


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
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THE IMPACT OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN PREVENTING CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING:

A Report
of the

Department of Housing and Urban Development's
INTERAGENCY ANTI-CRIME DEMONSTRATION.



in
FAIRVIEW HOMES
Charlotte, North Carolina

JANUARY, 1982

A PROGRAM SPONSORED BY THE CHARLOTTE HOUSING AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE SERVICES IN THE AREAS OF CRIME PREVENTION; DRUG AND ALCOHOL TREATMENT, OUTREACH AND PREVENTION; EMPLOYMENT REFERRAL; SOCIAL SERVICE INFORMATION AND REFERRALS; VICTIM ASSISTANCE; YOUTH ADVOCACY; YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING; AND YOUTH SERVICES AND COUNSELING.

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Charlotte, North Carolina

An
INTERAGENCY ANTI-CRIME DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
Sponsored by
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
The Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte
and
The City of Charlotte

Prepared by
John G. Hayes, Ph. D.
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January 8, 1982

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Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program Oversight Committee

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
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The research and publication of this report were made possible through a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Interagency Anti-Crime Demonstration grant (Instrument Number HA-6906). The findings presented in this report are those of the Public Safety Coordinator and do not represent those of the Housing Authority of the City of Charlotte, the United States Government, HUD, or the Police Foundation which has the contract to evaluate the entire HUD Interagency Anti-Crime Demonstration Program.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The notion of citizen involvement in crime prevention has gained popularity primarily due to the negative results obtained in experiments utilizing paid constabulary forces, such as the police. Until recently, there has been very little research to suggest that citizen involvement is any more effective in preventing crimes than any other strategy. There is, however, the growing potential for such research related to the LEAA/ACTION experiments in Community Anti-Crime Programs and HUD's Interagency Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. The preliminary indications from these efforts suggest that when low-income residents are empowered to run their own programs significant reductions in crime will result.

This report on the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program is one of the first reports on the evaluation of the HUD anti-crime efforts. The report was produced locally by the Public Safety Coordinator utilizing data collected specifically for the internal monitoring of program activities as well as the preliminary results of the broader evaluation being conducted by the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C.

The major findings of this report support the involvement of citizen in crime prevention efforts. The two goals of the program -- increased reporting of crime and reduced incidents of victimization -- were not only met, but exceeded. Reporting as measured by "calls for services" to the police increased by more than 50 percent; crime rates, on the other hand, declined by 4 percent for all types of offenses and by 32 percent for all non-assault offenses. Burglary and larceny, in particular, dropped by 35 percent in Fairview Homes at a time when such offenses were increasing by 20

within the city of Charlotte, North Carolina.

More dramatically, victimizations which reflect both reported and unreported offenses were reduced substantially for all offenses. For example, the percentage of families reporting that someone within the family had been the victim of a robbery or purse-snatching dropped from over 8 percent in 1979 to about 4 percent in 1980-81. Burglary victimizations declined significantly from 25 percent of the families in 1979 to 3.8 percent in 1980-81, while larcenies dropped from over 36 percent of the families to slightly over 18 percent.

The findings concerning assault victimizations were somewhat contradictory. While calls for services related to assault situations more than doubled and the number of recorded assaults increased by 25 percent, the victimization rate actually dropped from about 8 percent of the families in 1979 to just 2 percent in 1980-81. Since many of the assaults recorded by the police often occurred to members of the same household (roughly 40 percent of these offenses) while a similar number occurred among persons loitering in the community for the purpose of selling or buying drugs, the decline in the percentage of families victimized is reasonable.

These research findings point out that crime and associated problems have become less randomly distributed as a result of the crime prevention activities. Crimes which, at one time, seemed to affect the whole community, now tend to be concentrated within a few residences where the activities of the family members involve the family in a variety of deviant and potentially illegal activities -- activities such as, prostitution, the sale or abuse of alcohol and drugs, and the sale or purchase of stolen merchandise. The family itself may not be directly involved in these activities, but it is often the case that their friends and visitors are so involved.

The eviction of problem families, as well as the arrest of those engaged in illegal activities, has proven difficult

due to the rules of evidence which must be followed. Citizen involvement has not improved to the level that residents are willing to testify in court or grievance hearings against neighbors who may be engaged in these activities. They may report their activities to the police or the Housing Authority, but there is still a great deal of fear of retaliation which inhibits giving testimony in legal proceedings. Because of this, continued efforts on the part of the crime prevention staff and the vice and investigative squads of the police department are essential to insure that sufficient evidence is gathered to rid the community of those elements which continue to engage in illegal or disruptive behavior.

On the whole, the Fairview Homes program was found to be among the top five programs in the country. It ranks among the top four in citizen perceptions of community improvement even though the community did not receive the extensive modernization that the other communities received. It enjoys a higher rate of participation in programs and crime prevention activities than almost all of the other 38 HUD demonstration sites. The primary reason for this has been the continuing involvement of residents in program planning and implementation.

The report summarizes the kinds of programs which were found to be effective in reaching the overall goals. It examines some of the pitfalls experienced by the program staff in the hope that others who would seek to replicate the program will not encounter the same difficulties. One of the major problems experienced was that involvement of residents was inhibited not by the skills or abilities of the public housing residents, but rather by the attitudes of professionals and service providers toward the community and the abilities of low-income residents to undertake effective service delivery.

The report also provides a suggested model for preventing crime along with sample budgets for those wishing to explore the feasibility of developing similar programs. Stress is placed on utilizing existing resources rather than creat-

ing new or independent programs or services. This is especially important in the area of employment and training efforts; these efforts should be directed at encouraging employment and training within the private sector through apprenticeships and targeted jobs programs for high-risk individuals rather than through governmentally funded and run training programs.

It is the contention of this report that similar rates of success can be obtained in any community willing to provide the resources to coordinate the efforts of a vast array of services and agencies. It requires a commitment to employing and training residents of low-income areas to assume the key roles in implementing the actual program. The thrust of the effort is that of creating a partnership between the residents, law enforcement, government, social service agencies, and employers to attack the problems associated with crime.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.....	i
LIST OF TABLES.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
PREFACE	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
The HUD Interagency Anti-Crime Program	4
The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program	6
Organizational Chart	11
IMPACT OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES	13
The Community Context	14
Data Collection and Analysis	17
Findings: Impact Analysis	20
Crime and Victimization: Reporting Incidents to the police	20
Crime and Victimization: Calls for Services	26
Crime and Victimization: The Rate of Crime	29
Crime and Victimization: Perceptions of Residents	37
Summary	40
WHAT WORKS? SUGGESTIONS FOR CRIME PREVENTION IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND LOW INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS	43
I. Improved Housing Authority Management of Public safety	45
II. Improved Physical Design for Crime Prevention	50
III. Resident Involvement in Crime Prevention Activities	54
IV. Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Residents	57
V. Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims and Witnesses	67
VI. Additional and More Sensitive Law Enforcement Services	77
VII. Area-Wide Public/Private Partnerships	82
Summary	86
FUTURE PROGRAMS	89
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	96
APPENDICES.....	97
A. Crime Statistics	
B. Program Evaluation Data	

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1	Percentage of Crimes Reported to the Police or to the Housing Authority	21
2	Average Monthly Calls for Services by Type of Call, Year, and Pre/Post Implementation Periods for Fairview Homes	25
3	Burglaries and Larcenies: How Did the Thief Gain Entrance?	28
4	Fear and Worry About Crime in Fairview Homes	36
5	Perceptions of Crime-Related Problems in Selected Sites: Percentage Reporting "A Big Problem"	37
6	Suggested Budgets	95
7	Part I Offenses by type of Offense and Location Through September, 1981	98
8	Part I Offenses for the Period Prior to notification of Non-refunding of Program, May, 1981	99
9	Rates per 1000 Population for Part I Offenses through September, 1981	100
10	Rates per 1000 Population for Part I Offenses through May, 1981	101

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
1	Crimes Against Persons: Crime and Victimization Rates	30
2	Crimes Against Property: Crime and Victimization Rates	34
3	Perception of the Community as a Better or Worse Place in Which to Live Compared to the Period Prior to the HUD Anti-Crime Programs	38
4	Perceptions of the Crime Problem Compared to the Period Prior to the HUD Anti-Crime Programs	40
A-1	Part I Offenses by Month	102
A-2	Part I Offenses: Burglary and Larceny by Month	103
A-3	Part I Offenses: Assaults by Month	104
A-4	Calls for Police Services, 1980-81 by Month	105
A-5	Calls for Police Services, 1980-81 by Type of Call and Month	106
B-1	Percent of Residents Aware of Crime Prevention Meetings	108
B-2	Percent of Households Which Participated in Crime Prevention Meetings	109
B-3	Percent of Residents Aware of Engraving Valuables (Operation I.D.)	110
B-4	Percent of Households Which Participated in Engraving Valuables (Operation I.D.)	111
B-5	Percent of Residents Aware of Neighborhood Watch	112
B-6	Percent of Households Which Participated in Neighborhood Watch	113
B-7	Percent of Residents Aware of Apartment Watch Programs	114
B-8	Percent of Households Which Participated in Apartment Watch Programs	115
B-9	Percent of Residents Aware of Youth Work Programs	116
B-10	Percent of Households Which Participated in Youth Work Programs	117
B-11	Percent of Residents Aware of Alcohol/Drug Abuse Programs	118
B-12	Percent of Households Which Participated in Alcohol/Drug Abuse Programs	119
B-13	Percent of Residents Aware of Victim/Witness Programs	120
B-14	Percent of Households Which Participated in Victim/Witness Programs	121

PREFACE

The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was conceived during the summer of 1979 by a group of concerned individuals from the community, the Charlotte Housing Authority, and the City of Charlotte in response to a Request for Proposals issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The choice of Fairview Homes was an easy one: It was the largest and oldest housing complex operated by the Charlotte Housing Authority and had a serious crime problem which had severely diminished the quality of life.

Building on the experiences of a policing experiment which had taken place in Dalton Village, another large public housing community in Charlotte, during 1976, Larry Loyd and Bill Caufield of the Housing Authority, along with Betty McClure of the Fairview Homes Resident Organization and Boyd Cauble of the City of Charlotte's Office of Special Projects put together the initial design of the program. Dr. John Hayes of the University of North Carolina and the evaluator of the Dalton Village project was singled out as the person to coordinate the program if it was accepted by HUD.

Putting together a program as comprehensive as this one was not an easy task. The diversity of foci and innovative nature of the delivery systems created a need to turn to a variety of resource people within the community. It is difficult to recount all those who had significant input into the program design and implementation.

of the strategies due to this diversity.

In the employment area, advice and assistance was obtained from several key individuals. Among these individuals were Robert Person and Gus Psomodikis of the City's Department of Employment and Training who helped design and train counselors for the Youth Community Conservation Improvement Program. Assistance was also provided by Ms. Cathy Gaither of the Bethlehem Center Youth Employment and Training Department. Advice and assistance in setting up the Job Bank came from Ms. Fay Skidmore, Executive Director of the Women's Commission, and Ms. Curtrina Bradley of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Urban League. James Pierce of the Human Resources Development Institute of the AFL-CIO was also instrumental in making the program a success. Particular gratitude must be expressed to the staff: Mrs. Willie T. Hart and Mary Williams from the community along with Ms. Vergil Hyatt had primary responsibilities for the employment programs.

Special recognition must be given to employers who worked with the program. Particular gratitude goes to Mr. Leroy Lakey of the Housing Authority whose maintenance department trained many of the youths in the program. Ed Evans of Charter Oaks Farms was also helpful in providing employment.

In the social services and counseling areas, the program owes particular thanks to Dr. Warren Nance and Jean Long of the Information and Referral Program for providing training for our workers. Emma Beatty of the Charlotte Area Fund, the staff of the Loaves and Fishes, and various churches in the community were helpful in obtaining food for needy families. Jim Johnson and Jan Reading of the Victim Assistance Program; Ed Nadelman of Family and Children's Services; Al Petty of the Community Relations Committee; Jim Yancey of the Court

Counselor Services; Dr. Steven Newman of Drug Education Center; John Ford of Open House; Curtis Hunter of Randolph Clinic; Jon Speckman of Seventh Street Center; and the staff of Pre-Trial Release and the Public Defender's Office also deserve recognition.

The program would not have been successful without the assistance of the police department. Officers George (Mike) Porter and Xavier Artis along with Captain A. J. Europa and Commander Ron Stone were instrumental in providing direct services to the program. The Records Department, Crime Analysis Division, and Vice Squad provided support services which were invaluable.

The greatest amount of gratitude goes to the residents of Fairview Homes. Past and present presidents of the Resident Organization made the program work: Betty McClure, Bernitta Morgan, Wilma Petty, and Faye Jones. Recognition must go to Ms. Annita Stroud, Emma Johnson, Jeannette Emanuel, Emily Billings, Cora Bookman, Bernice Brown, Rosetta Caldwell, Alice Dunlap, Gloria Hood, Viola McClendon, Joyce Moore, Helen Ross, Fannie Smith, Catherine Stroud, and Belinda Williams. The staff from the community included Irene Hart, Willie Hart, Mary Williams, Gracie Seegars, Melvin Collins, Belinda Williams, Wilma Petty, Carolyn Dunlap, and Marie Billings. There are many others, including the building captains, officers in the resident organization which we have not named here.

Professional staff were particularly helpful. Arthur Griffin and Mildred Nix, as former residents, provided a unique understanding of the community. Maceo Mayo and Felecia Saunders from community drug programs lent important services to our programs. Linda Ellis from Victim Assistance provided a unique perspective to the program. Former staff, Randy Tate and Vergil Hyatt, helped get things organized

and then went on to other programs. Gail Miller's brief tenure with the program was also appreciated.

Although they were not staff of the Crime Prevention Program, Jennings Brewer, the Manager of Fairview Homes, and Nat Gary, the Maintenance Foreman, were so vital to the success of our efforts that we considered them part of us. Donnel Wilson, H. S. Brantley, Larry Loyd, Bettye Harris, John Crawford, and William "Butch" Simmons of the Central Office, along with the Board of Commissioners and the Executive Director, Ray Wheeling, provided both moral and technical support throughout the program.

The work of the Oversight Committee should not go unrecognized. Bettye Jackson, from the HUD Area Office in Greensboro, was always available and served as a constant source of comfort, assistance, and nagging as she attempted to insure that we remained on course and met all of the deadlines. Jim Johnson and Mae Watkins as chairpersons of the Committee kept the Coordinator on track and helped resolve several problems which threatened to undercut the program.

We would be remiss if we did not give credit to the HUD staff in Washington and the evaluators who made us cognizant of our commitments. Lynn Curtis, and later Imre Kohn, as directors of the HUD Interagency Anti-Crime Program in Washington were particularly patient and helpful in pulling the program together. Lenord Clay, Irv Wallach, Barbara Huie, and Bill Simms of the Anti-Crime staff were always available to provide technical assistance and helpful advice. We owe considerable gratitude to Tony Pate of the Police Foundation not only for providing much of the data for this report, but also for his friendship and advice. Similarly, Terry Hogan, our on-site monitor, has been more than just a spy for the enemy; she has been

a friend and confidant, even though much of what we tell her will probably appear in the final evaluation report. Sam Annan of Damons and Associates, who conducted the citizen surveys in May and June of 1981, has also served as a source of help from time-to-time.

Without each of these people, the program would hardly have achieved the level of success it did. Many provided their services, time, and resources without expectation of compensation. To all of these individuals, and to those whom we have inadvertantly overlooked because there were so many, we owe a tremendous vote of gratitude. They have proven what can be accomplished when people work together to overcome a serious problem.

John G. Hayes
Public Safety Coordinator

INTRODUCTION

The dual problems of crime and fear of crime are the most serious social problems faced by persons living in public housing. Surveys conducted during the 1970s for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) placed the crime rate in various public housing communities at more than five times the national crime rate and several times higher than the local communities in which they were located.¹

The problems of crime in public housing are similar in Charlotte. Crime rates in public housing communities such as Dalton Village, Boulevard Homes, Piedmont Courts and Fairview Homes have been consistently higher than the rates for the city as a whole.² The crime rate, as measured by offenses recorded by the police, was especially high in Fairview Homes during the 1970s. In 1978, for example, the crime rate for violent crimes (assault, robbery, rape and homicide) was 59.3 offenses per 1000 population in contrast to the city-wide rate of 11.8 offenses per 1000 population. Property offenses in Fairview Homes, on the other hand, were only slightly higher than the rate for the city: 146.7 offenses per 1000 households compared to 125.8 per 1000 households for the City of Charlotte.

Surveys conducted in public housing and within the City of Charlotte also reflect higher rates of criminal victimization for public

¹W. Victor Rouse and Herb Rubenstein, *Crime in Public Housing: A Review of Major Issues and Selected Crime Reduction Strategies, Volume 1: A Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, December, 1978).

²Office of Budget and Evaluation, *An Evaluation of Selected Aspects of Police Services* (Charlotte, N.C.: City of Charlotte, August, 1976)

housing residents.³ The surveys reveal that the crime problem is even greater than would be indicated in the police statistics because a large proportion of the crimes occurring in public housing are not reported to the police. Only 27 to 40 percent of the property offenses occurring in public housing are reported to the police in contrast to a city-wide reporting rate of 63 percent; for violent offenses, the reporting rate in public housing is 11 to 30 percent compared to city-wide rate of 79 percent.

Given this lower rate of reporting, it is not surprising to find victimization rates much higher than the crime rates recorded by the police. The burglary victimization rate in Fairview Homes in 1979 was 307 per 1000 households compared to a city-wide average of 160 per 1000 households in 1976. Similarly, the rate for violent victimizations in Fairview Homes was 104 per 1000 population while the rate for the city was 22 per 1000 population.

