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

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MINNESOTA

CRIME CONTROL PLANNING BOARD

82318

EVALUATION
of the
MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION DEMONSTRATION
- Summary

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RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT REPORT

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An Evaluation Report

Produced by the

RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT

of the

Crime Control Planning Board

444 Lafayette Road

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SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

The Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention (CCP) program was spawned from the belief that a criminal act requires a combination of criminal motivation and opportunity. If one can reduce the number of opportunities, then one may be able to reduce crime or at least greatly increase the risk of apprehension. The general methods used to reduce the number of opportunities consist of: 1) knowing and interacting with your neighbors so that they may recognize suspicious activity which might signify some crime occurring on your property, 2) securing one's home and property, and 3) as a result of the first two actions, feeling less apprehension about one's neighborhood and moving about it more freely and frequently.

As one might guess, this approach is limited in the types of crimes it may prevent. Obviously, its impact would be minimal addressing so-called "crimes of passion" between acquaintances, e.g., homicide. However, it does hold promise for opportunistic stranger-to-stranger crimes such as burglary, robbery, or vandalism. Its secondary impact may be upon such crimes as stranger-to-stranger assault or rape. Since crime prevention is directed toward certain types of crimes, the implication seems clear that it has not been assumed to replace traditional police efforts. In fact, it has been expressed as a cooperative effort to control crime. Its advantages seem worthy: it attempts to prevent crime

rather than react to it; it shifts the initiative away from the offender and directs it toward the environment in which the act occurs (e.g., by securing one's home, etc., one may force the offender to take greater risks--increasing the risk of apprehension); and CCP also facilitates informal social processes by improving the quality of life, reducing fear of crime, and fostering productive neighborhood groups.

B. THE MINNEAPOLIS DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

The demonstration project encompassed three distinct neighborhoods within the city of Minneapolis. The criteria used to select the sites emphasized their similarities: mixture of land use, a substantial level of crime (though not extreme), and existent neighborhood organizations. Although the neighborhoods had these factors in common, they are very different from one another in other aspects. For example: Willard-Homewood (in north Minneapolis) has a minority population that encompasses 46 percent of the total residents compared to less than 1 percent for the other two areas; in Hawthorne (also in north Minneapolis), residents move less often than in the other two neighborhoods; and in Lowry Hill East (in south Minneapolis), 83 percent of the residents rent the residential units they occupy compared to 62 percent in Hawthorne and 36 percent in Willard-Homewood.

Quite generally, what the CCP program set about to accomplish was to reduce crime and to reduce the fear associated with crime by: 1) increasing the involvement of residents in mutual concerns; 2) improving home and property security of the neighborhood residents; 3) creating physical changes to some areas of the neighborhoods which would reduce the opportunity for crime; 4) raising the general level of resident

awareness concerning crime prevention techniques; and 5) improving police-community relations. This plan was to be accomplished during the course of conducting informational meetings at the block level and of assisting residents in forming block clubs. Hopefully, block clubs were to establish a level of block cooperation and vigilance which was termed Neighborhood Watch. The police also offered free premise security surveys which informed residents of home security weaknesses. If people wished to make these recommended changes, a special subsidy program was available to assist in defraying costs. Engraving property with an Operation Identification number was also encouraged.

1. Administrative Structure

The Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention program was administratively located in the City Coordinator's office. Project staff were divided into two roles: central office staff and neighborhood staff. Central office staff consisted of the demonstration manager, an architect, a planner, a graphics specialist, and clerical staff. The responsibilities of staff members located in the central office were to perform planning activities for various segments of the project, establish (to some degree) priorities for overall project activities, develop materials to be used in neighborhood presentations, monitor neighborhood staff activity, act as liaison to other agencies and offices, and perform administrative duties for the project.

The neighborhood staff had responsibility for the actual delivery of the program in all its various forms. In each neighborhood there was a neighborhood coordinator and one or more organizers (the size of each staff was proportional to the population of the neighborhood). Each neighborhood also had the services of a police officer to supervise

those aspects of the program which provide a common linkage with the police department. Since Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood were located within the same police precinct, they shared the services of a single officer.

By design, the project was set up to provide some autonomy to the neighborhood staffs but still centralize certain administrative functions. Initial responsibility for organizing each neighborhood belonged to the neighborhood coordinator; it was his/her duty to see that blocks were organized in an appropriate and timely manner. The demonstration manager was to assume overall responsibility for task completion within the neighborhoods and address situations or developments which cut across neighborhoods.

2. Implementation Strategy

As mentioned previously, the CCP program addressed five topical areas: 1) increased resident involvement, 2) home and property security, 3) physical changes to the neighborhood, 4) increased resident awareness of crime prevention techniques, and 5) improvement of police-community relations. The first category subsumed quite a number of activities, but the main effort was directed toward organizing block clubs. The block clubs were to be vehicles by which the crime prevention message was to be disseminated. They were in fact the cornerstone upon which the program was built. Neighborhood staff members would canvass each block of the neighborhood telling people of the program and asking each resident to attend a CCP meeting.

