ICAP innovation. It is pointed out here because of the wealth of data in this area and because the relationship between management and the patrol personnel is formally instituted by contract.

Organizational management refers to a process of planning, organizing, controlling and leading. It concentrates on how well the management of an organization employs rational means to integrate and prepare the subordinates for accomplishing a mission. The application of management criteria is behind the MIS and organizational behavior areas. The former represents a type of control towards the attainment of goals and the latter represents the use of motivational means to harness needed human dedication to achieve the goals.

Organizational behavior is a recognized field of inquiry that examines group dynamics, the effects of cultural determinants on free will, leadership, and communications in a dynamic social context. The importance of this area cannot be overplayed. Police departments are essentially paramilitary social systems with traditionally rigid customs and expectations. How well patrolmen exercise individual judgments or covertly subvert threats to custom stability is extremely important. The political variable exists on the manifest as well as the covert level. Acceptance of change is determined by how well the individual and the group see the innovation as advancing their own self interest (e.g., new equipment, new vehicles, etc.).


Throughout all these there is a common thread. Each is dependent on the other and each looks at the problems of change in relation to the basic assumptions of the ICAP model and its application. This perspective is of value for the evaluation for another reason. Attention is always forced to the reality of the vital basic problems. Social systems are not trapped into a model or the assumption underlying a model and thus inevitably lead to false conclusions and broken expectations. This contingent open systems approach works from the reality back to the assumptions and proved to be more realistic and helpful in this evaluation.




# F. The ICAP Model Revisited

Early in the examination of the ICAP model in the first evaluation phase, comments were made on the strengths and weaknesses of the approach.<sup>8</sup>

To briefly review the main point, the ICAP model is presented as follows:



Data collection is singled out as the logical first step in this process of improved service delivery. The evaluation team agrees that it is an oversimplification of a more sophisticated management process that could be shown as follows:



A. Diagnosis of Local Service Delivery Problems - This phase consists of:

1. Planning of the needs analysis.
2. Development of a model of inquiry to structure the problem and the collection of data.
3. Establishment of an interdisciplinary approach to problem identification.
4. Identification of vital basic problems to be addressed.

<sup>8</sup>Op. Cit. Phase I Evaluation, pp. 3-4.

5. Constraint analysis.
6. Development of an approach categories for evaluation.
7. Design of evaluation instruments.

## B. Planning for the Introduction of Change

1. Establishing a base line for attitude, opinions, and beliefs.
2. Mapping of the culture; identification of key social variables, communications networks that must be dealt with.
3. Plan communications to translate change to local interests; plan use of innovation diffusion.

## C. Introduction of Change

1. Monitor attitude changes; formation of political reactions.
2. Test key social variables to see if we dealt with the right ones.
3. Monitor barriers to change.
4. Make necessary corrections.

## D. Analysis of Results

1. What were the social and technical consequences of the change?
2. Was the change instituted or planned or distorted?
3. Evaluate approach model.
4. Was the change the correct response to solve the problems turned up by the diagnosis?

## E. Modify Changes to Accomplish Results and Continue Implementation

1. Continue monitoring all social variables.
2. Monitor changes and communications patterns.
3. Evaluate results of entire approach model, and performance, and program goals, make changes if necessary.

Aside from being an over-simplification, the ICAP model is flawed by its exclusion of organizational behavior. There is no mention of the effects of fiefdoms, string personalities, local politics, evaluation levels, internal power struggles, etc. Persistent in the ICAP literature is the assumption of a benevolent and obedient patrol culture but this may be a false assumption in many applications.

One of the most serious problems with the model is its "mapping nature." This is indigenous to any process model including the one suggested. The assumption made is that the model is the reality. But crimes do not occur in accordance with classification systems of them or research assumptions. ICAP is applicable to crimes Patrol can reach by cars. The target crimes represent only a percentage of all crimes that are committed or unreported. There is really no effective way to detect and record all types of crime. Street crime may only represent 20% of all crimes while organized crimes, arson, vice and white collar crimes go unaddressed in intensity across city boundaries. This is why any assumption that directed patrol and street crime control suppression will result in a reduction of crime is extremely limiting. Even if the East Providence Police have a more proactive deterrent policy there is too much of a cost consideration in decreasing the opportunity for crime than there is to responding to calls for service. A brief review of the budget request from the Vice Department (see Appendix D) will show that directed patrol and better management of records will not affect the Vice operation. Hence, the suppression of Vice crimes require another model and revenue.

However, on the positive side, the current ICAP model does represent a sound first step in raising the right questions. Without it, this evaluation would not even be possible. After observing the random patrol operations in other communities, it is not conclusive that a structured approach to the

development of better management information systems will necessarily lead to crime reduction. However, the use of information to make resource allocation decisions in a cost-effective manner, more timely and accurate information is a decided benefit to the ICAP approach. Better management controls and resource allocations are a must for tight budget items. There may be serious problems for ICAP, if the key decision makers assume a deterministic response from the new, young, better educated patrol officer.



## V. RESULTS

### A. Patrol, Detectives and Vice Survey

In order to quantify the aggregate opinion of patrol, detectives, vice and crime analysts of the East Providence Police Department, an opinionnaire was anonymously administered. This instrument was designed to both assess the opinions and attitudes of all departments, and to evaluate the change of attitudes of the patrol officers since the Phase I evaluation. Unlike the Phase I evaluation in which the opinionnaire was distributed and analyzed from the viewpoint of rank, the Phase II opinionnaire was distributed to each of the departments of the East Providence Police Department. That is, patrol was administered its own opinionnaire, as were detectives, vice and the crime analysts. Responses yielded 38 patrol questionnaires completed, 7 detectives, 2 vice and one crime analyst completed. This opinionnaire was inspected by both command and the union and had the endorsement of both groups before distribution.

The decision to individualize this opinionnaire and distribute it to all departments contrasts with the Phase I decision to administer the opinionnaire only to patrol and generalize to all departments. Having completed two years of the ICAP program, it is important to evaluate the attitude of each specialty and assess the integration of ICAP goals and objectives throughout the police force.

Results will be reported on the basis of whether or not a simple majority agreed or disagreed with a statement, to conclude whether or not the general sentiment was favorable or unfavorable. In general, response of "don't know" or no opinion are considered neutral, but may lend themselves to further explanation.

It should be stressed that this opinionnaire represents only one of many tools used by the evaluation team to assess the wave of sentiment at East

Providence. Any attempt to draw iron-clad conclusions from this simple mechanism must be viewed warily. It illustrates only a portion of the complex system representing the East Providence Police Department.

The questions in the opinionnaire are divided into broad areas of people and operations and further sub-divided into specific subtopics in order to assist in evaluating the differences in opinion in various areas.

#### 1. People Oriented Issues

##### 1.1 Job Related Satisfaction.

Both patrol and detectives were asked to respond to the statement "I think I get quite a bit of recognition for the things I do well in my police work," 63.2% of Patrol either disagreed or strongly disagreed and 71.4% of Detectives disagreed with the statement. This tends to indicate that the satisfaction that they get from their work must be intrinsic.

Only Patrol responded to the statement "Most of the work that I do doesn't have anything to do with solving or preventing crime," and 65.8% of the officers either disagreed or strongly disagreed. It is encouraging to note that Patrol personnel feel as though they are contributing positively to the deterrence of crime. In an attempt to quantify job expectations, 50% of Patrol agreed that "I have a lot of faith in the future of this department," 32.4% disagreed and 15.7% were neutral on this issue.

Most Detectives in the East Providence Police Department are satisfied with their job as 87.5% agreed that "I like police work as much or more than when I started to work for EPPD." Additionally, 57.1% of the Detectives disagreed with the statement "I do get bored with my job from time to time." This tends to indicate that Detectives are still being challenged by their work.

When asked if offered another job at comparable wages outside of police work, only 14.3% of Detectives would seriously consider it, yet only 15.1% of the Detectives say they look forward to going to work, while 28.6% do not enjoy going to work and 14.3% are neutral.

## 1.2 Personal Growth and Development

Patrol personnel were asked to respond to the statement "Officers are capable of doing a lot more planning of their activities than they are given credit for," 84.2% agreed or strongly agreed. Along the same line, 78.9% of Patrol feel there is at least above average opportunity for independent thought and action, whereas 57.1% of Detectives feel the opportunity for independence in thought and action. Officers intrinsic job satisfaction may be a result of the independent nature of the job.

When asked how much authority is connected with the position of patrol officer now, 68.2% of Patrol responded either above average or maximum as did 85.7% of the Detectives. The question was nonspecific with regard over whom the officers exercised authority.

Patrol responded that 57.8% of the officers felt that there was either a minimum or below average opportunity for personal growth and development in their position, as did 42.9% of Detectives. However, 93.7% of Patrol and 100% of Detectives reported that there should be at least above average growth opportunity. This is the same sentiment expressed in the opinionnaire completed at the end of Phase I.

Detectives and Patrol derive some satisfaction of worthwhile accomplishment from their positions; 71.4% and 86.8%, respectively. There should be at least above average or maximum feeling of worthwhile accomplishment report 100% of Patrol and Detectives.

Personal growth and development can be translated into its promotion and transfer components. Detectives, when questioned about the fairness and honesty of promotion examinations, indicated that 71.4% do not feel promotion exams are handled fairly or adequately and should be corrected in the officers' presence directly after the examination. Additionally, 71.4% of the Detectives questioned feel that its who you know not what you know that gets you promoted. Phase I evaluation reported that promotion exams were considered unfair and arbitrary, and it is disappointing that there is no perceived improvement. Transfer policy has not improved over the past year as 92.1% of Patrol and 85.7% of Detectives feel that transfers are not given to the most qualified person. Permanent transfers to both Vice and Detective divisions should be based on examination, background and experience according to over 85% of Patrol officers and Detectives. Patrol and Detectives disagree as to whether short term three month transfers would be beneficial with 86.8% of Patrol agreeing or strongly agreeing and 57.1% of Detectives disagreeing.

## 2. Operations Oriented Issues

### 2.1 Work Activity.

Patrol officers were asked to respond to the question "How should Patrolmen be allocated?" and 28.9% felt that calls for service should be a major factor, while a smaller percentage also listed workload, incidence of violence, patrol consumption time, geography, hours of the day, and officer safety as considerations. Of Detectives, 71.4% had no response, and 28.6% listed calls for service as the primary criteria.

Next, with regard to the question concerning the potential of patrol being better organized than they are now, 73.7% of the Patrol division responded with agree or strongly agree while 100% of the Detective division



responded in these two categories. Thus, the concept of improved organization via the ICAP concept has potential for further investigation in the Patrol division.

Both Patrol and Detectives feel that more crimes could be solved if Patrol were more involved than they are with 75.9% and 100% respectively agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement. The term "involvement" was not elaborated upon and may have various interpretations.