Along with the recognition of the seriousness of the crime problem in public housing has come a growing awareness that crime reduction strategies initiated by the police are not effective or sustainable due to extreme costs. The experiences with two Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funded experiments in Charlotte, North Carolina, reinforced this conclusion.

First, in 1977 the police department had attempted to attack the crime problems in the Dalton Village public housing community by assigning a team of eleven police officers and a community services specialist to work and patrol in this 300 unit community twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week under an LEAA grant. In spite of this concentrated law

³Victimization surveys in Public Housing and the City of Charlotte have been conducted by faculty from the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for the Office of Budget and Evaluation, City of Charlotte, and the Charlotte Housing Authority in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979.

enforcement effort, crime and victimization rates did not decrease at a rate expected based on the increased level of patrolling experienced by the residents of this public housing community.⁴ The primary impact of the patrolling experiment was to reduce fear and improve citizen attitudes toward the police. One of the major conclusions from the study of this experiment, however, was to lay the foundation for the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program: "Making people feel safer and *getting them involved* in their own programs should be seen as the crucial first step in the long-term reduction of crime."⁵

Second, during 1979 and the greater part of 1980 the police department had attempted to encourage the development of crime prevention by stationing three police officers in the public housing communities of Fairview Homes, Piedmont Courts, Earle Village, and Boulevard Homes. The officers spent 40 hours a week in each community attempting to encourage the residents' participation in crime prevention programs such as household security, Operation Identification, and neighborhood watch. Perhaps it was because it was the police department deciding the types of programs which would be implemented or the officers' retaining control over the activities that the program failed to reach the residents. At any rate, after nearly two years of involvement by the police, less than one-third of the residents were aware of crime prevention meetings, neighborhood watch or Operation Identification and only half of those who said they were aware of the programs said they had actually participated.⁶

⁴John G. Hayes, Gerald L. Ingalls, and Wayne A. Walcott, *The Dalton Village High Crime Neighborhood Project: An Evaluation of Mini-Team Policing* (Charlotte, N.C.: The University of North Carolina at Charlotte and the City of Charlotte, June 1978).

⁵*Ibid.*, p 126.

⁶Estimates are based on the results of surveys conducted by Damons and Associates, Washington, D.C., as part of the overall evaluation of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program. The surveys were conducted in the spring of 1981.

It was against this background of crime and victimization and past attempts at crime prevention in public housing that the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was started. On the surface the task appeared formidable. However, there was an underlying history of community involvement and self-help upon which a program could be built. Moreover, the residents themselves maintained a positive attitude that things were improving and that something could be done to reduce crime. Unlike other neighborhoods with high crime rates, the residents did not view crime reduction as solely the responsibility of the police, but felt that they had a responsibility to work with other neighbors to reduce crime; they only needed the mechanisms to carry out their programs and ideas.

THE HUD INTER-AGENCY ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM. Congress in passing the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 provided the mechanisms whereby the resources within the Fairview Homes public housing community could be tapped and molded into a viable crime prevention effort. The Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978 directed HUD to initiate a program for the development, demonstration and evaluation of improved, innovative community anti-crime and security methods in public housing. Congress was interested in finding cost-effective ways to reduce the high levels of crime and vandalism which are so closely associated with most public housing communities and their secondary neighborhoods. HUD responded by implementing the Interagency Anti-Crime Program which had the following management objectives:

1. Improved management of public safety.
2. Improved physical security and design.
3. Increased involvement of residents in fighting crime.
4. Increased employment, especially of youths.
5. Improved anti-crime services for elderly residents, drug and alcohol abusers, project youths, and victims.

6. Additional and more sensitive police and law enforcement services.
7. Area-wide public/private partnerships targeted on public housing sites as well as surrounding neighborhoods.

To insure that funds would be available for local housing authorities to address each of these objectives, the HUD Anti-Crime staff obtained inter-agency agreements from the Community Development Department (CDBG), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), and a variety of other programs (e.g., Urban Parks, Comprehensive Modernization) to co-target funds to public housing sites selected to become part of the Anti-Crime Demonstration Program. Thus housing authorities were encouraged to develop proposals addressing each of the major objectives and designating additional program areas for which they would be willing to develop proposals on a competitive basis.

In the objectives and the implementation of those objectives, HUD recognized that there were many physical, social, and other factors which contributed to the crime problems in and around public housing. They also recognized that for a crime prevention approach to be effective, it must be tailored to the specific problems faced by each public housing complex. Unlike the police crime prevention experiments we discussed above, HUD entered the Anti-Crime Demonstration Program with the belief that there were no pre-designed crime prevention strategies which could be taken off the shelf and expected to work. They held the belief that there were only two essential elements of a successful crime prevention program: "(1) a clear understanding of the problems and (2) a successful implementation of approaches designed specifically to address these problems."⁷

⁷Rouse and Rubenstein, 1978, p. vii.

THE FAIRVIEW HOMES CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM.

The major premise of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was that the control of crime is not significantly influenced by a paid constabulary force whether such a force is a public agency such as the police, or a private endeavor such as a housing authority security force. While the police and private security are important elements, they are reactive agents drawn into action only after an incident has occurred. Crime, on the other hand, is controlled by an intricate, almost unconscious network of symbols and cues which establish voluntary standards and controls among the people themselves. These symbols and cues are present in every community and must be enhanced through environmental and social actions if effective crime control is to occur.

A second premise of the Crime Prevention Program was that there is a natural social structure in every community (or neighborhood) no matter how disorganized the neighborhood appears to the outside observer. This is especially true in public housing communities which are characterized by a relatively stable and homogeneous population and clear physical, social, and political boundaries. Subcultural norms and values as well as stable social relationships emerge which function to support behavior which helps residents cope with the particular social, economic and political realities in which they live. Failure to recognize this social and cultural structure will result in open resistance or passive acceptance of the program's activities. Attempts to impose a different and competing set of values may even result in open conflict and subversion of the program.

A third premise was that this existing social structure could be utilized to promote crime prevention activities, even though some

of the behaviors supported by that structure could be viewed as illegitimate behavior from a middle-class yardstick. The lay helping network consisting of the informal leadership structures, natural helpers, self-help groups, formal organizations, and friends and neighbors could be enhanced and linked with the professional helping network existing in the larger community in such a manner that many of the social conditions producing crime and vandalism could be alleviated or mediated and in a manner that dependence upon outside professionals and social programs would be reduced. It was assumed that dependency on outsiders, whether it was the police, the housing authority, the Department of Social Services, or some other agency foreign to the community, had brought about the erosion of the informal social controls governing criminal behavior. If this was true, then a reduction in such dependency would reestablish these social controls and reinforce more conventional standards of behavior.

A related premise was that *fear* -- fear of being the victim of a crime; fear of being attacked; fear of retaliation if one said something; fear of being put down; fear of not being valued, accepted, believed, or trusted -- created conditions which allowed crime and exploitation to thrive. Contrary to most crime prevention programs which emphasize raising the awareness of residents of crime problems in their communities, the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program de-emphasized such problems focusing instead on the strengths of the community and its positive social history. It was our belief that fear builds barriers between people causing them to withdraw from the world about them, giving up on their yards, their homes, and, in some cases, their own lives. Because of fear, people begin to restrict their activities thereby losing control of their environment and

failing to do those things which would have the greatest impact on crime: taking control of and maintaining one's yard; paying attention to strangers who enter the community; visiting with one's neighbors; spending time outside interacting with others. The emphasis, therefore, was on bringing people out into the community to participate in a variety of activities which would enhance the surveillance capacity of the neighborhood.

Finally, we held to the premise that if people are going to take control of their environments, they must believe that they can accomplish their goals through their own actions. We invest time and energy in finding solutions to problems about which we believe that something *can* and *will* be done; we avoid those things for which there is very little chance that we will succeed. Enhancing a person's or a community's sense of self worth is not an easy task. It involves helping the community discover their own strengths and resources and directing those positive attributes toward realistic future goals. It entails a diagnosis of weaknesses and then concentrated efforts to remediate those weakness such that they become strengths, or at least do not act to hinder the activities which are to be undertaken. It requires a willingness on the part of outside facilitators to let go of the programs once the residents have begun to take hold -- it means working oneself out of a job while ensuring that necessary external resources and linkages to the professional helping network remain.

Given this conceptual framework, the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was set in motion in October, 1979, with the hiring of a Public Safety Coordinator to refine the concepts set forth in the original grant proposal, design the strategies which would be employed, and prepare additional grant applications to support the

strategies which had been identified. In addition to these tasks, the Public Safety Coordinator began collecting police and housing authority data which would allow him to undertake a thorough analysis of the crime and social problems in the Fairview Homes community. The PSC spent considerable time in the community talking to the residents and attending community meetings to discover the nature of the existing social structure and the forces that operated within the community. He also undertook the design and conduct of a community attitude and victimization survey of a one-third sample of the community in December, 1979.

During the planning phase of the program (October, 1979, through June, 1980), the emphasis was given to input from Fairview Homes residents. Additional input was gathered from the staff of various programs that either worked with public housing residents or offered services which could be tapped once the program was underway. In this fashion, then, appropriate linkages between the lay helping network and the professional helping network would be assured once the implementation stage of the program was at hand.

The Coordinator also attempted to identify residents and former residents of Fairview Homes who could perform staff roles in the program. With the assistance of the Residents' Organization, a staff of sixteen professionals and para-professionals was assembled. Nine of these individuals were residents, two were former residents, and five were professionals from outside the community.

The total funding for the program was distributed as follows:

Physical security hardware (Solid-core doors, dead-bolt locks, and security porch lights)-- HUD Modernization	\$275,000
Anti-Crime and Resident Services -- CDBG Discretionary	75,000
Employment of youths under a Youth Community Conservation Improvement Program -- Department of Labor	150,000

Youth education and delinquency prevention -- OJJDP (2 year grant)	\$ 83,500
Victim/witness assistance -- LEAA	20,000
Anti-drug/alcohol abuse and mental health programs -- ADAMHA	48,000
Total Federal Funds Received	\$651,000
Additional local funding:	
Public Safety Coordinator and Support Services -- Charlotte Housing Authority	\$ 33,665
Weekend police patrol -- City of Charlotte	34,500
Total Local Funding:	\$ 68,165
Total Funding:	\$719,165

Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the Program.

The major program activities will be discussed in a later section on *What Works: Lessons Gained from the Demonstration Program*. The thrust of the program, however, was to provide residents with training opportunities in each of the following areas: resident-management relations; community crime prevention strategies; victim-witness assistance; criminal justice diversion; dispute mediation; drug and alcohol prevention and education; drug and alcohol abuse and mental health referral; job banking and development; social and medical service referral; and youth services programming. Additionally, the program sought to train the residents in ombudsman and advocacy skills in order that they might leverage resources for their own programs and necessary changes in the physical and social environment long after the funding for the program ceased to exist.

In the next section of this report we will take a look at the impact of the Program's activities after about 15 months of operation. This analysis of the impact of the Program is based on data collected prior to the completion of the hardware security items and therefore represents the accomplishments of the software or social service activi-

FAIRVIEW HOMES CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

1918 EDWIN STREET
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28206
TELEPHONE: (704) 376-1553



ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE:

Bettye Jackson, HUD Area Office
Betty McClure, Resident
Mae R. Watkins, Resident
Bernitta Morgan, Resident
Donal Steger, City Mgr Office
Cmdr. D. R. Stone, Police Dept.
Cpt. A. J. Europa, Police Dept.
Wm. Caulfield, Housing Authority
John Crawford, Housing Authority
Bettye Harris, Housing Authority
James Johnson, Family and Children's Services
Fay Skidmore, Women's Commission
Curtrina Bradley, Urban League
John Ford, Open House
Stephen Newman, Drug Education
Donald McDonald, Randolph Clinic

URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM
Washington, DC
Imre Kohn (202) 426-0015

HUD AREA OFFICE
Bettye Jackson (919) 378-5721

HOUSING AUTHORITY, CITY OF CHARLOTTE
Ray H. Wheeling (919) 332-0051

FAIRVIEW HOMES CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM
John G. Hayes, Coordinator

Mollie N. Smalls
Secretary

PHYSICAL SECURITY

(Leroy Lakey, Director of Maintenance, Housing Auth.)

- Target Hardening: Doors, Windows, Lights, Street Lighting
- Maintenance, Landscaping

POLICE PATROL

(Cpt. Europa, Charlie 3 Team)

- Increased Weekend Patrols
- Crime Prevention
- Officers: Mike Porter, Xavier Artis, John Staley

VICTIM-WITNESS ASSISTANCE

Linda Ellis,
Family & Child-
ren's Service
Youth Aide

Crisis Services
• Mental Health
• Family and
Children's Serv.

INFORMATION & REFERRAL PROGRAM

Gracie Seegars
Wilma Petty

FAMILY CENTER

Resident Organization
Youth Aide

DRUG & ALCOHOL OUTREACH

- Counseling/Treatment
Mildred Nix,
Director
Felecia Sanders,
Open House
Curtis Hunter,
Randolph Clinic
- Education/Information
Maceo Mayo, Drug
Education Center
Melvin Collins,
Outreach

JOB BANK

- Women's Commission
Mary Williams
- Urban League
Willie Hart

COOPERATION AGENCIES:
Area Fund
Bethlehem Center
Council on Alcoholism
Court Counselor Services
Drug Education Center
Employment and Training Dept.
Family and Children's Service
Human Resources Development
Institute
Information and Referral
Service
Mental Health Association
Neighborhood Centers Dept.
Open House
Pre-Trial Release Dept.
Probation and Parole
Randolph Clinic
Seventh Street Center
Urban League
Victim Assistance Project
Women's Commission
Youth Services Bureau

YOUTH PROGRAMS Arthur Griffin, Director

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Vergil Hyatt,
Counselor

Worksite
Supervisors

Youth Trainees

PUBLIC SERVICE
AIDES

Irene Hart
Youth Workers

YOUTH ADVOCACY PROGRAM

Counselors
Belinda Williams Carolyn Dunlap

• Youth Advisory
Council
Committees:
Employment
Government
Education
Criminal Justice
System
Health & Social
Services
Other Services

• School Relations
Project
Truancy
Prevention
Achievement
in School
Parent
Education

ties independent, for the most part, of the environmental design changes which are often stressed in crime prevention programs such as this. It should also be recognized that the funding for all of the program activities, except those funded under the OJJDP grant, will be exhausted as of December 31, 1981, and those things which remain after this date are those features of the program about which the residents feel the most positive and for which they are willing to continue operating on a volunteer basis because of the contribution they have made to the community -- this is the real evaluation of what works!

IMPACT OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program is a comprehensive program aimed at reducing crime and crime-related problems in public housing. The program began formal operations on July 7, 1980, and will cease operations by a paid staff on December 31, 1981.⁸ While the total program included security relevant hardware (solid-core doors, strengthened dead-bolt locks, porch lights, and improved street lighting), the analysis presented here reflects the impact of the software (crime prevention and social services) activities only because the hardware items were not in place until the very end of the analysis period -- July, 1980, through September, 1981.

The various crime prevention and social service activities against which the program's impact must be judged include operation identification, block watch, and elderly watch program in the crime prevention area; a phone observation system and increased police patrol on weekends in the formal security field; a youth employment program, youth advocacy, court intervention, truancy prevention, and tutorial programs in the delinquency prevention realm; and drug and alcohol awareness and counselling; social service referral; educational referral; and employment counselling and referral for adults. An integral part of the program was increased communication between residents and management and an

⁸ Program funding in all areas except the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention area will be exhausted on December 31, 1981. Program funding for the juvenile justice activities will run out on June 30, 1981. However, many of the program will continue through the efforts of volunteers from the community.

increased awareness of each others needs and problems.


There are two major goals against which the Crime Prevention Program should be judged: (1) *an increased level of reporting of offenses and other incidents to the police and the housing authority management*, and (2) *a decrease in the incidence of Part I (serious) offenses and the number of families victimized by crimes which may or may not have been reported to the police or the authority.*

Secondary goals include (a) increased employment of youths and adults; (b) increased attendance at and completion of educational programs; (c) increased availability of social and human services to community residents; (d) increased involvement of community residents in drug and alcohol awareness and treatment programs; and, (e) decreased involvement of community residents in illegal or criminal behavior.

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT.

Before one can fully understand the impact of the program, an understanding of the community and its social-demographic context is important. Fairview Homes is the largest public housing community in the city of Charlotte and one of the oldest. It first began receiving residents in the fall of 1940 and presently has 1234 residents living in the 460 apartments which make up the community.

Fairview Homes sits on a 29.8 acre tract of land along the southern border of Census Tract 50. The census tract itself is virtually isolated by major physical barriers: it is bounded by a major interstate highway, I-77; a four-lane thoroughfare, Oaklawn Avenue; and a major commercial and industrial area along Statesville Road. The tract is situated on the northwest fringe of the center



city, but is further cut off from the city by the Brookshire Freeway less than a mile away. It was further isolated by a large undeveloped community development area located on the southern side of Oaklawn Avenue; this area has since been developed for low- to moderate-income single family housing.

Census Tract 50 and the recently developed area along Oaklawn Avenue (Greenville) is composed primarily of low income black families. The median family income for the tract was \$4374 in 1970⁹ which was one of the lowest median incomes of any neighborhood in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Of the families in the tract, 39.4 percent were below the poverty level, but on an individual basis, the percentage rises to 42.6. Almost 18 percent of the families were receiving some form of public assistance income. In Fairview Homes itself, the average income was \$2,457 in 1979 with 67 percent of the families receiving some form of public assistance income.

The median number of school years completed in 1970 was 9.6 for the census tract. In Fairview Homes, only 18 percent had completed high school as of early 1981, compared to 28.2 percent in the census tract in 1970.

