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James L. Underwood
Acting Director

February 1982

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

II. STRUCTURAL-SITUATIONAL ISSUES: THE MATTER OF CONTEXT. 5

III. PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE EARLY MCGRUFF CAMPAIGN ........ 7
    Exposure to the Initial McGruff Campaign ..................... 7
    Effects of the Early McGruff Advertisements ................ 8
    A Perspective on the Early McGruff Campaign Effects ....... 10

IV. AUDIENCE SELF-SELECTION AND INFORMATION SEEKING ........... 13

V. CONTROLLING PURPOSEFUL PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS ON BEHALF OF CRIME PREVENTION ........................................ 16
    Controlling Targets ............................................ 16
    Controlling Themes and Appeals .............................. 18
    Controlling Beliefs ........................................... 19
    Controlling Fear ................................................ 19
    Controlling Source Credibility ............................... 20
    Controlling Risk Perceptions ................................ 21

VI. SOME GUIDELINES FOR FORMULATING RISK/BENEFITS MESSAGES .. 22

VII. CONTROLLING ACTION DEMANDS ............................. 25

VIII. CONSIDERING THE COMMUNICATIONS CONSUMER ............. 30

IX. THE MCGRUFF CAMPAIGN ..................................... 31
    Who is Behind It? ............................................ 31
    Development .................................................. 32
    Funding ...................................................... 32

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I. INTRODUCTION

To a very significant degree, the success of any public communications effort on behalf of crime prevention depends directly on the kinds and amounts of control that communicators can institute and carry out directly vis-à-vis explications of: (1) objectives and goals, (2) themes, (3) appeals, (4) targets, (5) media, and (6) timing of dissemination. The fewer are the components over which communicators can exercise direct control, the more likely will their dependence be on serendipity, random chance, coincidence, and audience self-selection for the achievement of "effects." Under these circumstances "effects" will be difficult to identify; oftentimes they will be inconsistent and even contradictory; and most importantly, such "effects" will be variable rather than singular or monotonic.

Research in mass communications informs us that in those instances where communicator control is neither exclusive nor persistent, we can expect some "effects" to occur in each of three audience "response" domains— in their levels of information; in their beliefs, attitudes and opinions; and in their actions. But to expect substantive changes to occur equally within each response rubric would be quite unrealistic.

In the real world, purposive mass media efforts designed to persuade can be expected to accomplish a good deal in the general areas of raising awareness and interest levels among various publics; somewhat less in the areas of attitude change and motivation; and just a discouragingly limited degree of success in generating recommended action-taking. Still, even with the limited prospects for affecting large-scale behavioral changes, it is essential that control of purposive mass communications on behalf of crime prevention be grounded in as much empiricism as possible. The questions we must ask in assessing a given campaign are multiple: How much awareness did the campaign generate and among whom? How much belief, attitude, and value formation and/or change did it produce and among whom? How much motivation did it stimulate and among whom? How much behavioral change did it induce, and among whom? How much reinforcement did it accomplish, and among whom?

Precisely, these were the questions addressed in the evaluation of the early phases of the McGruff public service advertising campaign.

In this particular evaluation the concern was mainly with finding out what happens when a major nation-wide mass media effort is made on behalf of crime prevention under conditions of minimal control by LEAA regarding the detailed specifics of the targets to be addressed, appeals and messages to be formed and disseminated; and most importantly, with no control whatever over where the advertisements were to be placed or when they would appear.*

*Because Federal law prohibits agencies of the government to purchase media space and time, the McGruff campaign had to rely on the voluntary placements of the ads as "public service announcements" (PSAs) in various media across the USA.
The focus of this research has been on those crime prevention messages that are disseminated via the media for the principal purpose of persuading message recipients to take the actions advocated.

Excluded from consideration in this study were crime prevention messages that are exchanged privately: didactic messages that are designed mainly for formal instructional activities; and advertising messages that are designed to sell products such as burglar alarms, door and window locks, firearms and such. Additionally, technical reports, straight news and commentary, and fiction and drama which may touch on crime prevention were excluded as well.

In this report a number of problems and issues are raised—problems and issues that from our primary and secondary source research appear to call for particular attention at this time. Undoubtedly, there will be additional issues and problems that the reader will recognize as important—one which the authors have either downplayed or neglected to acknowledge at all. Just as no one media campaign can possibly accomplish all the communications objectives that can be considered ideal, no one research effort can possibly contend with all the pertinent issues and problems that are inherent in the outcomes of that research.

The University of Denver study addressed five major issues and problems:

1. What structural situational issues must any public communication crime prevention effort accept as "givens"?
2. What happens when various publics with varying experiences are directed to take specifically advocated "crime prevention" actions? How is crime prevention action-taking related to and/or influenced by:
   a. Demographic characteristics;
   b. The nature of the advocated actions;
   c. Beliefs regarding responsibility for crime prevention; beliefs about self-competence; beliefs regarding the efficacy of individual action-taking in reducing victimization;
   d. Victimization experience and perception of vulnerability;
   e. Information about and interest in crime and crime prevention;
   f. Opinion leadership and participation in community organizations.
3. What happens when crime prevention advertisements are produced and disseminated exclusively as "public service advertisements"—PSAs? What are PSAs, what are their functions; who are their audiences; what are their effects? What are the strengths of PSAs; their weaknesses?
4. What were citizens' reactions to the initial McGruff campaign?
   a. Who was exposed to it?
   b. What effects among whom did exposure to McGruff advertisements appear to generate vis-à-vis changes in:
      1. Awareness and information gain
      2. Attitude-belief changes
      3. Action-taking

5. Other than the placement and timing of advertisements, what additional components of public communications should all those interested in exercising maximum control over crime prevention public communications be aware of?
   a. Delineating targets on attributes other than demographic characteristics.
   b. Risk-efficacy beliefs and action-taking; information and action-taking.
   c. Fear appeals.
   d. Source credibility.

The present report features highlights of theories, principles, hypotheses, and data that touch on the most salient aspects of these issues and problems along with suggestions for their possible resolution.

II. STRUCTURAL/SITUATIONAL ISSUES: THE MATTER OF CONTEXT

Rightfully so, the early "McGruff" crime prevention campaign, as were a previous number of similar efforts, was based overall on demands that audiences take specifically suggested crime prevention actions on their own. Synoptically, the slogan, "Take a Bite Out of Crime" was used in McGruff to persuade message recipients to engage in sixty different behaviors that ostensibly would either reduce or eliminate the threat of crime victimization.* One cannot foresee viable crime prevention media campaigns of the future to be anything but action-demanding in their thrust. However, consideration must be given to the number of demands to be made as well as to the nature of the demands themselves.