Patrolmen disagree (81.6%) that, "When it comes down to it, the Patrol officer doesn't do that much in the way of preventing crime." These results reaffirm earlier questions regarding Patrol's contribution to crime deterrence.

Information dissemination is an integral part of ICAP and one of the components of information processing is communications. 71.1% of Patrol either agree or strongly agree that there is good communication among Patrol officers.

52.6% of Patrol found no improvement in dispatchers since Phase I and 50% reported no improvement in dispatch procedures over the past year.

Detectives were asked to respond to the statement that "Patrolmen do an excellent job of writing case reports." The majority of Detectives (85.7%) do not feel that the Patrol case reports are excellent in quality. There were no follow-up questions designed to ascertain how adequately the reports are completed.

Detectives apparently feel they have a good rapport with each other as 85.7% report good communication in the department. An increase in street time rather than administrative time is considered desirable by 100% of those queried. About 86% of the Detectives questioned felt that they were adequately staffed in order to do the job properly, and 71.4% do not feel they are adequately funded to do the job.

## 2.2 Interdepartmental Relations.

The ICAP concept hinges heavily on the exchange of information and integration of services between departments. The following reactions to statements will help to clarify sentiment between departments. When asked to respond to "I understand just about everything that Detectives are required to do," 60.5% of Patrol either agreed or strongly agreed. Interdepartmental cooperation is assessed by responses to the statement "The Detectives and Patrol officers don't cooperate as much as they should," 86.9% of Patrol either agree or strongly agree with that statement, as do 85.7% of Detectives. It is important to note that the majority of the officers recognize the need for interdepartmental cooperation, but ICAP should be helping to provide the superstructure for working together. LEAA literature states that ICAP provides the framework for integration of the various police service delivery functions.<sup>8</sup>

Although Detectives do not feel that the Records division is well organized (57.1%), 71.4% of Detectives feel that Records division is well organized (57.1%), 71.4% of Detectives feel that Records is helpful to them in their work. Lastly, 85.7% of Detectives feel that Records division's duties do impact on Detective operations. When Patrol was asked to respond to the statement, "The Records division's duties have little or no impact on Patrol operations," 68.4% of the officers either disagree or strongly disagree. The majority of patrol (65.8%) do not feel they receive a lot of help from the activities of the Bureau of Criminal Identification. The Plans and Training Division is not seen as doing an adequate job by 65.8% of Patrol.

<sup>8</sup>Opcit, Hecht, p. 9.

Part of the ICAP objectives is to establish a back-up of personnel to perform routine field activities or administrative work which need not be done by sworn personnel. In East Providence this squad is called "special police" and the following statements were designed to assess the attitude of Patrol toward them and evaluate their effectiveness. Better than half of the officers (57.9%) felt that the public does not see special police personnel as full fledged police officers. When asked to respond to the statement "Special police personnel should have uniforms which distinguish them from regular police officers," 79% either agreed or strongly agreed with 65.8% of the responses strongly agreeing. It appears as though the Patrol officers of East Providence feel a strong sense of identity which they do not want to share with support personnel. Part of the reason for their reluctance to be associated with special police forces may be that 92.1% of the Patrol officers do not feel that specials are sufficiently trained. The majority of Patrol officers (86.8%) felt that most of the special police personnel were assigned as a result of political patronage, but 47.4% still felt that specials perform a necessary function.

### 2.3 Supervision and Administration.

Both Patrol and Detectives were asked to respond to the statement, "I don't think command is capable of a lot of changes." There is disagreement on the part of 71.4% of the Detectives, but 57.9% of Patrol agreed. The responses differ between the two groups, but the program changes do focus on Patrol and Detectives are not asked to alter standard operating procedures and a grand scale which may help to explain the perception differences.

When asked to rate the degree of leadership the ideal Chief should have in different areas, the majority (over 50%) of both Patrol and Detectives

felt that "maximum" degree should be exercised in: (a) rank and life experience, (b) leadership training, (c) accessibility, (d) most regularly with department personnel (e) being aggressive on behalf of the department, and (f) firm in enforcing the rules and regulations of the department.

In a response which at best can be described as lukewarm, only 57.9% of Patrol and 42.9% of Detectives feel that their supervisors understand the problems they face on a day-to-day basis. Interestingly, 68.5% of Patrol responded that they were able to talk freely with and express any opinions to my shift commander but only 76.4% do not think command has a good grasp of what Patrol is doing and what is needed by Patrol.

When asked about the discipline in Detectives 85.7% disagreed that there is more disciplining than there should be. However, 71.4% responded that discipline is not given out fairly. It appears that Detectives feel a need for tight control but do object to inconsistencies in that control. One hundred percent of the Detectives feel that they get adequate command guidance from the Chief of Detectives. In addition, 57.1% do not feel that there is good communication between the officer and head of the department.



#### 2.4 Community Relations.

The opinionnaire that solicited views from selected individuals in East Providence will clarify the community standpoint. This section tries to ascertain how well the officers' perception of the residents' opinion coincides with the actual opinion.

All Detectives either agreed or strongly agreed that they have no problem communicating with the public while on the job. Unfortunately, 85.7% of the Detectives felt that citizens do not report the majority of crimes they see. Also, 85.7% of the Detectives feel that, in general, the public respects Detectives more than police officers. Generally, Detectives (85.7%) feel that the policemen get adequate community support, but 57.1% feel the citizens of East Providence think highly of the police department.

#### 2.5 Equipment.

Phase I results indicated that Patrol officers were concerned about the condition areas of concern tested at the end of Phase I were retested at the end of Phase II to measure the improvement. Patrol reports that 86.8% of the officers feel there has been little or no improvement in the radar equipment since the end of Phase I. There was a reported 76.4% majority of officers who felt there had been "some" or "much" improvement in the vehicles used.

East Providence has updated their patrol car fleet by purchasing 20 1978

Plymouth Volares as a result of Phase I recommendations. Unfortunately, 76.3% and 78.9% see little or no improvement in terms of department layout or officer space, respectively.

When Detectives were questioned whether or not they felt the equipment that the department issues is safe to use, 57.1% did not feel the equipment was adequately safe. Additionally, 71.4% of Detectives feel that the

equipment is adequate to do the job we are expected to perform. Detectives were not specific as to the types of equipment they feel is unsafe or inadequate.

#### 2.6 Implementation of ICAP.

The next series of responses to statements and multiple choice questions are designed to evaluate those activities specific to ICAP; those that focus on increasing efficiency and effectiveness of all police services.

Information exchange, in quantity and accuracy is critical in the ICAP model. Only 50.0% of Patrol agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that there is a lot of information on a particular crime in the officer's head which never goes into a report, whereas, 100% of the Detectives agree there is a lot of information in the officer's head. One may suspect that the standardization of crime reporting systems is helping Patrol to elaborate on information that is useful in investigation as well as reducing administrative time. In addition, 94.8% of Patrol and 85.7% of Detectives feel that they would like to have more information on known criminals in the area. This is somewhat disturbing as there is now an intelligence analyst whose primary thrust has been to establish a functional career criminal information unit. Whether it is fully utilized by Detectives and Patrol is another story.

Both Detectives and Patrol were asked to assess the efficiency of ICAP policies. Patrol (78.9%) and Detectives (57.1%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the procedures should return to pre-ICAP days. When Patrol was asked if too much of an officer's time was spent in administrative work, 68.5% disagreed. The majority of Patrol (81.6%) felt that ICAP has provided a more efficient way for patrolmen to write case reports. It is interesting to note that Patrol is in favor of simplified, efficient case reporting, but do not favor spending less administrative time.

Certainly not to be ignored is the bargaining unit of the East Providence Police Department. The results indicate that the officers are not really aware of their union's participation in the ICAP program. Although 57.1% of Detectives feel the union does not have an effective say in ICAP, Patrol's opinion is evenly distributed between those who agree, disagree or are of no opinion. A little better than half of both Patrol (55.3%) and Detectives (57.1%) agree that as long as salaries, fringes, and safety are not compromised, the union will favor ICAP changes.

Those officers who understand and approve of ICAP goals are more likely to work to make the program successful. The next series of statements try to evaluate this sentiment. Disturbingly, 65.8% of the Patrol do not feel well informed of the department's plans for ICAP. However, 68.4% of Patrol feel they have a better understanding of ICAP since last year. A positive impact on the department by ICAP has been felt by 50.0% of Patrol.

When Patrol was asked where the problem with ICAP implementation lay, 31.6% felt the responsibility lies with ICAP staff personnel, 34.2% blamed the Plans and Training officers and 31.6% felt resistance to change was at fault. ICAP related changes are perceived as orderly (28.9%), necessary (26.3%), too sweeping (18.4%), and other (23.7%); includes too little compromise, unorganized, slow, improper utilization.

In assessing bi-daily reports and books, 57.9% of Patrol agreed that there has been improvement in this area. This indicates an increased effectiveness of the crime analyst whose job it is to make these books accurate, timely and readable. When referring to their books, 50% of Patrol generally uses slack time to look through it. In rating bi-daily reports, etc., were "a pain in the neck," non-essential paperwork and 28.9% felt that they were a real asset, especially in organizing activities for the shift.

However, 57.9% of Patrol feels that bi-daily reports and crime bulletins have resulted in the identification of trouble areas requiring more police visibility. ICAP objectives measure the success of a crime analysis unit by a series of criteria including the identification of existing or evolving crime patterns, establish operational data, supply support data for the department and providing data to target or direct patrol activities. East Providence's crime analysis unit does this, according to Patrol. It does not answer the question as to whether or not the causal relationship exists between supply of information that is accurate and timely results in an increase in the number of cases cleared by arrest and provide investigative leads to investigators.

A majority of Detectives (57.1%) feel they understand what the EPPD ICAP project is intended to do. However, 57.1% do not feel that ICAP has made a definite impact on the department.

When asked "What is the purpose of ICAP?" 34.2% of Patrol and 42.9% of Detectives felt that the application of directed management to the entire police force was the primary objective. However, 36.8% of Patrol felt that the purpose was to apply better management to Patrol activities rather than to the entire force. It is encouraging to note that Patrol and Detectives understand that ICAP is a management oriented change as well as operational.

### 3. Comparisons with City X

In an effort to try and compare improvement in the East Providence Police Department as a result of ICAP innovation, the opinionnaire was administered to Patrol officers randomly selected from a town of comparable size and population as East Providence. The results of selected questions follow.



Of those patrolmen questioned, 85.7% felt that most of their work does help solve or prevent crime. When questioned as to how much self-esteem a person gets from his position, 57.1% felt there was a minimum or below average amount in their work. Additionally, 71.4% of the officers questioned felt that they get a minimum or below average feeling of authority from their position. The majority (85.7%) do not feel there is adequate opportunity for growth and development in their position as well as little or no prestige (71.4%). Only 57.1% of Patrol felt there was adequate opportunity for independent thought and action in their position.