As can be expected from the income and education indices of achievement, occupational problems also characterize the area. The majority of those employed in the census tract are employed in low paying service or labor occupations. In 1970, unemployment was among the highest of any census tract in the city. In 1979, 81.0 percent of those 16-62 years of age were unemployed in Fairview Homes; this figure increases to 89 percent for those in the 16 to 26 age group which represents 38.6 percent of the adults in the community. With only 19 percent employed and one-fifth of those who are not

⁹Census data for the 1980 Census is not available at this time.

employed having no visible means of support, the pressures toward illegitimate and criminal activities are magnified.

Among the many social problems facing the community was the problem of the general unattractiveness of the area to potential residents. The reputation for high volumes of crimes and drugs combined with nearly 40 years during which there had been little if any modernization work on either the homes or the landscaping created a problem in the vacancy rate in the community; since December 1979, 785 potential residents refused occupancy in Fairview Homes citing fear of the area as their major reason. The average monthly vacancy rate was 22 units for the period 1976 through 1980.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS.

Various types of information have been utilized to develop a complete picture of the impact of the Crime Prevention Program. Information gathered varies from official crime statistics to surveys of residents attitudes and experiences to client data collected by the staff themselves.

To obtain this data, four major data collection techniques were utilized. First, in order to understand the nature of the crime problem (e.g., type, frequency, offenders, location), police incidents reports, recorded offenses, and records of calls for services were examined in detail. Second, a random sample survey of residents was conducted in the target community and a comparison community in order to obtain up-to-date information about the community's experiences, fears, perceptions, and behavior with respect to crime-related issues; and to obtain victimization information. Third, the results of victimization surveys conducted in Dalton Village and Boulevard Homes during 1976 and 1977 were used to compare

the results of the Fairview Homes Program with those of the mini-team policing experiment conducted in Dalton Village in 1976. We also utilized the results of victimization surveys conducted by the Police Foundation and Damons and Associates of Washington, D. C., for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in their evaluation of the HUD Demonstration Anti-Crime Program of which Fairview Homes was a demonstration site; 38 public housing demonstration sites, 7 comparison sites, and 22 displacement neighborhoods around the demonstration and comparison sites were surveyed during the summer of 1981 as part of this evaluation. Finally, we utilized Housing Authority and the Crime Prevention Program's records to gather information about the impact of the program on occupancy, terminations for lease violations, the resident organization, and management/maintenance problems in the community.

Analysis of the data is made primarily through comparison of pre- and post-implementation levels of specific behavior and attitudes where such data is available. Where possible, comparisons will be drawn to the results of other crime prevention programs conducted in public housing, especially the program conducted in Dalton Village during 1976 by the Charlotte Police Department.

Analysis of the impact of the program should be viewed with caution due to three specific data collection problems. First, the attitude and victimization survey conducted in December, 1979, was designed and implemented by the Public Safety Coordinator utilizing youths residing in public housing as the interviewers; the surveys conducted by the Police Foundation and Damons and Associates in July, 1981, utilized professional interviewers and contained slightly different questions than the earlier survey. However, because the Coordinator has a background in evaluation

research and survey methods and provided interviewer training to the youths, there is little reason to believe that this difference in survey methodology will have a significant affect on the results of the surveys. Both surveys utilized random sampling techniques and interviewed nearly one-half of the residents living in Fairview Homes.

A second problem in the analysis involves the utilization of police crime statistics. Although both specific police reports and crime summaries were available, the analysis relies on crime summaries published by the police department on a monthly and yearly basis. It was decided that we should rely on the summaries for the sake of comparison with statistics published by the police department for the city as a whole; many of the incidents appearing in the police incident reports do not appear in the published crime statistics due to the unfounding of the incidents at a later date. The use of the summaries presents an additional problem; the summaries are published by census tract and sub-census tract and the sub-census tract in which Fairview Homes is located is larger than the community itself. This problem is not serious, however, and may even be beneficial: it controls for displacement of crime to the areas immediately adjacent to the public housing community. Thus, if crime rates decrease in the sub-census tract, then it would be safe to conclude that no significant displacement has occurred; on the other hand, if crime rates have increased in the sub-census tract but analysis of crime in the community itself based on police reports shows a decline, then a significant displacement of crime would have occurred.

A final problem in the analysis is the absence of comparative before and after data for other sites in the HUD Demonstration Program.

Due to problems in obtaining the evaluation contracts from HUD, the Police Foundation was unable to conduct the evaluation as it was originally designed. Consequently, the evaluation relies primarily on the results of a single survey conducted when the programs were in various stages of implementation; some programs had even expended all of their grant funds by the time the survey was conducted. Thus, when comparing the results of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program, it should be kept in mind that many of the programs had completed substantial modernization of the demonstration site. In addition, some of the sites contained elderly residents while others were family complexes. Further complicating the issue of comparability is the prospect that some of the sites received additional modernization funds through the Comprehensive Modernization Program (HUD) which was one of the co-targeted programs and others received funding from the Urban Parks Program, another co-targeted program; none of these additional sources of funding were received by the Charlotte Housing Authority.

FINDINGS: IMPACT ANALYSIS.

Crime and Victimization: Reporting Incidents to the Police. Numerous studies of reporting crime have suggested that public housing residents tended to report fewer incidents to the police than any other group of residents within communities. Data from victimization surveys conducted in Charlotte in Dalton Village,¹⁰ Boulevard Homes, Fairview Homes,¹⁰ and Piedmont Courts support this generalization: As shown in Table 1, only 30 to 38 percent of all victimizations in public housing communities were reported to the police in contrast to a 64 percent rate

¹⁰ Figures were for the period prior to the crime prevention program.

Figure 1
PERCENTAGE OF CRIMES REPORTED TO THE POLICE
OR TO THE HOUSING AUTHORITY

COMMUNITY	PROPERTY OFFENSES	VIOLENT OFFENSES	ALL OFFENSES
REPORTED TO THE POLICE:			
National Averages ^a	47	43	51
Charlotte, N.C. ^b	62	74	64
Boulevard Homes (1976) ^c	27	19	25
(1977)	39	43	41
Dalton Village (1976) ^c	36	39	37
(1977)	41	41	41
Piedmont Courts (1979) ^d	29	13	23
(1981) ^e	28	11	N/A
Fairview Homes (1979) ^d	35	27	32
(1981) ^e	39	19	N/A
Anti-Crime Demon- stration Sites (1981) ^e	49	46	N/A
REPORTED TO THE HOUSING AUTHORITY SECURITY: ^e			
Piedmont Courts (1981)	19	2	N/A
Fairview Homes (1981)	49	29	N/A
Anti-Crime Demon- stration Sites (1981)	41	22	N/A

N/A = Data not available

^aU.S. Department of Justice, *Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973-78 Trends* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980)

^bOffice of Budget and Evaluation, City of Charlotte, *op cit.*

^cHayes, et al., *op cit.*

^dSurvey conducted by John G. Hayes, Public Safety Coordinator, 1979.

^ePolice Foundation, Interagency Anti-Crime Demonstration in Public Housing Workshop, Washington, D.C., December 2-3, 1981.

for the city of Charlotte and a 51 percent rate for the nation.

The data reflecting reporting rates in Table 1 and 2 appear to be contradictory. As indicated in the first part of Table 1, the proportion of victims who said they reported offenses to the police did not increase; in fact, while property offenses were reported slightly more often, the proportion of victims of violent offenses who said they reported offenses to the police actually declined. Table 2, on the other hand, demonstrates that there was a 51.3 percent increase in the number of calls for service received by the police during the implementation periods; More dramatically, the police department received 113.9 percent more calls related to crimes of violence! On the other hand, residents had said they reported more property offenses to the police but calls for services records indicated that the police received 5 percent fewer calls for property offenses during this period.

Accounting for the tremendous discrepancy in the data is difficult. While it could be argued that there were more offenses occurring during the implementation period, data on victimization to be reported in Figures 1 and 2 reveal that the percentage of families victimized by all types of crimes actually declined by 50 to 85 percent over the pre-implementation period. It could also be argued that the increase in calls for services was an artifact of changes in the way the police department records the calls they receive; however, if this was the case, then we would expect similar increases in calls in the surrounding areas; however, the number of calls in the balance of Census tract 50 were only 2 percent greater during the same period. Another explanation might lie in the unwillingness of black residents to discuss criminal incidents with white interviewers: The survey conducted in 1979 used black youths from public housing while the survey conducted in

1981 for the Police Foundation utilized the services of a local market research firm employing mainly middle-class white women as interviewers. While this latter explanation may have some validity, we feel another explanation is more likely.

The lower rates of reporting offenses to the police had been anticipated by the Crime Prevention Program. Evidence from the policing experiment in Dalton Village in 1976 suggested that many people in public housing would not report offenses to the police even when they were stationed in the community on a 24-hour basis because of fear of retaliation. Our 1979 survey and informal interviews with residents had forewarned us that "fear of retaliation" was a major factor in Fairview Homes. As one resident stated during an interview, "The unwritten code here is that you don't hear and see anything; if you do, you certainly don't snitch because that will mean trouble for you or your family."

The fear of reporting incidents extends only to the police, however. There is a willingness to discuss incidents and to provide names in informal discussions but when asked to report this to the police, the answer was always no. Part of the fear is that the police will come to the reporting person's house seeking information about the incident and this will tell the offender who had reported the incident. No matter what assurances are given that this will not happen, there remains a general belief that the police have ways of knowing who called even if the caller does not give their name or address. Because of this fear the Crime Prevention Program instituted a Telephone Observation system.

Under the Telephone Observation system, residents are advised to call the Crime Prevention Program when they observe an incident and are reluctant to call the police. The staff, usually the coordinator,

reports the incident to the police in the name of the program in order to protect the residents. If the incident requires a witness before the police can act, the staff will try to build the trust and confidence of the residents to the point that they will be willing to report the incident to the police directly. The program also offers minimal protection to persons who are especially afraid of retaliation and has helped residents obtain transfers to other areas when evidence supported their fears.

The second half of Table 1 provides some evidence on the effectiveness of the Telephone Observation program. Because this approach to reporting is new in Charlotte and the Housing Authority, we used the figures for Piedmont Courts as the baseline against which we judged Fairview Homes program. While only 2 percent of the victims of violent crimes in Piedmont Courts reported incidents to the housing authority, nearly 30 percent of the victims in Fairview Homes reported these incidents to the Program instead of directly to the police. Also, over twice as many residents in Fairview Homes reported property offenses to the Program as did residents in Piedmont Courts.

Additional support for the use of the Telephone Observation system is obtained when the results from Fairview Homes are compared with those from other demonstration sites, many of which relied heavily on the police or traditional private security approaches. The data shows that larger percentage of offenses were reported to the Fairview Homes Program than were reported to the housing authority security forces in the demonstration sites.

Based on these data it seems safe to conclude that the Crime Prevention Program did increase the reporting of incidents to the police or other authorities. The figures in Table 2 bear this con-

TABLE 2
AVERAGE MONTHLY CALLS FOR SERVICES
BY TYPE OF CALL, YEAR AND PRE/POST IMPLEMENTATION PERIODS
FOR FAIRVIEW HOMES ^a

TYPE OF CALL	Pre-Implementation					Implementation					Percent Change
	1976	1977	1978	1979	Jan-Jun 1980	AVG	Aug-Sep 1980	1981	AVG		
CRIMES AGAINST PERSON											
Assaults	5.4	6.2	6.1	5.0	6.8	6.1	8.4	7.1	7.6	+	38.1
Person with Gun	2.3	3.3	2.3	3.0	5.8	3.2	3.5	5.2	4.6	+	43.5
Fight in Progress	1.9	1.3	0.9	2.3	1.5	1.5	2.3	1.9	2.1	+	33.8
Robbery/Rape	1.3	1.3	1.9	3.3	1.0	1.9	0.7	0.2	0.5	-	73.8
Domestic Disturbance	3.0	4.4	9.3	18.4	22.8	10.5	31.0	36.6	34.5	+	228.6
Disturbance	4.7	6.7	7.6	9.7	6.3	7.3	12.3	16.7	15.1	+	105.6
Totals	17.5	23.2	29.3	40.2	45.0	30.6	61.0	68.2	65.5	+	113.9
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY											
Burglary	7.9	5.5	7.3	5.3	7.8	6.1	4.0	6.1	5.3	-	23.0
Larceny (home/car)	5.5	6.3	5.5	3.7	4.3	5.3	6.2	6.5	6.4	+	19.7
Damage to Property	1.3	4.4	1.8	2.4	1.8	2.5	2.7	2.2	2.4	-	5.6
Totals	14.8	16.2	14.7	11.3	14.0	14.8	12.8	14.8	14.0	-	5.1
REPORTING SUSPICIOUS PERSONS/INCIDENTS											
	15.3	14.3	9.6	7.1	12.8	12.8	17.3	19.1	18.4	+	51.8
OTHER CALLS											
	14.2	13.8	14.2	18.0	10.3	12.1	10.0	12.0	11.3	-	21.8
ALL CALLS	68.9	67.3	77.8	70.3	84.0	72.1	97.8	116.8	109.4	+	51.3

^a Data presented here are based on computerized printout of all calls for services in Census Tract 50. Addresses in Fairview Homes were then pulled by hand to compile these figures.

clusion out: Calls for services from the police were up 51.3 percent in Fairview Homes. More specifically, calls reporting potential crimes against persons increased 113.9 percent and calls reporting suspicious incidents and prowlers increased 51.8 percent during the Crime Prevention Program's operation. On the other hand, calls reporting burglary, damage to property and a variety of miscellaneous matters were down 23, 20 and 22 percent, respectively.

Crime and Victimization: Calls for Services. During the span of the program residents saw an average of 7 cars a day answering calls within the community; during June and July, 1981, upwards of 16 cars a day were dispatched to Fairview Homes.¹¹ The data in Table 2 reflecting this police activity in Fairview Homes would seem to suggest that crime is on the increase. Our image of crime trends is often based on just this observation -- the number of times we see a police car investigating an incident in our neighborhoods. However, calls for services do not necessarily reflect serious incidents nor are they always distributed randomly in a community such as Fairview Homes.

Only 14 percent of the calls responded to by the police resulted in offense reports and a large percentage of those reports were later unfounded through follow-up investigations. The majority of calls, therefore either involved relatively minor offenses, social service requests, or incidents in which no victim or concrete evidence of a crime could be found. This is not to say that the incidents were not serious or problematic to the persons making the calls, only that the police found sufficient evidence of a violation of the law in only 14 percent of the calls they received.

Over seven-tenths of the calls (72.6 percent) did not fall into one of the typical categories of crime; these were reports of suspicious incidents, domestic quarrels, disturbances, or requests for information. It is, of course, true that these calls sometimes resulted in the discovery of an offense (they account for 45 percent of the police reports filed), but only 8.2 percent of the calls were defined as offenses by the police. Assault, robbery and rape represent only 7.4 percent of the calls and 19 percent of the police reports. Burglary and larceny repre-

¹¹ This estimate of the number of police cars is based on the average number of cars responding to calls for services from within Fairview Homes. Slightly less than 2 cars responded to calls on the average.

sent 11 percent of the calls and 29 percent of the offense reports filed during 1981.

From this data it is easy to see that the types of problems in public housing are not the typical crime problems; rather they are characterized by excessive amounts of domestic and general disturbance. It is important to note that these types of problems demand different strategies than would be found in typical crime prevention programs; strategies which involve long range family counseling and fragile interventions. Since nearly one-fifth of all offenses and half of the assault offenses contained in police records result from domestic disturbances which are not preventable through conventional strategies, police departments and prevention programs in public housing must examine more closely various mediation and crisis intervention strategies designed to impact on these problems. The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program had just begun to employ these strategies with some positive impact when funding for the program ceased.

These comments on our findings bring us to another set of observations. Crime prevention programs such as this seem to be successful in reducing the number of stranger-on-stranger offenses; what remains to be dealt with are the number of friend-on-friend victimizations which become increasingly visible as the typical offenses decline. This pattern of victimization, while obvious in the calls for services data on assaults and domestic disturbances, became apparent when we examined the results of the 1981 evaluation survey concerning burglaries and household larcenies. As shown in Table 3, while the crime prevention program effectively reduced the number of physical break-ins, the number of people reporting property thefts from people they had either let into their apartment or given a key increased to the point that one-third

Table 3
BURGLARIES AND LARCENIES:
How did the thief gain entrance?^a

MODE OF ENTRY	Percent of Victims	
	HUD Demonstration Sites	Fairview Homes
Broke in through a door or window	56%	33%
Came in through an unlocked window or door	23	29
Let the person in or person had a key to apartment	16	33
Other method	5	5

^aData are from questions asked to victims of burglary and larceny in the police Foundation evaluation survey in 1981

of the victims in Fairview Homes gave this response.

Some people also appear to be victim-prone reducing the random nature of crime. Our analysis of the calls for service data for the summer of 1981 produced some rather startling results -- seven families accounted for 29 percent of the disturbance and domestic calls received by the police department and another 25 families received an additional 37 percent of the calls. Thus, 7 percent of the families in Fairview Homes received 66 percent of the disturbance calls or 212 visits by the police within a single three-month period.

Taken together, these data suggest that once the more obvious crime problems are dealt with in public housing, a new and more endemic set of problems beckons to be treated. The problems are not so widespread that they cannot be dealt with but the strategies we employ must be changed to meet the causes of the problems rather than just the symptoms. Traditional policing and crime prevention

programming cannot address these problems because they are reactive rather than proactive, short-term rather than long-term, and limited rather than comprehensive. Although the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program did not have enough time to fully address these problems, some of the activities and counseling strategies showed great promise to deal with these sets of issues.

Crime and Victimization: The Rate of Crime. The overriding goal of the Crime Prevention Program was to reduce the criminal victimization and rate of crime in the Fairview Homes community. On the surface this goal seems to be in direct contradiction with the goal of increasing the rate of reporting within the community -- if reporting increases then it logically follows that crime rates will also increase. However, it is also true that crime rates will decline if the criminal experiences of residents decrease more than the increase in reported offenses; this was our goal.