The manifest "logic" behind these particular types of action demands is simple enough:

Many "street crimes" can be prevented. The state cannot be totally responsible for the prevention of all crimes. The individual citizen must take on the responsibility of protecting himself/herself; his and her loved ones; and his and her property. One can accomplish such protection by (1) becoming better informed about crime prevention and (2) by carrying out the specific actions that "authorities" advocate.

It turns out that the latent logic of this kind of syllogism is extremely complex, and in this complexity lies a veritable mine field that is pockmarked by structural, situational, and psychological barriers that can hamper, derail and even annihilate the manifest argument to the point of virtual ineffectiveness.

For example, some publics do not believe it is the responsibility of the individual to "prevent crimes"; others who may actually believe in the doctrine of citizen responsibility nevertheless may not believe that quo individuals they are capable of carrying out the actions that are advocated; others still may find that from their personal situations and perspectives the suggested actions they encounter cannot possibly deliver the promised results.

On another level, some publics already have developed the habit of performing the actions advocated, and they find new media demands to do so to be redundant "nagging"; others find the "information" presented to them to be "interesting," but they see little or no relation between gaining the information and doing something about it; and still others find the same information adding to their confusions and anxieties rather than dissipating them.

*Audiences for the original McGruff PSAs who requested "further information," received an attractive book of "hints" in the form of 60 separate imperatives or demands.
All this is not to say that certain self-selected message recipients may find the crime prevention information they happen to encounter occasionally to be reasonable and useful and at times, even impelling to action.

III. PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE EARLY MCGUFF CAMPAIGN

For primary "confirmatory" data as a check on the secondary research that was done, a study of public reactions to the first phases of the McGruff campaign was conducted by the University of Denver.

The early McGruff PSAs featured (and still do) a trench-coated cartoon dog character who offered a wide variety of "hints" regarding actions to take to avoid being victimized by street crimes. The campaign was launched during autumn of 1979 and has received considerable play in the nation's media since. The Denver study covers the campaign's first four-month phase, based almost completely on public service advertisements running as television and radio spots and newspaper and magazine display ads. In brief, the PSAs in one form or another depicted the McGruff character urging citizens to help "Take a Bite Out of Crime" by doing such things as locking doors and windows, keeping a watch on their neighborhoods, contacting the police about suspicious-looking strangers and the like.

Two separate surveys were used both to evaluate the impact of the first stage of the McGruff public service advertising campaign and to gather additional appropriate information concerning crime prevention behavior. One survey, conducted approximately four months after the start of the campaign, was based on personal interviews with a national probability sample of 1,500 adults. This survey was primarily designed to describe the scope of public exposure to the campaign and reactions of various groups to it. The second survey entailed use of a two-wave panel design with a smaller and less generalizable sample, with interviews being conducted both immediately prior to and several months after the campaign's onset. The "before"-"after" panel survey consisted of personal interviews conducted with an initial probability sample of 1,050 persons over age 17 drawn proportionately from three U.S. metropolitan areas. The main goal of the panel study was to obtain more objective and exacting measures of campaign exposure patterns and effects under at least a somewhat controlled situation.

Because communicators were unable to control either the placement or the timing of the initial McGruff advertisements they were unable to control exposure to those particular communications. The consequence of this particular lack can be a serious inability to control "effects."

When communicator control over exposure is missing, we cannot expect precision in either targeting, exposure or effects. To a serious degree then, self-selection on the part of message recipients takes over here in governing both audience exposure and reactions. Consequently, we would expect that reactions to McGruff would be more or less "all over the lot."

A. Exposure to the Initial McGruff Campaign

Overall, 30% of the national sample claimed they either had seen or heard McGruff public service advertisements in the beginning of the campaign.
Most saw the ads on television.

Those who claimed awareness of the McGruff advertisements were likelier to be

- Heavier users of the media to begin with.
- Individuals who generally paid particular attention to public service announcements of all sorts.

Three demographic characteristics--age, sex, and social class--were particularly in evidence with regard to exposures. Awareness of the ads was most evident among

- Younger persons
- Males
- Persons occupying middle to lower socio-economic statuses

Important to note is the conspicuously lower exposure rate among the elderly.

The following attitudes, beliefs, and interests influenced exposure to the early McGruff advertisements importantly.

- Persons concerned with the well-being of others ("altruists") were more likely to have been exposed to the McGruff materials.
- Individuals exhibiting relatively high levels of distrust of others, in contrast, were more apt to have encountered the ads.
- People who generally were highly concerned about crime, but not necessarily those more concerned about crime prevention as a subject of interest.

Plus

- Those who saw themselves as needing prevention-related information, each were likelier to have been exposed to McGruff PSAs early on.

**B. Effects of the Early McGruff Advertisements in the Three Critical Response Areas of Information Gain, Belief-Attitude Change, and Behavior Change**

Overall, the early McGruff advertisements "registered" with a majority of the respondents who claimed exposure to them.

- Well over half of those who claimed exposure
- Were able to "play back" the contents of the ads.
- Believed the ads were "getting through" to audiences "just like" themselves.

Most respondents who were aware of the early McGruff advertisements were favorable in their overall reactions to them.

- Only a handful were "turned off" by them.

1. **Information gain effects**

- More than a fourth of those who recalled the McGruff advertisements claimed they had learned something about crime prevention from them.
- Respondents who manifested "information gain" were apt to
  - Manifest more distrust of others.
  - Come from lower socio-economic brackets.
- Otherwise, respondents reporting "information gain" did not differ from the sample as a whole.

2. **Belief/attitude changes**

- Four of every ten respondents who were aware of the McGruff advertisements claimed that the ads did affect some of their crime-related beliefs and attitudes.
- Respondents who came from lower economic statuses as well as
- Respondents who exhibited distrust of others each was likelier than all others to claim that exposure to the early McGruff advertisements contributed to their changing certain of their attitudes and beliefs about crime and crime prevention.
- Not all the attitude/belief changes reported, however, were related directly to the substantive aspects of crime prevention action-taking as such.
- For example
  - Exposure to the early McGruff advertisements appeared mainly to increase respondents' concerns regarding crime prevention and prevention-related behaviors, particularly among persons who believed themselves at risk to begin with.
  - Exposure appears to have increased respondents' feelings of personal responsibility for crime prevention.
- And, finally, increased beliefs in their own personal vulnerability were reported to have been produced among respondents as a result of exposures to the initial McGruff materials.
- At the same time there was no indication from the survey data that exposure to the beginnings of the McGruff campaign had any discernible impact on three critical action-taking predispositions:
  - Not on respondents' senses of personal responsibility for preventing crimes.
  - Not on respondents' feelings of competence (i.e., self-confidence) in regard to their ability to protect self and loved ones.
oo Not on respondents' acceptance of the principle of individual citizen responsibility for achieving crime prevention.