Operationally, 57.2% of those questioned agreed that too much of an officers time is spent on writing reports. The same percentage feel that there is a lot of information on particular crimes in an officer's head that is not reported in case writing. Patrol officer's (57.2%) do not feel that they help to prevent crime.

When questioned about interdepartmental relations 85.7% of City X's Patrol felt that Patrol and Detectives don't cooperate as much as they should. Additionally, 85.7% do not feel there is good communication among patrol officers. In contrast with the patrol personnel of East Providence, City X's Patrol reports that 71.4% agree that Records Division's duties have little or no impact on Patrol operations. Like EPPD Patrol, 57.1% of Patrol do not feel that the Plans and Training Division is doing the job adequately.

All the Patrol officers of City X feel that Command does not grasp what Patrol is doing or what is needed by Patrol. However, 57.1% of the officers feel they can talk freely and openly with their shift commander. 71.5% of those questioned do not feel that discipline has been handled more fairly than last year. Lastly, 71.5% do not feel that Command is capable of a lot of changes.

Although, the personnel of City X were not administered a questionnaire last year, they were still asked to compare improvement in equipment and facilities. A majority (57.1%) reported no improvement in vehicles. The Patrol officers did not respond to improvement in office space or department design of the building.

Because the officers of City X do not have a working knowledge of ICAP, those questioned pertaining directly to ICAP innovations on management were not evaluated.

#### B. Management Information Systems (MIS)

The ICAP approach is consistent with the real-world view of data being transformed into information useful to aid in the decision-making process encountered in a criminal apprehension effort. In fact, the ICAP Reference Handbook<sup>9</sup> (L.E.A.A., October, 1978) states that it requires a participating department to develop or enhance its approach to the management of police services through the establishment of department decision-based model characterized by (1) formal planning, (2) decisions based on empirical information and structured methods, (3) decision components measurable and subject to manipulation based upon feedback, (4) operational identity of an analytical capacity, and (4) a prediction-oriented and active empirical perspective. In this regard, the ICAP model is critically dependent upon the quality and quantity of data collected by various means which is then processed in some way to become information to support decision-making with regard to resource allocation.

The model used for the ICAP approach is a sequential model involving the following activities: (1) data collection, (2) analysis, (3) planning, (4) service delivery, (5) with feedback. The data collection component relies

<sup>9</sup> ICAP Reference Handbook, LEAA, October, 1978.

primarily upon reports generated by departmental field elements and the dispatch activity. Analysis of data collected and gathered include Crime Analysis, Operations Analysis, and Intelligence Analysis. Crime analysis involves those analytical processes directed at providing timely and pertinent information relative to crime patterns and trend correlations. Intelligence analysis is the systematic collection, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of information on criminals. Operational analysis is the analytical study of policy service delivery to provide a basis for decisions to improve operations or deployment of resources. The planning element of the ICAP model is defined as a structured approach to police decision-making for both strategic and tactical decisions. Strategic decisions involve police decisions which affect the long-term solution to service delivery by organizational and structural changes whereas tactical decisions relate to short-term allocations of resources for service delivery made on the basis of information from crime analysis and operations analysis functions.

It is interesting to note that the ICAP model is not dependent upon computers, but recognizes that a manual system developed for purposes of analysis is a necessary precedent to a semi-automatic or automatic system of data collection. The rationale presented is that before an analyst can advance to an E.D.P. system he/she must be able to articulate specific functions expected to be performed by a computer. Factors to be considered in evaluating manual versus computer crime analysis are (1) size of crime analysis unit, (2) size of police department, (3) volume of crime, (4) level of analysis required, (5) problems addressed by the crime analysis unit, and (6) timeliness of the required reports.

The thrust of the ICAP model leads to the efficient and effective use of information in a number of computer-based analytical models as well as resource

allocation models. Specific software packages available at this time are POSSE (Police Operational Support System -- Elementary), CASS (Crime Analysis System Support), and CAD (Computer-Aided Dispatch). However, all of these software packages are contingent upon a well developed information system (consistent with the ICAP model) for implementation.

POSSE is a complete management information and records system designed to be used in small to medium police departments (10,000 to 150,000 population). POSSE automates the master name index, calls for service, UCR reporting, and investigative reporting. CASS is a flexible file management and retrieval system for use in crime analysis. Known offenders, suspects, FIR, and other files can be created and searched by any criteria. CAD supports complaint-taking and dispatching with automatic address look-up and various status displays as well as logging CFS data for management reports.

#### MIS Implementation

Although the ICAP model is logical for an overall point of view, it imposes a structured approach to decision-making that may be alien to on-going organizations which have made decisions based upon an experienced-based model in which the provision of services is based simply upon a requirement to provide such services based upon experience or tradition but not on factual information. In addition, although most organizations are strongly in favor of planning, there is usually no on-going formalized planning process, but rather, planning is simply reaction to circumstances and/or changes in the political environment. Unfortunately, most planning activities have resulted in implementation of those activities which are intuitively attractive to decision-maker but perhaps not completely justifiable based upon the facts, i.e., data. On the other hand, many such decisions have been correct since the human decision-



maker acting upon cumulative experience can in many instances surpass computer techniques and/or other techniques in arriving at decisions.

Unfortunately, as addressed in other sections of this report, the ICAP model assumes that a structured environment amenable to an academically-correct managerial model which includes the planning process exists in each location cooperating with the ICAP program. In this regard, the managerial process includes Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, and Controlling with feedback. Although this model works well in a strict managerial sense, it does not allow for the political process inherent in many public sector agencies as well as resistance to change when confronted with technological innovations.

In addition, the ICAP model does not recognize that in certain instances there are constraints on the sharing of information on an interdepartmental basis according to local policy or custom which might defeat the intent of the ICAP model. For example, intelligence information gathered from informants by a particular department, e.g., Vice, may not be able to be shared with other departments or put into a master file. There are a number of other instances where certain levels of information cannot be shared or become part of an integrated effort, it may be vital to the function of a department and thus is worthy of consideration for automation. Thus, a conflict occurs in this situation where a particular activity may greatly benefit from improved information processing but this possibility is precluded by the overall thrust of the ICAP model since these data elements would not or cannot be shared in a general sense.

#### MIS Discussion

While reviewing the quantitative data, it is interesting to note that although many critical remarks were made with respect to the ICAP effort, there is general approval of the intent of the ICAP program. Although some information is not generated fast enough, the information is useful and being used by both Patrol and Detective units. In particular, the bi-daily reports and crime bulletins were considered useful but not up to date. Interestingly, of all groups surveyed, the majority of respondents would not want to return to the methods used prior to the implementation of the ICAP project.

On-site discussions with personnel from various divisions are consistent with the questionnaire results. In principle, everyone agrees with the need for accurate and timely information regarding criminal activity. However, some comments were made which indicated a lack of confidence in the personnel involved in the ICAP effort since the analysts involved are not police officers or are not experienced in police matters. Another revealing comment was that "... we do not want to know anything about statistics, we want to know what is going on." This comment implies that there may be a lack of acceptance of statistical terminology and/or definitions. This suggests that perhaps training sessions might overcome this barrier in using the information generated by the ICAP unit.

Since the first phase of the ICAP program, manpower has been increased in the Crime and Operations Analysis area resulting in the ability to perform more analyses and develop useful information. Although the bi-daily books were considered too voluminous, it is standard procedure to purge each book of all daily sheet copies on a weekly basis and to eliminate the crime analysis forms every two weeks. It was pointed out that the "extra" information (daily

log copies) were included at the request of Patrol since they originally felt that the crime analysis forms were "too selective." Maps indicating ICAP target crimes for each district are located in the roll call room and are updated daily and reviewed at roll call. Each month, photographs are taken of the maps to aid in subsequent analyses.

Over the past year there seems to be an improving acceptance to the ICAP unit and the personnel involved. There are more frequent requests for information as well as suggesting D-runs and/or surveillance based upon information generated by the ICAP unit. Increasing, the Chief of Police, city hall officials, and others are requesting certain types of information which show that the ICAP unit is slowly being recognized as a focal point for information. Importantly, in the nine months since the ICAP analysts have been hired, seven arrests can be documented as having occurred as a result of the ICAP unit. Although deterrence is hard to measure, at least one problem area regarding car thefts has been minimized due to specific ICAP suggestions. It is also estimated that one-third fewer problems have occurred in the past time period due to deterrence strategies, saturation patrol, and/or intelligence field interview cards completed on suspects in those areas. One important aspect of the ICAP unit is the feedback of information. In this regard, a monthly crime analysis booklet is produced and given to each officer supplying all target crime information as follows:

(a) a type of crime and/or property taken, (b) M.O., (c) chronological and environmental factors, (d) if property recovered, where and in what condition, (e) has an arrest been made, and if so, who, (f) monthly comparison of crimes by post and Geo-code, (g) clearance rates, and (h) tables and charts to aid in the interpretation of the monthly report. There seems to be positive feedback pertaining to this booklet which is produced within ten working days of the preceding monthly time period reviewed.

There are some specific examples that deserve mention here to illustrate the foregoing remarks. First, Appendix G, H, I and J show the results of the intensive analysis by the Crime Analysis Unit which resulted in positive steps in crime prevention proposed through the City Council. Second, although there was a dispute over post boundaries, a three month analysis of calls for service resulted in steps toward redefining post boundaries as shown in Appendix K and L. In addition, Appendix M illustrates typical Intelligence Bulletins distributed through the Crime Analysis Unit and are included to indicate the nature of the bulletins used. Lastly, Appendix N shows typical pages included in the bi-daily books available for each Patrol officer.

Forms used from which ICAP derives its information are illustrated as follows. First, dispatchers not only use the Dispatch Card, Appendix B, but also use two small cards (Appendix B) to log administrative and personal time of Patrol officers. The standard Field Interview Report introduced by ICAP is illustrated in Appendix B. Other forms (most of which have been revised by the ICAP unit) are the Crime Investigation Report, Police Processing Report, Missing Persons Report, Felony Case Report, Case Processing Report, and the Supplemental Report in Appendix B. (Please note that each of these reports have a well-developed set of instructions which are also contained in Appendix B). There is an attempt to standardize abbreviations as illustrated in Appendix B with Standardized Crime Reporting System (SCRS) field report abbreviations.

The Tele-Serve Program was implemented by the ICAP program in April, 1980 during Phase II of the ICAP grant program. Appendix O elaborates upon the nature of this program as implemented at EPPD and also shows the intent of the records produced from the foregoing information and filed by the crime analyst.



### MIS Results

In discussing the progress for the Second Phase it seems appropriate to review the problems associated with Phase I and see what changes have been made.

