


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MF-1
INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN ILLINOIS:
THE CASE FOR REMOVAL OF STATUS
OFFENSES FROM COURT PROCESSING

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ACQUISITION

The purpose of this case analysis is to assess the consequences of a statewide effort to deinstitutionalize status offenders.¹ The Illinois Status Offender Service (ISOS) was primarily an attempt to remove preadjudicated status offenders from secure detention through the provision of alternative community based services. It was also a limited effort to provide comprehensive service to chronic status offenders or Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS) violators. An incremental institutional change strategy was employed by the project. Resources were made available to social agencies to develop certain types of services, and the courts were encouraged to use them as alternatives to secure detention.

The project was a partial success. Detention for status offenders was substantially reduced, but there were negative side effects: more youths were labelled as detainable and they penetrated more deeply into the justice and public social service systems than the comparable preprogram group. ISOS failed to effect lasting changes in detention practices, because it focussed on one element of a highly interrelated system. ISOS also relied almost exclusively on the provision of additional services and was not aided with legal mandate or inter-agency policy support for deinstitutionalization. Most important the analysis leads to the conclusion that a successful deinstitutionalization policy requires an effective

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commitment to diversion as well, including removal of status offenses from the court's jurisdiction.

The analysis describes the impact of ISOS in individual and aggregate terms, but also seeks to explain unanticipated and negative consequences as a result mainly of justice system jurisdiction and processing of the status offender. The following discussion is divided into sections on: Deinstitutionalization Strategy, Program Structure, Services, Individual Outcome, Changes in Detention, System Processing, Political Effects, and Implications for Policy.

The findings are based on an evaluation of the Illinois Status Offender Services and associated research. The interrelated studies used different sources of data, including not only status offenders, but agency administrators, direct service workers, police, court officials, and adult residents in various communities and counties as well as an assortment of official records. The heart of the evaluation was 1) a comparison of preadjudicated youths served over a 12-month risk period by the ISOS crisis service between July 1976 and January 1977 (N = 305) and youths placed in secure detention between July 1975 and January 1976 (N = 222); and 2) a comparison of adjudicated Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS) violators served by a smaller Demonstration program of longer services (N = 68) and those served by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and the juvenile court (N = 68) a year earlier. Two different ISOS groups were compared with two respectively comparable pre-

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program groups over similar periods. Three of the groups received services and the fourth was in secure detention (Spergel, Korbelik, Reamer, Lynch, Alexander, 1980).

Deinstitutionalization Strategy

The Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO) was a national strategy mandated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 as amended in 1977. The Act required that states substantially reduce detention of status and non-offenders within three years of initial participation and totally eliminate the practice within five years. The start of the Illinois Status Offender Service (ISOS) Project in July 1976, and Illinois Senate Bill 346, prohibiting secure detention for all non-delinquents, on January 1, 1980, may be viewed as steps toward compliance with federal legislation.

The federal DSO strategy was largely an attempt to determine the values of 1) alternative to detention community-based services for status offenders; 2) distinctions between categories of status offenders and delinquents; and 3) an emphasis on deinstitutionalization to the exclusion of diversion or prevention (Velde, 1975). The rationale for the strategy was labelling theory (Lemert, 1972; Kitsuse, 1963), in particular the assumption that justice system processing, and especially detention, (Coates, Ohlin, and

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Miller, 1978) stigmatizes juveniles and is itself significantly responsible for the subsequent deviant careers of youths. It was important to "normalize" (Rosenheim, 1976) responses to misbehaving juveniles by treating them within the community (but still under the jurisdiction of the court) rather than in secure detention. Further, subsequent status offenses and delinquencies could be impeded by a less intrusive approach by the juvenile justice system (Spergel and Reamer, 1980; Klein, 1979).

The DSO strategy largely ignored theories such as Opportunity (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), Culture and Subculture (Cohen, 1955; Block and Neiderhoffer, 1958; Miller, 1959), and Community Prevention (Spergel, 1980). It did not attend to the possibility that the status offender problem might be located mainly in the lower income sector of the social structure, that basic cultural values might account for the assignment of a disproportionately large group of females as status offenders and males as delinquents; also that blacks, particularly males, were relatively more likely to be classified as delinquents than status offenders. There was little or no attention to the effects of local community values, justice and social service system arrangements on the extent of the problem and ways of dealing with it.

The DSO strategy was not clear as to whether it was

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concerned with the status offense or the status offender. The status offender could be a minor or casual offender, a chronic offender, or a mixed status offender and delinquent. Social policies addressed to the status offense and the status offender could each be very different, particularly since in fact the detainable or adjudicated status offender is essentially a mixed offender.

The DSO strategy may also have ignored the complex purposes for which detention of status offenders appeared to be an answer -- albeit confused -- including protection of the juvenile from his parents, protection of parents and community institutions from the juvenile, psychiatric examination, brief medical and educational services, social and emotional security, a taste of jail and punishment, deterrence (Schultz and Cohen, 1976; Sarri, 1974), as well as emergency shelter care. These were less explicit but important values which affected the implementation of the project.

Program Structure

ISOS had two major interrelated goals, only one of which it could reasonably achieve. The first was to create, through additional resources, a system of local services in lieu of secure detention and demonstrate that offenders could be supervised and treated in a non-secure setting. The second was to persuade local juvenile court judges and

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other key justice system officials to reduce and eliminate detention of status offenders, especially at the preadjudicated stage.

The "bottom-line" for the project was "the total elimination of all detention of status offenders in jail and county facilities" and "sufficient in-place alternative services and an established network of effective treatment oriented community based services in the various sites... after two years" (Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, 1975).²

ISOS was more successful in the development of community services than in the persuasion of the justice system to reduce detention. Its parent agency, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), was initially induced by fiscal pressures and by the state planning agency, the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) to sponsor the project and establish a special office to implement a state-wide Alternative to Detention program and related Service Demonstration in two (former) DCFS regions - Chicago South and Decatur. DCFS also did not provide explicit policy support for deinstitutionalization of status offenders and would have preferred a more decentralized effort. ISOS developed no real leverage during the two year project over local justice systems either through state law or planning and funding policy requiring cooperation from local court jurisdictions. ISOS received considerable support, however, from local justice systems and private agencies for the general development of services for status offenders.

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The service model for the Alternatives program was based on the premise that most of the status offenders who would normally be detained should remain in their own homes and be "given a reasonable amount of daily contact with an interested and skilled adult...[and]...can be expected to remain 'trouble free' at least between the time of complaint and the court hearing[s]." (Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, 1975) Where the law enforcement officer would have contacted a status offender and determined a youth should go to detention, he would now still arrest the youth but call the program which would provide an alternative non-secure community based service. Emergency shelter or foster care, advocacy and limited supervision services were to be made available. They were to be provided on a crisis twenty-four hour a day basis for up to two weeks, from initial court intake or custody hearing to adjudication and disposition. ISOS was to have custody of the child during this period.

The original expectation was that about 40 percent of all youths referred would need placement services the first night only. In fact, about 65 percent of all youths ended up in placement the first night. The estimate also was that 20 percent of the youths served would require placement during the period from initial court contact to court adjudication. About 30 percent of the youths required shelter or mainly

foster care service in this period.

The Service Demonstration program was viewed as complementary but separate from the Alternatives to Detention program. It was designed for the chronic offender. Its original goal was to "demonstrate the effectiveness of a full range of comprehensive services to status offenders in reduction of repeated offenses..." A "comprehensive service system" was to include "needs assessment, counseling, group home, home-maker service, alternative education, specialized foster care, etc..." In operation, however, the program became mainly a follow-up service for selected youths after the Alternatives program. It emphasized in-home counseling or advocacy services. (Spergel, Korblik, Reamer, Lynch, Alexander, 1980).

At the end of twenty one months of operation, ISOS was providing services in 15 of 18 (former) DCFS regions in Illinois. It had established arrangements with police, courts, and social agencies in 35 of 102 counties, particularly in the central and northern part of the state where the bulk of the detention of status offenders occurred. Special court orders were issued legitimizing ISOS and outlining procedures for program use in each of these counties, but the court orders were almost all permissive. ISOS was another dispositional option for law enforcement and justice system officers -- to be used either in place of, before, or even after detention. Only in Cook County were all law enforcement officers prohibited from detaining status

offenders, except those from out-of-county and those local status offenders for whom a court warrant had been issued.

ISOS achieved its objectives in respect to the development of services through use of purchase of service contracts with 246 social agencies, mainly private, some local community organizations, individual foster parents and advocates. The Alternatives program reached its service objective of 2,750 status offender cases by the end of the first year and was well on the way to serving a similar number by the end of the second program year. It also provided longer term services for approximately 172 youths in the Service Demonstration program, close to the original target number.

ISOS only partially achieved its objective of influencing the justice system to reduce detention for status offenders. In order to persuade judges to accept its program, it had not only to assure the provision of additional services, but also that minimal disruption of court processing of status offenders would occur. There were usually no reciprocal requirements of the court, other than use of the program. ISOS was a convenience for the police, and the discretion of court officers was not limited in any way by the project.