Figures 1 and 2 combine victimization data from the surveys conducted in 1979 and 1981 with police data on recorded offenses for the first 16 months of the program. The figures also present the results of the Dalton Village police experiment conducted in Charlotte in 1976 and the results for selected HUD anti-crime demonstration sites from the 1981 Police Foundation evaluation survey (only those sites at the high and low end of the victimization scales are presented).

A review of these figures provide some rather startling evidence that the Fairview Homes program was effective in reducing crime and victimization. Figure 1 presents data related to crimes against persons -- robbery/pursesnatching and assaults. For Robbery and pursesnatching the percentage of families reporting that a member of


the family had been the victim of these types of violent crimes decreased from 8.3 percent to 4.1 percent, or 50.6 percent. Although not presented in the figure, there was only one robbery/pursesnatching recorded during the implementation period in Fairview Homes compared with 8 robberies in the community during the previous year.

A more dramatic drop in offenses occurred with assault victimizations: In 1979, 7.9 percent of the residents reported that a family member had been assaulted in the community compared with only 2 percent in 1981. This drop in assaults seems to contradict the crime rate based on offense records which was 35 percent higher than the previous reporting period. It is with assault that the contradiction between the goals of increasing reporting of crime and reducing crime rates becomes most apparent: while the actual rate of victimization declined, the reporting of incidents related to assaults increased by two and a half times if domestic disturbances are included. Part of the reason for the increased crime rate was that residents tended to be reporting more serious incidents to the police than they had previously; over 45 percent of the reported assaults were recorded as offenses by the investigating officers compared with only 26 percent for the previous year.. Moreover, 41 percent of the assaults recorded by the police were the result of domestic conflict compared with only 18 percent from the previous reporting period.

Figure 1 also allows us to compare the results of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program with those obtained in the Dalton Village Mini-Team Policing Experiment in 1976. In that the Dalton Village experiment had similar goals but relied entirely on the efforts of police officers, this comparison can demonstrate the effective-

Figure 1

-30-



ness of these two strategies in reducing crime in public housing.

The data in Figure 1 present some interesting contradictions for both programs. First, although the crime rate rose 25 percent in Fairview Homes, the actual percentage of families experiencing violent crimes decreased from 8.3 percent to 4.1 percent. In Dalton Village, however, while the crime rate dropped from 21 per 1000 population to about 17 per 1000, the percentage of families experiencing these crimes rose. Thus, one would get the impression that the policing experiment was more successful based on the crime rates unless one looks at the victimization rates where the crime prevention program shows a 50 to 80 percent decline in families victimized. Second, the fluctuations in crime rates for violent offenses appears to be part of a trend in that similar fluctuations in crime rates occurred in the comparison areas for both strategies. Finally, recalling the discussion on reporting rates, in that reporting in Dalton Village did not increase substantially while reporting in Fairview Homes did, the rise in crime rates in Fairview Homes may be simply an artifact of the increased reporting rather than an actual rise in crime. Similarly, the drop in crime in Dalton Village appears to be a function of lower reporting rather than an actual drop in crime. These comments and observations suggest that the Crime Prevention Program was more effective than the policing strategy in the area of crimes against persons.

Figure 1 also provides a comparison between the Fairview Homes program and the other anti-crime programs sponsored by HUD. It also provides a comparison with rates of crime for residents in low- to moderate-income residential areas in Charlotte. For robbery and purse-snatching, the Fairview Homes program was below the average HUD program but had about twice as many families victimized by these offenses than the residential areas in Charlotte. It now has about the same rate of victimization as Dalton Village and Boulevard Homes, but less than Piedmont Courts. Eleven HUD sites fared better than Fairview Homes, but many of these were elderly

complexes and sites which combined both resident patrols and police and security patrols for a comprehensive approach to the problems of robbery and pursesnatching; Cleveland, for example, utilized youths as uniformed patrols in the community for an innovative and successful approach to security.

In the area of assault victimizations, the Fairview Homes program seems to have had its most dramatic impact. The rates of assault are now well below other public housing communities in Charlotte, low- to moderate-income residential areas in Charlotte, and the average for the 38 anti-crime demonstration sites. Only three anti-crime sites had lower assault victimization rates than did Fairview Homes and at least one of these was an elderly complex. Here, again, the Fairview Homes program demonstrates a significant advantage over the Dalton Village policing experiment.

Figure 2 present information related to crimes against property. As shown in this Figure, both the Dalton Village experiment and the Fairview Homes program successfully reduced both victimization rates and crime rates; the reduction for the Fairview Homes program was much more significant, however. In addition, while the reduction in crime rates in Dalton Village was part of a general trend in reduced property offenses in the area as shown by the similar reduction of property offenses in Boulevard Homes during the same period, the reduction of property offenses in Fairview Homes came while crime in the surrounding Double Oaks area was increasing and the city itself was experiencing about a 20 percent increase in property offenses. Thus, this data show that the Fairview Homes program was, indeed, more effective in reaching its goals than was expected based on previous experiences in Dalton Village.

The information contained in Figure 2 also demonstrates that as


far as burglary is concerned, the Fairview Homes program fared better than 33 of the other 37 sites where the HUD demonstration program was operating; three of four sites which fared better were elderly sites. Burglary rates in Fairview Homes are well below the average for the demonstration sites, other public housing in Charlotte, and low- to moderate-income areas in the city.

For larceny, however, the Fairview Homes program shows only modest improvements. While the victimization rate dropped by about 50 percent, the drop placed Fairview Homes at about the average for the HUD anti-crime demonstration sites and just below the other public housing communities in Charlotte. Larceny rates are still well above the rates for low- to moderate-income residential area in the city.

The larceny problem is much more difficult to deal with than the problem of burglary as we discussed earlier when talking about how thieves got in to steal items from the home. Larcenies are often committed by someone the resident has let into the home or to whom they have given a key. With nearly 90 percent of the families in Fairview Homes being female heads of house, these persons are often boyfriends and ex-boyfriends who remove articles or money from the home without the head of house giving permission. The problem is especially accute when they breakup and the boyfriend seeks to retrieve household furnishings he may have contributed to the home while he was living there.

The larceny problem is further exacerbated by the drug problem in the Fairview Homes area. A large percentage of the males staying in the area are part of the drug scene and are unemployed. They engage in small larcencies to support their habits. In spite of

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY: CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION RATES



SOURCES: Hayes, et al., The Dalton Village High Crime Neighborhood Project (1978); Hayes, The Fairview Homes Victimization and Attitude Survey (1980); The Police Foundation, Interagency Anti-Crime Demonstration in Public Housing Workshop (1981); and the Police Department, City of Charlotte.

Figure 2
-34-

several drug raids which have netted over 40 arrests for the possession and sale of heroin, drug abuse and sales remain the most significant problem in the community.

Crime and Victimization: Perceptions of Residents. Although only half the residents of Fairview Homes perceived crime as a major problem in 1979, two-thirds (69 percent) felt unsafe when they were out alone in their neighborhood at night. This fear of being out changed substantially during the program: only 25 percent of the residents surveyed in 1981 said they felt somewhat unsafe or very unsafe about being out alone either during the day or night. Thus, the presence of the crime prevention program made the residents feel safer when in their community.

When asked what types of crime they were most afraid of, the residents listed attacks, assaults and burglary as their major fears in 1979. When asked a similar question in 1981, their major fears center on damage to their automobiles and burglary, but the percentage listing these fears were less than in 1979 as shown in Table 4.

Table 4
FEAR AND WORRY ABOUT CRIME IN FAIRVIEW HOMES

	HUD DEMONSTRATION SITES	1979 SURVEY	1981 SURVEY
Percent Very Worried			
Attacks/Assaults	18	37	15
Robbery	25	21	26
Burglary	34	37	30
Damage to Auto	17	-	36
Larceny	-	20	-
Theft from Mail Box	-	13	-
Percent Afraid			
Very Unsafe	8	11	7
Somewhat Unsafe	24	58	17

- indicates that similar responses were not given in a survey.


Table 5
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME-RELATED PROBLEMS IN SELECTED SITES:
Percentage Reporting "A Big Problem"

Crime-Related Problems	HUD Demonstration Sites	Piedmont Courts	Fairview Homes 1979 Survey	1981 Survey
Neighbors Fighting	26	20	-	22
Use of Drugs	44	57	46	54
Garbage or Trash	46	58	82	46
Sale of Drugs	41	49	46	53
Groups of Teenagers	36	18	28	22
Drunks and Winos	35	53	61	48

As shown in Table 5, some major problems still remain in the minds of the residents. A key set of concerns among these are related to drug and alcohol abuse. Although the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program had a drug and alcohol component funded under an ADAMHA grant for 12 months, the nature of the problems demand a longer ranged approach than could be accomplished in a year. Cut backs under the Reagan Administration snipped the drug and alcohol program just as it was starting to gain some headway into this problem; consequently, the program was primarily successful in raising residents' awareness of the nature of the problem and only marginally successful in reducing the magnitude of the problem through treatment and counseling.

Another way of looking at the impact of the program on the attitudes and perceptions of the residents is to examine their feelings about the community and the changes which have occurred. Figures 3 and 4 present the results of the 1981 Police Foundation survey for the HUD Demonstration Sites, comparison sites (Piedmont Courts) and the displacement areas around the sites (Double Oaks, or the Fairview Neighborhood, as noted on these figures). Figure 3 summarizes the responses

Figure 3
PERCEPTION OF THE COMMUNITY AS A BETTER OR WORSE
PLACE IN WHICH TO LIVE COMPARED TO THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE
HUD ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS



SOURCE: Police Foundation, 1981. Data were reported for the following question: "Compared to last year, do you think this is a much better place to live, slightly better, about the same, slightly worse, or much worse?"

to the question, "Compared to last year, do you think this is a much better place live, slightly better, about the same, slightly worse, or much worse?" The responses were standardized by site in order to compare responses between the various HUD anti-crime programs. Fairview Homes ranks fourth among the demonstration sites in the proportion of residents saying it was a better place in which to live. This is significant since most of the sites ranking higher had undergone substantial modernization prior to the survey while Fairview Homes had not been modernized at the time of the survey.

Figure 4 presents the results of the question, "Compared to last year, do you think crime is much less of a problem, less of a problem, about the same, more of a problem, or much more of a problem?". Once again, the residents in Fairview Homes see crime as less of a problem than last year to a greater extent than did the residents in a majority the anti-crime demonstration sites.

Attitudes represent only one dimension. Unless these attitudes affect the behavior of residents, lasting change will not occur. One way to examine this is in terms of turn-over and vacancies in the apartments. When the program began, the Housing Authority had difficulty filling the apartments because prospective residents were afraid to live there; moreover, there was a higher than average number of residents moving out of the community when compared with other public housing sites. The average vacancy rate for the five years prior to 1981 (1976-1980) was 21.7 per month with a high of 25.3 per month for 1980; during 1981, the monthly vacancy rate dropped 42 percent over the five year average and 50.2 percent from the 1980 average to a monthly vacancy rate of 12.6 units.

Figure 4
PERCEPTION OF THE CRIME PROBLEM
COMPARED TO THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE HUD ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS

LESS OF A PROBLEM	
+0.70	
+0.60	
+0.55 College Hill Neighborhood-----	+0.55 Colonia Village
	+0.50 Allenton Heights et al., Nelton Court
+0.40	
+0.35	+0.35 Cassiano Homes, Rainier, Vista, Marion Gardens
+0.30	+0.30 Riverview Low Rise
+0.25 San Juan Homes, High Point Neighborhood-----	+0.25 Fairview Homes, Pine Chapel
+0.20	+0.20 Parkview Courts
	+0.15 Rosewood Gardens/Edgewood Towers
+0.10	+0.10 Clarksdale
+0.05 Piedmont Courts, Lincoln Courts Neighborhood-----	+0.05 Stateway Gardens, Port Lawrence
0	0 Brand Whitlock et al., Dosker Manor
MORE OF A PROBLEM	
-0.05 Allenton Heights Neighborhood, Rosewood Gardens/Edgewood Towers Neighborhood, Colonia Neighborhood-----	-0.05 Lincoln Courts, Holly Park
-0.10 Holly Park Neighborhood-----	-0.10
-0.15 Parkview Neighborhood, Average Comparison Displacement Area; Average Comparison Site-----	-0.15 Bellevue Square, Lakeview High Rise, Flag House Low Rise
-0.20 High Point Neighborhood, Riverview Neighborhood, Clarksdale Neighborhood-----	-0.20
-0.25 Average Demonstration Displacement Area, Ponce de Leon Neighborhood-----	-0.25 College Hill
-0.30 Fairview Neighborhood, Brand Whitlock et. al., Robles Park Neighborhood-----	-0.30
-0.35 Robles Park Neighborhood, Cedar Apartments Neighborhood-----	-0.35 Robert Taylor Homes, A. Harry Moore, Larchmont Gardens, Lafayette Courts Low Rise
-0.40 Dosker Manor Neighborhood-----	-0.40
	-0.45 Flag House High Rise, Lafayette Courts High Rise, Ponce de Leon
-0.50 Stowe Village Neighborhood-----	-0.50 Lakeview Low Rise
	-0.55 Little River Terrace
-0.65 Cedar Apartments Neighborhood-----	-0.60 Riverview High Rise
-0.70	
-0.80 Little River Neighborhood-----	-0.80
-0.85 Nelton Courts Neighborhood-----	-0.85 Stowe Village
-0.90	
-1.0	
-1.1 Pine Chapel Neighborhood-----	-1.1

SOURCE: Police Foundation, 1981. Data were compiled from responses to the following question asked in the citizen surveys:
"Compared to last year, do you think crime is much less of a problem, about the same, more of a problem, or much more of a problem."

Another way to examine the impact of attitudes toward the community is in terms of the number of delinquent rents each month. While rent delinquencies are a function of the state of the economy and Housing Authority policies, they are also a function of the residents' attitude toward the community as a place in which to live. If people view the community as a positive environment, they will be interested in maintaining a good rent record; on the other hand, if they are not attached to the community and view it negatively, they will be less concerned about meeting their rent even though they know that eviction papers will be drawn up and three delinquencies will result in automatic eviction. During 1976 through 1980, there were an average of 22 delinquent rent cases each month; the average for 1980 was 23 per month. During the first nine months of 1981 the average number of delinquencies dropped to 18 per month for an 18 percent decline over the five year average and a 21 percent decline over the average for 1980.

Vandalism has also declined as a consequence of the program. As the vacancies were filled and maintenance improved, the number of incidents of vandalism reported to the Authority dropped substantially. We found that when people believed that something would be done to rectify a problem, they would respect the property and even protect it.

SUMMARY.

This section of the final report has focused primarily on the achievement of the two major goals of the program: (1) increasing the reporting of crime and (2) decreasing the rate of crime.

Based on the data presented here, the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program has exceeded expectations in achieving the two principle

goals. The major findings were these:

- While the percentage of victims reporting incidents to the police did not increase, a larger percentage of those not reporting incidents directly to the police did report the incident to the Crime Prevention Program through the Telephone Observation Program.
- Reporting as measured by calls for services to the police department increased by 51 percent during the program's operation while reporting in the rest of the Census Tract did not increase.
- Calls for services reporting potentially violent crimes increased 114 percent with domestic disturbance calls showing an increase of 229 percent.
- Calls for services reporting suspicious incidents increased by 52 percent but calls reporting property offenses decreased 5 percent.
- The seriousness of calls for services actually decreased in proportion to all calls during the program. Seven of every ten calls were of a disturbance nature rather than the reporting of serious criminal incidents.
- Calls for services within public housing tend to be patterned rather than random with only a small proportion of the families receiving a majority of the calls, especially the disturbance calls. This patterning makes it possible to plan long-range programs to reduce the nature of the crime problem while protecting the rights of the residents.
- Overall, crime rates declined in Fairview Homes during the program while crime in the remainder of the Census Tract and within the City of Charlotte was rising. The most dramatic decreases in crime were experienced in robbery and burglary.
- When compared with the Dalton Village policing experiment in 1976, the approach taken by the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention program appears to have had a greater impact on the rates of victimization for all types of offenses than did the policing experiment.
- When compared with the other HUD Interagency Anti-Crime Programs, the Fairview Homes program appears to be among the top three or four programs in the country. This achievement occurred without the large expenditures on environmental design changes to improve security that other programs undertook.
- The crime problems which remain tend to be the result of friend-on-friend victimizations rather than stranger-on-stranger offenses.
- Residents feel much safer, feel the crime rate has decreased, and generally feel that the community has improved significantly as a result of the Crime Prevention Program.

WHAT WORKS?

SUGGESTIONS FOR CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING AND LOW INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS

It is becoming increasingly clear that the days of large expenditures for crime prevention programs in low income neighborhoods have past. Not only has the new fiscal conservatism forced a cut-back in such programs, but the results of past efforts were also so unimpressive that real questions have been asked about the appropriateness of continuing to fund expensive security and environmental design projects aimed at hardening target against crime.

Most of the past efforts at crime prevention had focused on either increasing police patrol or redesigning the physical environment in such a manner that opportunities for criminal behavior were reduced or discouraged. It has been only recently that the potential importance of citizen involvement in crime prevention has been stressed. According to Robert Yin, the "importance of citizen activities in preventing crime is based in part on the negative results of other courses of action."¹⁰ At the same time, positive evidence of the effects of citizen involvement in crime prevention has been scarce.¹¹ The evidence which does exist is heavily impressionistic and lacks clear guidelines for implementing similar programs in other areas. Moreover, most studies of community crime prevention have limited their focus to the individual

¹⁰ Robert K. Yin, "What is Citizen Crime Prevention?", in the National Criminal Justice Reference Service's *How Well Does It Work? A Review of Criminal Justice Evaluation*, 1978 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1979), p. 109.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

actions of making the home more secure.