1. Since Phase I ended, four new specialists have been added to the ICAP team. The Crime and Operations analyses are now being performed by two specialists. The over-emphasis on operations analysis has been corrected. Because of the close working relationship, the Crime Analyst receives more information and the difference in perspective from the Intelligence Analyst as well. The operations Analyst screens all calls for service on the dispatch cards and selectively pulls out more than the Crime Analyst who reviews only those targeted ICAP crimes. As was pointed out by the Crime Analyst, a miscellaneous call for service may shed more light on a crime pattern than the absence of a report for any such call.

The Intelligence Analyst has set up the necessary files and procedures to report to the ICAP model (see Appendix P).

2. In the last analysis bi-daily books were considered too voluminous by Patrol personnel. It is now a standard procedure to purge each book once a week of all daily sheet copies, and of crime analysis forms every two weeks. Each book now carries only timely information of the previous two weeks. Daily log copies have been included in the books because the officers felt they were receiving "too selective" a picture of crime in the city. The daily log is like a diary of each working day. Records Division now provides Crime Analysis with the necessary copies of the log as part of their standard routine.
3. A new beat restructuring proposal was worked up by Crime and Operations Analysis and forwarded to the Chief. Realignment based on geographics, workload and available manpower was forwarded in anticipation of favorable contract negotiations. There appears to be a problem here that must be addressed before a new contract is produced. An improvement has been made concerning the spot maps of ICAP crimes located in the roll call room. Using color coded dots as indicators of crime incidents created a problem in that a post man felt he looked bad with too many yellow dots in his area so he moved them. This effected crime analysis performance. As a result, each dot is numbered for its post and on individual offense maps the day the incident is recorded on the dot; color coded car thefts and recoveries are also indicated so that a visual pattern can be spotted. At the end of each month a photograph is taken of the overall spot map to aid in analysis and presentations.

4. Data on beat profiles and workload has been completed. The Patrol commanders see the necessity for recognizing beats and shifts but Patrol personnel are still threatened by minimum manning prospects. ICAP personnel have received communications from Patrol officers suggesting D-runs and/or surveillance. Other police departments have sought out these specialists for assistance. This would indicate a realization of the available potential in ICAP personnel and data.
5. A criminal Intelligence Analyst has been added since the last phase. His duties are summarized in Appendix P.
6. Training has been conducted for patrol personnel. However, ICAP personnel have not been as involved as they could have been. The training is more traditional in nature and not well coordinated with change acceptance or team building. Copies of course materials can be found in Appendix A. A great deal of planning yet has to be done here, especially in the performance evaluation as a function of training.
7. On the public relations fronts, it should be noted that ICAP personnel were asked to give several presentations to the public on crime prevention. Members of the clergy in East Providence requested their participation in a crime prevention forum. The forum was well publicized with a great deal of media exposure for unit as well as exposure to the taxpayers of the city.
8. This has been corrected by the Operations Analyst. The information is being used by management in contract negotiations.
9. The ICAP specialists feel that the information they receive from Patrol personnel have contributed to better planning. In one case, a suggested car theft area stake out eliminated this problem in that specific area. Suggested D-runs for a prowler resulted in an arrest. Ironically, in the nine months since the new analysts were hired, seven arrests can be documented. As far as deterrence strategy is concerned, at least triple the number of problem areas have seemed to subside due to suggested saturation Patrol and Intelligence Field Interview cards being filled out on suspects indicating to potential criminals that there does exist in East Providence, a network of information and a concerted effort to reduce the opportunity costs for crime.

In addition, a monthly analysis booklet is now collated and given to each officer. It supplies all target crime information in the following manner.

- Type of crime and/or property taken.
- MO.
- Chronological and environmental factors.

- If property was recovered, where and in what condition?
- Has an arrest been made? If so, who?
- Monthly comparisons are given.
- Both post and GEO code rates are given because GEO coding is more exact.
- Clearance rates are supplied showing the positive side to crime.
- Visual tables and charts are included to make the cognitive report less tedious.

Each report is five pages long. The Patrol officers see it as informative and of value. The crime analyst supplies this report within ten working days after the last day of each month to preserve the timeliness factor.

10. Even though there has been quite a bit done in the crime analysis areas, there is still a great deal more to be done in planning for the acceptance of ICAP. There is still a great deal of room for training on better management practices as well. In this area, there has been little significant progress.

In general, there has been a great deal of progress since Phase I in the operationalizing of the ICAP model. Our feeling is that the hiring of a new team has brought a great deal of activity and progress. There are some problems, however. We found a lack of measures of effectiveness for ICAP efforts. We also found the specialists extremely competent; with the available skills at hand they should be able to work more intensively to ask the basic questions--is there a correlation or causation between information generation and the reduction in target crimes? A review of the statistics shows crime up over 1978.

We also found a great deal of new data generated. Its use seems to be primarily for planning purposes. There are incidents where results can be directly linked to planning activities (see Appendix G) but the biggest problem of minimum manning is yet to be resolved. The results of the questionnaire are inconclusive about the usage of the bi-daily books. Even though officers see ICAP as having a positive effect, they have mixed feelings about the data they receive. Their responses on training also indicate

positive ratings. In our judgment, these measures of performance are too simplistic and ineffective for so superior an effort as has already been demonstrated by ICAP personnel. They need to concentrate on measuring application in this phase.

It is also clear that working conditions are still seen as inadequate. The facility, equipment, and uniforms contribute to the low morale. Yet, the Patrol officers evidence an understanding now that ICAP is a better management vehicle not a panacea for hardware and instant gratification. It could well be that ICAP has been an interesting diversion at a bad time, that the professionalism message overrides mundane concerns, or that ICAP has been ordered upon them. It is difficult to ascertain from the data.

Having considered the results of Phase II in relation to the project objectives of Phase I, it would be appropriate to consider the implication of the data within the categories mentioned in our approach philosophy.

#### C. Innovation Diffusion

ICAP seems to be an accepted phenomenon at the EPPD. It represents an innovation which has had a decisive effect on a fairly closed paramilitary culture. The fact that officers can identify ICAP purposes, see it is valuable, and would not return to pre-ICAP days tells us they respond positively or in neutral position to its objectives. It is difficult to tell from the questionnaire whether they are merely complying to orders or conforming to its intent.

From our interviews we found that there was a great deal of confusion still about expectations, problems with acceptance of ICAP personnel and with their leaders. We can understand this behavior better when considering



it in the light of Expectancy Theory. The question posed by the theory is: Will individual efforts at cooperation with ICAP goals yield rewards? A review of the extrinsic and intrinsic reward structure operation in the police department quickly showed that officers can expect little payoff for accepting ICAP imposed demands save for keeping their jobs. This question raises yet another more basic question: What do police officers value?

Our interviews show that they have a high sense of elitism, get satisfaction from adventure, action and intrigue. They enjoy a break from the monotony of riding around in vehicles and like administrative time, time to patronize and reinforce each other's need for affiliation. The need to communicate with each other is crucial to reinforce their own set or priorities and values, and, to bolster each other "against the outside world." There are many informal friendship groups within shifts and informal leaders who are suspicious of outsiders, even other shift officers. With a great deal of time to ride around and communicate with friends comes a great deal of time to do independent police work or complain about the lack of opportunity to do so. There is a healthy level of complaining going on; most of it in the form of projection, rationalization, and a response to loneliness and disenfranchisement from the total police picture.

We found officers to be very inquisitive about other departments, their commanders, about crime and their own welfare. ICAP has delivered a wealth of information which has satisfied their need to a great degree, but ICAP purposes are not romantic, neither does better management or interdepartmental cooperation excite dreams of adventure in a young officer's heart as he patrols Waterman Avenue. The potential for cooperation on D-runs and stake-outs does relieve the monotony and increase the sense of total involvement in a larger picture. The expectations of job satisfaction in this regard does

raise a question of intrinsic rewards that does not seem to be addressed by ICAP personnel. What the program needs is an opinion leader (or leaders) who can translate ICAP requirements into the world of the patrolman. With imagination and a realization that compliance to orders can move into conformity with the understanding of the socialization process, an informal leader can find the right hot button to push.

Another aspect of innovation diffusion to be considered is the flow of communications. The results show that interdepartmental relations reflect the classical organizational structure. The flow of formal messages travel down and sideways between departments and shifts, reports are also formal and carefully considered. Communications from dispatchers and between vehicles is similarly formal and in code. The symbols are indigenous to this culture and are used to economize and extract any sense of individualism or comment or emotion. Depersonalization is the theme of their humanness from above and from peers.

Recognizing that the department exists on various levels of activity we can better understand the flow of communications or change. On the manifest level we see the formal relations and overt transactions. The informal level is less obvious. This is the level of cliques and informal groups. The group tempers perceptions and demands certain compliance with norms; and these norms may be in direct conflict with those of the manifest level. On the personal level we see the individual trying to find identity relating to both the manifest and the informal. Knowing these levels helps us appreciate that reactions to overt attempts at change are ameliorated by expectations. On the manifest level, the union responds to messages that threaten the status quo. On the covert, shifts and subgroups react to ICAP civilians,

reporting requirements, the distant chief, and each other. On the personal, the officer seeks attachments and exercises his fears and hopes that ICAP will bring a safer vehicle, better equipment, hope for more advantages.

On each level, the selective perceptions operate. When the minimum manning issue comes up, the union perceives a threat to its power and control over working conditions; when orders come down to change reporting procedures, the groups have an issue to coalesce around. "Policing" the norms is exciting and gives a group or shift member the opportunity to reflect on something new, something around which he can get closer to his group's values. When an individual officer sees a need to cooperate, he may well violate the norm of the group (the dislike for ICAP civilians and the chief) to exercise some reaction to innovation. For example, sharing information with ICAP personnel is in some cases viewed as fraternizing with the enemy. But if a need for getting more information on a crime pattern exceeds the pull of the group then a break is made in resistance to change. The need to work on these people and on early adaptors is crucial to the acceptance of ICAP. It seems that a few good success stories would go a long way to bring the rest of the group around from public compliance to private conformity.

In this regard, it is still necessary to integrate ICAP benefits into the value system of patrol officers as they live on all three levels of organizational life. To do this, there is a need for the improvement of morale, interdepartmental team work, exploitation of early adaptors and persuasion from testimonies where ICAP was translated into patrol benefits. This program is still in need of a great deal of selling and translation.

#### D. Organizational Management

Planning is a term that either brings joy to the hearts of some high order abstractors or terror to the action oriented. In many paramilitary cultures it is seen as superfluous, nice to have, but not realistic. Akin to education, it is seen as theoretical and useful if time permits. What is being thrown out with the bathwater is the entire process by which we conduct our lives. Even the greatest detractor of planning does it albeit subconsciously. What most fear is the articulation of the process or the consequences of having to lay out goals and priorities.

Planning in its most basic form is concerned with taking action in the present to be able to control events in the future. Failure to plan puts organizations and individuals at the mercy of events, making one reactive and stagnant rather than anticipatory. The entire essence of ICAP is wrapped up in the planning process. Rather than repeat random patrolling and responding to calls for service, the data is to identify potential trends, improve the allocation of resources, and improve the decision making process as to be more premeditative.