Services

Our evaluation of ISOS (Spergel, Korblik, Reamer, Lynch, Alexander, 1980) utilized four groups, Alternative to

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Detention, a preprogram group in Secure Detention, Service Demonstration, and a comparison group served by DCFS and the courts a year earlier. We were able to compare three different service approaches. The Alternative to Detention program was characterized by brief crisis oriented service. Youths entered -- mainly through the police -- an average of 1.3 times; they received 2.3 service units, mainly advocacy, some limited counseling, and foster care for an average period of 18.8 calendar days. The Service Demonstration was longer, more continuous, more explicitly needs oriented and focussed on in-home counseling or supervision. Youths entered -- mainly through the courts -- only once, by definition, since there were no interruptions of service despite rearrests for status offenses; they received an average of 2.3 services, but over a period of 142.2 days. The comparison Service Demonstration program probably provided the most comprehensive or at least the most varied set of services, contrary to expectations, but they were discontinuous and emphasized residential treatment. Youths entered this program -- mainly through courts and DCFS, a year earlier -- an average of 3.3 times, received 3.3 services over a period of 135.7 days (Tables 1 and 2).

Cultural, organizational and random factors appeared largely to determine the pattern of services individual youths received as opposed, for example, to individual needs based on age, family structure, or problem history.

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ISOS developed two distinctive programs for youth, Alternatives to Detention and Service Demonstration, who according to the court and professional social workers were supposed to be different, but who turned out to be quite similar in social and demographic characteristics and even prior justice system history. There developed little relation between type of service provided and psychosocial needs of individual youths. A variety of legal and program patterns were created with little reference to differences among youths.

While there were clear distinctions among the three programs -- Alternatives, Service Demonstration, Comparison Demonstration -- there was at least as much variation by community or where the youth lived as to services received. Whether a youth was a preadjudicated or adjudicated MINS, whether he was in an ISOS or in a pre-ISOS program, he received a placement service far more often in Cook County and a home based counseling service in the DCFS Decatur -- mid state -- region (Table 3). This undoubtedly was due to different traditions of services and placement resources in the various communities. But it was also due to organizational and professional predispositions probably unrelated to individual client need.

The major assumption of any social service program is that clients individually require and profit from the services provided to them. We would expect first of all that youth, would be assigned different services related

somewhat to individual needs. This was clearly intended in the Service Demonstration, probably in the Comparison Demonstration, and we believe implicit in the Alternatives program where a decision had to be made as to whether a youth would be placed or returned home for service. Certain demographic or offense charge criteria such as gender, race, and type of status offense, therefore, should not necessarily be more important than individual (or family) need or psychosocial problem.

Our findings were in the opposite direction. Gender, race, and type of offense, rather than the youth's maturity, i.e. his age, family structure, or seriousness of his problems, at least as represented by prior justice system history, determined the type of service provided across programs. More females were drawn into the program than expected: 61.9 percent of the ISOS statewide population were females compared to 54.0 percent as detained status offenders before the project. Most youths in the programs were mixed offenders. More of the males than the females had histories of both delinquencies and status offenses.

In our analysis we found females were somewhat more likely to be placed than males. Females received more foster and shelter or group home services. Males were more likely to receive service at home (Table 4). This pattern, generally held for youths in the Alternatives, Service Demonstration, and Comparison Demonstration programs in Cook County suburbs,

Chicago, and the Decatur region. The pattern was reversed only in Cook County for the Service Demonstration program, where more females received counseling and more boys placement, especially institutional services. In this latter group, we know that males had particularly serious offense histories.

Females were more often charged as runaways and presumably stimulated greater community, especially police and court officer, concern that they would be sexually exploited or violated and therefore needed to be protected through secure detention or its equivalent. It was apparently more important to get the female status offender than the male status offender "off the streets."

Race was also associated with type of service received. Blacks were more often assigned to foster care and whites to shelter care or group home services. The pattern was especially prevalent in Cook County, including the Chicago area (Table 5). To what extent this represented some form of racism we do not know, although the practice did not affect outcome, as we will indicate below.

Type of status offense was associated with type of service. The runaway was somewhat more likely to be placed than the ungovernable youth (Table 6). However, this pattern was particularly strong in Chicago ($P = .008$), but also was prevalent downstate. The pattern was less clear in the Cook County suburbs.

Distinctive psychosocial factors, such as "weak" family structure, in particular the single parent home, was not

associated at all, as popularly believed, with type of service received. In the Cook County Alternatives program, there was no association with type of family structure and service pattern (Table 7). There was a tendency, however, for youths in the Service Demonstration and Comparative Demonstration Programs from extremely "weak" families, i.e. where neither a father nor mother was present -- usually extended family arrangements -- to be placed in an institution.

Contrary to professional or clinical view, the younger child, i.e., under 15 years, was not necessarily assigned home based services more often than the older child. The older adolescent who is expected more often to profit from a residential treatment experience was served at home and the younger child was more often in placement regardless of program. The younger child was regarded as easier to manage in a foster home than the older, bigger, perhaps more threatening youth.

It was also possible to test, to some extent, whether the more troubled or troublesome child was more likely to be placed in one type of service rather than another. We were also interested in whether organization, at least in the Alternatives program made a difference. We used number of previous offenses -- none, one or two, three or more -- as an indicator of degree of social problem and found no relation with type of service received or specific organization (Table 8).

Regardless of prior history with the justice system, the youth was as likely to be assigned a home based counseling as a placement service. The pattern was the same across a variety of social agencies.

Finally, we note that there was little to distinguish the chronic runaway or status offender from the more casual or preadjudicated offender, whether in the Alternatives, Service Demonstration and Comparison Demonstration programs, or even between repeaters and non-repeaters within the Alternatives program. They were similar in age, race, gender, family structure, and prior offense history. In general, there seemed to be little individual basis for the assignment of a youth to a particular service. Cultural considerations, availability of services in a particular county, general program orientation and specific organizational interest appeared to be the primary criteria for service provision.

Individual Outcome

ISOS was concerned with the improved social adjustment of individual youths, including lowered rates of contact with the juvenile justice system. We have dealt with various aspects of individual outcome elsewhere (Spergel and Reamer, 1980). We will briefly review these evaluation findings, but will emphasize subgroup analysis and the relation of types of service and agency

orientation to individual outcome.

The most important general outcome finding is that whether a status offender is placed in detention or in a community based service, whether in a short-term crisis or longer term home based, or even a comprehensive program of service, makes no comparative difference in terms of subsequent numbers and types of contacts with the police or court. Status offenders generally had fewer subsequent contacts with the justice system in the six month period after the instant offense than in the six month period prior to it. There appears to be no differential general effect for any of the approaches. Youths in each of the programs -- Alternatives, Service Demonstration, or Comparative Service Demonstration -- and in detention -- did about as well, controlling for a variety of factors. Each of the general approaches, probably along with maturation, lead to a modest reduction in subsequent contacts with the justice system.

In a series of hierarchical regression analyses, the most significant predictors of subsequent justice system contact were, in all cases, age and prior contacts with the justice system. The younger the youth and the more previous contacts with the police or court, the more likely he or she was to return to the justice system. The Alternatives program/detention variable was of little predictive value. It never accounted for more than one percent of the variance, once the control variables were considered. All of the independent and

control variables, including sex, race, prior detentions, county -- in addition to those already mentioned -- accounted for only 16 percent of the total variance (Table 9). These findings were consistent with findings from self-report and individual interview data collected over three time periods which indicated a general reduction in deviant behavior and an improvement in social relationships with family, school, and law enforcement figures (Spergel and Reamer, 1980).

Secure Detention or a particular kind of program also had little or no differential effect on type of offense subsequently committed. The strongest predictor of type of subsequent delinquent offense was gender, i.e. male, although race (black) and prior contacts as a delinquent were of some importance. While males were far more likely to become delinquents, females were more likely to continue as status offenders. In other words, while the total number of offenses was going down for almost all youths a partial specialization effect was occurring: males were increasingly charged as delinquents, but females maintained their existing, mainly status offender, pattern. Younger youths generally were also more likely to be charged as status offenders. The predominant pattern, however, was the mixed offender.³

A striking subgroup effect, moreover, was not simply the disproportionately larger number of females drawn into

the program but that they were more likely than males also to be detained subsequently as status offenders, as we will describe below. One subgroup, the younger white females in fact had a slightly higher number of subsequent justice system contacts (n = 2.33) compared to prior contacts (n = 2.14). This was contrary to the general finding. All other female (and male) subgroups did significantly better, i.e. reduced their contacts with the justice system after detention or entry into the program (Table 10).

The increased categorization of females by the police as detainable status offenders, perhaps so they could obtain special services had an unintended negative effect. More were referred to court and relatively more younger white girls were given justice system records than was the case under a secure detention strategy.

Services in Relation to Outcome

It was important to determine not only whether one general approach to dealing with status offenders was superior to another, i.e., detention, crisis intervention, long term home based or long term residential oriented service-- each approach yielded about the same result for the youth in terms of subsequent justice system contacts. But, it seemed important also to assess the value of specific types of service per se and the community based

influence of the social agency on the youth's subsequent justice system history.

The assumption which guided the creation of the deinstitutionalization strategy, that the status offender would benefit more from service and supervision at home and in his own community than placement, particularly outside of his community, needed to be specifically tested. In other words, the principle to be examined was that the less intrusive the service, the more effective the outcome. ISOS did not avoid placement services. Foster home, shelter care, and group home constituted 29.0 percent of all services provided in the Alternatives to Detention program and 22.5 percent of all services provided in the Service Demonstration (Table 1). ISOS was also much less interested in providing community based than alternatives to detention services. Few youngsters were served close to home, and in fact there was a practice, if not a preference, for placement of a youth in an adjoining community or county. In one analysis of physical distance between two large ISOS contract agency providers in Cook County only 15 percent of the status offenders (N = 96) who received advocacy/counseling lived within a two mile radius of the particular agency.