Few programs have focused on the social interaction upon which crime prevention is based.¹² These social interactions tend to also lead to greater cohesiveness of a neighborhood in which residents also help each other in coping with other everyday problems, such as employment, child care, shopping, education, and emergency assistance. Yin has suggested that it is these functions which may have diminished and kept crime higher than expected when the focus of programs has been on increasing patrol or private security: Relationships become atomized and the community is made dependent on outsiders for their security.

In this context, the findings of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program offer encouragement for a social interactionist approach to crime prevention planning. It is our thesis that the approach taken by this program can be implemented on a cost-effective basis in other public housing and low-income communities. In fact, many of the strategies can be implemented without cost to either housing authorities, community organizations, the police department, or local governments. Others may be employed at a cost much less than that of increasing police patrol or establishing special governmental bodies to carry out similar functions. Others require an innovative public-private partnership to implement but without the excessive funding required in the past.

Most of the strategies suggested in this section of the report require an examination of our assumptions about the nature of low income communities and the abilities of the inhabitants of these communities. In most of the previous efforts to promote crime prevention in public housing, there has been a reluctance to share responsibility with the residents on the part of those in authority positions. There has

¹²Ibid., p. 111.

been an implicit, and sometimes explicit, assumption that low-income residents were incapable of running their own programs or so intimately involved with the criminal activities occurring in their communities that their involvement in, let alone control of, crime prevention activities would invite disaster.¹³ It is difficult for those who have traditionally controlled decision-making in these areas to relinquish some of their power to the residents, but it is the sharing of power, of decision-making, of the use of community facilities which strengthens the fabric of the community to the point that the prevention of crime becomes a vested interest of the residents in the community: We protect those things in which we have the greatest investment.

The program and strategies suggested in the remainder of this report are those which the staff of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program and the residents of the community have selected as having had the greatest positive impact on the community. In our discussion of "what works", we will structure our comments according to the seven program objectives designated by HUD in funding the demonstration program. We will attempt to keep the comments relatively brief and limited to suggestions for implementing similar programs in other communities.

I. IMPROVED HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program established six objectives related to improved management of public safety in public housing. These included:

¹³ Negative assumptions about the abilities and reliability of public housing residents are not the providence of the police or management only. We experienced considerable prejudice toward residents acting in professional and para-professional roles on the part of the professional staff hired to work in the program. Conflicts over the role of the residents threatened to subvert the program at one point.

- Appointment of a Public Safety Coordinator familiar with crime prevention and social services problems in public housing.
- Strengthened screening of applicants for public housing.
- Increased understanding of the lease and the resident's rights and obligations.
- Increased capacity of housing authority managers to recognize and respond to the problems of residents.
- Increased involvement of residents in lease terminations for reasons other than non-payment of rent.
- Establishment of a Telephone Observation System for the reporting of lease violations.

During the course of the program, two other objectives emerged as central elements to improving the management of public safety. The first of these was the establishment of a base of trust between management and residents. One of the consistent problems undermining the implementation of the formal objectives was the absence of open and honest communication between residents and the manager of the housing complex. Until a mutual understanding of the problems faced by each occurred, the efforts to increase the involvement of the residents in crime prevention efforts were frustrated by rumors and assumptions of a lack of interest in their problems by management.

The second working objective was that of increasing communications between the police department and the courts and management. When the program began, there were neither formal or informal mechanisms for alerting management of the extent and nature of police activity within the public housing community. Thus, while the police investigated many incidents involving lease violations, the manager was unaware of many of these incidents and was unable to take the kinds of corrective actions which might have reduced their recurrence. Lacking this source of information, the manager was forced to pressure residents for information concerning such violations further driving a wedge between

himself and the residents.

Given these eight objectives, what works and how can they be implemented? The simplest answer is that all eight work as a cohesive unit. On the other hand, explaining how to implement them is more difficult in the limited space available to us here.

Of the eight objectives, the least important is the appointment of a public safety coordinator. Although such a person can help bridge the communications barriers between residents and management and management and the police and courts, the principles of positive crime prevention are to be found primarily in good management practices.

The most essential element of good management is that of being open and understanding toward the residents of the community. We found that a great deal of misunderstanding of the lease and the responsibilities of residents existed because no one had bothered to sit down and discuss the lease fully with the residents. Leases are often written in legal jargon decipherable only to lawyers. When we held a series of management and occupancy meetings between the residents and the managers, we discovered that neither group fully understood the terminology of the lease nor all of the different behaviors which were described as grounds for lease termination. Furthermore, we discovered that management had not been enforcing the lease in some areas which contributed to the residents' feeling of helplessness in controlling the crime problem. One result of these meetings was the writing of letters to the residents which explained the clauses in the lease and which was signed by the manager and mailed to all residents in the community.

More importantly, the management meetings laid the groundwork for improved communication between the residents and the manager.

Much of the meeting time often appeared wasted due to protracted discussions of management and maintenance problems faced by individual residents. But the willingness of the manager to deal with these issues in an objective manner allowed the group to explore many of the false assumptions they held and reach a better understanding of one another. Moreover, the residents began to understand why management often did not seek evictions on residents whom they knew were engaged in illegal activities and why it was important that they reported these activities to the manager and provide testimony in support of the manager's actions in a lease termination grievance hearing.

The Telephone Observation System which allowed residents to become secret witnesses reinforced the increased understanding of the residents' obligations in crime prevention which had emerged from the management meetings. This allowed residents to call either the Crime Prevention Program or the manager at any hour of day or night to report illegal activities. Such a system is only as effective as the response of the management team, however; residents will report incidents only if they believe that something can and will be done. This meant that either the manager or the public safety coordinator would have to respond almost immediately when called no matter what hour or day the call was received.

As managers become more and more involved in the problems of residents, there is an increasing need for them to become familiar with the network of professional helpers in the broader community. This is especially true in the areas of family disputes and drug and alcohol abuse. The establishment of linkages with agencies offering counselling in these areas is critical if the management of public

safety is to have its greatest impact. Managers can evict families who continuously cause problems or disturbances, but eviction simply displaces the problem. Instead, the manager needs to have options available to deal with problem families which will reduce the likelihood of the recurrence of the problems short of eviction. In this context, then, social service and counselling agencies receiving public funds need to target services to support housing managers. The manager has the authority to insist that problem residents seek help as a condition of continued occupancy; linked agencies must assume responsibility to provide that help at minimal cost either to the resident or the housing authority since both are publicly funded.

In a similar fashion, there needs to be better communication between the police and courts and the managers of public housing. Strengthening the screening procedures for applicants to public housing is problematic due to problems in the court record-keeping system wherein records of convictions are often difficult to locate and are not economically accessible to a financially strapped housing authority which lacks the ability to assign staff to undertake record searches or hire an agency to accomplish this task. Both the early recognition of problems and the eviction process could be strengthened if managers were automatically provided copies of police reports of incidents occurring in public housing and received regular reports of calls for services in their housing communities.

The major principle we learned as a result of our activities in this area is that *residents will become involved with management in reducing crime and illegal activities if they believe that something can and will be done about the problem.* It is up to managers to reinforce this belief by enforcing the lease to the best of their

ability, for it is management's response which often controls the belief that something can and will be done. Strict lease enforcement combined with referrals to appropriate helping agencies before problems become so great that eviction is the only alternative can do much to reduce the extent of crime in public housing. Moreover, it can encourage other residents to become involved in taking control of their community because they will come to believe that (1) those needing help will receive it and (2) those for whom the threat to public safety is too great will be evicted if they participate with the management by reporting incidents and providing testimony when needed.

II: IMPROVED PHYSICAL DESIGN FOR CRIME PREVENTION

There were three general objectives under this program area:

- Target hardening through replacement of all front and back doors with solid-core wood doors, complete with dead-bolt security locks; installation of porch lights at each doorway; and, installation of lockable mail boxes for each apartment.
- Rehabilitation of a complete apartment building to house employment, drug and alcohol counselling, information and referral, victim assistance, youth services, and crime prevention programs.
- Non-"anti-crime" related target hardening through improved street lighting and installation of new windows with metal frames.

Only the renovation of the apartment building to house the Crime Prevention Program and the installation of the new windows were completed during the period covered by the evaluation; they were completed by December, 1980. The other target hardening activities did not get started until the summer of 1981 and were not completed until September or later; the lockable mail boxes had to be excluded from the design due to cost overruns for the doors and hardware.

Thus, most of the target hardening activities were completed

after most of the evaluation data had been collected. Therefore, unlike other evaluations which experienced a confounding between target hardening and social programming, the Fairview Homes program remains free of those effects which might have been produced by environmental changes.

In spite of this lack of concrete activity within this program area, several comments about improved physical design seem appropriate. First, it would appear that significant reductions in crime can be obtained without large expenditures on physical design changes; resident involvement is the key factor involved in reducing crime within public housing. Second, even though large expenditures are not necessary to initiate crime prevention activities, residents should be involved in planning and implementing programs to improve the physical design of their communities. Third, resident attitudes toward management and their community is often related to maintenance and a good maintenance program can go further to reinstituting pride and involvement in the community than any comprehensive modernization program which might be designed. Third, managers and residents must take a close look at the existing environment and assess that environment for potential design conflicts which produce competing uses of private, semi-private, and public areas within the community. Finally, housing authorities and government should encourage residents to define their own territories and, once defined, they should assist them in improving the area in manner defined by the resident.

It is fiscally comforting to know that expensive target hardening programs are not essential ingredients for crime prevention. New door and locks, innovative lighting and security programs, and the like may increase the individual's sense of security but may also serve to cut the person off from their neighbors and social inter-

actions which are more important in discouraging criminal activities than are all of the locks and security devices.

In spite of this, it is important to involve residents in planning for various types of target hardening programs in a collective manner. One of the things which the Crime Prevention Program sponsored which did more to bring residents together than almost any other activity was to involve them in the planning of and advocacy for the comprehensive modernization of the Fairview Homes community. The act of coming together in small groups defined by area of the community did more for strengthening social bonds between neighbors than many of the other activities which were undertaken. In developing the plans for the comprehensive modernization program, the residents were forced to take a look at the strengths and weaknesses of their community and ask some tough questions about whether their assumptions about the benefits of various design changes for improving the quality of life were accurate or not. It is our belief that this involvement of the residents in the planning of a comprehensive modernization program was the key factor in winning an \$8.5 million grant from HUD to modernize the community in the Fall of 1981.

Similarly, housing authorities and other apartment complex managers can encourage similar involvement by inviting residents to participate in an analysis of existing environmental problems in their communities. Once these problems have been identified and potential solutions explored, managers should encourage the residents to implement their own programs to resolve the problem no matter how minimal or against traditional policies they may seem. Where residents lack the technical knowledge to carry out the strategy, the role of management ought to be to assist them in obtaining that knowledge rather

than undertaking the strategy as entirely a management function. The latter approach merely reinforces the dependency of residents on management instead of fostering a cooperative relationship between management and residents.

These comments extend to the issue of encouraging the residents to define their own yards through fences, flower gardens, or almost any other means independent of the clashes it may create with the notion of a planned community. The evidence from the Crime Prevention Program clearly supports the notion that those families who have attempted to define their own territories, no matter how meager the attempt, experienced fewer crime-related problems than did other families in the community. Managers should not only encourage such activities, but they should also provide technical assistance and materials to help them take control of their own territories.

The only area in which management should take primary responsibility is in the area of preventive maintenance; but even here, residents can be taught self-help skills which would allow them to repair small items before then become big problems. When equipment shows the first signs of wear and tear and nothing is done to repair the equipment, it exists as an invitation to either mistreatment or exploratory vandalism by inquisitive young minds who wish to see how the equipment is constructed. A vacant apartment is an open invitation for various types of misuse -- young people looking for a place free from adult supervision; young children testing their rock-throwing abilities; drug users looking for a safe "shooting gallery"; someone looking for appliances to sell or use; or a temporary home for vagrants. People tend to disrespect property when it does not appear to be valued by the owners; on the other hand, we found a great deal of respect given when management

made some very simple and inexpensive efforts at preventive maintenance.

III. RESIDENT INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

This is the essential element in programs. Policing experiments in crime prevention failed, in our opinion, because they did not assign primary responsibilities for crime prevention activities to the residents but undertook the activities themselves. Unlike programs in middle and upper income neighborhoods where the police merely provide the equipment and technical assistance to block leaders, crime prevention programming in low-income neighborhoods has been dominated by the police. It was our objective to keep this from happening. To accomplish this we stressed the following strategies:

- Establishment of an elderly watch program made up of community youths and adults who would check on the welfare of the elderly residents daily and assist them in getting to the stores or obtaining services when needed.
- Institution of a building captain and neighborhood (apartment) watch program to keep watch over apartments and become a linkage between management and residents.
- Provision of assistance to the resident organization to help it become better organized and more effective.
- Encouragement of the transfer of responsibility for the use of community buildings from management to the resident organization.
- Assignment of responsibility for implementing such programs as Operation Identification (the marking of valuables), home security, street lighting surveys, and other crime prevention activities to residents (adults and youths).
- Encouragement of and technical assistance for the development and implementation of fund-raising and self-help program within community groups.
- Involvement of residents in the planning and implementation of programs undertaken by the Crime Prevention Program, including the hiring of staff.

In spite of this list of activities, it is tempting to argue that the specific program which is implemented is not as important as the involvement of residents in its planning and implementation. Through involvement in these activities, residents obtain a social commitment to the community and others within it. Their commitment extends to informing management and the police when incidents occur as well as coming forth as witnesses when they have observed a crime. While this argument is attractive, it stretches facts and reality too much: We did see some elements of an increased social commitment, such as the reporting of incidents to the police and management; but, the extension of that commitment to step forth as witnesses to point an accusing finger at persons with criminal reputations had not yet emerged beyond the level of informal gossip.

Of the programs which seemed to be the most effective, the elderly watch, assignment of responsibility for community facilities to residents, crime prevention programs, and fund-raising programs stand out. They are concrete programs with clear objectives and procedures which make them particularly attractive activities to build the confidence of residents. For example, the youth in the community were bursting with pride when they completed marking and recording the property of residents within a four-month period after the police had spent nearly two years attempting to do the same thing and completed only 51 units. In fact, they went to other public housing communities to teach the youths in those communities how to accomplish the same goals -- three large family communities are now "Neighborhood Watch" communities with over 85 percent of the families participating.

The building captain program fared less well, experiencing many trying times as captains were accused as snitches or thinking they were

better than others in the community. In addition, the professional staff assigned to work with the building captains did not always follow through with the training and contacts to insure that captains were sufficiently familiar with their roles that they were able to perform the kinds of functions which had been planned. In spite of these problems in implementation, the block captain approach functioned well enough to help deter several offenses and to catch two break-ins in the process. Moreover, the management relationships which were established served as the basis for new and innovative strategies to improve the community.

The fund-raising and self-help programs served as vehicles for raising the self-esteem of residents. However, once again the professional staff's unwillingness to share equal-status roles with the residents in planning and implementing these activities often threatened to subvert the positive relations which were fostered. Care must be taken in finding the appropriate sources of assistance for residents of public housing when programs like these are undertaken; residents are overly sensitive to any overt or covert slights or inuendos from those working with them. The perception of negative attitudes, real or not, creates barriers to further participation among the residents which can make further efforts extremely difficult. Still, the encouragement of self-help programming represents an important step to breaking the cycle of dependency which often characterizes public housing communities. As success is gained in one activities, as we found in assisting the residents in sponsoring a 40th Anniversary celebration which raised over \$300 for the resident organization, there is greater willingness to attempt other activities which make them independent of the housing authority or other social

programs.

Finally, we found that it was less important to stress the involvement of large numbers of residents at any one meeting, than to hold many small meetings with three or four residents who were concerned about a particular issue. Large meetings tended to be unmanageable and to revert to either gripe sessions or lectures on the part of the leaders or dominant residents within the meeting. Small group meetings, on the other hand, provided a forum for those intimidated by large groups and allowed for meaningful communications between both the residents and the professional staff or manager in attendance. Thus, while we seldom had more than ten or twelve residents in attendance at any meeting, the results of the evaluation demonstrate that our program was among the most successful programs in making people aware of the services offered and gaining the participation of residents in programs (see Appendix B for data supporting this statement).

IV. INCREASED FULL AND PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT OF RESIDENTS

As we pointed out in earlier discussion, unemployment is one of the most acute problems in public housing. Over three-fourths of those capable of working are unemployed providing a tremendous pressure toward criminal and illegal activities within the community as a means of supplementing meager welfare incomes. As evidence of this pressure, we found 14 "liquor houses", about four "candy stores", and numerous apartments which sold marijuana and drugs. In addition, several residents allowed stolen property to be sold from their premises on a regular basis and others provided a place for drug users to "pop" their dope for a fee (usually either a percentage of the sales or \$2 a "pop").

Four related but distinct objectives were established within this program area:

- The employment and training of residents for key para-professional/helping roles within the framework of the Crime Prevention Program.
- Increasing the employability of adults within the community through the analysis of skills and qualifications, remediation of educational deficiencies, employment and behavioral counseling, and training in job seeking and interview skills.
- Provision of opportunities for work experience and training for high risk youths living in the community.
- Referral to employers through job development and on-site linkages with existing employment referral program.

To implement these objectives, nine residents were hired to work either full- or part-time in the program. All but one of the residents were placed in professional or para-professional roles. Training was provided either through internships with existing agencies or on-the-job training from professional staff in the program. Two residents were given internships with the United Community Service's Information and Referral Program and two were assigned to employment referral and counselling programs operated by the Urban League and the Mecklenburg County Women's Commission. On-the-job training was provided in drug and alcohol outreach and referral, victim/witness assistance, and delinquency prevention.