During the block meeting, the neighborhood organizer would present an overview of the program in an attempt to interpret the scope of the

program and its goals. Each of the program components was explained, and participants were then informed as to how each segment could contribute to the overall goals of reducing crime and its associated fear. Typically, the presentation would cover locks and home security, Operation I.D., premise security surveys (these home security checks were conducted free of charge by the Minneapolis Police Department), home security subsidy, and the basic concept behind Neighborhood Watch.

The second meeting usually included discussions of block club continuation, more on Neighborhood Watch, and a visit by local police officers. The focus of block club continuance was upon the potential clout the block club could utilize in solving neighborhood problems. Residents were also given a packet of materials which included a block map with names, addresses, and telephone numbers of residents who wished to participate in Neighborhood Watch. Other materials presented basic information on home security, proper means of identifying and recalling characteristics of suspicious persons, and a listing of telephone numbers of resources to assist in solving neighborhood problems. The police officers were available to answer residents' questions and to address their local concerns about police activity. More importantly, however, this meeting allowed residents and officers to interact in a nonthreatening and noncrisis situation.

Beyond merely organizing block clubs, some attempts were undertaken to form viable business associations for the commercial establishments in two of the demonstration neighborhoods. The general assumption was that through the business associations, the proprietors would learn about better security and become more actively involved with the community and each other. This in turn would induce the business people to remain in

the community and would prevent the gradual deterioration which develops as commercial property is vacated.

The citizenry was further involved in the operation of the program through Crime Prevention Action Councils (CPAC). Each neighborhood formed a CPAC to assist the staff with the establishment of program priorities for each neighborhood and to act as an advisory body. The composition of the CPAC was to be representative of neighborhood interests; i.e., members included residents, local proprietors, housing inspectors, representatives from community organizations, area landlords, and other interested persons.

As mentioned previously, premise security surveys consisted of home security inspections conducted by Minneapolis police officers. An officer would systematically examine a home and identify areas susceptible to entry by a burglar. The homeowner received a form identifying specific weaknesses and offering recommendations for improvement. A subsidy program was available to the homeowner to help defray the expenses of strengthening security. The subsidy would pay for one-half of the cost up to a maximum of $100. The names of two licensed locksmiths who had been secured through the city's bidding procedure were provided to residents. The city or the locksmith absorbed the cost, so that the residents did not have to wait for reimbursement. In addition, Operation I.D. engravers and stickers were distributed for use by block club members. The CCP program also had planned to make a sincere effort toward sensitizing absentee landlords concerning neighborhood problems, especially security problems of their rented property.

By and large the most ambitious plans for this demonstration project

were the environmental design changes. These included changing alleyway access routes, adding brighter lights for pedestrians, and erecting traffic diverters.

While most efforts at increasing residents' awareness of crime prevention techniques occurred in the block club setting, additional efforts were expended to enlarge the audience. In each neighborhood, the staff developed alternate methods of delivering the crime prevention message. This took a variety of forms but most often involved flyers, crime prevention newsletters, articles for community and city newspapers, radio spots, community meetings, and neighborhood festivals.

The final area in which the program undertook to produce some change was in police-community relations. The program staff felt it was important to strengthen the link between local officers and the residents involved in the program. The hope was to instill a sense of teamwork and respect between these two groups which would break down any barriers preventing mutual participation in the program. The means to accomplish this objective was to have officers attend block club meetings and conduct premise security surveys. The informal interaction provided by these two settings was determined by the staff to be the most appropriate method of bringing the police and citizens together.

C. EVALUATION STRATEGY

The object of the evaluation effort was to examine the project from the standpoint of both process and impact. The purpose of the process evaluation was to examine the structure and functions within a program and to relate them to the activities and accomplishments which signified project outcomes (impact). The evaluation strategy was operationalized

by closely observing the activities involved with implementing the program. This required attendance at block club and community meetings as well as many discussions with staff members. In conjunction with the foregoing, the evaluation team members conducted interviews with residents on their involvement, sponsored surveys which solicited citizen reaction to the CCP program and crime problems, and collected crime data for the during-project period to be compared to baseline 1975 fiscal year data. Crimes included in this collection were: residential and commercial burglary, commercial and personal robbery, vandalism, assault, and criminal sexual conduct.

The method used to measure change in crime rates was to select census tracts from within Minneapolis as experimental comparisons for the demonstration neighborhoods. Using demographic and crime characteristics, each of the three neighborhoods was matched with a noncontiguous census tract. In addition, crimes occurring within the ring of census tracts that surrounded each of the demonstration neighborhoods were closely examined to determine if the program had the effect of displacing or moving criminal activity beyond the demonstration neighborhood's boundaries.