We confined our test of the comparative value of specific home based versus non-home based services to the Alternatives program which had the largest number of cases. While essentially all youths received crisis intervention,

a sizable number in addition received a placement service. A cross-tabulation analysis compared various types of status offenders who received one of three kinds of services -- advocacy/counseling versus foster care versus shelter care/group home -- on categories of subsequent contacts with the justice system, none, one or two, three or more; or on whether the youth was subsequently detained (yes or no). Each set of services was arranged along a continuum of intrusiveness. Thus, foster care services included; advocacy/counseling; while shelter care/group home services included advocacy/counseling and sometimes foster care, as well.

The results of the analysis were that status offenders who received only a home based service -- advocacy/counseling -- had fewer subsequent justice system contacts than youths receiving foster home or shelter/group home services. (There was no difference in outcome for youths receiving various types of placement services.) These differences characterized almost all comparisons made. Chi square values approached statistical significance for Alternative youths in Cook County ($p = .109$), males ($p = .078$); those over 15 years ($p = .081$). Chi square values were significant using the measure of subsequent detention: Alternatives in Cook County ($p = .019$); females ($p = .002$), blacks ($p = .012$), whites ($p = .049$). The patterns were clear and consistent in Chicago and in the Cook County suburbs, but were not clearly manifested in the Decatur region.

The addition of two sets of controls -- numbers of prior contacts with the justice system (none, one or two, three or more) and either gender, race, or age -- revealed the same pattern. However, we also used a step-wise multiple regression analysis. Eight control variables were entered into the analysis: number of priors, age, county/Chicago, number of prior detentions, public assistance, race, gender. The independent variable was type of service: home-based versus any other types. The service variable made almost no difference; it contributed less than one percent to the total variance (19 percent). The variables of prior contacts with justice system and age again were the most significant predictors of subsequent justice system contacts (Table 11).

In other words, when we used a series of cross-tabulation analyses, based on limited statistical controls, we found that the less intrusive the service, i.e., advocacy/counseling, the more effective the result. However, when we used a highly rigorous statistical analysis -- requiring various assumptions, including linearity -- we found that intrusiveness of service made no difference.

Community Basedness of Agency

A similar set of analyses was employed to discover whether the community based character of the service agency made a difference in terms of individual outcome. We had already determined that community-basedness could not be established by geographic criteria alone since most youths

were served outside of their neighborhoods. We employed a complicated process for ranking organizations in Cook County on community basedness, indicated by 18 measures, including the extent to which agencies served youths close to home; the use of volunteers; the education level of staff; the variety of agency goals, i.e., services orientation, community development, and community solidarity; formality of interagency communication; degree of exchange with other organizations inside or outside the local area; and agency executive commitment to client participation in decision making. (Spergel, Korbélik, Reamer, Lynch, Alexander, 1980).

Outcome measures were established on an ordinal basis: none, one or two, three or more subsequent contacts with the justice system. A series of four simultaneous controls were established: prior court contact category, gender, race and sex. Only those five agencies with adequate numbers of youths served (10 or more) in the various sets of control categories were used. A relationship between the ranks on community basedness and successful outcome for youth served by the organizations was found.

The finding of the analysis was a perfect correspondence between community basedness and proportion of youths who did not return to the court. The more community-based the agency, the less likely youths would recidivate. Also, of the five agencies, the lowest ranked community based agency provided the bulk of placement services in Cook

County. The other four agencies were mainly concerned with the provision of home based advocacy/counseling services. This is consistent with our finding above, of the superior value of home-based services.

However, again, a step-wise multiple regression analysis was carried out with these data. Each youth was assigned a score depending on whether the agency providing the service was high or low on the community basedness index. The variables were entered in similar fashion as that described above. But once more, there was no relation between an intervention variable, in this case, community basedness of the organization, and subsequent contacts with the justice system. Community basedness accounted for less than one percent of the variance. The two most important predictor variables were number of priors and age (Table 12).

Thus, there was little evidence using a rigorous linear analysis that service pattern or community based character of the service pattern or community based character of the service organization made any comparative difference. No particular approach was more or less successful in contributing to reduced recidivism for detainable status offenders. However, using a less rigorous form of statistical analysis -- perhaps more consistent with the quality of the data -- we found that home based services and community based character of the organization were more effective than primarily placement and less community based approaches, respectively.

A conservative assessment would be that less intrusive

services from community oriented agencies were at least as effective as more intrusive services from noncommunity based agencies in the reduction of subsequent offenses by status offenders in the Alternatives program. A liberal interpretation of the data indicates that home-based and community oriented services may indeed have superior value.

Changes in Detention

ISOS was concerned primarily with the reduction of detention for status offenders throughout Illinois. Community based services was a means to achieve this end. The reduction of recidivism by youths in the program was in fact a secondary objective. Data from various sources indicated a clear and substantial reduction of detention for status offenders with the start of ISOS. The analysis, using aggregate tallies of all status offenders in detention in four key counties (accounting for approximately 70 percent of the status offender detention population) showed a sharp reduction, mainly for in-county or resident status offenders, after the first program year compared with the preprogram year: 60.8 percent in Cook, 25.0 percent in Macon, and 68.2 percent in McClean, but an increase of 71.1 percent in La Salle County. The aggregate decline

for the four counties was from 1638 to 733 during ISOS first year of operation. In other words, there were almost 1,000 fewer status offenders in detention, and most of the decline was accounted for by Cook County. The causal importance of ISOS in these reductions is underscored by the facts that the numbers of out of county and out of state status offenders, and also delinquents, detained remained stable throughout the period under consideration.

During the second program year, there was an increase over the first program year of 17.9 percent in Cook, but a further decline of 59.0 percent in Macon and a reversal of trend in LaSalle, where there was a decline of 42.0 percent, so that detention of status offenders was back to preprogram levels. During the first nine or ten months of the third program year, through March and April 1979, detention patterns stabilized in each of the counties at a rate substantially lower than the preprogram year. Status offenders were still being detained in three of the counties. They were technically no longer being detained in Macon County, although delinquents who violated probation by committing a status offense could still be detained there.

The finding based on individual evaluation data was similar. All youths in the Secure Detention group were in detention at the instant offense -- by definition, but only 24.5 percent (n = 76) of the youths in the Alternatives group were placed in detention -- mainly by the judge at

the initial custody hearing. This represented a substantial decline in detention rate for the Alternatives group compared to the prior secure detention group at the instant offense. During the subsequent 12-month risk period, the decline in detention for status offenses by the Alternatives group was greater than for the secure detention group. The detention rate was 67.7 percent for youths in the secure detention, but less, 38.0 percent, for those in the Alternatives, or a 43.7 percent comparative improvement.

Furthermore, there is evidence based in part on a recent Illinois Law Enforcement Commission Report (ILEC, 1980) of a 50 percent reduction in the number of status offenders in detention in the thirteen Illinois Regional Detention Centers between 1973 and 1979.⁴ Thus, analysis of aggregate tallies in four counties, individual evaluation samples, and the population of status offenders in all county detention centers indicates a clear trend of decline in the number of status offenders detained. Much of the decline must be associated with the existence of ISOS.

Other important changes in detention patterns for status offenders, in addition to the general rate decrease, was that the reduction was relatively smaller for females than for males. In other words, there were relatively more females compared to males detained as status offenders after the start of ISOS, at least in Cook County, than before (Table 14). Also, the stay in detention of all youths detained in Cook County was longer. Whereas the drop in detention rate for females at the custody hearing in the Alternative program compared to that in Secure Detention was from 87.8 percent to 30.9 percent, it was even greater for males, from 82.7 percent to 18.7 percent. In other words, the proportion of females in detention

had risen from 55.7 percent to 69.7 percent. Alternatives program females were also spending relatively longer periods of time in detention than males. This constituted a reversal of the pattern of the secure detention group at the instant offense (Table 13). Furthermore, based on Cook County aggregate detention data, relatively more older white females, although fewer younger white females, were in detention after the start of ISOS than before. We have already observed that younger white females in ISOS had an increase in court contacts, contrary to the pattern for other ISOS youths.

The findings from several detention analyses were consistent in indicating an increase in the amount of time status offenders -- although fewer in number -- were spending in detention, particularly after the custody hearing. Analysis of aggregate data on detained Cook County status offenders showed an increase from 6.45 to 9.85 days from the pre-program year to the first program year. Also while time in detention for youths in the Alternative sample at the instant offense declined to 4.25 days compared to that of the secure detention group, 6.13 days, time in detention for subsequent status offenses during the subsequent 12-month period by the Alternatives group rose to 9.10 days compared to 6.65 days for the secure detention group (see also Table 14).

However, youths in the Alternatives group were spending more time in detention for a subsequent delinquent offense compared to the secure detention group (Table 15). Also, youths in both groups were likely to receive more detention time for a subsequent delinquent than subsequent status offenses. Further, we observe that while relatively more females were in detention than males compared to the earlier period, males were spending longer periods of time in detention for status offenses in the

subsequent risk period. Yet overall, there appears to be a relative worsening detention situation for females compared to that for males.

As a group, males appear to have profited relatively more from ISOS than females. Considerably more females were now being referred to court as detainable, relatively more were being processed beyond the custody hearing and detained (see also System Processing Effects, below). While more females were obtaining social services through contacts with ISOS, this also meant for a subgroup of females a longer official record with the court. In the final analysis, while the proportion of status offenders in detention had dropped substantially, particularly for males, the number considered detainable had risen substantially. Absolutely more status offenders -- male and female -- were being processed by the court.