Work experiences for 48 youths were provided under a Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program (YCCIP) grant from the Department of Labor (\$150,000). Over half of the youths received training in the areas of building maintenance, painting, carpentry, plastering, and rehabilitation. About one-fifth of the youths were employed in office work and statistical analysis with the remainder being provided stipends to work with the

elderly and other public service projects, including crime prevention. Youths between the ages of 16 and 19 who were unemployed before joining the program were hired for a 12-month period. Youths who were out of school were hired full-time, while youths still in school were hired part-time (15 hours per week). Preference was given to youths who were high school drop-outs; who had juvenile or criminal records; and/or who had no previous work experience.

Adult employment referral was a function of a Job Bank Program designed and run by the two residents receiving internship with existing job referral programs. They were assisted by the employment counselor hired to work with the YCCIP Program. The Job Bank received lists of job openings from the Employment Securities Commission, the city and county personnel departments, newspaper want-ads, and various employers throughout the city. The staff undertook an employability analysis of each applicant coming through the job bank. Applicants were screened for drug and alcohol problems, medical or health problems, educational or training deficiencies, job attitudes, job seeking skills, and a variety of other potential barriers to employment. The counselors then referred the applicant to appropriate on- or off-site agencies or programs in order to remediate or diminish the barriers which were discovered. The counselors held regular workshops and training sessions on job-seeking, the application process, and interview skills.

The weakest aspect of the program was in the area of job development. Although the counselors from the Job Bank and YCCIP programs contacted major employers in person, by telephone, and in writing, few employers were willing to directly list openings with our program. Part of this was due to the stigma associated with public housing and

Fairview Homes, in particular: Employers were unwilling to take a risk on hiring people due to their assumptions that residents of public housing were either engaged in criminal activity or drug use. As the crime rates began to decline and the program began to establish a successful track record, the stigma of public housing was becoming less of a factor; unfortunately, the downturn in the economy further depressed the few employment opportunities available making it increasingly difficult to find adequate placements.

Additional barriers to placement were presented by the applicants themselves. Over half of the adult applicants lacked previous work experience and the work histories of the remainder were often inconsistent and spotty. Most of the women applicants could account for their lack of work experiences due to having young children at very early ages and some of the males had spent time in jail or prison thus accounting for the large empty periods in their employment histories. However, a large minority had neither children nor prison to account for the vacant periods in their employment applications. With these backgrounds, it was difficult to convince employers to risk hiring persons who appeared to either not care about working or be emersed in a deviant sub-culture which provided entrepreneurial opportunities outside the conventional labor market.

Histories such as these represent the major reason why employment programs in connection with crime prevention activities are important. By providing opportunities for work experiences in meaningful, realistic occupations along with appropriate levels of support and counseling, new paths can be started which can lead the individual away from the deviant subculture toward more conventional commitments. Most people, no matter what their background, want to work and earn

a living in occupations which will allow them to retain a sense of self-esteem. However, given their past experiences and those of others who have tried to work and maintain conventional jobs, they will hedge against failure. That is, they will never fully commit themselves to the job or conventional roles until they have enough evidence that they will succeed. To commit oneself and then fail is to open oneself to the ultimate fact that one is a failure, but to only go along with the game with only a partial commitment allows one to save face by denying that he or she was really trying to succeed.

Thus, employment programs must build in opportunities for success. The employment must be realistic; that is, non-productive or disruptive work habits must not be tolerated. But, it must also be sympathetic; that is, it must allow the worker the opportunity to learn from his or her mistakes without being permanently penalized. In the YCCIP program, we provided for this by placing youth workers in conventional roles within the Housing Authority's Maintenance Department. They were subject to the same rules and requirements as any other worker and were suspended or terminated for violations such as too many late arrivals or absences, insubordination, and failure to perform duties assigned by a supervisor. On the other hand, the workers were counseled weekly on their work habits by an employment counselor after discussions with their supervisors in an effort to eliminate problems before they reached the level of termination. If an employee was terminated, the employee could regain his or her position by attending more intense counseling sessions focused on the causes of the termination and their attitudes toward work and by meeting with their supervisor to renegotiate their employment contract.

The procedure described above worked extremely well with both the youth workers and some of the adults which had been placed in

private sector employment. The workers gained not only in experience but also in confidence; the employers also learned different approaches to employment problems and turn-over. So successful was the program that the Housing Authority has committed to rehiring the youths in permanent positions as they become available.

Employment efforts such as this, then, are central elements in bonding residents to both program goals and the conventional order. As they gain in employment stability, they find they have more to protect and are less tolerant of deviant activities of those in the community -- they have a stake in the conventional order. For those who move in and out of marginal roles, employment can be an important mechanism to divert them from total involvement in the deviant activities with which they are associated. Employment also provides an attractive "hook" to get people involved in other types of program, such as education and drug and alcohol counseling. In fact, the high school completion program which was started as part of the Job Bank in cooperation with Central Piedmont Community College reached over 100 residents and was the most successful educational effort in the area in the past seven years.

The utilization of residents in key roles must be seen as crucial to the success of the program. Not only is their employment essential in creating a sense of commitment and entree into the community, but it provides the kinds of experiences and exposure which will allow the community to carry on the programs with only limited resources, both financial and professional. This is an important point since budget cuts are severely limiting the availability of funds for social programs as well as causing the traditional helping agencies to retrench into a more centralized operation.

While the training and placement of residents in the major operational roles within community-based programs such as this is deemed essential, a few comments about the relationships between residents and the professional staff are essential if other programs are to avoid some of the pitfalls we experienced. For example, the placement of residents in equal-status roles with professionals hired from outside the community and traditional helping agencies can create unanticipated problems in role expectations. One of the major problems we confronted was that of resentment toward the residents on the part of a few of the professional staff: They viewed the residents as unqualified and lacking sufficient expertise to carry out similar functions with them. As a consequence, petty jealousies and power struggles began to emerge. Intervention by the coordinator was often seen as inappropriate, especially when demands were placed on the professional staff to work more closely with residents and no clear line of authority was given.

One result of this division between the staff was a lack of sharing of ideas for success in endeavors undertaken by the residents. Second, the professional staff was reluctant to share their resources and methodologies with the residents out of a belief that they would either not be capable of understanding the requirements of the role or would misuse the resources made available to them. Finally, training was often interpreted to mean complete authority of the actions of the residents instead of the sharing of ideas and techniques.

In this context, therefore, training through internships with only follow-up technical assistance from professionals in the field was a more effective method of upgrading the skills and abilities of the residents than the on-site, on-the-job training. When training

and program functions are too closely mixed in a short-term, innovative program, there is a tendency for one function to dominate at the expense of the other. For example, training was often overlooked in favor of meeting the demands to produce results within a year's period; if residents were called upon to assist in meeting program objectives, it was usually in custodial or information dissemination roles rather than an atmosphere of partnership. Demands to engage in training were seen as diverting energy from the program objectives unless residents were placed totally under the supervision of the professional staff so that they could direct the activities of the resident to insure meeting their own program goals and then, if time allowed, could receive some training.

The time-frame under which the program operated, therefore, created too great a demand for results for the on-the-job training goals to be met. Had there been two or three years, instead of 12 to 15 months, and had the activities and programs been more traditional in approach or part of an on-going program, the training goals might have been more adequately met.

Fortunately, some of the professional staff shared the coordinator's commitment to training residents and some training did occur, often at the expense of the time-frames set for achieving a goal. In addition, opportunities emerged to send residents to training programs run by the Substance Abuse Division of the State Department of Human Resources and by the National Center for Community Anti-Crime Programs at Norfolk State University, Norfolk, Virginia. Because of this commitment and these opportunities and because of the internships, the residents acquired sufficient skill and information to carry on the program on their own and with a great deal of success.

One final set of concerns needs to be expressed concerning employment programs. Based on our experiences, we question the wisdom of operating short-term, dead-end training and work experience programs, such as the YCCIP program. The basis for this questioning is threefold. First, our experiences with job bank applicants who had received either youth work experience or other CETA training was not very positive. This is not to say that the training was not good or the experience important for the individual. Rather, we often found that these individuals left their job placements after one or two weeks of employment complaining that the work was too hard or the pay too low for what they were required to do. In almost every case, the base of comparison was a CETA job which the individual had held. Part of the reason for this "false" economy lies in the fact that many of summer work and work experience jobs are make-work positions outside the regular labor market designed more to increase the opportunities for employment than for realistic work experiences. Moreover, employers often do not see the CETA worker as part of their regular work force and make fewer demands on them.

Second, in that most of these jobs are temporary with a definite cut-off period, workers do not commit themselves to the job as they might otherwise. They work to earn money which they can convert into either immediate gratification or some other enterprise which will earn additional money later. In this context, we found that some of the youths hired under the YCCIP program invested a large portion of their checks in "reefer", or marijuana, rationalizing that the job would soon be over and they needed a steady source of money coming in once they were no longer

employed.

Finally, most employees recognize that CETA-type experiences are generally not part of the conventional labor market and therefore outside the career ladder. They withhold commitment to these jobs because of this. They take little pride in the job because they know that when the money runs out, they will be out of a job no matter how good of a worker they were. In our conversations with both Job Bank applicants and the YCCIP participants we found a general attitude that it was foolish to work hard on these jobs because no matter how hard you worked, when it came time to hire someone permanently, the employer would hire someone outside the CETA program.

For these reasons, we feel that a more effective employment program could be devised which involved commitments from employers to set aside a certain number of positions within their regular work force to be filled by high risk workers. The advantage would be that the jobs would be part of a career path rather than in addition to it. The jobs would be perceived as "real" jobs by the workers thereby enhancing their commitment to do well.

If such a program were established, one of the keys to success will be the skills and commitment of the employment counselors who will be selected to work with both the high-risk employee and the supervisors. The problems presented by the high-risk employee are multiple and great skill is needed to help them overcome their barriers, whether they be drugs and alcohol, poor self-image, poor work habits, lack of commitment to conventional roles, immersion in a non-work subculture, lack of support from family and friends, or any of the magnitude of problems which serve as pulls away from the job. The counselor must not only be sensitive to the employees problems,

they must be demanding and intolerant of the many excuses and rationalizations which will be presented for failure. Ability to work with the employers and to help supervisors understand how their own expectations will influence the outcome for the high-risk employee is also necessary. With high expectations and appropriate supportive services, the employment program can succeed.

V. IMPROVED SERVICES TO COMBAT CRIME OR ASSIST VICTIMS AND WITNESSES

The causes of crime as well as the problems resulting from it are multiple. No program aimed at preventing crime can avoid dealing with these problems and hope to be successful. The following program objectives were aimed at addressing these problems:

- Establishment of a drug and alcohol abuse treatment, outreach and prevention program combining the services of existing drug and alcohol programs to identify problems, divert people from drug and alcohol abuse, and provide treatment and referral services when diversion cannot work.
- Institutionalization of a juvenile delinquency program to (1) assist youths and residents in organizing active and effective advocacy groups; (2) establish linkages between youths and community agencies which serve them; (3) provide diversionary services to keep young people out of lock-up; (4) assist youths in establishing independent resources to run their own programs; and (5) devise programs to reduce the rate of truancy and educational failure in school.
- Provide linkages with existing agencies to undertake sex education, family planning counseling, and alternatives to child bearing.
- Provide services to victims of crimes and witnesses through linkages with an existing victim assistance program.
- Establish an on-site information and referral program which can enhance the linkages between community residents and available social and medical service resources.
- Provide crisis intervention and mediation services to reduce the tendency for interpersonal conflicts to develop into serious incidents.

Each of the objectives were found to be relatively important in working with people in the community. However, the sex education and crisis intervention programs were slow to start and rather sporadic in their implementation. Part of the reason for this was that the initial linkages with agencies to provide technical assistance in training staff or conducting programs did not occur to the extent anticipated. In addition, the staff became so involved in other activities that they were unable to follow through to the extent that was necessary.

Future programs should consider making the crisis intervention and mediation service a more central activity than we were able to do at Fairview Homes. Had the staff effectively made follow-up visits to the homes of residents to which the police had been called, many of the assaults related to domestic quarrels might have been avoided. We had difficulty obtaining cooperation from the police department to inform us when they responded to calls which they did not classify as involving an offense. Instead, we had to wait for monthly reports of calls for services before we became aware of most of the police activities in the community. A stronger linkage with the police department and the officers patrolling in an area may have corrected this problem and insured timely notice of problems.

In addition, some of the professional staff were reluctant to become involved in interpersonal conflicts in a mediating or intervening fashion. Even though they say this as an important role, they either did not feel competent enough to provide such services or felt that mediation and intervention would be ineffective and refused to attempt this program. Still, when mediation was attempted, it generally served to defuse tense situations and keep arguments from boiling

over into more serious incidents. In this respect, we found that the Dispute settlement models presented by the Neighborhood Justice Centers reports¹⁴ provide workable guidelines for the development of programs in low-income areas.

The Information and Referral program and the victim/witness assistance program, instead of being separate programs can easily be combined into a single program. It is important that natural helpers from within the community be selected to fill this role. Such individuals will already have a working knowledge of the social services system relevant to the residents in the area and will have the rapport necessary to gain the trust of residents. Such a person will feel comfortable dealing with persons facing personal crises in the context of their own home rather than in an office setting which tends to intimidate victims, especially low income victims. This personal contact is important in making the person comfortable and allows the client control over the environment and where the counseling will occur. Because the counselor is a person from the community, neighbors and friends will not know the reasons for the visit unless the client wishes such information disclosed.

Training and support services for the resident selected as the informational and referral and victim/witness counselor will be a key to the success of the program. In our case, the counselors spent five months working in the Information and Referral Program for the county and then worked along side the victim/witness counselor from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Victim Assistance Program who was placed on-site with the Crime Prevention Program under a 12-month grant from LEAA. Although the relationship between the residents and the professional counselor were not as close and positive as planned, the experience

¹⁴ Daniel McGills, *Neighborhood Justice Centers: An Analysis of Potential Models* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977).

was sufficiently beneficial that the residents have continued to contribute three hours a day even though funding for their positions has expired.

The information and referral/victim assistance role is an important role within the total prevention approach. The counselors in the Fairview Homes program averaged 35-40 serious economic, medical, social service, legal problems each month along with 50 - 60 less urgent requests for information or assistance. They also carried and case-load of 15 - 20 victims each month. Most of the individuals they helped had no knowledge of the kinds of assistance available to them for emergency food, clothing, furniture, financial help with bills, and other problems often driving them toward illegitimate activities as a means of supplementing their incomes. Most victims and witnesses did not understand the criminal justice system and their rights and responsibilities in the courts. Many of the elderly did not understand the medicaid program and the spend-down requirements associated with that program.

When people do not understand or know about legitimate means for solving their problems, they will often turn either to illegitimate means or to drugs and alcohol. Both of these alternatives exist within the community as attractive alternatives to coping with problems. The use of drugs and alcohol is part of the social fabric of the low-income community; both are readily available through the subterranean entrepreneurial system which has served as one of the major means of supplementing meager incomes for decades. For those outside the conventional labor and economic system, the sale of controlled substances provides an attractive alternative: Unlike conventional business enterprises, entry into the illegitimate

market does not require a large initial investment and the profits are large and immediate.

Breaking the cycle of dependency on drugs and alcohol both as sources of supplemental income and as therapeutic/recreational substances is both crucial to preventing crime and nearly impossible to accomplish within a short period of time. It is crucial because a majority of the violent offenses and a substantial number of predatory crimes in low income communities, such as Fairview Homes, can be directly linked to drug and alcohol abuse. For example, in Fairview Homes, most of the assaults with deadly weapons occurred between people arguing either about drugs or money owed from the sale of drugs; many of the domestic assaults and fights occurred among people who were drunk or had been drinking heavily; and, a large percentage of the larcenies in which the victim had let the thief into the home were committed by people who were heavy drug users.

The Fairview Homes program attempted to address the problem by leveraging services from existing drug and alcohol programs rather than focus on training residents to undertake outreach and counseling activities due to the complex problems and delicate approaches necessary to impact on these issues. A community educator from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Drug Education Center, an intake counselor from Open House Counseling Services (the major drug treatment program in Charlotte), and an alcohol counselor with considerable experience in low income communities were hired through a grant from the Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration for a period of 12 months. Cooperative agreements with the above agencies allowed the program to pay half of the salaries while the agencies picked up the other half.

Even though 12 months is hardly enough time to create the kinds of trust and support networks capable of breaking down the sub-cultural values legitimizing drug and alcohol use and abuse, over 100 people were counseled for substance abuse: 27 were referred to intensive treatment for alcohol abuse; 7 received treatment for drug abuse through Open House; and 7 were referred to Mental Health for long-term counseling. Over 100 other residents participated in awareness and prevention workshops conducted by the staff and the program sponsored football, baseball, and basketball teams for the youths in the community. A functioning Al-Anon program was started and has continued to meet every Thursday even though the professional staff have left due to the exhaustion of program funds.¹⁵

While the counselors in the drug and alcohol program were diligent in working with clients who came into the office and in conducting various awareness, prevention, and educational workshops, several aspects of the program failed to be developed to the extent envisioned. First, although one of the primary goals of the program was to identify and train natural helpers in drug and alcohol recognition, crisis counseling, and referral, the natural helpers were never identified or, if identified, given consistent enough support and training to insure that they would participate in the program. There was a tendency to concentrate efforts on persons who came into the offices for individual counseling or programs instead of working with a broader spectrum from the community. Contacts with those who did not initially show an interest or need were often left to the resident staff but without sufficient training or guidance from the professionals.

¹⁵ Refunding for the drug and alcohol program was hampered by the shift from direct program grants to individual programs to block grants to states. While the block grants were supposed to reflect current programs which were funded by direct grant, the grant supporting us was too new to be considered in working out the block grant formulas.