In the larger sense, management utilizes planning to achieve objectives through people and the allocation of resources. Planning is the process through which operational goals of a department and ICAP program basis get classified and institutionalized. How well ICAP programs and operational goals mesh with police departmental operational and interdepartmental goals becomes a key issue. Both categories seem to be directed at reducing crime; the organization covers all crimes, organized, street and other while ICAP only relates to a subcategory of target crimes. Some of ICAP's initial goals have been broadened to encompass organizational operating goals, management control systems, integration of departments and information control. Goals become confused, nebulous, abstract and hard to operationalize.



When reviewing the grant proposal, reports and objectives of the department it became clear that a need exists to redefine all goals. If not, order and planning become academic. An additional fly in the ointment has caused many public agencies to reconsider planning. Goals are now being severely hampered by budget constraints and management's ability to act with fiscal skill. The trend seems to be towards greater utilization of resources, retrieval and retraining towards financial management. These constraints on planning should be enough of a motivator to make chiefs of police sit down and rethink priorities. The planning should be in the following areas.

1. Overall organizational operating, program, and divisional planning.

"What business should the East Providence Police Department be in?"

2. ICAP operating and program planning.

"What are the specific ICAP goals we want to push in 1980-81, 81-82?"

"How do these goals interact with the organizational goals?"

- a. Planning for attitude change and innovation acceptance.

"How do we socialize patrol personnel into desired behavior now and reinforce it when funding ends?"

- b. Planning for multiple uses of Management Information Systems.

"How do we measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire record keeping, reporting, and data gathering functions?"

- c. Planning for the continuing education of command personnel.

"How do we get command personnel to utilize good setting and planning as a daily operation?"

An immediate reassessment of goals would pinpoint problem areas, suggest strategies and action programs to reverse and monitor any trends. What we are alluding to here is the necessity for the establishment of some management monitoring system to see if ICAP impacted on organizational goals. With the present system we have few concrete goals, few performance measures and few solid indications of quantitative changes.

Akin to the planning process is the control system. At present, the Management Information System is set up to capture data about crime activity. It does not have a self-regulating system built in to monitor operations as well as program goals. It would be extremely worthwhile to see the MIS system expanded to monitor organizational operating goals.

The organizational structure as presently described is highly formal. Lines of authority and communication follow closed system boundaries with little crossing. This creates serious status and operational problems. The traditional detective/patrol relationship has been discussed in the literature in great detail. The observations tend to hold in East Providence. There is little sense of common purpose or team spirit between departments. When Patrol personnel rotate to Detectives, they return with greater potential for developing informal ties. Several recent experiments show the value of breaking the formal lines and raising the status of Patrol.

ICAP suggests how reporting systems can be used to integrate subdivisions. We tested their reference to integrating through better reporting systems. Records, routing, reports and files were examined in Vice, Detectives, and Patrol (where security was not an issue) and the relationship of Vice to the State drug control operation and to two other Rhode Island police departments. We found that different missions, need for security, lack of education in information systems, trust and personalities dictate the types of reporting and little feeling for the need to integrate reporting and recording systems. The personal information files, hoarding of information and overutilization of "security" cover a multitude of sins.

The Chief's delegation leadership style is appropriate for department heads who are educated in information control, management, or have the

desire to cooperate in the integration effort, but even with the willingness we saw there appears to be a need for more planning and control of interdepartmental relations.

Reporting systems are only one form of interaction. Alone they cannot form cooperation and the sharing of information. At present, Patrol, Detectives and Vice see operation as power. They still resist giving it up to others they feel will use it inadequately. This could be why specialists lock up data at 4:00 p.m. so evening Patrol cannot use it as needed. It could also be that these units do not feel that integration is essential, and in many cases, a division of labor and expertise is more appropriate. In any event, there should be more planning in the control of data and the integration of the relationship between units.

#### E. Organizational Behavior

At no time has there been more controversy over the proper role of the "modern" Patrol officer. Recent court decisions and social unrest in the 1960's and 70's have brought police operations under greater scrutiny. The controversy continues with little apparent agreement on the ideal pattern of behavior or profile for the police officer. Academicians and practitioners are in a quandry on even the right approach to the problem.

In the initial and continuing socialization processes recruits are conditioned to the values of academic norms, direct supervisors, and the value set of the immediate work group. Traditional views of officer behavior teach that crime prevention is a function of apprehension, that a good officer is one who follows orders and does not question those above him. This type of classical conditioning removes the officer from the organizational decisions and events that effect his life. He has little, if any, say in

the process which rewards or punishes him. Under this system seniority, testing ability, political connections and obedience are the paths to status and rank. This is the key point. Without knowledge of the organization and how to participate in change there is little testing of the classical philosophy that the upper echelons of management have an absolute edge on knowledge. No one tests and no one allows for a testing of tradition. One Chief of Police in Rhode Island condensed this point into a single sentence, "I don't want my men to think."

The 1960's saw the emergence of the behavioral approach in criminal justice. Organizational behavior specialists, mainly social psychologists and psychologists moved into the public and private sectors. Their approach concentrated on the use of humanistic techniques. Apprehensions were still sought but deterrence, understanding and empathy were advocated to treat the symptoms of criminal activity. Needless to say, this approach required value changes, norm changes, education and risk. The dilemma caused by this approach solidified entrenched positions. It was simplistic and still classical in its application. Organizational behavior and counselling techniques were taught as alternatives. Little was done to teach the officer how and when to differentiate. The balancing of both caused strains on the basic values of the paramilitary relationship structure. Many chiefs were highly threatened by participative management. Some saw the law and order issues and scarce resources as justification to return to a hard line. In any event, much of the value of this approach was thrown out because in application it violated the very things it taught.

In the last few years a more contingent approach has emerged which focuses on training police officers to think and differentiate. By developing tools of analysis he can make more effective decisions, be they related to

classical, traditional, or behavioral approaches. This approach is more contingent in that through more education and participation in the organization he can effect the events which give him rewards. Again, this approach may be highly threatening to the insecure manager who relies on position power and coercive negative reinforcement to maintain control.

What we are alluding to here is a change in perspective about the organizational role of the officer vis-a-vis his role as defined operationally. This is important because ICAP addresses the operational role and assumes that officers will follow orders and implement change without question. If we again refer to Expectancy Theory and the Lawler model of motivation we see that performance (acceptance and conformity with behavior prescribed by ICAP changes) under a classical conditioning model guarantees compliance which will only last as long as officers see reinforcement of sanctions or benefits from the mere act of following orders. Under an operant conditioning model, performance is seen as a function of ability and motivation. If the officers see themselves as part of an integrated team, learning, contributing and participating in ICAP programs, they may well derive rewards from the program.

These rewards are worth discussion. Under the classical concepts of organizations, be they paternalistic or dictatorial (e.g., paramilitary), man is considered an economic animal. His motivation can be manipulated simply by delivering extrinsic rewards such as status, rank, position, money, uniforms, vacations, etc.. With the emergence of the human relations movement men and women were now considered "social." Rewards come from membership in workgroups, from personal satisfaction, from participation and loyalty.

In the East Providence Police Department there is little overall application of social consciousness to the implementation of ICAP. Rewards are seen as nebulous but not directly connected to the officers intrinsic needs or his extrinsic expectancies.

Closely allied to the discussion on group dynamics is the concept of leadership. In a paramilitary organization such as the East Providence Police Department one would anticipate an autocratic leadership style from top management. However, under close examination it was found that the Chief's style was basically to delegate authority without delegating responsibility. It may be entirely appropriate in the political context of his relationship with several hostile city council leaders and with the union. The more dictatorial he becomes or the more changes he makes, the more boats he rocks. Change disrupts power relationships. This, in turn, would get back to political leaders who would, in turn, put pressure on the Chief to treat politically powerful members of the force and other officers in a more restrained fashion. To survive, the Chief may well develop a contingency style; always cautious of the political consequences.

This type of restrained behavior has caused a power vacuum in the organization. Since the group norm is for cohesiveness around the values of paramilitary leadership and tight control, it is easy to see how loyalty flows to the Shift Commander not the Patrol Commander or Chief. This is understandable because they have direct relationship with their direct supervisor.

After reviewing the responses of officers this all seems to boil down to an observation that there is little organizational excitement or "glue" to tie the entire department together. Shifts have developed their own separate identities. Detective, Records and Vice operate independently and ICAP is under question by the union. One of the primary objectives of ICAP is to tie all of this together. To do so requires a dynamic control leader-



ship and a tight control by the city council, town manager, Chief, and all command personnel. In the absence of the appropriate climate for innovation diffusion independent cultures combat change or assimilate it to their liking. To survive in a political environment where hostile political forces are constantly pushing the Chief and Command personnel in one direction or another requires adaptive leadership and conservative management techniques. Yet, to receive ICAP funds the department is required to change certain manning allocations and concepts of productivity which upset political relationships, the union, certain city council members, and many police officers. How change can be introduced in a political climate seems to be at the root of this problem.

On paper, the Chief's management position and authority are well spelled out. In reality, interlocking power relationships dictate his leadership response. Where management represents a role conferred on an individual and a process of achieving organization goals leadership is seen as the exercise of personal power. In this context, a leader is one who creates illusions of organizational excitement through the communication arts using emotional means of persuasion. Where management relies on institutional power, leadership relies upon personal power to give the goals excitement and the followers a feeling of "strength." As in any organization, the management leadership styles and personality of the key power holders set the organizational climate. After reviewing the responses to the Phase I, Phase II and interviews with officers, it is evident that the Chief and his Command staff are not perceived as effective managers or leaders. Many felt that the Chief motivates and teaches by negative enforcers, that he does not have direct personal contact at meetings or roll calls with his men, and when he does see them it is in a disciplinary context. He is seen as not very approachable, not accessible, or as a possessor of information or expert power. Since he is seen as working directly through the chain of command he

is isolated from the problems and "humanness" of his men. The officers fill in the vacuum by performing the culturally demanded rites associated with a paramilitary organization. They do not see a specific goal or direction for the Department; neither do they feel any organizational excitement from the ICAP leadership. By not being seen as involved in the daily operations of ICAP or the Department, the Chief is seen as not caring about centralizing his power or confronting his officers. This may well be an indication that the Chief is not "power hungry" or threatened by change. He has to be extremely careful in a department where political realities and critics stand on the side lines ready to criticize, never having to face the same pressures, and unwilling to assist.

To truly appreciate the dilemma, one must consider the nature of the paramilitary culture. In general, the Patrol officer commands a great deal of discretion in the performance of his job. The Chief has little; he is not at the scene of every crime or accident. The chain of command is set up to allow him this freedom of action, given policy guidelines. In the military context, the contrary holds. Generals and line officers have great discretion allowing the individual soldier much less ability to command local battles. One could envision the confusion of a battle situation if every soldier was a General.