D. EVALUATION FINDINGS

1. Increased Resident Involvement

By far, the greatest proportion of neighborhood staff time was spent in organizing and conducting block club meetings. Two approaches to these organizing activities were used in the neighborhoods. The first, which shall be termed single purpose, embodied a highly focused effort with its first concern being the organization of block clubs for crime

prevention. Only after presenting the complete information about crime prevention did organizers address other issues concerning residents and the neighborhood. In the second approach, termed multiple purpose, neighborhood issues quite frequently were addressed prior to, or in conjunction with, presentations of the crime prevention information. This meant that organizers using the single-purpose strategy completed organizing a block in two meetings. Organizers using the multiple-purpose approach, since they were not able to present information as concisely, had a tendency to require more meetings. The two approaches were not an experiment intended in the original project plan, rather they were two methods which developed from the working styles of the neighborhood organizers. In fact, the official project format called for only two meetings per block (single purpose). There appear to be no differences in longevity between block clubs organized under the two different methods, but the multiple-purpose strategy requires greater expenditure of staff time per block club.

Neighborhood organizers contacted residents on 100 percent of the blocks in Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East. In Willard-Homewood, 90 percent of all blocks were contacted. The form of this contact was either verbal exchange, flyers, and/or mailings. At least one block club meeting was held on 97 percent (35 blocks) of the blocks in Lowry Hill East, 92 percent (33 blocks) of the blocks in Hawthorne, and 48 percent (49 blocks) of the blocks in Willard-Homewood. Lowry Hill East had an average of 11.5 people attending each crime prevention meeting; this resulted in 10.8 percent of the adult population attending at least one meeting. The average attendance for Hawthorne was 5.0 persons which is 5.6 percent of the adult population. In Willard-Homewood, the average attendance at

a block club meeting was 6.2 persons which represents approximately 7.5 percent of the adult population in that neighborhood.

Thirty-five blocks in Lowry Hill East (97 percent) completed the program by participating in Neighborhood Watch (participating in Neighborhood Watch implies *all* crime prevention information was delivered). For Hawthorne, 21 blocks (58 percent) officially joined Neighborhood Watch, while 10 blocks (10 percent) became involved in the Willard-Homewood neighborhood. Did residents continue meeting and maintain neighborhood vigilance once the organizers finished their meeting? Follow-up information from a random sample of block club participants (97 persons) indicated that 56 percent of the respondents in Lowry Hill East said their block club would be meeting or had met on its own, that is, after the crime prevention staff person ceased efforts at organizing their block. Of the respondents from Hawthorne, 27 percent answered in the same manner as did 46 percent of the respondents from Willard-Homewood.

Generally, block club participants felt that they had become more familiar with other block residents and that this was an important aspect of the program. There was overwhelming support (90 percent of respondents) for the notion that Neighborhood Watch could be effective in preventing burglaries. However, most respondents felt that "knowing more neighbors" was the major change brought about by this program; they did not often mention less burglary or less fear of crime even though these choices were available to them in the survey.

The efforts at involving community representatives in project direction through the Crime Prevention Action Councils met with mixed

results. Each CPAC became involved in a different way depending upon the predisposition of the neighborhood coordinator. In general, the CPAC's were ineffective in undertaking any leadership or advisory role as was originally intended. The exception was Lowry Hill East where the council worked reasonably well with the coordinator and made decisions affecting the direction and operation of the program within the neighborhood.

Just as with the CPAC, Lowry Hill East was the only neighborhood to reach the business community effectively. Proprietors of neighborhood shops were informed about the program and were assisted by staff in forming two viable business associations. These associations served as forums for discussions of crime problems as well as other topics of mutual interest to the business community. In a number of instances, they provided means by which community members could voice their viewpoints to area proprietors.

2. Home Security

One of the best received services of the program was the premise security survey conducted by an officer of the police department. While residents liked the idea of the home security inspection, operation of this concept was plagued by delays from the start of the program. The proposed plan of paying for police overtime to conduct the surveys was rejected as a violation of LEAA funding guidelines. In Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne, there were the additional problems of manpower and scheduling of surveys. Toward the close of the project year, most problems had been resolved, and lengthy delays between request and completion of the survey had been eliminated.

A total of 266 premise security surveys were conducted during the demonstration year. Of this total number, 147 residents were queried to determine their reaction to this aspect of the program. Data from this survey indicate that only 13 percent of respondents had been victims of burglary, theft, or an act of vandalism within the last year. Most of the recommendations made by officers were related to improving the security of windows and doors (98 percent). Over 57 percent of the recipients had implemented at least some of the recommended changes by the time of the survey. Of those who made changes, 64 percent reported that they would have done so even if the subsidy were not available. Most of these respondents stated they were aware of the security deficiencies prior to the survey (72 percent). However, of those that made changes, 75 percent felt more confident concerning their home security. Finally, very few individuals made use of the subsidy program. Only 51 awards were made; with an average payout of $48.42 per award.