3. Behavior changes
o Fifteen percent of the persons who claimed they saw or heard the ads said they had changed certain pertinent behaviors as a consequence of having encountered the early McGruff;

oo Women in the sample were likelier than were males to claim having altered their behaviors.

oo Persons of lower income were also likelier to report such behavioral changes.

oo Overall exposure to the initial McGruff material does not appear to have influenced respondents' propensities to make use of household security devices in any measurable way.

C. A Perspective on the Early McGruff Campaign's Effects

These data are of course difficult to assess in terms of any absolute standard as to whether the campaign "succeeded" or not. Such decisions must rest in part on criteria established by the campaign sponsors and producers. Moreover, comparable evidence pertaining to public service campaigns, particularly in crime prevention, is most difficult to come by. (Hence one of the rationales underlying this study.) However, the fact that the McGruff materials were recalled by nearly 30 percent of this sample, and by inference by approximately that proportion of the adult public as a whole, appears noteworthy. It seems a rather positive accomplishment, given the reliance of the campaign on donated "free" air time and print space, plus the great competition for that access from other public service sector organizations.

Further insight may be gained by examining the responsiveness of citizens to crime prevention information campaigns in general. In this regard, respondents in the University of Denver survey were asked about their levels of exposure and attention to such messages overall as well as their perceived influence of such exposure to their behaviors.

While in some ways those respondents who were exposed to the introductory McGruff PSAs superficially resemble respondents who tend to be more exposed to crime prevention messages overall, when multivariate controls are inserted media-related factors evolve as the major significant predictors. In short, the likeliest sub-groups to be exposed to prevention-protection messages in the mass media overall are:

1. Persons who use all the media a great deal.
2. Persons who turn to the media more for information than entertainment.
3. Individuals who for whatever reason are peculiarly sensitive to "public service advertisements," PSAs.

4. People who generally are highly attentive to crime fare in the media.

The data gathered in the University of Denver survey showed these four factors to be generally more powerful than the more usual demographic factors of age, sex, and educational level alone in influencing overall exposure to crime prevention media content. Still, demographic characteristics did affect exposure to the McGruff advertisements to some extent. Recall that males, younger persons, and those in lower SES brackets were most aware of the materials. Precisely why these particular demographic types selected themselves out in attending the McGruff ads is a matter more of where the advertisements appeared and when--each a random and uncontrolled event--than it is of conscious target identification planning and implementation on the part of the communicators.

From the evidence at hand McGruff campaign planners did not particularly intend to reach disproportionate numbers in each of the four demographic sub-groups the ads did attract. It just happened that way.

Returning momentarily to prospective targets who appear to be among those "usually" interested in crime prevention information, over-representations among the following demographic sub-groups are in evidence overall:

oo Older persons

oo Women

oo Individuals manifesting high trust in others

In sum two sub-groups, one identified demographically, the other identified by their prior interests in crime and information regarding crime prevention, make up substantial targets at which any future crime prevention communications efforts ought to be aimed.

Most of the "expected" characteristics of individuals with a stake in knowing about prevention seem to form a core general audience for crime prevention messages. While exposure to prevention messages appears largely coincidental at first blush, and is based primarily upon general media orientations, those who pay the closest attention to such fare appear to make up a credible target audience for the content of such messages.

One implication of these findings is that there may be a fair amount of inefficiency in uncontrolled mass media prevention communications if the principal objectives are to reach persons (1) who need such information and (2) who would be most likely to pay high attention to the information they would encounter. It is important to note that the University of Denver survey identified these types of potential crime prevention message targets to be disproportionately represented among:

oo Women

oo Persons who believe their neighborhoods to be dangerous.
In other words there appears to be a "natural" target subgroup for crime prevention media messages within the general population. This ostensibly is a highly motivated target to begin with, and one which the data indicate are ready to act. It is a target that any effort designed to persuade publics via the mass media ought to focus on in the main, when the opportunities for clear-cut a priori total communications control present themselves. Overall, McGruff initially appears to have missed this prime "natural" target somewhat.

Still, in relative terms, persons exhibiting a need for crime prevention information were more likely than others to have been exposed to early McGruff materials. What occurred here was that exposure to McGruff happened by chance more so than as a result of "information seeking" on the part of the information "needy." In good part then, exposure to McGruff was governed more by the happenstance of overall prior high media exposure than it was by expressed needs for crime prevention information. This is not surprising in light of the random manner in which the materials had been disseminated as PSAs.

On the other hand, where attitude and behavioral changes could be traced to exposure to McGruff, they were altogether likelier to have taken place among persons (1) who expressed a need for crime prevention information and (2) individuals who customarily pay a high degree of attention to such information to begin with.

IV. AUDIENCE SELF-SELECTION AND INFORMATION-SEEKING

The data on McGruff confirm two basic mass communications effects principles that merit attention.

The first points to the greater efficacy of purposive mass communications efforts in creating awareness as compared to their relative inability to generate substantial changes in attitudes and behaviors.

The second touches on the matter of audience information seeking and self-selection as a function of need and prior interest. Here the principle is both simple and crystal clear: the more "useful" a person considers a given piece of information to be (either actually or potentially) the more (s)he might be expected to make an effort to gather it, assess it and act upon it.

However, in examining actual "information-gathering" behavior, researchers have discovered that even in those instances where individuals actually "want" certain information, they will seek it out from media and people sources that are readily available to them, sources that they ordinarily use and prefer. Information seekers (and others) normally do not "go out of their way" to gather information from sources that are beyond their normal access (e.g., "writing-in" for additional information). Thus, most instrumental information that most of us normally acquire most of the time comes to us mostly by chance as a function of (1) the media we usually turn to for news, information, and entertainment plus (2) the people we usually prefer to listen to (mostly people just like ourselves whom researchers label "opinion leaders") for ideas, information and advice.

Fundamentally it is only when we are confronted with the challenge of making a consequential behavioral decision—one that involves heavy investment or very high risk or both—that we make a special effort outside our normal courses of accessing information and advice. Otherwise, most of our useful information gathering occurs haphazardly and inadvertently—in our everyday encounters with the media as well as during the course of the casual and often random conversations that we normally engage in daily with friends, loved ones, acquaintances, neighbors, co-workers and such.