System Influence

We cannot understand why ISOS had certain unintended effects, for example, why more youths became "detainable" status offenders, why more females, in particular, were classified as detainable and did not do as well as males because of the Alternatives program, unless we examine certain system processing effects that ISOS induced. In this somewhat extended section, we discuss changes which occurred in police, court, and social agency decision making in respect to status offenders and other deviants as a result of the development of ISOS in the justice and social service systems. A major statewide program, such as ISOS, not only affected youths through services, but also through the decision patterns of agencies whose role was to process and serve juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the changes in the system in turn affected youths in ISOS in unintended ways.

ISOS stimulated four interrelated system changes which ultimately influenced individual outcome and aggregate detention rates for status offenders: 1) recategorization, 2) widening of the control net, 3) decrease in diversion, and 4) domain specialization.

These system changes, we believe, were an expression of organizational self-interest in the maintenance and "meaningful" use of additional resources stimulated by ISOS. Redefinition of the problem and expansion of its scope were also attempts, particularly by justice system agencies, to continue to exercise control of the problem. Value issues of altruism or rationality, i.e., efficiency, were only secondary.

Recategorization

Recategorization or relabelling of deviants refers to a change of classification of the offender because of a shift in an agency's practice based on increased (or decreased) →

resources and a change in technology or ideology (Perrow, 1970). For example, it may refer to the relabelling of status offenders as dependent/neglect, delinquent or mentally ill youths requiring alternative forms of processing. In the present instance, emphasis is on the results of change in the criteria used by the police to designate "detainable" status offenders. The term recategorization is preferred to relabelling, since resource availability, organizational interests, and interorganizational dependencies appear to be more important factors than professional ideologies (Kitsuse, 1963; Lemert, 1972).

Despite the fact that different types of court orders were in effect in Cook and Macon Counties, similar recategorization consequences occurred at the police or court intake levels. Whether the court order mandated the police to refer detainable status offenders to ISOS -- as in Cook County -- or simply permitted the police to refer them to ISOS, the relative numbers of detainable status offenders increased during the year after the start of the program. Furthermore, this took place despite a general increase of contacts by the police with status offenders in Cook County (16.6 percent) and a general decrease in Macon County (37.5 percent). There was an increase of 5.5 percent in detainable status offenders in Cook County and an increase of 8.1 percent in Macon County (Table 16). There was a commensurate decrease in almost all other categories of disposition for status offenders.

The change in decision making at the court level was more complex. There was considerable shift in decision making about detainable status offenders, particularly at intake or the custody hearing, but in effect no change at final disposition. The influence of the deinstitutionalization process and the increase of temporary referral of status offenders to community based agencies was evident at the custody hearing. But the same proportion of youths were placed in some form of agency or institutional custody at the final hearing. Since more youths were going through the court (see Widening of the Net), a larger absolute number were still in institutional custody.

During the ISOS program year, fewer youths were in detention prior to their appearance before a judge. However, even before ISOS, the judge holding the custody hearing still had the option of sending the detained youth back to detention until adjudication. After ISOS, the judge was much less likely to do so. Whereas earlier 65.5 percent of detained status offenders were sent back to detention, during the program year only 11.3 percent were returned to the detention center. There was a great increase in referral of youth to ISOS/DCFS, from 5.0 percent to 48.8 percent, and a substantial increase in release of youths to parental custody, from 26.8 percent to 37.2 percent (Table 17).

After adjudication, at the final dispositional hearing, however, the previous pattern of court decision-making

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was largely maintained. A few less status offenders were released to their parents, but a few more were released to the custody of community based, mainly institutionally controlled -- DCFS -- facilities. There was a reduction in transfer of youths to other institutions, but this number had been exceedingly small to begin with.⁵

Perhaps what is most important is that despite ISOS, which was available to the court principally as an alternative to detention resource at the preadjudicatory level, the same proportion as in the secure detention group -- about 21 percent -- were in the custody of an institution at the adjudicatory or dispositional level. DCFS, itself, mainly subcontracted with a variety of agencies for services, including placement for these adjudicated offenders.

The court had moderately accommodated to a deinstitutionalization strategy in the early stage of processing, but it did not appear to be especially concerned with the objective at the final stage. It continued to do business as usual.

At the same time there was a clear shift in the categorization or decisional process of DCFS, mainly at the termination of the court's processing of the status offender. More status offenders were going through the court's various stages and the court had to make additional plans for them. DCFS was required by law to accept MINS violators. There was also some further claim on DCFS services and jurisdiction

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because most of the additional adjudicated MINS had been generated through ISOS which was DCFS' program, at least during the demonstration period.

DCFS apparently accommodated to the additional pressures by taking more MINS cases but fewer delinquency cases, at least in Cook County. Our data suggest 10 percent or 11 percent more status offenders were reaching the court disposition stage, and this was essentially the increase in proportion of MINS cases that DCFS began to accept. Between 1975 and 1977 the total number of youths accepted by DCFS Cook County District Units from the court did not change, but the proportion of MINS accepted by DCFS rose from 47.4 percent to 61.2 percent (Table 18). The proportion of delinquents declined from 25.6 percent to 15.5 percent. Where the additional or "overflow" delinquents might have been going we will indicate below.

Widening of the Net

Widening of the net suggests extension of justice and service system jurisdiction in dealing with deviants, including status offenders, who probably would have been ignored or provided with less attention earlier. It is a consequence of a particular type of categorization process. More youths are defined or placed in a deviant category which requires additional system control. The increase of youths referred to the detainable status offender category may have resulted in part from more services or

resources available to deal with this form of offender. The increase may also have been due to the greater convenience afforded to police who now did not have to "babysit" for status offenders as much, "reach out," and get involved in "nasty family disputes" or have to contact a variety of local agencies to help the youth.

Additional services for status offenders meant that the police officer could now refer youths needing services, whom he wanted to protect and would not have considered detainable before. The detainable status offender no longer would be detained, although he or she would be processed by the court. More problems of the youth and his family could be handled.

However, while additional appearances of the youth in court and further exposure to its procedures may not be as restrictive or traumatic as secure detention it does create a bureaucratic or official history on which basis future decisions are made (Coates, Miller, Ohlin, 1978). Such a history can lead in a routine way to negative attention, restriction of personal freedom, and simply a "bad record."

The most striking of all system change effects was the widening of the control net over status offenders. More youths were classified as detainable and penetrated more deeply into the justice and public social service systems. The effect was salient at the level of preliminary court processing. We were able to measure this phenomenon through a widening of the net index based on the assumption that

compared to the pre-ISOS years not only should there have been fewer youths in detention but that no additional youths should have been referred to the justice system, if the program were working as expected. A "difference score" was computed: the number of status offenders (cases) in detention during the preprogram year minus the sum of the number during the program year and the number of ISOS cases from month to month. If the program were functioning perfectly, i.e., the ISOS detainable population was the same as that in the prior period, the "difference score" would be zero.

The findings indicate a large and positive "difference score" or a large widening of the net effect. More status offenders were classified as detainable considering the number detained the previous year: 24.7 percent more in Cook County and perhaps 75.0 more in Macon County (Tables 19 and 20). The control net was extended further in the second and third years of the program, particularly in Cook County as the number of status offenders in ISOS stabilized, but the numbers in detention increased.

The net widening effect indicated that youths who would earlier have been considered very minor offenders and who would not have been processed by the court were now swept up in its procedures through ISOS. The evidence is clear that status offenders defined as detainable and referred to ISOS had less prior involvement with the police and court than had detained status offenders a year earlier. For _____

example, while 21.1 percent of preprogram youths had no or one prior contact with the juvenile justice system, 40.6 percent of ISOS youths had such a contact; while 40.7 percent of preprogram youths had 5 or more prior contacts, only 24.7 percent of ISOS youths had such extensive prior histories (Table 21).

Not only were there more detainable status offenders in the court system, but evidence indicates that prior to ISOS they would have been more likely to be released to their parents or community agencies without contact with the court (Table 16). They penetrated further than the preprogram group during a comparable subsequent risk period. This was so only for status offenses. In other words, the pattern of processing for delinquencies, in particular for property crimes, did not change for program or preprogram youths, but the status offense was now treated more severely -- or at least more fully in terms of additional court processing -- for ISOS youths than preprogram youths, subsequent to the instant offense (Tables 22, 23, 24). Relatively more ISOS youths penetrated from police to court intake and through court adjudication/disposition for status offenses than did the preprogram group during the comparable subsequent period.

The difference in processing patterns was mainly attributed to the presence of more detainable female status offenders in the justice system. The processing pattern for males in the preprogram and program groups did not vary, but Alternatives females were now more likely to come to

the attention of the court and to penetrate more deeply into the justice system than had been the pattern for pre-program detained female status offenders (Table 25). ISOS meant additional negative labelling, especially for females. To what extent the court was more concerned or more punitive in respect to females because of the program and therefore dealt with them more extensively and severely after ISOS than before, we are not sure. There is a literature which indicates the court may be harsher than the police in its treatment of females. (Adler, 1975; Pollack, 1950; Reckless and Kay, 1967; Crites, 1976; Sarri, 1974).