Operation Identification received a substantial amount of emphasis from staff during block club meetings. Over the course of the project, 336 new people were enrolled in the Operation I.D. program. Data from the premise security survey follow-up indicate that 85 percent of the Hawthorne residents who received a premise security survey also engraved their property with Operation I.D. numbers. In Lowry Hill East, 76 percent and in Willard-Homewood, 61 percent of those having a premise security survey also used Operation I.D. Nonetheless, the unique individuals participating in either of these security aspects of the CCP program were few in comparison to each neighborhood's total population.

3. Physical Changes to the Neighborhood

The impressive environmental changes intended for this project were

never brought to fruition. Some minor changes occurred such as neighborhood cleanup drives and altering an alleyway in Willard-Homewood, but the real focus of the project staff--the traffic diverters--remained undone. Quite simply, the plans for the diverters were not set in motion early enough to have been carried out within the demonstration year.

4. Increased Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques

So much of everything attempted by the neighborhood staffs touched on this area that it is difficult to present specific results of project activities. Though many project materials were delayed, they were well prepared and provided useful insights to the public. Community meetings and festivals were held to publicize the program and address the issues which the program sought to affect. The dissemination methods used offered timely and reasonable coverage. However, judging from the number of households participating in the various aspects of the program, the effect of the overall diffusion of crime prevention education into the community must be considered small.

5. Improvement of Police-Community Relations

Police officers usually interacted with community members through block club meetings and premise security surveys. A total of 266 residential premise security surveys were conducted during this demonstration project while an additional 33 surveys were performed for business establishments. Officers attended a total of 31 block club meetings in Lowry Hill East, 14 meetings in Hawthorne, and 11 meetings in Willard-Homewood.

Results of a survey administered in 1976 and again toward the end of the project provide most information concerning community perceptions

of the police. In Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East, there was a consistent rise in positive attitudes toward the police; however, in Willard-Homewood, the tendency was to rate the police less favorably. Nonetheless, during block club meetings attended by the evaluators, residents expressed very positive attitudes concerning their conversations with the police officers. Residents and officers consistently expressed a new-found sense of respect gained through this interaction.

6. Project Management

Start-up inefficiencies plagued the first few months of the project. Besides the problems caused by misinterpretation of LEAA guidelines relating to payment of police overtime and the materials delay, two other problems occurred: the original demonstration manager resigned toward the end of the second month with the project architect replacing him as manager; and the lengthy procedures necessary to secure office space (and supplies, i.e., telephones, etc.) within each neighborhood caused the local staffs delays in initial organizing.

This project also suffered from the disharmony created by a series of conflicts between the demonstration manager and some of his field staff. These conflicts were sometimes related to specific procedural disagreements and other times dealt with personality conflicts. Both types of conflicts, however, were aggravated by poor communication. One of the procedural problems involved the method of organizing used by the northside offices.

For the purposes of this report, the evaluators identified two organizing concepts: the single-purpose strategy, and the multiple-purpose strategy (refer to Section D, pages 8-9, for explanations of these terms).

The demonstration manager instituted a formal system of block club organizing which supported the single-purpose strategy while the northside coordinators insisted the strategy they had been using (the multiple-purpose strategy) was the appropriate method for their area. The multiple-purpose strategy created a less efficient means of organizing blocks since more meetings were held per block, yet the coordinators felt the enhanced quality of the meetings justified this loss of efficiency. No data exist to support this assertion, however. Data were available concerning the extent of block club organizing and, indeed, the northside areas had lower organizing levels than the southside area which implemented the single-purpose strategy. The manager's intent by instituting this formal system was to provide assistance and to increase efficiency, but some staff interpreted this action as a rejection of their expertise, a lack of understanding of the concepts of community organizing, and an attempt to restrict their latitude in presenting the program to the neighborhoods.

This failure in communication was heightened when the manager devised a means of monitoring staff activities and identifying inefficiencies. The staff perceived the record-keeping duties imposed by this system as an inconvenience rather than a management tool. Eventually the demonstration manager grew frustrated with the individuals who were most resistant to his program decisions and tried unsuccessfully to secure their resignations. Failing in this attempt, he simply withdrew from the conflict and allowed them to go about their business as they wished. The result was that during the last half of the project year, there was little active positive leadership shown toward the two northside offices.