From the research on the dynamics of audience self-selection vis-à-vis mass communications information three factors of particular importance emerge as governing information seeking first, then exposure and effect, ultimately:

1. Usefulness of the information on the topic concerning the seeker.
2. The general level of education of the seeker, and his/her experience in processing and applying intellectual information in solving problems.
3. A lack of information regarding the soundness of alternatives to the beliefs the seeker of information initially holds.
The research on audience self-selection affords an observation that is summative on the subject:

For the most part, intellectual information, and instrumental information as well, are most apt to be sought out explicitly by persons (1) who are informed enough about a matter to recognize deficiencies in their knowledge and (2) who are prepared to act on the basis of the "new" information they may acquire in their search.

Given these conditions the communicator has the responsibility then of determining who knows what about a given topic area such as crime prevention well before determining what to say and to whom. It appears quite critical to audience "targeting" or "social marketing" strategy building to take into account a priori such motivational constructs as citizen's perceived need for information about a given crime prevention topic. Communication effects, in many ways, can be seen as resulting from interactions between audience motivations and customary media exposure and attention patterns. As the McGruff case indicates, those respondents who appeared to be affected by their exposure to the campaign were likelier to have seen themselves in greater need of crime prevention information, as well as having some prior expectation and hope that the contents of the campaign actually might help them do something worthwhile to protect themselves.

A most important caveat emerges from the research on the "effects" of information gain.

There is no clear correlation between knowing something about crime prevention, to cite an example, and acting positively on that information.

On this score, data from the University of Denver survey indicated that among those respondents who considered themselves to be particularly well-informed about crime prevention, no more than four in ten reported that they customarily engaged in person protective action-taking. In the same vein, nearly half of those respondents who considered themselves to be well-informed were not persistent in their property protection actions.

Turning the data around, we noted that fully a fourth of the respondents who classified themselves as being relatively "ignorant" about crime prevention nevertheless were the most persistent in "doing the right things" in regard to person protection, while more than a fifth of the ill-informed were the most persistent in regard to property protection.

With regard to the influence of knowledge on perceptions of risk, there is evidence from the survey that "ignorance" regarding "crime prevention" may indeed be a precursor to "bliss." The problem posed here focuses on the possibility that the sudden acquisition of "information" regarding crime prevention by some message recipients can actually produce more fear about the possibility of victimization than would be the case in the absence of such information. This is precisely the case with regard to cancer prevention information that some people acquire. The more informed many people become about the serious consequences of cancer and the limitations of efforts to "prevent" it, the more fearful of cancer they become, and as a consequence, the more resistance to "prevention" information they generate. The same may hold true for encounters with crime prevention information.
V. CONTROLLING PURPOSEFUL PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
ON BEHALF OF CRIME PREVENTION

Purposeful communications on behalf of crime prevention require prior communicator control over as many elements of the persuasion process as is possible.

Because no one communications strategy; thematic/appeal thrust; or "campaign"—by itself—is apt to persuade large heterogeneous publics across the board, it is prudent to consider directing public communications primarily to prospective "pay-off" targets via potential "pay-off" themes and appeals whenever possible.

In order to develop such control communications decision makers in crime prevention can avail themselves of previous research efforts plus the contemporary primary data that have been gathered in the University of Denver studies. Together, the materials from both the primary and secondary sources that have been examined analytically form a data base on which strategies for the control of future crime prevention public communications efforts can rest.

A. Controlling Targets

One key to selecting targets is prior identification of those sub-groups within the general population who (1) are in need of specific kinds of crime prevention information, (2) who are interested in receiving such information, and (3) who manifest some willingness and ability to act on the information to be provided.

This represents no easy task by any means, because what is required here is both intensive and extensive a priori "social marketing" research that is designed specifically for the task of identifying such likely targets. The University of Denver studies represent such a social marketing effort, and they can serve as models for future targeting research delineations.

The Denver studies bring to the fore several highly important considerations that merit serious attention at this point.

It is clear from the research that much more than "demographic" attributes of potential audiences are needed in the target delineation and control process. At minimum data on the following—in addition to demography—appear to be required as bases for selecting "high-prospect" targets:

1. Victimization experience
2. Perceived vulnerability
3. Belief in one's ability to protect self and property
4. Belief in the efficacy of individual action-taking to reduce or eliminate the threat of victimization
5. Information presently held concerning crime prevention
6. Perceived need for and interest in crime prevention information
7. Media usage habits
8. Past and current behavior vis-a-vis protection of self, loved ones, and property

Clearly, the purposive crime prevention messages appearing in the mass media cannot possibly address large homogeneous "masses" who are expected to react to such messages in exactly the same way at exactly the same time.

Categorically, there exists no such phenomenon as a "mass" audience. It is doubtful whether such ever actually did exist. "Audiences" not only are disaggregated—researchers in mass communications refer to the segmentalization of audiences—but they differ from each other in so many ways that most "mass media" messages addressed to the most people will be inapplicable to most audiences most of the time.

Consider the matter of "at-risk" targets as illustrative of the complexities involved in identifying prospective targets for crime prevention media messages. There are at least six quite different "publics" to be addressed in this one regard alone:

1. Those who are, and are likely to remain, relatively "safe," know it and believe themselves to be "safe."
2. Those who presently are, and are likely to remain, "safe" but believe themselves to be "at risk."
3. Those who presently are, and will remain, "at risk," know it and believe themselves to be "at risk."
4. Those who presently are, and will remain, "at risk," but believe themselves to be "safe."
5. Those who may be temporarily "safe) but have a good chance of becoming "at risk."
6. Those who may be temporarily "at risk," but have a good chance of becoming "safe."

If one notes that in each of these "non-demographic" target sub-groups there will be individuals who either believe or who do not believe in the efficacy of their individualized actions to diminish, control, or eliminate the threat of victimization, the absolute minimal number of separate targets...
to be addressed within any one such identified cohort can actually be a minimum of twelve quite different "publics" overall.

Again, it is quite unlikely that exactly the same one message can persuade each of these twelve different potential "audiences" with equal success.

As a consequence, public communications planners must make pre-campaign determinations of the targets they are most and least likely to reach with any one effort. Prudence suggests sustained pursuit of the high pay-off prospects in the main.