Also, we observe that ISOS not only contributed to a widening of the net effect at police and court but also at the public social agency level. The intake policies of DCFS seemed to have been affected in two ways: DCFS extended its jurisdiction 1) to more status offenders and 2) to status offenders whom it might not have served at an earlier period, i.e., DCFS was now dealing with less troubled or troublesome youths. A higher proportion of ISOS than preprogram youths became known to DCFS only after the instant offense: 76.3 percent of ISOS youths (N = 224) but only 10.3 percent of preprogram youths (N = 185). Also, a far higher proportion of youth in the preprogram group who ended up with DCFS had prior histories with DCFS than did the youth served by ISOS.

Finally, a consequence of the widening of the control net may have been an overload on court procedures and a

weakening of legal due process for status offenders. ISOS youths were less likely to be represented by an attorney, especially a public attorney, than preprogram youths at the instant offense. While 23.4 percent of preprogram youths were without representation, 36.6 percent of ISOS youths were not represented by an attorney during the first program year ($p = .01$). In general, there was a tendency for program youths to be less often represented than preprogram youths by an attorney at the adjudication hearing. There was a clear difference in legal processing of ISOS youths at the instant offense, however (Table 26). It is possible that the attorneys -- guardians ad litem -- were unable to cope with the large influx of status offenders into the system and youths received less than usual legal assistance with their cases.

Decrease in Diversion

Diversion signifies the referral of fewer youths by the police to the court and of more youths back to the community. It is the opposite of the widening of the net effect, but is usually consistent with a deinstitutionalization objective. The wider the net of control of official agencies, the narrower or more limited the diversion process, other things equal. If a strong diversion strategy had been in effect during the course of ISOS, the number of status offenders who were community adjusted would have increased and the number of detainable status offenders

decreased. This was not desired or made possible. In general, there was little concern with a widening of the net effect. The police, the courts, the social agencies were mainly concerned that status offenders received services. The fact that youths would more likely be referred to court thereby seemed to be of little consequence.

However, for some decision makers and particularly social reformers, the issue was not simply whether ISOS contributed to a reduction in the numbers of status offenders in secure detention and whether more community based alternative services were made available, but whether status offenders were also being diverted from the court. In other words, the question raised was whether as a consequence of the project more or fewer status offenders generally -- including detained and non-detained -- were being processed at the court.

The findings in Cook County and Macon County appear to be contradictory. It was clear in Cook County that there was less diversion of status offenders during the first year of the program compared to the pre ISOS period. There was an increase of 4.8 percent in the relative numbers of status offenders sent by the police to the court, while in the same period, even with an overall increase in total delinquents contacted by police, there was a decrease of 3.5 percent in the relative numbers of delinquents sent to court. We know there was a major effort through the Youth Service Bureaus to divert delinquents in Chicago. We believe that ISOS did contribute to a decrease in diversion for status offenders,

since the largest category of change was the increase, 5.5 percent, in number of status offenders who were considered detainable (Table 27).

The effect of the program on police processing was less evident in Macon County, although it was very clear at the court level. There was in fact diversion of status offenders by the police in Macon County. About 3.0 percent fewer status offenders were being sent to juvenile court, while during the program period about the same proportion of delinquents were being referred. Overall there was considerably less contact by the police with status offenders (-37.5 percent) than during the preprogram period. But the seeming contradiction is resolved when we discover that only 30.5 percent of the youths referred to ISOS in Macon County were from the police in comparison with 86.1 percent in Chicago and 90.2 percent in the Cook County suburbs. The bulk of status offenders in Macon County were sent to court apparently by social agencies, especially DCFS.

In other words, the widening of the net effect in Macon County was largely due to the use of ISOS by social agencies, rather than by the police. The police were narrowing the scope of their activities in respect to status offenders but its effect was counteracted particularly through the referral by DCFS of status offenders to ISOS, directly through the court.

Finally, we note that in both counties, there was a relative increase in detained and detainable status offenders

but a decrease in detained delinquents. In respect to detention patterns, there was indeed consistency between Cook and Macon Counties (Table 28).

Domain Specialization

Domain specialization refers to a tendency by organizations to focus and specialize in dealing with certain types of programs and clients, as they acquire more resources, or simply redirect their goals. It probably arises from the need of organizations to reduce uncertainty as they respond to changing environmental conditions (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Thompson, 1967). There is a continuing struggle by justice system and social agencies to seek individually, interactively and interdependently, to adapt more efficiently to changing pressures and resources in their political, legal, fiscal, and ideological environment. The agency comes to focus on these tasks and clients with whom it believes it can do a better job and/or for which it can obtain additional resources.

It is possible to speculate that ISOS contributed to a further process of justice and agency system specialization with deviants. This implies a centralization of decision making in the system resulting in a more categorical and less individualized way of dealing with deviants, despite intentions to the contrary. Youths may be more easily and "precisely" labelled and accorded a standardized response or form of "treatment." There was less need perhaps for

individual police officer and court intake worker decision making about what to do with a status offender. The status offender needed services and should be processed through the court. More bureaucratic rationality was built into the system.

Prior to ISOS, there may have been greater flexibility or more disposition options in dealing with a variety of the youth's problems at the court level. Earlier youth with multiple charges, for example, running away, truancy, assaulting a parent, could have been referred initially on a MINS or delinquency petition, but the probation officer could have added a neglect petition and supported referral of the youth to DCFS, rather than to the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 1977, the state's attorney's office in Cook County "tightened up" screening procedures and the youth was processed on the basis of the most serious charge. In the example described, the youth would probably have been referred to DOC.

With the advent of ISOS, a further sorting out of the deviant population occurred. There may have been a move to define females more often as status offenders and males as delinquents. The female runaway in need of services could now more readily be referred to court, particularly to ISOS. The likelihood of punishment through detention was reduced. The female would receive special treatment. A somewhat similar process could have occurred in respect to males who could now be referred to the Department of Correc-

tions for new and more appropriate services, e.g., U.D.I.S. We know there was a sharp increase in disposition of males as delinquents, from 341 in 1976 to 528 in 1977. The number of males, particularly from Cook County increased at about the time of the start of ISOS. We have already indicated that fewer delinquents were accepted by DCFS as more status offenders had to be admitted. The majority of status offenders referred to DCFS were females. The ratio of boys to girls sentenced to DOC from Cook County went from 26.2:1 to 42.1:1 and from Macon County from 6.3:1 to 12:1. The ratio of males to females as delinquents at the front end of the system, at the point of police arrest, is more likely to be 3 or 4 to 1. The increased "rationality" introduced by ISOS could have contributed to a processing of youth by gender rather than by offense.

Our findings indicate that ISOS resulted in a large number of ultimately dysfunctional processing effects by the justice and public social service system. They included such negative outcomes as more youths in contact with, and further penetration of, the justice system; also relatively more detention for females. This is not to deny there were also substantial reductions in the overall detained status offenders population. The issues we need to articulate are whether the positives of a unitary deinstitutionalization approach outweigh its unanticipated negatives, and whether there might not be a better, more complete strategy embodying diversion, including preferably removal of the status offense entirely from court

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processing.

Political Effects

ISOS was a project acceptable in principle to almost all interest groups. Tensions and operational conflicts that arose in the course of the implementation of the project, with the private social agencies, police, and especially the probation officers, were largely resolved. Only the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services finally rejected the programs, particularly the Alternatives to Detention, mainly because of fear that insufficient state funds would be subsequently appropriated and that its other programs would have to be curtailed. DCFS also had a traditional child welfare commitment to work with younger children. Its staff was reluctant to deal with status offenders who were almost exclusively adolescents. The judges, state's attorneys, and probation officers and police were now pleased with the addition of resources -- especially placement resources. The social agencies, particularly the large private youth service agencies, were glad to expand and modify existing programs, if necessary, to work with status offenders. The executive and legislative branches of government, social reformers and community groups were happy that status offenders were less likely to be in detention, treated as serious offenders, and instead were receiving services. There was continuing controversy, however, as to where ISOS should be located administratively.

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Since DCFS did not want the program it had generated, the governor decided to place ISOS in a reorganizaed Illinois Commission on Delinquency Prevention in July, 1978, at the end of the second year demonstration period. Service to status offenders was now in the jurisdiction of two public agencies, as well as the courts, since DCFS still had responsibility for MINS violators.

Interorganizational or political concern with ISOS, in particular its remaining Alternatives program, continued in relation to two issues: efficiency and compliance. It was important to develop a program which was administered efficiently, i.e., meshed smoothly with existing justice and social agency interests and procedures. It was even more important to meet federal compliance standards about the reduction of detention for status offenders. The first concern was met with the transfer of ISOS to the Commission on Delinquency Prevention. The second issue was only partially resolved through ISOS. The required 75 percent reduction of non-offenders, including status offenders, in secure detention was not met. Federal juvenile justice funds for Illinois were viewed as endangered. Illinois Senate Bill 346 was passed mandating the elimination of secure detention for all non-offenders, including status offenders, as of January 1, 1980. The law, however, did not prohibit the detention of MINS violators or status offenders in contempt of court, including those for whom a warrant had been issued, and of out-of-state status

offenders. To what extent judges as well as law enforcement officers would be inhibited from detaining MINS violators remained unclear. Nevertheless, a further step in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders was taken. The new law also made provision for the development of additional shelter care facilities in the community.

Only limited concern was voiced, however, about the high level of court processing of a large number of status offenders. ISOS was increasingly concerned with the reduction of the status offender population in detention but also primarily with providing services. It was using guidelines to encourage some diversion along with deinstitutionalization, as a condition for the provision of services. But public policy preferred that the juvenile justice and public social service system continue to deal with the "small" group of status offenders who "needed" secure detention. This "small" group amounted to 2164 status offenders in Regional Detention Centers and 1297 in county and municipal jails (illegally) for a total of 3461 status offenders detained in Illinois during 1979 (ILEC, 1980). The detained status offender group was in fact extremely large.