The northside field staff quite frequently felt ignored. They reported that the demonstration manager seldom initiated contacts with their offices, and he appeared quite unconcerned about their welfare. Their reaction to this situation did not facilitate accomplishment of program objectives in any positive manner. One of the northside coordinator's attention seemed to be distracted to other activities which were of uncertain applicability to block club organizing. Time was spent contemplating organizing strategies which were never committed to paper or implemented. One of the manifestations of this working style was the assumption of some duties by the WIPOG director which could have been considered part of the coordinator's responsibilities.[1] For example, the weekly staff meetings were essentially under the guidance of the WIPOG director (block club meeting assignments, as well as other matters, were decided upon in the weekly meetings). The situation was no less perplexing in the other northside office. The coordinator wished to act decisively and efficiently in completing neighborhood organizing. However, she needed (as well as desired) some degree of direction from the demonstration manager. Many times the evaluator observed her seeking clarification about methods used in organizing the neighborhood and in managing the office. What was puzzling was that her actions did not always correspond to the advice she received. It was as if she had a different opinion than the manager's and tried to follow his, as well as her own, advice for action. Many times the result was that the course of action she undertook had its own set of

[1]WIPOG (Willard Increasing Pride On the Go) is a publically funded, educational organization which contracted 40 hours of its staff's time to CCP organizing. This organization is an integral part of the neighborhood and has been organizing block clubs since 1972, thus it seemed appropriate to include this organization in the CCP project.

built-in inefficiencies which reflected her uncertainty. For example, she expressed the desire to follow the two-meeting format but many times conducted more than two meetings on a block.

Both the manager and these coordinators apparently employed whatever political leverage was possible to rally support for their individual interpretations of what was best for the project. The amount of influence wielded by the northside coordinators outweighed that held by the demonstration manager in some instances; this forced him to act against his own desires. The evaluators feel that the CCP program suffered in these two areas because of these procedural and interpersonal conflicts. Conflicts arose in the third neighborhood in south Minneapolis also, but the coordinator of that area and the manager were able to resolve the problems effectively.

7. Impact upon Crime

Seven crime types were monitored during the project to test for program impact: residential and commercial burglary, personal and commercial robbery, vandalism, assault, and criminal sexual conduct. Data were collected for the during-project period (July 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978--excluding June, 1978, because of time constraints) and compared to preproject data (July 1, 1974, through May 31, 1975).[1] The selected baseline year was 1975 because data for that year were available to select control areas. Crime data analyses were accomplished using both descriptive and statistical techniques.

[1]Douglas W. Frisbie et al., *Crime in Minneapolis: Proposal for Prevention* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, May, 1977).

The results provide no clear-cut answer to questions about program impact upon crime; although there were no consistent trends within or across the three demonstration sites, the evaluators believe the period of actual project operation was too brief to expect any consistent changes. Crime in Lowry Hill East declined in all crime categories except vandalism and criminal sexual conduct: *the overall decline was 17 percent*. Lowry Hill East's control tract (census tract 93) showed an increase in all categories except personal robbery. The area chosen to measure displacement of crime showed even more discrepant data--three crime types decreased while the remaining four increased over the period of measurement.

The statistical tests applied to the data revealed that crime decreased significantly more in Lowry Hill East as compared to its control area for personal and commercial robbery. Crime also decreased significantly more as compared to the displacement area for commercial burglary. Although these three crime types revealed statistically significant decreases over time for at least one of the control areas (none of them showed significance over both control areas simultaneously), they did *not* meet additional assumptions required of the statistical tests which would have indicated program impact upon crime. Nonetheless, this neighborhood displayed the most consistent decrease in crime of the three areas even though only three of the changes in crime rates were significantly lower.

In Hawthorne, only the crimes of residential burglary, personal robbery, and vandalism decreased: *an overall decrease of less than 2 percent*. In the control area, all crimes except assault and criminal sexual conduct decreased. All crimes except vandalism and criminal

sexual conduct decreased in the displacement area. There were no statistically significant differences in crime rate changes between Hawthorne and the two areas used for comparison.

Crime in Willard-Homewood *increased* with the exception of commercial burglary and commercial robbery: *the overall increase in crime was over 31 percent*. In the control area, all crimes increased except personal and commercial robbery. Crime in the displacement area decreased except for vandalism and criminal sexual conduct. The only significant difference in crime rate change demonstrated that commercial burglary decreased significantly more in Willard-Homewood as compared to its control area.

Given the lack of consistency in crime changes, it is impossible to make blanket statements concerning the ability of the Community Crime Prevention concept to reduce crime. The most that can be said is that the results from Lowry Hill East are *suggestive* of some degree of success in that particular neighborhood while Hawthorne and Willard-Homewood results remain discrepant.