To an important extent "reaching" specifically identified targets is dependent on the amount of control communicators have over the media their messages are to be placed in as well as over the timing of their distribution. Unfortunately, the PSA process does not allow for such control on the part of communicators, thereby hampering targeting control efforts quite seriously.

Until prior control over message placement can be accomplished, pin-point targeting via the planning process cannot be accomplished with strong expectations of success. In these circumstances target control must rely almost exclusively on the themes and appeals that make up the actual contents of messages to attract appropriate audiences rather than on the particular media such audiences typically turn to for news, information, ideas and guidance. Here control over themes and appeals becomes crucial.

B. Controlling Themes and Appeals

Typically, purposive public communications on behalf of crime prevention are made up of three major themes:

1. "Factual" information regarding the "problems" that crime presents for the individual, the community, and society.
2. Beliefs regarding the efficacy of voluntary protection action-taking that are offered as reasons why audiences should act on communicators' suggestions.
3. Demands for actions in the form of imperatives.

Mass communications research has shown that the three themes are so profoundly interrelated that neither one can be promulgated without encountering considerable difficulty vis-a-vis the remaining two. Nor can the formulation of the three themes be divorced from the basic appeals to fear that all messages regarding crime and its prevention necessarily must engender.

As a consequence of these considerations the present report touches on important strategic aspects of beliefs and action-taking, fear, risk perceptions, information-giving and their roles in developing strategies for communications control.

C. Controlling Beliefs

One major contribution that was made by the meta-research efforts of this study was the emergent consideration of the Health Belief Model (HBM) as a possible organizing principle around which crime prevention communications controls might be formulated.

Briefly, HBM posits the proposition that individuals will take advocated ameliorative actions under two fundamental belief circumstances: They must believe themselves to be vulnerable to a danger of consequence. And they must believe that compliance with a specific advocated action will result in an actual diminution or elimination of that danger.

By analogy then, the potentiality for audiences to take crime prevention actions that are advocated in the media can be seen importantly to be functions of their beliefs in regard to their vulnerability to victimization plus their beliefs in the probabilities that the advocated actions will reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.

Beliefs can be influenced by communication for a number of reasons. Beliefs are altogether concrete, and they are binary. Either we believe something to be so, or we do not. Additionally, we do indeed act on our beliefs. Because we act on our beliefs (as well as on other forces), and beliefs are potentially modifiable, we can conclude that if we can possibly change certain inappropriate crime prevention beliefs, inappropriate crime prevention behaviors flowing from them likewise may be corrected ultimately.

The mass media are peculiarly suited to the formation and modification of beliefs-crime beliefs included. They are not, by themselves, suited to changing behavior.

Sheer intellectual information communications that are "rational," "logical," and "consistent" often make very little impact on our "non-rational," "illogical," and "inconsistent" beliefs. Logic and emotion generally do not impact upon each other. Accusing someone of being "illogical" about a particular belief system will more likely result in hostility toward the communicator than in compliance with the communicator's recommendations.

When trying to change targets' beliefs, communicators might well bear this in mind: Success potentially lies more in efficacious attacks on the sources of beliefs than it may in either directly challenging the beliefs themselves or the believers.

D. Controlling Fear

Among others, the tasks of public communications on behalf of crime prevention are:

1. To reinforce risk beliefs that are already in congruence with actual risk.
2. To lower those risk beliefs that, in fact, overestimate actual dangers.
3. To increase those risk beliefs that, in fact, underestimate actual dangers.

In each of these instances the crime prevention communicator must cope with the problem of fear, bearing in mind the generalization that the higher the risk that a particular threat actually poses to a message recipient, and the more serious its potential consequences are perceived to be, the more fear will individuals manifest regarding any aspect of that phenomenon.

Nevertheless, the bulk of contemporary research suggests that high fear arousal communications are generally more persuasive than are weak fear arousing types—with the following caveats:

1. High fear appeals can be persuasive to a certain point of heightened audience tension. Beyond that point of generating intense fear of catastrophe, high fear appeals are likely to inhibit action-taking rather than producing it.
2. Similarly, high fear communications must incorporate simultaneously (a) realistic solutions that can be pursued easily by audiences plus (b) explicit directions and instructions for accomplishing such solutions.
3. High fear appeals must come from sources that enjoy the highest possible degree of credibility among message recipients.
4. They must be directed to message recipients who are far more used to coping with threats and dangers than they are in avoiding dangers and threats.
5. Persons who believe themselves to be highly vulnerable to crime cannot simply be frightened into taking appropriate actions other than avoidance, perhaps.

E. Controlling Source Credibility

Audiences will react to themes and appeals that culminate in action demands only if they believe them to be reflective of what they perceive to be reality. The one principal way we can judge a new "reality" from what previously may have been an unknown is to take the measure of the source of the "new" information.

We believe information about risks and benefits as much on the basis of who is making the claims as we do on the substance of the claims themselves.

And we consider sources to be credible or not on the bases of how we judge them to be simultaneously:

1. Experts on the topic.
2. Trustworthy in that they accept and defend the validity of their own assertions.
3. Attractive to and empathetic with us.

For these reasons we are most apt to consider familiar sources that are similar to ourselves as credible rather than unfamiliar "outside" experts and "authorities."

F. Controlling Risk Perceptions

From a very important perspective, a challenging task before the crime prevention communicator is to attempt to create congruence between targets' subjective estimates of the risks of being victimized and the actual risks that obtain in various situations—calculated, more or less, as reliable "objective" measures.

For the college-educated cosmopolitan minority of targets who are trained to deal with abstract "risk probabilities," actuarial evidence in mathematical statistical terms may be sufficient. For the majority of Americans in any target group who lack such education, the presentation of such actuarial evidence may only be confusing and uncertainty-provoking.

As illustration consider the following:

The older most of us become, the more "careful" we become; the fewer the risk-taking behaviors we engage in; and the greater the avoidance actions we take. The faithful among us often depend on "Pate" or on the "Divine" to intervene and reduce many dangers, threats and risks—a task that the institutional system seemingly is unable to accomplish.

Clearly, communicators will have a tough job on their hands in trying to convince many publics who believe quite seriously that luck and Divine intervention will keep them secure; convince them that, in fact, they may be in considerable danger...danger that requires "rational human" intervention if it is to be avoided, diminished or eliminated.

Perhaps information given in forms other than sheer exposition—forms that are narrative, dramatic, or even humorous—might be important to pursue for such targets. McGruff is an excellent example of the ability of these non-expository formats to reach less well-educated, unsophisticated sub-populations.
VI. SOME GUIDELINES FOR FORMULATING RISK/BENEFITS MESSAGES

Overall, eight principles relating to the interactions that may occur between beliefs about vulnerability and benefits emerge from both the primary and secondary studies undertaken at the University of Denver. These principles can serve as important frameworks for developing theme and appeal control strategies for future media efforts on behalf of crime prevention.