With more discretion the police officer has expectations of the Chief and his commanders vis-a-vis their roles. Many officers believe command personnel should be attending more closely to each situation as it develops, uncertainty in their world is filled with perceptions of hostility for those they feel are not "working" as hard. In truth, they do not understand the role of the Chief and the pressures he faces. Many officers were want to criticize but when faced with examples of the types of problems he faced became confused with details and resorted to personality traits they disliked

and rumors. It was apparent that many officers felt they were experts in everything from Vice, Detectives, management because they had control of their patrol sectors and duties. Over-generalization has led many to form impressions that have no basis in fact.

Reliance on command personnel and staff may well be a limited move in correcting these problems. The Chief needs information that goes beyond what is available in the traditional body of knowledge of criminal justice or operating procedures in the East Providence Police Department. With such complex problems, it may well be that all Chiefs face a similar basic problem--the problem of acquiring relevant and requisite information on how to manage and lead under innovation situations. More contact with experts and literature is needed. If anything, the ICAP adventure has shown how maladaptive traditional models of police management, leadership, union relations and organizational design become when changes are made to the system.

In all of this the role of the Chief must be viewed objectively, a dictatorial style forcing ICAP would be commensurate with expectations from a paramilitary culture. He could force compliance with "tough through" union reactions. The ultimate end would be a hollow victory in arbitration or a public defeat which would erode what little institutional power he had left to reward or punish. A humanistic counselling style might be interpreted as weakness and leave more opportunity for a power play from the union or officers who would misinterpret participative management.

The question we are raising here is how well the Chief actually can perform given conditions with the city council, the politicizing of the department, the pressures from the union, ICAP requirements, the nature of the culture, and his need for a viable source of information. It is easy to see the Chief as the focal point of all ills, much harder to share the responsibility for them. The expectations held by Patrol officers of the Chief are valid. His expectations of them are equally valid. Ultimately, the help he gets from advisors, and the support he has from the city manager and council sets the climate for more proactive management.

#### Implications

Several important points jump out after an analysis of the situation.

- A. Innovations into any organization, be they paramilitary, or participative, need to be viewed in a behavioral and political context. Innovations are accepted or rejected by people who see change as threatening or beneficial to their own spheres of influence.
- B. Innovations to be effective must be advanced through the personal power of the leadership. Resistance to institutional power is more common than to leaders who use charismatic techniques to create illusions for the implementation.
- C. The introduction of change puts stress on line and staff relationships as well as different levels and departments. This is especially true when one department (Patrol) or the staff (Plans and Training) or the key change agent (Captain Ferreira) are seen as benefiting more than the entire department. Where the change comes from, and how the power balances are affected creates perceptions of threat and isolation from the action. Unless these implications are analyzed before any change is attempted the change will fail. The failure will be laid at the feet of the innovation rather than at the feet of those who tried to move it, where it properly belongs.
- D. Leadership, conflict and organizational research cannot be carried out in the absence of the other. To merely cite leadership of the power holders as the key variable to change resistance is as offensive as blaming the ICAP model for its failure in implementation.

E. It appears that the key to effectiveness in the Chief's position is not found solely in his ability to manage police operations, lead effectively, or be able to identify relevant and requisite information. To have a loyal following is admissible but not essential to survive. Ability to relate, persuade, and manipulate perceptions of constituents is most crucial. This is the fountain head of support; yet this is the area in which there is little formal training for police chiefs. Personal power, personality, and political acumen are the keys to survival. In this political environment where patronage and personality differences abound there are few rules for survival save those that come with combat experience. To expect a chief to be an effective manager, leader, expert on change, and politician is asking the impossible. Few people have these concurrent abilities under all conditions. Holding some constant while operating on others might work. However, when a change comes in the form of federal money, the innovation could be a threat which calls the entire departmental relations balance into question.

F. Labor Relations

East Providence is an ICAP department with a dual challenge to change agents: the very difficult task of bringing change to the rigid order of police work and at the same time to bring about that change through changing a union contract.

Based upon the experience of the ICAP evaluators dealing with other police departments the twin hurdles referred to above are not unusual in union organized police departments, but East Providence stands out as uncommon in that it has had three eight-hour shifts identified in the union contract. The shift structure has stood in contrast to the patterns of crime activity identified by ICAP.

To understand the complexity of bringing about change in a unionized department LEAA officials should understand the dynamics of union politics as well as the recognizable traits of resistance to change in any structured organization. Sometimes, within the same constituency the union dynamics and the change elements can be at odds and to bring them together can be no small achievement. For example, for a city to deal with a union membership directly on terms and conditions of employment is an unfair labor practice;

if the city convinces a union leadership of the importance of certain kinds of change and the perception of the union leadership is that the membership resistance is too great, the union may decline to become the advocate for fear of being identified as having "sold out" or simply as being politically out of touch. At the same time, even if a union leadership becomes convinced of the acceptability of change it may be unwilling to acknowledge it while it tries to negotiate other improvements in salary or fringes thus appearing to concede for a return concession and convert the change into a politically safe "city demand."

Another difficulty in police union labor relations is the frequent (universal in Rhode Island) inclusion of the Chief and top brass in the bargaining unit. To the city, the Chief and the senior officers are "cops," often coming from the ranks and therefore not considered the city's agents in department operations. To the rank and file, the Chief and his staff are "brass" and out of sympathy with the rank and file. In East Providence and many other departments, the promotional ladder can lead from patrolmen to chief; as a paramilitary organization often engaged in life and death situations, the organization develops as a kind of closed society, e.g., one is either a police officer or a civilian. That sentiment is reciprocated in the dealings between the civilian control of the department by elected officials and the organization of the department.

Given the number of barriers to change that are erected because of the above cited relationships it obviously becomes difficult enough to bring about change, but there is one additional and important complication; the politics of the election of the city council. It is difficult enough to bring about rational change, but a police strike or visible police unhappiness with administration is always and anywhere a volatile political element.



Politics has always been recognized as a fluid decision making process and in crisis not always a rational process of decision making. A crisis between the elected municipal leadership and elected union leadership can easily lead to a breakdown of law and order with both parties losing sight of the primary objectives of preservation of order and acceptable conditions of employment. Secondary objectives of public political reaction and bargaining strength come to the fore.

For example, from personal interviews with people involved in the New Orleans police strike it became apparent to a member of the EPPD ICAP evaluation team that an anti-union attitude and the mutual failure to assess the determination of the other side led to the bitter strike and cancellation of Mardi Gras and both the city and the union leadership ended up with a teamster local that they would rather not have had. The city did what it could to avoid union recognition altogether, and then recognized a fraternal group which was (we were told) predominantly made up of retired officers. The union leadership then, for reasons of perceived strength, asked for teamster assistance and chartering and abandoned their hope for a police-only union organization. Disappointment with teamster assistance after the strike was over (at the time) outweighed by the feeling that a change to another union or independent status would lead to a rejection of bargaining unit status by the city and bring all the collective effort back to square one.

Certainly the labor relations climate in East Providence is much different from the climate in New Orleans a year ago, but the public reliance on the thin blue line is every bit as strong and therefore not to be ignored. ICAP certainly represents change. A change in the rigid order of business, a change in the working conditions (creation of demand for new shift to parallel newly identified patterns of criminal activity), a change in union-man-

agement relations (the ICAP changes originate with department brass who are members of the bargaining unit, but are negotiated by city), and a basic attitude change toward change itself.

It is our impression that most of the ICAP changes can be implemented in spite of the procedural and organizational obstacles. The department clearly is in favor of performing better police work and although not all aspects of the ICAP program are appreciated, the survey result showing a reluctance to return to pre-ICAP days demonstrates general appreciation of the program.

#### G. Community Survey

In a change process, causation factors for change must be targeted and examined in order to determine what paths should be taken to obtain a goal and to evaluate the change model's success.

Since one of ICAP's main goals is to provide better service to the community, it seems assumptions were made that something was wrong with the present delivery system. Community satisfaction or dissatisfaction had not been measured by the EPPD; therefore, this issue was examined and a questionnaire was designed to obtain the public sector's opinion of service provided by their police department.

The opinion poll was administered via telephone to a total of 115 residents selected at random from the East Providence City Directory. Results of each question will be discussed in turn (all percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percentage point).

Confidence in Police. A large majority (85%) of the respondents expressed confidence in the police to protect themselves and their property. Fifty six percent expressed a lot of confidence. Only 4% had no confidence, and 10% offered no opinion.

This high degree of confidence shown by the community may be largely attributed to the visibility of Patrol in the neighborhoods.

Visibility of Police Patrols. For instance, when residents were asked if they thought that the presence of police patrols in their neighborhood deterred crime, 70% said yes, definitely or somewhat. In addition, 84% of those polled responded that Patrol was visible to some degree in their neighborhoods. Whether or not crime actually is deterred by the presence of patrol cars, the public seems to feel more confident if they see police in their area. It may be one of the prime ways of community's measurement of police availability.

Adequacy of Police Protection. While its confidence factor was reported very high, the community showed a slightly less positive response to whether or not the city provided adequate police protection to them. Although this question appears redundant, it serves to compare the public's confidence in their police and how well they perceive they are actually being protected. Seventy-nine percent felt it was adequate, with 35% specifying to high degree. Nineteen percent felt the city did not provide adequate public protection. This latter percentage differs substantially from the low 4% who had previously responded to have no confidence in police to protect them.

There are several reasons which may help to explain the difference in responses. First, as previously mentioned the relatively high visibility of patrol seems to spawn more confidence in police. Secondly, the incidences which cannot be controlled immediately by Patrol (such as crimes with no suspects) may frustrate citizens toward the police. Thirdly, because of constraints in budget, manpower and vehicles, all areas cannot be highly protected at the same time.

Contact With EPPD Last Year. Forty-three percent of citizens polled reported that they had contacted the EPPD within the past year. Of these calls, 55% were target related. The majority of the calls were made during the evening hours; 63% phoned between 4:00 p.m. - 12:00 a.m., 22% called between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., and 15% contacted the police between 12:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.

Speed of Response. Nearly three-fourth (73%) of those who contacted the EPPD rated the speed of response as good to excellent. About 16% gave a fair rating, and 12% rated response as poor.

Handle the Situation. Responses to this question concerning how the officer handled the situation were unstructured. More than half (53%) offered positive responses, with 19% responding with a fair rating. Twelve percent felt the situation was not handled well; 16% had no opinion. The positive response figure seems to tie in with that of problems solved by the officer.

Solve the Problem. Over half (51%) of those who contacted the police reported that the officer either solved the problem or contacted someone else who could help solve it. Forty-five percent indicated that the officer did not solve the problem.

While this last percentage is high, it should be mentioned that several people admitted that the problem could not easily be solved on the spot, especially by one officer. Examples given were vandalism, auto theft, and stolen property.