8. Impact upon the Fear of Crime

In 1976, random samples of residents from each neighborhood were interviewed concerning their attitudes toward crime and fear of crime. In 1978, the surveys were readministered to a different sample of residents. The following findings are based on answers from approximately 400 respondents of each survey.[1]

[1]Usually a sample size of about 400 would be large enough to allow one to draw inferences from findings because the distribution would rapidly approach normality. This assumption holds true in these surveys, also, except for questions dealing with victimization. Since criminal

A fundamental assumption of CCP has been that where residents have stronger bonds to one another, there should be fewer incidents of crime. If a neighborhood is to be labeled cohesive, residents must be able to recognize some of the other block residents. Hawthorne respondents reported recognizing more families in 1978 than in 1976. In the other two neighborhoods, respondents recognized fewer families than in 1976. The same pattern held true when respondents were asked how many families living on their block would extend help to them. Hawthorne 1978 respondents felt more families would help than the 1976 respondents while the opposite was true in Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East. Even though Hawthorne residents reported recognizing more families in 1978 than reported in 1976, they also reported more difficulty in recognizing strangers on their block. Lowry Hill East residents reported similarly while Willard-Homewood respondents felt it was less difficult to recognize strangers.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate the length of time they had lived in the neighborhood. All three sites showed fewer respondents in 1978 than in 1976 that had lived in their neighborhood at least one year. Perhaps the strongest indicator of cohesiveness could be the extent residents identify with a neighborhood. Feeling a part of the neighborhood seems stronger evidence of identification than considering the area only a place to live. Both the 1976 and 1978 surveys asked respondents to state whether they felt a part of the neighborhood or viewed it just as a place to live. Significant increases were found in Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood for residents who felt more a part

victimization is a relatively rare event, the number within the 400 respondents likely to report a victimization would be quite low. Thus, the victimization findings should be treated only as suggestive.

of the neighborhood in 1978 than in 1976. Hawthorne residents showed a slight decline in feeling a part of the neighborhood. Using these questions to assess neighborhood cohesiveness then, *inconsistent* findings were reported for each neighborhood.

Residents were queried as to whether they felt crime had increased, decreased, or had remained the same. There was a statistically significant increase in 1978 compared to 1976 in the number of residents who believed crime had decreased in each neighborhood.

Each of the three neighborhoods displayed statistically significant decreases in 1978 over 1976 in the number of respondents who felt that the danger of crime was enough to consider moving out of their neighborhood. Of course, crime is just one factor of many that may motivate people to move. Thirteen specific types of crimes or activities were listed to respondents, and they were asked which were considered big neighborhood problems. In 1978, 10 of the 13 crimes were considered less of a problem in Lowry Hill East, 11 were considered less of a problem in Hawthorne while in Willard-Homewood, all 13 were considered bigger problems in 1978 than in 1976.

Residents' perception of personal victimization continues to be substantially higher than police records indicate; however, in 1978 respondents' perception of the possibility of being victimized was lower than that found in 1976. Hence, although the perceived level of victimization remains disproportionately high in comparison to the rates recorded by police, the level reported in 1978 indicates a more realistic picture of crime may exist in the neighborhoods.

Respondents were asked to indicate their victimization history from

the previous year and were then queried as to whether or not each crime they listed had been reported to the police. Based on survey findings, the reporting rates for all crimes taken in total *declined* in Lowry Hill East and Hawthorne. At the same time, Willard-Homewood's reporting rate increased. Looking specifically at residential burglary, this project's target crime, all three neighborhoods showed an increase in reporting rates in 1978 compared to 1976. These data should be viewed with caution since victimization findings may not meet satisfactory confidence levels.

According to the neighborhood surveys, the number of Lowry Hill East and Willard-Homewood residents participating in Operation Identification increased significantly. Hawthorne's participation increased, also, but not significantly. However, the number of Operation I.D. requests generated through the block club meetings did not alone account for the rise indicated in the surveys. In fact, in two of the neighborhoods the discrepancy between the sample percentage increase and requests through the CCP staff was substantial. Therefore, it would seem much of this increase in Operation Identification participation cannot be attributed to the CCP program intervention.

Residents were asked what devices were in their homes to protect against intrusion. The percentage increases in various kinds of home protection were significantly larger in 5 out of the 36 possible instances in 1978 compared to 1976. An increase was noted in 10 additional instances of home protection devices although these increases were not significant. Next, residents were asked about their usage of these security devices. Data indicate that for many of the instances were addressed by the CCP program, there were increases in the use of security measures

in 1978. At times these differences were significant when contrasted with 1976 findings. Hence, the improved security behavior is not likely to have occurred by chance and may well be due to CCP project efforts.

Residents were also questioned concerning their practice of "watching" one another's homes. A *lower percentage* of respondents in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne reported making arrangements to watch one another's places while they were gone in 1978 than in 1976. Moreover, the increase in Lowry Hill East was not significant. Except perhaps for Lowry Hill East, there is no evidence from the surveys that can demonstrate program effect leading to more vigilant behavior. The decreases in Willard-Homewood and Hawthorne seem contrary to CCP organizing efforts.

Respondents were asked to rate the Minneapolis Police Department. Combining the categories of "excellent" and "good," there was a substantial and significant decline in positive attitudes since 1976 in Willard-Homewood. There were positive trends in the other neighborhoods although they were not statistically significant. Residents in the three neighborhoods were also asked how they were treated by the police when they had contact with them. Of those Hawthorne and Lowry Hill East respondents who had some contact with the police, more answered positively in 1978 than in 1976. The only decline for all positive responses was in Willard-Homewood.