1. Most people who neither have experienced victimization nor who harbor undue concerns about the possibility of victimization are motivated to underestimate their chances of becoming victims of crime.

Consequently, one objective the communicator must pursue is to raise the estimates of risk among those who may deny they in fact are in danger. Before attempting to raise risk perceptions, however, the communicator must be certain that targets understand the concept of risk to begin with.

2. If a crime threat is perceived to be zero, the tendency to comply with a recommended crime prevention action will be zero. Again, the problem here is to form realistic risk beliefs among (1) the unaware, (2) the misperceivers, and (3) the misbelievers. A word of caution: One must be extremely careful in generating realistic risk beliefs among targets who do not have them. If it is done too gently, no one will pay much attention to such messages. If it is done with too heavy a hand, as in using raw high fear appeals from low credibility sources, such messages are likely to generate avoidance, anxiety or immobility more often than impelling appropriate action as in Principle 4 below.

3. If a benefit is perceived to be zero, the tendency to comply with a recommended action will be zero. Unless the communicator can spell out with greatest specificity exactly what benefits will actually accrue to targets from according to a particular crime prevention action suggestion, the skeptical, the unconcerned or the non-informed targets will give that recommendation a zero rating, and they will tend subsequently to ignore the action recommendation. Furthermore, if targets are skeptical about the law enforcement/criminal justice system's ability to actually help them (or if they do not know much about the law enforcement/criminal justice system) no amount of simplistic urgings will move them. Here the prime objective is more didactic than persuasive. First, targets ought to know how the criminal justice/law enforcement systems work (as well as about its dysfunctions). Second, targets must be given reasons to believe in the ability of the system actually to help to prevent or reduce victimization threats as perceived by targets.

4. If perceptions of threat are substantially greater than the perceived benefits, the tendency to comply with a recommended action will be zero. Here, the task for the communicator is to attempt to allay realistic anxieties as much as possible by trying to overcome misbeliefs and misperceptions—if and where such exist. In cases where in reality "benefits" from certain recommended actions are either vague or obtuse (e.g., How will "C.O.P.ing" personal property reduce or eliminate the threat of burglary?) or else they are in substantive contention (e.g., the continuing debate among professionals about the efficacy of individual versus societal responsibility for crime prevention), the thoughtful communicator probably should either hold off until consensus regarding actual and true benefits emerges, or else the responsible communicator should inform publics about the issues involved, and possibly recommend putting off taking certain actions until the issues regarding their efficacy are finally resolved. Another possibility open to the communicator is to offer secondary psychological "measures" that accrue to targets from acceding to a particular action suggestion, the skeptical, the unconcerned or the non-informed targets will give that recommendation a zero rating, and they will tend subsequently to ignore the action recommendation. Furthermore, if targets are skeptical about the law enforcement/criminal justice system's ability to actually help them (or if they do not know much about the law enforcement/criminal justice system) no amount of simplistic urgings will move them. Here the prime objective is more didactic than persuasive. First, targets ought to know how the criminal justice/law enforcement systems work (as well as about its dysfunctions). Second, targets must be given reasons to believe in the ability of the system actually to help to prevent or reduce victimization threats as perceived by targets.

5. The tendency to comply with a recommended action will be strongest among individuals who believe themselves to be at maximal risk and who simultaneously believe strongly in the benefits to be derived from a multitude of actions are more hypothetical than substantive. Communications that either hide this truth or ignore it not only deny their targets the information they need to make meaningful decisions about their own lives, but such communications become part of and help to sustain the quackery of irresponsible propagandizers for "benefits" that either do not exist or cannot possibly be delivered.

6. Unless a given recommended action is perceived as a truly effective means for preventing or solving a perceived problem or difficulty, it will not produce compliance... even among those who believe in the efficacy of individualized protective actions. Here the communicator must be able to guarantee that the particular actions advocated will result in the benefits promised for the large majority of persons intending to take the prescribed actions. If the communicator cannot offer such explicit assurance, no others
than the message recipient may receive psychological gratification should be made or implied regarding benefits to be derived from the actions prescribed.

7. Even if an advocated action is perceived by audiences as being potentially efficacious and beneficial, it will not be complied with automatically; particularly if at the same time the action is perceived to be either inconvenient, negatively consequential, expensive, unpleasant, embarrassing, complicated, unavailable, upsetting, or as requiring high frequencies of repetition over time. In other words, even where targets may believe in the efficacy of a given action, they may not intend to take the advocated action for a variety of reasons other than their intellectual acceptance of the recommendation as an idea. In these situations communicators might very well aim their messages at community officials to eliminate as many structural/situational barriers to compliance as possible (e.g., increase police "visibility"); or to decrease the cost and complexity of an advocated action prior to recommending those actions to individuals who comprise the "public.

8. Intellectual information, while often necessary, is frequently not sufficient to the development of crime prevention beliefs that can impel compliance or even intent to comply. Consequently, people who are unconcerned about a particular aspect of their security to begin with are least likely (1) to attend to communications relating to that aspect of self-protection or (2) to believe in the efficacy of recommended actions, should their exposure to such material occur either by accident or through some form of coercion which may result in their finding themselves members of a "captive" audience.

VII. CONTROLLING ACTION DEMANDS

In those communications circumstances where control is diminished by structural/situational restraints, the temptation is to toss out a veritable smorgasbord of action demands in the hope that someone "out there" may be persuaded to partake of some of the fare. In such circumstances, unspecified publics are presented with "menus" that offer a variety of "hints" and "tips" (the McGruff information booklet contains no less than 60 different tips and hints--each requiring a specific action) from which persons may choose something to their liking.

What usually happens in these situations is that audiences who may be interested in specific information that is tailored to their particular experiences, needs, and interests are "turned off" by what they perceive to be a veritable barrage of irrelevancies. Rarely will they make the effort to uncover the one tidbit that might interest them.

Controlling action demands involves paring down the total array of possible things one would like to see people do in order to protect themselves to a manageable few--those with the highest prospects for success.