Because of the ambiguity of this question, no real conclusions can be drawn from the results. It does, however, help to pinpoint the relation of problems solved to those unsolved.

## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the main some very fine progress was made in Phase II. Certain problems still remain, especially with implementation and decisive action needed to rethink some basic strategies, especially the role of computers in crime deterrence.

In order to lay out a plan for evaluating this evaluation the recommendations are broken down into two parts. The first deals with general procedures, the second with specific substantive recommendations.

### A. Procedural Recommendations

#### 1. The Role of the Chief and ICAP Head.

1. Upon receipt of this report, the Chief should plan to meet with the ICAP head to discuss the findings and ways of implementing those that are acceptable. They should also plan the sharing of the results with command, union personnel, and the city council.

2. An analysis should be made of the Phase I and II recommendations to see what progress was or was not made. A working session should be held with all of the yearly reports at hand. Such a meeting would go a long way to compare and contrast ICAP goals and evaluations by this team.

3. A report should be made to the Patrol personnel through the correct channels, either in an orientation meeting or a meeting conducted by ICAP personnel.

The notion behind these recommendations is that change in ICAP policy and implementation should first be discussed at the highest department level. The evaluation should be consulted for explanations and elaboration. Any information about this recommendation should only be released after the Chief understands the data and decides on a dissemination strategy. Most of this report could be used politically. It is intended to be therapeutic and objective, not as fuel to fire personality feuds or conflicts.

#### 2. The Role of ICAP Personnel.

##### 1. The team should study the report and plan conference sessions.

The evaluators should be invited, again, to clarify specifics. An implementation MBO should be discussed fully. Although we have not discussed management by objectives in the text we do feel it would be a good starting point for the Chief to go back to the notes on MBO discussed at a Chief's meeting in Newport in 1979. An MBO framework could be worked out quite easily. The evaluation report for the structured Management Conference for New England Law Enforcement Officers (LEAA grant #79-4426-C2A2) has some cogent recommendations that still hold true for Chiefs and command subordinates (see Appendix E).

2. The overall national goals of ICAP should be redefined as they apply to East Providence and tested for applicability. There seems to be a problem differentiating between implementation of ICAP and central goals as they stand in the grant proposal.

3. Measures of effectiveness for the Management Information System and the ICAP model should be devised so we can test effectiveness and efficiency as a basis for planning. In addition, measures of effectiveness should be devised for the ICAP effort in East Providence and for positions. It is vitally important to see a policy replanning of deterrence. At present, deterrence and projections do not receive the emphasis they should.

4. The ICAP model developed in this report should be used as a basis for discussion. It seems to direct attention to reality and offer a better method for focusing on the implementation of change.

5. There should be continuous meetings of the entire ICAP staff to discuss the better management of their efforts. One of these meetings should be set aside to discuss the implementation of innovation in a paramilitary



context. The ICAP evaluation team could serve as a resource until the team functioned on its own.

6. The training and utilization of these people should be rethought. It is our perception that they are extremely able, cooperative, underutilized and under-oriented to the daily operations. We saw little expanding of their jobs to encompass evaluation and research on implementation.

ICAP personnel should be required to relate throughout the entire department. They should go out on patrol, spend time in Dispatch, Records, Detectives and Vice. The relationship and perspective would be invaluable.

7. ICAP personnel should be actively involved in the training function. They should be involved in the planning of courses, agenda for orientation and the evaluation of that training. More use should be made in public relations to show how federal money is being used as a model for change. The ICAP personnel should be doing more consulting with other police departments in the state. This outreach program could run concurrently with that of the community relations section to seek out opportunities to tell the ICAP story. The success of efforts in this area should be expanded not only to bring a message, but to enhance a feeling of cohesiveness in the personnel area should be expanded not only to bring a message, but to enhance a feeling of cohesiveness in the personnel. We see them as more than clerks or researchers.

8. ICAP personnel should work on a plan to improve their relationship with Patrol personnel. Admittedly, Patrol shares in this problem as well but civilians are "outsiders" and therefore need to consider their roles in any attempt to influence.

9. The role and duties of the ICAP principle investigator should be redefined. As the head of overall Plans and Training, and as the internal

inspection officer the roles of change agent and staff officer create ambiguity for the patrol personnel. A program manager with police background should head the ICAP unit.

10. ICAP personnel should make a point to brief union as well as management on ICAP operations. They should not be seen as allied with management, hence, the enemy. ICAP personnel should be seen as a center of information and expertise that transcends departmental politics.

Because of their information and expert power, the ICAP team poses a threat to police officers who see the encroachment as an erosion of their legitimate power. Traditionally, the role of the patrol officer contained many of the duties now performed by the team. What was once sacred territory is now yielding to modern management techniques. A little more perspective is needed in understanding this problem. This can only come about when both sides work together on specific ICAP problems. It is up to ICAP personnel to work out this cooperation. The common enemy should be clearly defined; vague goals should not turn ICAP, Patrol and Dispatch personnel into competitors, neither should disenchantment with the management recoil on ICAP.

### 3. Command Personnel.

1. This management group should set aside on a regular basis to do an organizational assessment, set goals and plan for the integration of communications systems and control activities. The first session should concentrate on the evaluation of this evaluation.

2. Development education should be addressed as quickly as possible and plans set up for implementing contingency management education for staff and command personnel. In the Phase I report this was a very strong recommendation. We cannot help but re-emphasize it in the same form.

3. Command should rethink its power position in relation to the reward structure in the department. There is a new movement that could well serve here and we recommend it. It is known as Quality of Work Life.<sup>10</sup> It represents a movement (General Motors, A.T.T.) dealing with: the work itself; the work environment, including the physical surroundings and the management style and climate. The focal point of QWL is the "Quality Circle." This would be a system where the Patrol officer with ICAP staff, Detectives and Vice, tackle operational problems which traditionally have been decided by management alone. When a management team lays QWL they commit themselves to:

- . Communicating better, more openly.
- . Broadening participation in decision making and problem solving, providing Patrol and other rank and file personnel the opportunity to input and feedback about matters affecting their work.
- . Where possible, designing better matrix groups, more meaningful job assignments.
- . Being willing to solicit and adopt suggestions for alternative work methods and extending the degrees of freedom on the job to see whether different methods and practices will produce the same or better results.

Adopting the value of QWL does not mean that top management waives accountability or responsibility or even surrenders managerial prerogatives. It means that the people who work as specialists should be solicited to contribute to the running of their own operations. The benefits of this kind of an approach are:

- . Command is placed in and enjoys a more satisfying role.
- . Patrol and civilian personnel develop a sense of being important, respected as individuals.

<sup>10</sup> "Quality of Work Life: A Matter of Style," HGR, AT&T Long Lines, No. 2, 1980, pp. 6-9.

- . Organizational and ICAP information becomes more open.
- . Interest in the work and the department is enhanced.
- . Gripes become suggestions, grievances are more often settled on the spot.
- . Command and Patrol officers' priorities become more congruent.
- . Problem discussions more often lead to problem solutions.
- . Operations improve.

Recent research in management shows that regardless of the type of organization, public or private, people have a basic competence drive to perform well. When rewarded with respect and appreciation they see intrinsic reward of greater value than money, promotion, etc. QWL focuses on the development of a department and a leadership style where the pride in membership and loyalty override power struggles. Command would do well to consider these ideas, remembering that implementation would require a great deal of planning.

#### 4. Uniformed Personnel.

1. Union leadership should explore the implications of productivity measures, minimum manning and long range planning in conjunction with the ICAP team.
2. Rotation between departments should be encouraged and shift rotation explored as a means to increase job enrichment.
3. Patrol personnel should work on a plan to improve their relationship with civilian personnel. They are here to stay and have the same competence motivation.

## VII. SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Facility and Equipment

As in the first evaluation we recommend increased effort on the part of the city manager and council in obtaining a new facility, new radio equipment and uniforms. The present working conditions are inadequate for ICAP expansion and planning. Morale is still low and little hope is seen for a quick solution. Quality police work cannot be performed from a garage.

### B. The Chief

We recommend that the Chief move out with great effort to improve his image with the Patrol personnel. Even though much of his institutional power has eroded because of the union contract and the lack of support he perceives from the city council there are opportunities to implement a change in management operations. He should explore ways to accommodate, be seen as more involved and supportive of quality of life changes.

In making these recommendations, we realize the loneliness of his position and delicacy of the Chief's role. ICAP's success is inevitably wrapped up in his success yet they are both separate.

### C. The City Manager and the Council

From our interviews it appears that some council members have become directly involved in police operations. This represents a touchy management problem. As employees perceive council members as means of "bucking the departmental system" power relationships emerge which depreciate the institutional power of the Chief and his commanders. We strongly recommend that the city council not interfere in the daily management of the police department.

In the absence of measures of effectiveness and efficiency for the department personal feuds, or friendships tend to color the evaluation. We recommend that clearer goals and policy statements be designed for the department and that the city manager and councilmen support the Chief regardless of their personal feelings.

We further recommend that ICAP personnel, the Chief, the ICAP evaluators, and the ICAP head meet with the city council to explain the evaluation and suggest ways for more cooperation between all levels of management. In the final analysis, the success of ICAP rests on the shoulders of the city manager and the council. Their support or non-support effects any change.

A big decision will have to be made when the grant expires. This decision point is not too far down the road. The city manager and council will have to decide whether or not to pick up the cost of ICAP.

If they do, it will represent a sizeable outlay in funds. The commitment will have to be such that the ICAP philosophy and operating procedures will be continued, any change will jeopardize the intricate network of data collection and team work that must be maintained to fulfill the promise of the ICAP model.

If, on the other hand, the key decision makers in the city do not intend to continue ICAP, then a series of actions are in order now. A study should be started to assess the effects of activity reductions. If a great deal of federal money is invested in computers and then ICAP personnel are reduced the very use of the computers would be compromised. A reduction in one area would radiate throughout the entire system such that a proposed reduction in dispatchers reduces the collection of data which eventually effects the quality of information going to Patrol personnel. We therefore recommend:



1. If the city council and manager decide not to continue with ICAP after the grant runs out they -

- a. Return federal funds for the last phase and close down ICAP operations; or
- b. Retain the funds and use it to salvage and implement those ICAP procedures that can be used within the available budget.

The acceptance of federal funds should be based on the understanding that a commitment to continue is implied.

2. The absence of professional consultations when the second phase was started caused serious problems. Command personnel and the city council and manager made decisions (sometimes by default) primarily because they were too close to the problems, and, unfamiliar with the implementation of change.

We recommend.

- a. If the third phase is to be implemented that a management specialist be retained to help in the implementation.
- b. Even if a formal evaluation is not required in Phase III an evaluation be made by ICAP personnel with consulting assistance from LEAA-Washington or their consulting service. The problem we cited should be addressed with outside help. At present we see no mechanism within the system to correct the problem which they started.