Evidence has shown that there was some degree of diffusion to the community concerning crime prevention techniques. The majority of the survey findings were compatible with CCP project objectives; however, often these findings were not consistent or significant. Consistency was lacking both within neighborhoods at times and often between neighborhoods.

Hence, these results did not indicate program impact on the fear of or concern about crime.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS[1]

1. Increased Resident Involvement

a. Organizing block clubs should remain as an integral part of the community crime prevention concept. At the time of initial canvassing of a block, staff should solicit volunteer help to assist in efforts to organize the block. These volunteers should be relied upon more and more heavily as the implementation plan for that block nears completion. After conducting the required number of meetings, staff should continue to act as a resource to the residents, but should not attempt to organize additional meetings because of the time involved in pursuing that activity.

b. There will always be a certain number of block clubs in each neighborhood which will fail to meet on their own. For residents of those clubs who would wish to continue being active in their general community, the neighborhood organizer should provide information on block clubs which remain active.

c. It would be best to continue the block clubs as informal organizations. To make them more than that might merely create another layer of community organizations which compete for public attention and action.

d. Because the block club format is potentially a very effective political device, particular care must be exercised in the manner in which staff recommend block clubs become involved in the community. The potential for abuse of these block clubs by politically motivated staff is very real. Political candidates may covet access to this type of grass-roots movement in an attempt to build a system beneficial to their own aspirations. Any actions of a political nature should be initiated by the residents so that charges of political cronyism could not be leveled against any staff member. These cautions should not serve to inhibit any resident from gaining greater attention to serve his own political ambitions. They should merely serve as policy for staff to prevent them from using their positions for personal advantage.

[1]Some recommendations may seem unfounded from the context of the summary. However, in summarizing an extensive evaluation report only the most important points may be reviewed. A few recommendations were arrived at subjectively but these are identified as such. Thus the authors recommend review of the full report for those areas which seem unsubstantiated.

e. Staff leadership, at the neighborhood level, is of utmost importance for effective delivery of the CGP program. Supervision and direction should be better organized and committed to action to prevent the program from losing momentum.

f. The CPAC's should be continued and encouraged. Given the right blend of active people and an understanding of the scope of the Council, it can be an effective means of ensuring citizen input at the neighborhood level.

g. Based upon team observations, it appears the CPAC can most effectively operate at the neighborhood rather than the citywide level. Important local issues can assume highest priority rather than be forced to compete for attention with issues from other neighborhoods.

h. To prevent needless proliferation of community level organizations, the CPAC should be an organization with a predetermined life span, operating only while active organizing takes place. As the issue of crime prevention begins to diminish among block clubs, the CPAC should be disbanded.

i. Given the constraints of less than one year's data and the overall low level of block club participation, it is impossible to state with any certainty that Neighborhood Watch had any impact upon neighborhood crime. To specifically answer that question requires data over a longer period of time. During the upcoming year, crime levels should be monitored in each neighborhood to discover the contribution Neighborhood Watch may make to any reduction in crime.

j. Due to the above constraints, one must respond to the effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch on an intuitive level. Based upon a logical examination of the problem, Neighborhood Watch

could, without a doubt, be an effective deterrent. Its total impact would depend heavily upon the amount of participation within the block. It would seem that involvement of more than four or five families would be required to make the concept work. This number is pure speculation based on a concern for time and visual coverage of the full block. It would be appropriate to test this hypothesis empirically with data covering at least two years. In addition, with this type of longitudinal data, analyses could be undertaken to examine for effects of decreases in block involvement.

k. Block club members should be encouraged to commence Neighborhood Watch as quickly as possible after the first or second block club meeting. Intuitively, it seems that the more meetings held before starting Neighborhood Watch the greater the tendency for its importance to become submerged in other issues the block may choose to explore.

l. Also intuitively, block maps given to people participating in Neighborhood Watch should include information on residences located across the alley in addition to across the street. This would allow the residents to have reference to all areas around their dwellings rather than only to the front.

m. Increased attempts to involve the commercial sector of neighborhoods should be made by the CCP staff. The value of educating both the residential and commercial components of a community on the topic of CCP, as well as target hardening, should be great.