The key question of whether a strategy of deinstitutionalization could ever be successful without accompanying commitment to diversion of status offenders from the justice system, including removal of status offenders entirely from court processing, had not yet been addressed.

Conclusion and Implication for Policy

ISOS was a substantial but partial step in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders in Illinois. It was largely successful in demonstrating the viability of nonsecure treatment of status offenders and changing the practice of detention in local justice systems. Unfortunately, it contributed also to an expansion of justice system processing for status offenses. Fewer status offenders were served on an informal basis in the local communities as they had been prior to ISOS. More youths now had court records. A basic flaw of the DSO strategy and of the idea of community based alternative services was the intermediation of court processing. The extension of court jurisdiction to more and more youths for status offenses itself resulted in a slowing of the rate of deinstitutionalization.

A successful juvenile justice reform strategy requires a plan to control for complex system effects (Lerman, 1972). The research indicated that the extent of the problem of the status offender, including the chronic offender, was largely aggravated because of the intrusive patterns developed by the court and social agencies for dealing with it. It was possible that an approach which minimized, if not eliminated, justice system contact and emphasized informal and limited crisis oriented service to the youth in his home and community would be more effective. It

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meant also recognition of the distinction between the status offender and the status offense. It was necessary to change or eliminate system processing of the "status offender" for a status offense, but not for a delinquency.

We believe that future policy in Illinois in regard to status offenders, therefore, should seek to:

1. Eliminate the category of status offense from the justice system thereby removing status offenders from detention and the jurisdiction of the court.
2. Develop a series of community based programs in close cooperation with the police, for crisis intervention, brief counseling, and the availability of emergency and limited shelter or foster care placement. Emphasis should be on "outreach" service to the youth in his or her family environment.
3. Continue to provide appropriate and necessary community based services through DCFS to dependent, neglected, and abused children who also may have "acted out" through such behavior as running away, ungovernability, truancy, or curfew violation.
4. Assign public responsibility for troublesome adolescents to a separate Youth Services Agency, comprising staff with special interests and skills. Treatment of difficult adolescents required a different approach and set of priorities than that employed by most public child welfare agencies in their work with younger children.

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NOTES

1. A status offender is defined in Illinois law as a juvenile under 18 years who is a runaway, ungovernable, a curfew violator, a truant, drug or alcohol user. He or she is charged therefore with an offense which may not be an offense if committed by an adult or someone older than 18 years.
2. The Service Demonstration program was funded for a one year period, 1976-1977 at \$530,090, including \$476,872 from Block Grant LEAA funds and \$53,208 in state funds. The Alternatives to Detention award for a two year period was \$1,659,222, including \$1,493,300 from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and \$165,922 in matching state funds. The total two year costs of the project were \$2,189,312.
3. Most status offenders in fact had a prior and subsequent history of both status offenses and delinquencies: Preprogram Service Detention (64.6 percent); Alternatives (57.1 percent); Service Demonstration (65.7 percent); Comparison Demonstration (48.5 percent). Girls were more likely to pursue "pure status" offense careers (18.6 percent); boys (4.1 percent). A fairly high proportion of youth in each of the groups in fact had no prior or subsequent record as offenders: Secure Detention (7.6 percent); Alternatives (11.1 percent); Service Demonstration (9.0 percent); Comparison Demonstration

(11.8 percent).

While there was ample evidence of the mixed, delinquent and status offender history of the youths in our samples, there was very little evidence of an official history of neglect or dependency. At any level of justice system processing -- police or court -- for any of the four sample groups there was almost no pattern of official dependency or neglect. (less than two percent).

On the other hand, of 423 youth in our four evaluated samples in Cook County known to DCFS, 26.5 percent had "case openings" for dependent, neglect or abuse: Secure Detention (28.6 percent); Alternatives (32.1 percent); Service Demonstration (14.3 percent); Comparison Demonstration (17.6 percent). Only 2.6 percent of these youths were categorized by DCFS as delinquent, although the police and courts categorized about 30-35 percent of the charges against these same youths as delinquent. There were 21 "categories" or reasons that DCFS workers could list for opening a case. None of these reasons were necessarily related to overt behavior or legal categories. Therefore, despite the court referral of a child to DCFS as a MINS, his or her "case opening" reason could be something else.

Thus, while the police and court were highly consistent in their pattern of labelling, it did not at all agree with that of the public social agency for the same youths. The criteria for categorizing youths under the various labels were very

different.

4. We have not included in the discussion the problem of illegal detention of status offenders in Illinois. According to a recent report of the Illinois Law Enforcement Authority (ILEC, 1980), 41 of 98 county jails and 112 out of 244 municipal jails detained 1297 status offenders in 1979. Such detention is prohibited by law. In the original application for funding the Illinois Status Offender Project, it was noted that "over 84 percent of all operating jails violated the Juvenile Court Act by confining minors under 16 years of age." (Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, 1975, p. 2)

5. In general, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities did not accept status offenders from any source, either the Juvenile Court, or later from DCFS. DCFS was essentially the main, if not the sole, resource of institutional custody or service arrangements for adjudicated MINS. Other institutions to which status offenders were generally not referred included state training school, forestry camp, private mental hospital, and adult penal institution.

TABLE 1

Percent Distribution of Service Units by Program

	Alternatives	Service Demonstration	Comparison Service Demonstration
Crisis Intervention	57.9	3.8	0.3
Shelter Home	2.8	0.6	4.7
Group Home	2.9	2.8	19.0
Foster Home	23.3	19.1	22.8
Outreach (Supervision)	12.8	46.3	32.2
Counseling Only	0.1	20.6	9.6
Other	0.2	6.9	11.4
Total Services (N)	3,770	320	342

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

Item and Program	Program Expenditure	Program Revenue	1970-71 Expenditure	1970-71 Revenue	1971-72 Expenditure	1971-72 Revenue	1972-73 Expenditure	1972-73 Revenue	1973-74 Expenditure	1973-74 Revenue
Public Companies										
Alternatives	1.41	32.7	2.29	27.95	26.62	27.28	2.46	27.46	114	
Comparison Demonstration	3.52	—	2.26	229.95	99.92	44.09	42.04	—	—	
Service Demonstration	1.03	—	2.34	314.00	198.18	86.40	89.41	116		
Declaratory										
Alternatives	1.23	18.8	1.97	34.07	28.03	2.96	1.10	80		
Comparison Demonstration	2.97	—	2.27	209.0	179.47	12.60	24.12	64		
Service Demonstration	1.00	—	1.94	208.74	197.66	9.77	1.10	91		

- a. The figure indicates the percent of youth who were in the program more than once.
- b. The figure represents the amount of days (or contact days) for each service received aggregated. It does not represent calendar days. It is probably better estimate of service days than calendar period of sometimes overlapping services.
- c. Figure indicates contact days of counseling, i.e., numbers of days with a counseling contact.

TABLE 3

Percent Type of Services Received by Individuals in All Programs by Area/DCFS Region

Area	T Y P E O F S E R V I C E S				Total
	Nothing	Crisis Intervention Counseling	Foster Home	(Shelter Care/Group Home)	
Cook County	1.8 (18)	41.0 (419)	44.0 (449)	13.2 (135)	83.2 (1021)
Decatur DCFS Region	2.9 (6)	63.6 (131)	16.5 (34)	17.0 (35)	16.8 (206)
TOTAL	2.0 (24)	44.8 (550)	39.4 (483)	13.8 (170)	100.0 (1227)

$$\chi^2 = 55.2310 \quad \text{D.F.} = 3$$

$$P = .0001$$

TABLE 4

Percent Type of Services Received by Gender:
Cook County Alternatives Program

Gender	T Y P E O F S E R V I C E S				Total
	Nothing	Crisis Intervention/ Counseling	Foster Home	Shelter Care/ Group Home	
Female	2.2 (10)	38.9 (178)	49.7 (227)	9.2 (42)	62.9 (457)
Male	1.5 (4)	48.9 (132)	41.9 (113)	7.8 (21)	37.1 (270)
TOTAL	1.9 (14)	42.6 (310)	46.8 (340)	8.7 (63)	100.0 (727)

$$\chi^2 = 6.9823 \quad D.F. 3$$

$$P < .0725$$

TABLE 5

Percent Type of Services by Race:
Cook County Alternatives Program

Race	Crisis Intervention/ Counseling				Total
	Nothing	Foster Home	Shelter Care/ Group Home		
Black	1.8 (8)	42.0 (190)	50.7 (229)	5.5 (25)	62.2 (452)
White	2.7 (6)	41.3 (93)	40.9 (92)	15.1 (34)	30.9 (225)
Other	0.0 (0)	54.0 (27)	38.0 (19)	8.0 (4)	6.9 (50)
TOTAL	1.9 (14)	42.6 (310)	46.8 (340)	8.7 (63)	100.0 (727)

$$\chi^2 = 23.1924 \quad D.F. 6$$

$$\chi^2 = .0007$$

TABLE 6

Type of Service Received by Type of Status Offense of
Alternatives to Detention Youths in Cook County