#### D. Patrol Personnel

In Phase I we recommended education which would give officers more of a role in critical analysis than in memorization of standard police topics. We recommend developmental education with even more emphasis. Officers should be solicited for their opinions on what knowledge they see as most important. Together with ICAP personnel and the head of Plans and Training they should devise a curriculum and a series of courses, hopefully on the relationships of ICAP and deterrence management.

#### E. Vice Department

It became painfully evident as we interviewed the personnel in Vice that their isolation is on one hand self-imposed and on the other inflicted. ICAP has little to offer Vice, save a part in the management information systems. Information is of such secrecy and the operation so understaffed and underfunded that a proper role is difficult to ascertain. A reading of their budget request attests to their second class status. If any recommendations are forthcoming it would be in the areas of greater cooperation with Patrol in ICAP planned stakeouts and deterrence and in a better reporting system. At present, the Chief's span of control is too broad. We recommend that Vice report to the head of Detectives. In many communities, this arrangement has been working quite satisfactorily.

#### F. Detectives

The facilities for Detective work is perhaps the most spartan. Where Patrol does its work in the field, Detectives must operate in facilities that are so primitive that morale is at a very low level. We have already recommended changes in this area. We also recommend a rotation plan with Patrol. The literature tends to bear out the feasibility of this move. In addition, greater cooperation could be realized if matrix teams were formed with Patrol for joint operations. At present, there is not only an organizational barrier, a formal communication relationship, and a competency insinuation, there is a status problem. When Detectives leave at 4 p.m. sharp and Patrol continues around the clock, two shifts are devoid of a close working relationship with a Detective. Even though Detectives are on call, files, pictures, and a feeling of teamwork are missing.

We recommend a replanning and organization of the Detective Division to make it more integrated and deterrence focused. In this we realize the manning problem and the equipment and facilities limitations.

### G. Union Relations

The ICAP program in East Providence has had a difficult time because of departmental structure as reflected in the collective bargaining unit itself. One can visualize the difficulty of bringing about change in an organization that is military in nature and has the rigid order or rank. The department is not large, but the polarity between "brass" (city council and command staff) and "rank and file" is as clear as would be found in much larger departments. While this in itself is not counter productive to inducement of change, the department is closed off from the civilian sources in power in the management decision-making sense. The civilian (city manager, city council) view of the department is that the police department is a distinct unit within and yet apart from the city government; in fact the appearance of being a single unit is reinforced by (as mentioned above) having the entire police department, from the Chief on down, within the same union structure.

Measureable and positive change has been achieved in East Providence through the efforts of Chief Rocha and by his supporting Captain Richard Ferreira, the driving force. It is our opinion that more could have been done with clearer lines of authority. Had the Chief been seen as and been able to act as an agent of the City and the brass operating it the way it could or should have been able to have the department management function as a team in dealing with the union. The union for its part often felt frustrated because no power to effectively negotiate changes was vested in the Chief. A level of frustration exists because of a sense of union-management mutual impotence in decision-making.

The implications for ICAP spending become a little more obvious when Phase II is compared with the Phase I opinionnaire on attitude. Phase I demonstrated that the department as a whole was willing and eager to undertake positive changes as represented in ICAP. Within the department, however, the views by rank and file were opposite the views of the brass; each wanted improvement but thought the other unwilling or unable to accept it.

In a completely unionized situation which has seen non-union personnel additions to the department (civilian dispatchers, ICAP personnel) change becomes threatening because of inadequate labor relations authority to facilitate change. Much larger departments would have expertise in labor relations but many smaller and medium sized departments would rely on standard grievance machinery and outside expertise for contract renegotiation. What these procedures do not allow for is, in the first instance, decision making in non-grievance matters in such fashion as would allow for changing of the conditions of employment (ICAP changes), or in the second instance, the bargaining would tend to ignore the grievance problems or general dissatisfaction that might arise during the term of the contract.

For example, during the part of Phase II it became apparent that a number of unresolved grievances were causing frustration with the rank and file who in turn took the attitude "why should we accept these changes they want when they can't deal with the legitimate existing problems?" When pressed, union officials would agree that the nature of the grievances was such that there was no logical connection to the ICAP changes also under discussion, but nevertheless the grievances created a problem for implementation of ICAP. Although the labor relations consultant of the ICAP team did meet with union and brass on the matters, the role of the ICAP team was limited in this area and consequently the grievances and changes were not cleared up as expeditiously as possible.

Future ICAP projects should not overlook the importance of the role of facilitating change or the simple allocation of funds and studying the effect will be a matter of spending money and hoping for the best. We do not wish to underestimate the change or the good efforts of the union and management people in bringing it about.

While most people indicated that they do not wish to return to pre-ICAP days, there is a lack of permanence to the changes so far effected. We sense that although this is due in part to the separate (LEAA vs. local) funding the changes brought about have not been recognized by the civilian

authorities as being essential to efficient post-LEAA funding of the department. We believe that this, in turn, is a reflection of the civilian vs. military perception of the department by the city manager and council, rather than a management recommendation from the department.

In summary, we would recommend ICAP encourage the following:

1. Better integration of the management function of police with the civilian authority. To do this it may be necessary for the Chief and others to be out of the bargaining unit. We do not recommend precluding the top brass from bargaining within an appropriate bargaining unit.
2. ICAP should include in its appropriation funds to help facilitate change. In these days of Proposition 13, Proposition 2½ and the like, it will be rare to find a city willing to spend money to make a federal program work. Even if ICAP should require local funding for such purposes LEAA should not forget the importance of objectivity in making new programs work. Local funding may not assure proper expertise and may lead to patronage or undermine the credibility that any new program needs to survive.
3. A collective bargaining contract review for ICAP in order to early measure the probability of success or failure in bringing the union into a cooperative posture for dealing with management. The Germans have demonstrated the importance of "worker" involvement in decision making, and the U.S. auto makers recently paid the Japanese to advise them of the Japanese secret for good productivity: the secret? - worker involvement in decision making. Where collective bargaining contracts exist, this recommendation is compatible with recommendation (2) above.

#### H. Management Information Systems

Due to the increasing use of aggregated data and calculated statistics on these data, it would be quite appropriate to conduct training sessions on the interpretation of statistical terminology and definitions used in the various reports.

It is suggested that the Dispatch area could greatly benefit by the availability of computer terminals with both Cathode Ray Tube output as well as printers. Certain input information as well as the retrieval of information could be speeded up if devices were easily accessible to the Dispatch personnel.

The present hand set style of telephone used by Dispatch should be replaced by operator type head sets. This would improve the ability to record information or search for information by allowing both hands to be free for these tasks.

Word processing equipment should be evaluated for use in all divisions to expedite the typing of routine reports. This is especially true of the Vice squad where the forms must be legally correct and presently take the officers one or two days of typing for a typical case. An alternative that could also be considered is the use of a typing pool and the use of dictation equipment.

It is suggested that a centralized newspaper clipping operation be considered to avoid the duplication of efforts by the various divisions.

The present manual systems used by the ICAP project have been placed into operation without full documentation. It is strongly recommended that all information systems be flow-charted and documented to analyze the flow of information through the various divisions to reduce the duplication and overlap of information. This process will be necessary before automation of any of the systems can take place effectively.

A feasibility study should be conducted to determine whether each division should strive toward an individual microcomputer system to handle their internal information needs (including word processing) and tied together in a network to allow the ICAP analysts to generate the necessary aggregated reports as well as prepare information to be automatically inputted to the city-owned computer during Phase III of the ICAP project.

A complete dictionary of data elements used within the EPPD for reports should be completed as soon as possible to ease the task of automating the present manual systems. The dictionary should not only define the data elements, their standard abbreviation, where used, etc. but also specify the



anticipated format for computer input purposes.

In anticipation of an increased use of computer terminals and other peripheral devices, it is imperative that the operating environment be improved to include air conditioning and dust filtration systems. Constant exposure of computer devices to wide variations in temperature, humidity, and dust will lead to premature failures.

Efforts should be made now to find funds or commitment funds to support the ICAP approach after the present grant funds are depleted. EPPD is placing greater reliance on the ICAP developed information systems and it will be virtually impossible to revert to the pre-ICAP systems.

Serious consideration should be given to the immediate purchase of an inexpensive micro-computer system for use of the ICAP analysts. There are a number of areas where present manual tasks could be greatly speeded up by applying simple computer techniques. In addition, there is software available at modest prices which would allow for analysis and experimentation for Beat Plans and Shift Scheduling. Further, a micro-computer would provide the personnel involved with a way to experiment with different forms of analyses without using and perhaps interfering with other users of proposed city-owned computer equipment.

If the POSSE model is to be implemented on the city-owned DEC computer system, then a careful and well documented policy about priorities in using the system should be worked out. Other attempts at sharing municipal computer systems have shown that as the system use grows problems arise in the speed of response which in certain critical areas might be harmful to the ICAP developed functions. In critical areas, back-up manual systems must be developed in order that they can continue to function if the computer does go down for any reason including scheduled maintenance.

Most of the problems associated with LEAA have come through the area of innovation acceptance. Police seem to be pleased with hardware, equipment and "things." They are not pleased with abstractions such as management, resource allocation, and critical thinking; these are what they need more than they do machineguns or better uniforms.

We recommend a review of the ICAP model within the context of management, organizational design, and innovation acceptance.

### VIII. SUMMARY

ICAP has not proved to be a panacea for the reduction of crime. We did not see a meaningful correlation between crime and the introduction of better information processing systems. The suppression of crime is too complex to map through ICAP or traditional preventative means. What it has provided is a more effective and efficient way to organize data.

We found traditional resistances to change and a political environment which had to be considered in the implementation stage. In our research design a great deal of effort went into developing a framework of analysis and gathering data to test the approach. The effort bore fruit. We saw that the treatment of ICAP as an innovation diffusion problem reflected reality, and that the effect on social systems and management has been treated too lightly in many evaluations.

We feel strongly that future technological or procedural changes be advanced only with the concurrent planning of social change. Without considering the impact on people, cultures and political relationships change may well be in an opposite direction. This is especially true in the police culture.

### APPENDICES

- A. Training Material for Patrol
- B. New Forms
- C. Questionnaires
- D. Vice Department - Budget
- E. Evaluation of the Structured Management Conference for New England Law Enforcement Officials
- F. Community Opinion Poll
- G. Evidence of ICAP in Operation
- H. Crime Analysis Bulletin, July 28, 1980
- I. Crime Analysis Bulletin, July 11, 1980
- J. Crime Prevention Program Press Release
- K. New Post Boundaries Memo, July 3, 1980
- L. Target Crimes Report
- M. Crime Analysis Intelligence Bulletin, January 30, 1980
- N. Bi-Daily Incident Reports
- O. Tele-Serve Criteria for Handling Calls
- P. Intelligence Analyst Duties

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