Communicators can cut down on the numbers of actions they are promoting by not focusing on actions that are already engaged in by majorities of the public; by not focusing on actions that are questionable in regard to the primary "benefits" they produce; by not focusing on person-protection actions that require mental alertness and physical skills which cannot be acquired simply by reading a pamphlet or watching a PSA; and by not recommending infeasible actions that are complex and difficult to undertake, for example such as suggesting to elderly individuals who reside in what they consider to be dangerous locales to "form" crime control patrols with their suspicious-acting "neighbors.""}

In crime prevention, messages designed for the great majority of persons who have not experienced victimization plus the minority who have, the total number of voluntary actions that can be demanded with some hope of success are surprisingly few in number--no more than five:

1. Sustain positive behavior (e.g. Continue locking the entry doors);
2. Cease or diminish negative, or at-risk, behavior (e.g. Don't leave the car keys in the ignition when leaving the vehicle);
3. Take precautionary measures (e.g. Install a dead bolt lock; "I.D." your personal property);
4. Adopt or increase precautionary behavior in suspicious or unsafe environments (e.g. Keep an eye on your neighbor's residence; contact the police when you notice suspicious persons or behaviors);
5. Avoid unsafe environments (e.g., Don't go out alone in suspicious locales; drive instead of walking in dangerous areas).

The determination of which action-demands shall be given high, low and no priority goes hand-in-hand with the delineation of specifically identified targets to whom the demands will be addressed. Target delineation, it has been pointed out, is not at all a simple process of arbitrarily selecting potential audiences a priori on the bases of just their ages, sex, or incomes.

One way for communication planners to begin systematic control procedures in regard to their public communications is literally to write down the specifics for each action demand they wish to promulgate well before they decide to shotgun all the demands they can possibly conjure up out to an unspecified public. Obviously, the demands that best "fit in" with target orientations to action as well as with policy priorities are the ones that ought to be pushed forward, while those not "fitting in" ought to be laid aside or abandoned altogether.

The outline suggested looks something like this:

1. Content of action demand explicitly stated.
   a. How complex is it?
   b. How costly is it?
   c. How much of what kind of skills and resources does target need in order to comply?
   d. How often does the action need to be repeated to be effective?
   e. Is the action mostly concerned with person protection or with property protection?

2. Benefits to compliers explicitly stated.
   a. What actual benefits are compliers to experience?
      1) Primary benefits (e.g., reduction in theft insurance premiums).
      2) Secondary benefits (e.g., feeling assured that "something" is being done to prevent crime).
   b. How long will it take for compliers to experience the benefits promised?
   c. What explicit assurances can be offered to message recipients that compliance will indeed result in either the reduction or elimination of the threat of victimization?

3. "Costs" to compliers explicitly stated.
   a. Money costs.
   b. Time costs.

4. Detailed target description explicitly stated in terms of
   a. Demographic attributes.
   b. Crime related experiences, concerns, beliefs as well as in terms of its past and current protective action orientations and behaviors.
   c. Media orientations, behaviors and habits.

5. Priority for making demand vis-a-vis policy and vis-a-vis potentiality for successful compliance by target.
   a. High
   b. Moderate
   c. Low

Once the action-demands/target priorities are determined, the planner can move into the development of a four-tiered message strategy that is (1) information-oriented, (2) reinforcement-oriented, (3) belief-motivation oriented, and (4) action-oriented.

The sole purpose of "information" is to enlighten by virtue of its ability to reduce uncertainty. Its purpose principally is not to affect behavior. The data from the University of Denver studies demonstrate the relative impotence of "information" alone in influencing crime prevention behavior.

Still, we note that "information" is the only tool that public communications practitioners have to work with. But it is erroneous to assume that intellectual information is the only available tool here.

In addition to intellectual information, targets require risk estimation information; reassurance information; concrete "benefits" vs. "costs" information; and above all, instrumental information which spells out in very specific detail precisely what is being demanded from the target along with the specific steps the target must take in order to (1) carry out the demands to the letter, and (2) to experience the exact net benefits that compliance will produce.

The range of "information" messages that can possibly be useful here is quite limited. There are no more than eight.
1. Exposition of the "at risk" concept, including data on victimization and its causes.
2. Placement of target on a specific risk point on the continuum with exposition regarding consequence expectancies. (How likely is target to be victimized?)
3. Exposition regarding synergistic interactions between negative behaviors and high risk environments. (How likely is not taking protection actions in dangerous locales to result in victimization?)
4. Exposition regarding efficacy of the crime prevention system.
5. Exposition regarding the efficacy of individualized protective actions.
6. Information regarding sources of help other than the police, and how to gain access to them.
7. Proofs for claims.
8. Exposition regarding rationalization, delay and denial mechanisms that serve to inhibit compliance to the detriment of the target.

Additionally, there is just one primary "benefit" that crime prevention message targets must be "informed" about; namely that compliance with the advocated action will indeed result in either the reduction or elimination of a specific crime threat or danger.

All too often, in their zeal to "change attitudes and behavior," purposive public communications practitioners simply forget to reinforce the "good guy" majorities that already are practicing advocated actions. They forget to "stroke" the individuals who practice positive behaviors with "well-done," "thanks" and "keep up the good work" messages—messages that can serve two very important functions. One is creating a favorable climate in which positive action-takers are encouraged to continue to behave in an approved fashion. The other being the setting of "examples" vis-a-vis "recognition" (i.e., social reward) that is accorded to persons who do indeed comply with ameliorative demands.

Perhaps the most important finding from the University of Denver research is that, by virtue of their general disinterest in crime prevention or their lack of self-confidence, large numbers of Americans appear to be unprepared to take many of the protective actions that are being advocated in efforts like McGruff.

In the specific we have noted a considerable skepticism about the efficacy of individualized protective action-taking and that beliefs about the ability of such behaviors to actually reduce crime have a powerful influence on protective action-taking; on membership in informal community protection organizations; and on individuals' beliefs regarding their own personal competence to prevent crimes.

Similarly, we have noted strong relationships between interest in crime prevention and being (and keeping) informed about it; joining in with formal community groups; and taking (property) protective actions.

The data on public reactions to the initial McGruff campaign suggest that perhaps it has been premature to launch action-demands campaigns on behalf of crime prevention without first building up a very solid "climate for acceptance." That is to say, people who have little interest in crime prevention are not likely to respond enthusiastically to messages urging them to take a wide array of crime prevention actions. Interest generally precedes action. In a similar vein, we cannot expect individuals to take recommended crime prevention actions if they do not believe (1) that they can actually carry out those actions or (2) that such actions will actually reduce or eliminate the threat of victimization.