Type Status Offense	T Y P E O F S E R V I C E S			Total
	Crisis Intervention/ Counseling	Foster Home	Shelter Care/ Group Home	
Runaway	40.4 (201)	49.4 (246)	10.2 (51)	70.5 (498)
Ungovernability	50.5 (100)	43.4 (86)	6.1 (12)	28.0 (198)
Other	40.0 (4)	60.0 (6)	0.0 (0)	1.4 (10)
TOTAL	43.2 (305)	47.9 (338)	8.9 (63)	100.0 (706)

$$\chi^2 = 8.4419 \quad \text{D.F. 4}$$

$$P = .0767$$

TABLE 7

Percent Foster Placement by Type of Family:
Alternatives to Detention Youths in Cook County

Type of Family	F O S T E R P L A C E M E N T		Total
	No	Yes	
Two Parent	46.3 (113)	53.7 (131)	41.1 (244)
Single Parent	49.2 (123)	50.8 (127)	42.1 (250)
Extended Family and Other	54.0 (54)	46.0 (46)	16.8 (100)
TOTAL	48.8 (290)	51.2 (304)	100.0 (594)

$$\chi^2 = 1.702 \quad \text{D.F. 2}$$

$$P = 0.4268 \quad (\text{N.S.})$$

TABLE 8

Type of Program Service Received:

Advocacy or Foster Placement --

Alternatives in Cook County (12 months risk group)

Agency/Service	Prior Justice System Contacts ^a Percentage (n)		
	0	1 - 2	3+
BBF/Advocacy	84.6 (13)	78.4 (185)	77.7 (112)
CAP/Advocacy	50.0 (4)	67.9 (28)	71.1 (38)
CYC/Advocacy	76.2 (42)	67.0 (121)	69.9 (83)
CYC/Foster	71.4 (14)	61.9 (63)	65.2 (23)
Firman/Advocacy	73.4 (64)	74.7 (126)	72.8 (202)
GAMZO/Advocacy	0.0	57.1 (21)	66.7 (3)
Little People/Advocacy	0.0	66.7 (6)	71.0 (62)
MEBS/Advocacy	0.0	65.6 (32)	61.5 (13)
MEBS/Foster	60.0 (50)	61.5 (179)	61.3 (235)
Socio Tech/Advocacy	100.0 (1)	62.5 (8)	75.0 (32)
TWO	65.1 (43)	73.6 (53)	66.0 (94)

^a Youths were counted each time he or she was in a different agency program but only once regardless of number of times receiving the same agency service.

The residual in the categories for each agency program are those youths who had received an alternate service pattern. Advocacy represents youth receiving only an advocacy/counseling service. Foster care indicates usually both foster and advocacy/counseling.

Thus in each cell, the percentage represents the proportion of youths receiving the particular service by the agency. The residual percent -- adding to 100 percent -- is the proportion of youths with the same priors receiving another type of service by that or other agencies.

TABLE 9

Summary Statistics for Regression of Subsequent
Justice Contacts on Alternatives to Detention and Secure
Detention Groups and Control Variables

(N=527)

Variable	R. Square	Simple r	Beta	F
Age	.08	-.27	-.24	34.40
Black ^a	.08	.05	-.09	1.67
White ^a	.08	-.11	-.04	.34
Sex ^b	.09	-.12	-.07	3.09
Chicago ^c	.11	.18	.13	4.23
Non-Chicago Cook ^d	.11	-.13	-.04	.41
N of Prior Contacts	.15	.22	.27	24.21
N of Prior Detentions	.16	.06	-.12	4.72
Alternatives/Secure Det. ^e	.16	-.01	-.03	.49

^aResidual Category = Other Race

^bFemale = 1, Male = 0

^cResidual Category = Non-Chicago Cook County, Macon County

^dResidual Category = Chicago, Macon County

^eSecure Detention = 1, Alternative to Detention = 0

TABLE 10
Contacts with the Juvenile Justice System:
Females (Secure Detention and Alternatives)

	n	Prior \bar{X}	S.D.	Subsequent \bar{X}	S.D.	t-value
White, under 15 years						
Secure Detention	14	3.50	2.79	1.50	1.74	2.94 ^b
Alternatives	21	2.14	2.83	2.33	3.04	-0.24 ^d
White, over 15 years						
Secure Detention	23	2.48	2.39	0.52	0.79	3.82 ^c
Alternatives	37	2.41	3.07	1.19	2.03	2.44 ^a
Black, under 15 years						
Secure Detention	29	5.90	5.89	2.69	2.39	2.69 ^b
Alternatives	58	2.79	2.96	1.84	2.00	2.30 ^a
Black, over 15 years						
Secure Detention	45	3.93	3.20	1.11	1.28	5.45 ^c
Alternatives	61	3.08	2.93	1.39	2.06	3.75 ^c

^a p .02

^b p .01

^c p .001

^d n.s.

TABLE 11
Summary Statistics For Regression
of Subsequent Justice Contacts of Alternatives
on Type of Service Received and Control Variables
(N = 236)

Variable	R Square	Simple r	Beta	F
N of Priors	.08	.29	.42	22.67
Age	.15	-.23	-.23	14.74
Non-Chicago Cook ^a	.16	-.16	-.17	5.89
N of Detentions	.17	.12	.17	3.72
Public Assistance	.18	.03	-.08	1.48
Service ^b	.18	-.05	-.04	.54
Black ^c	.19	.05	-.08	.58
White ^c	.19	-.07	-.06	.26
Female	.19	.09	-.03	.19

^a Residual category = Chicago

^b Residual = Foster care/institutional (shelter care and group home)

^c Residual = other races

TABLE 12

Summary Statistics for Regression
of Subsequent Justice Contacts of Alternatives
on Community Basedness of Organization and Control Variables
(N = 236)

Variable	R Square	Simple r	Beta	F
N of Priors	.08	.29	.43	22.84
Age	.15	-.23	-.23	14.13
Non-Chicago Cook ^a	.16	-.16	-.18	6.38
N of Detentions	.18	.11	-.18	4.03
Public Assistance	.18	.03	-.08	1.55
Com Based Organizations ^b	.19	-.01	-.05	.59
Service ^c	.19	-.05	-.04	.47
Female	.19	.06	-.03	.30
Black ^d	.19	.05	-.07	.42
White ^d	.19	-.07	-.06	.27

^a Residual category = Chicago

^b Residual category = less community based organizations

^c Residual category = foster care/institutional (shelter care and group home)

^d Residual = other races

TABLE 13

Detention for Status Offenses by Gender:
Priors, Instant, Subsequents at Custody Hearing

Priors	Secure Detention		Alternatives	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
mean days	7.13	7.79	8.30	5.88
percent total cases (n)	48.5 (64)	40.6 (28)	31.4 (37)	45.4 (34)
<u>Instant</u>				
mean days	5.35	7.14	4.74	3.13
percent total cases (n)	87.8 (108)	82.7 (86)	30.9 (53)	18.7 (23)
<u>Subsequents</u>				
mean days	7.16	5.96	8.84	10.27
percent total cases (n)	64.0 (37)	70.0 (28)	39.6 (51)	32.4 (11)

TABLE 15

Detention for Delinquent Offenses by Gender:

Priors and Subsequents at Custody Hearing

<u>Priors</u>	<u>Secure Detention Group</u>		<u>Alternatives Group</u>	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Mean	7.80	13.98	12.00	8.09
Percent total cases (n)	37.7 (10)	40.2 (43)	29.4 (10)	35.5 (33)
<u>Subsequents</u>				
Mean	7.63	11.81	10.31	13.70
Percent total cases (n)	74.0 (16)	62.6 (62)	69.6 (16)	59.5 (50)

TABLE 16

POLICE DISPOSITIONS OF STATUS OFFENDERS 1976 AND 1977:COOK AND MACON COUNTIES

	Number Contacted	Percent Released to Parent Custody	Percent Released to Community Agency	Percent Released Outright	Percent Referred to ISOS and/or Detention
Cook County					
Time I (1976) ^a	1,002	11.8	34.2	41.4	12.6
Time II (1977) ^a	1,168	9.8	33.6	38.6	18.1
% Change	+ 16.6	-2.0	-.6	-2.8	+5.5
Macon County					
Time I (1976) ^b	96	17.7	16.6	43.8	21.9
Time II (1977) ^b	60	6.6	23.3	40.0	30.0
% Change	-37.5	-11.1	+6.7	-3.8	+8.1
a. Data based on <u>average monthly</u> flow of all status offenders (in-county and out of county/state) for April, May, June 1976 and 1977.					
b. Data based on <u>total three month</u> flow of all status offenders (in-county and out of county/state) for April, May, June, 1976 and 1977.					