2. Home Security

a. Program staff, rather than the police liaison officer, should arrange for scheduling of premise security surveys. Having police officers schedule premise security surveys is not the best use of an officer's time because quite often it can take two or three telephone calls to contact the resident.

b. The police department should examine the feasibility of having officers conduct premise security surveys as a part of their regular shift rather than on overtime status. Perhaps this would eliminate some delays and allow the surveys to be conducted in a less costly manner.

c. The positive reaction by both police and residents indicates that police officers should continue to conduct premise security surveys. Though civilian security technicians could no doubt perform as good a job in a more timely fashion, the value of this type of police visibility in the community serves a useful purpose.

d. It would be advantageous to get many police officers involved with the total delivery of the program. Therefore it is important that police administration at the city and precinct levels encourage officers to become involved in the CCP program by conducting premise security surveys and attending block club meetings.

e. Other communities undertaking a community crime prevention program may wish to seriously consider implementing a rental security ordinance. (This ordinance may include the use of deadbolt locks on all doors to public areas.)

f. Though a small number of people participated in the subsidy program, it should receive some consideration for continuation. It does provide a means of increasing security in the homes of those who have the most to lose in a burglary--the lower income families. While data do not exist to determine the number of low income families using the subsidy or use of the security equipment after installation, the subsidy should receive some consideration for continuance. Should this effort be undertaken on a citywide basis, it should require the commitment of large resources to this aspect of the program. To make most effective use of the funds, it would probably be necessary to categorically earmark monies for certain income levels.

g. It would be advantageous to continue the practice of affiliating several locksmiths with the program. The quality of installation and price guarantees would prevent unknowing citizens from being hoodwinked by any unscrupulous individuals. If this practice were to be continued, an active monitoring process should be instituted.

h. Even though other evaluation studies have raised serious questions as to the utility of Operation Identification, it should remain a part of the Community Crime Prevention program. It does not involve much staff time and people might continue

to view it as the only possible means of recovering stolen property. There does not appear to be widespread reluctance on the part of residents to participate, and the potential benefit should be considered. Effective responses to resident objections should be developed.

i. More work should be coordinated with the city inspections department to provide residents with viable alternatives concerning unresponsive landlords.

3. Physical Changes to the Neighborhood

a. A clear work plan for physical changes should be constructed, as much as possible, before project implementation. Without good prior planning, the overwhelming nature of attempting to achieve community consensus and governmental coordination can thwart the program.

b. Physical changes should be implemented as soon as reasonable after project starting date. Promises of physical changes over a long period with no activity weakens project credibility.

c. If at all possible, never undertake an environmental change in which a temporary construction must remain for an extended period of time.

d. When preparing to undertake any physical changes, it is imperative that the staff identify early the individuals outside of the project whose consent will be required to authorize the change. As an example, in Minneapolis, local aldermen submit traffic diverter plans to the city council for approval. Gaining the active support of the local aldermen during the initial stages of the project may have produced more positive results.

4. Increased Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques

a. It is important that the project continues to capitalize upon all avenues of dissemination. In this regard the project has done an effective job. Given the fact that it was to operate in only three areas, radio or television spots for the most part would have been impractical. The only effort which needs to be expanded would be the use of schools as a vehicle for disseminating crime prevention information to school-age children.

5. Improvement of Police-Community Relations

a. If work schedules permit, the police department should actively support and encourage officers to attend block club meetings.

b. The staff of the Community Crime Prevention program should become more acutely aware of the functioning of the juvenile justice system. In many instances, residents expressed dissatisfaction with police performance because of incidents involving juveniles. If residents had a better understanding of the operation of the juvenile justice system, they might be less inclined to blame officers for the existence of any particular problems.

6. Project Management

a. Start-up problems often occur in projects of this nature; however, care should be exercised to alleviate any unnecessary delays. Committed staff should be hired and needed facilities arranged within the time frame designated by the grant. Managers, especially, should spend ample time determining the most efficient manner of accomplishing project goals. Staff members' opinions should be solicited so that final decisions are viewed as a result of collaborative effort rather than seen as edicts.

b. Methods to achieve efficiency and accountability should be determined during the planning phase of the project. Staff should be made well aware of responsibilities, and monitoring procedures should begin with the implementation of the project. Performance reviews should be encouraged on a regular basis throughout the project so that individual employees may assess their own standing.

c. All project staff should attempt to resolve differences among themselves within the confines of the project. Attempting to seek remedies through political influence can often result in undermining the purpose of the project. Carrying problems outside the legitimate lines of authority merely serves to polarize issues rather than provide reasonable solutions.

7. Impact upon Crime

a. Monitoring crime rates, using the same data instruments, should be encouraged to continue. Assessment of crime rate changes in the demonstration and control areas occurring within the second year of the project should provide a more accurate picture of CCP impact.

8. Impact upon Fear of Crime

a. Since many results were in the direction desired by the program, the evaluators recommend that future testing of residents' perceptions would seem most beneficial. The Resident and Citizen surveys were administered in April of 1978. Even in Lowry Hill East, organizing to the Neighborhood Watch status did not fully begin until January, 1978 (due to materials delay). This means that these surveys were administered after less than six months of a fully operational project. Thus, an additional survey could produce more accurate information on the actual impact the CCP project may be able to produce on residents' attitudes concerning crime. This survey need not replicate the entire questionnaire but could include only some of the more important sections in order to reduce costs.

END