There is much work to be done, particularly in regard to strengthening public beliefs in the efficacy of individualized protective action-taking to begin with. Additionally, target publics such as women, the elderly, and the residents of dangerous neighborhoods need to have their beliefs in their own competence to protect self and property strengthened. Finally, various publics' interest in crime prevention per se must be sparked to a much greater extent than heretofore.

All this requires considerable effort before we can expect large-scale success with action-demands campaigns alone. In other words, we must begin from the beginning, and start building the public's motivations to act on behalf of crime prevention instead of trying to force them to act, regardless of motivation. The time for beginning the task is now.
VIII. CONSIDERING THE COMMUNICATIONS CONSUMER

We offer one concluding observation of importance for the communications practitioner to consider: in addition to adopting the best empirically grounded strategies possible, the practitioner in crime prevention public communications needs to consider a number of consumer rights, to wit:

1. The crime prevention consumer has a right not to be insulted— not to be treated as dumb, ignorant, neglectful, irresponsible, or apathetic.

2. Consumers have a right to receive crime prevention messages that are of interest to them; that are relevant to their needs; and not to the interests and needs of the communicator.

3. Crime prevention communicators must practice truth in labeling. The consumer has the right to know which of the communicated "facts" are totally true, which are partially true, and which are mere speculations and hypotheses. He or she must be given all the evidence on which assertions of "truth" are offered.

4. The crime prevention information consumer has a right to messages that are attractively put together, that are stimulating, that are easily comprehended, and well organized so that processing of the information by individuals can be accomplished with celerity and ease.

5. Crime prevention information consumers have the right to be addressed unobtrusively. They have the right not to be shouted at, conned, hustled, ridiculed or coerced.

6. Crime prevention consumers have the right to reject all demands that require inordinate expenditures of effort, time, or money on their part. They also have the right to reject all demands upon them that are vague, obtuse, and that are infeasible.

7. Crime prevention information consumers have a right to know the specific benefits they will experience if and when they comply with prevention action demands. They have a right to know all the negatives that are involved in complying with advocated actions as well.

8. Consumers of crime prevention information have the right to reject messages that are mundane, prosaic, dull or pedantic—messages that lack imagination, appeal, and regard for their audiences.

IX. THE MCGUFF CAMPAIGN*

The National Citizens Crime Prevention Campaign is a nationwide public education program to enlist citizen action in preventing crime. The campaign underscores the fact that citizens—-together with law enforcement—can and should take action against crime.

Recent studies have confirmed that the overwhelming majority of Americans are concerned about crime. The campaign responds to this concern. It lets people know that action is possible by offering practical tips on how to reduce the risk of being victimized and by suggesting ways to make neighborhoods and communities safer.

The campaign has four major objectives:

1. To change unwarranted feelings about crime and the criminal justice system, particularly those feelings of frustration and hopelessness.

2. To generate an individual sense of responsibility among citizens.

3. To encourage citizens, working within their communities and with local law enforcement, to take collective crime prevention action.

4. To enhance existing crime prevention programs at local, state and national levels.

A. Who is Behind It?

The campaign is sponsored by the Crime Prevention Coalition—a group of 37 national non-profit membership organizations and 11 Federal agencies. The Coalition's role is to provide overall guidance to the campaign and to help promote it nationwide.

The Coalition represents a partnership of business, labor, law enforcement, government and citizen groups in a common effort to prevent crime. It includes groups such as the National Association of Attorneys General, the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Association of Counties, and the Insurance Information Institute.

The Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS) of the Department of Justice is the convenor of the Coalition, coordinates the overall effort and is the principal source of funds. Under a grant from OJARS, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) provides Secretariat services to the Coalition.

The media portion of the campaign is under the auspices of The Advertising Council, Inc., a private, non-profit organization which conducts public

*This description of The McGruff Campaign objectives, and results has been provided by Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS).
service advertising in the public interest. Other Ad Council campaigns include the American Red Cross, the United Negro College Fund, the JOBS program of the National Alliance of Businessmen, and the Smokey the Bear forest fire prevention program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. All Ad Council campaigns are non-partisan politically, non-sectarian and non-commercial.

B. Development

Initial impetus for a national campaign came from discussions beginning in late 1977 between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (under the leadership of then director Clarence Kelly) and The Advertising Council. These discussions soon expanded to include the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the AFL-CIO. LEAA (now OJARS) submitted a formal proposal to The Advertising Council in March of 1978, asking the Council to take on a major national media campaign on crime prevention. This proposal spelled out the basic strategy: high quality public service advertising complemented by a comprehensive fulfillment effort of written materials, training and technical assistance. From the outset, it was clear that advertising alone would not be enough. Increased awareness would have to be matched by assistance to translate awareness into action.

Another basic element of the strategy was that the Campaign would be a cooperative undertaking, sponsored by national organizations committed to crime prevention and wanting to participate. LEAA would provide the bulk of the funding, matched in part by funds donated by NCCD. The Advertising Council, after rigorous screening, accepted the proposal in the Fall of 1978. Over the next 12 months major effort was committed to developing campaign themes, objectives and materials. Two groups were formed to help with this process: a Response Management Group composed of representatives of such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Association of Retired Persons and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and a Technical Working Group composed of state and local crime prevention practitioners. In addition, the volunteer advertising agency conducted field research.

The campaign was officially launched in early 1980, with the release of the first phase of public service advertising. The centerpiece of the campaign is a nationwide, multi-media effort that features a trench-coated animated dog named McGruff (see sample artwork in Appendix 1).

C. Funding

The campaign depends heavily on volunteer resources. All creative work is donated by the volunteer ad agency (Dancer Fitzgerald Sample). All time and space are contributed as a public service by the media. Much of the promotional effort is through the volunteer work of criminal justice professionals and citizens alike.

Federal funds have been used to pay for out-of-pocket production costs, development and distribution of booklets, and training and technical assistance support. Total annual Federal costs run about $1 million.

The study reported here was conducted during the first phase of the campaign which focused on offering audiences tips about protecting homes and property. Later phases of the campaign which, at this writing, are still underway, were designed to emphasize the importance of observing and reporting suspected criminal behavior and organizing neighborhood and local groups in support of various community crime prevention activities.
You don't know me...yet.

But you will. See, I've been assigned to help you learn how to protect yourself against crime.

You'll be seeing a lot of me, but in the meantime, write to: Crime Prevention Coalition, Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland 20850.

Find out what you can do to protect yourself and your neighbors. That'll help.

TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

The Advertising Council, Inc.
CRIME PREVENTION CAMPAIGN
NEWSPAPER AD NO. CP-79-004(A)—3 COL.

CAMPAIGN ART SAMPLE
END