TABLE 17

Court Processing and Disposition
at Instant Offense (12 month risk group)

	Secure Detention	Alternatives
Originally referred to Court	100.0 (226)	100.0 (310)
<hr/>		
<u>Intake Custody Decision^a</u>		
not released (detention)	65.5 (144)	11.3 (33)
released to parents ^b	26.8 (59)	37.2 (109)
released to foster/shelter care/group home	2.7 (6)	2.7 (8)
ISOS/DCFS	5.0 (11)	48.8 (143)
<hr/>		
<u>Final Hearing Custody Decision^a</u>		
released to parent	72.4 (126)	66.0 (126)
release to foster/shelter care/group home	8.6 (15)	8.9 (17)
release to DCFS	16.7 (29)	24.6 (47)
release to institution	2.3 (4)	0.5 (1)
<hr/>		
<u>Final Hearing</u>		
proportion of original group placed in institutional custody	21.2 (48)	21.0 (65)

^a Figures reflect losses at earlier stages of processing, i.e. youth leaving system at early stages are not included

^b Includes youths temporarily, as well as fully, released to custody of parents

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1967	1968	1969
391 (61.4%)	385 (67.32%)	345 (61.11%)
715 (75.6%)	182 (22.92%)	139 (15.52%)
118 (14.12%)	120 (15.12%)	87 (9.82%)
161 (12.82%)	112 (14.12%)	119 (13.42%)
831 (100.0%)	794 (100.02%)	890 (99.92%)

Source: Clerk Office, Cook County Juvenile Court

TABLE 19
ISOS PROGRAM EFFECT ON
DETENTION IN COOK COUNTY^a

Month	Secure Detention 1975-76	Secure Detention 1976-77	Program Cases	Difference Score ^b
July	126	79	25	-22
August	121	57	56	- 8
September	127	25	111	9
October	112	42	151	81
November	131	34	107	10
December	103	30	100	27
January	116	49	143	76
February	148	51	162	65
March	174	49	196	71
April	162	58	171	67
May	132	66	178	112
June	74	54	163	143
TOTAL	1526	594	1563	631

Detention Decrease = 61.1%

Increase in cases known
to court = 41.3%

Adjusted increase in
cases known to court = 24.7%^c

^aBased on Cook County Juvenile Court Detention and Illinois Status Offender Services records. The unit of analysis is cases, i.e., court and program contacts, not youths. Mixed status and delinquent, as well as delinquency, cases are excluded. Out-of-county and out-of-state cases are also eliminated since they were not served by ISOS.

-continued-

TABLE 19 (continued)

^b This score is computed by adding the number of youth in detention for 1976-77 and program contracts, then subtracting 1975-76 detention cases, on a monthly basis.

^c Adjustment is based on the estimated increase, 16.6 percent, of status offenders entering the justice system during the first program year (See Table 16).

TABLE 20

ISOS PROGRAM EFFECT ON
DETENTION IN MACON COUNTY^a

Month	Secure Detention 1975-76	Secure Detention 1976-77	Program Cases	Difference Score ^b
July	13	6	2	-5
August	11	9	6	4
September	4	14	10	20
October	10	7	8	5
November	7	8	5	6
December	11	9	5	3
January	22	1	4	-17
February	10	2	2	-6
March	14	8	7	1
April	13	4	9	0
May	13	6	4	-3
June	6	5	6	5
TOTAL	134	79	68	13

Detention Decrease = 41.0%

Increase in cases
known to Court = 9.7%Adjusted increase in
cases known to court = 75.5%^c

^aBased on Macon County Juvenile Court Detention and Illinois Status Offender Services records. The unit for analysis is cases, i.e., court and program contacts, not youths. Mixed status and delinquency, as well as delinquency, cases are excluded. Out-of-county and out-of-state cases are not eliminated, since they were served by ISOS in this county.

-continued-

TABLE 20 (continued)

^bThis score is computed by adding the number of youth in detention for 1976-77 and program contacts, then subtracting 1975-76 detention cases, on a monthly basis.

^cAdjustment is based on the estimated decrease, 37.5 percent, of status offenders entering the justice system during the first program year (See Table 16).

TABLE 21

COMPARISON OF
SECURE DETENTION AND ALTERNATIVES GROUPS:
Prior Offense Histories

Number of Prior Contacts	Pre-Program %	Program %
0	11.2	16.7
1	9.9	23.9
2	15.7	17.0
3	11.7	6.6
4	10.8	11.1
5	9.9	4.9
6	9.0	4.9
7	4.0	3.0
8	6.3	2.0
9	3.1	2.0
10+	8.4	7.9
TOTAL	100.0 (223)	100.0 (305)

TABLE 22

Movement of Cases of Evaluated Youth

Through the Justice System:

Status Offenses

Quarter/Population	Police	Court Intake ^a	Court Adjudication/Disposition ^a
First (12 months prior)			
Secure Detention	92	42 (45.6)	31 (73.8)
Alternatives	102	38 (37.3)	20 (52.7)
Second (6 months prior)			
Secure Detention	225	104 (46.2)	60 (57.7)
Alternatives	278	100 (36.0)	49 (49.0)
ISOS (Instant offense)			
Third (6 months after)			
Secure Detention	142	76 (52.8)	56 (73.7)
Alternatives	205	125 (61.0)	88 (70.2)
Fourth (12 months after)			
Secure Detention	55	22 (40.0)	15 (68.2)
Alternatives	85	49 (57.1)	37 (75.5)

^a Indicates the number of cases continued from the previous stage of processing and the proportion it represents.

TABLE 23

Movement of Cases of Evaluated Youth

Through the Justice System:

Property Crimes

Quarter/Population	Police	Court Intake ^a	Court Adjudication/Disposition ^a
First (12 months prior)			
Secure Detention	57	27 (47.4)	24 (88.9)
Alternatives	50	15 (30.0)	13 (86.7)
Second (6 months prior)			
Secure Detention	90	54 (60.0)	42 (77.8)
Alternatives	92	46 (50.0)	36 (78.3)
ISOS (Instant offense)			
Third (6 months after)			
Secure Detention	79	53 (67.1)	46 (86.8)
Alternatives	82	47 (57.3)	43 (91.5)
Fourth (12 months after)			
Secure Detention	51	39 (76.5)	39 (100.0)
Alternatives	57	35 (61.4)	30 (85.7)

^a Indicates the number of cases continued from the previous stage of processing and the proportion it represents.

TABLE 24

Movement of Cases of Evaluated Youth

Through the Justice System:

Person Crimes

Quarter/Population	Police	Court Intake ^a	Court Adjudication/Disposition ^a
First (12 months prior)			
Secure Detention	16	7 (43.8)	7 (100.0)
Alternatives	9	8 (88.9)	5 (62.5)
Second (6 months prior)			
Secure Detention	13	6 (46.2)	5 (83.3)
Alternatives	12	8 (66.7)	6 (75.0)
ISOS (Instant offense)			
Third (6 months after)			
Secure Detention	19	12 (63.2)	9 (75.0)
Alternatives	28	23 (82.1)	23 (100.0)
Fourth (12 months after)			
Secure Detention	9	9 (100.0)	9 (100.0)
Alternatives	11	5 (100.0)	5 (100.0)

^a Indicates the number of cases continued from the previous stage of processing and the proportion it represents.

TABLE 25

COURT CASES PROCESSED
BEFORE AND AFTER INSTANT OFFENSE:
MALES AND FEMALES

	Prior	Instant	Subsequent
<u>Males</u>			
Secure Detention	512 (56.3)	104 (11.4)	293 (32.2)
Alternatives	562 (58.9)	122 (12.8)	270 (28.3)

$\chi^2 = 3.616$ d.f. 2
prob. .20 (n.s.)

Females

Secure Detention	477 (58.1)	122 (14.9)	222 (27.0)
Alternatives	507 (49.2)	188 (18.3)	335 (32.5)

$\chi^2 = 14.477$ d.f. 2
prob. .001

TABLE 26

Representation by Attorney by Case Contact
At Adjudication Hearing
(12 Month Risk Group)

	Secure Detention	Alternatives
<u>Total Prior Cases</u>		
No*	25.4 (66)	32.4 (70)
Yes*	74.6 (194)	68.6 (149)
Private*	4.6 (12)	4.6 (10)
Public*	70.0 (182)	63.4 (139)
Total	100.0 (260)	100.0 (219)
<u>Instant Offense</u>		
No***	23.4 (40)	36.6 (68)
Yes***	76.6 (131)	63.4 (118)
Private**	3.5 (6)	7.5 (14)
Public**	73.1 (125)	55.9 (104)
Total	100.0 (171)	100.0 (186)
No*	21.5 (39)	26.6 (55)
Yes*	78.5 (142)	73.4 (152)
Private*	3.9 (7)	6.3 (13)
Public*	74.6 (135)	67.1 (139)
Total	100.0 (181)	100.0 (207)

* Chi Square: not significant
** Chi Square: significant, .05
*** Chi Square: significant, .01

TABLE 27

POLICE DISPOSITIONS OF STATUS OFFENDERS
AND DELINQUENTS 1976 AND 1977, COOK AND
MACON COUNTIES: PER CENT CHANGE*

County/Offender	Number Contacted	Per Cent Released To Parent Custody	Per Cent Released To Community Custody	Per Cent Released Outright	Per Cent Referred to ISOS and/or Detention
Cook County T ₂ Change Over Time T ₁					
Status	+16.6	-2.0	-0.6	-2.8	+5.5
Delinquent	+ 8.2	-0.9	+2.7	+0.8	-2.6
Macon County T ₂ Change Over time T ₁					
Status	-37.5	-11.1	+6.7	-3.8	+8.1
Delinquent	- 4.0	+ 4.2	+11.5	-12.4	-3.4

* See Table footnote (a) for data base in Cook County; footnote (b) for data base in Macon County.

TABLE 28

Countywide Detention (Detainability) Rates
Status Offenders and Delinquents,
1976 and 1977^a

	1976	1977
Cook County		
Status Offenders	12.6	17.2 ^b
Delinquents	10.0	7.0
Macon County		
Status Offenders	14.7	25.0 ^b
Delinquents	5.8	2.3

^a Based on Juvenile Justice System flowdata. See Table 16 footnotes.
The rate is simply the proportion of all offenders arrested by the police
referred to detention.

^b The percent includes youths detained as well as referred to ISOS.

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