Second, the goal of providing alcohol and drug training for staff unfamiliar with problems in these areas was only partially fulfilled. Staff were provided opportunities to attend classes conducted by the Charlotte Council on Alcoholism, the Drug Education Center, and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Mental Health Center. Plans to train the resident staff in referral procedures and points of contact within the network of professional drug and alcohol workers were never completed. There was a great deal of reluctance to share these resources with other staff members, especially the residents. When drug or alcohol problems were discovered, the staff were generally willing to provide direct counseling no matter when they were called, but difficulties arose whenever they were not available: The residents and coordinator knew the appropriate agencies to be contacted but had difficulty in circumventing the gate-keepers within the agencies in order to obtain the appropriate services at the time the client was receptive to treatment. Moreover, the ability of residents to continue support services to drug and alcohol clients after the counselors left the program was severely hampered: Neither the residents nor the counselors in the linked agencies knew who to contact regarding follow-up with clients.

Third, the goal of early intervention in problems arising from the abuse of drugs and alcohol was never fully implemented. The original design required home visits by the drug and alcohol counselors whenever a crisis situation was investigated or discovered by the manager, another crime prevention staff member, or the police. Home visits were required to be conducted within 48 hours after the situation had been discovered in order to reduce the likelihood of the problem continuing unchecked and, yet, long enough after the

initial incident to insure the safety of the counselors. Unfortunately, the Open House worker assigned to the program was not skilled in intervention or in-depth counseling and the remaining counselors did not feel comfortable dealing with these kinds of issues in the context of the person's own home; even the victim assistance professional expressed discomfort in conducting home visits and tended to request victims meet in the office rather than in their homes. Thus, initial interventions were usually made by either the coordinator or one of the resident staff. This had the disadvantage of making the drug and alcohol counselors seem aloof and unconcerned, even though nothing could be further from the truth. In addition, initial bonds were established between the coordinator or the resident staff making it difficult for these bonds to be transferred to the drug and alcohol counselors.

Even with these problems in implementing the program, a considerable dent was made in the social fabric supporting drug and alcohol use. The impact, of course, might have been greater and longer lasting had all aspects of the program functioned successfully, especially the training of staff and a network of natural helpers. Until programs like this view the community of public housing residents as containing the necessary resources to support prevention programs on their own without the constant supervision or intervention of "professionals", the community will continue to be dependent on external agencies.

The reduction of dependency was the focus of the youth program. The director of the program and his two community staff people sought to assist youths and young adults in becoming advocates for themselves rather than always depending on others to advocate for them. In this

context, youths were given assistance in identifying problems affecting them and the appropriate agencies capable of mediating those problems; the youths were then required to meet with officials or agencies to find solutions for the problems they had identified. Youths from the community have worked with the city council, the transportation department, the recreation department and the schools to attempt to change services or practices.

In addition to the advocacy role, the youth program also sought to both improve education outcomes for youths through tutorial programs and the relationships between parents and schools through parent education and a truancy program to alert parents without telephones when their children were out of school. As in the advocacy function, the staff attempted to avoid creating a dependency on them by using community volunteers and parents as the principle actors within their programs. For example, the tutorial program which taught over 90 children during the summer and about 30 youths during the school year, utilizes parents in teaching roles with supervision from volunteers drawn from the schools and universities in the area. The truancy program also utilizes parents through a concept of a school family consisting of ten families from the same area whose children attend the same school. Within the "family," at least one person will have a telephone; thus, when a child is absent from school, the school will contact the school family to find out why the child is absent. The school family also serves an important role in increasing communications between parents and the teachers and teachers and parents for those who cannot read or be easily contacted because they do not have a telephone.

The major problem the youth program has experienced has been the tendency to become too narrowly focused on a single program or

a limited number of problem youths. At the current time, the program has been caught up in trying to establish an ongoing tutorial program at a neighborhood school which was closed during 1981. The program worked with residents and youths to help them advocate, first, against the closing of the school, and, then, when the closing was inevitable, to turn the school into a viable, vital community service center housing recreation, educational, and social programs benefiting the community. In succeeding in advocating for a community service center, the program received four classrooms and the school library from which we were to operate educational programs for both young students and adults (through cooperation with the community college).

These, then, were the programs which we found to be the most important in reducing crime and victimization. In considering these programs, it is important to keep in mind the need to find those who are committed to training residents to run the programs, rather than to bring professionals in to run programs for them. Where training is adequate and support services available from existing agencies, the programs will become almost independent of external funding since the skills and resources will never totally leave the community. It will be important, however, to insure that periodic retraining occurs since many of those initially trained will find employment and leave the community over time. Retraining will also be important for those initially trained in order to keep them motivated and working toward the goals of the programs. It is also important for linked agencies to constantly check with and offer support to the residents; this will maintain the bonds which have been formed and enhance the residents' feeling that they are indeed performing a vital role in the community.

VI. ADDITIONAL AND MORE SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

While it is increasingly apparent that crime prevention is not the sole, or primary, domain of the police, the patrol officer does play an important role in the maintenance of order, especially in low-income communities such as Fairview Homes. The enforcement of laws, just as the enforcement of leases by management, sets the perimeters for behavior. When the police fail to act when a violation has occurred, they have inadvertently given approval to that behavior. The involvement of citizens in crime prevention places an even heavier demand of the police to act, for as citizens begin to exercise some control over their community, they will look to the police to support their actions and make arrests when violations have been identified; if the police fail to act, whether out of negligence or the absence of concrete evidence, the spirit giving rise to involvement is diminished.

Even more germane is the fact that people living in low-income neighborhoods look to the police for assistance more in settling interpersonal disputes than do people from other neighborhoods. For example, the police were called 552 times to deal with domestic disputes and 241 times to investigate disturbances within the 455 unit complex of Fairview Homes over the 16 months covered in this report; they were called back two or more times the same evening in more than one-fifth of the incidents. If they were better equipped to provide more effective solutions to these problems or had resources available to them to call upon, they may be better able to reduce the number of call-backs to the same address and to prevent the situations from escalating into more serious criminal conduct as we found at Fairview Homes.

The presence of police officers, just as the presence of resident crime prevention activities, has a deterrent effect on many types of crimes. Increased police visibility, especially foot patrols, have been shown to be effective in deterring crimes against persons as well as burglaries.¹⁶ Such presence is particularly important during those times when these offenses are most likely to occur -- weekends and evenings.

It was with these considerations in mind that the Crime Prevention Program in conjunction with the Charlotte Police Department entered into a cooperative agreement to place a two-person patrol in the community beginning Friday evening through Sunday evening every weekend from September, 1980, through August, 1981. The officers patrolled the community from 6:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays, and from 4:00 p.m. until midnight on Sundays. One officer was also available two days each week to work with various aspects of the program and provide crime prevention training to the youths and residents.

Originally, three officers were to be assigned to the program to work rotating week-ends. Unfortunately, one of the officers became seriously ill and was unable to provide services to the program. The Police Department experimented with assigning other officers to replace the officer who had become ill, but this experiment did not work out satisfactorily either for the officers who were already assigned to the program or those whose normal shifts were disrupted for this purpose. Moreover, some of the officers assigned to work in the community had never patrolled in low-income communities, especially one with the negative reputation that Fairview Homes enjoyed. As a result, they were on edge and bitter

¹⁶Hayes, et al., op cit.

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making the duty uncomfortable both for the other officers and the residents they encountered.

Not only did we encounter a problem of illness at the patrol level, but the team commander who helped us organize and set up the program also became ill and was replaced by another officer. We also experienced a reorganization of the police department which brought about another shift in both the commander and, this time, the patrol officers who regularly patrolled the community. These changes resulted in increasingly poorer communications with the police who answered a majority of the calls in the community.

The changes might not have had such a negative impact on communications had administrative liaisons remained functional. To maintain administrative liaisons, we had established an oversight committee consisting of representatives of the major agencies and organizations which were linked with the program. This committee functioned as a planning and problem solving committee to examine the program on a regular basis and modify activities or linkages when problems began to appear. After the team commander who originally worked with the program became ill, no representative from the police department came to any of the oversight committee meetings even though they received notice of the meetings and we were assured that they would attend.

One way of measuring the impact of the changes in police organization is in terms of notification of crisis interventions undertaken by the police. Prior to the illness of the team commander, we generally received notification when officers had answered calls within the community; after the illness these notifications decreased even though calls for services were increasing. When the reorganization occurred, we sent letters to the new police team informing them

of the program and the services we offered. We even requested an opportunity to speak to the team to request notification of calls they received and to offer supportive services and counseling to residents who were having domestic problems or problems related to drugs and alcohol. Unfortunately, we did not receive responses to these letters and notifications dropped off even further.

Fortunately, we did receive excellent support from the two officers assigned to the program and from the administrative and investigative divisions within the police department. We supplemented the lack of notification of police activities with monthly printouts of calls for services in the area. While these computerized printouts came to us as much as a month after the incident had occurred, they still allowed us to do follow-ups with those individuals experiencing repeated incidents and to identify trouble areas within the community.

The investigative and vice squads were extremely supportive of our efforts. Through their efforts we were able to break up a growing trafficking of drugs and solve a major theft. Although drug trafficking remains a serious problem, the vice squad has continued to provide support services when we are able to identify persons selling drugs in the community and has generally been successful in making arrests as well as keeping us informed of their activities.

The Records Bureau has also been supportive. They have provided us access to police reports for crimes taking place in all public housing in the city. These reports have proven useful in identifying those individuals and families who are creating an unsafe environment for other residents without relying on residents or placing residents in positions where they can be threatened by offenders. The reports have also allowed us to provide assistance to victims in communities

other than Fairview Homes thus giving them the feeling that the Housing Authority does care about their welfare.

We have found the linkages with the police department to be a very important part of our program. The most important linkage, however, has not been the increased police patrol on weekends, but the increased communications between residents and the police. We have started holding regular meeting between a representative from the Crime Prevention Division and the building captains to discuss problems and potential solutions. The residents are beginning to understand that the police cannot solve problems alone and that they need people who are willing to come forward when incidents occur and speak out. The residents are learning the limitations that the police must deal with and the police are learning that the residents will support them if they understand what is expected of them and are assured that the police will follow through if they do come forward.

It is communications between people which is the essential element, not increased police patrol. It is police officers taking time to get to know the residents and the community which is important, not how many times a car drives through. Once officers get to know the people in the community, they will learn where and when offenses are most likely to occur and who is likely to be involved. Most people in the community are supportive of the police and the department and they will come to the officers' aid if they feel he or she has their interests at heart.

VII. AREA-WIDE PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

The crime problem in public housing must be viewed from a broader social, economic and geographic context. Public housing communities do not exist in isolation from the surrounding neighborhoods, except, perhaps, through the psychological barriers which are often created through the stigma which is attached to living in public housing. In Fairview Homes, for example, we found that many of the serious crime problems such as robbery, shootings, assaults and drugs occurred in the surrounding streets more so than within the community itself, and that the majority of those committing offenses within the community were from these areas rather than from the community itself. Moreover, the deterioration of homes and buildings which was often associated with Fairview Homes was actually outside the community.

The problems of public housing residents are intimately tied to the problems of the surrounding areas--e.g., inadequate transportation; an absence of large markets and shopping centers within reasonable distances; poor access to libraries and health services; inadequate garbage and sanitation services; and poor street maintenance and lighting. Park and recreation facilities, while located within a reasonable distance, were inadequate for the numbers of children in the area and poorly patrolled and supervised such that they often became hang-outs for drug dealers and other deviant activities.

Opportunities for employment within the areas surrounding public housing seem to constantly decrease as businesses move their activities to the suburbs or "safer" areas within the community. Those industries and businesses which remain often stereotype people from the community as poor risks, thus further restricting

the employment opportunities which might otherwise have been available within the local area.

To address the issues created by these factors, the Crime Prevention Program sought to establish closer linkages with existing employment and social services within the broader community. The staff worked closely with the personnel departments of the city and county to insure that residents were informed of employment opportunities within both of these bodies of government and that residents understood their application and interview processes. The Department of Employment and Training within the city government both provided technical assistance to our staff and assistance in matching residents with prospective employers. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Urban League not only trained one of our staff members in their Private Sector Initiative Program but also assisted in identifying employment opportunities for residents. Similar assistance was provided by the Women's Commission and the AFL-CIO's Human Resource Development Program. The Employment Securities Commission assisted us by sending us daily job listings on micro-fiche and targeting a counselor to work especially with people referred to them through our program.

The Housing Authority and several of the companies contracting for modernization work in public housing provided training and apprenticeship opportunities for our residents. So successful were some of the placements that they become permanent employees of the Authority and the companies.

We worked closely with the City's Special Projects Office to apply for an Urban Parks grant to improve the parks in the area. Although we were unsuccessful in obtaining the grant, the background

information developed to support the grant provided the impetus for some significant improvements in recreation and community services within the existing facilities.

When the local elementary school was closed in the Spring of 1981, the staff and the residents of the community were successful in arguing that the school be converted into a community service center to house social and educational programs. In July, 1981, the Double Oaks Community Service Center opened housing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Area fund, a public health education unit, adult education and high school completion programs, a Park and Recreation program, and our tutorial programs. Eventually, a unit of the library will be located in the center as well.

Close relationships were established and maintained with programs such as the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Community Relations Committee, the Mecklenburg Court Counselor Services, the Pre-Trial Release Program, the Public Defender's Office, the Youth Services Bureau, and local colleges and universities. The Department of Social Services, Consumer Credit Counseling Services, Family Housing Services, Planned Parenthood, the Association for Sickle Cell Disease, and a variety of other groups conducted workshops and made themselves available to residents on a regular basis through the Crime Prevention Program.

In spite of all the linkages which were made in support of the program and the residents of Fairview Homes, there was one area which should have received more attention than it did -- the creation of a working partnership with businesses and industry. While we worked closely with many of the small businesses in the community, our contacts with and the involvement of business and

industrial groups in the planning and development of programs was weak. These groups have experiences which can be valuable in the operation of programs. More importantly, they hold the key to many of the problems which plague public housing residents -- access to meaningful employment and training. Unless businesses and industries create meaningful opportunities for low-skilled, high-risk people within public housing to find employment with a future, no amount of governmental money or public assistance will create a permanent change within these communities. People need a stake in a future that they will be willing to protect; jobs which have the promise of permanency and advancement offer that stake and temporary public service jobs funded entirely by government cannot fulfill this need.

Attention must be paid to developing a spirit of cooperation between the private and public sectors to meet this problem. It may entail an expansion of the concepts developed in Title VII of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act which encourages private sector initiatives under which the costs of employing high-risk workers is shared equally by the employer and government for the first years of employment, but such an expansion is necessary if it can increase the number of opportunities available to residents of public housing. It may also entail a certain amount of pressure on companies receiving governmental contracts or assistance for construction to hire high-risk individuals from public housing communities; care must be exercised, however, that these individuals are employed in meaningful positions rather than solely labor or temporary slots. Insistence that contractors have working apprenticeship programs to which the high-risk persons will be assigned is

still another way which governments can insure that the high-risk person is provided every opportunity to succeed.

SUMMARY

This section of the report has attempted to answer the question: "What worked?" Because of the multitude of activities undertaken within the Crime Prevention Program, it is hard to say with any degree of confidence that this worked and this didn't. We have, however, attempted to provide the reader with our impressions of those things which seemed to work and the reasons why others did not work as well as we had hoped. We felt, and still feel, that all aspects of the program were necessary to achieve the goals we had set for the program concerning the reduction of problems to the point that the professional staff would be able to turn the programs and activities over to the residents with the assurance that they would continue long into the future.

Perhaps 18 months is too short a period to achieve all of these goals or, if there had been a slightly different mix of staff, the results would have been more concrete. Still most of the programs worked satisfactorily and the major goals of reducing crime were achieved.

The major conclusion which we can draw from these findings is that in those areas in which the commitment to involving residents as working partners in program development and implementation was achieved, the greatest amount of success was experienced. Where residents were involved as partners with professional staff and management, the programs reached and exceeded the goals; when the residents played only menial or limited roles, only a partial achievement

of goals could be found.

It is important therefore that future programs look closely at ways to make residents meaningful partners in the programs and services they offer. This applies to everyday operations of housing management and police services. Rather than talking to and planning for the residents of low-income communities, programs seeking to serve these communities must begin to talk and plan with the residents for the services that will be offered. Once the talking and planning is completed, then programs must seek ways of meaningfully involving the residents in the implementation. If paid positions are available, then such positions should be set aside for residents from the community in which the program is to take place; if the program relies mainly on volunteers, then volunteers from the community should be sought first.

There needs to be a greater recognition that every community has a social structure with complementary roles and positions which have been established over time no matter how disorganized the community may appear to outsiders. Failure to work through that structure to achieve program goals will create resistance and competition which will doom the program in the long run. Attention must be given to understanding the nature of that social structure and the roles and relationships within it before the program gets off the ground. Many of the problems confronted by some of the professional staff occurred because they tried to supplant that structure with one of their own creation. Others recognized the structure but attempted to ignore it or avoid it.

Whatever is attempted, the key to success will be in making the experiences meaningful to the participants in the program. To

achieve this, activities must be seen as a part of a process of growth toward becoming something different than they were. In employment, it is movement up a career ladder which provides this sense of growth. In social programs, it is acquiring increasing skill which can be translated into meaningful helping roles which creates a sense of growth. In crime prevention, it is the acquisition of knowledge of the functions of various agencies and to whom to turn to find assistance in solving complex problems or in preventing minor incidents from evolving into more serious victimizations which provides the impetus for continued involvement. In sum, it is the process of learning how to take control over one's environment and life which provides the stake in the prevention of crime.

FUTURE PROGRAMS:

EFFECTIVE CRIME PREVENTION AT REDUCED COSTS

As we have seen the problems related to crime are among the most serious social problems faced by persons who live and work in and around low-income urban neighborhoods. The quality of economic and social life in these areas is reduced more by crime and the fear of crime than any other social problem. While other efforts to address these problems have not proven successful, the involvement of residents, as in the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program, has provided renewed hope that something can be done to remedy this situation.

The success of the Fairview Homes program is important not only because of the increased security for the residents living in the neighborhood, but also because the reduced crime rates may have important ramifications for the economic and physical make-up of these neighborhoods. High rates of crime and other social problems have caused developers and businesses to think twice about locating in low-income neighborhoods. This is unfortunate because many of the low-income areas are located adjacent to prime commercial centers whose development could further the economic and social well-being of the residents of these neighborhoods. If crime and fear of crime can effectively be reduced in these areas, then crime prevention can be an effective economic revitalization strategy.

The lessons learned from the Fairview Homes program allow us to suggest a program model which is workable and economically feasible.

The foundation of this model is a partnership between the residents of low-income communities, local law enforcement and government, social service agencies, and private employers, developers, and businesses. These groups working together can effectively address the problems of the low-income neighborhood and provide the resources necessary for the program model to work.

The residents of the low-income neighborhood, including the merchants, churches, and schools, represent the major source of labor for the program. The police and social service agencies form a network of consultants and technical assistants which support the residents. Finally government and private employers, developers, and businesses are the major suppliers for the program.

Briefly, the model contains six stages: (1) identification of crime and related problems affecting the neighborhood; (2) identification of potential resources within the community capable of addressing these problems; (3) planning strategies and linkages with resources; (4) training residents to implement the strategies; (5) program implementation, monitoring, and evaluation; and (6) modification of strategies according the results of monitoring and evaluation.

The problems in every community will be somewhat unique to that community. There are no apriori models of crime prevention which can be taken out of a book and applied as is to solve the problem of crime. Effective program development depends upon the adequacy of the information which is gathered concerning the problems which exist in each neighborhood or community. Minimally, the information required includes historical data concerning the types of crime as well as its distribution in time and space within the

target area; historical data on the educational, truancy, dropout, and unemployment problems; a mapping of the employment needs of business and industry within the larger community by type of job and geographic location; and, survey data on victimization, educational attainment, work experience, perceptions of problems and crime, and attitudes of residents living and working in the target area.

This information will serve as the basis for identifying problems to be targeted in the crime prevention program. For each problem, the planning committee will be required to initially list all of the potential sources for resources which can be targeted to solve the problem. The emphasis should be on finding existing resources which can either be expanded or redirected; most programs err by creating separate services which duplicate existing services which are underutilized or capable of expansion at less cost. The error is not only in terms of cost, but also in terms of the impact on the community when programs end; if the service is linked to an existing agency or program, then it is likely that the community will still be able to utilize the service even though the program which caused it to be redirected is no longer functioning.

The utilization of existing services through redirection or expansion saves in other ways as well. It is likely that the existing agency has developed a delivery system which functions smoothly; new programs spend considerable time and energy rediscovering the problems and solutions which the existing has already worked out. Moreover, the existing agency will have linkages with other programs which can be useful to the crime prevention program but which may not directly provide target services; by developing ties with the existing agency the program has indirect ties with these agencies; ties which the

program staff does not have to develop on its own.

A close examination of resources is especially crucial in the area of employment and training. Local businesses and industries can be a more valuable resource for these programs. As we pointed out in our discussion of employment programs in the last section, private sector employment is preferable to employment programs which are established to meet the short-range needs of high-risk workers. The cooperation of government, business and industry in establishing apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs for high-risk workers is desirable since the employment is potentially part of the career ladder rather than separate from it.

Once potential resources have been identified, the planning committee, which should initially consist of representatives from the target area, local government, law enforcement, business and industry, and the major social service agencies, will be ready to develop drafts of the various strategies to be utilized to reduce the problems. Committees should be set up to leverage the resources necessary from existing agencies to make the strategies workable. In many instances, the resources will be available without direct cost to the program itself; in others, small incentives may be necessary to help agencies enhance their services.

Every strategy developed should center around the ability of natural helpers within the community to deliver the services themselves. For example, rather than increasing patrols in the target area, the emphasis should be to train residents in what to look for and how to report crimes and/or suspicious situations. Similarly, instead of placing an alcohol or drug counselor in the community, residents should be trained in the recognition of alcohol and drug problems, minimal intervention techniques, and referral strategies;

counselors would be available to assist the natural helper, but only after initial contacts and referrals have been made.

The important stage in this process will be the training of residents to implement the programs. The quality of that training will determine how effective the program will be. Minimally, the residents should be trained in the following areas: Crime prevention; victim/witness assistance; information and referral; job banking; drug and alcohol abuse referral and prevention; and youth programs. Additional training in problem-solving and advocacy will be useful. The coordinating committee will be able to plan other training and insure that other aspects of the program function as planned.

Implementation of the program should be carried out by the residents who have been trained under the guidance of the planning, or coordinating, committee. The chairperson of the coordinating committee may be assigned the supervisory function to insure that all aspects of the program are functioning smoothly and that all linkages with existing agencies are maintained.

There must be constant monitoring and evaluation of the program. Periodically, the strategies will have to be adjusted to better serve the community, and residents will need to be retrained or redirected to better meet the program objectives. The results of monitoring and evaluation will also serve to encourage residents and leverage other services. Accurate information concerning the impact of the program will be the most valuable resource for changing policies and redirecting services since many decisions are made without much information and the more information one has, the greater the influence.

Based on the experience of the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program, the annual budget for a program like this should run between

\$35,000 and \$75,000, dependent on the comprehensiveness of the program to be designed. Start-up costs for the gathering of the background information should run about \$3,500, but may be cheaper if residents are used to collect the data. If a Public Safety Coordinator is hired to administer and coordinate the program, another \$30,000 to \$40,000 will be added to the annual budget for a salary and secretary to assist the coordinator and program staff.

Sample budgets are included on the following page. The samples provide both an austere proposal covering the minimal number of resident staff position necessary to make the program work and what should be considered as a maximal proposal including stipends for resident volunteers. Both proposals rely on the ability of the coordinating committee to leverage resources and support from existing agencies and private sector providers; a small amount of money is set aside for cooperative agreements which may be necessary to leverage additional resources from agencies whose resources may already be limited.

Communities should consider the proposals to be tentative; some communities may be able to leverage additional resources; while others may have difficulty. In addition, the larger the number of neighborhoods to be covered in the program, the smaller the per neighborhood cost will be as adjacent neighborhoods will be able to share personnel and resources.

It is our hope that many communities; especially the larger urban communities, seriously consider this proposal. Attention must be given to the multiple problems facing the residents of low-income neighborhoods if the quality of life is to be improved for the entire community. As the Fairview Homes program has demonstrated, these problems are not unmanageable when resident involvement with the public and private communities is stressed.

Table 6
SUGGESTED BUDGETS

BUDGET ITEMS	MINIMUM PROGRAM		MAXIMUM PROGRAM	
	Item	Cumulative	Item	Cumulative
	Cost	Total	Cost	Total
SALARIES AND FRINGES:				
Public Safety Coordinator			(\$35,000) ^a	
Secretary			(\$11,500) ^a	
Resident Staff				
Crime Prevention-Full-time @ \$4.00/hr	\$ 9,152		9,152	
Victim Assistance/Inf & Referral - Full-time @ \$4.00/hr	9,152		9,152	
Job Bank/Employment Referral - Full-time @ \$4.00/hr	9,152		9,152	
Part-time Aides @ \$3.50/hr			16,015	
Volunteer Stipends @ \$30/wk	4,680		15,600	
Total Salaries and Fringes		\$32,056		\$59,071
MATERIALS AND OFFICE SUPPLIES:				
Micro-fiche Reader	275		275	
Office Supplies	500		750	
Audio-Visual Material	500		2,000	
Telephone	500		500	
Walkie-Talkies	1,000		1,000	
Total materials		2,775		4,525
TRAVEL		300		2,000
CONSULTING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TRAINING:				
Agency services			14,000	
Training	1,000		4,000	
Workshops	500		1,500	
Total Contracts		2,500		19,500
TOTAL BUDGET COSTS		37,631		\$82,096
CONTRIBUTED SERVICES:				
Law Enforcement Assistance				
Office Space and Equipment				
Coordination of Leveraged Services				

^aThe salaries of the Public Safety Coordinator and Secretary are estimated but are not calculated into the total budgets. These positions may already exist within either local government or housing authorities and may be contributed to the program.

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APPENDIX A

CRIME STATISTICS

-98-

Table 7

PART I OFFENSES BY TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LOCATION THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1981

TYPE OF OFFENSE	FAIRVIEW HOMES				DOUBLE OAKS			
	1978 ^b	1979 ^c	1980 ^d	Percent Change ^a	1979 ^c	1980 ^d	Percent Change ^a	
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS	69	54	70	+29.6	89	133	+49.4	
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY	66	52	35	-32.7	81	111	+27.0	
OTHER OFFENSES	18	13	13	0.0	35	47	+41.9	
ALL PART I OFFENSES	153	119	118	- 0.8	205	291	+41.9	
ALL NON-ASSAULT OFFENSES	79	71	50	-29.6	124	170	+37.1	

SOURCE: MONTHLY SUMMARIES OF PART I OFFENSES BY POLICE TEAM AND CENSUS TRACT, CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT. The offenses attributed to Fairview Homes are actually for the sub-census tract which is actually slightly larger than Fairview Homes.

^a Percent change refers to the change from May through June, 1979-80, compared with July through August, 1980-81.

^b The data for 1978 is provided for comparison purposes only.

^c May through June, 1979-80.

^d July thorough August, 1980-81.

Table 8

PART I OFFENSES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO NOTIFICATION
OF NON-REFUNDING OF PROGRAM, MAY, 1981^a

TYPE OF OFFENSE	FAIRVIEW HOMES			DOUBLE OAKS		
	1979 -80 ^c	1980 -81 ^d	Percent Change ^b	1979 -80 ^c	1980 -81 ^d	Percent Change ^b
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS	47	57	+21.3	70	90	+28.6
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY	40	24	-40.0	64	85	+32.8
OTHER OFFENSES	11	8	-27.2	30	33	+10.0
ALL PART I OFFENSES	98	89	- 9.6	164	208	+26.8
ALL NON-ASSAULT OFFENSES	56	34	-39.3	105	131	+24.6

SOURCE: MONTHLY SUMMARIES OF PART I OFFENSES BY POLICE TEAM AND CENSUS TRACT, CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT. The offenses attributed to Fairview Homes are actually for the sub-census tract which is actually slightly larger than is Fairview Homes.

^aAfter the program was notified that budget cuts would mean that the program would not be refunded, staff morale declined noticeably. In addition, those who were deterred from engaging in crime while the program was fully operational now believed that they had little to fear after the program received the notice. It is important, therefore, to be aware of the program impact when it was fully operational.

^bPercent change refers to the change from August through June, 1979-80, compared with July through May, 1980-81.

^cAugust through June, 1979-80.

^dJuly through May, 1980-81.

Table 9

RATES PER 1000 POPULATION FOR PART I OFFENSES
THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1981

TYPE OF OFFENSE	FAIRVIEW HOMES			Percent Change	DOUBLE OAKS		
	1978	1979 -80 ^a	1980 -81 ^b		1979 -80 ^a	1980 -81 ^b	Percent Change
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS ^c	59.3	46.4	58.0	+25.0	22.0	33.2	+50.9
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY ^c	56.8	44.7	29.0	-35.1	20.0	27.7	+38.5
OTHER OFFENSES ^c	15.4	11.2	10.8	- 3.6	8.6	11.7	+26.5
ALL PART I OFFENSES ^c	131.6	102.3	97.8	- 4.4	50.7	72.7	+43.4
ALL NON-ASSAULT OFFENSES ^c	67.9	61.1	41.5	-32.1	30.7	42.5	+38.4

SOURCE: MONTHLY SUMMARIES OF PART I OFFENSES BY POLICE TEAM AND CENSUS TRACT, CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT. The offenses attributed to Fairview Homes are actually for the sub-census tract which is slightly larger than is Fairview Homes.

^aMay through June, 1979-80

^bJuly through August, 1980-81

^cRates per 1000 population were computed using the following population estimates: Fairview Homes, 1979-80 = 1163; Double Oaks, 1979-80 = 4045; Fairview Homes, 1980-81 = 1206; and Double Oaks, 1980-81 = 4002.

Table 10

RATES PER 1000 POPULATION FOR PART I OFFENSES
THROUGH MAY, 1981^a

TYPE OF OFFENSE ^d	FAIRVIEW HOMES			DOUBLE OAKS		
	1979 ^b -80	1980 ^c -81	Percent Change	1979 ^b -80	1980 ^c -81	Percent Change
CRIMES AGAINST PERSON	40.4	47.2	+16.8	17.3	22.4	+29.5
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY	34.4	19.9	-42.2	15.8	21.2	+34.2
OTHER OFFENSES	9.5	6.6	-30.5	7.4	8.2	+10.8
ALL PART I OFFENSES	84.3	73.8	-12.5	40.5	52.0	+28.4
ALL NON-ASSAULT OFFENSES	48.2	28.2	-41.5	26.0	32.7	+25.8


SOURCE: MONTHLY SUMMARIES OF PART I OFFENSES BY POLICE TEAM AND CENSUS TRACT, CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT. The offenses attributed to Fairview Homes are actually for the sub-census tract which is slightly larger than is Fairview Homes.

^aThe Crime Prevention Program received notice that it would not be refunded due to budget cuts and the end of May, 1981. This is important because staff morale became a problem and people in the community began to believe that the program had ended. Many of the deterrent effects of the program were diminished because of this.

^bAugust through June, 1979-80.

^cJuly through May, 1980-81.

^dRates per 1000 population were computed using the following population estimates: Fairview Homes, 1979-80 = 1163; Double Oaks, 1979-80 = 4045; Fairview Homes, 1980-81 = 1206; Double Oaks, 1980-81 = 4004.




Source: Charlotte Police Department

PART I OFFENSES BY MONTH


Figure A-1


Figure A-2
PART I OFFENSES: BURGLARY AND
LARCENY BY MONTH



Source: Charlotte Police Department

Figure A-3
PART I OFFENSES: ASSAULTS
BY MONTH





Source: Charlotte Police Department

Figure A-4
CALLS FOR POLICE SERVICES, 1980-1981
BY MONTH





Figure A-5
CALLS FOR POLICE SERVICES, 1980-1981
BY TYPE OF CALL AND MONTH

APPENDIX B

PROGRAM EVALUATION DATA


-108-
Figure B-1
Percent of residents aware of crime prevention meetings



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

Figure B-2


Percent of households which participated in crime prevention meetings



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-3


Percent of residents aware of engraving valuables (Operation I.D.)



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-4


Percent of households which participated in engraving valuables
(Operation I.D.)



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-5


Percent of residents aware of neighborhood watch



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION


FIGURE B-6

Percent of households which participated in neighborhood watch



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION


Percent of residents aware of apartment watch programs



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION


FIGURE B-8

Percent of households which participated in apartment watch programs




SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

Percent of residents aware of youth work programs




SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-10
Percent of households which participated in youth work programs



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-11
Percent of residents aware of alcohol/drug abuse programs



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-12

Percent of households which participated in alcohol/drug abuse programs

28	28 Nelton Courts
20	20 Ponce de Leon
18	
16	
14 High Point-----	14 14 Rainier Vista
12	12 Flag House Low Rise, Fairview Homes
11	11 Flag House High Rise, Colonia Village
10	10 Stateway Gardens
9	9 Holly Park
8	8 Lincoln Courts
6	6 Average Demonstration Site, Lafayette Courts Low Rise, Robert Taylor Homes, Pine Chapel Village, College Hill, Port Lawrence
4 Average Comparison Site-----	4 4 Brand Whitlock et al.
3	3 Lafayette Courts High Rise, Parkview Court, Cassiano Homes
2 Piedmont Courts, San Juan Homes, Robles Park-----	2 2 Clarksdale
1	1 Little River Terrace, A. Harry Moore, Larchmont Gardens, Bellevue Square, Stowe Village, Riverview Low Rise, Lakeview Low Rise, Marion Gardens, Dosker Manor
0 Cedar Apartments-----	0 0 Lakeview High Rise, Riverview High Rise, Rosewood Gardens/Edgewood Towers, Allenton Heights et al.

SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-13


Percent of residents aware of victim/witness programs

30	30.0 Marion Gardens
25.0	25.0 Lincoln Courts, Rainier Vista
23.0	23.0 Brand Whitlock et al.
22.0	22.0 Holly Park, Port Lawrence
20	
18.0 Ponce de Leon-----	17.5 Stateway Gardens
15.0 Lakeview Low Rise-----	15.5 A. Harry Moore
14.5 Lakeview High Rise-----	
	13.0 Average Demonstration Site
11.0 Pine Chapel-----	12.0 Flag House Low Rise, Robert Taylor Homes
10	10.0 Parkview Court
	9.5 Nelton Courts, Rosewood Gardens/Edgewood Towers, Colonia Village
9.0 Lakeview High Rise-----	8.5 Allenton Heights et al.
8.5 High Point-----	
6.5 College Hill-----	7.0 Fairview Homes, Cassiano Homes
6.0 Average Comparison Site-----	6.5 Bellevue Square
5.5 Clarksdale-----	5.5 Flag House High Rise
4.0 Dosker Manor-----	4.5 Stowe Village
2.5 Little River Terrace-----	3.0 Lafayette Gardens High Rise
2.0 Piedmont Courts-----	2.0 Lafayette Gardens Low Rise
1.0 Cedar Apartments-----	
0 Riverview Low Rise, Larchmont Gardens, San Juan Homes, Robles Park-----	0

SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

FIGURE B-14

Percent of households which participated in victim/witness programs



SOURCE: POLICE FOUNDATION

END